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ABSTRACT

Donors have increasingly promoted the provision of security assistance to states emerging from civil war as a tool to establish peace. Driven by both security and development concerns, donors have asserted the value of this assistance to improve both the governance and effectiveness of the security sector. Despite this increase in aid, however, we know relatively little about its effects. In some cases, security assistance has promoted security force professionalization and a consolidation of peace. In others, security assistance has gone towards fueling corruption and repression, seriously jeopardizing the stability of the recipient state.

This dissertation seeks to address this gap, contributing to our understanding of security assistance and post-conflict reconstruction. First, I outline the connection between security sector governance and peace, arguing that security institutions with high levels of civilian control, accountability, and respect for human rights are more likely to support peace and stability (Chapter 2). Second, I present a theory to explain the divergent effects of security assistance (Chapter 3). I show that different types of aid have differential effects on governance, and that the magnitude of this effect is conditioned by the timing of its disbursement. I test this theory through an analysis of the experiences of Côte d'Ivoire (Chapter 4), Burundi (Chapter 5), and Sierra Leone (Chapter 6), ultimately finding support for my hypotheses.

SECURITY AFTER WAR:
A THEORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT
STATES

by

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B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2014
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Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Syracuse University
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In March 2003, the West African nation of Liberia emerged from a decade-long civil war that had resulted in the death of over 250,000 people, destroyed physical infrastructure across the country, and wrought havoc on the political and security institutions of the state. In the years that followed, the government of Liberia worked to reform the state's security institutions, garnering over \$265 million in security assistance from the US between 2005 and 2010.¹ Five years after these reforms began, the government and its partners had stabilized the country. The military—once a predatory institution—now protected the people it used to abuse.² Three thousand miles south, the parties to the Second Congo War negotiated an end to a similarly brutal civil war, ending in 2009. Like Liberia, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo received substantial security assistance in the five years following the end of fighting to support military and police reform, attracting over \$185 million from the US alone.³ However, both the Congolese government and donors failed to integrate and professionalize the military. Worse, the high level of corruption and politicization that persisted in the security sector contributed to the rise of new rebel groups across the country.⁴ In 2013, renewed violence in the eastern region of Kivu pulled the country back into conflict – peace had failed.⁵

¹ Data taken from the Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid” (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2020), <https://www.securityassistance.org/data>.

² Sean McFate, *Building Better Armies: An Insider's Account of Liberia* (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2013), 91.

³ Data taken from the Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid.”

⁴ Judith Verweijen, “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars*, ed. Roy Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 151–52.

⁵ “DR Congo (Zaire): Government,” Interactive Data Access, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, December 14, 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory>.

Liberia and the DRC are just two examples of a varied empirical record of security assistance in post-conflict transitions. Security assistance has supported transformational change and peace in some states. In others, it has supported corruption and repression, without producing significant improvements in operational effectiveness. What explains why some security assistance interventions help sustain peace in some post-conflict states when others do not?

Despite the volume of security assistance disbursed to post-conflict states, we know relatively little about the relationship between security assistance, governance, and stability. Although a burgeoning literature has emerged on security sector reform (SSR), few studies test the implicit hypothesis that security sector governance is related to peace. Even fewer look at the impact of traditional military assistance on post-conflict governance and stability. Furthermore, the studies that do exist rarely consider how different aid types might interact. Dube and Naidu conclude that: “Most previous studies... have not distinguished between military and other types of foreign aid, and there has been little empirical analysis of how military assistance affects either institutions or violence.”⁶ Further, as Biddle et al. note, despite the significant academic attention on civil wars—many of which involve security assistance to one or more parties—little attention has been given to the effect of security assistance on the forces that receive it.⁷

This dissertation seeks to address these gaps. In this dissertation, I offer a theory of security assistance, governance, and conflict relapse. First, I argue that good security sector governance reduces the likelihood of conflict relapse by increasing the credibility of power-

⁶ Dube and Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia,” 4.

⁷ Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745>.

sharing promises. Good behavior by security forces may further bolster peace by increasing popular perceptions of regime legitimacy. Second, I argue that the effect of security assistance on security sector governance is a factor of the type of aid and the timing of its disbursement. Security assistance that supports institutional development is more likely to lead to governance improvements, while security assistance provided to support operational effectiveness may negatively affect governance – it may even undermine the reform efforts underway.

The failure of peace is not just an academic question. Conflict imposes severe humanitarian, economic, and strategic costs. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that the global economic toll of violence in 2017 was \$14.76 trillion – 12.4 percent of world gross domestic product.⁸ For the countries that experience these conflicts, the cost to development is significantly higher. States locked in conflict and instability suffer not only the direct effects of violence, but losses in foregone trade and investment.

The security sector is charged with providing the most basic public good a state can offer: stability. The ability of the security sector to create stability is intrinsically linked to the quality of its institutions; as an OECD report concludes: “Inappropriate security structures and mechanisms can contribute to weak governance and to instability and violent conflict.”⁹ The intervention of the military in politics and the economy can lead to waste and corruption.¹⁰

⁸ Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), “The Economic Value of Peace 2018: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict” (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, October 2018), 9, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Economic-Value-of-Peace-2018.pdf>.

⁹ OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance,” DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005), 11, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjHoNqpsdnoAhUNWq0KHeKSA50QFjACegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oecd-ilibrary.org%2Fdevelopment%2Fsecurity-system-reform-and-governance_9789264007888-en&usg=AOvVaw0YJElq4QAe6pwCDKaLPWgW.

¹⁰ Clare Short, “Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty” (Speech, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London, UK, March 9, 1999), <https://www.clareshort.org/speeches/security-sector-reform>.

Worse, politicization of the security sector and repression may perpetuate instability. In contrast, well-governed security sectors can support broader governance improvements. The Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Kurt Tidd, advocated for security professionalization support precisely for this reason: “Transparent, accountable militaries and security forces help reinforce good governance by being responsive to civil authority and respectful of the rule of law.”¹¹

The rest of this chapter provides the context for this study. In the next section, I lay out the empirical trends in security assistance and the growth of the “new wars” described above. I then discuss the existing explanations for conflict recurrence; in the third section, I lay out my theory of how security sector governance impacts the likelihood of conflict relapse. The final section of this chapter presents a roadmap for the rest of this dissertation.

More Aid, Less Peace?

Security Assistance as a Tool for Stabilization

The past twenty years have seen a sizeable increase in the amount of security assistance provided to post-conflict states driven by both strategic and developmental motivations. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 shifted the world’s perception of fragile states from a humanitarian issue to a security concern. US President George Bush argued that these attacks highlighted the changing nature of the international security environment: Western states were

¹¹ Admiral Kurt Tidd, Commander of the United States Southern Command, 2017, quoted in Pat Paterson, “Measuring Military Professionalism in Partner Nations: Guidance for Security Assistance Officials,” *Journal of Military Ethics* 18, no. 2 (2019): 147, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2019.1638461>.

now threatened “less by conquering states than by failing ones.”¹² Compounding the West’s attention to state fragility was a growing recognition of a shift in the nature of global conflict and the impact of these “new wars” on regional and international stability. The 2004 Action Plan published by the German Bundeswehr captures the issue:

“Today’s conflicts are often waged with varying degrees of intensity over long periods of time. In the reality of these new wars, the contours of the three traditional phases of conflict are becoming increasingly blurred – the crisis phase preceding the outbreak of violence, the actual war phase marked by systematic use of force, and the phase of peace-building following the formal termination of armed conflict. Only in about half of all cases does the formal termination of hostilities lead to enduring peace.”¹³

The link between state fragility and international security has been reiterated in the defense policy documents of most major Western states, including the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies of the US, the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, the 2013 French White Paper, and the 2006 and 2016 German White Papers.¹⁴ In addition to some direct


¹² “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, September 2002), 2, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>.

¹³ “Action Plan: ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace-Building’” (Berlin: Die Bundesregierung, May 2004), 7–8, <http://www.konfliktbearbeitung.net/downloads/file711.pdf>.

¹⁴ “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010), 26–27, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>; “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, February 2015), 10–11, <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>; “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” (London: Office of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, October 2010), 44–45, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf; “French White Paper on Defence and National Security” (Paris: Office of the President of the French Republic, 2013), 38–40, http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/the_white_paper_defence_2013.pdf; “White Paper 2006 on Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 18, https://issat.dcaf.ch/esl/download/17423/203638/Germany_White_Paper_2006.pdf; “White Paper 2016 on German

military assistance, most states have adopted an indirect approach to stabilization, prioritizing partner capacity building, sending increasing amounts of security assistance to “train and equip” host nation forces. Between 2000 and 2016, the US alone provided over five billion dollars in security assistance to post-conflict states, not including aid to Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan (Figure 1.1).¹⁵

Figure 1.1: US Security Assistance to Post-Conflict States, 2000 - 2016



Note: All dollar amounts have been converted to USD 2016.

This includes only security assistance given to states that are no longer experiencing fighting, defined here as fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year.

At the same time, the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) was gaining traction among donors looking to support stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction. SSR seeks to improve the ability of states “to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a

Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, June 2016), 39–40, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf>.

¹⁵ Note: All dollar amounts have been converted to USD 2016. This includes only security assistance given to states that are no longer experiencing fighting, defined here as fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year. Data taken from the Security Assistance Monitor. (<https://www.securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard>)


manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law.”¹⁶ Specifically, these programs focus on reforming the institutions of the security sector – building systems of accountability, increasing civilian control, and instilling respect for human rights. Underlying these programs is an assumption that the quality of security sector governance is intrinsically valuable, beyond its contribution to security force effectiveness. Unlike other development programs, the majority of support for SSR programs comes as security assistance.

Civil Wars and Conflict Recurrence

While civil wars are not a new feature of world politics, it appears that the nature of these conflicts is changing. Civil wars have grown longer and larger in scale, their occurrence and recurrence increasingly limited to states that have already experienced war. With a couple of notable exceptions, most instances of internal conflict are minor episodes of previously terminated conflicts, rather than new wars. Figure 1.2 shows the breakdown of internal conflict since 1990: of the 84 instances of conflict onset displayed, only 13 were the beginning of new civil wars. The rest were instances of conflict relapse.¹⁷

¹⁶ OECD, “Security System Reform and Governance,” 11.

¹⁷ Data on conflict episodes taken from Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–37.. “Relapse” here is defined as the resumption of a previously ended conflict resulting in 25 or more battle-related deaths; “civil war onset”, in contrast, signifies the outbreak of a conflict resulting in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths.

Figure 1.2: Internal Conflict Profile, 1990 - 2016

Understanding the “New Wars”

Studies of conflict relapse have expanded dramatically within the past ten years. Scholars have focused primarily on four lines of argument. The first set of theories focuses on the motivation for the initial civil war: citizens may be more likely to return to conflict if their contentions are not addressed. Structural conditions like underdevelopment and economic inequality that increase the probability of initial conflict outbreak are likely to have been exacerbated during the conflict, increasing grievances. The threat of ethnic conflict may also be greater in post-conflict states. All of the factors theorized to contribute to conflict onset—societal polarization, in-group/out-group perceptions, and unequal access to state resources—still exist when conflict ends. In addition, violence that falls along ethnic lines during the course of war

will create new grievances.¹⁸ While the logic of these arguments is intuitive, they are unable to explain why some conflicts relapse when others do not.¹⁹ Take, for example, Rwanda and Burundi. Originally part of the same colony, Rwanda and Burundi share a similar terrain, history of ethnic grievances, and level of development.²⁰ However, while Burundi continues to relapse into conflict, Rwanda has maintained peace since the late 1990s.

A second line of theory looks at the nature of the initial civil war, arguing that the duration and conduct of conflict influence the willingness of combatants to return to violence. These theories generally adopt a bargaining model to explain the choice to fight. According to this logic, long, costly wars tend to be the least likely to recur. As war continues, combatants gain more information about the relative capabilities of their adversary, helping each group to better assess the costs of future war. However, if the ultimate winner inflicts too many casualties on their adversary, they may create new grievances that could increase the likelihood of a return to conflict.²¹ As Kalyvas explains, personal feelings of vengeance and retribution can linger long after a conflict ends.²² Considering the destruction of physical infrastructure and reduction of

¹⁸ See Cederman Wimmer and Min on importance of impartiality in governance, Walter on conflict exacerbating grievances, Posen 28 on the security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Kalyvas argues that the conduct of war creates feelings of vengeance and desires for retribution, making war “personal.” Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Barbara F. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 373.

¹⁹ Analyzing occurrences of repeat civil war, Walter (2015) finds that while grievances are strong predictors of conflict onset, they are not significant predictors of recurrence. See Barbara F. Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1253–54, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714528006>.

²⁰ Devon E. A. Curtis, “Development Assistance and the Lasting Legacies of Rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda,” *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 7 (2015): 1366, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1041103>.

²¹ Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 256; Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 60; J. Michael Quinn, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” *International Interactions* 33, no. 2 (2007): 85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620701277673>; Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” 379.

²² Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” 373.

state capacity immediately following a war, it may be easier for dissatisfied parties to renew their cause.²³

A third, and related, line of research suggests that the way conflicts end has a significant impact on the durability of peace. Scholars have traditionally contrasted conflicts ending in military victories by one party against conflicts ending in negotiated agreements, finding that peace following a military victory tends to be the most stable.²⁴ At this point, it is still unclear whether peace is more durable following a rebel victory or a government victory.²⁵ Negotiated settlements have proven to be less stable: even if both parties are satisfied with the terms of agreement, the fact that groups retain some crucial resources creates uncertainty about commitment to the agreement. For this reason, peace agreements bolstered by international peacekeepers who can ensure compliance are much more likely to succeed.²⁶ Furthermore, implementing extensive power-sharing provisions may increase the stability of peace.²⁷

The fourth major strand of the literature focuses on the characteristics of the post-conflict state and how they influence the durability of the peace. These theories begin with the hypothesis that conflict relapse may be a distinct phenomenon: the drivers spurring actors to return to

²³ Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (2010): 37–38; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27.

²⁴ Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 86; Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 68.

²⁵ Victory by the incumbent regime often leaves many of the underlying motivations for rebellion unaddressed; for this reason, military victory may be the most stable when secured by the rebels. (Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, 146; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence," 183–84; Kreutz, "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset," 247.

²⁶ Virginia Page Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," *World Politics* 56, no. 4 (July 2004): 501; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 795.

²⁷ Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, 84.

conflict may be different than what motivated conflict in the first place. The course and conduct of conflict transform societies, changing the grievances and social dynamics of actors in the post-conflict state.²⁸ Once the conflict has ended, the governing strategies pursued by the post-conflict regime are likely to influence whether actors believe it is in their interest to work within the new system or return to arms.

Walter (2015) argues that institutionalized mechanisms of accountability provide ex-combatants a peaceful way to ensure the post-conflict regime holds up its end of the bargain: “the more accountable the government is to a wide range of people, the easier it will be to credibly commit to share power and reform, and the fewer incentives groups will have to return to violence.”²⁹ Governments that are accountable to a wide range of people may also be more likely to make policies that benefit the population at large. Better governance may thus reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence by reducing perceptions of inequalities, decreasing inter-group tensions and resentment.³⁰ The prospects of peace are further enhanced in states with representative and inclusive governance institutions.³¹ As the 2017 World Development Report concludes, “Violence recedes when individuals, groups, and governments have *incentives* not to use it to pursue their objectives, and when not using it eventually becomes the norm. Institutions create incentives to reach agreements (cooperation) and enforce them (commitment).”³²

²⁸ Charles T. Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 65.

²⁹ Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” 1245.

³⁰ See Havard Hegre and Havard Mogleiv Nygard, “Governance and Conflict Relapse,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 6 (2015): 986, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713520591>; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 31.

³¹ Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence*, 4.

³² World Bank, “Governance and the Law,” World Development Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2017), 110, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017>.

Until recently, scholars have focused primarily on the domestic factors of conflict, limiting analyses of foreign intervention to peacekeeping and the negotiation of conflict termination.³³ These studies have found strong evidence to support the value of peacekeeping missions. Interventions by external actors to maintain ceasefires and stabilize conflict zones can reduce the likelihood of a relapse into conflict by providing security guarantees – monitoring actors’ compliance, and reassuring adversaries that their rivals are respecting their commitments.³⁴ However, not all foreign military interventions are benign. External interventions during conflicts may create a moral hazard problem making relapse more likely.³⁵ Peacebuilding support given after a conflict has ended may be appropriated by domestic actors looking to advance their political or military position in the post-conflict state.³⁶

The internationalization of domestic conflict that has occurred in the past thirty years makes the focus on domestic factors insufficient to explain conflict recurrence. International actors are involved in conflict termination and post-conflict reconstruction in numerous ways beyond peacekeeping and mediation. Foreign states and international organizations provide humanitarian assistance, diplomatic support, and development aid to post-conflict states. They negotiate trade agreements and promote investment to spur private sector growth. They also provide a significant amount of security assistance.

³³ Niklas Karlén, “The Legacy of Foreign Patrons: External State Support and Conflict Recurrence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 20, no. 10 (2017): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317700465>.

³⁴ Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” 795; Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, 62.

³⁵ Karlén, “The Legacy of Foreign Patrons: External State Support and Conflict Recurrence.”

³⁶ Milli Lake, “Building the Rule of War: Postconflict Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict in Eastern DR Congo,” *International Organization* 71, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 282, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831700008X>.

The Argument

The work of Lake (2017) and Karlén (2017) show how external factors can impact post-war politics by influencing the strategic calculations of domestic actors. I argue that security assistance may impact post-conflict peace in a similar way. Specifically, I posit that security assistance impacts the likelihood of peace through its effect on the quality of governance of the security sector: security assistance that supports the development of a transparent and accountable security sector will likely increase the probability of peace, while assistance that supports patronage and repression may fuel a relapse into conflict.

The impact of security assistance varies by both its type and the political and institutional context under which it is disbursed. I break security assistance into two types: *institutional assistance*, given to support institutional reform and development, and *operational assistance*, given to increase the operational effectiveness of the recipient state's security forces. Institutional assistance is likely to have a positive impact on security sector governance, while operational assistance may have a negative impact. Thus, institutional aid is likely to reduce the probability of conflict relapse, while operational assistance may increase it. The size of the impact of aid on governance, however, is conditioned by timing. Drawing from the insights of historical institutionalism, I argue that aid will have a larger effect on governance when it is given at moments of high *regime vulnerability* – institutional assistance will have larger positive effects on governance, and operational assistance will have larger negative effects. Specifically, assistance that is given at moments of transition will have a greater impact on governance than aid that is given during times of regime stability.

I test this argument through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I test the relationship between security sector governance and conflict relapse among post-conflict states using a discrete-time logistic regression where “conflict relapse” is the dependent variable. The results of these analyses show a clear correlation between security sector governance and the likelihood of relapse: states with good governance are have a lower probability of relapsing into conflict. Having established a relationship between security sector governance and relapse, I then turn to examine the effect of security assistance on governance. I do this using a qualitative method called comparative process tracing, a method chosen to better illustrate the mechanisms through which security assistance affects governance within states, and whether those mechanisms are similar across cases. To get a sense of how different combinations of aid may lead to different outcomes, I analyze the experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Sierra Leone, three states with similar backgrounds but varied aid profiles.

Dissertation Roadmap

The following six chapters of this dissertation provide the theoretical and empirical support for the proposed relationship between security assistance, governance, and conflict relapse. In the next chapter, I make my case for studying security assistance by laying out the connection between security sector governance and conflict relapse. After outlining my theory, I use quantitative data to test the empirical relationship between governance and conflict relapse. The results of this analysis provide compelling support of a correlation between security sector governance and peace: states with higher levels of civilian control and rights-respecting security forces are less likely to relapse into conflict. Similarly, states that agree to and implement

military and police reform have a lower rate of relapse than those with little or no reform. These findings serve as the framework for the rest of the dissertation, answering the question: why should we care about security sector governance?

Chapters 3 – 6 address the relationship between security assistance and security sector governance. Chapter 3 presents my theory of security assistance in greater detail. After laying out my theory and hypotheses, Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the research strategy taken to investigate these hypotheses. Chapters 4 – 6 examine the impact of security assistance on governance in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The experiences of these three countries highlight how aid type and timing condition its impact.

Chapter 4 considers the experience of Côte d’Ivoire after the first and second Ivorian conflicts. Following the first Ivorian war, donors were loath to provide support to the transitional government, which they viewed as corrupt and inefficient. Without the financial support they required, the new security institutions established to facilitate security sector reform languished. The outbreak and escalation of the second Ivorian conflict in 2011 is considered by many to be a failure of these institutions to properly demobilize combatants and reform the security sector. When the 2011 crisis ended, donors were quick to provide assistance to the new government. However, while donors intervened quickly and provided high levels of institutional assistance, the electoral and military victory won by Alassane Ouattara left little room for donor influence. Unlike the years following the first conflict, regime vulnerability was low. As my theory would predict, this aid did little to support positive governance improvements. Fears by Ivorian security experts of a potential relapse into conflict during the 2020 elections expose the continued fragility of the security sector and the Ivorian state.

Chapter 5 examines the impact of security assistance in Burundi. Burundi received high levels of operational assistance during a moment of regime vulnerability, enabling the government to put off politically difficult—but necessary—reforms. Although the Netherlands initiated a program of institutional assistance shortly thereafter, its effect was limited: the inflows of operational assistance received for participation in peacekeeping missions and counterterrorism support allowed the government to continue policies that maintained the politicization of the security sector, undercutting the institutional assistance it received.

Chapter 6 presents a success story: Sierra Leone, receiving high inflows of institutional assistance in the immediate aftermath of conflict, set upon a course of security sector reform in the early post-war years that has continued today. When the government started to receive high levels of operational assistance in 2011, the institutions of the security sector were stable enough to absorb the aid without experiencing significant deteriorations of governance. Even in the success story, however, operational assistance did not contribute to lasting positive outcomes. Much of the equipment provided and systems put in place by this aid went to waste, unmaintained by the institutions receiving it.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with a comparison of the three presented cases. Together, these chapters lend support to my theory and suggest other potential factors mitigating the impact of security assistance on governance and peace. After discussing the empirical results of this dissertation, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications my theory and future avenues for research.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND POST-CONFLICT PEACE

In the previous chapter, I asserted that the security assistance plays an important and underexamined role in the peace and stability of post-conflict states through the way it impacts governance. Aid that supports civilian control, accountability, and professionalism in the security sector will likely bolster the likelihood of peace. Aid that supports operational effectiveness, in contrast, may have a negative impact on governance, potentially contributing to a relapse into conflict. These effects are moderated by the level of regime vulnerability of the recipient state.

Before delving into an examination of security assistance and its effects on governance, this chapter examines the validity of my assertion that security sector governance is related to conflict relapse. In the following section, I discuss the theoretical connection between security sector governance and conflict relapse. I argue that the quality of security sector governance is an important predictor of the sustainability of peace in post-conflict states, and that states that take steps to reform their security sector are more likely to see peace. Next, I test this relationship with a discrete-time duration analysis of relapse. I find strong evidence of a relationship between security sector governance and conflict relapse: among the states in my sample, better security sector governance is correlated with a lower probability of relapse.

Governance and Conflict Relapse

What is Good Governance?

Increasingly, scholars and practitioners have advocated the importance of “good governance” for breaking cycles of conflict and moving towards sustainable peace. Post-conflict states face myriad challenges ranging from rebuilding destroyed physical infrastructure, relocating displaced peoples, demobilizing and disarming former rebels, and restoring state services. The institutions charged with these responsibilities face significant shortfalls in available resources and trust of the population. Social and regional divisions among the population have likely been exacerbated throughout the course of conflict, aggravating tensions and heightening perceptions of unequal treatment by the government. Demobilized combatants may feel disenfranchised, wary of the post-war regime and its willingness to accommodate their demands. Theoretically, improving governance should increase the state’s ability to overcome these hurdles.

Despite a prolific body of literature dedicated to the topic, scholars of both economics and political science have yet to agree on a common definition of governance. Most conceptions of governance, however, center on the way the state exercises its authority. States with good governance produce more and better public goods, including political goods, e.g. stability; economic goods, e.g. wealth and development; and social goods, e.g. health care and education.³⁷ The formal rules and informal practices that define the process of government decision-making also shape the way that these goods are provided: ideally, states will distribute goods fairly and

³⁷ Robert I. Rotberg, “On Improving Nation-State Governance,” *Daedalus* 136, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 153; Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?” (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, January 2013), 3, <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1426906>.

impartially.³⁸ While scholars often connect good governance with democracy, governance is theoretically distinct from regime type: non-democratic regimes can be accountable providers of public goods, just as formally democratic regimes may fail to fulfill the needs of their citizens.³⁹ States with good governance generally share similar qualities: responsiveness, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and participation.⁴⁰

These studies have focused primarily on political governance. However, governance of the state is closely tied to governance of the security sector, i.e. the actors and institutions charged with the provision, management, and oversight of security in a country. Considering the value attached to control of the security sector by state and non-state actors, the way it is governed will have important implications for the perceptions of rival groups that the government is committed to accommodating them. By increasing accountability and inclusion in the security sector, the government may have a greater chance of incentivizing its opponents to work within the system. At a more fundamental level, the quality of security sector governance in a state impacts the state's ability to provide the most basic public good: security. By improving stability throughout the country, the state will be better able to address the grievances of its citizens.

³⁸ Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 21, no. 2 (April 2008): 166.

³⁹ Fukuyama, "What Is Governance?," 4.

⁴⁰ David Cortright, Conor Seyle, and Kristin Wall, *Governance for Peace: How Inclusive, Participatory and Accountable Institutions Promote Peace and Prosperity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 29.

Defining Security Sector Governance

Security sector governance describes the exercise of authority by the actors and institutions charged with the provision, management, and oversight of security within a state. Good security sector governance is characterized by many of the same principles of general governance: accountability, transparency, participation, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Specifically, states with good security sector governance will generally share the following features: (1) a formal institutional framework that outlining the roles and responsibilities of security actors; (2) civilian control; (3) accountable and transparent management; (4) capacity to meet the security needs of the population; and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law.⁴¹

A formal legal framework that outlines the roles and responsibilities of each institution helps to set standards regarding the proper functioning of security forces, the appropriate use of force, the hierarchy of command, and the roles of different institutions in respect to one another. Beyond setting standards, the codification of these roles provides a legal basis for redress if they are not respected.

Good security sector governance requires a high degree of civilian control and oversight across the security sector. Croissant et al argue that true civilian control requires that civilians alone have the power to set national policy and determine its implementation in traditional political governance, internal security, and external security. Importantly, this requires that civilians have effective oversight and sanctioning powers over the military.⁴² Increasing effective

⁴¹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "Security Sector Governance," SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2015), <http://ssrbackgrounders.org/fall.php?p=25&l=EN>.

⁴² Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Siegfried O. Wolf, "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Is: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 955, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.501180>.

civilian oversight of the security sector has implications for several aspects of governance, including the integrity of electoral politics, respect for civil and political rights, and accountability. The accountability of the security sector is further supported if it is representative of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the country it serves.⁴³

Accountability is either supported or undermined by the quality of management systems. Transparency in public expenditure management is thought to reduce corruption and waste by increasing information about potentially fraudulent defense contracts or spending. This may also enhance performance by increasing the efficiency of resource allocations.⁴⁴ Mechanisms for

Figure 2.1: Key Components of Good Security Sector Governance



⁴³ Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky, and Paul M. Bisca, eds., *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2017), 2226,

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjOiqib9JXmAhUrheAKHZR6B9gQFjACegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeacekeeping.un.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fsecuring_development-public_finance_and_the_security_sector.pdf&usg=AOvVaw250XaqPkzC6GFVaSyX-jhQ

⁴⁴ Harborne, Dorotinsky, and Bisca, 7.

accountability within and across security institutions are important for improving the professionalism of forces and personnel. Strong command and control systems within security forces enhance the ability of the administration to enforce accountability.

The capacity of security institutions to meet the security needs of the population is often diminished in post-conflict settings, where years of conflict have taken a toll on physical infrastructure, human capital, and civilian trust in state security. Restoring the capacity of the security sector often requires first restoring government authority throughout the country. Once conflict has ended, improving capacity also entails a particular focus on supporting the police force and its ability to respond to the needs of local communities.

Finally, good security sector governance requires that members of the security system—whether soldiers, police officers, intelligence agents, or otherwise—act in accordance with international standards for human rights.

Improving security sector governance has important normative benefits, such as the promotion of human rights and democratic governance. It also has critical instrumental value. Post-conflict governments face a range of issues complicating the provision of security, beginning with the need to re-establish their authority throughout the state. Previous work has shown that states that build inclusive and accountable post-war governance institutions are more likely to sustain peace. In the security sector, this means that choosing force integration and professionalization will be more likely to lead to peace than coup-proofing and repression.

The State of the Security Sector after Civil War

Post-conflict governments often face a condition of *dual sovereignty*, where an alternative group can pose a credible claim to government control. This condition of dual

sovereignty is particularly likely if conflict did not end with a military victory by either the government or the opposition, leaving doubts as to the military supremacy of the government and allowing opposition groups to persist.⁴⁵ The existence of social networks of former rebels poses a threat to the sustainability of peace: past research indicates that former fighters are more likely to return to conflict when mobilizers activate social ties.⁴⁶ In order to effectively provide security throughout the country, the government must establish itself as the only legitimate provider of security and gain a monopoly on violence. As Rotberg (2007) claims: “if a nation state does not hold that monopoly it cannot provide full security.”⁴⁷

Complicating this, the conduct of war often corrupts the relationship between the state, the security sector, and society. The post-war political landscape is characterized by a range of actors, with different interests. In an inherently fragile situation, the regime’s top priority will be self-preservation. In states that have implemented some degree of military integration, ethnic or political cleavages between the regime and a section of the officer corps may increase distrust of the military.⁴⁸ The regime may distrust the security sector even after cases of military victory, as the elevation of the security apparatus during conflict may have created expectations among the officer corps of continued inclusion in politics or of rewards for their part in securing victory after the war has ended. Thus, self-preservation for the regime will likely require some form of protection against military intervention against the state, either through promoting civilian control or by instituting coup-proofing measures.

⁴⁵ Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 173–74.

⁴⁶ Anders Themnér, *Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers, and Relationships* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 19–28.

⁴⁷ Rotberg, “On Improving Nation-State Governance,” 153..

⁴⁸ Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 48–49.

Like their political counterparts, security elites have an interest in maintaining their power and position. In states where the military or other security actors have a large stake in politics or the economy, officers may feel that participation in the government is of even greater value. This is especially likely in states with a historically ethnically-imbalanced military, where officers may fear the repercussions of a shift in the balance of power.⁴⁹ Opposition groups have an intense interest in capturing control of government institutions, the security sector in particular. If it becomes clear to one or more of the parties that they cannot hold full control of the military, they will likely work to achieve the “second-best option”: preventing their rival from gaining control.⁵⁰

These competing interests often come to light in the process of negotiating an end to conflict. Given the value of the security sector, rebel groups are likely to demand some form of power-sharing in the security sector, either through military integration or larger, sector-wide reforms. Whether the conflict ends with a negotiated settlement that stipulates reforms or a military victory, the post-war regime must decide on a governing strategy. As Powell (2019) summarizes, “to gain and maintain power is the first order of business”.⁵¹ Post-conflict regimes have to choose between two potential governing strategies to maximize their chances of staying in power: consolidate power over the opposition or include them. The choice made by the

⁴⁹ Kristen A. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 4 (2016): 606–7, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714545332>.

⁵⁰ Caroline A. Hartzell, “Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War’s End,” in *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars*, ed. Roy Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 15.

⁵¹ Johathan Powell, “Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox,” *Armed Forces & Society* 45, no. 1 (2019): 29, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X17728493>.

government between power consolidation and inclusion has important implications for the quality of security sector governance and the likelihood of peace.

Governing Strategies: Power Consolidation or Inclusion

Consolidating power often requires politicizing the security sector: incentivizing loyalty through systems of patronage, implementing coup-proofing measures, and repressing the opposition. As discussed above, post-conflict regimes are likely to experience a higher level of distrust of the security sector, potentially perceiving a heightened risk of a coup d'état. States have historically implemented a host of "coup-proofing" measures to reduce their vulnerability to a military takeover, including establishing parallel security institutions to weaken state forces, rotating command positions to weaken social ties, and purging security elites with questionable loyalty. All of these policies come with a cost: by reducing the effectiveness of the security sector, leaders are also reducing their ability to respond to a threat. Sensing a weakness in state capacity, rebel groups might feel emboldened to raise an insurrection.⁵² Repression may also be an attractive tool for governments that are unwilling to offer institutional accommodations to challengers.⁵³ However, this policy choice can have serious consequences. States that rely on repression may increase the risk of relapsing into conflict for both emotional and informational reasons: victims of war who are subjected to repression by state security forces are likely to experience "moral outrage" at the actions of the government; they are also likely to update their beliefs about the willingness of the government to accommodate their needs.⁵⁴

⁵² For a greater discussion of this, see Jun Koga Sudduth, "Coup-Proofing and Civil War," in *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, ed. Thompson William R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57631/1/Sudduth_2016_Coup_proofing_and_civil_war.pdf.

⁵³ Eric Keels and Angela D. Nichols, "State Repression and Post-Conflict Peace Failure," *Conflict, Security & Development* 18, no. 1 (2018): 20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2017.1420313>.

⁵⁴ Keels and Nichols, 24–30.

In contrast, a strategy of inclusion requires some degree of participation of opposition groups in the government. Inclusion is not without risk: incorporating former adversaries into the security may create opportunities for insurrection within the security apparatus. Mixing groups may lead to insubordination, either by the soldiers or police officers who do not trust their superiors, or by officers who do not respect the authority of the new government. Despite these challenges, inclusion is more likely to lead to lasting peace. As Toft (2010) argues, force alone is unlikely to be sufficient in maintaining peace; rather, “peace requires an additional factor: credible mutual benefit.”⁵⁵

In the security sector, inclusive governance strategies may entail some degree of force integration. To be effective, however, they require going beyond integration to extending civilian control over the security apparatus, including the right of oversight by representative bodies outside of the security institutions themselves. In other words, effective strategies of inclusion require improving security sector governance.

States that with strong civilian control, transparent and accountable management, and rights respecting security forces should be less susceptible to the corruption and abuse of power that inflame grievances against the state. Thus,

Hypothesis 1. States with good security sector governance are less likely to relapse into conflict than states with poor security sector governance.

⁵⁵ Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, 45.

Improving Governance through Security Sector Reform

To address these issues, donors now advocate for security sector reform. The OECD defines SSR as the “transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”⁵⁶ SSR proponents recognize the health and functioning of the security sector as crucial for peace. Along with preventing a return to violence, practitioners aim to address politicization of forces, militarization of internal security, ethnicization of the security sector, corruption and patronage, and lack of professionalism.⁵⁷ As part of the reform process, many policymakers advocate expanding the remit of the security sector from traditional to human security. SSR programs vary from country to country, but generally include five areas of focus: (1) disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants; (2) security institution building; (3) military integration and reform; (4) internal security reform; and (5) professionalization of the security services.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs aim to restore the state as the single provider of security within the state by demobilizing ex-combatants and reintegrating them into society. As the name implies, DDR involves identifying all combatants to a conflict and deciding upon which of these combatants will be allowed to continue serving in an official capacity and which will be reintegrated into society as civilians. Most programs focus on economic reintegration, with the hopes that this will lead to deeper community reintegration and

⁵⁶ OECD, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), 20.

⁵⁷ Michael Brzoska, “Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424603>.

ultimately, political reintegration. This approach is based on the understanding of the salience of economic grievances for conflict onset and the high remobilization potential of under-employed former soldiers.⁵⁸ The goal of DDR is to reduce the coercive capacity of rebel groups, break down their social networks, and change the motivations of former rebels in ways that discourage them from turning to violence.

Security institution building and professionalization efforts correspond closely with the principles of good security sector governance laid out above. Donor efforts to improve the institutional structure of the security sector generally aim to decrease corruption and waste, increase civilian oversight, and strengthen accountability measures in the Ministry of Defense. Professionalization efforts generally include normative training and technical training. Normative training focuses on respect for human rights and codes of conduct, while technical training is concerned with improving the operational capacity of the forces, such as improving military doctrine or police investigative skills. Donors are generally more concerned with the normative component of training.⁵⁹

Military integration and internal security reform are more institution specific. The integration of combatants into one army is often promoted as a way to simultaneously reduce the number of demobilized fighters in society and assuage societal groups that they are represented in the new regime. Governments have three options for military integration at the end of a conflict: (1) building an army from scratch; (2) drawing existing forces into a new army; or (3) merging existing forces. If successful, military integration should allow the military to retain a

⁵⁸ Michael J. Gilligan, Eric N. Mvukiyehe, and Cyrus Samii, "Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 4 (August 2013): 601, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712448908>.

⁵⁹ OECD, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 39–40.

necessary level of effectiveness without breaking down the social cohesion holding units together. Ideally, military integration will also be accompanied by reforms that promote civilian control and oversight, and a unified command structure while depoliticizing the institution.⁶⁰ These reforms support not only the professionalism of the military, but the stability of the state. As Wilen et al (2018) explain: “politicization, questionable loyalties, abuses of power, corruption and lack of accountability to civilian authorities, are likely to affect not only the military’s role in society in general, but also the larger peacebuilding process.”⁶¹

Like military reform, reform of the internal security institutions often requires some integration of former combatants, creation of oversight mechanisms, and depoliticization. In many conflict-affected states distrust for the police runs high. Like the state institutions they served before the conflict, many police forces were corrupt and abused their positions for personal gain or to perpetuate state repression. The overall goal for most police reform programs is to create a decentralized civilian police force with specialized units.⁶² Intelligence services are another important area for reform. Corrupt or authoritarian states often abuse intelligence services to gain information regarding political rivals or regime dissidents. Weak post-conflict regimes are likely to continue using state intelligence for personal gains. Professionalization efforts with the intelligence services and modifying institutional structures to support their independence is thus an important step for preserving the rule of law and supporting governance reforms.

⁶⁰ Roy Licklider, ed., *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 3–4.

⁶¹ Nina Wilén, Gérard Birantamije, and David Ambrosetti, “The Burundian Army’s Trajectory to Professionalization and Depoliticization, and Back Again,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2018): 122, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2017.1418173>.

⁶² Charles T. Call, “Competing Donor Approaches to Post-Conflict Police Reform,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 2, no. 1 (2002): 101.

SSR should reduce the likelihood of conflict relapse by helping to establish the government as the only legitimate provider of security. Together, these processes should help to break down former combatant networks, bringing some fighters into state forces and reintegrating the rest into society. By improving security sector governance and integrating former combatants into state institutions, SSR further supports peace duration by offering the institutional accommodation described above. However, for these reforms to be effective, they must be implemented fully. Halfway measures are unlikely to take root; worse, they may even detract from the functioning of the security sector. Furthermore, incomplete implementation of security sector reforms may lead the opposition to doubt the government's commitment to accommodation and inclusion. As discussed above, the security sector is the state's greatest prize – if it appears that the government is unwilling to share it, the opposition may be more willing to return to war. The importance of complete implementation of reforms is reflected in hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: SSR reduces the likelihood of conflict relapse when it is implemented fully.

Several studies have been done considering the relationship between security sector reform and peace. However, most of these studies use very limited measures to examine the relationships they posit, often looking only at whether the peace agreement includes a provision for SSR, ignoring the extent of its implementation.⁶³ As discussed above, it is unlikely that SSR would have any impact on the likelihood of relapse if not implemented; worse, promises of reform that were made and not kept may have the opposite effect. By not looking at

⁶³ For a concise overview of the literature on SSR implementation, see Ronald K. Krebs and Roy Licklider, "United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War," *International Security* 40, no. 3 (Winter /2016 2015): 97–98, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00228.

implementation, these studies leave us with an incomplete picture of security sector governance and peace.

In the following sections, I test the hypotheses listed above using a discrete-time logistic analysis of governance quality on peace during, looking at two indicators of governance and two indicators of reform as predictors of relapse. There are innumerable factors influencing whether or not a state relapses into conflict, many of which are unique to each case. Thus, statistical analyses of this kind are limited in what they can tell us about the relationship between governance and peace. The goal of these analyses is not to prove causation; rather, the following tests are intended simply as a probe of the relationships described above. If good security sector governance and security sector reform improves the sustainability of peace, we should see a negative correlation between governance quality and the probability of conflict relapse.

Testing the Governance-Relapse Relationship

Civil war, conflict relapse, and governance are widely studied by political scientists. I follow the conventions of the literature in the way I define and operationalize these concepts. Similarly, I adopt the theoretical assumptions of most authors in this field: namely, that actors seek to gain and hold power, that the quality of governance of post-conflict states is likely to be low, and that change in governance, when it occurs, is slow. In this section, I outline the scope of this study and the concepts and definitions I employ. For the sake of consistency, I maintain the same parameters for the logistic analysis of governance and conflict relapse conducted in this chapter and the qualitative analyses discussed in later chapters.

Research Design

Scope

This project looks at the impact of foreign aid on states emerging from civil war, defined as a conflict occurring between at least one rebel group and the government, producing a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths. To differentiate between a lapse in fighting and an end to war, I require that the end of conflict is followed by at least two years with fewer than 25 battle-related deaths. Defining conflict episodes by battle deaths is preferable to using conflict settlement for two reasons: first, as conflicts such as the Sudanese civil war demonstrate, states can conclude several peace deals and continue to fight; and second, as Kreutz (2010) shows, the majority of conflicts do not end with a definitive victory or negotiated settlement, making coding difficult.⁶⁴ Because of data availability, I limit my analysis to the years 1996-2016. Table 1 in the Appendix lists all of the countries included in this population.⁶⁵

Conflict Relapse

I define “conflict relapse” as the recurrence of conflict in a post-civil war society, following at least two years of little to no conflict activity (defined in terms of battle-related deaths). To qualify as relapse, the conflict episode must either (a) last for two or more consecutive years or (b) result in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths. I make these stipulations to differentiate between what could be the sporadic actions of a few unsatisfied ex-combatants and a real threat of renewed civil war. Among the 26 states included in this study, twelve relapsed

⁶⁴ Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset,” 245.

⁶⁵ Reliable data on aid flows are only available following 1995. Although this analysis only considers the relationship between governance and conflict relapse, I have limited my sample for this analysis to reflect the population that I draw from for the qualitative analyses of aid and governance that I conduct in the following chapters.

into conflict. Of these twelve states, three – Somalia, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – experienced a second relapse into conflict, bringing the total instance of relapse to 15. I follow the majority of scholars in choosing the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (ACD) for data on conflict episodes.⁶⁶

Security Sector Governance

As I discuss above, the quality of security sector governance is a function of formal institutions, civilian control, accountability, capacity, and respect for human rights. Unfortunately, there are very few data sources available to assess the quality of security governance.⁶⁷ In the following analyses, I test the following dimensions of security sector governance: civilian control and security forces' respect for human rights.

I operationalize civilian control using the “Military in Politics” measure from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide. This measure considers the involvement of the military in political decision-making, based off of a subjective analysis of available information. I recode their indicator, so that scores range from 0 (most involvement) to 5 (least involvement); thus, higher scores indicate high levels of civilian control (i.e. better governance).⁶⁸ Although this measure does not capture some of the more nuanced aspects of civilian control, such as civilian oversight of the military by groups other than the executive, it provides a good indicator of the most prominent aspect of civilian control.

⁶⁶ As Call (2012) argues, this lower threshold is appropriate—while a conflict with 500 deaths would not meet the threshold of “war” for COW, it still indicates a failure of the post-conflict peace. (Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Consequences of Civil War Recurrence*, 9.)

⁶⁷ I have not found any available data measuring the institutional framework or management of the security sector; while measures are available to approximate for the capacity of the security sector, they are too closely related to the dependent variable (conflict relapse) to employ in a statistical analysis like this.

⁶⁸ Llewellyn D. Howell, “International Country Risk Guide Methodology” (East Syracuse, NY: PRS Group, 2011), 5.

I measure state repression using data from the Political Terror Scale, which defines political terror as “violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question.” This includes violations ranging from political imprisonment and torture to abductions to extrajudicial killings or deadly force, committed by a range of security actors.⁶⁹ Using the three political terror scores included in the PTS, I construct a 5-point scale, with measures ranging from 0 (highest level of repression) to 4 (lowest level of repression); in other words, higher scores indicate better governance.⁷⁰ The decision to repress is one taken by the government. However, once presented with the order to repress, security forces must decide whether or not to comply. When security forces view their responsibility as to the people instead of the regime, they are less likely to comply with orders to repress.⁷¹ Security forces that have a high level of respect for human rights should be less likely to comply with orders to repress. As discussed above, the work of Keels and Nichols (2018) shows a positive, significant relationship between repression and conflict relapse.⁷² However, while their analysis includes measures for regime type, they do not consider other indicators of governance. Thus, it is unclear whether their results capture the direct effect of political violence on peace, or governance more broadly. By including repression into these models, this analysis will enhance our understanding of how the conduct of security forces impacts the sustainability of peace.

⁶⁹ For a full list, see the Appendix.

⁷⁰ The PTS includes three measures of political terror, each of which reflect counts of physical violations as recorded by the US State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. See Mark Gibney et al., “The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018,” Political Terror Scale, 2019, 1–3, <http://www.politicalterroryscale.org/>.

⁷¹ David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham, “Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century,” *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014): 241–45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012450566>.

⁷² Keels and Nichols, “State Repression and Post-Conflict Peace Failure,” 27–30.

These measures are blunt indicators of security sector governance. They do not take into account many of the other factors associated with good governance in post-conflict states, such as accountability, formal institutions, or capacity. However, with no measures available for those aspects of security governance, I argue that military involvement in politics and repression offer valuable indicator of governance.

Security Sector Reform

To capture the level of security sector reform in a state, I construct two measures capturing the level of military and police reform in a state, drawing from data from Notre Dame's Peace Accords Matrix.⁷³ These measures capture whether the state included a measure for military or police reform in a peace agreement and, if they did, whether the agreed upon reforms were carried out. "Military Reform" and "Police Reform" are categorical variables, scored 0 to 3. If the state did not specify reforms or did not follow through with them, it receives a score of 0. Minimal implementation is scored "1", moderate implementation "2", and full implementation of reforms is scored "3".

Like the other indicators employed in this analysis, these give a somewhat incomplete accounting of reform as they do not take into account the variation in the content of peace agreements, i.e. a state that stipulates only military integration is considered the same way as a state that commits to a more expansive set of reforms. The qualitative analyses in later chapters will allow a deeper, more multi-faceted analysis of the relationship between governance, security sector reform, and peace.

⁷³ Madhav Joshi, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick M. Regan, "Annualized Implementation Data on Intrastate Comprehensive Peace Accords, 1989-2012," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (2015): 551–62.

Controls

To maximize the power of these analyses, I limit the control variables I include to those that are most theoretically relevant. Theories about the feasibility of civil war posit that conflict is more likely to occur where the state has less ability to put down an insurrection. I include the logged value of GDP and the logged value of the population to control for state capacity. The grievance literature commonly posits underdevelopment to be a driver of conflict and conflict relapse. To account for this, I also include a measure of infant mortality, which is commonly used in the economics literature as a proxy for level of development.⁷⁴

Security sector governance is likely related to the political governance quality of the state. To control for political governance, I use a composite measure created with the political corruption, rule of law, and accountability indices from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (VDEM). These indices are coded using expert surveys to capture the pervasiveness of corruption; the extent to which the regime is accountable to the population, civil society, and other branches of government; and the respect for the rule of law.⁷⁵ To account for regime type, I use the revised combined polity score from the POLITY IV dataset, created for use with time-series data.⁷⁶

In light of the theoretical and empirical work relating the form of conflict termination and post-conflict governance, I include an indicator for “conflict outcome,” taken from the UCDP

⁷⁴ Data on GDP, population, and infant mortality were taken from the World Bank. See World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, 2020, <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.

⁷⁵ Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook V8,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), 2018, <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18>.

⁷⁶ Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, “POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regimes and Characteristics, 1800-2000,” n.d., 17, <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ucdcm/inscr/polity/index.htm>.

Conflict Termination Dataset.⁷⁷ Conflicts may end in four ways: (1) with a negotiated settlement, (2) a ceasefire, (3) victory by the incumbent government; (4) victory by the rebels; or (5) low activity – many conflicts do not end decisively, but dwindle until there are no more violent confrontations. In the following regressions, “negotiated settlement” is the baseline outcome.

To control for the strategic interest of OECD donors, I remove Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Iraq from the analysis because of their unique strategic value to the U.S. Given the strong security ties of most OECD donors with the United States and size of security and development assistance they receive, including these states is likely to skew the results of the analysis. States that are rich in extractable resources may be more likely to relapse into conflict; as they do not rely on taxed income for revenue, these states may not feel as great a need to accommodate the demands of their citizens. Additionally, full control of the state and its institutions may seem like a greater prize to elites, making those in power more desperate to keep power and those outside of power more motivated to take it.⁷⁸ To capture this, I include a measure of “resource wealth” taken from Ross Mahdavi (2008), recoded as a binary variable to reflect whether the state is a net exporter of oil or gas.⁷⁹

Analysis and Results

To test the effect of governance quality on the likelihood of conflict relapse, I derive maximum likelihood estimators of relapse using a discrete-time hazard model. Discrete-time

⁷⁷ Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.”

⁷⁸ Desha M. Girod, *Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15–17; Eric Keels, “Oil Wealth, Post-Conflict Elections, and Postwar Peace Failure,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 5 (2015): 1025, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595702>.

⁷⁹ Michael Ross and Paasha Mahdavi, “Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2014,” Data File and Codebook, Harvard Dataverse, n.d., <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y>.

hazard models offer an alternative to the Cox proportional hazards model and are better able to address the possibility of temporal variation when the data group time into blocks. Instead, Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) argue that a pooled logistic regression with cubic splines is the best approach to model grouped duration data like these. I follow their advice and use a traditional logit model with restricted cubic splines to estimate duration in this model.⁸⁰

Table 2.1 reports the results of the logistic analyses testing security sector governance and conflict relapse. Table 2.2 displays the logistic regressions analyses of security sector reform and relapse. To account for dependence within units, I apply robust standard errors clustered at the country level to Models 2 - 4. Unfortunately, data coverage by the ICRG within this sample is limited. Because of the constrained sample size, Model 1 is run without country-clustered standard errors. Removing clustered standard errors decreases the accuracy of these results as compared to the rest of the models I present.


Civilian control (Model 1) has a negative, significant relationship with conflict, as shown in Figure 2.2. In other words, states with greater civilian control are less likely to relapse into conflict than those states in which the military takes an active role in politics. Within this sample, the mean score for military in politics is 2.34, putting the average country at around a 17 percent risk of conflict relapse, all else equal. These results indicate that reducing the level of military involvement in politics by one standard deviation (1.54), cuts the risk of conflict relapse by over two-thirds, bringing the likelihood of relapse to around 5 percent.

⁸⁰ I specify four knots at 0, 3, 7, and 16 years after conflict has ended. To determine knot placement, I use STATA package called `mkspline2`.


Table 2.1 Security Sector Governance and Conflict Relapse
Discrete-Time Logistic Regression

	M1	M2
	Logit	Logit, PCSE
	b/(se)	b/(se)
Civilian Control	-24.487*	
	-11.998	
Respect for Human Rights		-0.638
		-0.721
Revised Polity	7.683*	-0.081
	-3.72	-0.3
Governance Quality	-13.158*	-0.04
	-6.516	-0.137
Infant Mortality		-0.095**
		-0.034
Outcome (Base = Peace Agreement)		
Ceasefire	160.415	8.366**
	-2550.97	-3.175
Government Victory	145.264*	7.610*
	-70.898	-3.266
Low Activity	139.913	9.051**
	-2550.737	-3.215
Log GDP	-27.824*	-3.393
	-14.135	-1.87
Log Population	53.426*	4.105
	-26.495	-2.353
Resource Wealth	40.379	4.38
	-21.241	-2.249
Peacekeeping Operation	73.147	7.079*
	-2550.16	-3.363
Peace Years		
Spline 1	7.73	3.136*
	-4.011	-1.226
Spline 2	-32.379	-14.195*
	-19.314	-6.603
Spline 3	69.12	25.782*
	-40.95	-12.693
Constant	-792.149	-52.479*
	-2578.378	-24.932
Wald Chi-Squared	49.38	21.43
Prob > Chi-Squared	0.00	0.09
Pseudo R-squared	0.738	0.374
N	197	266

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect of Civilian Control on Conflict

Model 2 shows the relationship between respect for human rights by security forces on the likelihood of relapse. The average effect of repression is insignificant. However, as Figure 2.3 shows, repression has varied marginal effects: in the mid-range, repression shows a significant relationship with relapse. Theoretically this makes sense: very low rates of repression are unlikely to incite grievances; very high rates of repression may deter potential rebels from picking up arms against the government. The states in this sample share a mean score of 2.06 on respect for human rights, which is within the range of significance. If respect for human rights is improved by one standard deviation (0.87), the likelihood of relapse is nearly cut in half. Put differently, reducing repression by state security forces reduces the risk of conflict.

Figure 2.3: Marginal Effect of Respect for Human Rights on Relapse

Models 3 and 4 test the impact of military reform and police reform on relapse, respectively. The results show strong support for Hypothesis 2: reform only reduces the likelihood of conflict when implemented fully. The negative, significant coefficients for full implementation of military and police reform indicate that honoring promises for reform made during peace negotiations lowers the risk of relapsing into conflict, but that this effect only holds when reforms are made in full. Specifically, full implementation of military reform is associated with a 13 percent reduction in the probability of relapse as compared to states where no reforms were pursued. Full implementation of police reforms reduces the likelihood of relapse by seven percent as compared to no reform. Figure 2.4 portrays the coefficients listed in Models 3 and 4, respectively. To simplify these figures, I include only the indicators that showed a statistically significant relationship with conflict relapse.

Table 2.2 SSR and Conflict Relapse

Discrete-Time Logistic Regression

	M3 <i>Military Reform</i> Logit, PCSE b/(se)	M4 <i>Police Reform</i> Logit, PCSE b/(se)
Security Sector Reform (Base = None)		
Minimal	0.734 -2.217	0 (.)
Moderate	0 (.)	2.149 -2.397
Full	-3.552* -1.421	-3.237** -1
Revised Polity	0.02 -0.297	0.078 -0.227
Governance Quality	-0.092 -0.222	-0.161 -0.203
Infant Mortality	-0.112 -0.058	-0.140* -0.057
Outcome (Base = Peace Agreement)		
Ceasefire	10.443** -3.695	10.532*** -3.005
Government Victory	9.240** -3.586	6.578** -2.468
Low Activity	8.487* -3.755	9.029** -3.253
Log GDP	-3.971 -2.113	-4.263* -2.144
Log Population	4.461 -2.282	4.561 -2.357
Resource Wealth	5.349 -3.4	5.983* -2.831
Peacekeeping Operation	8.862** -3.027	8.466*** -2.129
Peace Years		
Spline 1	4.851* -2.447	3.775* -1.494
Spline 2	-20.803 -12.097	-16.294* -7.833
Spline 3	37.258 -22.637	29.108 -14.881
Constant	-55.649** -21.58	-49.885* -19.612
Wald Chi-Squared	41.41	200.37
Prob > Chi-Squared	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R-squared	0.439	0.409
N	219	265

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

These figures illustrate relationships common across all four models. First, these models provide only weak support for arguments tying conflict relapse to state capacity. While the

direction of the coefficients for GDP and population point in the direction predicted by these theories, they only reach significance in model 1. Resource wealth is positively correlated with conflict relapse across all four models.

Grievance theories

received slightly more support:

Infant mortality is negatively correlated with relapse across all four models, reaching significance in Models 2 and 4.


Similarly, governance quality is negative across all four models, but only reaches significance in Model 1. The insignificance of governance quality in these models is surprising, as prior work would indicate a strong relationship between governance and peace. Rather than interpreting these results as evidence against the

governance-relapse link, it seems likely that their insignificance is a function of model choice.

By pooling observations, these models are unable to test for within-country variation over time.

Unfortunately, data limitations prohibit the use of a conditional fixed-effects analysis.

Figure 2.4 Security Sector Reform and Relapse



In contrast, these results provide strong support of relationship between conflict termination and relapse. In this sample, conflicts that ended with a negotiated settlement were less likely to relapse into conflict than those that end with ceasefires, military victory by the government, or taper out due to low activity. Peacekeeping operations appear to be a strong positive predictor of conflict relapse. This counterintuitive finding likely reflects what Fortna (2004) finds in her study of PKO effectiveness – the states that host peacekeeping missions are usually the “toughest cases,” the states that experienced the most intractable conflicts and the most precarious peace.⁸¹ Thus, the seemingly positive relationship between PKOs and conflict relapse is likely misleading. These results also provide strong support for a time trend. States face a heightened risk of relapsing into conflict within the first four years of peace; after that, the risk of relapse falls quickly.

Conclusion

The four analyses presented above all support a similar conclusion: the quality of security sector governance is connected to the likelihood that post-conflict states relapse into conflict. States with security forces that refrain from intervening in politics and respect the physical integrity of citizens are less likely to see peace fail than states with low civilian control and high rates of repression. Furthermore, states that adopt and implement security sector reforms are more likely to remain at peace.

⁸¹ Fortna, “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects,” 499.

Given the evidence of a relationship between governance and relapse, understanding the impact of security assistance on security sector governance becomes all the more important. In the next chapter, I present a theory of security assistance and governance.

CHAPTER 3

A THEORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND GOVERNANCE

In this chapter, I propose a theory of security assistance in post-conflict states. I argue that the impact of security assistance on security sector governance is a function of the type of aid and the timing of its disbursement. I assert that different types of security assistance have differential effects on governance: aid that supports institutional development (“institutional assistance”) is likely to have a positive effect on governance, while aid that supports operational effectiveness (“operational assistance”) will be more likely to have a negative effect on governance. Following the work of historical institutionalists, I argue that the impact of this aid is conditioned by the political context: institutional assistance that is provided during moments of regime vulnerability will be more likely to lead to positive governance changes than aid provided during periods of regime stability. Similarly, operational assistance that is provided during uncertainty will be more likely to lead to a deterioration in governance. It may even undercut the governance interventions underway.

This chapter proceeds in the following sections. First, I review the literature on security assistance and its impact on governance. Like the literature on development assistance, scholars of military aid generally fall in two camps: optimists and pessimists. Second, I present a theory to help explain the divergent theoretical and empirical expectations of aid scholars. I argue that military assistance has differential effects on security sector governance because of differences in the composition and timing of aid interventions. Third, I explain the research strategy I employ to investigate this theory in the rest of the dissertation. Finally, I conclude with a review of the arguments made thus far in this dissertation and provide a roadmap for the following chapters.

Can Aid Improve Governance? Reviewing the Aid Debate

In contrast to the large body of political science and economics literature devoted to development assistance, military assistance has received relatively little scholarly attention. Like development assistance, military aid experts diverge on their expectations regarding its effects. Critics of military aid argue that security assistance could be damaging to both the security and governance of the recipient state. In states with fraught civil-military relations, the regime is likely to prioritize its own survival over domestic security. Where this is the case, the regime may employ measures to reduce the likelihood that military officers will attempt a coup d'état, such as creating parallel security institutions, creating special security units loyal only to the regime, and intervening in military affairs to reward loyalty over merit.⁸² These strategies are often expensive, creating an incentive for the regime to mobilize all available defense funds to maintain their coup-proofing measures.

Mara Karlin highlights this issue in her study of US military assistance, offering the example of Yemen:

“In Yemen, from 2007 to 2011, the U.S. government disbursed more than \$500 million to assist the country’s military in its fight against a mix of domestic insurgents and al Qaeda affiliates. In its narrow focus on counterterrorism, however, the United States failed to fully appreciate that Yemen’s security challenges were only one of many problems facing the country. Its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, had filled the military with friends and family members who

⁸² For a good discussion of various coup-proofing measures and their effectiveness, see Erica De Bruin, “Preventing Coups d’état: How Counterbalancing Works,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 7 (August 2018): 1433–58, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717692652>.

grew rich while nearly everyone else in the country suffered from poverty, hunger, and unemployment. Moreover, Saleh used the U.S. funds and equipment intended for counterterrorism to enrich his family and bolster his personal security detail. In 2015, when Yemen descended into outright civil war, Pentagon officials admitted that they had lost track of millions of dollars' worth of military equipment and could not guarantee that U.S. weapons would not fall into the wrong hands."⁸³

In addition to institutionalizing poor security sector governance, the decision to coup-proof requires an inherent trade-off in conventional effectiveness: the same strategies that make a military less of a threat to the government also make it less able to respond to security threats.⁸⁴

Second, inflows of equipment and training to repressive regimes could make it easier for the state to punish dissidents and opposition groups. This was clearly the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the run-up to the 2015 elections as the Congolese government used its security forces to implement increasingly repressive measures against political opponents.⁸⁵ Where aid enables the state to repress the opposition, it contributes to political grievances against the state, potentially enabling support for a return to conflict. Increases in coercive power may also disincentivize the government from making political concessions to the opposition if they believe their increased power makes them a more formidable foe.⁸⁶ Alternatively, some scholars suggest that the increased power and standing of the military may jeopardize stability by

⁸³ Mara Karlin, "Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint: Minor Tools Can't Solve Major Problems," *Foreign Affairs*, December 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint>.

⁸⁴ Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*, 47–50.

⁸⁵ Kersti Larsdotter, "Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less," *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 30.

⁸⁶ Stephen Watts et al., *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 26.

increasing the likelihood of a coup d'état, or at least increasing tension between officers and civilian leaders.⁸⁷

Proponents of assistance argue that certain forms of security assistance have the potential to transmit liberal norms of civilian control and respect for human rights, and improve institutional quality and capacity in weak states. Credible threats by donors to withhold aid for human rights abuses may raise the cost of repression for recipient governments and incentivize changes in behavior.⁸⁸

Like certain forms of development assistance, security assistance in the form of force professionalization and defense institution building are focused on building professional norms and building institutions. This assistance also has the ability to break down existing networks of patronage in the security sector by prioritizing formal systems of recruitment and promotion. Thus, in addition to improving security sector governance, security assistance that addresses these “sensitive affairs” is likely to improve effectiveness as well.⁸⁹

Generally, this form of aid constitutes a small percentage of overall security assistance. However, funding devoted to security institution building in post-conflict states has grown in the past twenty years as the development community has embraced security sector reform as key for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Security sector reform (SSR) projects aim to professionalize the military and police through instituting civilian leadership and a clear chain of

⁸⁷ Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 4 (July 1, 2017): 545, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317713557>.

⁸⁸ Sam R. Bell, K. Chad Clay, and Carla Martinez Machain, “The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 10 (November 2017): 2025, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716632300>.

⁸⁹ Mara Karlin, *Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 292.

command; de-politicizing army recruitment; professionalizing the police force; and to bring the military and police under the purview of the judicial system. The goal of these actions is to reduce the influence of the military in politics and strengthen the state's efforts to promote the rule of law and reduce corruption.

Supporting Governance to Support Peace

Recent empirical work in political science and economics shows that different types of development aid have differential effects on governance: aid provided to support democracy and accountability often has a positive effect on governance.⁹⁰ However, all of these studies have only considered development assistance. I argue that certain types of military aid function in the same way, supporting accountability and transparency of operations. I define *institutional assistance* as assistance provided specifically to improve institutional quality by supporting systems of transparency, accountability, and public administration. *Operational assistance* is generally provided to expand the recipient state's resource base or improve the operational and tactical skills of security forces. Given the value of the organization and control of the security sector as a tool for conserving power, regime elites have large incentives to misuse this aid.

These different effects come down to a question of fungibility – the idea that aid money may be spent in ways that the donor did not intend. Aid becomes fungible due to the perfect substitutability of money – i.e. money that is provided for one activity relaxes the recipient

⁹⁰ See, for example, Jones and Tarp, “Does Foreign Aid Harm Political Institutions?”; Heinrich and Loftis, “Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability”; and Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: More Liberty, Less Terror?”. For a critique of democracy assistance, see de Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.”

government's budget constraints, making it possible for the recipient to take the money it had intended on spending on the financed project and spending it somewhere else. Some scholars distinguish between fungibility through substitution, and fungibility through manipulation, in which the recipient government applies the funding provided for one sector or project to another.⁹¹ For example, funding provided to build a hospital could be diverted towards the military. This is possible with all types of aid, and can be quite significant in scale. One study found that for every dollar spent by donors on health-related aid, recipient governments reduce domestic spending by \$0.43 to \$1.14.⁹²

Fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing – for cash-strapped governments, project support by donors can free up scarce resources for productive investment. For less scrupulous regimes, however, the fungibility of aid can be useful for maintaining patronage systems or funding politically popular (but unnecessary) projects. Aid that is low in fungibility and directed specifically towards improving transparency and accountability (i.e. institutional assistance) is more likely to lead to governance improvements than aid that is more fungible and intended to improve operational effectiveness (i.e. operational assistance).

How Fungibility Influences Aid Impact

Aid varies in fungibility based on the motivation of the donor and the form of assistance. Though aid recipients can request a certain type of funding, the choice of aid modality is

⁹¹ For a discussion of the different conceptions of fungibility, see Stefan Leiderer, "Fungibility and the Choice of Aid Modalities: The Red Herring Revisited," Working Paper (Helsinki: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, August 2012), 4, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Fungibility%20and%20the%20Choice%20of%20Aid%20Modalities.pdf>.

⁹² Chunling Lu et al., "Public Financing of Health in Developing Countries: A Cross-National Systematic Analysis," *Lancet* 375 (April 2010): 1375; cited in Haley J. Swedlund, *The Development Dance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 29.

ultimately up to the donor, and she may make the decision regarding which type of aid to send for either altruistic or strategic reasons. Altruistic donors are primarily interested in the political and economic development of the recipient state, and provide aid based on what they evaluate to be the most effective plan for that state. Strategic donors, in contrast, provide aid to further their self-interest. Aid allocated to further the strategic interests of donors is less likely to improve the institutional quality of states because donors want the support of the incumbent regime and thus may be less likely to impose or enforce policy conditions that are costly to the recipient regime. When donors cannot credibly threaten to enforce policy conditions, aid operates like other non-tax revenue sources such as oil: recipient governments have full discretion over its use, with no responsibility to put it towards the provision of public goods.⁹³ I follow the literature in adopting the assumption that states with poor governance are likely to appropriate aid to fund regime survival. This effect may be greater in post-conflict settings, where incumbent governments face a greater risk of coups or rebellion.⁹⁴ Empirical evidence supports this assumption: while there is variation among post-conflict states, states emerging from conflict have significantly worse governance than other developing countries.⁹⁵

Security assistance comes in a variety of forms. Unlike development assistance, there are no common terms used by donors to describe the types of assistance provided. Still, an analysis of the security assistance provided by the U.S. and three of its allies—the UK, France, and Australia—reveals common trends in aid giving. Donors generally provide security assistance

⁹³ David H. Bearce and Daniel C. Tirone, “Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments,” *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (July 2010): 840, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000204>; Bell, Clay, and Martinez Machain, “The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights,” 2026–27.

⁹⁴ Desha M. Girod, “Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic-Desperation Hypothesis,” *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 1 (January 2012): 190.

⁹⁵ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” *European Economic Review* 48 (2004): 1138.

through four main modalities: (1) education, (2) tactical and operational assistance, (3) institutional support and guidance, and (4) direct military support. These forms of assistance are distinct from peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism activities.⁹⁶ Table 3.1 outlines the characteristics of each type of aid.

Education is given to improve the skills and capacity at the individual and unit levels. This assistance is generally provided by sending teams from the donor country to work one-on-one with the recipient state's forces or by paying for individuals within the recipient state's security sector to attend training abroad. For example, France has established a network training centers across Africa as part of an initiative called *Écoles nationales à vocation régionale* (Region-Focused National Schools, ENVR) to provide specialized military training to forces across the continent.⁹⁷ The American International Military Education Training (IMET) program provides funding to send selected military officers to receive an education at a military institution in the U.S. This training is intended not only to improve participants' expertise, but to transmit Western norms of military professionalism and democratic governance. Despite the fact that this training is directly administered by donor country personnel, it is still susceptible to being appropriated or misused. In many states, selection for participation in trainings—particularly overseas trainings—is highly sought after. Selection has thus become a way for many regimes to reward political supporters.

⁹⁶ Jennifer D.P Moroney et al., *Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third World Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom*, Project Air Force (RAND, 2011), 80–83, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiguYDguonnAhXVPM0KHTb2BuMQFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rand.org%2Fpubs%2Ftechnical_reports%2FTR972.html&usg=AOvVaw21msSNqe9sPmPJFP8Yg3X0.

⁹⁷ “Les Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale,” France Diplomatie, October 2019, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/securite-desarmement-et-non-proliferation/nos-alliances-et-cooperations/la-cooperation-de-securite-et-de-defense/les-ecoles-nationales-a-vocation-regionale/>.

Table 3.1: Security Assistance Modalities

Modality	Purpose	Type of transfer	Level of Fungibility	Example
<i>Education</i>	Improve partner nation's capacity through individual-level education, support professionalization	Scholarships, grants for individuals	Medium	U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Regional Vocational Training Schools
<i>Tactical and Operational Assistance</i>	Enhance partner nation's capabilities through training, financial, and material support	Training, grants, loans, equipment	High	Arms transfers, foreign military financing, basic training
<i>Institutional Support and Guidance</i>	Provide advice and support on strategic and structural matters	Experts	Low	MOD advisors, Defense institution building measures
<i>Direct Military Support</i>	Provide emergency services to the population in cases to supplement/replace partner nation forces	Troops, equipment	Low	Force deployments during natural disasters

Donors interested in supporting the capacity of partner states may choose to provide *tactical and operational assistance*, either through loans, grants, or equipment donations to the recipient state. This aid is the most fungible type of military assistance. Like program aid, financial and equipment transfers free up government funding for alternative expenses. Group-level training also fits into this category. Like direct financing and equipment, donors provide this assistance to support the capacity of the recipient state. While training done by donor forces is less fungible than equipment, it is more vulnerable to fungibility than the individual-level

education provided through professionalization aid. Trainings administered in-country may free government resources for other purposes; alternatively, trainings may be misdirected. For example, millions of dollars of security assistance to the DRC were wasted by Congolese President Kabila who directed inflows of training and equipment to maintain the factionalized military he had created to support his rule.⁹⁸

Donors who are more concerned with developing institutions may send high-level advisors to partner states to provide *institutional support and guidance*, providing expertise on strategic issues and assisting in structural reforms. For most states, these advisors are provided to focus primarily on improving effectiveness and capacity, such as Australia or France. Recently, several states have shifted defense policies to support governance reform programs within the security sector, focusing attention on reforming defense institutions and building their capacity. These programs still constitute a very small percentage of security assistance. While their impact may vary from state to state, donors generally have a very high degree of control over the dispensation of these types of assistance.

Direct military support is generally provided only in times of crisis or emergency. Like humanitarian relief, it is provided when recipient states do not have the capacity to provide essential services to their population. As they are using their own troops and systems to provide assistance, donors have the highest degree of control over direct support missions. Still, although donors maintain control over the use of their own resources, this assistance is still fungible, due to its substitutability. Like humanitarian relief, direct military support is not intended to support longer-term developments in the recipient state.

⁹⁸ Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, and Maria Eriksson Baaz, *The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity*, Usalama Project (London: RIft Valley Institute, 2013), 42.

These aid modalities can be provided in different combinations depending on the donor's intent. In addition, post-conflict states receive large sums of assistance to facilitate DDR and fund reintegration training and stipends. Although the majority of this funding is provided directly to former combatants, I include it in my analysis as aid provided to support the security sector.

I argue that security assistance can be divided into two categories: *institutional assistance* and *operational assistance*. I define institutional as assistance provided specifically to improve institutional quality by supporting systems of transparency, accountability, and public administration. Specifically, this aid is often earmarked for security system management and reform or for defense institution building and is given in the form of education assistance and institutional support and guidance. This aid is primarily given in the form of education and institutional support and guidance, rather than more easily appropriated assistance like grants or equipment donations.⁹⁹ Additionally, this aid is only provided by donors whose intent is to foster better governance and are thus more likely to enforce policy conditions. This combination of modality and donor intent contributes to low fungibility, increasing the probability that institutional assistance is used as intended.

Hypothesis 3: Institutional assistance increases the quality of security sector governance.

Operational assistance is generally provided as tactical and operational support to expand the recipient state's resource base or improve the operational and tactical skills of security forces. Like many forms of development aid, operational assistance is highly fungible and thus easily misused: recipient governments can direct donor spending and use their own defense budgets

⁹⁹ Empirical work supports the idea that regimes are less able to stifle democratic change with less fungible aid. See Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, "Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship," *International Organization* 70, no. 1 (January 2016): 17.

into arms purchases or selectively reward officers with donor-provided training and equipment. Given the value of the organization and control of the security sector as a tool for conserving power, regime elites have large incentives to misuse this aid. Donors interested in pursuing their own strategic goals are more likely to provide operational assistance. Take, for example, the approach taken by donors following the conclusion of the Second Congo War in the DRC. Suspecting that President Kabila might remain in power, donors put little pressure on his government to fulfill the requirements of the peace agreement, even when it became clear that he was using his position as president to safeguard his position. Instead, donors focused their efforts on purely technical projects, such as building infrastructure or training soldiers.¹⁰⁰

Hypothesis 4. Operational assistance decreases the quality of security sector governance.

Table 3.2 outlines the characteristics of institutional and operational assistance and their predicted effect on governance.

Table 3.2: Predicted Effects of Security Assistance on Governance

Aid Type	Aid Modality	Aid Objective	Predicted Effect on Governance
<i>Institutional Assistance</i>	Institutional Support and Guidance; Education	Support SSR, promote professionalism	Positive
<i>Operational Assistance</i>	Foreign Military Financing; Tactical and Operational Assistance	Provide equipment/funding to support recipient budget; improve capacity of forces	Negative

¹⁰⁰ Verweijen, “Half-Brewed: The Lukewarm Results of Creating an Integrated Military in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 144.

Timing Matters: Regime Vulnerability and the Magnitude of Effects

Breaking security assistance into types helps to explain which forms of assistance are more likely to lead to positive governance outcomes. However, the historical record is riddled with examples of states that received large amounts of institutional assistance without experiencing any improvement in security sector governance, as well as states that received large amounts of operational assistance without experiencing a significant reduction in governance quality. Take, for example, the experience of East Timor, the recipient of some of the world's largest SSR assistance packages. Despite receiving enormous sums in the years since its war ended, East Timor has struggled reconcile its security forces, delineate institutional responsibilities, and reduce patronage and corruption within the institution.¹⁰¹ In contrast, El Salvador has successfully created an inclusive, civilian-controlled security sector in the midst of large flows of operational assistance from the US.¹⁰² I argue that to understand why some governance interventions succeed when others do not, one must also look at the timing of aid interventions. Drawing from the literature on historical institutionalism, I argue that institutional and operational assistance will be more likely to impact governance institutions when provided during periods of *regime vulnerability*.

I define regime vulnerability as periods of time in which the incumbent regime faces severe uncertainty regarding its survivability. While regimes may face external threats that challenge their position, this definition focuses on the domestic pressures that could result in a regime losing power. All governments are vulnerable at times, regardless of regime type. For

¹⁰¹ "Timor-Leste SSR Background Note," International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, October 27, 2016, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Timor-Leste-SSR-Background-Note#Overview%20of%20SSR%20in%20Timor-LesteB>.

¹⁰² Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, 81–90.

post-conflict states, regime vulnerability is a factor of (1) the form of conflict termination, and (2) the domestic political cycle.

As discussed earlier, the form of conflict termination plays a strong role in determining the balance of power between rival factions. Conflicts that end in a military victory give the winning party discretion over whether or not it includes the opposition in the government. Even if it chooses to include the opposition, the opposition is unlikely to supplant it due to the power imbalance that led to the military victory. Conflicts that end in a negotiated settlement, ceasefire, or low activity are much more vulnerable. Whether or not the post-conflict regime chooses to include the opposition in government, the power balance remains closer to parity, increasing the threat of a coup or return to conflict.


Domestic political cycles influence the tenure of the incumbent regime and the potential for their replacement. For democratic governments, vulnerability will be highest during elections, particularly those in which the opposition has a high probability of victory. Authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable when the political balance of power shifts, either within the leading party or when a group outside of the regime gains greater political influence. This vulnerability increases with the share of power held by the opposition in the post-conflict regime.

Research into the leadership dynamics of authoritarian regimes suggests that the early period of rule is the most fraught. Distrust among the leader and the ruling coalition will be highest in the first months and years of an authoritarian regime, as both sides fear that they might have their position taken from them. Empirically, dictators are at the highest risk of a coup during their first year. Similarly, elites within the ruling coalition will be on the lookout for signs

that the dictator is consolidating power, which may be used to eliminate them.¹⁰³ These dynamics create competing incentives in terms of control of the security sector. Fearing a coup, the leader will be tempted to purge opposition members from the ranks of the security forces and create forces that are loyal to him. However, these actions may inadvertently threaten his tenure by making others in the regime fear for their own security. In post-conflict regimes where the opposition is included in the government or security sector, the threat of a coup may be higher, increasing the costs of power consolidation by the leader.

These periods of vulnerability create critical junctures, in which dramatic institutional change is possible. In these moments, decision-makers are generally presented with a wider range of viable courses of action than usual.¹⁰⁴ These periods are often characterized by high uncertainty, making actors more likely to create new institutions or change existing ones

Figure 3.1: Regime Vulnerability, Aid, and Governance



¹⁰³ Daehee Bak, "Autocratic Political Cycle and International Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37, no. 3 (2020): 263, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894217741617>; Milan W. Svobik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 480.

¹⁰⁴ Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Keleman, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics* 59 (April 2007): 355.

depending on their perceptions of what is in their short-term interest. It is often in these moments that democratic transitions occur.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Barany argues that the creation of what he describes as “democratic armies” (i.e. armed forces governed by accountable civilian rule) is usually the result of a shock to the political system.¹⁰⁶

In this atmosphere of heightened vulnerability, the actions of donors are likely to have greater weight. The provision of aid may change the decision calculus of actors, making some policy options more attractive than others. The potential for security assistance to alter the path of the security sector is especially powerful in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, when there is still uncertainty about the post-war distribution of power, including control of the security sector. Like other political transitions, post-war institutions are not created on a “clean state” – pre-war and conflict institutions and power structures still exert a powerful influence on politics.¹⁰⁷ Still, these moments offer greater opportunity for institutional change and reform. During these times, elites act strategically, making consequential decisions about which governance strategy to pursue. A coordinated effort by donors to premise assistance on sector-wide reforms may shift the decision-making calculus in favor of inclusion and accommodation of the opposition. Furthermore, aid that supports civilian control may make it more difficult for elites to renege on earlier promises of accommodation.¹⁰⁸ In contrast, an influx of operational

¹⁰⁵ Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8/9 (2010): 937, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010370431>.

¹⁰⁶ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 20–21.

¹⁰⁷ Brzoska, “Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations,” 7.

¹⁰⁸ In their study of post-conflict election, Flores and Nooruddin argue that institutions that constrain elites such as civilian control of the military make it more difficult for elites to break promises they make regarding powersharing. See Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction,” *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 2 (March 2012): 560–61, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001733>.

assistance may create a pool of discretionary funds for the regime to use, making it easier for the government to pursue a strategy of power consolidation. By allowing the government to use its resources to appease the military and other security elites, this aid may even undercut the positive effects of governance reform efforts.

Once set on a particular path, it becomes increasingly difficult to change an institution, especially when those in authority benefit from the current structure.¹⁰⁹ Thus, as regime vulnerability decreases, leaders will have less of an incentive to alter the institutional structure of the security sector (Figure 3.1). Institutional assistance might produce marginal improvements in governance quality, but it is unlikely that it will significantly change governance practices. Similarly, operational assistance may allow poor governance practices to persist, but it is less likely to lead to a deterioration in governance quality or undercut security sector reform.

Hypothesis 5 reflects the conditional effect of regime vulnerability on aid:

Hypothesis 5. High regime vulnerability should intensify the positive (negative) effect of institutional (operational) assistance on governance.

Aid in Action

If my theory is correct, the effect of aid will vary not only by type, but by the institutional context of the recipient state at the time it is received. Due to the nature of path dependency, early aid interventions may have lasting effects that mitigate the impact of future interventions. Examining this type of relationship requires the sensitivity to context and contingency that best addressed through qualitative analysis. To test this relationship, I employ a method called

¹⁰⁹ For a greater discussion of path dependence and the principle of increasing returns, see Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 232–53.

comparative process tracing to analyze and compare the relationship of three post-conflict states: Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire. Together, the experiences of the security sectors of these three states illustrate the range of post-conflict outcomes. Although they started with similar conditions, the varying levels of institutional and operational assistance they received and differing disbursement schedules contributed to important differences in security sector governance.

Research Strategy

In the following chapters, I use a method of controlled case comparison proposed by Bengtsson and Rounavaara called “comparative process tracing” (CPT). Process tracing is uniquely suited as a form of analysis for theories that involve timing, conjunctures, and sequences of events, such as the theory I describe above.¹¹⁰ Unlike statistical analyses, process tracing attempts to go beyond examining covariation in the independent and dependent variables to analyze the impact of causal mechanisms in the unfolding of events.¹¹¹ CPT relies on the assumption that despite the idiosyncrasies and unique historical factors influencing each case, there are general and identifiable social mechanisms that influence political outcomes across cases. Identifying the influence of these mechanisms within and across cases can lead to a deeper understanding than within-case analysis alone.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 7.

¹¹¹ David Waldner, “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science*, ed. Harold Kincaid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 68; Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence,” *Political Analysis* 14 (2006): 259; James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 507–8.

¹¹² Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara, “Comparative Process Tracing: Making Historical Comparison Structured and Focused,” *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 47, no. 1 (2016): 46–47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116658549>.

Bengtsson and Rounavaara propose a two-step approach: the first step examines the processes leading from a particular event or input to its outcome, analyzing the process in terms of identified mechanisms; the second step compares these processes and the impact of the identified mechanisms across cases. CPT assumes only weak path dependence and thinly rationalist behavior – processes are not deterministic, and actors make decisions based on potentially faulty beliefs, based on the current situation. In sum, CPT is “a theoretically informed comparative approach that takes social and political processes seriously, combining elements of theory, chronology, and comparison to make general inferences possible.”¹¹³

Case Selection

In choosing cases, I followed a most-similar systems design, looking for states with similar post-conflict conditions and variation in the composition of aid they received.¹¹⁴ In other words, I was looking for similar cases that received different treatments. Specifically, I focused on choosing cases that shared similar values on the control variables I identified in Chapter 2 (i.e. form of conflict termination, regime type, level of development, and presence of a peacekeeping mission), as well as two other potentially confounding variables.

In addition to influencing the likelihood of relapse, the type of conflict, form of conflict termination, regime type, and level of development may influence the quality of security sector governance. Civil wars that end with negotiated settlements with detailed power-sharing measures may lead to better security governance by creating a roadmap for governance reforms,

¹¹³ Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 45–52.

¹¹⁴ For discussions of the logic of most-similar systems designs, their limits and their value, see Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Case Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 2 (2010): 234, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009350044>; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 158–59.

especially when the settlement is accompanied with a peacekeeping operation to monitor compliance and support reforms.¹¹⁵ In contrast, conflicts that end with a victory by the government are more likely to result in repression, as the government has an incentive to use its superior military power to put down any remaining threats.¹¹⁶

Regime type influences security governance by dictating the way the government responds to grievances. Regimes with institutionalized channels for groups to pursue their needs, such as democracies, have less need of repression. In contrast, states that are unable to provide material benefits or political participation are more likely to rely on repression to silence dissent.¹¹⁷ Similarly, the state's level of development will either facilitate or constrain reforms: professionalizing the police force is easier when the government can pay officers a living wage and provide them with the equipment necessary to do their job. In the following case studies, I will examine the impact of aid on governance in light of these competing explanations. Evidence that institutional assistance has helped to improve governance and that operational assistance has hurt governance will provide support for my theory.

In addition, I narrowed my scope to consider the nature of conflict and the state's history of repression. States that mobilized along ethnic or other identities may have a harder time reconciling grievances or working together in the post-conflict state. Historical politicization of identity will likely complicate efforts to integrate forces and build effective command structures. In these cases, even a high amount of institutional assistance may be ineffective in building democratic and accountable structures. Similarly, as Heydemann (2018) asserts, states that have

¹¹⁵ Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, 64; Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," 501.


¹¹⁶ Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," 685-86.

¹¹⁷ T. David Mason and J. Michael Greig, "State Capacity, Regime Type, and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War," *International Interactions*, November 2016, 6-7, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2017.1260012>.

relied on repression to silence dissent or have struggled to assert security services across the country historically are likely to continue to struggle with those issues, even after civil war. By choosing states with similar institutional backgrounds, it is easier to separate the influence of aid on governance from their institutional legacy.¹¹⁸

I further limited my case selection to countries within sub-Saharan Africa, in order to account for any cultural or historical factors that may region-specific. The choice of sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to Southeast Asia or South America, for example, was guided by two empirical trends. First, sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed an especially high prevalence of civil war. 14 of the 26 states considered in this study are located in Africa; 10 of those states have relapsed into conflict. (Figure 3.2) Second, African states have received large inflows of security assistance. As Figure 2 illustrates, the

Figure 3.2: Relapse and Aid by Region



¹¹⁸ Steven Heydemann, "Civil War, Economic Governance & State Reconstruction in the Arab Middle East," *Daedalus* 147, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 51, https://doi.org/doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00473.

proportion of institutional assistance intended for Africa is significant. While cross-national data regarding operational assistance is unavailable, reports indicate that Western states are sending increasing amounts of traditional military aid to African states who are seen as potential partners in the Global War on Terror.¹¹⁹ Importantly, though some countries within Africa are seen as having more strategic value than others, the region is generally assigned less of a priority by the West and other important donors like Russia and China.¹²⁰ Because of this, aid flows have generally been more stable.

The prevalence of conflict and security assistance makes Africa a valuable region to study in its own right, but there is nothing about my theory that suggests the relationships I posit are geographically limited. Moreover, the focus of comparative process tracing on identifying causal mechanisms across cases bolsters the external validity of my findings.

Cases: Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire

Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire share similar social divisions, institutional histories, levels of development, and conflict profiles, while differing on the composition of security assistance received. In Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire, colonial independence was followed by decades of authoritarian rule, in which the military and police were highly politicized and repressive. The regimes of each state pursued strategies of elite cooptation and mass marginalization, which produced deep resentment among groups over unequal access to land and wealth. These divisions created deep regional and ethnic divisions. In Sierra Leone, the prioritization of the Creole population in Freetown produced a deep division among the Western

¹¹⁹ Watts et al., *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present*, 13–17.

¹²⁰ Watts et al., 5.

Creole and the indigenous people who inhabited the rest of the country. In Côte d'Ivoire, the government politicized latent divisions when it instituted a policy of *Ivoirité*, marginalizing the “foreigners” of the North. In Burundi, the colonial and post-independence governments’ preference for the Bururi-based Tutsis hardened ethnic and regional cleavages between the Hutu and Tutsi, the North and the South. It is important to note that the depth and severity of these identity differences were weaker in Sierra Leone than Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi. Still, the regional and ethnic cleavages mobilized before conflict came to play an important role in the onset and conduct of each war, and continued to shape the ability of each state to initiate and consolidate security sector reforms.

Despite its abundance in diamonds, the majority of Sierra Leoneans rely on subsistence agriculture to survive. By the end of the civil war, the majority of the population lived in extreme poverty. Similarly, Burundi has consistently ranked among the least developed nations in the world, with citizens receiving little assistance from their government. Although it was once an economic hub in the region, Côte d'Ivoire began an economic downturn in the mid-1980s that was exacerbated by the conflict; by the time war ended, more than 50% of the population lived in poverty.

The rebel movements in all three states fought for government control, relying on widespread dissatisfaction with the regime to gain popular support. After their first failed peace agreements, the UN authorized peacekeeping operations to work in conjunction with regional forces. The fighting that occurred in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire produced widescale human rights abuses perpetuated by both government forces and rebels, creating deep distrust of state forces by local populations. Finally, by the end of their wars, the political and security institutions of all three countries were in shambles – the state unable to extend its power

across the country, the security sector politicized and fragmented. Table 3.4 at the end of the chapter summarizes the major similarities and differences between cases.

The UK intervention in Sierra Leone began in 1999, after the signing of the peace agreement that would come to serve as the backbone of the post-conflict government. Even though fighting continued, British advisors began working with the Sierra Leonean government, disbursing high levels of institutional assistance to support an expanding mission. This period was characterized by high regime vulnerability – with impending presidential elections and a range of options open for post-war security arrangements, the institutional trajectory of Sierra Leone was far from certain. Sierra Leone received relatively little operational assistance in the years following war, reaching a high of \$14 million in 2014, twelve years after the war had ended.

In the time period under consideration, Côte d'Ivoire experienced two conflicts and two peace spells. When the First Ivorian War ended (2007), donor intervention was piecemeal and delayed. Mistrustful of the incumbent administration, donors often delayed disbursements of promised institutional assistance. France, Côte d'Ivoire's main partner, focused predominantly on the operational capacity of the Ivorian military. Without robust domestic or international support, the newly established security sector infrastructure struggled to complete its mandate, and security sector reforms stalled. When the Second Ivorian War broke out in 2010, the new institutions were not strong enough to quell escalating violence. Upon its resolution in 2011, the international community vowed not to repeat their mistake and pledged to support the new government established by the victor, Alassane Ouattara. Although the international community intervened early and pressured for sector-wide reforms, their assistance did relatively little: the

military and political victory secured by Ouattara left little room for international influence; put differently, regime vulnerability was low.

Unlike the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, the Netherlands came late to promoting reform in Burundi. After putting off discussions for several years, the Dutch government did not decide on a reform program until three years after the first elections had been held. While the window for sector-wide reforms had closed, the resolution of hostilities created a need for policy change within the military. Although the SSR program initiated by the Dutch shortly after led to real improvements in the professionalism of the military, its effectiveness was undercut by the flows of operational assistance accessed by the Burundian government for participation in peacekeeping missions at that time. As the years progressed, operational assistance increased dramatically. Burundi received significantly more operational assistance than Sierra Leone, attracting large flows of operational assistance from the United States for peacekeeping preparations and counterterror activities even as conflict continued.

Based on the theory presented in this chapter, the different combinations of security assistance and levels of regime vulnerability should lead to a range of outcomes in security sector governance. Table 3.3 summarizes the aid profile of each case and its predicted outcome.

Confounding Factors

Choosing similar systems helps to isolate and identify the effect of security assistance on security sector governance. However, it is impossible to fully “control” for all confounding factors. While there are many similarities in the institutional development of each state, there are important differences that may have influenced the process of reform following the war. For

instance, the strong relationship between Sierra Leone and its main donor, the U.K., facilitated the deep

Table 3.3: Aid Profiles and Predicted Outcomes of Cases

	<i>Security Assistance</i>	<i>Regime Vulnerability</i>	<i>Predicted Outcome</i>
Côte d’Ivoire (First War)	Low Institutional Assistance	High	Little Impact
	Low Operational Assistance	High	
Côte d’Ivoire (Second War)	High Institutional Assistance	Low	Small, Positive Impact
	Low Operational Assistance	Low	
Burundi	High Institutional Assistance	Moderate	Mixed Impact
	High Operational Assistance	Moderate	
Sierra Leone	High Institutional Assistance	High	Large, Positive Impact
	Low Operational Assistance	Low	

cooperation that they enjoyed during the post-conflict period. In contrast, significant friction between Côte d’Ivoire and France likely hampered similar cooperative efforts.

Further, this research design is unable to address the fundamental concern of endogeneity that characterizes all studies of aid. As discussed above, donors are strategic in how they provide aid. Donors that are more concerned with misuse of their aid funds may prioritize aid modalities that are less fungible to try and mitigate these effects. Similarly—and more problematically for this study—donors may choose to provide more institutional assistance to states that they believe are more likely to implement governance reforms. If this is the case, institutional aid may support reforms, but it will have no independent effect.

It may also be that it is regime vulnerability driving states to adopt governance reforms, rather than aid. Theoretically, states may be more willing to appease the opposition when they

are in a position of weakness, or vulnerable. In contrast, states that face low vulnerability may not feel the need to include the opposition. If this is the case and it is regime vulnerability that drives selection into governance reforms, then aid does not have the direct effect I theorize above.

In the following chapters, I strive to show that aid does, in fact, have an independent effect on security sector governance and on relapse. Still, it is important to acknowledge at the outset that these concerns remain.

Data Collection

The data for these case studies comes from a combination of primary and secondary sources, including original interview data gathered during fieldwork conducted in Freetown, Sierra Leone (June 2018 and June 2019) and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (July 2019). Between both rounds of fieldwork, I conducted 35 interviews with officers of donor organizations, former and current government and military officials, NGO administrators, and civil society representatives. The rest of the data informing these case studies was drawn from a comprehensive review of technical reports published by international institutions, donor offices, implementing agencies, local and international civil society reports, contemporary newspaper articles, and academic publications.

All data on institutional assistance is taken from the OECD-CRS Database.¹²¹ To create a profile of operational assistance, I supplemented data from the Security Assistance Monitor, which tracks US security aid programs, with open source information regarding flows from non-

¹²¹ Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), “Creditor Reporting System (CRS),” OECD.Stat, February 5, 2020, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1>.

US donors.¹²² In Burundi, a large portion of operational assistance came from aid to support Burundian participation in peacekeeping missions. Data on Burundian peacekeeping contributions is computed from information provided by AMISOM, the Burundian government, and news articles.¹²³ To increase comparability, all aid flows have been converted to USD 2016 rates.

Conclusion

In Chapter 2, I show that there is an empirical connection between security sector governance and conflict relapse: states that engage in security sector reform, prioritize civilian control, and respect the human rights of their citizens are less likely to relapse into conflict. In this chapter, I argue that the security assistance provided by donors to post-conflict states has variable effects on governance; further, I suggest that these effects are conditioned by the timing of the aid's disbursement. The following chapters examine the impact of security assistance on post-conflict governance in Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Sierra Leone.

¹²² Security Assistance Monitor, "Security Aid."

¹²³ Abdi Sheikh, "Burundi Sends 1,000 Extra AU Troops to Somalia," *Reuters*, March 12, 2011, <https://af.reuters.com/article/burundiNews/idAFLDE72B08T20110312>; Assemblée Nationale, "Rapport de Mission de Visite Au Contingent Burundais de l'AMISOM Par Des Parlementaires Burundais" (Bujumbura: Republique de Burundi Assemblée Nationale, February 2013), https://www.assemblee.bi/IMG/pdf/Rapport_de_mission_AMISOM.pdf; AMISOM, "Burundi," African Union Mission in Somalia, n.d., <https://amisom-au.org/burundi/>; United Nations Peacekeeping, "Data: Troop and Police Contributors," United Nations, n.d., <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

Table 3.4: Summary Comparison of Case Backgrounds

	Sierra Leone	Côte d’Ivoire	Burundi
<i>Historical Context</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • West Africa • Colonial Heritage: British colony 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • West Africa • Colonial Heritage: French colony 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Africa • Colonial Heritage: Belgian Colony
<i>Major Cleavage</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North – South • Freetown – periphery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North-South • Autochthons – “foreigners” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethnic: Hutu-Tutsi • North-South
<i>Economic Profile</i>	Majority of the population is employed in subsistence agriculture, mining; Biggest revenues come from export of diamonds	Majority of the population is employed in agriculture; Heavily reliant on cocoa and coffee exports	Majority of the population is employed in subsistence agriculture
<i>Political History</i>	Long history of autocratic rule under Siaka Stevens	“Soft authoritarianism” under Houphouet-Boigny	Authoritarian rule under Tutsi leaders
<i>History of Repression</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Nature of Conflict</i>	Government Control Based in land grievances, regional tensions, frustration over corruption	Government Control Based in land grievances, regional tensions, frustration over corruption, policy of <i>Ivoirité</i>	Government Control Based in ethnic grievances; exacerbated by regional divide prioritizing Tutsi from the Bururi province
<i>Duration/Intensity of Conflict</i>	1991-2002 30,000 – 50,000 killed	2002-2007; 2011 First Ivoirian Civil War: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4,000 – 10,000 killed Second Ivoirian Civil War: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3,000 killed 	1993-2009 Estimated 300,000 killed
<i>Form of Termination</i>	Government victory following negotiated settlement	First Ivorian War: Negotiated Settlement Second Ivorian War: Rebel Victory	Government victory following negotiated settlement
<i>Presence of a Peacekeeping Mission</i>	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), French <i>Operation Licorne</i>	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)
<i>Post-Conflict Regime Type</i>	Democracy	First Ivorian War: transitional government Second Ivorian War: Democracy	Democracy


CHAPTER 4

AID AND GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND IVORIAN WARS

In 2002, tensions between the military and government of Côte d'Ivoire erupted, as a failed coup attempt escalated into a rebellion that would keep the country locked in a civil conflict that would persist for five years. After five years of conflict, the parties to the civil war negotiated a peace agreement and established an integrated transitional government in 2007. However, this agreement proved unable to address the underlying causes of conflict. Three years later, a political crisis broke out over national elections and the country relapsed into a short but intense military conflict. Since the resolution of the 2011 post-electoral crisis,¹²⁴ Côte d'Ivoire has remained at peace as the government has worked with the international community to implement a series of political and security sector reforms.

Donors provided very different security assistance packages to Côte d'Ivoire following the First and Second Ivorian Wars. Although total aid received was similar across both periods, the breakdown of institutional and operational assistance varied dramatically (see Figure 4.1). The end of fighting and creation of a transitional government in Côte d'Ivoire opened a window of opportunity for institutional change. After the first conflict, donors devoted the majority of institutional assistance towards ex-combatant reintegration; the security forces received mostly operational assistance. Without significant support for the SSR initiatives initiated by the transitional government, force integration and reform faltered. After the second conflict, donors

¹²⁴ Experts on Côte d'Ivoire often varies in its description of political violence in Côte d'Ivoire. Some insist that there was only one, long war (peace was never achieved), some refer to the 2011 conflict as a “crisis”, rather than a civil war. In this chapter, I follow the definitions for civil war and conflict relapse established in Chapter 2 and distinguish between the First Ivorian War (2002-2007) and the Second Ivorian War (2011). This characterization is shared by Martin (2018, 523).

Figure 4.1: Security Assistance Following the First and Second Ivorian Wars

changed their approach, giving high levels of institutional assistance and very low levels of operational assistance. However, the window of regime vulnerability that opened during the preparation for elections closed upon Alassane Ouattara's military defeat over incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo. Thus, despite high levels of institutional assistance, reforms have been shallow. Winning a sweeping electoral and military victory, President Alassane Ouattara has enjoyed a "victor's peace" – facing a weak opposition, Ouattara has focused instead on accommodating the divisions within his own party, favoring his network of former rebels rather than pursuing serious reforms.

This chapter compares the impact of security assistance on governance following the First and Second Ivorian Wars. First, I briefly outline the history of Côte d'Ivoire leading up to the outbreak of conflict in 2002 and the civil war that ensued. Next, I discuss the security assistance profile and institutional context of the country's first peace spell. I argue that despite

the window for institutional change, donors did not provide adequate assistance to support the security sector. Without the funding they needed to fulfill their mandate, security sector reforms stalled, and the country relapsed into conflict. The second half of the chapter examines the Second Ivorian War and post-conflict reforms under Ouattara. The fourth section analyzes the impact of security assistance following the Second Ivorian War and the gains to security sector governance made by President Ouattara. Finally, I conclude with a discussion comparing the two peace spells.

Background

Dubbed the “Ivorian Miracle”, Côte d’Ivoire shone as a model of economic growth and stability upon gaining independence from France in 1960. Its success and its eventual descent into crisis can be traced back to a delicate political and economic balance cultivated by its long-time ruler, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

Côte d’Ivoire was officially colonized by the French in 1893 as part of the scramble for Africa. Lacking the

extractable resources of many of its neighbors, the governors of Côte d’Ivoire focused on

Figure 4.1 Map of Côte d’Ivoire



cultivating crops for export, particularly cocoa, coffee, and rubber. Labor migration was promoted through a series of policies enacted by the colonial government and continued under Houphouët-Boigny when the country gained independence in 1960. As export production continued to grow, Houphouët-Boigny began to encourage not only internal migration to the cocoa plantations of the southwest, but immigration from neighboring countries, proclaiming “the land belongs to those who make it productive.”¹²⁵ Migrants from the north and neighboring countries came in large numbers, coming to constitute a significant portion of the population – by 1998, the number of ‘foreigners’ totaled 25% of the Ivorian population (over 4 million people).¹²⁶

In the decades that followed, Houphouët-Boigny used his considerable executive power to guide economic policy and promote export-led growth, achieving an annual growth rate of almost 7.5 percent from 1960 to 1982.¹²⁷ Like many other states in the region, Houphouët-Boigny and his political party—the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (*Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire*, PDCI) constructed a large state bureaucracy and system of state-owned enterprises to maintain political dominance. Access to these positions was carefully cultivated by Houphouët-Boigny to balance ethnic and political rivalries.¹²⁸

The politico-military history of Côte d’Ivoire shows a persistent, low-level battle between the military and the government for control. In the years following independence, the

¹²⁵ Kathleen Klaus and Matthew I Mitchell, “Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya,” *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 5 (September 2015): 631.

¹²⁶ Arnim Langer, “When Do Horizontal Inequalities Lead to Conflict? Lessons from a Comparative Study of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire,” in *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*, ed. Frances Stewart (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 164–65.

¹²⁷ Richard C. Crook, “Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d’Ivoire,” *African Affairs* 88, no. 351 (April 1989): 205.

¹²⁸ Crook, 214.

government faced multiple coups and rebellions from high-ranking officers in the army seeking greater power. Significantly, these officers were not interested in overthrowing the existing government – just increasing their position in it. Houphouët-Boigny worked to earn the allegiance of the army throughout his tenure, first by offering them high salaries and prestige, and eventually, by expanding their role in the government. The military came to be one of the best paid in West Africa, but worst equipped, a sign of the government's efforts to weaken the institution. This started to change with the appointment of Alassane Ouattara, a Western-educated economist from the North of the country, to Prime Minister. Facing pressure from international financial institutions, Ouattara gradually replaced unqualified military officers with technocrats to try and increase the profitability of state-owned enterprises. As the military began to lose its place in the state machine, the government began to negotiate a new role for officers and soldiers, directing them towards the maintenance of internal peace. Unlike the police, who were poorly trained and poorly equipped, the army became an effective force in the repression of opposition and political dissent.¹²⁹

In the 1980s, a drop in global cocoa prices initiated an economic crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny turned to the international financial institutions for help, but the structural adjustment programs so common at the time stipulated the dismantlement of the large state apparatus Houphouët-Boigny had built. Struggling under the weight of the national debt and stiff international insistence that the state privatize, Houphouët-Boigny was unable to adopt his usual tactic for diverting opposition – incorporation into the state machine.

¹²⁹ Guy-André Kieffer, "Armée Ivoirienne : Le Refus Du Déclassement," *Politique Africaine* 2, no. 78 (June 2000): 26–31.

The economic contraction exacerbated tensions between the north and south, natives and foreign residents. When the economy started to sour, many northerners—natives and foreign residents—moved to the south looking for agricultural work.¹³⁰ The army was not immune to the economic pressures: as the economic crisis grew, positions in the army became scarcer and more and more youth competed for them. As this happened, recruitment became less about merit and more about personal or political gain. The government pushed for recruitment as a tool for cooptation of potential opposition, while officers saw greater opportunities to exact bribes for entry into one of the few stable career paths that remained.¹³¹ As domestic tensions rose in response to the unfolding economic crisis, Houphouët-Boigny caved to popular pressures to democratize.¹³²

In 1993, Houphouët-Boigny died, fracturing the party he had led for over thirty years. Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the National Assembly, took up the mantle of PDCI leadership. Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara assumed leadership of a new party—the Rally for Republicans (*Rassemblement des Républicains*, RDR)—and established a platform advocating for those dissatisfied with the PDCI and its treatment of northerners. Countering these establishment candidates, Laurent Gbagbo of the new Ivorian Popular Front (*Front Populaire Ivoirien*, FPI) emerged as a fringe candidate.¹³³ Concerned about Ouattara’s growing support, Bédié invented a concept he called “*ivoirité*” and made it a condition of holding office. *Ivoirité*—being “truly Ivorian”—required that one be born of two Ivorian parents, which Ouattara was not.

¹³⁰ Langer, “When Do Horizontal Inequalities Lead to Conflict? Lessons from a Comparative Study of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire,” 164–68.

¹³¹ Kieffer, “Armée Ivoirienne : Le Refus Du Déclassement,” 34.

¹³² Yves Fauré, “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d’Ivoire,” *Africa* 63, no. 3 (1993): 317.

¹³³ Francis Akindès, “The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d’Ivoire,” Research Report (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004), 18–19, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/95521/128.pdf>.

In response to this clear manipulation of the electoral process, the RDR boycotted the election, essentially handing Bédié the election.¹³⁴

When Bédié took power, he abandoned the ethnically balanced system of Houphouët-Boigny, stacking the government with individuals from his own ethnic group and dramatically tilting the government in favor of the South. Bédié extended this policy to the military, rupturing the delicate balance that had been carefully cultivated by Houphouët-Boigny. At the same time, tensions among the officer corps began to simmer, as financial pressures pushed the government to cut military spending.¹³⁵ Discontent within the army reached a high in 1999, when a group of dissatisfied military leaders selected General Robert Gueï to mediate a negotiation with Bédié. When Bédié refused their demands, they carried out a military coup, installing Gueï to rule the country until elections could be held in 2000.

In an effort to tilt the election in his favor, Gueï continued many of the same human rights abuses committed by Bédié, using the military and police to repress potential opposition and the courts to tilt the election in his favor. Before the votes could be counted, Gueï declared himself the winner of the election. As the only real contender for the presidency not excluded by Gueï's repressive tactics, Gbagbo declared himself the real winner of the election and called for a unified opposition among the FPI, RDR, and PDCI; together, the three groups pushed Gueï out of the country.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Brian Klaas, "From Miracle to Nightmare: An Institutional Analysis of Development Failures in Côte d'Ivoire," *Africa Today* 55, no. 1 (2008): 117.

¹³⁵ Langer, "When Do Horizontal Inequalities Lead to Conflict? Lessons from a Comparative Study of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire," 172–73.

¹³⁶ Jeanne Maddox Toungara, "Francophone Africa in Flux: Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 3 (July 2001): 63–64.

Once in office, Gbagbo quickly worked to consolidate power, instituting repressive security measures of his own to ensure that the legislative elections would favor his party. At the same time, he began purging the military, police, and civil service and replacing them with fellow members of the Bété ethnic group. For further protection, Gbagbo raised personal militias for himself and his wife.¹³⁷

In the space of three years (1999 – 2002), Côte d’Ivoire had experienced two coup d’états. The ethnic balance so carefully cultivated by Houphouët-Boigny had been abandoned, as technocrats were replaced with co-ethnic loyalists. The security sector had lost any semblance of professionalism – the army fractured and politicized, the police and intelligence system transformed into a tool for government repression.

The First Ivorian War Begins

The First Ivorian War began in 2002, when a group of Muslim former army officers advanced from the border of Burkina Faso to take control of the capital and overthrow the Gbagbo government. Their advance was stopped by a group of soldiers loyal to Gbagbo; rather than de-escalation, however, this encounter only intensified tensions, and the coup plotters quickly adopted a more extreme approach: rebellion. Following the failed coup attempt, the group quickly took control of two major northern cities – Bouaké and Korhogo. Guillaume Soro assumed leadership of the growing rebellion and expanded its military mandate to a political one. The war opened a Western front in late November 2002 with the emergence of two new

¹³⁷ Daniel Chirot, “The Debacle in Cote d’Ivoire,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (April 25, 2006): 71, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2006.0024>.

insurgent groups along the Liberian border. With their help, the rebels came to control the northern half of the country. The three groups combined, creating the New Forces (*Forces Nouvelles*, FN).¹³⁸

The government's response to the incipient rebellion was swift and severe. As the rebels moved to consolidate their power in the north, the Gbagbo government rallied all its available forces, directing both formal state organizations and non-state forces loyal to the regime to target all who opposed him. Labeling the rebels "foreigners," his allies commenced a campaign of political repression against all who shared the same ethnicity or religion of the MPCI, raiding their neighborhoods, arresting and killing dozens of civilians.¹³⁹ In addition, Gbagbo mobilized groups of militant youth, some of whom formed urban militias.¹⁴⁰

The proliferation of armed groups, widespread commission of atrocities, and influx of demobilized fighters from neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia pushed the international community to intervene. France acted first, sending 4,000 troops in a new operation, known as *Opération Licorne*, to bolster its permanent presence, and was quickly followed by the Economic Union of West African States, which sent troops as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). In February 2004, the UN joined the French and ECOWAS, authorizing the creation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). When the government and the FN continued fighting, the UN Security Council authorized an arms embargo over the

¹³⁸ The World Bank, "Emergency Project Paper for an IDA Grant in the Amount of SDR 8.0 Million (US\$13.0 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire for a Governance and Institutional Development Grant" (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 30, 2008), 12, <http://documents.banquemoniale.org/curated/fr/353681468028829497/pdf/435460PJPR0P1011y10IDA1R20081019211.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Government Abuses in Response to Army Revolt," *Human Rights Watch* 14, no. 9 (A) (November 2002): 11, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/11/28/government-abuses-response-army-revolt>.

¹⁴⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Côte d'Ivoire: 'The War Is Not Yet Over'" (Freetown/Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 28, 2003), 17, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/72-cote-d-ivoire-the-war-is-not-yet-over_0.pdf.

country, requiring that all states “prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d’Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms or any related materiel, in particular military aircraft and equipment, whether or not originating in their territories, as well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities.” This embargo did not extend to training or assistance related to humanitarian activities or the restructuring of the security forces.¹⁴¹ In other words, the embargo outlawed the provision of almost all operational assistance, restricting security assistance to institutional support.

Despite the speed with which France dispatched troops to Côte d’Ivoire in the early days of the conflict, French willingness to intervene in the Ivorian conflict fell short of what was necessary to find a real solution to the problem.¹⁴² Over the next five years, the international organized four rounds of mediated peace negotiations, each of which failed as low-level fighting continued.¹⁴³ During this time, Côte d’Ivoire remained suspended between peace and war. International forces helped to retain a buffer between the North and the South, dividing the country in two. Violence in the West continued, largely through the attacks of the highway bandits that had been allowed to operate unhindered.¹⁴⁴

As fighting continued, the FN established an independent system of governance in the North, dividing the region into ten zones, each under the control of an appointed *commandant de*

¹⁴¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Resolution 1572 (2004)” (New York: United Nations, November 15, 2004), 2–3, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20SRES1572.pdf>.

¹⁴² International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: ‘The War Is Not Yet Over,’” 30.

¹⁴³ In 2003, the French organized talks at Linas-Marcoussis; in 2004, the UN, AU, and ECOWAS hosted a new round of talks in Accra; in 2005, parties reconvened once more in Praetoria.

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Afraid and Forgotten: Lawlessness, Rape, and Impunity in Western Côte d’Ivoire” (Human Rights Watch, 2010), 20–31, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/10/22/afraid-and-forgotten/lawlessness-rape-and-impunity-western-cote-divoire>.

zone, or “com’zone.” Each com’zone controlled a unit of troops charged with providing some degree of order and collecting taxes, largely through the collection of roadside fines and duties brought into the region. While the majority of funds went to the FN, com’zones were allowed to keep a percentage of their revenues as payment. Cut off from government support, many police officers located in the north of the country quickly joined with the rebel forces, using what little resources they still had to impose FN rule. This system encouraged widespread corruption and extortion of civilians by governing authorities, who were now encouraged by their leadership to do so. For those suspected of being sympathetic to the government, treatment was worse. As the government and rebels gained and lost control of towns, they executed scores of civilians.

The number and side of state security forces swelled during the conflict, as Gbagbo mobilized forces to fight on his behalf. In addition to the army, police, and gendarmerie, Gbagbo created the Security Operations Command Center (*Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité*, CECOS), a well-equipped elite unit with the main purpose of defending Abidjan from a coup attempt. At the same time, Gbagbo fortified the existing special forces units like the Anti-Riot Brigade (*Brigade Anti-Emuete*), Presidential Guard (*Guard Présidentielle*), Presidential Security Group (*Groupement de Sécurité Présidentielle*), and the Republican Guard (*Guard Républicaine*). All of these groups were well-armed and stacked with troops from ethnic groups loyal to Gbagbo, ensuring their loyalty as well as their potency. As an added layer of security, Gbagbo relied heavily on local militias loyal to the government.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Côte d’Ivoire: The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005), 10–12, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/12/22/cote-divoire-human-rights-cost-political-impasse>.

By 2007, as many as 10,000 people were killed; nearly one million had been displaced.¹⁴⁶ With few signs of military progress, the two sides came together in Ouagadougou to negotiate a new peace agreement, this time without international mediation. Under the facilitation of Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the government and rebels came to an agreement. The resulting Ouagadougou Peace Agreement included many of the provisions stipulated in previous agreements and set the stage for a transition to peace by establishing the zone of confidence and creating a transitional government with FN leader Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister.¹⁴⁷ The agreement also stipulated the importance of SSR, creating a “special mechanism” to determine the new structure and organization of the security sector and an Integrated Command Center (*Centre de Commandement Intégrée*, CCI) to unify government and FN forces.

The Interwar Period: Peace Stalls, Donors Equivocate

The Ouagadougou Agreement brought an end to the fighting, but it was ultimately unsuccessful in helping Côte d’Ivoire come to a sustainable peace. For three years after the fighting had ended, the two parties made little progress in reuniting the north and south under unified leadership, integrating rebel and government forces, or disarming and demobilizing the oversized security apparatus. While the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement stipulated the need for security sector reform, its drafters left the details of this process vague, choosing to put off the contentious debate for later to increase its chances of acceptance. In reality, the vagueness of the

¹⁴⁶ Chirot, “The Debacle in Cote d’Ivoire,” 71.

¹⁴⁷ Bruno Charbonneau, “War and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line,” *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 4 (n.d.): 516, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.709776>.

agreement may have been its undoing: without an agreed upon framework guiding SSR and DDR, the process was seen as politicized and was rejected by nearly all parties involved. When elections were finally held in 2010, Gbagbo lost. Rather than cede power, Gbagbo remained in office, rallying the security forces loyal to him to protect his rule. With the full backing of the international community, Ouattara rallied the army to his side, declaring a new joint force of government and FN soldiers: the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (*Forces Républicains de Côte d'Ivoire*, FRCI). Within months, the tense political standoff escalated, and the country relapsed into civil war.

Aid Profile: First Peace

Regime Vulnerability

The signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement opened a window of opportunity for real institutional change in Côte d'Ivoire. The ability of the international community to take advantage of that window, however, is unclear. Unlike previous agreements, the Ouagadougou Agreement weakened the mandate of the international community. In addition, observers have questioned the commitment of President Gbagbo to real change. A rebel leader interviewed by the International Crisis Group in 2007 argued that a power-sharing agreement that left him as president was not a concession or sign of cooperation – it was a political victory.¹⁴⁸

Despite these limitations, the introduction of the FN into the government and creation of FN leaders embraced the post-Ouagadougou arrangements. Fofana (2011) argues that the time between the signing of the Ouagadougou Accords and the elections witnessed a transformation

¹⁴⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?” (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 27, 2007), 4, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/127-cote-d-ivoire-can-the-ouagadougou-agreement-bring-peace.pdf>.

of the rebel leadership “to the point of making you forget that it had chosen the path of violence to come to power.”¹⁴⁹ While the international community was limited in its ability to influence the transitional government, it maintained a strong role in the security sector. By all accounts, the CCI remained committed to its mandate. Its failures came mostly from a lack of resources, not from a lack of will by its leadership.

The introduction of new actors and new institutions into the security sector created a high degree of vulnerability in the regime and opened the potential set of institutional trajectories in Côte d’Ivoire. Unfortunately, donors did not capitalize on this until it was too late: the first two years of peace saw a relatively low ratio of institutional assistance provided to the Ivorian security sector relative to the operational assistance it received. The institutional assistance provided went mostly towards the reintegration of ex-combatants. By the international community mobilized more resources for security sector reform, they had lost the time advantage they once had: although significant progress was made towards demobilization and integration in the months leading up to the elections, major gaps still remained.

Institutional Assistance

The institutional assistance provided to Côte d’Ivoire by bilateral and multilateral donors focused on two main projects: funding reintegration opportunities and supporting civilian policing throughout the country. With most of French aid going towards training for the military, the most significant source of institutional assistance in the interwar period came from the

¹⁴⁹ Moussa Fofana, “Des Forces Nouvelles Aux Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire: Comment Une Rébellion Devient Républicaine,” *Politique Africaine*, no. 122 (February 2011): 21.

International Development Agency of the World Bank, which mobilized substantial resources to provide support for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers.¹⁵⁰

Near the end of the peace spell, the UN intensified its efforts. In 2009, the UN initiated a capacity-building project with the working group established by the government to facilitate the reform and restructuring of the national army. Through a combination of technical and financial support, UNOCI facilitators brought military leaders of both sides together to build confidence and foster debates on integration methods. This was the largest SSR project undertaken by the UN to this point: it led to successful debates between former rivals and guided important discussions about military reform. Unfortunately, these efforts were insufficient; as Boutellis (2011) suggests, the intervention was “too little too late.”¹⁵¹

Operational Assistance

When fighting first ended in 2007, France initiated a security sector reform project with the transitional government led by Gbagbo. However, the proportion of this assistance that actually went towards institutional reform was very small. The majority of assistance provided during this time was focused instead on improving the maritime and air capabilities of the Ivorian armed forces. A good example of this is the SSR Support in the Gulf of

¹⁵⁰ The World Bank, “Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Pre-Arrears Clearance Grant in the Amount of SDR 79.2 Million (US\$120 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire for a Post-Conflict Assistance Project” (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2, 2007), 1, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/775081468028456714/pdf/40211.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ Arthur Boutellis, “The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace” (New York: International Peace Institute, May 2011), 8, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_cote_d_ivoire.pdf.

Guinea (*l'Appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans le golfe de Guinée*)

program.¹⁵² Although the French describe these programs as supporting security sector reform, their narrow focus on tactical and operational training suggests they are better considered operational assistance.¹⁵³ In addition to this assistance from France, Côte d'Ivoire received some operational assistance from the US. The majority of this assistance went towards providing non-lethal equipment for the military and police as well as some training seminars.¹⁵⁴

There is considerable evidence that foreign states breached the sanctions regime and provided military training and materiel to the government and FN. Specifically, the UN Group of Experts monitoring the arms embargo found evidence that the Ivorian government had been sending troops to participate in training sessions in Morocco and that the FN had smuggled weapons and ammunition into the country. However, there is no evidence that this support was provided as security assistance. Rather, considering the large extrabudgetary outlays of the federal government and the resource revenue available to the FN, it is more likely that these services were purchased.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² See “Les Projets ‘Sécurité Maritime’ de la DSCD,” *Partenaires Sécurité Défense: Revue de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense*, Autumn 2011, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/PSD_267_Web_3_cle86f71a.pdf.

¹⁵³ Although the French government has published doctrine regarding governance-focused SSR, assistance usually resembles traditional “train and equip” programs. Lebeouf argues that this is because the three institutions responsible for carrying out reforms—the Defense and Security Department (*Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense*), General Department of Globalization (*Direction Générale de la mondialisation*), and French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement*, AFD)—have either lacked the institutional knowledge or capacity to implement more comprehensive security reforms. (See Aline Lebeouf, “SSR in France -- In Search of a More Transformative Approach,” in *Strategy, Jointness, Capacity: Institutional Requirements for Supporting Security Sector Reform*, ed. Konstantin Bärwaldt (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), 51–52, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14813.pdf>.)

¹⁵⁴ “Report on the Uses of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and Peacekeeping Operations Funds (Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006, Section 584)” (Washington, DC: Security Assistance Monitor, 2014), <http://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/Section%207010%20Reports%20as%20of%206-30-15.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008)” (New York: United Nations, October 9, 2009), 24–53, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S2009%20521.pdf>.

The figures for operational assistance in Figure 2 reflect this aid, along with the relatively small flows of operational assistance from the US during that time. They do not include French defense expenditures made to continue Operation Licorne. The French only publish data on a small percentage of the security assistance they provide globally. However, a thorough review of diplomatic agreements, press releases, newspaper articles, and secondary sources suggests that these figures are likely representative of operational assistance given at the time. A review of the reports and statements by the UN Group of Experts monitoring Côte d’Ivoire and tracking military assistance bolsters my confidence in these estimates.¹⁵⁶

The First Ivorian War ended with a high degree of uncertainty about the future. Although still in power, the Gbagbo regime had not secured a military victory, and was facing domestic and international pressure to organize an election, in which he would face his opponent Alassane Ouattara. The combination of these factors created a high degree of regime vulnerability in Côte d’Ivoire. However, as discussed above, donors did not respond with a strong package of security assistance – either institutional or operational. Without significant international assistance, my

¹⁵⁶ See United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Midterm Report of the of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1782 (2007)” (New York: United Nations, April 9, 2008), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S%202008%20235.pdf>; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1782 (2007)” (New York: United Nations, October 8, 2008), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S2008598.pdf>; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008)” (New York: United Nations, March 20, 2009), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S%202009188.pdf>; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 1893 (2009)” (New York: United Nations, April 9, 2010), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S%202010%20179.pdf>; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008).”

theory would predict little effect on governance until the end of the period in question, when donors increased their aid to help prepare for the elections.

My theory does not predict how actors will behave in the absence of aid, beyond the assumption that actors will do what they need to ensure their political survival. Thus, I do not have any a priori assumptions regarding the actions of Gbagbo and Ouattara in this context. However, the relative lack of aid in this case allows us to gauge a baseline sense of the relationship between security sector governance and conflict relapse. If my theory is correct, actions to integrate the security forces and demobilize and disarm combatants will increase the likelihood of peace. In contrast, promises of reform by the Gbagbo administration that are not followed by concrete actions to include the FN will lower the FN's trust and raise the risk of relapse.

Security Sector Reform under Ouagadougou

The Ouagadougou Agreement defined security sector reform in narrow terms: military and police integration, disarmament, and dismantling of non-state militia groups.¹⁵⁷ The deeper questions regarding the structure of the security sector, roles of the internal security forces, and security policy were put off until after the election. Questions regarding the lack of accountability or oversight within the security sector, professional behavior of its forces, and logistical capacity were also ignored.¹⁵⁸ The OPA also offered little guidance on military

¹⁵⁷ "Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)," Peace Accords Matrix, 2007, 7–8, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/ouagadougou-political-agreement-opa>.

¹⁵⁸ Savannah de Tessières, "Reforming the Ranks: Public Security in a Divided Côte d'Ivoire," Small Arms Survey 2011 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2011), 197, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-07-EN.pdf>.

integration. Although it stipulated the creation of the CCI, it did not address the issue of rank harmonization, even though parties at the time of signing recognized the issue it would pose to integration.

Military and Police Reform

Despite these ambiguities, the process of military and police reform and integration began two weeks after the OPA was signed with the establishment of the Integrated Command Center (*Centre de Commandement Intégré*, CCI).¹⁵⁹ From the outset, the CCI received institutional support from the UNOCI and *Operation Licorne*. Together with their international advisors, CCI leadership decided upon the structure and functions of the unit. In addition to building a new, integrated military force, the Chiefs of Staff made a plan to integrate 4,000 FN troops into the police and gendarmerie. Peacekeeping troops arrived at the newly established headquarters to provide security for the new unit.¹⁶⁰ By 2008, 544 out of the designated 568 personnel had been integrated into the CCI from the FN and FDS. 3,400 FN troops were integrated into the police and gendarmerie. Progress quickly stalled, however, as CCI leadership struggled to access the funding that they needed from the government and international donors. Pressed for assistance, the French ambassador at the time insisted that available funding would only be disbursed when the CCI began undertaking “practical operations.”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: United Nations, May 14, 2007), 2, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/275.

¹⁶⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 11–12.

¹⁶¹ Author translation; Ibrahima B. Kamagaté, “Identification, Désarmement, CCI: Le Processus En Panne de Financement,” *Koffi.Net*, February 14, 2008, <http://www.koffi.net/koffi/actualite/37968-Identification-desarmement-Cci-0-Le-processus-en-panne-de-financement.htm>.

By 2009, only 500 of the intended 8,000 CCI troops had been deployed across the country. Of these, only a handful comprised former FN troops.¹⁶² By April 2010, only 1,053 out of an authorized 8,000 personnel had been assigned to the CCI's mixed gendarmerie and police units. Only eleven of the planned 23 mixed brigades had been established. More problematically, former FDS personnel continued to receive special treatment. Forces Nouvelles leadership noted that government was only providing salaries to former government personnel.¹⁶³

The actions of President Gbagbo further undermined the legitimacy and progress of integration. As the CCI pleaded with the government for more funding to continue with integration, Gbagbo proceeded to promote a series of loyalist officers to fill highly strategic posts in the security sector. In addition to the military, the Gbagbo administration took no steps to downsize or demilitarize the police and gendarmerie, which had swelled to a combined size of 33,000 during the conflict.¹⁶⁴

Although reports suggest that the FN entered the post-conflict space with good intentions, Gbagbo's clear rejection of the tenets of the Ouagadougou Agreement quickly convinced the rebels to take steps to protect themselves. The FN undertook similar actions to retain their strategic advantages. Despite rhetorical commitments to reunify the country, most of the institutions of the conflict remained in place, such as the system of checkpoints run by government forces along the highways of the country.¹⁶⁵ In 2009, com'zones relinquished their

¹⁶² Baudelaire Mieu, "Un Pays, Deux Armées," *Jeune Afrique*, September 8, 2009, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/201416/politique/un-pays-deux-arm-es/>.

¹⁶³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (New York: United Nations, May 20, 2010), 14, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CDI%20s2010%20245.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ Mieu, "Un Pays, Deux Armées."

¹⁶⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Côte d'Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?," 11.

administrative authority to the government. Though symbolically significant, this amounted to little more than a gesture. Many of the com'zones showed little intention of surrendering their position. Even those who participated in the ceremony remained armed with personal militia forces and in control of security in their zone.¹⁶⁶

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

During the course of the seven-year conflict, the number of armed combatants proliferated. When the crisis ended, the government faced a daunting demobilization caseload: between the FN and militia members, over 75,000 individuals would need to be cantoned.¹⁶⁷ CCI leadership struggled to move forward with their mandate, lacking needed funding for staff and personnel salaries.¹⁶⁸ DDR was also complicated by political disagreements between the FN and government regarding who was to be integrated and who was to be demobilized.¹⁶⁹

The lack of funding for the CCI was likely a result of political calculations by the government. The Ministry of Finance, responsible for the distribution of most government funding, was strongly dependent on the executive. A diplomat interviewed by the International

¹⁶⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis" (Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 2, 2009), 12–13, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/cote-divoire-what-s-needed-end-crisis>.

¹⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire," 6.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (New York: United Nations, April 15, 2008), 4, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/250.

¹⁶⁹ The World Bank, "Emergency Project Paper for an IDA Grant in the Amount of SDR 8.0 Million (US\$13.0 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire for a Governance and Institutional Development Grant," 15.

Crisis Group stressed the politics of funding: “The presidency, which controls the finance ministry, has turned the financing tap on or off to suit its political interests of the moment.”¹⁷⁰

Donor funding for DDR should have helped to make up for these shortfalls, but corruption within the Gbagbo administration prevented much of that aid from reaching its intended beneficiaries. The National Program of Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation (*Programme national de réinsertion et de rehabilitation Communautaire*, PNRRC) is one clear example of this, accepting immense sums of donor funds while producing no results on the ground. The corruption grew to be so bad that the World Bank withdrew its funds from the PNRRC and directing them through its own financial management firm.¹⁷¹

In addition, observers to the beginning stages of DDR noted a major gap between public statements of progress and actual reforms. For example, in contrast to statements by the executive branch that they had finished disarming and dismantling all self-defense groups in the west, the actual weapons collected by ONUCI represented a fraction of the arms analysts knew to exist in the region. By July 2008, only 86 weapons had been collected from the *Forces Nouvelles*. Of these, only ten worked.¹⁷² Similarly, while the government pressed for a reduction of peacekeepers and foreign troops in the zone of confidence, it failed to in-fill the area with Ivorian police or military forces who would be able to protect the local populations from an expected surge in violence.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis,” 6.

¹⁷¹ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: Garantir Un Processus Électoral Crédible” (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 22, 2008), 9, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/139-cote-d-ivoire%20-garantir%20un%20processus%20electoral%20credibile.pdf>.

¹⁷² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Seventeenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: United Nations, July 10, 2008), 5, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/451.

¹⁷³ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?,” 12.

As Côte d'Ivoire neared elections, donors began to note the lack of progress in SSR as a matter of concern for national security. By May 2010, 32,777 FN soldiers and 42,451 militia members remained armed, waiting to enter the official DDR program. The Ivorian government struggled to pay the promised demobilization allowances to those who had been processed. The CCI lacked the resources and capacity to properly run the cantonment sites housing demobilized fighters. The UNOCI recognized this and made a plea for international support to speed progress. Lack of assistance would not only compromise goal attainment, but it could serve as pretext for those benefiting from the current system to forestall progress. In addition to DDR, the UN noted the importance of continuing progress with military integration and SSR before elections: even though the OPA limited the focus of pre-election SSR activities, "local and international partners indicated the significant impact that security sector reform could have, even before the elections, in restoring confidence, consolidating achievements, strengthening the rule of law, and contributing to the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding."¹⁷⁴ Failure to address the proliferation of armed fighters, militant youth groups, and insecurity in the West, they cautioned, "could fuel any violence that may erupt as a result of a political stalemate."¹⁷⁵

Progress was made following this plea for assistance: by November 2010, 17,601 combatants and 17,301 militia members had been demobilized. However, few weapons had been surrendered; of the weapons collected, many were unserviceable.¹⁷⁶ The problem of weapons collection was exacerbated by a thriving market for illegal small arms and weapons in the Mano

¹⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire," 6–7.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 8.

¹⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (New York: United Nations, November 23, 2010), 8–9, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S%202010%20600.pdf>.

River Basin. Despite an arms embargo established by the UN in November 2004, weapons have continued to flow through the region.

Boutellis (2011) credits these failings to both political and technical factors. First, the government decided to divide the responsibilities for DDR among three agencies. Rather than speeding up the process, this had created confusion and delays. Second, suspected politicization of the concurrent military integration process led rebels to distrust the intentions of the government; many, in turn, decided to maintain their weapons as an “insurance policy” in case the government reneged on its promises.¹⁷⁷

Security Sector Failures and the Relapse into Conflict

Three years after the war ended, Côte d’Ivoire was still divided between two ruling groups: the government in the South and the FN in the North. The Ouagadougou Agreement postponed all deliberations regarding security policy, leaving the post-war forces without a formal institutional framework guiding reform. Both forces remained highly politicized, using promotion and rank inflation as tools to gain the political support of the military. At the same time, mass recruitment by both sides broke down the chains of command in place at the beginning of the war, weakening discipline and the ability of officers to command their subordinates.¹⁷⁸ Corruption and extortion by the government and rebel security forces had not abated since the end of the conflict. In sum, donor efforts had failed to improve the quality of

¹⁷⁷ Boutellis, “The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace,” 10–11.

¹⁷⁸ Boutellis, 5.

security sector governance in Côte d'Ivoire, despite the opportunity presented by the creation of the CCI.

The first signs of trouble began after the first round of elections in October 2010, following the announcement of Gbagbo and Ouattara as the winners of the first round of elections.¹⁷⁹ Violence broke out in the streets among partisans. Riots that broke out in pro-Ouattara neighborhoods often targeted FDS soldiers suspected of loyalty to Gbagbo. Despite the large presence of the state security forces in the region, however, neighboring soldiers did not intervene to help, signaling to some observers a fracture between soldiers loyal to Gbagbo, and those loyal to the state.¹⁸⁰

Despite these issues, the run-off election in late November ran smoothly; the UN officially declared the process “free and fair.” The Independent Electoral Commission announced Alassane Ouattara as the winner, with 54.1 percent of votes. Rather than accept these results, Gbagbo dissolved the Commission, claiming irregularities in the voting. Days later, the partisan Ivorian Constitutional Council announced new results, handing Gbagbo victory.¹⁸¹

In the months that followed, Côte d'Ivoire remained locked in a tense political standoff, as Ouattara and members of the international community continued to try and reach a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. Although Gbagbo remained in the presidential palace, he no longer held full control over the country. Shortly after the final election results were announced, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro had called for the army to align itself behind Ouattara. While many of

¹⁷⁹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Twenty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire,” 6.

¹⁸⁰ Fofana, “Des Forces Nouvelles Aux Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire: Comment Une Rébellion Devient Républicaine,” 3.

¹⁸¹ Nicolas Cook, “Cote d'Ivoire's Post-Election Crisis,” Report, Digital Library, March 3, 2011, 2–3, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc810765/>.

the troops recruited by Gbagbo during the first conflict remained loyal to him, many former Gbagbo supporters recognized the legitimacy of Ouattara's claim to the presidency.¹⁸² Despite a call by Ouattara for peace and an offer to form a "unity government" with Gbagbo, tensions continued to rise and sporadic violence broke out across the city.¹⁸³

Violence began slowly, primarily against civilians. Pro-Gbagbo forces targeted Muslims, northerners, and West Africans suspected of supporting Ouattara. They raided pro-Ouattara neighborhoods at night, murdering and capturing civilians, targeted public spaces frequented by pro-Ouattara civilians, and set up roadblocks to identify potential Ouattara supporters and harass them. Any form of political protest against Gbagbo was forcefully repressed, and virulent, ethnically-charged broadcasts in favor of Gbagbo filled state media to rally support against the *Ouattaristes*. As pro-Gbagbo forces waged their campaign of repression in the major urban areas of the country, a second strain of violence erupted in the West between the "natives" and "foreigners."¹⁸⁴

Three months into the crisis, Ouattara gave up on diplomatic efforts to end the crisis and ordered the elements loyal to him to push back against Gbagbo. In early March, Ouattara formalized these forces and announced the creation of the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (*Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*, FRCI). When the violence shifted from repression to organized conflict, the international community intervened and France and the UN began an air campaign against Gbagbo. On April 11, 2011, Laurent Gbagbo was captured. Fighting officially

¹⁸² "La Fracture Militaire Au Centre de l'Affrontement Gbagbo-Ouattara," *Jeune Afrique*, December 13, 2010, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/183315/politique/la-fracture-militaire-au-centre-de-l-affrontement-gbagbo-ouattara/>.

¹⁸³ Thomas Vampouille and Constance Jamet, "Côte d'Ivoire : les résultats de la présidentielle invalidés," *Le Figaro*, December 2, 2010, sec. International, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/12/02/01003-20101202ARTFIG00609-alassane-ouattara-remporte-la-presidentielle-en-cote-d-ivoire.php>.

¹⁸⁴ Scott Straus, "'It's Sheer Horror Here': Patterns of Violence During the First Four Months of Côte d'Ivoire's Post-Electoral Crisis," *African Affairs* 110, no. 440 (2011): 483–85, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr024>.

ended on May 4th with the military defeat of the pro-Gbagbo militias operating in the West. The Second Ivorian War resulted in the deaths of at least 3,000 people and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more.¹⁸⁵

The Role of Security Sector Governance in the Second Ivorian War

The electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire may have happened even if DDR and military integration had gone exactly as envisioned in the OPA. Laurent Gbagbo was not willing to relinquish power; it appears that his support for national elections was only because he believed that he would win them.¹⁸⁶ However, his refusal to cede power did not necessitate a military escalation of the size it did. The prevalence of militias, armed bandits, rebel fighters, and zealous government soldiers across the country created a combustible situation that Gbagbo was able to utilize to launch his campaign to maintain the presidency. If the government and international community had taken the steps outlined in the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement to disarm and demobilize non-government fighters and support the integration process, the crisis might have been contained to the political sphere. Instead of indiscriminate killing, the new FRCI and police—under the leadership of the CCI—could have refused to comply with Gbagbo's orders to attack, accepting the results offered by the Independent Electoral Commission and verified by the UN declaring Ouattara's victory.

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (New York: United Nations, June 24, 2011), 3–9, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/387.

¹⁸⁶ Jennifer G. Cooke, "The Election Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire," Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2010, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/election-crisis-côte-d'ivoire>; Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line," 519.

Despite the use of ethnic rhetoric by politicians, ethnographic work suggests that the distinction between “true born” Ivoirians and “foreigners” was less prevalent in the minds of the population, or at least those in the military. One major interviewed by Straus (2012) stressed the superficiality of the ethnic divisions in the country: “*Ivoirité* was a cultural idea used by politicians to win elections. It was not in the minds of Ivoirians.”¹⁸⁷ Rather, for the majority of the population, it was resentment of the informal land tenure system that allowed remobilization by political and military elites.¹⁸⁸

The form of conflict termination also played a key role. Years of fighting had failed to produce a victory for either the government or the rebels. Still, both sides exited the Ouagadougou negotiations with reserves of military strength and an institutional structure in place to extract resources should fighting resume. These wartime institutions continued to operate throughout the interwar period, and the FN continued to extract revenue using its com’zone system. The government also benefitted from increased opportunities for patronage after the war ended.¹⁸⁹

To Ivoirian observers, however, the most influential factor shaping the trajectory of the crisis was the army. One Ivoirian security specialist commented: “It’s the army that will determine the real winner between Gbagbo and Ouattara.”¹⁹⁰ When the crisis finally ended, the international community put a heavy emphasis on reforming the security sector and launching an effective DDR. This was no easy task: the number of combatants had ballooned during the

¹⁸⁷ Straus, “‘It’s Sheer Horror Here’: Patterns of Violence During the First Four Months of Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Electoral Crisis,” 355.

¹⁸⁸ Klaus and Mitchell, “Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya,” 632.

¹⁸⁹ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: Garantir Un Processus Électoral Crédible,” 9.

¹⁹⁰ Author translation, “La Fracture Militaire Au Centre de l’Affrontement Gbagbo-Ouattara.”

second conflict, the state's security forces were weak, fractured, and highly politicized, and state authority was still constrained to the south. Following the UN's assessment mission in the country, the Secretary General concluded: "FDS, including the police and the gendarmerie, were detrimentally politicized during the crisis and have effectively disintegrated, though some have rejoined under the auspices of FRCI. The prison institutions have also essentially collapsed in the south and have not been fully operational in the north since 2002. Most of the police, gendarmerie, judicial and prisons infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed."¹⁹¹ After some prodding by international partners, Ouattara made SSR and DDR policy priorities. Unlike past attempts, however, this time the process would be Ivorian-led.

Security Assistance after the Second Ivorian War

Regime Vulnerability

When Ouattara took office, there was little question about the direction of governance in Côte d'Ivoire. With the help of the international community, Alassane Ouattara had won a clear military victory over the government. Because of his history working in the IMF, Ouattara had the trust and support of the international community. With elections behind him, Ouattara faced near total control of the government he was to inherit. However, Ouattara's governing choices were constrained by political pressures from within his party. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, Ouattara had to make good on wartime promises to reward his supporters. As Piccolino (2018) puts it, Ouattara had to "pay off" his allies: "Senior former FN military leaders were

¹⁹¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Twenty-Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire," 6.

reintegrated into the new national army. The reunification of the army, the dismantlement of the FN administration and the liberation of public and private buildings occupied by their troops were undertaken slowly... the com'zones also exerted a strong control over the DDR process.”¹⁹²

While Gbagbo's forces remained in the security sector, the military and electoral victory won by Ouattara left him in a very different place than his predecessor in the first post-war period. Ouattara faced pressures within his own party, but the weakened position of the opposition reduced the credibility of a potential coup. Regime vulnerability was low.

Institutional Assistance

In the immediate aftermath of the second Ivorian war, a number of bilateral and multilateral development partners pledged to assist in the recovery. The country's most significant partners for security sector reform were France, Japan, the United States, the World Bank, the UN, and the EU. In recognition of the precarious security environment, the French retained a large military presence in the country. Along with its direct military support, French forces provided training and assisted with DDR activities. France also provided financial, technical, and capacity-building assistance to the FRCI and the MoD. While the process of military integration was determined and directed by the Ivorian leadership, they were assisted by a group of international advisors, including French General Claude Réglat, Colonel Major Marc Paitier, and two officers from the UN and US.¹⁹³ France also maintained a group of

¹⁹² Giulia Piccolino, “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Côte d’Ivoire: A Victor’s Peace?,” *African Affairs* 117, no. 468 (July 1, 2018): 494, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady020>.

¹⁹³ “L’Armée Ivoirienne depuis 2011” (Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra, October 4, 2017), 6, https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/18_civ_structure_armee.pdf.

advisors to support the Commandant of the Abidjan Gendarmerie School (*École de gendarmerie d'Abidjan*), and the Director of National Intelligence.¹⁹⁴ France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was strongly influenced by its complicated historical relationship with the partner. While France remained the main bilateral donor in Côte d'Ivoire, it refrained from exercising the leadership played by other lead partners, such as the US in Liberia or the UK in Sierra Leone.

In addition to France, the largest bilateral donors to support SSR were the United States and Japan. In the first five years after the Second Ivorian War ended, Japan provided nearly \$8 million to support disarmament and the destruction of small arms and weapons.¹⁹⁵ The second wave of Japanese assistance supported the reform and professionalization of the Ivorian national police. The majority of this aid was focused on police training and support to the criminal justice system more broadly.¹⁹⁶ The US worked largely outside of the Ivorian government, supplying the majority of its institutional assistance to support reintegration.

The major multilateral institutions—the EU, World Bank, and the UN—financed the most pressing needs of the country, including DDR. The World Bank continued its funding of reintegration training and compensation. The UN and its agencies organized the largest security sector reform program. The UN set two specific objectives: (1) Reinforce the capacity of the security institutions and local administrations to help them begin to function again; and (2)

¹⁹⁴ “Service de Sécurité Intérieure (SSI),” Ambassade de France à Abidjan, February 13, 2018, <https://ci.ambafrance.org/Le-Service-de-Securite-interieure>.

¹⁹⁵ Yousouf Diarra, “Japan and UNDP Team Up to Take Small Arms Off the Streets of Côte d'Ivoire,” United Nations Development Program, July 9, 2015, <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/07/09/japan-and-undp-team-up-to-take-small-arms-off-the-streets-of-c-te-d-ivoire-.html>.

¹⁹⁶ Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “JICA's Activities in Africa: TICAD V: Five Years Assistance” (Tokyo: Africa Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency, February 2016), https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/brochures/c8h0vm0000avs7w2-att/TICADV_en.pdf.

Bolster the processes of reconciliation and cohesion at the national and social levels and support the return of displaced persons.¹⁹⁷

With France taking a reduced role, the UN became the primary partner assisting Côte d'Ivoire in SSR. In 2013, Security Council Resolution 2112 authorized UNOCI to assist with DDR, support the implementation of the reform strategy devised by the government, and provide advice on the restructuring and organization of the military. Its primary role, however, would be to assist in the reform and professionalization of the police force.¹⁹⁸ The majority of UN assistance was delivered as technical assistance, providing counsel to the Government and specific institutions within the security sector.¹⁹⁹

The programs implemented by the UN and EU included a twin focus on governance promotion and supporting local ownership. Donors pushed the government of Côte d'Ivoire to design and initiate policies that they could support. This constituted a major shift from the approach taken by the international community in the earlier SSR interventions, which were strongly focused on building institutions and promoting widescale governance reforms.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Fonds Pour La Consolidation de La Paix (PBF): Rapport Narratif Final Sur Le Programme" (New York: United Nations, December 31, 2013), 4.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Resolution 2112 (2013)" (New York: United Nations, July 30, 2013), 4–5, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2112.pdf.

¹⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Thirty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (New York: United Nations, May 7, 2015), 8, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_320.pdf.

Operational Assistance

In April 2012, the United Nations Security Council lifted many of the restrictions on military assistance to Côte d'Ivoire. While states were still barred from providing most weapons, donors were now allowed to provide non-lethal weapons and equipment necessary to support SSR.²⁰⁰ In 2016 the embargo was lifted entirely.²⁰¹ Although the UN lifted restrictions against training and the provision of non-lethal assistance in 2013, operational assistance to Côte d'Ivoire has remained low. A review of documentation by the UN Group of Experts monitoring the embargo, news reports, and publications by watchdog organizations reveals little evidence of arms or equipment donations by foreign states.²⁰² In addition, there is little evidence of training or other operational assistance by donors other than what is published by the OECD or US.

The beginning of post-conflict reconstruction after the Second Ivorian War looked very different than it did following the First. Unlike Gbagbo, Ouattara took office facing low regime vulnerability. My theory would predict that the relative certainty of his position would reduce his need to accommodate the opposition or listen to international partners. Thus, although Ouattara received much greater institutional assistance during this time, I expect this assistance to have only a small effect on governance. Since most of this assistance was focused on DDR and the police, I expect that any improvements in security sector governance will be relatively

²⁰⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Resolution 2045 (2012)" (New York: United Nations, April 26, 2012), 2–3, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20S%20RES%202045.pdf>.

²⁰¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Resolution 2283 (2016)" (New York: United Nations, April 28, 2016), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2283.pdf.

²⁰² The majority of documented arms transfers were provided by private sellers. See United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 27 of Security Council Resolution 2153 (2014)" (New York: United Nations, April 13, 2015), 14, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_252.pdf.

constrained to the police and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. Since Côte d'Ivoire received relatively little operational assistance during this time, I do not expect that security sector governance will worsen during this time.

Security Sector Reform After the Second Ivorian War

SSR began in earnest with the appointment of a Security Sector Reform Working Group (*Groupe de travail sur la RSS, GT-RSS*) by President Ouattara in 2013. Although the government often stated the importance of SSR and DDR for peace, the development of a national plan was to a significant degree a response to pressure from the UN, which had consistently pressed for SSR since the electoral crisis ended through Resolutions 2000, 2045, and 2062.²⁰³

The National Strategy for Security Sector Reform they designed articulated six pillars of reforms: (1) National Security, (2) Post-conflict Reconstruction, (3) Democratic Control, (4) Economic Governance, (5) Human and Social Dimension, and (6) Human Rights and International Relations.²⁰⁴ The GT-RSS designed a technocratic approach to the security sector, focusing on security institution building, capacity building through training and equipment, the creation of strategies, policies, and documents, and a large communication campaign. In contrast

²⁰³ “L’Armée Ivoirienne depuis 2011,” 6.

²⁰⁴ Security Sector Reform in Côte d'Ivoire was envisaged to take place in four phases, dividing reforms into “urgent”, “short term”, “medium term” and “long term”. The majority of reforms, including the creation of new security legislation, building institutions, and integrating and reforming the armed forces and police, were set to be completed in the first year of reconstruction. In the medium to long term, the government would focus primarily on building the capacity of the military, strengthening local mechanisms of control over the security sector, and integrating more women into the security sector. See Conseil National de Sécurité, “Reforme Du Secteur de La Sécurité: Strategie Nationale” (Abidjan: Secrétariat du Conseil National de Sécurité, République de Côte d'Ivoire, 2014), 13–29.

to the “transformational” approach to SSR in Sierra Leone, the Ivorians produced a plan that was “above all, administrative and bureaucratic.”²⁰⁵ The key to this approach was training. The government rallied international support for training efforts, assuming that politicization and professionalization would improve in time.²⁰⁶

Disarmament, Demobilization, Resocialization, and Reintegration

The Ivorian government created the Authority for the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (*Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion des Ex-combattants*, ADDR) to lead DDR and community rehabilitation.²⁰⁷ When the conflict first ended, combatant estimates varied dramatically; before DDR could begin, the government and its partners would have to complete the enormous task of identifying the population of soldiers, dozos, and militia fighters to be demobilized.²⁰⁸ By 2012, the government announced a caseload of 60,000 to be demobilized, including 23,000 soldiers added to the FRCI during the crisis.

Institutional Assistance

As a demonstration of its commitment to DDR, the government also pledged to fund the majority of the process itself, with the financial assistance of the EU and African Union.²⁰⁹ In

²⁰⁵ Author’s translation; Aline Leboeuf, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” *Programme Afrique subsaharienne* (Paris: Ifri, March 2016), 7.

²⁰⁶ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁰⁷ “Décret n° 2012-787 du 8 août 2012 portant création, attributions, organisation et fonctionnement de l’Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion des ex-combattants, en abrégé ADDR,” *Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d’Ivoire*, October 11, 2012, 926.

²⁰⁸ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁰⁹ Bruno Clément-Bollée and Marie Miran-Guyon, “The Côte d’Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée,” *Afrique Contemporaine* 3 (2017): 281.

addition to funding reintegration packages, international donors provided technical expertise to aid the ADDR and experts to facilitate the demobilization process.

In response to the massive human and civil rights abuses committed throughout the conflict, policymakers deemed it important to include a “Resocialization” phase in DDR, to reorient former combatants to life in a peaceful society. This phase included group exercises run by UN and International Red Cross experts on participating in civic affairs and family life, individual therapy sessions, and seminars to educate former combatants on the opportunities that were available to them. The government was also pragmatic about finding employment opportunities for ex-combatants, looking to the informal economy when necessary.²¹⁰

Outcomes

In contrast to my theoretical expectations, it is not clear that institutional assistance led to any improvement in outcomes in DDR. As DDR progressed, civil society activists and civilians registered growing concerns that only Ouattara supporters were receiving reintegration benefits from the government after demobilization. Although overall numbers of participation in demobilization were high, participation and distribution of benefits was uneven: at the height of the DDR program in 2014, the ratio of ex-combatants who had fought on the side of President Gbagbo had yet to exceed 13 percent. There were also concerns as a significant number of people who had not been incorporated into the initial registries for DDR had been added retroactively.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, 283–84.

²¹¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: United Nations, May 15, 2014), 6, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/342.

The progress in demobilization masked a second failing in the overall progress of DDR: disarmament. As the DDR program moved forward, the number of arms collected remained far below the desired ratio of one weapon per combatant. In a region already beset by insecurity and porous borders, the proliferation of small arms around the country left the country in a vulnerable to a resurgence of violence. Some observers note that a large percentage of those who retained their arms were part of a network of former FN combatants who were never formally integrated into the rebel movement. These fighters have posed a particularly strong threat to the country: not only are they armed, they are organized, taking commands from the com'zone networks that have remained in place across much of the north.²¹²

By the presidential elections of June 2015, 52,000 ex-combatants had been formally reintegrated into Ivorian society. However, progress quickly stalled: for Ouattara, the success of the elections signified that the country was secure; he turned his attention to the economy. Bruno Clément Bollé, who had been an integral part of the DDR process described this shift: “From a complete focus on security and extreme vigilance on matters of security, all these issues were left behind... The 52,000 who took part before the end of June 2015 received careful attention and oversight. This was less the case for the remaining 18,000. These ex-combatants are still very much under the influence of their former leaders. They may still be able to cause problems, and those who want to stir up trouble could exploit that.”²¹³

²¹² Joe Bavier, “Ivory Coast Army Sow Fears of Return to Unrest,” *Reuters*, November 30, 2014, World News edition, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-army-analysis/ivory-coast-army-protests-sow-fears-of-return-to-unrest-idUSKCN0JE07720141130>.

²¹³ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, “The Côte d’Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée,” 287.

Institution Building

The greatest innovation of the GT-RSS's strategy was the creation of the National Security Council (*Conseil National de Sécurité, CNS*), a national security council modeled after the NSC in the United States and the Office for National Security in Sierra Leone. The CNS was specifically mandated with coordinating internal and external security; determining national priorities for security sector reform; and monitoring and coordinating action between different security ministries.²¹⁴

Several other important institutional changes were made during this time. To replace the highly politicized intelligence agency established by President Gbagbo during the first civil war in 2005, Ouattara established the National Intelligence Council (*Conseil National du Renseignement, CNR*) in 2014.²¹⁵ In addition, Gbagbo pledged to undertake serious reforms to the Ministry of Defense, beginning with the creation of a national security strategy.

Institutional Assistance

From its inception, the CNS received technical assistance from the UNOCI, France, and the US to support civilian oversight and accountability within the institution. Experts from the UNOCI offered training seminars to several committees in the National Assembly to bolster their ability to exercise oversight over the security sector.²¹⁶ These projects focused on the both strengthening the technical expertise of members of the CNS as well as supporting non-state

²¹⁴ “Décret n° 2012-786 du 8 août 2012 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du Conseil national de Sécurité, en abrégé C.N.S.,” *Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d’Ivoire*, October 11, 2012, 925.

²¹⁵ “L’Agence de Stratégie et d’intelligence (Ansi) Délocalisée Au Palais de Ouattara,” *ConnectionIvoirienne.Net*, June 12, 2014.

²¹⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: United Nations, December 24, 2013), 6, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_761.pdf.

actors to monitor the security sector on the principles of democratic governance, including civilian control, respect for human rights, financial responsibility, domestic security, and respect for the rule of law.

France and the US installed advisors to provide technical expertise to the nascent institution.²¹⁷ The UNOCI also provided assistance to the National Assembly Defense and Security Commission to increase democratic oversight within the military and clarify conditions for mobilization and intervention in law enforcement and rescue operations.²¹⁸ Other multilateral institutions offered similar support. For example, the African Development Bank hosted a series of workshops in 2016 focused on improving defense expenditure management.²¹⁹

Outcomes

The institutional assistance provided by donors made little impact on security institution building. Aline Leboeuf argues that the reliance of the government on oral communication allowed a gap to emerge between what was being said and what was actually being achieved. Large gaps emerged between official progress and the reality on the ground. She quotes a French advisor who describes the CNS as a large machine “running on empty” – while there were many seminars, there was little execution.²²⁰

Assistance has at times been hindered by a lack of coordination among donors. An analyst for Transparency International described the anti-corruption programming in Côte

²¹⁷ Aline Leboeuf, “La Réforme Du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” *Sécurité & Défense Magazine*, March 21, 2016, <https://sd-magazine.com/strategie-et-politique/la-reforme-du-secteur-de-securite-a-livoirienne>.

²¹⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” 8.

²¹⁹ Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Côte d’Ivoire” (London: Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme, 2015), http://government.defenceindex.org/generate-report.php?country_id=6330.

²²⁰ Leboeuf, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” 21–22.

d'Ivoire as “ad hoc” and “sporadic.” When the government of Côte d'Ivoire submitted its first self-evaluation to the Open Government Partnership, it made no reference to these trainings, suggesting, at best, that they had been forgotten about; more likely, these trainings had little impact.²²¹

Military Reform

The process of the second Ivorian war had broken down what little institutional capacity existed in Côte d'Ivoire. Minister of Defense Koffi argued that security infrastructure, equipment, and even the operational capacity of the military had been “reduced to nothing”.²²² Years of vicious conflict had broken the social compact between the army and the population. The military would need to be rebuilt as well as integrated. Relations between the military and society repaired.²²³

Ouattara abandoned the CCI, making the newly created army the site of all military integration, incorporating FDS and FN troops, as well as the soldiers recruited directly into the force during the crisis. In a speech to the nation, Ouattara declared that this new army would be a powerful instrument of national cohesion in service of civics, tolerance, transparency, and national integration: “Our army should equally be a tool at the service of development, at the service of the people, at the service of the Republic.”²²⁴

²²¹ Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Côte d'Ivoire.”

²²² Author translation, Paul Koffi Koffi, “Le Défi de la Reconstruction d'une Armée Républicaine en Côte d'Ivoire: Bilan et Perspectives,” *Les Rendez-vous du Gouvernement* (Abidjan: Centre d'Information et de Communication Gouvernementale, March 26, 2015), 1, http://www.gouv.ci/_grandossier.php?recordID=82.

²²³ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²²⁴ Author translation, “Cérémonie de Mise En Place Des Forces Républicaines de Côte D'Ivoire (FRCI) Par Le Président de La République,” *Abidjan.Net*, March 17, 2011.

Institutional Assistance

Like much of the rest of SSR, Ivorians dictated the process of military reform, with some assistance from French General Claude Réglat, as well as by Colonel Major Marc Paitier and two officers from the UN and US.²²⁵ When the crisis ended, the government set the new army at 22,000 soldiers, a mix of former FN combatants, former FDS soldiers, and the new soldiers recruited to the FRCI by Ouattara in 2010. During this process, much of the burden of integration fell on these new FRCI soldiers, who were tasked with building connections and keeping the peace between the former rivals.²²⁶ The combatants who remained would be demobilized.

After the post-electoral crisis, Ouattara instituted a “co-command” structure, in which posts would be shared by FAFN and FDS forces. In theory, this would facilitate cohesion among the ranks and encourage lower-ranking soldiers to respect the leadership of the other side. In reality, however, this system did little to improve inter-group relations, creating instead a parallel command structure.²²⁷

In 2016, the government passed new legislation regarding the organization of the armed forces. Law n° 2016-414 outlined the major divisions within the armed forces and created a unit for coordination between the various commands. Most importantly, it stressed the role of the army in assisting in the maintenance of internal security.²²⁸ Shortly after, the government issued a military planning document, outlining a program for reforms between 2016 and 2020. In addition

²²⁵ “L’Armée Ivoirienne depuis 2011,” 6.

²²⁶ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

²²⁷ Philip A Martin, “Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d’Ivoire,” *African Affairs* 117, no. 468 (July 1, 2018): 528, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady015>.

²²⁸ “Loi N°2016-414 Du 15 Juin 2016 Portant Organisation de La Défense et Des Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire,” Assemblée Nationale de la Côte d’Ivoire, June 15, 2016, 3, <http://assnat.amsontechology.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/05-Loi-portant-organisation-de-la-Défense-et-des-Forces-Armées-de-COTE-D’IVOIRE.pdf>.

to improving the operational capacity of the armed forces, the document stresses the importance of improving the autonomy and capacity of defense institutions to conduct professional intelligence operations, generate strategic reflections, and manage expenditures.²²⁹

One of the most visible restructuring efforts made by President Ouattara was to dismantle the Security Operations Command Center (*Centre de commandement des opérations de sécurité*, CECOS), known as an arm of state repression under Gbagbo. However, Gbagbo's praetorian guard—the Republican Guard (*Garde Républicaine*)—was left in place and put under the direction of Issiaka Ouattara (“Wattao”), a close ally of President Ouattara and famous war criminal.²³⁰ Additionally, Ouattara established several new autonomous units. In 2011, Ouattara created the Special Forces (*Forces Spéciales*, FS), who received training and assistance from Morocco, China, Egypt, and the U.S.; and two police units. Later, in 2013, Ouattara created a joint police-military unit called the Operational Decision Coordinating Center (*Centre de coordination des décisions opérationnelles*, CCDO).²³¹

Operational Assistance

The majority of the operational assistance that was provided came through the provision of training and equipment through the Operation Licorne and the US Peacekeeping Operations Fund.²³² Faced with integrating and mobilizing a new army, donors and the government set training as a high priority, seeing it as necessary to equalize troops with widely varying

²²⁹ “Loi Portant Programmation Des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure Pour Les Années 2016-2020,” *Journal Officiel de La République de Côte d’Ivoire*, March 17, 2016, 314.

²³⁰ Clément Boursin, “Wattao: Parcours d’un Militaire Ivoirien, Ex-Chef de Guerre Devenue Caïd,” *ACAT France*, April 10, 2015, <https://www.acatfrance.fr/actualite/wattao---parcours-dun-militaire-ivoirien--ex-chef-de-guerre-devenu-caid>.

²³¹ “L’Armée Ivoirienne depuis 2011,” 8–9.

²³² Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid.”

experience levels.²³³ Ivorian soldiers received training from a number of sources. All soldiers without basic training attended a course offered by the French through the *Licorne* forces in country and later from the *Éléments français en Côte d'Ivoire* (EFCI), which eventually replaced *Licorne*. Preparation for participation in peacekeeping missions formed another avenue for training. This instruction focused on all areas necessary for the functioning of an army, including training technicians and pilots.²³⁴ For most FN and FRCI recruits, this training was their first formal training experience. For former FDS soldiers, this training served as a refresher course. Regardless of the amount of knowledge gained through these sessions, government officials and donors both hoped they could contribute to socialization among the newly integrated forces. Traditional operational assistance has remained low, even after the lifting of the UN embargo.

Outcomes

As expected by my theory, the institutional assistance provided by international donors did little to improve the professionalization of the military. Despite the positive rhetoric of the Ouattara administration, the creation of new elite military units signaled continuity of policy, rather than change. An advisor to the government at the time described the new CCDO as “a Malinké replica of the Bété CECOS of the Gbagbo period.”²³⁵ Like Gbagbo, Ouattara created these autonomous institutions as an alternative to the weak national army. Like Gbagbo, Ouattara kept these new institutions outside the formal army system and placed them directly under his command. These elite security units today receive more attention from the government than the

²³³ Leboeuf, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” 18.

²³⁴ Leboeuf, 19.

²³⁵ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, “The Côte d’Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée,” 273.

conventional army, leaving them better trained and better equipped. One advisor to the security sector argued that these units balance against each other, making sector-wide reform difficult.²³⁶

Early into the reform process, a series of events revealed a high level of politicization and discontent within the military, suggesting that reform was not progressing as quickly as it seemed. After a series of attacks by pro-Gbagbo militants in the West of the country between 2012 and 2014, Ouattara took another opportunity to consolidate power in the hands of his former rebel network.²³⁷ Despite their numerical weakness, FN structures continue to dominate within the armed forces. "We have in reality two armies who do not always respect the chain of command and who regularly give proof of their lack of discipline and cohesion," explained one member of the National Security Council.²³⁸ Among both troops and officers, loyalty comes first to your party, second to the state.

These divisions have been allowed to continue due to policy choices by the government. As DDR progressed and the security situation improved, the government's priorities shifted. Without an immediate threat of conflict or insurrection, the administration's dedication to retraining quickly waned. It remains unclear how many soldiers actually attended the established training centers.²³⁹ Without a comprehensive plan for instruction and professionalization, selection for training events has become politicized: allocation of training opportunities is often based on personal ties rather than merit.²⁴⁰ Similarly, a review of the security sector found that

²³⁶ Interview with author, July 7, 2019.

²³⁷ "L'Armée Ivoirienne depuis 2011," 4.

²³⁸ Author translation; "Côte d'Ivoire: Ouattara et la Réforme de l'Armée"

²³⁹ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, "The Côte d'Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée," 278.

²⁴⁰ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

former FN soldiers are consistently given preference for the allocation of new equipment provided by donors.²⁴¹

The government has done little to promote integration within their ranks. One Crisis Group report found that former FN soldiers are consistently insubordinate to senior officers who fought for the FDS before the electoral crisis, refusing to obey orders or convey respect through practices like saluting.²⁴² French advisor Bollée noted this as well, arguing that beyond official statements promoting reconciliation and integration, “there was never even the slightest hint of rapprochement between the factions inside the army.” Members of the military who were thought to support Gbagbo were sidelined, sometimes denied even the employment they had been promised.²⁴³

The problems within the military have manifested in a series of mutinies since the 2011 crisis. In 2014, former FN soldiers now integrated into the FRCI poured into the streets of Abidjan demanding the back pay promised by both Gbagbo and Ouattara, but never paid. Although the government responded rapidly to the protests, they sparked doubts among observers of the progress of security sector reform in Côte d’Ivoire. Rinaldo Depagne, the West Africa project director for International Crisis Group, commented: “The army has always been the weak point and it really surprises me they didn’t learn the lessons of the past.”²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Leboeuf, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” 20.

²⁴² International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?” (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 3, 2011), 8, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/côte-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-only-option>.

²⁴³ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, “The Côte d’Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée,” 277.

²⁴⁴ Quoted in Bavier, “Ivory Coast Army Sow Fears of Return to Unrest.”

When mutinies broke out again in January and May 2017 it had become clear that the government had not taken steps to adequately address the issues plaguing the military. Chief among these issues was the size of the military. 90% of the Ministry of Defense's budget was devoted to paying salaries and still, some soldiers felt they had not been properly compensated. The 2017 mutinies also revealed issues in the DDR program. To that point, most observers had viewed DDR to be a success.²⁴⁵ The ease with which soldiers picked up weapons not authorized by the FRCI shattered that illusion and highlighted the programs failures in disarmament.²⁴⁶

The Ivorian government has recently taken steps to downsize the army. Their delay in doing so is likely due to political considerations of the Ouattara regime and the delicate balance of power within his political coalition. In other countries, the presence of international advisors has made it easier for domestic politicians to undertake necessary, but politically difficult reforms. In addition to creating pressure for these reforms, international involvement offers a useful justification for domestic politicians. This type of pressure was missing in Côte d'Ivoire, where French advisors to the military were focused more on improving effectiveness than sensitive issues like personnel.

Police Reform

Internal security in Côte d'Ivoire is divided between the gendarmerie and the police. The gendarmerie is a paramilitary force created to guard public safety, maintain order, and enforce laws in order to "protect institutions, people, and goods." Typically, the gendarmerie is generally

²⁴⁵ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁴⁶ Interview with author, June 27, 2019.

involved in civil policing and territorial defense and may be called upon for other security needs.²⁴⁷ In contrast, the police is charged with the maintenance of public security throughout the country, particularly in the cities. Force integration into the police was not continued after the Second Ivorian War. Thus, the police and gendarmerie faced few of the issues of cohesion that plagued the military. The greatest issues facing the police were a lack of training and equipment and, more importantly, a lack of trust by the population.²⁴⁸

Despite concerns that the police and gendarmerie would not be able to work together after the crisis has ended, the Ouattara government chose to maintain the existing institutional infrastructure of the police. Reform efforts focused primarily on the military, the police and gendarmerie were to be re-equipped and re-deployed.²⁴⁹ Rather than use resources to improve a potentially pro-Gbagbo institution, Ouattara sidelined the police and gendarmerie. This policy choice has hampered donor assistance to the police, with implications for the quality of governance and the level of domestic stability.

Institutional Assistance

Support for police reform was provided primarily by multilateral institutions. Before the GT-RSS completed its plan for security sector reform, the UNOCI began working with the Ministry of the Interior to help formulate new plans for the organization, structure, and jurisdiction of the police.²⁵⁰ The UNOCI provided training to 278 police officers and 118 gendarmes on the subjects of human rights, ethics, local policing, accident reporting, sexual and

²⁴⁷ “Rôle, Mission et Organisation Du Ministère de La Défense,” Ministère d’État, Ministère de la Défense, May 4, 2017, http://www.defense.gouv.ci/ministere/role_mission.

²⁴⁸ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁴⁹ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” 6.

gender-based violence, and the rights of children.²⁵¹ In 2014, the UNDP began implementing a series of human rights trainings for the police at *the École Nationale de Police d'Abidjan*, financed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. The program provided just under \$2 million between 2014 and 2016 to train officers from across the country in management, ethics, gender issues, and dealing with vulnerable groups. These trainings also included more traditional issues, such as maintaining order, crime scene management, and fighting organized crime.²⁵² To facilitate longer-term reforms, France sent technical experts to assist the National Police in improving training programs.²⁵³

Police reform in Côte d'Ivoire focused more on mandate than institutional structure. In 2015, the government announced the creation of a municipal police force with a decentralized leadership structure to better serve the needs of communities.²⁵⁴ This was an important step for the state to extend and improve its services across the country: up to this point, local security had been provided informally.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Fonds Pour La Consolidation de La Paix (PBF): Rapport Narratif Final Sur Le Programme,” 4–5.

²⁵² United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Près de 4000 Policiers Ivoiriens Renforcent Leurs Capacités En Matière de Respect Des Droits Humains,” Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement, April 8, 2014, https://www.ci.undp.org/content/cote_divoire/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2014/04/08/pr-s-de-4000-policiers-ivoiriens-renforcent-leurs-capacit-s-en-mati-re-de-respect-des-droits-humains-.html.

²⁵³ Landry Kohon, “Côte d'Ivoire: Sécurité - La France Offre Des Véhicules et Des Équipements à La Police Nationale et à La Gendarmerie,” *AllAfrica*, February 22, 2012, <https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201202220489.html>.

²⁵⁴ “Décret n° 2015-101 du 18 Février 2015 Portant Organisation de la Police Municipale” (Abidjan: Ministre de l'Intérieur de la Côte d'Ivoire, February 18, 2015), <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=27&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwinWnXyoXmAhXNTN8KHRyIC6Q4FBAWMAZ6BAgKEAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dgddl.interieur.gouv.ci%2Fdocumentation%2F2015031912282720150319122827POLICMUNI.doc&usg=AOvVaw1qBU5yVmECZetIBNSPgI1c>.

²⁵⁵ “Le gouvernement veut professionnaliser la police municipale,” *LeBabi.net*, February 19, 2015, <https://www.lebabi.net/actualite/le-gouvernement-veut-professionnaliser-la-police-municipale-40968.html>.

Operational Assistance

Operational assistance to the police has been provided primarily through the UNOCI, France, and Germany. In the early days of peace, the UNOCI quickly deployed funding to rebuild the physical infrastructure of the police. The UNOCI re-equipped and rehabilitated 6 prefectures, 14 sous-prefectures, 3 police stations, 4 police brigades in the West, the police district of Adjamé and provided the Abidjan police prefecture with a new radio system. France authorized multiple rounds of equipment donations to the police and gendarmerie, providing items ranging from uniforms to vehicles. The most significant provision of French assistance to Ivorian internal security, however, was through training. In addition to providing training opportunities at French schools, France provided seminars at the National Police Academy (*l'École nationale de police à Cocody*).²⁵⁶ Germany also intervened to help develop the Ivorian police and gendarmerie. Beginning in 2008, the German Development Agency (GIZ) has channeled assistance to reinforce the capabilities of the Ivorian Police. This assistance has included equipment provisions, training in countering drug trafficking, as well as training in basic policing skills.²⁵⁷ As in other reform projects, Ivorian authorities have shown a great interest in pursuing reform and shaping the process to fit Ivorian needs. In terms of police reform, Ivorian officers have advocated for the type of training most needed to address their security needs.²⁵⁸

Outcomes

²⁵⁶ Kohon, “Côte d’Ivoire: Sécurité - La France Offre Des Véhicules et Des Équipements à La Police Nationale et à La Gendarmerie.”

²⁵⁷ Ely Dieng, “La RSS En Action,” *United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Zoom Sur La RSS*, September 2012, 5–6,

[https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/12511/127719/Newsletter%20RSS%20N2%2012%20octobre%202012%20\(3\).pdf](https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/12511/127719/Newsletter%20RSS%20N2%2012%20octobre%202012%20(3).pdf).

²⁵⁸ Leboeuf, “La Réforme Du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne.”

Police reform efforts by donors appear to have had some positive results. UN crime statistics for Côte d’Ivoire show a marked decrease in armed robbery and homicide between 2012 and 2015, suggesting not only a reduction in instability, but an improvement in the effectiveness of the police and gendarmes. Reports of rape during this time increased dramatically; however, experts attribute this to the proliferation of sensitization trainings across the country to the population and security forces, leading to an increase in reporting as opposed to an increase in the actual incidence of crime.²⁵⁹ However, as expected, these improvements have been small. Public trust in the police remained strained due to a perceived “lack of integrity and accountability, use of excessive force, torture and ill-treatment in the maintenance of law and order” and low rates of disciplinary action taken against offending officers.²⁶⁰

Despite the operational assistance it received, the national police have remained significantly understaffed and lack the capacity to perform vital functions like intelligence collection. By 2014, the police and gendarmerie were still only equipped and operational in three major cities – Abidjan, Bouaké, and Daloa.²⁶¹ Further, it was estimated that there were only 7,149 pistols across the force, a ratio of 3 officers to one gun. Needs for training were just as great: by 2016, training for all officers at each level was still being conducted at the *École Nationale de Police* in Abidjan, which had been constructed at independence to service a maximum of 300 officers.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Fonds Pour La Consolidation de La Paix (PBF): Rapport Narratif Final Sur Le Programme,” 24–25.

²⁶⁰ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 25.

²⁶¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” 5.

²⁶² “Loi Portant Programmation Des Forces de Sécurité Intérieure Pour Les Années 2016-2020,” 315–17.

Unlike the integration plans set forth by the CCI, force integration under Ouattara was largely confined to the military, leaving the police and gendarmerie relatively untouched.²⁶³ Fearing latent pro-Gbagbo sentiments, the government has consistently marginalized the police and gendarmerie and instead has authorized the military to perform domestic security functions, often at the expense of the rule of law.²⁶⁴

One of the most significant sources of insecurity during the decade-long conflict was the proliferation of “checkpoints” along the highway manned by armed individuals looking to extort money from members of the community. These highway bandits were often allowed to operate with impunity; at times, they were even perceived to be working with the police. When the conflict ended and the government turned its eye to police reform, addressing the issue of highway extortion was made a high priority. In one of its first acts of reform, the government created an Anti-Racket Unit within the police, which would operate as an undercover unit to detect and investigate corrupt police and security officials participating in extortion. However, since its creation, the unit has been severely hampered by inconsistent funding from the government. Although funding was restored in 2014, the group’s initial inefficacy seriously

²⁶³ Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁶⁴ Following a string of attacks against Ivorian security officials in August 2012, the government deployed the military to investigate instead of the judicial police. The FRCI targeted ethnic groups that had supported Gbagbo, rounding people up and bringing them to detention camps, where they faced inhumane treatment, bordering on torture. An investigation into this incident also revealed pervasive corruption among the security forces, allowing some detainees to pay bribes in exchange for their freedom. See Matt Wells, “‘A Long Way from Reconciliation’: Abusive Military Crackdown in Response to Security Threats in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 2012), 4–5, 37–38, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj2wr-Unr_lAhVMJKwKHQ0HCoMQFjAAegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hrw.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Freports%2Fcotedivoire1112webwcover.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3Jd6AMD-mA-DuDV9Szy-4Q.

damaged its reputation and authority. Unable to effectively deter officers from demanding bribes, the unit has become a lame duck.²⁶⁵

Assessing Security Sector Governance After the Second Ivorian War

By 2014, Côte d'Ivoire had made substantial progress towards meeting its urgent goals: the government had successfully defined a national policy for defense, passed legislation regarding the creation of the CNS, and provided the equipment necessary to make the police, gendarmerie, and Special Forces operational. The government also passed several policies and pieces of legislation to guide DDR and address cross-border flows, as well as initiated action towards improving economic governance through the security sector. The country had made significantly less progress towards its short-term goals. While the government did begin some reforms towards the restructuring of the armed forces and police, it made no progress towards depoliticization or installing democratic governance in the security institutions.²⁶⁶

Despite the efforts taken by the Ouattara administration to restore state authority across the country, com'zones continue to exert authority in the north, challenging the primacy of the state and the stability of the region. It is unclear whether these efforts have failed due to a lack of state capacity or political will to shut down the security and economic networks operated by

²⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Côte d'Ivoire: Extortion by Security Forces," Human Rights Watch, July 29, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/cote-divoire-extortion-security-forces>.

²⁶⁶ Conseil National de Sécurité, "Tableau de Bord Des Réformes Par Priorité," Réforme de Secteur de Sécurité (Abidjan: Conseil National de Sécurité, January 23, 2015), http://dnsererrorassist.att.net/search/?q=http%3A//www.rssci.org/images/TB_Ref_Urg.pdf&r=https%3A//www.google.com/&bc=.

Ouattara's wartime allies.²⁶⁷ The continued operation of these parallel governance structures threatens the government's ability to enforce policies and exert its power throughout the country.

Insecurity has reigned across much of the country, as the highway bandits who had become so prevalent throughout the conflict continued to operate roadblocks across the country, particularly the in the West. To many observers, this represented a failure of DDR: "We know that the majority of the highway attackers are former fighters. Their impatience and the difficulties faced by the DDR to take them on board are the reasons for this situation," said Pierre Kouamé Adjoumani, the interim head of the Ivoirian Human Rights League.²⁶⁸

Beyond failures of state capacity, donors have been unable to effectuate significant improvements in governance. In the following discussion, I outline the Côte d'Ivoire's progress along the five major dimensions of security sector governance: (1) the existence of a formal institutional framework, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) capacity, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Formal Institutional Framework. In the years following the crisis, the Ouattara administration established a host of new legislation outlining the roles and responsibilities of the security sector. However, in practice, the Ivorian security sector rarely respects the parameters established by the legal framework. The military is overused, sent to participate in domestic affairs. Both the military and the police are seen by observers as being highly political bodies.

²⁶⁷ Martin, "Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d'Ivoire," 530.

²⁶⁸ Quoted in "Côte d'Ivoire Sees a Sharp Rise in Banditry," *The New Humanitarian*, October 16, 2013, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2013/10/16/cote-d-ivoire-sees-sharp-rise-banditry>.

Accountability is further hampered by a lack of formal doctrine or institutionalized training addressing corruption for members of the military or police.²⁶⁹

Civilian Control. Civilian control over the Ivorian armed forces remains low and is consistently identified as a source of insecurity by security experts. The Ouattara administration has consistently promoted former rebel leaders to high command posts as well as lucrative civilian positions, perpetuating the historical trend of military involvement in political affairs. Ousmane Coulibaly, an FRCI leader with the nickname “Bin Laden” is exemplary of this issue. After serving as a leader of a notoriously brutal unit during the civil war, Coulibaly oversaw troops in the Yopougon area who committed egregious human rights abuses during the second conflict, including summary executions, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Rather than being sanctioned for his part in this abuse, Coulibaly was promoted to a lucrative position within the government while continuing to serve as a commander.²⁷⁰ In addition to holding important posts at the national level, many of these former rebel commanders have strong economic and personal networks at the local level bolstering their financial and social capital. As Martin et al. explain, “These linkages complicate Côte d’Ivoire’s post-war peacebuilding project because they empower commanders to challenge the authority of the ruling government and undermine the cohesiveness of the armed forces, yet at the same time make these actors indispensable for maintaining short-term stability.”²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Transparency International, “Government Defence Integrity Index 2020: Côte d’Ivoire,” Transparency International Defence & Security, 2020, <https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/cote-divoire/>.

²⁷⁰ Wells, “‘A Long Way from Reconciliation’: Abusive Military Crackdown in Response to Security Threats in Côte d’Ivoire,” 49–50.

²⁷¹ Philip Martin, Giulia Piccolino, and Jeremy Speight, “Rebel Networks’ Deep Roots Cause Concerns for Côte d’Ivoire Transition,” *International Peace Institute Global Observatory*, October 12, 2017, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/10/rebel-networks-deep-roots-cause-concerns-for-cote-divoire-transition/>.

Civilian oversight of security issues is minimal. Although the National Assembly and civil society were kept apprised of developments in the security sector reform process, oversight remains low.²⁷² Legally, the Committee for Security and Defense in the National Assembly has the right to oversight, but it rarely exercises this authority. Further, there is little evidence that the executive has taken any of the Committee’s policy recommendations into account when formulating defense policy.²⁷³ The absence of legislative oversight hinders the establishment of accountability within the military and the security sector more broadly, particularly in light of the politicized relationship between Ouattara and the security forces.

Transparent and Accountable Management. Despite a host of new legislation defining the structure and management of the security sector, security policy decisions often do not adhere to formal criteria. There is very little transparency regarding the decision-making process. For example, information regarding high-level appointments within the military is only published after the appointment has been made.²⁷⁴ With the support of the UNOCI, the CNS has increased its communication with civil society and the media. However, this communication is consistently one-sided – instead of beginning a dialogue with domestic actors, the CNS has used the seminars and other UN-funded meetings to propagate the government’s message.²⁷⁵

Corruption remains an issue across the security sector. Despite the creation of an Anti-Racket Unit composed of police, gendarmes, and members of the military, enforcement has been complicated by the prevalence of unofficial fighters operating alongside government forces. Operating outside of the official system, these fighters are not subject to the disciplinary

²⁷² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 27 of Security Council Resolution 2153 (2014),” 16–17.

²⁷³ “Political Risk,” Transparency International, “Government Defence Integrity Index 2020: Côte d’Ivoire.”

²⁷⁴ Transparency International.

²⁷⁵ Leboeuf, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité à l’Ivoirienne,” 16.

mechanisms built into the FRCI that could punish extortion. Even if they were, however, military commanders have been loath to impose any sanctions on these fighters, who were never fully demobilized nor fully integrated into the army, but continue to work in the name of the state.²⁷⁶ These fighters and the abuses they perpetrate undermine the legitimacy of the security sector. They are a direct result of an incomplete DDR process.

Within the military, the existence of parallel command structures in the military weakens the ability of leadership to hold lower ranks accountable. The national police are not subject to the same degree of internal divisions; however, authority in the police is overly centralized, to the point that it hinders command and control across the organization. Similarly, the gendarmerie suffers from a command structure that is so centralized and hierarchical that it impedes lower-ranking officers from directing their subordinates.²⁷⁷

Capacity. Operational capacity of all bodies outside the army remained low until recent years, due in large part to an arms embargo placed on the country by the UN in the early days of the conflict. By 2016, the air force still had “no combat capability and a very limited capacity for transport,” despite of the French efforts to build up the mechanical and technical capacity of the air force.²⁷⁸ The politicization of the military threatens its ability to perform as well as challenging accountability and professionalization. Divided loyalties of the troops have significantly weakened command structures within the military, threatening its ability to respond should a crisis emerge. Worse, many experts fear that the fault lines in the military may

²⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Côte d’Ivoire: Extortion by Security Forces.”

²⁷⁷ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York: United Nations, March 31, 2016), 8–9, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_297.pdf.

²⁷⁸ “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa,” *The Military Balance*, 506.

contribute to a relapse into conflict following the elections of 2020.²⁷⁹ The decrease in crime across the country suggests an improvement in the capacity of the police; however, these improvements are offset by the persistence of networks of highway bandits and networks of extortion.

Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. The Ivorian security sector remains mired in a culture of impunity, allowed to persist since the end of the war. Although the Ouattara administration has instituted a truth and reconciliation commission and inquiry into the war crimes committed during the conflict, the prosecution of such crimes is highly political. A report by the International Center for Transitional Justice revealed that, despite evidence of abuses by pro-Ouattara forces, the state prosecutor has only proceeded with trials against Gbagbo supporters.²⁸⁰ This one-sided justice has created a permissive environment for human rights abuses and continued violations of the rule of law. Since the end of the 2011 conflict, various watchdog organizations have documented human rights abuses by the military, police, and intelligence services. In addition to arbitrary arrest and torture, the government has used the police to forcefully repress the political activities of FPI party activists.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Interview with author, June 27, 2019.

²⁸⁰ International Center for Transitional Justice, “Disappointed Hope: Judicial Handling of Post-Election Violence in Côte d’Ivoire” (New York City: International Center for Transitional Justice, April 2016), 31, <https://www.ictj.org/publication/judicial-handling-post-election-violence-cote-divoire>.

²⁸¹ Alfred Babo, “Postwar Governance: Human Rights and Peacebuilding in Côte d’Ivoire,” *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 35, <https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacerevi.9.1.02>.

Conclusion

Following the First Ivorian War, donors were slow to act. Despite an opening in the political sphere caused by high regime vulnerability and the creation of the CCI, donors hesitated to fund a government that they viewed as unwilling to act. Their fears were well-founded: both the Gbagbo administration and the FN system profited from the post-conflict system, creating large opportunity for corruption and disincentives for reform. However, their reluctance to provide funds for the CCI created serious delays in DDR and military integration. The importance of these funds for advancing both causes became clear in the dramatic progress that was made in the months leading up to the 2010 elections. Unfortunately, this assistance was ultimately insufficient: when the election crisis broke out, President Gbagbo could call upon a divided army and community of armed combatants to protect him, taking a political crisis and escalating it to the point of a renewed civil war.

When the 2011 post-electoral crisis finally ended in 2011, Côte d'Ivoire seemed poised to make a remarkable recovery. However, in contrast to the strong economic recovery, progress in rebuilding the security sector stalled. Despite greater flows of institutional assistance, donors have been unable to effect deep security sector reforms. Following his electoral and military victory, Ouattara had near total control over the government and security sector, leaving little room for donor influence. Feeling the need to compensate his wartime allies, Ouattara has focused more on fighting the fires within his own party than accommodating the opposition. While pressure from donors and institutional assistance help push for the creation of SSR policy and some improvements in police behavior, aid has not led to widescale improvements.

Since the end of the crisis, the army has launched three major coups. Ivorian security experts have serious doubts about the true success of DDR.²⁸² One advisor to the process described SSR as “botched.”²⁸³ Worse, as preparations are mounted for the 2020 presidential election, civil society leaders and civilians fear a second relapse into conflict.²⁸⁴

²⁸² Interview with author, June 27, 2019; Interview with author, July 11, 2019.

²⁸³ Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon, “The Côte d’Ivoire Armed Forces: Portrait of a Fragile System: Interview with Bruno Clément-Bollée,” 292.

²⁸⁴ Interview with author, June 27, 2019; Interview with author, July 5, 2019.

CHAPTER 5

SECURITY GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN BURUNDI

After decades of cyclic violence, Burundi plunged into a civil war in 1993 that would endure for over 15 years and claim the lives of over 300,000 people. At the heart of this conflict was a long history of ethnic marginalization and political exclusion. The Hutu population, comprising nearly 85% of the total population, sought representation in all domains of government; the most fervent objective, however, was control over the security sector and an end to the “*armée mono-ethnique*” that had dominated the post-independence era. Although fighting continued until 2009, security sector reform efforts began in Burundi in 2004, when the Tutsi-led transitional government reached an agreement with the largest Hutu rebel group – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The agreement they signed was built on the principle of power-sharing and formed the backbone of peace and reconstruction efforts. Donors matched their enthusiasm for peace with sizeable aid allocations. However, donor efforts were scattered. Although donors had secured a commitment from the transitional government to implement sector-wide reforms, continued fighting led donors to postpone policy talks.

When donors returned to the table, they had missed their chance. Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD was two years into his term as president and had already begun his program of power consolidation. Worse, donor intentions began to falter as the conflict dragged on. When conflict continued even after the holding of democratic elections and a ceasefire between the two major parties, donors shifted their priorities to domestic and regional stability. When peace was

achieved, Burundi grew increasingly attractive as a provider of peacekeeping support and as a partner in the fight against international terrorism.

At the time SSR began, the Burundian security system faced both contextual and institutional impediments to reform. Regional unrest and low-level domestic insecurity made it difficult to convince communities and ex-combatants to surrender their weapons. In addition, major issues remained with state institutions: the Burundian National Police (PNB) remained highly unprofessional, access to justice was limited, and the intelligence services were highly politicized. Unable to gain the consent of Nkurunziza for widescale reforms, the Netherlands initiated an innovative reform program focused on the military. Their program yielded significant improvements in the professionalism and capacity of the military, as evidenced by laudable performance in peacekeeping missions and improved relations with the Burundian population. However, improvements in the military were not enough to prevent the appropriation of the internal security institutions by the executive. In 2015, Pierre Nkurunziza announced his intention to run for an unconstitutional third term, with the full support of the police and intelligence services, who implemented increasingly repressive measures to stifle dissent. The military, politically neutral at the outbreak of violence, soon gave way to latent tensions, and the country relapsed into a second conflict, which continues to this day.

This chapter examines the impact of security assistance on security sector governance in post-war Burundi and considers the role that played in the country's relapse into conflict. It proceeds in the following sections. First, I provide a brief history of Burundi leading up to the conflict, with a focus on how the politicization of the security sector helped fuel the political grievances that led to war. Next, I discuss the conduct of the civil war and the moves towards security sector reform undertaken by the government and the international community, and give

a brief outline of the political events leading up to the country's eventual relapse into conflict. The second section discusses the security assistance provided to Burundi and the institutional context surrounding its disbursement. I highlight the international response to the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2003: the window of opportunity donors missed in 2004 for sector-wide reform, the window that opened for military reform, and the aid they provided once a degree of regime stability had been restored. I argue that, although donors provided large amounts of institutional assistance to reform the national army, the inflows of operational assistance received at that time undercut their reform efforts. In the third section, I discuss the developments that occurred in the security sector as a result of the institutional and operational assistance provided by donors. I conclude with an assessment of the quality of security sector governance in Burundi and an analysis of how poor governance contributed to the violent escalation of the ongoing crisis.

Background

Burundi is a small, land-locked country in central Africa, bordered by Rwanda and the DRC. Like its neighbor, Burundi's history has been strongly shaped by an enduring power struggle between its two main ethnic groups – the Tutsis, who comprise 13-14% of the population and have been historically favored by colonial leaders, and the Hutus, who comprise around 85%. Since its independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been locked in a series of political-military crises as its two main ethnic groups—the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi—have vied for power. After an attempted coup by a group of Hutu officers, the Tutsi military leadership initiated a purge of Hutu military officers and launched a coup of their own, toppling

the government and beginning a period of military rule in 1966. While the Tutsi had enjoyed greater access to resources and opportunities under colonialism, this move entrenched Tutsi leadership in the government and military as an independent state. This group of elites moved to further concentrate their power, restricting positions of power to those Tutsis from the southern province of Bururi. In 1972, Hutus launched a major insurrection against the ruling Tutsi elite, leading to the death of 2,000-3,000 Tutsis. In response to these attacks, the government responded with mass executions of all Hutus who appeared threatening to its interests. Between 100,000-200,000 Hutus are estimated to have died.²⁸⁵

Figure 5.1. Map of Burundi



After another conflict in 1988, President Major Pierre Buyoya faced strong international pressure to liberalize. Under his leadership, the government put forth a national unity charter in 1991, a new constitution in 1992, and prepared for elections in 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, created a new political party called the Front for Democracy in Burundi (*Front pour la*

²⁸⁵ Henri Boshoff, Waldemar Vrey, and George Rautenbach, *The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, Monograph 171 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2010), 5, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKewiC07y-39TnAhURVt8KHawQBXAQFjAAegQIAxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Ffissafrica.org%2Fresearch%2Fmonographs%2Fthe-burundi-peace-process-from-civil-war-to-conditional-peace&usq=AOvVaw2qnYETLmDOCqux78_5Yrxf.

démocratie au Burundi, FRODEBU) and placed security sector reform at the top of his agenda. Ndadaye and FRODEBU handily defeated Buyoya and won a large majority in the national assembly as well. Three months into his term, Ndadaye was killed by a group of Tutsi soldiers attempting a coup d'état. Although they failed to remove the FRODEBU regime, this attempt created a power vacuum in the government that was manipulated by Tutsi politicians looking to reaffirm their power. In the weeks that followed, violence spread across the country as Hutus perpetrated reprisal attacks against Tutsis and Tutsi security forces tried to intimidate FRODEBU supporters.²⁸⁶ As the Tutsi consolidated power in the government, many of the political leaders of FRODEBU left their government positions to begin a new movement, establishing the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (*Conseil nationale pour la défense de la démocratie*, CNDD), and its armed wing, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (*Forces pour la défense de la démocratie*, FDD). The CNDD-FDD mobilized against the government, rallying Hutu supporters in an insurrection.²⁸⁷

Civil War

Violence quickly escalated into a civil war, involving over a dozen rebel groups fighting for control of the government. While Hutus sought to reform all institutions of government and level access to resources, the army and police became a clear target for the rebellion: “The phrase *armée mono-ethnique* reflected the sense among those sympathizing with the rebellion that for decades, the army and police were mainly instruments of southern Tutsi domination.”²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, 6.

²⁸⁷ Cyrus Samii, “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000-2006,” in *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars*, ed. Roy Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 216–17.

²⁸⁸ Samii, 218.

The security sector was a key instrument of power, a conviction reinforced by the assassination of the first democratically elected president.²⁸⁹

After years of fighting failed to produce a decisive military victory, the government of Burundi agreed to enter peace negotiations. Due to the number of armed groups, talks were long and indecisive – although negotiations began in March 1996, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was not signed until August 2000. Even this agreement was not final. To reach an agreement, the parties involved had chosen to exclude the two major armed rebel groups—the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL—from the negotiations, working only with their more moderate political counterparts. Bringing them into the peace framework required separate sets of negotiations with the rebel groups, who protested that the Arusha Accords did not adequately address their biggest source of concern, which was army reform. Over the next two years, the governments of Gabon and Tanzania pursued talks with the various rebel groups, unable to bring the rebels to participate in a unified discussion.

Finally, on November 16, 2003, the Transitional Government of Burundi and CNDD-CDD signed and ratified the Global Ceasefire Agreement, bringing the CNDD-FDD under a modified version of the Arusha Accords and recognizing the Praetoria Protocols on defense and security power-sharing signed earlier in the year, as well as the Forces Technical Agreement (FTA), signed on November 2, 2003, which outlined power-sharing in the military. To help support the ceasefire and DDR, the African Union and the United Nations authorized peacekeeping missions: the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the United Nations

²⁸⁹ Willy Nindorera, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité au Burundi” (Bujumbura: Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits/L’Institut Nord-Sud, July 2007), 7, <http://www.cenap.bi/index.php/video/35-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-securite-au-burundi>.

Operation in Burundi (UNOB), respectively.²⁹⁰ This agreement created peace among the majority of the parties, with the important exception of the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (*Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu - Forces nationales de liberation*, PALIPEHUTU-FNL), which would remain a spoiler and source of insecurity for several years to come.

Reconstruction Begins, Fighting Continues

SSR began in earnest once the transitional government and CNDD-FDD had ceased hostilities. In accordance with the Arusha Accords and the FTA, the government replaced the Tutsi-dominated army with a new organization called the National Defense Forces (*Forces de Défense National*, FDN). A number of institutions were created to facilitate DDR and SSR, including the Implementation Monitoring Committee, established to monitor and coordinate the implementation of all of the Agreement's conditions; the Joint Ceasefire Commission, established to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and oversee the reform of the army; the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), a mechanism for donors to support DDR through financial and technical assistance; and the National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR), the Burundian national institution to manage the demobilization and socio-economic reintegration of former troops.

At the same time, the country moved towards its first elections since the conflict broke out, intensifying tensions between the Tutsi government and its Hutu challengers. In June 2005,

²⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Resolution 1545 (2004)" (New York: United Nations, May 21, 2004), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/BurundiSRES1545.pdf>.

the transitional government of Burundi held its first democratic elections since 1993. Like the elections of 1993, the presidency was won by a Hutu: Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD. The elections were significant for a number of reasons. They represented an end to the transitional government established by the Arusha Accords and a beginning to Burundi's transition to being a "post-conflict" state. They also caused a realignment of party politics, effectively shifting the dominant cleavage from Hutu-Tutsi, to inter-Hutu, as the CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU fought for the majority Hutu vote.²⁹¹

However, peace and security did not come with the assumption of office by Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD. In Bujumbura in 2006, the announcement of a coup plot by former government officials kicked off a wave of arrests and a crackdown on civil society. Once arrested, the suspects were subject to torture by the National Intelligence Service (*Service National des Renseignements*, SNR) and held in detention.²⁹² In addition, fighting resumed in the provinces, as the PALIPEHUTU-FNL continued to wage attacks against the unified government forces. Unlike the CNDD-FDD, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL believed that a negotiated settlement with the Tutsi required sacrificing too much. Rather than settle for ethnic parity in government institutions, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL wanted proportional representation for the ethnic groups and believed they could achieve an eventual military victory to secure this.

Continued fighting may have helped to facilitate a degree of cohesion among the newly integrated troops: as long as the war continued, soldiers could focus their efforts against a common enemy and distract themselves from the fact that they had recently been fighting against

²⁹¹ Andrea Colombo, Olivia D'Aoust, and Olivier Sterck, "From Rebellion to Electoral Violence: Evidence from Burundi," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 67, no. 2 (2019): 338.

²⁹² International Crisis Group (ICG), "Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk" (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, November 30, 2006), 2, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/120-burundi-democracy-and-peace-at-risk_0.pdf.

each other. The gains to cohesion notwithstanding, beginning SSR during a conflict may have forced sacrifices in the depth of reforms. Focused on defeating the last rebel group, the government focused all of its attention on improving the capacity of its security forces. Donors, as well, did not push for governance reforms that could come at the expense of operational success. Even the Netherlands, Burundi's primary SSR partner, provided mostly training and equipment during this phase.

As fighting continued, new rounds of negotiations occurred, as the government tried to incorporate the PALIPEHUTU-FNL while maintaining the integrity of the Arusha Accords. A ceasefire was reached in 2006, but it would take three more years for the fighting to stop. In 2009, in compliance with government demands, the leadership of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL removed the ethnic component of the group's name and registered as an official political party. Disarmament of FNL combatants began in March 2009, and in April, FNL leadership reached an agreement with the government that 3,500 FNL elements would be integrated into the FDN.²⁹³

Burundi's Slide Towards Authoritarianism

In 2010, Burundi held its first post-war elections. Democratic elections were to be held at all levels of government: communal, legislative, and presidential. Challenging the victory won by the incumbent CNDD-FDD in the communal elections, a group of twelve opposition parties came together to form an opposition coalition, including the FNL. Protesting the vote and the

²⁹³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi" (New York: United Nations, May 22, 2009), 2–3, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S%202009%20270.pdf>.

international community's recognition of its results, the new group boycotted the national elections, leaving President Nkurunziza to run unopposed and the CNDD-FDD to win a sweeping majority in the legislature. Despite the high politicization of the elections, the international community ruled them to be sufficiently democratic and, in August 2010, Pierre Nkurunziza began his second term as president with the full support of the legislature and a highly politicized judiciary.²⁹⁴ Progress towards democratization began to stall during this second term: within short order, without a real check on his power, Nkurunziza began to manipulate the still fragile institutions of the state, utilizing a fragmented donor presence to maximize operational assistance and avoid conditionalities. With institutional assistance strongly focused on the military, Nkurunziza focused on the police and intelligence service to repress opposition and protect his regime.

On September 7, 2014, the president of the CNDD-FDD first announced that President Nkurunziza was eligible to run in the 2015 elections: because of the special provisions of the Arusha Agreement guiding the 2005 elections, the 2010 presidential elections were the first instance of a direct popular vote; thus, Nkurunziza had only run for president once, leaving him constitutionally eligible for a second run. Unsurprisingly, this announcement was vigorously contested by all opposition parties.²⁹⁵ When this announcement broke, protests broke out across the country. The police were ordered to repress these protests, and violence was met with

²⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi," Addendum (New York: United Nations, August 14, 2006), 2–4, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S%202006%20429%20Add1.pdf>.

²⁹⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi" (New York: United Nations, January 20, 2014), 3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_36.pdf.

violence. Official estimates by the PNB report a death toll of 374 civilians and 77 police officers, with an additional 368 civilians and 367 police officers wounded.²⁹⁶

Aid Profile

Regime Vulnerability

Despite continued fighting, donors began providing institutional assistance upon the establishment of the transitional government. Aid came largely from four bilateral donors: Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the UK (Figure 5.2). Together with the UN, these donors pledged to coordinate support to maximize security governance reforms without duplicating efforts. In 2004, they came together with the transitional government of Burundi to put together a draft framework for SSR. With fighting ongoing and an unclear future for the transitional government, regime vulnerability was high. However, this never came to pass – as fighting continued between the CNDD-FDD and government, donors and the government shifted their focus from SSR to crisis-management. Despite a desire by Burundi’s main international partners to create a plan for deep security sector reforms, the government continued to postpone talks.²⁹⁷

After winning the 2005 election, the regime of President Nkurunziza has achieved a much greater degree of stability. He began to initiate moves to consolidate power. First on his agenda was to reduce the power of international actors in dictating internal security reforms. Upon taking office, Nkurunziza pressured UNOB to reduce its presence and scale back its

²⁹⁶ Gérard Birantamije, “Crise Politique Au Burundi: Vers Des Forces de Sécurité (Re)Politisées Après Une Décennie de ‘Success Story,’” in *Conjonctures de l’Afrique Centrale* (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2019), 21.

²⁹⁷ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, 97–102.

activities. Although the DDR and SSR wings remained intact, the ability of the UNOB's replacement—the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)—to coordinate sector-wide reforms was limited. Meanwhile, institutional differences between bilateral donors limited the interoperability of the different missions in Burundi, compromising their ability to coordinate and develop a framework for reform. In 2007, the Government informed BINUB that it no longer wanted to develop an overarching strategy for reforming the security sector, preferring to pursue “parallel reforms” in the security institutions.²⁹⁸

Despite this victory, Nkurunziza's rule was not yet established. Following the power-sharing agreements of the Arusha Accords, Nkurunziza led a multi-party government, where power was shared between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Retaining power thus required maintaining the support of the Tutsis and managing the delicate balance between Hutu and Tutsi in the newly combined military.

The electoral victory of the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza closed the window of opportunity for sector-wide reform in Burundi. As fighting continued, Nkurunziza was able to use the war as a justification for heightened military spending and a prioritization of operational effectiveness over governance. The end of fighting, however, provided a new, smaller opportunity for change, at least within the military.

Entering a period of peace, the Burundian government no longer had a valid reason to maintain the large army it had mobilized to fight the remaining rebels, nor the resources to maintain it. To accommodate the FNL and still downsize the force to a manageable size, the

²⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi” (New York: United Nations, November 23, 2007), 9, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S%202007%20682.pdf>.

government would have to demobilize an additional 7,000 soldiers, most of which would be Tutsi. This created a combustible political-military situation between the CNDD-FDD and supporters of the government it had replaced. The return of soldiers thus threatened the balance of power within the military and put significant pressures on Nkurunziza. It was in this context of heightened regime vulnerability that the Netherlands secured an agreement with Nkurunziza to integrate and reform the military.


Comprehensive military reform would begin in 2009; before that happened, the Burundian government found a different way to address the political crisis: by sending troops to participate in the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the government could justify its oversized military to donors and unlock the funds required to maintain it.²⁹⁹ One Western diplomat described peacekeeping missions as “a release valve”: “They have a bloated military because they’re obliged to take in all the former rebels, and it offers an opportunity to sort that out.”³⁰⁰

Institutional Assistance

Upon the reduction of the UN’s presence in Burundi, the Netherlands stepped up as Burundi’s main international partner. In 2008, the government of the Netherlands worked with the Burundian government to establish a Memorandum of Understanding to establish an eight-year commitment between the governments for a more comprehensive security sector reform

²⁹⁹ Nina Wilén, David Ambrosetti, and Gérard Birantamije, “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad, Sharing Power at Home: Burundi in Somalia,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 313, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1018498>.

³⁰⁰ Quoted in Elizabeth Dickinson, “For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns in Sending Peacekeepers to Somalia,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 22, 2011, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/1222/For-tiny-Burundi-big-returns-in-sending-peacekeepers-to-Somalia>.

Figure 5.2: Security Assistance to Burundi, 2005 - 2016

program, with governance at its core. The Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development (SSD) program, officially established in April 2009, was built on three pillars: (1) external security, with the Ministry of Defence and the National Defence Force at its center; (2) internal security, focusing on the Ministry of Public Security and the Burundi National Police (PNB); and (3) governance.³⁰¹ The Dutch placed a high priority on local ownership. While Dutch officials were deeply involved in the strategic design and implementation of the SSD; the majority of staff were Burundian.³⁰²

The crafters of the Dutch Security Sector Development (SSD) program chose its specific design out of a recognition both of the importance of improving governance to create lasting

³⁰¹ Nicole Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme” (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” March 2014), 21, <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Putting%20governance%20at%20the%20heart%20of%20SSR.pdf>.

³⁰² Ball, 22–26.

changes and of the failure of most modern SSR programs to do so.³⁰³ This commitment is spelled out in the Memorandum of Understanding deliberated between the two parties. This agreement outlines the strategic objectives of the program as follows:

- “Affirmation of the principles of partnership through political dialogue
- Accountability of the security services to civil authorities
- Adherence of the security services to civil authorities
- Adherence of the security services to national and international law
- Adherence of the security services to the general principles of public expenditure
- Impartiality on the part of the security services
- Professionalism of the security services”³⁰⁴

Unlike other security and development programs, the Dutch focused on a process-oriented approach to achieving and measuring results. To make this program work, the SSD would unfold in four two-year stages, designed to build trust between the Dutch and their Burundian counterparts and build the capacity of Burundian officials allowing them to gradually assume control of the program.³⁰⁵ The peaks in security governance aid disbursements

³⁰³ Despite international rhetoric in support of holistic SSR, most donors have continued to rely on traditional “train and equip” approaches.

³⁰⁴ Mémorandum d’Entente entre le Gouvernement de la République du Burundi et les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération au Développement et de la Défense des Pays Bas sur la Développement du Secteur de la Sécurité, 9 April 2009, Annex B.; quoted in Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 11.

³⁰⁵ Nicole Ball, Jean-Marie Gasana, and Willy Nindorera, “From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States: Burundi Case Study,” International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 29, 2012), 51, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiX79fQzdLnAhUyjK0KHbXLDfwQFjABegQIBhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Freliefweb.int%2Fsites%2Freliefweb.int%2Ffiles%2Fresources%2F290312_Report_SJ_Burundi_final.pdf&usq=AOvVaw3aACFrjU3yyI8NOvvC2JNl.

(represented in Figure 5.2) correspond to the beginning of each phase of the SSD program, when funding was disbursed.

Operational Assistance

While the SSD program was being implemented, the Burundian government began receiving operational assistance from other sources. The US emerged as Burundi's second-largest partner, providing large inflows of operational assistance beginning in 2011.³⁰⁶ The vast majority of this aid was authorized under the Department of Defense's Train and Equip Authority. Through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, the US provided basic training to the Burundian military to help prepare it for participation in peacekeeping missions. Although the program was intended only for peacekeepers, the US agreed to extend this training out to the entire military.³⁰⁷ This training is intended primarily to build capacity, focusing on improving skills at all ranks. Between 2009 and 2015, the U.S. provided over \$241 million in non-governance assistance through the ACOTA program alone.³⁰⁸ In 2014, the US signed a Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Burundi and pledged \$9.5 million in training and assistance to help prepare Burundi to participate in the fight against terrorism.³⁰⁹ This new assistance would include specialized training in combat operations, communications, and logistics.

³⁰⁶ Wilén, Ambrosetti, and Birantamije, "Sending Peacekeepers Abroad, Sharing Power at Home," 314.


³⁰⁷ Dickinson, "For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns in Sending Peacekeepers to Somalia."

³⁰⁸ Lesley Wroughton, "U.S. Suspends Burundi Peacekeeping Training Over Protests," *Reuters*, May 22, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-unrest-usa-training/u-s-suspends-burundi-peacekeeping-training-over-protests-idUSKBN0072I820150522>.

³⁰⁹ "Burundi-USA: La FDN Va Débuter Une Formation Contre Le Terrorisme," *AGNews*, April 12, 2014, <http://burundi-agnews.org/diplomatie/burundi-usa-la-fdn-va-debuter-une-formation-contre-le-terrorisme/>.

Burundi's second greatest source of operational assistance has come from donor financing for participation in AU and UN peacekeeping missions. In addition to providing funding for soldiers' salaries, donors have provided the government with equipment, ammunition, and logistics.³¹⁰ Beginning with its first deployment of troops to the AMISOM mission in Somalia in 2007, Burundi has maintained a contingent of around 5,000 troops abroad (Figure 5.3). Since deployments first began in 2007, the government has deducted \$200 from each soldier's monthly pay. With an average of 5,000 troops deployed, these payments have generated an estimated \$13 million annually for the Burundian government that accrues to extrabudgetary accounts.³¹¹ This money is in addition to the tens of millions saved annually by

Figure 5.3: Burundian Contributions to Peacekeeping Missions



³¹⁰ Dickinson, "For Tiny Burundi, Big Returns in Sending Peacekeepers to Somalia."

³¹¹ Observatoire de Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Malversations Économiques (OLUCOME), "Communiqué de Presse N°001/OLUCOME/03/2016 Portant Sur Le Detournement Des Fonds de l'AMISOM" (Bujumbura: Observatoire de Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Malversations Économiques, March 2016), <http://olucome.bi/IMG/pdf/-22.pdf>.

the government in salaries and equipment.

Burundi has also received operational assistance from China. While the conflict continued, China supplied light arms and weapons to the government. These arms have gone to support the police and SNR but have also filtered to non-state groups like the *Imbonerakure*.³¹² Once conflict officially ended, China began providing larger assistance packages, with the majority of assistance provided in support of the FDN. This assistance has been part of a broader initiative by China to improve its bilateral relations with the government of Burundi.³¹³ Although official data are not available, published donations appear to be a relatively small fraction of overall Chinese assistance to Burundi. Between 2010 and 2012, reported operational assistance flows totaled around \$3 million.³¹⁴ Most of this aid has been provided through materiel, including uniforms, parachutes, and logistical equipment. Total security assistance is likely to be higher than these reports suggest; still, these numbers pale in comparison to the security non-governance aid provided by the United States. The greatest value of Chinese military aid may not have been felt until after the 2015 crisis broke out. While nearly all Western states suspended development and military aid flows to Burundi when violence escalated, China has continued to provide materiel and funding to the Burundian government.³¹⁵

³¹² Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, “Enquête de l’APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains” (Brussels: Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits Humains et les Personnes Détenues, August 25, 2016), <https://www.focode.org/574/>.

³¹³ “La Chine Accord Un Don de \$1.3 Millions à l’Armée Burundaise,” Présidence de la République du Burundi, December 21, 2010, <http://www.presidence.gov.bi/archives/spip.php?article1013>.

³¹⁴ “La Chine Accord Un Don de \$1.3 Millions à l’Armée Burundaise”; “Don Chinois d’un Matériel de Plus d’1.5 Million US\$ à l’Armée Burundaise,” *L’Association de Réflexion et d’Information Sur Le Burundi*, June 26, 2012, http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5400.

³¹⁵ “Burundi/Chine: Don Chinois de Matériel Militaire à La FDN,” *AGNews*, July 7, 2016, <http://burundi-agnews.org/diplomatie/burundi-chine-don-chinois-de-materiel-militaire-a-la-fdn/>.

Although secure in his electoral victory, the return of FNL troops in 2007 changed the political balance of power in Bujumbura and introduced a new degree of regime vulnerability.³¹⁶ This vulnerability increased the likelihood that security assistance would have an effect on security sector governance. If my theory is correct, we should see the greatest improvements in the sectors that received the highest amount of institutional assistance, i.e. the army. However, because institutional assistance was targeted at the military and Burundi began receiving high amounts of operational assistance at the same time, we should see a deterioration of governance outside of the army.

Consolidating Power, Constraining Reform

SSR began shortly after the signing of the Arusha Accords, in early 2004, even though conflict was ongoing. At the time the SSD began, the Burundian security system faced both contextual and institutional impediments to reform. Regional unrest and low-level domestic insecurity made it difficult to convince communities and ex-combatants to surrender their weapons and commit to DDR. In addition, major issues remained with state institutions: the Burundian National Police (*Police Nationale du Burundi*, PNB) remained highly unprofessional, access to justice was limited, and the intelligence services were highly politicized.³¹⁷ As Burundi lacked a comprehensive strategy for security sector reform for the first several years of reconstruction, early interventions did not correspond to a cohesive framework for reform. Although the introduction of the SSD added some structure to reforms, the majority of assistance

³¹⁶ Due to his continuing electoral mandate, I would characterize this as “moderate” vulnerability.

³¹⁷ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 16.

has continued to be provided in an *ad hoc* manner following bilateral negotiations between donors and the Burundian government.³¹⁸

Without an overarching framework guiding sectoral reforms, donor efforts in Burundi concentrated on reforming specific elements of the security sector. While limited, Burundian efforts to initiate structural reforms, such as creating a National Security Council and designing new legislation to guide security institutions, received support from donors. When the Burundian government created the National Security Council (*Conseil National de Sécurité*, CNS) in 2008, it received technical assistance from BINUB. This assistance was continued by BNUB when the CNS set out craft its first National Security Strategy in 2012.³¹⁹ Through the SSD, the Dutch provided assistance and expertise to Burundi as it crafted its first defense review in 2010.³²⁰ Although there has been some cooperation between donors, the majority of this assistance has been implemented unilaterally. The majority of donor reforms have focused on four programs: (1) disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the combatants not integrated into the new institutions, (2) integrating and professionalizing the FDN, (3) reforming and equipping the PNB, and (4) professionalizing the SNR.

³¹⁸ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “Burundi,” *Security Sector Reform Monitor*, no. 4 (October 2010): 5, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssrm_burundi_v4_october_8.pdf.

³¹⁹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi” (New York: United Nations, January 18, 2013), 5, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_36.pdf.

³²⁰ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 39.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of troops in Burundi was to occur in two stages. The first stage of DDR would consist of the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants not integrating into the FDN or PNB. The second stage would occur over the next two to four years, as the government gradually reduced the size of the security forces to bring them to a sustainable size. During this process, all soldiers—including those integrating into the new security forces—were cantoned to both help keep tabs on combatants and to reduce social tensions and prepare former fighters for the transition into civilian life. For those who chose to demobilize, donors offered an immediate reinsertion package and subsequent payments for the next ten months to help support living expenses. By 2006, 19,739 former combatants had been demobilized.³²¹

Institutional Assistance

Several donors came together to support DDR in Burundi, funneling support through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme ran by the World Bank. In coordination with the United Nations and South African leadership, donors created an operational plan for disarmament and demobilization and established the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to ensure compliance.³²² In addition, the World Bank authorized funding to support the demobilization of civilian militia members. This process began in late 2005 after a series of issues in the planning process. The biggest issue was identifying and verifying the

³²¹ Henri Boshoff and Waldemar Vrey, *A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi*, ISS Monographs 125 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2006), 18–22.

³²² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi” (New York: United Nations, May 17, 2007), 8, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S%202007%20287.pdf>.

identity of militants; without a unified structure, it was difficult to ensure that those registering for demobilization benefits were, in fact, fighters. Several lists of militia members had been produced, with estimates ranging from 11,700 to more than 35,000 fighters. The NCDDR eventually settled on a list of 24,272 militia fighters.³²³

When the conflict with the FNL ended in 2009, the government was faced with the need to demobilize an additional 6,500 FNL combatants and dissidents. To support the new wave of DDR, the African Union and BINUB came together with the government of Burundi to establish a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to both monitor the ceasefire and oversee disarmament and verification. The NCDDR would handle demobilization and reintegration, supported by funds from the UNDP and other donors to subsidize reintegration packages.³²⁴ Donors also funded a series of programs aimed to facilitate community reconstruction and reconciliation.³²⁵ The actual program of DDR utilized the same processes installed for the first wave of demobilization.³²⁶

Outcomes

DDR in Burundi is generally considered a success. Among the reasons for its success, analysts note that the close collaboration of donors among themselves and with the

³²³ Boshoff and Vrey, *A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi*, 39–41.

³²⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” 3.

³²⁵ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi” (New York: United Nations, November 30, 2009), 8–9, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Burundi%20S2009%20611.pdf>.

³²⁶ Société d’Etudes et d’Evaluation sarl, “Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l’Allemagne, de La Belgique, de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi” (Luxembourg: Société d’Etudes et d’Evaluation sarl, February 27, 2014), 34, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Evaluation_Burundi_-_Rapport_final_-_Vol_2_-_ANNEXES_imprimables_cle83e251.pdf.

government.³²⁷ By the end of the second wave of DDR, a total of 55,000 combatants had been demobilized by the World Bank-funded NCDDR, including former government soldiers, rebels, and militia members.³²⁸ Despite this progress, DDR has failed to engage the *Imbonerakure*, a militia that emerged in 2010 from CNDD-FDD fighters—primarily youths—who were unsatisfied with the peace process. This group, whose name means “those who see far”, has since aligned with the government operating as a non-state arm of the regime. By some reports, the group comprises over 50,000 members across the country.³²⁹ Seymour (2015) argues that a major factor in the group’s emergence was a failure by the DDR team to properly socialize and reintegrate youth soldiers.³³⁰ The *Imbonerakure* has become known for its participation in illicit activities throughout the country and its excessive force when dealing with the population.

In addition, DDR did not address the proliferation of small arms among the civilian population, much of which keeps weapons due to continued fears of insecurity. In 2011, an estimated 100,000 small arms remained in circulation around the country, despite the DDR program and a civilian disarmament campaign.³³¹ In 2013, BNUB supported a second civilian disarmament campaign; however, given the considerable security concerns that remained across the country, its success was limited.³³² In addition, civilians continued to acquire new weapons. One Burundian security expert argued that the prevalence of weapons in civilian homes is a signal of deep fears among the population of a recurrence of conflict: the cost of an AK-47, the

³²⁷ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, 86–87.

³²⁸ Claudia Seymour, “Unprotected: Young People in Post-Conflict Burundi,” *Small Arms Survey*, 2015, 252.

³²⁹ “Who Are the Imbonerakure and Is Burundi Unraveling?,” *The New Humanitarian*, April 28, 2015, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2015/04/28/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling>.

³³⁰ Although the program had a special unit for child soldiers, it only included people under the age of 18; considering the 13-year duration of the war, this excluded many who spent their childhood fighting. See Seymour, “Unprotected: Young People in Post-Conflict Burundi,” 253.

³³¹ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” January 20, 2014, 21.

³³² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 5.

weapon of choice for many, is the equivalent of about six months' salary, yet people continue to purchase them.³³³

Military Integration

Military reform was one of the major drivers of conflict and, thus, a major focus of the peace agreement. Together, the Arusha Accords and the Forces Technical Agreement laid out the guidelines for integration and reform. Unlike the failed Ouagadougou Agreement in Côte d'Ivoire, the FTA provided very specific guidance for force integration and DDR. Rather than integrate into the existing army, the FTA established a new institution entirely. The FTA stressed the importance of civilian control, with the President as the Commander-in-Chief. The FDN was to be a non-partisan body, comprised of no more than 50% of any particular ethnic group.³³⁴ This ethnic balance was carried up to the highest levels of the officers corps. To facilitate integration, the Arusha Accords created the Integrated Chief of Staff, comprised of 60% former FAB and 40% former rebel group officers. When military integration first began in 2004, these officers took the lead, navigating issues like rank harmonization and immediate training for forces. Their coordination was a major factor in the eventual success of integration

Throughout the conflict, nearly all parties had used promotions as a reward for troops, creating significant issues of rank inflation and differences in skill across the board. To solve this

³³³ Nindorera, "La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité au Burundi," 42.

³³⁴ "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi," August 28, 2000, 37–38, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf; "Forces Technical Agreement (FTA) Between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)," November 2, 2003, 2–6, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Burundi_The%20Forces%20Technical%20Agreement2002_English.pdf.

problem, the Integrated Chief of Staff devised a system using group size to determine the number of allocated spots each group received per rank. The Integrated Chiefs of Staff used a similar formula to determine quotas for integration for each use, accounting for both the number of combatants and the number of weapons the party possessed.³³⁵ Nindorera (2007) credits the power-sharing requirements for military high command in the Arusha Accords with the early success of integration. Ensuring the continued access to power of both Hutu and Tutsi gave the leadership incentives to support the Accords and push their subordinates to follow their lead. This initiated a positive feedback cycle: once integrated, it became more and more difficult for the leadership to defect on the agreement and risk jeopardizing a democratic process supported by both the domestic population and the international community.³³⁶

The new army was composed of mixed units – a structure that offered the best hopes for long-term cohesion, but created a combustible situation during the process of integration. Tensions were high in the early days of integration. Former CNDD fighters didn't trust the Tutsi officers of the old regime. Ex-FAB soldiers were wary of the newly incorporated CNDD fighters who lacked the formal training they had received.³³⁷ Worse, until the FAB and CNDD-FDD signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement in 2006, conflict between the groups outside of the FDN continued. Although integration is widely viewed to be a success today, there were several moments when the process came close to unraveling. Many of these disputes can be traced to the tight budget constraints faced by the Ministry of Defence, such as a series of mutinies by soldiers in February 2009 demanding higher payments.³³⁸

³³⁵ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, 81–82.

³³⁶ Nindorera, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité au Burundi,” 36.

³³⁷ Samii, “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000-2006,” 221.

³³⁸ Wilén, Ambrosetti, and Birantamije, “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad, Sharing Power at Home,” 312–13.

Institutional Assistance

The first professionalization efforts began immediately after the Joint Comprehensive Ceasefire was reached between the CNDD-FDD and FAB in 2006. Through the Peacebuilding Fund, the UN organized a professionalization program aimed at improving leadership and discipline within the FDN. Specifically, this project sought to “promote discipline, respect for human rights, and political neutrality through the reinforcement of knowledge in military leadership and international human rights,” measured by the number of violations committed against the population.³³⁹ This project, while focused primarily on training military leadership, was also intended to reach lower-ranked officers and enlisted soldiers. The UN would “train the trainers” who could propagate lessons on human rights and international law; it would then proceed to the “moral improvement” part of the project, intended to elevate troop behavior by training soldiers on proper behavior. In addition to instructing officers who could reproduce trainings, this project aimed to support long-term professionalism by creating codes of conduct, tailored to every level in the army and translated to Kirundi, the language of most Burundians.³⁴⁰

In addition to trainings, the UN worked to bring soldiers together by organizing large group activities: obstacle courses, bike races, and walks. To improve civilian perceptions of the military, these activities were opened up to the local communities in which the soldiers were stationed.³⁴¹ When the Dutch began operating the SSD program with the FDN, they continued

³³⁹ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Promotion de la Discipline et Amélioration des Relations entre la Force de Défense Nationale (FDN) et la Population à travers la Moralisation du Corps” (BINUB-Section SSR SA/PNUD, October 23, 2007), 6–7,

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj5jsLU9dPnAhVvkeAKHReZByMQFjAAegQIAhAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmndf.undp.org%2Fdocument%2Fdownload%2F94&usg=AOvVaw0jSSNIXqFwJFu0M4c6U0cH>.

³⁴⁰ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 11.

³⁴¹ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 13–14.

this focus on improving community relations. One of the major programs they initiated to do this was a series of “open door” days, where the citizens could come and speak with members of the military about their questions or concerns. This was one of the only initiatives taken across the security sector to improve the confidence and capability of the public to interact with security providers.³⁴²

The Netherlands’ SSD program began in 2009, initiating a series of reforms in the military, primarily. As stated above, the Dutch program was laid out in four two-year programs, each one building on the next. At the beginning, the Dutch built trust with the government and the bodies it worked with by adopting a two-track strategy: providing training and equipment to fill the material needs of the security forces while also promoting reforms.³⁴³ However, the focus on governance was not strongly incorporated into the program until the second phase; rather, practitioners focused more on building capacity and performance than addressing procedure.

Operational Assistance

Despite the volatile security situation at the beginning of integration, many joint trainings were held. Training was made a priority by the government and donors with the hope that joint sessions could help even out the varied background of the different troops as well as reinforce unit cohesion. Reaching a standard level of knowledge would also help the government address the issue of rank harmonization that hindered the integration process. Remarkably, there were no reported incidents of violence between former FAB and FDD troops during the process of

³⁴² Société d’Etudes et d’Evaluation sarl, “Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l’Allemagne, de La Belgique, de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi,” 30.

³⁴³ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 30.

integration.³⁴⁴ Burundi did not begin to receive major flows of operational assistance until the comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached in 2009. Once that agreement was reached, the U.S. began limited materiel assistance; in 2011, the U.S. seriously increased its investment in the country by providing over \$15 million to “train and equip” the Burundian military.³⁴⁵ Since this partnership began, the U.S. has become the country’s most significant provider of non-governance military assistance. The majority of the pre-deployment training Burundian soldiers receive comes through the U.S. as part of its African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.³⁴⁶

U.S. capacity building with the FDN began as early as 2007 when the Burundian government first requested peacekeeping training assistance. This training has largely focused on increasing the FDN’s ability to lead themselves in complex operations. When cooperation first began in 2007, the focus was on basic capacity building. Cooperation started small. The U.S. sent retired military trainers to the country through the ACOTA program to assist with basic infantry training. As cooperation has grown, activities have evolved to include air and ground operations. Beginning in 2011, the FDN began receiving assistance through the U.S. Air Force in Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Training – Air and Ground programs, with a focus on deploying personnel and equipment via aircraft.³⁴⁷ The army has also provided training for support operations, such as surgical training for FDN medical staff. The scope of assistance has

³⁴⁴ Nindorera, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité au Burundi,” 33.

³⁴⁵ Security Assistance Monitor, “Security Aid.”

³⁴⁶ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Burundi: The Army in Crisis” (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 5, 2017), 12, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/247-burundi-army-crisis>.

³⁴⁷ U.S. Army Public Affairs Office, “U.S. Army Africa Conducts Deployment Capability Training in Burundi,” U.S. Army, July 19, 2011, https://www.army.mil/article/61835/us_army_africa_conducts_deployment_capability_training_in_burundi.

grown from a handful of advisors to military-to-military training, in which teams of American soldiers have deployed to Burundi to work directly with the FDN.³⁴⁸

Because of its growing capacity and geographical proximity to al-Shabaab, Burundi became an attractive partner in the United States' Global War on Terror. Burundi also received support from other Western partners as well to support counterterrorism activities, although this assistance was marginal in comparison with U.S. security assistance. France provided support through equipment donations and by training contingents of officers at their Operational Instruction Detachments (*Détachement d'Instruction Opérationnel*) located in Gabon.³⁴⁹ In early 2015, France began sending instructional elements to Burundi to lead tactical trainings as well. This was meant to be the beginning of a series of trainings to improve the tactical and operational capabilities of the FDN to improve their ability to respond with graduated force and instruct units on operations in close combat.³⁵⁰ The UK has participated in several training missions with the U.S. Army, leading a course on civil affairs to improve the ability of the FDN to interact with the civilian population and gain intelligence in Somalia.³⁵¹

³⁴⁸ U.S. Army Public Affairs Office, "U.S., Burundian Military Choose to Go Far Together," United States Africa Command, December 26, 2013, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/11602/us-burundian-military-choose-to-go-far-together>.

³⁴⁹ "Coopération Française: Un Coup de Main Aux Unités Burundaises Envoyées En Somalie," *Iwacu*, June 5, 2013, <https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/cooperation-franaise-un-coup-de-main-aux-units-burundaises-envoyes-en-somalie-2/>; "Fin de Formation Du 16ième Batallion Burundais de l'AMISOM Par Des Instructeurs Français," *Iwacu*, June 5, 2013, <https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/fin-de-la-formation-du-16me-bataillon-burundais-de-lamisom-par-des-instructeurs-franais-2/>.

³⁵⁰ "EFG: Formation de 850 Militaires Au Burundi," Ministère des Armées, République de France, February 27, 2015, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/efg-formation-de-850-militaires-au-burundi>.

³⁵¹ Christopher Gross Staff Sgt., "US, UK Team Up, Prepare Burundi Soldiers for Civil Affairs in Somalia," *Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa*, April 4, 2014, <https://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/8073/us-uk-team-up-prepare-burundi-soldiers-for-civil-affairs-in-somalia>. The majority of British assistance in the region is provided through the British Peace Support Team for Eastern Africa, which leads an instructional center for peacekeepers in Kenya.

Outcomes

In many ways, Burundian military integration was a success. In short order, troops from hostile units were integrated into one national army and deployed to fight a common enemy. Despite differences in training, a recent history of conflict, and deep ethnic and regional tensions, this integration occurred without a single incident of violence. Donors played a significant role in this success. Through the SSD program, the military received numerous trainings on ethics and human rights. These trainings were part of a structured program with mechanisms to monitor and evaluate implementation. Importantly, these trainings appear to have led to significant improvements in behavior: national data show a notable decrease in rapes and physical integrity violations by members of the military between 2004 and 2011.³⁵²

The Burundian army quickly gained an international reputation for professionalism in its behavior during peacekeeping operations. Burundian authorities have linked this directly to the ethics trainings provided by the SSD program.³⁵³ In addition, the “open door” activities designed by the MDNAC groups to improve the accessibility of the military to the population led to a visible improvement in relations between the military and the population, evidenced by a reduction in reported infractions. Importantly, DSS program evaluators commented on an appropriation by the military command of the “open door” policy and the focus on ethnics more broadly. According to their report, the high command had envisioned the creation of a center of

³⁵² Ball, Gasana, and Nindorera, “From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States: Burundi Case Study,” 31.

³⁵³ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 31.

excellence in governance, leadership, and ethics; already, commanders had begun to integrate ethics trainings and other DSS activities into training their units.³⁵⁴

Participation in international peacekeeping missions brings significant financial benefits, making it highly coveted by soldiers and officers alike. Soldiers can earn the equivalent of their annual salary in just one month of peacekeeping: the typical salary for a private in the FDN is just \$80 per month; up through 2015, AMISOM soldiers earned \$1,032 monthly.³⁵⁵ One Tutsi major argued that the AMISOM funding had been crucial for maintaining order and subordination within the army – by providing soldiers with the opportunity to gain this extra income, the government has been able to quell demands for greater compensation.³⁵⁶ Without this, the government would risk the damaging the threads tying the organization together.

Despite the positive benefits to the lives of soldiers and their families, the access to this operational assistance has had negative effects on accountability and transparency within the army. The negative effects outside of the army have been larger. The value of participation in peacekeeping missions has made it a valuable tool for maintaining patronage networks.

Observers note that while most soldiers have had an opportunity to tour once with AMISOM or other missions, soldiers who fought for the CNDD-FDD during the war are often privileged over former government troops for these lucrative postings. The politicization of selection for training

³⁵⁴ Ball, 32.

³⁵⁵ This was reduced to \$800/month in late 2015. (Richard Moncrieff and Thierry Vircoulon, “The Burundian Army’s Dangerous Over-Reliance on Peacekeeping,” *African Arguments*, September 1, 2017, <https://africanarguments.org/2017/09/01/the-burundian-armys-dangerous-over-reliance-on-peacekeeping/>.)

³⁵⁶ Edmund Blair, “Exclusive: EU Takes Aim Where It Hurts Burundi: Peacekeeper Funding,” *Reuters*, March 29, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-security-eu/exclusive-eu-takes-aim-where-it-hurts-burundi-peacekeeper-funding-idUSKCN0WV0BD>.

and eventual participation in peacekeeping missions has contributed to a politicization of the ranks within the army, undermining the fragile unity gained during integration.³⁵⁷

Civil society groups have reported questionable purchases made using the government revenues from peacekeeping funds. For example, in 2014, the spokesperson for the Burundian government announced that the government was withdrawing 8.5 million dollars from this account to replace the presidential jet. After an investigation into the purchase, a watchdog group reported that the new plane had been gifted to the government in exchange for a lucrative mining contract. The true use of the \$8.5 million is still unknown. OLUCOME attributes this corruption to the nature of the funds: by withholding a fraction of donors' payments, the government has essentially created an extra-budgetary account outside of auditory control.³⁵⁸ This money has been an important source of income for the government.

Although military integration and reform occurred successfully, the process failed to produce cohesion. While the groups interacted during training and daily tasks, they did not socialize, using separate dining facilities and frequenting different bars. The International Crisis Group reported that the CNDD-FDD created an unofficial chain of command within the military in an effort to institute some level of control over an otherwise independent system: "This situation led to a lack of transparency in management of grades and even to denials of access to

³⁵⁷ Original: "L'armée était donc une institution intégrée sans pour autant être unie." Quoted in Ignatius Ssuuna, "Les Fissures Se Propagent au Sein de l'Armée Burundaise," *The New Humanitarian*, October 12, 2015, <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/analyses/2015/10/12/les-fissures-se-propagent-au-sein-de-l-armee-burundaise>.

³⁵⁸ Observatoire de Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Malversations Économiques (OLUCOME), "Communiqué de Presse N°001/OLUCOME/03/2016 Portant Sur Le Détournement Des Fonds de l'AMISOM," 2.

training. In addition, it subjected the army to a hierarchy that was unofficial, partisan but known to all.”³⁵⁹

At the highest levels of command, the government has respected the structure of the Arusha Accord. However, while the president has appointed the appropriate number of Tutsis, their appointments are contingent upon their loyalty to the regime. What from the outside may look like a balanced and reformed administration is really a more diversified system of clientelism. By incorporating Tutsi officers into its network, the government has been able to simultaneously give the appearance of respecting the Arusha Accord while ensuring partisan control over the army. To protect this control, the government has relied upon a divided command of operations and logistics; although former army commanders have held positions as high as the Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff of the Armed forces, their ability to organize against the government is hampered by the CNDD-FDD's control over the army's finances and logistics.³⁶⁰

Police Reform

In late December 2004, the government overhauled the police system and passed legislation establishing the Burundian National Police (PNB). This new system represented a complete restructuring of the police system from before the war, placing the police under the purview of the Ministry of Public Security. In accordance with the Arusha Agreement, the new police forces drew its officers from the former army and the seven ex-rebel groups party to the

³⁵⁹ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Burundi: The Army in Crisis,” 8.

³⁶⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk,” 3.

negotiations.³⁶¹ Most importantly, the new police force was given a new mandate: the PNB would be a *police de proximité*, focusing on needs at the community level to better protect citizens. Within months, the new police force accepted thousands of former combatants into its ranks: between 2000 and 2007, the Burundian police grew from 2,300 to between 15,000 - 20,000.³⁶²

The overwhelming military composition of the new police force led observers to register concerns about the professionalism of the new force and its ability to function as a purely civilian force. With no training in civilian policing, the former combatants operating in the force quickly showed a tendency to respond to minor issues with excessive force. Although the Arusha Accords and the FTA called for universal basic training, the PNB had to be deployed quickly across the country to provide security for the upcoming 2005 elections. Faced with these logistical and operational challenges, the governance reforms mandated by the new legislation were largely pushed to the side. The reforms that were made were largely surface-level changes.³⁶³ The variation in professionalism among the groups as well as the distrust between their members created challenges at all levels of the PNB, putting a strain on command and management, training, and discipline.³⁶⁴ These concerns led a variety of donors to get involved in the training and development of the new force.

³⁶¹ Like the FDN, the police were to be integrated according to ethnic quotas, with no affiliations to political parties or groups. See “FTA,” 10–11.

³⁶² “‘Every Morning They Beat Me’: Police Abuses in Burundi” (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2008), 19, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burundi0408_1.pdf.

³⁶³ Boshoff, Vrey, and Rautenbach, *The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace*, 98–99.

³⁶⁴ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “Burundi,” *Security Sector Reform Monitor*, no. 1 (November 2009): 5, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssrm_burundi_v1.pdf.

Institutional Assistance

Police reform under the DSS was primarily led by the German development agency, GIZ. While this program placed a nominal focus on governance of the police reform, the program was much less governance-focused than the military dimension of the program. German assistance focused primarily on rebuilding the infrastructure and equipment stores of the Burundian police. Germany also devoted some of its funding to “train the trainers” in the police force, focusing on issues like management and organization and human rights.³⁶⁵

Other European donors focused the majority of their attention on police professionalization in Burundi. Most of their efforts were complimentary. France supported the *Institut supérieur de police*, which trained officers; Belgium devoted its assistance to supporting local police forces; and the Netherlands focused on reforming the organization of the police force and training officers in election security and management.

Operational Assistance

The German program consisted predominantly of technical training, physical infrastructure development, and some efforts at professionalization of forces.³⁶⁶ Other donors, such as France and Belgium, similarly focused their attention on improving police capacity, while acknowledging the importance of improving police behavior to improve ties with the

³⁶⁵ Société d’Etudes et d’Evaluation sarl, “Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l’Allemagne, de La Belgique, de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi,” 45–46.

³⁶⁶ International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “Évaluation de La Phase II Du Programme de Développement Du Secteur de La Sécurité Au Burundi” (The Hague: International Security Sector Advisory Team: Programme DSS Burundi, July 29, 2014), 18, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/ser/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Evaluation-de-la-phase-II-du-Programme-du-Developpement-du-Secteur-de-la-Securite-au-Burundi>.

community.³⁶⁷ Donors also focused on improving performance through training in investigative and reporting techniques as well as some basic education to reduce illiteracy among the force. Beyond general capacity, this assistance was intended to improve the accessibility of the police to local populations and re-orient the PNB to local needs. In addition, the DSS provided some trainings on the use of force, respect of human rights, violence against women, and corruption. However, unlike the military, these trainings appeared to have little effect on the behavior of police officers, who, external reports confirmed, continued to use excessive force and participate in corrupt activities.³⁶⁸

These trainings had a limited effect on police professionalism for several reasons. First, unlike the human rights and ethics trainings included as part of the SSD program for the military, trainings for the police have not been built into a coordinated and cohesive program. Rather, they have been provided in an ad hoc nature by the various donors involved in police reform. Third, the value of training was diluted by the lack of coordination between donors. Although all donors shared broadly similar goals and messaging, different prioritization of issues compromised the cohesion of the training provided.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁷ Kristiana Powell, "Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Burundi: Accomplishments, Dilemmas and Ideas for International Engagement" (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, July 2007), 19–20, <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2007-Security-Sector-Reform-and-the-Protection-of-Civilians-in-Burundi-Accomplishments-Dilemmas-and-Ideas-for-International-Engagement.pdf>.

³⁶⁸ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), "Appui Pour Un Service National de Renseignement (SNR) Respectueux de l'Etat de Droit," Projets PBF - Burundi (Bujumbura: United Nations Development Program, 2009), 37, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiW3LXR37rnAhVQVK0KHYZA_AQFjABegQIBRAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmptf.undp.org%2Fdocument%2Fdownload%2F9737&usg=AOvVawImcfRxAhRp6iBfUEy-2BJL.

³⁶⁹ Willy Nindorera, "Des Principaux Défis de La Police Nationale Pour Une Meilleure Sécurité Publique et Le Renforcement Démocratique" (Bujumbura: Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits/L'Institut Nord-Sud, December 15, 2009), 26–28, <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2009-Des-principaux-défis-de-la-Police-Nationale-pour-une-meilleure-sécurité-publique-et-le-renforcement-démocratique.pdf>.

These trainings were also insufficient in both the depth and in the number of officers it has reached. Most training seminars were short: governance training provided by the DSS consisted of one-week training sessions.³⁷⁰ When surveyed, 96.6% of officers who had participated in training seminars responded that they valued the information they gained, but thought it was insufficient. Significantly, many of these officers complained that they were unable to implement changes in their unit because their superior officers were involved in illegal activities or did not support changes to the unit.³⁷¹

Outcomes

Major issues remained in the police force several years after the conflict ended. Unlike the FDN, the ethnic balance provisions of the peace deal regarding the internal security institutions were never incorporated into domestic law.³⁷² This left the PNB and the SNR accessible to the regime for political appointments and promotions. The government has taken advantage of this, making both institutions highly politicized and loyal to the regime.³⁷³

As predicted by my theory, the focus of donor assistance on tactical training and infrastructure did little to improve the behavior of the police. The military backgrounds of most officers have contributed to a pattern of excessive force in response to minor community incidents. The lack of training is further exacerbated by a lack of appropriate equipment. One Burundian security expert argued that police officers may obtain new uniforms from the capital

³⁷⁰ Société d'Etudes et d'Evaluation sarl, "Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l'Allemagne, de La Belgique, de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi," 37.

³⁷¹ Nindorera, "Des Principaux Défis de La Police Nationale Pour Une Meilleure Sécurité Publique et Le Renforcement Démocratique," 26.

³⁷² International Crisis Group (ICG), "Burundi: Réussir l'Intégration Des FNL" (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 30, 2009), 5, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b63-burundi-to-integrate-the-fnl-successfully-french.pdf>.

³⁷³ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Burundi: The Army in Crisis," 2.

but are unlikely to be given the necessary tools to do their jobs. Without access to batons or light arms, many officers rely on the assault rifles that are available on the streets.³⁷⁴ Inadequate funding for the PNB hurts professionalism a second way: it encourages corruption. Low salaries encourage police officers to exact “tolls” from drivers; one report found that traffic cops can obtain the equivalent of their monthly salary in one day from bribes.³⁷⁵ The ineffectiveness of the PNB encouraged some vigilantism among the population, as citizens were pushed to adopt mechanisms of popular justice.³⁷⁶

The Burundian police has been viewed by many as a partisan force since its establishment in 2004. Despite the power-sharing requirements in Arusha and the stated mission of impartiality, the government has filled all leadership roles in the BNP with former CNDD-FDD officers. The high number of former CNDD-FDD troops integrated into the new force has contributed to partisanship within the institution. One officer admitted this politicization in an interview with Human Rights Watch in 2007, and suggested that his unit was deployed to a district “because the government thinks that people are abandoning the party in power, and that the people won’t vote for them in 2010... They sent us there to intimidate the population, to win back the population by force.”³⁷⁷

According to a study on security needs in Burundi, the police lacked accountability within the force, particularly for high-ranking officers. This issue was exacerbated by a lack of a unified command structure and the political context in which these efforts were taking place. The persistence of these governance issues also threatened the impact of donor programs. For

³⁷⁴ Nindorera, “La Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité au Burundi,” 21.

³⁷⁵ Nindorera, 21.

³⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” 10.

³⁷⁷ “‘Every Morning They Beat Me’: Police Abuses in Burundi,” 22.

example, a Belgian study found that lower-ranking police officers found their training insufficient because it did not teach them how to address the illegal operations run by their superiors.³⁷⁸ Despite these structural issues with the PNB, survey evidence suggests that trainings yielded some improvement in police behavior: in 2008, 63.5% of those interviewed believed that the behavior of the police had improved over the past year, a direct result of training provided by the Belgians.³⁷⁹

A national survey found that the population generally had much higher trust in the military than the police. 12% of those surveyed cited the police as a source of insecurity in the country, while only 0.4% cited the army.³⁸⁰ Part of this difference is likely due to contact: due to the nature of their different roles, most of the population interacts very little with the army. Still, reports of police abuses by international and local watchdog organizations paint a picture of an undisciplined, political force, supporting the lack of trust among the population.

Intelligence Reform

Burundi's main intelligence service — the National Intelligence Service *Service (National de Renseignement, SNR)* — began operating in 2006 upon the decree of the newly elected CNDD-FDD government. Established in March 2006, the SNR replaced the former

³⁷⁸ Société d'Etudes et d'Evaluation sarl, "Evaluation Conjointe de La Coopération de l'Allemagne, de La Belgique, de La Commission Européenne, de La France, Des Pays-Bas, Du Royaume-Uni et de La Suède Avec Le Burundi," 47–49.

³⁷⁹ Nindorera, "Des Principaux Défis de La Police Nationale Pour Une Meilleure Sécurité Publique et Le Renforcement Démocratique," 20.

³⁸⁰ Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits (CENAP) and Centre de Recherche, d'Études et de Documentation en Sciences Sociales (CREDESS-Bdi), "Étude Sur Les Besoins de Sécurité Au Burundi" (Bujumbura: CENAP/CREDESS-Bdi, May 2012), 67, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Etude-sur-les-Besoins-de-Securite-au-Burundi>.

National Documentation Office (*Documentation Nationale de Burundi*), known to be a partisan tool of the government. The mandate of the new intelligence service was to investigate unlawful acts posing a threat to the nation; specifically, its purpose was to research and pursue “all information of a political, security, economic, and social nature necessary for the government to act to guarantee the security of the state.”³⁸¹ Very quickly, observers began to doubt the impartiality of the new institution. By waiting until after the 2005 elections and exempting the new agency from the ethnic quota requirements of Arusha and the FTA, the newly elected Hutu government could stack the SNR with party loyalists.³⁸²

The ambiguity of the law is often exploited by SNR agents, who are rarely held to account by the prosecutor, leaving the agency a powerful institution to be employed at the pleasure of the president.³⁸³ The broad mandate of the SNR was specifically identified by the UN as a problem to be addressed by SSR: to ensure good governance of the security sector, the responsibilities of the intelligence service should be “limited to gathering and analysing intelligence in conformity with international standards.”³⁸⁴

The SNR was implicated in gross human rights abuses in the fight against the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. In the campaign to defeat the FNL after the 2006 ceasefire, the government increasingly deployed the intelligence agency to investigate and punish suspected rebels or civilians associated with the FNL. In 2005 alone, Human Rights Watch reported over

³⁸¹ “‘We Flee When We See Them’: Abuses with Impunity at the National Intelligence Service in Burundi” (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2006), 8, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/burundi1006/index.htm>.

³⁸² Mbonimpa, “Enquête de l’APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains.”

³⁸³ “‘We Flee When We See Them’: Abuses with Impunity at the National Intelligence Service in Burundi,” 8–10.

³⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi,” 7.

38 extrajudicial killings and 13 instances of torture, in addition to the suspected human rights abuses perpetrated at the illegal detention facilities operated by the SNR.³⁸⁵

Institutional Assistance

Many donors held concerns regarding the SNR. However, despite the clear necessity of reform in intelligence, the Dutch MoU excluded the intelligence services from its mandate. The Dutch made this decision precisely *because* of the intelligence service's role in the human rights abuses that occurred during the conflict: the government did not want to be affiliated with an institution responsible for so many rights violations.³⁸⁶ This left the UN as the major donor in support of intelligence reform.

The UN made reforming and professionalizing the SNR a central component of its SSR assistance in the early years of reconstruction. Between 2007 and 2009, the UNDP provided \$500,000 in assistance with the following goals: (1) clarify the mission of the SNR, (2) reinforce the oversight mechanisms provided for in the Constitution, and (3) reinforce the technical capacity and professionalism of intelligence agents. Over the course of the project, the UN provided significant amounts of equipment to support SNR activities, provided trainings to 264 agents, and conducted a sensitization campaign across the country to inform the population about the proper role of the SNR.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁵ “‘We Flee When We See Them’: Abuses with Impunity at the National Intelligence Service in Burundi,” 12–22.

³⁸⁶ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 21.

³⁸⁷ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), “Appui Pour Un Service National de Renseignement (SNR) Respectueux de l’Etat de Droit.”

Outcomes

These trainings contributed to a decline in the use of torture, inhumane treatment, and arbitrary arrests by the SNR agents who received them. Unfortunately, this decline was short-lived. The people most in need of these trainings were not the field agents, but the high command of the organization; when they continued to perpetrate human rights abuses, the field agents followed suit.³⁸⁸ Ultimately, the institutional assistance provided to the SNR was insufficient to improve the governance of the institution because it did not address its politicization.

The institutional framework establishing the SNR created very few opportunities for oversight. With its placement directly under the Presidency, the executive has an unusual amount of discretion over the agency's deployment. In addition, the SNR's budget is not subject to any oversight, rendering a vast amount of resources free for use by the executive.³⁸⁹ SNR agents who were known to use excessive force and torture suspects were not sanctioned; rather, many were awarded by the organization. A report by a Burundian human rights organization details how certain SNR agents made infamous for their mistreatment of former transitional government officials were given material rewards, such as new vehicles.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁸ Mbonimpa, "Enquête de l'APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains."

³⁸⁹ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), "Burundi," *Security Sector Reform Monitor*, no. 2 (April 2010): 5, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssrm_burundi_v2_april_20_2010.pdf.

³⁹⁰ Mbonimpa, "Enquête de l'APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains."

Assessing Security Sector Reform in Burundi

When the conflict finally ended in 2009, the government quickly re-established its authority throughout the country. While general trust of the police was relatively low, much of the population believed that the police could be a valuable source of social protection with training and assistance.

Politicization of the security sector began to show in the run up to the 2010 election, the first election cycle since the end of the war. After a positive trend towards increased respect for human rights, the lead up to the elections saw a return to the use of torture by the SNR. The government also called upon the *Imbonerakure* to intimidate opposition voters.³⁹¹ Since the beginning of his second term, Nkurunziza and other party elites have worked to consolidate the CNDD-FDD's power. In the government, this included manipulating the party's lists of eligible candidates and replacing them with Nkurunziza loyalists.³⁹² In the military, this has been accomplished by promoting CNDD-FDD veterans faster than other officers. Although there are technically regulations regarding promotions within the military, the Cabinet maintains a level of discretionary power which has allowed them to circumvent the rules.³⁹³

Worse, the emergence of the *Imbonerakure*, a militant youth group pledging allegiance to the CNDD-FDD, threatened the legitimacy of the security sector and the fragile stability of the country. Since its emergence in 2009, the *Imbonerakure* has been active during all major

³⁹¹ "'A Step Backwards' -- Torture and Other Ill-Treatment by Burundi's National Intelligence Service," Amnesty International, August 23, 2010, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/afr160022010en_0.pdf.

³⁹² Jean Bosco Nzosaba, "Burundi: La Paix en Sursis," Rapport d'Observation de la Gouvernance, Janvier-Février 2011 (Bujumbura: Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale, March 2011), 14–16, http://www.oag.bi/IMG/pdf/BURUNDI_La_paix_en_sursis_rapport_d_observation_de_la_gouvernance_janvier_fevrier_2011.pdf.

³⁹³ Transparency International, "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Burundi," Transparency International Defence & Security, 2015, http://government.defenceindex.org/generate-report.php?country_id=6330.

elections, using intimidation tactics to threaten the opposition and discourage people from voting against the CNDD-FDD.³⁹⁴ Although the group preys on the population, it has continued to receive support from the government. As one civil society organization described, the *Imbonerakure* “calls the shots” in provinces across the country, acting with “total impunity.”³⁹⁵ *Imbonerakure* members rarely faced arrest; those who were detained by the police were immediately released upon request from local authorities.³⁹⁶ APRODH reported that the SNR has been active since its inception in the formation, arming, training, and radicalization of the *Imbonerakure*.³⁹⁷ Members of the political opposition have also alleged participation of the PNB in the militia’s violence.³⁹⁸ Many of the weapons provisioned to the group have come from donors.

In addition to the *Imbonerakure*, internal security has been compromised by the large number of former combatants who were never formally integrated into the security sector but were never fully demobilized. Many of these former troops continue to work for the government in a non-official capacity, as informal members of the SNR. Because they are not officially recognized staff, these combatants are often the most brutal and abusive agents as SNR leadership can still deny responsibility for their actions.³⁹⁹ Even before the 2015 crisis erupted,

³⁹⁴ “Burundi: Events of 2009,” Human Rights Watch, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burundi>.

³⁹⁵ Jean Bosco Nzosaba, “Burundi: La Gouvernance au Premier Semestre 2013: Un Contexte Socio-Économique Très Préoccupant,” Rapport d’Observation de la Gouvernance (Bujumbura: Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale, August 2013), 41, <http://www.oag.bi/spip.php?article1715>.

³⁹⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” January 20, 2014, 3.

³⁹⁷ Mbonimpa, “Enquête de l’APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains.”

³⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” January 20, 2014, 3.

³⁹⁹ Mbonimpa, “Enquête de l’APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains.”

the activity of these militants has allowed pockets of instability to persist across the country and threatened civil rights.

Improvements in security sector governance stalled the longer Nkurunziza stayed in power. Below, I review how Burundi has scored on the five components of security sector governance.

Formal Institutional Framework. Legislation exists to guide the Burundian security sector. The Arusha Accords and FTA laid out the framework for the post-war framework; the 2005 Constitution establishes the new National Security Council; the strategic plan for the Ministry of Public Security and defense review for the FDN created with the assistance of donors set guidelines for the police and military. However, severe discrepancies exist between the security sector on paper and the practices of its members. For example, the National Security Council was established to be an independent advisory body. Since its creation, however, Nkurunziza has served as its head; furthermore, the body has eschewed its mandated role to organize and implement SSR, focusing just on the current security situation.⁴⁰⁰

Civilian Control. Although the government has stated a commitment to instituting civilian control, military influence in politics remains high. A former army officer himself, Nkurunziza leads a government filled with active and retired military officers.⁴⁰¹ More problematically, the group of generals at the head of the SNR have become a first point of contact for most major political decisions in the country. In an investigation into the agency, the Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained People (*Association*

⁴⁰⁰ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “Burundi,” *Security Sector Reform Monitor*, no. 3 (August 2010): 3–4, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssrm_burundi_v3_0.pdf; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” January 20, 2014, 6.

⁴⁰¹ Moncrieff and Vircoulon, “The Burundian Army’s Dangerous Over-Reliance on Peacekeeping.”

Burundaise pour la protection des Droits Humains et des personnes Détenues) concluded that “the military has taken the upper hand on the civilian.”⁴⁰²

There are very few mechanisms for civilian oversight over defense policy. Although the Burundian Constitution grants the Parliament the right to oversee security and defense activities, that power is rarely exercised. This lack of action comes down to political calculations: the military holds great sway over politics; interference in security policy is thus risky for those hoping to stay in office. A similar commission exists in the Senate, which has been slightly more active than its parliamentary counterpart. Still, little action has been taken to implement changes suggested by the committee’s reports.⁴⁰³ When Parliament has tried to play its role, the executive has generally refused to share meaningful information. Defense policy itself is made by army generals, keeping civilian involvement to a minimum.⁴⁰⁴

Transparent and Accountable Management. Although Burundi is a signatory of the UN Convention against Corruption and has created several domestic laws outlawing corruption, little action has been taken to address reported instances of corruption by public officials. The inquiries that have been brought have not been followed through.⁴⁰⁵ At the end of the day, it falls to civil society and the media to monitor corruption. Organizations like OLUCOME are active monitors of corruption and frequently publish reports. Similarly, the media frequently report on instances of grand corruption, such as a detailed report on the misuse of DDR funds, alleging that

⁴⁰² Author translation, Mbonimpa, “Enquête de l’APRODH sur la Composition, les Abus, les Responsabilités, Impunité au Service National de Renseignement du Burundi/Organe Cité dans les Violations des Droits Humains.”

⁴⁰³ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “Burundi,” August 2010, 6.

⁴⁰⁴ Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Burundi,” 0.

⁴⁰⁵ Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Burundi.”

the president's wife received 100 million Burundian francs intended to support DDR as well as a utility vehicle intended for the program.⁴⁰⁶

Some action has been taken within the military to investigate and punish soldiers accused of participating in corrupt or illicit activities. For example, there have been many instances where officers have been prosecuted for stealing fuel or for taking bribes. However, enforcement has been too inconsistent to say that there is a serious commitment within the military to end corruption.⁴⁰⁷ While donors have expressed rhetorical support for anti-corruption measures, they have provided little material assistance to support these institutions. The greatest support for anti-corruption measures has come from the UN through a BINUB initiative providing \$1.5 million in support of equipment and training for the anti-corruption court and special brigade.⁴⁰⁸

Command and control within the Burundian military are weak and politicized, compromising the ability of leaders to control their subordinates and control tensions. As one observer noted: "The senior ranks are still part of a violent and corrupt regime operating with zero-sum political mentality. Parallel chains of command reach up to the presidency, wielding great power, undermining formal structures and sowing distrust."⁴⁰⁹

Capacity. Given its significance to the outbreak of the civil war, donors touted the integration of Burundi's military as exemplary of a successful stabilization and reconstruction program. The heavy operational assistance given to the country through training and equipment did yield some gains in both the army's operational capacity and military cohesion. While the capacity of the military in the face of an external foe may be limited, the FDN has received

⁴⁰⁶ Rukindikiza, "Le Scandale de La Démobilisation au Burundi."

⁴⁰⁷ Transparency International, "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Burundi."

⁴⁰⁸ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), "Burundi," April 2010, 9.

⁴⁰⁹ Moncrieff and Vircoulon, "The Burundian Army's Dangerous Over-Reliance on Peacekeeping."

significant international recognition for its effectiveness and professionalism in conducting peacekeeping missions abroad.⁴¹⁰ However, the improvements brought about by operational assistance were limited by the lack of accountability and politicization in the ranks.

Violent crime—banditry in particular—has remained high, allowing insecurity to persist. This issue reached a peak in 2014, when citizens reported a surge in violent attacks by young men armed with machetes. It is still unclear whether these attacks were personally or politically motivated.⁴¹¹ The failure of the DDR process to effectively disarm and fully demobilize troops contributed most to the high rates of crime; the low number of economic opportunities for demobilized troops added fuel to the fire.⁴¹²

After the 2010 elections, displeasure with the ruling party contributed to a spate of attacks against security forces in the Bujumbura, Bubanza, and Bururi provinces. These militants charged police officers, the most visible agents of the state for most of the population, as “bandits” who needed to be “chastised.” Analysis at the time by local and international groups identified these attacks as emanating from a small insurgency led by former FNL soldiers.⁴¹³ The fact that these attacks did not transform into larger movement supports the capacity of the newly formed security institutions. However, the emergence of the group in the first place illustrates the dangers of an incomplete DDR process as well as how a security sector that is perceived as illegitimate can threaten the peace.

⁴¹⁰ Jean-Jacques Irombona, “Somalie Ou l’Honneur Retrouvé de l’Armée Burundaise,” *Iwacu*, June 5, 2013, <https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/somalie-ou-lhonneur-retrouv-de-larme-burundaise-2/>.

⁴¹¹ Seymour, “Unprotected: Young People in Post-Conflict Burundi,” 247.

⁴¹² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” 5.

⁴¹³ Nzosaba, “Burundi: La Paix en Sursis,” 12–14.

Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Once the crisis broke out, the government took up old tools of repression with new vigor. In particular, the SNR expanded its activities to eliminate opponents within the security sector and root out suspected dissidents in society. The old *Sûreté Nationale* was infamous for its repression, but it had never caused the society-wide fear that the SNR now creates.⁴¹⁴ Since violence has expanded, the police have also been involved in repressive activities throughout the country. In contrast, the military has been lauded by international observers for its professionalism during peacekeeping operations. The seminars led by the Dutch contributed to a noticeable improvement in military relations with the population. According to an interlocutor involved in the SSD program, “In some places, the population has asked that the police be replaced by the army.”⁴¹⁵

2015 Crisis

In 2015, Pierre Nkurunziza announced his intention to run for a third term as president, a move viewed by many as unconstitutional. His announcement created a rupture among Hutus and Tutsi alike, sparking violent protests by angry citizens. These protests were met with violence by the state, put down with forceful repression by the politically loyal police and SNR.

When the crisis first broke out in 2015, the army remained neutral. Unlike the police, the army did not participate in the repression of protestors or dissidents, vowing not to interfere in a

⁴¹⁴ Rémi Carayol, “Torture au Burundi: L’Enfer à Côté de la Maison de Dieu,” *Jeune Afrique*, April 19, 2016, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/316757/societe/torture-burundi-lenfer-a-cote-de-maison-de-dieu/>.

⁴¹⁵ Ball, Gasana, and Nindorera, “From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States: Burundi Case Study,” 31.

way that would violate the Arusha Agreement.⁴¹⁶ Rather, as a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department described, the military acted “professionally and neutrally.”⁴¹⁷ The outbreak of the crisis simultaneously revealed the professionalism of the lower ranks of the army while exposing fault lines among the units. In a statement to the U.S. House of Representative, Dr. Joseph Siegle argued:

“Despite extraordinary political pressures, the Burundian military has largely stayed neutral during the crisis. During the protests, soldiers regularly acted as a buffer between the protesters and police and government-affiliated militias.... The enormous value of Burundi’s security sector reforms is underscored by how poorly the police, gendarmerie, and intelligence services have behaved in comparison to the military. These groups are made up of former combatants who were ineligible for integration into the military. Burundi’s police and intelligence services, therefore, have remained politicized and are collaborating with the CNDD-FDD’s youth league, the Imbonakure, in cracking down on opposition and spearheading the pro-government violence.”⁴¹⁸

While the lower ranks admirably continued to protect civilians, higher-ranking officers fell into political camps. Two weeks after President Nkurunziza made his controversial announcement, soldiers under the direction of General Godefroid Niyombare attempted to depose the president. The coup failed to remove the president, but it sparked a series of a series

⁴¹⁶ Isma’il Kushkush, “3 Protestors Dead in Burundi After Clashes with Police,” *The New York Times*, May 4, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/world/africa/2-protesters-dead-in-burundi-after-clashes-with-police.html?searchResultPosition=48>.

⁴¹⁷ Wroughton, “U.S. Suspends Burundi Peacekeeping Training Over Protests.”

⁴¹⁸ Hilary Matfess, “Impunity, the Imbonerakure, and Instability in Burundi,” The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), October 25, 2018, <https://www.acledata.com/2018/10/25/impunity-the-imbonerakure-and-instability-in-burundi/>.

of assassinations within the ranks of the army that unraveled the fragile cohesion built after the war.⁴¹⁹ Most of the victims of these killings have been high-ranking officers, suggesting that these killings have been reprisal attacks for either support of or opposition to the regime.

Violence has expanded to the lower levels as well, often perpetrated by the police and SNR. In 2016, the *Ligue Burundaise des droits de l'homme* (Burundian Human Rights League, “Iteka”) reported that between April 2015 and September 2016 and at least 52 military and police officers had been killed, 22 had been disappeared, 7 tortured, 43 arbitrarily arrested, and 39 injured. It is likely that the actual numbers were much higher.⁴²⁰ The government has also intervened to ensure the military’s support of the regime. Factions suspected of participating in or being sympathetic of the coup attempt were removed from their post – some getting transferred to new units, other units dismissed altogether.⁴²¹ Between 2015 and 2018, the *Imbonerakure* were responsible for over 110 reported deaths, and have been associated with over 940 violent incidents across the country.⁴²²

Warnings from the West to Nkurunziza to respect the constitution seem to have had no effect on the President’s decision-making. As the crisis escalated, donors began to take action. In May 2015, the U.S. suspended all training activities with the Burundian military.⁴²³ In March

⁴¹⁹ “Découverte d’un Arsenal de Guerre au Lendemain d’une Armée dans le Nord de Burundi,” *PANAPRESS - Pan African News Agency (French)*, July 13, 2015, <https://advance-lexis-com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=f21f9f2c-2943-422d-a641-ddfb28c8a61b&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5GF4-44F1-F11P-X3VH-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5GF4-44F1-F11P-X3VH-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=411396&pdteaserkey=sr5&pditab=allpods&comp=sp79k&earg=sr5&prid=0e2896f1-3a51-4be4-9b36-e651bab2aeea>.

⁴²⁰ Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme« ITEKA », “Bulletin Spécial Sur La Répression Du Pouvoir Contre Des Militaires et Policiers Soupçonnés Être Contre Le Troisième Mandat Du Président Pierre Nkurunziza” (Bujumbura: Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme« ITEKA », August 27, 2016), 4, <https://bujumburanewsblog.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/bulletin-spc3a9cial-de-la-ligue-iteka-sur-les-agressions-commises-sur-les-militaires-et-policiers.pdf>.

⁴²¹ Ssuuna, “Les Fissures Se Propagent au Sein de l’Armée Burundaise.”

⁴²² Matfess, “Impunity, the Imbonerakure, and Instability in Burundi.”

⁴²³ Wroughton, “U.S. Suspends Burundi Peacekeeping Training Over Protests.”

2016, the EU cut off all development assistance to the cash-strapped country until the government took steps to end the crisis. When this failed to deter CNDD-FDD officials, the EU ceased payment to the Burundian government of AMISOM salaries, disbursing payments directly to the soldiers instead.

Conclusion

Institutional assistance to Burundi has produced some improvements in the capacity of the security sector, but it has failed to produce lasting improvements in other dimensions of governance. Even though security sector reform was at the heart of the Arusha agreement and received significant donor support, the government was able to manipulate the system put in place by the accords and maintain a highly politicized system. It did this three ways: first, by elevating the role of the SNR, which remained outside of the prescriptions of the Arusha Agreement; second, by filling the PNB with former CNDD-FDD troops, in excess of the quotas stipulated by Arusha; and third, by establishing a parallel chain of command with the army and police.⁴²⁴ This was all made easier by the late intervention of donors in Burundi and the opportunity provided by participation in peacekeeping missions.

Donor involvement was high in the mediation of the Arusha Accords and subsequent agreements and remained significant in the years following the signing of the 2006 ceasefire. However, once the agreement was signed with the FNL, donor attention waned. Despite the fact that the conflict had just ended, donors evaluated progress as strong and stable, significantly

⁴²⁴ Thierry Vircoulon, "Leçons de la Crise Burundaise: Les Ratés du Peacebuilding Démocratique," Notes de l'Ifri (Paris: Ifri, June 2016), 12–13, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/notes_vircoulon_crise_burundaiseok.pdf.

underestimating the hurdles to good governance the country continued to face.⁴²⁵ Donors' hesitancy to hold the government to higher standards of governance became evident when Nkurunziza began manipulating the system in the run up to his second term. Although they received credible reports of the President's governance abuses, donors did not restrict aid or demand better action from the government.⁴²⁶ In one instance, the EU expressly assured the Burundian government that it would not lower aid despite its verbal condemnation of the government's practices.⁴²⁷ Even the Dutch, whose assistance was focused on improving security sector governance, did not follow through on threats to withdraw assistance in light of increasing extrajudicial killings following the 2010 elections.⁴²⁸

Part of this is likely due to the proliferation of donors involved in the reconstruction process, which created a level of ambiguity that was beneficial for certain political agenda.⁴²⁹ This was partially due to the security environment when reconstruction began: war was declared over while serious conflict continued to rage. The level of insecurity in the country allowed the government to postpone serious structural changes or implement governance reforms in the name of national security without much blowback from donors. By the time donors began to seriously engage in governance reform programs, the "new" security institutions had already been functioning for several years. In particular, the disengagement of donors allowed the SNR to grow in strength and establish itself as the primary security institution in the country.

⁴²⁵ Vircoulon, 20–21.

⁴²⁶ Nzosaba, "Burundi: La Paix en Sursis," 43.

⁴²⁷ Jean Bosco Nzosaba, "Burundi: Évolution de la Situation Politique et Sécuritaire Janvier-Mars 2012" (Bujumbura: Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale, April 2012), 21, http://www.oag.bi/IMG/pdf/Rapport_final_imprime_Analyse_contextuelle_janvier-mars_2012_A5-2.pdf.

⁴²⁸ Ball, Gasana, and Nindorera, "From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States: Burundi Case Study," 58.

⁴²⁹ Devon Curtis, "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi," *African Affairs* 112, no. 443 (2012): 74–75, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ads080>.

Still, the difference in behavior of the military towards the population provides a stark contrast to the abusive actions of the police and SNR. This supports the value of the Dutch program and suggests that it could have brought lasting change had it been able to establish a better relationship with the government.

CHAPTER 6

SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION IN SIERRA LEONE

The previous chapters have discussed two examples of security assistance gone wrong. In contrast, this chapter focuses on one of security sector reform's most vaunted success stories: Sierra Leone. Together with the United Kingdom, the post-war government of Sierra Leone initiated the first attempt at modern security sector reform. Its successes (and failures) have become the focus of countless studies. In this chapter, I offer a new perspective on the security sector transformation of Sierra Leone. I argue that the early intervention of the United Kingdom helped to shape and define the regime's approach to the security sector. The UK initiated talks with the government of Sierra Leone regarding security sector reform even before the conflict ended—before the government had decided upon a plan for post-conflict governance. By the time fighting ended, the government and its partners had already outlined a strategy for rebuilding the architecture of the security sector and developing its institutions. In contrast to the large inflows of institutional assistance it received at the outset of peace, Sierra Leone received relatively little operational assistance for the first nine years of peace. When it did start receiving larger funds of operational assistance, its institutional trajectory was well-enough defined that it did not seriously impact the quality of security sector governance.

This chapter proceeds in the following sections. In the next section, I provide a background for Sierra Leone, discussing how the institutional trajectory of the country contributed to the fracturing and politicization of the security sector. Next, I provide a brief outline of the events of the civil war and the intervention of the UK towards the end of the conflict. In the second section, I discuss the security assistance provided to Sierra Leone to help

it reform its security sector. I argue that the British intervened at a critical moment, while the institutional trajectory of the country was still in flux. The third section outlines the series of interventions undertaken to reform the Sierra Leonean security sector and discusses the role that aid played in these reforms. In the fourth section, I assess the quality of security sector governance against the backdrop of the Ebola crisis in 2014. The fifth section concludes this chapter.

Background

The roots of the civil war in Sierra Leone can be found in a series of policies instituted during British colonialism and carried forward into years of authoritarian rule following independence. Policies favoring the ruling elite at the expense of the population, personalizing security to protect the regime, and institutionalizing corruption fed decades of poor governance and widespread discontent.

Sierra Leone is a small West African country rich in natural resources, particularly diamonds. After serving as a port during the slave trade, Freetown, its capital, began attracting international attention as a haven for freed British slaves; the British established a formal protectorate over the country in 1896. Once in power, the British adopted a strategy of “divide and rule”: focus on the British citizens and “Creoles” in Freetown, co-opt and decentralize power to the Paramount Chiefs, and play on ethnic divisions to prevent potentially threatening cooperation between groups. Over the years, this strategy created and hardened two major social divisions between the Creoles and “natives”, and the southern Mende and northern Temne. Although this system effectively served British interests, it did little to encourage the institutional

growth; even less to spur infrastructural or economic development across the country. The strength of the Paramount Chiefs encouraged the emergence of “big men” and patronage systems began to take root.⁴³⁰

Figure 6.1 Map of Sierra Leone



When Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961 and moved towards democratic elections, political elites soon found that appeals to different ethnic identities was an easy way to mobilize support. The Mendes and Temnes—united in the fight for independence—split, leading to the establishment of the Mende-supported Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) in the south and the Temne-supported All People’s Congress (APC) in the north. Six years into independence, Siaka Stevens of the APC took power of the government in a relatively free and fair

democratic election. Despite the promising start to the Sierra Leonean democracy, Stevens soon began instituting authoritarian measures and concentrating power in the executive to consolidate his power.

⁴³⁰ David Keen, *Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone* (London: James Curry, 2005), 9–10.

By the late 1970s the APC had instituted a one-party state through cooptation of the willing opposition and imprisonment of those unwilling to cooperate. Access to government services and basic public goods was limited to regime elites. The legal system under Stevens was crafted to strongly favor the government at the expense of the poor, to stifle dissent and imprison regime opposition.⁴³¹ Stevens relied on many of the same techniques employed by other patrimonial systems, using government positions as rewards for loyal followers and intentionally discouraging institutional development to maintain control.⁴³²

Stevens employed the same tactics to shield himself from any threats from the security sector: hiring and promotions were based on political loyalties and personal ties, corruption was encouraged, and merit was disregarded. Weak security institutions favored Stevens, who relied on hired security services and specialized police units to reduce the risk of a coup and utilized the judiciary to punish political opponents—or former allies suspected of disloyalty. Stevens relied on these private security forces to maintain some level of order and to reinforce the perception that he maintained a monopoly over the use of force, which was crucial for his ability to provide patronage.⁴³³ In addition to his private security forces, Stevens relied on a specialized branch of the police he created called the Internal Security Unit (ISU). Their violent repressive tactics quickly earned them a reputation for brutality among the population and the nickname “I Shoot U”.⁴³⁴ With the majority of government funding for policing devoted to Stevens’ loyal Internal Security Unit, the conventional police force made do without formal uniforms or

⁴³¹ Keen, 17–18.

⁴³² James A. Robinson, “Governance and Political Economy Constraints to World Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone,” October 2008, 4–7, <https://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson/publications/governance-and-political-economy-constraints-world-bank-cas-priorities-sierr-0>.

⁴³³ William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 133.

⁴³⁴ Interview with author, June 25, 2018.

equipment.⁴³⁵ The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) languished under Stevens' tenure, intentionally underfunded and politicized.

Beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, the economy of Sierra Leone slowed. Growing local discontent, combined with the violent overthrow of neighboring dictator Samuel Doe of Liberia, pushed Stevens to announce his retirement in 1985, to be succeeded by Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh. Momoh came into office on a campaign of a "New Order", characterized by sweeping reforms of the public sector. However, like Stevens before him, Momoh used these new revenue windfalls to build a network of elite support, continuing a legacy of government appropriation.⁴³⁶

By the early 1990s, the people of Sierra Leone had grown sick of the years of corruption and government neglect. By 1991, the United Nations Human Development Index ranked Sierra Leone 140 out of 144 countries. When Foday Sankoh first launched his rebellion, he was met with hope for change, and a willingness to do whatever was necessary to get it.

Civil War

The decade-long Sierra Leone civil war began in March of 1991, when a group of Liberian, Burkinabe, and exiled Sierra Leoneans calling themselves the Revolutionary United

⁴³⁵ Sarah Meek, "Policing Sierra Leone," in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, ISS Monographs 80 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2003), 106, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwjaisTWj4HmAhUQEqwKHTb1DgkQFjABegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fissafrika.org%2Fresearch%2Fmonographs%2Fmonograph-80-sierra-leone-building-the-road-to-recovery-mark-malan-sarah-meek-thokozani-thusi-jeremy-ginifer-patrick-coker&usg=AOvVaw0gmFdb6ateOaSD-RZEDn12>.

⁴³⁶ Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, 152–56.

Front (RUF) crossed the Liberian border into the Eastern District of Kono.⁴³⁷ Civil war quickly spread throughout the provinces, as the capital, politically and infrastructurally disconnected from the rest of the country, denied the existence of rebel activity.⁴³⁸ When the government did finally acknowledge the spreading civil war, it found itself unable to stop it. In addition to lacking the administrative and infrastructural power to quickly extend to the provinces, the unskilled SLA lacked the motivation to counter the notoriously brutal rebel group. By the time the war broke out, many soldiers outside the relatively better-resourced barracks of the Western area felt disconnected and indifferent to the fate of the APC. The result was a widespread defection of troops who chose to cooperate with the RUF in the hopes of monetary gain or simply survival. As the *sobel* (“soldiers by day, rebels by night”) problem grew, citizens came to rely more heavily on traditional defense forces, known as *kamajors*, and forming civil defense units.⁴³⁹

Frustrated with the government’s weakness and its reliance on the underpaid and undertrained troops of the Sierra Leone Army, a group of officers under the direction of Valentine Strasser seized power in 1992. The National Provisional Ruling Council that they established initially enjoyed widespread support from the population for its promise to put a quick end to the war and restore democratic governance. Soon, however, the junta quickly fell out of favor, adopting many of the same practices of the APC. Worse, the new government was unable to quell the rogue elements of the national army; rather, the installation of a military junta

⁴³⁷ For a timeline of events in the civil war, see Annex 1 of this chapter.

⁴³⁸ Tunde Zack-Williams, “Multilateral Intervention in Sierra Leone’s Civil War: Some Structural Explanations,” in *When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 20.

⁴³⁹ Keen, *Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone*, 82–90.

seemed to empower soldiers, leading to an escalation of violence towards civilians by government forces.⁴⁴⁰

Pressures for democracy intensified. In January 1996, a fellow officer in the NPRC, Julius Maada Bio, forced Strasser out of office. Soon after, he opened negotiations with the RUF and organized elections. In February 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was democratically elected to the presidency and the United Kingdom began what would become a significant and long-standing partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone. Recognizing the critical need to establish security in the country, the UK authorized funding through the Foreign Commonwealth Office for projects with the military, police, judiciary, and parliament. In March 1997, he was deposed by a new military coup.

With the support of an ECOWAS intervention, Kabbah was restored to power in 1998, when he launched a new strategy: mobilize international support, rebuild the SLA with the support of the UK, and empower the *kamajors*. To further reduce the role of the military in domestic affairs, Kabbah mobilized resources to rebuild and restructure the Sierra Leone Police to take over as the main provider of internal security. In 1998, Kabbah established the new role of the police in the Sierra Leone Policing Charter and proclaimed the force a “force for good.” Police reform was thus incorporated into SILSEP.

As all of this was happening in the West, the RUF continued their advance from the East, culminating with a siege of Freetown in January 1999. With the government weakened and the rebels strengthened, the parties entered into peace negotiations in July; the Lomé Peace

⁴⁴⁰ Keen, 96.

Agreement signed outlined extensive provisions for power-sharing between the government and RUF, military integration, and broader security sector reform.⁴⁴¹

Sierra Leone experienced a few months of relative stability after the signing of the Lomé agreement. Recognizing the critical need to establish security in the country, the UK authorized funding through the Foreign Commonwealth Office for projects with the military, police, judiciary, and parliament. Initial SSR efforts were short-lived, as large-scale fighting resumed in October of 1999, forcing the newly authorized United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the small UK team to focus on supporting the government push back the rebel offenses. In early 2000, the UK corralled significant international support and created the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) to train and rebuild the SLA and Operation Palliser to evacuate British citizens.⁴⁴² It was the military intervention of the British that proved to be the decisive factor in ending the war. Significant SSR and DDR efforts restarted in 2001 as the Sierra Leonean government, with the assistance of its international partners, consolidated its victory over the RUF. At that point, the first priority for all parties was creating a stable environment that would allow IDPs and refugees to return home and service delivery to recommence.

In January 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over. The eleven-year conflict had killed over 50,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Sierra Leone fell to the bottom of most major development indicators, receiving the lowest score on the Human

⁴⁴¹ “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone” (Lomé, Togo: Economic Community of West African States, July 12, 1999), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf.

⁴⁴² Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, “Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007” (London: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and International Alert, February 2009), 46–48, <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/security-system-transformation-in-sierra-leone-1997-2007/>.

Development Index, the highest infant and child mortality rates (286 per 1000), as well as the highest maternal mortality rates (1,800 per 100,000 live births). Life expectancy at birth was 38 years, seven years younger than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the physical capital that existed before the conflict was destroyed during the war, with the greatest destruction to health and education facilities. GDP per capita—relatively low to begin with—had dropped 40% in the 10 years since the start of the war to approximately \$142.00.⁴⁴³

The security sector was similarly in shambles: after nearly a decade of conflict, mass defection of soldiers, and a series of coups, the Sierra Leone Army had lost all appearance of professionalism. The elevation by the government of civil defense forces (CDF) and increased reliance on private military companies further weakened the monopoly on violence held by the government. In addition, internal security institutions had ceased almost entirely to function. The local police had become targets of the rebels, leaving an admittedly corrupt and predatory police force devoid even of manpower. Courts had been suspended across the country, prisons were overcrowded and under-resourced. By the end of the war, people saw the police and judiciary as epitomizing injustice.⁴⁴⁴

Aid Profile

Discussions about reforming the security sector began as early as 1998, when President Kabbah was restored to power. In the midst of continued fighting, the UK mobilized a team of personnel to deploy to Sierra Leone and make a plan for SSR. After his personal experience with

⁴⁴³ World Bank, “Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, March 3, 2002), 11, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/795981468781168112/pdf/multi0page.pdf>.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with author, June 18, 2019.

military intervention, President Kabbah remained deeply skeptical of the military. Internal security institutions had ceased almost entirely to function. The targeting of local police had left an admittedly corrupt and predatory police force devoid even of manpower. Courts had been suspended across the country, prisons were overcrowded and under-resourced.

The first priority for all parties when the fighting stopped was to create a stable environment so that displaced peoples and refugees could return home and service delivery could recommence. While institutional reforms began in Freetown, local commanders and British advisors focused on quick-impact projects and information campaigns to establish order and win the “hearts and mind” of the population. At that time, the British and other international forces enjoyed widespread support among the population for their role in bringing peace. Cooperation between SLA and international troops in local reconstruction projects helped confer some of that legitimacy onto the SLA in the eyes of the population and eased some of the distrust that had accrued after decades of predation. The army quickly became involved in a number of projects: bringing in equipment to rebuild wells, sending its engineers to build bridges, sending troops back to their hometowns to assist in education, and offering army medics to the population for care.⁴⁴⁵

Donors turned their attention to resuming and completing the DDR process. National security was directed by the Office of the President in Sierra Leone, assisted by UNAMSIL, the UK, the US, and ECOWAS. DDR would be headed by the newly established National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Program, UNAMSIL, the World Bank-managed Multi-Donor

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

Trust Fund, International Development Association, and the African Development Bank.⁴⁴⁶ Military integration would occur through the Military Reintegration Programme led by the British.

Regime Vulnerability

The government and donors began designing a plan for SSR during a point of high uncertainty. The President had just been restored to power after being forced into exile. Meanwhile, the war still waged, leaving open major questions about the ultimate balance of power and post-war settlement. Although Kabbah would eventually win a second election, his tenure was far from certain. In other words, regime vulnerability was high.

When negotiations first began, President Kabbah expressed a desire to disband the military completely. Ultimately, it was the advice of Nigerian Brigadier General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, who was serving as an advisor to Sierra Leone, that convinced the government to retain a military and utilize foreign military assistance to reform and professionalize it.⁴⁴⁷ Kabbah directed the small UK team (called the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, or SILSEP) to focus on reforming the armed forces and strengthening civilian control.

When the government negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement with the RUF in 1999, it included provisions stipulating the restructuring of the Sierra Leone armed forces to integrate the

⁴⁴⁶ World Bank, “Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Sierra Leone,” 21.

⁴⁴⁷ Albrecht and Jackson, “Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007,” 23–24.

RUF and create a “truly national armed forces.”⁴⁴⁸ Despite the government’s eventual victory over the RUF, it remained committed to implementing the Lomé Agreement and continuing security sector reforms. Massive inflows of security governance aid flooded into Sierra Leone from the UK and other international partners to kickstart DDR and SSR. Integrating and reforming the military, scaling up the police, and establishing civilian control were made priorities by President Kabbah.

Institutional Assistance

Sierra Leone received the highest levels of institutional assistance in the years immediately after the conflict ended. In 2001 and 2002, Sierra Leone received over \$80 million in institutional assistance from bilateral donors such as the U.S., UK, Canada, and Japan and multilateral donors. As part of its agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone, the UK structured its Medium-Term Strategy to achieve stable peace by 2005. Its key objective was to construct a security sector capable of providing and maintaining national security independently by the time UNAMSIL withdrew from the country in late 2004. This would require fully integrating the army and training and equipping the national police.⁴⁴⁹ Institutional assistance reached its peak in 2002 and dropped precipitously between 2003 to 2005, corresponding with the drawdown of UNAMSIL.⁴⁵⁰ The next peak of institutional assistance to Sierra Leone came to


⁴⁴⁸ “Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,” 22.

⁴⁴⁹ Albrecht and Jackson, “Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007,” 22.

⁴⁵⁰ “DAC Statistics: Classification by Type of Aid,” OECD, February 2019, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/type-aid.htm>.

support the security sector as the country prepared for national elections, the first real test of peace.

Figure 6.2: Security Assistance to Sierra Leone



The United Kingdom remained Sierra Leone’s most significant security partner during reconstruction. In February 2003, the Government of Sierra Leone signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Kingdom outlining a set of commitments for post-conflict reconstruction and UK support for their implementation. As the main partner of Sierra Leone, this agreement set the framework for all international efforts in the security sector. As part of its effort to assist the government consolidate control and improve governance quality, the UK made the creation of an effective and democratically governed security sector one of its top priorities.⁴⁵¹ To achieve this, the program focused on the establishment of civilian control within the MoD, strengthening of command structures within the army, creation of sustainable defense

⁴⁵¹ UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in Sierra Leone, included in Ginifer, “Sierra Leone,” 31.

and budget policies, and the creation of a civilian-led institution to coordinate across the sector.⁴⁵² A list of the exact commitments made by the UK is provided in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3. SSR Tenets in UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in Sierra Leone

- Provide basic and equipment to 8,500 soldiers in the SLA.
- Provide advice on military and security strategy and the administration of the SLA, with the Commander of the British Forces in Sierra Leone acting as Military Adviser to President Kabbah.
- Establish an IMATT to provide advice and expertise in operational planning in Defence Headquarters; to follow up on training by providing training and operational advice at Brigade HQ level.
- Increase accountability of SLA by reforming the MOD and establishing effective civil control of the SLA.
- Refurbish new premises for reformed MOD.
- Assist with Military Reintegration Package, which includes absorbing limited number of screened ex-combatants into SLA, converting CDF militias into a territorial defence force and downsizing SLA to a sustainable level consistent with threats to state.
- Help ensure GoSL and UNAMSIL establish satisfactory DDR and RRR programmes, with adequate reintegration projects.
- Establish team, including UK secondee as Inspector General of Police, to reform, train and equip more accountable police force, and assert police primacy in GoSL controlled areas.
- Push for cost-effective establishment of TRC and Special Court as soon as possible.
- Help GoSL reform and build capacity of judiciary.
- Assist National Security Adviser to develop an accountable, non-political security service capable of monitoring external and rebel threats.
- Provide humanitarian support for refugees and internally displaced.
- Assist in the building of capacity of civil society to engage in peacebuilding activities—in particular reconciliation and reintegration of former combatants and refugees.

Taken from UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in Sierra Leone, in Ginifer (2005), 31

⁴⁵² Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006): 84.

By intervening quickly and establishing a long-term strategy for reform, the UK set the foundation for continued security sector reforms beyond the immediate political horizon. As the distance grew between war and peace, the domestic political pressure for security sector reforms diminished. Unsurprisingly, politicians turned their attention from security governance issues as the threat of renewed conflict receded, focusing on more immediate issues, like the economy. By 2005, the administration's interest in the security sector was severely reduced, to the point that it suspended security council meetings up through 2007.⁴⁵³

Operational Assistance

Sierra Leone received the largest flows of operational assistance during the conflict. Shortly following its intervention into the civil war, the UK authorized £21.27 million to support training and equipping the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. The majority of this funding went to support the British mission Operation Silkman, established in 2001 to consolidate preliminary training efforts as part of a broader stabilization mission. By October 2001, 9,300 troops had been re-trained by the British, comprising nearly the entirety of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.⁴⁵⁴

Once the conflict had ended, the operational assistance provided by the British went towards financing infrastructure construction and re-equipment of the military and police. The RSLAF Re-Equipment Programme was the most significant UK initiative to provide non-

⁴⁵³ Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, *Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action*, Whitehall Papers (London: Routledge, 2015).

⁴⁵⁴ Alex Neads, "Improvise, Adapt And Fail to Overcome? Capacity Building, Culture and Exogenous Change in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42, no. 3-4 (n.d.): 434-36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1405808>.

governance military assistance to Sierra Leone. After that program ended in August 2002, material assistance from the British was provided on an ad hoc basis through the annual budgets of the various programs operating in country, including £4.5 million to provide trucks and technical assistance for the RSLAF.⁴⁵⁵ Unlike international support for institutional development of the RSLAF, the majority of assistance provided to the SLP was provided as tactical and operational assistance. In their largest police assistance project, the UK channeled nearly £25 million into a procurement program for the SLP between 1999 and 2005.⁴⁵⁶ The exact timing of these disbursements is unclear; thus, Figure 2 portrays only the disbursements of operational assistance from the US.

Aside from this funding from the UK, the U.S. has been Sierra Leone's most significant source of security assistance. In the years following the end of the conflict, the U.S. provided \$27.85 million in operational assistance. In the first years of reconstruction, the focus of the U.S. was on supporting military hospitals and health initiatives. The majority of aid was provided through donations of medical equipment and other basic necessities such as textiles and gear. As is clear in Figure 6.2, disbursements remained relatively low until nearly a decade after the conflict had ended.

US operational assistance to Sierra Leone increased dramatically in 2010 and 2014 as the U.S. focused more attention on improving the counter-narcotics and counterterrorism capacity of Sierra Leone as part of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. One of the major goals of the Sierra Leonean government at the time was to improve the operational capacity of the RSLAF to make it eligible to participate in peacekeeping missions.

⁴⁵⁵ Jon Smith, "4.5M Military Aid to Sierra Leone," *Press Association*, July 29, 2004.

⁴⁵⁶ This was part of the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which occurred between 1999-2005 (Albrecht and Jackson, "Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007," 34.)

While Sierra Leone faces a comparatively low threat of terrorism, the government has made participation in peacekeeping missions a policy priority since the mid-2000s, hoping to access some needed revenue for its security forces.⁴⁵⁷ The greatest contributor to the spike in assistance to Sierra Leone, however, was the outbreak of the Ebola virus. While the U.S. provides a significant amount of equipment and supplies to Sierra Leone through its Excess Defense Articles program, it does not provide Foreign Military Financing, the primary program through which other security partners receive funding for arms.

Sierra Leone receives some assistance from China. Although the exact amounts and nature of assistance are unknown, news reports suggest that the majority of Chinese aid has come through training and equipment. Like the U.S., China's main focus in Sierra Leone has been to support the medical infrastructure of the military and provide the equipment that it needs to become eligible for UN peacekeeping missions.⁴⁵⁸ Unlike the U.S., China has provided small arms and artillery as well. In November 2003, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced that it was providing 25 million yuan (just over three million dollars) to support training and the rehabilitation of RSLAF facilities. In following years, China continued to provide training and equipment including surveillance speedboats and artillery ammunition and equipment, including through a second grant of 25 million yuan in 2011.⁴⁵⁹ When Ebola broke out, the Chinese military pledged millions of dollars of support and sent a team of military medical experts to assist in containment efforts.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁴⁵⁹ "Chinese Army Gives Rocket Launchers, Weapons to Sierra Leone," *Terra Daily*, May 2, 2011, http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Chinese_army_gives_rocket_launchers_weapons_to_Sierra_Leone_999.html.

⁴⁶⁰ "Chinese Military Joins Anti-Ebola Aid Efforts: DM Spokesman," *Xinhua Economic News Service*, October 30, 2014, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj_-

Lack of data prevents a complete accounting of security assistance to Sierra Leone. However, the data that are available allow for a general understanding of aid trends. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the military and major security institutions received large amounts of institutional assistance, and relatively little operational assistance. The military continued to receive relatively small inflows of operational assistance until 2011, many years into its long-term development program with the British. In contrast, while the police received some institutional support at the beginning of peace, the SLP was given primarily operational assistance. While tactical training has been a component of operational assistance provided to the SLP since the beginning, it is only recently that donors have started to seriously focus on improving governance.⁴⁶¹

The combination of high regime vulnerability, high institutional assistance, and low operational assistance theoretically created the best conditions for a successful SSR intervention. Still, within Sierra Leone, we can expect to see some variation. The high levels of dedicated assistance provided for military reform and institution building lead me to expect the greatest positive improvements to occur in the army and in the institutional infrastructure, i.e. the Ministry of Defence and Office of National Security. In contrast, the high levels of operational assistance provided to the Sierra Leone Police should theoretically lead to negative governance changes in the police force. Despite this variation, my theory leads me to expect an overall positive change in the governance of the Sierra Leonean security sector.

q__xoPnAhVETt8KHdmYBx4QFjABegQIARAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fza.china-embassy.org%2Feng%2Fzt%2F20141006b%2Ft1206950.htm&usg=AOvVaw3qUZLALS27vaKFsB5sV2mS.
⁴⁶¹ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

Remaking the Security Sector: Early Inflows of Institutional Assistance

In the following sections, I discuss the role that security assistance played in the development of these institutions and how it has impacted the quality of security sector governance. Specifically, I evaluate how aid impacts the five components of governance discussed in Chapter 2: (1) the presence of a formal institutional framework, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) capacity, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Institutional Assistance

DDR officially began in October 20, 1999. The early stages of DDR saw the establishment of demobilization centers in Lungi, Port Loko, Daru, and Kenema. By the time hostilities erupted in May 2000, 24,042 troops had been disarmed. Progress in weapons collection, however, seriously lagged, with only 10,840 weapons collected. When fighting resumed, many demobilized soldiers took up arms and rejoined the conflict and formal DDR activities were put on hold.⁴⁶² The second stage of DDR began in May 2001 and lasted until January 2002, when it was formally completed. In that time, 47,076 troops were demobilized, and 15,840 assorted weapons and approximately 2 million rounds of ammunition were collected.

⁴⁶² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (New York: United Nations, May 19, 2000), 5, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/407/22/IMG/N0040722.pdf?OpenElement>.

Demobilization was officially completed in January 2002. Though it was considered a success, a large number of weapons remained unaccounted for.⁴⁶³

Reintegration officially concluded in December 2003. By that point, 51,000 ex-combatants had participated in re-integration projects. An additional 6,845 child combatants had participated in a unique program designed for children, and had been reunited with their families. Reintegration was funded by a number of donors: together the World Bank-managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund, Germany, UK, United States, UNDP, UNAMSIL, International Organization for Migration, and International Committee of the Red Cross provided enough funding to provide reintegration packages to all demobilized soldiers. While medium-term integration was successful, concerns remained among observers that reintegration packages would not be enough.⁴⁶⁴ The economy of Sierra Leone was destroyed; vocational training would provide little economic security if there were no jobs available.⁴⁶⁵

In addition to the official DDR process, the Sierra Leone Police and UNAMSIL organized the Community Arms Collection and Destruction program to collect weapons that were not considered part of the official DDR program either because they were officially exempted (such as shotguns and hunting rifles) or because they belonged to non-combatants. Although the UN was unconcerned with the possession of firearms by non-combatants, the government initiated the program to address RUF concerns that civil defense forces could rise up

⁴⁶³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (New York: United Nations, March 14, 2002), 3, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/285/18/IMG/N0228518.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁶⁴ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Twenty-First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (New York: United Nations, March 19, 2004), 5–6, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/270/25/PDF/N0427025.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁶⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), “Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance” (Freetown/Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 2, 2003), 15–16, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/67-sierra-leone-the-state-of-security-and-governance.pdf>.

again and use these weapons against them.⁴⁶⁶ The SLP collected several thousand weapons; however, because of the continued trafficking of arms across the region and security fears by the population, observers believed there to be many more weapons across the provinces.⁴⁶⁷

Outcomes

The greatest contribution of the DDR program to peace, however, was the dismantlement of the RUF's military wing. In addition to losing political support following its losses in the 2002 elections, the RUF lost most of its leadership when the Special Court for Sierra Leone arrested four of its top officers. Those who stepped in to fill their roles proved unable to rally support from former combatants, now returned to their communities. With the RUF dismantled, the *kamajors* remained the only potential challenger to government authority. However, unlike the rebels, the *kamajors* posed no significant threat to the state or to the peace. The majority of fighters had joined the war effort to protect the government and their communities; even if one leader attempted to mobilize, it is unlikely that he could have garnered support.⁴⁶⁸

Creating the Security Architecture of Sierra Leone

In January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone established a new Ministry of Defence (MOD) under joint military/civilian control. The MOD was essentially split into two forces: The

⁴⁶⁶ Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, "Disarmament and Demobilisation," in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, ISS Monographs 80 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2003), 29–30, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwjaisTWj4HmAhUQEwKHTb1DgkQFjABegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fissafrika.org%2Fresearch%2Fmonographs%2Fmonograph-80-sierra-leone-building-the-road-to-recovery-mark-malan-sarah-meek-thokozani-thusi-jeremy-ginifer-patrick-coker&usg=AOvVaw0gmFdb6ateOaSD-RZEDn12>.

⁴⁶⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance," 14.

⁴⁶⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), 14–15.

Joint Force Command, under military leadership, and the Joint Support Command, under civilian leadership. Initially, both commands were placed under IMATT leadership in an attempt to guide institutional development as well as cultivate local capacity. In addition to increasing civilian leadership responsibility, this division was chosen in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of a coup by preventing too great a concentration of power.⁴⁶⁹ With his great distrust of the military, Kabbah insisted on maintaining his position as the Minister of Defence.

The National Security and Central Intelligence Act of 2002 created the institutional framework for Sierra Leone's security apparatus, establishing the National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), and the Office of National Security (ONS). The NSC was formed to centralize all information regarding internal and external security threats. At the time of its formation, many of its positions were filled by British advisors. CISU was created to collect and assess intelligence relating to threats to the state's security or economic interests as well as threats to the government. Finally, the ONS was created to coordinate within all areas of the security sector, maintain a relationship between the national security community and civil society, prepare a national security policy, vet all potential staff members within the security sector, and to implement any policies required to maintain high standards across the government.⁴⁷⁰

The Sierra Leonean government also passed a number of new security policies during this time, including the 2003 Defence White Paper and beginning the country's first Security Sector Review, which was begun in 2003 and completed in 2005. The 2003 White Paper was

⁴⁶⁹ Albrecht and Jackson, "Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007," 98.

⁴⁷⁰ The Act also outlawed the use of private security companies without official permission from the ONS. After the proliferation of private security contractors throughout the war, this provision represented an important step towards restoring the government's monopoly on violence. "The National Security and Central Intelligence Act, 2002," *Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette* CXXXII, no. 42 (July 4, 2002): 9–11.

prepared by the Ministry of Defence. It outlined a new structure for the armed forces as well as a strategy for reducing corruption and increasing democratic accountability within the military and the greater security sector, including provisions for defense expenditure management and procurement.⁴⁷¹ One of the most significant contributions of the 2003 White Paper was to define the scope and responsibilities of the police and military, including defining the appropriate conditions for military involvement in domestic affairs.⁴⁷²

One of the biggest innovations of the new security system was the creation of Provincial and District Security Committees – PROSECs and DISECS, respectively. These bodies were created to form an early warning system to alert authorities of any threat to the province, country, or the government.⁴⁷³ These new security committees were an important step towards decentralizing the security sector and increasing local trust. These changes reflected a recognition among the government and donors that the failure of the central and local government institutions to provide law and order had contributed to the conflict. Still, despite these positive developments, power was still concentrated in the executive, leaving the security services vulnerable to continued politicization.

Institutional Assistance

UK support was fundamental in all of these developments, from assisting with the design of the new MOD, financing the construction of the new MOD building, and funding training courses for new civil servants.⁴⁷⁴ UK security advisors helped their Sierra Leonean counterparts

⁴⁷¹ Directorate of Defence Policy, “Defence White Paper: Informing the People” (Freetown: Ministry of Defence, Sierra Leone Government, 2003), 12–20, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156808/SierraLeone.pdf>.

⁴⁷² Directorate of Defence Policy, 16.

⁴⁷³ Directorate of Defence Policy, 6–7.

⁴⁷⁴ Directorate of Defence Policy, 12–13.

draft new legislation guiding the sector, delimiting the roles and responsibilities of the new institutions. The most important of these developments, however, has been the introduction of civilian control, which stakeholders link directly to UK assistance. Today, the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense has a civilian budget director and a civilian Chief of Defence Staff.⁴⁷⁵

Donors helped establish Chiefdom Intelligence Committees to supplement the PROSECs and DISECs and improve intelligence collection across the country by training local people to conduct analyses. One of the main concerns by donors was that improving the capacity of the intelligence institutions would create an incentive among political elites to utilize them to collect information on political opponents.⁴⁷⁶ At the beginning, this was largely the result of strong efforts by ONS leadership to maintain its political independence. Professionalization of the ONS would be crucial to making sure the body remained an independent agency, rather than a personal advisor to the president.

Outcomes

Institutional assistance and the presence of external advisors within the security sector allowed the post-conflict institutions to develop, encouraging professionalization and political independence by creating space between political influence and civil servants. Kellie Conteh, the National Security Coordinator in the early years of reconstruction, argued that the British advisor to the ONS had been a crucial buffer for the institution, allowing it to develop as an independent agency, rather than a personal advisor to the president: “Our advisor had been fighting wars in the sense that much of their job was to protect the institution [from political interference] and

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁴⁷⁶ Albrecht and Jackson, “Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007,” 71.

allow it to grow. Election time [in 2007] showed security was still an issue and the entire system could have been thrown down.”⁴⁷⁷

Significant challenges remain, however. While civilian control has been introduced in some areas of the security sector, such as budgeting and procurement, many areas remain totally under military control. Problematically, the introduction of civilians into the Ministry of Defence has not led to greater democratic governance. This is partially due to a lack of formal institutions. In spite of efforts to introduce greater oversight over the security sector, monitoring is limited to executive bodies: the ONS, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National Security Council Coordinating Group. More problematically, there is often a low appetite among civilian officials to apply any pressure on the military. Thus, the formal channels that do exist to enforce accountability are rarely used.⁴⁷⁸ Lack of institutional oversight also contributes to continuing corruption within the security sector. Despite the introduction of public expenditure management reforms, corruption is still widespread in security procurement processes. Often, donor funds are diverted towards contracts that are never expected to go through.⁴⁷⁹

The ONS has consistently developed and published Security Sector Reviews since its creation, demonstrating a level of ownership of the institution and a commitment to self-evaluation. However, the government of Sierra Leone has not put forward any formal defense policies since the publication of the White Paper in 2003. Without a coherent, forward-looking defense strategy, security sector development is unlikely to continue after the UK leaves.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁷ Albrecht and Jackson, 112.

⁴⁷⁸ Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “Bringing the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly into the Peace Fold: The Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces after the Lomé Peace Agreement,” in *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars*, ed. Roy Licklider (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 205.

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with author, June 24, 2019.

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

Furthermore, there is a tendency among government ministers to bypass the ONS when they are in need of the security sector and reach out directly to contacts within the military.⁴⁸¹ This challenges the effectiveness of the institution and its ability to organize and regulate the performance of security actors. The experience of the ONS is illustrative of a broader issue within the security sector: policies and institutions designed by the British are not always implemented.⁴⁸²

Other institutional reforms have yielded better results. One Sierra Leonean security official posited that one of the greatest successes of UK support has come through the creation of local intelligence, such as the Chiefdom Intelligence Committees. In this case, it was the combination of creating the institutional structure (institutional assistance) and providing trainings to build local capacity (operational assistance) that made the project successful.⁴⁸³ This supports the arguments for capacity building through operational assistance, and suggests that it can, in fact, be good for governance when it is coupled with strong institutional support to ensure that the assistance is being utilized well.

Military Reform and Integration

Institutional Assistance

Preparation for military integration began in early 2000. Although the British had been providing some small-scale trainings and reform projects through IMATT, the UK authorized the

⁴⁸¹ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁴⁸² Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁴⁸³ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

creation of a Military Reintegration Programme to integrate former RUF and civil militia soldiers who had been through the disarmament and demobilization process into the national army. By May 2002, the British had trained 2,600 former combatants and integrated them officially into the military. All soldiers were mixed across and within units. Impressively, military integration was completed without any reports of incidents between soldiers from opposing parties and little evidence even of friction between them. Former SLA soldiers were also retrained through the program. As the program moved forward, IMATT advisors gradually transferred control for training exercises to Sierra Leonean commanders, which one expert observed led to a “discernible increase in confidence” of the force and improved performance in training exercises.⁴⁸⁴

Despite the peacefulness of the integration process, tensions ran high even among the different factions in the military. Former RUF members who were integrated into the RSLAF were often greeted with mistrust by leadership and their peers. CDF fighters often felt themselves to be short-changed.⁴⁸⁵ The MoD identified overcoming this distrust as crucial to achieving the ultimate goal of integration: uniting ex-combatants into a single force that was “professional, efficient, effectively structured and representative.”⁴⁸⁶ Military leadership and its

⁴⁸⁴ Mark Malan, “Security and Military Reform,” in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, ISS Monographs 86–99 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2003), 99, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwjaisTWj4HmAhUQEqwKHTb1DgkQFjABegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fissafrika.org%2Fresearch%2Fmonographs%2Fmonograph-80-sierra-leone-building-the-road-to-recovery-mark-malan-sarah-meek-thokozani-thusi-jeremy-ginifer-patrick-coker&usg=AOvVaw0gmFdb6ateOaSD-RZEDnl2>.

⁴⁸⁵ Jeremy Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, ISS Monographs 80 (Praetoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2003), 47, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwjaisTWj4HmAhUQEqwKHTb1DgkQFjABegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fissafrika.org%2Fresearch%2Fmonographs%2Fmonograph-80-sierra-leone-building-the-road-to-recovery-mark-malan-sarah-meek-thokozani-thusi-jeremy-ginifer-patrick-coker&usg=AOvVaw0gmFdb6ateOaSD-RZEDnl2>.

⁴⁸⁶ Directorate of Defence Policy, “Defence White Paper: Informing the People,” 10.

IMATT advisors approached this through continued trainings and professionalization efforts involving all troops.

On January 21, 2002, President Kabbah announced a new official name for the military: the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This new name was chosen to signify a new military: the former military, though called the Sierra Leone Army, comprised separate land, sea, and air forces; the new RSLAF would be a joint force structure, restructured and retrained at almost every level.⁴⁸⁷ Changes in the military were not limited to integration. Under the direction of IMATT, RSLAF embarked on a process of wholesale reform of top-down and bottom-up reform. The British installed advisors in all major positions in the military. For example, the head of logistics was a British officer with Sierra Leoneans under him.⁴⁸⁸ This organization provided a loud voice for the British and led to the imposition of the British system on Sierra Leone.⁴⁸⁹ The restructuring of the process was also intended to draw the military down to a more sustainable size, from 14,000 to 10,500 troops and, later, to 8,500.⁴⁹⁰ This restructuring process was viewed by Sierra Leonean officials as crucial for supporting civilian control as well as improving effectiveness. In a statement in 2002, the Deputy Defense Minister insisted that the process would lead to better governance: “Though the unfortunate event of the recent past has been blamed on the military, we believe that the ongoing restructuring of the RSLAF has made

⁴⁸⁷ Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, “Speech by His Excellency the President and Minister of Defence Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah At the Opening of the New Ministry of Defence Building” (Speech, Freetown, January 21, 2002), <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-012102.html>.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with author, June 18, 2019.

⁴⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (New York: United Nations, September 5, 2002), 4, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SL%20S2002987.pdf>.

us see the new armed forces as a force that would be democratically accountable to the people."⁴⁹¹

The 2003 White Paper made professionalization of the forces a priority. In order to avoid repeating the past, the government would need to instill a set of values that would make them “loyal and accountable to the government of the day, regardless of its political composition, while retaining their professional effectiveness.”⁴⁹² Advisors to the military have implemented a number of professionalization programs, most of which involved “train the trainer” programs. The most significant contribution of donors to the professionalism of the RSLAF was the establishment of Horton Academy – a military academy intended to provide junior staff formal training on “soft skills” such as military ethics and leadership. While initially founded to support military professionalization, Horton has expanded its mandate in recent years to include officials in other security institutions. Now, the first stage of program provides a certificate in public administration and is open to the military, police, and ONS.⁴⁹³

Operational Assistance

The majority of operational assistance from the UK in the post-conflict period was provided to support military infrastructure construction. Military housing, where it existed, was dilapidated and substandard. In an initiative to support the new military, the government of Sierra Leone and the UK came together to design an infrastructure development plan to construct new or refurbish existing military barracks across the country to provide a better standard of living for soldiers. Operation Pebu (“Op PEBU”), as it was named, would be funded through a

⁴⁹¹ Regina Thomas, “Sierra Leone: Soldiers Must Submit to Civilian Authority Joe Blell,” *Concord Times*, September 17, 2002, <https://allafrica.com/stories/200209170170.html>.

⁴⁹² Directorate of Defence Policy, “Defence White Paper: Informing the People,” 10.

⁴⁹³ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

combination of British and Sierra Leonean funds. The UK pledged £3.6 million to the project. The project was to be completed by the time the rainy season began in the summer of 2004.

It quickly became clear that the Sierra Leonean military lacked the materials and technical knowledge to complete the project. By the beginning of 2004, assessors concluded that only 12% of the project would be completed by the time the rainy season began that summer. In addition to unrealistic planning and poor construction choices, there had been a deep mismatch between what RSLAF officers envisioned and what was possible with the resources available.⁴⁹⁴ A British advisor to the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence argued that the operation “failed on so many counts that it is best described as conceptually flawed.”⁴⁹⁵ Shortly after the failure of Op PEBU came to light, the project was abandoned.⁴⁹⁶

In 2011, the US also began providing military assistance to Sierra Leone to support their counterterror abilities. Much of this assistance was provided to securing Sierra Leone’s borders and prevent the cross-border flows of illicit goods so common in that region. Years later, the project has yet to advance beyond its beginning stages.⁴⁹⁷

The next spike in operational assistance came in 2014, with the outbreak of the Ebola virus. The U.S. provided equipment to Sierra Leonean forces to support their containment efforts and over \$11 million in assistance through the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, an initiative created to “implement biosafety and biosecurity measures for

⁴⁹⁴ Neads, “Improvise, Adapt Amd Fail to Overcome? Capacity Building, Culture and Exogenous Change in Sierra Leone,” 441.

⁴⁹⁵ Aldo Gaeta, “Operation Pebu,” Working Paper (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, October 2008), 7, <https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/17013>.

⁴⁹⁶ Gaeta, 4–6.

⁴⁹⁷ Interview with author, June 24, 2019.

facilities housing pathogens of security concern and to enhance partner ability to quickly detect, diagnose, and report diseases with implications for international security.”⁴⁹⁸

Outcomes

The institutional assistance provided to set up and support Horton Academy will likely yield governance improvements for years to come. As more officers are given a professional education, they may push to change the politicization and corruption that persist among the higher ranks of the RSLAF. According to a former RSLAF officer, the junior officer corps, brought up through Horton, are anxious to abandon the personalistic system perpetrated by the former combatants who now hold many of the institution’s leadership positions. Instead, they want a system based on merit and accountability; they want the RSLAF to become a more professionalized force.⁴⁹⁹

The assistance of the UK and the other contributors to the IMATT force played a key role in developing the command system, capacity, and professionalism of the new army. However, politicization remains a problem. Selection for prestigious posts often requires a vetting process to make sure you are loyal to the party. While formalized processes have been created to ensure selections are merit-based, officials often “check the boxes” to make donors happy.⁵⁰⁰ In some cases, the continued British presence has allowed Sierra Leonean officers experiencing political pressure to defer decision-making responsibility. For example, cognizant of continued

⁴⁹⁸ Stephanie Young, Henry H. Willis, and Jeffrey Engstrom, “Measuring Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) Performance: Capacities, Capabilities, and Sustainability Enablers for Biorisk Management and Biosurveillance” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 1, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR660/RAND_RR660.pdf.

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

politicization within the military, the Chief of Defence Staff has turned to the British to select Sierra Leonean officers to receive overseas training.⁵⁰¹

Much of the operational assistance that has been provided has gone to waste. As part of its work addressing the Ebola outbreak, the U.S. and other security partners set up a nationwide Ebola response system and build up the medical capabilities of the military.⁵⁰² However, once the acute crisis had ended, the system was neglected.⁵⁰³ If a new outbreak were to occur, it is questionable whether it would still function.

Police Reform

British support for the SLP took a very different form than its support for the RSLAF. By the end of the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police Force had lost the one resource it had before the conflict began: manpower. It is estimated that the SLP lost 30% of its officers during the course of the war, either through death or attrition (from 9,500 to around 6,000).⁵⁰⁴ In addition, the SLP was greatly hampered by a lack of resources and equipment. Unlike its holistic approach to military reform, donor support for the SLP was thus largely focused on providing equipment and training specific elements of the police force for rapid deployment.⁵⁰⁵ The SLP did receive substantial institutional support, most significantly, through the leadership of guidance of Keith Biddle – a retired British police officer named the first Inspector General of the Police. However, the UK undertook few projects to reform or support the Ministry of the Interior, the institution

⁵⁰¹ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁵⁰² Crispina Taylor, “Sierra Leone Army Gets Rapidly Deployable Ebola Treatment Centre,” *Politico SL*, October 21, 2015, <http://politicosl.com/articles/sierra-leone-army-gets-rapidly-deployable-ebola-treatment-centre>.

⁵⁰³ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

⁵⁰⁴ Meek, “Policing Sierra Leone,” 106.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

charged with the oversight and supervision of the police and internal security forces.⁵⁰⁶ In contrast, the focus of donors was on traditional capacity-building.

Institutional Assistance

In 1998, the government signed into force the Sierra Leone Policing Charter, which established the police as the primary force for establishing order within the country and rechristened the SLP a “force for good.”⁵⁰⁷ Kabbah’s strong support for police reform contributed to a high level of buy-in across the administration to support police reform. This was evidenced by the inclusion of police salaries in the national budget in 2003 – a sharp contrast from the total reliance on donor funds to maintain the military in the immediate postwar period.⁵⁰⁸

To support the changes envisioned by Kabbah, the UK sent Keith Biddle—a retired police officer who had focused his career on police reform—to serve as Inspector General of Police (IGP). As the IGP, Biddle spearheaded major structural changes in the force, along with rank reforms and the introduction of new offices. To better serve the needs of local populations, the SLP adopted a community policing approach called “Local Needs Policing,” with the aim of “creating a community police service, which is accountable to the people and is not an organ of the government.”⁵⁰⁹ This new approach aimed to increase community participation in matters of security through the establishment of decentralized Police Partnership Boards. In light of the gender-based violence that occurred during the conflict, the SLP created a Family Support Unit,

⁵⁰⁶ “Presidential Transition Team Draft Report,” Draft Report (Freetown: Office of the President, Republic of Sierra Leone, October 2007), 30, www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/IMG/docx/transition-report.docx.

⁵⁰⁷ Sierra Leone Policing Charter, quoted in Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, “Keynote Speech by the President His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at Seminar on ‘The Role of the Sierra Leone Police in the 2007 Elections’” (Speech, Freetown, August 30, 2006), <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-083006.html>.

⁵⁰⁸ Meek, “Policing Sierra Leone,” 108.

⁵⁰⁹ Meek, 107.

which deployed across the country.⁵¹⁰ In addition, the government created the Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigation Department to receive and investigate reports of misconduct by the police. In 2014, an additional body was formed to increase accountability, called the Independent Police Complaints Board (IPCB).⁵¹¹

While implementing these changes, the government faced a very real shortfall in policing capacity. UNAMSIL was set to withdraw in 2004, leaving the government completely responsible for internal stability. Rather than extend the army, the government decided to invest more heavily in the better-trained, armed unit of the police: what had begun as Siaka Stevens' Internal Security Unit was re-christened the Operational Support Division (OSD) in 2003 and deployed across the country.

The appointment of British Keith Biddle as Inspector General of the Police from 1999 – 2003 facilitated major reforms and restructuring. Security experts describe his appointment as crucial for increasing confidence in the SLP. Considering the highly politicized nature of the SLP, the appointment of an international advisor alleviated fears that politically-contentious reforms—such as reforming the rank structure—would follow a political agenda. Albrecht and Jackson quote an SLP officer: “If outsiders had not come, there would have been a lot of political pressure on the IGP at the time.”⁵¹²

However, beyond the work done by Keith Biddle, donors did relatively little to implement lasting institutional change. Although legally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of

⁵¹⁰ Ibrahim Bangura, “Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual: The Sierra Leone Police and Democratic Policing in Sierra Leone,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 7, no. 1 (April 27, 2018): 6, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.601>.

⁵¹¹ Bangura, 6.

⁵¹² Albrecht and Jackson, “Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997 - 2007,” 36.

Internal Affairs, police matters are left to the discretion of the Police Council, a pre-war body under the leadership of the Vice President. Without real legislative or cabinet-level oversight, the SLP are under direct control of the executive.⁵¹³

Operational Assistance

By 2006, the SLP had accumulated 700 vehicles, including motor bikes, over 1,000 hand-held communication sets, mobile HF communication sets, and around 80 HVF base sets.⁵¹⁴ In addition to providing equipment to the SLP, the UK offered training courses. Most of this training has focused on specific elements within the police force, with the intention that these elements could then share their training with the rest of the force (“train the trainer” missions). Recently the UK has widened the mandate of ISAT to include improving governance; before this point, all trainings have focused on improving occupational skills, like crime scene investigation.⁵¹⁵

The training and re-equipment of the SLP did little to improve its capacity. Training seminars often were not tailored to fit the realities faced by the police force. A British expert on SSR in Sierra Leone noted that early training programs often focused on teaching policing techniques that required expensive equipment inaccessible to the country at the time.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹³ Peter Albrecht, “Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Police and Broader Justice Sector Reform” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Strategic Studies (DIIS), 2010), 47, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiUhqCQ_4npAhVvUN8KHTWOBIsQFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fissat.dcaf.ch%2Fesl%2Fdownload%2F17734%2F207241%2FRP2010-07_transforming_Sierra_Leone_web.pdf&usg=AOvVaw20P8xDwCaygl7kHBUOUPbR.

⁵¹⁴ Kabbah, “Keynote Speech by the President His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at Seminar on ‘The Role of the Sierra Leone Police in the 2007 Elections.’”

⁵¹⁵ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵¹⁶ Albrecht, “Transforming Internal Security in Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone Police and Broader Justice Sector Reform,” 22.

Discussions with a current advisor to Sierra Leone suggest that donors have continued to make the same mistake, severely limiting the value of these training seminars.⁵¹⁷

Outcomes

As expected by my theory, an increase in access to uniforms and equipment has not led to appreciable improvements in policing. Reports of lagging response times and violent armed robberies carried out by individuals wearing police uniforms in the early post-war years prompted concerns that the police were, at best, inept or, worse, active perpetrators. One journalist posed the question: “with a fleet of vehicles at the disposal of the police force at the moment and a reliable means of communication, coupled with an appreciable personnel, why is the response time of the police still very poor?”⁵¹⁸

Public perceptions of police conduct have improved since the end of the war, but complaints of police misconduct remain.⁵¹⁹ The OSD, in particular, has repeatedly garnered international condemnation for its excessive use of force against civilians. The continuation of these tactics in the face of governmental condemnation flows from failures in the chain of command: one human rights report noted that many in the OSD do not respect orders from the conventional police, listening only to the Inspector General.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁷ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵¹⁸ “The Sierra Leone Police Force: Where Is Your Protection?,” *Standard Times*, February 4, 2005, sec. Africa News, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4FFX-PTH0-0040-T1F8-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵¹⁹ Bangura, “Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual,” 6.

⁵²⁰ Amnesty International, “A Force for Good? Restrictions on Peaceful Assembly and Impunity for Excessive Use of Force by the Sierra Leone Police” (London: Amnesty International, June 2018), 58, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR5185902018ENGLISH.PDF>.

Pervasive corruption by the police, such as at traffic stops, has contributed to a widespread distrust of the police by the population.⁵²¹ While reform efforts have been made to reduce corruption, funding for police and salaries is too low for most of the changes to make place or for anti-corruption efforts to take hold. For example, an Inspector makes less than £3 a day, a sergeant makes even less.⁵²² Poor accountability throughout the lower ranks of the SLP has allowed this persist. The decentralization of the SLP that was instituted to improve service delivery may actually contribute to this: the lack of a strong hierarchy within the SLP and prevalence of local systems of governance make it impossible to know what the true level of crime is across the country, or whether police reforms have taken hold.⁵²³

The institutions that have been created to enforce accountability generally lack the resources and the mandate to significantly change police practices. The IPCB was created to replace the ineffectual CDIID; even the new institution, however, is seen by many as little more than a “paper tiger.”⁵²⁴ Evidence suggests that the high level of operational assistance provided to the SLP may have contributed to the lack of institutional accountability. As early as 2007, analysts noted that the high level of donor support was having a perverse effect on the institution – the Sierra Leone Police was acting as an “autonomous entity vis-a-viz its constitutional obligations to its supervisory ministry.” Further, they noted, the lack of oversight of the police should be corrected “in the interest of democratic and accountable governance.”⁵²⁵

⁵²¹ I witnessed this twice while taking taxis during my fieldwork in Freetown.

⁵²² Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵²³ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵²⁴ Amnesty International, “A Force for Good? Restrictions on Peaceful Assembly and Impunity for Excessive Use of Force by the Sierra Leone Police,” 53.

⁵²⁵ “Presidential Transition Team Draft Report,” 39.

Assessing Security Sector Governance in Sierra Leone

Two decades have passed since security sector reform efforts first began in Sierra Leone. Despite its faults, the security sector has witnessed a dramatic transformation from the corruption and predation of the pre-war period to a democratic and professionalizing system. This progress is due in no small part to the dedicated assistance of the UK. Supported by the institutional assistance of the British, the government of Sierra Leone has made improvements across all five dimensions of security sector governance: (1) the presence of a formal institutional framework, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) capacity, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Formal Institutional Framework. The institutional infrastructure established by the 2002 National Security and Central Intelligence Act and 2003 Defence White Paper continues to operate today. Despite its weaknesses, the Office of National Security has persisted as an independent, apolitical institution long after the departure of its British leadership. The military has maintained the joint force structure established by the 2003 White Paper and has relied upon the framework set out in the Military Aid to Civil Authorities provision to guide its domestic operations. This framework has reduced tensions between the military and internal security forces and facilitated cooperation.

Civilian Control. The institutional assistance from the British was instrumental in establishing civilian control. Beginning with the 2003 White Paper, successive policy documents have stressed the importance of maintaining civilian authority over the military. The 2007 Presidential Transition Team Report applauds the progress of the security sector in this respect:

“Both the MoD and RSLAF now have a clear understanding and focus with regards their respective mandates. Trust and confidence in the military within

and among the wider civil society have been restored, as the military is now subjected fully to civil authority and conducts itself in a manner that guarantees transparency, openness and accountability, a situation that was hitherto non-existent. Civil-military relations are now enhanced as the MoD is jointly run and managed by both civilian and military personnel in an atmosphere that is congenial.”⁵²⁶

As discussed above, work remains in extending parliamentary oversight of defense, particularly over police matters. However, the legal provisions granting Parliament the right to exercise oversight of defense leave an opportunity for improvement.

Transparent and Accountable Management. Sierra Leone has a suite of policies designed to regulate defense procurement, acquisition, and budget management. For example, the 2004 Public Procurement Act regulates transparent procurement within government ministries, including the MOD. In addition, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior are subject to annual audits by the Auditor General. All evidence indicates that the Auditor General is an independent office whose reports are comprehensive. However, to this point the government has been less thorough in following through with these accountability measures. There have been several notable instances of corruption within the security sector, many of which have gone unpunished. Although IMATT advisors helped their Sierra Leonean counterparts draft anti-corruption policy, there has been little action to train or inform lower-

⁵²⁶ “Presidential Transition Team Draft Report,” 30.

level military or police personnel. Furthermore, the government does not subject the intelligence service to the same level of scrutiny as it does the military and police.⁵²⁷

Within the RSLAF, the strong command and control structures implemented with the help of the British have helped to improve vertical accountability. The weakness of command hierarchies within the SLP, in contrast, is one of the reasons that corruption has been able to persist for so long. This issue is exacerbated by tensions between the regular police and the OSD.

Capacity. The government of Sierra Leone has achieved the most fundamental objective of regaining a monopoly on the use of force. Since the beginning of reconstruction efforts, it has improved its administrative and security capacity across the country and is now able to extend security services across all the provinces. While questions remain regarding the capacity of the RSLAF to respond to a significant external threat, the military is considered able to respond to all primary threats to the country.⁵²⁸ By 2011, the military was deemed sufficiently professional to participate in international peacekeeping missions, and the government sent its first battalion of soldiers to Somalia.⁵²⁹ When the country faced its first major crisis since the civil war in 2014, the military was able to provide effective and professional services across the country. The professionalism and effectiveness of the RSLAF stands in strong contrast with the SLP, which continues to receive heavy criticism for excessive use of force and ineffectiveness, in addition to the challenges it faces regarding corruption and enforcing accountability.

Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Respect for human rights and the rule of law has improved since the pre-war era. Since post-conflict reconstruction first began, respect

⁵²⁷ Transparency International, "Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Sierra Leone" (London: Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme, 2015), https://government.defenceindex.org/generate-report.php?country_id=6336.

⁵²⁸ "Chapter 9: Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Military Balance* 114, no. 1 (2014): 456.

⁵²⁹ Josh Kron, "Somalia: Sierra Leone to Send Troops," *The New York Times*, November 3, 2011, sec. Africa, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/world/africa/somalia-sierra-leone-to-send-troops.html>.

for physical integrity rights has increased. However, as discussed above, there is significant variation across security institutions. While the RSLAF is respected as a professional force, the police are distrusted after repeated instances of violence. Survey data reveals a significant difference in public perception of the two forces, as depicted in Figure 5. In 2011/2012 (the first years data are available), 63.8% of people trusted the army “a lot” or “a very great deal.” By 2017/2018, that number had increased to 81.6%. In contrast, in 2011/2012 only 33.9% of people trusted the police; that number only increased to 36.8% by 2017/2018.⁵³⁰

Improvements to the quality of security sector governance have not only improved its legitimacy in the eyes of the population, they have left the country better able to respond to significant security threats. The outbreak and spread of the Ebola virus in 2014 launched the country into the greatest national security crisis since the civil war. The government’s response illustrates the gains made to security sector governance and the impact they had on maintaining domestic stability.

Security Response to the Ebola Outbreak

The government of Sierra Leone was late to recognize the security threat posed by Ebola. Despite the centralized structure of ONS and its mandate to coordinate a response to all issues of human security, the government called first upon the Ministry of Health and Sanitation to coordinate a response. After months of a “haphazard and ineffective” response, the government declared a national state of emergency in late July 2014, activating the security sector and delegating crisis response to a new unit headed by the President and the former Minister of

⁵³⁰ “Online Data Analysis: Sierra Leone,” Afrobarometer, 2020, <https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis>.

Defence. The new working group acted expeditiously, “with the sense of a military operation”, activating the security institutions to quickly implement stay-at-home orders, inform the population, and slow the spread of the disease.⁵³¹

When called upon to secure infected areas, the RSLAF successfully deployed and engaged teams of personnel in a timely and efficient manner. A UK advisor at the time argued that the success of this operation came from good leadership and strong command structures, showing an understanding among the officer corps of how to command and hold people accountable.⁵³² The military’s effective and professional response to the crisis further increased public confidence in the military and strengthened the institution’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.⁵³³ The high capacity of the RSLAF has made led the government to call upon it to fill more and more positions. Today, the RSLAF is much more than an army: it is the country’s crisis response and disaster management system.⁵³⁴

As with the RSLAF, the SLP’s response to the Ebola outbreak provided insight into its performance. Although the force showed surprising professionalism at the operational level, its participation in the Ebola response revealed major problems at the strategic level. For much of the early intervention, the integration of strategy and operations fell to the Inspector General of Police, as the rest of the SLP command focused solely on operational issues. This failure of delegation led to holes in the SLP’s response.⁵³⁵

⁵³¹ Osman Gbla, “Hybrid Security Governance Responses to Crises: The Case of the Ebola Response in Sierra Leone,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 7, no. 1 (2018): 6–8, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.612>.

⁵³² Quoted in Cathy Haenlein and Ashlee Godwin, “Containing Ebola: A Test for Post-Conflict Security Reform in Sierra Leone,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4, no. 1 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.gb>.

⁵³³ Interview with author, June 13, 2019.

⁵³⁴ Interview with author, June 24, 2019.

⁵³⁵ Haenlein and Godwin, “Containing Ebola: A Test for Post-Conflict Security Reform in Sierra Leone.”

Conclusion

The preceding sections outlined the security assistance received by Sierra Leone in the years following independence. Generally, the institutions that received the most institutional assistance have witnessed the greatest improvements in governance quality as well as operational effectiveness. In contrast, the SLP received mostly tactical and operational assistance, with the exception of the expertise provided by IGP Biddle. The introduction of local policing has led to important improvements in access to police services by the population. However, without an institutionalized plan for force professionalization, practices among the SLP have not improved.

The training and equipment provided to the SLP did not yield long-term governance improvements. Today, it is unclear how useful this aid has been – whether it fits into the wider scope of the reform process or optimizes the resources possessed by the force. Much of the equipment already provided to the force has fallen into disarray as the SLP’s budget is too small to maintain their transportation and communications systems.⁵³⁶ For their part, the British are forced to devote a significant amount of aid resources towards “fire-fighting” – addressing small emergencies as they appear, rather than working towards long-term reforms.⁵³⁷

The continued provision of equipment has created a dependency within the SLP on donor assistance, and an expectation that when machinery breaks down, it is up to the donor community to replace it.⁵³⁸ This problem extends beyond the SLP: one security official explained that the presence of the British prevented various security agencies from creating realistic

⁵³⁶ Bangura, “Democratically Transformed or Business as Usual,” 37.

⁵³⁷ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵³⁸ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

budgets: without a hard date set on the British exit, long-term strategies to deal with budget constraints were never developed.⁵³⁹

Some evidence suggests that the government has adopted policies to appeal to donors that weaken performance. One official argued that in an attempt to get more assistance from China, the government has started using its funds to purchase uniforms made in China, as opposed to taking advantage of the tailoring units in the RSLAF. This has not only prevented capacity building within the RSLAF, it has taken away much needed income from soldiers.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁹ Interview with author, June 18, 2019.

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with author, June 25, 2019.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Between the growing focus on foreign military capacity building and security sector reform, post-conflict states have received increasing amounts of security assistance to help rebuild and reform their security sectors. The track record of this assistance, however, has been mixed: while some states have been able to use that assistance to build professional and effective security forces, others have fallen back into historical patterns of patronage and repression. There is no clear relationship between security assistance and the probability that the states that receive it are able to secure peace. In this dissertation, I have aimed to provide one explanation for why this variation occurs.

Understanding the impact of security assistance on post-conflict governance is important for several reasons. Most importantly, the security assistance provided to states may have an important impact on whether it remains at peace or relapses into conflict. Beyond the immediate threat of conflict relapse, the quality of security sector governance is connected to a number of other important policy goods. Good security sector governance may support accountability and transparency in other sectors of the government. When the police and intelligence agencies respect the rule of law and operate under transparent and accountable management, they may be less vulnerable to politicization or manipulation by other state actors. In contrast, poor security sector governance may undermine political governance. The quality of security within a country is also an important factor in development: when states are mired in instability, communities are

less able to access the government services and protections required to build up their local economies.⁵⁴¹

Gains in security sector governance may lead to improved operational effectiveness as well. In her study of military effectiveness, Talmadge argues that the tenor of civil-military relations has significant implications for battlefield success. Take, for instance, Saddam Hussein's policy of promoting politically loyal Ba'athist officers. Conditioning promotion on political loyalty and ethnic affinity constituted an effective measure to prevent a coup d'état but proved to have catastrophic consequences on the army's ability to fight and win a conventional war.⁵⁴² Improving the processes of recruitment and promotion within security forces, as well as increasing transparency in selection for training opportunities, is likely to have noticeable benefits for the capacity and effectiveness of forces.

Summary of the Dissertation's Main Arguments

In the chapters that followed, I made a series of arguments. In Chapter 2, I argued that we should care about the effect of security assistance on security sector governance because the quality of governance is an important predictor for the likelihood that post-conflict states remain at peace. I based this argument out of the assumption that control of the security sector is a prize, one that is coveted by all parties to a conflict. Although most actors would prefer full control over the security sector, post-conflict regimes are more likely satisfy their opponents and their population when they adopt a governance structure that is inclusive, transparent, and

⁵⁴¹ OECD, "Security System Reform and Governance," 11.

⁵⁴² Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*, 62–64.

accountable. I present five main facets of security sector governance: (1) the presence of a formal institutional structure, (2) civilian control, (3) transparent and accountable management, (4) capacity to extend security throughout the country, and (5) respect for human rights and the rule of law. I argue that states with good security sector governance will be better able to assure their opponents that they are committed to power-sharing, which may reduce their justification to work outside the system. A series of logistic regressions provided support for this argument: states with higher levels of civilian control and lower rates of repression were less likely to relapse into conflict. Post-conflict regimes that followed through on their promises for security sector reforms were also less likely to relapse into conflict: Models 3 and 4 presented in Chapter 2 showed that states that agreed to and fully implemented reform programs in their police forces and military had a lower probability of conflict relapse.

Chapters 3 through 6 examined the relationship between security assistance and security sector governance. In Chapter 3, I presented a theory of why security assistance can lead to such divergent outcomes in post-conflict states. I argue that the effect of security assistance is a factor its level of fungibility: aid that is provided for education and institutional development (i.e. “institutional assistance”) is less likely to be misused and more likely to lead to governance improvements than aid that is provided to improve tactical and operational skills (i.e. “operational assistance”). The impact of this aid is further conditioned by the institutional context of the state receiving this aid: aid will have a larger effect on governance when it is provided during periods of regime vulnerability than when it is provided during periods of stability.

The cases examined in the chapters that followed were carefully selected to illustrate the effects of security assistance along a range of values in aid and regime vulnerability. Chapter 4

examines the experience of Côte d'Ivoire following the First Ivorian War (2002-2007) and the Second Ivorian War (2010-2011). The first and second peace spells in Côte d'Ivoire show a wide variation in assistance provided: after the First Ivorian War, donors provided large sums of assistance for reintegration, but little funding to support the integration and demobilization activities of the CCI and ADDR, respectively. Rather, the majority of support for the military was provided as operational assistance from France. Lacking resources, the CCI and ADDR were unable to make necessary progress in force integration and DDR. When elections came in 2010, Côte d'Ivoire relapsed into conflict. Learning the lessons of the First Ivorian War, donors jumped in to support DDR and SSR following the end of the Second Ivorian War in 2011. Unfortunately, security sector governance did not improve dramatically under Ouattara, either. While donors channeled millions more into institutional assistance, regime vulnerability was low: donors had little leverage over the victorious government to push for deeper reforms. Although it did not lead to serious declines in security sector governance, this aid did little to improve the professionalism, accountability, or quality of command and control of the Ivorian security sector.

Chapter 5 looks at Burundi, a state that received large inflows of both operational and institutional assistance during a period of moderate regime vulnerability. In Burundi, access to operational assistance in the early post-conflict period allowed the government to maintain a large umbrella of patronage in the military. By the time the Netherlands initiated its SSD program, it was too late: the government had already begun down a path of power consolidation. Although this aid did lead to improvements in the army that received the most institutional assistance, donors were unable to promote sector-wide reforms.

Chapter 6 presents the experience of Sierra Leone. Unlike donor efforts in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi, the British intervention in Sierra Leone was able to secure lasting security sector improvements. The British began negotiating a security sector reform plan with the Sierra Leonean government as early as 1998, while the future of the state and the security sector were still unclear. Working under an sector-wide framework for reforms, the British and other donors worked with the government to implement a series of structural reforms across the security sector. By the time the military began receiving high levels of operational assistance in 2011, it had been transformed into a professional force. Although this assistance did little to improve the capacity of the RSLAF, it also did not lead to a notable deterioration in governance quality.

Cross-Case Comparison

Separately, the case studies presented in this dissertation have allowed for a deeper examination of the causal mechanisms shaping the relationship between security assistance and security sector governance. This section will compare some of the variation among across cases.

The relative success of the Sierra Leonean army in instituting a coherent chain of command despite the tensions between troops strongly contrasts with the experience of Côte d'Ivoire, where parallel chains of command continue to threaten both military capacity and command and control. In Sierra Leone, the decision to integrate combatants both within and across units helped to establish unit cohesion and bolster the legitimacy of leaders from opposing groups. It also helped to prevent wartime social networks from persisting. At the same time, the experience of Burundi illustrates that platoon-level integration is not sufficient to build cohesion. Although military integration is generally considered a success, the persistence of parallel chains

of command within the army contributed to factionalization within the army when the 2015 crisis broke out.

The different military institutions established in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone give further evidence to the nature of reforms. The establishment of Horton Academy and the shared experience it created among officers was crucial in supporting greater unity among the officer corps and supporting the diffusion of essential norms of civilian control and democratic governance. The Ivorian military academy (*Centre Interarmées de la Formation Initiale des Militaires*) addressed the variation in basic training among enlisted soldiers, but did not include the focus on “soft skills” necessary to transform the officer corps.

When asked about the impact of donor assistance, an officer in the RSLAF argued that one of the most valuable results of the British intervention was that it pushed Sierra Leonean officials to undertake politically difficult reforms, such as installing such a strong corps of civilian leaders into the Ministry of Defense. This highlights one of the limits of nationally led reform projects in post-conflict states: rulers face strong political needs to support those who brought them to or kept them in power. In Sierra Leone, external advisors created a demand for necessary but unpopular reforms; more importantly, their presence also created a buffer for leaders to enact them protected from some of the domestic political pressures that might have prevented them from doing so otherwise. President Ouattara did not have this. Instead, the strong pressures from the FN leadership pushed him to impose “victor’s justice.”

The proliferation of donors and lack of a comprehensive strategy for reform weakened the impact of institutional assistance that was provided in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi. For example, Nicole Ball reports that SSD stakeholders in Burundi viewed the program’s forums as

fundamentally different from discussions held by the UNDP, which Burundians see as “one-off” events.⁵⁴³ Similarly, the uncoordinated anti-corruption seminars held by donors in Côte d’Ivoire had little impact on policy or policymakers.⁵⁴⁴ This supports the experience of the SLP who have received a series of individual training seminars from various donors, as opposed to the institutionalized training provided to RSLAF. Provided outside of an institutionalized framework, there has, to date, been no way of gauging the impact and longevity of these trainings. More significantly, it is likely that this lack of accountability has disincentivized those receiving the training from implementing it in their units.⁵⁴⁵

For the Dutch specifically, reform was limited by a failure of program leaders to build meaningful relationships with the powerholders that mattered in the Burundian government: CNDD-FDD leadership.⁵⁴⁶ Without the necessary buy-in from the government, the SSD could accomplish little more than surface-level reforms. Thus, although the SSD brought measurable improvements within the military, all gains were compromised once the crisis broke out. One of the greatest contributing factors to security sector reform success in Sierra Leone was the political buy-in by President Kabbah at the end of the war. This support was crucial for allowing the breadth and depth of reforms to occur; it created enough support to initiate structural reforms and gave the British authorization to hold politically contentious roles until institutions could develop independence. In Burundi, in contrast, one of the biggest impediments to deep security

⁵⁴³ Ball, “Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme,” 40.

⁵⁴⁴ Transparency International, “Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015: Côte d’Ivoire.”

⁵⁴⁵ Interview with author, June 20, 2019.

⁵⁴⁶ Erwin van Veen, “Double Dutch or Going Dutch? How Institutional Factors Influenced Security Sector Reform Policy in the Low Countries,” in *Strategy, Jointness, Capacity: Institutional Requirements for Supporting Security Sector Reform*, ed. Konstantin Bärwaldt (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018), 26.

sector reform was a lack of support among the highest-ranking officials – the ones who are responsible for initiating deep reforms and ensuring that they are respected.

This lack of high-level support was not a foregone conclusion: political buy-in can be gained. The experience of Uganda illustrates this. In an effort to gain political buy-in for the defense review process, the military officer leading the exercise communicated extensively with senior military officers and politicians. This informal networking proved to be essential in gaining their support for the process and the eventual product.⁵⁴⁷

Limitations

The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Sierra Leone provide strong support for a relationship between security assistance and security sector governance. Still, these findings are limited by the possibility of the endogeneity of aid and the confounding effect of regime vulnerability. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult in any study of aid and governance to disentangle the effects of donor motivation, regime intent, and aid itself. While qualitative studies may be better positioned to identify these competing influences, it may still be the case donors provide more governance aid to reform-minded states, which may have undertaken positive governance reforms regardless of the type or amount of aid they received.

The experience of Burundi provides some evidence that this may not be the case: after declaring his intention to stop sector-wide reforms from occurring, most donors should have questioned the commitment of Nkurunziza to implementing security sector reform. Despite this,

⁵⁴⁷ Ball, Gasana, and Nindorera, “From Quick Wins to Long-Term Profits? Developing Better Approaches to Support Security and Justice Engagements in Fragile States: Burundi Case Study,” 25.

the Netherlands pushed for a strong reform program, which was agreed to and implemented in the military. Although their program was ultimately ineffective in changing the broader security sector, their assistance had a measurable effect on the professionalism and behavior of the military.

Second, as mentioned earlier, the choice to implement governance reforms may actually be a factor of the internal balance of power, rather than external pressures. Regimes that come to power following a negotiated settlement may feel a greater need to accommodate the opposition than regimes that come to power following a military victory. In other words, regime vulnerability may be driving adoption of governance reforms, independently of aid. However, as most governance reforms involve giving the opposition more power, states that adopt these changes while in a state of vulnerability may actually be increasing the risk of relapse by bringing the balance of power closer to parity. This was the case following the First Ivorian War, which ended the fighting but left both parties mobilized and well-equipped and the regime in a state of high vulnerability. Rather than appeasing the opposition, Gbagbo chose not to implement deep governance reforms. Receiving relatively little institutional assistance, progress on SSR and DDR stalled, and the country quickly relapsed into conflict.

The experiences of Liberia and the DRC provide a valuable opportunity to explore these questions. While the post-conflict trajectories of these countries helped to drive my theory, I did not test it on them. Looking at their experiences now may help to gauge the validity of my theory outside of the three cases studied in depth. First, to examine the role of endogeneity in aid provision, I consider the role of donor motivation – did donors base their aid packages to support the reform preferences of the incumbent, or to support security interests?

Following the end of the Liberian civil war in 2003, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected to the presidency. As a former World Bank official and human rights advocate, she campaigned on promises of peace, development, and democracy. Upon assuming office, Johnson-Sirleaf made inclusion and security sector reforms major priorities. More importantly, she followed through on these priorities by reaching out to international partners to help fund an SSR program.⁵⁴⁸ With ongoing conflict in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, and a recent end to war in Sierra Leone, donors were anxious to end the cycle of violence in Liberia and prevent further destabilization of the region. When Joseph Kabila took office following the first democratic elections in the DRC in 2006, the international community praised the country for achieving such a milestone of good governance and began to organize programs to support political and security reforms. One year later, however, repression by state security forces was on the rise.⁵⁴⁹ By 2010, the government had made no more progress towards SSR than when Kabila first took office.⁵⁵⁰ Despite these signals, Western donors continued to provide aid in the interest of regional stability and to ensure continued access to the country's resource wealth.⁵⁵¹

If donors base their aid packages off of recipient state priorities, we should see variation in the amount of institutional assistance provided to Liberia and the DRC. Both Liberia and the DRC presented immediate security concerns to donors, raising the probability that donors might provide high levels of operational assistance in an attempt to secure peace. However, the

⁵⁴⁸ McFate, *Building Better Armies: An Insider's Account of Liberia*, 36–37.


⁵⁴⁹ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Congo: Staying Engaged After the Elections" (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 9, 2007), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congo-staying-engaged-after-elections>.

⁵⁵⁰ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda" (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 8, 2010), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congo-stalled-democratic-agenda>.

⁵⁵¹ Stearns, Verweijen, and Baaz, *The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity*, 70.

commitment to reform of Johnson-Sirleaf and Kabila varied significantly; hypothetically, donors should have provided a high level of institutional assistance to Johnson, and little institutional assistance to Kabila once it became clear that he was not committed to SSR.

Figure 7.1: Security Assistance to Liberia and the DRC



The real aid patterns defy what we would expect if aid was, in fact, endogenous to recipient priorities. As expected, both Liberia and the DRC received high levels of operational assistance. However, while Johnson received levels of institutional assistance that match her policy priorities, donors did not alter their aid practices to correspond with Kabila's revealed policy preferences. In fact, despite observations by experts that reforms had not progressed, donors continued to increase the amount of institutional assistance they provided.

The experience of Liberia casts further doubt on the concern discussed above of selection into governance reforms. When Johnson-Sirleaf took office in 2005, the country had been at peace for two years. Although she did not face the same level of stability enjoyed by President

Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire, her administration was bolstered by both the electoral victory she had won. The capture and arrest of Charles Taylor—the leader of the opposition and former president—in 2006 further reduced the vulnerability of her administration.⁵⁵² Johnson-Sirleaf was in a position of strength relative to the opposition, yet she initiated and carried out deep security sector reforms.

These cases do not prove that endogeneity and selection bias do not exist. However, they do support my assertion that observed relationships between aid and security sector governance cannot be solely attributed to these factors.

Contributions

Theoretical Contributions and Implications for Future Theory-Building

A growing body of literature has emerged examining the impact of SSR programs in post-conflict states. These studies have revealed important variation in the success of donor-funded projects and the mechanisms influencing the success of international aid. We know that security sector reform is most likely to be effective when it is accompanied by a strong government commitment to reform, when the reforms are tailored to the customs and norms of the post-conflict state, and when they engage local actors who take ownership of the program.⁵⁵³ Still, these studies leave important questions unanswered. The majority of scholars writing on

⁵⁵² McFate, *Building Better Armies: An Insider's Account of Liberia*, 36.

⁵⁵³ See, for instance: Alex J Bellamy, "Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 15, no. 2 (2003): 101–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150303903>; Brzoska, "Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations"; Paul Jackson, "Security Sector Reform and State Building," *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 10 (November 1, 2011): 1803–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610577>.

security sector reform employ single case studies to examine the impact of specific programs. This method allows for a deep analysis of the mechanisms and processes shaping that state's experience; however, it remains unclear how these factors function in other states. More importantly, studies on SSR rarely consider the impact of traditional military assistance flows on the quality of security sector governance in the states they examine. By focusing only on the SSR interventions underway, these studies leave unaddressed the effect that traditional military assistance may be imparting on states in question. Similarly, while the literature on traditional military assistance is growing, the majority of studies focus on a single assistance program, such as arms transfers or the US International Military Education and Training Program.⁵⁵⁴ By incorporating all forms of security assistance into my theory, this dissertation helps to explain why some governance interventions are successful when others are not.

Future Research

The process of examining these cases has illustrated several points for future work and examination. At the outset of this project, I did not have strong theoretical predictions regarding the interaction between different types of aid. The results of my case research suggest that there may be an interesting relationship between the levels of different types of security assistance. Future research into the potential threshold or interaction effects of different types of aid is needed to fully parse this relationship.

This dissertation also did not address the potential interaction of security assistance and development assistance on governance and post-conflict reconstruction. However, some

⁵⁵⁴ Bell, Clay, and Martinez Machain, "The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights"; Savage and Caverley, "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol"; Arvind Magesan and Eik Leong Swee, "Out of the Ashes, into the Fire: The Consequences of U.S. Weapons Sales for Political Violence," *European Economic Review* 107 (August 1, 2018): 133–56, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2018.05.003>.

evidence from Burundi indicates that the development aid practices of donors sent important signals to President Nkurunziza, which likely impacted his decisions to politicize the security sector. Specifically, although donors vocally pressed the government to more stringently uphold the spirit of the Arusha Accords in the early days of Nkurunziza's tenure, they did not alter stop providing development assistance.⁵⁵⁵ Future research into the impact of development assistance on security sector governance and the potential interaction effects of development and security aid would add an important dimension to our understanding of how donor decisions shape local policymaking.

Finally, this dissertation presented a strong empirical correlation between the quality of security sector governance and conflict relapse. Unfortunately, this study was limited by the availability of existing quantitative indicators for security sector governance. Future qualitative research into the dynamics of security sector governance and peace duration would add needed nuance to our understanding of this relationship, and could reveal the mechanisms through which governance is linked to relapse. This field would also benefit from an exploration into other potential measures for security sector governance, or the creation of new measures to capture dimensions such as integration, cohesion, transparency, accountability, and capacity of local forces such as the police.

The theory that I present in this dissertation presents important implications for the provision of security assistance to states emerging from conflict. In the following section, I will apply these insights to the case of South Sudan, a country that has been fighting an internal war for the past seven years.

⁵⁵⁵ Curtis, "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi," 89.

Policy Implications: Application of Theory to South Sudan

South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after decades of conflict with its former ruler. Its experience as an independent state has been dominated by civil war, costing the lives of up to 400,000 people and displacing as many as four million.⁵⁵⁶ Although the majority of fighting stopped in 2018, peace still hangs in the balance. Policy disagreements between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, Kiir's former Vice President and current rival, have left the country suspended between war and peace: although major fighting has stopped, violence continues. Earlier this year, Kiir and Machar made an important step towards ending the conflict, announcing the creation of a unity government on February 22, 2020. At the time, this agreement was heralded as "the most serious bid in years" towards ending the war.⁵⁵⁷ Today, it appears the peace is once again in jeopardy. Despite progress towards peace, Kiir and Machar have faltered on two key points: how to delegate state authority and how to integrate military forces.⁵⁵⁸ South Sudan is at a vulnerable point in its transition to peace.

The theory that I have presented in this dissertation presents clear policy implications for the approach of the international community towards South Sudan. The creation of a transitional government and deliberation of post-conflict policy occurring at the moment have created a situation of high regime vulnerability. Donors have an opportunity to influence positive

⁵⁵⁶ "Global Conflict Tracker: South Sudan," Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

⁵⁵⁷ Max Bearak, "South Sudan Forges 'Unity Government' in Bid to End Civil War That Has Killed 400,000," *The Washington Post*, February 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/south-sudan-forges-unity-government-in-bid-to-end-civil-war-that-has-killed-400000-lives/2020/02/22/4afea024-54f2-11ea-80ce-37a8d4266c09_story.html.

⁵⁵⁸ Denis Dumo, "South Sudan's Kiir, Machar Differ Over States, Jeopardising Unity Government," *Reuters*, May 8, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-politics/south-sudans-kiir-machar-differ-over-states-jeopardising-unity-government-idUSKBN22K244>.

governance changes if they provide high levels of institutional assistance under a coordinated framework.

When South Sudan emerged from its war with Sudan in 2005, it was faced with transforming an oversized guerilla force into a professional national army. In addition to integrating the various militias that made up the force, the government would have to severely reduce its numbers, bringing the force down from 210,000 to 90,000 soldiers. DDR failed. Little more than 12,000 fighters completed the official process; at the same time, the government recruited new soldiers into its military.⁵⁵⁹ Military integration also hit a snag. To maintain the loyalty of the disparate groups making up the new national army, President Salva Kiir appointed Riek Machar of a rival group as his vice president and appropriated the country's vast oil revenue towards the military. Rather than integrate and reform the force, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SLPA) remained in their wartime state: a collection of ethnic militias driven by patronage and personal loyalties.⁵⁶⁰ The failure of DDR and SSR following the end of the country's war with Sudan were major contributors to the outbreak of the current conflict. As in Côte d'Ivoire, the prevalence of armed fighters across the country created a combustible situation: a political crisis quickly exploded into conflict.

The South Sudanese civil war first broke out in late 2013, when President Kiir accused Machar of plotting a coup d'état and removed him from government. Shortly after his removal, clashes broke out across the country, which quickly escalated into organized violence. The

⁵⁵⁹ Lesley Anne Warner, "Force Reduction Key to South Sudan's Military Transformation," *World Politics Review*, November 5, 2012, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12473/force-reduction-key-to-south-sudans-military-transformation>.

⁵⁶⁰ Alex de Waal, "South Sudan's Corrupt Elite Have Driven a Debt-Free and Oil-Rich Country to Ruin," World Peace Foundation, June 15, 2016, <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2016/07/15/conflict-south-sudans-corrupt-elite-have-driven-a-debt-free-and-oil-rich-country-to-ruin/>.

majority of the conflict has been fought along ethnic lines, pitting the Nuer, who support Machar, against the Dinka, who support Kiir. The real roots of the conflict, however, are not found in ethnic rivalries, but weak state institutions – specifically, the oversized and unreformed army.⁵⁶¹

For the first nine years of independence, the US had been South Sudan's most significant international partner. Since 2011, the US has provided billions of dollars in development assistance and approximately \$460 million in security assistance.⁵⁶² That changed in January 2020, when the US government announced it would no longer support the much-delayed peace process and began placing sanctions on individuals associated with the conflict.⁵⁶³

The current moment provides an unparalleled opportunity for the international community to intervene in support of stabilization and security sector reform. The decision of the US to step back as South Sudan's largest international partner has created an opportunity for the African Union to step in to lead institutional reform efforts. A multilateral body such as the AU has a unique capacity to step in a politically-neutral body to assist with monitoring integration and DDR as well as mediation of any disputes that arise between groups.⁵⁶⁴

The 2013 AU Policy Framework on SSR emphasizes a commitment to the normative goals of democratic governance of Western SSR doctrine while stressing the importance of "African ownership." The emphasis the AU Policy Framework places on national and regional ownership creates a valuable opportunity for context-specific policies. Significantly, this

⁵⁶¹ Katharine Noel and Alex de Waal, "Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 14, 2016, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/understanding-roots-conflict-south-sudan>.

⁵⁶² Security Assistance Monitor, "Security Aid."

⁵⁶³ Nicholas Bariyo and Julia Steers, "U.S. Goes from Support to Sanctions for African Ally: Washington Punishes South Sudan After Giving It Billions, as Political Deadlock Prolongs Conflict and Raises Famine Risk," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 13, 2020, <https://search-proquest-com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/docview/2336241936?accountid=14214>.

⁵⁶⁴ Gwinyayi A Dzinesa, "South Sudan's Bid to Build a New Army Is Troubled," *Mail & Guardian*, February 20, 2019, <https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-20-00-south-sudans-bid-to-build-a-new-army-is-troubled/>.

framework includes provisions to address all five aspects of security sector governance I lay out in Chapter 2. To boost national ownership of reforms, the AU framework advocates for the use of national institutions to guide donor coordination. This provision may be valuable to promote local institutional development; however, donors should be careful to carefully monitor donor coordination, as the reliance on national structures for donor coordination has historically hindered the implementation of a cohesive, sector-wide reform plan.⁵⁶⁵

Key to the success of SSR will be effectively integrating soldiers into a unified national army and thoroughly disarming and demobilizing all remaining fighters. The importance of ethnic ties and personal connections among the various militia groups fighting in South Sudan will make military integration difficult, particularly during the cantonment phase. The easy fracturing of the military in the leadup to the current conflict suggests the importance of integrating troops at the platoon level in order to prevent wartime networks from persisting in the new military. Maintaining current leadership hierarchies creates a risk of recreating the experience of Côte d'Ivoire, where parallel command structures have allowed the military to languish as a politicized and unprofessional force. As the experience of Burundi shows, this approach can produce very high tensions without the promise of success. Still, until the 2015 crisis broke out, the FDN had made significant progress towards professionalization and showed surprising cohesion. It is likely that had the crisis been contained, the army would have continued to consolidate its progress.

The international focus on Kiir and Machar obscures the prevalence of rival militia leaders across the country, many of whom are likely to be wary of a peace deal that reduces their

⁵⁶⁵ See African Union Commission, "African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform" (Addis Ababa: African Union, April 13, 2013), <http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ssr>.

power and position.⁵⁶⁶ Donors should be wary of repeating the mistakes following the First Ivorian War, in which a lack of domestic and international funding for DDR hindered the dismantlement of militias across the country before elections take place.

In addition to supporting institutional reform, donors should refrain from providing operational assistance to the security institutions of South Sudan. Even with a strong institutional development program in place, operational assistance is unlikely to lead to great improvements in capacity in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. In the best-case scenario, this assistance would likely go to waste. Seven years of conflict have crippled the South Sudanese economy; it is highly unlikely that the government would have the funds to maintain expensive technology and equipment donations provided to the police force or military. In the worst-case scenario, this assistance would be used to reward political supporters in the security institutions, fueling politicization and undermining reforms.

⁵⁶⁶ Dzinesa, “South Sudan’s Bid to Build a New Army Is Troubled.”

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- 2017 *Research Assistant, Professor Daniel McDowell, Syracuse University*
- 2015 – 2016 *Research Assistant, Global Black Spots Project, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Syracuse University*

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- 2019 *Teaching Assistant, Professor James Steinberg, Syracuse University*
PAI 700: Security, Economic, and Political Challenges in Asia
- 2018 *Teaching Assistant, Professor James Steinberg, Syracuse University*
PAI 710: International Actors and Issues
- 2017 *Teaching Assistant, Professor Miriam Fendius Elman, Syracuse University*
PSC 322: International Security
Teaching Assistant, Professor Daniel McDowell, Syracuse University
PSC 124: Introduction to International Relations
- 2016 *Teaching Assistant, Professor Margaret S. Thompson, Syracuse University*
HST 341/PSC 329: The Modern American Presidency

Teaching Assistant, Professor Shana Gadarian, Syracuse University
PSC 315: Politics and Media

2015 *Teaching Assistant*, Professor Sarah Pralle, Syracuse University
PSC 308: Politics of U.S. Public Policy

2014 *Teaching Assistant*, Liceo Scientifico Statale “A. Volta” di Milano
English Language and Conversation

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Foreign Language: Italian (fluent), French (proficient)

Fieldwork: Sierra Leone (2018, 2019), Côte d’Ivoire (2019)

Archival Research: United States (2016)

PUBLICATIONS

“The Promise and Pitfalls of Security Sector Interventions: Examining the Medium-Term Impact of SSR in Sierra Leone” (*Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, Revise and Resubmit)

“In Sierra Leone, Corruption Isn’t Gone, but It Is Falling Under Bio” *World Politics Review*. April 2020.

“Is Côte d’Ivoire Headed Towards Another Conflict?” *World Politics Review*. September 2019.

“The Rhetoric of White Supremacist Terror: Assessing the Sources of Threat Attribution” (with Jason Blessing, Syracuse University). *Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism*. September 2018.

Works in Progress

“Aiding War or Developing Peace? Foreign Aid and Governance in Post-Conflict States”

ADDITIONAL WORKSHOPS AND TRAINING

2017 – Present Carnegie International Politics Scholars Consortium

2018 Columbia University’s Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS)

2017, 2018 Carnegie International Politics Scholars Summer Workshop

2017 Tobin Project Prospectus Development Workshop

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2019 ISSS-IS Annual Conference, Denver, CO
- 2019 Maxwell African Scholars Union, Syracuse University
- 2018 Political Science Research Workshop, Syracuse University
- 2016 Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University