Beyond the Land: Maritime Interactions, Border Control, and Regional Powers between China and Korea, 1500-1637

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation interweaves the maritime dynamics of Ming China and Chosŏn Korea’s northern sea space, the Bohai Sea and the northern Yellow Sea, with the Northeast Asian transition of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This region formed an arena in this time period that allowed various players to communicate, negotiate, and contest. It also established a linkage between Northeast Asian terra-centered states and maritime East Asia. A systematic investigation of this particular region is thus essential to improving our understanding of interactive territorial and maritime relations. This dissertation investigates the increase of maritime commerce, wartime logistics, and military intervention in the Bohai Sea and the northern Yellow Sea. In this context, it also focuses on the relations between China-Korea maritime interactions and the two states’ border control practices. It further analyzes the interplay between the maritime expansion of Chinese regional military powers, and the Ming and Chosŏn authorities.

This study argues that the China-Korea northern space experienced a remarkable maritime orientation and witnessed the development of regional maritime powers. This transition and its interconnection with state control of maritime peripheries played important roles in influencing the Northeast Asian history of this period. The prosperous maritime economy and the successive military operations in China and Korea beginning in the sixteenth century encouraged transmarine mobility and regional integration of their northern littoral across state boundaries. This tendency increased government attention to this area and strengthened state involvement in cross-border affairs. Maritime policies between the Ming and the Chosŏn showed much plasticity and permeability, which benefited their transregional and large-scale deployment of
resources, secured their northern coasts, and expanded state influence to the sea. However, these practices also generated tensions with the two authorities’ attempts to distinguish their maritime frontiers and control their coastal people. This problem not only existed within China and Korea but it also greatly influenced their relations. Porous and adjustable coastal control in the circumstances of the quickening maritime integration of China and Korea enabled Ming regional military men to grow their individual power across the sea. The establishment of Mao Wenlong’s military regime in the early seventeenth century represents this tendency. While Mao’s utilization and mobilization of coastal resources furthered his flexibility and semi-autonomy in a changing international environment, this trend also intensified his conflicts with neighboring continental powers and caused his followers to shift their stances between the Ming and the Qing.
Beyond the Land:
Maritime Interactions, Border Control, and Regional Powers between
China and Korea, 1500-1637

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Introduction

In the year 1500, Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) sent troops to an island located southeast of the Liaodong Peninsula. This was a diverse group of about seven hundred people, including two envoys and their six assistants, seven military commanders, thirty military officers, two hundred soldiers, and some boatmen and guides. The purpose of this trip was to repatriate Korean and Chinese people who had traveled by sea to reside on the island without government permission. After twelve days’ voyage from the coast of P'yeongan Province, the Korean troops arrived at their destination, capturing seventy-eight Chinese and thirty-four Koreans. The Chosŏn court returned the Chinese to the Ming empire (1368-1644) and executed or expelled its own people. This marine journey back and forth took a total of twenty-five days.¹

The implementation of this operation was not easy. While the Chosŏn king and his officials planned to arrest the illegal Korean inhabitants on the island, due to its geographic proximity to the Liaodong Peninsula they needed to first understand whether the island was within Ming China’s territory. After several years of fruitless communications with the Chinese Liaodong Military Commission, the Chosŏn court was finally able to inquire about this issue with the Ming emperor at the end of 1499. The emperor replied that the affiliation of the island was unknown and approved the Chosŏn’s repatriation request. He also asked that the Chinese islanders be returned to China, where they would be investigated and punished in Beijing.²

Before analyzing the details of this case later in this research, I want to raise two related

¹ Hong Kwital 洪貴達, Hŏbaekchŏng chip 虛白亭集, fasc. 3, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 韓國文集叢刊 (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch'ujinhoe, 1988), vol.14, 121b-122a; Yŏnsan'gun ilgi 燕山君日記, Yŏnsan 6/6/28 (7/23/1500), fasc.38, in Chosŏn wangjo sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄 (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1956), vol. 13, 418.
² Yŏnsan'gun ilgi, Yŏnsan 6/4/3 (4/30/1500), fasc.37, vol. 13, 408.
questions at the beginning. First, why did the Chosŏn court make so much effort to negotiate with the Chinese local and central governments, dispatching troops totaling seven hundred men, and spending almost a month at sea to capture only around one hundred maritime migrants in a place far from its territory? Second, why did the Ming emperor agree to repatriate his people from this remote island that he was not even aware of at that time?

The vigilance of the two central governments regarding the increasing maritime mobility and interaction of this region, a trend that the rulers regarded as a destabilizing factor that would weaken their border security, largely holds the answer. Geographic accessibility provided the foundation for this mobility. The northern part of the Yellow Sea (C. Huanghai, 黃海), or the West Sea (K. Sŏhae, 西海) in the Korean language, lies between the northern Korean, eastern Liaodong, and northern Shandong peninsulas. Its water is shallow where inhabitable islands are situated, such as those among the Miaodao 廟島 and Changshan 長山 archipelagos off the shore of Shandong and Liaodong, and some major islands on the west coast of Korea.

Historically, while seafarers had to conquer various navigational difficulties in order to cross the region, these islands formed sea routes to connect the three peninsulas and provided their coastal residents with a space to mobilize to the sea. Therefore instead of a barrier with a distinct boundary to distinguish and separate one group of people from another, this zone was an inclusive frontier in which multiple players encountered one another and interacted.

This transnational exchange was intensified by economic and social transformations in China and Korea after the late fifteenth century. Driven by considerable economic interests, people in the peripheries were increasingly involved in private commerce and foreign trade, trespassing territorial boundaries and sailing overseas to pursue profits despite official prohibitions. A self-sufficient agricultural economy and state-dominated institutions based on it
were therefore challenged by the burgeoning private economy to a certain extent. China’s and Korea’s northern littoral also experienced these changes: a variety of coastal individuals and groups began to participate in private commercial activities with each other as well as with the outside world.

In regard to the above event in 1500, were the two central governments overanxious about their maritime security? The historical trend at least shows that their forceful repatriation and punishment did not stop the activeness and expansion of maritime actors beyond state control. Although the two continental states always attempted to make their fluid and permeable maritime frontiers distinguishable and controllable, the tension with their thriving maritime interactions still increased. In the early seventeenth century the ambiguous maritime zone between China and Korea bred the semi-independent military regime of Mao Wenlong, one of the most famous warlords in late Ming China. He and his successors’ presence not only troubled the Chinese and Korean land-based authorities, but also greatly influenced the East Asian transition from the collapse of the Ming empire to the rise of Qing power.

This study traces the distinct changes between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea’s northern sea space in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In this time period the China-Korea sea frontier witnessed their growing interactions, the prosperity of regional maritime powers, and finally, their quiescence. It ends with the year 1637 when Korea and the maritime regime Mao Wenlong established were successively defeated by the Qing armies. This elimination of obstacles largely smoothed the way for the Qing’s conquering of China proper in 1644. The geographic space this research focuses on is the northern region of the Yellow Sea, including its islands and coasts that were incorporated in the Ming’s Liaodong and Shandong and the Chosŏn’s P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces. The Bohai Sea, enclosed by Liaodong and
Shandong and connected to the Yellow Sea by the Bohai Strait, is also often mentioned since it played an integral role in Chinese-Korean maritime exchanges. Although my research concentrates on a specific space, emphasizing its particularity and regional dynamics, it does not intend to isolate this area: no geographic boundaries exist to demarcate it from the southern Yellow Sea and the vast East Asian waters, and exchanges in this area also interacted closely with those in broader regions.

My research aims to answer two questions. First, how did the changes of China and Korea’s northern sea space connect with the growing maritime economy and interactions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries? Second, how did China-Korea maritime relations interact with the Northeast Asian historical trend of this period? By addressing these issues, this study underlines the importance of the Chinese-Korean maritime frontier in leading to a fuller understanding of Northeast Asian regimes and their relations, mainly the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Qing, beyond their territorial boundaries. It also displays the regional diversity of the East Asian waters, which need to be understood not only as a connected and interdependent whole but also as an integration of distinctions and varieties. Moreover, this study emphasizes the dynamic relations between China and Korea as well as the agency of Korea in influencing Northeast Asian history.

Ming-Chosŏn Border Relations and Northeast Asia in Transition

Presented by John King Fairbank, the conduct of imperial China’s foreign relations was through the “tributary system,” which evolved from the assumption that Chinese cultural was ego-centric and was formalized by the ritual in which surrounding “barbarians” paid tribute to
the Court as “a sign of their admission to the civilization of the Middle Kingdom.” However, many studies of early modern East Asia have been uncertain about the assertions and applicability of this Sinocentric and homogeneous framework. Similarly, recent research on Chinese-Korean relations has also challenged the conventional view that Korea played a passive role in accepting China’s political dominance and cultural preeminence as its model tributary. These studies augment our understanding of Chinese-Korean relations as fluid and multidirectional, paying much attention to Korea’s role in representing, modifying, and manipulating this relationship for its own international and domestic benefits. Korea’s self-agency being intermingled with its dynamic foreign relations further promoted its reconstruction of a self-centered worldview. After the “barbarian” Qing overturned the Ming in 1644, the Chosŏn began to regard and glorify itself as the “small China” (K. Sojunghwa, 小中華) that inherited the Ming legacy.

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3 See John King Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol.1, no.2 (Feb. 1942), 133.
A cross-border approach to exploring the flexible interconnection—not only between Chinese and Korean central authorities but also among their multilayered actors—is especially effective since mutual contacts across their borders were more active than in other places. During the Chosŏn and the Ming-Qing dynasties, communications between their central governments were most often accomplished by Chosŏn envoy trips that passed through the territorial borderline of the Yalu River and arrived at the Chinese capitals several times a year. However, due to the geographical contiguity of the Korean and Liaodong peninsulas, more frequent and diverse exchanges also occurred on the China-Korea border region between their local governments and residents.

Scholars have already investigated the northern borders of China and Korea from the center versus the periphery perspective, and the regional perspective. The former view positions the border regions in relation to the central or the national, and the latter emphasizes their inter- and subregional interactions. Both have focused on the particularity and subjectivity of these areas instead of regarding them as passive backgrounds of human activities. While also attaching importance to regional characteristics, a cross-border standpoint breaks away from a state-

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dominated framework that is constrained by territorial boundaries and dynastic orders. It
decentralizes the Sinocentric narrative and regards Northeast Asia as a distinct region, stressing
the agency of non-Chinese actors and the use of their accounts in a multistate context.⁹

Adopting this cross-border perspective, recent scholarship has explored various topics to
look into the fluid border relations between early modern China and Korea. As Seonmin Kim
observes, Mu-ke-deng’s investigation of the Changbai Mountain (K. Paektu-san Mountain) in
1712 and the two surveys of the origin of the Tumen River in the 1880s are the most noticeable
events in regard to the Qing-Chosŏn boundary, and their territorial debates have lasted to today’s
scholars of China and Korea.¹⁰ Departing from a nationalist narrative, Kim’s own recent
publication examines how the Qing and the Chosŏn maintained and managed their borderland
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. It regards “borderland” as “a zone of demarcation,
a site at which the two neighbors encountered one another and clashed but nonetheless
recognized their mutual boundary,” and argues that Qing China and Chosŏn Korea’s borderland
was characterized by the Qing’s limitations regarding northeast China and the Chosŏn’s efforts
to protect its domain.¹¹

Early modern China-Korea border relations and domestic transitions were interwoven with
their territorial understandings. For example, Li Huazi argues that the divergent border
perceptions of the Ming/Qing and the Chosŏn resulted from their processes of boundary making
and territorial expansion.¹² Kang Sŏkhwa interrelates the Qing-Chosŏn boundary demarcation in

¹¹ Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636-1912, 15.
¹² Li Huazi 李花子, Mingqing shiqi zhongchao bianjieshi yanji 明清時期中朝邊界史研究 (Beijing: Zhishi chanquan
1712 with the subsequent development of Hamgyŏng Province and the Chosŏn’s changing northern territorial awareness in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which in turn served as the background of the Qing-Chosŏn boundary dispute in 1880. Pae Usŏng’s research examines the late Chosŏn’s varying territorial consciousness, worldview, and cartographic practice in relation to its political tensions with the Qing and its social and intellectual transitions. Kenneth R. Robinson rejects a unitary controlled region of “Chosŏn” and demonstrates that the separation between the “territorial” and “jurisdictional” Chosŏns enabled the court to adjust its interactional policies toward the Jurchens residing in Hamgyŏng Province. Instead of paying attention to state-level perceptions of territorial boundaries, both Marion Eggert and Hwang Pogi use Korean travelogues as their core sources to look at Korean intellectuals’ perspectives on the Chinese-Korean border. Their studies show how Korean literati groups demarcated and interpreted the border as reflections of its nature, their travel experience, and the varying social and political circumstances.

While China and Korea’s cross-border interactions need to be understood in a multilateral context, they were also directly shaped by and interacted with domestic participants and practices. Hasumi Moriyoshi’s research, for example, focuses particularly on the practical realm of the institutional functions of the Liaodong Military Commission, the administrative unit the

chubanshe, 2011).

13 Kang Sŏkhwa 姜錫和, 18,19 segi ŭ Hamgyŏng-do chiyŏk kaebal kwa pukpang yŏng'i ŭísik ŭi pyŏnhwa 18, 19 세기의咸鏡道地域開發과北方領土意識의變化 (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn, 1996).

14 Pae Usŏng, Chosŏn hugi kukt'ogwan kwa ch'ŏnhagwan ŭi pyŏnhwa 조선 후기 국토험과 천하관의 변화 (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1998).


Ming established to govern Liaodong, in the Ming border affairs and foreign relations with the Chosŏn as well as the Jurchens. Adam Bohnet’s research deals with the Chosŏn’s shifting attitudes toward its Jurchen and Ming Chinese border subjects between the Imjin War and the early eighteenth century. It shows that the Chosŏn’s treatment of the Ming migrants was not subject to its tributary relationship with the Ming and Qing, but instead had much to do with its domestic considerations and self-esteem. Moreover, Chinese-Korean border society has recently attracted more scholarly interest. For instance, Masato Hasegawa’s dissertation discusses the social consequences of acquiring and transporting military supplies across the China-Korea border from 1592 to 1644. It shows how this mobilization was affected by factors—such as logistical difficulties, local trade, climate, and topography—and disturbed local communities and society.

The recent studies have extensively increased our understanding of the territorial border relations of Ming China and Chosŏn Korea. Their maritime space, however, has been less examined. Differing from the precedent that Yuan and Koryŏ rulers implemented to boost their maritime trade and transport with each other, the founders of the Ming and the Chosŏn turned to a conservative attitude toward the maritime world to protect their coasts from pirate raids, as well as to preserve a hierarchical and sedentary small peasant society. The lack of a proactive strategy to legitimize and support Chinese-Korean maritime interactions marginalized their

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20 As David M. Robinson has noted, during the Mongol and Koryŏ reigns, “overland and maritime transportation networks bound the region [Northeast Asian] more tightly than in previous centuries, facilitating the flow of personnel, material, and culture from Kaegyŏng to Liaodong, Daidu, and beyond.” In David M. Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols, 8.
coastal residents’ sea-oriented activities, which their governments often considered illicit or at least suspicious, requiring scrutiny and prevention. This maritime abnormality defined by the Ming and Chosŏn continental authorities during most of their bilateral interactions made them vigilant in regard to any possible danger from the sea and any foreign seafarers, and led them to adopt sea-salvage and repatriation procedures to handle transmarine castaways. Issues of piracy and sea warfare, which greatly endangered their coastal security, were therefore at the core of their dealing with maritime affairs.

The northern Yellow Sea region appeared to be in a long-term tranquil period in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: its coastal security was far less threatened by rampant piracy than it had been in the first several decades of the Ming, even while the maritime smuggling and violence of the so-called “Japanese pirates” or “dwarf pirates” troubled China’s and Korea’s southern provinces in the mid-sixteenth century. Korean embassies also no longer needed to travel across the Yellow Sea to the Ming’s former capital, Nanjing, but only passed through the Liaodong overland to Beijing. However, as this research shows, far from a pool of stagnant water and a barren boundary lacking tensions and interactions, after the late fifteenth century this region was connected by growing Chinese and Korean private seafarers, and was deeply involved in the Japanese invasions of Korea of 1592-1598 and the Ming-Qing conflicts. The military and economic status of this region was therefore rapidly elevated, and its maritime


dynamics were greatly influenced by wartime needs, such as opening Chinese-Korean sea routes, conducting speedy maritime transport, reinforcing naval defense, and lifting the restriction on maritime trade.

In return, these changes had both positive and negative impacts on Northeast Asian societies. On the one hand, they fostered the transregional mobility of manpower and natural resources that were essential for Chinese and Korean rulers to defending against the enemies in a wartime period. To a large extent, the accelerated militarization of China and Korea’s northern sea region also hindered invaders’ expeditions and protected the inland area. On the other hand, the prosperous maritime economy and growing coastal military strength of Northeast Asia allowed regional maritime agents to expand beyond state control. Their off-coast development generated tensions with land-based polities’ attempts to govern and secure the sea; this zone therefore became an arena where multiple players negotiated and contested.

Although scholars have introduced a maritime dimension to the traditions of Northeast Asian history, many of their studies are fragmented, focusing on discovering historical facts, and lacking a thorough look at the maritime dynamics of Northeast Asia. While some recent studies have begun to stress the maritime element in the rise of Manchu authority and the proactiveness of its maritime policy, the strong presence of the Ming and the Chosŏn states in

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23 Scholars are increasingly interested in topics on sea transport of military supplies, the restoration of Chinese-Korean sea routes, and Korean envoys’ voyages to China after the Liaodong overland route was obstructed by the Later Jin. For some recent examples see Jung Byung-chul 鄭炳喆, “Late Ming Island Bases, Military Posts and Sea Routes in the Offshore Area of Liaodong,” in The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources, ed., Angele Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), 41-50; “Myŏngmal yodong yŏnhaeltaeŭi haesangseryŏk” 明末 濱東 濱海沿岸的‘海上勢力’, Myŏngch’ŏngsa yŏn’gu 衛青史研究 23 (April 2005): 143-170; O Irhwan 奧一煥, Hailu, yimin, yimin shehui: yi Mingqìng zhiji zhongchao jiaowang wei zhongxin 海路·移民·遺民社會: 以明清之際中朝交往為中心 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2007); Wang Ronghuang 王榮湟 and He Xiaorong 何孝榮, “Mingmo dongjiang haiyun yanjiu” 明末東江海運研究, Liaoning daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 遼寧大學學報（哲學社會科學版）, vol. 43, no. 6 (November 2015): 145-152.

their maritime frontiers is rarely discussed. One important goal of this research is thus to shed new light on Chinese-Korean border relations by conducting a systematic investigation of the maritime orientation of the China-Korea border region. It examines how specific historical events and phenomena interconnected to form this trend as a whole, and how this maritime transition influenced the Northeast Asian history of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

**East Asian Seas and Chinese-Korean Maritime Interactions**

Recent studies have regarded the Asian maritime space as a connective, interactive, and interdependent frontier to counteract the early modern nation-state, or the terra-centered historical traditions. As Harriet Zurndorfer recently pointed out, the scholarship of maritime Asia stresses “this zone’s permeability, its fluidity, and hybridism rather than the fixed framework of rigid boundaries demarcating one state from another.”25 This trend puts the maritime space in a vital place in multistate and multilayered exchanges, not only between states and governments but also between individuals and regional groups.

This point of view also highlights the inner rhythm of the East Asian maritime economy in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a period when the Ming and the Chosŏn imposed a significant interruption of their private maritime trade. Takeshi Hamashita’s research on conceptualizing the East Asian regional order, for instance, argues for the existence of a “vibrant Asian trade zone” built on the East Asian tribute trade system. It spotlights the economic dimension of tribute exchanges between China and its tributaries as well as in “several other

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lesser or satellite tributary relationships not directly involving China” whose commercial transactions were driven by the price differences inside and outside of China. Silver functioned as the medium in this interregional trade zone, and its worldwide circulation created a linkage between the East Asian regional economy and the international market.26

The circulation of silver, which was mined in the Spanish colonies of the Americas and Japan and transmitted through the hands of European and Asian agents into the early modern East Asian market, intensified other forms of trading as well. For instance, the Ming’s suppression of private trade bred rampant smuggling and piracy, especially in the reign of the Jiajing emperor (r. 1522-1566). Armed traders involved in this illegal maritime activity were together called “Japanese pirates,” but in fact their nationalities and backgrounds were diverse, with the majority of them being southeastern Chinese merchants. In the second half of the sixteenth century the Ming partially lifted the maritime prohibition in southeast China and licensed Chinese merchants to trade overseas, except Japan. However, through trading with the Europeans intermediaries and Chinese merchants in Taiwan and southeast Asian ports the Japanese were able to connect commercially with China.27

This interconnection within East Asian subregions and peoples, as well as the dynamics of different forms of their exchange relations, are foregrounded by the idea of the East Asian “Mediterranean,” which is informed by Fernand Braudel’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unity of complex seas and their surrounding lands that interconnected and “shared a common destiny” across time and space.28 In a series of conference volumes, editor Angela Schottenhammer

explains that the East Asian Mediterranean was surrounded by the neighboring countries of China, Japan, Korea, the Ryûkyûs, and Taiwan, whose exchanges were furthered rather than separated by the common space of East Asian seas. The East Asian Mediterranean comprises “the southern part of the Japanese Sea, the Bohai 海 and the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and at least some stretches of the South China sea,” and its central regions include the Yellow and East China Seas. While this view emphasizes the entire East Asian maritime space as a “contact zone” for promoting various exchanges, it also admits that “the East Asian waters cannot be regarded as a uniform entity, because not all commodity flows that occurred in the north would also touch the south.” These regional and relational differences within East Asian waters, especially between the East and South China seas, cause some skepticism regarding the adoption of the Mediterranean model for Asian maritime history.

Many scholars adjust, interconnect, or localize the East Asian maritime space to make it a useful and operable scale in their works. For instance, Haneda Masashi has pointed out that narratives in the framework of a “maritime world” 海域世界, although revealing commonalities and connections beyond nation-state boundaries within that region, create a new, enclosed world


distinct from others. He states that depending on different features and relations scholars want to capture, a “maritime space” should be manifold and overlapping with flexible boundaries. Therefore although he positions the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea in the center of the “East Asian maritime space,” he emphasizes that it is a space that cannot be defined clearly. Another example is using “maritime China” as an applicable space to examine dynamic exchanges in China’s surrounding maritime zone that interconnects the Northeast and Southeast Asian regions. While scholars regard maritime China as cohesive, fluid, and diverse, as its name indicates, China is put in the focal position and imposes the most profound impact on its interactions with its neighbors.

Some studies pay closer attention to a portion of the East Asian waters, aiming to particularize its internal cohesion and to reveal its relation with other maritime regions. For instance, Chen Shangsheng incorporates China’s Liaodong, Shandong, and Jiangsu coasts, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s Kyushu Island into the “Yellow Sea region,” revealing the dynamics of the trilateral trade relations and the transition of the Chinese-Korean cooperative salvage system in this geographic scope. In terms of the Bohai and the northern Yellow Sea,

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34 For instance, Angela Schottenhammer uses the “China Seas” to refer to the East Asian maritime space that includes the East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the southern section of the Japanese Sea, and parts of the South China Sea, because this area “as a whole or all of the sections that we address in this paper at any time belonged to China or were part of Chinese sovereignty,” and also because of her focus “lies in the importance and role of maritime space for and in China’s history.” See Angela Schottenhammer, “The ‘China Seas’ in World History: A General Outline of the Role of Chinese and East Asian Maritime Space from Its Origins to c. 1800,” Journal of Marine Island Cultures, vol.1, no.2 (December 2012): 64. Similarly, Robert Anthony uses the concept of the “Great China Seas” with its scope “radiating from the core South China Sea into the East China Sea and Japan’s Seto Inland Sea to the north, and into the smaller Sulu, Java, Celebes, and Banda Seas to the south.” While this region is “a sum of its multiple parts and pasts,” Anthony also argues that “China has long been the economic powerhouse.” See Robert Antony, ed., Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 3, 7.
Chinese scholars often interrelate this space with China’s regional history of ports, coasts, and peninsulas. Yang Qiang raises the concept of the “Bohai coastal region” 環渤海區域, which encompasses the Bohai and the northern section of the Yellow Sea as well as their coastal regions, under the framework of Chinese social and economic history. Yang states that it was a regional unit of multiple subsystems that was increasingly integrated and connected with the outside maritime zone in the Chinese Ming and Qing dynasties.36 The maritime history of northern China, especially Shandong, has also been attracting growing scholarly interest, including topics such as the region’s sea trade and transport, coastal defense and security, and its interconnection with East Asian countries.37

What is Korea’s role in the broader picture of East Asian waters? Since around the turn of the twenty-first century, Korean scholars have been increasingly emphasizing a maritime perspective when investigating Korean history.38 They raise the feasibility of placing maritime Korea on different spatial scales. For instance, Yun Myŏnch’ŏl suggests putting Korea in the East Asian Mediterranean model and combining both the territorial and oceanic views when examining its history.39 Kwŏn Tŏkyŏng, on the other hand, states that the geography of the Yellow Sea as well as its multiculturalism and interconnection make it a better case than the East Asian waters as a whole to reflect the features of a Mediterranean.40 Kim Pohan uses the concept

37 For instance, see Wang Saishi 王赛时, Shandong yanhai kaifashi 山东沿海开发史 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2004); Liu Fengming 劉鳳鳴, Shandong bandao yu gudai zhonghan guanxi 山東半島與古代中韓關係 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010); Ma Guang 馬光, “The Shandong Peninsula in East Asian Maritime History during the Yuan-Ming Transition” (PhD diss., Ghent University, 2016).
38 For the Korean-language scholarship on Korean maritime history see Ha Sebong (Ha Sae-Bong) 河世鳳, “Han’gug’ai tongshia haeyangsa yŏn’gu- minjokchul’ijŏng sŏnggwawa t’alginjŏngch’ŏnmang” 韓國의 동아시아 海洋史觀- 民族ullo 物과 世界觀과 連接의 演變, Tongbūga munhwayŏn’gu 동북아 문화연구 23 (June 2010): 167-189.
39 Yun Myŏnch’ŏl (Young Myong-Cheol)尹明喆, “HaeyangsgwanŬro pon han’gung kodaesaŭi palchŏn’gwa chongŏn” 海洋史觀- 本 한국 고대사의 발전과 종언, Han’guk’yŏn’gu 한국사연구 123 (December 2003): 175-207.
40 Kwŏn Tŏkyŏng (Kwon Deok Young) 권덕영, “Tongjijunghae’ton’gwa kodaehwaŭi chijunghae’jŏng sŏnggyŏk”‘동아지중해’론과 고대 황해의 지중해적 성격, Chijunghaejivŏyŏn’gu 지중해지역연구, vol.13, no.2 (May
of “circum-Korea sea” to centralize the Korean Peninsula in its interrelationships with its neighbors by making good use of the surrounding sea-lanes. Indeed, Korea’s maritime dynamics are often discussed in its interactive relations with Japan and the Ryūkyūs since they can only be connected by sea routes. When discussing Korea’s maritime interactions with China in the Yellow Sea, the Korean-language scholarship pays the most attention to Korea’s coastal area based on a Korea-centered historical narrative.

My research centers on the northern Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea region. While applying multiple spatial scales to incorporate maritime China and Korea, the above studies have more or less neglected their mutual contacts in the north, or tend to concentrate on either Chinese or Korean maritime history without paying adequate attention to their common sea zone as a relational space. My study aims to reveal this area’s regional particularity as an integrated constituent of the East Asian seas. It also emphasizes the interconnective role of this space between the edges of lands. As this research shows, the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Later Jin/Qing...
terra-centered states all displayed strong intervention in this zone, and thus it was not only a channel open to the East Asian waters but also a scene for the continental states to expand or contract their powers. Another goal of this study is thus to combine the traditions of East Asian territorial and maritime history.

**Border Control and Regional Maritime Powers**

I have discussed the China-Korea maritime zone as a frontier and a channel, and its actors as mobile and connected, but this is only one side of the story. It was also a border region that governors attempted to control in order to demarcate, separate, and regulate fluid maritime interactions. “Borders,” as I understand the term, are demarcations of territories and markers of limits of control and governance. However, the production and maintenance of borders should not just be understood as a spatial expression of sovereign authorities that separate and differentiate their territories. The construction of borders and the formation of territories reflect multiscaled practices, and involve various spatial contexts such as administrative units, cultural regions, diverse institutions as well as social, economic and ethnic groups. It is also not just a horizontal process but a vertical one, to borrow David Delaney’s descriptions of territory that I find are also useful here. He states that territory is horizontal, “a two-dimensional bounded space or mosaic of ‘like’ spaces” that exclusively marks dichotomy. But it is also vertical, with

44 See Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border* (New York: Wiley, 1996), 3. A good example of a combination of macro- and micro-scaled spaces as reflected in the construction of nation-state boundaries and territorial transformation can be seen in Anssi Paasi’s own work on the Finnish-Russian border. The aim of the work, as Paasi states, “has been to pass behind the ‘official narratives’ that manifest themselves in the socio-spatial consciousness of Finnish society and to reveal what the boundary means on the local scale and in the everyday lives of the people living in its immediate vicinity.” See Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, 308.
heterogenous levels since “every physical location … is positioned within a dense matrix of multiple, overlapping territories and territorial configurations.” Moreover, borders do not have to be material and spatial but can exist on ideological and institutional levels for purposes such as delimitation, regulation, and restriction. Last but not least, borders should not be considered stable, linear, and sharply defined. Instead, especially in the early modern maritime space, they were largely mobile, zonal, and vague in the process of marking distinctions.

In this research the term “border control” refers to entities exerting dominance and regulation over borders by such means as jurisdiction and the military. It has a twofold meaning: maintaining and strengthening control of “this side,” while demarcating and excluding outsiders and invaders coming from “the other side.” The features of borders make border control not only a state-level and homogeneous process; rather, multilayered authorities such as the courts, grand coordinators, local government officials, and coastal military officers were essential performers of border control on different spatial scales of state, region, and locale. They cooperated and compromised, but could also behave differently from and even in conflict with each other. They constructed, intensified, and interpreted borders not just spatially but also among ambiguous maritime groups and activities. However, the process of border control itself was varying, vague, and diverse: those who differentiated and regulated trespassers could themselves be participants in cross-border navigations, both legal and illegal, and regulations could also be tightened or loosened depending on specific contexts.

Therefore if considering Ming-Chosŏn maritime border control from these points of view, it could be fluctuant, adaptable, and able to be manipulated on multiple levels and scales of practices. For instance, as this research reveals, when handling and negotiating transmarine

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affairs the local and central authorities of the Ming and Chosŏn could make distinct responses on the basis of their subtle stances. The extent to which they emphasized border regulations differed and varied, and the roles they performed in practicing coastal control were multifaceted. This correspondingly generated much flexibility and complexity in Ming-Chosŏn border relations.

The application of the Ming maritime trade prohibition, which this research discusses in detail, is another demonstration of this situation. Scholars have discussed the diachronic features, influences, and practices of the maritime prohibition as well as its relation to maritime violence and commerce, the tribute system, and Ming social-economic dynamics, but the analysis of this policy was still largely based on the experience of southeast China without addressing the regional difference of the north.46 Although the Ming state defensively regulated its northern coast, it would loosen the interregional or overseas maritime prohibition and legitimize private commerce, especially in emergency conditions such as a natural disaster or a war. When it lifted the maritime prohibition in the southeastern provinces in the second half of the sixteenth century, it then strengthened the prohibition policy in the north. Government officials might also debate and be in conflict over the implementation and effects of this policy based on their respective considerations. While state agents, e.g., coastal navies and local authorities, were the major performers of the maritime prohibition, they were also directly involved in unauthorized sea transport, commerce, and other kinds of exchanges. The boundaries between the official and the illicit were thus not clear-cut but could be adjusted and blurred.

The multifarious, variable, and ambiguous process of state control over maritime borders, as

well as the quickening maritime integration of China’s and Korea’s northern littoral together promoted the prosperous development of regional maritime players. Among them, Ming coastal military men were the most visible and active group. Their rapid growth in the northern Yellow Sea was largely based on their exceptional advantages in dealing with maritime affairs and their deep power from penetration in this area. They served to ensure maritime security, supervising and preventing border crossings and defending against potential enemies, but they also conspired and secretly sailed across the sea. They were the mediators between the Ming and the Chosŏn to accomplish official tasks, but they also used their talents and positions to pursue individual benefits. By seizing the wartime opportunity of the enhanced military and commercial exchanges between China and Korea, they became smugglers and pirates themselves. When they were assigned to control maritime borders for the state, they marked off their own sphere of influence and developed into semi-independent warlords.47

The military regime, established by the late Ming warlord Mao Wenlong and his followers, across the northern Yellow Sea demonstrates how the fundamental struggle between effective state control over borders, and the maritime development of China and Korea’s northern region, finally reached its peak. While the subject of Mao’s contemporary Zheng Zhilong and his family enterprise, which composed the most powerful regional monopoly in southeast China in the seventeenth century, has been attracting much scholarly interest with many English-language articles and monographs published, there is little English-language research focusing on Mao

Wenlong’s maritime kingdom. In addition, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese scholarship has mainly investigated the military and political aspects of Mao’s case, and thus paid less attention to his connection with the Northeast Asian maritime orientation and the rise of regional military powers in China’s northern littoral.

Unlike the Zheng family, who “exemplified the pirate-cum-merchants-cum-rebels” of the pirate epoch in South China during the Ming-Qing transition from 1620-1684, Mao Wenlong was first and foremost a military general and a governor appointed for the purpose of controlling the Ming maritime border. While the Zheng family expanded its political dominance based on the economic foundation of being merchant-pirates outside of state control, the smuggling, piracy, and rebellious activities of General Mao and his followers was generated from within the Ming military institution, displaying a different path of the development of regional maritime powers in northern China from those in the south. By tracing the rise and expansion of Ming

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military powers in the northern Yellow Sea region in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this research analyzes how they turned from border governors and guards to semi-independent warlords and then rebels. Therefore in addition to contributing to studies on Ming-Chosŏn border relations and revealing the connectivity between East Asian territorial and maritime history as mentioned above, the final goal of this work is to display the profound tension between border control and the growth of maritime powers, and its impact on the Ming-Qing transition.

**Chapter Outline**

This dissertation consists of five chapters that follow chronological order. Chapter 1 focuses on the perceptions, negotiations, and border control practices between the Ming and the Chosŏn regarding a small sea island offshore the Liaodong Peninsula that entered their awareness due to its mingling of Chinese and Korean migrants and traders. It begins with the Chosŏn court’s fruitless and divergent discussions of the island as either unclaimed or within the Ming’s territory. It then discusses the Chosŏn’s multilayered communications with both the Ming Liaodong and Beijing governments to confirm and clarify possession of the island and its request to launch troops to repatriate illegal residents on the island. While the former issue remained unclear even at the level of the Ming central government, the expedition to the island was approved and executed smoothly, by which the Chosŏn expanded their knowledge of the surrounding sea region. By demonstrating how the Chosŏn and Ming authorities adopted the newly obtained information about this island to border control, this chapter also investigates their agency in response to the emerging challenge of private maritime interactions. By improving its
understanding of the sea region between Liaodong and Korea, in 1528 the Chosŏn was able to discern the illegality of several Chinese castaways for the enhancement of its coastal security. The Ming also improved its geographic knowledge and maritime domain awareness of this region, transforming the island and its surrounding area from an unrecognized frontier into its claimed border.

Chapter 2 focuses on how evaders, castaways, and pirates in the northern Yellow Sea challenged the Ming’s and the Chosŏn’s regulations of their coastal regions. It begins with a summary of the sixteenth-century cases of Chinese castaways on Korea’s northwestern coast before the 1590s, showing how increasing seafaring activities reconnected the sea space between China and Korea, which had been intentionally separated since the early fifteenth century. It then analyzes the Chosŏn’s investigations and treatments of these castaways, as well as the various reasons that caused the Chosŏn’s struggle to distinguish the “water bandits” among them—the violent smuggling group it conceptualized as different from “Japanese pirates.” Finally, this chapter examines the Ming state’s failed attempt to expand its administration over offshore islands of Liaodong and Shandong. This chapter aims to show how the fluidity and ambiguity of maritime agents conflicted with the land-based authorities’ discernment, categorization, and assimilation of them. In particular, the vagueness of the three categorized groups of “evaders,” “castaways” and “pirates”; these individuals’ transregional mobility; and the interchangeability between legitimate and illicit maritime activities are discussed.

Turning the focus from the attempts of the Ming and Chosŏn governments to sever their maritime connection before the 1590s, chapter 3 examines their efforts to increase cross-border mobilization during the Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598. Due to the importance of keeping their sea routes unimpeded in order to facilitate wartime logistics and naval battles,
the two states elevated the strategic role of their maritime transportation. This chapter first shows how Ming China and Chosŏn Korea hastily reopened their sea-lanes and responded to the unprecedented challenges in their collaborative sea transport. The regional limitations to conducting an interregional sea transport are emphasized. The chapter also illuminates the adjusted maritime strategies between the two states in foregrounding efficient logistics during the second Japanese war on the basis of their experiences in the first attack. The efforts to coordinate sea transport, such as clarifying regional responsibilities and regularizing transport procedure, are examined. This chapter pays special attention to how Chinese-Korean sea transport spurred the mobilization of wartime resources and the regional integration of their northern littoral by analyzing the collection and construction of transport vessels in 1597-1598.

Chapter 4 looks at the maritime transition of China and Korea’s northern border region during and right after the two Japanese invasions of Korea. It examines two remarkable changes in this region: the reinforced militarization that integrated the Bohai Sea and the northern Yellow Sea and enabled Ming state power to permeate offshore; and the prosperity of cross-border private trade, including the formation of maritime smuggling networks. The core analysis of the first two sections of this chapter addresses the role of Ming coastal military men, especially those who migrated from South China to the northern littoral, in shaping and intertwining with these two trends. The last section discusses the influence of the Ming coastal sailors over China and Korea’s sea space, based on their joining of legitimate violence and private commerce. It examines how their indistinct boundary with piracy provided diplomatic elasticity and nuance in the multilayered Chinese-Korean border relations.

Chapter 5 traces Ming regional warlords’ rise to power and expansion across the northern Yellow Sea during the Ming-Qing transition by investigating the maritime dynamics of Mao
Wenlong’s military regime. It first concentrates on the maritime migration and accommodation of Liaodong refugees, which built the foundation of Mao’s military power but directly intensified his political tensions with the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Later Jin polities. Regarding Liaodong maritime migrants as crucial yet troublesome manpower, these land-based governors displayed divergent responses of contestation, negotiation, and rejection. The chapter then analyzes how Mao Wenlong promoted Liaodong migrants by exploiting offshore islands, maritime trade, and transportation. It further directs attention to the flexibility and adaptability of Mao Wenlong and his followers to the surroundings and the varying political circumstances, on the basis of their advantage in mobilizing and integrating interregional resources. However, it was this indispensable reliance on the neighboring continents that prevented Mao’s maritime regime from fully independent development.

Together these chapters investigate Ming China and Chosŏn Korea’s maritime orientation interwoven with the Northeast Asian transition of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. They also display the intricate interrelations between multiple maritime agents as well as their trajectories in a connected and contested sea space. I conclude that China and Korea’s maritime interactions and their tension with state border control in the context of regional integration were important factors that shaped early modern Northeast Asian history.
Chapter 1

Knowledge Collection and Territorial Consciousness: Contact between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea on a Maritime Frontier

In the first half of the sixteenth century, the northern sea region of China and Korea appeared to be relatively peaceful. Smuggling and piracy had targeted southern coasts more frequently, and the transborder threat of the Japanese Invasions of Korea in the 1590s was yet to come. However, although restrained by the government prohibition of overseas travel between the two states, seafaring, smuggling, and offshore migration had still begun to spread in the northern Yellow Sea area. This emerging issue forced the Ming Chinese and Chosŏn Korean governments to take notice of the territorial ownership, administrative situation, and geographic circumstances of the sea space that lay between the two countries. Haiyang Island (C. Haiyang dao, 海洋島), called Haerang Island (K. Haerangdo, 海浪島) by Chosŏn Korea, was one area of this focus. The island is among today’s Changshan Archipelago in the southeast sea of the Liaodong Peninsula.

The Korean-language scholarship regards the borderline of the Yalu River 鴨綠江 (K. Amnikkang) as a contested region and the Ming’s and Chosŏn’s perceptions of maritime borders as ambiguous.1 Recent studies also note the importance of Haiyang Island (henceforth “Haerang

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Island” when referring to Korean historical accounts) in Chinese-Korean border crossings, piracy, and smuggling in a relatively long historical period from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. While the current research leads to a fuller understanding of the flexible border relations in early modern East Asian waters and reveals private interactions in the northern Yellow Sea, their focus is primarily on a Korean perspective. This chapter, however, pays attention to the interactive and energetic China-Korea maritime relations, as well as the elasticity in their border control and territorial awareness.

The following analysis raises three questions: how was knowledge collected on the sea region including Haerang Island and the surrounding area between China and Korea? How did the Ming and Chosŏn authorities perceive their maritime territories and borders? How did their understandings of the common sea space interact with the issue of coastal control? To answer them, this chapter begins with the Chosŏn court’s fluid sense of comprehension and the Ming’s uncertainty regarding the ownership of Haerang Island. It also examines the Korean central government’s information collection from multiple channels to understand the sea area beyond its known domain, and its use of this accumulated knowledge to handle trespassing and enhance border security. It further analyzes the expansion of Ming maritime domain awareness reflected in the recompilation process of Gazetteer of Liaodong. By looking at these issues, this chapter

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helps us understand how early modern Northeast Asian states shaped and adjusted their maritime perceptions under the influence of their multilayered interactions. The chapter also shows how their fluid border consciousness and knowledge collection in response to changing circumstances reflected their attention to coastal control and further effected its practice.

**Fluid Perspectives and Ambiguous Claims on a Maritime Frontier**

In the eighth lunar month of 1492, the Chosŏn Royal Secretariat received a report from a royal military aide who had arrested the husband of his female slave along with a man named Ko Ikkyŏn 高益堅 because they were suspected of illegally going back and forth to Haerang Island. During the interrogation conducted by the Royal Secretariat, Ko soon admitted the truth of the charge, saying that during his trip along the northwestern coast of Korea from Map'o to the coastal county Sŏnch'ŏn of P'yŏngan Province, he had he once passed by the offshore Chang and Nok islands. After three to four days of his journey he berthed at Haerang Island. In his confession Ko depicted a scene of Korean Cheju people migrating to Haerang Island and their coexistence with people who appeared to be Ming Chinese: “There are five households on [Haerang] island whose language seems like Chinese. They wear buckskin, burn wasteland for cultivation, and live on fishing and hunting. About twenty Cheju people recently went to live there. There are six boats on the island, and one of them is always on the sea for surveillance.”

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3 Map'o 麻浦 is at the estuary of the Yongsan River located west of Seoul. See Shinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 新增東國輿地勝覧, fasc.3 (Seoul: Kyŏngmunsa, 1981), 66. Chang Island 錐島 is also recorded as Changja Island 錐子島, which is near the estuary of the Yalu River. Nok Island 鹿島 is to the west of Changja Island. See Zhongguo lishi ditu ji 中國歷史地圖集, ed. Tan Qixiang 譚其驤 (Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1982), vol.7, 52-53.

Although Ko Ikkyŏn’s identity was not recorded in the Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty (K. Chosŏn wangjo sillok, 朝鮮王朝實錄), according to the accusation of his violation of the seafaring ban and the route of his navigation away from Korea’s coastal waters, he may have been engaged in overseas smuggling in the northern Yellow Sea region. The Haerang Island that he mentioned is called Haiyang Island (39°04′02″N, 123°09′12″E) by the Chinese. It is the island located farthest east in the Changshan Archipelago, southeast of Liaodong Peninsula. Today it is administered by Changhai County, Liaoning Province of China.

Ko’s description was not the first time this island had come to the attention of the Chosŏn court. Just a few months earlier the Liaodong Military Commission transmitted a document to the Chosŏn stating that two small Korean boats were approaching Liaodong. These Korean sailors confessed that they dug clams to submit tributes to the king under the permission of the Ŭiju government, and arrived in the Liaodong waters to pursue their lost companions. However, Liaodong still doubted their status because their words seemed crafty and unreliable. This case reminded Liaodong of a similar situation that occurred in 1487 when two Korean boats were found berthing at Haiyang Island. Facing the inquiry of Liaodong, the arrested Korean people declared that they were from Ŭiju and went to sea to dig clams. Considering the repeated appearance of Korean boats near its coastal regions within just a few years, the Liaodong Military Commission urged the Chosŏn king to strictly forbid his people from crossing the sea.

Liaodong’s suspicions regarding the Korean trespassers in 1487 were verified after they were sent back and reinvestigated by the Chosŏn. They were confirmed to be smugglers from

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5 The accusation of Ko Ikkyŏn can also be seen in Ŭ Sukkwŏn 魚叔權, Kosa ch’waryo 改事撮要 (Changsŏgak, C15 2A), vol.1, 27b. 弘治九年(丙辰) 燕山二年 本國高益堅 高石山 金孟孫等違禁下海 往來海浪島 因遼東咨文取問 本犯等俱按律科斷.  
6 For the location of Haiyang Island see Changhai xianzhi 長海縣志, ed. Zhonggong changhai xian weiyuan hui, Changhai xian renmin zhengfu (Changhai Xianzhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, 1984), 88.  
P'ungch'ŏn, a coastal county of Hwanghae Province, who accidentally landed at Haiyang Island after a violent storm during their illegal navigation to Chang Island (Changja Island). While it is hard to know if the Chosŏn court understood that Haiyang Island and Haerang Island were the same place, it appears clear that both the Liaodong and Chosŏn governments had already recognized the suspicious transmarine activities conducted by Korean coastal residents since the late fifteenth century.

Figure 1 The northern Yellow Sea region

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8 *Sŏngjong sillok*, Sŏngjong 18/11/30 (12/14/1487), fasc. 209, vol. 11, 268.
Ko Ikkyŏn’s confession further increased the Chosŏn court’s awareness of the unauthorized inhabittance of Korean people on Haerang Island. The maritime prohibition (K. haegŭm, 海禁) had been enforced since the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty and was inherited from the late Koryŏ emptying islands policy (K. Kongdo chŏngch'aek, 空島政策) for the suppression of local maritime powers. It was also greatly influenced by the Ming haijin policy on the coastal regions of the Korean Peninsula since the Hongwu reign (1368-1398). This led to an overall restriction of Korea’s sea trade and a government prohibition of individual overseas commerce throughout most of the Chosŏn dynasty until 1882. In China the Ming rulers generally forbade private trade overseas and restricted official trade with foreign countries within the tributary system, although this prohibition was not always strictly applied throughout the dynasty.

If Ko’s confession was authentic, Korean people were not only trading but also migrating into the sea region without the central government’s knowledge. More seriously, according to Ko’s observation they may have even contacted and lived with Chinese islanders. This situation violated the Ming and Chosŏn governments’ consensus of separating their individual connections through a stringent sea ban. In order to avoid a potential dispute with the Ming, the Chosŏn court immediately raised a discussion in the eighth month of 1492, attempting to

determine whether military officers should be dispatched to arrest the Korean residents on Haerang Island, or to inform Liaodong of this illicit migration and request that these people be repatriated. The focus of this discussion soon turned to resolving the puzzle of the ownership of Haerang Island since the answer directly impacted the Chosŏn’s decision. If the island was indeed within Ming territory, the Chosŏn ought to ask for permission from Liaodong to return the Korean trespassers; but if it was not, consideration of launching a straightforward military operation would be more swift and efficient.

In this discussion King Sŏngjong and his senior officials maintained a cautious attitude toward conducting a military expedition because they tended to believe that Haerang Island belonged to the Ming state. For instance, Chief State Councilor Yun P'il-sang expressed his concern about the unpredictable result of this unapproved navigation. Since Haerang Island seemed to be within Ming territory, Yun was concerned that if Korean troops were sent there they might encounter unexpected misfortune. Although Yun did not clarify what could happen, he may have worried about possible conflict with the Ming people on the island. “Even if there is no incident,” Yun continued, “as long as the Superior Country knows [about this operation], it will be certain to rebuke us. It may only meet the cardinal principle if we transmit a document on these people’s confessions and request repatriation.”

Second State Councilor No Sashin also speculated that because it took eight days and nights to drift from Changyŏn County of Hwanghae Province to Haerang Island, the latter might be in Liaodong waters rather than be an isolated island (K: chŏlto, 绝島) belonging to Korea. He further stated that since the

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14 Sŏngjong sillok, Sŏngjong 23/8/10 (9/1/1492), fasc. 268, vol.12, 214. 尹弼商議 海浪島想在上國之境 若遣官推刷 須領軍而去 萬有不虞 禍在不測 假使善變 上國聞之 必譴責於我 將各人招辭 移告刷還 庶合大體.

15 According to Chosŏn wango sillok, the concept of chŏlto generally refers to islands geographically isolated from the Korean Peninsula. For instance, see Sejo sillok 世祖實錄, Sejo 12/7/7 (8/27/1466), fasc. 39, in Chosŏn wango sillok (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe,1956), vol.8, 30.黃海道海州人金孝生上言 黃州廳庫牧場 非絕島 及連陸之地; Sejo 13/3/5 (4/8/1467), fasc.41,vol.8, 64.但南海鎮 環海絕 四面受敵.
ownership and the waterway distance of the island had not been determined with certainty, it would be improper to repatriate the Haerang inhabitants without the Ming’s approval.\textsuperscript{16} Third State Councilor Hŏ Chong 許琮 held the most definitive opinion, regarding all the region west of the Yalu River as Ming territory.\textsuperscript{17}

Although No Sashin and Hŏ Chong made similar conclusions, their sources of knowledge differed. No’s argument was based on his understanding of the proximity of Haerang Island to the Liaodong Peninsula. It is possible that this information was drawn from the above P'ungch'ŏn smugglers drifting to Haerang Island in 1487, whose trip may have departed from neighboring Changyŏn County. On the other hand, Hŏ’s view extended the China-Korea territorial boundary of the Yalu River to their sea regions. Since he had once been appointed as the chief border inspector of P’yŏngan Province this familiarity with the Liaodong-Korea territorial border was understandable.\textsuperscript{18} King Sŏngjong accepted their suggestions, and he agreed to send a repatriation request to Liaodong.

In response to the successive cases of smuggling and runaways on Haerang Island, the Chosŏn court sent several more petitions to Liaodong over the next several years.\textsuperscript{19} However, no reply was received. This intractable situation placed the Chosŏn in a dilemma, and a court conference in the fourth year of Yŏnsan'gun (1498) was correspondingly held on whether to exert pressure on Liaodong by expressing the Chosŏn’s intention to submit a direct report to the Ming court. While the court hesitated in regard to this option because it seemed like a threat, it also worried about the fact that its routine communications with Liaodong appeared to be

\textsuperscript{16} Sŏngjong 23/8/10 (9/1/1492), fasc.268, vol.12, 214.
\textsuperscript{17} Sŏngjong 23/8/10 (9/1/1492), fasc.268, vol.12, 214.
\textsuperscript{18} Sŏngjong 8/10/22 (11/27/1477), fasc.85, vol.9, 520.
\textsuperscript{19} For some of these cases see Sŏngjong sillok and Yŏnsan'gun ilgi. Sŏngjong 24/1/29 (2/15/1493), fasc.273, vol. 12, 271; Yŏnsan 1/10/19, (11/5/1495), fasc. 9, vol. 13, 41; Yŏnsan 3/10/18 (11/12/1497), fasc. 10, vol. 13, 288.
useless.20

The confession of Korean smuggler Ko Chŏngnam 高正南, who was caught after returning from Haerang Island, provided another possible solution in this conference. Although his words were unrecorded, they seemed to convince the Chosŏn court officials that Haerang Island lay beyond Ming territory.21 Based on this conclusion, the court proposed a dispatch of insightful and talented military officers and forces along with experienced sailors travel to the island. However, if the Korean troops confirmed this island as indeed being in the territory of Ming China after they arrived, they would carry out a backup plan to eliminate the Ming’s suspicions regarding this border trespassing. The Korean troops would adjust their words and give the excuse that they drifted on the sea when searching for illicit Korean migrants. Meanwhile, they could show the official certificate to prove their status and endeavor to repatriate the Korean people on Haerang Island.22

In contrast to the careful decision made in Sŏngjong’s 1492 court conference, in 1498 the senior officials of the newly crowned Yŏnsan'gun put forward a more-radical solution in dealing with the Korean people migrating to Haerang Island on the basis of their judgment that this island was not part of China. However, Yun P'il-sang, who participated in the discussion of 1492, immediately objected to this proposal and persisted in his original stance. He argued that it was improper to send troops because their arrival would arouse the Ming’s suspicion even if they claimed to be adrift. As a result, Yŏnsan'gun was convinced to bluntly inform Liaodong that the

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Chosŏn intended to report the Haerang Island case to the Beijing government, regardless of the Liaodong government’s attitude.23

The interrelated court conferences in 1492 and 1498 were held to address the emergency of recalling Korean migrants on the sea, and a confirmation of the territorial ownership of Haerang Island was the core of these discussions. The Chosŏn intentionally collected related knowledge to clarify this issue, but discrepant opinions existed and lasted for years among court officials, whose unsubstantiated conjectures were based on geographic knowledge (No Sashin’s statement), the China-Korea territorial boundary (Hŏ Chong’s argument), and Korean smugglers’ observations (Ko Chŏngnam’s confession).

Although the Chosŏn officials were unsure about Ming China’s maritime boundary, they differed on whether they considered Haerang Island as belonging or not belonging to Ming territory, indicating their demarcation of the sea region between the Liaodong and Korean peninsulas as “the Ming’s,” “ours,” and “the unclaimed zone in between.” While they understood that Haerang Island was beyond Korea’s possession, the possibility of conducting a military expedition without the Ming’s approval or even without its knowledge was not excluded from their options. However, in the end the king decided against this action in order to prevent possible friction with the Ming. It can be seen that while the tributary protocol put a crucial restriction on handling its border affairs, the Chosŏn also displayed flexibility in spreading state power toward the unclaimed sea region between Korea and China.

The affiliation of Haerang Island for the Chosŏn state remained unclear even though the Chosŏn increased its understanding of the geographic conditions and economy of the island during its communications with Liaodong people. At the end of 1498 when a Korean diplomatic

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mission was passing through Liaodong to Beijing, envoy Yi Son 李蓀, who was responsible for escorting and transporting tributes, sent a report back to the Chosŏn court on his newly acquired knowledge of Haerang Island. This report was derived from the narrations of two Liaodong people: Li Hao 李浩, the successor to a military officer (C. sheren, 舍人) subjected to Liaodong military commissioner, and Yu Ying 庾英, a laborer serving in the Liaoyang Posthouse. The content of this report includes the location and acreage of Haerang Island, the composition of its inhabitants, their livelihood, and their contacts with Korean smugglers.

According to Li Hao, Haerang Island was located in the southeast sea of the Liaodong Jinzhou Guard and its length along each side was 100 里 (57.6 km). The number of military service evaders and rebellious Liaodong coastal people who had moved there had increased to about fifty households. Yu Ying described Haerang Island as the largest of the numerous islands in the southeast sea of Jinzhou and Gaizhou, with a perimeter about 300 里 (172.8 km). Murderers, robbers, and felons from the Liaodong guards escaped to the island, and numbered nearly a thousand. They lived by trading wild animals and sea products or by looting goods from coastal residents. Korean people also frequently traveled to Haerang Island for trade.

These two statements on the acreage and perimeter of the island vary considerably from the current measurements. Although Li Hao’s use of the words 方百里 may be a rough estimation, the approximate acreage of the island based on this description is still 3317.76 km², which is a much larger number than today’s calculation of 18.03 km². Yu Ying’s account of the

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24 One chi 尺 (for official use) in the Ming was about thirty-two centimeters. Qiu Guangming 丘光明, Qiu Long 邱隆, and Yang Ping 楊平, Zhongguo kexue jishu shi, du liang heng juan 中國科學技術史〈度量衡卷〉(Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2001), 411. Therefore, one 里 was roughly equal to 0.576 kilometers (one li=1800 chi).

25 Yŏnsan'gun ilgi, Yŏnsan 4/12/11 (1/22/1499), fasc.31, vol. 13, 337. 管押使李蓀到遼東馳啓 一都司薊廣舍人李浩言金州衛東南海中有海浪島 方百里 於此逃賦人不記數潛入此島 又朝廷軍東寧衛士人郭成得罪 率妻子往此島 誘引沿海之民 則漸繁滋 人家五十餘戶 郭成自稱擔官麾下人或稱指揮 千戶 百戶 拚旗 一遼陽館夫庚英云 金州蓋州二衛東南海中 有七十二島 而海浪島最大 周回三百餘里 關外二十五衛民人 或強盜 或殺人 或犯關常重罪 數多潛入 几至千數 不事農業 或賣獐鹿 海羊皮 魚肉 或搶奪沿海居民財產 以爲生業 且高麗人亦數數往來興販 因此以資生.
300-li perimeter is also considerably higher than its coastlines of 32.5 km. Moreover, Yu’s understanding of Haerang as the largest island in the southeast sea area of Liaodong is contrary to the fact that among the Changshan Archipelago Dachangshan Island 大長山島, Guanglu Island 廣鹿島, and Shicheng Island 石城島 are all larger than Haerang Island. These erroneous assessments may be explained by a lack of relatively reliable access to accurate knowledge of the Liaodong islands far offshore, when considering the low status of Li Hao and Yu Ying in Liaoyang and the remote distance from Liaoyang City to the Jinzhou Guard. However, their understanding of the location and direction of Haerang Island in the Liaodong sea still indicates that general information about the island had already spread beyond the high-ranking Liaodong officers and Jinzhou coastal guards who were directly involved in dealing with the Korean trespassing cases in 1487 and 1492.

Li Hao’s and Yu Ying’s knowledge of Haerang Island is also reflected in their detailed descriptions of its inhabitants. Although great disparities exist in their estimations of the population (Li estimated their number to be about fifty households, and Yu increased the population to almost a thousand), they both agreed that Haerang Island was a shelter for Liaodong criminals, rebels, and evaders. Li’s narrative of the rebels residing on the sea is especially intriguing. According to him, these people were led by a horse soldier named Guo Cheng 郭成 after he committed a crime and escaped to Haerang Island. Guo declared himself to be chief commander (C. Zongbing, 總兵) and assigned his subordinates the positions of commander (C. Zhihui, 指揮), battalion commander (C. Qianhu, 千戶), company commander (C. Baihu, 百戶), and platoon commander (C. Zongqi, 總旗). Since Li served under the

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26 *Changhai xianzhi*, 88. The acreage of Haiyang Island (high tide) and its coastlines are recorded as 18.37 km² and 45.2 km in *Haiyang xiangzhi* 海洋鄉志 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2013), 1.

27 *Changhai xianzhi*, 84-89.
contemporary Liaodong military commissioner, it was possible that he learned this information directly from Liaodong senior officers. According to Li and Yu, Haerang Island was large, in the southeast sea of the Jinzhou Guard, on which Liaodong outlaws migrated to escape from military service and criminal punishment. They lived by smuggling and robbery and had frequent contact with Korean smugglers. If Li Hao’s citation of Guo Cheng’s case is authentic, Haerang islanders may have also formed a resistance group.

Figure 2 Today’s Haiyang (Haerang) Island

However, although Korean envoy Yi Son’s report provided more-elaborate and accurate knowledge of Haerang Island than the Chosŏn had previously received, the principal issue of its affiliation was still unknown. Adopting Peter Sahlin’s concepts of “territorial sovereignty” and “jurisdictional sovereignty” in his study of Chosŏn Korea’s foreign relations with the Jurchen tribes, Kenneth Robinson reveals the difference between the royal realm of a “territorial” Chosŏn—“the area claimed by the Korean king,” and a “jurisdictional” Chosŏn—“the area
within the royal territory that the state administrated.\textsuperscript{28} The use of these terms is also applicable in this analysis. While Li Hao’s and Yu Ying’s accounts of the anarchic Haerang inhabitants suggest an absence of the Liaodong jurisdiction in this region, it is still unclear at this point whether the island was within the territory that the Ming emperor claimed.

This puzzle was finally solved at the Ming central government level. In 1499 the Chosŏn king submitted a request to the Ming emperor stating that if the island was acknowledged to be within China’s territory, the Ming office would search for and deal with the illegal Korean inhabitants; if it was not, the Chosŏn court asked to organize the repatriation on its own under the Ming emperor’s approval. The submission of this petition was probably also under the consent of the Liaodong regional governor, who simultaneously reported to the emperor on the escape of coastal soldiers and commoners to the sea island and requested their prompt expulsion.\textsuperscript{29} Although it is uncertain whether the Liaodong government’s inaction in handling this matter in the past few years was due to negligence or indecision in coastal control, it seems clear that in 1499 the Korean and Liaodong governments finally reached an agreement to inform the Ming emperor of the Haerang Island case, attracting attention to the Ming central government’s decision making process.

The Ming emperor’s reply was reflected in his edict to the Chosŏn, which was brought back by the New Year’s felicitation envoy to Korea several months later in 1500. This edict first elaborates on the report he received from the Chosŏn king, as well as his concern about Korean and Chinese coastal people escaping to the sea and assembling to cause trouble. It then displays

\textsuperscript{28} Kenneth R. Robinson, “Residence and Foreign Relations in the Peninsular Northeast during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” 20-21.

\textsuperscript{29} Ming Xiaozong shilu 明孝宗實錄, Hongzhi 12/12/30 (1/30/1500), fasc. 157 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1964), 2834. 朝鮮國王李.Execute character '巖' 本國人屢有違禁下海者 因逃住海島不歸 復誘引軍民 漸至滋蔓 乞許本國自遣人搜刷還國 若係上國地方者 請敕令官司搜發處分 於是 遼東守臣亦奏近海軍民或有逃聚海島者 請及時逐散 下兵部議 謂宜如所奏 從之.
the emperor’s opinion of the vague association of Haerang Island: “My state rules all the land under heaven, whether the Chinese or the barbarian. Lands are enfeoffed and domains are demarcated with their own boundaries. It is unknown to whom the island [Haerang Island] mentioned before is affiliated.” Under this circumstance, the Ming emperor allowed the Chosŏn to arrest and interrogate the islanders independently and return those who were confirmed to be Chinese: “There will be no additional envoys being dispatched. As soon as the edict arrives [in Korea], the king can send people there to search for and repatriate all the escapees on the sea island. … If they are identified as Chinese after being interrogated, or if there are people being plundered or had drifted, officials need to be dispatched [by the Chosŏn] to hand them over to the Liaodong governor. They will then be escorted to Beijing for a further decision.”

While the Ming emperor displayed a Sinocentric worldview to incorporate both the “civilized” and the “barbarian” in his imperial rule, he also clearly delimited their territories and expressed his ignorance of the affiliation of Haerang Island. His approval of the Chosŏn’s petition instead of sending the Ming troops to deal with the illicit maritime migration also indicates his exclusion of this island from Ming territory. This point of view corresponds to the Chosŏn’s knowledge of the existing “empty zone” beyond the Ming’s and Chosŏn’s claimed domains, which functioned as a natural barrier between the two states due to its nautical risk, geographic remoteness, and the bilateral sea ban.

However, this space was more than a quarantine for separation and protection. If using Leonard Thompson and Howard Lamar’s definition of “frontier,” it was also “a territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies” that fostered private

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interminglement and interaction and had begun to draw state-level attraction and negotiation between China and Korea. Takahashi Kimiaki also notes the fluidity and interconnection of this maritime zone, conceptualizing the Haerang islanders as “marginal people” (J. Kyōkaijin, 境界人) on the intersecting edges of multicultural, economic, and ecological systems. While Takahashi does not point out the ambiguity and absence of political powers in this region, it should be noted that, as Stephen Aron and Jeremy Adelman observe, in a frontier “no single political authority has established hegemony and fixed control over clearly demarcated borders.” This lack of territorial claim and hegemonic control over the frontier of Haerang Island made it possible for the Chosŏn to express its intention to launch a military operation in this region and finally put it into practice.

**Maritime Knowledge and Border Security: The Repatriation Operation in 1500 and the Treatment of a Case of Drifting in 1528**

In the third month of 1500, after the Ming emperor approved the Chosŏn’s request to forcefully return the escapees on Haerang Island, court officials began to discuss the implementation of this plan in detail, including the appointment and dispatch of emissaries, the siege of islanders, and the supply of provisions for a navigation from Korea to Haerang Island. As a result, an emissary and a vice-emissary were appointed to lead civil and military retinues.

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32 Takahashi Kimiaki, “Kaiiki sekai no koryū to kyōkai jin,” 272-273.


with Japanese, Jurchen, and Chinese interpreters; the smugglers who had previously gone to Haerang Island; and troops for this operation. Since its historical facts have already been noted in current scholarship, the following analysis mainly focuses on the Chosŏn’s developing understanding of the geographic situation, living status of the residents, and transnational migration of the northern Yellow Sea through a survey of the surrounding region of Haerang Island on this trip.\(^{35}\)

As can be seen from the survey report submitted to the Chosŏn king after the Korean troops returned, this travel experience provided the court with much more precise and updated knowledge in a straightforward way, compared to the information it had gained from Korean smugglers and Liaodong servicemen in past years. In the sixteenth month of 1500, this report was promptly sent to the court to describe the Korean troops’ observations on the sea. When they arrived at Haerang Island, they found there were only nineteen house foundations and three cattle. By following traces of human activity, four people were discovered berthing their boat at Shuiniu Island 水牛島, which was two li (1.152 km) east of Haerang Island. While the place name Shuiniu Island is not found in today’s gazetteers, it probably refers to Nantuozi, a tiny islet southeast of Haerang Island (as shown in Figure 2).\(^{36}\) The armies arrested and interrogated the four islanders and learned that they had settled on Haerang Island only for farming. All the other former residents had already moved to Xiaochangshan Island 小長山島, which was to the northwest of Haerang Island. The armies then went to Xiaochangshan Island and caught seventy-eight Chinese and thirty-four Koreans.

\(^{35}\) For a detailed description of this repatriation see Ryu Ch’ango, “Sŏhae pukpu haeyŏgesŏ haerangjŏk hwaltonggwa Chosŏnjóngbuŭi taeŭng. Haerang-do su’o (1500 nyŏn) esŏ Paengnyŏnggin sŏlch’i(1609 nyŏn) kkaji,” 69-107. Also see Zhang Shizun, Mingdai liaodong bianjiang yanjiu, 135-136; Li Deyuan 李德元, Mingqing shiqi hainei yimin yu haidao kaifa 明清時期海內移民與海島開發 (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2006), 57-58; Chu Kanghyŏn, Yu’op’i’aii t’ansaeng, 143-157.

\(^{36}\) Changhai xianzhi, 88.
The living situation on Xiaochangshan Island attracted the king’s attention. He asked about its distance from Haerang Island as well as its acreage, topography, and natural products. The reply was that the island was two days’ distance to the west of Haerang Island and had abundant natural products. Its area was wide, comparable to about a thousand kyŏl 結 of paddy fields. A kyŏl was a unit of measurement of soil productivity in the Chosŏn dynasty. Since the reign of King Sejong land was ranked in six categories based on its productivity. For each ranking the acreage of one kyŏl was correspondingly different, ranging roughly from 0.01 km\(^2\) to 0.04 km\(^2\). The acreage of Sojangsan Island (a thousand kyŏl) was thus between 10 and 40 km\(^2\). Surprisingly, this calculation is close to today’s measurement of Xiaochangshan Island at 17,5325 km\(^2\). Compared to the exaggerated acreage of Haerang Island that Liaoyang military servicemen Li Hao and Yu Ying had reported, the result of the field investigation was apparently more accurate and reasonable.

The development of the Chosŏn’s maritime understanding is also reflected in its renewed knowledge of livelihood of the illegal islanders. According to Yu Ying, the Haerang residents primarily lived by smuggling and robbing, but the Chosŏn also learned that they had lived in a more-secure way by cultivating land, indicating their long and stable residence on the sea. This steady settlement is proven in a later Chosŏn court discussion on how to handle the offspring of Korean men and Chinese women living on the sea islands.

The Chosŏn’s nautical knowledge was further promoted on this trip. In the seventh month of 1500, when the pacifying emissaries reported on their completion of their task to the king,
they narrated their travel route in detail, which went from Yongch'ŏn of P'yŏngan Province to Haerang Island by passing through the offshore islands of the Korean and Liaodong peninsulas.\(^1\) This information spread among the court officials, as seen in the contemporary scholar-official Hong Kwital’s 洪貴達 writing: “Inscribing the Painting of Haerang Island.” Hong once participated in the decision making of this repatriation. Unfortunately the painting honoring the cooperative spirit of the Korean armies has not been preserved, but the writing still provides valuable knowledge of the Yongch'ŏn-Haerang sea route and its navigation distance, as well as the process of this successful military operation.\(^2\) The collective memory of this achievement remained until the late Chosŏn, reminding Korean scholar-officials of a glorious voyage in the past—especially when their current border security was challenged by piracy.\(^3\)

In the late fifteenth century the Chosŏn government began to continuously acquire knowledge of Haerang Island and the surrounding sea from various sources of court officials, Korean private traders, Liaodong military servicemen, and the Ming central government. However, a direct survey offered the most accurate and timely information to promote the state’s understanding of this contact sea region. The purpose of this dynamic collection of maritime information was to make proper and prompt diplomatic reactions to transborder affairs. It also played a role in distinguishing suspicious maritime activities, and therefore in securing Korea’s coast. The Chosŏn government’s investigation of a Liaodong drifting case in 1528 is one example. While the current scholarship concentrates on Qing China and Chosŏn Korea’s salvage, repatriation, and negotiation, as well as the appearance of foreign drifting cases in Korea’s

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\(^{1}\) *Yŏnsan’gun ilgi*, Yŏnsan 6/7/9 (8/3/1500), fasc. 38, vol. 13, 419.
\(^{2}\) Hong Kwital, *Hŏbaekch'ŏng chip*, fasc. 3, in *Han’guk munjip ch’onggan*, vol. 14, 121b-122a.
\(^{3}\) Some related records can be seen in Yi Ik 李瀷, *Sŏnghosa sól* 星湖先生僿說, fasc. 2, “海浪島”; fasc. 25, “田霖,” in *Sŏnghosa chŏnsŏ* 星湖全書, ed. Yi Usŏng 李佑成 (Seoul: Yŏgang Ch’ulp’ansa, 1984), vol. 5, 41-42; vol. 6, 927.
southern provinces, the 1528 case is a manifestation of the Chosŏn state’s growing attention to northwestern coastal security in the sixteenth century.\(^{44}\)

In the seventh month of 1528, two reports from the Hwanghae provincial governor to the Royal Secretariat attracted the Korean central government’s attention. Four Ming Chinese castaways were detained at Changyŏn County of Hwanghae Province. Along with them, two boats were driven away by the other forty-eight Chinese people. The local Hwanghae government investigated the four castaways, and their confessions were submitted to King Chungjong. Suspicious of the official certificates the castaways held, the king immediately asked a crucial question regarding their status: whether they went to sea for hunting on the islands as they claimed, or were “water bandits” drifting to Korea.\(^{45}\) In order to verify their words and their purpose of going to sea, they were sent to Seoul for further investigation. However, this made the situation even more complicated.

As the Royal Secretariat determined, Cui Tang 崔堂, the leader of the four castaways, did military service under a battalion commander and lived in the Dongning Guard of Liaoyang. His

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\(^{45}\) Chungjong sillok 中宗實錄, Chungjong 23/7/22 (8/6/1528), Chungjong 23/7/23 (8/7/1528), fasc. 62, in Chosŏn wango sillok (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’ŏn witwŏnhoe, 1956), vol.17, 13. As I will analyze in chapter 2, the Korean government perceived “water bandits” on its northwestern coast in the sixteenth century as violent smuggling and poaching groups formed by Chinese and Korean border people.
companions, Cui Wu 崔五 and Cui Bao 崔保, were his brother and cousin. The fourth person was Cui Tang’s relative by marriage, and Cui only knew his surname Zhang and called him Brother Zhang 张哥. According to Cui Tang’s confession, the forty-eight people who had escaped all lived at Liaodong Linjiang, a place ten days’ distance from Liaoyang, but Cui Tang did not know their names. Cui Tang then described in detail their travel and how they drifted to Hwanghae Province and were captured. He claimed that after he received the order from the Liaodong Military Commission to hunt water deer to pay tribute to the Ming emperor, he departed from Liaoyang on the eighteenth day of the fourth month of 1528. He arrived at Linjiang seven days later. He led a total of fifty-one people, including Cui Wu, Cui Bao, Brother Zhang, and the other hunting armies; prepared bows, arrows, nets, and hounds; and navigated to Haerang Island. Although they had never been there before, they fortunately met Zhang Kuan 張寬 and Li Pi 李匹, who took two boats from Haerang Island to Linjiang for trade. With Zhang and Li’s help, the armies finally arrived at Haerang Island. Along with seven or eight indigenous islanders they hunted and dried twenty water deer. However, they then successively encountered two storms and lost their way on the sea. On the seventeenth day of the seventh month, after they moored at Changsan Cape of Hwanghae Province, they decided to go ashore. Cui Tang, Cui Wu, Cui Bao, and Brother Zhang held the official certificates and debarked while the others waited on the boats. After they saw Korean soldiers with bows and arrows appear on the shore to evidently pursue and capture them, they were terrified and ran away, leaving Cui Tang and the other three to be caught.

46 According to Chungjong sillok, Linjiang was a place about 100 li (57.6 km) to the west of Tangzhan, a border fortress of Liaodong. Chungjong 23/8/24 (9/7/1528), fasc. 62, vol.17, 29.
47 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/7/30 (8/14/1528), fasc.62, vol.17, 16.
From the beginning of the Korean central government’s investigation, King Chungjong posed the question of whether Cui Tang and his companions were “water bandits” or were indeed ordered by the Liaodong government to hunt on sea islands. Although Cui Tang insisted on the latter and gave a particular explanation, the Chosŏn court still found holes in his confession. The biggest issue the Chosŏn court raised was why the Liaodong government had sent them to such a remote island for hunting: “How can it be that there be no place for hunting in Liaodong and [you have to instead] travel so far to a sea island?” In order to verify Cui Tang’s words, the court further inquired about his experience on Haerang Island. Cui responded with information about its inhabitants and geographic environment. According to him, the people going to trade on the island were all Chinese. There were about forty households there, all of whom were Chinese as well. Zhang Kuan, the person directing Cui Tang’s trip to Haerang Island, was the boat owner 鬼主 leading the islanders and making all the decisions. The perimeter of the island was about forty 里. It had big mountains but no paddy fields. Its lands were unfertile and dry. The inhabitants did not own military equipment or iron, and only had farm implements imported from Liaodong. Regarding the issue of Korean seafarers on the island, Cui Tang and his companions replied that they did not know if there were Korean traders. Although they had heard that there were Korean people from Yongch’ŏn and Insan of P’yŏngan Province who went to the island for picking and gathering plants in the past, they had not observed this situation.

50 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/7/30 (8/14/1528), fasc.62, vol.17, 16.
The king and his officials immediately found discrepancies between Cui Tang’s words and their own knowledge of Haerang Island and the Ming maritime policy, and therefore doubted that Cui Tang went to sea secretly without the Liaodong government’s permission. King Chungjong stated: “However, the confessions of the four people (Chinese people) indicate that they were ordered by the Liaodong governor to hunt, but this is not credible. Furthermore, there are also many people of our country migrating and trading back and forth on Haerang Island (The other name is Haiyang Island). But [these people] said they never heard or saw this situation. Therefore it is unclear whether these people are bandits or not.”

Second State Councilor Sim Chŏng also raised doubts about this contradiction, stating that when he had previously served in the Bureau of Crime Korean drifters to Haerang Island confessed that several thousand Chinese people and four to five hundred Korean people lived there. In contrast, the four Chinese castaways said that no Koreans resided there and only the Chinese islanders paid silver tax. Sim further speculated that Cui Tang’s seafaring was unpermitted since the Ming state prevented its people from going to sea for hunting.

Although the Chosŏn court suspected that Cui Tang’s group were deceitful poachers, it should be noted that Cui’s understanding of the geographical features of Haerang Island was not inaccurate. His estimation of its perimeter of 23.04 km (about forty li) was very close to today’s measurement of its coastline at 32.5 km. His description of the mountainous topography and unfertile lands was also in accordance with our knowledge of its natural environment.

However, if Cui was indeed familiar with the geographic situation of this island, how can the

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52 Changhai xianzhi, 88.
53 Haiyang xiangzhi, 82, 87.
contradictions between his words and the Chosŏn court’s understanding of its trading and living situation be explained? One possible reason is that he needed to make his navigation appear to be an authorized task by portraying the island as a place under Liaodong’s administration where only Chinese people lived, traded, and were taxed.

There are other doubtful points in Cui Tang and his companions’ statements as well. For instance, although Sim Chŏng believed that there were Liaodong people among them based on the language they used, the boats they took seemed to be from Haerang Island instead of Liaodong. Due to this, Sim raised the possibility of collusion between Liaodong people and offshore islanders to carry out illicit activities.54 Also, Cui Tang’s two confessions on his drifting experience, drawn from the investigations conducted by the Hwanghae provincial governor and the Royal Secretariat, conflicted with each other; he was unclear about his companions’ full names and made the excuse that it was Chinese custom to call people by their surname. Moreover, Cui Tang’s statement that they were ordered to hunt on a sea island is untenable. He said that because there were few wild animals on the land, the Liaodong Military Commission had no option but to send them to sea for hunting. However, the east Liaodong mountain region is actually covered by pine forests and abounds with furred animals.55 The two official certificates they held were especially questionable, issued respectively in the thirteenth year of the Zhengde reign (1518) and the sixth year of the Jiajing reign (1527). The Korean government believed that these documents did not verify Cui Tang’s legitimacy since their dates were much earlier than Cui Tang’s trip in 1528 and their content did not reference hunting.56

55 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/7/30 (8/14/1528), fasc. 62, vol.17,16. For the natural environment of the Liaodong Peninsula see Liaoning shengzhi, dili zhi bianzhi (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2002), 89-90.
56 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/7/30 (8/14/1528), fasc. 62, vol.17,16.
Considering all these problematic statements, although the Korean government was still uncertain whether these Chinese castaways were indeed pirates, at least their activities on the sea were confirmed to be illegal.  

The follow-up of this drifting case supported the Chosŏn’s conjecture. When it attempted to return the four Liaodong drifters through the land route and hand them over to the Liaodong Military Commission as it usually did when handling Chinese drifting cases, they fiercely resisted this arrangement, “spoke arrogantly and disobediently, lost their temper capriciously, and disregarded the law.” They even claimed that if they were sent back by the land route they would rather perish together with the Korean escorts. The Liaodong Military Commission’s attitude also indicates that although the drifters’ status of belonging to Liaodong military households was authentic, Liaodong refused to acknowledge that it had issued them official certificates and considered their behavior to be breaking the prohibition of fishing and hunting on the sea by holding counterfeit documents.

The Chosŏn’s investigation of these Chinese castaways followed its routine procedure when detecting foreign trespassers on the Korean coast, which was intended to clarify their identities and navigation purpose. In this process, the adaptability of applying its growing understanding of the outside maritime world to external challenges as the Chosŏn’s response mechanism is especially noteworthy. Its identification of Cui Tang and his followers was based on the thorough knowledge it obtained about their travel purpose and drifting experience from close observations of their spoken language, official documents, tools, and transportation methods, as

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59 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/10/7 (10/19/1528), fasc. 63, vol.17,50.
well as a careful comparison between their confessions and its current maritime knowledge. In particular, the Chosŏn’s mastery of the livelihood and trade on Haerang Island played an important role in its determination that Cui Tang’s words were false, promoting a successful recognition of illegal maritime activities in the northern Yellow Sea.

The Chosŏn continued to collect relevant information on Cui Tang’s case after these Liaodong castaways were returned. As noted above, the Ming and Chosŏn both agreed to expel their intermingling residents on Haerang Island, leaving it an unpopulated zone in order to prevent clandestine transnational contact. However, in the early sixteenth century the appearance of Liaodong poachers on Korea’s northwestern coast again triggered concern in the Chosŏn court. In order to ascertain if Cui Tang’s behavior was permitted by the Liaodong Military Commission, the Korean escort carefully reported what he observed in Liaodong when accompanying Cui Tang on his return journey. He first observed that when they arrived at the Liaodong border Cui Tang’s cousin, Cui Qing 崔清, came to angrily blame Cui Tang for his secret settlement by the Yalu River for fishing and hunting. After the Korean escort visited the Liaodong governors he then inquired about the Liaodong’s maritime policy and even carefully observed their expressions in order to understand their real attitudes toward this case. Although the Liaodong governors seemed to not be proactive and even appeared evasive when dealing with this matter, they denied the legitimacy of Cui Tang’s living by the Yalu River and hunting on the sea, and further encouraged the Chosŏn to arrest those who crossed the borders. The Liaodong chief commissioner stated: “The humble people of our lands privately occupy and live on sea islands in order to escape from military service. How can the vast territories of the

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60 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/10/7 (10/19/1528), fasc. 63, vol.17, 50.
Great Ming be left and ordinary people be permitted to live in a dangerous place in the middle of the river! People like these, such as your people offending our sea islands or our natives offending your sea islands, should be immediately arrested and returned to their own countries and be punished mercilessly.”  The accounts of Cui Qing’s and the Liaodong Military Commission’s reactions vividly mirror the Chosŏn’s significant interest in understanding the practice of the Liaodong maritime prohibition. Its special attention to confirming the illegitimacy of Liaodong people’s maritime activities further reflects its vigilance against any possible maritime expansion of Ming state power.

The Dynamics in the Ming’s Awareness of Its Maritime Domain

From a Korean perspective, the above sections examine how the Chosŏn state developed and applied its maritime understanding in its interactions with multiple Ming players. This section further argues that this process was not unilateral; in the early seventeenth century the Ming government also began to increase its understanding of the northern Yellow Sea space and expanded its domain awareness toward the Changshan Archipelago southeast of the Liaodong Peninsula. This process is reflected in the updated edition of Gazetteer of Liaodong (C. Liaodong zhi 遼東志). Before analyzing this issue, it is necessary to understand the distinct writing style of the Changshan islands in Gazetteer of Liaodong.

The nine-volume Liaodong zhi is the earliest existing gazetteer of northeast China. It was published in 1537, records the comprehensive situation of the Liaodong Military Commission

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62 Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 23/10/7 (10/19/1528), fasc.63, vol.17,50. 掌印大人答曰 我土下民 謀免軍家役使 自占居島耳 何必以大明廣大地方 反令小民許住江中危地乎 如此等人 或汝國人貳我海島 或我土人貳汝海島者 即拿送本國 當重治不饒.
and the administration of the Nurgan Military Commission in Manchuria, and introduces Liaodong’s neighboring tribes and countries. The revised version of *Liaodong zhi* was published in 1565. However, since its stylistic rules and outlines were changed, it was renamed *Quanliao zhi* 全遼志, the comprehensive gazetteer of Liaodong, and is usually considered a different book from *Liaodong zhi*. According to Chinese scholar Du Hongtao, the original *Liaodong zhi* was finished in 1413 and published in 1450, experiencing three revisions from the late fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries. Its first recompilation was completed and published in 1488; the second recompilation was begun in 1529 but its completion year is unknown; and the third recompilation and publication occurred in 1537 and was based on the unpublished 1529 version. This is the only existing version we have today.

The only record on Haiyang Island in *Liaodong zhi* is under the category of “Mountains and Rivers” (C. *Shanchuan*, 山川) of the Jinzhou Guard in the first volume on Liaodong geographic conditions. The distance from Haiyang Island to the Jinzhou Guard was recorded as “450 li from the (Jinzhou) City.” This account indicates that as late as 1537, the publication year of the existing version of *Liaodong zhi*, Haiyang Island was considered as lying within the territorial realm of Jinzhou in the official Liaodong gazetteer. The same stylistic rule of recording Haiyang Island is also applied to some other place names in *Liaodong zhi*: Wangjia Island 王家島, “300 li from the City”; Guanglu Island 廣鹿島, “200 li from the City”; Dachangshan Island 大長山島, “300 li from the City”; Xiaochangshan Island 小長山島, “260 li from the City”; Guapi Island 刮皮島, “280 li from the City”; Geteng Island 葛藤島, “300 li from the City”; Hadian

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Island 哈店島, “280 li from the City”; Seli Island 澀梨島, “290 li from the City”; Zhangzi Island 獐子島, “400 li from the City”; Shicheng Island 石城島, “270 li from the City”; Heiguo Island 黑堝島, “150 li from the City”; Wumang Island 吳忙島, “300 li from the City”; and Bayi Island 八义島, “320 li from the City.”

Two stylistic features distinguish these fourteen islands from all the other place names in Liaodong zhi’s category of “Mountains and Rivers.” First, compared to the other offshore islands of Jinzhou, which were mostly recorded as lying less than 150 li (86.4km) away from Jinzhou, these islands were relatively remote, located between 150 li (86.4km) and 450 li (259.2km) from Jinzhou. Also, while they were recorded in the style “place name + its distance from the guard city,” the other places were written in the style “place name + its direction + its distance from the guard city.” These marked differences indicate that the geographic knowledge of these fourteen islands was collected separately from the other places listed in Liaodong zhi.

Figure 3 Two writing styles of place names in Liaodong zhi, fasc. 1 “Geography,” in Liaohai congshu 遼海從書, ed. Jin Yufu 金毓黼 (Shenyang: Liaohai shushe, 1985), vol. 1, 362.
Based on this assumption, the first question that needs to be raised is the location of the above fourteen islands. When comparing their pronunciation and character pattern with their current name (Table 1), it can be concluded that they are among today’s Changshan Archipelago to the east of Jinzhou District of Dalian City, Liaoning Province, China.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Island names in <em>Liaodong zhi</em></th>
<th>Current names</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wangjia Island 王家島</td>
<td>Dawangjia Island 大王家島, or Xiaowangjia Island 小王家島</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guanglu Island 廣鹿島</td>
<td>Guanglu Island 廣鹿島</td>
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<td>Dachangshan Island 大長山島</td>
<td>Dachangshan Island 大長山島</td>
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<td>Xiaochangshan Island 大長山島</td>
<td>Xiaochangshan Island 大長山島</td>
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<td>Guapi Island 刮皮島</td>
<td>Guapi Island 瓜皮島</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geteng Island 葛藤島</td>
<td>Gexian Island 格仙島</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hadian Island 哈店島</td>
<td>Haxian Island 哈仙島</td>
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<td>Seli Island 澯梨島</td>
<td>Saili Island 塞里島</td>
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<td>Haiyang Island 海洋島</td>
<td>Haiyang Island 海洋島</td>
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<td>Zhangzi Island 獐子島</td>
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<td>Heiguo Island 黑塌島</td>
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<td>Wumang Island 吳忙島</td>
<td>Wumang Island 烏蟒島</td>
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<td>Bayi Island 八义島</td>
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Table 1 The fourteen *Liaodong zhi* islands and their current names
As shown in this table, other than the unrecognized Heiguo Island and Bayi Island, all the other places correspond to the Changshan Archipelago, with their names preserved or only slightly changed in pronunciation or characters. The map below presents the geographic locations and current names of these islands (except Heiguo Island and Bayi Island).

Figure 4 Geographic location of the fourteen Liaodong *zhi* islands among the Changshan Archipelago

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66 *Changhai xianzhi*, 22. “刮皮島” is annotated as “瓜皮島”; “葛藤島” is annotated as “格仙島”; “哈店島” is annotated as “哈仙島”; “澀梨島” is annotated as “塞里島”; “吳忙島” is annotated as “烏蟒島.” Although the current name and exact location of Bayi Island is unknown, according to an entry from the earliest gazetteer of the Shengjing region (roughly the jurisdiction of the Liaodong Military Commission of the Ming) compiled in the Kangxi reign, Bayi island is to the east 170 li (97.92km) of Jinzhou. *Ibahan 伊把漢（伊巴罕）*, Dong Bingzhong 董秉忠, and Sun Cheng 孫成, *Shengjing tongzhi* 盛京通志 (published in 1684, collected in Kyoto University), vol. 9, 39a. 八义島 [金州]城東一百七十里.
The second issue to be resolved is when the information of these fourteen islands was included in *Liaodong zhi*. First, the editing process of *Liaodong zhi* needs to be understood. According to the former Liaodong Military Commissioner Wang Xiang’s 王祥 prefacing, the original *Liaodong zhi* was finished in 1413. In this preface Wang mentions that the Yongle emperor ordered all his administrative prefectures and districts to compile and submit their illustrated gazetteers, and sent envoys to Liaodong to announce this message. After the original *Liaodong zhi* was finished it was presented to the Ming court and the manuscript was preserved in Liaodong. This manuscript was not published until 1450, with its woodblock prints replaced and supplemented. As Japanese scholar Inaba Iwakichi notes, the submission of the first edition of *Liaodong zhi* was for the central government’s compilation of *Daming yitong zhi* 大明一統志, the comprehensive geography book of the united Ming. Therefore the original version of *Liaodong zhi* was not merely preserved in Liaodong and served the need of the regional Liaodong government, but was also authorized by the Ming court.

The reediting of *Liaodong zhi* was completed in 1487-1488; it was directed by Liaodong Vice-commander Han Bin 韓斌, who ordered a supplement and correction of the original edition. The project was carried out by local Liaodong literati and published under Han Bin’s sponsorship. While no evidence suggests that this reediting was inspired by the Ming central government, it was at least a task on the local-government level. From the Chosŏn’s several fruitless negotiations with Liaodong in the 1490s as well as the Ming emperor’s uncertainty regarding the ownership of Haiyang Island in his edict in response to the Chosŏn’s inquiry in

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67 For Wang Xiang’s political career see “Liaoyang wangxiang muzhiming” 遼陽王祥墓志銘, in *Liaoning beizhi* 遼寧碑誌, ed. Wang Jingchen 王晶辰 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2002), 150-151.
70 Chen Kuan 陳寬, “Chongxiu liaodongzhi houxu” 重修遼東志後序, in *Liaohai congshu*, vol. 1, 278.
1500, it can be concluded that the Ming state’s incorporation of Haiyang Island into its domain awareness could not have been in the first and second editions of Liaodong zhi in the fifteenth century. The information on the above fourteen islands, including Haiyang Island, could only have been added in the third or fourth edition of Liaodong zhi in 1529 and 1537. This is especially understandable when considering their relatively remote distance from the Jinzhou Guard in comparison with other offshore islands.

The third compilation of Liaodong zhi was started in 1529. This edition was further revised and finally submitted for publication in 1537 by the cooperative efforts of Ming central and Liaodong provincial officials. It was not only preserved in China but spread to Korea in 1538, only one year after its publication. After that Liaodong gazetteers and military books incorporated Liaodong zhi’s claim that Haiyang Island and its neighboring sea was part of Chinese territory. For instance, Quanliao zhi, published in 1565, fully copied the related records of Liaodong zhi without even adjusting the writing style. Sizhen sanguan zhi was completed in 1574 to stress the strategic importance of the Ming northeastern border. It recorded the mountains, rivers, and islands of Liaodong, including Wangjia Island, Dachangshan Island, and Haiyang Island in the Changshan Archipelago. But different from the detailed Quanliao zhi, this book only briefly pointed out their location south of Liaoyang City.

Shengjing tongzhi was first compiled during the Qing Kangxi reign, and directly reproduced the category of “Mountains and Rivers” from Liaodong zhi but modified the writing

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73 Quanliao zhi 全遼志, fasc. 1, in Liaohai congshu, vol. 1, 534.
74 Liu Xiaozu 刘效祖, Sizhen sanguan zhi 四鎮三關志, fasc. 2, in Siku quanshu jinhui shu congkan, shibu 四庫全書禁燬書叢刊·史部(Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), vol. 10,63.
style in accordance with its overall pattern. The islands’ distance from Jinzhou was also reestimated for a more-accurate measurement.\(^75\)

Although a conclusion cannot be made that a definitive cause-effect relationship existed between the Ming-Chosŏn diplomatic communication on the maritime frontier of Haerang Island and the incorporation of this region into the Ming official narrative of its imperial realm, or if Cui Tang’s 1528 drifting case played a role in influencing the recompilation of Liaodong zhi, it was the growing cross-border private interactions in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that promoted the Ming state’s interest in understanding and exploring the northern Yellow Sea.

**Evaders, Migrants, and Smugglers in the China-Korea Border Region**

One remarkable impetus for the increase of private interactions on the China-Korea borders was the dramatic increase in the number of Liaodong military evaders escaping to the sea. The Ming established military garrisons (C. *weisuo*, 衛所) on the Liaodong Peninsula under the Liaodong Military Commission in the early Hongwu reign. The Liaodong garrisons functioned not only as military defense units, but also interacted closely with the regional administrative management as well as cultural and economic developments.\(^76\) The primary population that the Liaodong Military Commission governed was hereditary households bound by military service. From the early Ming dynasty each military household was required to send one adult male to serve as a soldier (C. *zhengjun* 正軍) in appointed garrisons. However, the selection of more

\(^{75}\) *Shengjing tongzhi*, vol.9, 38b-39a.

\(^{76}\) Guo Hong 郭紅 and Jin Runcheng 靳潤成, *Zhongguo xingzheng quhua tongshi, mingdai juan* 中國行政區劃通史·明代卷 (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2007), 249.
than one zhengjun in each military household had been occurring since the Yongle reign (1403-1424) and continued to exist until the late Ming. Besides the forced military service by soldiers, their male relatives functioned as supernumeraries (C. junyu, 軍余) who had to take on corresponding responsibilities such as serving as alternates and sponsors of soldiers. However, from as late as the Yongle reign, supernumeraries had also been forced into military service, a practice that became commonplace in the mid- and late Ming dynasty. In addition, Ming soldiers suffered from shortages in their pay and subsidies, and excessive economic burdens, issues resulting from hereditary officers’ misappropriation. Military officers falsely claimed the benefits of their subordinate soldiers, and exploited them to gain bribery payments in the increasingly competitive circumstances of obtaining limited official positions.

The Ming military farming system (C. tuntian, 屯田) coerced soldiers serving as guards into cultivating land to be self-sufficient, which had been a practice in Liaodong since the Hongwu period. In the early Ming the tuntian system developed the Liaodong economy and strengthened its military power in a meaningful way. In order to bind military households to the land, the government adopted various forceful methods and imposed onerous labor forces and land taxes on them. For instance, the Ming Veritable Records (C. Ming shilu, 明實錄) show that as early as the Chenghua reign (1465-1487) grain tax on Liaodong military lands had doubled compared to that of the early Hongwu period, and was three times higher than usual in official land. These onerous burdens resulted to a large extent in idle cultivation and runaways from Liaodong military households.

77 Wang Yuquan 王毓銓, Mingdai de juntun 明代的軍屯 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965), 235.
79 Yu Zhijia 于志嘉, Mingdai junhu shixi zhidu 明代軍戶世襲制度 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1987), 155.
Although the escape of Liaodong military personnel had been occurring as early as the Hongwu period, according to Wang Yuquan’s study this phenomenon became much more common until after the Xuande reign (1426-1435). This situation corresponds with Yang Yang’s statement that from the Ming Zhengtong (1435-1449) to the Zhengde period (1505-1521), northeast Chinese society was in turbulence: “Lands were annexed, military farming was destroyed, the economy was in gradual decline, and social contradictions were increasingly revealed.” Of course, there were other issues that stimulated the collapse of the *tuntian* system since the mid-Ming, such as Ming bureaucratic corruption, military officers’ significant embezzlement of provisions and military land, as well as their illegal exploitation and enslavement of military households.

At the beginning, Liaodong military personnel tended to escape to the neighboring Mongol and Jurchen tribes. They then went to the southeast Liaodong mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. Some of them also returned to their hometowns, either by crossing the Baohai Strait to Shandong or by the Shanhai Pass overland route. Unmanaged islands in the southern sea region of Liaodong became their gathering places as well. For instance, as early as 1434 the migration of many Liaodong deserters and their families to Wantan Island east of the Fuzhou Guard had already been reported to the Ming court. The above analysis of this chapter shows that it was as late as the late fifteenth century, Liaodong evaders had also spread to the Changhai Archipelago in the contact sea frontier between northern China and Korea.

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82 My translation of Yang Yang, *Mingdai dongbei shigang* (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju), III.
85 *Ming Xuanzong shilu* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1966), 2423.
Stimulated by emerging economic and social changes in China and Korea, it was also during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that smuggling between Liaodong and Korean border people had been developing markedly. With the collapse of the rank-land system (K. kwajönbŏp, 科田法) that had been applied in Korea since the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, land was more concentrated in the hands of private landowners. This reform resulted in the transformation of tenant peasants into businessmen and handicraftsmen for their livelihood, and promoted the development of the transaction mechanism and the marketization of surplus products in the King Sŏngjong period (1457-1495). It even fueled a rapid increase in demand for luxuries and their consequent import from the Ming in the Yŏnsan’gun (1476-1506) period. In Ming China the gradual establishment of a silver-based monetary system in the sixteenth century led to a boom in the domestic private economy. Regardless of the reinstatement of the sea ban policy in the mid-sixteenth century, the need to import silver and export Chinese commodities also activated China’s international trade in a significant way. Under these circumstances coastal residents and border people in both China and Korea became increasingly involved in informal economic activities.

It should be noted that when Chinese and Korean government interests were evoked in handling the emerging private interactions on their maritime frontier, as this chapter has stressed, the need to enhance their territorial border security and more explicitly demarcating their territorial boundaries also increased. From a regional perspective, one important impetus of this tendency was the Ming military construction and expansion of strength in Liaodong, which

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directly caused active cross-border contact between Chinese and Korean individuals in the early sixteenth century. Since the Tianshun reign (1457-1464), the Ming had begun to reinforce its military power in the eastern Liaodong mountain area in response to the rising threat of the Jurchen tribes. Chosŏn Koreans linked the Yalu River bank and the land east of Liaoyang City connected by the eight abandoned posts that had been established by Mongol Yuan, and named this area the “East Eight Posts” (K. Tongp'alch'am, 東八站), a term often seen in Korean historical accounts. It was intentionally vacated as a buffer zone from the early Ming and Chosŏn dynasties in order to preclude border conflicts. With the establishment of military fortresses and the Great Wall to the east of the Liao River from the 1450s to 1470s, as well as the subsequent reconstruction process of courier stations, the Liaodong military population flowed into this depopulated region. This propelled the illicit movement of Liaodong evaders by the Yalu River and their cultivation of the river islets, beginning in the Zhengde reign (1506-1521). As a consequence, cross-border collaborations between Liaodong and P'yŏngan border residents in smuggling and stealing also became more visible in the sixteenth century.88

With no fixed and distinct boundary in the Yalu River islets, this area functioned as a flexible borderland where the Ming and Chosŏn powers expanded, contested, negotiated, and compromised.89 Korean peasants exploited this land with government encouragement from the early fifteenth century, displaying the Chosŏn’s expansion of rule beyond its royal claim of territory. Since the late fifteenth century with the Ming’s military reinforcement of eastern

Liaodong, discussions on promoting cultivation of the islets were further raised in the Chosŏn court to prevent the possibility of the land being occupied by Ming people. When the Chosŏn finally retreated from this region in order to avoid occasional harassment from the Jurchens as well as possible conflict with the Ming, it also expressed concern about Liaodong people approaching it and therefore initiated continuous negotiations with the Liaodong government on banning its people from entering and cultivating the islets. During the 1540s consentient prohibitions, such as erecting a stone stele to demarcate the boundary line and forbid cross-border cultivation as well as expelling Liaodong peasants from the Yalu River islets, were finally executed to depopulate the space.

Multilateral competition and tensions led to this tendency to delimit the Yalu River islets as a boundary and a barrier to divide and separate both Chinese and Korean people from entry. However, although making a compromise in practice, it appears that the Chosŏn competed with Ming power by claiming possession of this region in its gazetteer compilation. In court discussions in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Yalu River islets were considered an area “in between”—beyond the Chosŏn’s territory, or even across the river within Ming territory. However, in the Korean geographical treatise Shinjūng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 新增東國與地勝覽 completed in 1530, these islets were recorded under the category of Ŭiju.90 This contestation has lasted until present day—Chinese and Korean contemporary scholars claim this area belongs to the Ming or to the Chosŏn, and regard their negotiations on this case as a territorial concession to each other. This situation is in accordance with Seonmin Kim’s

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statement in her examination of the Qing-Chosŏn borderland: “Strong nationalism in China and Korea makes contestation over the border an ongoing process.”\textsuperscript{91}

However, what makes the case of Haerang Island in the Ming-Chosŏn northern sea region different from their territorial borderland created by the meeting of competing polities is a lack of potential contestation and dispute on claiming the border and clarifying the borderline in this maritime frontier.\textsuperscript{92} On the contrary, in the late fifteenth century it was still undefined beyond the territorial claims of both states. But in the early sixteenth century, by incorporating information on the Changshan islands in its official-narrative Liaodong gazetteer, the Ming expanded its domain awareness to this region and transformed it into a maritime border.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter aims to answer the three related questions that were asked at the beginning. Motivated by the illegal maritime communications between Korean and Chinese residents in the northern Yellow Sea, it focuses on how the Chosŏn acquired maritime information through multiple channels, from its own officials and private smugglers as well as from its communications with Liaodong and Beijing. This process greatly helped its understanding and


reaction to the outer sea region. Through navigation to the Changshan islands in 1500, the Chosŏn gained an opportunity to directly update its knowledge of this area.

While in domestic discussions the Chosŏn was uncertain about the affiliation of this island, it was through its diplomatic communications that the Ming and Chosŏn courts shaped their territorial perceptions of Haerang Island, which was confirmed as a frontier beyond their realms. Unlike the multistate interest to define maritime boundaries “governed by the principles and rules of public international law” after World War II, the perception of maritime boundaries in premodern times was usually unclear, and therefore the determination and demarcation of maritime boundaries was “generally an infrequent and uncontentious process.”93 As reflected in this chapter, the two court conferences of the Chosŏn as well as its confirmation first with Liaodong then with the Ming central government indicate that there was no specific and clarified maritime boundary between China and Korea, just as Kenneth Robinson argues on the maritime territories of Korea and Japan: “A boundary line in the sea did not separate and distinguish Korean territory from Japanese territory (or, presumably, from Chinese territory, either).” Robinson further states: “Rather, the Chosŏn court identified maritime territory, and thus islands and the peninsula, within a zonal boundary. This shaping of space and of place emphasized presence rather than the location and moment of entry.”94 In this chapter it can be seen that even this awareness of a zonal boundary did not exist at the beginning but was dynamically formed. The Ming’s transformation of the Changshan islands from a maritime frontier to its claimed territory reflects this situation.

Finally, this chapter discusses the Chosŏn and Ming’s adaptability in dealing with the increase in transborder seafaring. In the analysis of Liaodong castaway Cui Tang’s case, the Chosŏn actively applied its current understanding of the sea region between Liaodong and Korea to the enhancement of coastal security. Especially when comparing its accumulated knowledge of Haerang Island to Cui Tang’s confessions, the Chosŏn incisively pointed out discrepancies and successfully established Cui Tang’s illegitimacy. The Ming’s developing geographic information and domain awareness of the Changshan islands also led to an inclination to incorporate this area into the scope of its territorial control.
Chapter 2

Evaders, Castaways, and “Water Bandits”:
A Dilemma in Sixteenth-Century Coastal Security

Frequent commercial exchanges between China’s southeastern coast and Japan’s Kyushu Island in the Ming Jiajing reign (1522-1566) led to the growing appearance of “unrecognized ships” (K. hwangdangsŏn 荒唐船) in Korea’s coastal regions, especially Chŏlla Province and Cheju Island. For the Korean government, whether these ships belonged to China or Japan was ambiguous. During the mid-sixteenth century this trespassing by Chinese and Japanese merchants triggered the Chosŏn state’s great anxiety regarding the maintenance of its coastal security in the southern provinces.¹ Simultaneously, its northwestern coast also witnessed the increasing arrival of castaways, who came mainly from the Liaodong Peninsula. This phenomenon correlated with the active private interactions in the northern Yellow Sea and the Bohai Strait. The resulting emergence of maritime outlaws and pirates worried both Chosŏn Korea and Ming China.

This chapter investigates the growth of private seafaring activities between China’s and Korea’s northern littoral in the sixteenth century, as well as the tension they created in the two states’ discernment, categorization, and regulation of maritime groups. Three themes frame this chapter. It first highlights how evaders, castaways, smugglers, and pirates connected the China-Korea maritime space, which challenged the central governance and local stability of the Ming

¹ Takahashi Kimiaki, “Ichiroku seiki chūki no kōtōsen to chōsen no taiō,” 95-112. According to this research, during the 1540s-1550s, there were eight recorded cases of “unrecognized ships” in Chŏlla Province and four cases in Cheju Island.
and the Chosŏn. It then examines the Chosŏn’s differentiation and handling of the organized and
violent Chinese and Korean smugglers and poachers, as well as the regional maritime
development in Korea’s northwestern provinces. Finally, this section investigates the Ming
state’s failed attempts to legitimize and assimilate its maritime migrants between Shandong and
Liaodong. This situation resulted from the Ming’s dilemma of maintaining a fragile balance
between transforming these people into resources for the government and constraining them
from uncontrollable development. The regional tension between Shandong and Liaodong that
created an ambiguous space in between, both geographically and administratively, also restricted
the maritime expansion of the Ming state’s power. This analysis aims to foreground the maritime
dynamics of Northeast Asia, a region that was not isolated but involved in the developing East
Asian maritime economies in the sixteenth century. It also aims to describe the limits to the land-
based polities’ control of their sea regions.

“Water Bandits” on Korea’s Northwestern Coast in the Sixteenth Century

During the late fifteenth century the Korean government was already paying attention to the
illegal migration toward the Changshan Archipelago. This motivated its forceful repatriation of
Korean overseas inhabitants in 1500. However, this measure did not succeed in alleviating the
Korean government’s anxiety about maintaining its coastal security. Beginning in the 1520s the
Chosŏn noted the appearance of “water bandits” (K. sujŏk 水賊) in northwest Korea, causing its
increasing concern about the illicit interactions in the northern Yellow Sea. This concern was
first reflected in an entry in Chungjong sillok in 1522. After some Korean offshore traders were
catched secretly going to Haerang Island, King Chungjong demonstrated his special interest in the
issue of maritime safety. In addition to ordering an inquiry about the island’s trading, cultivation, and immigration, he wanted to determine whether or not the Haerang islanders had a connection with water bandits and were equipped with weapons for defense.²

The Korean government’s conception of “water bandits” varied from time to time. This term first appeared in Chosŏn wangi jo sillok in the fifth month of 1474, and was used to describe those who acted rampantly in the coastal counties of Chŏlla Province.³ Takahashi Kimiaki’s and Seki Shūichi’s studies of water bandits of the late fifteenth century reveal that the stimulation by Japanese people’s maritime activities between Cheju Island and Chŏlla Province caused the Cheju sea people to behave like pirates to attack the southern coasts of Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang provinces. They spoke and dressed like Japanese as a disguise, and had close communications with the Japanese people. The Korean government called these Korean pirates “water bandits” to distinguish them from the so-called “Japanese pirates” (K. waegu 倭寇).⁴ In contrast, Rokutanda Yutaka argues that the first Korean water bandits were armed residents coming from the southern Chŏlla coast and running amuck on Korea’s southern coast. The primary members of water bandits then changed to the western coastal people of Chŏlla, who attacked Korea’s southwestern coastal regions.⁵ All three scholars agree that in the late fifteenth century the population of water bandits was mainly composed of Korean pirates active in the southern provinces of Chosŏn Korea.

² Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 17/9/28 (10/17/1522), fasc. 46, vol.16,162. 但其中有海浪島往來人 則問此島人但耕種資生耶 我國人及唐人投居者幾何 與水賊交通乎 漁獵興販往來于京江 耶 土地膏瘠何如 備兵器以防禦耶 並問之可也.
⁵ Rokutanda Yutaka, “Jūgo jūroku seiki chōsen no suizoku,” 322.
However, in the 1520s the range of these water bandits’ activity expanded to the sea region between the northwestern coast of the Korean Peninsula and the southeastern coast of the Liaodong Peninsula. King Chungjong’s concern about the possible connection between the Haerang Island inhabitants and water bandits is a reflection of this expansion. According to Rokutanda Yutaka’s analysis, in the sixteenth century the term “water bandits” no longer referred only to the Korean pirates from the southern and western coasts of Cholla Province. The Korean government’s consideration of their subjects had been generalized to incorporate groups such as sea raiders, suspicious ships, or people who engaged in illegal maritime activities around Korean as long as they were not perceived as Japanese pirates. However, as further argued by Rokutanda, the categories of “water bandits” and “Japanese pirates” were created for the Korean government’s purpose of treating them differently, and therefore do not represent their transnational and cross-ethnic character.

Ryu Ch’angho also points out that in the sixteenth century before the Imjin War of the 1590s, the water bandits of Haerang Island were those poaching and smuggling Phoca largha seals and deer, not the offensive pirates threatening

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Korea’s southern coast.\(^8\) To combine these opinions, other than those who were defined as Japanese pirates, the Chosŏn Korean government included a wide range of illicit maritime activities observed on Korea’s northwestern coast in the scope of water bandits, such as people using suspicious ships and lawbreakers who poached and smuggled on the sea.

While I agree with their views that water bandits in the northern Yellow Sea area between Korea and Liaodong were engaged in illicit commerce, especially poaching and smuggling Phoca largha skins and horsehide leather, the range of their activities and subjects needs to be further narrowed.\(^9\) According to the related records from *Chosŏn wangjo sillok*, in the late fifteenth century the Chosŏn court had already confirmed that Korean people were smuggling and poaching on Haerang Island, but they were still not named water bandits. As shown in King Chungjong’s above investigation of the Korean smugglers returning from Haerang Island in 1522, it was only then that the specific expression was first used to describe a possible connection between water bandits and the Haerang inhabitants.\(^10\) Beginning in the early sixteenth century, the Chosŏn court continued to differentiate water bandits from normal poachers in the northern Yellow Sea. For instance, when clarifying a Chinese drifting accident in 1528 Chungjong asked if the Chinese castaways were indeed water bandits or whether they were just hunting privately and had drifted to Korea by accident.\(^11\) These two examples indicate that

\(^8\) Ryu Ch’angho, “Sŏhae pukpu haeyŏgesŏ haerangjŏk hwaltonggwa Chosŏnjŏngbuŭi taeŭng, Haerang-do sut’o (1500 nyŏn) esŏ Paengnyŏngjin sŏch’i (1609 nyŏn) kkaji,” 85-86. For maritime activities of the Haerang people and the Haerang pirates from the late fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries in the context of cross-border trade and military interactions between China and Korea. See Fujita Akiyoshi, “Tōajia ni okeru tōsho to kokka Kōkai wo meguru kaiiki kōryūshi,” 232-254.

\(^9\) For instance, in 1526 the Korean government caught seventy-six smugglers under the suspicion of them being water bandits. But the crucial evidence of Phoca largha skins and horsehide leather that typically belonged to water bandits was not found at their places. *Chungjong sillok*, Chungjong 21/11/16 (12/19/1526), fasc. 57, vol.16, 538.

\(^10\) *Chungjong sillok*, Chungjong 17/9/28 (10/17/1522), fasc. 46, vol.16,162.

those who the Chosŏn government perceived as water bandits were not equivalent to common cases of unlawful hunting, smuggling, or maritime migration.

In the sixteenth century the Korean government tended to define water bandits appearing on its northwestern coast as armed and organized groups derived from Chinese and Korean coastal outlaws, whose violent tendencies could threaten the Chosŏn’s state security more severely than scattered sea-ban breakers. One case of a confirmed crime conducted by water bandits is recorded in Myŏngjong sillok. A 1546 report was submitted from the Office of the Inspector-General to King Myŏngjong stating that a Korean water bandit named Ko Chijong 高之宗 was arrested on Ch'o Island of Hwanghae Province. The island had once played an indispensable role in the sea route for the Silla kingdom’s tribute trip to the Chinese Tang dynasty.12 Since the early Chosŏn it had been enclosed as either a state horse ranch or woodland where transportation, inhabitation, and cultivation were forbidden.13 However, because of its strategic location off the protruding coastlines of Hwanghae Province, private voyages departing to Liaodong Peninsula were not rare.

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12 Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 and Song Qi 宋祁, Xin tangshu 新唐書, fasc. 43 (part 2) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), 1147.
13 Shinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam, fasc.43, 766. 椒島 [豐川都護]府北四十里 海中有牧場; Sejong sillok 30/8/27 (9/24/1448), fasc.121, vol. 5, 96.
Figure 5 Map of horse ranch on Ch'o Island, in *Mokchang chido* 牧場地圖 (1678), ed. 許穆 (Seoul: Kungnipchungangdosŏgwan kojŏnunyŏngshil, 2006, reprint).

The following report narrates how water bandit Ko Chijong’s activities expanded across the border region of China and Korea:

The Office of the Inspector-General presents: “Water bandit Ko Chijong was caught on Ch'o Island at P'ungch'ŏn of Hwanghae Province. He was originally from Ŭiju, escaped to the Superior Country, and advocated and led treacherous traitors there. They have already formed a base which is not an unimportant matter. Probably the Ŭiju border is contiguous with the Superior Country so that households on one side can be seen from the other side. Their people and goods have long been secretly in contact, and this damage to our state will be beyond description. More than that, our coastal residents commonly pursue profits by boat back and forth to Haerang Island and the Jinzhou Guard, and Hamgyŏng border people hasten to seek refuge in the Jurchen places while they were in an unfavorable situation. And it is also frightening that the confidential information of our state leaks without exception. Fortunately these men [Ko Chijong, etc.] have been caught by border defending generals and
their crimes should not be treated as previous cases. Please arrest them to the Bureau of Crime separately for trial in order to prevent infinite damages.” The King replies: “As you say.”14

According to this report, King Myŏngjong agreed with the Office of the Inspector-General that Ko Chijong’s case should be handled differently due to the severity of his crime, who organized a transnational group of outlaws that may directly threaten Korea’s border security. This clearly demonstrates that unlike the scattered smugglings of Korean commoners via sea routes between China and Korea, water bandits were more organized and involved both Chinese and Korean border people.

Probably the most direct explanation of water bandits comes from a Chosŏn official, Kim Sŏngil 金誠一, when he was appointed as the royal inspector of Hwanghae Province to examine its armament in 1583.15 In the same year Kim submitted a memorial to King Sŏnjo in which he pointed out that the declining sea defense negatively impacted the ability to resist attacks from water bandits on the offshore islands of Hwanghae Province. In this discussion he depicted their acts and equipment in detail:

This province [Hwanghae Province] connects to the route of Yangho [Chŏlla and Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces] sea raiders [K. haegu, 海寇] in the south, and links the strategic place of Liao-Bo [Liaodong and the Bohai Sea region] water bandits. … I inspected the coast and consulted border affairs [to confirm] that the unidentified Chinese or Japanese bandits go back and forth on the sea and rob consistently. Ch’o Island of P’ungench’ŏn, Paengnyŏng, Taech’ŏng and Soch’ŏng islands of Changyŏn, and Yŏnp’yŏng Island of Haeju have become their dens. Fishing and merchant ships are plundered, and even patrol ships are also attacked. This kind of misfortune occurs more than once or twice a year. Moreover, border generals are only good at concealing rather than reporting [the raiders], and it is an

14 Myŏngjong sillok 明宗實錄, Myŏngjong 1/12/15 (1/6/1547), fasc. 4, in Chosŏn wangjo sillok (Seoul: Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1956), vol.19, 472. 憲府啓曰 黃海道豐川椒島捕捉水賊高之宗 本以義州人 逃移上國 唱率奸賊 已成窟穴 所關非輕 大抵義州境連上國 煙火相望 人物潛通 其來已久 國家之害 將有不可勝言 非特此也 我國水邊居人 或乘舟逐 利 尋常往來於海浪島金州衛等地 咸競邊寇 事有不利於己 奄投野人之居 國內機事 無不漏洩 亦為駭愕 此輩今幸見捕 於邊將 其所犯不可以例推 請拿來 各別下禁府推鞫 以杜無窮之弊 答曰 如啓.
especially sorrowful and troubling situation that they do not make efforts to suppress and arrest [them]. The so-called “water bandits” do not have military equipment for assault and combat, but only own weak crossbows, blunt arrowheads, rocks, and wooden sticks as weapons. If border generals can keep a careful lookout, repair navy ships, and launch a sneak attack to besiege [water bandits] when [they] come to berth at those islands, capturing them will be as easy as turning our hand. But [border generals] just let them come and go, and such conduct has never been done before. It is not surprising that sea bandits get in and out of the islands to hunt ranch horses and cut wood for ship construction.16

Kim distinguished water bandits from sea raiders coming along the southern coast of Korea. While the term “sea raiders” probably refers to Japanese pirates who most often attacked Korea’s southern provinces, water bandits traveled from Liaodong and the Bohai Sea to Hwanghae Province, robbing and establishing bases on Korea’s offshore islands. They built ships by logging, probably in the woodlands of these islands, and also poached ranch horses and smuggled horsehide leather between Korea and China. This description corresponds with another contemporary Korean scholar-official’s writings that water bandits were robbers, but their crimes were not as serious as invading Korean territory.17 Regarding the military strength of water bandits, they owned weapons and threatened Korea’s coastal security—although Kim considered them weak and easily defeated if the Chosŏn navies could place a higher priority on this matter.

The above records illuminate that between the 1520s and the 1580s the Chosŏn court was paying ongoing attention to the emergence of water bandits in the northwestern coast of the Korean Peninsula. The features of the records can be summarized. First, the Korean government

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16 Kim Sŏngil 金誠一, *Hakpongjip sokchip* 鶴峰集續集, fasc. 2, in *Han’guk yŏkt’ae munjip ch’ongsŏ* 韓國歷代文集叢書 (Seoul: Han’guk munjip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, Kyŏngin munhwasa, 1999), vol. 1903, 258-260.
本道南通兩湖海寇之路 北接遼渤水賊之衝…臣巡歷沿海 詢咨邊事 則倭倭未辨之賊 往來海中 日以搶掠為事 豐川之椒島 長澗之白翎 大 小青 海州之延平等島 為賊藪穴 漁采商船 爲其所奪 本道之變 一歲之內 非止一再 而邊將以匿不以報為能事 以驅捕之計 尤可痛憤也 所謂水賊者 非有攻戰器械 只以弱弩鈍鏃石塊木梃為兵 為邊將者 於能詭詐瞭 矢箇軍船 舟諸島來泊之際 四面掩襲 則其捕獲之易 有如反手 而任其往來 更無誰何 海賊之出入諸島 以射獵牧馬 伐材造船為事者 無足怪也.

17 O Kŏn 吳健, *Tŏkkyejip* 德溪集, fasc. 4, in *Han’guk munjip ch’onggan*, vol. 38, 119b.
水賊 特蚍蜉之類耳 寄生舟楫 草賊為事 非是犯境之寇.
regarded water bandits as organized but poorly armed gangs, and differentiated them from Japanese pirates. They usually robbed, poached, and smuggled along Korea’s northwestern coast. The major purposes of these activities were obtaining Phoca largha seals, horsehide leather, and logging. Second, the majority of water bandits included Chinese and Korean border people. They mixed with those who sailed unidentified ships to Korea. Third, the Korean government understood that water bandits came from the direction of the Bohai Sea and Liaodong, and were especially active between the offshore islands of Liaodong and Hwanghae Province such as Haerang Island, Ch‘o Island, Paengnyŏng Island, Taech‘ŏng Island, Soch‘ŏng Island, and Yŏnp‘yŏng Island.

Figure 6  Map of Hwanghae Province in *Kwangyŏdo* 廣輿圖 (dated in the first half of the nineteenth century, Kyujanggak, 古 4790-58).
Figure 7 Map of Hwanghae Province in Yŏjido 與地圖 (dated in the first half of the nineteenth century), in Yŏngnamdaebangmulgwan sojang Han'gugŭi yet chido top'anpyŏn 영남대박물관소장 韓國의옛地圖 (Kyŏngsan: Yŏngnamdaebangmulgwan, 1998), 38.

Figure 8 Ch'o Island and Paengnyŏng Island in two comprehensive Korea maps, author and time unknown, collected in the National Library of Korea, in Han'guk kojido 韓國古地圖 (Seoul: The Korean Library Science Research Institute, 1977), 70, 79.
Liaodong Castaways and Water Bandits: An Insoluble Problem for Chosŏn Korea

Incited by the private maritime trade between China, Japan, and other foreign countries, the rampant piracy along Korea’s western coast during the sixteenth century intertwined with the increasing drifting accidents of unrecognized ships. In 1523 the Ming closed the Office of Shipping Trade that was in charge of the tribute trade with Japan due to a tribute conflict between two Japanese clans in Ningbo. This interruption of the authorized Chinese-Japanese trade relationship dramatically motivated illicit commercial activities, including armed smuggling. It was not until the Ming’s moderation of the maritime prohibition in 1567 that the piracy crisis eased. Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang describe the period of 1523 to 1567 as “wild and woolly” because of its thriving smuggling and piracy in “an ambiguous and complex web of sovereignties.”

The prosperity of this private maritime commerce in defiance of the Ming sea-ban policy was closely interrelated with the import of a tremendous amount of silver into China from overseas countries in the sixteenth century. Influenced by this flow, cross-border poaching and smuggling operations between China and Korea were also activated. In Liaodong one consequence of the development of private economy, as opposed to a military farming system, was a considerable portion of the local population being separated from the garrison system; they

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18 Chosŏn Korea was also involved in this incident by repatriating two Japanese participants and their Ming captives. See Zheng Liangsheng 鄭樑生, *Mit-Nichi kankeishi no kenkyû* 明·日関係史の研究 (Tokyo: Yûzankaku, 1985), 290-291; Yamazaki Takeshi 山崎岳, “Chôkô to kaikin no ronri to genjitsu—mindai chûki no ‘jianxi’ Sô sokei o daizai toshite” 朝貢と海禁の論理と現実—明代中期の「奸細」宋素卿を題材として, in *Chûgoku Higashi Ajia gaikō kōryūshi no kenkyû* 中国東アジア外交交 流史の研究, ed. Fuma Susumu 夫馬進 (Kyoto: Kyôto Daigaku Gakujutsu Shuppankai, 2007), 234-244, Ku Toyŏng, “16segî chosŏnnû ningboûin na kwallyônjâ p'yoryuin songhwan: chomyôngirû se kaji sisôn” 16세기 조선의‘寧波의亂’관련자 표류인 승환—朝·明·日의‘세 가지 시산’, *Yôksahakpo* 역사학보 224 (December 2014): 197-226.

either entered the eastern Liaodong borderland for digging ginseng, mining, farming, or smuggling with the Korean people, or migrated to sea islands between Liaodong and Shandong to conduct trade and transportation. With this process of Liaodong runaways successively migrating toward the sea after the late fifteenth century, Chinese drifting incidents increased on Korea’s northwestern coast.

Since the early sixteenth century the Korean government began to pay attention to the maritime violence of Liaodong castaways. While this situation needs to be contextualized in armed smuggling in East Asia, Liaodong soldiers’ more severe actions against government tyranny during this period may be one impetus in the locale to stimulate the appearance of violent Liaodong seafarers. As shown, in 1509 the earliest mutiny of the Ming occurred in both the Jinzhou and Yizhou guards of Liaodong, fighting against eunuch Liu Jin’s exploitation. More disturbances were triggered thereafter in the Jiajing reign, such as the five-month-long mutiny in Liaoyang, Guangning, and Fushun in 1535-1536, and the 1540 Guangning Munity. Liaodong civilians also markedly participated in revolts in the sixteenth century, such as Lu Xiong and Li Zhen’s murder of the Shanhai Pass guardian in 1524 and Zhu Bao’s resistance to heavy taxation in 1546.

While the scarcity of Korea’s provincial and local records of foreign drifting accidents in the sixteenth century makes a thorough investigation of its multilayered responses and a

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21 Instead of stressing Liu Jin’s negative personal image, Liao Xinyi’s research contextualizes Liu Jin’s case in the acute political and social conflicts. This study also examines the relatively positive effects of Liu’s policies including his survey of military farmlands on appeasing social contradictions. See Liao Xinyi 廖心一, “Liu Jin ‘bianluan juzhì’ kāolüè 呂瑾 “變亂舊制” 考略,Mingshi yanjiu luncong 明史研究論叢, vol.3 (1985), 139-166.
22 For the positive effect of Liu Jin’s Yang Yang, Mingdai dongbei shigang, 357-363.
comprehensive collection of related cases difficult to achieve, the limited reports to the court at least provide a glimpse into how Chosŏn Korea attempted to discern and regulate transmarine violence at the central government level. By using Chosŏn wangjo sillok as the core source, this section summarizes the drifting cases in P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces in the sixteenth century in which the Korean government confirmed or speculated that the participants were Chinese. To narrow the scope of this analysis, those who were identified as Chinese southerners and/or appeared together with the Japanese as their captives or trade partners are not included.\footnote{For such cases see Myŏngjong sillok, Myŏngjong 8/6/27 (8/6/1553), fasc. 14, vol.20, 145; Myŏngjong 14/7/2 (8/4/1559), fasc. 25, vol.20, 522.} In addition, the Korean history book Yŏllyŏsil kisul 燃藜室記述 is used as supplementary material. It is one of the most representative and invaluable private historical writings of the late Chosŏn period. Based on a large variety of official and private works, the compilation of Yŏllyŏsil kisul reflects the empirical and impartial attitudes of a Practical Learning school (K. Sirhak, 實學) scholar, Yi Kŭng'ik 李肯翊 (1736-1806).\footnote{Yi Chonhŭi 李存熙, “Yi Kŭng'ik kwā Yŏllyŏsilgisulū p'yŏnch'an” 李肯翊과《燃藜室記述》의編纂, Chindanhakpo 진단학보 61 (June 1986): 197; Sin Insu 申寅洙, “Yŏllyŏsil kisulū p'yŏnch'an charyoe kwanhan sŏjiŏk yŏn’gu” 燃藜室記述의編纂資料에관한書誌的 研究, Sŏjihakpo 書誌學報 23(December 1999): 147-148.} This analysis uses the records under the category of hwangdangsŏn 荒唐船 in the separate collection of Yŏllyŏsil kisul, which show a portion of Chinese and Japanese cases of drifting to the Korean Peninsula from the early Chosŏn dynasty to the reign of King Yŏngjo (1724-1776).\footnote{The category of hwangdangsŏn was inherited by some encyclopedias of the late Chosŏn, such as Tongjon'go 東典考 (Seoul: Minch'ang Munhwasa, 1991) and Munhyŏng goryak 文獻略 (Changsŏgak, K2-2079).}

The cases below briefly sum up the years and locations of drifting incidents, the (possible) hometowns of the castaways, their confessions, and the Korean government’s investigations and treatments:

**Case 1**
In 1528 four Liaodong castaways named Cui Tang 崔堂, Cui Wu 崔五, Cui Bao 崔保, and Zhang Feng 張奉 drifted to Changyŏn County of Hwanghae Province from Linjiang, Liaodong. According to Cui Tang’s confessions, they went out to sea and hunted on Haiyang Island under the Liaodong Commissioner’s order. After their hunting operation, they encountered a storm and drifted to a horse ranch of Korea. They met several Korean shepherds and asked them the direction of Liaodong and úiju. However, suffering from another storm, they then drifted to Changyŏn County of Hwanghae Province and were captured there. The Korean government cast doubt on their identities as either poachers or water bandits. Based on the discrepancies of Cui Tang’s confessions along with its own knowledge, the Korean government conjectured that they violated the Ming’s maritime prohibition policy and went to sea for poaching. Cui Tang and his companions were finally repatriated to Liaodong.

Case 2
In 1532 five Liaodong people drifted to Tangjinp'o of Ch'ungch'ŏng Province. Since it was very rare for Liaodong people to drift to Korea’s southeastern coast, the Chosŏn government paid special attention to the investigation of this case. For this reason this case is also included in this analysis. One of the five castaways, Jiang Fu 姜福 from the Dongning Guard of Liaodong, described his experience on the sea with the little Korean language he knew. According to his confessions, a total of ten Liaodong people took the boat to Guanglao Island to mine silver and make charcoal. On their way to Chenzhou 陳州 City a storm overturned their boat; five people drowned while the other five swam ashore. Guanglao Island was later recorded as Guanglu Island 廣鹿島 in a more-detailed confession of Jiang Fu; it is located in today’s Changshan Archipelago in the southeast sea of Liaodong. The term “Chenzhou City” probably refers to the coastal Jinzhou 金州 City of Liaodong since the pronunciation of Jin 金 in Chinese is similar to the pronunciation of Chin 陳 in Korean. This case was regarded as unusual because it seemed to be too rapid a trip for these Liaodong castaways to travel from China, pass P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces, and arrive at Ch'ungch'ŏng Province in only one month. Due to the fact that Liaodong castaways are rarely found in Korea’s southern region, the Chosŏn court considered sending these people directly to the Ming court rather than repatriating them to the Liaodong government. However, Chosŏn officials worried about this kind of report becoming routine and resulting in “countless disadvantages.” The court discussed transmitting a document on this unusual drifting case to the Ming Ministry of Rites.

Case 3

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26 Chungjông sillok, Chungjong 23/7/30 (8/14/1528), fasc.62, vol.17,16.
27 Chungjông sillok, Chungjong 27/2/18 (3/24/1532), fasc.72, vol.17,356.
28 Chungjông sillok, Chungjong 27/2/30 (4/5/1532), fasc.72, vol.17,358.
29 Chungjông sillok, Chungjong 27/2/21 (3/27/1532), fasc.72, vol.17, 357. 且今以不緊之事而聞于中朝 則後必成例而有無窮之弊矣.
In 1532 the governor of Hwanghae Province reported to the Chosŏn court that some Chinese people were captured. King Chungjong provided them abundant clothes and food and ordered them to be returned to China.  

**Case 4**  
In 1533 King Chungjong received a report from the governor of P'yŏngan Province that some Chinese boats were caught floating on the water of Ka Island. The Chosŏn court believed that these people were gangs since they aggressively entered Korea. Because of their unusual behavior, the court discussed putting them into prison and carefully interrogating them about their ancestral homes, their ringleader, and the reason for their going overseas. Although their confessions were inconsistent and their behavior was suspicious, the king did not order further interrogation of them by torture since they were people of “the Superior Country.” In the end, the court only confirmed their violation of the maritime prohibition and deceitful acts, failing to find clues of them being pirates. It also discussed whether to directly inform the Ming Ministry of Rites about this case or to repatriate the trespassers to Liaodong. Concerned that the Liaodong government would be rebuked by the Ming central government due to its loose border management, the Chosŏn court only sent a report to Liaodong.  

**Case 5**  
In 1535 several Liaodong seafarers drifted to Hwanghae Province from Haerang Island. The Chosŏn court doubted the veracity of their confessions and ordered the Bureau of Crime to conduct a more-detailed interrogation. However, this case was later confirmed as a normal drifting incident and the Chinese men were sent back on a Korean tribute trip.  

**Case 6**  
In 1540 King Chungjong received a report that an unrecognized ship was found in P'ungch'ŏn County of Hwanghae Province. Although the language the castaways spoke could not be understood, based on their clothes and belongings the king concluded that it was not a pirate ship and these seafarers were Chinese. He ordered food and clothes to be provided and sent them back with the Korean envoys. The king suspected that they drifted to Korea when cutting wood or fishing overseas.  

**Case 7**  
In the seventh month of 1544 two Chinese boats drifted to Sŏnch'ŏn County of P'yŏngan Province. Since the language these castaways spoke was incomprehensible, the P'yŏngan government was unable to interrogate them. At first the Chosŏn court discussed reporting

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30 Chungjong sillok, Chunjong 27/12/4 (12/29/1532), fasc.73, vol.17, 386.  
33 Chungjong sillok, Chunjong 30/6/8 (7/7/1535), fasc.79, vol.17.590; Chungjong 30/7/1 (7/30/1535), fasc.80, vol.17,594.  
34 Chungjong sillok, Chunjong 35/1/19 (2/26/1540), fasc.92, vol.18,373.
this case to the Ming court and returning the Chinese men to Beijing.\(^\text{35}\) In the eighth month of 1544 the Chosŏn court verified that the Chinese boats berthing at Sŏnch'ŏn belonged to Liaodong Jinzhou people.\(^\text{36}\) They were sent back to China with a Korean tribute group.

Case 8
In 1544 fifteen Liaodong inhabitants drifted to Ŭllyul County of Hwanghae Province. One person confessed that they lived in Wuchiguli Island and fished together with a shipowner at Lu Island. They experienced a shipwreck after strong winds on the sea. Fifteen people survived and drifted to Hwanghae Province. Although the current location of Wuchiguli Island is unknown, Lu Island could refer to either Dalu Island 大鹿島 or Xiaolu Island 小鹿島 west of the estuary of the Yalu River. Doubting the truth of their confessions, the Chosŏn court dispatched an interpreter to Hwanghae Province to conduct further investigation but its result was not recorded in Chungjong sillok. They were escorted to China by a Korean tribute group.\(^\text{37}\)

Case 9
In 1545 the governor of Hwanghae Province submitted a case of drifting in Changnyŏn County to the Chosŏn court; he considered these castaways to be Chinese. However, because their language was incomprehensible and it was impossible to conduct an explicit investigation, King Myŏngjong was confused about whether their identity was Japanese or Chinese. Since the Chosŏn court had just ordered unrecognized ships to be prevented from going ashore due to the difficulty of repatriating the castaways frequently coming to Korea in the mid-sixteenth century, it decided to provide them a small amount of food and ask them to leave by themselves without reporting this case to the Ming.\(^\text{38}\)

Case 10
In 1547 when the Chosŏn court discussed the situation of more than forty unrecognized people berthed at Hwanghae Province (case 11), it mentioned that in this case (Case 10) there were some Chinese people caught establishing homes and making anvils in Ch'o Island of P'ungch'ŏn, Hwanghae Province. Since they were suspected to be water bandits colluding with the Koreans, the Chosŏn court decided to interrogate them by torture.\(^\text{39}\) The exact time of this case is unknown.

Case 11
In 1547 more than forty people berthed at Changyŏn County, Paengnyŏng and Taech'ŏng islands of Hwanghae Province, establishing large houses, setting forges, and fixing ships in Korea. While these acts looked suspicious, the governor of Hwanghae Province believed

\(^{35}\) Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 39/7/12 (7/31/1544), fasc.104, vol.19,111.


\(^{38}\) Injong sillok 仁宗實錄, Injong 1/9/24 (10/29/1545), fasc. 47, vol.19, 343.

\(^{39}\) Myŏngjong sillok, Myŏngjong 2/2/13 (3/4/1547), fasc.5, vol.19,484.
that they were Chinese escapees from labor forces and therefore did not interrogate them by torture. The Chosŏn court was also unwilling to give them an inquisition by punishment after identifying them as Chinese, so it discussed sending a document to Liaodong and asking the case to be transmitted to the Ming emperor. The identity of these castaways was more definitively recorded as Chinese evaders in Yŏllyŏsil kisul.

Case 12
In 1550 there were Chinese people berthing at Ch'o Island of P'ungch'ŏn, Hwanghae Province. They established houses, cut wood, constructed ships, and killed ranch horses as if “entering into a place where no one lives.” The court was startled by the impotent defense of Hwanghae Province, and dismissed and interrogated the district magistrate for his weak regulation of borders.

Case 13
In 1564 some Chinese castaways were captured in Ongjin County of Hwanghae Province. Their activities corresponded with the recent concern of the Chosŏn court regarding the collusion between Chinese border people and Korean coastal runaways on sea islands. Since the Chosŏn court did not find any evidence of this transnational piracy, these Chinese castaways, who were suspected to be pirates, were carefully investigated. One of them, named Gong Cheng, confessed that he once served as a sailor in the Fuzhou Guard of Liaodong but escaped to Haiyang Island with his family when he heard that the barbarians were going to rob Fuzhou. He then drifted to Korea after going to sea. The king concluded that Gong Cheng seemed to be a normal castaway, submitted the case to the Ming court, and escorted the drifters to China.

Case 14
In 1582 Zhao Yuanlu from the Jinzhou Guard of Liaodong drifted to Hwanghae Province and was returned to China.

These cases show that most drifting incidents on Korea’s northwestern coast reported to the Chosŏn court occurred from the 1530s to the 1550s, and peaked in the 1540s. The Korean government knew the points of departure in cases 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 13 and 14 were the Jinzhou and

40 Myŏngjong sillos, Myŏngjong 2/2/12 (3/3/1547); Myŏngjong 2/2/13 (3/4/1547), fasc.5, vol.19,484.
41 Yi Kung'ik 李肯翊, Yŏllyŏsilgitsul pyŏlichip 燃藜室記述別集, fasc. 17, in Kajŏn 'gunsŏyŏkch'ongsŏ 古典國譯叢書 11 (Seoul: Minjongmunhwach'ujinhoe, reprint, 1982), 744.
42 Myŏngjong sillos, Myŏngjong 5/2/26 (3/14/1550), fasc. 10, vol.19, 684. 唐船來泊于豐川地椒島 造家留住 斬木造船屠殺牧場馬 加入無人之境.
44 Yi Kung'ik, Yŏllyŏsilgitsul pyŏlichip, fasc.17,744.
Fuzhou guards and/or the southeastern offshore islands of Liaodong. These castaways claimed various purposes of going to sea, such as hunting, mining silver, making charcoal, fishing, and escaping. While the Korean government did not mention the hometowns of the Chinese castaways in cases 4, 10, 11, and 12, it is highly possible that they came from Liaodong as well. In case 4 the arrested Chinese intentionally crossed the border without official authorization and posed a threat to Korea’s coastal security. However, the Chosŏn court hesitated to submit this case to the Ming Ministry of Rites since this report would provoke the Liaodong government’s anger. This situation indicates that the Chinese castaways in case 4 were under the direct management of Liaodong.

In case 10, as mentioned in the court discussion of early 1547, the Chinese people on Ch'ŏ Island were determined to be water bandits connecting with Koreans. This description corresponds with Ko Chijong’s case, as noted above. At the end of 1546 a Ŭiju water bandit, Ko Chijong, colluded with Chinese Liaodong border conspirators and was also captured on Ch'ŏ Island. Although the accurate date of case 10 is not given, considering these overlapping details the two incidents may interrelate, and therefore the Chinese trespassers in case 10 probably came from the Liaodong border region as well. Case 12 is similar to case 10; the Chinese seafarers in case 12 built houses, conducted lumbering, and killed ranch horses on Ch’o Island, similar to water bandits’ crimes. The king also regarded them as pirates that needed to be executed.

In case 11 the Chinese sailing to the coast of Hwanghae Province were recorded as evaders from labor forces. Their motivation was distinct from the southern Chinese residents who went overseas for the purpose of smuggling. Considering the remarkable movement of Liaodong inhabitants toward the sea region between Liaodong, Shandong and Korea to avoid taxes and services from the mid-Ming dynasty, as well as the inland migration of Shandong coastal
residents in the early Ming that caused coastal depopulation, the seafarers in case 11 were most likely from Liaodong. The above analysis reveals that with the exception of cases 3, 6, and 9 in which the participants were recorded as unidentified Chinese or Japanese, the other cases were all related to the seafaring activities of Liaodong border people who came to Korea either by accident or on purpose.

The activeness of water bandits in Korea’s northwestern coastal areas from the beginning of the sixteenth century made it crucial for the Chosŏn to distinguish those who approached Korea intentionally and threatened its border security from normal drifting accidents. Its doubt of the legitimacy of Chinese seafarers was also heightened by their frequent maritime trade and overseas travel without government permission. Therefore the Chosŏn court always expressed caution in accepting the authenticity of Chinese castaways’ confessions, and ordered more-detailed investigations after they were sent from the incident sites to Seoul.

However, even after the Korean government displayed its competence in recognizing illegal seafarers and inhabitants on the sea, as shown in my analysis of Cui Tang’s case in chapter 1 (case 1 in this chapter) it found it difficult to establish solid evidence of water bandits and was unable to further discern them from those who generally violated the sea-ban policy. This is reflected in Cui Tang’s case as well; although King Chungjong and his officials raised the possibility that Cui Tang and his followers were water bandits based on their questionable confessions, they never confirmed this with a court investigation. This problem reoccurred in the court’s examination of case 4. While it regarded the Chinese captured on Ka Island in 1533 as intending to attack Korea, no evidence was found on their boats to prove this opinion. A more-

evident example is reflected in the drifting case of Gong Cheng (case 13), which the Korean government assumed to be collusion between Chinese border people and Korean coastal escapees who founded a base on the sea to be bandits. However, since the Korean government failed to find any evidence supporting this conjecture after investigating Gong Cheng, it had to treat this case as a normal drifting incident.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Departure</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>Seafarers’ Identity</th>
<th>Korea’s Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1528</td>
<td>Offshore Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Liaodong military households</td>
<td>Only reported to Liaodong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1532</td>
<td>Offshore Liaodong</td>
<td>Ch'ungch'ŏng</td>
<td>Liaodong residents</td>
<td>Discussed reporting to the Ming court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1532</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Unidentified Chinese drifters</td>
<td>Escorted to China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>Probably Liaodong</td>
<td>P'yŏngan</td>
<td>Probably Liaodong residents</td>
<td>Only reported to Liaodong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>Offshore Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Liaodong residents</td>
<td>Escorted to China by Korean envoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Speculated to be Chinese drifters by the king</td>
<td>Escorted to China by Korean envoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>P'yŏngan</td>
<td>Liaodong Jinzhou residents</td>
<td>Escorted to China by Korean envoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>Offshore Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Liaodong islanders</td>
<td>Escorted to China by Korean envoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Unidentified Chinese or Japanese drifters</td>
<td>Expelled without reporting to the Ming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Water bandits, probably from Liaodong</td>
<td>Interrogated by punishment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This difficulty of discerning piracy from other illegal maritime activities indicates their flexible and malleable boundaries, which made pirates, smugglers, poachers, and castaways who broke the maritime prohibition interchangeable and interrelated. When private seafarers were found to be violently threatening Korea’s coastal regions they were categorized as pirates; but as long as they withdrew or even when their crimes were not detected, they could be transformed into other kinds of maritime groups.\textsuperscript{46} The Korean government itself also displayed limitations in effectively recognizing and responding to water bandits, which were largely constrained by its careful diplomatic consideration in the framing of Chinese-Korean tribute relations. As can be seen in the above cases, the Chosŏn court’s reluctance to interrogate the suspicious Chinese castaways by torture was a major obstacle in its identification of water bandits. In case 4, even when King Chungjong had noted the contradictory confessions of those who trespassed borders and occupied Korean castles, he did not order the use of punitive measures against them because

\textsuperscript{46} For the overlapping meanings of piracy and smuggling, and their subtle and complex relationship see Robert Antony, ed., \textit{Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers, Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas}. 

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>Probably Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Chinese evaders, probably from Liaodong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Probably Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Water bandits, probably from Liaodong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>Offshore Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Liaodong Fuzhou sailor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1582</td>
<td>Liaodong</td>
<td>Hwanghae</td>
<td>Liaodong Jinzhou resident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Unidentified Chinese ships and Liaodong castaways on Korea’s northwestern coast in the sixteenth century
they were Chinese. This constraint of dealing with Chinese drifting incidents is more clear in case 11, in which more than forty Chinese people were found to be establishing houses, setting forges, and repairing ships off the shore of Hwanghae Province. However, regardless of the fact that their intent to settle within the territory of Korea was unusual, both the governor of Hwanghae Province and the Chosŏn court hesitated to interrogate them by torture because they were people of the “Superior Country.”

Only when the detained Chinese were confirmed to be pirates did the Korean government seek a more-radical solution. In case 10, since the Chosŏn had ascertained that the Chinese trespassers connecting with Korean people were bandits on Ch’o Island, it extorted a confession from them by torture even though they were Chinese. Considering that it was also from Ch’o Island that the Korean government arrested Ŭiju water bandit Ko Chijong, a successful recognition of these Chinese outlaws’ crimes might first be achieved through the interrogation of the Korean domestic bandit Ko. Otherwise, due to the lack of decisive evidence, the Korean government only investigated suspicious Chinese trespassers conventionally, acknowledged them as normal drifters, and submitted the accidents to the Ming court.

The Korean government encountered similar difficulty in distinguishing pirate ships from drifting accidents on its southern coast. In his research on a rare case in which the Korean government successfully recognized and repatriated a Ming captive, Hua Chongqing, 華重慶, who was captured by Japanese pirates and drifted to Korea’s southern coast in 1556, Hasumi Moriyoshi argues that it was impossible for the Korean coastal defense armies to separate Chinese ships from Japanese pirate ships or distinguish pirate ships from Chinese or Korean

48 Myŏngjong sillok, Myŏngjong 2/2/12 (3/3/1547); Myŏngjong 2/2/13 (3/4/1547), fasc.5, vol.19,484.
ships. The blurred distinction between Japanese and Chinese ships had once caused the Chosŏn to execute Chinese castaways, and promoted the transition of its policy from salvage and repatriation of Chinese castaways to passively expelling them from the Korean coast in the mid-sixteenth century. This change of policy is also reflected in the cases of this chapter; instead of returning the castaways to the Ming (case 3 and case 6), after King Myŏngjong ascended to the throne in 1545 the Chosŏn court ordered them to return to the sea by themselves (case 9).

The Chosŏn’s tension with the Liaodong government further influenced its treatment of the Liaodong seafarers in cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, and 13. Korean kings and officials often discussed whether to submit unclear cases to the Ming central government according to the custom of repatriating Chinese castaways in the late Ming. In cases 2, 5, 8, and 13, only after it determined that these Liaodong seafarers were nonthreatening castaways did the Chosŏn court make a final decision to repatriate them to Beijing. In contrast, because the Chosŏn considered cases 1, 4, and 11 as poaching or deliberate trespassing, it only reported them to the Liaodong government. This was based on the Chosŏn’s intention to maintain a neighborly relationship with the Liaodong government since the latter directly dealt with Chinese-Korean border affairs, and the Liaodong overland route was the main way that Chosŏn envoys passed through to Beijing. This reliance on the Liaodong government to maintain its tribute relations with the Ming compelled the Chosŏn to treat Liaodong poachers and trespassers with caution, and conceal their behavior from the Ming central government in order to prevent the Ming court from blaming Liaodong for its negligence in regulating the border.

50 Takahashi Kimiaki, “Ichiroku seiki chūki no kōtō sen to chōsen no taiō,” 104.
In the sixteenth century the Korean central government adjusted its treatment of Chinese people who arrived on its northwestern coast in response to different circumstances. If the Chosŏn believed that they had sailed to Korea by accident, even though they violated the maritime prohibition it would handle the case as a normal drifting incident by submitting it to the Ming court. However, if it discovered that they were Liaodong trespassers who could threaten Korea’s border security, it instead reported them to the Liaodong government. In the mid-sixteenth century its reaction to normal Chinese drifters also changed to taking action that would prevent them from going ashore. Furthermore, beginning in the early sixteenth century the Chosŏn expressed concern about the appearance of water bandits in the northern Yellow Sea—the armed and organized Chinese and Koreans gangs who participated in smuggling, poaching, and robbing in Korea’s coastal regions. Since this issue was interwoven with the increase of Liaodong castaways, on most occasions the Chosŏn was unable to distinguish piracy from drifting accidents, which consequently impeded its response to this external challenge in governing its maritime borders. Only in rare cases in which it had indisputable evidence of Liaodong seafarers’ crimes did the Chosŏn convict and adopt punitive measures against them.

**Regional Changes in Korea’s Northwestern Provinces**

In addition to the difficulty of recognizing and handling water bandits due to their indistinct boundary with private seafarers and the restriction of Ming-Chosŏn tribute relations, the

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52 For the Chosŏn’s negative response to unrecognized ships on its western coast during the Qing dynasty due to reasons such as the Chosŏn’s concern about Chinese people’s injury, escape or death when they were captured or repatriated, and the heavy economic burden it undertook to escort them see Min Tŏkki, “Tongasaa haegŭmjŏngch’ae gui pyŏnhwa haeyang kyŏnggye$$

punjaeng” 동아시아 해금정책의 변화와 해양 경제에서의 분쟁, Hanilgwan'gyesayŏn'gu 한일관계사연구 42 (August 2012): 212-218.
debilitated sea defense in northwest Korea and its regional maritime development also impacted the effectiveness of the Korean central government’s coastal control. This situation was first reflected in the fact that the sea defense system in the north was less effective than in the south, since Japanese piracy had harassed Korea’s southern coast more frequently. As recorded in the early Chosŏn statute book Kyŏngguk taejŏn, compared to the southern Kyŏngsang, Ch'ungch'ŏng, and Ch'ŏlla provinces where a greater number of maengsŏn ships were constructed, Hwanghae and P'yŏngan provinces had weak naval strength. Their total number of maengsŏn was less than the number maintained by Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, let alone Kyŏngsang or Ch'ŏlla. Maengsŏn was a battleship in the early Chosŏn with three standardized sizes of small, medium and large, which was generally used since the Sejo period (1417-1468). Eighty, sixty, and thirty navies were respectively assigned in each size of maengsŏn. It could also be used to transport grain.53

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Large maengsŏn</th>
<th>Medium maengsŏn</th>
<th>Small maengsŏn</th>
<th>Small maengsŏn without navies</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'ungch'ŏng Province</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyŏngsang Province</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ŏlla Province</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwanghae Province</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'yŏngan Province</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 The number of maengsŏn in Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏngsang, Ch'ŏlla, Hwanghae, and P'yŏngan provinces. In Kyŏngguk taejŏn 経國大典, fasc.4 (Seoul: Korean Legislation Research Institute, 1993), 1029-1031.

53 See Kim Chaegŭn 金在瑾, Chosŏnwangjo kunsŏnyŏn'gu 朝鮮王朝軍船研究 (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1977), 45, 61.
This decrease of sea defense in northwest Korea negatively affected its coastal security against Japanese intrusions in the sixteenth century. For instance, in 1523 the Hwanghae navies encountered a Japanese vessel in P'ungch'ŏn, fought against several militarized Japanese men, and captured one of them alive. The Japanese captive confessed that there were three vessels berthed at Hwanghae Province, on which there were fifty, forty, and twenty-six persons respectively. This incident greatly upset the local P'ungch'ŏn people, who hid in the mountainous area so that “the prefecture was vacant.”

The Chosŏn Ministry of War officials were also surprised by this unforeseen attack, caused by the lack of readiness of the Hwanghae coastal defense: “The defense in the south of our country has always been strict in consideration of unexpected changes, whereas the defense of the west sea has only been assigned to the interior and is not specifically supervised. So how could we know about the occurrence of today’s incident?”

The Chosŏn’s overall sea defense was also weakened in the sixteenth century. The increased military burden on Korean commoners caused them to often attempt to avoid military service by running away from home or changing their social status. This especially impaired Korea’s naval strength and further aggravated the negative impact of Japanese piracy on its southern provinces. The royal inspector Kim Sŏngil observed the same situation in Hwanghae Province. In his 1583 report to King Sŏnjo, he carefully narrated the malpractice in Hwanghae military service, such as the onerous and unfair distribution of responsibilities on commoners.

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54 Jungjong sillok, Chungjong 18/5/28 (7/10/1523), fasc. 48, vol.16, 227. 府民人等聞倭變驚駭 隱匿九月山 境內一空云。
55 Jungjong sillok, Chungjong 18/5/28 (7/10/1523), fasc.48, vol.16, 227. 兵曹判書洪淑 參議洪彦弼 參知李偉等來啓曰 今此倭變 出於無外 至為驚駭 國家南邊則素嚴防備 以無不虞之變矣 西海則委諸內地 專不綱舉防備之事 安知今者有此變乎。
56 Chang Hakkûn 張學根, Chosŏnsidae haeyangbangwisa 朝鮮時代海洋防衛史 (Seoul: Changmisa, 1988), 103-136.
that led to their fleeing from their homes. He mentioned the utmost hardship on the Hwanghae navies due to their multiple and burdensome forced labor requirements as well as their illegal oppression at the hands of border military officers. In particular, he pointed out the harmful effect of neglecting the Hwanghae coastal defense; when confronting the harassment of water bandits, the local navies were incapable of subjugating them.\footnote{Kim Sŏngil, \textit{Hakpŏngjip sokchip}, fasc. 2, in \textit{Han’guk yŏktae munjip ch’ongsŏ}, vol.1903, 234-264.}

The regional maritime dynamics of northwestern Korea in the mid-sixteenth century put additional pressure on the Korean central government’s border regulation. In this time period, court officials, regional magistrates, provincial inspectors, and merchants on Korea’s northern border were closely connected in forming a chain of benefits through coastal cultivation, sea transportation, and grain transactions. As noted above, the Chosŏn court already had concerns about the common private maritime trade between Korean and Liaodong coastal residents.\footnote{\textit{Myŏngjong sillok}, Myŏngjong 1/12/15 (1/6/1547), fasc.4, vol.19,472.}

More importantly, local government officials were also actively engaged in illegal maritime commerce. One example is the crimes of P’ungch’ŏn magistrate Yun Sasang 尹思商, accused by Chosŏn scholar-official O Kŏn 吳健. His crimes included exploiting subordinates and transporting acquired items to his own house by boat, demanding cloth from the households he administered under the guise of supplying Chinese envoys, exchanging official storage grain for cotton cloth from the local people, and instigating popular discontent and evasion. He conducted an unauthorized hunt on the sea but caused a shipwreck in which many people drowned. To prevent a lawsuit over this accident, he even bribed the court by using official grain.\footnote{O Kŏn, \textit{Tŏkk’yejip}, fasc.4, 124b-125a.} The exact date of this accusation was unrecorded, but based on O Kŏn’s political career and Yun Sasang’s...
pursuit of self-interest by using the excuse of receiving Chinese envoys, O’s report was most likely submitted between 1567, the year of his appointment as a censor handling refutation and admonition, and 1568, when two groups of Chinese envoys came to Korea to canonize King Sŏnjo and issue the Longqing emperor’s confirmation of the crown prince. This situation accords with Yun Sasang’s preparatory work for the reception of the Chinese envoys.\textsuperscript{60}

This was not the first time that Yun Sasang was accused of economic crimes. Yun Sasang’s family originated from Chŏlla Province; he passed the special military examination (K. pyŏlsi, 別試) in 1528.\textsuperscript{61} In 1537 he was still serving in the post of a low-ranking officer kwŏnji pongsa 權知奉事 when the Office of the Inspector-General charged him with bribing his superior in the Office of Military Training in order to get an advanced recommendation. However, due to the lack of solid evidence he was not interrogated by torture, under the suggestion of the Chief State Councilor.\textsuperscript{62} From 1567 to 1568, when Yun was finally serving in the position of district magistrate, he was once again accused, as O Kŏn reported: “Yun’s nature is greedy and cruel, and he is also old and feeble.” This statement reflects O’s personal opposition to the abuse of power by royal relatives and high-ranking officials, as well as by local bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{63}

More implications were behind Yun Sasang’s case. As Eugene Y. Park illuminates, in the sixteenth century the king and senior Hun’gu conservatives supported frequent military examinations, in particular the special examinations, which consequently caused a rise in the number of military-examination graduates. On the other hand, the reformist Sarim scholar-

\textsuperscript{60} For O Kŏn’s political career, see Tŏkkyejip, fasc. 1, 174b-182b. For Ming envoys’ trips to Korea in 1568 see Du Huiyue 杜慧月, Mingdai wenchen chushi chaoxian yu huanghuaji 明代文臣出使朝鮮與皇華集 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 2010), 380-385.

\textsuperscript{61} Kajŏngch’illyŏn mujakuwŏlril pyŏlshibangmok 嘉靖七年戊子九月日別試榜目, “mugwa” 武科 (National Library of Korea, 古貴 6024-204).

\textsuperscript{62} Chungjong sillok, Chungjong 33/8/17 (9/9/1538), fasc.88, vol. 18, 197; Chungjong 33/8/17 (9/12/1538), fasc. 88, vol. 18, 200.

officials were “quick to criticize what they saw as abusive institutional practices, and the frequent military examinations certainly did not escape their attention.” The Office of the Inspector-General played a consistent role in resisting the king’s recruitment of a large number of military men. The Office of the Inspector-General and the Sarim censor O Kŏn’s accusations of Yun Sasang as a military-examination graduate may be a reflection of this factional conflict. Also, Yun Sasang’s malfeasance indicates his struggle to obtain a military appointment. According to a special entry officer’s statement recorded in Chungjong sillok in 1516, the number of kwŏnji pongsa in the Office of Military Training was unlimited, and totaled up to thirty-eight at that time. They could remain unpaid for over fifteen years until this term terminated, showing the difficulty military men faced in securing official positions. Park also mentions that “the military examination graduates as a whole found it increasingly difficult to obtain an appointment after earning their degrees.” This explains Yun’s association with his superior officer in order to get a salaried appointment nine years after passing the special examination.

As Park continues to argue, the intensified competition for offices among military-examination graduates forced them to be “more dependent on the patronage of influential statesmen, including the royal in-law officials and their associates.” This is also reflected in the misuse of regional coastal resources by the district magistrates of P’yŏngan Province and

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their corrupt ties with the central influential powers. In 1554 a censor, Yi Kwan 李瓘, discovered chief councilors and court officials misappropriating fertile coastal lands in P'yŏngan, and transporting local official grain to their own homes by boat. Because Hamgyŏng Province was unreachable by the sea route, as were the fully cultivated coastal lands in southern Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏngsang, and Chŏlla provinces, the influential central officials turned their attention to building country estates in P'yŏngan Province. Except for the border prefecture Ŭiju, which was in a succession administered by civil officials and insightful military officers, the mud flats of P'yŏngan coastal prefectures Yongch'ŏn, Ch'ŏlssan, Sŏnch'ŏn, Sukch'ŏn, and Yŏngyu were completely exploited, leading to the destitution of the local people. Moreover, Chief Royal Lecturer Sang Chin 尚震 mentions that because of the improvement of marine techniques, people could travel through the previously impassable Changsan Cape of Hwanghae Province to transport grain from the border region.68

The participation of local and central political powers in sea transport and coastal cultivation further boosted grain transactions in P'yŏngan Province. According to one report by Yi I 李珥, probably written during his appointment as a censor in 1565 and 1566, “the authorities have widely occupied farmlands in coastal counties and towns, and largely opened the route for ship transport. Therefore the official stores have all been used to sponsor corruption and bribery, and private grain completely belongs to itinerant traders for the making of profits.”69

While during the court discussion of 1554, Yi Kwan and Sang Chin still held contradicting perspectives on whether to prohibit sea transport in order to prevent the abusive occupation of coastal lands. A decade later the prosperity of private commercial activities had already

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69 Yi I 李珥, Yulgoksansaeng changsŏ sŭbyu 栗谷先生全書拾遺, fasc. 2, in Han'guk munji p'onggan, vol.45, 494b. 權勢之家廣占田畓於沿海郡邑 大開船運之路 以此官庫之儲 盡為肥己事人之資 民間之粟 盡歸行商牟利之手.
exhausted P'yŏngan grain stores, which potentially threatened its border security. Yi I worried, “Once the border alarm is raised, where can we collect military provisions for assistance?” Under this circumstance and likely following Yi’s suggestion, the court finally decided to strictly prohibit sea transport in P’yŏngan Province.\footnote{Yi I, Ilgoksŏnsaeng chŏnsŏ sŭbyu, fasc. 2, in Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, vol.45, 494b. 脫有邊警一起 餓糧餉軍之費 於何 取辦以濟事乎.}

The Liaodong Maritime Prohibition in the Sixteenth Century

While the Korean government was facing the dilemma of effectively regulating its northwestern coast, the Ming also confronted trouble brought by the increasing number of Liaodong escapees and their border crossings, an issue interrelated with the Ming’s varying considerations of its maritime governance during the sixteenth century. Impeded by the influence of northern Yuan power, it was difficult to conduct overland transport of provisions through the Shanhai Pass to support early Ming military expeditions to Liaodong. Meanwhile, Liaodong was unable to be self-sufficient due to the lack of labor forces and the ineffective implementation of a military farming system (C. tuntian 屯田) that failed to supply Liaodong soldiers with ample agricultural products.\footnote{Myŏngjong sillok, Myŏngjong 21/11/30 (1/9/1567), fasc. 33, vol.21, 134; Myŏngjong 22/2/27 (4/6/1567), fasc. 34, vol.21, 143.} As a result, the Deng-Liao sea-lane 登遼海道 between Shandong Dengzhou and Liaodong Lūshun via the Bohai Strait became the only transportation route for connecting Liaodong with interior China, in which the Miaodao Archipelago functioned as stopovers. In the early Ming many military provisions and items traded with neighboring tribes

and states were transported by this route.\textsuperscript{73} Private maritime trade between Shandong and Liaodong consequently developed after the opening of this sea-lane. It was due to the great reliance of the Liaodong economy on inland China and the geographical proximity of Liaodong to Shandong that the Shandong Provincial Administration Commission and Surveillance Commission were placed in charge of Liaodong’s administrative and judicial affairs.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Figure 9} (left) Dengzhou, Lüshun, and the Miaodao Archipelago in the Baohai Strait

\textbf{Figure 10} (right) Dengzhou and the Miaodao Archipelago in \textit{Haijiang tu} 海疆圖, Du Zhao 杜詔 and Qiu Jun 丘濬, ed. \textit{Shandong tongzhi} 山東通志, in Jingyin wenyuange siku quanshu, shibu, dili lei 景印文淵閣四庫全書·史部·地理類, vol. 539 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 39.

\textsuperscript{73} For a detailed examination of the initial points and stopovers of the early Ming sea routes through the Deng-Liao lane see Zhang Shizun, \textit{Mingdai Liaodong Bianjiang Yanjiu} 明代遼東邊疆研究, 315-329.

In the Yongle reign (1403-1424) the military farming system was successfully practiced in Liaodong, which helped halt the sea transport of massive amounts of army provisions from South China. Still, from the Yongle to Hongzhi reigns, cotton and cloth that were not produced locally in Liaodong were transferred by state-sponsored fleets from Dengzhou to Lüshun. The scale of this transportation had been shrinking and finally came to an end in the early Zhengde period (1506-1521). Scholars have examined various causes of this decrease and cessation of Deng-Liao sea transport. For instance, Zhang Shizun has pinpointed its economic impetus: the losses in conducting sea transport for Shandong and Liaodong governments gradually outweighed its gains. Also, the development of a commodity economy and Liaodong agriculture made it possible for Liaodong soldiers to trade supplies from inside the Shanhai Pass or in the local area. Chen Xiaoshan considers this breakdown a long-term, complex process in a transitioning historical background. It was impacted by multiple factors such as navigational risks, geographic disadvantages, regional tensions, management problems, and economic transitions. To put it briefly, because it regarded Liaodong sea transport as a wartime enterprise, the Ming government tended to seek safer and more economical alternatives, which greatly reduced the role of sea transport in supporting Liaodong society. At the same time, the Deng-Liao transport system was also in gradual decline.

However, although Deng-Liao official and private sea transport had long been under official suppression, debates on its resumption had never stopped since the early sixteenth century. Both

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75 Some other reasons also ceased the sea transport of grain in early Ming China, such as navigational dangers, the threat from Japanese pirates, and the successfully revived river transport. See Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫, The Ming Tribute Grain System, trans. Mark Elvin (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1969), 6-10. Wu Jihua 吳緝華, Mingdai haiyun ji yunhe de yanjiu 明代海運及運河的研究(Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1961), 31-36.
76 Zhang Shizun, Mingdai Liaodong bianjiang yanjiu, 332-334.
Zhang Shizun and Chen Xiaoshan point out that from a regional perspective these debates reflected conflicts between the Shandong and Liaodong governments based on their respective interests. The Liaodong region’s partial dependence on Shandong to supply provisions and develop its economy forced it to support the maintenance of maritime communication with Shandong, whereas Shandong officials usually objected to conducting sea transport because they had to bear more risks and burdens.

The disbandment of Deng-Liao sea transport also corresponded with the Ming dynasty’s inward-looking maritime policy in the Jiajing reign (1522-1566), during which period maritime prohibition was increased to constrain piracy and private maritime economy during the Jiajing reign (1522-1566). However, some Ming officials who valued the strategic role and social dynamics of Liaodong often suggested the reestablishment of Deng-Liao transport. They emphasized the positive role of indigenous maritime agents under proper government control in improving Liaodong’s military and economic strength. In 1536 Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Gong Yongqing 龔用卿 and Supervising Secretary of the Ministry of Revenue Wu Ximeng 吳希孟 submitted a memorial to the emperor on Liaodong border affairs, based on their travel experience in Liaodong during their diplomatic mission to Korea. In this memorial they mentioned the convenience of transporting provisions through the Deng-Liao route since it took only one day and night to arrive at Lushun from Dengzhou if sailing with the wind. They noted that the people of the Liaodong coastal Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Haizhou, and Gaizhou guards owned private boats and traded between Dengzhou and Liaodong for a living, and further suggested allowing them to navigate official ships to transfer cotton and cloth. In order to prevent illicit trade, Gong and Wu also provided a management solution of giving them transportation
remuneration and numbering their boats.  

While Gong Yongqing and Wu Ximeng still attempted to separate private maritime trade from official sea transport, a statement from Wei Huan 魏煥 addressed a proper laxity to the maritime ban. As a low-ranking official of the Ministry of War in the Jiajing period, following the emperor’s order Wei wrote a book to discuss Ming border defense in about 1540, in which he proposed resuming Deng-Liao sea transport based on its strategic significance in connecting Liaodong with inland China. He expressed concern over the potential military threats caused by the obstruction of this sea-lane, and emphasized the current underestimation of sea defense in maintaining Liaodong border security. To smooth the way for reestablishing Liaodong sea transport and improving its coastal defense, he suggested advancing maritime mobility through the agency of private seafarers so that their proficiency in navigation could be utilized to supply provisions, trade goods, and defend against enemies.

Shandong Border Defense Assistant Liu Jiurong 劉九容 believed that it was impossible to restore the official maritime transport of cotton and cloth between Liaodong and Shandong because of the massive cost of constructing vessels, the hardship local people endured, the dangers of sailing on the sea, and the arduous arrangements. However, he argued that it was still necessary to reopen the Deng-Liao route for private transport not only because “Shandong and Liaodong are justifiably one province, like one person’s body,” but because Liaodong soldiers and commoners would greatly benefit from maritime trade. On this occasion Liu advised

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79 Wei Huan 魏煥, Xunbian zonglun 巡邊總論, fasc. 1, in Ming jingshi wenbian 明經世文編, ed. Chen Zilong 陳子龍, Xu Fuyuan 徐孚遠, and Song Zhengbi 宋徵璧 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), vol. 248, 2612.
encouraging local competent people to voluntarily trade under the inspection of the coastal Jinzhou and Dengzhou guards.\textsuperscript{80}

These proposals were not accepted. In the sixteenth century before the Imjin War of the 1590s, the official permit of Liaodong sea transport and trade was implemented occasionally and temporarily, and only in emergencies. A major concern was the potential collusion between Liaodong escapees and Japanese pirates, which could threaten the Liaodong coast. Based on this consideration, the Liaodong-Shandong coastal defense and the maritime prohibition were enhanced to some extent in the Jiajing period, although their coastal regions were attacked less frequently in comparison to the recurrent raids by Japanese pirates in China’s southeastern provinces.\textsuperscript{81} This anxiety was reflected in a 1554 proposal written to the emperor by Censor-in-Chief Jiang Dong \textsuperscript{82} when he was governing Liaodong. When Japanese pirates had expanded to Shandong and approached the Liaodong coast, Jiang presented eight measures to intensify Liaodong coastal defense, one of which was to implement a strict maritime prohibition of Liaodong’s private wood trade, aimed at keeping merchants from guiding Japanese pirates.

The Ming court carried out the intention to strengthen Liaodong’s maritime trade prohibition. For instance, when Liaodong suffered a great famine in 1558, due to the suggestion of Vice Minister of War Wang Yu \textsuperscript{83} who governed the Jizhou and Liaodong areas, the emperor decided to lift the maritime prohibition and take advantage of private commercial fishing boats to trade grain from Shandong to Liaodong in order to alleviate the famine.

\textsuperscript{80} Liu Jiurong \textsuperscript{84} 刘九容, “haiyun yi” 海運議, in Quanliaozhi, fasc. 5, Liaoai Congshu, ed. Jin Yufu, vol.1, 659. 况山東與遼東名為一省，如人一身.

\textsuperscript{81} For the causes of the less Japanese attacks to Shandong in the Jiajing period see Huang Zunyan \textsuperscript{85} 黃尊嚴, “Mingdai Shandong wohuan shulue” 明代山東倭患述略, in Yantai shifan xueyuan xuebao (zheshe ban) 烟台師範學院學報(哲社版), no.3 (1996): 12-17.

\textsuperscript{82} Ming Shizong shilu jiaokanji 明世宗實錄校勘記, Jiajing 33/4/3 (5/4/1554), fasc.409 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1965), 2189.

\textsuperscript{83} Ming Shizong shilu 明世宗實錄, Jiajing 37/6/3 (6/18/1558), fasc. 460 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo,
However, this maritime policy was soon rejected by the Censor-in-Chief Zhu Heng 朱衡 in his governance of Shandong in 1561. He stated that after Deng-Liao maritime trade was reopened, not only did merchants secretly travel through the Great Canal to the southeast ports of Suzhou, Hangzhou, Huai’an, and Yangzhou, but outlaws residing on islands between Shandong and Liaodong had ganged together. He feared this would destroy the Ming’s careful and solid sea defense and develop into a danger just like that of Japanese piracy. The Ministry of War approved Zhu’s proposal to reinstate the prohibition of Deng-Liao maritime trade.  

**Failed Attempts: The Irresolute Governance of Liaodong Evaders**

What was interwoven with the Ming’s conservative maritime policy in Liaodong was the increasing challenge that Liaodong evaders posed to Ming coastal governance in the sixteenth century. It appears that in 1525 the Ming court adopted specific measures toward Liaodong coastal evaders for the first time, which was just two years after the Ningbo Incident of 1523 when Japanese pirates had begun to raid China’s southeastern coast. Corresponding with the enhancement of the maritime prohibition right after this incident, the Ming Ministry of War ordered the Jinzhou and Fuzhou deserters to sea islands to be recalled because of the possibility of their connecting with Japanese pirates.  

This policy aimed to isolate these islands from the continent and to prevent an out-migration that would extend beyond state governance. However, mere separation and prohibition did not function effectively for long. In the following decades Ming officials gave tacit consent to the Liaodong evaders’ inhabittance of the

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84 *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 40/10/5 (11/11/1561), fasc. 502, 8298.
85 *Ming Shiozong shilu*, Jiajing 4/7/5 (7/24/1525), fasc. 53, 1314.
sea and attempted to expand their administration of them. As mentioned in Gong Yongqing’s memorial, by the 1530s the taxation on runaways had been implemented in the offshore islands of the Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Haizhou, and Gaizhou guards. In the 1540s Wei Huan discussed a more-thorough administration of them. He first mentioned the trouble of handling evaders in the southeast Liaodong mountains and islands. These men were either called “refugees” (C. liumin, 流民) if they gathered in mountain areas, or “islanders” (C. daomin, 島民) if they migrated to sea islands: “They are outlaws from everywhere, who earned their own living and ignored government rules. If we do not deal with them, the assembled will not be dispersed and may raise unexpected disorder. However, if we restrain them by law, they could be stimulated to instigate disaster.”

Although the government had adopted various regulation methods such as inspection, imposing the baojia 保甲 self-administration, repatriation, and taxation, Wei attributed the inefficiency of these methods to the lack of official governance in the southeast Liaodong mountain and sea areas—a “vacant space” that had been maintained as a barrier for Liaodong since the early Ming. To solve this problem, he suggested a censor be dispatched and prefectures and counties be established in this region. The community-based baojia units were also to be set. Wei also proposed a loose management of them at the beginning in order to settle the runaways without protest. After they were pacified and stabilized, they could then be easily indoctrinated and regulated, and even recruited as soldiers.

86 Gong Yongqing, “奉使復明具題遼東地方民情疏,” in Yungang wenji, fasc. 7, 276.
87 Wei Huan, Xunbian zonglun, fasc. 1, in Ming jingshi wenbian, vol. 248, 2613. Also see Wei Huan, Huangming jiubian kao 皇明九邊考, fasc. 2, in Zhonghua wenshi congshu 中華文史叢書, ed. Wang Youli 王有立 (Taipei: huawen shuju, 1968), vol. 15, 149-151.
88 Wei Huan, Xunbian zonglun, fasc. 1, in Ming jingshi wenbian, vol. 248, 2613. Also see Wei Huan, Huangming jiubian kao, fasc. 2, in Zhonghua wenshi congshu, vol. 15, 150-151.
Compared to the preventive controls of Liaodong evaders in the past decades, Wei Huan’s thought was more radical, aiming to expand state governance to unmanaged offshore islands of Liaodong, authorize the existence of maritime migrants, and absorb them into the Liaodong administrative system. Although Wei’s proposal was not fully realized, in response to the threat of Japanese pirates in the 1550s Censor-in-Chief Jiang Dong suggested temporarily sending officials and organizing the dense population of the Jinzhou islands by the baojia system for their self-defense. The Ministry of War approved this, showing its intention of turning maritime evaders into legitimised military strength when it was necessary.\(^{89}\)

The Ming state’s transformation of Liaodong’s illicit maritime agents into official resources was also reflected in the great Liaodong famine during the late 1550s and early 1560s. In order to rescue Liaodong in an efficient way, the Ming government conducted sea transport along the Bohai Bay, either from Tianjin or from Shandong. In this process private boats were requisitioned and organized for grain transportation. This was based on the fact that “[the number of ships of] commercial fishermen coming and going between the Jinzhou and Deng-Lai coasts from north to south easily reaches one thousand, and government officials are unable to fully investigate and deal with this.”\(^{90}\) One record in the Ming Liaodong archives provides a glimpse into how the inhabitants from the Jinzhou islands were integrated into the official transport system in this famine. Liaodong officers carefully examined islanders and their boats; the hired boats were then numbered and registered, and the sailors were paid with silver for transporting grain from the Shanhai Pass. According to this account on the number of hired boats and the amount of grain they loaded, from the twentieth day of the first month to the ninth day of

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\(^{89}\) *Ming Shizong shilu jiaokanji*, Jiajing 33/4/3 (5/4/1554), fasc.409, 2188-2189.

\(^{90}\) *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 37/6/3 (6/18/1558), fasc. 460, 7774-7775. 然金州登萊南北兩岸間漁販往來動以千艘官吏不能盡詰.
the second month of 1560, sixty-three island boats departed from Liaodong, carrying a total
3,765 dan 石 (389.6775 m³) of rice; 489 taels of silver were paid for this transportation.⁹¹ In
order to supervise their work, these boats were arranged into groups and led by officers of the
Liaodong coastal guards, with their numbers, captains’ names, sizes, amount of rice, and
transportation fees being recorded in detail.⁹²

If conducting an official grain transport was not sufficient, the Ming was willing to lift the
ban on Liaodong private maritime trade with Tianjian and Shandong. To incentivize seafaring
merchants, preferential policies were adopted to encourage their active trade. For instance, while
governing Liaodong, Censor-in-Chief Hou Ruliang 侯汝諒 stated that since local Shandong
offices often thwarted the smooth process of Dengzhou and Laizhou sea transport, Shandong
coastal residents should be allowed to trade without being taxed under government permission.
In addition, Hou suggested strict inspection of individual merchants in order to eliminate
unstable factors in private transactions such as contraband trade, runaways, and collusion with
Japanese pirates that would threaten coastal security.⁹³

The boundary between legal and illegal maritime agents could be modified and blurred: the
Ming authorities would either adjust administrative policies and transform them into a
legitimated resource, or, in the majority of cases, regard them as outlaws or even pirates. Ming
official Wang Nie 王臬 vividly described the latter situation: in order to gain merit, coastal
military officers identified islanders residing between Dengzhou and Lüshun as pirates once they
drifted to shore, although, as Wang argued, they only made their living by logging and fishing.⁹⁴

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⁹¹ According to Qiu Guangming, Qiu Long, and Yang Ping’s research, one sheng 升 (0.001 dan 石) in the Ming and Qing
dynasties equaled 1035 cm³. See Zhongguo kexue jishu shi du liang heng jian, 411.
⁹² Mingdai Liaodong dang an huibian 明代遼東檔案彙編, no. 175 (Shenyang: Liaoshen shushe, 1985), 672-677.
⁹⁴ Wang Nie 王臬, “答詢訪政體民情,” in Chi’an xiansheng ji 避菴先生集, fasc.3, Siku weishou shu jikan, jibu 四庫未收書
輯刊·集部, series 5 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2000), vol. 19, 57.
While officials often raised the possible solution of enhancing supervision and regulation when relaxing the prohibition of private trade and transportation, as shown in Hou Ruliang’s statement, the difficulty of explicitly categorizing maritime agents made it a challenge for the Ming to maintain distinct and balanced control over them, which thus led to the flexible policies on governing the Shandong and Liaodong coasts. As mentioned in the previous section, although maritime trade was allowed via the Deng-Liao lane to assist the Liaodong grain market, it was soon prohibited after Zhu Heng expressed his opposition.\(^95\) This process of lifting and then reinstating the prohibition of Shandong-Liaodong maritime trade reoccurred several times thereafter. For instance, just one year after Zhu Heng’s rejection, the Ming court reapproved commercial activities between Dengzhou and Jinzhou at the request of Vice Minister of War Ge Jin 葛縉, who oversaw Liaodong military affairs.\(^96\) However, due to the opposition of Shandong officials, the lifting of the prohibition was terminated once again.\(^97\)

Policy shifts intertwined with the regional dilemma between Shandong and Liaodong on dealing with illicit economic activities and the violence of Liaodong evaders in the Bohai Strait.

In his military treatise *Chouhai tubian* 筹海圖編, published in 1561, Zheng Ruozeng 鄭若曾 records that those who lived on neighboring Dengzhou islands were Liaodong households rather than Shandong defending soldiers. The presence of these unconstrained outlaws had become a major source of trouble in Shandong that needed to be solved as quickly as possible.\(^98\) Several years later this issue was still developing. As described by Censor-in-Chief Han Jun’en 韓君恩 upon inspecting Shandong affairs, after the emperor authorized maritime grain trade in

\(^95\) *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 40/10/5 (11/11/1561), fasc. 502, 8298.
\(^96\) *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 41/11/4 (11/29/1562), fasc. 515, 8456-8457.
\(^97\) *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 42/12/5 (12/19/1563), fasc. 528, 8613.
Liaodong, lawbreakers seized this chance to frequently take large vessels to the sea islands for logging and trading. They migrated there with their families to cultivate the fertile land, and formed gangs of outlaws to rob the indigenous Shandong residents. Han worried that their threat could even be greater than that of the Japanese pirates, and forbade their trade and inhabitancy on the islands of Dengzhou and Laizhou.99 Liaodong officials, however, resisted a complete maritime prohibition and argued that they were unable to eradicate smuggling and evasion. They blamed Shandong officials for their nearsightedness since they only concerned themselves with investigating illicit actions, regardless of the benefits gained from maritime trade.100

To clarify the ambiguity of governing these private maritime players, the Ming state transferred the administration power over them from Liaodong to Shandong in the Longqing reign (1567-1572). Some specific regulations included distributing the responsibility of managing Liaodong residents on the Shandong offshore islands to the Shandong coastal prefectures, using the *jiji* 寄籍 policy to register the domicile of Liaodong evaders in Shandong and the *baojia* system to control them, imposing land and boat taxes on them, and permitting their fair and legal trade with Shandong people. However, their navigations overseas, including to Korea, in two-masted ships were strictly prohibited. Their private exchanges at night, contraband smuggling, and successive migration to the sea were also banned.101

The *jiji* policy aimed at acknowledging the maritime migration of Liaodong evaders and authorizing the Shandong government’s control of them. However, as Vice Minister of War

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99 *Ming Shizong shilu*, Jiajing 45/10/16 (10/28/1566), fasc.563, 9020-9021. Han Jun’en is written as Han Ju’en 韓居恩 in this record.


101 *Ming Muzong shilu* 明穆宗實錄, Longqing 5/9/7 (9/25/1571) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1966), fasc.61, 1480-1482.
Wang Daokun 汪道昆 pointed out in 1573, this policy furthered the escape of Liaodong coastal residents because it separated their juridictive and familial connections from Liaodong and provided them with a legal shelter to be exempted from heavy taxation. Therefore after *jjiji* was implemented Liaodong evaders flowed into the Shandong offshore islands, which depopulated the Liaodong border. Although Wang presented the enhancement of the inspection of their trade and transportation through cooperative efforts between Shandong and Liaodong officers, his proposal once again failed to solve the problem.

**The Policy Retreat to Depopulation of the Sea Islands of Liaodong and Shandong**

The Ming explored various methods of legalizing, categorizing, and incorporating Liaodong evaders by expanding and adjusting its administration in the sea area of Liaodong and Shandong. However, the failure to create a balance between taking advantage of their maritime mobility and maintaining border security finally compelled the Ming to turn its maritime policy in this area to thorough depopulation. In 1574 a total of 4,070 people were returned to Liaodong, among whom were more than 2,000 “vigorous, strong and available” males. As the following analysis shows, the violence of Liaodong trespassers in Korea was a direct reason leading to this policy shift.

In 1568 a conflict erupted between Liaodong islanders and Korean seamen. This event was so serious that both the Liaodong and Chosŏn local offices and central governments were

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102 Wang Daokun 汪道昆, “遼東善後事宜疏,” in *Wang sima ji* 汪司馬集, fasc.1, Ming jingshi wenbian, vol.337, 3619-3620. The brief content of this memorial is also included in *Ming Shenzong shilu* 明神宗實錄, Wanli 1/8/10 (9/5/1573) (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1966), fasc. 16, 481-482.

involved in the diplomatic negotiation. While *Sŏnjo sillok* only briefly describes this case as a battle between water bandits from Hŭksan Island 黑山島 of Chŏlla Province and the Chŏlla Naval Commander Im Chin 林晉, 104 a memorial written by Liaodong Imperial Itinerant Inspector Sheng Shixuan 盛時選 in 1569 records its trial process in detail, providing direct insight into Liaodong islanders’ individual lives and commercial activities, and the diplomatic interactions between the Ming and the Chosŏn.

According to Sheng Shixuan’s narration, in the eighth month of 1568 Korean coastal military men encountered four bandit boats at Hŭksan Island of Chŏlla Province. Ten criminals on the boats, including one named Liu Ming 劉名, were caught alive. The Korean government interrogated them and identified them as Chinese, so they were returned to Liaodong for further action. King Sŏnjo reported this case to the Ming Ministry of War, and asked for a thorough investigation and prohibition of Chinese sea bandits. The Ming Ministry of War transmitted this case to Sheng Shixian, requiring him to inquire into the truth and give Liu Ming and his company a heavier punishment than in prior trespassing cases. It also asked for an investigation of the local Jinzhou officers who did not impose a strict prohibition on their subjects.

Sheng Shixuan recorded Liu Ming and the other criminals’ confessions. In simple terms, Liu Ming was a supernumerary of the Jinzhou Guard. In the Jiajing reign Liu Ming and some other military servicemen of the Gaizhou and Dongning guards went to live off the Jinzhou coast in order to evade forced labor, where they met several islanders who constructed three two-masted ships without government permission. They hired Liu Ming and his companions to go to sea to acquire timber and then to conduct trade on land. In the seventh month of 1568 Liu Ming

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104 *Sŏnjo sillok* 宣祖實錄, Sŏnjo 2/1/16 (2/1/1569), fasc.3, in *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'ān wiwŏnhoe, 1957), vol.21, 201.
and his companions departed to the sea islands of Korea. Concerned about being caught in Korea, they brought forbidden weapons, including gunpowder, for self-defense. Without being detained or even noticed by the Liaodong Jinzhou officers, they began their travel on the fourteenth day of this month.

After arriving at Hŭksan Island on the second day of the eighth month, they bought three document papers sealed by Unbong County of Chŏlla Province and five signal arrows from nearby, which were probably used to disguise their real identities and pretend they were native Koreans. They were later discovered by Korean guards and pursued by Im Chin and his followers. A total of twenty-six of the Chinese seafarers were killed in this conflict; the other ten, including Liu Ming, were arrested. After the Korean local government investigated the case, Liu Ming and the others were confirmed to be from Liaodong. The Chosŏn court connected this case to several other crimes in the fortieth year of Jiajing (1561), stating that in those cases the pirates attacking the Korean coastal regions wore clothes like Han Chinese. The court suspected that Liu Ming’s people were also a gang based on a sea island, and made their living by robbery. In contrast, the Liaodong government officials believed that this trespassing was carried out by Liaodong seafarers with private weapons who were only logging in Korea, and whose intention was not to plunder as pirates did. Since Liu Ming and the others had indeed violated the maritime prohibition, they were sentenced to be executed or flogged/fined in accordance with the extent of their crimes. Some governing officers of the Jinzhou, Fuzhou, and Left Dingliao guards were also accused of dereliction of duty as required by the Ming Ministry of War.105

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While Liaodong and Chosŏn displayed divergent perspectives on whether to define Liu Ming’s case as piracy, the noticeable violence between Liaodong, Shandong, and Korea attracted great attention from Liaodong Governor Zhang Xueyan 張學顏. He observed that the Liaodong islanders had seriously endangered the border security of China and Korea as they plundered coastal fishermen and deserters. Their crimes also induced coastal outlaws and escapees of Shandong and Liaodong to assemble on the sea and even to be pirates. Their looting of Korean people was especially emphasized; they seized property and horses in Korea and sold them openly, yet the Korean government did not dare arrest them.

Zhang analyzed the Ming’s military plight of whether to exterminate or passively defend against this disturbance. The former would incur a massive cost and stimulate the outlaws’ resistance, whereas the latter could permit them to grow into an uncontrollable problem. This problem was worsened by the geographic distance and administrative ambiguity of the Bohai Strait since the islanders residing there “neither belong to Shandong in the south nor belong to Liaodong in the north.” This situation allowed the coastal Shandong and Liaodong offices to “tolerate and shuffle, sit idle and be conservative, which develops [the problem] step by step and almost leads to disaster.”

Zhang argued that the best resolution was to repatriate offshore evaders to Liaodong land. To prevent their return to the sea, Zhang ordered their houses and living materials to be destroyed, as well as a regular and thorough check and arrest of maritime migrants with the cooperation of Dengzhou and Jinzhou officers. He also established rigid regulations on the size and number of boats owned by coastal Dengzhou and Jinzhou residents; a household could only own three boats, and each of them could be no larger than one zhang 丈.

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These boats had to be numbered and registered in local governments, and used only for fishing and to transport daily supplies. Zhang also compromised on removing evaders from the relatively remote Shandong islands and relocating them to the nearer Shicheng, Guanglu, and Changshan islands if they had kin in these places. These islands were taxed and cultivated under the control of the Liaodong coastal guards. This measure aimed at restraining the evaders’ mobility while ensuring their livelihood.  

Zhang Xueyan’s proposal represented a shift of sixteenth-century maritime policy on China’s northeastern coast from expanding to retracting state power over the northern Yellow Sea and the Bohai Strait; a depopulation of the islands between Shandong and Liaodong was applied in the last few decades of the sixteenth century. As recorded by Liaodong Governor Gu Yangqian 顧養謙 in the late 1580s, a regular search of illicit islanders was still consistently conducted each year at that time. However, it should be noted that this policy was not established in order to prevent remigration to this region. For instance, a 1579 record from Ming Shenzong shilu suggests that some island bandits who were subdued and returned to the Jinzhou Guard went back to sea and remained in Korea as armed robbers. The maritime violence between Shandong and Liaodong was more vividly described by Shandong Dengzhou magistrate Tao Langxian 陶朗先 in the 1610s. He stated that the disconnection between Shandong and Dengzhou left the islands in between uninhabited, and thus sea bandits were able to occupy the region: “They are neither Chinese nor barbarians, and cultivate lands for self-sufficiency. If
Liaodong is asked, it says that they are refugees of Dengzhou; if Dengzhou is asked, it says that they are Liaodong runaway bandits.”

**Conclusion**

This chapter provides a portrait of how evaders, castaways, smugglers, and pirates spread across the sea between northern China and Korea in the sixteenth century. It illuminates how private maritime activities increasingly challenged the central governance of coastal societies, and interacted with the Chinese and Korean authorities’ attempts to adjust their responses to transmarine mobility. The appearance of water bandits, who were defined as violent Chinese and Korean gangs living by means of logging, poaching, and smuggling, posed a potential threat to Korea’s northwestern coast. However, multiple constraints were placed on the Korean government’s detection, recognition, and handling of these cases. It was impossible to draw a clear line between water bandits and Liaodong castaways due to the interrelatedness of the two categorizes. Robert Antony also explains this vagueness of differentiation between pirates and smugglers: “There appear no firm distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate in the actions of what we and others label pirates and smugglers. It is better to think in terms of a continuum, with activities that are completely legal on one end, those that are completely illegal on the other end, and most activities somewhere in between.”

The Ming-Chosŏn tributary relations and the nuanced Chosŏn-Liaodong border interactions made it even more difficult for the Chosŏn court

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to verify and deal with suspicious Chinese trespassers. Meanwhile, in Korea’s northwestern provinces the weakened sea defense and the growing number of commercial activities together challenged the central government’s regulation of its coastal regions. Local magistrates, merchants, and influential court officials were also involved and interconnected in private sea transport and embezzlement of coastal resources—a misappropriation often criticized by the Chosŏn Office of the Inspector-General and the Office of the Censor-General in the mid-sixteenth century.

In China’s Shandong and Liaodong coastal regions the maritime migration of Liaodong evaders intensified the Ming’s suspicion of their possible connection with Japanese pirates. Liaodong evaders’ interregional mobility and malleable activities shifting between the illicit and licit made the Ming’s administration of them less clear-cut, such as preventing their private seafaring while using them to conduct official operations, or registering them explicitly in either Liaodong or Shandong. As a result, the Ming’s policies often vacillated in coping with their migration, leading to the maritime ban between Liaodong and Shandong being alternately lifted and reinstated in the mid-sixteenth century. The increasing violence of Liaodong evaders finally forced the Ming to enforce depopulation and a strict maritime trade prohibition in order to prevent their offshore expansion. This policy also suggests that the Ming maritime trade prohibition in the late sixteenth century was largely region based concerning local conditions since it was partially lifted in China’s southeastern provinces in this same time period.
Chapter 3

Transporting Grain across the Sea:
Maritime Logistics in the Imjin War, 1592-1598

Although private seafarers who violated the sea-ban policy continuously connected the maritime frontiers between China and Korea in the sixteenth century, it was not until the two Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598 (also called the “Imjin War” since 1592 was an Injim year in the Chinese sexagenary cycle) that their northern sea space was greatly integrated by massive-scale logistics led by the two governments and achieved through the cooperative efforts of their diverse coastal actors. While they faced unprecedented difficulties in conducting transmarine operations, they also displayed much adaptability in solving this problem by exploiting coastal resources, promoting transnational interactions, and increasing the military and economic roles of the Bohai and northern Yellow Sea region against the Japanese armies.

Fruitful studies of the Imjin War have been published in the past several decades, which since the 1990s have looked at the war from an international perspective.¹ The conduct of military logistics can illuminate military, economic, and social movements across state

boundaries since multilateral and multilayered agencies and resources were widely involved in this process. However, compared to the remarkable research on the military, political, and diplomatic facets of the war, less attention has been paid to the transportation of provisions, in particular through the sea routes of China and Korea.  

The current Korean scholarship only briefly narrates the Chosŏn state’s management of sea transport in the second stage of the war from 1597 to 1598, and lacks a specific, thorough, and multiangle investigation from a cross-border perspective. But more diverse research has appeared in the last several years. For instance, Rokutanda Yutaka provides a detailed examination of the logistics of military supplies in Korea in 1592. He emphasizes the agency of the regional and local armies in this practice instead of viewing the issue from the perspective of a central government. Masato Hasegawa’s Ph.D. dissertation promotes our understanding of Chinese-Korean military logistics from a transnational perspective, highlighting its regional and social strains and their great influence on both sides of the Chinese and Korean borders during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

2 For an introduction to the studies of the military logistics of China, Korea, and Japan during the Imjin War see Masato Hasegawa, “Provisions and Profits in a Wartime Borderland: Supply Lines and Society in the Border Region between China and Korea,” 13-17.  


centuries. The tension appeared between “the Ming state’s capability—rather than its lack thereof—to mobilize resources for the war effort” beyond its boundaries, and the lasting impacts it had on the local society. He considers different transport methods regarding local environmental and social situations, stressing the danger of navigating Korea’s coastal regions and the shortage of ships, labor forces, and navigational intelligence for the Chosŏn to conduct sea transport.

The Ming’s role in acquiring and transporting military supplies in China and Korea has attracted more attention in Chinese-language scholarship, such as Chen Shangsheng’s research that focuses on Ming officials’ efforts to collect and transport grain from China to Korea in 1592-93. He evaluates the consequences of the lack of wartime military provisions and the Chosŏn’s emergency capability of dealing with this matter. Dong Jianmin examines China and Korea’s cooperation and negotiation on their preparations of the Ming armies’ provisions in 1597-98. This study reveals how the two states balanced their realistic considerations and tributary relations when they interdepended to accomplish this logistical task. China’s provincial participation in sea transport is also noted: a portion of Zhang Jinkui’s research on Shandong coastal defense in the Ming period comprehensively analyzes Shandong’s acquisition and sea transport of grain throughout the Imjin War.

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By exploring diverse primary sources these studies reveal various tensions and nuanced interactions in Northeast Asian military logistics. However, a transmarine dimension is rarely offered to investigate the dynamic process of the China-Korea sea transport, which should not only be contextualized in the East Asian wartime environment in the late sixteenth century but also integrated in the diachronic Northeast Asian maritime history. This chapter first traces the challenges in organizing transport along the northern coasts of China and Korea, looking at how unexpected problems and multifaceted contradictions decreased the effectiveness of their maritime logistics. It particularly illuminates the tension between regional limitations in both China and Korea—such as environmental, navigational, economic, and technical difficulties—and their interregional mobility that was stimulated by the war. This chapter then stresses the remarkable change in the Chinese and Korean allies’ maritime strategy in response to the second Japanese attack on Korea, which significantly promoted collaboration and regularized sea transport of provisions to support the Ming armies in Korea. Moreover, this chapter displays the growing mobility and integration of China’s and Korea’s coastal resources in the war by paying special attention to the construction and collection of transport vessels in 1597-98. It argues that the Imjin War significantly strengthened state intervention in their northern sea space and encouraged its connection in the late sixteenth century, showing how state power expansion toward the frontier and its regional integration beyond state boundaries could interact with each other under the impact of international warfare.

**Preparations for Operating Maritime Transport**

In the first Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592-93, the process of grain transportation across
the Bohai and the Yellow Sea space was filled with tension between the necessity and the urgent need to organize Chinese-Korean sea transit, and the obstructions involved. This section discusses how the Ming and Chosŏn governments proposed, arranged, and practiced their previously prohibited and neglected sea transport in Shandong, Liaodong, and northwest Korea. As can be seen in the discussion below, it was a process that involved a series of unforeseen circumstances and new explorations, and was thus often delayed, suspended, or less effectively accomplished.

In the fourth month of 1592 Japanese general Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1536-1598) launched his first invasion of Korea to fulfill the ambition of using the Korean Peninsula as the springboard for conquering China. He rapidly swept through most regions of Korea, and in mid-1592 successively occupied Seoul, the capital city of Korea, and P'yŏngyang, the provincial capital of P'yŏngan Province. Faced with this emergency, the Chosŏn king, Sŏnjo, retreated to the Ŭiju border and asked for the Ming troops' help in fighting the Japanese armies. After a few thousand Liaodong soldiers were defeated in P'yŏngyang, the Ming central government decided to dispatch its main forces to Korea in the latter half of 1592. This decision was not made on the basis of King Sŏnjo’s requests and the Ming’s obligation as the suzerain state, but for the purpose of securing its own border as well as claiming universal sovereignty.11 According to Sŏnjo sillok, the first group of Ming soldiers across the Yalu River in winter 1592 totaled 48,585, with 26,700 accompanying horses. Their consumption of provisions was enormous: as the Border Defense Council estimated, a total 43,730 dan (45,260.55 m³) of grain and 48,060 dan (49,742.1 m³) of fodder beans were needed to support their encampment in Korea for only two

Before the Ming expeditionary forces were launched into Korea the Ming court had already taken the matter of how to efficiently collect and transport military provisions in the territory of China into account. In the ninth month of 1592, the Ming Minister of War, Shi Xing 石星, stated that if Liaodong was unable to provide provisions the Ministry of Revenue should incorporate Tianjin and Shandong into the grain reserves, either transporting tribute grain of Tianjin and Shandong or making use of the Deng-Liao sea-lane between Shandong and Liaodong to address the shortage of Liaodong grain. In the tenth month Shi’s proposals were put into practice by the Vice Minister of War, Song Yingchang 宋應昌, who was appointed to be the military commissioner taking responsibility for managing the military affairs of the Ming expeditionary forces. In Song’s memorial to the throne he suggested that Tianjin-Liaodong sea transport be established, since the tribute rice sent to Tianjin through the Great Canal could be directly transferred to the Shanhai Pass along the Bohai coast. He assured the reliability of this plan based on successful official experience in the past, as well as the existence of private grain trade between Tianjin and the Deng-Lai region.

To release the pressure of the limited geographic conditions of the Liaodong area and its years of turmoil during war, Song also asked to purchase and transport Shandong grain across the Bohai Strait to Liaodong. As seen in the documents he transmitted to the Shandong grand coordinator and the Administration Command of Liaodong Haizhou and Gaizhou, Song ordered the allocation of 50,000 taels of silver to trade and accumulate grain at the nearby ports of

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Dengzhou and Laizhou, and then the hire and dispatch of fifty sea vessels from the Liaodong coastal areas to Shandong to carry the grain.\(^{15}\) This consideration of opening the Bohai Strait in the war was based on the rapidity of its sea transport and Shandong’s geographic proximity to Liaodong. In the early and mid-Ming dynasty military provisions were routinely transferred from Shandong through this sea route to remedy the shortfall in Liaodong production. Although massive sea transport between the Shandong and Liaodong coasts was terminated after the early sixteenth century, their temporary cooperation in grain transport still benefited each other in the famine years.

However, Song’s plan encountered several challenges from the beginning of its implementation. The first problem was assembling enough private ships in Liaodong. Due to the fear of the reduction of their carriage expense, the coastal Liaodong boatmen were reluctant to respond to the governmental requisition and claimed to have no boats available. To cope with this matter Song insisted on paying them a fee comparable to the local market price, and simultaneously ordered them to report in three days.\(^ {16}\) However, more than one month later this task had still not been completed; Song had to increase the carriage expense above the market price and severely punish those who hid their boats and resisted the government order.\(^ {17}\)

The scarcity of grain reserves in Shandong also made it difficult to meet Song’s requirement of purchasing sufficient grain from local residents. Sun Kuang 孫鑛, who at that time was the right vice censor-in-chief in command of Shandong military affairs, complained about this situation. In his memorial to the throne in the eleventh month of 1592, he addressed the difficult


issue of feeding the soldiers stationed in Shandong. According to Sun’s calculation, in order to enhance the Shandong defense by supplying the newly recruited and requisitioned troops, repairing the defensive infrastructure, and purchasing military equipment, the budget for Shandong’s military expenses in 1593 was 300,000 taels of silver. However, only about one-third of this amount could be obtained from the local populace, and the remaining sum had to be raised from other sources.18

In these circumstances local officials resisted Song Yingchang’s request to collect additional grain in Shandong. As reflected in Song Yingchang’s correspondence with Sun Kuang and officials of the Sea Defense Command of Shandong, these officials once asked Song to decrease the amount of the budget for purchasing grain from 50,000 to 20,000 taels of silver. In order to convince them, Song insisted that this purchase was not only for the need to feed the Ming expeditionary forces but also beneficial to the indigenous Dengzhou and Laizhou people, since they no longer had to be concerned with the transaction and transportation of grain in a harvest year.19

However, the procurement and transport of grain from Shandong were not completed by the time the sea froze in winter 1592, so Song Yingchang had to adjust his plan. He urged the Shandong government to promptly gather sufficient grain, and the Haizhou and Gaizhou officials to prepare for its transportation after the ice thawed in the spring. Also, since it was more urgent to supply provisions for the Ming armies who had already crossed the Yalu River at that time, Song changed the destination of this transport from Liaodong directly to Ŭiju.20

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After Liaodong ships finally navigated to Shandong from the Lüshun port at the end of the first month of 1593, loading the grain that had been collected away from the Dengzhou port became another challenging task. Some of the storage locations were hundreds of li away from Dengzhou, where Liaodong boatmen had never traveled before, making it especially troublesome to conduct efficient transport. Song therefore had to ask the Shandong sea defense circuit to transport the grain to the coastal waters of Dengzhou.21

When the interregional grain carriage between Liaodong and Shandong was postponed by the difficulty of collecting grain and ships from the local population, the geographic inconvenience of loading the grain, and the harsh weather in the winter, the Chosŏn government faced even more severe challenges to transferring the Ming armies’ provisions in Korea’s northern region. According to Masato Hasegawa’s analysis, the Chosŏn government undertook the logistical pressure of “physically transporting the Ming’s provisions, coordinating war effort with Ming officials, and enlisting the labor of local residents inside Korea,” although both the Ming and the Chosŏn made various preparations for overland transport in the last few months of 1592.22

The urgency as well as the difficulty of transporting provisions in Korea’s border region forced Chosŏn officials to consider adopting more-efficient sea transport along the coastlines as a complementary method. Before the Ming main forces departed for Korea in order to defeat the Japanese armies before the winter, the Chosŏn suggested implementing the expeditious sea transport of Chinese provisions and armies, placing it in the military blueprint of defeating the

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22 Masato Hasegawa, “Provisions and Profits in a Wartime Borderland: Supply Lines and Society in the Border Region between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea,” 64. The cooperative efforts of the Ming and Chosŏn to conduct cross-border overland transport can be seen in their government correspondence included in Kuksŏ ch’orok.
Japanese. As stated in a request to a Ming Assistant Regional Commander (C. canjiang, 參將), Luo Shangzhi 驍尚志, Chosŏn official Yi Homin 李好閔 believed that if the Ming could dispatch a number of handpicked soldiers to retake P'yŏngyang and then use the western sea route of Korea and the east overland route in Hamgyŏng Province to transport provisions and dispatch troops from both sides, it would form an “undefeatable strategy” against the Japanese enemies.\(^{23}\)

This was not the first time the Chosŏn took the transport of provisions along Korea’s western coast into account. As early as when the king and his subordinates took refuge in P'yŏngyang in the fifth month of 1592 after the Japanese armies occupied Seoul, transferring their daily supplies had been a problem. Since the west sea-lane was still obstructed, official Ko Kyŏngmyŏng 高敬命 suggested moving grain directly from the south to the Taedong River through the West Sea. He further proposed employing water transport sailors (K. chojol, 漕卒) and private fishermen in this, which was not only to efficiently supply military provisions but also to successfully deliver military instructions and aggregate troops.\(^{24}\)

Ko Kyŏngmyŏng’s proposal aimed to mobilize labor forces and resources from Korea’s southern provinces to P'yŏngyang, which was an easier target when considering the relatively active maritime activities in the southern coast. In contrast, Yi Homin’s suggestion of organizing maritime transport in Korea’s northwestern provinces was a new attempt for the Chosŏn and the

\(^{23}\) Yi Homin 李好閔, “參將駱尚志前呈文,” in Obongjip 五峰集, fasc. 14, Han'guk munjip ch'onggan, vol. 59, 532b-533a. 小邦道路有水陸互進之勢 若從東海及鴨綠江下流 搬移糧資 駕船齊發 則到黃海道豐川 京畿江華等地方 不過便風三四日程 允為便利 其在咸鏡者 則又發精騎 從本道儳路進討 東西掎角 水陸並進 則實是萬勝之策. A similar statement can be seen in the Chosŏn king’s diplomatic credential transmitted to the Ming court in the late 1592. See Kuksŏ ch’orok, “倭情變詐日增 勢益猖獗 萬分可虞 恳乞聲明早賜議處以伐狂謀以圖治安事,” 57. 但郡邑盡喪 饋餉難繼 計諸處見虜僅勾萬人所食 若調精騎萬餘 約費資糧 剋日長驅 仍整統重兵 駕船齊發 從東海鴨綠江下流直抵黃海道等處 允為便利.

\(^{24}\) Ko Kyŏngmyŏng’s proposal is included in Cho Kyŏngnam 趙慶男, Nanjung chammok 亂中雜錄, fasc. 1 (Seoul: Minjok Munhua Ch’ochingsa, reprint, 1977), 17.
Ming needed to be settled with detailed discussions. Although there is no record found from the Ming side in response to Yi, his request to transport grain on Korea’s northwestern coast was indeed put into consideration in early 1593, when the delay in supplying provisions had become the major hindrance to the Ming troops’ further expedition in Korea.

This issue grew even worse after the Chinese-Korean allied troops were defeated in the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan on the twenty-seventh day of the first month of 1593. Earlier in this month they had gained victories against the Japanese, recaptured P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng, and restored all of P’yŏngan and Hawanghae provinces and a portion of Kyŏnggi and Kangwŏn provinces. However, their rapid progress toward southern Korea encountered its first setback at Pyŏkchegwan, a postal station near Seoul. They then had to retreat and station in Kaesŏng. There they suffered severely from the undersupply of provisions. The Second State Council of the Chosŏn, Ryū Sŏngryong 柳成龍, even flogged the Kaesŏng registrar because he did not distribute grain promptly.

This plight compelled Ming and Chosŏn officials to seek a more-efficient way to convey provisions from China to the encampment of the Ming armies in Korea. One day before the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan, Song Yingchang ordered an investigation into the sea routes in Korea’s northwest coastal regions. In a document to Secretary of the Ming Ministry of Revenue Ai Weixin 艾維新, Song urged an increase in the efficiency of Korean’s overland transport, and discussed using Liaodong ships for direct transport not only to Ŭiju, as he mentioned earlier, but

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25 Yi Kyŏngsŏk, Imjin chŏllansa, 675.
26 For the process of the Chinese and Korean allies’ victories in P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng, their retreat to Kaesŏng after the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan, and the result and the evaluations of this battle see Kenneth Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 150-164; Li Guangtao 李光濤, Chaoxian renchen wohuo yanjiu 朝鮮「壬辰倭禍」研究 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1972), 12-141; Yi Kyŏngsŏk, Imjin chŏllansa, 650-669, 674-688.
also to the more-remote cities of P'yŏngyang and Kaesoŋ.  

My ministry [the Ministry of War] also urged the Circuit of Haizhou and Gaizhou to arrange vessels and transport grain to Korea by sea routes. Then the circuit reported the situation that the ships had all been prepared. It has been investigated that there are big rivers to the east of P'yŏngyang and to the west of Kaesoŋ, both leading to the sea. Now it is discussed that grain ships go out to sea from the ports of Lushun and Jinzhou along the coast, pass Matou Mountain on the east, and arrive in P'yŏngyang, Úiju, or Kaesoŋ. Koreans must know whether the sea routes are feasible. Your office should also immediately transmit a document to the Chosŏn king to conduct a thorough investigation of the sea transport routes and report it to our ministry in order to operate the transport. This matter is of the utmost urgency and should not be delayed.

This document reflects Song's great interest in developing ship transport from southeastern Liaodong to directly reach P'yŏngyang and Kaesoŋ across the sea. As shown in Sadae mun'gwe, the collective diplomatic correspondence mainly between the Chosŏn and the Ming in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Ai Weixin delivered this proposal to King Sŏnjo only two days after Song's order.

Song also asked that the sea route between P'yŏngyang and Seoul within Korea be investigated since "the frozen ice will gradually melt in the mild weather," and "it is especially convenient compared to overland transfer if boats are able to navigate on the seas and rivers from P'yŏngyang to the royal capital."


transmitted this to King Sŏnjo in the first month of 1592, requesting that the king immediately hire transport ships if the P'yŏngyang-Seoul sea route proved to be usable.

Different from the Yuan dynasty’s encouragement of maritime trade and transportation both domestically and internationally, formal sea communications between the Ming and the Koryŏ/Chosŏn had only been permitted in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Impeded by the Northern Yuan’s occupation of the Liaodong region, Ming and Koryŏ envoys traveled between their capital cities of Nanjing and Kaesŏng through the Yellow Sea that connected the estuaries of the Yangtze and Yesŏng rivers. The frequent occurrence of marine disasters on this route forced the Koryŏ to change to a safer way—passing through the Liaodong overland route, sailing across the Bohai Strait, and going ashore at Shandong Dengzhou. This seaway was still in use after the Chosŏn dynasty was founded, and until the Yongle emperor moved the Ming capital to Beijing in 1421, which enabled Chosŏn envoys to choose a safer land route via the Shanhai Pass.32

After the Yellow Sea route had been abandoned for almost two centuries, Yi Homin’s and Song Yingchang’s considerations of its resumption presented a challenge to both Ming and Chosŏn governments. Moreover, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries when official maritime contacts between the two countries were frequent, they never attempted to navigate Korea’s northwestern coast and therefore needed to explore its sea route. Shortly after Ai Weixin transmitted Song Yingchao’s words to King Sŏnjo, he received a reply confirming the applicability of sea transport in Korea’s northwestern coastal waters. The Chosŏn Ministry of Taxation conducted this investigation with the cooperation of Korean boatmen who were familiar

with the sea-lane from Ŭiju to P'yŏngyang and Kaesŏng: “[This route] meanders along the coast from Ŭiju and the Yalu River toward the east. [Its distance] is over 600 li to the Taedong River of P'yŏngyang Prefecture. [This route then] meanders along the coast from the Taedong River toward the south. [Its distance] is over 700 li to the Yesŏng River of Kaesŏng Prefecture. Although shoals and reef exist in the route and the waterway is zigzag, there are no difficult places to go through. If the wind is mild and the journey is successful, it takes four or five days from Ŭiju and Kaesŏng.”

Meanwhile, in response to Zhang Sanwei’s requirement King Sŏnjo assured him that there was indeed a seaway between P'yŏngyang and Seoul. The local boatmen had already been requisitioned, and were ready to transfer the grain once the weather warmed up.

However, although the Chosŏn offered an optimistic expectation of the voyage along the northern coast of the Korean Peninsula and made preparations to investigate the sea-lanes and employ oceangoing vessels, direct sea transport from China to Korea turned out to be a laborious task because of the logistical, administrative, and navigational difficulties.

**Challenges in Grain Logistics on Korea’s Northwestern Coast**

After receiving the Chosŏn’s supportive reply, Ming officials had begun to practice cooperative transnational transport from Dengzhou-Laizhou to Kaesŏng. Differing from Song’s original thought of sending Liaodong ships to Korea, Ming officials expected to rely at least

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33 朝鮮國王咨遼東都司張（三畏）（回答）,” Wanli 21/2/4 (3/6/1593), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc.3, 23.
自義州鴨綠江沿海邐迆而東 至平壤府大同江六百餘里 自大同江沿海邐迆而南 至開城府禮成江七百餘里 其間雖有沙嶼礁港 水路迂曲 而別無難通去處 風和汛順 則自義州至開城四五日可到等因.
partially on the Chosŏn’s efforts to sail Korean ships to Liaodong to carry grain to China. In the second month of 1592, Ai Weixin sent a document to King Sŏnjo, asking to examine the actual number of boats in Korea, both official and private. Ai also ordered that except for those staying in the localities, the remaining boats were to be deployed to Liaodong Jinzhou. Even if this requirement was unable to be satisfied, he continued, the Chosŏn should still reply unequivocally without making a false declaration of the numbers of its boats and seamen.³⁵

Ai did not explain why he presented this proposal, but the lack of sufficient transport ships in China to serve in such pressing circumstances may have been a major reason. Four days later King Sŏnjo sent back a document to Ai that stated the difficulty of putting his plan in effect: Korean seamen had no experience in navigating the waterway west of Changja Island of P'yŏngan Province, which was located at the estuary of the Yalu River. Due to this, the king had to requisition and retain Korean seamen at Changja Island, waiting for Chinese provisions to be transferred to Korea.³⁶ Ming officials compromised on merely using Chinese ships in Liaodong and Shandong, and Song Yingchang had to seek additional financial assistance from the Wanli emperor to accomplish this plan. In his memorial submitted in the second month of 1593, Song described the current progress of the domestic transport. He had already asked Ai Weixin and Zhang Sanwei to accelerate the grain collection, and the administration vice commissioner of the Circuit of Haizhou and Gaizhou Guo Xingzhi郭性之 to collect ships. The ships were to depart for Dengzhou and Laizhou through the islands of the Bohai Strait, and head to Ŭiju along the Lushun coast, transferring grain to Korean seafaring ships going to Kaesŏng.³⁷ The Wanli

³⁵ “經理征倭糧餉艾（維新）咨朝鮮國王（戶部咨調本國海船運糧）,” Wanli 21/2/10 (3/12/1593), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc.3, 44-45.
³⁶ “朝鮮國王咨經理艾（維新）（回咨）,” Wanli 21/2/14 (3/16/1593), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc.3, 45-46.
³⁷ Song Yingchang,“議乞增兵益餉進取王京疏 [二月] 十六日,” in Jinglüe fuguo yaobian, fasc.6, 505.
emperor approved Song’s plan, allocating silver to support the purchase of grain and ship transport in Shandong.\textsuperscript{38}

Although Song realized the impracticality of summoning Korean boats to Liaodong, he did expect them to carry grain in their own territory. However, it was soon proven that effective organization of sea transport in P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces was still challenging for the Chosŏn, as the related discussions between King Sŏnjo and his officials reveal. First, due to the geographic limitations of Ŭiju, provisions conveyed from the Liaodong land route had to first be moved to Yongch'o'n, a neighboring coastal county of Ŭiju, for further transshipment.\textsuperscript{39} This situation resulted in inefficient transfer in P'yŏngan Province to some extent. In the sixth month of 1593, when the Chosŏn faced the exhaustion of manpower in Ŭiju, King Sŏnjo urged alternative ship transport be immediately pursued. However, the Provincial Military Commander, Shin Chap 申礧, replied, “It seems that it is easy to carry out ship transport in other provinces, whereas in Ŭiju it is extremely difficult. There is no alternative way but to use about ten boats to do grain transport. However, there is no accessible route.”\textsuperscript{40}

Inefficient management was another impediment. As the Border Defense Council complained, the dispatched officials and local magistrates did not completely devote themselves to transporting the Ming provisions. It considered sea transport much more effective than labor power carriage since “[the amount of grain] ten thousand people carry is less than one boat carries.” Although over about Ŭiju boats had been deployed, only one low-ranking official was designated to lead them, which caused the local government to disregard his orders. Even though

\textsuperscript{38} Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 21/2/29 (3.31.1593), fasc. 257, 4786-4787.
\textsuperscript{39} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/1/12 (2/12/1593), fasc. 34, vol.21, 603.
\textsuperscript{40} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/6/21 (7/19/1593), fasc. 39, vol.,22, 15.
this official had served in this post for almost a half month, the boats had not even departed yet. To address this delay, the Border Defense Council suggested appointing high-ranking officials to do the inspection.\footnote{Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/2/7 (3/9/1593), fasc. 35, vol.21, 625.}

Moreover, the small size of local boats constrained sea transport in P'yŏngan Province. For instance, in the second month of 1593 the Ministry of Taxation reported that although boats were grouped in the coastal Yongch'ŏn coastal county to carry provisions moved from Ŭiju, “the amount of grain is large whereas the boats are small, so that it is difficult to carry [grain] completely by boat.”\footnote{Sŏnjo 26/2/1 (3/3/1593), fasc.35, vol.21, 621.} To compensate for this, the Ministry of Taxation suggested a thorough gathering of manpower and beasts of burden in order to load provisions in the P'yŏngan overland route.

Needless to say, the enormous wartime demands engendered a deficiency of carriers in P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces. This made the arrangement of their regional shipment immensely challenging, especially when considering their less-satisfactory geographic and economic conditions in comparison to Korea’s southern provinces. In the third month of 1593, shortly after the Chosŏn began to transfer the Ming armies’ provisions, the Second State Councilor, Yun Tusu 尹斗壽, put forward the proposal of allowing Chinese ships to unload directly at P'yŏngyang and Hwanghae instead of on the Ŭiju border to ensure prompt transport.\footnote{Sŏnjo 26/3/15 (4.16.1593), fasc.36, vol.21:663.}

Yun’s words suggest that the Korean government expected the Ming to bear at least some responsibility for shipping, even in the territory of Korea. This thought accorded with the Ming’s adjustment to some extent since Chinese ships simultaneously encountered the problem of

\[\text{目今江冰幾解 定州船隻已皆浮泊 催弁發陸到龍川 將輸載義州之穀 而穀多船小 難盡載船．}\]

\[\text{海運之船自上國來者 不必於義州 若交卸於平壤 黃海 則運到無礙矣．}\]
unloading provisions at Matou Mountain in Liaodong, the transfer destination that Song Yingchang had suggested, as mentioned above. Since there were no storehouses at Matou Mountain, the Ming considered constructing a podium and putting straw mats over it to create temporary grain storage. However, this plan was suspended because the storehouses could not withstand the frequent rains in that region. To solve this problem, Song ordered Chinese oarsmen to sail directly to P’yŏngyang, paying them additional transportation fees and protecting and guiding their transnational trip.⁴⁴

Some remaining records reveal that this arrangement was indeed implemented. For instance, Guo Xingzhi transmitted a document, included in the collection of Sadae mun’gwe, to King Sŏnjo on Guo’s supervision of ship transport to Korea. According to this account, Guo began to organize this trip in the fourth month of 1593, requisitioning nineteen Jinzhou ships to carry 8,680 dan (8,983.8 m³) of millet, beans, and rice to Dengzhou. They unloaded 6,490 dan (6717.15 m³) of rice in Korea, including 5,870 dan (6,075.45 m³) in P’yŏngyang.⁴⁵ Another entry from Sŏnjo sillok in the seventh month of 1593 also shows that Zhang Sanwei once paid Shandong, Fuzhou, and Gaizhou ships to carry 3,900 dan (4,036.5 m³) of grain to P’yŏngyang.⁴⁶

Although Song’s order regarding cross-border sea transport was realized, navigating across the Yellow Sea was not easy for Chinese oarsmen, who faced dangers when sailing in a longer and less secured sea-lane. A drifting case mentioned by Guo Xingzhi in the above document reflects this situation. In the eighth month of 1593 a Jinzhou boatman carrying 450 dan (465.75 m³) of grain arrived at Changja Island in Korea. However, when he continued his journey he

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⁴⁵ “整飭金復海蓋兵備屯田兼管苑馬寺事郭咨朝鮮國王 （布政咨行本國查究糧船漂泊被賊搶奪緣由）,” Wanli 22/1/11 (3/2/1594), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc.8, 3.
encountered strong wind, lost 330 dan (341.55 m\(^3\)) of grain, and was blown back to an offshore island of Shandong.

The possibility of being plundered by pirates also existed, as Guo Xingzhi recorded in the same document. One Jinzhou boatman stated that when he carried 560 dan (579.6 m\(^3\)) of millet from Dengzhou to Korea in the ninth month of 1593, he was blown to the Chŏlla coast and encountered six local pirate ships. The Korean pirates killed two Chinese seamen and plundered their millet and clothes.\(^{47}\) The Chosŏn verified this statement and reported its subsequent treatment of this case: the pirates came from a coastal county of Chŏlla, and eighteen of them were successively caught and executed. However, it was difficult to recover the grain taken away from the Chinese boatmen.\(^{48}\)

The challenges of sailing along Korea’s northwestern coast hampered the Ming’s grain transport and military encampment to the south of Seoul even after the Japanese armies had retreated to Korea’s southern port of Pusan in mid-1593. In Song’s memorial to the Wanli emperor in the seventh month of 1593, he explained that the stay of the Ming main forces in Kaesŏng and Seoul with no southward expedition was due to the extreme difficulties of feeding them in Korea’s southern regions: the sea route from Ŭiju to the Kaesŏng and Seoul areas was remote and dangerous, and this was the utmost distance that Chinese grain could reach. South of Seoul the Ming armies had to rely solely on Chŏlla and Kyŏnsang provinces to supply provisions. Worse than that, Kyŏnsang was devastated after the war, and thus only Chŏlla was currently functioning as a source of grain.\(^{49}\)

\(^{47}\) “整飭金復海蓋兵備屯田兼管苑馬寺事郭咨朝鮮國王（布政咨行本國查究糧船漂泊被賊搶奪緣由）,” Wanli 22/1/11 (3/2/1594), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 8, 3-5.

\(^{48}\) “朝鮮國王咨山東布政使郭（回答）,” Wanli 22/2/8 (3/29/1594), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 8, 5b-6.

\(^{49}\) Song Yingchang, “議經略提督不必屯駐一處疏 [七月] 二十一日,” in Jinglüe fuguo yaobian, fasc. 9, 778.
While no record has been found assessing the Ming’s sea transport capability in Korea in the early stages of the war, the following data drawn from Sŏnjo sillok does enable us to understand the overland and water logistical capabilities of the P'yŏngan region from the twelfth month of 1592 to the eighth month of 1593:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grain Received</th>
<th>Local Consumption</th>
<th>Ship Transport</th>
<th>Overland Transport</th>
<th>Remaining Grain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ŭiju</td>
<td>105,700</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>27,010</td>
<td>24,090</td>
<td>Unrecorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millet:50,610</td>
<td>Millet:2,490</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beans:50,310</td>
<td>Beans:4,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forage:4,780</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P'yŏngyang</td>
<td>29970</td>
<td>12,430</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>11,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millet:13,790</td>
<td>Millet:6,760</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beans:16,180</td>
<td>Beans:5,610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136,670</td>
<td>19,570</td>
<td>30,400</td>
<td>26,280</td>
<td>11,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Chinese grain received, consumed, and transferred in Ŭiju and P'yŏngyang (unit of measurement: dan)\(^{50}\)

This table shows that China transported a total 136,670 dan (141,453.45 m\(^3\)) of grain to Korea before the Japanese retreat in 1593. The Chosŏn adopted both overland and ship transport to move Chinese grain from their unloading locations of Ŭiju and P'yŏngyang. The volume shipped by boat in Ŭiju was only 1.12 times that of land transport, and in P'yŏngyang this rate was 1.55. On average, grain transport by water in P'yŏngan was only 1.16 times that transported overland. It should also be noted that in the first phase of the Imjin War neither overland nor ship transport in northwest Korea can be regarded as effective. Except for the provisions consumed, the amount

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\(^{50}\) Chosŏn Korea had its own unit of measure of grain and rice, sŏm 石, which was roughly equal to 144 kg. See Jan Gyllenbok, *Encyclopaedia of Historical Metrology, Weights, and Measures*, vol.3 (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2018), 1672. I use the Chinese dan when a Korean record is referring to Chinese provisions or when the Chosŏn was corresponding with the Ming because their units of measure ought to maintain consistent for a smooth communication and calculation.
of provisions moved from Ŭiju was only 51.8 percent of the total, indicating that the remaining half stayed in the local area.51

In addition to their respective problems in sea transport, grain waste in China-Korea cooperative transit was a controversial issue between the Ming and the Chosŏn. In 1594, Secretary of the Chosŏn Ministry of Punishments Hwang Yŏil 黃汝一, who was supervising grain transport, sent a letter to Ryu Sŏngryong describing the malpractice and misappropriation of Shandong and Liaodong transporters in the sea transit of 1593, and greatly ascribed the loss of grain to their misconduct. According to Hwang’s observations, after Shandong grain was unloaded in Korea it was always soaked, causing decay, even though the ship holds were well constructed and airtight, with their cracks sealed to prevent water from entering the hold during the trip. Hwang explained the reason for this phenomenon: in order to change the appearance of the inferior grain transported to Korea, when the Shandong conveyers sailed close to Korea or just one or two days before handing the grain over to the Koreans, they immersed the grain and then immediately dried its surface in the wind to make the particles appear larger with a good color in spite of the decaying interior of the kernels. By the time Shandong grain was moved to Korean ships, it had become mushy and inedible. Making this situation worse, the Ming directing officers colluded with the conveyers and urged Zhang Sanwei, who was in charge of grain transport, to convince the Chosŏn to accept the decayed grain by saying that this spoilage was due to the long-distance voyage from Shandong to Korea.

Hwang also vividly narrated how Liaodong Haizhou and Gaizhou transporters exploited the grain transport. Hwang described these people as especially cunning and fierce; they not only

51 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/8/7(9/1/1593), fasc.41, vol.22,64. The low mobility of grain from P'yŏngyang to other places was because the Ming main forces were stationed in the locale, and thus the transport rate of P'yŏngyang does not represent the logistical capability of the P'yŏngan area, and therefore is not taken into this analysis.
soaked the grain more thoroughly than the Shandong boatmen but also used various methods to decrease the capacity of the measuring vessels in order to steal a portion of the grain. This embezzlement increased since neither the deceived Zhang Sanwei nor the unresisting Koreans would punish these scoundrels. Hwang expressed his deep concern that the Ming conveyers’ deceitful behavior would worsen in 1594—after learning from the previous year’s first attempt, they would be more acquainted with the sea transport process. To solve this problem, he even suggested that the Chosŏn persuade Liaodong to dispatch an additional supervising officer to prevent tampering with the measuring vessels.\footnote{52 Hwang Yŏil, “上西厓柳相國書,” in Haewŏl chip 海月集, fasc. 6, Han’guk munjip ch’onggan sok 韓國文集叢刊續 (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 2005), vol. 10, 87-88a. 第與山東人授受交割之際 例必浥水漬米 廃破而不可食 此則不可不預防而痛斷 彼山東人初非漬米來 米豆亦初非不乾整也 觀其船制極為完密 重重疊板 隙塗油灰 一氣不通 萬無侵潤之勢 故其中或良善不用術者 則專然本色米粒 精硬極好 而所謂良善者僅一二於千百矣 其他例必近我國地方一二息 或於交收前一二日 始以水浸漬之 旋即出而風之 止大其顆而要好其色 其中則已腐朽不堪 煞積時而氣蒸如煙 斗量而臭不可近 纔移載我船了 已如泥如麴而不可食矣 將此所見 處分領來委官 所謂委官者 不過曰千百戶旗舍官等 其用心反甚於舟子 無異說經於牛耳 故每聞海運之來 必於張都司處善其辭說而告其不可受之由 則都司雖是其言 而都司之左右書子 皆舟子委官之類 計舟而受贈 反與彼同心 日懶怠於都司 故都司亦不能罪之 乃曰海氣青齊距爾國路二千里 久於水上之物 輕能免蒸潤之患乎 運使亦受之 以此不能防奸而坐受其弊 於是海蓋人 性尤蒙悍 漬水尤甚於山東 斗量又小於山東 故實數之外 餘剩又減於山東 不惟此也 其授受之際 斗量不平 百巧千奸 圜減升斗 或以厚紙塞其斛隅 或以泥土塗其斛底 或流於袋口 或凹其斗面 雖曰所失毫釐 而積而至於千萬石則不待多乎 當初一運 不若是甚焉 二運則甚於一運 三運則甚於二運 至四五運而用詐用術無窮焉 無他 張都司不能罪之 而我國人莫與之抗故也 其或痛防之 則橫起事端 譁然戰塲 到此境界 處置極難矣 然上年則海路初通 不甚相熟 煞云爾也 今年則必術作尤神而末流難防 其弊不淺矣… 虽使張都司專摠運糧 而乞別差一將官 管察斗量 則必無如韓委官書子之弊 清水滅斗之術。}

What complicated this case was Zhang Sanwei’s contradictory report, included in Imun tŭngnok 吏文謄錄. Zhang’s report was written after his Liaodong superiors instructed him to investigate the inferiority of the grain stored in P’yŏngyang. This investigation may have been facilitated by the Chosŏn’s complaint about the poor quality of the grain transferred from Shandong and Liaodong. However, Zhang claimed that when he coordinated the grain transfer in 1593 he was never informed that grain unloaded in P’yŏngyang had been mingled with sand to make it coarse, and therefore this situation must have been due to the Chosŏn’s malpractice during the handover. As for the dampness and mustiness of the grain, Zhang said that it could
have been caused by moisture on the sea after being contained in ships for months; the humid weather in Korea and the long-term storage may have contributed to this situation as well.\textsuperscript{53} King Sŏnjo accepted Zhang’s accusation, and investigated and penalized the involved Korean director in charge of receiving and storing Chinese grain in P'yŏngyang.\textsuperscript{54} It is hard to know whether King Sŏnjo agreed with Zhang Sanwei, or he was simply trying to avoid offending Zhang. However, Hwang Yŏil’s and Zhang Sanwei’s statements at least show that the Ming and the Chosŏn both paid attention to grain spoilage in their sea transport, although they tended to blame the other for this problem by offering conflicting interpretations.

The above analysis shows that various limits reduced the efficiency of China-Korea sea transport, especially on Korea’s northwestern coast. Some examples mentioned in this section include the Chosŏn’s logistical inefficiency due to its topographic, bureaucratic, and environmental restrictions; the Ming’s navigational risks; and the considerable waste of grain in sea transit. It should also be noted that even when sea transport did not play an important role in the early stages of the war, the difficulty of collecting and making use of seagoing ships had already presented a problem to both governments. In China the inactivity of Liaodong coastal shipowners enhanced Song Yingchang’s recruitment of them. In Korea the limited size and number of boats in the north narrowed the scope of transportation that the Chosŏn government could arrange. Did Ming officials broaden the pool of transport ships? What made private ships in northeast China hard to summon? Did the Chosŏn conquer its regional restrictions in sea transport? The next section seeks answers to these questions by looking at China and Korea’s

\textsuperscript{53} “軍務事,” Wanli 22/10/10 (11/21/1594), in \textit{Imun tŭngnok} 史文謄錄 (Changsŏgak, K2-3497), fasc. 4, 130-132. \textit{Imun tŭngnok} is a collection of transcribed records of Ming-Chosŏn official correspondence from 1593, the early stages of the Imjin War, to 1621, right after the Later Jin’s occupation of Liaoyang. It provides a direct look at China-Korea wartime diplomacy and social conditions.

\textsuperscript{54} “查明軍餉事,” Wanli22/10/?, in \textit{Imun tŭngnok}, fasc. 4, 132-134.
negotiations on the sea transport of Shandong grain during the peace talks of the Imjin War.

The Predicament of Dispatching Ships: Regional Restrictions on Interregional Sea Transport

The winter of 1593 was hard for the Chosŏn dynasty. The grain stores in Korea were exhausted from supplying the allied armies; starvation, plague, and frost afflicted the war-shattered populace; the agricultural economy was destroyed after the war; and the sowing season was yet to come. Moreover, once the peace negotiations between China and Japan were unsuccessful, the severe lack of grain in Korea could not support the Ming main armies’ reentering Korea. As the Border Defense Council stressed in one document to King Sŏnjo in the eleventh month of 1593: “Currently the big concern is specifically the extreme insufficiency of provisions everywhere. The arrangement and preparation must be very circumstantial, the transportation must be hastened day and night, and only then can the poverty and exhaustion, both inside and outside, be relieved.” Fortunately 120,000 dan (124,200 m³) of grain appears to have been sent from Shandong to alleviate Korea’s grain shortage. Understanding the importance of transporting this amount of grain efficiently, the Border Defense Council suggested the specific dispatch of a chief official to manage the calculation and transportation affairs once the grain arrived.

It is not hard to imagine the eagerness of King Sŏnjo and his officials to receive the Shandong grain. However, they did not know its current location or when it could be conveyed.

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to Korea. Just one day after the Border Defense Council submitted this document, Zhang Sanwei gave King Sŏnjo disappointing news before he was to leave Korea. Zhang stated that since the ice was beginning to form, ships in Shandong were probably not able to come. The shortage of ships was also an impediment, although about one hundred thousand dan of grain had already been prepared. Zhang further pointed out the problems of transferring grain from Dengzhou and Laizhou, which, according to his words, was much more difficult than transferring it from Jinzhou.56

As noted above, the postponement of Song Yingchang’s plan in winter 1592 shows that harsh weather, inconvenient transport, the difficulty of requisitioning private ships, and Liaodong boatmen’s lack of navigational experience all hampered beginning the process. Zhang Sanwei’s words further indicate that even after interregional logistics had been carried out in China for a year, the process had not become any easier. In response to Zhang’s emphasis on the shortfall of ships and the disadvantage of transferring grain in Shandong, the following analysis presents the issues of collecting, constructing, and sailing seagoing ships in Shandong.

First, it was unnecessary for the Ming state to maintain its coastal defense in Shandong, which explains why few official-use ships in the local region were assigned to sea transport in the Imjin War. In the Zhengtong reign (1436-1449), active Japanese piracy on China’s northern coast decreased. Lacking a constant external threat, the Ming’s coastal defense system in the north was then gradually relaxed and unable to satisfy the immediate need of recruiting local sailors and battleships when the Imjin War burst out. Therefore when Right Vice Censor-in-chief Sun Kuang discussed the Shandong government’s defensive measures against the potential

Japanese attack in the eleventh month of 1592, he strongly suggested that sailors from Zhejiang and South Zhili be recruited because the Shandong populace was not skillful at sea warfare.\(^{57}\)

The same situation existed in Liaodong. In Zheng Ruozeng’s military monograph *Chouhai tubian*, he explained that compared to Liaodong’s solid territorial border defense, its sea defense had declined in the peaceful environment after Liaodong general Liu Jiang 劉江 defeated the Japanese pirates in the 1410s. With the halt in Liaodong-Shandong sea transport, the Liaodong coastal military infrastructures were also of no further use.\(^{58}\) One consequence of the lack of preparation in Shandong and Liaodong coastal defense in the late sixteenth century was that it had to largely rely on the construction and dispatch of battleships from the southern provinces, and incorporate local fishermen and islanders into military and sea transport systems.

The collection of private ships also encountered tremendous difficulties in Shandong and Liaodong during the war. Regarding the frequent Japanese pirate raids, in the Hongwu reign (1369-1398) the Ming applied a depopulation policy to the offshore islands of Shandong.\(^{59}\) In the following centuries, although Ming maritime policies varied from time to time, the suspension of sea transportation from the south and through the Bohai Strait, as well as the reinforced sea ban between Shandong and Liaodong after the 1570s, significantly decreased the dynamics of the private maritime economy in the Bohai region. This led to a lack of fishing and merchant boats, especially large ones for interregional transport, on the Shandong and Liaodong coasts. Therefore when Zhang Sanwei explained the difficulty of collecting Chinese ships to the

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\(^{57}\) Sun Kuang, “防倭疏,” in *Sun Yuefeng xiansheng quanji*, fasc.1, 31-32.


Chosŏn, he observed: “China has a prohibition on going to sea, so there are only small boats without any large ones at all.”

Compared to Liaodong, the Shandong government faced even more environmental and technological restrictions on hiring ships. As Sun Kuang complained to Song Yingchang in early 1593, the majority of ships that traded and transported items in Shandong had formerly come from Liaodong, and the lack of Shandong ships hindered his completion of the task of hiring them. He thus wanted Liaodong to offer ships and even encourage nonlocal and merchant ships to come to Shandong. The transport capability of Shandong ships was also limited. According to another letter from Sun to Shi Xing, only fishing boats commonly existed on the Shandong coast, and their size was not large. Because fishing boats were not suitable for long-distance navigation to Liaodong, Sun had to requisition small Shandong merchant ships. He discovered that only about ten of them had reluctantly followed his order, and each of them could carry only 200 dan. However, the transport capability of Liaodong private ships was at least double this amount. According to Guo Xingzhi’s arrangement noted above, in the fourth month of 1593 nineteen ships from Liaodong Jinzhou transported a total 8,680 dan of millet, beans, and rice to Korea, meaning that their average transport volume was about 457 dan. His subsequent accounts also mention the grain amounts of several individual Jinzhou boatowners, including Yang Mei 杨梅, 500 dan; Jin Zhicang 金志倉, 600 dan; Hong Tianxiang 洪天祥, 450 dan; and Jin Tinghu 金廷湖, 560 dan. Their average transport volume was 527.5 dan.

61 Sun Kuang, “與宋桐岡書,” in Sun Yiefeng xiansheng quanji, fasc. 4, 189.
63 “整飭金復海蓋兵備屯田兼管苑馬寺事郭咨行本國查究糧船漂泊被賊搶奪緣由,” Wanli 22/1/11 (3/2/1594), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 8, 3-5.
The dearth of timber in Shandong for shipbuilding is one important reason for the flaws of its local boats. Shandong officials reiterated this issue when sea-transport responsibilities overburdened the province in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Shandong Grand Coordinator Wan Xiangchun 萬象春 sharply pointed out the environmental discrepancy between Liaodong and Shandong in the second stage of the Imjin War, expressing his discontent of the Liaodong grand coordinator’s discussion on navigating Shandong ships to Korea:

Although not every Liaodong household lives by ship, the local residents sometimes still own ships as the [Liaodong] grand coordinator’s memorial says. The large ones are registered in the government and go to Tianjin for employment and seeking profits; the small ones submit fish tax and catch fish in coastal ports for daily living. Putting small ships aside temporarily, it is also not impossible to have large ships. They just need to be specially assembled. If they do not have the heart to completely take the livelihood away from the people, they also have plentiful wood that makes shipbuilding easy. Does the Dengzhou and Laizhou region have even one boat that can be registered or one piece of wood that can be logged? Neither.”

Later in the early seventeenth century when sea transport was being extensively practiced in North China to satisfy the Ming’s growing provision requirement against the Latter Jin, the collection of transport ships placed greater pressure on Shandong. For instance, Shandong Grand Coordinator Wang Zaijin 王在晉 once complained about the unachievable task of transferring massive grain amounts with an insufficient number of ships: “Shandong has never had any woody plants. It does not have shipyards as well. If ships are prepared yet grain is not provided, you can still rebuke Shandong. However, if provisions are gathered but ships do not arrive, how

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can Shandong be charged!” The scarce timber and the undeveloped shipbuilding in Shandong explain its technical problems in cross-regional navigation. The Tangtou boat, named after the coastal Tangtou Camp of Shouguang County in Shandong, was a typical ship type used in local private voyages. In the Imjin War Tangtou boats were requisitioned to accomplish official transport tasks. However, because their thin decks were easily broken, they were often unqualified to go out. The same issue reoccurred in early-sixteenth-century grain transport; because Tangtou ships were small with few nails and thin decks that could only be used in coastal fishing, they were unable to sail into the rocky Gaizhou Bend of Liaodong. In Zhang Sanwei’s conversation with King Sŏnjo, although he did not mention Shandong Tangtou boats by name he did specifically point out the weakness of the wood materials of Chinese ships in regard to seafaring.

Lacking advantageous military, economic, environmental, and technical conditions to make use of local ships, the Shandong government often relied on ships coming from neighboring regions, including the Liaodong coast as mentioned above, and Huai’an Prefecture of South Zhili located at the estuary of the Huai River. The latter functioned as a hub of the Great Canal where rice dealers, conveyors, and fishermen gathered. However, although the quantity and quality of Liaodong and Huai’an ships were more suitable for seafaring than local Shandong boats, when China-Korea sea transport had just begun in early 1593 their prompt and massive aggregation was still a difficult task for the Shandong government to complete. This was especially because


66 Li Changgeng 李長庚, “Zhuoyi haiyun shiyi shu” 趨運海運事宜疏, in Chouliao shuohua, fasc. 6, vol.2, 754.


68 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/12 (1/21/1594), fasc. 46, vol.22, 175.
of the strengthened maritime prohibition policy in this region before the war: “In the former days most traders purchasing rice were [taking] Huai ships from the south and Liao ships from the north. Recently caused by the strict maritime prohibition, they have all scattered to different places and are hard to be gathered at the moment.”

The administrative barrier to implementing the cross-regional instructions influenced the Shandong government’s collection of transport ships as well. This situation lasted until the late stages of the Imjin War. Wan Xiangchun’s description of the slowness of summoning Huai’an ships beyond his jurisdiction reflects this situation:

Currently my hope day and night is only on Huai ships, but it is not easy to obtain Huai ships as well. When boatmen there heard that my province went to seek their employment, they fled to distant places in succession, as if they were escaping from boiling water and raging fire. Although the dual efforts of the canal transport governor’s stringent call and the local government’s urge to cooperate were made, it still took over a month to collect them. After they were collected, they repaired decks and purchased equipment, and it then took over a month to start the journey. After they departed they waited for the wind and detoured among the islands, and then it took over a month and they still have not arrived at Dengzhou yet. It [the situation] is as difficult as this.

Besides all these obstacles, the navigational dangers between Shandong and Liaodong may be the most direct reason that the Ming’s sea transport of grain to Korea ceased in 1594. As recorded in an official document that Zhang Sanwei sent to the Chosŏn in the second month of 1594, although rice and beans were still being preserved in Shandong, in this spring the winds

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were strong and the waves were roaring, which made the Shandong government unwilling to carry out a voyage: thirty ships had already sunk on the sea. Probably due to these events, the Ming approved Dengzhou and Laizhou’s petition to suspend their sea transport.72 Zhang Sanwei’s document resulted in a discussion between King Sŏnjo and his officials about the intention of the Ming’s rejection of the plan to send grain from Shandong. Ryu Sŏngryong seemed to accept Zhang’s statement after seeking confirmation from a Ming military officer, Hu Ze. According to Hu, who was a Shandong native, the high danger of waves in Shandong did indeed make grain transport difficult.73

The hardship of preparing sufficient and qualified ships in Shandong to transport grain even across the Bohai Strait caused King Sŏnjo to discuss the possibility of dispatching Korean ships to Shandong with Zhang Sanwei. This idea immediately got Zhang’s positive response. Zhang emphasized the low risk in navigation between Shandong and Jinzhou, explaining that this was due to multiple islands lay in this sea route to direct the navigation. He also suggested that experienced Chinese oarsmen could secure Korea’s sea transport by serving as escorts. Sŏnjo expressed his eagerness to fulfill this plan, replying that although there were no remaining ships in Korea’s southwestern seaports would still discuss the issue with his officials.74

Only two days later the Border Defense Council began to discuss the operability of sending Korean ships to Shandong. It stressed the great advantage of this plan since if this route was kept open there would be no more problems in grain transport. Meanwhile it was concerned about the potential risk of traveling through the Bohai Strait, which was a new attempt for the Chosŏn. To solve this issue it suggested asking the Liaodong Military Commissioner about the Ûiju-Jinzhou

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72 “遼東都指揮使尋索朝鮮國王（都司查審海路運）,”Wanli 22/2/12 (4/2/1594), in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc.8,80b-81a.
and Jinzhou-Denglai sea routes, including their distances and stopovers. In regard to transport methods, the Border Defense Council proposed examining the number of both official and private ships in P'yŏngan Province and encouraging the participation of transporters by increasing their payment.\textsuperscript{75} The exploration of the Ŭiju-Jinzhou waterway may have been the first step that was put into practice. On the first day of the twelfth month of 1593, the Border Defense submitted a detailed plan to the king stating that because Korean helmsmen were unacquainted with the sea route between Ŭiju and Jinzhou, the Chosŏn needed to send two or three Korean helmsmen with one interpreter to Liaodong, where Zhang Sanwei could further guide their investigation of this sea-lane.\textsuperscript{76}

As the Chosŏn attempted to overcome this new challenge to sail across the borders, the process having the promised Shandong grain be delivered was also frustrated. It seems clear that the Ming was unwilling to send Shandong grain in early 1594 not only because of the enormous transport cost in the locale, but also because it hesitated to resend forces and provisions to Korea since it still hoped for peace talks with Japan. A more direct cause was the severe flood in Shandong at the end of 1593, which enabled the Ming to temporarily decide to use its military supply to alleviate this domestic disaster.\textsuperscript{77} However, the Chosŏn’s active negotiation with the Ming was not fruitless. In the first month of 1594 it specified that the retired provincial governor of Ch'unghŏng, Hŏ Uk 許頊, would serve as the envoy to Beijing to urge that the Shandong grain be delivered to Korea.\textsuperscript{78} By the fifth month the Chosŏn had already received Hŏ’s report

\textsuperscript{75} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/11/19 (12/11/1593), fasc.44, vol.22,125.  
\textsuperscript{76} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 26/12/1 (1/21/1594), fasc.46, vol.22,175.  
\textsuperscript{78} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 27/1/9 (2/28/1594), fasc. 47, vol.22,203.
stating that the Ming court was determined to support the Chosŏn by sending 22,700 dan (23,494.5 m³) of grain accumulated in Liaodong Jinzhou and Fuzhou to the Yalu River.79

Meanwhile, the Ming informed the Chosŏn that this amount of grain needed to be transferred by Korean ships from the Liaodong coast. Although it is unclear how the above Ŭiju-Jinzhou sea-lane investigation was conducted, the Chosŏn’s repeated negotiations, both with Liaodong senior military officers and the Ming court, reveal that it failed to meet the Ming’s expectation of sending ships to Liaodong. Some social, navigational, and economic issues in Korea explain this unsatisfying result, as recorded in a document the Chosŏn sent to Liaodong Grand Coordinator Han Qushan 韓取善 before his dismissal in summer 1594.80 The writer of this document, Minister of Personnel Ch'oe Ip 崔豊, first states the reason for the deficiency of official ships in P'yŏngan Province. Since the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty, because the main duties of the P'yŏngan border were to receive Ming envoys and defend against the Jurchens it had to rely on land tax revenues retained locally to compensate for its fiscal expenses.81 To offset the considerable military and tribute burdens of this region, the Korean central government did not require water transport of rice to the capital. “Because of this,” Ch'oe states, “official ships were arranged at the beginning, and what [P'yŏngan] has are only private fishing ships.”82 Ch'oe Ip reemphasized this point of view later that year when Sŏnjo asked him if Korean boats could be sent to China to carry grain. Ch'oe replied, “I once asked the P'yŏngan provincial

80 Han Qushan was appointed to be Liaodong grand coordinator in the tenth month of 1593, and he was dismissed in the fifth month of 1594 due to his dereliction of duty in the Liaodong border defense. See Ming Shenzong shilu, Wănli 21/10/7 (10/30/1593), fasc.265, 4934; Wănli 22/5/21 (7/8/1594), fasc. 273,5066.
81 Naehyun Kwon, “Chosŏn-Qing Relations and the Society of P'yŏngan Province during the Late Chosŏn Period,” in The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture, ed. Sun Joo Kim, 44.
82 Ch'oe Ip崔豊, “上韓巡撫書,” in Kani chip 簡易集, fasc.4, Han'guk munjip ch'onggan, vol. 49, 332a. 小邦以國西一路上有華使之館待 下有野人之戒備 專峙稅糧毋漕 為此本不置官船 所有乃漁採私船而已.
governor whether there were boats or not, and [he] said that it is impossible to go back and forth because the route is not usually in use and there are no official ships.”

The risks of sailing P'yŏngan private fishing boats in Liaodong were another concern. As noted above, from the beginning stage of the Chosŏn’s sea transport the small size of P'yŏngan private ships had restricted its grain transport. In this negotiation with the Ming the Chosŏn stressed this problem: although local fishermen were assembled, the insufficient size and equipment of their ships made it impossible to sail in distant seas. This task was especially difficult to accomplish when considering their inexperience in traveling to China. The Chosŏn considered the alternative of summoning ships from the southern provinces. However, their devastated economy and exhausted regional resources could only satisfy the preparation of warships for military use, leaving no available ships to support transportation in the north. In addition, ship construction in the south was unsuitable for the water conditions of the north.

Due to its issues in collecting and navigating ships from both the northern and southern coasts, the Chosŏn eagerly sought Han Qushan’s help in facilitating Liaodong boatmen’s transportation of grain to Ŭiju.

It should be noted that some Chosŏn officials also ascribed the deficiency of private ships in Korea to their unreasonable transport burden. As mentioned above, Secretary of the Chosŏn Ministry of Punishments Hwang Yŏil once provided his perspective on how Ming transporters’ illicit behavior caused the waste of grain being transferred to Korea. He continued to argue that after Korean boatmen accepted the spoiled grain they had to balance the amount by using deceitful methods, probably to avoid conflict with the Ming and to prevent receiving punishment themselves. However, the Chosŏn directors refused to accept the decayed grain and forced Korean boatmen to make amends for this loss. Korean boatmen thus lost their fortune, were imprisoned, or escaped, which caused a decrease in the number of available ships on Korea’s northwestern coast.  

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86 Hwang Yŏil, “上西厓柳相國書,” in *Haewŏl chip*, fasc. 6, *Han'guk munjip ch'onggan sok*, vol.10, 87-88.
From a regional perspective, this section analyzes the specific constraints on the Shandong and P'yŏngan peninsulas to integrate their manpower and natural resources into an effective cross-region transport during the stalemate of the Imjin War. At this time the Chosŏn’s demand for provisions was even more urgent after its local society had experienced tremendous destruction and destitution. Although the Ming’s domestic disasters and its expectation of an armistice with Japan also slowed its grain supply to Korea, the regional challenges to collecting and navigating transport ships in Shandong and P'yŏngan were at the core of the Ming and Chosŏn’s constant negotiations on the struggle on who should send ships to complete their transport task.

Due to the prohibition on private maritime economy, the relaxed coastal defense, environmental and technical defects, and the interregional administrative inefficiency, the organization of ship transport across the Bohai Strait was particularly frustrating for the Shandong government. On the other hand, yearning for the arrival of Chinese grain, the Chosŏn court positively adopted an alternative way of sending ships to the Shandong or Liaodong coast. It considered this plan seriously, attempting to survey the sea-lane from Ŭiju to Jinzhou and summon ships in P'yŏngan Province. Although the Chosŏn court discussed the feasibility of this idea more than once before Japan reattacked Korea, it unfortunately never conquered the regional restrictions of its northwestern coast to organize transregional transportation.87

87 Some of these discussions are recorded in Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 27/8/20 (10/3/1594), fasc. 54, vol.22, 330; 28/1/22 (3/2/1595), fasc. 59, vol.22,421.
Coordinating China-Korea Maritime Logistics: Reinforcement and Regularization

More than three years of stalemate provided the Ming and Chosŏn a respite to make more-effective preparations in logistics and defense for another forthcoming Japanese offensive in 1597 and 1598. Gaining experience from the first Japanese attack, they adjusted their wartime maritime strategy by addressing a better arrangement of transnational logistics. During this time period, sea transport was no longer seen as a supplementary method to serve in an emergent circumstance; rather, its role was improved to a dominant place in both states.

In the second month of 1597, immediately after the second Japanese invasion of Korea, Shen Yiguan 沈一貫 and Zhang Wei 張位 submitted a memorial to the Wanli emperor in which they proposed the establishment of prefectures and towns in P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng under the administration of Ming bureaucrats. As grand secretaries of the Ming cabinet, both Shen and Zhang actively participated in the decision-making process of the Ming’s wartime affairs. Their suggestion attracted the attention of the Ming court; it was transmitted to the Chosŏn court asking for its response. The main purpose of their suggestion was to enhance Korea’s economic and military strength and to reduce China’s arduous logistical burden. This memorial first analyzes the strategic advantage of the Ming armies’ stationing in P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng because their superior geographic locations would make the Ming’s battle plan neither too adventurous nor defensive. Shen and Zhang suggested setting prefectures and towns in these two cities and increasing their strength by training Korean troops, cultivating military farms, and encouraging economic activities. If these expectations were met, Shen and Zhang alleged that in one year’s time the local wealth, grain, and populace could be transformed to military provisions.

For these military preparations see Kenneth Swope, A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598, 227-231.
and armies, and “it will be unnecessary to have everything rely on the imperial court.”

Shen and Zhang then stated the importance of planning a long-term station in P’yŏngyang and Kaesŏng, as well as the necessity of adopting an efficient method to transport provisions and soldiers from China. They therefore stressed the strategic role of the Deng-Lai sea route, regarding it as freeing China from the exhaustion of overland transport and assisting in naval battles against the Japanese. Not only were Liaodong and Shandong connected for mutual support by keeping this route open, but also Pusan could be reached and Tsushima Island could be seen.

This memorial specifically discusses the security of using the Deng-Lai sea route for the Ming naval forces’ approach to Korea. Different from the first Japanese invasion in which the Ming only transported provisions across the sea to aid Korea, in the second war it dispatched 13,000 sailors and 500 battleships from Guangdong, Zhejiang, and South Zhili to fight in Korea. This military reinforcement enabled the Ming to place more attention on securing its maritime logistics. Shen and Zhang argued that if the navies arrived at Liaodong directly along the coast, they would endure a long journey with navigational risks and unsuitable conditions by sailing the southern ships. The most reliable way of arriving in Liaodong was entering Shandong through the overland route, then navigating the Deng-Liao lane by taking ships from Dengzhou and Laizhou.

In the ninth month of 1597 Shen Yiguăn further emphasized the Bohai region by establishing the cohesive position of Tianjin and Deng-Lai grand coordinator on the basis of the

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89 Shen Yiguăn 沈一貫, “經理朝鮮疏,” in Jingshi cao 敬事草, fasc.2, Siku quanshu cunmu congshu, shibu, zhaoling zowyi leixianshu 全書存目叢書·史部·詔令奏議類 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996), vol. 63, 31. 而不必一一盡仰于朝廷．
90 Yi Kyŏngsŏk, Imjin chŏllansa, 1318.
91 Shen Yiguăn, “經理朝鮮疏,” in Jingshi cao fasc.2, 30-32. The similar content is also included in Zhang Wei 張位, “經理朝鮮疏,” in Zhang Hongyang ji 張洪陽集, fasc. 1, in Ming jingshi wenbian, vol.408, 4434-4436.
Ming’s extensive concern regarding the coastal defense of Tianjin, Dengzhou, and Laizhou. Shen was born in Ningbo, a coastal port of Zhejiang to the south of the Yangtze River estuary in which both exchange and conflict with the Japanese occurred frequently. Growing up in this environment, he was confident that Japan was adept only at fighting land battles, and therefore there was a high possibility of defeating them in naval battles by taking advantage of the Ming’s military expertise, advanced firearms, and geographic convenience.\(^2\) In his proposal Shen stressed the integrality of this region, stating that “Tianjin and Deng-Lai belong to one sea and cannot be divided,” and foregrounded its fundamental role in supporting the frontline rather than only forming a defensive zone.\(^3\) To prove his argument Shen made a sharp distinction between the inefficient Liaoyang overland transportation and the Deng-Liao sea route in the aspects of their moving and carrying capabilities, claiming that abandoning the speedy, ingenious, and easy sea transport would be a mistake. According to Shen, a grand coordinator should be appointed in Tianjin and Deng-Lai, making use of its crucial geographic location to cooperate with military actions in Liaodong and Huai’an, dispatching Ming navies from southern China, and launching attacks in Korea against the Japanese.\(^4\)

This view can be seen as a reflection of the transition in Ming maritime strategies during the two Japanese attacks, from defensive and China centered to offensive and transnational. Ming officials had begun to regard the region of the Deng-Liao sea route and the Bohai Sea coast as an indispensable chain for handling wartime logistics and military operations. Although fearing Ming China’s annexation, the Chosŏn court refused the proposal of establishing prefectures and

\(^2\) Shen Yiguan was a native of Yin County, Ningbo Prefecture. See *Mingshi* 明史, fasc. 218 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), vol. 19, 5755.

\(^3\) Shen Yiguan, “請設天津登萊巡撫疏,” in *Jingshi cao*, fasc. 2, 46. 天津與登萊同是一海 不得分.

military towns under the administration of Ming officials in Pyŏngyang and Kaesŏng on the basis of its destituteness, but a fuller utilization of Chinese-Korean maritime space was indeed realized in the second stage of the war.95

As a matter of fact, before Japan’s resumption of hostilities against Korea, the Ming had already made arrangements for grain storage and sea transport. In the fifth month of 1596 the Ministry of War raised a discussion on preparing for war among the Ming court, immediately after Ming chief envoy Li Zongcheng’s 李宗城 flight from Pusan negatively affected the Ming’s peace talks with Hideyoshi. Hawkish Ming officials always felt Hideyoshi was unwilling to accept the Ming’s investiture and aimed to invade Korea once again. The Wanli emperor ordered the Ministry of Revenue to cooperate with local officials in transferring provisions in multiple ways, such as reopening the sea route for transportation or purchasing grain from Liaodong. Wanli also required that the strategic points of China’s offshore regions neighboring Korea be inspected in order to seek proper locations for stationing armies and storing grain.96

Serving as the Ji-Liao grand coordinator at this time, Sun Kuang followed this instruction and submitted the result of his examination in the eighth month of 1596. He first narrated that he inspected seaports, coastal campsites, and early Ming naval battlefield in Liaodong, looked out over the ocean connecting Shandong Deng-Lai and Korean islands, and reached newly built castles, stores, and cultivated lands by the Yalu River. In response to Wanli’s inquiry, he then argued that as a barrier for protecting China Korea was the most appropriate place to defend against Japan, and making efforts to send forces and provisions to Korea was the most economical way to save China from the depletion of war.

95 For the Chosŏn’s reply to the Ming see Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/2/14 (3/31/1597), fasc. 307, 5739-5742; Ryu Sŏngryong, “陳本國開府經理便否奏文,” in Sŏae chip 西厓集, fasc. 3, Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, vol. 52, 63-66.
96 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 24/5/10 (6/5/1596), fasc. 297, 5553-5556.
He further established a corresponding transportation plan between China and Korea. According to his calculations, grain, fodder beans, and forage were accumulated in the Liaodong coastal Haizhou and Gaizhou districts, on the Liaodong overland route, and throughout Korea. These storages could support 30,000 soldiers for over nine months and 20,000 horses for over six months. He planned to send provisions stored on the Liaodong coast directly by boat to P’yŏngyang and move those on the land route by mule to Ŭiju. In terms of reorganizing China-Korea sea transport, Sun’s knowledge of the Shandong regional arrangement enabled him to put this plan into better practice. As mentioned, Sun was appointed as the grand coordinator of Shandong in the first Japanese invasion, and worked with Song Yingchang to purchase grain and fodder from Dengzhou and Laizhou, hire private ships from Shandong and Huai’an, and dispatch them to P’yŏngyang for transfer. Based on this experience, Sun suggested keeping the sea route open from Shandong to Korea. To prevent the undersupply of provisions, he also asked Huai’an and Shandong to prepare and transport a total 200,000 dan (207,000 m³) of grain and forage from the southern provinces, Dengzhou, and Laizhou, once a war had been declared.\(^97\)

To continue the supply of provisions Shandong officials also endeavored to relieve the grain shortage imposed on the local populace during the first Japanese invasion. They adopted methods to rehabilitate the economy and accumulate grain such as cultivating wasteland, including those off the coast. Under the direction of Shandong Grand Coordinator Zheng Rubi 鄭汝璧, from the first month to the fourth month of 1595 20,225 mu (12.4 km\(^2\)) of military farmlands on three offshore islands of Shandong were opened up. In addition, to increase government grain storage, a portion of land taxes in Shandong was allowed to be paid with grain

\(^97\) Sun Kuang, “奉旨東巡疏,” in Sun Yuefeng xiansheng quanji, fasc. 2, 84-90.
instead of with silver.⁹⁸

The operation of sea transport from Shandong to Korea was put into the agenda in the third month of 1597 after Wanli received Sŏnjo’s memorial requesting assistance. Wanli ordered the Ming forces to reenter Korea, and urged his officials to conduct Shandong sea transport to supply provisions in Korea immediately, without shirking their responsibilities and delaying the work.⁹⁹ The Minister of War, Xing Jie 邢玠, who was in charge of Jizhou, Liaodong, and Baoding military affairs as well as managing provisions and fighting Japan as Sun Kuang’s successor, was the planner and director of this operation.¹⁰⁰ On the twenty-ninth day of the third month, when Xing was still in the former position of the Vice Minister of War, he submitted a memorial to Wanli to propose the details on defending against Japan’s attack.¹⁰¹ Its full content is recorded in Sŏnjo sillok, in which Xing discusses the practical arrangement of Shandong-Korea sea transport:

On our side, although sea transport was discussed, which officials to be ordered to call for purchasing [provisions], which soldiers to be selected to escort transport, where to unload and store [provisions] have not been talked about yet. And it is heard that it is possible to reach Hwanghae Province directly from Deng-Lai, and the route is also very easy to travel. We do not know whether there are grain ships or their number. We also do not know if it is convenient to borrow the battleships that were previously discussed. If there is a temporary emergency, Deng-Lai is also the place for sea defense and troop encampment. However, we cannot completely rely on Deng-Lai to provide provisions. In addition, where to call for the purchase or widely assembling [provisions] should all be discussed and determined rapidly, and carried out strictly according to deadlines.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Zhang Jinkui, Mingdai Shandong haifang yanjiu, 326-331.
¹⁰⁰ Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/3/29 (5/14/1597), fasc. 308, 5771-5772.
¹⁰¹ Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/3/29 (5/14/1597), fasc. 308, 5774-5775.
Both Wanli and Xing Jie stressed the necessity of the advanced planning of sea transport. They may have learned from Song Yingchang’s experience in purchasing grain and requisitioning private ships in Shandong and Liaodong in 1592-93, which were repeatedly delayed by the unreadiness of the local governments and societies.

Xing also stressed the coordination between Ming ministers, local governments, and Chosŏn officials. In order to fully understand Korea’s situation in improving the practical application of his transport plan, Xing suggested that appropriate Chosŏn officials acquainted with war affairs be selected and called to Beijing in turn for examination so that Ming officers in Korea conveying military information could not fabricate their responses. Then, to increase administrative efficiency, Xing Jie underlined the specific tasks and cooperative relationships of Ming officials at different levels. The Ministries of War and Revenue should immediately discuss and handle military and fiscal affairs, and provincial governors and commissioners should be in charge of recruiting soldiers and transporting provisions. While their individual responsibilities were explicit, they had to also “unite in a concerted effort, making no distinction between each other,” and “complete [their tasks] as instructed by imperial advice” to solve the urgent situation. This order corresponded with the previous edict of Wanli, who emphatically urged his officials to avoid shirking responsibility.

It appears that Xing’s deliberate thinking on organizing cross-border sea transport was first reflected in his order to examine China’s and Korea’s coastal terrains. As a matter of fact, when he submitted the above memorial to Wanli, Xing had already displayed his familiarity and

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同心協力 無分彼此 又恐[不]濟緩急 更望天語丁寧 齊成之.
attention to Korea’s geographic conditions. To build a solid foundation for his military defensive plan, he consulted the Chosŏn envoys in Beijing in order to correct the Korean map left by Song Yingchang, and then urged that his plan be adjusted to the changing wartime circumstances by filing an investigation in Korea.

Xing’s plan to investigate the Chinese and Korean coastal waters was realized under the cooperative work of Liaodong and the Chosŏn. In an official document sent to the Chosŏn from Zhang Dengyun 張登雲, an assistant administration commissioner inspecting Liaohai Dongning District, he ordered a Liaodong brigade commander and a clerk, along with skilled boatmen and sailors, to explore the coasts from the Tianjin, Dengzhou, Laizhou, and Liaodong regions to Korea’s Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces. The purposes of the expedition were to determine both landing sites and inaccessible places off the coast as well as the availability of sea transport in these regions, which were considered “the most important affair for using military forces and defending against the Japanese.”104 If the result was unreliable, the Chosŏn was asked to conduct a reexamination.

Due to their respective interests, Liaodong and the Chosŏn offered different suggestions in the process of determining the sea transport route. In order to avoid the tortuous route from Lushun to Ŭiju and then to P'yŏngyang, and possibly also to save Korea’s own transit burden, King Sŏnjo’s plan was to have grain unloaded directly at Kwangnyang under the jurisdiction of Samhwa County of P'yŏngan Province. It was located at the estuary of the Taedong River to the southwest of P'yŏngyang, had constructed storage rooms, and its water conditions were suitable for berthing boats.105 The Liaodong grand coordinator, on the other hand, argued that it only

105 Xing Jie 邢玠, “酌定海運疏,” in Jinglüe yuwo zouyi 經略御倭奏議, fasc.2, Yuwo shiliao huibian 御倭史料彙編 (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 2004), vol. 4, 60; Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 30/6/23 (8/5/1597), fasc. 89,
took about a half month for a round-trip navigation from Lüshun to Ŭiju, but if the journey went to P'yŏngyang it would take an entire month. The alternative of the direct lane to Kwangnyang was an untested navigational risk for Liaodong, not to mention its lack of manpower and ships. According to Liaodong, the solution was to use Shandong boats to finish the transport to Korea by increasing their carriage fees. However, Shandong officials fiercely opposed this idea, stressing the impossibility of operating this long-distance navigation due to regional restrictions.

Based on his comprehensive consideration of Liaodong’s and the Chosŏn’s opinions, as well as the illustrated geographic descriptions of their territories, Xing suggested regularizing the China-Korea sea route and coordinating regional efforts in the transportation process. He rejected Liaodong’s proposal, pointing out that compared to the meandering and distant Lüshun-Ŭiju-P'yŏngyang lane, the Lüshun-Kwangnyang lane was indeed faster and easier. When navigating the former lane boats had to turn in several directions for 1,610 li (927.36 km). The latter route, however, went directly from the west to the east, with a distance of only 1,000 li (576 km) by sailing along the shores of Liaodong and Korea. This sea route relied on a chain of islands as connective points. Xing estimated their distances as follows:

1 250 li (144 km): From Lüshun to Sanshan Island;
2 100 li (57.6 km): From Sanshan Island to Guanglu Island;
3 100 li (57.6 km): From Guanglu Island to Dachangshan and Xiaochangshan islands;
4 200 li (115.2 km): From Xiaochangshan Island to Shicheng Island;

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⑤ 300 li (172 km): From Shicheng Island to Korea’s Chŏ Island, Nap Island, and Kwangnyang.

Figure 12 The Lüshun-Kwangnyang sea route Xing Jie proposed

Xing stated that the applicability of this lane had been verified by an accurate investigation conducted by the Chosŏn and Liaodong authorities, and the successful experience of navigating from Lüshun to P’yŏngyang in the first stage of the war. Xing also argued that changing the destination to Kwangnyang would be easier than a route directly approaching P’yŏngyang. It can be seen from the existing records that the sea route that Xing suggested, with Kwangnyang as the transfer location between China and Korea, was indeed implemented in 1597. However, by the seventh month of 1598 at the latest, a new transfer location had begun to be used: Chinese ships traveled through Korea’s Sin Island near the estuary of the Yalu River and unloaded grain

at the Migwan fortress under the jurisdiction of Yongch’ŏn, P’yŏngan Province. Chosŏn official Yi Homin’s negotiation in 1598 with a Ming assistant prefect in charge of sea transport indicates that the Ming seemed to first raise this change of destination, while the Chosŏn regarded it as an unnecessarily long way for grain transit and convinced the Ming to adhere to the original plan of navigating to Kwangnyang. Considering the difficulties for Chinese ships to sail along Korea’s northwestern coast as mentioned above, the Ming’s adjustment in 1598 may have been due to the unconquered regional restrictions in its cross-border navigation.

Returning to Xing Jie’s proposal, he also standardized the domestic Dengzhou-Lüshun sea route based on the Shandong grand coordinator’s investigation. Xing divided this route into four segments, listing their accurate distances and berthing locations:

1. 60 li (34.56 km): From the Dengzhou Guard, to Changshan Island, and then to Shamen Island;
2. 130 li (74.88 km): From Shamen Island to Tuoji Island;
3. 140 li (80.64 km): From Tuoji Island to Huangcheng Island;
4. 230 li (132.48 km): From Huangcheng Island to Lüshun.

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109 An entry from Sŏnjo sillok shows that in the tenth month of 1597 grain was still transported to the Kwangnyang region and waited for the Chosŏn’s domestic transit, Sŏnjo 30/10/1 (11/9/1597), fasc. 93, vol.23, 303. But in the seventeenth month of 1598, Migwan had already become the destination of China’s sea transport in Korea, Sŏnjo 31/7/7 (8/8/1598), fasc. 102, vol. 23, 464; Sadae mun’gwe，“整飭遼陽等處海防兵備兼朝鮮中路監軍梁祖（祖齡）咨朝鮮國王（查給駕船腳價）,” Wanli 26/7/25 (8/26/1598), fasc. 28, 31b.

Although he felt sailing in this lane was safe due to its favorable topography, he admitted that shipwrecks had occurred in the previous transports due to unpredictable weather. To decrease this danger, he believed that it was crucial to employ those acquainted with predicting weather as transporters. He also advised publishing route books to guide the trip.  

Later in 1597 Xing also opened the Tianjin-Lüshun sea route to transfer local grain in order to release the burdens of grain collection and sea transport undertaken by Shandong and Liaodong. While Song Yingchang had occasionally relied on grain transportation from

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112 After Xing’s proposal was carried out, Tianjin grain was transported along the Bohai coast to Dengzhou and then went through the Bohai Strait to Lüshun. Zhang Yangmeng 張養蒙, “春運備領防護要務疏,” in Zhang Yimin ji 張毅敏集, fasc.1, Ming Jingshi wenbian, vol. 427, 4669.
Tianjin, it was not until the second Japanese attack that systematic Tianjin sea transport came into realization, under the suggestion of Xing Jie. In the ninth month of 1597 Xing submitted a memorial to make an assessment of its feasibility. Due to the dense population and convenient geographic location of Tianjin and its connection to the Great Canal—by which the grain stored on its banks could be directly delivered to Tianjin—it was much easier to obtain grain there than in Dengzhou and Laizhou. The navigation of battleships also proved that the Tianjin-Lüshun sea route was accessible. Regarding the lack of transport ships in Tianjin, Xing Jie presented several solutions, including using battleships as an alternative, taking advantage of coastal fishing and merchant boats, and employing ships from the Huai’an, Wusong, and Zhejiang regions around the Huai River and the Yangtze River Delta.\(^\text{113}\)

Xing further developed the procedure for conducting sea transport between Liaodong and Shandong by coordinating the efforts of local governments. To solve the ship shortage in Shandong, he suggested the use of Huai’an ships and regulated the different levels of transportation fees corresponding to the distances they would travel. Over thirty large Huai’an ships could then be hired, with each of them carrying over 500 dan of grain. For each dan they carried to Lüshun they should be paid 0.15 tael of silver; if they carried to the Yalu River the transportation fee for each dan should be increased by 0.08 tael of silver; if they went to P’yŏngyang the payment should be further increased. Each ship was to be accompanied by one man acquainted with water conditions, who was selected by the Liaodong government and paid 0.05 tael of silver each day for his guidance. Regarding the inconvenience of loading the grain scattered along the Shandong coast, as Song Yingchang once encountered, Xing presented a

\(^{113}\) Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/9/22 (11/1/1597), fasc.314, 5875-5876; Xing Jie, “議增天津海運疏,” in Jīnglüe yuwo zouyi, fasc.2, Yuwo shiliao huibian, vol.4, 167-175.
solution in advance. He observed that after Dengzhou and Liaizhou prefectures purchased grain
in the local regions, mules, carts, or manpower could be hired at a fair price to transport grain to
the ports beforehand. Thus, as long as ships arrived, the grain could be sent out.\textsuperscript{114}

The Chosŏn settled its water routes ahead of time as well. After Kwangnyang was
determined as the destination of Chinese ships, the Korean government made further
arrangements on transferring grain in its territory. It noted that once grain ships from Lüshun
arrived, Korean private and official ships south of Hwanghae could be used in the transfer to
Kanghwa Prefecture, and the grain could then be distributed from Kwanghwa to the Ming
armies’ encampments. If it was transported to Ch’ungju flat-bottom ships could sail from the Han
River; if it was going to Namwŏn, Chŏnju, and Kongju transportation could be directly
conducted off the coasts of Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla provinces. The Chosŏn provided the
distances of these routes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item 400 \textit{li} (230.4 km): From the Yalu River to Kwangnyang;
  \item 600 \textit{li} (345.6 km): From Kwangnyang to Kanghwa;
  \item 300 \textit{li} (172.8 km): From Kanghwa to Ch’ungju;
  \item 400-500 \textit{li} (230.4-288 km): From Kanghwa to the coasts of Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Sŏnjo sillok}, Sŏnjo 30/6/13 (7/26/1597), fasc. 89, vol.23, 244. Chosŏn Korea used the unit of length \textit{ri} 里. Its estimated value
was 552.96 meters during the tenth to fourteenth centuries. See Jan Gyllenbok, \textit{Encyclopaedia of Historical Metrology, Weights, and Measures},
vol.3, 1670. Here I use China’s unit of length \textit{li} and its estimated value 576 meters during the Ming dynasty, since
the Chosŏn was corresponding with the Ming.
The Chosŏn then discussed the transfer arrangements in its southern regions. For instance, regarding the Ming’s inquiries into how grain sent from Kanghwa would be further stored, transferred, and distributed, the Chosŏn replied with a detailed investigation to determine the distances of the overland and waterways from Kanghwa to the Kyŏngsang encampments and battlefields, the departure and arrival locations of grain, and how the local storage facilities and fortresses were built to stockpile grain. It also constructed new warehouses in the transfer locations on the Korean coast. According to Xing Jie’s report, a vice prefect as manager of tax transport, Chen Deng 陳登, was dispatched to Korea in the fourth month of 1597 and had supervised the construction of more than 150 storage facilities in Kwangnyang, Kanghwa, and

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Migwan during a year.\textsuperscript{117}

The Chosŏn court further assigned an inspector to manage sea transfer of Chinese grain in Korea. The former provincial governor of Ch'ungch'ŏng, Yu Kŭn 柳根, was chosen for this position due to his appropriate skills, based on Chief State Councilor Ryu Sŏngryong’s recommendation.\textsuperscript{118} While Yun held this post he pointed out the current administrative challenges to conducting interregional logistics, which had troubled Korea’s previous sea transfer in the first Japanese invasion. Yu noticed this problem occurring once again, and stated that because of the holding power of governors and magistrates in the provinces, “it is clear that my humble status cannot command the provinces and enable those under the management of governors and magistrates to obey.”\textsuperscript{119} Yu’s solution was to dispatch additional clerks responsible for cooperatively transferring the grain in P'yŏngan, Hwanghae, and Kanghwa.

The Construction and Collection of Transport Vessels

After the Ming and Chosŏn routinized the procedure of transborder sea transport, the next issue to be solved was the shortage of capable transport vessels, a main problem for the two states since the beginning of the war. In contrast to the Ming government’s initial, almost-complete dependence on coastal individuals, such as owners of private fishing and merchant ships in Shandong, Liaodong, and Huai’an in its grain transportation in 1592-93, by the time the Japanese reattacked Korea, the Ming had made great efforts to construct large transport vessels.

\textsuperscript{117} Xing Jie, “題陳同知乞休疏,” Jinglüe yuwo zouyi, fasc.4, Yuwo shiliao huibian, vol.4,248.
\textsuperscript{118} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 30/5/15 (6/29/1597), fasc. 88, vol.23,222.
\textsuperscript{119} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 30/4/27 (6/11/1597), fasc. 87, vol.23,211. 以臣之微末，其不能號令諸道，使方伯守令以下奉行，明矣.
Probably written in late 1597, one of Xing Jie’s memorials displays some details of the Ming’s shipbuilding plan. Although thirty Huai’an and thirty Liaodong ships had been collected by that time, and could carry 500 and 300 dan respectively, their transport volume was still insufficient to meet Xing’s expectations. He therefore suggested employing an additional twenty merchant ships from Zhejiang, South Zhili, and Huai’an for Shandong government use. In the meantime, thirty vessels with shipping capability over 500 dan were to be built in Kuandian, a border fortress of Liaodong that had ample shipbuilding timber and competent craftsmen.120

Xing Jie’s decision to construct Liao ships (C. Liaochuan, 遼船) was later put into practice, as recorded in a Shandong official’s memorial as a reference for the fiscal assessment of shipbuilding in the early seventeenth century. As this memorial shows, in 1597, sponsored by the Shandong Provincial Administration Commission and implemented by a Dengzhou battalion, fifteen Liao ships were built in Kuandian. However, the other fifteen Liaodong ships were built in South Zhili instead of Kuandian under the direction of Laizhou Prefecture.121 This division of construction responsibilities in Liaodong, Shandong, and South Zhili at the fiscal, geographical, and administrative levels was possibly because Liaodong resources were incapable of completely supporting this project.

The seagoing features of Liao ships explain the necessity of the Ming’s investment in their construction. According to Shandong Grand Coordinator Wan Xiangchun’s description, the bottom of Liao ships was over one chi (0.32 m) thick, which was strong enough to sail through the shoals and rugged reefs of the Liaodong coast.122 Also, Liao ships had excellent carrying

121 Haiyun zhaichao, 五十三, fasc. 5, 4157-4170.
capability, ranging from several hundred to even one thousand dan. These navigational advantages enabled Liao ships to handle important transnational transport tasks throughout the Imjin War; they were often summoned from the coastal residents and constructed by the government.

Huai ships (C. huaichuan, 淮船) were also frequently used in grain transport. To compensate for the deficiencies of local Shandong boats, they were requisitioned from the gathering place, Huai’an Prefecture of South Zhili. Wan Xiangchun observed that compared to the thickness of the bottom of a Liao ship, the bottom of a Huai ship was only three cun (0.096 m) thick, which was not strong enough to travel across the stony Liaodong coastal sea. However, Huai ships had their own advantages. First, their general transport capability was vast. In fact, according to a late Ming record, the ship was so large that it could not sail in narrow and shallow bends. Also, their production cost was relatively low: a Ming official of the early seventeenth century once noted that building a Huai ship in the Imjin War cost only about 100 taels of silver each. He considered the construction of Huai ships an energy-efficient and convenient method that should be reapplied to support sea transport to the Liaodong battlefields in the Ming-Qing war.

While the exact form of a Huai ship remains unclear, considering its pervasive use and construction in Huai’an and the regional prosperity of canal transport, it may have been a kind of “shallow ship” (C. Qianchuan, 淺船) used in Ming inland river transport of tribute rice, which

124 Wan Xiangchun, “題為運糧業有成議事 朝鮮糧運,” in Wan zhongcheng zoushu, fasc.1, Ming jingshi wenbian, vol. 410, 4450. 載甲多而強
125 Haiyun zhaichao, fasc.4, 四十二, 4080. 載甲多而強
was transformed from a lightweight seagoing ship. This shallow ship had a flat and two-cun (0.064 m) bottom, which confirms Wan Shide’s statement regarding the thin bottom of Huai ships.

In addition, Huai’an merchants often sailed a specific boat called a “sea-eagle boat” (C. *Haidiao chuan*, 海雕船) to the Shandong coast for trade. Because of the common use of sea-eagle boats between Shandong and South Zhili, the Ming court once employed them in the 1570s to investigate sea routes and transport tribute rice. In the Imjin War this sea-eagle boat may have also been collected from Huai’an coastal seamen and merchants.

Figure 15 Pictures of flat-bottom, shallow grain boats (Song Yingxing, *Tiangong kaiwu*, fasc. 2, 178-179)

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129 Guo Tingxun 過庭訓, *Benchao fenxsheng renwu kao* 本朝分省人物考, fasc. 48, in *Xixiu siku quanshu, shibu, zhuangji lei* 續修四庫全書·史部·傳記類 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), vol. 534, 293. 泰州有沙船 淮安有海雕船 嘗遊海至山東蓬萊貿易云.

A noticeable change in the Ming’s sea transport of provisions in the second Japanese attack was the construction of sand junks (C. Shachuan, 沙船). Originating from the lower Yangtze region in the Chinese Tang dynasty, a sand junk gained its name for its specialty of sailing in shoal waters. In the Ming dynasty sand junks became a major ship type that was used in seafaring. A large or middle-size sand junk had a flat bottom, multiple masts, a square head, and a square stern. Although its flat bottom made it hard to navigate deep ocean waters with the strong wind in South China, a sand junk was especially suitable for smooth and safe sailing on the shallow northern sea. When functioning as a battleship, it was usually used to defend ports and patrol coastal waters. Due to its great shipping capability, the sand junk also played a significant role in Yuan and early Ming sea transport of tribute rice.

Figure 16 (left) The sand junk ship type, in Zheng Ruozeng, *Chouhai tubian*, fasc. 13, 1230.

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These advantages of sand junks fostered their use in grain transport in China’s northern coast in the second stage of the war. Zhang Yangmeng 張養蒙, the Vice Minister of Revenue in charge of supporting provisions for the Ming forces in Korea, wrote a memorial in the eleventh month of 1597, describing the cost and construction of sand junks in detail. According to him, Shandong had recently built forty sand junks for grain transport in Nanjing Tianningzhou, which was on the south bank of the Yangzte River. The reason for choosing this construction location was its favorable environment where timber merchants assembled, commodity prices were relatively low, craftsmen were easily hired, and the weather was warm enough for ship construction. Each of the sand junks produced was 1.6 zhang wide (5.12 m) with a shipping capability 400 to 500 dan, and each of them cost 300 taels of silver. Because of the sand junk’s solidness for overseas navigation and their dual uses for grain transport and sea battles, Zhang asked that an additional one hundred sand junks be built to assist in Tianjin transport.

The Ming central government’s fiscal expenditures for constructing transport ships were remarkable. For example, according to Zhang Yangmeng’s estimation, building one hundred sand junks for Tianjin transport would require 30,000 taels of silver, and another 30,000 taels would be used to hire corresponding seamen for a year.¹³⁴ Late Ming accounts show that at the central government level, a total of 135,000 taels of silver had been allocated from the treasuries of the ministries of War, Revenue, and Works for shipbuilding during the Imjin War: 45,000 taels in 1597, and 90,000 taels in 1598.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Haiyun zhaichao, fasc.3, 三十四, 4014. 備查東征舊案 動戶兵工三部銀共一十三萬五千兩; fasc.5, 五十三, 4157-4158.
The Ming’s successful preparation of transport ships relied on collaborative efforts to construct and employ transport ships and seamen among multiple regions, ranging from the northern borders of Liaodong, Shandong, and Tianjin to the Yangtze region, both financially and administratively. The following summary of Dengzhou and Laizhou prefectures’ shipbuilding and employment costs in 1597 gives us a glimpse into the diversity of ship types, their production or employment locations, and the sources of payment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Seamen</th>
<th>Cost in silver (taels)</th>
<th>Ship origin</th>
<th>Sources of silver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liao ships</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>Construction of ships: 2,661</td>
<td>Kuandian</td>
<td>Shandong Provincial Administration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment of seamen: 658.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant ships</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Employment of ships and seamen: 2,466.55</td>
<td>Suzhou and Songjiang</td>
<td>Suzhou Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment of ships: 1,566</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shandong Provincial Administration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment of seamen: 844.061</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shandong Qixia and Lai counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai ships</td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction: 10,529.668</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shandong Provincial Administration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Huchuan</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

案查二十五年征倭赴淮安及南直等處造船共銀四萬五千兩 二十六年造船共銀九萬兩 俱于解京庫料價馬價銀扣除 系戶兵工三部協辦。

136 *Huchuan* 虎船 was a speedy and small battleship used in Ming China’s coastal patrol.
Table 5 Dengzhou and Laizhou construction and employment costs for sea transport in 1597 (Data from *Haiyun zhaichao*, fasc. 5, 五十三, “山東等處提刑按察司整飭登州海防總經理海運兼管登萊兵巡屯田道副使陶為查議造船銀兩事,” 4157-4170.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Huai ships</th>
<th>Huai’an</th>
<th>Shandong Provincial Administration Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Employment of ships: 1,200</td>
<td>Employment of seamen: 3,623.059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Transport volume | 70,000 dan |
| Silver cost      | 23,663.128 taels |
| Ships constructed | 65         |
| Ships employed   | 80         |

The increased economic investment as well as the strategic, institutional, and administrative improvements in sea transport promoted it to the leading place in Ming grain logistics in the second Japanese attack: as Zhang Yangmeng noted, 80 percent of the Ming forces’ provisions arrived at Korea by sea, and only the remaining 20 percent were carried overland.137 My estimate agrees with this rate: records from *Ming Shenzong shilu* show that Shandong and Tianjin completely relied on sea transport, while Liaodong had to use both sea and overland routes. In terms of their transport rate, in 1598 30 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent of Ming provisions were assigned to be transported in Shandong, Tianjin, and Liaodong respectively.138 If we assume 50 percent of Liaodong grain was loaded by boat, a total of 80 percent of the Ming provisions were transported by sea to Korea.

In Korea, compared to the Chosŏn’s limited engagement in sea transfer of Chinese

137 Zhang Yangmeng, “議明春運船疏 運船,” in *Zhang Yimin ji*, fasc.1, *Ming jingshi wenbian*, vol. 427, 4666. 竊惟東征軍餉 資陸輓者十之二 資海運者十之八。
provisions in 1592-93, a remarkable transition in 1597-98 was its tremendous efforts to overcome obstacles to operating maritime logistics, in which multiregional and multilevel agencies were largely integrated. The Chosŏn’s construction and requisition of transport vessels reflects this situation. In the autumn and winter months of 1597 the Chosŏn began the construction project at Changsan Cape of Hwanghae and Ch’ŏlssan County of P’yŏngan by employing craftsmen and cutting wood in order to resolve the problem that “originally no official ships for water transport of grain exist[ed] on the coasts of P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces.”\(^{139}\)

After the allies’ defeat in Ulssan in the first month of 1598, Xing Jie pushed the prolonged operation forward and required Ming armies to encamp in Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang to “build walls and defend” and to “farm and combat,” which increased the demand for transferring greater amounts of provisions.\(^{140}\) Xing systematically initiated a series of measures in response to this operation, forming Korea’s and China’s coasts into a military and logistic network. He divided China’s northern coastal regions west of the Yalu River and Korea’s northwestern coast in the east into lower and upper routes, and Korea’s southern provinces into the eastern, middle, and western routes. He then made precise encampment preparations, such as land cultivation, the construction of castles and courier stations, and distribution of military forces.

The improvements in shipbuilding for grain transfer in Korea was an integrated part of Xing’s plan. He assigned specific tasks to Chinese officials, asking them to cooperatively supervise and implement construction.\(^{141}\) Ming Military Commissioner to Korea Yang Hao 楊

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\(^{139}\) Yi Homin, “御史前呈文,” in Obongjip, fasc. 14, 535. 平安黃海兩道沿海地方原無漕運官船.

\(^{140}\) Xing Jie, “議三路屯守疏,” in Jinglüe yuwo zouyi, fasc.4, Yuwo shiliao huibian , vol.4, 255. 在我亦當對着而應 且城且守 且耕且戰 為經久之圖.

soon transmitted this message to the Chosŏn: “The matter of transferring provisions is of utmost urgency. Ships should be rapidly built for sea transport at places with timber in P'yŏngan, Hwanghae, Ch'ungch'ŏng, and Chŏlla.” To avoid any postponement of this instruction by the local provinces, “impartial, strict, and competent” directors were to be additionally appointed, whose reward and punishment were to be explicitly expressed on the basis of their performance.  

In the second month of 1598, Yang Hao’s instruction was put into practice in Korea. Supervised by the Sea Transport Inspector, Yu Kŭn, a total of one hundred transport vessels (K. chosŏn, 漕船) had already been under construction on Korea’s western coast. Among them, eight ships had been finished in Ch'ŏlssan of P'yŏngan and twelve more were added; forty had been accomplished at Changsan Cape of Hwanghae and ten more were added; ten boats had just begun construction at Anmin Cape of Ch'ungch'ŏng; besides thirteen existing official ships, seven more ships were to be built at Pyŏnsan Mountain of Chŏlla. In addition, forty ships built by naval forces were also reported to Yang Hao, which may have been included in Korea’s transport arrangement as well.  

This interchangeability of Korean transport and warships (K. Pyŏngsŏn, 兵船) was due to their flexible structures. In 1466, learning from experience in China, Japan, and Ryukyu, Second State Councilor Sin Sukchu standardized the early Chosŏn ship sizes into large, medium, and small, and reformed them for dual uses—by removing the board building above the deck of a warship, it could be transformed to carry rice.

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142 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 31/2/2 (3/8/1598), fasc. 97, vol.23, 375. 糧餉轉運極為緊急平安黃海忠淸全羅有材木處急速造船以圖海運今春冰漸開漕轉甚急若行文各道而已則必然稽緩，另差剛明幹事人觀其處事何様造船多少明示賞罰。
Figure 18 Late Chosŏn transport ship, in *Kaksŏn tobôn* 各船圖本 (Kyujanggak, 奎軸 12163, dated around 1776-1800).

Figure 19 Late Chosŏn transport ship used in Hamgyŏng Province, *Kaksŏn tobôn* 各船圖本. ¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ For the estimated date of *Kaksŏn tobôn* and the use of transport ship in Hamgyŏng Province see Yi Wŏnsik 이원식, *Han'guk ŭi pae* 한국의 배 (Seoul : Taewŏnsa, 1990), 32,42.
It should be noted that in the shipbuilding process heavy burdens were inevitably imposed on the local population, which consequently led to social tensions. As Korean scholar O Hŭimun recorded, in the fourth month of 1598 when O and his family ran away the upheaval and were staying in P'yŏnggang County of Kangwŏn Province, he observed that the masses had been assembled to drag wood in the middle of a busy farming season, and their chanting reverberated in the valley. He later recorded another situation in which a tyrannical official broke one ship. He then forced the craftsmen to repair it, telling the frightened craftsmen that this would allow them to receive a more-lenient punishment than their penalty of death. The craftsmen believed they would certainly die, and their crying could be heard from a long distance. Moreover, due to the additional construction responsibilities but facing a lack of wood in the local region, the people of Anhyŏp County even took away wood from P'yŏnggang.\(^{146}\)

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In addition to constructing transport vessels, the Chosŏn court increased the strength and widened the scope of acquiring ships. By early 1598 it still mainly relied on private fishing and commercial boats, summoning a total 357 of them from the provinces. After the Battle of Ulssan, however, in response to the growing demand for provisions, the Chosŏn turned to ships owned by royal offices and palaces, and punished those who avoided compulsive transportation tasks. The compilers of *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* claimed that simply summoning royal ships would be ineffective since government officials also commonly owned private ships but were not part of the requisition. Sŏnjo himself also realized this problem later, and issued an order in the fourth month of 1598 that sent an upright official to call up ships without omission, including those owned by high-ranking officials and influential powers. This instruction was strictly carried out, as seen in the intense punishments of those who hid ships or neglected their inspection duties in the following month.

The Chosŏn also adopted measures to maximize the efficiency of transport management. For instance, it grouped and titled with words and numbers the collected ships in P'yŏngan and Hwangahae. To prevent their further omission, in the fifth month of 1598 the Border Defense Council suggested that the remaining ships in these two provinces, whether official or private, should also be labeled, and those without registration should not be allowed to sail. It believed that “if this order is issued it does not have to wait for a search but [people] themselves dare not conceal [ships].”

Regarding the deficiency of manpower, Chosŏn officials sought to motivate transporters by

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increasing their payment. After Yu Kŭn was appointed as the sea transport inspector, he described the dilemma that when the government faced difficulty in assembling and paying mariners, the populace at the same time could be discontented and passive because they were not being rewarded. However, because Korea experienced a severe financial crisis, Yu Kŭn’s concern was not solved in the following year: only one dan of grain was paid to private boatmen departing from Yongch’ŏn, and this standard was even lower among sailors on official ships; one dan of grain was paid to each group of thirty sailors. In addition, they had to compensate for losses during the trip.

The greater transport pressure in early 1598 forced the Chosŏn to consider incentive methods to attract more conveyers. Among them, the Ministry of Taxation’s suggestion of increasing transportation payments was possibly the most successful one; it stated that two of every ten dan of the Chinese grain accumulated in ŭiju could be extracted to reward transporters. This policy was later adjusted to reflect different transport distances. For instance, fishermen and merchants traveling from Hwanghae to Seoul were rewarded one-tenth of their transported provisions, and those from P’yŏngan to Seoul were paid double. “After hearing this, [people] competed to come out and many were enlisted, unlike the bitterness and escapes in past days.” Although Ming officials expressed their reluctance to accept this payment and thought it was reasonable for the Chosŏn to be self-supportive, they compromised in order to prevent transport delays, agreeing to carry out this policy until the autumn harvest.

155 “整飭遼陽等處海防兵備兼朝鮮中路監軍梁（祖齡）咨朝鮮國王（查給雇船腳價），” in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 28, 31a.
came and Korean peasants were able to engage in land transport after their farm work was completed.  

All these methods significantly improved the role of sea transport in Korea’s northwestern coast during the second Japanese attack. Korean official Ch’oe Ip, who participated in the organization of sea transport, inscribed Yu Kŭn’s achievement in the major sea transshipment location Migwan. In this inscription Ch’oe states that the court assigned Yu Kŭn to be in charge of sea transport in 1597, collecting official ships from naval armies and private ships from fishermen and merchants in the provinces, and managing their transportation of Chinese provisions. Ch’oe then describes the construction of ships and the amount of provisions they carried:

Over 140 ships were constructed and coastal individuals were hired to sail [them]. When they operated the transport, they were fed by the government; when they rested, they returned to being fishermen and merchants, and we still possessed the ships. These ships transported over 425,800 dan of rice and beans received in Migwan. The remaining 150,000 dan received in Ŭiju were transported by land. Because of the appropriateness of ship style and the increasing familiarity with the sea route, it was able to set sail and leap several hundred li. The previous hardship was eliminated, and the imperial armies’ provisions were not deficient.  

According to this account, the Chosŏn received 575,800 dan (595,953 m³) of Ming grain on its P’yŏngan borders. Of this amount, 425,800 dan (440,703 m³) was received after Migwan was determined as the transshipment location. The Ming grain that was moved from P’yŏngan Province by the seagoing ships constructed in Korea was about 2.84 times that conveyed by land;

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156 “整飭遼陽等處海防兵備兼朝鮮中路監軍梁（祖齡）啓朝鮮國王（查給雇船腳價）,” in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 28, 32.
157 Ch’oe Ip, “彌串海運碑,” in Kani chip, fasc. 1, 44.
this number could be higher if the transport work of the requisitioned private and official ships was included. Compared to the rate of 1.16 in 1592-93, as calculated in the first section, the Chosŏn’s endeavor of improving sea transport on its northwestern coast had proven to be a success.

Based on a record of Sŏnjo sillok, from the fifth month of 1597 to the ninth month of 1598 about 195,180 dan (202,011.3 m\(^3\)) of Chinese grain was accepted at Kanghwa, the Yongsan storage in the capital, or transported to some southern encampments of the Ming armies.\(^{158}\) After Migwan became the sea transfer location and Korea constructed 140 official transport ships in 1598, according to Ch’oe Ip’s above account 575, 800 dan of rice and beans were accepted in P'yŏngan. Therefore it is estimated that about 770,980 dan (797,964.3 m\(^2\)) of grain was transported from China to Korea in the second Japanese invasion, an amount 5.64 times the 136,670 dan amount in the first invasion, as mentioned above. The accomplishment of this formidable scale of transportation can be ascribed to the efforts the Ming and Chosŏn made to improve their maritime logistics.

Conclusion

This chapter examines the process of the Ming and Chosŏn’s attempts, including their failures, to open and enhance their sea transport of Ming forces’ provisions between Shandong, Liaodong, and northwest Korea in the Imjin War of 1592-98. It displays the challenges both governments encountered in their northern coastal regions and the efforts they made to conquer

these problems. In this process, tensions existed between the regional limitations and the interregional mobilization of resources, as well as among multiple groups of people such as the local governments, individual participants and government officials, the Chosŏn central government and influential groups, and the Ming and Chosŏn administrators and their transporters.

Although some Ming officials, especially Liaodong governors, addressed the enhancement of coastal militarization and the resumption of maritime transport in China’s northern coastal waters in the sixteenth century, it was not until the beginning of the Imjin War that the Chinese central government increasingly realized the military and economic value of its northern sea space. This was also the case in Korea before the late sixteenth century when the maritime economy and naval strength of the north were much less appreciated than in the south. The lack of government concentration and experience in state-led transnational seafaring in this region after the early periods of the Ming and Chosŏn made it difficult for both states to conduct effective and well-prepared sea transport in an urgent wartime environment.

Regional restrictions in economic, environmental, technical, and navigational aspects were also major obstacles to interregional procurement and transportation of provisions. The dilemma of Shandong-Korea transport in the stalemate especially reveals this situation. However, it should also be noted that although regional tensions never disappeared throughout the process of China-Korea sea transport during the Imjin War, the fluidity and strategic importance of China’s northern offshore areas were reconsidered and the integration of Chinese-Korean maritime space in assisting with provisions and naval battles was stressed during Japan’s second attack on Korea. After learning from their earlier problems and compiling a more-sufficient material reserve in the three years’ armistice, the Ming and the Chosŏn enhanced their cooperation and
sought various solutions to conquer the difficulties they had once encountered. Their advance arrangements, including collaborative investigation of coastal waters in Shandong, Liaodong, and Korea, regularization of sea routes, standardized distribution of transfer responsibilities, and administrative improvements, all indicate that compared to the abrupt exploration and adjustment of sea transport in the early stage of the war, great improvements were indeed made in the reorganization process. They paid particular attention to solving the shortage of transport vessels and conveyors on the northern coast, the most challenging yet crucial issue they had confronted. The result was remarkable: in both countries, sea transport played a leading role in smoothing the way of delivering Chinese provisions in 1597-98.

This increasing maritime connection between China and Korea in the broader historical background of the East Asian transformation in the late sixteenth century greatly promoted the cross-border mobility of offshore resources, leading in turn to a continuous development of the maritime economy and coastal militarization in the early seventeenth century. Under these circumstances, regional maritime agencies increased their power across China and Korea to challenge land-based central polities, which is the core of my analysis in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

**Commerce, Pirates, and Military Men: The Growth of Regional Maritime Powers**

This chapter examines how, under the impact of the Imjin War (1592-1598), the maritime orientation of China’s and Korea’s northern littoral, and the penetration of power and expansion of the Ming coastal forces in this region, mutually influenced each other. It first investigates the wartime elevation of the strategic role of the northern Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea space and its integrated and penetrative militarization. It especially demonstrates how the presence of the Ming southern forces facilitated the coastal militarization of northern China by embedding an insignificant southern officer’s military career in this transition. In the circumstance of the prosperous private trade in the border region of China and Korea in the early seventeenth century, this chapter then investigates the formation of a smuggling network in the northern Yellow Sea and the role of Ming coastal military men in fostering this process. While the Ming soldiers were appointed as coastal defenders, their violent tendencies and cross-border mobility also produced illegal transmarine activities that challenged state control over the peripheries. The case of Ming military officers Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu is used to exemplify this phenomenon. This chapter further stresses the Ming-Chosŏn multilayered diplomatic interactions and border relations when handling maritime trespassing. It is noteworthy that the indistinct boundary between the Ming sailors’ maritime activities and the rampant piracy in the northwestern provinces of Korea provided much flexibility to Chosŏn and Liaodong officials in
interpreting the intruders’ identities, based on their own considerations.

**Integrated and Penetrative Militarization of the Bohai and Yellow Sea Space**

Although no naval battles occurred in China and Korea’s northern sea space in the Imjin War, it was deeply involved in wartime defense and logistics. To guard against the Japanese and to supply provisions to the Korean battlefield, the coastal military strength was reinforced and the prohibition of China-Korea sea transport and trade was lifted. Consequently this Japanese aggression toward Korea fostered the regional integration and militarization of the Bohai Sea and the northern Yellow Sea between China’s and Korea’s northern coasts. Meanwhile the Ming government dispatched a considerable number of troops, especially from the south, across the China-Korea boundary to assist in warfare. They were largely stationed in China’s northeastern littoral to compensate for its lack of sea defense. Mainly recruited from Zhejiang province, the southern forces (*C. nanbing*, 南兵) were mercenaries who established a reputation for their bravery, sense of discipline, and expertise in firearm use and infantry fighting. The maritime orientation of China’s and Korea’s northern littoral interacted with the varying trajectory of the Ming southern troops during and right after the Imjin War. This maritime change was accelerated by the Ming southern military’s stay in northern China and Korea, and in turn furthered the growth of their influence across the sea.

Historians have increasingly used a cross-border perspective to investigate the China-Korea territorial border in the Imjin War. However, there is less focus on their northern sea region,

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particularly in a transnational context. Some studies have noted the strategic importance of China’s northern littoral and its dramatic change beginning in the 1590s. For instance, Kenneth Swope states that the Ming re-developed naval strength on the east coast of China, which was threatened by the Japanese in the Imjin War. Later, in the 1620s-1630s, the Ming rulers gradually relied on the Bohai littoral defenses and island strongholds in their confrontation with the Jurchens.\(^2\) Adopting Chinese scholar Yang Qiang’s framework of the “Bohai Coastal Region” \((C.\ Huan\ Bohai\ quyu, \環渤海區域)\), Christopher S. Agnew contextualizes the rebellion of Kong Youde 孔有德 from 1631 to 1633 in the integration and militarization of this region during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.\(^3\) More specifically, Chinese scholars examine the sea defense measures and strategies that impacted China’s northern coast. Zhao Shuguo notes that during the 1590s China’s northern region enhanced their sea defense with a strategic and integrated system.\(^4\) Zhang Jinkui stresses that a remarkable change of the Ming coastal defense in this time period was the long-term deployment of navies in north China.\(^5\) Zhao Hong analyzes the interaction between the Shandong coastal defense construction and its social development.\(^6\) While the current discussions are framed in Chinese regional history, this chapter is embedded in the connective Bohai and the northern Yellow Sea space beyond the China-Korea boundary. It aims to shed new light on the maritime dynamics, which created a new space for state and individuals to interact to expand influence, of this discrete region of Northeast Asia.

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\(^4\) Zhao Shuguo, *Mingdai beibu hafang tizhi yanjiu*, 322.


Past scholarship demonstrates the double-edged effect of Ming military assistance on Korean society, but it also emphasizes the positive contribution of the southern troops in the Imjin War. Scholars have primarily paid attention to the adoption of these troops’ martial arts and military tactics in Korea, their conflict with the Ming northern forces (C. *beibing*, 北兵), and specific cases of southern officers. In particular, Yang Haiying systematically analyzes the individual careers of some Zhejiang Yiwu 義烏 soldiers intertwining with Northeast Asian history and the Ming political atmosphere, providing a vivid portrait of the southern troops as a whole from a microhistorical perspective. This chapter does not intend to repeat and assess the southern troops’ achievements, nor does it regard this group as static and homogenous. Instead, it weaves their shifting trajectory into the regional transition of Northeast Asia in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Although private maritime exchanges between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea were never severed by their mutual sea bans, the land-based authorities had separated and neglected the

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9 Yang Haiying, *Yiwai changcheng, Waili yuanchao kangwo yiwu bing kaoshu* 域外長城——萬曆援朝抗倭義烏兵考實 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chuban she, 2014).
Bohai and Yellow Sea space prior to the late sixteenth century. The legal contact through the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Strait only lasted to the early Ming dynasty and the Koryŏ-Chosŏn dynastic transition in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. After the Yongle emperor moved the Ming capital to Beijing in 1421 and consolidated his dominance in northeast China, he regularized the safer and more convenient Liaodong land route for Chosŏn tribute trips.10 From the early sixteenth century on, the domestic sea transport of provisions between Shandong and Liaodong was also terminated and only occasionally resumed to relieve natural disasters.11 Moreover, with fewer pirate raids occurring in north China after the early fifteenth century, its coastal defense had been relaxed: the number of defending soldiers and battleships was decreased, the role of the coastal patrol and inspection administrations declined, and garrison construction was halted.12

The Imjin War of 1592-1598 significantly enhanced the strategic status of the Bohai and the Yellow Sea and prompted their military integration. From a spatial perspective, one striking change was that the Ming government had begun to perceive this region as cohesive and interdependent in supporting the Chinese-Korean sea defense. Ming Vice-Minister of War Song Yingchang systematically suggested this idea after he was appointed in the eighth month of 1592 as the military commissioner in northeast China to resist the Japanese armies.13 To illustrate the importance of the Bohai and Yellow Sea region, he submitted to the Wanli emperor a map titled Huayi yanhai tu 華夷沿海圖, which depicted northeast China from South Zhili to Liaodong and the Korean Peninsula. Altogether he presented two maps, Sizhen tu 四鎮圖 and Chaoxian

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12 Zhao Shuguo, Mingdai beibu haifang tizhi yanjiu, 239-247.
13 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 20/8/18 (9/23/1592), fasc. 251, 4681.
tu 朝鮮圖, that roughly divided the geographic range of *Huayi yanhai tu* based on a state-centered view. *Sizhen tu* depicted the four northeast Chinese garrisons of Tianjin, Jizhou, Liaodong, and Shandong; *Chaoxian tu* provided Chosŏn Korea’s marine conditions, which were rarely known to the contemporary Chinese. Coastal guards, rivers and mountains, administrative units, and offshore islands of northeast China and Korea were particularly marked in these maps.

Figure 21 *Huayi yanhai tu* 華裔沿海圖 [Map of China’s eastern coast (from South Zhili to Liaodong) and the Korean Peninsula], (Song Yingchang, *Jinglüe fuguo yaobian*, 28-29.)

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Figure 22 *Sizhen tu* 四鎮圖 [Map of Baoding, Jizhou, Liaodong, and Shandong Garrisons] (Song Yingchang, *Jinglüe fuguo yaobian*, 30-31.)

Figure 23 *Chaotian tu* 朝鮮圖 [Map of Korea] (Song Yingchang, *Jinglüe fuguo yaobian*, 32-33.)
Not only did the making of *Huayi yanhai tu* break away from the China-Korea territorial framework, in the preface of *Huayi yanhai tu* Song illuminated the interrelation between the Bohai Sea and the Yellow Sea by stressing the Japanese invaders’ easy access to Korea and then to China’s northern coast. He stated that the large-scale invasion launched by the Japanese was based on their being acquainted with the maritime situation, and the fact that they could readily go ashore at the Pusan port from Tsushima Island and enter into Korea. He then described Korea as a protruding tongue in the sea that connected Liaodong Lüshun and pointed toward southeast China. He observed that the Japanese could use this as the springboard for entering China. While Song did not express concern about an attack via the Liaodong land route, he requested an urgent distribution of armies in the southern provinces of Korea to prevent the Japanese from sailing across the Yellow Sea.\(^{15}\)

The Ming government also integrated the Bohai Sea into the transnational military operations for connecting and supporting the front line. For instance, in the second month of 1597 Ming Grand Secretaries Shen Yiguan and Zhang Wei argued that the opening of the Shandong-Liaodong sea route through the Bohai Strait could free the Ming from the exhaustion of overland transport and facilitate its naval battles against the Japanese.\(^{16}\) Later in the year Shen Yiguan elaborated on this thinking by proposing the appointment of a Tianjin and Dengzhou-Laizhou grand coordinator to unify Bohai naval affairs. Instead of regarding this region as merely a defensive zone, Shen emphasized its crucial role in mobilizing the Ming navies from

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\(^{15}\) Song Yingchang, “華裔沿海圖序,” in *Jinglüe fuguo yaobian*, 26-27.

south China, transporting provisions, and launching attacks to aid Korea.\(^{17}\)

In addition to strengthening the spatial association between the Bohai and the Yellow Sea, another remarkable change was the Ming state’s penetration of power into the Liaodong and Shandong offshore islands since they played an integral role in forming a defensive network on China’s northeastern coast. Song Yingchang had once raised the necessity of transforming the Miaodao Archipelago at the Bohai Strait into a military fence; he explained the strategic location of these islands at the entrance of the Bohai coast and their dotted distribution that connected Liaodong and Shandong. When the Japanese appeared, he argued, beacons and torches on the Miaodao Islands should be ignited day and night to spread the alarm and light the sea. The enemies would thus know that the Chinese were prepared, and flinch. Even if they entered the Bohai Sea, the military control of the Miaodao Islands could still cut off their retreat.\(^{18}\)

The Ming’s military penetration into the sea was especially reflected in its assimilation of offshore runaways. In the sixteenth century the Ming state considered maritime migrants, mainly composed of Liaodong evaders, in the Bohai Strait and the northern Yellow Sea to be a major threat to its coastal security that needed to be prohibited.\(^{19}\) However, during the Imjin War the Ming legitimated and made good use of their existence as defenders against the foreign invaders. In the early stages of the war, Song Yingchang had already stated that the inhabitation of the Miaodao Archipelago was ideal for building up an army. By adopting the incentive method of selecting and entitling a leader on each island, the island-dwelling population could be organized as a militia. As seen in the following section, this proposal was implemented in the second


\(^{18}\) Song Yingchang, “議處海防戰守事宜疏,” in *Jinglüe fuguo yaobian*, fasc. 3, 207-209.

\(^{19}\) Zhang Xueyan, “逋民盡數歸順疏,” in *Zhang Xinzhai zoushu 張心齋奏議*, fasc. 1, *Ming jingshi wenbian*, vol. 363, 3909-3911.
Japanese invasion of Korea. Song also requested the dispatch of a total 280 ships with 7,950 sailors and 1,535 seamen to these islands; together with the local militia, these units could patrol the sea to detect Japanese armies.\(^{20}\)

The Ming state also emphasized the productive value of China’s northern offshore islands, which were farmed for the purpose of producing military supplies in the Imjin War. When the Shandong government was overburdened by the responsibility of supplying provisions to Korea, it took this maritime exploitation into account. Ming official Zheng Rubi, who successively took the positions of vice commissioner and grand coordinator of Shandong during the war, suggested the expansion of the Dengzhou military farmlands by cultivating the uninhabited yet fertile Changchan Island in the north of Dengzhou.\(^{21}\) This military-oriented exploitation was implemented in Tianjin as well: in the second Japanese invasion of Korea in 1597-1598 the Ming allowed its soldiers and civilians to farm the Tianjin coastal wastelands; they were then exempted from paying land taxes for three years.\(^{22}\) In 1601 Baoding Grand Coordinator Wang Yingjiao 汪應蛟 reported that this successful practice yielded more than 5,000 mu (3.072 km\(^2\)) of grain, and discussed expanding the scope and efficiency of farming.\(^{23}\)

Ming officials were aware of the potential administrative difficulty of military expansion toward the sea. They strengthened control over coastal military men in order to keep them from

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22 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/12/1 (1/7/1598), fasc. 317, 5903.
23 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 29/11/3 (11/27/1601), fasc. 365, 6819. Wang Yingjiao 汪應蛟, “海滨屯田试有成效疏,” in Fu Ji zoushu 放鴛奏疏, fasc. 8, Xuxiu siku quanshu, shiba, zhaoling zouyi lei, vol. 480, 504-509. The implementation of military farming on the Tianjin coast was raised by Tianjin grand coordinator during the Imjin War (See Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/12/1 (1/7/1598), fasc. 317, 5903). After the war, this position was determined and Tianjin affairs were still under the administration of Baoding grand coordinator. For the relationship between the two positions, Tianjin and Baoding grand coordinators, see Kawagoe Yasuhiro 川越泰博, Mindai Chūgoku no gunsei to seiji 明代中国の軍制と政治(Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 2011), 17-20.
losing their connection with the continent. For instance, in order to prevent illicit maritime migration Dengzhou garrison soldiers’ cultivation of Changshan Island was under strict government regulation. They were organized into squads of five or ten when farming and returned to Dengzhou when their tasks were accomplished at end of the farming season; they were not allowed to possess personal property nor have family members with them on the island.\(^{24}\)

The maritime militarization of northeast China strongly relied on the efforts of its coastal armies, which in turn boosted their expansion of power in the locale. In 1597 the Wanli emperor ordered the newly appointed Tianjin Grand Coordinator Wan Shide 萬世德 to improve the Bohai Sea defense by using multiple methods, such as widely recruiting intelligent and brave individuals from within and without the civil and military systems, and enlisting capable and vigorous coastal residents into the military.\(^{25}\) Squad leader (C. bazong，把總) Jiang Liangdong 姜良棟 from Zhejiang province was deeply involved in this process, both as a beneficial owner and a contributor. Since Jiang’s coastal military experience in the Imjin War was in the larger picture of the presence of Ming southern migrants in the late sixteenth-century Northeast Asian borderland, the following analysis of his appointment on China’s northeastern coast is based on the entire path of his career.

Jiang Liangdong’s self-compiled works *Xizheng lu* 西征錄, *Dongzheng lu* 東征錄, and *Zhenwu lu* 鎮吳錄 are the core sources in narrating and analyzing his military experience. These collections are formed from memorials, official documents, poems, and literary works

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written by Jiang himself, his superiors and subordinates, and the Chosŏn king and officials. The content of *Xizheng lu*, the records of westward expedition, is Jiang’s service in north China in the 1580s and 1590s. *Dongzheng lu*, the records of the eastward expedition, collects his achievements in northeast China and Korea during and right after the Imjin War. *Zhenwu lu*, literally the records of pacifying Suzhou, focuses on his stay in Suzhou of South Zhili until his retirement in 1605. Together these records form the five-volume *Zhenwu lu* and display Jiang’s unknown life story as a Ming low-level military officer, which will be explored in the following section.

**The Trajectory and Violent Tendencies of the Ming Southern Forces**

Although the tension between the increasing need to recruit soldiers and the shortage of hereditary military households after the Tumu Crisis of 1449 stimulated the Ming state’s employment of indigenous mercenaries, it was not until the dispatch of Qi Jiguang 姜繼光 (1528-1588) to Jizhou 蓟州 in the 1560s that the requisition of southern mercenaries to China’s northern borders became noteworthy.²⁶ Qi was well known for his enlistment and training of Zhejiang armies in China’s southeastern coast in the mid-sixteenth century. Born to a Shandong hereditary military family, Qi inherited the position of Dengzhou guard assistant commander, and was then promoted to Regional Military Assistant Commissioner for defending the Shandong coast during the early years of his career.²⁷ In the mid-sixteenth century Qi was sent to Zhejiang and Fujian to control the rampant Japanese piracy. He broadly enlisted soldiers from the eastern


²⁷ For Qi Jiguang’s biography see *Mingshi*, fasc. 212, vol. 18, 5610.
Zhejiang prefectures Chuzhou 处州, Shaoxing 紹興, Yiwu 義烏, and Taizhou 台州 based on their brave, martial, and disciplined character as well as their skill in using firearms and infantry fighting. In training Zhejiang locals, Qi improved drill techniques and organizational innovations, and combined tactical formations. His forces rapidly gained superior fighting capability and were equipped with advanced weaponry. After Qi returned to the north as Jizhou Regional Commander in 1568, he added 20,000 Zhejiang armies to his original 3,000 handpicked troops and continued to rely on their formidable combat strength to guard the Great Wall. Qi’s successful adaptation of the southern military to the north spread their prestige and popularized their nationwide employment. In the late sixteenth century Zhejiang mercenaries’ encampment in the northern garrisons of China was essential to China’s border defense. It was under this circumstance that Zhejiang bureaucratic clerk Jiang Liangdong began to develop his military career in the north.

Jiang Liangdong was born in Gui’an County 歸安縣, Huzhou Prefecture 湖州府 of Zhejiang. He had read Confucian classics and prepared for the civil examination at a young age. However, he did not complete his Confucian education but became engaged in practical matters as a local clerk. Lacking an opportunity to display his capability and realize his aspirations in the bureaucratic system, he decided to join the military. While it is unclear how he traveled to Beijing and became acquainted with Wan Shide when Wan was still a supernumerary at the Ministry of War in the early 1580s, we know that he won Wan’s recognition. Thenceforth he had

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30 Xu Guangqi 徐光啟, “兵事百不相應疏”, in Xu wending ji 徐文定集, fasc. 2, Ming jingshi wenbian, vol. 489, 5392.
a close personal relationship with Wan, which directly contributed to Jiang’s promotions throughout his entire career. Through Wan’s recommendation Shanxi Datong Grand Coordinator Hu Laigong 胡來貢 had a conversation with Jiang and was impressed by Jiang’s pertinent thoughts on border affairs. Since Hu was engaged in handling frontier trade with the Mongol tribes and keen to find interpreters (C. tongshi, 通事), he asked Jiang to be his subordinate interpreter.  

Based on his great eloquence, Jiang was dispatched to north China to negotiate trade affairs with the Mongol tribes. In 1584 he and his companions successfully persuaded Sengge, the leader of the Mongol Tümed tribe, to withdraw his armies from the Ming border. This achievement attracted much attention from Shanxi Governor-general Zheng Luo 鄭洛, who was in charge of frontier trade with Sengge and the Third Lady, Sengge’s stepmother and wife.  

Zheng praised Jiang’s contribution, stating that it even surpassed a great victory because it solved a potential conflict peacefully. Due to his accomplishments in facilitating the Mongol-Ming frontier trade, Jiang was awarded a hat string and five taels of silver. However, in 1591 when Jiang was stationed at Xining to guard against a rebelling Mongol tribe, he was still an unranked interpreter serving as Zheng Luo’s subordinate. At that time Zheng had already been promoted to minister of war and commissioner of the north and northwestern garrisons, with Wan Shide as his assistant in the military defense circuit. Probably based on Jiang’s communication skills, Wan assigned Jiang to cooperate with the indigenous Mongol chieftains and tribal people to guide the Ming armies. This credit was submitted to the Ming court and

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34 For Zheng Luo’s biography see Mingshi, fasc. 222, vol.19, 5850-5851.
Jiang was awarded eight taels of silver.\textsuperscript{37}

Although Jiang’s negotiation capabilities had been recognized, it was during the Imjin War that his military career reached a turning point. In the 1590s, relying on the southern troops’ superior military strength and vast experience in fighting naval battles, the Ming government dispatched a great number of them to Korea. At the end of 1592 about 11,000 southern troops crossed the Yalu River to enter Korea. They were the most valiant Chinese armies during the war, and infantries equipped with the most advanced firearms formed their majority.\textsuperscript{38} In the second Japanese invasion of 1597-1598, more than 30,000 southern soldiers were dispatched from Zhejiang to Korea—a number equivalent to the entire Zhejiang force.\textsuperscript{39} Many southern leaders were former followers of Qi Jiguang. They devoted themselves to guarding China’s southeastern coast, and once again played an important role in resisting the much more large-scale and well-organized Japanese attacks. They were also directly engaged in instructing the Korean troops on drilling and artillery techniques, land warfare tactics, and gunpowder production.\textsuperscript{40}

In China the southern forces were deployed along the Bohai coast. For instance, in 1592 a brigade commander for maritime defense was stationed in Jizhou to lead its 3,700 southern troops, and was also in charge of aiding the Liaodong border.\textsuperscript{41} In 1597 6,000 southern troops

\textsuperscript{37} “萬曆十九年八月經略題分佈青海兵馬疏略五,” in Xizheng lu, Zhenwu lu, vol. 5, 32b-33a; “萬曆二十年二月初十日兵部覆經略事竣大敘功疏略七,” in Xizheng lu, Zhenwu lu, vol. 5, 46a. An interpreter could also bear the responsibilities as a guide or vanguard on the Ming “nine borders.” Xiao Lijun 肖立軍, Mingdai shengzhen yingbing zhi yu difng zhidu 明代省鎮營兵制與地方秩序 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2010), 58.

\textsuperscript{38} Sun Weiguo, “Li Rusong zhi dongzheng jiqi liuxi liuyu chaoxian kao,” 80-82.


\textsuperscript{40} Yang Haiying, and Ren Xingfang, “Chaoxian wangchao jundui de zhongguo xunlian shi,” 165-205; Yang Haiying, “Wanli yuanchao zhanzheng zhong de nanbing,” 16-23.

\textsuperscript{41} Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 20/9/30 (11/3/1592), fasc. 252, 4702; Wanli 22/10/16 (11/27/1594), fasc. 278,5142.
were newly enlisted in the Jizhou, Yongping, and Miyun areas near Beijing. In Tianjin 3,000 southern seamen were assigned to cooperate with 3,000 ground forces to prepare a possible attack by both water and land. In Shandong a southern camp was established in Laizhou in response to the absence of local professional navies; strengthened by the aggregation of naval and ground forces from south and north, Dengzhou grew into a military garrison equally as important as the Ming border garrisons.

Jiang Liaodong was transferred to northeast China and Korea in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. After Zheng Luo retired in the 1590s, Jiang continued to serve Tianjin Grand Coordinator Wan Shide and was assigned the task of pacifying offshore islanders in northeast China at the end of 1597. As shown in Wan’s recommendation memorial, this assignment was based on Jiang’s abundant experience negotiating with border populations. Wan pointed out that Jiang was the appropriate person to bear this important yet difficult responsibility due to his forthright, distinctive, and generous character. Jiang formed sincere friendships with his subordinates, dealt firmly with dangerous circumstances, expressed himself eloquently, and had many years of military experience on the northern border. Since Wan suggested increasing Jiang’s authority before he was dispatched, Jiang was finally promoted and given the title of squad leader. Jiang expressed his gratitude, saying that while his previous trivial merits did not cause a rise in his status, Wan’s appraisal of his competency provided him

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42 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 25/8/3 (9/13/1597), fasc.313, 5854.
43 Ming Shenzong shilu, Wanli 22/7/6 (8/21/1594), fasc. 275, 5090.
45 “萬曆二十五年十二月海防巡撫題招撫把總疏二,” in Dongzheng lu, fasc. 1, Zhenwu lu, vol. 3, 2. 查得臣標下效勞見委賜把總姜良棟 係浙江湖州府歸安縣人 俶儻不群 勇於自命 餐下則傾身結納 疚金石而可靡 承委則矢志周旋 即湯火而 不避 十年邊塞曾掉舌而折龍庭 千里沙場又捐軀而掃魚海 誠得若人而用之 必有成效。
with a final opportunity to strive and succeed.\footnote{跋，“跋,” in *Dongzheng lu*, fasc. 1, Zhenwu lu, vol. 3, 1.}

Specifically, Jiang’s assignment was to enlist the unregistered islanders, located from Huai’an and Yangzhou prefectures of South Zhili and the Shandong coast to Liaodong Lüshun. He was to adopt pacification methods, such as selecting noble and prestigious leaders, electing headmen within the self-defense *baojia* system, offering the islanders titles, and promising to exempt their service. Jiang also needed to make use of potential military resources and survey the topographic condition of this region, such as addressing the military use of private ships for going on patrol and the coastal mounts to transmit alarms, and reporting whether defensive infrastructure and equipment could be placed in uninhabited areas.\footnote{萬曆二十五年十二月海防巡撫題招撫把總疏二,” in *Dongzheng lu*, fasc. 1, Zhenwu lu, vol. 3, 3. 自淮楊界起自安東而至靖海 自靖海而至威海 自威海而至登州 自登州而至旅順 中間各島有人住居者 可立耆民 或立保長 或優以冠帶 或免其差役 其有自備船隻 可資會哨 臨海山阜 可據傳烽 供議給行糧 務裨實用 其原無人住之處 是否可以泊船 是否可以瞭望 如果堪臥險則議添哨船 果能望洋則議增墩戍 一一親歷 處處調停 務使我之耳目外張 臂指內扞.}

Wan Shide’s other memorial in 1598 records the process of Jiang Liangdong’s investigation and incorporation of some Shandong offshore islands in administration. As Jiang reported, he traveled along the Dengzhou-Laizhou and Lüshun coasts and discovered that there were nine ports in Jinan Prefecture and thirty-four islands and ports in Dengzhou that were suitable for berthing ships and stationing soldiers. He incorporated three offshore residents of Shandong Qingzhou and Laizhou prefectures into the *baojia* system and registered the numbers of their households, population, cultivated lands, taxes, and fishing ships. According to Jiang’s survey, the migrants residing in these islands were originally from Liaodong and made their living by fishing. They were brave, strong, and acquainted with the waterways to Korea, and hence could be deployed on standby. Wan praised these efforts highly, and stated that Jiang had successfully transformed the islanders who could otherwise be “the Japanese’s talons and fangs” into “our
eyes and ears.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zhaitang Island</th>
<th>Lingshan Island</th>
<th>Zhucha Island</th>
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<tr>
<td>Taxes (liters/mu)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing ships</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 Information on three Shandong offshore islands, collected by Jiang Liangdong

Jiang Liangdong also compared the geographic factors of China’s southern and northern seas and put forward new perspective on where to reinforce maritime defense in the north. As he stated, the experience of being born and growing up in Zhejiang and traversing the northeastern islands led to his clear understanding of the insular condition. The southern sea in Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong had deposits of soft silt and had regular tides, while the northern sea in Dengzhou-Laizhou and Lüshun was characterized by sand, rocks, and severe weather. Thus travelers could easily berth in the south but were hard-pressed to navigate in the north. Regarding the northern sea defense, Jiang evaluated the Chengshan Guard of Shandong stretching out to the Yellow Sea as the most strategic place for preventing the Japanese attack, and suggested that troops be dispatched there to guard Tianjin and act in cooperation with Dengzhou-Laizhou.50

This successful operation built a foundation for Jiang Liangdong’s further promotion. In the seventh month of 1598, Wan Shide dispatched Jiang to the Korean battlefield as an assistant brigade commander (C. *Shoubei*, 守備), leading 600 newly enlisted southern infantries and cooperating with the northern cavalries. However, he did not stay in Korea for long. With the sudden death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the eighth month of 1598 and the subsequent withdrawal of the Japanese armies from Korea by the tenth month of 1598, Jiang and his southern armies returned to Liaodong and were fighting the Mongols there.

In 1599 Wan Shide again sent Jiang Liangdong and his southern camp to Korea in order to assist in its social reconstruction and military defense. When Jiang was in Seoul he disciplined his subordinates, urging them to save their pay rather than indulging in debauchery and the disruption of Korea’s social order, yet he also displayed great thoughtfulness and sympathy toward them, actively seeking treatment for ill soldiers, mourning the dead and preparing coffins, and requesting promotions and awards for the meritorious. Jiang’s subordinates greatly admired him, saying that he treated them like his sons, sharing in their well-being and woes, and caring for them as he cared for his own life, regardless of danger. They even expressed the desire to donate 200 taels of silver to erect a monument in Korea to glorify Jiang.

Jiang also gained a reputation with the Koreans before he left Seoul. The Chosŏn king Sŏnjo transmitted a document to Wan Shide praising Jiang’s virtuous, incorruptible, and merciful
character, and asking that he be allowed to remain in Korea.\textsuperscript{56} An entry of \\textit{Sŏnjo sillok} indicates that this document was written at Jiang’s suggestion and his subordinates’ request to publicize Jiang’s popularity. However, this was not just a polite or diplomatic statement. According to one Korean official, although Jiang had the defects of indiscretion, fickleness, and ostentatiousness, his attention to detail and persistence made him “indeed a genuine and sincere man of the south.”\textsuperscript{57}

Although Jiang was no longer involved in military affairs of the north after the Imjin War, it is necessary to introduce his whole political career for a fuller understanding of the up and down of the collective southern troops. Jiang returned to China in 1600 and followed Right Assistant Censor-in-chief and Yingtian Grand Coordinator Cao Shipin 曹時聘 to Suzhou to pacify conflicts caused by local Confucian students and citizens in 1603.\textsuperscript{58} Cao stayed in Suzhou until 1604 when he was transferred to the Ministry of Works.\textsuperscript{59} Jiang received a rapid promotion while he was under Cao’s command, which may have been partly related to Cao’s political connections with Jiang’s former leader Wan Shide; Wan had become Cao’s superior in the Council of Censors after the Imjin War.\textsuperscript{60} In 1602 Jiang filled the vacant position of the stationary aide-de-camp (\textit{C. zuoying zhongjun, 坐營中軍}) to the Yingtian grand coordinator. The following year, in response to the increasing coastal discord and the unstable social order caused by the Suzhou conflicts, Jiang was promoted to stationary brigade commander (\textit{C. zuoying youji, ...

\textsuperscript{56} “朝鮮國王李昖咨萬都爺保留咨文,” in \textit{Dongzheng lu, fasc. 2, Zhenwu lu}, vol. 4, 9a-10a.
\textsuperscript{57} Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 32/9/8 (10/26/1599), fasc. 117, vol. 23, 676. [姜良棟]雖有輕躁自伐 唯恐人不及知之病而臨事詳密 不少放過 務令成就乃己 此實南人之有誠悃者也.
\textsuperscript{59} Ming Shenzhong shilu, Wanli 32/10/27 (12/17/1604), fasc. 402, 7532.
\textsuperscript{60} Ming Shenzhong shilu, Wanli 27/9/9 (10/26/1599), fasc. 339, 6289; Wanli 29/3/12 (4/14/1601), fasc. 357, 6670; Wanli 30/9/17 (10/31/1602), fasc. 376, 7071-7072.
坐營遊擊) in order to repress bandits.61 His responsibilities included selecting and training 1,200 soldiers, and organizing them to patrol inside and outside Suzhou. Because of his efforts, in three years the bandits were dispelled and the soldiers were a disciplined group.62

In 1605, immediately after Cao Shipin left his post and the new Yingtian grand coordinator Zhou Kongjiao 周孔教 assumed office, Jiang Liangdong’s growing career was terminated. According to Jiang himself, this was due to his repeated reports of colleagues’ malpractice, which incurred their outrage. To avoid revenge, he pled illness and requested a retirement to his hometown.63 Jiang’s statement corresponds with a Korean official’s observation that as Wan Shide’s trusted follower, Jiang did not get along with the Ming officers in Korea because he often reported their lack of qualifications.64 Regarding Jiang’s request, Zhou submitted a proposal to the emperor asking for Jiang’s transfer to the border region. However, the imperial attendant of the Ministry of War Sun Shanji 孫善繼 declined this memorial and suggested a direct acceptance of Jiang’s request. His opinion was approved by the Ministry of War, and Jiang returned to his hometown for “recuperation.”65

Jiang’s political connection, personal character, and the late Ming factional conflict directly influenced his appointment and retirement. While Jiang’s several promotions were fostered by Wan Shide and Cao Shipin, his career came to an end after Wan’s death in 1602 and Cao’s transfer in 1604. Lacking their protection, his personal conflicts with colleagues surfaced and became the catalyst for his retirement. Jiang’s fall also seemed to be related to the factional

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63 “萬曆三十三年七月為懇憐痼疾速賜回籍調治延生事,” in Zhenwu lu, vol. 1, 33a-34a.
64 Sonjo sillok, Sonjo 32/9/8 (10/26/1599), fasc. 117, vol. 23, 676.
tension between Zhou Kongjiao and Sun Shanji. Together with his discussion on transferring Jiang, Zhou also suggested the promotion of two other southern military officers—Wu Weizhong 吳惟忠 and Lan Fangwei 藍芳威—who were returning from the Korean battlefield. However, Sun accused Jiang of presumptuousness, Wu of bribery, and Lan of greed; not only did Jiang return to his hometown, but Wu and Lan were dismissed without any further appointment. Sun also skillfully attacked Zhou by disclosing his disharmony with Jiang, casting doubt on his conduct, and indicating that his recommendation of Wu and Lan was improper. This rejection was probably Sun’s warning to Zhou since later in 1608, after Zhou was the director-general of the Grand Canal, Sun directly accused Zhou of flattering his superiors to achieve rapid advancement.66

Jiang’s promotion was closely interconnected to the coastal militarization of China and Korea, and was firmly based on his naval capability. This further demonstrates how a southern military officer exerted and expanded power in the embattled Northeast Asian borderland. Like many contemporary southern officers, Jiang abandoned the attempt to serve in the Ming bureaucratic institution and instead joined the army against the nomadic and overseas attacks in the late sixteenth century.67 He did successfully seize the chance to expand his power beyond the China-Korea territorial boundary, although his career was suddenly terminated due to political conflict.

This was not the only case that displays the setback to southern military officers’ careers after the war. As noted above, the reputable southern commander Wu Weizhong was charged at

66 *Ming Shenzong shilu*, Wanli 36/11/12 (12/18/1608), fasc. 452,8542. For the political conflict between Zhou Kongjiao and Sun Shanji and Sun’s accusation of Wu Weizhong see Yang Haiying, *Yuwai changcheng, Waili yuanchao kangwo yiwu bing kaoshu*, 10-17.

67 Yang Haiying, “*Wanli yuanchao zhanzheng zhong de nanbing.*” 23.
the time of Jiang’s retirement. He had devoted his career to fighting Japanese enemies and made remarkable military contributions in Korea but was unfairly dismissed more than once. His experience reflects the sharp contradiction between the southern and northern armies, the political tensions between multiple factions, and late Ming institutional and fiscal defects.68

When southern officers like Jiang Liangdong, Wu Weizhong, and Lan Fangwei were excluded from the military system, a cluster of southern troops remained in northeast China. Their postwar experience was no less frustrating as the Ming immediately decreased their numbers to ease its fiscal burden after the war. For instance, in 1599 the Ministry of War accepted Tianjin Grand Coordinator Wang Yingjiao’s proposal to eliminate 3,000 seamen in Dengzhou-Laizhou and Lüshun respectively, while only the southern armies were preserved in Dengzhou ground forces. In Tianjin most of the navies, infantries, and cavalrymen were recalled,69 but some sea defense measures remained—the Tianjin maritime defense camp established in the war continued until the early seventeenth century. Some new military positions, such as the Shandong commander and vice-commander as well as some Shandong regional commanders and subprefects, also remained after the war.70

The Ming expected these military men to regulate and defend the coastal regions, but their violent tendencies caused them to become a disruptive force that challenged the state’s control over maritime borders. It is noted that the boundary between illicit violence and government-controlled forces was often indistinct and fluid. As David Robinson argues, “Through an ever-shifting mix of physical coercion, education, moral suasion, negotiation, and co-option, it is held

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68 For an examination of Wu Weizhong’s case see Yang Haiying, *Yuwai changcheng, Waili yuanchao kangwo yiwu bing kaoshu*, 3-111.
69 *Ming Shenzong shilu*, Wanli 27/3/5 (3/30/1599), fasc. 332, 6140.
that even the most recalcitrant elements could be transformed into useful members of the wider community."\textsuperscript{71} The maintenance of the Ming social order was thus not a separation between violence and suppression, but a fluid process of negotiation in which all interested parties participated. While this statement stresses illicit violence as an ongoing, pervasive, and recurrent factor in Ming everyday life, the fragile balance between the licit and the illicit could be more easily broken when the Ming state had to widen the scope of its regulated forces and integrate a motley crew of shiftless and disorganized people into its border defense during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.\textsuperscript{72}

In the first Japanese aggression the total number of Chinese soldiers in Korea reached 50,000; during the second Japanese attack this number almost doubled.\textsuperscript{73} The management of such a large number of combat forces was a concern for both the Ming and Chosŏn governments. Although the southern troops were more orderly than those from the north and rarely caused trouble for the Korean locals, the relaxation of military discipline was still pervasive among the Ming overseas forces, as can be seen in the behavior of Jiang Liangdong’s subordinates in Korea, who commonly drank excessively, gambled, owed debt, and patronized prostitutes. More seriously, as Num-lin Hur states, “When there were no battles, Chinese soldiers easily transformed themselves into local tyrants, casually plundering the homes of civilians, raping women, and abusing local Korean officials with demands for food, liquor, and so on.”\textsuperscript{74} In addition to the social disruptions caused by the Ming forces’ lack of discipline, the supply and transportation of Ming military provisions and the long-term stationing of Ming soldiers also

\textsuperscript{71} David M. Robinson, \textit{Bandits, Eunuchs and the Son of Heaven: Rebellion and the Economy of Violence in Mid-Ming China} (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 13.

\textsuperscript{72} Liang Miaotai, “Mingdai jubian de mubing,” 46-47.


\textsuperscript{74} Nam-lin Hur, “The Celestial Warriors: Ming Military Aid and Abuse during the Korean War, 1592-8,” 248-249.
imposed extreme pressure on the Korean people, leading to their extreme poverty, decline in population, and out-migration.\textsuperscript{75}

The Ming state’s deficient financial revenues and its postwar demobilization of southern troops further stimulated their violation of state orders and abuse of official resources. One late Ming Nanjing official, Gu Qiyuan 顧起元, described the similarities between the southern armies and rabbles that threatened social security. During the Imjin War several thousand soldiers of Zhejiang Yiwu armies were requisitioned to enhance the Nanjing water defense. However, these fierce soldiers were not dismissed thereafter because after some died in accidents or they returned to hometowns, the remaining soldiers hired local bullies to take their place and receive their payments. Gu complained that these Zhejiang troops brought no benefit to the local society but instead consumed massive amounts of grain and money.

For the Ming state, the most feasible solution might have been the dismissal of a portion of its newly enlisted soldiers. After the Ming had invested millions of taels of silver into the war, it was eager to reduce the expenditures of feeding the superfluous armies once the war alert ended. However, the tension between the Ming’s fiscal problems and its postwar disposition of military forces intensified the transformation of registered soldiers into unconstrained gangsters. As Gu Qiyuan continued to state, as long as the Ming intended to dismiss the Zhejiang military men in Nanjing, the soldiers were angry and created a disruption. Worse than that, they turned to thievery, banditry and adultery. Even the local government dared not punish them for fear that it would increase this misbehavior.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Han Myung-gi, “Imjinwaeran shigi myŏnggunch'amsungnŭi sahoe'mmunhwajŏk yŏnghyang”壬辰倭亂시기 明軍참전의 社會文化的 영향, Kunsa 군사 35 (December 1997): 65-82.
\textsuperscript{76} Gu Qiyuan 顧起元, “浙兵,” in Kezuo zhuiyu 客座贅語, fasc. 1, Yuanming shiliao biji congkan 元明史料叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), reprint, 27.
The southern troops’ violent tendencies were especially noticeable on China’s northeastern coast, as shown in their recurring mutinies. In 1595 when the Ming was negotiating with Japan on the peace agreement, a mutiny broke out among the southern coastal defense forces in the Jizhou garrison due to the Ming court’s unfulfilled promise to grant them awards and allowances. The rebels were killed, and the remaining soldiers were forced to the south.\textsuperscript{77} In the same year the Ming’s decision to dissolve the Zhejiang troops stationed in Dengzhou incited another incident; their leader, Shandong Sea Defense Vice-Commander Yang Wen 楊文, was accused of instigating this disorder.\textsuperscript{78} Probably due to this incident, Yang was soon dismissed for his “voracity and violence.”\textsuperscript{79} In 1607 another dismissal agitated the southern navies in Liaodong Lüshun; they sailed across the sea and created a disturbance in Dengzhou. The local government had to execute the initiators to suppress this riot.\textsuperscript{80} By the early seventeenth century Ming officials had grown accustomed to disorder caused by coastal seamen in northeast China and described it as frequent.\textsuperscript{81}

The Private Commercial Network on the Chinese-Korean Borders: The Chunggang Market and Its Participants

The degeneration of Ming southern seamen into troublemakers, from the Ming state’s

\textsuperscript{77} For an analysis of this mutiny see Yang Haiying, “Wanli er shi san nian Jizhou bingbian guankui” 萬歷二十三年薊州兵變管窺, in Mingdai Jizhen wenhua xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 明代薊鎮文化學術研討會論文集 (Beijing: Zhongguo mingshi xuehui, 2010), 118-135.


\textsuperscript{79} Ming Shenzong shilu 明神宗實錄, Wanli 23/6/24 (7/30/1595), fasc. 286, 5310. 萬曆倭僉副總兵楊文任 以御史俞价論其貪暴故也.


\textsuperscript{81} Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, “重海防疏,” in An Liao shugao 按遼疏稿, fasc.1, Xixiu siku quanshu, shibul zhaoling zongyi lei, vol. 491, 437.
perspective, was closely interrelated with growing cross-border economic activities between China and Korea after the 1590s. With the enormous need to supply provisions, numerous merchants and transporters accompanied Ming generals and troops to the Korean Peninsula and traded with local residents. The classification of traders and military men were therefore often indistinct, “shifting constantly in the Chinese-Korean borderland during the Japanese invasion of Korea.”

This intertwinement between Chinese merchants and military men continued after the war. Although the Ming ordered the withdrawal of its troops from the Korean battlefield, many deserters remained in Korea and earned a living in commerce, acupuncture, or agriculture. The Korean government also hired a portion of them as military trainers, gunpowder producers, geomancers, and defenders. Their engagement in private trade was common. Several documents sent from King Sŏnjo to the Ming in 1601 regarding repatriating some Chinese deserters provide a glimpse of this situation. As recorded, six out of the nine deserters made a living in Korea in trade after the disengagement of the major forces. For instance, beginning in 1597 a thirty-six-year-old Zhejiang solider named Shi Zizhong stayed in Seoul and then in Kyŏngsang Province to work in trade. Although he had once been captured and repatriated, he returned to Seoul because he lacked the essential pass document to China.

The most steady and frequent commercial exchange in the border region between China and Korea took place at the periodic Chunggang market, located along a Yalu River islet near Ŭiju beginning in 1594. As a newly emerging trade on the Chinese-Korean borderland, the Chunggang market offered military provisions such as grain, horses, and donkeys from China in

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84 “挐解逃兵事,” Wanli 29/7/?, in Imun tŭngnok, fasc. 9, 483. The other cases along with Shi Zizhong can be seen in Imun tŭngnok, fasc. 9, 483-485.
exchange for ginseng, marten fur, and fabrics in Korea. The Chunggang market also played a
necessary role in supporting Korean society; as Chosŏn Chief State Councilor Ryu Sŏngryong
observed, due to the high exchange rate of Korean cloth, silver, copper, and pig iron at the
Chunggang market, Liaodong grain flowed plentifully into Korea and fed countless people. After
the war the market continued to provide essential supplies to Korea by exporting ginseng and
luxury items to China, and became an important channel for increasing tax revenues of the Ming
and the Chosŏn until its suspension in 1613.85

Although the Chunggang market was only permitted to conduct business by the Yalu River,
participants in its private commerce were wide ranging. For instance, Korean merchants based
on Seoul played a direct role in Chunggang commerce. As one record in Sŏnjo sillok suggests,
they actively initiated the opening of Chunggang market even before Chinese merchants arrived
at the borders.86 Ryu Sŏngryong also pointed out that capital merchants could be involved in the
Chunggang grain trade through waterways during a famine.87 The prosperous Chunggang
commerce stimulated smuggling and border trespassing that caused the Chosŏn court great
anxiety, as was vividly described in Sŏnjo sillok: the Chinese people built houses and cultivated
lands in the Ŭiju and Isan area of P’yŏngan Province, and in the season for picking yellow
ginseng in the eighth and ninth months of a year they went out in small boats by night and
“secretly traded at hidden places.”88 This had become an abuse the Chosŏn court aimed to
prevent.

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88 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 33/11/16 (12/21/1600), fasc. 131, vol.24,150. 自義州至于理山 隔江相望之地 唐人等築室墾田 八九月黃參採取之節 則乘其月黑人斷之時 互騎小船 潛相買賣於隱秘之處 弊不可防.
In the Chunggang region the smuggling of gunpowder especially flourished after the Imjin War. From the P'yŏngan provincial governor’s perspective, after Chinese idlers stole considerable amounts of gunpowder from the eastern Liaodong fortresses, they traded secretly at night with Korean capital and provincial merchants. According to him, in recent years all the gunpowder in the Liaoyang area had been lost. What worried him more was the Úiju smugglers crossing the Yalu River in groups to steal gunpowder themselves from Liaodong. The prosperity of the illicit gunpowder trade was related not only to the opening of the Chunggang market; Korea’s increasing demand for gunpowder to keep its state secure in the early seventeenth century was a more fundamental cause. As recorded, Korean military enrollees and magistrates were important purchasers and receivers of Liaodong gunpowder. To meet the need for military training, Korean magistrates offered those who donated gunpowder and saltpeter an exemption from their military service, which promoted the popularity of low-priced Liaodong saltpeter at Korea’s borders. Twenty kūn (twelve kg) of Liaodong saltpeter was worth one tael of silver, and if one presented sixty kūn (thirty-six kg) of saltpeter or three taels of silver one would be free from military service. Local magistrates could even keep the donated saltpeter themselves.90

Through the work of Korean merchants, the Chunggang market was further illicitly connected to the Korean-Japanese trade at the Japan House (K. Waegwan, 倭館) of the Pusan port after the Chosŏn and Tsushima Island resumed diplomatic relations in 1609. The interconnection of the Korean-Japanese official trade, government-regulated private trade, and

89 Sŏnjo sıllok, Sŏnjo 39/7/16 (8/19/1606), fasc. 201, vol.25,236.
smuggling in Pusan may have encouraged this situation. For instance, Korean capital offices would send people to trade contraband with the Japanese on the pretext of conducting official trade. Korean merchants also received silver from the Japanese and smuggled commodities to them in return. This use of silver for trade extended beyond Pusan during Korean traders’ trips to Seoul.91 The scope of their activity had expanded to the border region of Korea and China; they first obtained gold and silk fabrics there and then resold them completely in Tongnae, the southernmost prefecture of Kyŏngsang Province where the Pusan Japan House was located. The great profits of this operation attracted the Japanese merchants’ interest, who even attempted to seek a route to travel directly to Liaodong to purchase goods themselves at the Chunggang market. The issue of smuggling between the north and the south increased the Chosŏn Censors Office’s great concern about state security in the early seventeenth century, and it urged the Tongnae and Óiju magistrates to severely penalize this crime.92 After the Chunggang market was suspended in 1613, Korean smugglers still played an active role in creating the commercial network between China and Japan; acting as middlemen, they carried Japanese silver from Pusan to exchange for goods in China. Because of this, Japanese traders had to remain in Korea and wait for the Korean brokers to bring back commodities.93

Korean interpreters and military officers also directly participated in the Chunggang illicit economic activity. In the late stage of the Imjin War, while the border magistrate ordered them to control the overactive Chunggang market, which was open every third, sixth, and ninth day of each ten-day period, they failed to complete this task, and further gained profits from the

91 Tsuji Yamato, “Chōsen no tainichi tsūkō to Chōmin kankei” 朝鮮の対日通交再開と朝明関係, in Chōsen ōchō no taichū bōeki seisaku to min shin kōtai 朝鮮王朝の對中貿易政策と明清交替 (Tokyo: Kyūkoshoin, 2018), 46, 48-49.
93 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 10/7/11 (8/30/1618), fasc. 130, vol.33, 131.
Chunggang merchants.\textsuperscript{94} Even worse, their illegal activities may have caused social tensions and diplomatic disputes between Korea and China. A document collected in \textit{Sadae mun'gwe} particularly provides a case of a Korean interpreter being trapped in debt at the Chunggang. In the fifth month of 1600, the Ŭiju magistrate reported to the Chosŏn court that a Chinese merchant, Li Jiru 李繼儒, charged a Korean interpreter named Ku Nam 具男 and two Korean capital merchants; they were arrested by the Liaodong Zhenjiang office. The reason for this charge was that these Koreans were indebted to Li Jiru from smuggling with him.\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Sŏnjo sillok} provides more details of Ku Nan’s misdeed. After he accepted Li’s money, he did not provide equivalent goods, and even attempted to falsify the government stamp and the king’s decree, probably to prove his innocence to avoid being taken into custody. Due to these serious crimes Sŏnjo ordered the execution of Ku.\textsuperscript{96}

This case became the starting point of the Chosŏn’s repeated request to disband the Chunggang market. As the Chosŏn court complained in 1600, “recently, due to the operation of this market, scoundrels were able to secretly contact each other, who even defrauded others of goods and interrupted government transactions.”\textsuperscript{97} Several years later a major issue developed due to this situation of Korean people owing debt to Chinese merchants. Korean ginseng smugglers slipped across the Yalu River and contracted with the Chinese to accept their advance payment. However, when the Koreans handed over the ginseng, the Chinese traders often made excuses to receive only half of the amount, thereby forcing the Koreans to pay interest on the remaining half. Even if the Korean merchants cleared the interest, they failed to repay the

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Sŏnjo sillok}, Sŏnjo 30/8/8 (9/18/1597), fasc. 91, vol. 23, 275.
\textsuperscript{95} “朝鮮國王咨經理朝鮮軍務萬（世德）（本國乞罷中江開市咨）,” Wanli 28/5/5 (6/15/1600), in \textit{Sadae mun’gwe}, fasc.36, 1a-3a.
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Sŏnjo sillok}, Sŏnjo 34/10/26 (11/20/1601), fasc.142, vol.24, 308.
\textsuperscript{97} “朝鮮國王咨經理朝鮮軍務萬（世德）（本國乞罷中江開市咨）,” in \textit{Sadae mun’gwe}, fasc.36, 2b. 但近來有等奸頑之徒因此開市 私相往來 至於欺取貨物 妨擾官府事.
principle. Chinese merchants also forced Korean people to return the money by showing them the Liaodong Chunggang tax officers’ notes, which may be used to prove the validity of this transaction. This always resulted in Korean merchants’ bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{98}

This situation indicates the Liaodong tax officers’ acquiescence or even support of the Chinese merchants lending money.\textsuperscript{99} In addition, historical records suggest that Liaodong military officers commonly participated in various illicit economic activities between China and Korea in the early seventh century. The Chosŏn’s accusation of Liaodong tax officer Liu Yihuan 刘一瓛 is such an example. According to a Korean tax officer’s report, Liu was a Liaoyang commander dispatched to the Chunggang market for its tax administration. Instead of stabilizing the economic order, without authorization Liu imposed additional taxes and extorted money from the Chunggang merchants. Even the slightest resistance caused him to bind and beat them. Liu’s actions harmed both the private and government interests in the Chunggang market—commodity prices were inflated, merchants gained no profits and dispersed, and little tax revenue was collected from the ginseng trade. To prevent further malpractice by Liaodong military officers, the Chosŏn requested the appointment of an authoritative Ming civil official as the director of Chunggang tax affairs.\textsuperscript{100} This case demonstrates the Korean government’s discontent with the Liaodong collective tax officers, who took advantage of the political situation to accumulate their own fortune by applying coercive policies.\textsuperscript{101} As the Chosŏn Border Defense Council criticized, each year these officers could levy several thousand taels of silver on the Chunggang market, and the amount of their embezzlement was also large. This was the main reason these tax officers

\textsuperscript{98} Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjioksan pon), 10/15/1608, fasc. 8, vol.31, 351.
\textsuperscript{99} Feng Zhengyu 馮正玉, “17-19 shiji chaoxian dui qing maoyi yanjiu” 17-19 世紀朝鮮對清貿易研究 (PhD diss., Jilin University, 2011), 82-83.
\textsuperscript{100} “遼東鎮江等處地方副總兵（維貞）咨朝鮮國王（鎮江乞鎮抑買咨）,” Wanli 31/6?, in Sadae mun’gwe, fasc. 43, 1b-3b.
\textsuperscript{101} Sŏnjo sillow, Sŏnjo 36/7/20 (8/26/1603), fasc. 164, vol.24, 502.
insisted on the preservation of the market in spite of the Chosŏn’s intention of stopping it.102

Liaodong military officers also conducted smuggling and trespassing. One example of this is recorded by Ming Imperial Itinerant Inspector Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 in his memorial to the Wanli emperor in 1609. According to Xing’s investigation, a Liaodong assistant regional commander named Li Ze 李澤 was caught ordering his subordinates to slip into Korea and trade ginseng and pearls. Li also forced Liaodong merchants to lower the price of ginseng, which indirectly caused some of them to be killed by the Jurchens when they crossed the border to dig ginseng to gain more profit.103 The crimes of both Liu Yihuan and Li Ze reveal the increasingly visible role of Liaodong military men in the Chinese-Korean commercial exchanges and their participation in illegal economic activity even though their duties were to keep the borders demarcated and regulated.

The weakened central government control of the borders, compared to before the war, corresponded to the prosperous cross-border private trade in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the deep involvement of Chinese and Korean state agents in this process. As is often seen in Sŏnjo sillok, the Chosŏn court reiterated the importance of keeping its borders delimited from the Ming’s.104 This reflects the Chosŏn’s growing anxiety regarding frequent border crossings and the greater challenge it encountered to maintain a more stable economic order than before the war. King Sŏnjo especially complained about the Ŭiju government’s failure to regulate the people on the Korean border. As described in an edict of Sŏnjo to the royal secretariat in 1606, the recent Ŭiju magistrates lacked intelligence and were all

102 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 2/2/4 (2/26/1610), fasc.25, vol.31, 489.


derelict in their duties, disregarding the demarcation of the territories and showing no respect for national laws. Because they acted out of personal considerations and demonstrated no concern for state affairs, not only Korean interpreters but people living around Êiju engaged in smuggling across the borders.\footnote{Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 39/11/10 (12/9/1606), fasc. 205, vol.25, 284.}

Chosŏn civil officials and military leaders also actively participated in embezzling and abusing official properties, which further impaired the state’s regulation of mobility along the Korean territorial boundaries and its western coast. This situation was already noted during the Imjin War; near the Han River an official in charge of military provisions used official transport ships to seek private benefits on Kanghwa Island. In Êiju a county magistrate stole official grain for his own use.\footnote{Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok, Sŏnjo 29/5/19 (6/14/1596), fasc. 75, vol.22, 709.} In the capital region coastal military leaders only pursued their private gains, neglecting their defense duties and leaving battleships, military equipment, and weapons unprepared. Moreover, they used battleships to transport goods procured for their own use.\footnote{An analysis of the Ming’s costs for border defense and its financial crisis in the Jiajing, Longqing, and Wanli reigns appears} 

In Liaodong the Ming state’s control was especially weakened by the persistent poverty of the Liaodong populace and their continuous out-migration after the Imjin War, an issue largely caused by the deficiency of Ming financial revenues from the borders since the sixteenth century. While this problem was ascribed to the structural defects of the Ming border defense system, bureaucratic corruption, luxury consumption, and Wanli’s enormous military expenditure on the three campaigns of the 1590s—the Ningxia Campaign, the Bozhou Rebellion, and the Imjin War—more directly led to the Ming state’s relaxed regulation of the Liaodong border in the early seventeenth century.\footnote{Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 29/5/19 (6/14/1596), fasc. 75, vol.22, 709.} An even more immediate stimulus was Wanli’s nationwide imposition of...
mine taxes for the reestablishment of burned palaces in 1596-1597. In Liaodong this task was completed by the dispatch of eunuch Gao Huai 高淮 in 1599-1608. However, his misconduct in Liaodong and Korea led to criticism and fierce resistance. For instance, Ming Censor-in-Chief He Erjian 何爾健 described how Gao’s imposition of mine taxes on Liaodong soldiers and merchants forced them to abandon their businesses and properties; they either escaped to the Jurchen settlement and offshore islands or gathered together to rebel. According to He’s observation, while seventy to eighty percent of military men were stationed on the southern Liaodong coast, only twenty or thirty percent remained in the north. This displays the extreme mobility in the late Ming borderlands.

**The Interaction between Maritime Powers and Overseas Trade**

The above section discussed the development of the Chinese-Korean private economy during and after the Imjin War that catalyzed cross-border interactions between border populations. Among them, Ming border military men were especially active. In China and Korea’s northern sea space, Ming coastal defense soldiers, particularly the southern seamen remaining in the north, played an important role in promoting private maritime trade. Except for the early decades of the Ming and Chosŏn dynasties when the opening of the sea-lanes was essential to maintain their diplomatic relations, the Chinese and Korean rulers banned official and private maritime communications prior to the late sixteenth century. However, to meet the

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109 He Erjian 何爾健, *An Liao yudang shugao* 按遼御珰疏稿, in *Siku jinhui shu congkan bubian* 四庫禁燬書叢刊補編 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2005), vol. 22, 563, 582.
need of conveying military provisions to the Korean Peninsula during the 1590s, the Ming temporarily lifted the maritime prohibition for the massive mobilization of coastal manpower and natural resources.  

The Ming coastal defense forces directly participated in the process of supervising, arranging, and escorting sea transport and the grain trade. Right Vice Minister of Revenue Zhang Yangmeng explained the feasibility and multiple benefits of combining the Ming sea defense system with grain shipments. In a proposal submitted in early 1598, Zhang suggested that rather than assigning additional directors, the existing Tianjin, Shandong, and Lüshun sea defense commanders should be in charge of accompanying and delivering grain, and preventing smuggling and wastage. Zhang argued that this amalgamation would not only save excessive expenditure but also unify the authorities of sea defense and transport.  

In addition, the lifting of the sea ban policy and the state-led logistics advanced the flexibility between licit and illicit maritime activities. As a consequence, the Ming coastal military men’s deep involvement in cross-border commerce and transport expedited their pursuit of self-interest. A Chosŏn official provided one vivid example—their misconduct in sea transit by colluding with Shandong and Liaodong boatmen. After these boatmen soaked inferior grain to enlarge the appearance of its particles and used illegitimate methods to reduce its amount, the escort officers concealed their misconduct from the Chinese director. After refusing the spoiled and decreased grain, the Korean boatmen had to offset their loss. They increasingly avoided this corvée, resulting in a shortage of transport ships in northwest Korea.  

After the war the Ming government attempted to cut off its interregional and international logistics, but the fiscal problems caused by the country’s military service and border conflicts had not been resolved. The current financial difficulties also hindered the implementation of the officials’ proposals for state-led sea logistics. 

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110 Chen Renxi 陈仁锡, *Huangming shifa lu* 皇明世法錄, fasc. 75, in *Siku jinhui shu congkan, shibu*, vol.16, 236.
maritime connections to strengthen coastal control. One example is its dissolution of the Lüshun brigade commander post and the reduction of Lüshun navies in 1606, which had been managed by the Shandong sea defense circuit. An important reason for this decision was the possibility that Lüshun navies could not be controlled from the Shandong coast due to the administrative difficulty between Lüshun and Dengzhou. This concern was not groundless: several years before some Lüshun navies had been found drifting toward Korea when they sailed to Dengzhou to receive provisions.\(^{113}\) Ming Military Commissioner Xing Jie also restrengthened the maritime prohibition to keep Chinese and Korean coastal residents from transmitting military information and guiding enemies. However, their interactions on the sea in the early seventeenth century did not apparently live up to Xing’s expectations.\(^{114}\) A report from Liaodong Grand Coordinator Zhao Ji 趙楫 in 1603 provides a glimpse of this situation. Zhao pointed out that in the Liaodong Jinzhou garrison “profit-seeking merchants break the prohibition to go to sea privately, trade contraband goods, and carry army deserters secretly.” Moreover, “military officers disobey explicit orders. They are so insatiable and unscrupulous that no one dares to do anything to them.”\(^{115}\) This statement clearly displays the participation of Liaodong coastal deserters and military leaders’ scheming in maritime smuggling. In order to prevent this situation, Zhao suggested the dispatch of a specific government subprefect to enhance the Jinzhou coastal defense; his responsibilities were to include instructing naval affairs and implementing maritime prohibitions, such as inspecting smuggling ships and punishing officers and commoners who

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\(^{114}\) Xing Jie, “春汛分布海防疏,” in *Jinglüe yuwo zouyi*, fasc. 9, *Yuwo shiliao huibian*, vol.5, 384-386.

\(^{115}\) *Ming Shenzong shilu*, Wanli 30/12/4 (1/15/1603), fasc. 379, 7134.
disobeyed.

This official appointment did not prevent the maritime expansion of Ming sea defense soldiers. Past scholarship has traced the growth of Ming regional military powers in China’s coastal peripheries and territorial borders, displaying its interrelation with the thriving commerce and multilateral mediation in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. For example, John E. Wills Jr. points out a military-merchant-mediator triad in the development of maritime powers in which the leaders had the capability to conduct maritime commerce, leading naval forces, and mediating between bureaucracy and foreign powers. Kishimoto Mio explores this combination in the rise of the Jurchens and Ming warlords in China’s northern borderlands and regards it as a common character of the burgeoning powers in China, Southeast Asia, and Japan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and China’s northern coast has been addressed less frequently. In the context of the growing military agency and the prosperous private commerce between China and Korea, this section analyzes the case of two Chinese military leaders’ maritime smuggling and violence between Shandong, Liaodong, and northern Korea. Together with the Chinese-Korean diplomatic tensions on two related cases, this section aims to illuminate the ambiguous relations between pirates and navies, as well as the interactions of the multilayered authorities on border management.

In 1609 Liaodong Imperial Itinerant Inspector Xiong Tingbi submitted a memorial to Wanli accusing Shandong Coastal Defense Vice-Commander Wu Youfu 吳有孚 and Zhenjiang Brigade Commander Wu Zongdao 吳宗道 of economic crimes. Xiong Tingbi (1569-1625) was

116 John E. Wills Jr. “Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang: Themes in Peripheral History,” in From Ming to Ch’ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China, eds. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 201-238.
an important military figure in late Ming Liaodong whose military achievements and political conflicts directly affected the war situation between the Ming and the Manchus. This position of inspecting Liaodong was just the starting point of his career there. According to Xiong’s accusation, Wu Youfu and Wu Zongdao sponsored and sheltered maritime smuggling conducted by Wu Youfu’s subordinate seamen. They sold goods gained from overseas trade in the Chunggang market, and extorted money from Korean and Chinese merchants and commoners by violence. These seamen even pretended to be Koreans by wearing their clothes and slipped into Korea to demand marten furs and ginseng at low prices. The consequence of this case was so serious that not only were Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu dismissed, but the Ming court also gave an order to severely penalize its coastal military officers who connived with their sailors to trespass borders.

The full content of Xiong Tingbi’s memorial is included in his collection of writings on governing Liaodong. In this memorial Xiong provided details on how Wu’s maritime illicitness operated. According to Xiong’s investigation, three patrol vessels and sixty-three Shandong Dengzhou and Laizhou seamen under Wu Youfu’s management were caught participating in smuggling, distributing and depositing items. These seamen were all from Zhejiang. One of Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu’s relatives was in charge of accompanying the goods. In the previous two years thirty to forty vessels had sailed to Liaodong Zhenjiang, Lushun, Jinzhou and Fuzhou, and overseas islands for trade. After they returned, half of the items were sold in the Chunggang market, while the remaining half was secretly transported to Korea to exchange for marten furs and ginseng by seamen who changed into Korean clothes and sailed in Liaodong boats.

118 *Ming Shenzong shilu*, Wanli 37/2/1 (3/6/1609), fasc. 455, 8579.
120 Xiong Tingbi, “重海防疏,” 438.
To have a fuller understanding of the background of this case and how the smuggling network was formed, attention needs to first be paid to the two military positions Wu Youfu and Wu Zongdao filled and the locations at which they were stationed. The positions of Zhenjiang brigade commander and Shandong coastal defense vice-commander were established in the Imjin War for defending the Shandong coast and the southern Liaodong region; even the Zhenjiang fortress had been newly built by the Yalu River in response to the war.\textsuperscript{121} In the early seventeenth century the Zhenjiang fortress continued to play an essential role in Liaodong defense due to its convenient geographic location. The Zhenjiang brigade commander also directly participated in dealing with cross-border affairs with Korea, such as transmitting documents, preventing trespassing, and collecting intelligence. The management of the Chunggang market was also an important task of the Zhenjiang bridge commander. When the Chosŏn discussed dissolving the Chunggang market, it mentioned the possible attitudes of the Ming Ministry of Rites, the Liaodong imperial itinerant inspector, and the Zhenjiang brigade commander, indicating that to some extent the Zhenjiang office had a voice in determining Chunggang affairs.\textsuperscript{122}

The connective role of Dengzhou City in Northeast Asia has been attracting more scholarly interest. For instance, Christopher Agnew states, “Along with changing attitudes towards the regulation of foreign trade and the maintenance of coastal security came a relaxation of maritime trade bans in the late sixteenth century. As a consequence, the city of Dengzhou and the northern Shandong coast returned as a critical port both strategically and commercially in the regional

\textsuperscript{121} Zhao Shuguo, \textit{Mingdai beibu haifang tixi yanjiu}, 424.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Kwanghaegun ilgi} (T'aebaeksan sago pon) 光海君日記（太白山史庫本），Kwanghaegun 2/2/14 (3/8/1610), fasc. 9 (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe,1958), vol.26,533.
trade networks of the greater Bohai Sea.” 123 In his analysis of Dengzhou in the eighteenth century, Ronald C. Po stresses the “cosmopolitan” function of Dengzhou port in the Northeast Asian market, as well as its role as a strategic center overseeing the Bohai region. 124 This research also shows that Dengzhou rapidly gained its strategic significance during the Imjin War, and the stationing of the Shandong coastal defense vice-commander in Dengzhou was a reflection of this.

The convenient locations of Zhenjiang and Dengzhou provided a geographic setting for Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu to conduct economic activities across the border. Their personal life experiences and political careers further built a foundation for their rise of power in the locale. Wu Zongdao was born in Shanyin County of Zhejiang Province in 1533, and passed the military service examination in 1585. He began his military career in the north as a military assistant to Ming military commissioner Song Yingchang during the first Japanese invasion of Korea, and re-entered Korea with Ming chief commander Xing Jie during the second invasion. He played an important role in Korean military affairs and China-Japan peace negotiations, especially in transmitting Ming political information to the Chosŏn court to assist with its decision making. 125

Wu Zongdao not only acted as a middleman in wartime multilateral relations, but had friendly individual relationships with the Chosŏn king and his officials that continued after the war. He even helped the Chosŏn’s connection with high-ranked Ming officials to promote the Ming court’s official acknowledgement of King Injo’s ascension to the throne. 126 Wu once

proudly stated that his wide social network with Chosŏn officials enabled him to fully understand Korean affairs just like one of them. His personal life was also deeply rooted in Chosŏn society; he fathered a son with a Chosŏn female entertainer during his stay in Korea.

After the war Wu Zongdao continued to stay in Liaodong, and in 1606 was finally promoted to the position of brigade commander to guard the border fortress Zhenjiang by the Yalu River. Given that the position of Zhenjiang brigade commander was an important channel between Liaodong and the Chosŏn, this appointment was possibly based on Wu’s excellent negotiation skills and his familiarity with Korean affairs. Wu’s post in Zhenjiang near the entrance to the Chunggang market made it very convenient for him to interfere in individual Chunggang trade in the early seventeenth century.

Wu Zongdao’s and Wu Youfu’s acquaintance with naval battles and marine conditions, and their grasp of power in the coastal regions of China and Korea also played a role in their maritime trade network. During Wu Zongdao’s time in Korea he showed military talent as a navy general who commanded sailors to support Korea’s coastal defense, and had been stationed on Kwanghwa Island right after the war. Wu Youfu (1554-?), Wu Zongdao’s nephew, was appointed as Shandong Coastal Defense Vice-Commander beginning in 1607. Although he lacked the connection with Korea that Wu Zongdao had, Wu Youfu’s appointment on the Shandong coast enabled him to hold control of the navies, whom, as we have seen in Xiong

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127 Yi Tŏkhyŏng 李德馨, “與吳宗道問答留兵事宜啟,” in Hanŭm mun’go 漢陰文稿, fasc.9, Yŏngin p’yojŏm Han’guk munjip ch’ŏnggan, vol. 65, 416a.
Tingbi’s investigation, were the most direct participants in maritime smuggling. 131

Furthermore, a close relationship with Ming central official Zhu Geng 朱賡 advanced the political careers of Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu. Xiong Tingbi implied that Wu Youfu’s and Wu Zongdao’s military positions could not be separated from Youfu’s in-law relationship with the deceased Ming grant secretary, Zhu Geng, who often employed his fellows and countrymen so that the greater part of the border generals were from his sects. 132 This statement was proven by the Ming official of the Ministry of the Rites, Zheng Zhenxian 鄭振先, who wrote a letter to Zhu Geng in 1608 to criticize his awarding posts on the basis of his personal favor. In particular, Zheng noted that it was Wu’s family relationship with Zhu Geng that granted him his military position and immediate promotion. 133

The regional tie between Wu Youfu and his subordinates is another important reason for their increasing power. Xiong Tingbi’s investigation shows that the seamen under the command of Wu Youfu all came from Zhejiang, and were fellow townsmen of the Wu family. This situation suggests the close regional connection between military leaders and their soldiers, but also corresponds with my above analysis of the deep penetration and growing disturbance of the southern navies on China’s northern coast.

Xiong Tingbi explicitly described how these coastal seamen manipulated their political and military privileges to expand their private commerce. He first stressed the emerging problem in the coastal defense of the time: “In former days, China’s difficulty [in maintaining coastal security] was due to its outlaws on the sea. But the recent difficulty has been related to military

officers and soldiers who defend the sea.”

He then ascribed this issue to the expanded integration of coastal populations—since the Imjin War, the Ming had begun to enhance its coastal defense by enlarging the pool of capable military recruits. Those who were previously considered marginal groups, such as boat-dwelling inhabitants, islanders, nonconscript members of military households, merchants, and bullies, were now incorporated into the military system and sponsored by the government. These seamen made use of their navigational skills and knowledge of overseas profits to sail and trade on the sea. They were equipped with weapons and battleships, legitimated by government-issued certificates, and subsidized and covered by their commanders. After Xiong Tingbi discovered the involvement of Wu Youfu’s subordinates in maritime smuggling, he tied their misbehavior to the violent crimes along Korea’s northwest coast and further concluded that these seamen were “merchants within borders still in the name of trade but bandits overseas who only work on robbery.”

The cases of Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu show their integration of diverse geographic, military, political, and economic resources, as well as their regional and lineage connections, into the formation of the transnational smuggling network across the territorial and maritime borders of China and Korea. Based on Wu Youfu’s affinity, the Wu family’s maritime smuggling even expanded to China’s inland water system of the Great Canal. This situation was not rare in Ming China. Michael Szonyi’s recent research on Ming military households stationed on China’s southeastern coast also shows that their “proximity to the state” provided them with competitive advantage in gaining benefits from illicit maritime commerce and creating new social networks even while away from their ancestral homes. Szonyi further points out that by working the

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134 Xiong Tingbi, “重海防疏,” 437. 往時中國之難 難在海上之亡命 而近日之難 難在防海之官軍。
135 Xiong Tingbi, “重海防疏,” 437-439. 在境內則為商賈 猶以買賣為名 在境外則為賊盜 專以擄掠為事。
military system, the coastal military men whose duties were to control and suppress illegitimacy became smugglers and pirates.\textsuperscript{137} However, unlike the military households who had resettled on China’s southeastern coast for generations, such as the Jiang family in Szonyi’s study, Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu became involved in the local society and illicit economy much more rapidly, displaying the southern migrants’ adaptation to the maritime transition of the Northeast Asian borderlands in warfare.

As the Ming central government noticed the pervasiveness of coastal sailors’ active participation in maritime smuggling in Shandong, Liaodong, and Korea, the Chosõn was simultaneously encountering rampant piracy in its northwestern provinces. Is there any connection between these two phenomena? How did the Chosõn handle this threat to its maritime security? How did the reactions to these trespassing cases differ among the Chosõn court, Liaodong, and the Ming central government?

As the analysis in the second chapter shows, on Korea’s northwestern coast, the term “water bandits” was used to distinguish the violent and organized seafarers categorized by the Chosõn Korean government from “Japanese pirates.” In the sixteenth century before the Imjin War, the major group of water bandits was Chinese and Korean border people—in particular, Chinese Liaodong evaders who often smuggled, poached, and caused disturbances in the northern Yellow Sea region. Compared to the scattered accounts of elusive water bandits before the Imjin War, the instances of their appearance in the early seventeenth century grew significantly, revealing their more-distinct, frequent, and violent attacks on the Korean coast. The Chosõn court was already concerned about this issue during the Imjin War when water bandits made Korean-Chinese sea

transport difficult. Their activity reached its peak during the 1600s-1610s. Korean officials used the specific expression “water bandits of Haerang Island” or, more concisely, “Haerang pirates” (K. Haerangiok, 海浪賊) to describe the pirates who often attacked along Korea’s northwestern coast in this period.

Related records from Chosŏn wangjo sillok display the process the Chosŏn court used to identify and distinguish the Haerang pirates. For instance, in the seventh month of 1603 the Border Defense Council reported that after the Haerang pirates benefited from robbing grain ships departing from Migwan of P’yŏngan Province, they frequently plundered the coastal regions of P’yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces. The Border Defense Council stressed that this problem had recently become particularly serious and needed to be solved promptly in order to prevent their further harassment. The account further cited the features of the Haerang pirates: “It has just been heard from the captives returning from Haerang Island that the length and width of its land are comparable to Tŏngmul Island 德物島 of the capital district. [The Haerang pirates] own weapons but only use stones and sticks, and take boats to go out.” This observation regarding the weapons of the Haerang pirates was reconfirmed in a later Border Defense Council statement that claimed they only used sticks and stones as their weapons.

In 1607 piracy seemed to be an especially serious issue, and the Chosŏn began to pay greater attention in determining the origin and identity of the Haerang pirates. While there is no direct evidence showing their connection with the mentioned Lushun mutiny in the same year, or

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139 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 36/7/1 (8/7/1603), fasc. 164. vol.24, 499.
140 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 4/9/12 (10/6/1612), fasc. 57, vol.32, 103.
with Wu Youfu’s and Wu Zongdao’s achieving power in Dengzhou and Zhenjiang in 1606-1607, it is clear that at that time Korea’s western coast were suffering from more-frequent pirate raids.

A report from the Border Defense Council in the third month of 1607 indicates that although the Chosŏn ascribed the recent maritime crimes to the residents of Haerang Island, it was actually uncertain about their exact identity. The Border Defense Council doubted that they were Chinese since it had been proven that Korean runaways would also migrate there. Although the specific term “Haerang pirates” was used, it was understood that other islanders joined them:

In recent years, pirates have often appeared on sea islands of the southwest to rob ships going back and forth. Border generals cannot capture them by surprise, which makes the previous trouble hard to manage. This situation is extremely pitiful. Given their head coverings and clothes, it appears that Chinese people did the crimes. If this matter is transmitted to the Liaodong guarding office to repatriate them, it will be fundamentally solved. The king’s mind is very appropriate. However, the so-called Haerang Island inhabitants are not just Chinese: our people also participate with them. This situation has existed since the old times. … Now it cannot be specifically known whether the residents of the [Hearang] island are all Chinese or not. There are runaways on some other islands as well, so it is unknown if today’s pirates are all the residents of Haerang Island. If this case was suddenly transmitted to the imperial office, it is worrying that its details would be hard to determine.¹⁴¹

Although the king suggested that the Liaodong government repatriate the Haerang pirates, because of their uncertain identity the Chosŏn court decided not to take this diplomatic risk and continued its investigation.

In the fifth month of 1607, however, the Border Defense Council reported that after

comparing the detailed information on Haerang Island with the map of Haiyang Island and Shicheng Island in Liaodong, it could be concluded that the so-called Haerang pirates came from these two islands. The scope of the pirates’ activity was found to be expanding to Korea’s southern coast. In 1609 when a Korean official discussed establishing a military town on Paengnyŏng Island 白翎島, a strategic offshore island of Hwanghae Province, to defend against the Haerang pirates, he stated that they berthed at Paengnyŏng Island and waited for wind to enter the coastal waters of the Chosŏn. They usually attacked in Hwanghae Province but also traveled to the southern Ch'ungch'ŏng and Chŏlla Provinces by the west wind. This explains the occasional reports in Chosŏn wangjo sillok of their appearance in the southern Korean Peninsula during the early seventeenth century.

The above discussion shows that at first the Chosŏn king and officials termed those harassing Korea’s northwestern coast as Haerang pirates and were uncertain about their identities. They then tended to define them as runaways on the Liaodong offshore islands. On one hand, this was to some extent based on the Chosŏn’s contemporary experience from border generals and Korean captives, and geographic knowledge. On the other hand, it was a simplified categorization for a better understanding of more-ambiguous and multifaceted occasions, as is discussed below.

It is interesting to compare the Chosŏn’s knowledge of Haerang Island in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries with its understanding process in the early seventeenth century. The Chosŏn’s accumulation of knowledge on the remote sea region was neither a voluntary process nor a linear progression, but rose and fell in response to changing external conditions. While the

142 Sŏnjo sillok, Sŏnjo 40/5/2 (5/27/1607), fasc. 211, vol.25, 331.
Haerang Island issue attracted the Chosŏn’s increasing attention when it noticed that seafarers could permeate the maritime barrier, its interest in the outside maritime world seemed to decrease in the decades before the Imjin War. This was probably due to the lesser external threat to Korea’s maritime security in this time period. However, in the early seventeenth century, reacting to the reappearance of rampant piracy on its northwestern coast, the Chosŏn had to restart the process of collecting, understanding, and conceptualizing maritime knowledge about this region.

In contrast to the Chosŏn’s perception that the Haerang pirates were less heavily armed, the following case indicates that those attacking Korean ships were much more violent gangs that were equipped with firearms. For instance, in 1603 a pirate ship with forty-five water bandits robbed a Korean ship departing from P'yŏngan Province in order to trade. Among them were two Korean boatmen wearing white clothes and straw hats; the others all wore Chinese-style hats and clothes. They were armed with cannons (K. *Ch'ongt'ong*, 銃筒), iron pellets, tridents (K. *Samjich'ang*, 三枝鎗), and wood sticks.\(^{144}\)

The boundary between the Haerang pirates and the Ming coastal defense soldiers was also ambiguous. In 1606 the Hwanghae provincial governor submitted a report stating that nineteen Chinese men, including one named Hu Weizhong 胡惟忠, were caught drifting toward the Haeju coast. Their government documents indicated their identity as military men serving in Lūshun.\(^{145}\) Their ancestral home, as mentioned in a later Korean record, was Zhejiang.\(^{146}\) However, their suspicious acts, such as holding Korean belongings and chasing a Korean salt boat, made them appear to be pirates in the eyes of King Sŏnjo and his officials, and

\(^{144}\) *Sŏnjo sillok*, Sŏnjo 36/6/22 (7/30/1603), fasc. 163, vol.24, 496.


\(^{146}\) Yi Kŭng'ik, *Yal'yŏsil kisul pyŏlchip*, fasc. 17, 745.
correspondingly aroused their vigilance. After several discussions in court Sŏnjo was inclined to conclude that Hu Weizhong and his companions were indeed Chinese military men. He argued, “If Weizhong and the others are pirates, how could there be official documents and gift lists on their boat? In my view, it is clear that they are certainly castaways instead of pirates.”

What makes this case interesting is Sŏnjo’s order of narrating Hu Weizhong’s acts with different priorities in front of the Liaodong local government and the Ming court. When this case was first transmitted to Liaodong, the Chosŏn recorded the piratelike details of these Chinese people pursuing a Korean boat. However, Sŏnjo then asked that this description be deleted, and only recorded them as drifting military men when submitting this case to the Beijing government. An existing Korean memorial confirms this statement, which was written after Hu Weizhong was repatriated to Beijing and the Ming court rewarded the Chosŏn for its allegiance. To express its gratitude the Chosŏn submitted this memorial, in which Hu Weizhong and his companions were recorded as “floating officials who accidentally arrived” (流播之官，適然漂到).

It should be noted that the Chosŏn’s identification of Hu Weizhong was not based on Sŏnjo’s firm belief but out of his moral principle and circumspect consideration of serving the Ming suzerain as a loyal tributary. Sŏnjo believed that it was not merciful to punish or even execute Hu Weizhong and his companions based only on the Chosŏn’s doubt. Worse than that, if this doubt about Hu Weizhong’s suspicious acts was proven to be untrue, the vassal would be deceiving the Ming court. The nuanced discrepancy between the Chosŏn’s two reports further indicates its multilayered diplomatic strategies in response to Liaodong and the Ming court.

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149 Koewŏn tŭngnok 槐院謄錄, “胡惟忠等發解降敕謝恩表,” fasc. 2 (Changsŏgak, K2-3465), 134.
Since the local Liaodong government directly participated in handling Ming-Chosŏn border affairs and was responsible for keeping the territory secure, the Chosŏn accurately recorded Hu Weizhong’s case to remind Liaodong to strengthen its coastal control. However, it was also due to their close interactions that the Chosŏn attempted to avoid potential discord with Liaodong. If Hu Weizhong’s disobedience was pointed out to the Ming court, Liaodong could be rebuked for neglecting its duty in regulating its military forces. Compared to the Chosŏn’s conservativeness in dealing with Hu Weizhong’s trespassing, the Ming court was more radical. It ordered a reinvestigation of this case and a corresponding punishment if Hu Weizhong had indeed secretly gone to sea for trade.\footnote{151}

While Hu Weizhong’s case reveals the vague relation between pirates and Ming navies and the Chosŏn’s agency in interpreting this fluidity for its multilayered diplomatic purposes, another case from 1607 demonstrates the Liaodong government’s manipulation of the identity of trespassers when handling maritime crimes. On the first day of the seventh month of 1607, a military conflict exploded between P'yŏngan Province magistrate Yu Min 柳旻, army officer Kang Hyŏp 康孝業, and the so-called Haerang pirates. Thirteen pirates and ten Korean seamen were killed. Concerned by the recent rise in piracy, King Sŏnjo finally decided to transmit a document to the Liaodong government to describe the recent loss.\footnote{152}

The content of this document and Liaodong’s reply, fully recorded in Sadae mun'gwe, display the nuances in their correspondence. The Chosŏn first described several recent attacks on its northwestern coast in detail, and then examined the contents of one pirate ship caught by Yu Min. According to its analysis, “the pirate ship that was caught was constructed by our country,
but among the items it carries are clothes and documents owned by Chinese people.”  

The Chosŏn raised the possibility of Korean people pretending to be Chinese based on the mixed Korean and Chinese items, and observed that “it is unknown whether it was our villains who hid on islands, behaved secretly, and awaited an opportunity to pretend to be Chinese in order to conceal their identity, or it was Chinese ruffians who escaped and hid on isolated islands, appeared and disappeared by boats, and created disturbances back and forth.” However, the following negotiation indicates that based on the convincing evidence in the Chinese official documents the trespassers held, both the Chosŏn and Liaodong governments concluded that they were from China.  

The Chosŏn’s uncertainty may thus be rhetoric to release diplomatic pressure with the Ming caused by the military conflict between Korean navies and Chinese invaders.

However, Liaodong officials offered a different perspective on the Chinese seafarers’ identity. While the Chosŏn court emphasized the active attacks of these identified pirates, Liaodong seemed to be reluctant to acknowledge this, focusing instead on investigating whether these people occasionally drifted to Korea when doing official business. They used the expression “drift sea boats” 漂流海船 to describe this case, repeatedly instructed that more-detailed examinations of their identity be carried out, and blamed the Chosŏn for its arbitrary killing of these Chinese men. Zhenjiang brigade commander Wu Zongdao was sent to Korea to investigate this case. However, according to his report, because all the trespassers had been killed it was hard to determine where they were from and who they were. This result enabled Liaodong officials to cast more doubt on the Chosŏn’s statement, asking it to provide further confirmation.

153 “朝鮮國王奏（捕獲賊船奏）,” Wanli 35/7/17(9/7/1607), in Sadae mun'gwe, fasc. 48, 67.

154 “朝鮮國王奏（捕獲賊船奏）,” in Sadae mun'gwe, fasc. 48, 67.
that these drifters were pirates. Liaodong’s interpretation of this case reflects how the flexibility of cross-border maritime activities could be manipulated in diplomatic negotiations. By avoiding acknowledgement of this crime, Liaodong would evade blame for dereliction of duty.

The Chosŏn replied to Liaodong in a strident tone. It expressed discontent with Liaodong’s repeated inquiries into this case and its disregard for the fact that the case had already been reported in abundant detail. The Chosŏn also argued that its judgment of the trespassers as pirates was not unsubstantial: “They took our boats and used swords and spears to launch direct attacks by night, so how can our considering them pirate ships be without evidence? Since they came as pirates, of course we cannot regard them as official men sent by the imperial office.”

It should be noted that Zhenjiang brigade commander Wu Zongdao may have played a role in influencing Liaodong and the Chosŏn’s communications; he directed an investigation of this trespass and transmission of official documents between the Chosŏn court and his superior officials without result. Two years later Xiong Tingbi’s accusation indicates that there was a connection between Wu Zongdao’s act in this case and his involvement in illicit maritime acts. In his memorial to Wanli, Xiong recorded the Chosŏn official documents sent to the Zhenjiang office on this conflict and stated that its participants were just like those in Wu Zongdao’s and Wu Youfu’s cases, who acted as merchants inside China and as pirates overseas. Xiong further criticized the Zhenjiang office’s passive reaction to this trespassing since it ignored the Chosŏn’s request and processed the case carelessly without any regulation or punishment.

155 “遼東鎮江等處地方游擊將軍都指揮使吳（宗道）咨朝鮮國王（鎮江捕獲賊船咨），” Wanli 35/11/22 (1/9/1609), in Sadae mun'gwé, fasc.48, 85a-87a.
156 “朝鮮國王咨游擊將軍吳（宗道）（回咨），” Wanli 35/12/28 (2/13/1608), in Sadae mun'gwé, fasc.48, 92b.
Probably due to the Liaodong government’s unwillingness and inefficiency in seeking a solution, the Chosŏn finally submitted this case to the Ming Ministry of War at the end of 1607. In contrast to Liaodong’s impassive attitude, under the consideration of pacifying its tributary and maintaining a stable maritime order, the Ministry of War agreed with the Chosŏn’s side and stated that it should not be blamed for killing the Chinese intruders. Instead, once the Chosŏn discovered that there were armed trespassers plundering the area, it could fight back directly without hesitation whether these invaders were Chinese or not.\textsuperscript{158}

**Conclusion**

Although both the Ming and Chosŏn central governments attempted to govern their maritime borders more strictly, the dismissal of Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu in 1609 was not the end of this story. Only one year after, the Chosŏn re-sent requests to two newly appointed Liaodong commanders, Yang Gao 楊鎬 and Ma Gui 麻貴, to deal with the active piracy on the Yellow Sea.\textsuperscript{159} In the 1610s frequent attacks by Haerang pirates were still occurring on Korea’s western coast. After the Later Jin’s occupation of Liaodong and Ming warlord Mao Wenlong’s rise in the northern Yellow Sea region in the 1620s, Ming maritime powers continued to expand in a way that was more challenging to the land-based polities, leading to complications in the trilateral relationship between the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Later Jin.

The growth of military powers in the maritime peripheries of China and Korea, a

\textsuperscript{158} “兵部咨朝鮮國王（兵部捕獲賊船咨）,” Wanli 35/11/27 (12.23.1607), in Sadae mun'gwe, fasc.48, 93a-95a. This decision is also recorded in *Ming Shenzong shilu*, Wanli 35/11/24 (12/20/1607), fasc. 440, 8348.

\textsuperscript{159} Kim Sanghŏn 金尚憲, “楊都御史鎬前揭帖,” “麻總兵前揭帖,” in *Ch'ŏng'un chip* 清陰集, fasc. 16, *Han'guk munjip ch'onggan*, vol.77, 219a.
ramification of the enhancement and expansion of state coastal control, was interwoven with their military and economic orientation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. As this chapter has discussed, during the Imjin War, the maintenance of coastal security for both Ming China and Chosŏn Korea was not to demarcate boundaries and prevent transmarine activities. Instead, it became a cross-border practice, in which Ming coastal sailors were deeply involved in various wartime affairs, such as conducting maritime commerce, logistics, and conveying information between the two states. As a consequence, the strengthened integration and militarization of China and Korea’s northern space promoted the presence of Ming coastal forces, in particular the southern troops, in this region.

In the early seventeenth century, even when the Ming state began to sever its connection with Korea via the sea routes and narrow the scope of recruited sailors and authorized maritime activities, these military men continued to display their centrifugal and independent development beyond the administrative limits of land-based polities. However, this maritime expansion was also deeply rooted in the integration of coastal resources, showing the great reliance of maritime powers on the continents. This contradiction became more remarkable after Mao Wenlong and his successors dominated the northern Yellow Sea, which fundamentally influenced their political decisions in the Ming-Qing transition.
Chapter 5

Liaodong Migrants on the Sea: Burdensome Resources, Transregional Mobility, and Mao Wenlong’s Maritime Regime

The mounting tension between the maritime expansion of regional military powers and Northeast Asian land-based states’ control over them in the early seventeenth century is best demonstrated with the presence of a maritime regime based on Ka Island (K. Kado, 椵島) of Korea, which is also called Pi Island 皮島 or Ping Island 平島 in Chinese historical accounts. Founded by Ming general Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 and maintained by his successors, this military garrison was given the name Dongjiang 東江 by the Ming state, “East of the River,” from the geographic location of Ka Island east of the Yalu River mouth. The garrison dominated the northern sea space between China and Korea from 1622 until the Manchu armies finally defeated it in 1637.

From a regional perspective, Mao Wenlong’s kingdom was “the product of the Ming court’s practice of appointing individuals with strong local ties to semi-autonomous regional military commands.”¹ This rise of regional warlords stemmed from the late-Ming military adjustments in which a commander was stationed in each province, and coastal defenses were encouraged to recruit military personnel.² Mao Wenlong, who seized power in the Northeastern Asian maritime zone, was one of a series of emerging military influentials on the late-Ming northern and southern borders, such as Li Chengliang 李成梁, Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍, and Nurhai 努爾哈

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¹ Evelyn Rawski, Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives, 73.
Moreover, if the Ka Island regime is placed in an international economic and political context, it reveals a “broader regional integration that emerged from the maritime commercial revival of the late sixteenth century,” as Christopher Agnew states.\(^3\) Kenneth Swope also argues that the Bohai region’s “increasing involvement in international trade” and the “fluidity of borders and boundaries in Northeast Asia” contributed to Mao Wenlong’s dominance of the area.\(^4\)

Combining both regional and international views, this chapter contextualizes the maritime dynamics of Mao Wenlong’s power (1622-1629) in its interactions with the Ming, the Chosŏn, and the Later Jin polities. This analysis addresses the mobilization capability of the Ka Island regime between different regions on which Mao boosted his independence. Two primary tensions are revealed in this process: the inescapable conflict between Mao’s centrifugal development away from the land-based authorities and his inevitable reliance on neighboring areas to fulfill this goal; interconnectedly, the regional integration of the Northeast Asian seas was in conflict with the coastal restrictions that were set. This analysis uses the maritime migration of the Liaodong Han fugitives as the entry point into understanding these issues, regarding the Liaodong offshore populace as crucial yet burdensome resources for the formation and semi-independent development of Mao’s military power. This chapter aims to enrich the current scholarship on the remarkable, multifaceted impacts of the Liaodong Han Chinese on the Ming-Qing transition.\(^5\) Also, by examining Mao’s accommodation of the Liaodong insular

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\(^5\) For the roles of the Liaodong Han population in the rise of the Manchus see Frederic Wakeman’s analysis of “Chinese frontiersmen,” in *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 37-49. Also see Mark Elliot’s discussion of the Chinese banners, in *The Manchu Way: The
residents, this chapter discusses the intermediacy of the Ka Island regime and its interdependency on the neighboring regions, which provided it with much elasticity in adapting to the varying international circumstances.

Fluid Resources: Contesting for the Liaodong Refugees

As the Ming state was struggling with its military and fiscal crises on the borders from the mid-sixteenth century, which were intensified by the latest challenge of the Japanese invasions of Korea, Nurhaci (1559-1626), the leader of the Jianzhou Jurchen, seized the opportunity to rise and expand in the Northeast Asian borderlands. Beginning in 1410, the chieftains of the Jianzhou Jurchen began to accept Ming titles as the commanders of the Jianzhou Guard to be a Ming vassal. By the mid-fifteenth century they resettled themselves on the banks of the Suzi River, near Fushun of Liaoning Province, from their original residence in Heilongjiang. By 1442 the Ming had established three political organizations to discern the Jianzhou Jurchen—the Left Guard, the Right Guard, and the Jianzhou Guard, which continued to exist until Nurhaci’s establishment of the Later Jin in 1616.

Nurhaci inherited the title of the commander of the Jianzhou Left Guard in 1583. Shortly after, he began to resist the Ming’s dominance, taking revenge on a Jianzhou chieftain as well as

a Ming subject, Nikan Wailan 尼堪外蘭, for his assistance in a Ming slaughter in which Nurhaci’s father and grandfather were mistakenly killed. Nurhaci launched a series of successful military attacks to unite the Jurchen tribes, and declared himself khan in 1616. He named his regime Jin 金 as the continuation of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115-1234), which was thus often called the Later Jin. In 1618 Nurhaci announced his direct resistance against the Ming by proclaiming the “Seven Grievances,” which placed his father’s and grandfather’s deaths as the first. In less than half a year, he seized strategic fortresses of the eastern Liaodong, such as Fushun and Qinghe.

Alarmed by Nurhaci’s successive military successes, in early 1619 the Ming court selected and organized a massive force to fight the fast-rising Jurchens. Although the Ming armies were equipped with more-advanced weaponry and outnumbered the Jurchen soldiers, they were soon decisively defeated at Sarhū located in the east of Fushun, and then failed to maintain its military superiority in Liaodong. As the turning point of his relations with the Ming, the Battle of Sarhū led to Nurhaci’s rapid expansion. He began to attack eastern Liaodong, and in a short time conquered the cities of Kaiyuan, Tieling, and Liaoyang.

In 1621 Nurhaci occupied Liaoyang City and then successively took more than seventy fortresses in eastern and southern Liaodong by the end of the third month. To consolidate his domination both culturally and militarily, Nurhaci forced the Han Chinese officials and commoners in these vanquished regions to wear the queue hairstyle in accordance with the Jurchen tradition. These residents were also heavily recruited into the Jurchen armies: three of

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7 Ming Shenzong shilu 明神宗實錄, Wanli 46/4/15 (5/9/1618), fasc. 56, 10685-10687; Wanli 46/7/22 (9/10/1618), fasc.572,10808.
every five or two of every three males were selected from each household. After learning about
this practice, numerous residents of the southern Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Haizhou, and Gaizhou guards
of Liaodong escaped to the sea. Those with fortunes and power could migrate to Shandong, but
people who were unable to sail across the sea gathered on coastal islands. The Liaodong
refugees also escaped to the northwestern border region of Korea. As noted by the Êiju army
commander, only a few days after the occupation of Liaoyang the Zhenjiang border people had
began to reside on the Yalu River islets.

In order to win over these Liaodong runaways, the Later Jin competed with the Ming to
accommodate them under its administration and thus exerted pressure on the Chosŏn, asking that
the Liaodong refugees in Korea be returned. For Nurhaci, the Chosŏn’s reception or repatriation
of these runaways demonstrated whether it supported the Ming or the Later Jin during this
confrontation. Right after Nurhaci annexed Liaoyang City in 1621 he transmitted a letter of
credence to the Chosŏn king, Kwanghaegun, urging him to clarify his political stance: “If you
still want to help the Ming, that is the end of this issue. Otherwise, as long as there are Liaodong
people who crossed Zhenjiang and escaped to avoid the warfare, you may return them all.
Liaodong officials and commoners have all shaved their hair and surrendered; obedient officials
have all been reinstated in their original positions. If you accept those Liaodong people who have
already surrendered to me, harboring and not returning them, and only assisting the Ming, do not
blame me later.”

Nurhaci’s attention to the Chosŏn’s handling of this matter was not just a diplomatic

consideration but also based on economics. The newly conquered Liaodong Han population could function as an essential labor force in building a foundation for his domination in Northeast Asia. As recorded by contemporary Korean official-scholar O Yŏn 吳淵, when a Jurchen messenger arrived at the Korean border and conveyed Nurhaci’s letter, he expressed the idea to a Chosŏn army officer that the repatriated Liaodong people were considered Jurchen subjects and thus would not be killed. Furthermore, they would be ordered to farm Liaodong lands separately.12 This statement corresponded with Nurhaci’s policy of permitting the majority of the captives in the Liaodong and Liaoxi campaigns of 1618-1622 “to live more or less as before, working their own land, outside the framework of the Eight Banners.”13

The Ming regarded the Liaodong Han refugees as significant players in recovering the Liaodong territory and in cooperating with the Chosŏn military to defend against the Later Jin. After the fall of Liaoyang and the suspension of the connection between the Ming and Chosŏn governments, a Liaodong military examination graduate, Wang Yining 王一寧, became the first Ming communicator and negotiator with the Chosŏn court to make use of the Liaodong refugees to accomplish these tasks. Wang served as the assistant regional military commander of the Liaodong Kuandian fortress at that time, and later played an important role in the pacification of Liaodong islanders, the recovery of Zhenjiang, and the establishment of the Dongjiang garrison at Ka Island.14 His correspondence with the Chosŏn has fortunately been preserved in detail in the collection of Ming-Chosŏn diplomatic documents Imun t'ungnok, providing a direct look at his intention to mobilize Liaodong refugees to assist in the war.

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12 O Yŏn 吳淵, Yaŏn kiryak 野言記略, fasc.1, in Han'guk saryo ch'ongsŏ 韓國史料叢書, vol.45 (Kwach'on: Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, 2001), 509-510.
13 Mark Elliot, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China, 76.
14 Wang Yining’s short biographies can be seen in Sŏng Hae-ŭng 成海應, “草榭談獻二·王一寧、金溟鵬,” in Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnjip 研經齋全集, fasc. 55, Han'guk munjip ch'onggan, vol. 275, 156-157; sequel, fasc. 15, “風泉錄·題王一寧傳後,” “復題王一寧復遼議後,” in Yŏn'gyŏngjae chônjip sokchip 研經齋全集續集, fasc. 15, Han'guk munjip ch'onggan, vol. 279, 387.
According to one of his letters written in the fifth month of 1621, Wang observed that only the gentry and civilians in the occupied towns in Liaodong were killed or forced to surrender; numerous village residents escaped to the southern Liaodong garrisons, or grouped and resisted throughout the border region near Korea. While countless people with motivation and military strength waited to launch an insurrection against the Jurchens, they lacked a leader to organize them. Wang Yining believed that if the Chosŏn could take on this role of dispatching tens of thousands of soldiers across the Yalu River to Liaodong, there would be “hundreds of thousands of them [waiting] to be assembled right away.” Wang argued that this operation was not only to support Ming China but also to guard Chosŏn Korea itself so that it would not be contiguous with the territory of the Later Jin. While he emphasized the importance of absorbing the Liaodong refugees into the military alliance of the Ming and Chosŏn, Wang was also wary of the hidden dangers caused by their similar appearance with the Jurchen people. Since the Ming forces might not be able to distinguish the shaved Liaodong Han Chinese from the Jurchens, they could mistakenly slaughter them. This mistake would enrage the Liaodong people and easily transform them into subjects of the Later Jin who would oppose the Ming.

After cautiously observing the conflict between the two strong neighbors, Kwanghaegun neither satisfied Wang Yining’s request nor did he return the escaped Liaodong people to Nurhaci. Instead, he adopted a neutral attitude by acquiescing to their stay in Korea. For instance, after two months of the Later Jin’s occupation of Liaoyang, the Ming court learned that the number of Liaodong fugitives in Korea had already increased to no less than 20,000. They

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15 “王一寧揭帖,” Tianqi 1/5?, in Imun tungnok, fasc. 15, 1039-1040. 如貴國發兵數萬過江為之聲援 則數十萬眾可以傾刻而集.
16 “王一寧揭帖,” Tianqi 1/5?, in Imun tungnok, fasc. 15, 1040.
were offered support and arrangements were made for them to live there.\textsuperscript{17} However, this strategy did not ease the tension but stimulated small skirmishes between the Later Jin and Chosŏn; these developed into one of the major conflicts that caused the two Manchu invasions of Korea, as this chapter discusses below.\textsuperscript{18}

In addition to relying on the Chosŏn’s reception of the Liaodong refugees, the Ming also endeavored to resist the Later Jin’s expansion of power to the Liaodong littoral. This region played a strategic role in the Ming’s recovery plan, and the fugitives on the Liaodong southern islands were regarded both as potential military forces and a symbol of morale that needed to be incorporated into the Ming’s control. For instance, in the fourth month of 1621 a supervising secretary of Ming Ministry of Rites considered the possibility of organizing the refugees and rebels in offshore Liaodong. He suggested selecting troops from the more robust individuals, training and stationing them at Dengzhou, and launching a military operation through the sea-lanes to the southern Liaodong guards whenever there was an opportunity.\textsuperscript{19}

The southern sea region of Liaodong was further integrated into Xiong Tingbi’s military strategy \textit{sanfang buzhi} 三方佈置, which involved of sending forces on three sides to besiege the Later Jin. After Xiong was appointed as an imperial itinerant inspector of Liaodong in 1608, as mentioned in the previous chapter, he stayed there for the next several years. He was then sent to South Zhili as a school imperial inspector in 1611 before being dismissed in 1613. In the sixth month of 1621 he was reinstated and returned to Liaodong as the military commissioner. In his besetment plan, Xiong proposed dispatching army and naval forces to Guangning, Tianjin, and the Deng-Lai area, which were in the west, southwest, and south of the conquered Liaoyang and

\textsuperscript{17} Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/5/12 (7/1/1621), fasc. 10, 515.
\textsuperscript{18} O Yŏn, Yaŏn kiryak, fasc.1, 512-513.
\textsuperscript{19} Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/4/25 (6/14/1621), fasc. 9, 474.
Shenyang cities respectively. Converging attacks would then be launched on the Jurchen armies at the same time. In order to implement this plan, navies from Tianjin and Deng-Lai needed to sail to the southern Liaodong guards across the sea. Similarly, a supervising secretary of Ming Ministry of Rites, Yang Daoyin 楊道寅, stressed the importance of pacifying and absorbing the Han refugees in the southern Liaodong littoral. Thus the Liaodong border could be approached by sea, and the Ming could recover the Liaodong Zhenjiang border and connect with Chosŏn Korea for further assistance.

These discussions demonstrate that after the use of the Liaodong overland road was hindered by the Later Jin’s rise to power, the strategic significance of the Liaodong-Korea sea route once again attracted the Ming court’s attention. Compared to the previous supportive role of this sea-lane in transporting naval forces and military supplies in the Japanese invasions of Korea, two decades later the Ming’s conflict with the Later Jin in Liaodong turned the China-Korea northern littoral into a frontline, which led to the Ming’s unprecedented military intervention in this region. Its dispatch of a Liaodong brigade commander, Mao Wenlong, to accommodate the Chinese coastal fugitives was the first step in this process.

Mao Wenlong (1576-1629) was born in Qiantang County of Zhejiang Province. His father died early, and his mother raised Mao in her brother Shen Guangzuo’s 沈光祚 house. Although Mao was educated in the Confucian classics, driven by personal interests he turned to the army in search of personal achievement. He inherited the position of his father’s elder brother as a company commander of the Haizhou Guard, and stayed in Liaodong for more than twenty years.

20 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/6/1 (7/19/1621), fasc.11, 543.
21 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/7/13 (8/29/1621), fasc.12, 603-605. For Xiong’s and Yang’s discussions of the roles of the southern Liaodong guards, Zhenjiang, and Korea in recovering Liaodong see Li Guangtao 李光濤, Xiong Tingbi yu Liaodong 熊廷弼與遼東 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1976), 244-249.
This experience greatly promoted his familiarity with the local circumstances. As Mao himself stated, “I thoroughly understand the topographical advantages of mountains and rivers and the comings and goings of Jurchens.” However, before 1621 his career was unsuccessful since he only accomplished unimpressive military achievements. He even considered retiring and returning to Zhejiang.

A turnaround in his career occurred after he gained Liaodong Grand Coordinator Wang Huazhen’s appreciation. Mao’s personal relationship with Wang and his talents facilitated this. Tired of learning Confucian texts, Mao was interested in warcraft and displayed his great ambition in front of his uncle Shen Guangzuo, who was serving as Shandong Provincial Administration Commissioner at that time and had a good relationship with Shandong native Wang Huazhen. Before Wang began his post of Liaodong Grand Coordinator, he sought advice from Shen and accepted Mao as his trusted follower under Shen’s recommendation. After the fall of Liaoyang, he soon appointed Mao as the Brigade Commander of Training Soldiers (C. Lianbing youji, 練兵游擊) and dispatched him to Shandong Deng-Lai and the southern islands of Liaodong.

Various historical accounts provide different reasons of this dispatch, such as reclaiming Zhenjiang, requesting armies from Korea, or connecting with the four southern guards of Liaodong. However, Mao’s contending for the Liaodong islanders was essential to achieving all these goals, especially considering that the Later Jin was simultaneously increasing its influence.

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23 Mao Qiling 毛奇齡, Mao zongrong muzhiming 毛總戎墓志銘, in Dongjiang yishi 東江遺事, fasc.2, Mingmo Qingchu shiliao xuankan 明末清初史料選刊 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1986), 213-214; For Mao’s family background see Chen Hantao 陳涵韶, Dongjiang shilue: Mao Wenlong shengping shiji yanjiu 東江事略:毛文龍生平事跡研究 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1996), 1-6.
over the Liaodong littoral.24 One Chosŏn official, An Kyŏng 安璥, provided a glimpse into this situation when he accompanied a Chinese envoy back to Dengzhou by sea in 1621. In the sixth month of this year, after An’s diplomatic corps arrived at a Liaodong offshore island, they encountered an old Chinese man who kneeled in front of them, begging for rice. He said that in the past few days the Jurchens had captured the escaped Ming soldiers on this island, who were threatened with death if they did not surrender immediately. An had also seen some Liaodong Chinese on the sea, many of whom had shaved but others who had kept their hair. He even communicated with them, saying that those who had changed their hairstyle must not follow their conscience, and those who did not shave were especially honorable.25 To counteract this pressure the Later Jin put on the Liaodong coastal populace, the Ming had to speed up its control of the Liaodong offshore islands.

According to the contemporary military gazettes from Mao, on the twentieth day of the fifth month in 1621 he departed with 197 soldiers and four private sand junks. He tried to convince Jinzhou and Fuzhou military officials to transfer allegiance to the Ming, including the famous Later-Jin general Liu Aita 劉愛塔 (or Liu Xingzuo 劉興祚 after he submitted to the Ming), who later secretly connected with and assisted the Ming, and finally surrendered in 1628.26 Mao also contacted the previous Ming servicemen in Jinzhou and Fuzhou, asking them to provide


25 An Kyŏng 安璥, Kahae choch'on nok 駕海朝天錄(Harvard-Yenching Library, TK3051 5483), Tianqi 1/6/3 (7/21/1621).

26 Liu Aita was born and educated in Liaodong Kaiyuan. In the early seventeenth century, he turned to serve Nurhaci, maybe voluntarily, and was appreciated during the Later Jin’s military conflicts with the Ming. He was in charge of the Jinzhou Guard as a brigade commander in 1621 at the time when Mao Wenlong arrived there. From 1623 on, under Liaodong military commissioner Sun Chengzong’s 孫承宗 and Mao Wenlong’s persuasions, he began to communicate with the Ming, surrendered and went to Ka Island with his brothers in 1628. See Jiang Shoupeng 姜守鵬, “Liu Xingzuo shiji bukao” 劉興祚事跡補考, Dongbei shida xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 東北師大學報（哲學社會科學版）,no.5 (1984): 77-82.
assistance from the inside. From the mid-sixth month to the mid-seventh month, he occupied the southern offshore islands of Liaodong, appeased several thousand islanders, and offered titles to their leaders. He even directly encountered the Later Jin officials on the islands, fought them, and captured their boats and cannons. The islands Mao subjugated ranged from the Lüshun coast to the Changshan Archipelago, including Zhu Island 豬島, Changxing Island 長行島, Guanglu Island 廣鹿島, Hadian Island 哈店島, Dachangshan Island 大長山島, Xiaochangshan Island 小長山島, Shicheng Island 石城島, Lu Island 鹿島, Haiyang Island 海洋島, Wangjia Island 王家島, Dazhangzi Island 大獐子島, Xiaozhangzi Island 小獐子島, and Haozi Island 號子島.27

The importance of absorbing the Liaodong population and transforming them for the Ming’s use was immediately revealed in a military operation in Zhenjiang that Mao and Wang Yining planned when Wang returned from Korea. On the eighteenth day of the seventh month of 1621, Mao arrived at Korea’s Migwan fortress and contacted the Zhenjiang officers and commoners. They secretly transmitted the military information that Zhenjiang’s defense was weak at that time. By seizing this chance, on the twenty-first day of the seventh month Mao joined them in launching a strike from both inside and outside, seized the Jurchen guardians in Zhenjiang, and occupied the city.28

Ironically, this temporary success caused far-reaching negative consequences for Ming China. It angered the Later Jin, leading to its massacre and reoccupation of Zhenjiang seven days later. The Later Jin also began to be wary of the Ming’s possible military operations conducted

27 Mao Chengdou, ed., Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao, fasc.1, 5-6.
28 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/8/7 (9/22/1621), fasc. 13, 653-654; Mao Chengdou, ed., Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao, fasc.1, 6-7. The process of Mao’s occupation of Zhenjiang can be seen in Li Guangtao 李光濤, “Mao Wenlong niangluan Dongjiang benmo” 毛文龍醜亂東江本末, in Mingqing dang’an lunwen ji 明清檔案論文集 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1986), 166-168.
from the sea. Even in the Ming court a fierce debate was raised between Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen on whether Mao’s unexpected strike interrupted the Ming’s overall military arrangement sanfang buzhi before it was fully prepared, or was a great achievement on the Liaodong battlefield. This dispute then developed into a personal conflict that foreshadowed the Ming’s defeat in Guangning City in 1622.\textsuperscript{29} However, Mao’s action still inspired the Ming court’s confidence in reconquering Liaodong. The emperor at once promoted him to the position of vice regional commander based on this victory. In mid-1622 he was promoted to assistant commander-in-chief and the regional commander of pacifying Liaodong (C. Pingliao zongbing guan, 平遼總兵官), whose military power expanded to the estuary of the Yalu River and the territory of Korea.\textsuperscript{30}

According to Wang Huazhen’s report to the Ming court, after occupying Zhenjiang, Mao gathered and recruited about ten thousand soldiers.\textsuperscript{31} Most of them were Liaodong fugitives who had once shaved their hair and become subjects of the Later Jin.\textsuperscript{32} A note in the Dongjiang military gazettes gives a higher number of over forty thousand Liaodong fugitives who successively turned to Mao during his stay at Zhenjiang.\textsuperscript{33} Except for about three thousand southern sailors that the Ming court dispatched to assist Mao and who remained on the sea in the following years, the selected Liaodong Han escapees contributed the majority of Mao’s armies. In the late 1620s their estimated number was about 39,000, and the total Liaodong fugitives Mao accommodated before his death in 1629 was about 200,000.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} For the fall of Guangning see Kenneth M. Swope, The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618-1644 (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 44-49
\textsuperscript{30} Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/8/7 (9/22/1621), fasc. 13, 654; Tianqi 2/6/4 (7/11/1622), fasc. 23, 1127.
\textsuperscript{31} Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/8/7 (9/22/1621), fasc. 13, 653.
\textsuperscript{32} Li Guangtao, Xiong Tingbi yu Liaodong, 251.
\textsuperscript{33} Mao Chengdou, ed., Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao, fasc. 1, 9. 將軍駐鎮江七日 遼民歸順者四萬餘人.
\textsuperscript{34} Wang Ronghuang 王榮湟, “Mao Wenlong yanjiu xianyi santi” 毛文龍研究獻疑三題, Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, no. 2 (May 2016): 32-33.
It was on the basis of consolidating these enormous numbers that Mao established his maritime regime. As a Zhejiang migrant in Liaodong, Mao’s life experience had similarities with many late Ming southerners who seized wartime opportunities, were transformed from Confucian educators to military men, and exerted individual power over the northern borders, as was noted in the last chapter. However, Mao’s military power was more firmly rooted in the Liaodong locale, which was due not only from his family background but was also a product of his endeavor to actively absorb and strengthen personal attachments with the Liaodong residents. Mao selected and surnamed his subordinates as his adopted sons and grandsons, provided his people with official positions, and bonded with them through affinity relations in order to form a quasiblood network. Most of his followers were Liaodong natives.35 More intriguingly, according to Yang Haiying’s research, as a latecomer to Liaodong Mao’s emerging power generated tension with the southerners who had developed influence earlier in Liaodong, such as Wu clan members Wu Zongdao and Wu Youfu. Their conflict was interwoven with the contradiction between the Dongjiang maritime regime and coastal Dengzhou power, which reflects the intricate political factions in the late Ming.36

**Korea’s Dilemma in Resettling the Kadal**

The Ming and Later Jin contested for the support of the Liaodong escapees, and Mao took this opportunity to incorporate the island migrants and develop his individual power on the sea. In contrast, Chosŏn Korea held a more negative perception of them and was trapped in the

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difficult situation of handling them after Mao entered its territory. Compared to the eagerness of the Ming and Later Jin for assimilating Liaodong Han fugitives, the Chosŏn’s attitude toward Mao’s subjects was much more ambiguous and even negative. This is reflected in its contemptuous designation of the shaved Liaohang Han people as the *kadal* 假㺚, literally meaning “fake otter.” In *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* this term only appears during the reigns of Kwanghaegun and King Injo from 1621 to 1645. In comparison, the term “real otter” (K. *chindal*, 真㺚) was also intensively used in this time period to refer to the Manchus. On the one hand, this term shows the Chosŏn’s intention to express the similarity between the shaved Liaodong Chinese people and the uncivilized “barbarians”; on the other hand, it was used to distinguish one from the other in a specific historical context. Although the more objective word *ch’ehan* 剃漢, simply “shaved Han,” was also used among the Chosŏn court, it appeared much less frequently than *kadal*. This negative term grew from Korea’s sense of cultural superiority to the Manchus, whose queue hairstyle distinctly differentiated them from the “civilized” Ming and Chosŏn people. This terminology also vividly reveals the fluidity of the shaved Liaodong population between the Ming and the Later Jin; according to the Chosŏn’s judgment, they could be easily persuaded to support the latter.

Chosŏn Korea took advantage of the *kadal* to obtain important and secret information from Mao Wenlong and from the Later Jin. For instance, in 1623 when the Chosŏn court was trying to determine whether the Later Jin planned to invade Korea’s territory, a general-in-chief stressed the significance of using spies in dealing with military affairs and suggested recruiting some intelligent *kadal* people from Mao to investigate the Later Jin’s situation. He even proposed including some Koreans who were fluent in the Chinese language, shaving their hair to pretend
that they were *kadal* spies as well.\(^{37}\) The Chosŏn also learned advanced technology from the *kadal*. In 1624 the Border Defense Council proposed that since Chinese people were skilled in manufacturing gunpowder in an economical way, the *kadal* staying in Korea must be knowledgeable about its production and therefore could be hired to train Koreans.\(^{38}\)

However, more often the Chosŏn held a distrustful attitude toward the *kadal* group, regarding them as a great threat to the state security of China and Korea because they could easily leak confidential information and defect. For instance, in the tenth month of 1621 An Kyŏng, a Chosŏn envoy, observed that even after the Ming took control of the Liaodong littoral *kadal* spies were still negatively influencing China’s maritime defense. Because of the *kadal*’s frequent surveillance on the sea, Ming military men were unable to be stationed at Guanglu Island for long. Spies could also mix with Ming soldiers. During An’s trip he heard that an unrecognized ship was found sailing from the direction of Guanglu Island to Dengzhou. Although the sailors claimed that they were coming to receive provisions, their unreported navigation was suspected to be espionage and they were arrested.\(^{39}\)

The Chosŏn warned Mao more than once of the potential danger of his extensive enlistment of *kadal* since spies and traitors could be among them.\(^{40}\) This situation further influenced the Chosŏn’s estimation of Mao’s combat capability. After the Later Jin retook Zhenjiang and Mao was expelled to Korea, the Chosŏn Border Defense Council expressed its concern that except for less than a few hundred soldiers, the remaining group that Mao led were all “people who shaved their hair and submitted,” and it was possible for them to betray Korea and surrender to the Later

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\(^{38}\) *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 備邊司謄錄, Injo 2/5/15 (6/30/1624), fasc.3 (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 1982), vol.1, 225.


\(^{40}\) *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏnggioksan pon), Kwanghaegun 13/10/30 (12.12.1621), fasc. 170, vol.33,411; *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Taebaeksan sago pon), Kwanghaegun 14/5/15 (6/23/1622), fasc.61, vol.33,452.
In addition to perceiving the *kadal* as untrustworthy actors between the Ming and Later Jin, the Chosŏn’s cautious and even hostile view of them was based especially on the significant problems that their sojourn in Korean territory brought to the Chosŏn’s diplomatic relations and social situations. After Mao was defeated in Zhenjiang, he resettled on the P’yon’gan border near the Yalu River estuary. This compelled the Chosŏn to face the political issue of whether to submit Mao to the Later Jin and form an alliance with the latter, or to receive Mao’s forces as a manifestation of its loyalty to the Ming. Because of this great pressure, proper handling of the *kadal* became an extremely important issue that related to state security for the Chosŏn.

A solution that would satisfy both the Ming and the Later Jin was to convince Mao to relocate to the sea islands of Korea. As the Chosŏn Border Defense Council proposed in the twelfth month of 1621, if Mao’s forces penetrated inland into Korea, the Later Jin would chase him and invade Korea as well. In contrast, if Mao was stationed on sea islands the Later Jin’s attention could be distracted from Korea. Later that month the Chosŏn’s concern became a reality: the Later Jin trespassed over the Korea border and launched a military attack on Mao at Impan, a posthouse in a P’yŏngan coastal county. This military threat to Korea made Mao’s resettlement a more urgent issue. A Korean official even furiously criticized the failure of this policy: “How many times has the strategy of convincing General Mao to sail on the sea and expelling the *kadal* toward islands been instructed by the king? If we [Chosŏn officials] had obeyed his order and implemented this plan, today’s calamity would have been prevented.”

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41 *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun, 13/9/17 (10.31.1621), fasc. 169, vol.33,405. [毛文龍所率兵士不滿數百 其餘皆剃頭歸附之人.]

42 *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 13/3/19 (11/2/1621), fasc. 169, vol.33, 405.

43 *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 13/12/5 (1/16/1622), fasc. 172, vol.33, 415.

44 *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 13/12/18 (1/29/1622), fasc. 172, vol.33, 417.

45 *Kwanghaegun ilgi* (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 13/12/18 (1/29/1622), fasc. 172, vol.33, 417. 勸毛將泛海 驅假僞入島
While by the end of 1621 the major issues that the *kadal* brought to Korea were still at the political and military levels, after the Ming’s defeat in Guangning in early 1622 the pressure of the inflowing Liaodong escapees on Korean border society was soon revealed. Kwanghaegun later warned the Border Defense Council of the growing chaos produced by the nationwide spread of the Ming deserters and *kadal*. He was concerned that even before the Jurchen forces arrived the Ming people’s disturbance would put Korea in peril. The Border Defense Council summarized the major threats of the *kadal*, including their guiding enemies from inside, interrupting farm work, and escaping from the sea and assembling for banditry. The Border Defense Council even stated that the survival or extinction of the state was not determined by the Jurchen armies but by the crimes of the *kadal*. It suggested registering all the Han escapees in Korea and reporting on this issue to the Ming army supervisor, who was dispatched to Korea partially to aid the Liaodong refugees. Although it is uncertain how much impact its attitude had on Mao’s decision, at the end of 1622, as the Chosŏn expected, Mao finally withdrew from the Korean continent and founded a military base on Ka Island in P'yŏngan Province.

However, Mao’s resettlement on the sea provided little relief to the Chosŏn since the maintenance and growth of his maritime power were still fundamentally based on support from the neighboring regions. In a wider context, this tension was a concentrated reflection of the continental and regional constraints on the intensive mobility in the Northeast Asian maritime space that began in the sixteenth century.

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之策 自上下救 凡幾度乎 遵上敎奉行 則應無今日之禍.

46 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 14/4/10 (5/19/1622), fasc. 176, vol.33, 434.
47 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 14/6/27 (8/3/1622), fasc. 178, vol.33, 457.
48 Kwanghaegun ilgi (Chŏngjoksan pon), Kwanghaegun 14/11/11 (12/13/1622), fasc. 183, vol.33, 482. There are other sayings about the specific time of Mao Wenlong’s retreat from Korea, such as in the fifth moth of 1622 as recorded in *Mingji beilüe* 明季北略, or in the ninth month of 1622, according to *Nanjung chammok* 亂中雜錄. See Chang munsŏk, 張文石, “Momullyongŭi kadosagŏne taehan ilgoch'al: yodong hanjok hangmin'gwai kwan'gyerŭl chungshinŭro” 毛文龍의 檢島事件에 대한一考察: 遼東 漢族 降民과의 關係를 中心으로 (Master’s thesis, Hogik University, 1988), 9.
Provisioning Liaodong Refugees on the Sea: Insular Exploitation, Coastal Supply, and Maritime Trade

Being fully aware of the risk of the Liaodong people’s conversion to Later Jin subjects, Mao Wenlong himself reiterated the urgency and necessity of appeasing them: “If you do not provision a domestic soldier, only one soldier is lost; if you do not feed a Liaodong person, he will run away and belong to the Jurchens, and an enemy will be added.” 49 More importantly, a primary issue Mao needed to solve to consolidate his military power was to accommodate and feed the tens of thousands of Liaodong Han people flooding into the northern Yellow Sea area. Although this area had never been isolated from the continents due to private maritime activities and the intermittent relaxation of the maritime prohibition, the Ming and Chosŏn central governments prevented their coastal residents’ maritime migration and mutual contacts, regarding their sea space as dangerous, uncontrolled, and not strategic in the sixteenth century. In the Imjin War the China-Korea maritime trade and transportation were largely increased and the role of this region attracted much more government attention. With the establishment of the Dongjiang garrison, this region was exploited to an unprecedented extent.

Some scholars have pointed out this development occurred with Mao’s encampment on the sea. O Irhwan’s monograph on Chinese-Korean sea routes and maritime migration in the Ming-Qing transition period briefly describes Mao’s management of the Dongjiang garrison, as well as the geographic and economic conditions of the Liaodong sea islands that Korean envoys passed

through on their way to Beijing. Matsuura Akira conducts a detailed examination of the economic foundation of the Dongjiang regime, describing the cultivation of its major islands and the distribution of defending armies on them. Using an important account on Mao’s maritime activities written by a contemporary Ming businessman and scholar, Wang Ruchun, as the core source, Matsuura points out that there were ten thousand mu (6.144 km$^2$) of cultivated lands on Shicheng and Changshan islands respectively, and the farmlands of Guanglu Island measured up to tens of thousands of mu. Wang Ronghuang analyzes the regulations and the practical activities in cultivating the Dongjiang sea islands, and argues that Wang Ruchun’s account exaggerates the actual situation. Wang Ronghuang states that even a fertile island could only produce one thousand dan (1035 m$^3$) of grain, and for a sterile one the annual output was no more than several hundred dan.

While the above examinations are mainly based on Chinese historical materials, Korean envoys’ contemporary travelogues provide more-detailed, vivid, and dynamic descriptions for a fuller understanding of Mao and his successors’ territory in the 1620s and ’30s. In the ninth month of 1623, while sailing along the Liaodong coast, an envoy named Cho Chip witnessed the ongoing escape of the Chinese refugees to Shicheng Island. Those who already resided on the island lit torches to direct the navigation of the escapees from Liaodong. The Chinese officers on these islands also actively engaged in assembling the Liaodong people. Because of these successive escapes, Liaodong refugees gathered to live on Shicheng Island.

53 Cho Chip 趙濈, Yŏnhaeng nok 燕行錄, in Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip 燕行錄全集, ed. Im Kijung 林基中 (Seoul: Tongguk
The increasing settlement of Liaodong people on the sea can be seen from Korean envoys’ chronological observations. For instance, in 1623 envoy Yi Minsŏng 李民宬 described the Shicheng Island landscape. He stated that the perimeter of the island was twenty li (11.52 km) and was wide, flat, and livable. About seventy original households were established there, and the number of Liaodong refugees doubled this figure. In 1628 another travel account estimated the number of households as several hundred, along with several thousand soldiers stationed there. In regard to Changshan Island, Yi Minsŏng recorded that it was enclosed by mountains on three sides and its terrain was vast and flat. There were about one hundred households there, led by the defending armies at that time. As for Guanglu Island, Yi observed that it had almost three hundred households, six battleships, and several Zhejiang artillerymen. However, in 1630, even after Mao had been killed and the power of his followers had been restricted, Changshan Island still had several hundred Liaodong households, and the households at Guanglu Island numbered five to six hundred.  

54 Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2001), vol.12, 263, 265. 
The situation of Ka Island attracted Korean envoys’ special attention. Although strategically located at the Yalu River estuary, from the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty the island had only been used for horse breeding, and was kept uninhabited and uncultivated until Mao’s settlement. In mid-1623, according to Yi Minsŏng’s account, construction on Ka Island was in an initial phrase. Except for several roofs covered by tiles, the remaining buildings all had grass roofs; there were only soil shacks and grass depots on the island, and the stores had also been hastily established. However, in Korean envoy Chŏng Tuwŏn’s depiction of Ka Island in 1630 (Figure 25), the buildings there seemed to be well constructed.

55 For the analysis and comparison of several copies of Choch’ŏndo that depicted the places a 1624 Korean tribute trip passed see Chŏng Ŭnju (Jeong Eunjoo) 鄭恩主, Chosŏnsidae sasaenggirokhwasa: yet kārimūro ingnun hanjunggwan’gyesa 조선시대 사행기록화: 옛 그림으로 읽는 한중관계사 (Seoul: Sahoep’yŏngnon, 2012), 120-169.
56 Yi Min-sŏng, Kyehae choch’ŏllok, in Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip, vol. 14, 286.
Despite Mao Wenlong’s exploitation of the sea islands, their limited natural resources were unable to support the influx of refugees from the continent. Most of the islands were small in size and infertile; even Ka Island was mountainous, covered with sandstone, and did not have even one piece of arable land.\(^{57}\) Even worse, facing the successive betrayal of Liaodong residents, as early as in the eighth month of 1621 the Later Jin had forced Liaodong people to retreat sixty li (34.56 km) away from the Jinzhou coast, or the Later Jin removed the Han people of the coastal guards from their hometowns in order to cut off their connection with the Ming’s domain.\(^{58}\) In 1623 the Later Jin carried out a more-thorough depopulation in the Jinzhou and Fuzhou guards,

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\(^{57}\) *Sukchong sillok* 肅宗實錄, Sukchong 2/8/9 (9/16/1676), fasc. 5 (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’ŏn Wiwŏnhoe, 1957), vol. 38, 334.

\(^{58}\) *Chongyi manwen laodang* 重譯滿文老檔, fasc. 2, in *Qingchu shiliao congkan* 清初史料叢刊 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue lishixi, 1978), vol. 1, 46, 50.
moving the southern coastal residents to the west and the north. This policy largely impeded the escape of the shaved Han to the sea. In the eighth month of 1624, when a Korean envoy passed through an island of Liaodong, he stated that before Nurhaci scattered the surrendered Liaodong people they gathered to plunder on the sea, but now coastal farmlands were desolate, houses were deteriorating, and there were no signs of human habitation.

To ease the shortage of grain on the sea due to its geographic and political restrictions, Mao fundamentally relied on integrating and mobilizing transregional resources, especially by requesting provisions from and conducting sea trade with the Ming and the Chosŏn, thus building an economic foundation of his military power. China’s Tianjin and Dengzhou were the major ports for conveying provisions to Ka Island. The reopening of the China-Korea sea transport in the early seventeenth century came in the context of the intensifying connection in Northeast Asia through sea routes after the late sixteenth century. More specifically, while the purpose of cross-border maritime transportation in the Imjin War was to increase efficiency in supplying provisions, the reorganization of Tianjin and Dengzhou transportation to Ka Island was more of a reaction to the Later Jin’s obstruction of Liaodong overland communication and transport.

Beginning in 1618, domestic sea transport along China’s northern and eastern coasts had already been reestablished to support the Ming armies on the Liaodong frontline. This was largely based on the Ming’s experience in conducting massive sea transport in the 1590s. However, this time the scale was much greater: from 1618 to 1627, over one million taels of silver and over ten million dan (1,035,000 m³) of grain and soybeans were carried to Liaodong.

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60 Yi Tŏkhyŏng 李德泂, Chukch’ŏn choch’ŏllok 竹泉朝天錄, in Yŏnhaengnok sokchip, ed. Im Kijung, vol. 105, 428-429.
61 For instance, see Li Chenggeng, “酌議海運事宜疏,” in Chouliao shuohua, fasc. 6, vol.2, 750-764.
After the eastern Liaodong was occupied, the Tianjin and Dengzhou sea routes began to serve in transporting grain to the Dongjiang garrison. Provisions, living materials, and military equipment were transferred from Tianjin to Dengzhou, and then along the Liaodong coast to Ka Island. Soldiers’ payment and a portion of provisions were directly transported from Dengzhou. To raise these items the Ming employed multiple methods, such as requisitioning them from Tianjin storage, from the tribute grain transport system, or through the western Liaodong overland transport; purchasing them from Dengzhou, Laizhou, or Tianjin; and allocating them from the imperial storehouse.

According to Ming Vice Minister of Revenue Bi Ziyuan, due to the weather and geographic limits, sea transport from Tianjin could be conducted only once each year. Vessels loaded grain in the third month, departed in the fourth month, and returned from Korea empty in the sixth month. For the annual amount of Tianjin sea transport, Bi proposed assigning no more than 160 vessels to carry 120,000 dan (124,200 m³) of grain and beans to Mao. While Wang Ruchun’s account mentions that sea transport was conducted from Tianjin to Dongjiang three times each year, and from Deng-Lai to Dongjiang two times each year, his assessment of the total amount of grain transported was not far from Bi’s regulation. According to Wang, three hundred vessels were used, and each vessel could carry four to five hundred dan of grain. Therefore each year they could transport over 100,000 dan (120,000 to 150,000 dan) of grain. This estimation generally corresponds with the actual provisions Mao received. As reported in

64 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 3/3/13 (4/12/1623), fasc. 32, 1638-1639.
65 Wang Ruchun, “Mao da jiangjun haiyang qingxing” 毛大將軍海上情形, punctuated and collated by Li Shangying 李尚英, Qingshi yanjiu tongxun 清史研究通訊, no.2 (1990): 45.
his military gazettes, from 1622 to 1627 Mao received a total of 934,578 dan (967,288 m³) of grain (155,763 dan per year) together with 1,050,969 taels of silver and 127,312 bolts of cloth.66

However, although direct material support from the Chinese littoral was necessary for Mao’s stay on the sea islands, the amount it could provide was insufficient. Compared to the Ming cavalrymen defending the western Liaodong guards, Mao’s soldiers received much less provisions and inferior military equipment, which caused him great discontent and stimulated his political tension with the Ming court. The deficiency of provisions on the sea was due to the late Ming’s fiscal crisis, but its more direct causes were Mao’s exaggeration of the number of his soldiers and the Ming court’s doubt regarding his role in opposing the Later Jin.67

Another measure Mao used to feed his subjects was to obtain provisions from Korea, either by direct request or by using silver. According to Ming Minister of War Wang Zaijin’s memorial submitted in the fifth month of 1622, by that time Mao had already borrowed about ten thousand dan of rice and one thousand bolts of cloth from the Chosŏn.68 After King Injo’s coup d’état in 1623, he further turned from Kwanghaegun’s swing strategy between the Ming and Later Jin to a pro-Ming political stand. Since Mao promoted the Ming court’s legitimation of Injo’s enthronement, Injo’s response to Mao’s request for provisions was much more favorable compared to Kwanghaegun. According to an account from Injo sillok, only several months after his accession Injo had already sent several tens of thousands of sŏm (1 sŏm ≈144 kg) of grain to Ka Island.69

68 Wang Zaijin, Sanchao liaoshi shilu 三朝事實錄, fasc.9, in Siku jinhui shu congkan, shibu, vol.70, 552-553.
69 Injo sillok, Injo 1/7/3 (7/29/1623), fasc. 2, vol.33, 538. Sŏm 石 is a Korean unit of measure of grain and rice. One Sŏm was roughly equal to 144 kg. See Jan Gyllenbok. Encyclopaedia of Historical Metrology, Weights, and Measures, vol.3, 1672.
While it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of provisions the Chosŏn sent to Ka Island, Mao’s increasing requests undoubtedly exceeded the tolerance of local Korean society. In a court discussion between King Injo and his officials in the mid-1626, Injo complained, “It is only halfway through the year, and we have already given 100,000 sŏm.” This amount was not far away from the 110,000 sŏm of the official slaves’ tribute (K. Nobī sin’gong, 奴婢身貢) in P’yŏngan and Hwanghae, which formed the largest portion (84.4 percent) of their annual tax revenue. Thus although the official grain reserves in P’yŏngan and Hwanghae had all been sent, it was still insufficient to meet Mao’s request. The three southern provinces of Korea could only transport several tens of thousands of sŏm of rice every year, which was not enough to continuously provision Mao. Only one month later the Chosŏn sent an additional 40,000 sŏm of grain to Mao, which greatly concerned the Border Defense Council: “It just passed a half of year and the amount that we have given is already 140,000 sŏm. Among this, over 70,000 sŏm are additional to the original cost. We do not know how many tens of thousands of sŏm will be demanded hereafter.”

Why did the Chosŏn have to send such enormous amounts of provisions to Mao? Injo’s political tendency was only one reason. As the Border Defense Council explained, Mao’s requests were often conducted in the name of trade, and therefore the Chosŏn had no excuse to reject his demands. By bringing silver to Korea Mao asked for an exchange for grain at an equal value, but this target was not easy to achieve in Korean society. Beginning in the late sixteenth century silver had become the intermediary in Korea’s international trade. In the Imjin

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71 Injo sillok, Injo 4/7/13 (9/3/1626), fasc.13, vol.34, 125. 年纔過半矣 所給之數已至十四萬而其中七萬餘石即是原價之外此後責出者 又不知其幾萬石. For a summary of Mao Wenlong’s demanding provisions and equipment from Injo see Tagawa Kōzō 田川孝三, “Mŏ Bunryû to Chôsen to no kankei ni tsuite,” 毛文龍と朝鮮との関係について (Keijō: Imanishi Ryū, 1932), 81-88.
72 Injo sillok, Injo 4/7/13 (9/3/1626), fasc.13, vol.34, 125.
War silver flowed into Korea from China and circulated between the two countries, mainly for paying the Ming forces and purchasing provisions, military equipment, and weapons. After the war the circulation of silver was continuously increasing in Korea along with its tighter economic connections with neighboring states, as reflected in its reopening of the Japan House trade, its border trade with the Ming until 1613, and after 1628 with the Later Jin (the regime’s name was changed to Qing in 1636). However, although inevitably involved in the international economy, the circulation and absorption of silver in the local peasant society of Korea was still limited because silver was not the domestic currency. This problem had already been brought into focus in the early stages of the Imjin War as the Ming exchanged provisions inside Korea. In addition, warfare and recurring natural disasters after the late sixteenth century depleted grain storage in Korea, which made it increasingly difficult for the Chosón to trade grain with Mao. For example, in the third month of 1624 the Border Defense Council reported that Mao’s request to purchase grain with more than 10,000 taels of silver was extremely hard to accomplish due to the exhaustion of the supply of grain in P’yŏngan Province.

Although the Chosón explored various ways of earning money and grain in order to adapt to the economic exchanges with Mao, such as building saltworks to promote the rice trade, casting coins or exchanging Ming copper coins for silver, and purchasing rice from Dengzhou by using the silver Mao provided, trade with Ka Island caused problems that were difficult for the central

73 Han Myŏnggi, Injinwaeran’gwa hanjunggwan’gye (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip'yŏngsa, 1999), 89-98.
74 For the Chosón’s trade relations with the Ming, Japan and the Later Jin (Qing) in the early seventeenth century see Tsuji Yamato, Chōsen ochō no taichū bōekikyō to shin shin kōtai.
government to solve. First, thriving private interactions largely advanced the local mobility, posing pressure on effective border management. One example is the active ginseng trade between Korean merchants and Mao, a phenomenon that could not be prevented even by severe prohibition and punishment.78

Also, the benefit the Chosŏn could gain from maritime commerce was impaired because it earned no tax income from merchants coerced into doing business with Mao. The Chosŏn Ministry of Taxation expressed its indignation regarding this situation: “While countless Korean capital and provincial merchants gather on Ka Island and bring silver and ginseng for exchanging goods, the government never attempts to tax even one of them, how can there be such a rule!” However, because Mao received traveling merchants and imposed a huge amount of tax on them, he encouraged them to come.79 Mao once even blamed the Chosŏn for its heavy taxation on the border horse market with Dongjiang, which discouraged Korean merchants from coming to trade.80 While the Ministry of Taxation and the Border Defense Council proposed taxing and supervising Korean merchants to Ka Island, this discussion did not continue because Injo worried about angering Mao.81 Moreover, trade conducted by Chosŏn tribute groups directly in inland China conflicted with Mao’s economic interest. After the resumption of the China-Korea sea routes in 1621, their bilateral maritime trade was enlarged through the efforts of Chosŏn tribute trips. Mao was discontented with this growth and asked that the number of Chosŏn tribute trips

79 Injo sillok, Injo 6/12/21 (1/14/1629), fasc. 19, vol.34,311. 戶曹啟曰 毛都督于島中接置客商 一年收稅不啻累巨萬云. …
81 Injo sillok, Injo 6/12/21 (1/14/1629), fasc.19, vol.34,311.
ships be reduced, “intending to centralize profits.”

While commercial activities with Mao appeared to bring more disadvantages to the Chosŏn, maritime trade based on Ka Island provided Mao with essential capital and material resources for expanding his individual power. In the eighth month of 1623, having obtained insufficient provisions from the Ming, Mao submitted a report to the emperor that stressed the necessity of feeding Liaodong refugees and proposing merchants be persuaded to transport and trade items on the sea, based on the experiences learned from the Imjin War:

As a last resort, there is one solution: in light of the expedition to the Japanese in the Imjin year, merchants from places of South Zhili, Shandong, the Huai River, and the Jiao River can be attracted to transport rice. They should be ordered to prepare grain and vessels by themselves. On the day they arrive in Korea, their local rice price should be examined and the transportation fee should be added. In the total cargo one boat carries, eight-tenths could be rice and two-tenths could be goods. Rice must be traded fairly, and their goods are allowed to be sold for gaining profits at the market. If so, traders will not suffer from imbalance, and the profit seekers will be delighted to have a solution. … If this way of trading could be found, more than 300,000 Liaodong people could live.

Restricted by its limited resources but at the same time benefiting from its connective location, the role of Ka Island was not to provide raw materials in maritime trade but to be the intermediary linking the neighboring states and the outside world. In addition to purchasing essential living materials, Mao functioned as the middleman to exchange goods, impose taxes, and sometimes offer credit to merchants. Saltpeter, cloth, raw silk, and silk fabrics from China

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82 Injo sillok, Injo 6/12/21 (1/14/1629), fasc. 19, vol.34,311. 毛將之請減貢船 意在專利. For the expansion of Korean tribute trade in the early seventeenth century and its tension with Mao Wenlong see Tsuji Yamato, Chōsen ōchō no taichū bōeki seisaku to min shin kōtai, 97-126.

were often transacted on the sea, and involved multiregional merchants from Shanxi, Shandong, Liaodong, South Zhili, and Zhejiang. Ginseng and mink fur flowed into Ka Island through the hands of Korean merchants. They also played a role in mobilizing commodities to the Later Jin and Japan. Goods from Thailand were traded on Ka Island as well. All these exchanges indicate that the economic network centering on Ka Island was linked with the wider East Asian seas.  

Regardless of the legitimacy of its participants, the prosperous maritime commerce based on Ka Island reflected the increasing transregional mobility and revived maritime dynamics of Northeast Asia in the early seventeenth century. Diachronically, the formation of the Ka Island economic network interacted with the continuous rise of Ming regional military powers in maritime Northeast Asia after the late sixteenth century. Spatially, it strengthened the transnationality of Mao’s regime, which enabled him to adjust to the economic and political circumstances and to integrate resources beyond the regional limits of sea islands to better survive in the transition period. The interconnectivity of this market also implies that its prosperity was rooted in great reliance on its neighbors and lacked independence for developing maritime hegemony. For instance, Mao often stressed the crucial role of silver from interior China in attracting merchants and conducting trade, vividly stating that without silver to pay them it was like “cooking meals without rice.”


In the 1620s to 30s, Hong Taiji, Nurhachi’s son, especially encouraged the growth of foreign trade, including commercial exchanges with the Kado generals.

The tension between Mao’s reliance on the continents and his demands to provision the Liaodong Han people to strengthen his individual power triggered his conflict between the Ming and Chosŏn land-based polities. As is seen in the next section, the intertwined social, economic, and political dimensions of this conflict were especially revealed in the three parties’ negotiations on handling the Liaodong Han refugees on the sea.

**Regional Tensions and Trilateral Negotiations on Resettling Liaodong Islanders**

The Chosŏn’s reluctance to receive Liaodong migrants due to its political vigilance, social pressure, and material shortages led to its persistent negotiations with Mao Wenlong on repatriating additional residents to inland China. Although Mao adopted various methods to maintain the livelihood of his subjects, a dearth of grain deteriorated their living conditions. They were extremely destitute, demoralized, and prone to violence, as noted by both Ming and Chosŏn contemporary observers. Seeking survival, a huge number of Liaodong refugees swarmed into Korea and disrupted the local society during the reign of King Injo. In the sixth month of 1623, a Chosŏn official who returned from Mao’s camp observed that the Korean border was filled with Chinese refugees who traded goods and made this area “no different from Liaodong.” Several days later this concern was again raised in the Chosŏn court: “The Chinese people who run away from upheaval and come to our territory are countless.” Responding to this situation, an official

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86 Jung Byung-chul also stresses that the volume and variety of commercial transactions at Ka Island were limited by its geographic location within Korea, and therefore the market was not as flourishing as trade conducted in Southeast China. See Jung Byung-chul, “Late Ming Island Bases, Military Posts and Sea Routes in the Offshore Area of Liaodong,” in *The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources*, ed. Angele Schottenhammer and Roderich Ptak, 48.


was sent to persuade Mao to return some of these people to Dengzhou. The details of this negotiation do not appear in the existing historical records, but its consequence was clear: Mao did not accept this suggestion and imposed even-greater pressure on Korean society.

The year 1624 was especially hard for the Chosŏn. The winter weather obstructed sea transport from China to Ka Island, and severe natural disasters in P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces resulted in a poor harvest, making their supply of provisions extremely difficult. After their food stores were exhausted the Liaodong people on the unfertile Ka Island began to eat grass and tree roots to survive, and almost all of them were forced to go ashore. As a Chosŏn official observed, Liaodong people invaded one province and committed crimes there, which could have caused damage like the Red Turban Rebellion, an uprising that occurred at the end of the Chinese Yuan Dynasty and spread to attack Koryŏ Korea. Anchoring his hope on Mao to solve this problem, Injo ordered that Mao be urgently persuaded to only keep his handpicked troops and return the old and disabled population to Dengzhou. However, Injo was disappointed once again.

Mao’s military reports to the Ming court explain the reason for his refusal to repatriate his subjects on the sea—he supposedly planned to connect with the Korean armies to recover Liaodong. To underscore his indispensable role in this plan, Mao continued to accept Liaodong refugees and exaggerated the number of soldiers he commanded in order to ask for a larger amount of provisions from the Ming. When this was not satisfied, he expressed his discontent with the Ming court’s neglect of the Dongjiang garrison, stating that it treated the Liaodong

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89 Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi, Injo 1/6/25 (7/22/1623), fasc.1, vol.2, 44a. 逃避唐人，來在我境者，不知其幾。
90 Changgye tŭngnok 狀狀勝錄, in Kyebon tŭngnok 數本勝錄(Kyujanggak, 古 4255-17), vol.1, Tianqi 4/8/26(10/8/1624), 3, Tianqi 4/10/10 (11/20/1624), 22.
91 Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok, Injo 2/1/7 (2/25/1624), fasc.3, vol.1,145. For the influence of the Red Turban Rebellion to Korea see David M. Robinson, Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).
refugees on the sea differently from those who migrated to the Shanhai Pass.\textsuperscript{92} He then threatened that if the court intended to reduce its financial expenses and did not offer him enough provisions for retaking Liaodong, why not recall the Dongjiang forces and dismiss his position as well?\textsuperscript{93} However, having a negative evaluation of Mao’s military strength, the Chosŏn Border Defense Council believed that Mao only wanted to retain his power on the sea and was unwilling to fight against the Later Jin, and thus his refusal to return the Liaodong people was just for requesting provisions from the Ming as “a stratagem for sustaining himself.”\textsuperscript{94}

After failing to convince Mao, the Chosŏn also attempted to relieve its regional pressure when accepting Liaodong refugees. P'yŏngan Province suffered the most from them, not only because they mainly gathered in the P'yŏngan coastal regions but also because of the local destitution from warfare, as well as the logistical and economic difficulties for the southern provinces in providing support.\textsuperscript{95} One solution was to enhance the environment of the P'yŏngan border, such as opening up wastelands for military farming and exempting its coastal residents from taxation when they experienced natural disasters.\textsuperscript{96} Another method was to scatter the Liaodong famine victims to the interior of Korea, aiming to disperse P'yŏngan Province’s pressure and reduce the threat of the assembled refugees.\textsuperscript{97}

However, the Chosŏn was still unable to absorb these migrants, whose presence intensified their conflicts with the Korean indigenous residents. Contemporary Korean officials repeatedly recorded this social tension. For instance, in early 1624 the Ŭiju magistrate reported: “Recently

\textsuperscript{92} Mao Chengdou, ed., \textit{Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao}, Tianqi 3/10/16 (11/8/1623), fasc. 2, 30.
\textsuperscript{93} Mao Chengdou, ed., \textit{Dongjiang shujie tangbao jiechao}, Tianqi 3/10/15 (11/7/1623), fasc. 2, 29.
\textsuperscript{94} Injo sillok, Injo 3/6/29 (8/1/1625), fasc.9, vol.34,16. 其意在於托以遼民多集 請糧皇朝 以爲自奉之計也.
\textsuperscript{95} Cho Ik 趙翼, “論西邊事宜疏 再疏,” in \textit{P'ojo chip} 浦渚集, fasc.3, Han'guk munjip ch'ŏnggan, vol. 85, 63b.
the subjected Kadal crossed [the sea] to come every day, whose number is countless. Fifty or over one hundred of them gathered and spread, digging and eating all the spring-plowing malt. If encountering the starving on the road, they competed to kill and eat them. They robbed villagers and forced them to cook. There was one person who was too poor to provide them food, so they threw a kadal corpse in his house and framed him for the murder. They bound people in the whole village, robbed their properties, and left.98 Due to these atrocities, Korean border people resisted violently; some of them even beat Liaodong refugees to death.99 Social violence generated official-level tension as well. In spring 1625 the Úiju magistrate bludgeoned one of Mao’s subordinate officers because of his harassment of villages. This enraged Mao’s people, who regarded this act as a violation of the father-son relationship between the Ming and the Chosŏn and the Chosŏn’s ingratitude regarding the Ming’s contribution in the Japanese invasions of Korea. While Chosŏn court officials debated whether to pacify Mao’s subjects by dismissing the Úiju magistrate, considering his important task of defending the border region, he was only demoted one rank.100

The conflict regarding accommodating the Liaodong people not only existed between Mao and the Chosŏn government, it also developed into a major issue for diplomatic negotiations between the Chosŏn and the Ming. Finding no solution through its direct communications with Mao, the Chosŏn court finally requested that the Ming central government and the Dengzhou military commissioner repatriate the Dongjiang people, regardless of Mao’s disapproval.101 The result of this petition was recorded in the travelogue of Hong Ikhan 洪翼漢, who was the

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document officer on the tribute trip to Beijing for celebrating the Tianqi emperor’s birthday and the winter solstice at the end of 1624. According to Hong, the Deng-Lai grand coordinator, Wu Zhiwang 武之望, agreed with the Chosŏn’s request and submitted a memorial to the Ming court stating that except for strong men who were selected as soldiers, the remaining old and young should be registered and sent to reside in Shandong. In order to prevent treacherous people from entering into the interior, he also suggested that Mao himself should carefully examine the voices and appearances of the repatriates to identify the actual hungry masses. However, Hong’s accounts continue to state that the Ming Ministry of War rejected Wu’s proposal. This was because the supervising secretary, Li Lusheng 李魯生, listed five problems with sending the Liaodong people on the sea back to China, and believed that because Mao’s aggregation and instruction of them were carried out properly they should remain under his command.\(^{102}\) While Hong did not fully record their memorials, and therefore how Li Lusheng narrated the disadvantages of accepting Mao’s subjects in the interior of China are unclear, another memorial that Li recorded in *Ming Xizong shilu* offers his supportive opinion of Mao’s pacification policy because the Ming state had to rely solely on his armies on the sea to contain the Later Jin’s expedition.\(^{103}\)

The *Injo sillok* records on the attitudes of the Ming court and the Deng-Lai grand coordinator regarding the Chosŏn’s petition contrast to Hong Ikhan’s accounts. According to the *sillok*, in the fifth month of 1625 the Ming Ministry of War transmitted a document to the Chosŏn, saying that the emperor had approved the Liaodong maritime migrants’ resettlement in China. Based on this reply, the Border Defense Council discussed implementing the repatriation

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103 *Ming Xizong shilu*, Tianqi 5/2/21 (3/29/1625), fasc. 56, 2578-2580.
of Liaodong famine refugees. However, in the sixth month this plan had been stopped not only because of Mao’s decline but also because the Deng-Lai grand coordinator expressed concern about the sudden and massive inflow of the Liaodong population to his jurisdiction. He transmitted a document to Mao and asked him to impede this plan. 104

Considering Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Wu Zhiwang’s political conflict with Mao Wenlong and the Ming court’s emphasis on the military importance of the Dongjiang garrison at that time, Hong Ikhan’s records appear to be closer to the Ming’s political stand.105 Regarding Mao’s mastery of Liaodong refugees as a symbol of his military strength, the Ming court’s attitude toward settling them on the sea or inland reflected its evaluation of the role of the Dongjiang garrison, as well as its relations with Mao. From this point of view, the Ming court’s rejection of the Chosŏn’s request was based on its acknowledgement of the garrison’s strategic importance at that time. Hong Ikhan also noted the Ming court’s affirmative attitude. In Hong’s travelogue he included a memorial written by the Ming Grant Academician, Sun Chengzong 孫承宗, who praised Mao’s generalship and asked that his “wholehearted assault from the sea with bare hands, connecting with the vassal state, collecting the survivors, repeatedly intriguing against the jackals and tigers, and constructing the strategic garrison at the east of the river” be rewarded.” 106 The Tianqi emperor immediately promoted Mao to Left Commissioner-in-chief. 107

105 Wu Zhiwang and Mao Wenlong’s conflict on the jurisdiction of Liaodong Lushun, as well as the political tension between the Dongjiang regional commander and the Deng-Lai grand coordinator can be seen in Zhang Jinkui, Mingdai Shandong haijiang yanjiu, 430-446.
106 Hong Ikhan, Hwap’o Sŏnsaeng Choch’ŏn hanghaerok, fasc.1, Yŏnhaengnok chŏnjip, ed. Im Kijung, vol.17, 207. 大學士 孫承宗 上本論將才 其中稱毛文龍以赤膽空拳突之海上 聯屬國 集移子 頻窺豺虎之窟 修成重鎮于東江 自是奇男子 宜按其功捷紀錄優敘矣。
The Ming court’s high esteem of Mao’s role corresponded with its denial of the Chosŏn’s additional repatriation request. As the Ming Ministry of War expressed, “Maintaining or removing the Liaodong people depends on Wenlong. If Wenlong does not leave one day, the Liaodong people do not leave one day. Koreans can expel them to the islands but cannot force them to leave the islands.” Driven by this thought, the Ministry of War only ordered that Liaodong people be repatriated from the territory of Korea to the sea. It urged the Deng-Liao grand coordinator to promptly offer grain and expected the Chosŏn to assist, asking them to not grow estranged from the Liaodong land and people. In addition to the Ming court’s emphasis on the strategic role of the Dongjiang garrison, its reluctance to recall the Liaodong refugees was also based on a realistic consideration of the social and environmental pressures they posed on China proper. Due to its geographic proximity to Liaodong, after 1621 the Shandong Dengzhou-Laizhou coastal region experienced the greatest pressure to accept Liaodong soldiers and refugees from the sea.

Liaodong Military Commissioner Wang Zaijin 王在晉 vividly narrated the issues the Dengzhou locale encountered after the Liaodong people crossed the sea to seek shelter. The unfavorable agricultural conditions of Dengzhou posed the first problem. The mountain city of Dengzhou was funnel–shaped, and the seaside farmlands were neither flat nor vast for cultivation. This caused the shortage of grain and an abrupt increase in rice prices when a large amount of Liaodong refugees arrived in Dengzhou. The local Shandong society also faced the challenge of settling the homeless Liaodong soldiers in the limited living space. They were first stationed in the county city, and then were moved to Wei County of Laizhou Prefecture, but

108 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 5/12/25 (1/26/1626), fasc. 66, 3152-3153. 遼人去留 文龍是視 文龍一日不去 則遼人一日不離 鮮人驅之入島可也 驅之離島不可也.
neither of the two cities was able to accept them. Wang Zaijin stated that if the Liaodong soldiers could not be settled, this would lead to banditry and treachery that could threaten local security. Moreover, Wang was concerned that if those moved to inland China had no means to make a living, those still on the sea would collude with enemies and spies could mingle with the inflowing refugees to access information.

Figure 26 Dengzhou beiwo cheng tu 登州備倭城圖, in Guangxu zengxiu Dengzhou fuzhi, Zhongguo difang zhi jicheng, Shandong fuxian zhi ji, vol. 48, 20.
Wang stressed the flexible nature of Liaodong refugees; they could be either law abiding or traitorous, depending on whether the Chinese government provided appropriate accommodations. To solve this issue Wang offered multiple suggestions regarding different groups of people, including recruiting those good at navigation into forces, employing those who were unqualified to be soldiers to cultivate wastelands, and supplying the famine victims with food and houses.\(^\text{109}\) The Ming court officials also discussed more-detailed implementations. They suggested different methods of assigning Liaodong refugees to farm wastelands from Zhili and Tianjin to the Shanhai Pass; appointing specific officers, especially those from Liaodong, to assemble them and manage the cultivation; and raising funds from local governments and official donations.\(^\text{110}\)

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110 Wang Yingjiao, “艱危日甚匡濟無能敬陳切要事務疏,” in Jibu zoushu 計部奏疏, fasc. 2, Xuxiu siku quanshu, shibu,
Wang’s negative feelings regarding the Liaodong escapees also influenced his defense policy. He debated with Ming Minister of War Sun Chengzong when Sun inspected Liaodong border affairs in 1622: Wang regarded these people more as mischief-makers, expelled them from Liaodong, and suggested relying on the western Mongol tribes for defense, while Sun raised the importance of “letting the Liaodong people guard the Liaodong land” 以遼人守遼土, recruiting them into the military, stationing them in Liaodong, and pacifying those under the Later Jin’s dominance.111

In addition to the emerging social tensions on the Shandong coast caused by the Liaodong migration, the Ming government also faced the problem of enhancing inspection. Since the Liaodong people were allowed to reside in the Shanhai Pass, the Ming faced the dilemma of identifying spies and traitors. The Ministry of War officials worried, “Liaodong people are our people. They come to us in a rush for shelter, so how can we have the heart to deny them? However, the faithful cannot be distinguished from the traitorous. If they say there are no henchmen of the barbarians, we dare not believe them. If they say they entered the Pass and do not spy and induce the barbarians, we dare not believe this either.”112 Therefore when the Ministry of War mentioned the rescue of the Liaodong refugees, it also stressed a careful examination of those who looked questionable and spoke differently, or those who had once been shaved and subjected to the Later Jin.

By early 1622 the number of Liaodong refugees inside the Shanhai Pass already totaled

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112 *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, fasc. 7, 507. 遼人 吾人也 急而投我 何忍拒之 然而良奸莫辨 謂此中無奴之心腹 臣不敢信也 謂入關不為奴之間謀勾引 臣亦不敢信也.
over two million. Although the Ming raised various methods either to aid their survival or to strengthen state security, this massive transregional mobility still greatly troubled Chinese society. Wang Zaijin once observed about the border population, “The strong think of robbery and the weak think of escape.” After they gathered in the capital region the economic difficulties and natural hazards worsened their living conditions. Wang ordered that they receive aid, but the depleted grain and silver stores of the local governments made this an idle command. The long-term drought further parched the local lands, making them unsuitable for farming.

Even after the Ming court had allocated lands and funds, the difficulties in implementation made the suggestions for cultivation hard to accomplish. Summarized by the Minister of Imperial Stud and the Henan Investigating Censor, Dong Yingju, eight or nine out of every ten Liaodong refugees were reluctant to engage in military farming. Due to their fear of the hardy Liaodong refugees’ occupation of the farmlands, the indigenous inhabitants and officials apathetically followed the central government’s instructions, leading to ineffective implementation of these policies.

These tensions catalyzed the tendency to expel rather than accept Liaodong refugees from the beginning of their inland migration. In the sixth month of 1621 Xiong Tingbi noted that immediately after Liaodong people went ashore to Shandong, they were obstructed and driven from the local regions. This situation then developed into sharper political and military conflicts between local gentry and Liaodong military men. For instance, driven by his hatred of

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114 王在晉題邊情疏,” in Sanchao liaoshi shilu, fasc.8, Siku jinhui shu congkan shibu, vol.70, 537. 強者思搶 懦者思逃 此邊境之民情也.
115 王在晉題賑遼人疏,” in Sanchao liaoshi shilu, fasc.8, Siku jinhui shu congkan shibu, vol.70, 541.
117 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 1/6/20 (8/7/1621), fasc.11, 570-571.
Liaodong migrants’ dependence on the local society for a living, the magistrate of Wei County falsely accused a Liaodong officer’s intention to launch a rebellion in 1624.118 The temporary resolution of this issue did not prevent a further crisis: from 1631 to 1633 a Dongjiang brigade commander, Kong Youde 孔有德, initiated a mutiny in Zhili and Shandong, which was stimulated by the tension between Liaodong soldiers and local people.119

**Intensified Political Conflicts in the Interactions between the Ming, the Chosŏn, and Mao Wenlong**

While the Chosŏn’s above petitions were not approved, in the mid-1620s the Ming inclined toward reaching a consensus with the Chosŏn on constraining Mao’s military power by repatriating a portion of his subjects from the sea. After the first several years of Injo’s ascension to the throne, his political relations with Mao worsened partially due to the Liaodong population’s growing violence in Korea despite the strict regulations on their behavior. This situation was vividly narrated in a Chosŏn envoy’s proposal to the Ming Ministry of War and Ministry of Revenue:

> It is seen that the estimated number of Liaodong people now living in our small country is no less than 100,000. They are scattered throughout villages, where two to three out of ten are indigenous and seven to eight out of ten are strangers. They begin with borrowing houses, then rob food, and finally rape wives. Who can bear it if human nature degenerates to such an extent? The weak take their families to migrate inland, and the strong grind blades

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and wait for a chance to resist. Neither General Mao’s restrictions nor our small country’s laws can fully prevent [Liaodong people’s misconduct].

Moreover, the Chosŏn noted that Mao Wenlong’s acts had become suspicious and even seemed to display an inclination to betray the Ming. While the Chosŏn’s previous perception of Mao’s overstated military strength as well as his negative reaction to the Jurchen aggression suggest his being content with the current situation as a regional warlord, after the mid-1620s the Chosŏn began to show awareness of the possibility that Mao could convert to the Later Jin. In the ninth month of 1625, when King Injo expressed his doubt regarding the report of Mao’s collusion with the Later Jin, the Third State Councilor, Sin Hŭm 申欽, confirmed that it had already existed for a while. In the eighth month of 1626 Mao’s disloyalty seemed to become more apparent: when King Injo asked his officials about Mao’s recent situation, Sin Hŭm replied, “Wenlong’s actions have long been unusual. Recently his subordinate officers explicitly said that his rebellious situation has been formed.” Sin believed that sooner or later Mao Wenlong would either surrender to the Later Jin or attack Korea. This led to Injo’s vigilance; he ordered a guard be prepared against Mao’s further operation. This concern appears to be well-founded: beginning at the end of 1627 Mao had secretly conducted peace negotiations with Hong Taiji 皇太極, the successor and son of Nurhaci, without the Ming’s permission.

The final straw in Injo’s deteriorating relationship with Mao was Mao’s false accusation of the Chosŏn’s collusion with the Later Jin. At the end of 1625 Mao reported to the Ming court

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120 Kim Chisu 金地樫, “皇朝辯誣疏·禮部兵部呈文,” in T’aech’on chip 萍川集, fasc.2, Han’guk munjip ch’onggan sok, vol.21, 530. 目今遼民之方住小邦者 計不下數十萬口 散走村閭 在處墟満 主居二三 客居七八 始借房屋 中奪饔飧 終淫妻婦 人情到此 孰能堪之 弱者携妻負子 轉徙內地 強者礪劒懷刃 乘暗相圖 毛鎭之約束 小邦之法令所不能避禁。
121 Tagawa Kōzō 田川敏, “Mō Bunryū to Chōsen to no kankei ni tsuite,” 91-104.
that he had caught two traitorous Korean generals who surrendered to the Later Jin and turned to attack the Korean borders. Mao claimed that their remaining companions escaped and colluded with the Second State Councilor of the Chosŏn, Yun Úirip 尹義立, in order to launch another assault in the winter. The Deng-Lai grand coordinator, Wu Zhiwang, cast doubt on the authenticity of Mao’s words and indicated that its underlying reason was the Chosŏn’s worry about Mao’s growing strength that caused their estrangement. The Chosŏn court expressed great anger regarding Mao’s accusation. It sent envoys to Beijing to defend itself and correct Mao’s statement, explaining that Yun was an official minister who had once served as Mao’s reception official but had resigned due to his offending Mao. Yun himself also confirmed Mao’s hatred toward him because of his attempt to stop Mao’s excessive exploitation and private trade in Korea. The Chosŏn argued that Yun had no relationship with the Korean traitors that Mao mentioned, and indicated that Mao’s accusation was based only on a personal grudge.

The Chosŏn opposed Wu Zhiwang’s opinion, arguing that it never held estranged and defensive attitudes toward Mao. However, this statement was just for the purpose of displaying loyalty to the Ming court because it apparently contradicted Injo and his officials’ accumulating discontent and suspicion of Mao’s acts at that time. Intertwining with its political tension with Mao, the Chosŏn’s earnest persuasion of the Ming to resettle Mao’s people was therefore aimed not only at seeking an abatement of its increasing social and fiscal burdens but also to avoid a more-intense conflict with him.

The Ming court’s changing attitudes toward the repatriation of Liaodong migrants was

124 Mingshi, fasc.320, vol. 27, 8303.
interwoven with the internal factionalism between Mao and civil officials. While the emperor emphasized Mao’s role in hampering the Later Jin and thus made compromises to his requests, Mao’s exaggeration of his military achievements, his obstinate rule as a regional warlord, and his seeking a political alliance in the Ming court by bribing the influential eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 all increasingly troubled Ming civil officials in the mid-1620s. This strained political relationship with Mao allowed Ming civil officials to restrict Mao’s individual power in a radical way.

In early 1626 the Ming armies first defeated the Later Jin in a major battle, the Battle of Ningyuan, under the command of Administration Vice-Commissioner of the Ningyuan-Qiantun Circuit Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥. His consequent rapid promotion and profound influence in Liaodong further enabled the Ming court to emphasize the strategic importance of the western Liaodong defensive line and reconsider the effectiveness of using the Dongjiang garrison to constrain the Later Jin. The Ministry of War’s support of Yuan Chonghuan’s proposal to move Mao’s encampment to the nearer offshore islands was a reflection of this policy.

The dispatch of Ming envoys Jiang Yueguang 姜曰廣 and Wang Mengyin 王夢尹 to Korea in mid-1626 functioned as a mediator to spur agreement between the Ming and the Chosŏn on sending the Liaodong maritime migrants back to China proper. Jiang Yueguang was a junior compiler in the Hanlin Academy and Wang Mengyin was the supervising secretary of military affairs when they traveled to Korea to issue the emperor’s edict on the birth of the crown prince. They were also given the mission of inspecting the situation in the Dongjiang garrison for

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129 For Mao Wenlong’s economic and political connections with Wei Zhongxian and Wei’s role in consolidation Mao’s power see Ye Gaoshu, “Mingqing zhiji Liaodong de junshi jiazu: Li, Mao, Zu sanjia de bijiao,” 143-144.
130 For the Battle of Ningyuan see Kenneth Swope, The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 56-59.
131 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 6/2/25 (3/22/1626), fasc. 68, 3271; Tianqi 6/4/7 (5/2/1626), fasc. 70, 3345-3346; Tianqi 6/5/5 (5/29/1626), fasc. 71, 3415-3416.
a fuller understanding of Mao’s acts. As explained by Jiang Yueguang, this was to solve the problem of the Ming court’s divergent and uncertain perspectives on Mao’s merits due to his geographic remoteness.  

During Jiang and Wang’s stay in Korea the Chosŏn court reemphasized its innocence and Mao Wenlong’s groundless accusation, as well as its eagerness to remove his people from Korea. To prove its concern about Mao’s disloyalty, it even secretly transmitted to Jiang and Wang the information received from a Liaodong Confucian scholar, Ni Ruting. Due to Mao’s disagreement with the Chosŏn and the Deng-Lai Grand Coordinator Wu Zhiwang, he intended to train soldiers to attack Korea and Shandong.

The reliability of Ni Ruting’s report was not verified, and Jiang and Wang’s attitude toward this secret is vague since they only cautiously asked the Chosŏn to not divulge its contents without giving further comments. However, their response to the Chosŏn’s self-defense and repatriation request is positive. In a conversation with Injo, they demonstrated the emperor’s trust of the Chosŏn’s innocence, indicated that the doubt regarding its loyalty had not been posed by Ming civil officials but by military officers, and assured that they would solve the issue of the Liaodong people’s disturbance of Korea. Regarding the Ming Ministry of War’s query on the Chosŏn’s allegiance after Mao’s report on Yun Ūirip’s treason, Jiang and Wang also stated that there was an underlying purpose to this action. Although the Ming envoys did not clarify what the “hidden purpose” was, the Chosŏn believed that it referred to the issue related to Mao.

There are several implications to Jiang Yueguang and Wang Mengyin’s dialogue with Injo.

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They indicated that it was Mao, a military officer, who claimed the Chosŏn’s disloyalty. However, Ming civil officials were in agreement with the Chosŏn. This situation indirectly reveals the controversy between Ming military and civil officials. Also, while Jiang and Wang did not disclose the Ming court’s opinion of Mao at that time, the “hidden purpose” they mentioned behind the Ministry of War’s communication with the Chosŏn might have been to appease Mao in order to conduct an in-depth inspection of the Dongjiang garrison. Jiang and Wang’s concealment of the Ming court’s intention was also revealed in their cautiousness toward Ni Ruting’s secret report on Mao’s possible rebellion, which may have been because of its lack of evidence, but was also to prevent Mao Wenlong from being enraged. This attitude corresponded with Jiang Yueguang’s personal writings on the difficulty of examining the Dongjiang situation since they had to be careful, neither indulging nor irritating Mao.\(^{137}\) Considering this political subtleness, Jiang and Wang’s support of the Chosŏn was not just to pacify the vassal state and consolidate their political alliance, but also to reveal the Ming’s tendency to restrict Mao’s growing power.

After they returned to Beijing Jiang Yueguang and Wang Mengyin reported their observations of the Liaodong people suffering from starvation in Korea, and suggested multiple solutions to this problem. For instance, they suggested reducing the number of Liaodong people on the sea and an increase of their arable lands by means of keeping the forces and laborers, allowing the weak and old to immigrate to China and encouraging maritime migrants to cultivate the Liaodong Jinzhou and Lushun areas. In particular, they pointed out that Mao’s armies were mainly composed of Liaodong commoners, with only 20,000 to 30,000 qualified soldiers. Thus the total number of his soldiers should be pared down to 30,000. The Tianqi emperor accepted

these methods. After the Ming and Chosŏn courts finally reached an agreement on permitting the additional population on the sea to return to the interior of China, the Chosŏn began to urge Mao to follow this instruction. Compared to its previous negotiations, this time it warned Mao sharply that he would be responsible for bringing about the Liaodong people’s death if he prevented them from making a living in Shandong. However, once again it failed to convince Mao.

In the context of the Ming-Qing confrontation, the struggle of dealing with Liaodong refugees not only caused tensions in Ming China and Chosŏn Korea. The Later Jin attacked Korea in early 1627 (K. Chŏngmyo horan, 丁卯胡亂) in order to meet its political and economic needs for establishing an allied relationship with the Chosŏn and opening their border markets to obtain essential provisions. One impetus for Hong Taiji to launch this operation was the Chosŏn’s reception of Mao Wenlong. If the Chosŏn was defeated, its pro-Ming political and economic stances through the mediator, Mao, could be shifted. Another catalyst was Mao’s contestation with the Later Jin over the Liaodong labor forces, an issue that had lasted from the rulership of Nurhaci. Therefore the problem of accommodating Liaodong maritime refugees also closely interacted with the Later Jin’s military actions.

This invasion of Korea further intensified the political conflict between the Chosŏn and Mao. Mao did not launch armies to assist the Chosŏn, and even directly accused its people of spying and guiding the Later Jin forces to kill his soldiers. He especially pointed out that this betrayal was a result of the Koreans’ loathing of the Liaodong refugees’ harassment.

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138 Ming Xizong shilu, Tianqi 6/9/5 (10/24/1626), fasc. 76, 3667-3670.
141 “登萊巡撫李嵩塘報,” in Sanchao liaoshi shilu, fasc. 17, Siku jinhui shu congkan, shibu, vol.70, 738.
contrast, the Chosŏn court blamed Mao for his biased description, which ignored the sacrifice of the Korean border generals. The war also aggravated Dongjiang soldiers’ endangerment of Korean society. By taking advantage of the wartime chaos, the random intimidation of the scattered Liaodong famine victims developed into armed soldiers’ attacks and plundering. For example, in the fourth month of 1627 they attacked two fortresses in P'yŏngan Province. Given that they were Han Chinese, the guarding officers hesitated to fight back. As a result, only one guard survived and was badly injured, but over two hundred Korean people were killed, three to four hundred horses and oxen were stolen, and all the houses were destroyed. In Hamgyŏng Province Dongjiang soldiers gathered to plunder villages and towns; the number of one armed group could total over one thousand. In addition, a Korean district magistrate reported that over one thousand Han infantry and cavalrymen gathered in his jurisdiction and planned to launch a rebellion. Mao’s subjects were also violent pirates. As reported by the provincial governor of P'yŏngan in the third month of 1627, even after his coastal residents survived the Later Jin attack, those going to sea did not escape from the plundering carried out by the Han Chinese boatmen. Also, on the Hwanghae coast men were killed and women were looted by pirates who resembled Han Chinese. The Chosŏn believed that these pirates must be Mao’s unlawful soldiers and subjects, and strongly urged Mao to prevent their piracy.

The establishment and expansion of Mao’s power across the northern Yellow Sea was based on his incorporating maritime migrants, and integrating and mobilizing transregional resources. This development led to Mao’s inextricable interactions and tensions with the Ming, Chosŏn, and Later Jin. The Chosŏn failed to restrict Mao’s individual strength by making diplomatic

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142 Injo sillok, Injo 5/2/25 (4/10/1627), fasc.15, vol.34, 178.
efforts to repatriate Liaodong migrants, which largely led to the desperate international situation it faced after 1627.

The Death of Mao Wenlong and Its Aftermath: The Ming’s Struggle for Maritime Control

The final and most acute conflict between Mao Wenlong and the Ming land-based authority was his execution by Yuan Chonghuan in 1629. Yuan retired from the position of Liaodong grand coordinator in 1627, the last year of the Tianqi reign, due to his political exclusion by eunuch Wei Zhongxian. After the Chongzhen emperor’s succession to the throne and the death of Wei, Yuan was recalled from his hometown and reappointed to supervise military affairs of the northeast. From the beginning of his reinstatement Yuan demonstrated his intention to kill Mao, due to his ineffective constraint of the Jurchens as well as his enormous consumption of provisions and trade in contraband goods.145

In the sixth month of 1629 Yuan sailed to Shuang Island 雙島 near Lushun in the name of inspecting the Dongjiang garrison. For several nights Yuan secretly negotiated with Mao on transporting provisions from Ningyuan instead of from Tianjin and Deng-Liao, relocating the Dongjiang base, reorganizing and dividing the Dongjiang troops, and allowing the Dongjiang military and financial situations to be checked. Failing to convince Mao to accept his suggestions, Yuan accused Mao of twelve crimes, including disobeying, embezzling, smuggling, engaging in piracy, forming a clique, and failing to recover lost territories. He executed Mao

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without authorization under the pretext of following the Chongzhen emperor’s order.\(^{146}\)

Considering Yuan’s essential role in the Liaodong border defense at that time, Chongzhen rewarded Yuan and supported his accusation of Mao’s crimes. However, only three months after the Later Jin forces bypassed the western Liaodong defensive line from Mongolia and entered the Shanhai Pass to approach Beijing. A rumor of Yuan’s treason in this incident aroused Chongzhen’s suspicion, who soon imprisoned Yuan and put him to death the following year.

Ironically, one of Yuan’s charges was his arbitrarily murder of Mao.

The examinations and judgments of Mao Wenlong’s and Yuan Chonghuan’s loyal or treasonous reputations have been long lasting, and shifted with different political and historical contexts.\(^{147}\) The Chinese-language scholarship pays much attention to Mao’s conflict with Yuan Chonghuan as a concentration of the relationship between Mao and Ming civil officials. From a political perspective, they examine Mao’s merits and demerits, as well as whether Yuan Chonghuan’s beheading of Mao had a positive or negative effect on Ming politics during the Ming-Qing transition. Some studies criticize Yuan’s exaggerated and concocted accusation of Mao, and point out that Mao’s death led to the Ming’s inevitable defeat in the subsequent conflicts with the Later Jin. On the other hand, some scholars deny Mao’s military importance and argue that Yuan actually removed a significant problem for the Ming.\(^{148}\) The recent scholarship holds a more-neutral perspective, either seeking a comprehensive understanding of

\(^{146}\) Wang Ji 汪楫, *Chongzhen changbian* 崇禎長編, Tianqi 2/6/5 (7/24/1629), fasc.23 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjui su, 1967),1383-1388. Also see “薊遼督師袁崇煥題本,” in *Mingqing shiliao jiabian* 明清史料·甲編, ed. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjusuo (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2008), vol.8, 719-720.


Mao’s trajectory or probing into the internal dynamics of his contemporary social, economic, and cultural circumstances.\textsuperscript{149}

It should be noted that these varied views were based not only on the patriotic and moral standards of the acts of Mao and Yuan Chonghuan but also reflect the lasting controversy about the role of the Chinese-Korean maritime frontiers in the Ming-Qing confrontation, as well as how the Ming state should have handled the centrifugal military power rooted in this area. However, the goal of this analysis is neither to seek a solution to this problem nor to evaluate right and wrong. Rather, by introducing a maritime dimension, it interweaves Mao’s death into the intensified tension existing in the land-based governance over maritime peripheries in the early seventeenth century.

While the presence of the Dongjiang military garrison needs to be understood in the specific international circumstances of the 1620s and ’30s, it was also the consequence of the continuing expansion of maritime agents in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries in China and Korea’s northern sea space. Ming military men vitally participating in and interacting with this expansion. Their rise to power especially intertwined with the enhanced military connection, maritime transportation, and economic intercourse in Northeast Asia after the late sixteenth century. While the establishment of the Dongjiang garrison based on Ka Island provided the breeding ground of the semi-independent development of Ming regional military powers, it simultaneously stimulated the most severe tension with the Ming’s coastal control, as reflected in Yuan Chonghuan’s execution of Mao Wenlong.

It is clear that after the mid-1620s the Ming attempted to restrict Mao’s orientation toward self-governance. Examples include the court’s changing attitude toward the Chosŏn’s request to repatriate Liaodong refugees, the dispatch of officials to inspect the Dongjiang situation, and discussions on removing the Dongjiang base from Ka Island. This situation shows that while the Ming state indeed exerted influence over the northern Yellow Sea to an unprecedented extent in the context of the Northeast Asian maritime integration and under the need to contain the Jurchens, it also faced insurmountable administrative limits to controlling the performers of its military intervention in the sea.

It was in the context of this fundamental dilemma that Yuan Chonghuan’s execution of Mao was made, an act driven not only by the political conflict between Mao as a military man and a member of Wei Zhongxian’s faction with Ming civil groups. It also displays the tension between Yuan Chonghuan and Mao’s maritime power. Gaining his successful military experience from emphasizing the strategic importance of the Liaodong overland route, Yuan’s unification of military power and underestimation of the strategic role of the Bohai and Yellow Sea maritime zone were fundamental to his execution of Mao. As mentioned earlier, after his victory in the Battle of Ningyuan Yuan proposed relocating Dongjiang town to nearer offshore islands. After his reappointment in the reign of Chongzhen, this strategy continued to be carried out. For instance, he dissolved the Deng-Lai garrison town and decreased its role to only supporting the Dongjiang garrison.\footnote{Wang Ji, Chongzhen changbian, Chongzhen 1/9/21 (10/17/1628), fasc.13, 754.} Yuan also reinforced the maritime trade prohibition between Shandong merchants and Ka Island in order to deprive Mao Wenlong. To cut off Mao Wenlong’s connection with Liaodong Lüshun, he changed the sea route of Korean tribute trips from sailing across the Bohai Bay to passing through Jüehua Island 觉華島 offshore Ningyuan. He proposed...
transferring Mao’s provisions from Ningyuan in order to establish tighter control over him.\textsuperscript{151} Yuan’s accusation of Mao’s twelve crimes shows that his primary objection was Mao’s military and fiscal autocracy off the coast that could not be supervised. After Mao was executed Yuan further adopted a series of policies to restrict and pacify the Dongjiang generals: Mao’s armies were divided into four branches and the vice-commander, Chen Jisheng 陳繼盛, was ordered to supervise Dongjiang affairs.\textsuperscript{152}

Mao’s death caused great dissent in China, among both his contemporary and later defenders.\textsuperscript{153} However, it was apparently good news for Chosŏn Korea. Although the harassment of Korean society by Liaodong migrants and the hostility between Mao and the Chosŏn court were not included in Yuan’s accusation of Mao’s twelve crimes, Yuan later conveyed documents to the Chosŏn, notifying it of Mao’s death and the control of his remaining troops. For the purpose of pacifying the Chosŏn, Yuan criticized Mao’s squeeze of the Chosŏn and made the decision to strictly prevent and punish the border trespassing of Chinese soldiers. The reform of simplifying Mao’s personnel and resettling his residents was also put on the agenda.\textsuperscript{154} The Chosŏn replied by describing the threefold benefit from Mao’s elimination: removing a vital problem for China, rescuing the Liaodong people from the tiger’s mouth and returning them to their loving mother, and breaking a carbuncle for Korea and bringing the dying back to life.\textsuperscript{155}

Although the Chosŏn court held an optimistic view that Mao’s death would solve its

\textsuperscript{152} Wang Ji, \textit{Chongzhen changbian}, Chongzhen 2/6/5 (7/24/1629), fasc.23, 1388.
\textsuperscript{153} Kenneth Swope, \textit{The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty}, 83-84.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Injo sillok}, Injo 7/7/28 (9/15/1629), fasc. 21, vol.34, 339; \textit{Injo 7/8/8} (9/24/1629), fasc.21, vol.34, 341.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Injo sillok}, Injo 7/9/6 (10/21/1629), fasc. 21, vol.34, 344.
regional tension with the Dongjiang garrison, the subsequent turmoil suggests that the formation of this rebellious maritime power continued and contended against the Ming authority in an explosive way. It experienced even more political chaos before the final collapse in 1637 from the attack of the Qing armies. While there is no need to repeat the detailed history and political complexities of the post-Mao regime in this analysis, a brief summary of its major incidents demonstrates how Mao’s successors acted as vacillating and flexible agents and shifted their allegiance between the Ming and Qing. As the compilers of *Mingshi* described, “After the island lost its commander in chief, [the Dongjiang generals] gradually held the heart of deviation and became increasingly unusable, resulting in betrayals thereafter.”

Mao’s death fragmented his military unit, leading to internal political conflicts and uncontrolled mutinies. For instance, after Liu Xingzhi 刘兴治 and his brothers surrendered to Mao from the Later Jin in 1628, they then launched a mutiny in 1630 to kill Chen Jisheng and take Ka Island, an act triggered by Chen Jisheng’s unfair treatment. They secretly aligned with Hong Taiji, but still maintained a relationship with the Ming. As Huang Yinong analyzes, Liu Xingzhi’s double-dealing indicates his intention to “temporarily survive in the crack between the Ming and Jin states.” The Liu brothers’ rulership did not last long; in early 1631 they died in a clash between the subjected Manchus and Han soldiers on the island.

Successive mutinies and power shifts continued among the Dongjiang military men, in which the Mutiny of Wuqiao (C. *Wuqiao bingbian*, 吳橋兵變) had the most impact. At the end of 1631 Li Jiucheng 李九成, Kong Youde 孔有德, and Geng Zhongming 耿仲明, former

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subordinates of Mao stationed in Dengzhou, launched a rebellion in Wuqiao county of North Zhili. It was largely caused by the tension between the indigenous residents and Liaodong soldiers. The mutineers occupied Dengzhou, claimed military titles and issued seals of office, and continued to take cities and seize territory in Shandong. Under induction, those remaining on the Liaodong islands also went ashore to Dengzhou to join the rebels. This mutiny was suppressed in early 1633. Because Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming’s ambition to establish the third power between the two powerful states of Ming and Jin failed, they had to escape and surrender to Hong Taiji.\footnote{Huang Yinong, “Wuqiao bingbian: Mingqing dingge de yitiao zhongyao daohuoxian” 吳橋兵變：明清鼎革的一條重要導火線, Qinghua xuebao 清華學報, vol. 42, no. 1 (March 2012): 104.}

After Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming’s submission, more generals from the sea turned their loyalty to Hong Taiji. On the new year’s day of 1634, suffering from the Dongjiang Regional Commander Shen Shikui’s life-threatening hatred, Vice Regional Commander of Shicheng Island Shang Kexi 尚可喜 raised an army to pacify Guanglu, Dachangshan, Xiaochangshan, Shicheng, and Haiyang islands and sailed to the Later Jin for shelter.\footnote{Pingnan wang yuangong chufan 平南王元功垂範, fasc.1, in Beijing tushuguan cang zhenben nianpu congkan 北京圖書館藏珍本年譜叢刊, vol. 68 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), 112-116.} In 1636-1637 Hong Taiji, who proclaimed himself the emperor of the newly established Qing dynasty, successively attacked Korea (K. Pyŏngja horan, 丙子胡亂) and the Ka Island regime. These operations severed the Chosŏn’s tributary relationship with the Ming and eradicated the military threat the Ming posed from the sea. In early 1638 after Shi Shikui died in fighting the Qing, his nephew, Shen Zhixiang 沈志祥, titled himself the new Dongjiang regional commander. The Ming launched a punitive expedition against him, leading to his final surrender to the Qing.\footnote{Qingshi gao 清史稿, fasc. 234, vol. 31 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), 9416-9417.}
Although these generals converted to Qing supporters under particular political, social, and military circumstances, they shared the common attribute of making decisions that were neither firm nor unchanging, and shifted their political stances constantly between the two powerful land-based states based on maximizing opportunities for self-development. This tendency of reinforcing their individual strength was a double-edged sword for the Qing. On the one hand, the defections of Kong Youde, Geng Zhongming, and Shen Zhixiang with their advanced cannons and troops facilitated the Qing’s conquest of China proper; on the other hand, their military independence greatly shook the early Qing rulership, and even developed into the most influential rebellion in the seventeenth century under the command of the three Han Chinese feudatories Wu Sangui 吳三桂, Shang Zhixin 尚之信, and Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠(C. Sanfan zhiluan, 三藩之亂, 1673-1681). The late Ming Liaodong general Wu Sangui was known for opening the Shandong Pass and allowing the Qing armies to enter into inland China. Due to this merit, Qing rulers awarded him the title “Prince of Pingxi.” In 1673 he rebelled against the Kangxi emperor’s order revoking feudatories, an operation responded to by the other two feudatories Shang Zhixin, the son of Shang Kexi, and Geng Jingzhong, the grandson of Geng Zhongming. During the revolt Wu Sangui even established his own dynasty, Zhou, and proclaimed himself as the first emperor of the regime.

Frederic E. Wakeman’s description of these former Dongjiang military men as “freebooters” who were “opportunistic and fickle”\(^\text{161}\) helps our understanding of their ever-changing positions. Differing from the old Liaodong “frontiersmen” who were assimilated into the Manchus and often firmly devoted themselves to the Qing enterprise, the Liaodong freebooters had more

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\(^\text{161}\) Frederic E. Wakeman: The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China, 196.
complicated origins. After their surrender they still maintained their original military divisions and formed a semi-feudal relationship with their loyal followers.\textsuperscript{162} This lesser level of acculturation to the Qing military institution explains the shifting loyalties of the Liaodong commanders throughout the seventeenth century. The regional context of their individual decisions should also be noted. As the recent scholarship addresses, their upheaval resulted from the rise of the Ka Island regime, which needs to be examined along with the thriving international commerce and the maritime-oriented integration during the Ming-Qing transition.\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{Conclusion}

After the fall of Liaoyang, accommodating and making use of mobile Liaodong refugees became a focal issue in the Ming-Jin-Chosŏn trilateral interactions. At this point the northern Yellow Sea and its Liaodong migrants attracted dramatic attention from the government. Ming-Jin political competition for the Liaodong-Korea sea-lanes and Chinese maritime migrants made this region strategically important in the early seventeenth century. The Ming state actively developed governance over the sea, but its porous control simultaneously provided a space for warlord Mao Wenlong’s military expansion.

Mao’s provision of Liaodong refugees based on his maritime exploitation and transregional mobilization of provisions, silver, and commodities built a fragile foundation for his military

\textsuperscript{162} Frederic E. Wakeman: \textit{The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China}, 200.

regime. Lacking the environmental condition of being self-sufficient on the sea, it was essential for Mao to rely on and mediate between the neighboring regions. This was a feature in his development in interactive and interdependent circumstances, both economically and politically. However, it was also in this process that Mao’s requests surpassed the capability of the coastal regions and his centrifugal tendency broke away from the land-based central governance. These contradictions shaped the vacillating characteristic of Mao’s generals. Once their needs were not satisfied, the tension between pursuing self-interest and their unavoidable reliance on strong neighbors caused their defection to the Qing in order to seek a more-reliable, although temporary, alliance.

The Liaodong maritime refugees, who showed great liquidity beyond regional and national boundaries, were themselves migrants, middlemen, and negotiators. For a newly risen military officer like Mao Wenlong, the sea space was a stage for realizing his personal aspirations in the transitioning and contested Northeast Asian borderlands; for the indigenous Liaodong population it provided a shelter to expand their power beyond the continental control. Their roles of being connective and mediating players in international interactions facilitated their flexibility and inclusiveness, and could thus more easily vary their footholds to adapt to the transitional surroundings.

164 The Dongjiang generals who surrendered to the Qing were either Liaodong natives or Liaodong immigrants. Geng Zhongming’s birth place was Shandong and he moved to Liaodong Gaizhou. Kong Youde was also from Shandong and then went to Liaoyang City. See Jingnan wang Geng Zhongming zhu, 靖南王耿仲明傳; Dingnan wang Kong Youde zhu, 定南王孔有德傳, in Mingji baiishi chubian, 明季稗史初編, vol.4, fasc. 26 (Wanyou wenku, 萬有文庫), ed. Wang Yunwu, 王運五, series 2, vol. 700, Shanghai: Shanghai, Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 454, 461. Shang Kexi was born in Liaodong Haizhou, but his grandfather and father were migrated from North Zhili. See Pingnan jingqin wang Shang Kexi shishi ce, 平南敬親王尚可喜事實冊, in Shiliao congkan chubian, 史料叢刊初編, vol.2, ed. Luo Zhenyu, 羅振玉, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1964), 853. Liu Xingzhi, his brother Liu Xingzuo, and Shen Zhixiang were originally from Liaodong. See Zhou Wenyu, 周文郁, Bianshi xiaoji, 邊事小紀, fasc.4, “劉將軍事實,” in Xuanlan tang congshu xuj, 玄覽堂叢書續集, ed. Zheng Zhenduo, 鄭振鐸, Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1985), vol.204, fasc.79, Qingshi liezhuang, 清史列傳, “貳臣傳乙” 沈志祥,” fasc.79, vol.20 Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 6525.
Conclusion

Early Qing rulers did not overlook the dynamics of maritime commerce nor did their coastal policies lack fluidity. After the decline of the Dongjiang regime in the early 1630s, Hong Taiji relaxed the depopulation policy by restoring defense construction and expanding territorial control over southern and eastern Liaodong.¹ Before 1661 the Qing court allowed a conditional lifting of the sea ban, legalizing overseas purchase of copper and licensing private merchants to trade in Macao, but its maritime policies were still due to the primary consideration of strengthening coastal security before the pacification of the Zheng hegemony based in Taiwan.² In order to sever its connection with China’s coastal residents, from 1661 to 1683 the eastern coast and its sea islands were depopulated and private maritime trade was prohibited.

The Qing’s attitude toward the Dongjiang military men was also mixed in its attempt to mobilize them in a secure environment. The Qing adopted the Dongjiang’s advanced equipment and technology to improve effectiveness in combat, offered them preferential treatment, and assigned them to fight the anti-Qing forces. Their experience in handing naval affairs and participation in maritime trade played a role during their encampment in south China as well.

Geng Jimao 耿繼茂, the eldest son of Geng Zhongming, and Shang Kexi were dispatched to pacify Guangdong and Fujian in their opposition to the Zheng family.³ Shang freed Macao from the evacuation policy, kept it open for trade, and permitted overseas smuggling by his merchants. Geng and the Fujian navies even aimed for domination of the maritime East Asian trade and to use Taiwan as their “illicit offshore emporium” for smuggling goods into China’s evacuated

³ Liu Fengyun 劉風雲, Qingdai de sanfan 清代的三藩 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1994), 113-118.
coast. However, the Qing was wary of the Dongjiang generals’ vacillating stances and semi-independence, and appeared to constrain their maritime power from the time of their surrender. Hong Taiji reassigned them to assist only in land battles instead of taking advantage of their naval strength. Even thirty years after the Qing had overturned the Ming, it still failed to find a peaceful resolution to eliminate the former Ming generals’ lasting influence over China’s southern borders. This provoked another period of chaos just like the late Ming court had once encountered, but this story is beyond the scope of this discussion.

Three interrelated themes constitute the principle part of this dissertation. It first concentrates on the increasing maritime interactions in the geographic area of the northern Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In this time period diverse exchanges and complex interconnections in this region were concurrently interwoven with the prosperous East Asian maritime economy and accelerated by Northeast Asian warfare. In the changing international and regional circumstances, such as the development of private commerce, intensified cross-border communications, and loosened institutional constraints, the maritime activities between Chinese and Korean coastal outlaws had become noticeable to the two governments beginning in the late fifteenth century. These individuals poached, smuggled, and migrated offshore, and caused violent conflicts with the land-based authorities, reattracting state attention to China and Kora’s northern sea space after the turbulent power shifts of Northeast Asia in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.

Although private maritime interactions were often considered a threat to coastal security, the role of the state was never passive nor invisible in response to this change. On the contrary, when the Ming or Chosŏn needed to expand influence over the sea, especially in order to compete with the Japanese or the Manchus, they accordingly adjusted maritime policies, resuming their sea transport and trade, and transforming illegal seafaring into government activity. In the context of this enhanced Ming-Chosŏn maritime cooperation, the state’s effort to connect China and Korea’s northern sea space greatly promoted its regional integration, a tendency that had been developing from the late fifteenth century and reached its peak in the wartime period of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

A diverse group of coastal actors, such as local fishermen, merchants, insular migrants, envoys, marine patrolmen, government officials, cross-regional merchants, transporters, and sailors, were actively involved in transmarine contact. Their identities varied and their legitimacy was unclear, given the variability of seafaring activities, maritime policies, and even diplomatic interpretations. Smugglers, pirates, or general sea-ban violators were hard to distinguish; the definitions of the legal and the illegal also shifted and ramified in different situations. This flexibility enabled the two states to incorporate and organize a broad range of maritime players, making use of them to serve cross-border military and economic needs when necessary.

However, regional obstructions were not unimportant to interregional mobilization, either beyond the China-Korea boundaries or from their southern coasts. Throughout the process of sea transport and trade during the Imjin War, regional restrictions such as navigational dangers; the shortage of provisions, transport vessels and sailors; administrative inefficiency; and conflicts of interest consistently troubled the two governments. In the early seventeenth century the conflict between the development of the Dongjiang military garrison spanning the northern Yellow Sea
and the environmental tolerance of China’s and Korea’s coastal regions intensified, and finally evolved into an uncontrollable factor beyond state power.

The massive, energetic, and lasting communications in the Bohai and the northern Yellow Sea area boosted the maritime orientation of China’s and Korea’s northern littoral. From a military aspect, this region was strategic in smoothing sea transport and launching naval attacks; from an economic aspect a regional trade network was formed that not only included Northeast Asian land-based states but also connected with the broader East Asian maritime world. This remarkable change facilitated the Ming and Chosŏn allies’ military resistance against the Japanese. In the 1620s, after the Later Jin’s annexation of eastern Liaodong, this northern sea space became the only channel between the Ming and Chosŏn, and the Ming’s military expansion in this region also impeded the Manchus’ ambition to conquer China proper.

The second focus of this dissertation is the nuanced relations between maritime interactions and the integration of China and Korea’s northern region, and the processes of the two states’ border control. With the increase in China-Korea maritime contact, state control over maritime borders was secured by the means of suppression, prohibition, and restriction; however, it was also dynamic, adjustable, and even expansive in response to varying circumstances. Border control was also a multiscaled and porous practice since multiple performers could interrelate and create cracks for developing distinct yet overlapping spheres of influence. Moreover, problems occurred in the attempts to categorize, discern, and incorporate flexible maritime agents as well as in the process of making penetrable maritime peripheries distinct and manageable. This was especially the case when border control was connected to complex international relations and intertwined with power expansion over the sea.

As this research shows, Ming-Chosŏn diplomatic tensions greatly affected their control of
unauthorized transmarine activities. For instance, when the Chosŏn encountered aggressive Liaodong escapees on its coast it found it difficult to recognize and directly punish piracy. Instead, it had to report border trespassing cases and repeatedly negotiate with the Liaodong and sometimes the Ming court to determine the handling of these cases. Each political player’s self-regard also generated much complexity in these multilayered diplomatic communications. Divergencies commonly occurred in dealing with issues such as the explanation of trespassers’ identities and their legitimacy, to which extent their behavior could be prohibited, and who would take responsibility in disputes.

When state power spread to the sea effective border control became even more demanding. The analysis of the Ming’s plight in managing Liaodong escapees in the Bohai Strait and the northern Yellow Sea in the sixteenth century reflects this situation. The state adopted various methods to incorporate the Liaodong refugees into their governance rather than merely applying a strict sea ban on their coastal navigation and inhabitance. To benefit from the Liaodong escapees’ maritime mobility, the Ming legalized their status, regulated their maritime trade, and clarified administrative authorities. However, regional conflicts, geographic and administrative ambiguities, and the conflict between transforming maritime agents into governable resources and restraining their illegal activities all made the Ming’s jurisdiction of Liaodong islanders difficult.

The problem of coastal governance was even more obvious in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the Ming and the Chosŏn experienced successive military challenges from the Japanese and the Manchus. This experience interconnected the two states more closely in conjunctive maritime affairs yet also caused greater tension and strife. The Japanese invasion of Korea and the expansion of the Manchus in Northeast Asia forced the Ming and Chosŏn to
open their seas in order to increase military, economic, and diplomatic communications. Recurrent trespassing, smuggling, and piracy accompanied the expansion of state power over the sea area and were interwoven with state-sponsored transmarine projects. While having the essential need of preserving coastal security, the states wanted to keep their borders distinct, reinforce their coastal security, and regulate maritime agents, but the officially separated sea regions were linked and in this process the boundaries of various participants and their activities were obscured and manipulated.

This tension prevailed within China and Korea during the unrest of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Both countries experienced domestic problems, such as the misappropriation of official resources, collusion between legitimate and illegal actors, and the difficulty of restraining maritime agents. Dissension existed between the two states as well, especially when the Ming strengthened its military intervention into the northern Yellow Sea, approaching Korea and overlapping with the Chosŏn’s coastal governance. In particular, the influx of Liaodong refugees to sea islands after the fall of Liaoyang and the establishment of the Dongjiang garrison based on Ka Island heightened the Chosŏn’s concern about its coastal security. Therefore in the early seventeenth century the Chosŏn faced threats not only from the Manchus occupying the Liaodong by land, but also from the Ming’s expansion of power on the sea.

The intricate interactions between the maritime orientation of Northeast Asia and the permeable process of coastal control enabled regional maritime agents to spread their own influence. The third focus of this dissertation is on the most vigorous actors among these individuals, China’s coastal military men, who played an ambivalent role in coordinating maritime affairs between China and Korea. While they did not form a homogenous group but
had complex backgrounds, internal disputes, and different individual trajectories, they did collectively and markedly expand individual power that interacted with official authority over the sea space between China and Korea. While before the late sixteenth century the illegal maritime activities of Liaodong’s military population were common, it was not until the Imjin War that the Chinese military’s sea power was largely legitimized and strengthened.

Since the Imjin War of the 1590s a great number of sailors, mainly originating from south China and especially Zhejiang, had been stationed along the coasts of northeast China and Korea. They were extensively empowered to guard the coastal regions, direct and escort sea transport, administer diplomatic affairs, and participate in cross-border warfare, and therefore indispensably contributed to the protection of state security and substantially benefited from this process. However, by exploiting coastal resources and political expediency, they also established smuggling networks and increased illicit violence on the sea.

This tendency continued after the Later Jin seized power in the Liaodong Peninsula and the Ming more aggressively extended military strength in the northern Yellow Sea, which contextualized the foundation of the Dongjiang garrison. Mao Wenlong, a Zhejiang migrant to Liaodong, rooted his influence in this locale due to his family background, personal talent, and his grasp of political resources and wartime opportunities. His consolidation of control over Dongjiang was largely based on his accommodation of Liaodong refugees, which required that he exploit and mobilize coastal resources. While this maritime power tended to grow beyond Ming state control, it was also fundamentally restricted by Mao’s reliance on material support from the continents. On the one hand, this situation facilitated the intermediate role of Mao’s regime in influencing multilateral political and economic relations and encouraged Mao’s adaptation to a power transition period in Northeast Asia; on the other hand, it sharpened the
tension between the Dongjiang garrison and the adjacent land-based authorities, and advanced the former’s shifting allegiance in the Ming-Qing confrontation.

In the context of the interplay between China and Korea, these themes reveal the regional transformation of the China-Korea northern sea space and its complex interaction with coastal control in the sixteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This analysis regards this area as a channel for bridging Northeast Asian terra-centered states and maritime East Asia, and stresses the importance of examining interactive territorial and maritime history.
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