Political Emotions: Toward a Fresh Perspective on Collective Emotion in Composition Work

Ingrid Jonna Gillfus
Syracuse University

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Abstract

This dissertation examines theories of emotion in politically contentious discourse in order to better understand the implications for teachers and students in composition classrooms where critical pedagogical practices lead to contentious political work. I suggest that partly as a result of the social and political turn in composition studies, the expectation for disrupting the normative political values and beliefs of students has become part of the curriculum in many writing classrooms. Yet teachers and students charged with such learning goals may be largely unaware of and unprepared for the role emotion might play in this teaching and learning situation. I argue that it is both ethically imperative and pragmatically in our best interest to better understand the complexities of the intersection between emotion and politically contentious discourse.

Drawing on a variation of grounded theory methodology called “situational analysis,” I examine two seemingly separate sites of inquiry, a politically contentious discussion among teachers in composition and rhetoric, and materials from a new teaching assistant practicum, that together help begin to illuminate the less than visible influences and importance of collective emotion in contentious political discourse in the writing classroom. In chapter one I establish the exigency for the project and provide an historical account of the divergent paths that have led to politically contentious discourse in writing classrooms. In chapter two, I develop a working definition for the
concept of emotion and suggest particular theoretical frames from political sociology useful to the analysis of emotion. Chapter three provides an explanation and justification for the use of situational analysis as a methodological way forward in exploring relational factors involved in the situation of inquiry. Chapter four analyzes a politically contentious discussion among professionals in composition and rhetoric, which highlights the autonomous power of collective emotion to open and reinforce social division. In chapter five I examine steps that scholars in composition and rhetoric have taken toward understanding the implications of emotion in politically contentious classrooms, and argue that there are important gaps in this work, particularly with regard to the range of experience of the teachers taking on the challenge of critical pedagogy in first year composition. The final chapter examines a particular site of such teaching work, a new teaching assistant practicum, through materials collected retrospectively from teachers, students and mentors. In sum, this dissertation argues for first steps we might take to ensure a more productive way forward for teachers and students in classrooms where politically contentious work is part of the writing curriculum.
Political Emotions: Toward a Fresh Perspective on Collective Emotion in Composition Work

By

Jonna Ingrid Gilfus

B.A./B.S. Syracuse University, 1985
M.S. State University of New York College at Oswego 1995

DISSERTATION

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Table of Contents

Abstract................................................................................................................................. i

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1  Arguing about what Matters: Politics and Emotion ........................................... 12
A glimpse inside ....................................................................................................................... 12
Emotion (at) work in the classroom ....................................................................................... 13
Social justice on the agenda of higher education ................................................................. 20
Political questions in the writing classroom ......................................................................... 27
Working-class academics, gatekeepers and sad women in the basement ......................... 33

Chapter 2  Defining Political Emotion .................................................................................. 41
(Re)conceptualizing emotion ............................................................................................... 41
Emotion through a macro-Lens: intergroup emotion the “affective economy” .................. 47

Chapter 3  Finding the Way In: Methodological Approach to Emotion ............................... 55
Framing the question ............................................................................................................. 55
Grounded theory as a starting point ...................................................................................... 60
Situational analysis and mapping techniques ...................................................................... 66

Chapter 4  Collective Collegial Emotion ............................................................................. 80
Opening-up the data ............................................................................................................. 80
Composition teachers as a social world .............................................................................. 82
The Rachel Corrie thread ..................................................................................................... 84
A “pernicious postulate” regarding reason and emotion ...................................................... 91
Defining the work of (courageous) composition teachers: rhetorics of justice ................. 95
The (surprising) power of collective emotion .................................................................... 99

Chapter 5  Ubiquitous Emotion in Critical Pedagogy .......................................................... 105
(Whose) freedom? (Whose) power? .................................................................................... 105
Embodied emotion and critical pedagogy ........................................................................... 110
Critical pedagogy and first year comp: ideals & realities .................................................... 115

Chapter 6  Negotiating the work of the writing classroom: emotion and critical pedagogy . 118
First year composition: ideals and realities revisited ........................................................ 118
The new teaching assistant practicum ............................................................................... 120
Emotion work: invisible labor of the writing teacher ......................................................... 125
Emotional and political negotiations in the writing classroom: grades, authority and content ............................................................... 130
Some implications... and a cautious way forward .............................................................. 146

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 150

Vita ...................................................................................................................................... 158
Introduction

As a child I attended the “campus school” at the college where my father was an art teacher. The school emphasized student learning completely through curiosity—no grades, no set curriculum. I worked with a young graduate student named Noel, who taught me about the religion she practiced, which today would likely be called Neopaganism or Wicca. I bring up this experience not to highlight what might have been a bit out of control in the progressive elementary schools of the 1960’s, but to remember a lesson this woman taught me that has remained with me, especially in my teaching. Noel taught me about what she and others from this religion called the “Rede,” an agreement among those performing elements of her religion to always assume responsibility for effects their workings might have, intended or unintended. These women believed that their religious work was not so much grounded in the “supernatural” as in the natural—but natural channels that they simply had no full understanding of.

It’s been decades since this experience, but some of these ideas resonate for me as I make teaching decisions that involve the use of channels of emotion that I have no full understanding of: invoking shame in my students for their prejudices, intentionally or unintentionally, for example; or encouraging a collective anger or resentment in my classroom for corporations that put profit before human welfare. As professionals, we have a responsibility to examine the ways that the seemingly “natural channel” of emotion, which we have no full understanding of, is at work, even when our intentions are positive.
Shifts in the teaching of writing over the past three decades have moved many of us toward a greater sense of responsibility for social justice in the world, both through our individual actions, and through our work with students. I am not interested in taking an argumentative stance regarding the shifts toward a focus on social justice and critical pedagogy in many writing classrooms, but I am interested in what it means for us as teachers and for our students.

This question of how emotion is involved in our work is not new for educators, of course. When we teach, there is necessarily change involved; and change is sometimes painful, or joyful, or exciting. But invoking emotion in relation to the political has special implications—and, I would argue, special responsibilities. As writing teachers, we have always used emotion to make things happen in our classrooms, but as we learn more about it, as we get better at purposefully using it to build toward the goals of social justice, it becomes more and more our responsibility to recognize the consequences and impacts of our efforts. Is it possible, for example, that we might be opening new or larger rifts at the same time we are working to bring people to a greater awareness of social injustice? Emotion is not supernatural, but sometimes its forces remain outside our full range of understanding. We can see the effects, but it is very difficult to cipher how and why these effects occurred. This dissertation is an attempt to find some preliminary ways of better understanding how emotion functions, so that we might more ethically and productively work with it, especially in our politically-oriented teaching work.

This project grew out of my curiosity regarding the emotion work that appears increasingly integral to successful teaching of writing in classrooms where critical pedagogy is employed. As a mentor for new teaching assistants in a college writing
department, I saw intersections, sometimes clashes, between the political questions given prominence in many of the shared course designs, and seemingly unrelated classroom matters such as teacher authority, grading, and classroom management.

Yet the relationship between these practical, classroom-based concerns and the more theoretically based uses of political inquiry was not often observed or analyzed. Conversations about the intersection, when they happened, tended to circulate around terms such as the “resistance” of students, or “contrapower harassment” of teachers. While discussions of the problems in terms like resistance or contrapower harassment is certainly helpful, they tend to bracket the emotion involved, and come to stand in for larger, more complex processes of emotion at work with the political. Within a term like resistance, for example, is a built in notion of both instantiating a critical view of the world in students (as in resisting the neoliberal agenda) and the students’ reluctance to take up such a critical view, as well as collective feelings about the people who are “resisting” and what is being “resisted.” By looking more closely at the situation of critical pedagogy in the writing classroom, relationally and within a larger context, it may be possible to make some progress in understanding and addressing these types of recurring concerns.

Though intersections between the politics involved in critical pedagogy and the writing classrooms of these new teachers initiated my interest, analysis of the teaching practicum itself does not come until the final chapter of this dissertation. In order to make sense of the moments recorded in the practicum materials, it is necessary to first establish new ways of seeing the connections between emotion and political contention in the writing classroom. As a way to help the reader better see the approach taken in this dissertation project, I offer a concrete example of such a political moment from the
new teaching assistants’ practicum, followed by an explanation of how each chapter of the dissertation is designed to make possible a more nuanced and productive understanding of the situation, and those like it.

A new teaching assistant I was mentoring wrote to me asking for help with a situation from class. She was using a shared inquiry for the class called “Contested Space.” This inquiry for the first year composition class was guided by questions from critical human geography about the inequitable power relations in the production and reproduction of the use of space. After a shared reading from Don Mitchell’s “The End of Public Space? The People’s Park, Definitions of the Public, and Democracy,” the teacher invited Matthew Works to speak to the class. Works is an artist and homeless advocate, who was homeless himself for sometime, but now takes up residency at colleges where he speaks to students about his work and activism. According to a news story from Street Spirit, a publication about homelessness produced in the Bay Area, Matthew Works “became homeless after he stood up for himself and others in a job in which his duties were doubled without extra pay or compensation” (Clair). A large part of Works’ activist message is that because urban areas have criminalized poverty, churches should offer sanctuary, more specifically, he argues that “Jesus was homeless and churches should give sanctuary to homeless people 24 hours a day” (Clair).

The teacher was very upset about the way that her students reacted to Works. Her email to me, as well as the exchange between her and the student, is reprinted below:

From: J
Sent: Friday, October 1, 2010 4:10 PM
To: Jonna Gilfus
Subject: Help!
Hey, Jonna,

I’m sure this is old hat for you, but as a new teacher, I’m really shocked by the students’ responses to Matthew Works’ talk.

It’s as if they think homeless people are homeless for the explicit purpose of...upsetting their ideals!

I’m forwarding this email, but man, you should see the Blackboard posts on this. I’m really going to have to take class time on Thursday to talk about the finer points. At the very least, I can use their responses as jumping-off points for making more sophisticated and nuanced claims about a subject.

But, whew. It’s going to take every ounce of restraint I have to appear calm, cool and collected. I knew bringing a homeless person into the classroom was slightly unorthodox, but I was completely unprepared for the students to react by victim-blaming, which most of them are doing. Anyway, here’s one...(below)

Any suggestions?

J.

From: J
Sent: Thursday, September 30, 2010 6:39 PM
To: A
Subject: Texting in class

Hi A,

I saw that you were texting and drawing all during class today.

As you know, I tried to get your attention by sort of waving my foot in your line of sight. You stopped for a moment, and then resumed texting. I found the click of the texting --- and the very act of texting -- to be disruptive, not to mention disrespectful to our guest. As you know, it’s not tolerated in my class.

Let me know if you need further clarification on this.

Best, J

Hey J,

I thought that the speaker was terrible...he was saying some things that really disturbed what I stand for and how I was raised. I wrote about that in my notes that I took during the presentation. I was tempted to up and leave but I thought that would be
taking it a little too far and I didn’t want to make a scene or make anything awkward for next class.

I do respect your no texting rules and I never text in your class besides that one. It was not anything against you or your class I just found that what this guy was portraying to the class or myself specifically was not something that I believe in and or will listen to so I needed something to take it off my mind. My apologies and it won’t happen again.

--A

In the opening chapter of the dissertation, the first task I undertake is to try to better understand how and why as professionals, we came to design a classroom space and course inquiries which take up questions of social justice, such as this teacher has chosen regarding the right to public space. A more thorough look at the history and development of the practices we have come to regard as critical pedagogy allow us to see, first, that practices labeled as critical pedagogy actually vary quite broadly, and that this variation is not without controversy in the field. Secondly, this historical view provides a sense of where and how writing teachers identify collectively. Our professional identity matters, in terms of both the larger university structure and the larger world; it makes a difference in how we understand and experience emotions in a setting like the one above. Who does it appear this teacher sees herself aligned with, for example, Matthew Works, or the students whom she perceives as part of the upper-middle class?

In chapter two, I look for how we might define this ubiquitous and abstract concept, “emotion,” in order to better understand how it actually might be working. In the email reprinted above, we see references to emotion—the student’s note about feeling disturbed, the teacher’s comment that it will take every ounce of restraint she has to work with the students. We can point to emotion in the text, but it is necessary to
decide, at least tentatively, how to define what exactly it is referring to. Thinking of emotion as a bodily experience, or as located in the unconscious, or as located within the soul, is very different from imagining emotion as part of a larger system that is integrated with rationality, beliefs and values. Before we can take on the analysis of “the emotion” at work in this episode, or any other, we must find a way to at least tentatively agree on what emotion is, and how it functions, especially with regard to groups. This “macro” level functioning of emotion is one part of the scholarly interest in the topic where some progress has been made that may be useful to our work.

Chapter three introduces a methodological approach called “situational analysis” that can be used to examine these concerns regarding emotion, writing teachers and critical pedagogy. In many cases, teachers and students using critical pedagogy are not connecting the possibility of political contention to other teaching issues, such as the concern about texting in the example above. The exchange above between the teacher and student is rather an anomaly in that there is an honest and straightforward connection between a classroom issue (texting) and of the underlying problem related to political values or beliefs. The fact that the student feels free to indicate the underlying political issue may speak to the teacher’s ability to form a relationship with the student that makes this communication possible. Situational analysis suggests that researchers should examine the data more relationally and contextually. Through these methods, we are able to examine intersecting relational elements, in order to better illuminate “sites of silence” in the data, such as the curious lack of willingness to connect classroom issues with the political emotions that may actually be at work in the situation.
In order to look more closely at the way emotion functions in political contention within the “social world” of writing teachers, chapter four next takes a closer look at a listserv thread where professionals interact in a contentious political moment. Close analysis of the discourse presented reveals that even among colleagues with similar goals and interests in the world, collective emotion functions as an autonomous force in matters of political contention, shaping social relations and shifting power, sometimes in surprising ways.

Chapter five reviews the approaches writing teachers have taken up in the project of critical pedagogy as it relates to emotion, and I argue that, given what we have seen at work in the listserv discussion, there are problematic gaps. For example, many scholars operate on the premise of a more uniform, informed version of the individual writing teacher undertaking these practices. In reality the “social world” labeled as writing teacher is incredibly diverse, and includes teachers like the one above, who have never taught, never studied composition, and whose graduate training has provided them with strong, preceptive views regarding social justice.

With an eye for what it means for teachers with little or no training to be working with complex collective emotions related to political values and beliefs, chapter six finally returns to data gathered from the new teaching assistants’ practicum. The analysis in chapter six highlights more obvious examples of the politics of what Arlie Hochschild has identified as “emotional labor” involved in this work, but it also seeks to make visible the connections that are missing between the political work of the critical pedagogy classroom and what appeared at first to be practical classroom management issues, and uses theory developed and uncovered in earlier chapters.
regarding emotion to show how collective emotion may be at work as an autonomous collective force.

Returning then to the emails and request from the teacher for help, we might be able to ask some new questions about the way emotion is functioning within the situation. We can’t know exactly what Matthew Works might have said that brought the student to explain that his words “really disturbed what I stand for and how I was raised.” But we might ask what collective sense of emotion is at work in such a statement. Who might also ask ourselves who this student sees himself aligned with, or aligned against, and why? His apology to the teacher, and declaration of respect for her and for the class appear sincere. At the very least, with a generous read, we can identify a kind of emotion work on the part of the student, as he strains to keep himself aligned with her. Like the teacher, he showed restraint. What worked against his impulse to leave the room?

How might the teacher also be subject to collective emotion, as she sees the class as a whole as simply stubbornly resistant: “It’s as if they think homeless people are homeless for the explicit purpose of... upsetting their ideals!”

Obviously the teacher is simply expressing her frustration and dismay over the situation; she does not believe that her students actually feel people are homeless to upset their ideals. But I would argue that the decision to invite Works to visit that classroom was made with at least some sense that his presence and words would potentially upset students’ ideals. Probyn argues that “ideas and theories, especially about embodiment, cannot be divorced from their affective connections” (33), and that it gives life to learning when we invoke emotion, which she and many other recommend.
In this classroom, this is exactly the formula put in play by this new teacher when she took this “slightly unorthodox” risk toward more emotionally centered learning. It’s one thing to read Mitchell’s theory of the urban environment in the assigned text, where he explains: “It is not so much a site of participation as one of expropriation by a dominant class (and a set of economic interests) that is not really interested in making the city a site for the cohabitation of differences” (Mitchell 18), and quite another to have Matthew Works, homeless, sitting in front of you (a student at a private university which costs more than fifty thousand dollars a year to attend), telling you his story, his version of the world. In the latter scenario, you potentially have what Probyn refers to as the “goose bump” moment, the emotion/feeling/affect response that calls the person to action. Probyn’s assertion is that it is this introduction to caring at an emotional level that makes it possible to do the work intended in critical pedagogy. I agree, but how do we know exactly what we have unleashed in that moment?

Probyn also warns that this needs to be done safely. “Careful consideration needs to be paid to providing safety structures for students for whom a triggered affective response may be deeply disturbing. In elaborated terms, these questions gesture to what might be called an ethics of the affective in the classroom. This in turn entails consideration of the structure of the space in which affect is generated and experienced” (30). I agree with Probyn, an “ethics of the affective” is exactly what is required. But what might this look like, especially in a space where so many positions are held with regard to political and social identity, by teachers and by students? And where the world outside the classroom walls seems to tend more and more toward a
polarized version of political stances possible in the world (left/right, liberal/conservative).

I argue that the complexities of “using” emotion as a force in the classroom have not been fully examined, so even if we are using them toward a perceived common good, such as social justice, and even if they are not purposefully invoked, as teachers, we are still responsible for their effects. In this dissertation I attempt to provide a view into of the complexities involved in the emotion work in critical pedagogy, and to suggest a few small steps we should consider in order to move forward more productively.
A glimpse inside

In “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love” Jim Corder asks his readers to consider the idea that “each of us is an argument, evidenced by our narrative” (18), and asks a series of questions as he explores what happens in those moments when our own beliefs and truths, the story we have built about who we are, is brought into question in an encounter with another. He asks:

What happens, then, if the narrative of another crushes up against our own—disruptive, shocking, incomprehensible, threatening, suddenly showing us a narrative not our own? What happens if a narrative not our own reveals to us that our narrative was wanting all along, though it is the only evidence of our identity? What happens if the merest glimpse into another narrative sends us lurching, stunned by its differentness, either alarmed that such differentness could exist or astonished to see that our own narrative might have been or might yet be radically otherwise than it is? (18)

Corder’s depiction of encountering a new and radically different perspective allows his reader a glimpse inside some of the intense emotional work involved in a moment where we understand, in a personal way, the implications of seeing our views of the world, even our very identity, brought into question. Corder’s project is
addressing questions of the way rhetoric functions in argument, but the passage is one I return to as I encounter examples of students and teachers grappling with the renewed emphasis on what has often been labeled “critical” approaches to writing instruction.

Practices often short-handed as critical approaches, or critical pedagogy have been growing in the field of composition for at least the past two decades. As Olson commented, “Many of the notions of such theorists as Freire, Ohmann, and Sledd that seemed so shockingly revolutionary in the 1970s now regularly inform composition scholarship, and even official NCTE and CCCC resolutions” (297). I have seen many examples of moments like the one Corder describes in my own composition classes, as well as the classrooms of new teaching assistants I mentor. The intense emotion work involved is not relegated to students alone; it circulates through everyone involved in classrooms where attention has been turned toward topics that invoke political contention. And there are significant ways that teachers and students may be affected.

By “political,” I mean here inquiry that is explicitly directed toward power and difference as it relates to particular groups or institutions; often examined in terms of categories such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation or disability. There are complicated reasons for the shift toward political topics in composition classrooms, which will be examined later in this chapter, but I would like to begin with a concrete example of such a moment, which may help illustrate the complexity of emotion work required of those involved.

**Emotion (at) work in the classroom**

This is a story that may feel familiar to many composition teachers. It comes from a national listserv, a virtual community where professionals who work in composition and rhetoric come together, asking questions and posting ideas, arguing about theory
and practice, and seeking advice. In 2005, a teacher wrote the list asking for help with a class that left her quite distraught. Her post is reprinted below:

Hi everyone. I just finished teaching one of the most disastrous classes of my career, and I could use some advice.

I have two overtly racist students in one comp class, and I’ve spoken with both of them privately about it. One of them has said such disturbing things about African-Americans in essays that I’ve spoken to a counselor and the assistant dean about him, but neither of them has offered substantive help.

So today in class we were workshopping as a group on their upcoming paper topics, and this guy suggested that he would write his next essay on the fact that “blacks are not as intelligent as whites.” His classmates were obviously shocked, and one blurted out, “That’s terrible!” But this student persisted and said that anyone who wouldn’t consider his thesis was actually closed minded and just interested in “political correctness.”

The other students in the class seemed too surprised to respond (except for one other guy who pronounced the whole thing “disgusting”) so I was trying to salvage the “teaching moment” on my own and, I fear, failed utterly. I suggested to him that one of the reasons people respond so badly to his thesis is that it has been used in the past to perpetrate great crimes on a group of innocent people, and I talked about the problems with the so-called studies he cited to support his point, saying that they were biased and didn’t take into account all sorts of important factors.

Unfortunately, he only became more dogmatic and defensive, and he was egged on the entire time by Racist #2. Then class ended and everyone just left. I should have probably stopped the conversation much earlier, but I really felt as though I should try to make it into a productive educational moment. Instead, it was a total nightmare, compounded by the fact that today is the last day of class before spring break.

So... Should I send the class an email tonight or tomorrow following up on WHY they should not be racist? Should I plan a lesson for our first day back from break following up on today’s conversation? Should I just forget the whole thing and let these two jerks lead their miserable lives? The last option would obviously be the easiest but would leave me feeling the worst, I think, for giving up so easily. But if I choose one of the first two, I don’t really know what to say in the email or on our first day back from break.

Sorry for such a long email, but has anyone dealt with anything like this before? What did you do? What would you do in this situation?

Thanks so much.

G.
Members of the list wrote back with many kind words and suggestions, ranging from asking the racists to leave the class to developing pedagogy around the incident. I offer this post not to argue that politics could or should somehow be excluded from the work of composition teaching, but rather to illuminate what seems often ignored in much of the work where people are arguing in classrooms about politics—the questions about how emotion is functioning in these writing classrooms using critical pedagogy.

In this dissertation, I argue that emotion merits much more careful consideration in the critical pedagogy classroom featuring contentious political situations; not because it may somehow get in the way of reason, or because it may evoke ethical questions in terms of pathetic appeal in argumentation, or even because it is attached to labor that often goes unrecognized; but because collective emotions have an analytic autonomy that we have not taken into full consideration, and may be shifting actions in ways we cannot fully anticipate.

A closer examination of this post yields a sense of the complexity of the emotion work the teacher and her class are performing, as well as the forces of emotion as it gathers people together and divides them, and as it reformulates or reinforces identities, beliefs, values and ideological views. As the teacher struggles to use the tools of persuasion she has available to help promote understanding, to fight racial oppression and to change minds, what other forces are at work that may be less visible?

We can’t know exactly what motivated the behavior of her racist students, or what resulted, but even with a partial glimpse through the teacher’s perspective, it may be possible to see a great deal of the emotional work that both students and teacher are doing at the moment of this incident. Through Corder’s framing of the situation, for example, we might imagine the racist student being in the midst of a violent internal,
emotional clash, finding himself at the kind of crossroads where the self, the “narrative and the argument,” in Corder’s words, that he has constructed of self, his identity, are in deep trouble. What is driving the “dogmatic and defensive” behavior the teacher describes? As we shall see in subsequent analysis and attention to theories of political emotion, this part of the reaction is actually quite predictable, perhaps even to be expected in such a moment, because factual corrections often do little to change views or values, as Nyhan and Reifler explain in “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions.” Correcting an inaccurate fact often leads, ironically, to reinforcing original beliefs. So the young man goes charging ahead with the “story” he has created for himself—where race is not a construction, but a fact; where there is a way of imagining his privilege as naturalized, or worse, even biologically based. Again, it is not that we would like to see these ideas maintained. But in a situation like this, where the teacher feels the responsibility to make this young man see something he has not seen before, something that potentially changes much of his worldview, it is curious how little attention or focus there is on any of the emotion work of the participants, let alone the force that emotion may have on shaping the very beliefs and values the teacher has set out to change.

Consider, for example, that theorists of political emotion such as Berezin have noted that kinship bonds are the most influential of all collective emotional forces in terms of political identity. Perhaps “Racist #1” is making choices about maintaining his faith and respect for other family members in his life who may have taught him this version of the story that no longer seems to make sense. “Racist #1” is joined by a student whom the teacher has called “Racist #2;” becomes an ally in maintaining this story. Corder might say that what is being challenged at this moment is more than logic
or a single belief; what is being challenged is the identities, the stories of who we are. Berezin’s work, and other similar theories regarding political emotion help reinforce Corder’s version of the upheaval required for change. Our emotions are linked to our identities in profound ways, and it takes more than what one might expect to shift values, especially regarding political belief.

“Racist #2” feels compelled to provide “Racist #1” with a sense that he is at least not alone in his story, that they have some shared, collective feeling that informs ethical and moral views of the world. And the collective force of emotion is something that deserves very careful consideration. Emirbayer and Goldberg, argue, for example that the role of collective emotion in situations of political contention have been hugely misunderstood and underestimated, that collective emotion has a kind of autonomous force that often goes unrecognized. This emotional turmoil does not, of course, excuse racist behavior, and I am in no way implying that the young men are somehow victims. Corder himself argues that we need to teach those who are learning to argue some foundational understanding regarding the risks and mindsets that make a shift in view possible. But I am arguing that the forces of emotion, especially as they relate to the political, are something that needs much more attention. Most people tend to think of emotion as something that “belongs” to a particular individual. After all, our language about emotion operates to reinforce this; we speak about someone “being angry,” for example. It appears to be an internal and private state. But newer understanding of emotion conceive of it more as an “economy,” one in which emotion may coalesce around groups, and in which emotion itself has force to shape and influence collective identity.
Inquiries into the way such moments play out are often centered on those targeted to have their minds changed, but it is not only the “racists” who are being asked to rethink deeply held, albeit “disgusting” (as one student in the class put it) views of the world. Aside from the rather obvious emotion work required of the students directly involved, we might also consider the emotion work required of the other students in the class. Surely even as first year students they have heard or experienced versions of racist rhetoric, but the placement of this racist talk, from a peer, and in the presence of the authority of the teacher, has new significance in terms of collective emotion. How are emotions functioning at this moment to gather, but also potentially to fragment group identities? How is emotion circulating? These questions become even more complex when we try to more fully account for the embodied nature of the situation—how do participant’s gender, or race, or other factors complicate the emotional work? Where and how does one align oneself? How is silence, or the decision to speak up, read?

The teacher feels she “failed utterly,” implying that she has a direct and unquestioned responsibility for changing the racist views of students in her writing class. She says she has received no help from the counselor or the assistant dean at her school. In this moment, whom does she feel aligned with, aside from the listserv community to whom she has written? Her first idea is to respond to the students’ racist comments with reason, providing examples as evidence. She tells her student about “the problems with the so-called studies he cited to support his point,” which, she explains to him, “were biased and didn't take into account all sorts of important factors.” She is surprised that none of this has any impact on the students’ views and response, at least outwardly. But she perhaps should not have been surprised at all,
given findings like those of Nyhan and Reifler, which indicate that correction of facts may actually increase misperceptions and reinforce worldviews. Rationality is certainly important to learning and to argument, but what Emirbayer and Goldberg refer to as the “persistent postulate” that rationality and emotion are somehow separate, and that rationality is the cure for emotion, is highly problematic, especially for teachers so often asking students to engage in contentious political questions that are often deeply linked to various identities.

The scene in this writing classroom is not rare, and, in fact is not restricted to writing classrooms at all. The focus on social justice and critical pedagogy is not confined to composition and rhetoric; it is a longstanding interest in formal education more generally, and growing within many disciplines. But the fact remains that teachers who believe in and employ critical pedagogy, or who teach in departments where the curricular goals make the study of power and difference a central focus, are frequently confronted with such complicated questions about emotions, often without even recognizing that this is an integral part of their work. In order to understand the ways in which many writing classes have come to require this level of skill in working with emotion, it’s useful to think through the trend toward a focus on what is often labeled by the broad term critical pedagogy, both within composition and in the larger academy. I’ll begin at a more global level, examining this shift through trends in higher education more generally, and then focus on trends within composition and rhetoric. I do not intend to enter into the discussion of whether social justice or critical pedagogy is or should be the focus of the composition classroom, (see Phelps’ “A Constrained Vision of the Writing Classroom” for a thoughtful and interesting approach to this question). My interest and approach are pragmatic, beginning instead with what the
path we have taken, and how best to navigate it. The more that can be understood about the sources of the emotion work performed, as well as the forces of emotion being invoked and employed, the better chance there is for making good productive decisions about what is best for our students and our classrooms when politics come to the forefront.

Social justice on the agenda of higher education

Just over a decade ago, the World Conference on Higher Education called for a renewed commitment for higher education to promote social justice. At the conference, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal, South Africa, noted:

It seems to me that universities have done their least impressive work on the very subjects where society’s needs for greater knowledge and better education are most acute - poverty, violence, war, unemployment etc. And if universities, wherever they may be, with whatever their resources (human and physical) do not seek solutions to the pressing human conditions of the society in which we are embedded then this could only be regarded as an ethical failure or an intellectual failure, or both. (Gourley 20)

This call for a more intense and directed effort in solving global problems is not only a call to action, but also a recrimination for the lack of effort up to this point. And this call can be read, in part, as a demand that more scholarly work of the professoriate be directed toward solutions to crises in the world. There is a simultaneous commitment in many universities to teaching the undergraduate population in a way that ensures they will develop a sense of the urgency regarding a response to oppression and global injustices. In 2008, the American Association of Colleges and
Universities “Core Commitments” Initiative surveyed students and teachers across a wide variety of colleges and universities to learn whether they felt the development of “personal and social responsibility” should be better emphasized and taught to undergraduates on campuses. There are certainly many members of the university community who feel the broad ideas of “social justice,” or of “personal and social responsibility,” are, at the very least, in need of further definition, and that the move to take on the task of solving global crises should be made cautiously. Still, according to AACU findings, more than 50% of students and faculty agreed that there should be an increase in such teaching. Of the five “core commitments” named, three stand out as especially important to the questions surrounding social justice: “contributing to a larger community; taking seriously the perspectives of others; and developing competence in ethical and moral reasoning” (Dey and Assoc. 2).

But the call for emphasis on social justice is often more than a requirement for renewed attention to ethical and moral reasoning, or acceptance of the perspectives of others. Ron Barnett of the University of London has called for not just critical thinking as a major goal for higher education, but critical being -- taking an active role in the world and influencing change. Though not every institution makes these goals explicit, it appears that in many cases higher education is being called upon to produce students who become involved not just in their studies independent from the world, but with and through the world. This call is for students to recognize their own role in the circulation of power, and personal responsibility and implication in the types of issues that Professor Gourley spoke of more than a decade ago.

The plans for implementing this kind of work often span the entire university, including programs for community building and equal access for diverse populations
to the college or university, the development of relationships with the towns and cities where these institutions are situated through service learning, scholarly projects and research toward solutions to social inequities, and undergraduate curricula designed to foster critical thinking about political issues that might lead to a sense of responsibility for “social justice.”

Consider, for example, “Educating for Social Justice,” the Massachusetts Campus Compact’s Resource Guide produced at Tufts University. The guide is designed to help teachers, students and staff in the affiliated institutions of higher education to fight oppression and social injustice through classroom work. In the opening explanation of purpose, they write: “In order to further the role of civic engagement in higher education, it is imperative that we honestly consider the ways in which our society discriminates against different kinds of people: racism, sexism, classism, ageism, and homophobia” (Cooper).

Students are required to grapple with these issues, as well as related crises that are occurring globally, and they are asked to see these issues not just as a concern, but also in relation to their own place in the world. It is not difficult to imagine how this type of critical examination of one’s beliefs and morals might lead a student to the kind of moment that Corder describes, a violent and painful realization that one’s “narrative” has been lacking all along, even that one’s identity is in flux. This conception of social justice teaching or critical pedagogy is presented not just “about” the struggle of some distant other(s), but also as a call to political action.

These types of curricula are designed to promote changes in the structures of power in the world, especially in relation to social class. The project of critical pedagogy has great breadth and variation, but nearly all those interested in it agree that Paolo
Freire is central to the movement. In “Critical Pedagogy and Class Struggle in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization,” McLaren, who might be thought of as representing one end of the spectrum, laments the practices he thinks of as missing the point of critical pedagogy: “The conceptual net known as critical pedagogy has been cast so wide and at times so cavalierly that it has come to be associated with anything dragged up out of the troubled and infested swampland of educational practice, from, for instance, classroom furniture organized in a "dialogue friendly" circle to "feel-good" curricula designed to increase students' self-image.”

McLaren argues that Marxist philosophy must be at the heart of any true critical pedagogy, and that cross-fertilized versions of the pedagogy that emphasize “a performance of ethics, or as a post-truth pragmatics, or as an open-ended, non-determinate process that resists totalizing tropological systems” are problematic, because they ignore the central problem, in his view, which is the influence of capitalism, and they forego what he sees as the essential philosophical center, Marxism. In McLaren’s conception, “It is an encounter with the process of knowledge production from within the dynamics of a concrete historical movement that transcends individuality, dogmatism, and certainty. Only within the framework of a challenge to the prevailing social order en toto is it possible to transform the conditions that make and remake human history,” McLaren claims. For him and other self-proclaimed radical teachers of critical pedagogy, the underlying premise is that the work of critical pedagogy is a project that transforms the prevailing social order, and more specifically, capitalism, using education.

This is an important point to take into consideration, because McLaren’s sense of what “counts” as critical pedagogy dismisses many other practices, practices that may
also have interesting possibilities for furthering social justice and democratic principles, even if they are not defined as McLaren has defined them. It is also important because often those who take issue with these practices (students and the public alike) view this “radical” Marxist version of critical pedagogy as representative to all critical pedagogical practices focusing on power and difference.

Yet the term critical pedagogy in composition can also be linked to the same basic political project outlined as “social justice” in some of the earlier descriptions in higher education. In some composition classrooms, a shift toward critical pedagogical practices might be much more subtle. For example, teachers might encourage students to recognize the larger discursive and social understandings essential to persuasion, or open up questions about the ethics and consequences of the writing produced, and to whom. But often it is the more radicalized version of the project that receives press coverage. Students entering these classrooms may have strong objections to this critical pedagogy based on what they have already heard and seen about such work, especially if it is laced with the overtones of blame, a predetermined ideological approach and responsibility. Consider, for example, Giroux’s recent statement regarding the responsibilities of students in North America for our democratic society’s future:

Thus, the most important question to be raised about American and Canadian students is not why they do not engage in massive protests, but when will they begin to look beyond the norms, vocabularies, and rewards of a market-driven society they have inherited? When will they begin to learn from their youthful counterparts protesting all over the globe that the first step in building a democratic society is to imagine a future different than the one that now stunts their dreams as much as their social reality? Only then can they be successful in
furthering the hard and crucial task of struggling collectively to make a future based on the promise of democratic freedom happen.

Giroux’s message concerning the effects of late stage capitalism has an element of hopefulness, in that he invokes a future of “democratic freedom,” but it is also an indictment of current behaviors and attitudes, implying a carelessness and blindness on the part of these young people in to the harmful “norms” they live by, and the need for “hard and crucial” task of change. It is expressed as an imperative, and necessarily involves political clash and activism. Giroux invokes a version of “democratic freedom” as a binary with the way that young people are now living; and implies that this battle is the responsibility of the youth of North America.

Most would agree that the basic concept of social justice is a positive goal (how could it not be? after all, who is in favor of social injustice?), and that critical approaches to reading, thinking and writing are important to developing writers. But the version of the project offered through scholars such as Giroux has hardly been agreed upon. Some welcomed the more ideological approach to writing instruction, while others saw it as a serious concern. Consider Maxine Hairston’s response to the impression of a movement toward social reform as the centerpiece of first-year composition teaching from her 1992 essay “Diversity, Ideology and Teaching Writing:”

I see a new model emerging for freshman writing programs…It’s a model that puts dogma before diversity, politics before craft, ideology before critical thinking, and the social goals of the teacher before the educational goals of the student…. The new model envisions required writing courses as vehicles for social reform rather than student-centered workshops to build students’ confidence and competence as writers. (660)
Hairston’s complaint comes in the midst of significant influence from the growing field of cultural studies twenty years ago, and allows a view into the shifts that many departments were/are experiencing as the “turn toward the social” gains momentum. It’s interesting that she includes “critical thinking” as an element pushed out by the “new model” of the “freshman” writing program. She differentiates the “critical” approach that Giroux and McLaren call for from another kind of “critical”—a student’s ability to make choices for her or himself. Hairston places the blame for much of this ideological focus on the influence of English departments, (with a nod toward the political and economic influences of the day). But one can just as easily point to examples of this approach attracting scholars to composition.

In Changing the Subject in English Class, Alcorn offers an account of his interest in composition teaching as deriving from an adoption of a critical theory/cultural studies influenced approach to teaching:

Berlin’s widely read theoretical essay ‘Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories’ pushed many of us to see writing from a broader and more responsible perspective than we had entertained earlier. I was just beginning my career at the time of its publication, and the essay was instrumental in persuading me to accept a position primarily in composition rather than in theory. Berlin’s later essay, “Rhetoric and Ideology in Writing Class,’ pushed many of us further to see writing as part of an ideological cultural practice. (3, emphasis added)

I am especially interested in the Alcorn’s use of the phrase “more responsible” here to describe the perspective that Berlin offered. In many ways, Berlin, Giroux and others opened up not just possibilities for writing teachers to follow a path of inquiry
regarding theories of ideology and power, but a sense that this inquiry was an imperative, and maybe even the only ethical choice. Rather than a theory about the teaching of writing, the framing of the situation that Alcorn offers signals a shift in what many teachers and students ought be reading, thinking and talking about in the writing classroom. Teachers who do/did not move to a course design featuring questions regarding power and difference, social justice and the critical, would be, in effect, irresponsible, given this new paradigm. All of this has implications for emotion work, as well.

But how did we get here? The answer to that question is not simple, but a few threads from the history and conception of composition may shed some light on this.

**Political questions in the writing classroom**

In “Rhetoric and Composition as a Coherent Discipline,” Jan Swearingen provides an analogy to illustrate one conception of the complexity of the “family” ties that bind us in the field of composition and rhetoric:

Deconstructionist daddies and their feminist children were among the first to theorize and colonize rhetorical studies and graduate programs of the late 1970’s. Asserting equal footing, and some shared ancestry with literary scholars and their favorite theorists, rhetoric and composition scholars turned to several tasks. Invoking Derrida, Foucault, and deMan, rhetorical scholars observed linguistic and rhetorical elements in much critical theory, and they adapted critical theory to the study of linguistic and rhetorical legacies. Ancestry and self-definition were among the first projects. Deconstructing “straight” historical studies in rhetoric, and hierarchal models of writing pedagogy, postmodern theories were
adapted by rhetoric and composition scholars and graduate program designers
to define several new sites for scholarship and pedagogy. (17)

Swearingen argues that composition was (is) working out the challenges which
postmodern rhetorical theory introduced. Her description and analogy help point out
the complex intertwining of composition, rhetoric, critical theory and literature. North,
Phelps, Berlin, Bloom, Connors and other noted scholars have created maps and
histories of the field, but in the end, no one history can ever really be complete. The
history of composition is complicated and falls under no simple pattern, but for the sake
of creating some order by which we might examine the development of what has come
to be known as critical pedagogy in composition, I’ll begin with a sort of composite that
has taken hold in the mind of many in the field.

One version of the story begins with a group of practices, theories and materials
swept together and short-handed “current-traditional rhetoric.” In this historical
framing, current-traditional “before” lays the groundwork for social-epistemic
rhetoric’s “after,” because, in effect, it is seen as arriving at a deeper (more
“responsible”) understanding of the construction of knowledge. CTR, in this version of
the story, is associated with formalism, with Hugh Blair’s influence in writing
instruction, and with the notion that science had the path to Truth. In Berlin’s account of
the history, which has wide traction for many in the field of composition, current-
traditional rhetoric is challenged by expressivism and social rhetoric, and leads finally
toward the notion of rhetoric as epistemic, that knowledge as a human endeavor and is
constructed within the exchange of language itself. Credit for this idea is often
attributed to Scott for his 1967 essay on the concept, but Berlin and others forwarded
the these theories and applied them to composition history more specifically. This
version of the story sets up composition and rhetoric in a progress narrative—one that allows those involved in the shift to see their work as having gained the strength of new understanding. It is related, I would argue, to Alcorn’s sense that he could now see writing “from a broader and more responsible perspective than [we had] entertained earlier…” and “in persuading [him] to accept a position primarily in composition rather than in theory” (3).

But this progress narrative leaves out a great deal of the history. There are interesting parallels, for example, between the conception of rhetoric as epistemic and much, much older arguments about the relationship between language and the construction of reality—namely the Greek sophists and Plato. In the more recent past, the 18th century traditions of civic writing and moral philosophies that might be seen as deeply connected to social justice are made much less visible in this version of history, as well.

A revival of interest in the debates over the sophists from scholars such as Neel, Jarrat and Crowley explore the possibilities for what sophists of 5th century BCE might offer in the present world of rhetoric. These scholars did not set out to try to trace the full history of the Sophists. As Greenbaum and others have pointed out, this eclectic group of paid teachers and craftsman are actually not very easily traced or defined in historically. Neosophists draw mainly from their understanding of work of Gorgias and Protagoras, examining the way that relativism might be productively reincorporated into thinking about constructions of knowledge. For example, Crowley’s “A Plea for Sophistry” outlines a history of the place rhetoric held up until the 18th century, highlighting the importance of the work of rhetoric in “improving the life of man” and “providing guidance, especially in moral and ethical questions” (118). She goes on to
describe a search for wisdom as the proper approach for teachers of writing to take, rather than a search for (K)knowledge in our scientific and fragmented world.

This theory, that rhetoric might provide the key to educating students in composition toward wisdom, and in particular a wisdom that could “improve the life of man” might also be understood as part of the project of critical pedagogy, albeit from a different vantage point than McLaren expresses. And it might be thought of as related to another strand that the progress narrative outlined above (from current-traditional to epistemic rhetoric) seems to gloss. Many rhetoricians of the 18th century offered ideas about how “perspective-taking” allows for a more pro-social, more civil interaction and treatment of one’s fellow man, and perhaps even, more social justice. These rhetoricians are often credited with paving the way toward the discipline of composition. Hume’s work spoke to the way that imagining oneself in another’s place might evoke feeling, and Adam Smith’s thinking on this goes even further. “The concepts of sympathy and spectatorship, central to the doctrine of Theory of Moral Sentiments, had already been put to work by Hutcheson and Hume, but Smith’s account is distinct. As spectator of an agent’s suffering we form in our imagination a copy of such ‘impression of our own senses’ as we have experienced when we have been in a situation of the kind the agent is in” (Broadie). We can imagine ways in which this ability to see from another’s point of view links to questions of power and difference in modern composition.

Agnew offers a useful approach to the question, revisiting the eighteenth century doctrines of “taste” and “propriety” from a more dynamic vantage point than previously considered. She argues that in order to find ways to help “students develop more expansive notions of civic participation and responsibility” it might be possible for look again at Blair’s ideas about the important connections between language,
reason and a just society. Rather than imagining taste and propriety simply as terms that recollect the reproduction of social class, they might be considered the tools students in composition classrooms could learn to use with skill, in order to produce citizens prepared for the complex political questions and circumstances in the classroom and beyond.

Greenbaum’s “Dissoi Logoi: Neosophistic Rhetoric and the Possibility of Critical Pedagogy” in which she describes “social activism to remedy the ‘actual’ in the hopes of achieving the ‘possible’—a more equitable democracy” (14). This too might be labeled a theory applicable to critical pedagogy, but Greenbaum links herself quite firmly with the Marxist imperative that Giroux and McLaren call for-- a challenge to the foundational capitalist structure as the centerpiece of “true” critical pedagogy.

I would argue that this more radical version of critical pedagogy is not the only one that a practitioner interested in the work of critical pedagogy might choose from, yet parts of this have found their way into other kinds of critical pedagogy teaching, perhaps partly because their is the perception of a stigma attached to not taking a radical Marxist approach. In many ways, Giroux, McLaren and others are trying to make a case that other versions of the project are simply watered down or naïve, or examples of teachers’ deep misunderstanding of the history, culture and sociology. Many of these same self-proclaimed proponents of radical critical pedagogy name Dewey as foundational to their project. Though Dewey was a philosopher and educator deeply interested in social change, he was not a proponent of Marxist philosophy. In fact, much of his writing on progressive education echoes the practices more linked to the less “radical” practices of critical pedagogy described by Giroux McLaren and others—learner driven curricula, collaboration, and active learning, for example.
Returning to our story of composition, we might then make room for some other versions that allow further possibilities regarding what should count as critical pedagogy. North sees “the birth of modern Composition, capital c” (15) traced to 1963, with Kitzhaber’s challenge to those already administering and overseeing first year writing to step up to a leadership role in the English reforms of the time. Or perhaps we can also trace composition (small c) back to important previous moments such as the Morill Act and subsequent need for workers with composing skills, as well as the written entrance exams at Harvard that led to the “English A” programs there.

Expressivism, often associated with Peter Elbow and the “authentic voice,” does not need to be read as a period of naïveté regarding social aspects of writing, for example, but rather a moment where quite explicit attention was being paid to the developing writer. A period overlapping with this one is sometimes labeled social constructivist. Teachers and theorists such as Bartholomae and Harris asked about how we compose in communities, and, some might argue, provide an opening for what has been labeled “the social turn” in composition. It is at this juncture that Delpit and others begin to ask questions about power dynamics in the classroom, and that many teachers in the field seem to “discover” Paolo Freire’s “The Banking Concept” and the possibilities for critical pedagogy in their own classrooms, where interest had grown in what it meant to be teaching in a community. Freire’s work was used in many different ways, but one of them is in helping students see more about how their education shaped their beliefs and views, as well as the possibilities for change that might exist. This version of critical pedagogy might be understood as an exploration of the politics of difference, and of the classroom as community, rather than a call to take up the challenge of defeating neoliberalist agendas.
None of these threads of history are complete, (or completely fair) to those who have worked on them. They are highlighted not as a way to understand composition in some stable or coherent way, but rather to demonstrate a few of the tendrils that have informed the project of “critical pedagogy” and perhaps illustrate, at least in some small way, why these practices might be so diverse, and why we should allow for this diversity. But before turning to theories that might help us better understand more about emotion work and the forces of collective emotion, I need to point to a few more places in composition that require attention in terms of the questions that will be explored later regarding how emotion operates in critical pedagogy. As we shall see, emotion is deeply linked with identity, so it is worth looking, at least briefly, at the ways that composition as a field sees itself. As I implied in the opening of this section, composition is certainly not a field with one unified identity, but there are particular elements and concerns that recur. The importance of naming some of these recurring collective notions about what it means to be part of composition becomes especially important as we begin to examine the teacher of writing in a politically contentious classroom.

**Working-class academics, gatekeepers and sad women in the basement**

As we have seen, there is a broad spectrum of practices and inquiries that fall under the heading of critical pedagogy, but in many of these classrooms, teachers and students need special skill at emotion work, and can benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the forces behind collective emotion as they interrogate issues of political contention. But there is another important element to consider in the study of emotion and political contention in writing classrooms—the collective identity of practitioners and scholars in the field of composition.
The first is the perception of composition teachers as having the conflicting functions as both gatekeeper and advocate to those not initially invited into the academy. This becomes important as questions of social justice are explored and made more explicit in classrooms, because part of the historical identity for many practitioners in composition arises out of this conflict of both wanting to empower writers (especially those who are not given access to academic literacy) and also being implicated in maintaining what came to be seen as an unjust system. The second strand of collective emotion comes out of a version of the history of composition that identifies its roots as working class and the work itself as feminized and undervalued. These strands become important when one examines collective emotion, because shared and conflicted identities are at the center of the power of collective emotion.

Mina Shaughnessy’s landmark book of the late 70’s, *Errors and Expectations*, made the “basic writer” suddenly more visible. Changes in admissions policies in that time period required the immediate attention of writing teachers, and Shaughnessy helped teachers recognize the “logic” in patterns in student writing once labeled simply as “error.” And in so doing, she also unlocked some of the sense of their academic potential. Shaughnessy’s work is well-known, but in terms of better understanding how composition teachers begin to take on social injustice and critical stances in their pedagogy, one might think about her book as constructing an insider’s view of “the basic writer,” a view that many writing teachers who work(ed) with “underprepared students” at the time shared.

Shaughnessy’s book made visible not only what patterns could be understood in the writing produced by this population, but also what was happening to these students as they were trying to compose. For many, myself included, her words created
a sense that I was not alone in sensing a great injustice and frustration in what was happening to these young people as they worked to gain a foothold in the educational system. “For the BW student, academic writing is a trap, not a way of saying something to someone…. writing is but a line that moves haltingly across the page, exposing as it goes all that the writer doesn’t know, then passing into the hands of a stranger who reads it with lawyer’s eyes, searching for flaws…. Some writers, inhibited by their fear of error, produce but a few lines an hour or keep trying to begin, crossing out one try after another until the sentence is hopelessly tangled” (7). For anyone who has ever worked closely with writers who are bright, interesting and perfectly fluent in the version of communication that has mattered up to this point, but are unprepared to tackle the version of literacy prescribed by the outside forces that get to decide what counts as literate, this is a familiar description. The metaphoric “lawyer’s eyes” belong to standardized versions of literacy, but also to you, as the teacher, because as teacher you have taken on a particular role in the reproduction of power and authority through teaching standardized language of the academy.

Shaughnessy’s groundbreaking book helped teachers begin to identify patterns of “error” and to suggest what might be done to help. But Shaughnessy did more than suggest a way of looking more closely at these patterns. In her assessment of the basic writer’s situation, she launched, along with many of her colleagues at the time, a study of ourselves and our role in this process. We hear directly from the writers she is studying, and in the end, can’t help but agree with Shaughnessy that when it comes to basic writers, that “colleges must be prepared to make more than a graceless and begrudging accommodation to this unpreparedness, opening their doors with one hand and leading students into an endless corridor of remedial anterooms with the other”
There is a way in which she has represented two simultaneous and linked interests for the writing teacher, and for composition as a field—looking inside the student and empathizing, and looking outward at the structures that have created the barriers for the student. Later, we see some further signs that we might be imagining the teaching of writing as a kind of protector and nurturer of writers.

Putz utilized a version of Berne’s psychological theory of transactional analysis to help “free” students’ from the many rules she claimed stopped their ability to produce text. Putz reasoned that just as children must have space to practice new skills like walking or talking in a playful positive environment, so too must a student learning to write be allowed the freedom to experiment without criticism. “So in writing, if a student is protected from his own and other’s criticism for a while in a climate of acceptance I believe he will claim his writing potency” (572). This idea, that there was an authentic writer waiting to be brought out given the right circumstances, is echoed in other composition research and theory of the time—Peter Elbow, Don Murray, Ken Macrorie. Critical observations about this early work have since developed, of course, but it marks a time in the development of writing instruction practices that focused on the development of writer, and on the teacher’s relationship to that writer. If we imagine this conflicted positioning, of wanting to nurture and protect developing writers from the criticism that they are not producing standardized academic literacy, while also feeling complicit maintaining these standards, it may begin to identify the collective emotion of the practitioners in the field.

In Irving Peckham’s “Complicity in Class Codes: The Exclusionary function of Education” he explains “In writing classes, we are particularly implicated in this class-based screening agenda for we are experts at evaluating students via their texts. We
have been trained to valorize texts flashing with class codes of the professional managerial classes and to marginalize the texts betraying our students’ working class origins” (273).

But there is another layer here, and it has to do with how these practitioners identify themselves in terms of social class. In the his essay from collection in *This Fine Place so Far from Home*, Peckham names himself as “a working-class academic” and expresses his belief that “although the educational institution claims to be promoting universal literacy and egalitarianism, it has embraced a system that institutionalizes difference, and through difference, failure, with the failed ones coming primarily from the working class (the ones who have different habits of language and cognition)” (275). It also helps one see where there may be some clash in terms of one’s sense of identity. *Coming to Class*, another anthology of essays by composition scholars who see themselves as outside the academic world in terms of social class, speaks quite directly to both “working class roots” of many academics and also to the desire to become an ally of one’s working class students (MacKenzie). Mike Rose’s *Lives on the Boundary*, so often anthologized in composition readers, is another example of the concerns over class division, one’s socio-economic roots, and teaching composition made visible. Rose’s auto-ethnographic analysis inspires critical examination of the politics of language, class and race; and situates these questions in the writing classroom. In so many of these publications, we can see a story that invites collective anger and indignation about injustices done to our students and ourselves, but also inspires conflicting collective guilt in our implication in this division. Faigley goes as far as to note, “If we look at the history of writing instruction in America, we find that writing
teachers have been as much or more interested in who they want their students to be as in what they want their students to write” (396).

And, perhaps we might add another concern that some have argued has trumped questions about writing itself—the concern about “who” composition studies wants to be? In Rhodes’ description of the “drive to legitimize ourselves in the academe” we can see how composition has struggled to find an identity, and that while part of this struggle for legitimacy is related to social class, there is also a way in which composition’s association with the feminine has been at issue in this struggle. In Susan Miller’s chapter “The Sad Women in the Basement,” from *Textual Carnivals*, she argues that the feminized nature of composition has been partially responsible for the slow move toward being taken seriously in the academe. Schell has noted that the kind of nurturing approach to writing instruction in some models of classroom practice could be problematic in terms of reinforcing a structure already in place that denigrates the work of composition as female/nurturing work. The relationship between the feminine and composition studies becomes especially important as we contemplate the importance of emotion work to classrooms where contentious political arguments occur. Emotion has long been negatively associated with women, and the move to explicitly address its intersection in composition studies is potentially problematic for a field that has just come to enjoy some respect as a discipline.

Yet without this exploration, emotion work and its cost continue to go uncounted. And perhaps more importantly, the powerful forces of collective emotion stirred and circulated in the political composition class remain largely undertheorized. It is important to take account of some of the foundational understandings of shared identity in the field in order to recognize how these collective emotions of guilt, of
righteousness, or of shame, might relate to what happens in the often politically contentious atmosphere of the classroom. These emotions, collectively, have a force, and it is not always the kind of force we hope for or imagine.

Calls like the one Giroux makes for students to “engage in massive protests” or the MCCRG Program at Tufts are evidence that in many cases, it is activism that is sought from these students, and education necessarily means political education. Why then, with so many smart, dedicated composition teachers working on the project of critical pedagogy in such diverse ways, are there a growing number of groups that collectively identify themselves as counter to this philosophy? Across the country, student groups such as Students for Academic Freedom, founded and supported by controversial writer David Horowitz, promote the idea that the social justice agenda at the university does not allow room for other views. They cite the AAUP’s “Declaration of Principles” as a doctrine entitling not just professors’ freedoms as educators, but students’ freedom from what they view as indoctrination. Horowitz’ views may be less than reputable among many scholars, but recent cases such as the one at the University of North Carolina are proof that at east some of the views of these groups are taken quite seriously. In this case, a student made comments regarding his “disgust” for homosexuality in class. The teacher called his student’s comments “hate speech” in a later email to entire the class about the incident. The U.S. Education Department’s Office of Civil Rights ruled that the professor had violated the student’s civil rights.

The appearance of groups that announce strong opposition to call for activist support of a particular view of the world should not be a surprise, according to much of the research done on political emotion study, and this is much of the reason it becomes particularly important at this moment to look more carefully at both the emotion work
being performed by those involved, and also the forces of collective emotion in the political situations being investigated and entered into.

In chapter two I use a historical context to workably define the concept of emotion, and also examine more recent research on emotion at the macro level that might lead toward a productive examination of the forces of emotion in politically contentious discourse.
Chapter 2 Defining Political Emotion

This chapter briefly traces some of the philosophical history of the study of emotion, especially as it relates to reason, ethics and morality, in order to provide some insight into how emotion might best be defined and located in the work of critical pedagogy. Research in intergroup emotion theory and macro-structural emotion theory are then examined in an effort to define emotion in relation to collective identity.

(Re)conceptualizing emotion

Robert Solomon’s “Philosophy of Emotions” opens by making note of a basic problem nearly all scholars interested in the study of emotion face: defining the term. Although Solomon agrees that it would be best to define one’s terms before study commences, he argues that because emotion has grown out of a tradition in which it is “slave” to the “master” reason, in philosophy, and because it has been approached from so many differing disciplinary angles through history, “the truth is that a definition emerges only at the end of a long discussion, and even then it is always tentative and appropriate only within a limited context and certain models of culture …” (4). Rather than attempting to offer an abstract definition of emotion at the outset, I hope to develop a definition (even if, as Solomon suggests, it will be necessarily tentative and limited), through examination of emotion in several different contexts. I begin by examining the persistence of the conception many theorists share, that emotion has been historically placed in a binary position with reason, or as something that impedes clear reason. Next, I examine Dixon’s suggestion, that this persistent historical account
is flawed, creating the category “emotion” as an over-inclusive term for a more complex relationship among the various aspects of human will and affection. In addition, I offer further implications regarding the nature of emotion explored through Raymond Williams’ thinking about “structures of feeling.”

According to Solomon, many scholars persist, consciously or unconsciously, in privileging reason, thereby positioning emotion as something that impedes reason. Solomon argues emotion back into the mix with his analysis of the shift in thinking about emotion from Plato to Aristotle. “The emotions, as such, accordingly, do not form one of the three aspects of Plato’s tripartite soul as defined in The Republic. There are reason, spirit and appetite; not only does what we call emotion seem divided between spirit and appetite, but considering Plato’s discussion of eros as the love of Good… there are emotions involved in reason as well”(4). Solomon is making note of the confusing way that emotion is referenced for those trying to make sense out of it in Plato’s work. While reason is the most important element for Plato, emotion is perhaps implied in the aspects of spirit and appetite, and also in the use of “eros.” As scholars from anthropology, sociology and psychology reassess former treatments of emotion from philosophical traditions, many identify a recurrent misconception of emotion as static and categorically different from reason.

The consideration of a (dis)connect between emotion and reason is mapped in Fortenbaugh’s Aristotle and Emotion. He analyzes the ways that reconsideration of Aristotle’s definition of emotion might help shift previously held conceptions of emotion. As long as emotion remained locked in the soul, without any embodiment, Fortenbaugh argues, it was nearly impossible to study. In his discussion of the complex definition that Aristotle took up with regard to particular emotions, such as anger, and
their causal contexts, Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle cleared the way for perhaps the most interesting contribution to thinking about emotion in relation to reason: “By construing thought or belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle showed that emotional response is intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion” (17); this a very different formulation from earlier Platonic views of emotion. Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle’s thinking shifted the original conception of the tripartite to a bipartite, (a dual systems of logic and illogic); yet the reasoning, logical side of man was not closed to emotion. Ellen Quandel makes similar claims regarding this way of understanding Aristotle as “an indispensable predecessor for acknowledging and working with, rather than against emotion in rhetorical education” (111). As Quandel points out, many contemporary thinkers such as Walker, Nussbaum and Cooper, agree that Aristotle’s work exemplified the understanding of emotion as not separate from rationality and reason, but rather important to it. Thus when arguments are made, perhaps especially political arguments, it is not simply a matter of finding the logical answer without context or emotion. Emotions, conceived of in this way, are integral to the ways we make decisions, are persuaded, and persuade others.

Thomas Dixon approaches the concept of emotion from a different angle, in part to show the importance of the shift from religious conceptions of emotion to moral sentiments. He argues that the persistent myth many of his colleagues (including Solomon) speak of is not in the disconnection between reason and emotion, but rather in the tendency to see emotion as a “coherent category” (29). Dixon argues that it would be more useful to look back at the moment when passions, affection and sentiments were swept together into the single category, “emotion,” as psychology became more secular:
It is particularly important, then, to realise that—contrary to popular opinion—classical Christian views about reason and the passions were equivalent neither to the view that reason and ‘the emotions’ are inevitably at war, nor the idea that ‘emotions overpower us against our will. Appetites, passions and affections, on the classical Christian view, were all movements of different parts of the will, and the affections, at least, were potentially informed by reason. (31)

Dixon’s historical account posits that classical Christian principles shifted to become moral principles in the Victorian period (see Dixon’s “The Invention of Altruism” for a more thorough treatment). Dixon explains that earlier Christian conceptions were of the lower animal soul “passions and appetites” (the appetites here referring to such things as hunger, thirst, and sexual appetite) and the higher order “affections” (love, sympathy, joy); but all were operating under the will of man. Dixon contends that there is a need for a much more complex understanding of what we mean when we say “emotion,” and the way that this concept has been the historically conceived. It isn’t as simple as reviving the concept in contrast to reason.

Dixon’s argument, that the category of emotion is “over-inclusive,” is important to recognize, because it allows for a more complex look at the forces at work, especially in matters of morality, ethics and beliefs, which I would argue are closely linked to the project of critical pedagogy, where a student is likely to be asked to form a moral or political position. Emotion, as I am here defining it, is socially constructed, but this does not preclude bodily experiences such as the heat of shame, or a raised heart rate in anger or fear. A critical-pedagogical experience like service learning, for example, may involve very direct, “present-tense” or lower-order response like, hunger, thirst, or fear— but still also involve the will; and, as we saw in the discussion in chapter one regarding
Hume, sympathy and empathy can move someone toward similar responses to first-hand experiences. Dixon moves us closer to seeing that it is problematic to collapse all of this under the umbrella term emotion, which then is investigated through cognitive science as a coherent category “inside” the body and outside of human will. He also helps us see the subtle shift from religious conceptions of “affections” as being closer to God, to secular conceptions, of being pro-social.

Some researchers have chosen to name the interaction between bodily responses and the will “affect,” instead of emotion. Lawrence Grossberg, for example, described emotion as “ideological attempt to make sense out of some affective productions” (316). But I would argue that choosing the competing category “affect” is potentially just as misleading, because neuroscience uses affect to describe physical changes (heat, heart rate) arises from particular situations.

Ray Williams’ perspective on this system of processes helps collapse some of the inside/outside binary concept of emotion by noting that it is that it is always in a formative phase. He unravels an idea he refers to as “structures of feeling” (128) that speaks to the intersections Dixon has touched upon. Williams argues that the social and cultural tend to be understood only in formed, fixed categorized states, rather than taking into account the way feeling, always in present tense, moves one toward “practical consciousness” in our social system:

We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity. (132)
The elements of lived reaction are not in contrast to rationality; instead, thought and feeling combine, though perhaps recognized only in a pre-thought/pre-language moment. In this way the idea of the unconscious is less a silent and fixed thing, as many early descriptors would have it, rather it is feeling and thinking “in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange” (131). This is an important difference, for it helps us to understand how what appears to be organic and physical is part of a larger process, a process that is “alive, active, subjective” (128). Emotion is located in the present, in relationships, sometimes barely available to semantic formation, but still part of and in relation to our larger social and physical world. Like Corder’s description of that moment when our narrative comes bumping up violently against someone else’s, Williams helps explain the elements of lived reaction as not in contrast to rationality, but within and through it. I suppose I could have named the object of study here “structures of feeling” or “practical consciousness” in order to be more precise regarding the object of study I have in mind, but I leave it at “emotion,” hoping it can still provide a sense of the complex grappling of will and feeling and rationality and relationship to others that are sometimes left out.

Fortenbaugh’s argument, that once emotion was “unlocked” from the soul it was possible to better examine and assess it, has value, because there must be a starting point for examining the phenomenon, but it also runs the risk of simplifying emotion into an objectified and unitary thing which belongs to/within a body; a stationary and fixed entity. Once it is conceived of as categorically different from rationality, we ask what I would argue are the wrong questions about the process. Dixon and Williams provide a way to imagine how emotions are perhaps better conceived as an ongoing exchange between our senses and larger questions about our place in the social and
physical world. Emotion is always about our values, beliefs and ethics; a process always under new construction as we take account of both our perceived physical and psychological needs and the larger social rules we sense around us.

**Emotion through a macro-Lens: intergroup emotion the “affective economy”**

Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta argue that until the 1960s, emotion was central to the interest in political action, but only through a “pathologizing” perspective (66). The dominant notions before 1960 were that people involved in large-scale actions were unwittingly caught up in emotion that was dangerous and contagious (LeBon, Blumer), and that those prone to this type of activity were typically seen as irrational, empty, and anxious to lose themselves in a larger identity. For example, Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta explain that Hoffer offered a “list of ‘undesirables’” likely to engage in political action. His list described them as “the poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent youth, the ambitious, those in the grip of some vice or obsession, the impotent (in body or mind), the inordinately selfish, the bored, the sinners” (qtd. in Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta). This is quite a collection to place together, but aside from this, and more worth note, is Hoffer’s reference to them as “in the grip of some vice or obsession,” because it resonates in interesting ways with the questions just examined in the history of emotion. Dixon’s more careful look at the history of emotion allows us to see that even in this much later work, there are the echoes of the slippage between religious and moral philosophy, as well as a simplistic flattening of “emotion” as a term, and the use of scientific methodology to study it. The results are claims such as this one, in which various weak-minded sinners and outliers are whisked away by emotion toward political movements outside of their own will. Hoffer invokes the old reference to the lower order appetites, neglecting any parlance with reason or will in the process. Dixon
explains that as thinking moved away from classical Christian psychology and toward a more mechanistic view in the 18th century, “Passions and affections were conceived increasingly as mini-agents in their own right, or as a faculty of their own, rather than as acts or movements of the individual will” (31), which seems to be the case in Hoffer’s work. Hoffer has essentially removed the idea that the will is involved in the choices of those involved in social movements of the time, and then gestured back vaguely to the notion of this as a lack of godliness.

More recent theories of inter-group emotions, however, offer instead the idea that “important group memberships become a person’s identity...along with the person’s individuating attributes” (Smith and Mackie 428). The “group” can be relatively small, such as people who interact on a regular basis, or a larger social category (race, religion, gender, nationality). These theories are not based on the idea that people have a “group think” mentality, in the way Hoffer portrayed his subjects, but rather as a more fluid part of identity that becomes more important given certain conditions:

Under circumstances that make a particular group membership or social category salient, people do not think of themselves as unique individuals but rather as relatively interchangeable members of a group...This occurs primarily when an ‘intergroup situation,’ one in which social comparisons, competition, or conflict between groups are salient. (429)

This model, known as Intergroup Relations Theory (IET), was developed in an effort to better understand how intergroup conflict might trigger emotional responses. According to Smith and Mackie, emotions toward outgroups can be negative (disgust,
anger, outrage), but may also include more positive collective emotional response (empathy, desire to offer help).

“Macrostructural” analysis of emotion is an area of emotion studies dedicated to examining the relationship between emotions and larger social structures. One theorist who has taken on this project is Jack Barbalet, who explores relationships among “certain aspects of social culture—especially those having to do with inequality, power and specific emotions, namely resentment, fear, confidence, vengefulness and shame—from a more macro-level” (37). Barbalet contends that emotions are distributed in different ways across various groups in culture, most typically relating to a person’s socioeconomic status. For example, confidence, according to Barbalet, arises out of circumstances where a sector of society “perceive(s) their future is under their control and predictable” (37), while vengefulness may occur among groups that perceive themselves as less powerful and denied access to high-status positions. Barbalet’s speculations point to the idea that emotions are, as most resources, distributed unequally.

In “Affective Economies” Sara Ahmed offers a correlative argument, beginning with the premise that emotions are not ever really “contained” or “belonging” to persons or objects, though this is often the way that emotions are framed through discourse (i.e. I am sad). Ahmed says that emotions may be better understood as circulating in a way that might be thought of as analogous to the Marxian theory of surplus value (money to commodity to money).

Ahmed opens her essay by analyzing the example of a posting on an Aryan Nation website, which suggests, among other things, that “It is not hate that makes the white workingman curse about the latest boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be
Ahmed borrows from psychoanalysis to explain where a kind of repressed transference that allows a statement like this to have emotional currency is derived:

What is repressed from consciousness is not the feeling as such, but the idea to which the feeling may have been first (but provisionally) connected. Psychoanalysis allows us to see that emotionality involves movements or associations whereby “feelings” take us across different levels of signification, not all of which can be admitted in the present. This is what I would call the rippling effect of emotions; they move sideways (through “sticky” associations between signs, figures, and objects) as well as backward (repression always leaves its trace in the present—hence “what sticks” is also bound up with the “absent presence of historicity. (120)

In her analysis of the Aryan message, she points to the feeling invoked by a threat of “aliens” taking away security, and the way that the Aryan group channels this collective desire to protect. She also provides the example of how historical myth about who built the country might shape collective pride in the targeted group. Together, according to Ahmed, they allow transference of hate toward the figure of “the alien” who is poised to take it all away (118).

Like Barbalet, Ahmed argues that emotions are part of an economy; they are the “binding force” (119) that creates the sense of collective—and also determines displacement. Her theorization of the economy of emotion helps one see how emotions could inhere in a group, yet not be contained in any person or object. Ahmed’s argument focuses on the idea of how hate circulates toward a group, for example: “The impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to circulate in an
economic sense, working to differentiate some others from other others” (119). As in her work on “recognizing” a stranger, Ahmed has theorized a way to understand collective emotion as a kind of precognizant differentiation. In the example from the Aryan website described above, the sense of fear, or aggression or love is not attached to a particular body, but instead aligns itself toward a group or categories.

In such affective economies, emotions do things, and they align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of their attachments. Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions, argues Ahmed, we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the collective (117).

Sara Ahmed uses her theory of affective economies to analyze the less than visible work emotion is doing in situations such as the mobilization of anger and fear toward immigrants or members of the Islamic faith, but it also provides a potential way to theorize emotions in circulation in other contexts.

If we return to Giroux’s call for North American youth to stand up against neoliberalism, for example, what might Ahmed’s analysis help us see?

Thus, the most important question to be raised about American and Canadian students is not why they do not engage in massive protests, but when will they begin to look beyond the norms, vocabularies, and rewards of a market-driven society they have inherited? When will they begin to learn from their youthful counterparts protesting all over the globe that the first step in building a democratic society is to imagine a future different than the one that now stunts their dreams as much as their social reality? Only then can they be successful in
furthering the hard and crucial task of struggling collectively to make a future based on the promise of democratic freedom happen. (Giroux)

I recognize the irony of using a Marxist cultural studies theorist (Ahmed) to analyze the collective emotion invoked in a call for Marxist actions, yet this is exactly what I am arguing we need to do. Not in order to critique the use of critical pedagogy, a project embedded in much of the composition work currently underway, but to better understand the circulation and force of emotion in all requests for collective action. In the above call to student action, for example, the “future that stunts their dreams” is caused by a “a market driven society” that they did not ask for, nor help build, but “inherited.” Their dreams have been taken away, according to Giroux, and democratic freedom is in danger of being lost. Further, “they,” (American youth), are the only ones who might find the strength to accomplish this “hard and crucial task.” Students are, in this case, “aligned with other communities” or “social space,” as Ahmed has suggested—namely with the coming loss of freedom, the destruction of dreams, actions attached, in his view, to the market-driven society.

Perhaps, as Ahmed has argued, because of the affective economy, hate or fear is aligned with “the liberal” or “the conservative” rather than with particular bodies. And perhaps, as Barbalet has suggested, this economy is distributed differently along segments of the society, might we inadvertently be causing further divisions through collective shame, resentment, fear or anger?

For example, consider this Google groups post entitled “Fighting the Liberal Faculty Thought police,” in which an anonymous poster offers advice for a new place to write about experiences in the university where students feel they have been “abused”: 
Everyone knows that America’s universities have become centers of political indoctrination, whose faculties regularly stomp on the academic freedom of their students. But few have bothered to do anything about it. Until now.

Noindoctrination.org is a new website that gives students who ‘have experienced sociopolitical bias’ in a college course a forum where they can comment on the professors who abuse them. (Google groups: nyc.general)

This invitation to participate in Noindoctrination.org is ripe with the kinds of emotion work Ahmed is interested in—collective bodies, the circulation of fear, the movement from the non-contained to the larger, yet unknown other. This use of emotion to make the moves Ahmed traces is not the province of the frustrated ‘conservative’ alone, however. In a recent article from The Dartmouth College newspaper, announcing a new “People’s coalition to unite progressive orgs” professor Russell Rickford writes: “We’re in a profoundly dangerous moment politically…. I see the country in a sort of pre-fascist state. College students are the most vulnerable to conservative ideas, but they also have the most potential for challenging the moral bankruptcy of a narrow individualism and amoral careerism” (People’s coalition).

In both cases, Ahmed’s theory of the economy of emotion is a useful way to begin to analyze the work emotion is doing, especially in terms of a circulation of fear and anger, as well as a desire to somehow “protect” those imagined as threatened. There is no denying that each of us, as individuals, experiences emotion. But examined through the lens Ahmed provides, we also see the tremendous power emotion has as a kind of currency that allows for collective experiences and attitudes toward individuals and groups.
Now that we have established some of the terms of this inquiry, it is necessary to make the path the inquiry takes more explicit. In chapter three, I provide the methodological framework used to approach the questions about critical pedagogy and emotion in the writing classroom.
Chapter 3 Finding the Way In: Methodological Approach to Emotion

This chapter is an explanation and overview of the methodology and methods used in this dissertation project to examine the situation of emotion in classrooms where critical pedagogy is employed. Drawing from a new strand of grounded theory called situational analysis, the data is examined within a larger context in relation to other factors that might otherwise be ignored.

Framing the question

In *Composing Research*, Johanek encourages researchers in composition and rhetoric to “explore a question in the context of the researcher’s curiosity, experience and available resources” (186), and to let this be the determining factor in choosing methodology, rather than an allegiance to one methodological approach or another. She argues that researchers in rhetoric and composition must respect the diversity of methodological choices available. Johanek offers a pragmatic approach to methodology, guided by such straightforward questions as: “…What do I want to know? Why do I need to know it? How can I frame my question in such a way it can be answered?” (104.)

This dissertation project grew primarily out of my interest regarding emotion and emotion work in composition teaching and learning. While emotion work has always been required in teaching, the shift sometimes noted as “the social turn” in composition appears to have brought new types of emotion work for students and for
teachers. In my work as part of a team responsible for mentoring and training new teaching assistants at a large private research university, for example, I began to hear more stories about contentious political moments in the classroom and about the “resistance” of students. Teaching assistants told stories about episodes in which they felt tensions in the classroom during discussions, about their authority being questioned in new ways, about grading and evaluating political arguments, and about the difficulties they sometimes felt when talking with students about race, gender, social class, disability or sexuality. Sometimes these tensions brought excitement and a sense of fulfillment, other times they were the source of anxieties and resentments. From my standpoint as a mentor, the classroom concerns regarding issues such as authority and evaluation appeared often to be related to collisions occurring as a result of the more politicized content of the course, as the curriculum shifted to focus quite explicitly on issues of power and difference. But, as I will explain, this connection was not visible in my first attempt to analyze the materials gathered from their teaching work. I needed a larger context and more relational view in order to see the connection, which I found in Adele Clarke’s “situational analysis” methodology.

As we have seen in chapter one there have been general trends in the field of composition toward critical pedagogy. These shifts in the curriculum were particularly visible at the site where I teach, because a generous grant through the university’s diversity initiative launched a large project in the writing department directed toward developing a more purposeful engagement with diversity. In an effort to avoid some of the worn out and counter-productive ways “diversity” is sometimes addressed, the task of addressing “diversity issues” was re-conceptualized in the writing department as engaging with critical issues of power and difference. Especially in the two required
lower level writing courses, where new teaching assistants were working, students and teachers were asked to address the political in a more direct way.

The shift was not abrupt or wholesale; no one announced that we would suddenly be working on a critical pedagogy. In fact, many members of the department, including myself, were already interested and highly invested in work such as service learning and community literacy, and students were already often asked to read texts that would bring issues of race, class, gender or sexuality in relation to power to the forefront. But the work one might put under the heading of critical pedagogy became more uniformly an expectation, as, for example, the term “critical” was carefully woven into revised course goals, course titles, readings and assignments, including the materials that new teaching assistants were required to use.

“Critical,” in this context, was broadly conceptualized as the deliberate questioning of what was once imagined as normal or obvious. Inherent in this questioning, in theoretic terms, is a critique of the social and ideological structures informing the writer’s worldviews. Though the phrase critical pedagogy was not employed in this work, the move to highlight “the critical,” “power,” and “difference,” closely mirrors the kind of questioning common to the goals of what I have earlier identified as along the spectrum of practices of critical pedagogy. All teachers in the department, including full-time faculty, part-time faculty, and teaching assistants were asked specifically to address issues of power and difference in their course designs, course inquiries, readings, assignments and activities. Most of the materials developed were directed toward an examination of ideological structures that produce and reproduce cultural power and normalization.
Because of my mentoring work, I was especially interested in the reactions that new teaching assistants to the department might experience in relation to the new more political focus for the inquiries of the course. These graduate students come from a variety of areas of study; some are poets, novelists and short story writers from fine arts, others are pursuing degrees in English textual studies, still others are part of the graduate program in composition and rhetoric. They represent diverse approaches to, and philosophies about, writing and writing instruction. Most of the new TAs arrive with little or no teaching experience, some having just finished their undergraduate work themselves. New teaching assistants, required to choose from materials developed by the department in their first year, were provided with a menu of course inquiry choices such as “Reimagining the Normal;” “Cinematic Depictions of Global Poverty” and “Contested Space.” After participating in a brief one-week introduction to teaching the required writing courses, typical responsibilities for new TAs include teaching two 20-seat sections of first-year academic writing each fall, and one sophomore level class in the spring. They attend a weekly two-hour practicum throughout the academic year.

Learning to teach is no small task for anyone, of course, and I have witnessed many instances of emotional response from TAs during my ten years as a member of the teacher training team. But instances of what I later identified as “emotion work” shifted notably with the new emphasis on critical, and sometimes contentious, political analysis and argument, and the complex and sometimes contradictory elements of this visible emotion work invited my curiosity and further inquiry: How might the “critical” and more overtly political approach to writing instruction be influencing emotion in students and teachers? In what ways might emotion, in turn, be influencing the work of the classroom?
Returning to Johanek’s basic questions, this was, crudely carved out, the “…what do I want to know?” of the project. The exigency for the project (in response to Johanek’s “why do I need to know it?”) is the concern that not all teachers or students were fully prepared for, nor did they fully understand the emotion work required while using political inquiries such as those we were focusing on. I wondered about how students—both the graduate students whom I mentored, and the undergraduate students they were responsible for in their own classrooms—were being affected.

Johanek’s final simple question: “how can I frame my question in such a way it can be answered?”(104), however, was more difficult. As we have seen, the concept of emotion itself is not easily defined—and even the history of defining the concept has been contested. Added to this problem is the positioning of emotion in relation to politics. Berezin writes:

The study of emotion and politics is the study of the non-cognitive core of politics. Emotion and politics presents its own special set of difficulties.... [First,] the social analyst has to attempt to understand how an individual micro-level instinct, an emotion, contributes to the collective macro-level processes and outcomes... Second, emotions are ontological and in the moment... a robust analysis of emotion demands a multi-disciplinary approach. (35)

Though Berezin’s description of emotion as individual and instinctive may not completely take into account the complexity of the concept, I believe she is correct about the seemingly inverse relationship at the micro and macro level between emotion and politics, and also about the ontological and present-tense nature of emotion, all of which present quite particular problems for a researcher interested in pursuing questions regarding these phenomena. In the next section, I explain the roots of my
methodological choices for the project in grounded theory, and how this approach helped address these concerns.

**Grounded theory as a starting point**

Grounded theory was developed as a way to build original theory through close reading of data. It is sometimes presented as if it is a cohesive methodological approach, but in actuality involves quite a number of differing perspectives and methods. This is in part due to the historical development of the methodology, as it was positioned as one side of a binary— a “qualitative” approach that needed to be justified in relation to more accepted “quantitative” methodologies. Especially in fields where qualitative approaches have been regarded as suspect, some of the early development of grounded theory appears to be working hard at answering the potential questions about the objectivity or reliability of findings. Glaser and Strauss are often named as the “fathers” of grounded theory. Their work was in the pursuit of knowledge in social-scientific work, in this case a study of terminally ill patients (Bryant and Charmaz 33). They developed a system built around multiple readings of data (usually collected through ethnographic or interview methods), coding and categorizing, and construction of careful theories based on the findings. But as views of the social sciences shifted in the 1970’s (with challenges to conventional science such as Kuhn’s critique of “normal science” and notion of importance of “the paradigm”) new questions and visions for the method and philosophy of grounded theory emerged. In fact, Glaser and Strauss went on to differentiate their approaches to grounded theory from one another quite significantly in later work. Accounts of the differences that developed often highlight
Strauss’ direction toward the “symbolic interactionist” and Glaser’s as a more empirical approach.

Charmaz’ *Constructing Grounded Theory* represents a next generation in grounded theory methodology (GTM). She illuminates what she refers to as a constructivist approach, which emphasizes the subjective interrelationship between the researcher and participant, and the co-construction of meaning. She objected to the idea that this methodology was being approached as if objectivity were possible, and felt that the researcher should take into more careful consideration the interrelations and previous knowledge in the research site. In his 2002 article, “Constructivist Grounded Theory?” Glaser wrote that he felt Charmaz’ “constructivist” take on grounded theory illustrated a significant misunderstanding on her part of the intent and philosophy of grounded theory itself. But Charmaz’ methodology and constructivist approach continue to be taught and used fairly often in anthropological and sociological research. No matter which scholar of GTM one is drawn to, some basic parts of the methodology are shared. Grounded theory methodology takes as its central premise the idea that it is possible to construct theory by looking closely and inductively at data in context. And though method for GT is not as straightforwardly provided for the researcher as one might hope, in nearly all cases, the researcher is expected to select or collect materials for analysis, read and reread this material in order to begin to create emerging categories (open coding), keep careful notes about emerging categories and look for their relational perspectives (axial coding) and focus the ideas by determining what might be most important in the patterns (selective coding). In some versions of method, the researcher is expected to try to begin with a kind of blank slate about the data, and
allow categories to emerge naturally. Others, myself included, see this as less than possible, taking as a starting point the subjective, interested nature of all inquiry.

Although there has been quite a lot of disagreement about GT as methodology, it remains potentially useful to many researchers in composition. Two decades ago in his contribution to Kirsch and Sullivan’s 1992 *Methods and Methodologies*, Huckin called for “a broader conception of text analysis that includes not only the cognitive and expressive aspects so closely associated with the process movement, but sociological and cultural dimensions, as well” (85). His epistemological assumptions bring him to a position matching many of the principles of Grounded Theory, and help illustrate many of the connections that researchers in composition have found useful in grounded theory as a methodological approach.

For example, Huckin notes that meaning includes not just “propositional” content but also “meta-linguistic and interpersonal content,” and that “writers belong to multiple discourse communities, and the texts they write reflect their divided loyalties” (85). Likewise, Grounded Theory takes into consideration the larger contextual possibilities in data, by allowing the researcher to see patterns of all kinds through coding, which involves combing data carefully to find possible categories as they emerge in the reading and rereading of the material.

Huckin also asserts that “text-sensitive analysis is problem-driven, not theory driven,” and this is also in line with the basic notion in GTM that it is the material one is examining that helps the researcher develop a theory, rather than a selected theory applied to the data. Huckin notes that we must account for “as much of the context as possible” and rely on “plausible interpretation” rather than proof, assumptions also important in Grounded Theory. After initial coding of data in GT, the researcher is
encouraged to look for relationships, and put ideas into conversation with one another in a step often referred to as axial coding, and then create “memos” that are developed toward a theory. This process is very much in line with Huckin’s methodological recommendations. Finally, Huckin observes that researchers in composition need to be open to “multiple forms” of analysis. Many versions of GTM recommend the triangulation of data and multiple forms of analysis. Huckin recommends that the researcher begin by looking for “salient patterns” and determine what he refers to as “interestingness,” which he finds useful to composition in terms of building theory. Huckin’s discussion of the methodological requirements of textual analysis for composition research foregrounds the usefulness of grounded theory methodology for many researchers in composition.

The inquiry for this dissertation began with rather broad questions about how to identify and conceptualize the emotion responses I was noticing; what one might learn by looking closely at these instances of emotion; and what might be important about the instances I had observed. These questions demand a great deal of attention to context, and also do not immediately suggest a theoretical frame for the research, making Grounded Theory a reasonable choice. I did not begin the examination of the data with the “blank slate” approach the Glaser might advise, however. I acknowledged the fact that given my own experiences in the field it was not possible, nor was it particularly desirable to erase the potential connection between the social turn and new emotion work I thought I could identify going on in classrooms. But I also wanted to be careful to make this an element of the inquiry still under investigation, rather than a foregone conclusion. I also wanted to be sure that I learned more about other framing for emotion than those I was most familiar with from psychology, instead of beginning
with the premise that I had already found the most useful ways to conceptualize emotion—or critical pedagogy for that matter. Chapter two, then, is partly an inquiry that helps shape the definitions for emotion in order to avoid missing important ideas by flattening the concept. Having worked with grounded theory for analyzing data in the past (in an ethnographic study of rural language patterns and in a project analyzing student journals), I was drawn to the methodology for this dissertation project, given the nature of the inquiry and the materials available.

A large collection of retrospective material that referenced all kinds of emotional reactions linked to teaching experiences was available to me through my teacher mentoring work—notes from classroom visits, notes from interactions during the two-hour a week TA practicum, notes from individual meetings and the bi-weekly meetings with the rest of the teacher training team, and reflections and email exchanges between myself and teaching assistants. In addition, student evaluations for each TA, along with monthly reports of their work and progress provided more formal documents available for collection and analysis.

These materials are diverse in terms of their intended audiences and purposes, making coding a very useful way forward in terms of identifying patterns and moving toward a theory that helped tentatively explain the data. Susan Star has noted that “Grounded theory is an excellent tool for finding invisible things” (79). This may sound, in the fragmented version I present her comment here, as if GTM is magical or alchemical, but in actuality she is simply asserting the possibility inherent in the approach to finding phenomenon not otherwise easily identified or overlooked. And I would assert that emotion, so far as we have worked to define it, is such a phenomenon.
As Berezin notes, emotions are “ontological and in the moment” (35), making them less easily identifiable through some traditional methods of analysis.

Applying the inductive methods of grounded theory in a first round of open coding revealed data categories of concerns shared by teaching assistants circulating around authority, grading and classroom relationships. And while there was talk about emotions (fear, anger, frustration, joy), there was little reference how those emotions might potentially be connected to the political topics used in class.

My first (open) coding of the data revealed the categories illustrated in figure 2.

The connections between emotion and critical pedagogy were present, but lurking in context. For example, one teacher reflecting on frustration with a student’s reactions to grading referenced the student’s “dismissal” of the core for the unit (Manning Marable’s “What we Talk about When we Talk about Race”) as particularly problematic to the argument the student finally made in the essay (about representations of race), yet located the problem as essentially an issue the student had with his authority as a teacher, rather than considering it as potentially in relation to the

| AUTHORITY/POWER/IDENTITY (teacher, gender, ethnicity, class) |  
| RELATIONSHIP (building, destroying, trust, community, respect, openness to other views) | My text  
| DIRECT EMOTION (“I feel statements” anxiety, fear, anger, resentment) |  
| WP CURRICULUM (negotiating, understanding, note of “critical”) |  
| BELIEFS/OPINIONS (Respecting students, questioning where derived) |  
| QUIET STUDENTS/VOCAL STUDENTS (questions and concerns about why students are not talking, who is doing the talking) |  
| GRADING (anxieties, student anger, worry) |  

Figure 2: Open coding for Practicum materials
politics of the inquiry. There were surprisingly few direct references to the political questions being examined in class, though in many cases it was clear that they were likely at work in situations like these. References I categorized as “curriculum” related, were often couched as learning to think about writing from a “composition perspective,” though the term “critical” was sometimes referenced.

I needed a way forward that allowed me to think through the situation in its larger context, to move outside of the initial data set in a way that allowed me to see the TAs and students’ talk in relation to other factors.

**Situational analysis and mapping techniques**

Adele Clarke, a student of Strauss, developed a version of grounded theory which she calls situational analysis. In Clarke’s view, Glaser and Strauss did not take into full consideration the larger “context/situatedness” of some research questions, though she feels that Strauss made this an emphasis in later work. Clarke notes that the emphasis in early works on grounded theory “were on taking a naturalistic approach to research, having modest (read substantively focused) theoretical goals, and being systematic …to work against what they and others saw as the “distorting subjectivities of the researcher” (3).

Clarke notes several problematic “recalcitrancies” of traditional grounded theory that may be lingering because of the promises of a more positivist empirical version of the methodologies. These include a lack of reflexivity about research processes and products; an oversimplification in research reports that sometimes “strains toward coherence;” and oversimplifications that make it appear there are singular rather than multiple social processes characteristic of a particular phenomenon or situation” (12). Clarke sees much of the early work of grounded theory as taking an action-centered
approach, by which she means using ethnography and interviews as the standard method for collection of materials to be analyzed without consideration of other historical or discursive sources. Clarke advocates instead for a situation-centered approach that takes ethnography or interviewing into consideration in determining sources for material to analyze, but also takes into consideration such elements as narrative, discursive and historical complexities of the situation. Among other goals, Clarke suggests that situational analysis may help the researcher see how multiple sites may be important to grounded theory research projects. For Clarke, “the situation of inquiry itself broadly conceived is the key unit of analysis” (314). Clarke’s notion of “the situation” is based broadly on four scholarly contributions to the concept:

- Thomas and Thomas’ assertion that “situations defined as real are real in their consequences… perspective dominates the interpretation on which action is based” (Clarke 21).
- C Wright Mills’ argument that “we must approach linguistic behavior, not be referring to the private states in individuals, but by observing its social function of coordinating diverse action” (qtd. in Clarke 22).
- Donna Haraway’s concept of “situated knowledges,” which emphasizes that knowers are embodied and knowledges are situated”(22).
- Blumer’s notion of the “gestalt”—that a situation is always greater than the sum of its parts because it includes their relationality in a particular temporal and spatial moment. “Frequently power relationship [of various actors is] the result of the situation rather than the situation being the result of their respective power positions as they entered it” (Blumer qtd. in Clarke 23, emphasis added).
In the next chapter, I develop in more detail the “situation” as I framed it for this project, but this brief overview of the principles guiding Clarke’s sense of situation serve as a foundation for the way she is presenting the concept, and for her suggestion that the site of research move out to a more open range of materials and texts, if necessary.

In my research, for example, it is useful to look beyond the materials developed in the practicum, toward larger discourses and histories that might be important to the inquiry of the “situation.” This thinking takes me beyond the confines of the practicum materials as a flat data set. By examining the situation relationally, I would need to look beyond the immediate context of the production of emotion in critical pedagogy (the classroom, the practicum), at other relational forces at in work in the larger situation.

One central premise of this methodological approach is that paying attention to the work of discourse itself, rather than concentrating on individual actors or actions, allows the researcher to consider data that might otherwise not be recognized as salient to the inquiry (see reference in #2 of Clarke’s concept of situation). Situational analysis, as outlined by Clarke, uses a series of mapping exercises at various stages of a research project, each of which is prepared in order to illuminate relational factors involved in a situation of inquiry, even those that might start out as less than visible. In some ways the steps parallel the original conceptions of method in grounded theory (open coding, axial coding, selective coding, memo writing), but Clarke felt it was necessary to create space for other relational elements, including the researcher’s prior knowledge. Echoing Star’s assertion, Clarke notes that:

As trained scholars in our varied fields, usually with some theoretical background, we may also suspect that certain things are going on that have not
yet explicitly appeared in our data. In seeking to be ethically accountable researchers, I believe we need to articulate what we see as sites of silence in our data. What seems present but unarticulated? (85)

The possibility that there were indeed “sites of silence” was precisely my concern in developing a responsible methodology toward the inquiry regarding emotion and critical pedagogy. While it would be possible to examine only the materials collected from the teacher training practicum, it appeared that there were other relational factors at work.

Clarke’s mapping exercises (which are explained next) are not in place of the traditional coding and categorizing of data in grounded theory. They correspond to the stages coding, and the researcher should be reading all materials carefully looking for emerging patterns, just as one does with other grounded theory method. Like much of the other literature on grounded theory, there are few “how to” step-wise instructions for method in situational analysis, but Clarke provides examples of some of her own work that are helpful to designing a method for one’s own project. Clarke encourages researchers who see the methodology as useful to choose which parts of her mapping exercises best help “open up” data.
I created maps at each stage of the research, and simultaneously read histories and conceptual analyses that seemed to be pertinent to the categories I was uncovering. In the next section, I briefly sketch the mapping techniques Clarke proposes and the method she has used in her own research in medical sociology, so that some possibilities for method may be made a bit more concrete. Clarke proposes three kinds of situational analysis mapping exercises:

- Situational maps
- Social Worlds/Arenas Maps
- Positional maps

**Situational Maps.** The first of these mapping exercises, situational mapping, is used to articulate all the elements in a situation of interest. At this stage a researcher may or may not have compiled and begun to code data, and Clarke suggests that these maps may be especially “messy.” An important element of this part of the mapping procedure is that the researcher is urged to locate not just the people in the situation, but all elements that may be of influence or agency in the situation. She calls these elements “actors.” They may include concepts, technologies and other possible relational influences (see Figure 2). Once all actors in a situation have been identified to the best of a researcher’s ability, the next step is to systematically examine relationships between each actor and all others. This heuristic leads to the identification of some of the key relations within the situation of inquiry.

In Clarke’s work, this mapping exercise has helped to illuminate less visible actors in the situation. In her student’s research on nurses’ work under managed care, for example, in addition to the actors one would expect, such as patients and physicians and nurses, “pharmaceutical companies” were included as actors in her mapping, as were “old, current and new medical equipment and technologies” (95). Beyond the
initial site of data collection (as in my collection of materials from the TA practicum), Clarke stresses that “we also need to ask what ideas, concepts, discourses, symbols, sites of debate... may matter in this situation” (88). In the case of my own work, this included a wide array of “actors” in the situation including physical elements such as curriculum materials; concepts such as justice; peripheral actors such as the parents of students, as well as students, teachers and teaching mentors.

Social Worlds/Arenas Maps. Once the researcher has interrogated the relational factors between all actors in a situation, the next stage of mapping Clarke recommends is the creation of social worlds/arenas maps. In order to make this map, the researcher enters the situation of interest and “tries to make collective sociological sense out of it, starting with the questions: What are the patterns of collective commitment and what are the salient social worlds here? What are their perspectives and what do they hope to achieve through their collective action?” (110). At this stage the researcher is working to identify the various patterns of boundaries and collective actions and how they may be situated within a particular network, taking into account the porous and fluid nature of such activity. Clarke notes that some actors (individuals, collectivities...) might prefer not to participate in a particular arena, yet their dependencies (usually but not always for resources) often coerce their participation” (110). Yet these are still important
“worlds” of collectivity to take into consideration. Clarke outlines her student’s (Bones) project on nurses’ work under managed care, for example, for which she selected the US Healthcare domain as the largest plane of her situation map, and the Hospital as the “arena.” She explains the various ways that collective (social) worlds such as “big pharmaceutical world,” “the hospital management world” and the “hospital nursing world” might intersect relationally with the hospital arena. She has placed patients at the center.

Clarke uses the broad concept of discourse to describe the ways various discourses “write in” and “rewrite” what she has identified as social worlds—in other words, worlds are both creating and being constituted by various discourses. Clarke suggests the researcher can learn a great deal from examining collective action through examining discourses constructed by and constituted by these social worlds. This stage of her mapping techniques was especially interesting as a way forward in my own project. Clarke’s notion of the power of discourse to create and constitute various social worlds is strongly correlates to the power and function of collective emotion theorized in political and emotional psychology, which will be explained in more detail in the section of this chapter where I outline my own approach further.

**Positional Maps.** The final mapping strategy proposed by Clarke is positional mapping. This mapping exercise is a way of thinking through “positionality;” not of individuals or groups, but rather “…positions constituted in discourses. Individuals and groups of all sorts may and commonly do hold multiple and contradictory positions on the same issue. Positional maps represent the heterogeneity of positions” (126). This is perhaps the most important mapping exercise Clarke offers this dissertation project. This is because, as I noted in the section on social worlds/arenas
maps, emotion itself functions on a collective level (as we have seen in the analyses in the previous chapter), so the fluid and contradictory “positionalities” inside particular “social worlds” (in Clarke’s schema) are likely the places where emotion is collecting, and where we can see it doing particular work, sometimes in unexpected ways.

Emirbayer and Goldberg argue that studying the circulation of emotion in contentious politics requires an investigation of relational contexts and their complexities:

As we have seen, in the simplest of cases (as discussed by Dewey), emotional transactions occur between a single subject and a single object. However, in more complicated cases, they involve a potentially far greater number of actors, tied to one another in sometimes intricate patterns of emotional investments. These configurations of passion can be systematically mapped and charted, as with social-structural or cultural structures. And the mappings that result can give us a fuller picture of the relational contexts within which action, including collective action, unfolds. Episodes of political contention can thereby be seen as the complex emotional interactions that they are, without reducing that level of insight to a mere reflection of other sorts of patternings or dynamics. (104)

Emirbayer and Goldberg’s analysis of approaches needed to understand collective emotion in contentious politics parallel Clarke’s assertions. In both cases, they see the need to examine the larger context, and to map the socio-cultural structures in order to examine the complexities of collective emotion. Emirbayer and Goldberg do not use situational analysis in their work, but their call for relational analysis and mapping echoes Clarke’s. Clarke urges researchers to examine the discourses that potentially inform and construct what she conceives of as “social worlds;” and I would
argue that collective emotion is the same kind of force requiring contextual attention. Recognition of the importance of collective emotion to the project came from two sources investigated along side one another: the important work of scholars such as Emirbayer and Goldberg’s work on tracing the complex forces of emotion, and performing the first stages of Clarke’s strategies. Working with Clarke’s concept of the discursive construction of “social worlds” and “positionality” within these worlds it became clear that it was important not only to examine collective emotion as an actor in the situation, but as a force operating within the same plane that Clarke gives “discourse.” The two forces are integrated, though “collective emotion” is not an element of discursive function which Clarke pays particular attention to in her methodology.

Emirbayer and Goldberg argue that beliefs, values and attachments—ideological understandings—are shaped and developed through the movement of the emotion economy. Abu-Lughod provides a link between these in her discussion of the relationship between discourse and emotion. She has pointed out that researchers should be examining “how emotion discourses are deployed in social contexts…This would shift the concern from what Foucault has argued is widespread in the modern West—a focus on what is said in discourse—to the more interesting and political questions of what discourse is, what it does, and what informs it” (28 emphasis added). I argue that Clarke’s notion of the discursive construction of social worlds can be enhanced by looking as carefully as possible at how emotion is functioning in these moments, as Abu-Lughod puts it “how emotion discourses are deployed in social contexts” (28).
My methodology takes into account the fuller ecology of the situation, and of emotion transaction—it is a “contextualist approach” in which, as Phelps has noted, “all parts are not only interdependent but mutually defining and transactive, so that through their shifting relationships they continually constitute new parts or elements as well as new structures” (33). Clarke proposes that the mapping work in situational analysis can function as a tool to find “fresh paths into a full array of data sources that can lay out what you have to date...provoking the researcher to analyze more deeply” (83). But what exactly does Clarke mean by “the situation?”

**The Situation.** Anthropologist Tom Mathar finds Clarke’s work useful, particularly in terms of forwarding and expanding grounded theory, yet critiques Clarke regarding the soft definition she provides for “situation.” Earlier in this chapter, I laid out the groundwork Clark offered for understanding the concept she names the “situation.” Clarke attaches her notion of “situation” to assertions from other scholars regarding this concept, specifically about the power of perspective to generate action, the social function of coordinated actions, the situatedness of all knowledges, and the potential of a situation itself to shift and arrange power relations. Like Mathar, I find Clarke’s definition of situation may require further refining, but I also agree that as a methodology, situational analysis allows the researcher to recognize new relational elements through a range of positions, as well as to capture what is not yet articulated. This may then provide a key to understanding the nature of the situation in a more relational way. So what exactly is “the situation” or, the situated site of this research inquiry?

In some articulations of grounded theory methodology, my site would be the data from the practicum alone, and my task would be to approach this data without any
previous frame of reference, looking for emergent patterns. Instead, I frame the problem using the wider notion of the “situation” as: undergraduate composition classrooms and critical pedagogy, making particular note of emotion in relation to this situation as a collective and constituting force.

**Collective Emotion.** Collective emotion is a term used to describe the emotions of a group who possess some shared feature of identification, and for whom those who identify as a part of the group tend to “feel” alike, especially toward those outside the group. These groups may be large or small, and they may be built from direct contact, as in members of a department or a family, or through a cultural categorization, such as gender. In cultural studies, investigation of this phenomenon is sometimes viewed as a way of understanding belonging and non-belonging, as in Seigworth and Gregg’s attempt to describe the “accumulation” of emotion in bodies and groups: “Affect marks a body’s belonging to a world of encounters; or a world belonging to a body of encounters; but also, in non-belonging” (2). While cultural studies offers useful ways to think through affect and identity, scholarship in the field tends to differentiate between affect and emotion in a very particular way. For most scholars in cultural studies, “affect” is linked to physicality, to the body. And it is affect, rather than the parallel construct “emotion,” which is the focusing term used in much of the work in cultural studies theorization. Cultural studies scholar Lawrence Grossberg, for example, sees emotion as produced through affect. “Emotion is an ideological attempt to make sense out of some affective productions” (Grossberg 316). In the cases examined in this dissertation project, it is precisely the “ideological attempt to make meaning out of affective production” that is of interest. In order to better understand emotion, then, I turn to theorization of emotion drawn from social identity theory.
Social identity theory offers the basic premise that “when group identification turns a group into an important social identity for an individual, the group takes on emotional significance” (Smith & Mackie 429). Within this larger theory, Smith has further theorized the way that emotions may belong to groups, as well as the influence that belonging to a group may have on one’s emotions, or Intergroup Identity Theory. According to Intergroup Identity Theory, emotion can function in groups very much like it does in individuals, as a collective. This is not the same as “group think” theory developed in the past, where we imagine that people are not thinking for themselves, or become powerless as they succumb to the thinking of the group. Group identities are recognized as porous and in constant motion; there are complex layers of belonging that may influence reactions.

Building on Smith’s work, researchers have begun to examine the ways that a sense of belonging may activate larger structures of emotional reaction, based on that sense of identification with the group. This collective emotion may occur within a group, in feelings toward others that one identifies as part of “us,” but it may also be directed toward an “out-group,” whether hostile or sympathetic. Smith and Mackie outline in-group emotion in this way: “The individual who identifies with the in-group may feel that they are threatening us; we feel angry at them; we support policies preventing them from interfering with our best interest” (430). Emotion then, is not just an individual matter; shame, outrage, guilt, joy, any emotion, can be experienced collectively. In essence, our emotions are rooted in and schooled by our various group identities, and these groups may develop a sense of collective emotion impacting our relationship to those both inside and outside these belonging-groups.
The “situation” identified in this project—composition teachers engaged in teaching with critical pedagogy—often brings out questions that are linked to competing political identities, within individual people and within groups of people. Some of the most useful study of collective emotion comes from scholars interested in political emotions. Political contention has particular potential for evoking collective emotion, as it is always tangled with various categories that represent power struggles between groups. Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta, as well as other scholars of protest and social movements would agree with Grossberg’s assessment that emotion is the mixture of affect and ideology. In their explanation for the importance of emotion to politics, they note the intersection between what they label a more “constructed” level of emotion involved:

- The emotions most relevant to politics, we believe, fall toward the more constructed, cognitive end of the dimension. Moral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities, or the pride of refurbished ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and better society and participating in a movement toward that end—none of these are automatic responses. They are related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variable. It is for this reason that our analysis of emotions of protest and politics departs from much of the work in the sociology of emotion. (13)

The situational analysis, as I have conceived of it in this project takes emotion into account as an “actor,” (in Clarke’s terms), but it also examines emotion as an integral force in the work of discourse, especially when the discourse involves
contentious political situations. The situation is not the site of the practicum itself, but the larger contextual situation, that of critical pedagogy in the writing classroom and its intersection with emotion, especially collective emotion. In order to get a fuller sense of this larger situation, I identified a moment where one important “social world” within this situation, composition teachers, find themselves embroiled in a politically contentious discussion. Analysis of this site reveals not only the ways that collective emotion is operating within this group, but also the ways that it serves to align and divide various positions within the social world, and serves to confuse some of what might actually be central to the argument.
Chapter 4 Collective Collegial Emotion

When studying episodes of political contention, look for the intentional structure in the various parties’ emotions, whether they are social movements, established institutions, or third parties, and evaluate their perceptions and judgments on the basis of the intelligence and emotional appropriateness that they manifest.
~Emirbayer & Goldberg “Pragmatism, Bourdieu and collective emotions in contentious politics”

“Reason” is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It is a laborious achievement of Habit needing to be continually worked over. A balanced arrangement of propulsive activities manifested in deliberation—namely, reason—depends upon…proportionate emotional sensitiveness.

Opening-up the data

Clarke’s situational analysis methodology, outlined in chapter three, uses a series of mapping exercises designed to help the researcher open-up data:

• **Situational Maps** (brainstorming all possible actors in the situation and examining them each relationally to one another);
• **Social Worlds/Arenas Maps** (outlining the collective discourses involved in relation to one another and the situation); and
• **Positional Maps** (interrogating complexities and contradictory positions within social worlds toward the situation)

Clarke notes that these exercises are heuristic in nature, and encourages researchers to work with them flexibly in relation to one’s research goals and particular project. After initial open coding of materials from the new teaching practicum, (notes from classroom visits, practicum, individual meetings and team meetings, reflections, email exchanges, monthly reports); I used situational mapping to examine the larger context and relationships. In order to open-up the data (as Clarke suggested), I created a situation map of “actors” that might be important to consider in undergraduate composition classrooms and critical pedagogy. The situation map included people and group actors one might expect (undergraduate students, teaching assistants, teaching
mentors, parents, program administrators), but it also included material actors, (the
menu of shared inquiries and assignments, the course reader, new technologies such as
wiki space and computer labs, documentary film, the grant). In addition, the situation
map (which Clarke suggests purposely tries to make a “mess” of things) included
concepts that might be considered actors (social justice, critical pedagogy, power and
difference, emotion work, collective emotion, left/right and conservative/liberal binary
definitions of political views), and also larger outside forces that may have been at work
in the situation (the economic recession, the long-term war in the Middle East, the
national education debate). I spent time examining each of these in relation to each of
the other actors within the situation map, as Clarke suggests. Viewed relationally with
other actors, this created several new pathways for analysis, including the ways that
collective emotion might be examined in relation to writing teachers working on critical
pedagogy, the influences of the national economy and current educational debates on
students’ views of critical pedagogy, the influences of new technologies on collective
emotions and identity.

The next step was to look more closely in order to identify the salient social
worlds/arenas involved in the situation. In Clarke’s conception of the term, social
worlds generate shared perspectives that then form the basis for collective action.
Clarke argues that “activities in all social worlds and arenas include establishing and
maintaining boundaries between worlds and gaining legitimation for the world itself.
These processes involve the social construction of the particular world and a variety of
claims-making activities” (113). People typically participate in many such worlds
simultaneously, and such participation remains “highly fluid” (46). Clarke also notes
that “there can be implicated actors in a social world or arena, actors silenced or only
discursively present—constructed by others for their own purposes” (46). These social worlds are both constituted by and constructed through discourse.

**Composition teachers as a social world**

One social world that emerged through this mapping as particularly salient to the analysis, and thus worth closer examination is the social world of the writing teacher. Though the social world of writing teachers can be imagined as singular, differences and complexities within the group are important to keep in mind. Full-time faculty (tenured and untenured), adjunct faculty, graduate assistants—each of these is part of the larger constructed social world of ‘writing teacher,’ but each is also positioned quite differently in terms of power and in their relationship to the project of critical pedagogy. Closer examination of discourses (and collective emotions) that construct the collective identity of composition teachers could help uncover how this discursive construction might matter in moments where the project of critical pedagogy, or social justice is operating. How are writing teachers imagining themselves, collectively, in relation to others who are fighting for social justice, or victims of oppression? How are boundaries drawn in this social world, and how might this matter in critical pedagogy?

Returning to Clarke’s assertion that “activities in all social worlds…include establishing and maintaining boundaries between worlds… [and] gaining legitimation for the world itself,” and that these “processes involve the social construction of the particular world and a variety of claims-making activities” (113); one possible way to examine the social world of composition teachers/scholars is by looking for particular moments where this boundaries are actually being constructed or deconstructed. This can be difficult to locate, let alone capture for later analysis. We can see evidence, for example, of this type of construction of boundaries of the social world of writing
teachers through the brief historical review of the discipline offered in chapter one, but
it is more difficult to find examples of this activity in-situ and in some “real time” view.

New technologies, however, have provided some opportunities once
unavailable. Public, fully transcribed “conversations” among colleagues are available
through professional listservs. Listserv discussions have the added value of being both
highly public and feeling highly private-- a contradiction noted by recent researchers in
digital communication. Participants in listserv conversations or other social media often
feel a sense of privacy writing ‘alone’ at a computer screen, yet this is ironically
combined with a simultaneous lack of any of the physical privacy boundaries which
might otherwise encapsulate such communications in face-to-face discussion. The
participants in digital discussions, therefore, sometimes express themselves more
openly in digital forums.

What follows is an analysis of a listserv thread from such a digital forum,
examined for some of the complexities and positioning in social world of writing
teachers/scholars that might prove especially important in relation to critical pedagogy.
I am myself a member of this listserv, (a “lurker,” to put it in uncomplimentary terms),
who read this thread with interest at the time it was produced. As this research project
developed, this extensive, politically contentious thread appeared to have more and
more potential as a way to understand how reason, emotion and collective emotion
might be functioning within the category usually imagined cohesively as writing
teachers.

The posts are made available in a publically archived format, and provide an
excellent place to examine not just the writing teachers as a social world, but also
discourse within and about this social world in the midst of a contentious political
debate. The listserv thread illuminates longstanding beliefs about reason and emotion not easily shaken by theory, the complexity and contradiction in identities built into this social world, and a glimpse into the forces of collective emotion at work in it. When applied to the larger analytic situation, the undergraduate composition classrooms and critical pedagogy, each of these illuminations provides a way to better understand concerns regarding the forces of emotion that we should be taking into account in our work with critical pedagogy in composition.

The Rachel Corrie thread

The listserv thread examined here did not begin as an outward attempt at protest or even a politically contentious debate. It began several years ago with a call for nominations for the “Rachel Corrie Award for Courage in the Teaching of Writing,” on a listserv where administrators, teachers and others interested in writing and teaching actively and regularly participate in discussions about the field. Browsing the publicly archived list of posts, one finds that members often begin with the greetings such as “Friends…” or “Colleagues…” and frequently includes the exchange of praise, thanks, shared sorrows and joys, assistance, and congratulatory sentiments. In short, the more than 3,000 members of this list tend to think of themselves as sharing similar interests and obstacles and actions as professionals and pre-professionals in the field of composition and rhetoric—a social world invested in teaching and learning about writing, especially at the postsecondary level.

But the thread I analyze in this chapter, which began with a call for nominations for the Rachel Corrie award several years ago, quickly became a space for a contentious political debate, during which the complexities and contradictory positions and power
relations are made visible within this social world. The announcement posted to the listserv by a longtime member began with a description of the young woman for whom the award was named. I have included the open coding in this first announcement (see Figure 5) as a sample of the categorization work.

Rachel Corrie was a 23-year-old peace activist and senior at The Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington. She was killed on March 16, 2003 in Rafah in the Gaza Strip. She was on leave from school to work in Palestine with the International Solidarity Movement, a group using and promoting “nonviolent, direct-action methods of resistance to confront and challenge illegal Israeli occupation forces and policies.” Rachel was attempting to block an Israeli military bulldozer from demolishing the house of a pharmacist and his family when the driver of the bulldozer ran over her, then backed up and ran over her again. Wearing a bright orange jacket and using a bullhorn, Rachel was, by all eyewitness accounts and in horrifying photographs published on the Internet, exceptionally visible. Her parents, some members of Congress, and grassroots organizations including several Jewish peace groups have called for an independent U.S. investigation into her death. Such an investigation has yet to happen, and the U.S. media virtually buried the story—though it was featured prominently in the U.K. and in many other countries. Corrie took courses like “Labor and the Environment” and “Public Art and the Middle East Conflict”; she also wrote detailed emails from Palestine. The late Edward Said, who met with her parents in May, 2003, wrote, “Her letters back to her family are truly remarkable documents of her ordinary humanity that made for very difficult and moving reading....”

In addition to this description, the actual call for the award appeared on the list. Note that the memory of Corrie (as a student) is being honored through the recognition of a CCCC teacher willing to take risks for their commitments.

The Progressive SIGs and Caucuses Coalition (PSCC) of the CCCC wishes to honor the memory of this extremely courageous student by recognizing a teacher in the CCCC who has taken professional risks in order to promote social justice through the teaching of writing. It is well known that the politics of hiring, tenure, and promotion often motivate graduate students and junior faculty to write, teach, and serve in “safe” subject and project areas; many are encouraged by mentors to shy away from genuinely “controversial” or “risky” subjects until they are tenured. In making this award, the PSCC hopes, conversely, to encourage writing teachers early in their careers to take on research, pedagogy, and service projects that promote commitment to peace, justice, and human dignity—even when hazarding the ire of deans, chairs, editors, and hiring and review committees (coding added).
Following the advice of Abu-Lughod, I chose an examination of this listserv thread not just for “what is said” but rather “what it does, and what informs it” (28) as the best path toward an analysis of the discussion, and of this social world. As a way into the analysis, I used open coding a strategy. The categories emerging through this work are presented in Figure 5. These categories are not parallel to one another, and in subsequent reading (axial coding) of the material it became apparent that some were related to one another (direct naming of emotion and discussions of reason as opposed to emotion, for example), but the open coding provided a way to begin to make sense of the data. As I mentioned in chapter three, I did not begin with a “blank slate” approach to the materials; the theory on collective emotions, especially as related to contentious politics, informed my analysis and categorization, as did my preexisting understanding of some of the history behind the so-called reason/emotion split and the history of composition. So the categories reflect, in part, that interested approach to the analysis. In the announcement for the award, for example, note the frequent use of references in the second section to risk & justice (orange) and the calls for support and references to collective action (green). The review of the questions regarding reason and emotion are not set aside in my interest in how members of this social world are navigating and using their discourse with regard to reason and emotion, especially given the political nature of the discussion. Likewise, noticing such terms as “justice” presented in relation to both discussions of Middle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPEN CODING CATEGORIES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotion named directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name-calling, sarcasm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binary introduced/referenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct references to (in)justice and risk, safety or peace, war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calling for/referencing collective support or action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason (versus) emotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Open Coding Categories for listserv thread
Eastern political turmoil and the work of composition is obviously based partly on my reading on historical constructions of composition teaching as a discipline. All readings are interested readings, as Harris has pointed out, but this is also a careful reading.

Before further explanation of the coding and findings, however, I want to provide a better sense of the movement, tone and context of this thread, by offering in its entirety the opening move that “shook the tree:”

Hi M. and Others,

This is the first I’ve heard of the Rachel Corrie award, and I’m wondering if others on the list are as troubled by it as I am.

Of course I know about Rachel Corrie and respect her commitment and dedication to serving a very troubled and often abused population. At the same time, I would hope that as teachers of rhetoric we would be careful to avoid the very disturbing loaded language of this award announcement.

The implication of the sentence about Rachel’s "orange clothes" is essentially to confirm the charge of intentional murder against the Israeli driver of the bulldozer (an extremely contentious charge in the international community, to say the least). The assertion that this award promotes peace and justice suggests that Rachel Corrie was working on the side of peace and justice (not just in her own mind, which of course she was, but also objectively, which is a much more controversial idea) or, more problematically for me, that there is a clear "justice" in this terribly fraught and nuanced situation in the Middle East. The accusations against the US media smack of the longstanding anti-Semitic charges of Jewish media control.

I certainly support the cause that this award aims to promote, lauding pedagogical bravery and academic freedom among the non-tenured, but this seems to me a particularly problematic and polarizing, and, for me at least, offensive, way in which to do it.

As an untenured faculty member myself, I hardly feel prepared to take on the CCCC, but I am very curious about what others of you think of this rhetoric and what it means for our organization to advertise itself and its politics in this way.

G.

In this opening reply post, we can observe that the writer wonders if “others are as troubled by the award description” as she. One way to read this is as a call for who would like to join her in being “troubled” by this—asking, in effect, for who else might
be part of this collective emotion. The use of the term “troubled” is also worth noting, because as we’ll see in later posts, direct references to emotion tend, in many cases, to be carefully tempered. Listserv thread writers are “troubled” and “concerned” while “deans, chairs, editors, and hiring and review committees” are libel to express “ire.” These are some of the first quiet hints at the attitudes regarding emotion and its relational value with reason within this social world. It is not directly stated, but rather performed through the discourse, reasserting emotion as problematic, and positing emotion on those who are “unreasonable.”

The writer implies that those who belong to this social world would “avoid disturbing loaded language.” The speaker is framing the decision to post the announcement and description for the Rachel Corrie Award as falling outside the general behaviors agreed upon in this social world, which, based on their experience and skills, would not take such actions. In addition, the reference is to “loaded language” which is also a hint at the emotion rules of the social world. The speaker makes reference to the expertise of the group as trained rhetors, but also helps begin to form a sense of collective emotion—a sense of pride regarding their fairness and a generosity of spirit for other views, and a disdain for those who do not adhere to these principles. In her framing, this is part of what it means to belong to this social world, and what it means not to.

As we can see in announcement of the award, it is linked to a political incident between Israeli and Palestinian forces, to peace activism/violence, to (in)justice, to the costs of risk taking—and to contingent labor in composition teaching. But it is not until near the end of the post that the contributor directly references the section of the award she finds directly offensive in a political sense, when she points out “accusations against
the US media that smack of the long-standing anti-Semitic charges of Jewish media control.” Here another circle is drawn, invoking collective emotion regarding the stereotypes that “they” (some others, outside of this social world) circulate about the media and Jewish control.

In another move, the contributor invokes a larger collective emotion which all can ostensibly join; that of approval for the intent of the award itself, lauding “pedagogical bravery and academic freedom among the non-tenured” and adding that she is an untenured faculty member herself—aligning with those described as less powerful in the profession. It is interesting to note that this, in particular, is one principle on which all can agree; collective concern for contingent labor. After identifying as a member of the group that the award was ostensibly set up to honor, she adds that though she disagrees with this award, she feels “hardly prepared to take on CCCC,” (the Conference on College Composition and Communication) gesturing toward powerful sources that she is weak against, aligning herself not with the types of powerful forces gestured to in the award announcement (Deans, Chairs, Editors), but as someone who is ostensibly without power in her role in the social world.

The next two contributors simply clarified that this was not an award sponsored by CCCC, but did not speak to any of the other questions or assertions in the post critiquing and questioning the award. After these two clarifications, a new contributor spoke up, partly to further clarify the sponsorship of the award, but partially in response to the critique:

I should further clarify that Rhetoricians for Peace is NOT a 4C SIG and, thus, not part of the PSCC coalition. RFP is an independent group. While we do always participate at the C’s in various way, we have never sought SIG status.
I’m a bit disturbed by G’s words. The description of Rachel Corrie’s killing that G mentions is accurate. I have not read any competing accounts, so I’m not sure how the language is loaded. When human beings commit atrocities on each other, should we cover them up with euphemisms?

Further, has there been some accusation that Rachel Corrie was not working for peace and justice? I have read nothing to suggest that she was an agitator or that she took up arms against the Israelis. Perhaps G. could explain more about what unpeaceful and inequitable actions Rachel Corrie took. Being a Palestinian sympathizer hardly aligns a person with violence and injustice. To say that there is no clear side of justice in the Middle East is to ignore a lot of history and to succumb to the propaganda campaign that has allowed so much unnecessary death to continue.

Naming the PSCC award after Rachel Corrie is very appropriate. She lived her convictions. The parallel that the award tries to draw to adjunct teaching gives dignity to adjuncts who often take risks within exploitive working conditions.

-D. (Listserv post)

After these initial posts, over seventy posts followed in the thread, most occurring within a 24-hour period. Divisions were illuminated in this social world of teachers of writing that at other times are not very visible. The conversation became more and more heated as the arguments grew; arguments about Israel and Palestine, about charges that some members have insinuated that the U.S. media is “controlled” by Jewish interests, about using Rachel Corrie as a symbol in order to erase the context of the political situation, about why Rachel Corrie’s death was selected out of all the atrocities, about whether Corrie’s death can be “proven” to be murder using factual source materials, and about the question of whether adjunct faculty are actually “at risk” when they chose activist politics.

I present analysis of particular listserv posts and responses next which illuminate particular understandings about this social world important to our larger situational analysis:

- A collective sense that reason is separate from emotion, and has the true power to shift beliefs, values and ideologies in the heat of contentious debate.
- The fractures, complexities and contradictions within the larger social world described as writing teachers and in their collective relationship(s) to social justice and to critical pedagogy.
- The autonomous force of collective emotion in a situation that involves contentious political debate and action.

A “pernicious postulate” regarding reason and emotion

Emirbayer and Goldberg outline three “pernicious postulates” regarding emotion in situations of contentious politics, one of which is the notion that emotion and reason are mutually exclusive. They argue that this postulate leads to problematic interpretations of various political situations, and blocks the way to broadened views regarding the specific decisions and actions of political leaders and followers. Many scholars in composition and rhetoric have also noted the problems with the longstanding notion that emotion and reason are mutually exclusive. In fact, particular attention is paid to the problem of holding to the sense that emotion “gets in the way” of rationality. Scholars and teachers participating on this very list have written about the problems with binary visions such as theoretical/practical; spiritual/natural; ordered/chaotic; certain/uncertain; intellectual/passional; mental/bodily and male/female.

Yet this particular argument illuminates the point that theorizing and arguing this view in the abstract is not the same as enacting it. For example, as I indicated in the introduction to the conversation to my coding of direct emotion words, contributors carefully characterized their own emotions in cooler, more rational frames, while representing emotions of those they argued against as more inflamed. In the post responding to the person who first questioned the award recall, for example what B. writes: “I’m a bit disturbed by G’s words. Other examples from this coding include:
writers noting that they are “uncomfortable with...”; calls for “reasonable discussion among concerned scholars;” and members who find what another post has said “a bit distressing.”

When representing other views, however (those with whom they disagree), descriptions of their emotional states include “vehement,” “hypocritical,” “vitriolic” and “self-righteous.” Of particular note is a comment near the end of the thread in which J. says, “I guess I have to take the angry label. If it was any other ethnic/religious/racial group characterized as such, I’m sure others would feel the same. And I’m sure I would still be just as angry.” He recognizes the way that being outwardly angry positions him in the argument, because anger is seen as less than rational, and therefore problematic to clear thinking.

We know that anger has a place in terms of building collective emotion and actions, yet those who admit to feeling it are likely to be dismissed. In their explanation of the framework passed down from ancient Greece, Emirbayer and Goldberg explain, “Emotions occupy a distinctly unenviable position...They are denigrated, seen as irrational, precisely because they accord too much importance to changing and uncertain things; persons in the grip of emotions are seen as every bit as unstable as the natural, material world itself” (473).

Beyond the representation of others as less rational (and therefore, by implication, less likely to be thinking well), there is also another, related “pernicious postulate” passed down, the impulse to imagine a singular, capital “T” Truth, unsullied by emotional impulse. This view is rarely represented as valued in the scholarship of the writing teaching community. But the listserv thread contains many such references.
After some discussion regarding the representation of Corrie’s death, and whether there might be other interpretations possible, more than one contributor notes simply that “The description of Rachel Corrie’s killing is accurate” (Rachel Corrie thread). I point this out not as an indictment of the response, but rather to help illustrate the ways that our commitments to various principles, beliefs and values (such as representation and the multiplicity of views possible) can fall away in contentious political situations. In fact, the next post makes note of this. Responding to the following quote,

>To say that there is no clear side of justice in the Middle East is to ignore a lot of history and to succumb to the >propaganda campaign that has allowed so much unnecessary death>

J. makes note of the fact that this is being presented as Truth, arguing that this one-sided thinking:

Oh come on. I’m not getting dragged into another one of these endless parades of “we believe in justice” when the rhetoric used is blatantly one-sided and hardly demonstrative of any justice. Don’t act self-righteous. One can easily go after the rhetorical stance taken up by this award and show how it IGNORES history and how this award is a very specific case of PROPAGANDA.

Please. I’ve long had enough of this facade that somehow a side is immune from the very things it accuses another side of taking up. Rhetoricians for Peace hardly is an exception. You have a one-sided position. Fess up to it.

…Simply put: I don’t find the award appropriate and I don’t find the propaganda move here appropriate. I especially don’t find the pretending that it’s not propaganda appropriate….

’Nuff said.

J.

This post makes the move away from the political situation itself, in order to argue that there is in fact a political agenda at work in the naming of the award.

Another writer responded to this line of critique by saying that calling it propaganda closes off discussion, and offering the following:
…what I find problematic about this award is that it takes this tragic incident and holds it above the thousands of tragic incidents that have been going on in that region for decades now. Where is the award named for the busload of Israeli school children which was stopped so that the children could be shot, execution style, at close range, for example?"

This post introduces yet another element of emotion/reason problem often examined in this social world, the question of pathos in argument. The argument is presented in unemotional terms (this is the same post from which I made note of above, in which the person notes that he would like a “reasonable discussion among concerned scholars”), but at the same time it is obvious that the argument uses a high dose of pathos for its punch. Another example of this same sort of pathetic appeal occurs in a post by R. in which he defends G’s original post, and suggests that making the award aligned with Corrie’s death is “a bit disingenuous” and moves on from there to describe “members of Orthodox Burial Society’s collecting scraps of flesh from the sidewalk in accordance with Jewish religious law.”

In post that references source material and links that would show the “accuracy” of the description of Corrie’s death, the founder of the award responds directly to G. who first expressed being “troubled” by the award, even though there are, by this time, several other people who have expressed similar concerns. After a brief explanation and listing of links, she notes: “These are the facts.”

My point in recounting these moments from my analysis is to demonstrate that the scholarly will among writing teachers to be open to other views, to value the part emotion has in reason, and to respect a small t version of truth can quickly be upended in situations of political contention. This has significant implications for the classroom where political work is being done. In the classroom, in fact, there is an existing power structure that begins as openly unequal between teachers and students, and sometimes
among students themselves, further complicating problem. If political questions such as these have the power to unmoor writing teachers from their convictions regarding fairness, or the importance of respecting emotion in belief systems, or the thoughtful and careful use of pathos in argumentation, why would this be different in our classrooms?

**Defining the work of (courageous) composition teachers: rhetorics of justice**

In her analysis of the formation of political belonging and nationalism, Mabel Berezin has suggested that:

Identity is both a noun and a verb; singular and plural. What is it; whom do I identify with? Who am I? Who are we? Personal identity and political identity differ. Who am I becomes who are we? In addition, Identity has an ontological and epistemological status. It describes a state of being as well as a category of social knowledge and classification. (85)

Berezin suggests that identity is about both being and about categorization, about a sense of oneself as an individual and also as a part of a larger structure.

In chapter one, I recounted some of the ways that composition teachers have imagined their history and their collective identity. This sense of collective identity matters a great deal in defining the work of composition teaching, particularly in relation to the project of critical pedagogy. My initial coding (Figure 5) included as categories “binaries referenced” as well as “calls for collective support or action.” Both of these categories fit together, and relate to the ways that individuals imagine they belong in relation to any group. When we draw the binary, we often ask for support, as
in the initial post by G., who wonders whether anyone else was “troubled” by this. Through the analysis of this listserv thread we can see how writing teachers, identified as an important “social world” in mapping the situation of interest, are not only stratified in the ways one might first imagine (tenured/untenured) but also in more subtle, yet important ways for our situation of interest.

The initial request for award nominations itself points toward one binary/call for support. It references untenured, part-time or contingent faculty (as opposed to tenured, full-time faculty). The award frames this cross-section of the social worlds even more tightly, calling for support not for those graduate students and junior faculty to write, teach, and serve in ‘safe’ subject and project areas,” but rather for those who “take on research, pedagogy, and service projects that promote commitment to peace, justice, and human dignity—even when hazarding the ire of deans, chairs, editors, and hiring and review committees.” (Rachel Corrie thread). There is an implication here that safe projects are not in the interest of a commitment to peace, justice or human dignity.

As we have observed in earlier parts of this analysis, part of the divisions that are made visible in subsequent posts is centered on the attachment of pedagogical bravery to an activist for the Palestinian cause. Some listserv contributors attempt to avoid the political binary of “Pro Israeli” or “Palestinian sympathizer” by pointing his comments at problem with using Corrie’s death as a symbol: “This award doesn't speak for me. And by saying that I'm not expressing my political views, solutions to a regional conflict, or any other binary division so often taken up here and elsewhere.”(Rachel Corrie Thread).

In this post J. tries to steer away from the Israel/Palestine supporter binary, though this binary does divide the group during the argument at various times.
According to a recent (2011) Gallup Poll, 63% of the American public say that their sympathies lie more with Israelis, while 17% say their sympathies lie with Palestinians in this conflict. It is also interesting to note that support for one or the other is strongly arranged along political ideology, with 80% of Republicans supporting Israel, and liberals polled as the least supportive of Israel of any group Gallup measured” (Saad). This is important to our analysis, because examining the argument through this lens, we can see the way one group might be imagining itself pushing against the norms of American political thought, in the way that some critical pedagogy aims, while the other group may be concerned about being portrayed as naïve or uncritical.

The binary drawn originally, regarding safe versus courageous teachers is of particular, parallel interest in this analysis, because it speaks to the question of how we define “courageous” teaching. Is courageous teaching, as it has been carved out here, only in service of the liberal point of view? In one particular post, the contributor makes an interesting observation about the differences between university politics and politics at large:

…I would add this about the very premise of the award itself, quite apart from the connection to Palestinian/Israeli conflict and Rachel Corrie.

To me, the very notion that, in the Academy, adjunct faculty are likely to be terminated or tenure-track faculty are likely to be denied tenure because of their [progressive/ politics or activism—the premise of this award—is as laughable to me as the Religious Right’s assertion that mainstream American political culture is waging a war on Christianity and its values. In both cases, those who are making the decisions—tenured faculty and elected officials—overwhelmingly share the values of those who are leveling the “critique.” In each case, it seems to me, the tactic is to manufacture a crisis where none exists so as to further motivate (and polarize!) the group’s base. To be sure, the academy can be a conservative force: what counts as research, what counts as publication, what pedagogy is valid, what is the canon (of any discipline); but these conservative policies are not related to progressive or conservative politics as we generally define them. Many politically progressive faculty members are arch-conservatives when it comes to pedagogies and canons. Many politically more conservative faculty members can come under fire for their desire to innovate pedagogically and in their research.
The conservatism rampant in the academy is simply not the kind of conservatism that impels one to vote for George W. Bush; it is, instead, the sort of conservatism that squelches innovation, that discourages experimentation, and that dismisses what is new precisely because it is new—and the sort of academic conservatives who can make a professional life difficult for the adjunct and untenured in this way live on both sides of the political aisle.

So, in my perfect world, an award for bravery among the adjunct and untenured (which this amounts to) would not award teaching from an extreme-Left political viewpoint, but in practicing sound, innovative, effective pedagogies and bold experiments in research and its reporting in the face of administrative conservatism—which, in my view, presents the much larger threat to the careers of new and emerging scholars in the academy today.

This post in particular seems to me to call attention to a division within the social world of composition teaching and also to create a new layer of complexity to the binary created earlier (brave versus safe... courage versus cowardice). What does it mean to be courageous as a teacher of writing? As one subsequent contributor to the list put it: “After all, doesn't *all* teaching of writing--all teaching, even--require some courage? Why single anyone out as any more courageous than anyone else? What about the quietly courageous who go unsung?” The teacher’s analogy quickly realigns her with the views of her group, as she notes the equally laughable premise in “Religious Right's assertion that mainstream American political culture is waging a war on Christianity and its values,” but she also wants to call attention to a wide range of practices that make a teacher brave, critical or effective.

The questions posed here hearken back to the broad range of strategies and definitions for critical pedagogy explored in chapter two, and raises questions about where the space is located that allows one to ask such questions within the larger writing teacher social world we have identified. This contributor’s post/question received no response, and the conversation went on, as I will explain in the next section of the chapter, to return to the question of Israel, Palestine and representation, which, ironically may be the safer argument to engage in this social world. At issue for our
inquiry in particular here, are the less noticed divisions in the project of teaching writing. Clarke argues, “Activities in all social worlds and arenas include establishing and maintaining boundaries between worlds and gaining legitimation for the world itself. These processes involve the social construction of the particular world and a variety of claims-making activities” (113). The boundaries being drawn here seem to be about Israel and Palestine, but examining this conversation in relation to critical pedagogy, one can begin to see that it also may be about what kind of teaching of writing counts as worthy, or brave, or courageous—and about who gets to decide this. In this situation analysis of the writing classroom and critical pedagogy, this is an important question.

The (surprising) power of collective emotion

In order to illustrate the power of collective emotion as an autonomous force, I take you to a section of the thread where a member of the listserv, L., decides to put in her two cents regarding the argument.

The point of the Corrie award is to recognize teachers who in one way or another take chances while teaching activism.

In the US we are most likely to be proIsrael because of the history between the US and the state of Israel. Period. And do not fool yourselves we are all under the influence of a group that can readily draw sympathies from the horrible crimes against them during WWII.

To quote the Fox theme, there is nothing fair and balanced in our mainstream media sources and those of us who have been working with PSCCj and RFP for a long time have discussed this often. We have also advocated the award because of our sense that what we hear from the post, the nyt, or other papers must be taken with a huge grain of salt.

L.

Note that L. aligns herself with a particular collective in the conversation (those of us who have been working with PSCCj and RFP) and that she feels part of the group that
advocates the award. Up to this point, there has been plenty of discussion about the policies in the Middle East regarding Israel, the meaning and definition of Corrie’s death, and the appropriateness of naming the award in memory of Corrie—the second paragraph of this post, however, becomes almost immediately the central focus of the discussion. In fact, the listserv thread is renamed “And do not fool yourselves we are all under the influence” after this. E. is the first to respond, renaming the thread:

I don’t want to extend this no-winner thread, but this comment is finally WAY over the line. "We are all under the influence" of Jews because they can “readily draw sympathies”? This is classic anti-Semitism. Not cool. Not cool at all.

I cannot believe I just read this comment in my email this morning.

This is followed minutes later by:

Good grief.

Are you not a teacher who works with ideas, language, tropes, etc. Do you not ask the students in your courses to pay attention to the words they choose, to read texts in specific ways as to not fall back on cliches or basic assumptions or simplistic reasoning, or even racist conclusions?

I don’t know what’s worse here sometimes. Composition teachers who repeat - without any sense of awareness - classic racist statements and then claim innocence or “how dare you accuse me of that” when called out; or the rest of us who let it pass.

"We are all under the influence of a group..." Classic. What other tropes are you willing to bring out too?

And this:

I don’t mean to pile on, but I agree with J. that no one should be left with the task of calling this out and thus getting the reputation for being angry. (Though anger is the right response.) This is pure “Jewish conspiracy” bullshit; I presume that L. belongs to “Rhetoricians for Peace,” but this certainly doesn’t strike me as “rhetoric for peace.”

After a good number of other postings referring to L.’s being a “shocking” and “offensive” and a “racist,” one contributor spoken up for L., not to exactly defend her,
but to allow that she might have been “referring to Zionism and Zionists, many of whom are clearly not Jews, in her reference.”

After a barrage of references to L.’s racism, simplistic reasoning and unfit qualities for teaching, L. writes: “Since you clearly feel it is important to react and inflame this conversation, I will cease from participating in it,” at which point she leaves the list, though this was perhaps not necessary as the moderator notes afterward that “though he is not shocked by anti-Semitism,” he “filtered the poster after that remark.”

I am not representing this moment in the conversation in order to defend the remarks L. makes. I represent it in order to illustrate a powerful autonomous force that we often don’t recognize—collective emotion. In the end, whether it seems like a choice or not, L. is silenced. Her comments, by most measures, would be considered offensive, even racist, but particularly so in the social world of teachers of writing, where the rules are clear about such things. Yet it is also interesting to note that a thread that began with a call for nominations for contingent faculty willing to take risks, L., a female Latino adjunct instructor, leaves the list after public shaming for her views.

In chapter three, I noted that I approached the methods I used in situational analysis with some theoretical perspective already in mind, namely, I planned to theorize the actors and “social worlds” through the concept of collective emotion as a part of discourse. Collective emotion is a term associated with a macro-level analysis of the functioning of emotion. For many of us, emotion is habitually imagined as an internal and individual response. Certainly there are physical and personal ways that emotion is experienced. But for the purposes of understanding emotion in a conversation like the one we are presently analyzing, imagine instead emotion as
fundamental to the way we form social groups—to coalition and solidarity. Randall Collins’ explanation of this phenomenon in conversation is particularly helpful “…an appropriate image of the social world is a bundle of individual chains of interactional experience, criss-crossing each other in space as they flow along time. The dynamics of coalition membership are produced by the emotion sense individuals have at any one point in time, due to the tone of the situation they are currently in (or last remember, or shortly anticipate), which in turn is influenced by the previous chains of situations of all participants” (134). In his analysis of conversation as interactional ritual, Collins explains that what he labels as “successful” conversations bind the speakers and create a sense of membership. But more interesting perhaps for our purposes here are his assertions about what happens when conversations do not bind participants together fully. “Among those conversations that do succeed in evoking a common reality, some of these produce a feeling of rank differences, including feelings of authority and subordination. These types of variability, in fact, are essential for producing and reproducing stratified social order” (134). Collective emotion is a way of understanding the waves of unified feeling that move through conversation, gathering up power, and subordinating others.

Emirbayer and Goldberg note that as long as emotion is imagined as individual states of mind, “Transpersonal phenomena that figure importantly in their accounts—solidarity, trust, hope, loyalty, identification, enmity, and so forth—all of which clearly entail collective emotional processes… cannot be theorized” (488). They also warn that theorizing emotion as an individual state distorts our ability to understand power, because it deters researchers from examining emotional situations for sources of power. Conceptualizing emotions as both collective and transitive allows for new insights
regarding the sources of power. In the example from the listserv, it might be possible to look more carefully at the moment as an example of the work of collective emotion.

One of the ways that power has been examined is through Bourdieu’s explanation of symbolic violence. Emirbayer and Bayer assert that (in Bourdieu’s framing) “actors often enjoy a certain emotional power over others...Thus masculine domination, for example, perpetuates itself ‘invisibly and insidiously’ through feminine submissiveness, which often takes the form of —shame, humiliation, timidity, anxiety...or-sentiments-love and respect”(492). Bourdieu’s conceptualization of symbolic violence does not create a sense that there is a clear “victim”—all players in the situations enact and propel the forces of emotion. Our listserv example is certainly too small and incomplete to draw any full conclusions about the source of power; this would potentially require an entirely new situation analysis. But it does hint at both Collins’ theory of the ways that collective emotion can serve to bind, and also to stratify and define power relations and Emirbayer and Goldberg’s assertions about symbolic violence.

Rather than taking on a full accounting of the sources of power in circulation on this thread of the professional listserv, I want to examine the moment for what it can tell us about the situation of interest in this inquiry—critical pedagogy in the writing classroom. If collective emotion has the force it appears to have even in our small example, it is important that we study its power and influence very carefully before invoking forces such as shame in politically charged moments in our classrooms.

In one of the final posts in the thread, M. remarks:

*I find the self-righteous pitch of this thread kinda fascinating. Not much interest in *inter*locution going down here among us-rhetoricians....but lots of interest in ranting in the name of justice against the other on the list who is classically and hopelessly stupid*
or biased or prejudice or uninformed or insert-your-slam-here. In fact, it seems that the other is so morally or intellectually out of it that engaging with him or her in honest-to-the-gods deliberation would be like shooting fish in a barrel. This thread--on a Writing Program Administrators list, no less--seems to operate as a microcosm of the broader realm of “civic discourse,” which makes sense but which also sure does deflate any self-important claims rhetoricians make about the need for the sorry-ass political body to study rhetoric.

If a fairly cohesive group of people trained in thoughtful use of language and scholarly inquiry methods succumb to the forces of collective emotion in politically contentious discussion, as it seems evident happened in this admittedly isolated but interesting moment, perhaps we should be thinking more carefully about the forces of collective emotion in our writing classrooms, as well. The next chapter examines scholarly work regarding writing classrooms featuring critical pedagogy, in order to better assess how and where these concerns might be attended to and recognized.
Chapter 5 Ubiquitous Emotion in Critical Pedagogy

(Whose) freedom? (Whose) power?

Much of the argument about critical pedagogy has centered on exigency and definitions of the practices. Why should critical pedagogy be done (now)? What are the true goals? The social efficacy of emotion is missing from many of these accounts, both at an individual and collective level.

McLaren argues that true critical pedagogy begins with the goal of shifting a student’s ideological views regarding capitalism. Yet McLaren offers little in the way of theorization of the individual or collective effects and movement of emotion in such a project. His argument is situated around the exigency and definition of critical pedagogy. But once students are provided with such a challenge to their knowledge and understanding of the world, how can we know what (re)actions ensue, especially taking unacknowledged macro structures of collective emotion into account? McLaren also appears to take little notice of the material circumstances for teachers in first year composition classrooms. Teaching assistants, who are employed in many first year writing classrooms using critical pedagogy, may have little experience or interest in the Marxist project. Or, alternatively, they may be quite steeped in it, but have little or no teaching experience that helps them navigate this challenge with their students. And even if we were to examine “composition teachers” from a more macro level in terms of emotion, there is some evidence of an inherence to seeing themselves, as a group, as
“working class” and this carries along with it emotional implications that require careful examination, as Barbalet’s work points out. What group resentments or fears might composition teachers carry, as a category or group, given the accounts reviewed in chapter one of their recurring identification as “working class” for example?

Bruce Horner does examine the material circumstances surrounding critical pedagogy as he critiques Elizabeth Ellsworth’s account of the failure of her try at a critical pedagogy course. Horner argues that Ellsworth treated the course as a commodity “isolated from the material circumstances of its specific enactments” (82) and goes on to examine the importance of power as relational. He examines the positioning of composition teachers within the academy and in the classroom in an effort to identify the material factors in the power dynamics of the classroom, but ignores the direct relationships between power, material social conditions and emotion, or how they might influence perceptions of students and teachers. How might an emotion such as resentment, which was examined in Barbalet’s work, for example, be functioning in the project of critical pedagogy? How might it shape reactions to what teachers often name as “resistance” to the project?

Tompkins “Pedagogy of the Distressed” provides another inside view of an attempt to engage in a critical pedagogy where students are given the power and freedom to guide the class, as she enacts the Freirian philosophy of education as “a practice of freedom” (653). Frustrated by a sense that her teaching had, by her own description, become a performance contrived to show how smart, prepared and knowledgeable she is, Tompkins designed a class that took her out of the expert’s role, allowing students to explore and move through the ideas they encounter, following the
advice of Freire. Tompkins speaks frankly about the emotions that motivate her as a teacher to stay with a classroom “performance” model:

What is behind this model? How did it come to be that our main goal as academicians turned out to be performance? I think the answer to the question is fairly complicated, but here is one way to go. Each person comes into a professional situation dragging along behind her a long bag full of desires, fears, expectations, needs, resentments—the list goes on. But the main component is fear. Fear is the driving force behind the performance model. Fear of being shown up for what you are: a fraud, stupid, ignorant, a clod, a dolt, a sap, a weakling, someone who can't cut the mustard. (654)

This is a startling description of the emotions associated with enacting a version of critical pedagogy based on what she calls “getting out of students’ way.” The course she taught used emotion as a topic, and Tompkins speaks here directly to the anxiety and fear in the situation. But emotion, in the end, is not truly a central focus of her questions or theorization. Instead, her focus moves back to the need to enact critical pedagogy as a way of attending to her own needs as a teacher, as well as those of the students.

In her discussion of “The Politics of Politeness” Ryden seems to recognize the need for theorizing emotion with regard to critical pedagogy, as she recommends that “critical pedagogy may well pay more attention to the rhetorical and social functions of emotion, in particular, anger” (85), but in the end, her essay is a recommendation not to allow ourselves to quell emotion in the classroom where critical pedagogy is creating political contention, rather than a full exploration of what exactly happens when one “resists the urge to contain [a crisis] too handily through an evisceration of its emotional
component” (91). What is missing from this, as well as the other accounts and theorizations mentioned, is a sense of humility about how little we actually know about invoking emotional crisis—in ourselves, in our students, and in our colleagues. Emotion is discussed as something that exists, or something we might use, but where are the questions, for example, about how our approach as teachers might be oddly shaped by the collective emotion of resentment? Where are the questions about the implications for opening up to and inviting crisis, or in some cases, violence, in our classrooms?

In the opening essay of Blundering for Change, a collection of essays that feature teaching narratives characterized as “blunders” in critical pedagogy classrooms, Powell tells about an incident which took place between a white male and a female student of color, in a critical pedagogy class he had set up to explore racial issues. During the exchange the male told the female student to “SHUT THE FUCK UP” (17, caps in original), and the female student slapped the male student across the face. I deeply admire Powell’s courage in telling the story to an audience of his colleagues, and for not turning the story into a teacher hero-narrative. But his stated hope for the narrative, and the collection as a whole as “putting something in circulation that people might turn to in similar situations” (20) leaves me with the same worries as the examples noted above. To be fair, he says that he admits that these examples require reflection and critical inquiry. But many other contributors to the volume follow up their “blunder for change” stories with quite specific suggestions for using emotion, for example, Micchiche suggests reasons why we should not avoid the provoked and development of anger in the classroom, based on its status as “an outlaw emotion” for the middle class, because, she argues, quelling anger potentially removes possibilities for change.
But I would ask whether a recognition that anger is not accepted within the social expectations and habitus of the middle class should translate automatically into a practice where we as teachers are now responsible for a deprogramming of this habitus by encouraging or evoking it in our classrooms.

Joe Harris comes a bit closer to looking directly at and theorizing the concerns of evoking emotion in *A Teaching Subject*, as he reexamines the now well-established ideas Pratt brought into play regarding the classroom as contact zone (or as Harris names it in *Composition and Resistance* a “zone of contact”). Harris agrees with the basic premise of the idea of classroom as contact zone (as opposed to harmonious community), but he is concerned that this metaphor does not truly give the teacher or students in such a situation any real advice regarding the productive “wrangling” Pratt describes in her essay—what this might look like, or how it would actually be performed. Harris asks composition teachers to think through ways that a sense of one’s “culture” might be fluid, rather than essentialized. This is an important point as it relates to emotion theory, particularly with respect to collective emotion. Harris’ use of the term culture here implies cultural identities, which have various collective emotional attachments.

Harris’ opens up these questions, not so much in terms of social class, but by examining the ways fluidity in identity. Though he offers answers to these identity/conflict questions more in intellectual terms, Harris’ points speak implicitly to questions of emotion. His metaphor of the classroom as “city” where one is constantly asked to approach unfamiliar people and ideas, but still has the safety of some smaller enclave of understanding and acceptance, is parallel to the important question of belonging, and collective identity, emotional phenomena about which much has been examined recently in the political psychology of emotions. For example, Berezin, who
studies the specific relationships between politics and emotions, has researched political movements and activities that allow her to theorize the ways that cultural identities are indeed “fluid,” just as Harris points out. Berezin lays out a theory of the “hierarchy of felt identity” (85) that helps explain the emotional categorizing we undertake when it comes to political beliefs, and lays the groundwork for useful ways to begin to think about the circulation of power in the collectives we feel we belong to. This concept of the collective is useful in reimagining the critical pedagogy composition classroom as a place where beliefs and politics often create lines of belonging; where values and ethics are purposefully brought into question; and where “power” within collective groups is shifted in sometimes unexpected ways. One area that has been examined within critical pedagogy a bit more carefully is gender, especially in relation to shame, which is examined next.

Embodied emotion and critical pedagogy

The question of how gender or other embodied differences operates within critical pedagogy has been of particular interest in composition, and has led many researchers toward emotion as one key to understanding the complexities of the intersection. Worsham invites some of the most sophisticated rethinking of critical pedagogy with regard to emotion in her essay “Going Postal: Pedagogical Violence and the Schooling of Emotion.” Though Worsham differentiates between “critical” pedagogy and “postmodern” pedagogy, she asserts “both arguably seek to change the emotional constitution of the postmodern subject so as to produce either a democratic citizen who participates fully in public life, or more radically, a revolutionary subject who is capable of the kind of political struggle that will transform the world” (251). The term pedagogy itself, in Worsham’s analysis, is meant in the broadest sense. Using
anthropologist Catherine Lutz as a guide, she examines what she refers to as the “dominant pedagogy of emotion” (my emphasis)—that is, the way that various subjects have been schooled through the family and the external world about the appropriate ways to feel and react. “This pedagogy mystifies emotion as a natural category and masks its role in a system of power relations that associates emotion with the irrational, the physical, the particular, the private, the feminine and nonwhite others” (241).

This has particular implications with regard to the classrooms where critical (but also what she specifies as postmodern) pedagogy is employed. Worsham urges us to re-imagine the project of critical (and postmodern) pedagogy as one that depends, in large measure, on emotion (and the pedagogy of emotion). Worsham argues that although it should bear careful attention, “emotion appears as a phantom limb, so to speak, more nearly felt than precisely seen, thus it remains undertheorized and mystified in many important respects” (251). The potential result of this oversight is sizeable. For example, Worsham examines the positioning of female professors, where dominant emotion pedagogy has them represented and understanding themselves as nurturers and caretakers, and looks carefully at the reactions of both male and female students toward them in their role as teachers for critical pedagogy. In the end, Worsham urges those interested in the project of critical pedagogy to consider the importance of a more intersubjective model: “Without a fundamental revision in our concept of subjectivity and of our affective relationship to the world, the radical potential of recent pedagogy to reconstitute our emotional lives may be recontained, in spite of its best intentions and the euphoria of its claims, as a strategy of condescension” (260).
Worsham’s innovative work incorporating anthropology and psychoanalysis to examine the work of emotion in critical pedagogy invites further analysis of this type. For example, to what extent is it necessary to question the sense that there are universalized understandings and motives for such things as shame and anger, emotions that are both being used and examined more closely in critical pedagogy classrooms? If there are ways that gender influences emotional exchange and the efficacy of critical pedagogy, what other factors should be taken into consideration?

Arjun Appadurai, who has studied the culture-specific use of praise in Hindu India, provides an important example that may offer some perspective. She demonstrates through her analysis that praise is offered and understood quite differently in depending on the setting. “In the domestic situation of most Hindu households, parents do not praise their children directly, for this would be seen as inviting free-floating malevolence of the “evil eye” (99), but “flattery is a part of everyday public behavior in India,” she explains, especially in relation to political figures (97). Perhaps more important to our analysis, however, is the profoundly different conception of the act of praise itself between Hindu India and most Western ideas of it. The object of the more ritualized, sometimes hyperbolic display of praise is, according to Appadurai “to create a chain of communications of feeling, not by unmediated empathy between the emotional ‘interiors’ of specific individuals but by recourse to a shared, and relatively fixed set, of public gestures” (109). Appadurai’s suggestion, that “emotional and aesthetic communion between audience, artifact and ultimate reality… differs from those assumed and created by most varieties of post-Renaissance Western critical theory” (109) must also be taken into consideration our decision to use and invite emotion in critical pedagogy. Appadurai does not speak to
questions of critical pedagogy in her work, but it brings to the table some further concerns about utilizing emotion as a tool for this work by showing the fundamental cultural differences in conceptions about emotion that may be at work in the classroom. In what ways might the “hierarchy” of identity function in a classroom where contentious political issues are being discussed based on gender, culture or religious beliefs? How might an emotion such as shame circulate differently on various bodies, and do quite different work, depending on the way social identity is constructed in an individual, aside from gender?

Probyn’s project takes rather a different approach—acknowledging the fact that affect is at work in critical pedagogy, and examining ways it might be useful. Probyn’s work is of interest on two fronts: it provides a continuation of the conversation about the importance of our definition of emotion, and it also adds a very different theoretical perspective regarding the uses of emotion in critical pedagogy. Like Worsham, Probyn sees emotion as important to the work of critical pedagogy, but instead of concentrating on issues such as intersubjectivity, she works from a view that emotion has the power to make social change possible. Probyn differentiates between the terms emotion and affect—the divide, according the Probyn is this: while emotion is a cultural construct, affect is a more innate and bodily reaction. "In the face of an undifferentiated lumping together of emotion and affect, I want to try to clarify the difference between the two terms. A basic distinction is that emotion refers to cultural and social expression, whereas affects are of a biological and physiological nature" and further expresses that she is "taken with the argument that shame is biologically innate" (xiii).

Though this divide between emotion and affect may be useful to Probyn’s particular theorization, as I have suggested earlier in the chapter, the division is not at
all obvious or accepted unanimously. Probyn writes: “those interested in cognition, social expression and the interpretation of cultures tend to study emotions. Those interested in the workings of the brain and the body study affects or the affect system. Very few writers cross the divide between the social and the biological” (xv). Counter to this claim, Stets and Turner, though conscious of the divide, encourage sociologists to move past their suspicions of biological study of emotion and fears of reductionism, in order to incorporate the important new findings in neuroscience into social and cultural theories of emotion. And in “The psychophysiology of Emotion” Larsen et al. describe one of the goals of the field of psychophysiology of emotion as “to investigate the physiological processes by which emotion is embodied” (181). Probyn’s neat separation of the two elements suggests that one could invert the will, to grab the learner using what she perceives as a place within him to which he has no real conscious access.

Probyn wants to use shame “productively” in order to push the subject to see herself in relation to such things as colonial oppression. Probyn imagines shame as a tool for shifting habitus: “Through feeling shame, the body inaugurates an alternative way of being in the world. Shame, as the body’s reflection on itself, may reorder the composition of the habitus, which in turn may allow for quite different choices” (56).

Bartky problematizes Probyn’s argument that shame has a useful and productive place in critical pedagogy. She examines the ways that affect/emotion are situated differently on bodies—a position more in line with Harris and Worsham’s conceptions. Bartky does not make a distinction between emotion and affect specifically; however she does explain the importance of the historical understanding of shame through moral philosophy. In traditional moral philosophy, Bartky explains, shame is understood as a painful but necessary part of developing an ethical stance to the world.
In Probyn’s argument, this would be akin to affect functions, the nearly automatic sense in the body that recognizes error, doing its job to create more ethical and thoughtful relations between people.

Bartky, arguing specifically about the way women are positioned in terms of shame, makes an important point of distinction, useful to our thinking through critical pedagogy in composition classrooms: “But for the shame-ridden and the shame-prone, there is no moral equilibrium to which to return: ‘feeling inadequate’ may color a person’s entire emotional life. Under conditions of oppression, the oppressed must struggle not only against more visible disadvantages, but against guilt and shame as well” (237). This is an important point to keep in mind in analyzing the emotion work in critical pedagogy. Shame is one of the most discussed emotions in critical pedagogy, and Bartky’s argument regarding the habitually shamed points to the inadvertent ways the moves of critical pedagogy may work to disempower those it seeks to liberate.

**Critical pedagogy and first year comp: ideals & realities**

Micchiche borrows from Ahmed’s theories to re-examine composition studies in a wide reaching project, arguing that we must look beyond the simple conceptions of emotion, (for example in terms of the use of pathos in argumentation), for clues about the important work emotion is doing in the field. Her analysis brings her to ideas such as the “persistent use of [degrading] metaphor” that creates a “feeling of disposition and hurt” for professionals and for the field more generally (45). Borrowing from Ahmed, Micchiche provides ideas about utilizing the power of “wonder” in students (46). Micchiche plays with concepts she describes as feminist wonder and critical wonder, and uses Ahmed’s description of these concepts as being “about recognizing that nothing in the world can be taken for granted, which includes the very political
movements to which we are now attached” (Ahmed qtd. in Micchiche 48). The ideas point toward a much more attentive and thoughtful approach to the critical pedagogy classroom. Citing Amy Winan’s work as an example, Micchiche describes a method of “starting from what students already know and feel about race” (107), for example, and taking students’ beliefs seriously.

Yet Micchiche also describes the current work of critical pedagogy in a way that seems prematurely optimistic. Describing the “new” version of critical pedagogy, which starts with respect for students’ experience she says: “…this is different from projecting certain emotions onto student bodies, as early version of critical pedagogy have been critiqued for doing, because more recent teaching methods are invested in what Ahmed calls wonder, which involves ‘learning to see the world as something that does not have to be’” (107). While these utopian ideals have potential toward making the classroom space more emotionally inviting, I’m not sure that all those involved with critical pedagogy would agree that methods “projecting certain emotions” on students have been replaced with more informed teaching moves.

This may be true in some classrooms—especially among those who are granted the time and space to think through these issues in depth. But the economic and physical realities of first-year composition programs dictate that many if not most of these courses are staffed by part-time and graduate student labor. Examination of a teacher training practicum in a large research-based university like the one where I teach allows a glimpse into the particularly complex nature of the faculty teaching these courses. The writing curriculum features a version of the first year writing course that Worsham would likely describe as a “post-modern” critical pedagogy: issues of power and difference are emphasized as a required part of the inquiry for all classes, and listed
as the first goals for the course. Some of these graduate teaching assistants who staff the courses come from the English department, and may be aspiring poets, novelists or short story writers. They may also be working on doctoral studies in English, (a program with a strong influence from cultural studies), or they may be doctoral students in the composition and rhetoric program. Some new teachers have experience in the classroom, others have never taught. For new graduate assistants, teaching writing as critical pedagogy requires complex handling of issues such as classroom authority, grading and evaluation and the goals of critical pedagogy.

In the next chapter, I examine materials drawn from this particular site of emotion work in the critical pedagogy classroom, drawing together the perspectives gleaned through analysis in the previous chapters.
Chapter 6 Negotiating the work of the writing classroom: emotion and critical pedagogy

Outwitted
He drew a circle that shut me out--
Heretic, a rebel, a thing to flout.
But Love and I had the wit to win:
We drew a circle that took him in!
~Edwin Markham

First year composition: ideals and realities revisited

Chapter five reviewed some of the material realities of the teaching of first year writing in contrast to the hopeful visions offered by Laura Micchiche. I noted that while her approach is certainly more informed and thoughtful than many others when it comes to the force of emotion in critical pedagogy, it largely ignores the reality that a great number of first year composition classes are taught by adjuncts and graduate students. The graduate teaching assistants who often staff these sections are not “assistants” at all; they are expected to teach sections of the first-year composition course after very brief training. And while a university and/or a writing department may have made a commitment to teaching inquiries explicitly directed at issues of power and difference, those who are actually teaching the courses may have little experience in teaching, let alone in the project of critical pedagogy. Some new teaching assistants in the practicum where I mentor, for example, bring a strong background in areas such as Marxist, postcolonial, race or gender theory, while some come with what composition scholars might label “romantic” conceptions of the production of writing.
They are a very diverse group in terms of their experience and attitudes regarding writing, but generally have a common lack of experience with teaching.

Negotiating authority, allowing for experience to count in building knowledge, managing the circulation of emotion, respecting diverse (and sometimes offensive) opinions—in other words, teaching writing as critical pedagogy—is difficult for the most seasoned teacher. The social world I earlier identified as “teachers of writing” includes new teaching assistants, but they are often the least prepared in this social world to take on this complex work. As one of the three mentors leading a practicum for these teachers, I recognized that the artifacts that had been produced as a normal part of the work of this practicum might provide some insight into the negotiation of the work of critical pedagogy in the writing classroom for this group of teachers and students.

What follows is a closer look inside the emotion work of new teaching assistants, students and mentors as they navigate and negotiate the first year composition classes. I examine the data (detailed in the next section) through the lens of emotion work (Hochschild, Bellas). But perhaps most significantly, my analysis of the data brings theoretical threads examined in previous chapters to bear on what Clarke and Star have referred to as a “site of silence.” For all of the discussion of emotion involved in teaching in the notes, observations, emails and other materials from the practicum, there is very little talk about how this emotion might be connected to the political inquiries in the courses. In order to see this, it is necessary to look at the discussions beyond simple open coding, to see the data relationally and contextually.
The new teaching assistant practicum

As explained in chapter three, I explained the methods from situational mapping used to establish relational sites that might illuminate the larger situation of writing teachers and critical pedagogy. The first data site examined, the listserv thread (chapter four) featured a contentious conversation among professionals in the field of composition and rhetoric. Through this examination, we were able to see the persistent ways that reason is conceptualized as excluding emotion, how emotion discourse serves to shape collective identities, and the surprisingly autonomous power of collective emotion. The data used for this part of the dissertation project comes from a teacher training practicum at a private research university. The practicum met once a week for two hours throughout the year, and was required for all of the new teaching assistants who join the department each year (typically 25-30). This site adds a new angle to our understanding of the situation, as it focuses directly on one segment of the larger social world of writing teachers who hold a particular positionality with regard to the larger situation.

New teaching assistants begin with a one-week orientation before the teaching semester, and then continue to meet once each week for two hours in small groups. The practicum is supervised by full-time faculty, but responsibility for the detailed planning and teaching of practicum sessions, curriculum development, classroom observations, vetting of calendars and other teaching materials is left to a group made up of staff and adjunct faculty members.

In most cases, new teaching assistants are immediately responsible for two sections of first-year writing classes in the fall, and one section of second-year writing in the spring, though a few are asked to serve as consultants in the writing center.
Teaching assistants are generally required to use the shared syllabus, texts and assignments during their first semester with the department.

Though required to use the shared syllabus, assignments and textbooks, teaching assistants choose from a menu of inquiries to be used to focus the class. The course catalogue description explains the first year writing course as: “Study and practice of writing processes, including critical reading, collaboration, revision, editing, and the use of technologies. Focuses on the aims, strategies, and conventions of academic prose, especially analysis and argumentation.” The term “critical” appears in this description applied to reading, but the first of the eleven goals for the course makes this focus much more explicit:

1. By engaging with issues of diversity and community and considering issues of power and difference that shape every rhetorical act, students will compose texts that are ethically responsive to different perspectives.

The crafting of course goals is a painstaking collaborative process, and the first goal of the course is an excellent example of careful rhetorical production. Built into this first goal is the explanation of why “engaging with issues of diversity and community” and “considering issues of power and difference” is imperative to producing “ethically responsive texts.” The inquiries which teaching assistants were asked to select from are designed to engage students in critical examination of issues of race, class, gender, sexuality, disability or other political topics. Inquiries for the first year course which teaching assistants could choose from included:

- Cinematic Depictions of Global Poverty
- Re-imagining the Normal
- Visual Rhetorical Analysis (of race, class, (dis)ability or gender and sexuality)
- Contested Space
The reader used for the course was a collection co-edited by a fulltime member of the faculty and a staff member, offering a variety of textual and visual genres designed to meet the requirements of these inquiries. Many of these readings offer perspectives which may be new to many students, such as Marable Mannings’ “What We Talk About When We Talk About Race,” or David Sibley’s “Introduction to Geographies of Exclusion,” and Susan Stryker’s “A Hundred Years of Transgender History.” The readings included diverse genres, including scholarly texts, images, graphic novel excerpts, poems and news articles.

The materials from the TA practicum used for this analysis were collected retrospectively and with identification removed. Some of these materials were written by TA mentors, including notes from the two-hour practicum sessions; observations of classrooms where teaching assistants instructed undergraduate students; notes recorded during team planning meetings; and monthly reports to the department. Other material was produced by the new teaching assistants themselves, including teaching reflections requested as part of practicum work and email requests for assistance and advice during the semester. Further data available from the student perspective included student evaluations of the courses, email correspondence with students forwarded to me from new teaching assistants, and comments recorded directly from the classroom visits and observations. As explained in chapter three, the data was first examined using open coding strategies, and then reexamined in light of subsequent situational, social world and positional mapping techniques.

As noted earlier, the first work with open coding yielded categories built around concerns for the new teaching assistants, specifically,

• AUTHORITY/POWER/IDENTITY
(teacher, gender, ethnicity, class)

- RELATIONSHIP
  (building, destroying, trust, community, respect, openness to other views)
- DIRECT EMOTION
  ("I feel statements" anxiety, fear, anger, resentment)
- CURRICULUM
  (negotiating, understanding, note of "critical")
- BELIEFS/OPINIONS
  (Respecting students, questioning where derived)
- QUIET STUDENTS/VOCAL STUDENTS
  (questions and concerns about why students are not talking, who is doing the talking)
- GRADING
  (anxieties, student anger, worry)

But what appeared to be missing from this data was the direct discussion of the work of “engaging with issues of diversity and community, and considering issues of power and difference” noted as the first goal of the course. The category labeled “Curriculum” seems to imply references to political issues, but in most cases there were only vaguely glossed with comments about the teaching assistants needing “time to digest it” or “negotiating” the curriculum.

Given the influences noted regarding politics, identity and collective emotion found in the analysis of the listserv, the fact that teaching assistants had plenty to say about their emotional turmoil, but remained silent regarding political dimensions of the curriculum was something to examine closely.

When the discourse from these materials is placed in a larger context and examined relationally, is possible to see how political contention and collective emotion might be influencing any of these categories. As we shall see through the analysis, the concern and talk about “quiet students” and “vocal students” and “silenced students,” for example, actually appears to be potentially related to who felt authorized to speak in a class. Reflections regarding how to respect the “beliefs and opinions” of students may relate to the concern about how to negotiate differences in political identity. Likewise,
the many examples in the collected materials of teachers worrying about “authority,” could also potentially be about the critical angle of the curriculum. The following passage is taken from notes (internal to the teaching team) about a class observation of a new teaching assistant who was respected for her dedication and interest in teaching and in the practicum:

A. has spoken on a number of occasions about her struggles with a small passel of resistant students (mostly business majors), so I made arrangements to observe her teach the section with those students. They are pretty jerky—uninterested, dismissive—but A’s instruction was impressive; those students who haven’t tuned out are getting a great studio experience. A. paces her classes beautifully: she provides clear instruction and context for an exercise; she allows just enough time for students to apply themselves to the exercise; and she brings the class back for important debrief. She also responds to students’ questions, concerns, and struggles with patient, generous, clear comments.

What is at work here? The observations are not contextualized within the framework of the political nature of the inquiry, so we can’t know for sure. While it is certainly true that there are occasionally negative, disinterested or even disruptive students in undergraduate classrooms, one wonders how and why such thoughtful and well-planned instruction is being dismissed by a group of her students. The note made by her mentor regarding the fact that they are mostly “business majors” makes one wonder whether there are ways in which the expectations and worldviews of students who come to college to study business, in particular, might more likely be at odds with the critical examination of power and difference? If so, why and how?

In this and other examples, there appears to be a link between the issue the students and teachers appeared to be struggling with (authority, for example) and the course goals that put political contention at the forefront, but the link is tenuous.

Rather than analyzing the materials in a completely open-ended or uninterested way, I argue that by looking at this material from a situational viewpoint, and in light of
what we can see through the previous analysis of the listserv thread, we are able to observe some moments where the work of the writing classroom is being negotiated between three “actors”—the student(s), the teachers, and critical pedagogy. But perhaps more importantly, I argue that collective emotion may be an important element in the composition classroom, and in effect, on the negotiation of what the purposes and work of the space are or should be.

But there is another important element to consider as we examine this material, the emotional work teachers such as the one above must skillfully navigate in order to be successful is labor that goes largely unnoticed; it’s the labor that is quietly referenced in the last lines regarding the teacher’s patience and generosity in the face of “jerky” and dismissive students.

**Emotion work: invisible labor of the writing teacher**

The concept of emotional labor is best known through the writing of Arlie Hochschild; introduced nearly 25 years ago in her book, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Widely read and cited, Hochschild’s pioneering book examines the ways that workers, and especially female workers, are expected to regularly perform labor that requires a great deal of emotional skill and effort; work which goes largely unnoticed. Hochschild’s study of the work of flight attendants drew her to analyze the way emotion is trained and commodified. Flight attendants, she explains, are trained to smile, and to smile genuinely, to feign excitement and joy in the work they are doing. In the interviews Hochschild conducted, flight attendants explained that they were asked not just to be polite to difficult people, but also to actually try to devise a reasonable explanation for the unacceptable behaviors of customers through the use of imagination. They were encouraged to try to see things
from the passenger’s point of view, even if it meant making up a plausible story about passenger’s lives—and they were taught to create a metaphor for their relationship to customers, to think of the passengers as family members; the plane cabin as their living room. One attendant told Hochschild that if there was an especially difficult passenger, the attendant imagined that he had recently lost his spouse or job, and this was the cause for their irrational and rude behaviors (105). Some of these flight attendants found they could not stop behaving in this unnatural way even after the hours of work ended. Hochschild names this type of work emotional labor.

This labor requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others. This kind of labor calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality … (7)

This idea, that one might be expected to suppress their own emotion in order to produce “the proper state of mind in others” is a task many teachers will recognize from their daily work. In class discussions in the critical pedagogy classroom this can be a very tall order, as in the example from chapter one, in which a teacher was faced with racist talk from a student in her classroom. How far does/should the sense that it is our job to submerge our own emotions for the good of students? And in what respects are students encouraged to follow the same practice? How is this potentially productive, or oppressive?

In “Emotional Work in Academia,” Bellas examines the way emotional labor is performed, particularly by women, as they undertake the teaching, service and research required as a professional in higher education. Bellas’ findings indicate that: “Teaching and service clearly involve substantial amounts of emotional labor” (107). She finds this
work is particularly evident for females in the professoriate. “Not only must [female] professors display positive emotions, but they must also work to control negative emotions—both their own and their students” (100). Professors are expected to maintain a degree of neutrality and to suppress negative feeling toward their students, and any display to the contrary is read on the female in particular ways. Emotion work has always been built into teaching at all levels, and it has particularly implications for students and teachers in the writing classroom.

English and writing departments who develop instruction that features critical pedagogy in their writing courses do not set out to specifically demand emotional labor of writing teachers and of their students. Still, what does critical pedagogy, or perhaps more broadly, the cultural studies inspired curriculum of many composition classrooms, in its various forms, bring to the table that is new in terms of emotion work? In what ways might the kind of emotion work Hochschild describes above be played out, as teachers and students in these classrooms are asked to take on emotion invoking questions regarding contentious political issues such as construction of race, class, gender and sexuality. “The personal is political,” as the saying goes; but the political is also personal.

Hochschild theorizes that there are two levels of involvement in emotional labor. In “surface acting” Hochschild explains, the subject displays an emotion that she may not actually experience, recognizing that this is the emotion that is required of her in a given work situation. But “deep acting” goes further; deep acting is the step the subject takes away from the freedom to produce an authentic emotion, to an internalized version of the emotion required for the job. It is easy to see the parallel to situations teachers encounter in the classroom, when they hear or see things that are seem
problematic—even reprehensible. But perhaps we might also imagine this from the other side of the desk. Are we inadvertently asking for a kind of “surface acting”—or even “deep acting” from students who suppress emotional reactions to the political and ethical ideas we ask them to consider?

Bartky’s analysis of women’s emotion work offers important ideas that complicate the matter further. Bartky’s analysis draws from Hochschild, as she argues that women are the primary deliverers of what she describes as “the feeding of egos, the tending of wounds” (105). Bartky makes an interesting note about the distinction (or lack thereof) between the kind of emotional work Hochschild describes—commercialized—and the emotional work that is done for intimate others. “Surely the opportunity to attend to the Other in these ways must be morally empowering, for it gives us the chance not merely to be good by doing good, but to become morally better through the cultivation and exercise of important moral qualities” (105). But, upon closer analysis, this is not so, Bartky argues. The emotional nurturance women give is not truly reciprocated in many of our intimate relationships (as mothers and wives, for example), and the disempowerment is still there, though more “subtle and oblique” (108) than in the kind of commercialized emotional labor Hochschild outlines.

But perhaps the roles of teaching (and learning) lie somewhere in between commercialized emotional labor and intimate emotion work. Students and teachers are not intimates, but neither are they strangers. Each of us could name at least one teacher that we can say we honestly loved—we develop relationships, especially in the classes with smaller numbers, as in many first year composition classes. And critical pedagogy, with stated goals for a better world and a more just democratic society, complicates this sense of emotion further. In one student’s evaluation of a teacher, for example, the
student wrote: “I can’t answer these questions because literally M. is the best teacher I have ever had. Her class completely transformed my way of thinking and observing the world. This is not b.s.; she has transformed me as a writer and a person. She taught a course that has had more impact on me than the last 12 years of primary school combined. I can’t speak highly enough of her.”

It is non-commodified emotion work, born of free will, in that we are “doing good” --working to make the world a better more just place. And yet it is emotional labor as well, commodified emotion work which takes skill, is a required part of the job, financially compensated, but not likely to be reciprocated equally in terms of emotional care-taking.

This is not to suggest that there was not emotional work involved in composition teaching in the past. As a high school teacher in the early 1980’s, trained in process theory and equipped with suggested techniques such as student free-writing and journaling, I once received a 19-page journal entry. It was a confession from a male student, a senior in high school, who had been sexually abused as a child, and then gone on to sexually abuse other young men. I honestly don’t remember the prompt I used for the “free-write” that led to this heart-wrenching journal entry, and perhaps it doesn't matter. What does matter about this incident is that this personal/narrative writing (though not at this level of disclosure) was a quite common response to the open-ended writing tasks many teachers used to help developing writers. Peter Elbow, Ken Macrorie, Don Graves and other scholar-teachers encouraged writing teachers to think through the best ways to get students to produce “authentic” prose, often starting with personal experience. The result was narrative—sometimes quite personal narrative. Without training in psychology, many writing teachers who worked with
these methods, including myself, were placed in a precarious position in cases like these—navigating extreme emotion, doing grueling emotional work.

Many of us in composition realized (sometimes in disturbing and painful ways, as in my example above), that we were wholly unqualified to navigate the emotional responses evoked, and turned our attention to ways that we might quell the impulse toward self-disclosures of this kind in our work. The emotional work in composition teaching is not peculiar to critical pedagogy or to the turn toward a more cultural studies’ influenced curriculum, but it does change the shape of the work in important ways, and the choice to use the inquiries and teaching methods of critical pedagogy require as much, if not more responsibility to understand the emotional work we asking for and performing as did teaching practices that invited disclosure through narrative.

Emotional and political negotiations in the writing classroom: grades, authority and content

**Grading and Evaluation.** In any educational setting there is an intersection between grades, and in composition grading can be especially fraught with emotion. Evaluating another person’s written work, means, at least in part, evaluating their ideas. Writing teachers do not have the comfort of “objectivity” that comes from evaluation methods such as multiple-choice exams. This apparent “subjectivity” helps make grading and evaluation one of the most emotion-laden issues for teachers and for students.

Sometimes these moments seem to have little to do with questions of politics or other elements of critical pedagogy. For example, consider the following email from a
student regarding a grading issue, forwarded to me by a new teaching assistant seeking advice:

On Dec 22, 2008, at 11:28 PM, S wrote:

Hey E,

I see that my final grade for your class is a B-. I was wondering if there is anyway I could appeal my grade? I have spoken to you about my situation and how much it has affected me and I know you have been very sympathetic and understanding, and it is very much appreciated. But I will lose my scholarship now. I need to have a 2.75 GPA to maintain my scholarship. If you were to give me a B I would be able to keep my scholarship. And now I can’t afford staying in Syracuse next semester. I know it is not fair to ask you to rethink my grade but I am in a very bad situation right now, and I need your help. I am hoping you understand and help me, please. I need a B in your class just to be able to stay in Syracuse next semester and I would so greatly appreciate it, you have no idea. My home life is not going to get in the way any more but I need a second chance, I don’t want to have to leave Syracuse after a bad first semester due to things that weren’t in my control. Thank you so much for your time and consideration and I hope you are well and the baby is well too.

Sincerely, S.

After much thought and deliberation, the teacher wrote a carefully worded email in response, explaining that grades were based on academic performance, not personal circumstances, and explaining the student’s alternatives: “You are welcome to write back to discuss this with me further; to explain the academic reasons you feel your grade should be changed; or to begin a formal appeal process,” she wrote to the student. The student accepted the response and did not appeal further.

In her research regarding the feminized and “nurturing” role of teaching, and gendered emotional work, Bellas finds that male professors are less likely to relate personal experiences in the classroom, and that “female professors are more likely than males to exhibit warm, reinforcing behavior in the classroom” (99). We can see evidence of both of these in the above email, as the student mentions that the female teaching assistant has been “sympathetic and understanding” and also wishes she and her baby
well. These comments make clear that sympathy and understanding are important aspects of her work with the student. We might also glean from the email that the personal information about her being the mother of an infant was offered by the teacher.

This email, and the many others like this one, do not reflect direct influences of political contention connected to an inquiry of power and difference, but there are forces of emotion at work with regard to gender. In chapter one, I explained the ways that teachers of writing are often placed in the strange divided position of gatekeeper, along with the role of nurturer of champion of the student fighting against a system that appears biased. This teacher chose gender and sexuality as a topic of inquiry, but making this the focus of the inquiry for the class does not disrupt emotional forces that reproduce power related to gender. In other words, knowing/theorizing gender roles in the class does not necessarily influence on their reproduction through collective emotion.

Here’s another, similar example, from a student to a female teacher who has advised the student to drop the course because his grades were near failing:

…Yes you have been fairly understanding, but until you can step in my shoes, you’ll never understand. I thank you for your willingness to work with me, but if you knew all I had to go through, you wouldn’t quit on me, because even with all the things i’ve been through, I HAVEN’T QUIT ON ME…No one in that class is going through half of what I have to go through EVERYDAY….And I haven’t been doing bad considering what I could be doing…I could’ve dropped out and quit but I DIDNT!

So yes, i’d like to meet with you, just tell me a time and ill be there….Enjoy your the rest of your weekend…Because I wont.

B.

This email is indicative of the pattern regarding the expectations for female teacher’s emotion work noted by Bellas, Bartky and others. These teachers and students
may not recognize that they are being called into a particular position through collective emotion. The student in this email is using the emotional work role already in place, essentially arguing that by not supporting his decision to stay in class, the teacher is not fulfilling her role as a nurturer. In this case, a few of the student evaluations of this teacher at the end of the semester made reference to her “lack of responsiveness to student needs and questions,” further evidence that there is a collective identity and emotion role in place, one that makes grading and evaluation potentially more full of anxieties, stress and guilt, especially for a teacher with no experience navigating such emotional work.

In each of these cases, we can see collective emotion regarding gender roles in the power dynamics of the situation. But what about direct influences of a classroom where political topics themselves are influencing the grading process? As mentioned earlier, this is not as easily discernable, because in most cases, neither the students nor the teacher openly recognizes the role that political contention may play in the process. But there were places that this became a bit more visible.

A male teaching assistant, B., wrote with a particular concern about an email from an “angry student” he had received. The students claimed that the teacher used “biased, inconsistent grading.” The teaching assistant’s explanation of the problem was that the student had made generalizations that were not supported. The grade dispute was about a paper that made an argument that the “baby-boomers” who were once central to anti-war activity are now steering the country’s liberal movement. In practicum, B. explained to me that the student supported the war in Iraq, and was trying to establish a connection with the anti-Vietnam movement and the current antiwar sentiment as coming from the same basic, but now better established, group,
the baby boomers. I did not read this paper, and from B’s account of the argument there were, in fact quite serious flaws in logic. Here’s a small part of the student’s response to this TAs critique and grade:

Forgetting the pictures of boomers, draft ages and facts, or all of the other information I provided…as well as common historical knowledge…I guess i didn’t show any other link that boomers were anti-war?!

Who is the department head? I’d like to see what he/she thinks of my paper and your seemingly biased, inconsistent grading.

J.

The negotiation regarding “what counts” in the evaluation of student writing in this example is related to the others, in that emotion is playing an important role; but in this case there is the potential to see the political contention involved a bit more clearly. The teacher of the class had an anti-war sticker on his office door. The student was a first year recruit for the ROTC, according to the teaching assistant. Was the teacher correct in his assessment that the student had made hasty generalizations about the connections between large groups (the boomers) and their political affiliations (liberal) and later predilections (against the Iraq war)? Almost certainly. But the larger problem has to do with the forces of collective emotion at work in this moment as the two of them negotiate the evaluation of his writing.

For example, one might look at the student’s “angry” reaction as potentially related to the collective emotions he has gathered in his affiliation and identity as a new member of the Reserve officer’s training Corp. One might also look through the lens of Ahmed, and her suggestion that collective emotion (in this case, anger) toward large groups, (in this case ‘the liberals’) is part of a larger economy of affect, one in which anger and hatred circulate based on previous experiences and the framing of ideas from
our past and expected futures. On the teacher’s side of the situation, even if he is able to see past his own feelings about the war, how does he reconcile this with the tangled question of what makes a convincing argument, and to whom, and his authority at that moment to evaluate this other person’s argument?

Similar examples of collective emotion at work emerged in other grading situations, as well. In a formal monthly report, a member of the mentor team noted that a particular teaching assistant indicated he “struggled with the impulse to ‘make students see’ what he thinks they should see…. & this has led to some frustration and anger in students” And in the same report on this TA the mentor writes that “M. is willing to grade students rigorously. He’s currently experiencing push back from some disgruntled students over their analysis essay grades.” But are the two things fully separate issues? How does a teacher navigate contentious political terrain in the classroom without making students “see what he want them to see?” And in some variations of critical pedagogy, is this even the object? This TA, in particular, chose a difficult inquiry in terms of this problem. His class inquiry, “Re-imagining the Normal” takes as a central premise the idea that particular categories are developed and maintained (regarding race, sexuality, social class, gender and disability) in order to reproduce existing power structures. Core texts the TA chose to be included from the suggested menu in the reader included, Eli Clare’s “Freaks and Queers,” JoAnn Wypijewski’s “A Boy’s Life” and Jaspir Puar’s “In the Wake of It Gets Better.” All three of these texts make arguments regarding the problems with normative categories of sexuality and also with the reproduction of masculinity more generally. The teaching assistant’s scholarly interests were in sexuality and gender studies. Even a seasoned teacher might have difficulty deciding where the edge of “seeing what you want them
to see” actually is in such a circumstance. For a teacher who has no classroom experience, this seems like a nearly impossible task. Notice also the phrasing of his circumstance from the mentor: “M. is willing to grade students rigorously.” As mentors, we encourage TAs to use a range of grades, and to think very carefully about grade inflation. What exactly is the push back from disgruntled students? We don’t ever get to hear about this. It appears to be about grades. Yet we know, from examining the contentious political argument among rhetorically skilled and thoughtful colleagues on the listserv thread, that political contention can open up waves of collective emotion. Perhaps the teaching assistant’s inability to hold back his views as if they were already decided arguments had nothing to do with the disgruntlement or “push-back” of his students. But it is well worth asking more questions about.

**Authority.** In many of the materials collected from the practicum work, there were references to what emerged as a category I labeled authority/power/identity. In many cases, the issues and talk in this category appeared mostly related to the fact that many of these teachers were so new to this work. For example, consider the following TA reflection produced at the end of the semester:

> I think one of the most important things I learned in teaching this semester was that, despite the fact that, on the first day, they all wondered who the teacher was, there is a bigger difference than I ever imagined between myself and the freshmen.

The teaching assistant who composed this reflection had no teaching experience prior to this, and in her reflective analysis of the ways she found authority, at least in part, by differentiating herself from the students. She thought, for example, that they would have the same pop culture references, being close to the same age, but found this was not so. “At first I kind of resented it” she explains, discussing a lesson where she realized they had none of what she first assumed in common, “but then I realized it was
more important to learn about analysis, even if my examples weren’t working."

Learning to differentiate oneself as teacher is an important shift in identity, requiring a
great deal of emotion work.

As another TA put it, “I thought I’d be sort of a hardass. Instead, I’ve found that
I’m really not a hardass at all. In some ways, this is good…” Other TA’s talked about
this moment of finding oneself identified as the teacher in terms of fear:

Never having taught before, I was worried about being in front of a college classroom. I
worried about my brain freezing up, or them smelling fear. Over the course of the
semester, I have gotten more and more comfortable in front of the room, and that has been
a relief and has given me a sense of accomplishment.

One is reminded in some ways of the description provide by Tompkins of the
performance model of teaching, and her fears of giving up this sense of
accomplishment, in order to use a version of critical pedagogy that puts students in
charge of the class: “Each person comes into a professional situation dragging along
behind her a long bag full of desires, fears, expectations, needs, resentments-the list
goes on. But the main component is fear. Fear is the driving force behind the
performance model. Fear of being shown up for what you are: a fraud, stupid, ignorant,
a clod, a dolt, a sap, a weakling, someone who can't cut the mustard” (654). Setting
aside the more “radical” model of critical pedagogy that takes the students to new
political models, even a critical pedagogy like Tompkins’, which she describes as
“getting out of students’ way,” may be outside of the reach of many new teaching
assistants, emotionally speaking. How does one give back authority that she was never
really granted?

Some teaching assistants made direct note of the challenges of the curriculum,
though without direct reference to the concerns of contentious politics. In this reflection,
in fact, the TA denies any relationship between the curriculum and questions about authority,

_This was a semester of anxiety for me, and I think a lot of that anxiety emerged from dealing with a new curriculum and a shared syllabus. The problem is not with the curriculum itself. Indeed, I think it’s a strong and appropriately challenging curriculum that really has helped my students improve their critical thinking and academic writing. The problem, for me, was in feeling like I couldn’t own the curriculum, that I hadn’t internalized it yet._

The reflections are public documents posted to a wiki, and teaching assistants are aware of our particular interest in them as mentors. It’s not clear what part of the curriculum that this TA has not “internalized” yet, but like so many other examples from the data gathered here, the teacher subtly avoids any connection there might be between the issue being examined as producing emotion and the goal of engaging with issues of power and difference. Another TA described her challenge to “triangulate the program’s goals and expectations with my own teaching style and the particular needs of my students.” In each of these cases, we can see the hint of a connection between authority (“my own teaching style”) and critical pedagogy (“the program’s goals and expectations”), but it is not explicitly named.

Not all TAs are equally successful with achieving authority through “triangulation” of these goals. In the notes from a class observation reprinted below, we see the kind of fear that Tompkins discusses brought to the light of day for one new TA:

_I arrived before S. did and several students were quick to say, “Are you the boss?? Help us!” The class involved students’ questions not being answered, content that was unintelligible, and a classroom atmosphere that was uncomfortable. The rudeness coming from students was difficult to watch; I saw virtually no ability to pull the troublesome students back into a productive mode. The results of this observation turned into an intervention. S. was/is really struggling with both classroom management and delivery of content._

Like many of the other documents collected from this site, there is no overt indication that critical pedagogy or the study of power and difference is plays any part in the
authority questions evidenced in the above observation. S., a smart and dedicated scholar in feminist postcolonial studies, chose a particularly politically angled inquiry in the first year composition class, Visual Rhetorical Analysis of Sexuality and Gender. The mentor names the problems she has observed as “classroom management” and “delivery of content,” but she also notes that the atmosphere was “uncomfortable” and that the “rudeness” of the students was “difficult to watch.”

As in so many of the previous examples, questions about the relationship between the political nature of the course and other seemingly straightforward teaching matters as delivery, hover just far enough away from one another that it is impossible to derive any full conclusions. Bourdieu’s theories regarding symbolic violence and collective emotion might be at least a consideration in interpreting this particular classroom relationship, given a more thorough perspective. There is a kind of symbolic violence that appears to be swept onto this teacher by some members of her class. And though I do not wish to risk making her true identity visible for the reader of this dissertation by providing too many details, her cultural identity is embodied in the classroom through her speech and physical appearance, and it is possible that this impacted on the way she was bullied and harassed.

Such moments are often identified as “contrapower harassment,” but this seems like a term that may stop analysis of the dynamics of emotion in the room nearly as quickly as naming it a problem with “delivery of instruction.” Creating a name for the behavior does nothing to create more nuanced understanding of the dynamics involved. Buchanan and Bruce, writing about their own experiences with contrapower harassment, describe those who impacted them as “a small but significant group of students who found my presence offensive, my authority comical, and my capacity to
disperse knowledge non-existent. For this group of students, I will never be seen as knowledgeable or worthy of their respect because I do not embody the two factors they believe are key to being a professor: being white and being male” (AACU). My critique of this term is not to say that the phenomenon they describe does not happen, or that it does not matter. It happens and it matters. But I would argue that such a moment has more complexity than simply not believing anyone could be a professor except a white male. As Ahmed has theorized, the affective economy and the collective emotions in circulation within it are complex. A closer more analytic look at the circulation of emotion that results in these circumstances might yield more productive ways forward when encountering such behaviors and emotions. One can hear, in the description of the students imagining her authority as “comical” something of anger and resentment. Rightly so. But recall the power of collective emotion to create waves of power from the analysis of the listserv thread. In this case, Buchanan and Bruce suggest that this is the only reason for behaviors like those described, and also set the stage for collective aggression toward and student who seems to belong to the broad category of disruptive or disrespectful.

In my conversations with S. about her classroom, she reported how difficult it was some days to walk into the classroom. Her expectations regarding the behavior, interest and attitudes of her students were very different from what she actually encountered in this required class. She wanted to offer them freedom, but the students’ reaction to her made it necessary to reclaim this authority. She wanted to explore normative attitudes regarding gender, but the very thing she hoped to help students look more critically toward was being performed in the classroom, defying theorization and “rational” scholarly analysis.
There were many examples of the kind of “emotion work” that Bellas referenced in her study, as well—moments where the teachers are working hard to learn what Hochschild describes as the “feeling rules” of the profession—the appropriate public displays of emotion that represent the “moral stance” or script required of them (56). In some cases we also see individual moving from a “surface acting” to a “deep acting” of these rules. In surface acting, the teacher recognizes that there may be a gap between “what do I feel” and “what should I feel.” In deep acting, the distinction between these two things may blur, or may even be invisible to the person. Unlike the teacher in the opening example, who is learning to differentiate herself from students, the TA in the passage below is having a difficult time finding commonalities that allow for a sympathetic perspective:

_Education should not and cannot be viewed as merely an economic commodity. I should be teaching students because they want to learn, not simply because they’ve paid tuition. If a student refuses to participate or grow academically, this (to a certain degree) is not my responsibility. However, connecting with “below-average” students has been something I’ve worked on this semester. Not to sound egotistical, but I consider myself a relatively “good” student -- I always make an effort to participate, make thoughtful comments, and submit my work on time. So, at the risk of sounding naïve, being confronted with a student who never turns in homework, makes comments tangential to the topic at hand, or comes to class only to daydream is a whole new experience for me. I’ve had to place myself in the (relatively alien) position of a student who does not want to be an active part of the class and work to remedy that._

In puzzling through his response to uninterested students, M. is looking for the appropriate reaction; searching for a way to come to terms with his own irritation and disappointment, and also to decide whether guilt is appropriate as a reaction. His description of the student who “never turns in homework, makes comments tangential to the topic at hand, or comes to class only to daydream” makes his irritation and disappointment clear, if only by noting the unqualified descriptors such as “never” turning in homework or coming to class “only” to daydream. But at some point the
teacher has come across evidence in his experiences that the emotion of anger or irritation will not suffice in his role as teacher, and thus has tried to imagine himself in the “alien” position of the student who is causing this reaction, and find ways to try to “remedy” their behavior. This is not yet what Hochschild would call “deep acting;” the teaching assistant is trying on a way to identify with and empathize with the student, but this is not (yet) a part of his own sense of identity and beliefs. Rather this is the kind of “what-if” imagining that Hochschild explains can potentially lead to deep acting. For the veteran teacher, encountering such behaviors, is deep-acting already in place? Or perhaps the sense of collective authority based on years of experience makes this level of emotion work no longer necessary, as authority can be situated in another way?

The reflection can also be interpreted through the lens of collective emotion. The moral stance this teacher has taken on the issue of motivation still dominates, as the teacher struggles with whether it is part of her job to have “the burden of instruction” (motivation) on her shoulders alone, and the shadow of a collective sense of resentment toward the student, who the teacher reads as belonging to a group that sees education as purely an “economic commodity” becomes faintly visible. This collective sense of resentment, then, belongs to those who feel education is and should be separate from the marketplace. The negotiation of purpose for the composition classroom is examined in the next section.

**Purposes.** While there were few materials collected from the practicum which spoke to direct clashes between teachers and students regarding the purpose of their education in classrooms that focused on political inquiry, Russell Durst’s account of first year writing classes at University of Cincinnati provides a perspective on the much
deeper complications of understanding “motivation” in a classroom that centers on questions of power and difference. As Director of the Composition Program, Durst wanted to learn more about what he described as a general “resistance to writing instruction” (27). Durst was especially interested in the ways that the “cultural literacy” approach to the classroom (an approach with many of the same characteristics others would categorize as critical pedagogy) was negotiated between students and teachers. Through a two year analysis, he found that the goals students have in mind upon entering the writing classes at UC “differ substantially from those that will soon confront them” in the classes. “Students report little interest in engaging in critical analysis, in extending their writing processes, or in entering the sort of intellectual community the writing class entails” (60). In the end, Durst’s claims are not that we should forsake the goals of creating more critical and questioning students through a curriculum, but that while we are putting these ideas into practice in the classroom, we should also be honoring “the fundamental reasonableness of students’ desire to gain practical expertise in their college coursework” (180). The teacher’s goals are fundamentally different from the students, because the students, in this case, collectively saw their education as a means to other economic and employment goals. The democratic ideals built into the curriculum were viewed as an outsider group’s perspective on education. The lack of motivation was actually a mismatch in collective identity.

This is exactly the type of pragmatic concern that Gwen Gorzelsky attempts to address in “Ghosts: Negotiated Authority and Liberal Education.” Gorzelsky opens her essay with a “composite” incident set at her family Thanksgiving dinner table. The question of why a nephew was required to take liberal arts courses for his degree
program is brought up, and she fumbles for a response that makes sense to this group from outside academia. She uses this composite conversation to begin a theorization of the ways that she worked to negotiate authority with her own students, as well as to begin a critique of the current professionalization of composition studies. In fact, Gorzelsky sees a connection between the two, and is troubled by the disconnect between what she describes as “working class” attitudes, that is, utilitarian values regarding education, and democratic ideals fostered through liberal education.

The problem is quite complex, and is one I have encountered in my own teaching. While understanding the larger institutionalized structures that are “managing” our beliefs, choices, attitudes, motives and language is perhaps essential to the project of opening larger understanding about potential factors at work in such things as the reproduction of poverty, how much does one take into consideration the agency of the student herself in her own goals for education. Near the beginning of my work at the university, I was learning about theories of critical literacy in graduate classes, and I was still teaching at a rural high school during the day. Encouraged by ideas about critical pedagogy from some of my fellow graduate students and my reading, I tried to integrate some of the ideas into my work at the high school. A high school junior whose family owned a local farm politely told me that while the stuff I was telling him about why his way of talking was not any worse than anyone else’s was interesting, it wouldn’t get him the good score on the SAT he needed to get into the Ag School at Cornell so that he could keep his parents’ farm going. “Can you just show me how to do it right?” he asked me. It’s not difficult to see the dilemma.

Part of what Gorzelsky argues, (as Langstraat, Lindquist and Bean have), is that there has been too little examination of emotion in the matter of critical pedagogy,
especially with regard to class: “Addressing affect’s role is crucial in any effort to foster democratic practices and, more specifically, in any effort to foster more democratic negotiations of professional authority” (309). Gorzelsky’s analysis suggests that collective emotion may play a large part in the struggle between teachers who offer critical pedagogical approaches in a liberal arts tradition and students who see this as a waste of their important time and money, which they understood as being spent to create better possibilities for them economically and socially. Gorzelsky’s analysis suggests that the project of critical pedagogy might be more generously and productively negotiated between composition teachers and the students in those classes, or perhaps even the lay-public outside the classroom, as represented by her “working class” family at the Thanksgiving table. While Gorzelsky says she cannot defend liberal arts practices as they exist now to this public, she is seeking some way to put the various collective emotions of the groups together in some harmonious relation.

But in the day-to-day reality of classrooms set up to focus on power and difference, this is more easily said than done. And, as we have seen from the teaching assistant who remarked: “Education should not and cannot be viewed as merely an economic commodity,” many teachers have a deeply felt sense that education can and should be more than a system that provides training and credentials for various jobs. Simultaneously, we see teachers’ tendency to imagine their students as a “them” who needs to be converted to this other point of view about the uses of education, and as we have seen, this welcomes collective emotions toward large groups of students, blocking what might otherwise be a more respectful, harmonious negotiation regarding the purposes of education.
In all of these moments that appear at first glance to be about practical classroom practices, we can see hints that there are actually strong connections between teaching concerns like grading, authority, relationship and purpose, and the larger looming element of collective political identities and the emotions circulating around them. In the last section of this chapter, I’d like to offer a few ideas for the implications of collective emotion in circulation around issues of political contention, and to offer at least a few small steps in the direction that might be productive.

Some implications... and a cautious way forward

In the introduction to the dissertation, I offered a series of emails from a teaching assistant who seemed to be navigating a student’s disruptive texting in class, but was actually navigating his, and his fellow student’s collective emotions regarding homeless activist Matthew Works and the political views he offered. I noted that one of the things that this teacher has done that allowed for the student to tell her the truth about his reaction to the guest was to establish, somehow, a collective sense of belonging within the class itself, with her included, so that the student was trying to push back against the forces such as collective resentment for the ideological views represented in Matthew Works. His ability to come clean about his political feelings with the teacher, and to push against whatever shame felt in light of the embodied experience of being a privileged college student in the same room with someone who had no home, was overcome by his respect for the teacher and her class.

Not every ending is a happy ending, but I’d like to leave the reader with one in this case. In my response to J.’s request, I sent a link to Corder’s essay, “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love” because I think that it opens up a new way for many teachers to see the complicated painful work in political contention. I told her to try to
learn a little more about who her students were as people, to think about where they come from, and what might be informing their world-views. Not from a dismissive point of view, with the collective resentment toward the “they” we see in Giroux’s indictment of American youth, not in a patronizing or an “okay I see why you are limited as a thinker” kind of approach, but to understand why her vantage points and his might be so radically different. Here’s her email to me about how things worked out:

It’s been a really interesting process, and you know... I THINK I KNOW EVERYTHING, in much the same way that kid thought he knew everything. And we were both completely wrong. ;) So it was mutually humbling, I think, the whole experience.

And... psychologically... it was really difficult for me to have this kid in class, thinking he hates me, etc. And then he comes and talks to me, and we don’t address Matthew Work specifically, but we sort of address the notion of having one’s ideas and ideologies confronted... and it was so great, just chatting with him and getting to know more about him and about his experience in his first month of college (college has, in his words, “really kicked [his] ass.”). I really LIKE the kid. And some would say it’s not important to like your students... but I actually think it is. In fact, I think it’s essential. And I think a good teacher can find SOMETHING to like about every student. (I know it must be impossible in some situations... but still...)

In the rush to make sure that the writing classrooms featuring critical pedagogy were not the “nurturing, nonconflictual” spaces Jarratt and others worried were overtaking the landscape of teaching, and the concerns that we were abiding by middle class values that eschew anger, perhaps we have skipped over some important elements of the puzzle.

And while I am all for the propositions of less emotion work in the writing classroom, I don’t really see a way out of it. Teaching, and in particular politically based teaching, requires emotion work. The real question is which emotion work do we want to be doing? Which emotion work is most productive to the cause of social justice? And that should be a question every teacher takes seriously. If we imagine ourselves as “sad
ladies in the basement,” how do we find the strength and authority to imagine that it is not a feminized version of the profession to imagine that thinking “a good teacher can find SOMETHING to like about every student,” as J. does. It’s not an argument if no one is listening, as the saying goes. In an age of cynicism, where, as anthropologist Michael Wesch has noted, many young people take the “world is on fire” metaphor into account as a given in their daily lives, are agonistic classroom practices really the answer? What we see happening, for example, between this new teaching assistant and her student is not a glossing over of the important arguments around questions of homelessness, it’s a way into them.

My cautious way forward, then, is to begin by admitting to ourselves that there is no way to teach writing, and especially writing that involves political inquiry, without emotion labor, for both ourselves and our students. So we might as well begin with hopeful views, not just about the world, but about our students as people—starting with the premise that there is something to like about each of them, and that they might have things to teach us, and shake off the worries that it somehow feminizes our work to “nurture.” There are lots of ways to build positive collective emotion in a classroom, but it usually starts with some respect for people as individuals.

Second, I argue that we should be examining our own collective emotions toward others with the same verve we examine collective emotions of others. If we see ourselves as constantly the “working class academic,” how do we avoid the collective emotions attached to social class that foster resentments toward those we perceive as above our social standing, sometimes including our own students and colleagues? Our own social-political awareness must be more carefully interrogated.
Third, (and specific to those who inhabit more liminal spaces of the “social world” of teachers of writing) we need to be explicit about why and how critical pedagogy has become important to writing instruction and what their expected part in it is. We need to help them see that there may be a connection between something that at first may seem unconnected—silence in a discussion of a particular text, authority questions in a class where collective emotions of fear or anger have gained momentum among students, and teach with this as a basic understanding about what it means to work with political topics.

Fourth, and finally, we need to pay closer attention what might inform and expand the collective emotion in activists who see themselves as fighting against foundational elements of critical pedagogy, to assure that we aren’t helping to further feed this collective emotion so unproductive to the cause we have taken up.
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Vita

Jonna I. Gilfus
35463 Route 12e ● Cape Vincent, New York 13618
Phone: 315-532-3274 ● E-Mail: jigilfus@syr.edu

Education

Ph.D. (ABD) Composition and Cultural Rhetoric. Syracuse University. Defense Scheduled for April


Academic Employment

**Syracuse University**
The Writing Program
Professional Writing Instructor 1998-2007

Teacher Training Coordinator 2009-Present

Coordinator for Service Learning 1999-2003

School of Education
Instructor/Student Teaching Supervisor 1998-2004

Project Advance
Faculty Visitor/Curriculum Development/Speaker 2002-Present

**St. Lawrence University**
School of Education
Adjunct Instructor: Critical Literacy 2007

**Jefferson Community College**
English Department
Full-time tenure track faculty 2007-2008

**Cato-Meridian High School**
English Department
Full-time Faculty Grades 11 and 12 1986-1999

**Onondaga Community College**
Communications Department
Adjunct Instructor: Public Speaking/Intro to Com. 1996-1999

**Cayuga Community College**
English Department
Adjunct Instructor: Comp/Lit Sequence 1996-1999
### Teaching and Research Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories of Authorship</th>
<th>Public Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotion, Ethics and Affect Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Learning</td>
<td>Teacher Mentorship &amp; Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Studies</td>
<td>Rural Language and Culture</td>
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### Related Employment

| Loretto Geriatric Center, Director Of Communications | 1989-1990 |
| Fair Haven Yacht Club, Head Sailing Instructor/Coach | 1990-1992 |

### Publications/Conference Presentations

- “Core Strategies: Reading with Purpose” Teaching Workshop. Rumson Fair Haven High School, Rumson NJ. 2012
- “(Un)easy access: Pre-service Secondary Education Teachers' Reflections on Language Difference.” CCCC. San Francisco. 2005
- “Thieves, Scribes, Apprentices, and Authors.” CCCC. San Antonio. 2004
- “Service Learning: Intersections.” CCCC. Chicago. 2002

### University Teaching

| Graduate Level Teacher Training: Instruction and Curriculum Development | |

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159
Upper Division Electives:
Literacy and Community Writing, Schools and Power

Honors Level Courses: Lower Division
Lower Division Writing Sequence: Teaching and Curriculum Design
Introduction to Academic Writing
Introduction to Critical Research

Learning Community Linked Courses:
Women in Science & Engineering Education

Service Learning Classes linked to Public Schools and Refugee Centers
Online Learning/Course Development: Sophomore Level Research
Community College Writing Sequences: Teaching and Development
Student Teacher Supervision and Training

Awards and Honors
Alex Weirich Prize for Excellence in Teaching
Nominee for Women of Influence Award
Learning Communities Travel Award
Syracuse University Graduate Scholarship
Rossman Scholar for the Humanities
Phillips Scholar

Professional Certifications & Associations
National Council for Teachers of English
College Composition and Communication
New York State Teaching Certificate (Permanent)
Women In Communications
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society

Departmental Service & Professional Development

| Member Major/Minor Committee, 2009-2010 | Coordinator for Service Learning, 1999-2003 |
| Member Lower Division Committee, 2001-2003 | Coordinator New Faculty, 2008-2009. |
| Member Faculty Search Committee, 2003-2004 | Facilitator TA Summer Preparation 2001- |

160