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The University of Scholarly Deeds

Burton Blatt and Andrejs Ozolins

The sages have taught us that beautiful deeds are to be prized more than beautiful things. And we in the university should know that a good idea is worth more than the paper it’s printed on. The point is that a university is better known for its scholarly deeds than for what it owns or how much it spends. The great university shows rather than tells people how they should live their lives. The great university practices its ideals and its wisdom.

At our university—at all universities—the budget is tight. Of course, a budget of approximately $200,000,000 is tight only in relationship to what is wanted. There are large companies as well as great universities that would view such a budget as extraordinarily facilitating. If our budget is tight, so is Harvard’s and Yale’s and probably the world’s richest man’s. It may not be true that everything is relative, but certainly wealth is. And the equally true corollary is that university budgets have been, and always will be, tight. There will always be a discrepancy between what is wanted and what is available. But there will also be a discrepancy between what is wanted and what is needed. Hence these remarks have embedded in them the idea that there is virtue in working to discover how much we can save rather than spend, in seeing how little we can get along with rather than much we can get. The idea can be symbolized by the brimming cup, which spills over only when the cup, representing need, is just smaller than its contents, representing resources. How small a cup we are willing to live with will determine how rich we are.

Basically there are three needs in the university which must be satisfied: the need of the student to be educated; the need of the faculty member to pursue scholarship and research; the need of the university to cultivate and enhance academic traditions and responsibilities—to keep the promise implicit in calling our workplace a university.

A student needs to have a good environment in which to study and live—good professors, sufficiently small classes and laboratories, and a good library. Resources allocated in response to student needs must consider the numbers and teaching capabilities of the faculty, capital improvements of facilities, and allocations to the library. However,
Preoccupation with student needs to the neglect of other needs causes serious problems—as, indeed, does the reverse.

The faculty, in some ultimate reality, can get along without students. Of course, in a more mundane reality they can’t: first, because students pay a large share of the university’s bills, and second, because students enrich the life of a university; they even goad or inspire faculty to greater scholarly accomplishments. Nevertheless, responding to student needs may not necessarily be an affirmative response to faculty needs and, indeed, may at times be inimical to faculty needs. But faculty needs are not always directly met with either increases in their numbers or improvement of physical facilities. What the faculty require and deserve of academic resources is probably no one ingredient but an amalgam of students, facilities, and collegiality combined with no more money than it takes to make it all work.

While students and faculty need a good environment in which to learn—which may not be identical to a good environment in which to teach—the university requires attention to its tradition. One can imagine a situation in which students and faculty are pleased with themselves and each other but the ideals of the university are neglected or endangered. This is why, as far as a university is concerned, zero-based budgeting (i.e., the practice of beginning each budget cycle with no a priori commitments) is a bad idea. It is inimical to everything that a university stands for and to the way it has successfully made its decisions through the centuries. Zero-based budgeting denies history. It’s as if most things have equal value, and what was just learned is necessarily better than what was once learned. Zero-based budgeting is too reactive to short-term fluctuations; it promotes instability; it is too sensitive to political and social influences. It does not acknowledge the role of tradition or history or the fact that a university has been entrusted to guarantee the continuance of certain lines of inquiry.

Because they are so interrelated, at times in the most intimate manner, the needs of students, faculty, and university cannot be met through a single-dimensional approach to resource allocations. Therefore we must look at some of the dimensions underlying the interrelationship.

Perhaps as a result of the affluent times which have just forsaken us we have developed some peculiar habits in speaking about the university. We have relegated to the category of “unmentionables” certain very important realities of academic life. If we now want to “bite the bullet” and make realistic decisions, we will have to revive these relevant but unpleasant premises.

One such unmentionable is the well-known fact that Syracuse University, like every other university at every period of history, is a mess. The public relations image requires righteous posturing and chauvinistic breastbeating. But we can’t both sustain the image and understand the university. It would probably do no harm to acknowledge the mess publicly; but at the very least, academicians should acknowledge it among themselves: Syracuse University is a messy tangle of good professors and charlatans, of great programs and merely money-making programs, of wisdom and embarrassment. This is an important fact about the place and deserves to be examined and
considered. When this fact is sometimes acknowledged, it is swiftly minimized and then dismissed (“we are all human”) so that high-toned pretenses can be resumed on lofty planes. Well, certainly, let’s agree that this is a Great University preparing for a Great Future. And then, getting down to business, let’s see how we can prepare our great mess for becoming a greater mess, because the greatest university is the greatest mess and because universities advance by increasing their greatness and not by eliminating their messiness.

The mess is an embarrassment in the sense that a university stands for the best scholars and the highest achievements of civilization. But we have to recognize that what it stands for is not what it is. For example, our School of Education stands for the minds and work of a relatively few superb professors. But it actually consists of those and many more for whom no school could stand, or stand for long. We have to stop being embarrassed by this observation. It would be embarrassing and unacceptable in the University of Heaven. But in mortal universities such an observation is necessary and unavoidable and therefore universal. We won’t dwell on it except to note that our essential academic freedom cannot be secured for anyone if we are intolerant of a mess. But we must always be concerned enough with the mess not to ignore it. Above all, we must never lapse into thinking that, because a mess is unavoidable, it isn’t really a mess. But we must not think, either, that to recognize it requires a purge. Both of these views are oversimplifications to which we cannot afford to succumb.

The next unmentionable we should revive is that people must judge other people. Especially if we are aware that we have a mess, we must judge which people we stand for and which we merely stand. We are forever hinting darkly at the existence of those who are not pulling on their oars. Yet it remains perpetually a hint; present company is always excluded, and destructive practices go unremarked. This deceitfulness is bad enough, and ultimately cruel enough, in itself; but it leads inexorably to something even worse and often more cruel—the appeal to “objective” measures. The direct, inescapable consequence of this so-called politeness is the adoption of a bureaucratic model of academic assessment. The cultural epidemic of objective criteria, tests, and measures is in every case motivated by the desire to escape the responsibility of individual judgments. In a few cases, this is justified; in most cases, it is irresponsible. In university administration, it is destructive, if not self-destructive.

Scholars are obligated to criticize and judge each other’s work. To contrive enrollment trends, fiscal constraints, retirement ages—or even to compile publishing records, professional “honors,” and so forth—in such a way that they replace a judgment of the individual and his work is fundamentally dishonest and antischolarly. The clearest example, of course, is the issue of retirement: The hypothesis is that professors are struck stupid in their sixties. But the university does not have the honesty to force them out because they are (supposedly) stupid; it claims to discharge them because of age. The antischolarly nature of this practice is not inferential but is explicitly avowed. The university refuses even to consider whether a professor has lost his senses and rests its case on age as the sole and sufficient criterion. The fact that occasionally an extraordinary professor can, by obsequious petitions and pleadings, obtain permission to remain after
the mandatory expulsion date merely confirms the alienation of scholarly affairs from "objective" administration of universities. Only an intellectual emergency can override the authority of actuarial norms.

The case is virtually the same in all other areas of academic decision making. The excellence (or deficiency) of programs is discussed in terms of enrollments, job placement of graduates, or success in obtaining "soft money." By monitoring these objective indicators, the university can ignore the need to judge the work of colleagues. When a program or professor is curtailed or passed over, a column of numbers and facts is responsible. Politeness is preserved.

The point is not that professors should be impolite but that academic, intellectual judgments among professors are not by their nature impolite. The purpose of all the clumsy, mess-producing safeguards of academic freedom is to minimize the dangers of collegial judgment, not to remove one from it. The present evasive "objectification" of decision making has restored the dangers of academic life while doing away with the illumination that might have come of honest intellectual confrontation. That is, sound decisions based on enrollments and other hard data are completely capricious with respect to academic standards. And debates on how to increase enrollments, what new "markets" to reach, which programs do or don't pay their way—such debates never touch on the genuine academic treasures of the university, never reveal or enhance the sound reasons why more students could honestly be encouraged to attend a good institution.

If there is some mystery, then, about allocating resources in the university, it must be approached by first making clear judgments of the constituency competing for those resources. In some cases it will be impossible to act on the basis of the judgment; the safeguards of academic freedom will prevent it. Nevertheless such judgment is the only legitimate basis for decisions, and the safeguard machinery is there to be used, not avoided. If particular schools or individuals grab a bigger share, there should ensue not a debate over who has more students or money but a debate over the place of that school's or individual's work in the academic constellation. One view which no academic could argue against very strenuously is that the fundamental mission of a university is to comprehend the world and to gain understanding of what it is to be a human being. On this basic level, certain schools make fundamental contributions and others are peripheral. But we are not urging this as a settled matter. A debate would be inevitable—and important and illuminating as well.

This introduces a third major unmentionable: the idea that fiscal or management problems do not constitute the sole or greatest danger to a university. For some reason, it seems forbidden to consider the possible danger of ideological erosion. Progress, growth, change, development, are frequently mentioned—invariably with reverent approval. It never gets seriously asked whether all this evolution has been to the good or not. We don't like to think that, while dinosaurs evolved from some sort of toads or lizards, only the toads and lizards survived. In particular, the university's shift from understanding the world to mastering it, from educating students to training them, from cultivating humanness to transforming it into a marketable
item—these shifts are so fundamentally mistaken that, in any meaningful sense, universities may be going extinct. We may be wrong about this, of course. But because we may be right, our devotion to "progress" must not be permitted to obscure the issue.

The "old" ideals of scholarship are still paraded around, and most academics like to say they hold to them as noble standards. Then it must be taken as a very serious question whether the enormous and preponderant job-training role of the university is one that should be allowed to continue, much less grow. To the extent that such a role is adopted, the procedures, standards, and values of the old order must be revised to fit these new aspects of our practice. Indeed, we would argue that one of the most mischievous results of the unnoticed shift in the university's character is evident in the application of scholarly pretenses to purely technical activities. Too many students who have been badgered into the university by economic arguments are demoralized by the dissonance between economic goals and the academic experience. Therefore, in discussing our allocations of resources, we must be more conscious of the effect our decisions will have on the way our ideals survive or develop.

It should be pointed out that, as far as resource debates are concerned, the assumption is made that the amounts of individual benefits are inflexible. That is, the discussion is usually about who will get resources, not how much he will get. We make adjustments in the university in the same way we often do in the nation, by manipulating access rather than rewards. To reduce the budget for faculty salaries, we reduce the number of faculty; we never reduce salaries. If we have begun to realize that resources are limited, we nevertheless continue to believe that the world is infinite and can accommodate those excluded from participation. This is the only hypothesis that can sanction such exclusion as a means of economizing—the ideas that work can be found elsewhere. We have not appreciated the fact that the ultimate elsewhere is the dole, which all of us finance anyway. We can't escape the fact that a finite pool of resources is circulating among all members of the society, which includes our academic society, and the budget advantage we gain by sending a man away is lost in other ways.

What has to be raised as at least a possible response to hard times is that we can decrease salaries rather than decrease faculty. To deny this possibility is to deny that times really are hard. Because the habitual clamor for more money continues, it really is time for someone to begin pointing out that if a professor doesn't enjoy working at a university enough to do it for 10 or 15 percent less real earnings, he probably should not stay. There are many intangible benefits of academic life; but some benefits are very concrete: tenure, sabbaticals, travel, freedom. It is exasperating to hear people talk of economic crisis while demanding substantial increases in pay, as though they were exempt from the realities of their society.

There is one more unmentionable we must pose as a reality of academic life, and it is central to a university's allocation of resources: The community consists of many people who are not professors. There is a huge number of devoted, hard-working,
and competent support staff without whom the scholars would be nearly paralyzed. Many universities have historically exploited their dedication and work as though they were not only subprofessional but nearly subhuman. (Has ours?) For the most part, this insensitivity has been expressed because the support staff have allowed it—by not kicking up a fuss. But it is not unknown for even some great universities to go to considerable lengths to silence the fuss where it has occurred.

Now that the economy of the nation has soured a bit, some professors are disturbed that their relatively discretionary income is eroding—while their work is being supported by people whose genuinely subsistence income is falling below subsistence. The administration is no doubt concerned by the steady approach of further staff unionization. Prudence would suggest that the professorate had better take notice of it too. True, professors are a very special group in society. But they are not so special that they should be exempt from the obligation of all human beings to notice the fate of other human beings around them. Indeed, by the privileges they enjoy, their obligation to seek justice is increased. An important part of the specialness of professors should be the commitment and ability to do the “right thing” because it is right and to value what is right above personal gain. But beyond such lofty judgments: if a fully adversary relationship is evolved by the unionization of everyone, professors included, the equitable apportionment of salaries will become a concrete and practical issue for us all to face.

We realize that these unmentionables are awkward to bring up, difficult to discuss, and seemingly out of place in the realm of practical decisions. Nevertheless, since they touch on the reasons for our present existence at the university, they should also figure in our plans for continued existence. If we keep our talk to matters which are more comfortable, we can do so only at the expense of what is important.

Although in one sense it may be claimed that every university has insufficient resources (everybody is poor), in another sense we must view ourselves as rich. Even universities which do not live off endowments can consider themselves rich, compared with government or other businesses (and we are so eager to claim that we are a business when it suits our purposes). As a matter of fact, it is those very universities which live off endowments that today do the most crying because their endowments have dangerously eroded during inevitable market slumps. This is by way of asserting that there is never sufficient protection and insurance, either for individuals or universities, when the worst occurs. But there is always plenty if one has both reasonable optimism and capability. The state of a person’s resources is a measure of fiscal and mental health.

A school of education or management may be a good example of the conflict within any academic unit (but especially in a professional school) to see itself as both different from and part of the larger university. It is difficult for a professional school, especially one with rapidly rising enrollments, to accept easily its overburdened status in order to keep the classics alive. It’s even harder for a school of management or education to “need” to bring in the students or the sponsored resources in order to feel safe, when such schools know that the philosophy professor is safe until the very end of the university itself.
Certainly the thought has crossed the minds of people in education or engineering that their need to solicit external funding in the university is in a way their tribute or rent. Conversely, arts and sciences do not need to make such efforts—partly because outside funds are not so readily available to them, but more because colleges of arts and sciences don’t need outside funds to justify their existence or importance. Arts and sciences own the university because, in the deepest sense, they are the university. This doesn’t mean that classics departments have no worries about enrollments. They do need students. But, whereas a professional school needs students in order to survive, a classics department needs them because it is “good” to have students. If we project the curve of the size of our philosophy department, based on the last twenty or thirty years, we might expect its extinction. But fortunately, when it comes to that irrevocable decision to kill off philosophy or the classics in the university, we trust that everyone will have the good sense to resist as if our very academic lives depend on resistance, which of course they do. The point is that even the professional schools know this. And this leads to the reminder that, if the word college has come to seem like a misnomer for the professional schools, that’s only because we’ve allowed our idea of the university to change. If we want the word not to be a misnomer, then we had better remember that we are a community, all together. In the deepest sense, it doesn’t matter who has more students or less students, or brings in more money or less money; it matters only that we are together to engage in the common purpose to study and teach.

Why do people in the School of Management want to be part of the university? Why don’t they remove themselves to a business institute or create their own business school? They’re here for the same reason that education as a field of study is here, along with engineering and the rest. After all is said and done, the professional schools buy in to the idea of a university and its collegial value system. The Management School knows that in the university the truth will make the students and professors free, while at the separate business institute the truth will only make them rich.

Most of us are sick of talking about, but are continually fascinated with, the notion of quality. What is the relationship between the prestige of a university’s school and its budget? Probably zero. Possibly negative. Is good teaching enough? What’s good teaching? Is there, in fact, a latent but strong academic view that physics is “better” than engineering, that philosophy is “better” than social work, that mathematics is “better” than management? And when you have to make a last-ditch effort to keep the ship from sinking, who must abandon the ship? Of course, if the university is a community, then all its members are equally valuable, in spite of the greater centrality of the work of one person compared with the work of another. But it seems that a university often engages in ruthless games concerning money and power and is rather tame about ideas, especially when it comes to resource allocations. And that is why, while issues of quality reflect what is most important in the university, they should not be expected to reflect financial considerations. For one thing, academic quality is not correlated with lucrativeness: Basic research, for example, is the core of academic work, but in the main, applied research
securities the external contracts. For another example, the value of poetry is entirely independent of financial success or failure; there are those who would suggest that, by their nature, poets must be poor.

Certainly we can contrive artificial and objective benchmarks of quality—national rankings of our schools and colleges or departments and programs, lists of who’s in Who’s Who, compilations of sponsored funding, grade-point averages, Graduate Record Examination scores, percentages of students admitted and rejected, faculty publications, and, even more precisely, faculty publications in monitored journals and books published by commercial presses. While all of these suggest measures of academic quality, all are notoriously unreliable for making judgments of quality.

And then, what would we do with such measures of quality, even if we could obtain them to our satisfaction? Academic work of extraordinary excellence cannot expect proportionately extraordinary rewards. (How much is a beautiful poem worth? Can we put a price tag on a unified field theory?) Such a system would nail down for all time the fact that the university not only does business but is in every sense a business. That would be the beginning of our end.

Because there is no doubt that resource allocations represent a value statement, promoting the dialogue about resources is far more important than the actual criteria for assigning resources. That process should aim toward a search for common ground. It should avoid pitting one school against another, or gangs of schools against the administration. There is too much of the adversarial mentality already present in the university. Everywhere we find one scholar doing battle with another, trying to slay competing theories and to attract followings rather than to uncover hidden truths.

For the decision-making process to work well, participants must be given facts. Unfortunately there seems to be a fleeing from rationality today, even in the university. We’ve surrendered the notion that giving people facts can influence their behavior. Consequently there is the pernicious assumption that if people were told how much money is available, everyone would grab for all they could get. We believe people can be told the truth and remain sane, and our responsibility at the university is to demonstrate that this belief is true.

Resource allocations must give priority to programs more than support for transitory events. Therefore a university must support the program of elementary education before it supports open schools; it must support the program in epistemology before it supports the training of elementary teachers; it must support the program in sociology before it supports social work.

Teaching is but one part of a university’s mission. However, we can’t swindle students or pack them into the journalism school to keep the professor of Greek on the payroll. Consequently the hard questions concerning expansion and contraction must continually be asked. There is, unfortunately, no good formula to inform us when an area which happens to be lucrative has been asked to take on too much of a common load. But there is a good formula to inform us who must stay until the very end.

As long as the university decentralizes operating responsibility for its resources, one person must be relied upon to make the ultimate
decisions. In a system such as ours, where each school is allocated resources to employ with a near-free hand, there must be a final authority to determine allocations and settle appeals. Without a decisive voice, our collegial structure, fragile as it might be, would be replaced by a gladiatorial structure which would not be fragile. And that which we can enjoy in a community would become the burden of our anarchy.

At this university, the decisive voice resides in the office of the vice-chancellor for academic affairs. However, while decisions are exercised by the person, their authority is not the will of that person but rather obtains from the tradition, the common understandings, and the premises of the university. We should remember that for priests and rabbis, authority is in the Scriptures and not with the individual who reads the Scriptures. Similarly a decision of the vice-chancellor may be challenged, but not by questioning his responsibility to make final judgments. A challenge should only address how well he implements the authority of our university. But everyone must see it that way, or such a system won’t work. The problem we have with current procedures for allocating academic resources is frequently not that the system can’t work well but that some people want it to be a different system.

Because we haven’t offered rules for conduct here, what we have offered may not seem practical or helpful enough to who want more than these premises. Guidelines for Mathematics might look equally impractical if only the axioms were presented; yet from such axioms thousands of practical theorems, equations, and solutions are derived. In the deepest sense, axioms are practical. And while we cannot compare the wisdom or elegance of the United States Constitution with this statement, our intentions are similar. Without regard to the solution of practical problems, the Constitution nevertheless provides us with ways for dealing with every conceivable particular situation. In that sense, the Constitution is not only practical but also one of the most enduring guides to action the world has known. And the reason it is enduring is that it is a set of premises and not particulars. The university, it seems to us, must similarly resolve to live by its first principles and bear the responsibility of a continual need to exercise judgment.

There seems to be a malaise around. Many of us feel that we can’t do what is right. We respond to pressing economic and political forces as if there were little we could accomplish beyond getting through another day. This pattern of reacting has to be broken. Perhaps we can break it with an exercise in virtue—hence the attached Minority Scholarship Proposal as an example of something through which we could consciously do what is right, what is in the best interests of this university; something that can get us working together positively on resource allocations. While this proposal is formulated specifically for the School of Education, it can be applied in the rest of the university as well.

Although the Minority Scholarship Proposal is offered for adoption, we will settle for consideration in order to see how our beliefs meet the test of action. Perhaps it is not necessary that we actually take this particular test. But it is very important to know whether we could pass it.
Minority Scholarship Proposal

Our School of Education, if not the entire university, has made insufficient progress in recruiting capable low-income minority students. We have tried all sorts of remedies for this situation, but we are frank to admit that, in spite of the efforts of our Minority Affairs Committee and others in the school, there are few black faces, Spanish surnames, or Native Americans to be found here. We have sent teams of faculty to visit Southern schools to recruit minority graduate students, and we have come home with little to show for the effort. For a time we thought that recruiting minority faculty might be the answer. We once blatantly advertised for minority students in a rehabilitation journal, indicating that we would give preference for federal scholarships to such applicants. The result was that we recruited no candidates but were warned by a civil rights organization of a possible lawsuit if such discriminatory practices were not stopped.

At this point, after repeated failures, the faculty seems to be in a state of suspended embarrassment. We hope that the situation will be rescued by a benevolent government or philanthropist, but secretly we know that the government is sure to gum things up and that the philanthropy line is too long and usually too late to help when one’s number is called. In essence we find ourselves in a stalemate: while Washington and the Administration Building exhort us to recruit minority students, few of us believe that enough minority students can be recruited at the university to make a difference. It seems to be the right time to think differently about the problem.

What has been missing from our previous recruitment plans is opportunities for individuals within the community to take action directly, as individuals. Our efforts to foster minority participation have been aimed at influencing government policy, transforming social structures, persuading philanthropic institutions, and otherwise trying to affect the impersonal machinery of our society. But we have done relatively little to examine avenues of direct action. This Minority Scholarship Proposal is founded on the premise that the people who constitute our faculty, the larger university, and the surrounding community want to find a way to express their commitment to higher educational opportunities for minority students.

The School of Education has a faculty payroll of about $2 million. If each faculty member were to contribute 3 percent of his or her academic salary to a minority scholarship fund; and if that amount were matched ten times over by Syracuse University; and if industry and labor (combined) doubled the contributions of faculty and university, then a principal of over $2 million could be raised within one year. The interest on this amount at 9 percent would yield twenty-two full scholarships, including tuition, room, board, and incidentals (see Table 1). If these contributions were repeated for a second year, we would have a base of $4.5 million and over forty scholarships to award. Or, if faculty contributed 4 or 5 percent, the base would similarly change. The fact is that if the faculty, the university, industry, and labor wish to recruit minority students, this goal can be achieved without enormous sacrifices.

These are, of course, preliminary ideas which have yet to be tested by people in financial aid as well as by other experts in these matters.
TABLE 1

PROJECTED REVENUE FOR UNDERGRADUATE MINORITY SCHOLARSHIPS
(Based on $2.3 million total for 1981-82 School of Education faculty salaries, and $9,150 for undergraduate tuition, room, board, and incidentals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of contribution</th>
<th>Revenue based on percentage of faculty contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>$69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University (10 times above)</td>
<td>690,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>759,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry-labor (2 times subtotal)</td>
<td>1,518,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,277,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual yield on total (at about 9% interest)

|                        | 200,000a  | 340,000b  |

* a Provides 22 scholarships.  b Provides 37 scholarships.

However, the following points can be made in support of this proposal or some variation of it:

1. University faculty would be asked to contribute relatively little financially to achieve something we nearly unanimously claim to want very much. Also, for everyone concerned, this would be a one-time—certainly no more than a two-time—contribution. Moreover, the addition of basic opportunity grants and other financial aids could significantly stretch the number of students participating.

2. Labor and industry would probably be supportive—labor because it has a commitment to minority opportunities and industry because it appears to be seeking ways to invest in minority education. Our Development Office should have a relatively easy time securing support for this program. It will also be welcome to many to have the university speak with leaders of industry and labor concerning real problems which are of mutual importance.

3. The program should be for undergraduates. A four-year undergraduate education is much more expensive than the typical one-year master's program, and most of our doctoral students are already on some sort of stipend, assistantship, or fellowship. The bottleneck appears to be with entering freshmen. If a minority student is able to receive a solid undergraduate university education, graduate doors seem to open.

4. A substantial stipend beyond full tuition is suggested in order to prevent the student from going into great debt. Partial support that
may make college “less impossible” still leaves it impossible for the truly poor student; minority people, even with college degrees, have enough to worry about without monstrous debts to pay off. Most importantly, people who choose education as a career are not destined for wealth. Teaching is a relatively low-paying profession, and consequently it may not be reasonable to ask the poor minority students we want to recruit to assume large debts against a relatively meager financial future.

5. It is most appropriate that a school of education make a special effort to attract minority students. Our foreign affiliations draw only foreign minorities to Syracuse University; otherwise our student body represents only white Middle America. Of our current graduate applications, only 3 percent are from blacks and 2 percent are from other minorities. On the undergraduate level the picture is equally dismal. And since education is a major factor in diminishing the grip of the ghetto, we should teach teachers who might have an edge in helping others to achieve freedom of choice. It should be observed that the School of Education as a social institution has failed in two ways: It has failed to make the benefit of professional training directly available to minority members. It has also failed to foster an educational system in the larger community which makes minority students likely to become candidates for our professional training. Thus it is doubly important that the school attract this group of students—first to offer hope to individuals and second, through them, to promote systematic change.

6. Why should the faculty be asked to participate? If self-interest must be invoked to justify our actions, then the gesture has only remote recommendations; but it does have recommendations. During the past half century, our country has come to delegate social concerns to government. By doing this it has acquired an astronomical debt which in one way or another must be paid. By contrast, this proposal involves one or two years’ payment and no debt. Thus we can have a significant amelioration of a major social problem through a process which will continue to operate after the “taxation” has ceased; and we can do it cheaper than the government can. We might also be protected from government intervention if we do voluntarily what eventually would have to be forced upon us. If all this doesn’t add up to a self-interest incentive, at least it doesn’t go against our self-interest beyond the very short run.