Date of Award
8-23-2024
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department
Philosophy
Advisor(s)
Christopher Noble
Keywords
Avicenna;Causation;Chance;Neoplatonism;Providence;Stoicism
Subject Categories
Arts and Humanities | Philosophy
Abstract
This dissertation is a study of the concept of chance in post-Aristotelian philosophy, focused on the Stoics, the Neoplatonist commentators Philoponus and Simplicius, and Avicenna. These philosophers are all influenced by Aristotle’s seminal treatment of chance. The post-Aristotelian philosophers approach the concept of chance with two significant changes in their cosmology from Aristotle. They believe that chance events are not only causally determined but also brought into harmony with the cosmos by the divine nature. These new commitments lead these thinkers to propose that chance events are not a per accidens end of an individual subject, as Aristotle suggests. Instead, chance events are the per se end of the divine nature and contribute to the harmony of the cosmos. In chapter 1, I offer a metaphysical account of Stoic claim that chance is “a cause obscure to human reasoning.” I contend that the different versions of this epistemic interpretation are unsatisfactory. On the basis of evidence that the Stoics take there to be a preconception and a primary name corresponding to chance, I argue that the Stoics adopt a metaphysical conception of chance and identify chance with the divine will insofar as it produces outcomes in ways that are inaccessible to our limited rational capacities. In chapter 2, I explore an account of chance different from the Aristotelian one in Philoponus’s and Simplicius’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics II.4-6. I argue that the two commentators believe the external cause, which prevents the per se efficient cause from attaining its per se end and produces something else, is the true cause of chance events. Based on their account of chance, I further discuss their disagreement about whether monstrosities (terata) should qualify as chance outcomes and their discussion of the involvement of providence in the production of chance events. In chapter 3, I challenge Wisnovsky’s and Belo’s strategies for explaining the compatibility between chance and causal determinism in Avicenna, and offer an alternative account of how Avicenna’s Aristotelian account of chance is compatible with his causal determinism. Finally, I argue that, for Avicenna, something comes to be by chance, if and only if it has no per se efficient cause and is not a result of material necessity.
Access
Open Access
Recommended Citation
Huang, Weiting, "Three Studies on Chance in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy" (2024). Dissertations - ALL. 2012.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/2012
