An interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume: How to derive 'ought' from 'is'
1973
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Cite
Title
An interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume: How to derive 'ought' from 'is'
Author
Gray, Bonnie Jean (Syracuse University)
Contributor
Stewart Thau Advisor
Document Type
dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Department, Program, or Other Affiliation
Philosophy
Philosophy
Philosophy
College or School
College of Arts and Sciences
Date
1973-01-01
Keywords
Subjects
Note
Recent discussions in ethnics have centered around the "is-ought" passage that is found in the writings of David Hume. Essentially the problem is this, is it possible to derive and ought-statement from one or more is-statements? This particular passage from the writings of Hume has been given an interpretation which not only renders Hume's ethical writings as inconsistent, but which has also created what has been taken to be an unabridgeable gab between what is the case (i.e. actuality) and what ought to be the case (i.e. possibility). The purpose of writing this paper has been to show that ought-statements do depend upon is-statements and futhermore that dependence is such that one can arrive at what he ought to do by a consideration of certain matters of fact.
Access Note
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Record Appears in
System Control Number
phi_etd/59
Relation Type
Has Version