Description/Abstract
I examine whether individuals respond to monetary incentives to detect latent medical conditions. The effect is identified by an amendment to Title 38 that deemed diabetes associated with Agent Orange exposure a compensable disability under the VA’s Disability Compensation program. Since a diagnosis is a requisite for benefit eligibility, and nearly one-third of diabetics remain undiagnosed, the advent of disability insurance may have encouraged the detection of diabetes among the previously undiagnosed population. Evidence from the National Health Interview Survey suggests that the policy increased the prevalence of diabetes by 2.7 percentage points among veterans.
Document Type
Working Paper
Date
5-2008
Keywords
Policy
Series
Working Papers Series
Disciplines
Medicine and Health Sciences | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Recommended Citation
Singleton, Perry, "The Effect of Disability Insurance on Health Investment: Evidence from the VA Disability Compensation Program" (2008). Center for Policy Research. 196.
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/196
Source
local input
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Included in
Medicine and Health Sciences Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Additional Information
Working paper no. 105