ORCID
Lihong Liang: 0000-0003-2526-7126
Document Type
Article
Date
12-2015
Language
English
Disciplines
Accounting
Description/Abstract
This study investigates how external corporate governance provisions, specifically statutory and corporate charter provisions that limit direct shareholder participation in the governance process, affect the likelihood of an accounting restatement. The analysis indicates that strong external governance (fewer restrictions on shareholder participation) is associated with a relatively low incidence of accounting restatements. The effect of external governance is incremental to that of internal governance, which is considered as provisions that foster effective board oversight of management. Such evidence supports the premise that shareholder participation improves financial reporting quality.
Recommended Citation
Baber, W.R., Kang, S.-H., Liang, L. and Zhu, Z. (2015), External Corporate Governance and Misreporting. Contemp Account Res, 32: 1413-1442. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12137
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
