Date of Award

5-11-2025

Date Published

June 2025

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Political Science

Advisor(s)

Ryan Griffiths

Subject Categories

International Relations | Political Science | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Abstract

What explains variation in women’s participation in terrorist organization? Why do some terrorist organizations deploy women in violent, operative roles, whereas other terrorist organizations only deploy men as operatives? Why do some terrorist organizations begin a conflict with only male operatives but later begin to recruit, train, and deploy female operatives? Previous literature examining the deployment of women by terrorist organizations has been largely divided into those who examine the radicalization process of potential recruits (the “supply” side of the equation) or the reasons why an organization seeks to recruit women as potential operatives (the “demand” side). Scholarship examining the reasons why an organization seeks to recruit women has thus far focused on strategic or structural explanations for explaining women’s participation in terrorist violence. I argue that terrorist organizations primarily recruit and deploy men as operatives and women in auxiliary, nonviolent positions. However, when a terrorist group is facing increasing repression from the state in the form of coercive counterterrorism policies, they may be forced to innovate their tactics to increase operational success. One potential innovation is to deploy unexpected operatives, such as women, who can evade security personnel by exploiting security officials’ assumptions of female passivity. I argue that terrorist groups facing increasing counterterrorism pressure are more likely to incorporate women as operatives and in greater numbers. However, I also argue that there is a cost to the organization for incorporating women as violent operatives in the form of societal censure. The group’s domestic constituency may disapprove of the organization deploying women in violent roles and reduce their support for the organization. The terrorist group must weigh this potential cost against the operational benefits of incorporating women. I test this novel theory using a multi-method research design. First, I outline my theory of tactical innovation in Chapter 2. This chapter outlines the tactical benefits and costs to a terrorist organization for deploying women as operatives. Next, I undertake a plausibility probe examining two paired case comparison of terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland during the Troubles and Palestinian groups during the Second Intifada. In each paired case, one organization deployed women as operatives whereas the other group did not. This allows me to undertake an initial plausibility test of my theory of tactical innovation. Second, I conduct a large-N statistical analysis of 100 rebel groups to explore the impact of coercive state repression on the deployment of female operatives. I find that those groups who experience harsh counterterrorism policies are more likely to incorporate women as combatants and in greater numbers. I follow this time-variant statistical analysis with cases studies of Boko Haram and the Community Party of India (Maoist) in order to trace the temporal element of state repression on women’s deployment as operatives. Next, I deploy a survey experiment to test the theory that terrorist organizations will face a cost in the form of societal censure for deploying women as operatives. Using a novel online survey experiment conducted among adults in Northern Ireland, I find that respondents were less supportive of the goals of terrorist groups who deployed women as operatives compared to groups who deployed men. This supports my theory that terrorist organizations face an audience cost for deploying women as operatives. Finally, I conclude with a summary of the study’s main findings, weaknesses, theoretical and policy contributions, and policy implications.

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