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Spanish Conquest of the Americas was not Inevitable: Marronage as Resistance in Hispaniola

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at
Syracuse University

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and Renée Crown University Honors
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Honors Thesis in American History

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Abstract

There is a scholarly perception of Spanish colonization of the Americas as being inevitable. That following first contact, there was little opposition from the indigenous people living in the New World or the Africans who the Spanish trafficked there, with total conquest being rapid and effortless.¹ However, this was not the case and marronage, or the act of being a maroon and resisting enslavement, presented a real threat to the formation of the Spanish colonial state. Focusing on Hispaniola from 1492 to 1612, the Caribbean island serves as a microcosm of Spanish conquest due to its extensive history of colonization. Using a variety of letters and legal depositions ranging in date from 1523-1553 in addition to secondary sources in the form of journal articles and books, this thesis presents evidence that contradicts the traditional triumphalist narrative of Spanish conquest. Through acts of marronage, including maroon raids on Spanish settlements, the establishment of networks of connections across Hispaniola, protracted periods of guerilla warfare, the negotiation of treaties which established sovereignty, the extensive history of marronage in Hispaniola, and the continued existence of these communities in the face of attempted reconquest by the Spanish, maroons posed a serious threat to the Spanish colonial state in the Americas. Evidently, conquest was neither easy nor rapid, demonstrating that Spanish victory in the Americas was never inevitable.

¹ Mathew Restall, "The New Conquest History," *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (February 2012): 151.

Executive Summary

This thesis centers on Hispaniola, the Caribbean island modernly home to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, from 1492 to 1612, roughly from the start of the island's colonization by the Spanish,² to the approximate start of a period of decreased maroon activity due to Spanish efforts to depopulate certain areas where maroons were more active.³ Because of its extensive history of colonization, the Caribbean island serves as a microcosm of Spanish conquest. Maroons were indigenous and African or Afro-descended people who resisted colonial settlements through acts of rebellion, or marronage. This thesis specifically analyzes acts of grand marronage, where individual freedom seekers banded together to create autonomous maroon communities.⁴ Marronage was a form of long term resistance to colonial states in the Americas, and of great concern to colonial officials.⁵ It posed a serious threat to the Spanish colonial state in Hispaniola, and therefore demonstrates that conquest was neither easy nor rapid. This thesis analyzes many examples of maroons incapacitating the colonial government, openly rebelling against enslavers, successfully forcing the Spanish to treat with them and establishing sovereignty, and making reconquest – the act of conquering a previously conquered people again – of the island difficult and in some cases impossible due to maroons' purposeful implementation of tactics designed to exhaust the Spaniards hunting them.⁶

² Ida Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 590-2.

³ Robert C. Schwaller, "Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620," *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 631-5.

⁴ Richard Price, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 3.

⁵ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 3.

⁶ Erin Woodruff Stone, *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 143.

The traditional narrative of Spanish conquest of the Americas is triumphalist, with the perception of colonization being inevitable, rapid, and easy.⁷ Using a variety of letters and legal depositions ranging in date from 1523-1553 in addition to secondary sources in the form of journal articles and books, this thesis presents evidence that contradicts the traditional narrative of Spanish conquest. Analyzing these sources, this thesis contends that this narrative is inaccurate and that marronage did actually pose a serious threat to the Spanish colonial state, with maroons effectively resisting conquest for decades.

Although this thesis will draw upon well-known authors such as Richard Price, one of the first historians to research maroons and who published *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* in 1973, it also breaks with the traditional historiography (the way history is written) in order to advance my central argument – that marronage demonstrates Spanish conquest of the Americas was not inevitable. Traditionally, indigenous and African marronage are examined as discrete developments,⁸ despite evidence that not only did indigenous and African maroons coexist, but that they actively formed alliances with each other against the Spanish.⁹ This thesis demonstrates the extent and strength of these alliances.

Furthermore, in advancing my central argument, this thesis will also re-examine the *encomienda* system. The *encomienda* was a royal grant from the Spanish Crown where the person running it, the *encomendero*, could receive “tribute in goods and labor services from...Indians.”¹⁰ This grant was legally not a landed estate and only indigenous people were

⁷ Mathew Restall, “The New Conquest History,” *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (February 2012): 151.

⁸ See Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” for an example of a publication that discusses both African and indigenous marronage but does not present them as coexisting historical developments.

⁹ Erin Woodruff Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Espanola, 1500-1534,” *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2 (April 2013): 196.

¹⁰ Ronald W. Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas,” *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 46.

forced to labor under it.¹¹ As an *encomendero* could only own labor in a temporary and non-hereditary manner,¹² it is not considered slavery, which was lifelong, hereditary, and constituted ownership of a person.¹³ Thus, due to these legal stipulations, traditionally, the *encomienda* is not considered to be a form of slavery.¹⁴ However, despite the legal standard, in practice this standard rarely held up. Using historical evidence, I contend that there was in fact a de facto ownership through this system and that it was often a hereditary institution.¹⁵ This thesis draws upon the traditional historiography of marronage, but also breaks away from it at key moments.

Ultimately, through acts of marronage, including maroon raids on Spanish settlements, the establishment of networks of connections across Hispaniola, protracted periods of fighting, the negotiation of peace treaties, the extensive history of marronage in Hispaniola, and the continued existence of their communities, maroons posed a serious threat to the Spanish colonial state in the Americas. Evidently, conquest was neither easy nor rapid, demonstrating that Spanish victory in the Americas was never inevitable.

¹¹ Batchelder et. al., “The Encomienda,” 46.

¹² Batchelder et. al., “The Encomienda,” 46.

¹³ Batchelder, et. al., “The encomienda,” 49-50.

¹⁴ See Timothy Yeager, “Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown’s Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America,” Ida Altman’s “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America” or Robert Schwaller’s “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519-1620” for examples of different articles which do not define the *encomienda* as slavery.

¹⁵ See Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo” and Stone, *Captives of Conquest* for examples of historical evidence that support differences between the legal standards of the *encomienda* and how it operated in practice.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1519, the Spanish Caribbean colony of Hispaniola, the island now home to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, witnessed its largest and by far most successful rebellion by its enslaved laborers. The revolt was led by an indigenous Taíno *cacique* (Eng. Chief) named Enrique. By 1521 it became a joint effort with enslaved Africans, one of the first examples of this kind of collaboration between Africans and indigenous people against a European colonial power in the Caribbean.¹⁶ Enrique was born into a family of royal lineage in Hispaniola, and spent much of his childhood at the monastery of Verapaz where he was educated by Franciscan monks. He was taught to read and write, in addition to being Christianized by his conquerors like so many of the other Taíno in Hispaniola.¹⁷ By all accounts he lived an idyllic boyhood and was treated well by the Spanish authorities who governed his youth.¹⁸ What could have driven him to instigate such a violent and large-scale revolt?

In order to understand these acts of rebellion by indigenous and African people enslaved in Hispaniola, individual episodes such as Enrique's revolt must be understood as parts of a larger history of marronage, or the act of being a maroon. My research focuses on marronage specifically in Hispaniola from 1492 to 1612, roughly from the start of the island's colonization by the Spanish.¹⁹ Hispaniola was the birthplace of the Spanish colonial state in the Americas and functions as a microcosm of Spanish conquest. Through my research I demonstrate that acts of marronage, through maroon raids on Spanish settlements, the establishment of networks of

¹⁶ Erin Woodruff Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Española, 1500–1534," *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2, (April 2013): 196.

¹⁷ Ida Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 598.

¹⁸ A complete account of Enrique's early life can be found in Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo."

¹⁹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 590-92.

connections across Hispaniola, protracted periods of guerilla warfare, and the continued existence of their communities in the face of attempted reconquest by the Spanish, posed a serious threat to the Spanish colonial state in the Americas. Contrary to prevailing narratives of Spanish conquest, marronage in early Hispaniola shows that the process was not inevitable.²⁰

The very concept of marronage has Taíno roots, with the word being derived from *cimarrón*, a derivative of a Taíno word that refers to something that is wild.²¹ Those who came to be known as *cimarrones* fled to remote areas of Hispaniola, especially the mountainous region of the Bahoruco, survived outside of Spanish control for prolonged periods, and established their own communities in remote parts of the island.²² The reasons for this flight varied, but generally, flight was an act of resistance or rebellion to Spanish conquest and the deplorable and violent conditions to which indigenous and African peoples were subjected through colonial regimes including both the *encomienda* system and chattel slavery. Enrique was suggested to have revolted over a series of personal affronts, including the sexual assault of his wife, and the lack of response by the Spanish authorities, with the system effectively failing him.²³

These individual acts are important for understanding the history of marronage in Hispaniola. Marronage must be viewed as not just independent acts of rebellion, but as prolonged and successful resistance to the imperialism of the Spanish colonial state. There are two recognized forms of marronage, broken into what Richard Price in his book, *Maroon Societies*, deems petit marronage and grand marronage. Petit marronage was often “repetitive or periodic truancy with

²⁰ See Restall, “New Conquest History,” for a summary of the traditional narrative used by scholars when discussing Spanish conquest in the Americas.

²¹ See Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” for a description of the etymology of maroon. Based on this etymology, the author has decided to use ‘marronage’ in place of ‘maroonage.’

²² Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 610.

²³ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 595.

temporary goals.”²⁴ It happened frequently and was of little concern to colonial authorities because the temporary goals typically allowed for an enslaved person to be returned to their enslaver.²⁵ Grand marronage was of far greater concern, with individuals banding together to create these autonomous communities.²⁶ Although both are important historical developments, my research only focuses on longer term episodes of grand marronage. Continued references to “marronage” are specifically referring to grand marronage.

After fleeing their captors in these acts of marronage, maroons would establish communities within areas of Hispaniola that were difficult to access. These areas were unsettled by Europeans and considered *despoblado* (Eng. Unpopulated) by the Spanish despite the presence of maroons. Lands referred to as *despoblado* by the Spanish were rarely completely isolated. In reality, they were often lands that the Spanish were either unwilling to conquer or disinterested in settling.²⁷ In the case of maroon occupancy of *despoblado* lands, it was typically the former.

Cultural knowledge, especially that of indigenous agricultural and hunting practices, was essential to the survival of maroon communities.²⁸ For example, during the 1519 revolt initiated by Enrique and other Taínos, the cultivation of crops using practices native to the Taíno culture and the consumption of traditional foods were essential to the establishment of a sustainable community. It was through these experiences that the maroons were able to settle these areas.²⁹ A constant supply of food was critical to a group’s survival, especially given the difficulty of settling in these *despoblado* lands.³⁰ Although the harsh environments presented massive

²⁴ Richard Price, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 3.

²⁵ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 3.

²⁶ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 3.

²⁷ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 614.

²⁸ Schwaller in “Contested Conquests” notes that maroons were known to survive off of wild cattle and boar in the depopulated interior of Hispaniola.

²⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

³⁰ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 5.

obstacles to marronage, there was some deliberate action on the part of the maroons settling these areas. The harshness of the environments was useful for concealing and disguising settlements from invaders.³¹ Paths leading to villages were disguised and often traps were placed along false trails; clusters of homes were typically obscured by strong palisades.³²

Most critically, maroons were able to refine the use of guerilla warfare, utilizing a combination of ambushes and their natural environments in order to conduct raids on Spanish settlements and successfully defend themselves from encroachment or reconquest.³³ They established interconnected networks, along which maroon communities traded with each other and communicated across large distances. These networks also reached into the Spanish colonial state, allowing contact with Africans who were still enslaved.³⁴ Maroons conducted raids against the Spanish as well, with notable captains like Sebastian Lemba engaging in lengthy guerilla warfare against the Spanish in Bahoruco.³⁵ These periods of guerilla warfare demonstrate a serious lapse of Spanish power in Hispaniola. If conquest was truly inevitable and European powers were superior to anything else in the Americas, then threats like that of Lemba would be put down immediately, not engaged with.

Although these acts of guerilla warfare and the sustained survival of autonomous communities may seem small-scale and not necessarily actions constituting prolonged resistance, there is a wealth of Spanish acknowledgement of and treaty-making with these communities due to an inability to reconquer them and fear for citizens' safety. For example, maroon captains Diego Ocampo and Diego de Guzmán were both able to sue for their freedom, and were granted

³¹ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 5-6.

³² Price, *Maroon Societies*, 6.

³³ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 7.

³⁴ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

³⁵ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 40.

it by the Spanish following negotiations for the cessation of raids and other forms of guerilla warfare.³⁶ Enrique was also able to negotiate a peace treaty with the Spanish, with a clause recognizing the autonomy of his community and a legally binding assurance that they would not be subjected to reconquering.³⁷ Evidently, the activities of maroon communities, regardless of the duration of an individual community's survival, posed real threats to Spanish colonization of Hispaniola. I expand upon these acts of resistance to paint a more complete picture of maroon existence in this thesis and use them to support its larger argument, that marronage in Hispaniola demonstrates a substantial threat to Spanish conquest.

The success of these communities, and their acts of survival, which were often directly detrimental to the Spanish colonial state, is what makes the study of marronage so critical to understanding early America. I specifically analyze marronage in Hispaniola during the period of 1492 to 1612. This era runs from the start of Spanish colonization of the Americas, which began in Hispaniola, to 1612, the approximate beginning of a period of decreased maroon activity due to Spanish efforts to depopulate certain areas with more active maroon resistance.³⁸ Although I am using a narrowed time period, the 15th-17th centuries, and a specific location, Hispaniola, I demonstrate that Hispaniola represents a microcosm of Spanish colonization in the Americas. Marronage was in fact widespread and common throughout Spanish America with notable maroon captains in Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico.³⁹ However, Hispaniola has the longest history of colonization. Starting with Columbus's second voyage in 1493, there were campaigns of destruction and subjugation against the indigenous people on the island and the initiation of

³⁶ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 623.

³⁷ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 620.

³⁸ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 631-5.

³⁹ See Landers, "Leadership and Authority in Maroon Settlements in Spanish America and Brazil," for a brief discussion of these other maroon communities.

the trade in enslaved indigenous Taínos back to the Kingdom of Castile.⁴⁰ Thus, it is important to focus on the island, as it represents a critical turning point in Atlantic history as the first site of Spanish colonization of the Americas, and presents a unique history as the colony was colonized almost immediately after the “discovery” of the New World.

This microcosm can be used to demonstrate that Spanish conquest was not inevitable, breaking from the traditional narrative surrounding Spanish presence in the Americas. In “New Conquest History,” Matthew Restall discusses this triumphalist narrative of Spanish conquest. New Conquest History is a revisionist school of scholarship drawing on new forms of archival and paleographic work as well as the increased study of primary languages from Mesoamerica. A growing field during the 1990s, it was popularized largely by Restall himself in his publication “New Conquest History.” It “emphasizes multiple protagonists and accounts...the roles and interpretations of indigenous and black men and women” and new historical sources.⁴¹ This renewed emphasis on different narratives continues to be important in historical research, with some modern scholars of the Americas redefining which perspectives are incorporated. In “New Conquest History,” Restall argues that the original narratives of Spanish conquest “emphasized the inevitability and rapidity of military victory, religious conversion..., and colonization.”⁴² The undue significance given to the concept that conquest of the Americas was a straight line from first contact to total subjugation of the non-Europeans living there is detrimental to the telling of the history of the Americas. It is important to focus on historical developments that contradict these assumptions in order to more accurately discuss the relationships between New World

⁴⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 590-592.

⁴¹ Mathew Restall, “The New Conquest History,” *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (February 2012): 151.

⁴² Restall, “The New Conquest History,” 151.

colonial states and the African and indigenous people living within and outside of them. It is critical to study marronage in Hispaniola in order to contradict this inaccurate narrative.

Historiographic Overview

Marronage is not an extensively studied historical field, with interest typically being reserved to the Caribbean given the cultural importance of specific maroons or rebellions, such as the mythological and heroic legacy of Enrique in the modern day Dominican Republic as the leader of a last stand by the nation's surviving Taínos.⁴³ That being said, there have been some efforts on the part of mainland American historians to study this historical development more in-depth, originating with Richard Price in his pathbreaking work on marronage, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas*, originally published in 1973. It was the first systematic study of maroons in general, focusing on the mainland Americas (e.g. America, Mexico, Latin America) as well as the Caribbean. However, what is important to note about Price's work as well as the work of other authors who have contributed to the expansion of the field of marronage, such as Ida Altman in her publication, "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," is that these works do not generally incorporate a discussion of both indigenous and African marronage. When it is incorporated, it is not analyzed as a combined history.⁴⁴ African and indigenous marronage are typically viewed as discrete historical developments, isolating joint efforts such as those that occurred in early colonial Hispaniola.

Price, for example, in his book *Maroon Societies*, details an expansive history of African marronage in the Americas, focusing on a wide range of geographical locations, but leaving out

⁴³ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 587.

⁴⁴ See Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," for an example of a publication that discusses both African and indigenous marronage but does not present them as coexisting historical developments.

discussion of resistance by indigenous maroons in the Americas. Similarly, Ida Altman's 2007 work on the revolt of Enrique is one of the most detailed records of Enrique's life and the conditions of Spanish rule in Hispaniola which contributed to his rebellion, in addition to a discussion of the revolt and its aftermath. However, Altman solely focuses on indigenous marronage, despite the direct contributions of African maroons to this specific revolt.⁴⁵ This view of African and indigenous marronage as discrete events is typical for the historiography of maroonage. In this thesis, I move away from this antiquated view and focus on the combined efforts of African and indigenous maroons, drawing on the work of historian Erin Woodruff Stone, who incorporates this methodology of researching both African and indigenous marronage as a joint effort in her 2013 article "America's First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Española" detailing the 1519 revolt of Enrique. Incorporating Stone's process, I take an expansive look at the history of marronage from 1492-1612 in Hispaniola. Analyzing marronage as an African and indigenous phenomenon, I am combining the prior historiography's discrete understanding of both in my argument of the importance of marronage in demonstrating that Spanish conquest was not inevitable.

One important feature of this argument is my detailing of the role of the *encomienda* and the abuses suffered under it, which fueled indigenous revolts in Hispaniola, by correctly redefining the system as a form of slavery. The *encomienda* consisted of a royal grant from the Spanish Crown in which the person running it, the *encomendero*, could receive "tribute in goods and labor services from the Indians comprising the *encomienda*."⁴⁶ It was legally not a landed estate, but rather the *encomendero* was intended to own the labor in a temporary and non-hereditary

⁴⁵ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 196.

⁴⁶ Ronald W. Batchelder et al., "The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas," *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 46.

manner.⁴⁷ Due to these legal conditions of the *encomienda*, it is not considered to be a form of slavery in comparison with the later institution of chattel slavery that was utilized by the Spanish in Hispaniola that relied on the forced labor of Africans, which was both lifelong and hereditary and constituted the complete legal ownership of a person as well as anything they produced.⁴⁸

Typical publications which describe the role of the *encomienda* in Spanish society, such as Timothy Yeager's 1995 journal article "Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown's Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America" completely differentiate the institution from chattel slavery. Yeager, an economist, centers his argument around the legal stipulations of the *encomienda* rather than the practical ways in which it was imposed and functioned in a colonial settler state across the ocean from the Spanish Crown which was creating these laws.⁴⁹ However, historical articles which mention the *encomienda*, such as Ida Altman's "The Revolt of Enriquillo" or Robert Schwaller's "Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519-1620," also will not define the institution as slavery despite having a greater understanding of the conditions on Hispaniola in which it was allowed to operate. Although these systems were legally the standard, I argue that in practice the *encomienda* was in fact slavery as the legal standard rarely held up in practice in Hispaniola. Using historical evidence on the practice of the administration of the *encomienda*, I contend that there was in fact a de facto ownership of Taínos through this system and that it was often a hereditary institution.⁵⁰ This intervention is a complete shift from contemporary

⁴⁷ Batchelder et. al., "The Encomienda," 46.

⁴⁸ Batchelder, et. al., "The encomienda," 49-50.

⁴⁹ Timothy J. Yeager, "Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown's Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America," *The Journal of Economic History* 55, no. 4 (1995): 843.

⁵⁰ See Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo" and Stone, *Captives of Conquest* for examples of historical evidence that support differences between the legal standards of the *encomienda* and how it operated in practice.

historiography and understandings of the *encomienda* as an institution practically different from chattel slavery.

My research draws upon the pioneering work of revisionist New Conquest Historians who broke away from the traditional narratives of Spanish conquest of the Americas. New Conquest History was popularized in the 1990s through the work of historians who shifted focus away from Spanish conquistadors in Peru and Mexico, the countries in which the Aztec and Inca empires existed, and have produced alternative narratives using archival and paleographic work as well as analysis of Mesoamerican languages.⁵¹ Matthew Restall's "New Conquest History" includes a complete analysis of the works of these historians and lists groundbreaking publications such as James Lockhart's *We People Here: Nahuatl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico* or Jeanette Peterson's *The Paradise Garden Murals of Malinalco*, both published in 1993.⁵² These narratives "emphasize multiple protagonists and accounts...the roles and interpretations of indigenous and black men and women" and examine understudied regions of the Americas. However, even with this expansion of the scope of American history and the focus of historians on under-researched cultures and historical figures, there is still a central focus on Mesoamerica in New Conquest History.⁵³ In my research, I utilize the key concepts of New Conquest History, such as its focus on indigenous and black perspectives and roles as well as a rejection of the traditional narrative of Spanish conquest which focuses on "the inevitability and rapidity of military victory" and places undue emphasis on the use of religion in the conquest of the indigenous people.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, I move away from the New Conquest History's focus on

⁵¹ Restall, "New Conquest History," 151.

⁵² See Restall, "New Conquest History," for a more complete list of these works.

⁵³ Restall, "New Conquest History," 151.

⁵⁴ Restall, "New Conquest History," 151.

Mesoamerica and the mainland towards the Caribbean, applying these principles and concepts to an area less studied, Hispaniola.

Chapter Outline

In my second chapter, “Maroon Communities and Their Peoples,” I explain the structure of maroon societies in Hispaniola. I primarily center on maroon communities in Hispaniola, but I also supplement some of my research with authors such as Richard Price in *Maroon Societies* in order to establish common features of these communities.⁵⁵ I discuss the settlement and development of maroon communities and the ways in which they were governed. Additionally, I examine how maroons sustained themselves through the use of raids and an interconnected network of communication.⁵⁶ Analyzing several notable treaties, I demonstrate the importance of treaties in establishing the sovereignty of maroon communities.⁵⁷ I also elaborate upon the importance of indigenous techniques of land cultivation and animal husbandry, as well as the ways in which maroons were able to utilize skills gained through their enslavement to their advantage against the Spanish colonial authorities.⁵⁸ Focusing on the utilization of these skills and other forms of cultural knowledge, I demonstrate that they were integral in maroons remaining outside of the realm of the Spanish colonial state.

In my third chapter, “Indigenous Resistance to Spanish Colonization,” I analyze and describe the various forms of indigenous resistance that existed in Hispaniola prior to the introduction of large scale African slavery. Focusing largely on the most documented of these instances of

⁵⁵ As colonial authorities did not document the cultural aspects of maroon communities and maroons could not always document their own history, within the historical record there is a relative gap of information specific to marronage in Hispaniola. As a result, the author relies on secondary sources which discuss marronage more generally to supplement their research.

⁵⁶ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

⁵⁷ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

⁵⁸ Schwaller in “Contested Conquests” notes that Sebastian Lemba and his men would ride horses to travel between locations, a skill learned from their relationships to cattle farming.

indigenous resistance, Enrique's revolt, I discuss the factors which likely influenced Enrique's decision to rebel, and his early life, spent largely with Franciscan monks, where he became educated in the ways of the Spanish.⁵⁹ Then, drawing upon the lengthy history of indigenous resistance to colonization in Hispaniola, I discuss what tactics were used and how indigenous people were able to successfully repel attacks and create alliances which benefitted themselves at the expense of the Spanish.⁶⁰ I analyze the strategies used by the indigenous maroons during Enrique's revolt, drawing on Ida Altman's article on the rebellion, "The Revolt of Enriquillo." Finally, I conclude this chapter by highlighting the importance of indigenous marronage in breaking away from traditional perceptions of Spanish conquest as inevitable and rapid.⁶¹

In my fourth chapter, "Spanish Systems of Forced Labor and Joint Rebellion," I discuss the forms of slavery that existed in Hispaniola during my period of research. I provide an explanation of the *encomienda* system of forced labor to which the Taínos were subjected and present a consideration of the *encomienda* as slavery, not just forced labor. Breaking from earlier historiography, I present my argument as to why the *encomienda* in practice is distinct from chattel slavery. I also include a brief discussion of why there was a transition away from the *encomienda* in Hispaniola c. 1520 where the Spanish initially enslaved non-Taíno indigenous groups, then trafficked Africans, to replace the declining Taíno population.⁶² Illustrating the differences between the *encomienda* system and chattel slavery, I demonstrate what combination of factors fueled Spanish trafficking of Africans to the island. I then explain the importance of differentiating African identity in slavery, including a discussion of the differentiation between enslaved *ladinos*, African people or people of African descent who were typically acculturated to

⁵⁹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 589.

⁶⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 45.

⁶¹ Restall, "The New Conquest History," 151.

⁶² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

Spanish society and were skilled laborers, and *bozales*, who were forced to labor in the ways we currently associate with chattel slavery and were often directly trafficked from West Africa.⁶³

Although the Spanish did not traffic West Africans from one specific tribe, it is hard to distinguish the origins of enslaved Africans in Hispaniola. Spanish records for Hispaniola often only refer to African people through the use of these imposed racial identities, *ladino* and *bozal*. I briefly argue why the Spanish did not more accurately document where people were trafficked from in Africa and how it relates to Spain's colonial Eurocentrism. I conclude my third chapter by drawing on a 1545 letter from the Spanish Prince Philip and Erin Woodruff Stone's key argument in her article, "America's First Slave Revolt," in order to discuss the 1519 revolt led by the *cacique* Enriquillo and the 1521 Christmas Rebellion led by enslaved Wolof Africans. By focusing on these revolts as a joint effort by indigenous and African maroons, as they are typically considered discrete events, I demonstrate the extent that indigenous and African maroons coexisted and actively allied together against the Spanish.

In my concluding chapter, centralizing my argument to Hispaniola, I contend that maroons' abilities to stay outside of reconquest by the Spanish through rebellion, raids, guerilla warfare, negotiations, and sustained survival indicates a real threat to Spanish colonization and refutes the traditional narrative that this conquest was inevitable or rapid.⁶⁴ This chapter is framed around the central research question of "How does marronage in Hispaniola contradict the idea that Spanish conquest was inevitable?" Arguing that maroons do represent an impactful form of resistance to Spanish encroachment, I provide a summary of my main research points from my previous chapters in order to illustrate that rebellion and prolonged occupation of areas like the Bahoruco show the degree to which Spanish conquest was contested in Hispaniola. Throughout

⁶³ Jane Landers, "Africans in the Spanish Colonies," *Historical Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1997): 86-87.

⁶⁴ Restall, "The New Conquest History," 151.

this thesis, I reference a variety of secondary sources in the form of journal articles and books in addition to letters and legal depositions ranging in date from 1523-1553 which provide insight into the Spanish Crown and Hispaniola's colonial government's views on marronage and the true threat it posed to the establishment of Spanish colonies in the New World.

Chapter 2

Maroon Communities and Their Peoples

Born in the Congo region of West Central Africa, a man who came to be known as Sebastian Lemba arrived in Hispaniola sometime in the 1520s. Soon after his arrival on the island, he took advantage of the unrest stemming from a 1519 rebellion orchestrated by the indigenous Taíno people of Hispaniola.⁶⁵ Lemba joined ranks with other African and indigenous maroons in the mountains of the Bahoruco, a region that straddles the south of the present-day Dominican Republic and Haiti,⁶⁶ where the rebels' leader, a Taíno *cacique* (Eng. Chief), had located his camp.⁶⁷ When the *cacique*, known as Enrique or Enriquillo, negotiated a 1534 peace for the indigenous people within his tribe, hostilities ceased and one of the longest maroon rebellions in Hispaniola was believed to be at an end.⁶⁸ Following the Spanish government's approval of the peace, however, some African maroons decided to break away from Enrique when they faced a forced relocation to Sabana Buey.⁶⁹

Lemba was one of these men. He remained in the Bahoruco, using the region as a base for his raids throughout the 1530s and early 1540s.⁷⁰ He was a skilled fighter and adept at riding on horseback, a skill gained through his time enslaved and working amongst cattle herders.⁷¹ Lemba was furthermore a man of importance in the Bahoruco, one of several key leaders out of the “two

⁶⁵ Ana Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle in Hispaniola: From indigenous Agitators to African Rebels,” *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 11, no. 7 (May 2018): 85.

⁶⁶ The Bahoruco mountain range is now split between the countries of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. During the 1500s and early 1600s, the entire island was considered territory of Spain. Modernly, the Bahoruco mountains only refer to a portion of what the territory would have been – maroons occupied both *Sierra de Bahoruco* in the Dominican Republic and *Chaîne de la Selle* in Haiti. See Schwaller, “Contested Conquests” for maps of Hispaniola in the 1500s depicting locations of high maroon activity.

⁶⁷ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 598.

⁶⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

⁶⁹ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁷⁰ Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 624.

⁷¹ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

or three thousand maroons” present in the area.⁷² In 1545, when *Oidor* (Eng. Judge) Alonso Cerrato proposed a peace treaty with the maroons still active in the Bahoruco, the terms were rejected. Cerrato “declared war on the maroon constituencies in 1547” and moved further into the mountains in pursuit.⁷³ Lemba was killed in combat with Spanish militia at the hands of an African soldier.⁷⁴ The captain was so despised by the Spanish that his head was displayed in a city square after his death as a warning to those who dared to rebel. As detailed in a 1553 legal manuscript documenting witnesses’ memories of the war against Captain Lemba and his militia, the image was poignant enough to be remembered years later.⁷⁵

Today, Lemba is memorialized by a 1980 statue dedicated in his honor in Santo Domingo. His statue was once adorned with a plaque that read “Defender of the rights of the slaves brought to these lands by the Conquistadors just as he was, from the African continent. In 1532, he headed an act of resistance that, with the passing of the years, converted into a true rebellion.”⁷⁶ The marker has since been moved to a different location inside the *Museo del hombre dominicano* (Eng. Museum of the Dominican Man). Hated during his lifetime and rewarded in death centuries later by a statue memorializing his triumph against those who oppressed him, Lemba is a key example of the turning tides of maroon historiography. What was once considered important enough to document – the legacy of a war against those considered the enemies of the Spanish state – has been replaced by another narrative, one which centers on the

⁷² Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.


⁷³ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁷⁴ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁷⁵ Archivo General de Indias, Justicia, 76, F.1592V.-1594R., Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-062-manuscript/transcription/](http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-062-manuscript/transcription/).

⁷⁶ “Sebastián Lemba,” The Historical Marker Database, last modified June 3, 2018, <https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=118055>. “Defensor de los derechos de los esclavos traídos a estas tierras por los conquistadores al igual que él, desde el continente africano. En 1532 encabezó un acto de resistencia que con el correr de los años, se convirtió (*sic, convirtió*) en una verdadera rebelión.” (Translated from Spa. to Eng. by Author)

acts of rebellion by a people trafficked and subjugated as subhuman chattel. The scarcity of Spanish colonial documentation of maroon life and culture has constrained my work, just as it has constrained our remembrance of and tribute to revolutionary maroons like Lemba. Despite this, as I endeavor to tell the full story of marronage in Hispaniola, this chapter sheds light on the forgotten lives of maroons and situates their struggles within the broader story of anti-colonial resistance during the early periods of American colonialism.



Pictured is the Dominican Cultural Ministry's plaque dedicated to Lemba as well as the statue depicting him outside of the *Museo del hombre dominicano*. Note the broken chains around Lemba's wrists and his defiant pose. The statue's base bears his given surname.

Self-government and Leadership

Although there exist colonial records of maroon activities in Hispaniola, these are largely focused on the more violent aspects of this form of resistance. Letters to the King, as well as surviving legal documents, are centered on colonists' and colonial officials' discontent with runaway enslaved laborers or fears of the murder of Spanish subjects and violent raids on Spanish settlements.⁷⁷ Colonial authorities did not seek to document the cultural development or survival tactics of maroon communities. Thus, there is a relative absence of information specific

⁷⁷ See list of primary sources located in Sources Cited for examples of information documented about maroons in Hispaniola 1523-1553.

to marronage in Hispaniola within the historical record. Therefore, when discussing the establishment of maroon communities and the formation of their leadership and self-government throughout this chapter, I will be drawing on secondary sources which detail marronage not specific to Hispaniola, but rather within the Americas as a whole. These other sources establish the core characteristics of maroon communities and their settlements, which can then be expanded and generalized to Hispaniola, bridging some of the historical gap.

Maroon towns were “often organized under the leadership of an African and, in some camps, political and military leadership were divided.”⁷⁸ Although by the 1530s, African leadership was a growing component of maroon towns in Hispaniola, there would certainly still have been communities that were guided primarily by indigenous Taíno leaders like Enrique. Taíno maroons were active well into the 1530s, despite population decreases resulting from the introduction of Spanish disease and poor labor conditions.⁷⁹ A 1532 revolt led by Tamayo, another Taíno *cacique* acting somewhat in tandem with Enrique, was a notable instance of indigenous marronage and resistance.⁸⁰ Given the continued presence of indigenous maroons in primary sources dating back to this period, it is likely that in addition to African leadership, there would have also been indigenous leadership. Communities comprised of a majority Taíno population or those with a more mixed ratio of Africans and Taínos were also likely to have still been present in the 1530s given that African and indigenous maroons were known to work together, as demonstrated by Enrique’s revolt in 1519 and the Christmas Revolt in 1521.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” *Historical Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1997): 86.

⁷⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

⁸⁰ Erin Woodruff Stone, *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 145-6.

Richard Price, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 5.

⁸¹ Erin Woodruff Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Espanola, 1500-1534,” *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2 (April 2013): 209.

There were certain notable maroon captains who operated within Hispaniola, the three most well-known African maroons being Sebastian Lemba, Diego Ocampo, and Diego de Guzmán. All three centralized their operations within certain provinces during the 1540s, to differing extents.⁸² They gained notoriety by raiding throughout the island, with Diego de Guzmán typically attacking areas around La Vega and Sebastian Lemba operating out of the Bahoruco. Each of these men were known to use horses to travel greater distances, with Diego Ocampo raiding the largest portion of the island – La Vega, Azua, the Bahoruco, San Juan de la Maguana, and Puerto Plata.⁸³ They were prolific in targeting the Spanish, and by 1545 some “officials feared that maroons could take the entire island if they chose.”⁸⁴ Not much is known about their lives outside of their exploits at the expense of the Spanish.

While more is known about Sebastian Lemba, who was born somewhere in the Congo and joined up with Enrique’s rebellion during the 1520s, before establishing his own base in the Bahoruco,⁸⁵ there is little recorded about the early lives of Ocampo or de Guzmán. Ocampo and de Guzmán sued for their freedom from the Spanish state in 1546, with Ocampo negotiating directly with a resident of Puerto Plata. Ocampo and his family – specifically his wife and two of his cousins – were freed and he agreed to work with the Spanish as a slave catcher.⁸⁶ De Guzmán sued for his freedom soon after, although he negotiated just a personal pardon. Like Ocampo, he agreed to work to capture escaped enslaved people and to combat maroon raiding.⁸⁷ Lemba, unlike his contemporary counterparts, did not sue for his freedom. In fact, he continued raiding for two more years after Ocampo and de Guzmán surrendered in exchange for their freedom.⁸⁸

⁸² Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

⁸³ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

⁸⁴ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

⁸⁵ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁸⁶ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

⁸⁷ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 623.

⁸⁸ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 623.

Lemba was killed in combat in 1548 after evading Spanish patrols for more than a year in the Bahoruco following raids on estates in San Juan de la Maguana and Azua.⁸⁹ Lemba's death was seen as the end of maroon activity on the island.⁹⁰ Although evidently that was not the case, it speaks to his importance as a maroon captain in the eyes of the Spanish.

The history of indigenous leadership in Hispaniola is even less well documented than that of African maroon captains. There is only one well-known Taíno leader, Enrique, who led a 1519 revolt against the Spanish, although there are several mentions of other smaller revolts in the historical record.⁹¹ Enrique spent most of his youth at the monastery of Verapaz where he was educated by Franciscan monks and learned to read and write Spanish.⁹² By lineage, he was a *cacique*, which meant he would have ruled over a Taíno *cacicazgo* within the island.⁹³ Enrique and his people were absorbed into the *encomienda* system with the passage of a new *repartimiento*, an informal division of indigenous labor,⁹⁴ in 1514.⁹⁵ His people were destined to be divided between two *encomenderos*, Francisco de Valenzuela and Francisco Hernández, under the new terms.⁹⁶

Initially, Enrique was willing to cooperate within the system and moved to San Juan de la Maguana with his people, where the *encomenderos* were located. However, just five years later he fled into the Bahoruco Mountains with thirty or forty of his people in tow.⁹⁷ Enrique initiated one of the longest-lasting revolts in the history of marronage in Hispaniola, successfully evading

⁸⁹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 624.

⁹⁰ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 625.

⁹¹ See Manuscript 034 in Sources Cited for mentions of indigenous revolts.

⁹² Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 589.

⁹³ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 590. A *cacicazgo* refers to a territory similar to a kingdom, but connotes a person-based "rule" rather than a European understanding of a kingdom as ownership of land. A *cacique* would rule over a *cacicazgo*.

⁹⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 592.

⁹⁵ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

⁹⁶ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

⁹⁷ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

the colonial militia for nearly a decade and a half.⁹⁸ In 1534, he agreed to a peace treaty with the Spanish Crown, ending the revolt. He was able to successfully establish a new community near Azua for his family and his people.⁹⁹ Enrique died a year after the ratification of his treaty, a free man in Sabana Buey.¹⁰⁰

Leadership was established in maroon societies in a number of ways, with authority being derived from “political seniority, religious power, military prowess, and corporate or familial connections.”¹⁰¹ Some of these leaders established themselves through founding their settlements, although their ability to maintain their position within the community as a political or military authority would have been what solidified their status within the settlement.¹⁰² It was common in other parts of Spanish America and Brazil for maroon rulers to gain some degree of power by making a claim of royal heritage, often one which dated back to their tribal ethnicity or nation of origin in Africa.¹⁰³

Additionally, national origin was important in governing maroon communities. In some settlements there was an ethnic division of military responsibilities, with a war captain belonging to a certain ethnic group assuming leadership over men who were of that same ethnicity.¹⁰⁴ This shared African ancestry likely created a sense of companionship that persisted even in the Americas. Furthermore, older maroons in more established settlements or those who had come directly from Africa could bring with them “direct knowledge about African social and political

⁹⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 587.

⁹⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 607-8.

¹⁰⁰ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 211.

¹⁰¹ Jane Landers, “Leadership and Authority in Maroon Settlements in Spanish America and Brazil,” in *Africa and the Americas: Interconnections during the Slave Trade*, ed. José C. Curto and Renée Souldre-La France (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 173-184.

¹⁰² Landers, “Leadership and Authority, 175.

¹⁰³ Landers, “Leadership and Authority, 175.

¹⁰⁴ Landers, “Leadership and Authority, 176.

models” which could then be replicated within new communities.¹⁰⁵ The same can be said about Taíno leadership in Hispaniola, with some traditional methods of organization, specifically chiefdom divisions and different *cacique* rankings within a community, persisting within Enrique’s rebellion when the maroons relocated to the Bahoruco.¹⁰⁶

There are no clear records of the ethnicity of African people who arrived in Hispaniola, as the Spanish typically referred to enslaved people through the terminology of *ladino*, an enslaved person acculturated to Spanish customs and norms, and *bozal*, an enslaved person who was directly from Africa, unaccustomed to Spanish cultural norms.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, it cannot be determined whether or not African maroons in Hispaniola would have used claims of royal lineage to their advantage or whether leadership divisions were impacted by ethnicity, as there are too many unknowns when it comes to national origin and ethnicity.

However, Enrique’s lineage was certainly a benefit to his establishment as a maroon leader. Enrique was the grandnephew of Anacaona, the principal wife of Caonabó, “a leading cacique of the island at the time that the Spaniards arrived with Columbus.”¹⁰⁸ Anacaona was the sister of another *cacique* and she eventually succeeded him as the ruler of Jaraguá in the southwest of the island.¹⁰⁹ Due to these royal origins, Enrique’s initial group of followers derived from his inherited *cacicazgo*, although certainly diminished at that point in time.¹¹⁰ Enrique was well-regarded by those who followed him for his intelligence and military strategy,¹¹¹ and eventually

¹⁰⁵ Landers, “Leadership and Authority,” 176.

¹⁰⁶ See Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 590 for a description of Taíno political organization, 610 for an example of Enrique’s continued use of chiefdom divisions, and 600 for an example of collaboration with a *cacique* of lesser status.

¹⁰⁷ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86-7.

¹⁰⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

¹⁰⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

¹¹⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 610.

¹¹¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 601.

Taíno from other chiefdoms as well as African maroons joined ranks with him.¹¹² However, his lineage was essential to his establishment as an authority figure within his community although eventually it was military prowess that solidified his position.

Maroon Settlement Overview

As Richard Price shows in his groundbreaking work on maroon societies in the Americas, maroon communities had to be practically inaccessible to have any chance at success. In order to establish a village, maroons had to settle areas which were not already occupied by colonists and that were far away enough from settlements to provide refuge from those who sought to re-enslave them. This often meant living in areas which were difficult to settle due to harsh terrain, lack of fertile ground, or less than desirable surroundings.¹¹³ These areas in Hispaniola were referred to by the Spanish as *despoblado* (Eng. Unpopulated). Considered unworthy of conquering due to a lack of desirable features, *despoblado* lands provided refuge for maroons fleeing the colonial state.¹¹⁴ With great suffering and hardship, these areas would be settled. Depending on whether maroons in that area had the benefit of cultural knowledge and experience, the founding of the village could be easier.¹¹⁵

Although the harsh environments presented massive obstacles to the initial preservation of the community, the undesirable and dangerous features of the terrain were often utilized to the advantage of the maroons who successfully settled within them.¹¹⁶ Successful communities worked with their surroundings, concealing or disguising their settlements. Price in *Maroon Societies* tells us that maroons would create a series of false trails in order to trick potential

¹¹² Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 610.

¹¹³ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 5.

¹¹⁴ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 614.

¹¹⁵ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 5.

¹¹⁶ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 5.

invaders. Some were even filled with traps to harm those who tried to attack the community. Maroons residing within these towns would know which paths would take them to their village and which were trapped to keep outsiders away.¹¹⁷ Price also adds that often villages were surrounded by strong palisades, an additional defense against siege. These palisades helped with protecting the community and strengthening guerilla warfare, the typical tactic used by maroons. The natural environment aided ambushes and made it easier to take on enemies who had better access to firearms.¹¹⁸

The most successful and long-lasting of these settlements in Hispaniola were within the mountainous Bahoruco area.¹¹⁹ First settled by an indigenous *cacique*, Enrique, and his people following a 1519 revolt against their Spanish enslavers, the space was used with increasing frequency into the 1530s as a refuge for maroons.¹²⁰ Even as the Spanish invaded the Bahoruco over the course of the 1540s in response to an uptick in maroon resistance and entrenchment within this area, they would seldom succeed in fully eradicating the community's population in attacks.¹²¹ Not all maroons would be captured or killed, allowing those who remained to move further into the unsettled 'wilderness' of the area and occupy new territories.¹²²

Maroon captains such as Sebastian Lemba would use the Bahoruco as a base for raids, benefiting from the natural defenses the area provided.¹²³ Raiding was typically a gendered activity, with reports of raids centering on male captains and fighters.¹²⁴ But marronage – the act of running away – is not in itself a gendered activity.¹²⁵ This is evidenced most prevalently by

¹¹⁷ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 6.

¹¹⁸ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 6.

¹¹⁹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 610.

¹²⁰ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 620.

¹²¹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 624.

¹²² Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 617.

¹²³ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 624.

¹²⁴ See primary sources located in Sources Cited for examples of the records of raiding in Hispaniola 1523-1553.

¹²⁵ Landers, "Africans in the Spanish Colonies," 86.

the importance of *ganadoras* (Eng. Winner/Successful, Fem. Plural), women who would assist in the selling of goods stolen from Spanish cities in raids.¹²⁶ This meant that not all communities were established as a safehold for guerilla groups, as was the case with Lemba and other maroon captains operating in Hispaniola, indicating that different communities served different purposes.

Although many of the remote camps were originally settled by male freedom seekers and established to help sustain the raiding of Spanish towns and create trade routes, “Over time, the successful bands evolved into more settled and sexually balanced communities.”¹²⁷ Even as marronage transitioned into a more stable way of life, with maroon villages seeking self-sufficiency through “agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and gathering, and contraband trade,” often with enslaved Africans or impoverished Europeans,¹²⁸ there continued to be a need for guerilla hideouts, as demonstrated by maroon captains Sebastian Lemba, Diego Ocampo, and Diego de Guzmán operating well into the 1540s.¹²⁹

The desire of some communities for stability and a mixed economy clearly demonstrates that not all maroon towns served similar purposes. Certain communities were hideouts, or trading posts, where militant guerilla captains could shield their men from Spanish militia and trade raided items with those still enslaved.¹³⁰ Some were havens for insurgent maroons of all ages and genders, as was the case with Enrique; “by the latter stages of the rebellion they constituted a...community of several hundred that included women and children.”¹³¹ Although there is no exact count of the number of women present in Enrique’s camps, Dominican missionary Bartolome de Las Casas noted that it was significant enough that “the women and children and

¹²⁶ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

¹²⁷ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹²⁸ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹²⁹ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 623.

¹³⁰ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

¹³¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 598.

elderly would live at all times” in huts spaced far enough away from each other in the mountains so as to decentralize the rebels’ total numbers.¹³² Other communities were formed to provide shelter to the growing number of escaped Africans trafficked and enslaved in Hispaniola, with numbers keeping maroon populations in areas like the Bahoruco steadily rising even after attacks by the Spanish.¹³³ Eventually, certain areas became home to large towns, with four of these settlements, numbering more than 1,000 residents, being established in Hispaniola by the mid-17th century.¹³⁴

Evidently, maroon communities in places such as the Bahoruco in Hispaniola were established in waves, with some settlements serving different purposes depending on which group founded it. These communities were located in the harshest parts of the island, often making use of the natural environment when establishing defenses. The longevity of these settlements depended on a number of factors – including but not limited to the incorporation of indigenous knowledge or adapted European skills, the location of the settlement, and the ability to forge a fully functional village in some of the severest and least desirable *despoblado* locations in Hispaniola.

Maroon Interactions with Spanish Authorities

Raiding was a common tactic utilized by maroons, especially in the earliest stages of establishing a settlement. Many of the original settlements and camps were populated largely by men.¹³⁵ These early communities did not have the initial supplies required to be self-sustaining – they lacked the proper tools for agriculture, materials for planting, and weapons for hunting. This created a situation in which raiding of Spanish settlements became a necessity for survival. Even

¹³² Quoted in Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 601.

¹³³ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 617.

¹³⁴ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹³⁵ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

Enrique and his followers, who eventually founded a settlement noted for its crop cultivation apparatus, spaced out, well-established huts, and animal husbandry,¹³⁶ “occasionally raided Spanish settlements and estates for tools, supplies, arms and perhaps women.”¹³⁷ Camps which survived became more sexually balanced, highlighting the importance of raids.¹³⁸ Even villages which became self-sufficient through the establishment of farms and the raising of animals would “supplement their diets by raiding local Spanish settlements.”¹³⁹ However, raiding had other practical purposes outside of supplementing maroons’ diets and helping to establish communities. It served an important psychological purpose when it came to fighting back against Spanish encroachment, helped strengthen numbers, and fortified communication networks.

In the 1521 Christmas Rebellion, enslaved Wolofs – people from the present-day Senegambia region – engaged in a series of raids on Spanish estates. These men “stole gold and other valuable items, and recruited other enslaved insurgents.”¹⁴⁰ This initial raid helped to swell their numbers, while depleting the resources of wealthy Spanish colonial estates. These men would later combine forces with Enrique and his followers in the Bahoruco Mountains, creating an even larger and more formidable group of rebels.¹⁴¹ “Maroons regularly raided Spanish estates and communities to free other slaves,” which in turn disrupted Spanish commerce and depleted Spanish labor supplies.¹⁴² Robert Schwaller notes that raiding as a method of labor deprivation against enemies was a key feature of conquest and warfare utilized by African tribes. The incorporation of newly-freed Africans through raids is an interesting example of the ways in

¹³⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 601.

¹³⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 598.

¹³⁸ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹³⁹ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 82.

¹⁴⁰ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 82.

¹⁴¹ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

¹⁴² Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 616 and 621.

which African culture was adapted and utilized by maroons in America.¹⁴³ This transfer of labor from one group to another strengthened maroon militia forces and helped to establish communities by introducing extra laborers, often armed with unique skills earned through laboring while enslaved within Spanish settlements.¹⁴⁴

Spanish patrols “failed to subdue the internal maroon militia,” which heightened fears surrounding potential attacks.¹⁴⁵ Although these raids were often confined to the edges of settlements and the boundaries of Spanish territory, by the mid-1540s residents of Santo Domingo were particularly concerned with incidents of raiding by maroons.¹⁴⁶ In a 1545 letter from Prince Philip of Spain to *Licenciado* (see Translation Note)¹⁴⁷ Cerrato of the *Audiencia* (Eng. Council/High Court) of Santo Domingo, the Prince called upon the council members to make a decision regarding their enslaved population.¹⁴⁸ Philip was concerned with *ladino* enslaved Africans, who were acculturated to Spanish cultural standards and considered rebellious by nature,¹⁴⁹ inciting the enslaved population to revolt. He called for them to either be expelled from Hispaniola or freed, demonstrating the severity of the situation.¹⁵⁰ As enslaved Africans were considered an investment and ‘property,’ willingly losing that investment by expelling your

¹⁴³ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 616.

¹⁴⁴ David Wheat, *Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570-1640* (Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 185.

¹⁴⁵ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 82.

¹⁴⁶ Archivo General de Indias, Justicia 62. CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-050-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-050-manuscript/)

¹⁴⁷ Although the historical translation of *Licenciado* is someone who holds a certificate for a practice – in this context, what we would modernly consider to be law school graduate – the meaning was more nuanced in 1545. *Licenciado* is often used interchangeably with *Oidor* (Eng. Judge) as they signify a similar legal status. Cerrato was licensed to practice law and served as a colonial judge, President of the *Audiencia*, and a colonial governor of Santo Domingo although he is often referred to as *Licenciado* Cerrato regardless of his position by others. See Manuscript 034 and Schwaller, “Contested Conquests” for examples.

¹⁴⁸ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto–Imagen Núm:489/766., CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/).

¹⁴⁹ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 87.

¹⁵⁰ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto–Imagen Núm:489/766., CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/).

property or freeing your possessions from your ownership was the last thing any enslaver would have wanted to do. The sudden desire on the part of the Prince for the council of Santo Domingo to remove or free their enslaved Africans was an indication of how dire the raiding situation was.

The situation became so severe that in that same year, the inhabitants of La Vega, Puerto de Plata, and Santiago refused to leave their properties unless in groups. They even went so far as to sleep in shifts with spears in hand to defend against raids.¹⁵¹ The psychological damage even the threat of a raid held over Spanish settlements was a significant advantage. Concerns over protecting the local population would surely have taken precedent over sending a militia out to track freedom seekers in the forest. Centralizing the Spanish militia towards cities like Santo Domingo, which would have relied heavily on enslaved labor as a major port city, would in turn have allowed greater flexibility for maroons seeking refuge in *despoblado* lands and towards the edges of the colonial settlements. Raids and concerns about attacks were more frequent in these regions, indicating militia presence was weaker there.¹⁵² Concerns over the control of the depopulated *despoblado* lands were so great that the Spanish would only travel in large groups of 15 or 20 along certain roadways.¹⁵³

Furthermore, raids served an important purpose when it came to the establishment of commercial networks. Maroons were able to carve out extensive lines of communication between camps and also within the colonial apparatus to those still enslaved.¹⁵⁴ These connections were important for trade purposes, but would have also allowed for better coordination for those who may have wanted to free themselves and seek out an established

¹⁵¹ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-250 Recto-Imagen Núm:499/766 - 251 Recto-Imagen Núm: 501/766, CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-035-manuscript/>.

¹⁵² Archivo General de Indias, Justicia 62. CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-050-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-050-manuscript/).

¹⁵³ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

¹⁵⁴ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

maroon community.¹⁵⁵ Using items stolen during raids, maroons would often conspire with women called *ganadoras* in order to sell back these contraband goods to Spanish cities, effectively forcing them to pay up for items already once in their possession.¹⁵⁶ These networks were key for maroons establishing self-sufficiency, as contraband trade provided a source of income and other supplies. Often through trade with enslaved Africans or impoverished Spaniards, maroons were able to trade items stolen from raids for necessary materials they could not readily obtain in the natural environment or sell these stolen items for a profit.¹⁵⁷ Raiding was a key feature of maroon life, and it strengthened the community in a wide variety of ways, providing for its members and helping maroons achieve self-sufficiency while protecting themselves from encroachment.

Maroons and Treaties

Peace treaties and other forms of legal agreements between the Spanish and individual maroon settlements offered these groups freedom and recognized the territorial integrity of their settlements, creating a legal framework that ensured their continued survival.¹⁵⁸ Some of these treaties made provisions for meeting the economic needs of the maroon community, in exchange for the cessation of hostilities against plantations and estates. Often this included an agreement to return future escapees and aid colonists who were trying to track down freedom seekers.¹⁵⁹ This was likely an attempt on the part of the colonial authorities to reduce collaboration between free maroon communities and enslaved Africans, something which Robert Schwaller in “Contested Conquests” notes occurred with enough frequency that commercial networks were formed.

¹⁵⁵ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹⁵⁶ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

¹⁵⁷ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

¹⁵⁸ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

¹⁵⁹ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

These networks reached even within the colonial sphere of Hispaniola.¹⁶⁰ This stipulation of treaty-making was also likely to prevent the incorporation of additional maroons into the community. By turning established maroons against enslaved Africans or Taínos, the Spanish seemingly hoped they would be able to sow enough discord as to reduce incidents of grand marronage and flight from colonial settlements.

Several prominent maroons in Hispaniola agreed to treaty terms similar to these. For example, in 1546 both Diego Ocampo and Diego de Guzmán approached Spanish authorities to sue for their freedom.¹⁶¹ Ocampo was able to have his request carried out, but only after agreeing to work as a slave catcher. Similarly, de Guzmán agreed to combat marronage as a mercenary of sorts in the stead of the Spanish. Ocampo requested freedom “only for himself, his wife, and two cousins” whereas Diego de Guzmán only requested his own freedom. Enrique would agree to similar stipulations in return for his community’s surrender.¹⁶² Even with such a diversity of freedom requests, the Spanish would only pardon these men under the condition of collaboration with colonial authorities against future freedom seekers.

The treaty between Enrique and the Spanish is particularly notable. It was a mixed victory for the maroons as “Enrique’s reconciliation with Spanish authorities more or less brought to an end the era of indigenous rebellion on the island.”¹⁶³ Although indigenous marronage did not disappear in 1534, it was certainly diminished and never again to the scale of Enrique’s rebellion.¹⁶⁴ The peace between Enrique and the Spanish was ratified in 1534, solidified by a trip

¹⁶⁰ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 622.

¹⁶¹ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 623.

¹⁶² Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 623.

¹⁶³ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 608.

¹⁶⁴ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.1, F.33R-34V, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-030-manuscript/](http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-030-manuscript/).

the *cacique* took to Santo Domingo with an entourage of twenty men.¹⁶⁵ The fear of future maroon revolts drove Spanish demands for the cessation of hostilities and “Enrique relinquished several escaped African slaves to Spanish authorities when he agreed to the peace treaty.”¹⁶⁶ It was very likely that the Africans he allowed to be re-enslaved had spent time with him and his people during the revolt.¹⁶⁷

Despite the large population of Africans living within the Bahoruco who had aided the Taíno during the revolt, Enrique agreed to a treaty that contained less than favorable conditions for these African maroons.¹⁶⁸ There exist different accounts of the full treaty stipulations,¹⁶⁹ but what is clear is that the agreed-upon terms necessitated the Taíno community relocate to Sabana Buey, near Azua, either to form a community or to join one already established by other Taínos.¹⁷⁰ The enslaved Africans were also forced to relocate outside of the Bahoruco, likely to Sabana Buey as well, although this is not confirmed. Those who were pardoned were bound to capture future runaways, as well as turn away any who tried to seek refuge amongst them,¹⁷¹ something Enrique agreed to during initial treaty negotiations in 1528 and later within his community’s stead prior to his death in 1535.¹⁷² Ultimately, the displeasure with potential relocation and the possibility of becoming slave catchers caused a divide between the African and Taíno maroons collaborating under Enrique.¹⁷³ Lemba, who had joined the rebellion early on after his arrival to Hispaniola chose to remain in the Bahoruco, along with other African maroons

¹⁶⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 607.

¹⁶⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 612.

¹⁶⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 612.

¹⁶⁸ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 620.

¹⁶⁹ See Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” Ozuna, *Rebellion and Anti-Colonial Struggle*,” and Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” for a discussion of the major impacts of Enrique’s treaty. These accounts all differ somewhat to the exact specifications of the treaty.

¹⁷⁰ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 620.

¹⁷¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 602.

¹⁷² Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 211.

¹⁷³ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

and a few indigenous people who decided to break “ranks with Enriquillo and continue their maroon activity.”¹⁷⁴

Although this peace came at the expense of the bonds that had been forged between African and Taíno maroons and diminished the strength and numbers of the Taíno resistance to the *encomienda* system, it was a truly unprecedented event. Enrique’s peace was the first of its kind, where the Spanish had to concede defeat and allow an undefeated indigenous group the freedom to self-govern. It even set a precedent for future dealings with African maroon groups, although these groups were typically smaller scale settlements.¹⁷⁵ The forced recognition of the sovereignty of the Taíno under Enrique was an unlikely event which paved the way for the other peace treaties between maroons and the Spanish in Hispaniola such as those made by Ocampo and de Guzmán.¹⁷⁶ It came at a price, but established a core tactic maroons could use to gain legal recognition of their settlements and allow for continued survival. Although the unfavorable terms were intended to reduce collaboration and prevent the growth of maroon numbers, it evidently did not work out the way the Spanish intended. Just a decade after Enrique’s treaty was ratified, there was an uptick in maroon activity in the Bahoruco¹⁷⁷ – which had just been cleared of a majority of its inhabitants, allowing for further settlement and the expansion of the fragmented communities who remained.¹⁷⁸

Use of Indigenous and European Techniques

The Taíno in Hispaniola developed a system of agriculture that was “diverse and productive, centered on the staple crop of manioc.”¹⁷⁹ They were able to incorporate systems of irrigation in

¹⁷⁴ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

¹⁷⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 612.

¹⁷⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 613.

¹⁷⁷ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 624.

¹⁷⁸ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 620.

¹⁷⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

order to better manage the growth of crops.¹⁸⁰ The Taíno were also experienced mariners, who built large wooden canoes in order to better take advantage of the resources found within the Caribbean Sea and Hispaniola's many rivers.¹⁸¹ The cultural knowledge that came with the historical development of these skills would prove useful for the establishment of maroon settlements following Enrique's rebellion in 1519.¹⁸² For example, Bartolome de Las Casas, who wrote extensively on Enrique and the 1519 rebellion noted that the Taíno incorporated small scale agriculture into their settlement in the mountains. They had fields which they cultivated in order to provide food for those living there.¹⁸³ Given the Taíno knowledge of crop cultivation, the community's chance of survival was heightened by the application of ancestral methods of agriculture.

The rebels also "took advantage of other sources of food, which included not only the ubiquitous pigs...but also other items that Spaniards considered inedible but traditionally had formed a part of the indigenous diet."¹⁸⁴ Although the pigs themselves were not native to the island, being introduced by Columbus on one of his voyages,¹⁸⁵ it is likely that the Taíno would have adapted traditional methods of hunting or weapon-making to this endeavor – by the time of Enrique's revolt, pigs had been on the island for some two decades. This reliance on traditional methods of food cultivation and hunting, specifically the focus on foods considered inedible to the Spanish despite their cultural importance to the Taíno, was key to Enrique's ability to sustain his community for so long. Ida Altman in "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of

¹⁸⁰ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 592.

¹⁸¹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 591.

¹⁸² Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 587.

¹⁸³ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 601.

¹⁸⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 599.

¹⁸⁵ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 599.

Spanish America” cites a 1528 document in which *Oidores* (Eng. Judges) claimed the rebels knew the land well enough that they mocked the Spanish hunting them.¹⁸⁶

Altman even argues that the Taínos’ ability to sustain themselves utilizing traditional methods of agriculture and hunting was at the expense of the Spaniards tracking them.¹⁸⁷ The continued reliance on cultural knowledge made possible the rebels’ prolonged survival through both subsistence farming and the gathering of supplies. However, patrols of Spanish militia who went hunting for maroons had to carry supplies with them, often including water, on trips that could last “weeks or even months searching in vain.”¹⁸⁸ The land was so rough that it was said a pair of sandals was needed for each day spent hunting the rebels.¹⁸⁹ While traditional methods of hunting and land cultivation provided for those trying to rebel against their enslavers, it further allowed them to outlast and tire those who sought to re-enslave them through a war of attrition.

Although it is unclear whether or not Enrique purposely sought to weaken his enemies this way, he was noted for his “attention to critical detail”¹⁹⁰ and his “knowledge of Spanish ways gained through his childhood,”¹⁹¹ which was spent amongst Franciscan friars at a monastery.¹⁹² President Ramírez de Fuenleal of the *Audiencia* (Eng. Council/High Court) of Santo Domingo compared the conflict with the Taíno in Hispaniola with those that occurred within New Spain and Cuba, noting that the indigenous people in Hispaniola were educated by the Spanish through the *encomienda* and raised amongst them.¹⁹³ Enrique and his followers therefore knew the Spanish well, and may very well have intentionally secluded themselves in order to weaken

¹⁸⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

¹⁸⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

¹⁸⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

¹⁸⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

¹⁹⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

¹⁹¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 598.

¹⁹² Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

¹⁹³ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 601.

militia men who lacked knowledge of the landscape and did not have ready access to supplies in *despoblado* lands. Notably, in 1533 Enrique and some of his followers were able to evade a Spanish Captain searching for them for an extensive period of time. When they finally encountered the rebels, after two and a half months of fruitless searching, the Spanish found them in canoes.¹⁹⁴ Given the traditional importance of the canoe for the Taíno in regard to trade,¹⁹⁵ the use of it here is particularly poignant. Though the Spanish company only found a portion of the rebels in canoes,¹⁹⁶ it is likely that the canoe was used for both gathering a ready supply of resources as well as a method of avoiding capture – these canoes could hold one hundred or more people.¹⁹⁷

African maroons did not necessarily have this same benefit of being able to utilize traditional or cultural knowledge in a foreign land and thus experience gained through labor was an important part of their ability to develop adaptability in new circumstances. Following an increasing reliance on enslaved African labor in Hispaniola, there was also a diversification of roles into which enslaved people were forced. Rural estates on the island housed Africans who “raised cattle, swine, and chickens and cultivated food crops...They cleared fields for cultivation, processed cassava, tanned hides...”¹⁹⁸ Enslaved Africans who worked as cowboys on these rural estates often raised and cared for large livestock animals like cows, sheep, and pigs.¹⁹⁹ The skills developed through enslavement in rural areas increased the viability of maroon resistance in a number of ways – namely, allowing enslaved Africans to develop new animal husbandry skills and important secondary skills such as horseback riding. The mastery of

¹⁹⁴ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 605.

¹⁹⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

¹⁹⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 605.

¹⁹⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

¹⁹⁸ Wheat, *Atlantic Africa*, 187.

¹⁹⁹ Wheat, *Atlantic Africa*, 187.

horseback riding by maroons was particularly deadly for Spanish settlers, decreasing travel time, strengthening the overarching networks connecting communities and those still enslaved within the colonial state, and giving maroons an edge during raids or guerilla fighting with Spanish militia.²⁰⁰

For example, Sebastian Lemba and other maroons operating from within the Bahoruco lived among cattle herders before they escaped bondage, allowing them to develop the skills necessary to use horses in their raids.²⁰¹ Although Lemba's operations were largely confined to the mountainous area of the Bahoruco, the incorporation of European modes of transportation and knowledge of animal husbandry is critical to understanding the adaptability of maroons.²⁰² In fact, Diego Ocampo utilized horseback riding even more extensively than Lemba: "His raids took him from La Vega to Azua, then into the Bahoruco. From the Bahoruco he...raided San Juan de la Maguana and Azua..." moving with ease between distant locations.²⁰³ Given the harsh climates and the adversity maroons faced in Hispaniola, the incorporation of such techniques would prove a requirement for survival.

Although African maroons were stripped of their cultural heritage through the process of enslavement and largely deprived of resources, such as the crops, animals, and methods of agriculture which they would have been familiar with in their homelands, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that they were able to adapt and respond to changing environments, learning new skills to benefit their resistance. By 1606 it was reported by Hispaniola's governor, Antonio Osorio, that two-thirds of Hispaniola's enslaved population "labored on farms, cultivating

²⁰⁰ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

²⁰¹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

²⁰² Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

²⁰³ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

“ginger, cassava and maize.”²⁰⁴ Due to a decline in the island’s sugar industry, there were only 12 *ingenios* (Eng. Sugar Mills) remaining by 1606. This shift began as early as the 1550s, transitioning from major sugar cultivation to a more substantive focus on hides, maize, yuca, and ginger.²⁰⁵ The diminishing prevalence of *ingenios* and the sugar industry as a whole in Hispaniola roughly coincides with a reported increase in grand marronage beginning in the 1540s.²⁰⁶

Due to increasing food prices during the latter half of the 16th century, plausibly linked to an uptick in maroon activity as raiding often included stealing food supplies or destroying farms, enslavers “who were invested in sugar production might have allowed enslaved workers to spend more time growing foodstuffs for their own subsistence.”²⁰⁷ The ability to grow their own food would have benefitted enslaved Africans as they adapted to their new climate and conditions. Crops like maize, cassava, and ginger are subsistence crops and able to grow well in the climate conditions of Hispaniola. The practical knowledge that comes with subsistence farming would be crucial to establishing a new settlement and supporting its population. Cassava for example, became a staple food for enslaved people in the Caribbean despite its original importance in the diets of indigenous peoples.²⁰⁸ Other filling staple crops like sweet potatoes and yams were grown by enslaved Africans living in the Caribbean.²⁰⁹ The ability to learn new agricultural methods not native to their own cultures would have been a key factor in developing the

²⁰⁴ Wheat, *Atlantic Africa*, 187.

²⁰⁵ Wheat, *Atlantic Africa*, 187.

²⁰⁶ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 624.

²⁰⁷ Wheat, *Atlantic Africa*, 189.

²⁰⁸ Salem State University exhibits on Caribbean Food, accessed at <http://di.salemstate.edu/provisions/exhibits/show/the-roots-of-cassava-flour/cassava-flour-as-a-provision>.

²⁰⁹ Salem State University exhibits on Caribbean Food, accessed at <http://di.salemstate.edu/provisions/exhibits/show/the-roots-of-cassava-flour/cassava-flour-as-a-provision>.

adaptability and resilience seen in African maroon communities throughout the 1530s and into the early decades of the 17th century.

Conclusion

The activities of maroons demonstrate a clear pattern of prolonged and impactful resistance to Spanish colonization of Hispaniola. Raiding is especially indicative of the impact of maroon resistance, largely due to the effect it had on Spanish settlements. As demonstrated by the 1521 Christmas Rebellion and the initial raids enslaved Wolofs participated in against Spanish estates, the theft of valuables could greatly reduce the wealth of affected towns within the colony.²¹⁰ Furthermore, estate raids which resulted in the freeing of enslaved laborers disrupted commerce and depleted labor supplies, effectively slowing down the core functions of Spanish settlements in Hispaniola.²¹¹

The psychological impacts of raiding additionally demonstrated the fruits of meaningful resistance. *Despoblado* lands became warzones, giving rise to debilitating lifestyle changes at the edges of colonial settlements, where Spaniards would refuse to travel along certain major roadways unless in large groups of 15 to 20 people.²¹² Those living in La Vega, Puerto de Plata, and Santiago would not leave their properties unless in groups.²¹³ Evidently, raiding was very successful at slowing down the cogs of the colonial machine. Maroons depleted supplies and robbed the colonists of their laborers, decreasing potential wealth and production.²¹⁴ Even just the fear of raiding was enough to keep most inhabitants of affected towns indoors unless in

²¹⁰ Ozuna, "Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle," 82.

²¹¹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 616 and 621

²¹² Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

²¹³ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-250 Recto-Imagen Núm:499/766 - 251 Recto-Imagen Núm: 501/766, CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-035-manuscript/>.

²¹⁴ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

groups, likely slowing down trade between towns and preventing the running of estates and *ingenios*.

Additionally, the self-sufficiency derived from raids was a form of resistance in and of itself. The success of a maroon settlement in spite of the Spanish doing everything possible to try and put a stop to grand marronage is true resistance against the colonial state. Raiding supplied maroons with ways to supplement their diets with items which they could not readily find around their settlements,²¹⁵ and created extensive commercial networks in which items could be traded, generating another source of income which could strengthen the community as well as improve coordination and communication with those still enslaved.²¹⁶ Additionally, through treaty-making, maroons found another option for providing for their communities and meeting the growing economic needs that came with establishing a self-sufficient settlement.²¹⁷ The adaptability demonstrated by maroons in attempting to create and grow their communities through initial raiding and warfare, agriculture, and subsequent treaties is an excellent example of the many ways in which they could resist Spanish encroachment and attempts at reconquest.

Furthermore, treaties, which offered maroons a legal way of recognizing their sovereignty and allowing for their continued survival, were important and impactful forms of resistance against the Spanish colonial state.²¹⁸ Forcing the Spanish to recognize the individual sovereignty of a group that was once enslaved, as Enrique was able to do through his rebellion and subsequent treaty with the Spanish, was critical to weakening the colonial state.²¹⁹ Even though these treaties often included slave catcher provisions or stipulated the return of some

²¹⁵ Ozuna, "Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle," 82.

²¹⁶ Landers, "Africans in the Spanish Colonies," 86.

²¹⁷ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

²¹⁸ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

²¹⁹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 612.

escaped enslaved laborers,²²⁰ their ratification and the resulting legal protections given to maroon communities in exchange for the cessation of hostilities reduced the number of people forced to be enslaved laborers for the Spanish, weakening the manpower of the state as well as its potential production output. Furthermore, it solidified resistance. Owing to the success of Enrique's treaty agreement, other maroons became aware of what was possible and some like Diego Ocampo took it upon themselves to negotiate their own freedoms.²²¹ The glimmer of hope that one can escape and forge a life for themselves as a free person, just as Enrique did following the ratification of his treaty with the Spanish, would have been a powerful motivator for further resistance.²²²

²²⁰ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

²²¹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 622.

²²² Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 620.

Chapter 3

Indigenous Resistance to Spanish Colonization

Following his surrender to the Spanish Crown in 1534, the Taíno *cacique* (Eng. Chief) Enrique and his followers were finally recognized by the Spanish as free people.²²³ Beginning fifteen years earlier, in 1519, Enrique led one of the most well-known rebellions against the Spanish Crown, a reaction to the unstable political situation, the onset of a smallpox epidemic, and the abuses he suffered living under his *encomendero*.²²⁴ In exchange for the cessation of hostilities against the Spanish, Enrique was awarded the aristocratic title of “don,” becoming Don Enrique. He was gifted amnesty for himself, his family, and his followers who were able to live within the free Indian town of Sabana Buey.²²⁵ Enrique died in 1535, only a year after the official recognition of his sovereignty by the Spanish. His last testament declared that his wife, Doña Mencía, and his nephew should govern the town in his place as its *caciques*.²²⁶

Enrique ultimately only lived for a year as a truly free man. He spent the majority of his life within the *encomienda* system as a forced laborer,²²⁷ and lived another decade and a half as a fugitive in the remote Bahoruco mountains of Hispaniola.²²⁸ His life was difficult and much of his time free was spent in hiding. Why take the risk of rebellion at all? Was the allure of freedom so strong that Enrique would risk death at the hands of Spanish militia, brave the harsh and inhospitable conditions maroons faced, and potentially alienate himself from his ancestral lands? Understanding why Enrique decided to liberate himself from the oppressions of the *encomienda*

²²³ Erin Woodruff Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Espanola, 1500-1534,” *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2 (April 2013): 211.

²²⁴ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 595-7.

²²⁵ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 211.

²²⁶ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 211.

²²⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 594.

²²⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 587.

system is critical to understanding indigenous resistance to the Spanish. His personal motivations are somewhat debated,²²⁹ but his story is clear. Freedom was coveted above all else, regardless of the difficulties it could bring.

Enrique's role in the larger history of Spanish-indigenous relations in Hispaniola is underscored by the circumstances of his death. He was despised by the Spanish for over a decade as a fierce rebel, yet Enrique was allowed to settle in a free community, rather than being forced to return to the racialized *encomienda* system into which he was born, following the ratification of a peace treaty. He earned a noble title and was even allowed to name heirs for the town he was living in, despite residing there for a mere year.²³⁰ Who was Enrique and why, even in death, was he such an important figure? Why was he, unlike the other maroons before him, offered a peace agreement by the Spanish?²³¹ By examining the specific factors that may have prompted Enrique's rebellion, while simultaneously situating his revolt within a broader history of Indigenous resistance to Spanish colonization, this chapter demonstrates that Spanish conquest of the Americas was neither as rapid nor as inevitable as it is commonly said to be.²³²

Enrique's Early Life

There is relatively little known about Enrique's life prior to the rebellion he orchestrated in 1519. He was born around 1500 into a family with noble lineage,²³³ the grand-nephew of Anacaona who was the wife of a leading *cacique*, Caonabó, and the sister of another *cacique* who ruled over a portion of Southwestern Hispaniola – Anacaona later succeeded her brother,

²²⁹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595-7.

²³⁰ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 211.

²³¹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 613.

²³² Mathew Restall, "The New Conquest History," *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (February 2012): 151.

²³³ Enrique's birthdate is somewhat debated. Ida Altman in "The Revolt of Enriquillo" writes that he was born around 1500, while Erin Woodruff Stone in "America's First Slave Revolt" writes that he was born between 1498 and 1500. Although his exact birthdate is unknown, 1500 is a relative estimate based off of these secondary sources.

becoming the ruler of Jaraguá until her execution in 1503, a few years after Enrique's birth.²³⁴

Enrique was educated by Franciscan monks at a monastery in Verapaz, where he was schooled in Roman Catholicism and learned to read and write Spanish.²³⁵ He was baptized as Enrique, a name closely associated with the Spanish nobility, although he was often referred to as Enriquillo.²³⁶ 'Enriquillo' is a Spanish diminutive form of his baptismal name, Enrique, indicating affection or potentially meant as an insult.²³⁷ Enrique married his cousin Doña Mencía, another Taíno, in an official Catholic ceremony.²³⁸ Shortly thereafter, he was forced to move to San Juan de la Maguana as part of the *repartimiento*.²³⁹ He was accompanied in this move by 109 fellow Taíno, including 17 children, 82 who were of working age, and 10 who were elderly.²⁴⁰ His people were split between two different *encomenderos* following the move.²⁴¹

This relocation was one of many where indigenous people were moved between different parts of the island as the Spanish sought to use the *repartimiento* of 1514 to transition their gold-based mining economy to one dependent on sugar production.²⁴² One stipulation of this *repartimiento* allowed for the provision of Taíno people "to residents or towns that did not have any."²⁴³ This often meant the relocation of indigenous people closer to gold mines or to the newer *ingenios*.²⁴⁴ These relocations "changed the societal makeup of the island while...diminishing the power of Taíno caciques, who derived much of their power from their

²³⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 589.

²³⁵ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 589.

²³⁶ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 590.

²³⁷ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 590.

²³⁸ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595.

²³⁹ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 205.

²⁴⁰ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 205-6.

²⁴¹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

²⁴² Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 204.

²⁴³ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 204.

²⁴⁴ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 204.

cacicazgos.”²⁴⁵ Although the Taíno sought to maintain their pre-colonial political structure, the subsequent restructuring of the *repartimiento* meant that in some cases multiple *cacicazgos* were combined, in order to account for the declining indigenous population as a result of the introduction of Spanish disease and poor labor conditions.²⁴⁶ The combination of different *cacicazgos*, in turn, decreased the potential power held by each individual *cacique*.²⁴⁷ Other times, a *cacicazgo* was split apart and spread among multiple *encomenderos*, as was seen in the case of Enrique and his people.²⁴⁸ The removal of indigenous people from their ancestral territories and the combination or separation of multiple *cacicazgos* undermined what remaining power was held by *caciques*, weakening their ability to bargain with the Spanish and maintain their traditional rights.²⁴⁹ Ultimately, the *repartimiento* and *encomenderos* were a threat to indigenous sovereignty and severely diminished the bargaining power of the Taíno, “inflaming an already volatile political situation.”²⁵⁰

Causes of Enrique’s Revolt

The *encomienda* consisted of two separate institutions, in which the *repartimiento* was run locally, and the *encomienda* was run by government officials.²⁵¹ Historians typically refer to the entire system as the *encomienda*, although in the 16th century the Spanish typically referred to it as a *repartimiento*.²⁵² The two terms, *repartimiento* and *encomienda*, are often used interchangeably and will be throughout this thesis. The *encomienda* as it existed in Hispaniola

²⁴⁵ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 212. A *cacicazgo* refers to a territory similar to a kingdom, but connotes a person-based “rule” rather than a European understanding of a kingdom as ownership of land. A *cacique* would rule over a *cacicazgo*.

²⁴⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 591.

²⁴⁷ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 204.

²⁴⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 594.

²⁴⁹ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 212.

²⁵⁰ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 204.

²⁵¹ Robert G. Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento in Spanish America: A Structural Analysis,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 51 no. 3 (August 1, 1971): 433.

²⁵² Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 433.

“gave individual Spaniards the right to demand labor and tribute from the Indians assigned to them.”²⁵³ Although land rights were an important fixture in European society, at the time of Spanish arrival in the Americas, indigenous societies were structured around the ownership of tribute and labor as opposed to land.²⁵⁴ As the Spanish learned, “control of land did not necessarily confer control of the labor needed to exploit it,” and indigenous people often did not stay in one place.²⁵⁵ They could move off of the land ‘owned’ by a Spaniard, rendering that land essentially worthless as there would no longer be a resident population to exploit it.²⁵⁶ Thus, the system became structured around the ownership of a right to tribute and labor. Ultimately, the *encomienda* was never “a landed estate and involved no ownership of land.”²⁵⁷

Those who owned the rights to these tributes were referred to as *encomenderos*. The system was established out of the Crown’s belief that indigenous people owed the Crown their service, and the service obligation of a certain indigenous group was transferred temporarily to a Spaniard. This transfer was often done as a reward for the *encomendero*’s service to the Spanish Crown,²⁵⁸ with many conquistadors becoming *encomenderos*.²⁵⁹ *Encomenderos* were meant to provide for the “protection, education, and religious welfare of” indigenous people.²⁶⁰ When *encomenderos* were attentive to this stipulation, it created a generation of indigenous people who were acculturated to Spanish norms and society, as we see was the case with Enrique and many of his followers.²⁶¹ Theoretically, the ownership of the *encomienda* was meant to be

²⁵³ Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 435.

²⁵⁴ Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 434.

²⁵⁵ Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 434.

²⁵⁶ Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 434.

²⁵⁷ Ronald W. Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas,” *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 46.

²⁵⁸ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist, 46.

²⁵⁹ Timothy J. Yeager, “Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown’s Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America,” *The Journal of Economic History* 55, no. 4 (1995): 844.

²⁶⁰ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist, 46.

²⁶¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 601.

nonhereditary and temporary, although in practice it was often not.²⁶² This was seen in the case of Enrique's second *encomendero*, who was the son of his original *encomendero* Francisco de Valenzuela.²⁶³ Bartolomé de Las Casas cites the abuses of this second *encomendero*, the younger Valenzuela, as one of the primary motivators for Enrique's revolt.²⁶⁴

In 1514, the Spanish enacted a new *repartimiento*, which split Enrique and the few hundred Taínos who still remained from his original tribe between two *encomenderos*, Francisco de Valenzuela and Francisco Hernández.²⁶⁵ According to Las Casas, the abuse Enrique was forced to face as a result of his assignment to this new *encomendero* was severe. Valenzuela took away Enrique's horse, a sign of "considerable prestige and favor," and sexually assaulted Enrique's wife.²⁶⁶ When Enrique attempted to report his treatment and the abuse of his wife to the lieutenant governor of San Juan de la Maguana, where the *encomienda* had placed Enrique's people, he was harshly punished.²⁶⁷ Enrique then sought alternative means of legal recourse and traveled to speak before the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo. However, Enrique was directed yet again to the same local lieutenant governor. The governor's reaction was allegedly even more violent than the first time.²⁶⁸ These injustices, as Las Casas writes, were what drove Enrique to rebel – abused and unable to seek recourse due to the failures of the legal system and the *encomienda* that imprisoned him, he rose up.

Las Casas's record of the events leading up to Enrique's revolt centers around the inability of the *encomienda* as it was institutionally structured to protect the *cacique* or his family from abuse or allow him to seek legal recourse for said abuses. However, it is not clear whether this

²⁶² Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 596.

²⁶³ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 601.

²⁶⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

²⁶⁵ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 594.

²⁶⁶ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595.

²⁶⁷ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595.

²⁶⁸ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595.

retelling of these events is entirely accurate. Las Casas's version of the revolt "is not substantiated by other contemporary sources," and he was not actually in Hispaniola at the time the rebellion began.²⁶⁹ Despite this, as Ida Altman points out in "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," Las Casas's record of the rebellion is fairly factually accurate, save a few minor discrepancies, such as mistakenly referring to Enrique's wife as Lucía rather than Mencía.²⁷⁰ Given the presence of this fairly accurate factual basis for Las Casas' account, his dramatization of the events is not due to a lack of knowledge, but rather was likely a deliberate rhetorical choice. Las Casas is well-known for his defense of indigenous people in the Americas.²⁷¹ His dramatization of Enrique's life under his *encomendero* Valenzuela could have aided Las Casas's cause of advocating for the rights of the Taíno in Hispaniola by creating a sympathetic protagonist who did everything right, but was still abused and harmed by the *encomienda* and the Spanish legal system. The particular grievances Enrique suffered, specifically the removal of personal items by a man Las Casas refers to as a "tyrant" and the forceful violation of his marriage,²⁷² would have been particularly poignant.

Regardless of Las Casas's explanation of what caused Enrique's rebellion, there are a number of circumstances which happened within a few years of the incitement of the revolt in 1519 which may help to explain Enrique's decision to rebel. Between 1518 and 1519, there was an outbreak of smallpox in Hispaniola. As Altman explains, this compounded "the already notable mortality rate that had carried off such a large proportion of the island's original

²⁶⁹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 596.

²⁷⁰ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 596.

²⁷¹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 587.

²⁷² See Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo" for an excerpt of Bartolome de Las Casas's *Historia de Las Indias*. In it, Las Casas refers to the younger Valenzuela as a "tyrant of a young man" and frames Doña Mencía's sexual assault as the violation of Enrique's marriage through the *encomendero*'s forcing of his wife. The forceful violation of a Catholic marriage was the contemporary focus of this grievance, hence Las Casas's phrasing and the author's use of this same phrasing. However, a modern audience may use different language to describe Mencía's assault.

population in so few years.”²⁷³ The Taíno living in such concentrated areas and already suffering from being overworked by the Spanish were hit hard by the epidemic.²⁷⁴ This short period of just a year would have likely been a major stressor for the surviving Taíno, who had already experienced an intense few decades of rapid death following the introduction of previously unknown pathogens from Europe, famine from lack of agricultural production, and violent labor conditions.²⁷⁵

Additionally, around this same time, the Castilian regent charged Jeronymite friars with the task of determining whether the *encomienda* should be reformed.²⁷⁶ The three friars who were sent to Hispaniola spoke only with Spaniards during the course of their inquiry, resulting in haphazard reform. Some villages were removed from *encomiendas*, although they were largely just those belonging to absentee *encomenderos* who lived in Spain. Other Taínos living in certain *encomiendas* were relocated.²⁷⁷ About 25 to 30 so-called free villages were established, although the extent to which they were truly free is unclear, as the residents of these communities were still subjected to the threats and force of their former *encomenderos*.²⁷⁸ Enrique and his people were not released from their *encomienda*. Following this reorganization, many indigenous people were said to have sought refuge in the mountains.²⁷⁹ Realistically, the limits of reform by the Jeronymites and perhaps anger at or frustration with the system may have fueled Enrique’s decision to forcibly free himself and his followers. The combination of the smallpox epidemic’s death tolls and the newfound understanding that those seeking to reform the system were not

²⁷³ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

²⁷⁴ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 206.

²⁷⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 593.

²⁷⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

²⁷⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

²⁷⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

²⁷⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

necessarily acting with the Taíno's best interests in mind may have finally been the breaking point for Enrique.

Hispaniola's Tradition of Indigenous Resistance



Map taken from *Life of Christopher Columbus* by Clemens R. Markham. The map includes the names of Spanish settlements and Taíno cacicazgos. Additionally, it lists the names of prominent caciques next to their cacicazgos. For example, Caonabó's name is positioned next to Maguana, his cacicazgo. The Bahoruco is located at the very bottom heel of Xaragua (Jaraguá), near La Beata and Alta Vela.

The Taíno of Hispaniola resisted European encroachment from first contact. In the early period of Spanish conquest of Hispaniola, attempts at “pacifying” the Taíno were quite violent. Columbus's orders for his men included the mandate that a person's ears and nose were to be removed if they were caught stealing and orders to “take anything they needed by force” should the Taíno refuse to trade.²⁸⁰ Naturally, tensions between the Taíno and the Spanish escalated quickly. As the Spanish militias marched towards the interior of Hispaniola in 1494, following

²⁸⁰ Erin Woodruff Stone, *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 40.

indigenous threats to a fort called Santo Tomás, they captured a *cacique*, imprisoning him and removing the ears of one of his relatives in order to force the cooperation of the remaining Taíno.²⁸¹ In response to this brutality, the Taíno attacked the Spanish expedition, suffering great casualties, but sending the message that they would not be conquered so easily.²⁸²

Around this time, following the capture of Caonabó – an important *cacique* who was in charge of one of the most powerful *cacicazgos* on Hispaniola – by Alonso de Hojeda under Columbus’s orders, the Taíno waged all-out war against the Spanish to protect their homelands. An alliance between Behechio, Guarionex, and Higuanaamá, all powerful *caciques*, was formed in response to the capture of Caonabó and an attack against another *cacique*, Guatiguará, which resulted in the enslavement of 1,600 Taíno.²⁸³ Although this alliance was broken following Columbus’s capture of Guarionex, the indigenous people of Hispaniola did not stop resisting Spanish conquest,²⁸⁴ even as the violent and deadly trade in enslaved Taíno began.²⁸⁵

In fact, by 1497, Guarionex had already revolted against the Spanish once again. Despite being forced into forming an alliance with Columbus following a successful attack by Spanish troops, Guarionex chose to betray the Spanish and continue resisting colonization.²⁸⁶ Guarionex’s resistance is notable, as he was considered by the Spanish to be an important intermediary between themselves and the Taíno. Without Guarionex, the Spanish could not guarantee the indigenous peoples’ cooperation, “including the delivery of tribute.”²⁸⁷ He was therefore released almost immediately following his second capture, yet within months he made

²⁸¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 41.

²⁸² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 41.

²⁸³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 42.

²⁸⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 41.

²⁸⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 42.

²⁸⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43.

²⁸⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43.

an alliance with a Spanish rebel actively opposing the Columbus government.²⁸⁸ Guarionex fled first to Maguá under the protection of this rebel, Francisco Roldán, and eventually to the north of Hispaniola to seek refuge with Mayobanex, another *cacique*. By first forming an alliance with Columbus, albeit one that was forced upon him by the Spanish,²⁸⁹ and then betraying his alliance in order to negotiate a better one with Roldán, Guarionex was able to pit the Spaniards against each other before he relocated to a northern *cacicazgo*. His continued resistance to the Spanish, even after being subjugated initially, demonstrates the ferocity and resilience with which the Taíno protected their native land and contested early conquest.

Columbus was arrested and sent back to Spain in 1500 as a result of his inability to resolve many of the problems plaguing the early Spanish settlements in Hispaniola. He was replaced as governor by Nicolás de Ovando, however, the Taíno continued to resist Ovando just as they did Columbus.²⁹⁰ The first to rebel against Ovando, who employed “ruthless policies” and “labor and tribute demands,” was the *cacique* Cotubanamá.²⁹¹ His *cacicazgo*, Higüey located in the southeast of Hispaniola, had been given tribute obligations by Ovando. The lesser *caciques* had attempted to renegotiate these terms.²⁹² During these negotiations, a Spanish attack dog killed one of the *caciques*, sparking the uprising of the Taíno in Higüey.²⁹³ Although there were high casualties on the indigenous side and many more Taíno were enslaved and sent to Santo Domingo, the island’s capital, and to Seville in Spain as a result of this uprising, Cotubanamá’s actions demonstrate the continued Taíno resistance to injustices against their people.

²⁸⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43.

²⁸⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43.

²⁹⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 44.

²⁹¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 44.

²⁹² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 44.

²⁹³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 45.

Soon afterwards in 1503, Ovando led an expedition into southwest Hispaniola, specifically the *cacicazgo* of Jaraguá. The previous *cacique* Behechio had “agreed to provide Bartolomé Columbus with cotton in 1496” but after his death, the government no longer received tribute.²⁹⁴ Behechio was succeeded by Anacaona, his sister and Enrique’s aunt.²⁹⁵ Anacaona, like Guarionex, strove to negotiate the best deal for her people by forming and reforming alliances as benefitted her leadership. By 1503, she aligned with Roldán, who had relocated to Jaraguá. Thus, she did not deem it necessary to send tribute to Ovando’s government as they did not offer her protection – instead, she received protection from Roldán.²⁹⁶ Although Anacaona was ultimately hanged by the Spanish, with eighty-four of her subjects being brutally murdered, she had chosen to greet Ovando “with ceremony, welcoming them.”²⁹⁷ The reasoning behind Ovando’s extreme reaction is not certain, but his violence was likely “due to the lack of tribute or Anacaona’s alliance with Roldán.”²⁹⁸ Anacaona did not choose military resistance like the other *caciques* before her; instead, her rebellion came in the form of selective alliances. It was far subtler, but still demonstrates her desire to protect her people and provide for them while retaining her ancestral *cacicazgo*.

Anacaona’s experience likely would have been something Enrique factored into his decision to rebel. Despite the familial connection, it is unclear whether Enrique and Anacaona had met or if he remembered her. She was executed by the Spanish in 1503, only a few years after Enrique was born.²⁹⁹ Enrique’s knowledge of Taíno culture and history may also have been stunted due to his being placed at the Monastery of Verapaz to be educated by the Franciscans as part of an

²⁹⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 45.

²⁹⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

²⁹⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 45.

²⁹⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

²⁹⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 45.

²⁹⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

effort to instruct the sons of Taíno *caciques* in Hispaniola in the ways of the Spanish.³⁰⁰ The school was established around 1513 following the passage of the Laws of Burgos.³⁰¹ Although it is unclear exactly when Enrique was sent to Verapaz, he would have been on the verge of adolescence at the time the school was established. Enrique remained close to one of his instructors, Fray Remigio de Mejía due to his close commitment to Catholicism, suggesting the level of impact the school had on him at a formative age.³⁰²

Regardless of the time Enrique spent away from his *cacicazgo* and his family, he spent his first ten years or so growing up immersed within his culture and may have been exposed to his family's history of revolt during that first decade. Enrique was also not the only Taíno being educated at the school. During the first two years of the school being open, the Franciscans were given fifty copies of Antonio Nebrija's *Artes de gramática*, suggesting that there may have been quite a few students educated there in addition to Enrique.³⁰³ Evidently, he would have been exposed to other Taíno even while away from his family, where he may have learned about different instances of resistance to the Spanish in Hispaniola. Thus, Enrique likely learned of his great-aunt's revolt or was at least exposed to the history of Taíno resistance to colonization growing up. The effectiveness of violent reactions to Spanish encroachment in comparison to the formation of alliances, especially in the case of Anacaona, would have likely been apparent to him. After first attempting to legally resolve his dispute with his *encomendero*,³⁰⁴ the combination of the declining political situation of the island, the stressors of a smallpox epidemic, and his understanding of how the Spanish have acted in the previous decades in

³⁰⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 62.

³⁰¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 62.

³⁰² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 62.

³⁰³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 62.

³⁰⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595.

response to different methods may have factored into his decision to incite a revolt rather than try another legal outlet.³⁰⁵

As the great-nephew of Anacaona and her late husband, Caonabó,³⁰⁶ Enrique was therefore born into a line of important *caciques* who had resisted Spanish encroachment of Hispaniola since the early period of colonization. Rather than adopt the tactics of alliance that had resulted in the execution of his great-aunt, Enrique embraced tactics of indigenous marronage to rebel. His revolt, which lasted more than a decade,³⁰⁷ involved “raids on Spanish *ingenios*, farms, and towns” where they stole “what provisions they needed...killing any Spaniards that they encountered.”³⁰⁸ The success of the rebellion was largely due to “the rebels’ ability to sustain themselves, seemingly indefinitely,” from the resources available to them.³⁰⁹ Within the Bahoruco mountains, they grew crops and hunted pigs, supplementing their diets with items that were considered to be inedible by the Spanish but had been traditional food for the Taíno, such as spiders, crayfish, snakes, and roots.³¹⁰

It was said that the rebels knew the land, and because of that they mocked the Spaniards hunting them down.³¹¹ Knowing that the Spanish militia had to travel up to 150 miles to track them down within the Bahoruco, maroons would climb to the highest peaks of the mountains in the area.³¹² The Spanish were unable to scale these sections due to their excessive baggage and artillery – they carried all their provisions on their backs as food and water were difficult to find

³⁰⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

³⁰⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 589.

³⁰⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 587.

³⁰⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³⁰⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

³¹⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599. Here Altman cites a testimony from a 1517 inquiry by the Jeronymites, where royal factor Juan de Ampies stated that indigenous people who fled from Spanish settlements would survive by consuming certain foods he considered filthy and poisonous, such as the above.

³¹¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

³¹² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

in the region.³¹³ Additionally, Enrique and his followers posted spies “throughout the mountains to report on the Spanish army’s progress,” allowing their troops to be prepared and using their superior knowledge of the land to their advantage.³¹⁴ Although they largely avoided direct engagement with military patrols, seeking refuge only in the most inaccessible regions of the mountains, Enrique and his followers continued to raid settlements and estates.³¹⁵ The rebels’ ability to incorporate traditional Taíno knowledge of the land and its resources was important as “food was hard to locate as the region is incredibly dry and barren, making even fresh water a trial to obtain.”³¹⁶ The incorporation of this ancestral knowledge was critical for their survival. Furthermore, Enrique’s careful coordination of raids was particularly damaging to the Spanish. Indeed, by the mid-1520s the Spanish settlers on Hispaniola were forced back within Santo Domingo while the rest of the island was dominated by Enrique and the other rebels.³¹⁷

Responding to Enrique’s success, other *caciques* rebelled throughout the 1520s and 1530s in Hispaniola. Ciguayo, Murcia, Hernandillo el Tuerto, and Tamayo were Taíno *caciques* who instigated revolts around this time.³¹⁸ Ciguayo, who in 1528 attacked Spanish mining towns located in Cibao, was largely successful in gathering hostages and burning *haciendas* (Eng. Estates) until 1529, when two Spanish captains reported killing him.³¹⁹ Tamayo organized a rebellion near Puerto Real in 1519, nearly simultaneous with the incitement of Enrique’s revolt. While this revolt was quickly suppressed by colonial authorities, he had more success with a 1532 revolt he instigated against Puerto Real.³²⁰ Like Enrique, Tamayo had suffered under the

³¹³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³¹⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³¹⁵ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 599.

³¹⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³¹⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³¹⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 144.

³¹⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 144-5.

³²⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 145.

repartimiento and was moved away from his ancestral *cacicazgo*.³²¹ However, unlike Enrique, Tamayo did not attempt to minimize bloodshed and engaged in fairly severe acts of violence, including killing children and enslaved indigenous people.³²²

Conclusion

Despite the perception that Spanish conquest of the Americas was inevitable and rapid,³²³ the Taíno response to governors Columbus and Ovando in Hispaniola demonstrate both the heavy presence and the sheer strength of indigenous resistance. The Taíno reacted to Columbus's aggression and violence with immediacy, through attacks and larger scale revolts coordinated between important *caciques*.³²⁴ These *caciques* created alliances against the dominant Spanish political faction with other rebelling Spaniards, and even when Columbus was arrested and replaced by Ovando, the Taíno continued to ally themselves against the new governor in order to protect their people and their ancestral *cacicazgos*.³²⁵

Enrique, who was born of a long line of powerful *caciques* who resisted Spanish colonization, embodied these traditions of indigenous revolt in his own actions when he chose to flee his oppressors and incite a rebellion. In the ensuing chaos, Spaniards were forced back within Santo Domingo, the island's capitol city, while the maroons under Enrique dominated the rest of the island.³²⁶ The scale of this revolt was unprecedented, and the rebels' tactics were so successful that it encouraged other *caciques*, like Tamayo and Ciguayo, to engineer and incite impactful revolts in the 1520s and 1530s.³²⁷ The Spanish were ultimately forced to admit defeat

³²¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 145.

³²² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 145-6.

³²³ Restall, "The New Conquest History," 151.

³²⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 41-2.

³²⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43-5.

³²⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

³²⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 144.

and negotiate a peace treaty with Enrique, which was ratified in 1534,³²⁸ nearly a decade and a half after the initial start of his rebellion in 1519.³²⁹ This broke the “rule of thumb that Spaniards did not negotiate with Indians, whom they considered to be their subjects by virtue of conquest,” demonstrating just how significant Enrique’s treaty was in the history of Spanish and maroon relations.³³⁰

This was the first occasion that the Spanish were forced to concede to a treaty with an “undefeated indigenous group that had long resisted authority,” recognizing the sovereignty of those they oppressed.³³¹ The treaty set a precedent for the future peace treaties that the Spanish would make with maroons, although these groups would be largely comprised of African and Afro-descended rebels in the future.³³² Enrique demonstrated to the Spanish and to those they enslaved that resistance was possible and could be done at such a scale as to earn freedom for those oppressed. When placed within the proper context of the decades of resistance to Spanish encroachment by the Taíno, it becomes clear just how extensive and powerful this resistance was following first contact and Columbus’s arrival in Hispaniola.

³²⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 607.

³²⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 587.

³³⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 613.

³³¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 613.

³³² Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 613.

Chapter 4

Spanish Systems of Forced Labor and Joint Rebellion

On Christmas eve, 1521, twenty enslaved Africans initiated what would become a full scale revolt against the Spanish. The insurrection began on La Isabela *ingenio* owned by Diego Colón.³³³ The rebels “killed Spanish residents, raided estates, stole gold and other valuable items, and recruited other enslaved insurgents.”³³⁴ Their destination, Azua, in the South of Hispaniola, was located near the mountains of the Bahoruco where the indigenous *cacique* Enrique and his followers were camped out while fighting their own rebellion against the Spanish.³³⁵ By 1523, the governor of Hispaniola had declared open war against all maroons participating in both Enrique’s revolt and the Christmas Rebellion. In the declaration, he stated that the Spanish were warring with both indigenous and African combatants,³³⁶ owing to “the great harm, deaths, robberies, and scandals that the indians and blacks walking free were committing.”³³⁷

Despite the Spanish understanding that African and indigenous maroons often allied together, historians still tend to treat these two developments as separate. Scholarly articles such as Ida Altman’s “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America” typically only focus on either indigenous or African resistance when discussing marronage in Hispaniola, and others such as Robert Schwaller’s “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620” may discuss both, but will continue to separate

³³³ Erin Woodruff Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Espanola, 1500-1534,” *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2 (April 2013): 209.

³³⁴ Ana Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle in Hispaniola: From indigenous Agitators to African Rebels,” *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 11, no. 7 (May 2018): 82.

³³⁵ Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 619.

³³⁶ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

³³⁷ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt, 217.” In end note 70, Stone cites an excerpt from the original declaration which reads “los grandes danos (*sic daños*) y muertes y robos y escándalos que los indios y negros que andan alzados hacen.” This had been translated to English by the author.

Taíno and African marronage in their analysis.³³⁸ Historical events such as the Christmas Rebellion remind us of the existence of indigenous and African alliances and the depth of their shared goals – as Richard Price writes of African and indigenous maroons in Brazil, “there was a common ground of opposition to the European-imposed system and slavery, which naturally led to cooperation.”³³⁹ Revolts such as the 1521 Christmas Rebellion and Enrique’s revolt in 1519 demonstrate that it was fairly common for indigenous and African maroons to ally against the Spanish, especially given the coexistence of systems of oppression like the *encomienda* and chattel slavery. These groups did not just coexist in Hispaniola, but actively allied with each other. Examining the strength and extent of their shared resistance refutes traditional narratives of Spanish conquest as being rapid and inevitable.

The Encomienda as Slavery

The *encomienda* in Hispaniola allowed Spanish *encomenderos* to be given the right to “demand labor and tribute from the Indians” who were assigned to them by the Crown.³⁴⁰ The system was structured around ownership of labor rather than land rights, as in the Americas the Spaniards quickly learned that controlling the land did not inherently include control of “the labor needed to exploit it.”³⁴¹ Ultimately, the *encomienda* was never “a landed estate and involved no ownership of land.”³⁴² Theoretically, the ownership of the *encomienda* was

³³⁸ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 587-614. and Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 609-638.

³³⁹ Richard Price, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 215.

³⁴⁰ Robert G. Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento in Spanish America: A Structural Analysis,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 51 no. 3 (August 1, 1971): 435.

³⁴¹ Keith, “Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento,” 434.

³⁴² Ronald W. Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas,” *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 46.

restricted, and “*encomenderos* were forbidden inheritance rights.”³⁴³ Indigenous people could not be relocated from the location of the *encomienda*,³⁴⁴ and the institution was originally intended for temporary assignments during conquest.³⁴⁵

As the *encomienda* was a temporary, non-hereditary institution, and as the *encomendero* owned only the labor of the indigenous people rather than humans themselves, the system is not typically argued to be a form of slavery.³⁴⁶ On paper, the temporary *encomienda*, in which the *encomendero* only owned “an unregulated share of the outputs from a stock of human capital,” and was unable to sell, buy, or rent a Taíno, seems distinct from chattel slavery.³⁴⁷ However, I will argue that in practice, the *encomienda* was a form of slavery as these conditions were not abided by.

Although the system was intended to be non-hereditary, it was common for successions to occur between male members of a family regardless of the law.³⁴⁸ This can be seen in Enrique’s case, where he and his people were part of an *encomienda* that was inherited by the son of his original *encomendero* after his death.³⁴⁹ Although at this time the *encomienda* was legally a non-hereditary institution, cases like Enrique’s show that intergenerational transfer still occurred.³⁵⁰ This practice was later made legal, however.³⁵¹ Despite legal strictures on an *encomendero*’s ability to buy, sell, or rent a Taíno living in their *encomienda*, in practice they still had a lot of control over their forced laborers.

³⁴³ Timothy J. Yeager, “Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown’s Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth Century Spanish America,” *The Journal of Economic History* 55 no. 4 (Dec. 1995): 843.

³⁴⁴ Yeager, “Encomienda or Slavery?” 843.

³⁴⁵ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 49.

³⁴⁶ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 49.

³⁴⁷ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 49.

³⁴⁸ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 595-7.

³⁴⁹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 594.

³⁵⁰ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 596.

³⁵¹ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 49.

By 1503, Queen Isabella made it legal to enslave Caribs, indigenous people considered to be cannibals by the Spanish.³⁵² Although the law “nominally prohibited the enslavement of peaceful Indians,” including the Taíno, it still forced these peaceful indigenous people to labor for the Spanish, constructing towns, providing food, and mining gold.³⁵³ If an indigenous person refused to labor, they were to be forced to complete other tasks, despite the Spanish government still considering them “free.”³⁵⁴ In order to carry out these decrees, from 1502 to 1509 colonial governor Ovando institutionalized the *encomienda* in Hispaniola, effectively ending any illusion that the system would consist only of temporary assignments.³⁵⁵

During the Jeronymite inquiry in Hispaniola in 1518, the *encomenderos* greatly resisted giving up the Taíno in their *encomiendas*. As an *encomienda* was only temporarily granted to an *encomendero*, with the understanding that they would be collecting tribute by proxy for the Crown, it was well within the Spanish government’s right to reorganize the institution at will.³⁵⁶ Yet, the few Taíno who were freed still found themselves “at the mercy of their *encomenderos*, who tried to force or cajole them into returning to service.”³⁵⁷ Even though there was no legal stipulation allowing for the ownership of indigenous people living in an *encomienda*, the power that *encomenderos* had to force them to labor and prevent them from leaving suggests a de facto ownership. Although legally, *encomenderos* did not own Taínos, in practice they were able to exert all the force that comes with ownership. Ultimately, for the Taíno living in the *encomienda*,

³⁵² Erin Woodruff Stone, *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 46.

³⁵³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

³⁵⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

³⁵⁵ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 46.

³⁵⁶ Batchelder et al., “The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist,” 46.

³⁵⁷ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

their lives “were only marginally different from that of slaves.”³⁵⁸ There were few authorities monitoring the *encomenderos*, allowing abuse to be widespread and common.³⁵⁹

The Transition to African Slavery

The implementation of the *encomienda* fueled indigenous population decline and led to an abusive system. *Encomenderos* created punishing production quotas, where population loss had no impact on how much tribute the Taíno were expected to provide.³⁶⁰ Taínos worked “in gold mines, on cattle ranches, and at sugar plantations,”³⁶¹ often suffering in abusive situations.³⁶² Population declined due to “wars and attacks...the spread of diseases, famine, overwork and exhaustion...and suicide.”³⁶³ It became apparent to the Spanish that they would need to replace their diminishing workforce.

Initially, in order to mask the diminishing number of Taínos, the Spanish legalized the enslavement of other groups of indigenous people.³⁶⁴ In addition to the so-called Caribs mentioned above, these included those from islands considered useless due to an absence of gold.³⁶⁵ Taken from the Lucayos (Bahamas) Islands, the Lesser Antilles, Puerto Rico, and the coastal areas of Venezuela and Brazil, indigenous people were trafficked and put to work in Hispaniola, fueling the growing colony.³⁶⁶ The trade in enslaved indigenous people quickly exploded, growing out of control. By 1520 at the latest, the Lucayos Islands were completely depopulated.³⁶⁷ For the indigenous people brought to Hispaniola, “only a small percentage of

³⁵⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁵⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁶⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁶¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 29-30.

³⁶² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁶³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁶⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 29.

³⁶⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

³⁶⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 29-30.

³⁶⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 49.

those captured survived the journey and their initial days on” the island due to the severity of the treatment they received at the hands of the Spanish.³⁶⁸ Many starved to death or perished from wounds sustained at the hands of enslavers. At this time, the Spanish viewed the population of indigenous people in the Caribbean as inexhaustible.³⁶⁹

In order to combat the rapidly declining indigenous population, and to diminish the intensity of slave raiding in the Caribbean, the Crown executed the 1514 *repartimiento*.³⁷⁰ Although only indigenous people living in *encomiendas* like Enrique were affected by the *repartimiento*, in contrast to those enslaved through other means, it was a measure intended to reorganize and combine the Taíno’s *cacicazgos* which had been heavily impacted by the sharp population decline.³⁷¹ The indigenous population continued to decline, however, prompting calls by reformers like Bartolome de Las Casas for the Crown to make indigenous slavery illegal.³⁷² Shifting away from indigenous slavery, the Spanish began to traffic Africans to the Americas with a greater frequency.³⁷³ Few Spaniards objected to the enslavement of Africans, who were believed to be “more suited to toil in the tropical climate of the Spanish colonies.”³⁷⁴ Revolts by indigenous *caciques* like Enrique also contributed to a shift in enslavement, with *encomenderos* demanding *bozal* Africans to replace their forced workers turned maroons.³⁷⁵ By 1518, the Spanish began to increasingly traffic Africans to the Americas to replace the dwindling

³⁶⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 49.

³⁶⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 49.

³⁷⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 50.

³⁷¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 51.

³⁷² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁷³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁷⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁷⁵ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

indigenous populations.³⁷⁶ A significant number of enslaved Africans arrived on the island between 1520 and 1521.³⁷⁷

In the Spanish Americas, the wealth gained from mining operations fueled the traffic in enslaved Africans.³⁷⁸ Africans who were trafficked to Spanish America would remain “chattel slaves for life,” meaning that they would be in bondage and that the children of enslaved women would also be born into bondage.³⁷⁹ This distinction separated them from indigenous people within the *encomienda*, who were not considered the hereditary property of *encomenderos*.³⁸⁰ Additionally, enslaved Africans were distinct from enslaved indigenous people, such as the Caribs, Lucayans, and the Taíno, within the *encomienda* in terms of the work they were forced to do. Enslaved Africans were not typically utilized in mining operations, which the Spanish reserved for indigenous people.³⁸¹ Due to how expensive the Spanish considered enslaved Africans, they worked in “domestic, agricultural, or specialized labor” which was considered safer than mining where indigenous forced laborers harvested gold.³⁸²

During the first half of the 16th century, indigenous people continued to labor in the mines while enslaved Africans were increasingly introduced into Hispaniola, demonstrating the two groups’ continued co-existence even with the high death rates of Taínos.³⁸³ Enslaved Africans could be four to five times more expensive than an enslaved indigenous person due to costs associated with reimbursement for the merchant’s slave license, taxes, and life insurance.³⁸⁴ Due to this high cost, the desire to traffic indigenous people – for whom the Spanish would pay

³⁷⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁷⁷ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

³⁷⁸ David Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000), 25.

³⁷⁹ Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, 73.

³⁸⁰ Yeager, “Encomienda or Slavery?” 843.

³⁸¹ Eltis, *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, 24.

³⁸² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 134.

³⁸³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

³⁸⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 134.

considerably less – rather than Africans persisted well into the mid-16th century,³⁸⁵ despite the fact that enslaved Africans were intended to replace enslaved indigenous people.³⁸⁶ Trafficking Africans to Hispaniola ultimately did not end the *encomienda* or indigenous slavery in the island.³⁸⁷ For several decades, the trade in enslaved Africans and indigenous people would coexist, with indigenous people and Africans living and working alongside one another.³⁸⁸

Spanish Racialization

The Spanish did not typically document the origins of the enslaved Africans they trafficked to Hispaniola. This lack of detail is then reproduced in subsequent scholarship on African marronage in Hispaniola, which often lacks a description of some of the ethnic groups from which maroons originated, or even the approximate regions of Africa from which they were trafficked.³⁸⁹ There are a few exceptions, for example, the known role that Islamic Wolofs from the Senegambia region had in inciting the 1521 Christmas Rebellion.³⁹⁰ However, in general, there is a clear lack of this knowledge, likely due to the Spanish system of racialization.

The Spanish categorized enslaved Africans based on their acculturation and familiarity with Spanish society and how recently they had been trafficked to the Americas. *Ladino* enslaved Africans were familiar with Spanish culture, having been immersed in Spanish society for a longer duration than their less acculturated counterparts.³⁹¹ Some even lived in the Iberian Peninsula or the Canary Islands before being transported to Hispaniola.³⁹² *Ladinos* often received better treatment “based on older metropolitan slave relations and...legal and religious

³⁸⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 134.

³⁸⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁸⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

³⁸⁸ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130-1.

³⁸⁹ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 614.

³⁹⁰ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

³⁹¹ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” *Historical Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1997): 87.

³⁹² Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 203.

protections.”³⁹³ In contrast, *bozal* enslaved Africans were less familiar with Spanish society and were trafficked directly from Africa. They had no knowledge of European civilization and were considered by the Spanish to be much easier to pacify and enslave.³⁹⁴

The Spanish mistakenly believed that *bozales* did not share the same desires for freedom as their *ladino* counterparts. In a 1545 letter from Prince Philip, the prince expresses his desire that there should be no *ladinos* in Hispaniola.³⁹⁵ He writes that they are “badly inclined” and often the ringleaders of revolts, with many *ladinos* becoming the captains of maroon bands. Philip does not believe *bozales* have the same yearnings for freedom as *ladinos*, which he writes is the only thing they desire, and thus *bozales* should be imported in the place of *ladinos*.³⁹⁶ The Spanish perception of *bozales* as unskilled, easily controllable laborers was far from the truth. Many *bozales* were “familiar with metallurgy, pastoral activities, and large-scale agriculture” prior to arrival in the Americas.³⁹⁷ These skills were widely applicable in Hispaniola and essential to the function of the Americas, with colonial officials claiming by the seventeenth century that African labor was essential to mining, ranching, and the sugar industry.³⁹⁸

The severity of these misconceptions is best demonstrated by the involvement of Wolofs in inciting the 1521 Christmas Rebellion. Although the Wolofs were considered *bozales*, many were literate in Arabic, had experience with trade and mercantilism, and had infrequent but steady contact with the Portuguese in West Africa.³⁹⁹ Yet the Spanish considered them *bozales*

³⁹³ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 87.

³⁹⁴ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 204.

³⁹⁵ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto–Imagen Núm:489/766., CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/).

³⁹⁶ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto–Imagen Núm:489/766., CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents, accessed online at [www.http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/](http://www.firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/).

³⁹⁷ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

³⁹⁸ Landers, “Africans in the Spanish Colonies,” 86.

³⁹⁹ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

due to their direct arrival from Senegambia and their lack of familiarity with Spanish society – despite contact and trade with another Iberian power. The *bozal* Wolofs who arrived between 1520 and 1521 would shatter Spanish perceptions of *bozales* as being more passive than the rebellious *ladinos* as they rose up in 1521,⁴⁰⁰ participating in a revolt that was so devastating it would force Spanish settlers back within the walls of Santo Domingo, while the rebels dominated the rest of the island.⁴⁰¹

The Spanish racialization of Africans, and the subsequent lack of detail in the historical record on where exactly they were trafficked from, is likely due to Eurocentrism. Specifically, the Spanish racialization of non-Europeans was based upon standards related to familiarity with Spanish culture and society, with the implication there being that those possessing this acculturation were more intelligent, hence this misconception that *ladinos* were obsessed with freedom in contrast to *bozales*. This misconception was commonly seen in documents from the 1500s.⁴⁰² The Spanish likely thought *bozales*, unlike their acculturated counterparts, the *ladinos*, would not rebel because they would be too simple to understand they could be free. Although Prince Philip is not directly stating this in his 1545 letter to Santo Domingo, that is certainly the implication. The perception of intelligence, and thus likelihood to rebel, is contingent upon proximity to Spanish culture, and with it, civilization, education, and intelligence. Clearly, Spanish racialization and the prioritization in written records of whether a trafficked African was *bozal* or *ladino* as opposed to originating from a certain ethnic group or region is due to Eurocentrism.

Rebellion as an African and Indigenous Alliance

⁴⁰⁰ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴⁰¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

⁴⁰² See Manuscript 034, a 1545 Letter from Prince Philip, in works cited for an example of how commonly accepted this belief was.

Typically when discussing marronage, historians will treat the onset of indigenous and African marronage as discrete events and separate phenomena.⁴⁰³ For example, Ida Altman in “The Revolt of Enriquillo” discusses the revolt as a purely indigenous rebellion. She makes only a few mentions of the existence of enslaved Africans and their participation in the revolt, but often only as figures secondary to the Taíno.⁴⁰⁴ This is despite the clear involvement of Africans, especially Wolofs, in the revolt and their importance in aiding Enrique’s efforts.⁴⁰⁵

Additionally, Robert Schwaller in “Contested Conquests” discusses Enrique’s rebellion as well as African marronage, but separates the two developments. He goes so far as to write that relocating Enrique’s people “left the Bahoruco devoid of Spanish subjects,”⁴⁰⁶ which allowed African maroons to establish communities in the Bahoruco, negating the fact that there was an African presence throughout the 1520s there due to their involvement with the revolt and that some Africans, like Sebastian Lemba, chose to remain in the Bahoruco after the treaty agreement in 1534.⁴⁰⁷ However, Enrique’s revolt is an instance where a rebellion was carried out by both African and indigenous maroons and clearly demonstrates that both groups not only coexisted, but actively allied with each other against the Spanish. Undoubtedly, Enrique’s revolt is fundamental to understanding the relationships between Africans and Taínos in Hispaniola.

Around the time that Enrique fled from Spanish society with his followers to the Bahoruco, *encomenderos* became fearful that they would soon have a completely depleted labor force and began to demand importation of *bozal* enslaved Africans.⁴⁰⁸ The Spanish mistakenly believed

⁴⁰³ See Schwaller, “Contested Conquests” for an example of a traditional discussion of indigenous and African marronage as discrete developments in Hispaniola.

⁴⁰⁴ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 598.

⁴⁰⁵ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 196.

⁴⁰⁶ Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 620.

⁴⁰⁷ Ana Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle in Hispaniola: From indigenous Agitators to African Rebels,” *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 11, no. 7 (May 2018): 85.

⁴⁰⁸ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 208-9.

that because *bozales* were trafficked directly from Africa and lacked acculturation to European society and culture, they were therefore “easier to control and pacify than ladino slaves.”⁴⁰⁹ By 1519, the Spanish king allowed the trafficking of enslaved Africans to increase, with a significant number arriving between 1520 and 1521. Notably, a large portion were Wolofs from Senegambia.⁴¹⁰

The Spaniards considered the Wolofs to be *bozales* despite the fact that they were members of an empire which had traded with the Portuguese on a regular basis. Although they were likely limited in their contact as their homeland was land-locked, and their empire was in decline by the sixteenth century, historic trade with an Iberian power meant that the Wolofs had some knowledge of European culture and society.⁴¹¹ Additionally, many Wolofs worked in the merchant trade prior to enslavement, making them “likely equipped to deal with diverse groups of people in new, strange situations.”⁴¹² The Spanish perception of enslaved Wolof people as *bozales* despite their backgrounds is critical to understanding the events of the subsequent 1521 Christmas Rebellion.

Erin Woodruff Stone in “America’s First Slave Revolt,” writes that it is likely that the Wolofs who initiated the Christmas Rebellion knew of Enrique’s revolt and his community’s presence in the Bahoruco.⁴¹³ Stone cites archaeological evidence which shows that the two groups were living together and were in contact.⁴¹⁴ The remains of three people who existed during the period of Enrique’s rebellion, “two of which were adult African males and one whose ethnicity could not be determined,” were found in a cave within the Bahoruco.⁴¹⁵ The skeletons

⁴⁰⁹ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 203.

⁴¹⁰ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹¹ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹² Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹³ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹⁴ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 142.

were found alongside Taíno ceramics and pig bones, suggesting that the two groups likely inhabited the caves simultaneously.⁴¹⁶ In 1521, on Christmas eve, enslaved Africans initiated what would grow into a full-on revolt against the Spanish. The insurrection began on La Isabela *ingenio*,⁴¹⁷ and the rebels made their way to the Bahoruco where Enrique was camped out with his followers.⁴¹⁸

The combined forces, estimated to number at least four hundred Africans and Taínos under Enrique, spread throughout the island, forcing Spaniards to be all but confined to Santo Domingo, the capital of Hispaniola.⁴¹⁹ The Spanish were particularly fearful given the fact that there were more enslaved Africans than Spaniards in certain parts of the island, causing the King to mandate that each person who enslaved Africans must have in their household other Spaniards amounting to one third of the total enslaved population.⁴²⁰ He ordered that they should be “capable of taking arms when it may happen that it be needed,” suggesting that potential secondary uprisings could occur at any moment, underscoring the chaos and discord the maroons were causing through their revolt.⁴²¹ Although the African maroons did not join up with Enrique until 1521, two years after his revolt was initiated, they quickly became enmeshed with the indigenous rebels. As evidenced by the joint declaration, the Spanish understood that they were not fighting solely Taíno or African maroons, but rather a combined force, underscoring the depth of this alliance.

⁴¹⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 142.

⁴¹⁷ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴¹⁸ Schwaller, “Contested Conquests,” 619.

⁴¹⁹ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴²⁰ Archivo General de Indias, PATRONATO, 20, N.2, R.2, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-021-manuscript/translation/#page-1>.

⁴²¹ Archivo General de Indias, PATRONATO, 20, N.2, R.2, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-021-manuscript/translation/#page-1>.

This alliance is further highlighted by later Spanish recollections of the event. In a 1545 letter from Valladolid, Spain, Prince Philip addresses the *Oidor* (Eng. Judge) of Santo Domingo and describes his concern over the tendencies of *ladinos* to seek freedom in comparison to their *bozal* counterparts. He describes the *ladinos* as “very daring / and badly inclined” and states that a number of *ladino* captains have gained notoriety on the island.⁴²² The Prince also writes that the freedom seeking behavior of the *ladinos* “was seen in the matter of Enriquillo,” specifically referencing the role that *ladino* enslaved Africans had played in the revolt.⁴²³ This clearly demonstrates the Spanish perception of Enrique’s revolt as an African and indigenous endeavor, contrary to other authors’ discussions of the revolt as just indigenous resistance, separating it from the broader history of African maroon resistance to the Spanish.⁴²⁴

Although the alliance was fractured following Enrique’s acceptance of a peace treaty in 1534, causing many maroons of African descent to separate from the camp in the Bahoruco,⁴²⁵ there continued to be scattered instances of indigenous and African collaboration. In a 1545 Letter from the Spanish Prince to *Oidor* Cerrato, the Crown expressed concern over the continued revolt of enslaved Africans. The Prince wrote that near “Sant Joan de la Maguana” [sic] there were many African maroons active in the area, killing Spaniards in their raids.⁴²⁶ When writing ‘Blacks’ in reference to the African and African-descended maroons, he initially

⁴²² Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto-Imagen, Núm:489/766, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/translation/>. “muy atrevidos/y mal ynclinados” (Translated from Spa. to Eng. by author)

⁴²³ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-245 Recto-Imagen, Núm:489/766, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-034-manuscript/translation/>.

⁴²⁴ See Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo” for a discussion of the revolt as a purely indigenous rebellion and Robert Schwaller, “Contested Conquests” for a discussion of both African and indigenous marronage, but as separate developments.

⁴²⁵ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁴²⁶ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-250 Recto-Imagen Núm:499/766 - 251 Recto-Imagen Núm: 501/766, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-035-manuscript/translation/>. (*sic San Juan de la Maguana*)

wrote ‘Indians’ then crossed it out, suggesting that the ties between the two groups were still well-known to the Spanish and potentially indicating that there was continued collaboration in marronage.⁴²⁷ The Prince’s erroneous labelling of the rebelling Africans as indigenous people clearly demonstrates collaboration between these groups may have been on-going, or at least that they were actively rebelling at the same time. Several indigenous rebels had left the camp in the Bahoruco following the 1534 peace agreement, breaking ranks to join the African maroons who sought other opportunities.⁴²⁸ It is plausible that these indigenous people could still have been working in tandem with African maroons.

Conclusion

Despite the legal stipulations of the *encomienda* preventing familial successions, in practice the system very quickly developed into a hereditary institution in early colonial Hispaniola.⁴²⁹ Additionally, *encomenderos* were able to exert a lot of power over the Taíno within their *encomiendas*, forcing them to labor under laws crafted by Queen Isabella,⁴³⁰ and preventing them from leaving their *encomiendas* despite being freed by the Jeronymites.⁴³¹ This was all in spite of the legal strictures on an *encomendero*’s ability to buy, sell, or rent a Taíno who was part of their *encomienda*. Despite the distinction that is often made between the *encomienda* and chattel slavery, for the Taíno living within the system, their lives were hardly different from those enslaved by the Spanish.⁴³² Regardless of the legal distinctions between the *encomienda*

⁴²⁷ Archivo General de Indias, SANTO_DOMINGO, 868, L.2-250 Recto-Imagen Núm:499/766 - 251 Recto-Imagen Núm: 501/766, Dominican Studies Institute Dominican Colonial Documents Collection, accessed online at <http://firstblacks.org/en/manuscripts/fb-primary-035-manuscript/translation/>. “andan mu/chos de los dichos [crossed out: yndios] negros y an muer/to y matan cada dia (*sic día*) cristianos” (Translated from Spa. to Eng. by author)

⁴²⁸ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle,” 85.

⁴²⁹ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 595-7.

⁴³⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

⁴³¹ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

⁴³² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

and chattel slavery, in practice, the lives of indigenous people and Africans who labored in early colonial Hispaniola were much the same.

The brutality and lack of regulation of the *encomienda* system contributed to the declining indigenous population in Hispaniola,⁴³³ fueling the trade in enslaved Africans who were trafficked to the Americas with increased frequency in order to allow for the transition to African rather than indigenous labor.⁴³⁴ Ultimately, despite the growing numbers of Africans enslaved by the Spanish on the island, the *encomienda* and indigenous slavery did not end.⁴³⁵ Systems of indigenous forced labor persisted, with enslaved Africans living and working alongside indigenous people for decades.⁴³⁶

Although historians will often draw distinctions between indigenous and African marronage, it is clear that both groups interacted throughout the 16th century through Spanish systems of forced labor.⁴³⁷ However, these groups did not just coexist, but also actively allied together against their oppressors. Events like the 1521 Christmas Rebellion, where enslaved Wolofs from Senegambia initiated a rebellion against the Spanish, when examined in conjunction with Enrique's revolt in 1519, demonstrate these alliances.⁴³⁸ These African maroons sought out Enrique's camp within the Bahoruco mountains in order to join forces with him, becoming powerful enough that they pushed the Spanish population of Hispaniola back within the walls of the capitol city, Santo Domingo.⁴³⁹ Ultimately, African and indigenous maroons coexisted well into the mid-16th century, and allied with each other against the Spanish, contradicting the

⁴³³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

⁴³⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

⁴³⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

⁴³⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130-1.

⁴³⁷ See Ida Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 587-614. and Robert C. Schwaller, "Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519-1620," *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 609-638.

⁴³⁸ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 209.

⁴³⁹ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 209.

perception of these groups' resistance as discrete historical developments and refuting the narrative of a rapid and effortless Spanish conquest of the Americas.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Spanish conquest of the Americas is typically viewed as the unavoidable result of first contact, with the traditional triumphalist narrative of conquest emphasizing “the inevitability and rapidity of military victory.”⁴⁴⁰ This narrative reduces the efforts of indigenous people, who have resisted colonial encroachment since Columbus’s second voyage to the Caribbean,⁴⁴¹ and of Africans trafficked to the Americas as enslaved laborers, who engineered successful and powerful revolts.⁴⁴² Ultimately, the traditional narrative of Spanish conquest is inaccurate. It overemphasizes the role of religion in the conquest of indigenous people, the strength of the Spanish military, and the ease of colonization.⁴⁴³ Using Hispaniola, the island now home to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as a microcosm of Spanish conquest, this thesis has disproven this narrative. By studying marronage, or the act of being a maroon, from 1492 to 1612, a period that roughly covers from the start of the island’s colonization⁴⁴⁴ until a period of decreased maroon activity, it becomes clear that there was active and successful resistance to Spanish conquest in the Americas.⁴⁴⁵

Maroon activities demonstrate a distinct pattern of resistance to Spanish colonization in Hispaniola. The raiding of estates completely disrupted Spanish commerce, depleted supplies, and helped bring about the freedom/self-emancipation of enslaved laborers, effectively halting

⁴⁴⁰ Mathew Restall, “The New Conquest History,” *History Compass* 10, no. 2 (February 2012): 151.

⁴⁴¹ Erin Woodruff Stone, *Captives of Conquest: Slavery in the Early Modern Spanish Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 40.

⁴⁴² Erin Woodruff Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt: Indians and African Slaves in Espanola, 1500-1534,” *Ethnohistory* 60 no. 2 (April 2013): 209.

⁴⁴³ Restall, “The New Conquest History,” 151.

⁴⁴⁴ Ida Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America,” *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 590-92.

⁴⁴⁵ Robert C. Schwaller, “Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519–1620,” *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 631-5.

the core functions of Spanish settlements.⁴⁴⁶ Additionally, raids which occurred at the beginning of the 1521 Christmas rebellion resulted in the theft of valuables from Spanish estates, reducing the wealth of affected towns.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, the intense psychological impacts of raiding made this form of resistance even more effective. Spanish fears of raids forced debilitating lifestyle changes, with Spaniards sometimes refusing to travel along the island's major roads unless in large groups composed of 15 to 20 people.⁴⁴⁸ Raiding slowed trade between towns and prevented colonial institutions like the *ingenios* from running properly, reducing potential wealth and production.⁴⁴⁹

Additionally, raiding allowed maroons to gain a level of self-sufficiency. Maroons were able to supplement their diets with foods not readily available at their settlements,⁴⁵⁰ facilitating the establishment of extensive commercial and trading networks, and allowing them to maintain communication with those still enslaved.⁴⁵¹ Treaties also allowed maroons to provide for their communities by responding to the growing economic needs of their newly established settlements.⁴⁵² Most critically, these treaties forced the Spanish to legally recognize maroons' sovereignty.⁴⁵³ Enrique and other successful maroons utilized treaties to earn protections for their communities, a critical part of weakening the colonial state.⁴⁵⁴ Treaties which gave these protections to individuals or groups who were formerly enslaved reduced the number of forced laborers the Spanish could use, weakening the colonial state's manpower. Raiding and treaties

⁴⁴⁶ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 616 and 621.

⁴⁴⁷ Ana Ozuna, "Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle in Hispaniola: From indigenous Agitators to African Rebels," *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 11, no. 7 (May 2018): 82.

⁴⁴⁸ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

⁴⁴⁹ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

⁴⁵⁰ Ozuna, "Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle," 82.

⁴⁵¹ Landers, "Africans in the Spanish Colonies," *Historical Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1997): 86.

⁴⁵² Richard Price, *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 4.

⁴⁵³ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

⁴⁵⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 612.

allowed maroons to create self-sufficient, and therefore long-lasting communities, and weaken the colonial state. Although the weakening of a state's power and the survival of a community are different forms of resistance, they are both key developments to consider when examining the alleged strength of the Spanish military and the rapidity of total conquest.

Furthermore, maroon groups began resisting Spanish conquest from the earliest period of contact. The Taíno in Hispaniola responded to Columbus's aggression and violence almost as soon as he arrived, coordinating attacks led by important *caciques*.⁴⁵⁵ In addition to warfare, the Taíno also actively allied against the dominant Spanish political factions. The *caciques* Guarionex and Anacaona both allied with the rebel Roldán against colonial governors in order to retain their ancestral lands and protect their people from further violence.⁴⁵⁶ The Taíno's knowledge of the land also proved to be a great tool of resistance. Rebels led by the *cacique* Enrique tracked Spanish troops through the use of scouts positioned throughout the Bahoruco mountains and deliberately led the Spanish through difficult mountainous terrain to exhaust them and deplete their supplies.⁴⁵⁷ The Taíno also relied on traditional food sources to sustain themselves while establishing maroon settlements. Foods like spiders, crayfish, snakes, and roots provided sustenance, but were considered inedible by the Spanish, allowing the indigenous rebels to outlast the militia hunting them.⁴⁵⁸

Enrique led one of the most successful rebellions against the Spanish, forcing the Spaniards back within the walls of the island's capitol, Santo Domingo,⁴⁵⁹ and encouraging other

⁴⁵⁵ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 41-2.

⁴⁵⁶ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43-45.

⁴⁵⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

⁴⁵⁸ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 599. Here Altman cites a testimony from a 1517 inquiry by the Jeronymites, where royal factor Juan de Ampies stated that indigenous people who fled from Spanish settlements would survive by consuming certain foods he considered filthy and poisonous, such as the above.

⁴⁵⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

caciques like Tamayo and Ciguayo to incite rebellions.⁴⁶⁰ The ratification of Enrique's peace treaty completely altered the way the Spanish viewed rebellions by indigenous and African maroons, breaking the "rule of thumb that Spaniards did not negotiate with Indians, whom they considered to be their subjects by virtue of conquest,"⁴⁶¹ and setting a precedent which allowed for future treaties with African and Afro-descended maroons.⁴⁶² This extensive history of indigenous resistance from the earliest years of Spanish conquest definitively counters any claims that conquest was inevitable. The defeats suffered by the Spanish military, culminating in a complete change of negotiation policy, demonstrates how contested Spanish conquest was. The strength of indigenous resistance presented a serious and extensive threat to the Spanish Crown's ability to colonize Hispaniola.

The systems of oppression into which indigenous and African people were forced ultimately aided in the establishment of alliances between the two groups. Although historians often treat indigenous and African marronage as separate historical developments, both groups coexisted and actively allied together against the Spanish.⁴⁶³ The *encomienda* system, although not typically considered slavery due to the legal stipulations which did not allow familial successions⁴⁶⁴ and prevented *encomenderos* from fully claiming ownership over a Taíno in the same way an enslaver can claim ownership over an enslaved laborer in a system of chattel slavery,⁴⁶⁵ in practice functioned very similarly to slavery. The *encomienda* was often passed down between fathers and sons, as was the case with the *encomienda* to which Enrique and his

⁴⁶⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 144.

⁴⁶¹ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 613.

⁴⁶² Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 613.

⁴⁶³ See Ida Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America," *The Americas* 63, no. 4 (2007): 587-614. and Robert C. Schwaller, "Contested Conquests: African Maroons and the Incomplete Conquest of Hispaniola, 1519-1620," *The Americas* 75, no. 4 (October 2018): 609-638.

⁴⁶⁴ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 595-7.

⁴⁶⁵ Ronald W. Batchelder et al., "The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas," *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 49.

people were assigned.⁴⁶⁶ Additionally, *encomenderos*, despite not being able to buy, sell, or rent a Taíno within their *encomiendas* could still force indigenous people to labor under laws implemented by Queen Isabella regardless of whether the government had deemed them “free,”⁴⁶⁷ and could prevent Taínos from leaving their *encomiendas* even if they were freed under the 1518 Jeronymite inquiry.⁴⁶⁸ Although legally, the *encomienda* can be distinguished from chattel slavery, for the Taíno assigned to *encomiendas*, their lives did not differ much from those fully enslaved, fueling a shared desire for freedom.⁴⁶⁹

The brutality of the *encomienda* system culminated in a high deathrate for Taínos and prompted the Spanish to traffic greater numbers of enslaved Africans to Hispaniola in order to supplement the declining indigenous population.⁴⁷⁰ Although the Spanish intended to transition completely from indigenous to African slavery, ultimately the *encomienda* and the enslavement of indigenous groups like the so-called Caribs did not end.⁴⁷¹ As institutions of indigenous forced labor persisted, enslaved Africans lived and worked alongside indigenous people in Hispaniola for decades, contradicting the notion that these groups did not coexist.⁴⁷² This coexistence allowed for alliances to be created in which the Taíno and Africans were able to initiate joint rebellions, like the 1521 Christmas Revolt.⁴⁷³ Enslaved Wolof Africans from Senegambia initiated a revolt on an *ingenio* and then marched to the Bahoruco, gathering supplies and recruiting other enslaved Africans through raids along the way,⁴⁷⁴ and eventually joining the

⁴⁶⁶ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 596.

⁴⁶⁷ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 46.

⁴⁶⁸ Altman, “The Revolt of Enriquillo,” 597.

⁴⁶⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

⁴⁷⁰ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 47.

⁴⁷¹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130.

⁴⁷² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 130-1.

⁴⁷³ Stone, “America’s First Slave Revolt,” 209.

⁴⁷⁴ Ozuna, “Rebellion and Anti-colonial Struggle in Hispaniola,” 82.

rebellion being led by Enrique.⁴⁷⁵ This joint resistance was so powerful that it pushed the Spanish population of Hispaniola back within the walls of Santo Domingo, demonstrating a critical threat to the colonial state.⁴⁷⁶ Both African and indigenous maroons were able to resist Spanish conquest successfully, and they were able to do it through the use of alliances, raids, and guerilla warfare. The coexistence of these groups and their shared experiences from being compelled into Spanish systems of enslavement and forced labor cultivated resistance and, ultimately, successful acts of marronage.

Despite the traditional narrative of Spanish conquest focusing on its inevitability and the rapidity of military victories,⁴⁷⁷ marronage demonstrates that this narrative is inaccurate. By utilizing Hispaniola as a microcosm of Spanish conquest and studying the ways African and indigenous maroons resisted enslavement, land encroachment, and colonization, this thesis clearly shows that there were consistent threats to the Spanish colonial state on the island. Maroons raided Spanish towns, destabilizing their commerce and production output,⁴⁷⁸ and successfully outsmarted militia hunting them.⁴⁷⁹ Rebellions led by indigenous and African maroons working in tandem were so effective at harming the Spanish colonial state that the Spanish government was forced to treat with them to cease hostilities,⁴⁸⁰ with maroons earning legal recognition of their communities' sovereignty.⁴⁸¹ The Taíno resisted Spanish aggression as early as Columbus's second voyage⁴⁸² through guerilla warfare, coordinated attacks,⁴⁸³ and

⁴⁷⁵ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 209.

⁴⁷⁶ Stone, "America's First Slave Revolt," 209.

⁴⁷⁷ Restall, "The New Conquest History," 151.

⁴⁷⁸ Schwaller, "Contested Conquests," 621.

⁴⁷⁹ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

⁴⁸⁰ Altman, "The Revolt of Enriquillo," 613.

⁴⁸¹ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

⁴⁸² Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 40.

⁴⁸³ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 43-45.

alliances with non-dominant Spanish political factions.⁴⁸⁴ Spanish conquest was never certain, as resistance from maroons was effective in harming the colonial state to the point of the Spanish having to seek recourse with treaties recognizing maroon sovereignty.⁴⁸⁵ In many occasions, Spanish power in Hispaniola was contested through large-scale rebellion and enslaved peoples' self-liberation. Spanish conquest of the Americas was never inevitable and victory was not rapid, with maroons in Hispaniola successfully resisting colonization and military subjugation for over a century following first contact.

⁴⁸⁴ Stone, *Captives of Conquest*, 143.

⁴⁸⁵ Price, *Maroon Societies*, 4.

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