THE GOOD LIFE & GROUP AGENTS

Date of Award

8-22-2025

Date Published

September 2025

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor(s)

Ben Bradley

Subject Categories

Arts and Humanities | Philosophy

Abstract

In this dissertation, I address the question of what the Good Life is for groups that are genuine well-being subjects, namely group agents consisting only of persons. This topic is both novel and timely, for there are “group turns” happening elsewhere in other areas/topics that are relevantly similar to the contemporary well-being literature, and yet there is no analogous group turn in the latter. To begin to fill this lacuna, I argue for several things. First, I indirectly argue that group agents are genuine well-being subjects. Second, I argue for irreducible group well-being. This is the view that a group agent’s well-being need not necessarily be identical to some simple function of the well-being of the group’s individual members. And finally, I argue for a perfectionist view of group agent well-being wherein what is good for group agents involves their capacity for realizing their narrative self-identity through autonomous action. I also show how my view intercedes on topics concerning other group-related phenomena.

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