The ‘‘global game with strategic substitutes and complements’’ of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S > 1 sites. In this game, a fisherman’s payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.
Hicks, Robert L.; Horrace, William C.; and Schnier, Kurt E., "Strategic Substitutes or Complements? The Game of Where to Fish" (2011). Economics Faculty Scholarship. Paper 18.
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