Date of Award

6-26-2026

Date Published

August 2026

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Business Administration

Advisor(s)

David Harris

Keywords

Confidential Treatment;Earnings Management;Information Obfuscation;The FAST Act

Subject Categories

Accounting | Business

Abstract

This paper examines how the SEC’s deregulation of confidential treatment under the FAST Act affected firms’ material contract redaction behavior and the broader economic consequences associated with disclosure opacity. Using a large sample of SEC filings, I document that confidential treatment is positively associated with both product market competition and lower 10-K readability, suggesting that redaction reflects both proprietary protection incentives and broader disclosure opacity. Further analyses using abnormal file size show that discretionary disclosure complexity remains significantly associated with redaction behavior after controlling for firms’ underlying economic complexity and reporting environment. I further find that the association between redaction and product market competition weakens following the FAST Act, while the association between redaction and discretionary disclosure complexity strengthens significantly, consistent with increased managerial discretion under reduced regulatory scrutiny. Building on these findings, I document that firms engaging in greater post-FAST Act redaction activity exhibit significantly higher levels of future real earnings management, particularly over longer post-redaction horizons. Finally, I find that auditors charge significantly higher audit fees for firms engaging in greater post-FAST Act redaction, although audit report lag remains largely unchanged. Overall, the findings suggest that the FAST Act altered both the motives and consequences associated with confidential treatment redaction by increasing managerial discretion and disclosure opacity.

Access

Open Access

Download

Included in

Accounting Commons

Share

COinS