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International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia From the 1990's Through the 2000's

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Abstract

This study researches international intervention and what makes it successful and unsuccessful. The analysis of the Bosnian and Macedonian interventions from the 1990's through the 2000's provides clues as to what makes intervention more successful for other international actors considering intervention. These two interventions are a great analytic tool because of their similar situations yet divergent outcomes and studying the successes and mistakes of each intervention is helpful in deciding what should be emphasized in future interventions. Bosnia and Macedonia were the two most multiethnic republics in Yugoslavia before their independence, each had forces from the United Nations and other international actors stationed in their nations at the same time, each had heavy international involvement in their state constitutions, and each hope to become members of the European Union. Given all of these similarities, studying the actions made by the international community helps explain their divergent outcomes and make recommendations for future interventions.

This study analyzes resolutions from the United Nations, failed and successful peace agreements, and state constitutions to determine what the role of the international community was supposed to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and what their role actually was. This research concludes that the international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a failure while the international intervention in Macedonia was a success. It also concludes that international intervention works best when actors intervene early on in a country, when sustained physical violence has not begun at the time of intervention, and when actors look at the situation as a whole without faulty preconceived notions of the reason(s) for intervention.

Executive Summary

This study focuses on the international community's intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in the 1990's through the 2000's when each former Yugoslav republic declared independence from Yugoslavia and worked towards establishing stable, secure states. The purpose is to find what elements of intervention lead to successful outcomes, what elements lead to unsuccessful outcomes, and what interveners should learn from the Bosnian and Macedonian interventions moving forward.

Primary source documents, including, but not limited to, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Macedonian Constitution, and the Ohrid Agreement, served as the main source for analysis for this study. I looked for direct and indirect references to the international community in some documents and in other documents, I looked at how the international community shaped their creation and implementation as a whole. I used the liberal theory of international relations throughout this study to better understand the role of non-state international actors in the international system and their interactions with traditional state actors. Non-state actors such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were all incredibly important to the interventions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and they worked to liberalize the countries in order to bring them and the Balkans more stability.

I found that the international community can definitely take elements from both of interventions studied and apply them to future interventions. First, it is incredibly important for international actors to intervene early on in a conflict before the situation worsens into sustained armed conflict. Early intervention allows interveners to be proactive, not reactive, and they can properly execute peacekeeping mandates. A peacekeeping mandate does not help a situation in

which war has already begun, as it did in Bosnia by the time United Nations forces deployed, so the timing of the intervention must be chosen carefully to optimize chances of success. Early intervention is important in both diplomatic and military interventions, but it makes a bigger difference in military interventions. The military intervention in Macedonia deployed before sustained physical violence happened, so the troops could work to diffuse hostilities and assist the government with state building processes without having to worry about the politics of war.

Furthermore, actors must be aware of the actual cause of the conflict or war before they intervene diplomatically or militarily. The reasons Bosnia and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia were multifaceted and it's important for interveners to look at the bigger picture when assessing a potential intervention. Attempting to impose causes for a war on a situation hurts the intervening actors and it hurts potential peace negotiations because when the intervening force that is supposed to help is ill informed, they propose ill informed solutions for peace. Many within the international community believed the "ancient hatreds" myths and applied it to Bosnia, which resulted in ethnic solutions for a problem that wasn't all about ethnicity.

This study is significant because it identifies a series of factors that are important to a successful international intervention. As the world faces new challenges and states face internal turmoil, international intervention may be necessary to ensure the security and stability of that region, continent, and even the world. Having a set of factors for success derived from previous interventions is invaluable in figuring out how to best intervene in similar situations in the future. Even though every intervention is different, the general principles derived from this study can apply to every potential international intervention that happens in the future.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Civil wars and other internal conflicts initially may seem like isolated instances of violence that are specific to one state or possibly the general region that state is in. However, internal conflicts pose significant threats to the international community as a whole¹. As the conflict continues, questions of refugees, contagion, regional stability, and war crimes demand the attention of the international community. The international community has an interest in mediating the conflict to prevent humanitarian tragedies, diffuse the conflict so it doesn't cause a crisis for neighboring countries, and minimize the numbers of refugees and/or internally displaced persons. It is under these assumptions that the international community intervenes in an independent state's affairs in an attempt to resolve the conflict. However, international intervention has had a mixed record since the end of World War Two and interveners, who are traditionally powerful actors in the international system, are still working to find the best methods of intervention that will produce positive results and a successful intervention.

These interventions took place in the post-Cold War era when the world had its first crisis that resulted in international intervention. In 1991, Yugoslavia started to violently unravel in many, but not all, of its six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Before their independence, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

¹ The term "international community" is problematic for a multitude of reasons and will be unpacked later in this research.

were two multiethnic republics living in this larger socialist state. The Republic of Macedonia declared its independence relatively quietly compared to the other republics and initially entered into statehood without major physical conflict. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, encountered much different circumstances after they declared independence. Violence and war officially made its way to Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992 and lasted until late 1995 when the Dayton Peace Agreement, the treaty that ended the war, was signed.

The United Nations (UN) sent peacekeeping forces to both former republics in February 1992 under the same mandate when each faced interethnic conflict; considering these similarities, their profoundly different paths to statehood are striking. After each former Yugoslav republic successfully gained independence and statehood, more similarities emerged – their state constitutions have provided for relatively peaceful, but not necessarily stable, states in the twenty-plus years since independence and the interethnic conflict they experienced during the early to mid 1990's was never fully resolved².

Besides the fact that Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were both ethnically heterogeneous Yugoslav republics, their similarity is also evident in the aforementioned fact that each had heavy international intervention during and after their independence. The UN sent the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to both Bosnia and Macedonia under a peacekeeping mandate to aid each country's transition from Yugoslav republic to independent state, assist in the formation of their constitutional framework, and help the state building process. Therefore, the international community, comprised of many different state and non-state actors, greatly influenced the independence paths of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

² In this context, "peaceful" refers to an absence of sustained physical violence.

Since UNPROFOR operated within the confines of a peacekeeping mandate, it was easier for forces to work in Macedonia because violence had not begun when UNPROFOR deployed in early 1992. Also, Macedonian leaders were largely more receptive to UNPROFOR intervention and a peaceful solution for independence, which helped interveners fulfill their mandate (Pushinka, 2002, p. 90). Alternately, the Bosnian War had already begun when UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, meaning forces couldn't "keep peace" because there was no peace to keep when they arrived. The leaders of the three warring parties (and their respective "governments") did not all cooperate with UNPROFOR, nor were they committed to finding a peaceful solution to independence with the help of UN forces and other interveners. The majority of international interveners thought that the Bosnian War was caused by "ancient hatreds," thus believing that the war was inevitable and beyond reason, which skewed their potential solutions for the war in favor of ethnic solutions.

After Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia, they quickly encountered internal threats to the stability of their new state. Albanians residing in Macedonia took issue with the Macedonian Constitution because they felt as though it marginalized them and made them inferior to Macedonians (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 20-22). Furthermore, Macedonia faced external threats to their stability and sovereignty from Greece, who took issue with the name "Macedonia" and parts of their constitution (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 260). The Macedonian government and prominent Albanian politicians worked together to address the internal and external threats posed by the disagreement over the constitution to the best of their ability and Macedonia avoided war for the first decade of statehood. However, in 2001 unresolved ethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians led to armed conflict that lasted the majority of

2001. It resulted in the Ohrid Framework Agreement that established a ceasefire agreement and gave more rights to Albanians in Macedonia (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 37, 118).

In contrast to Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence and existence as an internationally recognized state did not come until the end of the Bosnian War. The Bosnian War pitted the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia against each other and caused a degradation of trust in the government, international interveners, and those belonging to other ethnic groups. After the Bosnian War, the Bosnian government had to learn how to operate within a state that essentially categorized everything in terms of ethnicity and "equality" to prevent any one ethnic group from taking advantage of another. The government also became chained to the international community to run the majority of internal state processes, such as elections, reorganization of the police force, and the courts (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 132).

The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina failed because the Bosnian War had already begun at the time of intervention, Bosnian officials largely did not welcome intervening forces, and simplified notions of the root cause of the War fundamentally changed the way interveners operated. The international community's intervention in Macedonia was overall successful because Macedonia was not in a state of war at the time of intervention, the majority of Macedonians welcomed international interveners, and their state institutions were able to handle internal and external pressure that threatened the integrity of the state. In what follows, I explain these multiple similarities and differences between the international interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in detail. First, a brief summary of the previous research on international interventions is necessary for establishing the foundation on which this research stands.

Literature Review

This research aims to compare and contrast the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia to discern why their paths to independent statehood were so radically different. In a broader sense, this research hopes to illuminate what methods of international intervention have more success than others and why. Finally, it tries to identify the factors inherent to the intervening actors and those inherent to the place of intervention that make intervention successful. In order to accomplish these goals, in each section of this paper I engage with and build on previous research from other scholars studying international intervention and its effects. International intervention has been a heavily researched topic and there is a lot of literature available on what makes an intervention successful, the diplomacy surrounding intervention, and how actors legitimize their intervention.

Pushinka argues that a UN mission's success relies on strong and consistent UN member commitment to conflict management, abolishing external support for the warring parties, and a low level of animosity between warring parties (Pushinka, 2002, p. 8)³. Based on this research, Pushinka concluded that the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia from March 1992 – December 1995 succeeded because the Macedonian government was willing to work with UN forces, it fulfilled its mandate, limited violence and the intensity of conflict, and the conflict did not spread (Pushinka, 2002, p. 79). Neofotistos agrees with Pushinka that part of the reason why the Macedonian intervention succeeded was because Macedonian elites invited UN forces to help

³ She also found that the military strength of the warring parties did not influence the success of a mission (Pushinka, 2002, p. 8-9).

with peacekeeping efforts and there was a relatively high degree of cohesion between the government and UNPROFOR (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 27)⁴. Neofotistos also credits Macedonian institutions for having enough strength and stability to reasonably handle diplomatic threats from other nations and internal crises, which led to their successful transition to independence.

Other scholars have argued that the international intervention in Macedonia was not a complete success. Ilievski and Taleski conclude that initially the EU's intervention was a success because it kept the new nation free from sustained armed conflict and helped to deescalate interethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians. They also argue that the initial assistance from the EU and other international actors in the Macedonian-Greek name dispute helped Macedonia stand up to an established state in the international system without throwing their state institutions into panic mode (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 355)⁵. However, they believe the EU's intervention in the early 2000's during Macedonia's 2001 violent crisis cannot be described as a complete success because it did not lead Macedonia on a swift path to EU membership as promised (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 359-360). Rather, they argue international institutions such as the EU and NATO have not done enough to facilitate Europeanization and integration in Macedonia due to the Macedonian-Greek name dispute.

Similar to Ilievski and Taleski's critical view of EU intervention in Macedonia, the majority of scholars researching the Bosnian intervention overall conclude that the international community's efforts failed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pushinka asserts that the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia from March 1992 – December 1995 failed because it did not fulfill its

⁴ The overall welcoming of intervening forces showed a commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Pushinka's research shows that peacekeeping is more successful when there's a "growing perception on the part of all warring parties that conflicts should be resolved by non-violent means" (Pushinka, 2002, p. 96).

⁵ The Macedonian-Greek dispute will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

mandate, violence intensified during the mission, there were large outflows of refugees, and the conflict spread (Pushinka, 2002, p. 79). There is some debate on whether the concept of “ancient hatreds” and the presence of an ethnic component in the Bosnian War led to the intervention’s failure. Some assert that the presence of an ethnic component in the conflict has no influence on the success of an intervention (Pushinka 2002, p. 8-9). However, many more scholars argue against this point. While an ethnic element in a conflict that necessitates international intervention may be the factor that divides the warring parties and separates society, it goes much deeper than that. Presence of an ethnic component influences how the interveners view the conflict and it can change their methods of intervention. Many scholars argue that the nature of the ethnic component to the Bosnian War led interveners to propose peace agreements written strictly in terms of ethno-nationality (Baker, 2015, p. 69; Moore, 2013, p. 40; Woodward, 1995, p. 198). These scholars argue that the proposed peace agreements were written through the biased lens of “ancient hatreds” and manifested in an ethnic solution to a conflict that was not strictly an ethnic conflict⁶.

The Dayton Peace Agreement, the peace treaty ending the Bosnian War, has also been met with mixed reviews from scholars. On the one hand, Dayton achieved its central goal of ending the physical violence of the war but on the other hand, it institutionalized ethnic divisions and infused an ethno-national element to everything in Bosnia. Holbrooke – the main Dayton architect – wishes negotiators had tried to include more in the agreement to strengthen it and have more compromises between the three ethnic groups on paper (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 233). Scholars overall deem the Dayton Peace Agreement a failure because of its endorsement of

⁶ It’s important to recognize and address the violence along ethno-national lines in the Bosnian War, but that was certainly not the only factor involved in the War. A more nuanced understanding of the contributing factors is necessary to fully understanding it.

ethno-national divisions, the omnipresence of international institutions in Bosnian affairs that led to a reliance on international actors, and because it has stalled Bosnian European integration (Aolain 1998, 958; Baker, 2015, 77; Chandler, 2000, p. 115).

In terms of European integration, there is widespread agreement that the EU has not been very successful in the Europeanization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many scholars contend that EU conditionality has not worked because Bosnian elites are not committed to EU integration (Bieber, 2011, p. 1783; Tolksdorf, 2015, p. 402; Tzifakis, 2012, p. 137). Bieber goes a step further and asserts that ever since the EU effectively took control of state building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has not been an effective state builder because they have not had a unified, cohesive plan for the relationship between conditionality and state building (Bieber, 2011, p. 1784).

The breadth of research shows that determinates of success in an international intervention aren't necessarily arbitrary. Internal and external factors influence the intervention in a myriad of ways and attempting to codify these factors is essential in understanding why intervention works in some cases and fails in others. This paper builds on the research discussed in this section along with other scholar's work to gain a better understanding of what differences existed between Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that can help explain their different experiences with international intervention. Furthermore, this research hopes to expand on previous scholars' work to acquire a deeper understanding of the dynamics of a successful international intervention.

This research contributes to the aforementioned previous research on international interventions and hopes to discern why the intervention in Bosnia failed and the intervention in

Macedonia succeeded, and how the international community can learn from these interventions moving forward.

Methodology and Theoretical Perspective

While recognizing undisputable similarities between the two republics in terms of their ethnic pluralism, economy, and history, this capstone focuses on the international interventions' different outcomes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia and it asks; How did the involvement of the international community influence Bosnia and Macedonia with reference to their independence from the Former Yugoslavia, their legal frameworks, and their overall stability?

The purpose of this analysis is to see how the international community affected Bosnia and Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia, their legal frameworks, and overall stability post-independence. This paper uses a multidisciplinary approach drawing on many different social science disciplines, such as political science and anthropology, but primarily uses research focused on international relations. This study is rooted in a qualitative textual analysis of primary source documents including the UNPROFOR mandate for Bosnia and Macedonia, the Lisbon Agreement, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, various United Nations Resolutions, the Macedonian Constitution and the Ohrid Agreement.

In analyzing the primary sources, I looked for instances of direct and indirect international influence. Direct mentions and references to international actors such as the European Union or the United Nations in documents pertaining to another state can provide

insight as to how an intervener views the state they're intervening in and vice versa. These perception play a large role in the outcome of an intervention because they can potentially reveal how committed an actor is to the successful completion of the objectives in the document⁷. Finding the differences between the will of the new state government versus the will of the powerful international community is integral to understanding what the role of an international intervener is on another state. For this reason, I critically analyzed various primary sources including UN mandates, peace agreements, and constitutions in an attempt to discern how international intervention manifests itself in written documents and if it impacts the success of an intervention.

Of course, if the primary source document is directly from the United Nations, it's going to be written from their perspective, not the place they are intervening. However, the language in these documents and the goals for intervention are very important in figuring out how the intervener views the place it's intervening. The types of goals they set, the way they discuss the people living there, and how they contextualize the conflict that necessitates the intervention are all important in analyzing the overall success or failure of a particular intervention. This paper also contains analysis of peace treaties and state constitutions that were, in part, negotiated by international actors but written directly for the state the international actors intervened in. In these documents, analyzing mentions of international actors and what their role is in that particular document can help explain how and why the implementation of a document's objectives succeeded or failed.

⁷ The "actors" mentioned in this sentence refer to international interveners and the home state itself. A successful completion of the objectives of any document require commitment and dedication from all parties involved.

Furthermore, the overall language of documents negotiated by international actors can show which actor took the most responsibility and who dominated those negotiations. Knowing who or what entity negotiated the majority of a particular document can help reveal any biases the negotiator may have towards the issue at hand. These indirect discussions of international interveners are very important in the evaluation of an intervener's motives and preconceived notions of a state, conflict, or both. These allusions are very revealing and helpful in assessing why intervention outcomes differ and what the elements of a successful intervention are. For example, when the language in a document points to less ownership on behalf of the home state and a dominating international presence, it has an impact on the overall success of the document's intended purpose. Critically analyzing the language of a document allows this type of micro-level scrutiny to take place.

This capstone utilizes the liberal theory of international relations to analyze the importance of non-state actors and their interactions with state actors⁸. Liberalism holds that injustices and war are products of lacking social institutions and can be lessened or eradicated through "the expansion of human freedom...achieved in democracies and through well-regulated market capitalism" (Arreguin-Toft & Mingst, 2014, p. 86). Liberalism legitimizes the principle that global anarchy is reduced by interdependence among states through alliances, treaties, and intergovernmental organizations. "It offers the promise of continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace" (Doyle, 1986, p. 61). This is one of the reasons why it was important to analyze the Bosnian and Macedonian interventions with the liberal theory because it posits that international security and peace will increase as liberal states multiply. Interveners wanted to democratize the former

⁸ Liberalism views non-state actors as the primary actor in the international system. Examples of non-state actors are the UN, EU, NATO, and OSCE.

Yugoslav republics and, after they implemented reforms, welcome them into liberal intergovernmental organizations in order to heighten Balkan (regional) security, European (continental) security, and global security. Even though Europeanization and liberalization efforts have stalled, the end goal of acceptance into traditionally Western, cosmopolitan, liberal institutions is still there and Bosnia and Macedonia are still working with the EU to make this happen. International interveners wanted to place the former Yugoslav republics on the path to democratization and although they have had varying levels of success, it was one of the driving forces behind intervention.

Liberalism assumes that actors in the international system are rational and act out of self interest, which can help make sense of decisions made in both Bosnia and Macedonia in regards to cooperation with intervening forces and the implementation of Europeanization reforms (Arreguin-Toft & Mingst, 2014, p. 87). In Bosnia, it has been in political elites' self interest to resist constitutional amendments and legislative reforms necessary for EU accession because making these changes would reduce their political power in Bosnian government⁹. It was also in their interest to be combative with intervening forces during the war itself because they thought they could secure more power without cooperating interveners. In Macedonia, there was no war at the time of intervention, so it was in the government's interest to mediate ethnic hostilities before it reached the point of war. Furthermore, this helps explain why the international community got involved in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was in the self-interest of the United

⁹ While there are varying levels of commitment to legislative reforms among the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks, no group is completely willing to give up veto powers over the other group for EU membership.

Nations, the European Union, and other actors to intervene in order to prevent potential spillover from the Balkan region into the greater European region¹⁰.

Since this research focuses on the involvement of international actors working towards peace and stability in local affairs, liberalism is the most appropriate theory with which to frame my research. Analyzing Bosnia and Macedonia's relationships with the international community will provide insight as to why each state had vastly different paths to independence.

International Community Defined

The international community is a term with little meaning unless it is broken down and described. While the term itself suggests a homogenous entity with a unified set of objectives working together as a community, it is actually far from that. "Any reification of the international community or internationalism conceals the fact that its power, authority, and ability to impose systems of order are put into place by people – by men and women of different classes and nations who may conceptualize their participation in distinct ways" (Coles, 2012, p. 14). The international community is comprised of countless actors from state governments, militaries, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations that all converge around an event that warrants their attention.

During the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing state-building processes, the international community that converged there consisted of the United Nations, the European Union, state governments (especially that of the United States), the Red Cross, and many other IGOs and NGOs (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, p. 574). Each actor – and even individual bureaucrats within the larger organization – had different goals for achieving success, and a

¹⁰ While the US did not have to worry about spillover, it was still in their interest to prevent spillover to other European states so the war didn't get out of control and lead to a large regional or continental war.

successful intervention had different definitions for each of them (Coles, 2014, p. 14). The international community in Yugoslavia during the 1990s contained many different goals and a multitude of methods used to achieve them and they didn't always work together. This collection of non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and state governments often engaged in "sporadic and haphazard efforts" to establish peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and build its state institutions and internal framework from the ground up (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005, p. 573-574). All of the bureaucracy and standard operating procedures that exist within the international community often bogged the interventions down and hurt the international community's ability to carry out its objectives effectively.

Many people falsely believe the international community is comprised of the best and brightest the world has to offer. While this may be true for the top-level individuals in a specific NGO, IGO, or a particular state government, the "boots on the ground" representing their specific agency, organization, or state often aren't qualified for intervention and state building work. Many have no experience dealing with wartime intervention, peacekeeping, or state building and even though everyone has to have a first-time experience with this at some point, it's concerning when the majority of people implementing the objectives of the intervention have no experience and use the experience to launch a career on the international stage (Coles, 2014, p. 97). "...Some jobs were often filled without regard to qualifications...[and] it appeared to matter more that position was filled than that it was filled competently" (Coles, 2014, p. 97). Even though interveners were under qualified, the myth that internationals stationed within Bosnia and Macedonia were more capable and skilled than nationals led many to believe that "an international would always have more success than a national in forcing an issue to completion or resolution" (Coles, 2014, p. 100). Many internationals didn't speak the local language(s) or

have a basic understanding of the region's history, complicating communication between them and nationals and hurting the intervention's effectiveness as well.

For the purposes of this analysis, the term "international community" is used as a blanket term referring to the many international actors working in Bosnia and Macedonia. While this presents challenges for the aforementioned reasons, it is difficult to define the term in every situation because of the need for brevity within the analysis. In some situations, this research will focus on one actor or set of actors but other times, "international community" will be used to refer to the multitude of actors involved in Bosnian and Macedonian intervention. While this research is critical of the term "international community," it is designed to analyze the role of international interveners as a whole, not each individual actor.

Chapter 2

Background

Yugoslavia

The dissolution of Yugoslavia and its destructive wars ushered in the post-Cold War world order. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the West celebrated the “defeat of communism,” instability and insecurity permeated throughout the Balkans. Instead of the 1990s offering the promise of peace and prosperity that a world rid of communism supposedly provided, post-socialist Yugoslavia fell apart and Western institutions could not stop it. “Spanning the entire decade of the 1990s, this violence erupted at the exact moment when the confrontation of the Cold War was drawing to a close, when Westerners were claiming their liberal values as triumphant in a country that had only a few years earlier been seen as very well placed to join the West” (Gagnon, 2004, p. 1). The various conflicts in the Balkans forced Western nations and Western institutions in particular to take a critical look at their methods of intervention in foreign affairs.

Prior to the World Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century that impacted all of Europe (including the Balkans) a multiplicity of ethnicities and identities coexisted relatively peacefully in Yugoslavia for centuries (Baker, 2015, p. 58). After the socialist leader Tito died, Yugoslavia entered into a steep economic decline that would eventually become a reason for the

country's demise. As the promise of socialism faded and socioeconomic hardships fell upon the six republics unevenly, nationalist independence movements gained traction. "Different groups had different access to socioeconomic power and political privileges and tended to view each other's resources as a threat to their own well being" (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 19). As unemployment and inflation rose, the façade of socialism's ability to provide economically and politically for each republic and its citizens disappeared. In order to stay afloat, Yugoslavia had to accept loans from the International Monetary Fund, but this required the country to impose various restrictive austerity measures. "Yugoslavia had to freeze investment in infrastructure and social services, maximize exports while restricting imports, and prevent loss-making enterprises keeping workers employed if they could fire them" (Baker, 2015, p. 25). After the tumultuous decade of the 1980s driven by severe economic hardships, optimism for a unified Yugoslavia continuing into the 1990s quickly evaporated.

When it became clear that the instability in Yugoslavia could potentially dismantle Yugoslavia as a whole, the European Union established the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia and gave the commission "legal-advisory duties to establish and analyze the criteria for potential recognition of the Yugoslav successor states" and to mediate the dissolution (Ilievski & Taleski, 2010). The commission published a report in January 1992 determining that only Slovenia and Macedonia, and not the other four republics, fulfilled all of the conditions required for recognition as an independent state. "However, the European Council ignored the advice of its own commission and recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, despite the commission's opinion that Croatia did not meet all recognition conditions" (Ilievski & Taleski, 2010).

On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence from Yugoslavia after enduring a decade of political and economic challenges, which solidified Yugoslavia's fate. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) fought Slovenian forces for just ten days until negotiations were made between the Slovenian and the Yugoslav governments to solidify the terms of Slovenian independence (Moore, 2013, p. 38). On the other hand, Croatian independence was much more difficult and lasted longer than Slovenia's. After six months of war, the United Nations brokered a cease-fire between JNA and Croatian forces and the United Nations sent peacekeeping troops to Croatia (Woodward, 1995, p. 146). However, the UN involvement in the Croatian War for independence created a deadlock over four UN protected areas because these areas were disputed territories (Woodward, 1995 p. 146). JNA forces fought to keep Croatia within Yugoslavia and later, Serb forces fought with Croatian forces until 1995 when the war ended. The secessions of Slovenia and Croatia started a trend within Yugoslavia that other republics followed and it provided early clues to how problematic the dissolution of Yugoslavia would become.

Macedonia

After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, officials from the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia decided to hold an independence referendum as well. Macedonian independence played out very differently than the independence movements in the other republics because the majority of their fighting remained diplomatic instead of physical. Tension between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians living within Macedonia was the biggest obstacle for Macedonia during their independence movement and continuing into the first decade of their state.

Before the Macedonian independence referendum on September 8, 1991, the two largest Albanian political parties called for an Albanian boycott of the vote to show their dissatisfaction. As the largest minority in Macedonia, Albanians feared that they would lose rights if Macedonia became an independent state. The official Macedonian independence referendum in September 1991 showed that three-fourths of voters favored independence (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 22). Unhappy with the results, Albanians held their own (illegal) referendum in January 1992 regarding autonomy for Albanians in Macedonia, where 92% of eligible voters favored autonomy (Neofotistos, 2012, pp. 21-22). “Albanian politicians used the overwhelming popular support for autonomy as political leverage to try and secure greater political and cultural rights for the Albanian community, thus fueling within the Macedonian community even greater resentment of Albanians” (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 22). Regardless of the Albanian referendum on autonomy, the overwhelming majority in favor of Macedonian independence from Yugoslavia led the Macedonian Assembly to adopt the Founding Constitution in November 1991.

The Founding Constitution was a controversial document and instigated further disagreements between the ethnic groups. Yet, the initial disagreements over the constitution were quickly addressed through constitutional reforms and amendments. “In Macedonia, constitutional reform involves concepts such as nationality, ethnicity, statehood, majority, minority, citizenship, state symbols and even literary metaphors” (Peshkopia, 2014, p. 44). Macedonian and Albanian politicians had to work together to reform the Macedonian Constitution so hostility between the two groups did not reach the point of armed conflict.

The Preamble of the Constitution states, “Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities

living in the Republic of Macedonia” (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Preamble). At first glance, this may not seem problematic because it acknowledges the equality and citizenship of other nationalities and ethnicities besides Macedonians. However, this statement creates a de facto political power dynamic between Macedonians and all other nationalities, especially Albanians. While this phrasing does guarantee equal human rights for all, it does not guarantee equal political rights for all. The Preamble makes non-ethnic Macedonians subordinate to ethnic Macedonians in political circles, it defines Macedonian statehood in ethno-nationalist terms, and it leaves Albanians with no measureable political power (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 23). As the nation’s largest majority, they felt as though they deserved the same rights and privileges as ethnic Macedonians (Ripiloski & Pendarovski, 2013, pp. 1-3)¹¹.

The Preamble was not the only problematic section of the Founding Constitution. For instance, Article 7 states, “The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language in the Republic of Macedonia. In the units of local self-government where the majority of the inhabitants belong to nationalities, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in manner determined by law” (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Article 7). This states that the Macedonian language as the only nationally recognized language in the country, thereby excluding the Albanian language as a nationally recognized language. Furthermore, Article 7 is very ambiguous and does not outline any process to determine a “majority” and how one’s language becomes recognized at the local level. The Macedonian-Albanian conflict over the Constitution and minority rights came to a head in 2001 and was resolved with constitutional amendments, as discussed later in this research.

¹¹ 25% of the population identified as Albanian.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnian independence took much longer than Macedonia's and resulted in much more bloodshed. In many ways, political elites manipulated and politicized existing ethno-national tensions and imported violence to Bosnia from neighboring Serbia and Croatia in order for those elites to secure greater power¹². In the Bosnian national elections in 1990, the three main ethnic groups – Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) – captured a significant portion of the parliamentary seats and they also won every seat in the Bosnian collective presidency (Baker, 2015, p. 60). It was in the interest of each of those serving in the collective presidency to frame politics through an ethno-nationalist lens because it allowed them to appeal directly to the ethnic group they represented. All three parties forced every political issue into a discussion rooted in ethno-nationalist terms to strengthen and consolidate their support (Baker, 2015, p. 60). Ethno-nationalism benefitted political elites in each party and furthering this ideology awarded them even more power and influence, even though it came at a steep cost.

The president of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic worked with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to instigate violence in order to further his own political aims. "In January 1992, an independent 'Serbia Republic' was declared in the 66 percent of Bosnian territory that the Bosnian SDS controlled there... SDS leader Radovan Karadzic at this time had declared that Bosnia would never again be undivided" (Gagnon, 2004, p. 111). In March of 1992, SDS had called for a Serb boycott of the Bosnian independence

¹² Some argue the only true violence in Bosnian history has originated from imported conflicts from neighbors or even Western states such as Germany in the World Wars (Baker, 2015, 58).

referendum, and Bosnian Serbs also began attacking Bosnian Croat and Bosniaks at this time. In effect, Bosnia had been divided along ethnic lines and a month later the Bosnian War would begin.

Most historians say that the Bosnian War officially began the day after an SDS paramilitary group attacked a crowd marching for peace in Sarajevo on April 6, 1992 (Baker, 2015, p. 62). “The war was not a symmetrical civil war between two evenly matched sides, but rather a multisided conflict fought by combinations of conventional forces, local militias, and irregular forces representing, or claiming to represent, different ethnic groups” (Boyle, 2014, p. 99). The Bosnian War would last until late 1995 and become the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War Two with more than 100,000 people killed, two million refugees and internally displaced persons, and systematic ethnic cleansing and homogenization taking place (Moore, 2013, p. 33). Throughout the war, the scale of violence seemed to increase with each passing year. Neighbors committed atrocities against one another, UN safe areas/protected zones fell under siege, and the Srebrenica genocide showed what destructive new technology, polarization of ethnicity, and territorial disputes can offer. After intense negotiations, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed on November 21, 1995, ending the physical violence. While Dayton has severe systematic problems that have held Bosnia back from fully recovering from the War and integrating into Europe, it succeeded in ending the brutal war that lasted for three and a half years.

Many understand the Bosnian War in terms of “ancient hatreds,” or the idea that the three major ethnic groups have perpetually hated each other and the outbreak of violence was inevitable (Baker, 2015, p. 58). Western media outlets pushed the myth that the Bosnian Serbs have been resentful ever since the loss of Kosovo in 1389 and that the Bosnian Serbs have also

hated Bosnian Croats since World War Two (Schwartz, 1999, p. 39). However, these so-called reasons for ancient hatred neglect to mention the coexistence of these ethnic groups with one another since 1389 and since World War Two. A selective interpretation of history has fueled the ancient hatreds myth and interfered with the international community's intervention.

“It [ancient hatreds] assumes, implicitly or explicitly, the moral equivalence of warring parties,” which makes it a convenient scapegoat for those wishing to not take sides (Schwartz, 1999, p. 40). The ancient hatreds hypothesis as applied to the Bosnian War on behalf of many actors in the international community served as a negative force when they tried to present solutions for peace because international negotiators assumed moral equivalence of the warring parties. These preconceived notions about ethnic tensions worsened the conflict and worked as a destabilizing force for many of the proposed peace plans and potential state constitutions. While it's important to recognize the ethno-nationalist component in the Bosnian War, saying age-old hatreds between ethnicities caused the war is to ignore the politicization of ethnic tensions, which is a more telling cause of the war.

On the other hand, some internationals romanticize the relative peaceful coexistence of multiple identities in the Balkans, and specifically Bosnia. They embrace the myth of a “multicultural heaven in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and others have coexisted peacefully for centuries, and where a ‘true’ synergy of different cultures could emerge and flourish” (Hromadžić, 2015, p. 12). The international community created a dichotomy between what Bosnia was in the past (peacefully ethnically heterogeneous) to what it became at the end of the twentieth century (ethnically divided). Internationals believing this myth became so entranced by the idea of what Bosnia used to look like, no matter how flawed their interpretation may have been, and wanted to restore Bosnia to its former self. “It was

because the Bosnian war was portrayed as a struggle between civil society and ethnic division that it acquired an international importance well beyond the consequences on the ground. This was the test of the newly proclaimed international order based upon moral and ethical foreign policy” (Chandler, 2000, p. 31). International actors who subscribed to this myth left the “multicultural heaven” logic on the surface and did not analyze what factors made Bosnia-Herzegovina peaceful for the majority of their history. The continual compromises and negotiations made between different Bosnian identities and ethnicities for centuries “are absent from the crude multicultural logic underlying the Dayton Peace Agreement” (Hromadžić, 2015, p. 13).

International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia

On February 21, 1992, the United Nations issued Resolution 743 outlining the early deployment of the United Nations Protection Force. The Resolution explains that the UN is “concerned that the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,” making an immediate UNPROFOR deployment in the area necessary (UN Security Council Resolution 743, 1992). UNPROFOR Macedonia and UNPROFOR Bosnia originated from the same mandate, meaning each mission had the same guidelines and objectives, yet each mission encountered completely different situations on the ground. In Macedonia, tensions existed between Macedonians and Albanians, but there was no consistent physical violence or war. UN forces could work to maintain a state of peace in Macedonia, and they were not tasked with negotiating peace. By the time UNPROFOR deployed to Bosnia, however, the Bosnian War had already begun. This meant that there was no peace to keep and

UN forces had to work to establish peace, which is something Resolution 743 did not include. UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia worked to prevent war and UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia worked to make peace. Resolution 743 was better tailored to the tense but overall peaceful situation in Macedonia rather than the violent situation in Bosnia.

In the ensuing pages, I first analyze the diplomatic and military international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the 1990's to the 2000's using primary source documents. I then use primary source documents to examine the diplomatic and international intervention in Macedonia during the same time period. Next, I assess the case for European Union membership for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and how the international community has helped or hurt each state's membership potential.

Chapter 3

International Intervention: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Diplomatic Intervention

When the Bosnian government decided to hold an independence referendum in 1992, the European Commission proposed the Lisbon Agreement as an attempt to prevent war before the referendum took place. The Lisbon Agreement would have made Bosnia-Herzegovina a state “composed of three constituent units based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria...A map based on the national absolute or relative majority in each municipality will be the basis of work in the working group” (Lisbon Agreement, 1992, Section A). Essentially what this Agreement would have done is break up Bosnia into autonomous units based on the ethno-national identity of the majority population in each region (Baker, 2015, p. 69). This proposition meant to establish a preliminary state constitution and avoid war but it failed for many reasons, the most obvious of which being that Bosnian President Izetbegovic rejected the plan and the political parties representing the three major ethno-nationalities could not decide on who could claim what territory as theirs (Baker, 2015, p. 69).

When drafting the Lisbon Agreement, the European Community clearly did not look at the ethnic distribution of Bosnia. If they had, it would have been apparent that partitioning the country based on ethno-nationality would be impossible without the physical redistribution of people due to the “mixed” nature of the majority of Bosnia’s towns. “In one quarter of the 109 *opštine* [municipalities] in the country there was no ethnic majority, while in another 54 municipalities 25-50% of the population claimed a different identity than the majority population” (Moore, 2013, p. 40)¹³. The ethnically plurality of Bosnia makes the Lisbon Agreement incredibly difficult and almost impossible to implement because deciding the ethno-national majority would be impossible in 25% of municipalities, and it would lead to the disenfranchisement of large minority populations in the 54 municipalities with slight majorities¹⁴.

The Lisbon Agreement was the first step in the international community’s legitimization of a power structure and political climate established along ethno-nationalist lines, an idea that would ultimately outlast the war itself. “By accepting the principle of national self-determination for the independence of states – without regard to the Yugoslav conditions of multinationality and shared rights to national sovereignty of the Titoist system, or a willingness to enforce their unilateral decision on borders – Western powers were making war over territory inevitable” (Woodward, 1995, p. 198). The heart of the agreement was the principle that the conflict could be settled through a territorial settlement rooted in ethno-national identities and it ended up

¹³ Furthermore, “...the principle of self-determination could not be realized through territorial sovereignty because people were completely intermixed in marriages, neighborhoods, and towns when it came to ethno-national identities” (Woodward, 1995, pp. 191-192).

¹⁴ The Lisbon Agreement also ignore all other ethno-nationalities besides Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb, which is problematic because a multitude of other ethno-nationalities reside in Bosnia (Baker, 2015, p. 69).

fueling the logic of the aggressors that an ethnic group should seek territorial autonomy, and it also intertwined territorial control and ethno-nationalism.

After the Lisbon Agreement failed, representatives from the United Nations and the European Community introduced the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and its framers seemed to forget the mistakes they made in the Lisbon Agreement (Baker, 2015, p. 69). The Vance-Owen Plan envisioned a Bosnia-Herzegovina with a decentralized state recognizing “three constituent peoples, as well as a group of others, with most governmental functions carried out by its provinces” (Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 1993, Section I). It proposed ten provinces with the governor, vice-governor, and other members of government divided between the three ethno-nationalities in each province (Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 1993, Annex A). The Vance-Owen Peace Plan reinforced the same principle used in the Lisbon Agreement that the only domestic actors that matter and have power in Bosnia were those of Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, or Bosnian Serb dissent, with all other ethno-nationalities seen as inconsequential. This once again linked territory to ethno-nationality, signaling that the international community could not devise a more applicable or viable solution for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond the “solutions” empowering ethno-nationalism.

The international community’s peace proposals developed with ethno-nationalist terms is a key reason why their intervention in Bosnia failed. As seen in the Lisbon Agreement and the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the European Community and the United Nations held the debilitating misconception that ethnic hatreds caused the Bosnian War. “[It] has often been painted as a fundamentally intractable, timeless conflict rooted in primal urges of its respective combatants...Writing off a conflict as based in ‘ancient hatreds’ makes it easy for international actors to excuse their lack of coherent policy, or worse, to offer simplistic solutions” (Denison &

Mujanovic 2015). The simplicity of trying to appease aggressors – whose entire basis for war was on ethno-national platforms – with ethno-nationalist solutions legitimized their strategies and entrenched the warring parties in their ideologies. Interethnic relations were an important feature of the conflict to address, but they were not the root cause of it. In believing this myth, the international community failed Bosnia before they ever wrote a successful peace document. “By narrating Balkan history as inherently violent, Western soldiers and politicians could disavow any Western ethnical responsibility for the war continuing” (Baker, 2015, p. 72). They set themselves up to create destructive solutions for Bosnia and not learn from their previous mistakes because, according to them, the conflict couldn’t be helped because of the age-old ethnic hatreds. The ancient-hatreds hypothesis was easier for international interveners to handle instead of looking at concurrent events happening in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Military Intervention

The international community’s diplomatic missteps paled in comparison to the UN failures made during physical intervention, which were also made partly under the justification of ancient hatreds. In 1993, the United Nations established six safe areas in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa with Resolutions 819 and 824. The Army of Republika Sprska (VRS), the army representing Bosnian Serbs who were fighting for an autonomous Serb region in Bosnia, cut off humanitarian relief to the UN protected cities throughout the war because they controlled access points to them (Baker, 2015, p. 67). It wasn’t within UNPROFOR’s mandate to force the VRS to allow humanitarian relief into the safe zones, and the mandate was never properly updated to allow UNPROFOR forces to respond appropriately

as situations such as this arose. UNPROFOR soldiers were working with an underfunded mandate and understaffed forces, and many of these UN safe areas came under siege by war's end (Woodward, 1995, p. 320).

The case of the Srebrenica safe area is especially tragic. By late spring of 1995 – just six months before the Dayton Peace Agreement would end the Bosnian War – 400 Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers were taken hostage by Bosnian Serb forces around Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia after NATO conducted 2 airstrikes on ammunition bunkers outside Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital. Bosnian Serbs wanted to advance to Srebrenica, which was a UN safe area, and took the Dutch troops in order to gain leverage and have an easier time entering the city (Scheffer, 2012, p. 87). The hostage situation immediately worsened intervention efforts because the United Nations, specifically European member countries who had troops in Bosnia, no longer wanted to risk the lives and wellbeing of their own peacekeepers for more airstrikes to secure the Srebrenica safe area (Scheffer, 2012, p. 88). Support for protecting Bosnians, and specifically Bosniaks living in refuge in Srebrenica, quickly decreased because of the hostage situation. A main goal of the United Nations involvement in Bosnia was to protect Bosnians of all ethnicities from aggressors, but the hostage situation made the UN and other international actors lose hope in their mission (Scheffer, 2012, p. 88). It made them believe that the UNPROFOR mission was purely idealistic and that the war was an inevitable series of events that couldn't be stopped.

On July 8, 1995, Srebrenica came under attack by VRS paramilitary forces. "Soldiers took over several UNPROFOR observation-posts and separated out non-Serb townspeople. The UNPROFOR commander and UN special envoy in Bosnia-Herzegovina refused the Dutch UN battalion's request for airstrikes" (Baker, 2015, p. 74). After the denied airstrike request, most of the Dutch forces evacuated Srebrenica, abandoning the thousands of Bosniaks unprotected in a

supposed UN safe area with no way to realistically defend themselves¹⁵. Madeleine Albright, then the US Secretary of State, wanted more air cover for Srebrenica, but the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff thought that her request would result in international forces breaking neutrality and taking the side of the Bosniaks (Scheffer, 2012, p. 95). The international community was so focused on staying a politically correct neutral actor that they would not commit themselves to the protection Bosniaks in Srebrenica who were in immediate life-or-death danger at the hands of VRS forces.

By July 11, Pentagon officials said there were no military options left to resuscitate UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, indicating that they had all but given up on saving the Bosniaks residing there (Scheffer, 2012, p. 96). July 11 is also the day the genocide of Bosniaks began. “On 11-13 July, the VRS and paramilitaries abducted the 8,000 remaining men and boys to nearby sites, where they shot them dead and left them in mass graves” (Baker, 2015, p. 75). The international community, and most specifically the United Nations since Srebrenica was declared a UN safe area, had a duty to protect Bosniaks in Srebrenica. As a general rule of intervention, interveners attempt to stay neutral so as not to take sides in the conflict, but the nobility of neutrality only carries so far. VRS forces committed severe crimes against humanity and the UN and international community as a whole took a passive role in the name of neutrality. The duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves is absolute and once the United Nations made the decisions to declare safe areas, it committed to ensuring the safety and those residing within those areas.

“Srebrenica – the UN safe area – has come to represent the worst instance of the war’s collective violence and the ineptitude of the international community to protect the vulnerable”

¹⁵ Some peacekeepers stayed behind and witnessed the separation of men and women (Scheffer, 2012, p. 90).

(Wagner, 2008, p. 58). The United States had the satellite technology to monitor the genocidal acts occurring in Srebrenica and send emergency support for the Bosniak men and boys who were ruthlessly murdered, but they never did (Wagner, 2008, p. 86-87). Dutch UNPROFOR forces could have stayed in Srebrenica and tried to protect as many Bosniak men and boys as they could, but they left Srebrenica. Airstrikes could have been approved, but they weren't. The international community could have broken neutrality in this instance and taken sides to protect Bosniaks in Srebrenica and push back Bosnian Serb aggressors, but they didn't. There are plenty of potential intervention points leading up to the events of July 11-13, 1995 where international actors, specifically the United Nations, could have done something to save the lives of at least some of the Bosniak men and boys that were murdered and buried in mass graves. The international community's obsession with remaining neutral, their belief that this war was inevitable, and the lack of resources used throughout the intervention in terms of forces/men on the ground, airstrikes, and technology all contributed to the Srebrenica genocide. While VRS paramilitary soldiers pulled the trigger to kill 8,000 Bosniak men and boys, the international community is an indirect accomplice because they did not intervene when they had the chance to potentially stop the genocide.

Dayton Peace Agreement

Four months after the Srebrenica genocide, the Bosnian War came to an end. The International Contact Group opened negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic, then the president of Serbia, Franjo Tudman, then the president of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic, then the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All three met at a United States air base in Dayton, Ohio to

discuss the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what the new state would look like. The two clearly defined goals of the Dayton conference were turning the 60-day ceasefire into a lasting, permanent peace and reach a consensus among the three parties for a multiethnic state (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 232). Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke decided UN involvement in the peace talks would only complicate matters, so Albright actively worked to keep their desire for a larger role at bay in order to simplify the talks (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 201-202).

Holbrooke identified three conditions for negotiating the peace settlement: each president of the warring parties (Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniak Presidents) had to come to the United States with full power to sign the peace agreement, they had to stay as long as it took to reach an agreement, and they couldn't talk to the press or outsiders about the negotiations (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 199-200)¹⁶. The Dayton Peace Conference was completely cut off from the press and was an all-or-nothing environment. "Dayton" has entered the language as shorthand for a certain type of diplomacy – the Big Bang approach to negotiations: lock everyone up until they reach an agreement...[it's] a high wire act without a safety net" (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 232). It was out of this high stakes peace conference that the Dayton Peace Agreement was finalized on November 21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio and signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris, France. The Dayton Peace Agreement was an ambitious set of accords that aimed to end the Bosnian War, determine the specifics of Bosnia's borders, lay out a basic framework for the handling of war criminals, resettle refugees and IDPs, create a state constitution, and establish internal state institutions within Bosnia.

¹⁶ A better term for the three "presidents" of the warring parties is "leaders" but Holbrooke uses the term "presidents", so for continuity purposes the term "president" will be used in this section.

The West championed Dayton as “a triumph of diplomacy over chaos” that allowed for a stable and secure Bosnian state to exist (Aolain 1998, 958). While Dayton did achieve its core objective of ending the physical violence of the War, it enshrined a perpetual separation of Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks and forced Bosnia to rely on international support indefinitely. The ghosts of previous – and failed – ethnic solutions to resolving the Bosnian War such as the Lisbon Agreement reemerged in the Dayton Peace Agreement because the terms of Dayton were explicitly written along ethnic lines. The commitment to ethno-national politics regarding representation, refugee and IDP resettlements, and the division of the country into two entities created a fractured state that has heavily impacted Bosnian state institutions and politics. The Dayton Peace Agreement was an ill-fated solution forged between the Bosnian War’s aggressors who wanted to fulfill their individual war aims and members of the international community who wanted nothing more than to quickly bring an end to the Bosnian War.

Advisors and diplomats from the United States government created the Dayton Peace Agreement with little input or consult from Bosnian political representatives. “The imposed settlement contained far reaching powers for international institutions over the formally independent Bosnian state” (Chandler, 2000, p. 115). This resulted in a peace agreement and state constitution that depended on international involvement from various actors at every stage and furthered the goals that the United States in particular had for peace. Bosnia had little input when it came to the organization of their state institutions, military, schools, and a host of other arrangements that are typically left to the independent state’s government to decide¹⁷. “The treaty pays homage to the language of self-reliance while ensuring that a long-term international

¹⁷ NATO assumed control of the military implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and internationally appointed High Representative had final authority over civilian regulation of the economy, judiciary, and political institutions, and the constitutional court was dominated by internationals, just to name a few examples of the international-dominated postwar recovery (Chandler, 2000, p. 115).

presence remains a necessary element for the survival of the state” (Aolain 1998, 958). The framers of Dayton wanted to force Bosnia into having a democratic government and wanted control along the way in order for the so-called Bosnian democracy could be monitored. Furthermore, Dayton is written in terms of “the Parties” and “they,” which suggests the international representatives from the United States and United Nations, among others, did not fully trust the judgment of Bosnians to allow them to draft the document in terms of “we.” The phrasing of the document suggests the international community took more ownership of the Agreement than Bosnians, and this is not necessarily a fault of the Bosnians.

Annex 1A, Article 1, Section 1 of the Dayton Peace Agreement states “The Parties undertake to recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1995). However, the definition of “normal” had completely changed since the war. Neighbors turned against one another, families were destroyed, and many Bosnians became refugees or internally displaced persons. Going back to a prewar Bosnia was unfathomable and unrealistic because of the trauma all Bosnians faced during the war but for the internationals that created Dayton, returning to normal instead of adapting to the new political, social, and economic landscape of Bosnia was preferable. This one sentence in Dayton exemplifies the tension that existed between Bosnians and the internationals that drafted the treaty because it is clear that each group had varying understandings of what would be possible for postwar Bosnia¹⁸. International actors dominated the postwar recovery efforts and state building processes in Bosnia at the expense of a Bosnia that truly functioned as an independent state.

¹⁸ Bosnians and internationals are intentionally treated as monoliths in this context. In reality, there were factions within each group over what goals should be established and how to achieve those goals. For the purposes of this specific context, the overall goals of Bosnians as a group and internationals as a group were different enough to be treated as monoliths.

Annex 1A of Dayton also states that “They [the Parties] welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other military related provisions of the agreement” (1995). This provides the mandate for the Implementation Force (IFOR), which replaced UNPROFOR from the war. Annex 1A keeps international military units led by NATO heavily involved in Bosnian affairs after the signing of Dayton “to establish a durable cessation of hostilities” and “to establish lasting security and arms control measures,” which was initially supposed to last one year (1995, Annex 1A Section 1-2 A, C). This provision of the Dayton Peace Agreement made sense for Bosnia at the time immediately after the war. Bosnia did not have a fully functioning government or state institutions and it needed an outside actor to assist with the implementation of Dayton and other state building operations. However, the wording of the IFOR mandate shows how the interests of the international community monopolized Dayton.

Dayton gave NATO the authority to control and oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. “[NATO] will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (“NAC”) through the NATO chain of command...The Parties, therefore, hereby agree and freely undertake to fully comply with all obligations set forth in this Annex” (1995, Annex 1A, Article 1, Section 1(b)). In this arrangement, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recovery is at the mercy of the decisions between NATO and the NAC. This is problematic because what is in the best interest for NATO and the NAC or the easiest or most economical way to implement Dayton may not be what is best for Bosnia – the interests of Bosnia and NATO/NAC do not always align. Furthermore, it places the new Bosnian government below NATO in terms of power to decide the trajectory of Bosnia. Annex 1A, Article 1, Section 1(b) of the Dayton Peace Agreement does not say NATO will make decisions

in conjunction with Bosnian officials, but rather, it makes no mention of the Bosnian government or people whatsoever¹⁹.

Dayton also granted the international body the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the authority “to supervise, in a manner determined by the OSCE and in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections...” for various elected governmental positions (1995 Annex 3, Article II, Section 2). While it was wise for the international community to delegate a specific organization to supervise electoral processes in the immediate postwar years, it was not fair to Bosnians to leave them out of the process. These lines in Dayton make no mention of working with Bosnian leaders to determine what the biggest concerns were regarding elections. According to Annex 3, Article II, Section 2, the OSCE would work together with other international bodies, which is a clear demonstration of the international community and its various actors taking control of Bosnian internal affairs from the outset of the postwar era. Annex 3 does not give a timeframe for how many years or election cycles the OSCE will oversee the election processes, giving them the discretion to stay in Bosnia indefinitely and prolong Bosnia from taking control over their state institutions.

A stark example of the international community-dominated agenda was the practice of resettling refugees and internally displaced persons. Annex 7 of Dayton states “The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Dayton, 1995, Annex 7, Article 1, Section 1). In Section 2 of the same Article, Dayton goes a step further and says “The parties shall ensure that refugees and

¹⁹ Annex A, Article 1, Section 1(c) asserts that other state governments have the right to help with the implementation of Dayton in conjunction with NATO, but it does not give any outline for the Bosnian government’s involvement (1995).

displaces persons are permitted to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination” (Dayton, 1995, Annex 7, Article 1 Section 2). The talk of “early return” and safe returns sounds good on paper but in practice, these objectives were sorely misguided. Instead of acknowledging events of the recent past and recognizing the remaining unease between the three main ethnic groups, internationals wanted to ignore these realities through their resettlement projects. “Minority returns became a means of erasing the effects of the war, of returning Bosnia-Herzegovina to the way it had been in 1991...But the years between 1991 and 1999 had left a legacy of fear, destruction, and hate, and as this incident demonstrates, people are not willing to parenthesize the past” (Coles, 2010: 53). Aiding refugees and internally displaced persons is a noble pursuit and one that is essential to the recovery of a war torn area. Yet, those facilitating returns cannot expect refugees and IDPs to immediately forget the reasons they were forced to leave and pretend they never left.

Resettlement projects only changed people’s physical location, but didn’t erase people’s memories from the war. As much as the international community wanted Bosnia to return to normal, as evidenced in Annex 1A, the memories of lost loved ones and the years of fear, hunger, and uncertainty did not evaporate once they were resettled into their pre-war neighborhood. “While return projects harnessed the past, searching for and creating a prewar halcyon, they simultaneously wanted to cut out and deemphasize the more immediate past. And people or projects that prioritized the more immediate past were chastised and distrusted” (Coles, 2010: 54). Bosnia could never return to their prewar ways because Bosnia was now a state instead of a republic within a greater federation and they had just been ravaged by war, so “normal” had completely changed.

The international community desperately wanted to “fix” Bosnia and promptly make it more democratic and capitalist (more Western), but that era had long passed. Not allowing Bosnians to work through their postwar feelings and uncertainties about the future on their own terms only served to weaken the Bosnian state and prolong and possibly even solidify tensions between Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks. Furthermore, skipping over the realities of the Bosnian War in favor of the alleged normalcy of prewar Bosnia worked to invalidate the international community’s purpose for being in Bosnia. They were in Bosnia precisely because of the war and to aid rebuilding, recovery, and various state building processes so trying to ignore the war was a hypocritical action.

Critics of Dayton said that no matter what, “Bosnia would eventually divide into three parts, after which the Croat and Serb portions of Bosnia would join their neighboring ‘motherlands’” (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 232). They believed all of the time, energy, and resources used during the conference were a complete waste because in the end, there would be a partition of the country anyway. These critics didn’t think the Bosnian War could be solved because of the “ancient hatreds” myth and they believed this conflict couldn’t be helped, no matter who was involved or how the peace agreement was structured. Even though negotiators from the international community would not let the peace agreement to include the type of partition critics worried would happen, partition of Bosnia was not completely left out of Dayton²⁰.

Annex 2 of Dayton divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two sections – the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS) (Dayton, 1995, Annex 2). Republika Srpska corresponded to the wartime Republika Srpska claimed by Bosnian Serbs, while the Federation

²⁰ Holbrooke says American leadership would never allow a fractioning of Bosnia along ethnic lines because their own reputation was on the line and it could start an entirely new round of ethnic and border conflicts in the Balkans (1998, p. 233).

of Bosnia-Herzegovina corresponded to the alliance between the Croat Defense Council and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Baker, 2015, 77). This inter-entity boundary physically divided Bosnia and it allowed Bosnians belonging to each main ethnic group rely on habits acquired during the war concerning the “other,” or people of different ethnicities. It allowed Bosnians of all ethnicities to separate themselves from others, and it gave them the legitimacy to do so. If the Bosnia itself would be divided based on wartime territorial claims, the general public could separate themselves as well. The inter-entity boundary hurt the immediate postwar recovery because it set a poor example and a legal precedent for the separation of ethnicities. Annex 2 of Dayton is yet another attempted ethnic solution to mend Bosnia-Herzegovina. It shows that the framers of Dayton did not learn from the various failed ethno-nationalist solutions proposed in the past, and it demonstrates how committed they were to continually imposing the same kind of solution on Bosnia instead of adapting to new information and changing circumstances.

Annex 4, Section 2(d) of the Dayton Peace Agreement is one of the sources of the veto powers. “A dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency Decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected...If the declaration is confirmed by a two-thirds vote of those persons [the corresponding legislative body or delegates of the Presidency Member’s ethnicity] within ten days of the referral, the challenged Presidency Decision shall not take effect” (Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995, Annex 4, Section 2(d))²¹. This provision of Dayton allows any Presidency Member to obstruct any Presidency decision, as long as they have a two-thirds majority of delegates of their ethnicity’s support, on the basis of “vital interest.” Vital interest is never defined in the Dayton Peace

²¹ The “Presidency” refers to the tripartite nature of the Presidency position – one Bosniak, one Bosnian Croat, and one Bosnian Serb fill the seats of the Presidency.

Agreement, so the term can, and has, been used in very vague and broad ways to block another party's legislation.

Discussing Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks as separate Bosnian peoples instead of using the term "Bosnian" to refer to a unified nationality/peoples became commonplace. For example, the Interim Statute was a consociational agreement between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks that divided the city of Mostar in southern Bosnia into six ethnically organized districts (Moore 2013: 59). It contained a "vital interest" clause that ensured "...legislation could only be passed with the majority support of Bosniak and Croat deputies at both the city and municipal levels" (Moore 2013: 59-60). The vital interest clause seems as though it would encourage compromise among Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks because it allows each group to make sure no legislation is offensive or detrimental to their group. However, this clause "...promote[d] political obstructionism and institutionalized the ethno-territorial division of the city" because the Bosniaks could block any legislation introduced by the Croats on the basis of vital interest, and the Croats could do the same to Bosniaks (Moore 2013: 60). "Vital interest" itself was never defined or given parameters; therefore Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks could use it to further their own political and ethno-territorial ends and avoid compromise altogether.

Along with the actual implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement by actors within the international community, the language used in Annex 4 of Dayton, which serves as Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution, shows the direct influence of Western systems of government and ways of life. Article 1, Section 2 of this Annex states "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections," and Article 1, Section 4 states "Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall not

impede full freedom of movement of persons, goods, services, and capital throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1995). The Bosnian War was not fought to make Bosnia a more democratic or cosmopolitan country, yet their state constitution makes these ideals central to the Bosnian state. Mostly Western diplomats within the international community crafted the Dayton Peace Agreement and one of their goals for Bosnia was to ensure it was a democratic state, even if that was in name only. Bosnians weren’t necessarily asking to become more democratic, but the cosmopolitan, democratic actors within the international community made the decision to impose democracy on Bosnia-Herzegovina anyway.

Even though it was not right for the international community to take such a prominent role in Bosnia’s state institutions and government, it would have been wholly irresponsible for them to leave Bosnia to build a government from scratch on their own. Bosnia undoubtedly needed help from international organizations and more established state governments to guide them in their state building and war recovery endeavors. However, the way in which the United States, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations, among others, were involved with Bosnia did not allow them to take ownership (both literally and symbolically) of their own state institutions. As Baker describes, “Time revealed that Dayton placed high expectations on internationally-led ‘peacebuilding’ as the path to reconstruction and stability, while insufficiently challenging wartime bases of ethno-politics and patronage” (2015, p. 77). Bosnians didn’t have a chance to express what they wanted their new government to look like and in the end, they were left with a government made by international “experts” that did not meet the needs of a post-war Bosnia.

Chapter 4

International Intervention: Macedonia

Macedonia faced many of the same factors that led to war in Bosnia, but their transition from Yugoslav republic to independent state was relatively peaceful and did not involve widespread bloodshed²². “Poor, multi-ethnic and surrounded by neighbors who denied its existence in one form or another, Macedonia’s post-Yugoslav elites were confronted with a set of risk factors many feared would doom it to violence” (Ripiloski & Pendarovski, 2013 p. 3). International actors intervened before there was any war in Macedonia, Macedonian and Albanian leaders supported the intervention, and their state institutions were better equipped to handle internal conflicts and external diplomatic disputes, which made the Macedonian intervention an overall success (Pushinka, 2002, p. 81).

The Macedonian independence referendum created a very hostile environment for independence. Albanians boycotted the referendum and called for an autonomous Albanian region within Macedonia, which complicating ethnic relations in the Republic. Albanians feared that they would lose the majority of their rights in an independent Macedonian state and wanted to secure national status to protect their rights (Woodward, 1995, p. 342). Ethnic Macedonians

²² “Ever since the declaration of independence in 1991, successive governments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been hailed for engineering a successful transition to democracy with relatively few blemishes” (Zahariadas, 2003, p. 118).

viewed Albanian demands as a threat to their monopoly-like control over politics, education, and language rights and made them hesitant to addressing Albanian concerns. “The mere existence of national projects at some time in the past or in the dreams of small minorities can be sufficient to create the perceptions of threat, leading officials to view any demands by autochthonous minorities for cultural or administrative autonomy as the first step toward secession” (Woodward, 1995, p. 339). The threat Macedonians felt from Albanian demands for proper representation influenced their decision to include notions of Macedonian superiority in Macedonian Constitution.

The independence referendum results showed majority support for independence from Yugoslavia, so the Macedonian government declared independence and passed a state constitution. Albanians did not agree with many provisions of the Founding Constitution because they felt as though it disenfranchised them in favor of ethnic-Macedonians²³. On November 6, 1992, tensions over the Constitution boiled over at the Bit Pazar incident, which is shrouded in uncertainty as to what truly happened. One popular account is that police began to crack down on illegal smuggling operations at the Bit Pazar market and officers arrested a group of Albanians at the market where one Albanian teenager was beaten to death at the police station (Woodward, 1995, p. 342)²⁴. The confusion over what actually happened and outrage from the Albanian community led to a demonstration where shots rang out and three Albanian men and one Macedonian woman were killed, which only intensified interethnic hostilities (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 27).

²³ Please reference “Background: Macedonia” in Chapter Two of this paper for details on the Macedonian-Albanian constitutional disputes.

²⁴ Other accounts said an Albanian teenager was running from the police, fell, and was beaten by the police in the market. Another account said the police took the Albanian teenager to a hospital and an angry mob gathered outside the hospital (Neofotistos, 2012, pp. 26-27).

After the violence at the Bit Pazar incident and the following demonstration, Macedonian President Gligorov asked for peacekeeping forces from the United Nations to help the infant government deal with the growing conflict and to avoid spillover from the wars in other former Yugoslav republics. Gligorov knew that his government likely would not be able to avert war without help from the international interveners, so he acted proactively in his request for UNPROFOR. While international actors were not perfect in their intervention, they were successful in their overall goal of avoiding war in Macedonia, which is something that cannot be said for international interveners in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR wanted to safeguard minority groups in Macedonia from further disenfranchisement, marginalization, or potential sustained physical violence. However, their commitment to minority rights, while good intentioned, only served to exacerbate the divide between Macedonians and Albanians because their actions undermined the sovereignty of the Macedonian state. "In the name of human rights for minorities and of a stable solution to internal communal conflicts, the two international conferences on former Yugoslavia, the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe], the United States, and other European organizations paid substantial attention to the rights of Albanians, in particular" (Woodward, 1995, p. 342). The international community committed itself to the protection of human rights for minorities but in doing so, they encouraged and, in some cases, legitimized radical Albanian national self-determination within Macedonia.

The Albanian resistance to independence and the international focus placed on minority rights worked to Albanian's advantage, and the Macedonian state was adaptive enough to accommodate Albanian demands. Albanians calling for an autonomous region were seen as a threat to Macedonia, though "this political maneuver was meant to exercise indirectly political

pressure on Macedonian politicians and thus achieve a bi-national state in which Albanians would...become a constitutive nation together with Macedonians (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 28). Albanians were combative with the Macedonian state because they wanted to be treated as equals and not as an inferior minority group, but they were willing to work with governmental officials to find a solution to their concerns. Macedonian and Albanian politicians worked together to create Albanian universities as a compromise to quell any immediate threats Albanian dissent posed to the Macedonian government (Neofotistos, 2012, pp. 29-33).

Diplomatic Intervention

In addition to physical international intervention assisting peacekeeping efforts and attempting to increase security and stability, Macedonia had to handle a unique form of international intervention – Greece challenging the legitimacy of Macedonia. “The Greek government...refused to recognize the republic of Macedonia under that name, arguing that the use of the name implied the country had territorial ambitions to parts of Greek Macedonia” (Woodward, 1995, p. 344). The northern province of Greece is called Macedonia, leading Greece to believe the state of Macedonia undermines Greek national identity and will eventually have territorial ambitions in their state. Greece has committed itself to not recognizing Macedonia’s name, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as long as it has the word “Macedonia” in its title, which created many problems for Macedonia when they were trying to integrate more fully into Europe.

Greece’s conflict with Macedonia caused a significant drag on Macedonian integration on the global stage and cosmopolitan institutions such as the European Union. “At the insistence

of Greece, therefore, in December 1991 the European Community stated that it would not recognize the Republic of Macedonia until it guaranteed that it had no territorial claims against any neighboring state and that it would not engage in hostile acts against any such state, *including the use of a name that implied territorial claims*” (Danforth, 1994, p. 328). As a member of the European Community and the European Union, Greece wielded a lot of power with regards to how Macedonia would be received internationally and how their state would be perceived. Macedonian state institutions were responsive to the Greece’s objections, and worked to make constitutional changes in order to integrate themselves further into Europe. Articles 3 and 49 of Macedonia’s Constitution were a source of great contention for Greece because, in Greece’s interpretation, they implied a territorial claim to Greek land. Under pressure from the European Community (who was under pressure from Greece), Macedonia decided to amend these articles in 1992 to prove they had no territorial ambitions outside of their established borders.

Initially, Article 3 of the Macedonian Constitution stated, “The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inalienable...The borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only in accordance with the Constitution” (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Article 3). After the amendment, Article 3 stated, “The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inalienable. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards neighbouring states...The borders of the Republic of Macedonia can only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as in accordance with generally accepted international norms” (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Amendment I). The amendment to Article 49, which originally stated “In the exercise of these concerns the Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or

in their internal affairs” supplements the article with the statement, “The Republic has a concern for the status and rights of persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries, as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists in their cultural development and promotes links with them. The Republic has a concern for the cultural, economic, and social rights of the citizens of the Republic abroad” (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Article 49, Amendment II). Greece’s anxiety over potential Macedonian land grabs directly influenced these amendments, and it spoke quite explicitly to Greek fears.

After the amendments, the Security Council unanimously accepted Macedonia as a member of the United Nations in April 1993 under the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” even though the term “Macedonia” was still part of their name²⁵. Greece couldn’t stop Macedonia from becoming a UN member but because of the symbol used on the Macedonian flag, Greece would not allow their flag to be flown at UN headquarters (Danforth, 1994, p. 329)²⁶. Not only did Greece influence the actual Constitution of Macedonia; they also influenced how the rest of the world visualizes Macedonia. If a UN member state cannot display their chosen flag at UN headquarters, that hurts international awareness and intended identification of said state. Greece exerted every ounce of power they had to influence the Greek state internally and externally, and they did everything in their power to ensure the potential territorial threats Macedonia presented would never materialize. Macedonia handled all of the challenges thrown towards it by Greece in stride and worked to make concessions and compromises that wouldn’t hurt the sovereignty or strength of the state in order to integrate on

²⁵ On the United Nation’s website and official correspondences, Macedonia is listed under the “T’s” to reflect their official UN name, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

²⁶ The disputed flag has a symbol of the Star of Vergina (sixteen ray sun) and Greece contends that “this was the emblem of ancient Macedonians (who it believes were Greek) and is therefore a Greek national symbol” (Danforth, 1994, p. 329).

the global stage, but they also remained firm to keep their integrity in tact and so other state governments did not perceive Macedonia as easily manipulated.

When the United States established relations with Macedonia under its UN name, Greece levied an embargo on Macedonia in 1994 (Ilievski & Taleski, 2010). The embargo caused the European Union to become more involved in the Greek-Macedonian dispute because many EU member states did not support the Greek embargo²⁷. “The European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution in February 1994 demanding the lifting of the embargo, and...the EC [European Commission] President Jacques Delors sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister asking for explanations and supporting evidence that the embargo was justified under EU law” (Ilievski & Taleski, 2010). Furthermore, the EC sued Greece because they believed the embargo broke EU law, and the lawsuit was lifted only when the Interim Accord was signed between Greece and Macedonia, which ended the embargo.

The multifaceted intervention of various European organizations supported Macedonia’s right to existence, sovereignty, and independence under its current name and flag while it was under economic and diplomatic attack from Greece. At the time Greece levied the embargo, Macedonia (as a modern state) was not even five years old and did not have much bargaining power whatsoever with Greece. However, with the EU, EC, and individual state governments supporting the young state (or at least disapproved of Greece’s embargo), Greece was essentially cornered into negotiations with Macedonia to end the embargo with the signing of the Interim Accord.

Article 1 of the Interim Accord states that Greece recognizes Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state, and it also establishes “relations at the ambassadorial level”

²⁷ Germany, Holland, and Italy believed the embargo believed the embargo was “unnecessarily antagonistic” (Ilievski & Taleski, 2010).

between the states (Interim Accord 1995). Articles 2 and 3 establish the border between Macedonia and Greece and each party agrees to respect the sovereignty and independence of the other (Interim Accord 1995).

Notably, Article 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 directly address to the Macedonian Constitution and its interpretation. Paragraph 1 asserts that Macedonia cannot interpret its Constitution to constitute a claim on any territory not within Macedonia's existing borders (Interim Agreement 1995). This speaks to Greece's fear that Macedonia will attempt to annex the Greek province of Macedonia, and is not an unreasonable interpretation of the Macedonian Constitution. This fixed interpretation does not infringe on any rights or the sovereignty of Macedonia because it is a widely accepted international norm that countries do not make claims to territory outside of their existing borders. Article 6, Paragraph 2 declares that the Macedonian government cannot intervene in Greek affairs to protect the rights or status of Macedonians living in Greece (Interim Agreement 1995).

Article 49 Macedonia's Constitution – which is the portion of the document that Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Interim Agreement addresses – mentions concerns for the “cultural, economic and social rights” of Macedonians living abroad. Article 6 of the Interim Accord is important because it fixes the interpretation of the Macedonian Constitution and even states, “...the interpretations given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article will not be superseded by any other interpretation of its Constitution” (Interim Accord Paragraph 3, 1995). This diplomatic international intervention in Macedonian internal affairs is quite significant because it infringes on the Macedonian government's ability to exercise discretion regarding Preamble, Article 3, and Article 49 of their Constitution. The purpose of the Interim Accord was to boost trust and improve relations between Greece and Macedonia, but Article 6 shows how distrustful Greece

was of Macedonia. Article 6 is Greece's way of ensuring Macedonia will be a benign neighbor and will respect the sovereignty of all other states, regardless of any potential Macedonians living there.

Military Intervention

Initially, the Macedonian government (including both Macedonian and Albanian politicians) attempted worked through the interethnic tensions that existed within the country through constitutional reforms but by the turn of the century, hostility between Macedonians and Albanians kept worsening. The combination of an unpatrolled Macedonia-Kosovo border and very little international presence to mediate the Macedonian-Albanian hostilities contributed to the 2001 NLA insurgency in Macedonia.

In February 1997, Albanian politicians took office in the municipality of Gostivar in western Macedonia and decided to fly the Albanian and Turkish flags next to the Macedonian flag outside of town hall, claiming that the three flags better represented the demographics of the Gostivar population better than the Macedonian flag alone (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 34). By May 1997, a constitutional court ruled that flying any foreign flag in public violated Macedonian state sovereignty, making it illegal for the Albanian and Turkish flags to be flown outside of the Gostivar town hall. Macedonian police removed the Albanian and Turkish flags flying outside the Gostivar town hall in July 1997, inciting riots that left some Albanians dead and many others wounded. Over 400 people were arrested during the riots including Osmani, the Gostivar mayor,

who was arrested and sentenced to fourteen years of prison for “inciting national, racial, and religious hatred” (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 35)²⁸.

The harsh response to the Albanian demonstrations by the Macedonian police showed Albanians that the international actors in Macedonia at the time monitoring interethnic relations would do little, if anything, to help them. “UNPREDEP [United Nations Preventative Deployment Force] was increasingly seen as impotent in stopping perceived abuses by the [Macedonian] government and paramilitary police” (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 272)²⁹. Even though UNPREDEP did nothing to mediate ethnic conflict during the Gostivar situation, the UN Security Council extended UNPREDEP’s mandate through February 1999³⁰.

At this point, Macedonia was not as stable as it had been just a few years prior because of the heightened ethnic tensions and the removal of UN forces. In late 2000, tensions came to a head when the National Liberation Army (NLA), a pro-Albanian party, attacked a Macedonian police station in Tearce, an Albanian-majority town, killing one officer and wounding three others (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 37). Macedonians viewed the insurgents as terrorists and extremists, while the insurgents claimed that they only wanted equality between Macedonians and Albanians and the official recognition of Albanian as a national language (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 275)³¹.

²⁸ An appeals court reduced Osmani’s sentence to seven years in February 1998. Domestic and international human rights groups perceived Osmani’s sentence as “draconic” and there were many Macedonians who did not agree with the sentence either (Karajkov, 2009, p. 465).

²⁹ UNPREDEP was created to succeed UNPROFOR “as a preventative diplomacy measure to reduce ethnic conflict” in Macedonia (Zahariadis, 2003, p. 269).

³⁰ When the Security Council attempted to extend the mandate a second time, China used its veto power to block the proposal, causing UNPREDEP to withdraw from Macedonia. China vetoed the proposal because Macedonia recognized Taiwan as an independent state (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 36).

³¹ “There was a serious gap between what Albanians demanded – that Albanian be an official language equal with the Macedonia, and what they had in reality – very restricted use in local self government” (Karajkov, 2009, p. 467). Right to one’s language is an important validation and expression of identity as well as an access issue, so the Albanian demand for official national recognition for their language was a significant symbolic and pragmatic demand.

At the same time, Macedonia's neighbor Kosovo was at war with Yugoslav forces for independence from Serbia and violence from this war easily spread into Macedonia through Tanuševeci on the northern border between Macedonia and Kosovo. The remaining Yugoslav government, Kosovo, and Macedonia disputed control of the Macedonian-Kosovo border, so it was never effectively patrolled or secured. "Starting in 2000 the legitimate and seemingly innocuous activity of border crossing into Kosovo turned dangerous when, according to journalistic reports, the village became a transit point for smuggling arms into the Preševo Valley" (Neofotistos, 2012, 40-41). The NLA received arms smuggled through this permeable border, which allowed them to militarize against the Macedonian government.

Reports of NLA members abducting a television crew in Tanuševeci "...all of a sudden awakened the general populace in Macedonia of the possibility that the culture of terror had become revitalized despite the presence of the UN mission in Kosovo, and was seeping into Macedonia through the porous, contested, and inadequately patrolled northern border with Kosovo" (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 41-42). UN forces in Kosovo were not closely monitoring the border, which allowed illegal arms to flow across the border with ease. This "inaction" by the UN had a major impact on interethnic relations in Macedonia and eventually the constitution. Furthermore, since UNPREDER forces withdrew from Macedonia, Macedonia did not have international support from a large organization stationed in Macedonia (such as the UN) to address these activities.

On March 1, 2001, clashes between NLA insurgents and the Macedonian military intensified and on March 4, three Macedonian soldiers were killed (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 43). After the events of March 4, American troops stationed in Kosovo (KFOR) militarized the border between Kosovo and Macedonia to try and prevent NLA insurgents from crossing back

and forth into Kosovo without much success. “The NLA thus became increasingly daring: it was now killing Macedonian soldiers, publicly announcing that it would step up its military presence in Tanuševeci, aiming guns at US forces...erasing distinctions between civilian and military, and escaping destruction” (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 44). The American KFOR soldiers struggled to secure the border and prevent NLA insurgents from crossing into Kosovo because they did not want to inflame the situation in Macedonia or violate their own mandate, which was for Kosovo, not Macedonia.

Fighting between the Macedonian army and NLA insurgents intensified throughout March and a new front opened up in Tetovo, just twenty-five miles from Skopje, and continued to intensify and spread throughout the spring (Neofotistos, 2012, p. 47-49). In response, the Macedonian government created specific paramilitary units designed to attack villages under NLA control and before the Ohrid Framework Agreement (negotiated by multiple international actors such as the EU, NATO, OSCE, and the United States) was signed, between 200 and 300 people were killed during the conflict (Baker, 2015, pg. 85; Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 139).

Ohrid Framework Agreement

On August 13, 2013, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed between Macedonians and Albanians with the help from many international actors, such as the EU, NATO, OSCE, and the United States³². The core principles of the Agreement are the rejection of violence for political aims, commitment to Macedonian sovereignty and integrity, preserving and reflecting

³² The Ohrid Framework Agreement is also referred to as Ohrid.

the multiethnic composition of the Macedonian state, and an increased role for local self-government (Ohrid, 2001, Article 1, Sections 1-5). “The relatively low-level nature of the clash in Macedonia is significant, not only in terms of allowing the country to return to normalcy quickly, but also in creating a post-conflict environment amenable to the implementation of a peace settlement” (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 139)³³. The international community pressured both sides into negotiations so a peace agreement could be made in a such a way that each side would be willing to give up concessions to the other in order to come up with a workable agreement.

The preamble of Ohrid established the agreement’s main provisions and goals for the future. “The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia’s democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonians” (Ohrid, 2001, Preamble). Right from the outset, the international community has a strong presence in this document. One of the goals of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is to begin the process of negotiations and internal changes to the constitution and otherwise to better position Macedonia for membership to European and Atlantic cosmopolitan organizations (i.e. the EU and NATO)³⁴. This is in accordance with the liberal theory of international relations that states intergovernmental organizations increase

³³ Furthermore, since the insurgency was not a full scale civil war and did not last long, attitudes towards the “other” did not solidify to the point where negotiations were impossible (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 139).

³⁴ Though it’s slightly more descriptive, the term “Euro-Atlantic community” is just as problematic as the term “international community.” Nevertheless, “Euro-Atlantic community” will be used in reference to the Ohrid Framework Agreement because it is used within the document itself.

stability and security among states, so it's logical for Macedonia to strive for membership to them so they can become a more stable state.

Also, mentioning the "Euro-Atlantic community" demonstrates the influence of these communities upon Macedonia. Not only did they help Macedonia avoid civil war by brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but also during their initial independence from Yugoslavia, they intervened to monitor domestic interethnic hostilities and ensure neighboring conflicts didn't spill over into Macedonia. The Euro-Atlantic community and the greater international community have heavily shaped the existence of Macedonia as a modern independent state and now Macedonia was membership to and influence within the organizations that shaped them.

Article 2 of Ohrid illustrates the role of the Euro-Atlantic community in the implementation of Ohrid provisions, such as the ceasefire. "There shall be a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of ethnic Albanian armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment. They acknowledge that a decision by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems of this country, a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the parties of the conditions and limitation under which the NATO forces will operate" (Ohrid, 2001, Article 2 Section 1). NATO had the responsibility for enforcing the key aspects of the ceasefire such as disarming the NLA, and this task was crucial to the success of Ohrid and the cessation of violence³⁵.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement resulted in constitutional changes along with the ceasefire. Article 3 states that the Macedonian Constitution will be amended to expand the responsibilities of local self-government in accordance with the European Charter on Local Self-

³⁵ NATO administered the disarmament of the NLA and the beginning stages of the ceasefire over a period of 30 days immediately after Ohrid was signed (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p.139).

Government and the European Union (Ohrid, 2001, Article Section 1). This is meant to decentralize power away from the federal government to “provide local governments with substantive autonomy – in terms of policy-making and revenue-collection – from the centre, but fall short of territorial and political autonomy” (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 142). Article 3 Section 1 is meant to expand the political rights of minorities, including Albanians, which is a necessary condition for membership to the EU. Article 3 is a clear example of acceptance into intergovernmental organizations and the Euro-Atlantic community influencing Ohrid and the trajectory of Macedonia. Without strong international institutions such as the EU and NATO in place, the Ohrid Framework Agreement would look much different and it likely would not include so many compromises on interethnic relations or minority rights. The commitment to making concessions in order to someday gain membership to the Euro-Atlantic community proves that these organizations and institutions have the ability to transform states into more democratic and more stable actors within the international system.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement contains sixteen constitutional amendments on top of the provisions of the Agreement itself. These amendments change provisions for national languages, local government operations, and religion. The EU’s influence is clear in the amendments because many of them directly deal with constitutional reforms necessary for EU membership. For example, Article 48 was amended to be more inclusive to diversity in Macedonia and to preserve minority rights. Article 48 originally stated “Members of nationalities have the right to freely express, foster and develop their identity and national attributes...Members of the nationalities have the right to establish institutions for culture and art, as well as science and other associations for the expression, fostering and development of their identity” (Macedonian Constitution, 1991, Article 48). Amendment VIII changes Article 48

to state “Members of communities have the right freely to express, foster and develop their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols...Members of communities have the right to establish institutions for culture, art, education, as well as science and other associations for the expression, fostering, and development of their identity” (Macedonian Constitution, 1991, Amendment VIII).

Amendment VIII changes the language of Article 48 from “nationalities” to “communities,” which takes the concept of rights out of the context of nationality and ethnicity and gives it to “communities,” which is a broader, more inclusive term. The amendment also provides constitutional protections for the use of a community’s symbols (such as a flag) and the establishment of educational institutions that align with a particular identity/community. This change addresses two major Albanian demands from the Macedonian government – the ability to have Albanian schools and the ability to fly Albanian flags. The changes contained in Amendment VIII reflect the EU’s commitment to cosmopolitan, democratic values and it shows how the beginning stages of Europeanization were wrapped up in the Ohrid Framework Agreement³⁶.

The next section discusses the international community’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s and Macedonia’s potential membership to the European Union. Europeanization and EU membership is an incredibly important indicator of the success or failure of the international community’s involvement in these two states because one of the main intervention goals was eventual European Union membership, so the progress on this objective speaks to the overall success of the intervention.

³⁶ “In order to join the EU a new member state must ensure the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Kacarska, 2012, p. 60). Amendment VIII to the Macedonian Constitution reflects the minority protection provision of EU membership.

Chapter 5

Europeanization and European Union Membership

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have had the long-term goal of gaining membership status to the European Union and becoming accepted as a European state since their independences from the former Yugoslavia. Each state has had agreements that were supposed to help them move through the membership process, but they are both deadlocked in their current EU negotiations. There are unique situations that are individually specific to Bosnia and Macedonia, but their paths to membership have overarching similarities that have impacted their membership potential and Europeanization processes³⁷. The European Union's inability to provide a detailed outline of reforms and legislative changes that must occur before moving forward with membership has hurt their ability to sufficiently enact reforms – it is a guessing game (Gordon, 2010, p. 326-327).

In 1999 – four years after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed – Bosnia and Macedonia began the processes of Europeanization and EU ascension when the European Council of Cologne enacted the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The SAP's

³⁷ Europeanization is described as the “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4).

intention was to foster association through the promotion of trade with EU markets and proactive peace and state building policies to assist with stabilization. “The emergence of the SAP marked a shift away from an ad hoc ‘fire-fighting’ style of crisis management to a more long-term broadly integrationist approach to the Western Balkan region” (Gordon, 2010, p. 327). In Bosnia, the SAP was certainly an improvement to the poorly constructed and failed peace deals proposed to Bosnia before and during the war because it did not treat Bosnia as wholly inferior to traditionally Western states and organizations that intervened in Bosnia – the goal of the SAP was for Bosnia (and the other Balkan states) to gain EU membership status.

The EU’s definition of stabilization and association, and the relationship between the two concepts, is imprecise in the SAP document. It seems to value “democratic stabilization” in the Balkan region and macroeconomic integration with Western markets, but there is no precise definition given (Gordon, 2010, p. 328). The seemingly arbitrary “pass/fail” evaluation of reforms by the EU speaks to the EU’s tight grip on absolute control over the entire membership process. The unclear terms for accession has hurt Macedonian and Bosnian membership negotiations because in many cases, the internal reforms necessary for accession aren’t specified. The EU remains intentionally vague on the details of satisfaction so they can completely control the pace of EU ascension and membership. This is similar to the way various international actors treated the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the international actor wants the most control over the situation and wants to be the driving force behind the majority of state building and Europeanization efforts in the new Balkan states in order to mold them in Europe’s image. This dynamic between the European Union and aspiring member states is detrimental to the success and speed at which nations can gain membership to the EU and other traditionally Western organizations because it leaves them at the mercy of a much more powerful actor. They

do not have the opportunity to take complete ownership of the process because they don't even know the terms they are working towards to reach their end goal.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Although it was originally designed to help Bosnia with Europeanization processes, the Dayton Peace Agreement has actually impeded Bosnia's ability to achieve EU membership. It enshrined ethnic divisions and caused government positions to be identified and divided based on ethnicity, which has negatively impacted Bosnia's ability to implement non-discriminatory reforms and reforms in general because each political ethnic group has an incentive for maintaining the current arrangement (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 132).

Article 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement serves as Bosnia's constitution and is the source of many problems for Europeanization. "Being geared towards establishing a power-sharing system between the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (often referred to as Bosniaks) as the constituent peoples, the constitution emphasizes group rights over individual rights. As ruled by the European Court of Human Rights, the constitution thereby discriminates against parts of the Bosnian society that do not belong to one of the three groups" (Tolksdorf, 2015, p. 401-402)³⁸. Without removing the parts of the constitution the European Court of Human Rights has deemed discriminatory, Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot join the European Union. Even though the main negotiators and framers of the Dayton Peace Agreement were Americans, they consulted and worked with Europeans and representatives from the Council of Europe and the UN. One can reasonably assume that the majority of the Dayton architects were aware of and

³⁸ The European Court of Human Rights operates within the Council of Europe, not the European Union. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia became a member of the Council of Europe in 2002.

understood the anti-discrimination legislation and interpretations in the Council of Europe. Therefore, the power-sharing system in Dayton between the three main ethnic groups should not have made it into the document since EU membership was the eventual goal for Bosnia.

The architects of Dayton should have taken the legislation and norms of these institutions into consideration during Dayton's creation in order to make it easier for Bosnia to integrate into Europe. Dayton framers should not have been chained to the norms of the EU, NATO, or any other cosmopolitan institution, but they ought to have been more visible within Dayton. Holbrooke himself knew that whatever was not accomplished during the Dayton Peace Conference in the fall of 1995 would likely not be accomplished at all, so he should have considered the requirements for entry into European institutions to a greater extent during negotiations (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 233)³⁹. Just as Holbrooke predicted, adding to and amending the constitution has become nearly impossible in Bosnia because of the tripartite power-sharing system and the continued interethnic hostility. The legislative changes that need to be made before Bosnia can be seriously considered for EU membership haven't been made because legislators from the three ethnic groups cannot agree on what the changes ought to look like. "...The multiple veto rights in the legislative process allow the ethnic groups institutional blockage at the state level, often resulting in political stalemate" (Tolksdorf, 2015, p. 402).

Many politicians from each of the three main ethnic groups prefer to nationalize politics for personal gain and to remain in their positions. This creates political segregation of anyone who doesn't identify with the particular ethnicity that uses their veto power on any given piece of potential legislation. "History affects the governance and practices of citizenship through

³⁹ A convenient counter to this point is that the Dayton negotiators were dealing with radical ethnic nationalists and it took a lot of work to even negotiate what made it into the Dayton Peace Agreement. Even though the framers achieved the goal of ending the war, they should have paid more attention to one of their other goals – creating a stable and secure Bosnia that would eventually gain EU membership.

narratives and institutional legacies. If a narrative on national identity is consolidated, and if institutional legacies offer a network for articulating this identity, the governance of citizenship will be marked by strong ethnic elements” (Džankić, 2015, p. 25). Politicians have molded Bosnian citizenship for the last twenty years, in many ways, to rely on nationalistic and ethnocentric elements, which has hurt Bosnia’s ability to fulfill the conditions necessary for EU membership. Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs all agree that the discriminatory provisions in Dayton need to change so Bosnia can move closer to EU membership, but this agreement goes no deeper than rhetoric. “Due to their often diametrically opposed positions on the future constitutional structure in BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina], Bosnian policy makers have proved intransigent to reach a compromise on the issue” (Tolksdorf, 2015, p. 402).

However, the European Union itself does shoulder some blame for the stalled efforts to make Bosnia-Herzegovina a member. The EU assumed that membership would become Bosnia’s top policy priority, which would lead to interethnic compromise and consensus on the reforms needed. This has not been the case. “The EU underestimated the implications of the fact that Bosnia is an ethnically divided country in which there is not one, but three different cost-benefit calculations concerning EU membership” (Tzifakis, 2012, p. 137). All three ethnic groups are unwilling to trade the power they have over the other groups (ex. extensive veto powers) for EU membership. In other words, membership to the EU is not a top policy priority for Bosnian politicians because the reforms needed for membership would change the balance of power in government and the amount of power each ethnic group holds. The EU does not fully understand the dynamics of Bosnia’s ethnically divided state and their traditional conditionality methods used in other EU-hopeful countries has not worked because of their fundamental misunderstanding of Bosnian ethnic relations and politics.

Macedonia

Macedonian EU membership has also encountered many roadblocks, but they seem to have more assistance from the EU than Bosnia has. The Ohrid Agreement was supposed to put Macedonia in a good position for Europeanization reforms and eventual EU membership – just like Dayton in Bosnia – however this hasn't been proven to be true⁴⁰. The EU sees the benefit of Macedonia joining the organization, but they're to be dragging their feet on the actual process of allowing them to join. The EU has proposed various changes and amendments to Macedonian legislation (including their constitution) and they have assisted Macedonia in many ways, but Macedonia is at a standstill in regards to their membership. Membership has deadlocked because the terms of EU ascension have been unclear and the Greek-Macedonian name dispute has been a huge obstacle in the way of EU membership.

Throughout the negotiation process for the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the future membership to the EU influenced Macedonian policymakers working on the agreement because they wanted to use the agreement as an opportunity to place Macedonia in a good position for Europeanization⁴¹. On March 26, 2001 – months before the Ohrid negotiations began – Macedonia signed the Association and Stabilization Agreement with the European Community (EC). The main goals of the Association and Stabilization Agreement were to promote closer political relations between Macedonia and the EC and to better align Macedonian legislation

⁴⁰ “The negotiation and implementation of the OFA [Ohrid Framework Agreement] was designated by EU leaders as a critical precondition for Macedonia’s EU membership perspective” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 355).

⁴¹ “Both the EU and NATO seduced Macedonian elites with membership as a ‘carrot’ and the refusal of membership as a ‘stick’” (Peshkopia, 2014, p. 66).

with that of the EC (Association, 2001, Article 1 Section 2). Even though Macedonia was nowhere near fulfilling the criteria specified in the Agreement, it was used as an incentive for the Macedonian government to meet with Albanians and reach an agreement to end the insurgency before it worsened into a civil war (Peshkopia, 2014, p. 66). The Association and Stabilization Agreement is an example of the EU/EC using the allure of membership to diplomatically intervene and attempt to mold Macedonian legislation so it better resembles that of their organization. The Association and Stabilization Agreement was not a realistic set of criteria for Macedonia at the time it was signed, however, it helped bring both sides of the insurgency to the bargaining table to work on an agreement for a peaceful and stable future. Furthermore, it was an early outline of expectations Macedonia needed to achieve in order to move forward with EU membership, so it made officials aware of the work that needed to get done.

Successful implementation of the Stabilization Agreement allowed Macedonia to apply for candidacy status, which it received in November 2005 (Gordon, 2010, p. 331). However, the next steps for EU accession remain unclear and have caused the case for Macedonian membership to be stuck in diplomatic purgatory. “Brussels always had the political upper-hand in deciding when negotiations commence,” which proves that states vying for EU membership have no control in what the process looks like or how its pace, even if they hit the benchmarks given to them by the EU (Gordon, 2012, p. 331). The bigger, more powerful international actors dominated the narrative surrounding Macedonian EU membership and the Europeanization process and they have even made misleading promises to Macedonia in order to secure the Ohrid Framework Agreement and so Macedonia will implement certain constitutional reforms.

“The key incentive provided to Macedonia to secure an agreement [to end the insurgency] was the prospect of a fast track to EU membership” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p.

357). With this incentive in mind, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed and ended the Macedonian-Albanian conflict by the close of 2001 and Macedonia shifted focus from crisis management to EU accession. In practice, all of the rhetoric surrounding a sped-up path to EU membership was not entirely true. Fast accession was exaggerated in the Ohrid negotiations because the EU and the international community as a whole wanted an agreement to be signed and the best incentive they could offer was EU membership.

International influence, specifically EU influence, can be seen in the quick adoption of Ohrid-related legislation. International pressure from EU and NATO officials led to the quick enactment of the legislative reforms and constitutional reforms agreed on in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 360). The international pressure to follow through with the implementation of Ohrid paired with the promise of eventual EU membership helped push Ohrid-related laws through Congress. Without this pressure, it is unclear whether the Ohrid Framework Agreement would have seen the same level of successful implementation.

The Macedonian government following through with the agreements made in Ohrid is positive no matter how or why it was achieved, but the promise of “quick accession” never materialized. This is a product of a myriad of bureaucratic red tape but more importantly, it’s related to the Macedonian-Greek name dispute⁴². At a NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Macedonia’s membership bid was vetoed by Greece because “a mutually acceptable solution for the name of the country had not been reached” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 364). On top of the NATO veto, Greece threatened to veto Macedonian EU accession using the same argument about Macedonia’s name. This veto and the threat of an EU veto blatantly violated the terms of

⁴² Some examples of the heavy bureaucracy involved in the EU membership process are “commission progress reports, securing candidate status, [and] securing a date for the start of accession negotiations” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 360).

the Interim Accord which stated “[Greece] agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of [Macedonia] in international, multilateral, and regional organizations and institutions of which [Greece] is a member” (Interim Accord, 1995, Article 11). The Interim Accords has no enforcement mechanism and NATO or the EU cannot force Greece to refrain from using their veto power against Macedonia – it was a good faith agreement between Macedonia and Greece provisions for enforcement.

The Greek veto to Macedonian membership to NATO demonstrates that the Euro-Atlantic organizations that Greece is part of will effectively side with Greece rather than Macedonia. To extrapolate, member states come before the acceptance of new states if a member state and a potential member state has a dispute. “The 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest demonstrated that there was also a ‘hidden’ benchmark [to EU accession] – the resolution of the so-called ‘name dispute’ with Greece” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 364). Macedonia has made consistent progress on Europeanization and SAP conditions, but their membership prospects are held back due to Greece. This poses a serious problem for the EU and NATO in future post-conflict management situations. If the EU and NATO cannot live up to their membership promises that were made to end a conflict, it effectively “removes a major instrument for securing compliance from the EU’s toolbox” (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009, p. 365).

The European Union can certainly do a better job of managing Bosnian and Macedonian accession. The EU promised to fast-track membership, yet Macedonia and Bosnia are both bogged down with vague directions from the EU and bureaucratic politics without the help from the EU to guide them through this process. They must hold themselves more accountable for Macedonian and Bosnian EU membership or their memberships may take years and years longer to achieve.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Analyzing international intervention in Bosnia and Macedonia as it pertains to their independences from Yugoslavia and subsequent state building processes is important in understanding why some international interventions work and others don't. Each former Yugoslav republic had UN Protection Forces, ethnic diversity, and had international actors heavily influence their state constitutions. The Bosnian and Macedonian interventions show that new states, whether they gained statehood through peaceful means or through war, require support from the international community. New states are inherently weak and instable and established international actors can be the difference between the futures of infant states. While neither the Bosnian nor Macedonian intervention can be heralded as a complete success, there were successful elements within each. The similarities between the Bosnia and Macedonia are striking, but the differences provide insight as to why international intervention ought to be a highly individualized and carefully thought out set of actions that are unique to each intervention.

One of the most important lessons from the Bosnian and Macedonian interventions is that intervening actors have more success when they intervene early. One cannot overemphasize the importance of an intervention's timing. If an actor intervenes too early, the legitimization of their

mission will could be tarnished and their motives could be seen as imperial. If an actor intervenes too late, like the military intervention efforts in Bosnia were, interveners will have an incredibly difficult time keeping peace, enforcing peace, or negotiating a settlement that positions the intervened country in the best possible place for stability, security, and post-war recovery. The UN intervened in Macedonia at an optimal time to keep peace and mediate inter-ethnic hostilities.

Military intervention before sustained physical violence is a key factor in a successful intervention. When UNPROFOR deployed to the Former Yugoslavia, forces encountered very different situations in Bosnia and Macedonia. It was impossible for UN forces to carry out the peacekeeping mandate because the Bosnian War had already begun at the time of UNPROFOR's arrival. UNPROFOR was not a peacemaking mission, but the Bosnian War forced it to try and stretch the terms of their mandate to mold it to the situation on the ground with little success. UN forces couldn't enforce peace – they could only keep peace. Of course, the Bosnian War meant that there was no peace to keep; intervening forces were essentially set up to fail from the outset. However, when UNPROFOR arrived in Macedonia, interethnic tensions between Albanians and ethnic Macedonians were high, but there was no sustained physical violence. The deployment of UN forces before sustained physical violence was integral to its intervention in Macedonia because it allowed UNPROFOR the opportunity to realistically achieve the mission's objectives.

Diplomatic interventions, however, can occur at any time, but the earlier the better. Proposed peace agreements and treaties must be realistic and take into account all relevant aspects of the conflict for the diplomatic intervention to work and avoid war. In Bosnia, diplomatic interveners focused the majority of their proposed agreements on the ethnic component to the Bosnian conflict and did not recognize all of the other factors contributing to

the hostilities, such as neighboring conflicts. In Macedonia, the EU and the UN initially supported Macedonia in the Macedonian-Greek name dispute, which helped Macedonia's stability and the integrity of their state institutions.

In Macedonia, UNPROFOR forces could actually operate within their peacekeeping mandate, making it an environment that was much more conducive to peace than that in Bosnia, and it provided a solid foundation for international actors to work with. UNPROFOR forces deployed to Bosnia didn't have a chance to succeed because they did not have a peacemaking mandate and had to work within the confines of an ill prescribed peacekeeping mandate. After seeing the results of the Bosnian and Macedonian interventions, it is clearly essential that international interveners must intervene before sustained armed conflict takes place. This way, interveners working under a peacekeeping mandate can operate in an environment that actually allows them to fulfill their mandate. Also, it gives them the opportunity to mediate the conflict before the warring parties become completely entrenched in their ideologies and perceptions of the other, which will drastically improve negotiations and peace agreements. Early intervention can lead to questions of the legitimacy of an intervener and can cause some to question if the intervention is simply a pretext for a stronger power to impose its will on a weaker power. However, it will make the international system more stable and secure (and the intervention will be less expensive) as a whole if actors intervene before war breaks out.

Also, it's important for intervening actors to keep their biases about the nature of the conflict at bay until the actual facts of the situation are known. For example, some believed the violence following the breakup of Yugoslavia was inevitable, but that is not true. The various Yugoslav wars and conflicts are not easily explained by faulty theories of ancient hatreds or the state of modern day ethnic relations alone. Liberalism argues that injustice and war is the result

of lacking institutions and therefore they are not inevitable. This theory asserts that injustices and war “can be moderated or even eliminated through institutional reform or collective action” (Arreguin-Toft & Mingst, 2014, p. 86). Liberalism forces one to go beyond the surface of the conflict and look at the Yugoslav dissolution through the lens of broken institutions and problematic leaders to actually explain the conflict. Giving lazy explanations of inevitability distract from the true causes of war and injustice in the world and causes people to miss the important lessons the international community can learn from the collapse of a nation.

Many of the preconceived notions of the collapse of Yugoslavia revolved around the fact that both the Macedonian conflict and the Bosnian War had strong ethnic components that, in many ways, fueled the hostilities between warring parties. In Macedonia, the disputes between its two main ethnic groups, Macedonians and Albanians, mostly pertained to domestic affairs. Albanians were concerned about proper representation and the preservation of their cultural, social, and economic rights while Macedonians wanted to elevate their status in the new Macedonian government. The dispute between Macedonians and Albanians was not necessarily imported to Macedonia or manufactured only by elites – this is a typical majority-minority power struggle. However, ethnicized groups in Bosnia were taken advantage of by political elites in Bosnia and in neighboring Serbia and Croatia. The ethno-national divisions that had existed between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks were intentionally solidified in order for elites to gain more power. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, two of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia, were manipulated by ethno-nationalists in Serbia and Croatia and this dynamic essentially imported war to Bosnia.

Preconceived notions interveners have about the place they are intervening and the people that live there can impact the level of support intervening forces receive. Cooperation

with intervening forces in any peacekeeping mission is integral to a mission's success and can help explain why UNPROFOR Macedonia succeeded and UNPROFOR Bosnia failed (Pushinka, 2002, p. 84). Macedonian president Gligorov saw his own multi-ethnic, infant state in jeopardy of descending into violence and he wanted to put protective measures in place before any conflict escalated past the point of no return. "UNPROFOR-MC was to monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); to strengthen, by its presence, the country's security and stability; and report on any developments that could threaten the country" (Stammes, 2007, pp. 166-167). UNPROFOR didn't have to prove their legitimacy to the Macedonian government or people, so they could focus on fulfilling their mandate by promoting peace and stability in the state. The consent and legitimization of the UNPROFOR Macedonian mission by the Macedonian government contributed to the relative success of the mission overall, and it initially helped Macedonia avoid war, even though many of their neighbors were under siege.

In Bosnia, however, the official government and the leaders of the warring parties did not have a similar relationship with UNPROFOR forces as the Macedonian government did. "The leaders of all three groups challenged the validity of the UN peacekeeping mission, made military use of cease-fires and protection zones, hijacked UN personnel and supplies and made physical attacks on UN peacekeepers: (Pushinka, 2002, pp. 95-96)⁴³. The warring parties in Bosnia were combative with each other and with UN peacekeeping forces, which hindered UNPROFOR's ability to successfully carry out its mandate. The legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly welcomed UNPROFOR, but the illegitimate Serb and Croat

⁴³ "The operation to protect humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic has been consistently thwarted by obstruction, mines, hostile fire and the refusal of the parties on the ground particularly, but not exclusively, the Bosnian Serbs" (Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR: Background, 1996).

“governments” did not and undermined the mission as much as they could. These “governments” blamed UNPROFOR for many perceived weaknesses, such as “...its failure to fulfill tasks that the Force had not been mandated, authorized, equipped, staffed, or financed to fulfill” (Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR: Background, 1996). They held UNPROFOR accountable for many things they simply could not do for a variety of reasons, and the consistent criticism of UNPROFOR eroded their legitimacy throughout their deployment and hurt the mission’s success⁴⁴.

Intervening powers also take on responsibility for initiating negotiations and crafting peace agreements. Comparing the peace agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995 and the peace agreement that Albanian insurgency in Macedonia in 2001 shows how the international community finally learned from the mistakes of ethno-nationalist solutions. The Dayton Peace Agreement institutionalized ethno-national divisions in Bosnia through multiple provisions, but especially through Annex 2 with the establishment of an inter-entity boundary line between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Dayton, 1995, Annex 2, Article I). Dayton separates Bosnia, makes territoriality an ethno-nationalist issue, and legitimizes Serb aggression during the war. Checkpoints and other barriers obstructed on the inter-entity boundary line obstructed the free movement of people and goods and hindered refugee and IDP returns (Bieber, 2006, p. 30). The ethnic solution to the Bosnian War through the federalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a big mistake on behalf of the international community negotiations at Dayton. The inter-entity boundary essentially endorsed and solidified the ethnic

⁴⁴ A major reason why it was difficult for UNPROFOR to be successful in Bosnia was the fact that they operated under a peacekeeping mandate, not a peacemaking mandate. When UNPROFOR was deployed, there was no peace to keep in Bosnia. The mandate that put UN forces in Bosnia was insufficient and didn’t allow UNPROFOR forces to take actions that may have helped, but did not fall under their peacekeeping mandate.

homogenization of Bosnia and instead of fostering a unified sense of “Bosnian,” Annex 2 of Dayton supported the separation of ethnicities (Bieber, 2006, p. 30-31).

When the international community negotiated the terms of the Ohrid Framework Agreement six years later in 2001 for Macedonia, they learned from the mistakes of federalization. Instead of implementing an ethno-nationalist federation option like the one that exists in Dayton, the US and the EU suggested that “meaningful decentralization” would have more success in Ohrid for Macedonia (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 142). Ohrid “explicitly rejects territorial solutions to ethnic issues, and the position formally endorsed by successive post-conflict governments has been of a more inclusive unitary state, as opposed to an ethno-federal one” (Ripiloski and Pendarovski, 2013, p. 143). The Ohrid Framework Agreement directly states that there are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues and this sets an important precedent in the country that an ethnic dispute will not result in the federalization or fractition of Macedonia (Ohrid, 2001, Article 1, Section 2). This is a much better peace agreement than Dayton because it is more democratic and putx Macedonia in a better position for eventual EU accession than Bosnia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are both aspiring members of the European Union and are working towards the completion of “Europeanization” in order to make this happen. Both states face a variety of challenges that impede their ability to become a member of the EU, but one thread is common – they are at the mercy of the European Union. “In countries seeking to join the EU, Europeanization is unidirectional. These countries are affected by the EU’s rules, but have no direct impact on their formulation” (Džankić, 2015, p. 37-38). Member countries are affected by EU legislation and policies, but they can’t influence the policy in return, which has

led to problems for Macedonia and Bosnia implementing the reforms and conditions required for EU membership.

Liberal international relations theory states that one way global anarchy and instability can be reduced is through global organizations. Currently, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are not as stable as they could be because they do not have all of the internal framework necessary for stability. EU conditionality in Bosnia and Macedonia work towards putting the necessary internal reforms in place to make these states more stable and after these reforms are achieved, they can be considered for EU membership. While the European Union may not be addressing conditionality in the best possible way, the constitutional and internal reforms they require for EU membership will likely lead to greater stability and security in these countries. If they can successfully complete the terms of conditionality and are admitted to the European Union, Bosnia and Macedonia will have greater resources to use to continue to work on internal reforms and they will have an entire network of European states to work with and learn from. The turmoil the Balkans experienced in the 1990s and into the 2000s can be put completely in the past if Bosnia and Macedonia can gain EU membership. This membership is therefore in the interest of these two countries, the wider region, and the world at large.

Overall, studying the Bosnian intervention and the Macedonian intervention teaches many lessons. Intervention is most successful when actors intervene early on in a situation, when preconceived notions about the situation do not overpower the intervention, and when cooperation with intervening actors is relatively high. International intervention is a very complex area that intersects military and humanitarian concerns and it is a vital part of the international community. The international community, however, must learn from their previous

interventions and apply those lessons to others in the future in order to secure the best possible outcome for every actor involved.

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