December 2020

# Gendered Civil Society Context, Local Party Strength, and Candidate Emergence: Explaining Female Representation across the US State Legislatures

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**Abstract**

This dissertation examines the substantial and persistent variation in female representation observed across states and party caucuses in the US state legislatures. I develop and test the theory of *gendered civil society context* and *party strength* to explain why female candidates are more likely to run for office in some places rather than others. Gendered civil society context refers to the gender balance of civil society groups (e.g. unions, service organizations, advocacy groups, professional associations) in a party's local strategic environment; party strength is defined as the capacity of political parties to influence candidate nomination.

Two main hypotheses guide the project. First, I hypothesize that when a party's local gendered civil society context is comprised of female-dominated networks the emergence of female candidates is more likely compared to places where male-dominated networks wield more political power. Second, I expect that the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence is moderated by party strength. I employ a multi-method approach to evaluate these hypotheses using regression analysis with nationwide data and case studies of Georgia and New York, based on 30 semi-structured interviews with Democratic and Republican county party leaders.

Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative results suggest that the theory of gendered civil society context does indeed provide a promising new explanation for candidate emergence. The quantitative results indicate that within both parties, more politically active female-dominated industry groups (e.g. teachers unions) are associated with more female candidates. Moreover, more politically active male-dominated industry groups (e.g. trade

unions) are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office, but the same effect is not present on the Republican side.

Interviews generated rich data about how candidates come to run for office, and they indicate that gendered civil society contexts impact the likelihood of female candidate emergence in both parties. Party chairs in both Georgia and New York emphasized that prior community engagement is critical for successful candidacies. However, as expected, the types of engagement and organizations mentioned did vary across the states and parties in ways that point to gendered differences in candidate pipelines. Democratic chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds of potential candidates that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, women's rights) compared to those mentioned by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, business owners). Moreover, the results suggest that candidate emergence within Republican networks is driven by personal connections within civil society groups in contrast to candidate emergence from the networks of advocacy and other stakeholder groups with strong institutional ties to Democratic party organizations. Finally, while potential candidates who come forward on their own (i.e. self-starters) are common in both parties, Republican chairs seem to rely more heavily on self-starters. This reliance on self-starters disadvantages women, who are less likely than men to run for office without being recruited.

In sum, the dissertation argues that the gendered civil society context represents an innovative conception of candidate pipelines, which acknowledges party-based and gender-based differences and accounts for a broad array of civil society actors that impact female candidate emergence.

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Syracuse University
December 2020

## Acknowledgements

In many ways pursuing a PhD is a very solitary endeavor, yet at the same time completing it is not possible without a large network of support. I have been so fortunate to have such a network helping me in many ways from constructive feedback on my dissertation to friendship and camaraderie to childcare. Without this community, finishing this dissertation would have been impossible.

First, I want to thank my advisor, Shana Gadarian, whose encouragement, feedback, and advice were instrumental in my completing this project. Shana was always available whenever I was feeling stuck and needed to flesh out some ideas or work through various research obstacles. Her intellectual contributions and practical suggestions were always clear and made the project seem less overwhelming. Despite her many academic and personal commitments, she was never too busy to listen and provide invaluable guidance and support.

I also owe a heartfelt thank you to the other members of my committee – Seth Jolly, Danielle Thomsen, Chris Faricy, and Kristi Andersen. I thank Seth for being such a supportive professor and mentor through my years in the program. I truly appreciate his feedback on research-related issues and general advice and support in his role as Graduate Director. I am so lucky that my time at Syracuse overlapped with Danielle's because her expertise contributed immensely to this project. Her sharp, analytical feedback always helped me to clarify my thinking, refine the research, and situate the project in the broader literature. While Chris and Kristi both joined the committee in the later stages of the project, their insights and suggestions were extremely helpful as I finished the dissertation and I will continue to draw from their feedback as I work on future publications. Finally, I thank Jeff Gonda for taking the time to

serve as the external chair for my dissertation defense, especially at the beginning of a very unconventional semester.

I am also thankful to the broader Political Science Department, which provided a challenging and collegial environment in which to grow as a social scientist. I appreciate all the hard work of the gracious staff -- Candy Brooks, Jacquie Meyer, and Sally Greenfield -- to keep us graduate students organized and on track throughout the program. I am grateful for the wonderful Political Science faculty members, who always provided insightful comments and posed thoughtful questions about my work throughout various courses and research workshops, especially Margarita Estevez-Abe, who helped me develop this project in its earlier stages. I extend a special thank you to Colin Elman for the opportunity to work for the Qualitative Data Repository, which was an invaluable experience for me as a graduate student.

My friends and colleagues in the Political Science Department have also contributed intellectually to this dissertation in many ways, but more importantly, they provided friendship, fun, and diversions which are necessary elements for getting through the ups and downs of a PhD program. I especially thank Lindsay, Nneka, Pedram, Bess, Li (and Sherry), Rani, Franzi, and Darci for many great memories. Also, to our writing group and its founder, Catriona, I am so appreciative to have had such a supportive group of women to lean on during the final stages of dissertation research and writing, which can be isolating at times. Finally, I want to acknowledge Megan and Rich and Dessi and Rob, who have been wonderful friends with whom to share the early stages of parenthood in addition to our many common interests -- academic and otherwise!

I thank my family in the Philadelphia area, especially my parents and sister, for always providing love and encouragement as I pursued my goals through the years. I look forward to a

celebration with them once we can finally be together post-pandemic.  I truly could not have

finished this project without the love, support, and childcare of my in-laws, Kathleen and Mike,

throughout my time at Syracuse.  As Aidan's favorite playmates, it always felt good to leave him

in their care when I needed to focus on my research.  This was especially true over these final

months of dissertation writing during the pandemic when life was more challenging than usual.

My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Dan -- my husband and best friend.  He always

provided a listening ear as I worked through my ideas or mused about the quirks of academia.  I

will forever appreciate his constant love, support, and encouragement.  And to my sweet Aidan,

who has brought so much joy to our lives over the past three years -- he always helps me to keep

things in perspective.  I dedicate this dissertation to Dan, Aidan, and our little one on the way.

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## Chapter 1

## Introduction to Female Candidate Emergence in the US State Legislatures

**Introduction**

Despite recent gains, women are underrepresented in elective office at all levels of US government (CAWP 2019). By now, it is well known that the Democratic Party outperforms the Republican Party in terms of female representation. What receives far less scholarly attention is the substantial intraparty variation in female representation across the US state legislatures. For instance, consider only seats held by Democrats in state houses. Democratic caucuses have reached gender parity in many states, while in several others less than 25% of Democratic seats are held by women (Figure 1.1)[1]. While female representation across Republican-held seats is lower overall, they also exhibit a wide range of female seat-shares from around 30% in some states to less than 10% in several others (Figure 1.2). Notably, as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate, these variations do not correlate with partisan compositions of legislatures. In other words, a more Democratic legislature is not necessarily associated with a more gender-balanced Democratic caucus. Existing theories do not sufficiently explain these variations. With half of the population underrepresented in many states and within party caucuses, women miss opportunities to prepare for higher office and their perspectives and experiences are left out of important policy debates. It is crucial to know why the prospects for aspiring female politicians are much more promising for some compared to their counterparts, even co-partisans, elsewhere.

To this end, this dissertation explores why women are more likely to run for office in some places rather than others. I focus on processes of candidate emergence because prior

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[1] Nebraska is excluded from the analyses presented in this project because its state legislature is unicameral and nonpartisan. Sources for Figures 1.1 – 1.5: CAWP 2019, NCSL 2019.

research demonstrates that female candidates win elections at rates comparable to males, but women are much less likely to run for office in the first place (Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). I develop and test the theory of gendered civil society context and party strength to explain variation in female candidate emergence. Gendered civil society context refers to the gender balance of civil society groups (e.g. unions, service organizations, advocacy groups, professional associations) in a party's local strategic environment; party strength is defined as the capacity of political parties to influence candidate nomination[2].

Two main hypotheses, which are described in detail in Chapter 2, guide the project. First, I hypothesize that when a party's local gendered civil society context is comprised of female-dominated networks the emergence of female candidates is more likely compared to places where male-dominated networks wield more political power. Second, I hypothesize that the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence is moderated by level of party strength. I employ a multi-method approach to test these hypotheses using regression analysis and 30 semi-structured interviews with Democratic and Republican county party leaders across Georgia and New York.

Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the following chapters suggest that the theory of gendered civil society context does indeed provide a promising new explanation for candidate emergence. The quantitative results indicate that within both parties more politically active female-dominated industry groups (e.g. teachers unions) are associated with more female candidates. Moreover, more politically active male-dominated industry groups (e.g. trade unions) are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office, but unrelated to Republican female candidate emergence.

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[2] The concept of party strength as defined here is sometimes referred to as "party centeredness", especially in the comparative politics literature, derived from Carey and Shugart (1995).

Quantitative results do not support the party strength hypotheses, but qualitative analysis provides nuanced evidence about the role of party organizations in processes of candidate recruitment and emergence. Interviews with county party leaders indicate that gendered civil society contexts impact the likelihood of female candidate emergence in both parties. Party chairs in Georgia and New York emphasized that prior community engagement is critical for successful candidacies. However, as expected, the types of engagement and organizations mentioned did differ across the states and parties in ways that point to gendered differences in candidate pipelines. Democratic party chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds of potential candidates that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, women's rights) compared to those mentioned by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, business owners). Moreover, the results suggest that candidate emergence within Republican networks is driven by personal connections within civil society groups in contrast to candidate emergence from the networks of advocacy and other stakeholder groups that have strong institutional ties to Democratic Party organizations. Finally, while potential candidates who come forward on their own (i.e. self-starters) are common in both parties, the Republican chairs I interviewed seem to rely more heavily on self-starters, as opposed to trying to recruit candidates from the community. This reliance on self-starters disadvantages women who are less likely than men to run for office without being recruited (Moncrief et al. 2001, Lawless and Fox 2010, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013).

Overall, the dissertation demonstrates that the gendered civil society context represents an innovative conception of candidate pipelines, which acknowledges party-based and gender-based differences and accounts for a broad array of politically relevant civil society actors that impact female candidate emergence. In the remainder of this chapter, I present some descriptive

analysis of female representation across states and within party caucuses in US State Houses[3].  I also describe the existing research aimed at explaining female representation in the American and comparative subfields and identify some important shortcomings.

**Figure 1.1 - Female Representation in Democratic Caucuses of State Houses and Democratic Seat-share, Average 2015 - 2019**



■ % Female in Democratic Caucus    ○ % Democratic Seats in State House

**Figure 1.2 - Female Representation in Republican Caucuses of State Houses and Republican Seat-share, Avergage 2015 - 2019**



■ % Female in Republican Caucus    ○ % Republican Seats in State House

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
[3] I refer to the lower chambers of US state legislatures as State Houses throughout the dissertation, but some states refer them as State Assemblies.

**Significance of Project**

On a normative level, for the pursuit of gender equality and the legitimacy of American democracy, it is crucial to know why the prospects for aspiring female politicians vary so much across states and party caucuses. Scholars like Mansbridge (1999) argue that descriptive representation[4], especially of historically marginalized groups, is critical to democratic legitimacy. From this perspective, it is a moral imperative to understand the sources of inequality in political representation and address them accordingly. Failure to do so may undermine democratic functions because citizens of the underrepresented group may feel disempowered and estranged from the government and lose trust in governing institutions. In line with this view, this dissertation starts with the premise that it is important to have equitable descriptive representation for women and minority groups in democratic societies. At the very least it is important to understand why the inequality that we observe is present.

Understanding female representation in US state legislatures is important for several practical reasons as well. First, state legislators comprise an important pipeline for Congressional candidates and state-wide offices (Thomsen 2015). Second, state legislatures govern major policy areas that fundamentally impact the lives of all citizens from education to healthcare to public safety. With half of the population underrepresented in many states and within party caucuses, women miss opportunities to prepare for higher office and their perspectives and experiences are left out of important policy debates. The absence of these

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[4] Descriptive representation refers to how well the demographic composition of elected officials mirrors the demographic composition of the polity; it can also encompass non-demographic factors like certain life experiences. Since women comprise roughly 50% of the population, scholars investigate why females typically do not comprise 50% of elected representatives in parliament. This contrasts with studies of substantive representation, which investigate how well women's interests and preferences are represented by elected politicians, regardless of the identity or gender composition of the parliament. Many studies also investigate the connection between descriptive and substantive representation to determine whether or not increases in descriptive representation lead to enhanced substantive representation of women. Pitkin's (1967) seminal work examines these and other conceptions of representation (e.g. formalistic, descriptive, substantive, symbolic).

perspectives is problematic because when women are in power they offer innovative policy

solutions for existing problems and bring attention to social problems that may otherwise be

ignored (Osborn and Kreitzer 2014; Poggione 2004; Swers 2002, 2005).

Indeed, several studies have found female representatives to outperform their male

counterparts in various measures of legislative effectiveness. For example, Anzia and Berry

(2011) demonstrate that congresswomen bring more federal dollars home to their districts and

they sponsor and co-sponsor more legislation than congressmen. Similarly, for policy areas

traditionally considered "women's issues[5]" (e.g. healthcare, childcare, family leave, gender

equality) several studies show that women legislators introduce more bills than men and

facilitate their passage (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Gerrity et al. 2007; Osborn and Kreitzer

2014)[6]. Moreover, regarding constituency service, Thomsen and Sanders (2019) find that female

state legislators are more responsive to constituent requests than men. In short, having more

women in elective office may improve democratic representation and legislative outcomes for

female and male constituents alike.

Beyond the American context, the US state legislatures provide an informative set of

cases for comparative politics research because they challenge some conventional wisdom.

Perhaps the most robust finding in the comparative politics scholarship on female representation

is the positive correlation between closed list proportional representation (PR) systems and

female seat-shares (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, 254-255; McAllister and Studlar 2002, 9;

Paxton et al. 2010, 43; Reynolds 1999, 568). Conversely, single member district (SMD)

plurality electoral systems are found to be negatively correlated with female seat-shares in lower

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[5] Several studies demonstrate that voters perceive differences in issue expertise and trait ownership between male and female politicians, often based on gender stereotypes (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Lawless 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; King and Matland 2003; Dolan 2010).

[6] Cross-national comparative research indicates similar results; see, for example, Bratton and Ray (2002), Kittilson (2008), and Atchinson and Down (2009).

houses of national parliaments.  Thus, the cross-national scholarship suggests that legislatures with SMD plurality rules are at a disadvantage when it comes to increasing female representation, and legislatures with such rules would be expected to have low female seat-shares.  However, most US state legislatures have SMD plurality electoral rules[7], yet they exhibit extensive variation with several states approaching gender parity (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4).  National parliaments of advanced democracies similarly exhibit a wide range of female representation, with much of this variation attributed to electoral rules.  This dissertation project helps explain variation across US sub-national legislatures while controlling for electoral rules.

**Female Representation in the US State Legislatures over Time**

After a period of gradual growth from the 1970's through the 1990's, the increase of female legislators in state houses virtually stalled for nearly two decades, hovering around 25% female-occupied seats across all lower chambers until the past couple of years when another period of growth began.  Figure 1.3 illustrates this slow growth since 1981, when 13% of all state house seats were held by women. The 2018 elections marked a surge in female representation; currently 30% of all state house seats are held by women.

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[7] Ten states do use some form of multi-member districts (MMD) for electing State House members.  But, it is important to note that this system is not similar to closed list proportional representation, and, perhaps more importantly, these systems differ in important ways.  For example, Idaho and Washington have seat-designate (aka. post) systems, where each state legislative district has two representatives in the house.  After winning a party primary, the candidates run for a particular seat, seat A or seat B, in a two-person, Democrat vs. Republican, winner-take-all race.  These systems function as SMD, first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections, though in most regressions these are coded (or possibly mis-coded) as MMD.  Arizona and New Jersey have bloc systems, where each states house district has two seats, and voters vote for two candidates; the top two candidates win the seats.  This type of system coheres to the standard concept of MMD most closely; but only four states have this system in all state house districts.  Other states have a mix of SMD and MMD districts, though in most regression analyses, those states will be indicated as MMD.  Richardson and Cooper (2003) provide an especially helpful explanation of the different forms of MMD electoral systems across the states, and argue that the concept has been mis-specified in several studies leading to faulty conclusions, both regarding minority representation and female representation.  One final note is that even in the few states that do use true MMDs, the district magnitude (M) rarely exceeds 2, with some districts in New Hampshire and West Virginia as the exceptions.

Figure 1.3 also shows the partisan breakdown of female representation and makes clear that most of the growth in female representation is fueled by the Democratic Party. In 1981, about 6% of all state house seats were held by Republican women and just over 7% were held by Democratic women. In 2019, about 10% of seats are occupied by Republican women, while just over 20% are held by female Democratic legislators.

Female Democratic legislators have continued to occupy a larger share of all house seats despite fluctuations in partisan composition of state houses. For example, after the 2010 election cycle the share of all seats held by Democrats dropped from 55% to 47%, but the share of all seats held by female Democrats only dropped from about 17% to 15%. Conversely, the Republican Party increased their total seat-share after the 2010 cycle by eight percentage points, but the share of total seats held by Republican women only increased by two percentage points. Thus, even when Republicans have won more seats overall, those seats have mostly gone to male legislators. This observation emphasizes the need to consider the Democratic and Republican caucuses separately (see Figure 1.4). The Democratic Party has consistently increased female representation within its caucuses despite fluctuations in the Party's overall success. As seen in Figure 1.4, in 2000 female legislators comprised 28% of all Democratic seats, while in 2019 they occupy 44%. In stark contrast, Republican Party caucuses have stagnated with respect to female representation. In 2000, female legislators comprised 21% of all Republican-held seats, while they occupy only 20% in 2019.

**Figure 1.3 - Female Representation in State Houses by Party**
**1981 – 2019, All States**



Legend: % Female Republicans, % Female Democrats

**Figure 1.4 - Female Representation within Party Caucuses**
**2000 - 2019, All States**



Legend: % Female in Democratic Caucuses, % Female in Republican Caucuses

**Figure 1.5 –Variation in Female Representation, 1981 – 2019, Selected States**



The cross-state variation we observe has also persisted, with some states consistently

performing better or worse than others. This is demonstrated in Figure 1.5 with a selection of

states representing a wide range of female representation over time. For example, the female

seat-share in the Louisiana State House has increased from 3% in 1981 to 16% in 2019, but it is

low compared to other states. Female representation in Nevada, on the other hand, increased

from 13% to 55% over that time, with a marked increase after the 2018 election cycle. Nevada

achieved gender parity because both major party caucuses in the state perform better than

average as seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Over the past five years in the Nevada State House,

female representation within the Democratic caucus has averaged 55% and averaged 30% within

the Republican caucus. The figures are similar within Colorado's party caucuses – 56% and

32%, respectively; this state also achieved gender parity in its lower chamber after the 2018 elections.

**Explaining Gender Disparities in Political Office**

Why do men continue to outnumber women in elective political office across the US? One key empirical observation is that current female underrepresentation is not necessarily driven by overt voter discrimination against women[8]; instead, a shortage of female candidates is more likely to blame (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). Despite the evidence that "when women run, women win[9]" (Smith and Fox 2001), women just do not run for office as frequently as men. Why not?

Existing explanations fall into three categories: (1) behavioral and rational choice; (2) institutional; (3) structural and cultural. Behavioral and rational choice approaches typically focus on individual-level attributes related to potential candidates such as political ambition (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010), ideology (Thomsen 2015), or election aversion (Kanthak and Woon 2015). While these micro-level theories are useful for identifying why women on average are less likely to run for office compared to men, these approaches are less helpful for explaining cross-state and intraparty variation. To this end, macro-level explanations in the latter two categories are more effective by leveraging differences in political institutions, electoral rules, and socio-economic factors to determine why some state legislatures are approaching gender parity and others lag far behind. Many female representation scholars also adopt a supply and

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[8] However, it is important to note that anticipated discrimination may deter qualified women from seeking office as Anzia and Berry (2011) suggest.

[9] While "when women run, women win" is somewhat of a rallying cry for advocates of increased female representation, more recent research demonstrates that electoral outcomes are not completely gender neutral. For example, experimental work by Mo (2015) suggests that gender bias is likely to affect vote choice for some voters, while Fulton (2012) and Pearson and McGhee (2013) demonstrate that to achieve comparable electoral success to males, female candidates must exhibit higher levels for various measures of candidate quality.

demand model for organizing relevant factors (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Paxton, et al. 2010; Reynolds 1999; Rosenbluth et al. 2006). Supply-side factors relate to the pipeline of female candidates, while demand-side factors address characteristics of societies and electoral systems that may inhibit or encourage the election of female candidates.

Behavioral and rational choice theories have identified important micro-level factors that explain why women on average are less likely to run for office than men. Scholarship in this vein tends to emphasize supply-side factors. In their pioneering study, Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) demonstrate that qualified women exhibit lower levels of political ambition compared to similarly situated men. The authors critique previous research about why citizens run for office; much of this early work centered on the concept of the political opportunity structure, which measured political factors within an electorate such as chance of winning, strength of opponent, partisan composition of constituency, party congruence with constituents, etc. (see Schlesinger 1966). If a potential candidate evaluates these factors and they represent a favorable situation, then he would throw his hat in the ring. Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) challenge this model because it treats male and female potential candidates and their individual calculations alike. Instead, through their survey data, the authors found systematic differences between males' and females' self-assessments. Between similarly skilled and credentialed men and women, women consistently discounted their skills and abilities and gave themselves lower values on their perceived readiness to run for office.

This gender gap in political ambition is the oft-cited and emphasized finding; however, Lawless and Fox (2010, 97-105) also demonstrate a gender gap in candidate recruitment; women are less likely to be recruited to run for office than males. Recruitment is an important aspect of

candidate emergence. Regardless of gender, the likelihood for anyone to run for office is very low and recruitment by political actors (i.e. party officials, elected officials, interest groups leaders, community group leaders) greatly increases one's likelihood of running for office (Lawless and Fox 2010, 109). While this is true for both male and female potential candidates, if females are recruited less often, fewer females will run for office. The theory of gendered civil society context offered in this dissertation projects sheds additional light on why this gender gap in political recruitment exists and why it may be more pervasive in certain places.

Other micro-level research focuses on factors like political ideology and personal circumstances. Thomsen (2015) shows that ideological moderation among Republican women in particular has contributed to the stagnation of female representation in Congress on the right. Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) demonstrate that concerns about privacy, family obligations, and fundraising are more intense for female state legislators compared to their male counterparts. Indeed, these concerns are valid; Jenkins (2007) finds that women running for state legislatures must devote more time and effort to fundraising to achieve the same totals as men. These studies provide important insight into the unique challenges that female candidates face and tell us why the pool of potential female candidates is likely to be smaller on average compared to the male pool. However, in general, these approaches cannot necessarily tell us why women are apparently able to overcome these challenges in certain places, but not in others.

To explain variation in female representation, scholars leverage differences in macro-level factors across states in American politics and across countries in the comparative scholarship. The role of political parties in either impeding or advancing female representation has garnered much attention in both subfields. Some influential explanations in cross-national research, such as gender quotas and PR electoral rules, are not necessarily applicable to the US

state legislatures. Still, some important insights can be gleaned from the comparative work, and these are relevant to the theory underpinning this dissertation.

As noted previously, one of the most prevalent findings in the CP scholarship on female representation is the positive correlation between closed list PR systems and female seat-shares in lower houses of national parliaments (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, 254-255; McAllister and Studlar 2002, 9; Paxton et al. 2010, 43; Reynolds 1999, 568). Attempts to explain the causal connection between electoral rules and female representation typically focus on the role of political parties (Caul 1999; Kenny and Verge 2012; Krook 2006; Hughes 2011). In the closed-list PR context, parties typically control candidate nomination; thus, party organizations have the capacity to promote female candidacies if they want to either by actively recruiting female candidates or by implementing voluntary candidate gender quotas, for instance. In places where parties have less control over candidate nomination, they have less capacity to promote female candidacies even if the party wants to do so. Therefore, my interpretation of the comparative literature points to the interaction between parties and the broader electoral system as important to understanding the correlation, rather than the electoral system per se (see Thames and Williams 2010; Valdini 2013). As will be discussed in the next chapter, this idea of the interaction between party behavior and broader contextual factors is a key element of the theory developed in this project.

In the American politics research, institutional factors of interest include term limits, legislative professionalism, multi-member districts, public campaign finance options, and, of course, political parties (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). Term limits were thought to enable female candidates to overcome the incumbency advantage that sitting male legislators experienced (Darcy et. al. 1994). However, more recent research shows that the legislative

turnover created by term limits does not necessarily increase female representation because of the limited pipeline of willing female candidates, particularly on the Republican side (O'Regan and Stambough 2017). Legislative professionalism captures how lucrative and prestigious a state legislator position is (Squire 2007). The more professionalized the legislature, the more competitive the elections, which would disadvantage women, who are more hesitant to run to begin with. However, despite the party-neutral nature of this theory, the variable has been shown to have differential effects by party (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). Sanbonmatsu (2002, 801-802) found lower levels of legislative professionalism to be positively associated with rates of female Republican officeholders, but legislative professionalism was unrelated to levels of Democratic women in office. The same can be said for multi-member districts (MMD) and public campaign finance options, both of which are expected to have positive effects on female representation, yet the effects appear to differ between the two major parties (Norrander and Wilcox 2014).

Looking at the MMD variable more closely, some American politics scholars have found evidence that states with multi-member districts tend to have higher levels of female representation (Norrander and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016). The theory behind this is that when voters are choosing multiple candidates, they are more likely to consider the gender balance of their choices[10]. However, I contend that this measure is a bit problematic. The existence of multi-member state legislative districts has declined precipitously since the 1970's, during the same period we observed the most growth in female state legislators. Also, Norrander and Wilcox (2014) examine change in female representation between 1993 and 2011, and they found that eliminating MMDs was not statistically related to the dependent variable (Norrander

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[10] In contrast, Crowder-Meyer et al. (2015) find that female candidates in local city council elections fare better in elections for districted seats compared to at-large seats with more candidates on the ballot.

and Wilcox 2014, 281). Also, the mechanisms are somewhat questionable since most MMDs in the American states have district magnitudes of two, which does not allow for much flexibility in balancing vote choice or candidate support, especially if voters would have to cross party lines to do so. Furthermore, there are coding problems - some states, like Idaho and Washington, use seat-designate or post MMDs that function more similarly to SMD first-past-the-post systems, while others, like Maryland, only have a portion of districts that are MMD.

In terms of campaign finance, research has found that states with publicly funded campaigns tend to have higher levels of female representation (Norrander and Wilcox 2014, 283). Also, while studies find that women are not necessarily at a fundraising disadvantage compared to men, female candidates often have to use non-traditional fundraising schemes, or work harder and longer to achieve the same final totals (Jenkins 2007; Lawless and Fox 2010, 27-28; Thomas 2014, 9). Survey data also suggest that female candidates are more concerned about fundraising compared to males (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013).

Clearly party organizations are important political institutions that affect the process of candidate emergence. Recruitment by political parties, and by affiliated groups in civil society, is identified in multiple studies as important in determining whether any citizen would decide to run for office regardless of gender (Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). But when the effect of parties and party strength on female representation has been studied in the American context, results have been mixed. Sanbonmatsu (2002, 801-802) found that states with stronger, traditional party organizations tend to have lower levels of female representation, while Norrander and Wilcox (2014, 283) found no effect for the Traditional Party Structure variable. In another study, Sanbonmatsu (2006) surveyed state and legislative party leaders and found that gatekeeping negatively affects female candidate emergence. Crowder-Meyer (2013) studies

local party leaders in the US and finds that the networks that these leaders tap into for recruitment, as well as the gender of local party leaders, affects the likelihood that female candidates will be recruited.

Despite the plethora of research, we still lack a comprehensive theory about the relationship between party operations and female candidate emergence; in fact, most research assumes a direct relationship, but the hypothesized direction of the effect is mixed across studies. Hypotheses leaning on the comparative work tend to assume that stronger parties lead to more female representation (because PR systems typically have strong parties), but other work – more common in American politics research -- posits a negative relationship, assuming that historically male-dominated party organizations inhibit female representation. The theory offered in this dissertation posits that the predicted effects of party organizations can only be understood in conjunction with broader contextual factors.

Structural and cultural variables also explain some of the variation in female representation across legislatures. Public attitudes toward gender equality and women in leadership (Norris and Inglehart 2001), in addition to socioeconomic factors such as female labor force participation and female educational attainment fall into this category. In general, the literature would suggest that the more left-leaning a state – in terms of either liberal ideology or Democratic partisanship -- the higher its predicted level of female representation[11]. This is based on the gender gap in American politics, which shows that for the past several decades women have affiliated with the Democratic party at higher rates than men (Box-Steffensmeier et al.

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[11] The Democratic Party has higher rates of female representation than the Republican Party in the US (see CAWP 2019 and Figures 1.1 through 1.4). Left leaning parties also tend to outperform parties on the right cross-nationally with respect to female officeholders (Kenworthy and Malami 1999).

2004; Carroll and Fox 2014; Huddy et. al. 2008; Osborn and Kreitzer 2014; Pogionne 2004; Whitaker 2008)[12].

Lawless and Fox (2010) and Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) identify another mechanism at work in favor of the Democratic Party. The authors found that being contacted by a political activist or interest group or being affiliated with a women's interest group increased the likelihood that a woman would run for or hold a political office. Since women's interest groups are disproportionately liberal and endorse Democratic candidates, this may explain the rise in Democratic female politicians, compared to the stagnation of Republican females in office. More recently, Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman (2018) provide further evidence that groups advocating specifically for increased female representation, or "women's representation policy demanders[13]" as the authors term them, are more fully integrated into the Democratic Party coalition than into that of the Republican Party. These factors all suggest that the Democratic Party would outperform the Republican Party in terms of female representation, but they do not shed light on why we observe so much intraparty variation. This dissertation aims to contribute in this area.

Political culture is another structural variable of interest. Many scholars have tested the relationship between Elazar's (1984) state-level political culture measures and female representation. He classified states according to three political cultures -- traditional, moralistic, and individualistic -- based on the dominant perceptions of politics and political operations in the states (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). In "traditional political culture" states, largely found in the

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[12] Much scholarship is focused on the sources of the gender gap. Some research points to the rightward partisan shift of American men over the last three decades as the main driver of the gap (Kauffman and Petrocik 1999; Gillion et al. 2020). Other work focuses on socioeconomic transformations such as rising divorce rates and increased labor force participation of women (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

[13] Some of these interest groups include: The White House Project, Women's Campaign Forum, Emerge America, EMILY's List Political Opportunity Program (Lawless and Fox 2010, 104-105).

South, politics is seen as defending "traditional values", with important implications for gender and race issues. Thus, traditional political culture would be unfavorable to female representation. In "moralistic political culture" states, politics is seen as serving the "public interest" and broad political participation is emphasized. This culture is expected to be more favorable to female representation. "Individualistic" cultures are characterized by elite-driven politics that serve particularistic interests and have more traditional party machines. The closed nature of politics in this context is thought to be unfavorable to female representation.

Scholars employ a few composite measures to capture structural macro-level factors such as the "women friendly districts" (WFD) and the social eligibility pool indices (Palmer and Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Sanbonmatsu 2002). The social eligibility pool captures the level and nature of female labor force participation; the more highly educated and professional women in a state, the larger the pool of potential candidates, so a positive effect on female representation is expected. The WFD index includes factors such as urbanization, ethnic and racial diversity, rates of higher education and income, blue collar workforce, and district size. Using these broad socioeconomic factors, they aim to estimate the pools of potential female candidates and how these pools vary across space.

Adapted from Palmer and Simon's (2008) study of female representation in Congress, Pyeatt and Yanus (2016) apply the WFD concept to female representation in state legislatures. They find that the index has a positive and substantive effect on both the emergence and success of female candidates. This suggests that elements of the index are positively associated with female representation including, urbanization, diversity, rates of higher education and income, while others are negatively associated, such as Republican partisanship, conservatism, blue collar workforce, and district size. However, the causal mechanisms at work behind the broad factors

included in the index are unclear. It is possible that this factor captures how left-leaning districts are and reflects the longstanding gender gap in the US mentioned previously, in which women affiliate with the Democratic Party at higher rates than men. We would expect to find more female politicians in more Democratic places, but the intraparty variation shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrates that the path to office for Democratic women is more challenging in some places compared to others.

By building upon existing research, my theory offers an explanation of female candidate emergence that accounts for stakeholder groups in civil society and the strategic behavior of parties within local political contexts. In doing so, this theory addresses three areas of the extant literature that would benefit from additional development.

First, the broader structural factors (i.e. WFD, social eligibility pool) that have been developed are too broad and provide limited insight into the actual causal mechanisms at work behind them. They tend to capture Democratic partisanship and fail to explain intraparty variation across the states. For example, consider the correlations between the states' average WFD measure (Pyeatt and Yanus 2016) and partisan composition of the legislatures. The percent of house seats held by Democrats is highly correlated with a state's average WFD value, suggesting that the WFD measure captures general Democratic partisanship rather than something specific to female representation (Figure 1.6). In fact, female representation within Democratic caucuses does not appear to correlate with average WFD values by state (Figure 1.7) nor with the partisan composition of legislatures (see Figure 1.1). The correlation between average WFD scores and female representation in Democratic caucuses is weak and not statistically significant. If we want to understand party-level female representation, then this is an important variation that we should be able to explain.

Figure 1.6 - Correlation between Average WFD Score
and Democratic Seats in State Houses



0.681*** *(\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001)*

Figure 1.7 - Correlation between Average WFD Score and
Female Representation within Democratic Caucuses



0.304 *(\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001)*

Second, while research of political parties has been instrumental in identifying some causal mechanisms related to candidate recruitment, I contend that we need better theory about how exactly contextual factors shape incentives for parties when it comes to female candidate emergence. Third, interest groups and other civil society actors are important stakeholders in the candidate emergence context, yet such groups have received minimal attention in the female representation literature, aside from women's movement groups and "women's representation policy demanders" (i.e. EMILY's List, Emerge America).

These three areas of the literature that are in need of development are interrelated. I argue that contextual factors affect the likelihood that certain types of candidates will emerge in general, and moreover, they create candidate selection incentives for political parties. We need a better understanding of the candidate emergence context that accounts for an array of stakeholder groups in civil society, and the strategic behavior of parties within that context, in order to more fully understand the lack of gender balance in political representation. The theory of gendered civil society context contributes to this effort.

**Organization of Dissertation**

As explained in the previous section, existing scholarship shows that the process of female candidate emergence is dependent upon structural and institutional factors (Norrander and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Hogan 2001). Yet, the structural factors, which estimate pools of potential candidates, are often too broad and do not differentiate by party, as is the case with the "women friendly districts" concept (Palmer and Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016). To capture a narrower pool of potential political candidates relevant to a given party operating in a given district, Chapter 2 introduces the concept of gendered civil society context.

Among other things, parties rely on their allied groups in civil society for candidate recruitment. Civil society groups include unions, business and professional associations, civic and community groups, and advocacy and interest groups. The gender balance of these groups affects the likelihood of potential candidates being male or female. I hypothesize that when a party's local gendered civil society context is comprised of female-dominated networks, associated candidate pipelines are also more female-dominated, and so the emergence of female candidates is more likely compared to female candidate emergence in places where male-dominated networks wield more political power.

Chapter 2 also outlines the second main guiding hypothesis of the project, which explores the moderating effect of party strength on the relationship between the gendered civil society context and the likelihood of female candidates. Again, party strength is used specifically to refer to the amount of local party control over candidate nomination. Some research assumes a direct relationship between party strength and female representation (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 2006; Thames and Williams 2010). Instead, I argue that its effect is context-specific as some cross-national research suggests (Valdini 2013; Krook 2010a). High party strength implies more capacity of a party to influence candidate nomination, but just because a party has that capacity does not mean that it would necessarily use it to promote female candidacies. Not all parties want to, or have incentives to, increase female representation within their ranks. For instance, some parties promote gender equity, while others support traditional gender roles (Krook 2010b, 165). Therefore, we must consider the context within which parties operate and determine whether or not that context creates incentives to recruit and nominate female candidates. I hypothesize that when the gendered civil society context is favorable for female candidate emergence, party strength enhances the likelihood of female candidates. Thus, the interaction

between context and party strength effects the emergence of female candidates, but party strength itself is not expected to have an independent effect.

I employ a multi-method approach to test my theory of female candidate emergence. Chapters 3 and 4 present the quantitative tests of the two main hypotheses, respectively. First, I create an original dataset including measures of gendered civil society context and party strength as well as other control variables derived from the literature. I use regression analysis to test (1) if the gendered civil society context is associated with female candidate emergence, and (2) if that relationship is moderated by party strength.

Qualitative analysis, based on interviews with county party leaders across Georgia and New York, is presented in Chapter 5 and serves two crucial purposes. First, qualitative case studies enable me to assess whether the concept of gendered civil society context is meaningful in the real political world. Second, interviews with party leaders allow me to examine the interactions between local party organizations and civil society networks at a deeper level, thereby illuminating causal mechanisms at work in the process of female candidate emergence. Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings of the project, discussing its broader implications, and proposing ideas for future research related to female candidate emergence.

**Chapter 2**

**The Theory of Gendered Civil Society Context and Local Party Strength**

**Introduction**

As noted in Chapter 1, the theory tested in this dissertation has two main parts. First, I develop the concept of gendered civil society context, which I predict to have a direct effect on the likelihood of female candidate emergence. Second, the expected effect of party strength is clarified. Rather than having a direct effect on female candidate emergence, as has been suggested in many studies, party strength is expected to moderate the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence. This relationship is predicted to be stronger at higher levels of party strength.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the components of the causal model. The main dependent variable is the likelihood of a female candidate running for a given party in a given legislative district. The two main independent variables of theoretical interest are gendered civil society context and party strength. I expect a direct causal relationship between the gendered civil society context and the likelihood of female candidates. I expect this relationship to be moderated by the degree of party strength. The specific hypotheses derived from the theory are explained further in the following sections.

Figure 2.1 - Causal Model

While the existing research described in Chapter 1 is helpful in identifying broad socio-economic factors that correlate with female representation, I argue that we need a more precise conception of the candidate emergence context that is more expressly political. The concept of gendered civil society context fills this gap by systematically measuring the relative political influence of relevant stakeholder networks within a local party's strategic environment and combining that with information about the gendered composition of these networks. Essentially, it narrows the pool of potential candidates to include individuals tied to networks that are engaged in local politics, and indicates the gender balance, or lack thereof, of these networks. Where the gendered civil society context is more female-dominated, female candidates are more likely to emerge as compared to more male-dominated contexts. Since many groups in civil society are affiliated with industries and professions, I use data on industrial and occupational segregation by sex to estimate the gender composition of these groups.

It is important to note that the gendered civil society context is measured at the district-party level or the state-party level, rather than the district or state level. This unit of analysis acknowledges the fact that two parties operating in the same geographic area are responding to different stakeholders and thus have different gendered civil society contexts. For instance, a teachers union is more likely to be influential within the Democratic Party in a given district, while the local Chamber of Commerce may be a more influential player within the Republican Party in the same district.

The gendered civil society context sets the stage for the strategic behavior of political parties. While the first part of the theory focuses on the socio-political context from which candidates emerge, the second part focuses on the capacity of party organizations to affect processes of candidate nomination within that context. A gendered civil society context in which

female-affiliated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to nominate female candidates tied to these networks. Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination, this effect is expected to be greater.

Operationalizing party strength at the local level across the US is somewhat challenging. In some electoral systems abroad, party officials choose candidates and voters vote for parties rather than for specific candidates; this represents the highest level of party strength, where a party has high capacity to act on its candidate selection incentives. As a whole, the US is on the lower end of the party strength spectrum because in most places voters select party nominees through primary elections, leaving local party organizations with limited capacity to act on candidate selection incentives. However, while the formal rules governing candidate selection are fairly uniform – primary elections – there is indeed some variation in informal practices at the state and local party levels (Sanbonmatsu 2006). For example, in her survey of state and legislative party leaders, Sanbonmatsu (2006) found variation in the extent to which state parties engaged in informal gate-keeping activities like discouraging primary challengers to incumbents or endorsing a particular candidate during a primary campaign. Thus, the challenge is coming up with a measure of local-level party strength that captures both formal and informal modes of control over candidate nomination. Unfortunately, such a measure is not available at the state legislative district level. Therefore, I use two measures of party strength common in the literature – one from Mayhew (1986) and the other from Cotter et al. (1984). The Cotter measure of average strength of local party organizations is measured at the state-party level making it a better fit for the analysis than Mayhew's traditional party structure variable, which is measured at the state level. However, neither measure is ideal because they are quite dated and cannot capture county-level variations in party strength.

Once I have defined and measured both the incentive structure and the capacity of parties to act upon such incentives, then I can ascertain the implications for female candidate emergence. The specific hypotheses derived from this theory are described in the following sections.

**Hypotheses**

*H1 – Gendered Civil Society Context Hypotheses*

Tests of this set of hypotheses will evaluate three main claims: (1) the civil society context is gendered for both major parties; (2) the gendered civil society context differs between the two parties, and it is more favorable to female candidate emergence in the Democratic Party; and (3) the gendered civil society context has a direct effect on female candidate emergence for both parties.

*H1a: The gendered civil society context is more male-dominated than female-dominated for both the Democratic and Republican parties.*

Hypothesis H1a posits that male-dominated groups will have more relative political power compared to female-dominated groups, within both major parties. This prediction is in line with previous research that indicates political networks and recruitment tend to be controlled by men across the political spectrum (Crowder-Meyer 2013, Lawless and Fox 2010, Sanbonmatsu 2006, and others). Also, basic knowledge of occupational segregation by sex across industries would indicate that there are more male-dominated industries than female-

dominated ones, as females are concentrated in fewer industries and sectors (i.e. education, health) (Cohen 2013).

*H1b: Female-dominated groups will have more relative influence within the Democratic Party's gendered civil society context compared to the relative influence of female-dominated groups within the Republican Party's gendered civil society context.*

This hypothesis suggests that the gendered civil society context will be more favorable to female candidate emergence for the Democratic Party than for the Republican Party. This is derived from a few differences between the parties. First, the Democratic Party tends to embrace "women's issues" within its policy platforms more overtly than the Republican Party. Second, issues tied to occupations in which women are highly concentrated such as education and healthcare also tend to be high-priority issues for the Democratic Party, and groups associated with those sectors tend to be more aligned with the left of the political spectrum[14]. For example, teachers unions and nursing unions tend to align with the Democratic Party in most states. Finally, women's groups and groups that specifically advocate for increases in female representation are much more common within the Democratic Party's strategic context as compared to the Republican Party's. Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman (2018) show that "women's representation policy demanders," such as EMILY's List, are important stakeholders within the Democratic Party coalition, but not within that of the Republican Party.

*H1c: Higher relative influence of female-dominated networks in gendered civil society context*

→ *Higher likelihood of female candidates*

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[14] Bradley Jones, "Republicans and Democrats have grown further apart on what the nation's top priorities should be," Pew Research Center, February 5, 2019, https://pewrsr.ch/2S8P8UA.

Figure 2.2 - Illustration of Hypothesis H1c



Pr(Female Candidate)

less female-dominated                more female-dominated

Gendered Civil Society Context – Female-dominated

*H1d:  Higher relative influence of male-dominated networks in gendered civil society context →*

*Lower likelihood of female candidates*

Figure 2.3 - Illustration of Hypothesis H1d



Pr(Female Candidate)

less male-dominated                more male-dominated

Gendered Civil Society Context – Male-dominated

Hypotheses H1c and H1d, illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, examine the relationship between the political influence of civil society actors and the types of candidates that run for office. Social and political networks are important to candidate emergence generally, and appear to be especially important to female candidate emergence in particular (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). These networks may lack gender balance due to a variety of factors. For instance, the gender balance of membership in professional associations or labor unions may be skewed due to occupational segregation by sex across professions. Data reveal that the professional and civic group backgrounds of state legislators are indeed different for male and female legislators (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). For example, a higher proportion of female legislators compared to males come from the fields of education and health -- fields where women outnumber men (Cohen 2013). And so, H1c posits that the presence of female candidates is more likely in districts where networks affiliated with female-dominated industries and civic groups are more prevalent and politically relevant in relation to other networks – in other words, where the gendered civil society context is more female-dominated. The corollary is tested in H1d, which posits that the presence of female candidates is less likely in districts where networks affiliated with male-dominated industries and civic groups are more prevalent and politically relevant in relation to other networks – in other words, where the gendered civil society context is more male-dominated. As will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, measures of female-dominated and male-dominated GCSC are not necessarily mirror images of each other because there is a third "gender-balanced" GCSC category.

I propose that there is a positive relationship between the relative political influence of female-background civil society actors and the likelihood of female candidates for a few reasons. First, such groups and networks may push affiliated members to run for office, and members and

leaders of these groups are likely to be female. Civil society groups promote and support candidates whom they know and can trust to pursue their preferred legislative agendas once in office. Second, political parties will pull candidates from these allied groups. Parties rely on civil society groups for various resources including candidate recruitment. When searching for candidates, local party leaders will tap into their allied civil society networks to identify potential recruits.

It is important to emphasize the idea of *relative strength* of civil society actors. While women's groups like EMILY's List or Emerge America are surely important actors for promoting female candidate emergence, these types of groups do not operate in a vacuum. Indeed, many other groups in society also have stakes in promoting particular types of candidates with certain group ties or occupational backgrounds. Some groups, like EMILY's List, may benefit women directly because these "women's representation policy demanders" specifically advocate for the issue of increasing female representation (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018). Other politically relevant groups may lead to increases in female representation indirectly due to occupational segregation by sex. Such groups include teachers unions and nursing unions, whose memberships are female-dominated because women are over-represented in these fields. If parties tap groups like these for candidate recruitment, then there is a higher likelihood that female candidates would emerge from these female-dominated pools of potential candidates. Similarly, other civil society groups may be disadvantageous to potential female candidates because these pipelines of candidates may skew male. For example, trade unions or farming associations with political clout in certain areas would likely promote candidates with ties to their more male-dominated networks. So, while the presence and activity of women's groups is important to recognize, their potential for promoting female candidacies must be

assessed along with countervailing forces within the strategic political context within which parties act. This is what the concept of gendered civil society context captures.

For the quantitative tests of hypotheses H1a through H1d, I create a dataset using campaign fundraising data coupled with data on industrial segregation by sex to measure the gendered civil society context (GCSC). The GCSC variables capture the relative political influence of female-dominated and male-dominated civil society actors at the district-party level for US state legislative districts (lower chambers) and at the state-party level. The percentage of contributions to candidates from three groups of actors – female-dominated groups, male-dominated groups, and gender-balanced groups -- are the independent variables of interest. In Chapter 3, I construct empirical measures of the gendered civil society context (GCSC) and present quantitative tests of the first set of hypotheses, H1a through H1d. Then, I employ logistic and linear regression to test for a statistical association between GCSC and female candidate emergence at the state legislative district and state levels.

The Follow the Money (FTM) database of the National Institute on Money in Politics includes detailed records of contributions to all state-level political candidates for several recent election cycles. Contributors are classified according to multiple factors including industry-affiliation and type of interest group. I use information from the tables on occupational segregation by sex from the American Community Survey (ACS) of the Census Bureau to identify female-dominated and male-dominated contributors. These are groups affiliated with industries in which the workforce is comprised of over 60% women or men, respectively. Candidate gender information is obtained from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica 2016).

Using contribution data has strengths, but also some clear weaknesses mostly related to concerns about endogeneity.  In terms of strengths, these data provide information about political activity of groups in relation to each other.  So, if contributors affiliated with Group A give $500,000 to a Democratic candidate in District 1, while Group B gives $10,000, Group A appears to be more politically active and influential within the Democratic Party in the district as compared to Group B.  Of course, this is not a perfect measure of influence because, as noted, civil society groups provide myriad resources to political parties aside from campaign contributions.  Still, this measure allows me to use uniform data, which is available for all state legislative districts across the US.  Measuring simply the presence of groups in given districts would not provide information about the relative political influence of these groups.  Asking party leaders about their allied groups would be more difficult to collect at the district level for the entire country, though this is useful in the context of small-n analysis.  Also, this contribution data approach allows me to observe changes in the gendered civil society context over time.  Thus while not flawless, for the quantitative portion of the project, contribution data can provide a decent proxy measure for the concept that I aim to capture, namely, the relative influence of civil society actors, and their gendered nature, by party for all districts across the US.

Another potential problem with this approach is that the presence of a female candidate may lead to more contributions from female-dominated networks, so the direction of causality is in question.  However, previous research strongly suggests that *female* candidate emergence especially is a highly *relational process*.  Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013, 45) explain their theory of "relationally embedded candidacy" whereby "the candidacy decision-making process takes place in the context of a network of relationships and is deeply influenced by relational considerations."  So, female candidates do not necessarily emerge and then tap their networks for

resources. Instead, their emergence as candidates is related to, and often contingent upon, their involvement in relevant networks.

I complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis, which allows me to validate the measure of gendered civil society context and gain deeper insight into how it affects the candidate emergence process in two cases – Georgia and New York.  In Chapter 5, through interviews with local party officials, I examine the political implications of local gendered civil society contexts.  These interviews also contribute to the second set of hypotheses focused on party strength, described next.

### H2 - Party Strength Interaction Hypotheses

*H2a:  The positive effect of a more female-dominated gendered civil society context on female candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases*

Figure 2.4 - Illustration of Hypothesis H2a

*H2b: The negative effect of a more male-dominated gendered civil society context on female candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases*

Figure 2.5 - Illustration of Hypothesis H2b



This set of hypotheses – H2a and H2b -- addresses the posited moderating effect of party strength on the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence. While the previous hypotheses focus on the socio-political context from which candidates emerge, this hypothesis focuses on the capacity of party organizations to affect processes of candidate nomination within that context. A gendered civil society context in which female-dominated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to nominate female candidates tied to these networks. Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination, this effect is expected to be greater. Conversely, a gendered civil society context in which male-dominated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to nominate candidates tied

to these networks, who are more likely to be men.  Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination, this effect is expected to be greater.

Assumptions about the role of political parties and female representation need additional clarification.  As noted in the literature review presented in Chapter 1, there are some mixed findings regarding the effect of party strength on female representation.  Some scholars have inferred a direct positive relationship between party strength and female representation because parties tend to have more control over candidate selection in proportional representation (PR) systems, and because PR rules are highly correlated with female representation (Thames and Williams 2010).  Other scholars have looked into broader contextual factors – like social attitudes toward traditional gender roles – and found that party strength matters in only certain settings, but since the factors are so broad, the causal mechanisms are not always clear (Valdini 2013).  Still other scholars have delved into party organizations and operations and found certain factors tend to correlate with female representation such as the level of party organization decentralization (Kenny and Verge 2012) or the number of party leaders who are female (Crowder-Meyer 2013).

All of these findings are valid, yet seem to be theoretically disparate.  I think they can be consolidated into a causal path that can be applied across electoral systems.  My theory starts with the assumption that parties respond strategically to their political environment.  When thinking about candidate selection, we can derive a set of incentives from the context within which parties operate.  From these incentives we can identify how they may affect the gender balance of potential pools of candidates.  The concept of gendered civil society context developed in this project aims to identify how favorable a party's local context is to female

candidate emergence.  It identifies whether local stakeholder groups are comprised of mostly

male- or female-dominated networks, and how these networks relate to candidate pipelines.

Once candidate selection incentives are identified by assessing the gendered civil society

context, we can consider the capacity of party organizations to act on those incentives.  In

electoral systems where party officials choose candidates and voters vote for parties rather than

for specific candidates (high party strength), a party has high capacity to act on its incentives.

Where voters select party nominees through primary elections and there are few barriers to

primary ballot access (low party strength), the capacity of local parties to act on candidate

selection incentives is much more limited.  Once we have defined both the incentive structure

and the capacity of parties to act upon such incentives, then we can ascertain the implications for

female candidate emergence.

Without knowing their incentives, the capacity of parties to influence candidate

nomination does not necessarily tell us what we should expect regarding female candidate

emergence.  If the incentive structure is defined too broadly, it is difficult to trace the causal

mechanisms between context and candidate emergence.  Therefore, we need to be able to

identify a more specific and politically relevant candidate emergence context and then determine

the capacity of parties to influence candidate selection within that context.  From the existing

literature, it appears that the effect of party strength on female representation should indeed be

contingent upon broader incentive contexts, though this is not always recognized.  Take the

example of Sweden.  Swedish parties adopted candidate gender quotas and zipper lists[15] in

response to a change in their strategic environment; influential stakeholders were demanding

more gender balance in representation (Krook 2010c, 714-716).  The parties had the capacity to

adopt these tools because of the Swedish electoral rules.  If Sweden was less party-centered, then

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[15] Alternating female candidates and male candidates on ballots.

parties may not have had the capacity to act upon their change in incentives and implement these tools to increase female candidacies. The important point is that the capacity was there all along; it took a change in incentives to actually use the capacity to promote female representation.

For the quantitative test of hypotheses H2a and H2b, I will include a party strength variable in the regression models in addition to an interaction term – gendered civil society context * party strength. I expect the interaction term to be significant, while the party strength variable alone is not expected to be significant. As noted previously, many aspects of party strength within the US electoral context are informal. For instance, does the local party organization endorse candidates and provide resources to favored candidates in primary elections, or does the local party remain neutral? Do local party leaders attempt to avoid primary elections altogether by negotiating with potential candidates behind the scenes? To what extent do local party organizations collaborate with the state party organization when it comes to candidate recruitment? Identifying how, and the extent to which, local parties exert control over candidate nomination is crucial to understanding how effectively stakeholders in civil society are able to promote candidates. Unfortunately, this level of party strength detail is not available at the local level for all state legislative districts. Therefore, for the quantitative tests of these hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, I use the two party strength variables from Mayhew and Cotter, described previously.

**Chapter 3**

**The Gendered Civil Society Context and Female Candidate Emergence**

**Introduction**

Chapter 1 describes the existing research on female representation and demonstrates the key takeaways. One prominent finding is that "when women run, women win." In other words, women's underrepresentation is not necessarily caused by voters rejecting female candidates at the ballot box; instead, it is because women run for office much less than men. By ruling out overt voter discrimination against female candidates, researchers seek to identify why women are less likely to consider electoral politics in the first place. Some of this difference is attributed to another key finding in the literature – the gender gap in political ambition (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010). In other words, survey data indicate that similarly situated men and women express different levels of interest in running for elective political office. Ongoing research is geared toward explaining this gap based on gendered socialization effects, anticipated gender-based discrimination, gender gaps in ideological positioning, election and competition aversion, and other individual-level factors that may vary, on average, between men and women.

However, the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 1 also highlights something that many studies tend to overlook – women appear to have overcome the political ambition gender gap in some state legislature and party caucuses. Several Democratic caucuses have reached gender parity, meaning that women occupy about half of the Democratic-held seats in the legislature. There is some variation across Republican caucuses as well. While this project does not dispute the political ambition gender gap and its root causes, I argue that it is unlikely that individual-level explanations alone can account for the geographic variation in female

representation observed across the state legislatures.  Instead, the American and comparative politics literatures point to many external features of the electoral context that may be facilitating or inhibiting the emergence of female candidates, despite the political ambition gender gap.  To complement and refine some of these existing institutional and structural explanations, Chapter 2 introduces the two-part theory of gendered civil society context and local party strength, and the hypotheses derived from it, that guides this dissertation project.

In this chapter, I construct empirical measures of the central concept developed in the project – the gendered civil society context (GCSC) – and present quantitative tests of the first set of hypotheses, H1a through H1d.  These hypotheses predict a direct relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  More specifically, I employ logistic and linear regression to test for a statistical association between GCSC and female candidate emergence at the state legislative district and state levels.  Consistent with the expectations of the first two hypotheses (H1a and H1b), the results indicate that on average male-dominated industry groups are far more active than female-dominated industry groups in both major parties, and female-dominated industries are more active within the Democratic Party's GCSC than within the Republican Party's.  Male-dominated industries are also somewhat more active within the Democratic Party, compared to the Republican Party, due to the prominence of predominantly male labor organizations.

The regression analyses do indicate that the gendered civil society context is related to female candidate emergence, but there are differences between the Democratic and Republican parties.  More specifically, more female-dominated gendered civil society contexts are associated with more women running in both parties; however, there are higher levels of uncertainty in the estimates for the Republican Party compared to the Democratic Party.  More male-dominated

gendered civil society contexts are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office, but unrelated to female candidate emergence in the Republican Party. The results suggest that the gender composition of local stakeholder groups, and the level of their political engagement, may indeed influence candidate pipelines with respect to gender even after accounting for other factors related to female representation.

**Measuring the Gendered Civil Society Context**

*Gender-balance of Civil Society Groups Based on Industrial Segregation by Sex Data*

The theory of gendered civil society context described in detail in Chapter 2, starts with these few basic assumptions. Civil society groups are influential in local politics, and these groups are often more closely aligned with one of the two major political parties. Within each party's set of stakeholder groups, relative political influence varies by group; in other words, some groups wield more power than others. These politically relevant groups constitute a pool, or pipeline, of potential candidates. Female and male candidates are not equally likely to emerge from these potential candidate pools because the leadership and membership of civil society groups are not necessarily gender-balanced. In short, pipelines to political office vary by place, by party, and by their gendered composition. Observing and measuring these dimensions of variation in candidate pipelines allow us to determine if and how they are correlated with variations in female candidate emergence.

One important determinant of the gendered nature of civil society groups is industrial segregation by sex. Many civil society groups are tied to industries and occupations, which are not gender-balanced. The American Community Survey (ACS) from the Census Bureau provides

data on the gender composition of industry and occupational classifications.  In Figure 3.1, I break these top-level industry categories down into female-dominated industries, male-dominated industries, and gender-balanced industries.  I coded these as female(male)-dominated if over 60% of the industry's workforce is female(male).  Female-dominated industries include healthcare, social assistance, and education. Male-dominated industries include construction, energy and natural resources, agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, etc.

These broad industrial categories include numerous detailed sub-categories.  While the gender composition of most sub-categories mirror that of their parent category, some sub-categories or related occupations have different gender compositions compared to their top-level industry sector.  This is especially important to the analysis if these sub-categories have politically active associations organized at the sub-category level.  For example, healthcare is highly female-dominated; across the industry women make up 76% of the workforce.  However, within healthcare, physicians, dentists, and chiropractors are highly male-dominated occupations. These are occupations that have politically active medical associations, so it is important to classify them correctly given that the gendered composition of these fields starkly contrasts with the broader healthcare sector.

To account for these differences, Figure 3.1 also identifies any industrial sub-categories that were re-coded for the gendered civil society context measures.  Within "Other services, except public administration," for-profit correctional facilities and private prisons were recoded from gender-balanced to male-dominated, while non-profit foundations were re-coded to female-dominated.  Within "Public Administration" the courts and justice and military sub-categories were recoded from gender-balanced to male-dominated.  Within the "Professional, scientific, and technical services" top-level category, attorneys and computer-related occupations were re-coded

from gender-balanced to male-dominated. Recoding was done by examining the detailed industrial and occupational data by sex from the American Community Survey and identifying any sub-category with a % Female value that varied substantially from that of its parent category. With respect to the gendered civil society context, the assumption I make is that the gender composition of a civil society group affiliated with an industry roughly mirrors the gender composition of that industry's workforce.

Figure 3.1 – Industrial & Occupational Segregation by Sex Data for GCSC Variables

| Gender Composition of Major Industry Categories | % Female | Gendered Civil Society Context Category |
|---|---|---|
| Health care and social assistance * | 76% | Female-dominated |
| Educational services | 66% | Female-dominated |
| Finance and insurance | 56% | Gender-balanced |
| Management of companies and enterprises | 51% | Gender-balanced |
| Arts, entertainment, & recreation; Accommodation & food services | 45% | Gender-balanced |
| Other services, except public administration * | 43% | Gender-balanced |
| Public administration * | 43% | Gender-balanced |
| Retail trade | 43% | Gender-balanced |
| Real estate and rental and leasing | 43% | Gender-balanced |
| Professional, scientific, and technical services * | 40% | Gender-balanced |
| Information | 37% | Male-dominated |
| Administrative and support and waste management services | 36% | Male-dominated |
| Wholesale trade | 28% | Male-dominated |
| Manufacturing | 27% | Male-dominated |
| Transportation and warehousing | 22% | Male-dominated |
| Utilities | 22% | Male-dominated |
| Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; Mining | 16% | Male-dominated |
| Construction | 9% | Male-dominated |

| * Industry Categories w/ Recoded Sub-categories | % Female | Gendered Civil Society Context Category |
|---|---|---|
| Health care and social assistance | | |
|     physicians, dentists, chiropractors | 26% - 35% | Male-dominated |
| Other services, except public administration | | |
|     for-profit correctional facilities & private prisons; security services | 25% - 28% | Male-dominated |
|     non-profit foundations | 69% | Female- dominated |
| Public administration | | |
|     courts & justice | 37% | Male-dominated |
|     military | 9% - 16% | Male-dominated |
| Professional, scientific, and technical services | | |
|     attorneys, lawyers, law firms | 37% | Male-dominated |
|     computer engineering, software, components, services | 9% - 38% | Male-dominated |

source: American Community Survey 2015 (industry and occupation by sex data, Table S2404 and queries from the Public Use Microdata Sample)

*Relative Political Influence of Civil Society Groups Based on Contribution Data*

Next, I identify which industries and groups are active in local politics. I use campaign contribution data as a proxy for activity and relative political influence. The Follow The Money (FTM) database of the National Institute on Money in Politics includes contribution data for state legislative races since 2000. Contributors are classified as individuals or non-individuals. For this project, I only include contributions from non-individuals. The theory is about the influence of stakeholder groups within a party's local strategic environment, so I am most interested in seeing which groups make direct contributions to candidates. This may leave out members of groups who make individual contributions influenced by their group membership. For instance, a union may endorse a candidate and encourage members to contribute to that candidate. However, for this analysis, group contributions are most relevant.

It is important to note that I am not necessarily looking at contribution data because I am interested in money in politics or donations in and of themselves. Instead I want to emphasize the idea of contributions as proxies for relative political influence and activity. Contribution data allows me to identify politically active groups across the country at the state legislative district level and to compare the relative influence of these groups using contribution amounts. As mentioned previously, politically relevant groups provide numerous resources to candidates and parties, besides money. However, it would be extremely difficult to identify and compare groups by party and level of influence across all state legislative districts by other means. Contribution data has the advantage of being available and comparable for thousands of districts, but it cannot capture all the nuances of local political dynamics that are likely important to how groups affect candidate emergence. The data also leave out groups that maybe friendlier with one party but are precluded from making political donations or engaging in other overt political activities due

to their 501c3 non-profit status (e.g. Rotary Foundation, Planned Parenthood Federation). The interview data presented in Chapter 5 delves into some of those nuances and additional civil society groups.

Within the FTM database, each non-individual contributor is classified by three industry indicators, in order of level of detail - broad sector, general business, and specific business. The industry indicators roughly match the industry classifications used in the American Community Survey shown in Figure 3.1. I created a mapping from the ACS industry classifications to the FTM classifications. Two "broad sector" categories within the FTM database do not map easily to the ACS classifications – Single Issue/Ideology and Labor. The Single Issue/Ideology sector in the FTM database includes advocacy groups (e.g. environmental groups, gun rights, gun control) and does not have a corollary in the ACS database. Due to the difficulty in knowing the gendered composition of these groups, they are classified as gender-balanced with two exceptions. "Women's Issues" and "Abortion - pro-choice" groups are classified as female-dominated. The FTM database also groups all labor unions under the Labor sector, regardless of affiliated industry. Thus, I classified each union within this FTM category according to their industry (i.e. teachers unions are within the Educational Services industry).

Next, I classify all contributors based on their industry's gendered civil society context category – female-dominated, gender-balanced, or male-dominated. As an extra check for the FTM Labor sector, I validated the union GCSC classifications using union membership by sex data from the Current Population Survey (https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/data.html). I sum the contributions to candidates of both major parties by the GCSC category for all state legislative districts in the dataset.

I narrow my focus to three election cycles 2002/3, 2006/7, 2010/11. These three cycles provide some theoretical and practical advantages. Most states have State House/Assembly elections every two years but a few have them every four years or on off-federal years (LA, NJ, MS, VA). These three cycles allow me to capture all states, regardless of 2- or 4-year term, in non-presidential election years. This is a good test of the theory because it is really about the local dynamics that impact candidate emergence. Non-presidential election years are likely to better reflect local issues and dynamics. I use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME, Bonica 2016) for candidate gender data, which is updated through 2012.

I further narrow the universe of data under analysis by looking only at data associated with elections for open seats. Open seats are theoretically relevant because I want to see how likely a female candidate is to emerge based on the local political dynamics. Elections with incumbents running do not allow for a clear assessment of the determinants of candidate emergence due to the deterrence effect of incumbency. Prior research has demonstrated that the incumbency advantage deters even potentially strong candidates from entering elections (Maisel and Stone 1997) and several of the interviewees provided anecdotal evidence about incumbency's negative effect on candidate recruitment. This is not to say that the GCSC is not relevant when incumbents and challengers are present, but open seats provide a better first test for the viability of the theory.

With empirical measures compiled, I can observe the composition of the gendered civil society context for each party to evaluate the first two GCSC hypotheses.

**Testing Hypotheses H1a and H1b**

*H1a: The gendered civil society context is more male-dominated than female-dominated for both the Democratic and Republican parties.*

*H1b: Female-dominated groups will have more relative influence within the Democratic Party's gendered civil society context compared to the relative influence of female-dominated groups within the Republican Party's gendered civil society context.*

Figure 3.2 provides data to evaluate hypotheses H1a and H1b, which posit that the civil society context is gendered for both parties and that the composition of the GCSC differs by party. The table shows the average proportion of contributions from each GCSC category across the 5,173 district-years by party. To reiterate, these are contributions from institutions/groups to candidates running for open state house seats across three election cycles. The data provide some support for both hypotheses.

Consistent with H1a, for both major parties, contributions from male-dominated groups outweigh those from female-dominated groups. In districts with Democratic candidates, on average about 54% of contributions to Democrats come from male-dominated industry groups, compared to about 19% from female-dominated groups. In districts with Republican candidates, about 46% come from groups affiliated with male-dominated industries, while only 9% of contributions to Republicans come from female-dominated industry groups.

Moreover, in line with H1b, the differences between the parties are statistically significant across the three GCSC categories. A higher proportion of contributions come from female-dominated industries to Democratic candidates (19%) than to Republicans (9%). I did not necessarily have an expectation regarding differences in male-dominated contributions between the two parties, but Figure 3.2 illustrates that male-dominated industry groups account for a larger share of contributions to Democratic candidates than to Republicans – 54% compared to 46% of total contributions. As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, this is mainly driven by the activity of male-dominated unions within the Democratic Party, and the prevalence of contributions from gender-balanced industry groups on the Republican side.

| Figure 3.2 - GCSC Independent Variables – Difference in District Means by Party | Republican | Democratic | Difference/ [se] |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.089 | 0.194 | -0.105*** [.005] |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.463 | 0.536 | -0.0732*** [.007] |
| GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions | 0.448 | 0.269 | 0.178*** [.007] |
| n (# of district-years) | 2538 | 2635 | |

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
*Two-sample t-tests with unequal variances*

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide additional detail about the gendered civil society context for each party by illustrating the percent of total contributions by industry sector and GCSC category across all district-years[16].  On the Democratic side, Labor dwarfs the other sectors, accounting for nearly 40% of all group contributions to Democratic candidates.  As noted previously, because of how the Labor sector is categorized in the FTM database, the category contains unions affiliated with multiple industries, such as education, health, construction, etc.  Within Labor, unions affiliated with male-dominated industries comprise over half of those contributions, or 22% of total contributions.  Unions affiliated with female-dominated industries represent 10% of all group contributions to Democrats.  It is interesting to note that the contributions from female-dominated unions is comparable to contributions from the second and third highest donor sectors, "Finance, Insurance and Real Estate" and "Lawyers and Lobbyists." It appears that female-dominated unions wield substantial relative power within the Democratic coalition.  At the same time, male-dominated unions seem to have the most relative influence.

For Republican candidates, most group contributions came from the "Finance, Insurance and Real Estate" and "General Business" sectors, which are coded mostly as gender-balanced. Group contributions from the Health sector were third highest, and female-dominated industries

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[16] Underlying data are included in the Chapter 3 Appendix, Figure 3.21.

comprise about half of that sector's total.  Clearly female-dominated industries are represented less within the Republican coalition.  Yet, the data indicate that gender-balanced industries and sectors are represented about equally compared to mainly male-dominated industries.

**Figure 3.3 - Democratic Party Gendered Civil Society Context, % Contributions by Industry Sector**



**Figure 3.4 - Republican Party Gendered Civil Society Context, % Contributions by Industry Sector**

I contend that this contribution data indicates a level of relative political power within the party networks. This means that networks affiliated with female-dominated industries are less politically influential than networks affiliated with male-dominated industries in both major parties. If these networks reflect occupational segregation by sex, which seems likely, then networks with more women comprise a smaller share of candidate pools than male-dominated networks, on average, for both the Democratic and Republican parties. Moreover, female-dominated networks appear to be more influential within the Democratic Party than the Republican Party.

**Gendered Civil Society Context Independent Variables**

The contribution data presented in the previous section, coded by industrial segregation by sex, allows me to derive the key independent variables of interest. These will be used in the regression models, which test hypotheses H1c and H1d, presented next:

- **GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions**: contributions from female-dominated groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either primary or general election, by district-party-year and by state-party-year

- **GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions**: contributions from male-dominated groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either primary or general election, by district-party-year and by state-party-year

- **GCSC – Gender-balanced Industry Contributions**:  contributions from gender-balanced groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either primary or general election, by district-party-year and by state-party-year

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show each party's distributions for the two main gendered civil society context variables of interest at the state-year level.  When comparing the parties, the distributions are somewhat different for the GCSC – Female-dominated Industry Contributions variable.  For the Republican Party, mostly all state-years have values under 10%, whereas there is more variation on the Democratic side with contributions from female-dominated groups accounting for over 30% of group contributions in 20 state-years.  The GCSC – Male-dominated Industry Contributions variable has a normal distribution for both parties, with the values skewed a bit higher for the Democratic Party.  Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the same distributions at the district-year level.



Figure 3.5 - Distribution of GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions to Candidates by Party by State-Year

Figure 3.6 - Distribution of GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions
to Candidates by Party by State-Year



Figure 3.7 - Distribution of GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions
to Candidates by Party by District-Year

Figure 3.8 - Distribution of GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions to Candidates by Party by District-Year



**Dependent Variables**

The dependent variables require knowledge of the gender of candidates running for office. Candidate gender data is not included in official campaign contribution filing records so it is surprisingly difficult to obtain, especially when looking, as I am, at candidates running for office for both major parties across thousands of state legislative districts in multiple years. Fortunately, the DIME database does include candidate gender data through 2012.

For each of the two parties separately, I create dependent variables for the state-level and district-level regressions. For the state-level analysis, each party's dependent variable is the percent of all primary and general election candidates who are female by state-year, for open seats only. For the district-level analysis, the dependent variables are binary indicators for whether or not at least one female candidate ran in the primary or general election in that district by year by party, for open seat races only.

Figure 3.9 - Distribution of Proportion of Female Candidates
by Party by State-Year



Figure 3.9 shows the distributions of the state-level dependent variables. They reiterate the observation that more Democratic women run for office than Republican women. Across these three election cycles, in most states, over 20% or 30% of Democratic candidates were women. On the other hand, typically women made up less than 20% of Republican candidates.

**Figure 3.10 - Presence of Female Candidate Running in Primary or General Election
for Three Election Cycles by Party, Open Seats Only**

| # State House Legislative District Elections with: | Female Candidate | No Female Candidate | Total Elections | % Elections w/ Female Candidate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Democratic Candidates** | 862 | 1773 | 2635 | 33% |
| **Republican Candidates** | 613 | 1925 | 2538 | 24% |
| **Total** | 1475 | 3698 | 5173 | 29% |

Figure 3.10 presents the data for the district-level, binary dependent variables. Across the three election cycles, there were 2,635 races with Democratic candidates competing. Of those, 862 district-years, or 33% of races, had at least one female Democrat running in either the primary or general election. Even if a Democratic female candidate lost in the primary for a certain district and only male candidates competed in the general, that district would be coded as 1. For the 2,538 races with Republican candidates, 613 of them, or 24%, had at least one Republican woman running in either the primary or general election.

## Control Variables[17]

The regression models presented next include several control variables to account for existing explanations for female candidate emergence found in the literature, as described in detail in Chapter 1. These include: term limits, multimember districts, legislative professionalism, public campaign financing options, partisanship, traditional political culture, the social eligibility pool (indicated by the percent of females with at least a bachelor's degree), and the women-friendly district (WFD) index. Party strength variables are added to the models presented in Chapter 4. The control variables are all state-level, except for the women-friendly district score, which is measured by state house district in the district-level logit regression models. For the state-level OLS models, the district WFD scores are averaged for each state[18].

With respect to expected effects for the institutional control variables, the term limits variable is expected to have a positive sign, though research has shown mixed results. Originally, they were thought to enable female candidates to overcome the incumbency advantage that sitting male legislators experienced (Darcy et. al. 1994). However, more recent

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[17] Variable definitions and data sources are listed in the Chapter 3 Appendix, Figure 3.22.
[18] However, missing data for the WFD index results in the omission of 13 states.

research shows that the legislative turnover created by term limits does not necessarily increase female representation because of the limited pipeline of willing female candidates, particularly on the Republican side (O'Regan and Stambough 2017). Legislative professionalism is expected to have a negative sign, because the more professionalized the legislature, the more competitive the elections, which would disadvantage women, who are more hesitant to compete in elections to begin with (Kanthak and Woon 2015). Scholars have found some evidence that states with multimember districts and those with public campaign financing options tend to have higher levels of female representation, so these variables are expected to have positive signs (Norrander and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016).

Cultural and socioeconomic variables may also explain some of the variation in female representation across legislatures and party caucuses. In general, the literature would suggest that the more right-leaning a state, in terms of Republican partisanship, the lower its predicted level of female representation. This is based on the gender gap in American politics, which shows that for the past several decades women have affiliated with the Democratic party at higher rates than men (Carroll and Fox 2014, Chapter 4; Huddy et. al. 2008; Osborn and Kreitzer 2014, 184-185; Pogionne 2004, 308-312). Political culture is another structural variable of interest. Many studies have tested the relationship between Elazar's (1984) state-level political culture measures and female representation; he classified states according to three political cultures -- traditional, moralistic, and individualistic -- based on the dominant perceptions of politics and political operations in the states (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). In "traditional political culture" states, largely found in the South, politics is seen as defending traditional values, including traditional gender roles. Thus, traditional political culture is expected to be unfavorable to female representation.

Scholars employ a few composite measures to capture structural macro-level factors such as the "women friendly districts" (WFD) and the social eligibility pool indices (Palmer and Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Sanbonmatsu 2002). In the following regression models, the social eligibility pool is indicated by female educational attainment. The more highly educated and professional women in a state, the larger the pool of potential candidates, so a positive effect on female candidate emergence is expected. Adapted from Palmer and Simon's (2008) study of female representation in Congress, Pyeatt and Yanus (2016) apply the WFD concept to female representation in state legislatures. The WFD index is compiled from 12 factors for each district[19]: % urban, % African American, % Hispanic, % foreign born, % college educated, % school age, % blue collar workforce, Republican partisanship, conservative ideology, median income, district size, Southern. They find that the index has a positive and substantive effect on both the emergence and success of female candidates, so a positive sign is expected for this variable in the following regressions.

**Testing Hypotheses H1c and H1d**

*H1c: Higher relative influence of female-dominated networks in gendered civil society context → Higher likelihood of female candidates*

*H1d: Higher relative influence of male-dominated networks in gendered civil society context → Lower likelihood of female candidates*

In this section I employ regression analysis to test the relationship between the gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence. I use logistic regression for a district-level analysis, and I use linear regression for a state-level analysis.

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[19] However, there are many districts with missing data; 1,530 district-years in the dataset do not have WFD scores.

**District-level Logistic Regression Analysis**

This section presents the results of the district-level analyses that test H1c and H1d. I use logistic regression to see if the gendered civil society context variables have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of a female Democratic (Republican) candidate running in a district-year. I expect the GCSC – Female-dominated variable to have a positive sign (hypothesis H1c) and the GCSC – Male-dominated variable to have a negative sign (H1d). Figure 3.11 presents the results (Models 3-1 through 3-9), which indicate support for both hypotheses, even after controlling for other variables known to impact female candidate emergence.

Figures 3.12 and 3.13 present graphs of Model 3-1 and 3-2[20]. Consistent with H1c, the predicted probability of a female candidate running increases by about 20 percentage points when moving from low contributions from female-dominated industry groups to high contributions from such groups. For example, for the Democratic Party, in districts where contributions from female-dominated groups are near zero, there is a 25% chance of a female Democratic candidate running. Where such contributions are much higher, the likelihood of a female Democratic candidate competing is over 40%. Conversely, the GCSC – Male-dominated variable (Figure 3.13) is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a female candidate by about ten percentage points as you move from districts with low values to those with high values on this variable. The effects of the GCSC – Male-dominated and GCSC – Female dominated variables are statistically significant across models, with the expected signs. Also noteworthy is that the gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant in models 3-3 and 3-8, as expected.

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[20] The control variable values used to generate the graphs presented throughout Chapters 3 and 4 are meant to represent a "typical" state: Term Limits = 0, Multimember Districts = 0, Traditional Political Culture = 0, Public Campaign Funding = 0, and mean values for the other control variables (Republican Partisanship, Female College Graduates %, Legislative Professionalism, etc.).

Figure 3.11 - District-level Logit Models

| DV = Female Candidate in Primary or General Election (binary) | Model 3-1 | Model 3-2 | Model 3-3 | Model 3-4 | Model 3-5 | Model 3-6 | Model 3-7 | Model 3-8 | Model 3-9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| **state-level variables** | | | | | | | | | |
| Term Limits | 0.416*** | 0.391*** | 0.376*** | 0.417*** | 0.424*** | 0.455*** | 0.436*** | 0.424*** | 0.456*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] |
| Multimember District | 0.323*** | 0.336*** | 0.354*** | 0.320*** | 0.563*** | 0.522*** | 0.550*** | 0.562*** | 0.522*** |
| | [0.11] | [0.11] | [0.11] | [0.11] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] |
| Republican Partisanship | 1.017*** | 1.048*** | 1.012*** | 1.032*** | | | | | |
| | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] | | | | | |
| Traditional Political Culture | 0.018 | -0.032 | -0.009 | 0.003 | 0.09 | 0.089 | 0.058 | 0.101 | 0.081 |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.030*** | 0.024** | 0.025*** | 0.028*** | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| Legislative Professionalism | 1.298*** | 1.258*** | 1.302*** | 1.279*** | 0.697* | 0.656* | 0.635* | 0.713* | 0.642* |
| | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.37] | [0.37] | [0.37] | [0.37] | [0.37] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.283** | 0.301** | 0.310*** | 0.282** | 0.169 | 0.152 | 0.165 | 0.167 | 0.152 |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.21] | [0.21] | [0.21] | [0.21] | [0.21] |
| **district-level variables** | | | | | | | | | |
| Democratic Party | 0.336*** | 0.483*** | 0.441*** | 0.370*** | 0.336*** | 0.242*** | 0.369*** | 0.311*** | 0.257*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.974*** | | | 0.824*** | | 0.929*** | | | 0.868*** |
| | [0.17] | | | [0.19] | | [0.21] | | | [0.23] |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.520*** | | -0.244* | | | -0.388** | | -0.101 |
| | | [0.13] | | [0.14] | | | [0.15] | | [0.17] |
| GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions | | | -0.011 | | | | | -0.136 | |
| | | | [0.14] | | | | | [0.17] | |
| Women-friendly District Score | | | | | 0.090*** | 0.090*** | 0.088*** | 0.091*** | 0.090*** |
| | | | | | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| constant | -2.496*** | -1.995*** | -2.271*** | -2.332*** | -2.067*** | -2.253*** | -1.887*** | -2.021*** | -2.194*** |
| | [0.27] | [0.27] | [0.27] | [0.29] | [0.33] | [0.33] | [0.33] | [0.33] | [0.35] |
| n | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 3643 | 3643 | 3643 | 3643 | 3643 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

**Notes:** Data sources are listed in Figure 3.22 in the appendix. Unit of analysis is state house district-party-year. There are many missing values for the Women-friendly District Score variable, which reduces the number of observations by 1,530 in Models 3-5 through 3-9. Republican Partisanship is removed from Models 3-5 through 3-9 because it is also a component of the Women-friendly District index.

Figure 3.12 - Predicted Probability of Female Candidate Emergence by GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions by Party (Model 3-1)



Figure 3.13 - Predicted Probability of Female Candidate Emergence by GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions by Party (Model 3-2)

In terms of control variables, term limits and multimember districts are statistically significant and have the expected positive signs across all nine models. The percentage of female college graduates and public campaign funding are also positive, as expected, but they are only significant in Models 3-1 through 3-4, which do not include the WFD variable. Due to missing data, over 1,530 observations drop out of the models that include WFD – Models 3-5 through 3-9. This may affect the Public Campaign Funding variable in those models because only five states have public funding, three of which are excluded because of missing WFD scores[21]. The female college graduates variable may lose significance in Models 3-5 through 3-9 because the WFD variable better captures the effects of the social eligibility pool. The WFD variable is positive and significant in Models 3-5 through 3-9. Traditional political culture is not significant in any of the district-level models. Both Republican partisanship and legislative professionalism are statistically significant, but their signs are unexpected. Both variables would be expected to have a negative effect on female candidate emergence, but instead they are positively associated with it in these models.

The Democratic Party dummy variable is positive and significant across the board indicating differences across the two major parties. In Figures 3.12 and 3.13, these differences are indicated by the difference in intercept, or the starting point for the predicted probability for each party, but the slopes are the same. To accurately assess the differences across the parties, the models must include interaction terms between the Democratic Party and GCSC variables. Figure 3.14 presents the results of adding interaction terms to models 3-1 and 3-2. I focus on these models due to the missing data issues in models 3-5 through 3-9.

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[21] States with Public Campaign Funding options include Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota. Districts in the dataset from Connecticut, Maine, and Minnesota did not have WFD scores, so those are some of the observations dropped from Models 3-5 through 3-9. Other states dropped from those models include: Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia.

Figure 3.14 - District-level Logit Models with Interaction Variables

| DV = Female Candidate in Primary or General Election (binary) | | Model 3-10 B/[se] | Model 3-11 B/[se] |
|---|---|---|---|
| state-level variables | Term Limits | 0.417*** | 0.398*** |
| | | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| | Multimember District | 0.318*** | 0.321*** |
| | | [0.11] | [0.11] |
| | Republican Partisanship | 1.002*** | 0.979*** |
| | | [0.31] | [0.31] |
| | Traditional Political Culture | 0.025 | -0.035 |
| | | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| | Female College Graduates % | 0.029*** | 0.025*** |
| | | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| | Legislative Professionalism | 1.298*** | 1.246*** |
| | | [0.31] | [0.31] |
| | Public Campaign Funding | 0.281** | 0.284** |
| | | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| district-level variables | Democratic Party | 0.275*** | 0.816*** |
| | | [0.08] | [0.14] |
| | GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.594* | |
| | | [0.35] | |
| | Dem Party * GCSC - Female-dominated | 0.50 | |
| | | [0.40] | |
| | GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.113 |
| | | | [0.20] |
| | Dem Party * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.694*** |
| | | | [0.26] |
| | constant | -2.451*** | -2.205*** |
| | | [0.27] | [0.29] |
| | n | 5173 | 5173 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The inclusion of interaction terms does change the nature of the results with respect to the relationship between the gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 illustrate the differences. For the Republican Party, the GCSC – Female-dominated variable exerts a statistically significant, positive effect on the likelihood of female candidate emergence, but uncertainty in the estimates increases dramatically as one moves along the x-axis (Figure 3.15). Also, for the Republican Party, the GCSC – Male-dominated variable does not affect the likelihood of female candidate emergence as the predicted probability is basically flat (Figure 3.16).

It is a different story on the Democratic side. Both the female-dominated and male-dominated GCSC variables have statistically significant and substantive effects in the expected directions for the Democratic Party. As seen in Figure 3.15, the likelihood of a Democratic female candidate increases from about 25 % to nearly 50% as GCSC – Female-dominated contributions increase. Conversely, Figure 3.16 shows that the likelihood decreases by about 15 percentage points as GCSC – Male-dominated contributions increase.

Figure 3.15 – Effect of GCSC-Female-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-10)



Figure 3.16 - Effect of GCSC-Male-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-11)

Overall, the interaction models create a mixed picture for Hypotheses H1c and H1d. The hypotheses are supported on the Democratic side, but not fully on the Republican side. One factor that may partially explain this is that there is very minimal variation in the GCSC – Female-dominated variable when looking at districts with Republican candidates. As Figure 3.7 illustrates most districts with Republican candidates running have female-dominated contributions of less 10% of total contributions. Interview data presented in Chapter 5 also helps to shed light on these differences between the parties.

### *State-level Regression Analysis Results*

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to see how well the GCSC measures scale up to the state level. State-level analyses may be less effective at capturing the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence than district-level analysis because total level of contributions may vary widely across districts. For example, in a given state, a small district with relatively low campaign spending could have a high proportion of contributions from female-dominated groups. However, that one district's amount would not have much of an effect on the state's total contributions if many other districts have much higher levels of contributions.

I calculate the state-level GCSC independent variables by summing total contributions to Democratic (Republican) candidates by the three GCSC categories (female-dominated, male-dominated, and gender-balanced) and determining each category's proportion of total contributions. I choose this approach because I think it makes future use and replicability of these variables more likely and accessible. An alternate approach would be to take the average contributions by GCSC category across districts. This would limit the issue just mentioned

regarding diminished influence of districts with low total contributions[22].  However, this

approach would require collecting data at the district-level, which may not be feasible for other

scholars who may use this variable in future female representation research.

Models 3-A through 3-I test if the state-level GCSC independent variables are associated

with the percent of female Democratic (Republican) candidates running for open seats across

three election cycles; the unit of analysis is state-party-year.  I do not control for party strength

variables yet because they will be covered in Chapter 4.  Figure 3.17 displays the results.

With respect to the relationship between the gendered civil society context and female

candidacies, state models 3-A through 3-D are mostly consistent with the district-level results.

The main GCSC variables are statistically significant with the expected signs in these models.  In

other words, a more female-dominated GCSC is associated with more female candidates, while a

more male-dominated GCSC is associated with fewer female candidates.  Again, the gender-

balanced GCSC variable is not significant.

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[22] Here is an example to illustrate the differences in approach to measuring the GCSC variables.  Imagine a state with two districts – District A and District B.  Total group contributions to Democratic candidates in District A equal $10,000, with $5,000 coming from female-dominated groups and $5,000 from male-dominated groups.  So for District A, the district-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable equals 50% and the GCSC – Male-dominated value is 50%.  Total group contributions to Democratic candidates in District B equal $30,000, with $5,000 coming from female-dominated groups and $25,000 from male-dominated groups.  So for District B, the district-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable equals 16.7% and the GCSC – Male-dominated value is 83.3%.  The district-average method to calculate the state-level GCSC variables weights each district the same, regardless of their difference in total contributions.  So using the district-average method, the state-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable would equal 33.4% ((50% + 16.7%)/2), and the state-level GCSC – Male-dominated value would be 66.6% ((50% + 83.3%)/2).  Alternatively, using the state totals method, contributions from each GCSC category are summed and compared to the state's total contributions.  In this example, across the state's two districts, total contributions equal $40,000.  Contributions from female-dominated groups equal $10,000 and those from male-dominated groups equal $30,000.  Thus, under this approach, the state-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable value is 25% and the state-level GCSC – Male-dominated value is 75%.  The relative political influence of female-dominated groups appears lower using the state totals method compared to the district-average method.  Theoretically, the district-average method is preferable because it does not weigh District A less than District B, just because District A has lower total contributions.  Afterall, both districts will (typically) have one representative, who gets elected by working within the local political dynamics of her district.  In this example, female-dominated groups have fairly high levels of relative political influence in District A, but this influence is somewhat diluted at the state-level using the state totals method.  However, calculating these measures at the district-level may not always be practical, and the state totals methods certainly streamlines the process.  So, I chose to use the state totals method to see if the results are comparable to those of the district-level models presented previously.

Figure 3.17 – State-level OLS Regression Models

| DV = % Female Candidates | Model 3-A | Model 3-B | Model 3-C | Model 3-D | Model 3-E | Model 3-F | Model 3-G | Model 3-H | Model 3-I |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.02 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.018 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.022 | 0.021 | 0.022 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Multimember District | -0.009 | -0.008 | -0.006 | -0.009 | -0.021 | -0.021 | -0.022 | -0.021 | -0.022 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.032 | 0.037 | 0.03 | 0.038 | | | | | |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | | | | | |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.064*** | -0.069*** | -0.072*** | -0.065*** | -0.065** | -0.063** | -0.065** | -0.067** | -0.065** |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.03] | [0.03] | [0.03] | [0.03] | [0.03] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.006*** | 0.004** | 0.004** | 0.005*** | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| Legislative Professionalism | -0.133* | -0.114 | -0.121* | -0.118* | -0.150* | -0.154* | -0.148* | -0.144* | -0.149* |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.044* | 0.053** | 0.053** | 0.049** | 0.046 | 0.043 | 0.046 | 0.049 | 0.045 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.04] | [0.04] | [0.04] | [0.04] | [0.04] |
| Democratic Party | 0.076*** | 0.098*** | 0.099*** | 0.088*** | 0.086*** | 0.082*** | 0.091*** | 0.093*** | 0.090*** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.146** | | | 0.09 | | 0.038 | | | 0.008 |
| | [0.06] | | | [0.07] | | [0.08] | | | [0.08] |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.133*** | | -0.109** | | | -0.068 | | -0.066 |
| | | [0.04] | | [0.05] | | | [0.06] | | [0.06] |
| GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions | | | 0.059 | | | | | 0.045 | |
| | | | [0.04] | | | | | [0.05] | |
| Women-friendly District (state avg) | | | | | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.007 |
| | | | | | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| constant | 0.028 | 0.139** | 0.054 | 0.103* | 0.071 | 0.063 | 0.1 | 0.054 | 0.097 |
| | [0.05] | [0.06] | [0.05] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.07] |
| R-squared | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| n | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 | 206 | 206 | 206 | 206 | 206 |

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

**Notes:** Data sources are listed in the table in the appendix. Unit of analysis is state-party-year. Thirteen states have missing values for the Women-friendly District score variable, which reduces the number of observations in Models 3-E through 3-I. Republican Partisanship is removed from Models 3-E through 3-I because it is also a component of the Women-friendly District index.

Models 3-E through 3-I include the WFD state average score variables, which again results in a sizeable reduction in observations due to missing data. In these models, the GCSC variables are not significant. The only variables that are significant are traditional political culture (negative effect), legislative professionalism (negative effect), and the Democratic party dummy variable (positive effect). Given the missing data and overall lower explanatory power of these five models (i.e. lower R-squared values), I instead focus on models 3-A through 3-D.

While the effects of the GCSC variables in models 3-A through 3-D are consistent with the district-level results, there are several differences among the control variables. In the state models, term limits, multimember districts, and Republican partisanship do not meet the threshold of statistical significance. Traditional political culture was not significant in the district analysis, but in the state-level models this variable is significant with the expected negative effect on female candidate emergence. Similar to the district models, female college graduates and public campaign funding are significant with positive signs, as expected. Legislative professionalism is significant at the .1 level in three of the four models. In these models, the variable has the expected negative effect, in contrast to the district models in which this variable had a positive sign.

Again, the Democratic party variable is positive and significant across the models, indicating the need to assess the different effect by party using interaction terms. Figure 3.18 shows the results of adding the party-GCSC interaction variables to models 3-A and 3-B, thereby creating models 3-J and 3-K. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 present these models graphically and the patterns are very similar to those of the district-level analyses (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16). The level of female-dominated contributions is associated with more female candidates in both parties, but there is a high level of uncertainty in the Republican estimates. The negative

association between contributions from male-dominated groups and female candidacies is even more pronounced on the Democratic side in the state-level analysis, while there is still no association on the Republican side.

Figure 3.18 – State-level OLS Regression Models with Interaction Variables

| DV = % Female Candidates | Model 3-J | Model 3-K |
|---|---|---|
| | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.02 | 0.015 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Multimember District | -0.01 | -0.012 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.034 | 0.03 |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.067*** | -0.067*** |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.006*** | 0.004** |
| | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| Legislative Professionalism | -0.136* | -0.102 |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.043* | 0.050** |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Democratic Party | 0.093*** | 0.214*** |
| | [0.02] | [0.04] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.247** | |
| | [0.12] | |
| Dem Party * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.138 | |
| | [0.14] | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.012 |
| | | [0.06] |
| Dem Party * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.237*** |
| | | [0.09] |
| constant | 0.016 | 0.091 |
| | [0.05] | [0.06] |
| R-squared | 0.25 | 0.28 |
| n | 283 | 283 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 3.19 - Effect of GCSC-Female-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-J)



Figure 3.20 - Effect of GCSC-Male-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-K)

**Conclusion**

The analyses presented thus far indicate that groups affiliated with male-dominated industries are more active within both parties compared to groups affiliated with female-dominated industries. On average, female-dominated industries are more active within the Democratic Party than within the Republican Party. Male-dominated groups are also more active within the Democratic Party's GCSC, but to a lesser extent, and this is mostly driven by the activity of labor associations within male-dominated industries. Within both parties, more politically active female-dominated industries are associated with more women running for office, but there is a lot of uncertainty in the statistical effects on the Republican side. Within the Democratic Party, more politically active male-dominated industries are associated with fewer women running for office, while there is no association for the Republican Party. Overall, the gendered civil society context appears to provide a promising new explanation for female candidate emergence, even after taking other possible explanations from the literature into account, especially for the Democratic Party. The next chapter will address the second part of this dissertation's guiding theory -- role of local party strength.

## Chapter 3 – Appendix

Figure 3.21 - Data Table for Figures 3.3 and 3.4 – GCSC Contributions by Industry Sector

| All States<br>(3 election cycles; open seat races; non-individual donors) | Male-dominated Industries | Gender-balanced Industries | Female-dominated Industries | Total | % of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Democratic** | **42,218,194** | **26,728,542** | **14,210,143** | **83,156,880** | |
| Labor | 18,142,348 | 6,494,544 | 8,415,617 | 33,052,509 | 39.7% |
| Finance, Insurance & Real Estate | - | 9,307,258 | - | 9,307,258 | 11.2% |
| Lawyers & Lobbyists | 7,870,883 | 806,380 | - | 8,677,263 | 10.4% |
| Health | 3,097,757 | - | 4,127,444 | 7,225,200 | 8.7% |
| General Business | 1,684,436 | 5,225,297 | - | 6,909,733 | 8.3% |
| Ideology/Single Issue | - | 3,017,915 | 1,113,489 | 4,131,404 | 5.0% |
| Energy & Natural Resources | 3,305,288 | - | - | 3,305,288 | 4.0% |
| Construction | 3,141,498 | - | - | 3,141,498 | 3.8% |
| Communications & Electronics | 1,982,312 | 448,396 | - | 2,430,708 | 2.9% |
| Government Agencies/Education/Other | 90,713 | 1,401,903 | 478,833 | 1,971,449 | 2.4% |
| Agriculture | 1,499,007 | - | 74,761 | 1,573,768 | 1.9% |
| Transportation | 1,403,952 | - | - | 1,403,952 | 1.7% |
| Defense | - | 26,850 | - | 26,850 | 0.0% |
| **Republican** | **33,109,000** | **31,136,245** | **7,267,566** | **71,512,811** | |
| Finance, Insurance & Real Estate | - | 13,932,013 | - | 13,932,013 | 19.5% |
| General Business | 2,523,590 | 10,686,420 | - | 13,210,010 | 18.5% |
| Health | 4,038,792 | - | 4,904,858 | 8,943,650 | 12.5% |
| Construction | 7,048,514 | - | - | 7,048,514 | 9.9% |
| Energy & Natural Resources | 5,230,434 | - | - | 5,230,434 | 7.3% |
| Agriculture | 4,297,470 | - | 211,285 | 4,508,755 | 6.3% |
| Lawyers & Lobbyists | 3,109,078 | 1,172,278 | - | 4,281,356 | 6.0% |
| Labor | 2,021,121 | 339,967 | 1,571,896 | 3,932,984 | 5.5% |
| Ideology/Single Issue | - | 3,738,384 | 157,447 | 3,895,830 | 5.4% |
| Transportation | 2,633,330 | - | - | 2,633,330 | 3.7% |
| Communications & Electronics | 2,178,137 | 392,255 | - | 2,570,391 | 3.6% |
| Government Agencies/Education/Other | 26,285 | 829,709 | 422,080 | 1,278,073 | 1.8% |
| Defense | 2,250 | 45,220 | - | 47,470 | 0.1% |

Figure 3.22 - Information for Control Variables used in Regression Models in Chapters 3 & 4

| Variable Name | Variable Definition | Data Source |
|---|---|---|
| **Term Limits** | binary indicator (1 = term limits, 0 = no term limits) | National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx |
| **Multimember Districts** | binary indicator (1 = mmd, 0 = no mmd) | The Thicket at State Legislatures, NCSL blog (http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/09/a-slight-decline-in-legislatures-using-multimember-districts-after-redistricting.html); Ballotpedia (https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts) |
| **Republican Partisanship** | scale of -1 to 1 (-1 = more Democratic, 1 = more Republican) | Partisanship Means 1996-2006 from Norrander and Monzano 2010 replication data available on Norrander's website (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~norrande/data.html) |
| **Traditional Political Culture** | four-point scale based on Elazar 1984 (1 = traditional, .6 = mixed, traditional dominant, .3 = mixed, traditional non-dominant, 0 = not traditional) | Mead, Lawrence M. 2004. "State Political Culture and Welfare Reform." Policy Studies Journal 32 (2): 271–96. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2004.00065.x. (pg. 275) |
| **Female College Graduates %** | % of females age 25 and over with a bachelor's or higher degree | U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 2007–2009 American Community Survey (ACS) 3-Year Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data. (prepared July 2011) http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012001.pdf (pg. 33) |
| **Legislative Professionalism** | scale from 0 to 1, higher values more professional | values from 2003, Correlates of the States database. Jordan, Marty P. and Matt Grossmann. 2020. *The Correlates of State Policy Project v.2.2.* East Lansing, MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR). |
| **Public Campaign Funding** | binary indicator (1 = public funding, 0 = no public funding) | National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/StatePublicFinancingOptionsChart2015.pdf |
| **Women-friendly District Score; Women-friendly District (state avg)** | scale from 0 through 12 | data shared with me by Pyeatt and Yanus, which was the basis for their 2016 article, "Shattering the Marble Ceiling: A Research Note on Women-Friendly State Legislative Districts." Social Science Quarterly 97 (5): 1108–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12294. |
| **Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)** | scale from 1 to 5 based on Mayhew 1986; (1 = no historical presence of traditional party structure, 5 = strong historical presence of traditional party structure) | Mayhew, David R. 1986. Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century. Book, Whole. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. (pg. 196) |
| **Party Strength (Cotter)** | Democratic parties: scale from -.871 to 1.441 Republican parties: scale from -1.457 to 1.581 | Cotter, Cornelius P., et. al. 1984. Party Organizations in American Politics. American Political Parties and Elections. New York: Praeger. (pg. 52-53) |

## **Chapter 4**

## **The Role of Party Strength in Female Candidate Emergence**

**Overview**

The previous chapter tests the project's first main set of hypotheses – the direct relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence; and this chapter tests the second set of guiding hypotheses (H2a and H2b) – the moderating effect of party strength on that relationship. In other words, does level of party strength change the nature of the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence? If so, how? And are there differences between the Democratic and Republican parties?

Chapter 3 showed that groups affiliated with male-dominated industries are more active within both parties compared to groups affiliated with female-dominated industries, and that female-dominated industries are more active within the Democratic Party than within the Republican Party. Moreover, male-dominated labor organizations are major components of the Democratic Party's gendered civil society context. Regarding the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence, more politically active female-dominated industries are associated with more women running in both parties. Moreover, more politically active male-dominated industries are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office but are unrelated to female Republican candidacies. The gendered civil society context appears to have a direct effect on female candidate emergence, especially within the Democratic Party.

Quantitative tests of H2a and H2b are presented in this chapter. My theory suggests that the GCSC sets the stage for the strategic behavior of political parties. A gendered civil society context in which female-dominated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to

nominate female candidates tied to these networks. Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination – in other words, where party strength is higher -- this effect is expected to be greater. Similar to Chapter 3, regression analysis is performed at the district and state levels. As a robustness check, models are presented with two different measures of party strength used in the literature, one from Mayhew (1986) and the other from Cotter, et. al. (1984).

In general, the models do not provide strong evidence of a moderating effect of party strength. The models including the Cotter variable suggest that the relationship between GCSC and female candidacies does not change based on party strength for the Republican Party. On the Democratic side, some models suggest a negative direct effect of party strength, while one model indicates a moderating effect opposite of what H2a predicts. In other words, a more female-dominated GCSC increases female candidate emergence more where Democratic party organizations are weaker. On the other hand, a model using the Mayhew variable indicates that higher party strength does amplify the positive association between a female-dominated GCSC and female candidacies within the Republican Party, as H2a predicts. Overall, despite these few examples, the quantitative results do not support the party strength hypotheses as formulated in the theory.

There are several reasons why this may be the case. While these variables are commonly used in the female representation literature, they are quite dated. Furthermore, the party strength measures are averaged at the state level (Mayhew) or the state-party level (Cotter), so they are not specific to the districts[23]. A more recent district-level party strength variable would allow for

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[23] Of course, district-specific party strength measures would be very difficult to obtain for all state legislative districts in the country. There are over 4,800 state house districts and measures would be needed for both major parties for each one. Moreover, party committees are typically organized by county, and counties and state legislative districts are not perfectly aligned, which may complicate assigning party strength indicators to the districts. Therefore, state-party level measures, such as Cotter's, may be the most practical solution for large n studies.

a more accurate test of the theory. This is because state-level average values mask any district-level party strength variation; in other words, state-level and district-level values may not be highly correlated, thus making the state-level variable a poor proxy for district party strength.

Aside from practical data issues, there are likely important theoretical explanations for the null findings. In Chapter 2, I suggest that stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, which could create strategic advantages for the party. The comparative literature discussed in Chapter 1 suggests that this has happened in some European countries, where left-leaning parties responded to demands from civil society to increase female representation (Krook 2010c). In turn, these parties implemented tools to do just that (e.g. candidate gender quotas), thus responding to dynamics within civil society and increasing the pipeline of female candidates. On the other hand, the reverse logic could also make sense. Where local party organizations are weaker, civil society groups may be able to garner more political power and thus have more influence over candidate selection. This mechanism was addressed in some of my interviews with party leaders, which are the subject of Chapter 5. For example, a Republican party chair in Georgia, where party committees are relatively weak, addressed some challenges with respect to candidate recruitment and how civil society groups and the local party are not necessarily working in concert.

> "There's always those people who've never been involved in the party, don't even know that the party exists, really, but they want to run for office. They've always voted Republican. So they go down and they qualify for that office. And they've talked to maybe their homeowner's association, or they've talked to their fellow members of the Kiwanis or Rotary club, or they've been involved in [local] business associations. […] there may be a little bit of crossover [between these groups and the party committee], […] but in terms of anything formal, or even kind of a loose association, there isn't one. […] And that's part of the challenges you have in candidate recruitment […] -- the party's not necessarily the only one doing it." (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)[24]

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[24] GA_Rep_6 (Republican county party chair from Georgia) in telephone interview with author, 1/24/2020.

Even where party committees are stronger, like in New York, the effect of the party on candidate selection may be contingent on the nature of the relationship between the party organization and certain groups. The interviews show that these relationships can be very idiosyncratic and not necessarily related to party strength. For example, several Democratic party chairs discussed local Indivisible groups and other Trump resistance-related groups that formed after the 2016 election. In some cases, there was synergy between the groups and the party committee resulting in membership crossover, joint meetings, and even candidate emergence. In other counties, the relationship was not close. In some cases, the resistance groups sought to maintain a nonpartisan stance, while others were more progressive and took a somewhat anti-establishment posture toward the local party committee. In all these cases, the civil society groups affected local political dynamics, including candidate emergence, but the interactions between groups and party organizations were complex.

The results presented in this chapter and the next indicate that both the gendered civil society context and local party organizations impact candidate emergence. However, the concept of party strength, while likely relevant, does not necessarily lead to a predictable effect on female candidate emergence. The data presented in these two chapters may shed light on why there are mixed findings and competing theories in the literature with respect to the relationship between party strength and female representation.

## Testing Hypotheses H2a and H2b

*H2a: The positive effect of a more female-dominated gendered civil society context on female candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases*

*H2b: The negative effect of a more male-dominated gendered civil society context on female candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases*

To test for a moderating effect of party strength on the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence, this chapter adds party strength and interaction variables to the regression analyses presented in Chapter 3[25]. Three sets of regressions were run for both the district and state levels. First, party strength variables were added alone to the Chapter 3 models to see if they exert a direct effect on female candidate emergence and if their addition substantively changes the results. Next, an interaction term combining GCSC and party strength was added to see if the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence changes at different levels of party strength. Finally, a three-way interaction term was added to determine any differences between the two major parties.

As noted, I used two different measures of party strength. The Traditional Party Structure variable, derived from Mayhew (1986), is common in the literature. This variable is not ideal because it is a state-level indicator, and not measured at the state-party level. It classifies states on a scale of 1 to 5 based on the historical presence of patronage-based, hierarchical party organizations that seek to influence candidate nominations, among other things (Sanbonmatsu 2002, Norrander and Wilcox 2014). I also use the Local Party Organizational Strength measures from Cotter, et. al. (1984), which are available at the state-party level, and thus a better fit for the analysis. The values by state are shown in Figure 4.1.

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[25] I do not use models with the WFD variable in this chapter due to the missing data issues described in Chapter 3.

Figure 4.1 – Party Strength Measures from Cotter, et. al. (1984, 52-53) and Mayhew (1986, 196)

| State | Local Party Organization Strength (Cotter) | | Traditional Party Organization (Mayhew) |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic | Republican | |
| New Jersey | **1.441** | **1.581** | 5 |
| Pennsylvania | 1.033 | 0.943 | 5 |
| New York | 0.962 | 1.107 | 5 |
| Delaware | 0.899 | 0.647 | 4 |
| Indiana | 0.794 | 1.004 | 5 |
| Rhode Island | 0.783 | 0.380 | 5 |
| Ohio | 0.752 | 0.782 | 4 |
| New Hampshire | 0.650 | -0.015 | 1 |
| Connecticut | 0.626 | 0.649 | 5 |
| Illinois | 0.599 | 0.622 | 5 |
| Maryland | 0.531 | 0.872 | 5 |
| Michigan | 0.464 | 0.594 | 1 |
| Hawaii | 0.439 | 0.476 | 1 |
| Idaho | 0.417 | 0.176 | 1 |
| Washington | 0.406 | 0.615 | 1 |
| Maine | 0.311 | 0.199 | 1 |
| Florida | 0.307 | -0.758 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 0.297 | 0.339 | 1 |
| Alaska | 0.234 | -0.184 | 1 |
| Utah | 0.228 | -0.433 | 1 |
| Minnesota | 0.227 | 0.342 | 1 |
| New Mexico | 0.204 | 0.688 | 2 |
| Tennessee | 0.203 | 0.049 | 2 |
| California | 0.202 | 0.705 | 1 |
| North Carolina | 0.194 | 0.260 | 1 |
| Wisconsin | 0.175 | 0.314 | 1 |
| Iowa | 0.132 | 0.376 | 1 |
| Oregon | 0.051 | 0.101 | 1 |
| Vermont | -0.045 | -0.576 | 1 |
| Arizona | -0.051 | 0.810 | 1 |
| Colorado | -0.063 | 0.111 | 1 |
| Virginia | -0.072 | 0.123 | 2 |
| West Virginia | -0.099 | 0.200 | 4 |
| South Dakota | -0.109 | -0.121 | 1 |
| Wyoming | -0.125 | 0.297 | 1 |
| South Carolina | -0.131 | -0.058 | 1 |
| Missouri | -0.145 | -0.425 | 4 |
| Massachusetts | -0.150 | -0.309 | 1 |
| Montana | -0.155 | -0.217 | 1 |
| Oklahoma | -0.341 | -0.252 | 1 |
| Kentucky | -0.354 | -0.696 | 4 |
| Nevada | -0.493 | 0.269 | 1 |
| Alabama | -0.574 | -0.621 | 1 |
| Arkansas | -0.579 | -0.325 | 2 |
| Kansas | -0.598 | -0.230 | 1 |
| Georgia | -0.626 | **-1.457** | 2 |
| Mississippi | -0.671 | -0.318 | 1 |
| Texas | -0.717 | -0.423 | 2 |
| Louisiana | **-0.871** | -0.607 | 3 |
| *Maximum* | *1.441* | *1.581* | *5* |
| *Minimum* | *-0.871* | *-1.457* | *1* |
| *Average* | *0.135* | *0.155* | *2* |

**District-level Logistic Regression Analysis**

Figure 4.2 shows the results of adding the party strength variables to the district-level models, thereby testing for the direct effect of party strength on female candidate emergence. As noted in Chapter 1, existing American and comparative research that has explored this relationship has hypothesized, and found, effects in both positive and negative directions. Both the Cotter and Mayhew variables are significant at the .01 level with negative signs across all models. In other words, these results suggest that higher levels of party strength are associated with lower levels of female candidate emergence.

Figure 4.2 – District-level Logit Models with Party Strength Variables

| DV = Female Candidate in Primary or General Election (binary) | Model 4-1 B/[se] | Model 4-2 B/[se] | Model 4-3 B/[se] | Model 4-4 B/[se] | Model 4-5 B/[se] | Model 4-6 B/[se] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Term Limits | 0.363*** | 0.340*** | 0.321*** | 0.382*** | 0.358*** | 0.342*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Multimember District | 0.387*** | 0.396*** | 0.419*** | 0.318*** | 0.332*** | 0.350*** |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.11] | [0.11] | [0.11] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.880*** | 0.918*** | 0.869*** | 0.453 | 0.516 | 0.439 |
| | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.34] | [0.34] | [0.34] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.161 | -0.199 | -0.191 | -0.084 | -0.126 | -0.107 |
| | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.024** | 0.019* | 0.020** | 0.026*** | 0.021** | 0.022** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| Legislative Professionalism | 1.682*** | 1.623*** | 1.700*** | 1.205*** | 1.176*** | 1.213*** |
| | [0.34] | [0.34] | [0.34] | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.31] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.347*** | 0.363*** | 0.377*** | 0.191 | 0.216* | 0.217* |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Democratic Party | 0.334*** | 0.480*** | 0.436*** | 0.335*** | 0.480*** | 0.436*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.06] | [0.07] |
| Party Strength (Cotter) | -0.224*** | -0.212*** | -0.231*** | | | |
| | [0.08] | [0.08] | [0.08] | | | |
| Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) | | | | -0.093*** | -0.088*** | -0.095*** |
| | | | | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.969*** | | | 0.972*** | | |
| | [0.17] | | | [0.17] | | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.501*** | | | -0.490*** | |
| | | [0.13] | | | [0.13] | |
| GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions | | | -0.031 | | | -0.045 |
| | | | [0.14] | | | [0.14] |
| constant | -2.354*** | -1.870*** | -2.121*** | -2.161*** | -1.693*** | -1.926*** |
| | [0.28] | [0.28] | [0.27] | [0.28] | [0.28] | [0.28] |
| n | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Note: Party strength variables are added to Models 3-1 through 3-3 presented in Chapter 3.

The effects of the gendered civil society context variables are consistent with the Chapter 3 results, despite the addition of the new variables. The GCSC – Female-dominated variable is positive and significant in models 4-1 and 4-4, indicating that more contributions from female-dominated groups are associated with a higher likelihood of female candidates. The reverse is true, as expected, for the GCSC – Male-dominated variable in models 4-2 and 4-5. And finally, as a check, the gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant in models 4-3 and 4-6.

The effects of the control variables are also basically unchanged compared to Chapter 3 in the models including the Cotter measure (models 4-1 through 4-3). In the models including the traditional party structure (Mayhew) variable (models 4-4 through 4-6), the effects of Republican partisanship and public campaign funding are different. Republican partisanship is not significant in the Mayhew models, while public campaign funding is significant in two of the three models and at a lower level of statistical significance -- .1 rather than .05.

The models presented in Figure 4.3 include interaction terms combining party strength with the GCSC variables. This tests whether or not party strength moderates the relationship between the gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence. The interaction variables are not significant in models 4-7 through 4-10, while the party strength and GCSC variables maintain their independent effects in most, but not all, models. This indicates a lack of support for the hypotheses predicting a moderating effect of party strength.

To fully interpret the models, it is best to assess the results graphically, but to do that meaningfully, differential effects for each party must also be considered. Therefore, Figure 4.4 presents models (4-11 through 4-14) including three-way interactions between party strength, gendered civil society context, and the Democratic Party dummy variable. The results are graphed in Figures 4.5 through 4.8.

Figure 4.3 - District-level Logit Models with Party Strength * GCSC Interaction Variables

| DV = Female Candidate in Primary or General Election (binary) | Model 4-7 B/[se] | Model 4-8 B/[se] | Model 4-9 B/[se] | Model 4-10 B/[se] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Term Limits | 0.364*** | 0.341*** | 0.384*** | 0.363*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Multimember District | 0.387*** | 0.400*** | 0.322*** | 0.339*** |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.11] | [0.11] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.879*** | 0.916*** | 0.471 | 0.503 |
| | [0.31] | [0.31] | [0.34] | [0.34] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.165 | -0.199 | -0.079 | -0.119 |
| | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.024** | 0.019* | 0.026*** | 0.021** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| Legislative Professionalism | 1.671*** | 1.628*** | 1.215*** | 1.169*** |
| | [0.34] | [0.34] | [0.31] | [0.31] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.344*** | 0.361*** | 0.195 | 0.210* |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Democratic Party | 0.335*** | 0.479*** | 0.340*** | 0.489*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.06] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 1.008*** | | 0.825*** | |
| | [0.18] | | [0.27] | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.470*** | | -0.251 |
| | | [0.13] | | [0.21] |
| Party Strength (Cotter) | -0.187** | -0.093 | | |
| | [0.09] | [0.14] | | |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.244 | | | |
| | [0.32] | | | |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.248 | | |
| | | [0.24] | | |
| Traditional Party Structure | | | -0.104*** | -0.034 |
| | | | [0.03] | [0.05] |
| Traditional Party * GCSC - Female-dominated | | | 0.068 | |
| | | | [0.10] | |
| Traditional Party * GCSC - Male-dominated | | | | -0.113 |
| | | | | [0.08] |
| constant | -2.366*** | -1.889*** | -2.141*** | -1.820*** |
| | [0.28] | [0.28] | [0.28] | [0.30] |
| n | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 |

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Figure 4.4 - District-level Logit Models with Three-way Interactions

| DV = Female Candidate in Primary or General Election (binary) | "Party Strength" = Local Party Strength (Cotter) | | "Party Strength" = Traditional Party Organization (Mayhew) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 4-11 | Model 4-12 | Model 4-13 | Model 4-14 |
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.360*** | 0.344*** | 0.385*** | 0.368*** |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Multimember District | 0.379*** | 0.383*** | 0.332*** | 0.334*** |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.11] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.870*** | 0.850*** | 0.481 | 0.465 |
| | [0.31] | [0.32] | [0.34] | [0.34] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.165 | -0.211 | -0.071 | -0.125 |
| | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.025** | 0.021** | 0.026*** | 0.022** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| Legislative Professionalism | 1.675*** | 1.618*** | 1.185*** | 1.135*** |
| | [0.34] | [0.34] | [0.31] | [0.31] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.335*** | 0.337*** | 0.199* | 0.200* |
| | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] | [0.12] |
| Democratic Party | 0.293*** | 0.830*** | 0.552*** | 0.896*** |
| | [0.08] | [0.14] | [0.14] | [0.23] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.634* | | 0.366 | |
| | [0.37] | | [0.66] | |
| Party Strength | -0.117 | -0.045 | -0.043 | -0.014 |
| | [0.12] | [0.18] | [0.04] | [0.06] |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.11 | | 0.094 | |
| | [0.61] | | [0.20] | |
| Dem * Party Strength | -0.211 | -0.15 | -0.129** | -0.06 |
| | [0.16] | [0.27] | [0.05] | [0.09] |
| Dem * GCSC - Female-dominated | 0.479 | | 0.297 | |
| | [0.42] | | [0.73] | |
| Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | 0.03 | | 0.091 | |
| | [0.72] | | [0.23] | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.06 | | -0.034 |
| | | [0.20] | | [0.33] |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.208 | | -0.033 |
| | | [0.35] | | [0.13] |
| Dem * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.703*** | | -0.465 |
| | | [0.27] | | [0.44] |
| Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.01 | | -0.069 |
| | | [0.49] | | [0.17] |
| constant | -2.353*** | -2.127*** | -2.214*** | -2.052*** |
| | [0.28] | [0.29] | [0.29] | [0.33] |
| n | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 | 5173 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The graphs in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 display the three-way interaction models (4-11 and 4-12) that include the Cotter measures[26]. For the Republican Party, these models indicate no significant effects for the GCSC variables, party strength, nor for the interactions. On the Democratic side, the independent direct effects of GCSC and party strength are evident, but there is no indication of an interaction effect based on party strength. In other words, regarding the direct effects, the GCSC – Female-dominated and GCSC – Male-dominated variables retain their respective positive and negative effects on the likelihood of female candidacies. Also, party strength has a negative effect on female candidate emergence, evidenced by the lower intercept for the high party strength scenario. However, if party strength moderated the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence, then the slopes of the green and orange lines would differ. Instead, they are basically parallel for the Democratic Party in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, indicating the absence of a moderating effect.

Figure 4.5 – Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence (District Model 4-11)



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
[26] The following variable values were used to generate the Chapter 4 graphs: term limits = 0; multimember districts = 0; Republican partisanship = mean; traditional political culture = 0; female college graduates = mean; legislative professionalism = mean; public campaign funding = 0; high party strength (Cotter) = 1.4, low party strength (Cotter) = -1; high party strength (Mayhew) = 5, low party strength (Mayhew) = 1.

Figure 4.6 - Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence
(District Model 4-12)



Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the district models that include the traditional party structure

(Mayhew) variable.  For the Republican Party, these models similarly indicate no effects.  On the

Democratic side, Figure 4.7 does show a steeper positive slope for the high party strength

scenario, when examining the relationship between a female-dominated GCSC and female

candidate emergence.  This would suggest that stronger party organizations may amplify the

effects of the GCSC, as H2a predicts.  However, this is not very strong evidence, and it is

contradicted by the state-level models presented next.  There is no interaction effect evident

when considering model 4-14, which includes the male-dominated GCSC variable.  When

looking at the Democratic side of Figure 4.8, there appears to be a negative direct effect of party

strength (i.e. lower intercept for high party strength), but the slopes are basically parallel

indicating that the nature of the relationship is consistent, regardless of party strength.

Figure 4.7 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate Emergence (District Model 4-13)

**Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)
on Female Candidacies, by Party**
Model 4-13



Figure 4.8 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate Emergence (District Model 4-14)

**Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)
on Female Candidacies, by Party**
Model 4-14

**State-level OLS Regression Analysis**

Figures 4.9 through 4.11 present the state-level regression results. The party strength variables are added in Figure 4.9; in contrast to the district-level analysis party strength is not significant across the models. The Cotter variable (in Models 4-A through 4-C) has a negative sign, but it does not reach statistical significance in any model. The traditional party structure variable also has a negative sign in Models 4-D through 4-F, but it is significant in only two of the three models at either the .05 (4-D) or .1 (4-F) level. So compared to the district models, there is less evidence of a direct relationship between party strength and female representation.

Figure 4.9 – State-level OLS Models with Party Strength Variables

| DV = Proportion Female Candidates | Model 4-A | Model 4-B | Model 4-C | Model 4-D | Model 4-E | Model 4-F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.018 | 0.014 | 0.012 | 0.013 | 0.01 | 0.008 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Multimember District | -0.008 | -0.006 | -0.004 | -0.009 | -0.007 | -0.006 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.029 | 0.034 | 0.026 | -0.036 | -0.013 | -0.03 |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.067*** | -0.071*** | -0.077*** | -0.073*** | -0.076*** | -0.081*** |
| | [0.03] | [0.02] | [0.03] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.006*** | 0.004** | 0.004** | 0.005*** | 0.004** | 0.004** |
| | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| Legislative Professionalism | -0.123* | -0.108 | -0.11 | -0.136** | -0.118* | -0.127* |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.046* | 0.054** | 0.055** | 0.036 | 0.047* | 0.045* |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Democratic Party | 0.076*** | 0.098*** | 0.099*** | 0.075*** | 0.097*** | 0.097*** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.02] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.02] |
| Local Party Strength (Cotter) | -0.007 | -0.004 | -0.008 | | | |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | | | |
| Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) | | | | -0.010** | -0.007 | -0.009* |
| | | | | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.145** | | | 0.150** | | |
| | [0.06] | | | [0.06] | | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.132*** | | | -0.122*** | |
| | | [0.04] | | | [0.04] | |
| GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions | | | 0.057 | | | 0.043 |
| | | | [0.04] | | | [0.05] |
| constant | 0.03 | 0.140** | 0.056 | 0.066 | 0.162*** | 0.091 |
| | [0.05] | [0.06] | [0.05] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] |
| R-squared | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| n | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The GCSC – Female-dominated and GCSC – Male-dominated variables are statistically significant with the expected positive and negative signs, respectively, in Models 4-A, 4-B, 4-D, and 4-E.  The gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant, as expected, in Models 4-C and 4-F.  The Democratic Party dummy variable is also positive and significant across all models.

The other control variables are largely unchanged compared to the state-level models presented in Chapter 3.  Term limits, multimember districts, and Republican partisanship are all not significant in any state model, in contrast to the district models.  Traditional political culture is not significant in the district analysis, but in the state-level models this variable is significant with the expected negative effect on female candidate emergence.  The female college graduates variable is significant across all models and public campaign funding is significant in five of six models; both variables have positive signs, as expected.  Legislative professionalism is significant in four of the six models.  Like the Chapter 3 state-level results, this variable has the expected negative sign, in contrast to the district models in which this variable has a positive sign.

Figure 4.10 presents the models with the party strength-GCSC interaction terms.  Across all four models, the GCSC variables maintain their expected direct effects and significance.  However, the interaction term is only significant in one model, 4-G.  Model 4-G, which includes the GCSC-Female-dominated and the Cotter party strength variables, shows a positive and significant coefficient for the GCSC variable and a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term.  This would indicate that higher party strength reduces the positive association between a female-dominated gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  Since the Democratic Party variable is significant in all models, it again necessitates the inclusion of three-way interactions in order to decipher the effects by party.  The three-way

interaction models are presented in Figure 4.11, and they are presented graphically in Figures

4.12 through 4.15.

Figure 4.10 - State-level OLS Models with Party Strength * GCSC Interactions

| DV = Proportion Female Candidates | Model 4-G | Model 4-H | Model 4-I | Model 4-J |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.018 | 0.014 | 0.013 | 0.01 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Multimember District | -0.01 | -0.007 | -0.009 | -0.008 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.033 | 0.035 | -0.036 | -0.013 |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.070*** | -0.071*** | -0.074*** | -0.076*** |
| | [0.03] | [0.03] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.006*** | 0.004** | 0.005*** | 0.004** |
| | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| Legislative Professionalism | -0.124* | -0.108 | -0.137** | -0.118* |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.046* | 0.054** | 0.036 | 0.047* |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Democratic Party | 0.076*** | 0.098*** | 0.075*** | 0.097*** |
| | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.199*** | | 0.161* | |
| | [0.07] | | [0.09] | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.134*** | | -0.125* |
| | | [0.05] | | [0.07] |
| Local Party Strength (Cotter) | 0.028 | -0.01 | | |
| | [0.02] | [0.05] | | |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.257** | | | |
| | [0.12] | | | |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | 0.013 | | |
| | | [0.09] | | |
| Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) | | | -0.009 | -0.008 |
| | | | [0.01] | [0.01] |
| Traditional Party * GCSC - Female-dominated | | | -0.006 | |
| | | | [0.03] | |
| Traditional Party * GCSC - Male-dominated | | | | 0.002 |
| | | | | [0.03] |
| constant | 0.02 | 0.142** | 0.065 | 0.164** |
| | [0.05] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.07] |
| R-squared | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.26 |
| n | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.11 - State-level OLS Models with Three-way Interactions

| DV = Proportion Female Candidates | "Party Strength" = Local Party Strength (Cotter) | | "Party Strength" = Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 4-K | Model 4-L | Model 4-M | Model 4-N |
| | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] | B/[se] |
| Term Limits | 0.017 | 0.012 | 0.014 | 0.011 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Multimember District | -0.013 | -0.011 | -0.009 | -0.015 |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Republican Partisanship | 0.031 | 0.028 | -0.028 | -0.017 |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Traditional Political Culture | -0.073*** | -0.072*** | -0.070*** | -0.073*** |
| | [0.03] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Female College Graduates % | 0.006*** | 0.004** | 0.006*** | 0.004** |
| | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| Legislative Professionalism | -0.130* | -0.097 | -0.140** | -0.106 |
| | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] | [0.07] |
| Public Campaign Funding | 0.041* | 0.051** | 0.036 | 0.048** |
| | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] | [0.02] |
| Democratic Party | 0.083*** | 0.221*** | 0.101*** | 0.347*** |
| | [0.02] | [0.05] | [0.04] | [0.07] |
| GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions | 0.240* | | -0.267 | |
| | [0.12] | | [0.20] | |
| Party Strength | -0.001 | 0.012 | -0.016* | 0.019 |
| | [0.03] | [0.06] | [0.01] | [0.02] |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | 0.128 | | 0.212*** | |
| | [0.26] | | [0.07] | |
| Dem * Party Strength | 0.037 | -0.078 | -0.007 | -0.080*** |
| | [0.05] | [0.10] | [0.01] | [0.03] |
| Dem * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.054 | | 0.400* | |
| | [0.15] | | [0.22] | |
| Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated | -0.471 | | -0.218*** | |
| | [0.31] | | [0.08] | |
| GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions | | -0.012 | | 0.059 |
| | | [0.07] | | [0.10] |
| Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.011 | | -0.029 |
| | | [0.12] | | [0.04] |
| Dem * GCSC - Male-dominated | | -0.244*** | | -0.402*** |
| | | [0.09] | | [0.14] |
| Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated | | 0.087 | | 0.107* |
| | | [0.18] | | [0.06] |
| constant | 0.022 | 0.087 | 0.061 | 0.046 |
| | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.06] | [0.08] |
| R-squared | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.31 |
| n | 283 | 283 | 283 | 283 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 4.12 shows the moderating effect of party strength (Cotter) on the relationship between the GCSC-Female-dominated variable and female candidate emergence.  On the Republican side, there is no statistical difference between levels of party strength.  However, the Democratic graph shows that there is a positive relationship between a female-dominated gendered civil society context and female candidacies where party strength is low, but the relationship actually reverses where party strength is high.  As noted in the overview section of this chapter, this is the opposite of what hypothesis H2a would predict.  H2a posits that the positive relationship would be stronger in the high party strength scenario.  Instead, it could be that strong parties play a gatekeeping role that disadvantages female candidates, as suggested by Sanbonmatu (2006).  Or, where parties are weaker, civil society groups have more power to influence local politics and candidate emergence.  Alternatively, this could be a spurious finding since it is not robust to changes in party strength measure (Cotter vs. Mayhew) or to level of analysis (district vs. state).

Figure 4.12 – Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence (State Model 4-K)



Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidacies, by Party
Model 4-K

Figure 4.13 displays the moderating effect of party strength (Cotter) on the relationship between the GCSC-Male-dominated variable and female candidate emergence. On the Republican side, there is no difference based on level of party strength, and the lack of relationship between the GCSC variable and female candidacies is consistent with the other models presented so far. There is also no statistical difference based on party strength on the Democratic side. While the negative slope is steeper in the low party strength scenario, the confidence intervals overlap, so inferences cannot be made from this model.

Figure 4.13 - Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence (State Model 4-L)



Figures 4.14 and 4.15 replace the Cotter party strength variable with the Mayhew traditional party structure variable. The only instance of a clear moderating effect by party strength is on the Republican side in Figure 4.14. It shows that where parties are stronger, a female-dominated gendered civil society context is associated with more female Republican candidates; where parties are weaker, there is no association. This represents what my theory,

and hypothesis H2a, would predict. However, since the results are not consistent across models and levels of analysis, I am hesitant to draw any conclusions from this.

Figure 4.14 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate Emergence (State Model 4-M)



Figure 4.15 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate Emergence (State Model 4-N)

**Conclusion**

Overall, the models presented in this chapter do not provide confirmatory evidence for the second portion of my theory regarding the moderating effect of party strength. The district-level models do suggest a negative direct effect of party strength; however, those results do not hold up in the state-level models. As noted previously, there are various potential explanations for why this may be. Aside from practical data issues (i.e. party strength measures that are dated and not district-specific), theoretical issues are likely also at play. In Chapter 2, I suggest that stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, which could create strategic advantages for the party; and there is some evidence for this mechanism in the European context. On the other hand, the reverse could be true. Where local party organizations are weaker, civil society groups may have more political power to influence candidate selection. Still another possibility is that strong party organizations in the US serve as institutional gatekeepers, as Sanbonmatsu (2006) suggests, and they are not very responsive to the gendered civil society context with respect to candidate selection. Some of these possibilities and open questions are explored through interviews with local party leaders in Chapter 5.

The results presented in this chapter and the next indicate that both the gendered civil society context and local party organizations impact candidate emergence. However, the concept of party strength, while likely important, does not necessarily lead to a predictable effect on female candidate emergence, especially given the quantitative measures of party strength that are available. The data presented in these two chapters help explain why there are mixed findings and competing theories in the literature with respect to the relationship between party strength and female representation.

**Chapter 5**

**Female Candidate Emergence in Georgia and New York**

**Introduction**

In this chapter, I explore the dynamics of the gendered civil society context and party strength in two states – Georgia and New York.  I interviewed 30 Democratic and Republican county party chairs across the two states in order to assess the main hypotheses of the project, to the extent possible, and to explore additional factors related to female candidate emergence and to candidate emergence and recruitment more generally.

In the following sections, I explain my rationale for selecting these two states.  They are meant to be pathway cases (Weller and Barnes 2016, Gerring and Cojocaru 2016), which means they exemplify the expected effects of hypotheses in the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 3.  In addition, they vary by party strength, with NY having stronger party organizations than Georgia according to the party strength measures presented in Chapter 4.  I also explain my procedures for recruiting interviewees and conducting semi-structured telephone interviews.  Next, I explain the findings and synthesize the main conclusions drawn from these cases.

There was a common sentiment across the party chairs I spoke with in both states, regardless of party – prior community engagement is critical for successful candidacies.  However, the types of engagement and organizations mentioned did differ across the states and parties in ways that point to gendered differences in candidate pools.  In other words, the interviews bolster the quantitative findings that gendered civil society contexts indeed impact the likelihood of female candidate emergence.  As the hypotheses predict, Democratic chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds that are more female-dominated compared to those

mentioned by Republican chairs. Moreover, male-dominated unions were mentioned as important stakeholders in interviews with Democratic party chairs in New York, while unions of all types were not a major factor in the interviews with Democratic chairs in Georgia, given its right to work laws. Thus, this difference in importance of male-dominated groups may help to explain why the Democratic caucus in Georgia outperforms that in New York with respect to female representation.

The interviews also shed light on why the theory of gendered civil society context is more effective in explaining female candidate emergence on the Democratic side in the quantitative models presented in the previous chapters. A few chairs explicitly discussed the impression that the Democratic Party has more overtly political allied groups in its network compared to the Republican Party. To be sure, the interviews – consistent with my theory – suggest that civil society groups are important in both parties. However, it seems that candidate emergence within Republican networks is more driven by *personal connections* and social interactions within the groups as opposed to candidate emergence from the networks of advocacy and other stakeholder groups that have strong *institutional ties* to Democratic party organizations. These findings are in line with the asymmetric politics theory about the differences in the nature of the two major parties offered by Grossmann and Hopkins (2015, 2016). They argue that the Democratic Party has evolved as a coalition of interest groups in contrast to the Republican Party which evolved to serve as a vehicle for the ideological conservative movement. The case studies presented in this chapter indicate that groups are important for candidate emergence in both parties, but in different ways.

In terms of causal mechanisms, I explored the extent to which civil society groups push candidates to run for office from the perspective of party leaders. In other words, would civil

society leaders ever approach a party leader to suggest that an individual should run for office? Although I found more evidence of this on the Democratic side rather than the Republican side, this mechanism seemed infrequent compared to other modes of candidate emergence, such as recruitment or the reliance on potential candidates coming forward on their own. On the Democratic side, in NY some Democratic chairs mentioned that trade unions would suggest candidates and in Georgia some women's groups would do so as well. On the Republican side, only one GOP chair mentioned that such a thing would happen. It is important to note also that some organizations may push candidates to run without going through the county party committees, especially where party organizations are weaker and ballot access is easier, like in Georgia. Some chairs mentioned this happening, but it was impossible to explore that mechanism in depth through interviews with party chairs.

I also explored if parties pull potential candidates from civil society organizations. I did find evidence of this mechanism at work across states and parties. However, on the Republican side this mainly happens through informal personal networks rather than through formal integration between certain groups and party organizations. Informal personal connections were also important for candidate emergence on the Democratic side, but the interviews suggest that there are more formal ties between allied groups and Democratic party organizations that can facilitate candidate emergence. Interviewees also provided some insight into the gendered nature of civic groups and the extent to which certain professional backgrounds are relevant for candidate emergence in their counties.

**Case Selection**

As mentioned, for the case analyses I selected Georgia and New York. I roughly used

selection processes laid out by Weller and Barnes (2016), Gerring and Cojocaru (2016), and

Seawright and Gerring (2008). For the case studies, I am engaging in "pathway analysis" as

described by Weller and Barnes (2016) as:

> a mode of qualitative research that is part of a mixed-method research agenda, which
> seeks to (1) understand the mechanisms or links underlying an association between some
> explanatory variable, X1, and an outcome, Y, in particular cases and (2) generate insights
> from these cases about mechanisms in the unstudied population of cases featuring the
> X1/Y relationship. (426)

The authors outline two main criteria for selecting cases, as follows.

> (1)      The first goal of pathway analysis suggests the expected relationship criteria,
> which means the degree to which individual cases are expected to feature the relationship
> of interest between X1 and Y, given existing theory, empirical knowledge, and large-N
> studies.
> (2)      The second goal of pathway analysis implies the need to consider variation in
> case characteristics, meaning the extent to which the cases selected vary in terms of the
> X1/Y relationship, the X values, and the Y values. (Weller and Barnes 2016, 430)

For the first criteria, I calculated the average GCSC Female-dominated Contributions

values by state for districts with and without women candidates. Several states, including both

NY and GA, exemplify the expected X/Y relationship on the Democratic side. In other words,

as Figure 5.1 shows, female-dominated contributions were higher, and male-dominated

contributions were lower, in races with female candidates compared to races with only male

candidates. The same is not true for the Republican Party as seen in Figure 5.2, but that is not

surprising given the high uncertainty on the Republican side in the quantitative analyses. For the

second criteria, I wanted to have some variation on the party strength variable. NY represents

high party strength, and GA represents low party strength as evidenced by the party strength measures shown in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 (Cotter et. al. 1984, 52-53; Mayhew 1986, 196).

**Figure 5.1 - Average GCSC Contributions to Democrats for Districts with and without Female Candidates**



**Figure 5.2 - Average GCSC Contributions to Republicans for Districts with and without Female Candidates**

I contacted almost all the Democratic and Republican county party chairs across Georgia and New York using email addresses found on the state party websites.  I interviewed five Democratic chairs and seven Republican chairs in GA and 11 Democratic chairs and seven Republican chairs in NY, totaling 30 semi-structured interviews.  Interviews were conducted over the phone and lasted an average of 45 minutes.  Some party chairs responded to my email solicitation but declined to be interviewed because the party organization was so minimal in the given county that they barely even field candidates let alone engage in candidate recruitment.  This was most common among Democratic chairs in small rural counties in GA.  The interview questions and associated IRB documentation are included in Appendix A at the end of the dissertation.

**Overview of Female Representation in Georgia and New York**

In Georgia, the Democratic caucus in the lower chamber reached gender parity around 2012 (Figure 5.3, blue line), with just under 50% of Democratic seats in the GA Assembly held by women.  Democrats were losing ground in the Assembly after 2004 (purple line), when the Democratic seat-share dropped from 60% to just over 40%.  Democrats continued to lose seats and held between 30% and 40% of the Assembly over the past 15 years.  However, Democratic women continued to make up a larger and larger share of these Democratic seats over this same period (blue line).  It seems that Democratic women were holding onto or winning more seats than their male counterparts since 2005.  While the Democratic party may have been struggling overall, Democratic women were making progress with respect to female representation.

**Figure 5.3 – Female Representation in the Georgia State House, 2000 - 2019**



Legend:
- % Democratic Seats
- % Female in Democratic Caucus
- % Female in Republican Caucus
- % Female in State House

It is mainly a story of stagnation when considering female representation within the Republican Party in Georgia's lower chamber. Female legislators have comprised between 10% and 15% of the Republican caucus for the past 20 years (red line). Even as the Republican Party has greatly increased its share of seats in the legislature, female Republicans have not experienced substantial gains.

**Figure 5.4 – Female Representation in the New York State Assembly, 2000 - 2019**



Legend:
- % Democratic Seats
- % Female in Democratic Caucus
- % Female in Republican Caucus
- % Female in State Assembly

In New York, female representation in total in the lower chamber was mostly stagnant from 2000 through 2014, and then ticked upward due to increasing female representation within the Democratic Party (Figure 5.4, green line).  Starting in 2015, female representation within the Democratic caucus began steadily increasing from about 30% to nearly 45% in 2019 (blue line).  The partisan composition of the Assembly has stayed fairly constant over the past 20 years – around 70% Democratic (purple line).  During this time, the Republican Party has actually experienced a decline in female representation.  About 20% of Republican seats were held by women in 2000, while women make up only 10% of the Republican caucus in 2019 (red line).

**Interviewee Recruitment and County Characteristics**

*Georgia – Democratic Party*

Figure 5.5 – County Characteristics for Georgia Democratic Chair Interviews

| County Code/Alias | Region of State | Population | Urban/Rural/Mix |
|---|---|---|---|
| GA_Dem_1 | southeast | small | urban |
| GA_Dem_2 | central | large | urban |
| GA_Dem_3 | northwest | large | urban |
| GA_Dem_4 | north | large | urban |
| GA_Dem_5 | west central | large | urban |

Georgia has 159 counties, of which 98 have organized Democratic committees.  I contacted 89 of the chairs using public information from the state party website; four did not have email addresses listed and five were undeliverable.  Four chairs responded but declined to be interviewed because their committees were very weak and they did not field candidates because of the dominance of the Republican Party in their counties.  They were focusing on establishing the party organization and thus could not speak to issues of candidate emergence.  Ultimately, I interviewed five county Democratic party leaders in Georgia.  Unfortunately,

despite multiple attempts, I was not able to interview leaders from the major metropolitan areas in Georgia, where the Democratic party is most competitive.

Figure 5.5 shows the characteristics of the counties of the chairs I did interview.  The population column indicates whether the county has a population over 80,000 (large) or under 80,000 (small).  I chose that threshold because that is how the Republican Party of Georgia designates the counties.  It is an arbitrary cut-off but gives a sense of the size of the county.  The urban/rural/mix column is derived from 2010 census data.  If the county was over 60% urban, then the county is classified as urban, if the county was less than 40% urban, it is classified as rural, and between 40% and 60% is classified as a mix.  Across the five counties, the average population was 149,000 and the average portion of the population living in an urban area was 83%.  Thus, the chairs I interviewed were from large, but not huge, counties throughout the state where most of the population live in urbanized areas.

Three of the five counties were described as Republican strongholds, while the Democratic Party is somewhat more competitive in the other two (GA_Dem_2 and GA_Dem_5). In terms of party organizational strength, the chairs described them as fairly weak and rebuilding in all of the counties expect for GA_Dem_2, where the committee was a bit more stable and established.  Based on state party rules, county parties do not endorse candidates in primary elections, though this is not much of an issue for the chairs I spoke with because they struggle to field Democratic candidates at all, let alone have multiple Democratic candidates vying for a particular seat.

*Georgia – Republican Party*

Figure 5.6 – County Characteristics for Georgia Republican Chair Interviews

| County Code/Alias | Region of State | Population | Urban/Rural/Mix |
|---|---|---|---|
| GA_Rep_1 | east | small | mix |
| GA_Rep_2 | east central | small | rural |
| GA_Rep_3 | south | small | rural |
| GA_Rep_4 | north | small | urban |
| GA_Rep_5 | south | small | mix |
| GA_Rep_6 | north | large | urban |
| GA_Rep_7 | central | small | rural |

To solicit interviews with Republican county party leaders in Georgia, I contacted the chairs of 92 of the 129 organized committees with available contact information[27]. Ultimately, I interviewed seven Republican chairs, and the characteristics of their counties varied a bit more compared to my Democratic interviews in GA, as seen in Figure 5.6. Six of the seven counties have populations under 80,000, ranging from about 11,000 to 70,000, and the other county was the largest of the GA interviews with a population of nearly 700,000. In terms of urbanization, three were rural, two urban, and two urban-rural mixes. According to the chairs, three of the counties are fairly competitive with respect to partisanship – GA_Rep_3, GA_Rep_5, and GA_Rep_6 – while the other four were described as more Republican-leaning or Republican stronghold counties.

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[27] There was no contact information listed for 7 of the 136 organized Republican county parties. I did not contact 37 Republican chairs. Soliciting and scheduling interviews was an iterative process. Once I had a number of interviews scheduled that was comparable to my Democratic interviews, I decided to move on to recruiting for my New York interviews. The 37 chairs to whom I did not reach out were non-incumbents – so they would presumably have limited historical knowledge of candidate emergence dynamics – and were from small counties (under 80,000 populations). I already had several small-county interviews scheduled. For future research, if I conduct more interviews across Georgia, I may contact these chairs and, perhaps more importantly, focus on recruiting chairs of both parties in major metropolitan areas.

*New York – Democratic Party*

Figure 5.7 – County Characteristics for New York Democratic Chair Interviews

| County Code/Alias | Region of State | Population | Urban/Rural/Mix |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NY_Dem_1 | west | large | mix |
| NY_Dem_2 | central | small | mix |
| NY_Dem_3 | east central | large | urban |
| NY_Dem_4 | east | small | rural |
| NY_Dem_5 | central | large | mix |
| NY_Dem_6 | east central | small | mix |
| NY_Dem_7 | north | small | rural |
| NY_Dem_8 | southeast | large | urban |
| NY_Dem_9 | east | small | rural |
| NY_Dem_10 | west | small | mix |
| NY_Dem_11 | west | small | mix |

*New York – Republican Party*

Figure 5.8 – County Characteristics for New York Republican Chair Interviews

| County Code/Alias | Region of State | Population | Urban/Rural/Mix |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NY_Rep_1 | southeast | large | mix |
| NY_Rep_2 | central | large | rural |
| NY_Rep_3 | east central | large | urban |
| NY_Rep_4 | north | large | rural |
| NY_Rep_5 | central | large | mix |
| NY_Rep_6 | east central | small | mix |
| NY_Rep_7 | north | small | rural |

New York has 62 counties and I emailed the Democratic and Republican party chairs for all of them. Ultimately, I interviewed 11 Democratic and seven Republican chairs. As seen in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, the counties represented in the interviews exhibit variation across the three dimensions of region, population, and urbanization for both parties.

**Three Categories of Major Findings**

In this section I present the interview findings according to major themes, and I organized these themes into three overarching categories. The first category is "Gendered Civil Society

Contexts," which investigates the existence and relevance of the main concept developed in this dissertation and explores how GCSCs vary by party and by state. The second category is "Candidate Recruitment by Party Leaders," which identifies some main trends in recruitment and how recruitment is related to the gendered civil society context and party strength. "Assessment of Causal Mechanisms" is the third category in which I examine the two main mechanisms proposed in the theory regarding the interaction between party organizations and GCSC.

## 1. Gendered Civil Society Contexts

### *Civil Society Engagement Crucial for Potential Candidates across Parties and States*

The interviews allowed me to assess how relevant the concept of GCSC is in the real political world. In general, the interview data confirm that civil society contexts matter, they are likely gendered, and they vary across parties and geographies. Virtually all interviewees stressed the importance of prior community engagement for potential political candidates. To garner this information, I asked interviewees what qualities or characteristics would make for a high quality candidate for their party in their county. There are several common characteristics mentioned, but among the most important was significant engagement in the community as evidenced by participation in local groups, volunteerism, or local leadership positions (e.g. on board of local hospital or museum).

This level of engagement signaled a few things to party leaders that indicated a potentially successful candidate. First, name recognition is important. Voters will know the names of prominent community members, which is a major advantage in the ballot box. Second, being publicly engaged indicates a dedication to improving the community and a willingness to serve. It also may indicate knowledge of relevant issues, which many chairs

mentioned as important. Additionally, being well-known increases the network of potential

donors that a candidate can tap into, and several chairs stressed the ability to fundraise as critical

for success. The concept of GCSC is meant to capture the very networks of civic, social, and

professional groups mentioned by the interviewees. Thus, the qualitative data bolstered my

confidence in the existence and relevance of the GCSC to candidate emergence. The chair of

GA_Dem_2 summed up the importance of community engagement.

> When you talk about trying to win a local political seat […] the first thing [the average
> voter is] looking for is name recognition. And so, if you live in a community and you're
> not actively involved in your community, you know, in different organizations, how [are]
> people in your community going to know who you are? [28] (GA_Dem_2, 11/12/2019)

A Democratic chair of a small rural county in NY (NY_Dem_4), NY_Dem_6, and a

Republican chair of a larger NY county (NY_Rep_1) said very similar things regarding how

they would identify high quality candidates:

> So I consciously look at […] community organizations, groups, clubs, PTAs, firehouses,
> Elks club, Rotary, all of those organizations. All of the community-based organizations
> have leaders that could potentially run for office. And so how we recruit is we use our
> connections. […] So it's identifying the characteristics of a leader and then going and
> finding those people outside of elective service, outside of government, and then asking
> them the question: have you ever thought about running for office before? (NY_Dem_4,
> 2/3/2020)

> Someone that is involved civically, whether it's in the fire department or the American
> Legion for veterans or little league or school activities. There are some folks that
> naturally gravitate to being involved in their community, […] you know, through the
> Lions Club, the Elks Lodge, […] a women's club. […] We've got folks that are in our
> communities that are actively involved like that, and we naturally aspire to get them
> involved if we could. (NY_Rep_1, 2/6/2020)

> I think that somebody that's already committed to the community through their
> involvement in not-for-profit agencies or the PTA or little league or something like that,
> somebody that already shows a predilection towards service, that would be willing to
> serve in a broader way is what I would look for. And I think the people that we've
> elected are all people that are like that. They want to give back, they want to serve.
> (NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020)

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[28] Interview quotes are minimally edited to ensure anonymity, to remove filler words, repetition, and/or for clarity.

The chair of a much larger downstate suburban county committee (NY_Dem_8) described a similar approach to finding good candidates. When asked for some more specific examples of groups, he mentioned Indivisible, library boards, school boards, and unions.

> So we're constantly at our executive meetings, reminding people, 'You know, we've got an election coming up a year from now. Let's start looking at the PTA groups, the school boards, the community groups, the civic associations and the like. See who you've got that you might want to bring to our attention'. (NY_Dem_8, 2/6/2020)

The Democratic chairs in Georgia mentioned women's groups, alumni chapters of African American fraternities and sororities, and churches in addition to being involved in education and social justice activism. Unions are not powerful political players within the Democratic party in the counties that I investigated. Generally, unions are weak in Georgia given its "right to work" laws, although local unions may be more of a factor in the major metropolitan counties, the chairs of which I did not interview. The chair of GA_Dem_3 described the civic activity of a recent successful candidate for a local seat:

> He is very, very involved in the largest Black church in town. And very involved in the community. He's also served on [*inaudible*] committees, […] NAACP and Martin Luther King commission. So there's definitely an element of social activism or social engagement, like being on local boards or committees is definitely an asset in this community. (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019)

The GA_Dem_5 chair similarly explained what it takes to be a good Democratic candidate in her county and the activity of a current candidate for local office:

> We have a pretty strong group of activists groups here that try to address issues like voting rights of felons or educational support to provide for a successful school system. And there is a Southern anti-racist network group here […] There's actually one candidate who is running this year and, and she's an example of this. She goes to different church activities where they might be having a mentor program for middle schoolers or she might go to a conference on what can we do to mentor young men in the high schools. […] We have some groups that try to bring prison reform to the forefront. […] There's a lot of opportunities to be engaged. A lot of them come through churches, at

least on the Democratic side of the house. So they -- these churches and/or sororities and fraternities -- will put on a lot of different programs. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020)

She emphasized that given their non-profit status, these churches, sororities, and fraternities are very cognizant of the limits on the political behavior in which they can engage. However, these groups are important sources of civic engagement and networking in the South that lead to party officials identifying leaders who they may try to recruit as potential candidates. She explained that the groups did not approach the party committee to suggest candidates in her experience, but she emphasized the importance of these organizations and alluded to the possibility of identifying leaders and potential candidates.

> I think that those are very important political entities in the South[…] What I found was that churches and sororities, fraternities were very organized as far as their politics, doing things like, helping to register voters, helping to get voters to the polls, helping to conduct voter education, making sure people knew where their precincts were or if there were any changes to those precincts or anything like that. That was the real organization in the rural South. […] What I'm seeing is it that, especially in the Black community, these sororities and fraternities are lifelong sources of volunteering and community and […] they are very, very important. So these are sororities and fraternities that these people were in while they were in college. And then after they get out, they still have chapters in which they do lots and lots of volunteering and fundraising for these areas that they want to support, […] but they're supposed to be politically neutral […] So they're very aware -- the church is too -- of what the line is that they can't cross. And so they're careful about that. But nonetheless, they tended to be, in my experience, very organized and most of them were definitely more Democrat than Republican. […] Because it's organized, you start to see who the people are that are more active, more passionate. And so I think that that's an important relationship in politics in the rural South. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020)

The chair of GA_Dem_1 was even more direct about trying to recruit candidates from local chapters of African American sororities and fraternities:

> I speak at events and […] we have some sororities and fraternities in the area -- for African Americans, big sororities and fraternities -- and I go speak at some of those meetings and try to encourage people since there's a lot of leaders already there to run for office. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019)

There were clear differences between the types of community involvement mentioned by Republican chairs compared to those mentioned by Democratic chairs in Georgia. A few Republican chairs mentioned the Chamber of Commerce, local business associations, or hunting clubs as types of groups from which candidates might emerge, but generally the GOP party leaders did not emphasize groups as part of the party networks in any formal capacity. Instead, community engagement was noted as an important factor for candidate success, but through personal networks or being well known either through professional activities, churches, service clubs (i.e. Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions) or by being from a prominent local family with long-term roots in the county. Most chairs did not emphasize certain professional experiences that would be advantageous to Republican candidates, but when professions were mentioned they included law enforcement, finance, defense, law, real estate, and local business ownership – professions that are not female-dominated.

The chair of GA_Rep_1 opined about a few potential candidates, who are male, and why they would be good:

> You have to think in terms of sound principles to promote free markets. […] Now the one guy I'm thinking about […] I think he would be good [because] he has a real grasp of money and finance. […] He would understand state budgeting and be sober about state budgeting, state spending. […] Now another guy I was thinking about […] he is a lawyer, has a sense, does a lot of defense work. […] the point is, he's got legal knowledge. (GA_Rep_1, 1/13/2020)

When asked about characteristics of successful candidates in her county, GA_Rep_2 said the following:

> Roots in the community, family going back […] three or four generations, positions in the community, professions and occupations […] in a particular area -- like the young man that is now our economic development head for the County and working with the Chamber is third generation. He worked in the juvenile justice system in the County for a while [...] So he has a vested interest in improving his community. (GA_Rep_2, 1/17/2020)

Emphasizing the small town feel of her county, GA_Rep_4 similarly said "long term

roots in the County count for a lot" when asked about factors that would make for a successful

candidate. GA_Rep_3 also stressed the importance of long-term roots in the community and

discounted the role of the county party organization when describing candidates who come

forward to run for office:

> So far in my experience they have not necessarily been involved in the local party. […] What they tend to be are members of local, well-established families that have been here for many generations. And they may have had a [relative] who was in politics in the past. And it's almost as if, one day they wake up and go, 'Well, it's my turn. I'm going to step up.' And they kind of do it out of […] wanting to make the County better, and also, with the knowledge that they have some name equity that they can build on. (GA_Rep_3, 1/17/2020)

GA_Rep_7 explained some types of community involvement that would make for a

good GOP candidate in her small, rural county.

> We would like for somebody to have a religious affiliation because in a community like this, that is very important. That's how people get to know people, is through their church activities. And then their civic activity, whether it's they're a member of the Chamber or whether they're a member of Rotary, Kiwanis, Lyons, you know, just to know that they have had a civic outreach. (GA_Rep_7, 2/4/2020)

When asked about certain professional backgrounds, she mentioned some examples, but

emphasized that one's profession was not a major factor in assessing a potential candidate.

> No, we don't look at that as much. […] we've had dairy farmers, we've had businesspeople like in insurance, and we have military background people. […] We don't look for a certain profession. No. (GA_Rep_7, 2/4/2020)

### *Variation by Party in Types of Civil Society Engagement and in Gendered Ways*

While active community engagement was mentioned as important by most interviewees,

the types of engagement varied across parties and in gendered ways, adding credence to the

"gendered" in gendered civil society context. As many of the previous quotes indicate,

Democratic chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds of potential candidates that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, women's rights) compared to those mentioned by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, business owners). This section further demonstrates the gendered differences in party networks, which are especially evident in GA.

Democratic party committees in Georgia have experienced some revival since the 2016 election and Stacey Abrams' 2018 gubernatorial campaign, even in the Republican stronghold counties. Civil society activity and support from the state party organization are major factors that emerged as contributing to this revitalization. Both these factors suggest a supportive infrastructure for female candidate emergence in the Democratic party across Georgia in the form of grassroots women's activism on the local level and established female candidate recruitment groups on the state level.

Several of the chairs mentioned that local women's groups formed after the 2016 presidential election, inspired by the Women's Marches of 2017 and including individuals who had not necessarily been politically active before. This is consistent with recent research about the nature of the resistance to the Trump administration since 2016 and the increased civic activism of women (Gose and Skocpol 2019; Putnam and Skocpol 2018). GA_Dem_4 discussed the idea that the Republican Party has a "suburban mom problem" and discussed the group that formed in her county and how it has led to at least two current candidacies.

> There's at least 500 people in that group. And it was just started from three women who decided to get together and they were all like-minded. And now one of the cofounders is the person who's running for our state house or state Senate. So she's running for office and another one of the [members] is the other person who's running for our house seat. So these women are not only organizing, they took it upon themselves to do that, but now they're stepping up and running for office. (GA_Dem_4, 11/14/2019)

Similarly, GA_Dem_1 mentioned the activity of both new and long-standing women's groups as influential in reviving the county party committee. Previously the committee had not been active and very few Democratic candidates even ran for office. Now the committee is trying to capitalize on the resistance groups and formalize candidate recruitment.

> There were some women's organizations that formed over the last five or so years, especially after Trump was elected, that wanted to reach out and really target women to run […] it was called "Her Term." […] they're out of Atlanta. […] their thing is to get women to run and to support them when they run. There's also "Georgia Win List." […] They've been around more than 20 years and their sole purpose is to get pro-choice women elected. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019)

Her Term and Georgia Win List are state-wide organizations, which are addressed next, but local women's activity is also a factor in GA_Dem_1. The chairperson discussed a local group that formed from women meeting at the local satellite Women's March in 2017:

> We had a local women's group that formed after Trump got elected and […] it's all local women. We, within the span of a year, we had over 400 members. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019)

These quotes were about more recent activity, but the state-wide infrastructure for recruiting female candidates in Georgia has been robust and well-developed over the long-term. In addition to Her Term and Georgia Win List, several chairs mentioned the Georgia Federation of Democratic Women, which is focused on electing Democratic women throughout the state. It has been around for over 20 years with local chapters in some counties. However, they are more active in places where the Democratic party is more competitive. For example, when asked about the group's involvement in her county, GA_Dem_3 said:

> No, nothing. […] So those groups exist but they have not in my experience here been interested in our County or Northwest Georgia generally. […] it has not been a political priority. (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019)

In contrast, GA_Dem_2 has a more established Democratic party and does have a local chapter of the group, which has been active in recruiting candidates especially within the last few years as the county became more competitive for Democrats. Yet, the feeling of the chair is that the group is most active right around election time, and not necessarily a constant presence within the county committee.

I also asked about women's groups in the Republican sphere. Several chairs mentioned the Georgia Federation of Republican Women. Some of the counties had local chapters of this group, but the nature of the group is not necessarily similar to the women's groups on the Democratic side. The GA Federation of Republican Women was described as promoting Republican candidates generally as well as other GOP causes, rather than focusing on getting female Republicans into elective office. GA_Rep_2 summed up the nature of the group's work, and this was consistent with other chairs' descriptions:

> [the nature of their work is] mainly supporting the election […] of Republican candidates. […] I have not seen – [but] I'm not a party to everything -- any active recruitment of Republican women. Encouraged? Yes. […] They are definitely supported. Actively recruited? Not in this part of the world. (GA_Rep_2, 1/17/2020)

In the interviews with New York county chairs, women's groups came up sporadically, but there was no obvious, longstanding network of female candidate recruitment groups on the Democratic side like in Georgia. GOP chairs in NY also did not emphasize the role of women's groups in a significant way.

Aside from women's groups, the chairs of GA_Dem_1 and GA_Dem_5 mentioned some additional differences between the civil society contexts of each party. GA_Dem_1 said,

> our Chamber of Commerce definitely leans Republican. pretty much every social organization in this area is really flooded with lots of Republicans. The only ones that aren't are […] the ones that work with issues that deal with poverty […] All the big, like Rotary Club -- all of that kind of stuff -- Republicans all get the advantage because they

> can get invited to speak […] where we never get invited to speak. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019)

In terms of professional backgrounds that may be helpful, GA_Dem_5 said this:

> Well, we have a couple of big businesses in town. *[names insurance and financial services businesses].* And so they employ a lot of people […] but it tends to be more of the Republicans that come from that kind of a background. And the Democrats sometimes come from backgrounds of nonprofits. […]
> another source of candidates that tend to be successful here -- now that I'm thinking about it, a couple of the Democratic candidates […] share this in common -- and that is military experience. It's hugely beneficial to have had some military experience to the voters in the South, specifically Republicans, but also Democrats. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020)

Networking with civil society organizations was important for the party chair in the large county, GA_Rep_6. He provided many insights into the civil society context of both parties in Georgia from his perspective. The following quotes identify several types of civic engagement that are relevant to Republican candidates, and also address perceived differences between the two major parties with respect to the nature of group networks within them. He mentions that other civic groups may push candidates to run for office without necessarily engaging with the county party organization beforehand, which is a mechanism suggested in my theory of candidate emergence.

> It's just all about networking. It's getting out. It's meeting people. […] I do my best to try to keep primaries from happening. But there's always those people who've never been involved in the party, don't even know that the party exists, really, but they want to run for office. They've always voted Republican. So they go down and they qualify for that office. And they've talked to maybe their homeowners association, or they've talked to their fellow members of the Kiwanis or Rotary club, or they've been involved in [local] business associations. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

I asked if there are any formal connections between these groups he mentioned and the

GOP party organization and he said not really, but these groups may be involved in recruiting

candidates independently.

> There may be a little bit of crossover, […] but in terms of anything formal, or even kind
> of a loose association, there isn't one. […] And that's part of the challenges you have in
> candidate recruitment […] -- the party's not necessarily the only one doing it.
> (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

I asked if dynamics were similar on the Democratic side from his perspective and he

mentioned that the Democratic Party seems to have more formalized connections to allied

groups.

> Democrats more so than Republicans have a lot more issue groups that are friendly with
> the party but not part of the party. We only have a handful of advocacy groups.  But
> everything from Indivisible to Act Blue to […] MoveOn.org and all that -- we see a lot
> of Democrat candidates […] coming out of those allied organizations. It's rare that you
> see a Democratic candidate say, 'Oh, I was a member of the Kiwanis and the [local]
> business association, so I think it's time to run for office'. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

NY_Rep_5 had a similar impression:

> If somebody rises up out of a community group, that usually I think happens more on the
> Democratic side than the Republican side. […] I think more people who are in social
> organizations maybe lean Democrat.  Not Rotary or something like that, but more
> activist organizations lean Democrat than Republican it seems. (NY_Rep_5, 2/13/2020)

When asked about groups that would be more likely to be in the Republican committee's

network, NY_Rep_1 said:

> Sportsmen's clubs are definitely more [Republican] leaning because of the second
> amendment positions they have. […] you know, fire department members and
> ambulance corps members -- there's a [partisan] blend with them, but generally more
> towards Republican. I think people that are actively involved in […] school activities
> may be more leaning left. they want more things in school for their kids, so they want
> higher taxes, […] same thing with youth recreation. […] I think there's definitely, if you
> look at various civic groups, you may find the political leanings of folks that are
> involved will be different for different groups. (NY_Rep_1, 2/6/2020)

NY_Rep_7 had a similar take. In addition to law enforcement backgrounds, he

mentioned the following groups as more likely to be in the Republican orbit:

> There's a county Fish & Game League and then each one of the towns, for the most part, it has its own Fish & Game that are quite well-represented on my committee. […] I have committeemen who are part of the Lion's club, VFWs. You'd see, oftentimes people coming out of the military, wanting to become involved. […] So, I see a lot of retired military, that kind of thing. (NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020)

### *Variation by State in Importance of Unions for Democratic Party Organizations*

Despite declining membership and the rise of right to work laws over the years, unions

remain important stakeholders in American politics, especially within the Democratic Party as

seen in Chapter 3. Their membership can be quite gendered depending on the industry. For

example, given occupational segregation by sex, teacher and nursing unions are more female-

dominated, while trade and police unions are typically male-dominated. Unions in retail and

service industries and some public sectors unions may be more balanced. During the

interviews, I asked about the roles that various unions play in party networks. As expected,

unions are not much of a factor on the Republican side, but there were some interesting findings

on the Democratic side.

Unions of all types were not major political players in the Georgia counties for which I

conducted interviews[29]. In contrast, in New York, some Democratic party leaders emphasized

the importance of unions in their party networks. This is not surprising since, according to the

Bureau of Labor Statistics, New York has among the highest union membership rates in the

country (21%), while Georgia has among the lowest (4.1%).

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[29] There may be some influential local unions in the major metropolitan areas that I did not capture.

Within NY, there was variation in terms of whether unions were relevant and in how different types of unions interact with party organizations. Chairs of the larger NY counties[30], which are also urban or urban/rural mix counties, emphasized the importance of unions in their networks. Unions were typically less relevant in the smaller, more rural counties.

Interestingly, NY Democratic chairs described a clear contrast between teachers unions and trade unions (e.g. electricians, construction) regarding how these groups are integrated into the party organizations. Teachers unions were seen as mainly lobbying groups, who would advocate for favored policies regardless of which party holds a given seat. Thus, party chairs indicated that teachers unions are not deeply integrated into Democratic Party organizations. For example, interviewees mentioned that teachers unions may endorse Republican candidates in Republican stronghold areas. Perceptions of trade unions were much different, as these are seen to be more embedded within the Democratic Party. For example, where trade unions are more relevant, union representatives may sit on candidate interview committees and party chairs make sure that union leaders approve of particular candidates before giving endorsements. Chairs could recall instances when trade union leaders suggested potential candidates to party leadership, but they said that this typically would not happen with teachers unions. With respect to female representation, this suggests that the strength of female-dominated teachers unions may have a weaker positive effect on female candidate emergence compared to the negative effect of male-dominated union strength. This would line up with the quantitative results, which showed a more dramatic negative relationship between male-dominated GCSCs and female candidacies.

The chair of NY_Dem_1 cited union support as the first factor necessary for a successful Democratic candidate:

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[30] NY_Dem_1, NY_Dem_3, NY_Dem_5, and NY_Dem_8

Well, the first factor is that the labor unions are going to be willing to support the candidate. And anytime we have a candidate that has success, it's because labor money helped to fuel the campaign. You know, there aren't a lot of big givers in rural areas, and so if labor's willing to get in and help well then it's going to be enough money to run a successful campaign. (NY_Dem_1, 1/31/2020)

He was specifically referring to unions for electrical workers (IBEW), steel workers, operating engineers, as well as civil service unions (CSEA). In contrast, the NY State United Teachers (NYSUT) union has been less closely aligned with the Democratic party organization in NY_Dem_1, and I heard the same from a few other Democratic chairs in NY. They felt that NYSUT focuses more on lobbying and would typically back whoever would be most likely to win, regardless of party, as long as they could convince him/her to support NYSUT's favored policies. This was a common dynamic described by the Democratic chairs of counties in NY where unions were relevant. Male-dominated trade unions were more embedded within the party's organization. For example, union representatives may sit on the party's candidate interview or vetting committees. On the other hand, the teachers unions tended to stay more at arms length and focused on lobbying and supporting candidates with the highest chance of winning, whether Democrat or Republican. For example, NY_Dem_1 went on to say:

NYSUT only wants to get involved in races that are winnable, very winnable, very competitive races. […] or they want to get behind the Republican if they feel like, 'Hey, there's no chance of the Democrats winning'. (NY_Dem_1, 1/31/2020)

Similarly, regarding teachers unions, NY_Dem_11 said:

Around here they are more than likely to endorse a Republican just because they think the Republican's gonna win. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020)

The chair of NY_Dem_3 described dynamics between the party committee and local unions. He emphasized that he works more closely with the trade unions (e.g. carpenters,

Teamsters).  He does have relationships with teachers, nurses, and public sector unions as well,

just not as close.

> I usually have people from the unions on my interviews committee. […] So when we interview candidates, I make sure I have a representative from the Teamsters or the carpenters or the local unions within our party to be part of our process. […] so when we select candidates, I can say to the unions, 'Look, I had two members of the union on the interview committee. They agreed with it'. So, that's something that I've been able to do locally. I do go to the union breakfast. I do go to some of their meetings, so we have a good relationship with them. (NY_Dem_3, 2/1/2020)

### *Professional Backgrounds – Nuanced Relevance*

When asked if certain professional backgrounds would be more or less indicative of a

high-quality candidate, most party leaders in both states and parties said that this is not a major

factor they would consider.  Aside from certain offices requiring specific professional expertise

or credentials (e.g. district attorney, coroner) chairs felt that professional background was not

crucial in evaluating or recruiting potential candidates.  This is somewhat surprising given the

evidence presented thus far supporting the idea of gendered civil society contexts, of which

groups tied to professions and industries are important components.  Moreover, much of the

female candidate emergence literature focuses on "pipeline careers" – those careers that are

most common among members of Congress or state legislators including law, business,

education, and political activism (Lawless and Fox 2010, 30).  Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013)

show that focusing on those traditional pipeline careers may be too narrow because pipeline

careers are not necessarily the same for male and female legislators, which makes sense given

the level of occupational segregation by sex in the labor market shown in Chapter 3.  Given this

prior research, how does one reconcile the potential importance of pipeline careers to candidate

emergence with the perspectives of interviewees claiming that professional background was not important in and of itself in assessing candidate quality?

It seems that professional background is important in several indirect ways, based on other issues mentioned by interviewees along with the evidence for gendered civil society contexts presented in this project. In terms of GCSC, professional background may be important for candidate emergence insofar as one's career leads to certain patterns of group membership and community or political activities. One's career is also likely correlated with different resources necessary for running for office. Indeed, one's resources of time, money, and civic skills (i.e. communication and organizational capacities) are related to various modes of political activity (Brady et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001).

Several interviewees emphasized the importance of a prospective candidate's resources in evaluating his/her potential for success – two of the crucial resources being money and time. One's profession is clearly linked to these resources, or lack thereof. Given the centrality of money in politics in the US, it was not surprising that several chairs mentioned the importance of money in campaigning when assessing candidates. Could the candidate put some of his/her own money into the campaign? Is s/he comfortable asking for donations, and does s/he have a network of people that could contribute? For example, NY_Dem_2 said the following.

> The casual observer thinks parties can kind of underwrite somebody's campaign. We can't. I don't know any Democratic organization, including the New York State Democratic Committee, that can fully underwrite somebody's campaign. So you've got to have the discussion with the person. How much are you going to put in yourself? Because if you're not going to invest in yourself, don't expect anybody else to invest in you. And how much are you shamelessly willing to dial for dollars? Because you're going to have to do that. You've got to raise that money, the bulk of it you've got to raise it on your own. […] That's going to make you an attractive candidate to somebody. It's sad, but it's a reality. (NY_Dem_2, 1/31/2020)

Certain professions are associated with more wealth and time flexibility than others. For instance, lawyers may have the opportunity to build up substantial personal wealth and may have the ability to take on fewer clients during a campaign than workers in other occupations. In addition, workers in some careers may be more inclined to engage in related volunteerism, activism, or associations that would get them out in the community and increase their name recognition and donor networks. Another Democratic chair in NY discussed the ways that profession is tied to level of resources, and how this affects candidate emergence.

> I don't think you can […] categorize them and say, you know, this is the profession that's always gonna get elected. Everyone says that we elect too many attorneys, […] but attorneys arguably have more cash on hand and have more personal financial security to be able to dedicate their time to campaign. So it's a matter of financial stability that dictates a lot of whether or not an individual runs for office, because it takes a lot of money to run […] a campaign. So you typically don't see single moms who make $25,000 a year; [they] aren't chomping at the bit to run for office, for a state assembly job that's $130,000 a year because they simply cannot. They're barely making by right now and they can't take off from their two jobs in order to go campaign. It's not feasible, so they're not going to run. (NY_Dem_4, 2/3/2020)

In addition to resource differences, career paths may also be associated with partisan preferences. As Andersen (1999) terms it, careers that are "close to government" such as those in healthcare, education, and social services, which are female-dominated, may also be more closely aligned with Democratic policies that support a more expansive welfare state[31]. Andersen (1999) found some evidence of this relationship between career and partisan preferences. Thus, profession-to-politics pipelines seem to have important implications for candidate emergence with respect to resources, networks, partisanship, and gender, even if party

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[31] Of course, there is variation in preferences within fields. For example, in the healthcare industry, physicians associations like the American Medical Association have often worked to resist a more expansive role for government in healthcare (Hacker 2002) and currently advocates incremental reform (https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/patient-support-advocacy/ama-vision-health-care-reform). In contrast, the largest nurses union in the US – National Nurses United – currently advocates for Medicare For All (https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/medicare-for-all).

leaders are not consciously considering professional backgrounds when seeking out and assessing candidates.

## 2. Candidate Recruitment by Party Leaders

*Overwhelmingly Informal Recruitment and High Reliance on Self-starters*

Candidate recruitment by party leaders is an important factor in candidate emergence (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Lawless and Fox 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). Across most interviewees, candidate recruitment was described as a mainly informal process and most chairs relied heavily on individuals who come forward on their own to run for office (i.e. self-starters). Because of the political ambition gender gap explained previously, ad hoc candidate recruitment and reliance on self-starters are detrimental to female candidate emergence because women on average have a lower likelihood of running for office to begin with, compared to men.

In Georgia, some Democratic chairs are making efforts to institute more formal recruitment processes, but most of these efforts are very recent. Some examples include one chair developing a candidate recruitment guide, a few standing recruitment committees, and some semi-formal processes like going through voter rolls to identify potential candidates and maintaining spreadsheets with their names. For example, GA_Dem_3 said:

> There's been a constant effort to recruit people. So […] all through the year we have conversations with people and we make lists of who we think might run. We have a spreadsheet we created. […] We researched whether they voted Democrat or not. […] In Georgia, people don't actually register as Democrat. The only mechanism we have to identify if people are Democrats other than themselves identifying or coming to our party meetings is if they've pulled a Democratic primary ballot. (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019)

Some Democratic committees in New York also had some more formal processes such as interview and vetting committees for potential candidates. However, these procedures were mainly used to determine party endorsements or to vet candidates after they have come forward on their own rather than initiating the recruitment process. One NY Democratic chair explained his ideal recruitment approach versus what actually occurs.

> I know how to recruit candidates. I mean, you gotta look out into the community and find out who's involved in Rotary and Soroptimist and local nonprofits and boards and find people that are really popular in that regard. Find out whether they'd be willing to run. But nobody does that here. […] We haven't had even anything close to a sophisticated recruitment program. (NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020)

On the Republican side in both states, reliance on self-starters – those who voluntarily step forward -- seemed even more prominent, and when recruitment did occur it was largely based on personal connections of the chair or party committee members. All of the Republican chairs I spoke with in Georgia described candidate recruitment as either completely informal or something the committee does not do. In fact, two of the chairs even felt that actively recruiting candidates to run would violate the party rule requiring neutrality before nomination. When asked if the county committee actively recruits candidates, the chair of GA_Rep_2, who has been involved with the county party for a long time, simply said:

> No, [… we're] not inclined to do that sort of thing. We support those who volunteer. (GA_Rep_2, 1/17/2020)

Regarding active recruitment, GA_Rep_4 said:

> No we do not do active recruiting and that's partly because of the state party rule, we cannot endorse any candidate for office until they have been through the primary process, and then we are allowed to endorse whoever the Republican candidate it is. But as far as recruiting, no, we do not do that. (GA_Rep_4, 1/17/2020)

The chair of the largest county of my interviews, GA_Rep_6, explained that the county party there does engage in recruitment but described it as "very informal" and "a hodgepodge of tactics and strategies." This chair had an interesting perspective about the general low party strength of the Republican Party in Georgia and the South more generally, and how it may hinder efforts to formalize candidate recruitment and other party activities.

> I've heard from friends of mine up North there, it's much more formalized -- the whole party structure. It's more formalized, more organized. Party chairs have the ability to appoint individuals to actual government bodies. I can appoint someone to the Board of Elections, but that's it. I think in some states my position would be paid while in Georgia and most of the South a position like county chair is completely voluntary. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

The interviews revealed another factor that may hinder female candidate emergence on the Republican side. Several chairs in Georgia[32] emphasized that ideological conservativism and adherence to Republican principles were very important characteristics for a successful Republican candidate in their countries. This could possibly work against female candidate emergence in at least two ways. First, research shows that larger proportions of women identify as liberal or moderate compared to conservative, so the pool of conservative women is somewhat smaller (Norrander and Wilcox 2008; Thomsen 2015). However, there are plenty of very conservative women out there who could be viable Republican candidates. Second, the perception that women are more likely to be liberal or moderate may introduce bias into candidate evaluation and selection processes. GOP county chairs or committee members who see conservativism as a crucial factor for candidate success, may be less likely to promote female candidacies because they are less likely to see a woman as a strong conservative compared to male alternatives, whether consciously or unconsciously. For example, in talking

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[32] GA_Rep_1, GA_Rep_4, GA_Rep_5, GA_Rep_7

about the gender imbalance of the Republican committee in his county (he estimated about

70/30 male/female membership), NY_Rep_7 said,

> The reality is that there's probably more liberal females [here] than there are males. I mean, that's just the makeup. if you look at, you know, the media, your teachers, […] you get into the human services field and you know, it's 70%, sometimes 80% females, and oftentimes that they're more liberal-minded. That's just the reality of it. (NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020)

### *Variation in Importance of Party Involvement as Precursor for Candidates*

Generally, prior involvement with the local party committee was not an important

precursor for successful candidates according to the interviewees. Only a couple chairs

mentioned that being involved in the committee would be an asset and some others actually felt

that party involvement may be detrimental to candidates in their counties. NY chairs were more

likely to say that party involvement was important, but it was not really emphasized as a major

factor as compared to other forms of community involvement. For example, the chair of

NY_Dem_11 said,

> Constantly at County committee meetings we're saying, talk to people you know who seem civically minded. They don't have to be political. Some of the best candidates are people who are really active in community service type organizations rather than political ones. We're constantly trying to get folks to think in terms of candidate recruitment, but it's an uphill climb. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020)

The chair of GA_Rep_6 discussed some specific examples of candidates who won

elective office and emphasized the critical importance of community engagement, while

discounting the role of party engagement.

> What you're looking for in a candidate is you need someone who's well rounded. your successful candidates will not usually be the person who all they've done in terms of civic engagement is been a good party person. I've seen it happen over and over again -- where candidates have basically courted the party vote [and] had huge support within the party. […] Then when it comes time for the actual election and the 99% of Republican voters who are not engaged in the party vote, [these candidates] end up in third, fourth, fifth place. So having been involved in the party as a candidate is great, but if you want

to be successful, you probably need to be involved in a lot more. And in addition to those basic civic associations -- you know, the big clubs, Rotaries and Kiwanis -- there's also business associations -- the realtors have a business association; […] there's the county bar association for lawyers. I mean, pick your profession and there's probably a group of people meeting in the county, which is a great way to start a campaign. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

Prior party involvement was more likely to be cited as an important precursor for

candidacies in NY compared to Georgia.  For ex, NY_Rep_7 said the following.

Oftentimes, people are kind of groomed for these positions. You have to somewhat wait your turn. It can be disconcerting to a committee if somebody with no experience whatsoever, just steps forward and tosses their hat in the ring against somebody that's putting the time in and supported the committee and worked to get to a certain position. (NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020)

NY_Rep_6 also mentioned that many candidates emerge from the party committee.  A

few NY chairs echoed this idea of candidates "waiting their turn" and putting the time in while

working for the committee.  Given that NY has stronger party structures, this state variation is

not surprising.  On the other hand, NY_Rep_3 said the following, though he did emphasize a

contrast between local and state or higher-level positions:

I think, a lot of people would assume the first thing you're looking for is party loyalty. But honestly, that's probably not the first quality we are looking for. […] For local candidates, we're looking for people who are community-minded, who want to do this for the right reason. […] We look for people who really, genuinely want to work on behalf of the community. […] We're looking for people who are well known, who are obviously, smart, well-spoken -- traits that we think of as electable. And really I think political issues are probably the lowest on the list, on the local level. […] And so I'm more concerned about people understanding finance or understanding operations or understanding public safety or some aspect of what's important to run a community. I'm less worried about what the political values are.
[…] Now you're starting to get into a higher-level position where it is now more politically driven -- the Assembly, the Senate, congressional -- now these issues become a lot more based on ideology. So those factors do change. I mean electability is still very important. And all those things we talked about having connections to the communities and having a network.  But now when you get on the higher level, now you're looking at some more about what their political philosophy is. You're looking at their ability to raise money. (NY_Rep_3, 2/13/2020)

*Perception of Social Stigma Impeding Recruitment Efforts for Democratic Chairs*

Several chairs on the Democratic side mentioned issues of social stigma that may deter

the recruitment of high quality candidates in their counties.  These tended to be smaller rural

counties in both Georgia and New York.  The chairs felt that being openly affiliated with the

Democratic "brand" could have negative personal or professional repercussions, and thus

deterred potentially competitive candidates from running for office.  Several Georgia

Democratic chairs I spoke with mentioned social pressure and potential socioeconomic

repercussions for openly affiliating with the Democratic Party that hindered candidate

recruitment.  All the GA Democratic chairs, except for GA_Dem_2, mentioned this.  For

instance, the chair of GA_Dem_3 said:

> There's a segment of the population that thinks that this is a Republican area and that it's
> not okay to be a Democrat.  […] I've had people tell me 'I will never tell people I'm a
> Democrat because I will lose business.' (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019)

Similarly, the chair of GA_Dem_1, who had also run for office recently, said:

> Even though people have kind of come out of the closet more being a Democrat, I still
> have businesses that are Democrat-owned that will not support me visibly or financially
> because they're afraid they'll go out of business. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019)

This perception of social stigma affects the party's ability to recruit high quality

candidates.  For instance, of potential candidates, the chair of GA_Dem_4 said:

> They're not hesitant to run because they won't win. They're hesitant to run because of the
> repercussions in their personal lives and professional life […] for running as a Democrat.
> (GA_Dem_4, 11/14/2019)

She mentioned a fundraiser that the party held, which was ultimately unsuccessful due to the

inability to secure sponsors and she went on,

> Even key members of our party who owned businesses were afraid that if they were sponsors that it would somehow hurt their […] businesses because of that. (GA_Dem_4, 11/14/2019)

Even the chair of GA_Dem_5, where the Democratic party is somewhat more competitive mentioned the social stigma against affiliating with the Democratic Party in parts of the county, especially before the 2016 election:

> It was almost like you couldn't really be a public Democrat. You could, but it could affect your employment. It could affect how people looked at you. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020)

Issues of stigma were also mentioned by a few Democratic chairs in small rural counties in New York.  For example, NY_Dem_7 explained that the major employer in her county – a GOP stronghold -- is local government, and to obtain and maintain a county job there's an unspoken rule that one must be a registered Republican.  This pressure dissuades potentially qualified candidate from running as, or even openly supporting, Democratic candidates.  When asked if the pressure harms recruitment efforts the chair answered:

> Yeah, they're afraid. They're very much afraid because, um, if you have children in school or you have family members who work for one of the local governments, you can be harassed (NY_Dem_7, 2/5/2020)

> The chairs of two other small counties in NY (NY_Dem_9 and NY_Dem_11) said

something similar regarding pressure to be Republican if one wants to work for or do business with local government,

> The other thing that people have a tendency to do is if they want a job in the County, they make sure they're registered Republican. That is slowly changing, but not enough as far as I'm concerned. (NY_Dem_9, 2/6/2020)

> We have [very few] lawyers in the entire County who are registered Democrats. There's a definite message that they get when they come to [the] county that is, if they want to have any career they have to register as Republicans. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020)

Later the same chair said something similar and said that it "absolutely" hinders her ability to recruit candidates.

> something that you hear constantly is that people who work for the County government definitely feel under pressure to be registered Republicans. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020)

### 3. Assessment of Causal Mechanisms

The theory proposed in this dissertation suggests two main ways that gendered civil society contexts and party organizations interact to influence female candidate emergence. The first is the pull mechanism, by which party leaders reach out to allied groups in civil society to find and recruit candidates. The second is the push mechanism, by which civil society leaders identify preferred candidates and suggest them to local party leaders of the party with which the group is more closely aligned. There is another push mechanism, in which civil society leaders promote and recruit candidates, but not necessarily in conjunction with party leaders. By interviewing party leaders, I could not explore this second push mechanism in depth, though a few party leaders did mention that it happens.

### *Party Organizations Pull Candidates from GCSC*

The interviews did suggest that the pull mechanism is at work across states and parties, and many of the quotes already presented throughout this chapter provide evidence of this occurring. However, on the Republican side this mainly happens through informal personal networks rather than through formal integration between certain groups and party organizations. Informal personal connections were also important for candidate emergence on the Democratic side, but interview data suggest that there are more formal ties between allied groups and Democratic party organizations that can facilitate candidate emergence. The chair of NY_Dem_8 explained,

Generally if we're talking about other civic groups, civic association groups, we're generally seeking those people out rather than the reverse. It's often the case that people don't even think of running for office or don't think they can. So we've got to convince them, you know, that that's an option that might actually work. (NY_Dem_8, 2/6/2020)

### *Minimal Evidence that GCSC Groups Push Candidates Directly through Party Organizations*

To explore the push mechanism, I asked interviewees if civil society leaders would ever approach a party leader to suggest that an individual should run for office. Although I found more evidence of this on the Democratic side rather than the Republican side, this mechanism seemed infrequent compared to other modes of candidate emergence, such as recruitment by party leaders or the reliance on self-starters. On the Democratic side, in NY some Democratic chairs mentioned that trade unions would suggest candidates and in Georgia some women's groups would do so as well. When asked if teachers and nursing unions ever put forward candidates that they favor compared to trade unions, NY_Dem_3 said:

They [teachers and nursing unions] have not. No, not really. […] there's candidates they favor, but nobody that they've come up to me and said, 'Hey […], we've got a union representative who wants to run for office'. That's never happened. […] Yes. That does happen for the trades. (NY_Dem_3, 2/1/2020)

### Conclusion

The interview data presented in this chapter provide rich insights into the existence and nature of gendered civil society contexts and how local party organizations navigate them with respect to candidate emergence. Party leaders across states and parties emphasized the importance of civil society engagement when discussing both recruitment strategies and potential candidate assessments. There were also clear contrasts between states and parties when considering the GCSC in more detail.

The types of groups commonly mentioned by chairs of each party seemed to fit well with the differences observed in the quantitative results presented in Chapter 3. Democratic chairs identified key stakeholders in their networks including unions, women's groups, nonprofits, education, and social justice and other activist groups. Education, non-profit work, and women's rights and civil rights activism are occupations and civic backgrounds that tend to be more common among female state legislators (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013, 23, 55). In contrast, GOP chairs mentioned Chambers of Commerce, hunting clubs, churches, service clubs (e.g. Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions) along with backgrounds in law enforcement, military, or business. Many of these backgrounds are more common among male state legislators (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013, 23, 55).

Moreover, chairs of both parties expressed the idea that the Democratic Party has a more robust network of allied groups, compared to the Republican Party. This difference may help to explain why the quantitative models explained female candidate emergence on the Democratic side, but less so for the GOP. Republican chairs tended to rely more on personal connections for candidate recruitment, or on candidates coming forward on their own. With more institutional ties to allied groups and somewhat more formalized recruitment approaches, candidate emergence on the Democratic side may lend itself to more predictable patterns. Furthermore, the dependence on self-starters, who are more likely to be male due to the political ambition gender gap, likely accounts for some of the low female candidate emergence on the GOP side.

State-level variations were most obvious in the Democratic Party interviews. Unions were not important stakeholders in Georgia but played a prominent role in my discussions with several Democratic chairs in New York. In particular, male-dominated trade unions influenced

candidate selection processes in some NY counties, while female-dominated unions were important, but to a lesser extent. Moreover, Democratic chairs in Georgia described a strong, long-term network of "female representation policy demanders" (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018), that specifically work to increase female representation in the state. Georgia Win List, Her Term, and the Georgia Federation of Democratic Women have all been working for many years in the state to encourage women's political participation and female candidate emergence. These two factors – the prominence of male-dominated unions in NY and networks of female representation policy demanders in GA – may help to explain why the Democratic caucus in GA has outperformed that in NY in terms of female representation.

In relation to the concept of gendered civil society context, the interviews introduced some interesting ideas with respect to these women's representation advocacy groups. Groups like Her Term seem to serve as middlemen of sorts with respect to recruitment. It appears that they rely on local party and community leaders to identify potential female candidates, and then the "women's representation policy demanders" provide resources, training, funding, and support to help them be successful. Thus, while I have considered the idea of women's representation policy demanders to be somewhat of a competing theory to the GCSC, it seems that these may be complementary factors in explaining female candidate emergence. I think future research could tackle how exactly these groups decide where to put their resources, and how reliant they are on the gendered civil society contexts and/or local party leaders in identifying candidates for recruitment and support. Because it seems that the impact of these groups may be even greater where the Democratic Party is more competitive in GA, it would be interesting to discuss their impact with political leaders in the major metropolitan areas like Atlanta.

Interviews also shed on light on some issues regarding party strength and causal mechanisms suggested in my theory. Involvement with party organizations as a precursor for running for office was more important in New York, where parties are stronger, compared to Georgia. This would suggest that party organizations in NY may do more gatekeeping when it comes to candidate emergence. This could disadvantage women candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2006), though that is not clear cut as I have discussed elsewhere in previous chapters. In terms of causal mechanisms, interviewees did describe the "pull" mechanism, whereby party leaders network with civil society groups to identify candidates. I did not find much evidence of a "push" mechanism, whereby civil society leaders suggest and promote candidates to party leaders.

The data presented in this chapter support the idea that the gendered civil society context is a meaningful concept with respect to candidate emergence. Moreover, the interviews uncover the many ways that party organizations interact with the GCSC to impact the dynamics of candidate recruitment. The next chapter synthesizes the qualitative and quantitative findings and highlights the main conclusions drawn from this project.

## Chapter 5 – Appendix

## Figure 5.9 – List of Interviews

| County Code/Alias | State | Party | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| GA_Dem_1 | Georgia | Democratic | 11/12/2019 |
| GA_Dem_2 | Georgia | Democratic | 11/12/2019 |
| GA_Dem_3 | Georgia | Democratic | 11/14/2019 |
| GA_Dem_4 | Georgia | Democratic | 11/14/2019 |
| GA_Dem_5 | Georgia | Democratic | 1/13/2020 |
| GA_Rep_1 | Georgia | Republican | 1/13/2020 |
| GA_Rep_2 | Georgia | Republican | 1/17/2020 |
| GA_Rep_3 | Georgia | Republican | 1/17/2020 |
| GA_Rep_4 | Georgia | Republican | 1/17/2020 |
| GA_Rep_5 | Georgia | Republican | 1/21/2020 |
| GA_Rep_6 | Georgia | Republican | 1/24/2020 |
| GA_Rep_7 | Georgia | Republican | 2/4/2020 |
| NY_Dem_1 | New York | Democratic | 1/31/2020 |
| NY_Dem_2 | New York | Democratic | 1/31/2020 |
| NY_Dem_3 | New York | Democratic | 2/1/2020 |
| NY_Dem_4 | New York | Democratic | 2/3/2020 |
| NY_Dem_5 | New York | Democratic | 2/3/2020 |
| NY_Dem_6 | New York | Democratic | 2/3/2020 |
| NY_Dem_7 | New York | Democratic | 2/5/2020 |
| NY_Dem_8 | New York | Democratic | 2/6/2020 |
| NY_Dem_9 | New York | Democratic | 2/6/2020 |
| NY_Dem_10 | New York | Democratic | 2/7/2020 |
| NY_Dem_11 | New York | Democratic | 2/7/2020 |
| NY_Rep_1 | New York | Republican | 2/6/2020 |
| NY_Rep_2 | New York | Republican | 2/12/2020 |
| NY_Rep_3 | New York | Republican | 2/13/2020 |
| NY_Rep_4 | New York | Republican | 2/13/2020 |
| NY_Rep_5 | New York | Republican | 2/13/2020 |
| NY_Rep_6 | New York | Republican | 2/14/2020 |
| NY_Rep_7 | New York | Republican | 2/18/2020 |

**Figure 5.10 – Email Solicitation for Recruiting Interviewees**

Dear _____,

I hope this email finds you well.  My name is Colleen Burton, and I am a PhD candidate in Political Science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School in Syracuse, NY.  My dissertation research is about how local community groups and political party organizations influence who runs for political office.  As a county party chair, I am wondering if you would be willing to talk to me about the _____ County _____ Party Committee.  I am especially interested in the committee's processes related to candidate recruitment and its interactions with local stakeholder groups in the community.  The interview should take between 30 and 60 minutes, and we could talk over the phone.  Please let me know if you would be willing to participate and if you have any questions or concerns.  I am happy to provide any additional information that you may need in order to decide.  Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Best,
Colleen

Colleen Dougherty Burton
PhD Candidate, Political Science
Maxwell School
Syracuse University
cdburton@syr.edu

## Chapter 6

## Conclusion

> What you're looking for in a candidate is you need someone who's well rounded. […] So having been involved in the party as a candidate is great, but if you want to be successful, you probably need to be involved in a lot more. And in addition to those basic civic associations -- you know, the big clubs, Rotaries and Kiwanis -- there's also business associations -- the realtors have a business association; […] there's the county bar association for lawyers. I mean, pick your profession and there's probably a group of people meeting in the county, which is a great way to start a campaign. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)

> I know how to recruit candidates. I mean, you gotta look out into the community and find out who's involved in Rotary and Soroptimist and local nonprofits and boards and find people that are really popular in that regard. Find out whether they'd be willing to run. But nobody does that here. […] We haven't had even anything close to a sophisticated recruitment program. (NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020)

> I usually have people from the unions on my interviews committee. […] So when we interview candidates, I make sure I have a representative from the Teamsters or the carpenters or the local unions within our party to be part of our process. […] so when we select candidates, I can say to the unions, 'Look, I had two members of the union on the interview committee. They agreed with it'. (NY_Dem_3, 2/1/2020)

> The reality is that there's probably more liberal females [here] than there are males. I mean, that's just the makeup. if you look at, you know, the media, your teachers, […] you get into the human services field and you know, it's 70%, sometimes 80% females, and oftentimes that they're more liberal-minded. That's just the reality of it. (NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020)

These four selected quotes from Democratic and Republican county party leaders in Georgia and New York reflect many of the dynamics of candidate emergence that the theory of gendered civil society context and party strength developed and tested in this dissertation intends to capture. The concept of gendered civil society context refers to the many civil society groups from which candidates emerge, like the ones mentioned by the party chairs. Importantly, the GCSC aims to define the gendered nature of these groups and how it affects candidate pipelines and ultimately female candidate emergence. Moreover, the project explores interactions between

party organizations and gendered civil society contexts and helps to explain some of the observed cross-party and cross-state variations in female representation in the US. In this chapter, I highlight some of the major findings derived from the quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in previous chapters and discuss their broader implications. I also offer some suggestions about how the ideas explored in this project can contribute to future research on female representation and female candidate emergence.

In Chapter 1, I identify a few gaps in the existing female representation research to which I sought to contribute through this project. One weakness is the lack of attention to a broad array of civil society actors in influencing candidate emergence in general, and female candidate emergence in particular. While "female representation policy demanders" like EMILY's List have received much attention – and rightfully so – the gendered nature of other types of groups have not received much consideration. The concept of gendered civil society context is meant to account for the broad swath of groups from which candidates emerge, and to address how these groups may influence the gendered nature of candidate pipelines. As the party leader quotes emphasize, there are myriad groups from which candidates emerge, many of which are tied to industries or professions that are not gender-balanced, such as trades, law enforcement, education, or non-profits.

In addition to the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 5, the findings of Chapter 3 provide quantitative evidence to support the idea that the gendered civil society context varies by party and is directly related to female candidate emergence. Regression analysis indicates that within the Democratic Party, more politically active female-dominated industry groups (e.g. teachers unions) are associated with more female candidates, while more politically active male-dominated industry groups (e.g. trade unions) are associated with fewer Democratic women

running for office. As the quote from NY_Dem_3 (2/1/2020) illustrates, the close relationships between male-dominated trade unions and Democratic party organizations in some places may inadvertently hinder female candidate emergence. On the flip side, the lack of male-dominated unions coupled with the strong network of female representation policy demanders and other women's groups within the Georgia Democratic Party's gendered civil society context may have facilitated female candidate emergence in the state over the past decade, even before female representation became a more salient political issue.

The role of party organizations and party strength in female candidate emergence was another area of the literature to which this project sought to contribute. While the quantitative tests for the party strength hypotheses, presented in Chapter 4, resulted in null findings, the qualitative data provide useful insights. As the party leaders mention above, relationships between party organizations and civil society groups are important for candidate recruitment and emergence. However, recruitment processes vary widely across local party committees. Most interviewees emphasized informal recruitment through personal networks or relied more on candidates coming forward on their own. Lack of formal recruitment processes was most pronounced on the Republican side in both Georgia and New York. On the Democratic side there appeared to be more robust institutional ties between party organizations and stakeholder groups according to interviewees. These factors may explain why the quantitative results are more robust for the Democratic Party.

The party strength results presented in Chapter 4 also suggest an alternative to the theory I proposed about stronger parties bolstering the effects of the gendered civil society context. In Chapter 2, I suggest that stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, but in fact the reverse could be true. Where local party organizations are weaker, civil society groups may have more political

power to influence candidate selection. This would be an interesting area for future research. Interviews with leaders of civil society groups would be useful for understanding how they navigate local politics, and the extent to which they engage in promoting candidates either through party organizations or independently.

In terms of broader implications, the evidence supporting the existence and relevance of gendered civil society contexts indicates that occupational patterns can influence diversity in representation in many ways. Further investigating the indirect effects of careers on potential candidacies may lead to better understanding of how to encourage female candidate emergence. Party leaders and elected officials could focus on ways to provide the necessary resources for successful candidacies for individuals in careers that may not afford those resources automatically. For example, more public campaign funding options, more funding available from party organizations, providing childcare or other services to increase time flexibility for candidates are all initiatives that could lead to more diverse pools of candidates and would likely enhance female candidate emergence. These types of initiatives are already being implemented in some places (for example, https://cawp.rutgers.edu/use-campaign-funds-childcare-expenses#Table). In short, career backgrounds, which differ by gender, also differ in terms of resources necessary for successful candidacies. Directly alleviating the resources disparities is likely to improve female candidate emergence and improve diversity in representation more generally.

Another way to improve female candidate emergence would be for parties to formalize their recruitment processes and engage with stakeholder groups in civil society more directly and intentionally. This may also lead to better quality candidates in general for both parties, since party leaders almost universally deemed civic engagement as indicative of a high quality

candidate.  Relying on self-starters and ad hoc recruitment methods reduces a party organization's influence over candidate selection.  As explained in Chapter 1, compared to the European context, parties in the US have much less influence over candidate nomination due to the use of primary elections.  However, any informal power that US party organizations do have over candidate selection is further diminished when they rely on individuals stepping forward on their own.  Fostering relationships with stakeholder groups in civil society would be one way to cultivate candidate pipelines and reduce reliance on self-starters.

Going forward, the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 3 could be expanded in several ways.  While this initial study focused on open seat elections, future research could include elections with incumbents and challengers.  In addition to serving as a robustness check, this would allow for some analysis of gendered civil society contexts over time.  Since open seats occur sporadically and not necessarily in consecutive election cycles, over time analysis was not performed.  Also, assessing the industrial and occupational affiliations of individual contributors could be an interesting exercise.  This approach could potentially uncover more differences between the major parties.  For example, did GOP chairs emphasize the importance of personal networks in candidate recruitment because the Republican Party also tends to be more reliant on individual rather than group contributors?

Collecting additional qualitative data would also likely be a worthwhile endeavor.  More state case studies would be useful by providing additional elements of geographic and institutional variation.  For instance, conducting interviews in states with terms limits, multimember districts, or public campaign funding options would add to our understanding of how gendered civil society contexts and party organizations shape dynamics of female candidate emergence under different institutional frameworks than those in NY and GA.

As noted previously, interviews with civil society leaders would also be valuable. As GA_Rep_6 (1/24/2020) stated, when it comes to candidate recruitment "the Party's not necessarily the only one doing it." Talking to civil society leaders, or former candidates who emerged from them, would uncover the dynamics of candidate emergence from a different angle. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the GA interviews suggest that women's representation advocacy groups often rely on local party and community leaders to identify potential female candidates, and then the groups provide resources, training, funding, and support to help them be successful. Future research could examine how these groups decide where to put their resources, and how reliant they are on the gendered civil society contexts and/or local party leaders in identifying candidates for recruitment and support.

Overall, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that the theory of gendered civil society context does indeed provide a promising new explanation for female candidate emergence. Various research avenues could be pursued to further develop the concept of GCSC and enhance our understanding of the landscape for female candidate emergence across the US.

**Appendix A.  IRB Exempt Authorization, Consent Forms, and Interview Protocols**

## SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
MEMORANDUM

| | |
|---|---|
| **TO:** | Shana Gadarian |
| **DATE:** | March 29, 2019 |
| **SUBJECT:** | Determination of Exemption from Regulations |
| **IRB #:** | 19-091 |
| **TITLE:** | *Gendered Civil Society Context, Local Party Strength, and Candidate Emergence: Explaining Female Representation across the US State Legislatures* |

The above referenced application, submitted for consideration as exempt from federal regulations as defined in 45 C.F.R. 46, has been evaluated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the following:

1. determination that it falls within the one or more of the eight exempt categories allowed by the organization;
2. determination that the research meets the organization's ethical standards.

It has been determined by the IRB this protocol qualifies for exemption and has been assigned to category **2**. This authorization will remain active for a period of five years from **March 26, 2019** until **March 25, 2024**.

**CHANGES TO PROTOCOL:** Proposed changes to this protocol during the period for which IRB authorization has already been given, cannot be initiated without additional IRB review. If there is a change in your research, you should notify the IRB immediately to determine whether your research protocol continues to qualify for exemption or if submission of an expedited or full board IRB protocol is required. Information about the University's human participants protection program can be found at: http://researchintegrity.syr.edu/human-research/ Protocol changes are requested on an amendment application available on the IRB web site; please reference your IRB number and attach any documents that are being amended.

**STUDY COMPLETION:** Study completion is when all research activities are complete or when a study is closed to enrollment and only data analysis remains on data that have been de-identified.  A Study Closure Form should be completed and submitted to the IRB for review (Study Closure Form).

Thank you for your cooperation in our shared efforts to assure that the rights and welfare of people participating in research are protected.

*Tracy J Cromp*
Tracy Cromp, M.S.W.
Director

**DEPT:** Political Science, 315 Eggers Hall                    **STUDENT:** Colleen Burton

# SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

### INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
### MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Shana Gadarian
**DATE:** November 22, 2019
**SUBJECT:** **Amendment for Exempt Protocol**
**AMENDMENT#:** 1 – Consent Form Changes (New Oral Consent)
**IRB #:** 19-091
**TITLE:** *Gendered Civil Society Context, Local Party Strength, and Candidate Emergence: Explaining Female Representation across the US State Legislatures*

Your current exempt protocol has been re-evaluated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) with the inclusion of the above referenced amendment. Based on the information you have provided, this amendment is authorized and continues to be assigned to category **2**. This protocol remains in effect from **March 26, 2019** to **March 25, 2024**.

**CHANGES TO PROTOCOL:** Proposed changes to this protocol during the period for which IRB authorization has already been given, cannot be initiated without additional IRB review. If there is a change in your research, you should notify the IRB immediately to determine whether your research protocol continues to qualify for exemption or if submission of an expedited or full board IRB protocol is required. Information about the University's human participants protection program can be found at: http://researchintegrity.syr.edu/human-research/. Protocol changes are requested on an amendment application available on the IRB web site; please reference your IRB number and attach any documents that are being amended.

**STUDY COMPLETION:** The completion of a study must be reported to the IRB within 14 days.

Thank you for your cooperation in our shared efforts to assure that the rights and welfare of people participating in research are protected.

*Tracy J Cromp*

Tracy Cromp, M.S.W.
Director

DEPT: Political Science, 315 Eggers Hall                    STUDENT: Coleen Burton

**Consent Form to Participate in Research Study**

The purpose of this research project is to learn more about how community groups and political party organizations influence who runs for political office, and how political candidates decide to run for political office.

You will be asked to answer questions and discuss formal and informal processes of your organization. You will also be asked about your perceptions and experiences with these formal and informal processes. This will take approximately 30 to 60 minutes of your time.

Involvement in the study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Our discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your own words. The audio files will only be heard by me for the purpose of this study. If you feel uncomfortable with the recorder, you may ask that it be turned off at any time.

All the information you provide for this study will be treated confidentially. Your identity will remain anonymous in any report on the results of this research. This will be done by changing your name and disguising any details of the interview which may reveal your identity or the identity of people about whom you speak. Disguised extracts from your interview may be quoted in my academic writings (i.e. dissertation, scholarly presentations, published papers and books).

If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research, please contact:

Colleen Dougherty Burton
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science
Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs
Syracuse University
cdburton@syr.edu
610-220-7330

By signing this consent form, I certify that I am over 18 years of age and that I agree to the terms of this agreement.

_____

Signature of Participant                                                        Date


_____

Printed Name of Participant

## Oral Consent Script for Participation in Research Study

The purpose of this research project is to learn more about how community groups and political party organizations influence who runs for political office, and how political candidates decide to run for political office.

You will be asked to answer questions and discuss formal and informal processes of your organization. You will also be asked about your perceptions and experiences with these formal and informal processes. This will take approximately 30 to 60 minutes of your time.

Involvement in the study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time.

Our discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your own words. The audio files will only be heard by me for the purpose of this study. If you feel uncomfortable with the recorder, you may ask that it be turned off at any time.

Do you consent to audio recording?

All the information you provide for this study will be treated confidentially. Your identity will remain anonymous in any report on the results of this research. This will be done by changing your name and disguising any details of the interview which may reveal your identity or the identity of people about whom you speak. Disguised extracts from your interview may be quoted in my academic writings (i.e. dissertation, scholarly presentations, published papers and books).

Do you have any questions or concerns about the research?

Are you 18 years of age or older?

How can I provide you with a copy of this consent script?

If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research, please use the following information to contact me or the Office of Research Integrity and Protections of Syracuse University.

Colleen Dougherty Burton
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science
Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs
Syracuse University
cdburton@syr.edu
610-220-7330

Syracuse University
Office of Research Integrity and Protections
315-443-3013

## Interview Protocol for Political Party Leaders

- Does the local party organization actively recruit candidates?
    - o How important is candidate recruitment in relation to other activities?

- How do other Democratic (Republican) party organizations (state, national, etc.) affect local candidate recruitment?

- With regards to your local party organization, what activities are involved in candidate recruitment?
    - o Are there formal guidelines? What are they?
    - o Are there informal practices? What are they?

- Do you work with partners/stakeholders in civil society to recruit potential candidates?
    - o If so, with which specific groups do you work?
    - o Do any groups suggest candidates without your party organization's solicitation? If so, which groups are more, or less, likely to do this?
    - o Are potential candidates often affiliated with particular local community groups? If so, which groups?

- Does your local party organization formally endorse candidates in primary elections?

- Does your local party organization promote candidates in primary elections? If so, how?

- As a leader/member of your organization, have you had any direct experience in recruiting candidates in the past? If so, can you tell me about this experience?

- Are members of your local party organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with regards to gender?

- Are leaders of your local party organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with regards to gender?

- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful political candidate in this area?

- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area? Please explain.

- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area? Please explain.

- Here is my contact information. Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who may be willing to talk to me about some of the topics that we have discussed today.

**Interview Protocol for Civil Society Leaders**

- Does your group engage in local politics?  If so, how?

- Does your group see recruiting political candidates as important to your mission?
     o If so, what activities do you engage in to recruit candidates?
     o Are there any formal processes followed for candidate recruitment?
     o Are there any informal processes for this purpose?
     o Have you found any of these processes to be particularly successful?  Why, or why not?

- Does your group work with local party officials regarding candidate recruitment?
     o If so, how?
     o With which party does your group typically work?

- Do local party officials ever seek your recommendations for potential political candidates?
     o If so, how do you identify such individuals?

- Is your group active in promoting preferred candidates during elections?
     o If so, what activities do you engage in to promote candidates?

- As a leader/member of your organization, have you had any direct experience in recruiting or promoting candidates in the past?
     o If so, can you tell me about this experience?

- Are members of your organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with regards to gender?

- Are leaders of your organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with regards to gender?

- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful political candidate in this area?

- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office in this area?  Please explain.

- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office in this area? Please explain.

- Here is my contact information.  Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who may be willing to talk to me about some of the topics that we have discussed today.

## Interview Protocol for Candidates

- What was the first office your ran for?

- How did you decide to run for office?  Please tell me about your experience.

- Were you recruited?  If so, by whom were you recruited?  Please tell me about your experience.
    - If you were recruited, what attributes or characteristics do you think may have made you an attractive candidate to the recruiter(s)?

- Were you involved in any civil society groups prior to running for office? (These include unions, professional associations, community groups, advocacy groups, etc.)
    - If so, did this involvement affect your decision to run for office in any way? How?

- Were you involved with your local political party organization prior to running for office?
    - If so, did this involvement affect your decision to run for office in any way? How?

- As a former candidate, can you share any additional thoughts or experiences you may have about how political candidates are recruited in your local community?

- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful candidate in this area?

- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area?  Please explain.

- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area? Please explain.

- Here is my contact information.  Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who may be willing to talk to me about some of the topics that we have discussed today.

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## EDUCATION

***Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse, NY***
   Ph.D., Department of Political Science, December 2020
   Qualifying Exam Fields:  American Politics, Comparative Politics
   Dissertation Title:  Gendered Civil Society Context, Local Party Strength, and Candidate
      Emergence: Explaining Female Representation across the US State Legislatures
   Dissertation Committee:  Dr. Shana Gadarian (advisor), Dr. Kristi Andersen,
      Dr. Christopher Faricy, Dr. Seth Jolly, Dr. Danielle Thomsen

***Villanova University, College of Liberal Arts & Sciences, Villanova, PA***
   Master of Arts, Department of Political Science, May 2013

***University of Pennsylvania, College of Liberal & Professional Studies, Philadelphia, PA***
   Master of Liberal Arts, May 2010

***University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business, Notre Dame, IN***
   Bachelor of Business Administration, January 2004

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

   Political Institutions, Gender & Politics, Female Representation, Comparative Political
   Economy, Social Welfare & Labor Market Policy

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

***Qualitative Data Repository (QDR), Moynihan Institute, Syracuse University***
   Graduate Research Assistant, August 2015 – August 2016
   - Dr. Colin Elman, Faculty Supervisor
   - Support data management processes, facilitate data recruitment and curation efforts,
     produce literature reviews, and assist in the launch of pilot projects for a digital archive
     funded by the National Science Foundation, which enables data access and research
     transparency for social science research projects that employ qualitative and multi-
     method techniques of inquiry

***Department of Political Science, Syracuse University***
   Research Assistant
   - Dr. Margarita Estevez-Abe, Spring 2018
   - Dr. Shana Gadarian & Dr. Quinn Mulroy, Summer 2015
   - Dr. Seth Jolly, March 2014
   - Dr. Matthew Cleary, March 2014

***Institute for Latino Studies, University of Notre Dame***
   Research Assistant (full-time), January 2004 – May 2004

## PUBLICATIONS

Elman, Colin and Colleen Dougherty Burton. (2016) "Research Cycles: Adding More Substance to the Spin", *Perspectives on Politics*, 14(4), pp. 1067–1070. doi: 10.1017/S1537592716002991.

Anderson, Kristi, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Joseph V. Julian, Minchin G. Lewis, Grant Reeher, Danielle Thomsen, Michael Wasylenko, Colleen Dougherty Burton, Zach Huitink, Eric van der Vort, Sunju Raybeck. (2017) "Considering Shared Government Services in New York State: A Guide for Citizens and Public Officials." Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Syracuse, NY.

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

### *Teaching Assistant, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY*
Constitutional Law II (PSC325 – Dr. Keck), Spring 2019
Money & Politics (PSC300 – Dr. Weschle), Fall 2018
Gender & Political Economy (PSC300 – Dr. Estevez-Abe), Spring 2015
Introduction to American Government (PSC121 – Dr. Gadarian), Fall 2014
Senior Distinction Thesis Committee, Third Reader, Spring 2015, Spring 2017

## SCHOLARSHIPS & AWARDS *(graduate level)*

Syracuse University Summer Dissertation Fellowship, The Graduate School, 2020
Dissertation Completion Assistantship, Political Science Department, Syracuse University, 2019-2020
Teaching Assistantship, Political Science Department, Syracuse University, 2014-2015, 2018-2019
Research Assistantship, Political Science Department, Syracuse University, Spring 2018
Summer Funding, Political Science Department, Syracuse University, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
Syracuse University Graduate Fellowship, 2013-2014, 2016-2017
Andersen Award, Political Science Department, 2017 Institute for Qualitative & Multi-Method Research
Roscoe Martin Dissertation Research Funding, Syracuse University, December 2015
Graduate Research Assistantship, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, QDR, 2015-2016
Meiklejohn Award/Fellowship, Political Science Dept., Syracuse University, Summer 2015
Tuition Scholar, Political Science Department, Villanova University, 2011-2012, 2012-2013

## TECHNICAL SKILLS
Stata
R and RStudio (beginner)
Certified Microsoft Excel Specialist; Microsoft Office

**CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

***Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, April 2017***
    Paper Presenter, "Re-examining Variation in Female Descriptive Representation across the US State Legislatures"

***European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Montreal, QC, August 2015***
    Paper Presenter, "Revisiting the Gender Voting Gap in Advanced Industrial Societies: Placing Values & Interests in an Institutional Context" (co-authored with Dr. Margarita Estevez-Abe)

***New England Political Science Association Conference, New Haven, CT, April 2015***
    Discussant & Panel Chair, Comparative Identity Politics Panel

***Graduate Research Symposium, Syracuse University, March 2015***
    Poster Presenter, "Women's Substantive Representation & Social Welfare Provision: Assessing the Relationship between Female State Legislators & Implementation of the Affordable Care Act"

**ADDITIONAL SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY & DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES**

***Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Syracuse University***
    Graduate Research Associate, 2015 – 2020

***Academic Integrity Committee, Maxwell School, Syracuse University***
    Graduate Student Representative, Department of Political Science, 2015-2016

***Political Science Graduate Student Association, Syracuse University***
    Pre-Comprehensive Exams Representative, 2013-2014

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

***University of Pennsylvania***
    Office of Budget & Management Analysis, Philadelphia, PA
    Budget Analyst, September 2007 – July 2013

***Lockheed Martin Corporation***
    Cherry Hill, NJ; Newtown, PA; Sunnyvale, CA
    Financial Analyst, May 2004 – August 2007