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Abstract

South Korea's engagement policy toward North Korea has a unique potential to contribute to permanent peace on the Korean peninsula by improving inter-Korean relations. However, given Korea's historical, political, and socio-cultural context, comprehensive engagement has proved difficult. Any South Korean leader who adopts overall engagement strategies vis-à-vis North Korea may face constraints and setbacks stemming from the internal and external environments, including North Korea (the target state), domestic politics, and the United States. During Kim Dae-jung's presidency (1998-2003), North and South Korea engaged in an unparalleled degree of interaction, reshaping the pattern of inter-Korean relations. President Kim's Sunshine Policy demonstrated a genuine potential to stimulate limited but momentous behavioral change from North Korea. With a view to elucidating aspects of Kim Dae-jung's leadership that constituted the primary mechanism for the Sunshine Policy (the *What*), this study delves into the ways in which personality variables, such as: personal capital; political skills (the *Who*); beliefs and philosophy (the *Why*); and leadership traits and styles, perspectives, and motivational perceptions (the *How*) combined to shape his leadership as it relates to this policy, particularly in terms of procedure and implementation.

A dangerous radical; an exile; a Red; a political prisoner under house arrest; a death-row inmate; the champion of peace, democracy and human rights; the opposition leader; the president of South Korea; and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate. The various titles Kim Dae-jung went by throughout his political life may further the confusion one might struggle with

regarding what type of leader he was, or what he was like as a statesman in terms of personality and leadership characteristics.

The Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's flagship engagement policy towards North Korea, is arguably the political arena which most reflects his personality and leadership. The analysis in this study therefore delves into these characteristics through the prism of his peace initiative. Grounded on the actor indispensability thesis, which postulates that the removal of one individual's actions would lead to a significant change in the outcome, my project suggests that Kim Dae-jung served as an agent of change to improve inter-Korean relations at a critical juncture for the South Korean state.

Using the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) as a primary methodological tool, the study explores the ways in which Kim Dae-jung played the role of peacemaker amid the constraints constantly imposed by internal and external environments. With respect to policy implementation, Kim Dae-jung's leadership was consistent across different periods of time and across different types of situations. His profile consistently showed a blend of a set of personality traits: a high need for power, a high in-group bias, and a relationship/process focus. The content analysis also shows that Kim Dae-jung's leadership was flexible, in that his leadership style shifted from the advocate to the pragmatic in tandem with the changing contextual conditions. The study finds that it was Kim's perception of the severity of constraints, rather than the source of those constraints, that led to a change in his leadership style. The study also suggests that Kim's inherently advocate leadership orientations were mitigated, albeit to varying degrees, by an array of personality traits and leadership characteristics which had been shaped prior to his presidency.

KIM DAE-JUNG'S LEADERSHIP AS RELEVANT TO THE SUNSHINE POLICY (1998-2003)

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction: Sunshine Policy & Kim Dae-jung	1
A. Sunshine Policy: The Past & the Present	1
B. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership.....	13
C. Research Questions.....	19
D. The Who-Why-How-What Framework.....	21
Chapter 2. Who was Kim Dae-jung?	29
A. Biographical Sketch.....	29
B. Personal Capital and Political Skills.....	44
1. Personal Capital.....	44
2. Political Skills	59
3. Other Important Personal Characteristics	65
Chapter 3. Why the Sunshine Policy? Philosophical & Conceptual Bases of the Sunshine Policy	71
A. Evolution of the Sunshine Policy.....	71
B. Concepts and Principles of the Sunshine Policy	93
C. Conceptualization of Comprehensive Engagement (Sunshine Policy) as a Foreign Policy Tool.....	100
Chapter 4. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Decision-making System (1998-2003)	109
A. Methods.....	109
1. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).....	109
1. 1. What is LTA?.....	109
1. 2. The Use of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) in This Study	124
2. Qualitative Interviewing	128
B. Decision-Making System Involved in the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003)	131
1. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): Decision-Making System (LTA)	131
2. Advisory System under President Kim Dae-jung as Relevant to the North Korea Policy	134
3. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits & the Decision-making System as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy.....	138

Chapter 5. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Policy Implementation (Period 1: 1998-1999) Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty	157
A. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)	157
1. Periodization of the Analysis	157
2. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): Policy Implementation (LTA)	160
B. Constraints & Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)	162
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	162
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment	175
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	184
C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)	193
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	194
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment	202
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	206
Chapter 6. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy Implementation (Period 2: 2000) Heyday of the Sunshine Policy	215
A. Overview: Heyday of the Sunshine Policy (2000)	215
1. Background to the First Inter-Korean Summit	216
2. Leadership Profiles of the Two Leaders at the Summit Meeting: Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il (LTA)	218
B. Constraints & Responses	226
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	226
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment	234
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	237
C. Leadership Style (Period 2: 2000)	249
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	250
b. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	258
Chapter 7. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy Implementation (Period 3: 2001-2002) Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis	266
A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)	266
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	266
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment	278

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	293
B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002).....	298
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea	299
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment	303
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment	309
Chapter 8. What Aspects of Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Constituted a Key Mechanism for the Sunshine Policy?.....	316
A. Kim Dae-jung’s Personal Capital & Political Skills based on the Biographical Sketch	316
B. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits & Styles through the Prism of the Sunshine Policy.....	320
Chapter 9. Conclusion	341
A. Findings Based on the <i>Who-Why-How-What</i> framework	341
B. Contribution, Limitations, and Next Steps.....	354
Appendix A: List of Documents coded for Leadership Trait Analysis	363
Appendix B Interview Questions	368
Appendix C: List of Interviewees	373
References	375

List of Tables

Table 1. <i>Definitions of Engagement</i>	101
Table 2. <i>Leader’s Motivational Orientations toward the World</i>	118
Table 3. <i>Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints and Openness to Information</i>	121
Table 4. <i>Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	132

Table 5. <i>Norming Group Statistics (Means and Half Standard Deviations): 79 Pacific Rim leaders (1998-2008)</i>	132
Table 6. <i>Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) by Three Periods of Analysis (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	133
Table 7. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Three Periods under Analysis and for Three Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	160
Table 8. <i>President Kim Dae-jung’s Approval Ratings and the Public Support of the Sunshine Policy (%) (1998.3-2002.4)</i>	191
Table 9. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 1 (1998-1999) by Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	193
Table 10. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profiles before and after the breakdown of the Inter-Korean Talks in April 1998 (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	199
Table 11. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting</i>	219
Table 12. <i>Kim Jong-il’s Profile’s leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting</i>	221
Table 13. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Period 2 (2000) (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	249
Table 14. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 3 (2001-2002) by Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	298
Table 15. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s leadership styles shown during his presidency (1998-2003) across the three different periods of his presidency and by the three sources of constraints.</i>	326

Table 16. <i>Changes in Kim Dae-jung’s Motivational Perception and Leadership Style across the Three Periods of Interest and the Three Sources of Constraints</i>	335
Table 17. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for his Term of Office (1998-2003) and for Period 2 (2000) (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	343
Table 18. <i>Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles for Three Periods under analysis and for Three Sources of Constraints (Simplified) (Leadership Trait Analysis)</i>	346

List of Figures

Figure 1. <i>Ideal Types of Foreign Policy Strategies suggested along the Policy Spectrum in Relevant Studies</i>	107
Figure 2. <i>Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) under President Kim Dae-jung</i>	137

Chapter 1. Introduction: Sunshine Policy & Kim Dae-jung

A. Sunshine Policy: The Past & the Present

This study will examine the role of Kim Dae-jung's leadership in conducting the Sunshine Policy of comprehensive engagement of North Korea. The study takes note of the rationale that while South Korea's engagement policy toward North Korea has a unique potential to improve inter-Korean relations and reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, comprehensive engagement is an extremely difficult option in Korea's historical, political, socio-economic, and cultural context. Any South Korean leader who adopts a comprehensive engagement strategy will likely encounter various constraints stemming from the external and internal environments involving domestic politics, the United States, and North Korea, among others. Kim Dae-jung was sworn into office in January 1998 at a time when North-South relations were at an all-time low as a result of an incoherent, overall containment policy toward North Korea under the Kim Young-sam administration. A persistent commitment to inter-Korean reconciliation by the two minority governments under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun and a decade of comprehensive engagement policy ended up making an unprecedented level of progress in inter-Korean relations even amid treacherous contextual conditions and mounting tension between Washington and Pyongyang over the latter's nuclear program.

In an effort to prevent the outbreak of a second destructive war on the Korean peninsula, South Korea's current President Moon Jae-in engaged in a whirlwind of diplomacy upon his election, attempting to seize control over the Korea crisis and turning it into a peace

process. Moon earnestly strived to guide international efforts to defuse the North Korean crisis while balancing the interests of a belligerent and heavily-armed North Korea and an unpredictable government in Washington. These efforts facilitated negotiations between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, which had faced resistance from both sides for a long time.

President Moon's mediation between the United States and North Korea resulted in a historic summit meeting between a sitting American president and a North Korean leader on June 12, 2018 in Singapore. Moon expressed willingness to put himself in the "driver's seat" of the Korean peninsula, and to serve as a mediator in the conflict between the United States and North Korea; notably, this echoes President Kim Dae-jung's approach to an intensifying confrontation between the George W. Bush administration and the Kim Jong-il regime over the highly enriched uranium program (HEUP), a clash which led to the second nuclear crisis in October 2002.

A flurry of seemingly promising developments occurred during the year 2018. These developments came on the heels of the historic summit meeting between the United States and North Korea on one hand, and three summit meetings between the two Koreas in Panmunjom and Pyongyang on the other. This produced euphoria and optimism on both the diplomatic and the nuclear front. However, since the breakdown of negotiations at the second summit between the Trump and Kim in Hanoi in February 2019, diplomacy has remained in prolonged deadlock, not only between Washington and Pyongyang, but also between Seoul and Pyongyang. North Korea has since returned to its cycle of rebuffing, threatening, and provoking with a series of missile tests.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas are still technically at war after some 70 years of an armistice deal, and have yet to reach a peace treaty. Moreover, the two Koreas have yet to resume the construction of an inter-Korean railway, reopen joint-tourism ventures (including the Mt. Kumgang project), or resume the operation of the Kaesung Industrial Complex. In other words, the two Koreas have yet to pick up where Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, the two South Korean leaders who adopted the Sunshine Policy, and Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader who acceded, albeit reluctantly, to their overtures, left off.¹

Still, what happened in the previous decade under the hardline policy seems to indicate that the Sunshine Policy, to which the three presidents—Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), and Moon Jae-in (2017-present)—have been firmly committed, is the better, if not the optimal, option for any leader who seeks permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. There is little doubt that permanent peace cannot be achieved without improvement in US-DPRK relations. This in turn will be difficult, if not impossible, without improved inter-Korean relations. In fact, history shows us that all of the meaningful achievements in inter-Korean relations were made during the administrations of South Korean leaders—specifically, Roh Tae-woo, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun—who adopted the engagement, as opposed to the containment, policy toward North Korea.

During the nine-year period of conservative leadership under President Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye, South Korea employed a containment approach that resulted in

¹ President Roh Moo-hyun had the second inter-Korean summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang between October 2 and 4, 2007. At the end of the summit, the two leaders signed the October 4 Joint Declaration. In the eight-point agreement, dubbed the “Declaration of the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” the two sides agreed to build military confidence and peace mechanisms between the two Koreas, reactivate extensive economic cooperation, establish a “special zone of peace and cooperation” on the West Sea of Korea, and the promotion of tourism to Mt. Paektu.

deteriorating relations with North Korea. This demonstrates that comprehensive engagement is a superior option to containment in pursuit of more peaceful relations with the DPRK. During the nine years of hardline strategy, South Korea's policy toward North Korea was not driven by pragmatism and flexibility. In this period, all inter-Korean agreements signed under the Sunshine Policy as well as the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (1991) were virtually revoked in their entirety. Wide-ranging sanctions were imposed on the North. The Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project was closed in September 2008. All inter-Korean relations and trade were banned under the so-called "May 24 Measures" taken in response to the Cheonan incident on March 26, 2010. The Kaesung Industrial Complex was shut down in February 2016, and inter-Korean trade fell to near-zero in early 2016. At the end of the nine-year period, inter-Korean relations were not just bad—there existed no relations whatsoever (M. S. Kim, 2016).

Uniqueness of the Sunshine Policy

It is worth noting that the Sunshine Policy represents a significant departure from earlier South Korean policy as it was qualitatively different from the country's previous engagement policies. In contrast to the previous policies that articulated *unification*, which is the hallmark of emotional appeal to the Koreans, as the central goal, the Sunshine Policy replaced *unification* with *rapprochement* through peaceful exchange and cooperation that would lead to the dismantlement of the Cold War structure as the ultimate long-term goal (Moon, 1999, p. 13; D. Steinberg, 1999, pp. 59–60; Moon, 2000, p. 3). Moreover, Sunshine Policy replaced *strict reciprocity* with *flexible reciprocity* and exchanged *a principle for the linkage* between politics

and the economy with *the principle of separation*. As its central tenets, the policy was aimed at inducing incremental, voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, reform, and openness through the patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation (Kim, 1999, pp. 63–64). In the process, the emphasis was placed on sustaining political dialogue and the recognition of the North Korean leader as a partner for peace. All of this constituted the Sunshine Policy's core precepts that are generally deemed unique (Levin & Han, 2002, p. 131). Relevant studies note that Kim Dae-jung's patient, incremental, pragmatic and functionalist approach marked a major "paradigm shift" in South Korea's discourses on inter-Korean relations and national unification (C. I. Moon, 1999, p. 39). In implementing the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung pursued mutual identity shifts, that is, the reformation of identity vis-à-vis North Korea on the part of the South Korean public as well as the thawing of the frozen mindset vis-à-vis the South on the part of North Koreans (C. I. Moon, 1999; K. Y. Son, 2006; J. K. Choi, 2010; C. Moon, 2012).

By many standards, the Sunshine Policy marked a substantial improvement, both in conceptual and practical terms, over the policies toward North Korea undertaken under Kim Dae-jung's predecessors who had largely contained the North, the policies deemed mostly reactive, passive, inconsistent, defensive, tactical, and often counterproductive (e.g., C. Moon, 2012; Moon, 2000; Shinn, 2001). By many standards, the Sunshine Policy, South Korea's first comprehensive engagement toward North Korea, can be considered more proactive, consistent, and strategic than previous governments' North Korea policies while its scope was more comprehensive with a renewed emphasis placed on "whole-hearted interactions" with North Korea. Another distinctive aspect of the Sunshine Policy is linked with its timeframe.

While previous policies had been seeking short-term gains, Kim Dae-jung pursued medium- and long-term gains, emphasizing patience and endurance (C. Moon, 2012, pp. 26, 30). Moon and Steinberg (1999, p. 36) note that the Sunshine Policy is not a tactical or instrumental maneuver for domestic political gains and legitimacy by aiming for a short-term breakthrough to stalled inter-Korean relations. Rather, it can be seen as essentially “strategic” and “consummate” since the policy pursues genuine, long-term improvements in inter-Korean relations through peaceful coexistence and mutual exchanges and cooperation for a sustained period of time.

Furthermore, the Sunshine Policy took a cautious and sophisticated approach in dealing with North Korea in a bid to mitigate the threat perception and siege mentality of the North Korean regime. Most of all, the policy sought to build trust between the two Koreas by demonstrating sincerity and goodwill, which had been a notable rarity in inter-Korean relations thus far. The priority given to sincerity was the fundamental difference between the Sunshine Policy and other conventional forms of engagement policy including “conditional engagement” or “hawk engagement” strategies (e.g., Litwak, 2000; Cha, 2002). In this sense, this study takes note of the rationale that the Sunshine Policy goes beyond the engagement policy in the conventional sense.

Criticism of the Sunshine Policy

To its critics at home and abroad, the Sunshine Policy was little more than a failed experiment, geared toward achieving rapprochement with a totalitarian regime via aid and one-sided infatuation with its leader. They largely dismiss Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy—as was inherited by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun—as an ill-conceived strategy for dealing with

North Korea; it deterred neither North Korea's dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons nor the oppression of its own people (Lee, 2009). Lee Sung-Yoon (2009), a critic of the Sunshine Policy, says, "Kim Dae-jung will most likely be recorded in the annals of Korean history, however, not for his contributions to the economy or his efforts at advancing South Korea's political rights as a dissident, but for his failed North Korea policy as president."

For its critics, the Sunshine Policy constituted a mere appeasement policy that poured money into North Korea based on the delusion that the Communist regime could be bribed to modify its behavior. They argue that the element of punishment and the sense of urgency were utterly absent in the Sunshine Policy. They regarded reciprocity, a core principle of the Sunshine Policy, as effectively meaning 'unilateral giving' –a practice called "peojugi" in Korean- without getting a proper return (e.g., H. N. Kim, 2006; S. Y. Lee, 2010).

Critics refuted the policy's assumption that engagement policy would eventually induce the North to change its behavior, calling it wishful thinking (S. Y. Lee, 2009; Klingner, 2013; Straub, 2018). Regarding the Sunshine Policy, critics accused Kim Dae-jung of "naïveté" in believing that North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons once it obtained a security guarantee from the United States. Critics argue that Kim Dae-jung made unilateral concessions to the Northern leader, allowing the latter to make the most of South Korea's volatile situation to change the atmospheric in the Korean peninsula in favor of the communist regime (Lee, 2009).

Meanwhile, some pundits and critics take issue with the dubious rationale that a behavioral change in North Korea could possibly be made by South Korean actions. This viewpoint is problematic, they argue, as North Korea's autonomy in making policy decisions is

disregarded while the role of the South in affecting its policies and behaviors is overstated. Such misplaced expectations of North Korea's change, they posit, were proved unrealistic by the extent to which North Korea resisted the Sunshine Policy in the initial period of Kim's presidency (M. J. Sohn, 2001, p. 259).

Calling the Sunshine Policy "oddly optimistic, one-dimensional, and patronizingly didactic," Lee Sung-yoon (2010) argues, "Kim Dae-jung believed he could win North Korea's trust with patience and generosity while ignoring the fundamental political dynamics on the Korean peninsula, that is, the ongoing pan-Korean contest for legitimacy and the threat South Korea, by its sheer existence, poses to the impoverished North Korean system." Lee also states, "Kim Dae-jung conflated his personal ambitions, his considerable powers of persuasion, and his own political hopes and dreams with the national and security interests of the South Korean state, and, by extension, the interests of the entire ethnic Korean nation. In this respect, Kim Dae-jung was a visionary of sorts: he saw things that did not exist in reality."

Some scholars posit that President Kim Dae-jung's dealings with his opponents and critics of the Sunshine Policy were essentially zero-sum, which they believe further aggravated the political and social polarization in the country (Namkoong, 2004, p. 29). They refer to Kim's lopsided, self-righteous, or unilateral leadership as in part responsible for the accelerated polarization in domestic politics, arguing that this in turn held back Kim's own endeavors to engage the North during his term of office (Shin, 2013). Critics accused the term "Sunshine Policy" per se of having crippled the flexibility of South Korea's strategy in dealing with North Korea. They argue that the relevant terms such as reconciliation, exchange and cooperation served to constrain the scope of the strategies available in a toolkit in a way that forestalled the

use of a variety of tactical means that would have been available otherwise (Chung, 2011).

Moreover, pundits and observers denounced Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy as politically motivated. Straub (2018, p. 18) argues that Kim's sometimes over-the-top rhetoric—for example, on his return to Seoul from Pyongyang, he declared there would be no more war on the peninsula—was “hortatory” with regard to Kim Jong-il, and “the product of his own wishful thinking and domestic political calculations.”

Unsurprisingly, the so-called “cash for summit” scandal became an unmistakable target of criticism for opponents of Kim Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy. In reference to the illegal transfer by the Kim Dae-jung government of a cash payment of US\$450 million —of which US\$100 million was ruled as illegal by the Supreme Court- ahead of the summit, Lee (2010) notes that the Sunshine Policy was carried out through “financial bribes and a disposition toward appeasing” North Korea. Regarding the cash-for-summit scandal, Donald Kirk, a veteran correspondent and critic of the Sunshine Policy, notes, “Money would lay the groundwork for DJ to realize his Nobel dream, an inter-Korean summit to project him as a man of peace on a global scale” (Kirk, 2009, p. 208).

Much of the criticism was levelled at what detractors viewed as the “trade-off” between engagement and national security. Detractors claim that the policy was immoral affording the Kim Jong-il regime vast material resources to develop nuclear weapons, thus threatening the global security (Stanton et al., 2017). Critics regard the Sunshine Policy as a major culprit behind North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. The opposition Grand National Party argued that had it not been for massive aid and humanitarian assistance provided by the Kim Dae-jung

administration, it would not have been possible for North Korea to develop the highly enriched uranium program (HEUP) (J., Park, personal communication, November 23, 2016).

President Kim Dae-jung was assaulted for what critics called his double standards on North Korea's human rights. While he was considered the champion of human rights throughout his political life, Kim remained silent on North Korea's grave human rights conditions, critics noted (C. Moon, 2012, pp. 35–37). In criticizing Kim Dae-jung and his Sunshine Policy, Donald Kirk says, "Kim Dae-jung had little to say about human rights in North Korea, about mismanagement of the North's economy, about the 1.1 million North Koreans under arms (2009, p. 214).

Kim Dae-jung was accused of being so obsessed with forging ahead with his peace policy that he overlooked the potentially adverse implications for political polarization. Stressing the importance of properly dealing with the domestic opposition in undertaking the Sunshine Policy, Shin Jong-dae (2013) holds that the engagers should have been more open to critical views of their opponents and, instead of excluding them, should have had dialogue with them, and persuaded them of the need to endorse the engagement policy. Shin also notes that Kim Dae-jung failed to comprehend that the ideological confrontation in the domestic political landscape between pro- and anti-engagement forces might adversely affect the very rapprochement process to which he was so firmly devoted.

Achievements

During Kim Dae-jung's presidency, North and South Korea engaged in an unparalleled degree of interaction, reshaping the conventional pattern of inter-Korean relations. The leaders

of the two Koreas had a summit in June 2000 for the first time since the national division in 1948. Following the summit, significant progress was made in inter-Korean relations while the military tensions were considerably reduced. The two Koreas terminated anti-propaganda broadcasts towards each other at the DMZ. An inter-Korean military hotline was established and used on several critical occasions. The first inter-Korean defense ministerial talks were held in Cheju Island; inter-Korean railways and roads began to be re-linked; economic assistance and inter-Korean trade increased;² and the groundwork was laid for a joint project at the Kaesung Industrial Complex combining South Korean technology and capital with North Korean labor and resources. Moreover, a wide variety of inter-Korean business ventures were launched. It was intended to level up living standards in North Korea and increase its dependence on the south. South Korean firms were not only authorized but also vigorously encouraged to interact with the North often through subsidies. As a result, South Korean companies began to be involved in mining, agriculture, tourism, car manufacturing and textile production (Abt, 2016). The Mount Kumgang Tourism Project and the Kaesung Industrial Project were the most remarkable achievements of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy. The joint Mount Kumgang Tourism Project was launched in November 1998. Between 1998 and 2002, over 500,000 South Korean tourists visited Mount Kumgang by ship.³ Moreover, about 5,400 members of separated families were united on five rounds of reunions during Kim Dae-jung's tenure (*Ministry of Unification: Statistics*, n.d.; H. S. Paik, 2009, pp. 320–321).

² Under Kim Dae-jung, inter-Korean trade steadily grew from \$200 million in 1998, to \$400 million in 2000 and 2001, and to \$640 million in 2002. Humanitarian assistance also increased. Between 1998 and 2003, a total of US\$46,280 million of aid was delivered to North Korea at the civilian and government levels (Ministry of Unification; Paik, 2009, pp. 321, 323).

³ By the year 2002, the number of South Korean tourists who visited the Kumgang Mountain totaled over 510,000 while the number of people who visited each side by crossing the border increased thirteen times (Paik, 2009, pp. 321-322). With the land route opened in 2003, the number of visitors soared to more than 1.7 million citizens by 2009.

During Kim's term of office, more than 40 different types of inter-Korean agreements were signed between the two Koreas, and government-level inter-Korean dialogues were held sixty times in a variety of fields including military, economy, society, sports, and culture. Moreover, regular, biannual reunions of separated families were held between the North and South.

North Korea, for its part, began to show signs of change in its economic system and foreign relations during this period. Even with the tensions escalating with the Bush administration, North Korea showed that it was seeking major changes on external and internal fronts. After expressing regret over the September 11 terrorist attacks, North Korea signed two anti-terrorism international agreements in November 2001. The regime announced economic reforms on July 1, 2002 and attempted innovative ways to improve its economy and industries. For example, regarding agriculture, the North partially adopted an individual farming and private ownership system replacing collective farming under the existing "juche" method. North Korea gradually discarded inefficient Communist systems of production and accepted a market-based economy. Also, the regime sent a fact-finding team of 400 delegates to Western countries while extending invitations to foreign economic delegations. On diplomatic fronts, North Korea moved to improve relations with Japan – e.g., by holding a summit – while attempting to restore relations with China and Russia. It also opened diplomatic ties with a number of countries in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

B. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership

The focus of the Study

Why Leader?: Actor indispensability

This study advocates the “actor indispensability” thesis postulating that the removal of the individual’s actions would lead to a significant change in the outcome. That is, a particular act of an individual is likely to be a necessary link in some chain of events (F. I. Greenstein, 1975, p. 42). What is worth noting about the actor indispensability notion is that what is at issue is the actor’s personal characteristics and the degree to which they are indispensable for an explanation of his/her political behavior. Notably, actor indispensability has been linked to situations involving *transformational* leadership (Jentleson, 2018, p. xix).

This study begins with the hypothesis that the Sunshine Policy is the case of a foreign/security policy in which the political leader’s personal characteristics significantly influenced the country’s policy behavior.⁴ The “actor indispensability” model is challenged by the “action dispensability” thesis, which holds that political behavior in large part hinges upon situational stimuli to the exclusion of variations in the actors’ personal characteristics. Actor indispensability also stands in contrast to the “actor dispensability” notion that under certain circumstances different actors behave uniformly, meaning that individuals vary in personality but perform identically when exposed to common stimuli (F. I. Greenstein, 1975, pp. 47–48).⁵

⁴ As regards elements of personal characteristics that are most likely to affect the leader’s political behavior, Hermann (1977, p. 19) suggests that such elements as the leader’s political philosophy, cognitive map of the political environment, motives, decision style, and political training influence how the individual interprets incoming stimuli, develops strategies and chooses tactics.

⁵ Regarding how the political leader’s personal characteristics affect the “policy of the group,” or collective political behavior, Greenstein (1975, p. 42) notes, “the more demanding the political act, the greater the likelihood that it will be influenced by personal characteristics of an actor. Regarding this issue, Hermann (1977) suggests several conditions. One such condition concerns how well-defined the leader’s role is, that is, the degree to which the formal requirements of the role limit what the person can do. In other words, the more room the leader has to interpret what his/her job does and does not entail, the more

Leader-Context Nexus

While adopting the leader-centric approach, this study is focused on the interactive process between the leader and the context. In essence, the leader-context interplay is the key to understanding how the leadership was exercised in a way that helped achieve the policy goals in this study. With the focus of the analysis lying on the interaction between the decision-maker and constraints emanating from the context, the study will delve into how President Kim Dae-jung perceives and reacts to political constraints stemming from the context in undertaking the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Machiavelli found all of human life and history to be determined by only two forces: *virtù* (competent statecraft, or, in today's parlance, "good leadership") and *fortuna* (chance, or, in other words, contextual influences). Machiavelli conceded that however competent the rulers were, they could control only half of their fate. This means that even the most competent rulers will need a degree of luck to go down in history as successful leaders ('t Hart, 2014, p. 212). Theorists and experimentalists have held that the leader's success depends on the situation and that the personality characteristics required for effective leadership will vary with the situation (Winter, 1987, p. 196). Fred Fiedler's (1967) study on leadership effectiveness suggests that a leader's motivation towards task accomplishments versus maintaining positive relationships is more or less fixed. Fielder posits that particular types of contexts – e.g., defined by such variables as the scope of their

the impact he/she may have on the position. Another condition Hermann suggests relates to the degree of accountability the leader has for the policies or behavior of the group. Hermann posits that the higher the position the political leader holds in a group, the more likely his/her personal characteristics are to influence the group's decisions (Hermann, 1977, pp. 19–20). According to Greenstein (1975, p. 42), when a set of conditions are met, then this leads to a case of "non-substitutability" wherein the actions of an individual, as rooted in their distinctive goals, perceptions, and motivations, are necessary in explaining the outcome. Among the conditions Greenstein suggested are 1) the individual with distinctive beliefs or grounds; and 2) the situation that is ambiguous enough to allow some leeway in response. An overview of the leadership and contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy informs us that the case properly fits the conditions for the leader's personal characteristics to have a substantial impact on the overall policy process.

power, structure of the task at hand, and the climate of leader-follower relationships – may “favor or disfavor” certain types of leaders (e.g., t’Hart, 2014, p. 212). This leads to the rationale that the outlook is most promising when leaders are in control, the task at hand is straightforward, and they have positive relationships with their constituents (e.g., ’t Hart, 2014, p. 212).

Sunshine Policy: South Korea’s First “Leadership-Driven” Engagement Policy toward North Korea

South Korea’s engagement policy is the product of a long, evolutionary process. In this sense, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy can be seen as an extension of earlier engagement policies of the previous governments. The country’s engagement with North Korea began with the July 4th, 1972 Joint Communiqué under Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), which was followed by the *Nordpolitik* under President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). Roh’s engagement, in turn, was followed by the Sunshine Policy under President Kim Dae-jung. The Sunshine Policy was inherited by President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), and was revived by President Moon Jae-in (2017-present). The previous engagement policies all stressed the importance of peaceful co-existence with North Korea through exchanges and cooperation (Moon and Steinberg, 1999: 12).

Despite the historical importance conferred to the first inter-Korean document, the July 4th Joint Communiqué was a mostly tactical move on the part of both sides. Park Chung-hee’s engagement with North Korea can be seen as largely “situation-driven” considering that the policy was motivated to cope with the US-China détente centered around President Nixon’s

visit to China in February 1972. In fact, Park cared less about the substantive content of the joint document than about its sheer existence as he sought to use inter-Korean dialogues to consolidate his domestic power to perpetuate his dictatorial rule through the *Yushin* – *revitalizing reforms* – system (Koh, 1974, 1980; M. Lee, 1989). Roh Tae-woo’s engagement with North Korea as part of his foreign policy dubbed (Koh, 1974, 1980; M. Lee, 1989) *Nordpolitik* was also in part “situation-driven.” Still, in this case, the leadership factor was equally important as his apparently *pragmatic* leadership –in terms of the leadership typology– led him to actively adjust his strategy to the ongoing trend of global détente and engage North Korea. As a result, Roh Tae-woo’s engagement policy toward North Korea led to such achievements as the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation as well as the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991.⁶ A major goal of the *Nordpolitik* was to induce the North to open itself to the outside world and encourage it to build diplomatic relations with the West, particularly the United States, and Japan (J. Kim, 2010, p. 76). Despite all of the positive developments that occurred between the two Koreas during Roh’s presidency, his engagement policy failed to improve inter-Korean relations in any tangible way . This is mainly because the policy failed to understand and alleviate North Korea’s perception of the threat it faced from the South. The Roh administration’s diplomacy with North Korea’s communist allies helped to somewhat reinforce

⁶ The Basic Agreement effectively paved the way for improved inter-Korean relations, serving as a conceptual milestone in the dismantlement process of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. President Roh stressed that North Korea should not be seen as an enemy but as a “partner of the national community to share prosperity.” The Basic Agreement signed in December 1991 between Prime Minister Chung Won-shik (South Korea) and Premier Yon Hyong-muk (North Korea) was the first successful application of the principle of the “parties directly concerned.” The principle indicates that South Korea should take the initiative in dismantling the peninsula’s Cold War structure. This effectively constitutes a core concept of the Sunshine Policy (*The KDJ Government The SP*, 1999, p. 19).

the South's international legitimacy vis-à-vis the North (J. Kim, 2010), but contrary to its stated goals, the *Nordpolitik* strategy ultimately severely undermined North Korea's strategic posture, worsened its isolation from the international community, and intensified its siege mentality. Under President Roh's *Nordpolitik*, the South obtained diplomatic recognition from its erstwhile communist adversaries including the Soviet Union and China whereas the North was left without significant headway in normalizing relations with the United States and Japan.

In fact, the Sunshine Policy, which was adopted by Kim Dae-jung five years after the end of Roh Tae-woo's tenure, was South Korea's first engagement policy that was primarily "leadership-driven." The leadership-driven engagement strategy made it possible to make headway in inter-Korean relations regardless of whether constraints and difficulties were imposed by the internal and external environments. In this sense, the Sunshine Policy can be seen as representative of Kim Dae-jung's effort to address what was seen as the shortcomings of the previous engagement policy adopted by President Roh Tae-woo. It seems fair to say that the Sunshine Policy was designed to address the weaknesses of Roh Tae-woo's engagement policy toward North Korea. Kim Dae-jung's persistent endeavors to reduce North Korea's threat perception and build trust between the two Koreas in conducting his peace initiative can be properly understood in this context. The spirit of the policy was sustained by President Kim's immediate successor President Roh Moo-hyun under the name of the Peace and Prosperity Policy. Roh Moo-hyun's version of the Sunshine Policy was meant to expand the scope of economic and cultural exchanges with North Korea based on the principles of the flexible -or diffuse- reciprocity and the separation of politics and economy while striving to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, President Roh aimed to address what he regarded as

the shortcomings of the Sunshine Policy under his predecessor such as issues of transparency, citizen participation, and bipartisan support in implementing the policy. President Moon Jae-in has also implemented a version of the Sunshine Policy intended to make improvements on previous iterations.

Kim Dae-jung's Election During a Time of Turmoil

Just about a month before Kim Dae-jung's election, South Korea had been badly hit by the Asian financial crisis that erupted in the waning period of Kim Young-sam's presidency. The worst ever crisis in the country's history and arguably the most traumatic event since the Korean War forced South Korea to agree to a \$58 billion bailout package from the International Monetary Fund, one of the biggest loans in the IMF's history. This led to massive layoffs and bankruptcies of big banks and industrial firms, which prompted citizens to join the so-called "Gold Collection Campaign" with the purpose of donating to the national treasury (Fackler, 2011; McMillan, 2001). Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations remained at an all-time low as a result of the five-year-long hardline policy under the Kim Young-sam administration. Having brought the country's economy out of the financial crisis about two years and a half ahead of the IMF target of four years, Kim Dae-jung was successful in holding the first inter-Korean summit in June 2001 (Kihl, 2005; Song, 2001, p. 154).

The contextual conditions at the time of Kim Dae-jung's election in December 1997 constituted a *critical juncture* that was a catalyst not only for the country's economic, political,

and societal transformation, but also for the restructuring of inter-Korean relations.⁷ In the wake of South Korea's overall containment policy toward North Korea under the Kim Young-sam administration, the North-South relations were highly unstable and antagonistic, which could well have further exacerbated economic conditions that were already in shambles. At the time, the South Korean people were in desperate need of strong, effective leadership that would push the limits of the possible amid the evolving crisis.

C. Research Questions

How was it possible for President Kim Dae-jung to undertake the comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea amid all the constraints imposed by the external and internal environment?

- What was the role of Kim Dae-jung's leadership in undertaking the Sunshine Policy?
 - What aspects of Kim Dae-jung's leadership constituted a key mechanism, or crucial enabling factors, for the Sunshine Policy?
 - How did Kim Dae-jung's leadership characteristics influence his leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy?
 - What were the downsides of Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy?

This study begins with the quest for understanding the role of President Kim Dae-jung's

⁷ The concept of "critical junctures" is a fundamental building block of historical institutionalism. The causal rationales in the relevant literature suggest a dual model of institutional development comprising relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction that are sporadically punctuated by brief moments of institutional flux -referred to as critical junctures- during which more dramatic change is possible (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 341).

leadership in conducting the Sunshine Policy, South Korea's first comprehensive engagement strategy in dealing with North Korea. This study takes note of the rationale that Kim Dae-jung's leadership constituted a critical enabling factor for the Sunshine Policy, as noted by many insiders and outside observers. However, an understanding of specifically *which* aspects of his leadership served as a major enabling factor has been murky at best, with one exception: his ideas and beliefs have been highlighted as one important factor. The analysis is intended to identify the primary mechanism involved in Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy. The analysis will explore how Kim Dae-jung's personality traits and leadership styles, as well as his personal capital, political skills and characteristics, which had been developed and shaped in his early life, affected the way in which his peace initiative was undertaken over the course of his presidency and the nature of the concerned policy. The analysis will also enable a proper understanding of the downsides of Kim Dae-jung's leadership as reflected in the process of the Sunshine Policy.

Sub-Questions

The first sub-question to address in this study is: Who was Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's first president to adopt the comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea? The study suggests that his presidential leadership was intimately linked with his life experiences prior to his presidency since this is when "personal capitals" and "political skills" were largely shaped. This part of the inquiry is addressed in the *Who* chapter of this study.

The study then poses questions such as: What was the origin and conceptual basis of the Sunshine Policy? How were relevant ideas and beliefs developed and how did they evolve over the course of his political life before the presidency? Where can the Sunshine Policy be

conceptually situated in the relevant literature on engagement policy as a foreign policy tool? How were his ideas and beliefs reflected in the form of the Sunshine Policy during his term of office? This set of inquiries will be dealt with in the *Why* chapter.

The study then delves into the queries in the *How* chapters in which the analysis is aimed at understanding the fundamental mechanism of the Sunshine Policy in terms of 1) the procedural or the decision-making aspect; and 2) the implementation aspect of the policy. The questions to be addressed in this part of the study are as follows: What kind of constraints and difficulties were posed to the Sunshine Policy during Kim Dae-jung's tenure? How did he respond to all of these constraints imposed by the external and internal environment?

Another set of questions to be examined in the *How* chapters are: What was Kim Dae-jung's leadership like in regard to the Sunshine Policy? With the help of the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), the analysis seeks to explore the following queries: What type of leadership styles did Kim Dae-jung show in conducting the Sunshine Policy? Was his leadership consistent regardless of the nature of the context and interests of important constituents or did it change depending on the context and interests of important constituents? Under what conditions did his approach to leadership change? The study also seeks to explore whether, and if so, how Kim Dae-jung's perspectives on major sources of constraints influenced the ways in which he dealt with relevant constraints in implementing his North Korea policy.

D. The Who-Why-How-What Framework

This study will apply the *who-why-how-what* framework suggested by Jentleson (2018) in his recent publication on leadership—specifically, on the leadership of individuals who had

won the Nobel Peace Prize in global peace and security. This framework provides us with the tools necessary to do a “holistic” analysis of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy.

I. The *Who* Chapter

Who was Kim Dae-jung?

In Jentleson’s framework, the profiles of the leaders comprise varying combinations of two key variables: *personal capital* and *political skills*. According to Jentleson, personal capital means the “qualities the leader brings to the position separate from those inherent to it that strengthen the capacity to be transformational.”⁸ He defines political skills as the means to properly wield personal capital, get things done, and ensure the public support for one’s leadership (Jentleson, 2018, p. xxv; Keohane, 2010, pp. 25–26). Political skills constitute another key set of characteristics as it is not enough to have elements of personal capital for a leader to achieve foreign policy goals. In cases where positive changes are made through formal diplomacy, a leader’s professional stature becomes a key source of personal capital. This is the case of interest in this study as it concerns a leader’s statesmanship in relation to specific policy domains. In this case, the personal capital comprises the leader’s expertise, prior achievements, and overall prestige that the individual brings to the position held (Jentleson, 2018, p. xxiv).

The *Who* chapter of this study comprises two sections: A) Biographical sketch of Kim Dae-jung’s life prior to the presidency and B) Personal capital & Political skills. The chapter will also briefly discuss some other elements of personal characteristics deemed useful in

⁸ He notes that personal capital is distinguished from social capital, which relates to bonds of shared identity within a broad community, and from political capital, which mainly concerns resources to be distributed and rewards to be conferred.

understanding Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy. In this chapter, Kim Dae-jung's early life and experiences prior to his presidency are examined as the crucial formation process of his personal capital, political skills, and leadership characteristics, which would constitute essential components of his presidential leadership to be exercised in conducting the Sunshine Policy. The discourse will be focused on identifying major elements of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital and political skills, a toolkit which he would bring to his presidency for use in conducting the Sunshine Policy.

II. The *Why* Chapter

Why did Kim Dae-jung adopt the Sunshine Policy and strive to make peace with North Korea?

Regarding the *Why* chapter, Jentleson (2018) notes that a vision is "a political story" akin to what is more broadly seen as "narratives." Jentleson (2018, p. xxvi) observes: A vision tells us "where we want to go," it is "about the future;" it "guides action;" "defines meaning," and it "is simultaneously backward looking and aspirational." The *Why* chapter in this study discusses Kim Dae-jung's guiding vision which provided the motivations for his unrelenting quest for reconciliation and rapprochement with North Korea. In this chapter, the philosophical and conceptual bases of the Sunshine Policy are discussed along with its origin and the evolution of Kim Dae-jung's ideas and philosophies on unification which culminated in the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* in 1995. Then this chapter discusses the ideas and the set of core principles underlying the Sunshine Policy as well as its guiding rules. Also, the Sunshine Policy will be conceptualized in theoretical terms through discussion of how to conceptually situate comprehensive engagement in the existing literature on engagement policy as a foreign policy tool.

III. The *How* Chapter

How did Kim Dae-jung pursue his peace initiative amid all the constraints imposed by the external and internal environment?

The “How” part of this study comprises four chapters. Loosely speaking, this part of the study addresses Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in relation to two different aspects of the Sunshine Policy: 1) the decision-making system, and 2) the implementation of the policy. These chapters explore the ways in which Kim Dae-jung’s leadership traits and styles affected choices he made in undertaking the Sunshine Policy. Chapter 4 will begin by discussing the two methods used in this study: the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), and qualitative elite interviewing. President Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile comprises his personality traits and leadership styles linked with the Sunshine Policy pertaining to his entire term of office (1998-2003). This chapter will investigate how the decision-making system adopted in relation to the Sunshine Policy was affected by Kim Dae-jung’s personality traits and characteristics. The decision-making model discussed in this part of the study concerns the fundamental mechanism involved in the relevant policy-making process throughout Kim’s presidency. Data obtained through qualitative interviews were used in exploring the decision-making system and process adopted in relation to the North Korea policy under President Kim Dae-jung. The first section of the following three chapters on the implementation of the policy examines how Kim Dae-jung addressed major constraints stemming from the internal and external environment in implementing the Sunshine Policy. A part of these chapters addresses Kim Dae-jung’s perspectives on major sources of constraints that could have or effectively impeded the course of his policy implementation. Holsti (1962, p. 244) holds that a political leader “acts upon his “image” of the

situation rather than upon “objective” reality.” The interview data, which were collected through the author’s personal communications with Kim Dae-jung’s long-time associates and presidential advisers including those officials directly involved in the policy process, were used to explore President Kim’s perspectives on major sources of constraints imposed on his peace initiative.

Methods

1. Leadership Trait Analysis

In this study, the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is used as a primary methodological tool to assess Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style as a function of the interplay of seven personality traits, as will be discussed in detail in the “Methods” section of Chapter 4. The LTA, developed by Hermann (e.g., 1980, 1984, 1987, 2001, 2005, 2008), is an at-a-distance assessment technique for content analysis of verbal materials. A crucial assumption made with at-a-distance techniques is that psychological characteristics of individuals can be assessed by analyzing words they speak (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Winter, 1980, 1993; P. E. Tetlock, 1983; Winter et al., 1991). Used as materials in the analysis were Kim Dae-jung’s speeches, press conferences, and interviews that are available in the public domain as well as transcripts of the conversation he had his North Korean counterpart during the first inter-Korean summit meeting on June 14, 2000. Specifically, only segments of the text materials dealing with North Korea or related topics were used for content analysis so that the results were reflective of Kim’s leadership in relation to the North Korea policy. The analysis combines a quantitative content analysis approach in order to create and assess Kim Dae-jung’s

personality profile revealing his cognitive content and styles as well as his motivations with a qualitative analysis of the relationship between his leadership profile and the nature of the Sunshine Policy.

2. Qualitative Interviewing

In this study, qualitative elite interviewing was used to collect data. Specifically, the study employs semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth interviews as a supplementary instrument to delve into the leader's perspectives on, and perceptions of, the contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy, as well as into the nature of the relevant decision-making machinery. The interviews were conducted with the individuals who were involved in the relevant policy making and implementation process and/or served as close aides to President Kim for a long time prior to and/or during his presidency.

IV. The *What* Chapter

What aspects of Kim Dae-jung's leadership constituted a key mechanism for the Sunshine Policy?

In this chapter, a set of conclusions will be provided on the basis of the analysis from previous chapters. The *What* chapter will begin by discussing how elements of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital and political skills, which were formed throughout his political career prior to his presidency as explored in the *Who* chapter, influenced how he engaged in his peace initiative during his term of office. I then recapitulate the outcome of the analysis done in the *How* chapters. Specifically, I will discuss how the unique combination of Kim Dae-jung's personal traits and leadership styles affected the nature of the Sunshine Policy. I also discuss

whether, and if so, how, Kim Dae-jung's leadership style changed across the three periods of interest depending on the context—or with the passage of time—and/or the source of constraints. I will also discuss important results of the analysis, including the mechanism involved in whether, and if so, how, Kim Dae-jung's perspective on each of three major sources of constraints influenced how he dealt with relevant constraints imposed on his peace initiative, as manifested in his leadership style.

Conclusion

In the conclusion section, I will integrate the results of the analysis and suggest answers to research questions I posed in the introduction. I will summarize discourses on how Kim Dae-jung's leadership characteristics affected the nature of the Sunshine Policy in terms of the procedural and implementation aspects of the policy. Based on the outcome of the analysis, I will encapsulate the aspects of Kim Dae-jung's leadership that constituted a crucial mechanism for the Sunshine Policy as well as its downsides. I will then discuss the contribution of my study, limitations, next steps, and the future of the Sunshine Policy.

Significance of the Study

The study intends to explore the leadership factor of the Sunshine Policy holistically and in a methodologically rigorous and analytically sophisticated manner. It is worth noting that such studies have been a sheer rarity when it comes to the topic in question. The existing studies on the Sunshine Policy have discussed a variety of dimensions of the policy including the leadership, the origin and the conceptual evolution of the policy, its functionalist aspect, its

implications, concerned ideas and beliefs, and so forth.⁹ Notably, those analytical studies focused on an enabling factor of the Sunshine Policy mainly delve into an ideational dimension of the policy –e.g., collective identity formation, and ideas and norms involved in the policy– mainly employing a constructivist approach to the subject (K. Y. Son, 2006; J. K. Choi, 2010; C. Moon, 2012).

Even though many researchers and practitioners discuss the role of Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, their focus has been largely confined to the leader's philosophy and beliefs on the grounds that the policy was the fundamental epitome of Kim Dae-jung's philosophies of unification and strategies of engagement aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of inter-Korean rapprochement and peaceful unification (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 6). This study is intended to fill the gap, and to take a further step towards a holistic understanding of the fundamental dynamics of leadership as the most critical component of the development and implementation of the Sunshine Policy.

This study is expected to contribute to the fields of leadership, decision making, and foreign policy by offering insights into the role of leadership in understanding global peace and security. Also, the study's elaborately designed analytical framework tailored to the goal of the research will make a meaningful contribution to the methodological development of the field of study.

⁹ Studies on the Sunshine Policy include Koo Bon-hak and Nam Chang-hee (2001), Sohn Moo-Jung (2001), Kim Hak-joon (2003), Kim Hong-Soo (2005), and Cho Young-chul (2010). These studies discuss the origin and the chronological evolution of the Sunshine Policy. The researches by Koo Young-rok (2000) as well as Kwon Eun-dak and Lim Jae-cheon (2006) explore the functionalist aspect of the Sunshine Policy. Studies by Ju Sung-whan (2007) and Ju Sung-whan and Kim Jin-soo (2006) address the implications of South Korea's engagement of North Korea under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun shedding light on trade and conflict between two Koreas (Y. G. Kim, 2013, pp. 183–184).

Chapter 2. Who was Kim Dae-jung?

A. Biographical Sketch

Childhood

Kim Dae-jung was born on January 6, 1924, in a small village on a remote island called Haido in South Cholla province. His childhood was one of the gloomiest and darkest periods of Japanese colonial rule for Korea (Kim, 2011a, pp. 27–29). He was born to Kim Un-shik, a tenant farmer, to whom he attributed his artistic talents, and Chang Su-keum, a strict but very affectionate mother (Kim, 2011a, pp. 30–34). Kim Dae-jung was the firstborn son of his mother and the second son of his father.¹⁰ Even though his mother and the four children were living separately from the first family, Kim Dae-jung grew up going back and forth between the two families and had close sibling relationships (Kim, 2011a, pp. 27-37). Until he left for Mokpo -in 1936- in fourth grade at Normal school, he was educated in Haido. He went to school in Haido until 1936 when he left for fourth grade in Mokpo at Normal School.

Kim Dae-jung indicates that he inherited his father's artistic talent and his mother's political instinct involving a natural aptitude to judge a matter logically and verify it through practice. Kim Dae-jung honored his mother's role in making him a politician. Describing her as highly inspiring and self-sacrificing, Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir that his mother inspired him with an acute sense of right and wrong. She was utterly devoted to educating her children, especially Kim Dae-jung, her eldest and the most pampered son (Kim, 1996, pp. 3–4; Kim,

¹⁰ Kim's mother was his father's second wife. His father had one son and three daughters with his first wife, who reportedly later died, while having three sons and one daughter with Kim Dae-jung's mother.

2011a, pp. 31–5). In his boyhood, he was well-behaved and rarely argued with others. He also says he was timid and even frightened of ghosts (Kim, 1996, p. 26). A pragmatic aptitude, which Kim Dae-jung would demonstrate over the course of his political life for forming coalitions with his critics and opponents, to the extent that such acts were instrumental in furthering his causes, appears to be in part attributable to the unique situation he found himself in with regard to his family history and the roles he chose to play as the second son of his father and the first son of his mother.

School Age (Ages 9-11)

In his childhood, Kim Dae-jung was fond of studying and excelled in school. At the age of nine, he began to attend a local Seodang, a traditional village school providing Confucian elementary education. At Seodang, students were assessed through recitations instead of the examinations given in a modern school system. His parents were elated whenever he was awarded the top place at Seodang. When he won first place, his devoted mother prepared some delicious food including rice cakes and drinks to serve to his teacher and classmates (Kim, 1996, p. 114).

A year later, Kim was transferred to the four-year regular elementary school that was newly built in his village. Even as a little boy, he was attracted to politics. Serving as village chief, his father was eligible to receive a free newspaper. While learning the Chinese characters at Seodang, Kim Dae-jung was an avid reader of newspapers. With an intense interest in history and politics, he would devour the front page, which covered the political news. At school, he recalls that he would raise uncomfortably sharp political issues and enjoy discussing politics and

his own analyses (Kim, 1996, p. 3; Kim, 2011a, p. 30, 38, 47).

Adolescence (Ages 12-19)

In 1936 when Kim Dae-jung was in the fourth grade at elementary school, his mother persuaded his father to move to Mokpo to provide their gifted son with a better education environment (Kim, 2011a, p. 38). He went to the prestigious Mokpo Commercial High School, ranking first at the entrance exam among the mix of Japanese and Korean students. For the next three years, he stayed at the top of the class and would exhibit brilliance that annoyed some of the Japanese teachers (Kim, 2011a, pp. 42–50; Kirk, 2009, pp. 6–7). Kim Dae-jung's interest in politics was further intensified during this time. In his memoir, he recalls that the encouragement from some Japanese teachers who praised him for his oratorical talent and ability to speak in public significantly whetted his appetite for politics (Kim, 1996, p. 3). In this period, Kim Dae-jung realized that he had a talent for clearly conveying his thoughts and knowledge to others. He believed that his gift for teaching and ability for persuasion was linked with his passion for politics (Kim, 1996, p. 3).

In the meantime, Kim Dae-jung felt deeply frustrated with the abolitionist policy of the Japanese colonial rule, in which the Korean language class was abolished, and Korean students were banned from using their own language and forced to change their names to Japanese ones (Kim, 2011a, pp. 42-46). Disturbed by the brutal Japanese policy, his grades began to fall in his senior year (Kim, 2011a, p. 50). In those days, the school authorities used to have the students attend a monthly session wherein the school's Japanese military instructor would speak about the political situation. Kim Dae-jung often asked questions that used to corner the

instructor (Kim, 1996, p. 4). While in high school, he was often criticized for being an “impure element.” His school record, which was revealed in a biographical documentary in the Japanese NHK-TV broadcasting network in the early 1990s, indicated that he had “a strong critical attitude” and should “be put on a watch list” (Kim, 1996, p. 4).

During his high school days, Kim Dae-jung was a favorite student among many Japanese teachers (Kim, 2011a, pp. 45-47).¹¹ He discusses in his autobiography how one Japanese teacher gave him crucial mentorship in his formative years by teaching him invaluable life lessons on the importance of pragmatism and the balance between flexibility and adherence to principles (Kim, 2011a, p. 46).¹² Kim Dae-jung indicates in his writings that despite his firm resistance to the Japanese colonial rule and system, he maintained a pragmatic spirit. That is, he did not personally hold a grudge against the Japanese. Instead, he differentiated between hatred of the system and hatred of the people. This appears to evoke Nelson Mandela’s practical attitude toward the Whites, demonstrated throughout his crusade against apartheid.¹³

Young Adult (Ages 20-25)

After graduation from high school, he planned to go to Konkook University—or Kenkoku University in Japanese—located in Manchukuo. However, in December 1941, with the fighting between the United States and Japan raging on upon the outbreak of the Pacific War, he changed his plan as he dreaded the possibility of being drafted into the Japanese army. Instead

¹¹ He says in his memoir that his Japanese teachers neither discriminated against Korean students nor treated them with contempt (Kim, 2011a, p. 43).

¹² In his memoir, Kim Dae-jung reminds himself that the Japanese teacher taught students to “firmly adhere to the principle of life,” saying that to abandon it was like abandoning life itself” (Kim, 1996, pp. 124–125).

¹³ While vigorously pursuing his goals of ending apartheid and achieving African nationalism, Mandela was never viscerally anti-white, differentiating between hatred of the system and hatred of whites (Jentleson, 2008, pp. 144, 160).

of going to college, he chose to join a Japanese shipping company (Kim, 2011a, pp. 48-50). With the Japanese leaving Korea upon their surrender on August 15, 1945, the company was left with twenty or so workers without an owner. Kim Dae-jung ran the company as the workers elected him to become the company manager. He then decided to run another company acceding to the request from the employees of the biggest shipbuilding company in Mokpo (Kim, 2011a, p. 55). Around this time, Kim moved to launch his own company engaged in marine cargo transportation (Kim, 2011, p. 62).

Upon the liberation of Korea from the colonial rule, Kim Dae-jung began to engage in political activities aspiring to contribute to the establishment of the new country. In 1945, Kim joined the local chapter of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, led by Yeo Un-hyung, which would later become the People's Committee. At the time, many patriotic and conscious young men in the thoroughly left-wing Mokpo joined the People's Committee (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). The U.S. forces that arrived in Korea several weeks after the Japanese surrender outlawed the committee as leftist, if not communist (Kirk, 2009, p. 8). Kim Dae-jung then briefly joined the New Democratic Party or *Shinmin-dang* in Korean.¹⁴ In fact, Kim's membership in leftist political parties in the wake of the country's liberation would later become part of the charges in the indictment filed against him in September 1980 when he was sentenced to death for sedition and violation of the National Security Law at the military

¹⁴ On December 27, 1945, the announcement was made at the Moscow Conference that Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed upon a period of trusteeship for Korea, not to exceed five years. In Korea, the announcement was met with a growing wave of discontent, chagrin, fury, and eventually violence. Kim Dae-jung personally believed that the trusteeship, although humiliating, would be a better option than a divided, independent state. According to Kim Dae-jung, this is why he joined the New Democratic Party *Shinmin-dang* which was campaigning for a left-right collaboration. Kim's disenchantment with communism at the time was also affected by his conservative father-in-law, the father of his first wife (Kim, 2011a, pp. 58-59). However, as soon as he realized that the party was supportive of communism and the Soviet Union, Kim withdrew his membership (Dae Jung Kim, 2011a, pp. 58-59).

tribunal (H. H. Lee, 1997, p. 180).

Political Awakening: Korean War & Pusan Political Crisis (Age 26-29)

Kim Dae-jung was on a business trip to Seoul when the Korean War broke out. After suffering setbacks during the war –to be discussed in detail below– Kim Dae-jung decided to resume his business.¹⁵ In October 1950, Kim took over the local Mokpo Daily, which was the first-ever local newspaper in postcolonial Korea, and served as its president and publisher for two years. Additionally, engaging in a shipping business that was booming, he thrived as a businessman in his twenties (Kim, 1996, p. 5; J. Kim, 2010, pp. 79, 81–82).

During the war, Kim Dae-jung went through two critical events which gave him a rude awakening and led him to enter politics: 1) the Korean War (1950-1953), and 2) the Busan Political Crisis (1952). On the second day of the war, the South Korean troops, which were vastly inferior to their northern counterparts in human and material resources, abandoned Uijongbu, the gateway to Seoul. President Syngman Rhee assured the frightened Seoulites over the radio that he would do his utmost to secure the capital. As it later turned out, Rhee had already fled south to Daejeon when he made the announcement on the radio. The following day, the South Korean army blew up the Han River Bridge, cutting off the major route leading south. Hundreds of refugees and soldiers who were crossing the bridge were killed in the explosion that was set off without warning. Watching as all this happened, Kim Dae-jung, along with many other Koreans, felt deeply frustrated and pondered over the importance of leadership (C. S. Kim, 1998, p. 148; Kim, 2011, pp. 69–69; Lee, 2015).

¹⁵ As the war was prolonged, people were increasingly becoming desensitized and came to live ordinary lives at the time.

During the Korean War, Kim states in his autobiography, he endured some harrowing experiences at the hands of the North Koreans and thus became disenchanted with communism. In September 1950, Kim was arrested, imprisoned, and was almost killed by the Communists. He only narrowly escaped from being shot to death (Kim, 2011a, p. 73). His witness of the cruelty committed by the North Korean army made the danger of communism clear to him. Kim Dae-jung shuddered at accidentally watching a person be executed on the spot at a people's court on the street by the North Korean soldiers (Kim, 2011a, p. 69). As reflected in his own writings, Kim Dae-jung sought to explain away his alleged affinity with the communism and the North Korean regime that persistently hounded him throughout his political career.

Another incident that led to a political awakening in Kim Dae-jung and made him decide to enter politics occurred in the middle of the War. At the time, Syngman Rhee's reelection appeared difficult in the National Assembly through indirect presidential election as he lost support from the opposition Korean Democratic Party. In a bid to challenge this constraint and perpetuate his rule, President Rhee tried to amend the constitution.¹⁶ However, the January 1952 vote of the National Assembly blocked Rhee's scheme. In the summer of 1952, the Rhee government resubmitted the amendment bill to the opposition-led National Assembly, setting off the so-called "Pusan Political Crisis." In an attempt to get the bill passed with a two-thirds majority, Rhee declared martial law, suspended the National Assembly, and intimidated the assembly into approving a constitutional amendment for direct presidential election which

¹⁶ President Rhee proposed a constitutional amendment to replace the indirect presidential election by the members of the National Assembly, as stipulated by the constitution, with a direct, popular election. Rhee believed he could control the outcome of the direct election.

cleared the way for his third-term and eventual life-long term of office (Cumings, 2005, p. 347; Robinson, 2007, p. 122; Kil, 2010, p. 35).¹⁷

Formation of Lifetime Goals: Democracy & Unification

The experience of a tragic war left Kim Dae-jung with his lifetime goal of achieving rapprochement between two Koreas and genuine democracy in South Korea. He was badly shocked to see how easily representatives of the people yielded to the will of a dictator and how a single corrupt leader brought the whole country to a crisis and threw the people into despair. According to Kim Dae-jung, the Korean War taught him that a deceitful leader might lead to a failed society, and by extension, a failed state. He concluded that the real well-being of the people could never be achieved unless a genuine democratic system was established and one-man rule, which had changed the constitution at its will and had downgraded the National Assembly, was brought to an end (Kim, 2011a, pp. 86-87). Believing that all the tragedies resulted from the corruption of politics, Kim Dae-jung decided to enter politics at the end of the war.

Trials Suffered before the First Election (Ages 30-39)

His political career was full of trials from the beginning. After getting out of the shipping business, Kim ran for the National Assembly in May 1954 as an independent, only to be ranked fifth among eight candidates (Kim, 2011a, pp. 88-89). After his first run for election, it took him

¹⁷ In the process, the government arrested twelve assemblymen, censored the press, and threatened to dissolve assembly entirely, which Rhee had no legal authority to do.

nine years to win a seat in the National Assembly and to actually engage in legislative activities. Throughout nine years of running for election (1954-1963), Kim Dae-jung's strength and resilience were repeatedly tested. In May 1956, President Rhee won an easy victory in his bid for a third four-year term after the presidential candidate of the opposition Democratic Party died just before the election. Rhee, however, faced trouble from Chang Myeon, the victorious vice-presidential candidate from the Democratic Party.¹⁸ After Chang was wounded in an assassination attempt in 1957, Kim Dae-jung joined his Democratic Party. After joining the opposition party, he ran again for the National Assembly in 1958, this time in Inje, Kangwon province. This time, he could not even register as a candidate as the Rhee government spared no effort to block his election (Kim, 2011a, pp. 94-101; Kirk, 2009, p. 21).¹⁹ In the ensuing June 1959 special election which was held after Kim Dae-jung won a lawsuit he had filed against the electoral district, Kim was defeated again.²⁰ Eventually, Kim Dae-jung won election on his fourth try in May 1961 following successive electoral defeats in 1954, 1958, and 1959 (e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 88-104; Kirk, 1999, pp. 19-26). However, his political career was thwarted again as the National Assembly was dissolved a few days after his election by General Park Chung-hee who led a military coup. The Democratic government led by Prime Minister Chang Myeon was helplessly toppled by Park's coup (e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 128-129, 130-8; Kirk, 2009, pp. 19-23).

¹⁸ Chang Myeon, known as John Myeon Chang in the West, served as Prime Minister when the Democratic Party was in power (from 1960-1961). This was the only democratic government in Korea's history until the end of the President Roh's presidency (1988-1993). Chang was then the hope of the Koreans who longed for change in government. Kim Dae-jung was heavily influenced by Chang Myeon, whose words and deeds he found impeccable as a devout Catholic. Kim Dae-jung was baptized in June 1956 with Chang Myeon serving as his godfather (Kim, 2011a, pp. 91-92).

¹⁹ For example, in the spring 1958 election, government goons used every means possible to block his registration as a candidate. Kim managed to register his candidacy after a considerable uproar, only to see the registration invalidated by physical force. Charging fraud, Kim got the Supreme Court to rule in his favor, invalidate the vote, and order another election.

²⁰ This time, Kim appeared to have realistic chances of success. However, the government tried every tactic to hamper his election, enforcing an open ballot among soldiers who were known to be mostly supportive of the opposition, conducting a propaganda campaign labeling Kim as a "commie," and carrying out vote rigging (Kim, 2011a, pp. 94-101; Kirk, 2009, p. 21).

Kim Dae-jung continued to challenge a series of obstacles that were imposed on his election. Upon the lifting of an authoritarian decree in early 1963, he ran again for election as the Democratic Party candidate from Mokpo, his hometown district. This time, he easily won the election for the first time in nine years (Goldstein, 1999, pp. 43–44). After all, Kim Dae-jung's election to the National Assembly in 1963 (at age 45) was his first political success. All the adversities and setbacks he went through before entering politics afforded him tenacity, resilience, and perseverance, an important source of his personal capital. Notably, how Kim Dae-jung achieved his first political success apparently had a significant bearing on how he would deal with constraints and obstacles he would face throughout his political career.

Early Political Career (Ages 39-46)

Kim Dae-jung became a member of the opposition Democratic Party in 1956 at age 32 with the backing of Dr. Chang Myeon. His political career began in earnest in 1960 upon his appointment as party spokesman by Prime Minister Chang Myeon, a tribute to Kim's growing reputation for eloquence (Kirk, 2009, p. 23). Kim Dae-jung was elected to the National Assembly in 1961, 1963, 1967, and 1970. Kim Dae-jung worked his way up through the ranks of the opposition Democratic Party until he became its presidential candidate in 1971. Upon engaging in legislative activities in 1963, he quickly emerged as a national figure. He soon distinguished himself as an orator who could easily mesmerize a crowd with his verbal talent (Kirk, 2009, p. 27). Kim Dae-jung's stellar performance as an opposition lawmaker led him to emerge as the

most dreaded political rival to President Park Chung Hee.²¹ This reportedly made him the target of the assassination plot attempted by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in August 1971.

The Turning Point in Kim Dae-jung's Political Career (Age 47)

President Park Chung-hee regarded Kim Dae-jung as a serious threat to his rule and a nuisance that had to be silenced in light of his legislative activities in the National Assembly. In the 1967 assembly election, President Park reportedly made systematic efforts to defeat Kim Dae-jung even though the latter won by a landslide.²² It was the 1971 presidential election that marked a crucial turning point for Kim Dae-jung the politician (aged 47). His ideas on unification, developed through his legislative activities in the 1960s, began to be made public in the form of policy proposals in the early 1970s. In a press conference on the campaign trail in October 1970, Kim Dae-jung issued four innovative proposals on South Korea's policy toward North Korea: 1) security guarantees from the four major powers (the United States, Japan, China, and Russia) to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula; 2) full (cultural, social, economic) exchange with North Korea and South Korea's normalization of relations with communist countries; 3) peaceful coexistence with North Korea; and 4) peaceful unification based on the *three-stage unification formula* featuring peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and

²¹ On April 20, 1964, Kim Dae-jung conducted a filibuster for five hours and nineteen minutes, arguing against the arrest of a fellow lawmaker and party member. This earned him recognition by the Guinness Book Records for the longest speaking record in the National Assembly (Kirk, 2009, p. 27).

²² Kim Dae-jung, on his part, fought back zealously, charging that the ruling candidate was a henchman of the government and that the election would be rigged. Despite Park's concerted efforts to defeat him, Kim Dae-jung easily prevailed. In the election at large, the ruling party won overwhelmingly, securing more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. This was more than enough to allow for the constitutional amendment to enable Park Chung-hee's third term (Kirk, 2009, pp. 29-30, e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 176-190).

peaceful unification. (Kim, 2011a, pp. 205-207; 258-267).²³

Kim Dae-jung's 1971 proposal on North Korea policy aroused interest and passion among many South Koreans. At the time, the 'theory of Unification through Marching North' still remained a dominant discourse on unification in South Korean society as the Korean War had ended less than 18 years earlier. In the atmosphere of those days, it was difficult to issue any proposals unless they were anti-communist or dedicated to the annihilation of communism. In fact, Kim's proposals were made against the backdrop of emerging signs of détente in the global Cold War structure as was evidenced by the Nixon Doctrine on February 18, 1970. Still, Kim Dae-jung's proposals sounded creative since they were announced even before the visit to Beijing in July 1971 by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's secret envoy, following the so-called pingpong diplomacy, and President Nixon's subsequent visit to Beijing in February 1972 (S.S. Park, personal communication, November 23, 2016). In actuality, Kim Dae-jung's 1971 proposals would be implemented in the form of the Sunshine Policy twenty seven years later. Moreover, Kim's proposals on the four-power security guarantee would later serve as the conceptual foundation for the Six-Party Talks (2004-2008), which brought together the two Koreas and the four powers to the negotiating table to address North Korea's nuclear problem.

On his visit to the United States in February 1971 as a presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung revealed his proposal for the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* in his press conference at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. His proposal included an array of innovative ideas

²³ Such proposals were made in addition to a set of other policy proposals including industrialization based on agricultural development, participatory mass production, and abolition of the homeland reserve forces.

such as: 1) tension reduction through mutual abandonment of the use of arms; 2) inter-Korean exchanges in non-military fields; and 3) South and North Korea's simultaneous entry into the United Nations; 4) and the cross-recognition of South Korea by China and Russia and North Korea by the United States and Japan (Kim, 2011a, pp. 262-265).

As a presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung enlisted American legislative support and actively cultivated contacts in the United States, Japan and elsewhere in pursuit of international support for his causes. His initiative began in February 1971 by calling on two Democratic Party politicians in Washington, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both senators, who opposed the U.S. role in Vietnam, expressed sympathy and support for Kim Dae-jung in their zeal for American style democracy and their revulsion over the excesses first of Rhee Syngman and then of Park Chung-hee (Kirk, 2009, p. 40).

Political Ordeals Suffered under the State-led Anti-Communist Campaigns (Ages 48-63)

With regard to the country's North Korea policy under Park Chung-hee, Park announced the historic July 4 (1972) Joint Communique with North Korea, to the surprise of many South Koreans.²⁴ While welcoming the move, Kim found it incomprehensible that President Park, who had been undertaking an extremely hardline approach toward the North and repressing those calling for inter-Korean reconciliation, took an abruptly conciliatory turn stressing the need to promote inter-Korean exchange and reconciliation in pursuit of peaceful unification. Kim Dae-

²⁴ For an English version of the July 4 South-North Communique (1972), go to: <https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-4july-communique72>

jung then realized that this was no more than a political ploy designed to allow Park Chung-hee and Kim Il-sung to consolidate their respective rule since very little was done to follow through on the inter-Korean agreement.

Having emerged as Park Chung-hee's arch-rival in the wake of the 1971 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung became a major target of the state-led anti-communist campaign designed to stifle all forms of dissent. Kim Dae-jung was deeply disturbed by the ways in which President Park used the alleged threat from North Korea to tighten his grip on power amid growing popular aspirations for democracy and thus to perpetuate his rule. Throughout his term of office, Park took a series of extra-legal measures by declaring "emergency decrees" repeatedly – nine times – to stifle opposition, mainly from intellectuals and Christian clergymen, to his rule. Kim Dae-jung condemned the Park regime for abusing National Security Law as an expedient tool to oppress dissidents. In accusing the government of abusing National Security Law for political purposes, Kim Dae-jung said, "It is such an evil law that cannot exist in a democratic state. We also know that it has been arbitrarily misused by those in power, not for anti-communist purposes but for political aims to suppress scholars, reporters, literati, and students" (Kirk, 1999, p. 36). Notably, however, he took a highly pragmatic position on the National Security Law. Kim stopped short of demanding its repeal, taking a practical and nuanced approach that was distinct from the leftist claim at the time. Instead, he focused his criticism on Article Four, claiming that the notorious article "be applied to only those who have explicit anti-state purposes" (Kirk, 1999, p. 36). The anti-communist campaign targeted at Kim Dae-jung continued into the subsequent Chun Doo-hwan government. The fabricated pro-communist spy allegations led Kim Dae-jung to be sentenced to death under the Chun regime in

May 1980. The so-called “Red Campaign” was in full swing especially during election times.²⁵

Under the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan governments, Kim survived a death sentence (1980), imprisonments (1976-1978, 1980-1982), numerous house arrests (1973-1976, 1978-1979, 1985-1987), aborted assassination attempts (1971, 1973), and an abduction (1973). Throughout his political career, Kim Dae-jung suffered from an egregious form of regionalism initiated under the Park regime. This regionalism featured political and economic favoritism shown towards the southeastern Kyongsang province and discrimination against the southwestern Cholla province. President Park Chung-hee virtually excluded the Cholla region from the economic development plan he earnestly pushed for, leaving the entire region long destitute and underprivileged (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). This helped create the domestic political culture wherein voters were motivated not by the policies and competencies of the candidates but rather by regionalist prejudices. Many voters tended to vote along strict regional lines, thus squeezing the two Cholla provinces into a losing position. Kim Dae-jung, who was often mocked for his origins in Mokpo of South Cholla, accommodated grievances of the Cholla population and became their advocate, champion, and unquestioned leader (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). Noting that Park’s regional discrimination policy originated from pernicious regionalism, Kim posited that regionalism is “the biggest political, moral blunder” committed by Park Chung-hee under his 18-year rule, denouncing it as “a crime against history” (Kim, 2011, p. 152).²⁶

²⁵ For example, in the election of December 1992, the media linked an episode involving North Korean spy Lee Sun-shil with presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung. The newspapers spread a story in the headlines that the North was backing Kim Dae-jung for president, rooting for Kim Young-sam’s defeat (J. S. Kang, 2010). Candidate Kim Young-sam, for his part, unleashed anti-communist attacks against Kim Dae-jung, his longtime adversary, whom he falsely accused of being supported by Pyongyang (Oberdorfer, 2001, p. 287).

²⁶ Kim Dae-jung condemned regionalism by saying, “Regional discrimination is like a cancer cell that may snatch away our life any time (Kim, 1996, p. 94). I believe that, if our people want to become an advanced nation, we must unfailingly pass through the process of completely liberating ourselves from this evil practice (p. 88) ... There is no more urgent matter than this. Unless we do so, the future is not bright for us (p. 94).”

After spending two years and two months in exile in the United States, Kim Dae-jung returned home in February 1985. Upon his arrival at the Kimpo airport, he was immediately whisked away and put under house arrest. Kim's return home intensified the nationwide pro-democracy protest. In June 1987, Kim Dae-jung was cleared of all outstanding charges, had his political and civil rights restored, and became free to run for office. He was defeated again in two presidential elections in a row in 1987 and 1992 before being elected as the eighth President of the Republic of Korea in December 1997 at age 74. Kim Dae-jung's election marked the first-ever peaceful transition of power from the ruling to the opposition party in Korea's modern history.

B. Personal Capital and Political Skills

1. Personal Capital

Kim Dae-jung's experience as a democratic activist and an opposition leader throughout his forty year-long political career prior to his election as president afforded him ample sources of personal capital comprising various personal bona fides. However, it is worth noting that the leadership qualities required to govern or preside over specific policies as a president can be different from those required to be an effective opposition leader. This is in part because of the difference in the degree of accountability involved or of necessity for pleasing or placating important constituencies. Those running for office or leading the opposition do not have to be responsible for the effectiveness of specific policies and thus may criticize the leadership without any direct obligation to deal with the problems. Therefore, opposition leaders may appear more confident in their proposals or express the black and white worldview on their

campaign trail in enlisting support from the populace and the media (Hermann, 2003).

While serving as an opposition leader whose leadership mainly derived from popular support, Kim Dae-jung's personal capital took a strong moral dimension involving such elements as courage, sacrifices, charisma as well as a sense of commitment to causes such as democracy, human rights, and peaceful unification (e.g., Jentleson, 2018, p. xxv)

Meanwhile, the personal capital Kim Dae-jung brought to office as the president who would preside over the overall implementation of the North Korea policy and relevant diplomacy was more closely linked with his professional stature based on such elements as expertise, prior achievements, and overall prestige that he brought to office. This is because, in conducting his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was more focused on managing the policy process and engaging in diplomacy than on enlisting public support, communicating with the public, or responding to his critics and opponents.

Kim Dae-jung's political capital developed throughout his political career is comprised of tenacity, charisma and international recognition. Regarding the area of North Korea policy, his knowledge and expertise in the field constituted another crucial source of personal capital.

1) Tenacity

Prior to being elected president of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung's life remained constantly uncertain, as it was full of trials and tribulations. It took him nine years after his first try in 1954 to be elected to the National Assembly and engage in legislative activities. It took him 26 years after becoming a presidential candidate in 1971 to be elected president in December 1997. In the process, he lost three presidential elections in 1971, 1987, and 1992. In his political life, Kim

Dae-jung experienced four different brushes with death, spent six years in prison and over a decade under house arrest, and endured two exiles abroad. He survived an abduction, two assassination attempts, a death sentence, constant surveillance, and extensive defamation.

He was called by many different titles in his political life: a presidential candidate, an opposition leader, the ringleader of a treasonous uprising, a death-row inmate, an exile, a red/communist, a dangerous radical, the president, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Throughout his political life, Kim Dae-jung intensely pondered the theme of “challenges and responses.” Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on this leitmotif is clearly manifested in his letters to his family members while imprisoned. In his letters, he expressed a firm belief in the human being’s power to produce creative and courageous responses to challenges and in making a change.²⁷

2) Charisma

According to Weber (1947, p. 361), charismatic authority is outside the realm of everyday routine and the profane sphere, as distinguished from the cases of rational and traditional authority (Weber, 1947, pp. 328–329).²⁸ Other scholars suggest contrasting

²⁷ Kim Dae-jung says that he learned much and discovered, in the difficult times, a conviction for Toynbee’s philosophy of history (Dae Jung Kim, 1987, p. 62). He called Toynbee his intellectual mentor. Toynbee’s “A Study of History” is the text that gave Kim a sense of how to steer his life (Kim, 1987, p. 63; Kim, 1996, p. 42). Kim Dae-jung says in his letter (dated July 27, 1981), “Human beings cannot be dealt with by the natural science theory of causality. In the material world, the same cause will produce the same consequence, irrespective of time and place, but with human beings, because the human spirit can vary so greatly in their response to the same cause, different results occur. Depending on their imagination and courage, human beings can develop quite different results from historical condition, and the history of mankind is no more than the stage for this drama of diversity” (Kim, 1987, p. 63).

²⁸ Max Weber notes that the term *charisma* is “a quality of an individual personality” by virtue of which “he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” Weber holds that such qualities are not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the concerned individual is treated as a leader (Weber, 1947, pp. 358–359).

viewpoints on charisma. Referring to charisma in the Weberian concept as “a confusing and undemocratic form of leadership,” at best, and as “a type of tyranny,” at worst, Burns (2003, pp. 26–27) posits that effective charismatic leadership takes the “creative leader-follower interaction” dimension into consideration in which the leader provides initiatives that followers “pick up, amplify, reshape, and direct back onto the leader.” Similarly, organization scholars such as David Nadler and Michael Tushman (1990) note that charismatic leaders are supposed to “envision, energize, and enable” the followers. Hermann and associates (2001, pp. 97–98, 108) posit that charismatic leaders are aware that recognition of power and authority are in the “eye of the beholder.” These leaders are willing to include others and have them onboard in the process of moving towards their goal so as to enhance the chances of success.

Assuming that the two different notions of charisma suggested by Weber (1947) and Burns (2003) represent two extremes on the spectrum, a close examination of Kim Dae-jung’s political life and his perspective on the leader-follower relationship leads to the conclusion that his charisma would fall somewhere towards the middle of the spectrum. That is, Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was multifaceted in nature. On one hand, it presumably conformed to the traditional, Weberian concept of charisma and the notion of leadership embedded in the country’s Confucian culture. On the other hand, his charismatic personality was shaped by the political career he pursued as a democratic activist and dissident politician. This means that Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was affected by the notion of the leader-follower relationship in the democratic context as posited by Burns (2003), as well as Nadler and Tushman (1990).

Regarding the relationship between the leader and the follower, Kim Dae-jung posited that the leader “walk only a half-step ahead of the people” and that in doing so, the leader walk

hand in hand with the people (K. H. Choi, 2010, p. 47). From Kim Dae-jung's viewpoint, the leader is someone who leads the masses, but the individual should neither go alone or walk far ahead of the people nor mingle in the masses. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung's leadership combined the two different notions of charisma, as discussed above.

Studies (Bass, 1981; Byars, 1972, 1973; Hermann & Kogan, 1977) suggest that charismatic leaders focus on two distinct functions at the same time: that of pushing the organization toward completion of a task, and that of maintaining group spirit and morale. For Kim Dae-jung, the leader is supposed to articulate a compelling vision, be a good example, show consistency in behavior, exude personal confidence and enthusiasm, empathize with the masses, express confidence in people, and most importantly, come up with "a solution" to problems with which the people struggle. In short, Kim believed that the leader is responsible for "envisioning, energizing and enabling" people, as Nadler and Tushman (Nadler & Tushman, 1990, pp. 81–83) put it.

Kim Dae-jung's charisma was in part ascribed to the sheer power of his political discourse and persuasiveness in argument. As a dissident politician, Kim Dae-jung would exude a charismatic appeal, captivating crowds at a mass rally as easily as a small audience in an important forum (Kirk, 2009, p. 27). Studies surmise that much of the charismatic appeal of political leaders is attributed to their oratorical skills. Ann Ruth Willner (1968, p. 103) observes that charismatic leaders are commonly described as "eloquent" or "spell-binding" orators equipped with the ability to "arouse audiences to heights of enthusiasm and emotion."

Tucker (1977, p. 388) posits that one quality that may be common to charismatic leaders is "a contagious faith and confidence in the community's capacity to overcome, under

their leadership, its distress.” Apparently, this is the case with Kim Dae-jung, whose life prior to the presidency was marked by seemingly incessant hardship and adversity. To overcome this, he had to gather courage, holding faith and confidence in the capacity of the people in his mind. Kim Dae-jung had articulated such a faith and confidence as a source of his courage.

Another notable dimension of charismatic leadership is linked with the ability to promote change. Unquestionably, Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was also derived from this. Tucker (1968, p. 736) stresses this dimension, positing that “Whatever the particular social setting (religion, politics, and so forth), charismatic leadership rejects old rules and issues a demand for change.” Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was closely associated with his predilection for innovation. In strategizing the rapprochement process, Kim Dae-jung was all the more inclined to be innovative in his ways of thinking and to break with time-honored ways of thinking and acting in dealing with North Korea.

Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s charismatic charm had an authoritarian streak, a trait noted in Weber’s thesis. While Kim Dae-jung was the opposition leader, the epithet “imperial” was often used before his position when critics described him. Critics would note that Kim Dae-jung’s presence within his party was so powerful and absolute that it rendered the party highly personalized in nature. This certainly would conjure up a negative image linked with an authoritarian or magisterial streak, either in the leader’s personal characteristics or in cultural ethos at the time. In a conversation with the author, a former aide to President Kim used the term “bossy” to describe such an aspect of his leadership.

In a way, this can be seen as the remnant of the so-called the Three Kim era.²⁹ The three Kim politics were seen as linked with patrimonialism wherein personal relationships radiate outwards from an organization's leader as the three leaders tended to dominate their respective parties and to be in absolute control. Moreover, the Three Kim politics were often accused of being of factionalism wherein a cohesive clique of individuals is interconnected by dint of friendship and collegiality. Under the three Kim's leadership, their political parties were each built around a faction as key positions of each party were monopolized by a faction (Choi et al., 2014). Regarding Kim Dae-jung's National Commission for New Politics (NCNP) (1995-2000), the four out of eight executive members of the party were the Donggyo-dong faction and played dominant roles within the party. Not unlike the cases of the other two leaders, Kim Dae-jung's NCNP was so dependent on its charismatic leader that it assumed highly personalized characteristics.

3) Professional Stature based on Knowledge and Expertise

As regards the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's personal capital in large part derived from his professional stature based on his knowledge and expertise that was the product of his focused effort, hard work, intellectual ability, interest, and critical lifetime events. Regarding the concept of expertise, some scholars emphasize focused effort, hard work, and deliberate practice (e.g., Ackerman & Beier, 2003; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). This

²⁹ In the wake of the fiercely competitive 1971 presidential election, the competition between Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, the three opposition leaders, dominated South Korean politics for more than a decade. In this period, the three Kims shaped the leader-centric politics in South Korea as they formed, dissolved, merged, and split parties according to their political needs (J. N. Choi et al., 2014).

conceptualization surmises that anyone who is sufficiently motivated can become an expert at something and that the combination of deliberate practice and specialized training are necessary ingredients of expertise (Preston & M. G. Hermann, 2006, pp. 8–9). In contrast, other scholars stress the importance of pre-existing abilities in attaining expert performance and gaining knowledge (e.g., Ackerman, 1987; Connell, Sheridan, & Gardner, 2003; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Hunter & Hunter, 1984). They claim that, in addition to deliberate practice and experience, natural ability also matters. Still others underscore the importance of critical events in a leader's life, noting that such events can also lead to the development of expertise (e.g., Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings, 2002; Citrin & Sides, 2004). They posit that such events are particularly important during one's "impressionable years" when political socialization rapidly occurs. Such events include wars, protests, arrests, fighting for ethnic or religious identity, discrimination, depressions, coups, riots, as well as traveling, studying, and living abroad (Preston & M. G. Hermann, 2006, p. 6). The critical events and experiences Kim Dae-jung underwent at personal and national levels directly or indirectly influenced the formation of his beliefs and ideas about democracy and rapprochement.³⁰ All this, in turn, affected the development of his interest and expertise in the unification policy.

Regarding Kim Dae-jung's education, he got into higher education relatively late in life.

At age 39, he obtained a one-year diploma in Business Administration. At 42, he completed

³⁰ Kim Dae-jung's critical lifetime experiences include his abduction from Japan (1973) by the South Korean intelligence agency under President Park Chung-hee, four brushes with death, six years of prison, a death sentence, ten years of house arrest and forced exiles in Japan (1973) and the United States (1982-1985). Moreover, he lived through critical junctures in South Korea's history such as the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), the division of the Korean peninsula (1948), the Korean War (1950-1953), the 12 years of Syngman Rhee's rule (1948-1960), the April Student Revolution (1960), the May 16 military coup (1961), the 18 years of Park Chung-hee's rule (1961-1979), the Yushin system (1972-1979), Chun Doo-hwan's military coup (1979), the Gwangju Democratic Uprising (1980), and Roh Tae-woo's June 29 Declaration that marked the country's transition to democracy by adopting direct presidential election and amnesty and restoration of civil right for dissidents including Kim Dae-jung (1987).

another diploma in Industrial management, and at 45 a master's degree in Economics from Kyung Hee University in Seoul. At age 68, he earned a doctoral degree in Political Science at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow in 1992.³¹ Since he did not go to college, Kim Dae-jung sought to demonstrate his intellectual qualifications while engaging in legislative activities. He was well known as the best-informed member of the National Assembly. Kim Dae-jung says he effectively owed this reputation, somewhat paradoxically, to the very fact that he did not attend college. Regarding this, he said, "Instead of having been defeated by this deficiency, I turned it into a fierce will to educate myself (Kim, 1996, p. 118). Kim Dae-jung notes that he wanted to "encourage those who have not had the privilege of attending college to make up their minds to overcome the shortcoming by dint of hard work and self-study. He adds, "I am just an example that it can be done" (Kim, 1996, p. 119).

Notably, Kim Dae-jung's knowledge and expertise in various issue domains were further intensified and enlarged during his time in prison. Some of the letters he wrote were published in English under the title "Prison Writings" in 1987.³² Appended to his messages to his family members including his wife, three sons, and daughter in law, were brief essays in which he summed up his readings and relevant reflections. The letters were written under severely limiting conditions that circumscribed his freedom of expression.³³ With his letters being subject

³¹ His dissertation was titled "The Drama and Hopes for Korea's Democracy: Regarding the Growth and the Theory of Formation and Development of Democracy in Korean Society, 1945-1991."

³² The Prison Writings (University of California Press) are comprised of a collection of 29 letters sent to Kim's family from November 1980 to December 1982, a period when he was under a death sentence, later commuted to life in prison, for a conviction on sedition charges that would later turn out fictitious. Finally, he was allowed to go to the United States ostensibly for medical treatment in a deal between the Chun regime and the Reagan administration.

³³ While imprisoned, five wardens watched him all the time, alternating two at a time (Kim, 1996, p. 106). He was only allowed to write once a month on a single small sheet of paper the size of an aerogram. He eventually developed minuscule handwriting to put as many letters as possible on both sides of paper but still could not make any corrections or changes on his writing once put down (Kirk, 2009; Paige, 1988, p. 91).

to strict prison censorship, he found it hard to extensively address certain topics -including Korean politics- freely in his letters. Still, his lengthy musings on a wide array of topics reflected considerable energy as well as the breadth and depth of his knowledge and mind. His reading habits in prison encompassed the fields of philosophy, theology, history, economics, politics, and literature.³⁴

4) Commitment to Peace and Reconciliation

Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy derived from his beliefs, values, and motives pursued throughout his life. Kim Dae-jung's view of politics was closely linked with his commitment to reconciliation and peace. In his mind, a set of causes he pursued such as democracy, economic development, reconciliation with adversaries, rapprochement with North Korea, and peaceful unification were intricately interrelated. Kim Dae-jung's beliefs and motives were closely connected with his sanguine view of politics and politicians.

Kim Dae-jung had strong conviction in simultaneous pursuit of economic development and democracy. He firmly refuted the rationale that developmental dictatorship is a necessary evil and that democracy or human rights can be sacrificed for economic development, as claimed by Park Chung-hee. Kim Dae-jung believed that democracy and the economy can and should go hand in hand.

His belief in democracy was addressed in his 1994 article in *Foreign Affairs* titled "Is

³⁴ Regarding Kim's reading and writing in prison, Glenn Paige (1988) observes, "Kim's reading program constitutes a liberal arts education in a prison university, in which he serves as both teacher and student. ... "On one point, however, Kim's thinking seems unusual for one so prominent in Korean professional politics, and if further developed in thought and action, it may become his greatest contribution to the politics of his nation and the world."

Culture Democracy? The myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values" (Dae Jung Kim, 1994a).

Singapore's former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew holds that cultural differences make the "Western concept" of democracy and human rights inapplicable to East Asia where the concept of collective responsibility and Confucianism are practiced. In refuting Lee's claim, Kim Dae-jung argues that East Asia actually has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions, and possesses the "necessary conditions to develop democracy even beyond the level of the West."³⁵ In this article, Kim expresses a firm conviction in a resilient "people power" that was demonstrated through elections and popular movements in Asian countries including Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Kim emphasizes that the biggest obstacle is not the region's cultural heritage but the "resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists." An array of underlying rationales he refers to lends itself to the conclusion that "culture is not necessarily our destiny, and democracy is." The article also demonstrates how Kim's belief in democracy relates to his ideas about reconciliation, which constitutes a core value of his North Korea policy. Kim Dae-jung notes that the ultimate goal in Confucian political philosophy lies in bringing peace under heaven, as indicated in the Chinese aphorism meaning "to do so, one must first be able to keep one's own household in order, which in turn requires that one cultivate *self*" Kim explains that this teaching is a political philosophy that emphasizes the role of government and the ruling elite's moral obligation to bring about peace under heaven. On balance, Kim Dae-jung's firm belief in democracy stems from his belief in the value of peace, of which the precondition is forgiveness and reconciliation with adversaries.

Kim Dae-jung's belief in reconciliation effectively functioned both at the individual and

³⁵ In doing so, he cites Asian philosophies involving *Mencius*, *Confucius*, and Korea's *Tonghak* philosophy.

the national levels. During his term of office, Kim strived to forgive and reconcile with his political foes, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, who had attempted to kill him, while seeking to reconcile and build genuine trust, with North Korea. Upon taking office in 1998, Kim Dae-jung adhered to his pledge not to retaliate against his political foes and moved to pardon two of his predecessors, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who had been convicted of treason, mutiny and corruption for their roles in the military coup in 1979 and the brutalities committed against civilians in the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Movement.³⁶ Kim Dae-jung also sought to forgive and reconcile with Park Chung-hee. As part of his proposal for “reconciliation with history,” he put forth the idea of building Park Chung-hee’s Memorial Library on the campaign trail ahead of the 1997 election. Kim kept his promise by providing about \$18.6 million to support the commemorative project from 1999 to 2001 amid a vehement objection from civil society (Kwon, 2012).

Kim Dae-jung’s belief in forgiveness and reconciliation was rooted in his Catholic faith. Having been baptized in 1957 with former Prime Minister Chang Myeon as his godfather, Kim was a devout Catholic throughout his life. His spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation based on his faith was reflected in his letters to his wife and children while imprisoned. In these letters (Kim, 1987), Kim professes faith under adversity. He developed ideas on divine presence and influence through active self-questioning and reasoning on the basis of extensive readings in theology and reflection on the human condition and purposiveness. Kim Dae-jung attributed

³⁶ Chun Doo-hwan was sentenced to death in 1996. The Gwangju massacre broke out on May 17, 1980, when martial law was declared by South Korean military leaders to suppress a rising popular demand for democratization. The military leadership led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan dispatched paratroopers to Korea’s major cities. The southwestern city of Gwangju in the Cholla province was the center for pro-democracy demonstrations, with students and professors engaging in protests against the new junta. Official figures put the death toll at 200 with another 1,000 protestors injured (“Flashback: The Kwangju Massacre,” 2000).

the fact that he was able to endure all the ordeals and tribulations, personally, to his faith in God, and publicly, to his belief in democracy and his trust in the people of Korea (Dae Jung Kim, 1994a, p. 205).

From a broader perspective, Kim Dae-jung's commitment to forgiveness and reconciliation seems to have been the product of his life-long struggle with tribulations inflicted by his political opponents. From his struggle, he learned that forgiveness could be the key to achieving social cohesion and national development. He believed that politics based on retaliation and haste will only result in further polarization of the country as well as spiritual devastation not only for the victims but also for the assailants (Choi, 2010, p. 132). In his final statement at a trial on September 17, 1980 wherein he was sentenced to death, Kim Dae-jung said, "Even when I was sentenced to death by the military court, I did not want to engage in political retaliation. ... Democracy will definitely arrive in the 1980s. Fight on with hope and courage. But when you win, please don't forget that I don't want to see retaliation" (Kim, 1996, p. 124). Throughout his struggle against dictatorship, Kim Dae-jung stresses, he never gave way to pressure from dictatorial leaders. In the process, he says he tried to advocate and engage in nonviolent, peaceful oppositions. This was largely because of the lessons he learned from the history of the Western democratic process, says he. In this sense, Kim Dae-jung greatly admired Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. for their nonviolent resistance, which he considered as a source of inspiration (Dae Jung Kim, 1994a, pp. 205–206).

5) International Acclaim and Recognition

When Park declared the 1972 Yushin constitution designed to grant himself the right to

an unlimited term of office, Kim decided to go into exile abroad and enlist support of his campaign against dictatorship from the international community and media. This is because he believed that he could have easier access to freedom of expression while staying outside the country (Kim, 2011a, p. 270). Kim Dae-jung's unrelenting crusade for democracy and human rights gained him international fame and recognition.³⁷

On his visit to the United States in December 1972 as the opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung gathered support from academic, political, and religious bodies (Kirk, 2009, p. 43). Starting with Columbia University on December 14, 1972, Kim Dae-jung went on a speaking tour at colleges and universities across the United States (Kim, 2011a, p. 274). When Kim Dae-jung was abducted in Tokyo by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), it was U.S. intervention that saved his life.³⁸ Kim Dae-jung was put under house arrest and remained imprisoned until Park was assassinated in 1979 at the hands of the KCIA chief (Gittings, 2009). Kim Dae-jung was then thrown back into prison after a second military coup staged by General Chun Doo-hwan, who arrested him and sentenced him to death on trumped-up charges of instigating the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising in 1980. Kim Dae-jung was on the death row until another U.S. intervention. This time, the Carter and Reagan administrations (one leaving, one incoming) jointly intervened in late 1980 to keep him alive (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). President Chun Doo-hwan commuted Kim Dae-jung's death sentence to life imprisonment, and then to 20 years in

³⁷ He was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize seven times before receiving it in 2000. He received numerous international awards such as the Bruno Kreisky Human Rights Award while in prison (1981), the George Meany Human Rights Award (AFL-CIO) (1987), the Union Medal from the Union Theological Seminary in New York (1994), and Philadelphia Liberty Medal (1999).

³⁸ With his hands and feet tied on a small boat, Kim Dae-jung was about to be thrown into the East Sea when the ship was intercepted by a helicopter presumed to belong to the U.S. forces. As a result, Kim was returned home to Seoul safely (See, Kim, 2011a, pp. 287-298). As it later turned out, U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib decisively and successfully intervened upon being informed of the KCIA's plot to abduct and assassinate Kim. Donald Gregg, the then CIA station chief and later ambassador to South Korea later revealed the details of American intervention that saved Kim's life (Goldstein, 1999, p. 57).

prison. In a deal with the Reagan administration, Chun let Kim go into exile in the United States in exchange for being invited to Washington as the first visiting head of state after President Reagan's inauguration (Cumings, 2005, p. 388). A growing list of leaders and groups who led or joined the international campaign to keep him alive included the U.S. Congress and academe, the Japanese government, Germany's Socialist International Party, President Jimmy Carter, Senator Edward Kennedy, Chancellor Willy Brandt and President (then Mayor) Richard von Weizsacker as well as Pope John Paul II (Kim, 2011a, pp. 402–403; MacShane, 2018).

Kim Dae-jung's exile in the United States and his position at Harvard University (December 1982-February 1985) gave him a good opportunity to build a vast network of ardent supporters and sympathizers. Building on the sympathy and endorsement he had gained from politicians and scholars since he became a presidential candidate in 1971, Kim Dae-jung earned fame among many Americans and Korean-Americans. He became a celebrity among liberal politicians and intellectuals as a champion of democracy and human rights struggling against injustice and oppression. The longer he stayed in the United States, the more fans followed him from political, entertainment, academic, and non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and even the U.S. government (Goldstein, 1999; Kirk, 2009; Ungar, 1984, pp. 97–101).

Upon his decision to return to Korea after more than two years away from home, Senator Edward Kennedy, a strong supporter of Kim, along with other congressmen sent a letter to President Chun appealing for a guarantee of safety for Kim Dae-jung and restoration of his civil rights (Goldstein, 1999, p. 88). On the eve of his return, he was given a sendoff in Madison Square Garden attended by 3,000 people. On the day of his return February 8, 1985, an American delegation including 50 journalists and 22 other escorts and well-wishers and two

congressmen accompanied him back to Seoul in the hopes that their presence would prevent another tragic murder like that which shot down Benigno Aquino, a leading opponent of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, on the Manila tarmac in 1983.³⁹ Upon their arrival in Korea, Kim's entourage was met by security agents who whisked him out of sight right away. Kim was then placed under tight house arrest and strictly banned from outside contact (Jordan, 1997; Kirk, 2009, p. 107).⁴⁰

2. Political Skills

As with other policy areas, Kim Dae-jung's political skills regarding the North Korea policy largely centered around: 1) skills to build coalitions; 2) verbal talent and writing skills; and 3) persuasive ability.

1) Coalition Building

Kim Dae-jung's political experience in connection with the so-called "three Kims politics" helped him develop adroit political skills and acumen.⁴¹ As a politician having worked his way up through the opposition party, Kim Dae-jung learned how to cope with the largely disadvantageous political environment that imposed enormous constraints deriving from his narrow power base in the Cholla province and frail base of financial support along with the

³⁹ The delegation included Edward Feighan, Thomas Foglietta (House representatives), Patricia Derian (former Deputy Secretary of State for Human Rights), Robert White (former Ambassador to El Salvador), Raul Manglapus (former Philippine foreign minister), Pharis Harvey (Reverend), Bruce Cumings (Professor), Mary Travers (Singer) etc. (Burgess, 1985; Haberman, 1985; Kirk, 2009, p. 107).

⁴⁰ According to Bruce Cumings who was part of an American escort group: with thousands of riot police deployed on the roads, enormous numbers of Koreans supporting Kim Dae-jung were exclaiming that he was their "great leader" holding placards hailing his return (Cumings, 2005, p. 386).

⁴¹ The three Kims' era refers to the period (mainly 1960s-1980s) in which the three politicians with the same family name –e.g., Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pi) – had a major effect on South Korean political landscape.

hostile media. Kim Dae-jung was often portrayed as having impure political thoughts by the mainstream conservative media. During his unyielding struggle against dictatorial rules, Kim Dae-jung was often labeled as tough, radical, and aggressive. As a dissident politician he was called a communist when he addressed peaceful unification, a radical when he spoke of democracy, and a liar when it came to his political behaviors (Lim, 2012, p. 157).⁴² In a highly unfavorable domestic political environment, Kim Dae-jung sought to gain influence by building networks and relationships at home and abroad. Kim Dae-jung said he sought to build coalitions with rivals and opponents domestically within the boundaries of preserving his political identity as a center-left, pro-democracy opposition politician while sticking to principles he had been upholding. Kim Dae-jung formed a cooperative partnership with Kim Young-sam, his long-time rival, to augment the struggle against dictatorship, and twice supported him to become the opposition party leader (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, p. 205).⁴³ After returning to Korea from exile in the United States in February of 1985, he led opposition forces in coalition with Kim Young-sam to fight for democracy in Korea.

Under the Roh Tae-woo administration (1988-1993), Kim Dae-jung played a major role in promoting bipartisan collaboration at the National Assembly as the head of the leading opposition party. In the 13th general elections held in April, 1988, his Democratic Peace Party

⁴² Kim Dae-jung was harshly denounced as a liar by his opponents on two particular occasions. When he made his political comeback in 1997 to run for president, two and a half years after he retired from politics, and following his defeat in the 1992 presidential elections, he was severely condemned of being blinded by greed for power. Also, when he effectively broke his promise with Kim Jong-pil as part of the DJP coalition to amend the constitution to switch to the parliamentary cabinet system, he fell under severe criticism (Dae Joong Kim, 2002).

⁴³ Upon being informed of the news on May 22, 1983, that Kim Young-sam was staging a hunger strike in promoting a pro-democracy movement in Korea, Kim Dae-jung, while in exile, swiftly embarked on a drive to support his rival. Kim traveled around the United States to gain endorsement for Kim Young-sam's hunger strike. He also formed the Washington D.C. Committee on behalf of Kim Young-sam along with equivalent committees in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles (S. Han, 2012).

(DPP) won the second largest number of seats at the National Assembly only after the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Kim Dae-jung sought to cooperate with President Roh and his ruling party whenever necessary while working with Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, the other opposition leaders. As a result, bills were mostly passed unanimously at the National Assembly as negotiations went relatively smoothly between the two sides of the aisle (Kim, 2011a, pp. 516-517).⁴⁴

In boosting his posture and achieving his goals, Kim Dae-jung would occasionally build coalition with his opponents. With his force becoming further isolated around the Cholla region and the anti-communism propaganda campaign being in full swing, Kim Dae-jung opted to form what many viewed as the “odd coalition” with Kim Jong-pil, the leader of the conservative United Liberals Party, who was formerly President Park’s right-hand man and the KCIA director. The so-called DJP coalition was intended to secure victory in the 1997 presidential election.⁴⁵ Not surprisingly, Kim Dae-jung was accused of being opportunistic in relation to this move (J. S. Kang, 2010).⁴⁶

2) Oratorical and Writing Skills

⁴⁴ During this time, there was little room for arbitrary decisions to be made by the ruling party as the two sides of the aisle would frequently meet and talk. With the National Assembly being dominated by the opposition parties, Kim Dae-jung argued that the ruling and opposition parties should negotiate, compromise, and make concessions in running state affairs.

⁴⁵ Regarding this controversial decision, Kim Dae-jung argued that he had been convinced that such a choice would not impair the causes he pursued (e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 619-620). According to Kim Dae-jung, he was not against making compromises and collaborating with his political opponents insofar as he believed that the outcome would not undermine the principles he sought to adhere to.

⁴⁶ In response to such accusations, Kim Dae-jung stresses that he refused to join forces with opponents in cases where the resulting coalition was assumed to undermine his principles. Kim explains that he rejected President Roh Tae-woo’s proposal for a three-party merger involving the ruling party and the two opposition parties even though it could have guaranteed his victory in the forthcoming presidential election. This is because, he claims, he believed that such a move was incompatible with the democratic principles he was committed to upholding (Dae Jung Kim, 1996, pp. 31–32).

Much of Kim Dae-jung's political skills stemmed from his ability to present his ideas verbally and in writing. Kim Dae-jung appeared to be a born mass leader armed with oratorical skills as was shown on the campaign trail in 1971. Appearing dedicated and fearless, he would magnetize a massive crowd with his public speech. His famous speech at Jangchoongdan Park on April 18, 1971, which was made after the Constitution was amended to allow Park Chung-hee a third term, and ten days prior to the presidential election, drew a crowd of as many as one million people (Ji Hyun Kim, 2015). Willner surmises that much of charismatic affect is produced "less by logic and ideas than by emotional stimuli" (Willner, 1968, p. 103). However, this is not necessarily the case with Kim Dae-jung. In fact, his oratorical prowess and charismatic appeal were closely linked with logic and ideas. Another contributing factor was that he was an energetic seeker of knowledge and information. His energetic, scholarly-quality reading combined with his ardent quest for knowledge and information across a broad scope of areas furnished his leadership some inner quality that appeared unusual for a politician, observed American journalist Haberman (1987).

Very interestingly, Kim Dae-jung confessed that it was through omnivorous reading in prison that he honed his intellectual ability and writing skills. While imprisoned (1976-1978, 1980-1982), Kim Dae-jung learned to survive solitary confinement by reading, writing, and tending flowers. By reading, he gradually achieved stability and peace of mind, experiencing some pleasures amid an extremely monotonous prison life (Kim, 1996, p. 108). His extensive readings ranged from philosophy, theology, and history to politics, economics, and literature. He states in his memoir (1996, p. 42), "As I was reading masterworks of great scholars and thinkers, it dawned on me. Were I not in prison, I would have lived my life without

understanding such truth. In this sense, I was even thankful for being in prison.” He says in his autobiography, “My intellectual, personal maturity formed during my time in prison. The prison was indeed my university ... In my life after prison, I often felt a craving for my time there whenever my hectic life did not allow me to read. It may be hard to believe, but I sometimes felt like it was worthwhile to spend some time in prison considering the invaluable lifetime knowledge and understanding I encountered there” (2011a, pp. 411-412).

Speech Writing

While in office, President Kim was careful to accurately reflect his views and ideas in his speeches. According to Lee Hoon, an official who worked as a speech writer for Kim Dae-jung both prior to and during his presidency, in drafting a speech, President Kim would revise drafts as many times as needed to ensure that his remarks perfectly represented his thoughts and beliefs. An extreme degree of meticulousness and precision was displayed by President Kim here. That being so, presidential speech writers would assist him mainly with putting his ideas into words in the initial phase of drafting a speech. In case he did not like the manuscript drafted by a speech writer, he would record his own voice on a recording device while articulating his thoughts in words. Then a speech writer would write down words from the recorder and submit a copy of the draft to the president. Then, President Kim would continue to revise the manuscript until he was perfectly satisfied. He always made sure that the final draft of his speech reflected his ideas and beliefs “a hundred percent.” To this end, he revised, edited, and proofread his own draft, multiple times, first with a blue fiber-tip pen, and from the second time onwards with a red fiber-tip pen, in highly conscientious manners (H. Lee, personal

communication, November 22, 2016; e.g., Lee, 2016).

3) Persuasive Ability

Kim Dae-jung's persuasive ability relates to the teaching and preaching side of his leadership.

Kim Dae-jung had a talent for elaborating at length about his thoughts and ideas with modifications of emphasis from audience to audience. That is, he had a knack for adapting language and expressions to the capacity of his audience. He would use scholarly words and expressions when talking with scholars, and would explain in layman's terms and use more analogies when speaking to the general public (S.H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). Regarding this ability, Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir, "I believe I have a gift for teaching. ... Had I not become a politician, I would probably have become an educator because of the makeup of my character. I am sure I would have made a good professor. Sometimes, I have a sense that politics and teaching are inherently related" (Kim, 1996, p. 3).

Kim Dae-jung's proficiency as a public communicator and ability to speak and write based on a compelling logic afforded him an enormous sense of efficacy. Kim Dae-jung's vision was foundational to his persuasion. Therefore, in conversing with people, Kim Dae-jung never lost sight of the end goal, that is, where he was headed with his logic and persuasion (Jeong. S.H., Personal communication, November 22, 2016). Regarding Kim Dae-jung's ability to persuade, Kim's long-time associate, says, "Kim Dae-jung would never just say one thing to somebody. Rather, he would come to the same subjects or end goals in multiple different ways. He had the knack of beginning with the point that was not expected by anyone and eventually making a strong point." Kim was enormously self-confident in his ability to persuade, believing

that “he could always convince everybody no matter how” (S. Costello, Personal communication, November 3, 2017).

3. Other Important Personal Characteristics

1) Sense of Realistic Pragmatism

Kim Dae-jung’s aptitude for building coalition is closely linked with a sense of pragmatism he would emphasize throughout his political life. In presenting the version of pragmatism he seeks to defend, Posner (1993, p. 28) surmises that pragmatism “emphasizes the scientific virtues –e.g., open-minded, no-nonsense inquiry, prefers ferment to stasis, ... likes experimentation, likes to kick sacred cows –within the bounds of prudence-, prefers shaping the future to maintaining continuity with the past,” and “attacks dogma.”

Regarding his emphasis on pragmatism, Kim Dae-jung was famously quoted as saying that politicians should “possess both the intellectual awareness of the problem worthy of a scholar and a sense of reality characteristic of a merchant.”⁴⁷ Kim Dae-jung also says in his autobiography that a politician should be able to opt for the second best if the best choice is not available and that if circumstances dictate, a politician should go for the second worst if it helps avoid the worst option. He also claims that a politician should take stock of reality, no matter how harsh it is, in seeking the truth that is key to advancing to the future, and should not be obsessed with the truth and overlook the reality.

Kim Dae-jung exhibited a particular mix of pragmatism, flexibility, idealism, and

⁴⁷ Regarding this remark, Kim Dae-jung explained, “If we are going to succeed in any field, we must have both feet firmly grounded on principles, like intellectuals, while at the same time making free use of both hands, like merchants employing various methods. We must pursue a balanced development of both these aspects” (Kim, 1987, p. 55).

adherence to principles. Regarding this aspect of leadership, former Ambassador to Korea James R. Lilley (1986-1989) said, "What I especially admire about Kim Dae-jung is his particular mix of pragmatism and idealism" (Kim, 1996, p. xiv). Regarding the ideological basis of his *Three-Stage Unification Formula*, Kim Dae-jung cited "open nationalism," "positive pacifism," and "global democracy." He emphasized that the principle of "open" nationalism was contrasted with "extensive, aggressive, xenophobic, or closed-minded" nationalism that might exploit other countries for its own narrow, selfish national interests. By the principle of "global democracy," he stressed, he meant a democracy that would transcend the "selfish single country orientation" of traditional democracy (Kim, 1997, pp. 9–13).

Although fighting against the dictatorial rules of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee, he was not necessarily opposed to everything they advocated. This was also the case with his position on the controversial 1965 normalization treaty between Korea and Japan.⁴⁸ Judging that the normalization with Japan was in line with the national interest, Kim advocated the need for the normalization treaty. In short, his position was a "conditional approval" of the treaty. That is, he supported the treaty only under the condition that no disadvantage occur on the part of the Koreans in terms of provisions of the treaty. For such a posture, Kim was badly criticized and even ostracized by members within his party (Dae Jung Kim, 2011a, pp. 154–160; S. Kim, 2015). Kim Dae-jung's worldview was quite realistic, positing that there be neither a

⁴⁸ President Park signed the Korea-Japan Relations Treaty, which normalized diplomatic and economic ties two decades after Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. The treaty threw the Park government into turmoil as the provisions of the treaty, which included an article stipulating that Japan provide some \$300 million in grants and \$200 million in long-term and low-interest loans, were seen as "humiliating" by Koreans. The treaty was vehemently opposed by students, intellectuals, and opposition lawmakers, setting off massive demonstrations on the streets of Seoul. Kim Dae-jung was representative of moderates in the party making the case against hardliners. Kim Dae-jung objected to the hardline argument opposing the treaty, claiming that national interest demanded diplomatic ties be established with the former colonial master (Kirk, 2009, p. 27).

permanent ally nor a permanent enemy in international politics. He took note of the fact that many states with colonial history had been establishing diplomatic relations with former colonial powers, and that Korea was in need of going along with the tide of the rapidly rising Japanese economy.

2) Sophisticated Cognitive Qualities

Regarding the issue of effective problem solving, Kim Dae-jung stressed the need both to pursue grandiose goals and to carefully consider small matters (Kim, 1996, p. 47-49). Kim Dae-jung's fine-grained cognitive qualities and a broader strategic intelligence combined to make for a unique quality of his leadership characteristics. Kim Dae-jung said that he held Otto von Bismarck, Germany's first chancellor, in the highest esteem. In a meeting with his cabinet members during his term of office, Kim praised Bismarckian diplomacy for its subtlety and attention to details. Kim noted that this led Germany to improve its relations with neighboring countries (Funabashi, 2007, p. 215).

Kim Dae-jung said that he was inclined towards perfectionism. He says in his memoir (1996, p. 116), "No matter what I undertake, I try to do it perfectly to the best of my ability. That is why I seldom embark on a task without careful planning and adequate preparation." His tendency to view a phenomenon both as a whole and divided into smaller parts, coupled with his inclination towards perfectionism, led him to perform tasks with careful planning and preparation.

Being highly meticulous and precise, Kim Dae-jung had a habit of jotting down whatever information he deemed essential in tiny script on his little green-colored notebooks that were

individually numbered. This habit easily evokes the miniscule letters he used to write to members of his family while imprisoned under gravely restrictive conditions. In reading materials, he would underline texts he considered important. In addition to making notes, meditation was another crucial means for him to distill the knowledge and information he acquired during the day into his own. He would meditate on the information, arrange his thoughts and ideas, and put them into writing every day before going to bed (e.g., personal communications with S.H. Jeong, S.J. Yim; I.B. Kim). For Kim Dae-jung, this is how he piled up the data neatly in his head for possible future use.

Kim's close allies indicate that Kim Dae-jung had a highly sophisticated mind and knew how to read other people's minds (Kim S. J., Personal communication, October 16, 2016). Yang Sung-chul, the former ambassador to the United States under Kim Dae-jung, describes Kim Dae-jung as "a very thoughtful person and a very genuine figure about humanities and about Korea." He notes that, more often than not, President Kim's interlocutors "were persuaded by his such seriousness, such sincerity, such determination, such persistence, and such confidence" (S.C. Yang, Personal communication, October 12, 2016).⁴⁹

Kim Dae-jung indicates in his writings (1996, 2011a) that he is not the type of person who is innately courageous, as considered by many, and that he is the last person to be called a radical, as always described by his detractors. Rather, he describes himself to be "tender-hearted" and as "timid" as he was in his boyhood. He says that he had what may be called "the courage of a timid person" (Kim, 1996, p. 121).

⁴⁹ This is what Ambassador Yang said verbatim in his interview given in English with the author.

3) Self-Restraint & Composure

This personal characteristic concerns the leader's emotional fitness for office. Delving into the issue in the widely discussed *Presidential Character*, Barber (1972) suggests two behavioral criteria for assessing presidential performance: how actively a president exercises power; and whether political participation is a fundamentally positive experience for the president. Considering that Kim Dae-jung had a quite sanguine view of politics⁵⁰ and that he was active in exercising authority in making decisions and implementing policies, he can be seen as an active-positive type of president. As predicted in Barber's conceptual model, President Kim was largely immune from distracting emotional perturbations that could have impaired his public performance and leadership.

Even under extremely stressful situations, Kim Dae-jung would act in remarkably calm manners and put on a poker face. He would rarely burst out laughing at any funny jokes or hilarious situations, and instead would only gently smile (S.H. Jeong, Personal communication, November 22, 2016). Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung is said to have occasionally made jokes and properly knew how to use his sense of humor as a tool to invigorate conversation (K. H. Choi, 2010, p. 197).

According to his aides, Kim Dae-jung was the type of individual who will "take the situation on" in response to stress or negative feelings. In coping with a stressful situation, he would willingly confront the problem and try to deal with it head on.⁵¹ He rarely if ever

⁵⁰ Kim Dae-jung would often express his positive views on politics. He says in his autobiography that he neither hated or disparaged politicians, and rather found the people-centered politics -e.g., politics intended to open the world led by the people- to be "the most sacred task" (assigned to human beings) (Kim, 2011, p. 55).

⁵¹ Relevant studies suggest that there are three general ways in which people respond to negative feelings they are experiencing. They may withdraw from the situation, take the situation on, or panic (Hermann & Hermann, 1990, pp. 217–218).

appeared anxious, agitated, impatient, irritated or angry, always maintaining composure in the face of heavy stress or hard choices.

Yim Sung-joon, the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security (2002-2003), attributes these qualities of Kim's personality to his remarkable sense of efficacy, which he says was intimately linked with his unique personal history and life experiences punctuated with successive tribulations and ordeals. That is, Yim explains, the fact that President Kim worked his way up in politics and went through all sorts of hardships and ordeals in his life was a major contributing factor to his overall sense of efficacy (S.J. Yim, Personal communication, December 7, 2016).

Chapter 3. Why the Sunshine Policy? Philosophical & Conceptual Bases of the Sunshine Policy

A. Evolution of the Sunshine Policy

Origin of the Sunshine Policy

Kim Dae-jung's knowledge and expertise in a broad range of relevant areas culminated in the Three Stage Unification Formula (TSUF) in 1995. This constituted a major source of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital he brought to office as the country's first president to adopt the comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. Regarding the unification issue, Kim Dae-jung developed in-depth knowledge and expertise by constantly studying and educating himself. Kim Dae-jung's beliefs and ideas on unification constantly evolved throughout his pre-presidency years. The conceptual framework for his North Korea policy that was created in the late 1960s continued to be refined and adapted in tandem with the changing historical and socio-political context. This conceptual evolution ended up with a highly-calibrated conceptual framework dubbed the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* (TSUF) published in 1995. The TSUF had a significant conceptual bearing on the *Korean National Community Unification Formula* (KNCUF) (*Hanminjokgongdongchae tongilbangan*), which has been adopted as the country's official unification scheme under successive South Korean governments since President Roh Tae-woo (1987-1993).⁵² After all, the TSUF served as the conceptual underpinnings of the

⁵² The title of the official unification plan slightly changed from the KNCUF to the *National Community Unification Formula* (NCUF) (*Minjokgongdongchae tongilbangan*) in 1994 under President Kim Young-sam. The NCUF upholds independence, peace, and democracy as basic principles of unification. This unification formula prescribes a three-phase process for unification: 1) reconciliation and cooperation; 2) the formation of a Korean Commonwealth; and 3) the realization of a unified state following general elections in accordance with the unification constitution.

Sunshine Policy.

A treasure trove of Kim Dae-jung's knowledge and expertise was attributable to various factors involving focused effort, hard work, experience, and critical events in life, as discussed in the *Who* chapter. Kim Dae-jung's exile in the United States (1982.12-1985.2) served as a crucial opportunity to enhance his expertise in numerous issue areas relevant to his peace initiative. Kim's scholarly endeavors during his exile resulted in the publication of relevant works including the *Mass-Participatory Economy* that was published in 1985 by Harvard University Press. Kim Dae-jung's ideas about economic reforms needed in Korea as presented in this book have been central to the debate about the engagement policy and the political economy underpinning it.

After losing his third run for the presidency in 1992, Kim Dae-jung publicly announced his decision to quit politics and headed to the United Kingdom to research German unification (S. J. Han, 2017). His trip to the United Kingdom was intended to study problems of the European Community and the German unification as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University (Kim, 1996, p. 19). Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir, "From the German experience I have become wiser and learned two most important lessons. One is that we must not be impatient for reunification. The other is that we must not attempt reunification by absorption. Reunification is important, but how we achieve it is even more important" (Kim, 1996, p. 21). He adds that the lesson he learned was not "Don't pursue reunification," but rather "Start the reunification process as soon as possible but proceed by stages." During the Cold War, unification was not possible since Koreans were bound by the shackles of maintaining the status quo. However, now that the Cold War was over, the shackles removed, and communism disintegrating, Kim Dae-jung thought the time was ripe for beginning the process and Koreans

could avoid serious problems and be successful (Kim, 1996, p. 21).

The 1960s

The seeds of Kim Dae-jung's ideas on unification on the Korean peninsula were sown in the 1960s as he engaged in legislative activities as the National Assemblyman for the opposition Democratic Party in November 1963.⁵³ In the 1960s, the two Koreas, severely affected by the winds of the Cold War, remained in a state of unabated mutual hostility in which they refused to recognize each other's existence and avoided all forms of contact. South Korea's unification policy changed from a belligerent "March to the North" in the 1950s under President Rhee Syngman to the "Unification through Victory over Communism" in the 1960s under President Park Chung-hee. Park effectively put the unification issue on the back burner, adopting the strategy of 'Construction First and Unification Later.' Meanwhile, North Korea under Kim Il-sung sought to achieve the communization of the whole peninsula based on the "Four Military Line policy" (Kim, 1997, pp. 299–300).

In addition to the primacy of democratization in dealing with unification issues, Kim's beliefs and ideas on unification and national security conceived in the initial period of his political career largely revolved around the following points: self-reliance; independent foreign policy; the need for the government to abandon the Hallstein doctrine and to depoliticize unification issues; the elimination of undemocratic, anti-unification clauses from the Anti-

⁵³ Kim Dae-jung was elected to the National Assembly for the first time in May 1961 after four consecutive electoral failures. However, his first election only lasted two days with South Korea's National Assembly being dissolved amid Park Chung-hee's coup d'état.

Communist Act and the National Security Law; and the liberalization of unification discourses at the civilian level.

From the beginning of his political career, Kim Dae-jung actively engaged in legislative activities in the fields of unification and security policies. Under President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), unification issues were intensely politicized while related laws like the Anti-Communist Act and National Security Law were manipulated to repress his political opponents. Kim Dae-jung warned the Park regime to stop banning people from engaging in unification discussions, insisting on the desirability of such discussions especially in theoretical and scholarly terms (Kim, 1991, pp. 41–42).⁵⁴ Kim also criticized the government's dependent foreign policy strategy of bandwagoning with the United States in the international Cold War confrontation. In July 1966, Kim also urged the Park Chung-hee government to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine,⁵⁵ which had been cited in severing South Korea's diplomatic relations with two African nations and North Korea. Indicating that even West Germany – along with Romania – began to relinquish the doctrine, Kim expressed concern that South Korea's foreign policy may go against the tide of international relations as well as the national interest (Kim, 1991, pp. 38-9). Under the prevailing political conditions in South Korea, Kim's claim was outside of the permissible bounds for discussion of the unification issue set by the Park Chung-hee regime. His

⁵⁴ At an interpellation session on state affairs at the National Assembly in 1964, Kim Dae-jung called for a change in the government's deeply partisan approach to dealing with unification issues and the establishment of a government body devoted to unification issues (Kim, 1991, pp. 11–25). Kim's efforts at the time finally led to the establishment of the cabinet ministry of the "Board of National Unification" (Kim, 1997, p. 304).

⁵⁵ The so-called Hallstein Doctrine, which served as a central tenet of the Federal Republic of Germany's (FDR or West Germany) foreign policy from the mid-1950s to the early-1970s, prescribed that the FDR would not establish or maintain diplomatic ties with any nation that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany). This doctrine indicated that the FDR would regard those countries recognizing the GDR or maintaining diplomatic relations with it – barring the Soviet Union as one of the Four Powers responsible for Germany – as committing an "unfriendly act" possibly leading to severance of diplomatic relations.

statement was seen as deriving from suspicious intent and reckless ideas advocating for exchange with the communist enemy (Kim, 1997, p. 305).

Kim Dae-jung's advocacy of the country's independent, self-reliant foreign policy became more salient with the outbreak of the Pueblo incident on January 23, 1968, in which the U.S. spy ship was attacked, and its 82 crew members were detained by North Korea for 11 months.⁵⁶ At the time of the incident, Kim Dae-jung harshly criticized the Park Chung-hee government for its inability to play a role in managing the crisis and its marginalized stance in negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang despite America's One Korea policy of recognizing South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1991, pp. 66-67).

The 1970s

Evolution of Kim Dae-jung's beliefs and philosophy on unification

During Kim Dae-jung's unsuccessful presidential bid in the 1971 elections against a backdrop of intense political-military confrontation between the two Koreas, Kim Dae-jung presented to the public what was then viewed as a highly innovative idea of "the Four-Power Guarantee of Peace on the Korean Peninsula," suggesting an institutionalized security guarantee by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, the four nations with the

⁵⁶ On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo, a U.S. spy ship, was attacked and captured by the North Korean navy. The seizure of the U.S. navy vessel and its 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came three days after the so-called the Blue House Raid. In the incident, 31 North Korean spy agents infiltrated South Korea's presidential Blue House in a botched attempt to assassinate President Park and killed 26 South Koreans in the process. The seizure of U.S.S. Pueblo and the abuse and torture of its crew by the North Korean regime during their 11 month detainment marked a major Cold War incident heightening tensions between the two opposing ideological blocks. [For more information on Kim Dae-jung's perspective on the Pueblo Incident and the Blue House Raid that occurred in January 1968, see Confederation of Republics by Kim Dae-jung (1991, pp. 57-68).

biggest stake in the security of the Korean peninsula. Kim's 1971 proposals on inter-Korean relations also addressed the following issues: the reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula through the mutual abandonment of war and armed aggressions between two Koreas; and inter-Korean exchanges in non-political areas such as the media, sports, and mail. Even though the idea failed to materialize due to his narrow defeat by Park Chung-hee, Kim Dae-jung's proposal on the four-power security guarantee would later serve as the conceptual foundation for the the Six-Party Talks, which began in earnest in 2004. The Six-Party Talks brought the two Koreas along with the four powers to the negotiating table to address North Korea's nuclear problem. (Kim, 2011a, pp. 217–9). This was followed by Kim Dae-jung's presentation of the "Three-Stage Unification" Formula in 1972 (Kim, 1997, p. 300).⁵⁷

Kim Dae-jung became an ardent evangelist for the Sunshine Policy starting in the early 1970s. With the themes of détente and reconciliation marking a watershed in the Cold War system in the early 1970s, Kim Dae-jung desired to capitalize on a subtle but visible change in the international situation, seeking to form a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula (*The KDJ Government The SP*, 1999, pp. 50–51). Beginning with the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, there were signs, although faint at the time, of the winding down of the Vietnam War as well as a series of events indicative of easing tensions and détente among the great powers such as: West Germany's Ostpolitik, U.N. membership for the People's Republic of China, and the normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States and Japan. These visible trends notwithstanding, the Cold War confrontation in Korea showed no sign of abatement.

⁵⁷ (For comparison between the unification proposals of the two Koreas and Kim Dae-jung's *Three Stage Unification Formula*, see Kim, 1997, pp. 30–31).

Kim Dae-jung then made the historic proposal to take advantage of the global trend of relaxation in a bid to promote peace on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1997, pp. 300–301).

Kim's unification philosophy is composed of two conceptual components: Three principles of Korean unification and the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* (C. Moon, 2012, p. 30). In its initial version, the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* that was first presented in 1972 had suggested three stages of unification: peaceful coexistence; peaceful exchanges; and political unification. The first stage of peaceful coexistence was to provide an institutionalized structure and mechanism for: 1) renunciation of war as the instrument of policy; 2) negotiation of a peace agreement; 3) the establishment of a structure for peaceful coexistence based on the mechanism of mutual oversight; 4) simultaneous membership in the United Nations; and 5) the creation of an institutionalized system for the four major powers' guarantee of non-aggression and a peace agreement between two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 308). In a campaign to promote his unification plan and its viability, Kim held a press conference at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents Club in July 1972. He raised the issue of the two Koreas' simultaneous membership in the United Nations, causing a major shockwave in the political landscape. Kim's proposal was based on his conviction that national unification could only begin from the premise of mutual recognition of each other as a partner for dialogue (Kim, 1997, p. 309).

The 1980s

In the 1980s, Kim Dae-jung integrated institutional elements into his unification formula to yield the new concept of a Federation as a transitional phase prior to complete unification (Kim, 1997, p. 310). In the mid-1980s, the unification discourse became active and diversified in

South Korea with heated, often emotionally charged, discussion taking place among civil society. During this period, Kim Dae-jung sought to lay the theoretical groundwork for his *three-stage unification formula*. As a result, his unification formula made significant headway in theoretical depth and evolved into a practical scheme for the South Korean government to pursue unification (*The KDJ Government The SP*, 1999, p. 53).

Kim Dae-jung presented the unification formula dubbed the “Federation of the Two Korean Republics” Unification Plan (aka: “The Confederation of the Two Korean Republics” Unification Plan). The discourse mainly dealt with the first stage of unification. In this formula, the Peaceful Coexistence and Exchange under Symbolic Federal Structure was suggested as the first stage, in which the two states retained their sovereignty. It is notable that, in the 1980s, Kim Dae-jung’s formula used the term “symbolic federal structure” to effectively mean the confederation system as the first stage of unification.

In the first stage of unification, both Koreas are enjoined to recognize the existence of two completely independent governments based on different ideologies and systems. That is, the two independent governments continue to be in charge of their respective foreign relations, internal and military affairs while the symbolic federal government administers peaceful coexistence and exchange (Kim, 1997, pp. 316-317).

Kim Dae-jung noted that both governments shall focus on the promotion of mutual exchanges and cooperation either directly or through the “symbolic federal structure,” which he defined as a loose confederation, without interfering in each other’s internal affairs. Kim Dae-jung believed that the transition can and will be made to a Federal structure, and that, in

the process, the political authority should be incrementally transferred to the central government from the two independent governments (Kim, 1997, pp. 310-311).

Kim Dae-jung's Three-Stage formula calls for a transitional phase of the confederation as the "necessary, and the inevitable prerequisite to national reunification. In this regard, Kim Dae-jung's proposal was practically different from that of North Korea, which argued for a direct transition to a federal stage straight from the division and confrontation.

At the time, however, Kim Dae-jung's formula was accused of being identical to North Korea's proposal under the military government's campaign to label him as "a red" or "a commie." With his unification formula being distorted by the military government, Kim Dae-jung strived to underscore the differences between his unification formula and North Korea's. In this context, Kim Dae-jung sought to clarify his ideas on national unification through the principles of the "Three Nos": no violence, no communism, and no anti-Americanism. Regarding the principle of "non-Communism," Kim Dae-jung posited that democracy should be the ultimate goal for Korea and that North Korea should be given opportunities to voluntarily accept the principles of democracy. He envisaged that, after a reasonable lapse of time, North Korea would move towards a market economy and democracy. The possibility will then emerge for the transition to a Federal system (Kim, 1997, pp. 311-313).

Kim Dae-jung's unification formula envisioned a Federation comprised of two local governments as the second stage of unification. In this stage, both republics would no longer retain sovereignty, and a newly established federation would manage foreign policy, national defense, and important domestic affairs, leading to a fully-fledged Federal system. In this stage, the formula posits, the two Koreas will retain each government as regional authorities.

The final stage would be complete unification made up of one nation, one state, and one government that would be based on an open-market economy and democracy (Moon, 2012, p. 31).

The 1990s

The July 7th Declaration was issued in 1988 by President Roh Tae-woo while Kim Dae-jung sought to clarify the contents of his proposal and its difference from the North Korean plan. Even though Kim Dae-jung agreed in principle with President Roh's July 7th Declaration, he found it regrettable that it made no reference to a peace structure between the two Koreas. In a bid to fill this gap, he exerted efforts to systematize the concepts and ideas behind his formula. In the 1990s, Kim Dae-jung sought to explain the inter-relations between confederation and federation, and elucidate relevant concepts. He also expounded on the process of transition from confederation to federation, and the transition to full unification (Kim, 1997, p. 313).

In April 1991, Kim Dae-jung presented the "Confederation of the Two Korean Republics," a revised version of his unification proposal. In another revision to his previous plan, the previous expression of the "loose federal stage" was replaced with the "stage of confederation." Kim Dae-jung also re-conceptualized the three stages of peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification as three guiding principles specifically for the first stage of confederation. The reconceptualization reflected a shift in his fundamental perception of the issues that could easily be a bone of contention between the two sides. Under the revised formula, peaceful exchange does not necessarily require peaceful co-existence to be in

place, as previously posited (Kim, 1997, p. 314). In other words, a realization occurred on the part of Kim Dae-jung that there could be two different types of exchanges: “peaceful exchange within peaceful coexistence” and “peaceful coexistence from peaceful exchange.”⁵⁸ Such perceptual modification accelerated the systematization of Kim’s unification formula which became more realistic (Kim, 1997, p. 314).

While staying in the United Kingdom in 1993, Kim Dae-jung visited Germany four times. During these visits, Kim Dae-jung observed how serious Germany’s problems had been in the wake of reunification by absorption. He discovered that even though reunification ended the political division, the ensuing economic and social differences caused an internal division in German society. In the newly-reunified Germany, the perception was growing that West Germans were first-class citizens and East Germans were second-class citizens. Regarding this issue, Kim Dae-jung observed, “In the past, there were two nations for one people, but now there are two communities in one nation (Kim, 1996, p. 20). Kim Dae-jung became acutely aware of the importance of the process of reunification and the experience of an interim stage prior to complete unification. Going through a proper process of rapprochement and unification was all the more important, Kim Dae-jung believed, considering that Koreans engaged in a fratricidal war, and thus may be the only people in the world who hate each other so fiercely. He feared that otherwise unification would bring about serious confusion and struggle, and its aftermath would be far worse than in the German case (Kim, 1996, p. 21).⁵⁹

⁵⁸ A contemporary parallel of the rationales can be the distinction between “denuclearization as a precondition for peace” and “denuclearization as the outcome of a peace process.”

⁵⁹ In a 1990 meeting in Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt advised Kim Dae-jung that “Korea should learn valuable lessons from policy mistakes that Germany committed. I think it is fortunate for Koreans that Korea will be reunified after Germany (Kim, 1996, p. 21).

Three-Stage Unification Formula (1995)

With a view to furthering his research, in 1995 Kim Dae-jung established an institute for unification research named the Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation. Kim then moved to recruit Lim Dong-won, a former general with an extensive scholarly and bureaucratic background, as the secretary general.⁶⁰ Lim joined Kim Dae-jung in completing the *Three-Stage Unification Formula* and devising the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung's vision, as reflected in the conceptual framework of the unification plan dubbed the *Three-Stage Unification Formula*, was analytic, prescriptive, and normative in nature.⁶¹

Kim Dae-jung's ideas were further elaborated in terms of specificity and concreteness, culminating in the 1995 publication of 'Kim Dae-jung's *Three-Stage" Approach to Korean Reunification* (Kim, 1997, p. 302).⁶² Kim's newly revised *Three-Stage Unification Formula* addressed the importance of a *peace agreement* and *non-aggression treaty* between two Koreas as crucial stages deemed necessary to realize peaceful coexistence. It also calls for arms control measures, strict verification procedures, and an international warrant of the Korean peace structure. Moreover, the formula suggested that Korea's peaceful unification should neither be dependent on the superiority of power by either side nor on the absorption of one

⁶⁰ As a representative responsible for arms control and diplomatic issues under the Roh administration, Lim Dong-won led the inter-Korean negotiations in the run up to the signing of the following two historic inter-Korean agreements in December 1991: 1) the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (aka the Basic Agreement); and 2) the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (aka Denuclearization Agreement). Lim Dong-won attended the eight rounds of North-South High-Level Talks as well as more than sixty inter-Korean negotiation sessions until the agreement was reached between two Koreas in 1991 (Lim, 2012, pp. 76, 85).

⁶¹ Jentleson (2008, p. XXVI) defines three aspects of a vision as follows: *analytic*, identifying the problem of what is wrong with the president; *prescriptive*, providing a solution for a better future; and *normative*, doing so while avoiding deeply rooted cultural taboos.

⁶² The basis of Kim Dae-jung's ideas on national unification, which was represented in his *Three-Stage Unification Formula*, can be summed up as the three fundamental precepts: 1) unification is the sacred task for all Koreans; 2) diplomacy ought to be based on the principles of national self-determination and practical interest; and 3) the democratization of Korea is not only a shortcut to unification but a central tenet to observe in the process of achieving unification (Kim, 1997, p. 303).

side by the other (Kim, 1997, p. 314). Under this formula, Kim suggested three guiding principles of unification: Self-Reliance; Peace; and Democracy. The principle of *self-reliance* means that all national issues, including unification, ought to be solved by the country itself on the basis of the spirit of self-determination without relying on outside forces. The principle of *peace* posits that all national issues be settled not through violence but by way of peaceful negotiation. The principle of democracy requires that the unification processes be democratic and relevant decisions be made through national consultation and consensus (Kim, 1997, pp. 9-13).

The three conceptual elements constituting the ideological basis of Kim Dae-jung's *Three-Stage Unification Formula* are: "Open Nationalism; Positive Pacifism; and Global Democracy" (Kim, 1997, pp. 9-13). The nationalism he referred to is "open nationalism," as opposed to "extensive, aggressive, xenophobic, or closed-minded" nationalism that oppresses or exploits other nations for its own narrow, selfish national interests. "Positive Pacifism," the second ideological basis of Kim's unification formula, denotes the positive concept of peace transcending the negative or minimalist stance of merely opposing war. It means an active creation of peace like the pursuit of a nuclear-free world or the establishment of a Northeast Asian security cooperation system. Global Democracy, the third element, implies the broader international application of its lofty principles, going beyond the selfish single country orientation of traditional democracy. Noting that the ideas of Global Democracy can be found in Asia's democratic thoughts, institutions, and traditions, Kim Dae-jung noted that the time had come for broader views of Asian democracy to exert more constructive influence and to overcome the limitations of Western democratic practices (Kim, 1997, pp. 9-13).

The *Three-Stage Unification formula* (1995) proposes three stages of unification: Confederation; Federation; and Complete Unification. Under this formula, the process of unification involves a transition from confederation to federation, and to either a centralized government or several autonomous regional governments as in the case of the federal system of the United States or Germany (Kim, 1997, p. 25).

Confederation

The first stage of confederation between the two Koreas would be composed of “one nation, two states, and two independent governments.” In this stage: (1) the two governments would maintain their status quo of opposing ideologies and conflicting political and economic systems while exercising the existing authority in their respective territories. That is, the current governments of North and South Korea would maintain all the existing authority and power in foreign affairs, defense, domestic affairs; (2) the government would consist of an equal number of delegates from each side; (3) the confederation would operate on the basis of unanimous voting to prevent any misgivings; and (4) the primary task of the confederation would be to implement the three policy guidelines of peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, p. 154).

The principle of peaceful coexistence entails the need to provide an *institutional peace mechanism* to avoid any contingency or armed confrontation that could impede the unification process. This would involve the reduction of military armament that is the conversion of offensive military deployments to ones that are completely defensive in nature. Kim Dae-jung posited that this would help ensure the building of mutual security and confidence between the

two sides. The principle of peaceful exchange aims to promote mutual interests and restore national identity and homogeneity via extensive inter-Korean exchanges in broad spheres including politics, economy, society, and culture. This would help avoid the discord and antagonism manifested in the case of Germany after reunification. Regarding this principle, Kim Dae-jung stressed that South Korea would also reap considerable economic benefits, for example, by utilizing North Korea's high quality, low wage workforce. He also noted that North Korea's considerable natural resources and basis for tourism would significantly benefit both sides (Kim, 1997, pp. 10-11). Meanwhile, the principle of peaceful unification rejects the possibilities of either unification by force or by absorption via the use of the country's superior economic power. Peaceful unification under this formula indicates a transition to a unified state through the peaceful democratic process of negotiation (Kim, 1997, pp. 2-3). Notably, all this would constitute the fundamental concepts underlying the Sunshine Policy that would be adopted by President Kim Dae-jung.

The first stage of a North-South Confederation is meant to be "a cooperative system between the two governments that peacefully manages the state of division toward unification." It is worth noting that this is not a form of unification but a form of cooperation for peaceful coexistence as a preparatory phase for unification (Lim, 2012, pp. 158-159). In other words, this stage is a transitional mechanism aimed at realizing the foundation for reconciliation and cooperation. During the phase of confederation, several key confederal organs would be established such as the Inter-Korean Summit as the supreme decision-making body; the Council of Confederation as the inter-Korean legislative organ; and the Inter-Korean Ministerial Council as the executive body (Kim, 1997, p. 3). In essence, the goal of this stage

would be to induce North Korea to change voluntarily; build political trust; restore a unified national identity; build an inter-Korean economic community; realize arms reduction; and change the armistice into a permanent peace regime (Lim, 2012, pp. 158-159). In actuality, this set of goals constituted the North Korea policy agenda under the Kim Dae-jung administration.

In his article in 1993, Kim Dae-jung expressed his hope that the confederation of states would begin to be implemented in 1995, the 50th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule.⁶³ He said, "If the nuclear issue can be resolved by early 1994, I feel this can be accomplished." Noting that the unification approach through a confederation of states had been echoed by the then Kim Young-sam government as part of the then officially adopted unification formula, Kim Dae-jung hoped that the first stage of unification would be launched during the Kim Young-sam administration.⁶⁴ Under Kim Dae-jung's formula, the next stage of the South-North Federation would be possible only after a considerable period of confederation as a preparatory phase given the prolonged period of deepening heterogeneity between the two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 22). The formula posits that, during a confederal stage, concerted efforts would be made to propagate democratic values in both Koreas, especially by North Korea. With exchanges and cooperation continuing to expand during the confederation, the formula holds, North Korea would inevitably accept gradual democratization before entry into a Federal phase (Kim, 1997, p. 26).

⁶³ The article published in *Security Dialogue* (December 1993) was a response to an article by Helmut Schmidt: "Lesson of the German Reunification for Korea."

⁶⁴ Regarding the first stage of the unification plan, there existed a notable difference between the Kim Young-sam government and Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung's unification formula was based on the notion that the confederation, the first stage of the Three-Stage plan, can be established without much difficulty if the people in both Koreas desire unification and if the authorities in the two Koreas make the political decision based on popular aspirations. That is, the popular support for unification was considered *sufficient* to warrant a confederal system. Meanwhile, the then South Korean government felt that a confederation would not be possible without mutual confidence in place between the two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 18).

Federation

The second stage of Federation would involve “one nation, one state, one system, and two regional autonomous governments.” Under the federal system, diplomacy, defense, and important internal affairs would be managed by the federal government, while the remaining internal affairs would fall under the jurisdiction of the two Korean regional autonomous governments (Kim, 1997, p. 25). Kim Dae-jung noted that the federation system would be similar to that of the United States with the federation government being in charge of foreign affairs, defense, and vital dimensions of domestic affairs. At this stage, the independent governments of the two Koreas would switch over to local autonomous governments which would take care of most domestic affairs (Kim, 1993).

The federation is intended to alleviate the shocks and confusion expected from the unification of the two starkly divergent systems (Kim, 1997, p. 22). During this phase, an elected office of a federal president and legislature would be established on the basis of a federal constitution. The legislature under this system would be bicameral, based on regional and functional representation. Also, the membership of the two Koreas in all international organizations including the UN would be unified under this system (Kim, 1997, p. 25). The proposal discusses the importance of this stage, noting that the mere entry into the second stage of federation can be seen as “de facto unification” (Kim, 1997, p. 15). Kim Dae-jung noted that after about a decade of confederation, it would be possible to enter into the federation stage. In the meantime, he explained, under the confederation stage North Korea would have established diplomatic relations and economic exchanges with the West. Kim Dae-jung

expected North Korea's economy by then to follow the example of China's market economy (Kim, 1993).

With regard to the process of unification of the two Koreas, Kim Dae-jung stressed the principle of self-reliance. He said, "Maintaining amicable relations with neighboring countries is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for unification. This we must achieve independently, by ourselves, since the Koreans have the right and the responsibility to determine their own destiny." He went on to say, "While the importance of international cooperation should never be underestimated, ... I want to make it clear that, although we will continue close cooperation with all of these parties, we cannot accept them as actual participants in the process. Reunification itself must be a matter of the Korean people" (Kim, 1993).

Complete Unification

The third and final stage is the state of complete unification, meaning "a unified state of either a centralized government or several regional autonomous governments as in the case of the federal systems in the United States or Germany" (Kim, 1997, p.25). Kim Dae-jung posits that the final decision on the form of a unified system in the third stage –either a centralized government or decentralized federation- would have to be made in the next generation by the people themselves.

Kim Dae-jung's TSUF and NCUF, South Korea's Official Unification Plan

Regarding his government's official unification scheme, Kim Dae-jung followed suit after his predecessors who adopted the *National Community Unification Formula* (NCUF) (1989) as

the country's official unification plan instead of insisting on his own *three-stage unification formula*. On September 11, 1989, President Roh Tae-woo announced the *Korean National Community Unification Formula* (KNCUF) (Hanminjokgongdongchae tongilbangan) at the National Assembly in the form of the *special presidential statement*. Kim Dae-jung noted that President Roh's KNCUF was essentially based on the same conceptual framework as his *Three-Stage Unification Formula* (Kim, 1991, p. 212). In fact, the KNCUF, which was announced in September 1989 by President Roh Tae-woo, and was subsequently revised under the administration of Kim Young-sam, had accommodated much of Kim Dae-jung's proposal.

In devising the formula, efforts were made on the part of the Roh administration to collect views on how to achieve unification from various groups of society including three opposition parties, the Democratic Peace Party (Kim Dae-jung), the Democratic Unification Party (Kim Young-sam), and the New Democratic Republic Party (Kim Jong-pil). In gathering bipartisan opinions on unification, Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo had frequent talks with Kim Dae-jung, then the head of the opposition DPP.⁶⁵ In the process, Chairman Kim Dae-jung sought to get his ideas on how to achieve unification to be reflected in the national unification plan. To do so, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his ideas both in the form of discussions and written notes to the unification minister demanding that they be reflected in the formula (H.K. Lee, Personal communication, October 6, 2016). As a result, the NCUF came to incorporate a good deal of Kim Dae-jung's ideas on unification (Lim, 2012, p. 153).

⁶⁵ In doing so, the unification minister was also working with advisers from the four political parties who were members of the Special Committee for Unification at the National Assembly.

Upon taking office, President Kim Young-sam presented the *National Community Unification Formula* (NCUF), which was a revised version of his predecessor's *Korean National Community Unification Formula* (KNCU), on August 15, 1994, the National Liberation Day. The NCUF proposes three stages of unification. The first stage is that of *Reconciliation and Cooperation* based on the principles of self-reliance, peace, and democracy; the second stage is a *Confederation*; and the third stage is a Unified State (1997, Kim, p.29).⁶⁶ It is worth noting that, in practice, President Kim Dae-jung rarely mentioned the unification formula or the three stages of unification during his presidency, instead constantly emphasizing the promotion of exchanges and cooperation between two Koreas.

Kim Dae-jung's Policy Proposals

On the basis of the philosophies and ideas reflected in his *Three-Stage Unification formula*, Kim Dae-jung made an array of policy proposals. In suggesting how to create the atmosphere of maximum confidence between two Koreas, Kim urged the North to scrupulously execute all of the provisions agreed upon with the United States. Also, he claimed that the South, for its part, should positively consider either amending or abolishing the controversial National Security Law. Kim Dae-jung also claimed that a unification approach that seriously undermined the other party through the use of force or caused unbearable economic cost could not be considered a "genuinely serious plan" (Kim, 1997, p. 32). Kim held that the

⁶⁶ Kim Dae-jung, the then leader of the opposition Democratic Peace Party, contributed substantial thoughts and ideas through discussions he had with then Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, who led the process of devising the pan-national, bipartisan formula of national unification at the instruction of President Roh Tae-woo (H.K. Lee, personal communication, October 6, 2016).

approaches to unification must be based on the objective and proper understanding of the realities in which the two Koreas are situated and that a radical and emotional approach to unification must be rejected at all cost (Kim, 1997, p.32).

In his speech titled “A New Approach towards North Korea” at the University of London in August 1993, Kim Dae-jung, as the chairman of the Kim Dae-jung’s Peace Foundation, presented the fundamentals of his unification formula, addressing the newly emerging post-Cold War context in the wake of the collapse of the socialist bloc. This would later constitute a significant aspect of his Sunshine Policy. In this speech, Kim Dae-jung made policy suggestions as follows: (1) to shift the stance from hostility and competition to reconciliation and co-operation; (2) the principle of autonomy and self-determination; (3) the declaration to effectively renounce the intention of a “unification by absorption”; (4) the support of North Korea’s economic development and the enhanced cooperation with international organizations in solving the problem of North Korea’s nuclear development; (5) the support for moderates in North Korean domestic politics; and (6) the development of concrete programs for the gradual social fusion of the two Koreas (“The KDJ Government, the SP,” 1999, pp. 51-52).

Kim’s Dae-jung’s policy ideals as reflected in the *Three-Stage Unification formula* had influenced U.S. policy toward North Korea before he was elected as president of South Korea in December 1997 (Kim, 1997, p. 320). Upon the outbreak of North Korea’s first nuclear crisis in March 1993, Kim Dae-jung, while on his visit to Great Britain in April 1993, suggested the idea of “a package deal” involving “give and take” regarding the nuclear issue and diplomatic and economic concessions. At the time, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea under President Kim Young-sam was based on the notion that North Korea still remained intent to convert the

South to communism and thus was far from being a proper partner for dialogue, compromise, and negotiation. However, Kim Dae-jung believed that South Korea's policy toward the North ought to be fundamentally modified to account for the end of the Cold War. Regarding how to address North Korea's first nuclear crisis, Kim Dae-jung presented his proposal on a package deal in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington in May 1994. He suggested that a solution would not be possible without a direct meeting with Kim Il-sung. Kim also proposed that the United States consider sending a respected elder statesman like former president Jimmy Carter.⁶⁷ His proposals were materialized in the form of Carter's visit to Pyongyang in July 1994, and the subsequent signing of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in October 1994. In practice, Carter's meeting with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang proved instrumental in defusing the crisis situation by turning a precariously escalating confrontation into dialogue and negotiation (Kim, 1997, pp. 320-323).

Regarding North Korea's nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung claimed that entry into the confederal stage would serve as a crucial medium to solve the problem (Kim, 1997, p. 19). Kim argued that the 1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear accord would help develop political confidence not only between Washington and Pyongyang but between Seoul and Pyongyang. Moreover, he claimed that political confidence building through the implementation of the 1991 North-South Basic Agreement on Non-Aggression, Reconciliation, Exchanges, and Cooperation –concluded under the Roh Tae-woo administration– as well as military tension reduction measures, and the completion of the cross-recognition of two Koreas by the four major powers would all help facilitate the establishment of the confederation. While such factors were not necessarily

⁶⁷ Kim Dae-jung's speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. On May 12, 1994 (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, pp. 11–31).

preconditions for entering into the confederation, they would contribute to a prompt entry into a confederal structure (Kim, 1997, pp. 320–323).

As reflected in his *Three-Stage Unification Formula*, Kim Dae-jung believed that if the North and the South agreed, it would be possible to establish a confederation without going through the stage of reconciliation and cooperation. After becoming president, however, Kim came to believe that it would be difficult to skip the reconciliation and cooperation stage and immediately enter into a confederation. Consequently, the Sunshine Policy began by implementing the first stage of reconciliation and cooperation as stipulated in *the National Community Unification Formula* (Lim, 2012, p.159). For this reason, the Kim Dae-jung government's North Korea policy was officially titled the "Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation" even though it has been more commonly called the Sunshine Policy. In short, President Kim Dae-jung's goal was to complete the first stage of his unification plan by the end of his presidency (K.H., Choi, personal communication, October 18, 2016). From his perspective, the historic first North-South summit and the Joint Declaration in 2000 effectively marked the beginning of the first stage of reconciliation and cooperation in the country's unification process (Lim, 2012, p.159).

B. Concepts and Principles of the Sunshine Policy

Sunshine Policy: Ideas and Principles

The term "Sunshine Policy" dates back to 1994. Kim Dae-jung initially employed the term in an attempt to convince the U.S. government of the need to seek a soft-line approach to dealing with North Korea. On September 30, 1994, Kim Dae-jung, then a defeated presidential

contender, delivered a speech entitled “Sunshine Policy from a Position of Strength” at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. Highly commending President Carter for his role in defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis through negotiations with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung stated, “America must patiently adhere to the Sunshine Policy which had proven to be the only effective way to deal with isolated countries such as North Korea.” Citing a famous Aesop’s Fable of “The North Wind and the Sun,” Kim argued that the warmth of sunshine would be more effective than strong wind in inducing North Korea to quit the policy of isolation and confrontation and instead to engage in behavioral modification (C. I. Moon, 1999, pp. 36–37).

Goals

The Sunshine Policy was intended to pave the way for peaceful unification by achieving peaceful co-existence through inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The policy’s goal was to lay the foundation for peaceful unification by breaking off the vicious cycle of adverse actions and reactions through peaceful co-existence and peaceful exchanges and cooperation (Moon, 1999, p. 38). Specifically, the policy’s goal lied in dismantling the Cold War legacy on the Korean Peninsula in five key areas: 1) improvements in Inter-Korean relations; 2) normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and Japan-North Korea relations; 3) promotion of North Korea’s participation in the international community; 4) prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons; and 5) replacement of the armistice agreement by a peace treaty (Ministry of Unification, 2002).

In his inaugural address in February 1998, Kim Dae-jung officially declared that he would relinquish the previous policy of pursuing unification through the absorption of the North. He also underscored the need to promote exchanges and cooperation via the implementation of the Basic Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, Exchanges and Cooperation that was signed between two Koreas in February 1992.

Three Principles of Sunshine Policy

The Sunshine Policy is based on three fundamental principles, as outlined in Kim Dae-jung's inaugural speech: 1) No tolerance of armed provocation by North Korea; 2) the official abandonment of unification by absorption – that is, the cession of any measures to undermine or threaten North Korea; and 3) the promotion of exchanges and co-operation with North Korea.

Kim Dae-jung considered maintaining a strong security posture as the top priority in conducting the Sunshine Policy. Referring to *no tolerance of North Korea's provocation* as the policy's first principle, Kim Dae-jung made it clear that he would never relax South Korea's vigilance against the North while pursuing peace. Even though any armed aggression by North Korea would not automatically trigger the immediate suspension of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, this principle indicates that aggression would not be tolerated either (Moon, 2012, p. 27). In this regard, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy was rooted in the traditional wisdom that those who seek peace must prepare for war. Even though this may sound paradoxical, this

constitutes the essence of the Korean conflict where peace and war constantly overlap.⁶⁸ The ambivalence deriving from the fact that the two Koreas seek reunification while each regards the other as its main enemy resulted in a two-pronged approach simultaneously involving peaceful co-existence and a strong security posture (Moon, 2012, p. 30). In relation to this principle, the Sunshine Policy laid much emphasis on a strengthened U.S.-ROK alliance as the foundation of improved inter-Korean relations, which constitutes elements of historical continuity. Stressing the need to secure a position of strength in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung regarded the U.S.-ROK alliance as the central force in building a permanent peace regime and assuring stability not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Northeast Asia as a whole (Dae Jung Kim, 2001; K.-S. KIM, 2002).⁶⁹

The second principle of abandonment of unification by absorption indicates that the Sunshine Policy repudiates the so-called collapse theory postulating North Korea's imminent collapse. Kim Dae-jung viewed the collapse theory as misleading at best on the ground that any sign of change –such as an uprising by the people or some sector in the regime, or systematic resistance by the military or the party– was absent inside North Korea.⁷⁰

Instead, Kim Dae-jung sought to change North Korea incrementally, believing that the collapse of the Northern regime could backfire and undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula (Moon, 2000, p.15). Underscoring the importance of mutuality in dealing with

⁶⁸ In this sense, Moon Chung-in (1999, p. 54; 2012, p. 22) reasons that Kim Dae-jung consistently pursued peace, but that he was not “an ideal pacifist” even though he was “a liberal idealist”. That is, he was acutely aware of the vulnerability of peace-making and peace-keeping while being convinced of the virtue of peace. Kim properly understood that a weak security posture may prompt an adversary's hostile action, which in itself could jeopardize peace.

⁶⁹ Kim Dae-jung's speech on March 8, 2001, at the American Enterprise Institute and Council of Foreign Relations in Washington.

⁷⁰ Kim Dae-jung's interview with Newsweek on February 20, 1998.

the North, Kim Dae-jung described the Sunshine Policy as a “win-win” strategy that would contribute to peace and safety not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in the entire world.⁷¹ Regarding the mutuality involved in his strategy, Kim noted that the South could give the North the following benefits: assurance of security; the support to revitalize its economy; and the support to lead it to become a responsible member of the international community. With regard to North Korea’s responsibilities in return, Kim Dae-jung indicated the abandonment of its nuclear weapons and missiles as well as engagement in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation would be required (“Interview with President Kim Dae-Jung,” 1999).

Kim Dae-jung, who had long explored unification policy, was expected to prioritize unification over other issues when he was elected president. Nevertheless, he gave far greater emphasis to reconciliation and normalization in inter-Korean relations over unification. The reasons for this lied in Kim’s highly pragmatic considerations of his North Korea policy.

Upon assuming the presidency, Kim Dae-jung changed the articulated theme of the North Korea policy from unification to engagement (Steinberg, 1999, p. 60). Regarding the possibility of unification, President Kim said, “It is impossible to achieve reunification in the foreseeable future, so it is not proper to discuss this kind of hypothetical situation. It might also cause some misunderstanding. At present, I feel the issues they are interested in are maintaining peace, holding exchanges, and cooperation” (“Interview with President Kim Dae-Jung,” 1999).⁷² Kim Dae-jung emphasized that the goal of the Sunshine Policy be to create a

⁷¹ Kim Dae-jung’s speech in Oslo, Norway on December 7, 2001.

⁷² Kim Dae-jung’s interview with International Herald Tribune on March 9, 1999.

“favorable environment” in which North Korea would voluntarily change its behavior and adopt reforms and open up to the outside world.

Kim Dae-jung was concerned that the discussion of unification by the South might intensify North Korea’s threat perception based on its permanent siege mentality by making it suspect a South Korean aspiration of unification by absorption. Therefore, he chose to delay discussion of the final form of unification, an issue of divergent views between the two sides, until an appropriate solution could be identified. This way, Kim Dae-jung’s strategy aimed to lay solid stepping stones for unification, firmly grounded in reality. From his viewpoint, ameliorated inter-Korean ties may lead to a “practically unified situation” and if this continued for long, then the systematic differences of the two sides would gradually disappear (K. Y. Park, 2001, p. 74).

With regard to the third principle of exchange and cooperation, Kim Dae-jung strictly adhered to the *separation of politics and economy* throughout his presidency clearly departing from the linkage principle adopted by the previous governments. In doing so, Kim Dae-jung sought to eliminate the vicious cycle practically linked with the linkage principle wherein any temporary amelioration in inter-Korean ties would be far too readily undone when confronted with a political logjam or armed provocation by the North. After all, it was the separation principle that enabled the Kim government to promote exchange and cooperation uninterruptedly even amid political bottlenecks or occasional provocative acts committed by North Korea (C. I. Moon, 1999, pp. 39–40).

Guiding Rules of the Sunshine Policy

The Kim Dae-jung government took a *gradual* approach in intensifying exchange and cooperation with North Korea rather than hastening to integrate legal systems and institutions between the two Koreas (*White Paper on Korea Unification*, 2001, p. 25). In prioritizing tasks in implementing the North Korea policy, the Kim Dae-jung government observed a set of guiding principles: (1) “Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later”; (2) “Economy first, politics later”; (3) “civil society first, government later”; (4) “Give first, and take later” (Lim, 2012, p. 212).

Attributing the failure of the previous administration to improve inter-Korean relations to a rigid adherence to such principles as *government first, civil society later, linkage between politics and economy* and *strict reciprocity*, President Kim Dae-jung adopted an innovative set of concepts such as: “civil society first, government later”; “separation of politics and economy”; and “flexible reciprocity.”

Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung separated inter-Korean exchange and cooperation from the North Korean nuclear issue while separating inter-Korean dialogues from U.S.-DPRK relations. That is, he sought to forsake the linkage thesis that had been operating in terms of inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s foreign relations with other countries such as the United States. For example, inter-Korean relations had been predicated on parallel progress in U.S.-North Korea relations under the Kim Young-sam administration. In a sweeping policy change, Kim Dae-jung, upon taking office, urged the United States and Japan to engage and normalize relations with North Korea regardless of the degree of progress made in inter-Korean relations (Shinn, 2001, p. 29).

Regarding practical components of the Sunshine Policy, Chung-in Moon (2012, pp. 26-29) sums up the “five operating principles” as follows: 1) strategic offensive; 2) flexible dualism

based on the separation of politics and economy; 3) credible military deterrence; 4) international collaboration; and 5) emphasis on domestic consensus.⁷³

C. Conceptualization of Comprehensive Engagement (Sunshine Policy) as a Foreign Policy Tool

The review of the existing studies about engagement as a foreign policy tool helps elucidate how to categorize the Sunshine Policy as a foreign policy tool. It helps to understand why the policy is categorized as ‘comprehensive engagement’ as distinct from other cases of engagement policy such as U.S. engagement of adversary states. Generally referred to as ‘comprehensive engagement’ in both scholarly and practical terms, the Sunshine Policy is distinguished not only from appeasement but from other cases of engagement policy as the Sunshine Policy involved a lengthier process, a longer-term evolution of the adversary, and a greater emphasis on cooperation than other cases of engagement and cases of appeasement (For information on the difference between appeasement and engagement, see R. Schweller, 1999; Litwak, 2000; Rock, 2000; R. L. Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000; Resnick, 2001). As in other cases of engagement, the Sunshine Policy does not exclude the simultaneous use of elements of containment such as negative sanctions like economic sanctions and military deterrence as “complements” to engagement (e.g., Cha, 2002; Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000; Resnick, 2001; R. Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000; R. Schweller, 1999, p. 15).

⁷³ Regarding the fifth component, Moon indicates that South Korea’s conventional North Korea policy was guided by two implicit operating logics: clandestine management of inter-Korean relations and domestic political utilization. Having been a victim of such political manipulation, President Kim Dae-jung proclaimed that his government would not politicize inter-Korean relations (C. Moon, 2012, p. 29).

Concept of Engagement

Both scholars and practitioners have long been grappling with the issue of how to conceptualize engagement. Robert Suettinger, a former member of the Clinton administration's NSC, stated that the term engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" (Haass & O'Sullivan, 2000, pp. 18, 27). Some definitions of engagement are focused on its means, and others on its goals. Table 1 shows how engagement policy has been defined as a foreign policy tool in the literature.

Table 1

Definitions of Engagement

Author, Year	Definitions of Engagement as a Foreign Policy Tool	Focus: Means
Litwak, 2000	<i>Positive sanctions</i>	
A. Johnston & Ross, 1999	<i>The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior</i>	
Haass & O'Sullivan, 2000	<i>A foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives</i>	
Nincic, 2011	<i>Positive inducements that are tools of external leverage designed to advance the nation's interests</i>	
Johnson and Ross, 1999	<i>The promise of rewards, rather than the threat of punishment, to affect the target state's behavior</i>	
Resnick, 2001	<i>The attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (diplomatic, military, economic and cultural)</i>	
R. L. Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000	<i>The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power's behavior</i>	
Shambaugh, 1996	<i>A process and a vehicle to the ultimate goal of integrating a target state into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and normative international system</i>	

		Focus: Goal
Nincic, 2011	<i>The attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state</i>	
Johnston and Ross, 1999	<i>(A foreign policy strategy intended) to ensure that the growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order</i>	
Haass and O'Sullivan, 2000	<i>(Positive inducements meant) to shape the behavior of problem states</i>	
Shambaugh, 1996	<i>(A foreign policy strategy intended) to integrate the target state into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and normative international system</i>	
Schweller and Wohlforth, 2000	<i>The goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize a dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order.</i>	
Cha, 2002	<i>A process of strategic interaction designed to elicit cooperation from an opposing state.</i>	

Opposite of Engagement is Disengagement or Isolation: It is worth noting that some scholars reason that engagement has to be defined in terms of means; engagement may share goals with other policies, but it can be distinguished by its means. Considering that contacts and exchanges are among the most critical means of engagement, the opposite of a policy of engagement seems to be a policy designed to comprehensively reduce or withdraw contacts across multiple issue areas with an adversary state. Therefore, disengagement or isolation by means of negative sanctions are considered conceptually opposite to engagement. It is also noteworthy, however, that disengagement or isolation is conceptually distinct from the containment policy (Geldenhuis, 1990, p. 6).

Engagement vs Appeasement: Even though the engagement approach is often criticized for being no more than appeasement (as both are linked with positive sanctions), appeasement is not equivalent to engagement. Simply put, the two terms are distinguished mainly in terms of

means. Appeasement is defined as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or geopolitical sphere of influence to that state (R. L. Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000, p. 81).⁷⁴ While appeasement is a strategy with relatively short-term aims, engagement implies a lengthy process and a distant time horizon. That is, engagement is a broader approach, placing greater emphasis on cooperation. Engagement seeks increased leverage and a longer-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system. The policy also seeks to enmesh the adversary in a web of rules, institutions, and commercial connections (Rock, 2000, pp. 22–23).

Containment vs. Engagement

Furthermore, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy tools, such as sanctions or military force. Therefore, in practice, an overlap of strategies between engagement and containment may occur (Haass & O'Sullivan, 2000, p. 114). This indicates that the opposite of containment is not engagement but appeasement, to the extent that containment is the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or sphere of geopolitical influence.⁷⁵ This means that a sender state can engage the target

⁷⁴ The well-known cases of appeasement are Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and Nazi Germany in the 1930s (Johnston and Ross, 1999, p. 14; Resnick, 2001, p. 562). Appeasement employs more direct and militarized means than does engagement, and does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence.

⁷⁵ The concept of containment originated from diplomat George Kennan's doctrine of diplomacy designed to transform the Soviet Union from a revolutionary power into an orthodox great power. Kennan's position was that modifying Soviet behavior required both positive and negative inducements. That is, it was as important to reward the Soviets for their conciliatory gestures as it was to resist their aggressions. In short, Kennan's concept of containment addressed the possibility of conditional engagement as a long-term strategy (Gaddis, 1982, p. 71).

state while also containing it. However, it is impossible for a sender state to appease and contain a target state simultaneously (Resnick, 2001, pp. 564–565).⁷⁶

The twin concepts of containment and engagement have been invoked in US foreign policy since World War II, when the United States, the hegemonic power of the Western hemisphere, resorted to all available means to dispel what they viewed as the expansionist penchant of the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. In the Cold War Era's fierce ideological confrontation, foreign policies adopted by US allies were derived from a grand strategy devised by the United States. Under the constantly evolving international milieu, the demise of the Soviet Union was followed by the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and then by an increasingly multipolar international order characterized by greater diversity and less hierarchy. Despite a continued preference on the part of the United States and the international community for this sanctions-oriented policy toward adversary states, the dissolution of Cold War alignments has opened new opportunities and created new rationales for engagement.

President H.W. Bush's conviction that the US should take unique responsibility to foster the development of democratization and market economies was followed by the Clinton administration's strategy of engagement and enlargement (Litwak, 2000, p. 2).⁷⁷ Under President Clinton, the United States engaged North Korea through the 1994 Agreed

⁷⁶ This is because as the sender state cannot cede a sphere of geopolitical influence to the target state while preventing the same state from expanding its territory or sphere of influence. This also indicates that whereas a state can appease and disengage another state simultaneously, it is impossible for a state to engage and disengage with another state.

⁷⁷ The H.W. Bush administration adopted engagement in dealing with China before and after the shooting of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square (e.g., Skidmore & Gates, 1997). Also, U.S. foreign policy toward an emerging China under President Clinton, was designed to enmesh China in various international regimes and binding commitments so as to minimize its potential for disruptive behavior and facilitate the smooth integration of China into the international order (Shambaugh, 1996, p. 184).

Framework, committing North Korea to halt and eventually eliminate its existing nuclear program. Moreover, Clinton adopted a policy of comprehensive engagement, seeking to integrate China into the international community as a responsible member.⁷⁸ Under the Obama administration, the United States not only sought to “reset” the strained US relationship with Russia, but reoriented strategies toward the disparate group that had been previously designated “rogue states”. President Obama’s shift in nomenclature from “rogues” to “outliers”—specifically targeted at North Korea and Iran, in whom he had inherited twin nuclear challenges—was a signal that the pathway was open for adversarial states to rejoin the “community of nations”, provided they came into compliance with international norms (Litwak, 2012, p. 1).

Ultimately, foreign policies and initiatives adopted in dealing with problem states in the post-Cold War period mostly fall somewhere along the continuum between containment and engagement. Policy choices made by the United States in dealing with rogue states largely derive from the government’s assessment about the effectiveness of incentives or penalties in modifying the behavior of those states, as opposed to differences over the degree to which these states posed a threat to the nation and its allies (Litwak, 2000, p. 3). Negative pressures against adversaries in the state’s foreign policy can be arrayed along a continuum encompassing diplomatic criticism, economic sanctions, military force, and subversive intervention. Among these strategies, economic sanctions and military coercion constitute the two most widely used means of containment (Nincic, 2011, p. 2).

⁷⁸ President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: White House, February 1995).) see the following link: <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1340/1996stra>

Regarding foreign policy instruments in dealing with unsavory states, studies suggest a range of possible strategies. Robert Litwak (2000, p. 246) suggests three alternative choices: (1) rollback (e.g., an overt policy to change the regime); (2) comprehensive containment (e.g., politico-economic isolation and military deterrence); and (3) conditional containment (e.g., mixed policies that integrate an engagement component into an overall containment approach).


Regarding the range of foreign policy instruments, Victor Cha (2002, pp. 42–43) proposes the following three alternatives:⁷⁹ (1) containment-plus-isolation, combining military presence with diplomatic ostracism; (2) containment-plus-coercion, which would supplement conventional deterrence with counterproliferation measures meant to dismantle the WMD threat through diplomatic pressure and military action; (3) containment-plus-engagement, which stresses a strong military defense posture complemented by conditional diplomatic and economic inducements. The last option, which he termed “hawk engagement,” is referred to as “the most desirable option.” The first two options that Cha suggests appear mostly equivalent to the strategy of *comprehensive containment* while the third option, containment-plus-engagement, is equivalent to the strategy of *conditional containment* in Litwak’s typology.

These studies discuss possible strategies the United States may adopt in dealing with problem states. It is worth noting that relevant discussions in the literature do not even consider strategies more oriented toward engagement like conditional engagement and comprehensive engagement. In other words, comprehensive engagement in the form of the Sunshine Policy is effectively considered a non-starter in other cases. Litwak (2000, p. 246)

⁷⁹ Specifically, Cha’s study addresses U.S. policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

posits that the study chose not to consider “strategies further along the policy spectrum toward engagement” such as conditional engagement since such alternatives are “not politically plausible,” although theoretically possible (Litwak, 2000, p. 246).⁸⁰ Ideal types of foreign policy strategies suggested by Litwak (2000) and Cha (2000) can be summarized along the policy spectrum as in Figure 1.

Figure 1. *Ideal Types of Foreign Policy Strategies suggested along the Policy Spectrum in Relevant Studies*



Cha’s (2002, 2005) studies on engagement policy toward North Korea can be of help in understanding the nature of the Sunshine Policy as compared to a more *typical* form of engagement.⁸¹ In fact, the “hawk engagement” that Cha proposes shares many core attributes

⁸⁰ Regarding U.S. policy toward adversary states, Litwak notes that the case of U.S. policy toward China in the 1990s may fall under the category of “conditional engagement” (Litwak, 2000, p. 118).

⁸¹ Nincic’s (2011) conceptual framework for engagement foreign policy also facilitates the understanding of the concepts and mechanisms underlying South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea under President Kim Dae-jung. Nincic (2011, pp. 58–90) suggests two types of theoretical models -the exchange model and the catalytic model- which help to understand conceptual mechanisms involved in the engagement strategy as a foreign policy tool as well as the conditions for the successful use of the strategy. When applying this conceptual framework to Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, the policy properly fits the conceptual underpinnings of an ambitious type of exchange model. This is because the policy revolved round flexible or diffuse reciprocity -deriving from the concepts of non-equivalence and non-contingency- from the perspective projecting a more distant time horizon and sought a fundamental change in the relationship between the two Koreas from a long-term perspective (e.g., Y. G. Kim, 2013, pp. 186–187). Nonetheless, the Sunshine Policy is distinguished from the catalytic model in

with previous U.S. engagement strategies like President G.W. Bush's engagement policy toward North Korea especially from 2006-2008.⁸² After all, the policy of hawk engagement, which is a mixed strategy of containment-plus-engagement, appears largely equivalent to the policy of *conditional containment* or mixed strategies integrating an engagement component into an overall containment approach (e.g., Litwak, 2000, p. 246). Calling the Sunshine Policy "unconditional engagement," Cha expresses skepticism about its utility in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue (2005, pp. 153, 159). Meanwhile, hawk engagement and the Sunshine Policy have in common the tenet of a strong defense posture based on the strong U.S.-ROK military alliance. Otherwise, however, these two strategies are in stark contrast to one another in terms of the perspective on fundamental variables such as North Korea's presumed intentions, the source of threat, goals of engagement, and the type of reciprocity involved, among other things.

that the policy neither sought nor depended upon a change in North Korea's internal system for its success. For a catalytic process to be activated in a target state, positive inducements of the engagement policy should serve to create some political space so that elements of civil society or liberalizing forces within the regime can be bolstered. This way, the target's political equilibrium becomes unstable or the disequilibrium shifts from the latent to the manifest stage (Nincic, 2011). In fact, the Sunshine Policy was cautious not to raise the threat perception of North Korea and thus stopped short of pursuing its internal political change while still seeking to bring its overall interests in line with those of the international community.

⁸² This is the period in which North Korea's nuclear issue made good progress in the context of the Six Party Talks.

Chapter 4. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Decision-making System (1998-2003)

A. Methods

1. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

1. 1. What is LTA?

According to Burns (1979), leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. The theory of leadership suggests that successful leadership stresses the importance of the “match” between “what the leader is like, what relevant constituencies want, what the setting calls for, and the nature of the relationship between leader and led” (M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 32). Burns (1979, p. 434) posits that political leadership is tested by the extent of real and intended change achieved by leaders’ interactions with followers through the use of their power bases. In this sense, Burns (1979, p. 18) suggests that leadership is considered “relational, collective, and purposeful.” Leaders play a pivotal role in the bargaining required to build a consensus between their domestic constituencies and their international counterparts around a particular option. Moreover, in conducting foreign policies, leaders must operate under various constraints from the external and internal environment.

Leadership style is defined as the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituencies, advisers, opponents, or other leaders- and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules and principles they use to guide such interactions (Hermann,

2005, p. 181). Leadership style helps to explore how the leader as the negotiator, who steers the government toward a certain foreign policy in the “two-level game”, deals with domestic and international constraints in shaping foreign policy (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 88; e.g., Putnam, 1988; Evans et al., 1993). Leadership style is instrumental in determining the processes leaders are likely to follow in working toward goals, the structure of decision making, from whom they will seek advice, and the kinds of settings they prefer (M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 32; e.g., Preston, 2001; Kowert, 2002; Mitchell, 2005; Kille, 2006).

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is a technique designed to assess leadership styles based on key personality traits and discern behavioral expectations from personal characteristics (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 1980, 1984, 1987; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2005, 2008). This is linked with the idea that how political leaders construe the constraints in their environment, shape their ideas, strategies, advisory systems, and the political behaviors they engage in through their governments (Hermann, 2008, p. 3). LTA, which is a multi-method approach combining the rigor of quantitative content analysis and the contextual richness of qualitative approach, is particularly appropriate when addressing complex questions about the role of individuals in macropolitical events (Stephen B. Dyson, 2009). This content analysis tool, which has become available in *Profiler Plus software*, has proven itself to be a reliable, systematic way of conceptualizing and measuring personal characteristics of political leaders in a way that helps understand and predict how they behave and what type of decisions they make (N. Levine & Young, 2014).⁸³

⁸³ The automated system eliminates inter-coder reliability issues as the computer impeccably reproduces the results of a given set of materials each time. Regarding the validity of the at-a-distance assessment technique, Hermann (2008) discusses how the four types of validity (content, predictive, concurrent, and construct validity) have been ascertained by this method. For

LTA presumes that frequency represents salience to the speaker.⁸⁴ The trait analysis of this study will be conducted in the following three steps: 1) Measuring seven personality traits; 2) Assessing cognitive and motivational propensities; 3) Assessing leadership styles.

The traits of *belief in ability to control events* and *need for power* interrelate to suggest how likely leaders are to challenge or respect constraints. The interplay of *conceptual complexity* and self-confidence is indicative of how responsive or sensitive they are to incoming information in making decisions. Meanwhile, the other three variables (*task orientation*, *distrust of others*, and *in-group bias*) are used to assess the leader's motives for seeking the position of power. The resulting individual differences combine to indicate the leader's leadership style (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2005, 2008; M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009; e.g., M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Keller, 2005; Kille, 2006).

a. Measurement of Personality Traits

This content analysis technique determines an individual's leadership style as a function of seven personality traits: (1) *Belief in ability to control events* (BACE); (2) *Need for power* (Power); (3) *Conceptual complexity* (CC); (4) *Self-confidence* (SC); (5) *Task orientation*; (6) *Distrust of others*; and (7) *In-group bias* (IGB) (M. G. Hermann, 2005). The seven variables are

example, in examining the concurrent validity, the ratings from profiles of 21 leaders as developed by LTA were compared with similar ratings issued by people who had observed or interacted with these leaders such as journalists, historians, biographers, psychologists, and political scientists. The correlations between the two sets of ratings averaged 0.84 across the group of 21 leaders.

⁸⁴ An important focus of this content analysis lies upon "the degree to which" the leader exhibits certain behavioral characteristics. That is, the more frequently leaders use certain words or phrases in their spoken or written products, the more salient such content is to them, and the more representative it is of their beliefs (M. G. Hermann, 2008).

indicative of the leader's cognitive content, cognitive style, and motivations. The seven traits provide information on how political leaders respond to constraints in their environment, how they process information, and what motivates them to act.

1) *Belief in ability to control events (BACE)*

In leadership literature, *belief in ability to control events* refers to a belief in an “internal” locus of control in the political domain (Keller & Foster, 2012, p. 587).⁸⁵ Leaders with a high BACE score are confident in their potential for success and thus show high self-efficiency. They are more likely to take risks, and perceive risky situations as affording more opportunities than threats, than leaders with a low score on this trait (Y. Y. I. Vertzberger, 1998, p. 68). These leaders tend to be proactive in initiating proposals rather than awaiting input from others. Once they decide, they will push ahead with confidence and hardly compromise with others. In contrast, those leaders with a low BACE score—that is, with an “external” locus of control—will take a wait-and-see approach and assess the situation before taking any action. When confronted with a formidable task, these leaders are more likely to delegate authority to their lieutenants so as not to take responsibility in case things go wrong (Hermann, 2005, pp. 188–189).⁸⁶

2) *Need for Power (Power)*

⁸⁵ Locus of control is defined as one's belief about the extent to which results of one's behavior are contingent upon an internal locus or an external locus. An internal locus of control refers to one's belief in the controllability of events. When someone believes in the controllability of events, the individual regards its outcome as derived from their own attributes and skills. Someone who does not believe in ability to control events sees the outcome as derived from forces that work outside one's own agency, such as luck, chance, or fate (Rotter, 1966; Y. Y. I. Vertzberger, 1998, pp. 67–69).

⁸⁶ The coding of the belief in ability to control events focuses on verbs reflective of the responsibility for initiating or planning an action.

Leaders who are high on the *need for power* scale focus themselves on consolidating power or having “influence” on others (e.g., Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978; M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987). They often come across as “charismatic,” “daring”, and “charming”, like a “dashing hero” (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 191). They are particularly good at solving problems when meeting with other leaders face to face. They are skilled at sizing up situations. Studies also show that leaders with a high *need for power* are more adept at hiding their intentions and working behind the scenes. In attaining their goals, they tend to take cautious, gradual steps lest the other party or their enemies should interfere with their planned course of action (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 190–191; e.g., Winter, 1973).⁸⁷ Notably, studies suggest that leaders with *power* motives are more likely to exploit and take risks than leaders with *achievement* or *affiliation* motives (Terhune, 1968; Winter, 2003). Hermann posits that leaders who score highly on *need for power* will resort to “Machiavellian” tactics or “manipulate” the environment in order to gain the upper hand and make themselves appear as winners (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 191).⁸⁸

3) Conceptual Complexity (CC)

Conceptually complex leaders are responsive to a broader range of “stimuli” from their environment. They are more likely to see diverse causes of a certain situation and perceive ambiguity in the environment. In essence, “flexibility” is key to behavior for these leaders (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 195-196). Meanwhile, those leaders who are low on this trait tend to

⁸⁷ Leaders with a low Need for Power are less likely to be in charge and are more open to sharing power with others. They are not reluctant to allow others to receive credit for achievement. They serve as the agent for the group representing their interests in policy-making. They value a team spirit and relationship of trust. They find it important to make their followers feel strong and motivated (Hermann, 2005, pp. 190-2).

⁸⁸ Coding of the need for power centers around verbs representing action proposed or taken by the leader or the government.

rely on their own stereotypes to assess contextual information and react rather “inflexibly” to stimuli. For these individuals, interpretation and consistency become key to behavior.⁸⁹

4) Self-confidence (SC)

Leaders whose score is high on *self-confidence* tend to be more immune to incoming information. They are less likely to be pushed around by whims of contextual conditions or to feel compelled to adapt to a changing situation. For these individuals, consistency is seen as key to behavior (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 195). Conversely, leaders with a low *self-confidence* score tend to be more subject to the whims of situational contingencies. Without a well-developed sense of self-worth, they tend to keep searching for information from the environment to figure out how to perform their tasks (M. G. Hermann, 2005).⁹⁰

5) Task vs. Relationship Focus (Task)

Regarding Leadership Trait Analysis, three traits are intended to measure the leader’s motivations: *task-focus*, *in-group bias*, and *distrust of others* (Hermann, 2005, p. 197). Task-oriented leaders are often “taskmasters” focused upon pushing a group to carry out tasks to achieve the goal (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 199). They tend to see the world in terms of problems and their role as problem solvers (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 197-199). These leaders tend to be obsessed with achieving “standards of excellence.” It is worth noting that the task motive is consistently linked with success as an entrepreneur (McClelland, 1961; Winter, 1996,

⁸⁹ The coding for the conceptual complexity focuses on words denoting that the speaker can consider varying dimensions in the environment (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 196–197). Words such as “approximately, possibility, trend” are suggestive of high conceptual complexity while words such as “absolutely, without a doubt, certainly, and irreversible” are considered indicative of low conceptual complexity (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 196).

⁹⁰ The coding for self-confidence centers around pronouns such as “my,” “myself,” “I,” “me,” and “mine.” Sentences containing such pronouns are seen as conveying an enhanced sense of self-worth and a display of self-confidence (see R. C. Ziller, 1973; R. C. Ziller et al., 1977; House, 1990).

pp. 141–142) Winter (2005, p. 561) notes that, more likely than not, the achievement motivation—e.g., that is, task focus—rarely if ever translates into success in the political arena. Put simply, task-oriented leaders appear quite flexible in business settings, but often prove rigid in politics. Meanwhile, process-focused or relationship-focused leaders tend to prioritize the “process” or “the people” over “what needs to be done.” For these leaders, collegiality, loyalty, and commitment to the organization are crucial (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 197-199).⁹¹

6) *Distrust of Others*

Leaders who are high on *distrust of others* tend to be suspicious of the intentions of others, especially their rivals, opponents, or critics. Individuals who are low in *distrust* prefer to put things into perspective and assess others’ motives not in a blanket manner but based on more realistic cues.⁹²

7) *In-Group Bias (IGB)*⁹³

Studies have explored how leaders’ beliefs may affect how confrontational their state will be in dealing with adversaries (Druckman, 1968; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977; Kelman, 1983; Dodge et al., 1986; Hagan, 1993; Vasquez, 1993; Hagan, 1994; Hermann & Kegley, 1995). *In-group bias* refers to a view of the world in which one’s own group holds center stage. The leader has strong emotional attachments to this in-group and makes decisions that

⁹¹ The coding for task focus or relationship focus revolves around words indicating work on a task as well as concern for others’ feelings, desires, and satisfaction. These two functions operate on a continuum, with one extreme representing a focus on a task and the other extreme a focus on group maintenance.

⁹² In coding for this trait, the focus lies on nouns and noun phrases reflective of the leader’s distrust, doubt, and misgivings about others’ acts and behaviors.

⁹³ The coding for IGB focuses on the modifiers referring to the leader’s own group that are reflective of favorable feelings, strength, or the need to maintain group honor or identity (M. G. Hermann, 2005). A score for each trait is the percentage of times in a document that a leader refers to words or phrases that meet the criteria suggested in coding guidelines. The leader’s overall score for a given trait is the average of these percentages across all the documents under examination.

benefit the group. The higher the score on this trait, the more isomorphic the leader and group. For leaders with a high score on this trait, anything that happens to the group is considered equivalent to what happens to the leader, and vice versa.⁹⁴

b. Assessment of Cognitive and Motivational Propensities

1) Propensity to respond to constraints

The leader's scores for the *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) and *need for power* interrelate to assess the leader's propensity to respond to constraints (McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Hermann, 1980; S. G. Walker, 1983; Hermann & Preston, 1994; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Keller, 2005). Leaders with a high BACE and a high *need for power* are likely to challenge constraints. In doing so, they are skillful in exerting both direct and indirect influence, or in using both direct and indirect tactics. Leaders with a low BACE and a high *need for power* tend to challenge constraints, and to feel more comfortable doing so in an "indirect" fashion. That is, they are excellent at maintaining power "behind the throne," where they can "pull strings" but be less accountable for the outcome (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 188). Leaders with a high BACE and a low *need for power* are also predisposed to challenge constraints. However, these leaders are, in general, less effective in doing so, since they are too direct and open in using power and less skilled in reading how to manipulate the situation. Meanwhile, leaders with moderate or low scores on both traits are more likely to respect constraints (Hermann, 2005, pp. 187–192). Leaders who are inclined to challenge constraints will seek to

⁹⁴ Meanwhile, those leaders who are low on in-group bias are less likely to view the world in black-and-white terms and are more willing to categorize people as "us" or "them" based on the nature of the situation or problem at hand.

meet a situation head-on, resolve an issue quickly, act decisively, and assertively push to address the problem (Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Suedfeld, 1992). These leaders prefer to bring policy-making under their control (Hermann & Preston, 1994; Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Kowert & Hermann, 1997). Those leaders who are predisposed to respect constraints tend to be more open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise, and deal with problems on a case-by-case basis (e.g., Driver, 1977; R. C. Ziller et al., 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Suedfeld, 1992; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998).

2) Propensity to process information

The degree of a leader's propensity to process information is a function of two personality traits: *self-confidence* and *conceptual complexity*. These two traits interrelate to suggest how open the leader will be to contextual information in making decisions (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 192–194; e.g., Driver, 1977; Ziller et al., 1977; Jonsson, 1982; Stuart & Starr, 1982; M. G. Hermann, 1984; M. Snyder, 1987; P. D. Stewart et al., 1989b; Suedfeld, 1992; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998). When leaders' scores on *conceptual complexity* are higher than their scores on *self-confidence*, they are prone to be open to information. These leaders are more sensitive to input in making decisions and more responsive to interests, demands, or ideas of others. When leaders' scores on *conceptual complexity* are lower than their scores on *self-confidence*, they tend to be closed to information. When leaders' *conceptual complexity* and *self-confidence* are both high, they are likely to be open to information.⁹⁵ When the scores on both traits are low in relation to other leaders, the individual is prone to be closed to

⁹⁵ These leaders benefit from the best qualities for the characteristics inherent in these two traits. Their high self-confidence promotes their patience in the situation while their high contextual complexity will make them capable to check the environment to discern what is most feasible at any point in time.

information and adopt the ideas of their advisers. Such leaders tend to show some sign of narcissism, relishing the spotlight, and pursue extreme moves (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 192-4).⁹⁶ Meanwhile, those leaders with moderate or low scores for both self-confidence and conceptual complexity are prone to be closed to information (M. G. Hermann, 2005).

3) Orientation to Politics (Propensity to be driven by threats versus opportunities)

A leader's scores on *distrust of others* and *in-group bias* interact to provide evidence concerning how confrontational their country will be, or whether the leader is driven by the threats or by the opportunities to solve problems through diplomacy (Hermann, 2005, pp. 199–200). This reflects “leader orientation to world affairs,” which refers to “the core beliefs and interests” possessed by leaders (Hagan, 1994, p. 29). It is noteworthy that these trait categories are fluid and susceptible to change depending on the situation leaders find themselves in. In this sense, these traits are seen as the most flexible and adaptable of the seven traits of interest. Table 2 summarizes how distrust of others and *in-group bias* interrelate to determine leader orientation to politics or motivational perception.

Table 2

Leader's Motivational Orientations toward the World

<i>In-Group Bias</i>	<i>Distrust of Others</i>	
	Low	High
Low	<i>Moderate:</i> They do not see the world as inherently hostile or threatening to their state's security. Conflicts are	<i>Opportunity-grabbing</i> (Looking out for opportunities): These leaders see the world as a dangerous place full of threats.

⁹⁶ Hermann's studies exploring 87 heads of state and 122 political leaders show that conceptual complexity and self-confidence are correlated to 0.10 and 0.33 respectively. This suggests that all combinations of the traits scores can be found among political leaders (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 193, 194).

	<p>seen as issue-specific or situationally-bound. Other nations are seen as typical actors who are motivated by the same kinds of pressures that guide their own nation. They tend to be flexible and restrained in their foreign policy behavior as they recognize certain constraints exist that limit what they can do. They find it possible and feasible to cooperate with other states toward solving problems.</p>	<p>Still, they have relatively moderate and complex views of the nature of the threats. The major theme of their worldview is <i>opportunity</i> as they are on the lookout for opportunities amid difficult conditions. They strive to figure out how to take advantage of the opportunities they find as they believe that, otherwise, they could lose everything. Adversaries are viewed as having limited goals and capabilities such that they do not pose a direct threat to the leader's nation's security. There is room for diplomacy which allows for bargaining, compromise, and even certain limited forms of cooperation. Skilled diplomacy is an important means of containing the adversary's behavior. While being open to confrontation and the use of force, they tend to be flexible and restrained in addressing threats.</p>
High	<p><i>Zero-sum</i>: They perceive the interaction with adversaries as essentially zero-sum. They view the environment around them as comprised of winners and losers. Their worldview revolves around the <i>either-or</i> proposition. Therefore, they become extremely cautious in walking a fine line between becoming a winner who gains everything and becoming a loser who loses everything. That is, they tend to believe: "If I go too far, I cannot just lose but lose everything. If I don't make it work, I'm gone. Therefore, I have to win at all costs." They are significantly more permanent in their perception of the environment than are those leaders who are on the lookout for opportunities and, to an</p>	<p><i>Focused</i> (Focused on opposition & enemies): They have the most extreme beliefs about the nature of the political universe. They see adversaries as posing unrelenting and immediate threats. They view adversaries as evil actors whose ambitions are unrestrained and expansionist in nature. Bargaining and restraint are not even considered as viable options. In contrast to the other orientations, there is a strong offensive dimension to this type of motivational orientation. In comparison to those leaders with a zero-sum type of worldview, they are more <i>focused</i> or <i>targeted</i> in dealing with their opponents. That is, they are particularly focused on dealing with adversaries, believing that they can win so long as they properly deal with them. In other words, they are not worried about everything, as in the case of those leaders with a <i>zero-sum</i> type of</p>

	even greater degree, those who focus on opposition and enemies.	worldview. Rather, they tend to be only concerned about their adversaries.
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Note. The typology for leadership orientations toward adversaries was originally created by Hagan (1993). Hagan's (1993) framework delved into the relationship between domestic politics and war proneness; Hermann (2005) subsequently adapted and reinterpreted this framework in a way that incorporated the motivational traits of *distrust of others* and *in-group bias* into the reformulated conceptual structure. It is worth noting that the analysis in this study deals with more conventional political situations—e.g., involving interactions between the leader and those opposed to him or his policy, such as accommodation, co-optation, dismissal, criticism, resistance, and confrontation. Considering that the subject of discourse in this analysis is distinguished from the type of situations addressed in the existing studies, the conceptual framework—as adapted by Hermann (2005)—was further adapted and reinterpreted in this study to suit the cases involving more ordinary political decisions than decisions on whether to go to war or how to deal with enemy states. In this analysis, the categorical variables such as *pragmatic*, *military*, and *radical* regimes were respectively replaced with *opportunity-grabbing*, *zero-sum*, and *focused* orientations, with amended narratives. Adapted from "Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis, by M. G. Hermann, in J. M. Post (Ed.), *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (p. 200), 2005, University of Michigan Press.

c. Assessment of Leadership Style

The analysis in this study pays heed to the four leadership traits that provide answers to the two questions discussed above: (1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment- do they respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How open are leaders to incoming information –do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response?

Table 3 summarizes how leaders' management of political constraints and processing of information interact to determine four types of leadership style: *advocate*, *strategist*, *pragmatist*, or *opportunist*.

Table 3

Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints and Openness to Information

Processing of Information	Dealings with Constraints	
	Challenge Constraints	Respect Constraints
Closed to Information	<i>Advocate (Crusader or Ideologue)</i>	<i>Pragmatist</i>
Open to Information	<i>Strategist</i>	<i>Opportunist</i>

Note. Adapted from “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals” by M. G.

Hermann, T. Preston, B. Korany, and T. M. Shaw, 2001, *International Studies Review*, 3(2), p. 95.

(<https://www.istor.org/stable/3186566>)

Advocates are prone to challenge constraints and be closed to information.⁹⁷ They are considered “cognitive misers” in that they are the least concerned with contextual conditions of the four styles of leadership in terms of leadership typology (M. G. Hermann, 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2009). These leaders bear their own agenda in mind when taking office and seek to accomplish it during their term of office. In pursuing their goals, they are proactive, rarely waiting until the time is right to take action. They adopt a hands-on approach to setting political goals and achieving them. They extend their power base and influence. In the process, they tend to push the limits of what appears possible, and otherwise demonstrate assertive political behavior. They sought to maintain formal and informal control over the focus of their group. They are predisposed to repress or ignore opposition depending on its strength. In making decisions, they are selective in processing information tending toward the types of information that may promote their agenda. They are likely to take charge and work to be in control of events and situations. They select advisers who may serve as implementers, that is, those who are committed to furthering the agenda and to “spinning, selling, and persuading” others of that agenda. *Advocate* leaders often come to power in authoritarian systems, strong one-party systems, in democracies where the “winner takes all,” and hierarchically structured revolutionary or terrorist groups (M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

Meanwhile, *strategic* and *pragmatic* leaders are more attentive to situations as they seek to use and benefit from them (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). Leaders who challenge constraints but are open to information are *strategic* leaders. As with *advocates*, *strategists*

⁹⁷ When it comes to Leadership Trait Analysis, *advocates* are considered identical with *ideologues* or *crusaders* in terms of typology (Stoessinger, 1979; Hermann et al., 2001; Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

come to power with a set of goals but tend to be flexible in the use of means to reach these goals. Appearing maneuverable and flexible in pursuing their agenda, *strategic* leaders are “cognitive managers.” They seek control over information and challenge constraints, but prefer to do so informally in manipulative or Machiavellian manners. In pursuing their agenda, they find a well-tuned sense of political timing to be crucial. They are adept at walking a fine line between actions designed to achieve the goals and moves to avoid risks, mistakes, and failures. In the process, they seek to take advantage of opportunities and avoid threats. For these leaders, it is important to “size up” the other party and to get a sense of their position before deciding on next moves (M. G. Hermann, 2005). They often engage in “tit-for-tat” behavior in interacting with outside parties. They are best when they meet face-to-face with other leaders and do so in order to obtain more specific information about the issues at hand (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95–96; Hermann & Gerard, 2009, pp. 34–35).

Leaders who respect constraints and are closed to information are pragmatists. These leaders struggle with the dilemma that they want to make some progress toward their goals while working within the bounds of their positions. They search for ways to reach their goals and maintain the support of important constituents while not alienating or excluding opponents. In dealing with political opponents, they seek to bargain with them and come up with ways to accommodate various viewpoints to achieve a compromise. They seek to build consensus or compromise between conflicting parties. They are driven by the situation. These leaders seek to become agents of their constituencies and are willing to work on the agenda of their constituents. In essence, they are “diplomats and mediators at heart.” They believe in

debate and dialogue and value the power of persuasion (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001: 96; Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 35-36).

The *opportunists*, who are the opposite of *advocates*, respect constraints and are open to information (hypothesis testers/native scientists). They are the most “buffeted by the political winds” since they are most sensitive to contextual information. These leaders are expedient, defining the issue and taking a position based on the agenda of important constituencies. Bargaining lies at the heart of the political game. They tend to act as a broker and intermediary between various political groups. For them, others’ views and positions become crucial in shaping their agenda (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95, 98-99).

1. 2. The Use of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) in This Study

Scoring and Norming Group

The leader’s scores on each of these traits will be determined by numbers that range from 0 to 1. To judge whether the leader’s scores are high, moderate, or low on a certain leadership trait, the trait’s numerical score is compared to the average score for the trait of a norming group. A norming group consists of the aggregated scores of other leaders on the traits of interest. In this study, the data on a group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders who were in power from 1998 to 2008 were used as a norming group. The norming group data were based on Margaret G. Hermann’s research on political leadership across different world regions (see Hermann & Sakiev, 2018).

The logic is that an average and a standard deviation is calculated for a norming group of leaders and the leader’s individual score for each trait is compared to the relevant mean of

the norming group of leaders. Typically, when the leader's score on a certain trait is higher than one standard deviation above average of the norming group, his/her score is considered high on that trait. In this study, the leader's score on a trait is higher than a half standard deviation above the average of the norming group, his score is deemed high on this trait. The use of a half standard deviation, rather than one standard deviation, was intended to increase the degree of differentiation in the strength of the leader's trait scores. This is so that some scores which would have fallen into the moderate range if a full standard deviation had been used can be more distinct in strength. This in turn has the effect of making a leadership style 'more distinct' than using typical differentiation would have shown. By employing a half standard deviation to determine the average range of the norming group, the individual's leadership style that would have been assessed to be a mixed style can be categorized in a more discrete way as a particular type of leadership style.

Types of Coded Materials

Leadership Trait Analysis allows for measuring personality traits through content analysis of materials that are available in the public domain. The materials transcribing leaders' utterances verbatim constitute the primary documents for this method. Considering that this study explores Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the North Korea Policy during his tenure, verbal materials of Kim Dae-jung's speeches, press conferences and interviews dealing with North Korea-related topics including peace, war, security, inter-Korean relations, unification, etc. that are available online or in the form of paper publications were used in this analysis.⁹⁸ Regarding the source materials that address other topics in addition to North Korea-

⁹⁸ For the list of documents used for content analysis in this study, see Appendix A.

relevant issues, only those text segments addressing North Korea-related topics were extracted for content analysis. This is because the focus of this research lies in President Kim's leadership traits and styles as relevant to the North Korea policy. Therefore, the LTA results discussed in this analysis concerning the leader's personal traits and leadership styles are "practically and exclusively" relevant to the policy in question. Therefore, the results can serve as a useful proxy for Kim Dae-jung's approach to leadership as relevant to his North Korean policy. Moreover, only those interview responses and speeches that comprise 500 or more words were used for the profiling purpose in the analysis in order to assure significance of the resulting trait scores for each material and thus to assure confidence in the resulting personality profile. This is based on the theoretical ground that the greater the length of the document, the more accurate or significant the result of the content analysis.

Contextualization of Materials

For analytical purposes, Kim Dae-jung's five-year term was divided into three periods based on the changing nature of the environment in terms of the severity of constraints imposed on his North Korea policy. By categorizing materials by time, audience, and topic, the content analysis can assess how sensitive a particular leader was to the context in terms of leadership traits and styles (M. G. Hermann, 2008, p. 7). If the leader's trait scores show variability, the research will explore how and when the leader was likely to change his behavior, and under what contextual conditions he changed his approach to leadership (M. G. Hermann, 2008, p. 19). With the coded materials all dealing with North Korea-relevant topics, this research further contextualized the profile by categorizing materials by time and audience. That is, for the purpose of profiling, the LTA results were contextualized to account for the changing

environment based on the passage of time (in terms of the degree of constraints imposed on the Sunshine Policy) and on each of the three major sources of constraints.

Therefore, in this study, Kim Dae-jung's leadership style was explored in relation to three different periods of time and three different sources of constraints, that is, the United States, North Korea, and the domestic political environment. This is because the study examines whether the leader's trait scores show a pattern of change across the three types of the environments of interest, that is, whether the leader's trait scores were affected by the evolving situation in relation to North Korea policy during his tenure. Kim's trait scores based on the North Korea-related materials targeted at domestic audiences were used to assess his leadership styles in relation to the domestic environment involving political constraints and obstacles he faced in implementing the North Korea policy. Similarly, the trait scores based on a set of materials targeted at foreign audiences were used to analyze Kim's leadership styles relating to the external environment and external constraints, such as the United States, posed to the Sunshine Policy.

In the same vein, his trait scores based on the full set of North Korea-relevant documents used in this analysis were used to evaluate his leadership styles regarding his overall North Korea policy. These overall scores are assessed to examine Kim's leadership as relevant to the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy given that the underlying system framed around the National Security Council was adopted at the beginning of his term and remained in operation throughout his presidency in relation to the North Korea policy. Moreover, the overall scores based on the North Korea-related materials—as contextualized to account for his leadership characteristics by the three periods of interest—were used to

investigate President Kim's leadership in dealing with North Korea, or constraints imposed by North Korea, for each period of interest.

Translation Issue

As President Kim Dae-jung's interviews and speeches were made in Korean, those materials that had been translated into English for publication purposes were used for content analysis in this study. Regarding concerns about the effects of translation on the results of the analysis, tests have been conducted in which persons trained from other countries conducted the content analysis in their original language, and the results of their analyses were compared to the results generated by another group of researchers who did the same on the English translation. Such tests have been conducted with documents in French, Swahili, Russian, and Mandarin Chinese. On average, the results of the tests have shown 87 percent overlap (M. G. Hermann, 2008, pp. 7-8). In this study, both interview responses and speeches were used for content analysis. Speeches are regarded as equally important, if not more so, than interview responses as types of documents subject to the analysis. This is partly because of a significant degree of representativeness involved in Kim Dae-jung's speeches. This will be further discussed in the section of Political Skills of the *Who* chapter.

2. Qualitative Interviewing⁹⁹

Qualitative interviewing is used in this study as the data collection method. Semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth interviews were conducted as a supplementary tool to explore President Kim's perspective on the contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine

⁹⁹ For the list of questions the author asked the interviewees in relation to this study, see Appendix B.

Policy as well as the nature of the relevant decision-making system. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were done with individuals who were involved in the policy process or closely assisted Kim Dae-jung for an extended period time prior to his election as president, and throughout his presidency and implementation of the Sunshine Policy.

Selection of Interviewees

Interviews in this study provides a critical source of data as the existing materials fail to provide sufficiently substantive information deemed necessary to explore the leader's perspectives on major events or developments and the innerworkings and dynamics of the relevant advisory system. The interviewees were recruited in this study in ways that could ensure the credibility, accuracy, and balance of the analysis (e.g., Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 61-70). Interviewed in this study were those individuals who had firsthand experience with Kim Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy and thus whose words can serve as credible evidence for the conclusion of the analysis. Some interviewees represented different points of view or provided alternative interpretations or perspectives on the events and developments relevant to the policy of interest. This presumably had the effect of making the data more balanced and thorough.

Specifically, the interviewees in this study were those individuals who were directly involved in the decision-making and implementation process of the Sunshine Policy as well as Kim Dae-jung's longtime aides and close associates. The interviewees also included those who had a significant interaction with him, such as working as a personal secretary, an interpreter, or a biography writer, as well as a couple of former opposition lawmakers who were opposed to the Sunshine Policy.

The list of the individuals who participated in the interviews for this study include former government officials who served under the Kim Dae-jung administration. The positions held by these officials include those of Unification Minister, Deputy Unification Minister, Ambassador to the United States, Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Deputy Director of NIS, First Secretary to NIS, Chief Presidential Secretary, Presidential Press Secretary, and Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomacy and Security.¹⁰⁰

Characteristics of interviews

In-depth, qualitative interviewing was employed in this study as a data collection method. The type of responses sought in the interviews were ones involving rich and detailed information. The interviewees were expected to share examples, experiences, narratives and stories relevant to the topic of the study and interview questions. Moreover, as the questions asked were not fixed but open-ended, interviewees were encouraged to respond any way they desired –e.g., elaborating upon responses or raising other issues. This also means that the researcher did not have to adhere to a given set of questions and, may change the wording or skip questions if they were considered inappropriate at the time of the interview. Also, the interviewer was able to make up new questions on the spot to follow up on new insights, and ask a separate set of questions to different interviewees (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 29).

The interviews conducted in this study were ‘semi-structured’ in that the interviewer sought to focus on the planned items that spoke to the research questions. That is, the researcher had a specific topic to explore, prepared a given set of questions in advance, and

¹⁰⁰ For the list of interviewees, see Appendix C.

planned to ask follow-up questions, focusing on the planned items that were closely relevant to research questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 31).¹⁰¹

Period of Interviews

Most of the interviews were conducted from September to December in 2016 with 20 interviewees in South Korea. All of the data collected in Korea during this period were in Korean except for one interview (with Yang Sung-chul) that was given in English. An additional two sessions of interviews were conducted in the United States (Syracuse, New York) with the two American interviewees (Leon Sigal and Stephen Costello) in English in September and November of 2017. At the beginning of interview sessions, interviewees were asked if they agreed to be recorded or quoted in the dissertation. The interview data was recorded only when the interviewees gave consent to the recording.

B. Decision-Making System Involved in the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003)

1. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): Decision-Making System (LTA)

In this study, Kim Dae-jung's overall leadership profile, comprised of the seven personality traits as relevant to the Sunshine Policy for his five-year term of office, is used to explore how his leadership characteristics affected the nature of the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung's mean scores as well as the strengths of these scores, determined by comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders (Table 5), are

¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, in an unstructured interview, a researcher has a general topic in mind, but the majority of the questions are formulated as the interview proceeds in accordance with interview responses. Both structured and unstructured interviews seek responses given in vivid detail. The major difference lies in the degree of control the researcher retains over the interview.

shown in Table 4. The scores concern Kim Dae-jung's term of office (1998-2003), representing his overall personality profile as relevant to North Korea policy.

Table 4

Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	<i>Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)</i>	<i>Need for Power (Power)</i>	<i>Conceptual Complexity (CC)</i>	<i>Self-Confidence (SC)</i>	<i>Task/Relationship Focus (Task)</i>	<i>Distrust of Others (Distrust)</i>	<i>In-Group Bias (IGB)</i>
North Korea Policy	0.35 Moderate	0.36 High	0.57 Moderate	0.33 Moderate	0.53 Low	0.15 Moderate	0.25 High

Note. Number of the documents used for content analysis: 68; Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis: 77262. Materials used for content analysis: Interview responses and speeches on North Korea-relevant topics.

Table 5

Norming Group Statistics (Means and Half Standard Deviations): 79 Pacific Rim leaders (1998-2008)

Pacific Rim Leaders	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
Mean	0.34	0.27	0.59	0.32	0.62	0.14	0.16
SD (1/2)	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.025

$\mu - \sigma$	0.31	0.24	0.55	0.26	0.58	0.10	0.135 (0.14)
$\mu + \sigma$	0.37	0.30	0.63	0.38	0.66	0.18	0.185 (0.19)

Note. Data courtesy of Margaret G. Hermann¹⁰² and *Social Science Automation*.¹⁰³ Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB).

The results based on the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) shows that, regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile was distinct in relation to a norming group for the three traits. Specifically, Kim Dae-jung's profile showed a high *need for power*, a high *in-group bias*, and a low *task focus* across his five-year term of office. It is noteworthy that these three personality traits are "exclusively and consistently" distinct in terms of the strength of scores in comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders across the three periods under analysis, as illustrated in Table 6. This profile provides crucial information on the type of decision-making system that President Kim Dae-jung adopted in relation to North Korea policy during his presidency.

Table 6

Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) by Three Periods of Analysis (Leadership Trait Analysis)

¹⁰² The norming group data were provided by Margaret G. Hermann based on her research on political leadership across different world regions. The data used in this study were on 79 heads of state in the Pacific Rim region who were in power from 1998 to 2008 (see Hermann & Sakiev, 2018).

¹⁰³ For the *Profiler Plus* text coding platform provided by *Social Science Automation*, see the following link: <https://socialscience.net/>

	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
Period 1 (1998-1999)							
North Korea - N of doc: 28 - N of words: 26872	0.36 High	0.37 High	0.56 Moderate	0.35 Moderate	0.54 Low	0.14 Moderate	0.28 High
Period 2 (2000)							
North Korea - N of doc: 19 - N of words: 29869	0.35 Moderate	0.36 High	0.55 Low	0.29 Moderate	0.53 Low	0.11 Low	0.25 High
Period 3 (2001-2002)							
North Korea - N of doc: 21 - N of words: 20521	0.33 Moderate	0.34 High	0.59 Moderate	0.34 Moderate	0.53 Low	0.20 High	0.21 High

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

2. Advisory System under President Kim Dae-jung as Relevant to the North Korea Policy

According to George and Stern (1998), a leader's decisions on structuring the policymaking system is significantly affected by his/her own preferences based on the prior experience, perceived expertise, and competence in foreign policy and national security affairs. After all, the president's personality will help shape the institutional structure of the decision-making system as well as the practical management of the structure. All this indicates that

discrepancies in presidential preferences for management and decision-making style will lead to variations in the advisory system and the attendant decision-making process.

The classic works on advisory systems by Richard Tanner Johnson and Alexander George, which address an advisory structure and patterns of interaction among advisers, differentiate among formalistic, competitive and collegial systems.¹⁰⁴ George (1980) suggests that three variables –cognitive style, orientation toward conflict, and sense of efficacy- as well as experience, competence, and interest in foreign policy have implications for a president’s choice of collegial, formalistic, or competitive models.¹⁰⁵ According to George, these elements combine to determine how the president will develop a policymaking system and how he will define his role and that of his advisers. Regarding this classification, there has been a general consensus among scholars and practitioners that advisory systems mostly take one of two forms: formalistic or collegial (Haney, 1997, pp. 44–46; A. L. George & Stern, 1998, pp. 203–204; Mitchell, 2005, p. 11).¹⁰⁶

Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung established a decision-making system by creating the National Security Council Standing Committee (NSSC) and its Secretariat that was in charge of

¹⁰⁴ Originally, Richard Tanner Johnson (1974) created the typology suggesting three basic management styles. Alexander George (1980; 1998) then elaborated on the Johnson typology specifying the characteristics of each advisory system.

¹⁰⁵ The cognitive style dimension in George’s study addresses the president’s beliefs about context as well as his preferred ways of acquiring information, selecting advisers, and interacting with them (A. L. George, 1980, p. 147; A. L. George & Stern, 1998, pp. 201–203). The second personality dimension of a sense of efficacy relates to management and decision-making tasks. This dimension relates to the president’s feelings of competency in performing tasks. This dimension influences the nature of the advisory system by determining the specific type of role that the president takes in the system. A third personality dimension addresses the president’s general orientation toward interpersonal conflict over policy among advisers, which has an impact on the nature of debate. This indicates that the president may or may not want to avoid face-to-face confrontation and seek consensus on solutions before decisions are made. In addition, George claims that these personality dimensions are complemented by a president’s prior experience and competency in foreign policy (George and Stern, 1998, pp. 202-203, 262).

¹⁰⁶ Many scholars concur that the typology may be comprised of the two categories of formalistic and collegial models considering that the competitive system may not be regarded as a full-fledged category generalized across administrations since it is somewhat anomalous and viewed as specific to U.S. former President Franklin Roosevelt.

providing staff support for the standing committee.¹⁰⁷ Under the administration of President Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung's predecessor, inter-Korean issues were under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council. Nevertheless, under Kim Young-sam, there was no supportive mechanism in place and no minutes of the meetings were kept even though important discussions were held on national security and North Korean issues.

Under President Kim Dae-jung, the NSSC was established as a regular, primary deliberation forum for North Korea and security policies. The meeting was attended by the heads of all ministries and departments relevant to national security and unification issues including Minister of Unification, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of National Defense, the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the Senior Presidential Secretary of National Security and Foreign Affairs, and the Director of Coordination from the Office of the Prime Minister (Lim, 2012, pp. 172–173).¹⁰⁸ Under President Kim Dae-jung, the NSSC deliberated on major North Korea policy issues and significantly contributed to the president's decision-making throughout his five-year tenure.


Formalistic System (George/Johnson)

The decision-making model Kim Dae-jung adopted in relation to North Korea policy was a formalistic system in terms of the Johnson and George's typology. The Kim Dae-jung administration's formalistic model can be depicted in simplified terms as in Figure 2.

¹⁰⁷ The senior presidential secretary would concurrently head the NSC Secretariat and the NSSC.

¹⁰⁸ The director of coordination was able to voice his views but would not participate in decision votes.

Figure 2. Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) under President Kim Dae-jung



Under President Kim Dae-jung, the National Security Council was normalized as a full-blown decision-making mechanism. The NSC Standing Committee (NSSC) was held on a weekly basis, every Thursday at four o'clock. As a supportive mechanism for committee operation, a working-level meeting attended by mostly deputy minister-level officials would be held every Tuesday to prepare the agenda for the standing committee meetings to ensure the system's efficient operation (S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016). The system was formalistic in nature, following well-defined procedures that facilitated orderly policymaking. At the end of each meeting, a report that included minority views would be drafted and submitted to the president. Once approved by the president, the presidential memo would be distributed to the members of the committee for thorough implementation (Lim, 2012, pp. 173, 177).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ In contrast to the formal model, the collegial system largely relies on informal procedures. In this model, the president seeks to create a team of advisers who will work together to identify, analyze, and solve policy problems in a way that synthesizes divergent points of view. As an active member of the group, the president leads the decision-making team and shares responsibility with his key advisers, who are mostly 'generalists'. Divergent views arise from the interaction within the team, and the vetting of different views leads to the most feasible policy, rather than the best policy as sought in the formal model. This system intends to use divergent views as a means to find policy solutions that are 'substantively sound and politically doable.' In the collegial model, the president stands at the center as the hub of the information network and often reaches down the information channels. Building consensus and the collegial atmosphere are emphasized in this system as a way to

Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to have a mechanism for control and coordination in place that would protect the policymaking process from bureaucratic politics that could cause holdups or malfunctions in the process. The system's control and centralization were effectively maintained with the help of Lim Dong-won, President Kim's most trusted adviser and virtual chief of staff. The presidential preferences and guidelines were conveyed to cabinet heads, deputy ministers and other subordinates through Lim Dong-won, who played a central role as a liaison between the president and the advisory- and the working-level group (Y. S. Yang, personal communication, October 22, 2016).

3. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits & the Decision-making System as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy

Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile indicates that a high *need for power* combines with a low *task-focus* to result in unique leadership characteristics that are reflected in the decision-making system he adopted in relation to North Korea policy. It is notable that, in this study, the high *in-group bias* of the leader is a relatively less important variable in delving into the relevant advisory system. This is because the two motivational variables of *in-group bias* and *distrust of others* are the personality traits that are the most flexible and adaptable to the situation in which the leader finds himself (M. G. Hermann, 2005). That is, these two motivational traits are far more instrumental when delving into the implementation aspect of the policy rather than the decision-making aspect of the policy.

avoid the worst excesses in bargaining, infighting, and conflict linked with the competitive model (Haney, 1997, pp. 44–46; A. L. George & Stern, 1998, pp. 203–204).

1. High Need for Power

Kim Dae-jung's high score on *need for power* was clearly manifested in the inner workings of the advisory system he adopted in conducting his North Korea policy.

Formal System

Studies suggest that leaders with a high *need for power* tend to prefer a formal, hierarchical advisory system to tighten their control over the policymaking process. As a result, their policy preferences often dominate both the policy deliberations within advisory groups and the nature of the final decisions. These leaders are likely to centralize decision making within tight inner circles of trusted advisers and to pursue direct personal involvement in policy formulation (Preston, 2001). The hierarchy of the system enables the filtering of information and exclusion of dissenters from the decision-making process. The president, the final decision-maker, usually sticks to a formal channel and rarely reaches down to bypass a cabinet secretary to get information from subordinate officials (A. L. George & Stern, 1998; Mitchell, 2005, pp. 11–12). In his comparative analysis of several American presidents in terms of their personality traits and the impact of these traits on their preferred advisory systems, Preston (2001) found that Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, and George H.W. Bush were high on *need for power* in relation to the foreign policy.

In terms of Kim Dae-jung's model of decision-making, the formalistic feature centered around tight inner circles was primarily the case for Period 2 (2000), in which the relevant decision-making largely revolved around secret endeavors to achieve the inter-Korean summit. In the other two periods of study—Period 1 (1998-1999) and Period 3 (2001-2002)—the relevant decision-making process became normalized and relied more on the system involving the NSC.

Channels of Communication

As shown in the diagram, Kim Dae-jung's decision-making model positions the president at the top as the final decision maker so that the president takes full responsibility for the final decisions. Moreover, this system respected hierarchy, and formal channels of communication dominated the central decision-making mechanism. The president stuck to the channels of communication and seldom reached down to bypass a cabinet head to gain information or advice from lower-level officials or subordinates. In this system, access to the president was limited. In fact, deputy or working-level officials had virtually little access to the president while members of the cabinet and presidential secretaries had relatively easy access to the president. When they directly briefed the president, the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security and Lim Dong-won, the chief of staff, were present in order to remain informed of what was reported to the president as part of the policy process (e.g., personal communications with D. W. Lim; S. H. Jeong; H. Seo). Regarding the access to the president, informed sources indicate that top adviser Lim had the ear of the president since he had the most open access. This, they note, endowed him with authority and made him serve as an esteemed custodian manager with an effective control on the overall policy process.

Briefings to President Kim were done either verbally or in writing as he was largely open to both types of reporting. Equipped with a breadth and depth of knowledge and expertise in the field, Kim Dae-jung is said to have been able to absorb any type of information instantly on the spot (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016). Regarding the advisory system, Kim Dae-jung defined the role of each cabinet head as a functional expert rather than a generalist on relevant issue areas, which constitutes another characteristic of the formalistic

model (See Lim, 2012, p. 207). Equipped with functional expertise, advisers in this system served to provide specialized advice on specific policy problems. Another notable aspect of this system was that the members of the advisory group had mostly bureaucratic backgrounds, as opposed to scholarly or academic backgrounds, with many years of experience working for the government in the relevant field (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016).

Highly-Centralized System

Showing a leadership essentially distinct for a constantly high *need for power* regarding the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's decision-making system can be classified as a "formal and highly centralized" system in terms of David Mitchell's typology (2005). As discussed above, the system revolved around the hierarchical advisory structure and the president's sustained influence over the policy process. In making decisions, members of the advisory group devised policy options within the presidential mandates and guidelines that reflected President Kim's ideas and preferences. They also operated only within the bounds of presidential instructions when implementing the policy. The failure to observe such guidelines or any moves made outside the bounds of the presidential instructions were considered a dereliction of duty and would lead to the exclusion of the "disobeyer" from the process altogether even though such an incident was a mere rarity, if it happened at all.¹¹⁰ This way, President Kim Dae-jung sought to take charge and maintain consistent leverage over the overall policy process in conducting the Sunshine Policy (D. W. Lim; S. H. Jeong; H. Seo, personal communications, September and

¹¹⁰ A case in point is President Kim's dismissal of his unification minister due to his failure to follow presidential instructions as the chief delegate of the inter-Korean talks held at Kungang Mountain in November 2001. The eagerly-anticipated inter-Korean talks, which the Kim administration managed to hold following the six-month-long deadlock in inter-Korean relations, broke down quickly when the South Korean representative, Unification Minister Hong Soon-young, entered into a dispute with his North Korean counterpart. By doing so, he failed to comply with presidential instructions to reach an agreement with the North at the end of the talks. President Kim then moved to dismiss him as the Unification Minister.

October, 2016). All this demonstrates that effective presidential dominance and centralization characterized the decision-making process Kim Dae-jung adopted vis-a-vis his North Korea policy.

Under this system, very little conflict emerged across relevant bureaucracies and among the members of the policy group. One group that was hard-pressed to cope with a changed strategy adopted under the new president was South Korea's Armed Forces. However, the Defense Ministry generally endorsed President Kim's Sunshine Policy throughout his term of office.¹¹¹ When the government was struggling to bring the North back to the negotiating table amid heightening tensions between Pyongyang and Washington, the Defense Ministry agreed to postpone the publication of the Defense White Paper designating the North as the "main enemy" (S. J. Sohn, 2002).

The role of the NSSC under the Kim Dae-jung administration was particularly important when there occurred an overlap of issues across relevant ministries. The differing views were coordinated and synthesized at this forum through intense debates and discussions among its members. When members of the NSSC failed to reach a consensus, their positions including minority views were reported by Lim Dong-won to the president so that the final decision could be made at the presidential level (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016). In this sense, strictly speaking, the NSC under the Kim Dae-jung administration can be more

¹¹¹ Following the submarine incident that occurred on June 22, 1998, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were directly involved in handling the situation, defined the incident as a North Korean "armed provocation." Nevertheless, he stopped short of threatening the North with retribution in kind which had been the norm of past practices. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek expressed his strong endorsement of the new government's engagement policy in his speech at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on July 10, 1998, in Hawaii. Minister Chun said that a continued policy of engagement would increase transparency in the North's international situation and weaken the position of its hardliners and thus reduce the chances of any armed provocations (Y. J. Oh, 1998b).

appropriately described as *a mechanism for policy deliberation and coordination*, rather than as *a final decision-making body*, observes Seo Hoon, the agency's Deputy Director at the time (H. Seo, personal communication, November 25, 2016).

Under this system, dissenting views and conflicts were almost always reconciled through active coordination conducted at the NSSC. In case dissension occurred and council members had difficulty reaching consensus on certain policy issues, Lim Dong-won would intervene to coordinate differing views or make suggestions in a way that facilitated consensus-building. It is noteworthy, however, that the relationship between the top presidential adviser Lim Dong-won and other members of the advisory group was not so much hierarchical as lateral and mutually cooperative. As a member of the NSSC, Lim actively joined policy discussions with other advisers without seeking to be in control of the deliberation process (H. K. Kim, personal communication, November 30, 2016; S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016). Still, Lim maintained effective control over the decision-making process not least because other advisers were keenly aware of the fact that Lim's views put forward at the meetings were faithfully reflective of the president's views and ideas on the issues at hand. In fact, members of the government shared the notion that President Kim and Lim Dong-won were, in effect, of one heart and mind when it came to North Korea policy (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016). Moreover, it was difficult for a member of the advisory group to challenge Lim's views considering his extensive knowledge and expertise on North Korean and security affairs (S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016).

Another crucial reason for the relative lack of conflict in the policymaking process in this system was that final decisions were always made by the president (D. W. Lim, personal

communication, October 19, 2016). Regarding major issues of the North Korea policy, the president's policy preferences dominated the policy process, and final decisions reflected his preferences. In other words, with few exceptions, the president's views and judgments ultimately prevailed when there were disagreements at the advisory or bureaucratic levels.¹¹² This is also intimately linked with President's Kim's interest and expertise in the issue area. Studies posit that leaders who view themselves as having expertise in a domain tend to be more willing to play an active role in policymaking and to be reluctant to delegate their authority as a final decision maker (e.g., Preston, 2001).

Role of the Chief of Staff

In the formalistic system, the presidential chief of staff can promote the efficient management of the policymaking process. Lim Dong-won provided President Kim with a relatively unique combination of military background, academic credentials, along with bureaucratic and governmental experience. A native of North Korea, Lim was formerly a soldier, diplomat, and a lead delegate to the North-South High-Level Talks, which led two Koreas to sign the historic Basic Agreement in December 1991. A graduate from the Korean Military Academy (Class of 1957), he was a unique individual who was both well-versed in theory and long-experienced in practice on the issues of national security, diplomacy, and unification. Beginning in February 1995, Lim Dong-won assisted Kim Dae-jung as the Secretary General of the Asia-Pacific Foundation.¹¹³ Along with extensive experience in strategic planning as a former military

¹¹² For example, regarding the South Korean delegation of 337 people's week-long trip to Pyongyang in August 2002, President Kim decided to authorize the group's visit despite objections by relevant bureaucracies including the National Intelligence Service (NIS) (Lim, 2012, p. 279).

¹¹³ The Asia-Pacific Foundation was established by Kim Dae-jung in January 1994 for the purpose of achieving 1) peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula; 2) democratization of Asia, and 3) realization of world peace. Its programs included

officer, Lim's unique experience and background combined to reinforce strategic vision of the Sunshine Policy.

As the deputy architect of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung, Lim Dong-won became President Kim's most trusted adviser, confidant, and propagandist on the policy. Playing a central role as a liaison between the president and the policy group, Lim served as President Kim's de facto chief of staff for the overall policy process involving both the procedural and implementation aspects of the Sunshine Policy. Serving as a custodian manager of the overall decision-making system, Lim conducted effective interagency coordination of the policy between the executive branch and other government agencies and reconciled disputes between advisory members and relevant bureaucracies.

Lim also served as a high-leverage advocate of the Sunshine Policy. Considering that he engaged in substantial policy advocacy, it is difficult to see him as an honest broker. A chief of staff as an honest broker is policy-neutral and usually acts as a mere conduit for the information prepared in the advisory group. Rather, it seems fair to say that Lim Dong-won played a gatekeeper's role in this system considering that he helped promote the efficiency of decision-making and protected the president from being overloaded with resolving lower-level policy disputes. In the process, a degree of filtering likely would have taken place, and the information deemed irrelevant to the president's agenda may have been screened out (e.g., Alexander L. George & Stern, 1998; Mitchell, 2005). However, it is worth noting that the nature of final decisions made by the president would not have been affected, if at all, by the

research, education, and public affairs. In this period, Lim Dong-won also assisted Kim Dae-jung with refining the *Three-Stage Unification formula*, which was published in 1995 (Lim, 2012, pp. 158-159).

presumed filtering. It seems safe to assume that Lim and President Kim largely shared views when it came to North Korea policy, so closely that any screened-out ideas would not have been considered as viable options by the president himself.

Nature of the Control

The fact that the decision-making system was highly centralized, formalistic in nature leads to the reasoning that the phenomenon of *anticipatory compliance* of *groupthink* may have occurred in this system, as in the typical case of a formal model that is hierarchical in nature. Relevant studies have suggested that groupthink may prompt premature closure or excessive consensus seeking in the deliberation process. Studies have shown that particularly systems with formal, highly centralized structures will have a higher propensity for groupthink because a leader in such a system expresses a set of preferences (Mitchell, 2005, pp. 226-227).

It is worth noting that the president's control over the policy process in this system was not so much of a direct, outright sort, but was rather indirect, subtle, and behind-the-scenes in nature. This is closely tied to some attributes of the *need for power* trait, involving the tendency to manipulate the environment in order to be in control of the situation (Terhune, 1968; Winter, 2003). A holistic understanding of the *need for power* relevant to this qualitative dimension is vital for a proper understanding of Kim Dae-jung's model as linked with his leadership characteristics (Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978; Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990).

2. A Low Task-Focus: Relationship/Process-Focus

Kim Dae-jung's constantly low score on *task-focus* indicates that he was *relationship- and process-oriented* in his behavioral predispositions. The analysis demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung's *relationship/process-focused* orientation was manifested not only in how he implemented the Sunshine Policy but also in how he organized the relevant decision-making system (e.g., Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; Winter, 2003; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Winter, 2005). Stressing the importance of "teamwork" and the concept of "family" among his advisors, President Kim sought to build a collaborative, collegial atmosphere and encouraged his advisers to engage in joint efforts at problem-solving, observe his aides. This way, the system clearly prioritized cooperation over competition.

A close look into the system reveals that Kim Dae-jung's version of the formalistic model was not of a rigid, authoritarian sort, as noted by several members of the administration. Stressing the importance of discussion and debate for policymaking, the system was rather quite flexible and reasonable in nature, they noted (S.H., Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016; H. Seo, personal communication, October 25, 2016).

George and Stern (1998, p. 208) observe that policymaking in complex organizations normally proceeds on two simultaneous tracks: the formal, visible, and official track on one hand, and the informal, less visible track on the other. As in other cases of formalistic policymaking systems, Kim Dae-jung's model incorporated some informal elements. Throughout Kim's term of office, informal dinners were held at the end of each official NSC Standard Committee (NSSC) meeting. These dinners were intended for members to have an opportunity to exchange ideas and information, resolve misunderstandings, and discuss any issues that may not have been covered during official meetings. In fact, relevant sources

indicate that this was highly instrumental in building a spirit of teamwork and enhancing mutual understanding and good atmosphere among members of the advisory group (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016; S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016).

President Kim's motivational orientation toward process and relationship with regard to North Korea policy was also reflected in how Lim Dong Won supervised the relevant decision-making system. Even with the NSSC meetings fully normalized as a mechanism of systematic decision-making, this model also incorporated person-centered elements in that Lim Dong-won played a virtually indispensable role in the overall decision-making and implementation process. President Kim consistently maintained leverage over both the substance and the process of North Korea policy-making through Lim Dong-won, who closely assisted him in various positions ranging from the Senior Presidential Secretary to the Intelligence Chief to the Unification Minister and Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs and Security.

It is safe to posit that presidential chief of staff Lim Dong-won's personality and management style also had an impact on how the system operated. Notably, Lim was not a domineering or interfering type of chief of staff but an unostentatious, considerate, and respectful manager, as indicated by those officials involved in relevant policymaking. To be sure, Lim Dong-won's low-key personality and the fact that he was a good team player affected the nature of the decision-making system involved in Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy.

Regarding the way presidents are remembered by his former aides, lieutenants of such US presidents as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford, and H.W. Bush had little to complain about their erstwhile boss and mostly praised them (F. Greenstein, 2000, p. 181). Greenstein

(2000) surmises that this is “an illuminating postpresidential indicator of a president’s success as a team builder.” Meanwhile, the veterans of the Johnson, Carter, and Clinton presidencies mostly represented mixed views of the presidency they served. If at all, Kim Dae-jung’s case is more comparable to the former than to the latter. That is, as far as the North Korea policy was concerned, the lieutenants of President Kim mostly expressed highly favorable view of the Kim presidency. In some ways, the analysis suggests that this was in part because Kim Dae-jung’s was concerned with building relationship within his advisory group and acted an effective team builder in managing the policy-making machinery.

3. Personal Experiences and Expertise (Kim Dae-jung’s Personal Capital)

Expertise + High Need for Power = *Director* Leadership Style

In managing the decision-making machinery in relation to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung displayed the activist presidential style of the *director* in Preston’s typology (2001).¹¹⁴ The *Director’s* leadership style refers to a type of leader with extensive expertise in the issue area as well as a high *need for power*. According to Preston (2001), U.S. leaders who have shown themselves as *Directors* in leadership style include Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman in domestic policy, and John Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower in foreign policy.¹¹⁵ In essence, Kim

¹¹⁴ As with Mitchell’s (2005) study, Preston’s (2001) research applies presidential management to George and Johnson’s formal/collegial dichotomy, but suggests that certain dimensions of leadership style such as the need for control (and involvement) in the policy process and the leader’s sensitivity to context be incorporated into the framework. His typology is based on the interrelation of these two elements with prior policy experience or expertise. In delving into Kim Dae-jung’s decision-making system, a part of Preston’s framework that addresses the interplay of the two leadership attributes – the need for control and policy experience/expertise- were used in this analysis. This is because Kim Dae-jung’s leadership characteristics are particularly salient in terms of these two variables. Kim’s leadership profile shows a consistently high score on the need for power throughout his presidency and across the three periods of analysis.

¹¹⁵ Preston (2001) suggests that three leadership traits in particular -need for power, conceptual complexity, and prior policy experience or expertise- play crucial roles in shaping presidential leadership style (Preston, 2001). Preston found that, with regard to foreign policy, Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy showed a *director* style of leadership as they scored highly on

Dae-jung's marked sense of personal efficacy was intrinsically linked with his knowledge, expertise, and interest in the field. Kim Dae-jung's expertise in the field of North Korea policy, which constitutes a major source of his personal capital, consists of multiple dimensions: his innate intellectual ability; intense interest; extensive knowledge; and critical experiences he underwent throughout his four decade-long political career as a dissident politician.

Scholars (e.g., Merelman, 1986; Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings, 2002a; Citrin & Sides, 2004) suggest that critical events in a leader's life may lead to the development of expertise. Kim Dae-jung's critical life experiences discussed in the *Who* chapter would likely have both directly and indirectly contributed to his interest and expertise in the North Korea policy. Such critical experiences appear to have been a source of stability and decisiveness in his approach to leadership in undertaking the peace initiative. Even in turbulent periods of his presidential term, especially in the waning period of his presidency, Kim Dae-jung maintained remarkable composure, remaining imperturbable, measured, and decisive in the face of heavy stress and the pressure of hard choices. All of this constitutes crucial components of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital and important characteristics, as was discussed in the *Who* chapter.

Possession of domain expertise makes individuals more willing to actively advocate for their preferred positions, strongly dissent from others in the group, and seek greater control over the policymaking process (e.g., Horai et al., 1974; Alexander L. George, 1980; M. G. Hermann, 1986; D. D. Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Preston, 2001; Tjosvold et al., 2001). Those leaders perceiving themselves as possessing expertise in the policy domain tend to have greater

both need for power and prior experience in substantive policy areas. Lyndon Johnson and Henry Truman were classified as 'Magistrate' in leadership style as they were low on prior experience or expertise in foreign policy even though they were high on need for power. Meanwhile, George H.W. Bush was low on need for power but had extensive experience in foreign policy showing the activist presidential style of the 'Administrator.'

self-confidence and become interested in being actively involved in relevant policy processes. Having both perceived and recognized knowledge and expertise in the field, Kim Dae-jung advocated for his own policy views, framed issues, and set specific policy guidelines.

Another salient aspect of Kim Dae-jung's leadership concerns the use of analogy which is reflective of the degree of expertise. The use of analogy is intimately associated with the persuasive ability. Vertzberger (1990, p. 384) holds that "Experts perform better than novices in analogical problem solving, both when the problems share structural features but not superficial features and when problems share only superficial but not structural features." A vast reservoir of intellectual and practical knowledge developed throughout Kim Dae-jung's political career led him to use logically sophisticated analogies drawn from across temporal and cultural contexts, rather than just simple ones from his own generation and culture, as noted by several associates of President Kim Dae-jung (e.g., Stephen Benedict Dyson & Preston, 2006). Kim Dae-jung showed a relatively low degree of reliance on advisers for expert advice as a source of authoritative wisdom and creativity. He was so confident in his ability to define situations and make decisions and judgements that he relied on his advisers mainly for details of the information and relevant numerical data (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016). For him, advisers were mainly a source of tactical and technical support in conducting the Sunshine Policy.

For all the established intellectual foundation he laid for the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung lacked practical experience in the field. Relevant studies suggest that an individual's competence is based on a combination of experience, deliberate practice, and specialized knowledge regarding a particular field (Connell et al., 2003, p. 144; Mayer, 2008). This criteria

leads to the reasoning that one missing component of competence in Kim Dae-jung's case is 'deliberate practice.' In seeking to compensate for such a defect, Kim Dae-jung recruited Lim Dong-won, a longtime practitioner with a scholarly bent. Lim helped complete Kim Dae-jung's theoretical framework of unification. Upon taking office, President Kim appointed Lim as his point man on the Sunshine Policy.

Lim Dong-won's unique combination of bureaucratic background involving hands-on experience working as a lead delegate to the inter-Korean high-level talks, which led to the historic 1991 North-South Basic Agreement, and his military and academic background all constituted valuable resources for President Kim's North Korea policy. This was all the more so as Kim Dae-jung lacked the knowledge in the military field or the practical experience applying his methodology in dealing with North Korea (Y.S. Yang, personal communication, October 22, 2016).

Presidential Involvement in the Decision-Making Process

Relevant sources observe that President Kim provided his chief of staff and the heads of Cabinet with significant authority and discretion, as long as they worked within the bounds of the general guidelines based on the three principles of the Sunshine Policy.¹¹⁶ Kim Dae-jung delegated considerable authority and discretion to his lieutenants and advisers. In a way, this manifests his confidence in his own ability to be in effective control of the policy process, as well as his keen sense of efficacy. Kang In-duk, a prominent conservative who formerly worked for the KCIA and was President Kim Dae-jung's first Unification Minister (1998-1999), notes that

¹¹⁶ At the same time, he was strict in applying this principle in that anyone who broke the mold and acted outside the bounds would be excluded from the policy process altogether, as in the case with the unification minister who refused to follow presidential instructions when engaging in the talks with North Korea in November 2001.

he was given full discretion to perform his tasks as the Unification Minister. Therefore, Kang says, when organizing and managing inter-Korean events, including minister-level talks, he was only supposed to brief the president on his plans (I. D. Kang, personal communication, November 8, 2016). Placing perfect trust in Lim Dong-won, President Kim also gave his top adviser much discretion. Therefore, when necessary, Lim was able to make major decisions on the spot and report it to the president afterward. Moreover, having trust in members of his advisory group, Kim reportedly approved almost all of the policy recommendations made by the Standing Committee (NSSC) during his term of office (Lim, 2012, p. 176-177).

Regarding presidential involvement in the policymaking process, the pattern he showed does not necessarily fit with theoretical predictions for leaders exhibiting the activist leadership style of the *director* as Kim Dae-jung was not directly involved in the regular policy-making process. Instead of joining regular deliberations held at NSSC meetings on a weekly basis, he was briefed afterward about details of the deliberations and suggestions made at the meetings. President Kim then reportedly prepared his own comments or instructions for the chief of staff to distribute to the members of the advisory group.

When there were crucial issues on which the president himself needed to make decisions by seeking ideas and suggestions from relevant ministries and agencies, he would convene and preside over the Council of Ministers on Foreign Affairs and National Security; this happened about three or four times a year. In meetings held at the presidential Blue House, North Korea and security-related issues were discussed on a broader scale than at the NSC and among a greater number of officials including the Prime Minister and heads of other relevant ministries along with the members of the NSC. The meeting was also aimed at setting broader

goals and guidelines of the government's security and North Korea policy. Serving as a chair/moderator in this meeting, President Kim actively joined debates and discussions with members of his cabinet and coordinated different views to make final decisions (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016; S. H. Jeong, November 22, 2016; S. J. Kim, October 14, 2016).

In this model, the president maintained effective and efficient control over the decision-making system without being regularly involved in the decision-making process primarily by virtue of the role of Lim Dong-won, his most trusted adviser, in managing the system. Notably, his moderate score on *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) in his overall personality profile suggests that he was not necessarily in pursuit of robust control over the decision-making machinery even though he sought to have influence over it in a way that ensured his position would ultimately prevail. These characteristics denote a subtle but significant difference in behavioral dimensions of leadership.

Regarding the decision-making system in relation to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's unique personal style as reflected in a high *need for power*, a moderate *belief in ability to control events* (or a moderate internal locus of control), his focus on process and relationships, and his interest and expertise in the field, took the form of an effective but indirect control over the overall decision-making process.

Regarding the relationship between leader and advisers, the literature posits that high-power leaders are more likely to show assertive interpersonal styles and actively challenge or seek to influence the policy positions of their advisers. They are generally deemed more likely to override or ignore conflicting or opposing views of advisers (e.g., George and Stern, 1998;

Mitchell, 2005). According to those involved in the policy process in relation to the Sunshine Policy, however, this was not necessarily the case for this system. That the control exercised over the system was quite indirect and subtle constituted another unique aspect of Kim Dae-jung's interpersonal style, which was evidenced in a constantly high score on the *need for power* coupled with a moderate level of *belief in ability to control events* (BACE)—in his overall (or average) profile (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005). The analysis posits that the unique aspect of the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy was attributable to Kim Dae-jung's high *need for power* and *relationship/process focus* combined with the charisma factor of his personal capital.

Personal Capital and Personality Traits

Charismatic Factor, Relationship Focus, and High Need for Power

Another notable aspect of this system is limited access to the president. According to one of his speech writers, President Kim would not meet with him in person, and instead communicate with him only indirectly by exchanging manuscripts or handing over recorded tapes of his own words (W. K. Kang, 2014). Several informed sources indicate that President Kim was rarely, if at all, accessible by deputy minister-level officers or working-level officials when it came to the decision-making process.

Despite Kim's supposed aloofness or disengagement, the "insiders" interviewed for this study held that Kim was not an authoritarian leader. Several members of President Kim's advisory group indicated that he had actively engaged in policy discussions with members of the advisory group and had not been imperiously self-assured or arbitrary in issuing

instructions. Rather, the sources observed, President Kim had sought to be a good listener and open-minded when engaging in discussion with his aides.

Still, it is noteworthy that a charismatic factor of his personal capital, combined with his *relationship focus* and characteristically high *need for power*, made for a system with a unique character, a system which featured hierarchy and remoteness in terms of access to the president, and, at the same time, promoted communication and collegial relationships among members of the advisory system.

Regarding the North Korea policy, in this system, there were few if any advisers who would comfortably make outspoken comments or suggestions deemed disconfirmatory of a planned course of action when speaking with the president.

All this helps corroborate the reasoning, as discussed above, that there existed a phenomenon of *groupthink* among the advisory members in this system. Among contributing factors to this phenomenon may have been the mastery of subject matters of the president himself and the charisma factor of personal capital. That is, his professional stature based on knowledge and expertise along with his charisma may have generated “a structure of incentives” that could induce many actors to comply with the real or perceived stances and preferences of their superior (Schafer & Crichlow, 1996; t’Hart, 1990). This may have led to a degree of anticipatory compliance in this system.

Chapter 5. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Policy Implementation (Period 1: 1998-1999)

Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty

A. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

1. Periodization of the Analysis

In this section of the study, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile is presented for the period of his presidency (1998-2003) in relation to seven personality traits such as *belief in the ability to control events*, *need for power*, *conceptual complexity*, *self-confidence*, *task-orientation*, *distrust of others*, and *in-group bias*. For analytical purposes, Kim Dae-jung's five-year-long presidential tenure was divided into three sub-periods (e.g., 1998-1999; 2000; 2001-2002) in consideration of changing contextual conditions and changes in the severity of constraints posed to the Sunshine Policy. Kim's leadership profile as relevant to North Korea policy is constructed not only for the entire presidency but for each period of interest and with respect to the three different types of environment or sources of constraints from domestic politics, North Korea, and the external environment including the United States.

Period I (1998-1999): Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty

Throughout this period, Kim Dae-jung strived to break the prolonged deadlock in inter-Korean relations, which had long been exacerbating under his predecessor's highly inconsistent and fairly hardline approach to dealing with North Korea. In this period, North Korea continually

tested President Kim's resolve in conducting the Sunshine Policy, committing a series of provocations against the South and the United States. Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy in this period was primarily designed to "set the stage" for his peace process. In doing so, he aspired to replace the negative feedback loop with a positive one so that the history would undergo a fateful turnaround. His unflinching, assertive, yet extremely cautious endeavors to develop ties and build trust with North Korea while convincing the Clinton administration and the broader international community to be in lockstep with his Sunshine Policy were all aimed to achieve this goal. Amid all the difficulties and constraints imposed by the internal and external environment that could have impeded the pace of his peace process, Kim Dae-jung managed to pull off achieving a set of key goals he had set for this period including the opening of the Kumgang Mt. tourism project and President Clinton's adoption of the Comprehensive Approach as a revised North Korea strategy, among others. By the end of this period, the Sunshine Policy commanded resounding support from the international community including Japan, China, Russia, and many other Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries. Moreover, North Korea began to break out of its diplomatic isolation, normalizing diplomatic relations with many countries in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as well as with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Armstrong, 2013, p. 283). Despite Kim Dae-jung's persistent endeavors to promote inter-Korean relations, virtually little progress had been made in inter-Korean relations at the government-level by the end of 1999.

Period 2 (2000): Heyday of the Sunshine Policy

By almost all conceivable standards, the year 2000 constituted the heyday of the Sunshine Policy. On the North Korean front, the first inter-Korean summit was held on June 13-

15, three months after Kim Dae-jung's Berlin Declaration. The June 15 North-South Joint Declaration and subsequent developments surrounding the Sunshine Policy constituted a remarkable change in inter-Korean relations as a series of landmark events and developments followed the summit. Considering a seemingly endless cycle of mutual distrust, military confrontation, a crisis, and a negotiated settlement of the crisis that had hampered peace and security on the Korean peninsula for almost 50 years, the changes made in the wake of the summit constituted substantive progress in inter-Korean relations. Moreover, in the year 2000, the North-South summit paved a timely pathway toward improvement in US-DPRK relations, which was highlighted by Vice Marshal Jo Myung-rok's visit to Washington, D.C. to meet with President Clinton and the resulting U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique, which was followed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000.

Period 3 (2001-2002): Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis

With President George W. Bush taking office, the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy swiftly deteriorated, as hardliners and neoconservatives led by Vice President Dick Cheney expressed their hostile views on North Korea. President Bush, for his part, began to advocate the ABC—anything but Clinton—strategy in dealing with North Korea; this meant that he intended to employ a sharply distinct strategy from what the Clinton administration used toward North Korea. Upon taking office, President Bush expressed his will to shelve a missile deal that had been stricken between North Korea and the Clinton administration (Sanger, 2001). In protest against President Bush's hostile posture, North Korea began to withdraw from all inter-Korean dialogues and cooperation projects it had joined. Moreover, during this period, South Korean domestic opponents and conservative critics became more vehement in their

opposition to the Sunshine Policy, severely hampering its implementation. The Mankyongdae incident led to the collapse of the so-called DJP (Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil) coalition government and eventually forced resignation of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, President Kim's point man on North Korea policy, through a parliamentary no-confidence vote.

Meanwhile, a series of developments that occurred in terms of the US-DPRK relations posed the greatest-ever challenge to the Sunshine Policy. The September 11 (2001) terrorist attacks on the United States and President Bush's axis of evil statement in the State of the Union address in January 2002 further exacerbated military tension on the Korean peninsula. To add insult to injury, Assistant Secretary Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002 as President Bush's special envoy ended in the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework and eventually resulted in North Korea's 2nd nuclear crisis and its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10, 2003.

2. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): Policy Implementation (LTA)

Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile as it relates to the Sunshine Policy for the three periods of interest and the three sources of constraints is summarized in Table 7.

Table 7

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Three Periods under Analysis and for Three Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Personality Traits Source of Constraints	Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	Need for Power (Power)	Conceptual Complexity (CC)	Self-confidence (SC)	Task-focus (Task)	Distrust of others (Distrust)	In-Group Bias (IGB)
Period I (1998-1999)							
North Korea (Overall)	0.37	0.37	0.56	0.35	0.54	0.14	0.28
	H	H	M	M	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Motivational Perception: Close to Zero-sum	
	Leadership Style: Advocate						
Foreign	0.36	0.31	0.60	0.44	0.54	0.05	0.21
	M	H	M	H	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Zero-sum	
	Advocate						
Domestic	0.38	0.41	0.54	0.28	0.54	0.19	0.32
	H	H	L	M	L	H	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Focused	
	Advocate						
Period II (2000)							
North Korea (Overall)	0.35	0.36	0.55	0.29	0.53	0.11	0.25
	M	H	L	M	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Zero-sum	
	Advocate						
Foreign (Little Constraint)	0.29	0.33	0.56	0.33	0.50	0.06	0.25
	L	H	M	M	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Zero-sum	
	Advocate						
Domestic	0.40	0.38	0.55	0.24	0.56	0.15	0.23
	H	H	L	L	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Close to Zero-sum	
	Advocate						
Period III (2001-2002)							
North Korea (Overall)	0.33	0.34	0.59	0.34	0.53	0.20	0.21
	M	H	M	M	L	H	H
	Challenge		Closed		Process -Focus	Focused	
	Advocate						
Foreign	0.32	0.29	0.61	0.35	0.55	0.23	0.14
	M	M	M	M	L	H	L

	Respect		Closed		<i>Process -Focus</i>	<i>Opportunity- Grabbing</i>	
	<i>Pragmatic</i>						
Domestic	0.34	0.39	0.56	0.34	0.52	0.16	0.29
	M	H	M	M	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process -Focus</i>	Close to <i>Zero-sum</i>	
	<i>Advocate</i>						

Note. High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

B. Constraints & Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Constraint 1: North Korea's Resistance to the Sunshine Policy

Around the time when Kim Dae-jung was elected president in December 1998, inter-Korean relations had remained at a nadir.¹¹⁷ Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung declared his willingness to bring to an end the vicious circle in inter-Korean relations prolonged under President Kim Young-sam's inconsistent strategy which was based on an imminent collapse theory, the linkage principle, and disapproval of civilian contacts. At his inauguration, Kim Dae-jung declared his willingness to pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and to help North Korea in improving relations with the United States and Japan. This was in stark contrast with his predecessor who would readily bristle at any hint of rapprochement.¹¹⁸ In his

¹¹⁷ In handling North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's death on July 9, 1994, President Kim Young-sam stoked anti-North Korean sentiments among South Koreans, which further deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Moreover, tensions emerged between the United States and South Korea as President Kim Young-sam opposed the Clinton administration's strategy to address the nuclear issue through bilateral negotiations.

¹¹⁸ In his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim said, "If interaction and cooperation between the South and North are realized, we are prepared to support North Korea even if it pushes for interaction and cooperation with our friends, including the United States and Japan as well as international organizations. Despite the current economic difficulties, the new administration will carry out the promises the Republic of Korea made in connection with the construction of light water reactors in North Korea. We will not be stingy in extending food aid to North Korea from the Government and private organizations through reasonable ways. ... I hope that interaction between the South and North will expand in many fields based on the South-North Basic Agreement."

address, Kim also made an array of proactive proposals on official inter-Korean dialogues, an inter-Korean summit, and exchange of envoys, which North Korea refused to accommodate.

In the initial period of Kim Dae-jung's presidency, North Korea fiercely resisted the Sunshine Policy, considering it literally as a scheme to take off its cloak as the Aesop fable goes. Ironically, North Korea perceived elements of containment in Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy. Therefore, the North averred that Kim Dae-jung was attempting to scorch their skin through their coat with his sunshine (S. Y. Lee, 2010). Regarding North Korea's resistance to the Sunshine Policy during this period, Rah Jong-il, President Kim's long-time adviser on political affairs, indicates that, at the time, North Korea even found offensive President Kim's vow not to pursue unification by absorption as one of three principles' of the Sunshine Policy since they regarded it as deriving from the notion putting the North in a position inferior to the South (J. I. Rah, personal communication, October 4, 2016).

Awaiting a response from the North to his proposals, Kim Dae-jung kept a close watch on North Korea's behavior, planning to seize upon whatever opportunity would arise for inter-Korean dialogues (Kim, 2011b, p. 71). The opportunity eventually came in March 1998 when the North requested the shipment of 200,000 tons of fertilizer at the fifth Red Cross talks in Beijing in March 1998. This led to the North-South Vice Ministerial Talks in April 1998 in Beijing, the first inter-Korean meeting since June 1994 (Shinn, 2001, pp. 14–15). Regarding this event, Kim Dae-jung issued a presidential mandate instructing the Unification Ministry to link the provision of fertilizer in the spring with the North's agreement to hold a reunion of separated families in the fall. That is, Kim tried to apply the 'principle of reciprocity' in holding the talks with the North. However, the North appeared only interested in the fertilizer assistance,

turning down the South's proposition that inter-Korean cooperation at the government level is based on the principle of reciprocity (Shinn, 2001). According to Jeong Se-hyun, South Korea's representative at the talks and the then Vice Unification Minister, North Korea vehemently protested the proposal, accusing the South of attempting to associate "humanitarian needs" with "a political issue," claiming that applying the principle of reciprocity to a humanitarian issue was "inhumane." As the North had rebuffed the Southern proposal, the talks broke down after a protracted tug of war between the two sides. The North Korean representative expressed strong doubts about the policy by saying, "Is the Sunshine Policy a scheme to melt us down into death, isn't it?" (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). This way, the North expressed their profound weariness of the Sunshine Policy, which they saw as effectively intended to attain unification by absorption.

Response

With North Korea shunning all official contact with South Korea, the implementation of Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy for this period largely revolved around sending humanitarian aid in the form of food and fertilizer to Pyongyang, taking institutional measures to promote inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at the civilian level, and enlisting support of his peace initiative from the United States and the broader international community. The Mt. Kumgang tourism project, which marked the culmination of President Kim's efforts to promote inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges at the civilian level, kicked off in November 1998. He openly rejected unification by absorption which was the actual policy of his predecessors, committing the country to the cause of peaceful coexistence, a goal he intended to achieve during his term

of office. In early March, Kim underlined his pledge by authorizing large shipments of food aid to the North. He then lifted restrictions on business deals between North and South Korean companies in April, and called upon the United States to terminate economic sanctions against the North in June 1998.

After all, the fertilizer talks served as an essential turning point in the implementation of the Sunshine Policy as North Korea's extreme defensiveness led the Kim administration to push ahead with the engagement policy in far more earnest manners than before, and to decisively shift away from the principle of strict reciprocity to the principle of flexible reciprocity (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). In other words, with the failed talks as a starting point, the policy's conceptual framework changed from the one based on the exchange of discrete favors and inducements to one permitting deferral of reciprocation and pursuit of change in North Korea's perception of the South. In the wake of the incident, Kim Dae-jung became more visibly focused on alleviating North Korea's threat perception, showing sincerity, and thus building genuine trust with the North.

With the long-awaited talks with North Korea collapsing, Kim Dae-jung proceeded with a conceptual change in the reciprocity principle of the Sunshine Policy, shifting from strict quid-pro-quo to flexible reciprocity which involved "non-synchronous, non-symmetrical, and non-equivalent" interactions (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). A revised principle of flexible reciprocity can be summarized as follows: (1) Easy tasks first, difficult tasks later (先易後難); (2) Private channel first, government channel later (先民後官); (3) Economy first, politics later (先經後政); (4) Give first, take later (先供後得) (Lim, 2012, p. 212).

In the aftermath of the failed talks, President Kim and his policy team decided to put the civilian sector at the forefront of implementing the North Korea policy with the government supporting it from behind. In fact, North Korea preferred economic cooperation with the South at the civilian level to government-level contact and dialogue since the former did not threaten the survival of its regime. Kim Dae-jung took an array of bold measures to eliminate restrictions on the amount and areas of investment in North Korea in accordance with the principle of separation of politics and economy.

This way, the Kim government allowed businesses to freely decide on economic cooperation with North Korea without any government meddling based on the principles of the market economy (Lim, 2012, p. 179). At the end of April 1998, the Kim Dae-jung administration announced “Measures to Vitalize Economic Cooperation between the North and South,” and moved to allow business people to travel to North Korea, approved the free provision of production facilities to the North, and to lift the \$1 million limit on loans to the North. (Lim, 2012, p. 179).¹¹⁹

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective

Regarding North Korea’s defensive attitudes manifested at the fertilizer talks, Kim Dae-jung said in his autobiography, “It brought home to me that North Korea had far more pride than I believed. The failed talks taught me a lesson that a significant degree of caution needs to be exercised on our part when giving the North a favor given that we are a better-off party in

¹¹⁹ This means that, regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation, the Kim Dae-jung government switched from a “positive system” that authorized particular investment areas to be on a list to a “negative system” that imposed no restriction on investment save some sensitive areas (Lim, 2012, p. 179).

possession of more resources” (Kim, 2011b, pp. 71–72). In fact, the failed inter-Korean talks led him to take note of North Korea’s *siege mentality* that he saw as an essential attribute of the communist regime, which will be discussed below concerning the first Yeonpyeong naval battle. Stressing the need to adopt a more patient approach to North Korea, Kim Dae-jung said, “when we deal with North Korea, we must maintain an attitude of patience and a goal of engagement backed by a resolute security posture, rather than reacting to every North Korean action with alternating joy and disappointment. ... We must not forget that North Korea is the most dangerous when it is isolated. We can learn a lesson from the fact that the detente policy of the United States from the mid-1970s was based on power and brought changes in the Communist bloc, including the Soviet Union.”¹²⁰

Constraint 2: North Korea’s Submarine Infiltration (June 22, 1998)

On June 22, 1998, a North Korean submarine on a spy mission was discovered entangled in fishing nets in South Korean waters off the eastern coast. The incident took place amid the ongoing discussion on the Mount Kumgang tourism project and Chairman Chung’s second visit to North Korea that would deliver the second batch of 501 head of cattle to the North (C. S. Lee, 1998a).

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Unification Minister Kang decided to temporarily suspend the ongoing economic cooperation projects and humanitarian aid to the North, including Hyundai’s plan on Mt. Kumgang tourism project and the transportation of 501 head of cattle, pending an official apology from the North (K. Y. Son, 1998). Immediately after

¹²⁰ President Kim Dae-jung’s speech on October 8, 1998, before the Japanese Diet in Tokyo.

the sub was found in the South Korean territory, the English-language Korean Central News Agency -North Korea's state news agency-, issued an unusual announcement that it had lost a submarine and was searching for the sub and its crew (Kristof, 1998). However, a few days later, the North denied responsibility stating that they had nothing to do with the incident and that the body found was not that of its agent (Kirk, 1998).

Response

In contrast to U.S. government's strong, immediate reaction to the incident,¹²¹ President Kim refrained from immediately defining it as an armed provocation and instead cautioned against a hasty conclusion, adopting a wait and see approach (Y. J. Oh, 1998a). By doing so, he was cautious not to aggravate the situation. In fact, Kim's Dae-jung's measured approach was a clear departure from the usual hardline stance taken by the previous administrations.¹²² The National Security Council Standing Committee (NSSC), which President Kim presided over upon the outbreak of the incident, decided to take a "flexible" approach under the guiding principle of separation of politics and economy regardless of whether the North issued an apology for its provocative actions (K. Y. Son, 1998).¹²³ With the official probe concluding that the incident resulted from North Korea's infiltration, Kim Dae-jung used strong rhetoric condemning North

¹²¹ The United States and South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), immediately defined the incident as an armed provocation, and strongly condemned the North for its second intrusion into the South. The Clinton administration's strong reaction was clearly divergent from its wait and see attitude as shown in the case of the September 1996 submarine incident.

¹²² Under the previous governments, South Korea's responses to North Korean provocations were eye-for-an-eye counteractions characterized by immediate accusations but often without deeds matching words (Y. J. Oh, 1998a). When the first submarine incident occurred in Sept 1996 with 26 agents landing on South Korea's east coast, President Kim Young-sam defined the incident as a "military provocation" and warned of "all-out war." He then took strong steps avowing to increase in military spending and instructing a freeze on all aid and contact with the North pending its apology (Sullivan, 1996).

¹²³ At the end of this NSC meeting, the statement was issued that "any provocations from the North will never be tolerated, but the Sunshine Policy will be maintained based on its guiding principles of separation of politics and economy" (Kim, 2011b, p. 94).

Korea's provocation as an intolerable violation of the armistice and the 1991 Basic Agreement at the Cabinet meeting (C. S. Lee, 1998b). Still, Kim stressed the need for "concrete evidence" so that the government would "nip in the bud any North Korean propaganda." By so doing, he sought to assure that the incident should not derail his Sunshine Policy (C. S. Lee, 1998c; "South Urges Joint Inquiry On NKn Sub," 1998).

Reaffirming the principle of separation of politics and economy, Kim Dae-jung then pushed ahead with the Hyundai Group's Mt. Kumgang tourism project, regardless of North Korea's issuance of public apology, which he had demanded as a condition for moving ahead with this project (K. Y. Son, 1998). Adopting a changed tone from its initial response, North Korea, for its part, denied having dispatched the submarine and claimed that South Korean soldiers killed its crew members. In response, Kim Dae-jung suggested that the two Koreas conduct a joint investigation into North Korea's submarine infiltration ("South urges Joint Inquiry on NKn Sub," 1998).

Meanwhile, in an unprecedented development, the General Officers' Talks were held between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the North Korean People's Army at Panmunjom upon the outbreak of the submarine incident (C. S. Lee, 1998d). At the Panmunjom meeting, North Korea expressed its willingness not to argue over the submarine incident at a time when two Koreas were moving to build a friendly atmosphere. North Korea's soft attitude was interpreted by the South as an encouraging sign that the submarine controversy would be quickly resolved (C. S. Lee, 1998d).

After all, it was the Kim administration that made these talks possible in the first place. In effect, North Korea withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in 1991 in

protest against the appointment of a South Korean general as the UNC's chief representative on the MAC.¹²⁴ Taking note of the importance of the re-opening of Panmunjom in improving North-South relations, President Kim via his top adviser Lim persuaded the Defense Ministry to put pragmatic interests before their bureaucratic position. At the time, the Defense Ministry maintained that the meeting should be held within the previous framework of the MAC wherein the ROK representative had an equal voice. Finally, Kim Dae-jung managed to gain North Korea's acceptance of his government's revised proposal (Lim, 2012, p. 182).¹²⁵ Eventually, South Korea's decision to let an American general represent the UNC and its efforts to resolve disputes between Washington and Pyongyang ended up with the General Officers' Talks being held between the United States and North Korea even in the wake of the submarine incident. This, in turn, significantly helped reduce the tension on the Korean peninsula.

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

For President Kim Dae-jung, the submarine incident in June 1998 constituted the first major challenge he faced in dealing with North Korea. He called the incident "the first-ever ordeal" he faced since the Sunshine Policy's inception, and "a test board" of the Sunshine Policy (Kim, 2011b, pp. 93–94). Despite the initial concerns he had about the submarine incident, Kim

¹²⁴ In fact, the problem began with the UNC appointing a South Korean general as its senior representative for the MAC in 1991. North Korea then declared the UNC-North Korea MAC meeting invalid, and then had ignored the MAC for seven years. Intended to exclude South Korea and talk to the United States instead, North Korea demanded in 1994 that the UNC-North Korea MAC meeting be replaced by a "North Korea-US General Officers Meeting." This was simply unacceptable to South Korea. After President Kim Dae-jung took office in the South, North Korea revised its proposal to hold a "General Officers Meeting between the KPA and the UN Forces. Still, no progress was made on this issue due to some objections by South Korea's Ministry of Defense (Lim, 2012, p. 182).

¹²⁵ The presidential office convinced the Ministry of Defense of the need to revise the existing proposal based on the "framework of the Military Armistice Commission" to reflect a higher concept of the "framework of the Military Armistice Agreement" (Lim, 2012, p. 182).

Dae-jung's perception of the incident seems to have changed in terms of the degree of the incident's salience. As General Officers' Talks were held between the UNC –represented by the United States- and North Korea following the incident and North Korea showed what seemed to be an unusually softened attitude, Kim Dae-jung came across as even more decisive in pushing ahead with his peace initiative.

Regarding the General Officers' talks, Kim Dae-jung said in his autobiography, "I saw a ray of hope in that the UNC-North Korea talks were held in Panmunjom for the first time in seven years amid all the controversies surrounding the submarine incident" (Kim, 2011b, p. 95). Regarding the submarine incident, Lim Dong-won, President Kim's top adviser, observes, "The incident was a kind of provocation by the North against the South. However, it must also be noted that it was at the lower end of the provocation's scale considering that it runs the gamut of salience from atomic bombing, full-scale war, and attacks on certain targets, to limited exchanges of fire, and information gathering activities" (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).

Constraint 3: The First Yeonpyeong Battle (June 15, 1999)

The first naval battle, which would later be officially named "the First Yeonpyeong Battle," erupted on June 15, 1999, following a nine-day standoff in disputed waters in the West Sea as North Korean naval ships opened fire at South Korean patrol ships. The incident occurred at a time when South Korea and the United States were waiting for North Korea's response to the package peace deal handed over by U.S. envoy William Perry in May 1999. Every June, North Korean fishing boats would intrude south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) to catch crabs,

and usually readily scuttled north of the line when warned by South Korean patrol boats. However, in early June 1999 North Korean fishing boats stayed south of the NLL fishing every day while being protected by North Korean patrol ships despite warnings from the South Korean navy (Lim, 2012, pp. 225-226). The NSSC, which convened frequently to deal with the situation, decided to take the position demanding “North Korea’s compliance with the NLL and immediate withdrawal from south of the NLL.” As the North continued to defy South Korean warnings, the NSSC accepted Defense Minister Cho Seong-tae’s recommendation that the South Korean navy push the North Korean vessels back to north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) (Lim, 2012, p. 226).

President Kim Dae-jung then issued the presidential instructions as follows: “Hold the NLL by all means. However, do not fire first. If the enemy opens fire first, punish them resolutely. When an exchange of fire occurs, prevent escalation under all circumstances.” In giving instructions, he was careful not to go into much detail as someone who was not an expert in military affairs. Regarding his careful management of the incident, he said, “I was afraid that my half-baked ideas might undermine the otherwise sophisticated military strategies” (Kim, 2011b, p. 180). A fierce exchange of gunfire between the two Koreas that lasted for fourteen minutes ended up in a resounding victory on the part of the South as the North suffered heavy losses with more than thirty casualties (e.g., Lim, 2012, pp. 225-227). Regarding the first naval battle that erupted with North Korea’s violation of the NLL, Kim Dae-jung and the National Security Council sought to find out North Korea’s possible intentions. The NSSC took note of the fact that the North Koreans were advancing too far in violation of the NLL

in order to meet their mandatory quota for crab fishing (Lim, 2012, pp. 225-226).¹²⁶

Response

Despite the inter-Korean naval battle, Kim Dae-jung decided to continue the Mt. Kumgang tourism project as scheduled based on the principle of separation of politics and economy. When the naval incident occurred, the Kim Dae-jung administration asked Hyundai Group, the only existing communication channel, to contact the North immediately. When informed by Hyundai Group of the North Korean stance that they strongly wanted the Mount Kumgang tourism project to continue without interruption despite the naval clash, Unification Minister Lim moved to approve the departure of the cruise ship.

Two days after the incident, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group also decided to resume the shipment of 14,000 tons of fertilizer to the North (WuDunn, 1999). Regarding the decision on whether to recall the ships that had left for the North just prior to the naval battle, the relevant bureaucracies overwhelmingly insisted on the need to recall them. Nevertheless, Unification Minister Lim Dong-won decided not to recall the ships and continued to send the North fertilizer assistance as originally scheduled (Lim, 2012, pp. 228-229). Moreover, President Kim and his policy elite decided to hold vice ministerial-level talks as scheduled despite the naval incident (*South Korean Ships Sink North Korean Patrol Boat*, 1999).

¹²⁶ In fact, North Korea never recognized the NLL, sticking to a 12-nautical mile maritime demarcation. This is because the NLL, which was based on 3 nautical miles of territorial waters, had been unilaterally drawn by the UNC to control military vessels and airplanes under its jurisdiction. Regarding this issue, two Koreas agreed in the Basic Agreement (December 1991) to continue to observe the currently existing jurisdictions, meaning the NLL, until a maritime borderline is established (Lim, 2012, p. 226).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

According to Kim Dae-jung, the First Yeonpyeong Battle in June 1998 demonstrated, internally and externally, that the Sunshine Policy was “neither innocent ideas nor the soft-line appeasement policy.” Kim referred to the outcome of the naval incident as empirical evidence showing that the Sunshine Policy did not merely aim to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation and never underestimated the need to maintain the country’s top defense preparedness.¹²⁷ From Kim Dae-jung’s perspective, North Korea’s provocative behaviors were mainly attributable to the confrontation between hawkish and dovish elements inside the northern regime at a time when the tension appeared to decrease between Pyongyang and Washington (H. Lee, personal communication, November, 2016).¹²⁸ Believing that the Sunshine Policy was “the most painful policy for the hawkish elements in the North,” Kim Dae-jung was confident that his policy would help empower dovish forces and weaken hawkish elements inside the North Korean regime (C. S. Lee, 1998c).

Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on North Korea’s provocative behavior, Kim, Hang-jung, President Kim’s long-time aide and the former Chief Presidential Secretary, says, “From DJ’s perspective, the unruliness, belligerence, and provocative actions of North Korea constituted a unique, paradoxical way of expressing the sense of isolation and vulnerability. That is, because North Korea is weak, they strive to appear strong, and because they are isolated, they often insist on pride excessively. In giving instructions to those officials who were

¹²⁷ President Kim Dae-jung’s speech on March 1, 1999, commemorating the Independence Movement day.

¹²⁸ Lim Dong-won, the then Unification Minister, who was faced with irritable reaction from the North Korean delegation at the failed vice-ministerial talks held in Beijing on June 22-26, 1999, reasoned that the North appeared to “be caught between the military hardliners, who were obstructing the dialogue with the South after suffering serious damage from the naval clash, and the cold reality of its need for fertilizer.” At the talks, the North demanded an apology and an assurance against a recurrence of the naval incident and refused to discuss the issue of separated families (Lim, 2012, p. 230).

going to negotiate with North Koreans, President Kim would say, “Don’t be affected by North Korea’s offensive, aggressive words and behaviors at the meeting. Please note that these are their tactics and part of their culture. How can we talk with them if we confront them the same way they do?” This way, he suggested that South Korean officials show a degree of magnanimity in dealing with their northern counterparts.” Kim Dae-jung profoundly understood the fundamental nature of the North Korean state. That is, he was acutely aware that what appeared to be North Korea’s reckless behavior and attitude, which often invited derision and ridicule, essentially derived from the recognition of its own weakness and vulnerability. He fully grasped that the North Korean regime’s desperate desire for survival amid the external environment fraught with various threats was closely connected with its ‘siege mentality’ (H. J. Kim, personal communication, October 18, 2016).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)

b. Source of Constraints: External Environment

Constraint: Resistance to the Sunshine Policy by Republican-led U.S. Congress

During this period, North Korea’s missile test and the lingering suspicion over its alleged nuclear development at the underground Kumchang-ri site led to severe resistance among Republican members of U.S. Congress to President Clinton’s engagement approach. In July 1998, amid a growing suspicion over the Kumchang-ri nuclear site, the U.S. Congress issued a report titled “Threat Assessment of Long-range Ballistic Missile to the United States.”

Moreover, following North Korea’s missile test on August 31, 1998, Republican members of U.S. Congress moved to cut the budget for the provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea which was

part of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework signed in October 1994. In doing so, they demanded that the Clinton administration thoroughly review its North Korea policy and revert to the hardline approach (Lim, 2012; Lippman, 1998, p. 199). Also, the so-called Rumsfeld Report was issued concluding that rogue states like North Korea, Iraq, and Iran would be capable of developing long-range ballistic missiles that could pose a threat to the security of the continental United States within five years (Rumsfeld, 1998). This report gained increasing support from U.S. hardliners who had opposed the Clinton government's engagement approach in dealing with North Korea (Lim, 2012, p. 199).

There occurred still more actions in this period on the part of U.S. politicians demanding an overhaul of the Clinton administration's engagement of North Korea. In May 1999, U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee issued a press release indicating that U.S. policy toward North Korea needed a major overhaul. Also, Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, the Chairman of that committee, introduced bipartisan legislation called the "North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999." This bill not only targeted North Korea but also aimed at torpedoing South Korea's Sunshine Policy (Steinberg, 1999).

Japan and the United States fiercely reacted to North Korea's ballistic missile test on August 31, 1998, from the village of Musudan-ri on its northern coast.¹²⁹ The discovery of the suspected underground nuclear site and North Korea's test of a multi-stage rocket touched off speculation in the United States that North Korea, having frozen its existing nuclear program in exchange for two light water reactors, had clandestinely engaged in an alternative nuclear

¹²⁹ Startling Japan, the missile, called *Daepodong*, flew over the main Japanese island of Honshu before landing harmlessly in the sea 800 miles from the launch site (Kirk, 2009, p. 152).

program (J. H. Paik, 1999, p. 47). Under growing pressure from the Republican-led Congress for overall revision of his North Korea policy following North Korea's missile test, President Clinton appointed former Secretary of Defense William Perry as North Korea Policy Coordinator in mid-November 1998, instructing him to undertake the policy review and submit a final report to the Congress ("Former US D Sec Called to Deal with NK Policy," 1998).

Following a series of negotiations in New York, North Korea agreed to allow U.S. inspectors access to the suspected facilities at Kumchang-ri in return for reciprocal measures to improve US-North Korea relations including the lifting of economic sanctions and providing food aid. On May 20-24, 1999, a U.S. inspection team investigated the underground site and found no evidence of nuclear activities. Despite the settlement of the controversy over the Kumchang-ri site, the United States remained suspicious of the possibility that the North might have been storing nuclear materials in other hidden facilities (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 146).

Response

In an interview with the New York Times held days prior to his visit to Washington for his first summit with Clinton, Kim Dae-jung urged the international community to mitigate economic sanctions against North Korea. During his visit to the United States, Kim suggested again, this time in a somewhat subdued tone, that it would be desirable to ease economic sanctions against the North. In fact, President Kim's actions left the Clinton administration with more room for policy maneuvering with regard to South Korea's engagement policy (K. Y. Park, 2001, p. 82). During the first Kim-Clinton summit in June 1998, President Clinton not only expressed strong support of President Kim's North Korea strategy but also effectively handed

over the majority of the initiative in managing North Korean affairs to President Kim. In doing so, President Clinton said, "Given your stature and experience, I would like you to lead on the issue of the Korean Peninsula... You take the driver's seat, and I will take the seat beside to help you" (Lim, 2012, p. 188). President Clinton reiterated his firm support of Kim Dae-jung's peace initiative while visiting South Korea in November 1998 for the second summit.

In response to North Korea's missile test, Kim Dae-jung and his government adopted a highly measured approach, interpreting the missile launch as a politically inspired move on the part of Kim Jong-il to bolster his posture prior to the Supreme People's Assembly scheduled for the day following the missile launch (Kirk, 2009, p. 152; Kim, 2011b, pp. 103-4). Despite North Korea's first long-range missile test on August 31, 1998, the Hyundai Group led by chairman Chung Ju-young moved forward with the plan to make his second visit to North Korea and launch the Mount Kumgang tourism project. Strictly applying the separation principle between politics and economy, the Kim Dae-jung government actively supported the Hyundai-led inter-Korean tourism venture (Kirk, 2009, p. 152). By doing so, Kim Dae-jung showed the international community and the Clinton administration his firm willingness to push for his peace agenda in spite of North Korea's missile test.

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration sought to address the Korean problem via four-party talks involving the United States, two Koreas, and China aimed at reducing tension on the peninsula and replacing the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace regime.¹³⁰ Despite Kim Dae-jung's efforts to continue the talks, the four-party talks never got off the ground as

¹³⁰ The four-party talks were proposed to the North by President Clinton and President Kim Young-sam in April 1997 as a way of addressing North Korea's reluctance to negotiate directly with the South. North Korea had long sought bilateral talks with the United States, hoping to marginalize South Korea (Myers, 1997).

they broke down with the parties unable to reach a basic agreement over North Korea's insistence on a peace treaty and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea (*sa jahwedam chulbom [Launch of the Four-Party Talks]*, 2017).

Upon President Clinton's nomination of William Perry as North Korea Policy Coordinator, Kim Dae-jung made arduous endeavors to persuade Perry and his North Korea Policy Review team to adopt an engagement approach based on the Comprehensive Approach suggesting a package settlement of all major pending issues in accordance with the principle of "give and take" and "mutual threat reduction." In effect, the idea of "a package deal" involving "give and take" on the nuclear issue and diplomatic and economic concessions was exactly what Kim Dae-jung proposed in April 1993 in the United Kingdom as a way to resolve North Korea's first nuclear crisis that erupted in March 1993. The Comprehensive Approach was intended for a fundamental resolution of the roots of the problem by improving US-North Korea relations (J. H. Paik, 1999, p. 54).

Kim Dae-jung moved to persuade William Perry face-to-face while he was visiting Seoul in early December 1998. In response to Perry's questions about his views on U.S. policy toward North Korea, Kim Dae-jung referred to the European détente process and stressed the need for a package solution through a process of give and take. He also provided Dr. Perry with detailed advice on what kind of 'sticks and carrots' could be used in negotiations and what specific options were available to the United States (Lim, 2012, p. 205).¹³¹ In late January 1999,

¹³¹ As possible carrots, Kim Dae-jung proposed such options as food aid; lifting sanctions; removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism; allowing the North's access to international financial institutions; compensation for the suspension of missile exports; normalizing relations with Japan; and compensation from Japan for the colonial past. As possible sticks, he suggested such alternatives as cancellation of the Light Water Reactor project, suspension of Chinese assistance, and military pressure (Lim, 2012, p. 205).

President Kim then dispatched Lim Dong-won as a special envoy to Washington with a mandate to persuade Perry's North Korea Policy Review team to accommodate the Comprehensive Approach as U.S. policy toward North Korea. This time, the South Korean team explained a detailed action plan of the Comprehensive Approach (Lim, 2012, pp. 206 -209). President Kim then dispatched Lim to Japan, China, and Russia to secure their understanding and support (Lim, 2012, pp. 189-193, 210-213). In early March 1999, the Perry team visited Seoul again to brief President Kim on a "Tentative Review of the U.S. Policy towards North Korea" at the instruction of President Clinton (Lim, 2012, p. 213).¹³² Highly satisfied with Perry's proposal faithfully reflecting his Comprehensive Approach, Kim Dae-jung suggested that Perry visit Pyongyang to explain the proposal directly to the North Koreans, a suggestion which the latter accepted on the spot (Lim, 2012, pp. 215-216).¹³³ After holding a trilateral policy coordination meeting among South Korea, the United States, and Japan in Honolulu in mid-April, William Perry traveled to Pyongyang in May 1999 to persuade the North to accept his proposal and undertake a process designed to mutually reduce the threat (Lim, 2012, pp. 216-217). Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung strongly advocated North Korea's admission to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (Moon, 2102, p. 42).

Ahead of Perry's visit to Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group worked to persuade North Korea to accept the South Korean proposal and to undertake a process of mutual threat reduction (Lim, 2012, p. 217). In a monthly press conference at the Blue House,

¹³² In his meeting with President Kim Dae-jung, Perry stated that even if a crisis was created by North Korea's negative responses, the United States would take strong measures to prevent war. Satisfied with Perry's briefing, Kim said, "Instead of being overly concerned about failure, we should confidently focus our efforts on persuading the North Koreans. Confidence can produce better results."

¹³³ In this meeting, President Kim provided William Perry detailed advice on how to persuade the North to accept the proposal while gaining international support and cooperation for the strategy that Korea and the United States had agreed upon.

Kim sent the North a message by stating that there was no deadline for the North to accept his comprehensive approach designed to put the regime on the path to openness, reform and inter-Korean reconciliation. He stressed that North Korea should not miss this rare opportunity and capitalize on William Perry's upcoming visit to Pyongyang as a way to terminate the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula (C. S. Lee, 1999). Toward the end of May 1999, the North accepted the Perry team's visit to Pyongyang.¹³⁴ All the efforts made by President Kim and his policy team culminated with the announcement of the Perry Process on September 14, 1999, which closely reflected the South Korean proposal. According to the Perry Report, the United States would take steps to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea and lift economic sanctions in return for North Korea's implementation of measures to mitigate concerns of the United States and other nations regarding its missile and nuclear weapons program ("Perry Submits Report to US Congress," 1999).

Regarding William Perry's visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, Leon Sigal observes that it was a critical development in terms of US-DPRK relations and inter-Korean relations.¹³⁵ When Perry visited Pyongyang in May 1999, he brought a draft of the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué which would be issued on Vice Marshall Jo Myung-rok's visit to Washington in October 2000.¹³⁶ After all, Perry's visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 effectively opened the way for the North-South

¹³⁴ Ahead of Perry's visit to Pyongyang (May 26-28), the North accepted a visit by Ambassador Kartman's delegation (May 14-15) and a visit to Kumchari by the U.S. inspection team (May 18-25).

¹³⁵ Leon V. Sigal is the Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council and the author of *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking*; and *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*.

¹³⁶ The US-DPRK Joint Communiqué was explicit about steps to take to bring an end to mutual animosity between North Korea and the United States. Within weeks, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il to prepare for President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang. At his talks with Secretary Albright, Kim Jong-il offered to end the missile program, specifically exports, development, production, and deployment of all medium and longer-range missiles. This was followed by the resumption of missile talks wherein North Korea agreed upon the moratorium on missile tests while the talks lasted (Sigal, 2017).

summit in June 2000. It also opened the way for improved US-North Korea relations as it was followed by the issuance of the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué (on October 12, 2000) as well as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang (October 22-24, 2000) wherein Kim Jong-il decided to put the missile deal on the table (L. Sigal, personal communication, September 20, 2017).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Whenever North Korea engaged in provocative actions, Kim Dae-jung sought to read its underlying motives and to address the problem at its core. Regarding North Korea's first missile test, Kim concluded that it was intended to draw attention from the international community and to invoke the 'rally round the flag effect' for domestic purposes. Also, considering that the North wanted to be perceived as a strong and prosperous nation, Kim saw it as aimed at creating a festive mood to celebrate the opening of the Kim Jong-il era in time for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the nation on September 9 (Kim, 2011b, p. 102-103).

President Clinton's remarks involving the "driver seat" analogy at a summit in Washington constituted a significant achievement for Kim Dae-jung. For Kim, this was the moment in which a major step was taken toward reaching the goal he sought to achieve during this period. Kim recalls, in his autobiography, that at the time he felt exhilarated by President Clinton's remarks since it meant that, for the first time in the country's contemporary history, South Korea effectively took over the initiative from the United States in addressing North Korean issues involving international security (Kim, 2011b, p. 82). Nevertheless, President Clinton's decision to appoint William Perry to be in charge of reviewing U.S. policy toward

North Korea amid growing misgivings about the Agreed Framework among U.S. hardliners was a source of concern for Kim Dae-jung. Upon hearing the news, President Kim was reminded of the fact that William Perry was a hawkish Defense Secretary who had proposed a preemptive air strike on the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon to President Clinton upon the outbreak of North Korea's first nuclear crisis in 1994 (Kim, 2011b, p. 136). In the face of this development that he believed could jeopardize the peace process he was pursuing, Kim Dae-jung moved to take a series of steps to persuade the Clinton administration to adopt the engagement strategy, and by extension, to incorporate the so-called Comprehensive Approach in U.S. strategy vis-à-vis North Korea.¹³⁷

After all, Kim Dae-jung took Perry's appointment as a potential obstacle to and at the same time a crucial opportunity for the Sunshine Policy. As it turned out, the Perry Report issued in September 1999, was framed around fundamental concepts underlying the "Comprehensive Approach" as suggested by the South Korean government. The Comprehensive Approach, which was drafted by then Unification Minister Lim Dong Won, clearly mirrored President Kim Dae-jung's ideas on how to fundamentally dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. President Kim was so satisfied with the Comprehensive Approach drafted by Lim that he called it a "nearly perfect idea" and said, "it was just as if he has (Lim, Dong-won) gotten inside my head" (Kim, 2011b, p. 138).

Regarding Kim Dae-jung's approach to the United States in relation to his North Korea

¹³⁷ All such efforts eventually ended up with the Perry Report, based on which the Clinton administration would resolve North Korean issues through diplomatic engagement aimed at mutual threat reduction (Perry, 1999).

policy, the then Presidential Press Secretary Park Sun-sook, notes that Kim profoundly understood the underlying mechanism of inter-Korean relations and this was practically embodied in his strategy. She says, “Even though DJ considered South Korea’s choices and views as a crucial factor for improvement in inter-Korean relations, he precisely understood in realistic terms that, in the absence of a move made by the United States, and of consent being given by the United States, it would be difficult to yield any tangible result in addressing issues of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean relations. DJ knew that he had to persuade the United States and that he could not go alone” (S. S. Park, personal communication, November 23, 2016).

Leon Sigal takes note of a similar point regarding Kim’s role in relation to the Perry Process. He states, “Kim Dae-jung was always very realistic both about North Korea and about the importance of getting engagement between North Korea and the United States. That is the key to being able to do what he wanted to do with North Korea and North-South (relations). ... He did some tough stuffs when he saw North Koreans challenging him. But the key was getting the Americans through the Perry Process to re-engage North Korea. Kim Dae-jung and Lim Dong-won were critical in getting Perry to try a serious diplomatic engagement with North Koreans” (L. Sigal, personal communication, September 20, 2017).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

Constraint: Resistance to the Sunshine Policy among Conservatives in the Wake of North Korea's Provocations

North Korea's provocations committed mainly against South Korea and the United States –e.g., the submarine incident, missile test, and the naval skirmish- during the initial two years of Kim's presidency served to bolster opposition to the Sunshine Policy among the opposition party and conservative media. When confronted with domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy in the wake of North Korea's aggressive acts as discussed above, Kim Dae-jung would express his strong will to maintain his planned course of actions and implement his agenda as previously planned.

Upon the outbreak of the submarine infiltration in June 1998, conservative critics including the opposition Grand National Party called on the government to take firm punitive measures against North Korea and warned against continuing numerous inter-Korean exchange programs ("Seoul Backs Hyundai's Mt. Kumgang Project," 1998). However, President Kim chose to proceed with the ongoing inter-Korean project and events like the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and Hyundai Chairman Chung's visit to North Korea as they were initially scheduled without interruption even though North Korea failed to issue an apology as demanded by his government (C. S. Lee, 1998a).

In the wake of a gun-ship battle in the West Sea in June 1999, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) vehemently resisted the Sunshine Policy. Citing it as the culprit for the military clash and the detention of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang,¹³⁸ opposition

¹³⁸ At the time of the naval battle, a South Korean tourist detained by the North Korean regime. This further aggravated the opposition's protest to the Sunshine Policy.

lawmakers urged the government to abolish the Sunshine Policy, suspend all humanitarian aid to North Korea, and cancel the planned vice-ministerial talks. Moreover, the opposition party condemned Unification Minister Lim Dong-won for pushing for the Kumgang tourism project and demanded his resignation (Yoo, 1999). They accused the Sunshine Policy of slackening the country's defense posture, decrying that the government was totally unaware of the seriousness of the situation ("Sunshine Policy to Continue Despite Naval Clash," 1999).

On the following day of the naval battle, President Kim Dae-jung convened heads of the ruling and opposition parties to hold a meeting, intending to show the public that bipartisan efforts were underway to properly address an emerging security threat. In this meeting, the leader of the opposition Grand National Party, called on the president to reconsider the Sunshine Policy. In an attempt to convince Chairman Lee Hoe-chang and other opposition leaders of the credibility of the policy, Kim explained the necessity of maintaining the Sunshine Policy (Kim, 2011b, p. 181). Kim Dae-jung strongly assured them that he would be patient and long-term oriented in dealing with the North, and no longer pursue the North Korea policy with a Cold War-era mentality while warning the North against launching further armed provocations ("Sunshine Policy to Continue Despite Naval Clash," 1999). Moreover, combined with North Korea's prolonged failure to reciprocate President Kim's overtures, a growing criticism of the Sunshine Policy among conservative detractors of the policy as a one-sided love affair and a policy of appeasement that could undermine South Korea's national security, effectively put the survival of the Sunshine Policy in jeopardy by the end of the year 1999 (C. Moon, 2012, p. 43).

Response

Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung appointed some conservative heavyweights in senior positions. Such appointments included Kang In-duk, the former ranking intelligence officer under Park Chung-hee's government (1961-1979), as the first Unification Minister and Lee Hong-koo, the former Unification Minister under President Roh Tae-woo and Prime Minister under President Kim Young-sam, as his first Ambassador to the United States. By recruiting Kang In-duk, a prominent conservative figure as his first Unification Minister, Kim Dae-jung sought to mitigate domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy and gain support both from the Korean public and the Clinton administration. In relation to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung appointed another conservative figure, Park Jae-kyu, as his Unification Minister (December 1999 - March 2001).

In a way, President Kim's recruitment of conservative officials for some key government posts can be seen as linked with the fact that the ruling party, National Congress for New Politics, was forming a coalition government with Kim Jong-pil's conservative United Liberal Democrats. Still, Kang's appointment as the first Unification Minister was widely viewed as a bold move as it stunned both the conservatives and liberals. This is because the post of Unification Minister in South Korea was arguably the most important cabinet position when it came to the country's North Korea policy and North Korea policy was not the issue area of primary interest for the ULD. In other words, Kim Dae-jung would have been able to appoint an individual who had been more ardently supportive of the Sunshine Policy or more closely in line with himself in beliefs and ideas on how to deal with North Korea. It was indeed a politically shrewd choice on the part of Kim Dae-jung who had been anticipating hurdles to be imposed on

his Sunshine Policy by his critics and conservative opponents. Kim Dae-jung was well aware that: there were forces in Korea “who, influenced by over 25 years of vilification of Kim Dae-jung by his opponents, will regard what they might view as excessive accommodations for the North as detrimental to South Korean national interests and security,” as David Steinberg (1999, p. 74) put it.

Harkening back to his appointment as the Unification Minister by President Kim Dae-jung, Kang In-duk, indicates that, in accepting President Kim’s offer, he was prepared to implement the Sunshine Policy, even if it meant some concessions could be made to North Korea. According to Kang, he accepted the appointment despite his conservative beliefs and ideas on North Korea because he felt the urgent need to improve inter-Korean relations and peacefully manage the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at a time when the country was badly struggling to overcome the worst-ever economic crisis since the Korean War. That is, he believed that the Sunshine Policy would help build a peaceful domestic environment which would attract desperately needed foreign investment into the country (I. D. Kang, personal communication, November 8, 2016).

As it turned out, Kim Dae-jung’s strategy was highly effective in mitigating domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy. Then Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs Lee Hoon, observes, “President Kim sought understanding of the Sunshine Policy from his conservative unification ministers, who in turn sought the public understanding of the policy. This effectively had a bit of ‘buffering’ effect in relation to those who were worried about the Sunshine Policy at the time” (H. Lee, Personal communication, November 22, 2016).

Meanwhile, during the summit in Washington on June 10, 1998, President’s Clinton

expressed his willingness to hand over the initiative to President Kim on North Korea policy. Moreover, during his visit to Seoul in November 1998 for a second summit meeting, Clinton watched live on television the scene of the second cruise ship with 600 South Korean tourists aboard leaving the East Sea port for Mt. Kumgang. President Clinton described his impression of the historic emotional scene at the press conference the next day.¹³⁹ Clinton's strong support of the Sunshine Policy had a significant effect on the increase in credibility of the Sunshine Policy and the relevant authority of President Kim in the country. This, in turn, helped mitigate the resistance to his peace initiative among conservative critics.

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Stephen Costello, Kim Dae-jung's long-time political adviser from the early 1990s through to his presidency, indicates that, as the first progressive politician who was elected president in Korean history, Kim Dae-jung knew that he did not want to "just push it (the Sunshine Policy) in their face and have overturned the cart since he was much smarter than that. ... Kim Dae-jung was keenly aware of the South Korean society, and that he needed to have some comfort and some legitimacy even with conservatives" (Personal communication, November 3, 2017).

Kim Sung-jae, Kim Dae-jung's longtime aide and the Minister of Culture and Tourism under his administration, notes, "Having long been labeled as a Commie (a Red) or a leftist, President Kim wanted to relieve the public (with such appointments). At the time, the

¹³⁹ At the press conference held after a summit with President Kim, President Clinton described his impression of the scene, stating that he was moved by the festive mood of peace. He said it was "a very inspiring and beautiful scene" (Lim, 2012, p. 185).

conservative circle was taken aback by Kang's appointment as the first Unification Minister (of President Kim Dae-jung), while the progressive camp, for their part, severely criticized it."

During the presidential campaign, he went on to explain, Kim Dae-jung's predecessor President Kim Young-sam claimed that the United States and the South Korean military were against Kim Dae-jung's election as president. Under such circumstances, Kim Dae-jung acutely felt the need to counter the ideological offensive persistently taken against him so that he would be able to properly implement his peace initiative with backing from, and trust established with, the United States (S. J. Kim, personal communication, October 14, 2016).

Then Press Secretary at the presidential office and long-time personal secretary to Kim Dae-jung Choi Kyung-hwan indicates that such moves reflected the level of President Kim's confidence. He observes, "President Kim was open to recruiting conservative officials if they basically opposed war and agreed with him on the need to pursue inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. In fact, President Kim was so confident about his leadership that he was willing to recruit conservative officials if such a move would relieve the people" (K.H. Choi, personal communication, October 18, 2016). This appears to indicate that, in undertaking the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung had a flexible mind, and was not strictly bound by an ideology-driven orthodoxy.

Meanwhile, it is worth noting that President Kim Dae-jung did not see the domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy as a constraint grave enough to pose an effective threat to the Sunshine Policy. According to President Kim's top adviser on North Korea, Lim Dong-won, this is not least because the president considered the conservative opposition to be politically motivated and mainly designed to gain the upper hand on the domestic political front (D. W.

Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).

Another variable that had a considerable impact on Kim Dae-jung's perception of domestic constraints is the public opinion. In fact, Kim Dae-jung had strong confidence in popular support of the Sunshine Policy, which appeared robust even amid North Korea's occasional provocations during this period. With the people of South Korea being united and rallying around the cause of overcoming the financial crisis, the Sunshine Policy relished strong popular support in general. As the internal and external environment turned favorable to the Sunshine Policy by the end of this period (1998-1999), the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), for its part, would have found it difficult to express outright disapproval of the Sunshine Policy.

Public Opinion on the Sunshine Policy

Throughout Kim Dae-jung's term of office, the Sunshine Policy enjoyed a significant level of public endorsement. Table 8 (S. W. Park, 2002) displays President Kim Dae-jung's approval ratings and the public support of the Sunshine Policy, as measured throughout his tenure by surveys conducted by conservative and liberal press, as well as Gallup Korea and the Ministry of Unification.

Table 8

President Kim Dae-jung's Approval Ratings and the Public Support of the Sunshine Policy (%)
(1998.3-2002.4)

		1998 3-6	1998 7-12	1999 1-6	1999 7-12	2000 1-4	2000 5-8	2000 9-12	2001. 1-6	2001. 7-12	2002. 1-4	Aver- age
Conservative Press	Approval Rating	54.6	65.0	70.7	49.8	48.5	54.4	48.2	26.9	30.5	33.0	48.16
	Sunshine Policy	83.8	70.9	72.8	49.0		86.7	69.9	33.9	63.0	59.5	65.5
Liberal Press	Approval Rating	58	54.8	63.47	69	44.4	74.9	47.2	18.8	19.5	27.2	47.72
	Sunshine Policy	78.9	74.7	54.2	72.3		95.7	57.1	70.5	64.0	No Data	70.92
Gallup Korea (March 23, 2003)	Approval Rating	70.7	62.8	52.0	49.8	48.5	54.5	30.2	29.1	31.1	26.0	45.47
The Ministry of Unification	Sunshine Policy	86.9	72.6	65.6		85.2	93.7	79.6	76.7	76.8	73.5	79.81

Note. Adapted from *South-South conflict and media: The role of media in reporting on North Korea policy* [Conference paper], by S. W. Park, 2002, *Reconsidering North Korea Awareness and North Korea Policy*, Seoul Press Club.

As indicated in the table, the public endorsement of the Sunshine Policy was generally higher than the approval rating of President Kim Dae-jung himself. The support for the Sunshine Policy among the South Korean public showed a significant decrease in the year 2001, according to the conservative media, before reverting back to near the original level by the end of his term. Meanwhile, the president's approval rating rapidly declined toward the end of his term. As shown in the table, Kim's approval rating had very little impact on public support for the Sunshine Policy. In other words, the South Korean public somewhat differentiated the Sunshine Policy from the general approval rating of the president or the evaluation of the

overall performance of the government. In the initial period of Kim Dae-jung's presidency, public support for the Sunshine Policy was generally high, hovering around 80 percent as determined in various surveys. Polls show that the Sunshine Policy was generally endorsed by the majority of the South Koreans even with some vicissitudes shown across Kim's tenure.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)

Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile regarding his peace initiative in Period 1 (1998-1999) by the three different sources of constraints is summarized in Table 9.¹⁴⁰

Table 9

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 1 (1998-1999) by Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Period 1	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
North Korea - N of doc: 28 - N of words: 26872	0.37 H	0.37 H	0.56 M	0.35 M	0.54 L	0.14 M	0.28 H
Foreign - N of doc: 11 - N of words: 12181	0.36 M	0.31 H	0.60 M	0.44 H	0.54 L	0.05 L	0.21 H
Domestic - N of doc: 17 - N of words: 14691	0.38 H	0.41 H	0.54 L	0.28 M	0.54 L	0.19 H	0.32 H

¹⁴⁰ Kim Dae-jung's traits scores based on the entire collection of North Korea-related materials content-analyzed in this study were used to explore his leadership characteristics in dealing with North Korea—specifically, the constraints imposed by North Korea on his peace initiative. For detailed discussion of the methodological approach to the content analysis, see the Methods section of this study (Chapter 4. A.1.2. The Use of LTA in This Study).

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Regarding Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy, the LTA results show that his scores for belief in the *ability to control events* (BACE) (0.37) and *need for power* (0.37) are both high in strength in comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders. The interplay of these two scores evinces that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints in dealing with North Korea during the timeframe of the analysis. His high internal locus of control (BACE) coupled with a high *need for power* indicates that Kim Dae-jung was skilled in alternating between direct and indirect means in challenging constraints he faced in dealing with North Korea during this period (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005).

Meanwhile, the LTA results indicate that Kim Dae-jung's score for *conceptual complexity* (0.56) and his score for *self-confidence* (0.35) are both moderate in strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung was closed to incoming information in making decisions. All in all, the LTA results demonstrate that, in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was *advocate* in his leadership style during this period.

***Advocate* Leadership Style**

In dealing with North Korea in this period, Kim Dae-jung was highly proactive in initiating proposals, took charge, and worked to have control over what happened in interacting with North Korea. Beginning on the day of his inauguration, Kim Dae-jung sought to implement the Sunshine Policy, which was the embodiment of his time-honored philosophies and strategies of unification. Even though Kim was under heavy pressure from the task of overcoming the country's worst ever financial crisis from day one of his presidency, he did not wait for a "right time" to take action in implementing his peace agenda. In the face of North Korea's inaction, nonchalance, and resistance to his goodwill gestures, he was proactive in initiating proposals for inter-Korean rapprochement and taking institutional/legal measures to eliminate virtually all existing restrictions on civilian contacts, exchanges, and investments in North Korea.

Equipped with a clear sense of purpose, Kim Dae-jung was determined to challenge constraints imposed by North Korea in moving toward achieving his goals. For Kim Dae-jung, it was crucial to show both South and North Koreans as well as the international community his determination to implement his North Korea policy agenda based on strict adherence to the principle of separation between politics and economy. Despite North Korea's occasional provocations against South Korea or the outside world in this period, Kim Dae-jung expressed his determination to maintain his course of action and proceeded to implement his North Korea policy agenda. Following the submarine incident, he encouraged Hyundai to promote the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Despite the outbreak of the inter-Korean naval battle, he authorized the provision of fertilizer to the North, and ordered that Vice-Ministerial talks be held as originally planned (*South Korean Ships Sink North Korean Patrol Boat*, 1999; WuDunn, 1999). After all, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project was a symbol of consistency and boldness involved

in the Sunshine Policy as the project was maintained without interruption in accordance with the principle of separation between politics and economy despite North Korea's occasional provocations.

For *advocate* leaders, movement on an agenda framed around "a set of goals, an ideology, a cause, or a prob most importance (Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 33). Sworn into office with a pre-conceived agenda on North Korea, Kim Dae-jung committed the initial two years of his term to setting the stage for his Sunshine Policy. The policy process during this time revolved around a carefully devised, step-by-step approach, taken in a way that would achieve a set of major goals Kim Dae-jung had set for this period.

The goals Kim Dae-jung sought to achieve for this period included the establishment of the civilian-level contact and exchanges between two Koreas, the launching of the Kumgang Mountain tourism project, and the promotion of separated family reunions. The sequential steps taken by President Kim and his policy group throughout this period were intricately linked such that they would end up properly achieving the goals they were aiming for by the end of this period.

In achieving these goals, the Kim administration took a series of steps as follows: the massive overhaul of laws and regulations to promote South Korea's investment in North Korea as well as inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at the civilian level (March 1998); reopening of the truce village of Panmunjom (May, 1998); the General Officers Talks between UNC (represented by the United States) and North Korea at Panmunjom (March and June 1998); Hyundai Chairman Chung's spectacular visits to Pyongyang with 1001 head of cattle in two batches to discuss with Kim Jong-il the possibility of the Mount Kumgang tourism project (June

and October 1998). After all, all such developments and measures taken by the government were intended as preparatory steps to launch the Kumgang Mt. tourism project in November 1998, as noted by Jeong Se-hyun, the former Unification Minister under Kim Dae-jung. He also indicates, Kim Dae-jung's decision to remove the ceiling on South Korean investment in North Korea was effectively meant to pave the way for the inter-Korean joint project between Hyundai Group and North Korea (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016; Y. S. Han, 2002, p. 46).¹⁴¹

The handling of the submarine infiltration involved a highly measured, cautious, and incremental approach, geared toward preventing any escalation of the tension. Kim Dae-jung's response to this incident was gradual, from the initial wait and see attitude to a stern accusation coupled with the appeal to caution against a hasty conclusion, and to finally a strong push to move forward in achieving his policy goals. By doing so, Kim Dae-jung sought to accurately assess the posture and intentions of the North Korean regime before deciding on how to address the incident.¹⁴²

High Need for power and High Belief in Control Events (Internal Locus of Control)

As reflected in the combination of a high BACE (or an internal locus of control) and a high *need for power*, Kim Dae-jung showed himself highly confident in his own ability to be control of the political situation and maneuver it to suit his ends in implementing his North

¹⁴¹ In fact, Chairman Chung Ju-young had already made a deal with North Korea when he visited Pyongyang in 1989 to discuss his plan to develop the Mount Kumgang tourism project with the North Korean regime.

¹⁴² A close examination reveals that Kim Dae-jung's approach to leadership was more forceful in response to the first (Yeonpyeong) naval battle (in July 1999) than in dealing with the submarine infiltration (in June 1998).

Korea policy agenda. Moreover, the combination of these two trait scores enables the projection that his dealings with constraints stemming from North Korea and domestic politics in the first two years of his tenure likely would have incorporated both direct and indirect tactics to challenge constraints. Kim's penchant for an indirect, behind-the-scenes approach to his North Korea policy agenda was evidenced in the way in which he implemented the policy. Keenly aware of a deep-seated aversion to government-level exchanges on the part of North Korea, Kim Dae-jung took full advantage of North Korea's interest in joint business opportunities with Hyundai Group. Throughout this period, President Kim effectively put Hyundai at the forefront of contact with North Korea, with his government working vigorously behind the scenes to support virtually every aspect of the joint venture. Regarding the Hyundai-North Korea project, the activist government not only eliminated legal obstacles to business deals with North Korea, but also played roles of financier and underwriter, by granting bailout funds to troubled Hyundai subsidiaries and designating government agencies as the company's business partners (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 87). Meanwhile, his direct handling of constraints was equally evident in this period, as was manifested in the unmitigated way he overcame the obstacles posed by the first naval battle that was triggered by the North Korean navy's unprovoked attack on a South Korean vessel.

The impact of the Breakdown of the Inter-Korean Talks in April 1998 on Kim Dae-jung's

Leadership Style

The failed inter-Korean vice minister-level talks (in April 1998) served as a major turning point for the Sunshine Policy as it led President Kim to change an important element of his

North Korea strategy. Upon facing North Korea's strong reaction to the South's attempt to link the fertilizer aid with the North's consent to hold a reunion of separated families in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, President Kim adopted the principle of *flexible or diffuse* reciprocity in dealing with North Korea (e.g., Y. G. Kim, 2013). This section of the study examines if the breakdown of the inter-Korean talks had an impact on President Kim's leadership in terms of traits and styles.

As summarized in Table 10, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile based on a set of materials dated before the collapse of the April 1998 Red Cross talks can be compared to the profile based on the materials dated after the incident.¹⁴³

Table 10

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profiles before and after the breakdown of the Inter-Korean Talks in April 1998 (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Period, Materials used		BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
Before the inter-Korean Red Cross talks in April 1998 (January-April, 1998) - N of doc: 5 - N of words: 5342		0.37 H	0.39 H	0.59 M	0.28 M	0.61 M	0.15 M	0.30 H
		Challenge		Closed		<i>Task/Relationship Focus</i>	Close to Zero-Sum	
		<i>Advocate</i>						
After the inter-Korean Red Cross talks in April 1998 (May-August, 1998) - N of doc: 5 - N of words: 4277		0.34 M	0.36 H	0.59 M	0.43 H	0.53 L	0.05 L	0.20 H
		Challenge		Closed		<i>Relationship Focus</i>	Zero-Sum	
		<i>Advocate</i>						

¹⁴³ Kim's leadership profile for the period before the April 1998 incident is based on the (five) materials dated from January to April 1998. Kim's two leadership profiles for the period after the incident are based respectively on the five materials dated from May to August 1998 and on the other five materials dated from September to December 1998.

(May-December 1998)	(September-December, 1998) - N of doc: 5 - N of words: 3711	0.30	0.33	0.58	0.43	0.52	0.15	0.42
		L	H	M	H	L	M	H
		Challenge		Closed		<i>Relationship Focus</i>	Close to Zero-Sum	
<i>Advocate</i>								

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

The LTA results show that Kim Dae-jung remained *advocate* in leadership style both before and after the April 1998 Red Cross talks. However, notable changes were made in some of his trait scores in the wake of the incident. Specifically, his score on *self-confidence* increased (from moderate to high); and his score for *task focus* decreased (from medium to low). His score on *distrust of others* decreased (from medium to low) for the four months following the incident before it increased anew to a moderate level for the subsequent four-month-long period. The most notable change was made in the score for his locus of control, or *belief in ability to control events* (BACE). His BACE score continued to decrease from high (before the incident) to moderate (for the four months following the incident) and to low (for the subsequent four months).

Kim Dae-jung's leadership style regarding the North Korea policy in this period remained *advocate*, both before and after the breakdown of the talks. Still, it is noteworthy that the

incident had the impact of changing the strength of scores on certain personality traits: namely, *belief in ability to control events*, *self-confidence*, *task-focus*, and *distrust of others*. This means that, following the collapse of the talks, Kim Dae-jung showed a discernable change in the 'tone' of his leadership, if not the major approach to leadership and politics. The results also indicate that, after the much-anticipated inter-Korean talks ended in a rupture, Kim Dae-jung's perception of North Korea became even more zero-sum for the four months after the incident, before reverting back to a moderately zero-sum orientation.

All in all, this means that, following the incident, Kim became less direct and outright and more indirect and behind-the-scenes in challenging constraints (a decrease in BACE) and more focused on maintaining consistency (an increase in *self-confidence*) in dealing with North Korea. This also indicates that he became more focused on building relationships, and attached more importance to the process of the policy implementations (a decrease in *task focus*). Moreover, a decline in his score for *distrust others* (from moderate to low) in the immediate aftermath of the incident shows that President Kim became more inclined to put things into perspective and address relevant constraints on realistic cues following the breakdown of the talks (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005).

All in all, a close examination of this period suggests that Kim Dae-jung's highly assertive, forceful push for his planned courses of action combined with his meticulously calculated, flexible, and cautious approach in consideration of the North Korea's posture was instrumental in challenging constraints imposed by the North. All this helped Kim Dae-jung properly achieve a set of major policy objectives he had set forth at the beginning of this period. In only nine months after Kim Dae-jung was sworn into office, the inter-Korean

exchange and cooperation was already underway at the civilian level and many South Koreans traveled to Mt. Kumgang in North Korea beginning in November of 1998.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)

b. Source of Constraints: External Environment

According to the LTA results based on North Korea-relevant materials targeted at foreign audiences for Period I (1998-1999), Kim Dae-jung's score for *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.36) is moderate while his score for the *need for power* (Power) is high (0.31) in strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. The two trait scores interrelate to indicate that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints imposed by the external environment in conducting North Korea policy during this period. Regarding the two traits indicative of the degree of openness to contextual information, Kim Dae-jung's scores relative to the norming group for *conceptual complexity* (0.60) and *self-confidence* (0.44) are moderate and high respectively. It is worth noting that Kim Dae-jung's *self-confidence* score in relation to the external environment (at 0.44) is the highest of all three periods regardless of the source of constraints, and is distinctly higher than the relevant scores in the same period for the other two sources of constraints –North Korea (0.35) and domestic political environment (0.28)- that are moderate in strength. Such a sharp increase in the score for *self-confidence* means that Kim Dae-jung was more likely to be close to information in handling the external environment regarding North Korea policy in this period. On balance, the LTA results of the four traits show that, in dealing with the external environment, Kim Dae-jung showed an *advocate* leadership style during this period.

Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung's relevant scores for *distrust of others* (0.05) and *in-group bias* (0.21) are low and high respectively. These two trait scores denote that he held a *zero-sum* behavioral predisposition toward the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy. The fact that President Clinton not only expressed firm support of the Sunshine Policy but also effectively handed over the initiative in managing North Korean affairs to President Kim apparently had a tangible impact on the latter's perception of the external environment surrounding his peace initiative. This is also manifested in his scores for the two relevant personality traits in this period: a high *self-confidence* (0.44) and a low *distrust of others* (0.05).

Advocate Leadership Style

In Period 1, Kim Dae-jung's determined, unflinching push to implement his agenda amid all the constraints stemming from the external environment reflected the *advocate* orientation of his leadership style. He was consistently goal-driven in implementing the Sunshine Policy, perceiving external constraints as something to be challenged and overcome, not something to be acceded to. Regarding the external environment as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's score on *self-confidence* (0.44) can be seen as especially high in this period given that his *self-confidence* scores are moderate or low both for all other periods of interest and for the other two sources of constraint in this period. This means that he was not easily subjected to whims of contextual contingencies and tended to show consistency in behavior in dealing with the external environment in this period (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 195). Having secured firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy from President Clinton and the international community including Japan, China, Russia and many European countries by the end of 1998,

Kim Dae-jung moved to take charge and worked to have an impact on what happened in the external environment in relation to North Korea policy. This is demonstrated in his markedly increased *self-confidence* score (0.44) with respect to the external environment in this period.

Kim Dae-jung perceived William Perry's appointment as President Clinton's North Korea Policy Coordinator as an opportunity to seize and, at the same time, a challenge to overcome in implementing his North Korea policy. With Republican members of the U.S. Congress remaining resolutely opposed to the Agreed Framework and President Clinton's engagement approach, Kim Dae-jung strived to persuade North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry to adopt the Comprehensive Approach involving a package solution based on a 'give and take' strategy and 'mutual threat reduction' principles such that the United States and South Korea would be in perfect consonance in terms of North Korea policy.

After all, in the face of difficulties imposed by the external environment, Kim Dae-jung further expanded the scope of his policy agenda pushing ahead with it in a decisive way. Even with a dramatic increase in tension on the Korean peninsula following the suspicion over the Kumchang-ri site and the issuance of the Rumsfeld Report and North Korea's first missile test, Kim Dae-jung chose to broaden the horizon of his peace initiative. The enlargement of President Kim's agenda was embodied in the Comprehensive Approach that Kim persuaded the Clinton administration to adopt as a revised North Korea strategy. President Kim came up with a highly elaborate policy proposal with the help of Lim Dong-won, the then Presidential Secretary for Security and Foreign Affairs, and was proactive in persuading William Perry to embrace it (e.g., Lim, 2012, pp. 200-216). With the Clinton administration adopting the Perry Process featuring the comprehensive strategic design as proposed by his government, Kim Dae-

jung became more optimistic about improved U.S.-North Korea relations and, by extension, about the prospect of possible dismantlement of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula.

Motivational Perception: *Zero-Sum*

A *zero-sum* orientation toward the external environment as manifested in his low *distrust of others* and high *in-group bias* indicates that Kim Dae-jung may have seen politics as a zero-sum game in which there existed winners and losers and the role of the leader lied in dealing with threats and coming out on top (Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 41). That is, he believed: if he lost this opportunity and failed to persuade William Perry and the Clinton administration to engage North Korea, this would result in a permanent defeat on his part against hardliners in Washington. This could mean the failure of his Sunshine Policy. In other words, Kim Dae-jung believed that how he responded to the relevant constraints would have a direct bearing on the failure or success of the policy. Such a perception led him to make relentless efforts to convince the Clinton administration of the need to adopt the Comprehensive Approach.

In sum, in dealing with external constraints during this period, Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* approach to leadership was manifested in his strong, decisive push for his agenda based on strong personal conviction and robust self-confidence. Such propensities led him to be generally closed to information or to largely dismiss the potentially *disconfirmatory* contextual conditions linked with external constraints. His determined push for his ambitious agenda involving the Comprehensive Approach paid off in the form of the North Korea policy review,

called the Perry Process, adopted by President Clinton in October 1999. This contributed to the building of external conditions that became far more favorable to the Sunshine Policy by the end of the year 1999. Under such circumstances, President Kim expected the North to be more willing to undergo a voluntary change of behavior. After all, Kim Dae-jung's unswerving drive to implement his agenda based on an *advocate* leadership style in this period went to great lengths to achieve his goal of bringing all major players in the international community including the United States onto the same page so as to move forward in achieving his longer-term goal of dissolving the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

The relevant literature notes that a regime's orientation for foreign policy reflects the ruling group's general beliefs about foreign affairs as they are related to their nation's internal and external situation and the coalition of societal and political interests aligned with the regime (Hagan, 1993, p. 214). Studies on domestic politics and foreign policy have suggested that the impact of domestic politics in all but the most extreme political circumstances tends to be 'limited' since debates concern relatively narrow aspects of issues (Hagan, 1993, p. 214). That being so, the effects of political opposition may take the form of "amplifying or constraining" the orientation of the regime's foreign policy. For example, a moderate regime facing hardline opposition will gravitate toward a more assertive foreign policy posture, while a hardline regime confronted with the relatively moderate opposition will engage in less assertive behavior. Such effects are to be measured by the extent to which leaders are able to implement

their preferences (Hagan, 1993, p. 214). Regarding the impact of domestic opposition on a regime's foreign policy, Hagan (1993, p. 217) posits that the basic content of the foreign policy remains intact, with political effects being manifested by the level of "commitment, initiative, and affect involved in implementing that orientation."

Regarding the domestic environment surrounding Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy, the LTA results show that his scores for *need for power* (0.41) and *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.38) are both high in strength in comparison to the norming group of Pacific Rim Leaders. This indicates that he was predisposed to challenge constraints imposed by the domestic political context in this period. One notable aspect of this tendency is that his score on *need for power* (0.41) is the highest of all and is significantly so in comparison to the relevant score for the external environment (0.31). Regarding such a difference, the relevant t-test results show that his score on *need for power* for the domestic environment is significantly statistically different from his relevant score for the external environment. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung tended to become more indirect, subtle and behind-the-scenes in the use of means to challenge constraints imposed by the domestic political context than in dealing with the external environment during this period. Still, a high score on BACE indicates that he would likely have been able to use direct means, if need be, in challenging constraints.

Regarding his predisposition to process information, a distinctly low *conceptual complexity* (0.54) coupled with a moderate score for *self-confidence* (0.28) shows that he was more likely to be closed to information. All in all, in dealing with the domestic political environment in this period regarding his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was *advocate* in leadership style. In achieving his goals, this indicates, he was prone to challenge constraints and

to be a “cognitive miser,” narrowly focused and relatively insensitive to the political context (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 91-92).

In relation to the domestic environment in this period, it is notable that his scores for *distrust of others* (0.19) and *in-group bias* (0.32) are distinctly high in strength in comparison to the norming group. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung’s approach to domestic political opposition in relation to his North Korea policy in this period was markedly *focused* in nature (e.g., Hagan, 1993, 1994; M. G. Hermann, 2005). In essence, *distrust of others* and *in-group bias* are motivational traits deemed the most flexible and adaptable in nature. In other words, scores of these traits tend to vary depending on the nature of the situation or the contextual conditions. In this period, the pattern of these two trait scores differs between domestic environment and external environment. That is, Kim Dae-jung’s scores for *distrust of others* vary from high to low compared to the norming group between the two different types of environment –the external environment and the domestic environment- in this period while *in-group bias* constantly remains high. This implies that, in conducting his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was prone to show a *focused* orientation in challenging domestic constraints while exhibiting a zero-sum orientation when responding to constraints arising from the external environment during this time.

Advocate Leadership Style

Kim Dae-jung’s *advocate* leadership style was manifested in how he addressed constraints imposed by the domestic political environment during this period. In response to domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy in the wake of North Korea’s provocations – such as

the submarine incident, the first Yeonpyeong battle, and the first ballistic missile test- President Kim challenged constraints by showing himself highly determined to stick to his plan of action. He did so amid all signs of uneasiness among conservative critics over what they called his soft-line posture on the North. While condemning North Korea's provocative behaviors, Kim expressed his robust will to maintain the Sunshine Policy and moved to push ahead with inter-Korean projects as previously planned based on the principle of separating politics from the economy. Kim Dae-jung tightly held on to his strategy of comprehensive engagement in a remarkably consistent manner despite fierce condemnation of the Sunshine Policy among his political opponents. By doing so, he sent the South Korean public a clear signal of his firm willingness to pursue his engagement policy against all the odds.

President Kim's appointment of prominent conservative officials such as Kang In-duk, who was reputed for strong anti-communist credentials, as the first Unification Minister, and Lee Hong-koo, as his first Ambassador to the United States, can also be seen as use of indirect means to challenge domestic constraints presumed to be imposed on his peace initiative. In appointing Kang as his first Unification Minister, President Kim expected his conservative lieutenant to mitigate resistance among members of the conservative circle and to convince them of the credibility of the Sunshine Policy on his behalf.

Linkage between Kim Dae-jung's Perspective, Perception and Leadership Style

Kim Dae-jung's dealings with the domestic political environment appears intimately connected with his own perception of relevant constraints. When taking office, Kim Dae-jung envisaged severe resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his political opponents and the

conservative circle.¹⁴⁴ Such a perception is also manifested in his distinctly high score on *distrust of others* (0.19) in relation to the domestic political environment surrounding his North Korea policy. As was indicated by his aides, Kim Dae-jung considered the steadfast opposition to his peace process among his opponents and conservative critics as mainly “politically motivated,” or as “a given” to a certain degree, something that remained inherently embedded in South Korea’s political landscape. This means that he found it innately difficult to fundamentally address the problem by persuading his opponents to endorse the Sunshine Policy. Even though, for Kim Dae-jung, the South-South conflict was a significantly agonizing issue that he desperately desired to solve, he stopped short of considering the domestic opposition to his North Korea policy as posing a grave challenge to the Sunshine Policy (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).

Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on his political opponents influenced his *advocate* approach to leadership in relation to the domestic environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy. Moreover, a firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy both from the South Korean public and the international community, including the Clinton administration, constituted a crucial enabling factor for Kim Dae-jung’s determined push for his North Korean agenda with confidence despite constantly staunch opposition from his political opponents.

Motivational Perception: *Focused*

¹⁴⁴ Kim Dae-jung had long been a victim of South Korea’s version of McCarthyism that had been prevalent under prior authoritarian administrations. He had been often labeled pro-communist or pro-North Korean since the 1970s.

His distinctly high scores for both *distrust of others* and *in-group bias* in relation to the domestic political environment in this period are instrumental in understanding Kim Dae-jung's perception of his adversaries. A *focused* approach, specifically an approach focused on opposition or the enemy, can be seen as qualitatively different from a zero-sum orientation which involves *a low distrust of others* and a high *in-group bias*, as was shown in his dealings with the external environment during this period. In essence, the *focused* orientation is more targeted, limited, or immediate in nature than the zero-sum approach, which is inherently more permanent, dispersed, and fundamental in terms of the degree and scope of commitment involved. Regarding this motivational orientation, which involves the most extreme beliefs about the nature of politics on the part of the leader, Hagan (1993, 1994) posits that these leaders are likely to see diplomatic means such as bargaining and restraint as meaningless.

In Kim Dae-jung's case, he viewed his own capacity to convince his domestic political opponents and critics of the Sunshine Policy as severely limited. Such a mindset appears to have had an impact on how he dealt with domestic political constraints in this period. His *focused* orientation toward the domestic political landscape indicates that Kim Dae-jung was likely to see the resistance to his Sunshine Policy among his critics and political opponents as an imminent problem to deal with in implementing North Korea policy. He may have believed that he could win eventually as long as he properly dealt with domestic opposition. This, in turn, means that he stopped short of associating challenges and difficulties stemming from the domestic political landscape with the ultimate success or effectiveness, or lack thereof, of his peace initiative. In other words, he saw whatever constraint was imposed by the domestic political environment to the Sunshine Policy as something to be challenged and overcome in

and of itself as problems arose, rather than as something that had a potential to pose any serious, existential threat to the Sunshine Policy itself.

Personal Capital and Political Skills

As shown in the implementation process of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's personal capital was embodied in the way in which he implemented the North Korea policy in the initial two years of his presidency. Aside from some of his personal capital resources deemed fundamental to the Sunshine Policy in general—e.g., his commitment to peace and reconciliation; and professional stature based on the relevant knowledge and expertise—certain sources of his personal capital and political skills were vigorously tapped in this period.

In particular, Kim drew on his international recognition and aptitude for coalition building—e.g., at both the international and national level in the implementation process of his peace initiative during this period. Kim Dae-jung's charisma as a prominent dissident-turned-president was a crucial source of personal capital that helped promote the rally-round-the-flag effect at a critical juncture of the South Korean state. Moreover, the appointment of prominent conservative figures in some key posts, including the first unification minister and the first Ambassador to the United States, evidences his political aptitude for building a coalition with conservative circles in implementing his agenda.

Regarding flaws of Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, it is worth noting that, in response to domestic political constraints in this period, Kim Dae-jung's leadership was far less flexible than was in dealing with constraints imposed by North Korea. When confronted with obstacles arising from North Korea, he moved to adjust his tactics and

principles, as was evidenced in a change in the pattern of his personality traits. In contrast, in the face of domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was adamant in clinging to his planned course of action, and in doing so, failed to seriously try to persuade the conservative circle and the public of the credibility of his peace initiative. President Kim expected his conservative lieutenant, Unification Minister Kang, to help mitigate resistance to the Sunshine Policy by his critics and political opponents. Truly, such an appointment is indicative of Kim's willingness to be inclusive and seek bipartisan support of his peace initiative. However, he was willing to delegate authority in persuading the conservative circle to participate in his peace process. Such dealings with the domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy can be viewed as a passive move on the part of President Kim Dae-jung in light of his political skills such as the aptitude for building coalitions and his art of persuasion.

Interestingly, in contrast to Kim Dae-jung's muted response to domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy, the leadership profile shows a distinctive pattern in his personality traits for the domestic political environment during this period. In response to domestic political constraints, his profile shows the highest scores for the three sources of constraints and for the *belief in ability to control events, need for power, distrust of others, and in-group bias*, while showing the lowest scores for *conceptual complexity* and *self-confidence*. This apparently represents the following inclinations: his clear consciousness of domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy; his perceived limited ability to persuade the conservatives to endorse his approach; his relatively rigid response to domestic political constraints; his deftness at alternating between direct and indirect means to challenge constraints; and profound mistrust or wariness toward his critics and political opponents.

While intending to join forces with the opposition in embarking on his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung stopped short of going the extra mile to address domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy. He was far less motivated to change the minds of his political opponents than he was to change the minds of the North Koreans. After all, in Kim Dae-jung's implementation of the Sunshine Policy, the coalition-building skills in his political skillset were not properly displayed in relation to his critics and opponents.

Chapter 6. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy

Implementation (Period 2: 2000)

Heyday of the Sunshine Policy

A. Overview: Heyday of the Sunshine Policy (2000)

The period between January 2000 and December 2000 effectively constituted the heyday of the Sunshine Policy. In this period, patient endeavors on the part of President Kim and his government to bring about the first inter-Korean summit bore fruit, leading to a remarkable improvement in inter-Korean relations. Meanwhile, with inter-Korean economic cooperation being conducted at a civilian level, the Hyundai Group had difficulties managing the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The project was suffering from severe financial difficulties as it was not as lucrative as expected, mainly due to high cost and rigid regulations set by the North Korean authorities. The Mt. Kumgang tourism project played a pivotal role in improving inter-Korean relations and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. Considering that the Kumgang tourism project was closely intertwined with the fate of the Sunshine Policy, it was crucial for President Kim to maintain the project despite its shortcomings. With a view to propping up the project, Kim Dae-jung made the state-run Korea Land Corporation (Koland) participate in the tourism project as Hyundai's business partner starting in November of 2000. Under the new business scheme, Koland and the Kim Dae-jung government were to shoulder all of the financial burdens involved in the construction of the next inter-Korean project, the Kaesung Industrial Complex, totaling an estimated US\$175 million (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 129).

In this period, domestic political factors posed burdens for the Sunshine Policy despite all the achievements made in both inter-Korean relations and in U.S.-DPRK relations.

Conservative critics staunchly opposed the Sunshine Policy while the opposition party even refused to join the presidential delegation in visiting Pyongyang for the June 15 summit. The first inter-Korean summit and the related developments became a source of heated debate in South Korean politics. North Korea, for its part, became far more active in acceding to South Korean overtures to improve inter-Korean relations than in the previous period. Meanwhile, the external environment, including the United States, surrounding the Sunshine Policy was largely favorable throughout this period as unprecedented headway was made in U.S.-North Korea relations in this period.

Before moving on to discuss President Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the implementation of the Sunshine Policy in this period, some background to the process of actualizing the inter-Korean summit and post-summit developments is discussed below. Also, the leadership profiles of the two leaders of Koreas, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, are discussed and analyzed in terms of their leadership styles and traits, on the basis of the conversation they had during the summit meeting on June 14.

1. Background to the First Inter-Korean Summit

Berlin Declaration

In the first official step to achieve the goal he had set forth for this period, Kim Dae-jung issued a major policy statement known as the Berlin Declaration. Kim Dae-jung indicated in his autobiography that he took extreme care to draft his speech, and it took him nearly endless

revisions to complete a final draft. In his speech delivered at Berlin Free University on March 9 2000, Kim pledged to assist the North with rehabilitating its bankrupt economy through inter-Korean cooperation and, among other things, modernizing its infrastructure, while urging the regime to abandon nuclear and missile development. He also called on the North to work together to reunite separated families and convene government-level talks to discuss all pending issues to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. He claimed that the summit, if it materialized, would help North Korea more actively join with the international community as a responsible state. Ahead of President Kim's speech, the document was delivered to the North Korean authorities through the truce village of Panmunjom as a goodwill gesture while copies were also sent to the United States and Japan.

On June 3, ten days before the summit, President Kim dispatched Intelligence Chief Lim Dong-won as his special envoy to Pyongyang so that Lim could exchange views with Kim Jong-il about how to establish a successful summit and secure Chairman Kim's consent on a joint declaration based on the draft statement previously sent to the North. One major task assigned to special envoy Lim was to seek objective, accurate, and concrete information about Kim Jong-il and detailed knowledge about North Korea's intent for the summit as President Kim was discontent with the information provided by the NIS about the Northern leader as it was mostly negative (Lim, 2012, pp. 12–13). This special envoy's visit to 1 proved highly useful in acquiring much-needed information on Kim Jong-il's style and personality that would give President Kim some concrete ideas about how to interact with Chairman Kim in the summit meeting.

The First Summit in Pyongyang

The historic summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il was held on June 14 between three o'clock to seven o'clock at the Baekhwawon conference room. From the Southern side, three delegates and the president joined the meeting.¹⁴⁵ The initial discussion addressed the four main issues Kim Dae-jung had in mind as the subject of the summit talks: unification, reduction of tensions and peace, promotion of exchange and cooperation, and separated families (Lim, 2012, p. 40). During the summit, the two leaders had a four hour-long in-depth discussion on a wide array of issues involving: inter-Korean relations, unification formula, North Korea's foreign relations, Kim Jong-il's views on US forces in South Korea, the opposition GNP's stance on North Korea, North Korean defectors, National Security Law, the South Korean Defense Ministry's designation of the North as the main enemy, a military hotline, and North Korean nuclear and missile issues, among other things.¹⁴⁶

The summit proved to be the most efficient and effective policy tool available for President Kim to achieve his goal of making a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations during his term of office. It helped revive a broken official channel of communication and substantially expanded inter-Korean social, cultural, and economic cooperation and exchanges.

2. Leadership Profiles of the Two Leaders at the Summit Meeting: Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il (LTA)

The content analysis of Kim Dae-jung's four-hour-long conversation with Kim Jong-il on

¹⁴⁵ The three delegates who attended the meeting are: Director of National Intelligence Service (NIS) Lim Dong-won as the presidential special envoy; Senior Secretary for National Security Hwang Won-tak; and Senior Economic Secretary Lee Ki-ho. From the Northern side, only Secretary for South Korean Affairs Kim Yong-soon attended the meeting even though the two sides had agreed that three personnel from each side would accompany their leaders (Lim, 2012, p. 37).

¹⁴⁶ For detailed information on the summit discussion between the two leaders, see Lim, 2012, pp. 31-66.

June 14, 2000, informs us of how Kim Dae-jung interacted in person with his North Korean counterpart during the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang.

The LTA results indicate that, when meeting face-to-face with Kim Jong-il, Kim Dae-jung's scores for *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.39) and *need for power* (0.41) were both high in comparison with a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. That is, Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints, and was skilled in alternating between direct and indirect means of doing this. Meanwhile, his score on *conceptual complexity* (0.71) was high and *self-confidence* moderate (0.30) in strength. On balance, the LTA results show that Kim Dae-jung was *strategic* in his leadership style when conversing with the North Korean leader during the historic summit in Pyongyang. Table 11 represents Kim Dae-jung's personality profile based on his conversation with Kim Jong-il during the June 14 summit meeting in 2000.

Table 11

Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting

Kim Dae-jung	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
Conversation with Kim Jong-il (N of words: 1875)	0.39	0.41	0.71	0.30	0.57	0.12	0.29
	H	H	H	M	L	M	H
	Challenge Constraints		Open to Information		Relationship/Proces s-Focused	Close to Zero-Sum (Motivational Perception)	
	Strategic (Charismatic) Leadership Style						

Note. N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual

Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

Regarding Kim Dae-jung's personality profile as presented above, it is noteworthy that his score for *conceptual complexity* (0.71) is the highest of all of the relevant scores for the three periods under study. The personality profile demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung was *strategic*, and more specifically, *charismatic*, in his leadership style.¹⁴⁷

In other words, Kim Dae-jung showed a distinctly different leadership style when dealing face-to-face with the North Korean leader. In effect, regarding the North Korea policy, his leadership profiles showed neither a high score on *conceptual complexity* nor a *strategic* leadership style. In talking with Chairman Kim in the summit meeting, however, President Kim demonstrated a *strategic* leadership style based on a characteristically high *need for power* and a distinctly high *conceptual complexity*.

During the four-hour-long tête-à-tête with the Northern leader, Kim Dae-jung was highly sensitive to information, as evidenced in his high score for *conceptual complexity*. During the meeting, Kim Dae-jung closely watched Kim Jong-il trying to size him up. While being convinced of where to go in overall strategies, he was interested in collecting information about what Chairman Kim was like and what he had in mind. By doing so, he sought to figure out what would be possible and how far he could push to move forward to carry out his agenda. In seeking to collect the right information as much as possible during the historic forum, Kim Dae-jung sat back and tried to listen to his North Korean counterpart.

¹⁴⁷ A *strategic* leader who is *relationship-focused* is termed *charismatic* in terms of leadership style in the leadership typology (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 95).

Regarding the issue of the Joint Declaration to be announced on the following day, Chairman Kim suggested that the two leaders should mainly agree upon a broad outline of the statement, and that the rest of the work should be delegated to ministerial-level meetings so that the details would be worked out in compliance with the will of their superiors. Chairman Kim argued that the important thing would be to supervise and control the implementation of agreements. President Kim refuted Chairman Kim's proposal, arguing that the two leaders ought to discuss all specific details of the pending issues for implementation. In persuading his counterpart to change his mind, Kim Dae-jung explained that the principles of unification and the method for improving inter-Korean relations had been already agreed upon in the July 4 (1972) Joint Statement and the 1991 North-South Basic Agreement. Eventually, Kim Jong-il decided to accept Kim Dae-jung's counterproposal, and had in-depth conversation with the latter on a broad range of topics (Lim, 2012, pp. 44-56). Table 12 displays Kim Jong-il's personality profile based on his conversation with Kim Dae-jung during the summit meeting on June 14, 2000.

Table 12

Kim Jong-il's Profile's leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting

Filename	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
Conversation with Kim Dae-jung (N of words: 2446)	0.38	0.25	0.75	0.27	0.48	0.15	0.23
	H	M	H	M	L	M	H
	Challenge Constraints		Open to Information		Relationship /Process-Focused	Close to Zero-Sum (Motivational Perception)	

	Strategic (Charismatic) Leadership Style	
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Note. N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il's personality profile based on what he said during the June 14 summit meeting with President Kim shows that the North Korean leader was also *strategic*—and *charismatic*—in his leadership style. Very interestingly, the personality profiles of the two leaders based on what they said verbatim during the summit are nearly identical in terms of the relative strength of their trait scores. The only difference between these two profiles lies in their scores for *need for power*. Their profiles are alike for six out of seven traits: both leaders show a high *belief in ability to control events*, a high *conceptual complexity*, a moderate *self-confidence*, a low *task focus*, a moderate *distrust of others*, and a high *in-group bias*. This means that, as with his Southern counterpart, Kim Jong-il exhibited a strategic leadership style, being inclined to challenge constraints and to be open to incoming information. Moreover, the North Korean leader was also *relationship-oriented* and showed a (close to) *zero-sum* motivational perception of the summit meeting.

Their personality profiles are different only in one trait: the *need for power*. Kim Jong-il's *need for power* score is moderate (at 0.25) while Kim Dae-jung's is distinctly high (at 0.41) compared to a norming group. The two leaders' profiles as relevant to the June 14 summit are reflective of how they dealt with each other and how they perceived the summit meeting. In

actuality, the two leaders showed a different way of dealing with each other. The difference in their scores on *need for power* is useful in understanding why and how the two leaders dealt with each other in divergent manners. During the summit, Kim Jong-il, with a high locus of control (BACE) and a moderate *need for power*, sought to take charge and to be in control—at least, visibly more so than his Southern counterpart. Showing a lower score on *need for power*, Kim Jong-il was less skilled at reading how to influence the other party and manipulating him to have the desired outcome. Appearing more direct and less measured in demeanor than Kim Dae-jung, Kim Jong-il sent more signals concerning his intentions and motivations than Kim Dae-jung would have. In seeking to have control over the event and his South Korean counterpart, the Chairman was far more voluble than Kim Dae-jung, while Kim Dae-jung was far more focused on listening than on talking.

Kim Jong-il acted in more direct, straightforward manners, revealing his intention more directly. In contrast, Kim Dae-jung acted in a calm and controlled fashion. Lim Dong-won, who attended the summit along with two other presidential aides,¹⁴⁸ indicates in his memoir that President Kim showed a “logical and orderly style of presenting.” In contrast, Lim observes, Chairman Kim sounded “free-flowing and led the conversation in a somewhat disorderly manner” while making all the points he desired to make (Lim, 2012, p. 43). In his conversation with President Kim Dae-jung, the chairman brought up a range of offensive or sensitive topics and expressed strong dissatisfaction with what was going on in the South.¹⁴⁹ In response, Kim

¹⁴⁸ From the South’s side, three delegates in addition to the president attended the meeting: Lim Dong-won, the presidential special envoy, Senior Secretary for National Security Hwang Won-tak, and Senior Economic Secretary Lee Ki-ho (Lim, 2012, p. 37).

¹⁴⁹ For example, Chairman Kim opened a dialogue complaining about the recent incident in South Korea wherein some college students were prosecuted for violating the National Security Law after raising the DPRK flag on a college campus. He also expressed strong discontent at an array of issues including the National Security Law; the South’s designation of the North as

Dae-jung sought to give clarifying explanations and persuade Kim Jong-il to put things into perspective. The LTA results suggest that, during their summit meeting, the two *strategic* leaders vigorously sought to size each other up in order to gain an accurate sense of each other's position—presumably in an attempt to decide on their next move.

What is the ground for considering that there are common elements in the two Koreas' different unification proposals?

During the summit, the two leaders discussed the topic of reunification, both seeking to persuade each other to accommodate their respective unification scheme in deciding on the wording of the Article 2 of the Joint Declaration. North Korea's unification formula -the "Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo" argued for a unified state in the form of a federation while the South's proposal called for the creation of the confederation as the first stage in the unification process.

Regarding Article 2 of the Joint Declaration, the two leaders ended up agreeing upon the following statement: "Acknowledging that there are common elements for achieving reunification in the South's proposal for a confederation as well as the North's proposal for a federation of a lower stage as the formula, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction."

North Korea has persistently pursued federation as its unification strategy since August 14, 1960, when Kim Il-sung proposed an interim system of federation wherein the two Koreas

the "main enemy"; the South's acceptance of North Korean defectors; the opposition party's failure to join the reconciliation process; etc. (Lim, 2012, pp. 37-56).

with different political systems would coexist for a certain period of time prior to a final stage of unification. The core of Kim Il-sung's unification plan, framed around the Juche ideology, was a theory composed of "independent national liberation" and "people's democratic revolution"—meaning the South Korean revolution (or communization) for national liberation. However, North Korea's strategic goal has gradually changed from hegemonic revolutionary unification to unification based on the coexistence between the two Koreas.¹⁵⁰

That being so, in 1980, Kim Il-sung presented North Korea's official unification formula, titled "Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo", as a final form of unification. The formula comprised one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments. Under this proposal, North and South Korea should form a federation while retaining their existing systems and ideologies.

North Korea then moved to eliminate anti-revolutionary elements from its unification policy, and instead demanded preconditions for establishing a federation, including the abolishment of the South's National Security Law, withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and a guarantee that communists be allowed a greater voice in South Korea. This led some people in the South to have antipathy to North Korea's federation unification, viewing it as a mere ploy to extend the latitude of communist forces in the South (W. Choi, 2001, pp. 116–117).

In his 1991 New Year's address, Kim Il-sung presented a modified unification formula in which greater authority—e.g., diplomatic and military rights—would be temporarily accorded to the autonomous regional governments, but with a gradual step-by-step shift of power to the

¹⁵⁰ North Korea's economic decline amid the rapidly deteriorating external conditions and the resulting discrepancy in national power between the two Koreas led the communist regime to shift its focus away from unification toward regime survival (W. Choi, 2001).

central government over time (W. Choi, 2001). Notably, it was in 1991 when the so-called Basic Agreement was signed between the two Koreas—the inter-Korean agreement which stipulated a gradual approach to unification—that North Korea began to go with “a loose federation” (Lim, 2012, p. 47). In fact, a “loose form of federation” is considered little different from the federation formula originally proposed by Kim Il-sung. Meanwhile, the North’s “loose form of federation” has also been viewed as having some elements in common with South Korea’s confederation unification plan, in that it implies one nation, one state, two systems, and two governments. That is, under a loose form of federation, both Koreas are to maintain their existing authority and functions involving political, military, and diplomatic rights.

B. Constraints & Responses

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Constraint 1: North Korea’s request for cash support

Despite the smooth appearance of the process that led to the agreement between the two sides upon the inter-Korean summit, it was later revealed that the Kim Dae-jung government and Hyundai covertly funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea before the summit was held in Pyongyang. Details of the so-called cash for summit scandal began to emerge through the independent counsel’s investigation and court trials in June 2003 during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. In fact, President Kim and his advisors sought to conceal the cash transfer because they were afraid that, when made public, it might cause major backlash from the conservative circle and the public. Nonetheless, it was reported in January 2003 in the waning days of Kim Dae-jung’s term of office that a cash payment of

US\$450 million had been made to the North through Hyundai several days before the summit was held.¹⁵¹

Before leaving office on February 14, 2003, President Kim Dae-jung admitted to irregularities involved in the money transfer to North Korea and made a public apology. He said that the transfers were part of a business deal. Kim firmly opposed a special investigation into the case, arguing that the abnormality of inter-Korean relations necessitated dealings outside the usual legal boundaries (Marquand, 2003; K. Y. Son, 2006, pp. 113–114). Not only did the investigations threaten to tarnish the legacy of his Sunshine Policy but the fallout from the probe could seriously alter the government's strategy regarding North Korea at a highly sensitive time in inter-Korean relations. It could also further exacerbate the already serious political division underway in South Korea (Marquand, 2003).

Nonetheless, the GNP-dominated National Assembly rammed through a bill on February 26, 2003, to appoint an independent counsel to investigate into the so-called Cash for Summit scandal with the ruling MDP lawmakers boycotting the congressional session. President Roh Moo-hyun, who strongly advocated the Sunshine Policy as a way to make peace with the communist regime of Kim Jong-il, chose not to veto the bill and gave a reluctant nod for the special counsel's investigation into the scandal. This led the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) and the independent counsel to launch two separate investigations into Hyundai's

¹⁵¹ In effect, speculation began to surface in March 2002 when Larry Niksch of the U.S. Congressional Research Service raised the suspicion citing that the U.S. Military Command in Korea and the Central Intelligence Agency had alleged that Hyundai had paid the North an estimated US\$800 million including the remittance of US\$400 million for the right to operate a tourism project at Mt. Kumgang (Niksch, 2001, p. 9). The timing of the scandal could not have been worse for those who advocated the Sunshine Policy. At the time, Kim Jong-il remained in direct confrontation with the United States with the erupting nuclear crisis upon North Korea's alleged admission of a secret highly-enriched uranium program (HEUP) during a U.S. envoy's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002.

remittances.¹⁵²

At the end of the seventy-day probe, the independent counsel announced on June 26, 2003, that North Korea had requested cash support while the two Koreas discussed the possibility of a summit. The counsel stated that the South Korean government “promised” to send \$100 million to North Korea on April 8, 2000 (*S Koreans Charged over Summit Cash*, 2003). The head of the independent counsel concluded that the money was clearly linked with the summit and had been sent covertly through improper channels (*S Koreans Charged over Summit Cash*, 2003). Regarding the issue of how the cash remittances should be defined, the independent counsel judged that out of the \$450 million agreed upon during the secret envoy’s meeting on April 8, around US\$350 million was assessed to be Hyundai’s ‘up-front’ payment for investment in seven joint business projects with North Korea. The independent council defined US\$100 million as “policy-level assistance” provided by the Kim Dae-jung government. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled that this portion of payment constituted an “incentive” to hold the summit, and thus was “illegal,” even though it stopped short of classifying it as a bribe (Ahn, 2003; C. Moon, 2012, p. 36).

Response

By choosing to accommodate North Korea’s demand for cash support, Kim Dae-jung decided to take risks and assume a hefty price to accomplish what he believed to be a greater

¹⁵² Regarding President Roh’s decision, pundits note that it was impractical for the president to exercise the veto under the domestic political circumstances at that time. First, President Roh took office on the pledge of impartiality and willingness to run state affairs in a transparent manner and thus found it difficult to veto the bill. Moreover, with the opposition constituting the majority at the National Assembly, Roh was in desperate need of cooperation from the opposition, and consequently was not in a position to confronting the GNP by exercising the veto to block investigation. (J. Y. Choi, 2014, pp. 148–149).

goal (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 111). In doing so, he was keenly aware that if it were revealed that the money had been transferred illegally to the North, it would not only blacken his reputation, but also lead to a powerful argument against his engagement policy toward North Korea.

As the government found it difficult to raise \$100 million in cash, Minister Park Ji-won asked an executive at Hyundai Asan Corporation to provide the money on the government's behalf. The Kim government then moved to arrange for the Hyundai group to secure \$341.6 million USD -or ₩400 billion won- in loans from the state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB). Hyundai then secretly transferred the money to North Korea mostly through Macao a few days before the June 13-15 summit (Demick, 2003). Lim Dong-won, the then NIS chief, instructed his deputies to assist the associated processes (K. Y. Son, 2006, pp. 115–116). As it turned out, the NIS assisted Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. with converting the money into U.S. dollars at the KDB, enabling the company to send \$187 million to North Korean accounts at a Chinese bank in Macao on June 9, 2000 (Gordon, 2003; Woo, 2003). At the end of its investigation, the independent counsel concluded that the cash transfer in fact constituted a collaboration among those from the presidential Blue House, the NIS, financial institutions, and Hyundai. Eight individuals were indicted¹⁵³ while a total of six individuals were convicted in connection with the illegal cash transfer to North Korea (Ward, 2003).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Among those indicted were Chung Mong-hun (the Chairman of Hyundai Asan); Lim Dong-won (President Kim Dae-jung's former Intelligence Director); Park Ji-won (a former Minister of Culture and Tourism). Park Ji-won was charged with abuse of power and obstruction of public business. The charges for most of them were for fairly minor offenses such as violation of a law requiring government approval for any donations or aid to North Korea (Demick, 2003).

¹⁵⁴ Even though the independent counsel judged that President Kim Dae-jung was aware of the cash transfer, they indicated that they chose not to conduct an investigation on President Kim since there was no evidence that he had been involved in an illegal act ("Cash Transfer Was Linked with the Summit," 2003). Minister Park, Intelligence Chief Lim and Chairman Chung were charged with violating the law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and the law on Foreign Exchange Transactions. Minister Park was additionally indicted of abusing official power and Chairman Chung of doctoring company books to cover up the money transfers (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 117).

After all, the Kim Dae-jung government's interaction with North Korea in the months leading up to the summit largely centered around secret contacts and behind-the-scenes negotiations. From the beginning, the process of setting the terms and conditions for the summit mainly involved the two Koreas and Hyundai as the Kim administration sought assistance from Hyundai to organize the summit.¹⁵⁵ In the pre-summit period, the roles of NIS director Lim Dong-won and Culture and Tourism Minister Park Ji-won, the two key presidential advisers, were particularly important as key implementers of the Sunshine Policy. Lim Dong-won was the major architect of the Sunshine Policy after President Kim, while Park Ji-won, who worked for both the ruling party and the government, was one of the most prominent political figures in the Kim administration (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 118). President Kim denied allegations that the payment was a backhander intended to induce North Korea to agree to hold the summit, claiming that the remittance was made to secure Hyundai's right to launch seven projects involving railways, electricity, communications, and the Kaesong industrial park in North Korea (Y. S. Kim, 2003). Not surprisingly, the Cash for Summit scandal, when breaking out in February 2003, wrought havoc on the moral high ground the Sunshine Policy was commanding, impairing the policy's legitimacy and the corresponding transparency and validity of means of the policy's implementation (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 11).

At the first secret envoy's meeting in Shanghai on March 23, one week after the preliminary meeting, the North requested some cash support. As Special Envoy Park Ji-won

¹⁵⁵ Hyundai's business partner in North Korea was KAPPC, which was in charge of a variety of inter-Korean projects as one of the key front organizations of the Workers' Party. The KAPPC was a powerful organization led by Kim Ong-sun, the party's secretary, who was in charge of promoting political, economic, and cultural exchanges with countries with which North Korea had no diplomatic ties. The KAPPC was a dual-front organization entitled to represent the North as a state organ and to sign business deals with foreign entities as a quasi-business agency. While the South Korean government and Hyundai jointly worked to organize the summit, the KAPPC handled the two parties simultaneously (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 114).

flatly rejected the request, the second session of the envoy's meeting was delayed after the first day (Lim, 2012, pp. 6-7). Upon North Korea's request for cash support, Kim Dae-jung and his top adviser Lim Dong-won engaged in an intense debate.

They discussed whether to provide \$100 million worth of rice and fertilizer as a gift or direct cash support as the North demanded. The remark President Kim made when he decided to accept the North Korean demand is suggestive of what he had in mind in doing so. When giving instructions to Special Envoy Park Ji-won, Kim reportedly said, "A rich older brother should not visit the poor younger brother's home empty-handed. As we are going to hold a historic summit, it seems that we need to consider providing food aid for the North Koreans who are in extreme distress, doesn't it? Special Envoy Park, please tell them we will offer \$100 million (in cash) as a gift for the summit. That is the bottom line for your negotiation" (Lim, 2012, p. 7).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

By deciding to accede to the North's demands, Kim Dae-jung desired to seize the window of opportunity that had been coaxed open by his patient endeavors to pull off the successful launch of the joint tourism project and to enable the Perry Process in the previous two year period. Eventually, Kim Dae-jung chose to take a substantial risk and pay a steep price if need be. Such a move, if disclosed, had the potential to not only severely undermine the integrity of his peace process and derail its overall implementation, but also lead to paralyzing political backlash in South Korea. Kim Dae-jung explained why he made such a decision when making a public apology on February 14, 2003 as follows:

The Government accommodated this, even though there were some legal problems because it judged that such projects would be helpful for peace and the national interest. ... According to our law, the North Korean regime is an anti-state entity. Cooperation with it is subject to stern punishment in accordance with the National Security Law. However, based on a national consensus, we are pursuing reconciliation and cooperation with the North while maintaining a strong security stance. Because of the dual nature of South-North relations and because the North is so closed, there are times when inter-Korean relations inevitably have to be dealt with covertly and outside the framework of our laws. This kind of relationship can be found in the historic ties between East and West Germany. The current case arose from the fervent desire to prevent war under any circumstance and assure peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula so we could go about living peacefully with the hope of achieving reunification eventually. I will assume responsibility for the incident currently in question. I only hope that the nation will understand that it was motivated by my earnest desire to realize peace and national interests. (K. Y. Son, 2003)

With little tangible outcome yielded in inter-Korean reconciliation into the third year of his presidency, Kim Dae-jung apparently believed that the cash transfer was a “necessary evil” as long as if it served as a catalyst for a summit and the amelioration of inter-Korean relations where any ground rules or relevant precedent remained practically absent (K. Y. Son, 2003).

Constraint 2: North Korea’s insistence on President Kim’s visit to Keumsusan Palace

In the process of arranging the summit meeting, North Korea posed another constraint that could have hampered the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. In arranging the itinerary for President Kim’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea insisted that the Geumsusan Memorial Palace be included in his itinerary so that President Kim could pay tribute to the dead body of late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung.¹⁵⁶ Arguing that it was not only the practice and protocol of politics for state visitors to their Republic but also a matter of courtesy, North Korea showed

¹⁵⁶ This request was conveyed by Lim Dong-ok, the North Korean official in charge of North-South relations, to Lim Dong-won, who was visiting Pyongyang on March 27 as a presidential secret envoy in preparation for the upcoming summit.

extreme rigidity in holding fast to its demand. Under South Korea's political context, however, visiting the palace called the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum was a nonstarter for any president. Aside from a dispute over the violation of the National Security Law, it is simply not acceptable to the South Korean people that their president pay tribute to the body of the late North Korean leader. Doing so could have not only badly damaged President Kim Dae-jung's reputation, it also could have caused tremendous turmoil even if it resulted in a historic inter-Korean summit (Lim, 2012, p. 6).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Despite Lim Dong-won's stern rejection and call for understanding, North Korea was adamant. They threatened to cancel Lim's meeting with Chairman Kim during his visit to Pyongyang as a presidential envoy on May 27 if they did not agree. After returning home without any result, Lim Dong-won went on a second visit to Pyongyang a week later on June 3. Upon Lim's return from the May 27 visit to Pyongyang, President Kim decided to accept the North Korean demand after "agonizing deliberation." He said, "Holding the summit is more important than the issue of visiting the Keumsusan Memorial Palace. Improving North-South relations is more important than protocol. If we fail to hold a summit now, it would bring despair to our nation's seventy million people, and we would become the laughing stock of the world. We must hold a summit and announce a joint declaration. Tell them I can visit the palace after I do these things" (Lim, 2012, pp. 13–15).

Kim Dae-jung's decision was indeed a 'bold' move considering that it had the propensity to invite harsh accusations from his domestic opponents and adversely affect the

implementation of his peace initiative (C. Moon, 2012). Eventually, however, President Kim was spared a visit to the Keumsusan Palace, mainly by dint of Lim Dong-won's relentless efforts to persuade the North Korean leadership, including Chairman Kim Jong-il, even after President Kim's decision to accept the North's request. After repeated attempts to persuade the North Koreans, Special Envoy Lim eventually succeeded in extracting a concession from Kim Jong-il on this issue on the day of the summit. In fact, Lim interpreted President Kim's difficult decision as indicative of his desperate desire to have a summit with Chairman Kim despite his reluctance to visit the palace. Therefore, Envoy Lim kept trying to persuade Chairman Kim to abandon his plan to have President Kim visit his deceased father's palace both on his second visit to Pyongyang as a special envoy and on the day of the summit meeting. Finally, Kim Dae-jung's visit to the Keumsusan Palace did not take place as Kim Jong-il ended up withdrawing his insistence, deciding to accede to Lim's request (Lim, 2012, pp. 34–35; 60–61).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 2: 2 000)

b. Source of Constraints: External Environment

Relatively Little Constraint was Imposed on the Sunshine Policy

In this period, the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy was generally favorable as a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations coincided with a major improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations. That is, in the year 2000, the external environment regarding the United States posed little constraint to Kim Dae-jung's peace initiative. A chain of promising developments occurred in U.S.-North Korea relations beginning from William Perry's visit to Pyongyang in May 1999. The ensuing momentum grew throughout the latter part of 1999 and

continued into the year 2000 before it began to unravel in early 2001 with President Bush effectively shelving a missile deal that had been reached between the Clinton administration and the Kim Jong-il regime in Berlin in September 1999 (Sanger, 2001).¹⁵⁷

In the previous two years, the Clinton administration consistently maintained close coordination with South Korea and Japan in seeking to resolve pending U.S. concerns about North Korea. President Kim Dae-jung was particularly careful to work in close policy coordination with Washington, informing the Clinton administration of each and every move made by his government in dealing with North Korea. All such efforts, in turn, contributed to a significant improvement in relations between Washington and Pyongyang in this period (Lim, 2012, p. 247). In September 2000, the U.S.-DPRK missile talks resumed in New York, and the two countries issued a joint statement on terrorism in October, a move that represented significant progress toward removing North Korea from the State Department's terrorism list. This also made it easier for North Korea to join international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (*North Korea Handbook*, 2003; Perlez, 2000). On October 9-12, Chairman Kim's special envoy Jo Myung-rok, the number two man in North Korea, visited Washington to meet with President Clinton and conveyed to him a letter from Chairman Kim in which Kim invited Clinton to visit Pyongyang. Upon being informed of Chairman Kim's invitation of President Clinton to Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his message to Clinton wherein he sought to persuade the latter to accept Kim Jong-il's invitation

¹⁵⁷ A landmark deal on North Korean missiles was struck in Berlin between the United States and North Korea from September 7-13, 1999. Under the deal, North Korea promised to suspend its missile testing in return for U.S. measures to ease economic sanctions ("US Agrees to Ease NK Sanctions in Return for Missile Launch Halt," 1999). The following day, the Perry Report was submitted to U.S. Congress, and, three days later, President Clinton eased parts of economic sanctions that had been imposed against North Korea ("A Step Forward With North Korea," 1999).

(Lim, 2012, p. 250; Perlez, 2000). In his message to President Clinton, President Kim suggested that the American President meet with Kim Jong-il and hold a US-DPRK summit, referring to President Nixon's visit to China at a time when the United States had no diplomatic relationship with that nation (Lim, 2012, p. 250).

By doing so, Kim Dae-jung sought to play a mediating role between the two sides, seeking to take advantage of a promising development then underway in inter-Korean ties in a way that would lead to a substantial improvement in relations between Pyongyang and Washington.¹⁵⁸ With President Clinton deciding to accept Chairman Kim's invitation to visit Pyongyang, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang on October 23 in a bid to prepare for a visit by President Clinton. In his meeting with Secretary Albright, Chairman Kim reportedly said he was ready to make concessions if North Korea's security was assured and it were provided economic assistance. At the press conference following her visit to Pyongyang, Secretary Albright said, "We made important progress, but much work remains to be done," expressing her satisfaction with the talks with Kim Jong-il (Jun, 2000; Lim, 2012). Even though Secretary Albright's trip to Pyongyang was designed to prepare for President Clinton's visit, his trip to Pyongyang was canceled in the fading days of Kim Dae-jung's presidency.¹⁵⁹

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Throughout this period, Kim Dae-jung was highly optimistic about the prospect of U.S.-

¹⁵⁸ With a view to giving advice and consultation to the US team prior to Madame Albright's visit to Pyongyang, President Kim's top adviser Lim Dong-won traveled to San Francisco with Ambassador Bosworth to meet with U.S. Policy Coordinator Wendy Sherman and Ambassador Kartman (Lim, 2012).

¹⁵⁹ President Clinton personally called President Kim on December 21, 2000, a week before the public announcement was made, explaining that he had to cancel his visit to North Korea due to the time pressure further intensified by the ongoing Middle East peace process (Kim, 2011, pp. 361-364).

DPRK relations, and by extension, of his Sunshine Policy with the near perfect policy coordination and close cooperation maintained between Washington and Seoul. The Perry Process featuring the Kim Dae-jung administration's suggested Comprehensive Approach was vigorously implemented under President Clinton, who gave Kim Dae-jung's peace initiative framed around the Sunshine Policy a full, sustained endorsement (see Kim, 2011b, p. 354-356). President Kim was thus all the more frustrated with President Clinton's decision to cancel his planned trip to Pyongyang in December 2000, and with Chairman Kim's failure to seize the golden opportunity to accept President Clinton's invitation and visit Washington. Kim Dae-jung expressed his regret by saying, "Had Chairman Kim visited the United States, the normalization of relations would have materialized, and the Bush administration would have had no choice but to recognize it. Then, no more conflict would have occurred between Washington and Pyongyang, and by extension, inter-Korean relations would have made unprecedented progress (Kim, 2011b, pp. 361-364).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 2: 2000)

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

Constraint 1: President Kim's Weak Power Base in Domestic Politics

The minority status of the ruling party at the National Assembly caused the Kim government an array of difficulties in implementing both various reform measures as well as the Sunshine Policy. A set of reform measures ran aground while the Sunshine Policy began to lose its momentum as little tangible result had been produced in inter-Korean relations at the government level by the end of initial two years of Kim's presidency.

Kim's two years in office had received somewhat mixed reviews. Even though there was a general consensus that the president had achieved significant successes in the fields of democracy, economy and the North Korea policy, he was criticized on the grounds that his performance regarding human rights, political reform, and social justice had been somewhat disappointing (French, 2000). Some observers resented that he had shown much of the imperial style of his authoritarian predecessors. Conservative critics and some independent commentators observed that his government took a vindictive attitude toward critics and perceived political opponents. The cases most frequently cited involved tax prosecutions and other legal measures to penalize the owners of conservative newspaper companies, including *JoongAng Daily* and the head of Korean Air (French, 2000).

With his newly reformed Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) holding barely one-third of the seats at the National Assembly, things remained uncertain at best. At the time, his coalition with the conservative party led by Kim Jong-pil, who had just resigned as Prime Minister, appeared distinctly fragile. Public polls showed that his MDP and the main opposition, GNP, were almost neck and neck (French, 2000).¹⁶⁰ The polls conducted in the weeks prior to the April 13 general elections showed that voters were increasingly turned off by the North Korea Policy and that the policy only appeared to be a marginal issue in the upcoming elections.

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

¹⁶⁰ In a fervent "rejection" drive waged by an alliance of civic groups against politicians deemed "incompetent and corrupt," the name of President Kim's coalition partner Kim Jong-pil appeared at the top of the list. Those supportive of former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil accused President Kim of seeking to outmaneuver their man by having him step down from his position and then allowing for a disconcerting attack on his reputation (French, 2000; Kirk, 2000).

President Kim desperately needed to win the April 13 election. Most South Koreans agreed that the elections would be decisive in its implications. He aspired to crown his presidency not only with inter-Korean reconciliation but also with a second round of economic reform in the remaining two years in office. Regarding the April general elections, Kim said in a New Year's press conference, "We must win the general elections to ensure political stability, without which we cannot carry out reforms. Only when there is reform and politics becomes stable, will inter-Korean dialogue go smoothly" ("Kim to Propose S-N Summit After April Election," 2000). Kim expressed his desire to win by stating in an interview with the New York Times, "Only with a mandate can we promote our agenda of a new human rights law, a new anticorruption law, a new national security law and legislation to further democratize this country. ... 'We must win these elections'" (French, 2000).¹⁶¹

Response

In an attempt to create much-needed momentum for his critical reform measures and the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung established a new political party, the Millennium Democratic Party, and expanded his power base beyond his existing progressive political realm. In the months before the elections, Kim Dae-jung assiduously worked to renovate his political wing into a broad-based party. In expanding his power base, he engaged in political maneuvering in multiple ways. To begin with, he moved to recruit some conservative politicians into his new party. In establishing the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in January 2000, President Kim

¹⁶¹ President Kim also says, "The ruling party must win in this election in order to continue its reforms, and to make Korea a leader in the world" (French, 2000).

merged the ruling National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) with a conservative party -New People's Party (NPP)- led by Rhee In-je, a prominent conservative politician. He then co-opted leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and encouraged many progressive NGOs to cooperate with the government to overhaul the country's politics. He also strongly endorsed "clean-up" campaigns waged by NGOs to drive corrupt politicians away from the political scene. The president's move dealt a severe blow to the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) and, to a lesser degree, the Grand National Party (GNP) (Y. S. Han, 2002).

With the two Koreas agreeing to hold a summit at the end of the month-long process of secret negotiations, President Kim may have envisaged that the announcement of the planned summit would affect the outcome of the elections to his advantage. Therefore, he made a dramatic announcement of an unprecedented inter-Korean summit three days before the April 13 general elections. It seems safe to assume that such a move on the part of President Kim Dae-jung was intended to increase the odds of a parliamentary majority, or at least plurality, being formed in his favor in the upcoming elections.

Not surprisingly, the timing of the announcement became highly controversial with President Kim's political opponents charging it as a political ploy to influence the election. The conservative Grand National Party (GNP) immediately cried foul, citing President Kim's earlier pledge not to take political advantage of inter-Korean relations or use them for electoral purposes. Calling the announcement of a South-North summit "a surprise political show" and "an election gimmick," the conservative parties -e.g., the Grand National Party (GNP), the Democratic People's Party (DPP) and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD)- vehemently accused the president of politicizing inter-Korean relations for domestic political purposes. The GNP

challenged the government to come clean about what it promised to give the North in return for the surprise show. Raising suspicions of a secret deal with North Korea, the GNP's chief campaign manager said, "The inter-Korean summit must have been arranged at an exorbitant cost. People have the right to know what kind of burden they should bear in return for the summit." Moreover, the opposition party assailed the government for what it called "the beggar's attitude," citing North Korea's official announcement that it agreed upon the summit at the request of President Kim Dae-jung ("Opposition Decries S-N Summit as Campaign Gimmick'," 2000).

Despite all his efforts to expand his power base for the remaining half of his five-year term, President Kim's strategy failed to yield the desired results as the opposition GNP won the parliamentary majority in the April 13 general elections, leaving the ruling MDP with a minority status at the National Assembly.¹⁶² The April legislative elections made the country's political landscape an unstable two-party system which pundits expected would further complicate President Kim's national agenda ranging from continued economic reform to the improvement of inter-Korean relations.¹⁶³ In an attempt to maximize his political force even after the election dealt him a bitter blow, Kim Dae-jung drew four mavericks elected in his home district of Cholla into his party and successfully persuaded disgraced Kim Jong-pil to reverse his position to restore the coalition (Hong, 2000).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² The MDP came in a distant second in the April 13 general elections by winning 115 of the 273 parliamentary seats, while the opposition GNP garnered 133, only four seats short of a majority. The United Liberal Democrats (ULD) headed by Kim Jong-pil, who had just severed his coalition with President Kim, suffered a stunning decline in its National Assembly seats from 50 to 17 in the elections.

¹⁶³ A bipartisan paradigm, a political construct centering around a dominant ruling party and a minority opposition party, is not unusual in South Korea. What appeared peculiar about this election was that the ruling party remained as a minority while the opposition gained plurality, leaving neither party equipped with a legislative majority (Hong, 2000)..

¹⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the total force of the ruling party was still short of a majority that required 137 parliamentary seats.

Constraint 2: Controversy over the inter-Korean Summit amid Deteriorating South-South

Conflict

At the end of Period 1 (1998-1999), what appeared to be South Korea's continued unilateral, conciliatory actions vis-à-vis North Korea without reciprocation caused considerable political backlash, seriously undermining the momentum of the Sunshine Policy (C. Moon, 2012). However, the historic summit between two Koreas helped reinvigorate domestic support for the Sunshine Policy. Following the summit, an absolute majority of South Koreans expressed endorsement of the policy reflecting the heightened post-summit euphoria (H. S. Paik, 2009; S. W. Park, 2002).¹⁶⁵ Still, public opinion became increasingly divided with criticism in the mainstream conservative media beginning to devalue political dividends from the summit (Y. S. Han, 2002; C. Moon, 2012).

Meanwhile, the opposition GNP refused to join the presidential delegation to North Korea for the summit in Pyongyang which comprised 24 special delegates including representatives from political parties, social and economic organizations, business entities, press groups, and academia. After the summit in early August 2000, the South Korean media group composed of forty-eight heads of news organizations, went on a weeklong visit to North Korea at Chairman Kim Jong-il's invitation. However, the country's two largest newspaper companies, the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Dong-A Ilbo*, refused to join in the media group's trip to North Korea led by Minister of Culture and Information Park Ji-won (Lim, 2012). Another source

¹⁶⁵ According to public opinion polls conducted by three conservative newspapers—*Chosun*, *Dongah* and *Joongang*—for the period from May to August 2000, the approval ratings for the Sunshine Policy were 86.7 percent on average while the polls by the progressive newspapers -*Hankyoreh*, *Hankook*, and *Kyounghyang*- showed the policy's average approval rating to be 95.7 percent (S. W. Park, 2002).

of worry for President Kim Dae-jung was that the GNP's chairman refused to cooperate with the government in relation to the Pyongyang summit. Even though President Kim tried to inform him of what was going on during the summit, the opposition leader even declined to meet with the presidential aide (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).

The South-South conflict only worsened in the wake of the summit as the hitherto latent ideological polarization between conservatives and progressives was brought to the surface. Conservatives vehemently expressed skepticism about the Sunshine Policy, labeling it as “pro-North Korea and anti-U.S. leftist” and a “give-away” policy (Ko, 2006; H. S. Paik, 2009). With the national euphoria sweeping across the country following the televised summit meeting, domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy was largely muted in the overall atmosphere of excitement. However, as the enthusiastic mood dissipated in the latter half of 2000, the conservative media and opposition began to raise their voices and struck back with the skepticism of the Sunshine Policy. Making a case for the need to “adjust the speed” in improving inter-Korean relations, President Kim's conservative opponents urged him to put the brakes on the Sunshine Policy. They also warned President Kim against being obsessed with improving inter-Korean relations, denouncing him for confusing values and being duped by North Korean tricks (W. S. Lee, 2003).

Furthermore, the summit agreement became a bone of contention in the domestic political arena. Regarding the South-North Joint Declaration signed by the two leaders at the end of the summit meeting, a political controversy flared up as the opposition GNP immediately expressed concerns over Article II of the Joint Declaration. The article reads, “For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's

concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction." The opposition party voiced their concerns over the government's partial approval of the "one state, two regimes" system as had been suggested in North Korea's unification formula. They argued that the confederation system as indicated in Article II might run counter to the "one state, one regime" unification principle of the South Korean government given that the constitution defines the entire peninsula as South Korea's sovereign territory and denies the legitimacy of the North Korean state.

The GNP's criticism was based on the notion that the "confederation system" as addressed in Article II is indicative of the first stage of President Kim's *three-stage unification formula*. This was opposed to the government's officially adopted unification scheme; that is, the *Korean National Community Unification Formula* (KNCUF) devised under President Roh Tae-woo and later revised by President Kim Young-sam under the title of the *National Community Unification Formula* (NCUF). In brushing off such concerns, the presidential Blue House emphasized that the Kim government's official unification policy did not change from the previous government's unification formula (Y. B. Kim, 2000; K. Son, 2000). Some pundits note that the "concept of a confederation" as addressed in the Joint Declaration is reflective of a South-North confederation, as was indicated as the second stage of the *Korean National Community*,¹⁶⁶ and also as the first stage of Kim Dae-jung's *Three-Stage Unification Formula* (Cho et al., 2001).

¹⁶⁶ Under the *Korean National Community Unification Formula*, which was adopted at the end of 1988 after a series of National Assembly hearings and a process of collecting public opinion, stipulates three stages of unification as follows: 1) Reconciliation and Cooperation; 2) a South-North Confederation; and 3) Complete Unification.

Regarding the June 15 Joint Declaration, the GNP also questioned the absence of reference to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and prisoners of war arrested by the North during the Korean War. This was because the Joint Declaration (Article III) only addressed the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South (Y. S. Han, 2002; C. Moon, 2012).¹⁶⁷ President Kim Dae-jung was also under fire for “being too easy” on the North over the sensitive issue of South Koreans held in the North. The Kim administration sent back 63 North Koreans on September 2, 2000, as President Kim acceded to Chairman Kim’s demand to repatriate those unconverted political prisoners who had been long held in the South. However, the North denied the existence of South Korean POWs. The opposition GNP also accused President Kim of his plan to provide a food loan to the North in response to the North’s demand for one million tons of food in total with 200,000 tons scheduled to be delivered by the end of October. The opposition party held a massive protest rally against what they called President Kim’s mismanagement of North Korea policy. Over 10,000 protesters took to the streets in Inchon, west of Seoul, condemning the Sunshine Policy for its “irresponsibility” and “lack of reciprocity” (“South Korean Opposition Condemns Food Aid for North,” 2000).¹⁶⁸ In September 2000, in the wake of the state visit to the South by the secretary for inter-Korean affairs at the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Yong-soon, the opposition GNP launched an all-out offensive against the Sunshine Policy. The conservative media, the GNP, and its chairman all fervently demanded the resignation of Lim Dong-won (Lim, 2015).

¹⁶⁷ Article III of the Joint Declaration is as follows: The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.

¹⁶⁸ The GNP issued a statement saying that “It is irresponsible to offer 200,000 tons of food as a loan (to North Korea) as there is no way (for South Korea) to get it paid back.”

In another significant development, the Nobel Committee announced President Kim Dae-jung as the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 13, 2000. This further polarized South Korean society chiefly along the regional lines, as the mainstream conservative media set out to release unfavorable reports and editorials after a brief period of favorable coverage. The opposition party and media harshly criticized President Kim for leaving the country to accept the Nobel Prize for seven days in the midst of the country's economic instability and the ensuing political uncertainty (B. S. Kim, 2000).

Response

With the opposition GNP refusing to support the government's peace initiative and to join the presidential delegation for the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung sought to make his initiative more inclusive, promoting a visit to North Korea by conservative politicians. President Kim suggested to Chairman Kim Jong-il during the June 14 summit meeting that the latter invite GNP Chairman Lee Hoe-chang to Pyongyang, a demand which Chairman Kim readily accepted. After the summit, President Kim suggested, albeit in vain, that the GNP leader visit Pyongyang to meet with the North Korean leader. He also authorized GNP Vice Chairwoman Park Geun-hye's visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il in May 2002 (K. H. Choi, personal communication, October 18, 2016; D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).

On August 8, 2000, one and a half months after the summit, President Kim undertook a cabinet reorganization, and in doing so, signaled his determination to maintain consistency in his North Korea policy by retaining all key members of his Cabinet in charge of defense, foreign

affairs, unification, and national intelligence. By doing so, President Kim sought to assure the Pyongyang regime as well as the domestic opposition and the international community that South Korea would maintain continuity in its approach to North Korea (C. S. Lee, 2000). On Kim Dae-jung's watch, members of the advisory group were responsible for informing the public of the process of the Sunshine Policy. However, a couple of informed sources indicate that, during Kim's presidency, such efforts were made chiefly with the media, scholars, leaders of religious or civic groups rather than with the general public.

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Kim Dae-jung was deeply frustrated with the South-South conflict that grew progressively worse throughout his presidency. For Kim Dae-jung, this constituted arguably the most agonizing issue to deal with in implementing the Sunshine Policy. Lim Dong-won, President Kim's top adviser on North Korea policy, indicates that, President Kim found the South-South conflict much more difficult to address than the North-South conflict, and South-South communication even much harder than North-South communication. Despite all of President Kim's and his aides' efforts to overcome the issue, little proved effective in addressing the problem (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016). Apparently, Kim Dae-jung found the situation in which conservative critics and opponents continued to resist the Sunshine Policy mainly out of political considerations quite hopeless.

That is, Kim Dae-jung would likely have taken the domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy as 'a given' or something that remained so deeply ingrained in the South Korean political landscape that there was little he could do to resolve it. Regarding domestic opposition to the

Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's long-time aide observed, "Kim Dae-jung knew very well what was the basis for this very big strange, anti-sunshine or anti-engagement feelings. ... DJ knew very well they were rooted, first of all, in the Korean War, and secondly, it is (was) very rooted in the authoritarian, anti-democratic nature of South Korea's ideological conservatism" (S. Costello, personal communication, November 3, 2017).

Under President Kim Dae-jung, public opinion was taken into account only after a decision was made, or was referred to, in considering how the policy might be explained to the public. Kim Dae-jung believed that leaders must 'lead' as opposed to 'follow' public opinion, as many informed sources testified. Regarding the influence of Kim Dae-jung's views on public opinion on his North Korea policy, it seems fair to say that public opinion did not affect the government's policy choices, even though he found it important to generate public support for the Sunshine Policy through efforts to "lead" the public. In other words, President Kim cared about public opinion to a certain degree, even though it did not constrain or limit the options available to him as the final decision-maker or serve as a guide to his policy choices (Foyle, 1999). Regarding his perspective on public opinion, Kim Dae-jung believed that it was important to gain public support for a chosen policy, but that it was not necessarily desirable for public opinion to influence specific policy choices. In this sense, Kim Dae-jung held negative normative beliefs and positive practical beliefs about public opinion.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ This indicates that Kim Dae-jung held pragmatic beliefs about public opinion according to Douglas Foyle's typology (1999). Douglas Foyle (1999) examines individuals' beliefs about public opinion in two areas of normative beliefs and practical beliefs. Normative beliefs involve an individual's judgement about the desirability of input from public opinion influencing foreign policy choices. Practical beliefs represent the leader's assessment of the necessity of public endorsement of a foreign policy for its success. He categorizes those leaders who hold positive normative and practical beliefs about public opinion as "delegates"; those with positive normative beliefs but negative practical beliefs, as "executors"; those with negative normative beliefs but positive practical beliefs, as "pragmatists"; and those with negative normative and practical beliefs as "guardians."

C. Leadership Style (Period 2: 2000)

Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's personality profile for Period 2 (2000) is summarized in Table 13 by the three sources of constraints.

Table 13

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Period 2 (2000)
(Leadership Trait Analysis)

Period 2	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
North Korea - N of doc: 19 - N of words: 29869	0.35 M	0.36 H	0.55 L	0.29 M	0.53 L	0.11 L	0.25 H
Foreign - N of doc: 8 - N of words: 11814	0.29 L	0.33 H	0.56 M	0.33 M	0.50 L	0.06 L	0.25 H
Domestic - N of doc: 9 - N of words: 14862	0.40 H	0.38 H	0.55 L	0.24 L	0.56 L	0.15 M	0.23 H

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

According to the overall LTA results for this period, Kim Dae-jung's score on *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.35) is moderate while his score for the *need for power* (0.36) is high in strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This means that he was predisposed to challenge constraints in dealing with North Korea. Regarding the traits indicative of the leader's predisposition to process information, Kim's score on *conceptual complexity* (0.55) is low while his score on *self-confidence* (0.29) is moderate in strength in comparison to the norming group. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung was prone to be closed to information in dealing with North Korea during this period. On balance, Kim's leadership profile demonstrates that he was an *advocate* in his approach to leadership in dealing with North Korea during this period. Meanwhile, the coupling of a high *in-group bias* (0.25) and a low *distrust of others* (0.11) indicates that Kim Dae-jung's motivational perception was essentially *zero-sum* with regard to North Korea.

***Advocate* Leadership Style**

In this period, Kim Dae-jung acted highly proactively in dealing with the North and sought to secure his dominance over the policy process in pursuing his peace initiative.

Decision-Making Process in the Pre-Summit Period

In conducting North Korea policy during this period, Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership style involving a high *need for power* and a low *conceptual complexity* was manifested in the ways in which he managed the decision-making process in the months leading up to the inter-

Korean summit. Kim Dae-jung's scores on these two traits and a high level of interest and expertise in the issue domain interrelate to shape a distinct leadership style in relation to the relevant decision-making process in this period. According to Preston (2001), three leadership characteristics in particular –that is, *need for power*, *conceptual complexity*, and prior policy experience- play a crucial role in shaping the presidential leadership style with regard to decision-makings in foreign policy. In this period, Kim Dae-jung showed leadership styles of the *director* (a leader with a high score on *need for power* and extensive policy expertise) and the *sentinel* (a leader with a low *conceptual complexity* score and extensive policy expertise). Kim Dae-jung's leadership style regarding the decision-making process can be classified as *director* (that is, a leader with a high score on *need for power* and extensive policy expertise) and *sentinel* (a leader with a low *conceptual complexity* score and extensive policy expertise) in Preston's typology.

Director and Sentinel

In the pre-summit period, from the start of secret contacts with North Korea in early February to the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in mid-June 2000, Kim Dae-jung showed a *director* approach to leadership, which was evidenced in his high *need for power* (Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978; Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990). During this period, as reflected in his *director* leadership style, he reinforced his sway over the policy process and, in making decisions, mainly relied his own policy judgments.

Moreover, as manifested in his *sentinel* style of leadership, involving low *conceptual complexity* and extensive policy expertise, Kim Dae-jung showed a “deductive expert” style of

information processing in this period. That is, he was even more reluctant to conduct broad information search or gather competing views within his advisory group in making decisions than in the previous period (e.g., Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Driver, 1977; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984; P. Tetlock, 1985; M. G. Hermann, 1987). Instead, he trusted his own intuition and insight, demonstrating a highly decisive, less deliberative style. He did not reconsider his views once an action had been taken (e.g., Preston, 2001). The resulting decisions and strategies were immune to change while tactical elements were subject to modification in tandem with the situation (e.g., G. Snyder & Diesing, 1977).¹⁷⁰

Personalized Decision-Making Process and Maintenance of Secrecy

During the pre-summit period, President Kim relied on a highly personalized decision-making mechanism that was centralized within a tight inner circle of close advisers. In managing secret inter-Korean contacts and the special envoy's visits to Pyongyang in the months leading up to the summit, President Kim made key decisions while his two advisors, Minister of Culture and Tourism Park Ji-won and Intelligence Chief Lim Dong-won, served as key implementers of his decisions.

Moreover, President Kim was careful to maintain top-level secrecy in negotiating with North Korea to discuss the possibility of the summit. As a result, even senior members of the policy group were kept in the dark up until the day before the public announcement on the

¹⁷⁰ A close examination shows that the relevant decision-making system applied throughout his term of office, as analyzed in Chapter 4, was distinct from the system adopted specifically for the pre-summit period (Period 2). The difference was particularly salient in the degree of openness to information and of personalization of the decision-making system. Such a difference was manifested in the difference in the strength of his scores—in relation to a norming group—for conceptual complexity between the overall period of his presidency (moderate) and Period 2 (low).

summit was made on April 10, 2000. Even the Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu and the Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister were not aware of the secret process. Only Prime Minister Park Tae-joon and four or five individuals from the U.S. government -including President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Stephen Bosworth- were informed of secret inter-Korean contacts at the time (Lim, 2015, pp. 28–29). While maintaining the highest-level of secrecy even within his own government, Kim Dae-jung was extremely careful to maintain trust in his relationship with the United States.

In fact, such a decision-making process was a clear departure from the regular, formal decision-making mechanisms centered around the National Security Council. In this period, the process of organizing the summit was not subject to discussion at the NSC meetings. Seeking to complete the first stage of the unification plan, the stage of peaceful coexistence based on peaceful exchange and cooperation, he may have felt time pressure as inter-Korean relations had not yet made any headway at the government level.

Kim Dae-jung chose to streamline the decision-making process and maintain outright secrecy in organizing the summit. After all, such a strategy resulted in remarkable speed in moving forward in the implementation of his policy agenda. Under this system, difficult decisions such as whether to accept North Korea's request for a sizable cash remittance were made by the president himself without interruption and were speedily implemented. With a clear roadmap for a peace-making strategy in mind, Kim Dae-jung strived to speed up the policy process so that he could achieve the set of goals he had established for this period. All this made it possible for the announcement of the summit to be made on April 10, only one month after the first contact via secret envoys was made between two Koreas on March 8.

Strengthened Influence

In dispatching his special envoys to negotiate with North Korea, President Kim issued detailed instructions on what to discuss, what to say, and how to interact with their North Korean counterparts. In preparing for the summit after the public announcement was made on April 10, President Kim continued to hold sway over the decision-making process. The Summit Preparation Committee led by Yang Young-shik, the Vice Unification Minister, was set up to discuss and negotiate with the North on various issues in preparation for the summit. Members of this committee discussed an array of agenda items that had been formulated along presidential guidelines and instructions issued in detail (Y. S. Yang, personal communication, October 29, 2016). This also shows that the enhanced presidential leverage characterized the policy process involved in the first inter-Korean summit.

As reflected in his handling of the North Korean demand for cash transfer and his decision to visit the Keumsusan Memorial Palace, or the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum, Kim Dae-jung decidedly challenged constraints. In pursuing his peace agenda, he was not reluctant to make bold decisions that entailed potentially serious political risks and severe backlash from the public. His tasks at times involved covert actions on the part of his government that could be conceived as breaking the law. He chose, however, to resolutely challenge constraints by making decisions that could have subjected him to stern punishment under the National Security Law.

High Need for Power

In his period (2000), Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership style was integrated with a high *need for power* and a low *conceptual complexity* to yield an idiosyncratic aspect of his leadership (Terhune, 1968; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). In the year 2000, Kim Dae-jung's approach to leadership appeared highly manipulative in pursuing his peace agenda. Kim Dae-jung resorted to indirect means and worked behind the scenes in challenging constraints. His decision to accommodate North Korea's demand for cash transfer as a way to increase the chances of holding the summit demonstrates that he was readily manipulative in achieving his goal. In response to North Korea's demand for cash transfer and for his visit to the Keumsusan Memorial Palace, or the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum, Kim Dae-jung challenged constraints by making bold decisions that could entail serious political risks and severe backlash from the public. President Kim was well aware that the illegal cash transfer to the North days before the scheduled summit could subject him to stern punishment under the National Security Law. He had such a strong personal conviction about his course of action that he believed his decision constituted a *necessary evil* to pursue national interest and achieve the goal of realizing peace.

Kim Dae-jung's high score for *need for power*—in relation to a norming group—was also reflected in his effort to work behind the scenes to implement elaborate strategies step-by-step so as to push his agenda while minimizing risks. Each and every step he took in holding the summit was carefully choreographed and calculated to help achieve his goal. In an interview with Japan's Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) on February 9, 2000, President Kim Dae-jung expressed his fairly positive view on Chairman Kim Jong-il. He stated that the North Korean leader had "a good judgement" and "insight as a leader" (Kim, 2011b, p. 225). In fact, Kim Dae-

jung's favorable assessment of Kim Jong-il was a calculated move to induce the latter to embrace the idea of a summit and to leave the reform-minded officials in Pyongyang with more leeway to maneuver among more policy options available to them. Kim Dae-jung says in his autobiography that he intended to send the North a conciliatory signal via this interview seeking to achieve the main goal through a strategic use of the unique political circumstances of the communist regime (K. Y. Park, 2001, pp. 83–84; Kim, 2011b, p. 225).¹⁷¹

The Berlin Declaration was publicly known as President Kim's first official proposal to North Korea for economic cooperation and building mutual confidence.¹⁷² As it turned out, however, the South had begun the contact with the North behind the scenes and already held the first secret talks in Singapore a day before his landmark speech in Berlin. This was because he wanted to increase the chances of the Berlin Declaration leading to the inter-Korean summit (Lim, 2012, pp. 2-5).¹⁷³ Eventually, North Korea, which had rebuffed President Kim's repeated proposals for an inter-Korean summit throughout his initial two years in office, expressed its intent to hold an inter-Korean summit unofficially via the Hyundai channel in late January, 2000.

Ultimately, Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership style based on a high *need for power* and a low *conceptual complexity* enables an understanding of how this major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations was made in a remarkably short span of time, effectively rendering the

¹⁷¹ In giving this interview, Kim Dae-jung had in mind the fact that the North Korean system was mainly comprised of two groups: military hardliners and those taking a more pragmatic approach wanting to benefit from the improvement in inter-Korean ties.

¹⁷² The Berlin Declaration was meant to persuade the North to accommodate the Southern proposal to promote government-level inter-Korean cooperation.

¹⁷³ The first secret meeting between special envoys Park Ji-won and Song Ho-kyung, from South and North Korea respectively, was held on March 8 in Singapore, a day prior to President Kim's Berlin Declaration. A series of secret special envoy and working-level meetings were subsequently held in Shanghai and Beijing, eventually resulting in an agreement to hold the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang from June 12 to 14 (e.g., Lim, 2012).

year 2000 a heyday of the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung's Berlin Declaration (March 9), which marked a watershed moment in inter-Korean relations, was followed by an earth-shattering announcement of a planned summit (April 10) and finally the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and the formulation of the Joint Declaration (June 14-15), which was an essential turning point in inter-Korean relations from distrust and confrontation to cooperation and reconciliation. Following the first historic summit, there occurred a rapid expansion of inter-Korean cooperation and reconciliation as the two sides proceeded to implement an array of summit agreements by holding a series of talks and events in various fields. The ensuing rapprochement between the two Koreas helped reshape the political, economic, and socio-cultural landscape of inter-Korean relations during this period.

Motivational Perception: *Zero-sum*

Kim Dae-jung's decision to comply with Pyongyang's excessive demands to transfer cash and visit the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum is indicative of the degree of pressure Kim Dae-jung was feeling about achieving the goal of holding the first inter-Korean summit in this period. Kim's personality profile shows that the controversial choices he made in dealing with North Korea were linked with his *zero-sum* motivational perception of the communist regime, as manifested in his high score on *in-group bias* and low score on *distrust of others*. His *zero-sum* motivational perception indicates that he may have thought: "I could lose everything if I didn't gain everything. If I lose this opportunity, it would mean a permanent defeat for my peace initiative." Such a perception may have led him to bend over backward to hold the first inter-Korean summit and then make it an effective turning point in inter-Korean relations. To do so,

he may have regarded an *advocate* approach to leadership as most befitting the nature of the situation at hand.

Note.

Regarding the External Environment in Period 2 (2000): Kim Dae-jung's leadership in relation to the external environment for Period 2 is not discussed in the analysis section of this study. The reason for this is as follows: The study is focused on delving into how Kim Dae-jung addressed the constraints and difficulties imposed by contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy. In fact, as explained in the above section, in Period 2, virtually little constraint was posed to the Sunshine Policy by the external environment. Several informed sources indicate that this was in accord with Kim Dae-jung's own perspective on this period. Therefore, the relationship between Kim Dae-jung's leadership style and how external constraints were dealt with in Period 2 is beyond the scope of this analysis.

C. Leadership Style (Period 2: 2000)

b. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

The LTA results indicate that, when compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders, Kim Dae-jung's scores for *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.40) and *need for power* (Power) (0.38) are both high. This means that Kim Dae-jung tended to challenge constraints in dealing with the domestic political environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy in the year 2000. Regarding two traits indicative of the leader's predisposition to process information, Kim's scores for *conceptual complexity* (CC) (0.55) and *self-confidence* (SC) (0.24) are both low

in strength in comparison with a reference group of Pacific Rim leaders. These two scores indicate that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to be closed to information. The LTA results indicate that Kim Dae-jung tended to be an *advocate* in his leadership style in relation to the domestic political environment in conducting North Korea policy in this period.

***Advocate* Leadership Style**

With the Sunshine Policy beginning to lose popular support due to its prolonged failure to produce any tangible results in inter-Korean relations by the end of the year 1999 and a seeming lack of change in North Korea's behavior, Kim Dae-jung desperately sought to create a momentum for the Sunshine Policy in terms of domestic politics. He earnestly challenged constraints arising from the ruling party's minority status at the National Assembly, the constraints he had been struggling with since he was sworn into office. He embarked on a series of bold moves to expand his power base in order to push for his North Korea policy agenda more actively. Instead of waiting until the next general election, scheduled for April 13, and hoping for his party -the National Community for New Politics (NCNP)- to win the majority at the National Assembly, Kim Dae-jung launched his new party called the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in January 2000. President Kim then launched a recruiting drive in earnest to expand his power base. In this period, Kim Dae-jung seemingly switched the main goal of his peace initiative from undertaking the Sunshine Policy based on national consensus and a coalition with the ULD to building his own independent power base via the successful results of the Sunshine Policy (Y. S. Han, 2002). By doing so, he chose to be the master of his own destiny and improve his lot in a proactive manner showing an *advocate* approach to

leadership.

Kim Dae-jung's vigorous drive in challenging domestic political constraints in this period is shown in his high score on *belief in ability to control events* (BACE) (0.40) that is indicative of a firm internal locus of control. His BACE score regarding the domestic environment (0.40) is distinctly higher than for the external environment, a low score at 0.29. This indicates that, in handling domestic politics with regard to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to be more in control and was less likely to seek compromise than in dealing with the external environment. In enlarging the scope of his influence, Kim Dae-jung did not delegate authority for tasks to ensure that his preferred courses of action would be properly enacted. As reflected in his high BACE score coupled with a high *need for power*, Kim Dae-jung's response to domestic political constraints in this period was more direct and outright than in response to the external environment. A combination of high scores for these two traits also indicate that Kim was more likely to be skilled at alternating between direct and indirect means in challenging constraints when handling domestic politics.

In this period, President Kim strived to enlarge his power base through various means while attempting to turn the progress made in inter-Korean ties into political benefits. He deliberately timed the announcement of the historic summit to be made just before the legislative elections, seeking to influence voters to his political advantage. Furthermore, after the election, he attempted to forge an artificial political realignment by co-opting some GNP – the main opposition party- members to make up a parliamentary majority in the ruling party's favor (Hong, 2000). All this demonstrates that his handling of domestic political constraints in relation to North Korea policy was not so much passive or indirect as proactive and direct

during this period.

Moreover, his low scores for both *conceptual complexity* (0.55) and *self-confidence* (0.24) show how closed he was to information in dealing with domestic politics in relation to his peace initiative during this period. In dealing with North Korea, he did not seek feedback from the opposition or the public because, from his perspective, an alternative course or fallback strategy to the Sunshine Policy was a dead loss. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung did not see growing calls by his opponents and critics to “adjust the speed” or even to scrap the policy altogether as something that posed a serious constraint to the implementation of his North Korea policy. In this period, the worsening South-South conflict surrounding the inter-Korean summit was another source of concern for Kim Dae-jung. As noted by several informed sources, Kim Dae-jung found his ability to resolve this problem inherently limited while considering domestic opposition and the resulting South-South conflict as arguably the most agonizing issue he was faced with. This was manifest in Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile. That is, regarding domestic politics in this period, Kim’s relevant score for *self-confidence* (0.24) is distinctly low in strength compared to a norming group.¹⁷⁴ This may be understood in the context of Kim’s different perspectives on two different sources of constraints regarding the Sunshine Policy, the external environment and the internal environment. This shows that Kim Dae-jung was less confident in his ability to challenge constraints imposed by the domestic political environment than was in the case of the external environment in this period.

As was discussed in the previous section, Kim Dae-jung held negative normative beliefs

¹⁷⁴ Both in Period 1 and Period 2, Kim’s self-confidence score regarding the domestic environment was constantly lower than in relation to the external environment.

and positive practical beliefs about public opinion. Also, he believed in need to 'lead,' as opposed to following, the public. In short, it was important for President Kim to obtain public support for the Sunshine Policy even though he did not find it necessarily desirable to reflect public opinion in specific policy choices. All this combined with his perception of limited ability to persuade his political opponents of the credibility of the Sunshine Policy appears to lead him to adopt an *advocate* leadership style in dealing with domestic politics in relation to the Sunshine Policy. That is, Kim Dae-jung showed a determined push to implement his North Korea policy agenda without being highly sensitive to growing accusation of his policy on the domestic political scene.

Motivational Perception: Close to *Zero-sum*

Another salient aspect of his approach to leadership regarding the domestic political landscape in this period concerns a decrease in *distrust of others* from a high score in Period 1 to a moderate one (from 0.19 to 0.15) in Period 2. Such a change in the leader's perception of the domestic political environment had an impact on how he undertook the concerned policy. That is, the *zero-sum* behavioral predisposition he showed vis-à-vis North Korea in Period 2 was a shift from the *focused* orientation –or *radical* orientation in Hagan's terminology (1993, 1994)- he demonstrated in Period 1. This means that, regarding his handling of domestic politics in relation to the Sunshine Policy, Kim may have thought: 'if I keep going this way, I won't make it.' Having seen domestic opposition to his peace initiative as something to be dealt with in and of itself, independent of the success of the Sunshine Policy (in Period 1), Kim Dae-jung, in Period 2, appears to have felt the need to address the problem in more fundamental

ways as he believed: “if I do not make a change, I could lose everything and see the legacy of my peace process badly undermined.” During this period, Kim strived to turn around the domestic political landscape in a way that would render it more conducive to his peace process. After all, a change in his motivational perception translated into a series of proactive moves he made in relation to his North Korea policy on domestic political fronts during this period.

Political Skills

Meanwhile, what happened in the domestic political arena in relation to the Sunshine Policy during this period sheds light on some rough edges of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership. Showing a consistently low score on *task focus* throughout his tenure, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile indicates that he was an innately *relationship/process-oriented* leader. In this period, his leadership in dealing with North Korea was mainly *advocate*, and more specifically, *evangelistic*.¹⁷⁵ In leadership typology, *evangelistic* leaders refer to those *advocate* leaders who are *relationship/process oriented*. *Evangelistic* leaders are inclined to be even more concerned with the relationship with relevant constituencies than with the issues facing their organizations. *Evangelists* tend to focus on persuading others to accept their message and join their cause (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 97). Considering that the persuasive ability constitutes a core ingredient in Kim Dae-jung’s political skills inventory, it is not surprising that Kim was an inherently *evangelistic* leader. Nonetheless, the *relationship/process focus* was less than salient to the way in which he handled domestic political constraints in implementing the North Korea

¹⁷⁵ In their study delving into the relationship between leadership styles and foreign policy behaviors based on leadership typology, Hermann and associates (2001) classify those advocate leaders who are relationship/process-oriented as evangelists, and the advocate leaders who are task-oriented as expansionists (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001).

policy.

In Period 2 (2000), in a bid to fundamentally address domestic political constraints imposed on the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung committed much of his energy and resources to expanding his power base and turning the headway made in inter-Korean relations into his political benefit. This way, he strived to create domestic political conditions conducive to the implementation to his peace initiative. Showing an *advocate* leadership style, Kim Dae-jung exercised a constantly assertive push to implement his policy agenda, seeking to create desperately needed momentum for his peace initiative in domestic political terms. Upon taking office, President Kim underscored the importance of pursuing the rapprochement on the basis of national consensus. In this period, however, he seemingly shifted away from the pursuit of national consensus as a major operating principle of the Sunshine Policy, towards expanding his own power base via tangible outcomes in inter-Korean relations.

Expansionist leaders—e.g. *advocate* leaders who are *task-focused*—tend to focus on broadening their power base, whereas *evangelistic* leaders are more concerned with persuading their constituencies to endorse and join their cause. In this sense, on the domestic political front, Kim Dae-jung's leadership appeared closer to an expansionist than to an *evangelistic* style of leadership. In undertaking the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung worked hard to persuade foreign leaders and the North Korean regime to join his peace initiative while striving to build trust with North Korea and the U.S. government. Nonetheless, he apparently was not as earnestly committed to persuading domestic audiences and his political opponents of the need to endorse the Sunshine Policy. That is, in engaging in his peace initiative, the art of persuasion and coalition building, the two major ingredients in Kim Dae-jung's political skillset,

were mainly displayed on the North Korean and international front; this was not quite the case with the domestic political front.

In fact, he made little, if any, serious effort to lessen misunderstandings or controversy over, or facilitate understanding of, the terms of the Joint Statement among the Korean public in the wake of the summit in Pyongyang. Upon his arrival back in Seoul from Pyongyang on June 15, 2000, President Kim explained what the Joint Statement was about by delivering a speech briefing the South Korean public on the outcome of the summit. However, he could have held a press conference, directly communicated with the public, and explained what transpired during his visit to Pyongyang.

Kim Dae-jung's leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy in the year 2000 mainly centered around his *advocate*—more specifically, *evangelistic*—leadership style, with a focus lying on building trust with North Korea and making a genuine leap forward in inter-Korean ties. However, regarding the North Korea policy, his ability to persuade and build coalition, the two core ingredients in his political skillset, were underutilized on the domestic political front.

Chapter 7. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy

Implementation (Period 3: 2001-2002)

Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis

A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Constraint 1: Stalled inter-Korean relations due to North Korea's withdrawal from inter-Korean cooperation

In protest to President Bush's hardline stance toward Pyongyang, North Korea cut off official channels for inter-Korean dialogue one after another beginning in early 2001 (Lim, 2012).¹⁷⁶ North Korea's unilateral decision to suspend dialogue with the South brought all government-level exchanges to a complete halt for one year.¹⁷⁷ The inter-Korean relations only resumed in April 2002 after special envoy Lim Dong-won reached an agreement with Chairman Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang to resume the process of promoting the stalled inter-Korean relations.

The September 11 attacks led the Bush administration to take an even harder line vis-à-vis North Korea, further aggravating U.S.-North Korea relations,¹⁷⁸ and having an adverse impact on inter-Korean relations. Upon the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Kim

¹⁷⁶ Following Kim Dae-jung's first summit with President Bush in March 2001, North Korea abruptly canceled the fifth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks scheduled for March 13, 2001 in Seoul on the day of the meeting on the grounds that President Kim had failed to persuade President Bush (Lim, 2012).

¹⁷⁷ The two rounds of Ministerial talks, held on September 8 and November 8, 2001, were the only government-level inter-Korean dialogues held in this period.

¹⁷⁸ Following September 11, President Bush and U.S. hardliners repeatedly questioned North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and criticized it as a "threat to the security of the international community" (K.-S. KIM, 2002, p. 104).

administration took emergency steps to protect the U.S. forces stationed in Korea and major strategic facilities from a possible terrorist attack. Taking issue with the South's support of the Bush administration in the War on Terrorism, the North abruptly canceled plans to send a group of separated families to Seoul for family reunions. North Korea's actions constituted a political embarrassment to President Kim, dealing a severe blow to his Sunshine Policy (Kirk, 2001).

Response

In a bid to push ahead with the Sunshine Policy amid North Korea's rejection of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, Kim Dae-jung appointed Lim Dong-won, the Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), as the Unification Minister on March 26, 2001. By doing so, President Kim expressed his willingness to push ahead with his planned course of action despite unfavorable contextual conditions. This appointment left Lim, the top presidential adviser on North Korea, unencumbered by whatever constraints and restrictions had been linked with the position of Intelligence Chief in pursuing inter-Korean rapprochement. This enabled him to openly negotiate with the North and to persuade the South Korean people and the United States to support the government's North Korea strategy from the forefront.

This appointment was interpreted as President Kim's clear message that his Sunshine Policy would stay on course despite the discrepancy in opinions between himself and President Bush that became apparent during the summit. With North Korea suspending inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation in reaction to the Bush administration's hardline posture, Kim Dae-jung chose to unilaterally implement the inter-Korean agenda, as agreed upon with North Korea

during the June 15 summit, regardless of whether the Northern side performed its share of tasks.

A handful of former aides to President Kim indicated that, by the end of his presidential term, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group had nearly fully implemented their North Korea policy agenda, except for the revision of National Security Law and Chairman Kim Jong-il's return visit to Seoul for a second summit.¹⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the Kim administration's patient endeavors to persuade the North to get back on the engagement track finally led the North to issue a proposal on September 8, 2001, to resume inter-Korean talks after a six-month hiatus (Y. J. Oh, 2001b). In the process of organizing the sixth North-South Ministerial Talks scheduled for November 2001, North Korea abruptly demanded that the venue of the talks change from the previously agreed upon Pyongyang to Mount Kumgang instead. After exchanging fourteen proposals and counter-proposals with the North within three weeks, the South chose to accommodate their demand on the ground that substance should prevail over form or sustaining dialogue mattered more than anything in improving inter-Korean relations (Lim, 2012). Such a flexible attitude of the South Korean government led inter-Korean contact to be sustained, albeit sporadically, throughout this difficult period.

Breakdown of the North-South Ministerial talks

¹⁷⁹ As Chairman Kim accepted President Kim's proposal, the agreement was made between two Kims at the June 15 summit upon a second North-South summit in Seoul. After delaying a discussion on the issue for quite a while, Chairman Kim proposed Irkutsk of Russia as the venue for the next summit in his meeting with Special Envoy Lim in April 2002. Concluding that it was not acceptable, President Kim proposed a summit, this time, at Panmunjom if Seoul was not acceptable to the North. As the North then withdrew the proposal altogether, a second summit failed to materialize between the two Koreas.

Despite the high hopes President Kim held for resumed inter-Korean relations, the sixth Ministerial Talks held in Mt. Kumgang on November 8, 2001, broke down without reaching an agreement as a senior delegate from South Korea, Unification Minister Hong, walked out of the talks after entering into acrimonious exchanges with his North Korean counterpart over the dates for the next round of talks. By doing so, the South Korean representative disobeyed the presidential instruction that he reach an agreement with the North and issue a joint statement at the end of the talks.

Response

For President Kim, who found it critically important to make headway in inter-Korean relations, the November 8 meeting was a hard-won opportunity to have dialogue with the North and to increase the odds of gaining U.S. support for his engagement strategy. However, it was his own team which was to blame for the breakdown of the talks, ruining everything. Feeling extremely disappointed, President Kim proceeded to dismiss the Chief Delegate as the Unification Minister, excluding him from the peace process altogether going forward (Kim, 2011b; Lim, 2012, p. 287).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Meanwhile, North Korea did not show any sign of change by the end of March 2002. Kim Dae-jung expressed his frustration in his autobiography by saying, "I felt exasperated and at the same time deeply frustrated with the North Korean behavior. On the other hand, I felt sympathy for them. I was extremely disappointed with the North Koreans at the time" (Kim,

2011b). Nevertheless, in this period, Kim Dae-jung perceived more opportunities than threats from a series of moves by the North Korean regime that appeared indicative of its possible opening and reform. Such moves include the rapid expansion of North Korea's diplomatic normalization with other countries such as Italy, the Philippines, Australia, the U.K. (in 2001), Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Spain (in 2001).¹⁸⁰ In this period, Kim Jong-il also revised the socialist constitution: 1) to authorize private ownership of property, albeit in a limited fashion, 2) to introduce various concepts of the market economy, and 3) to allow freedom of travel. Moreover, North Korea's first economic reform was undertaken through 'economic management improvement measures' beginning on July 1, 2002. In September 2002, the first Japan-North Korea summit meeting was held in Pyongyang. During this period, Kim Jong-il displayed eagerness to seek a change in the socialist system both at home and abroad (K. Y. Park, 2001).

Regarding the opportunities he perceived from the North, Kim Dae-jung said in his speech in Washington D.C. in March 2001, "North Korea today is not the North Korea of the past, which had criticized Chinese reforms and openness as a corruption of socialism. We cannot say for certain whether North Korea will follow China's lead, but it is surely opening up. We must not lose this opportunity. We must assist the North so that it can continue along the path of change. We must help so that it does not return to its old ways, which would be unwelcome by other countries and would not be good for North Korea itself" (Kim, 2001b).

¹⁸⁰ Moreover, Kim Jong-il's visits to China in 2001 and 2002 confirmed for him the futility of opening up without reform. Regarding his visit to Shanghai in January 2001, North Korea's state-run media reported at length the Chinese city's finance, culture, industry and foreign-owned corporations including a General Motors' factory, which were symbolic of the city's efforts to open and reform (K. Y. Park, 2001, p. 59).

Response

With the tension between Washington and Pyongyang further escalating in the wake of President Bush's 'Axis of Evil' speech on January 29, 2002, Kim Dae-jung sought to maintain an emergency hotline and a secret channel with the North. As a result, a secret communication channel between the South's intelligence agency (NIS) and the Unification Front Department of Korea Workers' Party was maintained through the end of Kim Dae-jung's term of office even amid a protracted stalemate in inter-Korean dialogue (S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016; Seo H., personal communication, October 25, 2016). Even in this difficult period, some closed-door contacts occurred between the two sides in Kaesong and Beijing (J. Y. Shim, 2001).

Having achieved a positive outcome in his efforts to persuade President Bush on his visit to Seoul to change U.S. strategy, Kim then embarked on an initiative to persuade North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to change his plan of action by dispatching a special envoy to Pyongyang on April 3, 2002.¹⁸¹ While sending his own letter to Chairman Kim making suggestions on how to address pending issues involving North Korea's relations with the United States and South Korea, President Kim Dae-jung gave his special envoy detailed instructions on what to discuss with the North Korean leader regarding three major issue areas: U.S.-DPRK relations, Japan-DPRK relations, and North-South relations (Kim, 2011b; Lim, 2012).

Lim Dong-won met with Kim Jong-il on April 4, 2002, at the Baekhwawon Guest House

¹⁸¹ Prior to Lim's visit, President Kim had sent a letter to Chairman Kim conveying his views on pressing issues such as the Bush doctrine, the changing international security environment, and U.S.-DPRK relations along with his advice on how to manage North Korea's relations with the United States and Japan. President Kim's letter reportedly persuaded Chairman Kim to accept the presidential emissary (Lim, 2012).

and had a five-hour-long in-depth discussion on a broad range of critical issues (Lim, 2012).¹⁸² Envoy Lim told Chairman Kim that even though the two Koreas had wasted valuable time since the previous year, the eleven months that remained of President Kim's presidency was not a short time. Lim urged Chairman Kim to join a "speed battle" in North-South dialogue to make up for the lost time. He also suggested that the North switch from an "America first and the South later" strategy to a "South first and America later" one (Lim, 2012, p. 305). Lim's visit to Pyongyang resulted in the April 8 North-South Joint Statement, which was followed by the resumption of inter-Korean cooperation, the reunion of separated families at Mount Kumgang in April, and the provision of 200,000 tons of fertilizer in May 2002.

Another deadlock in inter-Korean relations

However, inter-Korean relations were halted again, albeit temporarily, as the North closed itself off after holding a round of family reunions in late April 2002. Having canceled the inter-Korean economic cooperation promotion meeting scheduled for early May 2002, Kim Jong-il suspended inter-Korean dialogue for two months.

Response

¹⁸² During the discussion, Chairman Kim made numerous on-the-spot decisions on major issues involving US-DPRK relations and inter-Korean relations at the suggestion of Lim. During his meeting with Lim, Kim Jong-il expressed his desperate willingness to normalize relations with the United States while condemning the Bush administration's hawkish stance on North Korea. He also took issue with Bush's insistence on the South getting U.S. approval to promote inter-Korean relations during the Kim-Bush summit in March 2001, and protested what he called President Kim's surrender to President Bush's pressure. Lim refuted Chairman Kim's assertions and explained how President Kim and his policy team strove to persuade President Bush to shift his hardline stance on North Korea. Lim relayed to Chairman Kim President Kim's advice that the North engage in open dialogue with the United States to draw international attention so as to weaken hard-liners' influence on President Bush (Lim, 2011, pp. 312-317).

To proceed with his peace agenda, Kim Dae-jung decided in May 2002, to indefinitely postpone the publication of the Defense White Paper designating North Korea as South Korea's "main enemy." Observers indicated that the decision was a clear reflection of how desperate the government was to bring the North back to the negotiating table. As it were, as a pre-condition for resuming inter-Korean dialogue, North Korea had demanded that the South abolish the main enemy concept from its Defense White Paper claiming it conflicted with the spirit of the June 15 inter-Korean summit. Determined to salvage whatever remained of goodwill between the two Koreas, President Kim, through his top adviser Lim, persuaded Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin and other members at the NSC to approve a delay of the publication so that the Defense Ministry would not issue the Defense White Paper during his presidency (S. J. Son, 2002a). In the South Korean political context, the Defense Ministry's designation of North Korea as the country's main enemy has been the subject of fierce debate and political wrangling. Regarding this decision, President Kim was vehemently accused of what they called his "obsession" with the Sunshine Policy to the point of disregarding what appeared to be obvious self-serving maneuvers of the North (S. J. Son, 2002a).

Constraint 2: the 2nd Yeonpyeong Naval Battle (June 29, 2002)

On June 29, 2002, amid a national frenzy about the World Cup Games co-sponsored by South Korea and Japan, the second West Sea battle erupted with a North Korean patrol boat launching an unprovoked attack on South Korea's naval vessels in the West Sea. In the exchange of fire, one South Korean naval patrol boat sank and four South Korean sailors killed

and another 19 were wounded (S. J. Son, 2002b).¹⁸³ Immediately after the incident, the North warned of more clashes if South Korea and the United States claimed their right to obstruct North Korean ships from proceeding south of a line in the West Sea that the North had never recognized (Kirk, 2002). Both critics and supporters made the forecast at the time that the naval clash would make it impossible for President Kim Dae-jung to adhere to the Sunshine Policy for the last year of his presidency. Many observers both in Seoul and Washington were perplexed by the timing of the second inter-Korean sea battle in three years and expected it to badly disrupt U.S.-North Korea relations as well as inter-Korean relations (Struck, 2002a). The timing of the incident could not have been worse. The skirmish occurred only hours after Washington confirmed its proposal to send a ranking State Department official to Pyongyang to resume negotiations that had been frozen since President Bush's election (Struck, 2002b). Blaming the North for starting the gunfight and calling it an "armed provocation," the Bush administration withdrew its proposal to dispatch a delegation to Pyongyang (Dao, 2002). Moreover, the naval clash outraged many South Koreans, who had grown impatient with North Korea's reluctance to reciprocate the South's goodwill gestures (Torchia, 2002).

Response

Upon the outbreak of the naval clash, President Kim put the South Korean military on high alert and condemned the North for opening fire on the South Korean navy, calling it "an

¹⁸³ Two North Korean navy gunboats reportedly opened fire when they were deterred by two South Korean patrol boats for crossing what South Korea claims is an extension of the sea boarder and fired on its boats (August & Kay, 2002; Struck, 2002a). Regarding North Korea's provocative act, pundits observed that the shooting was the North Korean navy's retaliatory act against a similar clash in the same area in 1999 wherein the South Korean navy claimed no casualties, winning a clear victory (Struck, 2002a).

obvious breach of the armistice agreement” that ended the 1950-1953 Korean War and saying that South Korea “can’t tolerate” it (Y. B. Shin, 2002; Struck, 2002a). Kim Dae-jung also said his government would demand an apology from the North (Kirk, 2002).

Hotline message from North Korea

On the following day of the naval battle, however, North Korea sent a message via the hotline expressing regret, stating that the incident was not deliberately planned and that they did not want any further escalation. The message was even more surprising for the President Kim’s government considering that the statement just hours ago the North had issued warning of more possible clashes upon the eruption of the incident. The message also proposed ministerial-level talks with the South and steps to resume the stalled process to achieve inter-Korean rapprochement (Kirk, 2002). Over three weeks later, on July 25, North Korea sent the South another message, this time officially, concerning the naval incident (Lim, 2012, p. 322; “SKn President Says North Virtually Apologized,” 2002).

In handling the second naval battle, Kim Dae-jung and his advisory team were careful not to undermine trust with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung chose to take the (first) hotline message expressing regret as an apology. (Jeong, S.H., personal communication, November 22, 2016). Although the first hotline message played a crucial role in easing tensions, President Kim and his advisers decided not to highlight it publicly (Jeong, 2013, p. 145; Lim, 2012, p. 320). Instead, they took a highly restrained response. As the Kim Dae-jung government decided to maintain civilian exchanges despite the naval incident, a cruise ship with 520 South Korean tourists on board left the port of Sokcho for North Korea’s Jangjeon Port and Mount Kumgang

on June 30, 2002, the day after the clash (Seo, 2002). President Kim, for his part, moved to take a 'cool' response, seeking to prevent the escalation of tension. At the risk of being severely criticized by his political adversaries, he went on a scheduled trip to Japan to attend a summit meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister and the closing ceremony of the joint World Cup Games (Jeong, 2013, p. 145). While still criticizing the North for violating the armistice treaty, Kim demanded the North publicly apologize, punish those responsible for the incident, and take measures to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. Meanwhile, at the summit meeting in Japan, President Kim obtained agreement from Prime Minister Koizumi to respond calmly to the naval battle and expressed his commitment to maintaining the Sunshine Policy ("Koizumi, Kim Agree," 2002). After all, the second Yeonpyeong battle had little, if any, adverse impact on inter-Korean relations. Rather, the process of promoting inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation accelerated following the naval incident as the North began to reciprocate the South's overtures in an unprecedentedly prompt manner (H. K. Kim, personal communication, November 2, 2016).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Regarding the official message that the North sent on July 25, Kim Dae-jung considered it a public apology even though critics claimed that the message fell far short of an apology.¹⁸⁴ Kim said, "Some people say it is unsatisfactory, but it is unprecedented for the North to make

¹⁸⁴ He defended his Sunshine Policy, rebutting arguments that the engagement policy pampered the North such that it gained the confidence to commit an armed provocation against the South. Reaffirming that he would pursue dialogue with the North based on firm security, Kim said, "There were cases of North Korea's armed provocation when the Sunshine Policy did not exist. The Sunshine Policy has nothing to do with the provocation" ("SKn President Says North Virtually Apologized," 2002).

an expression of regret so quickly.” Moreover, the South Korean public’s general endorsement of the government’s North Korea strategy was another source of momentum for the Sunshine Policy. Kim indicated in his autobiography that despite growing criticism of the Sunshine Policy by the opposition and media companies, as well as calls for suspension of the Kumgang Mt. tourism project, “the South Korean people did not budge [in their support of the Sunshine Policy]. He also said, “This is where the power of the Sunshine Policy derived from” (Kim, 2011b, p. 469).

Regarding the naval incident, Lee Hoon, Kim Dae-jung’s longtime aide and the former Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs, explains that President Kim was careful to prevent the clash from evolving into a more serious development that could shake the fundamentals of the Sunshine Policy while handling it as if it were an isolated incident with limited implications. In doing so, he strictly adhered to the principles of the Sunshine Policy by sternly responding to North Korean provocations in military terms while confining the handling of it to the dimension of an “accident” (H. Lee, personal communication, November 22, 2018).

Meanwhile, Kim and his policy elite held a realistic assessment of the North Korean behavior. Regarding North Korea’s handling of the second naval incident, then Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, notes that the government effectively attributed North Korea’s apparently “softened attitude” not so much to its trust in the Sunshine Policy as to its desire to receive scheduled deliveries of rice and fertilizer. In effect, Jeong observes, it was a material reward, more specifically, the food and fertilizer assistance from the South that effectively inclined the North to prevent any military confrontation from developing into a more serious

conflict in the form of a limited or localized warfare (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 11, 2016).

A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)

b. Source of Constraints: External Environment

Constraint 1: The Bush administration's Hardline Stance on North Korea

The first Bush-Kim Summit in Washington

Anxious about a possible change of course on the part of President Bush from the Clinton administration's Comprehensive Approach in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung hurriedly organized a summit with President George W. Bush in Washington.¹⁸⁵ By any standard, this was hardly a pleasant start to the relationship between the two heads of state. At this time around, the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea remained in flux and was fiercely disputed internally. At the breakfast meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell on the day of the summit, Kim Dae-jung explained the fundamentals of the Sunshine Policy. In response, Powell expressed his strong support of Kim's strategy (Kim, 2011b, p. 396). Kim Dae-jung felt relieved as Powell's remarks were construed both as the Bush administration's intention to continue the Clinton administration's North Korea strategy and as the

¹⁸⁵ In fact, the Japanese Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Washington as the first Asian leader to have a summit with the newly elected American president on March 1, 2001, six days before the Bush-Kim summit. However, Japan wanted to put it off for about a week due to the prime minister's scheduled attendance at the parliamentary interpellation session. Under these circumstances, Washington asked the Kim administration to postpone the Bush-Kim summit by a week or so to accommodate the Japanese request. However, the Kim government refused to adjust the plan insisting on holding the summit as originally planned (Yang, 2015, pp. 126–128). From the outset, Bush reportedly was not inclined to have a summit with President Kim. Before Kim left for the summit in Washington, Bush talked with him on the phone for the first time. As Kim sang the praises of his Sunshine Policy, Bush held the phone away from his head, covered the mouthpiece, and said to his aide, "Who does this guy think he is?" (Rothkopf, 2005, pp. 403–404).

endorsement of his own of the Sunshine Policy (Powell, 2001).¹⁸⁶ Powell's remarks from his breakfast with Kim were immediately reported by the media. However, Powell's remarks that he was inclined to continue Clinton's policies with regard to North Korea generated an almost immediate rebuke from the White House, forcing Powell to rectify his position (Rothkopf, 2005, p. 403).

Kim Dae-jung's first summit with Bush in March 2001 turned out to be a miserable failure, as described in the South Korean media (Funabashi, 2007, p. 226).¹⁸⁷ In an attempt to get President Bush to support his engagement path at the summit on March 8, 2001, President Kim expounded on the Sunshine Policy, suggesting that the American President adopt the "comprehensive principle of reciprocity" (Lim, 2012, p. 272; Y. Oh, 2001). Kim Dae-jung's proposed approach was a combination of Bush's strict rule of reciprocity and his more tolerant approach in dealing with North Korea. Kim also suggested that Bush adopt a strategy intended to make inter-Korean relations and U.S.-North Korea relations go side by side, complementing each other. He called on Bush to seize the momentum to negotiate the missile issue and play a proactive role in ending the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula (Lim, 2012, p. 272). However, the hurriedly-organized summit by the South Korean government was nightmarish to Kim Dae-jung as President Bush continued to express strong skepticism about North Korea and its leader and avowed that he had no intention of resuming dialogue with Pyongyang any time soon. During the summit meeting, Bush bluntly said, "When you make an agreement with a

¹⁸⁶ Powell had made similar remarks at a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister on the day before President Kim's arrival in Washington. On March 6, 2001, Powell stated at a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister, "We want to make sure that our North Korea policy is totally synchronized with what our South Korean friends are doing. ... We do plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."

¹⁸⁷ At President Kim Dae-jung's first summit with President Bush on March 8, 2001, the issue of North Korea reportedly dominated about half of the discussion between two leaders (Mufson, 2001).

country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of the agreement?" (*Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, 2001*). Bush also urged that South Korea not promote any reciprocal visit of Kim Jong-il to Seoul, which Kim Dae-jung said he was expecting to occur by the end of June around the first anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration (H. C. Kim, 2006, p. 223).

Bush also expressed profound skepticism about the Clinton administration's two-year campaign to reach a deal on the North Korean missile issue and the eventual normalization of relations with North Korea. During the summit, Bush told Kim that he would not resume missile talks with the North anytime soon (Sanger, 2001). During the press conference, President Bush called President Kim "this man," while appreciating Kim's leadership in reaching out to North Korea. This caused a media frenzy especially in South Korea where Bush's blunt statement was considered deeply offensive ("Calling Kim 'This Man' Earns Bush a Censure," 2001).

Kim Dae-jung was frustrated with the outcome of the summit. On the following day of the summit, Kim sought to persuade those Americans in positions of influence of the need to support his course of action at a conference held at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and in a meeting with Republican members of Congress. Moreover, before leaving Washington, Kim made a call to former President H. W. Bush to ask him to persuade his son, George W. Bush, to shift his strategy and engage North Korea (Kim, 2011b, pp. 397–9).

Despite all his efforts, U.S.-DPRK relations continued to deteriorate. The Bush administration unilaterally severed the existing 'New York channel.' In response, North Korea declared that it would not enter into negotiations with the United States unless it were compensated for the damage done by the loss of the communication channel (Funabashi, 2007,

p. 109). On June 6, the Bush administration announced a revised policy agenda toward North Korea, which was aimed at comprehensively eliminating all North Korean threats posed by both nuclear and conventional weapons.¹⁸⁸ In its revised agenda, the Bush administration retained the dialogue option, stating that the U.S. was willing to negotiate “without conditions and virtually whenever and wherever the North Koreans wanted it” (“Interview with President Kim Dae-jung,” 2003). However, despite the Bush administration’s offer of dialogue to North Korea with the announcement of the revised policy, U.S.-DPRK relations only grew worse amid a prolonged absence of dialogue.¹⁸⁹

Axis of Evil Speech

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the situation even more rapidly declined as they led the Bush administration to reconsider the earlier review of its strategy concerning North Korea. Kim Dae-jung felt deeply frustrated with the lack of control over escalating tension between Pyongyang and Washington (Kim, 2011b, p. 248). After all, the September 11 attacks gave the Bush administration a good excuse to discard the Sunshine Policy altogether and outright embrace the containment approach entailing a series of sticks. President Bush then designated North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ along with Iraq and Iran in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002. Regarding U.S. policy toward North Korea, this speech was practically construed as the expression of U.S. intent not to

¹⁸⁸ The revised North Korea policy agenda stipulated: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable restrictions on North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its export of missiles; and a less-threatening conventional military posture on the part of North Korea.)

¹⁸⁹ In response to President Bush’s North Korea policy review, North Korea immediately rejected Washington’s offer to resume negotiations, calling it an “utterly unacceptable agenda” that is “unilateral, preconditioned”, and inherently “hostile” (Lim, 2012, p. 278).

diplomatically engage the North but to pursue a goal of bringing down its regime through military means or preemptive strike and regime change. Not surprisingly, the North Korean foreign ministry strongly reacted to the speech by immediately issuing a statement that read, "This time Bush revealed his reckless attempt to attack us militarily. ... This is tantamount to a declaration of war against us... Our people will never forgive the preposterous U.S. attempt to stifle us. We will ruthlessly crush the invaders"(Lim, 2012, p. 289).

Following President Bush's 'Axis of Evil' speech, U.S. news media reported on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was drafted by the Bush administration as a guideline for the use of nuclear weapons in case of an emergency. The NPR listed seven countries as potential targets of a nuclear attack: North Korea topped the list and was followed by Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, and Russia (M. Gordon, 2003).

Response

With the Bush administration considering a military option vis-à-vis the North Korean nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung strived to deter President Bush and his policy team from using military force in dealing with North Korea. In February 2002, Bush traveled to South Korea for a third summit meeting with Kim Dae-jung, who eagerly sought to take advantage of the opportunity. During the summit in Seoul, Kim Dae-jung addressed the Clinton administration's emergency plan, which projected the loss of one million people in the event of an attack, underscoring that this must be avoided at any cost. He also said, "No South Korean, including myself, praises the North Korean regime. But we cannot openly denounce it, either. It will not be wise to try to change it by force. I beg for your understanding on this particular point." Kim

Dae-jung also expressed his uneasiness about the concept of the “axis of evil.” Kim stated, “Diplomacy is not about who is good and who is bad. It is about national interest and peace.” In making his point, Kim used the analogy of Ronald Reagan. He said, “Ronald Regan had called the Soviet Union an evil empire, but he engaged in constructive dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev. North Korea invaded South Korea, but the United States signed an armistice treaty with the invader, and somehow this has enabled us to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula for the past 50 years. Nothing is solved by just mentioning that North Korea is evil.” When Kim was talking about Reagan, Bush nodded his head several times (Funabashi, 2007, p. 111).

Eventually, Kim Dae-jung’s efforts to change Bush’s mind appear to have paid off. At the press conference following the summit, Bush showed an apparent turnabout in his position on North Korea. He said, “I support the Sunshine Policy... We are peaceful people. We have no intention of invading North Korea. South Korea has no intention of attacking North Korea, nor does America. We're purely defensive. And the reason we have to be defensive is because there is a threatening position on the DMZ. But we long for peace. It is in our nations' interest that we achieve peace on the Peninsula.” Bush also said that he would seek to resolve the issue through dialogue and that he would continue to provide food aid to the North Korean people (*P Bush & P KDJ Meet in Seoul*, 2002). As it turned out, Bush’s remark that “We have no intention of invading North Korea” had not been included in the talking points prepared for the talk. While the summit meeting was originally planned to be about fifteen minutes long, the two leaders discussed for an hour (Funabashi, 2007, p. 111).

In search of an effective way of persuading President Bush, Kim Dae-jung sought to

include a visit to Dorasan railway station in Bush's itinerary after lunch.¹⁹⁰ In fact, President Bush had been scheduled to visit the U.S. army base near the Demilitarized Zone to make a tough statement against North Korea (S. J. Kim, personal communication, October 14, 2016). The Dorasan station, which was the newly-built railroad station along the railway linking the two Koreas through the DMZ, was a symbolic place of peaceful coexistence and representative of the improved inter-Korean relations under the Sunshine Policy. Showing another approving gesture at the Dorasan station, President Bush, wrote on a crosstie, "May this railroad unite Korean families." Bush then stated in his speech, "President Kim has just shown me a road he built, a road for peace. And he's shown me where that road abruptly ends, right here at the DMZ. That road has the potential to bring the peoples on both sides of this divided land together, and for the good of all the Korean people, the North should finish it." Bush said in answering a question asked by the press, "During our discussion, President Kim reminded me a little bit about American history, when he said that President Reagan referred to Russia as the "evil empire," and yet, was then able to have constructive dialog with Mr. Gorbachev." All such positive remarks notwithstanding, President Bush still expressed his negative views on North Korea and its leader, as shown in his description of the North as an "evil" and "despotic regime" oppressing its people (*Remarks at the Dorasan Train Station in Dorasan, South Korea, 2002*).¹⁹¹

In fact, one portion of the speech prepared by the White House was modified at the last

¹⁹⁰ On January 17, 2003, President Kim discussed inter-Korean relations and the North Korea policy of the Bush administration with Donald P. Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to Korea. Ambassador Gregg advised Kim to have a candid, "Texas-style" dialogue with President Bush. The ambassador also gave him detailed advice on Bush's visit to Seoul suggesting that the American President be ushered to the DMZ and given a tour around the Dorasan Station (Kim, 2011b, p. 444).

¹⁹¹ He also said, "I will not change my opinion on the man, on Kim Chong-il, until he frees his people and accepts genuine proposals from countries such as South Korea or the United States to dialog, until he proves to the world that he's got a good heart, that he cares about the people that live in his country"

minute. At the urging of Kim Dae-jung during the summit discussion, Bush's reference to the evil regime in North Korea was reportedly dropped from the text (Funabashi, 2007, p. 113). In assessing the outcome of the summit, some in the U.S. Defense Department expressed confusion by complaining that President Bush "went too far" (Lim, 2012, p. 299).

Kim Dae-jung then moved to take the diplomatic initiative to improve Japan-DPRK relations. At a summit meeting with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Seoul on March 22, 2002, Kim encouraged the Prime Minister to improve Japan's relations with North Korea, and strongly suggested that the Prime Minister visit Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim" (Kim, 2011, p. 452). In a follow-up on this proposal, President Kim advised Chairman Kim in a letter handed over through Special Envoy Lim on his visit to Pyongyang on April 4, 2002 saying that the improvement in North Korea's relations with Japan was inevitable due to North Korean economic considerations. President Kim also shared with Chairman Kim his views on how to resolve the issue of Japanese abductees. Kim Dae-jung's behind-the-scenes endeavors to improve the relationship between Japan and North Korea eventually bore fruit with the Kim-Koizumi summit meeting in Pyongyang which was followed by the adoption of the historic Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration on September 17, 2002 (Osedo, 2002).¹⁹²

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

Kim Dae-jung's first summit meeting with Bush on March 8, 2001 left him in agony. Even

¹⁹² In the declaration, the two sides agreed to resume the Japan-North Korea normalization talks in October 2002. Koizumi made an apology for its past colonial rule and said that Japan would be ready to provide the North financial assistance, though not war reparations. Kim Jong-il, for his part, admitted for the first time responsibility for the abduction issue and confirmed that he would "take necessary steps to let them return home or visit their hometowns if they wish" (Osedo, 2002).

though the Joint Statement issued after the summit contained Bush's official endorsement of the Sunshine Policy,¹⁹³ Kim Dae-jung became gravely concerned about the prospect of his peace initiative. Kim Dae-jung found President Bush's attitude at the press conference highly "unpleasant and inappropriate." He was disconcerted by the American President's blunt remarks and Secretary Powell's abrupt change of posture shown at the summit (Kim, 2011b, pp. 397–398). According to Kim Taek-geun, who authored Kim Dae-jung's autobiography based on over forty sessions of interviews and conversations with him from July 2006 to April 2009, indicates that, from Kim Dae-jung's perspective, the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea constituted the most significant threat posed to the implementation of his peace process (T. G. Kim, personal communication, October 26, 2016).

For Kim Dae-jung, the fate of his Sunshine Policy hinged on President Bush's visit to Seoul scheduled for February 2002. Therefore, Kim made desperate efforts to seize what he saw as an invaluable opportunity to convince the American President of the need to change course and engage the North in dialogue lest the United States should apply the Bush Doctrine to North Korea. The 'Axis of Evil' speech reminded President Kim of an unpleasant memory of his first summit with President Bush a year before, which effectively brought the inter-Korean relations to a stalemate (Lim, 2012, p. 293; Y. J. Oh, 2002). Kim Dae-jung said in his autobiography that he literally "strained every nerve" to persuade President Bush on his visit to South Korea (Kim, 2011b, p. 445).

According to then Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, President Kim was highly satisfied

¹⁹³ The joint statement was a consolation for Kim Dae-jung as Bush expressed endorsement of South Korea's Sunshine Policy and Kim Jong-il's visit to Seoul, and promised to stick to the 1994 Agreed Framework.

with the outcome of the summit, and regarded the Dorasan event and, by extension, his summit with Bush in Seoul greatly successful overall. Kim appreciated that President Bush who, only less than a month earlier, had effectively designated North Korea as a target for regime change by preemptive strike, shifted his stance and pledged that he would neither attack nor invade North Korea (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016).

Constraint 2: Assistant Secretary Kelly's Visit to Pyongyang and North Korea's Second Nuclear Crisis

With the stalled inter-Korean relations getting back on track following Special Envoy Lim's visit to Pyongyang in April 2002, President Bush dispatched Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang from 3-5 October 2002 as a special envoy.¹⁹⁴ Despite all anticipations made on the part of North and South Korea, this visit proved catastrophic for the Sunshine Policy as it was followed by the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the outbreak of North Korea's second nuclear crisis.¹⁹⁵ The crisis began with North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-joo's statement which was interpreted as a defiant admission of the existence of the uranium enrichment program. In his conversation with the American delegation, Kang reportedly protested by saying, "When the United States designates North Korea as the axis of evil and threatens to launch a preemptive attack with

¹⁹⁴ In addition to the hard-won breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, some other positive developments occurred surrounding the Korean Peninsula at the time such as North Korea's promotion of opening of economic reform; Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang and the Japan-North Korea summit; and the ASEM's declaration of peace on the Korean Peninsula" (Lim, 2012, pp. 333-334).

¹⁹⁵ In fact, what North Korea anticipated from Kelly's visit was a package deal to be negotiated between the highest levels of Pyongyang and Washington (Lim, 2012, pp. 336-337). Kim Dae-jung and his government, for their part, had a positive outlook on Kelly's upcoming visit to Pyongyang based on a series of positive developments surrounding the Korean Peninsula at the time (Lim, 2012, pp. 333-334).

their enormous quantity of nuclear weapons, North Korea has no option but to develop nuclear weapons or even something more powerful for the protection of national security” (Lim, 2012, p. 336).

In the wake of this statement, Seoul and Washington showed fundamental differences in opinion regarding how to interpret Kang’s remarks and what kind of countermeasures to take. Seoul officials noted that Kang Sok-joo’s statement needed to be carefully studied because it would likely have been rhetoric claiming North Korea’s sovereign right to possess nuclear weapons, rather than a legitimate declaration on the existence of its nuclear program (Lim, 2012, p. 337).¹⁹⁶

Upon hearing the news, President Kim was even more frustrated as all this happened at a time when inter-Korean cooperation, which had been suspended after a brief period of resuscitation, was getting back into a full swing beginning in the summer of 2002. Washington’s public announcement on October 16, 2002 concerning North Korea’s admission on a highly enriched uranium program (HEUP) sent shockwaves across the globe. The announcement meant that North Korea had been pursuing an alternative nuclear program representing a switch from a previous plutonium-based program that the North had agreed to halt in the groundbreaking 1994 Agreed Framework (Slevin & DeYoung, 2002; Laney & Shaplen, 2003).

Response

¹⁹⁶ The Kim government cautioned the Kelly team to exercise prudence in accepting what they saw as the exaggerated and emotional language of North Koreans. In his meeting with Kelly, Lim Dong-won raised the issue of ambiguity over whether the North Korean question “Why should not we have our own nuclear weapons?” was an admission of the existence of the HEUP or insistence on their right to have nuclear weapons (Lim, 2012, p. 337).

In an attempt to play a mediating role between Pyongyang and Washington and achieve a peaceful solution to an evolving crisis, Kim Dae-jung began by persuading the international community. With Japan-DPRK relations appearing to improve, President Kim dispatched his envoys to Moscow and Beijing and sought help from Russia and China in persuading North Korea to end its nuclear brinkmanship (“SKn Vice Foreign Minister to Leave for Moscow,” 2003).¹⁹⁷ Having secured the support for his peace initiative from Russia, China, and Japan, which echoed the same voice calling for the United States to engage North Korea, Kim Dae-jung then moved to persuade the Bush administration and North Korea with only about four months remaining until the end of his tenure.

In the run up to his summit meeting with President Bush at APEC in Los Cabos, Mexico scheduled for October 26, 2002, Kim Dae-jung prodded North Korea to issue a statement expressing its desire for peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, laying the groundwork for persuading President Bush (Lim, 2012, p. 341).¹⁹⁸ In accommodating President Kim’s suggestion, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a public statement to announce its official position on October 25, one day before the trilateral summit in Los Cabos. In its statement, North Korea sought to explain the background against which Vice Foreign Minister Kang made the statement in question, and assured them that the North Koreans were “ready to clear the security concerns of the United States if the United States legally assures the DPRK of non-

¹⁹⁷ In tandem with his efforts at inter-Korean talks, Kim Dae-jung dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Tae-sik to Beijing and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hang-kyung to Moscow to seek their help in persuading North Korea to end its nuclear brinkmanship

¹⁹⁸ President Kim’s letter was conveyed to Chairman Kim through Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, who went on a visit to Pyongyang for an eighth round of Ministerial Talks from October 19-23, 2002. President Kim also suggested in his letter to Chairman Kim that North Korea “take proactive steps to engage the United States by sending First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju to Washington, and that in any situation, they should not engage in any act that would contribute to the abolishment of the Agreed Framework.”

aggression, including the non-use of nuclear weapons” (Lim, 2012, p. 343).¹⁹⁹

Kim Dae-jung then proceeded to persuade President Bush directly at the summit meeting on the sidelines of the APEC in Los Cabos on October 26, 2002.²⁰⁰ Following the APEC summit, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea issued a joint statement calling on the North to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a prompt and verifiable manner, while warning Chairman Kim that North Korea’s relations with the international community hinged on his swift response to their joint appeal. Despite U.S. efforts to form a joint front against North Korea, the joint statement did not include the condemnation of the North that the Bush administration was eagerly seeking. Instead of including talks of reprisals, the trilateral statement urged dialogue, which was close to what South Korea, along with China, sought to achieve (Allen & DeYoung, 2002).²⁰¹

2nd Nuclear Crisis

Immediately after the APEC summit, the hardliners in Washington, who had raised the issue of North Korea’s HEUP, took steps to terminate the provision of heavy fuel oil to the North, effectively causing the collapse of the Agreed Framework in November 2002. Eventually, North Korea’s restart of its nuclear program was followed by an announcement of its decision

¹⁹⁹ In its statement, North Korea also proposed a package solution for the dismantlement of its nuclear program in return for a non-aggression treaty (Lim, 2012, pp. 341–342).

²⁰⁰ In his message intended for President Bush, Kim Dae-jung called for concerted efforts to mobilize all diplomatic means through international cooperation to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue and indicated that North Korea had just proposed a package solution for the dismantlement of its nuclear program in return for a non-aggression treaty. Kim also called for prudence and caution against any attempt to take measures to abolish the Agreed Framework in consideration of the dangerous risks involved.”

²⁰¹ The Joint Statement said both South Korea and Japan would continue ongoing normalization talks with North Korea, in which they would raise the nuclear issue and warn that continuation of the nuclear program would jeopardize further improvement in relations (“Bush’s Efforts on Iraq, N. Korea Flag,” 2002).

to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003, which in turn resulted in North Korea's second nuclear crisis.

Response

Upon the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Kim Dae-jung employed a three-step approach in challenging the constraint: 1) to persuade the Bush administration; 2) to gain support of China, Japan, and the international community; and 3) to persuade North Korea. First, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his proposal to the Bush administration by dispatching Senior Secretary for National Security Yim Sung-joon to Washington.²⁰² By sending his proposal, Kim Dae-jung sought to persuade the Bush administration to switch from its "bold approach" to a "gradual step-by-step approach."²⁰³ In effect, the bold approach adopted by the Bush administration was a conditional offer meaning "North Korea's change first, negotiations later." To President Kim's proposal, Secretary Powell and National Security Adviser Rice showed a positive response saying that they were expecting South Korea to persuade Pyongyang. However, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did not support the South Korean proposal.

Upon his return to Seoul, Senior Secretary Yim briefed President Kim on the atmosphere of the Bush administration by stating, "In view of the Korean people's choice of Roh Moo-hyun - who pledged to inherit the Sunshine Policy in the presidential election- as the next president, North Korea's strong reaction, the advice from China and Russia for dialogue, and their need to

²⁰² This time around, Roh Moo-hyun, the Democratic Party's candidate, had just been elected as South Korea's next president in the December 19 election.

²⁰³ The Bush administration had expressed its intention to take a bold approach at the TCOG meeting held in San Francisco (June 17-18) by saying that if North Korea showed a fundamental change by taking positive steps regarding the military threat and the human rights issue, the United States would take a 'bold approach' in response.

concentrate on the Iraqi war, the hawks seemed to have taken a step back in order to see how the doves deal with the situation” (Lim, 2012, pp. 348–349).

With the two rounds of ministerial-level talks making little headway in addressing the nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung moved to dispatch Special Envoy Lim Dong-won and his delegation to Pyongyang on January 27, 2003, to “discuss with Chairman Kim the outcome of profound consultations with the U.S. side on the nuclear issue and to come up with necessary measures” (Lim, 2012, p. 349). The eight-member delegation included Lee Jong-seok, a North Korea expert who was expected to assume a key post in the incoming Roh administration. In fact, as his presidency was to end in one month, Kim Dae-jung wanted to assure Kim Jong-il that President-elect Roh Moo Hyun would be a like-minded successor to his government and that the Sunshine Policy would continue to be upheld (Funabashi, 2007, p. 203). President Kim sent a letter to Chairman Kim advising him on how to address the nuclear issue and improve U.S.-DPRK relations. However, Special Envoy Lim was not even given a chance to meet Chairman Kim this time.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective

Kim Dae-jung was outraged at the outcome of his special envoy Lim’s visit to Pyongyang in January 2003. In an interview he had in May 2006, he expressed how anxious he had been about this incident.²⁰⁴ Even though Kim Dae-jung had been informed of Kim Jong-il’s consent to

²⁰⁴ Regarding this, Kim Dae-jung said in an interview in 2006, “Kim Jong Il had said he would see my special envoy. But once I dispatched one, he wouldn’t see him, even though he was bringing with him my personal letter. Kim Jong Il ignores international customs, diplomatic protocol, and even courtesy. Moreover, he hasn’t even mentioned anything about a return visit” (Funabashi, 2007: 205).

meet his special envoy, North Korea had not made its promise. Lim Dong Won's visit to Pyongyang with only one month remaining in President Kim's term seemed like an act of South Korea's one-sided courtship for North Korea (Funabashi, 2007, p. 205).

In his autobiography, Kim Dae-jung expressed how deeply disheartened and dispirited he had been at the time. He says, "North Korea's move to challenge the United States with its nuclear development was indeed dangerous at a time when the neoconservatives were gaining power in Washington. For me, it was not easy to persuade Washington and Pyongyang at the same time. Domestically, the Cold-War mentality deeply embedded among conservatives constituted another obstacle that was hard to surmount. I felt too bitter about both the United States and North Korea. Especially, I was very concerned about the hardline approach of the Bush administration which first reneged on its commitment (to the Agreed Framework). All this was represented later in the form of North Korea's (active) nuclear development" (Kim, 2011b, p. 489).

A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

Constraint: Mankyongdae incident (August 2001) and a Deteriorating Domestic Political Environment Surrounding the Sunshine Policy

On August 15, 2001, the South Korean delegation of 337 people including 26 journalists flew to Pyongyang on a direct air route over the West Sea for a week-long visit to jointly

celebrate the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule.²⁰⁵ Despite objections from relevant bureaucracies including the National Intelligence Service (NIS), President Kim instructed Unification Minister Lim Dong-won to authorize the group's visit to Pyongyang. The problem arose when around 80 members of a progressive organization visited a monument dedicated to the North's unification policy and Mangyongdae, the birthplace of former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung (Lim, 2012, p. 279; "Seoul to Take Punitive Steps Against Visitors to NK," 2001). At Mangyongdae, a South Korean professor wrote an allegedly pro-North Korean message in a guestbook saying, "Let's uphold the Mangyongdae spirit to accomplish the great task of national unification." In South Korea, any act praising or expressing support for the communist North is considered a violation of the anti-communist National Security Law ("SKn Professor Charged over North Reunification Festival Message," 2001). When the South Korean delegation returned to Seoul after their week-long trip, sixteen of the 300 South Koreans who attended the unification festival in Pyongyang were arrested at the airport ("SKn Professor Charged over North Reunification Festival Message," 2001). The controversy over the behaviors of these individuals swiftly turned into major political strife as the incident caused a furious reaction from South Korea's conservative circle. Opposition lawmakers and the mainstream conservative press vehemently criticized the government and demanded the resignation of Unification Minister Lim as well as a complete overhaul of the Sunshine Policy (H. J. Kim, 2001; J. H. Kim, 2001; Lim, 2012, p. 279).

²⁰⁵ In fact, South Korea's Unification Ministry had initially prohibited the delegations from visiting the North. It was because the relevant agencies including the National Intelligence Service had concurred that the government ought to disapprove the civilian visit on the grounds that a planned event could possibly be exploited by North Korea's propaganda and that behaviors of over-300 individuals representing over one hundred organizations would be hard to monitor and control. However, President Kim Dae-jung pushed forward and approved of the group's visit to Pyongyang (Lim, 2012, p. 280).

GNP lawmakers moved to submit to the National Assembly a motion of no-confidence in Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, holding him responsible for authorizing the group's visit to Pyongyang. Despite President Kim's determined will to keep him in the Cabinet, the no-confidence vote on Lim was passed on September 1, 2001, with the support of the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), the government's coalition partner, enforcing the resignation of Minister Lim. This eventually brought an end to the DJP (Kim Dae-jung -Kim Jong-pil), or MDP-ULD (Millennium Democratic Party-United Liberal Democrats) coalition government (Y. J. Oh, 2001a).²⁰⁶ Following the parliamentary censure against Lim, the 22-member cabinet resigned en masse (J. H. Shim, 2001). Throughout the unfolding of the incident, the conservative newspapers, the opposition GNP, and the ruling coalition ULD joined forces to fight the Kim Dae-jung government and the Sunshine Policy.

Response

In fact, the domestic political environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy had already begun to deteriorate prior to the Mankyongdae incident. Beginning in January 2001, the government undertook a massive tax audit of media companies, striking a lethal blow against the country's major newspapers. In the process, several major newspaper companies were slated to be prosecuted for tax evasion (Y. S. Han, 2002, p. 62). The Kim government's massive tax audit on the media was severely condemned by the opposition parties and the conservative

²⁰⁶ Regarding the coalition partner ULD's participation in the GDP-initiated no confidence motion at the National Assembly, it is notable that it was not so much indicative of their discontent with the Sunshine Policy per se as of their protest against President Kim's breach of a promise to introduce a parliamentary system. In fact, Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil and his ULD in general did not pose any serious challenge to the Sunshine Policy since North Korea policy was not the issue area of primary interest for the ULD coalition partner at the time (S.H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016).

circle as President Kim's politically-motivated, retaliatory measure to repress or close down conservative newspapers that were principal critics of the Sunshine Policy ("Opposition Moves to Impeach President Kim," 2001). The three major conservative newspapers –*Chosun Ilbo*, *Dong Ah Ilbo* and *JoongAng Ilbo*- and the opposition GNP stood at the forefront of the protest against the government's move. In the process, the country's political landscape became even further polarized (Y. S. Han, 2002, p. 62).

A flurry of negative reports portraying the Mankyongdae incident from an ideological angle continued to make headlines while conservative critics fervently demanded the dismissal of the Unification Minister. Under these circumstances, President Kim made an official statement that he would not change the Unification Minister and that the individual behavior of members of the group had nothing to do with the viability of the Sunshine Policy (Lim, 2012, p. 282). In effect, Kim Dae-jung was not obligated to abide by the no-confidence motion as it was not the National Assembly but the President that elected the Cabinet ("Kim Dae-jung at the Crossroads," 2001). Nonetheless, Kim Dae-jung opted not to go with the confrontational option.

Instead, on September 12, 2001, shortly after the parliamentary vote on Lim Dong-won's dismissal as the Unification Minister, Kim appointed Lim as the Special Advisor to the President for National Security and Unification despite the expectation of severe resistance from the opposition (Kim, 2011b, p. 418; J. H. Shim, 2001). By reinstating his point man on the Sunshine Policy in a newly created post immediately after his parliamentary dismissal as the Unification Minister, President Kim made Lim Dong-won return to work so as to continue to serve as a de facto Chief of Staff and a key implementer of the Sunshine Policy (Lim, 2012, p.

285).

In fact, the period between the Mankyongdae incident and the 2nd Yeonpyeong Battle (August 15, 2001 - June 29, 2002) was the most difficult period for the Sunshine Policy in domestic political terms, as noted by the then Vice Unification Minister (H. K. Kim, personal communication, November 2, 2016). With the parliamentary motion to dismiss Lim being passed with the help of the ULD, the coalition government collapsed in three years and eight months. The incident also made President Kim anticipate a rough road ahead for the Sunshine Policy as the leader of a minority government (Kim, 2011b, p. 418).

Kim Dae-jung's Perspective

By reinstating his top adviser Lim Dong-won as the Special Adviser shortly after he resigned as the Unification Minister after the parliamentary motion against him, Kim Dae-jung sought to express his iron will to maintain the Sunshine Policy both at home and abroad (Kim, 2011b, p. 418). Regarding the reasons why he quickly restored Lim Dong-won as his Special Adviser, the President noted, "As someone playing a preacher's role in terms of the Sunshine Policy, he served to implement the North Korea policy of the Government of the People. ... Despite an increasingly fierce attack (on the Sunshine Policy) from the opposition, I could not replace him as my chief associate working for unification. He was gaining profound trust from leaders of other countries including North Korea and China. If I dismissed him, it may well have given the wrong impression both at home and abroad that the keynote of the Sunshine Policy was faltering or could have been interpreted as indicative of the retrogression of the Sunshine Policy. Despite the difficult political situation, I could not yield ground when it came to inter-

Korean relations. Minster Lim was a man of ability indispensable for the future of the Korean Peninsula. ... I had to keep him on my side” (Kim, 2011b, p. 417; Lim, 2012, p. 284).

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)

Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile in relation to the North Korea policy for Period 3 (2001-200) by the three different sources of constraints is summarized in Table 14.

Table 14

Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 3 (2001-2002) by Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Period 3	BACE	Power	CC	SC	Task	Distrust	IGB
North Korea (N=21) - N of doc: 21 - N of words: 20521	0.33 M	0.34 H	0.59 M	0.34 M	0.53 L	0.20 H	0.21 H
Foreign - N of doc: 11 - N of words: 10125	0.32 M	0.29 M	0.61 M	0.35 M	0.55 L	0.23 H	0.14 L
Domestic (N=10) - N of doc: 10 - N of words: 10396	0.34 M	0.39 H	0.56 M	0.34 M	0.52 L	0.16 M	0.29 H

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Regarding the overall results reflecting Kim Dae-jung's personal profile regarding North Korea policy for this period, his score on *belief in ability to control events* (0.33) is moderate while his score for *need for power* (0.34) is high in strength in comparison to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was prone to challenge, rather than respect, constraints. Kim's scores on *conceptual complexity* (0.59) and *self-confidence* (0.34) are both moderate in strength compared to a reference group of Pacific Rim leaders. This means that he was likely to be closed to input from others and the environment. On balance, the LTA results show that in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was *advocate* in his leadership style during this period. Meanwhile, his high scores for both *distrust of others* and *in-group bias* indicate that Kim Dae-jung was more or less *focused or targeted* in his motivational orientation toward North Korea in this period.

***Advocate* Leadership Style**

From the beginning of this period, North Korea posed a challenge to the Sunshine Policy by unilaterally suspending inter-Korean dialogue and exchange in protest of the Bush administration's hardline posture and what they saw as South Korea's surrender to U.S. pressure. During this period, President Kim's *advocate* leadership was salient in his patient, relentless endeavors to implement his peace agenda while being closed to information with the external environment rapidly deteriorating surrounding the Sunshine Policy.

In the six month-long hiatus in inter-Korean relations following North Korea's cancellation of inter-Korean talks in March 2001, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group were

focused on implementing the agenda as agreed upon during the June 15 summit and the Joint Declaration regardless of whether North Korea carried out its share of tasks. With inter-Korean projects and cooperation remaining at a standstill, he strived to promote inter-Korean exchanges with North Korea at the civilian level.

Moreover, President Kim pushed ahead with his decision to authorize a massive delegation of South Koreans working for non-government organizations to visit Pyongyang to join the National Liberation Day ceremony on August 15, 2001, despite objections on the part of relevant bureaucracies. This means that he was dismissive of the information that could have been disconfirmatory of his planned course of action.

After all, Kim Dae-jung's resolute, uncompromising drive for his planned strategy made it possible for inter-Korean relations to become prosperous in the wake of the second naval battle in June 2002. By appointing Lim Dong-won, the intelligence chief and his point man on North Korea, as the unification minister, President Kim effectively conveyed his strong will to maintain his strategy and overcome whatever obstacles were posed—whether by North Korea or by unfavorable internal and external conditions. The decision to postpone the publication of the Defense Ministry's White Paper (May 2002), which designated the communist regime as the country's main enemy, was a proactive move on the part of President Kim, intended to prevent the North from making excuses for its failure to carry out its share of tasks agreed upon in the Joint June 15 Declaration.

Kim's *advocate* leadership style was also evidenced in the ways in which he dealt with the rupture of the sixth inter-Korean ministerial talks, which his government managed to hold in November 2001 following the six-month-long deadlock in inter-Korean relations. When the

eagerly-anticipated talks broke down after the South Korean representative, the then Unification Minister, entered into a dispute with his North Korean counterpart and failed to comply with presidential instructions to reach an agreement with the North, President Kim moved to exclude him from the policy process altogether by dismissing him as the Unification Minister. This way, Kim Dae-jung took charge and maintained persistent sway over the overall implementation of his North Korea policy, assuring that his preferred course of action would be properly enacted. With one month to go until the end of his tenure, Kim's overriding concern about the rapprochement agenda encouraged a decision to send a special envoy to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il. In doing this, he hoped to break the deadlock in inter-Korean relations, and to mitigate rapidly escalating tensions between Pyongyang and Washington.

High Need for Power

Meanwhile, in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung exhibited an assortment of leadership characteristics deemed closely linked with his high *need for power* (e.g., Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). In an attempt to head off unfavorable public sentiment toward his rapprochement agenda, Kim Dae-jung interpreted the messages from North Korea in which they expressed "regret" over the naval conflict as an apology that would help to rationalize his planned mode of action. This indicates that the processing of information on the part of the president was highly selective and arbitrary in dealing with North Korea.

Furthermore, in an attempt to prevent the incident from negatively affecting his peace process, Kim and his policy group adopted a fairly restrained, measured approach. President

Kim chose not to emphasize the informal hotline message the North sent the day following the naval battle out of concern that making it public could hamper the trust-building process between the two Koreas. This way, the activist government's handling of the incident largely revolved around an extreme level of caution to avoid giving the North a wrong signal and thus to prevent the incident from evolving into a more serious situation.

By sticking to his schedule to attend the World Cup closing ceremony in Japan at the risk of exacerbating domestic criticism of his conciliatory posture, Kim Dae-jung sought to assure that the incident did not exert any adverse impact on the inter-Korean relations. This way, Kim Dae-jung sought to send the North a positive signal in a way that would lead the North Korean leader to willingly join his peace process even after the naval incident. In short, Kim Dae-jung's leadership characteristics associated with a high *need for power* were notable in the way in which he handled the second Yeonpyeong naval battle in the summer of 2001.

Ultimately, President Kim's steadfast, assertive pursuit of his policy agenda, as well as his subtly manipulative, highly discreet, restrained handling of the constraints imposed by North Korea, all combined to elicit belated but active reciprocation from the North in the wake of the naval clash. The naval incident was followed by successive developments leading to unprecedentedly rapid progress in the inter-Korean rapprochement process even though it all began to unravel with the U.S.-DPRK relations taking another disastrous turn in the wake of Assistant Secretary Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002.

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)

b. Source of Constraints: External Environment

In comparison to the norming group of Pacific Rim Leaders, Kim Dae-jung's scores for Power (0.32) and *belief in ability to control events* (0.29) are both moderate in strength. This indicates that he was predisposed to respect constraints. Regarding the two traits suggestive of the leader's tendency to process information, Kim's scores for *conceptual complexity* (0.61) and *self-confidence* (0.35) are both moderate in strength. This means that he was prone to be closed to incoming information. Notably, the scores of these four traits are all moderate in strength compared to the norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that, in dealing with constraints imposed by the external environment –e.g., the United States- to his peace process, Kim Dae-jung showed a *pragmatic* leadership style during this period.

In comparison to the previous two periods, it is noteworthy that Kim's score on *need for power* shows a remarkable shift—from high to moderate—during this period in relation to the external environment. In fact, this is indicative of a significant change being in his leadership style from the *advocate* to the *pragmatic*.

Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung's low score for *in-group bias* in relation to the external environment during this period is also distinct in that his score on this trait constantly remained high for all periods under study, or throughout his term of office, regardless of the type of environment and for the two other sources of constraints -North Korea and domestic political environment- during this period. Kim Dae-jung's high score on *distrust of others* coupled with a low *in-group bias* in relation to the external environment in this period indicates that, in implementing his peace agenda, he was focused on catching whatever opportunities were posed by the external environment. This is suggestive of a crucial change occurring in his

motivational perception toward the external environment surrounding his peace initiative from the *zero-sum* orientation in Period 2 to the *opportunity grabbing* orientation in Period 3.

Pragmatic Leadership Style

Kim Dae-jung's trait scores indicate that, in this period, he showed the most flexible approach to leadership of all three periods of interest in the face of what he viewed as the most serious threat to his peace-making efforts. That is, in dealing with the external environment as relevant to the Sunshine Policy in this period, Kim Dae-jung was more likely to work within the political constraints, be driven by the situation, and be willing to adjust his goals in tandem with the changing situation. This also means that he was more likely to be sensitive to political constraints and work within established parameters than in the previous periods of interest.

A significant decrease in the score for *need for power* as related to the external environment in this period was evident in how Kim Dae-jung interacted with George W. Bush during the first summit. For all the importance he attributed to his first summit with President Bush in March 2001, President Kim was not tactful or skillful enough to get the best possible results from what he saw as an invaluable opportunity to address constraints that could pose a serious threat to his peace process. Even though President Kim firmly believe that he would be able to persuade President Bush successfully, such confidence in his ability to persuade did not work well during the first summit. A former government officer who served the Kim Dae-jung administration points out that President Kim tended to push forward somewhat excessively as soon as President Bush was sworn into office, and that such an approach may not have been highly regarded by George W. Bush. This is all the more so, he says, considering that Bush, as

the newly elected president, may have been highly exultant and ambitious about pursuing his own agenda upon taking office. He added, "I personally believe that it (the summit) would have been more successful if President Kim had attempted to win over President Bush by taking more time in trying to persuade him" (S.C. Yang, Personal communication, October 12, 2016). Under the heavy pressure to win over Bush in the first summit meeting, Kim was less skilled in reading how to manipulate the environment, and was more likely to signal his intent to the other party than in the previous periods. All of this can be properly understood in light of his personality profile, involving a notable decrease in his score on the *need for power* (from high to moderate compared to a norming group) in this period in relation to the external environment (e.g., McClelland, 1975; D. G. Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). A longtime aide and adviser to Kim Dae-jung presents a different view, noting that President Kim could have employed any range of approaches to President Bush, but there is little that would have been successful in persuading him at the time. That is, it did not matter how Kim approached Bush; nothing would have worked, mainly because of "who President Bush was and who the team around him was" as well as "what they were doing." He holds that, despite all this, Kim Dae-jung did all he could do to persuade Bush to engage North Korea while on his first visit to Washington (S. Costello, personal communication, November 3, 2017). This means that no matter how he approached his first summit with Bush, it would not have affected the outcome of the summit.

Having had a bitter experience from his first summit with Bush, Kim took extraordinary care to prepare for the summit in Seoul scheduled for February 2002 to make sure that the hard-won opportunity would not go down the drain as in the case of the first summit of a year

ago.²⁰⁷ With U.S.-North Korea relations rapidly declining, President Kim Dae-jung made desperate endeavors to persuade his American counterpart to change his strategy for North Korea from a hardline stance as reflected in the “Axis of Evil” speech.

The fact that Kim was highly satisfied with Bush’s statement that he had no intention of either attacking or invading North Korea while Bush still expressed his negative views on North Korea and its leader indicates that Kim Dae-jung had adjusted his policy goals in relation to the Bush administration in tandem with the changing circumstances. Indeed, President Bush’s remarks made during his visit to Seoul were less than equivalent to the type of engagement President Kim had been seeking from the United States. In other words, this time around, Kim’s goals regarding the Bush administration was to deter it from conducting military action or a preemptive strike against North Korea.

In short, the deteriorating contextual conditions surrounding his peace process in the wake of the September 11 attacks and President Bush’s subsequent ‘Axis of Evil’ speech led Kim Dae-jung to scale back the scope of his agenda and adjust relevant policy goals to make them more realistic. In the face of what he perceived as the most serious threat ever posed to his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung became more willing to adjust his agenda according to the situation at hand or in consideration of the needs and wants of the Bush administration. Likewise, Kim Dae-jung exhibited a distinctly different pattern of leadership style, that is, a *pragmatic* approach to leadership, during this period.

²⁰⁷ With a view toward persuading Bush to change his course of action, Kim Dae-jung availed himself of his time off during Lunar New Year holidays by staying at the Walkerhill Hotel (in Seoul) where he discussed the summit strategy with his staff including Lim Dong-won, his Special Adviser, and Yim Sung Joon, his Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security (Lim, 2012, p. 293; Y. J. Oh, 2002).

Even though Kim Dae-jung had a clear political agenda, he may have believed he must work within the parameters that defined his political space in the international arena during this period. However, even while adjusting the scope of his agenda in relation to the external environment, he pushed ahead with his policy agenda in terms of inter-Korean relations. This way, he continued to stick to the separation principle between inter-Korean relations and U.S.-DPRK relations or North Korea's nuclear issue. In doing so, he differentiated his leadership style with regard to North Korea from that in relation to the external environment surrounding his North Korea policy.

Regarding his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung differentiated his approach to leadership in relation to the external environment from in relation to North Korea and in relation to the domestic political environment. It is worth noting that his score for *need for power* is distinctly moderate in relation to the external environment during this period while the scores on the same trait remain high regarding both North Korea and the domestic political environment; his scores for the trait were high in the other two periods under study regardless of the sources of relevant constraints. This means that, in the face of what he perceived as a potentially existential threat to his overall peace process –the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea- Kim Dae-jung showed a change in his approach to leadership, shifting from an *advocate* leadership style to a *pragmatic* one.

In this period, Kim Dae-jung exhibited the most versatile approach to leadership in pursuing his peace initiative. He showed a *pragmatic* leadership style in dealing with the external environment, while showing an *advocate* leadership style regarding the domestic political context and North Korea –or the overall policy toward North Korea. Kim Dae-jung's

uniquely *pragmatic* approach to leadership in response to constraints and setbacks arising from the external environment appears to be closely associated with his own perception of the relevant constraints. That is, he considered the constraints imposed by the Bush administration and the resulting tension between Pyongyang and Washington as the most serious threat ever posed to his peace initiative. Such a perceptual change for Kim Dae-jung seemingly resulted in a change in his approach to leadership.

Motivational Perception: *Opportunity-Grabbing*

Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile shows that his two motivational traits also underwent a significant change in relation to the external environment during this period. His high *distrust of others* and low *in-group bias* combine to be indicative of a change in his motivational perception regarding the external conditions surrounding his North Korea policy. With the external context rapidly deteriorating, Kim may have believed that if he continued to employ the same approach to leadership as before, he would likely lose and would never achieve his goal.

Regarding the external environment, Kim Dae-jung's high scores for *distrust of others* and low *in-group bias* indicate that he was likely to be obsessed with grabbing whatever perceived *opportunities* emerged from the external conditions to move forward on his peace agenda amid all the difficulties and setbacks arising from the relevant environment. In this difficult period, Kim Dae-jung remained highly optimistic about what he could do to improve, if not fully resolve, the situation, seeking to make use of whatever opportunities arose from the evolving contextual conditions.

The situation further exacerbated amid growing suspicions over North Korea's alleged highly enriched uranium program (HEUP) in the wake of Assistant Secretary James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002. Demonstrating a *pragmatic* leadership style, he sought to play an intermediary role not only between the United States and North Korea, but between Japan and North Korea. By doing so, he sought to lead the inter-Korean, Japan-DPRK and U.S.-DPRK relations to all make headway simultaneously, even though the end result was less than promising under swiftly aggravating contextual conditions over North Korea's nuclear issue. From Kim Dae-jung's viewpoint, the world and politics were not anarchic, and thus the cooperation was not only possible but made for a good policy. In a nutshell, as a pragmatist in his leadership style in dealing with the external environment surrounding his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung showed himself as a diplomat and mediator at heart. That is, he firmly believed in dialogue and persuasion as major policy instruments (M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 35).

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)

c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment

In relation to the domestic political environment in Period 3 (2001-2002), Kim Dae-jung's score on BACE (0.34) is moderate while his score on power (0.39) is high in strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. That is, in dealing with the domestic environment, Kim was predisposed to challenge, rather than respect, constraints. Moreover, regarding scores for traits suggestive of the self-other orientation, Kim's scores for *conceptual complexity* (0.56) and his *self-confidence* (0.34) are both moderate in comparison to the

norming group. This means that Kim Dae-jung was likely to be closed to information from contextual conditions. All in all, the LTA results demonstrate that, when it came to the domestic political environment, Kim Dae-jung was likely to show an *advocate* leadership style during this period.

***Advocate* Leadership Style**

With a robust sense of purposes and personal convictions, Kim Dae-jung pushed for his plan of action regardless of the cost it may have incurred in domestic political terms in this period. Amid the worsening domestic environment in the wake of a massive tax audit of major newspaper companies and the Mankyongdae incident, Kim Dae-jung sternly resisted calls to reconsider his comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. His *advocate* leadership style was evident in the ways in which he handled the Mankyongdae incident that erupted on August 15, 2001. By reinstating Lim Dong-won in a newly created post of Special Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Security shortly afterward, Kim Dae-jung expressed his renewed determination to maintain his peace policy. As manifested in his high scores on both *ability to control events* (BACE) (at 0.40) and *need for power* (Power) (at 0.38), Kim Dae-jung was self-assured in his ability to take the reins and remain in firm control of the political situation despite all the constraints imposed on his rapprochement agenda.

Kim Dae-jung's handling of the second Yeonpyeog naval battle on June 29, 2002, also suggests that he was insensitive to domestic political conditions in making decisions on North Korean issues. This way, he sought to meet the challenge head-on and was decisive in advocating his position. Immediately after the naval clash, he decided to leave for Japan to

attend the scheduled summit meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister and the closing ceremony of the joint World Cup Games. Even though it was not highlighted in public, President Kim had already ascertained the communist regime's position on the naval incident through a hotline message –the North expressed regret and certainly did not want any escalation of the incident- when he decided to take a cool response. By doing so, he sought to cope with the aftermath of the incident in a way that would prevent the situation from any further escalation and would not leave the global community with any negative impression of the security of the Korean Peninsula (J. H. KIM, 2015; Lim, 2012, p. 320). In making such a move, Kim Dae-jung risked incurring grave political costs, being harshly blamed for leaving the country on the day after the incident without attending the group memorial for those soldiers killed in the naval battle.

With the end of his presidency drawing near, Kim Dae-jung, under severe time pressure, could not afford to be adversely affected by a deteriorating political landscape in pursuing his rapprochement agenda. Moreover, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group decided not to play up North Korea's hotline message received on the day following the 2nd Yeonpyeong battle out of concern that making it public could hamper the trust building between the two Koreas despite critics' growing attack on the Sunshine Policy for being culpable for the incident. This demonstrates that President Kim strived to achieve the goal of promoting inter-Korean reconciliation via trust building at all costs that it incurred in domestic political terms. In sum, in implementing the Sunshine Policy during this period, Kim Dae-jung was hardly influenced by the deteriorating domestic political conditions. One important contributing factor for Kim Dae-jung's determined pursuit of his peace agenda, despite all the obstacles and setbacks he was

confronted with, was the persistent backing to the Sunshine Policy on the part of the majority of South Koreans. Ultimately, the near constant public support of the Sunshine Policy constituted a crucial enabling factor for President Kim's resolute, unflinching drive for his strategy vis-à-vis North Korea in the midst of an array of constraints imposed by the domestic political environment (Kim, 2011b, pp. 469).

Regarding the type of means used in the domestic political scene, Kim Dae-jung's tactics in dealing with his critics and political opponents were mostly circuitous, diplomatic, political, and subtle in nature. Such an indirect approach to the policy process was manifested in his constantly high scores for *need for power* (0.39). Still, it is noteworthy that he also resorted to means that appeared very direct in dealing with detractors opposed to the Sunshine Policy. Having focused on expanding his political power base in the previous period (the year 2000), President Kim undertook a massive tax audit of media companies, which resulted in the arrest or conviction of the heads of the major conservative media companies. His moves were vehemently condemned by the conservative circle as "retaliatory" against those opposed to the Sunshine Policy (G. M. Lee, 2003). Meanwhile, in most other cases, he stopped short of being directly confrontational or overbearing in dealing with the opposition to his Sunshine Policy. In effect, he could have ignored the parliamentary no-confidence motion against Minister Lim Dong-won, if he chose to do so.²⁰⁸ Still, he opted to avoid confrontation with his opponents. Instead, he reinstated his Chief of Staff in a newly created post of Special Advisor to the President.

²⁰⁸ This is because he had no obligation to observe it as the Cabinet was elected by the President and not the National Assembly ("Kim Dae-Jung at the Crossroads," 2001).

Even though Kim Dae-jung showed an *advocate* leadership in relation to both North Korea and the domestic political environment in this period (2001-2002), the tone of his leadership was qualitatively different, albeit in subtle ways. One reason for this appears to be closely linked with his motivational perceptions of the two different sources of constraints in this period. That is, his motivational perception vis-à-vis North Korea was mainly *focused* in nature while he was close to *zero-sum* in motivational perception with regard to the domestic political arena. As in the previous period of analysis (the year 2000), Kim Dae-jung viewed domestic politics as a *zero-sum* game in which the universe consists of us and them (friends and enemies), or winners and losers. For President Kim, his group's gain would likely have meant the opposition's loss, and vice versa.

Motivational Perception: Close to *Zero-Sum*

Although he was deeply concerned about growing political polarization over the Sunshine Policy, President Kim stopped short of incorporating it into his policy agenda, giving the impression that he was remiss in pursuing national consensus and making his peace initiative more inclusive.

The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung's *zero-sum* motivational perception of domestic politics—based on a distinctly high *in-group bias* and a moderate *distrust of others*—combined with a relatively low *conceptual complexity* and a high *need for power* translated into a highly emphatic and uncompromising drive to carry out his policy agenda, no matter what happened in the domestic political context surrounding his peace initiative. Kim's *advocate* orientation regarding domestic politics reflects a tendency to be closed to disconfirmatory information

from the domestic political scene—the information about growing resistance to the Sunshine Policy among conservative critics and a rapidly polarizing domestic political landscape. This may have made his leadership appear self-righteous and inflexible in terms of domestic politics with regard to the Sunshine Policy, as noted by his critics.

Kim Dae-jung's approach to leadership in handling domestic politics in this period was clearly distinguished from his leadership styles shown in relation to both North Korea and, to a greater degree, the external environment wherein his relevant leadership appeared far more flexible and adaptable. The second Yeonpyeong battle in June 2002 was illustrative of a notable difference between his handling of North Korea and that of the domestic political environment in terms of the degree of commitment, initiative, and affect involved. In addressing the incident, President Kim appears to have clearly prioritized building trust with North Korea and maintaining the reconciliation process, while showing himself to be somewhat insensitive to the resulting domestic political costs. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that President Kim constantly remained in a difficult dilemma, stuck between a rock and a hard place when it came to dealing with domestic political opposition to the Sunshine Policy. In fact, the more focused he was on finding a new way forward in pursuing rapprochement with North Korea, the more severe his conflict with the opposition party and his conservative critics, and the greater the political polarization in the country.

Personal Capitals & Political Skills

In striving to rescue his Sunshine Policy from an evolving crisis situation in Period 3, Kim Dae-jung exhibited much of his personal capital and political skills. Aside from the sources of

personal capital constituting fundamental aspects of the Sunshine Policy—e.g., tenacity, professional stature based on expertise, commitment to peace, and international recognition—Kim Dae-jung vigorously displayed political skills involving the ability to persuade and build coalition in implementing his North Korea policy. Notably, this was primarily the case with his dealings with North Korea and the external environment. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s ability to remain unperturbed and self-possessed under intense stress, which was reflective of his sense of efficacy, shone through in this period, particularly when he came under tremendous pressure imposed by a looming crisis amid a rapidly escalating confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang.

Chapter 8. What Aspects of Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Constituted a Key Mechanism for the Sunshine Policy?

A. Kim Dae-jung's Personal Capital & Political Skills based on the Biographical Sketch

Personal Capital

Kim Dae-jung's prior life and experience as a dissident politician brought him his own extraordinary courage and character, which constituted immense personal capital. His tenacity, commitment to peace and rapprochement, and political stature based on his interest, knowledge and expertise in a broad array of relevant domains all constituted vital enabling factors for the Sunshine Policy, South Korea's first comprehensive engagement toward North Korea. During his presidency, Kim Dae-jung's lifelong commitment to peace and reconciliation, a major source of his personal capital, was faithfully embodied in the form of the Sunshine Policy. In undertaking his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung desired to become a change agent by making a significant change for the better not just for his own country but for the world in general.

In essence, Kim Dae-jung's sense of pragmatism (elements of "Other Important Personal Characteristics") combined with his nationalist orientation (as evidenced in his distinctly high score on *in-group bias*) to produce a unique type of engagement policy toward North Korea. Kim Dae-jung's tenacity is a crucial element of personal capital that had been constantly tested in his lifelong struggle for democracy, human rights, and inter-Korean reconciliation. Kim Dae-jung was never deterred in pushing for his course of action in undertaking his peace initiative

amid all the constraints and challenges imposed by the external and internal contextual conditions.

Another important source of personal capital that facilitated the implementation of the Sunshine Policy was Kim Dae-jung's professional stature based on his knowledge and expertise. A constant evolution of his thesis on unification culminated in the Three Stage Unification Formula (1995), which served as conceptual framework for the Sunshine Policy. His professional stature also influenced the nature of the decision-making process, who joined the advisory group, and how issues were framed and problems were addressed. Kim Dae-jung's formal and informal networks of contacts across the world as well as international recognition as a champion of democracy and human rights also proved a valued source of personal capital that helped reinforce the credibility of his peace initiative. This in turn helped to facilitate the implementation of his peace agenda during his term of office. By the end of 1998, the first year of his presidency, he secured staunch support for his peace initiative from President Clinton and many other foreign leaders including leaders of Japan, China, Russia, and other Asian and European nations.

Kim Dae-jung's charisma also served as a vital source of personal capital that affected both the decision-making and implementation process of the Sunshine Policy. In implementing the North Korea policy, the charisma factor drove him toward innovation and made him constantly look for opportunities to manage the problem and improve the situation amid all the obstacles and setbacks encountered. In the process of the policy's implementation, Kim's charismatic appeal may have helped to enhance his advisors' loyalty and commitment. Meanwhile, the charisma factor, combined with his professional stature based on his expertise,

was linked with attributes of the system involving a *groupthink* phenomenon, as well as limited room for forthright feedback or opportunities for communication between the president and lower-ranking officials.

The study also finds that sophisticated cognitive qualities and self-restraint and composure—“other important personal characteristics”—all constitute important factors that had a significant impact on Kim Dae-jung’s leadership regarding the Sunshine Policy, in that they were closely connected with an approach to leadership that was highly cautious, meticulous, measured and restrained in nature.

Political Skills

Kim Dae-jung’s oratorical and writing skills, which partly constituted his political skillset, served as a useful tool to promote his peace agenda during his presidential tenure. For him, public speeches were an important tool for persuading people at home and abroad to back his peace initiative. Viewing presidential speeches as a “record of history,” Kim Dae-jung took great care in drafting speeches.

It is noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung’s persuasive ability is part and parcel to his political skills set. Especially in Period 3 (2001-2002) when Kim Dae-jung’s peace initiative faced its gravest-ever constraint, the Sunshine Policy was arguably all about his unrelenting campaign to persuade leaders of the United States, North Korea, and the international community including Japan, China, and Russia, to join his efforts to sustain the peace process that had been put in jeopardy amid rapidly increasing tension between the United States and North Korea.

Throughout his term, he made vigorous endeavors to build an external milieu conducive to

North Korea's change by persuading all major players in the international community to stand on the same page in joining his peace initiative aimed at dissolving the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. As regards the North Korea policy, his art of persuasion, however, was not properly exercised domestically, either with the public or with conservative opposition forces. Even though he occasionally attempted to engage the opposition party, including its leader, in his peace process, his efforts were somewhat muted or passive, and not sufficiently vigorous to make any practical difference in the aggravating political division.

In undertaking the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's political skills at building coalition were eagerly exercised at the international level. In implementing his peace initiative, President Kim vigorously pursued a collaborative, interdependent foreign policy. He relentlessly sought to join forces with the United States and the broader international community, particularly those countries with stakes in a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, such as Japan, China and Russia. His ability to build coalition and join forces with his political opponents was also demonstrated domestically, mostly in the initial period of his presidency.²⁰⁹ However, it seems safe to say that Kim Dae-jung's political skills at building coalitions were not properly tapped, and remained underutilized in undertaking the North Korea policy. For the rest of his tenure, he did not appear as committed to seeking national consensus on, or bipartisan support of, his peace agenda. He was severely criticized for further exacerbating the polarization over the North Korea policy in South Korean society during his term of office.

²⁰⁹ In his first year in office, President Kim sought to gain support for his peace agenda from the conservative circle by recruiting distinguished conservative figures including in the positions of the Unification Minister and the Ambassador to the United States.

B. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits & Styles through the Prism of the Sunshine Policy

1. Kim Dae-jung's Three Distinct Leadership Traits

In undertaking his North Korea Policy, Kim Dae-jung showed a set of distinct leadership qualities and traits that made his approach to leadership idiosyncratic in nature. The LTA, an at-a-distance method for content analysis, demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile was distinct in relation to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders in terms of three personality traits: 1) a high *need for power*; 2) a high *in-group bias*; 3) a low *task-focus*.

A. High Need for Power

During the first three years in office, Kim Dae-jung consistently showed an *advocate* leadership style based on a high *need for power*, regardless of the sources of constraints (1998-2000) (McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Keller, 2005; Hermann, 2005). In his last two-year period in office (2001-2002), President Kim continued to show an *advocate* leadership style in undertaking his North Korea policy. Meanwhile, the contextualization of materials for content analysis based on the type of audience indicate that, in this period, he exhibited a *pragmatic* leadership style in dealing with the external environment, while simultaneously relying on an *advocate* leadership style in response to domestic political constraints imposed on his peace initiative.

In sum, regarding the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile consistently showed a high *need for power* throughout his term of office. The only exception to this was his dealings with the external environment surrounding his peace initiative in the last two years of his presidency (Period 3 (2001-2002)), when he showed a moderate score (0.29) for the *need for*

power. Still, in this period, he showed a consistently high *need for power* in addressing constraints imposed by North Korea (0.34, the score related to the overall North Korea policy for this period) and the domestic political environment (0.39). In actuality, in implementing his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung showed a flurry of leadership characteristics that reflected a high *need for power*.

As evidenced in his high *need for power*, he was more inclined to challenge constraints than to respect them. In implementing his peace agenda, he sought to preserve dominance of the overall policy process. Also, he was skilled in sizing up situations and sensing what tactics would be effective in achieving his goals. Moreover, he was adept at challenging constraints indirectly and working behind the scenes to ensure that his position would eventually prevail. He was occasionally manipulative, if need be, in challenging constraints and obstacles that encumbered his path. A case in point was his handling of the inter-Korean issues in the year 2000, in which he was in desperate need of building positive momentum toward his goal. In this period, he made an array of decisions—e.g., announcement of a planned summit days before the general elections, and illegal cash transfer—that might well become a bone of contention in domestic politics. Regarding the procedural aspect of the policy, Kim Dae-jung consistently maintained effective control over the decision-making system and process. Notably, however, his control over the decision-making system was not so much direct, outright, or overbearing, as subtle, indirect, and behind-the-scenes in nature. This was evident in a constantly high score on *need for power* as reflected in his leadership profile regarding the North Korea policy during his presidency. President Kim's shrewd reliance on his Chief of Staff Lim Dong-won as a

custodian manager of the relevant system and process constituted another crucial enabling factor for an effective control he maintained over the overall policy process.

Kim Dae-jung's high *need for power* was also manifested in the ways in which he dealt with his political opponents and critics domestically. In conducting his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was politically astute and adroit enough to push for his agenda and achieve his goals without being confrontational with his adversaries and critics. Rather, he sought to be inclusive by appointing conservative officials in some key government posts and co-opting conservative politicians to join his party. However, he largely relied on his conservative lieutenants to prevail over the conservative circle to endorse the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung's high *need for power* was also manifested in how he challenged constraints arising from North Korea. His eagerness to size up and build trust with North Korea by assuaging its threat perception and siege mentality translated into a highly cautious, measured, and guarded approach he adopted in dealing with North Korea. By doing so, President Kim was careful not to send a wrong signal that could have encumbered his path forward in achieving his rapprochement agenda. This demonstrates the extent to which he was subtle and sophisticated in the use of means to challenge the constraints in conducting his North Korea policy.

B. Low *Task-focus*

Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile was distinct in terms of the *task focus*, which represents a leader's motivation for seeking office. As far as the North Korea policy is concerned, Kim Dae-jung's score for the *task* trait is consistently low regardless of the period of time or the source of constraints -or the type of environment-, meaning that he

was innately *relationship/process-focused* rather than *task/achievement-focused* in his motivational perception. That is, for Kim Dae-jung, building relationships was more important than achieving excellence in task performance, and that the process of achieving a goal was more important than achievement of the goal itself when it came to North Korea policy.²¹⁰

Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung believed that means and process mattered more than an end result. By the same token, he prioritized building trust with North Korea in conducting his North Korea policy. Such a behavioral tendency on the part of Kim Dae-jung also appears related to the lessons he learned from German unification during his stay in the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s. His consistent focus on relationship/process—rather than task accomplishment—had a significant impact on the ways in which he dealt with North Korea, conducted diplomacy, and managed the advisory system involved in his peace initiative (McClelland, 1961; Hersey & Blanchard, 1982; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1996, 2005).

C. High *In-Group Bias*

With regard to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's leadership profile shows an invariably high score for *in-group bias* across the three periods of interest regardless of the source of constraints except for the Period 3 in relation to the external environment in which his *in-group bias* was scored low (at 0.14) compared to a norming group. This means that he was the type of leader who held strong emotional attachments to his own group (e.g., Druckman, 1968; R. A.

²¹⁰ Winter (2005, p. 561) notes that *achievement-motivated*, or *task-oriented*, leaders are highly flexible in business settings, but often show themselves quite rigid in politics. Studies show that *achievement-motivated* leaders enter office with considerable idealism, which will inevitably collide with various constraints inherent in politics such as opposition, compromises, cost overruns, delays, and intractable bureaucracies.

Levine & Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977; Brewer, 1979; Stuart & Starr, 1982). This also means that, in undertaking his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung constantly perceived threats from the environment and confronted challenges and adversaries (Hagan, 1993, 1994).²¹¹ As manifested in this trait score, Kim Dae-jung was a nationalist leader; in engaging in his peace initiative, he strived to reinvigorate the people's aspirations to be the master of their own destiny. Put simply, Kim Dae-jung was at once a nationalist and a pragmatist, as was manifested in the tone and pattern of his approach to leadership. Kim Dae-jung's scores for the trait of *in-group bias* are to be discussed below in connection with his scores on *distrust of others*, another motivational variable, as these two personality traits interrelate to reflect the leader's motivational perception of specific sources of constraints.

2. Kim Dae-jung Challenged Constraints or Worked Within Constraints Depending on the Degree of Constraints

Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was more likely to challenge and overcome constraints so as to move forward with his agenda and achieve his goals. A marked exception to this was during the last two years in office (2001-2002), in which he exhibited a *pragmatic* approach to leadership and showed himself to be willing to adapt to the situation at hand. That is, he was more likely to be driven by the situation and to behave within the parameters newly set by the changing circumstances than he had been in the previous periods of interest.

²¹¹ Underlying this logic is the "statist approach" to foreign policy decision-making, as opposed to the "regime structure approach," which posits that the general structure of a regime largely determines the types of leaders selected to rule as well as how they respond to political constraints (Hagan, 1993, 1994).

Kim Dae-jung's personality profiles indicate that he was inherently an *advocate* leader, predisposed to challenge constraints and to be closed to information. However, he changed his leadership style when faced with what he perceived as a genuine constraint to his peace initiative. By shifting from the *advocate* to the *pragmatic* in leadership style in response to a serious threat posed to his peace policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to escape a losing position and to explore opportunities amid an evolving crisis situation. By shifting from the *advocate* to the *pragmatic* in leadership style in response to a serious threat posed to his peace policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to escape a losing posture position and to explore opportunities amid an evolving crisis situation.

The study suggests that Kim Dae-jung's high *need for power* and his flexibility in terms of leadership style led him to be effective in attaining his major goals with respect to North Korean issues. While inclined to be closed to information in making decisions, Kim Dae-jung stopped short of being rigid or inflexible to the point of failing to sufficiently challenge or overcome constraints in order to achieve his goals. This can be attributed in part to his approach to leadership based on a high *need for power*, as well as to his *pragmatic* inclinations, which the study (the *Who* chapter) showed were part of his personal characteristics.

3. Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Style by Periods

As demonstrated in Table 15, Kim Dae-jung's leadership styles by the three periods of interest and across the three sources of constraints indicate that he shifted between the *advocate* and the *pragmatic* in his approach to leadership and that he was inherently close to an *advocate* in undertaking the Sunshine Policy.

Table 15

Kim Dae-jung's leadership styles shown during his presidency (1998-2003) across the three different periods of his presidency and by the three sources of constraints.

	North Korea	Foreign (US)	Domestic
Period 1 (1998-1999)	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>
Period 2 (2000)	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>
Period 3 (2001-2002)	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>	<i>Pragmatic (or Consultative)</i>	<i>Advocate (or Evangelist)</i>

Note. In leadership style typology as developed by Hermann and associates (Hermann et al., 2001), advocate leaders who are *relationship-focused* are categorized as evangelists, and pragmatists who are *task-focused* as consultative leaders.

A. Period 1 (1998-1999): Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty

In Period 1 (1998-1999) in which Kim Dae-jung sought to lay the groundwork for the Sunshine Policy, both internally and externally, the overall degree of constraints was about midway between the other two periods. Regardless of the source of constraints, Kim Dae-jung mostly exhibited a determined, assertive push for his course of action in this period based on strong personal convictions and belief in his strategy, as evidenced in an *advocate* leadership style.

In the initial two years of his tenure, he sought to accurately assess the fundamental posture of the North Korean regime and properly set the stage so as to establish a solid groundwork for his ambitious peace initiative. In the process, from Kim Dae-jung's perspective, it was critically important to mitigate North Korea's perception of threat to induce its active

response to his overtures. Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership style integrated his proactive, forceful push to implement his pre-conceived agenda with his calculated, cautious, and restrained use of tactics, with the aim of promoting inter-Korean relations at the civilian-level and inducing the North to accede to his overtures; this was instrumental in achieving a set of goals he had established for this period.

B. Period 2 (2000): Heyday of the Sunshine Policy

Low Scores for Distrust of Others

By almost all conceivable standards, the year 2000 (Period 2) was the prime time of the Sunshine Policy as major breakthroughs were achieved not only in inter-Korean relations but also U.S.-North Korea relations. Even though some constraints were imposed on the Sunshine Policy in this period, especially by the domestic political environment, the constraints were much less severe than in the other two periods under study.²¹² A close look into his leadership profile indicates that the pattern of Kim Dae-jung's *distrust* scores reflect the perceived severity of relevant constraints that he was faced with in conducting the Sunshine Policy. That is, his *distrust* scores were at the lowest level in Period 2 and the highest in Period 3, with the Period 1 situated in between.

In Period 2 which was the virtual heyday of the Sunshine Policy, Kim consistently exhibited an *advocate* style of leadership in dealing with constraints imposed on his North Korea policy. Having persuaded the Clinton administration to espouse the Comprehensive

²¹² This was manifested in Kim Dae-jung's relatively lower scores for *distrust of others* in this period. Specifically, in Period 2, his scores on *distrust of others* were especially low with regard to North Korea (0.11, low) and the external environment (0.06, low), while being moderate (0.15) in relation to the domestic political environment.

Approach as its revised North Korea strategy by the end of Period 1 (or the year 1999), Kim Dae-jung came across as even more pushy and assertive in implementing his policy agenda in Period 2. The analysis suggests that Kim Dae-jung further accelerated his drive to push forward his peace agenda exhibiting an *advocate* leadership style when the environment surrounding his policy was largely favorable affording him ample room for maneuver in conducting his North Korea policy.

With regard to the overall North Korea policy in this period, Kim Dae-jung adopted a highly streamlined and personalized decision-making process. The decision-making system he adopted in the pre-summit period was a clear departure from the regular decision-making mechanism involving the National Security Council. As discussed in Chapter 4, with a high *need for power* and extensive expertise in the policy domain, Kim Dae-jung demonstrated the activist leadership style of the *director* in managing the decision-making system throughout his presidency. Meanwhile, the analysis shows that, in Period 2, he exhibited a *sentinel* leadership style in addition to that of a *director*. This is because, in this period, his profile shows a notable decrease in *conceptual complexity* (from moderate to low compared to a norming group) (e.g., Preston, 2001).

In Period 2, President Kim adopted a system centered around a tight inner circle of his closest advisers. In effect, he made key decisions mostly by himself while his two closest advisers –e.g., Lim Dong-won and Park Ji-won–served as the key implementers of his decisions. During this period, he further increased influence over the overall policy process and maintained top-level secrecy. He trusted his own insight, knowledge, and expertise in making decisions, exhibiting a highly decisive, less deliberative decision-making style. All this was

reflected in a distinctly low score for *conceptual complexity* (0.55) coupled with a high score for *need for power* (0.36) regarding the overall North Korea policy in this period. In this period, his unrelenting push to achieve his goals coupled with a decision-making system further centralized within his tight inner circle helped him achieve his goal in a timely manner. By his term's halfway point, the first inter-Korean summit was held, a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, which was followed by a flurry of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, both at the government and the civilian level.

C. Period 3 (2001-2002): Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis

The nature of the overall environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy in Period 3 (2001-2002) was in stark contrast to Period 2 (2000) in terms of the severity of constraints involved. The Sunshine Policy faced the greatest-ever challenge in Period 3 (2001-2002) as the Bush administration effectively invalidated all the landmark agreements, including the US-DPRK Joint Communique signed in Washington in October 2000, made with North Korea under the Clinton administration and took an outright hawkish posture. In this period, Kim Dae-jung's leadership became more flexible and maneuverable than in the previous three years. In response to what he regarded as the biggest obstacle ever posed to his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung moved from the *advocate* to the *pragmatic* in leadership style. What is worth noting is that his *opportunity-grabbing* type of motivational perception, or orientation to politics, indicates that, when confronted with the constraints he perceived as genuine threats to his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to find opportunities and benefit from rapidly unfolding situations. Amid all the difficulties posed to his Sunshine Policy, he remained optimistic about

what was possible, viewing the world around him as giving more opportunities than threats, and sought to promote cooperation.

4. Kim Dae-Jung's Leadership Style by Three Sources of Constraints

A. North Korea

In addressing constraints derived from North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was persistent in showing an *advocate* leadership style. His leadership characteristics based on a high *need for power* were salient in his dealings with North Korea across his presidency, or across the three periods of interest. In period 1 in which he strived to set the stage for the Sunshine Policy by putting the civilian contact and exchanges into full operation amid North Korea's outright rejection and occasional provocations, Kim Dae-jung exhibited an *advocate* leadership linked with a high *need for power*. The opening and smooth operation of the Kumgang Mountain tourism project, the most crucial attainment of his goal for this period, was in large part attributable to his unique approach to leadership, involving *advocate* orientations based on a high *need for power*. Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership style continued into Period 2 (2000) in which the relevant threat considerably dwindled as the North began to actively join the peace process following the first summit in Pyongyang. In dealing with North Korea, President Kim adopted an enormously streamlined and personalized decision-making system in this period, and sought to make the best of North Korea's excessive demands—e.g., for cash transfer. In this period, his *advocate* leadership based on a high *need for power* helped him achieve an array of goals on his North Korea policy agenda in a quicker time, and consequently unprecedented progress was made in inter-Korean ties. In period 3 (2001-2002), the

communist regime posed a fresh set of challenges and dilemmas by withdrawing from all ongoing inter-Korean talks and projects amid its escalating confrontation with the United States. Showing himself as an *advocate* in leadership style, President Kim adhered to his peace agenda by appointing Lim Dong-won, his point man on North Korea, as the unification minister, thereby affording his intelligence chief a freer hand in implementing the North Korea policy. He also implemented his policy agenda regardless of whether the North carried out its share of the task. At the same time, his dealings with North Korea in this period involved a highly selective processing of information in order to rationalize his planned course of action—e.g., the second naval battle in June 2002. Utterly single-minded in his aim to make progress in his peace agenda, he sent his envoy to Pyongyang with one month left before the end of his term.

B. Domestic Political Environment

As in relation to North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was persistently *advocate* in leadership style vis-à-vis the domestic political environment throughout his term of office. In other words, in dealing with domestic political constraints, Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints and to selectively perceive information.

It is noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* leadership on the domestic front was distinguished to a degree from that on the North Korean or the external front. Even though he was inherently a *relationship/process-oriented* leader, rather than a *task-oriented* one, the empirical evidence shows that such a tendency was much less salient in the way in which he handled domestic politics than in the way he dealt with North Korea or the external environment. As a result, his leadership style on the domestic political front in relation to the

North Korea policy looked more *expansionist* (e.g., an *advocate* leader who is *task-focused* in motivational perception) than *evangelist* (e.g., an *advocate* who is *relationship/process-focused*) (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001). All this relates to the fact that his persuasiveness and ability to build coalition, the two major ingredients in his political skillset, were not sufficiently exercised to make any difference in the polarizing political division in South Korean society over the North Korea policy. After all, Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* orientation in leadership style on the domestic political front enabled him to carry out his agenda very rapidly and without interruption amid all signs of unease and resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his opponents and critics.

Upon being elected president in December 1997, President Kim Dae-jung was fully occupied with overcoming the country's worst-ever financial crisis. Nevertheless, already armed with a well-formulated North Korea strategy, he never relented in moving forward in implementing his peace agenda. In doing so, he showed an *advocate* leadership style in the face of vehement resistance and criticism on the part of his political opponents and conservative detractors. In the process, he sought to send a clear signal to both domestic and international audiences of his determined will to push for his policy against all odds.

In Period 2, he continued to show an *advocate* leadership style in striving to create fresh momentum for the Sunshine Policy concerning domestic politics. He bent over backwards to consolidate and expand his power base in a way that helped build a domestic political landscape deemed favorable to his Sunshine Policy. In this period, he sought to take political advantage of positive developments in inter-Korean relations prior to the inter-Korean summit, demonstrating a manipulative tendency as reflected in his high *need for power*. With the

domestic political environment growing unstable surrounding his peace agenda in tandem with the swiftly exacerbating external conditions in Period 3, Kim Dae-jung maintained an *advocate* leadership style. That is, he decisively challenged constraints and remained largely closed to information. As a result, neither parliamentary dismissal of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won nor a fierce condemnation of the Sunshine Policy among his adversaries—e.g., in the wake of the second naval battle—adversely affected the implementation of his policy agenda.

C. External Environment

In dealing with the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy, he showed two different types of leadership style across his term of office: an *advocate* leadership style and a *pragmatic* leadership style. In Period 1 (1998-1999) and Period 2 (2000), with a view to establishing the favorable external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung largely dismissed conditions that were 'disconfirmatory' of his policy agenda, showing an unflinching drive to attain his goal. In Period 1, Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* approach to leadership led him to expand the scope of his peace agenda and push ahead with it. In doing so, Kim Dae-jung exerted concerted efforts to persuade William Perry, Clinton's newly appointed North Korea Policy Coordinator, to adopt the so-called Comprehensive Approach as Washington's revised North Korea policy. Kim's relentless efforts to persuade the Perry team through a special envoy eventually paid off in the form of the Perry Process which faithfully reflected the Comprehensive Approach as suggested by Kim's government. In Period 2, Kim Dae-jung continued to show an *advocate* leadership style in dealing with the external environment surrounding his peace policy. Notably, in this period, the external environment became

remarkably favorable toward his Sunshine Policy as a major breakthrough was made in U.S.-DPRK relations.

In Period 3, Kim Dae-jung showed a *pragmatic* leadership style in response to constraints stemming from the external environment. In other words, he was more likely to consider 'how to co-opt or accommodate the broadest range of constituents' when confronted with an array of constraints and setbacks emanating from the external environment surrounding his peace initiative (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009). This way, his leadership became markedly more adaptable and accommodating in this period. Under rapidly worsening contextual conditions in the wake of President Bush's Axis of Evil speech (on January 29, 2002), Kim Dae-jung became more willing to work within the constraints, scale back the scope of his agenda, and adjust his goals, particularly in response to constraints imposed by the Bush administration. With the prospect of the Sunshine Policy growing increasingly dubious amid tensions rising between Washington and Pyongyang over the nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung moved to embark on extensive diplomacy, seeking to persuade President Bush and Chairman Kim Jong-il simultaneously to change course while bringing the international community including major stakeholders such as Japan, China, and Russia into line with his peace agenda. When it became imperative to conduct sweeping diplomacy, not only between the United States and North Korea but involving numerous stakeholders in the international community, Kim Dae-jung's leadership became remarkably adaptable in this period.²¹³

²¹³ His relatively higher score for conceptual complexity compared to a norming group (at 0.61, moderate in strength) in relation to the external environment in this period also shows that he was more sensitive to incoming information and what major (external) constituencies wanted in this period in conducting North Korea policy.

5. Linkage among Kim Dae-jung's Perspective, Motivational Perception, and Leadership Style

As shown in Table 16, during his term of office, Kim Dae-jung alternated among the three different types of motivational perception—*zero-sum*, *focused*, and *opportunity-grabbing orientations*—across the three different sources of constraints and the three different periods of time.

Table 16

Changes in Kim Dae-jung's Motivational Perception and Leadership Style across the Three Periods of Interest and the Three Sources of Constraints

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits	Source of Constraints	<i>Distrust of Others</i>	<i>In-Group Bias</i>	Motivational Perception	Leadership Style
Period 1 (1998-1999)					
	North Korea	Moderate	High	Moderately Zero-sum	<i>Advocate</i>
	External	Low	High	<i>Zero-sum</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
	Domestic	High	High	<i>Focused</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
Period 2 (2000)					
	North Korea	Low	High	<i>Zero-sum</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
	External	Low	High	<i>Zero-sum</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
	Domestic	Moderate	High	Moderately Zero-sum	<i>Advocate</i>
Period 3 (2001-2002)					
	North Korea	High	High	<i>Focused</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
	External	High	Low	<i>Opportunity-Grabbing</i>	<i>Pragmatic</i>
	Domestic	Moderate	High	Moderately Zero-sum	<i>Advocate</i>

A. North Korea

From Kim Dae-jung's perspective, North Korea was a brother state with economic and strategic vulnerabilities and a partner to collaborate with for peaceful unification and mutual prosperity, rather than "the major enemy" to defeat or prevail over as indicated in the White Paper published by the Defense Ministry. For him, North Korea's obstinacy, belligerence, and occasional provocations constituted a unique way of expressing their vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Understanding that North Korea's desperate pursuit of survival effectively derived from its permanent *siege mentality*, Kim Dae-jung stressed that North Korea was likely to become most dangerous when isolated (e.g., Harrison, 2003, pp. 8–20). With North Korea feeling vulnerable and besieged, he believed, any ill-conceived dealings with North Korea could well jeopardize the overall peace process.

In addressing constraints imposed by North Korea in Period 1 and Period 2, Kim Dae-jung showed a *zero-sum* orientation in his motivational perception. This means that, in these periods, President Kim regarded North Korea as a source of constraints requiring a strategy to 'fundamentally' address the problem as it had the potential to make or break the fate of his peace process. Meanwhile, his motivational perception on North Korea became distinctly *focused* in orientation in Period 3. This means that, in Period 3, Kim Dae-jung did not see North Korea as a source of a permanent threat to his peace process but rather as a problem in need of a more *targeted* or *focused* approach, in contrast to the fundamental approach befitting a *zero-sum* perception as was the case in the previous periods. This indicates that he no longer associated his handling of constraints imposed by the North with the fate of his overall peace

process and instead sought to address relevant constraints and difficulties individually so that he eventually became the victor in this game.

B. Domestic Political Environment

From Kim Dae-jung's perspective, the sustained resistance to the Sunshine Policy among conservatives was politically motivated. Kim Dae-jung viewed the so-called South-South conflict regarding the North Korea policy as grounded in deep-seated regionalism and saw it as arguably the most agonizing issue he had to address. Nevertheless, he perceived his own capacity to persuade his opponents and critics to support the Sunshine Policy as fairly limited. President Kim, however, stopped short of viewing the domestic resistance as posing a genuine threat to his Sunshine Policy. In other words, Kim Dae-jung was less optimistic about his own capacity to persuade his domestic political opponents to be supportive of his peace process than he was in relation to North Korea and the United States.

In Period 1 (1998-1999), Kim Dae-jung showed a *focused* orientation in motivational perception vis-à-vis domestic political constraints. This means that, in this case, the leader will believe, "I can definitely win so long as this problem is properly dealt with." In this case, the leader stops short of associating relevant constraints with the success or failure of the policy or the fate of his organization. Therefore, he seeks to address the issue in and of itself since, from his viewpoint, it is not a make-or-break issue. In this case, bargaining or restraint does not make sense from the leader's perspective (e.g., Hagan, 1993, 1994). Kim Dae-jung's *focused* orientation toward the domestic political environment implies his belief that he would be able to succeed in achieving his goal insofar as he addressed the domestic problems he was

confronted with in and of themselves such that the implementation of his peace agenda would not be adversely affected. That is, President Kim viewed domestic political constraints imposed on the Sunshine Policy as having little potential to pose a serious threat to the fate of the Sunshine Policy or his administration.

Throughout his presidency, Kim Dae-jung constantly showed an *advocate* leadership style vis-à-vis the domestic political environment. Kim's perspectives on the domestic political environment as a source of constraints for the Sunshine Policy led to *focused* or *moderately zero-sum* orientations in motivational perception, depending on the nature of the situation at hand.

C. External Environment

Regarding Kim Dae-jung's perspective on the United States in relation to the North Korea policy, he found it imperative to get his course of action to be perfectly coordinated with US strategy for North Korea. He also regarded the fundamental mechanism underlying inter-Korean relations as intricately intertwined with U.S.-North Korea relations. He firmly believed that he could not go it alone, and that if he did not get the United States on his side, he would never make it, and the Sunshine Policy would end in failure.

A leader with a *zero-sum* orientation tends to view how he would address the problem as having a direct influence on the success of the policy or even the fate of his government. In this case, the leader seeks to resolve the problem at its core in a fundamental way.²¹⁴ Kim Dae-jung's *zero-sum* orientation in Period 1 and Period 2 (1998-2000) indicates that he aspired to

²¹⁴ See the table adapted from Hagan, 1993, Hermann 2005.

fundamentally address the problem and to commit whatever resources were available in challenging external constraints.

As regards the external environment, Kim Dae-jung's motivational perception changed from a *zero-sum* orientation in Period 1 and Period 2 (1998-2000) to an *opportunity-grabbing* orientation in Period 3 (2001-2002). That is, Kim Dae-jung's perspective on the United States regarding his North Korea policy, as discussed above, led to different types of motivational perception under different types of situation as perceived by himself. In Period 3, with external conditions turning extremely unfavorable towards his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung's motivational perception underwent a dramatic change from a *zero-sum* orientation to an *opportunity-grabbing* orientation. In other words, he became more preoccupied with seizing whatever opportunities emerged from the swiftly deteriorating conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy. This also indicates that Kim still remained optimistic about his capacity to cope with the crisis situation.

Kim Dae-jung viewed the Bush administration's hardline posture on North Korea as a genuine threat and the most serious constraint ever imposed upon his overall peace initiative. The situation as perceived by President Kim, combined with his view (perspective) that his peace process could never be successful without U.S. backing, led to a shift in his relevant motivational orientation. This, in turn, led to a *pragmatic* leadership style for President Kim in dealing with the external environment, zeroing in on diplomacy and being more open to making compromise. In Period 3, he became more willing to work within the constraints and adjust his policy goals in tandem with evolving contextual conditions. Believing in the power of persuasion, Kim Dae-jung made the best of his abilities as a mediator and diplomat. He bent

over backwards to play an intermediary role between Washington and Pyongyang as well as between Japan and North Korea while conducting active diplomacy involving a broader international community.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ According to Hagan (1993, pp. 199–200), a leader with this type of perception tends to focus on “diplomacy” in which “bargaining, compromise, and even more limited forms of cooperation” are employed.

Chapter 9. Conclusion

A. Findings Based on the *Who-Why-How-What* framework

In exploring the fundamental dynamics of leadership as a critical component of a peace initiative that was mainly leadership-driven, the study has uncovered the primary mechanism involved in the role of leadership as the major enabling factor for South Korea's first comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. The study reveals the relationship between leadership characteristics and the nature of the policy as reflected in the form of its procedural and implementation process. With a view to elucidating aspects of his leadership that constituted a primary mechanism for his peace initiative (the *What*), the study explores the ways in which multiple personality variables, such as: personal capital; political skills (the *Who*); beliefs and philosophy (the *Why*); and leadership traits and styles, perspectives, and motivational perceptions (the *How*) combined to shape Kim Dae-jung's leadership as it relates to the Sunshine Policy during his term of office.

1. The *Who* & The *Why*

Kim Dae-jung's philosophies, beliefs, and ideas formulated in the initial period of his political career served as a guiding vision that provided the "why" for the Sunshine Policy. As discussed in the *Who* chapter, Kim Dae-jung's forty year-long political career as an opposition leader and democratic activist left him with a great deal of sources of personal capital and political skills. The study suggests an array of sources of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital involved in his leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy as follows: 1) Tenacity, 2) Charisma,

3) Professional stature based on knowledge and expertise in the issue domain, 4) Commitment to peace and reconciliation, and 5) International fame and recognition. Moreover, the biographical sketch suggests a set of political skills, which were honed throughout his political career and would have influenced the Sunshine Policy, as follows: 1) Ability to build coalitions, 2) Oratorical & writing skills, and 3) Persuasive ability. The study also uncovers a set of personal characteristics that would have had a mostly indirect but significant bearing on how his leadership was exercised in conducting the Sunshine Policy: 1) A sense of realistic pragmatism, 2) Sophisticated cognitive qualities, and 3) Self-restraint and composure.

It is worth noting that sources of Kim Dae-jung's personal capital and political skills were linked with both positive and negative aspects of his leadership relating to North Korea. Kim Dae-jung's charisma was effective in enhancing the power of political discourse and inspiring members of the advisory group toward deeper commitment and trust. The study suggests that Kim Dae-jung's leadership characteristics associated with his persuasive ability, his ability to build coalitions (even with his adversaries), and his *relationship/process-focused* orientation were at least in part attributable to the charisma factor.

Meanwhile, the charisma factor had its share of negative implications for the procedural aspect of the Sunshine Policy, as will be discussed below. Throughout his term of office, Kim Dae-jung's art of persuasion and coalition-building skills were vigorously exercised vis-à-vis both North Korea and the external environment—the United States—in particular surrounding his peace initiative. It is worth noting, however, that Kim Dae-jung's political skills were not exercised as vigorously or evenly at the level of domestic politics—apparently except for the

initial period of his tenure. President Kim's response to domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy appeared somewhat passive, rigid, and occasionally dismissive.

2. The How and The What (LTA)

The Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) was applied based on speeches and interviews dealing with North Korea-relevant topics given by President Kim Dae-jung during his presidency. LTA analysis demonstrates an array of leadership characteristics involving leadership styles (as a function of traits) as they relate to the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy and the relevant policy implementation. In examining the relationship between leader perspective and policy process, a collection of data from semi-structured, in-depth elite interviews conducted with over twenty individuals, who were directly involved in the decision-making process or the implementation of the Sunshine Policy, were used in this study.

2. a. Findings (LTA): Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits and Styles as reflected in the Decision-Making System

Divergence in leadership characteristics involved between the regular decision-making system and the system in place for Period 2 (2000)

As shown in Table 17, Kim Dae-jung's approach to leadership in managing the decision-making process in Period 2 (2000) was subtly but importantly distinguished from that shown in managing the regular decision-making system for his overall term of office.

Table 17

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits and Styles as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for his Term of Office (1998-2003) and for Period 2 (2000) (Leadership Trait Analysis)

	<i>Belief in Ability to Control Events</i>	<i>Need for Power</i>	<i>Conceptual Complexity</i>	<i>Self-Confidence</i>	<i>Task Focus</i>
Kim Dae-jung's Term of Office (1998-2003)	Moderate	High	Moderate	Moderate	Low
Leadership Style	<i>Advocate</i>				
	<i>Director (Extensive Expertise + High Need for Power)</i>				
Period 2 (2000)	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	Low
Leadership Style	<i>Advocate</i>				
	<i>Director (Extensive Expertise + High Need for Power)</i> <i>Sentinel (Extensive Expertise + Low Conceptual Complexity)</i>				

Kim Dae-jung's traits and styles as relevant to North Korea policy for his term of office (1998-2003), as summarized in the table above, help to explore what type of decision-making system he preferred and how he managed it.²¹⁶ In managing the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung showed an *advocate* leadership style, as well as the activist presidential style of the *director*²¹⁷ (Preston, 2001; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2005; M. G. Hermann, 2008; Hermann & Gerard 2009). The decision-making system that was in place throughout his term of office largely centered around the National Security Council (NSC). The model can be classified as a *formal* system featuring a highly

²¹⁶ This is because the system, once adopted, remained in full force throughout his presidency.

²¹⁷ With extensive expertise in the policy domain and a high need for power in his personality profile, Kim Dae-jung showed a *director* style of leadership style in handling the decision-making system as regards the Sunshine Policy (Preston, 2001).

centralized, hierarchical advisory structure (George and Stern, 1998; Preston, 2001; Mitchell, 2005). Without being directly involved in the regular decision-making process, he maintained effective and efficient control over the system throughout his presidency; meanwhile, Lim Dong-won, his most trusted adviser and point man on North Korea, served as a custodian manager of the overall system.

Regarding Kim's personal capital and the nature of the decision-making system, the study suggests that the charisma factor served to reinforce the hierarchical nature of the decision-making machinery. Access to the president was highly limited within the system; even the access of deputy minister-level officers was restricted, let alone that of subordinate officials. Kim Dae-jung's remarkable calmness and emotional stability could reinforce the impression of aloofness and disengagement. His self-assured style of leadership appears reminiscent of Weber's concept of "pure charisma." This leadership style, combined with his high *need for power* and *relationship focus*, contributed to a unique decision-making system; it featured hierarchy and remoteness in terms of access to president, while at the same time promoting teamwork and a collegial atmosphere among members of the advisory system.

Meanwhile, during the pre-summit period in 2000, Kim Dae-jung opted for a system that was clearly differentiated from the regular decision-making mechanism. In this period, in addition to *advocate* and *director* styles of leadership, he demonstrated a *sentinel* leadership style—characterized by a low *conceptual complexity* and extensive expertise—in making policy decisions. In this period, his decision-making process was enormously streamlined, more personalized, less deliberative, more behind-the-scenes, and extremely confidential in nature (Preston, 2001; Mitchell, 2005; For a low CC, see Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Driver, 1977; Suedfeld

& Tetlock, 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984; P. Tetlock, 1985; M. G. Hermann, 1987; For a high need for power, see Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Etheredge, 1978; M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990; Winter, 2003; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). The analysis suggests that the difference between the two systems is mainly attributable to the difference in his scores for *conceptual complexity*. With respect to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's scores on *conceptual complexity* remained moderate except for Period 2 (2000), during which his *conceptual complexity* was scored low compared to a norming group.

2. b. Findings (LTA): Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits and Styles as reflected in the Policy Implementation

Regarding the implementation aspect of the policy, the LTA results suggest that Kim Dae-jung's leadership was highly consistent across different periods of time and across different types of situations in terms of the severity of constraints involved, while at the same time being highly flexible. The pattern of Kim Dae-jung's personality traits and leadership styles as relevant to the Sunshine Policy by the three periods under analysis and across the three sources of constraints is demonstrated in Table 18.

Table 18

Kim Dae-jung's Leadership Traits and Styles for Three Periods under analysis and for Three Sources of Constraints (Simplified) (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Personality Traits	Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	Need for Power (Power)	Conceptual Complexity (CC)	Self-confidence (SC)	Task-focus (Task)	Distrust of others (Distrust)	In-Group Bias (IGB)
Source of Constraints							
Period I (1998-1999)							
North Korea (Overall)	H	H	M	M	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Motivational Perception: Close to Zero-sum	
	Leadership Style: <i>Advocate</i>						
Foreign	M	H	M	H	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Zero-sum	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Domestic	H	H	L	M	L	H	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Focused	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Period II (2000)							
North Korea (Overall)	M	H	L	M	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Zero-sum	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Foreign (Little Constraint)	L	H	M	M	L	L	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Zero-sum	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Domestic	H	H	L	L	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Close to Zero-sum	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Period III (2001-2002)							
North Korea (Overall)	M	H	M	M	L	H	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Focused	
	<i>Advocate</i>						
Foreign	M	M	M	M	L	H	L
	Respect		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Opportunity-Grabbing	
	<i>Pragmatic</i>						
Domestic	M	H	M	M	L	M	H
	Challenge		Closed		<i>Process-Focus</i>	Close to Zero-sum	
	<i>Advocate</i>						

Note. High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).

Consistency: Tendency to Challenge Constraints

Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung's leadership was consistent throughout his tenure in challenging, rather than respecting, constraints. The president held enormous sway over the overall policy process, showing himself innately *advocate* in his approach to leadership. Kim Dae-jung's *advocate* inclinations allowed him to move forward on the agenda rapidly and without interruption. This was possible in Period 1 and Period 2 in particular because his agenda matched both that of the domestic public and that of the Clinton administration.²¹⁸

Consistency: High Need for Power, Relationship Focus, and High In-Group Bias

Regarding his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung consistently demonstrated both a stable set of personality traits and a specific pattern of leadership styles. His leadership profile reliably showed a strong *need for power*, a *relationship/process focus*, and a high degree of *in-group bias*—compared to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders—regardless of the passage of time or the type of situation he found himself in. The study finds that aspects of the policy considered characteristic of a leader with a high *need for power* were intimately linked with Kim Dae-jung's personal characteristics involving personal capital and political skills as discussed in the *Who* chapter. Meanwhile, his consistent focus on *relationship/process*—rather than *task accomplishment*—had a significant impact on the ways in which he dealt with North Korea,

²¹⁸ If the political conditions facilitate the agenda of these leaders, or there is a match between the agenda they pursue and that of the public, implementation of the agenda will be rapid and difficult to interrupt (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 95; M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 34; e.g., Suedfeld, 1992; M. G. Hermann & Preston, 1994; M. G. Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Kowert & Hermann, 1997).

conducted diplomacy, and managed the advisory system involved in his peace initiative (Hersey and Blanchard, 1982; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1996; Winter, 2005). In implementing his North Korea policy, he was more concerned with the process –or how to achieve the goal–and with building relationships than he was with achieving the goal itself. As reflected in his high *in-group bias*, he drew on nationalism in reinvigorating the Korean people’s aspirations to be the masters of their own destiny (e.g., Druckman, 1968; R. A. Levine & Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977; Brewer, 1979; Stuart & Starr, 1982).

Advocate Leadership Style based on High Need for Power

The study finds that another source of idiosyncrasy in Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy was the unique combination of an essentially *advocate* approach to leadership and a high *need for power*. As evidenced in the latter, Kim Dae-jung’s control over the policy process and the manner in which he challenged constraints were not so much direct, straightforward, or outright as indirect, roundabout, subdued, or behind-the-scenes in nature.

Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power was also evidenced in his efforts to carry out his meticulously choreographed strategies step-by-step in a way that properly achieved a set of goals he had set for a relevant period. The sequential steps taken to implement his rapprochement agenda were intricately interconnected in a way that made all the steps contribute to the attainment of the goals in a timely manner.²¹⁹

²¹⁹ In a way, Kim’s leadership characteristics and qualities appear to have closely resembled those of strategic leaders. The content analysis suggests that this was largely attributable to his markedly consistent high *need for power* as manifested in his leadership profile throughout his presidency. It seems safe to say that Kim Dae-jung’s high *need for power* had the effect of

The implementation of the North Korea policy agenda under Kim Dae-jung persistently involved a significant level of caution, restraint, measured moves, and highly calculated strategies and corresponding tactics, designed to minimize the risk of sending the wrong signals to the North. In addition, in implementing his peace agenda, President Kim showed himself occasionally manipulative in taking advantage of the situation at hand (e.g., Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Etheredge, 1978; S. G. Walker, 1983; Winter, 1987; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung's calm demeanor, restraint and discipline were also closely related to his high need for power. Winter (2011, p. 1075) posits that the high need for power helps foster a calm demeanor by alleviating "the inevitable frustrations of politics."

The combination of a high score on *need for power* and a moderate score on *belief in control events* in Kim Dae-jung's overall personality profile regarding the North Korea policy indicates that, more likely than not, he was more interested in having influence over the situation (or his organization) and manipulating it to suit his needs than in being in complete control of the situation or his organization.²²⁰ As manifested in how he managed the regular decision-making system in relation to the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was willing to give his lieutenants considerable authority and discretion in implementing the peace agenda, and did not pursue complete control over the decision-making machinery.

making his inherently *advocate* leadership as relevant to his peace initiative appear quite similar to the *strategic* style of leadership (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

²²⁰ It is worth noting that his *belief in control events* (BACE) was more flexible, in that its scores went up and down over the course of his presidency across the three periods of interest and according to the source of constraints he was dealing with. Still, his moderate score on BACE in his average (or overall) personality profile for his term of office (1998-2003) indicates that he was inherently close to moderate in this trait.

Kim Dae-jung's idiosyncratic approach to leadership based on *advocate* inclinations and a high *need for power* enabled him to implement his peace agenda swiftly and without interruption. This enabled him to attain his goals amid all the constraints arising from internal and external environments; for example, the Kumgang Mountain tourism project (1988), the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach on the part of the United States as a revised policy toward North Korea (1999), and the first inter-Korean summit (2000), among other things. His approach to leadership integrated a proactive, forceful push to implement his preconceived agenda with an extremely calculated, cautious, and restrained use of tactics to induce the North to lower its threat perception and join his rapprochement agenda.

Flexibility: Change in Leadership Styles

The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung's leadership was flexible in that his approach to leadership shifted in tandem with the changing contextual conditions. The study suggests that it was the severity of constraints as perceived by the leader, rather than the source of constraints, that led to a change in his leadership style. In dealing with the constraints deriving from Washington's hardline policy toward North Korea in Period 3 (2001-220), which he perceived as a serious impediment to his peace agenda, he exhibited a *pragmatic* approach to leadership; this was distinguished from the *advocate* leadership style he exhibited in dealing with North Korea or domestic politics in the same period. In the face of what he assessed to be an existential threat to his peace process, he became markedly *pragmatic* in his leadership style, adjusting the scope of his agenda and working within the bounds of political constraints. At the same time, he challenged constraints and pushed for his rapprochement agenda in dealing with

North Korea and the domestic political environment. Likewise, Kim Dae-jung's response to constraints was differentiated according to the perceived level of threats, demonstrating flexibility in his approach to leadership.

Divergence in his handling of the two different types of environment surrounding the

Sunshine Policy: North Korea vs. Domestic political environment

Kim Dae-jung was more likely to be cautious and guarded in his approach to leadership in dealing with North Korea than in dealing with domestic politics. Whenever North Korea created obstacles to his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung sought to read its underlying motives. His perspective on North Korea involving its threat perception and siege mentality was closely associated with his highly cautious, vigilant, elaborately planned moves intended to build trust with the northern regime. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung was distinctly less sensitive to the vicissitudes of the domestic political situation or opposition than he was with respect to North Korea or the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy. From his perspective, sustained resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his opponents was primarily politically motivated. Therefore, he was hardly optimistic about the prospect of properly addressing the problem stemming from growing political polarization in Korean society. He did not, however, view domestic opposition as having the potential to pose any grievous threat to the Sunshine Policy.²²¹ Kim Dae-jung's perspective on the domestic political context in turn affected how he processed information in making decisions, making him effectively more closed to information

²²¹ The study suggests that firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy on the part of the South Korean public and the Clinton administration all constituted an important contributing factor for this tendency.

in response to domestic constraints than he was in dealing with North Korea or the external environment surrounding his peace initiative. Kim Dae-jung's handling of the external environment in Period 3 (2001-2002) indicates that he was fundamentally more contextually oriented in conducting foreign policy than in addressing domestic politics.

Linkage among Leader Perspectives, Perceptions & Leadership Styles

The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung's perspective on a given source of constraints had a significant bearing on how he addressed those constraints and the way in which he undertook the relevant policy. The study suggests that leadership motivational perception of specific constraints may serve as a mediating force between the leader's perspective on the relevant source of constraints and the type of leadership style exhibited in dealing with these constraints.²²² In other words, Kim's motivational perception is instrumental in understanding how and why this leader, who had a certain perspective on a given source of constraints, chose to address those constraints in a specific way, as reflected in his leadership style under given contextual conditions.

For example, in Period 1 (1998-1999), in which he sought to set the stage for the Sunshine Policy, his motivational perception of North Korea was essentially *zero-sum*. That is, his perception of North Korea as a source of constraint imposed on this peace initiative was permanent and fundamental in nature, meaning that he perceived how he would address relevant constraints as directly linked with the fate of his peace process. Such motivational

²²² In essence, a leadership motivational perception can be seen as a highly adaptable variable in that its two trait components—that is, *distrust of others* and *in-group bias*—are essentially the most flexible personality variable (e.g., Hermann, 2005).

perceptions on the part of Kim Dae-jung apparently influenced the way in which he dealt with the relevant constraints in this period, such as North Korea's resistance to the Sunshine Policy and its series of provocations against the South. Meanwhile, in period 3 (2001-2002), he showed a *focused* type of motivational perception vis-à-vis North Korea under the rapidly deteriorating external conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy. This indicates that, unlike in the previous periods (1998-2000), he no longer associated his handling of constraints posed by the North with the fate of his overall peace process. Instead, he sought to address relevant constraints individually, such that the implementation of his peace agenda would not be negatively affected. These motivational perceptions on the part of Kim Dae-jung may have influenced the way he handled relevant constraints, including North Korea's withdrawal from inter-Korean cooperation, and the second naval battle. Regarding the external environment, Kim Dae-jung viewed the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea as the most serious threat ever posed to the Sunshine Policy. Nonetheless, under rapidly escalating tensions between Washington and Pyongyang, he still remained optimistic about what he was able to do to address the crisis situation. Kim Dae-jung's perspective on the Bush administration's hardline stance on North Korea entailed an *opportunity-grabbing* orientation in his motivational perception. This made him show a uniquely *pragmatic* approach in dealing with the Bush administration regarding his peace agenda. Believing in the power of persuasion, Kim Dae-jung made the best of his abilities as a born mediator and diplomat in this period.

B. Contribution, Limitations, and Next Steps

Contribution

The study explores the importance of the leader and his approach to leadership and politics in understanding the nature of the relevant policy, in terms of its procedural and implementation aspects. The study is expected to contribute to knowledge in the field of leadership and decision-making, as well as Korea Studies. Despite its significance as the subject of scholarly investigation, the political leadership of Korea has rarely, if ever, been explored in an analytically sophisticated or methodologically rigorous manner. Even though many scholars and practitioners perceive Kim Dae-jung's leadership as arguably the most important enabling factor for the Sunshine Policy, an understanding of specific ways in which his leadership was exercised, and which aspects of his leadership played a crucial role in engaging in the peace initiative, has been murky at best. The study demonstrates how an individual leader can become a significant driving force behind political processes which have the potential to yield a major breakthrough in the long-standing conflict on the Korean peninsula.

The study suggests ways to achieve a holistic understanding of the statesmanship of an individual leader as reflected in carrying out a flagship policy. Considering that leadership attributes develop over time and through various events and circumstances, the study identifies the components of leadership that need to be explored to achieve a holistic understanding in relation to a specific policy. In order to achieve that holistic understanding, the study also helps to understand how an assortment of leadership variables can be interrelated.

The study also highlights the importance of exploring idiosyncratic aspects of a leader's approach to leadership. The study suggests that an effective way to do this is to explore variations in a given leadership style as a function of a set of traits. That is, the idiosyncratic

leadership aspects of a certain individual are manifested in divergent patterns of scores for a set of personality traits. In Kim Dae-jung's case, the pattern of trait scores remained remarkably consistent in terms of their strength—compared to a norming group—throughout his term of office.²²³ The resulting *advocate* orientation in leadership style is reflective of the leader's tendency to push for his agenda, dismiss opposition, expand his power base, and strengthen control of his organization. However, such orientations were mitigated, albeit to varying degrees, with interventions of certain traits. For example, in Kim's case, a moderate degree of closedness to information had the effect of mitigating his innately *advocate* tendency.²²⁴ Moreover, Kim's moderate scores on *belief in ability to control events* and *distrust of others*, as well as a low *task focus* (or *relationship focus*), all combine to moderate the leadership attributes linked with authoritarian orientations generally deemed characteristic of an *advocate* leader. Likewise, the study surmises that the analysis of individual trait scores can give clues to the idiosyncrasies involved in the statesmanship of an individual leader.

Moreover, the study contributes to typological flexibility when it comes to the conceptual framework of motivational perceptions, as manifested by the interplay between *distrust of others* and *in-group bias*. Existing literature focuses on extreme forms of political activity, such as whether to go to war or how to confront enemies. I reinterpreted the typology of motivational perceptions developed in the literature in a way that can be applied to cases

²²³ Specifically, his profile consistently showed a high need for power, a low task focus, and a high in-group bias across the three periods under analysis.

²²⁴ For example, the degree of Kim's selectiveness in processing information as evidenced in medium scores for both conceptual complexity and self-confidence—compared to a norming group—is considered moderate in relation to other cases involving, say, low scores for both traits or a low conceptual complexity and a high self-confidence.

involving more conventional political situations or activities.²²⁵ Specifically, the original typology, developed by Hagan (1993, 1994) and adapted by Hermann (2005), involved categorical attributes such as *pragmatic, military, and radical* regimes. These categories were respectively replaced in my study with *opportunity-grabbing, zero-sum, and focused* orientations, with attendant revised narratives.

Limitations

The study has its share of limitations and weaknesses. To begin with, the study is not a comparative analysis, but a single case study. Therefore, the analysis does not allow Kim Dae-jung's leadership to be compared and contrasted to other global or South Korean leaders in terms of his leadership styles, qualities, and attributes. Moreover, personality attributes such as personal capital, political skills, and other leadership characteristics, as discussed in the *Who* chapter, were not subject to any measurement. For example, the data concerning leader interest and expertise in the domain of interest would have been more accurate had it been measured to reflect factors such as the nature of the leader's previous political positions, the degree to which he was devoted to relevant issue areas, and the extent to which he had other relevant policy experiences (Preston, 2001, p. 13; see also Preston, 1996). Regarding the extent to which the individual chapters are tightly connected in a way that makes them fit into the study as an organically integrated body of work, the *Why* chapter,

²²⁵ The typological classification of leadership orientations toward adversaries, as suggested by Hagan (e.g., 1993, 1994), and then adapted by Hermann (2005), addresses the linkage between domestic politics and war proneness.

dealing with the philosophical and conceptual aspect of the concerned policy, is relatively less closely intertwined with the other parts of the study—e.g., the *Who*, *How*, and *What* chapters.

Moreover, as regards the *How* chapters, the replicability of the analysis is somewhat limited without a collection of data available in public repositories. In this study, the content analysis on leadership traits and styles was based on verbal materials available in the public domain. The fact that only those segments of the text materials addressing North Korea or related topics were extracted for content analysis indicates that a degree of subjective judgements were involved in material selection procedures. Moreover, the interview data included only a couple of former legislators who were opposed to the Sunshine Policy at the time of Kim Dae-jung's administration. In Seoul in the fall of 2016, I attempted to recruit a few additional leading opposition figures who were opposed to the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung; this attempt was less than successful. I believe that the inclusion of these individuals as interviewees would have been a great boon to my research.

Next Steps

Regarding leadership style typology, the interplay between the leader's propensity to respond to constraints and to process information determines four types of leadership style. The incorporation of a motivational dimension—e.g., a *task/relationship focus* that is represented by either of two extremes on a continuum—into the matrix further categorizes the four leadership styles into eight sub-types of leadership, within which characteristics are shared.

The ideal type of *advocate* leadership can be further subdivided into two categories of leadership style, according to whether the leader shows a high *need for power* compared to a norming group. By the same token, the ideal type of strategic leadership can be further classified into one category based on a high *need for power*, and another based on a low *need for power*. Meanwhile, a *pragmatic* leadership style can be further divided into one category based on a moderate degree of closedness to information, and another based on a significant degree of closedness to information. My study shows that it is necessary to differentiate, within a certain ideal type of leadership style, between a high *need for power* and a low *need for power*, on one hand, and between a moderate closedness to information and a significant closedness to information, on the other. The study highlights the importance of such scholarly endeavors for methodological development in the field of leadership.

In future research, the scope of my study can be expanded to situate Kim Dae-jung's leadership in relation to other South Korean leaders who took office before and after Kim's tenure regarding North Korea policy. Building on the outcome of my analysis, such future studies would be aimed at achieving a broader goal of understanding the primary mechanism involved in South Korea's policy toward North Korea. In this case, the subject of research can be the leadership of those presidents who came to power after South Korea's first democratic elections in 1987.²²⁶

Comparative research in Korean leadership may address the question of how those three presidents who engaged North Korea—Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)—differed from each other in terms of leadership traits

²²⁶ The presidential term has since been constitutionally limited to a single term of five years in South Korea.

and styles or operational codes.²²⁷ Future studies may also examine how the two progressive leaders who adopted comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea—Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun—were distinguished in terms of leadership traits and styles or operational codes, both from each other and from Roh Tae-woo, the conservative president who engaged the North but stopped short of adopting comprehensive engagement strategy. Future studies may also explore whether, and if so how, the *engagers* (soft-liners) differed from the *containers* (hardliners) in terms of leadership traits and styles or operational codes regarding North Korea policy.

Future of the Sunshine Policy

The process of implementing the Sunshine Policy involved painstaking endeavors on the part of Kim Dae-jung and his advisory group to deal with a vast array of difficulties and challenges posed by the internal and external environment. Domestically, the conservative circle and his political opponents resisted the Sunshine Policy, castigating it for jeopardizing national security and pandering to the communist regime. While North Korea's resistance, nonchalance, and unpredictable and occasionally provocative behaviors posed another set of challenges to the Sunshine Policy, the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea for the last two years of Kim's tenure effectively posed an existential threat to the Sunshine Policy. Throughout his term of office, Kim Dae-jung bent over backwards to achieve his goal of completing the first stage of his unification plan—that is, the stage of Confederation he

²²⁷ (For operational code analysis, see Alexander L. George, 1969; O. Holsti, 1970; McClellan, 1971; L. Johnson, 1977; S. Walker, 1977; Starr, 1984; Ayubi, 1992; Crichlow, 1998.)

regarded as a de-facto unification—through peaceful exchange and cooperation with North Korea.

Certainly, Kim Dae-jung's leadership in relation to the Sunshine Policy had its fair share of drawbacks and limitations. He was accused by his critics and opponents of attempting to turn the progress made in inter-Korean relations into political benefits. He occasionally maneuvered the situation to suit his goals and protect his political position in implementing his peace agenda. The participation of the National Assembly in the relevant policy process was minimal at best. The ultimate failure to gain bipartisan support for, and national consensus on, the Sunshine Policy was at least in part attributable to his passive dealings with domestic opposition to the policy. Moreover, he failed to have any institutional safeguard measures in place—e.g., ratification of the inter-Korean agreements by the Congress—which would have been necessary to ensure that the progress made in inter-Korean relations under him and his successor President Roh Moo-hyun would remain in effect, and thus that the inter-Korean agreements would not be revoked as easily. These agreements were virtually declared null and void in 2008. Indeed, going back to square one involved excruciatingly painful time and effort, and the process is still underway.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that what transpired in inter-Korean relations under Kim Dae-jung's statesmanship constituted a change for the better. In embarking on his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung served as an *agent of change*, effecting improvement in inter-Korean relations at a critical juncture for the country's fate. The Sunshine Policy originated from Kim Dae-jung's creative and pragmatic insight, which was elaborated into a broader vision of change. As manifested in the tone and pattern of his approach to leadership and politics, Kim

Dae-jung was a nationalist and yet, even to a greater degree, a pragmatist. My study suggests that this was key to the idiosyncrasy involved in his leadership as regards the Sunshine Policy. In the face of all the constraints and challenges, he sought to break through confining structural barriers and redefine structural parameters of inter-Korean relations, from conflict and confrontation to exchange and cooperation. By the end of his term of office, Kim Dae-jung strived to fulfil his mission as a trailblazer, with the help of Lim Dong-won, his alter ego in the rapprochement with North Korea. For all of its drawbacks and shortcomings, the Sunshine Policy has at least demonstrated a potential to stimulate limited but momentous behavioral change from North Korea.

Admittedly, the Sunshine Policy has been less than successful in making any systematic breakthrough for peace. Rather, there remains ongoing confrontation between the two Koreas, sustained tension between Washington and Pyongyang, and a continued Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. In a way, the U.S.-DPRK relations constitute another crucial variable in the equation for peace on the Korean peninsula—arguably an even more crucial variable than inter-Korean relations, especially when it comes to the North Korean denuclearization that could lead to the eventual achievement of permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. Still, it seems safe to say that progress made in inter-Korean relations through a proper engagement policy led by South Korea will positively contribute to some form of peace on the Korean peninsula. The Sunshine Policy, as initiated by Kim Dae-jung and inherited by his two successors thus far, is an ongoing process. The majority of Koreans remain hopeful that Kim Dae-jung's creative efforts to provide the optimal solution to the Korean problem will ultimately bear fruit and prove transformational in terms of practical end results.

Appendix A: List of Documents Coded for Leadership Trait Analysis

Materials used for content analysis: Interview responses and speeches on North Korea-relevant topics.

Leader	Date of Interviews & Speeches	Audience (Source of Constraints) (Foreign/Domestic)	Document Type (Interview/Speech)	Occasion	Number of Words
Kim Dae-jung (68 Documents)	1998 0220	Foreign	Interview	Newsweek (United States)	934
	1998 0225	Domestic	Speech	Inaugural address	816
	1998 0301	Domestic	Speech	National Independence Day	707
	1998 0316	Domestic	Speech	Commencement Ceremony at Korean Military Academy	590
	1998 0404	Foreign	Speech	London University (United Kingdom)	2295
	1998 0529	Domestic	Interview	Korea Times	899
	1998 0608	Foreign	Speech	Meeting with Korea Society, Asia Society and Council on Foreign Relations, (New York)	1076
	1998 0609	Foreign	Interview	NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (United States)	904
	1998 0610	Foreign	Speech	US Congress (Washington D.C.)	561
	1998 0817	Domestic	Speech	National Liberation Day	837
	1998 0923	Domestic	Speech	The 8th term Advisory Group	791
	1998 1001	Domestic	Speech	Armed Forces Day	926
	1998 1112	Foreign	Speech	Beijing University (China)	923

1998 1121	Domestic	Interview	Press conference (with President Bill Clinton)	526
1998 1121	Domestic	Speech	State Dinner (For President Clinton in Seoul)	545
1999 0101	Domestic	Speech	New Year's Message	535
1999 0224	Domestic	Speech	Press Conference at Blue House	742
1999 0301	Domestic	Speech	Independence Day	593
1999 0308	Domestic	Speech	Korea Military Academy	1051
1999 0309	Foreign	Interview	International Herald Tribune	673
1999 0310	Domestic	Speech	Korea Air Force Academy	1308
1999 0312	Domestic	Speech	Korea Naval Academy	1288
1999 0505	Foreign	Interview	CNN	1198
1999 0704	Foreign	Speech	Philadelphia Liberty Medal Award Ceremony (Philadelphia)	1507
1999 0815	Domestic	Speech	Liberation Day	757
1999 0913	Foreign	Interview	Time (United States)	643
1999 1001	Domestic	Speech	Armed Forces Day	1780
1999 1108	Foreign	Interview	Washington Times (United States)	1467
2000 0102	Foreign	Interview	CNN (United States)	598
2000 0225	Foreign	Interview	Le Figaro (France)	866
2000 0301	Domestic	Speech	Independence Movement Day	1432
2000 0307	Domestic	Speech	Korea Air Force Academy	1451

2000 0309	Foreign	Speech	Berlin Speech (Germany)	2598
2000 0314	Domestic	Speech	Korea Military Academy	1215
2000 0316	Domestic	Speech	Korea Naval Academy	1590
2000 0605	Domestic	Speech	Opening of the 16th National Assembly	1228
2000 0614	North Korea	Statement/Conversation	Inter-Korean Summit (Pyongyang)	2036
2000 0615	Domestic	Speech	Arrival in Seoul from Pyongyang	2534
2000 0615	North Korea	Speech	Grand Dinner with Kim Jong-il (Pyongyang)	1157
2000 0625	Domestic	Speech	50th Anniversary of Korean War	2250
2000 0906	Foreign	Speech	UN Millennium Summit (New York)	710
2000 0908	Foreign	Speech	Korea Society (New York)	2255
2000 1001	Domestic	Speech	52nd Armed Forces Day	1814
2000 1101	Domestic	Interview	Korea Times	1348
2000 1127	Foreign	Speech	Institute of South East Asian Studies (Singapore)	2092
2000 1210	Foreign	Speech	Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Oslo, Norway)	1033
2000 1213	Foreign	Speech	Parliament of Sweden (Sweden)	1662
2001 0307	Foreign	Interview	Press Conference with President Bush (Washington, D.C.)	585

2001 0308	Foreign	Speech	American Enterprise Institute and Council of Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C.)	1571
2001 0309	Domestic	Speech	Korea Naval Academy,	1018
2001 0313	Domestic	Interview	Korea Military Academy	1464
2001 0423	Foreign	Interview	Newsweek (United States)	708
2001 0616	Domestic	Speech	Jeju Peace Forum	1618
2001 0815	Domestic	Speech	National Liberation Day	716
2001 0925	Foreign	Speech	World Statesman Award Ceremony (New York)	739
2001 0928	Domestic	Speech	53rd Armed Forces Day Anniversary	1004
2001 1204	Foreign	Interview	Bergens Tidene (Norway)	760
2001 1207	Foreign	Speech	Nobel Centennial Symposia (Oslo)	1690
2001 1208	Foreign,	Interview,	Nepszabadsag of Hungary	726
2001 1211	Foreign	Speech	European Parliament (France)	1567
2002 0125	Foreign	Speech	Defender of Democracy Award at Annual Parliamentary Forum	526
2002 0219	Domestic	Interview	Press Conference (with President George W. Bush)	1118
2002 0220	Domestic	Speech	Dorasan Station	615
2002 0603	Foreign	Interview	Business Week (United States)	644
2002 0715	Domestic	Speech	International Communication Association Conference (Seoul)	577

	2002 0815	Domestic	Speech	Liberation Day	1455
	2002 0924	Foreign	Speech	ASEM Summit in Demark	609
	2003 0214	Domestic	Speech	Statement to the Nation	811
Kim Jong-il	2000 0614		Conversation	Inter-Korean Summit (Pyongyang)	2446

Appendix B: Interview Questions

The interview protocol consisted of a set of *main questions*, as listed below, as well as *follow-up questions* and *probes* intended to seek detailed, in-depth information on the themes, topics, and stories that the interviewee mentioned, or to seek illustrative examples or clarification (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 115–129).

A. Kim Dae-jung's Perspectives on Possible Sources of Constraints in relation to the Sunshine Policy:

- From President Kim's perspective, what contextual factors (such as North Korea's unprovoked aggressions, domestic opposition, conservative media, public opinion, the Bush administration's hardline policy toward North Korea) do you think posed serious constraints or difficulties in undertaking his North Korea policy?

1) US Policy toward North Korea

- What was President Kim's perspective on U.S. policy toward North Korea?

- How did he perceive the Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea?
(Perception)
- How did he perceive the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea?
 - Did he consider US policies toward North Korea under the respective administration as giving an opportunity for, or posing a constraint or threat to, his Sunshine Policy? Why do you think so?

2) Domestic Politics

- What was President Kim's perspective on domestic politics with regard to the formation and implementation of the Sunshine Policy?

- What did he do, if anything, to deal with the constraints or difficulties imposed by the domestic political environment?

- What were President Kim's (normative and practical) beliefs about public opinion? From his perspective, was it desirable and/or necessary for public opinion to affect the government's policy choices regarding North Korean issues?

- How did public opinion influence President Kim in implementing his Sunshine Policy?
- Do you think President Kim tried to influence public opinion with respect to the Sunshine Policy? If so, how did he do so?

3) North Korea

- What was President Kim's perspective on North Korea's occasional provocations against South Korea (for example, the two naval battles near the Yeonpyeong Island in 1999 and 2002) and its unilateral decision in 2001 to avoid dialogue that put inter-Korean engagement on hold for a year?

B. Decision-Making System involved in the Sunshine Policy

- To what extent was the National Security Council (NSC) systemized or established as a formally institutionalized decision-making body?²²⁸
- Were there any differences in policy preference between key advisers or relevant bureaucratic organizations in conducting North Korean policies? If so, how were such differences addressed or reconciled?
- How was the NSC organized?
 - What type of decision-making system and chain of command were in place at the NSC?
 - Did the system revolve around orderly policy-making with well-defined procedures or rather informal procedures?
 - Was it a hierarchical advisory structure or informal, less hierarchical advisory structure designed to enhance participation by subordinates?
 - To what extent was teamwork or collegiality emphasized among its members?
 - What was the major function of the NSC Standing Committee (NSSC)?
 - Did it effectively serve its intended function as a central coordinating agency?
 - How did the system coordinate and integrate differing positions among ministries to formulate and implement policies?

Role of the President

- Regarding North Korea policy, how were final decisions made?

²²⁸ Prior to the Kim administration, an institutionalized system of decision-making was not established on important issues of foreign affairs, national security and North Korea. The National Security Council involved no designated sponsoring agency and its meetings were held on an ad hoc basis producing no binding decisions.

- To what extent was the president influenced by expert advice?
- Did the president's own policy preferences dominate?
- What was the range of views the president took into account when making decisions on North Korea policies?
 - Was it possible for a member of the advisory group to convey dissenting views on major policy decisions on North Korea to the president?

- How often did the president attend the NSC meetings?

- Did the president attend top-level interagency meetings or did he rely on his chief of staff or others to keep him informed of developments?

- Did he prefer direct personal involvement throughout policy process or did he delegate policy formulation and implementation tasks to his advisers or lieutenants?

Role of the Chief of Staff: (Questions designed for Lim Dong-won)²²⁹

- Regarding North Korea policies, what role did you play in the decision-making process? Were you more of a custodian manager of the policy process, an honest broker, a gatekeeper, a high-leverage policy advocate, or something else?

- Were the minority or dissenting views also reported to the president? Was the president interested in such views?

²²⁹ Lim Dong-won served as President Kim Dae-jung's de factor Chief of Staff regarding North Korea policy during his term of office.

- Was the Chief of Staff given discretion to make some important decisions on his own, if need be, and to assign tasks to other advisers without necessarily consulting with or being explicitly instructed by the president?
- What kind of relationship was there between the president and his Chief of Staff?
- What kind of relationship was there between the Chief of Staff and other key advisers?

Appendix C: List of interviewees ²³⁰

- 1. Jeong Se Hyun:** Deputy Unification Minister (1998-1999) and the Unification Minister (2001-2004) under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (hereafter referred to as KDJ) and Roh, Moo-hyun
- 2. Ra, Jong Il:** First secretary of the National Intelligence Agency (1998-1999)
- 3. Lee, Hong Koo:** Unification Minister under President Roh Tae-woo (1987-1993); Prime Minister under Kim Young-sam (1993-1998); Ambassador to the U.S. under KDJ (1998.5 – 2000.7)
- 4. Yang, Sung Chul:** Ambassador to the United States (2000.5 -2003.2)
- 5. Kim, Sung Jae:** Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs, Senior Presidential Secretary for Policy Planning; Minister of Culture and Tourism under President KDJ
- 6. Kim, Han Jeong:** Chief Presidential Secretary under President KDJ (1999-2003); Chief Secretary to former President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2005)
- 7. Choi, Kyung Hwan:** Presidential Press Secretary; Press Secretary to the KDJ Peace Foundation; Personal Secretary to KDJ during his post presidential years
- 8. Lim Dong Won:** Senior Presidential Secretary for Unification, Security, and Foreign Affairs; Minister of Unification; Director of National Intelligence Agency; Special Secretary for Unification, Security and Foreign Affairs under KDJ (1998-2003)
- 9. Moon, Jung In:** Director of the KDJ Presidential Library
- 10. Yang, Young Shik:** Deputy Minister of Unification (1999.5-2001.4)

²³⁰ Regarding the language used during interview, all interviewees spoke in Korean, except for three individuals (Yang, Sung Chul; Leon Sigal; and Stephen Costello) who spoke in English.

- 11. Seo, Hoon:** Deputy Director at National Intelligence Agency in charge of North Korean affairs during KDJ's term (1998-2003)
- 12. Kim, Taek Keun:** Writer of KDJ's autobiography and biography ("Saebyuk" meaning Broken Morning Calm in Korean)
- 13. Kim, Hyung Ki:** Deputy Minister of Unification under KDJ (2001.4 – 2003.3).
- 14. Kang, In Duk:** Unification Minister under KDJ (1998.3 – 1999.5)
- 15. Lee, Hoon:** Presidential Secretary; Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs under KDJ; Lee helped KDJ with drafting speeches before and after his election as president
- 16. Park, Jin:** National Assemblyman for the opposition Grand National Party during KDJ's presidency
- 17. Park, Sun Sook:** Presidential Press Secretary under KDJ; Spokeswoman for the presidential Blue House under KDJ
- 18. Hong, Sa Duk:** National Assemblyman and Member of the Standing Committee for Unification, Diplomacy and Trade at the National Assembly at the time of the Sunshine Policy
- 19. Yim, Sung Joon:** Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomacy and Security (2002.1 – 2003. 2)
- 20. Kim, Il Beom:** Presidential Interpreter
- 21. Leon Sigal:** Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York; Author of "Disarming Strangers" (Princeton University Press)
- 22. Stephen Costello:** Vice President of the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation-U.S.A. (1993-1997); Advisor to KDJ from 1990 to 1992, and again leading up to the presidential election of 1997

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