Date of Award

5-11-2025

Date Published

June 2025

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Psychology

Advisor(s)

David Kellen

Subject Categories

Cognitive Psychology | Psychology | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Abstract

Across the risk and uncertainty literature, a particular focus has been made on the description-experience gap (DE Gap). The DE Gap creates figurative and literal gaps between description and experience-based choices. Researchers claim that these DE Gaps are problematic for classic models in decision-making research, such as Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). This has led to a focus on experience-based models instead. However, following a literature review on CPT and the DE Gap, I aimed to test these claims. In fact, throughout three experiments, I demonstrate that the description-based theories need not be tossed away wholly. Instead, the researchers should conduct studies with critical tests that challenge specific aspects of these models. In experiment 1, I reexamined CPT’s inability to account for risk attitudes in experience. I demonstrate that the issue with CPT’s capability here is related to an auxiliary assumption on the utility function rather than a core assumption of the model. Beyond this, in experiments 2 and 3, I discuss how description-based research can extend existing theories and better explain the data. In experiment 2, CPT with a two-source weighting function captures how ambiguity might influence choices in experience. In experiment 3, a memory-based judgment model is used to extend CPT. While this memory-based CPT fails to outperform other models, it does suggest ways in which experience-based research can inform future description-based designs.

Access

Open Access

Download

Share

COinS