Revolution and Its Discontents: The Revolutionary Faith in the Modern World

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Perhaps the main faith of the modern era is the belief in revolution. Like all true faiths it is based on something inherently implausible: that a perfect secular order will emerge from the forceable overthrow of traditional authority. The idea of a violence that will end all violence, of the miraculous which is yet totally secular, gave unique dynamism to Europe in the nineteenth century and has become the most successful ideological export of the West to the world in the twentieth century. This distinctively modern faith in revolution was born and bred in the key European cities of the industrial era from Paris to Petersburg, although not confined to these two centers. The disputes, dialogue, and symbolic speech of urban revolutionaries has produced most of the language and much of the confusion of modern politics.

The characteristic revolutionary was, and has remained, a thinker lifted up by ideas—not at all a worker or peasant bent down by toil. There is a need, therefore, to consider the spiritual thirst of those who think, no less than the material hunger of those who work. Passionate intellectuals created and developed the revolutionary faith, and it is important to understand this faith as well as the process of revolution itself.

To describe the revolutionary faith in one word, I must immediately flee to a foreign language and use the Russian oprostis'sia ("to simplify things"). It is a cri du coeur that occurs in the correspondence of the early Russian Hegelians of the 1840s, and it reveals part of the essence of the modern revolutionary impulse. Radical simplification appeared in the French revolutionary desire to move from many estates to one state; from many titles to one title, citoyen; from many forms of address to one form, tu, the familiar; from many points of power to one point; from a national assembly to a twelve-man committee, to a five-man directorate, to a three-, to a two-man consulate, to a one-man emperor; from the complexity of a discussion to the simplicity of a slogan: bread, peace, land.

This impulse toward radical simplification is inherent in the internal
dynamics of modern scientific inquiry and particularly in the passion
to find in society one unifying law like that which Newton discovered
in nature. The basic divisions which I would like to suggest in the
modern revolutionary faith can be described by the most simple and
elementary formative revolutionary slogan of the modern era: liberty,
equality, fraternity. Liberty was the first form of the revolutionary
faith to take shape.

Revolution for political liberty was a phenomenon of the northern
Atlantic Protestant world from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth
century, moving from Holland to England to the United States and to
France in the early stages of the French Revolution. The basic belief
was in political revolution against tyranny, whether that of Charles V,
Charles I, or George III. Political oratory in some kind of representa­tive
body was the vehicle, the aim was a rational constitution, and
the magic word—what one of the key revolutionaries called le mot
talismanique—was république. This type of revolution for political
liberty continued into the nineteenth century; the Swiss and Belgian
revolutions are interesting examples. But I would contend that
political revolution against tyranny is not the dominant or typical form
in the modern world—a fact that is particularly hard for Americans to
understand, since our own war for independence came from this tradi­tion.
The limited nature of our type of revolution is suggested by the
fact that the leaders of the American war did not call themselves
revolutionaries.

What distinguishes this first form of the revolutionary
faith from the other two (those on behalf of fraternity
or equality) is that, once completed, it moves away
from simplicity and towards complexity. When the Americans, for ex­ample, moved beyond mere independence to form a constitution,
they created an extremely complex system of checks and balances, of
multilayered federal structures, and the like. They moved toward com­plexity in order to limit central authority. The creation of complex
constitutional limits on central power reflected in some ways
aristocratic modes of thought, as later revolutionaries contended, even
if not always an aristocratic social composition.

This type of revolution—for constitutional liberties—dominated in
the early stages of the French Revolution and reached its apogee with
the creation of the First French Republic in 1792. Then at last the most
powerful king in Christendom was overthrown and replaced by a
republic. Almost immediately, however, the ideal of political revolution
was overtaken by the first of the two new and distinctively modern
types of revolutionary faith: the revolution for fraternité, or
"brotherhood"—the romantic, characteristically modern form of
mass revolution, not just against tyranny but essentially against the
isolation and anomie of modern life. Its prophet was Rousseau; its
vehicle, lyric vernacular verse. Its aim was the emotional union of peo­ple,
not the rational constitution of government. The magic word was
la nation, whose English equivalent was not used at all during the
American war. The word swept away all others until it became la
grande nation, as expansionist France provided the first modern asser­tion
of revolutionary nationalism. A phenomenon of Catholic, largely
southern Europe, ranging from Latin America to Poland, revolu­
tionary nationalism became the dominant faith of the revolutionary movement until the final defeat of the Paris commune and the discrediting of French leadership in 1871.

The revolution for fraternity began with the mobilization of *la grande nation* for war in 1792 and 1793. Its quintessential expression was not any form of written constitution but "*La Marseillaise,*" that great song which became the basic text of modern revolutionary nationalism. It was written by Rouget de Lisle on a piano in Strasbourg on the first day of the transformation of the French Revolution into war. Three days later the guillotine, built by a piano maker in the same city of Strasbourg, was used for the first time on human beings. The interaction between music and violence and the interaction of both of them with the essentially ineffable, emotional, romantic second type of revolution is evident from the beginning.

Beyond this ideal of revolution for fraternity there soon appeared the third type: revolution for equality. The Paris commune celebrated the end of one revolutionary tradition and the rise of another, giving birth to the "*Internationale,*" the rival song of the tradition of social revolution, composed in 1871 as Paris was going up in flames. The revolution for equality represented a rationalistic revolution against a social hierarchy. If the paradox of the national revolutionary ideal was that it cultivated fraternity within and violence without, the paradox of the social revolutionary tradition was that it required an elite hierarchy within order to eliminate all elites and hierarchies outside.

The new vehicle for social revolutionaries was neither a constitution for government, in the tradition of liberalism, nor a song for the people, in the tradition of nationalism. The new vehicle was a manifesto for a new social order, which the elite group suddenly revealed as truth to the larger group outside. The revolutionary elite thus made a program manifest to the masses they were determined to save. The aim of the manifesto was the rationalistic equalization of the socioeconomic structure; the new magic word was *communism*.

The struggle between national and social revolution—revolutionary nationalism versus revolutionary communism—has been the internal civil war of the modern revolutionary faith. National revolution has ancient roots; but social revolution, in its distinctive, purely secular form, is altogether new. This new tradition is antitheistic and not merely agnostic, and reached its climax and quintessence in Leninism. It is here that I would like to dig in deep and try to trace the actual origins of Leninism, this third form of the revolutionary faith.

There are five essential ingredients in Leninism, which appear to be the characteristics of the movement as it first emerged in the decade between Lenin’s arrival in Petersburg as a mature student (1893) and the formation of the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic party abroad (1903); Lenin himself dated the birth of Bolshevism from 1903. The early essential ingredients of Leninism must be distinguished from Lenin’s later amplifications of Marxism (to accommodate the peasantry, account for imperialism, etc.). Leninism as a revolutionary faith was defined already in the early years to include the following essential elements:
1. An approaching social revolution will be the last act of violence in human affairs, replacing all government authority with a new order of socioeconomic equality.

2. The revolution will be legitimized by a secular ideology that both describes and prescribes social change.

3. The revolution will be led by a new type of disciplined, hierarchical party acting to represent all oppressed people.

4. This final revolution in the name of equality will occur inside, and in dialectical opposition to, a prior political revolution in the name of liberty.

5. The revolutionary party will organize its network and translate its ideology into tactics largely through a combat-oriented central journal.

These five key ingredients can in a general way be traced to certain distinctive influences on the young Lenin in this critical decade (1893–1903). He was clearly shaped by (a) the Russian tradition of peasant rebellion dating back to Stenka Razin, the folk hero of Lenin’s native town of Simbirsk; (b) the belief in a professional vanguard party derived from the People’s Will Organization, which in the late nineteenth century had dominated the imagination of revolutionaries inside Russia and had claimed Lenin’s older brother as one of its martyrs; (c) the secular, scientistic ideology of Marxism, which Lenin read and admired through Das Kapital before he got to the Communist Manifesto; (d) the codification of orthodoxy by the German Social Democratic party, which offered the blueprint for a disciplined, two-stage revolution (Lenin adhered to this doctrine of Engels and Kautsky until 1917, long after many other revolutionary Marxists had discarded it, and used it to check both the Blanquist and the Bakuninist impulses of Russian revolutionary tradition); and (e) the special dedication of Russian revolutionary intellectuals to using radical journalism as a means of mobilization and not merely of propaganda.

When we try to determine precisely what was the first Leninist organization, we enter an area of fascination for both history and methodology. Hard evidence is scarce; we confront the mystery of the generation of anything new in human affairs. In history as in biology it may be easier to trace how we grow than to find out how our lives began. The historians’ occupational predisposition is, of course, to evade the question by retreating perpetually to the preceding period whenever any issue of origin arises. For example, there was some growth of Lenin as a revolutionary during the six years between his older brother’s execution and his move to St. Petersburg in late 1893. These years were largely spent in the interior cities of Kazan and Samarra—where, incidentally, recent scholarship has shown that Lenin originally seized on the slogan “From the spark comes the flame,” which gave his journal its title of Iskra (“the spark”), founded in 1900.

But Lenin’s special spark did not really ignite until it found combustible material within the first radical group in which he participated after arriving in Petersburg. In this neglected body Lenin first met both live workers from heavy industry and the main corpus of
Marxist ideas. Most importantly, perhaps, he acquired a gifted group of lifelong friends and colleagues like the Krasin brothers, his future wife Krupskaia, and a number of obscure Polish and Ukrainian associates who have been almost obliterated from the historical record by subsequent layers of historiography. (One of these associates, Stepan Radchenko, was, I believe, the most important formative figure of this early period.) This group predated not only the Bolshevik party but also the Union for the Liberation of the Working Class in Petersburg, which is generally regarded as the first organization to be imbued with Leninism. The group had been forming for at least a year before Lenin was introduced into its activities, and it represents the embryo of Leninism as a political movement.

One key term which emerged at that period and which was new to Leninism became its mot talismanique. The term was partiinost’, difficult to translate but close to “sacrificial party spirit.” It suggests a protototalitarian concept of party obligation and discipline that supersedes all other ethical norms. Lenin first used the word in 1894 in his initial polemic with the other more orthodox Marxists in Petersburg; Krzhizhanovsky later insisted that it had been used in the group as early as 1893.

It is difficult to agree on the factors relating to the origins of Leninism, let alone to identify a principle source: the personal genius, whether saintly or satanic, of Lenin himself; social change in Petersburg as workers flooded into large industrial compounds after the great famine of the early 1890s; the intellectual appeal of Marxism; or some inherited immunity of the Russian body politic to liberalism. What one can do, I believe, is not so much identify a cause as specify a physical location in which Leninism came into being; a precise place within Petersburg where the spark first turned to flame. The most powerful chroniclers of the origins of the Bolshevik Revolution have instinctively fixed on some dramatic location as a kind of causal symbol of the Revolution’s rush into reality: Edmund Wilson’s use of the Finland station; John Reed’s picture of Smolny; Eisenstein’s dramatization of the Winter Palace; George Kennan’s image of Petersburg itself.

The most important monument of all may have been the forgotten first point of mobilization for the new order, the special student building within the larger courtyard of the St. Petersburg Imperial Practical Technological Institute. It was here in the early 1890s that the key figures of that first circle, except for Lenin, began to meet for their first political discussions and primitive attempts at organization. The group was able to function precisely because it assembled within the protective walls of a building within a privileged institute under direct imperial patronage. The group was inclined to practical affairs by the explicit commitment of the institute to turn theory into practice. The students were free to explore revolutionary ideas within a secure inner building that they controlled themselves. The student lunchroom was in fact referred to by this group as the “Zaporozhian Sech,” the name of an isolated island retreat in the Dnieper River where the free Cossacks had traditionally exercised virtual autonomy on the Russian frontier. This student sech (“cleared area”) provided the womb within which the Leninist embryo first formed; the place in which nowhere, the literal meaning of utopia, first became somewhere.
Leninism thus originated in a cleared and secure free zone within an institution that enjoyed special protection from the normal restrictions of an authoritarian old order.

This structural feature of Leninism, like the five basic ingredients already mentioned, points to anticipations (if not origins) that predate the Russian and even the Marxist revolutionary traditions. Not surprisingly, the trail leads back to the early years of the French Revolution. Only then did the first two ingredients that we have identified with Leninism come into being: belief in social revolution as the final upheaval in human history, and belief in a totally secular ideology as the guide for getting there. Only then did both the adjective and the noun revolutionary (along with anti-revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, and a host of related terms) come into widespread usage. Only then did men speak of revolution in the altogether new and entirely secular sense of totally transforming the social order—not in the earlier political sense of re-volution, back to some preexistent order temporarily violated by a tyrant.

The first group in which these—and the other—essential ingredients of later Leninism first appeared was a small organization called the Social Circle, which has been almost totally ignored in all the verbal outpouring over one of the most overwritten chapters in modern history. The story of this forgotten forerunner of Leninism can be traced through the activities of its neglected leader, Nicholas de Bonneville.

Just as the Russian intellectuals were radicalized by their discovery of Schiller (Herzen and Ogaryov pledged atop Sparrow Hills, now Lenin Hills, in Moscow to avenge the fallen Decembrists of 1825 by reading lines to each other from Don Carlos), so Nicholas de Bonneville became radicalized on the eve of the French Revolution by his decade-long immersion in the works of this playwright; Bonneville was, incidentally, Schiller’s first French translator. Schiller even more than Rousseau—art even more than philosophy—repeatedly led men onto the long road from Bonneville to Lenin. His plays became a kind of lens through which the rays of the rising revolutionary sun were brought into incendiary focus.

The art which Bonneville and his contemporaries used to overthrow royalty in France was appropriately known as the Royal Art, which is, of course, the name given to occult higher-order Freemasonry. This “art” had developed with a wild rapidity in France in the later 1770s and 1780s, wrenching the entire Masonic movement away from its philanthropic, rationalistic Anglo-American origins into a new identity as a purveyor of secret hierarchical gradation and pseudo-chivalric rituals. The new occult circles provided a place where, in the phrase of another literary enthusiast for the Royal Art and a close friend of Bonneville, les extrémes se touchent. The extreme positions of the far right and the far left both found their deepest spiritual resources in the Royal Art. The term itself is appropriate because there was a kind of implied political program half-consciously buried in its rituals.

In the waning years of the ancien régime in France, the locus of legitimacy for the new higher-order occult Freemasonry was the Grand Orient, the symbolic “Great East” or location of wisdom embodied in the leader-protector of higher Masonry who bore this title. In the
1780s the Grand Orient was Philip of Orleans, cousin of King Louis XVI. It was Philip’s vast colonnaded emporium in the heart of Paris, the Palais Royal, which provided the privileged sanctuary within which, paradoxically, the French Revolution may have begun in an even more literal sense than the Russian Revolution began in the Technological Institute in Petersburg. The French Revolution literally started with the first formation of the mob within the Palais Royal that flowed forth to desecrate the symbols of royal authority in central Paris and eventually to storm the Bastille. The decisive moment came at about 3:30, Sunday afternoon, July 12, 1789, in a speech delivered from a tabletop in front of the Café Foy in the Palais by Camille Desmoulins, ending with the famous cry “Aux armes!”

Nicholas Bonneville, Desmoulins’ close friend and sometime roommate in a flat near the Palais Royal, had been the first to write the slogan “Aux armes” and was soon to pioneer in using the familiar tu as the form of revolutionary address. He soon became the first to proclaim, and to live out in his life, all of the future major characteristics of Leninism: He was one of the first to represent the Revolution in Paris as a social revolution of the urban commune as a whole against the authority not so much of the king as of the mayor and the National Guard under Lafayette. He began a long literary tradition which lasted right down to Lenin of representing Lafayette as the incarnation of the betrayal of revolution, the strutting martinet of the fraudulent partial revolution for liberty, which distracts men from a real revolution for social equality. Bonneville saw the Revolution heralding not so much a change of government as an end to the very business of governing—at least within liberated Paris. He saw the movement legitimized by a primitive form of scientific ideology: To Bonneville, occult Pythagoreanism (of which he was a master) conceived of secular change as an emanation of light from its center of truth. The microcosm of a totally illuminated inner group was in Bonneville’s view transforming the macrocosm of the world; the Royal Art was to bring an end to royal rule.

Most important and original was Bonneville’s concept of a new party in which perfection would first be realized in secret and then made manifest in public. He believed that his group, the Social Circle, was the vanguard of a new totalistic revolution borne not by the états généraux (the “estates general”) but by what he called the écrivains généraux (the “writers’ general”). His esoteric, vanguard circle was to operate within a broader Universal Confederation of the Friends of Truth, which met in the so-called cirque, the partially submerged pleasure dome inside the gardens of the Palais royal, which was soon renamed the Garden of Equality. In this Garden of Eden, this central liberated zone, the coming universal transformation was announced by his Universal Confederation, which was the only important revolutionary body to grant early and consistent equality to women and blacks. The illuminated microcosm within the inner group, the Social Circle, saw its members achieving the perfect equality of equidistance from the center of truth in their midst. This inner circle was able to spread its doctrine inside the secure, free zone of the cirque within the outer walls of the Palais Royal, a strikingly close architectural parallel to the structure of the Technological Institute in Petersburg, with its
outer buildings and its independent student preserve within the courtyard.

Even more important than the appearance of a liberated base area within the privileged sanctuaries of the imperial enemy was the political strategy which Bonneville evolved of working from within a republican, political revolution to produce a social revolution. Bonneville early established a close link with Brissot and other leaders of the Girondist republican faction, particularly with the aid of his most famous journal, *La Bouche de fer*, “the mouth of iron.” But beyond any political republic of the complex federative bourgeois type envisioned by the Girondists, Bonneville was working actively for his own “universal republic of letters,” to be regulated by what he called “superior intelligences” (those within the Social Circle) and to be characterized by total equality. The legitimizing point of truth within the Social Circle acquired a socioeconomic coloration when he sought to establish a central rallying point for the artisans and simple workers of Paris; he called this the *point central des arts et métiers*, the “central point of arts and crafts.”

Bonneville saw the organization and production of a political-ideological journal as the means of mobilizing and creating a new kind of social revolutionary party within Paris—not only in his oracular “mouth of iron” that was to provide militant leadership against the “mouth of gold” (the tradition of privilege), but also in his remarkable publication of 1789, the *Tribune of the People*. This journal purported to represent the voice of the sovereign people, the legitimate counterauthority (as in the old Roman constitutional tradition) to established power. This title was later revived by Babeuf, whose “conspiracy of equals” was similar to and perhaps partially derived from Bonneville’s Social Circle. Here again, occult truth was made manifest, not just in Babeuf’s journal but also in the *Manifesto of Equals* by Sylvain Maréchal, Bonneville’s old friend. Maréchal called himself HSD, *l'homme sans Dieu*, “the man without God,” a term that dramatized his stance of metaphysical atheism. *L’homme sans Dieu* considered himself the first really liberated man, and was that rarest form of true believers, a dedicated atheist. This posture became characteristic of militant social revolutionaries, as distinguished from national or political revolutionaries.

This comparative look at the origins of Leninism in Russia in the 1890s and its foreshadowing in France in the 1790s suggests that there may be something like a deep structure to modern social revolutionary movements. There has, however, been a clear change in the hidden model for revolutionary organization, which helps us differentiate the two eras in the history of the revolutionary faith. For Bonneville and the revolutionary movements of the Francocentric era (lasting down to the time of the Paris commune), the microcosmic model was the aristocratic Masonic lodge: a structure that suggested the world itself being transformed into a rebuilt Temple of Solomon. It was an architectural model—static, yet capable of local adaptation by the great variety of revolutionary movements that arose largely against monarchical Catholicism in the nineteenth century. For social revolutionaries, however, the subconscious model was a machine, which is by its nature dynamic, uniform, and ultimately incapable of basic varia-
tion without losing its functional integrity.

But the machine did not yet dominate the popular imagination within the factory complexes of Petersburg during the early industrialization of the 1890s. Most Russians still carried within them an essentially rural identity, and more than a third in the capital lived only seasonally away from the land. The machine seems to have first become an important force in the imagination of the upwardly mobile young students who worked and lived with the new machine models that dominated the laboratories and factorylike regimen of the Petersburg Technological Institute. The thermodynamic machine became a kind of totem for the first Leninist group, who were perhaps influenced by the Siemens Electric Company (whose Russian head Krasin later became) as well as by the German Social Democratic party, which provided the model for combating the established revolutionary tradition of anti-intellectual and anti-industrial anarchism and populism in Russia.

In the late nineteenth century, the revolutionary battlefield spread north and east away from its origins in Catholic lands into areas with authoritarian political cultures like Prussia and Russia. These lands had little experience with the more leavening liberal experience accumulated in the Francocentric era by their more westerly and Catholic neighbors, the Rhineland Germans and the Poles respectively.

There may have been a further structural similarity between Leninism and its anticipation in Bonneville and Babeuf, notwithstanding the drive towards uniformity and impersonal discipline that was new to the machine age. This similarity concerns the fate of the two movements. Bonneville’s fragile organization and his Girondist allies through whom he was trying to work were both utterly defeated by the rival Jacobins, who during the Reign of Terror reestablished authoritarian political power around the ritual of execution and the cultivation of xenophobia. Bonneville and his new roommate, Thomas Paine (through whom Bonneville’s wife and child eventually migrated to the United States), were viewed as major rivals by the Jacobins; the two were imprisoned and nearly executed as dangerous cosmopolitans, since xenophobia was central to the Jacobin formula. When Babeuf revived the social revolutionary dream of equality after the fall of the Jacobins, he too was crushed, even more decisively by the even more imperial nationalism of Napoleon. Many perceptive social critics, seeing the essence of Jacobinism to be its emotional, nationalistic content, have viewed Napoleon as a sort of Jacobin writ large.

The Leninist social revolution envisioned the transcending of nationalism and created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: a state which did not include a national designation within its name. But this dream was defeated even in victory by the reestablishment of authoritarian political power, rituals of execution, and the cultivation of xenophobia under Stalin, in whose hands power was essentially impersonal and machine driven. But its ultimate fuel was nationalism rather than socialism.

The universal ideal of social equality that both the Bonneville-Babeuf group and the original Lenin group had juxtaposed to the parochial national ideal of fraternity was first given the name of com-
munism in the 1790s by one of Bonneville's friends; in 1918 Lenin formally adopted this same name. It was very little used in between, except during the 1840s, when Marx wrote his Communist Manifesto.

In 1920 Krzhizhanovsky, the technologist and early friend of Lenin, gave communism its first accepted definition after power: Soviet power plus electrification. Krzhizhanovsky, who lived on to become the founder of the State Planning Agency in the USSR, built his definition of communism on two images that were gestated within the bosom of his alma mater, the Petersburg Technological Institute; the institute had not only introduced to Russia the first Siemens electric dynamo in the 1890s but had also, during the Revolution of 1905, housed the first Soviet of workers' deputies.

The dream of international social revolution and of power going to the proletarianist Soviets rather than to the Leninist elite ended, as we have seen, with Stalin. The end may have been foreshadowed by the movement of the Russian revolutionary capital back to Moscow and away from Petersburg, the city in which the social revolutionary tradition had initially triumphed. As the locus of legitimacy for the dream of universal social revolution had been the privileged sanctuaries of liberalism within an authoritarian capital (the Palais Royal in Paris, the Technological Institute in Petersburg), so the locus of legitimacy for Leninism in power became the privileged sanctuary of conservatism within a prior, more insular capital, the Moscow Kremlin. Revolution in the making began in a café in Paris and a student lunchroom in Petersburg; but revolution in power was finally sanctified by a tomb in Moscow.

Schiller's Don Carlos—the heroic, romantic, revolutionary symbol of liberation translated into French by Bonneville, into music by Verdi, into a kind of Christianity by Dostoevski—somehow became transformed under Stalin into the Grand Inquisitor. Lenin represented social revolution in anticipation; Stalin, social revolution in power. Revolutionary nationalism was also different in power from what was anticipated. Mussolini’s early fascismo della prima ora, for instance, bears a relationship to Hitler’s Nazism, to the “final solution,” in a way not unlike the progression from Leninism into Stalinism.

What is the the meaning of the betrayal of the hopes of the secular faith in revolution in the modern era, particularly in its social-revolutionary variant? Perhaps the belief in revolution has been only a political flash fire of the European industrial era, now burning itself out on the the periphery of the Third World. Even some violent revolutionaries of the Third World seem now to be moving away from the political religions of the past, away from secular political doctrine generally. There and elsewhere the human spirit, seeking new forms of political legitimization, may now be rebelling not so much against the religious-based monarchies of the past as against the untraditional technologies of a future relentlessly forced on the present. Revolutionary movements in the future may increasingly seek (as in Iran) alliance with sacred rather than secular forms of legitimacy. Revolutionary nationalism revives at every turn when it is thought to be extinct, and may be fortifying fraternity with paternity.
As the flames die down, it is not impossible that somewhere on the burned-out field the older seeds of liberty—the older, enduring struggle for freedom that preceded the cause of fraternity and equality—may push up some of its shoots in unexpected places. The secular revolutionary creed of political revolution which arose within Judeo-Christian culture could even prove in the long run to be only a stage in the continuing metamorphosis of older forms of faith. Perhaps the belief in secular revolution that legitimized so much authoritarianism and authoritarian repression in the twentieth century may prefigure dialectically some rediscovery of religious evolution to revalidate freedom in the twenty-first.

Whether or not such speculations prove justified, we will need to understand better our turbulent neighbors who are likely to remain revolutionaries for many years to come. We will need fuller study of the historical record as we enter an age when free men will have to rely on their wits no less than on their strength, if they hope to pass on much of their own heritage to the generations that lie ahead.