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Chilean Media and Public Opinion (1973-2013)

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Chilean Media and Public Opinion (1973-2013)

A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Renée Crown
University Honors Program at Syracuse University

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Abstract

In this thesis, I examine the extent to which the media censorship of the Pinochet dictatorship, which ended over 20 years ago, continues to influence Chilean public opinion and policy today. The dictatorship's control, penetration and censorship of the press in the 1970s and 1980s appears to have created a lack of pluralism in the media that helped the dictatorship retain political power for 17 years. However, it seems that the dictatorship's influence did not end with its reign and that this lack of media pluralism still exists today and could be correlated with a widespread conservatism in Chilean public opinion.

After providing a brief history of Chile and the dictatorship's immediate impact on the media, I present a qualitative analysis that compares *El Mercurio*, a conservative and prominent Chilean newspaper, and *La Nación*, a newspaper that historically has served as the government mouthpiece, to determine if both the 1973 and present press have conservative tendencies that could impact readers. To discover if the findings are unique to Chile, I compare the results to those of the Argentine press and indicate that Argentina has more media pluralism and less widespread conservatism than Chile, regardless of the two nation's similarities. Lastly, to determine if the dictatorship's censorship has had a tangible impact on Chilean public opinion today, I quantitatively analyze media framing bias through cross-tabulations of Chilean ideology and trends in news consumption. Based on the comparative content analysis of Chilean newspapers both during and after the dictatorship, the juxtaposition of these findings to trends in Argentine media, and the quantitative analysis of the relationship between Chilean media and trends in public opinion, I conclude that, while the dictatorship's censorship still influences content in the press today, there are other factors that may be more significant in influencing Chilean public opinion and policy.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary..... 5
Chapter 1: Historical Background..... 8

Chapter 2: Chilean Media and the Dictatorship.....	13
Chapter 3: <i>El Mercurio</i> vs. <i>La Nación</i>	26
Chapter 4: Media and the Southern Cone.....	45
Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis of Chilean Media and Public Opinion...51	
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	74
Works Cited.....	77

Executive Summary

This paper aims to discover if the 1973-1990 Chilean dictatorship had a significant and lasting influence on the Chilean press and, subsequently, Chilean public opinion. Before and during the military dictatorship, Pinochet and his followers employed numerous propaganda and censorship tactics that resulted in a lack of press freedom. As a result, little ideological diversity proliferated among the media within Chilean society, which created a conservative consensus among the information disseminated. Furthermore, limits on the oppositional and leftist press forced many outlets either to close or to sell to one of the two large conservative media conglomerates that still dominate most Chilean outlets today.

Even among the newspapers that were permitted to circulate during the dictatorship, evidence suggests that selection and presentation bias may have had a significant impact on Chilean public opinion during the time, thus allowing the dictatorship to retain power for as long as it did. By comparing a pre-coup issue of *El Mercurio*, the most widely circulated and conservative newspaper in Chile, to a pre-coup issue of *La Nación*, the historically government-operated newspaper, I determine that both left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers disseminated what the Groeling study defines as “biased” information. However, due to the conservative *El Mercurio*'s higher circulation and credibility, it likely had more of an impact than other newspapers.

To determine if a bias in framing and word choice still exists among the Chilean press today, I compare two current issues of these same newspapers and conclude that, when using definitions of media bias from the Groeling study, *El Mercurio* appears to hold a slight conservative bias today, while *La Nación* appears to have become politically neutral. While there are a number of factors that could not be accounted for in this study, such as the context of political events and changes in technology, this conclusion indicates that, although small, the

dictatorship's control of the media still impacts the type of information that Chileans receive today.

In comparing Chilean media with Argentine media, a country that experienced a similar dictatorship, I indicate that, qualitatively, the impact of conservative bias and framing in Chile appears to be more significant than that of Argentina. In doing so, I create an opportunity for further research analyzing the effects of other Latin American dictatorships on the press to examine whether or not Chile is similar or the exception.

After determining that a conservative leaning existed and still exists within the content of Chilean newspapers, I hypothesize that the dictatorship's impact on the press in the 1970s and 1980s is correlated with a more conservative public opinion today. I perform a quantitative analysis using survey data from Latinobarómetro to examine the relationship between the Chileans that choose newspapers as a way to obtain political information and how they identify on the left-right ideological scale. By comparing these results to Argentine media and to other media platforms, it appears that Chileans have more conservatism, regardless of what media outlet they use to inform themselves and regardless of the frequency with which they use their preferred media outlet. However, when controlling for other possible reasons that a conservative public opinion exists in Chile, I identify that the press may not be a statistically significant factor. This result could be due to a number of reasons, one of which is simply that the press is not as important as education or income, but it could also be that newspaper readers have become more conservative and then, disseminate their views to non-readers who also become more conservative, thus affecting overall public opinion.

While, in conclusion, I still maintain that the dictatorship had an influence on the press and aided in the creation of a conservative media, I acknowledge that the extent of the dictatorship's

effects today could be attributed to a variety of factors that are difficult to isolate and that more research is needed in order to determine the full impact of the dictatorship on the Chilean media and society today.

Chapter 1: Historical Background

In this chapter, I present historical information about September 1973 and the political, social and economic environment in Chile leading up to the Pinochet dictatorship in order to provide the context for the current media environment and indicate how it may influence public opinion.

I. Independence

Starting with its declaration of independence from Spain in 1810, Chile experienced extensive political and party conflict that has had lasting effects on its society. From 1810 to 1814, military aristocrat José Miguel Carrera ruled the nation during the *Patria Vieja (Old Country)* and set the precedent for military involvement in the government (Astudillo, 2013). However, his dictatorial way of governing caused controversy and tension, and prompted a state of anarchy and war known as the *Reconquista (Reconquest)*, in which Spanish loyalists tried to reclaim control (Astudillo, 2013).

In 1817, Chilean nationalists defeated the loyalists in the Battle of Chacabuco and established the *Patria Nueva (New Country)* with an official declaration of independence (Astudillo, 2013). Conservative Bernardo O'Higgins was the president of the new nation, but he had a similar authoritarian governing style to Carrera and, as a result, there was much discontent and unrest. O'Higgins was forced into exile and, once again, Chile went into years of anarchy and turmoil (Paredes, 2013).

II. Constitution

In 1833, wealthy businessmen and dictator Diego Portales implemented a formal constitution and republic (Paredes, 2013). Conservative Portales valued peace, order and control and, among other things, he was able to maintain his power through the censorship of the press. His constitution gave extensive power to the executive branch, which was run by a wealthy oligarchy, and he set up a civil militia that supported the military authorities in Chilean government, which is a move that would influence Chilean government for centuries (Paredes, 2013). Furthermore, while the Chilean Congress created by the new constitution was supposed to check the power of the executive branch, it was not given any significant capabilities and was dominated by elites who often participated in bribes and fraud (Paredes, 2013).

It was not until the 1920s that middle and lower classes gained enough power to create a coalition and elect a more liberal president, Alexander Alessandri. However, the traditionalist and conservative military staged a double coup that threw Chile into political chaos yet again so that, between the years of 1924 and 1932, Chile had a span of ten dictators (Paredes, 2013).

III. Allende

It was just after this time that the position of a Chilean centrist political party became an important factor. Scully (1992) states that Chilean centrist parties, due to coalitions created among the working and middle classes, gained power and influence during three important junctures, the last of which occurred during the election of Eduardo Frei in 1964. Frei implemented far more liberal programs than any previous ruler; however, he was a member of a centrist party and many members of the left wing felt that his reforms did not reach far enough (Paredes, 2013). Therefore, in 1970, socialist and communist parties joined forces to elect Salvador Allende, a member of the Popular Unity, to the presidency.

Allende's policies were more leftist than any other previous Chilean president. In part due to support from the Christian Democratic Party, the centrist party, Allende created a platform based on the nationalization of industries, the division of the economy into both public and private sectors and the advancement of union and worker rights (Scully, 1992). However, his policies posed a threat to the Chilean elite and to U.S. economic and political interests, which prompted a strong opposition movement.

As Allende's presidency progressed, inflation and unemployment increased and the economy plummeted, which fueled the opposition. Even those who had previously supported him, namely the centrist Christian Democratic Party that dominated Congress, withdrew support and made it difficult for him to achieve success (Scully, 1992). In fact, Valenzuela (1978) argues that the

recurring loss of support of the centrist party throughout Chilean history, which is what happened during Allende's presidency, has been the key contributor to the instability of Chilean democracy and consistent dictatorial leadership.

IV. The Dictatorship

By 1972, inflation had skyrocketed and the economy was suffering so significantly that there was an eruption of social and political discontent in the form of strikes and protests (Astudillo, 2013). As a reaction, the head of the army, General Augusto Pinochet, led a military coup and took control of the nation on September 11, 1973. At the time, many members of the public were relieved that order and peace were restored (Astudillo, 2013). However, it soon became clear that this order and peace would come at the expense of personal liberties. For the next 17 years, Chile was under the harsh military rule of the Pinochet dictatorship, which, among other things, entailed curfew, a new constitution, extensive censorship of the press, the closure of a national congress, and large-scale torture and execution of the opposition (Paredes, 2013).

In 1988, Pinochet lost the plebiscite due to bad publicity from human rights violations and discontent with the struggling economy. While democracy was restored with the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1989, Pinochet continued to hold a key governmental position, serving as the Commander-in-Chief of the army for a number of years and, later, as a senator and top-level advisor until his death in 2006 (Paredes, 2013). From 1990 to 2001, centrist democratically elected governments held power, but due to Pinochet's continued influence, Chilean government and society did not change much during this "transitional" period, and power remained concentrated in the hands of the conservative members of the previous regime.

V. Today

In 2006, Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party was elected and, after forgoing the 2010 term while a more conservative Sebastian Piñera served, she was recently reelected to a new term in 2014. However, since the Pinochet dictatorship, there have been few major policy reforms that have altered Chilean society. For example, the nation is still governed using the 1980 Constitution written by the Pinochet regime and Chile still remains one of the most privatized countries in the world, with transportation, water and social security all privately owned (Mallén, 2013). Due to the ongoing historical impact of conservative dictatorships and the lack of significant policy reforms, I hypothesize that the media and public opinion have also experienced lasting effects from the Pinochet regime.

Chapter 2: Chilean Media and the Dictatorship

In light of understanding the historical context of Chilean government and society as a whole, the purpose of this chapter is to provide specific history and information about the newspapers and other media outlets in Chile and their role in the dictatorship to provide the context to understand the media climate today.

I. The Allende Years

Before the 1970s, the Chilean press was relatively heterogeneous (Baltra, 1988). While there were ample social and economic divisions in Chilean society that permitted the wealthy to dominate most outlets of communication with education and political clout, there were laws in the 19th century that protected the freedom of the press. This allowed many different businesses to publish newspapers and magazines, from the communist *El Siglo* to the far-right *El Mercurio*, and promoted an open marketplace of ideas (Insunza, 1999). However, in 1970, this heterogeneous environment began to change radically with the election of socialist candidate Salvador Allende and subsequent intervention by the United States.

During the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union were at the height of the Cold War. Tensions were high and the United States wanted to do everything in its power to ensure that communism did not extend into its own hemisphere. Even though the United States experienced success with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the loss of Cuba to communism and the struggles in Vietnam were fresh in the minds of the Nixon

administration (Kornbluh, 2003). Therefore, the United States saw the election of socialist Allende as a huge threat to its sovereignty because Chile is located within its same hemisphere and the election came at a time when the Nixon administration was desperate to reassert its power and reaffirm that its democratic ideology was morally correct (Kornbluh, 2003).

Essentially, the United States' principal fear was that Chile would become a communist country and the "domino effect" would ensue, meaning other Latin America nations would also fall to communism, helping the Soviet Union win the ideological war.

In order to prevent this from occurring, the Nixon administration launched its own internal propaganda efforts in a campaign known as the "Red Scare" to create a consensus against communism among its people (Kornbluh, 2003). It then moved its concentration to other nations. For example, due to the ideological and economic threat of Allende's presidency, particularly the potential nationalization of the copper industry, the Nixon administration launched anti-communist propaganda campaigns in Chile that greatly influenced media coverage in the months and years leading up to the coup (Kornbluh, 2003).

While the United States pumped thousands of dollars into a variety of communications outlets in Chile to support its anti-Allende campaign, the most famous case of its covert support is its partnership with the newspaper *El Mercurio* (Dounac & Lagos, 2009). *El Mercurio* was founded by Pedro Félix Vicuña in 1827 and, shortly after, was acquired by the conservative and wealthy Agustín Edwards family, which still owns it today. Known as the oldest national and largely conservative newspaper in Chile, *El Mercurio* of the late 1960s and early 1970s enjoyed a daily readership of more than 120,000 during the week and about 350,000 on Sundays, which was more than any other Chilean newspaper of its time (Dounac & Lagos, 2009). Additionally, during the time of the dictatorship, the Edwards family had strong relations with influential

people in the Nixon Administration, such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which, besides the fact that *El Mercurio* was known to be conservative and had a widespread circulation, made the newspaper a logical partner for the United States' campaign (Kornbluh, 2003).

As early as 1967, *El Mercurio* began receiving funds from the CIA to publish subjective articles, editorials and photos battling Marxist ideas (Kornbluh, 2003). When Allende assumed the presidency, the CIA increased these funds and launched an overall propaganda effort against Allende, thus setting the stage for the military coup (Kornbluh 2003). In total, the CIA provided more than one million dollars to Edwards for propaganda in *El Mercurio* and at one point the relationship between the two parties was so close that, in the instance that Edwards asked for more money, President Nixon personally allotted it (Kornbluh, 2003).

El Mercurio was not the only newspaper that spoke out against the Allende administration in the years leading up to the military coup, but there were several others that condemned Allende and blamed him for the problems in the Chilean economy. For example, *La Tercera*, a center-right newspaper founded in 1950 with a total readership of approximately 200,000 during the 1970s, also published information that painted negative connotations of socialism during this time (Baltra, 1988). In fact, pre-coup issues of both *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera* had examples of word bias, such as the repeated use of the phrase "marxistas extremos" in *La Tercera* when referring to anyone who supported leftist ideology. While Marxism is generally accepted as an "extreme" view, this phrase and others were often placed in negative contexts in the conservative newspapers, which caused readers to associate Marxism with negative images. Examples include headlines like "Allende industria donde trabajan los asesinos" ("Allende industry where the murderers work") or "El falso socialismo," ("The false socialism"), which both place negative words with actions of Allende or the ideology that he embodies.

Under normal circumstances, the language bias may not have proven to be especially significant because of the ability of leftist news outlets to speak out with equally “biased” support for Allende. However, while the circulation of *La Tercera* was close to 200,000 and *El Mercurio* equally as high, the circulation of all the leftist papers together in the years leading up to the coup only totaled about 250,000 (Landis, 1977). Therefore, the ideas of the left were not distributed as widely as the ideas of the right, which could be attributed to a number of factors.

One possibility is that due to the stagnant economy during the final years of Allende’s presidency, these papers did not have the financial resources to produce the same number of issues as they could in previous years and may not have been receiving covert support like some of the right-wing newspapers (Landis, 1977). Another possibility could be that there were simply fewer Chilean journalists that shared a liberal ideology (Landis, 1977). Chilean universities are very expensive and not easily accessible to lower classes, which means that many of those who attend are wealthy and conservative (Paredes, 2013). Besides creating an even larger division between social classes, the education system perpetuates the power of an elite oligarchy because it makes social change incredibly difficult and causes the elite discourse to become the public discourse (Dermota, 2002). In the time leading up to the dictatorship, Allende supporters were often from lower classes and did not have accessible education or tools to disseminate and communicate their ideas, while many of the educated journalism students of the time likely held a conservative ideology and pursued work at newspapers that shared this ideology, such as *El Mercurio* (Cole, 1996). Due to this educational divide, it would have been easier and more common for the educated, conservative people to use the media to disseminate and communicate their ideas, support for their ideology and, thus maintain the power of the elite discourse, which could help explain why *El Mercurio* enjoyed a higher circulation and readership.

II. The Media and the Coup

On September 12, 1973, the day after the military coup, General Augusto Pinochet declared a law that said the press, radio and television could not release any information to the public that was not approved by the armed forces and, additionally, gave the government the ability to intervene if necessary (Baltra, 1988). This law was shortly followed by another one, nicknamed “Operation Silence,” which declared that only two newspapers, *El Mercurio* y *La Tercera*, could circulate until further notice (Dougnaç & Lagos, 2009). Essentially, these two right-wing newspapers were the only communication outlets permitted to cover the military coup of September 11, 1973 and, to do so, they used language that indicated it was the military’s moral obligation to overthrow Allende, which suggests that Pinochet understood the importance of the media in seizing and maintaining power.

III. Censorship

To maximize the power of the media to his advantage, Pinochet created many censorship laws and financially supported conservative newspapers, such as taking over for the United States in financing *El Mercurio*. Additionally, the dictatorship closed many newspapers that had written in favor of the Popular Unity and Allende, such as *El Siglo*, *Última Hora*, *Puro Chile*, *Clarín*, *El Diario Color de Concepción*, *Mundo*, *Onda*, *Paloma*, *Ramona*, *Punto Final*, *Mayoría* and more (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). The only oppositional newspapers that were permitted to circulate were *Qué Pasa*, *Ercilla*, *Las Últimas Noticias* y *La Segunda* (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). Even so, many of these newspapers did not have the funds to continue and, even when they did publish, often suffered from the effects of self-censorship (Monckeberg, 2009).

In this paper, I refer to self-censorship in two ways. The first is editors and journalists monitoring the message of the newspaper due to the fear of being shut down or suffering a worse punishment, such as that put in place by the Law of the Security of the Interior, which gave the government the power to “restrict” anyone who spoke poorly about the President of the Republic, the state, the armed forces, the court, or the regime in general (Monckeberg, 2009). In other words, talking badly about the Pinochet regime often resulted in torture or worse.

The other core idea of self-censorship involves the readers. Due to the low-circulation of leftist newspapers, many of the prominent and disseminated ideas in 1970s society were based in conservative ideology. Often times, those who had a different point of view had fear of sharing their thoughts and opinions in case of rejection by their peers, or, in the times of the dictatorship, fear of punishment and torture (Insunza, 2009). This form of self-censorship also could have had other effects, such as a stifling of overall creativity and innovation, because readers did not get exposed to different ideas or new information and, therefore, had no new ideas to share.

Newspapers were not the only media outlets affected by censorship laws and self-censorship, and radio stations, television stations and magazines also suffered. Pinochet assumed control of all public and governmental channels of communication to spread support for the dictatorship (Halpern, & Ball-Rokeach, 1993). For example, while there were about 200 radio stations in support of the dictatorship, there were only four that could talk out “against” it (Landis, 1977). Another example is Pinochet’s support for the magazine *Juventud*, which attempted to sway youth to support the dictatorship and the ideology of the right by highlighting the achievements of past dictators, such as Diego Portales. In fact, Pinochet even went so far as to write a propaganda book, *El Libro Blanco*, to justify his actions during the military coup and gain support for his regime (Paredes 2013).

Throughout the dictatorship, Pinochet created many other censorship laws in the Constitution of 1980 and in the “Fondo Ministro Interior” (“Interior Ministry Background”), which is an outline of the internal agenda of the regime. He even created censorship offices that made it easier for the government to target those who did not obey (Monckeberg, 2009). While the law did not explicitly permit the government to kill or torture those who dissented, many journalists, both Chileans and foreigners, were killed or exiled for their alternative views. A majority of the time the government denied playing a role in these deaths and disappearances, but if evidence forced a justification, the administration would reference sections of the censorship laws. According to the Valech Commission, the regime imprisoned over 230 journalists and killed at least 23 during its reign (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, 2004). This constant fear of death and torture was another element of the self-censorship that dominated the creation of content and limited the pluralism of ideas.

IV. Fighting the Censorship

Despite the censorship, there were also many media outlets that made it their mission to speak out against Pinochet and fight for a change. This backlash was not extremely visible until the 1980s, when Pinochet’s human rights violations were becoming common knowledge to the global eye. To avoid foreign interference and social unrest, Pinochet decreased his use of torture and lightened some of the censorship restrictions, which gave more oppositional outlets the opportunity to publish. For example, *La Última Hora* and *The Clinic* both published editorials and articles that attacked Pinochet and supported cultural movements against the dictatorship, such as “No+,” which encouraged the Chilean public to vote against Pinochet in the plebiscite of 1988 (Sorensen, 2009).

Furthermore, many journalists, like Mónica González Mujica and Patricia Collyer, began to investigate torture and human rights violations and expose the realities of the dictatorship to the Chilean public (“Chilean journalist,” 2010). With more voices and opinions in the public sphere, the resistance to Pinochet became stronger, indicating that the press may not only be one of the reasons that the dictatorship began, but also may be one of the primary reasons that it ended, which provides a great opportunity for further research. However, having said this, aforementioned factors, such as fear of foreign intervention and increased attention to human rights violations, may have been more significant influences in ending the dictatorship because they may have been influential in Pinochet’s decision to lessen censorship laws, which enabled the press to speak out. On the other hand, it is also possible that Pinochet lessened the restrictions for other reasons, such as thinking that he had a strong enough hold over the country to allow the press to communicate, which would indicate that the press did have an important role in the demise of the dictatorship.

V. Effects Today

With that being said, the dictatorship’s censorship still had serious implications for the nation, not only in the press, but also in other industries and in augmenting the social and economic division. While Africa may be the poorest continent in the world, South America has the largest socio-economic divide, which is reflected in today’s concentration of ownership among media outlets that has roots in the dictatorship (Bucciferro, 2012). As previously mentioned, censorship laws caused many publications and media outlets to close due to lack of liberty, funds and readers. Consequently, the successful conservative media companies that were approved by Pinochet could afford to buy the smaller publications and form conglomerates. Not only were the heads of these companies conservative, but they also often had close relations with the

government, which, over time, caused the formation of a conservative oligarchy, or more precisely, a duopoly, among the communications outlets in Chile (Monckeberg, 2009). One of these conglomerate heads is the aforementioned Agustín Edwards, owner of the right-wing *El Mercurio* and, now, approximately twenty other newspapers and forty radio stations throughout Chile (Monckeberg, 2009). The other is Alvaro Saieh, owner of the conglomerate Copesa, which owns *La Tercera*, many magazines and other newspapers, banks and even a chain of supermarkets and department stores (Monckeberg, 2009).

Ironically enough, both of the newspapers that had monetary funding during the dictatorship are owned by these conservative conglomerates and are still prominent news sources today. While Chile currently has approximately 60 circulating newspapers, which is significantly more than during the dictatorship, approximately half of these are owned by one of the two conservative conglomerates (“Chile Press,” 2014). This lack of pluralism in Chilean press suggests that a possible financial and ideological consensus exists among the highest and richest class, often the same people who had the benefits of education and are influential in the government, to control the diffusion and content of the information in the press (Monckeberg, 2009). It also suggests that, due to the dictatorship and its censorship, much of today’s news is coming from the same sources, meaning the rich and conservative members who own the conglomerates, which not only contributes to the growing division between the social and economic classes, but also slows the spread of diverse ideas and information (Monckeberg, 2009). In fact, Chilean laws and norms appear to reinforce this lack of pluralism because the media industry is one of the least regulated by Chilean law, which gives the wealthy and influential elite free reign to control the industry (Mastrini & Becerra, 2011).

Today, *El Mercurio* still enjoys a large daily readership and a Sunday circulation of approximately 300,000 and *La Tercera's* daily circulation has increased to about 210,000 readers. A recent study that found that newspaper circulation in Latin America increased 3.5% from 2008 to 2012, which indicates that many Latin Americans still prefer to read the news in print even with the increase of digital outlets (“Marketing Charts,” 2013). In fact, the influence of the press during the dictatorship and its lasting relevance today is one of the reasons why I chose to focus this paper on the effects of the dictatorship specifically on the press and, subsequently, public opinion.

Due to the large period of time my study attempts to account for, it is also important to consider some of the general theories concerning media usage in Latin America in order to relate the effect of the dictatorship on Chilean media to today's increasingly technological environment. Numerous studies have demonstrated that due to fear established during the dictatorship, many Chileans do not trust the media, the government, or even each other (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1979). This is not only a trend seen in Chile during the dictatorship, but even today, all over the world, citizens are trusting the media less and less (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). Since the mass media is the primary way that people receive information, a lack of trust in this institution could be a significant factor when analyzing its effect on public opinion. For example, currently, the agenda-setting theory, which suggests that the media chooses what issues are important in society, is a commonly accepted theory of the role of the media in Chilean society because the politics of media ownership allow a concentrated and relatively homogenous elite group to control and frame the messages to the public (Monckeberg, 2009). However, a combination of increased technology and general lack

of trust may make this theory less applicable in the future for younger generations and change the level of impact the press has on public opinion (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011).

To illustrate, another study found that, due to the lack of trust, younger generations are increasingly not affiliating themselves with political parties and, instead, are going to social media outlets to express their opinions (Valenzuela, Arriagada & Sherman, 2012). When forming opinions, younger generations are more influenced by friends and family than by the media and, instead of bringing these opinions to the polls, they are using technological activism as a way to change society (Valenzuela, Arriagada & Sherman, 2012). In partnership with increased globalization, these increased outlets for expression could have interesting implications for the future of Chilean politics and the amount of power that the press will actually have in future generations and, therefore, are important to keep in mind when reading this paper.

Chapter 3: *El Mercurio* vs. *La Nación*

Having discovered that, of all the media outlets, the printed press is the outlet that both played a prominent role during the Chilean dictatorship and is still a relevant force today, in this chapter, I perform a qualitative analysis of the content of certain newspapers to affirm that bias exists. This chapter examines, compares and contrasts both a current and a 1973 edition of *El Mercurio*, which I have identified as the prominent conservative newspaper, to discover if there is evidence that suggests it undermined the Allende administration and helped promote the coup. In order to discover the magnitude of these findings, I juxtapose my findings to a similar analysis I perform with both the current and 1973 editions of *La Nación*, the state-controlled newspaper that has historically served as the government mouthpiece.

I. Research Design

I chose *El Mercurio* and *La Nación* as the newspapers for my study because, in addition to the fact that both were permitted to circulate throughout the dictatorship, *El Mercurio* had the largest circulation of conservative papers during the time and *La Nación* was a liberal paper

before the coup and a conservative paper during the regime, which was the closest long-term outlet contrasting *El Mercurio* and a good comparison to measure bias.

The reason that I chose to only compare one day of coverage over a forty-year period was to enable a closer look at the actual content of these newspapers, without having too much data to compare. When choosing these dates, I recognize that Chilean society has changed substantially from 1973 to today and that there are no current events or protests equal to that of those in September 1973. I understand that, by simply comparing one issue from only two newspapers, my analysis does not have the external validity that it would have if I had used every *El Mercurio* and *La Nación* issue from 1973 and then compared them to each issue in 2013. If I had done this, my analysis would have more widespread applicability and given a more realistic picture into the full effects of any press bias, but the data would have been vast and I would not have been able to delve into the actual content of the articles to see differences in framing and use of code words. Furthermore, even if I had attempted a larger analysis, the passage of time, innovations in technology and the difference in world events would have impacted results. While there have been studies that examine the immediate effects of the dictatorship on press and public opinion in the 1970s to 1990s, there is little research that tries to relate the dictatorship's control of the media to today, which is what my study attempts to do and why I chose such a large time period.

In order to correctly analyze these newspapers, I need to define my use of the term "bias" in this paper. When discussing media bias, I am referring to the definition created in Tim Groeling's 2013 study that media bias is a "portrayal of reality that is significantly and systematically (not randomly) distorted" (Groeling, 2013, p. 133). Under this broad definition, there are many areas in which something could be biased, from race to geography to income.

Furthermore, Groeling suggests that there are two different types of bias. There is selection bias, in which the outlet has the power to choose what stories it covers, and presentation bias, in which the content of the stories is manipulated, such as through tone, framing or length, to elicit a certain reaction (Groeling, 2013, p. 134).

Having defined my use of the term “bias,” I still believe it is still important to stress that news can be seen as inherently biased due to a number of different factors, such as the identity of the writer or outlet. For example, in the time leading up to the military coup, leftist papers, such as the communist *El Siglo*, could be considered biased because they often staunchly supported Allende and leftist ideology. Yet, as I previously mentioned, *El Siglo*, although biased, did not enjoy the same widespread circulation as *El Mercurio* before and during the dictatorship, which is why I have argued that the bias present in *El Mercurio* had a more significant impact on Chilean public opinion than that of leftist newspapers like *El Siglo* (Garretón, 1999).

Furthermore, since the term “media bias” is difficult to define, it is more challenging to perform a valid study to measure the impact of bias. Doing so would require subjectivity in defining what is biased, and subsequently, would be biased itself. Therefore, in this paper and using the Groeling study, I created a research design to identify bias in the newspapers.

While the articles chosen for this study could also be products of content and selection bias from Groeling’s study, I chose them systematically to lessen this possibility. The articles analyzed in each issue are from the same days, September 1, 1973 and September 1, 2013, and are from the same sections of the newspaper, specifically the comparison of front-page articles, to ensure they would be similar and have similar importance. However, as previously mentioned, the events of September 2013 are not equivalent to any of the events and build up to September 11, 1973, which contributes to a difference in coverage.

Although I only deeply analyzed the diction of the front-page articles, I compared the content and topics of articles throughout the entire issues of the newspapers to determine the overall tendency of bias and attempt to achieve as much objectivity as possible. This allowed me to analyze the overall tone and framing to determine how many articles were for or against a certain ideology. Again, this research only presents a small one-day analysis of possible bias in these newspapers, which means it may not have widespread applicability, but it will nevertheless aid in the understanding of how the coup and the dictatorship affected the press and public opinion.

To measure the selection and presentation bias in the articles, I identified criteria for the information that would appear in the headlines, topics and language of biased articles. For 1973, I identified articles as leaning conservative if the topics were critical of Allende and socialism or praised the military and leaning liberal if they defended Allende, praised socialism or discussed successes of the current government. I looked for words with strong connotations, either positive or negative, and analyzed them within the context to determine their impact. For example, both sides tended to use code words, such as “extremists” or “radicals,” but in different ways. Since I chose to only analyze one day of coverage, I had the advantage of understanding the context of these code words and what each side wanted to convey when using them, instead of relying on a surface systematic method that could successfully identify code words, but could also miss their importance in context.

For 2013, I identified articles as having a conservative bias if they were authored by conservative groups or had a favorable tone toward the military or previous dictatorship, which would be discussed in September due to the anniversary of the coup. I identified articles as having a liberal bias if they were critical of the military or the previous dictatorship or authored

by liberal groups. Like in 1973, I looked for any words with strong connotations and analyzed the context to examine if they were being used to promote one ideology over another.

Finally, for both 1973 and 2013, I deemed an article as objective if it presented fair coverage of both sides within the article and did not use strongly negative words against one side over another. Furthermore, for both years, I looked at the entire newspaper issues to see if the number of editorials from one ideology were equal to the number from the other ideology and if selection bias was present.

II. *El Mercurio* 1973

The September 1, 1973 issue of *El Mercurio* had approximately 27 of its 60 articles concern one of two topics: support for the military or the shortcomings of Allende's presidency. The articles that did not concern one of these topics were often about soft news and culture, such as sports or art, and not political in nature. Furthermore, all of the editorials and opinion pieces were written about a social problem or were to speak out against Allende and Marxism, thus not showing a diversity of ideology and presenting only one point of view. Additionally, people and groups who had and have conservative tendencies, such as the "Informe del Colegio de Abogados," ("Report of the Lawyers Union") which is similar to the American BAR Association for lawyers, dominated as the authors of the editorials. These editorials focused on topics like "incapacidad presidencial" ("presidential inability"), which when analyzed in context, are critical of Allende (*El Mercurio*, 1973). Using my pre-determined criteria for a conservative bias, it appears that this issue leaned to the right in its selection of topics.

Not only did *El Mercurio* feature news that focused on the failures of Allende and the threat of Marxism, it also has signs of presentation bias, as evidenced in the actual language of the articles themselves. When looking at the content of the articles on the front page, each appears to

sensationalize and escalate the problems in Chilean society to create fear and prompt social action. For example, in “Azucar Al Cero” (“Sugar to the Zero”), there is a line that says, “Gracias a la capacidad incomparable y destructiva de la Unidad Popular, los precios y la inflación están aumentando...” (“thanks to the incomparable destructive capacity of the Popular Unity, prices and inflation are increasing...”) and essentially states that the lack of food and bad economy is due to the failures of Allende’s government (*El Mercurio*, 1973). Instead of simply stating that there was a food crisis, which would be a less biased way of communicating, the article explicitly linked societal problems to the Popular Unity and used language derogatory to the political party and liberal ideology, which conforms to my criteria of having a conservative bias.

Another example of presentation bias can be found in the article “Atropellos al Poder Legislativo” (“Abuses of Legislative Power”), which states, “El Gobierno de Allende ha capitaneado una infamante campaña de injurias y calumnias contra la Corte Suprema” (“The government of Allende has captained an infamous campaign of injuries and slander against the Supreme Court”), which basically accuses Allende’s government of falsely attacking and injuring the Supreme Court, the national symbol of justice (*El Mercurio*, 1973). Once again, instead of simply stating the news, the article uses diction to create a negative stigma toward the Allende government and paints it as though the Chilean society and economy were in shambles only because of Allende’s policies.

Another example of bias is in the language of the article “Ataque de Rusia Teme China Roja” (“Russia Fears Attack of Red China”), which contains the terms “radical,” “volátil” and “extremistas” (“radical,” “volatile,” and “extremists”), when discussing China’s communist

influence. Even the headline itself paints a negative view of the leftist ideology, with communist China being the aggressor against a fearful Russia.

The front-page article “Renunció Almirante Montero” (“Resignation of Admiral Montero”) featured the resignation of Allende’s Chief of the Navy in a positive light, discussing how he was a traitor and weak (*El Mercurio*, 1973). Using my criteria, I determined that, although this article is technically critical of the armed forces, it is more of a personal attack and an attack on Allende than on the institution itself because it is favorable to the idea that a new admiral would take over, which would make it more conservative than liberal (*El Mercurio*, 1973).

This specific issue also contained a lot of information about the Christian Democratic Party and its response to the Allende government, which is interesting because, as previously noted, the Christian Democratic Party was the centrist party, not Allende’s party. Research about Chilean party politics indicates that in the 1970 election, the Christian Democratic Party supported Allende and the Popular Unity and created a coalition that helped him get elected. However, as the economy grew worse and problems arose, the Christian Democratic Party withdrew support for Allende and began to support more conservative groups. This shift was evidenced and exaggerated in *El Mercurio* articles, such as “PDC responde al Gobierno de Allende” (“PDC responds to Allende government”), which discusses the party’s criticism of Allende (*El Mercurio*, 1973). In this coverage, the newspaper made it seem as though there was no support for Allende in the Chilean community, not even among moderate parties. While it is true that the Christian Democratic Party withdrew its support, this issue of *El Mercurio* appears to capitalize on and exaggerate it, which hints at both presentation and selection bias. This framing also successfully aided the aforementioned environment of self-censorship in which

people may be reluctant to share their views if they are different from those that are prominent in the public discourse.

Another noteworthy and rather peculiar aspect about this issue of *El Mercurio* is its attack on *La Segunda*, another newspaper owned by the conservative Edwards family. The article titled “*La Segunda* Emplaza al Subsecretario del Interior” (“*La Segunda* Summons the Undersecretary of Interior”) discusses that the Undersecretary met with *La Segunda* editors to shut down the publication due to communist infiltration (*El Mercurio*, 1973). On one hand, this contradicts a traditional media theory that states that the ideology of an outlet’s owners shapes and creates bias. However, on the other hand, this same theory is confirmed by *El Mercurio*’s incessant attack on Marxist and leftist ideas and, therefore, it is possible that *El Mercurio*’s attack on *La Segunda* was a public relations tactic and aimed to demonstrate that even the most conservative are not safe from the evils of communism (Dougnaç & Lagos, 2009). In either case, the attack on the *La Segunda* still exemplifies the widespread lack of pluralism and tolerance for any suggestion of leftist ideas, no matter who proliferated them.

III. *La Nación*

La Nación, a state-owned and government-subsidized paper founded in 1917 by Eliodoro Yáñez and taken over by dictator Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in 1927, essentially has served as the mouthpiece for whatever political party has held power (Cole, 1996). With a smaller circulation than *El Mercurio*, at about 45,000, the September 1, 1973 issue of *La Nación* served the interests of the Popular Unity because it was the political party in power during the time. However, within the next few months, this would change and *La Nación* would serve as the voice of the Pinochet authorities, which may contribute to a shortcoming in my overall analysis.

In terms of selection bias, this issue of *La Nación* mostly featured topics where it could defend actions of the Allende government and not draw attention to failures of the economy. While its articles covered topics similar to the articles in *El Mercurio*, such as discussions of the failing economy or of other nations and their reactions to communism, it often took the opposite position and defended the left while focusing on the weaknesses of the rightist arguments, which according to my criteria would indicate a liberal bias. For example, one of the article headlines was “En Descubierta Falsedades de la Prensa Derecha,” which translates to “In discovery of the falsities of the rightist press...” and basically attacks *El Mercurio* and other newspapers for exaggerating the failures of the economic situation (*La Nación*, 1973).

In fact, a majority of the articles in the issue tried to rebut attacks that were instigated by the right or tried to demonstrate that the right was incorrect and, in doing so, undermined some of the newspaper’s credibility. For example, one of the articles that attacked the right claimed that *El Mercurio* prostitutes the profession of journalism, which is language that clearly carries a connotation and indicates a bias against what I identified as conservative. However, *La Nación* also does not have any substantial claims or arguments against the opposition and all of its attacks on conservatism are mere puffery, which questions if any bias existing in *La Nación* was significant.

While statements like the one above indicate that *La Nación* may have been liberally biased in its language, due to its defensive position, it is unlikely that the power of its bias was equivalent to that of *El Mercurio*. *El Mercurio* had the upper hand and, if it chose to, could subliminally suggest and frame that problems in society were due to the leftist ideology. *La Nación*, on the other hand, was under attack and could only defend itself by using bias to say that the right was exaggerating. While *El Mercurio* had events with which to back up its claims, *La*

Nación had nothing but the faulty economy and failed policies of the Allende administration. This not only made its bias more exaggerated and lessened its credibility, but also meant that it had no real power in communicating the liberal agenda, suggesting that *El Mercurio* had the agenda-setting power and, therefore, the selection power.

While there are some exceptions in *La Nación*, such as “Quisieron Masacrar a 23 niños cubanos” (“They Wanted to Massacre 23 Cuban Children”), which proactively attack the right in ways like framing conservatives as child-killers, most of its articles are not biased in the way that articles in *El Mercurio* are biased because, as mentioned earlier, they are simply fending off attacks (*La Nación*, 1973). For example, the front-page headline “El Gobierno Chileno no es Marxista” (“The Chilean Government is not Marxist”) has the structure of a retort to rightist attacks and does not attack the right, but instead tries to reassure citizens that the Allende administration is not Marxist (*La Nación*, 1973). This is noteworthy to my analysis because my criteria for a liberal bias include supporting Allende and, while this article does not defame Allende, it explains why the Chilean government is not Marxist, which is an ideology that liberalism would support and, therefore, would not be liberal by my criteria.

I conclude that since the left had no positive events or information to promote its position, the right was able to exploit the power of the media to aid in the demise of the Allende administration by focusing on the negative. Using the “Fourth Estate” communications theory, it can be inferred that, because the media is the watchdog of the government, if one group has power over the media, it cannot also hold power over the government, which suggests that, even though both newspaper outlets were biased, the right had an advantage in the Chilean press before the coup.

IV. Significance in 1973

While according to my criteria both *El Mercurio* and *La Nación* were biased in the selection or presentation of content in the years leading up to the coup, due to the wider readership and higher status of *El Mercurio*, the impact of the conservative bias in *El Mercurio* was likely more significant than the impact of any liberal bias in *La Nación* during this time. Furthermore, *El Mercurio* appears to have been in a more powerful position because it could create stronger arguments and attack the left while defending its own ideology, thus contributing to the growing discontent with the Allende presidency.

V. The Newspapers Today

As previously mentioned, *El Mercurio* still enjoys a widespread print circulation. On the other hand, *La Nación* ceased its printed publication in December 2012 and now operates exclusively online. While this is most likely due to the effects of new technologies and increased globalization, the fact that the rightist newspaper is one of the few newspapers that can still afford to print and widely distribute also suggests that the dictatorship had a serious impact on pluralism in the press and, subsequently, Chilean society and public opinion. However, at the same time, it appears that other South American countries of similar populations and dictatorships, such as Ecuador, have far less press freedom and far fewer in-print publications, which suggests that maybe the Pinochet dictatorship did not have a noteworthy impact on the Chilean media in comparison to other nations. To discover whether *El Mercurio* still has a right-leaning frame today, I use the aforementioned criteria for conservatism, liberalism and objectivity to analyze its issue for September 1, 2013, 40 years after the coup, and juxtapose it to an online edition of *La Nación* for the same day. Additionally, in order to reliably grasp the context of my findings, I compare and contrast both issues of the current newspapers to their 1973 editions.

VI. *El Mercurio* Today

In comparison to the September 1, 1973 issue of *El Mercurio*, the modern issue appears to have far less conservatism and bias according to my criteria. The articles throughout the issue cover a diverse array of topics, ranging from the economy to politics to foreign affairs, presented more objectively than the 1973 issue. While the 1973 issue had front-page articles that only promoted the right, such as “Azucar al Cero” (“Sugar to the Zero”) that painted Allende as the sole cause for the failing economy, the 2013 issue has front-page articles like “Nueve de 11 sectores económicos en Chile han perdido productividad desde 2009” (“Nine of 11 economic sectors in Chile have lost productivity since 2009”), which discusses economic difficulties, but does not blame any particular ideology or political party for the problems, which conforms to my definition of objectivity in this study (*El Mercurio*, 2013). This wider range and, by my criteria, more objective presentation suggests that, unlike in 1973, the newspaper no longer just focuses on promoting the interests of the right and demonstrating the failures of the left, but tries to present a more accurate depiction of Chilean society.

That being said, when looking at certain articles, the impact of the previously obvious conservative bias is still somewhat evident today. For example, an article titled “PS y conmemoración del Golpe hará el Gobierno: ‘Estará llena de cómplices’” (“The Socialist Party and Commemoration of the Coup will make the Government: ‘It will be full of accomplices’”), discusses the military coup of 1973, which, in a sense, is more objective in that it at least acknowledges the realities of the dictatorship and does not completely exclude any discussion (*El Mercurio*, 2013). However, the content and word choice within this article appear to have a presentation bias, such as when a prominent member of the left is described as a “socialist helmsmen,” which, by my pre-determined criteria, indicates a slight conservative bias because of

the connotations that accompany the language. While the article itself is actually about keeping peace on the forty-year anniversary of the coup, the headline uses the word “accomplices” in a sensationalistic way that paints socialists negatively. Therefore, while the diction is not as radical as terms used in 1973, such as “volatile,” it still carries a slight negative connotation and indicates a bias against leftist politicians (*El Mercurio*, 2013).

Furthermore, while there is more balance in the selection of editorial views, the 2013 issue still appears to contain a slight bias for rightist over leftist submissions, such as seen in “Una mirada desde la perspectiva histórica” (“A look from the historical perspective”), a segment that debates the events of the coup as exaggerated memories versus actual historical facts and contains a significant amount of conservative contributors (*El Mercurio*, 2013). As editorials, these segments are expected to have bias, but are still important to consider because if an audience is only receiving the opinions of one side through the editorials, it is difficult for it to make its own informed decisions simply due to lack of information about the other side.

Even so, there is still a wider range of topics within this modern issue than in the 1973 issue, such as more articles about foreign affairs and culture, and none of the content outwardly attacks or condemns the left. This may indicate that, while *El Mercurio* still leans to the right, the threat of the dictatorship is not at the level it was before or during the military coup and may not have a serious and lasting effect on Chilean society and public opinion. However, it could also just be that in 1973, there was a crisis that was not paralleled in 2013 and the conservative media needed to be more vocal against the left in order to solicit change favorable to its ideology. Or, while today’s *El Mercurio* may just simply be less biased, it could also be that the censorship during the dictatorship and today’s lack of media pluralism created a context in which *El Mercurio* has not needed to actively combat the leftist ideology. Additionally, the rise of 24-hour news and

ability to post content online may have had implications for the content in the print edition, which can only be determined through a more thorough and extended analysis. In any case, the reason why the shift in *El Mercurio* framing and coverage occurred is still unclear.

Another interesting observation about the modern issue of *El Mercurio* is its obsession with American politics and foreign policy. While it covers events going on in other nations, such as Argentina, the majority of the articles concerning foreign affairs are centered on the United States, such as one headline that discusses Obama's plans for action in Syria. The stress on this topic could simply be due to the hegemonic role of the United States in the globe, but it could also be linked to remnants of the newspaper's previous ties to the United States government and the financial support it received in the years leading up to the coup (Kornbluh, 2003).

VII. *La Nación* Today

When compared to the 1973 issue, the modern *La Nación* appears to have changed dramatically. Not only is it now strictly online, the leftist Popular Unity is no longer the political party in power and, therefore, the content is unlike the content in 1973. Instead of featuring stories that defend the government and attack the right, *La Nación* contains a plethora of topics within its headlines, from the presidential race to events in Argentina, which is a trend that is also evidenced in today's *El Mercurio*.

However, unlike the September 1, 2013 issue of *El Mercurio*, the September 1, 2013 issue of *La Nación* does not address any of the upcoming events commemorating the anniversary of the September 11, 1973 coup. While on one hand this means that there cannot be presentation bias in discussing the events, the avoidance of this topic could also imply a sense of denial and hint at selection bias (McCombs, 2004). Even the editorials, which represent both leftist and rightist opinions, do not have any content discussing the dictatorship, its effects or the upcoming

anniversary. This could affect Chilean society because, in a sense, it continues the self-censorship from the dictatorship. However, at the same time, I only chose one day to analyze news coverage and a limit of this research is that it is possible that in the days to come *La Nación* included much information about the coup and its anniversary.

Few of the articles had content that coincided with my criteria for a left or right bias, which differs from the 1973 issue of *La Nación* and from both issues of *El Mercurio*. For example, one article discusses three of the presidential candidates and their campaigns and, in doing so, does not favor any one candidate over another, which falls most closely to my definition of objectivity. Like many of the articles, each candidate was quoted and there was no language or code words that suggested that one was less capable or desirable, indicating that the leftist bias of *La Nación* before the dictatorship is now not of serious consequence. However, it is also important to note that in the years between my two analyses, *La Nación*, as the statist paper, switched from supporting Allende to being a conservative outlet for the Pinochet government, which may explain why the paper does not appear to have a strong bias in either direction today (Secretaría de Comunicación y Cultura, 1994).

Additionally, like *El Mercurio*, most of the articles in *La Nación* about foreign policy concern the United States, which highlights the influence of the United States in Chile and suggests that my previous speculation about the special relationship that *El Mercurio* shared with the Nixon administration may not be a significant factor as to why news coverage focuses on the United States today.

VIII. Conclusion

In qualitatively examining both past and present issues of *El Mercurio*, the most prominent and widely circulated newspaper in Chilean society today, my research indicates that, according

to my criteria, the newspaper had an evident conservative bias in both the selection and framing of its articles leading up to the coup. I also observed that remnants of this bias exist in the paper on a smaller scale today and, due to the prominence of *El Mercurio*, may have an effect on how Chileans view their society. In fact, this conclusion is even supported by other research, such as a 2010 study that identified that 60% of *El Mercurio* readers identify with the right (Ilabaca, Lucero & Pineda, 2010). However, this could also be due to a number of other reasons that influence people to read *El Mercurio* in the first place, such as education or income.

Using my criteria for bias, I also determined that *La Nación* had a liberal bias during the years leading up to the coup, but is fairly objective today. While this could be due to its switch from a liberal to a conservative paper to a centrist paper, it could also imply that maybe the dictatorship's impact on *El Mercurio* was significant.

While my juxtaposition of *El Mercurio* to *La Nación* evidences the effects of the dictatorship on media and indicates that, in comparison to *La Nación*, *El Mercurio* and its conservative bias might have a more influential impact on public opinion today, it is also important to consider that there is no crisis occurring in Chile today that is equal to the events in 1973. Furthermore, the new technologies and ways of receiving information could also have a significant impact on how these outlets are presenting information. Therefore, it is impossible to tell if *El Mercurio* is more balanced in its coverage or if in a crisis it would revert to its tactics from the time of the coup. However, in analyzing *El Mercurio* coverage from more recent instances of civil unrest, such as the 2011 student protests, studies have shown that the newspaper consistently uses a conservative frame and tends to reaffirm its conservative ideology (Cabalin, 2014). On the other hand, these student protests are still not equal to the civil unrest of

the coup and, therefore, there is no way of completely knowing if *El Mercurio* exhibits the same level of bias today as it did in the 1970s.

Chapter 4: Media in the Southern Cone

Having seen in the previous chapter that during the dictatorship *El Mercurio* had, to some extent, a conservative bias that is still slightly present today, my goal in this chapter is to contrast these findings with information about the press in Argentina, another nation that experienced a dictatorship similar to Pinochet. In doing so, I aim to discover if the effects of the dictatorship on the Chilean press are different compared to other nations. However, this analysis can only provide historical and factual comparisons, as I will not compare framing and possible bias between newspapers in the two nations because applying my criteria for bias across countries would be challenging due to differences in culture and events. However, in this analysis, I strive

to determine if it is likely that the current lack of media pluralism in Chilean media also exists in other Latin American countries and, subsequently, analyze possible reasons as to why Chile may be similar or different to other nations that experienced dictatorships.

I. Argentina's Dictatorship

Like Chile, Argentina also experienced a long history of military involvement in government and had a military dictatorship in the 20th century that was a response to the increase of leftist ideas in society. Due to fear of communism and domestic disputes, an alliance of military officials overthrew the government in 1943 (Noel, 2013). In 1945, Juan Perón became President and implemented a populist government, which rejected extreme capitalism and communism and promoted the state as the mediator in conflicts between workers and businesses (Noel, 2013). As the number of unionized worker and government programs increased, the United States felt threatened by possible communism in the Western hemisphere, so it became increasingly involved in supporting the "antiperonist parties." Furthermore, due to Perón's increased social programs, there was an increase in government spending, which, in conjunction with his isolationist foreign policy that limited economic and intellectual trade with other nations, caused inflation to skyrocket and the economy to suffer (Noel, 2013).

When newspapers and other opposition began to speak out against his regime, Perón, like Pinochet, resorted to violence and censorship. While the Constitution of 1853 clearly gave rights to the press, even mentioning that there was to be no censorship, Perón nationalized the broadcasting system and monopolized the newspaper industry, which shut down many opposition papers and left in circulation only *La Nación*, *Clarín* and *La Prensa*, the last of which he also eventually shut down (Samples, 2008). Like Pinochet in Chile, he was the first Argentine ruler to fully recognize the power of the media and use it for propaganda, advertising and even

intimidation. For example, *La Democracia*, the unofficial newspaper of Peronism, contained many similarities to Chile's dictatorship-influenced *El Mercurio* in that every aspect of the paper, from the tabloids to the editorials, was infused with support for the regime (Samples, 2008).

Existing research suggests that the effects of Argentine media control were similar to those in Chile, meaning that there was increased self-censorship, a widespread fear of speaking out against the government and a lack of diverse ideas spreading within society (Samples, 2008). With the government using the media as a mouthpiece for its policies, it was difficult for Argentine citizens to organize against the oppressive regime, let alone receive any truthful and unbiased information.

Even though Perón was overthrown and exiled in 1955, the Argentine military dictatorships did not cease and neither did the press censorship. Throughout the rest of the 1950s and into the 1970s, the Argentine government was extremely unstable, with frequent military coups, and it wavered between different ideologies, even returning to Peronism for a time (Noel, 2013). In the early 1970s, Argentina, like many other countries in South America, experienced a strong increase in the number of Marxist and leftist groups who outspokenly and sometimes violently advocated for a more leftist government. Peronism was seen as unable to resist the threat of these groups and, as a result, there was a coup by the armed forces in 1976 to overthrow Perón's wife Isabel, and institute a government ruled by the junta (Noel, 2013). From 1976 to 1983, the most prominent member of the junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, ruled the nation and perpetuated what is known today as the "Dirty War," in which thousands of members of the opposition were killed and media outlets were censored and closed (Samples, 2008).

During this time, the junta primarily focused on censorship of the printed press and not other outlets because of its widespread credibility and its ability to reach all social classes, which was not true for television and radio at the time (Samples, 2008). Therefore, while there may have been a slight return of pluralism in the time between Perón and Videla, any pluralism that did reemerge vanished with the newspapers' passive acceptance of the censorship. Only two newspapers occasionally spoke out against the regime, the *Buenos Aires Herald* and *La Opinión*, and, even so, they often only did so subtly (Samples, 2008). The effects of media censorship and control by Argentine dictators paralleled those in Chile during Pinochet, such as self-censorship and a decrease in pluralism, thus indicating that the Argentine media may be similar to Chilean media today due to impact of the dictatorship.

II. Argentina's Media Today

As a result of the continued censorship, the Argentine media was significantly polarized and has been dominated primarily by one group, the Group Clarín, which owns the *Clarín* newspaper, the most widely circulated newspaper in Latin America, and Papel Prensa, which is the nation's largest newsprint manufacturer (Cole, 1996).

Due to similarities between Chile's and Argentina's historical and economical framework and their dictatorships' impacts on the media, I speculate that Argentina's present media domination by one corporation could suggest that its dictatorship had a significant effect on newspaper circulation and, subsequently, Argentine public opinion. However, when simply examining the data qualitatively, this does not appear to be the case. The number of newspapers circulating in Argentina, which is at least 90, is higher than the number of newspapers circulating in Chile, which is approximately 60, and there is a more diverse representation of both leftist and rightist ideas exhibited in Argentine newspapers. For example, while many of the newspapers

that spoke out against the Pinochet regime, such as *El Siglo*, do not have significant circulation today, Argentina's *Buenos Aires Herald*, which highlighted some of the horrors of the "Dirty War," is flourishing today (Samples, 2008). While the Argentine population is double the Chilean population, which may be one possible explanation as to why there are more newspapers circulating, Chilean newspaper circulation still experienced a larger percent decrease than that of Argentina. From 2000 to 2004, the circulation per 1,000 inhabitants in Chile went from 90 newspapers to 50.6 whereas in Argentina it went from 45.8 to 35.92, which is a much smaller decline (Millet, Holmes & Perez, 2010).

There could be many reasons to explain why the Argentine media appears to be experiencing more pluralism than the Chilean media. The first could be that the Argentine dictatorship, ending in 1983, ended before the Chilean dictatorship and, thus, Argentine society has had more time to reclaim its civil liberties and freedoms. The second could be that there are differences in activism levels between the citizens of the two nations. For example, the Argentine government passed a law known as "Ley de Medios" ("Law of Media") in 2009 that essentially limits the number of media outlets a single company can own and, on face value, promotes more pluralism (Warren, 2014). Previous to the implementation of this law, the Clarín Group held a monopoly of the television and radio licenses and, thus, controlled what was considered "news." Therefore, in 2008, when President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner decided to raise taxes on exports and the Clarín Group used its media power to support the opposition, she initiated the "Ley de Medios" to try to diversify coverage and also give her administration more power over the media (Smink, 2013). The Clarín Group was not pleased with this law and recently, as of November 2013, took it to the Supreme Court, which upheld its constitutionality and approved the division and distribution of the company in order to promote more media pluralism (Warren,

2014). While the court claimed the law was constitutional because it promotes media pluralism, it appears that the intentions of Fernandez de Kirchner were actually to assert more control over the media, which may have interesting implications for the future and indicates that the Argentine government still has much control over the information disseminated in society and that, maybe, its pluralism and press freedom is a façade.

However, Argentina is not alone in passing legislation that inadvertently promotes more freedom for the press. In 2007, Uruguay, the other Southern Cone nation that had a dictatorship paralleling those in Chile and Argentina, passed an anti-monopoly law ensuring more media pluralism (Uruguay, 2013). Like Argentina, Uruguay's dictatorship ended in 1983, which is earlier than Chile's dictatorship and may explain why the Chilean Congress has not introduced any legislation that seeks to divide the Copesa and Edwards media duopoly. While it is possible that passing similar legislation could make Chilean media more pluralistic and lessen any lasting effects of the dictatorship, it is unlikely that any will be passed in the near future because of the elite consensus. In fact, this legislation may only come as result of a situation similar to that of Argentina, when a person of power does not like the way they are portrayed by one of the media conglomerates and, thus, advocates for legal action.

Chapter 5: Media and its Effects on Public Opinion

Thus far, I have argued that the Chilean military dictatorship had a severe impact on Chilean media. Through both a qualitative comparison between Chilean newspapers and a comparative analysis with another nation, I have shown that press framing, censorship and self-censorship before and during the dictatorship have had a severe impact on the ownership of media in Chile today, and, thus, the pluralism and proliferation of ideas in Chilean society. The goal of this chapter is to quantitatively analyze if the results of the effects of the dictatorship on the media

have any real and lasting effects on Chilean public opinion. In other words, through cross tabulations, I aim to discover if there are any actual lasting and significant impacts of the dictatorship's relationship with the media on Chilean society.

I. Literature Review Concerning the Media

Traditionally, media has been defined as the most powerful means of collective mass communication and, throughout history, each scholar has applied this definition differently to explain the role that the media plays in society (Dwivedi & Pandey, 2013). Some have said that the role of the media is to be a watchdog of the government. Others claim that the purpose of the media is to inform and engage people in society (McCombs, 2004). Still others state that the media's true role is dependent on how society chooses to use it, in other words suggesting that the effects of the media actually differ depending on who consumes the content (Scherman & Arriagada, 2012). For example, one such theory is the hypodermic needle theory, which was named because it suggests that media content producers create messages that have a direct, immediate and powerful impact on passive content consumers by "injecting" them with appropriate messages to elicit a desired response. Hand-in-hand with this theory is the agenda-setting theory, which claims that the media presents and frames issues in a manner that gives it significant power to influence topics in the public agenda (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). On the contrary, there are other theories, such as the reception theory, that argue that, depending on an audience's previously held beliefs and experiences, it will view and react to media content differently (Ilabaca, Lucero, & Pineda 1999). This theory relates closely to the cultivation theory, which argues that when consumers see things in the media, they adopt them as part of their own ideology and lifestyles (Ilabaca, Lucero & Pineda, 1999).

When discussing the application of media theories in the case of Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship, scholars have argued that, due to the aforementioned censorship and propaganda of the time, the agenda-setting theory is the most relevant theory (Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). In fact, research has indicated that the effects of censorship and media control were so significant that they not only impacted the proliferation of ideas in society, but the political agenda and socio-economic environment as well (Robinson, 2001). While scholars vary in their opinions concerning the extent of this impact, most agree that due to the media's role as the primary deliverer of information, the dictatorship's influence on the media has been a significant factor in influencing public opinion (McCombs, 2004). In other words, the media has so much power in determining the topics in the public discourse and the way people view society, that any indication of bias within the media, often initiated by the elites that dominate the industry, may have significant impacts on public policy. A study by Robinson argues that when the government controls the media, elite policy preferences are simply maintained in order to keep the wealthy in power, which subsequently perpetuates the growth of social problems instead of solving real issues (Robinson, 2001).

More specifically, research unveils that, in the case of an authoritarian regime, the government retains the ability to control versions of reality so that a higher dependency on mainstream media manifests a more right-based ideology (Halpern & Ball-Rokeach, 1993). A specific example of this relationship is evidenced in the case of Chile and the Pinochet regime's relationship with *El Mercurio*. During the time of the dictatorship, the press, along with radio, was the top source of information for citizens and was also deemed the most reliable (Garretón, 1999). However, in reality, due to censorship, self-censorship and propaganda efforts, the press was not as reliable or objective as people believed, which, during the dictatorship, had a

significant impact on public opinion. By only permitting the distribution of ideas that supported the dictatorship, the regime created a false climate of support for Pinochet within the media that allowed the dictatorship to retain power for a longer period of time and resulted in a rightist political tendency that may not have existed if the press had been free (Ilabaca, Lucero & Pineda, 2010). For example, in the plebiscite of 1988, only a little over half of Chileans voted against Pinochet after 17 years of the dictatorship and its human rights violations, even though many were not happy with his government (Paredes, 2013). While there are many reasons why this is true, one of them is that many Chileans just did not know the realities of the dictatorship and, when they did, were afraid to speak out, both of which can be at least partially attributed to being denied access to unbiased information (Secretaria de Comunicación y Cultura, 1994).

Even immediately following the dictatorship, the Chilean public did not vote for an overwhelmingly leftist candidate, but chose Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democratic Party, the centrist party that eventually aided the media effort against Allende in the 1973 coup (Scully, 1992). Even though censorship laws were lifted when the dictatorship was over, research shows that the effects of the dictatorship on the press have lasted and created conglomerates that have perpetuated a lack of pluralism that exists today (Insunza, 1999). While in this paper I have suggested that censorship and control of the media during the dictatorship had substantial impacts on media bias and, subsequently, Chilean public opinion at the time, there has been little to no empirical research examining if any bias has had a lasting effect on Chilean public opinion and ideology, thus providing an opportunity for quantitative research.

II. Hypothesis

In light of the impact of the dictatorship's creation of bias within the press, a key source of information during the time of the dictatorship, I propose that, due to the Pinochet dictatorship's

control of newspapers during the 1970s and 1980s, Chilean newspapers today still display a rightist bias that is contributing to a widespread conservative Chilean public opinion.

III. Research Design

To test my hypothesis, I obtained all of my data from the 2010 public opinion survey from Latinobarómetro database, an online database containing annual public opinion survey data for Latin American nations. Then, I compared the results for the units of analysis, which were survey respondents, using cross-tabulations and linear regressions created in SPSS software.

I used responses from multiple survey questions as variables in order to improve the validity of the analysis. For the first set of cross tabulations, the independent variable is whether or not the respondents inform themselves about politics using the newspaper or another media outlet and the dependent variable is the respondent's identification on the left-right scale. I recoded the latter so that 0 to 4 constitutes as left, 5 as centrist and 6 to 10 as rightist in order to collapse the data and make it easier to read.

For the second set of cross tabulations, the independent variable is the number of days per week a respondent reads the newspaper and the dependent variable is the respondent's opinion about the previous military dictatorship, which I recoded as favorable, neutral and not favorable. The values of the independent variables and dependent variables remained the same for each country I used in the analysis and comparison.

To measure the relationships between these variables as accurately as possible, I obtained information from Latinobarómetro to control for other factors, such as income, education and age, because each could have a statistically significant effect on the results of the study. For example, I could discover that those with higher levels of education are more likely to read the newspaper and, thus, the ideological effects could be different and, maybe, in reality, education

influences rightist ideology more than newspaper readership. Another possible outcome could be that the way newspapers frame certain issues resonates differently between older members of the population, who may have lived through the dictatorship, and younger members of the population, who may more readily turn to social media to receive their information. Whatever the case, I recoded each of these variables and placed them into larger groups in order to more visibly account for which factors are statistically significant in the formation of ideology. My goal in controlling for these variables is to increase the validity and reliability of the analysis and hopefully isolate for the effect that the press may have on Chilean public opinion.

However, even though controlling for some of the external factors can increase the validity of the study, there are some aspects of public opinion surveys that are inherently unreliable and inaccurate. For example, some of the questions in the survey may have been phrased in a confusing or biased way, thus eliciting inaccurate responses from participants. Another way in which this study could be inaccurate or unreliable is that it does not consider which newspaper the respondent is reading. In other words, of those who read the newspaper, it is possible that this particular sample only read leftist newspapers, which would decrease the validity and accuracy of my analysis.

Additionally, as with a majority of media studies, it is hard to isolate the media from other factors that play a role in the creation of ideology and this could call into doubt the extent of the media's effect. For example, it could be possible that Chileans in general are just more conservative than citizens of other nations, independent of the effects of the press. Lastly, since I only used data from one year and did not compare it to previous responses, such as those from 1970, I cannot effectively track changes over time and it is hard to determine whether or not a conservative bias always existed within Chilean public opinion or if it is a result of the changes

in the media. However, due to the large impact of the dictatorship on the press in the 1970s and existing evidence of this impact today through the media dupoly, I believe that an argument can be made that the events of 40 years ago still affect Chilean public opinion.

The Latinobarómetro survey itself appears to have good internal reliability because it has multiple questions that ask the same thing in different ways and all receive consistent responses. I used the varying questions to my advantage in this paper by using different variables that all measure the same concept in my various cross tabulations in order to discover if the results were all similar and, therefore, provide more validity for the conclusions.

I expect that the data will show that an increase in newspaper use or a preference to read the newspaper over other media outlets will result in a higher identification with conservative ideology. In order to place the significance of these findings in a larger context, I compare the results of the Chilean cross tabulations of the 2010 Latinobarómetro public opinion survey data to the results in Argentina and for Latin American as a whole. I hypothesize that the effects of the press on ideology are similar in both Chile and Argentina and thus indicate that authoritarian control of the press has a noteworthy impact on public opinion and creation of policy even after years of democracy.

IV. Assessment and Analysis:

Table 1: Latin American Ideology And Information about Politics from Newspapers				
		Political Information from Newspapers		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
	Left			
	Count	3106	2120	5226

Ideology	Percentage	30.60%	31.30%	30.80%
	Center			
	Count	3315	2274	5589
	Percentage	32.60%	33.50%	33.00%
	Right			
	Count	3742	2390	6132
	Percentage	36.80%	35.20%	36.20%
	Total			
	Count	10163	6784	16947
	Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson Chi-Square 4.47, p=0.107

Table 1 is a cross tabulation between the number of Latin Americans who inform themselves about politics using newspapers and their subsequent identification on the left-right scale. It indicates that when not controlling for any other possible variables, people who chose to inform themselves about politics using newspapers are not significantly impacted in their identification on the left-right scale. While 35.2% of those who mentioned newspapers as a source of information about politics identified with the right, 36.8% who did not mention newspapers as a source also identified with the right, thus showing that there is not a substantive ideological difference between those who read newspapers and those who do not in Latin America as a whole.

Table 2: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from Newspapers				
		Political Information from Newspapers		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Left				

Ideology	Count	193	103	296
	Percentage	36.90%	31.70%	34.90%
	Center			
	Count	182	100	282
	Percentage	34.80%	30.80%	33.30%
	Right			
	Count	148	122	270
	Percentage	28.30%	37.50%	31.80%
Total				
Count	523	325	848	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square 7.913, p= 0.019

The results from Table 1 can be contrasted to Table 2, which is a cross tabulation strictly between the number of Chileans who inform themselves about politics using newspapers and their identification on the left-right scale. When not controlling for any variables, 37.5% of those who identify with the right in Chile mentioned reading newspapers as a source of political information whereas 28.3% who identify with the right in Chile did not mention newspapers. Furthermore, whereas only 36.9% of those who do not read newspapers in Chile identify with the left, 31.7% of those who identify with the left read Chilean newspapers. This data, along with the chi-square value of .019, indicates a statistically significant conclusion that Chileans who read newspapers are more likely to have a conservative leaning than those who do not and supports my hypothesis that there is a correlation between Chilean newspapers and a more conservative public opinion. Furthermore, when compared to the results from Table 1, it appears that newspaper readership in Chile is significant related to ideology among the countries in Latin America.

Table 3: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from Radio				
		Political Information from Radio		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Ideology	Left			
	Count	186	110	296
	Percentage	35.90%	33.30%	34.90%
	Center			
	Count	182	100	282
	Percentage	35.10%	30.30%	33.30%
	Right			
	Count	150	120	270
Percentage	29.00%	36.40%	31.80%	
Total				
Count	518	330	848	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.271, p=0.072

Table 4: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from Internet				
		Political Information from Internet		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Ideology	Left			
	Count	225	71	296
	Percentage	35.50%	33.00%	34.90%
	Center			
	Count	221	61	282
	Percentage	34.90%	28.40%	33.30%
	Right			
	Count	187	83	270
Percentage	29.50%	38.60%	31.80%	
Total				
Count	633	215	848	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 6.497, p=0.039

Table 5: Chilean Ideology And Information about Politics from TV				
		Political Information from Television		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Ideology	Left			
	Count	56	240	296
	Percentage	37.60%	34.30%	34.90%
	Center			
	Count	57	225	282
	Percentage	38.30%	32.20%	33.30%
	Right			
	Count	36	234	270
Percentage	24.20%	33.50%	31.80%	
Total				
Count	149	699	848	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.078, p=0.079

Table 6: Frequency - Those Who Inform Themselves About Politics Using Media
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	Newspaper	Television	Radio	Internet
Not mentioned	14363 63.30%	4771 21%	11951 52.70%	18945 83.50%
Mentioned	8324 36.70%	17919 79.00%	10736 47.30%	3742 16.50%

In order to more fully understand the significance of the effects of Chilean newspaper usage, I compared the results to other media platforms as shown in the cross tabulations of Tables 3, 4 and 5. It appears that newspapers are not the only media platforms that result in increased identification with rightist ideology and that, in fact, no matter what source Chileans receive their news from, they tend to identify more strongly with the right. For example, when looking at Table 3, which is a cross tabulation between radio usage and ideology, 36.4% mentioned listening to the radio and identified with rightist ideology while 29.0% of those who identify with the right did not mention listening to the radio. With there being similar results for those who obtain information about politics from both television and the Internet, it appears that the more that Chileans choose to inform themselves about politics through the media in general, the more conservative they tend to be. Therefore, the results indicate that my hypothesis that reading newspapers is related to a rightist bias in Chilean public opinion may have some level of accuracy, but cannot be exclusively supported because it appears that every media outlet in Chile creates rightist leanings in public opinion, not only newspapers. This is further supported by the data in Table 6, which compares the frequencies that people mention any form of media as a source of information, and indicates that maybe Chilean society is conservative due to other reasons, not media framing and bias.

Table 7: Argentine Ideology And Politics from Newspapers				
		Political Information from Newspapers		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Ideology	Left			
	Count	74	125	199
	Percentage	19.70%	22.90%	21.60%
	Center			
	Count	185	244	409
	Percentage	44.00%	44.60%	44.40%
	Right			
	Count	136	178	314
Percentage	36.30%	32.50%	34.10%	
Total				
Count	375	547	922	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 1.928, p=0.381

		Political Information from Radio		
		Not mentioned	Mentioned	Total
Ideology	Left			
	Count	62	137	199
	Percentage	43.10%	45.00%	44.40%
	Center			
	Count	127	282	409
	Percentage	43.10%	33.20%	34.10%
	Right			
	Count	106	208	314
Percentage	35.90%	33.20%	34.10%	
Total				
Count	295	627	922	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 0.68, p=0.712

To further place this information in the context of Latin American media usage, I compared the cross tabulations of Chilean media’s influence on ideology to Argentina. In doing so, I found that while those who inform themselves using any media outlet in Chile identify with the rightist ideology in a statistically significant way, those who inform themselves about politics through media outlets in Argentina do not. As seen in Table 7, there is not a substantive difference in the

ideology of Argentine people who mentioned informing themselves about politics through newspapers and those who do not. In fact, when looking at the influence of other media outlets in Argentina, such as radio in Table 8, it appears that the Argentine media sways public opinion more to the left than to the right. While this does not directly support my hypothesis that strictly reading newspapers in Chile results in a more widespread conservative public opinion, it does suggest that maybe the Chilean media and not other factors are the reason that Chileans have a conservative public opinion that is not evidenced in similar countries such as Argentina. While there are many reasons this could be true, such as the aforementioned communications laws in Argentina that promote more media pluralism, the data still demonstrate that the relationship between media consumption and conservatism is stronger in Chile than it is in other similar South American countries.

Table 9: Opinion of Dictatorship And Frequency of Reading a Newspaper					
Frequency					
		None to 2 days	3 to 4 days	5 to 7 days	Total
Opinion of Dictatorship	Do Not Support				
	Count	84	39	54	177
	Percentage	34.30%	35.80%	35.30%	34.90%
	Neutral				
	Count	82	26	39	147
	Percentage	33.50%	23.90%	25.50%	29.00%
	Support				
	Count	79	44	60	183
Percentage	32.20%	40.40%	39.20%	36.10%	
Total					
Count	245	109	153	507	
Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100%	

Pearson Chi-Square: 5.361, p=0.252

Table 9 shows that while 34.3% of those who disliked the previous military dictatorship claim to only read newspapers for up to two days a week, 32.2% of those who were favorable to the dictatorship make the same claim. When comparing percentages for those who read newspapers seven days a week, 35.3% were not favorable to the military dictatorship and 39.2% were favorable to the dictatorship. This indicates that those who read the newspaper more frequently tend to have a less favorable view of the previous military dictatorship, regardless of their identification of the left-right scale, which does not explicitly support my hypothesis. However,

the data are all very similar, which suggests that the frequency that one reads the newspaper may not be as important as actually choosing to learn about politics through the media.

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Significance
	B	Standard Error	Beta		
Constant	0.597	0.1		5.958	0
Information About Politics from Newspapers	0.082	0.058	0.052	1.413	0.158
Income	0.296	0.057	0.193	5.2	0
Education	0.074	0.037	0.08	2.017	0.044
Age	0.156	0.039	0.158	4.039	0

R Square: 0.259, Adjusted R Square: 0.067

Thus far, the data have largely supported my hypothesis that newspapers are related to a conservative ideology within Chilean public opinion that may be due to a bias that exists within the media. However, this conclusion can be drawn only without controlling for any other possible causes. Education is a possible cause because it could be that those with higher levels of education are more likely to read the newspaper and, thus, the ideological effects could be different and, maybe, in reality, education influences ideology more than newspaper readership. Age is another possible influencer because the way newspapers frame certain issues resonates differently between older members of the population, who may have lived through the dictatorship, and younger members of the population, who may more readily turn to social media to receive their information. Income is also a possible reason that those who read the newspaper are more conservative because maybe wealthier people, who tend to be of more conservative

societal classes, can simply afford to while other income levels cannot. While there may be other reasons that may contribute to Chileans' level of conservatism, after running a few cross tabulations of possible reasons, I deemed these as the most logical and significant of my influencers, which is why they are presented in my paper.

Table 10 shows a multiple linear regression analysis exemplifying the relationship between those who chose to inform themselves about politics through newspapers and their ideology, while controlling for education, age and income. In doing so, it appears that newspapers no longer play a significant role in the reason that Chileans identify with the right.

The partial effect of the number of people who chose to read newspapers as a source of political information, the independent variable, shows that with each additional person who decided to read about politics using the newspapers, there was an increase in .082 in the likelihood that they would identify as more conservative. This supports the claim made in the hypothesis that reading newspapers contributes to Chilean conservatism. However, when analyzing the t-statistic of 1.413, I determined that the effect that using newspapers as a source of political information has on ideological identification is not statistically significant in comparison to other variables. In fact, the research shows that all the other variables that were controlled for, which were age, income and the level of education, play a positive and statistically significant role in the formation of ideology because all of those t-statistics were greater than two. This suggests that, while reading newspapers may be related to people's identification with the right, there are other factors that are more significant that could be the true reason that Chilean public opinion leans conservatively. Therefore, my hypothesis that the conservative framing of newspapers causes Chilean public opinion to be more conservative cannot be fully accepted. However, it draws attention to other factors that may have a more

statistically significant effect on ideology and calls for more research concerning the relationship between these factors and newspaper readership.

Additionally, the R-squared value of .067 or 6.7% is very small, indicating that the variations in ideology were not fully explained by the independent or control variables. This indicates that, although this paper accounted for some of the reasons Chilean public opinion may be more conservative, there are a wide variety of factors that may explain why and more research needs to be done to identify these factors before connecting ideological identification in Chile solely to the influence of the press or media. While I controlled for other variables throughout the research and analysis, such as the effect of sex on ideology, I found many to be statistically insignificant and, therefore, I omitted them from this paper in order to present the information with more clarity and efficiency.

V. Conclusion

In my analysis, I demonstrated that while there is a relationship between Chilean newspaper readership and conservative tendencies in Chilean public opinion, there might be other factors that play a more significant role in the creation of a conservative Chilean public. Therefore, my hypothesis, which was that the dictatorship's influence on the press and subsequent right-leaning newspapers contributes to a conservative Chilean public that still exists today, cannot be fully accepted.

The analysis demonstrated that, without controlling for other factors, the members of the Chilean public that read newspapers have a more conservative ideology than those who do not and than those of Argentina. In fact, the results of the data from Argentina, a country that had a similar dictatorship to that of Pinochet, showed the opposite and demonstrated that those who read newspapers actually identify more with the left. However, when controlling for other

possible reasons that the Chilean public is conservative, I discovered that other factors, such as the education, age and income levels of the respondents, actually played a more statistically significant role in the creation of a conservative public opinion. Furthermore, it appears that no matter what media outlet Chileans use, whether that is radio, television or the Internet, they still have a conservative tendency, which suggests that the dictatorship's control of the media in general could be a reason that Chilean public opinion is more conservative today in comparison to other countries.

In further quantitative research attempting to connect the dictatorship's influence on the press to the impact on Chilean public opinion, it may be beneficial to narrow down the responses for those who only consume newspapers as a source of political information. This way, the full impact of just newspaper readership and not multiple sources can be analyzed. Furthermore, it could be interesting to take technological advances into account and analyze how they affect Chilean public opinion and activism. While earlier in this paper I mentioned a study that shows that Latin America has seen a recent increase in newspaper readership, it does not mean that the newspaper industry is outselling other communications outlets because emerging forms, such as social media, could actually have a bigger impact on Chilean public opinion in the future. Even though the press was the most influential mode of communication during the dictatorship, it is possible that even if the dictatorship's censorship and control had a lasting impact on the industry, it is not a true significant factor today.

To conclude, while this quantitative analysis supports my earlier claim that the dictatorship's control of the press aided in the creation of a conservative Chilean public opinion, it shows that the press may not be the only reason that there is a conservative public opinion and, as a result, it provides the opportunity to explore other reasons why this conservative tendency exists.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Through secondary research and qualitative and quantitative analysis, I demonstrated that the Pinochet dictatorship did have an effect on the press and may still have an effect today. In presenting Chilean history, I provided the necessary context to understand what it means to be a member of Chilean society and accounted for other factors that may influence culture and public opinion, such as its centrist party politics or its consistent return to military dictatorships. My subsequent discussion of the Chilean press during the Pinochet dictatorship provides evidence to show that the military regime's control of the media existed and had an effect on the Chilean public. Through censorship, propaganda, legislation and foreign and financial aid, the dictatorship created a widespread atmosphere of fear that slowly limited the circulation of leftist ideas and prompted self-censorship. This then led to the consolidation of the industry, as right-leaning media conglomerates were the only ones that were experiencing financial success during the dictatorship and bought the centrist and leftist newspapers. Over time, a duopoly in Chilean media formed, in which two wealthy conservatives purchased and still run a majority of the communications outlets, thereby creating a lack of sources from which Chileans can receive their information.

In my qualitative case analysis between *El Mercurio* and *La Nación*, the extent of this duopoly's control determined that, while media bias certainly existed among the selection and content of articles in both of these newspapers in 1973, this bias still moderately exists in *El Mercurio* today due to a lack of media pluralism. By using pre-determined criteria to compare and contrast framing, word choice and circulation, I determined that, even today, after over two decades of democracy, the dictatorship's impact on the media during the 1970s and 1980s might influence the presentation and selection of content disseminated within Chilean society.

In order to determine the significance and extent of this impact, I presented a quantitative study using public opinion survey data analyzing the relationship between those who chose to read newspapers and how they identify on the right-left ideological scale. By using a number of different variables to account for validity and reliability, I determined that in comparison to other nations, such as Argentina, Chile has a more conservative public opinion that appears to be independent of which media platform Chileans use to inform themselves. In other words, whether Chileans use radio, television, newspapers or the Internet to obtain information about politics, those who use the media identify as more conservative than those who do not.

When controlling for other reasons as to why a conservative public opinion may exist, I discovered that the media may not be a statistically significant factor in the creation of a right-leaning Chilean public and that education, income and age may play a larger role. Therefore, while my hypothesis for the quantitative analysis could not be completely accepted, it does highlight that the Chilean press favors those who are more conservative, thus affirming my earlier arguments in this paper and providing opportunities for more research about how the media may be important for perpetuating a conservative slant, especially among the wealthier or more educated. For example, the data I used in this paper made it difficult to isolate for those

who only read the newspaper to obtain political information. Therefore, conducting an independent survey and possibly asking which outlet, channel or newspaper each respondent uses could be helpful in performing a more in-depth analysis and could allow for analysis and isolation of the impact of individual newspapers, such as *El Mercurio*, to qualify the case study's conclusions. Furthermore, it could be interesting to more closely examine the effects and impact of other possible variables in creating a right-leaning public opinion and if these variables are correlated with media usage.

While in this paper I uncovered that the dictatorship created a conservative Chilean press, it is also theoretically possible that the dictatorship just created a more conservative Chilean media in general. Additionally, while it appears that the conservative media has an impact today, the extent and significance of this impact is difficult to isolate for, which provides the opportunity for continued research into the lasting effects that an authoritarian government and a lack of media pluralism can have on society and, furthermore, what can be done to neutralize them.

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