Degree Type
Honors Capstone Project
Date of Submission
Spring 5-1-2011
Capstone Advisor
Kris McDaniel
Honors Reader
Mark Heller
Capstone Major
Philosophy
Capstone College
Arts and Science
Audio/Visual Component
no
Capstone Prize Winner
yes
Won Capstone Funding
no
Honors Categories
Humanities
Subject Categories
Other Philosophy | Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind
Abstract
The objective of this paper is a defense of a particular answer to van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question: when is it the case that some objects together compose some additional object? The answer is the conjunction of two claims. The first claim, compositional nihilism says that, necessarily, there is never an instance of material composition, and therefore all material objects that do exist are simple, or without proper parts. The second claim, existence monism, says that there exists a material object, and that all other material objects are identical with this object. In other words, there is just one material object that extends throughout the entirety of the material world.
These claims are formalized as follows, where (N) represents compositional nihilism and (M) represents existence monism:
(N) [∀x: x ∈ M] ~∃y(Pxy ^ x ≠ y)
(M) [∃x: x ∈ M] ∀y[(y ∈ M) ⊃ (x = y)]
Other claims will be argued for. While I do believe these additional claims are true, I am not committed to them as strongly as I am to compositional nihilism and existence monism. These other claims serve mostly compliment the primary two claims.
The dialectic of the paper is essentially that of an argument to the best explanation. Alternatives to compositional nihilism – universalism and compatibilism – are eliminated on various grounds. Alternatives to existence monism – versions of pluralist nihilism – are also argued against. The idea is that the two views are the only strong candidates for an ontologically sound theory.
One last task of the paper is to disarm various objections to the two primary claims. This is done by demonstrating that what was previously seen as objectionable consequences of the views are, in fact, unproblematic. In at least one instance, a previously objectionable consequence is shown to be, in fact, a potential benefit of the views.
Recommended Citation
Finocchiaro, Peter, "In Defense of Existence Monism" (2011). Renée Crown University Honors Thesis Projects - All. 240.
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/240
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