

ABSTRACT

Since UNSCR 1325 was introduced in 2000, 105 countries have adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) for the purpose of implementing UNSCR 1325 at the domestic level. Each NAP varies widely in content as does the successfulness of their implementation. I seek to explain why states comply with a non-mandated UN Security Council resolution. I ask what factors contribute to successful implementation and analyze how these factors affect the outcome of participation of women in UN peace operations. To do so, I conduct comparative case studies and analyze the content of selected case countries' NAPs. Additionally, I operationalize Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance* for each selected case to examine how the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness work together to influence the case study countries. I conclude by evaluating the change in women's participation among each of the respective country's UN peacekeeping personnel contributions following their NAP adoption and discuss the implications in each case. Overall, this project finds that compliance with UNSCR 1325 results in increased participation of women in UN peace operations in the case study countries.

**UNSCR 1325 COMPLIANCE AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN UN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

by

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This project takes a hybrid approach, using Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance* to explain multiple states' approaches to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 via National Action Plans (NAPs). The primary focus of my research is understanding why states comply with a non-mandated UN Security Council resolution, what factors contribute to successful implementation, and how this can affect the outcome of increased participation of women within UN peacekeeping operations. I am studying policy compliance in relation to international policy at the domestic level, as well as the effect of successful implementation of such policy. In this dissertation, first, I provide a brief background of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda as well as UNSCR 1325. Next, I explain of my research question and the methodology in which I have operationalized the explanatory variables.. Then, I develop paired case studies, providing context for each of the selected countries of interest, highlighting the distinct factors pertinent in each case, and scrutinizing the content of the respective countries' NAP. I then apply the explanatory model, a modified version of Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance*, in each.

Finally, I conclude by evaluating the change in women's participation among each of the respective country's UN peacekeeping contributions following their NAP adoption and discuss what I consider to be the implications in each case.

Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

The United Nations Security Council has adopted ten resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) since 2000 known as the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. The purpose of this WPS Agenda is to address the previously unconsidered impact of armed conflict on women.

The four primary resolutions within this agenda are: UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888, and 1889. Resolutions 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467, and 2493 all follow-up to these initial resolutions. The follow-up resolutions highlight the shortcomings in the implementation of the primary resolutions and attempt to reiterate the importance of the goals of the primary resolutions.

In 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325 to highlight the need for women to be included and allowed to participate equally within the context of conflict, peace-building, and peacekeeping activities. UNSCR 1325 also emphasizes the necessity of considering gendered perspectives within these contexts. The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda expanded when in 2008, UNSCR 1820 was adopted to focus on the use of sexual violence as a weapon within conflicts and how this affects peace and security. The following year, UNSCR 1888 specifically tasked peacekeeping missions with protecting women and children from sexual violence during armed conflict. Also, in 2009, UNSCR 1889 reiterated the goal of UNSCR 1325 calling for actual measurement indicators of women's participation (UN).

The WPS Agenda encompasses major international-level policies concerning the relationship between women and conflict. The resolutions were passed unanimously, and now UN member states implement these policies domestically. Internationally, variations in the presence or absence of conflicts, gender relations, gender equality, level of development, and civil-military relations affect success of implementation as is highlighted by this project. This variation affects actual congruence with the WPS Agenda to implement international policies in a successful manner at the domestic level.

UN Security Resolution 1325

UNSCR 1325 is largely considered to be a non-binding Security Council resolution, though there is some debate as to its non-binding status (Appiagyei-Atua, 2011). UNSCR 1325 sought to acknowledge and address the differential and disproportionate effect of conflict on women in the form of targeting during conflict and exclusion from post-conflict peace processes. The disproportionate effect of conflict on women takes a number of forms, but of particular prominence are the following: the use of rape as a weapon of war, the exclusion of women ex-combatants from post-conflict reintegration efforts, the ostracism of women ex-combatants and sex and gender-based violence survivors from society in the post-conflict period, exclusion of half the population from participation in peace processes and post-conflict processes, and sexual assaults committed by male UN peacekeepers.

UNSCR 1325 is structured with a focus on four distinct pillars: participation, protection, relief, and recovery. It establishes 18 provisions and commitments that are tied to the four pillars as well as prior resolutions relating to women and armed conflict.¹

This project focuses primarily on UNSCR 1325 operative clause four, “*Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.*” This provision was mirrored by the original provision set forth by the Windhoek Declaration, which noted under its recruitment subsection,

“Member States should be asked to increase the number of women in their military and civilian police forces who are qualified to serve in peace support operations at all levels, including the most senior. To this end, a stronger mechanism than the current note verbale to troop-contributing nations should be developed. Requests to troop-contributing nations could be tailor-made to nations that are known to have suitable female staff, while other

¹ See Appendix C: UN Security Council Resolution 1325

potential troop-contributing nations could be encouraged to develop longer-term strategies to increase the number and rank of female personnel in their respective forces.”

In the years since its introduction, 1325 has had an impact on international law, domestic law in some cases, women’s empowerment, militaries, and the global security landscape. 1325 has served as a means to ensure the conversation about gender, peace, and security remains relevant and discussed at the international level as well as among diplomats, policymakers, and scholars among others. The resolution is pertinent not only to conflict and post-conflict countries but also to countries that participate in peace operations.

Some consider greater inclusion of women in UN peacekeeping personnel as a solution to the problematic history of male UN peacekeepers sexually assaulting the people, they were intended to protect in conflict environment. Specifically, some have expected the inclusion of women in peacekeeping to deter male colleagues from committing sexual assault (Hagen, 2006; Mackay, 2011; UNSC, 2010). There is some debate as to whether or not women peacekeepers do in fact have this desired impact, and a lack of training in SGBV response likely detracts from that desired capability (Alchin, Gouws & Heinecken, 2018). Furthermore, challenging gendered assumptions, women also commit sexual violence (Cohen, Green & Wood, 2013). Some consider that an essentialist view of women is an assumption built into the content of 1325 (Jansson & Eduards, 2016; Elshtain, 1995; Shepherd, 2008; Sjoberg, 2011). Specifically, the view that women by nature are more peaceful and compassionate, and would therefore offer a considerably different viewpoint to peace processes. Others view the inclusion of women in peacekeeping personnel as a potential strategy to improving troops’ effectiveness in their operational environment (Bridges & Horsfall, 2009). Putting aside the question of the “nature of women,” the inclusion of women in conflict response, peace process efforts, and post-conflict solution building ensures that these

efforts are more reflective of the population as a whole. The more diversity of those involved in these processes the greater the potential for more diverse solutions to be conceived. This project evaluates how NAP adoption impacts the outcome of women's participation and in turn the outcome of greater diversity across roles.

UNSCR 1325 was passed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on October 31, 2000. Between May 29 and May 31, 2000, there was a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations seminar held in Windhoek, Namibia. The seminar was "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations." There were 62 participants, among the participants there were 11 Namibians and 51 women from diverse geographical backgrounds (Lahoud, 2020). The participants came from broad backgrounds and had extensive experience in peacekeeping and gender issues (Lahoud, 2020). Discussions and recommendations borne out of the seminar focused on the entire cycle of the peacekeeping mission, and identified key measures needed at each phase necessary for gender mainstreaming and gender balance (Lahoud, 2020). The work conducted during this three-day seminar was codified in two essential documents that Lahoud has deemed to be the blueprints of UNSCR 1325, these documents were the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan for Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective.

The timing of the seminar was opportune. Namibia held the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly during this time, under Dr. Theo-Ben Gurirab. It was decided that Namibia would take both documents, borne out of the seminar, and convey them via letter to the UN Secretary General since Namibia was a Security Council member. As Namibia held the Presidency of the General Assembly and would be President of the Security Council in October 2000, it seemed like the crucial moment to gather support for this issue (Lahoud, 2020).

Participants of the Windhoek Seminar were able to build on the momentum of the conference and Namibia's position in the United Nations. Lahoud argued that prior efforts were evident with 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the 1995 Beijing Declaration from the Fourth World Conference on Women. However, prior efforts on gender and conflict issues lacked the targeted sufficient action items that the Windhoek participants were able to establish.

According to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), since 2000, 105 countries have adopted a NAP in support of 1325. The first country to adopt a NAP was Denmark in 2005 (Peace Women). In the following year, the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, and Norway followed suit. Most recently in 2022, Kazakhstan and Morocco adopted their first NAPs for 1325. Additionally, 27 countries have all introduced revised updated NAPs (Peace Women). WILPF also reports that, 51 percent of countries that have adopted NAPs have also established a domestic monitoring mechanism, often from civil society, that evaluates and produces reports which provide an evaluation of the country's implementation progress (Peace Women).

Research Question

The key research question I addressed in this project is:

How do we explain compliance with the non-mandated UN Security Council resolution 1325?

Additionally, I am interested in understanding how compliance in varying forms affects women's participation, and seek to answer the following question:

Does successful compliance of UNSCR 1325 alter a country's peacekeeping mission contributions in terms of women's participation?

I study this particular question through comparative case studies and by applying a modified version of Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance*.

Borzel's *Pull-and-Push Model of Compliance*

Tanja Borzel's work has examined policy compliance within the European Union. In Borzel's development of the pull-and-push model, she sought to explain why there was variation in compliance within and across EU countries as it related to environmental policies. Using this model, Borzel argued that non-compliance was likely a result in instances where the EU policy was a "significant policy misfit" and if there were no domestic actors exacting pressure on the government to implement such a policy (Borzel, 2000).




Figure 1.1: Tanja Borzel's Pull-and-Push Model

Borzel's model was constructed to examine what external and internal pressures government actors within the states of interest were subjected to. The three components of interest in this model are: 1) the extent of "policy misfit" between the national policy and the proposed EU policy; 2) the "push" pressure in the form of punitive costs via EU infringement procedures the country could be subjected to, and 3) the "pull" pressure in the form of domestic mobilization by social actors that government actors faced.

My project varies from Borzel's in that I am looking beyond the context of the European Union and I examine variation in compliance with UNSCR 1325 by multiple countries

representing not only Europe but also Africa and South America. Within the context of this project, the United Nations serves as the surrogate for the European Union. The United Nations is in a weaker position than the European Union in its capacity to exert pressure as it lacks the infringement proceedings that the European Union has the power to wield.

Given the different focus of this project, I modify Borzel's model for the purpose of this research. The three general components of the model are consistent: 1) the degree of policy misfit; 2) the "push" pressure from the international community; 3) the "pull" pressure originating from the domestic level. Rather than examining how these pressures impact the "public authorities," I instead examine how these components impact the country's ultimate compliance with 1325 and its implementation.

My modifications further delineate the sub-components I consider within each of the three components of interest. The degree of policy misfit I determine for each country by evaluating the existing military policy in addition to the historical level of gender inequality observed within the state. The degree of "push" pressure I determine for each country by evaluating the peer pressure that exists via membership in international organizations or regional partnerships, as well as what neighboring countries are choosing to do in regards to UNSCR 1325 implementation. In addition to peer pressure, I evaluate whether or not the country of interest has sought to secure a Security Council seat around the time of its consideration of implementation of UNSCR 1325. The final element I consider in evaluating "push" pressure is whether or not the country of interest is currently on the honor roll, in arrears for its assessed contribution or UN dues. This element is important because it is an opportunity for the UN to exert coercion via punishment. Under UN rules, "a country can lose its General Assembly vote if

it is in arrears by any amount that equals or exceeds the contributions due for the previous two years, unless it shows evidence of an inability to pay that is beyond its control (UN GA).”

The degree of “pull” pressure I determine for each country by evaluating the presence and activeness of women’s groups domestically, the presence and activeness of women within local level bureaucratic roles, and the presence and activeness of women within higher level policy making roles. The key factor within each of these sub-components is whether and to what degree these entities are advocating for compliance and implementation of UNSCR 1325; their mere existence without advocacy does not affect “pull” pressure.

Compliance has a two-prong consideration within this project. First and most simple consideration, compliance is considered achieved if a country adopts UNSCR 1325 domestically through a National Action Plan per UN recommendations. For the second and more complex consideration of compliance, I assess the adopted National Action Plan that has been implemented and the level of detail within the content as it relates to the goals of UNSCR 1325.

This project evaluates successful implementation under the specific outcome of compliance’s impact on the participation of women within the respective country’s UN peacekeeping missions across different roles. An increase in women’s participation across different roles is considered a success.




Figure 1.2: Modified Pull-and-Push Model

Key Concepts and Definitions

For the purpose of this project, I draw on Jacobson and Brown-Weiss' (1998) definition of *implementation* as the measures states take to make international accords effective in their domestic law.

In this project, *compliance* is understood as whether or not countries observe the requirements or recommendations established by UNSCR 1325 and that the implementing measures a state adopts make for effective implementation. Thus, the states most successful with implementation will have: a) adopted a NAP domestically; b) the NAP will include specific measures for effective implementation of the resolution; c) the desired outcome of an increase of women participating in UN peacekeeping personnel roles will be evident.

Civil society as defined by the United Nations is considered the 'third sector' of society comprised of civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and professionals in this sector. For this project, the primary civil society entities I focus on are women's groups and movements.

The goodness of fit is defined in the literature as the level of compatibility between existing and European Union (EU)-induced legislation (Heritier et al.1996). The *goodness of fit* proposition is utilized predominantly in the study of European Union policy adaptation. For the purpose of this project, I have modified this definition as I am not studying the implementation of EU policy but rather a UN resolution. Thus, the definition of *the goodness of fit* I utilize is the level of compatibility between existing military policy, historical gender equality domestically, and UNSCR 1325.

A **National Action Plan** (NAP) is an official government document that outlines the actions a government is taking or intends to take in a given timeframe to meet the requirements that are set forth by the WPS resolutions. The WPS resolutions offer general, not country-specific recommendations, and NAPs are an opportunity for countries to make their plans specific to their country context should they choose. This document serves as the WPS policy implementation plan for a country. National Action Plans are not required to be developed since this is considered only one tool for implementation. Other tools that could alternatively or additionally be utilized include regional national action plans, regional policy initiatives, women's participation efforts (i.e., supporting women's initiative projects or NGOs), defense reform, police reform, and transitional justice and justice reform.

I study NAPs over other tools for a number of reasons. First, the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly called on states to adopt these as a part of their implementation process and as such it is the most consistently utilized tool. Second, the NAPs take a broader approach to implementation which often may spur the use of some of the other tools noted. While some of these other tools are very specifically honed into one arena of change, the NAPs are more likely to have a holistic nature. Third, because NAPs are country-specific it allows for analysis of

individual countries and their domestic context while Regional Action Plans create a complicating factor in that respect.

According to WILPF's Peace Women as of April 2023, of 193 UN members, 105 countries have created NAPs since 2000 (Peace Women). NAPs can be revised and redeveloped at any time following their initial creation. Several of the countries that were among the very first to develop NAPs have already revised and reissued newer versions of their NAPs over the last decade. NAPs can include timelines for specific policies to be implemented by different entities domestically, call for reporting on progress, and call for audits and other means of monitoring. NAPs can either exist as stand-alone policy implementation plans, or they can be integrated into existing plans.

National Action Plans are a good example of an implementation tool being utilized systematically by countries throughout the world to adopt domestic policies that encompass the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. Rwanda is an example of a country in which NAPs have mattered. Within a year of implementation, the government and civil society organizations conducted a number of efforts in line with gender promotion consistent with UNSCR 1325. According to the Peace Women, Rwanda implemented its NAP in 2010, and in 2011 the civil society review compiled the following findings: Rwanda had the highest female representation in Parliament globally with 56%, policy mandating 30% minimum representation at all levels of government, while not achieved at every level was growing. A substantial number of women were promoted within the military, and a high representation of women in the justice sector agencies as a result of official gender representation policy. There was a need for improvement in hitting 30% representation in both the military and police. Low participation of women in peacekeeping operations tracked with low participation in military and police. The creation of

gender desks at all levels of military and police as well as gender training within these ministries aimed to improve this shortfall. Civil society organizations (CSOs) participated in Task Forces for UNSCR 1325 and 1820 making up 74% of those involved and were integral in identifying gaps and remedies in NAP development. The presence of a Gender Ministry served to inform all policy domestically. Recommendations were made for transitional justice reports on women's rights. Women were given special preference and higher resettlement packages, acknowledging the significant stigma they suffered, and civil society review found that the implementation still needs improvement (Balikungeri and Ingabire, 2011). Overall, the NAP has served as a useful tool for implementing UNSCR 1325 and 1820 in Rwanda where there have been substantial policy efforts, civil society involvement, and vast improvements in representation and consideration of gender in the crafting of new legislation.

Because NAPs are a tool used systematically, they make for efficient comparison and, in turn, analysis. NAPs are likely to matter because as a key implementation tool how they are used could greatly affect what implementation looks like domestically in addition to the effects of policy implementation. NAPs are intended to be the step-by-step approach to policy implementation and so what that plan looks like, who is in charge of formulating it, and the content included are all essential for successful implementation.

Chapter 2: Analytical and Theoretical Framework

I established the research question that this project seeks to answer and discussed the explanatory framework which I intend to apply to this question. I detailed Borzel's pull-and push model, how Borzel's work has evolved, and how I have modified her model for use beyond the EU context. Next, I discuss three literatures in International Relations that inform this dissertation: compliance, EU compliance, and 1325 literature. While EU compliance is often treated as separate, it is intricately linked to the compliance literature in International Relations. I proceed by highlighting the major arguments in the compliance literature that have been explored, centering on the arguments between the 'logic of consequences' and the 'logic of appropriateness' or the rationalist-constructivist debate. Consistent with Checkel and others I see how the study of compliance can use *both* explanatory approaches in a complementary manner. I transition to discuss how this literature speaks to the EU compliance literature, and I specifically delve into Borzel's pull-and-push model of compliance and discuss how it can be modified for use more broadly in the compliance literature in IR beyond EU compliance. The third literature I discuss is the literature that has critiqued UNSCR 1325, analyzing its shortcomings and questioning its effectiveness.

Research Question & Explanatory Framework

The key research question address in this project is:

How do we explain compliance with the non-mandated UN Security Council resolution 1325?

Additionally, I am interested in understanding how compliance in varying forms affects women's participation, and seek to answer the following question:

Does successful compliance of UNSCR 1325 alter a country's peacekeeping mission contributions in terms of women's participation?

I study this particular question through comparative case studies. I synthesize rationalist and constructivist explanations by utilizing Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance*. Borzel argues that policy misfits can be overcome by pressures from domestic actors, the "pull", and or through EU infringement procedures, the "push". Since I am not studying the adaptation of EU policy within the EU structure, I modify this model accordingly.

Borzel's first iteration of the pull-and-push model was seen in her 1998 work in which she sought to explain the differences that were present in how EU policies affected domestic political processes and institutions. Borzel further applied "push-and-pull effects" as a means of analyzing the effects of EU environmental policies on domestic institutions. Borzel posited if there is a misfit paired with sufficient pressure for adaptation, then it will be more costly to pursue ineffective implementation than bearing the legal and administrative costs necessary for compliance (Borzel, 1998). The model appears to be more refined by Borzel's subsequent publication "Why There is No 'Southern Problem,'" which was in progress at the time of the 1998 work. In this work, Borzel hypothesizes the higher the pressure for adaptation and the lower the level of domestic mobilization, the more likely it is that non-compliance will occur. Borzel analyzes EU environmental policies and their compliance across EU member states. Borzel found that compliance only improved when domestic actors were mobilized and exerting pressure of adaptation on public officials. Borzel also found that domestic actors in some instances simultaneously applied pressure to the EU Commission itself in order for the Commission to pursue infringement proceedings. There was at least one instance in which the Commission pursued infringement proceedings without the pressure emanating from the domestic level. Borzel argues that pressure emanating from push and pull explains emerging

compliance seen in the case studies, and instances where there was a policy misfit but there was no push and pull pressure it was likely that compliance would remain low (2000).

Borzel refined the explanatory power of the model by examining it within the context of the literature more broadly. Borzel viewed the model as an alternative that held greater explanatory power in understanding EU member states' propensity for compliance with EU policy as well as the variation within that compliance.² Borzel argues that this model draws on rationalist understandings of actors' behavior, but does not refute the potential explanatory power of alternative explanatory approaches. Borzel argues against pitting the logics of "appropriateness" and "consequences" against one another, and calls for exploration of how they can relate to each other (2003). I seek to accomplish this in my utilization and modification of Borzel's model in this project. I to show how both logics can inform the model and be used together. I expand on how I consider aspects of both logics later in this section.

In this project, the concept of policy misfit or goodness of fit is applicable and will be considered in terms of a) the costs of adaptation i.e., how compatible is the content of 1325 to existing military policy and/or b) is the content of 1325 incompatible to the existing gender equality historically within the state. The "pull" pressure from domestic actors is still applicable and will be evaluated in terms of women's groups, local officeholders, and national level lawmakers. Factors I use in my analysis of the "pull" pressure include the level of activity and participation of women's groups within the country, the role of local-level officeholders and their

² Borzel's work continues to analyze questions of compliance within the EU context. In her earlier work Borzel expected that EU enlargement would lead to greater instances of non-compliance, however, she has found that the EU has made strides in minimizing non-compliance. The EU has made policy changes via modifications to existing legislation rather than introducing new legislation altogether, additionally, the EU has taken steps to build member states capacity (Borzel, 2019). Through the eyes of the model, it seems that this is an example of the EU minimizing the misfit and lessening the burden of compliance. Borzel expands this argument through the use of a Power, Capacity, and Politicization model which puts forth the argument that the decline of noncompliance with EU law can be explained by political controversy, voting power, and administrative capacity (2021).

focus on gender issues, and policymakers at the national level and their concentration and efforts directed toward gender issues in policy. However, the "push" pressure must be modified. Since the United Nation lacks the power to conduct EU-style infringement procedures, I instead use as my "push," pressure from the international community in the form of a compilation of factors including the number of countries that have already implemented 1325 with NAPs, as well as how membership within regional groups or other relations with countries, that have sought to implement 1325, might contribute to a form of peer pressure. I also incorporate the bid process, for a spot on the Security Council, as an additional factor of consideration in the "push" pressure from the international community. A final factor I consider in this "push" pressure, is the publication of members states on the "honor roll", "arrearages", of waiver recipients for annual dues.

In utilizing this model as a means of explaining compliance with 1325, I conduct content and discourse analysis of each country's NAP to highlight the presence of the "pull" pressure. I also identify the year in which the NAPs were published, and I identify how many countries previously adopted NAPs in the years prior, countries' membership in pertinent regional groups and organizations, which will highlight the "push" pressure. I conducted interviews with representatives from some of the case study countries, who have unique viewpoints on the country's compliance with 1325, as a means of adding a richer context. Some of these individuals were working on the drafting of 1325 for the respective case study countries and were in a position to speak to the domestic context in which their own country's NAPs were developed. They can speak to "pull" and "push" pressures as well. Then, I analyze the change in the number of female peacekeepers serving as police, troops, and experts within each country's participation in UN missions, in pre-NAP operations to post-NAP operations.

I study this particular question by conducting a comparative analysis of seven countries. I conduct a content analysis on each country's NAP to determine the extent to which civil society was included in the process and the extent to which they will be included in the subsequent monitoring and evaluation. Also, content analysis allows me to compare the content included within the NAPs across each of the case studies, and to identify which countries were more specific relative to certain elements of the NAP. In identifying the extent of the role civil society plays in the process in each country, I conduct discourse analysis to determine if the countries that had greater civil society involvement ended up with a NAP that incorporated a different interpretation of 1325 that might explain why some states' content varied on certain elements.

Drawing on my comparative content and discourse analysis of the selected countries' NAPs, I study this question by analyzing each country's NAP as well as UN peacekeeping gender data. This analysis allowed me to identify changes regarding the desired outcome that has come about following the introduction of the NAP domestically.

Compliance Literature

An early general consensus in International Relations was that states tend to honor their international agreements, but there is debate in the literature as to the impetus for that compliance. Morgenthau and Mearsheimer view it as a matter of coincidence as states simply comply because it is already in their immediate interest. This view discounts the potential for international agreements to affect international order. Chayes and Chayes argue that states have a general inclination to comply, and noncompliance is a result of a lack of capacity, not intent to deliberately violate an agreement (1991, 1993). A significant portion of the literature focuses on the means of enforcing compliance or the 'logic of consequences.' A countervailing argument in

the literature focuses on non-enforcement means of securing compliance or the ‘logic of appropriateness.’

Logic of Consequences

The ‘logic of consequences’ focuses on different means of enforcement as an explanation for states’ compliance. The subsection of the literature that focuses on the ‘logic of consequences’ has developed explanations related to coercion via carrots or sticks, reciprocity in a tit-for-tat game, reputation for maintaining commitments, and the role of constraining domestic institutions all serving as various forms of enforcement.

Coercion

Coercion as a means of enforcement can come in the form of punishment for noncompliance as well as a reward for the desired behavior of compliance. States that are a party to an agreement may have an interest in convincing other states to comply as well, so inducements may be used to sway others to comply potentially through increased aid, trade deals, and the promise of cooperation on other matters (Von Stein, 2013). However, punishment is another means of coercion, so states that fail to comply may be subject to cuts in aid, economic sanctions, military action, and loss of cooperation on other matters (Von Stein, 2013). In this cost-benefit analysis, those states in a greater position of power wield greater leverage over weaker counterparts. For poorer states where desirable trade agreements will count for more, wealthier states can explicitly link compliance to preferential trade agreements to convince those countries that have been historically content to abuse their citizens to comply with human rights to ensure more promising trade deals (Hafner-Burton, 2005). This emphasizes that the benefits of compliance or noncompliance must outweigh the associated costs. Gippert’s study on

compliance with peacebuilding reforms by police in Kosovo found that all respondents primarily stressed that they had complied due to their fear of negative sanctions (Gippert, 2016). Not all international law comes equipped with sufficient built-in means of enforcement to ensure compliance, and when there is an enforcement mechanism built-in, it's often not utilized in a consistent manner. The uneven application of coercion in either form makes it difficult to point to as the primary driver of states' propensity to comply, and the balance of power in the international system certainly affects how and to what degree coercion may even be utilized (Morgenthau 1948; Goldsmith and Posner 2005). In this project, I consider the power of coercion as an explanatory factor. 1325 is certainly an example of international policy that lacks a sufficient means of enforcement. While this resolution in and of itself lacks sufficient means of coercion, I explore other means through which coercion may be employed. Specifically, the factor of "push" pressure via peers, most likely to be seen through regional or international partnerships, are capable of employing coercion that creates tangible costs. To a lesser extent, the United Nations itself is in a position to employ shame as a coercive measure through its honor roll or arrearages lists and punishment through the revocation of the right to vote within the General Assembly.

Tit-for-tat

Reciprocity is another means of enforcement used to explain compliance in the 'logic of consequences.' Axelrod's work on tit-for-tat strategies showed that these strategies can be effective in promoting cooperation by developing a link between an actor's behavior in the present and their expected future benefits. Both parties will reciprocate the others' behavior to achieve a mutual benefit (1984). Building on Axelrod's work, Morrow found that, in the context of laws of war when there is mutual ratification the propensity for noncompliance is lower. The

drawback of reciprocity and tit-for-tat as a driver of compliance is that when one state is noncompliant, other states are likely to respond with noncompliance as well (Morrow, 2007). This becomes a particularly interesting issue when reciprocal noncompliance cannot be targeted at the state which specifically reneged in the first place. For example, in environmental agreements with a focus on greenhouse gas emissions, states cannot punish the initial state which reneged by reciprocating because there will be negative environmental impacts for everyone (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2018; Barrett, 2007; Guzman, 2008). This project competes with the argument of tit-for-tat strategies because it challenges the assumption that countries are likely to view the impact of compliance as being of mutual benefit. With the example of environmental impacts mutual benefits are clear, for instance clean air and clean water is an obvious benefit for all even if there are costs associated with achieving such compliance. However, in the case of 1325, the matter of the status of gender equality historically within a given country may drastically alter a country's calculation of a benefit. If a state has significantly low gender equality, then it may not calculate compliance as offering any type of benefit. In fact, a country may view compliance as detrimental. Greater acknowledgement, participation, inclusion, and consideration of women may be a cost, without any evident benefits, that a country is not willing to bear short of other factors exerting pressure.

Reputation

Reputation arguments are found in both the 'logic of consequences' camp as well as the 'logic of appropriateness'. Within the 'logic of consequences,' a state's reputation can have material consequences. A state that establishes a reputation for keeping promises signals to other states that it is capable of cooperation, while a reputation for being unreliable signals that it lacks the credibility and capability for cooperation (Keohane 1984; Guzman 2008). Tomz's study of

sovereign debt contracts across three centuries found that states with a good reputation received better terms, while states with a poor reputation got sub-optimal terms, states' reputations could change, and states with no reputation received higher interest rates until they built up their reputations in a positive manner (2007). Downs and Jones argue that if a country is unreliable in its commitments in one realm it does not mean they will be unreliable in the context of other commitments (2002). Kim shows there are cross-issue reputational spillovers and how the effects of a poor reputation vary between states. Kim's study shows noncompliance negatively affects the South Korean public's belief about the likelihood of future compliance across different issue areas, while, past noncompliance has a limited impact on the US public's beliefs across different domains (2019). Much of this work assumes that states are in pursuit of a positive reputation. However, there is the possibility that states want to signal and establish a reputation for being 'tough' and protecting their interests (Keohane, 1997).

Beyond the question of what kind of states are interested in pursuing a better reputation is the matter of how long a state's reputation remains intact. Brewster argues that states don't bear the full brunt of reputational costs because it is widely known and recognized that those in office frequently change, at least in a majority of states (Brewster, 2009). The factor of reputation is an important consideration in this project. Specifically, in this project I expect that countries attempting to improve their international reputation, in order to secure future outcomes, will feel pressure to comply with 1325. Countries may be striving to combat a historical reputation for poor gender equality or simply to improve their status within the international community as a means of ensuring future opportunities for their country. Absent a strong domestic presence of women's groups, I expect that reputational concerns will be driven by the international community. However, in instances where there is a very strong domestic presence of women's

groups organized around the issue of 1325, I expect that local and national level policymakers will heed concerns about reputational costs over concerns relating to maintaining office which is explicitly linked to the factor of domestic institutions.

Domestic Institutions

Domestic institutions in the form of courts, elections, legislature, and civil society movements are discussed as other means of enforcement in the 'logic of consequences.' Several scholars articulate the role of the judiciary in ensuring states' compliance with international law. Slaughter argues that the courts make compliance more likely because citizens can mount legal challenges to pressure their states to comply and independent courts can evaluate if government actions of inaction are consistent with existing law (Slaughter, 1995). Powell and Staton found that states with greater judicial effectiveness that have ratified human rights treaties are less likely to partake in torture. However, it could be the case that judicial effectiveness alone protects people from torture and that treaty ratification is not a necessary factor (Powell and Staton, 2009). Simmons argues that litigation need not be successful, but rather the process alone can sufficiently empower citizens to bring the matter of compliance into the national dialogue to prompt change (Simmons, 2009). McGillivray and Smith argue that competitive elections are a low-cost way for citizens to hold leaders accountable for reneging on their commitments and as such democratic leaders have a greater incentive to comply (2000), though this assumes that the electorate cares enough about a respective matter of compliance. Dai similarly argues that a state's choice to comply or not reflects the domestic electoral leverage in addition to the informational states of domestic constituencies (2005). Hillebrecht argues compliance depends on executives' political will for compliance and their ability to build pro-compliance coalitions with judges and legislators (2012). Kim argues that public demand for compliance seems to elicit

legislators' willingness to comply by raising reputational concerns (2019). Flowers similarly argues that when domestic advocates are weak as in the case of the Refugee Conventions, then the level of compliance with the treaty obligations will also be low (2016). Largely these works assume that domestic institutions in their various forms constrain their states to comply with the respective policy matter. Peritz, on the contrary, highlights that democratic leaders can and do break international commitments when there is domestic pressure to do so. Peritz argues that together interest groups and voters impose political pressure on politicians (2020). The factor of domestic institutions is a significant consideration within this project, particularly within the role of the "pull" pressure as it emanates from the domestic civil entities. The domestic institutions are outlets through which I expect women's groups and advocates of 1325 to mobilize. In agreement with Flowers, I expect that where there is an absence of domestic advocacy around 1325 or women's issues more generally, compliance is likely to be lower. I expect the role of domestic courts to be negligible within the context of this project, but consider domestic entities mounting of legal challenges as a solid indicator of a strong and active domestic advocacy, even if it's not a factor in this project.

Logic of Appropriateness

Chayes and Chayes' counterargument to the 'logic of consequences' is that enforcement might be counterproductive to ensuring compliance if states fear they will be unable to comply sufficiently, they are inclined to avoid signing onto agreements in the first place (1993). The 'logic of appropriateness' on the contrary speaks to reasons that states comply other than enforcement. These explanations include the importance of legitimacy of the rules and institutions creating them. Reputation from the Constructivist view expects states to comply or not as a means of establishing or cementing a reputation, and capacity serves as an explanation of why we see noncompliance.

Legitimacy

Franck sought to answer why states obey laws in the absence of coercion. Franck argues that the more legitimate laws and institutions appear to be, the more likely it is that they will be complied with. Franck notes that legitimacy is dependent on perceived legitimacy and fairness of a rule by those to which it applies, the rule-making process itself, and how the rule is applied (1990). A study of fishermen's compliance in the Galápagos Marine Reserve found that fishermen were less likely to violate regulations when there were higher levels of legitimacy of those regulations, fishermen felt a sense of belonging, and fishermen participated in the institutions that created the regulations (Viteri and Chavez, 2007). Gippert (2016), as previously noted, found that Kosovan police complied with peacebuilding reforms mainly out of fear of negative sanctions. However, Gippert also found that for some teams, legitimacy considerations were a secondary motivation to comply. Gippert suggests, though avoids definitively arguing, that higher perceived legitimacy resulted in greater quality compliance. I expect that legitimacy will play a role in this project in the sense that countries that view the United Nations as being a more legitimate institution will more readily accept its non-mandated resolutions as a matter of policy, while as those that don't will feel less compelled to comply.

Reputation as constructivist

Reputation is another prominent explanatory variable used by constructivists in the 'logic of appropriateness' arguments. While rationalists view reputation as a means through which states can secure future cooperation with other states, constructivists argue that states' propensity to comply is borne out of a desire to establish and reify a certain identity or reputation, not to ensure future cooperation but to be viewed in a certain light. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that if states seek to improve their reputation, we should expect states that are insecure about their

reputation to embrace new norms more readily as a means to boost their status (1998). Jo and Thomson (2014) argue that reputational concerns of legitimacy can also serve as an explanation of non-state actors' behavior, their study found that states and opposition groups complied with the international norm of accepting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into their detention centers when they were seeking to establish a reputation of legitimacy for their political goals. Flowers argues, in addition to pressure from domestic advocates and the degree of fit between international and domestic norms, that Japan's desire for legitimacy led to its adoption of and compliance with human rights agreements. Flowers (2016) details that Japan took these steps as a means of shaping the state's identity and increasing its reputation as legitimate. Wotipka and Ramirez (2008) similarly argue that a 'logic of appropriateness' explains states' compliance with CEDAW, they argue states' compliance is driven by their reputational desire to present themselves as entities affirming women's rights, especially in the international arena. The factor of reputation considerations is significant in this project through both rationalist and constructivist arguments. I expect that countries that are trying to shake a reputation for lacking gender equality, and that are striving to improve that aspect of their reputation, are more likely to comply with 1325 through adoption of a NAP, consistent with Wotipka and Ramirez's evaluation of states' compliance with CEDAW. Though it is key to understand that not all countries have a desire to be viewed as affirming women's rights, some on the contrary, strive to have a reputation for reaffirming traditional gender roles.

Capacity

Chayes and Chayes (1993) argue noncompliance is less a matter of deviance than of capacity. They argue that ambiguity of the language in international law, a lack of technical and financial capacity, and the problem of transparency are all issues that if addressed could aid

states in ensuring compliance. Additionally, “jawboning” can be used to weed out those states who are purposefully noncompliant with law. Jawboning provides noncompliant states an opportunity to articulate why they have been unable to fulfill their commitments, and subsequently these reasons are evaluated and critiqued to determine if it's a matter of capacity or deviance. Haas’ work similarly found that a group of experts were able to aid states in developing policies that ensured compliance with the Mediterranean Sea pollution regime and the inclusion of experts was effective in promoting stronger and broader rules beyond the regime, supporting the argument that greater capacity lends itself to greater compliance (1989). The factor of capacity is a limited consideration as an explanatory factor for compliance in this project. The reason for that is capacity really does not provide a sufficient “out” as an excuse for non-compliance in this project. As established earlier, this project has a two-prong consideration of compliance: 1) does a country adopt a National Action Plan, and 2) how comprehensive is the content of the NAP. Capacity could be a stronger explanatory factor for the earliest adopters of NAPs, but it carries less weight as time has passed since the introduction of 1325. The reason for this is that numerous examples of NAPs publicly available for countries to draw on as examples for their own NAPs. Furthermore, international organizations have been accessible and willing to provide assistance to countries in the development of their NAPs. So at least for the first prong of compliance, I would argue that capacity bears little weight on whether or not a state has opted to develop a NAP. Certainly, for the second prong, capacity would be a weightier consideration within the quality of the content of the NAP by way of budget, experience, and resources allocated for the successful implementation.

Synthesize Rationalist and Constructivist approaches

Checkel (1997) argues that both rationalist and constructivist explanatory approaches hold merit and should engage in a dialogue to further our understanding of when rationalist or constructivist dynamics are expected to prevail. In later work, Checkel furthers this synthesis arguing that both rational instrumental choices and social learning lend themselves to the study of compliance and that domestic politics delimit the causal role of persuasion and social learning. Checkel finds that: 1) institutional legacies can frustrate plans of national agents to comply; 2) the structure of domestic institutions is key in explaining variance in mechanisms through which compliance occurs; 3) institutions are causally important and preexisting norms were key in affecting agents' willingness to comply. Checkel found the presence of cognitive priors hindered compliance, while the absence promoted learning. This lends itself to the concept of 'goodness of fit', which is discussed in the next section, as it is used in this work. An example of this synthesis in practice is Kim and Sikkink's analysis of the effect of human rights prosecutions have on compliance with human rights and argue that the impact that prosecutions have on states' behavior is a result of both normative pressures and material punishment (2010). Tallberg argues that enforcement and management mechanisms are most effective when combined and that this is what makes the European Union so successful in securing compliance, however, when only one of these mechanisms is utilized, compliance suffers (2002). In this dissertation, I seek to synthesize rationalist and constructivist explanations as well. I modify an explanatory model that draws upon the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness to explain states' propensity to comply with UNSCR 1325. This model is adapted from Borzel's pull-and-push model from the EU compliance literature.

EU Compliance Literature

The EU compliance literature fits well with the compliance literature in International Relations reviewed above. The initial wave of research in the EU compliance literature is based in the arguments similarly put forth by Chayes and Chayes (1993) with the focus on capacity. Specifically, this first wave of research focuses on legal and administrative reasons as explanations for whether or not states achieved compliance with EU policy. Azzi (2000) studied the transposition of EU directives and found that while there is less of a marked difference in overall transposition, differences in performance and delayed transposition rates are related to lack of resources. Comparable to Chayes and Chayes highlighting the issue with the ambiguity of language, Mastenbroek points out some scholars in the EU compliance literature also pointed to the complexity and poor quality of many directives as an obstacle to compliance in the early wave of research (Mastenbroek, 2005; Krislov et al., 1986; Weiler, 1988; Collins and Earnshaw, 1992; Azzi, 2000; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001).

Moving beyond early administrative explanations of compliance, the EU compliance literature's second wave of research largely focused on developing the 'goodness of fit.' The goodness of fit is defined in the literature as the level of compatibility between existing and EU-induced legislation (Heritier et al. 1996). In this wave of research, compliance is explained by the fit between European policy requirements and existing institutions at the national level of member states. Similar to the divide in the international relations literature on compliance, in this wave of research there was a 'logic of consequences' and a 'logic of appropriateness' divide.

The logic of consequences can be found in a number of works. Knill and Lenschow (1998) look at the national administrative traditions and EU implementation and argue that the embeddedness of existing structures is the cost that affects implementation effectiveness.

Duina's analysis focuses on the costs of institutional transformation as it relates to the implementation of EU policy testing hypotheses it considers the fate of the Equal Pay Directive in France, Italy and the U.K. Duina details that the model in this analysis seems to depict a static scenario: directives that introduce change will be rejected by nations but that is 'by no means a conclusive finding' (Duina, 1997). Mastenbroek highlights that while many academics have studied the goodness of fit from a rationalist perspective, others have stressed the normative aspects of adaptation (Duina and Blithe 1999; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Borzel and Risse, 2003). Regardless of the motivation, it largely argued that the 'goodness of fit' is neither sufficient or necessary in explaining EU compliance (Mastenbroek, 2005; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Haverland, 2000; Heritier et al. 2001; Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen, 2005).

The critique of the goodness of fit is neither sufficient nor necessary points to the need for a more dynamic explanation of EU compliance, according to Mastenbroek, and Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance* is an example of a more dynamic explanation. According to Borzel, the goodness of fit cannot be the sole determinant of whether or not a country will comply with international policy and ensure successful implementation. Rather, the researcher must consider the goodness of fit and its interaction with domestic and international pressure (2003). I utilize Borzel's *pull-and-push model of compliance*. Borzel argues that policy misfits can be overcome by pressures from domestic actors, the "pull", and or through EU infringement procedures, the "push". Since I am not studying the adaptation of EU policy within the EU structure, I modify this model accordingly.

1325 Literature

An extensive literature on 1325 analyzes the Security Council Resolution from a variety of viewpoints. Three particular areas of interest in this literature are pertinent to this project. I focus on the 1325 literature that focuses on the military as a difficult environment to enact changes, given its ingrained traditional gender dynamics. I also draw on the 1325 literature that focuses on the language of 1325 itself and critiques its structure and word-use as this translates to content analysis of National Action Plans. The third aspect of the literature that shapes this project is the work that has been done to evaluate the impact of 1325.

Many scholars observe the military is a historically masculine institution that reinforces traditional gender roles and poses obstacles to women's participation in 'masculine' roles in the military. Egnell (2016) argues that the military makes a difficult environment for implementing National Action Plans (NAPs) as an organization traditionally resistant to gender perspectives, but doing so will create greater military efficiency. Similarly, others such as Charlesworth (2008) and Deiana and McDonagh (2018) argue masculinist institutions negate female agency and perpetuate essentialist constructs of gender. Furthermore, the recommendations outlined in 1325 pose a significant challenge to the traditionally masculine military practices and limit its capacity to be a national priority (Rahmanpanah and Trojanowska, 2016). The deconstruction of institutional barriers is necessary to impact the restrictions set on the participation of women and to negate the reinforcement of the gentle pacifier stereotype (Bosetti and Cooper, 2015). This project focuses specifically on the matter of how compliance with 1325 through a NAP is impacted by the standing military policy the case study countries. The 1325 literature outlined above establishes that the military as a masculinist institution, means it makes for a hard test of the matter of compliance, but perhaps, even more significantly, a hard test in terms of what it

takes to achieve successful compliance in the form of increased women's participation across roles in peacekeeping operations.

The language of 1325 also serves as an obstacle to its implementation, given its passive nature and the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Women are consistently framed as victims in 1325, eliminating their potential agency, which detracts from the messaging for their greater inclusion and participation (Leyton, 2008; Shepherd, 2011). Additionally, 1325 uses the terms gender and women interchangeably, Puechguirbal (2010) argues, which weakens the scope of the UN's ability to de-gender peace and security. Given 1325's lack of punishments and progress evaluation, let alone a demand for these to be developed, it's little more than a strong message for governments to include a gender perspective in peacebuilding argues Fujio (2008). A major argument surrounding 1325 is that it is soft law since it lacks sanctions for inaction and was enacted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which some argue makes it non-binding (Chinkin and Lewis, 2015). Appiagyei-Atua (2011) counters that while 1325 uses weak language it also uses some strong language and that there is no 'bright-line rule' that states resolutions under Chapter VI are non-binding and that this is supported by the Namibia Case in the International Court of Justice. This aspect of the 1325 literature speaks most directly to my initial research question: why should we expect compliance when there is no clear mandate? My project while acknowledging the arguments put forth in these works challenges them in that even in light of the limits of the language of 1325, countries have persisted and compliance has been achieved. That is not to say that this compliance is in its most desirable form and that it could not be improved significantly, especially if 1325 had been more robust to begin with, but rather that even with a weak starting point we have seen 105 countries signal their compliance with 1325 via NAPs. Beyond initial NAP adoption, numerous member countries have gone on to develop

subsequent iterations of their NAPs, expanding and improving the content. This project highlights that every country has got to start somewhere, and 1325 has proved to be an impetus to that start.

The third aspect of this literature pertinent to this dissertation is the evaluation of 1325's impact. Many concede, 1325 has had a minimal impact in terms of women's representation in peace processes as well as peacekeeping operations, especially at senior levels (Binder, Lukas, Schweiger, 2008; Willett, 2010). Larsen (2012) argues that proper implementation of 1325 should lead to at least a six percent increase in female employment in top positions. In peace processes themselves, following 1325, Bell and O'Rourke (2010) found there were only references to women 27 percent of the time, showing little impact in the way of systemic inclusion. Hudson (2012) argues that the 'technical tasks' established by 1325 have done little to impact attaining the security of women via protection or participation. Tryggestad (2009) even more broadly argues that 1325 has had little impact on policies and or practices. This focus on the impact is important for understanding 1325's effect. This dissertation is interested in the impact of 1325 on women's participation in UN peacekeeping operations within the police, troops, and expert roles. While Larsen specifically argues that proper implementation should see a six percent increase in female in top positions, I look more broadly to see if an increase is seen across the different UN peacekeeping roles. This dissertation serves as a test of whether or not countries that have adopted NAPs have seen successful implementation in the form of an increase in women's participation across all roles within peacekeeping missions. I expect that increases will be modest rather than extreme, but modest increases across all roles are still an indicator of successful implementation for the purposes of this project.

Dependent and Independent Variables & Expectations

I use different dependent variables and independent variables in different phases of this project. In consideration of the model, the dependent variables of interest are compliance, in two different forms. First, compliance in terms of whether or not a NAP has been adopted. Second, compliance in its more complex understanding, (early adoption) x (specificity of content). Three independent variables of interest within the model consist of policy misfit, international pressure, and domestic pressure. In the later phase of the project, the dependent variable of interest is the number of women in peacekeeping operations roles, while the independent variables are compliance in its two forms.

In consideration of each of my paired case studies, I explore different variables of interest unique to each context. These variables include active women's groups, early vs. late NAP adoption, percent of women in parliament, women as head of government, and the absence of a NAP. Active women's groups are a factor that make up the independent variable of domestic pressure. Early vs. late NAP adoption is an aspect of the dependent variable of compliance, but it is later used as an independent variable as it relates to the dependent variable of the number of women in peacekeeping mission roles. Percent of women in parliament and women as head of government are aspects of the independent variable of domestic pressure. Absence of a NAP is an aspect of the dependent variable of compliance, but it is later used as an independent variable as it relates to the dependent variable of the number of women in peacekeeping mission roles.

Applying the model to the cases






Figure 2.1: Modified Pull-and-Push Model

Range of Fit (range from 1 to 5)



Range of Pressure (Scores range from 0 to 4)



Determining Degree of Compliance: 1x2x3

- 1) NAP adoption Yes=1 No=0
- 2) Year of NAP adoption
 - a. 2000-2004=10
 - b. 2005-2009=8
 - c. 2010-2014=6
 - d. 2015-2019=4
 - e. 2020-2024=2

3) Specificity Score³

- a. Scores range from 0 (least specific) to 9 (most specific)

My expectations for the application of the model to my case study countries include the following:

In instance of policy misfit, a combination of sufficient pressure from the domestic and international must be present to achieve compliance.

In instances of policy misfit, where there is no to low pressure from the domestic and international, there will be no to low compliance.

In instances where there is a good policy fit, pressure may not be necessary to achieve compliance, but greater pressure may contribute to more NAP specificity.

In instances of greater pressure, there will be greater compliance via earlier adoption and specificity.

In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles.

³ The specificity score is elaborated on later in the project. However, the basis of the score is derived from Miller, Pournik, and Swaine's work in which they evaluated the content of NAPs' language on nine different factors. The nine factors included the following: leading agents, civil society involvement, timeline, roles, coordination, financial allocation, indicators, reporting, and civil society monitoring. On each factor the authors noted whether the NAP content was specific, mentioned but not specific, and not specified at all. Countries were evaluated on each of the nine factors and they could earn a score of 0 to 9, as it related to items the NAP was specific on, 9 being the most specific.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

The primary focus of my research is understanding why states comply with a non-mandated UN Security Council resolution in a manner that ensures successful implementation and how this can affect the outcome of increased participation of women in UN peacekeeping operations. I am studying policy compliance in relation to international policy at the domestic level, as well as the effect of successful implementation of such policy. According to Borzel (2003), *goodness of fit* of a policy cannot be the sole determinant of whether or not a country will comply with an international policy and ensure successful implementation, rather the researcher must consider the *goodness of fit* and its interaction with domestic and international pressure. In the prior chapter, I detailed the modified pull-and-push model I use in this project through its application to selected case study countries.

Design

In keeping with the goals of the third-generation research paradigm (Saetren, 2014; Goggin et al. 1990; Lester et al. 1987) of the comparative policy implementation literature, this project will utilize cross-national longitudinal analysis of three pairs of countries' different paths to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 as well as a singular null case.

The project is designed around paired case studies that encompass countries from the Europe, South America, and Africa. For each of the selected countries of study, I conduct a content analysis of the country's original NAP as well as the country's existing military policy. In addition, I apply the modified pull-and-push model to each respective country to determine the extent to which the model's factors are at play in each instance. I utilize interviews, where possible, as a means to add further context and to illuminate the factors of the model at play to understand the process through which these countries adopted NAPs. Next, I analyze the UN

Gender data for the twelve-year period for each country's UN peacekeeping operations personnel contributions to determine if there is any change in the participation of women after the period in which the country adopted their NAP.

Structure

The dissertation is structured starting with a section on the background context that speaks to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and the relevance of UNSCR 1325. The next section clarifies the research questions of interest in this project as well as the relevant concepts and definitions drawn upon. The following section speaks to the analytical and theoretical framework used to answer the research questions of interest. Then, the research methodology is laid out, detailing how I proceed in answering these questions. From the research methodology, I have a section on each of my case study countries which details my analysis at each step. I close each case study section with a longitudinal analysis of the participation of women in UN peacekeeping operations to determine if there was a notable change in participation across roles following NAP adoption. I subsequently provide the findings from my comparative longitudinal analysis, provide recommendations, and offer concluding remarks.

My case studies are structured as pairings of countries from the same regions. The project focuses on a variety of regions internationally to ensure the explanatory power of the model is widely applicable. The project analyzes countries from the Balkans, South America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. These countries offer diversity on a number of items to include year of NAP adoption. Some adopted as early, while others adopted as late as 2017. This study analyzes the twelve-year period from 2009, the year the first case study country adopted UNSCR 1325, through 2021.

Case Studies

In the following chapters, I discuss a pair of case study countries in great depth, detailing their NAP content, the domestic context in which the NAP was developed, who participated in the process, and in turn if there were changes in the participation of women in UN peace operations before and after the implementation of their NAP, specifically in terms of women's participation across different roles. The following three pairs of countries and one singular country have been selected for analysis as follows:

- 1) Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia
- 2) Chile and Brazil
- 3) Ghana and Cameroon
- 4) Hungary

These cases were selected based on a number of factors. The first three pairs are all cases in which a NAP has been developed and implemented domestically, while Hungary has not implemented a NAP. There is variation across the pairings in terms of NAP specificity, timing of NAP adoption in relation to one another, role of women's groups, percent of women in parliament, strength of traditional gender roles domestically, and competition for a Security Council member seat. As depicted in the chart below, the pairings are organized based on a particular variable of interest in each case; however, there is overlap across the case study pairings. Each of the cases speak to different elements and factors of interest established by the explanatory model used in this project. Each paired case analysis examines the various "push" and "pull" factors previously noted, to include the roles of peer pressure, membership on honor roll, arrearages, or waiver lists, actively vying for Security Council seats, participation of women's groups, presence of local level bureaucrats, and national level policymakers.

Case Selection

I selected these seven countries because I wanted this project to be widely representative to provide a stronger test of the explanatory power of the modified pull-and-push model. Not only does this project modify Borzel's model for application beyond the analysis of EU policies and beyond the analysis of solely of Europe.

In selecting case studies, I created pairs that shared many similar features of interest to this project, but that varied on one or more factors or interest to flesh out what factors are essential to understanding variation.

The chart below highlights pertinent country details I considered for each selected case study during the selection process and highlights one specific variable of interest that varied within the pairs. The pertinent country details I considered were what year the country adopted a NAP based on PeaceWomen data, the level of development of a country at the time of NAP adoption, whether or not a country contributed to UN peacekeeping operations as noted by UN Gender data, how the country's NAP scored on specificity, where a country ranked in terms of the Gender Inequality Index at the time of NAP adoption, and whether or not a country was a member of any regional or international organizations.

The Human Development Index evaluates countries' levels of development based on a statistic composite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators. These factors are used to rank countries into four tiers of human development. The NAP specificity scores in the table below were established in the work of Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. The Gender Inequality Index evaluates a countries' level of gender inequality by considering developing a composite measure, reflecting inequality in achievements between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market. This cursory

analysis of a country's NAP specificity was based on the Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (2014) analysis of multiple countries' NAPs focusing on the specificity of NAP language on nine different factors: leading agents, civil society involvement, timeline, roles, coordination, financial allocation, indicators, reporting, and civil society monitoring. On each factor, the authors noted whether the NAP content was specific, mentioned but not specific, or not specified at all. Countries were evaluated on each of the nine factors, and they could earn a score of 0 to 9, as it related to items the NAP was specific on, 9 being the most specific.

Variables of Interest

As noted in the prior chapter, in each paired case study, I explore different variables of interest unique to each of their contexts. These variables include active women's groups, early vs. late NAP adoption, percent of women in parliament, women as head of government, and the absence of a NAP. Active women's groups are a factor that contributes to domestic pressure as outlined in the explanatory model. Early vs. late NAP adoption is considered as it relates to the impact on the number of women in peacekeeping mission roles. Percent of women in parliament is an aspect of domestic pressure as is women as head of government. Some might question why the project chooses to focus on different aspects of domestic pressure rather than focusing on a factor specific to international pressure. This is an opportunity for comparison between factors contributing to domestic pressure to see if one factor may be doing more work than the other. Also, to reiterate this project will be applying the full model and considering all factors laid out in that model in each of the cases. These variations are an opportunity to give more attention to specific aspects of the model. Another variable of interest addressed is the absence of a NAP in the case of Hungary. The absence of the NAP is an aspect of the dependent variable of

compliance, but it is later used as an independent variable as it relates to the dependent variable of the number of women in peacekeeping mission roles.

Paired Countries	Variables of Interest	Pertinent Country Details
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia	Very active women's groups Early adoption	<i>BiH:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High development • 7 NAP specificity • 2010 adoption • Modest but consistent peacekeeping contributors • .239 Gender Inequality Index (GII) (medium green) • Non-member of NATO/EU <i>Croatia:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high development • 4 NAP specificity • 2011 adoption • Modest but consistent peacekeeping contributors, • .17 GII (bright green) • Member of NATO/EU
Ghana and Cameroon	More women in parliament versus less WILPF involvement Early vs. Late adoption	<i>Cameroon:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low development • 2017 adoption • Unrated specificity • Top 30 peacekeeping contributors • .568 GII (Medium red) • WILPF involved • No regional/organization affiliations like ECOWAS <i>Ghana:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medium development • 2010 adoption • 5 NAP specificity • Top 30 peacekeeping contributors • .565 GII (medium red) • No WILPF involvement • ECOWAS member
Chile and Brazil	Early vs. Late adoption Woman head of government	<i>Chile:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high development • Consistent peacekeeping contributors • .359 GII (light green) • First Latin American Country to adopt • 2009 adoption • 4 NAP specificity <i>Brazil:</i>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High development • Top 30 peacekeeping contributor • .414 GII (light red) • Just adopted NAP in 2017 Unrated specificity
Hungary	No NAP Not vying for Security Council seat	<i>Hungary:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high development • No NAP • Not vying for SC seat • Not a significant contributor • .252 GII (medium green) • NATO member/non-EU

Table 3.1: Case Studies and Variables of Interest

Content Analysis

In the introductory section of this project, I conducted content analysis of UNSCR 1325 to identify the specific recommendations it includes which states, in theory, should include within the content of their NAPs to ensure successful implementation. I also analyzed the language in the Windhoek Declaration and addresses made by the Secretary-General urging states to implement 1325 domestically through the use of NAPs.

I conduct content analysis using Miller, Pournik, and Swaine's (2014) refinements to Gumru and Fritz's (2009) criteria to analyze NAPs that have yet to be analyzed in their work so as to ensure consistent comparison across NAPs. As previously noted, these authors analyzed the content of NAPs across numerous countries and specifically focused their attention on the language used on nine different factors: leading agents, civil society involvement, timeline, roles, coordination, financial allocation, indicators, reporting, and civil society monitoring. The authors applied a designation of specific, mentioned but not specific, and not specified at all to each of these factors to determine a country's NAP specificity. I utilize this same approach in determining the NAP specificity of Brazil and Cameroon whose NAPs were not previously evaluated by the authors given their late adoption. I also highlight examples of specific NAP language seen in the other case study countries as well as non-specific or absent factors of

consideration. The following chart depicts the various elements used by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine's approach to NAP content analysis:

<i>YEAR OF ADOPTION</i>
<i>TIMEFRAME OF ADOPTION</i>
<i>NUMBER OF PAGES</i>
<i>1. LEADING AGENTS PARTICIPATING IN DRAFTING</i>
<i>2. CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN DRAFTING</i>
<i>3. TIMELINE: DETAILING IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS</i>
<i>4. ROLES: SPECIFIC ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED</i>
<i>5. COORDINATION: SPECIFIC MECHANISM OR ENTITY IN CHARGE OF COORDINATION</i>
<i>6. FINANCIAL ALLOCATION: SPECIFIC SOURCES OF FUNDS ARE NOTED</i>
<i>7. INDICATORS: SPECIFIC BASIS FOR EVALUATION</i>
<i>8. REPORTING: SPECIFIC MONITORING BODY</i>
<i>9. CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING</i>

Table 3.2: Content Analysis Criteria

Each of these criteria for evaluation is considered in terms of one of three classifications: no mention, mentioned with no specifics, or mentioned with specifics.

I also conduct content analysis of domestic military policy of case study countries. Specifically, I looked at whether or not the language of existing military policy explicitly bars the participation of women in certain military roles as well as if the language of the policy reifies traditional gender roles. In instances where there is such explicit language it is an indication of a misfit; however, in some instances, there may be enough pressure to cause a country to adopt a NAP. In these instances, I expect that if a country develops a NAP it will result in changes to domestic military policy relating to gender and subsequently, these changes in military policy

will affect the participation of women (particularly as troops) in UN peace operations to which the countries provide resources.

Interviews

My project includes details derived from the personal experiences of individuals who served in roles within their respective countries that afford them the understanding and experience to add further context to understanding the process through which these different countries adopted NAPs. Not all cases include interview data. Some interviews reflect experiences of individuals very close to the drafting process, while others reflect those in a position to speak to the context of the country more generally. Anderlini (2007) focused on detailing the personal experiences of those acting behind the scenes of 1325 pushing for its adoption and stressed the importance of women's voice in the realm of policy and the fact that their inclusion brings alternative perspectives to peace and security discussions. The goal of my interviews is that subjects should be able to speak to why the NAP looks the way it does in their countries, what elements were prioritized for inclusion, what obstacles were there throughout the process, or why a NAP took so long. I initially focused on interviewees tasked with working on the drafting of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 as representatives of their countries. This means that those interviewees can uniquely speak to their experience in the drafting process as well as the bargaining, challenges, and decision-making processes that transpired with their countries with regards to what the desired end product should encompass. Given the inaccessibility of interviewees fitting this standard, I expanded my focus to interviewees active in their countries tangentially to the issue of 1325, working on gender issues or UN matters more generally too. Not all case studies in this project include interviews, due in part to the global pandemic.

Data: UN Gender Data

For each of the selected case studies, I conduct longitudinal analysis specific to the participation of women in different UN peacekeeping mission roles. I analyze UN Gender Data which details how many men and women donor countries provide to different active UN missions (UN Peacekeeping Data Portal, 2023). These datasets include the following pertinent data: the number of individual police provided by each country disaggregated by gender, the number of formed police units provided by each country disaggregated by gender, the number of experts on mission provided by each country disaggregated by gender, the number of troops provided by each country disaggregated by gender, the specific mission on which these individuals were serving, and the particular date, which is updated monthly to account for a change in personnel.

Given that military organizations have enduring “traditional” gender divisions, I expect that troops will be the hardest category for women to grow their participation. I analyze the gender makeup of a case study country’s contributions starting in 2009 through 2021. I pay specific attention to how this gender participation does or does not change following the implementation of the country’s NAP. I track overall change in women’s participation as a whole. Furthermore, I analyze the overall change, if any, in women’s participation within each of the different roles accounted for by the data.

Conclusions

Following the case study portion of the project, I look at the findings gleaned from each of the paired comparisons as well as the results of the longitudinal analysis across each of the countries. I highlight implications from the case studies and outline overarching findings and offer recommendations based on these.

Chapter 4: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia

This dissertation covers case study countries I presented in a paired comparison format. The first pairing presented is the Balkans to explore how a recent history of war marked prominently by sexual violence influences these two countries and their paths to early implementation of UNSCR 1325 via National Action Plans (NAPs). The analysis highlights the role of active women's groups. I operationalize my chosen explanatory model through the comparison of the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. These two countries have comparably high development, are within the same geographic area, adopted NAPs, has had modest but consistent contributions to peace operations, have similar Gender Inequality Index ratings, and have a shared history of conflict in which sexual violence played a significant part. One factor of particular interest and which I expect to play an impactful role in this paired comparison, is that of women's groups. Women's groups are a factor considered in determining the strength of the pressure emanating from the domestic level. Women's groups and their corresponding activeness are an example of the logic of consequences via domestic institutions exerting pressure; additionally, they are a factor which can generate reputational considerations both in the vein of logic of consequences as well as the logic of appropriateness. I find women's groups were very active in the development of BiH's NAP but appear to have been absent in Croatia's, so this comparison may highlight what differences emerged in their NAPs as a result. In this sense, women's groups' participation in the drafting process indicates greater capacity and speaks to the expectation that greater capacity is likely to result in greater specificity within the NAP.

Paired Countries	Variables of Interest	Pertinent Country Details
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia	Very active women's groups Early Adoption	BiH: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High development • 7 NAP specificity • 2010 adoption • Modest but consistent peacekeeping contributors • .239 Gender Inequality Index (GII) (medium green) • Non-member of NATO/EU Croatia: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high development • 4 NAP specificity • 2011 adoption • Modest but consistent peacekeeping contributors, • .17 GII (bright green) • Member of NATO/EU

Table 4.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia Variables of Interest

Conflict as a Precursor of NAP Adoption

In the decade prior to adopting their NAPs, each country was a part of the former Yugoslavia and embroiled in conflict as a part of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Extensive media coverage of the conflict depicted the wars as a result of “centuries of hatred” either based in religion or ethnicity, but historians dispute this depiction of long sustained ethnic divisions rooted in religion (Donia, Fine, 1994; Malcolm, 1996). Bosnia is described as having a history of tolerance and coexistence characterized by a multiethnic society for centuries. Since World War II (WWII), upwards of 40% of marriages in Bosnia were mixed ethnicity. In 1993, the government's cabinet was comprised of 9 Muslim members, 6 Serbs, and 5 Croats, and many Bosnian Serbs and Croats within urban epicenters supported a sustained multiethnic Bosnia (Donia, Fine, 1994). The only difference among Bosnians was religious background, but with 50 years of a considerably secular state, few modern Bosnians and largely none of those involved in

the leadership roles during the conflict were deeply religious so religion as a basis for the conflict is also refuted (Donia, Fine, 1994).

During WWII, the fascist Croatian Ustasha state stirred ethnic hatreds and carried out ethnic cleansing in the region, but under Josip Broz, known as Tito, there was an effort to restore tolerance for mixed populations and reject the chauvinism lauded by the Ustasha (Donia, Fine, 1994). In 1987, when Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Yugoslavia, he sought to stoke nationalist sentiments among the Serbs with his call for the reclamation of Kosovo, and in 1989 with constitutional changes Milosevic reclaimed control of Kosovo's judiciary and police (Malcolm, 1996). In 1990, Franjo Tudjman won in Croatia's first free elections and Milosevic began to employ propagandist rhetoric about the threat of an Ustasha regime from Croatia, stoking fears among Serbs living in Croatia (Malcolm, 1996). Soon thereafter, Serbs in Krajina began to declare autonomy from the Croatian government out of fear from the "Ustasha regime." Historian Noel Malcolm details the three techniques the Serbians utilized within their efforts in the conflict: 1) The general technique of bombarding the Serbian population with misinformation and fearmongering to radicalize them (i.e. describing the Croatian government as Ustasha); 2) The guerilla warfare technique of "compromising the village"⁴; 3) Create violence incidents, then ask the army to intervene as a show of an impartial arbiter, while it was known full well the army's allegiance is to the Serbs. In May of 1991, Bosnian Serbs in three major areas within Bosnia also call for autonomy setting these techniques in motion, this time stoking fears of "Muslim Fundamentalism" in lieu of the Ustasha.

⁴ First, stage an incident like a shooting of a carload of Croatian police to invite a crackdown by Croats. Then distribute arms to villagers telling the police (Croats) are planning to attack them. Then when police arrive it's easy to spark a gun battle. Now, where there was a whole village previously uncommitted there is now a village committed to the side of insurgents.

In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, and Croatia and the Serbs were embroiled in fighting. In September 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Regions in Bosnia asked for the army to intervene and in 1992 Croatia and Serbia reach a cease-fire. Fighting continued in Bosnia with the Croatian government leadership briefly shifting from its position of supporting a continued multi-ethnic state in Bosnia in April of 1993, to vying to acquire Croat dominated areas in the Herzegovina area of Bosnia. By March 1994, the Croats and Bosnians realigned in agreement that the Bosnia government would entail a Croat-Muslim federation (Malcolm, 1996).

A significant aspect of this conflict, important to understand the context in which each country's NAP was developed, is the campaign of sexual violence inflicted upon Bosniak and Croat civilians by Serbian forces, irregular and formal Rape was a part of an ethnic war of extermination and a policy of ethnic uniformity and ethnic conquest. Women were raped to help make a Serbian state by making Serbian babies (MacKinnon, 1993). Prior to the Balkans conflict in the 1990s, pornography had become so steeped in Yugoslavian culture that its market had been deemed the "freest in the world" (MacKinnon, 1994). During the war, Bosniak and Croatian women were held in rape/death camps where soldiers made pornography of the rapes they perpetrated and then used such footage in propaganda efforts. These videos were doctored to make it appear that the victims were Serbian while the perpetrators were either Muslim or Croatian even though the verbal dubbing failed to distort intonation and word usage that was distinctly Serbian (MacKinnon, 1994).

The systematic rape campaign within this conflict was substantiated in military trials following the war. While rape was widely permitted to be carried out by soldiers, as is often the case in war, it was also *ordered* from the top, and in some instances, with the intended goal of

“building morale” among Serbian troops (Burns, 1992). While sexual violence permeated the conflict by those involved in the war itself, those that were sent to "protect" also contributed to and partook in this sexual violence against women. The introduction of the United Nations (UN) into the conflict area, is said to have increased the trafficking of women and girls. A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commander, in particular, is reported to have accepted offers from Serbian officers to bring him Muslim girls from the camps for orgies (MacKinnon, 1993; Die Welt, 1992). The experience of such systematic and egregious sexual violence characterizing the conflict that women in each of these countries endured in the years prior to both countries’ adoption of NAPs shaped the context and had impact on the content of these documents as well as the process for their drafting.

Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina NAP Content

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) developed its initial NAP in 2010. This NAP is one of, if not the most, specific among the other NAPs analyzed in this project. BiH’s NAP is 69 pages and is specific on 7 of 9 criteria according to the content analysis using criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. The NAP details the situational context in which this NAP is drafted to include the developments in the ways war is conducted, highlighting the participation of women as well as the weaponizing of gender-based violence, the development of international policies, and the evolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s domestic policies and push for equality and representation. The NAP specifically details the goal of increasing women’s participation within the military, policy, and peacekeeping operations, including comprehensive benchmark participation goals in each. The NAP also includes sizeable unique sections on fighting human trafficking and reducing mine-contamination. This is a notable influence of the trafficking that

occurred during BiH's prior conflict. Miller, Pournik, and Swaine highlight that the areas of prioritization in this NAP included the following items: 1) Increased participation of women in decision making roles in government; 2) Increase women's participation and leadership in military and police; 3) Increase participation of women in peacekeeping operations and introduce gender perception in training of personnel; 4) Fight Human Trafficking; 5) Reduce rise of mine-contaminated areas in BiH.

Table 4.2: BiH: Content Analysis Criteria & Text in BiH's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	2010		
Timeframe of adoption	2010-2013		"Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010-2013"
Number of pages in NAP	69		
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	Gender Equality Agency of BiH; Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH	Specific +1	"The Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees shall submit the report on the fulfillment of Action Plan on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 to the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina..."
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	National and international non-governmental organizations are repeatedly noted as partners within the specified objectives of the NAP they are specifically referenced with regard to cooperation for implementation, however, no specific organizations are detailed as participating in drafting. A number of	Not Specific 0	"...The report will be prepared according to the set reporting methodology, based on reports from ministries, international, non-governmental and civil society organizations, listed in the Action Plan as responsible institutions."

	women's organizations are thanked for contributing "greatly to the implementation of this resolution," but again they are not specified as participating in drafting.		
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	Yes; each objective and corresponding measures has a specified deadline	Specific +1	<p>"15. Initiate training of police inspectors, social workers and create modules for cooperation with women and girls who are potential victims of trafficking</p> <p>Responsible institutions: Ministry of Security of BiH (SIPA, Border Police, State Anti-trafficking Coordinator, INTERPOL), Entity Interior Ministries, Cantonal Interior Ministries, police BD.</p> <p>Partners: Non-governmental and international organizations</p> <p>Deadline: 2011</p> <p>16. Initiate media education to observe international standards and ensure full protection of the victim's identity</p> <p>Responsible institutions: State Anti-trafficking Coordinator, Entity Interior Ministries, police of BD, media.</p> <p>Partners: Non-governmental and international organizations</p> <p>Deadline: 2010"</p>

<p>4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned</p>	<p>Yes, for each objective and corresponding measure there are specified roles which delineate responsible institutions as well as partners. The identified partners tend to be vague but responsible institutions are specific.</p>	<p>Specific +1</p>	<p>“International and regional networking of present and possible female candidates for leadership positions to exchange best experiences and practices Responsible institutions: Gender Equality Agency of BiH, Entity Gender Centers Partners: Political parties, non-governmental and international organizations Deadline: Ongoing”</p>
<p>5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination</p>	<p>The Gender Equality Agency of BiH as the leading agency has also been specified as leading coordination efforts. There prior efforts have been noted as has their intention to continue with these efforts.</p>	<p>Specific +1</p>	<p>“From their very establishment, the Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Entity Gender Centers embarked upon training civil servants on gender equality issues. To date, numerous training sessions were organized on: gender concept, international and domestic legal framework on gender equality, gender mainstreaming, institutional mechanisms for gender equality in BiH, program/project planning including gender standards, integration of gender equality principles in all programs and projects. One of the most important topics with which all persons responsible for gender issues in ministries and institutions were</p>

			familiarized is the UNSC Resolution 1325. As the Action Plan on Implementation of UNSCR 1325, the Gender Equality Agency will continue to organize trainings and introduce civil servants and other officials on the importance and content of UNSCR 1325
6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	Source of funding for each objective in Annex but very general and no figures given	Not Specific 0	
7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	Yes, there is a detailed appendix which notes objectives and corresponding activities, each of which have a number of identified indicators noted.”	Specific +1	<p>“Activity: Apply “zero tolerance” method onto any form of illicit sexual behavior of peacekeeping mission personnel, gender-based violence, discrimination</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Number of gender-based discrimination cases recorded - Number of proceedings conducted and sanctions ordered - Number of trainings held for peacekeeping mission members”
8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	The NAP establishes that the Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees will form a committee for monitoring the implementation of the action plan.	Specific +1	“To monitor the implementation of Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall

			launch the procedure to form a committee that shall follow the implementation of the Action Plan, within one month of the Plan's adoption. The committee should include representatives of responsible ministries, institutions and non-governmental organizations."
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	Civil society organizations will submit reports to committee who will include their findings in annual report to the Council of Ministers of BiH	Specific +1	"The Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees shall submit the report on the fulfillment of Action Plan on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 to the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report will be prepared according to the set reporting methodology, based on reports from ministries, international, non-governmental and civil society organizations, listed in the Action Plan as responsible institutions. The report will be prepared and delivered for adoption to the Council of Ministers each year in December or earlier, at the request of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina"
TOTAL: 7/9			

Bosnia and Herzegovina: So-So Fit, Moderate Pull, Strong Push

In considering the fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of BiH, it becomes clear that it is a “so-so” fit. Established military policy in BiH did not contain specific provisions to address equal representation; the existing law did explicitly call for sex-based discrimination to be avoided in the recruitment process (Official Gazette of BiH 14/05). Police policy similarly addresses sex-discrimination, though some cantons have gone so far as to make comprehensive laws at the local level which seek to improve equal representation (Becirevic, Sulc, Sostaric, 2011). There is a history of patriarchal understandings of sex and gender roles in BiH. Women are largely occupied by childcare and household responsibilities, while police and military roles are largely seen as unfitting for women (UNDP, 2005). However, while military policy and patriarchal views seemed to make for an ill-fitting environment for the adoption of UNSCR 1325, there were significant strides made via legislation that improved the environment domestically. In the period leading up to BiH NAP adoption, the country had taken steps to improve gender equality. In 2003, the country adopted the Law on Gender Equality, which sought to achieve full equality in all spheres where women lagged, though this was a burdensome undertaking because every sphere but the household had women lagging. Furthermore, BiH established the 2006 Gender Action Plan which made direct references to international documents addressing gender from CEDAW, Beijing Platform, Council of Europe, and the European Union and used these in crafting objectives. This plan established 15 areas of focus and was much more specific in terms of efforts and content for attempting to address equality than was military policy. The direct references to other international documents also highlight the influence those entities held over BiH in advancing its work on gender.

There was moderate pull pressure in the case of BiH; however, active women's movement NGOs were certainly a powerful pull pressure. Multiple civil society organizations (CSOs) that were comprised by women's organizations were highlighted as contributors to BiH's NAP implementation efforts, though their participation in the drafting process is not specified.⁵ Their efforts seem to have been borne out of an environment in the post-war period where NGOs grew a significant presence. Among the burgeoning NGO environment, the women's movement led the way as the most active element. Through the late 1990s to the early 2000s, these groups made contributions to a number of legislative efforts including the 1998 provisional election laws, the creation of a public policy to combat human trafficking in 2000, 2003 Gender Equality Law, and more (Babic-Svetlin, 2009). Additionally, these groups worked on representation quotas that were ultimately included in the 1998 legislation. Much of the work done by women's groups in this period clearly laid the groundwork for BiH's NAP which may be most evident by the NAP's focus on human trafficking.

Beyond the active women's movement via NGOs, the element of pressure from the local level was largely lacking in BiH in the lead-up to NAP development. While the European standard goal for women serving in local political positions is 40%, BiH on average had about 15% female representation in local level roles in the mid-2000s. In 2008, municipal elections saw 20% females elected to local municipalities. Furthermore, women were largely absent from policy and issue bodies and committees with the exception of those focused on gender (Babic-Svetlin, 2009). At that national policymaking level, there was certainly growth in the participation of women at national level legislative bodies from 2% in 1996 to 14.5% in 2006.

⁵ The following organizations were noted as NAP development partners: Women to Women (Sarajevo), Women United (Banja Luka Center for Women – Flame (Sarajevo), Woman of BiH (Mostar), Helsinki Citizens Parliament (Banja Luka), Viktorija 99 (Jajce), Forum of Women (Bratunac), Horizons (Tuzla), Bridge (Višegrad), Future (Modriča), Lara Bijeljina (Duvanjke), Orchid (Stolac), Local Democracy Foundation (Sarajevo), Legal Aid Center (Zenica), Anima N (Goražde), New Future (Sarajevo), Aurora Sokolac, Dawn and Milidani Milidi (Majdan Kravica).

This growth once again significantly lags behind the noted European goals of representation. These two aspects of pull pressure are rather weak and don't add much to this portion of the model. BiH seems to have lacked a level of interconnectedness between political parties and women's groups, and ultimately BiH lacked pressure from the local level politics and national policymaking entities. After the war, the international community's focus on funding the NGO community⁶ likely added to the government in BiH recognizing the need to engage with women's groups on matters of legislative import to the topic of gender. However, that recognition of the need to include women's groups in drafting efforts didn't translate to a focus on actively trying to include these groups as participants within politics at the local and national levels via running candidates or shaping party platforms.

In the case of BiH, the international level exerted a strong push pressure in the lead-up to BiH's NAP adoption. 18 countries adopted NAPs before BiH (Peace Women). BiH was under negotiation for NATO candidacy dating back to 2000 but not a full member, nor was BiH an EU member country, only submitting its application in 2016 for membership. Additionally, BiH was not a member of WILPF at the time. By 2002, NATO had mainstreamed gender balance and diversity efforts in its policy (NATO 2011). So, in BiH's efforts to attain NATO membership, it is likely this type of policy would serve as an impetus for BiH to take steps to align with NATO.

Also at the international level, BiH was elected to a Security Council seat for the 2010-2011 period, winning its election in October 2009. This indicates BiH was vying for a Security Council seat at the same time as it was drafting its NAP. Just seven months after assuming its

⁶ "While some NGOs in BiH are already well organized most of them still depend on international donations, with local sources of funding remaining extremely limited and generally coming from municipal budgets. The total number of active non-profit organizations in BiH in 2004 was estimated at 4,629, which amounts to 23,163 BAM organization 33 per from local budgets. The total annual income of NGOs in 2004 was estimated at 552,709,876 BAM (on average, 119,402 BAM per organization), coming from all sources (international donations, local budgets, own member contributions, etc.)." (Babic-Svetlin, 2009)

seat in the Security Council, BiH formally adopted its NAP. In the years leading up to NAP adoption, BiH was in arrears for its annual 2008 UN member dues. However, in 2009, BiH paid its dues in full as well as residual dues it had still owed from 2008 (UN GA). In the context of leadup to NAP adoption, BiH seemed not to be keeping up with expectations or demands of the international community. BiH serves as an example of the logic of consequences at play via coercion, reputation, and domestic institutions considerations. BiH was already punished by being placed on the arrears list for lack of compliance with UN dues requirements. Taking steps to draft and adopt their NAP they were able to signal alignment with UN expectations. Taking this step put the country in a position to bolster its reputation for compliance and to overcome missteps relative to UN member dues, to ensure election to the seat. Considering the prominent role of women's groups domestically and those groups' impact on legislation with a focus on gender equality and representation quotas it is also an example of the logic of consequences in the form of domestic institutions. The women's groups were a strong push pressure in BiH, and exerting pressure on leadership to improve gender equality.

Case Study: Croatia

Croatia NAP Content

I conducted content analysis of Croatia's first NAP using the criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine as the basis for that analysis. Croatia developed its NAP in 2011 following both the 10-year anniversary of 1325 and the publication of NAPs by BiH and Serbia in the prior year. This NAP is 18 pages and is considered to be specific on 4 of 9 criteria according to the content analysis conducted using the criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. The NAP makes references to multiple international partnerships and their work related to the goals of 1325. Specifically, the NAP references the UN, NATO, and the EU and the steps

Croatia has taken in line with efforts being made by these entities. This aspect of the NAP seems to speak directly to the matter of ‘peer pressure’ that is a key component of the explanatory model used in this project. The Croatian NAP lays out measures and objectives which are directly corresponding to 1325’s key areas of prevention, participation, protection, and post-conflict recovery. Much of the measures themselves lack specificity in how they will be carried out, but indicators laid out hint at what types of activities will be undertaken. Timelines are altogether lacking; instead, the NAP just notes the intention to continue the established measures as permanent efforts rather than detailing when these measures will be effectively underway. References to working with civil society as a part of its efforts are vague. Furthermore, the fact that the working group only planned to meet on an annual basis is problematic, especially for the first year. From the NAP it seems unlikely civil society would actually be at the table to monitor implementation progress. The intention to exchange implementation experiences at local, regional, international levels is a promising opportunity for meaningful exchange and a prospect to share best practices. Miller, Pournik, and Swaine highlight that the areas of prioritization in this NAP included the following items: 1) Strengthen gender perspective through participation in international activities and integration of gender perspective in the education programs; 2) Introduce gender balance in the security system, increase representation of women in decision-making activities of peacebuilding and security; 3) Protect the rights of women and girls including victims of gender-based violence. Croatia has more generalized priorities, with many of the same general goals as BiH with the exception of the special attention given to human trafficking and mine specified goals established in the case of BiH.

Table 4.3: Croatia: Content Analysis Criteria & Text in Croatia's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	2011	Not rated	
Timeframe of adoption	2011-2014	Not rated	“National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) On Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions (for the period of 2011 to 2014)”
Number of pages in NAP	18	Not rated	
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	Ministry of Foreign Affairs & European Integration	Specific +1	“Croatia passed the decision in August 2010 to establish a Working Group for preparing the Draft National Action Plan (NAP)...coordinated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.”
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	None	Not Mentioned 0	
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	There are time limits	Not Specific 0	“Review the existing documents related to the implementation of the gender perspective in accordance with the implementation of resolution 1325 and related resolutions; - Facilitators: MoD, MoI and MFAEI - Time limit: the last quarter in 2012” Every other implementation objective has the “Time limit: permanently” but there is no specific start date, or corresponding benchmark dates.

<p>4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned</p>	<p>For every detailed objective there are designated facilitators noted as responsible for executing the identified task.</p>	<p>Specific +1</p>	<p>“Obj 2.5. Conduct education of judicial staff with a view to raising awareness of women victims of armed conflicts and the importance of the implementation of resolution 1325 and related resolutions in the operation of judicial bodies; - Facilitator: Ministry of Justice, Judicial Academy Time limit: permanently Obj 2.6. Conduct education of professional staff at health care establishments about resolution 1325 and related resolutions; - Facilitator: Ministry of Health Care and Social Welfare; - Time limit: permanently Obj 2.7. Continue education to raise awareness of heads of international peace-keeping operations of the need to protect the security of women and girls and children and their human rights; - Facilitators: MoD, MoI - Time limit: permanently”</p>
<p>5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination</p>	<p>None. There is no specific mechanism or entity noted as handling coordination of the NAP effort. The closest the NAP gets to discussing coordination is its identification of an objective that notes cooperation with civil society, but there is no designated facilitator of that</p>	<p>Not Mentioned 0</p>	<p>“Cooperate with civil society organisations and religious organisations engaging in the provision of humanitarian and other aid in the implementation of resolution 1325 and related</p>

	objective, instead all parties are noted as facilitators.		resolutions (conflict prevention, peace building, participation of women in peace negotiations), and report to the public about what has been done; - Facilitators: calls the facilitators of measures - Time limit: permanently”
6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	None	Not Mentioned 0	
7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	Yes. Each established objective and its corresponding measures have a detailed indicator noted.	Specific +1	“Obj 2.1. Indicator: Number of women who participated in education programs Obj 2.2 Indicator: Number of pre-deployment education courses on subjects”
8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	Yes, the working group coordinated by MFAEI will report to Human Rights Commission.	Specific +1	“The present working group, with possible future changes in its members, will systematically monitor the realisation of NAP measures, prepare annual reports with performance estimates and report the to the Human Rights Commission of the Government of the Republic of Croatia.”
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	None.	Not Mentioned 0	
TOTAL: 4/9			

Croatia: So-So Fit, Strong Pull, Weak Push

In considering the fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of Croatia, it is clearly not the best fit by far; however, it is not an absolute

misfit. The military policy in Croatia, up until 2008, was one of compulsory service for men ages 18-27 for a period of 6 months (CIA World Factbook). As of 2005, there was an effort to eliminate conscription in favor of a voluntary professional force (BBC, 2005). In June 2006, the Ministry of Defence of Croatia published its “Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006-2015.” Parliament adopted by Parliament in July 2006. The plan called for recruitment efforts to give special attention to increasing active military women to achieve a minimum of 10% participation of women by 2015 (Croatia MoD, 2006). The document also contained gender-inclusive language for the outlook on roles within the Armed Forces including soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, and military specialists. In the same year that Croatia adopted its NAP, the European Parliament released a report evaluating Croatia's Policy of Gender Equality. This report noted that the country had developed solid institutional mechanisms via laws and measures to achieve gender equality. However, the report found four major indicators of problems with gender equality in the country, including under-representation of women in political and decision-making, disadvantaged position of women in the labor market, gender-based violence, and extensive stereotypes (Gruden and Gruden, 2013). The report noted a lack of societal awareness and education on the issue of gender discrimination. On paper, via established military policy and general gender policies, 1325 appears to be a decent fit. However, when considering the roadblocks these policies face as a result of the conservative gender traditional society in which they've been enacted, it's likely this case is more of a so-so fit.

There is strong pull pressure at play from the domestic level in the case of Croatia. Civil society in the form of women's groups, in particular, exerted a significant amount of pull pressure. The NAP only vaguely referenced women's groups, and they were not involved in the interdepartmental working group to develop the NAP. However, civil society organizations were

invited to provide suggestions to the draft and are noted throughout the NAP vaguely as “partners in implementation” (Peace Women). However, while women’s groups were not included as a major component of the drafting process, women’s groups were very active domestically in the years preceding NAP adoption. In the late 1990s, Croatia Women’s Network was formed. This network united numerous organizations, groups, and initiatives focusing on matters of gender discrimination and the advancement of equality. In 2006, there were 47 organizations across Croatia united under this network and working on gender equality (CWN). The network developed a political platform and emerged as a strong civil society actor in the post-war period. Women's groups, including Croatia Women's Network and the Women's Ad-Hoc Coalition, were very active in the lead-up to the 2000 election in Croatia and were able to establish strong links to local constituents and international donor support (Irvine, 2012). During this time, the Women's Ad-Hoc Coalition and other women's groups pushed their political platform which called for 40% of women in decision-making bodies and executive bodies of parties, the establishment of a parliamentary entity to address gender equality, the end of stereotyped presentations of women in the media, and more (Barilar et al. 2000; Belic and Bijelic, 2001). Many of the initiatives advocated by these women's groups were ultimately adopted by political parties as a part of their party platforms; furthermore, some created internal party gender quotas and included more women on party lists. This is an example of the logic of consequences via domestic institutions, the women’s groups’ advocacy was able to motivate domestic politicians and parties to adopt this as a part of their platforms, also potentially driven by reputation concerns under the logic of appropriateness. Parties and politicians looking to signal to their constituents their support for women’s issues.

After the 2000 election, the Croatian parliament did create a committee to address gender equality as well as introducing a gender equality law (Irvine, 2012). This election also saw the participation of women in the parliament jump from 7.1% representation to 21.9% participation; however, this growth in participation has plateaued since 2000 (Sirocic, 2014). While the participation of women at the level of parliament has maintained a high global average, local level political participation has been low in Croatia. There has been modest growth from 2001 through 2009 in women's participation within local level roles. In 2001, average female representation in local or regional government was 11.5%, in 2005 it was 12.9%, and in 2009 it reached 15.4% (OHCHR). Croatia in the decade leading up to NAP adoption had a very active civil society in the form of women's groups organizing and affecting domestic politics. The changes to political party platforms and the greater inclusion of women in policy-making roles created an environment of considerable domestic pressure for 1325 to be adopted.

In the case of Croatia, there is a weak push pressure at play from the international level. Peer pressure, in this case, is considered strong and comes from a number of factors. 29 countries had adopted NAPs before Croatia and among those 29 countries were Croatia's two neighbors which were also involved in the Balkans Wars of the 1990s (Peace Women). Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Serbia and Slovenia, had adopted their NAPs in 2010, the year before Croatia. Additional peer pressure came from the fact that Croatia was a NATO member since 2009, having been invited in 2008. Croatia was also recommended for candidacy in the European Union back in 2003 though not achieving membership until 2013. Its effort to comply with UNSCR 1325 likely aided in its pursuit of EU membership. The Treaty on the European Union Article 3, specifically notes, "It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between

generations and protection of the rights of the child (EU, 2012).” While peer pressure is strong in this instance the other factors of consideration at the international level are weak or non-existent in the case of Croatia. Croatia was not vying for a Security Council seat in the lead-up to its NAP adoption; however, it was a sitting member on the council from 2008 to 2009. As a dues-paying UN member in the years leading up to NAP adoption, Croatia was paid in full for its annual dues both in 2009 and in 2010 (UN GA). In consideration of Croatia's membership in international organizations, supportive of UNSCR 1325, it is likely it would try to comply with it as well. Furthermore, with its neighbors in compliance, there was additional pressure to adopt a NAP.

Conclusion




Figure 4.1: Modified Model Applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina

BiH did achieve compliance with UNSCR 1325 by developing and adopting a NAP domestically in July 2010, and the NAP was notable for its comprehensive and detailed content. This detailed content largely seems attributable to domestic legislative work in the years prior to

NAP adoption with which women's groups helped, and when it was time to draft the NAP for 1325 once again the government included these groups in the drafting process. In evaluating the successful implementation of the NAP, giving specific attention to the change in the participation of women within UN peacekeeping missions, BiH saw 18.8% growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions overall since its time of NAP adoption. BiH saw 35% growth in women's participation within the role of police within peacekeeping missions in the same time frame. BiH had no participation of women within the expert or troop roles during the twelve-year period of analysis.

UN data on staff officers, by gender, started being generated in 2017, so there is a narrower window for consideration and it does not provide a picture of participation by gender prior to NAP adoption. In 2017 and 2018, BiH had two staff officers within its peacekeeping missions for each respective year. In 2017 and 2018, women did not occupy either of BiH's staff officer positions. In 2019 and 2020, BiH again had two staff officers within peacekeeping missions each year, and a woman filled one of these two officer roles making up 50% of their deployed staff officers. BiH contributed no staff officers in 2021. It is hard to get a clear picture of women's participation in this role within peacekeeping missions, but this limited data has a promising outlook.

BiH has seen consistent moderate growth of women's participation overall and more substantial and consistent growth of women within the police role.




Figure 4.2: Percent of BiH Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations; *Source: UN Gender Data*




Figure 4.3: Modified Model Applied to Croatia

Ultimately, Croatia did achieve compliance with UNSCR 1325 by developing and adopting a NAP domestically in 2011. However, its compliance could have been improved upon with a more detailed and comprehensive NAP, and perhaps had women's groups been included in the actual drafting of the plan it may have been. Croatia's conservative and traditional gender

views in its society historically served as an obstacle to a comprehensive NAP. In evaluating the successful implementation of the NAP, giving specific attention to the change in the participation of women in UN peacekeeping missions, Croatia saw 15.3% growth in women's participating within peacekeeping missions overall since its NAP adoption. There was 16.8% growth in women's participation in the expert role in peacekeeping missions in the same time period. Croatia has not contributed police in its peacekeeping missions since 2014, so there is a limited picture to analyze the growth in women's participation in the police role. Between 2011 and 2013, women's participation grew 26.2% in the police role and then dropped to 0% in 2014. In 2014, there were a total of 3 male personnel serving within the police role. Croatian has not contributed troops within peacekeeping missions since 2018. Between 2011 and 2018, women's participation declined by 4% in the troop role of peacekeeping missions. Women have not served in the staff officer role as of yet, since the role's data started to be generated in 2017. Croatia has seen modest growth overall and within the expert role with respect to women's participation.




Figure 4.4: Percent of Croatian Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations; *Source: UN Gender Data*

Paired Comparison

These two countries were used to develop a paired case study because they shared the unique history of a significant period of conflict and war marred by gender violence. My expectation with respect to these cases was that the history of gender violence within conflict would mean that UNSCR 1325 would resonate domestically with the general public and politicians. Both of these countries were ultimately early adopters in the larger picture of UNSCR 1325 NAP adoptions globally.

Women's groups had a strong presence in both countries, but their presence was seen in different forms. Women's groups' activeness is an example of the logic of consequences via domestic institutions exerting pressure. Additionally, they are a factor which can generate reputational considerations both in the logic of consequences as well as the logic of appropriateness. In the context of BiH, women's groups were referenced within the content of the NAP as participants and as future participants within the important role of monitoring. In Croatia's NAP, women's groups were not specifically outlined as participants in either the drafting or future monitoring processes. While Croatia's women's groups were not explicitly identified in the NAP development, they maintained a very strong presence domestically which clearly impacted policymakers and political platforms.

Expectations tested within this paired case study include the following:

In instances where there is a good policy fit, pressure may not be necessary to achieve compliance, but greater pressure may contribute to more NAP specificity

In instances of greater pressure, there will be greater compliance via earlier adoption and/or specificity

In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles

The BiH-Croatia paired case study supports all three expectations. First, BiH and Croatia were each a so-so fit. BiH saw a greater degree of pressure present in comparison to Croatia. BiH achieved a greater specificity score with respect to the content of its NAP in comparison to Croatia. However, a case with a stronger “good fit” or “perfect fit” will be a better test for this expectation.

Second, had greater pressure and adopted earlier in 2010, while Croatia did not adopt until 2012. BiH’s NAP also was more specific in terms of content with a specificity score of 7 out of 9, while Croatia’s NAP had a specificity score of 4 out of 9.

Third, BiH had a greater compliance score of 40 in consideration of its earlier adoption and greater specificity compared to Croatia’s specificity score of 24 with its later adoption and less specific NAP. In the time since its NAP adoption BiH has had 18.8% growth overall in women’s participation within peacekeeping missions while Croatia has had 3.1% growth overall in women’s participation within peacekeeping missions.

This chapter explored the cases of two countries in the Balkans with a strong presence of women’s groups which was a key factor of consideration with the domestic pull pressure. Additionally, both of these countries were early adopters. The next chapter, explores two cases in Africa which vary on a few variables of interest to include early vs. late NAP adoption and a partnership and lack thereof with WILPF within the NAP process. But perhaps the most interesting variable highlighted in the next chapter explores the extent of women’s participation in parliament and local level politics.

Chapter 5: Ghana and Cameroon

The next paired comparison is from Africa, specifically Western and Central Africa, where different experiences historically with conflict that have influenced the content found in each respective country's National Action Plan (NAP). In this chapter, an early and a late adopter and analyze their paths to implementation. While the prior case explored the role of active women's groups in the path to implementation, in this case, the role of women's participation in the domestic political realm is highlighted. I operationalize my chosen explanatory model through the comparison of the cases of Ghana and Cameroon. These two countries have medium and low development and are within the same geographic area; each adopted NAPs, ranks as a top contributor to peace operations, and have low Gender Inequality Index ratings, but vary on involvement of WILPF among other factors. One factor that is of particular interest, that plays an impactful role in this paired comparison, is that of women in the national parliament. This comparison highlights the differences in their NAPs as a result the combination of more women in parliament and the involvement of WILPF versus an absence of both. Because Cameroon had both of these elements its NAP was more specific than Ghana's. My expectation was that greater NAP specificity would result in greater involvement of Cameroonian women in peacekeeping operations, particularly in traditionally gendered male roles of troops and police. The paired case study supports this expectation.

Paired Countries	Variables of Interest	Pertinent Country Details
Ghana and Cameroon	<p>More women in parliament versus less</p> <p>WILPF vs. not</p> <p>Early vs late</p> <p>Bad fit</p>	<p><i>Ghana:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medium development • 2010 adoption • 5 NAP specificity • Top 30 peacekeeping contributors • .565 GII (medium red) • No WILPF involvement • ECOWAS member <p><i>Cameroon:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low development • November 2017 adoption • 7 NAP specificity • Top 30 peacekeeping contributors • .568 GII (Medium red) • WILPF involved • Not affiliated with ECOWAS, but with ECCOS

Table 5.1: Ghana and Cameroon Variables of Interest

Adding Context: Historical Conflict

Both Ghana and Cameroon frame their National Action Plans in the historical context of their experiences with conflict. Ghana’s foreword notes the country has “not experienced armed conflicts with grave humanitarian consequences,” but there has been a “number of violent ethnic conflicts with adverse impacts especially on women and girls which make it absolutely appropriate for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Ghana (2010, p.2).”

Cameroon’s introduction describes Cameroon as an once model of peace in Africa. However, it goes on to highlight how the country has contended with political instability of neighboring countries, attacks carried out by Boko Haram, and “miscellaneous social claims.” The introduction to the NAP notes, “the consequences of this situation include the increase of violence, the death of numerous innocent Cameroonians among whom many women and children...(2017, p.13)” The introduction goes on to note further implications of these

experiences with conflict to include forced and massive movements of population, the destruction of whole villages, disruption of normal day to day activities, psychological impacts country-wide, weapons proliferation, insecurity, and refugees to include young girls who are used as suicide bombers.

While both countries frame their NAPs in the historical context of their experience with conflict, those experiences with conflict vary in notable ways. The following section provides greater contextual background relating to each country's experience with conflict.

Ghana's experience with conflict

Ghana's history of ethnic conflict has been particularly present in its Northern region. The early 1990s saw a number of conflicts in the region including fighting between Nawuri and Gonja in 1991 and 1992, and Gonjas against an alliance comprised of Gonja-Valga, Konkomba-Nanumba, Mamprusi-Kusasi and Kokomba in 1992 that lasted several months (Pul, 2003; Debrah et al., 2016), and the Kokomba-Nanumba conflict in 1994.

The colonial history of Ghana adds important context to understanding the history of conflict in the country. Ghana was colonized in 1874 by the British, who called it Gold Coast Colony. The Asante resisted Britain's colonizing efforts and sought to maintain independence. This led to fighting between the Asante and the British colonizers. In its continued pursuit of colonization, Britain negotiated treaties elsewhere in the country (Addo-Fenning, 2013). During colonization, Britain awarded land to Ghanian groups which operated under a chieftaincy hierarchical system (McGadney-Douglas and Ahadzie, 2008). However, numerous regional groups throughout Ghana did not ascribe to such a hierarchical system and were not awarded land by Britain. Britain's indirect rule system empowered four groups with chiefs and subsumed 12 groups without. Britain's colonial practices led to long-standing grievances with respect to

land ownership and discrimination against chiefless groups in the country. Groups organized under a chieftaincy system came to be referred to as “majority” groups, while chiefless groups came to be referred to as “minority” groups.

The Nawuri were subsumed under the Gonja as a result of this colonialist policy (Mbowura, 2014). In April 1991, a long-standing grievance over land ownership came to a head when the Gonjaland Youth Association arranged to hold a conference in the territory of Kpandai. The Nawuri protested. The District Security Committee (DISEC) conducted a security assessment and provided recommendations based on its findings that violence was a very plausible likelihood. A sub-committee was created, per recommendations by DISEC, with the goal of resolving land right claims over Kpandai. During the committee meeting in Tamale with Gonja and Nawuri leaders the conference was barred from occurring in Kpandai and individuals were barred from possessing arms and ammunition in the Kpandai area. Police conducted searches and seized weapons from homes in the area (Mbowura, 2014). In spite of security precautions, violence started between the two groups, with street fights that the police struggled to contain. Between April 1991 and May 1992, the Gonja and Nawuri took turns running the other out of Kpandai. The final phase of the fighting saw Gonja fail to regain and re-occupy Kpandai, and the Nawuri ultimately massacring the Gonja as the police looked on unable to stop the violence (Mbowura, 2014). By the end of the conflict near 100 people died, 323 houses burned, and two tractors, a corn mill, a flourmill, and various vehicles belonging to the Nawuri and the Gonja were destroyed (Mbowura 2014; Ampiah 1991: part I, 37; Daily Graphic 1992, 25th May Issue; Gonja Memorandum 1994: Appendix II, 3)

In 1993, Konkomba and Mossi war broke out (Debrah et al., 2016). On January 31, 1994, the Konkomba-Nanumba war started and proved to be even more significant (ibid). This war is

also referred to as the “Guinea Fowl War.” The Konkomba-Nanumba war can be better understood with the added context of Ghana’s colonialist history. The Konkombas were the largest of groups without a chief (Mahama, 2003). In 1994, at the market a Konkomba man (minority group) fought with a Nanumba man (majority group) over the purchase of a guinea fowl. The Nanumba man was killed, the Konkomba man ran to his village, started a war chant, and the market was rushed (Apt et al., 2004). This war resulted in approximately 2,000 deaths, 230,000 people displaced, and the destruction of more than 500 villages (Debrah et al.2016; Tonah, 2012; Brukum 2001; Awedoba 2009; Mahama 2003). Women were the most significantly internally displaced persons as a result of this fighting (Apt et al. 2004). Additionally, in 2001 and 2002, violence was seen between Mamprusis and Kusasis, in response to local elections and the appointment of a new mayor (Debrah et al. 2016; Lund, 2003).

Cameroon’s experience with conflict

Cameroon’s history with conflict has been comprised of a combination of intra-state conflict in the Anglophone crisis as well as inter-state conflict in the Bakassi conflict with Nigeria, and attacks from Boko Haram. The Bakassi conflict arose over the contested territory of borderland between Cameroon and Nigeria extending between Lake Chad and the Gulf of Guinea in particular when it became known that there were oil and gas deposits (Baye, 2010). Nigeria occupied the territory in 1993 with military which led to violence and deaths of Nigerians and Cameroonians. Cameroon as a result submitted the matter of the border disputes to the International Court of Justice in order to reach a resolution (Baye, 2010). In 2002, the ICJ ruled in favor of Cameroon and by August 2008 Nigeria had completed the withdrawal of its troops (ICJ, 2002).

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest regions started in 2016 when peaceful protests by striking lawyers were held calling for linguistic reforms in the country, specifically full restoration of the Common Law system and demand for federalism (Bone, 2021). Gendarmes responded violently to the peaceful march, which led to violent clashes. Shortly after, teachers went on strike as well protesting a lack of Anglophone teachers. Again, protestors faced a violent response from police and military. In late November 2016, a student protest was violently suppressed as well. Violent clashes continued, resulting in the government entering negotiations, however in January 2017 negotiations failed (International Crisis Group, 2017). The government's violent response spurred many in the Anglophone regions to adopt a separatist position, but there are now multiple factions of the divided movement (Bone, 2021). This conflict has continued on past the time of Cameroon's NAP adoption in 2017.

Boko Haram is a terrorist group that started in Nigeria. Boko Haram has been described by Walter Gam Nkwi as "an ultra-violent social movement that has deep roots in the social and economic marginalization of a large section of Nigeria's northern population" (2013). Boko Haram's main objectives according to Nkwi are "to do away with anything pro-Western." Cameroon and Nigeria's shared border is the location where Boko Haram has established a strong presence (Nkwi, 2013). In 2014, the group conducted armed attacks in northern Cameroon but Cameroonian, Chadian, and Nigerian forces responded successfully to the incursion and by early 2015 defeated Boko Haram which led to subsequent asymmetric warfare by the terrorist group (Rackley, 2017). In response to recurring attacks, the Cameroonian government mobilized a significant military presence in the Far North region which led to human rights abuses and considerable distrust between the northern Muslim populations and the Cameroonian military

(Rackley, 2017). The ongoing violence and government response has exacerbated vulnerabilities and worsened an already suffering socio-economic situation in the region. In January 2017, the year of Cameroon's NAP adoption, the Far North region of Cameroon was host to over 191,000 internally displaced persons, 23,000 unregistered refugees, and 35,000 Cameroonians who returned from Nigeria (Rackley, 2017).

While each country faced different experiences in terms of its history with conflict, that experience likely impacted their approach and considerations within its NAP process. In the context of Ghana's conflict, which was intra-state primarily driven by lasting colonial impacts, Ghanaian women were disproportionately displaced internally within the country during times of violence. Ghana's experience likely impacted its choice to include the following specific objective within its NAP: "Protect the rights and safety of women and girls displaced" (2010, p.13). Cameroon, on the contrary, has had a more recent history in dealing with conflict that has involved border disputes, intra-state divisions, and terrorism. Recent acts of terrorism in the country have frequently seen girls and young women as the targets of choice, and terrorists' use of the borders have required countries to work together to facilitate coordinated responses to attacks. This reality is reflected in the content of Cameroon's NAP which takes into account its shared borders with six neighboring countries and how issues with Boko Haram, and other conflicts, have led to mass movements of people from Cameroon and neighboring countries. This reality is reflected in Cameroon's NAP as it highlights priority areas for humanitarian resources. This highlights how countries' lived experiences of conflict have shaped the way they have approached their NAP drafting process.

Ghana NAP Content

Ghana developed its NAP in 2010, but it was not launched until 2012 (Peace Women). This NAP is 35 pages and is considered to be specific on 5 of 9 criteria according to content analysis using the criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (2014). The NAP makes references to NGOs that contributed their input, including women's groups and faith-based organizations. Specifically, Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-Africa) and the Women's Peacemakers Program of West Africa Network for Peacebuilding were noted as CSOs that contributed to NAP development (Ghana NAP). Additionally, the lead Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs held a consultative forum in 2009 to allow stakeholders an opportunity to participate in the process (Peace Women). However, CSO involvement in implementation and monitoring aspects of the plans noted in the NAP are vague. The NAP is organized by three pillars of Protection, Participation, and Prevention under each of these three sections are objective outcomes, outputs, corresponding strategies, activities, indicators, stakeholders, partners, and timelines. The specified objective outcomes include the following: increasing awareness of needs of women in peace operations; protecting the rights and safety of women and girls displaced; protecting human rights of women and girls by fighting impunity and prosecuting sex and gender based violence (SGBV) crimes; increasing the deployment of women by 30% over current level in peace operations (timeline specifies this begin in 2012); increase women's participation to ensure increased recruitment, retention, and advancement of women in security institutions; mainstreaming peace and security into work of women's groups and institutions; raising awareness and sensitize stakeholders for zero tolerance of SGBV; promoting measures to prevent the misuse of illegal small arms; instituting mechanism for preventing and responding to conflict and violence against women; building culture of peace and non-violence

(Ghana NAP). Each of these objectives includes a number of corresponding specific indicators as well as timelines, but financial allocation specifics are lacking completely with a blank appendix budget.

Table 5.2: Ghana: Content Analysis Criteria & Text in Ghana's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	(2010) 2012	Not rated	
Timeframe of adoption	2012-2014	Not rated	
Number of pages in NAP	35	Not rated	
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	Ministry of Women and Children Affairs	Specific +1	“Therefore, since 2008, Ghana, through the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, began the process of developing a National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 in collaboration with other Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) as well as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).”
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	Repeated reference to civil society organizations, none are explicitly identified.	Not specific 0	“Therefore, since 2008, Ghana, through the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs, began the process of developing a National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 in collaboration with other Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) as well as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).”
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	The Ghana NAP implementation is organized around the three pillars of Protection, Participation, and Prevention. The implementation timeline is established from the 2012-2014 time period. Under each of those pillars the NAP details output objectives identified to help achieve the goal of the	Specific +1	“Output Objective: Increase the level of deployment of women to peace support operations by 30% over current level. Timeframe: 2012”

	respective pillar. Each of the noted output objectives have a noted timeframe.		
4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned	Each of the noted output objectives has a corresponding primary stakeholder/lead agency designated as well as “other partners” tasked with responsibility of objective implementation. However, for each and every output objective the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs is the sole designated lead agency. As such it seems probable that the designated “other partners” are likely the entities charged with addressing the objective and MoWAC is serving in a position of oversight.	Specific +1	<p>“Output Objective: Increase the level of deployment of women to peace support operations by 30% over current level. Primary Stakeholder/Lead Agency: Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs. Other Partners: Ministries of Interior and Defence; Parliament; CSOs; Security Sector Institutions (Customs, Immigration etc.) WIPSEN; FOSDA; WANEP KAIPTC DOVVSU”</p>
5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination	There is a designated portion of the NAP which includes an action plan specific to matters of coordination. There are corresponding output objectives, strategies, and specific activities noted.	Specific +1	<p>“Action Plan for Coordinating the Implementation of GHANAP 1325... Specific Activities: Establish a multisectoral working group on 1325.</p> <p>Develop terms of reference for working group.</p> <p>Launch of 1325 working group.</p> <p>Organise intensive training for working group.</p> <p>Develop a fundraising strategy for the implementation of GHANAP.:</p>
6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	The NAP makes references to the need for financial resources, makes reference to planning of fundraising efforts, and thanks donors for support. However, there	Not specific 0	<p>“The effective implementation of the National Action Plan is dependent on the following factors: } Allocation of financial</p>

	is no specific breakdown of financial responsibility or budgeting.		and material resources towards the implementation of the National Action Plan.”
7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	As previously noted, the NAP is organized according to the three pillars and corresponding output objectives are established under each of the pillars. Along with the output objectives and timeframe for implementation of each of those objectives there are also indicators noted for each.	Specific +1	<p>“Output Objective: Increase the level of deployment of women to peace support operations by 30% over current level.</p> <p>Indicators: Existence of a baseline study on Ghanaian women’s participation in PSOs; and the type of functions they perform while in missions.</p> <p>Number of institutional PSO policies reviewed and the extent of gender-sensitivity evidenced by the changes in the level of women’s participation in PSOs.</p> <p>Number and percentage of women involved in PSOs and their level of involvement in strategic positions and units.</p>
8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	The NAP recognizes the need for and importance of a reporting system but does not establish a specific monitoring entity. Instead that is one of the goals of the NAP’s implementation.	Not specific 0	<p>“Output Objective: Strengthen institutional and national capacities to monitor the implementation of GHANAP 1325.</p> <p>Specific Activities: Establish a national monitoring committee”</p>
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	The NAP does not explicitly establish a process or mode for civil society monitoring. It does make reference to CSOs as an “other partner” tied to the output objective of establishing an effective reporting system. Though as noted earlier, no specific CSOs entities are identified within the NAP.	Not specific 0	<p>“Output Objective: Ensure transparency and accountability for 1325 through an effective reporting system. Other partners: SSIs, Ministries of Defence, Interior and Information; CSOs MLGRD; District</p>

			Assemblies; Local Govt. Service
TOTAL: 5/9			

Ghana: Poor Fit, Moderate Pull, Strong Push

In considering the fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of Ghana, I find 1325 is a poor fit. The history of gendered military policy in Ghana begins with the first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who took steps to promote equality within the armed forces by creating the Directorate of Women's Auxiliary Corps in 1964. However, it was disbanded in 1966 following the overthrow of Nkrumah (Franks, 2013). Since 1966, no other unit has been created to address women's affairs or to promote their representation, but women were accepted in 1964 as telephonists and signalers and as of 2013, women served in support services in almost all units except infantry (Franks, 2013.). In 1992 the constitution included a number of guarantees tied to women's right to full and equal participation in the armed forces to include the following: 1) no discrimination based on gender; 2) paid maternity leave and childcare; 3) equal rights to training and promotion; 4) state will take steps to ensure full integration of women into the mainstream of economic development of Ghana (Franks, 2013.). On paper women are not excluded from participation in any units or from applying to job advertisements, but because the women lack experience and involvement in roles specific to combat, they lack the necessary skills and training that would allow them to perform these roles (Franks, 2013). Ghanaian women did not participate in peacekeeping operations until 1984, and even then, a single nurse was sent to assist in Lebanon. After this in, 1986 under Jerry Rawlings administration, all women were banned from participating in peacekeeping missions. Just shy of ten years later, in 1994 still during Rawlings' tenure, a mixed gender infantry

company of rifle soldiers was sent to serve in Rwanda and ever since then the participation of women has gradually improved (Franks, 2013.).

According to the Gender Inequality Index, Ghana has a low score for gender equality, and this is bolstered by Ghanaian women's interpretations of gender inequality in the country as well. A study of Ghanaian women's voices and interpretations of the gender inequality they regularly experience highlighted that traditional social values that shaped gender roles were in conflict the expectations of modern society (Soussou, 2011). The study explored women's perceptions surrounding gender equality specific to political and decision-making realms in Ghana. Soussou found that women were largely dominated and oppressed in Ghana, lagging behind men in all sectors, relegated to inferior status, taught to be obedient and to respect elders, subjected to an education gap that widened as grade levels increased, and were underrepresented in office as well as political organizations (2011) In evaluating the history of gendered military policy as well the history of gender inequality, Ghana was determined to be a poor-fit.

There is moderate pull pressure at play from the domestic level in the case of Ghana. While civil society in the form of women's groups exerted strong pull pressure, pressure exerted domestically in the form of local level bureaucrats and public officials as well as national level policymakers was determined to be weak. Women's groups were considered to be a strong element of domestic pressure in the lead-up to NAP adoption for a number of reasons. Abantu for Development, an NGO created in 1998 with offices based in Ghana and Nigeria, was established to work on matters of gender justice and policy advocacy. The policy advocacy and research elements of the NGO led to the creation of the "Women's Manifesto for Ghana" in 2004 as well as the formation of a coalition focused on getting women into parliament. Since 2003, the NGO has hosted a biennial conference of district assemblywomen and an interparty caucus to

advocate for women's participation. Abantu's efforts led to the creation of a broader CSO coalition with NGOs to work on disseminating the manifesto. The manifesto demands the achievement of equality and highlighted that there had been insufficient attention given to matters critical to women paired with underrepresentation in politics, policy, decision-making, and public life (Manifesto, 2004). The manifesto was drafted over the course of three drafting meetings between February 2004 and April 2004 in consultation with 180 district assemblywomen from 110 districts and NGOs and CSOs. This initial draft was then used in further consultation countrywide in coordination with men and women from the media and senior executives from key ministries and agencies (Manifesto, 2004). The manifesto detailed gender analysis, demands to the government, and guidance for advocacy across ten themes specific to women that Ghana needed to address: 1) economic empowerment; 2) land; 3) social policy and social development; 4) politics, decision-making, and public life; 5) human rights and the law; 6) discriminatory cultural practices; 7) media; 8) conflict and peace; 9) special needs; 10) institutions of mandate to promote women's rights (Manifesto, 2004). In addition to civil society's robust efforts in developing this manifesto, the Women Peace and Security Network (WISPEN) was established in Ghana in May 2006. WISPEN self-described as "a women-focused, women-led Pan-African NGO with the core mandate of promoting women's strategic participations and leadership in peace and security governance in Africa." WISPEN was specifically focused on furthering UNSCR 1325 and took steps to focus on women in serving in the traditionally male security sector in Ghana. WISPEN develop a Women in Security Bulletin that profiled and brought attention to women serving in these sectors, and brought together the different security sector associations of women colleagues including Ghana Police Ladies Association, Fire Service Ladies Association of Ghana, Prison Ladies Association, Custom

Ladies Association of Ghana, and Immigration Ladies Association of Ghana. In the years leading up to NAP adoption, Ghanaian women's groups were laying significant ground work in normalizing women in security roles and establishing the need for a greater focus on women. The activeness of women's groups in this effort is an example of the logic of consequences via domestic institutions seen through civilian population exerting pressure on domestic government to work on addressing the needs as established within the manifesto.

However, these efforts were not aided by a robust representation of women serving in local level roles nor national level policymaker roles. At the local level in the years leading up to NAP adoption, the number of women serving in local assemblies between 2002 and 2008 was low.

Table 5.3: Women in Local Assemblies between 2002 and 2008 in Greater Accra District

District	Total #	Elected	Appointed	Total %
Accra Metro Area	102	10	12	22%
Tema Municipal	79	6	8	18%
Ga West	41	1	6	17%
Dangme East	52	3	4	13%
Dangme West	52	4	5	17%
Greater Accra	326	24	35	18%

Source: Odame, Felicia. "WOMEN IN POLITICS IN GHANA: A Study on Local Government in the Greater Accra Region." 2010. Odame compiled chart data from records in the various District Assemblies in 2005.

Though there is a low number of women serving in local level roles within the capital area this level of representation outpaces women's representation country-wide at the district level historically. Abakah's (2018) work, provides an overview of data that shows the trend of modest

increases of women's participation in elections with even more modest electoral gains country-wide.

Table 5.4: Women Representation in District Assembly Elections in Ghana 1994 through 2015

Year	Contested			Elected				
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Percentage	Male	Percentage	Total
1994	N/A	N/A	NA	122	2.9	4,082	97.1	4,204
1998	547	14,696	15,243	196	4.1	4,624	95.9	4,820
2002	965	12,625	13,590	341	7.4	4,241	92.6	4,582
2006	1,772	13,084	14,856	478	10.1	4,254	89.9	4,732
2010	1,376	15,939	17,315	412	7.95	5,681	92.05	6,093
2015	1,182	17,756	18,938	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: From Abakah, Ellen. 2018. "Participation without a voice? Rural women's experiences and participation in local government activities in the Abura-asebu-Kwamankese district of Ghana." Adapted from ABANTU (2013) and Agyare-Kwabi (2013) Agyare-Kwabi, P. (2013). Policy brief gender, social inclusion (GESI) and education in Ghana. Accra: STAR Ghana.), Ofei-Aboagye (2000) Ofei-Aboagye, E. (2000). *Promoting the participation of women in local governance and development: The case of Ghana*. Netherlands: European Centre for Development Policy Management.

In addition to the low level of participation of women in the local level districts country-wide, women are also hindered in their participation as decision-makers locally in traditional societies. Women are expected to serve in complementary or subordinate capacities to their male colleagues and only become substantive leaders when there are no available men (Odame, 2014). In Ghana in matrilineal societies in the south, women are encouraged to some degree to participate in decision-making roles, but their counterparts in the northern part of Ghana from patrilineal societies are much more constrained, highlighting that cultural belief systems are another factor at play in the country that is impacting the participation of women and their

ultimate capacity to the local level (Odame, 2014). In consideration of the limited participation of women in local level decision-making positions and a limited capacity in traditional societal decision-making positions, Ghana is considered to have weak pressure resonating from this factor of the domestic realm.

Similar to the limited participation of women at the local level within decision-making roles women have had limited presence at the national level within the parliament in the years prior to NAP adoption.

Table 5.5: Percent of Women Serving in Ghanaian Parliament 2007 through 2010

Year	Percent of Women in Parliament
2007	10.9%
2008	7.9%
2009	8.3%
2010	8.3%

Source: Data from worldbank.org/indicators; Inter-Parliamentary Union archive <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm>

The lack of participation at the national level is consistent with Sossou's findings that Ghanaian women perceive that they are relegated to the background in politics, that they face significant cultural, education, and financial barriers to participation in politics, and that when they do participate, they tend to occupy lower positions within their political parties which in turn limits their capacity to run for higher office (Sossou, 2011). Thus, national policymakers are considered to exert only weak pressure within the domestic realm. In evaluating the three contributing factors to domestic pressure, while civil society via women's groups certainly exerted strong pressure domestically in the years leading up to NAP adoption, the weakness of local level and

national level policymakers lead to the factor of domestic pressure being deemed moderate overall.

In the case of Ghana, there is strong push pressure at play from the international level. Peer pressure, in this case, comes from a number of factors including peer pressure from the number of countries which adopted NAPs prior to Ghana as well as involvement in regional organizations with partner countries like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. In addition to peer pressure, whether or not a country is vying for a Security Council seat and its UN financial standing are all considered as elements of push pressure emanating from the international level.

Ghana is unique in that it developed its NAP in 2010 but did not launch it until 2012. 35 countries adopted and launched their NAPs prior to 2012; of those, 18 countries had adopted NAPs prior to 2010 (Peace Women). Among those 18 countries that adopted prior to Ghana in 2010, were 5 other ECOWAS countries including Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Peace Women).

In September 2010, ECOWAS held a three-day conference of its members to develop an ECOWAS Plan of Action on UNSCR 1325, the Dakar Declaration, which served as a general NAP for its member countries. The Declaration created a deadline was created for ECOWAS member states to develop a NAP by December 2010 if they had not already developed one (Dakar Declaration, 2010). This deadline likely created a significant impetus for Ghana to complete its NAP by the end of the year, but also likely indicates that while it was down on paper, it may not have been ready for execution, which is why 2012 was its ultimate time of implementation. In reviewing the content of both Ghana's NAP and the ECOWAS Action Plan, similarities in content emerge. While the action plan was only 14 pages and provided an

overview, it seems Ghana borrowed from the ECOWAS plan to develop its own. Specifically, Ghana's NAP also organizes its content according to the pillars of Protection, Participation, and Prevention, it has similar focus areas like increasing awareness of the needs of women, protecting women and girls' rights, fighting impunity, raising awareness and sensitize stakeholders, as well as the specific call for a 30% increase of women's participation in peace operations. This is an example of reputation as a source of influence under both the logic of consequences as well as the logic of appropriateness. This was an opportunity for Ghana to signal to its regional partners that it could cooperate with ECOWAS partners in order to ensure future cooperation with ECOWAS partners; however, it was also an opportunity for Ghana to signal shared identity with its partner countries and present Ghana as affirming women's rights. This is an example of mixed reputational motivations, and both considerations were important to Ghana's decision to move ahead with NAP adoption.

In addition to Ghana's membership in ECOWAS, it is also a member of the African Union which also attended and participated in the Dakar Declaration Conference from September 15 through 17, 2010. The African Union (AU) was deemed to be in charge of the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Dakar Declaration, so in addition to the pressure ECOWAS exerted on Ghana there was an added layer of pressure now from AU in order to develop a NAP. The leading recommendation that came out of the conference was that, "Member States of the West African Region that have not yet done so should, before December 210, elaborate a national plan of action on the implementation of resolution 1325 with the financial support of the United Nations" (Dakar Declaration, 2010). This is an example of coercion as a source of influence und the logic of consequences. As an AU member, Ghana

could risk losing the benefits it enjoys as a member of the AU if it were to fail to comply if the organization is in charge of monitoring and evaluation of implementation.

Ghana was not vying for a Security Council seat in the years leading up to its 2010/2012 NAP adoption, but it had been serving in a seat through January 2008. Ghana was in arrears for its annual dues in 2009 in the amount of \$97,435 and again in 2010 in the amount of \$129, 876 (UN GA). Being shamed by the UN via the arrears list and at risk of losing its General Assembly vote, is an additional example of coercion as an influence on Ghana at this point in time. In consideration of Ghana's membership in ECOWAS and the AU, the timing of the Dakar Declaration paired with being behind in UN dues on the heels of the country's time as a Security Council member, Ghana was under strong international pressure to adopt a NAP and fall in line with its international partners. The result seems to be a rushed NAP document that borrowed heavily from its experience in workshops and the resultant Dakar Declaration to meet the deadline, but in practice the country was not prepared to execute, likely on account of a poor fit as reflected by its gender inequality and a lack of domestic pressure and motivation.

Ghana is a case a poor fit, moderate pull, and strong push. The key variable of interest, women's participation in local level and national level politics, is weak in the case of Ghana. In the next section, Cameroon provides a case study of a poor fit, strong pull, and negligible push. In this case, the key variable of interest has a strong presence as reflected by strong participation of women at the local level of politics and moderate participation of women at the national level.

Cameroon NAP Content

Cameroon developed its NAP in November 2017. This NAP is 122 pages and achieves specificity on 7 of 9 criteria according to the content analysis criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. A unique aspect of Cameroon's NAP process was the development of a

national survey which was used to determine the level of domestic knowledge of 1325 that focused on questions related to conflict, violence, role of women, peace, and 1325 itself. The survey found 72% of respondents in Cameroon had a low level of knowledge regarding the UN Security Council Resolution. The NAP establishes four goal effects, each with corresponding outputs, and an extensive list of output activities, to be attained by 2020 in Cameroon. The four specified effects include the following: 1) Leadership and participation of women in process of prevention and management of conflict and post-conflict situations, construction of peace and social cohesion is increased; 2) Protection of the rights of women and girls, including against sexual and sexist violence in periods of peace, conflict, and post conflicts is ensured; 3) Better integration of ‘gender’ dimension in emergency aid, reconstruction during and after armed conflicts and in the treatment of the past is ensured; 4) Institutional, quantitative, and qualitative data collection tool mechanisms on the implications of women in peace, security conflict prevention, and resolution programs are strengthened (Cameroon NAP, 2017, pp.45-53). Each of these effects’ corresponding outputs have an extensive list of activities covering a number of topic areas and efforts. The following includes a small number of the specified activities detailed in the NAP: 200 security forces trained on rights of women; 20 Husbands’ Schools created to educate on women’s health and needs; produce 100 radio programs on living together and 152 programs on SGBV; train 200 peer educators; adopt measures to strengthen participation of women in command and decision making positions in military; train 500 women as mediators and negotiators; political dialogue tables should include 30% women; zero-tolerance policy for sex violence and harassment in the army; 50 training sessions for women to trace antipersonnel mines (Cameroon NAP). In addition to the extensive and specific activities included in the NAP, civil society organizations, both domestic and international, were explicitly noted for their

involvement in the NAP preparation process, including WILPF Cameroon. This NAP also ensures a comprehensive timeline and financial allocation details. Each noted activity has a specified timeline and corresponding cost, and established that whichever department is responsible for a specific activity is in turn responsible for the associated cost. Furthermore, coordination is established for a national level inter-ministerial committee, as well as requirements for local level meetings that must then report up to the national level.

Table 5.6: Cameroon: Content Analysis Criteria & Text in Cameroon's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	2017	Not rated	
Timeframe of adoption	2018-2020	Not rated	
Number of pages in NAP	122	Not rated	
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Family	Specific +1	"The process of drafting the present plan of action was piloted by the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and the Family, with support of concern public administrations, civil society organizations, and development partners, mainly UN Women."
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	The final pages of the NGO list the "drafting team" comprised of individuals, their associated organizations and it also list different civil society entities involved.	Specific +1	"-Civil Society: ALVF, ACAFEJ, CIPCRE, CIDIMUC, NGO-WILPF Cameroon"
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	There is an appendix within the NAP which outlines outputs, corresponding main activities, a designated budget, and a timeframe for implementation within the 2018-2020 timeframe, as well as specific location of implementation, and highlight partners for implementation of output.	Specific +1	"Output 1.1: The representation of women in high-ranking decision-making positions in civilian and military life is improved. Specific activities: ii. Adopt measures aimed at strengthening the participation of women

			in command and decision-making positions in the army, the gendarmerie, and the police. Period: 2018, 2019, 2020.”
4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned	The appendix within the NAP outlines outputs, corresponding main activities, budget and timeline, while it does designate “partners” associated with those outputs it does not establish a clear responsible entity. Furthermore, the same list of “partners” is utilized for every output. The listed partners could be described more as categories than specific entities.	Not specific 0	“Partners: Administrations CSO United Nations Bilateral and multilateral cooperation Private Sector”
5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination	Section 5 of the NAP is titled: Mechanism for the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of Implementation. This section specifically addresses the matter of coordination and includes specific plans for coordination.	Specific +1	“The Committee made up of 20 members...The committee meets once a year and technical secretariat is ensured by the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and the family...divisional and sub-divisional units are placed under the authority of regional Governors, Senior Divisional Officers and Divisional Officers, respectively. They are in charge of monitoring the implementation of the plan in their area of competence, centralizing information at local level and transmitting it to the national coordination unit. The members the local equivalents of the concerned administrations. They meet once a term.”

6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	There is an appendix within the NAP which outlines outputs, corresponding main activities, a designated budget, and a timeframe for implementation within the 2018-2020 timeframe, as well as specific location of implementation, and highlight partners for implementation of output.	Specific +1	“Output 1.3: The participation of women in peace construction, keeping and consolidation operations (civilian and military aspects), including in international and regional organizations is strengthened. Main activities: Train 500 women as mediators and negotiators... Unitary cost: Workshop (10) Total cost (per unit): 5,000,000 Total Cost: 50,000,000”
7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	The appendix within the NAP notes specific indicators linked to the noted outputs.	Specific +1	“Output 1.1- The representation of women in high-ranking decision-making positions in civilian and military life is improved. Indicator 1.2- Proportion of women in civilian and military decision-making positions Base: AD; Target: + 10%”
8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	Within Section 5 of the NAP coordination and monitoring procedures are detailed.	Specific +1	“The national technical coordination is presided over by the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and the family. It is in charge of: The monitoring of the implementation of the plan; The collection of information on the level of implementation of the provisions in relationship with the 1325 focal points...The preparation of quarterly, biannual and yearly reports.”
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	“Civil Society” is noted as a member of the Interministerial Committee tasked with monitoring NAP implementation, but it	Not specific 0	“The interministerial committee is made up of 20 members including Secretaries General... National

	is never made explicit who specifically is expected to occupy that role.		Committee of Human Rights, Civil Society, the United Nation, the Private Sector, Multilateral Cooperation.”
TOTAL: 7/9			

Cameroon: Poor Fit, Strong Pull, Negligible Push

In considering the fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of Cameroon, 1325 is a poor fit as with Ghana. In terms of the gendered military policy history in Cameroon, the Army was created in 1959 and in 1960 came under the president’s control. No formal law banned women from participating nor barred them from combat; in fact, the existing policy noted ‘open to both sexes,’ but it was not until 1984 that women were recruited into rank-and-file roles as well as admitted into the military academy (Munge and Kewir-Kiven, 2015). As of 2014, women constituted 10% of the army and only 2% of leadership positions. In 1997, women were integrated into the Rapid Intervention Battalion, but no women have been recruited to the high-risk combat force since 2000. Many women who previously reported to the battalion opted to leave, and it has been an all-male force since 2014 (Ibid). Munge and Kewir-Kiven conducted an in-depth study of female Cameroonian soldiers in 2014 and found that the army in Cameroon continues to be a male-dominated space that poses unique challenges to women’s participation and shapes female soldier’s views on the appropriate roles of women. None of the study participants had served in combat roles, and some characterized such positions as ‘not good for women.’ Participants agreed females need to work harder than men, there are gendered responsibilities, accusations of sexual promiscuity are made, servicemen think females require assistance in all physical tasks, but that supportive leadership and mentoring can be very helpful. Overall, while Cameroon’s military policy has not been

explicitly restrictive the traditionally masculine security sector has proved difficult for women to gain entry to in an equitable capacity.

According to the Gender Inequality Index, Cameroon has low gender equality consistent with evidence of its gendered security sector. According to the Borgen Project, Cameroon is shaped by patriarchal norms that have been a detriment to girls' education as girls face disproportionate discrimination, sexual harassment, and violence. In addition to gender inequality at play in education, women suffer under other patriarchal norms to include restrictions in executing a divorce, forced child marriage, and a lack of access to legal support from the government. While there are technically laws on the books that should address these matters the fact that men dominate the courts and have even created civil statutes to get around certain laws serve as further detriment to the possibility of gender equality (UN Foundation). In evaluating the gendered military policy as well as the history of gender inequality in Cameroon, I determined Cameroon was a poor fit.

There is strong pull pressure from the domestic level at play in Cameroon based on an analysis of the strength of women's groups, local level bureaucrats and decision-makers, and national level policymakers. As a part of the NAP development process in Cameroon, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Cameroon chapter was integral to the process. According to an interview with Paulette Beat, an officer with UN Women and member of WILPF's Cameroon chapter, in approximately 2013, WILPF contacted UN Women to start the NAP development process for Cameroon (personal communication, 5/7/2020). Beat further noted that WILPF and UN Women brought on the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and later the Ministry of Defence to be involved in the NAP process. This is an example of the logic of appropriateness in the form of legitimacy, reputation and even capacity. Cameroon,

certainly its civil society entities, recognized the legitimacy of the UN and UNSCR 1325, its active WILPF chapter sought on its own accord to pursue compliance with the resolution ahead of government buy in, and WILPF promptly brought in UN Women, which can be seen as a capacity multiplier in this instance. This example speaks to my earlier point that in this project, capacity likely bears little weight on whether or not a state adopts a NAP initially, but is more likely to impact the content of the NAP. In this case, WILPF Cameroon would likely have continued with its NAP process even if UN Women was unable to lend assistance. The government paired with WILPF underwent an extensive educational campaign and study which speaks to the country's reputational goals of improving its relationship and standing in relation to gender equality.

In October 2014, WILPF held a workshop with the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and later a retreat with Servitas Cameroon (Peace Women). That same October, WILPF launched an extensive country study to gauge the understanding and knowledge of UNSCR 1325 which was used to shape the approach to the NAP development. In November 2015, a calendar of activities to achieve in the NAP was developed with the assistance of the Swedish peace agency, Folk Bernadette Academy (wilpf.org). WILPF played an extensive role in the preparation and drafting of the NAP through the development and execution of its study the result was a significant piece of the NAP. In addition to WILPF, a number of other civil society organizations were noted in the NAP for their contributions including the Association to Fight Violence Against Women (ALVF), Cameroon Association of Female Jurists (ACAFEJ), and the International Circle for the Promotion of Creation (CIPCRE). ALVF was created in 1991 by 7 Cameroonian feminists to provide counseling, education, public information and awareness, lobbying/advocacy with partners, studies on SGBV, and training of social workers. There are

four offices in Yaoundé, Maroua, Douala, and Bafoussam (plateforme-elsa.org). ACAFEJ was established to contribute to Cameroonian law in particular those laws that pertain to statutes of women and children, combat gender discrimination, and provide legal consultations for women (web-africa.org/acafej). CIPCRE was created in the 1990s for the promotion of faith dialogue and social transformation (paxchristi.net/member-organizations/Cameroon/173). While these three CSOs were noted for their involvement, WILPF was evidently the most prominent CSO entity involved in the process and specifically advocated most vocally for the 1325 NAP. These three other CSO entities generally were working toward women's rights and equality noted in the NAP, but specific contributions are unknown and unclarified in the document. They seem to have had a long-term presence in the country focused on their specific goals, so overall I find there to have been strong pressure at the domestic level emanating from civil society via women's groups.

Cameroon has seen significant efforts to increase the number of women serving in local decision-making positions in the last ten years. In 2009, women made up approximately only 1.5% of local councilors and 3.9% of mayor/chairperson positions across the 10 regions and 360 councils in the country (CLGF, 2018). An extensive effort to train women to pursue running for local office that combined international, national, and local level entities working towards the agenda of increasing women's participation began in 2013. The Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), a non-profit international development organization, started a Women in Power campaign in 2012 and was aiding in hosting training sessions for women in Cameroon ahead of the 2013 elections (Adewunmi, 2013). The Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Family created a manual for women to educate them about politics and increase their participation, the ministry released this manual about 3 weeks prior to the 2013 elections in addition to hosting

training workshops for women interested in politics (Zih Fon, 2013). The Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMISUND) worked with VSO in Cameroon to mobilize women and minority candidates for local councilor positions in 2013 (Adewunmi, 2013). Following the 2013 elections, women's representation jumped to 28% among councilors and 9% of mayor/chairperson roles (CLGF, 2018). The results of this election and the widely publicized campaigns to increase women's participation indicate that Cameroonian efforts were a success and bolstered the representation of women at the local levels. This highlights the growing and strong presence of pressure from the domestic level via local level decision-makers in the years leading up to NAP adoption. Paulette Beat contends that even with this growth in women's participation at the local level it was not significant enough to influence the NAP process (personal communication, 5/7/2020). Beat explained that throughout the local level within Anglophone provinces any were unfamiliar with 1325 as seen with the survey results. However, Beat noted that many of these provinces, upon learning about 1325, were very supportive of it given their experiences of unrest in their regions as well as the influx of refugees from conflicts in Central African Republic, Chad, and Nigeria. So civilians rather than the local level politicians drove support for 1325.

2013 also saw a significant increase in the representation of women at the national level of policymaking. Prior to the 2013 election, women comprised just 13.9% of parliament, but this number jumped to 31.1% with the 2013 election, and women made up 26% of the Senate following the 2013 elections (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). In addition to the growth in the involvement of women at the national level, in 2011 the administration published the National Gender Policy Document for 2011-2020 noting six strategic areas to create an equitable and equal society for men and women. These six areas were education, health, economy and

employment, laws, governance, and the promotion of gender policies (National Gender Policy Document, 2011). While there was a significant increase in representation and a national administration buy-in to gender matters via the Gender Policy Document, in addition to the women's training manual, there had not been significant progress in the promotion and development of gender policies in the lead-up to NAP adoption, so the element of national level policymakers is deemed to be exerting only moderate pressure domestically. However, in consideration of the pressure exerted by civil society via women's groups, local level decision-makers, and national level policymakers, the domestic pull pressure is considered to be strong.

In the case of Cameroon, I found a negligible push pressure emanating from the international level. Peer pressure is one of the elements considered in the analysis of the push pressure, and in the context of Cameroon, that includes the number of countries which had adopted NAPs prior to Cameroon as well as the membership in regional organizations. 62 countries adopted NAPs in the years prior to Cameroon's 2017 adoption. Cameroon was not a member of ECOWAS like Ghana, but Cameroon was a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). In 2000, ECCAS created a Standing Advisory Committee on Security, including special peacekeeping forces, and was also in the early stages of developing early warning systems (Nduwimana, 2006). ECOWAS and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) at this time operated the most advanced warning systems on the continent, signaling ECCAS may be a bit behind on such efforts. Additionally, Cameroon joined the WILPF NGO international organization and established its own branch in 2014. In 2018 ECCAS had a 2-day workshop with the UN which led to the Central African Regional Action Plan for 1325 being endorsed on May 24, 2018 in Brazzaville, Congo. Cameroon participated via its WILPF branch which had been critical to their own country's NAP development and adoption

(Security Council 2018; Ndongmo). Both Cameroon and Ghana were members of regional organizations. Ghana belonged to ECOWAS and Cameroon was a member of ECCAS. These organizations' efforts specific to security and 1325 differ. ECOWAS had a specific focus on 1325, while ECCAS did not. So rather than ECCAS exerting pressure on Cameroon to institute a NAP, Cameroon seemed to be leading ECCAS' involvement as a region on 1325 and its steps to institute a regional action plan. Having had 62 countries adopt NAPs to include most ECOWAS countries likely created some impetus for Cameroon to adopt but not significant pressure, thus peer pressure in this instance was considered weak. Cameroon had been an elected member of the UN Security Council in 1974-1975 and again in 2002-2003, but was not actively vying for a Security Council seat in the lead-up to its NAP adoption. Additionally, Cameroon was in good financial standing on UN membership dues in the years leading up to NAP adoption (UN GA). In analyzing the various elements of the overall push pressure from the international level, I determined in the case of Cameroon to be negligible. In this case the logic of consequences seems to lack explanatory power. Neither coercion related to the potential of losing a vote within the UN General Assembly, nor reputational concerns related to future cooperation, nor domestic institutions seemed to wield influence in the case of Cameroon.

Conclusion




Figure 5.1: Modified Model Applied to Ghana

Ghana achieved compliance with UNSCR 1325 by developing and adopting a NAP domestically between 2010 and 2012. Its compliance could have been improved upon with greater detail in its NAP. However, its early compliance and moderate specificity likely aided in Ghana leading the top ten peacekeeping contributors in 2018 for the greatest proportion of female personnel (UN, 2018; Candela, 2018). 8.7% of Ghana's personnel were women in 2018, while Pakistan's personnel by comparison comprised of only .3% women. Pakistan was the top contributor of peacekeeping personnel overall in 2018.




Figure 5.2: Women in Peacekeeping a Status Report; Source: Candela, Kacie. 2018. *Women in Peacekeeping a Status Report*. The New Humanitarian

Analysis of Ghana's peacekeeping operations participation shows that the country saw 6.1% increase in women's participation in peacekeeping missions overall since its time of NAP adoption. Ghana saw 32% growth in women's participation within the expert role. Ghana saw a 6.1% decrease in women's participation within the role of police within peacekeeping missions in the same timeframe. Ghanaian troops saw a 5.5% increase in female participation, while modest in light of Ghana's poor fit and history of traditional gender roles, this increase indicates the gendering of roles may be breaking down to some extent. This is further bolstered by 2014 data which reflects women constituted 78.32% of peacekeeping police. This is certainly an outlier in the data and this number dropped off significantly following 2016, but the significant representation for a moment in time indicates that when there was a need, there was greater acceptance of women serving in this historically male role. The role of police prior to the NAP adoption had the most representation of women in comparison to the expert and troop roles. While there has been a modest decline in women's participation in the police role, women's

participation in the other roles has seen considerable growth in expert and staff officer roles and modest growth in the troop role.

UN data on staff officers, by gender, started being generated in 2017 so, as previously noted, this provides for a narrower window for consideration. In 2017, 10% of staff officer roles were filled by women. By 2021, 31.1% of staff officer roles were filled by women. The data shows a steady increase in women's participation in this role.




Figure 5.3: Percent of Ghanaian Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations Source: UN Gender Data




Figure 5.4: Modified Model Applied to Cameroon

In comparison, Cameroon took considerably longer to comply with UNSCR 1325, starting its process in 2012 and later developing and adopting a NAP in November 2017. However, while delayed, the NAP was much more specific in its content than was Ghana's. Analysis of Cameroon's peacekeeping operations show that country had a modest 4.5% increase in women's overall participation in peacekeeping missions between the time of NAP adoption and 2021. Cameroonian troops saw an 8.6% increase in women's participation. Cameroon saw a considerable 21.8% increase in women's participation in the expert role. There was a 4% decrease in women's participation in the police role.




Figure 5.5: Percent of Cameroonian Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations Source: UN Gender Data

Paired Comparison

These two countries were used to develop a paired case study because while both are top contributors to peace operations with similarly low ratings on gender equality from the same geographic region, they differ on degree of women in parliament, early versus late adoption, and the participation of WILPF in the NAP process. My expectation with respect to these cases was that given that Ghana adopted earlier, it likely experienced greater domestic and international pressure. Also, given that Cameroon had greater representation of women politically as well as the integral participation of WILPF in its process, my expectations was its NAP would achieve greater specificity and in turn result in greater growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions.

Both countries were deemed a poor fit for UNSCR 1325, but each country experienced a different degree of pressure based on the applied model. Ghana did in fact experience greater

pressure collectively in comparison to Cameroon: Ghana experienced strong international pressure and moderate domestic pressure, while Cameroon experienced negligible international pressure and strong domestic pressure. As expected, Cameroon did have a more specific NAP; however, based on information obtained via interview with Paulette Beat WILPF is likely more responsible for that end result rather than effort from women parliamentarians and women's groups. While it may be that the women's groups did the heavy lifting, I suspect that the women's groups' successful advocacy to parliamentarians improved the odds for successful government buy-in for the NAP process.

Both cases saw modest gains in the participation of women in peacekeeping missions overall. Not surprisingly, only modest gains have been seen in the peacekeeping troops as this is the most traditional male role of the various peacekeeping elements and women have likely had a more difficult time breaking into these roles on account of the historically gendered traditions of their countries. Also similarly, both countries saw a modest decline in women's participation in the police role while experiencing considerable growth in women's participation in the expert role. One point of distinction evident in the data is that while both countries saw growth in women's participation in the staff officer roles, Ghana's growth in this area far outpaced Cameroon's.

Both countries have made progress. Ghana as a top contributor of peacekeeping personnel has in recent years become the leading country among the top ten contributors, of female personnel. In the year that Cameroon finalized its NAP, it was the sixth leading country in terms of the percent of women deployed as military observers and staff officers. The long-term effects of its adoption remain to be seen, but this initial analysis suggests further growth of

women's participation, though I anticipate troops will continue to lag behind the other contingents of peacekeeping missions.

Expectations tested within this paired case study include the following:

In instance of policy misfit, a combination of sufficient pressure from the domestic and international must be present in order to achieve compliance

In instances of greater pressure, there will be greater compliance via earlier adoption and specificity

In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles

This paired case study supports the first and third expectations and provides some mixed support for the second. First, Ghana and Cameroon are both a poor fit, but both experienced a combination of pressure in pull and push form and ultimately adopted NAPs.

Second, Ghana had greater presence of pressure and adopted much earlier than Cameroon. However, when Cameroon did later adopt its NAP was much more specific in terms of content. Cameroon had negligible push pressure, but it still did ultimately achieve compliance though it was a late adopter. The presence of a strong pull pressure may have been a sufficient catalyst. Given the greater time and resources available to aid in the development of NAP content, it is not surprising that Cameroon's NAP was more specific, but this combination of outcome results in mixed support for this expectation.

Third, Ghana had a slightly greater score with respect to compliance with 2012 adoption and 5 out of 9 specificity, it achieved a compliance score of 30. Cameroon had 2017 adoption

and 7 out of 9 specificity, it achieved a compliance score of 28. Ghana saw 6.1% growth in women's participation within peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption and Cameroon saw 4.5% growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption.

This chapter explored the cases of two countries in Africa, which show variation with respect to women's participation in domestic politics at the local and national level. These cases also varied from the prior chapter by comparing cases of an early vs. late NAP adoption and the participation or lack thereof of WILPF. These cases also varied from the prior chapter in that they were examples of a bad fit. The next chapter, explores a new variable of interest not yet encompassed by the prior chapters: women as head of government prior to and or during the NAP adoption process. In none of the prior cases, has the country had a woman head of government prior to or during the period of NAP adoption.⁷

⁷ Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia currently have their first female head of government sitting in office. Both heads of government took their office after the countries adopted their NAPs.

Chapter 6: Chile and Brazil

This project so far has analyzed cases in the Balkans and in Africa, covered early adopters and late adopters, and highlighted the role of active women's groups and the role of women's participation within domestic legislative politics. This chapter focuses on South America and explores the role of female heads of government, each with personal lived experiences of violence at the hands of dictatorial regimes during their youth. The chapter analyzes each country's history with violent regimes and how those histories and their female heads of governments have impacted their paths to UNSCR 1325 implementation. I operationalize my chosen explanatory model through the comparison of the cases of Chile and Brazil. These two countries have high and very high development, are in the same geographic area, each adopted NAPs, each are consistent peacekeeping contributors, and both had a female head of government in the lead-up to NAP adoption; however, the countries vary on Gender Inequality Index ratings with Brazil lagging and also a later NAP adoption than Chile. One factor of particular interest which I expect to play an impactful role in this paired comparison is the role that the female heads of government played with respect to the NAP adoption. This comparison will highlight the differences which emerged in the content of NAPs and what role the matter of early versus late adoption has on NAP specificity as well as impacts on women's participation in peacekeeping missions. I expect that female heads of government were integral to NAP adoption and that earlier adoption will result in greater growth of women's participation in peacekeeping missions.

Table 6.1: Chile and Brazil Variables of Interest

Paired Countries	Variables of Interest	Pertinent Country Details
Chile and Brazil	<p>Early versus late adoption</p> <p>Female head of government</p>	<p><i>Chile:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high development • Consistent peacekeeping contributors • .359 GII (light green) • First Latin American Country to adopt • 2009 adoption • 4 NAP specificity <p><i>Brazil:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High development • Top 30 peacekeeping contributor • .414 GII (light red) • 2017 adoption • 3 NAP specificity

History of Sexualized Torture under Dictatorships

Both Chile and Brazil have a history of authoritarian military dictatorships in their recent pasts. Between 1973 and 1990, Chile was under military rule. In 1973, the Chilean armed forces, led by Army Commander in Chief Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and with US backing, executed a coup d'état ousting President Salvador Allende, who had won the presidential election in 1970. Allende died in the fighting at the presidential palace (Washington Post, 2000). During the 17-year dictatorship, it is estimated 40,018 people were killed, tortured, and imprisoned for political reasons (Associated press, 2011). 3,065 people were killed or disappeared. As a part of the campaign of fear and violence, the dictatorship sought to suppress women whom leaders felt should stay in the role of wife and mother. Women who partook in politics or were closely aligned with men who were active in politics were seen as enemies of the state. Women who belonged to left-wing political organizations and women who had relationships with men who were politically active in such organizations were arrested (Carrera, 2005). Members of the armed forces, regular police and detectives, intelligence analysts, guards, and even civilians implementing the repression partook in sexual violence as torture on a systematic and

institutional scale at all known detention centers, concentration camps, stadiums, and clandestine prisons (Carerra, 2005). According to accounts by female detainees, women were subject to beatings, rape, cigarette burns, and electric shocks to the breasts and vagina (Larsson and McGowan, 2020). Michelle Bachelet, who would go on to be elected president of Chile in 2006, was 23 years old when a group of men tied to the military dictatorship broke into her home and kidnapped her and her mother (Guardian 2005). Bachelet and her mother were taken to the now infamous secret detention center, Villa Grimaldi, where they were tortured. Bachelet was subjected to thirty days of torture. Bachelet noted her abusers, “did not put me on the parillada (Guardian, 2005).” The Parillada was a metal table used to torture prisoners with electrocution. In various women’s accounts across Chile and Brazil, this has been referred to as the parrot’s perch and macaw’s perch and is understood to have been used to electrocute genitalia. Bachelet and her mother were spared death and exiled to Australia. When Bachelet later became president, she established the Presidential Advisory Commission on Human Rights in May 2006. The commission was tasked with furthering the investigations of violent crimes of the dictatorship by finding mechanisms to more rapidly and accurately identify victims (Borzutzky, 2017). By 2011, it was evident the initial Valech Commission had been insufficient in investigating all cases of political imprisonment and torture, as a result Bachelet renewed the mandate of the commission. Valech II was established and received 32,000 new complaints (Borzutzky, 2017).

Similarly, Brazil was under military rule between 1964 and 1985. In April 1964 the military executed a coup d’état ousting the leftist president João Goulart which was prompted by Goulart’s consideration of reforms meant to address wealth inequality within Brazil (McDonald, 2021). Goulart was replaced by General Humberto Castelo Branco who was moderate compared to his successor, Artur da Costa e Silva, who succeeded Castelo Branco in 1974 (Phillips, 2019).

Costa e Silva enacted “Institutional Act No.5” which gave the head of government near unlimited powers, closed Congress, impeached other politicians, suspended the rights, laid the groundwork for years of torture, repression, and censorship with no recourse among civilians. This era became known as Brazil’s Years of Lead (The Brazilian Report, 2018). The most violent period of the repression lasted from 1968 through 1974, and the post-dictatorship investigation at least 434 political opponents were killed and thousands more tortured under the dictatorship (McDonald, 2021).

According to the Brazilian National Truth Commission, approximately 6,000 people were tortured under the dictatorship. The Truth Commission’s report detailed the methods of sexual torture used by military personnel which included electric shock to the genitals, blows to breast and stomachs of women in an attempt to induce abortions or damage reproductive capabilities of imprisoned women, animals and objects were forced into women’s vaginas and anuses, nightsticks soaked with pepper were inserted, and both male and female detainees were gang raped (Leão, 2018). Women survivors’ accounts, detail how they were subjected to the pau-de-arara, known as the “parrot’s perch” or the “macaw’s perch.” During the reign of Brazil’s military dictatorship, it took on new meaning as a common method of torture in which a victim is hung from a bar placed behind the victim’s knees, with wrists bound over the legs (Leão, 2018).

In 1970, Dilma Rousseff, who would go on to be elected Brazil’s first female president in 2011, was arrested by agents of the dictatorship. Rousseff was a member of a left-wing guerrilla group. She was captured in 1970 and held through 1972 in Tiradentes Prison in Sao Paulo, during which time she endured torture (Watts, 2016). Rousseff has rarely talked about her experience with torture but has divulged that she endured beatings, electric shocks, and was left on the floor (Watts, 2016.) When Rousseff later became president, she established the Truth

Commission tasked with investigating the crimes that occurred under the dictatorship. The Commission's final report was presented on December 10, 2014. As a part of the report's presentation, President Rousseff gave a speech during which she was overcome by emotion (Danica, 2015). During the presentation, female Federal Deputy Maria do Rosário also made comments. Following Rosário's statements, another federal deputy, Jair Bolsonaro, verbally accosted her stating, "Stay, Maria do Rosário. Stay here and listen. A few days ago, you called me a rapist in the Green Hall and I said, "I wouldn't rape you because you don't deserve it"" (Danica, 2015). This exchange is particularly illuminating as an indicator of the domestic sentiment, among some in Brazil, with respect to women. Bolsonaro went on to win the presidency and become the head of government in 2019. In the lead-up to his election and during his political tenure, he has often openly praised the dictatorship. In 2016 during the impeachment vote of Rousseff, Bolsonaro cast his vote for impeachment and dedicated his vote to Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, the colonel who headed the feared Doi-Codi torture unit in the 1970s, the same unit responsible for Rousseff's detainment and torture (Watts, 2016).

Both Chile and Brazil have a shared history of political violence and that woman experienced this violence during the years of dictatorship in each country. In both cases, women who were politically active were violently punished for their participation, but later emerged as political leaders in their respective countries. Certainly, their personal experiences impacted their choices in office, as each established or expanded a truth commission specific to investigating the violence their countries endured. I expect as I go into deeper detail in each of these cases the role of these female leaders will be key to how each of these countries approached UNSCR 1325 and NAP implementation.

Chile NAP Content

Chile launched its NAP in August 2009 during Bachelet's first term as president (Peace Women). This NAP is 30 pages and is considered to be specific on 4 of 9 criteria according to content analysis and criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (2014). The NAP was prepared by a coordinated effort across the government and non-governmental organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Women's National Service acted as the coordinating agencies (Chile NAP). The Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning, Chilean Army, Chilean Navy, Chilean Air Force, the Chilean police, the Chilean Investigative Police, Chilean General Staff, Joint Center for Peace Operations of Chile, National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies and the Chilean Diplomatic Academy all served in the process as participants (Chile NAP). In addition to the broad representation of the Chilean government, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were a part of the process. These NGOs included the Public Affairs Institute Universidad De Chile, Corporacion Humanas, the Strategic Studies Center Universidad Arcis, and Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales FLACSO-CHILE (Chile NAP).

The NAP begins with a prologue by President Michelle Bachelet followed by a section of speeches from individuals representing each of the three leading governmental agencies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Women's National Service. This portion of the NAP is about a third of the total text. The NAP goes on to detail the contextual background for the adoption of a NAP for UNSCR 1325. This section discusses the Chilean Constitution's call for equality, the country's international commitment to human rights, its prior commitments to UN doctrine, the introduction of UN Women, Peace, and Security focused efforts, and how women's participation in peace operations have been limited in general as well as within Chile's context. This section also highlights how Chile had taken steps in 2005 to open

women's access to the armed forces and claims this has resulted in significant advances in women's broader participation. The most sizeable portion of the NAP is dedicated to establishing the objectives and commitments that Chile sought to take. There are four major objectives detailed in this section: 1) Promote gender mainstreaming; 2) Observe, secure, and protect the rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations; 3) Generate equal participation in particular within the peace and international security field; 4) Coordination of the international, intersectoral, and civil society levels. Within each of these objectives are organized areas of focus that correspond to an identified governmental agency that bears responsibility for addressing specified efforts. Some of the specific areas of focus include strengthening the technical skills of both men and women, incorporating USNCR 1325 as foreign policy, ensuring a duty to protect with respect to sex and gender-based violence, supporting a zero-tolerance policy for Codes of Conduct, promoting local women's participation in peace processes, identifying female candidates for posts, keeping statistics disaggregated by sex, and identifying restrictions necessary to overcome (Chile NAP). Chile's NAP sees specificity with relation to identifying the leading agents of the process, inclusion of civil society, detailing roles, and establishing how the reporting process will work. However, the NAP lacks any mention of a timeline as well as any details regarding the financial allocation that will be made to ensure the successful implementation of the plan.

Table 6.2: Chile: Content Analysis & Text in Chile's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	August 2009	Not rated	
Timeframe of adoption	None specified	Not rated	
Number of pages in NAP	30	Not rated	
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	Noted right at the start of the NAP, coordinating lead agencies are then followed	Specific +1	"COORDINATING AGENCIES: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

	by other participating entities.		Ministry of National Defense, Women's National Service"
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	Under the section noting other participating institutions, non-governmental organizations that were a part of the process were listed.	Specific +1	"Non-Governmental Organizations: Public Affairs Institute, Universidad de Chile, Corporación Humanas, Strategic Studies Center, Universidad Arcis, Facultad Latinoamericana d.e Ciencias Sociales FLACSO-CHILE"
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	No implementation timeline is included within the NAP.	Not mentioned 0	
4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned	Yes, the NAP details roles and responsibilities within its "objectives and commitments" section.	Specific +1	"WOMEN'S NATIONAL SERVICE: - To follow up female candidacies for decision-making posts in peace and international security matters, both at a local and foreign level. - To disseminate, by institutional means, the experience of women who took part in cooperation programs in conflict and post-conflict situations."
5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination	The NAP mentions coordination even devoting a sub-section to it within the "Objectives and Commitments" but it lacks a specific mechanism for coordination.	Not specific 0	"MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: -To promote coordination with other countries to implement Resolution 1325, particularly within the region. -To strengthen coordination with agencies and donor countries to implement Resolution 1325."
6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	The NAP does not include any information regarding financial allocations necessary or designated for implementation.	Not mentioned 0	

7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	Within the NAP's "Follow-Up" section it notes the need for indicators but does not establish any.	Not specific 0	"To develop indicators to follow up the plan's implementation process. To develop internal indicators with a view to following up the plan's implementation process within each institution."
8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	Throughout the NAP reporting obligations are built-in within designated responsibilities. The NAP's "Follow-Up" section in details various means of monitoring reporting specific to the implementation of the NAP.	Specific +1	"To include statistical information on female staff deployed in Peace Operations and the availability of female contingent troops to be deployed in the annual reports to be submitted by the Armed Forces... Follow-up: Council of Ministers for Equal Opportunities: To hold an annual session aimed at discussing the advances and obstacles encountered in the implementation of the National Plan of Action, including, to such end, participation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, as well as any other Ministry usually forming part thereof
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	Within the "Follow-up" section it's noted that an observatory should be formed consisting of government and civil society, but it does not formally establish one nor designate participating entities.	Not Specific 0	"To generate and coordinate an Observatory formed by members of the Government and of the civil society, with half-yearly follow-up sessions."
TOTAL: 4/9			

Chile: So-So Fit, Strong Pull, Moderate Push

The fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of Chile is considered to be so-so. Chile's Gender Inequality Index prior to NAP adoption was moderately positive with a score of .359. In terms of historical gender equality in the country, like much of the world, Chile has a lingering history of traditional gender roles and a patriarchal culture. Entrenched conservatism existed as a significant obstacle to Bachelet's government garnering civil society support for gender parity efforts. The strong presence of the Catholic church, similar to Brazil, has been a powerful force within the country's political context. There has even been an alliance between the traditional left and the Christian Democrats historically which means divisive issues, like advancing women's rights, have been avoided altogether (Tobar, 2003). One interesting component of Chile's history with regard to women's rights, was the development of the National Women's Service or Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM) in the early 1990s, a government agency whose mission statement was to focus on equal opportunities for women by designing and implementing social programs to aid vulnerable women though progress has not been substantial (Tober, 2003). Some individuals in Chile held a strong commitment to traditional gender roles and ensuring the rigid distinction between masculinity and femininity was maintained (Nierman et al. 2007; Whitley 2001). In 2007, leading up to NAP adoption, Contreras and Plaza conducted a study comparing gender role beliefs between Americans and Chileans (2010). The pool of participants from Chile included 108 Chilean students, 46 men and 62 women between the ages of 17 and 29. Among the participants 60.8% were Catholic, 21.6 held no religion, and 10.8 were agnostic. The study found that compared to Americans, Chileans as a group hold more traditional gender role beliefs and men held even more traditional gender role beliefs (Contreras and Plaza, 2010). The authors of the study found that the more women have internalized machista and conservative cultural values

the less they participate in the labor market. Machismo and other cultural values influence female labor participation (Contreras and Plaza, 2010). Another study found that 29% of those polled in Chile believed it is better for women to concentrate on home and men to concentrate on work. It also found 26% believe men are better political leaders than women (Llanos and Sample, 2008). These studies indicate a substantial portion of the population in Chile in the lead-up to NAP adoption had strongly held views in favor of maintaining traditional gender roles.

In terms of the existing military policy in the lead-up to NAP adoption, however, the country appeared to be advancing the inclusion of women in the traditionally male dominated sphere of the armed forces. In 1974, during the dictatorship in Chile, women were only able to occupy administrative or teaching roles in the armed forces. As of 2000, the Chilean Air Force allowed women to enroll on equal footing with men and, by the following year, both the Air Force and the Army opened their doors further by allowing women entry to the pilot program, allocating 60 spots for female volunteers. As of 2005 there were 1,000 spots opened to women and 3,000 applied (Ross, 2005). By 2003, the Chilean Army allowed women to take the same courses as men, including combat weaponry and artillery courses, which are largely considered the most masculine spaces internationally (Ross, 2005). In Chile, women are able to advance to the highest ranks of General and Commander which is a unique right in Latin America. In 2004, female officers served for the first time in the armed UN International Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. Michelle Bachelet, as the Minister of Defense since 2002, spearheaded an effort, in March 2005, to revise military national policy on women's inclusion and to establish equality of opportunity (Frederic and Calandrón, 2015). As of 2005 in Chile, the Chilean Armed Forces saw women's participation increase to 15%, the highest rates in the world. Women made up 1 in 5 army officers in training and 1 in 3 students in military aviation colleges (Ross, 2005). This

indicates that within a span of a five years the Chilean Armed Forces has made significant advances in pushing women's participation ahead, and that its new policies were likely to be amenable to pushing forward the goals of Chile's NAP. Thus, evaluating the moderate Gender Inequality Index score, an ingrained history of machismo and traditional gender roles, and the more recent progress of military policy, Chile is categorized as having a so-so fit.

There is strong pull pressure from the domestic level in Chile based on an analysis of the strength of civil society women's groups, local level bureaucrats and decision-makers, and finally the national level policymakers. Four NGOs were included in the drafting process of Chile's NAP; three of these were associated with academia while one, Corporacion Humanas, was the only women's rights group involved in the process. Corporacion Humanas is a regional center for human rights and gender justice in Chile (Humanas, 2018). Beyond the drafting process, the presence and strength of women's groups in the lead-up to Chile's NAP adoption was limited. While there were many women's groups country-wide with diverse areas of focus (Tobar, 2008; Tobar et al. 2004), they seemed to lack the capacity to operate in a coordinated effort. The women's movement in Chile, similar to Brazil, was very strong in the country's effort to end Pinochet's dictatorship. The women's movement brought together different classes, ethnicities, and ideologies. However, this pluralistic approach declined as there was no more unifying issue amongst the different groups which was further compounded by competition over funding as well as the introduction of the state agency, SERNAM, which absorbed many of the former activities starting in 1991 (Cosgrove, 2010). SERNAM was created during the transition to democracy and was a state-sanctioned institution meant to address gender equality in social, economic, political, cultural, and familial spheres of everyday life (Richards, 2003). Some see SERNAM as weakening the women's movement as a result of absorbing former activists, being

limited in scope, and inadequately representing concerns to the government (COHA, 2008).

Some have argued that SERNAM does not weaken the women's movement, but rather provides the movement with resources by ensuring a discourse on women's equality and a set of objectives around which to mobilize, and in turn encouraging different women's groups to work together in pursuit of these goals and holding the state accountable (Franceschet, 2003). The unique element of Chile's domestic environment relating to women's groups is that the government elevated a new institution at the time of democratization to focus exclusively on issues of gender equality, but this has arguably had adverse effects on the strength of civil society women's organizations. So, while there is a moderate civil society presence in the case of Chile, it is far from robust.

Similarly, Chile has a modest representation of women in general in local level political roles. As of 2007, women made up only 12.1% of mayorships in Chile, but made up 26.8% of council members, which is sizeable though still far from representative of the population (Hinjosa, 2012). This modest representation was present at the national level as well. In 2007, women made up 15% of the lower house and only 5.3% of the upper house. However, similar to Brazil, Chile elected its first female president, Michelle Bachelet, in 2005. While Rousseff's prioritization of women, peace, and security in Brazil was up for debate, Bachelet's focus on this issue area was a high priority and immediately evident. Bachelet's election invigorated the women's movement even when she had little support from civil society for gender parity efforts due to strong conservatism (Tobar, 2009) Bachelet's focus on gender relations and women's political roles in the country led to the question of the woman's place in society becoming a key conversational point in the election process (Tobar, 2009). So, while Bachelet's campaign and subsequent election made significant strides in bringing gender equality matters to the forefront,

her prior role as Minister of Defense, had set the stage in terms of policy efforts that would ultimately allow Bachelet to usher Chile into becoming one of the earliest signers and adopters of a NAP for UNSCR 1325. While civil society activism was moderate along with representation at the local level, the robustness of the highest national leader's platform on gender equality efforts and her prior focus on remolding the military policy of the country set Chile up to become one of the earliest adopters of UNSCR 1325. Therefore, Chile is categorized as having a strong pull pressure from the domestic level. Chile is an interesting case because its strongest component of pressure seems to be derived from the national leader. In this case we see that the logic of appropriateness is at play via legitimacy. Bachelet viewed the UN and specifically UNSCR 1325 as a legitimate fair institution that ought to be complied with, it was in alignment with her earlier efforts as Defense Minister to address gender equality concerns. Bachelet later went on to head UN Women in its earliest iteration and served as a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which I think further bolsters the point that Bachelet viewed this matter as having the utmost legitimacy. In addition to legitimacy, this case is also representative of reputational concerns as it the logic of appropriateness. Bachelet's tenure in her various government roles had been focused on improving Chile's identity and reputation with respect to gender equality, and NAP adoption of UNSCR 1325 was another means to reify this reputation of the country.

Chile is categorized as having a moderate push pressure emanating from the international level. In the context of Chile peer pressure includes only 12 countries adopted NAPs prior to Chile, and none of these were Latin American countries, Chile was the first. Chile was vying for membership in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2007. OECD has its own gender network and was very involved at the international level in aiding with the development of gender action plans (World Bank, 2006). OECD called for countries to

employ NAPs so it certainly would have been in Chile's interest to pursue that effort. As of 2020, about 93% of OECD members have abided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation of developing National Action Plans to address the implementation of 1325 (UN Women, 2020; OECD, 2021). Additionally, Chile was a member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which in 2002 had published its own guidelines for a Framework for Integration of Women in APEC. This framework called for gender analysis by senior members and at the project level at APEC to determine if policy priorities and plans were equitable for both men and women. The framework had a very practical focus and use of language, focused on detailing efforts rather than passive or theoretical language. Chile's membership in an organization focused on being active in improving gender equities and holding members to that standard was likely a positive influence, but it does not seem to have served as a significant catalyst in pushing Chile to adopt its own NAP, since Chile's NAP was not adopted for another seven years following APEC's framework. Thus, peer pressure in this instance falls between weak and moderate. One missing factor of international pressure was Chile not vying for a Security Council seat in the lead-up to its NAP adoption. Chile had already sat on the Council from 2003 to 2004 and was unlikely to secure the rotating seat again so soon after. Thus, the country was not feeling pressured to adopt a NAP to garner favor to secure a seat. A final factor of international pressure was Chile's UN financial standing with regard to membership dues for the general budget in the years leading up to NAP adoption. Chile owed a significant sum in membership dues as a result of failure to pay over the course of several years. By 2009, the year of NAP adoption, Chile owed US \$9,288,214 in outstanding dues (UN GA). The various factors of the overall push pressure from the international level in the case of Chile was only moderate.

Brazil NAP Content

Brazil launched its NAP in March 2017 (Peace Women). This NAP is 62 pages specific on 3 of 9 criteria according to content analysis using the criteria established by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (2014). The NAP was prepared by a working group coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and included the Ministry of Defense (all 3 branches of Armed Forces), the Ministry of Justice & Public Security and Human Rights, and it notes that included civil society entities were Igarape Institute and UN Women (Brazil NAP). The NAP provides a brief history of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) effort internationally then details Brazilian engagement in the form of its domestic gender agenda and how WPS takes form at the national level and within the process of Brazil's NAP development. The NAP highlights two main strategic objectives of gender mainstreaming and empowerment of women and girls and it identifies goals to be pursued by key activities according to four pillars of 1) Participation, 2) Prevention & Protection, 3) Consolidation of Peace and Humanitarian Cooperation, and 3) Awareness, Engagement, and Deepening. The NAP concludes with details regarding the durations, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NAP. Brazil's NAP notes the country's recognition of UNSCR 1325 as an international obligation and as such in the national interest of Brazil to promote and that NAP adoption shows Brazil is complying with provisions of relevant resolutions and its alignment with the latest global debates on strengthening the UN framework in relation to international peace and security (Brazil NAP).

Brazil's focus in recent years on foreign policy and its efforts to assert itself as a country focused on security may have served as an impetus for its alignment with this UNSCR, Brazil wants to be seen as a global leader, compliant, and as a part of the international community on 'security matters,' and this resolution with its connection to security issues is an opportunity to

signal that. Within the NAP, Brazil indicates that the country has been ‘consistently’ working towards gender equality since its re-democratization and that those efforts have led the country to joining the international community in this WPS effort. The NAP itself lacks specificity in 6 areas of analysis. The NAP is specific in terms of who it identifies as the leading agents on the NAP as it notes the working group and its particular members. It is specific in detailing civil society involvement by noting Igarape Institute as the key, though only, partner from civil society. It is also specific in detailing roles, identifying lead agencies and partners designated to fulfill various activities associated with NAP implementation.

However, the NAP lacks specificity on its timeline which only identifies that the NAP is intended to cover a two-year timespan but includes no timeline information for the specific NAP activities. Other vague aspects of the NAP include reporting and civil society monitoring. The NAP mentions annual reports and evaluation of “respective spheres” but lacks additional detail. Similarly, civil society monitoring is said to be used to “spread the knowledge and engagement about the NAP in Brazil,” but offers no further explanation. Meanwhile, coordination, financial allocation, and indicators are absent altogether. The area that includes the most specificity in the NAP is the section addressing the four pillars previously noted: 27 activities are included under the first objective of the Participation Pillar and 5 activities are included under its second objective, 31 activities are detailed in the Prevention and Protection Pillar, 13 in the Consolidation of Peace and Humanitarian Cooperation Pillar, and 9 in the Awareness, Engagement, and Deepening Pillar. The Brazil NAP, similar to others, utilizes pillars as an organizational tool in its implementation plan, which was a result of drafters relying primarily on UNSCR 1325 as the guidepost in their drafting process because sticking to the content of 1325 was easier to sell to those in the process who were resistant (personal communication, 2019).

While UN Women pushed Brazil, as part of a global campaign to encourage countries without NAPs, to adopt a NAP, it was not very involved in the working group and drafting process itself. UN Women was not responsible for organizing the content according to the pillars (personal communication, 2019).

Table 6.3: Brazil: Content Analysis & Text in Brazil's NAP

Criteria		Specificity Rating	Excerpted Language
Year of Adoption	March 2017	Not rated	
Timeframe of adoption	2017-2018	Not rated	
Number of pages in NAP	62	Not rated	
1. Leading Agents Participating in Drafting	The NAP details the leading agencies that comprised the working group tasked with the drafting of the NAP.	Specific +1	“The Plan was prepared by a Working Group (WG) coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defence, including the three branches of the Armed Forces, and the Ministries of Justice and Public Security and Human Rights (then the Ministry of Justice and Citizenship).”
2. Civil Society Involvement in Drafting	The NAP notes the two main civil society entities that assisted the Working Group in its drafting process.	Specific +1	“The Plan was prepared by a Working Group (WG)... The WG also had the support of members of civil society (Igarapé Institute) and UN Women.”
3. Timeline that details implementation actions	The NAP details that its duration will be a two-year period spanning 2017 through 2018, but there are no specifics regarding the timeline for corresponding implementation actions.	Not specific 0	“The Brazilian National Action Plan will have an initial duration of 2 years (2017-2018).”

4. Roles: Roles are specified and responsibilities are assigned	The NAP is organized according to pillars. Under each of the pillars the NAP details corresponding Objectives-Activities to address the objective- Lead Institution-Institutions Involved. This specifically establishes what entities are tasked with achieving the activities and overall objectives as they are laid out.	Specific +1	“Pillar 1: Participation Objective: To increase the participation of Brazilian female military personnel employed on individual missions and/or as part of contingents of peacekeeping operations and/or special political missions, including in leadership positions. Activity: To appoint military personnel, regardless of sex/gender, for the performance of individual missions, including as military observers and/or in positions related to international peace and security in the United Nations and other international organisations, provided they have the necessary requirements to fulfil those missions. Lead Institution: MD Institutions Involved: EB, MB, FAB”
5. Coordination: There is a specific mechanism or entity in charge of coordination	The NAP does not discuss coordination nor a mechanism for ensuring it occurs.	Not mentioned 0	
6. Financial Allocation: There are specific sources of funds are noted	The NAP does not discuss any financial allocations to be made or planned for in association with the NAP.	Not mentioned 0	
7. Indicators: There are specific considerations for evaluation	The NAP while it establishes specific objectives and activities does not establish or discuss any specific indicators for evaluating the implementation of those items.	Not mentioned 0	

8. Reporting: There is a specific monitoring body detailed	The NAP notes that ministries will establish mechanisms to monitor implementation and publish annual reports. There is not a clear monitoring body or reporting system established.	Not specific 0	“The Ministries in charge of implementing this Plan, in their respective spheres, will establish mechanisms to monitor its implementation. At the end of each year, they will publish reports on the measures taken to pursue the objectives and activities provided therein, the progress achieved and challenges identified.”
9. Civil Society Monitoring is established	The NAP does not specify what role if any civil society will play within “respective Gender Commissions” which will be tasked with monitoring compliance with the NAP.	Not specific 0	“In the tasks of monitoring compliance with the NAP, the contributions of the respective Gender Commissions and/or specific commissions related to the NAP will be taken into account, where applicable.”
TOTAL: 3/9			

Brazil: Poor Fit, Weak Pull, Strong Push

Considering the fit of UNSCR 1325 with the existing military policy and historical gender equality of Brazil, 1325 is a poor fit. In terms of the gendered military policy history in Brazil, the integration of women into the military didn’t start until the 1980s. The Navy started integration in 1980, the Air Force in 1981, and the Army in 1992, each branch integrated women into non-combat roles (Milani, 2019). Not until 2012 was it mandated by law that military academies allow female candidates entry and the first Naval class with females didn’t graduate until 2017 (Milani, 2019). As of 2016, only 8 percent of the military was comprised of women, and women are still restricted from certain military specialties. According to Milani, Brazil lags behind other countries in the region in terms of the full integration of women into the military:

Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay do not restrict access to women to combat roles (Ibid). Additionally, Brazil is well behind other Latin American countries to include Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay in participation of women and civilian personnel in UN Mission as of September 2104 report (Igarape, 2018). While Brazil is taking steps to open access to women in the, UNSCR 1325 is a poor fit with military policy historically and in recent times.

According to the Gender Inequality Index, Brazil has low gender equality, with a score of .407, in 2017 the year of NAP adoption. The country was under a military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985 (Serbin, 2019). Following the end of military rule, in 1988 the concept of gender equality was added to the Constitution. Traditional gender roles and family structures have long been central features in Brazilian society; the role of family was intimately linked to the success of the state (Besse 2018). Women's entry to the working force historically has posed a threat to that family structure, and the introduction of feminist ideals threatened the primary role of wifehood and motherhood for man (Besse, 2018). This continues to be a point of contention and to pose obstacles to women in the workforce and in society more widely. According to 26 interviews of female professionals in Rio and Sao Paulo, while Brazil demonstrates "an idealized national ethos that promotes equality, gender roles are still very traditional" (Santos and de Hilal, 2018). Women have made notable achievements in education, work, and political participation since the 1980s, but this has not resulted in a reduction in a gender inequality. The underlying issue "the clash between modernizing values and traditional practices" feeds into three areas of inequality, including: 1) political participation and representation; 2) reproductive rights and abortion; and 3) violence against women (Simoes and Matos, 2008). In evaluating this long-

existing gender inequality as well as a gendered military policy, Brazil is categorized as having a poor fit.

There is weak pull pressure from the domestic level at play in Brazil, based on an analysis of the strength of civil society women's groups, local level bureaucrats and decision-makers, and national level policymakers. As a part of the NAP development process Igarape Institute was the sole civil society entity included in the NAP process (Brazil NAP). While Igarape workshopped with other civil society entities in Brazil ahead of the NAP development process and also released an online form to garner feedback from the public, there was not significant civil society participation. There is real lack of civil society interest and participation in matters linked to UNSCR 1325 and from the public so Igarape was really the only option (personal communication, 2019). Even the effort to open the process up to public feedback was met with a minimal response, with about only 10 respondents to the online feedback form (personal communication, 2019). Civil society tends to be focused on other issues; peace and security is not an issue they have been very interested in, so there was no real pressure on the NAP development process in that respect. Had there been civil society pressure, the NAP likely would've been more specific because those participating in the process who were resistant to the NAP and the cause of such content compromise would have felt compelled to do more as a result of political pressure (personal communication, 2019).

Similar to the near non-existent presence of civil society exerting pressure on this issue, there is a weak presence of women in general in local-level political roles. In 2012, while women made up 52 percent of the population, they only comprised 12 percent of mayors and 13.3 percent of councilors (Watts, 2012). While quotas have been used since the early 1990s, the numbers have never quite been met since it's largely voluntary (Moura, 2014) Beyond the

general low level of participation of women in local-level political positions similar to civil society there is no real motivation among local level politicians, male or female, to pursue the peace and security agenda (personal communication, 2019). This modest degree of participation of women in political roles is mirrored at the national level as well. In 2005, women made up 8.6 percent of parliament and in 2016 the year prior to Brazil's NAP adoption this number had only risen to 9.9 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). Brazil saw its first female president in 2011 with the election of Dilma Rousseff, but during her first and second tenure terms foreign policy, to include peace and security issues, was not a priority because the economy was the main focus. In her first term, Rousseff "declared war on poverty," but economic woes continued into her second term (Langellier, 2011). However, some countered the NAP came to fruition when it did because Rousseff did prioritize this issue of women, peace, and security and wanted to capitalize on her position of power to push this issue during the end of her term (personal communication, 9 November 2019). One distinct policy at the national level in the lead-up to NAP adoption that served as support was the 2012-2015 Multi-Year Plan, which included the intention to increase the participation of women in Brazilian Armed Forces. In 2017, a presidential decree obligated the armed forces to accept women in military schools (Giannini et al., 2016). These national level policy items aligned with the ultimate adoption of a NAP, but likely served as a limited catalyst for the ultimate NAP development. Gender policy and women's representation has been advanced historically not by Brazil's central government, but mainly at the local level through work done by the Worker's Party (PT), the progressive political party, through its grassroots participation and a range of social rights efforts (Mcaculay, 2006). During the drafting process, women that were involved in the drafting and pushing for NAP development in the first place received significant pushback and disinterest from their male

counterparts representing the Ministry of Defense (personal communication 31 October 2019). Supportive male counterparts recognized that it was difficult for women to participate in the drafting and planning meetings. So much of the drafting process itself was frustrated by gendered power dynamics, complete with male participants referring to female participants as ‘girl’, ‘kid’, and ‘daughter,’ so supportive male counterparts felt their role was to create an environment that would allow these women to speak to the issues they knew were important to this process (personal communication, 31 October 2019). Many of these participants did not want to develop a NAP, because they did not consider the issue of gender and conflict to be a problem for Brazil, and writing a NAP would signal that there was a problem whereas if you don’t talk about it, it remains a non-issue (personal communication, 31 October 2019). These interactions were heavily influenced by entrenched views of appropriate gender roles. In analyzing these various elements of pull pressure from the domestic level and how the drafting process ensued, the case of Brazil shows there is weak pull pressure.

In the case of Brazil, I found strong push pressure emanating from the international level. Peer pressure in the context of Brazil includes 62 countries adopted NAPs before Brazil and of those 62, three Latin American countries adopted before Brazil including Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. Guatemala and El Salvador adopted NAPs in the same year as Brazil (Peace Women). Parties to the Brazilian NAP drafting process that were resistant to adopting a NAP, namely the Ministry of Defense, struggled to see how 1325 was pertinent to Brazil, but others involved in the process pointed to the fact that neighboring countries had already developed and implemented NAPs as a means of exerting pressure on those participants (personal communication, 2019). Brazil has long considered foreign policy a top priority specifically international peace and security and Brazil has played a prominent role in the United Nations.

Brazil plays a significant role in particular in peacekeeping for the United Nations, assisting in training as well as providing peacekeeping forces, most prominently in Haiti. In 2011, UN Women signed a memorandum of understanding with Brazil's Ministry of Defense to 1) train Brazilian peacekeepers on gender perspectives; 2) advance South-South cooperation via regional training bodies; 3) promote programs focusing on sport activities with a gender dimension; 4) work together to promote implementation (Giannini et al., 2016). In 2012, during the Rio +20 Conference, Brazil signed a cooperation agreement with UN Women to promote gender equality (UN Women Rio Conference). The presence of peer pressure was a very strong force present in the case of Brazil. The most prominent aspect of international pressure came in the form of Brazil's goal of not only securing a rotating Security Council seat, but in the lead-up to NAP adoption, Brazil was actually waging a campaign to secure a *permanent* seat on the Security Council. Brazil had served on the Security Council more times than any other non-permanent country and in 2015 Brazil was pushing for the G4 (India, Japan, Germany, Brazil) to secure permanent seats. Brazil's ambitions of securing a permanent seat affected the country's willingness to move ahead with developing a NAP to implement 1325 to signal its willingness to comply to align with UN efforts (personal communication, 24 October 2019). Brazil was in good financial standing on UN membership dues in the years leading up to NAP adoption, so the possible pressure that could be derived from shame over being in the arrears was not present in this case (UN GA).

Analyzing the various elements of the overall push pressure from the international level shows in the case of Brazil to be strong. The peer pressure in this instance represented the reputational concerns under the logic of consequences. Brazil was very focused on establishing itself in the context of international "security matters" and wanted to be recognized for as much

in the international community as a “global power.” Participants in the drafting process were able to amplify this pressure to reluctant military participants partaking in the 1325 drafting process. Proponents of 1325, who participated in the drafting process, highlighted how so many countries, to include neighboring countries, had already adopted NAPs in support of the 1325 and they were able to frame 1325 as a prominent international security matter. This pressure helped achieve buy-in. The goal of securing not only a Security Council seat but a permanent seat was representative of the logic of consequences as well, namely coercion. In its quest to be considered an important player in the realm of international security, Brazil wanted to secure a permanent seat, and may have felt pressured to demonstrate compliance in exchange for a “carrot” by developing a NAP in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

Conclusion




Figure 6.1: Modified Model Applied to Chile

Chile achieved very early compliance with UNSCR 1325 by developing and formally adopting its NAP in August 2009. The NAP lacked specificity on a number of items, in particular lacking a timeline and budgetary considerations altogether, which may have been related to being such an early adopter and lacking other NAPs as examples of best practices. The analysis shows Chile's early adoption is largely attributable to its national leader at the time, Michelle Bachelet, serving as the driving force behind the effort. Since its adoption, Chile has seen a 19.8% increase in women's overall participation in peacekeeping operations with a 22.2% increase in women's participation as experts, a 60% increase in women in the role of police, but a 2.3% decrease in women's participation in the troop roles. The UN role of staff officer began in 2017 and shows, Chile has only deployed staff officers in 2017 and 2021. In neither of those years did Chile's staff officers include women.

Though data for gendered participation prior to the country's NAP adoption are lacking, Chile has a larger span of time to view how participatory rates have changed over the last decade, and those numbers indicate that Chile has seen growth in the number of women serving as police and expert roles in UN peacekeeping operations.




Figure 6.2: Percent of Chilean Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations; Source: UN Data




Figure 6.3: Modified Model Applied to Brazil

Brazil achieved compliance with UNSCR 1325 by developing and formally adopting its NAP in March 2017. The NAP lacks specificity, leaving significant room for improvement in particular including specific indicators and budgetary allocations. The country was a very late adopter, but this late adoption did not translate to a more specific NAP. Since its adoption Brazil has seen 10.6% increase in women's overall participation in peacekeeping operations. The UN data show a 4.5% increase in women in the role of experts, a 57.1% increase in women in the role of police, and a 1.3% decline in women's participation in troop roles. The role of staff officer did not have data until 2017, the same year as adoption; the most recent data for 2021 shows that Brazil's staff officers were comprised of 10.3% women.

While not much time has passed since the NAP adoption, some close to Brazil's peacekeeping missions have no expectation this will improve in the coming years, barring some other change (personal communication, 9 November 2019). A number of women from each military branch have participated in peacekeeping trainings in preparation of a possible deployment and many have added their names to a list, expressing interest and volunteering for peacekeeping deployments (personal communication, 9 November 2019). However, when deployment opportunities have arisen, women vying for spots are denied by more senior male officers at the decision-making level, opting to send no one at all over sending these women. Often the point raised by these male officers is, "who will take care of her children?" The lack of women in these decision-making roles will continue to be a hindrance to women deploying. To make progress, academies should institute gender-conscious training, incorporate the WPS resolutions so that men and women in these roles can internalize the importance of these resolutions (personal communication, 9 November 2019). The training as it exists now is not getting through to the trainees. As of this point, the NAP has not had an impact on Brazil's

peacekeeping missions (personal communication, 9 November 2019). While the data shows that Brazil has seen an overall growth in women's participation, this viewpoint is not supported by the UN Women data specific to women serving in police roles, but data specific to women servicing in troop roles does support this viewpoint.




Figure 6.4: Percent of Brazilian Women in UN Peacekeeping Operations; Source UN Data

Paired Comparison

These two countries were used to develop a paired case study because both are in the same geographic region of South America and have high to very high degrees of development, and yet they differed greatly with respect to when they adopted their NAPs. My expectations with respect to these cases was that the female heads of government in each country would be integral to the NAP adoption process. Also, given that Chile had an earlier NAP adoption, I expected that Chile would see greater growth in women's participation within peacekeeping missions. The case studies as detailed above provide support for the expectation that the female heads of government played an integral role in the NAP process, though Bachelet's influence appears to be more central. Furthermore, the data does support that Chile has seen greater overall

growth; however, given the short period of time that has passed since its NAP adoption, Brazil's participation rates seem to be trending in a positive direction.

Chile and Brazil varied on the degree of fit of UNSCR 1325 domestically, Chile was a “so-so” fit, while Brazil was a “poor” fit. Chile experienced strong pull pressure largely attributable to the role that Bachelet played as the head of government. Chile also experienced moderate push pressure from the international level. Brazil meanwhile experienced weak pull pressure but strong push pressure from the international level. Given the poor fit of 1325 for Brazil, it is not surprising that both coercion and reputational concerns, due to the desire to be seen as a player in the realm of international security, served as a sufficient pressure to ensure Brazil's compliance, even if late. Brazil may have seen considerable influence by Rousseff, as interviews suggest, in its efforts to adopt a NAP. However, given her 2015 impeachment, it is possible the process was derailed and that is why it did not occur until 2017. So, while in the case of Chile Bachelet is considered to have been a very strong influence on these efforts, in the case of Brazil, Rousseff exerted only moderate pressure in comparison.

Both cases saw gains in the participation of women in peacekeeping operations overall. Both countries have seen the most significant gains in the role of police in peacekeeping operations: Chile has seen a 60% increase in women serving as police since 2009, and Brazil has seen a 57.1% increase in women serving as police since 2016. Both countries have seen a decline in the number of women serving in the troop role: Chile's participation is down 2.3%, and Brazil's is down 1.3%. Chile has seen a 22% increase in women serving as experts, while Brazil has only seen a 4.5% increase.

Expectations tested within this paired case study include the following:

In instance of policy misfit, a combination of sufficient pressure from the domestic and international must be present in order to achieve compliance

In instances where there is a good policy fit, pressure may not be necessary to achieve compliance, but greater pressure may contribute to more NAP specificity

In instances of greater pressure, there will be greater compliance via earlier adoption and specificity

In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles

These paired cases show moderate to strong support for all four expectations. This paired case study only has one half which constitutes a poor fit. Brazil is a poor fit. This case lends support for the first expectation. 1325 was deemed to be a poor fit for Brazil and not until 62 other countries, including three neighbors, had adopted did Brazil adopt a NAP. Also NAP adoption transpired at a time when Brazil was ardently seeking a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. 2017 was the moment when there was finally sufficient pressure for Brazil to comply.

This paired case study only has one half which constitutes a so-so fit. Chile is a so-so fit, though it is the case that comes closest to achieving a good fit. In particular the case of Chile lends mixed support for the second expectation. 1325 was deemed to be a so-so fit which likely aided in early adoption. Chile experienced a combination of moderate and strong pressure for adoption, but the end result NAP was far from high scoring in terms of specificity. A stronger civil society presence and involvement may have made the NAP more specific in terms of content. In comparison to Brazil, Chile had a better score with respect to NAP specificity, but not by much.

The paired case study lends support for the third expectation. Chile saw a greater combination of pull and push pressure and adopted its NAP 8 years prior to Brazil, which saw a

lesser combination of pull and push pressure. Chile's NAP also had a slightly stronger specificity in terms of content.

The paired case study lends support for this fourth expectation. A country's compliance score is derived from 1) compliance via adoption; 2) year of adoption; 3) specificity of NAP. Chile had a greater compliance score of 32 due to 2009 adoption and 4 out of 9 specificity on NAP content. Brazil had a compliance score of 12 due to 2017 adoption and a 3 out of 9 on NAP specificity. Since its NAP adoption Chile has had 19.8% growth in women's participation within peacekeeping missions versus Brazil's 10.6% growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption.

This chapter, observed the variable of what role female heads of governments in two Latin American countries played within the context of NAP adoption. Ultimately one country, Chile, was an early adopter and the other, Brazil, was a late adopter. The next chapter, pivots to explore a null case study, Hungary. Hungary as of April 2023, has not adopted a NAP and does not appear likely to do so. The next chapter explores two different points in Hungary's recent history to include 2010-2011 and 2022. During these two different time periods, the level of push and pull pressure, in addition to the fit, are notably different.

Chapter 7: Hungary

The case of Hungary poses an interesting scenario. I would expect a transitioning country to grow over time with respect to its gender views and strides toward improving gender equality. Hungary quite contrary to such expectations proves to be an example of quite the opposite, a devolution with respect to gender equality. This chapter is an analysis of Hungary as a null case study. In analyzing the case of Hungary, I compare the difference in pressure present during two different time periods. In the 2010/2011 time period, in looking at the factors of interest from the modified *push-pull model*, Hungary was under greater push pressure from the international level to adopt a NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as compared to the 2022 time period. However, since 2010/2011, the fit of a UNSCR 1325 has devolved and seems to be on a continued downward trajectory, becoming more of a misfit due to the domestic political climate and a significant shift in Hungary's political culture.

History of Narratives Around Sexual Violence in Conflict

A prominent feature of Hungary's experience with conflict and sexual violence is the post-World War II occupation of the Red Army. Hungary was allied with Nazi Germany in World War II. Sexualized violence in the context of war is often obscured and silenced. In the case of Hungary, there is frequent discussion with respect to the mass rapes committed in Hungary by the Red Army as highlighted by two notable documentaries to include Sándor Sára's 1997 movie *A vád* [The Prosecution] and the 2013 documentary *Silenced Shame*, directed by Fruzsina Skrabski (Beavor, 2003; Peto, 2021). Estimates vary widely from 50,000 to 800,000 rapes committed by the Red Army (Deák-Sárosi, 2018). This number varies so widely, as Peto notes, because of the complicated manner in which rape can and should be counted: How do you count a gang rape or a woman's experience of multiple rapes (Peto, 2017)? A further

complicating factor is the use of rape in wartime as a narrative for political purposes. Mark (2005) provides an account of multiple interviews with 76 Hungarian men and women born between 1907 and 1938, highlighting how political narratives have shaped Hungarian views on wartime sexual violence based on their personal political views at the time of WWII. Prior to the Red Army's arrival, the army was framed as brutalists and rapists by the conservative government's propaganda efforts, while anti-fascists framed the Red Army as liberators (Mark, 2005). Interviewees, men and women, with more conservative views discussed the experience of rape in Hungary as horrific experiences and traumas. When asked about their experience with the German occupation in the war, many respondents minimized the role of Germany's atrocities in WWII, instead highlighting how the Red Army was the true problem (Mark, 2005).

Anti-fascist male respondents tended to frame rapes committed by the Red Army as consensual sex for conservative and liberal women. Anti-fascist female respondents, on the contrary, acknowledged that they were in fact rapes. However, they minimized the severity of the rapes, stating that they were never in fear, didn't die, and the women actually commended soldiers' use of condoms. These respondents, men and women alike, feared demonizing the anti-fascist movement and minimizing the atrocities of fascism (Mark, 2005).

Nationalists used the mass rapes of the Red Army to frame Hungary as the victim of horrific atrocity, signaling the "rightness" of the Hungarian struggle alongside Nazi allies. Mark (2005) highlights the deeply politicized understanding of sexual violence in this period, from outright denial of rapes to horrific accounts of rape framed as raping the nation. While the mass rapes of the Red Army in Hungary have been widely acknowledged, the commission of mass rape by the Hungarian Army in the Soviet Union has largely been silenced (Peto, 2017). Nazi-allied Hungarian troops raped Hungarian women in particular Jewish Hungarian women (Peto,

2017). Hungary persecuted and deported its Jewish population to concentration camps, including Auschwitz, and it is estimated that half a million Hungarian Jews were killed (Mark, 2005). In the decades since, Hungary has highlighted the Soviet role as rapists in Hungary; however, the reality of commission of mass rape by both Hungarian and German has largely been silenced and few whether Soviet, Hungarian, or German have been held accountable (Peto, 2017). An historical focus on controlling the narrative of sexual violence in wartime rather than addressing it as a problem in the context of Hungary.

Hungary's historical experience with sexual violence as a prominent tool of war, similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, might have motivated Hungary to adopt a NAP to implement UNSCR 1325, to highlight the experiences endured by Hungarian women during conflict. However, the control of the narrative with respect to the sexual violence used in war seems to be the paramount interest of the Hungarian government. Hungary may see adopting a NAP as a means of forfeiting control over that narrative. The following sections analyze two different time periods in Hungary's recent history which have varying degrees of pull and push pressure and fit present. The tendency to control the sexual violence narrative will be important to keep in mind to analyze this case in different timeframes and the ultimate outcome.

Hungary No NAP

As of April 2023, Hungary still has not developed or adopted a National Action Plan intended to guide the country in implementing UNSCR 1325. According to a 2013 survey of NATO member states, Hungary, a member since 1999, referred to existing domestic legislation as the basis for the country's implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Reeves, 2013).⁸ However, the

⁸ In 2010, Hungary passed the Annex to Government Resolution No.1004/2010 (1.21.) the 'National Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality.'

country's existing legislation is internally focused on gender equality lacking an external focus specific to conflict. In addition to the existing legislation missing the mark, NATO also found that Hungary had not taken any steps to implement the 2015, 2016, or 2017 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives' recommendations, signaling a lack of compliance with UNSCR 1325 beyond the lack of NAP adoption (NATO, 2017). In October 2019, Hungary's Ambassador to the United Nations, Katalin Bogay, told representatives of the Security Council, "Hungary is committed to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. I am glad to announce that we are currently in the process of drafting our own National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which we aim to adopt before the 20th anniversary of the UNSCR 1325" (Bogay, 2019). As of April 2023, there has been no NAP published by Hungary.

Hungary 2010/2011: So-So Fit, Weak Pull, Strong Push

In the case of Hungary there is a so-so fit given its historical gender equality and existing military policy. Hungary's biggest commitment to gender equality in the 1990s was its adoption of a National Action Plan intended to address the Beijing Platform in 1995 (Krizsán and Zentai, 2006). This NAP established 7 areas of focus: 1) women's human rights; 2) implementation of women's equal opportunity; 3) improvement of women's social equality; 4) recommendations for gender education in public schools; 5) violence against women; 6) coordination of activities involving women's NGOs; 7) establishment of an information system for women on women (Hungarian Government, 1999). From this policy document came the Secretariat for Equal Opportunities to focus on women's policy matters; however, in 1998, the new Conservative government demoted this entity to a much lower level signaling a devaluation of women's policy issues. Also of note, while Hungary published this NAP in 1995 and designated violence against women as a focus area, marital rape was not acknowledged as a crime until 1997 (Parti, 2021).

Further, since then in criminal proceedings, a marital relationship between victim and their assailant can be “used as an extenuating circumstance” (Parti et al., 2017). In 2002, the Secretariat for Equal Opportunities status changed it was advanced to the level of a Directorate (Krizsán and Zentai, 2006). The trend of developing entities, meant to serve this issue of women’s equality, and then eliminating their capacity was repeated with the deprioritization of the Council for Women’s Affairs and the Council for the Representation of Women. These actions did not go unnoticed by the international community: in 2002, CEDAW expressed concern over Hungary’s lack of progress on the issue of gender equality (Parti et al., 2017).

According to the Gender Inequality Index, Hungary had a moderate score for gender equality in 2010 of .255. Within the context of the case studies included in this research, Hungary ranks 3 out of 7 countries for gender equality (GII). A longitudinal study on changing public views of gender roles from 1988 to 2002 found Hungary’s trajectory with regard to public attitudes towards gender roles. The study found that traditional views towards gender were bolstered following the collapse of socialism, but as of 2002 the country has been trending toward a more liberal view of gender roles receding. The study looked at Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Ireland, Netherlands, and Hungary in 1988, 1994, and 2002. In each year of study, Hungary was consistently the most traditional of all countries under review (Braun and Scott, 2009). As of 2010, these traditional views were still largely engrained in Hungarian society. Hungary’s political elite still maintained very traditional views of gender (Fodor and Bulogh, 2010). Hungarian media showed discrimination at work was a significant issue as was the conflict between having a career and having children. In comparison to other Visegrad countries in 2010, Hungary was markedly less liberal holding more conservative views on gender roles (Fodor and Bulogh, 2010). Visegrad countries are comprised of four Central

European countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary share a common history, traditions, culture, and values. In consideration of Hungary's historical gender equality, this aspect is deemed to be a poor fit.

Hungary's military policy in the lead-up to 2010 was distinctly less traditional in a sense. In 1994, women were able to apply to the military academy, but they were only able to pursue logistics, finance, signal, radio-reconnaissance, and informatics (Garcia, 1999). As of 1996, some combat roles were made accessible to women (NATO, 2002). The Hungarian Defence Forces maintained a policy for parental leave which served as one less barrier to the conflict between having a career and having children. In 2001, the Defence Law included a prohibition against discrimination comparable to the prohibition found in the country's constitution (NATO, 2002). Since 2005, all training programs have been accessible to women in the academy, though they did still maintain a majority presence within the medical, public information, communications, logistics, and administrative branches (Kecskeméthy-Spinosé, 2010). In 2010, Hungary significantly outpaced its NATO counterparts in participation of women in the military across roles and fields at 19.6% (Kecskeméthy-Spinosé, 2010.) As of 2010, the country managed to open its military to women in a way that other countries struggled to accomplish. Hungary also maintained a moderate Gender Inequality Index score in 2010. In consideration of these factors, Hungary is categorized as a "so-so fit" for 2010.

A weak pull pressure generated from the domestic level in Hungary. Civil society in the form of women's groups exerted little pressure, similarly pressure exerted in the form of local level bureaucrats and public officials and those at the national level weak. The absence of a strong feminist movement in Hungary has been described as one of the weakest aspects of the Hungarian policy context (Krizsan and Zentai, 2006). A 2000 CEDAW report noted that while

NGOs have seen a robust increase in the post-transition era, the growth of women's groups and organizations has actually slowed (Krizsan and Zentai, 2006). In 1999, 57,000 registered NGOs; 30,000 were actually operating, and, of those 30,000, only 70 attended the civil form of the Secretariat of Representation of Women; though 150 had connections to the Secretariat as a result of work on women (Krizsan and Zentai, 2006). Women's groups in Hungary developed in 1989 and organized in the context of trade unions and caucuses, such as the Women's Electorate of the National Association of the Hungarian Trade Unions and the Association of Hungarian Women, and in the early 1990s, these groups forced political parties to address women's questions (Fabian, 2009). What proved more powerful in this era, though, was women's voting patterns versus en masse movements. Trade unions and caucuses became more organized but less able to move women's specific issues forward (Fabian, 2009). Niche NGOs with very specific foci of women began to form (i.e., training women to communicate through the internet), and while some of these groups worked together by covering stories on and petitioning for signatures for legislation, they have had difficulty effectively bringing about social change (Fabian, 2009). Pressure emanating from civil society in the form of women's groups was weak in the late 1990s through the early 2000s.

Hungary had weak to moderate presence of women in local-level political roles. In 2011, women made up 20.1% of municipal council representatives and 10.7% of mayoral or leadership positions in the country (EIGE, 2022). At the national level the presence of women within political roles was even further limited in 2010 and 2011. In 2005, women occupied 9.1% of the National parliament, and, in 2010, the percent of women in parliament remained stagnant at 9.1% (EIGE, 2022). Between 2009 and 2011, no women occupied any positions in the national

government (EIGE, 2022). These various elements of pull pressure from the domestic level Hungary in 2010/2011 are categorized as weak.

Hungary in 2010/2011, had strong push pressure from the international level. Peer pressure included 29 countries that had already adopted NAPs. Among those 29, there were four neighboring countries that had already adopted NAPs including BiH, Serbia, Austria, and Slovenia. Croatia adopted in 2011. Hungary was a member in NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at this time. NATO funded the Women in International Security's (WISE) development of a scorecard to evaluate how well UNSCR 1325 was being implemented in NATO states and armed forces of its allies (NATO, 2014; Wright, 2012). NATO, in partnership with EAPC, created a policy on "Women, Peace, and Security" in 2007 (NATO/EAPC, 2018). As of 2012, NATO's efforts in this area have had a direct impact on at least seven countries' NAPs to explicitly call for increasing women's participation in the military (Wright, 2012).⁹ In June of 2011, NATO and EAPC revised their policies on 1325 implementation and included a new focus to mainstream 1325 into NATO-led missions and operations. NATO also drafted annual progress reports and called on members and allies to have a high level of 1325 commitment (NATO, 2011). Hungary's membership in NATO during this time highlights that the country was party to an organization exerting pressure on its members to adopt and implement 1325, even taking the lead and adopting an organizational implementation policy. Hungary's additional membership in EAPC compounded that pressure. Thus, the presence of peer pressure was a strong force present in the case of Hungary.

⁹ Wright details that Austria and Denmark actually refer to NATO's NAP within theirs while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, the UK, and Italy explicitly outline integrating women into the military.

Another aspect of international pressure came in the form of Hungary vying for a Security Council seat in 2011 for the 2012-2013 period. Hungary lobbied hard in the lead-up to this election. The country established diplomatic relations with Pacific nations and contacted all 191 voting states (BBJ, 2011).

A final aspect of international pressure for Hungary was its poor UN financial with regard to payment of its UN membership dues. In 2010, Hungary was overdue \$4,685,616 in UN dues (UN doc). The various elements of the overall push pressure from the international level in the case of Hungary were strong in 2010/2011. In this instance, the logic of consequences in the form of coercion, not only is Hungary facing punishment via the arrears list but it hopes to achieve election to the Security Council seat. This degree of pressure should have impacted Hungary's behavior with respect to 1325 compliance; however, Hungary showed no effort toward developing its NAP at this point in time. Hungary suggests support for my earlier point that if a country does not view compliance as offering any type of benefit or views compliance as detrimental it may lead to non-compliance.

Hungary 2022: Poor Fit, Weak Pull, Weak Push

In the more current context of 2021/2022, some Hungary's elements have changed. UNSCR 1325 is considered to be a misfit in the context of Hungary's hardening political climate, and some of the pressure discussed in the previous section no longer exists as well.

UNSCR 1325 is a "so-so fit" in the context of Hungary's historical gender equality in the country and existing military policy. In 2010, Viktor Orbán won his second term as prime minister, and the country has seen a continued rise of right-wing conservative movement that has been reflected in policy as well. In 2011, the Council of Europe championed the Istanbul

Convention as the first EU binding instrument to prevent and combat violence against women to include marital rape (France-Presse, 2020). Hungary and other EU states signed the convention in 2014. However, as of April 2023, Hungary has not yet ratified the treaty. Orbán stated that women are already protected by Hungarian law and took issue with the treaty's references to "gender" (France-Presse, 2020). Hungary has made similar arguments for why it has not adopted a NAP in support of 1325. In 2019, the Hungarian government under Orbán implemented the "Family Protection Action Plan," calling 2019 "the year of the family," and monetarily incentivized ethnic Hungarian women to bear multiple children as was their duty as established by the government these monetary incentives included direct cash payments as well as tax breaks (Kovacs, 2019; Parti 2021). Women who birthed four or more children benefitted the most financially via exemption of personal income tax and families could receive taxpayer-funded assistance to buy a new car. (Inotai, 2019; Parti, 2021). As of 2012, Hungary's GII score had not changed much but there was a minor improvement from .255 in 2010 to .221 in 2021 (GII). An important element of the GII, which is a very strong component for Hungary, is maternal mortality rates. For Hungary in 2021, that rate was 12 deaths per 100,000 live births (GII). In comparison, the United States had a rate of 19 deaths per 100,000 live births. It is not surprising that Hungary would have such strong maternal mortality rates, given its top priority for women is to birth future generations. There have not been significant changes in military policy concerning women in Hungary. Based on the country's resistance to international policy concerning women and the hardening of domestic policy, with respect to women and the matter of "gender," the reality seems to be that Hungary is fine with women participating in conflict; however, Hungary will not heed any consideration of gendered outcomes of violence. Due to these developments, Hungary is a misfit for the UNSCR 1325.

The elements of pull pressure emanating from the domestic, are a very modest growth. There was no notable change in the strength and presence of women's groups and civil society's activeness on the front of UNSCR 1325. Representation of women at the local level saw improvement, but still left considerable room for growth. As of 2017, men still held four out of every five seats in Regional Assemblies in Hungary (Margaras, 2019). Representation at the municipality level saw modest improvement. As of 2022, 31% of municipal council seats were occupied by women. 21.4% of mayoral or leadership roles were occupied by women amounting to a near 100% increase since 2011 (EIGE).

Representation at the national level saw very modest improvement. As of 2022, 13.1% of seats in parliament were occupied by women and 6.7% of positions in the national government were occupied by women, up from 0% in 2010 (EIGE, 2022). As of 2022, Hungary had the lowest share of women in parliament and national governments among all EU members (EIGE, 2022). Women filling roles at the national level banded together and took to the bully pulpit in February 2019. Female politicians from all the opposition parties in Hungary united against the government's new overtime bill, referred to as the "slave law"; perhaps signaling future growth in the strength of female representation in Hungary (Walker, 2018). Between 2010/2011 and 2021/2022, there has been very modest growth in the pull pressure emanating from Hungary domestically, though it is still categorized as weak.




Figure 7.1: Percent of Seats Held by Women in National Parliament, 2022 from EIGE




Figure 7.2: Seats Held by Women in National Government, 2022 from EIGE

The elements of push pressure emanating from the international, saw significant decrease in push pressure from the 2010/2011 period to the 2021/2022 period. As of December 2022, 104

countries adopted NAPs for the implementation of 1325 (Peacewomen). Every neighboring country with a shared border had adopted a NAP by 2021, including Croatia, Serbia, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. Furthermore, other neighboring countries including BiH, Czech Republic, Poland, Kosovo, and Montenegro had also adopted NAPs by 2021 (Peacewomen). Hungary is still a member of NATO and EAPC so the presence of peer pressure is still strong. As of 2017, NATO has noted Hungary has not taken any action to implement the 2015, 2016, or 2017 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives Recommendations (NATO, 2017). Similar to Hungary in 2010/2011, peer pressure is still a significant factor. Another aspect of push pressure at the international level is the competition for a Security Council seat. However, during the 2021/2022 timeframe, Hungary was not a prospective candidate for a Security Council seat, so there is no pressure present from this element. The final aspect of international pressure, UN financial standing, is also a non-issue in 2022 because Hungary is current on dues from 2018 through September 2022 (UN GA, 2022). Compared to 2010/2011, push pressure is weak for Hungary in 2022.

In the 2022 analysis, the logic of consequences via coercion is now absent and there is neither logic of consequence nor logic of appropriateness serving as a source of pressure on Hungary to adopt a NAP. I again point to the argument that Hungary likely views compliance as being detrimental. Eva Fodor's 2021 analysis of Orbán and the government since 2010, highlights how Orbán started with small legislation which ended the requirement to eliminate gender stereotypes in the kindergarten curriculum (2021). Later the government refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention because of the use of the word "gender." From there the government has moved to remove the term from domestic legislation as well as other international proposals to which it is a party. The government amended its constitution in December 2020 to define that a

family can only consist of a male as father and a female as a mother, and the government continues to take more codified steps to control women through constrained reproductive rights, appropriate social roles, and largely trying to limit women to traditional roles in the home. Furthermore, the Hungarian government stopped funding NGOs which addressed gender equality problems and put an end to all government agencies that designed, implemented and monitored legislation to promote women (Fodor, 2021). All of this highlights the manner in which 1325 is truly at odds with the Hungarian government's agenda to enact control and as such implementing 1325 would be detrimental to its efforts.

While women's participation in the military has not been hindered, the true cost which Hungary may see as detrimental to the country likely lies in UNSCR 1325's acknowledgement of violence against women. Greater acknowledgement of and consideration of women and violence against women is a cost without any evident benefits, that Hungary is unwilling to bear. Sufficient pressure emanating from the domestic or international levels or a combination thereof must be present in order for Hungary's calculation of benefit to be changed in such a way that would result in compliance and NAP adoption.

Conclusion




Figure 7.3: Modified Model Applied to Hungary 2010/2011




Figure 7.4: Modified Model Applied to Hungary 2022

As of December 2022, Hungary made no visible signs of progress in efforts to draft and adopt a NAP beyond Katalin Bogyay's pronouncement in October of 2019. Under Viktor Orbán's administration, Hungary has been described as backsliding on women's rights, targeting civic groups, and systemically detaining asylum-seekers (Gorondi, 2019). Furthermore, the Commissioner for the Council of Europe has stated, "the space for the work of NGOs, human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government has become very narrow and restricted" (Council of Europe, 2019). Given the actions of Hungary's administration, the adoption of a NAP on 1325 seems unlikely. Bogyay and Orbán may just be giving lip service to the UN, or if Hungary does adopt a NAP in the coming year, it seems probable that it would just be an act for the Orbán government to point to in an attempt to quiet criticisms of the governments

In analyzing the participation of women within Hungary's UN Peacekeeping missions between 2009 and 2021, since 2009 Hungary has had an overall increase of total women in peacekeeping missions by 6.9%, with a 27.3% increase in women's participation as experts, and a 6.8% decrease in women's participation in troop roles. There has been no change in women's participation within the role of police which has been 0 since 2009. The UN did not generate data on the role of staff officer until 2017, however, as of 2021 33.3% of staff officer roles for Hungary were occupied by female personnel. Among NATO countries, Hungary has consistently had high female participation as compared to its counterparts (UN data). However, the rate of women's participation in troops in peacekeeping missions is less than the rate at which women occupy military roles with the Hungarian Defence Forces. In 2008, women made up 19.6% of HDF's professional and contract soldiers (Kaur, 2016). In 2017, women made up 19.3% of active military personnel and 10.7% of military reserves in Hungary (NATO, 2017). In

Hungary's participation in UN peacekeeping missions, that the expert roles and staff officer roles have been the most significant space in which women have made participatory gains in the last decade.

The 2010/2011 timeframe appeared to be the most likely time in which Hungary would have been likely to adopt a NAP to implement UNSCR 1325, but it did not. While the government of Hungary has made statements in the more recent years that it had intentions of adopting a NAP, that seems improbable. In October 2015, Katalin Bogyay made a statement on the debate of Women, Peace, and Security, "Hungary fully allies itself with the common pledges on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security delivered by the observer of the European Union... We also commit ourselves to stepping up all efforts aimed at strengthening justice and accountability" (Peace Women, 2015). Again, in October 2019, Bogyay, associating herself with the Group of Friends of Women, Peace, and Security as well as the African Women's Leaders Network, told UN press that Hungary was currently in the process of drafting a national action plan on the topic of Women, Peace, and Security (UN, 2019). As of April 2023, no known draft or NAP has been published.

While pull pressure from the domestic remains weak, there will be insufficient pressure to enact change. Given Hungary's historical capacity for controlling the narrative specific to sexual violence in conflict, its increasingly conservative political climate domestically, regressive policies with respect to women it seems, and its historical lack of inclination to cooperate with and ratify international policy specific to violence against women, I suspect that a NAP is unlikely to be in Hungary's future.




Figure 7.5: Percent of Hungarian Women in UN Peacekeeping Missions; source UN Data

Expectations tested within this null case study include the following:

In instances of policy misfit, a combination of sufficient pressure from the domestic and international must be present in order to achieve compliance.

In instances of policy misfit, where there is no to low pressure from the domestic and international there will be no to low compliance

In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles

The case of Hungary lends support for the first expectation. In 2010-2011, Hungary was a so-so fit for 1325. During that time pull pressure emanating from the domestic level was weak and even with the strong push pressure emanating from the international level this combination

was not sufficient to result in compliance. In 2022, Hungary is still a poor fit for 1325, given the changing domestic climate. During that time, pull pressure remained weak and push pressure was also weak thus lacking sufficient pressure to prompt compliance. In consideration of these factors, the case of Hungary also lends support for the second expectation. With a poor fit and low pressure, we see no compliance in either timeframe.

The case of Hungary does not support the third expectation. There is no compliance with 1325 by Hungary; however, there was growth in women's participation in peacekeeping mission roles which actually exceeded a number of the compliant countries discussed previously in this project. Hungary's membership in NATO is likely a significant factor in Hungary's growth in women's participation. NATO and Women in NATO Armed Forces (WINF) has maintained a focused effort on implementing a Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in the years following the introduction of 1325. In 2010, NATO published a brochure for its member countries, in which, NATO detailed a number of recommendations for member countries related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NATO, 2010). NATO continues to modify its organized implementation of 1325 within the organization (NATO, 2023). Hungary joined NATO in 1999. The year prior to joining representative of Hungary attended the 1998 NATO conference in Brussels. During the 1998 conference, a dialogue between the Committee on Women and NATO's Partnership for Peace program took place. Topics discussed highlighted issues related to equality, recruitment, retention, mentoring, and improving the quality of life for women in the military by addressing discrimination and sexual harassment (Garcia, 1999). Just a few years later, in 2003, the Hungarian National Report Committee on Women in the NATO Forces was published. The report discussed topics like ensuring equal rights between men and women. However, the report highlighted Hungary's traditional views on gender roles within the military.

Specifically, within the “recruitment” section, the Hungary report notes, “During the recruitment women applying for contracted service were offered posts which comply with the particularities of their sex, however it’s a regular case that themselves ask for so called manful posts in order to prove that they are able to come up challenges raised by the post” (Hungary, 2003). Additionally, the “deployment section” notes, “Hungarian service women have deployed in support of IFOT, SFOR, KFOR, UNFICYP missions since 1996. They continue to serve as doctors, medical technicians, personnel, in administrative posts as well as in signal corps. Recruitment policy for these types of missions is the same for women and men – screening process including a physical and mental examination and military peacekeeping training” (Hungary, 2003). While UN Gender data does not disaggregate within roles, based on this information, it would not be surprising to find that women’s participation within Hungarian peacekeeping may be largely within roles deemed to be more “appropriate” and less “manful posts” as the government put it in 2003.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

At the outset of this project, I developed a number of expectations which I tested through analysis of three paired case as well as a sole null case. In each paired case studies, the expectations tested showed the strongest support for expectations one and five. Figure 8.1 depicts the findings across the case studies with respect to the previously established expectations. Generally, the paired case study analysis tends to support the expectations.

My expectations for the application of the model to my case study countries include the following:

- 1) *In instance of policy misfit, a combination of sufficient pressure from the domestic and international must be present in order to achieve compliance*
- 2) *In instances of policy misfit, where there is no to low pressure from the domestic and international there will be no to low compliance*
- 3) *In instances where there is a good policy fit, pressure may not be necessary to achieve compliance, but greater pressure may contribute to more NAP specificity*
- 4) *In instances of greater pressure, there will be greater compliance via earlier adoption and specificity*
- 5) *In instances where there is greater compliance, there will be greater growth in the number of women participating in peacekeeping mission roles*

Expectation 1 achieves the strongest support and was tested across three of the case study chapters. The paired comparison of Ghana and Cameroon support the first expectation. Ghana and Cameroon are both a poor fit, but both experienced a combination of pressure in pull and push form and ultimately adopted NAPs. In the paired comparison of Chile and Brazil, Brazil is a poor fit and lends support for the first expectation. 1325 was deemed to be a poor fit for Brazil and not until 62 other countries, including three regional neighbors had adopted, did Brazil adopt a NAP. Also NAP adoption transpired at a time when Brazil was ardently seeking a permanent

seat at the UN Security Council, so 2017 was the moment when there was finally sufficient pressure present in order for Brazil to comply. The case of Hungary lends support for the first expectation. In 2010-2011, 1325 was deemed to be a so-so fit for Hungary and during that time pull pressure emanating from the domestic level was weak and even with the strong push pressure emanating from the international level this combination was not sufficient to result in compliance. In 2022, 1325 was deemed to be a poor fit for Hungary, given the changing domestic climate, and during that time pull pressure remained weak and push pressure was also weak thus lacking sufficient pressure to instill compliance. In consideration of these factors, the case of Hungary also lends support for the second expectation. With a poor fit and low pressure, there was no compliance in either timeframe.

Expectation 2 gains support, though it was tested only by the case of Hungary. In 2010-2011, 1325 was deemed to be a so-so fit for Hungary and during that time pull pressure emanating from the domestic level was weak and even with the strong push pressure emanating from the international level this combination was not sufficient to result in compliance. In 2022, 1325 was still a poor fit for Hungary, given the changing domestic climate, and during that time pull pressure remained weak and push pressure was also weak thus lacking sufficient pressure to instill compliance. In consideration of these factors, the case of Hungary also lends support for the second expectation. With a poor fit and low pressure, there was no compliance in either timeframe.

Expectation 3 achieves mixed support and was tested in two case study chapters. The paired comparison of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia offered support for this expectation. BiH and Croatia were each a so-so fit. BiH saw a greater degree of pressure in comparison to Croatia and achieved a greater specificity score with respect to the content of its

NAP in comparison to Croatia. However, a case with a stronger “good fit” or “perfect fit” will be a better test for this expectation. In the paired comparison of Chile and Brazil, Chile is a so-so fit, though it is the case that comes closest to achieving a good fit. In particular the case of Chile lends mixed support for the second expectation. 1325 was a so-so fit which likely aided in early adoption. Chile experienced a combination of moderate and strong pressure for adoption, but the end result NAP was far from high scoring in terms of specificity. It is possible that with a stronger civil society presence and involvement, the NAP may have been more specific in terms of content. In comparison to Brazil, Chile had a better score with respect to NAP specificity, but not by much.

Expectation 4 achieves mixed support and was tested across three case study chapters. The paired comparison of BiH and Croatia does not support this expectation. BiH had greater pressure and adopted earlier in 2010, while Croatia did not adopt until 2012. BiH’s NAP also was more specific in terms of content with a specificity score of 7 out of 9, while Croatia’s NAP had a specificity score of 4 out of 9. The paired comparison of Ghana and Cameroon lends mixed support for this expectation. Ghana had greater presence of pressure and adopted much earlier than Cameroon. However, when Cameroon did later adopt, its NAP was much more specific in terms of content. Cameroon had negligible push pressure but did ultimately achieve compliance, though it was a late adopter. The presence of a strong pull pressure may have been a sufficient catalyst. Given the greater time and resources available to aid in the development of NAP content, it is not surprising that Cameroon’s NAP was more specific, but this combination of outcome results in mixed support for this expectation. The paired comparison of Chile and Brazil lends support for this expectation. Chile saw a greater combination of pull and push pressure and

adopted its NAP 8 years prior to Brazil which saw a lesser combination of pull and push pressure. Chile's NAP also had a slightly stronger specificity in terms of content.

Expectation 5 was tested across each of the four case chapters and achieves support in three of the four cases. The paired comparison of BiH and Croatia offered support for this expectation. BiH had a greater compliance score of 40 in consideration of its earlier adoption and greater specificity compared to Croatia's compliance score of 24 with its later adoption and less specific NAP. In the time since its NAP adoption BiH has had 18.8% growth overall in women's participation within peacekeeping missions while Croatia has had 3.1% growth overall in women's participation within peacekeeping missions. The paired comparison of Ghana and Cameroon also supported this expectation. Ghana had a slightly greater score with respect to compliance with 2012 adoption and 5 out of 9 specificity, it achieved a compliance score of 30. Cameroon had 2017 adoption and 7 out of 9 specificity, it achieved a compliance score of 28. Ghana saw 6.1% growth in women's participation within peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption and Cameroon saw 4.5% growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption. The paired comparison of Chile and Brazil also lent support for this expectation. Chile had a greater compliance score of 32 due to 2009 adoption and 4 out of 9 specificity on NAP content. Brazil had a compliance score of 12 due to 2017 adoption and a 3 out of 9 on NAP specificity. Since its NAP adoption, Chile has had 19.8% growth in women's participation within peacekeeping missions versus Brazil's 10.6% growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions since its NAP adoption. The null case of Hungary does not support this expectation. There is no compliance with 1325 by Hungary; however, there was growth in women's participation in peacekeeping mission roles. That exceeded a number of the compliant countries discussed previously in this project and as previously noted this is likely

because of Hungary's NATO membership and NATO's proactive stance on the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda; however, it seems probable that women's participation may be limited to more "gender traditional" roles.

	<i>SUPPORT</i>	<i>NO SUPPORT</i>	<i>MIXED SUPPORT</i>
IN INSTANCE OF POLICY MISFIT, A COMBINATION OF SUFFICIENT PRESSURE FROM THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MUST BE PRESENT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE	<i>Ghana/Cameroon</i> <i>Brazil/Chile</i> <i>Hungary</i>		
IN INSTANCES OF POLICY MISFIT, WHERE THERE IS NO TO LOW PRESSURE FROM THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL THERE WILL BE NO TO LOW COMPLIANCE	<i>Hungary</i>		
IN INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A GOOD POLICY FIT, PRESSURE MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE, BUT GREATER PRESSURE MAY CONTRIBUTE TO MORE NAP SPECIFICITY	<i>BiH/Croatia</i> <i>Brazil/Chile</i>		
IN INSTANCES OF GREATER PRESSURE, THERE WILL BE GREATER COMPLIANCE VIA EARLIER ADOPTION AND SPECIFICITY	<i>Chile/Brazil</i>	<i>BiH/Croatia</i>	<i>Ghana/Cameroon</i>
IN INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS GREATER COMPLIANCE, THERE WILL BE GREATER GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF WOMEN PARTICIPATING IN PEACEKEEPING MISSION ROLES	<i>BiH/Croatia</i> <i>Ghana/Cameroon</i> <i>Chile/Brazil</i>		

Figure 8.1: Findings

Overall participation trends




Figure 8.2: Overall Participation Growth Since NAP Adoption by Compliance, Source: UN Data

Consistent with expectations, the countries with the higher compliance scores tend to show greater growth with respect to women's participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, Brazil and Hungary prove to be outliers in that while they have the lowest compliance out of the cases analyzed, they have greater growth rates than three countries with higher compliance scores.




Figure 8.3: Overall Participation Growth by Year of NAP Adoption




Figure 8.4: Overall Participation Growth by NAP Specificity

Of the countries analyzed in this project, the two countries with the earliest adoption do prove to have the greatest overall growth in women's participation. Though Figure 8.2 depicts compliance score as it relates to growth in women's participation in peacekeeping missions; this is a better indicator for compliance than year of adoption alone. In terms of 8.2 depicts NAP specificity as an indicator of growth in women's participation, again the compliance score proves to be a better indicator than NAP specificity alone.




Figure 8.5: Change in Participation Across Roles since NAP Adoption

When looked at altogether support for the expectations becomes more mixed but in general the outlook for women's participation has been positive seeing modest to moderate increases in women's participation overall. In particular, women's participation in the role of experts has seen considerable growth across the case studies. Women's participation in police and troops has been more mixed. Given that these are arguably the more traditionally masculine roles, it is not surprising that growth in these areas has not been as consistent.

Recommendations

As more countries continue on the endeavor of drafting and redrafting their NAPs as they relate to 1325 and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, there are a number of items for prospective drafters and advocates to consider. This project has highlighted that women continue to face obstacles gaining access to the roles of peacekeeping troops and police. A potential area of focus for future NAP drafters could be to focus attention on overcoming the barriers that exist to women in gaining access to these roles. This project has also highlighted the importance of

women's groups and their inclusion in the NAP drafting process. Advocates and drafters should seek to leverage women's groups domestically for their expertise. Additionally, advocates and drafters should seek to engage with regional and international women's organizations who have worked with UN Women. These entities are a source of knowledge that can aid drafters and advocates in drafting NAPs which meet higher standards of specificity. This project, through content analysis, has outlined the importance of specificity. The results indicate that greater specificity, as a component of greater compliance, leads to the desirable outcome of greater participation of women in peacekeeping missions.

On March 7, 2023, Ms. Sima Bahous, UN Under-Secretary-General and UN Women Executive Director to the UN Security Council delivered a speech to calling for “radical change” during the debate on Women, Peace and Security. Bahous highlighted that while many firsts have been accomplished within the realm of gender equality the stark reality is that there has been no significant change with respect to peace tables or violence committed against women within the context of conflict (Bahous, 2023). Bahous noted that with the 25-year anniversary of 1325 in our near future the time is now to enact radical change. Bahous made the following call for action:

“First, we cannot expect 2025 to be any different if the bulk of our interventions continue to be trainings, sensitization, guidance, capacity building, setting up networks, and holding one event after another to talk about women's participation, rather than mandating it in every meeting and decision-making process in which we have authority.

I ask that your plans be remarkable for their special measures and accountability for their application: that they be characterized by mandates, conditions, quotas, funding earmarks, incentives, and consequences for non-compliance. To transform the way, we do peace and security will take more than exhortations and consultations in the margins.

Second, we need to broaden our reach to get resources to those who most need them—and don't have them. The best tool that we have in the United Nations to channel funds to women's organizations in conflict-affected countries is the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund” (Bahous, 2023).

Consistent with Bahous' call for action, my prior recommendation of effectively leveraging women's groups and advocates in the drafting process stands. Additionally, I think that Bahous and UN Women should focus their efforts on tying these calls for action to the UN Security Council non-permanent member elections process. In contested elections for rotating non-permanent member seats, candidate countries typically campaign for support to voting countries. As a part of this campaigning process, candidate countries bargain and make commitments to the voting population (Library of Parliament, 2019). I recommend that UN Women leverage this as an opportunity for ensuring greater commitment to 1325 by advocating to the voting countries to demand a commitment for NAP development, for those candidate countries that still lack NAPs, and demand a commitment for improved NAP revisions for those candidate countries that do have NAPs. Specifically, for countries to move beyond the "training, sensitization, guidance, capacity building" etc. that Bahous details and to include concrete mandates, quotas, and clear funding lines. UN Women is in a unique position to proactively advocate for its radical call to action. UN Women can highlight its resources and aid member countries in connecting with women's organizations that can support countries' efforts to make these radical changes. UN Women can drive this effort from its headquarters as well as through its country-based offices. Country-based offices can leverage their working relationships with other women's organizations in-country and regionally to push this effort.

Additionally, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, can leverage his position of power to hold contributing member countries accountable. The Department of Peace Operations is responsible for providing "political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the

implementation of Security Council mandates” (UN Peacekeeping, 2023). Similar to the prior recommendation, I think to ensure the radical change called for by Bahous, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations should tie desired positions within peace operations to UNSCR 1325 compliance. Specifically, if contributing countries are vying for leadership roles of peacekeeping missions or other peace operations, then it should be an established requirement that the country have a NAP in place. Furthermore, there should be established expectations with respect to greater NAP specificity and inclusion of mandates, quotas, and financial earmarks as called for by Bahous. Countries determined to be in greater compliance with UNSCR 1325 should be the countries tapped to lead peacekeeping missions and peace operations, as those are the countries that have taken the steps to build their reputation with respect to gender equality as well as a reputation for cooperating with the standards set by the UN Security Council.

Logic of Consequences vs. Logic of Appropriateness

As noted at the start of this project, Borzel rejects pitching the logics of “appropriateness” and “consequences” against one another, and calls for exploration of how they can relate to each other (2003). This project has utilized a modification of Borzel’s model to highlight some ways these logics do in fact work together. The cases of Chile, Croatia, and Ghana show that pressure emanating from both appropriateness and consequences have worked together to overcome issues of misfit to ensure compliance with UNSCR 1325. While the cases of Brazil, BiH, and Cameroon show that appropriateness or consequences alone have overcome issues of misfit to ensure compliance. In this project I have evaluated 7 different countries and their paths to compliance or lack thereof. Of the six countries that ultimately achieved compliance with UNSCR 1325, 3 had a mix of appropriateness and consequences present, 2 countries had only consequences present, and one country had only appropriateness present. In the null case,

Hungary, during the 2010/2011 timeframe of evaluation only consequences were present, and, by 2022, neither consequences nor appropriateness were evident.

BiH had a combination of solely consequences at play via coercion and reputation. Croatia had a combination of consequences via domestic institutions and appropriateness via reputation. Ghana had a combination of consequences via domestic institutions, reputation, and coercion paired with appropriateness via reputation. Cameroon had a combination of solely appropriateness in the form of legitimacy, reputation and capacity. Chile had a combination of consequences via coercion and appropriateness via legitimacy and reputation. Brazil had a combination of solely consequences in the form of coercion and reputation. Hungary had solely the consequence via coercion present in the 2010/2011 analysis, this instance lent support for refuting the explanatory power of tit-for-tat as well. By 2022, Hungary saw neither the logic of consequences nor the logic of appropriateness present. Coercion was the most frequently seen factor with respect to the logic of consequences, while reputation was the most frequently seen factor with respect to the logic of appropriateness.

Implications

This project lends support for the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness being complementary. My modification of Borzel's model brings these complementary explanations together to show how pressure emanating in different forms can combine to create a sufficient impetus to ensure compliance with UNSCR 1325 even in light of its non-mandated status. While sometimes one source of pressure alone is sufficient, often they operate in collaboration. This project further shows that Borzel's model, while modified, holds explanatory power beyond EU policies.

The null case in this project also indicated an important finding: 1325 compliance is not the only means to improve women's participation as is evidenced by the case of Hungary. However, Hungary's continued rejection of policy from the international level that is intended to address violence against women, speaks to ideological noncompliance. Women's participation is just one element of 1325, granted a primary focus of this project, however it would be interesting to see how Hungary is performing with respect to other elements of 1325.

Overall, this project lends support for the argument that compliance with UNSCR 1325 results in increased participation of women in UN peacekeeping missions. Women have seen significant growth in the role of experts, but not strong growth in the areas of police and troops. This is consistent with the expectation that these particular roles, being the more traditionally masculine roles, are harder for women to break into and gain acceptance within. In the over twenty years since UNSCR 1325 has been adopted, more countries have continued to draft or revise NAPs to implement 1325 at the domestic level. Adopters continue to focus on Women, Peace, and Security as a prominent aspect of their focus on international security issues. This project shows that the domestic context of a country and the internal and external pressures they experience, impact how policies to implement this action and in turn affects the makeup of its peacekeeping mission personnel.

Appendix A: IRB Exemption and Sample Interview Protocol

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY



INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD MEMORANDUM

TO: Miriam Elman
DATE: September 23, 2019
SUBJECT: IRB Review Not Required
IRB#: 19-253
TITLE: *Comparative UNSCR 1325 Policy Implementation: National Action Plans and Gender Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions*

It has been determined by the Office of Research Integrity and Protections that the information submitted pertaining to the above referenced protocol does not meet the definition of human subjects research ("a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge involving any intervention or interaction with a living individual about whom an investigator conducting research obtains data through an intervention or interaction, or identifiable private information.") and does not require IRB oversight.

Should there be any change in the nature of the activity originally proposed (e.g. testing results used for research purposes), a new protocol application specific to these changes must be submitted. Thank you for your cooperation in our shared efforts to assure that the rights and welfare of people participating in research are protected.

Sincerely,

Tracy Crompton
 Director
 Office of Research Integrity and Protections

DEPT: Political Science, 100 Eggars Hall

STUDENT: Carly Rasiewicz

Sample semi-structured interview guide

1. Opening Remarks

Thank you very much for meeting with me today, I anticipate that our conversation will last approximately one hour, but please let me know if you need to leave early or break at any time.

As I have mentioned, I am doing research for my PhD dissertation project. I am interested in learning about how countries implement UNSCR 1325 domestically through the use of National Action Plans and how that ultimately affects gender participation in UN peacekeeping missions.

As per the consent form, you are free to refuse to answer any of these questions, and to retract your statements at any time during or after our interview. Your responses will remain confidential. If I use direct quotes from these interviews in my research, identifying information will be removed unless you authorize identifying information to be included. Please stop me at any time if you have any questions about this process.

Do you have any questions before we start?

I am going to begin recording our conversation now.

2. Introductory questions

Could you tell me about your role with the advocacy, development, drafting and/or adoption of a National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 in your country?

3. Questions about policy fit

How did existing military policy fit with the goals of UNSCR 1325?

How did historical gender equality within the country fit with the goals of UNSCR 1325?

4. Questions about international influence

Did country membership or involvement in international organizations affect country's NAP process? If so, how and what international organizations?

Was the country vying for a Security Council seat with the UN in the lead-up to NAP adoption or lack thereof? If so, how did that play a role in the NAP process domestically?

How did the country's standing in the UN affect the NAP process?

5. Questions about domestic influence

What role did civil society, specifically women's groups, play in the country's NAP process?

What role did local level bureaucrats and politicians play in the country's NAP process?

What role did national level policymakers play in the country's NAP process?

6. Questions about NAP drafting process

Who was actively involved in the NAP drafting process?

Who was not included in the NAP drafting process?

How long did the NAP drafting process take?

If any, what were obstacles faced during the NAP drafting process?

7. Questions about NAP content

Were other countries' NAPs used as a basis for the content of country's NAP?

What do you think are the most important details included in the country's NAP? What makes those details so important?

Do you think the NAP is missing details that would be important for successful implementation? If so, what are those details and why are they so important?

8. Questions about NAP effect on UN Peacekeeping Missions

How has the country's NAP affected the inclusion of women in UN peacekeeping missions?

How has the country's NAP affected gendered participation in UN peacekeeping missions?

9. Concluding questions

Do you have anything that you would like to add before we finish?

Appendix B: Primary Sources

National Action Plans	Published
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010
Croatia	2011
Ghana	2012
Cameroon	2017
Chile	2009
Brazil	2017

NAPS available via <http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/>

Interview	Country	Conducted
Interviewee 1	Brazil	2019
Interviewee 2	Brazil	2019
Interviewee 3	Brazil	2019
Paulette Beat	Cameroon	2020
Interviewee 4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021

Appendix C: UN Security Council Resolution 1325

United Nations

S/RES/1325 (2000)



Security Council

Distr.: General
31 October 2000

Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on
31 October 2000*The Security Council,*

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to

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submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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