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An Exploratory Study Examining Germany's Integration Processes of Syrian Refugees into Society – Multiculturalism or a Post-Migrant Society?

Chloe Hanley Kempken

An Exploratory Study Examining Germany's Integration Processes of Syrian Refugees into Society – Multiculturalism or a Post-Migrant Society?

A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at
Syracuse University

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Candidate for Bachelor of Arts Degree
and Renée Crown University Honors
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Honors Capstone Project in International Relations

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Abstract

The aim of this exploratory study is to examine factors, that account for the differential treatment of Syrian refugees in Germany, in the wake of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. The paper will discuss motives within the context of national citizenship laws, security issues, and public perception of asylum seekers. Since 2015, Germany has experienced a surge of refugees from Syria fleeing danger and persecution. The conflict has placed a strain on the German parliament to adapt national policies and develop integration programs, as well as preserve the fundamentals of German society. Along with distinct historical events, such as the Holocaust, national identity has been shaping the public's perception towards migrants.

The paper will examine whether Germany is leaning towards a policy of multiculturalism or a post-migrant society with integration deficits. It will look at the steps Germany has taken to assist refugees with integration processes, as well as the degree to which Syrians have adjusted to German culture. To determine integration trends, a case study was conducted in Berlin, Germany, with a focus group of fifty-five participants. It is through a complex analysis of factors, that a larger picture of today's integration issues can be constructed.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my mother, who has inspired me all my life. Without her expertise and support, I would have not had opportunity to visit refugee camps in Berlin, Germany. Her unfailing love and guidance have made me into the person I am today. It is her daily experience with refugees on Berlin's public transportation, that has influenced me to write about the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany.

I also would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Tod Rutherford, who spent long hours discussing and unfolding my ideas. Not only did he give me valuable academic advice, but he also pointed me in new intellectual directions and developed my analytical skill sets. It was him and Jamie Winders, who made my capstone coherent and legible for others to read.

Executive Summary

Since the start of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015, more than 1.5 million refugees have entered the European Union, seeking asylum (UNHCR, 2017). Germany stands at the forefront of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, carrying a moral and legal responsibility to those in need. Chancellor Angela Merkel projects a humanitarian vision to the world, heightened by expectations of potential economic benefits for Germany.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis has developed into a labyrinth of opposing political views. Amongst Germany and other parts of the European Union, public sentiment has been progressively skeptical of refugees. Political parties, following xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric, have seen an increase in supporters. As a result, the German government has laid an emphasis on expanding integration policies within the political agenda. While the government is seeking to close projected demographic and labor market shortfalls due to a rapidly aging population, a more challenging issue emerges – a segregated refugee community.

This paper addresses the dimensions of integration processes of Syrian refugees into society, and will analyze whether Germany is facing a future of multiculturalism or a post-migrant society. Angela Merkel's open-door policy, revised citizenship laws, and the extensive allocation of funds into refugee programs, should theoretically be creating a welcoming environment for Syrian refugees to adjust and assimilate over time. However, reality suggests public discrimination to imposes on integration practices, allowing the German public to craft biased guidelines regarding the treatment of Syrian refugees.

To contextualize the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany, the paper will examine relevant historical and cultural events to identify factors that contribute to today's integration dilemma.

German identity plays a key role in understanding public resentments. The first section of this paper, provides an overview of national immigration laws, the history of Turkish Gastarbeiter, as well as the effects of German leadership. The second section focuses largely on the case study I conducted in summer 2016, when I traveled to Berlin, Germany, and interviewed a focus group of fifty-five Syrian refugees. The third section analyzes data revolving around security threats in Germany as well as the European Union, which partly reinforce the overall stigma around refugees. The final section offers insight on possible future trends, concluding thoughts, and an app proposal to stimulate acculturation practices.

My research concluded that an interconnected system of factors attributes to Germany's tolerance of Syrian refugees. While individual Syrian refugees bear different experiences in German society, integration processes appear sluggish, almost stagnant. Despite the fact that government institutions provide resources, Germany's political and social histories prohibit effortless integration of Syrian refugees to this day. A feasible future for Germany, therefore, points away from multiculturalism and toward a post-migrant society. A national identity, shaped by the repercussion of the Holocaust, citizenship laws and current security threats, has been working against conceivable integration goals. Refugees remain alienated from society, lack employment opportunities, and find themselves facing not only cultural challenges but also a prominent language barrier.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1997 Alan Cowell wrote in an editorial piece by the New York Times, "Like it or not, Germany becomes a melting pot". Twenty years later, Germany still struggles to see itself as a country of multiculturalism. For a further understanding of this discussion, we have to define two terms: multiculturalism and post-migrancy.

Multiculturalism refers to the respectful collaboration of diverse ethnic or religious groups within one country and endorses the idea of heterogeneity (Mishra, 2014, p. 64). Merriam-Webster defines multiculturalism also as "relation to, reflection, or adapting to diverse cultures". Multiculturalism enforces open dialogue between different ethnic groups, without impeding on one's background or identity. A country following policies of multiculturalism promote social integration while also preserving diversity (Mishra, 2014, p. 64-65). Globally, multiculturalism is viewed as a positive attempt to promote public acceptance and mutual respect of migrants, and overall ethnic diversity.

A post-migrant society deals with the repercussions caused by migration, and shows a clear distinction between native citizens and foreign migrants. This paper will define "post-migrancy" as an integration deficit, occurring within a society after migration is considered politically legitimate by its government. Migrants and/or refugees are thus exposed to a gap between its own minority group and the host country's society. Naika Foroutan, vice-director of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM) at the Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany, defines post-migrancy as:

"(a) Social change towards a heterogeneous underlying structure has been acknowledged ("Germany is a country of immigration") regardless of whether this transformation is seen as positive or negative,

(b) Immigration and emigration are recognized as phenomena that have a tremendous impact on the country, which can be discussed, regulated and negotiated but not reversed,

(c) Structures, institutions, and political cultures are adapted ex post to the identified migration reality (i.e., post-migration), resulting in, on the one hand, greater permeability and upward mobility but, on the other hand, also in defensive reactions and distributional conflicts" (Foroutan,"Zuwanderung", 2015).

Governments tend to encounter hardships of acculturation, including participation in society, preservation of cultural identity, and protection of equal rights. Naika Foroutan also considers post-migrant societies as "negotiation societies" (Foroutan, "Unity" 2, 2015). This approach acknowledges the responsibility of the government and the public to renegotiate social standards and resources.

In Germany's particular case, migration existed before the 1960s. Once-welcomed Turkish Gastarbeiter, developed quickly into a marginalized community. The German government failed to accept the changing societal profile or creating a welcoming atmosphere for the rising number of migrants and refugees. Refugees in Germany are officially categorized as asylum seekers, after having filed an application for international protection. Under the Geneva Convention[1], a refugee is a displaced person who fears persecution due to reasons of religion,

[1] The Geneva Conventions were a succession of treaties that established protocols for international law and humanitarian standards.

race, nationality, or social belonging. Refugees are unable to return home safely without fearing greater harm.

In 2010 Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in a milestone speech near Berlin that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed" ("Kanzlerin", 2015). Merkel continued her speech by saying, "we lie to ourselves, saying that they (once Turkish Gastarbeiter) won't stay – that they will disappear" ("Kanzlerin", 2015). Days prior, a study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation found that more than 30% of people agreed that "Germany was overrun by foreigners" (Connolly, 2010). Angela Merkel's demand for integration in 2015 as one of Germany's key tasks, marked a shift in her previously liberal line on immigration.

This paper will examine whether the integration of Syrian refugees is succeeding or failing. My preliminary hypothesis is as follows: If integration processes stand analogous to German sentiment, then distinct factors have to be hindering assimilation, tolerance and/or multiculturalism. These factors are likely to include socio-economic determinants, such as education and employment.

Literature Review

My research aims to examine integration processes of Syrian refugees into Germany's society through the evaluation of nationality laws, German identity, and current security threats. Along those lines, the paper seeks to illustrate whether Germany is moving toward a policy of multiculturalism or a post-migrant society. Discussions will identify factors that contribute to the success or failure of integration practices and distinguish future trends.

Roland Benedikter highlights this divide. He recognizes the long-term economic advantage for Germany but also directs attention to the risk of creating a new class of underprivileged, poorly educated and unemployed people (Benedikter, 2016). Carl Nilsson from

CSIS agrees with Benedikter on the urgency to reform policy and find non-discriminatory institutional solutions. Nilsson introduces a set of policy recommendations in which he aims to diminish disparities; investing in education and language training and expediting work permits (Nilsson, 2015).

German Labor Minister Andrea Nahles recognizes the potential for an employment fast-track program as well. Her forecast reads, that by 2020 every second Syrian refugee in Germany will receive employment (Klaiber, 2017). An OECD report titled "Matching economic migration with labour market needs in Europe", underlines Germany's need for migration to counterbalance market demand and an aging population (OECD, 2014). Syrian refugees today show potential to countervail demographic imbalances in Germany. This, however, is dependent on the right allocation of skill sets regarding refugees, as well as the institutional development of the job pool. Andrea Müller, reporter for Germany's national news outlet, Tagesschau, states that over 100,000 1-Euro-Jobs are currently in the making (Müller, 2017).

The 2003 Geneva Conference brought further hope for integration processes of migrants and refugees. Local integration was emphasized as one of the key components to future solutions. Processes involved reducing refugees' reliance on state aid and humanitarian assistance; instead, promoting independence for refugees to attain sustainable livelihoods (UNHCR Geneva Conference, 2003). Section II in the conference report also focused on integration methods by enabling refugees to live amongst their host population and encouraging tolerant interactions.

Since the start of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015, Angela Merkel has followed a liberal, pro-immigrant rhetoric. The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner reported 2016, for there to be no clear correlation between refugees and terrorism. Ben

Emmerson, therefore, called for greater tolerance at the General Assembly in NewYork, asking to not "stigmatize Syrian refugees as potential terrorist" (Emmerson, 2016). In August 2017, Merkel met UN Refugee Commissioner Filippo Grandi to pledge 50 million euros to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2017).

Against successful integration processes speak the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which in October 2016 announced there to be an "existential crisis for the EU" (Weber, 2016). The political scientist and sociologist, Bodo Weber, argues that Merkel has failed to shift from crisis management to joint European policy (Weber, 2016). A strong statement against Germany's leadership and liberal asylum policy. Thilo Sarrazin's number one German bestseller titled "Wunschdenken: Europa, Währung, Bildung, Einwanderung - warum Politik so häufig scheitert", rises similar questions about growing xenophobia in Germany and Merkel's leadership abilities. He claims the assimilation of Muslims has failed in the past, as will the integration of Syrian refugees (Sarrazin, 2016). Sarrazin blames the Chancellor for Germany's deteriorating education level and fading cultural heritage.

Pew Research takes a more quantitative approach to declining acculturation measures. With the help of a number of surveys, Pew analyzes the disposition of Germany's public and other European nations. Results show that Germans carry an anti-immigrant rhetoric; many convey worries about national security and economic repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Data presents, that Europeans in general, bear a negative relationship with Muslims; only very few see diversity as an improvement of their country (Wike, 2016, p.1). For Germany almost 73% of the population found that sharing customs and traditions, a national identity, was important to them (Wike, 2016, p.2). These findings follow along the lines of Sarrazin's claims and give room for magnified or hyperbolic theories.

Recent terrorist attacks and acts of violence also point toward failing integration processes. Literature on this subject matter relies heavily on current news. For a more comprehensive overview, Table III broadly outlines a timeline of attacks in Europe. Nilsson argues here that the Islamic State recruits Syrian refugees in Europe to infiltrate vulnerable countries (Nilsson, 2015). Vice versa, Germans have taken to more violent measures. The news station N24 reported there to be ten attacks a day against refugees in Germany (N24, 2017). Ben Knight, takes a step further and predicts an increased amount of deportations in 2017 (Knight, 2017). Peter Altmaier, the government's coordinator on refugee affairs, underlines this statement by giving direct numbers: "Last year, 80,000 people whose applications for asylum were rejected returned to their countries of origin… (2016) almost 300,000" (Chase, 2017).

Across all sources there seem to be overarching agreements. One, the true repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis are only now starting to unfold. Two, Germany has witnessed an increase in violence and anti-immigrant rhetoric, which may lead to stagnating integration processes and more drastic government regulations. Three, there appear to prevail long-term economic benefits that fall in line with Germany's self-interest.

Stefan Trines summarizes the dispute over success and failure of Syrian refugee integration into Germany's society. He states: "refugees may emerge as part of a much-needed solution to the long-term economic challenges posed by a rapidly aging native population", yet to "mitigate social and economic impact" Merkel will have to pay high costs (Trines, 2017). As a country, Germany has reached a stage where it is obligated to redefine national identity structures, participation, equality of opportunity and cultural diversity. Naika Foroutan calls this social negotiation process a stage of post-migrancy (Foroutan, "Unity", 2015).

The breadth of research shows that determinates of success in integration processes aren't arbitrary. There exist interconnected factors that this paper tries to highlight. Contextualizing these factors is essential to the understanding why Syrian refugees face differential treatment in Germany. This paper expands on the research discussed in this section, along with other scholar's work to build a deeper awareness of the subject matter. Research hopes to discern strengths and weaknesses of integration processes of Syrian refugees into Germany's society

Throughout my research, I had difficulty identifying comparable reports that highlight a comprehensive view of the subject matter. Most documents outlined either an economic, social or legal perspective. However, research suggests the complexity of a diverse array of factors are detrimental to the deeper understanding of integration processes. My investigation doesn't exclusively present statements on refugee integration failures; it provides the reader with historical and topical background knowledge concerning the development of assimilation shortages. German identity was largely absent from immigration literature, which motivated me to delve deeper into the topic area. Although hard to quantify, German identity and laws are unique to the narrative of migrancy and integration.

Methodology and Theoretical Perspective

For my methodology, I primarily focused on qualitative analysis. The chosen methods were devised for the deeper examination of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany and to build a larger picture of integration processes. My methodology encompassed two main research areas: interviewing, as well as primary and secondary document analysis.

For the method of interviewing, I examined my research subjects, Syrian refugees, in Berlin, Germany. I traveled to a refugee camp in Germany in summer 2016 to conduct a case study with fifty-five Syrian refugees. This method gave me the benefit to discover my topic area

at firsthand and create an appreciation for my subject area, that I otherwise wouldn't have obtained. To receive access to the refugee camp, I contacted family members in Germany, several refugee camps in the city of Berlin and German diplomats.

For the physical interview process, I spoke directly with my research subject on my topical area and recorded answers utilizing written notations. My interview questions were structured in such a way that it allowed me to ask participants targeted questions through the help of a translator. My series of questions promoted simple "yes or no" answers or explicit responses with little room for variations. This gave me the opportunity to codify the interviews after completion. I circled key words that appeared frequently in my subject's answers, to then aggregate the most significant topics for my research paper. Further procedures are mentioned in Chapter 3 of this paper.

For the method of document analysis, I facilitated research with both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included: my case study, public opinion polls, speeches by Angela Merkel, reports and laws by the German government, as well as research data from think tanks. Important, for instance, were reports by Europol, UNHCR and OECD's migration databases. Secondary sources included: newspaper articles in both German and English, books, and archival documents. Due to the recentness of my subject matter, I relied heavily on news articles, speeches, and data bases. Secondary sources lead me to theorize too much about underlying meanings, creating a disconnect to today's occurrences. Within a week's time events and data often shifted, asking me to revise entire sections of the paper. My firsthand experience in Germany, therefore, provided me with a richer understanding of my subject matter.

Using largely a qualitative methodology proposed some obstacles. I frequently questioned the validity and reliability of sources. Especially, with newspaper articles, authors

seemed swayed by underlying ideologies. Often, I tried to compare and contrast individual news-stories through the application of multiple sources from different countries. This allowed me to form a clearer, more detached and neutral outlook. I would then let my judgment decide which country presented a more non-partisan portrayal of an event.

In addition, I was concerned about the legitimacy of my case study. I had to be careful not to construct answers based on my knowledge, but to listen to my subjects and record word for word. With respect to keeping the interview within ethical limits, I utilized SU's IRB screening method and phrased questions as neutral and respectful as possible. My research revealed the complexity of the issue. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany can be examined from a multiplicity of positions. In the attempt to highlight an accurate picture of integration processes, I deemed it necessary to acknowledge a variety of external factors and included segments of economics, security and social benefits into the paper.

Chapter 2: Background

The history of immigration to Germany is vast. During the Holocaust hundreds of thousands of Jews and non-Jews fled the Reich and emigrated abroad. Post-World War II, about twelve million German refugees returned to the territory of today's Germany (Oezcan, 2017). Integration processes were mostly facilitated by a homogenous ethnic origin. The idea of immigrants as alien and threatening continued to persist in the minds of many Germans (Wilhelm, 2016). This was a direct result of the Nazi expansion across Europe.

Starting in the 1950s, inflows of immigrants with non-German ancestry began to increase. This was largely due to labor shortages prompted by the post-war economic boom. The German government quickly signed a series of bilateral recruitment agreements, most importantly with Turkey. By 1973, West Germany had recruited 2.6 million Gastarbeiter, which made up for 23 percent of foreigners in Germany (Oezcan, 2017).

Cornelia Wilhelm states in her book that "From the 1970s to the 1990s, almost every democratic party failed to effectively address migration as a social reality and economic necessity (Wilhelm, 2016, p.2). Although Germany routinely accepted more immigrants into the 1990s, to maintain a dynamic workforce and balance the rapid aging of its population, no leadership was provided for the integration of migrants. Instead, Chancellor Kohl developed a program that promised financial rewards to Turkish Gastarbeiter, who were "willing to relocate after long-term residence in Germany" (Wilhelm, 2016). Five-hundred thousand foreign workers thereupon returned back to Turkey.

With the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Germany faces today the largest influx of migrants in history. Germany is a desirable destination country within the European Union, as it bears a high

standard of living, affluent social programs, and a liberal government. Although it might not perceive itself as an ethnic melting pot, Germany is the second most popular migration destination in the world (Lauer, 2014). At the end of 2016, a total of 1.09 million refugees had entered Germany's borders mainly from crisis areas of the Middle East, such as Syria (BAMF). The influx of Syrians searching for asylum in Germany has resulted in the biggest population increase in more than two decades, consequently boosting the German population by more than one percent.

Immigration Laws in Germany

For decades, Germany followed nationality laws based on *jus sanguinis*, the right of blood. Under these provisions, German citizenship was exclusive to children born to German parents. Regardless of the origin, all children of immigrants were excluded from citizenship and often identified as foreigners in the only country they were raised in. A recent OECD report on labor market integration states, "being German is still linked to specific phenotypes… homogenous, ethnically based nation and Leitkultur[2]" (OECD, "Labour", 2017). These norms lie at the foundation of so-called Germanness.

In 2000 the set of laws were modified toward *jus soli*, the right of soil (Kern, 2016). This step allowed people who had been born on German soil and meet specific criteria to finally claim German citizenship. This affected especially children of Turkish parents, who had settled in Germany over 50 years ago as Gastarbeiter. The reform came as recognition of the German government's pursuit to provide a more immigrant-friendly leadership. However, while German

[2] Leitkultur refers to the European idea that draws on common cultural roots and values such as human rights, tolerance, and the separation of church and state.

laws were changed, the national mindset did not. The ethnic conception of national identity continues to persist today in the minds of most Germans.

In light of the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis, the Bundesamt für Migration and Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), BAMF, revised the initially unlimited right of asylum, defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention, to give states the legal option to impose an upper limit or quota.[3] While the German legislature did not see it necessary to grant asylees full refugee status in the mid-1950s, today, both can access the same resources with only slight variations in waiting periods (OECD, "Labour", 2017). This, in theory, allows for equal opportunity in residence, social benefits, and employment. In 2016 the European Commission reported, "a total of 62 percent of cases were approved" (European Commission, "The EU", 2016).

Important to Germany's immigration laws in the present is the Schengen Agreement of 1985 (BAMF, 2017). This law allowed European citizens to freely move and work throughout the border-free Schengen Area. European officials regarded this as a step toward creating the European Union and enabling a passport-free movement across most of the bloc. However, in an attempt to regain control over the rising numbers of asylum seekers, several member states, including Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, have reinstated checks in early 2016 at their borders (European Commission, "The EU", 2016).

In 2016 more rigorous measures were taken to regulate incoming refugees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel facilitated an agreement between the EU and Turkey to stop irregular migration flows. Refugees from the Middle East now face greater hurdles to reach European borders overland. Although the EU allocated three billion euros for the support of Syrians in

[3] The revision can be found in section 16a GG.

Turkey in the form of food, shelter, education, and healthcare, criticism within the international community has pointed to expanding human rights violations (Schinas, 2016). Amnesty International claimed that refugees have been facing greater dangers as they cross into the EU, facing overcrowded detention centers in Greece and Turkey and inadequate legal protection (Dalhuisen, 2017).

In May 2016, Germany's coalition government agreed to reform its integration law to focus on the deeper regulation of asylum seekers, their rights, and responsibilities. The provisions require refugees to enroll in integration courses on German culture and society in order to receive benefits. Hours have increased from 60 hours to 100 hours, as well as seats increased from 20,000 to 200,000 nationwide (Kern, 2016). Independent of an individual's refugee's status, job positions, and language-training courses become accessible two months after arrival. Refugees accepted into job training programs are automatically permitted legal resident status for the duration of the program.

Under the 2016 Integration Act, the German government also introduced a program titled "Integration Measures for Refugees" (Flüchtlingsintegrationsmaßnahmen, FIM), which seeks to provide over 100,000 low-wage jobs and education opportunities (Kern). Experts, however, have criticized the "Ein-Euro-Jobs[4]" (one-euro jobs) program as government costs rise, and refugees are left with no upward mobility in the German labor market. Even with Labor Minister Andrea Nahles diverting 240 million euros into German job centers, retention rates were low in 2016 (Müller, 2017). Merkel also relaxed existing labor laws to encourage German firms to hire

[4] The one-euro job is a "public-funded reintegration measure" for recipients of unemployment benefit II. The regulation is set by the German federal agency of work and can be found in § 16 d SGB II. The official name of the one-euro job is "job opportunity with additional expense" (DBG, 2016)

refugees, opening up the labor market to wider employment opportunities. Refugees showing high proficiency in the German language and culture may apply for residency after five years. The law places greater emphasis on regional governments, allowing them to determine the area of settlement as well as training progress.

Leadership in Germany

Criticism increased in regards to Chancellor Angela Merkel's spending package and integration laws. Although Merkel has seemingly mastered all crises facing Germany and the EU, her authority has been gradually eroding. Critics have stated that forcing refugees to settle in often low-income areas and offering them only sub-minimum wage jobs threatens the very dogma of the German constitution. Others seek to follow Switzerland and cut social benefits, who in September of 2017, via popular vote, reduced social benefits from 780 euros per month to 310 euros (Pichireddu, 2017).

In regards to spending, Angela Merkel has allocated more than twenty billion euros of the federal budget toward the management of the Syrian Refugee Crisis (European Commission, "An Economic", 2016). After serious contentions, the German federal government and all sixteen Prime Ministers of the "Länder" amended current state laws and complied with the guidelines of Asylpacket II to pay 670 euros per refugee each month from the date of registration to the end of the asylum procedure (Bundesministerium der Finanzen Monatsbericht, 2016). These costs are to support integration and accommodation processes. Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) promised to provide a 93.6-billion-euro package by 2020 (Funk, 2017).

What Merkel left unclear is, which of the 16 federal states will be responsible for paying for the implementation processes. Hans-Peter Uhl of the Christian Social Union (CSU)[5] argued against Merkel's Asylpacket II, "Integration is good and important, but placing limits on the number of refugees would be much better." According to the Gastone Institute, "a recent estimate of total cost for integrating refugees will reach twenty-five billion euros" in 2016 alone (Kern, 2016). Numbers vary, and the German government is already facing instructor shortages, making the planned integration courses unfeasible.

In an attempt to prevent public resentment from spreading, Merkel has taken a stronger stance on social benefits provision. The technical committee of the European Commission recommended that the needs of migration should be determined by the needs of the market (OECD, "Matching", 2014). Germany's CDU party has tried to diminish any incentive for secondary migration flows by cutting social assistance programs and medical services. In years prior, refugees have used medical certificates to postpone or even prevent deportation to their home country. This has led individuals to abuse the system for greater self-benefits.

Additionally, Merkel approved a 15-point plan in February of 2017, to accelerate the deportation of rejected asylum-seekers. Based on 2017 data provided by the UNHCR, the right to family reunion was suspended for all refugees who have the lower status of subsidiary protection for two years (Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration, 2017). Based on the Dublin Regulation[6], asylum seekers are required to remain in the EU member state in which they have entered or face

[5] The Christian Social Union (CSU) is a Christian-democratic and conservative political party that only operates in Bavaria and is a smaller counterpart to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that operates in all other states of Germany.

[6] The Dublin Regulation is a law by which all EU member states are responsible to examine an the application of asylum seekers. Regulations have been revised.

deportation. Asylum applicants may now remain in government shelters for longer or be kept in custody for up to 10 days if rejected (Knight, 2017). The new plan also grants security forces to track refugees and surveil cellphone data. Since international humanitarian assistance in the Middle East increased by 120%, 2015 seemingly appeared like the year of humanitarian help (Development Initiative, 2015; Chase, 2017). Peter Altmaier, the head of the Chancellor's Office and the government's coordinator on refugee affairs, projects 2017 to develop into the year of deportation (Chase, 2017).

In Germany, Merkel's governing has divided public opinion. Politicians on the left argue that it has damaged Merkel's position as the EU's guiding moral compass on migration, while politicians on the right identify regulations as too compromising. Thilo Sarrazin, a German central banker and former member of the Social Democrats (SPD), has been warning the public about the consequences of mass migration of millions of non-integrated Muslims, writing in his book that Germany has to "regain control of our borders … an existential issue for our culture and the survival of our society" (Sarrazin, 2016). Thilo Sarrazin further accuses Merkel of "no longer being concerned about the interests of Germans and the future of their nation … and their cultural identity" (Sarrazin, 2016). These allegations made Sarrazin's book not only a number one German bestseller but also raised a national debate about failing integration policies of Syrian refugees and xenophobic public sentiment.

Chapter 3: Case Study

a. Objective

The influx of Syrian refugees in Germany has coincided with an intensification of public distrust and animosity toward migrants. The purpose of my interviews is, therefore, to learn the depths of integration processes through the exploration of attitudes, experiences, and motivations of Syrian refugees in Germany. Important is the distinction of factors that are most influential to my research subjects and to critically assess elements that prevent integration processes from evolving. I seek to gain a deeper understanding of my topic area through detailed firsthand experience.

b. Research Methodology

The study was conducted in July 2016. I interviewed 55 persons, all of which were classified as asylum seekers and currently housed in a high-security refugee camp in Berlin at Osloer Str. 23 - 26. Questions were first submitted to Syracuse University ethics review board and later asked via a translator, as respondents were not able to fully understand German. While the overarching goal was to initiate the subject to expand on questions and reveal information that cannot be achieved with a structured interview, dialogue was sparse due to the language barrier. Interviews were conducted one on one or in small groups. Participants were chosen by a social worker or on a voluntary basis. The final sample size amounted to 55 participants. Answers were recorded on a questionnaire, filled out by myself due to the language barrier. The deeper interpretation of my subject's answers follows personal perception.

The methodology of this study presents significant limitations. Due to the fact that most respondents were considerably young (<25) as well as single males, results may have been

skewed. The survey also did not test for the correlation between concepts mentioned. Does a lack of family contribute to a heightened feeling of alienation? While general assumptions can be drawn, one would have to engage in psychological analysis to quantify further hypothesis. The study also presents a specific time and place, censoring the ability to measure change over time. It allows us to gain a general impression of how the demographic and trends may look in a refugee camp in Berlin, Germany.

c. Trends

To find underlying trends within my study, I codified my research subject's answers for reoccurring themes. I systematically labeled key words to distinguish larger concepts and problem areas. Every time an interviewee referred to a language/ language barrier, for example, I underlined the following passage to later examine it thoroughly. Most helpful was sorting the codes into appropriate groups, comparing and finding patterns.

Table I. Gender and Age Group of Participants

Gender	**Number of Participants**	**Percentage of Total**
Male *under* the age of 25	38	69.1%
Male *above* the age of 25	11	20.0%
Male with Family	6	10.9%
Female	0	0%

Table II. Issues Mentioned during Interview

Concepts mentioned	Number of Participants that Mentioned	Percentage of Total
Language barrier	54	98.18%
Unemployment	55	100%
Loss of Family	18	32.73%
Feeling of alienation from German society	55	100%
Verbal or physical abuse in Germany	9	16.36%
Welcomed into German society	14	25.45%

d. Evaluation

Table I categorizes participants by gender and age. Although the selection process was at random, only men were interviewed. I attribute this trend to a general inclination for males to migrate more often. To escape a country at war with family and friends, presents a greater risk and puts loved ones in danger. A large portion of participants was also under the age of twenty-five years. Younger individuals bear fewer responsibilities and commitments at home, making it easier for them to up and go. The demographic at the refugee camp was therefore largely male and young.

Table II details the most common hardships participants have experienced. The three most common issues mentioned, were: language barrier, unemployment, and feeling of alienation. All interviewees had lost their job after leaving their home country and for different reasons had not acquired a new one in Germany. A prominent language barrier existed, despite

language programs offered to refugees by the government, leaving all participants with feelings of alienation from German society.

e. Interpretation

Based on findings in Table I and Table II, we can build a preliminary profile of a Syrian refugee in Germany. One, I can assume that integration processes are hindered by three main barriers: language, unemployment, and alienation. Second, I argue that all three trends are interconnected. As refugees are denied from legally working in Germany, they lack exposure to not only the German language and culture but thus also, the overall integration process. A respondent who had resided in the refugee camp for fourteen months and showed proficiency in the English language said: "I am just sitting and waiting". Refugees often wait for months for German authorities to process their asylum status, work clearance, and admission to language courses. Another factor that cultivates a feeling of alienation from society a feeling of constraint and neglect.

As I asked questions I did not so much look for accuracy but for consistency in answers. All three trends were shaped by signs of displacement trauma. I found participants became quite emotional, having difficulty voicing their experience and becoming teary-eyed. My experience matched the data and descriptions found online. World Education Services (WES) stated, "65 percent of all asylum seekers in Germany between 2015 and 2017 were male" (Tines, 2017). This factor might influence the perception of the German public and possible integration processes. In the larger context of the German culture, language skills, and employment are high qualifiers for a sense of identity. If the following qualities are not present within the refugee community, the general reception of the German public has a potential of decreasing and consequently creating a cycle of alienation and resistance.

German Identity

The discussion over national identity has been a sensitive subject, post-WWII. For a long period, German identity was characterized by its gruesome past, leaving native citizens disoriented and migrants alienated from acclimatization processes. While the German government invited large numbers of Turkish Gastarbeiter after the war, it took society several decades to come to terms with the notion that migrants would develop into long-term residents. In 2009, a report by the Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung (Berlin Institute for Population and Development) disclosed that Turks were the least well-integrated community in Germany, showing an unemployment rate of "11% (compared with 6.5% nationally) and with only 14% passing their final secondary school exam" (Younge, 2011).

There exists a strong cultural component to Germany's notion of national identity. Chancellor Merkel stated in a speech in 2015, "Those who have found refuge and protection with us must obey our laws, values, and traditions. In order to understand us, they must learn the German language" ("Multiculturalism", 2015). Native Germans pride themselves on high education and value language as a fundamental means of identification. A study by the Pew Research Center suggests that across ten EU countries[7] surveyed, a median of 97% think that being able to speak the national language is important to aquire a sense of national identity (Wike, 2016). The education system is free of charge and available to all citizens, as are social benefit programs and health care. Thousands of Syrian refugees seeking schooling with as good as no German language proficiency, deter not only the education system due to budgetary reason but also teachers, parents, and peers who have to reassess inclusionary classroom policy.

[7] Countries surveyed: Germany, France, Greece, Hungrary, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Italy, Poland and Spain.

Women play a vital role in German society and the economy. Apart from equal job compensation, female employment in Germany has steadily increased since 2002. Today, nearly 71.5 percent of eligible women are in the German workforce (DESTATIS, 2017). Women have a clear presence in government. Not only is the Chancellor female, but so is the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy, the Federal Minister of Education and Research, the Federal Minister of Defense, etc. The share of employed women in the German labor force now exceeds most other EU nations (European Commission, "An Economic", 2016)

Nevertheless, the absence of a policy of multiculturalism has driven tensions around issues of race, religion, and German identity. Since the 1950s, Germans and Muslims remain aware of the divisions between their ethnic groupings (Oezcan, 2017). Cornelia Wilhelm quotes social scientist Asiye Kaya in her book, stating that during the development of the German nation-state foreigners have been branded as "alien or a threat" (Wilhelm, 2016). Today, Germany faces a longer-term demographic development trend marked by a decrease in the proportion of native Germans and a drastic increase of ethnic minority groups, resulting primarily from migration patterns (BAMF, 2017). German identity continues to stand in denial of immigration or fails to see cultural diversity as positive features of society.

Much of the public debate about the Syrian Refugee Crisis coincides with the fear surrounding immigrants and ethnic minorities. In a report published by the Migration Policy Institute, Naika Foroutan claims: "Common attributes and associations linked to Muslims in Germany include terms such as *fanatic, backwards, intolerant* and *undemocratic* (Foroutan, "Identity", 2013) Today's attitudes toward refugees are in part influenced by biases and negative mindsets against Muslims that have existed in German over the last decades. Pew Research

found in 2016 that "61% of Germans believe that Muslims in their country want to be distinct[8]" (Wike, 2016). These numbers represent over half of German population and remain widely shared by all age groups. Acts of violence and nationalist political agendas enhance a widespread anxiety that has shifted its focus from inclusionary policies to a widely discriminatory scapegoat ethos.

[8] In 2005 these numbers were as high as 88% (Wike).

Chapter 4: Security

For some, such as the Heinrich Böll Stiftung[9], the Syrian Refugee Crisis poses an existential threat to both Germany and the European Union (Weber, 2016). Its failure to establish efficient crisis management policy qualifies widespread anguish concerning future strategies and the preservation the European vision. Public authorities today are not only pressured to work on building peace and democratic reforms in the Middle East, including Syria, Iraq, and Libya but also to maintain lines of security within Europe and individual member states.

This chapter will highlight human security based on the larger picture of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Europe and Germany. The UN defines human security as, "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment… It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity" (UN, 2009). Human security deviates from traditional top-down security studies and focuses more on the empowerment of people in relation to their potential (Nasu, 2013). Instead of looking at the security of a state and hard power, the protection of individuals and society is the subject of interest. This approach is largely prevention-oriented, multi-sectoral, and developed after the Cold War to address rising social problems in the wider context of globalization.

Today, non-traditional threats can range from economic to environmental, health and social issues. While state security remains a significant component of governance, it does not guarantee the cultivation of human welfare. The lack of human security as such can stifle greater

[9] The Heinrich Böll Stiftung is a German political foundation that concentrates on areas of resource policy, climate change, gender issues as well as European policy.

peace and stability within the EU. A continued lack of consensus amongst member states on how to manage refugees and curtail human security threats, tears at European solidarity.

Security Threats to the EU

Many Europeans are empathetic toward refugees fleeing war-torn countries. They are receptive to integration processes, invite refugees into their homes, and provide time and energy to volunteer in refugee camps (Dettmer, 2015). However, among circles the number of refugees are perceived to rupture the foundation of the European Union, causing not only social turbulence but also security threats.

Map 1.



Source: European Commission, Emergency Response Coordination Center, 2017

The EU is struggling to identify migrants at point-of arrival and control their settlement routes. Map 1 shows that Germany, as well as Sweden, carries the largest number of asylum applications within the EU, with numbers over 230,000. EU lawmakers are now determined to adopt ECRIS, the European Criminal Records Information System, established in 2012

(European Commission, "ECRIS", 2017). ECRIS facilitates a more interconnected exchange of criminal records among member states. The European Commission is looking to install rules and "standardized formats" to expedite convictions (European Commission, "ECRIS", 2017). ECRIS supports the idea of gathering fingerprints of every refugee entering the EU to enter him/her into the system and enforce a background check. European asylum legislation, however, makes it difficult to enforce ECRIS. Unless given definite evidence regarding a criminal past, any individual claiming political asylum in Europe has to legally be authorized protection.

Another risk for the EU lies in the growing ultranationalism sentiment in certain countries, where elected officials with anti-immigrant rhetoric are gaining public support. Far-right parties have always been present across Europe. In Germany, these have long been relegated to the fringe in institutional governance. Pew found in a study in 2016 that people on the "ideological right express more concerns about refugees, more negative attitudes toward minorities and less enthusiasm for a diverse society" (Wike, 2016). With the rise of political parties that follow an anti-immigrant narrative, public fears surge among local communities about refugees contributing to terrorism or harming Germany's economy.

Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's far-right National Front party, won 33.9% of votes in the recent presidential election (Mulholland, 2017). Le Pen campaigned on the belief to slash legal immigration from 200,000 to 10,000 entries per year (Bell). She also supported political isolationism and economic nationalism to protect France from the "twin evils of Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism" and politically correct liberalism (Bell, 2017).

In the United Kingdom the right-wing populist party, U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), gained popularity promoting a euro-skeptic and nationalist agenda. Many associate Brexit with a far-reaching anti-immigration sentiment. NatCen, an independent British social research agency,

released a study on Brexit, showing that immigration was the main concern for U.K. citizens who were thinking of voting to leave the EU. The survey showed that 73% of Brits who answered that they were worried about immigration also voted to leave the EU (NatCen, 3, 2016).

Sweden is another example of the far-right trend seen throughout Europe. In 2015, the country had received more refugees per capita than any other European nation, leading to riots in cities such as Rinkeby near Stockholm. At the peak of the European migrant crisis in 2015, more than 160,000 people arrived in Sweden requesting asylum. Magnus Ranstorp, a counter-terrorism expert at the Swedish National Defense University, argued that Sweden took in a number that is "equivalent in the US to about six to seven million refugees" (Weller, 2017).

Prime Minister Stefan Löfve quickly enforced border controls in 2016 to halt the flow of asylum seekers. Today, the far-right, anti-immigrant party, Sweden Democrats (SD), are highly popular. Public animosity and resentment toward refugees have nearly doubled the support for SD from 2014, making it the second-most influential party today. In the run-up to the 2018 general elections, pollsters have produced predictions based on samples of populations: In October 2017, Sifo[10] released data showing SD winning 15% of the overall votes, while YouGov[11] saw SD winning almost 25.3% (Kruse, 2017).

[10] Sifo is a Swedish company, focusing on opinion polls and social research. They were established in 1954 and are today one of the strongest brands, being a subsidiary of TNS Global.
[11] YouGov is an international internet-based market research and data analysis firm. It was founded in 2000 and is headquarted in the UK. Opinion poll analysis website FiveThirtyEight assigns YouGov a grade of B (no. 81 of 372 pollsters), calling 93 percent of races correctly.

I. Economic Threats

The Refugees Crisis may also be considered to pose economic challenges to the European Union, in terms of its impact on the labor market and public services. In the past, security was primarily viewed within the confines of hard security dimensions.[12] In relations to the European Refugee Crisis and today's interconnected world, soft security plays a more significant role. Today, an established and sufficiently functioning liberal market economy is the prerequisite to security.

In the analysis of refugee integration in the economic market, employment is usually the single most significant determinant of their net fiscal contribution. Evidence shows that refugees may take longer than other categories of migrants to integrate into the labor market and society (Dustmann, 2013). Many Europeans are, therefore, worried that refugees will be an economic burden by taking away jobs and social benefits. The Pew Research Center found that fear of crime was "much less pervasive" than economic fears (Wike, 2016). This may drive a competitive behavior, imbedded in the suspicion that refugees will take away jobs.

The European Commission recorded that in 2015, 70 % of asylum seekers were of working age.[13] The age distribution of refugees is, therefore, more youthful compared to the native European population, which in 2014 reached only 62% (European Commission, "Economic", 2016). With the right set of institutional policies, this valuable demographic group has the potential of spurring economic growth and stability. A dissenting economic security impact, therefore, may occur in the short-term, in the period where refugees are not yet integrated into the German labor market.

[12] Nato defines hard security in terms of military and soft security as non-military. (Zukrowska, 269)
[13] The working age in Europe ranges from 18-64.

The short-term economic changes present security risks, as the increase of public spending can cause imbalances in the budget. When looking at the short-term effects, it is detrimental to identify if a refugee transits or stays in a country, as well as the overall size of inflows. Member states may vary dramatically in addition to offering different economic profiles regarding capacity, programs, structures, and size. Transit countries, for example, channel most of the funds in rescue operations, border protection, provision of food, health care, and shelter, whereas destination countries spend more on social housing, language training, and education (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 22, 2008). Because governments have to invest significantly more money on public services that migrants benefit from such as health care, unemployment benefits, and education, it is reasonable to assume that asylum seekers receive more from the public sector than they put in the primary stages, potentially leaving their host country in debt.

Many member states had to face the burden of additional fiscal costs. Sweden, for instance, which had the highest share of asylum seekers relative to its population, faced budgetary costs that were over that of the EU average. In 2016, the costs for Sweden reached a peak of 0.9 % of GDP, while the EU showed a net impact of 0.1 % to 0.6 % of GDP. Germany reached 0.5 % of GDP (European Commission, "Economic", 2016). In 2017, the budgetary impact is projected to increase at a slower pace.

Figure I. Unemployment Among Asylees, 2012-2017



Source: World Education Service, 2017

In the long-term, the drastic influx of refugees may have positive impacts on the host countries' economy. This, nevertheless, is conditional on the success rate of refugee integration into the labor market, including employment opportunities, policies, and speed of progress. Figure I depicts the rapid increase of unemployment with the start of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015. The effects of migration seem concentrated, while benefits appear diffused. If, conversely, present asylum seekers are interspersed into society, then host countries can expect improvement in the performance of the labor market as well as fiscal sustainability[14] (European Commission, "Economic", 2016). Countries such as Germany may even counterbalance native demographic challenges if governments match human capital with the needs of the labor market. These investments will facilitate and manage integration processes for the long term.

[14] In this context fiscal sustainability is used to describe the affordability and maintenance of government programs in relation to overall taxation source

II. Terrorism

The European Union has encountered a number of terrorist attacks, stimulating a debate over European security. Concerns have been growing regarding the Islamic State targeting refugees in Europe in an effort to radicalize them. Ben Farmer, reporter for the Telegraph, writes: "Young people are being targeted in refugee camps … Islamic State was offering free passage for those crossing the Libyan deserts if they pledged allegiance" (Farmer, 2017). CSIS found European intelligence agencies to report that "Islamic militants are using people-smuggling networks or refugee routes to infiltrate vulnerable European countries with insufficient vetting procedures" (Nilsson, 2015).

Differences in opinion on this risk in the European Union are widening. Europol's[15] Director, Rob Wainwright, stated that in "the last two years (we) have seen a number of jihadist attacks", with the intention of turning EU citizens against refugees seeking asylum (Europol, 2016). The level of infiltration by the Islamic State is unknown, making the issue of terrorism linked to Syrian refugees susceptible to exaggeration. Intelligence agencies throughout Europe stand in disagreement about the degree of influence. While the Danish Intelligence Services (PET) dismissed statements linked to militant recruitment, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (PST) suggested that "5–10 out of the 1,000 quota refugees assigned by the UNHCR were suspected of having ties to the al-Nusra Front or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)" (Nilsson, 2015).

[15] Europol is the law enforcement agency of the European Union

Table III. Outline of Terrorist Events in Europe

Location	*Date*	*Type of Attack*	*Deaths/ Wounded*	*Perpetrator/ Organization*	*Linked to Refugees*
Paris	Jan 7, 2015	Shooting at offices of Charlie Hebdo	17 killed	2 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Denmark	Feb. 15, 2015	Shooting	2 killed 5 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Paris	Aug. 21, 2015	Shooting on train	4 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Paris	Nov. 13, 2015	Bombings and shootings	130 killed Hundreds injured	11 Perpetrators claimed by ISIS	Yes
Marseille	Jan 11, 2016	Machete attack	1 killed	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Brussels	March 22, 2016	Suicide bombing at airport/ subway	32 killed Dozens injured	5 Perpetrators claimed by ISIS (linked to Paris attacks)	No
Nice	July 14, 2016	Van attack	77 killed 434 injured	1 perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Normandy	July 26, 2016	Hostage in Church	1 killed 5 Hostage	2 Perpetrators claimed by ISIS	No
Hamburg	Oct. 16, 2016	Knife attack	1 killed	1 perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Berlin	Dec. 19, 2016	Van attack through Christmas market	12 killed 56 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	Yes
Paris	Feb. 3, 2017	Knife attack in shopping mall	2 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
London	Mar. 22, 2017	On Westminster Bridge	5 killed 40 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Saint Petersburg	April 3, 2017	Suicide bombing in subway	12 killed 45 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Stockholm	April 7, 2017	Van attack	5 killed Dozens injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Paris	April 20, 2017	Shooting at Champs Elysee	2 killed 3 injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
Manchester	May 22, 2017	Suicide bombing at Ariana Grande Concert	22 killed Dozens injured	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
London	June 3, 2017	Van attack on Bridge and stabbing in Borough Market	8 killed 48 injured	3 Perpetrators	No
Barcelona	Aug. 17, 2017	Van attack	14 killed	1 Perpetrator claimed by ISIS	No
London	Sep. 15, 2017	Bombing in subway	22 injured	3 Perpetrators claimed by ISIS	Unknown

Source: … [16]

[16] This list is gathered from various online articles and is meant to give a general overview of events. Data is incomplete.

Based on Table III and general inference, attackers appear to be mostly 2nd- and 3rd-generation immigrants who show a link to the terror organization ISIS.[17] Whether the Syrian Refugee Crisis is the root cause for the increase of terrorism within Europe lacks clear evidence. Numbers also show that key metropolitan cities within France, UK, Spain, and Germany were under attack more frequently. The number of deaths/per attack has risen since the beginning of 2015.

While Europol found there to be no definite evidence that ISIS/Jihadist was systematically using refugees to infiltrate terrorists into EU member states, it does not exclude the linkage between perpetrators and terror organizations. In the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks, two perpetrators entered the EU through Greece as alleged refugees from Syria. Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, disclosed, "while there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity, migration policies that are restrictive or that violate human rights may, in fact, create conditions conducive to terrorism" (Emmerson).

[17] ISIS is also referred to as ISIL or Islamic State.

Figure II. People Killed by Terrorist Attacks in Western Europe 1970-2017



Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2017

While the total number of terrorist victims in Western Europe appears to have decreased since the 1970s, it is important to notice that the Islam-inspired/ Jihadist attackers have only been prevalent since the early 2000s. Even more relevant is the increase of terrorist victims since 2015 that marks a spike in the curve depicted in Figure II. Even without credible evidence, as depicted in Table III, these numbers may give rise to link Syrian refugees with terrorism. The public instinctively seeks a scapegoat that will suffer the blame for someone else's wrongdoings. Cornelia Wilhelm calls this occurrence in her book "contemporary racism" (Wilhelm, 2016, p.7).

Figure III. Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism 2012 to 2016



Source: Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017

Figure III shows that there has been an increase in arrests of terrorist suspects occurring within the EU. The question emerges whether this is due to rising numbers of attacks or public perception? The Pew Research Center reported that the refugee crisis and threats of terrorism are interlinked in the minds of many Europeans. A recent study by Pew argued, "in eight of the 10 European nations surveyed, half or more believe incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country" (Wike, 2016). These findings point in the direction of an integration deficit and lack of acceptance for multiculturalism.

Security Threats to Germany

Germany has opened its borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees in the effort to provide humanitarian relief. Chancellor Merkel spoke of a sustainable solution to Germany's aging population and shrinking workforce. Merkel has faced public backlash after New Year's Eve assaults by male refugees on women and the van attack on a Berlin Christmas market by a

Tunisian refugee. Time has been of the essence to build integration process and prevent greater resentment.

Violence has not remained one-sided. According to Germany's interior ministry, "nearly 10 attacks a day were carried out on refugees" in Germany last year (N24, "2016", 2017). Attacks injured 560 people, including 43 children, and prompted accusations that the country's hardened stance on the refugee issue was encouraging hate crimes. Ulla Jelpke, domestic spokeswoman for the Left Party, announced: "Must there be deaths before acts of violence are classified as a central problem of Germany's internal security structure or classified higher on the agenda of domestic politics?" (N24, "2016", 2017). The government under Merkel has faced difficulties accommodating German citizens to integration measures. In November of 2017 Andreas Hollstein, conservative mayor of Altena, was stabbed in the neck for his pro-refugee asylum policy.

I. *Economic Threats*

Since the 1950s Germany's economy has been dependent on migration, due to an aging population and vigorous labor shortage. In 2015, 28 percent of Germans were 60 years or older (UN Economic & Social Affairs, 2015). While Germany is looking for high-skilled, specialized workers, it is also in constant need for individuals with moderate qualifications in the fields of agriculture, gastronomy, and caretaking. The newspaper Spiegel stated, "About a million jobs have been created for foreigners in the last four years in fields requiring no formal training" (Dettmer, Markus, et a, 2015). Refugees fit right into that category.

To maintain a prosperous country, Germany will have to focus on continuous economic growth. The German economist, Ferdinand Fichtner, argued that future and present refugee expenditures act as a "large stimulus package" by injecting billions of Euros into the German

market (Trines, 2017). A larger workforce translates into a larger amount of people paying taxes for social benefit programs, the education system, the pension fund, and healthcare system. The IMF and the Deutsche Bank agree that successful integration of refugees could not only help balance Germany's age structure but also be an investment in the enlargement of its labor force (Bräuniger, 2016; IMF, 2016). Research calls for further policy actions to promote the recognition of informally acquired skills from the home country of refugees. This would allow for more flexible forms of vocational training.

The Federal Employment Agency, which currently oversees the integration of refugees into the labor market, administered laws that classify candidates into 17 different types. These range from residency permission, residency permit, and tolerance (BAMF, 2017). For each type, different regulations apply where and when a candidate is permitted to work. Without regards to language barriers, the length and intricacy of these documents is beyond comprehension. The OECD report titled "Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany", also mentions that it remains unclear whether work opportunities "actually increase participants' employability" (OECD, "Labour", p.59). If this statement abides true, then time an energy is wasted for a job that merely acts as a placeholder to keep refugees occupied.

While Germany has paid millions to cope with the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the federal government has also collected a surplus of 2.6 percent more taxes than in the previous year. Certain states reached a high 7.7 percent, adding up to 288.6 billion euros (N24, "Kosten", 2017). The private sector has experienced a surge due to government demand for goods and services. A 2015 study by the German Institute for Economic Research, anticipated "cost-intensive investments in integration would, within the next years, reach a break-even point… one

percent increase in German GDP by 2025" (Trines, 2017). Refugee's entry into the labor market then has the potential to stimulate economic growth.

II. *Social Benefit Programs*

The Syrian Refugee Crisis has prompted a polarized political debate concerning the rising public sector costs. In 2016 the German government spent almost 22 billion euros to tackle the influx of asylum seekers (Funk, 2017). The newscaster Welt broke down the numbers: registration and accommodation of refugees cost the federal government 1.4 billion euros, integration services added another 2.1 billion euros, social transfers resulted in a further 1.7 billion euros. Furthermore, the German government provided federal states with added municipalities of 9.3 billion euros (N24, "Kosten", 2017). WENR claimed that in 2017 Germany spent 6% of its annual operating budget of 329 billion euros (Trines, 2017).

Many German citizens fear losing their share of social benefits as the government is allocating funds for social and educational programs toward refugee integration processes. If the latter fails, the influx of Syrian refugees could result in sustained net transfer payments from the public sector. Following the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling, Germany's Cabinet has discussed legislation restricting social welfare for non-German EU citizens. Andrea Nahles, labor minister and member of the SPD party, explained in 2016 that refugees without employment were denied social welfare from "Hartz IV[18]" for five years (Otto, 2016).

III. *Education*

Education presents a ripple effect: higher education may produce less crime, stimulate the economy, and bridge inequality gaps among a society, leading to less conflict (OECD, "Labour",

[18] Hartz IV reforms are a financial support system for unemployed seeking to find a job in the labor market.

2017). Without an educated workforce, it is difficult for a government to maintain internal security. Over the years there has been growing international recognition of the significance of education in conflict resolution.

Education was found to be the cornerstone of civic engagement and a sustainable society as well as a sense of community security. The OECD found that insufficient language skills are one of the primary hurdles to workforce integration. Refugees showed lower than average levels of education. In 2015, "18 percent said they had attended a tertiary education institution … 20 percent a grammar school" (OECD, "Migration", 2017). Providing refugees with access to education is therefore relevant to long-term social advancement in Germany.

The sample group in Table II depicted that 98.46% of refugees experienced a language barrier. Most refugees arriving in Germany speak Arabic as their native language. WENR found that while "28% of surveyed first-time asylum applicants said that they spoke English, a mere 2% stated that they knew any German" (Trines, 2017). Syrian refugees specifically showed even lower proficiencies, with only 1.1 % speaking any German. The lack of German language aptitude can deter refugees from attending school, applying to higher education institutions, and later applying to jobs.

The recent reforms, brought to light by Merkel in 2016, have given refugees the opportunity to acquire financial aid toward university degrees. The German government will pay up to 720 euros every month, contingent on the refugee's asylum status and language skills necessary for enrollment. Due to the high percentage of asylum seekers that are below the age of twenty-five, the number of refugees in higher education is expected to increase within the next year: "between the 2016 summer semester and the 2016 winter semester, the number of refugees registered for foundation courses reportedly increased by 80% to 5,700 refugee" (Trines, 2017).

UN Solutions

The UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has proposed three primary solutions for refugees to not be dependent on humanitarian assistance for decades to come. The UN tries to facilitate durable solutions that progress refugee processes.

Number one is voluntary repatriation. This idea is based on mobilizing support for refugees to return to their homeland. This approach connects humanitarian and development actors on a level playing field. The goal is to build an environment in which refugees can return and thrive. This is possible through the allocation of resources by international organizations such as UNICEF, World Bank etc. It is important to unify the country again and stop massive outflows by engaging in peace practices and providing legal aid and social programs.

Number two is resettlement. To protect refugees from dangerous conflict, wars, or persecution, a host country is chosen in which the asylum seeker is relocated. This method is seen by the UN as a tool of burden sharing; however, only a small percentage undergo resettlement. The UN aids resettlement processes with cultural and vocational training and access to school and the labor market.

Number three is integration. This concept revolves around the adjustment of refugees into the community of the receiving country. These are individuals who are unable to return home. The host country is often required to provide programs and opportunities for refugees. The integration approach can be the most beneficial in term of social and economic progress.

The European Union encountered problems with the established resettlement program. Many nations did not honor their quota, creating a drastic imbalance and logistical nightmare. By March of 2016, the European Commission reported, 17 member states to have made space for only 6,642 immigrants, which added up to about 4% of the promised total (European

Commission, "Member States", 2017). These violations may be fined by the European Commission. Due to this series of events, both resettlement and integration stalled, leaving grave bureaucratic obstacles. A handful of member states, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic refused to take in refugees and redistribution the weight away from the frontline states.

Chapter 5: Future Trends

Refugee integration is likely to remain an overarching theme in German politics. Sentiments divide on the future outcome of refugee integration in Germany. The federal government currently follows a rigorous integration approach, in an attempt to stimulate the German economy and provide protection from potential conflict. Even though Merkel has won her fourth term as Chancellor by a small majority, many see Germany continuing its political influence within the European Union. Trends predict a continued ethos of Wilkommenskultur (welcome culture), in which refugees will experience more economic integration into the labor market (Klaiber, 2017).

On the contrary, acculturation practices appear unattainable, even unsuccessful. Many show concern for the lack of integration of Syrian refugees into society and the rapidly changing political landscape. Hungary's anti-immigration Prime Minister Victor Orban accused Merkel of pursuing "moral imperialism" (Brenner, 2016). Cultural fragmentation within Germany may not only lead to greater political backlash against the current refugee policy but also a decrease in Merkel's popularity. A poll by the independent German research institute TNS stated, "82 percent of the more than 1000 interviewees wanted a clear change in the "asylum politics" (Benedikter, 2016). This trend may threaten the entire political system of the European Union, as Germany presents a cornerstone of its foundation.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis continues to polarize the German public and could cleave politics across the EU in the future. In January 2017, "42 percent of surveyed Germans considered refugees a threat to German culture, up from 33 percent in October 2016" (Wike, 2016). Ideological differences, language barriers, and Germany's rocky history have seemingly

stagnated the convergence of immigrants' circumstances with those of German natives. Khayal argues, "the danger is very real that if we don't take care now, we're going to have a larger group of alienated young men — men who are angry, who are bitter, who are both distant to their country of origin and distant to their new home country and who are going to, of course, have radical ideas" (Ydstie, 2017). Such trends point to a future with a post-migrant society.

A significant future trend appears to rise within regional governments. Among the most important institutions supporting integration of refugees are cities (Katz, Bruce, et al, 2017). In comparison to the federal government, local governments play a larger role in the allocation of housing, job placement, and education. In the future, additional ties may form with the private sector, using them as a regional platform to integrate new arrivals into the job market. Companies could then be compensated with stipends from their local government. As a result of high demand for integration courses, partnerships may also occur with non-profit entities.

As analyzed in this paper, future integration trends are dependent on the following issues:

- *Management and law-enforcement of Europe's borders*
- *Coherent, uniform laws and regulations based on individual countries*
- *Access to social programs and job opportunities to stimulate acculturation*
- *Challenging the public's stigma around refugees*
- *Monitoring right-wing parties with a xenophobic narrative*

While experts claim that the Syrian refugee crisis will provide long-term economic advantages to Germany, a serious risk lingers in a disconnected and impoverished refugee community. This risk may form a new class within German society – a class that is impoverished, poorly educated, unemployed, and of different cultural and religious background. Today, a general behavior of resentment and public resistance can be identified. With the right institutional leadership, this can develop into public resignation and acceptance over time.

App Proposal

The Syrian Refugee Crisis has generated conflicts that have spread deep into the core of German society and political structure. To facilitate multiculturalism in the future and move away from a post-migrant society, innovative thinking has to conjoin with immediate actions. I, therefore, propose for the German government to start a communication-based platform that will stimulate social interactions between different ethnic groups and encourage a level of trust within the German community.

Introducing CIVtalk (Civil Talk), a virtual app for the exchange of ideas, visions, and concerns. CIVtalk is based on the sentiment of "people helping people". Every refugee seeking to settle in Germany will receive a code and a date, with which he or she will log in online. Each participant will then be sorted into a group of 8-10 people through an automatic algorithm. Half will be native German citizens; the other will represent asylum seekers and migrant applicants. In a time-frame of about an hour, each group will discuss an assortment of ten questions regarding origin, ideology, cultural and political differences, everyday burdens, future endeavors etc.

CIVtalk is a means to build interpersonal connections for everyone involved. Albert Einstein once said: "We cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that created them". First and foremost, the app seeks to build the fundamentals of empathy and understanding. A personal first-hand experience, in which refugees and German citizens meet, may become a future asset that fosters acceptance of diversity. Likewise, CIVtalk may be a tool to report suspicious activity. After the discussion rounds, participants are encouraged to give

feedback. While CIVtalk is not intended to function as a surveillance tool, reviews may possibly help government agencies track down criminal activity.

CIVtalk is expected to be a forward-thinking application, that engages the current refugee population on eye-level. For better communication, the app will include a setting for speech translation. Many refugees, due to their young demographic, appear adequately tech savvy to maneuver and adapt to the program. Disadvantage points include access to the app and building a level of trust. However, with computer clusters dispersed throughout many refugee camps in Germany and appropriate funding for additional technological devices, this hurdle can be overcome. Secondly, it is detrimental to both native citizens and refugees to attend CIVtalk meetings. Important here is positive reinforcement, an inclusive marketing strategy and creating an unbiased workspace with the help of social workers. If attendance is low, the government may discuss fines for no attendance.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In the wake of the Syrian Refugee Crisis and its effects on Germany and the entire European Union, successful integration processes have been sluggish. Political distrust appears to outweigh possible economic benefits, causing a lack of solidarity among EU member states over asylum laws and quota systems. A deep ideological divide has evolved between native citizens and refugees, generating discriminatory practices in form of violence, deportations, and social inequality. These findings coincide with my preliminary hypothesis. Distinct factors have to be hindering assimilation, tolerance and/or multiculturalism.

After completion of my case study, the three main trends observed to interrupt refugee integration processes are: unemployment, a preeminent language barrier, and repeated feelings of alienation within German society. These determinants appear to challenge refugees on a day to day basis and present a significant factor for long-term success. In addition, gender and age have challenged integration processes, moving the German society away from a multicultural approach.

Further research concluded that an interconnected system of factors attributes, to Germany's lack of tolerance toward Syrian refugees. In spite of the number of initiatives government institutions have taken for early intervention purposes, Germany's political and social histories regarding Muslims and national citizenship laws, prohibited effortless integration of Syrian refugees to this day. On one hand Germany's public suggests to follow liberal asylum policy and a moral compass; on the other hand, many demand to preserve German national identity through nationalistic premises. The rise of right-wing populist parties and acts of violence are a confirmation of this.

The refugee conflict has significantly shifted Germany's political discourse. Greater support for the refugee community thus appears unlikely. Immigration has dominated the 2017 presidential elections as anti-immigrant movements have targeted the fears of the German public. The "Bundestag" elections gave rise to the nationalist, right-wing party, AfD, which campaigned for national sovereignty and against the presence of Muslims. Some even claim that current immigration flows mobilized the success of the Brexit campaign in Great Britain. This overall political backlash has recently caused the German government to reign in control. To contain migration flows, there has been talk about increased deportation, more extensive integration measures, and the establishment of European asylum-processing centers. Merkel's open-door policy of 2015 is no longer viable two years later. In a country where the fusion of cultures has been ignored for decades, it is easy for distorted animosity to cloud rational.

A feasible future for Germany points consequently away from multiculturalism and toward a post-migrant society. Equivalent to the 1960s, when the German government failed to integrate Turkish Gastarbeiter, so do Syrian refugees struggle today to find acceptance. Germany is dependent on immigration as an injection for their workforce and social security system. Despite efforts to expedite job placement and language qualifications, migrants are routinely marginalized. Diversity continues to be viewed with public distaste.

Future policy should focus on enhanced language and culture training as well as equal employment initiatives. Germany could enforce these guidelines by subsidizing specific job fields or sponsoring German firms and giving them a higher incentive to hire refugees. After assimilation prerequisites, such as job placement and cultural developmental training, are successfully completed, family reunification may be taken into consideration. Potential policy may place a higher emphasis on financial responsibility requirements. Documentation should be

provided examining an individual's independence status from government programs, as well as yearly screenings for financial stability. Important also is to revise policy at entry-point. Future monitoring processes should meet thorough background checks and clear resettlement structures.

As social change is taking place toward greater diversity, many signs still point at a post-migrant future, in which ethnic groups live side by side but do not foster acceptance of one another. Many seem to view refugees as a modern-time invasion threatening to devastate culture and society. Germany and its government have to acknowledge that the Syrian Refugee Crisis has had a tremendous impact on the country and that Germany, once and for all, is a country of immigration. Repercussions can be examined, deliberated, or regulated, but they have to be acknowledged in the here and now. Moving forward Angela Merkel has to change negative stereotypes of Muslims in the public realm and support a new national narrative on identity that reflects the reality of a plural nation. Germany has to face the following questions: Who are we, and how will our actions define us?

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