Date of Award

5-10-2026

Date Published

June 2026

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor(s)

Kara Richardson

Keywords

Avicenna;estimation;intentions;voluntary motion

Subject Categories

Arts and Humanities | Philosophy

Abstract

This dissertation investigates Avicenna’s theory of non-rational voluntary motion. Avicenna’s most significant innovation in this domain is his theory of the internal senses, and in particular, his account of the estimative faculty (wahm) and its proper objects, the intentions (ma'nā). Intentions are non-sensible features of perceived particulars—such as the hostility of a wolf—that carry evaluative significance for the perceiving animal. This dissertation argues that understanding the nature of intentions is the key to explaining how a non-rational animal can pursue goals through relatively complex courses of action. Avicenna recognizes two ways in which intentions are acquired: through instinct and through experience. Experiential intentions are acquired through encounters involving pleasure and pain. To understand the nature of experiential intentions, we must first understand Avicenna’s theory of pleasure. After providing an overview of Avicenna’s psychology, I discuss Avicenna’s understanding of pleasure in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I argue that experiential intentions are neither pleasant forms nor proto-concepts. Rather, by apprehending intentions, the animal registers the practical significance of an object. Building on these results, in Chapter 5, I show how estimation, working through the compositive imagination, can construct practically ordered complexes out of stored forms and intentions, thereby enabling the animal to devise an action plan and reach a resolution without propositional reasoning or rational deliberation. Finally, in Chapter 6, I examine the corporeal substrate of these operations.

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Open Access

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