Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Arts and Humanities | Philosophy
The aim of this project is to make a case for a felt-quality hedonistic account of well-being. To do so, I first argue that the best iteration of the leading account of well-being - a desire-satisfactionism which employs genuine-attraction desires - is fatally flawed. I then show that, unlike other objective views of well-being, hedonism is not at risk of alienating individuals from what is purported to be good for them. Finally, I offer a hybrid account of the nature of prudentially valuable pleasure and disvaluable pain according to which pleasure and pain involve both a felt-quality and an attitude. I argue that this conception of pleasure and pain captures our intuitions about their contribution to well-being better than any existing view. The upshot of these arguments is that we have more reason to take hedonism seriously than has previously been thought.
Fortier, Nikki, "Bringing Hedonism Back: Toward a Felt-Quality Account of Well-Being" (2023). Dissertations - ALL. 1728.