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To Plow a Lonely Furrow: Indigenismo and Mapuche Politics in Chile, 1920-1960

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Abstract

This study examines Mapuche political organization in Chile from 1920-1960 through the lens of transnational indigenismo. In that period, politicians, academics and social reformers across the Americas were questioning how to incorporate indigenous populations into modern national states. While many historical accounts of similar phenomena in other countries have drawn categorical distinctions between indigenismo (as a movement led by white elites) and indigenous activism (led by Indians themselves), this work places the two phenomena side-by-side to explore connections between them. That approach shows that collaboration, periodic conflict and strategic alliance making were important components of indigenous politics in Chile. It also brings indigenous agency to the fore, and in doing so challenges historical interpretations of indigenismo that have characterized it as a paternalistic mechanism of the neocolonial state. It joins a growing body of scholarship that recognizes indigenismo as an important influence on and precursor to identity-based indigenous social movements that emerged in the late-twentieth century.
To Plow a Lonely Furrow: 
Indigenismo and Mapuche Politics in Chile, 
1920-1960

by

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present. More importantly, he taught me the value of listening to students, which still forms a foundational pillar of my professional practice as an educator. In Brockport, New York, Anne Macpherson introduced me to the disciplinary complexities of indigenous history and the pioneering work of Florencia Mallon. As I transitioned from graduate student to adjunct professor, she and Jenny Lloyd encouraged me to continue the journey and pursue the PhD at Syracuse.

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For Jeani
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Introduction

In December 1924, the Chilean presidency was up for grabs. For the moment, control fell to a military junta brought to power by a group of young officers intent upon breaking the stalemate between a reform-minded president and a parliament committed to the status quo. Meanwhile, in the southern region known as La Araucanía, 15,000 Mapuche Indians assembled to pray for the military government. Manuel Aburto Panguilef, a Mapuche chief with “sword in hand,” called upon his shaman to lead the people in prayer and ritual sacrifice so that the Almighty might bless the junta and bring great benefit to the country.³

Three years later in 1927, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo, one of the brash young military officers who had brought the junta to power by “rattling their sabers” on the floor of the Chilean Congress, seized the presidency and ruled as a dictator until 1931. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Aburto and the political organization he founded radicalized, aligned their interests with the far left, and went so far as to propose the creation of an autonomous indigenous republic in southern Chile. During that time, Ibañez had his agents surveil Aburto’s activities and confiscate the archives of his organization. Aburto Panguilef was arrested, detained and sent into internal exile in the capital of Santiago. Yet by the late 1930s, Aburto joined forces with more moderate and conservative Mapuche leaders to form a single umbrella organization to better represent the political interests of

their people. Despite the earlier repression, Aburto Panquilef and other Mapuche leaders again supported Ibañez in his 1938 and 1952 presidential campaigns.

Throughout Latin America in this era, politicians, indigenous leaders and non-indigenous intellectuals were wrestling with broad questions about how to incorporate indigenous populations into modern national states. Those questions had their roots in the colonial and early national periods, when only small segments of large, diverse American societies were afforded political rights. In the twentieth century, efforts to spur economic and social development while supporting native political participation gave rise to a transnational intellectual movement called *indigenismo*. Participants in that movement were known as *indigenistas*, and although they did not typically claim an indigenous identity themselves, they respected and promoted indigenous art, culture and history. Indigenistas were mostly men – although some women made important contributions – who were based in urban areas, well educated and of European descent, and many were trained in anthropology. Through their work in literature, the arts, politics and social science, indigenistas sought to improve the lives of Indians and incorporate them into the national fabric.⁴

Traditional interpretations of indigenismo have characterized indigenistas as paternalistic do-gooders and set their perspectives apart from those of the Indians they sought to help, as seen in the following editorial excerpt from an indigenista publication entitled “Dialogue on Indian Questions.”

⁴ Note on terminology: Throughout the text, the English word “Indian” and the Spanish “*indígena*” are used interchangeably. In Spanish, “*indígena*” is used to connote respect for indigenous peoples. By contrast “*indio*” is a derogatory term. “Mapuche,” which translates literally as “people of the land,” is used as both singular and plural forms.
Indigenista:
"In order to achieve the acculturation of the Indian, it must be done gradually in accordance with the stages of evolution to which he is incorporated. First, it is necessary to understand the nature of the many psycho-cultural pre-Columbian surviving characteristics related to these stages, using the methods of social science. In this way practical means of acculturation can be formulated authoritatively."

Indian:
"I want more money to satisfy my needs, but I do not want to change my way of living which comes from my ancestors. During the colonial period, I lived as a slave and since then, I have been exploited and deceived frequently. Even those who try to help me do not understand that they live in one world and I live in another."  

In some countries, for example Mexico and the United States, indigenistas held important positions within the structures of their respective states, and steered the course of national Indian policy. In Chile, indigenismo was less formalized and therefore less influential in the period studied here. Both Chilean indigenismo and indigenous activism resist neat classification and challenge traditional interpretations that arose from other national contexts.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, some Mapuche organizations were founded with the assistance of indigenistas, but others were founded and led by Mapuche themselves. Non-indigenous Chilean intellectuals contributed to the transnational indigenista discourse and influenced national indigenous policy, but so too did Mapuche leaders, several of whom became important elected officials. Mapuche organizations and their leaders embraced a wide range of political philosophies and forged alliances with one another, Chilean leaders, and other national and international actors. The era of indigenismo was one phase of a longer and more complex history between the Mapuche people and the state, in which

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patterns of hostility, negotiation and mutual dependence – tactics rooted in the colonial era – persisted. Those patterns also created substantial division within the Mapuche movement. Nevertheless, the large and sustained mobilization of Mapuche made it possible to insert indigenous leaders and their ideas into the apparatuses of the state.

By showing that in Chile distinctions between Indians and indigenistas were blurred, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the way in which indigenistas and Indians worked together and at odds in twentieth century projects of state formation. Indigenismo was not simply an outsider’s attempt to improve indigenous life in Chile; indigenous agency was crucial. Although they often partnered with non-indigenous Chileans, I argue that Mapuche were themselves leading contributors to Chilean indigenismo in ways that challenge us to re-interpret the movement itself. Such a view modifies our understanding of indigenous collective action in Chile, and shows that partnership with (and leadership of) the indigenista movement represent important foundations of more recent identity-based indigenous activism. In other words, indigenous social movements that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s drew from longer and broader traditions of conflict, collaboration and compromise rooted in the indigenista discourse half a century earlier.

To illustrate those foundational connections, four of the five chapters that follow examine some of the most important participants in Chile’s indigenous debate from the 1920s through the 1950s. Chapter one explores the roots and emergence of Mapuche political organization, establishing Manuel Aburto Panguilef
as an archetypal Mapuche activist. Chapter two examines the indigenismo of Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberg, a Bavarian Catholic missionary who became the leader of the Church’s efforts to educate and assimilate Mapuche into Euro-Chilean society through a conservative political and cultural philosophy. Although Aburto and Beck occupied opposite ends of the spectrum on most indigenous issues, placing them side-by-side shows that they served as foils for one another in the formative period from 1926-1938. Comparing their contributions to the indigenista discourse also informs our understanding of the movement’s later evolution in important ways.

Chapters three and four shift the focus first toward the transnational indigenista discourse that officially began with the founding of an international institute in 1940, then to a detailed examination of the life and career of Alejandro Lipschütz, Chile’s most prolific indigenista. While Lipschütz began his indigenista career with a theoretical treatise on race in the Americas and an ethnographic study of indigenous Fuegians, by the 1960s he became an advocate for indigenous autonomy and self-determination within national states. Finally, chapter five studies an important episode in the career of the most successful Mapuche leader of the era, as he founded and led the national Office of Indigenous Affairs from its inception in 1953 until 1958. Over the course of his career, Venancio Coñuepán brought the major Mapuche organizations together to form a unified political front, used that to win election to the Chilean National Congress three times, and then convinced President Ibañez to establish an official government agency to protect the rights of Indians in Chile. In doing all that, he himself contributed to the
transnational indigenista discourse and identified his indigenous-led organization as part of the indigenista movement. Together, Aburto, Beck, Lipschütz and Coñuepán demonstrate the tremendous variety of voices and positions within Chilean indigenismo, and show that the categories of Indian and indigenista were dynamic, fluid and permeable.

**Historiography**

By situating the Mapuche movement within the political context of Chile and the broader Pan-American indigenista movement, this dissertation bridges a historiographical divide between studies of indigenous activism and studies of the intellectual questions surrounding indigenismo. It also contributes to an expanding body of literature on Pan-American indigenismo and recent studies of indigenista projects that show a great diversity of goals, participants and outcomes in distinct national contexts. Chilean indigenismo is not the only example in which indigenous leaders played an active role in developing indigenista ideas and projects, but until recently indigenous contributions have largely been overlooked. Historian Laura Gotkowitz has shown how local and regional indigenous leaders engaged indigenista debates in Bolivia in the 1930s and 1940s. In *A Revolution for our Rights*,

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6 In 1945 the Mapuche organization Corporación Araucana added the subtitle “Movimiento Indigenista de Chile” to their name, emphasizing the deep connections between indigenismo and indigenous activism in Chile.

7 For an introduction to the idea that Indians were themselves important actors in the indigenista movement, see Laura Giraudo and Juan Martín-Sánchez, “'Soy Indígena e indigenista': Repensando el indigenismo desde la participación de algunos, no tan pocos, indígenas,” in *Protagonismo Ameríndio de Ontem e Hoje*, Maria Cristina dos Santos and Guilherme Galhegos Filipe, eds. Brazil: Paco Editorial, 2016, pp. 257-294.
she argues that indigenous leaders and activists challenged the authority of large
landowners and power brokers in rural Cochabamba, thus influencing military
leaders to adopt more populist political strategies at the national level and
contributing an overlooked causal strand of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution. In
contrast to traditional assumptions that indigenismo was rooted in the
contributions of white urban intellectuals, Gotkowitz demonstrates that in Bolivia
rural indigenous peasant leaders meaningfully impacted the course of national
politics.

Although indigenista projects did produce some short-term improvements in
the lives of Indians in certain contexts in the 1940s and 1950s, indigenismo as a
whole did not lead to lasting change on a large scale across Latin America. By the
1960s, indigenous questions were subsumed by a broader class-based discourse
and rural Marxist uprisings that were sometimes carried out in indigenous
territories. Therefore, in the 1970s many critics looked back on the previous efforts
of indigenistas as broad failures. But in the 1980s, indigenous activists began to
form identity-based social movements in many countries, especially in response to
political repression in the previous decade. Indigenous collective action expanded
and accelerated in the leadup to the 1992 quincentennial of Columbus’s “discovery”

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9 Chile and Guatemala offer two examples of this phenomenon. In Guatemala, government forces targeted Indians for providing aid and shelter to Marxist rebels during a protracted civil war. In Chile, because of their previous support for socialist reforms during the Allende presidency and their participation in unlawful land occupations, Mapuche became targets for repression during the Pinochet dictatorship. Similar patterns can be found in Peru in the 1980s during the Sendero Luminoso uprisings, and in Colombia where the FARC sustained a long-running guerrilla revolt against government forces for more than two decades.
of the Americas. As neoliberal social and economic reforms became common across Latin America in the 1990s, the view of indigenismo as an isolated period of state-directed reforms carried out on passive indigenous subjects went largely unchallenged. More recently scholars have begun to re-examine the role that indigenismo played in laying foundations for the rise of indigenous social and political activism. That historiographical turn critiques previous interpretations that characterized the movement as scientific and apolitical, or as a form of internal colonialism that sought to assimilate and exploit Indians. In 2012, this emerging body of scholarship was recognized in a special edition of the journal *Latin American Perspectives*, entitled “Rethinking Indigenismo on the American Continent.”

In their introduction to that volume, lead authors Laura Giraudo and Stephen E. Lewis showed that from the beginning, many indigenista efforts were complicated by events on the world stage, including large-scale military conflicts, global trade and economic cycles, and foreign policies that interfered with national agendas.

The founding of the *Instituto Indigenista Interamericano* (III – Inter-American Indianist Institute) in 1940 epitomized those complications, coming just months before the German army occupied France and began the aerial bombardment of

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12 Althought the founding of the III represents a watershed moment for the movement, indigenista activities had begun much earlier in several countries. In addition to the early Chilean forms of indigenismo presented in chapter 1, which date to the decade of the 1910s, the creation of an “Indian Protection Service” in Brazil in 1910 and the work of Luis Valcárcel and José Carlos Mariátegui in 1920s Peru all predate the formalization of Pan-American indigenismo. See Giraudo and Lewis, p. 3.
Britain during World War II. The III was dependent upon member states for its funding, much of which came from the United States government. But by 1940, Native American issues in the U.S. had waned in importance in the six years since the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, and the country would soon be embroiled in the War and its aftermath. Following World War II, U.S. interest in Latin American affairs shifted from the relatively non-interventionist aid programs of the Good Neighbor Policy, to Cold War efforts to “contain” the spread of communism by supporting regimes friendly to American-led capitalism. The case of Guatemala illustrates this tendency, where “an indigenista movement took root during the ‘Guatemalan Spring’ of 1944-1954, but it fell victim to the U.S.-backed coup that ousted Jacobo Árbenz and ushered in a series of repressive, sometimes genocidal dictatorships.”

While broad transnational trends can explain some of indigenismo’s challenges, they do not account for the tremendous variation in specific national contexts. In her individual contribution to the same 2012 volume, Laura Giraudo focused on the transnational connections that were forged through the III. She finds that the effectiveness of the movement’s broader agenda was limited by the willingness of member states to meaningfully contribute to its projects. Varying levels and forms of support for national indigenista efforts in the United States, Guatemala and Peru illustrate that indigenismo was neither fully “‘scientific’ nor

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‘colonialist’
in those cases. In this study I show that while the class of indigenistas in Chile was relatively small, some of them were well connected to the III and the broader Pan-American discourse. But Chilean indigenistas received little direct funding from the state, and so their effectiveness in achieving policy objectives supported by scientific inquiry was limited. While the state and well-intentioned indigenistas remained largely ineffective, Mapuche leaders themselves advocated directly for their own interests, but in doing so they themselves participated in the indigenista discourse and applied ideas to their own unique circumstances.

Following the failure of relatively conservative forms of institutional indigenismo across the Americas in the 1940s and 1950s, indigenous activists and Marxist revolutionaries sought new ways to advance their projects. It was in the radical politics of the 1960s that the seeds of the 1970s critique of indigenismo were sown. In the case of Peru, that transition can be seen in later historiographical attempts to understand native participation in leftist political projects like the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement. In Chile, leftist organizers themselves have shed light on that transition in the lead-up to Salvador Allende’s socialist experiment of 1970-1973. However, a full understanding of Latin

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15 The anthology *Shining and Other Paths* (Steve Stern, ed. 1998) provides a variety of explanations as to why the violent movement took root in the highland region of Ayacucho, among a largely indigenous population. Particularly insightful for this project is Marisol de la Cadena’s essay in that volume “From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals *de provincia* in Peru, 1910-1970,” and her book (*Indigenous Mestizos*, 2000) which together show that Peruvian indigenismo was linked to very fluid notions of race and ethnicity that were bound up with class identities and a profound rural-urban divide. See also, Jaymie Heilman, *Before the Shining Path* (2010).
American state formation projects should also take into account the historical voices of indigenous activists themselves. This work shows that Indians navigated their own path across the broad political landscape, seeking openings and opportunities to protect their interests from within the political system when possible, or seeking to modify the existing political order when necessary. The Chilean example illustrates that independence, and also that Mapuche political organization arose parallel to and intertwined with the emergence of an indigenista movement.

This study of Chilean indigenismo and Mapuche political action also adds conceptually to studies of indigenismo in other national contexts by showing how the discourse was formed, how it spread through public consciousness and how indigenous activists altered the discourse and transformed ideas into strategies. It challenges the view that indigenismo amounted to little more than a paternalistic attempt by whites to “improve” native peoples or preserve their culture in a national state that served as a kind of living museum. At the same time, this work also adds an ethnic and racial dimension to the literature on twentieth century Chilean politics and shows how the politics of race and class intersected, which was significant but has been largely overlooked to date. This work also contributes a study of the Mapuche political project to the North American literature on indigenous politics in Latin America, and it critically examines indigenismo as a contested corpus of ideas projected onto a landscape of unequal power relations.

For the past three decades, historians of Latin America have increasingly tried to shed light on the participation of marginalized groups in episodes of historical change. The roots of that transition can be seen in the late 1970s as labor
historians shifted away from structural analyses of political economy and union leadership, and toward studies of the lived experiences of workers. In the 1990s the trend in labor history was complemented by studies that documented the roles of subaltern groups in processes of state formation and nation building. One can also observe a similar emphasis in the literature on the impact of the Cold War in Latin America, which began with state-level analyses of U.S. foreign policy and journalistic accounts that documented the involvement of state actors in military interventions. Those were followed by historical works that expanded upon themes of ideological warfare, terror and repression, and illuminated the much more varied roles of Indians, peasants and activists in Cold War campaigns and the impact of those experiences on historical memory. This study builds upon those trends by combining “top-down” analysis of supranational and state-level politics and guiding ideologies, with “bottom-up” analysis of the way political principles and realities were understood by people on the ground.

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17 This movement began following the lead of labor historians of the US and Europe inspired by E.P. Thompson’s influential study of the English working class. By the late 1980s this shift was well-documented and the best scholarship combined structural and experiential analyses. See Emilia Viotti da Costa, “Structure vs. Experience” (1989) in which she points to works by Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution (1986) and Daniel James, Resistance and Integration (1988) that combined analyses of political and economic structures with the ways institutional change was experienced by workers.


20 For select examples see Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre (2004), Joseph and Spenser, eds. In From the Cold (2008) and Steve Stern’s fine trilogy on the role of violence on historical memory, The Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile (2004, 2006 and 2010).
This project also draws from (and contributes to) the recent proliferation of studies devoted to understanding the social, cultural and political experiences of indigenous peoples in Latin America, a body of work that benefits from disciplinary intersections between anthropology and history. Most existing studies of indigenismo fall into this category, and have explored national contexts where indigenous persons constitute a large percentage of the overall population. Numerous studies of indigenismo exist in the Mexican historiography, in part because indigenista projects were sponsored by the government and viewed as integral to the consolidation of the post-revolutionary state, especially under President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1920s and 1930s. In Chile during the same period, national politics tended to favor reform movements focused in urban areas and supported by broad coalitions of political parties, as evidenced by the Popular Front coalition of Radical, Socialist and Communist political parties from 1938 to 1946. Although their base of power rested more in the rural south, individuals and groups of Mapuche began migrating to Chile’s cities in this era. Mapuche politicians learned to maneuver across the shifting sands of political alliances and demographic changes, and were courted for the relatively small but symbolically important constituencies of voters they could deliver.

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21 The orientation of indigenismo to anthropology can be seen in David Brading’s "Manuel Gamio and Official Indigenismo in Mexico," (1988). A more thorough treatment of the panoply of indigenista programs of this era can be found in Alexander Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (2004). Dawson also takes pains to show how Indians participated in those programs. The relationship of indigenista philosophy to post-colonial theories of economic development is elaborated in Karin Roseblatt, "Modernization, Dependency and the Global in Mexican Critiques of Anthropology" (2014).
Much of the historiography of twentieth century Chile adopts class as a central motif for explaining political conflict and change. Peter Winn’s *Weavers of Revolution* complemented trends in Chilean historiography that had previously done so, and was among the vanguard of new labor histories from the North American academy that combined structural and experiential analyses of workers’ movements. Since its publication in 1986 that book has influenced a generation of Chileanists to incorporate lived experience into their analyses, leading to several important books explaining the ways that class and gender identities overlapped in political projects across the twentieth century. What is largely missing from those works is the role of race and ethnicity in the imagining of the modern Chilean nation. This dissertation helps to fill that void by showing that debates about the “Mapuche question” were also a central concern in many twentieth century political projects, including those devoted to economic development and agrarian reform.

While an extensive literature on the Mapuche now exists in the Chilean historiography, only a handful of books have been published in English. Several

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24 One of the few scholars of Chilean history that emphasizes the role of race in Chilean politics is Karin Rosemblatt. While her co-edited volume *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (2003) does not include an essay on Chilean history, her essay “Sexuality and Bio-Power in Chile and Latin America” (2002) does.
ethnographic studies emerged in recent years that are largely focused outside the scope of politics and activism. The most important scholar to publish sophisticated historical work in English on the Mapuche and indigenous politics in Chile is Florencia Mallon. Two recent books include a testimonial collaboration with Mapuche activist Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef and a fine-grained monographic study of one Mapuche community and their struggle to maintain control of their land over the course of the twentieth century. Both studies provide points of guidance for this dissertation project. The former makes the strong point that Mapuche activists have always been distributed across the political spectrum, as Reuque Paillalef herself is a member of the Christian Democratic Party and reports often feeling ostracized from the male-dominated and predominantly leftist nature of the movement since the 1960s. In *Courage Tastes of Blood*, Mallon shows that the issue of land has been central to Mapuche political struggles across the twentieth century. By illuminating the indigenista discourse, questioning how it shaped activism and showing how Mapuche themselves participated in that discourse, strategies of political alignment and the theme of dispossession from rightful territory are both better understood.

While Mallon’s work has shown that Mapuche political strategies varied dramatically over time, she argues that the position of the state remained fairly

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25 Two examples are Ana Maria Bacigalupo’s work on gender and shamanism among the Mapuche, especially *Shamans of the Foye Tree* (2007), and a recent book by Magnus Course on Mapuche notions of selfhood, *Becoming Mapuche* (2011).

static. I set out to show that while state policies did consistently work to reduce Mapuche land tenure, a variety of voices attempted to influence the state’s position in favor of Mapuche rights over the course of the mid-twentieth century. In doing so, this dissertation builds upon the survey of Mapuche cultural politics in the twentieth century by historian Joanna Crow. By examining social, cultural and political trends across the century, Crow demonstrates that the contributions of Mapuche and Chilean artists, intellectuals and politicians all contributed to place indigenous themes at the heart of many of the century’s most important events. Chile’s two most important poets, Gabriela Mistral and Pablo Neruda, both incorporated indigenous themes into some of their most significant works, and so did the musicians of the Chilean New Song movement. Likewise, Mapuche activism was deeply connected to some of the most significant political developments, including agrarian reform efforts in the 1960s and Salvador Allende’s democratic path to socialist revolution that commenced with his election to the presidency in 1970.

In addition, three important works of Chilean scholarship on Mapuche politics in the twentieth century guide this study in significant ways. The first is a book by two Chilean anthropologists that surveys the creation and rise of the major Mapuche political organizations from the turn of the century until the Allende era. Their work is primarily based on newspaper reports of the organizations’ activities and some private archives. It provides a framework for understanding the main

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29 Foerster and Montecino (1988).
thrust of each group’s ideological orientation and catalogues their leaders and activities. The second is a recent biography of Alejandro Lipschütz, the most important Chilean indigenista of the twentieth century, written by one of his former students, an anthropologist himself with connections to the North American academy. That book serves as an overview of Lipschütz’s life and career and provides this study with a guide to using Lipschütz’s published work as primary source material. The third is a collection of four essays that serve as a historical manifesto of the Mapuche movement, written by Mapuche historians. That work provides this study with an understanding of the role of history in the current politics of the movement, as Mapuche activists have used historical methods to document the loss of territory and the opposition and betrayal of state actors and projects.

Sources

This work draws from four main categories of primary source material. The first category is composed of the historical records of the largest and longest-lasting Mapuche organizations of the period. Until 1938, the Sociedad Caupolicán, Federación Araucana and Unión Araucana operated independently of one another, but in that year they partially merged operations under the umbrella of the Corporación Araucana. The Sociedad and Corporación archives have not survived,


31 Pablo Marimán, et al, ¡...Escucha, Winka...! (2006). Although the authors identify themselves as “historians of the Mapuche movement,” Mallon notes that only Marimán has had access to PhD studies (“Decolonizing the History of Allende’s Chile” lecture).
but their activities were well documented in the regional press. As the group that most regularly organized large gatherings, accounts of the Federación’s activities also appeared frequently in the press. Although the state confiscated their official archives in 1929, fragments of the Federación’s founder and leader Manuel Aburto Panguilef’s prolific writing survive in several smaller caches. Aburto Panguilef’s descendants retained some of his personal journals, which now are housed at the Liwen Center at the Universidad de la Frontera in Temuco. Chilean scholars André Menard and Jorge Pavez have published some of those documents, as well as other fragments that Pavez discovered in the official archives of the Ministry of the Interior.  

Because the Unión Araucana was founded, supported and directed through much of its existence by Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberg, its records are well preserved and organized at the headquarters of the regional Diocese in the southern town of Villarrica. Combined with newspaper accounts and scholarship based upon oral history, these sources provide good insight into the activities of the major Mapuche organizations during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the transnational indigenista movement gained momentum and benefited from the organization and coordination provided by the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. The III archives are housed in Mexico City, and the two major journals that they produced during the period (Boletín Indigenista and América Indígena) have been digitized. The work in chapter three draws primarily from the Boletín, which served as a newsletter providing accounts and updates on indigenista activities across the Americas. Larger countries and nations

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32 Archivo Nacional de la Adminstración (ARNAD), Ministerio del Interior, Libro 7321.
with large indigenous populations, like the United States, Mexico and Peru, logically had more activity and therefore received more coverage, but Chilean indigenismo is represented there less extensively.

The personal papers of Alejandro Lipschütz, Chile's most famous and prolific indigenista, are housed at the University of Chile's special collections library at the Ñuñoa campus in Santiago. Lipschütz maintained regular correspondence with many of the leading indigenistas of the day, including the U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, and Mexican anthropologist and III Director Manuel Gamio. He also exchanged letters with many leading academics interested in indigenous affairs from around the world. Taken together with the seven book-length texts Lipschütz published on indigenous themes, his papers and published work provide key links that enable me to trace the exchange of ideas between Chile and other national contexts through the transnational intellectual network of indigenismo in chapter four.

Finally, the Chilean state produced official documents through several bureaucratic channels that inform this study. Chapter five is largely based on records generated by the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas (DASIN) found in the Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ARNAD) in the capital of Santiago. President Carlos Ibañez del Campo created DASIN in 1953 as part of a sweeping reorganization of the national government, and Venancio Coñuepán led that agency from its inception until shortly after the election of Jorge Alessandri in 1958. Not only was Coñuepán the most successful Mapuche leader in terms of advancing indigenous issues before the national government, but DASIN represents a high-
water mark of more than thirty years of Mapuche organizing and political mobilization. It also can be viewed as a formal counterpart to indigenista institutions in other countries, like the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States and the *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (National Indigenous Institute) in Mexico.

While the historical record of Mapuche political activity in this period is extensive, it is not complete or without limitations. The Sociedad Caupolicán was perhaps the most influential and mainstream of the three major Mapuche organizations between 1910-1938. The Mapuche leaders elected to Congress in this period all rose through the ranks of the Sociedad. However, it is unfortunate that the organization left no archives. It is likely that they were merged with the papers of the Corporación Araucana after 1938, and that organization’s official archives have not survived either. That archival void complicates this study by limiting insight into the organizational history of the 1940s, during which time Venancio Coñuepán used the Corporación to consolidate his leadership of the Mapuche movement. Nevertheless, that history can be surveyed through newspaper accounts of his activity and correspondence with leaders in other organizations. The Federación and Unión archival caches are helpful in that regard, but it is worth noting that this analysis of the Mapuche movement proceeds from a detailed look at the two organizations that tended toward the extremes of the political spectrum rather than the more centrist Sociedad and Corporación. That perspective supports

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33 Although this claim is broadly true, it is important to note that in the late 1920s the Sociedad drifted dramatically to the left under the leadership of Arturo Huenchullán, as the broader Mapuche movement mobilized to oppose the 1927 indigenous law. After Venancio Coñuepán was elected president of the Sociedad in 1931, he realigned the group under a more centrist, pro-economic development agenda.
the argument that the movement was ideologically diverse, and that the full breadth of views impacted the course charted by the more mainstream leaders and organizations.

Chile’s position on the periphery of the indigenista movement also limits how much the III archives illuminate the discourse there. To begin with, Chilean submissions to the Boletín Indigenista were less frequent and less abundant than those from other countries, and the Chilean indigenista movement was smaller and less formally established. Alejendro Lipschütz, as the Chilean indigenista most well-connected to the transnational movement, was also limited in his ability to make inroads with state bureaucracies because of his communist political views that distanced him from the more centrist, rural and conservative orientation of the main body of the Mapuche movement and their allies in government. Although these factors present challenges to the analysis of both indigenismo and Mapuche politics within Chile, they support a central contribution of the study, which is that both movements were diverse and contested throughout the period.

**Historical Context**

This Mapuche story of political organization, resistance and ethnic resurgence opens near the end of a fifty-year process of conquest, colonization and subjugation. Through much of the nineteenth century, the Mapuche controlled the Araucanía as a large autonomous territory between the Bío Bío and Toltén Rivers. In that time they prospered as herdsmen and traders. But between 1861 and 1883 the

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34 André Menard, personal conversation, July 2013.
Chilean state executed a military campaign in which they conquered the Mapuche and occupied their territory. That campaign is euphemistically known as the Pacification of Araucanía.\textsuperscript{35} Resettlement followed the war, and between 1883 and 1929 the state created a system of \textit{reducciones} (reservations) by granting land titles called \textit{títulos de merced} to about 3,000 Mapuche heads of household. The process of \textit{radicación} (settlement) diminished Mapuche territory from approximately five million hectares to 526,285,\textsuperscript{36} and the newly formed communities continued to lose land through widespread legal fraud accompanied by violence and intimidation. By the end of the 1920s, Mapuche lands totaled less than ten percent of the territory they had controlled before the Pacification.\textsuperscript{37}

Parallel to the radicación, beginning in the 1890s and carrying into the first decades of the twentieth century, the state redistributed former Mapuche lands to European and Chilean colonists through a mechanism of land grants. Chile's policy

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\textsuperscript{35} At about the same time, the Argentine army executed a series of military campaigns known as the “Conquest of the Desert” to subdue Mapuche and other “Araucanized” peoples on the eastern side of the Andes. Both campaigns were related to disputed border territory along the cordillera and both countries’ mutual ambition to lay claim to Patagonia.

\textsuperscript{36} The Pacification, reducción and founding of Mapuche organizations in this early period is narrated in English in Xavier Albó, “Andean People in the Twentieth Century,” in \textit{The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas}, Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz, eds., Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Albó relies primarily upon Foerster and Montecino \textit{Organizaciones, Lideres y Contiendas Mapuche}, which remains the most comprehensive source on this formative period of Mapuche politics. On the scope of land loss, see Albó p. 776.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 787. Albó cites José Bengoa, \textit{Historia del Pueblo Mapuche: Siglo XIX y XX}, Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Sur, 1985, to estimate that by 1929 almost one-third of Mapuche communities established by radicación had filed suit to recover lands subsequently usurped, which likely amounted to the loss of another 105,000 hectares. Meanwhile the total size of the Mapuche population was counted in the 1920 census at 105,162, which amounted to 2.8 percent of the total population of Chile, which in 1920 was counted at 3,753,799. Dirección General de Estadística. \textit{Censo de Poblacion de la República de Chile, 1920}. Santiago de Chile: Sociedad Impresa y Litografía Universo, 1925. Available at: \url{http://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/censos/censos-de-poblacion-y-vivienda}, accessed 6/29/17.
of "concessionary colonialism" was rife with fraud and contributed to the further loss of reserve land by Mapuche communities. The state granted huge tracts of land to political insiders and colonization companies, the latter being charged with recruiting colonists from Europe and other parts of Chile to settle across the region. It was an effort to make land productive, and thereby increase the nation's economic might in an era when the Chilean economy was primarily devoted to the production and export of agricultural and mineral resources. From the beginning, the Pacification was part of the Chilean state's attempt to increase, consolidate and dominate its territory, inhabitants and their resources. As these processes unfolded, some Mapuche families were never granted land in the first place, while others saw their smallholdings decreased further through fraudulent land dealings of the colonizers and their entrenched Euro-Chilean allies.

During this period, Mapuche leaders began to form “mutual protection” societies for the purpose of defending their lands from usurpation and their culture from the pressures of assimilation. From the very beginning the Mapuche organizations were joint projects between Indians educated in Chilean society who returned to the south as teachers and merchants, and white Chileans who collaborated with them. The Mapuche leaders tended to be descendants of traditional longkos (political leaders) who had been educated in Chilean schools and attained measures of success in business or education. In the Araucanía, where a large portion of society identified as Mapuche, many speaking only the native

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38 Jesse Zarley, *Settling the Mapuche Question: Concessionary Colonization in Chile, 1900-1912*, unpublished manuscript. In this text, Zarley provides detailed accounts of land usurpation and coins the phrase "concessionary colonialism."

39 The first of these was the *Sociedad Caupolicán*, founded in 1910.
Mapudungun language, the leaders of those organizations were quickly able to utilize their organizational capacity to produce votes, and two Mapuche *diputados* (deputies) were elected to the Chilean National Congress in the 1920s. It is significant to note that those two leaders represented political parties at almost opposite ends of the political spectrum.\(^{40}\)

While broad debates between conservative and liberal political ideologies had embroiled Chilean national politics since independence in 1818, by the 1920s both ideologies were being challenged.\(^{41}\) During and after World War I, the nation's economy struggled under lower prices and decreased international demand for nitrates, its principal export commodity. Riding a popular wave of political and

\(^{40}\) The first Mapuche representative elected to Chile’s lower house (Chamber of Deputies) was Francisco Melivilu, representing the Partido Demócrata, one of the most progressive parties in Chile at the time, and not-coincidentally part of President Arturo Alessandri's ruling coalition during his first term as president (1920-1924). Manuel Manquilef was the second Mapuche elected the Cámaral de Diputados in 1925, representing the Partido Liberal. His firm commitment to the tenets of private property and classical liberalism is important to understand the legislative reforms he proposed. In 1927, Manquilef proposed a new indigenous law that encouraged the further fragmentation of Mapuche communal lands through subdivision and the establishment of individual property titles. Chapters one and two illustrate how this law created a significant rift in the Mapuche movement, with major organizations aligning to either support or oppose subdivision.

economic dissatisfaction, Arturo Alessandri was elected to the presidency in 1920, supported by an alliance of the Liberal, Democrat and Radical Parties, in an unprecedented election that threatened to end the thirty-year period of parliamentary oligarchic rule. His fiery campaign rhetoric earned him the nickname “the Lion of Tarapacá” as he promised reforms to the popular sectors of society. But following his election, the parliamentary regime in Congress stymied his proposals and kept Alessandri from delivering on his campaign promises. The public (and eventually the military) became increasingly frustrated with the government’s inability to function effectively. Some blamed the legislative branch for blocking Alessandri’s reform proposals, while others blamed the president for pushing them in the first place.42

The persistence of this stalemate prompted the military to intervene in Chilean politics in September 1924, and eventually enabled Carlos Ibañez del Campo to ascend to the presidency in 1927.43 Ibañez pushed forward a host of social reforms that had been frustrated in the first half of the decade, but two of the most significant to the Mapuche people were the Southern Property Law and the Ley Indígena 1.469 of 1927. The former sought to stem the tide of fraudulent land dealings in the south, where settlers, colonization agents and political insiders had stolen tens of thousands of acres from the Chilean government.44 The latter created a process whereby communally held Mapuche lands, only recently established as

43 Nunn, pp. 3-4.
reducciones through the granting of titulos de merced to heads of household and their extended families, could be subdivided and titled individually at the request of a single member of the community.45

By the 1920s, Mapuche communities increasingly found themselves defending their lands against settler incursions legitimized by state policies. Using their organizations, Mapuche appealed to the state for redress through courts and elected representatives. The reducciones had been established as a form of communal land ownership, with tracts granted to longkos who would hold land in trust and distribute parcels to members of the community for agricultural purposes. The 1927 indigenous law was premised on classical liberal notions of private property, and some Mapuche supported the subdivision of communal lands to establish individual title so they could sell or borrow against their property. But the major Mapuche organizations fought to maintain communal ownership as they defended and promoted indigenous cultural practices, and they increasingly allied with more left-leaning parties to protect their people from further loss of land. Broad Mapuche opposition to the law ultimately forced its modification in 1931.

The 1930s brought continued political instability, a second period of military intervention in civilian politics, and vacillation between conservative and progressive political impulses. Mapuche organizations adeptly navigated the full breadth of the political spectrum to advance their interests. For example, when the largest Mapuche groups came together to form the conglomerate Corporación Araucana as a politically moderate entity in 1938, a second group of leaders formed

a more left-leaning umbrella organization.\textsuperscript{46} As Chilean presidential politics stabilized in the late-1940s and 1950s, the Corporación developed into a de facto “Mapuche political party,” defined by the indigenous ethnic identity of its leaders and supporters.\textsuperscript{47} The Corporación and its long-time leader Venancio Coñuepán developed a kind of hegemony over the Mapuche movement, and channeled that power to form an alliance with the populist but fairly conservative Ibañez, who returned to the presidency in 1952 as a stable alternative to the partisan chaos of national politics in the 1940s. Ibañez created an Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Land and Colonization, which he tapped Coñuepán to run. In this way, Mapuche leaders were able to carve out space for their people within the Chilean state as it developed over this fifty-year period.

\textbf{Chapter Outline}

The first two chapters open this dissertation by summarizing the emergence of Mapuche organizations in the early twentieth century. As popular movements brought changes to the Chilean political landscape in the early twentieth century, the major Mapuche organizations were founded with the help of non-Mapuche allies, but most rapidly became independent of non-native leaders. As they did so, some made use of new political openings made available by left-leaning political parties. Chapter one focuses on Manuel Aburto Panguilef and his Federación Araucana, which represent the more radical elements within the Mapuche

\textsuperscript{46} Here I refer to the \textit{Frente Único de Araucanía}, which quickly curried the favor of the \textit{Frente Popular} coalition led by President Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941). \textsuperscript{47} Albó, 818.
movement. Aburto’s political thought and strategy were premised upon older traditions of alliance making between Mapuche leaders and Spanish/Chilean state actors that extended back to the colonial era. When Aburto developed ties with the Socialist and Communist Parties, he used them to oppose Liberal Party projects that had the potential to further diminish Mapuche lands. In the same era, he also fought to preserve Mapuche cultural traditions by organizing large religious ceremonies and by supporting and practicing polygamy. At one point Aburto even went so far as to propose the creation of an autonomous indigenous republic for the Mapuche in southern Chile, which he believed would be supported by his socialist and communist allies.

But Aburto’s radical proposals did not go unchallenged; he was watched and arrested by federal police, and other elements in Chilean society organized a response to the prospect of greater independence for Indians. In chapter two I show that the Catholic missionary and bishop Guido Beck helped found and lead the Unión Araucana as a response to Aburto and the Federación. Beck and his Mapuche collaborators advanced a more conservative form of indigenismo, one that staunchly opposed the spread of communism and sought to assimilate Indians to western social norms through Catholicism. But their efforts to carry out the subdivision of communally-held indigenous lands using a new indigenous law in 1927 caused the other Mapuche organizations to unite in opposition, pushing the main body of the movement further to the left of the political spectrum. Shortly after that frustration, Beck had a falling out with Antonio Chihuailaf, the president and indigenous face of the Unión, which was publicized in the regional press and
threatened to undercut Beck’s influence with state actors. His response was to continue attacking Aburto and the Federación, and as a result he maintained a level of importance within the movement by providing a connection to indigenous populations that did not fundamentally challenge state control of southern property or indigenous populations. The more conservative orientation and deep connections to state actors proved valuable to the movement, and the right-wing Unión joined the left-leaning Federación and the more centrist Sociedad Caupolicán to form the Corporación Araucana when they came together in 1938.

The next two chapters shift the focus from Mapuche and indigenista organizing within Chile to consider the impact of the emergent transnational indigenista movement after 1940. Chapter three first provides an overview of the indigenista discourse by framing it within global and hemispheric geopolitical trends before shifting the focus to Chilean indigenismo more specifically. I show how the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano was formed at a critical but imperiled moment. During and after World War II, geopolitical events shifted the foreign and domestic policies of the most powerful governments in the hemisphere from populist and progressive efforts supported by international cooperation in the 1930s toward new priorities, principally the consolidation of the post-revolutionary state in Mexico and the containment of communism led by the United States. The III did initiate and guide significant development projects toward the improvement of Indian populations in Mexico and other countries. However, those efforts unfolded as development schemes shifted their focus from integrated models that combined social enhancements with economic growth, toward more targeted development
projects that prioritized growth in economic production over other forms of improvement. In Chile, indigenistas contributed their insight to a variety of indigenous projects both within the country and through the III.

Chapter four brings the analysis of indigenismo even more directly to Chile by examining the life and career of that country’s most accomplished indigenista. Alejandro Lipschütz was born in Latvia and trained as a biologist before emigrating to Chile in 1920. Once there, Lipschütz became interested in biological, social and political questions pertaining to indigenous populations in the Americas, and gradually developed a productive avocation as an indigenista. Between the 1930s and his death in 1980, he published seven books on indigenous topics, and developed deep personal connections to indigenistas around the world. Lipschütz corresponded regularly with leading indigenistas linked to the III. In addition to participating in several international indigenista conferences, he helped found a national indigenista institute (Instituto Indigenista Chileno – IIC) in Chile and tried to convince the government to ratify the Patzcuaro Convention and support the institute’s work, but was largely unsuccessful. As an avowed communist living and working in Santiago, I argue that Lipschütz and his counterparts at the IIC struggled to influence the Mapuche movement or the Chilean government directly. As the transnational indigenista movement gained steam, Mapuche leaders based in the rural south and Chilean state actors were moving toward a more conservative brand of indigenismo. They utilized long-standing traditions of political clientelism and alliance-making, which effectively marginalized both Euro-Chilean indigenistas and more radical voices within the Mapuche movement at the same time.
The fifth and final chapter closely examines the work of Venancio Coñuepán during his time as Director of the Office of Indigenous Affairs (DASIN), and interprets that episode as an example of formal, institutionalized state indigenismo. The critical period from 1952-1958 represents the height of Mapuche influence in Chilean national politics during the second presidency of Carlos Ibañez del Campo. While in many ways DASIN can be viewed as analogous to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States or the National Indian Institute in Mexico, its work was underfunded and consumed with functional tasks related to its supervision of the Indian courts in southern Chile. Those courts attempted to sort through decades of land claims that were complicated by persistent fraud perpetrated by Euro-Chilean landowners, colonists and their allies in the legal system, and sustained by collusion between those sectors. In some cases, Coñuepán was able to use the mandate given to DASIN by Ibañez as leverage to improve systems for researching legal claims, administering contracts and lending money to Mapuche smallholders. But by the end of the decade, during the administration of President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), the political winds shifted and Coñuepán was forced from his post as Director at about the same time that many Mapuche politicians were swept from office. Thereafter the agency ceased to be an effective bulwark of protection for the Mapuche people. When the Mapuche movement did reorganize in the 1960s, the previous order that sought alliances with politicians and parties in power gave way to more radical forms of political organizing and agitation affiliated with the left.

This dissertation brings together these disparate forces to understand the complex set of relationships between Mapuche leaders, state actors, indigenistas
and their ideas. In combining those perspectives, I map the terrain upon which the Mapuche people were incorporated into the Chilean state in the forty-year period from 1920-1960. I show that indigenous leaders adeptly borrowed from the transnational flow of ideas that circulated throughout the period. Although the story ends as the tide of Mapuche influence ebbed, the movement would quickly rebound to form a main source of support for Salvador Allende’s electoral socialist revolution in the early 1970s. It would later emerge as a vibrant and multi-faceted identity-based movement that helped to bring democracy back to Chile after the seventeen-year dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ended in 1990. This dissertation joins a growing list of studies that critically re-examine the role of indigenismo and the origins of indigenous activism in the mid-twentieth century. While relatively small groups of Chilean indigenistas and Mapuche activists were on the periphery of the Pan-American movement, their connections to it provided a framework that enabled Mapuche leaders to formulate demands, and which state actors could access to understand and respond to those demands.
Chapter 1: The Roots of Mapuche Activism

Across the twentieth century, Mapuche activists, organizers and politicians expressed many different viewpoints on the central challenges facing their people. Traditional interpretations of the Mapuche movement have focused on the central, compromising character of leaders, specifically Venancio Coñuepán and his alliance of organizations under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana after 1938. This chapter and the next one explore the diversity of thought, strategies and alliances within the Mapuche movement by focusing on two organizations at the extremes – the Federación Araucana and the Unión Araucana – in the period from 1920-1938, before they came together to form the Corporación.

Chapter one shows that Mapuche activism emerged in partnership with white Euro-Chileans who exemplified the traditional characteristics of indigenistas.\textsuperscript{48} Thirty years before the institutional framework of indigenismo was formalized with the creation of the III, the first Mapuche organizations were founded in the 1910s. Even in that early period, Mapuche leaders chose a range of strategies and political alliances to advance their goals. Those choices show that the movement was broad, diverse and influenced by many factors. Then focusing more directly on Manuel Aburto Panguilef’s thought, philosophy, early influences and his

\textsuperscript{48} Foerster and Montecino use the phrase “huincas ‘indigenistas.’” Huinca (also spelled “winka” or “wingka”) is a phrase that means white and non-Mapuche, but also carries connotations of the unbalanced power relationship in the process of Chilean colonial expansion. Foerster and Montecino, 16-18. Mallon points out that “wigka” originally meant “thief who operates quickly and violently.” See Florencia Mallon, 2005, p. 255.
leadership of the Mapuche movement through the Federación Araucana, I show that Aburto drew from a long tradition of engagement with colonial and Chilean authorities, and that his projects and positions were conceived in a reflexive way. Aburto not only drew ideas from both opponents and allies, he understood that both contributed to his own prestige and authority. The Federación Araucana and the projects it carried out were clearly influenced by (and reactive to) the broader social, cultural, economic and political circumstances of Chile in the 1920s and 1930s. But in the process of advocating for a particular set of solutions to Mapuche problems, Aburto effectively constituted specific terrain and social roles for his people. In effect, his work was part of the ongoing creation of the Mapuche indigenous identity.

**The First Mapuche Organizations**

As Chilean settlers advanced into the Araucanía in the late nineteenth century they established schools. The first Mapuche organizations were founded with the help of non-Mapuche educators associated with those schools. Their projects were initially collaborative, and illuminate a Chilean form of indigenismo in which white, educated intellectuals helped indigenous Mapuche leaders establish themselves and promote the interests of their people. Mapuche leaders derived from a relatively high social stratum within Mapuche society, the foundations of which predated the Pacification. This understanding provides an intellectual jumping-off point to guide analysis of their evolving political philosophy and later strategic alliance making.
Perhaps due to the influence of the indigenistas, but also deriving from their own familial and cultural backgrounds, early Mapuche leaders brought distinct perspectives to the Mapuche movement and the organizations they founded and led. Historian Joanna Crow has analyzed the intellectual underpinnings of three of those Mapuche leaders’ views on land and culture in the 1920s and 1930s: Manuel Manquilef, Manuel Aburto Panguilef and Venancio Coñuepán. Manquilef was a strong proponent of individual land rights and the subdivision of communally held land. He spearheaded the passage of the Ley Indígena 1.469 in 1927, which created a process for subdividing Mapuche communal land so that individuals could sell, borrow against and improve their lands. Manuel Aburto, on the other hand, saw the preservation of community land (and recovery of lost land) as central to his people’s ability to maintain their cultural practices and therefore their identity as Indians. He also held out hope for the re-creation of an independent Mapuche republic, which put him at odds with the Chilean state and made him a target for incarceration and repression.49

Although they both strove for the betterment of their people, Manuel Manquilef and Manuel Aburto held competing visions of the indigenous past of the Mapuche. On one hand, Manquilef expressed ambivalence between the glorious, prosperous and warlike past and the Mapuche’s destitute and repressed present. Accounting for that difference, he blamed a lack of education and Mapuche ignorance of Chilean legal and economic practices, hence his perseverance in demanding educational opportunities and ultimately a greater measure of

assimilation for Mapuche in the 1920s. Aburto, on the other hand, felt no ambivalence toward the past or contradiction in the value of Mapuche culture in the present. It was not necessary for individuals to give up aspects of indigenous culture in order to prosper in the 1920s; it was only necessary for the Chilean state and people to gain a measure of respect for that culture and value it as equal (or at least equivalent) to their own.\textsuperscript{50}

Foerster and Montecino trace this distinction to the hereditary roots of the two leaders. Manquilef was the son of a \textit{cacique aliado} (a chief who cooperated with the Chilean army during the Pacification) and a captive Chilean mother. Aburto descended from the Mapuche \textit{“huilliche”} culture group in territory further south and less directly affected during the Pacification. A distant ancestor had served as a “go-between” and had participated in the peace treaty signed in 1793 between the Spanish Crown and Mapuche caciques in the southern region of Osorno. That accord, the authors argue, resulted from a significantly less traumatic “pacification” than the one that occurred a hundred years later and further north.\textsuperscript{51} It also occurred before the period of Mapuche prosperity in the mid-nineteenth century, and therefore reinforced Aburto’s conception that traditional Mapuche culture did

\textsuperscript{50} In chapter three, I establish a continuum of cultural preservation-assimilation that is a useful tool in understanding the indigenista approach to uplifting Indians. Without exploring that concept fully at this point, it is interesting to note that these three indigenous leaders occupied different places on that continuum as well, related to the positions they took on specific questions related to social and economic advancement.

\textsuperscript{51} For a different perspective on the “trauma” produced by the Spanish colonial subjugation of the Huilliche, see Jesse Zarley, “Towards a Transande\-ean Mapuche Politics: Ritual and Power in Chile and Argentina, 1792-1834,” PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2017. Zarley shows that although the Huilliche peoples around Valdivia maintained a tenuous peace with Spanish colonial authorities, they were the victims and perpetrators significant episodic violence. In particular, the 1793 Parlamento de Negrete was precipitated by a brutal campaign against Huilliche longkos who had pushed back against colonial incursions on their territory (chapter 3).
not need to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{52} Those differences aside, they both supported their people against perceived injustices from the state and Chilean society. As early as 1915, Manquilef was trying to overcome the racial prejudices that Chilean society had of Mapuche. In his book \textit{Las Tierras de Arauco}, Manquilef listed and refuted several commonly held prejudices, including the notions that Indians were lazy, dirty and dishonest. Ten years later in an interview published in the region’s newspaper of record \textit{El Diario Austral} he added, “It can be said that all of the vices that are today attributed to Indians are fictitious. They are the products of efforts made by those who would steal their last inch of land.”\textsuperscript{53}

Venancio Coñuepán, meanwhile, charted a pragmatic middle course in which he maintained support for the rights of Mapuche to hold land in common and thereby prevent the division and sale of land by individuals. However, he also viewed economic progress as critical for Mapuche survival and therefore recognized the need for some measure of cultural assimilation.\textsuperscript{54} Coñuepán’s pragmatism enabled him to become a kind of political insider. He went on to unite and then lead the major Mapuche organizations under the umbrella of the Corporación Araucana in 1938. Then he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1945 and 1949, and appointed as Minister of Land and Colonization in 1953. Finally, he oversaw the creation of an Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Land and Colonization and served as the Director of that office from 1953 until 1960. That period represents a high-water mark for the incorporation of the Mapuche

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\textsuperscript{52} Foerster and Montecino, pp. 81-88. \\
\textsuperscript{53} Manuel Manquilef, \textit{Las Tierras del Arauco}, Temuco: Imprenta Modernista, 1915. Cited in Foerster and Montecino, p. 82. \\
\textsuperscript{54} Joanna Crow, 2010, p. 132. 
\end{flushright}
movement into the Chilean state. But in order to fully understand the process by which the Corporación came together, and why that component of the movement was able to penetrate the state while others were excluded, we must step back and explore more fully the roots of these Mapuche political organizations and the spectrum of political issues and positions they supported.

La Sociedad Caupolicán

The first major Mapuche political organization, La Sociedad Caupolicán, was founded in 1910, with the assistance of Tomás Guevara and Charles Sadleir. Guevara was the Director of the Liceo Temuco, a secondary school in the regional capital that educated Mapuche youth, and Sadleir was an Anglican minister whose mission founded several schools that functioned as gathering places for Mapuche leaders and their children in the first decades of the century. Foerster and Montecino explain that their presence at the founding banquet of the Sociedad illustrated a connection between the Mapuche-led organizations and “white ‘indigenistas’ who promoted education.” However, they add that their partnership was not exactly one of equals. “We can appreciate that the indigenista ideas of the Sociedad Caupolicán were based on the notion of equality between Mapuche and Huinca. However, this equality was not real because ‘reason’ was a source of power in the hands of whites. Only by being compassionate and handing over ‘reason’ could equality be realized.”

55 Foerster and Montecino, p. 18.
Although their partnership carried with it an imbalance of power tilted in favor of the indigenistas, the Mapuche leaders of the Sociedad soon eclipsed them in leading the organization. In 1916, Manuel Manquilef rose to become president of the Sociedad Caupolicán. Manquilef was the son of a Mapuche longko and his Chilean wife. He had been educated briefly at one of Sadleir’s mission schools, but later studied at the Liceo Temuco, where he met Tomás Guevara. Manquilef and Guevara co-authored several books on Mapuche history, culture and linguistics, and Manquilef would pioneer the publication of bilingual Spanish-Mapudungun texts with his Comentarios del Pueblo Araucano in 1911.

Under his leadership, Manquilef built a platform for the Sociedad that included the settlement of communities not yet granted land, tax exemption for Mapuche lands, education and persistent denunciation of the abuses received by Mapuche. For a time the Sociedad was able to work together with the leaders of other Mapuche organizations that were founded later in the 1910s, like the Federación Araucana and Moderna Araucanía. But in 1925, Manquilef resigned his leadership position in the Sociedad in order to run for a seat in the Cámara de Diputados. Soon after his election, he introduced a revised indigenous law to the Chilean National Congress that facilitated the division of Mapuche lands. On that

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57 Manuel Manquilef, Comentarios del Pueblo Araucano (la faz social), Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Cervantes, 1911.
58 Moderna Araucanía was an organization founded by Antonio Chihuailaf. In 1926, Chihuailaf became the president of the Unión Araucana, a role that is explored more fully in chapter two. Although Moderna continued to exist throughout the period, it did not develop a major role in the movement.
issue, the Sociedad and other Mapuche organizations broke with Manquilef and began to organize their opposition to the law.⁵⁹

In 1925, the Mapuche schoolteacher Arturo Huenchullán Medel succeeded Manquilef as president of the Sociedad. Huenchullán aligned the Sociedad more strongly against Manquilef’s proposed Ley Indígena. For two years they fought against the law, but in 1927 Ley Indígena 1.469 was promulgated by the Senate and signed by President Carlos Ibañez del Campo. Huenchullán left Chile to study in the United States, and José Cayupi took the reins of the Sociedad with Esteban Romero as his Secretary. All three men would later win election as diputados themselves, but in the meantime tried to use the law’s provisions to recover usurped lands and called for the establishment of a fund to loan money to indigenous farmers for agricultural development.

Resistance to the division of community lands continued, and in 1929 the tribunal that had been tasked with subdividing lands was disbanded. Romero took over the presidency of the Sociedad, with Venancio Coñuepán as Secretary, at a time when the Sociedad had maintained a relatively antagonistic position toward President Ibañez’s reform of southern property and indigenous landholding through Manquilef’s Ley Indígena 1.469.⁶⁰ It is worth noting that although many Mapuche leaders rose to prominence through their leadership of the Sociedad, those leaders took a range of political positions and the organization itself moved across the political spectrum over time. Manuel Manquilef’s land reform project was based upon classically liberal notions of private property, Arturo Huenchullán moved the

⁵⁹ Foerster and Montecino, pp. 22-23.
⁶⁰ Foerster and Montecino, pp. 23-28.
group to the left to oppose Manquilef’s law and Coñuepán ultimately charted a more moderate middle path to bring the disparate movement together after 1938.

In 1931, Coñuepán would assume the presidency of the Sociedad, which marked a new phase not only in the political orientation of that organization, but soon all Mapuche organizations. In that year, Coñuepán joined other Mapuche leaders like Romero, Cayupí, Huenchullán and Manuel Aburto to support the candidacy of Arturo Alessandri for President of Chile. For his part, Coñuepán viewed economic advancement as central to the aspirations of the Mapuche people, and believed that they could achieve a measure of equality within Chilean society by collaborating with the ruling class. In Alessandri, those Mapuche leaders saw a candidate who would champion the working classes and return Chile to the rule of law following years of dictatorial and junta rule. Although Coñuepán, Romero and Cayupí tended to favor economic advancement, Huenchullán supported improvements in education and Aburto fought for cultural independence, they all agreed that the defense of Mapuche landholding was central to their cause, and for a time saw Alessandri as a champion for the Mapuche people in the highest office in the land.61

La Federación Araucana

La Federación Araucana was the brainchild of Manuel Aburto Panguilef, a descendant of a distinguished line of Mapuche longkos, from the southern town of Loncoche. In 1916, Aburto formed the Sociedad Mapuche de Protección Mutua de

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61 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 30-32.
Loncoche (Mapuche Mutual Protection Society of Loncoche), which from the beginning had as its primary aim the preservation and continuation of Mapuche cultural traditions that were being eroded and undermined by the processes of radicación, Euro-Chilean settlement in the region, and agricultural development. Those forces were combining to divide Mapuche communities and parcel off their land. One of their earliest cultural efforts included a theater tour that brought a Mapuche troupe through Valparaiso and Santiago, introducing indigenous songs and dances to white, urban Chilean society. In 1921 Aburto organized the first Congreso Araucano (Araucanian Congress), which brought together Mapuche from throughout the region in a gathering that expressed their common cultural characteristics and the need to unite in order to defend indigenous culture, land and community against the onslaught of migration and development. In 1922, in order to broaden the organization's focus, Aburto reconstituted it as the Federación Araucana, which he would go on to lead until his death in 1952. At its inception the organization was led entirely by Mapuche. Although Sadleir supported the Federación and participated in the Congresos it organized as “Cacique General,” that title was more ceremonial than functional, and throughout its existence the Federación would remain the most radical, autonomous and for a period of time left-leaning of the major Mapuche political organizations.\(^{62}\) The adoption of the name “Federación” mirrored the terminology used by two of the most important leftist organizations of the period, the Federación Obrera de Chile (FOCh – Workers’

\(^{62}\) Foerster and Montecino, pp. 33-36.
Federación de Chile) and the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh – Federation of Students of the University of Chile).

In 1924, Aburto used the Federación to form a committee to support the candidacy of Francisco Melivilu, another young Mapuche who had been educated at the Liceo Temuco under Tomás Guevara’s tutelage. In the same year Aburto formed the Comité Ejecutivo de la Araucanía (Executive Committee of the Araucanía), which served to bring together the leaders of several Mapuche organizations, most importantly the Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán, and coordinate the annual Congresos that he used to mobilize rank and file participants. Melivilu campaigned to become a Diputado in the Chilean National Congress representing the Partido Demócrata (PD), which emerged as the first significant pillar of support for Mapuche interests within the Chilean political landscape in the 1920s. Not inconsequentially, the PD was also part of President Arturo Alessandri’s ruling coalition. In the same year, Aburto joined other Mapuche leaders with different political allegiances in a regional Parlamento where those assembled agreed on proposals to suspend payments of property taxes, subdivide indigenous property and found an industrial and agricultural boarding school for Mapuche in Temuco. Although Aburto and the Federación worked with the other

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64 Menard and Pavez 2005a, p. 51
65 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 36-39. See also, André Menard and Jorge Pávez, (2005a), p. 51. In footnote 1, the authors explain that in 1923 Aburto expressed support for the project of land division for the first and only time by signing a document prepared by Manquilef. They add, “the details of their agreement remain murky.” It is possible that Aburto’s early support for subdivision was due to the belief that the process would unearth past land fraud
Mapuche organizations, they maintained a cultural and religious character in their political action that set them apart from mainstream Chilean society and even the other Mapuche groups.\footnote{Aburto joined Manuel Manquilef and Antonio Chihuailaf in the 1924 Parlamento. As we have seen, Manquilef’s Ley 1.469 would later divide the two over the issue of land reform. Chihuailaf was at this time the leader of Moderna Araucanía, a small Mapuche organization based in the southern town of Cunco, but he would later be chosen by Guido Beck to lead the Unión Araucana. His leadership of the Unión is examined more fully in chapter three.}

As the 1920s wore on, more Mapuche leaders were elected to national office and they made more concrete proposals for the subdivision of land. As mentioned, Manuel Manquilef was elected as a Diputado representing the Liberal Democratic Party, and he pushed for a new Ley Indígena that subdivided Mapuche community land. Aburto and the Federación vehemently opposed Manquilef’s law, and that put them at odds with other Mapuche leaders. For example, in the same year, the outspoken Martín Collío published a letter in *El Diario Austral* (paper of record in Temuco and throughout Cautín Province) in which he called Aburto the “caudillo (strongman) of communism” and referred to the Federación as “the Soviet of the Mapuche.”\footnote{Martín Collío R., letter to El Diario Austral, Jul. 8, 1926, cited in Foerster and Montecino, pp. 40-41. See also, Martín Collío R., letter to El Diario Austral, Jul. 5, 1926. Published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, p. 99, where Collío uses the same language to lambast Arturo Huenchullán and the Sociedad. For their part, members of the Unión Araucana also accused Collío of having communist sympathies. See complaint sent by Antonio Trangulao} Those charges situate Aburto and the Federación within the political
landscape of Chile in the 1920s, which was an era in which workers’ parties were being organized and left-wing factions were breaking off of mainstream parties. As political parties evolved and contested one another for power in Chile, Aburto attempted to navigate this shifting terrain to advance the interests of his people. His allegiance with left-leaning parties would have broad significance that extends beyond Chile’s borders. Scholars have pointed out that in the Cold War period, the hesitance of the United States to participate more officially in transnational indigenismo was due in part to procommunist attitudes within indigenous politics and the indigenista movement.68

In 1927, the same year that Carlos Ibañez seized power and promulgated Manquilef’s Ley 1.469, the rift between Mapuche organizations grew, with Huenchullán’s Sociedad and Aburto’s Federación opposing the law and Manquilef, Collío and Guido Beck’s Unión Araucana supporting it. As the divide grew, the rhetoric escalated. In March of that year, the Sociedad and Federación hosted a joint rally attended by as many as 5,000 Mapuche. The Mexican Protestant preacher Roberto Tellez spoke about Mexico’s history of revolution where Indians rose up to demand land and rights from an oppressive liberal regime. According to a report in El Diario Austral, the crowd was whipped into frenzy, shouting “war” and “cannon,” at which point “Aburto increased the dread by emptying his revolver with five shots

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Huentecura to Intendente de Cautín, Jul. 6, 1928 and responses, Archivo Diócesis de Villarrica, Carpeta Unión Araucana 1. See also footnote 217.

into the air.” Such actions drew not only the criticism of the Bishop Guido Beck, who called Aburto “the seducer of the Araucanian people” who “openly spread anti-Christian, subversive and ill-fated propaganda and knows how to stir their baser instincts,” but also the future President Ibañez himself. As Minister of the Interior, Ibañez sent a telegram to the Intendencia of Temuco, threatening Aburto and Huenchullán with jail or exile if they persisted in propagandizing against the government and the proposed law.\footnote{Foerster and Montecino, pp. 42-44.}

Ibañez would make good on his threat six months after his uncontested election to the presidency. In November of 1927, Ibañez called on his newly created national police force, the Carabineros de Chile, to detain Aburto and send him into internal exile, where he would remain until March 1928. The following year, Aburto organized the ninth Congreso Araucano, which boasted the largest crowds yet with about 10,000 Mapuche in attendance. The Congreso subsequently sent their accords to President Ibañez in the form of a telegram, which included calling for a study of potential reforms to the Ley 1.469 and the return of the archives of the Federación and Comité Ejecutivo, which had been seized in 1929.\footnote{Foerster and Montecino, pp. 44-48.} In this period, Aburto was increasingly well connected with actors on the left, although the extent to which that contact was intentional and strategic is debatable.\footnote{Some have argued that Aburto’s, and by extension other Mapuche actors’, ties to the left were exaggerated by their political enemies like Guido Beck and the Unión Araucania, as we shall see in the next chapter. See also, Thomas Miller Klubock, “Ránquil: Violence and Peasant Politics on Chile’s Southern Frontier,” in Greg Grandin and Gil Joseph, eds. A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counter-Insurgent Violence During Latin America’s Long Cold War, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, pp. 144-145.}

\footnote{El Diario Austral, Feb. 16, 1927; cited in Foerster and Montecino, p. 43.}
As Chile plunged into a second period of political crisis, in which the country had a total of eight different presidents between Ibañez’s resignation in July of 1931 and the second presidency of Arturo Alessandri that began in December of 1932, Aburto worked to bring the Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán together. He relied on his partnership with Arturo Huenchullán, who still had great influence with the Sociedad and would later be elected to the Chamber of Deputies himself in 1933. But in the meantime the Aburto and Huenchullán collaborated to support Alessandri’s campaign in the fall of 1931. Aburto’s political positions and aspirations were becoming significantly more ambitious and increasingly moving toward the left. In order to understand how those transitions were compatible with his support for Alessandri, we must remember that Chile’s political turmoil began when Alessandri’s populist legislative reforms became mired in parliamentary gridlock during his first presidency in the early 1920s. Aburto also saw Alessandri as a candidate who would be willing to help him solve the central problems facing his people.73

Meanwhile, the Federación, Sociedad Caupolicán and other Mapuche organizations came together to celebrate the eleventh Congreso Araucana in December of 1931. That gathering produced the most radical elements of Aburto’s vision for his people, including his utopian dream of an independent Mapuche republic. Moreover, the Congreso coincided with a political transition in which Aburto worked to create allegiances with the most radical segments of Chile’s political left, including the Partido Comunista (PC – Communist Party) and the

73 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 48-49.
FOCh. In order to more fully understand the reasons behind and significance of Aburto’s transition toward the left in the late 1920s and early 1930s, we next turn to examine Aburto’s personal and family background.

**Manuel Aburto: Portrait of a Mapuche Leader**

Many of the twentieth century Mapuche leaders, organizers and activists descended from powerful chiefs and merchants of nineteenth century Araucanía. That was certainly the case for Manuel Aburto Panguilef, and an examination of his lineage provides a window into his framework for thinking about political practice and the issues that he engaged during his career. Although he sometimes staked out positions that could be considered radical or extreme from a Euro-Chilean perspective, he maintained a respect for political authority that made him seem somewhat contradictory as a revolutionary figure. In the mid-nineteenth century Aburto Panguilef’s great grandfather José Ayiñamco adopted the surname “Aburto” as a symbol of a pact he made with the Chilean Francisco Aburto y Ramírez.

Members of the Aburto family had served in the capacity of *comisario de naciones* (literally, “commissioner of nations”) since the late-eighteenth century, a role that functioned as a kind of ambassador between the Spanish colony (and later the Chilean state) and various Mapuche chiefs in the frontier region. Because the *comisario de naciones* had the authority to create treaties, the Mapuche longkos who interacted with them derived some of their own authority from that relationship. It also put them in a privileged position relative to other Mapuche

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74 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 49-52.
longkos, as they had the authority to negotiate with the state and represent other longkos in doing so. Chilean historian André Menard examines this lineage in detail in his presentation of Aburto Panguilef’s *Libro Diario*.\textsuperscript{75}

Aburto Panguilef’s paternal uncle, Bernardo Aburto Namuncurá, also figured prominently in the development of Aburto Panguilef’s political mindset. Aburto Namuncurá served as a secretary to the renowned longko Juan Calfucurá, which put him in a position to collaborate and negotiate with both Chilean and Argentine authorities to draft treaties in the 1870s as the Pacification and War of the Desert unfolded. Namuncurá derived his authority and prestige from his proximity to Calfucurá and Chilean authorities, and also from his ability to speak, read and write the Spanish language. Speaking of his grandfather and Uncle Bernardo in a 1923 interview, Aburto Panguilef said they “played a great role in the pacification of Araucanía in the province of Valdivia, and never allowed the Indians to lack the respect owed to the government.”\textsuperscript{76} Considering that Aburto Panguilef is often characterized as the most radical of the Mapuche leaders in this period, and also that he was surveilled and persecuted by Chilean authorities in the 1920s and 1930s, this insight provides a counterbalance to the view of Aburto Panguilef as a radical when trying to ascertain his intentions and understand his political strategy.

Aburto Namuncurá and other leaders of his father’s generation figured importantly in the creation of the Anglican mission at Quepe, which was founded by


the Canadian missionary Charles Sadleir. 77 Namuncurá and the longko Ambrosio Payllalef adopted the Christian faith and spent considerable time at the mission. In the next generation, Aburto Panguilef and Manuel Manquilef were both educated there, and established important indigenista contacts through the mission. Charles Sadleir corresponded with the famed Chilean linguist and folklorist Rodolfo Lenz between 1896 and 1912. 78 Manuel Manquilef began his education at the mission’s school, then went on to graduate from Liceo Temuco where he studied with Tomás Guevara, and eventually returned to the Quepe mission as a teacher. 79 Sadleir would also later attend many of Aburto’s Congresos, adopting the ceremonial title “Cacique General de la Araucanía.”

Manuel Aburto Panguilef originally set out to become a missionary himself, and the training he received at the Quepe mission school established the roots of his profound spirituality, which remained an important thread in his writing throughout his prodigious career. However, upon graduating from the school, he took his first job working for the Protectorado de Indígenas (Indian Protectorate) in Valdivia, where he served as a translator for the court. 80 There he himself entered the tradition of Mapuche “go-betweens” as his grandfather and uncle before him. In the introduction to Aburto Panguilef’s published diaries from the 1940s, Menard shows how this family and personal history shaped his life, work and writings from his founding of the Sociedad Mapuche de Protección Mutua de Loncoche in 1916

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77 For a photographic introduction to the work of Sadleir at the Quepe mission, see André Menard and Jorge Pavez, Mapuche y Anglicanos: Vestigios fotográficos de la Misión Araucana de Kepe, 1896-1908, Ocho Libros Editores: Santiago de Chile, 2007.
78 Mapuche y Anglicanos, pp. 174-181.
79 Ibid. 158.
80 Menard 2013, p. XXIV.
and throughout his career. Menard traces those influences through three distinct phases, which correspond to the evolution of his political activities and organizations, and also to the existing archival sources that remain. To follow Menard’s work, let us take a brief aside to explain and establish the chronology of Aburto Panguilef’s political career.

The corpus of archival material relating to Aburto Panquilef’s life and career includes three distinct caches. In 1929, Carabineros (Chilean military police) raided the offices of the Federación/Comité Ejecutivo and confiscated their archives. Some of those documents ended up in the National Archives collection of the Ministry of the Interior, and were discovered by sociologist Jorge Pavez in 2003. Those constitute a sample of approximately 170 pages, dating from 1924-1929.

Although Aburto Panguilef (and later his son Germán) repeatedly and officially requested the return of all the confiscated documents, it is not clear what became of the remainder. The second cache of documents is found in the Museo Municipal de Loncoche, where about 300 pages of material from 1933-1955 represent internal documents related to the function of the Federación, Comité Ejecutivo and the annual Congresos they organized. Finally, descendants of Aburto Panguilef retained in their family archive a series of journals that he wrote, which totaled

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81 Menard recounts this family history in several published works, including “Los Archivos del ’29,” p. 60, “El Congreso Araucano,” p. 221, and “Libro Diario,” p. XIX-XXVII.
82 Menard and Pavez 2005, p. 56.
83 Menard 2013, p. XVI.
84 In 2013, André Menard explained to me in a personal conversation that the documents held at the Loncoche museum had gone missing. Prior to their disappearance, he had created a photocopied set of the documents, which he shared with me and upon which much of my analysis below is based. In order to trace their origin, I have cited them to the Archivo Museo Municipal de Loncoche, where he found them.
nearly 1,900 pages.\textsuperscript{85} With the exception of one early notebook recording
genealogical and historical information related to his family from the 1910s, the rest were produced between 1940 and his death in 1952, although some may have been confiscated in 1929 and subsequently disappeared. The period covered by these journals was a time in which Aburto’s dominance over the Mapuche movement had waned and in which his writings had become increasingly spiritual in nature.

Combined, these three caches represent only a fragment of the written material this important leader produced during his career, but nevertheless are an extensive set of resources.\textsuperscript{86}

Surveying this vast collection, we can identify at least four distinct categories of his work. First, working through the Federación in particular, Aburto sought to mediate disputes, both between individual members of the Federación, and between those individuals and the state. Disputes over land possession and titles were common, but he also received claims and requests for things like education and legal representation. Second, the annual Congresos organized through the Federación and Comité Ejecutivo produced elaborate accounts of cultural and political ceremony, and also extensive lists of demands and proposals to the state. The latter include suggested legal reforms, requests for the creation and funding of state schools, forms of political representation and a host of other things. Third, the Federación maintained a civil registry in which Aburto Panguilef recorded births, deaths and marriages, including plural marriages that were not recognized by the

\textsuperscript{85} These journals are now held at the Centro Liwen, a Mapuche archive and library at the Universidad de la Frontera in Temuco.

\textsuperscript{86} Menard 2013, pp. XI-XIX. See also, Menard and Pavez 2005a, p. 67.
church or state. Finally, and especially in the years following the integration of the Federación into the Corporación Araucana, Aburto Panguilef’s writings became increasingly spiritual in nature, recording dreams and visions he had that were often related to the past, current status and future of the Mapuche people as part of, or distinct from, the Chilean state.

André Menard and Jorge Pavez have argued that this proliferation of work amounts to a kind of “written sovereignty,” expressed by Aburto Panguilef as a counterpoint to the territorial sovereignty they had lost through the processes of conquest and resettlement. His re-appropriation of the written word turned the tools of European colonialism against the Chilean state, and it almost seems as if Aburto Panguilef was “writing the Mapuche state into existence.” Menard believes this “archivistic tendency” is a cultural marker that predates the post-radicación period in which the Mapuche movement flourished, the roots of which can be seen in the production of Mapuche scribes in the nineteenth century, for example the work of Bernardo Namuncurá.

All of this background is important to a full understanding of Aburto Panguilef’s political project in several distinct ways. It shows that his work was not purely a response to the aggression of the state in the immediate period, but rather was constructed upon a much longer and deeper tradition of political engagement with Spanish and Chilean states. That longevity is significant to the debate about

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87 Menard 2013, pp. XXVIII-XXX.
88 Ibid. pp. XCII-C.
why and how Aburto Panguilef, and potentially other Mapuche activists, allied themselves with particular political parties at the times and in the ways they did. For example, José Bengoa has characterized the explosion of Mapuche political activity after 1910 as arising out of a vacuum of leadership created by the process of radicación. Menard’s work, on the other hand, shows that the Mapuche political legacy and activity stretched back much further, and that it only seemed new in the 1920s because the broader Chilean political landscape was rapidly transforming in that period. Whereas Bengoa explained Aburto Panguilef’s political strategy as one of alignment with the working classes, Menard shows that his strategy only appeared class-based in the 1920s. Bengoa’s argument fails to explain Aburto Panguilef’s later criticism of the left and support for Ibañez del Campo (a much more conservative figure) in the late 1930s and 1940s, despite his surveillance and repression of Aburto in the 1920s and early 1930s.

In a 2003 interview, Aburto Panguilef’s son Germán explained that his father’s worldview was in part shaped by the pre-existing class order of Mapuche society, in which his family figured prominently as a kind of aristocracy. Menard suggests that in addition, the spiritual dimension of Aburto’s politics cut across his

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91 José Bengoa, Historia de un Conflicto: El estado y los mapuches en el siglo XX, Santiago, Chile: Editorial Planeta, 1999.
92 Menard 2013, pp. XLVII-XLVIII. Here Menard refers to the end of a century of oligarchic rule that came about with the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920, who adopted a populist political strategy in an era when new political ideas related to anarchism, socialism and communism were circulating through Chile, and when miners and other workers began organizing to press demands upon the Chilean bourgeoisie. For a detailed of state repression against anarchists in this period, see Raymond Craib, The Cry of the Renegade: Politics and Poetry in Interwar Chile, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
93 Menard 2013, pp. XLIX-LI.
entire career and tied back to even older traditions from the nineteenth century.94 “In other words, the material forces (military, political and economic) belonged to the state, while the ancestral and the spiritual pertained to the Araucanian race.”95 Ultimately, Menard proposes a deeper look at the turbulent period of the 1930s to understand the immediate and pragmatic causes of Aburto’s shifting party allegiance. From 1932-1936, Aburto walked a fine line between forging alliances with the left without provoking Alessandri, although the president did eventually send him into exile on the island of Chiloé in 1936 as a response his leftist provocations.96 Menard acknowledges that Aburto was willing to shift allegiances when it was politically expedient, but maintains that alliance with the state and/or parties in power was his preference, in keeping with Mapuche tradition dating back through the nineteenth century and into the colonial period.97

By the time the 1938 election was held, the Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán had combined as the Corporación Araucana, which officially supported Ibañez in his campaign for the presidency.98 But that support aggravated a rift within the movement between the young, urban Mapuche who supported Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the Frente Popular, and the older generation of leaders who backed Ibañez. It also caused a bit of a row between the Federación and Sociedad, due to the public pronouncements on both sides during the campaign. Aburto had

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94 Ibid. pp. LX-LXII.
95 Ibid. LXIII.
96 Ibid. LXV.
97 Ibid. LXVII-LXX.
98 Ibañez campaigned for the presidency in 1937-1938, but withdrew his candidacy shortly before the election following a large demonstration and massacre of his supporters. See Collier and Sater, pp. 233-234.
initially lent his support to Marmaduke Grove as he formed and led the Frente Popular from his position in the Socialist Party. However, the outcome of the election cemented Aburto’s break with his previous allies on the left, especially the Partido Comunista. Menard explains this as the result of two factors: the PC advanced another Mapuche leader, José Andrés Huichalaf, as a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies in 1936 without consulting with Aburto first, and they supported a group of urban youth who formed a Congreso Nacional Araucano (Araucanian National Congress) which Aburto saw as competition for his own Congreso.99 Perhaps the larger issue was the emergence of a generational transition, in which Aburto represented the old guard that was being challenged by a more progressive urban youth on one side and a more centrist rural faction led by Coñuepán on the other.

Menard argues that 1938 was a point of inflection for Aburto and the Mapuche movement. Throughout the 1930s, the Federación had maintained strong ties with the left and worked primarily for the recovery of usurped lands, which put it at odds with the entrenched powers of the region. Meanwhile, the Sociedad Caupolicán had worked for the creation of the Caja Indígena (Indigenous Fund – established for making agricultural loans to Mapuche peasants) and for economic and commercial advancement of the race, which made them politically more moderate. The two groups, and their leaders, had very public rivalries, which made their union difficult in 1938.100 The merger not only represented a break with the parties of the left and a younger generation of urban Mapuche, it also represented

99 Ibid. LXXIII-LXXIV.
100 Ibid. LXXVI-LXXVII.
Venancio Coñuepán’s eclipse of Manuel Aburto Panguilef as the hegemonic leader of the Mapuche movement with the merger of their two organizations into the Corporación Araucana under Coñuepán’s leadership.  

Proposals, Projects and Quotidian Assistance for Indígenas

Aburto’s efforts through the Federación Araucana engaged a host of questions that were all related to Mapuche legal, cultural and territorial sovereignty. His civil registry project, in which he began recording the names of both parents on Mapuche birth certificates, took place in the same era that the Chilean state created its own civil registry, which was technically established in 1884 but only began requiring citizens to obtain passports and identification cards in 1924. By recording births with the mother’s name, which the state registry often neglected to do for indigenous children, Aburto helped Mapuche avoid later complications in the inheritance of land stemming from the 1874 Ley Indígena. The functional aspects of the Federación and Aburto’s other projects were able to directly assist Mapuche in defending their material interests, especially related to land disputes.

When the indígena Antonio Maria Paillalef came to Aburto for help in making a claim against Fermín Sebastian Miguel for assaulting him and destroying two buildings on his property during a land dispute in 1924, Aburto first recorded his testimony. He then helped him hire an attorney, who ordered a visual inspection of the property. Aburto even helped Paillalef prepare his case to present to the

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101 Ibid. LXXV-LXXVI.
102 Menard 2013, XXXIV.
103 Actas del VI Congreso Araucano, published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 81-82.
In a similar complaint from 1927, Rufino Chepo Montecino accused Luciano Raynante of attacking him on his own property, and subsequently seizing a fallow field and constructing a house on it. Drawing from his early experience working as an interpreter for the Indian Protectorate, Aburto collected testimony from witnesses, typed a formal complaint, and helped Chepo prepare for his court appearances. In a similar fashion, Aburto assisted Fernando Paillan Shayhueque with a land dispute, in which he claimed that an engineer had deceived and defrauded him while conducting a survey on behalf of the Commission for the Settlement of Indians. Paillan maintained that he had cleared the land, which had been virgin forest when he arrived, and that no one else had ever worked it. Aburto was able to assist by securing a letter of support from the President of the Settlement Commission, which he sent along with his own letter of support to the Minister of Agriculture.

Aburto first proposed the idea of an autonomous indigenous republic at the 11th Congreso Araucano in 1931. Almost immediately the idea was met with strong and loud opposition from many sectors of Chilean society. When Armando Bergue, a landowner from the south, wrote a letter to the editor of El Diario Austral in 1932 to oppose the idea, Mapuche leader César Colima replied with his own vehement defense of the idea. Colima passionately justified the right of Mapuche to assemble and advocate for solutions to their problems. He referenced a long list of abuses in

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the south, and said that Bergue raised alarm at the prospect of an indigenous
republic because he and his compatriots stood to lose the land and advantages they
had stolen from the Mapuche people.\(^\text{107}\)

In more mundane affairs, Aburto used the official status of the Federación to
help members petition the government with a variety of requests. In August of
1928, Alonso Quilaqueo, a Mapuche Carabinero, wrote to Aburto to ask for his help
in securing a transfer to a squad closer to his family. Over a period of several
months, Aburto maintained a correspondence with the Director General of the
Carabineros to communicate and lend his support to Quilaqueo’s request.\(^\text{108}\) He also
helped Maria Loncomilla Santana clarify the relationship in which workers farmed
her property. He certified a rental agreement, in which she leased land to other
Mapuche farmers for cultivation.\(^\text{109}\) In these relatively mundane ways, Aburto both
engaged the state and assisted with or performed functions that the state otherwise
neglected. Aburto also assisted indígenas with their legal defenses when they were
accused of crimes. That was the case of Rufino Rainante Becerra, whose son Juan
was charged with robbery. Aburto traveled by train in order to advocate for Juan
Rainante before the Tribunal in the rural town of Pitrufquen.\(^\text{110}\)

While in many cases, Aburto performed legal services for Mapuche that could
have otherwise been performed by non-Mapuche attorneys or advocates, he was

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\(^\text{107}\) César Colima, letter to the editor, *El Diario Austral*, Jan. 6, 1932. Published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 102-103.


also in the unique position to help with more culturally sensitive Mapuche concerns.

In October of 1925, Celestino Quileñan came to the Federación offices to refute slanderous charges made against his wife, Anjelina Meliñamco, who had been accused of witchcraft. Aburto drafted a formal statement on Quileñan's behalf, in which he said, “As this office represents the entity in which the sovereignty of all Araucanians in the country is embodied, I wish to (renounce) before it these slanderers and their criminal accusations.”

Later that month, Quileñan returned to the Federación office to request help in finalizing his second marriage, to Emilia Urrutia. It seems that both families had initially given their support, but then Quileñan received word that the parents of Urrutia had changed their minds. Aburto drafted a statement on Quileñan’s behalf in which he stated that plural marriage was “in agreement with the laws of the Araucanian race, all in perfect accord with the parents of my second wife.” Although that was the case, this particular instance was complicated by the fact that Urrutia was not indigenous. Ultimately, Aburto was able to gain written consent from Urrutia’s parents, but her father requested a payment of 500 pesos in exchange.

Collaboration and Division within the Mapuche Movement

Manuel Aburto Panguilef’s first efforts to support and promote the well being of his people centered on the promotion and defense of Mapuche culture. Those efforts were apparent in the theatrical shows he organized in the late 1910s, which

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introduced Mapuche art, song and dance to Chileans in major cities like Valparaiso and Santiago. Then as the 1920s advanced, Aburto expanded his organizational capacity and engaged more directly in political matters. As we have seen, the Federación and Comité Ejecutivo grew parallel to the expansion of popular politics in Chile during the first Alessandri presidency. In a 1923 interview, Aburto explained that the first Congreso Araucano came about when in 1921 a law was being considered that would have profoundly impacted Araucanian society, but that no one debating it had any direct experience or understanding of the realities of Mapuche life and culture. That conversation provided the impetus to bring together Mapuche from across the region to consult and debate the needs of his people to guide that legal project. At the Congreso, they decided to create the Federación Araucana, which would be independent of all outside influences and could create its own laws and governing structure to support and defend Mapuche customs, rights and territory.112

From there, Aburto used his organizational capacity to help Francisco Melivilu become the first Mapuche elected to the Chilean Congress in 1924. As noted above, when Manuel Manquilef, in concert with Ibañez and the Unión Araucana, pushed through a Ley Indígena that threatened to dissolve Mapuche lands, and by extension the fabric that held together Mapuche culture, spirituality and identity, Aburto expanded the political activity of his organization by forging alliances with other Mapuche organizations and non-Mapuche political parties. He was thus able to mobilize as many as 20,000 Mapuche to attend his Congresos, and demonstrate

that the vast majority of Mapuche opposed Manquilef’s law.\textsuperscript{113} Although they were drastically opposed on the subject of communal versus private indigenous landholding, Manquilef and Aburto both criticized various other laws that they blamed for the impoverishment of the Mapuche people, while ignoring the class hierarchies within Mapuche society. Both came from relatively privileged backgrounds, descended from “caciques ‘civilizados’” and educated in colonial schools, in fact the same primary school at the Anglican mission at Quepe. But whereas Manquilef advocated for the dissolution of the Mapuche body politic into that of the Chilean state, Aburto fought for the (re)creation of a Mapuche state.\textsuperscript{114} But neither advocated for the dissolution of class hierarchies.\textsuperscript{115}

The 1927 Ley Indígena created a deep divide between ordinary Mapuche and some of their leaders. Those divisions correlated to splits between the political affiliations of those leaders. Francisco Melivilu was elected to the Cámara de Diputados as a member of the Partido Demócrata, but Manuel Manquilef represented the Partido Liberal Democrática, a decidedly more conservative party that was originally formed in 1891 as a reaction to the creation of the parliamentary republic that the junta sought to correct.\textsuperscript{116} As Manquilef proposed what would become the Ley Indígena 1.469 and campaigned for support across the Araucanía in 1926, Aburto and other Mapuche leaders came together in the Congreso of 1926 to oppose his project. In fact, Manquilef was not invited to participate, a meaningful and public rebuke of his leadership. That Congreso revealed deep divisions between

\textsuperscript{113} Menard and Pavez 2005b, p. 212.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. p. 225.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. pp. 225-228.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. pp. 52-53.
factions within the Mapuche movement, with Manquilef and the newly formed Unión Araucana supporting the law, and Aburto, Huenchullán and the membership of the Federación and Sociedad vehemently opposing it.\textsuperscript{117}

While the Ley Indígena 1.469 was ultimately revised in 1930 and 1931, the opposition campaign pushed Aburto’s political allegiances to the left. Recently declassified documents from the Comintern in Russia reveal that there were close ties between the Partido Comunista and Mapuche activists in the early 1930s, although Menard and Pavez point out that we ought to read those documents critically. They are skeptical of the communists’ claims of broad support among Mapuche, as their project tried to assimilate the organization and mobilization of all workers and peasants into the class-consciousness raising efforts of international communism.\textsuperscript{118}

Nevertheless, as early as the 1926 Congreso, Aburto sent a copy of their accords to the president of the Communist Committee in the Chamber of Deputies, and other details from that Congreso bear out the political alignment of Aburto and the Federación in that early period.\textsuperscript{119} But as the 1930s progressed, Aburto adeptly navigated the shifting sands of Chile’s political landscape by continuing to court the support of leftist parties, but also remaining in close collaboration with more moderate Mapuche actors like Coñuepán and the Sociedad.\textsuperscript{120} Carlos Ibañez was

\textsuperscript{117} Menard and Pavez 2005b, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{119} Published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 71-95. See also ARNAD, Ministerio del Interior, Libro 7321.
\textsuperscript{120} Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 52-54.
forced to resign the presidency in July of 1931. A series of presidents associated with the Radical Party succeeded him over the course of the next year, and then a government junta briefly established a Socialist government in late 1932. In December of that year, Arturo Alessandri returned to the presidency and carried out a full six-year term through the end of 1938. Aburto and the Federación moved to the left in the early 1930s following these national political trends, but by 1938 they remained close enough to other Mapuche organizations to combine forces through the Corporación. ¹²¹

When Manuel Manquilef was not invited to the 1926 Congreso, Mapuche leaders José Andrés and Luciano Huichalaf Alcapán complained, to which Aburto replied, "Manuel Manquilef was not invited because he had declared, in the capital of the Republic, in the Ministry of Agriculture, that he was not a deputy of the Araucanian Race, rather he represented his party." ¹²² That statement illustrates the importance of ethnic identity in the Mapuche movement, despite party alliances or other political overtures to other groups. Subsequently, Aburto also referenced the Ley Indígena that Manquilef had proposed before the Cámara, which did not reflect his campaign promises to help settle landless Mapuche, but instead created a path for the division of those communities already settled. On the second day of the Congreso, a large delegation traveled by horseback to the train station in nearby Ercilla to greet the Senators Artemio Gutierrez and Luis Enrique Concha, both

¹²¹ Corporación included not only the Federación and Sociedad, but also the Unión Araucana. The merger is examined more closely in chapter two, making use of that organization’s perspective on the reconciliation.
¹²² Actas del VI Congreso Araucano, published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 74-75.
members of the Partido Demócrata.\textsuperscript{123} Their visit was significant, as that party was one of the first to begin fighting for social reforms. In fact, Luis Emilio Recabarren, the founder of Chilean socialism had broken away from the party in 1912 to found the Partido Obrero Socialista, which then became the Partido Comunista in 1922. Close ties remained between the two parties in 1926, which necessitated Aburto’s explicit rejection of “subversive, agitating or communist” activities, addressed to the governor.\textsuperscript{124} His clarification suggests that those ties were already becoming a concern, and he felt the need to distance himself from attempts at surveillance and oppression by the state, and attacks from his enemies within the movement, from Beck and the Unión Araucana for example.

In this period, Aburto and Huenchullán, as well as the organizations they led, courted the left in order to oppose efforts to divide Mapuche lands. In December of 1926, in the same month that the sixth Congreso was held, Antonio Chihuailaf had publicly criticized Huenchullán in a letter published in \textit{El Diario Austral} on December 15\textsuperscript{th}, in which he charged him with holding communist sympathies and called him a hypocrite for criticizing the government when he himself had benefited from the government’s support of schools in which he had been educated and employed as a teacher.\textsuperscript{125} Huenchullán replied with his own letter two days later in which he denied being a communist. He maintained that he loved his country and respected its authorities, but felt that it was his duty to fight for his people when he

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. p. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. p. 81.
observed their suffering. Considering the reflexive notions of authority previously discussed, it must have been difficult for Mapuche leaders to navigate the rapidly changing political landscape during this period of Chile’s history. The impulse to align oneself with the party or leader in power was often in tension with the best interests of the Mapuche people.

**Surveillance, Repression and Connections with the Left**

Between 1926 and 1936, Manuel Aburto Panguilef was the object of political surveillance and persecution. His archives were confiscated and three times he was sent into internal exile by Chilean authorities. Antonio Chihuailaf attributed that attention from state agents to “his great popular influence among the Mapuche of the era and a certain radicalness in his proposals.” The political attention Aburto garnered from the state stemmed from his close ties to unions, worker’s organizations and the Communist Party. Beginning in 1926, charges of communist sympathizing, combined with Aburto’s persistent opposition to the subdivision of Mapuche lands being carried out under the authority of the Ley Indígena 4.169 of 1927, led to the first of three periods in which Aburto was detained and exiled. From December 1927 to March 1928, Aburto was arrested and sent to Santiago, where he was detained. Then, following the 1929 confiscation of the Federación and Comité archives, he was exiled to the northern port city of Caldera in 1930. Ibañez’s surveillance of Aburto and censure of the Federación relates to two distinct types of

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126 Arturo Huenchullán, reply to Antonio Chihuailaf, El Diario Austral, Dec. 17, 1926, "Response to Antonio Chihuailaf." Published in Menard and Pavez 2005a, pp. 100-101
127 Ibid. p. 51.
128 Menard, LXVII (footnote 2).
information that were heavily monitored by the state in this period: those related to property in the south, and political agitation.129

About 170 pages of documents relating to Ibañez’s surveillance of Aburto are located in the Ministry of the Interior collection of the National Archives. Some of those papers seem to have originated from the Federación archives that were seized in 1929. Other documents include correspondence between the Intendente of Cautín, the Minister of the Interior and various Carabineros who carried out the surveillance and assessed the threat that Aburto posed. In February of 1929, the Intendente of Cautín Province, Arturo Vidal Pizarro, wrote to the Minister of the Interior to express his concern that a reporter for the Heraldo del Sur had intercepted a telegram about the surveillance of Aburto, which had not been encoded. He suggested that future communications related to ongoing surveillance should be encrypted, to preserve the secrecy of the work.130 It is not clear whether Aburto knew he was being watched, but on February 1, 1929 he wrote to the Minister of the Interior to refute accusations that he was a subversive and political agitator. Rather, he claimed to be a keeper of peace and order in the south, and said he only defended the rights of his people by opposing large landowners who cheated them as far as the law would allow.131 In November, Captain Alberto Sotomayor Gonzalez wrote to his commander at the Prefecture of Cautín with a summary of the documents he sent, which are included in this collection. His own

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129 Menard and Pavez, 2005a, p. 60. In a slightly earlier period, see Raymond Craib, 2016.
assessment ends by saying, “I consider (Aburto) to be a danger to the peace of the entire province, and above all the sector in which he lives – Loncoche.”

A short while later, Coronel Facundo Grismali Barrientos passed along his own assessment to the Intendente, which indicated that while he did consider Aburto to be a danger to the region and those who followed him, and he did think his statements seemed to suggest the violation of various laws, that he did not find Aburto to be in violation of the particular law that was the justification for his surveillance.

After Alessandri returned to the presidency in 1932, Aburto, Huenchullán and the Mapuche organizations maintained a working relationship with him for a time. In May 1933, Aburto convened an Extraordinary Session of the Congreso Araucano to debate several reforms proposed at previous Congresos. In his announcement, Aburto mentioned that he had recently met with Alessandri, who had asked them to debate the issues to more fully develop their proposals. The following year he traveled to Santiago to meet with Alessandri again, this time also with the Minister of Land and Colonization, to discuss their requests for changes to the Ley Indígena. Upon his return, Aburto called a meeting to discuss the newly created Caja Agrícola (Agricultural Fund), which was a major initiative of Coñuepán and the Sociedad. In particular, Aburto asked the regional representatives to bring a list of all Mapuche farmers who would request seed loans from that fund. Meanwhile, Aburto’s private correspondence to his son Cornelio during May and

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135 Circular No. 687, May 20, 1934. AMML, Carpeta 1.
July of 1934 sheds additional light on his interactions in Santiago, including meetings with Huenchullán and other state officials, a lunch at the Palacio Moneda (Chile’s presidential palace), a legal victory in the Supreme Court and a visit to the Chamber of Deputies. He also referenced reports of threats made against Marmaduke Grove, who had recently returned from exile to found the Chilean Socialist Party and won a special election to the Senate two days later. In fact, Grove had carried out that campaign from prison, where he had been detained for conspiring against President Alessandri. Aburto’s comments suggest that he was well aware of the fine line he was walking in trying to maintain alliances with more radical elements on the left and at the same time remain in the good graces of the President. Other simultaneous events in southern Chile reinforced the need for caution.

In June 1934, several hundred Chilean and Mapuche peasants carried out an armed rebellion against the owners and managers of the sprawling Ránquil and Guayalí estates in the province of Lonquimay, near the headwaters of the Bío-Bío River. After ten days of violence on the part of peasants armed mostly with farming tools, the Carabineros brutally repressed the uprising, sending hundreds of combatants and their families fleeing across the snow-covered Andes while they rounded up hundreds more and marched them toward Temuco for a hastily arranged trial. In the process, somewhere between 350 and 1,500 indigenous and mestizo peasants died during the direct conflict, ensuing flight and subsequent hardship. Many of the detainees were executed during the march from Lonquimay

to Temuco, and their bodies were discarded into the river, not to be seen again. This episode is known as the Ránquil Massacre, and has come to occupy a significant place in the historical memory of southern Chile.\footnote{For two valuable but different interpretations of the Ránquil Massacre, see Thomas Miller Klubock (2010) and Florenzia E. Mallon, “Victims into Emblems: Images of the Ránquil Massacre in Chilean National Narratives, 1934-2004,” \textit{Labor: Studies in Working Class History of the Americas}, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 29-55.}

Historians Thomas Klubock and Florenzia Mallon have each analyzed the Ránquil Massacre in recent essays and shown that the event contributed to important political narratives both at the time and later in the century. Klubock demonstrates that violence and disputes over land stemmed from the state’s inability to establish and maintain administrative control over the frontier region from the 1880s through the middle of the twentieth century, in contradistinction to the relatively peaceful landowner-labor relations in the central valley.\footnote{Klubock, 2010, pp. 150-152.} The Ránquil uprising began at a meeting of a local union that had been organized with the assistance of the FOCh, the most prominent workers’ organization in Chile during the period, which was allied with the Chilean Communist Party. While both the FOCh and the Communist Party had begun to organize peasants in the countryside, they had little direct influence in the south and their efforts were not being guided directly by the Comintern.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 144-145.} Mallon, meanwhile, emphasizes important ways that various actors have remembered the uprising. “For the Left, it has served as a symbol of the Chilean people’s revolutionary spirit...For the right, it became a symbol of state consolidation and the loss of popular innocence caused by international communism. More recently for Mapuche intellectuals and activists,
Ránquil has served as a metaphor for the enduring usurpation and resistance of the (Mapuche) people.”

Manuel Aburto and the Federación were connected to the FOCh and his idea for an autonomous indigenous republic was in line with the Comintern’s platform that supported national liberation for ethnic minorities, but he was not directly involved in the uprising. However, because Aburto had been branded a communist for close to ten years by 1934, and had already drawn attention and repression from the state, the Ránquil Uprising almost certainly made his position with Alessandri more precarious. For a time, Aburto continued to maintain connections with both Alessandri and the left. In October 1934 he invited Alessandri to attend the fourteenth Congreso Araucano and on the 30th of that month he had a twenty-minute phone call with the President. Alessandri did not attend the fourteenth Congreso, but there Aburto established a formal alliance between the Congreso and the FOCh. Accord No. 2 included the statement “that the problems that directly concern the Araucanian race are completely analogous to those that affect the proletariat in general.” In March and April of 1935, Aburto held additional special sessions of the Congreso, to which he invited representatives from the FOCh, FECh, the Federation of Railroad Workers, Confederación General de Trabajadores, Asociación de Profesores, and other workers’ organizations. There they formed a “frente único” (united front) with the block of leftist organizations and formalized

those alliances.\textsuperscript{143} Again at the fifteenth Congreso, held in December 1935, Aburto invited President Alessandri, and extended invitations to all the organizations of the leftist block. While some members of the left did attend, Alessandri again declined the invitation.\textsuperscript{144}

In February 1936, Aburto was again arrested. On behalf of her father and the Federación, Manuel’s daughter Herminia called a special meeting to plan a response. In a handwritten note to her brother Cornelio at the bottom of the announcement, Herminia wrote, “They took papa, despite the fact that we told them he was not a communist.”\textsuperscript{145} In the mid-1930s, Herminia served as Secretary of the Federación, and in her father’s absence she took on the work of spearheading its ongoing activities, as well as keeping her family apprised of his situation. On the 21\textsuperscript{st} of February, she wrote to Cornelio to inform him that in the morning their father was to be exiled to the city of Quellón, on the island of Chiloé. She reported that Manuel said he was ready to make whatever sacrifice was demanded of him.\textsuperscript{146} The following month, Aburto himself wrote to Cornelio, expressing hope but also anger and frustration at the injustice of his detention. He said he did not want to reach out to President Alessandri for help, perhaps indicating that he saw him as in some way responsible for the detention in the first place.\textsuperscript{147} In the meantime, Cornelio took up a collection of funds from the membership of the Federación to help Aburto and

\textsuperscript{143} Circular No. 753 and 762, “Acuerdos de Sesiones,” Mar. 17-18 and Apr. 21-22, respectively. AMML, Carpeta 1.
\textsuperscript{144} Circular No. 814, Nov. 27 1935 and “Acuerdos del 15\textsuperscript{o} Congreso,” Jan. 9, 1936. AMML, Carpeta 1.
\textsuperscript{145} Circular No. 853. AMML, Carpeta 1.
\textsuperscript{146} Herminia to Cornelio, Feb. 21, 1936. AMML, Carpeta 1.
\textsuperscript{147} Manuel to Cornelio, Mar. 13, 1936. AMML, Carpeta 1.
Aurelio Ñanculeo (who was detained with him) to assist with their expenses while in exile.148 Herminia organized a special session where members produced a series of statements to send to Aburto, the press, and President Alessandri directly. They asked all the longkos of the south to pray for those in exile, and requested the contribution of funds to support the office of the Federación and the families of those detained.149 On April 3rd, Herminia again wrote to Cornelio to say that Aburto had lost his appeal. She said she was despondent and could not stop crying, and that she prayed that God would take her life. She even thought of killing herself, but said she was too afraid to follow through.150

Then on April 19th, Aburto was released. Upon his return from Quellón, the Federación held a special session on May 16-17, in which they passed several accords that signaled a continuation of their left-leaning alliances and a break from President Alessandri. The very first accord asked God to remove his support from Alessandri for not having addressed the problems of the Mapuche people. They went on to express gratitude to the leaders and residents of Quellón for treating Aburto so well during his time there. Accord No. 4 established the Federación as a member of the Frente Popular de Temuco, with Aburto, Martín Painemal and Avelino Melivilu as delegates to that organization. Finally, they expressed their appreciation to the members of the Frente Popular de Temuco for their protests against Aburto’s exile, and to several workers’ organizations for supporting his

149 Circular No. 856, May 19, 1936. AMML, Carpeta 1.
150 Herminia to Cornelio, Apr. 3, 1936. AMML, Carpeta 1.
family financially during that time. The following month, Aburto sent a telegram to the President and the press denouncing the application of the “corrupt Ley Ibañez.” He also requested that the Frente Popular de Temuco petition the government for an investigation into irregularities in the administration of justice through the Juzgados de Indios.

In the elections of 1937, the indígena José Andrés Huichalaf ran as a Communist Party candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. However, the Federación resolved not to put forward a candidate who officially represented the organization, and made clear in a resolution at the sixteenth Congreso that Huichalaf was running without the knowledge or consent of the Federación. They did at first formally express their support for Marmaduke Grove as he formed and led the Popular Front coalition that would bring Aguirre Cerda into power. It seems that the repressive actions of the state in exiling Aburto for a third time pushed him and the Federación further to the left in 1936 and 1937, but that was about to change.

The presidential elections of 1938 exacerbated a growing divide between rural elders and urban youth, who were beginning to form their own organizations in the capital. In February of 1938, Aburto planned a trip to Santiago where he met with a delegation of members of the Confederación de Trabajadores and the Sociedad Galvarino, both urban Mapuche organizations with leftist ties. But in the end, Aburto would abandon the left in favor of a partnership with the Sociedad and

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155 Crow, 2013, p. 79.
Unión. In 1938, the three groups would come together to form the Corporación Araucana, and Aburto’s impact on the Mapuche movement in the rural south would begin to wane. The alliance between the Federación and the Corporación Araucana would necessitate a measure of political moderation, which was somewhat contradictory not only with the positions of his previous allies, but also with many of the issues and proposals he had previously championed.

Explaining Aburto’s Political Philosophy

Dating back to the late nineteenth century, the Chilean state had crafted legislation that applied only and specifically to the Araucanians of the south. In 1866, the process for settling Mapuche kin groups on specific parcels of land by granting them titulos de merced was established. The 1874 law established a process for contracting with firms to colonize large tracts of land with foreign (European) settlers, and it specifically excluded Indians from acquiring those lands, which were government-owned territories that were granted or sold by the state to the privately-owned colonization companies.\(^\text{157}\) Because the Congreso Nacional created these laws, and all laws for that matter, Aburto realized that it was in that body that the sovereignty of the state rested. We can understand almost all the rest of his work as a variety of attempts to reassert the sovereignty of the Mapuche people. In that vein, “the Congreso Araucano functioned as a kind of reflexive inverse of the Congreso Nacional,”\(^\text{158}\) and that is why Menard and Pavez consider Aburto’s vast archival production to represent a kind of “written sovereignty.”

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\(^{157}\) Menard and Pavez 2005b, p. 215 (footnote 1).

\(^{158}\) Ibid. p. 216.
created on paper when there was not a territory in which to establish it.\textsuperscript{159} The sovereignty claimed by Aburto’s writing also correlates to earlier patterns of treaty-and alliance-making, in which Aburto’s ancestors, role models and namesakes had established their sovereignty over territory and people through the ritual parlamentos in which Mapuche longkos and colonial or Chilean officials reflexively legitimized one another’s claims to rule.\textsuperscript{160}

Notions of race figured prominently in Aburto’s political philosophy. At the same time he used the word *raza* (race) to define a biological category, Aburto was also speaking of cultural features of Mapuche life, and there exists a degree of slippage between his use of the two categories. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aburto and just about everyone else in the era considered the Mapuche people to be a biologically and culturally distinct population, even if their claims to political sovereignty were questioned. In much of his writing, he referred to the “natural law of the race.” That phrase indicates a familiarity with European political philosophy, and also suggests that he understood certain features of Mapuche civilization to be endemic to the group. The implication for politics was that those features should be considered when governing or incorporating the Mapuche people into the Chilean state. That was the basis for his original proposal to bring together Mapuche in the first Congreso in 1921, and the subsequent evolution of the Federación Araucana, which he described in his 1923 interview in *El Mercurio*.\textsuperscript{161} In thinking about race in this way, Aburto drew from much of the predominant racial thinking of the era,

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. p. 221.
\textsuperscript{160} Zarley, 2017.
which lent his arguments an “aura of scientific legitimacy” by adopting the same basic framework that others used to argue for the inferiority of the Mapuche people and justify the colonization of the south, for example. Aburto was both describing and constructing the Araucanian race in his writing, “through a process of continual inscription, an entity in constant production between the alliances and treaties that were recorded, the product of a body or of a judicial or political archive in which they were manifesting their own natural law.”

There is also an underlying political philosophy at play that can help us understand Aburto’s seemingly enigmatic alliance-making strategy. By tracing Aburto’s lineage and the ways in which his paternal forebears derived power through their proximity to powerful figures, Menard has shown that the force of one’s allies reflects upon oneself. That makes a strong figure a better ally, but also means that a strong opponent implies one’s own strength. In the formative period of the 1920s, Aburto’s political emergence coincided with the rise of the labor movement and the populist politics during the first Alessandri administration. We see that Aburto even patterned the name of his own organization after those of some important leftist organizations of the era, like the FOCh and FECh. However, as appealing as the left may have seemed as a collection of allies, Ibañez was a stronger figure by the end of the decade, and according to Menard’s formulation he could have been as valuable as an enemy as he would have been as an ally in terms of constructing Aburto’s own political strength in the eyes of his constituents.

Furthermore, although the left made efforts to incorporate peasants into their class

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162 Ibid. p. 215.
163 Menard 2013, p. XXXVIII.
struggle in the early 1930s as Klubock and Mallon showed in their studies of the Ranquil Massacre, the international communist movement was attempting to erase racial barriers at the same time, which Aburto had relied upon to justify the unique relationship of the Mapuche with the Chilean state and fight for their claims to sovereignty. That made the left a somewhat incompatible set of political allegiances.\textsuperscript{164} This is perhaps why Aburto would have supported Ibañez in the late 1930s, after he had surveilled and persecuted him in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{165}

Finally, we cannot overlook the spiritual dimension of Aburto’s political philosophy. His faith seems obviously prominent at the beginning and end of his career, evidenced by his early religious training and pastoral work at the Anglican mission at Quepe, and the increasingly spiritual tone of his later writings. But traces of that spirituality are scattered across his work in the 1920s and 1930s also, in the form of prayers spoken at Congresos, invocations of the name \textit{Dios Todopoderoso} (Almighty God) and petitions for God’s strength to be delivered to, or removed from, his political allies and enemies. In April 1938, Aburto referred to information about the upcoming presidential election as “spiritual news,” suggesting he used a religious frame to understand that political contest.\textsuperscript{166} Following the election, Aburto called on Federación members to maintain the “spiritual forces” they had brought into play in the election as they continued to fight for Ibañez’s eventual political triumph. “According to my revelation...I exhort each one of you, as well as

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. pp. LI-LII.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. pp. LXXXIII-LXXIV, see footnote 3.
\textsuperscript{166} Circular No. 995, Apr. 30, 1938. AMML, Carpeta 2.
all Evangelicals of our country...that we should keep praying until Sr. Ibañez is carried to the Presidency of the Republic."\textsuperscript{167}

As he withdrew from active political life in the 1940s, Aburto’s emphasis on the spiritual dimension of his personal life as well as the broader Mapuche struggle became even more prominent. Writing to his sons Cornelio and Manuel Segundo during a trip to Santiago in 1946, he wrote, “Each day I am more content with all that I have done in this city,” in reference to the divine messages he had received.\textsuperscript{168} And he increasingly referred to the Mapuche movement as a “movement of faith” in the official accords produced by the Federación, acts which he characterized as “of divine origin and material aspects.”\textsuperscript{169}

While a full exploration of the spiritual component of Aburto’s later writings is not possible here, it will suffice to say that his religious worldview was deeply syncretic. He drew from both the polytheistic ancestral traditions of his people, as well as the monotheistic teachings of his Anglican mentor Charles Sadleir. Aburto was a “bricoleur,” in Claude Levi-Strauss’ famous formulation.\textsuperscript{170} Aburto’s political millenarianism reminds the observer of the Incaic tradition that foretold of the return of an indigenous leader who would overthrow the colonial order. But he also saw the creation of the state of Israel as a sign that the same could happen for the Mapuche people in the Araucanía, which he noted in a 1948 journal entry.\textsuperscript{171} Aburto was able to see parallels in vastly different circumstances and pull them together in

\textsuperscript{167} Circular No. 1019, Nov. 1, 1938. AMML, Carpeta 2.
\textsuperscript{168} Letter from Santiago, Jun. 1, 1946. AMML, Carpeta 3.
\textsuperscript{171} Menard 2013, pp. CX-CXIII.
service of his people’s political struggle. He acknowledged the hegemony of the United States in the western hemisphere, and he prefigured many of the rights of indigenous peoples, which fifty-five years after his death were codified in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, especially the right to self-determination and political participation established in Articles 3-5.\(^{172}\)

**Summary**

Mapuche organizations were founded in the 1910s and 1920s as the process of radicación was drawing to a close. Settlement and the right to maintain communally owned land was a central issue in that early period. The Ley Indígena 4.169, which facilitated the easy dissolution of Mapuche community land, provided a flashpoint that enabled the organizations to mobilize large numbers of their members and fellow Mapuche, ultimately expanding the capacity of the organizations. The Federación and Sociedad Caupolicán, in particular, mobilized thousands of Mapuche in defense of their lands. Additionally, the unstable and rapidly evolving political context of the 1920s created a landscape that enabled the organizations to stake out a range of positions on the issue of settlement and division of Mapuche lands, as well as other issues like cultural preservation and assimilation. The leadership of Manuel Aburto Panguilef is especially insightful into those trends, because his lineage is well established, and his own positions tended toward political extremes. Even though he recognized that his own authority

derived from the proximity to power, he did not hesitate to forge alliances with opposition parties, even when the establishment persecuted him for it.

More importantly, the example of Manuel Aburto Panguilef demonstrates how fluid and flexible the reflexive strategies of alliance making could be. Aburto attempted to navigate the complex terrain of national politics in Chile during a very unstable period. While he was guided by the political expediency of certain partnerships, he also was guided by his broader view of the world and political principles that pre-date the era in question. His own spiritual beliefs, while certainly influenced by his Anglican education and the indigenista partnership of Charles Sadleir, did not preclude him from taking two wives and defending Mapuche cultural practices that were considered antithetical to most Christian teaching. Aburto, as an indigenous leader who was influenced by non-indigenous allies, and in turn influenced the indigenista discourse in Chile, was most certainly a complex figure who left an indelible mark on the politics of his own era and well beyond.
Chapter 2: A Conservative Indigenismo

The Unión Araucana was also founded as a partnership between religious educators and indigenous leaders, in this case between Bishop Guido Beck de Ramberga and Antonio Chihuailaf. However, from its founding in 1926 until its merger with other organizations in 1938, Beck retained a much firmer control over the direction and efforts of the organization than either the Sociedad or Federación, which were fully directed by the Mapuche leaders themselves. Beck was the leader of the Catholic Church in Araucanía, and came from the Capuchin order of monks who had first come to the region in the mid-nineteenth century. Chihuailaf, meanwhile, was the mayor of the southern town of Cunco, and had founded the organization Moderna Araucanía de Cunco in 1916. Although Moderna Araucanía continued to operate throughout the 1920s, the Sociedad Caupolicán and Federación Araucana had emerged as the two most influential groups, and the founding of the Unión was a reaction to the leadership of those groups moving to the left of the political spectrum under the influence of Manuel Aburto and Arturo Huenchullán as they sought to oppose Manquilef’s Ley Indígena 1.469.

The Unión Araucana hosted its own regional parlamentos (parliaments, or formal gatherings for decision making) in the late 1920s, where they advanced a substantially different kind of indigenista influence over the Mapuche movement. Their discourse prioritized branding and attacking the Sociedad and Federación and their leaders as communists. They also took pains to "prohibit the practice of
ancient pagan and superstitious indigenous customs, like the *machitún, rehuetún, guillatún* and others that are celebrated with great excess."\(^{173}\) As they worked to convert Mapuche to Christianity, the Capuchins did offer mass in Mapudungun and allow a measure of syncretism between Catholic and indigenous spirituality. Félix José de Augusta, another Capuchin missionary, was instrumental in those efforts, as he had studied Mapudungun and even published a Spanish-Mapudungun dictionary.\(^ {174}\) In response to claims that Mapuche children lacked adequate education, Beck and the Unión publicly reminded critics that the Capuchins operated more than thirty schools in the province, which were subsidized by the national government. It is not surprising then, that the government was at times more receptive to the Unión’s petitions and supported the organization more than the other two. The Unión, after all, was the only of the major groups to support Manquilef’s Ley 1.469, and they used their assemblies to actively support the law and attack the other groups at the same time.\(^ {175}\)

The example of Beck and the Unión Araucana further demonstrates the breadth and diversity of thought within Chilean indigenismo and Mapuche activism. While most of the Mapuche organizations operated independently under indigenous leadership, the Unión could only be described as autonomous at most. And if we are to compare Beck and Lipschütz as indigenistas, we clearly see the two at opposite

\(^ {173}\) *Diario Austral*, Apr. 26, 1926. Cited in Foerster and Montecino, p. 57. The Nguillatún is a religious ceremony that involves a large gathering of Mapuche for the purpose of connecting to the spiritual world. The Machitún is a related ceremony led by a shaman that helps connect living people with their ancestors. The Rehue is a vertical pole used by the machi in religious ceremonies.
\(^ {175}\) Foerster and Montecino, pp. 56-58.
ends of an ideological spectrum. Beck was committed to the Conservative Party and its candidates, and maintained few connections to the indigenista movement outside of Chile. His firm commitment remained to the education and cultural assimilation of Mapuche in the Araucanía. Nevertheless, many indigenous students benefited from the education Beck's schools provided, and he opened many doors to Chilean society, which addressed one fundamental tenet of the indigenista movement.

**Monsignor Guido Beck de Ramberga**

Guido Beck de Ramberga was born in the town of Ramberg, Germany, on the western edge of Bavaria, in 1885. He entered the Capuchin Order of Franciscan friars and was ordained as a priest in 1910. Two years later, Beck traveled to southern Chile to become a missionary and teacher. He taught in Padre Las Casas, just outside the regional capital of Temuco, served as a parish priest in Cunco and as a missionary in Coñaripe, all small communities in Cautín Province with large indigenous populations. In 1925 he was appointed Apostolic Prefect of Araucanía, and in 1928 his status was elevated to Apostolic Vicar and he was granted the title of bishop as the Church’s work in the region advanced under his leadership.\(^{176}\) He learned to speak Mapudungun as a missionary and operated more than thirty schools in the region, many of which included Mapuche youth alongside white Chilean students.

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\(^{176}\) Mario Céspedes and Lelia Garreaud, *Gran Diccionario de Chile (Biográfico-Cultural)*, CMA: Santiago de Chile, 1988, 2nd ed., p. 77. Beck was technically the “Titular Bishop of Mastaura,” a region in Asia, as the Araucanía did not become a full diocese until 2001. However, throughout the period examined here, Beck was referred to by the title of bishop or monsignor within the region.
Beck’s promotion as the central leader of the Catholic Church in Araucanía coincided with the chaotic period of presidential politics in the nation’s capital during the 1920s. At the same time, the radicación process was coming to end, and Mapuche communities were increasingly struggling to hold onto their meager land holdings and organizing to carry out that effort. It is not surprising then, that he inserted himself into the Mapuche political movement at the time he did. By creating the Unión Araucana, Beck carved out space within the movement for a more conservative brand of indigenous politics, and through his schools he had the organizational capacity to cultivate leaders loyal to him and his political priorities. From 1926 onward, Beck and the Unión supported private ownership of land, staunchly opposed traditional Mapuche cultural practices like polygamy and faith healing, and allied the group with the Conservative Party and its candidates.

Beck was willing to blend elements of indigenous culture with the Catholic rites of mass in order to attract Mapuche into the church. At the fourth Parlamento of the Unión Araucana in 1928, Father Félix de Augusta celebrated a mass that included prayers and songs recited in Mapudungun, and the bread and wine for Holy Communion were brought to the altar by an Indian. However, the rest of his efforts were quite culturally conservative and required Mapuche to assimilate to the values of western Christian culture. Foerster and Montecino illustrate how the Unión Araucana’s vision of cultural development was an inherently gendered one. Recognizing that Mapuche women were the keepers and purveyors of much traditional wisdom and power, for example in the role of machi (shaman), the Unión

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177 Foerster and Montecino, p. 63.
and the Church sought to subject women to more patriarchal western norms. “The woman owes her husband obedience and subservience, and he owes her compassion in return, he should rule her with moderation and good sense because she is fragile and weak.”

Boarding schools most fully carried out the goal of cultural integration, Beck argued, because they brought Mapuche and Chilean children into sustained contact and interaction through their living arrangements, thus assimilating their customs. “What type of school does the Araucanian need? The boarding school. Why? Because only there, watched and instructed daily, in contact with Chilean children who already have a higher level of culture, does the Indian lose his savage customs and acquire the true habits of a civilized person.” In the same proposal, Beck also asked for direct funding for the Unión Araucana and its official newspaper *El Araucano*, for the purpose of carrying out an anti-alcoholism campaign. By aligning the group’s efforts with the priorities of state actors, Beck was able to increase the influence he had with the state, and extract resources to support his programs. Statistics compiled by the Bishop indicate that since 1896 the Capuchin missions had educated 83,692 students in the Araucanía. By 1930, the Capuchins claimed 80 primary and secondary schools under their operation, in which they were educating 5,920 students, 2,061 of whom they identified as indigenous. When

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179 For a comparative treatment of indigenous boarding schools as indigenista projects in other national contexts, see Dawson, 2012 (referenced in introduction and discussed further in chapter three).
181 Notes on mission Schools, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
they came under fire for doing a poor job of serving those indigenous charges, Beck defended the work by arguing that teachers struggled with high rates of absenteeism and a myriad of social and family problems that interrupted the educational process for indigenous children.\textsuperscript{182}

In addition to Guido Beck’s political strategy, his work with Mapuche was also inherently personal. It is not entirely clear how or why Beck chose Antonio Chihuailaf to lead the Unión Araucana, but before his appointment as Apostolic Prefect he had been a parish priest in Cunco, where Chihuailaf had founded the organization Moderna Araucanía and served as mayor of the town. In comparison to the relationship that Beck maintained with Floriano Antilef as the second President of the Unión Araucana, he and Chihuailaf remained rather distant. Antilef regularly wrote to Beck to ask for assistance with his son’s education and to update the Monsignor on Floriano Segundo’s progress.\textsuperscript{183} Beck helped Antilef get his son into a secondary school in Temuco, and both father and son would regularly write to express their gratitude.\textsuperscript{184} On the other hand, the correspondence between Beck and Chihuailaf sometimes lapsed for months at a time, especially in the late 1920s as tensions rose between the two.

Later in the organization’s history, the Unión would draw leaders from the cohort of students that Beck’s missions had cultivated. In the late 1930s, Beck supported Victor and Zenón Leñam as they came up through mission schools and

\textsuperscript{182} Statistics on mission Schools, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{183} Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Feb. 21 and 26, 1932. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{184} Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Mar. 23, 1933 and Mar. 3, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
went on to study in Santiago at the Universidad Católica.\textsuperscript{185} Victor would go on to contribute to the Unión Araucana, first through the group’s youth branch “Juventud Araucana.” In 1940 he gave a speech to the Youth Conference that was later published as an article in the Juventud’s official bulletin Pelomtúe. There he argued for the importance of developing and maintaining a strong organizational structure for their movement.\textsuperscript{186} In early 1944, Beck helped Victor Leñam secure a job as an agronomist, working on the estate of Senator Carlos Haverbeck.\textsuperscript{187} Later that year, in October, Victor Leñam was elected president of the Unión Araucana.\textsuperscript{188} He would continue to put his education and scientific training to work in the service of his people and Guido Beck’s broader educational objectives. In 1949, when he toured a group of Mapuche communities and compiled statistics, Leñam wrote to Beck, commenting on their living conditions and offering to share some insights he developed into the benefits of agricultural training for Mapuche smallholders.\textsuperscript{189}

Other Union members would also go on to play influential roles outside of that organization and develop connections to the broader indigenista network. Domingo Curaqueo was a leader in the UA in the 1930s and 1940s\textsuperscript{190} and would later become a professor in Santiago and a member of the Instituto Indigenista

\textsuperscript{185} Correspondence between Guido Beck and Victor and Zenón Leñam, Jan. 1937, Apr. 1941 and Dec. 1943. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{186} Pelomtúe, Issue 2, Feb./Mar. 1940. ADV, Carpeta UA 2. “Pelomtúe” is actually a Mapudungun word meaning “genius.” It is curious that the Unión allowed its youth cohort to embrace this linguistic aspect of their native culture as the title of their official publication, and illustrates that although the UA was the most conservative of the major Mapuche organizations and broadly supported assimilation into Chilean society, they did also make concessions to indigenous culture.
\textsuperscript{187} Guido Beck to Carlos Haverbeck, Senator, Mar. 4, 1944. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{188} Report of annual assembly, Oct. 8, 1944. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{189} Victor Leñam to Guido Beck, Aug. 3, 1949. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{190} Domingo Curaqueo to Guido Beck, Jun. 12, 1937. Domingo Curaqueo to Victor Painemal, Aug., 4, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
Chileno.\textsuperscript{191} Through the IIC, he became acquainted with the Alejandro Lipschütz, and when the American anthropologist Louis Faron reached out to Lipschütz to ask for help arranging a site for his fieldwork in the early 1950s, Lipschütz put Faron in touch with Curaqueo, who helped him make arrangements for his study in the Comunidad Alonqueo near Temuco in 1952-1953.\textsuperscript{192} But one of the most consistent and salient features of Guido Beck’s role in the Mapuche movement was that he maintained connections, both personal and professional, with a whole host of state actors.

As the Apostolic Prefect of Araucanía, Beck was able to communicate directly with high-ranking officials, obtain a personal meeting if he requested one, and was often consulted when elites in Santiago had a question about how a particular policy would affect the region. Some of those interactions were relatively minor and mundane, such as when Floriano Antilef asked him for help getting livestock imported from Argentina,\textsuperscript{193} but others were more significant to the Mapuche movement, as when he asked the Minister of Land and Colonization to reject a Radical Party proposal that would have ended restitution payments to Indians

\textsuperscript{191} IIC statement, undated, signed by Curaqueo. Collección Alejandro Lipschütz (CAL), Caja 6357.

\textsuperscript{192} Correspondence between Alejandro Lipschütz and Louis Faron, Jan.-Aug. 1953. CAL, Caja 6353.

\textsuperscript{193} It is worth mentioning that the transport of livestock across the Andes was a major component of the Mapuche economy in the nineteenth century, and including livestock stolen from Argentinian herds in the Pampas through much of that earlier period. Most of that traffic was brought to an end with the conclusion of the Pacification and War of the Desert (Argentine conquest of native peoples in the Pampas) between the 1860s and 1880s. Thus while Antilef’s request held relatively little economic significance in 1930, it also carried much greater historical and cultural significance.
whose land had been usurped. In May of 1928, Beck requested and received from the Ministry of Development a monthly salary from the state of $200 pesos for each of the thirty-five missionaries working in the Araucanía. At about the same time, Beck wrote to the Minister of Development to request his intervention in a land dispute where Mapuche settlers were being evicted from their land. Through exchanges like these, Beck was able to advocate for the Mapuches under his care and state actors offered him privileged access and support.

Indígenas also utilized their relationships with the bishop to access his connections within the state. In May 1932, Beck received a request for help from Antonio Penchulef, when his property had been attacked. Beck passed his concern along to the Juez de Indios (Indian Court Judge) in Pitrufquén, and assured Penchulef that if he was attacked again they would elevate the concern to the Governor of Valdivia or the Minister of the Interior. Beck’s agents also advocated directly to government officials, although presumably those direct petitions carried less weight. In 1933, Floriano Antilef wrote to the Governor of La Unión to request that he intervene to stop “various caudillos that have given themselves the title of cacique” from making unreasonable demands of Indians in the province. In the same year, he also asked the Minister of Land and Colonization to intervene with the courts as they implemented provisions of the Ley Indígena, to help Indians who had

195 Correspondence with Ministry of Development, May 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1
196 Reply to Antonio Penchulef, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
197 Floriano Antilef to Governor of La Unión, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
been granted titulos de merced but not yet received restitution for lands that had been stolen from them.198

It is also likely that Guido Beck’s connections with state actors played a role in the desire of Coñuepán and the Sociedad Caupolicán to partner with them in the creation of the Corporación Araucana. In a summary of the January 15, 1937 General Assembly of the Unión, Antilef provided members with an account of a meeting that he, Coñuepán and Esteban Romero had with President Alessandri, in which they asked for his assistance in dealing with land issues, promoting agricultural development, forming a consumer cooperative and other issues like combating alcoholism.199 Two years later, after the Corporación had officially been formed and Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Frente Popular government came to power, Antilef asked Beck his opinion about a proposal that he and the Corporación leaders had drafted for the new President, especially because the plan called for enhanced educational opportunities for Mapuche youth.200

Beck’s connections were also valuable in that he could get state actors to intervene quickly in the event of an emergency or fast-moving situation. In May 1938, in the wake of a disastrous harvest in the south, Beck reached out to the Minister of Agriculture, who provided 400 sacks of wheat to help eighty Mapuche families ward off starvation as they headed into the winter.201 The Unión’s regional centers provided a mechanism for assessing the needs of the suffering peasants, and

198 Floriano Antilef to Minister of Land and Colonization, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
199 Summary of General Assembly meeting, Jan. 15, 1934. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
200 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Sep. 11, 1939. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
201 Guido Beck to Máximo Valdes, Minister of Agriculture, May 13 1938 and related petition for food aid. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
tracking the amount of grain that they needed and were then awarded. And state actors were sure to keep Beck in the loop when various proposals were being considered. In 1943, when the Minister of Land and Colonization formed a commission to study the “indigenous question,” he included Coñuepán, Aburto and “a missionary from Araucanía” on the panel, and the Minister forwarded a summary of the findings to Beck for his reference.

Manuel Aburto and Guido Beck both served as leaders of Mapuche organizations and intermediaries between individual Mapuche and the state. Many of their efforts were even directed at solving similar problems, in particular those pertaining to land claims. However, Aburto and Beck maintained very different relationships with the state officials they interacted with, including political appointees like ministers, elected officials like deputies, governors and even several presidents. Because Aburto’s proposals were often more radically in support of minority interests and therefore more difficult for politicians to support, he often found himself in the role of provoking entrenched interests, as in his alignment with the Socialist and Communist Parties in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In addition, because he was much more flexible ideologically, the alliances Aburto crafted were relationships of convenience and likely to change with the political winds, as he did after 1938. Beck, on the other hand, consistently favored more conservative policy positions on social, economic and political questions. His steadfast support of the

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202 List of accounts, Apr. 29, 1938. ADV Carpeta UA 2.
203 Decree empaneling Commission on Indian Affairs, Jul. 29, 1943 and list of proposals, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
status quo and the Conservative Party must have made him seem like a more reliable partner.

**Ley Indígena 4.169 and the Special Tribunal**

The Unión Araucana was founded in 1926, in the same year that Manuel Manquilef was elected to the Chamber of Deputies and began proposing the Ley Indígena that would be passed the following year. Some Mapuche supported Ley 4.169 because the process included a historical review of legal titles and a survey of lands to be divided, which Indians could use to recover usurped lands. However, others were staunchly opposed because the process was relatively easy to set in motion, beginning with the request of a single community member. Many viewed that as a very low threshold and raised concerns that more Mapuche communities would thus disintegrate.

The law created a *Tribunal de División de Comunidades* (Tribunal for the Division of Indigenous Communities), which was charged with overseeing the process of subdivision. The Tribunal consisted of three members, a president, secretary and indigenous representative, and from the start Antonio Chihuailaf was appointed as the sole Mapuche member of the Tribunal. In some instances, the Tribunal had to reject requests because “the action of this Tribunal extends only to those indigenous communities with a *titulo de merced*, and does not apply to land rights of Indians derived from other ownership titles.”

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204 Letter from Tribunal, May 24, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
heads of household in the period of resettlement that began after the Pacification in 1883. However, over the years many Mapuche communities had lost portions of their communal land through fraud, which in some cases happened when neighboring landowners simply moved fencelines onto indigenous plots adjacent to their own.

As early as 1927, the Unión leaders were connected with the Conservative Party and sent their suggestions for the Ley Indígena 4.169 to their representatives in Congress.\textsuperscript{205} The Unión also maintained alliances with some Mapuche leaders in this era, but were among the few indigenous supporters of Manquilef in the promotion of Ley 4.169. In July 1927, Antonio Chihuailaf traveled to Osorno to visit with members of the Unión there, in which he encouraged them to support Manquilef’s proposed law.\textsuperscript{206} In addition, from the start the Unión maintained a cultural and political position distinctly separate from the more radical Manuel Aburto Panguilef. In Chihuailaf’s invitation to the third Unión Parlamento in Boroa, he mentioned that there would be no machi dances or nguillatún celebrated there. Instead, Chihuailaf advocated for progress, cultural assimilation and substituted Catholic Masses for the ancient pagan traditions embraced by Aburto and the Federacion.\textsuperscript{207} It seems that for those reasons, as well as his respect and personal relationship with Guido Beck, the new President Ibañez named Antonio Chihuailaf

\textsuperscript{205} Letter from Conservative Party officials, Jan. 1927. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{206} Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Jul. 18, 1927. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{207} Public invitation to 3rd Annual Parlamento, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
as the indigenous representative to the Special Tribunal that Ley 4.169 established to carry out the subdivision of indigenous lands.208

Ley 4.169 did have some success in recovering usurped land and returning it to communities. By February of 1929, the Tribunal had recovered 1653 hectares of land. However, those from whom Mapuche lands had been recovered mounted a challenge to those actions through the regional press, characterizing themselves as the legitimate owners of the lands and the Tribunal and the state as those stealing it unjustly. At the same time, other Mapuche leaders were challenging the law because it made subdivision easier and organizations like the Caupolican Society and Araucanian Federation swelled their ranks by organizing peasants in opposition. Some challenged Chihuailaf’s appointment to the Tribunal, and in February 1929, Diputado Hector Alvarez proposed legislation in the Cámara that would modify Ley 4.169 to stipulate that the President’s nominee for indigenous representative to the Tribunal must first be nominated by the Minister of Education and be employed as a teacher. Because that move would have disqualified Antonio Chihuailaf, he wrote to Beck to ask him to contact his friends in Santiago and oppose the amendment. “This would mean the achievement of the goals of many who have bothered us and sought to stir things up,” he wrote.209

In May 1929, Chihuailaf wrote to Beck to explain that several options were being discussed to reform the subdivision process. Diputados from the Democrat and Radical Parties were proposing the creation of supervisory positions above the Tribunal that would report to the Court of Appeals. Other rumors were circulating

208 Copy of Presidential Decree, Jan. 13, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
209 Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Feb. 15, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
about a change of personnel on the Tribunal, including the possibility that Manuel Aburto would replace Chihuailaf as the indigenous representative. The following month, Beck sent a telegram directly to President Ibañez, lamenting the end of the first project of subdivision. He expressed his opinion that new proposals were problematic and might open the door to “pernicious ambitions” of “undesirable elements that abound in this region.” Beck regularly utilized such defamatory language as code when referring to Manuel Aburto and other left-leaning Mapuche leaders like Arturo Huenchullán.

As proposals for the modification of Ley 1.469 were being developed in the spring of 1929, Beck submitted to the Minister of Development Luis Schmidt a broader plan for the incorporation of Araucanians into Chilean society. Beck suggested the government should continue to expand and subsidize educational opportunities for Mapuche youth and include them in the military draft. Regarding education, he proposed more rural schools, grants for exceptional students and a system of traveling agronomists who could teach modern agricultural techniques to Mapuche farmers in the countryside. The following month, Beck expanded upon his proposal with a request that the Ministry support his work by funding boarding schools for both girls and boys.

Chihuailaf wrote to Beck again to suggest they employ some members of the Unión to propagandize on behalf of their position, recommending Floriano Antilef

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211 Guido Beck to President Ibañez, Jun. 11, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
212 Draft proposal, Guido Beck to Minister of Development. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
and Antonio Cofian for the role.\textsuperscript{213} He also asked Beck to write to President Ibañez, which he did a week later.\textsuperscript{214} In that communication, Beck suggested that instead of adding five judges to the Tribunal, they should hire twenty-five surveyors. More judges would mean more legal wrangling and competing interpretations, slowing the process even further. He explained that a shortage of surveyors was the current bottleneck in the process.\textsuperscript{215} Antilef and Cofian, representing the interests of the Unión Araucana and La Moderna Araucanía, subsequently sent letters and telegrams to Ibañez, the Minister of Development and several Diputados with a similar proposal.\textsuperscript{216}

In trying to carry out the division of indigenous communities, Chihuailaf and the Tribunal faced many obstacles and great opposition from Mapuche constituents. In July 1928, Antonio Trangulao Huentecura sent a complaint to Arturo Vidal, the Intendente of Cautín Province. He protested the actions taken by Chihuailaf and the Tribunal. He wrote that Chihuailaf was a tool of the other non-indigenous members of the Tribunal, who had colluded with a wealthy landowner to evict him from his land because they disputed his heredity. The Intendente forwarded the protest to the Tribunal. Chihuailaf responded with information about the lineage of deceased members of the community, and an official statement from the Tribunal said that they believed alleged communist Martín Collío was the true author of the complaint. As evidence, they pointed out that Collío had not been quiet about his opposition to

\textsuperscript{213} Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Jun. 13, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{214} Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Jun. 25, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{215} Guido Beck to President Ibañez, Jul. 2, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{216} Floriano Antilef and Antonio Cofian to Cámara and Senado, Jun. 24, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Chihuailaf, that the letter appeared to be written on the same typewriter as a previous message sent by Collío, and that all the members of the community except Collío disputed Trangulao’s claim. Chihuailaf wrote to Beck to affirm the Tribunal’s response and told him not to worry about it. He claimed that other communist agitators were behind Collío, and worried about connections between the Partido Comunista and the current president of the Catholic center in Imperial.\footnote{Complaint by Antonio Trangulao Huentecura, Jul. 6, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1. It is not clear from the existing historical record who Martín Collío was or what his role he played in this period of Mapuche history. Here an accusation is made that Collío is himself a communist agitator. In other correspondence he levies similar charges against Aburto and Huenchullán. See also, footnote 67.} Fear of communist infiltration was an important theme trumpeted by Beck and the Unión leaders throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Even though he supported the Ley 4.169 and the Tribunal it established, Beck was not completely satisfied with its progress either. He recognized it was an enormous task that required more manpower, time and resources. In addition, there was not enough land to settle all the Indians who were never settled in the first place, and there was not enough time or manpower to divide the communities given the level of conflict and confusion that the process produced. He also worried about violence if *ocupantes* (squatters) were forcibly removed from state lands.\footnote{Guido Beck, draft proposal for legal reforms, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.} Chihuailaf acknowledged those concerns even as he carried on with the project.\footnote{Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Oct. 26, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.}

The Tribunal and the process of subdivision also provided a means by which Mapuche communities could recover land that had been stolen from them. Manuel Aburto tried to use the process in that way, as in the case of Filipe Millahuala
Caniulaf, who had been granted 42 hectares within the reducción of José Painequeo. Aburto explained that the Comité Ejecutivo had studied his claim, confirmed Millahuala’s assertion and requested that the government restore his property. In some cases, the process did work to restore lost land to its rightful owners. In November 1928, the Tribunal offered a lengthy explanation and resolution of a dispute between Juan Millahuaiqui and Simón Puchi. Millahuaiqui claimed that Puchi had colluded with others to push him off his land, and petitioned to have the Comunidad Juan Manque divided in an effort to recover that land, which they granted.

It is difficult to establish conclusively what percentage of land disputes arose within Mapuche communities and how many were between Mapuche and non-indigenous landholders. However, all of the major indigenous organizations were involved in defending Mapuche lands from usurpation at one time or another, suggesting that the latter was a much more prevalent injustice. As Manquilef’s Ley 1.469 was being applied, Beck, Chihuailaf and the Unión ardently supported the subdivision of land that it prescribed, arguing that private property was in the best interest of Indians seeking to advance in modern Chilean society, and at the same time that the process contained valuable tools to recover lost land. However, by 1929 pressure from the other Mapuche organizations led to the modification of the law, and the Tribunal was disbanded. Eventually, President Ibañez would modify Ley 4.169 with Decree Law 4.111 in 1931. The latter raised the threshold by which a

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220 Manuel Aburto to Guido Beck, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
221 Record of land dispute, Nov. 26, 1928. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
222 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 62-64.
community could request subdivision from a single person to one-third of the group, which did serve to dramatically slow the number of subdivisions requested by Mapuche communities even though private ownership of land remained a strategy for helping Indians develop economically and integrate socially.\textsuperscript{223}

\textbf{The Fracas of 1930: Internal Politics}

Following the breakup of the Tribunal, several cracks appeared in the partnership between Antonio Chihuailaf and Guido Beck, which nearly resulted in the Unión’s demise. In early 1929, Chihuailaf began having personal problems, and at the same time his relationship with Beck was becoming strained. In May of that year, Unión member Floriano Antilef wrote to Monsignor Beck to inform him that for some time he had been hearing disturbing rumors about Antonio’s wife. At first he did not believe them, as he did not know the young men who were spreading the stories. But it was later confirmed by people he trusted that Antonio’s wife had been caught having relations with another man in the house of Antonio’s father. Antilef suggested that Antonio ought to divorce his wife for that reason, but thought the Bishop might be able to offer counsel on what he should do.\textsuperscript{224} It seems that Beck already knew about the incident, because the day before two officers of the court in Cunco had written to Beck, explaining the circumstances in even greater detail. On March 22, 1929, Antonio Chihuailaf’s parents, Juan Antonio Chihuailaf and Rudecinda Huenulaf, had come before the court to denounce Antonio’s wife, Camela Morales, and request that their son’s marriage to her be annulled. It seems that the

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. pp. 79-81.
\textsuperscript{224} Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, May 11, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Carabineros in Cunco had investigated a claim that Antonio had murdered Camela, but found her living at her grandmother’s house. Antonio’s parents claimed Camela suffered from a serious mental illness, and that she was “a threat to Antonio’s existence.” In fear of her, Antonio had moved back into their house. Antonio had written to Beck only days before and asked for a personal meeting to discuss what to do. He reassured Beck that even though “such incredible things” had occurred, his “enthusiasm and discipline would not be withered.”

Later that year, in November, Beck wrote to Antonio to say that he would be in Santiago soon (where Antonio had been staying) and offered to meet up with him. He mentioned that he had not received a reply to his most recent letter, and wondered if Antonio had received it. It seems that as President of the Unión Araucana, Antonio Chihuailaf operated with quite a bit of autonomy from Beck, whose title was Director General. In some cases, Beck’s letters indicate that he had not heard from Chihuailaf in months, or that Antonio had not responded to a previous communication Beck had sent. Later on, Beck would maintain a closer working relationship with Floriano Antilef after he became President. Chihuailaf’s independence contributed to the strained relationship with Beck, and the distance that grew between them led eventually to outright antagonism.

In January 1930, Beck wrote to Chihuailaf to express his concern that Antonio had declared his candidacy for Diputado without consulting him. He was

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225 Antonio Cofian and P. Huentemil to Guido Beck, May 10, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
226 Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, May 8, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
227 Guido Beck to Antonio Chihuailaf, Nov. 13, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
most disturbed that Antonio had claimed to stand as an official candidate of the
Unión, but had not received an endorsement from the group.

“My dear Antonio! This is bad for you, very bad. No one would be happier for you if
you became a Deputy than the one who writes these lines. But you have lost the
confidence of the one who has been like a father to you until this day, and that you
would not communicate matters of such importance like standing as a candidate for
Deputy is a bad sign. To announce your candidacy as a Deputy of the UA without an
official accord having been made, is not truthful, it is to deceive the public. You do
not know how much it has made me suffer and how much it has hurt me that you
did not answer my last letter and that you have shown me this mistrust.”

It is clear that Beck saw Chihuailaf’s independence as more than just bad form. He
was concerned that it was dishonest and felt personally let down that this man
whom he had educated, mentored and promoted to lead the organization would
shut him out of such a major decision. The move not only hurt their relationship, it
also sowed discord and mistrust among the members of the Unión.

Unión member Juan Pichunlaf wrote to Beck in April 1930 to ask why he had
opposed Chihuailaf’s candidacy. He characterized Beck as the one who had betrayed
Antonio, and questioned whether he had done this because Antonio divorced his
wife, a choice that he thought was justified given the nature of her “crimes.” Beck
responded to Pichunlaf to refute the claim that he had opposed Chihuailaf’s
candidacy. “To the contrary, I recommended him directly in a letter to the Minister,”
he wrote, in spite of his concern that Antonio’s claim to represent the Unión
contradicted their own bylaws. He added that he preferred Chihuailaf to a dozen
other candidates, especially Manuel Aburto, because he knew Antonio to be a decent
and honorable man.

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228 Guido Beck to Antonio Chihuailaf, Jan. 16, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
229 Juan Pichunlaf to Guido Beck, Apr. 9, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
230 Guido Beck to Juan Pichunlaf, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
But Beck and Chihuailaf continued to drift apart, and the indígenas they represented were caught in the middle. In April 1930, Chihuailaf wrote to Beck to say that he heard from Pichunlaf and a friend of Antilef’s that their associates in Loncoche had a distinctly bad impression of the Capuchins. Chihuailaf asked Beck for a monthly salary of 800 pesos so he could begin again to travel there and work to undo the damage that had been done by criticism of the mission schools. In Beck’s reply, he answered that he could not accept his terms. “It is too much. Do not make, Antonio, a business with the defense of your race. Another piece of advice for you: Don’t allow yourself to be dominated by your friends. Guard well your independence and your good sense, which will always guide you well.” It is not clear who Beck thought was influencing Chihuailaf, but this reference suggests that Chihuailaf maintained ties with other indigenous leaders who had different political views and/or allegiances. Although Beck referred to Antonio’s independence as a good thing, it was that very independent streak that seemed to have damaged their relationship.

As the relationship between Beck and Chihuailaf broke down, Beck turned increasingly to Floriano Antilef, who would eventually become the next President of the Unión. However, Antilef was at first ambivalent about whether to follow Chihuailaf as the President or Beck as the Director General. In April 1930, he wrote to Beck, expressing his concern that Beck’s ties to the Conservative Party did not seem to be in the best interest of the race. He referred to comments Conservative candidates had made, disparaging Mapuche as culturally backward. He added that

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231 Antonio Chihuailaf to Guido Beck, Apr. 6, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
232 Guido Beck to Antonio Chihuailaf, Apr. 12, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
he never wanted to be in contradiction to the Church’s teachings or Beck personally, but he viewed the brand of capitalism advanced by the Conservative Party as exploitative. He acknowledged that Beck had not openly opposed Chihuailaf’s candidacy, but also recognized that by not actively supporting him he dealt a fatal blow to his chances for election. Ultimately, Antilef’s trust in Beck and his faith in the Church overshadowed the misgivings he had about the politics of the Conservative Party being best for the Mapuche people.

The following month, in a reply to Antilef, Beck suggested that the heart of the matter lay in Chihuailaf’s criticism of mission schools, which centered around the types of careers for which the mission schools prepared its indigenous students.

“To work against our schools, that produce such immense benefit for the race, is true insanity, a thing that cannot be understood. I spoke extensively about this with the President of the Republic. He was very indignant and willing to proceed against these agitators. He said that an honorable and hardworking Indian who cultivates the land is a greater tribute to his people than a lawyer, and contributes more to the wealth of the nation than a lawyer.”

It seems that Chihuailaf’s unforgiveable sin was to side with other Mapuche activists in their criticism of Beck’s schools. By not separating himself from the other Mapuche organizations on that point, Chihuailaf fatally distanced himself from the Unión Araucana and had to embark on a new direction.

In the spring of 1930, Antonio Chihuailaf abandoned his role as leader of the Unión Araucana, and attempted to dissolve the organization. In a battle waged on the pages of the region’s newspapers, Chihuailaf challenged Beck’s self-proclaimed status as a representative of the Mapuche people as he criticized the educational

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233 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Apr. 17, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
234 Guido Beck to Floriano Antilef, May 9, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
work carried out in the mission schools. On the first point, he questioned why the Mapuche needed a German Catholic mission to represent them when they already had multiple members of their own race elected to the Chilean Congress and several other organizations fighting for their rights and well being. Regarding the Capuchin schools, he claimed that Mapuche youth accounted for only a small percentage of the students there, and that they had been unsuccessful in training them for careers as teachers, lawyers and business leaders.

Guido Beck fired back, claiming he had dedicated his life’s work to helping Mapuche peasants in Southern Chile, and that he had personally visited the homes and communities of many of the students he had guided into and through the mission schools. He characterized Chihuailaf’s statements as politically motivated betrayals as the dispute played out publicly in the region’s newspapers. On April 25th, 1930, several members of the Unión Araucana published an article in the Heraldo del Sur that defended the Capuchin mission and listed the good works the fathers had done on behalf of Mapuche communities. On May 9th, the paper printed a rebuttal, which characterized the Capuchins as businessmen, trying to make a buck on the education of poor indigenous peasants. The authors echoed Chihuailaf’s statement about the strength of the Mapuche movement, contending that they had their own elected representatives and did not need the missionaries to fight their battles for them. Charges of profiting from the business of representing poor Mapuche peasants became ammunition for both sides.

235 Statement published in Heraldo del Sur, May 9, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
In the wake of such public discord, between organizations and even within the Unión, statements were prepared and distributed through the organization’s regional centros (centers). In those messages, Unión leaders apologized for the attitude and actions of former president Antonio Chihuailaf, and rejected the criticism levied against mission schools as unjust and unfounded. They clarified that the Unión Araucana had not been disbanded, and that they were calling for members to regroup and confirm their commitment to the Unión by flying their tricolored flag, on which were written the words “religion,” “family,” “education” and “work.”

Beck and several priests were instrumental in helping Floriano Antilef coordinate this response, sketching out five points with which to respond. Antilef and another Mapuche member of the Unión, Marcelino Ñanculeo, remained in close correspondence with the Capuchin priest Father Sebastián, expressing their support and ongoing loyalty. However, they did indicate that “the protest of Chihuailaf has infected some members” of the Unión. In May 1930 they published an explanation of Chihuailaf’s attempt to dissolve the Unión, indicating that it was invalid because the meeting in which it was approved did not have a quorum. Then they called the Unión leadership together in a special meeting on June 4th, 1930, to chart a path forward.

The priest Father Vicente wrote to the editor of the Heraldo del Sur to refute several charges levied by Mapuche individuals identified as “R. Chuquelef” and “Fr.

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236 Notes related to Antonio Chihuailaf, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
237 Notes related to Antonio Chihuailaf, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
238 Marcelino Ñanculeo to Fr. Sebastián, Oct. 12, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
239 Floriano Antilef to Fr. Sebastián, Oct. 12, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
240 Statement published in Heraldo del Sur, Apr. 18, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
241 Marcelino Ñanculeo to Guido Beck, May 23, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
Caniulaf” in a previous article. He clarified that the numbers of Mapuche students in their schools were much higher than they had claimed, and that the cost of tuition and fees were much lower. In fact, the schools’ fees were so low that the mission could not possibly make a profit from their work, Vicente added. He also explained that the school provided a range of instruction, including practical lessons in agricultural techniques. 242

In May 1930, Antilef wrote to Father Remigio about the dispute between Chihuailaf, Aburto and the Unión. He said he was sorry to see the fight playing out publically, in the papers. “You said it well, that one (bad) potato can spoil a sack of potatoes. We see the insertion of Pichunlaf among the Indians (like that) and (wonder) why Chihuailaf allowed it. We are like crazy idiots fighting amongst ourselves.” 243 Antilef went on to mention that he was traveling to Temuco in the morning to speak with Chihuailaf, and he planned to tell him that if he decided to leave the Unión he would not try to convince him to stay.

From that point on, Beck and the Capuchin fathers embarked on a project of damage control. Since much of the criticism against them had played out in the region’s newspapers, they began a letter and article writing campaign to defend their work. At the fifth Unión Parlamento, those who assembled passed an accord and sent it to the editor of the Heraldo del Sur. The Unión’s membership established an official stance that walked back the toughest talk of their former president. In response to the criticism, the Unión proposed asking the government to fund more Mapuche schools and students, and reiterated that they deeply valued the education

242 Fr. Vicente to Heraldo del Sur, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
243 Floriano Antilef to Fr. Remigio, May 4, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
that the Capuchins provided. They also argued that criticism of mission schools had been overstated in the press.244

Beck was able to secure the endorsement of President Ibañez, who defended the technical aspects of mission education, explained that cultures are uplifted little by little, and that the Capuchins’ mission should not be to train a cadre of indigenous lawyers. At the same time, Ibañez retreated from his previous advocacy for the carte blanche subdivision of indigenous lands and credited Beck for changing his mind rather than leaders who had been more vehemently and vocally opposed, in the process agreeing with statements Beck had recently made on the subject.245

Following a meeting with the president on May 5, 1930, Beck's secretary Tomás de Augusta sent minutes from their meeting to newspapers, in which Ibañez confirmed that he thought the mission schools were “very adequate” and that their practical approach to indigenous education was very sensible.246 In a subsequent piece of pro-Capuchin propaganda, they reported asking the President what he wanted them to teach the Indians, to which he replied, “to read and write and cultivate their lands effectively.”247 Finally, in a lengthy “call to the President,” Beck contrasted the Catholic Church’s historical approach to indigenous affairs, and by extension that of Chile and all of Latin America, with United States General William Sherman’s infamous motto “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.”248 He coupled the Church’s

244 Letter to editor, Heraldo del Sur, Apr. 23, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
245 Draft statement, President Ibañez, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
246 Minutes from meeting with President Ibañez, May 5, 1930; Tomás de Augusta to newspapers, May 10, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
247 Draft statement to newspapers, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
248 This reference to U.S. Indian policy is interesting in this moment, as federal policy was being heavily criticized in the United States in the early 1930s. At that time, the critique was
enlightened historical defense of American aborigines with a defense of himself against the "unreasonable" attacks against him and his schools that had been circulating in the papers.249 Beck also advocated directly to other Mapuche leaders. Writing to Antonio Cofian, president of Moderna Araucanía's regional center in Cunco, Beck refuted Chihuailaf's claim that the mission had demanded land from Indians in order to build a school in Quechurehue.250

Meanwhile, Antilef and other Unión members continued to distance themselves from Chihuailaf. Writing to Beck in early May, Floriano claimed that his name had been added to a letter published in the Heraldo del Sur without his permission. He was indignant that a private conversation with Chihuailaf had been made public in that way.251 Two weeks later, Emilio Baeza of Nueva Imperial wrote to Beck to say that a recent article published in the Heraldo del Sur was falsely attributed to him – he had not even been present at the meeting where it was supposedly generated.252 At the same time, opponents of the Unión Valentin Morales and Juan Pichunlaf attacked Beck, publishing a statement in the Heraldo del Sur on May 27th in which they refuted his recent statements and suggested he was no friend of the Mapuche – that he should stay out of their affairs.253 Beck denounced the attacks against him to René Reyes, the Intendente of Cautín Province, and sent

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249 Draft statement, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
250 Tomás de Augusta to Antonio Cofian, May 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
251 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, May 4, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
252 Emilio Baeza to Guido Beck, May 21, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
253 News clipping. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
him a list of names of those who were attacking him. He also clarified that Chihuailaf’s attempt to disband the Unión was not legal, as he had met without the full leadership of the organization present.  

At the end of the month, Beck sent a circular to the regional presidents to call a special meeting to be held on June 4th to discuss Chihuailaf’s “frankly hostile attitude toward the Unión Araucana” and “clarify the situation produced by his disloyal conduct.” Finally, on June 17th he sent a circular to the Capuchin fathers throughout the region, which explained the current state of affairs.

Following that defense of the mission schools, Beck gave notice that Antonio Chihuailaf and all the members of his reducción had been expelled from the Unión Araucana, and that Floriano Antilef had been named Interim President. Furthermore, he explained that the teacher and Deputy Arturo Huenchullán had offered an explanation of his position on the mission schools, in which he clarified that he had never sought to undermine the educational work of the Fathers in particular, and that his criticism before the government was only addressed toward the general state of indigenous education broadly. However, Beck had recently received an anonymous letter full of insults from an Indian who claimed to be a friend of Huenchullán’s. For that reason, he advised all the mission schools that Huenchullán should not be provided any documents if he were to show up and request them, and that the mission’s Provincial Director of Education was calling all teachers together at a meeting in Valdivia to discuss the state of affairs.

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255 Circular to centro presidents, May 22, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
In November of 1930 Beck organized a General Assembly of the Unión to elect new leadership. But even as the 1930s progressed with the Unión Araucana under new indigenous leadership, the organization struggled to stay relevant as the political climate of the country rapidly evolved. Ibañez would be forced to resign the presidency in 1931, and a short-lived Socialist Republic was established. The other Mapuche organizations tried to come together to strengthen the Mapuche position amid the political turmoil. In the early 1930s, Beck and his team rejected the Sociedad Caupolicán's call for a unification of Mapuche organizations, writing “this idea is totally unfeasible because the true ties of union do not stem from sharing the same race and blood, but rather the same ideas.”

Beck's view stood in contrast to the view of most Mapuche leaders, who prioritized ethnic identity over allegiances to ideas or political parties. He would eventually change that view, but not for several more years, and not before the Unión continued to limp along with relatively weak indigenous leadership and management.

In January 1935, Marcelino Ñanculeo, president of the UA center in Nueva Imperial, wrote to Monsignor Beck to complain that he had not received communication from Antilef as president and that the Unión seemed to be devolving from its previous vibrancy and efficient function. He went so far as proposing to renounce his position as Secretary General in protest. The following week he wrote to Antilef directly to say that he finally received the announcement of their upcoming meeting, but that it was too late for him to attend as he received word

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258 Marcelino Ñanculeo to Guido Beck, Jan. 8, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
only the day before the event was scheduled.259 In the week following the Assembly, Antilef sent a circular to the regional centers sanctioning members for not attending the General Assembly, and followed that with a personal note to Ñanculeo asking him to step down since he missed the meeting.260

In subsequent years, the Unión Araucana would go on to improve its organizational efficiency and expand its capacity to help indigenous peasants by offering more services to its members. Regarding a meeting scheduled in July 1937, Antilef wrote to Beck suggesting they postpone, because he had consulted with other regional presidents and they agreed that the agricultural work to prepare for the planting season would make it difficult for many members to attend.261 In 1936 Beck had hired an attorney on retainer to provide legal services to Unión members in Osorno, and by 1938 proposed hiring a second to offer the same services to members in Valdivia.262 All Unión members received an identification card when they paid regular dues, and Beck required the attorneys to ask for the card before helping them. He also required a monthly summary of services be provided so he could track the work of the attorneys.263

All of this led Victor Painemal, in his role as Secretary General, to opine optimistically in June 1938, “I’m certain that with a little more work we will create

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260 Circular; Floriano Antilef to Ñanculeo, Jan. 18, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
261 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Jul. 27, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
262 Guido Beck to José Schwerter, Nov. 1, 1936; Guido Beck to Aurelio Herrera, Apr. 12, 1938. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
263 Fr. Gundecar to Guido Beck, Apr. 27, 1938; Letter to Aurelio Herrera, May 27, 1938. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
an excellent organization.” Painemal continued to carry out that work in the late 1930s, arranging contracts for printing materials like ID cards, flyers for their General Assemblies and coordinating the publication of the Unión newspaper, El Araucano. But there were bumps in the road also, as when Painemal declined the position of Director General in 1939 because of Antilef’s leadership, which he characterized as oppositional in Unión meetings as he rejected proposals based on his personal opinions while refusing to carry out the will of the regional centers. Beck asked him to continue working as before and try to reconcile with Antilef. In 1940, Painemal proposed to Beck that they create a new “Provincial President” position to help administer the work of the Unión, and expressed his concern that the partnership with the Sociedad Caupolicán through the Corporación was creating confusion, as some Unión members were also organizing Sociedad centros, which he thought created the danger that messages and priorities become mixed.

Opposing Aburto: Communism & Indigenous Culture

It is important to acknowledge that from the very beginning, “the Sociedad Unión Araucana was founded by the Capuchin missions for the purpose of counteracting the subversive communist propaganda among the Araucanians to whose civilization (the Capuchins) are sent.” When the Ley Indígena 1.469 was

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266 Victor Painemal to Guido Beck, Sep. 16, 1939. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
267 Guido Beck to Victor Painemal, Sep. 29, 1939. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
268 Victor Painemal to Guido Beck, Feb. 6, 1940. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
269 Telegram from Guido Beck de Ramberga to the Governor of Cautín Province, published in El Araucano, May 1, 1927, quoted in Foerster and Montecino, p. 54; a copy of this
debated in the Cámara de Diputados in 1927, the delegation of the Communist Party were the only representatives who opposed it. “The Communist representatives are opposed to this project, and vote against it. We consider this project to be one that not only will not protect the Araucanians, but on the contrary, one that covers a system of theft and plunder that has made them victims for a long time with a cloak of legality.” When Aburto’s Comité Ejecutivo immediately objected and sent a series of demands to the President, the regional press in Cautín Province characterized their objections as “communist agitation.”

As a parallel goal, the leaders of the Unión made efforts to stamp out traditional cultural practices that they perceived to be antithetical to the development of Mapuche as practicing Catholic Christians. In his invitation to the Unión’s third Parlamento, to be held in Boroa in January 1928, Unión president Antonio Chihuailaf explained to the membership why this was important.

“But if we celebrate our Parlamentos with the dances of machis as was done recently (by the Federación), if we recommend to our brothers the celebration of nguillatún in its ancient forms, if we tell them to return to polygamy and to sell their daughters, we shamefully degrade our sisters. Then, my compatriots, we do not civilize our race, we degrade it, we throw it three centuries into the past, we are criminals that do not deserve the name of educated and civilized men.”

Although Chihuailaf did not mention Aburto by name in his exhortation, the implication would have been clear to his audience, and he positioned the Unión as relatively supportive of cultural assimilation, particularly as compared to the Federación, which fought for cultural preservation. Both of those priorities put the

communication, dated Apr. 16, 1927, is found in the Diocesan archives, and is signed by Beck, Chihuailaf and Marcelino Nanculeo, as Director General, President and Secretary General of the UA, respectively: ADV, Carpeta UA 1.

270 Foerster and Montecino, p. 78.
271 Invitation to 3rd Annual Parlamento, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
UA in direct opposition to Manuel Aburto and the Federación Araucana, who embraced political alliances on the left and fought to maintain polygamy and celebrated the nguillatún at every Congreso Araucano that they organized.

Beck’s preoccupation with Manuel Aburto was sustained throughout the period. In January 1930, Manuel Raiman wrote him to describe what he had observed at the recent Congreso Araucano that Aburto had organized in Boroa. “My beloved pastor, I was very sad to see the little civilized Mapuche dancing with the machis and in that way the Araucanian race was insulted by a con man who is deceiving the ignorant with his old ideas.” Enclosed with his letter, Raiman included notes on the events he witnessed, in which he described an assembly of about 1,000 Mapuche dancing with machis and celebrating the nguillatún. In his address, Aburto criticized Beck and belittled the size and activities of the Unión Araucana. He mentioned that Arturo Huenchullán was also present, having recently completed his studies in the United States.272

Beck took his objections to Mapuche cultural gatherings all the way to the President of the Republic. In October 1929 he wrote to President Ibañez to express his concerns about the celebration of nguillatún, which included assertions that they were characterized by excessive drinking, thievery and vandalism. He also opposed on religious grounds the “demonic possession” of the machi and the sacrifice of cows and horses by removing their still-beating hearts during the ceremony.273 In addition to Aburto’s efforts to corrupt the Indians by promoting communism and ancient pagan practices, Beck complained that he was encouraging Mapuche to

273 Guido Beck to President Ibañez, Oct. 18, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
break the law and not pay their taxes. In doing so, Beck positioned the Unión on the side of the direct interests of the state, while Aburto threatened those interests.\textsuperscript{274}

The fight against Aburto was waged in the papers, as well as the personal correspondence of Beck and other indígenas who wrote directly to state actors. In response to Aburto’s open opposition to Ley 1.469 and his public protests through the Federación’s assemblies, Beck prepared a press release in May 1930 in which he characterized Aburto’s position as illegal, and in open opposition of the rule of law. In contrast, the Unión was conservatively aligned with state policies and willing to adhere to whatever laws it passed. “We believe that the only viable path is to obey the Law; to not put any obstacles before it; to cooperate so that the judges, who are all very honorable and competent people, may carry out their work.”\textsuperscript{275} On June 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1930, Floriano Antilef mentioned to Beck that he heard from the Carabineros in Loncoche that Aburto had been detained on the fifth, and driven to San Felipe de los Andes, a town in the Valparaíso region north of Santiago.\textsuperscript{276} That would prove to be the second of three times that Aburto was “relegated” by the state, or sent into internal exile, for political stances that threatened the order and stability of the state.

In response to Aburto’s criticism and that of other radical elements within the Mapuche movement, Beck was on the defensive throughout the early 1930s. In December 1930 Diputado Enrique Montero Cabrera\textsuperscript{277} wrote to Monsignor Beck to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[274] Draft letter. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\item[275] Draft statement. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\item[276] Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Jun. 7, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
explain the status of subsidies delivered by the state. The Vicariate received twenty-five pesos per student, with an additional amount for indigenous students. Some Diputados from the Democrat and Radical parties were trying to strip the subsidies, perhaps to wrest control of indigenous education away from religious institutions, but Montero was fighting to keep them in place. He indicated that he was hopeful for success, and that the support of the President of the Cámara, and President Ibañez would help him win.\textsuperscript{278} The dustup over Chihuailaf’s betrayal and subsequent charges of mismanagement of the schools had threatened Beck’s access to those state subsidies. Monsignor Beck fought back by attacking Aburto, whom he believed to be behind the antagonism facing the Unión, and in February 1931 wrote to Pedro Opazo Letelier, the President of the Senate, to request his support in opposing Aburto’s organization of nguillatún through the annual Congresos.\textsuperscript{279}

Members of the Unión directly opposed and denounced Aburto and other more radical elements of the movement to state actors. In September of 1930, Marcelino Ñanculeo and Floriano Antilef wrote a series of short notes to the Intendente of Araucanía, the Minister of Development and President Ibañez himself, to “protest corrupters of the race who would return us to ancient, barbaric customs.”\textsuperscript{280} Antilef also opposed Aburto publicly in an attempt to win over Mapuche who might favor his ideas. Writing to Father Sebastián in January of 1932, Antilef said that he was inclined to write a statement for \textit{El Diario Austral} opposing Aburto’s idea for an autonomous indigenous republic, saying he was willing to face

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\textsuperscript{278} Enrique Montero to Guido Beck, Dec. 4-5, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1. \\
\textsuperscript{279} Guido Beck to Pedro Opazo Letelier, Feb. 23, 1931. ADV, Carpeta UA 1. \\
\textsuperscript{280} Draft letters, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\end{flushleft}
whatever consequences came from opposing him and his supporters.\textsuperscript{281} Antilef’s statement sketched his opposition in very broad terms. He argued that Aburto was attempting to enrich himself and his associates at the expense of poor Mapuche peasants. In addition to the familiar defense of Capuchin mission schools and assaults on the backwardness of indigenous ceremonies that Aburto promoted, he also criticized the leftist political position of the Federación. He called the idea for an indigenous republic “communism in its most revolutionary form,” and branded Aburto’s proposals as class warfare. “Russia has shown us clearly. There, millions of peasants were killed, only because they were not in agreement with the tyrants of the Soviet government.”\textsuperscript{282} That position of the Unión was communicated internally through circulars sent to the regional centers. In May of 1932 Antilef promised to begin sending monthly updates on the challenges faced by Araucanians in the region. In particular, he implied connections between Aburto’s utopian pipedreams and the worst aspects of communism in Europe, in the process appealing to a sense of loyalty to their homeland. “My fellow Araucanians: let us not lose the momentum we have gained. The fatherland does not want the death of your children, the fatherland does not kill your children, the fatherland does not see its own children as slaves, as the Russian communists do, and as will happen in Chile if we embrace communism.”\textsuperscript{283}

Throughout this period, not only Mapuche leaders, but also ordinary peasants in the countryside were navigating a shifting set of political alliances. It is

\textsuperscript{281} Floriano Antilef to Fr. Sebastián. Jan. 14, 1932. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{282} Floriano Antilef to newspapers. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{283} Francisco Catrileo to Guido Beck, June 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
important to remember that on one level the leaders of organizations tried to navigate political alliances strategically, in the interests of their members and their view of what was best for all Mapuche. In the spring of 1931, Antilef wrote to Beck asking if he should support Juan Esteban Montero, representing the Radical Party, in the upcoming presidential election. He wanted to make sure Montero was a good supporter of Catholicism, and proposed to send a circular to the regional presidents advising them to counsel their members to vote for Montero also.\textsuperscript{284} He wrote again following the election to say that all the Unión members in Loncoche voted for Montero, and asked Beck to pass along their best wishes to the President-elect.\textsuperscript{285} But Montero’s time in office was to prove short-lived, and he was deposed in June 1932. In September, Antilef sent another circular in which he reinforced the importance of voting, not only for the candidate who represents the material best interests of Mapuche, but also who shares their values. In this case, Antilef wrote that the Conservative Party best represents Catholic ideals, and he listed their candidates for office.\textsuperscript{286}

On a more grassroots level, individual Mapuche were targeted for political support. In October of 1932, the president of the UA centro in La Unión wrote to Monsignor Beck to complain about the attacks of Aburto and his associates on the Unión. He also mentioned that two men in La Unión who demanded to know for whom he had voted in the recent election had confronted him. One was an official with the Socialist Party and the other a member of the Democrat Party.

\textsuperscript{284} Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Sep. 15, 1931. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.  
\textsuperscript{285} Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Oct. 15, 1931. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.  
\textsuperscript{286} Circular No. 3, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
"He got a curious look on his face when he asked me which party I supported and I told him I did not trust or belong to any political party. Well, said the Socialist, I am a furniture maker and I can give you work, but if you accept the post of secretary of the Party I can give you a government job in Valdivia; they made me many promises, but ultimately the Democrat spoke badly of the clergy. 'Enough,' I said, these people are bad influences." 287

For some Mapuche peasants, their Catholic faith alone was enough to draw a line in the political sands.

Aburto, meanwhile, engaged the Monsignor on his own terms. In January of 1930 he wrote to Beck to share with him a resolution from the Federación’s most recent (9th) Congreso, celebrated the previous month in Boroa. The resolution expressed that fifty years before, the Mapuche leaders had donated land to the founders of the Capuchin mission in Boroa, and that in exchange they had been promised that the fathers would look after the education and well being of their children. They now, therefore, respectfully asked that the mission school provide free education for Mapuche youth. “If it is not possible for you to provide these services free of charge, we ask that you provide a reasonable discounted rate for children of both sexes, without denying entry to the children of the chiefs or other Indians that belong to the Federación Araucana, as it follows that this Federación coordinates the activities in Araucanía in defense of their moral and material interests.” 288 In making the claim in this way, Aburto claimed legitimacy and hegemony for the Federación in indigenous affairs. He made no mention or reference to the Unión Araucana or Sociedad Caupolicán.

287 E. Molina to Guido Beck, Oct. 8, 1932. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
288 Manuel Aburto to Crecente Errázuriz, Archbishop of Santiago, Jan. 6, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
Beck stayed informed about Aburto’s claims to authority over the Mapuche movement. The Unión Araucana papers housed at the Diocesan archives in Villarrica contain news clippings of material published by a number of organizations, especially those that referenced Aburto and the Federación. In March of 1935, *El Correo de Valdivia* published a story about a letter Aburto sent to the Intendente of Araucanía, in which he claimed that the Mapuche were not consulted in the reform of the Ley Indígena.\footnote{News clippings, *Correo de Valdivia*, Mar. 23, 25, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.} The following year, Beck clipped an article about "Communist Agitation in Araucanía," which claimed that the resolutions of the Congreso Araucano "clearly show the communist infiltration (of the Federación) and the terrible results that uncontrolled infiltration is producing in the indigenous communities and their populations."\footnote{News clipping. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.} Responding to the Congreso’s accords published in the newspaper *La Frontera*, Antilef wrote an editorial in which he referred to the Congreso as a "Soviet." In an increasingly direct confrontation between the two groups, Antilef drew particular opposition to the Federación’s claim to represent all Mapuche and their call to eliminate the Bishop of Araucanía.\footnote{Floriano Antilef, draft statement, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.} Writing to Beck to say that *El Diario Austral* had agreed to publish his protest, he added that "the Sociedad Caupolicán has not protested the accords of Panguilef; I’ve been deceived!"\footnote{Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Feb. 17, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.} While the groups sometimes saw one another as necessary allies, the Sociedad seemed more willing to walk a centrist position between the Unión and Federación, especially after 1931 under Coñuepán’s leadership.
Although Beck, Antilef and the Unión Araucano remained staunch adversaries of Aburto, with one of their most strident objections being his association with communist ideas, party activists and projects, some of their own initiatives approached communalism. In their June 1936 General Assembly, the UA discussed creating a consumer cooperative, a project they later undertook and which was well received.\textsuperscript{293} In January of 1936, Aburto wrote to Monsignor Beck and Father Gúndecar, requesting that they return the house they were occupying within the reducción of Juan Chihuailaf in Cunco.\textsuperscript{294} It seems that the Capuchins had plans to convert the property into a school that would be located within the reducción, but as the Capuchins and Aburto squared off over the project, the Chihuailafs were caught in the middle. In December of that year, Venancio Manquel, a Unión member who was involved in the project, wrote to Monsignor Beck to suggest that Father Sebastián speak directly to Chihuailaf to try to resolve the dispute. Otherwise, he feared, the disagreement would escalate if the two sides dug in their heels.\textsuperscript{295}

Projects like these show how the diversity of political thought among the organizations at times led to infighting and fragmented the movement. It also shows just how tenuous it would become for the Corporación to hold together an alliance between the three main groups. However, in contrast to Manuel Aburto, Guido Beck saw Venancio Coñuepán and the Sociedad Caupolicán as better allies against the more radical Socialist and Democrat political influences in the region. In a 1933

\textsuperscript{293} Program of General Assembly meeting, Jun. 18, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{294} Manuel Aburto to Guido Beck, Jan. 22, 1935. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{295} V. Manquel to Guido Beck, Dec. 20, 1936. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
letter to Alfredo Rodríguez Mac Iver, Governor of Cautín Province, Beck indicated that Coñuepán and the Sociedad provided an important counterweight to Aburto and Huenchullán. He expressed his support for the Sociedad’s efforts to stimulate the development of agriculture in the region, and also included a statement about the need to curb the abuse of alcohol among the Mapuche.296

As the 1937 elections approached, several Mapuche leaders and their organizations stepped forward to support candidates for Diputado. In December 1936, Coñuepán wrote to Guido Beck to say that the Sociedad wanted to put forward a candidate, but they were unsure about which party to approach. Acknowledging that the Mapuche were themselves “still divided,” and that no political party had uniformly supported indigenous issues, nor did any one “inspire much confidence,” he asked Beck for his support and a recommendation.297 Beck replied that in his estimation it was impossible for them to unite when Aburto and his supporters had “publicly declared war on the Capuchin fathers,” and when their positions were so diametrically opposed. He referred to the Federación’s propaganda as a “frenzy of Chilean Nazism.” For his part, Beck favored an alliance with the Conservative Party.298

In 1937, as the Sociedad Caupolicán was working to bring the major Mapuche organizations together under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana, Venancio Coñuepán and several other Mapuche leaders considered running for election as Diputados representing various districts in the Araucanía. As they made

296 Guido Beck to Alfredo Rodríguez Mac Iver, Jul. 22, 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
297 Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck, Dec. 21, 1936. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
plans, Coñuepán reached out to Beck to ask for his advice and counsel. Beck replied that he did not “desire to get mixed up in political issues,” but agreed to the meeting because he did “not want to neglect to give my opinion.” Antilef later wrote to Beck saying that he was sorry to hear that Coñuepán was not accepted as a candidate by the Conservative Party, and that he feared he would be unsuccessful if he did decide to go ahead with his candidacy. He then wrote to Fernando Varas, of the Conservative Party, to say that the Unión Araucana’s values aligned with Conservative Party principles, and asked if they might consider one of the Unión members as a candidate instead. In the end, Venancio Coñuepán, Floriano Antilef and José Cayupi all ran as independents, but were unsuccessful in their bids for office.

The Federación, meanwhile, decided not to put forward their own candidate for Diputado, but rather endorsed José Huichalaf Alcapan who was running on the Communist Party ticket. The following summer, at the Unión’s meeting of the executive committee, they held several sessions about the dangers that communism posed to the Araucanian race. Even within the conservatively aligned Unión Araucana, the threat of communism had penetrated. In October 1938, José Neculmán wrote to Beck as the president of the Boroa centro to inform him that Bartolo Neculmán (relation unknown) had been spreading propaganda in support of

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299 Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck, Jan. 20, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
300 Guido Beck to Venancio Coñuepán, Jan. 23, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
301 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Feb. 10, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
302 Floriano Antilef to Fernando Varas, Feb. 10, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
303 Campaign flyer. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
305 Floriano Antilef Segundo to Guido Beck, Apr. 1, 1937. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
leftist candidates within the centro. All of this shows how remarkable it was that within two years Coñuepán was able to bring both the Federación and Unión under the umbrella of the Corporación, and the savvy of his political alliance-making both within the Mapuche movement and also with the entrenched powers of Chilean politics.

Indeed, throughout the period, the fight against communism was perhaps the most consistent thread running through the Unión’s goals and strategies. As early as 1929, before succeeding Chihuailaf as president of the Unión, Floriano Antilef had written Father Sebastián to affirm the idea that education was one of the most effective ways to counter the communist threat. In a letter dated May 21, 1936, Antilef wrote that he had read in the papers that Aburto had been deported to the Juan Fernandez Islands, and he asked Beck if it was true. In fact, Aburto had been exiled to the island of Chiloé, for what would turn out to be the third and final detention by the state of his political career. The repeated harassment by the authorities illustrates that Aburto was a potential liability as a partner to the other organizations, and also that ties to leftist political parties were dangerous.

**Forming the Corporación Araucana**

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Unión Araucana operated without much collaboration from other Mapuche organizations. In fact, from their founding, the Unión took as its priority to combat other Mapuche organizations, especially

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307 Floriano Antilef to Fr. Sebastián, Apr. 1, 1929. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
308 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, May 21, 1936. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
Manuel Aburto and the Federación Araucana, but also the Sociedad Caupolicán during the late 1920s when it was led by Arturo Huenchullán and oriented toward the left in opposition to the Ley Indígena 1.469. Most of the correspondence in their archives from this period is internal, with the exception of Beck’s deep connections with the state. However, as the 1930s wore on, more ties to other organizations developed. By 1938, the Unión joined with the Sociedad Caupolicán and even Aburto’s Federación to form the Corporación Araucana. The Unión archives reveal that Venancio Coñuepán worked to cultivate a relationship with Beck for several years leading up to that critical juncture. But it was a long road from the fracas of 1930 to the founding of the Corporación.

Although the Unión was probably the most distinct and least collaborative of the Mapuche organizations, they were not entirely without allies within the movement. In the midst of the turmoil of 1930, Francisco Catrileo, president of a newly founded Mapuche organization (the Sociedad Araucana), reached out to Beck to express that group’s official regret for the “unjust attacks that have been launched by some young brothers of the race who are misguided.” Catrileo went on to say thank you for all the efforts the Capuchins had made to benefit and improve the lives of Mapuche in southern Chile. In December 1931, the Sociedad Caupolicán invited Floriano Antilef to a meeting where they planned to discuss the creation of indigenous schools and a credit fund for Mapuche farmers. Antilef wrote to Beck, saying he thought their plans for schools were not serious because they did not have access to resources or teachers. About the credit fund, though, he said he thought it

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was a good idea, but was careful to ask Beck for his opinion and his blessing to attend the meeting to learn more.310

Soon the Sociedad Caupolicán would begin to court the Unión also, but Beck was initially resistant to their proposals. He sent a circular to the Unión’s membership in October that acknowledged he had heard that the Sociedad had begun to invite young Mapuche to meetings with the purpose of uniting the various organizations. In principle, he wrote, “this idea of a merger is not bad, it is good.” But he recognized the vast differences between the Unión and other Mapuche organizations, and ultimately said that a partnership between groups with such vastly different goals would not work. The Unión Araucana was first and foremost a Catholic organization, in Beck’s mind. “The society they hope to found, composed of people so different, cannot survive. It carries within it the germ of dissolution. We are Catholics, and before all else Catholics.”311 This early pronouncement illustrates two important things. First, the effort to bring the organizations together under one umbrella was a long process, taking place over a span of almost ten years. Second, the process of unification was a component of a larger process, under which Mapuche organizations transitioned from partnerships founded with Euro-Chilean allies to self-sufficient groups led by Mapuche politicians and activists. In addition, the transition from reliance on white allies to a more unified and self-sufficient Mapuche movement represents an eclipse of racial and ethnic identity politics over simple political alliances and short-term expedience. But that transition took place

310 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
311 Guido Beck to centro presidents, Oct. 28, 1930. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
at different times and in reaction to vastly different circumstances in the three major organizations.

Venancio Coñuepán continued to court Beck directly as a collaborator in his efforts to create a unified Mapuche organization. In the fall of 1932, he wrote to Beck several times. The main subject of those letters was his effort to gain Beck’s support for Mapuche candidates for the Congress, and include him and the Unión leaders in the process by which they were selected. But more broadly, Coñuepán’s outreach signified his desire to unify the organizations around the racial and ethnic identity of his people and across religious, cultural and political divides. In June 1933, Coñuepán wrote again to share with the Bishop information about an Assembly of Indigenous Farmers that the Sociedad was organizing, at which they planned to discuss solutions to their problems and petition the government for help in solving them. In the text of the circular, Beck underlined the phrase, “we are powerful when organized collectively and in that way we have the best defense.” It is likely that such a statement of ethnic collectivism made Beck uncomfortable as it had the potential to eclipse his promotion of Catholicism, but nevertheless he wrote back to express his support. He did ask, however, that they work to suppress alcoholism and pagan rituals – that they could count on his support as long as they did not directly or indirectly oppose his religious convictions.

Throughout that winter and into the spring, Coñuepán stayed in contact with Beck about their projects. He forwarded letters that the Sociedad had solicited or drafted in support of their agricultural efforts. They had secured the support of the

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313 Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck correspondence, Jun. 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
Junta Provincial de Agricultura de Cautín (Provincial Agricultural Council of Cautín) for their proposals, and the leaders of that group advocated on their behalf to the Minister of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{314} But in September the Sociedad wrote to the Minister directly to express their disappointment that he did not see the necessity of their proposals, including the idea of a traveling agronomist to offer technical advice to Mapuche farmers. That suggested he did not understand the needs of their constituents, they wrote, and asked him to reconsider.\textsuperscript{315}

In July 1933, Coñuepán again brought up the idea of combining the organizations to put forward a “united front” and asked about Antilef’s opinion of the proposal.\textsuperscript{316} By September the two organizations agreed to publicly announce their accord. In that communication, they highlighted the fact that the two groups that had done the most to advance the cause of Indian education in the region were the Anglican and Capuchin missions, which were the same two groups that helped to found the Sociedad and Unión, respectively. Mapuche leaders like Coñuepán and Antilef had been trained in the very schools that the two missions operated.\textsuperscript{317} This religious and educational connection was therefore a lasting and important feature of Chilean indigenismo.

In November 1933, Antilef’s circular to the regional presidents announced that at their upcoming General Assembly they would elect three delegates to participate in the United Front with the Sociedad Caupolicán, because the time had

\textsuperscript{314} Alfredo Rodríguez Mac Iver and Manuel Cruz to Minister of Agriculture, Aug. 10, 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{315} Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Agriculture, Sep. 25, 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{316} Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck, Jul. 29, 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
\textsuperscript{317} Correspondence between Unión and Sociedad leaders, Sep. 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
come for all Mapuche to confront their common problems together. But Antilef remained ambivalent about the project. The following July he wrote to Beck to say that he had not heard much from the Sociedad Caupolicán with respect to their partnership, and that he was having doubts about the utility, effectiveness and durability of an alliance with a group that had such different values. At about the same time, in the mid-1930s, Unión Araucana leaders were attempting to develop greater self-sufficiency from Beck’s patronage, and also more substantive and effective organizational structure. In his May 1934 circular to the presidents of the regional Unión centers, Antilef announced that they would be instituting annual dues of one peso per member, in order to cover the cost of correspondence and publicity, an expense that Beck had covered up until that point. It is important to recognize that in the institutional history of the Unión Araucana, efforts to develop greater organizational efficiency and independence from the Capuchin fathers came at the same time their alliances with other Mapuche organizations grew stronger and more formal.

Antilef’s loyalty to Beck and uneasy feelings about the partnership with the Sociedad Caupolicán persisted for some time. By July 1936, the Sociedad had achieved their goal of creating a centralized Mapuche agricultural fund called the Caja Central to lend money to Mapuche peasants. Writing to Beck about the

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318 Circular, Nov. 12-13, 1933. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
319 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Jun. 29, 1934. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
320 Circular No. 15, May 25, 1934. ADV, Carpeta UA 1.
321 The Caja Central is also sometimes referred to as the Caja Agrícola (Agricultural Fund) or Caja Indígena (Indigenous Fund) in the historical record. Accordingly, the three terms are used interchangeably at various points in this text, in keeping with the way they are used in the sources referenced.
celebration of this event, Antilef lamented the fact that Beck had not been invited to the ceremony, and seemed offended by the snub. Nevertheless, Beck suggested to Antilef that if he had occasion to deliver remarks, he might emphasize the importance of saving money for the Mapuche small farmer, the lack of which he blamed for the poverty of many Indians. But the groups did stay together, and on the 12th of November, 1938, the Sociedad Caupolican, Federación Araucana and Unión Araucana formally came together as the Corporación Araucana. One of their first official acts was to send a telegram to the President of the Republic announcing their union, and claim to be the official political voice of the Mapuche people. For Antilef and Guido Beck a sense of ambivalence surely remained, as the following month the Caja Central (under Coñuepán’s leadership) celebrated its anniversary by bringing together 2,000 Mapuche to host a nguillatún. However, in 1938 Pedro Aguirre Cerda won the presidency representing the Popular Front coalition of left-leaning political parties, which dealt a blow to Beck in his steadfast support for the Conservative Party.

But the combined efforts to represent the Mapuche people continued and advanced to the highest levels of government. In October 1939, Antilef wrote to Beck to inform him about a proposal that the Corporación was about to make to President Pedro Aguirre Cerda, taking care to point out there was no danger of undermining the Capuchin schools. In a six-page document, the Corporación proposed the creation of a sub-cabinet-level position within the government to

322 Floriano Antilef to Guido Beck, Jul. 1936. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
323 News clipping, El Diario Austral, Nov. 1938. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
324 News clipping, El Diario Austral, Dec. 21, 1938, ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
oversee indigenous affairs. This “Subsecretariat Indígena” would supervise three initiatives toward improving land tenure, economic development and education for Mapuche communities.326 While it took some time for this proposal to gain traction, this seems to be the first incarnation of the idea for what would later come to be the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas that Ibañez created in 1953, and which Coñuepán would lead for much of the 1950s. It is also worth recognizing that this initial proposal predates Coñuepán’s visit to the Patzcuaro Conference in 1940 where the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano was founded, and shows that the organization and formalization of the Mapuche political movement was well underway in the 1930s. At that time, proposals made by Mapuche leaders were on pace with similar developments that had already begun in Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.

As the 1930s gave way to the 1940s, Coñuepán stayed in contact with Guido Beck, and the two remained cordial, although they were not always in agreement on the material aspects of the Mapuche movement. In December 1943, Beck wrote to Eulogio Robles as Minister of the Courts, to share his thoughts on “the indigenous question,” but at the same time to reject Coñuepán’s proposal for the sub-secretariat, which he thought “would create a state within a state.”327 He did write to congratulate Coñuepán when he was elected as a Deputy in August 1945 representing the right wing party, Alianza Popular Libertadora (Popular Freedom Alliance). Coñuepán wrote back to thank him and to affirm their alliance, but he also acknowledged that some of the younger Mapuche who worked for Beck in Padre Las Casas supported another candidate “whose party was not on the right and who are

326 Notes from meeting with Corporación leaders, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
327 Guido Beck to Eulogio Robles, Dec. 16, 1943. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
actually enemies of those who support the subsidies” that supported the Capuchin mission schools.\textsuperscript{328} Throughout the 1940s, their relationship remained strained by various political issues, as when Beck wrote to Coñuepán in 1948 to complain that he had criticized the mission schools.\textsuperscript{329} Coñuepán replied that he had not said those things, that his enemies within the movement, and other politicians, had attributed the comments to him.\textsuperscript{330}

**Summary**

While the Unión Araucana was not able to mobilize large numbers of indigenous peasants in public gatherings like the great congresos organized by Manuel Aburto, they did exert significant influence over the Mapuche movement. Monsignor Guido Beck de Rambergia was well connected with high-level state actors, which made him an important ally and a difficult adversary for other leaders within the movement. Although Manuel Aburto courted and was supported by left-leaning political parties, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, at the same moment the left triumphed with the election Popular Front presidential candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda, he and other major Mapuche organizations joined forces under the auspices of the Corporación Araucana with a decidedly more moderate political orientation. That enabled Venancio Coñuepán to become the de facto leader of the Mapuche movement, and later win a second election to the to Chamber of Deputies as a candidate of the Conservative Party in 1949.

\textsuperscript{328} Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck, Aug. 13, 1944. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{329} Guido Beck to Venancio Coñuepán, undated. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
\textsuperscript{330} Venancio Coñuepán to Guido Beck, Mar. 3, 1949. ADV, Carpeta UA 2.
While it would be a stretch to credit Guido Beck’s influence as the sole cause of the Mapuche movement trending toward the center of the political spectrum in this period, his connections to state actors enabled him to influence ways that the state received and reacted to Mapuche political demands and advance a more conservative indigenista agenda. Again, we see that Mapuche and other indigenista leaders were guided by factors outside the locus of their control. The case of Guido Beck and the Unión Araucana represents both a response to the leftist provocations of Manuel Aburto and others, and a distinct effort to proactively influence the movement toward preferred outcomes. Beck and the Mapuche leaders of the Unión Araucana built their following from among the many indigenous youth that Catholic schools educated, and expanded the tradition of organizing in the rural south. They too were operating within a sphere of influences created by national and international political events, as well as the goals of their allies and opponents. What is more, although Beck retained more direct control of the organization he founded than Guevara and Sadleir did with the Sociedad, even in the Unión the indigenous leaders had room to maneuver, advocate and express their individual and collective agency as Indians.
Chapter 3: Indigenismo in Chile and the Americas

At this juncture, we shift our lens of inquiry from the organizational work of Mapuche activists and their Chilean allies, to consider the broader influence of transnational indigenismo on the Mapuche movement. One central argument of this dissertation is that the categories of Indian and indigenista were much more flexible and dynamic than most scholarship on indigenismo and indigenous activism has traditionally accounted for. However, I maintain the use of such categories in the effort to illustrate the fluidity between them, and to show how ideas were shared between actors.

In order to demonstrate that intellectual flow in the case of the Mapuche in Chile, chapter three first examines the origins of formal transnational indigenismo and the creation of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. I lay out some key aspects of the global context in which the indigenista discourse developed, explaining the significance of World War II and the Cold War on indigenista initiatives. I then show how the transnational network of indigenistas formed and developed through travel, joint projects and the exchange of scholars across national contexts during the 1940s. The second part of chapter four turns to look at the contributions of Chilean indigenistas to the pan-American discourse in the 1950s, with particular attention paid to news items reported through III publications. That work shows that although the Instituto Indigenista Chileno operated as a private organization from 1949-1961 and the Chilean state did not
formally support its initiatives, members did actively participate in the indigenista
discourse. They sent delegations to several international conferences and
contributed scholarly and journalistic articles to its publications.

**Indigenismo across the Americas**

Gathering force in the 1920s, the broad goal of indigenismo as a movement
was to incorporate indígenas into national states as citizens, retaining only the
“least offensive” features of their native cultures as their life ways and living
conditions were modernized.\(^{331}\) The vanguard of this movement broke out in
Mexico during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas during the 1930s, where the
incorporation of indígenas into the national political system was a major goal of the
populist revolutionary government.\(^{332}\) In Mexico, the official status of indigenismo
led to broad funding and support from the government, which in turn created an
indigenous school system, public health projects and economic development
schemes.\(^{333}\) In other countries, the goals of indigenistas varied widely based on the
degree of support they received from political institutions and the various
ideological orientations of proponents.

In the United States, indigenista projects found support during the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the Indian Reorganization Act (also known as
the “Indian New Deal”) aligned with other policies geared toward social reform,
economic stimulus and modernization in the 1930s and early 1940s. John Collier, as

\(^{331}\) Berdichewsky, p. 16.
\(^{332}\) Giraudo and Lewis, p. 3.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1933-1945, was responsible for many of the advances in U.S. Indian policy in those years, and is generally viewed as the architect of the Indian Reorganization Act. Collier is also credited with closing the federal Indian boarding schools that had served a critical role in the assimilation of Indian youth into the national culture since the late nineteenth century. But following World War II, the emergence of the Cold War dramatically shifted the priorities of the U.S. federal government and indigenismo lost its official prioritization and support. In the post-War era, a new cadre of reformers sought to “terminate” the special relationship that Indian nations had with the United States, which unraveled many of the gains indigenistas had made in that country.

In Peru, the impact of indigenismo also fluctuated as the nation’s political winds shifted. Peruvian sociologist Osmar Gonzales describes that country’s indigenista movement as composed of two distinct branches. One school of thought, epitomized by the work of radicals inspired by Marxism in the 1920s like José Carlos Mariátegui, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and a young Luis Valcárcel, held that the indigenous question stemmed from fundamental flaws in the Peruvian state. As a result, they favored the overthrow of the state and its reconstruction along very different lines, i.e. socialism. The other line of analysis saw indigenous problems as flaws within a project of state formation that was incorrect or incomplete, but which could be fixed through reforms. After repressive political regimes effectively crushed leftist politics in the 1930s, a more reform-minded indigenismo emerged in Peru at the same time the III was forming in the 1940s. Luis Valcárcel, who had previously advocated for a more strident, revolutionary brand of indigenismo,
became one of the most prominent Peruvian indigenistas, eventually leading the Peruvian Indigenista Institute from 1946-1949. By that time, through his association with the III and captivation with the more scientific approach of North American anthropology, Valcárcel had tempered his views. His career trajectory mirrors the incorporation of indigenismo into official state policies and projects in Peru, and elsewhere in the Americas.334

Historical memory reflects the fluctuations and ambivalence of national Indian policy. Historian Alexander Dawson has compared indigenista education projects in Canada, the United States and Mexico. In all three national contexts, indigenistas operated boarding schools that removed indigenous children from their home communities in efforts to improve the lives of the students and their communities. But while the Mexican schools were part of a broad strategy to honor and recognize indigenous contributions to the Mexican nation, other North American schools were part of a strategy to assimilate Indians into white culture by stripping them of their native language and customs. In the U.S., federal Indian boarding schools are remembered as violent places where indigenous children were deprived of food and subjected to harsh punishment when they ran away or refused to speak English. In Canada, owing to a handful of high-profile lawsuits seeking damages stemming from sexual abuse in church-run schools, the legacy of First Nations schools has been tainted and is remembered as one more chapter in a sad history of ethnocide. Dawson’s work shows that broad similarities in the projects

themselves contrast with the very different ways in which the projects were remembered, owing to the unique national contexts in which they were produced.\textsuperscript{335}

\textbf{Origins of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano}

“After the first World War, persons working on behalf of Indians...gradually became aware of each other and, realizing they had a great deal to learn from each other, began working together.”\textsuperscript{336} Some years later in 1933, at their Seventh International Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Organization of American States (OAS) identified the need to bring together various individuals and agencies working to improve the living conditions of indigenous peoples across the Americas in a more formal way. Then in 1938 at the Eighth International Conference in Lima, Peru, the OAS announced that the first \textit{Congreso Indigenista Interamericano} (Inter-American Indianist Conference) would be held in 1940 in Patzcuaro, Mexico. Among the resolutions adopted in Patzcuaro was the formal establishment of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano.\textsuperscript{337} John Collier, Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), was appointed president of the conference and eventually the president of the III Board of Directors, and Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas attended the opening ceremonies and delivered an impassioned speech extolling the


legacy of Mexico's indigenous cultures. Mexican educator, politician and diplomat Moisés Sáenz was selected as the first Director of the III, although his sudden and untimely death in 1941 got the new institute off to an unstable start. Soon afterward, Manuel Gamio, an anthropologist trained by Franz Boas at Columbia University, was appointed as the Institute's next director. Two years into his leadership, Gamio wrote of the Institute's mission:

“...we are not attempting to reconstruct for the Indian an existence like the one his ancestors led before the Conquest... Nor are we trying forcibly to impose upon him a ridiculous process of complete Europeanization, uprooting him from his traditional and natural environment. We simply wish to elaborate and offer him an harmonious combination of the best of his pre-Hispanic and colonial legacy, the best autochthonous material he possesses today, and the best elements in western culture which may be adaptable to the nature of his particular needs and aspirations.”

That mission would later be scrutinized and criticized by historians of indigenismo, but does represent a valuable lens through which I analyze its many projects.

Delegates attending the first Congreso Indigenista Interamericano in the Mexican city of Patzcuaro created the III in 1940 and required each member state also create its own national indigenista institute. The purpose of that broader structure was to support collaboration and coordination between the III, its affiliated national institutes, social scientists and indigenous organizations in each country. Results produced by social science research would be coordinated and disseminated by the III. That research would then inform policy decisions made by

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the state, which could also consult indigenous organizations through the national institutes as policies were adopted and implemented.\textsuperscript{341} Although member states were expected to contribute funds to the III and to support national institutes within their countries, in many countries indigenistas had difficulty building political support for their projects at the national level, which slowed the III’s progress toward its goals. The Institute had no means to enforce its requirements, so many member states simply refused to create national institutes or pay their annual dues. That was precisely what happened in Chile. The country did send an official delegation to the Patzcuaro conference that included the Mapuche leaders Venancio Coñuepán and César Colima. But while the Instituto Indigenista Chileno (IIC) was created in 1949, it was not recognized by, and did not receive funding from, the Chilean government until 1961, and was only inconsistently consulted on indigenous questions. However, Alejandro Lipschütz was a major contributor to the IIC and attempted to prompt state actors to comply with III policies and requests for information throughout the period.\textsuperscript{342}

Writing in a 1942 editorial in the \textit{Boletín Indigenista}, Manuel Gamio further elaborated the scientific mission of the III. In order to identify populations with which to work, Gamio categorized Indians in four groups: those whose characteristics and needs are unknown because they had never been studied, those whose characteristics and needs were known generally but had yet to be prioritized, those who had been studied scientifically but not yet targeted for social improvement, and those who had been studied and subsequently benefitted from

\textsuperscript{342} Colección Alejandro Lipschütz, Caja 6353.
social or political intervention. By placing indigenous populations in categories along a continuum in this way, Gamio made clear that the goal of the III was to facilitate the transition from the first to the fourth categories. Although the consequences of that approach were inherently political, often requiring the direct intervention of the state, Gamio strove to maintain an apolitical stance for the III. But as we shall see, such independence proved impossible to maintain.343

While the III would make progress on those initiatives and others in the coming years, their advancement was sometimes slow and plodding, and at other times inconsistent. The III was founded at the beginning of American involvement in World War II, which instantly became the priority of the United States, the largest and most internationally powerful of the member states. As a result, interest in Native American issues waned at the level of national political debate in the United States. Native Americans did play key roles in the U.S. war effort, most famously the Navajo “code talkers.” For his part, Collier also contributed to the war effort, using the BIA to create and manage a Japanese internment camp at the Colorado River Indian Reservation, where interned Japanese-Americans were put to work on an irrigation project intended to ultimately benefit Native Americans in the southwest by bringing irrigation waters to 90,000 acres of previously unproductive soil.344 In reality, Collier's experiment was more complicated as he sought not only to benefit Native Americans under his charge, but also minimize the trauma of what he believed to be the injustice of internment in the first place, while simultaneously

conducting social experiments to understand how the interned Japanese-Americans themselves managed life in the camp. Collier and his wife, anthropologist Laura Thompson, saw in their experiment a model for self-sufficient indigenous communities in the U.S. and Latin America, and also for the administration of U.S. dependencies in the Pacific in the post-war era. John Collier, as a major architect of both the III and United States Indian policy reform, would resign as commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1945 as the war was drawing to a close, in large part because the priorities of federal Indian policy shifted significantly in the post-War administration of President Harry S. Truman to favor efforts to “terminate” the special relationship sovereign native nations had with the United States government.

During the war, the III attempted to link Latin American indigenous peoples to the war effort.

“While it is physically impossible for the countries extending from Mexico’s northern frontier to Patagonia to carry out a job of such magnitude, they will in general gladly cooperate to the limit of their respective capacities...If the totalitarian aggressors later attempt to invade the continent, or it becomes really urgent to fill the decimated ranks of the Allies, in which Indians of the United States and Canada already fight, the companies, battalions and armies will come from those southern countries.”

Of course, no such invasion would come to pass, and ultimately no major contribution of troops to Allied armies was made. Then after the war, as U.S. foreign policy became increasingly preoccupied with containing the spread of communism,

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indigenous populations in Latin America gradually presented a different sort of concern as they were alternately targeted by or recruited into Marxist uprisings across the region.

Although Indians in Latin America did not participate in direct combat during World War II, several indirect hardships fell upon them, which the III tried to mitigate. In 1943, the editors of the *Boletín Indigenista* pointed out that the costs of basic raw materials used by Indians across Latin America were climbing out of their reach. Wool, leather and even rubber dedicated to the production of wartime supplies created shortages and therefore inflationary costs for those materials that were fundamental to the indigenous production of handcrafts and utilitarian items like blankets, sarapes and sandals. The situation was so bad, the editors pointed out, that rubber from discarded tires could not even be substituted for leather in the construction of sandals, as the value of the latter had become even greater than leather. In proposing solutions, the III called upon the governments of the hemisphere to intervene, or at least remember, the plights of their indigenous inhabitants. In doing so, the editors fell into the paternalistic tone that later led to the sustained criticism of the movement, writing that “The Indian can do nothing himself, and if the governments do not assist in this extremely difficult situation, he must remain silent, continuing to suffer perhaps more acutely than before.”

**Transnational Connections**

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The III offered opportunities for indigenistas to collaborate and learn from one another. In 1941, Ernest Maes, at the time working as a Field Representative for the U.S. BIA, traveled throughout South America, “seeking to glean from the administrative experiences of these countries in dealing with their Indian populations, information which might be of use to the U.S. Indian Service.” News of his travels was reported in the *Boletín Indigenista*, which indicated he spent one month in Venezuela before moving on to Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil.\(^{349}\) Maes later spent time in Chile, where in 1942 his visit resulted in the creation of a “provisional commission” in Temuco. The commission had three primary objectives: 1) to convince the Chilean government to sign the Patzcuaro Convention, 2) to bring information from the III to Chilean indigenistas broadly, and Chilean government officials in particular, and 3) for the provisional commission to be officially recognized by the III and Chilean government, laying the groundwork for the establishment of a National Indigenista Institute in Chile.\(^{350}\) However, in order to establish the provisional commission quickly, Maes drew upon members of the Corporación, which shifted the orientation of the group. Whereas in other countries indigenista efforts were led by white indigenistas trained in the social sciences, these first III efforts in Chile were reliant upon indigenous leaders whose primary objectives lay with their own political activities and direct engagement with the state.\(^{351}\)

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\(^{351}\) Vergara and Gundermann, p. 6.
In 1942, there were only four official national indigenista institutes among the countries of the two continents: the United States, El Salvador, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Even Mexico, the official seat of the III, had failed to obtain official approval for its national institute, illustrating the difficulties that indigenistas encountered in obtaining political and financial support from their governments. As Secretary of the National Indian Institute in Washington, D.C., and acting as a representative of the III, Ernest Maes again traveled to member countries in 1942 to encourage the creation of national institutes. He eventually worked his way through Central America, visiting Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Following his two-month trip to all the countries of Central America, Maes summarized the insight he had gathered for readers in other places in a letter published in the Boletín. He identified a method by which national institutes could start small and grow their operations, providing examples of micro-projects undertaken by the affiliates in El Salvador and Honduras. National institutes represented the only way to ensure that the III would be effective at producing tangible results for indigenous groups, and not just function as a distributor of research findings.

Maes offered the insight that they should function not only as a “friend in court” for disenfranchised indigenous peoples, but also set an example of scientific approaches to social problem solving, both for native peoples and for their

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governments.354 For their part, the editors of the Boletín Indigenista reminded those trying to get national institutes off the ground that:

“It is essential that these National Institutes avoid becoming what so many Indianist groups have become in the past, a debating society where well intentioned but largely futile Indianists gather together to make discourses with revolutionary implications on the situation of the Indian, instead of pointing out specific Indian problems by demonstrations of constructive suggestions on how to deal with them. These suggestions must be practical within the resources of the governments concerned. The organization of these Institutes need not be at all elaborate, much less bureaucratic.”355

An example of just such a simple, straightforward solution was the III’s proposal to broadcast technical, cultural and administrative information via radio, directly into indigenous regions and in native languages.356

Maes’ travels were productive, and by 1943 Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua had created national institutes. More significantly he was able to exchange ideas with indigenistas working in different contexts and populations with distinct needs. He reported that the first projects undertaken varied significantly, as El Salvador’s national indigenista institute began a project to encourage soy production among Indians, Honduras undertook a pottery project and Panama and Guatemala were working on health initiatives. He suggested that although national institutes were created within various branches of government or the educational system in each country, it was important for them to be connected to key decision

354 Ibid. p. 213.
355 Ibid. pp. 210-215
makers and leverage their successes in early projects toward gradually larger efforts.\textsuperscript{357}

In his role as Director of the III, Gamio was perhaps the single most widely traveled and well-connected indigenista. In 1944 he visited Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, meeting with Presidents Isaías Medina and Getulio Vargas, as well as ministers of foreign relations, education and economy. Among other issues addressed, Gamio encouraged Colombia to pay the dues they owed to the III under the Patzcuaro Convention and secured a promise from Vargas that Brazil would soon sign the agreement as well. Recognizing that Brazil had been working for the advancement of indigenous peoples for more than thirty years through their Indian Protective Service and Council for Indian Protection, he proposed the creation of scholarships to support the exchange of students between those three South American countries and Mexico and the United States, so that “once they have a scientific training, (students) would visit Brazil in order to study the systems used there...then...return to their respective countries in order to work among the various jungle Indian groups.” In the following months, Gamio planned to visit the United States as a complement to his trip to South America.\textsuperscript{358}

The professional networks built through the indigenista movement facilitated advanced study at U.S. universities for scholars across Latin America. Manuel Gamio and Moisés Saénz had both studied at Columbia University in the 1910s, under Franz Boas and John Dewey respectively, and by the early 1940s news

\textsuperscript{358} Noticias, “The Director’s Trip to South America,” Boletín Indigenista, 1944 Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 172-189.
of scholarships and the progress of anthropology students regularly made the pages of *Boletín Indigenista*. In 1941, anthropologist Robert Redfield provided such an update informing readers that Guatemalans Antonio Goubaud Carrera and Juan Rosales were pursuing doctoral study in his department at the University of Chicago.\(^{359}\) Those networks also provided field research opportunities to North American academics, such as the work completed by professors John Gillin and Melvin Tumin, who spent part of 1941 conducting research in eastern Guatemala.\(^{360}\) In other instances, North American anthropologists spent time at Latin American universities offering courses as visiting professors. In 1942, anthropologist Sol Tax offered a seminar on Maya ethnography at the National School of Anthropology in Mexico City, and later offered a field methods class in Chiapas.\(^{361}\) In 1943, Alfred Métraux of the Smithsonian’s Bureau of American Ethnology taught a course on the Ethnology of South America at the National School of Anthropology in Mexico City, and Alfonso Caso of Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology taught a course on Mexican archaeology at the University of Chicago.\(^{362}\)

The III also directly supported Indians in efforts to travel and learn from indigenous communities in other American contexts. In August of 1940, five indigenous Mexicans accepted the invitation of the U.S. BIA to travel to the north,

\(^{359}\) Noticias: United States, "Guatemalan Students in Chicago Anthropology Department," *Boletín Indigenista*, 1941 Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 33


where they visited several American Indian communities. At times, III work was supported by direct contributions of personnel from member states, rather than consistent funding. For the first two years following the Patzcuaro Convention, the U.S. BIA stationed Emil Sady in Mexico City to support the growth of the III until he was recalled to the United States for service to the war effort. For other initiatives, funding originated both from the coffers of member states, and later on from supranational entities like the United Nations.

For the U.S. Coordinator of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (COIAA), Nelson Rockefeller, the III’s onchocerciasis project, which was identified as a priority at Patzcuaro, fit with the goals of the COIAA’s broader campaign to raise standards of living across the Americas. Beginning in 1945, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs at the U.S. State Department began experimental projects under the name Servicio Cooperativo (Cooperative Service), which operated as “an organic, permanent part of the government where it works. Its Director is both a functionary of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and an officer of the Latin American government.” In addition to projects like the eradication of onchocerciasis, indigenismo also sustained transnational engagement with theories and intellectual trends. One such body of thought is the theme of race and its relationship to the place and role of Indians within modern society. We now turn our attention to that

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important concept to understand how scientific theories that impacted indigenous issues circulated through and were shaped by the indigenista discourse.

**Indigenismo and the Concept of Race**

Indigenismo contained a continuous thread of anti-racism, which cut across and through the periodic shifts in the policy goals of the III and national governments. On the occasion of the Indian Day celebration on April 19, 1945, Manuel Gamio broadcast a radio address tackling the issue of racial prejudices and the perceived psychological inferiority of indigenous persons. Those issues linked together several important themes in the history and legacy of indigenismo as an ideology. “In certain countries...where although race prejudices are practically unknown, there exist culture prejudices. These prejudices are not common only to the social elements of European origin, but are frequently shared by Indians of favored economic position who are incorporated into Western culture.” Gamio built his argument on the foundational understanding that race is a social construct, not a biological one, thus connecting his work to that of racial thinkers like his mentor Franz Boas and his longtime friend Alejandro Lipschütz. He also linked that insight to the emerging anthropological interest in the North American academy in personality studies. Finally, and most significantly for the overall agenda of the III and indigenismo as a movement, Gamio made clear that the goals of social and economic advancement for Indians were threefold: first, to improve living

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conditions broadly; second, to help indigenous leaders emerge into the upper echelons of society; and third, that the success of individuals would serve to offer hope and inspiration to all members of the indigenous classes.\textsuperscript{368}

Indigenistas realized that they were working to overcome social prejudices of many types in their efforts to improve the lives of Indians. They viewed those prejudices through broad lenses informed by history, culture and comparison with other contexts. In 1957, for example, in the wake of efforts to desegregate schools in the United States, a comparison of racism in North American and Latin American contexts was framed on the pages of the \textit{Boletín}. The editor, like many later historians have done, characterized racism in the United States as grounded in biology and genetics, while the prejudices of Latin America were fundamentally more socially and culturally constructed.

“If in Mexico, Bolivia or Guatemala an individual with dark skin and other Indian racial characteristics appears in a first-class hotel or restaurant, who, however, is dressed the same as the other customers, no one would take notice of him. But if this same person appears in these places wearing Hauraches or sandals, white cotton trousers and a straw or reed hat, he would probably not be admitted, or else he would be an object of contempt. On the other hand, if a Negro, no matter how elegantly he might be dressed, appears in a first-class hotel or restaurant in the above mentioned North American regions, he would certainly not be admitted and he would be refused admission even more certainly if he should be more modestly dressed.”\textsuperscript{369}

The author explained that foundational difference on the legacy of racial mixing in Spain, where “for approximately eight centuries they had maintained racial contacts with the Moors.” In reality, the Spaniards who colonized Latin America “were themselves mestizos,” he wrote, and therefore viewed racial origins as less


significant that social adaptations. In some ways this feature made indigenista projects easier in Latin America, but in other more ideological ways they were profoundly complicated and contradictory.

At times, indigenista arguments over-simplified the differences between social sectors. Given the complexity of indigenous social realities, it was tempting to reduce a diverse population into categories of traditional and acculturated – those who were succeeding at bridging a divide and those being left behind. Similarly, it was often expedient to classify those cultural traits that were “favorable and valuable” into the aesthetic realm of the arts, and to characterize all others as obstacles to progress.\textsuperscript{370} Over-reliance upon corn as a staple food, inferior tools and inefficient methods of production, and especially the persistence of native healing, were all construed as obstacles by some indigenistas.\textsuperscript{371} But the persistence of indigenous people hanging on to those traditions suggested that the Indians themselves valued them in ways that indigenistas either ignored or could not understand. Furthermore, although it was tempting to point to basic demographic observations like population growth as signs of progress, indigenistas were quick to point out that a larger population did not necessarily mean improvement in their standards of living. In fact, more individuals in a given community that lacked the resources to supply health care, education and economic opportunity could often


overtax traditional cultural patterns, leading to a greater breakdown of the social system.\textsuperscript{372}

As the 1950s progressed and relatively little was done by national governments to address these problems, the tone of the indigenista discourse became increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. Observers could see social programs created to benefit other ethnic minorities, while indigenous sectors of society were increasingly left behind.

“These monolingual Indians, who have no idea of what nationality is, are more foreign to their own country than the foreigners themselves. They can do nothing for themselves in raising their standard of living, and, since no one helps them, they continue to exist as they did many centuries ago. In the meantime, the social minorities of their countries and, above all, of the Indo-Hispanic ones, are making progress in every field. Is this just, at a time when so much is said about democracy, equality of rights, humanity, etc.?”\textsuperscript{373}

By the end of the decade, it seemed as if the indigenista argument that national progress depended upon progress for Indians in Latin America had gone unheeded. Although they continued to advocate for improvements in education, infrastructure, public health and agricultural production, few resources generated by the increasingly prosperous post-war economy were being allocated for the benefit of indigenous sectors of society.\textsuperscript{374} Nevertheless, indigenistas continued to advocate for projects like the Pan-American Highway, which had the potential to link

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indigenous sectors to the national electorate, connect Indians across national boundaries and integrate them into national and international markets.\textsuperscript{375}

When the fourth Inter-American Indigenista Conference was held in Guatemala City in 1959, the only Chilean delegate to attend was the ambassador to Guatemala, Edmundo Fuenzalida Espinosa.\textsuperscript{376} The United States, for its part, included a special disclaimer written into the end of the proceedings stating that even though the delegation agreed to sign the final act, the U.S. would not comply with all the recommendations because some of them were not applicable due to assumptions about organizational framework and capacity. Furthermore, “any of these resolutions having financial implications for the Government is subject to review and approval by the authorized agencies of the Executive Department, as well as by the President and Congress.”\textsuperscript{377}

By 1960, the indigenista movement was losing steam. Committed anthropologists and social reformers would continue to labor on behalf of the cause, but governments were less motivated to allocate resources to produce meaningful change for their indigenous populations. Coinciding with the waning of indigenismo was the rise of social movements led by Indians themselves, which sometimes took a more antagonistic stance toward national governments. In the United States, the gradual application of termination policies during the 1950s led to the rise of the American Indian Movement in the late 1960s. In Chile, all the Mapuche deputies lost

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\textsuperscript{377} Resolutions, (clause added by American delegates to final resolutions), \textit{Boletín Indigenista}, 1959 Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 178.
their re-election bids to the Camara de Diputados in 1958, and DASIN was increasingly marginalized within the Ministry of Land and Colonization until Venancio Coñuepán was replaced as the agency’s Director during the Alessandri administration. For its part, the III would continue to function, but its efficacy was clearly waning.

In July of 1960, Manuel Gamio died following several months of poor health. His passing marked the end of an era and the dawn of another. The leadership of the III passed to the renowned Mexican anthropologist and historian Miguel León-Portilla, and the Institute would continue to carry out research and projects for social improvement.378 Under Leon-Portilla’s leadership, the III continued the basic tenets and trajectory of indigenismo, supporting efforts to improve the lives of Indians by blending elements of indigenous culture with modern technical and economic improvement. But the era in which it seemed possible for governments to provide support for indigenista projects was rapidly vanishing.

**Indigenismo in Chile**

By tracing Chile’s participation in the III from 1940-1993, Chilean historians Jorge Vergara and Hans Gundermann have shown that state actors hesitated to sign on to the Patzcuaro Convention, and although they sent delegations to the periodic conferences, the work of the III did not have a significant impact on Chilean indigenous policy through much of this period. Vergara and Gundermann raise (but leave unanswered) the question of whether the unenthusiastic engagement with the

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III was a reflection of the ambivalence of internal Chilean indigenous politics, or had more to do with Chile’s foreign policy priorities during the period. They do suggest, however, that the passage of a new indigenous law in 1961 served as a primary impetus for Chile to become more formally involved with the III. But in order to understand when, how and why the Chilean state finally did embrace the III as an institution, we must first examine what forms of interaction non-state actors had with the III and how those changed during the 1940-1961 period.

During the 1940s and 1950s, Chilean participation in the transnational indigenista movement was continuous, but the official involvement of the Chilean state was minimal. Chile fell into the class of countries with minority indigenous populations that promulgated laws specific to their concerns, even though they had technically been considered citizens of the Republic of Chile since independence in the early nineteenth century. Changes and proposed changes to the indigenous laws that regulated landholding were a perennial concern for both indigenous activists and indigenistas in Chile, and news of those events was regularly sent to the III for publication in the Noticias section of the Boletín Indigenista.

When the first International Indigenista Conference was held in Patzcuaro, Mexico in 1940, Venancio Coñuepán and César Colima, Mapuche leaders of the Corporación Araucana, attended as official members of the Chilean delegation. At the conference, Coñuepán and Colima gave a paper on the indigenous problem in Chile. Their essay argued for the state’s support in solving indigenous problems,

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379 Vergara and Gundermann, p. 11.
380 Catholic educator Father Juan de Forcheim claims that he was the author of a paper that Coñuepán read at the Patzcuaro Conference. It is unclear if this is an authentic claim, if he's
and suggested that support should focus on three areas: education, landholding, and economic development. Although they demanded the state’s support for those projects, they wanted to retain the participation of indigenous leaders in the process. Finally, Coñuepán and Colima recommended the state create an “Under-secretary of Indigenous Affairs,” – a sub-cabinet level position working across four separate ministries (Land and Colonization, Treasury, Education, and Agriculture) – that would work with indigenous leaders appointed to a Council of Indigenous Affairs.\footnote{381}

At Patzcuaro, Manuel Hidalgo, the Chilean ambassador to Mexico, accompanied Coñuepán and Colima. At the conclusion of the conference, the two Mapuche leaders were unable to immediately return to Chile because they were not provided with funds to purchase return tickets. Hidalgo sent an urgent telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting those funds, which had been promised by the Ministry of Education.\footnote{382} That the state would include the two Corporación leaders as members of the official delegation but not fully support their travel needs can perhaps be viewed as symbolic of the state’s indifference or ambivalence toward including indigenous leaders in official state projects and affairs. Nevertheless, engagement with the broader indigenista movement clearly had an effect on Coñuepán. It provided him a comparative lens from which to draw ideas for the Mapuche movement and legitimize demands for state support for indigenous advancement within Chile. For example, in a 1947 address to the Chilean Congress, claiming to have written the paper that Coñuepán delivered, or if there was a second paper. See notes 458-460. \footnote{381 Vergara and Gundermann, p. 4.} \footnote{382 Ibid, pp. 3-4.}
Coñuepán made reference to the successes in Mexico and the US, while criticizing “our enemies” in Chile, who failed to elevate indigenous issues to the level of concern held in other American countries.\textsuperscript{383}

Even though, as Vergara and Gundermann illustrate, Chile’s acceptance of the Patzcuaro Convention and more formal participation in the III did not commence until the early 1960s, for two decades the III facilitated an exchange of ideas between indigenistas working in Chile and their counterparts in other countries. In early 1942, notice of a new publication by the famed Chilean archaeologist and folklorist Ricardo E. Latcham appeared on the pages of the \textit{Boletín Indigenista}. Latcham’s article, which was about the correlations between popular and indigenous art forms in Chile, came near the end of his long career studying Mapuche language, art and archeology.\textsuperscript{384} Those interests stemmed from his early excursions to southern Chile as an engineer working to develop railroad lines through the region, and mirrored those of other early Mapuche ethnologists like Tomás Guevara and Carlos Sadleir, who both assisted with the founding of the first Mapuche political organization, the Sociedad Caupolicán, as described in the opening chapter.

As chapter one also makes clear, the founding of the first Mapuche organizations in the 1910s and 1920s came as direct responses to the ongoing loss of land experienced by Mapuche communities. Similarly, Chilean contributions to the \textit{Boletín Indigenista} in the early 1940s illustrated the ongoing centrality of the issue of land loss. In June of 1942, the \textit{Boletín} reported that Minister of Land and

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid, pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{384} Noticias: Chile, “Indian Handicrafts,” \textit{Boletín Indigenista}, 1942 Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 22-23.
Colonization Rolando Merino Reyes had proposed a bill to exempt Mapuche communities from paying tax on their land. According to Merino Reyes, although no formal exemption existed, Mapuche landholders had by custom not paid such taxes, and that unless the law was amended he would be required to begin proceedings to seize land and auction it off to pay back taxes.\(^{385}\) In the following issue, another proposed legislative project was mentioned, one that would enable absentee members of the community, presumably those who migrated to cities in search of work, to establish legal recognition of their land rights and provide other restraints to the further subdivision and sale of communal landholdings.\(^{386}\)

In other less formal ways, Chilean state actors did sometimes contribute to the indigenista discourse even though the state had not formally accepted the Patzcuaro Convention. In 1943, the Ministry of Education submitted a report for publication in the *Boletín Indigenista*. That report, written by Inspector of Indian Education Andrés Aguayo Paillalef, made recommendations on land tenure, economic development and the approval of the Patzcuaro Convention and founding of a national indigenista institute.\(^{387}\) In light of contributions like that one, we should remember that the state did not act as a monolithic entity, and that some state actors, working on behalf of indigenous interests, did attempt to engage the broader indigenista project when they perceived it could advance their efforts.

At other times, the III became a foil for non-state actors attempting to influence the state. In 1944, someone sent a newspaper story to the III that reported on a telegram that the Corporación Araucana had sent to Minister of Land and Colonization Osvaldo Vial, in which they simultaneously thanked him for his work on behalf of the Mapuche people and requested that the Minister grant an audience to the Corporación’s representative, Venancio Coñuepán. They claimed that Indian Courts had allowed the illegal usurpation of Mapuche lands for years, and that was the cause of indigenous poverty. For his part, Vial refused Coñuepán an audience, replying that “the Government was engaged in making a complete study of the Indian problem; that it was considering the good of the whole, and hence would not receive suggestions from interested groups, since such suggestions could only be detrimental to the carrying out of the Government’s plan.”\textsuperscript{388} In that way the Mapuche struggle for land and rights played out not only in the pages of the Chilean press, but also through the transnational medium of the III and therefore became identifiable within the indigenista movement.

Rather than undertake difficult projects to uplift indigenous populations, leaders seeking pure economic development often preferred to encourage immigration to indigenous zones. That was certainly the case in Chile, where European immigration was encouraged and the state actively resettled German and Italian immigrants throughout the southern region and interspersed them between Mapuche reducciones. That practice had a long history throughout the Americas, which Manuel Gamio drew attention to in his 1956 Day of the Indian address. He

\textsuperscript{388} Noticias: Chile, “Improvement of the Indian,” Boletín Indigenista, 1944 Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 114-117.
pointed out that the most prosperous countries in the Americas were the ones that had drawn the most extensive flow of migrants from Europe, and which also contained the smallest percentages of indigenous peoples, notably the United States and Argentina. On the other hand, nations in the tropical region with larger indigenous populations, i.e. Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, had stagnated economically. For those countries, he argued, “there is no need then to resort today to extended immigration in order to stimulate the progress of the republics under discussion; the most necessary and urgent step to achieve such an end is to raise by all possible means the inferior standards against which great masses of Indomestizos struggle.”

Chilean indigenistas could surely relate to that line of reasoning, as state policies had encouraged Euro-Chilean migration to the southern region since the mid-nineteenth century.

For his part, Alejandro Lipschütz saw the events of World War II as heralding a new epoch in the socio-political experience of humankind, which he termed “the great social world reform.” He viewed that as a positive development and his optimism drew broadly from his experience working out problems associated with race relations in the Americas as he wrote his first indigenista treatise, Indioamericanismo y Raza India, and also his experience as a child in Eastern Europe. In a 1944 speech delivered in Santiago and reprinted in the Boletín Indigenista, Lipschütz argued that “upon the basis of the sociological experience among uncultured or primitive peoples and the experiments realized on other groups...the American Indian will proceed upwards, incorporating the values of European

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culture, however, preserving his own traditional values (emphasis in original).” The experiences and experiments he referenced included those in the Baltic region, where in previous centuries German feudal lords subjugated Estonians and Lithuanians, but who later re-emerged as culturally distinct groups within the Soviet Union. Additionally, Lipschütz referred to the work accomplished by John Collier in the United States, where the Indian New Deal had reformed education and stemmed the tide of land loss through legal reform. Lipschütz’s optimistic analysis represents a truly global network of ideas and contributed to the transnational flow of ideas about indigenous development.390

In 1946, following Lipschütz’s anthropological fieldwork in Tierra del Fuego (which is examined more fully in chapter four), reports of his mission were included in the Boletín Indigenista. They included a brief summary of their findings, and mentioned the members of the international team of scientists who participated in the effort. That work established Lipschütz as a bona fide anthropologist, and cemented what was perhaps the strongest individual connection between Chile and the III in the period.391 Other, more general, reports ensued, for example an update on the work of staff at the Chilean National History Museum, who offered courses on indigenous history and culture to elementary school students in Chile, which worked to “break down prejudices and to implant ideas favorable to the Indian and his culture.” Capuchin missionaries also received favorable mention, in part for

supporting indigenous youth as they pursued university studies that “enable them to help their Indian brothers and contribute to the advancement of their country.”

In September of 1949, indigenistas in Chile finally formed a national institute, although they did so without official support from the Chilean government. The group included both whites and Mapuche among its leadership, with important indigenistas like Alejandro Lipschütz and Bishop Guido Beck de Ramberg as honorary members. In the notice printed in the Boletín Indigenista, the editors wrote that although the IIC “does not have an official character, it is expected...that the Chilean government...will not delay in recognizing and aiding the institution.” They went on to speculate that pending legislation intended to reform the Ley Indígena might include the recognition and support of the state. However, it would be another twelve years before Chile officially signed onto the Patzcuaro Convention, coinciding with yet another round of legislative reforms to the Ley Indígena in 1961.

The year after it was formed, in 1950, the Instituto Indigenista Chileno organized a series of lectures and a photographic exhibition to celebrate the Day of the Indian. Lt. Col. Gregorio Rodríguez, vice-president of the institute gave an overview of the indigenous presence in Chile, while Lipschütz and Grete Mostny presented on groups inhabiting the extreme latitudes of the country, Tierra del Fuego and the Atacama Desert, respectively. Although much indigenista work, and certainly indigenous politics, in Chile centered on the Mapuche, the IIC attempted to

broaden the scope of their work.\textsuperscript{394} It is also interesting to note the participation and support of the armed forces within Chilean indigenismo. Air Force General Ramón Cañas Montalva had previously provided support for Lipschütz’s mission to Tierra del Fuego, and Lt. Col. Gregorio Rodríguez served as the founding Vice-President of the IIC. In 1951, the \textit{Boletín Indigenista} recognized the Air Force for its efforts to protect and provide for Alcalufe Indians near its southernmost bases. Since 1937, commanders stationed there provided protection from unscrupulous merchants who sought to defraud the Indians, and basic education for their children by founding a small school.\textsuperscript{395}

By 1952, Augusto Iglesias and Grete Mostny had resigned as the founding President and Secretary of the IIC and the group elected new leadership. At the same time Gregorio Rodríguez took over as President, the IIC’s voice in Chilean indigenous affairs was increasing. They again led the Day of the Indian celebrations in 1952, and expanded the scope of their work to include public statements on proposed legislation, such as a plan put forth by the Department of Urbanization to redistribute Mapuche land around Temuco to German and Italian immigrants.\textsuperscript{396} The IIC also made plans to compile a report on the history of indigenous legislation

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\textsuperscript{396} Accompanying this proposal was a sustained campaign in the regional press that characterized the Mapuche population surrounding Temuco as a “suicide belt” that strangled the town and its ability to develop economically. See Foerster and Montecino, pp. 129-132.
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in Chile, to contribute to the III’s effort to gather that information from countries across the Americas.\footnote{Noticias: Chile, “Indian Activities,” Boletín Indigenista, 1952 Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 228-245.}

That same year, Carlos Ibañez del Campo was elected President of Chile for a second time. After his first presidency had ended with his exile in 1931, Ibañez returned as a more centrist and populist presidential candidate, and had courted the Mapuche vote as he assembled an electoral victory. With a new president in office, the IIC again pressed the government to accept the Patzcuaro Convention and grant it official recognition as a state agency, “independent and advisory in nature, which should be consulted with reference to Indian policy and legislation in Chile.” Ibañez met with members of the IIC’s governing board, including Lipschütz, Rodríguez and historian Álvaro Jara, even posing with them for a photograph that was reprinted in the Boletín Indigenista. Although Ibañez expressed “his desire that his government take up these problems seriously and in due time” and promised to study their requests thoughtfully, he would not grant official status nor sign the Patzcuaro agreement during his presidency.\footnote{Noticias: Chile, “The Indian Institute Should be a Government Agency,” Boletín Indigenista, 1952 Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 296-299.}

However, when he assembled his new cabinet in 1952, Ibañez named Venancio Coñuepán as Minister of Land and Colonization. In early 1953, the editors of the Boletín Indigenista printed a short biography of Coñuepán along with news of his appointment as Minister, in which they expressed their “hopes that in this position he will be able to give greater support to the Chilean Indian Institute, as the
President of Chile himself has promised to do.” However, Coñuepán would step aside as Minister after only six months to become the Director of the newly established Office of Indigenous Affairs. While Coñuepán’s tenure as DASIN’s Director is examined in greater detail in chapter five, it is important to mention here that in this context Ibañez’s move could be viewed as an alternative to granting the IIC an official status as a state agency. By placing Coñuepán atop the agency he was able to reward the most accomplished and politically connected Mapuche leader of the era for his support in the recent presidential election, and provide a nod to members of that constituency for their loyalty. For Coñuepán’s part, he may have believed he would have more direct control and influence on governmental indigenous policy from that post. The agency also mirrored the model created in Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas, although the Office of Indian Affairs in that country was later integrated into the Ministry of Education and was never led by indigenous leaders, rather by indigenistas with training in social science.

Also in 1953, Gregorio Rodríguez stepped down as President of the IIC and was replaced by General Ramón Cañas Montalva, who was at the time a retired Air Force General. In addition to his military career, Cañas Montalva was an active scientist who published works on geography and would later go on to lead the Pan American Institute of Geography and History. At the same time the Boletín Indigenista reported on that leadership transition, it also provided notice of the creation of DASIN, an issue “of utmost importance” that they anticipated reporting

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on soon. However, no further news of DASIN appeared on the pages of the *Boletín Indigenista* for some time.

In 1954, eight representatives from Chile attended the third International Indigenista Conference in La Paz, Bolivia. Álvaro Jara served as president of the delegation, and it seems that they again participated as private citizens, with no official representatives of the government in attendance. For the remainder of the 1950s, the IIC continued to function independently of the Chilean government and DASIN. Although individual members contributed news and scholarly articles to III publications, the Mapuche political project advanced separately from indigenista contributions. As can be seen in the analysis of DASIN’s history in chapter five, Coñuepán spent much of his time as Director of DASIN advocating for Indians and supervising the Indian Courts, which were under his jurisdiction. But private Chilean contributions to the indigenista movement continued.

In 1955 Lipschütz forwarded to the III news of a unique legal decision in which a Mapuche woman was acquitted of murdering her grandmother, whom she alleged had practiced witchcraft against her. The judge found Juana Catrilaf Calfiñanco not guilty on the grounds that she acted in self-defense, believing as she did that her grandmother had cast a spell upon her. In the decision, Judge Maria Mardones cited a report provided by the IIC, authored by Rodríguez, Lipschütz and

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Rigoberto Iglesias.\textsuperscript{402} The case was later written up in a law review journal in Chile, which gave the case an important distinction as legal precedent. The law review’s analysis of Catrilaf’s acquittal established that an indigenous worldview could be used as a legitimate line of defense in criminal court. This was of course very interesting and important to the III, which had resolved at the La Paz Conference to construct “an adequate understanding of the legal and administrative problems of American Indians” within the frameworks of various national legal systems.\textsuperscript{403} The issue brought together questions of legal interpretation, economic development and Mapuche cosmology. When printed in the III journal \textit{Boletín Indigenista}, it became a part of the transnational discourse about the relationship between indigenous people and modern nation-states. In the process, what it meant to be an Indian became an inherently political subject, effectively placing limits on the state’s ability to establish the terms of justice in accordance with the values of the dominant culture. In this way, indigenismo offered the Mapuche a powerful set of analytical tools to push back against the efforts of state actors to simply assimilate the Mapuche or reduce their landholdings.

That decision notwithstanding, the courts remained an important battleground in the effort to protect and advance indigenous causes. In 1955 the District Attorney of the Court of Temuco issued a report condemning the slow and inefficient progress of Mapuche land division through the Indian Courts supervised


by DASIN. When viewed through an indigenista lens, District Attorney Leon Erbetta Vaccaro’s report could be seen as verification that the protections afforded Indians by DASIN were actually working, for as the Boletín editors point out, without thorough “preparation and self-defense, the Indian would sell out for a paltry sum,” leading to further concentration of land in the hands of latifundistas (large landholders) who would leave much of it unproductive. “Such a thing took place in Mexico, where President Benito Juárez, guided by the best intentions, abolished communal properties, the allotments being rapidly secured by landholders. This led to a state of misery of millions of natives, which in turn brought about the 1910 Revolution...”

A notice printed in the next issue suggests that Erbetta’s report prompted “indigenistas of the continent” to write to the Institute. “Their opinion is that the aforesaid report should be openly condemned for comprising acts contrary to the rights of the Indian population of Chile.”

Although it remained outside of the state bureaucracy, members of the IIC labored on in defense of indigenous causes. In 1956, they expanded the Indian Day celebrations to comprise an entire week of events. On April 20th, Alejandro Lipschütz highlighted the week’s events with a lecture on “The Indian Community in Chile and Latin America,” which coincided with the publication of his new book of the same title. While Lipschütz and Coñuepán occupied opposite ends of the political spectrum, and therefore had little direct interaction that can be verified in the archives, they were both present at the Indian Day celebration of 1956. The week

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culminated with the opening of a new exhibition of Indian crafts at the Cerro Santa Lucia museum, which arose from collaboration between the IIC and the Museum of Popular Art.406

As the IIC worked to expand awareness of the rich legacy that indigenous sectors contributed to Chilean popular culture, legislators continued their push to repeal legal protections for Indian lands. Chilean indigenistas kept the III informed of developments, as Álvaro Jara did in 1958 when a bill was introduced to the Chilean Congress that stood to abolish the Indian Courts and place “the Indians and their property within the jurisdiction of common law, as well as (suppress) the Department of Indian Affairs.” The editors of the Boletín Indigenista voiced their opposition to that project on grounds that the minority status of Indians in Chile justified special protections under the law. In doing so, they referenced Jara’s Legislación Indigenista de Chile, where he traced the origins of and challenges to the various indigenous laws in Chile, and thus contributed to the III’s project to collect and disseminate information about legislation that impacted indigenous peoples across the Americas.407

In 1959, Jara reported to the III that Antonio Mulato Ñunque and Martín Alonqueo, the President and Secretary of the Mapuche organization Sociedad Lautaro, had presented a written assessment of the problems facing Mapuche communities in the south to a group of Diputados in Santiago. Among those

problems, the loss of land was presented as the main source poverty and ill health. Population growth, combined with individual sales of divided community land, had led to a landholding pattern they termed *minifundios* (small landholdings). “Each family is left with two or three hectares, impoverished by intensive cultivation. This situation has obliged thousands of Araucanos to emigrate to Argentina in search of new lands.” As a remedy, they requested the “prohibition of transfer of Mapuche land to private persons (Chilean and foreigners), during a period of fifteen years.” They went on to address health concerns related to poor living conditions and a lack of access to education for Mapuche youth. But loss of land continued to be viewed as the source of other deprivations, and also the primary aim of anti-indigenista forces within Chile.408

Chilean indigenistas served as allies to Mapuche organizations and activists as they sought to protect indigenous lands and support the general advancement of Mapuche society. In June of 1959, the IIC organized the First Indigenista Forum in Santiago. Those gathered passed a resolution to formally request legislation from the Chilean state that served four functions. The first identified “preservation of the Indian communities and their way of life, *based on possession of the land*, with a view toward modernizing economic exploitation...” (emphasis added). The second requested that Indian lands be protected from sale or transfer by classifying them as “inalienable in perpetuity.” Those demands illustrate the view in Chile, shared by both Mapuche and indigenistas, that land ownership was central to both the preservation of indigenous culture and economic development. The latter would

also require the “organization of technical and economic help on a grand scale” in order to increase productivity. Here we can see the persistence and scope of those two indigenista themes in the Chilean landscape. The Forum also requested the “perfection” of DASIN, “so that it may be used to undertake and carry out this vast plan of protection and help,” and the ratification of the Patzcuaro Convention “in order to be able to benefit…from the valuable experiences in Indianist work on the continent, especially in countries such as the United States, Mexico,” and others. The Forum recognized the value of formal organizations in assisting with the advancement of indigenous society, but also acknowledged that it was not working well because of flaws within DASIN and the state’s refusal to participate more fully in the broader indigenista movement.409

In 1961, the III published a special edition of the Boletín Indigenista, which was presented as a panoramic view of the status of indigenous populations in each American nation-state. In consultation with specialists – in Chile, those included Alejandro Lipschütz, Grete Mostny and Álvaro Jara – demographic data was compiled from the most recent censuses and presented alongside other cultural information. The guide included geographic distribution of populations, linguistic characteristics, primary economic activities, overview of indigenous laws and a summary list of indigenista organizations operating in each country. For Chile, the guide drew statistics from the General Census of 1952 and established the total Mapuche population at 127,151, acknowledging that the figure included only those living in southern communities, as “no reliable information on the Indians in the

northern part of the country” existed.\textsuperscript{410} That acknowledgment provides an
important insight into the importance of the existence of Mapuche communities and
communal land. According to the Chilean state, at least for the purpose of
establishing statistics, when an Indian left the reservation, they ceased to be an
Indian. Understanding that, it is not surprising that the maintenance of communal
land and ties to that land were so important to the Mapuche political struggle.

Summary

Although efforts to provide aid and social improvement to indigenous
populations began early in the twentieth century across the Americas, the founding
of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano in 1940 provided a formal network for
indigenista researchers and indigenous leaders to collaborate and share ideas.
While the period opened with broad and ambitious goals to generate solutions to
complex social problems that spanned a broad range of issues like health, sanitation,
education, racial prejudices and political participation, global and hemispheric
geopolitical priorities narrowed the scope of interventions to focus on economic
development. In that transition, nuanced connections between economics and other
aspects of indigenous culture and society were glossed over.

In Chile, as in other national contexts, the efforts and accomplishments of
indigenistas were minimized by the state’s lack of support for the IIC as an
institution, as well as fairly tepid support for their cause more broadly. The
relatively small group of indigenistas never attracted the attention and support of

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the state, while the relatively large Mapuche organizations garnered much more serious consideration from elected officials. In some ways, we can see the strength of the Mapuche movement as another factor that limited indigenista effectiveness.

Finally, in much the same way that economic development eclipsed more integrated development goals and projects in the indigenista movement more broadly, the ongoing emphasis on Mapuche land tenure and legislative reforms that either supported or threatened Mapuche community lands overshadowed efforts to improve education, health, infrastructure and other objectives.
Chapter 4: Alejandro Lipschütz and Chilean Indigenismo

In many ways, the story of Alejandro Lipschütz embodies the story of indigenistas across the hemisphere. His interest in the plight of indigenous peoples began through personal contacts and the general belief that Indians required special consideration as national states adopted a rational scientific approach to development and governance. Lipschütz is also important to the story of indigenismo in Chile, as he was the foremost Chilean contributor to the transnational discourse in the mid-twentieth century. But Lipschütz came to indigenismo as a second (or parallel) career, and the existence of his voluminous body of work and its influence is remarkable considering that for him it was an avocation coexisting alongside his career as a research biologist and Director of the Institute for Experimental Medicine, which he founded within the National Health Service and led for more than twenty years. Furthermore, the indigenismo of Alejandro Lipschütz was never supported by the Chilean state, and through most of the period ran counter to the goals of state officials and the larger Chilean public. This chapter will first locate Lipschütz within the broad trends of Chilean anthropology and indigenismo in the Americas, and then tease out his contributions to the pan-American discourse and impact on the Mapuche movement. That analysis demonstrates that his work was prolific, sophisticated and important. His personal connections with Mapuche individuals and organizations left a lasting impact within Chile and across the Americas.
Alejandro Lipschütz’s indigenista career contributes several important insights into the relationship between indigenismo and Mapuche activism throughout the entire period. First, it shows that formal transnational indigenismo developed significantly later than the indigenous-indigenista collaboration that took place through the Mapuche political organizations. Related to that observation, the formal category of indigenismo held less significance in Chile than in other countries, at least in its ability to influence state policies. Finally, recognizing how important partisan political alliances were for Mapuche leaders as shown in earlier chapters, I contend that Lipschütz was fairly ineffective in the 1940s and 1950s because the main body of the Mapuche movement was aligned with the political right in that period, while Lipschütz was decidedly more leftist in his views. By the end of the era that would begin to change, as the last section of this chapter shows by following Lipschütz’s work into the 1960s as the left became more influential in Chilean national politics. The picture that emerges shows that indigenismo, as a body of ideas, was filtered through national political circumstances as it was applied to the case of the Mapuche in Chile. In addition, those ideas were adopted selectively and sometimes excluded or transformed significantly by indigenous actors and organizations.

**Biography**

Alejandro Lipschütz was born in the capital of Riga, in what is now Latvia, in 1883. He was born into a family of cultured, relatively secular, German-speaking Jews in the Livonian province of the Russian Empire. From a very early age,
Lipschütz was effectively trilingual, as German was the native tongue of his parents, Latvian was the popular language in the province, but primary schooling was carried out in Russian. His father, owner of a successful publishing house, supported his scientific education by sending him to study medicine at the University of Göttingen at the age of twenty, but even in his teens Alejandro had begun to take an interest in social questions by observing the emerging workers’ movement in his hometown, which later contributed to the Russian Revolution.\textsuperscript{411}

After graduating with a medical degree from the University of Göttingen, Lipschütz went on to hold professorships at three European universities, first in Germany, then Switzerland where he met his wife Marguerite Vogel, and finally returning to Livonia to teach at the University of Tartu in 1919. During that time, he studied and collaborated with important experimental scientists throughout Europe and published prolifically, establishing himself as a world-renowned endocrinologist in his thirties. But in the wake of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, life was difficult in the Baltic republics and shortages hampered his work. So in 1926 he accepted a chaired faculty position in the School of Medicine at the University of Concepción. Attracted in part by the temperate climate of central Chile, he immigrated with his wife, two daughters and his long-time secretary Dagmar Staden. In Concepción he was first introduced to Mapuche culture in villages located not far from the city. His research formed a bridge between his interests in laboratory and social science.\textsuperscript{412}

\textsuperscript{411} Berdichewsky, pp. 25-32.
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid, pp. 32-35.
Lipschütz’s work in endocrinology led him to investigate ways in which human sex glands produced sexual difference during the course of physical development. While still in Europe he had studied the Skoptsi, a religious sect in Eastern Europe that practiced castration for spiritual reasons. Skoptsi eunuchs provided an opportunity to learn how the absence of sex glands altered the development of masculine and feminine physiognomic traits. In southern Chile in the 1930s, Lipschütz found himself amid broader efforts to reimagine Chile as a homogeneous mestizo nation. In that climate, researchers sought to understand apparent physical differences observable in indigenous populations. Endocrinology provided a useful framework for those inquiries, and Lipschütz consulted on several investigations. Lipschütz used hard science to dispute widely held notions of indigenous racial inferiority, and his first indigenista book, although it was not published until 1937 after he had moved to Santiago, drew on research he conducted and supervised while in Concepción.

**Origins of Chilean Anthropology**

Intrigued by both biological questions about indigenous peoples and his personal connections to Mapuche through visits to nearby villages, Lipschütz began to read works by the founders of Chilean anthropology to learn more about the

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414 Lipschütz, 1937.
Mapuche language and their life ways in modern and colonial times. The roots of Chilean anthropology can be traced back to the chroniclers of Spanish conquest and colonization, but the true scientific orientation of the observation of indigenous populations began earnestly in Chile during the late nineteenth century with the work of historians José Toribio Medina and Diego Barros Arana. Moving into the early twentieth century, anthropological investigations were supported more by new national museums than by the country’s universities, whose missions were oriented toward professional training and licensure rather than pure scientific investigation. The two most influential museums, “the Museo Nacional de Historia Natural (National Museum of Natural History) led by Ricardo E. Latcham, and the Museo Etnográfico y Antropológico (Museum of Ethnography and Anthropology) directed by Aureliano Oyarzún,” were both based in Santiago but their influence extended across the entire country and even to foreign scholars conducting research in Chile. In that context, the transnational theoretical debate between evolution and diffusion as competing producers of social and cultural change played out within Chile, with Latcham and the Museo de Historia Natural aligning with classical evolution of Engels and Morgan and Oyarzún’s Museo Etnográfico influenced more heavily by the diffusionist views of German scholars like Martín Gusinde and Max Uhle.415

Following the Second World War, Chilean universities reoriented their mission toward research and became the intellectual centers of Chilean anthropology. That transition in the 1940s and 1950s coincided with a generational

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415 Berdichewsky, pp. 81-86.
shift in which a new cadre of researchers associated with universities became the vanguard of anthropological and ethnographic research. Although his life and career spanned both eras, Alejandro Lipschütz’s anthropological, ethnographic and indigenista work aligns with the latter group. The new generation also collaborated with and drew intellectual inspiration from foreign scholars who conducted research in Chile, originating in both North American and European academic circles.\textsuperscript{416}

After 1920 the Chilean political scene underwent dramatic transformation, as discussed more fully in chapter one. Beginning with the economic trauma wrought by World War I and the Great Depression, Chile embarked on a developmental program of import substitution. More factories meant more workers concentrated in urban areas, and consequently more populist sentiments in Chilean politics. Labor organizations became influential and the influence of Socialist and Communist political parties grew. Later in the century anthropologists studying campesinos and indigenous populations were inclined to support political movements and apply their research to those ends. In such a contested political climate, Lipschütz was not only important for the work he personally contributed, but also the many younger scholars whom he influenced.\textsuperscript{417}

In order to fully understand Alejandro Lipschütz’s contributions to indigenismo, it is important to recognize the confluence of four broad trends. First, his background as a medical doctor and research biologist made him an informed critic of prevailing views of race in his era. Second, the reorientation of the Chilean

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{416} Ibid. pp. 87-88.} \textsuperscript{417} Ibid. pp. 90-93.
academy toward evidenced-based research and within it the transformation of anthropology brought his racial and evolutionary ideas into contact with questions pertaining to indigenous populations, both related to their origins and their current social conditions. Third, Lipschütz’s own politics and experiences as an observer of the emergence and evolution of Russia’s communist transition made him sympathetic to the idea of popular organizing and social reform, and also made him a politically engaged scholar. Finally, the emergence of indigenismo as a transnational ideology and movement provided a platform and community in which to apply those various elements of his background.

The Indigenismo of Alejandro Lipschütz

Considering his training as a biologist, it is interesting to note that most of Lipschütz’s indigenista work engaged with questions of cultural anthropology from a social perspective. Yet it was Lipschütz’s biological understanding of the fallacy of indigenous racial inferiority that led him into anthropology and indigenismo in the first place. His 1937 work *Indoamericanismo y Raza India* was the bridge by which he crossed the divide between physical and social science. Work that followed was in one way or another dedicated to combatting or correcting the wrongs perpetrated by anti-indigenous racism and to create and support conditions conducive to political self-determination for indigenous populations in the Americas.418

Beginning with *Indoamericanismo y Raza India*, Lipschütz consistently maintained that there was no biological justification for social inequality or racial inferiority of indigenous peoples. His anthropological work endeavored to show that observed differences between ethnically distinct populations were socially and politically constructed.  

In general, Lipschütz leaves clearly established that the social laws and those that govern the evolution of society, are the same for all human societies, but they manifest themselves according to the specific characteristics, sometimes natural, sometimes historical, in which the society's modes of production are developed, and where the greatest types of social formations have existed, they introduce their own modalities.

In *Indoamericanismo y Raza India*, Lipschütz showed that social forces impact ethnic groups in similar ways. For example, he compared indigenous hierarchical societies of the Americas (Inca, Aztec & Maya) with those of Europe, and similarly equated pre-modern European tribes with indigenous societies like the Mapuche. In making those comparisons, Lipschütz discussed the tensions between tribal and national identities, and showed that those double affiliations occurred in a variety of national contexts, including Russia and the United States. Chile was no exception, with the Mapuche caught in the bind of "double patriotism." Their troubles were exacerbated by the fact that the Chilean state and Chilean society had oppressed them, stolen their land and discriminated against them on almost every level of social interaction. Out of this recognition arose Lipschütz's commitment to social and political activism on behalf of indígenas in Chile.

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419 Berdichewsky, pp. 73-81.
420 Ibid. p. 81.
421 Ibid. pp. 76-78; Lipschütz, 1937.
One of the most salient features of Lipschütz’s work in anthropology and indigenismo, is that his thinking did not devolve into biological reductionism, “as could have been expected in a biologist moving into the social sciences.”

Furthermore, he viewed indigenismo as more than a form of benevolent social action, rather as an outgrowth of bona fide social science (applied anthropology). But as a social scientist and a Marxist, he also believed that the scientist’s role included political intervention on behalf of the subjects of analysis. Much of his thinking aligned closely with the movement’s leaders in North America, especially John Collier and Manuel Gamio. However, both of those men were constrained by their formal roles as employees of the state, and many others preferred instead to pursue policies from a detached, apolitical and scientific orientation.

Lipschütz felt it was the duty of social scientists to engage with politics in support of the people they studied. He further criticized as “timid” social scientists that adopted a more neutral, apolitical, stance.

Lipschütz was greatly influenced by the trajectory of Mexican history and politics. He was an acquaintance of Manuel Gamio and drew inspiration from the example of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, and also the revolutionary government of Lázaro Cárdenas that followed. In Mexico, indigenismo was institutionalized with a whole range of policies that supported the advancement of indigenous populations and their incorporation into the national state as citizens.

Lipschütz’s brand of indigenismo was also influenced by his socialist political

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422 Berdichewsky, p. 74.
423 Ibid. pp. 74-75.
424 Giraudo and Lewis, pp. 3-11.
inclinations and the work of Peruvian journalist and Marxist political theorist José Carlos Mariátegui.\footnote{Berdichewsky, p. 87.}

Within the world of indigenista thought, two of the strongest voices in support of indigenous self-determination were those of Mariátegui and Lipschütz. But even for them the concept was more theoretical than practical or political.\footnote{Ibid. p. 113.}

Mainstream leftist politics preferred to conceive of Indians in class-based terms, combining forces with workers or peasants for the overthrow of capitalist structures. As we saw in chapters one and two, Mapuche-led political organizations were caught up within these trends along with the indigenistas. By the late 1960s, Lipschütz came to realize that indigenismo as a movement was failing to restore rights, ancestral territories and cultural artifacts to indigenous peoples.\footnote{Ibid. p. 17.} His biographer Berdichewsky described Lipschütz’s divergence from mainstream indigenismo as follows:

> Indigenismo in America, during more than half a century of life, from the 1920s to the 1970s, was a progressive movement developed by socially advanced, non-indigenous populations that tried to resolve the ‘indigenous question.’ Lipschütz understood the basic contradiction of the indigenista movement by the 1960s and 1970s. He was one of the first to make up his mind about it, as much on an ideological level as in his vision of indigenous autonomy; he expressed the real tendency and the historical and social practice of real indígenas.\footnote{Ibid. p. 97. Berdichewsky notes that Lipschütz’s awareness grew at about the same time the American Indian Movement arose in search of similar autonomy.}

\section*{1937-1949}

At the same time Alejandro Lipschütz was working to break into the field of indigenismo and applied anthropology by publishing books and articles on
indigenous questions, he was corresponding and collaborating with a host of international researchers. Lipschütz’s insertion into a network of indigenistas across the Americas would help to establish him as a leading indigenista, and provide a Chilean perspective on indigenismo that was in some ways distinct from the discourse in other national contexts. Lipschütz’s voice added variety to indigenismo in Chile and provided it with a unique blend of characteristics that drew from his own life experiences and an eclectic set of influences. What started as a quest to illustrate the biological instability of race as an analytic category, eventually grew to a broad view that the future of indigenous peoples would always be dictated to them in postcolonial, imperialistic terms unless indigenous peoples organized themselves to fight for independence or at least autonomy within the context of national states contrived along a trajectory of European conquest and domination.

In 1944, Lipschütz followed the well-received *Indoamericanismo y Raza India*, which was more like an essay on racial myths than a complete treatment of the racial questions pertaining to indigenous Americans, with a vastly expanded second edition entitled *El Indoamericanismo y el Problema Racial en las Américas*. At more than 500 pages, the second edition added a broader review of existing literature and tackled the question of African migration and racial mixture in the Americas also. Taken together, those works in addition to his “day job,” earned Lipschütz a reputation and respect among indigenistas across the Americas.

Throughout the 1940s, Lipschütz corresponded with important figures in the

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indigenista movement, including Manuel Gamio and Juan Comas in Mexico, and John Collier in the United States.

For the much-expanded second edition of *Indoamericanismo*, Lipschütz collected eighty-three images, including charts, tables, microscopic slides and many photographs of indigenous people and cultural artifacts. Some images were his own productions, but many were gathered by writing to indigenistas in his expanding network. For that purpose, the newly formed III was extremely useful to him. In July of 1943, Lipschütz wrote to Manuel Gamio to request copies of photographs used in III publications and for permission to reproduce them in his book. He also mentioned that he was including a chapter on Africans in the Americas.\(^{431}\) Gamio replied by sending original photographs for Lipschütz to reproduce and return, and mentioned that he was eager to read the new chapter on Africans, indicating there was great interest for that subject in Mexico.\(^{432}\) Gamio shared Lipschütz’s request with his colleague Juan Comas, who in turn sent it to another colleague, Professor Pablo Martínez del Rio. Comas then wrote to Lipschütz to share with him a reference to a French work on racial categories and two bibliographic summaries that might be useful.\(^{433}\) Lipschütz concluded the exchange by sending a thank you note to Comas, Gamio and their colleagues at the III expressing his appreciation for their assistance and mentioning that he would be sure to cite the photographs to the

\(^{431}\) Alejandro Lipschütz to Manuel Gamio, Jul. 29, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.
\(^{432}\) Manuel Gamio to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 10, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.
\(^{433}\) Juan Comas to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 17, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.
fledgling III journal *América Indígena*, in which they had originally been published.\(^{434}\)

In the early 1940s, Lipschütz’s indigenista network also extended to North America, where he was in contact with John Collier, the Commissioner of the U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. In August 1943 Lipschütz received a note from Collier’s administrative assistant E. M. Izquierdo approving his request to reproduce photographs from BIA publications in *El Indoamericanismo*. Izquierdo went on to make suggestions about how to go about publishing an English translation of the text, although he lamented that the BIA did not currently have funds for such an endeavor. He did however request a copy of the Spanish version for the BIA library once it was published.\(^ {435}\) Later, after Collier retired as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1945, he would continue trying to help Lipschütz get English translations of his work published in the United States by reaching out to his contacts at university presses, but ultimately those efforts were unsuccessful.\(^ {436}\)

When *El Indoamericanismo* was published, Lipschütz sent complimentary copies to scholars across the globe, which functioned as a way to continue building his professional indigenista network. In December of 1944 John Collier wrote to Lipschütz congratulating him on the publication of *El Indoamericanismo* and thanking him for sharing a copy of a radio address that Lipschütz had made about the book. He went on to affirm the interdependence of their work by stating his

\(^{434}\) Alejandro Lipschütz to III, Aug. 24, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.

\(^{435}\) John Collier to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 9, 1943. CAL, Caja 6370.

\(^{436}\) Correspondence between John Collier and Alejandro Lipschütz, 1956-1959. CAL, Caja 6373. Most notably, in 1956 following Lipschütz’s publication of *La comunidad indígena en América y en Chile*, Collier wrote letters to various university publishers in the U.S. in the attempt to get that work translated and circulated in the North American academy.
agreement that indigenous peoples have something important to offer their respective national communities in the form of their culture, and that national progress in many countries depended on the progress of their indigenous populations. The two indigenistas shared an optimism that the future would bring such progress, and held the mutual view that “trying to help the Indians to help themselves and to exercise their rights and discharge their obligations of conscientious citizenship” was the way to pursue that progress.437

While Lipschütz, Collier, Gamio and Comas endeavored to build a transnational network of scholarly inquiry around subjects pertaining to indigenous peoples in the Americas, in the mid-1940s that network was relatively small and fragile and suffered from the isolation produced by long distances, language barriers and the difficulty of procuring information published in other national contexts. In the fall of 1944 Lipschütz sent a copy of El Indoamericanismo to Melville Herskovits, the influential anthropologist at Northwestern University who helped establish African and African-American studies in the North American academy. In his reply, Herskovits lamented that “more of the work of the late Professor Franz Boas and the late Professor T. Wingate Todd was not available to you.” Herskovits also arranged for several of his own publications to be sent to Lipschütz for his future reference on questions pertaining to “the problem of the origins of New World Negroes.”438

In November, Lipschütz wrote back, thanking Herskovits for the texts, but also providing insight into his own view on the significance of the work.

437 John Collier to Alejandro Lipschütz, Dec. 1, 1944. CAL, Caja 6370.
438 Melville Herskovits to Alejandro Lipschütz, Sep. 19, 1944. CAL, Caja 6370.
I was also very interested in reading your brilliant article on Native Self-Government published in Foreign Affairs. I fully agree with your standpoint but I have not the necessary optimism as resumed [sic] in your words of “sufficient good will.” The point is that this good will is lacking on the part of whites in Africa and elsewhere where colored people served for the purpose of making money by the white. The only way to come out from the difficulties is dropping the capitalistic system as it has been done in the U.S.S.R where the problems of mutual relations between white and colored have been settled definitively. And it is surprising that this was done happily without sacrificing those advantages which are due to the incorporation of formerly independent territories into the economy of the Empire.439

Already in 1944 Lipschütz was developing his view that self-government was to be the ultimate goal to which indigenismo should be applied. Furthermore, he expressed his lack of confidence in the ability to achieve that through reform of capitalistic and imperial politico-economic structures. Instead, the liberation of the Indian in the Americas was tied to socialist revolution in his view, just as it had been for blacks in Africa and the Soviet Union.

Although Lipschütz held firm convictions about the future of indigenous peoples and their liberation from capitalist and imperialist forces, he maintained cordial friendships with indigenistas across the ideological spectrum. In January 1946 he received a long letter from Doris Stone, the daughter of Samuel Zemurray, who was popularly known as “Sam the Banana Man.” In 1946 Stone was living and working in Costa Rica where her husband Roger Stone had business interests in a large coffee plantation. She wrote Lipschütz about her plans to build reservations for Indians “not to keep these people like monkies [sic] in a zoo, but to educate them to become useful citizens.” She was petitioning the ruling junta for money to create schools for Indians who could be trained as teachers and return to their people to educate them to work for progress and protections from non-indigenous colonists

439 Alejandro Lipschütz to Melville Herskovitz, Nov. 9, 1944. CAL, Caja 6370.
who were moving into their territory as a new highway was being completed.\textsuperscript{440} Stone’s project was similar in orientation to indigenista efforts in Mexico to create indigenous boarding schools. She was trained as an ethnographer and later became the Director of the National Museum of Costa Rica. Her friendship with Lipschütz and his wife Marguerite illustrates the flexibility of indigenismo as an ideal.

Lipschütz, an ardent communist who was ultimately working for the liberation of indígenas from the clutches of capitalistic imperialism, maintained a friendship with the daughter of Samuel Zemurray, chairman of the United Fruit Company who orchestrated several coups in Central America to oust or establish dictators in service of his neo-colonial corporation. Zemurray infamously pushed the CIA to intervene in the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954, thus bringing to an end the most promising socialist experiment in Latin America at the time.

If \textit{Indoamericanismo y Raza India} represented Lipschütz’s theoretical jump into indigenismo in the late 1930s, the interdisciplinary field research he supervised in Tierra del Fuego in 1946 constituted a more praxis-oriented transition in which he established himself as an applied anthropologist. In the process, he earned credibility as a field researcher with indigenistas abroad, and continued to expand and solidify his network. Having previously consulted on biological studies of Mapuche in south-central Chile, in 1945 Lipschütz assembled a team of researchers to gather a broad range of data about the Ona, Yamana and Alakaluf cultures of the extreme southern reaches of Chile and Argentina – peoples collectively referred to as “Fuegians.” The mission’s two primary goals were to collect information on

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\textsuperscript{440} Doris Stone to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jan. 3, 1946, CAL, Caja 6371.
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physical characteristics that would be useful to the National Health Service and
cultural practices that would benefit the Chilean Museum of Natural History.
Accordingly, Lipschütz asked Grete Mostny, Director of the National Museum of
Natural History, to join the mission. But as the mission also sought to contribute to a
broader transnational debate about the racial origins and cultural adaptations of
indigenous Fuegians, Lipschütz built an international team of researchers and drew
support from a host of Chilean institutional sponsors. The *Misión Científica Chilena
para el Estudio del Indio Fueguino* (Chilean Scientific Mission for the Study of
Fuegian Indians) included Chilean Army General Ramón Cañas Montalva and foreign
scholars like Ecuadoran anthropologist Antonio Santiana, French anthropologist
Louis Robin, and German photographer and ethnographic filmmaker Hans
Helfritz.⁴⁴¹ For Lipschütz, the expedition resulted in two inter-related outcomes.
When Antonio Santiana abruptly left the mission in the field and later claimed that
his research findings had been stolen by the team, Lipschütz found himself
embroiled in the second rather messy and public controversy of his career.⁴⁴² At the
same time, the broad publication and dissemination of the mission’s findings
through journal articles, conference presentations, the highly collaborative nature of
the mission itself and publication of the group’s collected works in a volume entitled
*Cuatro Conferencias sobre los Indios Fueguinos* helped Lipschütz continue to grow his
network of professional indigenista contacts.

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⁴⁴² For a fuller discussion of the Lipschütz-Santiana controversy, see MacMillan chapter 3.
The previous controversy, his highly publicized lawsuit and subsequent firing from the
University of Concepción in 1936, stemmed from a contract dispute.
While still in the field on the Fuegian expedition in March of 1946, Lipschütz wrote to Manuel Gamio as Director of the III from Punta Arenas. He sent Gamio information about the expedition for publication in *Boletín Indigenista.* Later that month Gamio replied to inform Lipschütz he would gladly publish the information, and took the opportunity to express an appreciation for Lipschütz’s varied work and tireless efforts. “I admire the intensity and variety of your activities, because as I see, after your trip to Tierra del Fuego, you will give lectures in England about hormones in relation to their cancer-fighting properties. I would be glad to know the secret of your eternal youth that keeps you first in line among the hardest-working researchers on the continent.”

While in England lecturing on his biological research, Lipschütz also gave an interview to the BBC about his recent work in Tierra del Fuego, which included a hypothesis that he and his team constructed to explain the historical decrease in the population of indigenous Fuegians. They had heard stories about professional Indian hunters who were paid by the head for the number of Indians they killed. Coincidentally, Dr. H.M. Stanley Turner, a medical doctor, President of the British Medical Association and also a Wing Commander in the R.A.F, heard Lipschütz’s radio address and wrote him a letter about a story he heard while stationed in the Falkland Islands between 1909-1915. In their exchange of letters, Turner explained that those hunters were sold obsolete Martini-Henry rifles from the British Army in the Falklands with the understanding they would be used to kill Indians, and the two men tried to reconstruct figures about how many Indians the hunters may have

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444 Manuel Gamio to Alejandro Lipschütz, Mar. 15, 1946. CAL, Caja 6371.
killed. In other correspondence, Turner suggested (from his own expertise in medicine) that studying the Rh factor could aid in mapping blood characteristics among indigenous peoples. In this way Lipschütz’s travels and public profile as a researcher in experimental medicine contributed to his work, reputation and transnational network as an indigenista.

Following his trip to England in 1947, Lipschütz traveled to the United States where he gave medical lectures in St. Louis and also visited Washington D.C. In the capital, Lipschütz met with T.D. Stewart, then editor of The American Journal of Physical Anthropology who later went on to become the Director of the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History. In an exchange of letters with Stewart following his visit, Lipschütz recounted the remainder of his trip, in which he toured Mayan remains throughout Central America and met with indigenistas in several countries. Stewart was also in contact with Grete Mostny and Fidel Jeldes, with whom he was working to publish some of their work from the Fuegian expedition in the Journal of Physical Anthropology. Lipschütz’s travel and connections were not only an asset to his own publications, but also those with whom he collaborated.

Upon his return to Chile, Lipschütz set to work preparing for the second Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, which was to be held in Cuzco, Peru in October of 1948. While Chile had sent a delegation to the 1940 Patzcuaro Congress,

446 Stanley Turner to Alejandro Lipschütz, Sep. 8, 1947. CAL, Caja 6371.
447 Lipschütz published his account of their exchange in Perfil de Indoamérica de Nuestro Tiempo, pp. 218-221.
448 Alejandro Lipschütz to T.D. Stewart, Nov. 11, 1947. CAL, Caja 6371.
449 T.D. Stewart to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jan. 4, 1947. CAL, Caja 6371.
the government had not officially complied with any of the accords that came out of that conference. Indeed, much of the work of the III was put on hold across the Americas after Patzcuaro, as World War II stole the attention of most of the world’s governments, especially shifting the focus of the United States away from domestic Indian affairs. Lipschütz had not attended the Patzcuaro Congress, but as his thought and work turned increasingly toward indigenista issues in the 1940s, he became more involved with the III. He began corresponding more with indigenistas through the III network and gradually began championing indigenista causes in Chile. As the preparations for the Cuzco summit unfolded in 1948, Lipschütz planned to attend as a member of the Chilean delegation, representing the University of Chile and the Chilean Museum of Natural History. He was to be named the technical secretary, official spokesperson for Chile and the president of the anthropology section of the conference.\textsuperscript{450} 

In May of 1948, Manuel Gamio wrote Lipschütz to request that he gather information about what measures had been taken in Chile to comply with the resolutions passed at the 1940 Patzcuaro Congress.\textsuperscript{451} So in the summer of 1948, Lipschütz began writing letters to functionaries across Chile to collect and disseminate information on behalf of the III. Between June 21\textsuperscript{st} and August 5\textsuperscript{th} 1948, Lipschütz wrote at least twenty letters requesting that people supply information so he could report to the III what had been done in Chile since the 1940 Patzcuaro Congress. He acknowledged that there was not yet a central office affiliated with the III in Chile, so he was circulating the request personally to interested researchers.

\textsuperscript{450} Alejandro Lipschütz to unnamed Minister, draft communication. CAL, Caja 6349. 
\textsuperscript{451} Alejandro Lipschütz to Manuel Gamio, May 21, 1948. CAL, Caja 6371.
Following a standard introduction explaining his request, Lipschütz included the relevant parts of the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro pertaining to the expertise of his request’s recipient. Of the twenty requests recorded in Lipschütz’s personal papers, five are accompanied by responses. Taken together they illustrate the indifference of many sectors of Chilean society toward indigenous concerns and the difficulty of organizing efforts on behalf of Chilean indígenas.452

From the School of Public Health at the University of Chile, Lipschütz received a reply that they had no information to address his request.453 Although the Director of the Institute of Criminology replied that he could not directly answer Lipschütz’s questions, he referred him to Fidel Jeldes, the anthropologist working at the Institute who had been part of Lipschütz’s recent Fuegian expedition. Jeldes had also written a short work entitled “Some Considerations on Criminality among the Araucanians,” which he enclosed for Lipschütz to read.454 Doctor Ernesto Herzog, Director of the Institute of Pathology at the University of Concepción and a former colleague of Lipschütz, wrote that he had previously heard nothing about the 1940 Congress nor the resolutions passed in Patzcuaro. He claimed that no one in Concepción outside of their few mutual acquaintances was working on indigenous issues.455 Professor Eugenio Pereira Salas of the Institute for Musical Research in the School of Fine Arts at the University of Chile wrote that his Institute “had complied, from a certain point of view,” with the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro by building

452 Alejandro Lipschütz to various researchers and officials in Chile, on behalf of the IIC, June 1948. CAL, Caja 6353.
453 Mario Pizzi to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 12, 1948. CAL, Caja 6353.
454 Israel Drapkin to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 23, 1948. CAL, Caja 6353.
455 Ernesto Herzog to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 5, 1958. CAL, Caja 6353
an archive of Araucanian music and sharing that music publicly. However, the implication in all four of those responses is that if any work was undertaken that complied with the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro it was not an issue of compliance, only because it was otherwise a relevant part of their work.

The most thorough reply that Lipschütz received from his many inquiries was from Father Juan de Forchheim, the Catholic Church’s Dean of Humanities and Director General of Primary Schools in Araucanía. Forchheim wrote that he was a subscriber to the III publications Boletín Indigenista and América Indígena, and had recently received an invitation to the Second International Conference in Cuzco. He claimed to have written a paper that he sent to the Patzcuaro Conference, which was read there by Venancio Coñuepán. Regarding the effects of the resolutions passed at Patzcuaro in Chile, Forchheim had seen little effect on public opinion. In and around Temuco, there was a “suicide belt” of neglect and economic and agricultural stagnation. The reinvigorated activism of Mapuche organizations like the Unión Araucana and the propaganda that periodically flared up to support the development of new schools in the region, particularly the stories printed and circulated by teachers who had come to the region to teach Mapuche children, represented bright spots in his view.

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456 Eugenio Pereira Salas to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 6, 1948. CAL, Caja 6353.
457 The term “suicide belt” came into use in the late 1940s and became a popular refrain in the regional press used to criticize and explain the region’s lack of development. The basic idea was that the lands surrounding Temuco, in the hands of Indians who do not exploit them productively, were strangling the development and progress of the city and the region. See Foerster and Montecino, pp. 129-132, 159-164 and 276-281.
458 Juan de Forchheim to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 14, 1948. CAL, Caja 6353.
Regarding research into indigenous languages, Forchheim wrote that no new work on Mapudungun had been conducted since that of Rodolfo Lenz, Félix de Augusta & Ernesto Moesbach in the late nineteenth century. Regarding education more broadly, in his view the state still had not adopted a meaningful or adequate program for educating Indians. Those working in various missionary efforts, including two indigenous priests and many Mapuche teachers, had filled the gap. Forchheim wrote that “the majority of the recommendations (Article 36, on Indigenous Education) always figure into our educational ideals, as made clear by the number of ‘friends of the school’ dating back to before the first Congreso Indigenista.” There did exist many vocational schools, which offered training in “home economics” and agricultural skills. But they did not have enough opportunities for talented students to enter secondary schools to get training in humanistic education needed to become leaders who might then help their fellow Mapuche regain political rights, he wrote. That criticism had been levied against Guido Beck’s mission schools since the early 1930s, so it is interesting to see it brought up in twenty years later by an educational leader within the same system of schools.

Referring to more technical concerns, Forchheim mentioned they were struggling to build schools with sufficient heat, light and water and which were located close to indigenous communities. However, they suffered from lack of material support, especially as it pertained to the health and well being of students. Many schools had a health office in name, but few had a doctor that regularly

459 Ibid.
serviced patients. Some material support was being provided in the form of free breakfast distributed to students in 168 schools, but little to no remuneration was coming from municipalities or the state. In short, not enough support was coming from the state to aid schools in complying with the III’s recommendations. In Forcheim’s view, efforts to benefit Indians in Chile needed the legitimacy of an official organization and support from the state to carry out the suggestions of the III. As to whether or not any progress had been made in the Camara de Diputados, he suggested asking Coñuepán directly.\textsuperscript{460}

Many of the problems identified by Forchheim could conceivably have been addressed if a national indigenista institute existed within Chile. According to Berdichewsky, “when the Organization of American States created the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, it was Lipschütz who was prepared to implement the program in Chile.”\textsuperscript{461} However, in 1940 Lipschütz lacked a committed group of indigenista counterparts in Chile to collaborate on the founding of a national indigenista institute. In the end, the Cuzco congress was delayed again and did not take place until 1949, and Guido Beck stood in for Lipschütz as president of the Chilean delegation.\textsuperscript{462} But later that year, Lipschütz and others came together to establish the Instituto Indigenista Chileno, which was “set up as a private organization on September 1, 1949.” And while, “it is hoped that in due course it will

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{461} Berdichewsky, p. 16.
become an official agency,” the organization received no funding from the state and had no formal role in setting indigenous policy in Chile.463

However, the diverse group of members that made up the IIC did come together to advocate for a more formal role in setting indigenous policy in Chile. After 1949, the IIC made an official declaration to oppose plans to develop areas around Temuco and settle German and Italian colonists there, in response to those critics who advanced the idea as a way to solve the “suicide belt” problem. They used Mapuche status as citizens with the same rights as white Chileans to oppose the government’s plan, and wrote that if the goal was to increase agricultural production state banks should invest in improving Mapuche cultivation of the land rather than push them out and replace them with other people. To make this argument the IIC referenced the 1813 Chilean constitution, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act in the United States and a July 1947 executive order signed by President Gabriel González Videla that condemned usury and other abuses carried out against Mapuche landowners. The latter, they argued, specifically contradicted the proposal then under consideration by the government. Finally, they requested a more formal role for the IIC by asking for official recognition by the state, in keeping with the conventions of the III. Although the IIC wanted that recognition, they simultaneously wanted autonomy and to be consulted before any modifications to indigenous laws were passed. This document was signed by a host of functionaries within Chilean society, including anthropologists like Lipschütz and Grete Mostny,

but also judges, public health officials, former army generals, a supreme court judge, a UN delegate and Mapuche representatives.464

1950-1961

In March of 1947, Presidential Decree No. 987 had established a commission to study the possibility of reforming laws pertaining to indigenous peoples in Chile.465 The study they produced addressed themes like the organization and function of the Juzgados de Indios, protection of indigenous rights and organization of property, needs for indigenous education and rural development, and finally the creation of a department of indigenous affairs located within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. In order to carry out those reforms, the commission recommended revising the Ley Indígena 4.111 of 1931 and following the international accords of the III established at the Patzcuaro and Cuzco conferences. Those included creating a national indigenous institute to be funded by the state and granted official powers.466 While the IIC remained a private organization, the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas that would be created in 1953 by presidential decree could be viewed as partially the result of this project.467 Ley 4.111 would not be revised until 1961, but DASIN was given broad powers to interpret and implement the law by controlling the courts and their employees as dependent branches of the Ministry of Land and Colonization.

464 Declaration of the IIC, undated. CAL, Caja 6357.
466 Report of the Commission to study proposed reforms to Ley Indígena. CAL, Caja 6357.
467 Copy of Decree 56, creating DASIN. CAL, Caja 6357.
Although Lipschütz was not officially named to the commission, he consulted on the project. In March 1950, Minister of Land and Colonization Ignacio Palma reached out to Lipschütz to ask for his advice. “Having considered the problem in the south, I think that some form of restoration of traditional indigenous institutions will be necessary to consider in the new law,” Palma wrote. Lipschütz replied that he would be glad to meet with the Minister for such a conversation, and also that he had been following the project through the IIC, which had been brought into the conversation by Javier Fermandois, as Director General of the Ministry and the vice president of the commission. Palma personally invited Lipschütz to attend a meeting with employees of the Ministry in Temuco in August 1950. He later wrote to thank Lipschütz for sending him a copy of his recent book on the Fuegians and mentioned that he had studied with anthropologist Martín Gusinde for three years as a secondary student, and was grateful for the wealth of scientific data that Lipschütz’s work had brought to the subject. Lipschütz also advocated on behalf of the IIC with other government officials in this period, for example addressing the Minister of Education to request that the position of Inspector of Indigenous Education in Temuco be filled through the appointment of an indigenous teacher.

Also in 1950, Lipschütz and Mostny collected several of the most significant lectures and papers they and others had given on the Tierra del Fuego mission and published them in a volume entitled *Cuatro Conferencias sobre los Indios*

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468 Ignacio Palma, Minister of Land and Colonization to Alejandro Lipschütz, Mar. 28, 1950. CAL, Caja 6372.
470 Ignacio Palma to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 29, 1970. CAL, Caja 6372.
471 Ignacio Palma to Alejandro Lipschütz, May. 30, 1951. CAL, Caja 6372.
They noted in a foreword that Santiana had published findings separately, but those were not included in the text. While they both attempted to support the publication of other manuscripts, the most significant achievement of the Fuegan research mission was that it established Lipschütz as a bona fide indigenista on a transnational scale. By the early 1950s North American anthropologists began to take interest in studying the Mapuche, and naturally they looked to Lipschütz for guidance and assistance in coordinating and conducting field research. One such researcher was Louis C. Faron, an anthropologist trained by Julian Steward at Columbia University.

Lipschütz helped Faron make contact with Mapuche scholars and subjects, and they continued to exchange letters while Faron was conducting field research. In January 1953, he wrote to Lipschütz updating him on progress, and thanking him for putting him in touch with Domingo Curaqueo, a Mapuche professor at the University of Chile, who then wrote “to his friend Victor Painemal, who in turn put me in touch with Martín Alonqueo.” Faron and his wife lived with members of the Alonqueo family while studying Mapuche kinship and agricultural production in 1953. Faron reached out a second time to ask Lipschütz to speak to Curaqueo and

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474 Lipschütz and Mostny, p. XV.
475 Grete Mostny to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jan. 4, 1947; Correspondence between Alejandro Lipschütz and T.D. Stewart, Jan.-Feb. 1947. CAL, Caja 6371. Both Lipschütz and Mostny had corresponded with T.D. Stewart to recommend Fidel Jeldes’s manuscript for publication in the American Journal of Physical Anthropology. Ultimately, he rejected it because the number of skulls examined was too small, Jeldes did not consult the exhaustive study of Martín Gusinde on a similar population, and because recent work by an American anthropologist conducting similar but more sophisticated analysis on Australian aborigines put Jeldes’s work “in an unfavorable light.”
476 Louis Faron to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jan. 20, 1953. CAL, Caja 6353. 380-384. Interestingly, Curaqueo, Painemal and Alonqueo were all connected to the Unión Araucana.
ask him to put Faron in contact with Mapuche farmers in Lonquimay, as he sought to expand his research to include a second field site. Finally, Faron wrote also to ask Lipschütz to write him a letter of introduction to his contacts in Tierra del Fuego, as he hoped to follow up on several of Grete Mostny’s lines of inquiry among the indigenous Fueginos.

In the early 1950s, Lipschütz also began interacting with Mapuche organizations more directly. While he continued to exchange ideas and friendly correspondence through the indigenista network, and also publish books on indigenista themes, this reorientation of his activities had an impact on his work. By the 1950s, Mapuche organizations had achieved greater political significance through the rise of the Corporación Araucana, the election of several more Mapuche deputies to the lower house of the legislature, and Carlos Ibañez del Campo’s appointment of Coñuepán to establish and direct DASIN within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. For his part, Lipschütz would continue to write, publish and interact through the indigenista network. He would also increasingly engage Mapuche political organizations within Chile, but his leftist political views would limit his interaction with “official” indigenous policy and representatives as more moderate Mapuche politicians and activists were aligned with the Ibañez government.

Lipschütz had always used his many personal connections with Mapuche individuals to support their own self-advocacy through training and mentorship. In a letter from Domingo Tripailaf in July of 1951, Tripailaf thanked Lipschütz for

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477 Louis Faron to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 6, 1953. CAL, Caja 6353.
478 Louis Faron to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 9, 1953. CAL, Caja 6353.
sending him a book, but also for his long and tireless work on behalf of his people. He referred to Lipschütz as inspiring, which illustrates Lipschütz’s goal of empowering Mapuche to better their own social, economic and political situation.479 As the 1950s wore on and Mapuche organizations began to formalize their activities, Lipschütz was invited to attend and participate in a number of meetings convened by Mapuche organizations. Martín Painemal and Juan Llanquinao requested his presence at the first National Mapuche Congress in December of 1953, to be held in Temuco. Continuing the theme of combining indigenista work with his career as a doctor and biologist, Lipschütz was scheduled to attend a medical conference on the same day, but was able to participate in both events. In an attempt to make participation in the congress as broad as possible, it was called to order without distinction to the political or religious agendas of the participants, rallying around the cause of studying and solving problems faced by Mapuche broadly. Those included the loss of land, rising prices and falling yields of agricultural products, inadequate educational facilities for Mapuche youth and the difficulty of passing language, culture and traditions to the next generation. The list of Mapuche organizations fighting this onslaught included the Corporación Araucana, Unión Araucana, an urban organization based in Santiago called the “Unión Araucano Sociedad Galvarino” and others.480 Through his work with Mapuche organizations, Lipschütz realized that the various problems they were trying to solve all in some way or another threatened

479 Domingo Tripailaf to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jul. 8, 1951. CAL, Caja 6372.
the stability of their communities. Those organizations began thinking and talking about “community” as an analytic framework within which to grapple with those challenges. In October of 1955, Galvarino and the IIC jointly hosted a forum on community, and the Galvarino leadership personally invited Lipschütz to attend.\(^{481}\) Lipschütz replied that he was unfortunately confined to bed for a few days and so would not be able to make it. However, he did provide a letter in which he shared his thoughts on the topic. Lipschütz asserted the importance of the agricultural community as a defense against the “proletarianization” of the Mapuche. He disputed the notion that legal protections preventing the sale of property deprived Mapuche of their rights, and equated that to the argument that holding a mortgage deprives one of the right to sell their land and keep the profits. Instead, he argued that Mapuche should borrow funds for the purchase of more land from a special fund created by the state if one wished to buy a parcel and move away from the community. "You have to develop the community, you have to improve it, but not liquidate it."\(^{482}\)

The forum drew a crowd of more than 200 people and passed a series of resolutions that expressed their positions on a variety of topics that could help defend Mapuche communities from the loss of land, while at the same time improve living conditions for comuneros. They began with a statement justifying the preservation of Mapuche communities in accordance with the títulos de merced that created them. Preserving and improving laws that protected communities, while speaking out against legislative efforts intended to include indígenas under common

\(^{481}\) Unión Araucana Galvarino to Alejandro Lipschütz, Oct. 17, 1955. CAL, Caja 6357.
\(^{482}\) Alejandro Lipschütz to Sociedad Unión Araucango “Galvarino.” CAL, Caja 6357.
Chilean law, would further that project, they argued. They also advocated for state efforts to support education in the communities, found post offices, hospitals and pharmacies, and lend money for land improvements. Finally, the accords were to be presented to public officials and journalists were asked to print and distribute them.  

Prompted by the ideas circulated at the forum, Lipschütz published *La Comunidad Indígena en América y en Chile* in 1956. The book brought together many themes that Lipschütz had treated before, but put them to work in service of preserving indigenous communities. In the preface, he described the project as follows:

The present volume owes its origin to circumstantial causes. The “Unión Araucana [Sociedad] Galvarino” and the “Corporación Araucana” extended me an invitation to summarize, in a lecture, my ideas about indigenous community in Chile. This was a very gracious invitation, because with it the directors of the societies, who look after the interests of the indigenous people of Chile, have asked me to use my scientific objectivity to make them aware of concepts that on several occasions before I had applied to the vast problems of indigenous peoples across the Americas.  

The collaboration Lipschütz described indicates that the agency of the indígena and the indigenista were working together to understand a complex set of problems and try to solve them. The instance provides an example that connects significant Mapuche leaders and organizations directly to the IIC and Lipschütz personally. His subsequent correspondence with Mapuche leaders and indigenistas outside of Chile connected the Mapuche movement to the broader transnational indigenista movement.

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483 Manuel Huenulao, President, Unión Araucano Galvarino to Alejandro Lipschütz, Nov. 1, 1955. CAL, Caja 6357.
As he was compiling *La Comunidad*, Lipschütz wrote to Coñuepán at DASIN to request verification of statistics on indigenous land ownership in Chile.\textsuperscript{485} He was trying to track down discrepancies between figures he had received from Louis Faron and some recently presented in the Cámara de Diputados. Treating that subject in the book, Lipschütz claimed that within a two-year period in the early 1950s, the subdivision of Mapuche land prompted 29 percent of divided land to be sold or otherwise lost by Mapuche communities.\textsuperscript{486} Refuting the claims of those advocating subdivision of indigenous land that individual property rights would encourage investment and more efficient exploitation of agricultural land to benefit Mapuche smallholders, Lipschütz asked, “What then is the real reason of the steps being taken to ‘liquidate’ the indigenous community in Chile?”\textsuperscript{487} In writing *La Comunidad*, Lipschütz also had the opportunity to correspond with Mapuche Diputado José Cayupi. In June of 1956, he wrote Cayupi to congratulate him on a recent speech in the Cámara and thank him for loaning Lipschütz some documents that he used in writing the book.\textsuperscript{488} While Lipschütz collaborated extensively with other indigenista scholars in the Fuegian project, *La Comunidad* involved more collaboration with Mapuche leaders and organizations.

The publication of *La Comunidad* also stimulated further dialogue with indigenistas in Mexico and North America. Manuel Gamio wrote Lipschütz twice in 1956 to ask him to contribute an article on indigenous community for publication in

\textsuperscript{485} Alejandro Lipschütz to Venancio Coñuepán, Feb. 13, 1956. CAL, Caja 6373.
\textsuperscript{486} Lipschütz 1956, footnote 42, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{487} Lipschütz 1956, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{488} Alejandro Lipschütz to José Cayupi, Jun. 27, 1956. CAL, Caja 6373.
Lipschütz sent a copy of the *La Comunidad* manuscript to Alfonso Caso, who at the time was serving as Director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista in Mexico, and asked him to write a prologue for the book. The publication of *La Comunidad* also brought renewed correspondence with a host of North American scholars, including Faron, Herskovits and Robert Redfield. That dialogue accomplished several things for Lipschütz and his indigenista work. On one hand his cordial relationship with John Collier led the latter to make numerous attempts to get *La Comunidad* translated and published by various North American university presses. At the same time it engendered a dialogue that compared Indian policy in the United States with legal reforms in Chile. The writing, publication and distribution of *La Comunidad* perhaps represents the most concrete example of Mapuche organizations and activism directly contributing to indigenismo as a formal, transnational intellectual debate.

After 1950, winds of change were altering the political landscape across the globe. Internationally, the expansion of the Cold War caused the United States to change both its Indian policy within the country, and also the nature of its engagement with Latin American states. In a 1956 letter to Lipschütz, John Collier wrote, “I resigned as Indian Commissioner in 1945, to engage in international work. However, it is a fact that the policies I had worked for were continued until 1950, when the whole movement of national policy was thrown into reverse.”

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489 Manuel Gamio to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jan. 11, 24, 1956. CAL, Caja 6373.
490 Alejandro Lipschütz to Alfonso Caso, Mar. 16, 1956. CAL, Caja 6373.
491 Correspondence with various North American scholars, Jun.-Sep. 1956. CAL, Caja 6373.
continued, “The Democratic Party’s platform this year, on Indians, has adopted completely the Indian’s own program and stated it with lucidity and brevity.”

Lipschütz replied:

“I was especially interested to hear that the Indians own program has been adopted by the Democratic Party. Let us hope that this program will become a reality. Quite recently I had lunch with the leaders of the Araucanians. The Araucanian members of the Chamber of Deputies informed me that they were successful in the Program Committee: the Committee refused to bring before the Chamber the project of a law abolishing protection of Indian land property. Unfortunately the Indians are politically very divided.”

The following year, Lipschütz updated Collier on the situation in Chile. “You may be interested to know that local groups are again working hard to obtain derogation of all the laws of protection of Indian (land) tenure including the law by which our Indian office (DASIN) has been created. Let us hope that they will not succeed.”

Collier replied:

“...the Indian situation in the USA is paradoxical, if not desperate, i.e., the expenditure on Indians has increased fourfold in three or four years and the fundamental benefits to Indians have not increased at all; while the onslaught against Indian properties, goes on unabated. I note your information as to the continuing attack against the Indian community in Chile.”

Later, in 1959, Collier reported:

“Concerning USA Indians, I can report that within the last two years, approximately, the Interior Department has moved away from its atomizing policies of the years since 1950, and approximately into the philosophy of the Indian Reorganization Act. For how long this good report may continue to be made, I can’t guess; you, better than almost anyone else, know in history and in the present what sort of struggle the Indian community has to wage, usually alone and unhelped.”
Lipschütz and Collier thus shared the frustrations and uncertainties involved in navigating the ever-shifting sands of national indigenous policies. In one another they found academic support and also intellectual inspiration.

In Chile, although efforts to bring Mapuche organizations together across political and ideological spectra continued throughout the 1950s, those efforts were often frustrated by the ambitions of individuals and infighting between organizations. The IIC sometimes found itself dragged into those disputes. In June of 1959, Juan Huaiquimil and Armando Huarapil, president and secretary of Galvarino respectively, wrote a letter to the president of the IIC to oppose a forum organized by the Corporación Araucana because it was not opened to the public. Due to recent unfavorable results in the Juzgado de Indios in Temuco, they claimed it would only serve to fracture Mapuche solidarity due to frustration with the Corporación’s leaders. They further claimed that someone within the Corporación had been claiming to represent the opinions of Galvarino, an act they considered “subterfuge.”

In October of 1960, a large gathering of Mapuche convened to discuss education, indigenous laws, the Juzgados de Indios and relations with the III. Illustrating divides within the Mapuche movement, attendees called for Coñuepán’s dismissal as Director of DASIN, under the rationale that he was not adequately doing his job and was currently running for office again. They also repeated the request that the state send official representation to the III in Mexico City. Again in 1961, the leaders of Galvarino invited members of the IIC to attend a public meeting to

498 Juan Huaiquimil and Armando Huarapil to Alejandro Lipschütz, Jun. 6, 1959. CAL, Caja 6358.
discuss the leadership of DASIN, among other things. But by the early 1960s, the attention of Mapuche organizations and indigenistas again returned to stave off efforts to change the Ley Indígena that would make it easier for Mapuche communal land to be subdivided and sold. This time, the push came from President Jorge Alessandri, who had been elected in 1958. The 1961 reform of the Ley Indígena would also serve as a bridge to broader agrarian reform efforts later championed by President Eduardo Frei Montalva after his election in 1964.

1961-1973

Following the 1958 national elections in which Mapuche politicians were swept from office, grassroots Mapuche organizations began to shift leftward along the political spectrum. As the 1960s unfolded, the weight of influence held by Mapuche organizations shifted toward those that aligned not with conservative politicians like Ibañez del Campo or his successor Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964). Rather, left-leaning Mapuche organizations ultimately became an important pillar of support for Salvador Allende in his unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1964, and later the 1970 electoral victory of his leftist Popular Unity coalition government. Meanwhile, Lipschütz continued to engage with Mapuche organizations and the transnational indigenista network. In doing so he stayed abreast of the themes of the era, grappling with questions of agrarian reform and the relationship between indigenismo and socialist revolution. He stayed true to his principles, including broad support for socialism but also the preservation of indigenous communities.

501 Albó, pp. 820-821.
He resisted the temptation to incorporate indigenous peoples into broader class struggles in ways that would threaten their cultural preservation or ability to seek political autonomy. But the most significant shift for Lipschütz was that in this period he more directly engaged the state to advocate for indigenous protections. As leftist political forces ultimately came to control the state by the end of the decade, national politics in Chile finally came into alignment with Lipschütz’s own views and values.

In 1960, legislators proposed changes to the Ley Indígena 4.111, which accompanied a broader effort to pass a package of agrarian reform measures that would benefit Mapuche and non-Mapuche Chilean peasants alike. The original purpose of the project was to reform the way the Juzgados de Indios functioned to settle indigenous land disputes and sell or divide community lands. However, in the course of their work, the commission decided that a completely new and revamped Ley Indígena was needed. The legislation that resulted mostly dealt with land issues, although discussions that arose subsequently raised other indigenous concerns. Most significantly, the Ley Indígena 14.511 of 1961 established the Juzgados de Letras de Indios (Indian Civil Courts) to deal with land and title issues. It did establish some protections against selling and dividing community land by creating a fifteen-year moratorium or waiting period for sales, but that nevertheless opened the door to the dissolution of community lands more than had been previously possible. The Ley Indígena 14.511 also established more detailed procedures for settling land disputes, recording sales or transfers of title, and

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502 Boletín No. 19.186, Commission to Reform Ley Indígena. CAL, Caja 6357.
procedures for the state to expropriate land from indígenas or assign state land to indigenous communities through the Juzgados de Letras. Most of these mechanisms were thought necessary and relevant in the early 1960s as the Chilean state embarked on a broader program of agrarian reform. Finally, the Ley 14.511 also created regional banks as dependencies of the Banco del Estado to loan money to indigenous communities and individuals.\textsuperscript{503}

Mapuche organizations, indigenistas and others rallied to oppose those changes and identify the many and various ways they would impact Mapuche peasants. In August of 1960 the President of the Corporación Araucana in Santiago Lorenzo Lemunguier penned a long letter to President Alessandri to oppose the new Ley Indígena on the grounds that it would make the subdivision of Mapuche community land easier. He argued that as a general rule, the elimination of indigenous communities would have broader negative consequences for Chilean society, and that instead the government should provide more technical and material support to help Mapuche increase the agricultural productivity of their land. He asked the government to postpone action on the new law so that Mapuche organizations would have more time to propose alternatives that would prevent the inevitable loss of land.\textsuperscript{504} By December of 1960, six major Mapuche organizations (including Galvarino, Corporación Araucana and Movimiento de Unificación Araucana) came together with the IIC to jointly request that the ratification of Ley 14.511 be delayed to give them more time to study and prepare a response. They complained that the proposed changes were causing a panic among the indigenous communities.

\textsuperscript{503} Draft revision of Ley Indígena, Nov. 15, 1960. CAL, Caja 6357.
\textsuperscript{504} Lorenzo Lemunguier to President Alessandri, Aug. 30, 1960.
population of the south and that indígenas across the country were universally opposed to the law because it made it easier to divide community lands, allowing a minority of the community to decide the fate of the whole group. In crafting their opposition to the law the authors cited Federal Indian Laws in the United States, which established tribal lands as inalienable in 1934, although they ignored the “termination” policies of the post-War period.505 Despite widespread Mapuche opposition, the Ley Indígena 14.511 was passed on January 3rd, 1961. In May 1961 Galvarino organized a public meeting to discuss the new law and other issues. In a letter addressed to the “President and members of the National Indigenista Institute,” the leaders of Galvarino invited the IIC to attend a large public rally where themes like the leadership of DASIN, the reform of the Ley Indígena 4.111 and the defense of Mapuche language, culture and folklore would be discussed.506

Following the promulgation of Ley 14.511, DASIN was increasingly viewed as an organ of the state, and one that was not particularly responsive to indigenous concerns in the early 1960s. However, the office did carry out significant work in coordinating or at least recording the efforts of various government agencies. In the annual report recapping the work of 1963, DASIN chronicled efforts that spanned the study and rectification of a variety of land issues, including legal disputes, technical challenges and efforts to increase agricultural production. The office, although situated as a dependency of the Ministry of Land and Colonization, coordinated efforts with the Ministry of Education to improve indigenous education and worked with the Ministry of the Treasury to absolve debt and extend credit to

505 Leaders of Galvarino to President Alessandri, Dec. 7, 1960.
indigenous farmers. DASIN was also involved in coordinating relief efforts following major earthquakes in 1960 and consulting on construction projects, including hospitals. Much of their work had to do with the agrarian reform efforts, even though the impact of agrarian reform on Mapuche communities was limited in the early 1960s. DASIN also collaborated with agencies outside of Chile to benefit Chilean indígenas, for example a program funded by the Mexican government to revive the art of Mapuche silverwork and Rockefeller Foundation initiatives to found schools in the south. Looking to the future, the 1963 report offered six proposals for improving education for Mapuche, which included: creating new primary schools, improving vocational training, serving breakfast and lunch to students, providing grants for students to continue their studies after primary school, offering adult education courses, and producing educational films for the benefit of Mapuche and all Chileans.507

Although intimately involved in the creation of DASIN, neither Lipschütz nor the IIC appear to have been consulted in the same way they were in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Ministry of Land and Colonization was getting DASIN off the ground. But when asked, Lipschütz did offer his advice and professional opinions, and when opposed to wrongheaded initiatives he spoke out vocally, especially when they pertained to the subdivision of indigenous community land. In March of 1962, he wrote to José Gonzáles, Secretary of the Socialist Party, to oppose the proposition that indigenous land be incorporated into broader farming cooperatives composed of Mapuche and non-Mapuche land and workers. He

507 Report of German Silva Echavarria, Asesor, DASIN. CAL, Caja 6357.
reiterated that indigenous interests could only be protected and served by preserving the integrity of their communities through communal land ownership. Lipschütz also took the opportunity to advocate for the creation of a National Mapuche Council, led by Mapuche and elected by Mapuche, and functioning to protect Mapuche material and cultural interests.⁵⁰⁸

As an indication of his influence across Latin America and particularly in socialist circles, when Lipschütz celebrated his eightieth birthday in 1963, he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Havana.⁵⁰⁹ Despite his age, Lipschütz continued to write, publish and participate in the transnational indigenista discourse. In fact, the 1960s and early 1970s were a particularly productive time for his indigenista work. Following his retirement as Director of the Institute for Experimental Medicine in 1962 he dedicated more time to writing, publishing four books on indigenista themes between 1963 and 1974.⁵¹⁰ Significantly, he also continued as an active member of the IIC and collaborated with Mapuche leaders and organizations as they grappled with the questions of the day. In 1964 he joined the Chilean delegation to the fifth Congreso Indigenista Interamericano in Quito. There he presented on the themes of agrarian reform and colonization as they pertained to indigenous populations, which coincided with the start of a major push for agrarian reform under President Eduardo Frei Montalva.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ Alejandro Lipschütz to José González, Mar. 5, 1962. CAL, Caja 6374.
⁵⁰⁹ Berdichewsky, p. 95.
⁵¹¹ Alejandro Lipschütz to Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, Jul. 6, 1964. CAL, Caja 6373.
Lipschütz’s status as a scientist gave him credibility in the eyes of Chilean society and Mapuche actors, and that cachet extended beyond his formal scientific training in biology. In June of 1960, members of the Movimiento de Unificación Araucana (Araucanian Unification Movement) wrote to ask for his help in a court case that was underway. In keeping with millenarian oral traditions, a machi in Puerto Saavedra had sacrificed a child on the shore of the ocean and threw his remains into the sea to calm its rage and prevent tsunamis. The authors of the letter acknowledged that the act was profoundly disturbing and it offended the norms of contemporary western civilization. However, they blamed the “cultural backwardness” of the Indians who carried out the act, and in keeping with indigenista philosophy argued that their culture needed to be brought gradually and thoughtfully into alignment with the more current norms of the country. They also acknowledged that in ancient times the forebears of western civilizations (Greeks and Romans) had also practiced human sacrifice. They objected to the treatment of the issue in the newspapers, which had sensationalized the events for profit and exploited them for commercial gain. They sought a judicial interpretation of the law that took into consideration the complicated history, social reality and cultural legacy of the Mapuche in Chile. They wrote to Lipschütz to ask him to serve on a commission that could interpret this act for the courts, in light of its ceremonial significance and legitimacy from the perspective of indigenous medicine.\textsuperscript{512} The request aligned quite specifically with much of his previous work, and the article

\textsuperscript{512} Leaders of Movimiento de Unificación de Araucanía, Jun. 24, 1960. CAL, Caja 6358.
that Lipschütz had published in the III’s *Boletín Indigenista*, which utilized a similar defense in another murder trial.\(^{513}\)

Lipschütz maintained active correspondence with North American academics with whom he had shared interests and insights in the past, and also continued to reach out to people whose work he respected but did not necessarily know personally. In February, 1964 he wrote to Woodrow Borah, an anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley who studied peasants in Latin America. “Although we have not been in correspondence, I have long read and made use of your work. Your insight into the problems of rural poverty in Latin America, and the directness with which you have cut through the entire mythology of indigenismo lighted my path twelve years ago for an understanding of much of the problem.”\(^{514}\) Likewise, his engagement with socialism and Marxist theory often set the tone for these exchanges. In November 1965 he wrote to Leslie White, an important anthropologist at the University of Michigan:

> “My feeling is that progress of social or cultural anthropology is intimately dependent on the spread of Marxian thought. Malinowski contributed to this progress because his thought was greatly influenced by Marx, though personally he was convinced that he was an anti-Marxist. It is the same with Kroeber…” \(^{515}\)

Although Lipschütz had held communist views since his early years in Europe, it was not until the 1960s that socialism became a viable alternative in Chilean national politics. Although some Mapuche leaders had flirted with the left in the

\(^{513}\) Noticias: Chile, “Acquittal of an Araucanian Woman for the Murder of a Witch,” *Boletín Indigenista*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 160-169. Lipschütz co-authored a report on a case in which a Mapuche woman was acquitted of murder charges after she killed her grandmother, whom she accused of witchcraft. This case is described more fully in chapter three.

\(^{514}\) Woodrow Borah to Alejandro Lipschütz, Feb. 3, 1964. CAL, Caja 6376.

\(^{515}\) Alejandro Lipschütz to Leslie White, Nov. 17, 1965. CAL, Caja 6376.
1920s and early 1930s (notably Aburto and Huenchullán), the failure of the Corporación’s more moderate position pushed the next generation of Mapuche activists further to the left.

By the end of the decade, the tenor of public events had become more radical and aggressive in their advocacy for change, and simultaneously more legitimate within the academy. In November 1970, the Department of University Extension of the University of Chile hosted a public forum entitled, “The Mapuche: Second Class Citizens?” which featured participants from Mapuche organizations, government agencies and university professors.516 Interestingly, those developed as Mapuche began to enjoy increased access to some state services and more support from indigenistas who had access to academic circles. This can be seen in the program of a conference hosted jointly by the IIC and Galvarino, which included remarks from IIC President Tomás Lago, Galvarino President Remigio Catrileo, Mapuche Professor Domingo Curaqueo and a lecture by Lipschütz. The evening concluded with a musical rendition by Lautaro Manquilef and his band.517 Cultural appreciation and support for the preservation of Mapuche culture developed alongside increasingly radical calls for change.

In addition to his work supporting Mapuche political organizations and initiatives, Lipschütz used his influence and contacts to support Mapuche cultural and artistic preservation. On Christmas Eve 1970, he and Marguerite addressed a letter to the Director of DASIN to suggest that a collection of art by the Mapuche painter Celia Leyton was a cultural treasure and should be preserved. In that

517 Program of IIC/Unión Galvarino joint conference. CAL, Caja 6358.
request, they referenced the work of the Office of Indigenous Affairs in Mexico, making a point that indígenas should be integrated into the nation-state in ways that preserve their cultural practices and legacy. The Lipschützes requested that DASIN provide or secure a place for the collection to be held, independent of the national museums where the collection would be lost among so many other works, only to be displayed infrequently. Ever optimistic, they proposed that the “future home of the IIC” would eventually become a good permanent solution.518

While Lipschütz was supporting, training and collaborating with young Mapuche students and activists, he also trained Chilean scholars, who carried on his indigenista work. Bernardo Berdichewsky, who later wrote a biography of his former teacher, and Cristián Vives, a sociologist working for the Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (Corporation for Agrarian Reform), wrote a paper advising Salvador Allende’s UP government to adopt an indigenista program to forestall the processes of change in the Araucanía, specifically through agrarian reform. By addressing the cultural distinctiveness of Mapuche populations and the long history of racial discrimination as justification for such a program, they affirmed the Mapuche right to self-determination and integration without assimilation. Within the process of agrarian reform, they suggested provisions for communal land tenure and proposed a series of other legal and administrative supports for Mapuche communities, including improvements to the constitution and function of the Juzgados de Indios, creation of a national indigenista institute supported by the state and affiliated with the III, and support for existing Mapuche organizations.

518 Alejandro and Margarita Lipschütz to Director, DASIN, Dec. 24, 1970. CAL, Caja 6357.
Other suggestions included hygiene and public health initiatives, promotion of Mapuche folklore and folk art, bilingual education for Mapuche children and the teaching of Mapudungun to Chilean children in non-Mapuche schools. In a two-page appendix, Lipschütz lent his support to the proposals of Berdichewsky and Vives, and significantly advocated for the creation of a Mapuche Council, to be elected by Mapuches themselves and with an official status within the state.\textsuperscript{519} That final point, although Lipschütz had held the conviction for some time, parallels broader disillusionment with indigenista efforts across the Americas by the early 1970s. Berdichewsky describes the decline of indigenismo commencing in the 1970s, which corroborates similar assertions by Stephen Lewis and Laura Giraudo in \textit{Latin American Perspectives}. By that decade, indigenous leaders and their organizations across the Americas were rising to eclipse the indigenista organizations that helped them gain a footing in political struggles.\textsuperscript{520}

Lipschütz had an ongoing tense relationship with the more conservative institutions within Chile, in particular with the editorial board of \textit{El Mercurio}, the nation’s paper of record, but a conservative one. Writing to Eduardo Castro in 1971, his editor at Editorial Universitaria, Lipschütz made suggestions as to how Castro could most effectively promote Lipschütz’s recent book on Bonampak in Chile. He suggested, “The most important (way) would be an article in \textit{El Mercurio}, which doesn’t like me because of my bad conduct in the treatment of social problems, and especially indigenista ones.” Lipschütz went on to make suggestions for Mexico,

\textsuperscript{519} Draft Manuscript, “Para una Política de Acción Indigenista en Alejandro Lipschütz Area Araucana,” CAL, Caja 6357.
\textsuperscript{520} Berdichewsky, pp. 115-118.
Guatemala, Cuba, Colombia and Uruguay, which illustrate not only his tense relationship with the Chilean establishment, but also his broad range of contacts across Latin America.\textsuperscript{521}

By the end of the decade, however, the whole tenor of Chilean national politics shifted dramatically to the left with the election of Salvadore Allende and his \textit{Unidad Popular} (UP – Popular Unity) coalition government. In response to growing cries for dramatic action needed to address Mapuche social inequalities, and also as a result of broad Mapuche support for Allende in the election, the UP undertook a major reform of the Ley Indígena in 1972. Although he was in his late eighties and officially retired, UP officials sought Lipschütz’s counsel for his expertise on indigenous rights and issues, and also because his politics were compatible with their agenda. In summarizing the new law, the indigenous problem was characterized as part of the UP’s over-arching goals, but at the same time a unique situation that required special efforts to rectify.

The basic program of the Unidad Popular attaches great importance to the situation of the most disadvantaged sectors of our society. Within the demands of the working class and peasants, there exists a sector that, above all the rest, has been forgotten for centuries, and is undoubtedly the most authentic example of a system that has supported the blind exploitation of man by man: the indigenous sector. The indigenous “problem” is a central concern for the Popular Government and should be also for all Chileans. We defend the integrity and support the expansion of indigenous communities so long dispossessed, in order to give them adequate, timely and sufficient technical and financial assistance – to provide the same possibilities as other citizens.\textsuperscript{522}

In presenting the actual text of the proposed law to the Cámara de Diputados, the Commission on Agriculture and Colonization, which had been tasked with studying the issue and drafting the legislation, added that it was their hope that the law

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\textsuperscript{521} Alejandro Lipschütz to Eduardo Castro, Dec. 12, 1971. CAL, Caja 6382.  
\textsuperscript{522} Message to Senado and Cámara, p. 1. CAL, Caja 6357.
would “end, once and for all, the false image that the rest of the country has formed of the indigenous race.”

On August 10, 1972, Acting Director of DASIN Hugo Ormeño Melet wrote to Lipschütz to ask for his suggestions and observations on the proposed law. Two weeks later, Director Daniel Colompil Quilaqueo sent a second request, this time with a copy of the text that had been vetted by the judicial team and which was currently being analyzed by Mapuche organizations before an anticipated vote in early September. Lipschütz thanked Colompil for asking for his input, but wrote that, “My knowledge and scientific interests allow me to give my opinion only on...(the subject of) indigenous development. Those are related to problems of ‘tribal autonomy’ in the advance of the ‘great nation,’ problems that acquired significant importance in recent years.” The section of the law that Lipschütz referred to replaced DASIN with the Instituto de Desarrollo Indígena (IDI – Institute for Indigenous Development). The IDI was proposed to exist for a period of twenty years, but Lipschütz recommended decreasing that duration to five, after which Mapuches would take over and operate autonomously. He also suggested that instead of including seven Mapuche representatives on the governing council, the number should be increased to fifteen. Finally, he advised referring to those representatives as simply “Mapuche” instead of “Mapuche campesinos” because as he pointed out, “the principal objectives of the Institute’ are not only (to find)

525 Daniel Colompil Quilaqueo to Alejandro Lipschütz, Aug. 22, 1971. CAL, Caja 6357.
526 Alejandro Lipschütz to Daniel Colompil Quilaqueo, Aug. 23, 21, 1972. CAL, Caja 6357.
solutions to problems related to lands but also *educational, cultural and public health* problems” (emphasis in original). 527 In the resulting Ley Indígena 17.729, none of Lipschütz’s three suggestions were accepted. 528 But Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol did invite him to the official promulgation of the law at the Palacio Moneda on September 15, 1972. 529

**Summary**

For more than four decades, Alejandro Lipschütz was an active participant in national and transnational debates about the place of indígenas in contemporary western society. In that time he worked tirelessly, mostly outside the traditional boundaries of his professional obligations, to study and propose solutions to problems faced by indígenas in Chile and across the Americas. In doing that, Lipschütz provides us with an example of how integrated and complex the indigenista discourse was. During the 1940s he established himself as a legitimate researcher in the field of applied anthropology despite the fact that his formal training was in biology. He built a transnational network of professional contacts who read and disseminated his work. In the 1950s, Lipschütz forged critical ties with Mapuche leaders and political organizations despite the fact that he did not share their ethnic identity, lived far removed from the majority of the population and was in fact himself an immigrant to Chile. Finally, although more conservative politics held sway during the 1950s, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the national

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527 Lipschütz to Daniel Colompl Quilaqueo, Aug, 21, 1972. CAL, Caja 6357.
528 Text of Ley Indígena 17.729, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile website, [http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29250](http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29250)
529 Jacques Chonchol to Alejandro Lipschütz. CAL, Caja 6381.
political climate turned in the direction of his long-held personal beliefs. Although he was officially retired, his public profile did not diminish and the frequency and volume of his publication actually increased. Across the entire period, from 1937 to 1973, Lipschütz wove together scholarship, politics and broad collaboration with indigenous leaders to construct an indigenismo that served to connect otherwise disparate actors and ideas. In doing so, he also maintained a commitment to political autonomy for indigenous peoples that would later become foundational for many indigenous activists in Chile and across the Americas after identity-based social movements emerged in the 1980s.
Chapter 5: Venancio Coñuepán and the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas

Thus far, we have seen that Manuel Aburto represented an archetypal indigenous leader by combining traditional notions of Mapuche authority and political strategy with a sophisticated understanding of the social and political environment in which he was fighting for his people. Meanwhile, Alejandro Lipschütz characterized the traditional description of an indigenista as a white man, based in the nation’s capital. He was integrated into the formal academic networks and government bureaucracy of his time and attempted to use those positions of privilege to advocate for solutions on behalf of indigenous people. We now turn our attention to Venancio Coñuepán, whose life and career show him to be both an indigenista and an indigenous activist, blurring distinctions between the two categories and demonstrating that they were highly permeable. Coñuepán’s creation and leadership of the national Office of Indigenous Affairs in the 1950s was an episode in which he clearly functioned as both Indian and indigenista simultaneously.

If there was a singular point, or goal, to Coñuepán’s thirty-year career in politics, it was to reach a high enough height within the formal structure of the Chilean government to protect the rights of Mapuche and lead them toward formal political participation as equal citizens of Chile. He viewed the creation of a government agency tasked with that specific purpose as the best vehicle by which to accomplish his goal. In 1953, Coñuepán’s efforts and accumulated political influence
led to the creation of the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas and his appointment as the Director of that agency. Because DASIN was tasked with overseeing the *Juzgados de Indios* (Indian Courts), Coñuepán was positioned to manage the courts to provide protection to Mapuche as they defended their interests. In the course of his tenure he also engaged other branches of government toward similar ends. In addition, he leveraged his personal influence with white Chilean leaders and his indigenous identity to function as a go-between, bridging what often seemed like two very different worlds sharing the Chilean landscape in the twentieth century. And although he sought to make Mapuche into citizens with equal rights, he employed indigenous identity and the legacy of conquest and colonization to argue that the Mapuche formed a special class of citizens, one that needed and deserved unique consideration and protection.

Twice elected to the Cámara de Diputados and long-time leader of the Corporación Araucana, Coñuepán's support had helped return Carlos Ibañez del Campo to the presidency in 1952 after a twenty-year hiatus. Upon his election, Ibañez first rewarded Coñuepán with a cabinet-level appointment as the Minister of Land and Colonization, but Coñuepán and the Corporación had lobbied for the creation of an office dedicated to the protection of indígenas, in one form or another, since even before his speech at the Patzcuaro Conference in 1940. So in 1953, as part of a broad administrative reorganization of the federal government, Ibañez created the Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. Ibañez chose Coñuepán to lead the new agency. As the Director of DASIN, Coñuepán achieved some success using his post to protect the rights of
Mapuche during the time Ibañez was in office. But ultimately, his accomplishments did not outlast his tenure. As political winds shifted, Mapuche deputies were swept from office in the 1958 congressional elections at the same time Jorge Alessandri succeeded Ibañez as President, and afterward a new generation of Mapuche leaders would seek political advantage by allying with the left to attempt more radical reforms and bring about a new political order.

This chapter examines the work of Venancio Coñuepán as the Director of DASIN. As a historical episode, the mid-1950s represents a unique moment in the twentieth century history of Mapuche-state relations and a distinct form of indigenismo, led not by white urban intellectuals but rather by indigenous leaders.530 Despite relatively weak ties to transnational indigenista projects, DASIN’s work was consistent with ideas circulating through that network, and therefore its successes and failures ought to be considered in the light of that broader transnational context. In addition, this chapter shows that DASIN represents a material form of indigenismo, consistent with economic themes of development and dependency circulating throughout the Americas, but largely distinct from other aspects of the indigenista discourse that emphasized culture and integrated development.

In order to evaluate DASIN as an indigenista project and understand Coñuepán’s leadership of the agency, I first introduce his life, background and career. Following that, I explain the political environment that led to Ibañez’s election in 1952, and discuss Coñuepán’s leadership of the Ministry of Land and

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530 This characterization follows the one established by Giraudo, 2016.
Colonization. Then I explore the reorganization of the federal government that coincided with the creation of DASIN in order to build context around the political environment in which it operated. I next turn to study the actual work that DASIN carried out during Coñuepán’s tenure as the agency’s Director, specifically as it related to Coñuepán’s role as an interlocutor in land claims and disputes, and his interactions with various government officials. I examine the forestry industry in greater detail, using the case of the Comunidad Bernardo Ñanco as an example, because it received significant coverage in the regional and national press and led to changes in the way DASIN approved contracts between Chilean companies and Mapuche communities. I show that the government’s goals for developing the forestry industry continued a pattern of colonial incursions onto indigenous lands and provide an example that explains the materialist orientation of DASIN. Finally, the complicated and frustrating work of DASIN is evaluated as an indigenista project, with special emphasis given to ways in which transnational connections can be seen in the work of DASIN and the Ministry of Land and Colonization during the 1950s. The chapter concludes by examining Coñuepán’s role supervising the Indian Courts, a significant part of his role as Director, but one that led to persistent frustration and conflict with the judges and courts he was tasked with overseeing.

**Biography and Political Context**

Born in Cautín Province in 1905, Venancio Coñuepán received his formal education at the same schools that Manuel Aburto and Manuel Manquilef had attended during their early years – first the Anglican mission school and then Liceo
Coñuepán had attained some wealth and success by the age of twenty-five working for the Ford automobile company in Temuco. In the late 1920s he rose to prominence within the Sociedad Caupolicán, becoming its secretary in 1929 and president in 1931. “Relying on his personal experience and that of other merchant leaders, he proposed that the Mapuche win equality within Chilean society through economic success.”

Coñuepán’s rise to prominence derived from at least three major factors. First, and principal among them, was his family history and personal qualities that established him as a ñizol longko, or “prominent chief.” Within traditional Mapuche society, the political power of longkos was not equal, and derived from many factors, including the size and significance of their kinship network, ability to mobilize forces in times of war, and wealth. Venancio descended from a prominent family of Mapuche longkos and his lineage could be traced back to famous chiefs who allied with Chilean patriot creole forces during the war for independence and also the Chilean army during the Pacification. In addition, the wealth displayed by his family’s large reduccion near Temuco and the income from his career enabled him to dress well, drive an automobile in an era when few Mapuche could afford one, and publicly display generosity to friends and acquaintances. His education and personal abilities also made him an excellent public speaker, and one who could

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531 Foerster and Montecino, pp. 30-32.
532 Albó, p. 818.
deliver his message to both Chilean and Mapuche audiences, as he often did in bilingual speeches.533

Leveraging those personal characteristics, Coñuepán’s success also resulted from his ability to mobilize a substantial ethnic Mapuche political base through the consolidated capacity of the movement’s major organizations under the umbrella of the Corporación Araucana.534 Building on the success of Mapuche mobilization that caused President Ibañez del Campo to soften his program of indigenous land division during his first presidency (1927-1931) Coñuepán sought increased collaboration between Mapuche organizations in the 1930s. Ultimately, those efforts led to the creation of the Corporación Araucana in 1938. As discussed in chapters one and two, Coñuepán assumed leadership of the Corporación after its formation in 1938, having worked for nearly ten years to grow an alliance between the major Mapuche organizations. Although the Corporación originally functioned as an umbrella group that allowed its constituent organizations autonomy to pursue their own agendas and political stances, by the 1950s its influence had increased and the Corporación began to function more like a political party, although he was formally a member of several other conservative political parties in that era.535

During the 1940s, Coñuepán strategically crafted political alliances with the conservative sectors of Chilean politics, which held the most sway in the rural south, resulting in electoral success. The Corporación supported Mapuche leaders in their

534 Ancan, p. 211.
535 Albó, p. 818.
bids for elected office and generated broad Mapuche support for conservative political factions. Coñupán was elected to the Cámara de Diputados representing the Partido Alianza Popular Libertadora (Popular Freedom Alliance Party) in 1945, the Conservative Party in 1949, and then again in 1965 following political appointments during the Ibañez and Alessandri administrations. His electoral success simply would not have been possible at that time if Mapuche leaders had positioned themselves elsewhere on the political spectrum, according to former Corporación Secretary and Inspector of Indigenous Affairs, Carlos Huentequeo.

The Conservative Party was the most powerful in our (region)...so if we wanted to make an allegiance, how could we go to the Socialist Party in that era, or to the Communist Party? They had no power here...so we aligned ourselves with those who had the most power, to achieve something with that power...and that is what our people never understood.536

Although Carlos Ibañez was not officially a member of the Conservative Party, his success in the 1952 presidential election stemmed from his vague representation of conservative interests, combined with electoral frustration with partisan political coalitions and twelve years of Radical Party control since Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Popular Front victory in 1938.

During the administrations of Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941), Juan Antonio Rios (1942-1946) and Gabriel Gonzalez Videla (1946-1952), the Chilean economy struggled to effectively carry out import substitution development schemes, and the people suffered under high rates of inflation that accompanied deficit spending by the government. In the 1952 election, Ibañez was able to leverage the people’s frustration with economic stagnation and their disenchantment with partisan

536 Ancan, p. 213.
political bickering by establishing himself as a candidate who was “above petty politics.” In addition, he promised to rein in government spending and address the country’s development goals by reforming state-owned industrial enterprises and government lending practices. Although his platform was generally conservative, he resisted strict ideological classification, and received electoral support from across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, Ibañez’s broad and nondescript populist appeal was built upon his political legacy that spanned a generation.537

As a result of the election of 1952, Carlos Ibañez del Campo was returned to the presidency after a long and storied thirty-year career in Chilean politics. During his first presidency he had been a driving force behind the Ley Indígena 1.469 of 1927 that made the subdivision of indigenous communal landholdings much easier, and also persecuted Manuel Aburto and his Federación Araucana. But following the ascent of the Corporación Araucana under Coñuepán’s leadership, Ibañez rewarded Venancio for his support. Following an overwhelming victory at the polls, Ibañez named Coñuepán Minister of Land and Colonization, an important position for a Mapuche politician to occupy given the long legacy of land fraud and usurpation associated with the colonization of southern Chile. On the fifteenth of November, 1952, Coñuepán wrote to the President of the Cámara de Diputados to inform him

that he had accepted the appointment, and thank him for his support during his time as a Deputy.\footnote{538 Venancio Coñuepán to President of Cámara, Nov. 15, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3739.}

Coñuepán attempted to use his position as Minister of Land and Colonization to bring together many branches of government for the benefit of the Mapuche people and the problems they faced. Sometimes those efforts were relatively small and came about as reactions to specific problems or grievances. But as Minister he was also responsible for representing many other interests, including those of non-Mapuche indigenous peoples, Euro-Chilean citizens and state-owned property. Although Coñuepán held the post for less than six months, his time as Minister of Land and Colonization helped him learn how to navigate overlapping state bureaucracies and allowed him to expand his professional network within the government, and even in some cases outside of Chile.

While serving as Minister in 1953, Coñuepán proposed projects to construct houses, study soil erosion, the effects of forestry on indígenas and expropriate land from large fondos for redistribution to smallholders. He boldly requested the assistance of his fellow ministers for those efforts. “These are not expenses, but create wealth for the state and help solve a variety of social problems,” he wrote in one such request.\footnote{539 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Finance, Nov. 24, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3740.} In 1952, the Ministry of National Defense requested information from Land and Colonization about the possibility of establishing an experimental agricultural station to carry out reforestation on Isla de Pascua. That proposal included the sum of 500,000 pesos to be allocated for material assistance
to indigenous islanders. Later, in January 1953, Coñuepán allocated 300,000 pesos to provide food and supplies to fifty soldiers who were working on a forestation project in the Dunes of Chanco in the Maule region (just north of the Araucanía) over a ten-month period. In another collaborative effort, Coñuepán appointed Jacques Chonchol, an agronomist who later became Minister of Agriculture during the presidency of Salvador Allende, to lead a commission studying ways that the armed forces could contribute to public works projects. In other instances Coñuepán’s schemes constituted grander projects, like the request he made of the Minister of Housing for the large sum of 57 million pesos. While many of these efforts were intended to benefit non-Mapuche Chileans, even as Minister, Coñuepán attempted to use his influence to aid the advancement of his people.

In many instances he found support for those efforts from officials in other branches of government. Early in his tenure as Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán reached out to the Director General of Internal Taxation to request the suspension of land seizures from indigenous peasants due to outstanding tax debts. He proposed that in order to solve a “grave social problem,” those smallholders should have their back taxes and outstanding debts cancelled. He blamed their inability to pay on their extreme poverty, lack of farming tools, exhausted soil and

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540 Carlos del Río to Venancio Coñuepán, Nov. 25, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3740. It is worth noting that those indigenous islanders were not ethnically Mapuche.
even “ignorance and lack of culture.” In some cases, settlement and division of indigenous landholdings resulted from the need to pay back taxes, but in other instances it led to tax and debt relief, as in the case of Alberto and Carlos Chihuailaf Railef in November of 1952. Again in January of 1953, Coñuepán requested tax and debt relief for other “small indigenous farmers.” He argued that it was the President’s wish that agricultural production be stimulated and seizing their land would have the opposite effect.

Under Coñuepán’s leadership, local and regional officials delivered grievances to the Ministry of Land and Colonization. That was the case of a correspondence in February of 1953, following a large public meeting presided over by local officials the southern town of La Unión, in Ranco Province. Interestingly, the letter was addressed to the President of the Republic, and laid out demands to the Ministry of Land and Colonization as well as six other ministries. But Land and Colonization was listed first, and Venancio Coñuepán was the only minister addressed by name and of whom the complainants demanded a personal visit. Their request illustrates the importance of Land and Colonization in the rural and agricultural south, and also the significance of Coñuepán’s ethnic identity in his post as Minister.

543 Venancio Coñuepán to Director General of Internal Taxation, Nov. 14, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3739.
544 Venancio Coñuepán to Carlos del Río, Nov. 17, 1952; Venancio Coñuepán to President of Cámara, Nov. 26, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3739; 3740.
546 Alejandro Pozo and Norberto Wehrt to President of Chile, Feb. 17, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3840
Coñuepán also fielded complaints from indígenas about various types of prejudicial or discriminatory treatment, such as insults and personal attacks. In November of 1952, while serving as Minister, the president and secretary of the regional headquarters of the Corporación Araucana in Malleco registered such a complaint.\textsuperscript{547} Their correspondence indicated that Coñuepán’s position within the government engendered more direct access to state authority for Mapuche organizations, especially those with which Coñuepán had been personally affiliated. In many cases, Coñuepán or his subsecretaries would forward those complaints to the Carabineros.\textsuperscript{548}

As Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán also had opportunities to extend his reach outside of the Chilean government by contributing to international aid and development efforts. Throughout the 1950s, various branches of the Chilean national government participated in efforts to improve conditions for rural peasants by cooperating with international organizations and foreign governments. Those interactions made clear that Chileans were participating in transnational discourses on a variety of subjects, and several that pertained directly to indígenas. But it is striking is how rarely those peasants are referred to, or given special consideration, as indígenas.

In September of 1951, José Ramón Astorga, an Inspector working for the Ministry of Land and Colonization, participated in a conference on land tenure in the Americas at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Nowhere in his paper does he

\textsuperscript{547} Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Justice, Nov. 15, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3739.

reference indigenous issues as relevant to land tenure questions in Chile. In June of 1953, the Minister of Education wrote to the Ministry of Exterior Relations requesting passports and visas for five primary school teachers to travel to Patzcuaro, Mexico to attend training provided by CREFAL, an institution organized under the auspices of UNESCO to provide training to teachers in rural settings. In that communication, no mention of where the teachers were to work or what ethnic identity they claimed was identified.

It was apparent, however that in the context of the Cold War, the United States was calling for agrarian reform in countries where communist elements threatened the peace and stability of the region. Pasted into the records of the Ministry of National Property is an article from El Mercurio dated December 1, 1951, in which U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the argument that such action by developing countries could forestall communist uprisings. In addition, General Ramón Cañas Montalva of the Panamerican Institute of Geography and History, the indigenista who had assisted Lipschütz’s team during his Tierra del Fuego mission and later became president of the Chilean Indigenista Institute, communicated with Coñuepán in January of 1953, asking for his cooperation with studies they were conducting. Montalva was bringing a team to Chile later that month to assess the country’s natural resources and asked for the Ministry’s support, suggestions and cooperation in their work. In his letter introducing the team, he referenced the

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549 Documents related to José Ramón Astorga’s attendance at land tenure conference, Sep. 1951. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3830.
importance of their work to improving the health and livelihood of working classes, but not peasant farmers or Indians. That characterization is consistent with the priority of stimulating economic development on an industrial scale, and the shift from integrated development projects to targeted economic development that was a dominant trend in the post-War era.

Yet as Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán’s participation in some inter-American dialogues related to agriculture and rural development began to specifically mention indigenous land tenure. In April of 1953, the Director General of the Ministry wrote to the judges presiding over Indian Courts in Pitrufquén and Temuco to request data about indigenous land holdings and agricultural challenges in preparation for a “Seminar on Latin American Indians.” The judges wrote back with fairly detailed statistics on population and hectares under cultivation, indicating that the main problems faced by Indians stemmed from excessive division and exploitation of land and the degradation of soils that resulted from it. However, this interaction took place between the Ministry and two judges under its charge, rather than scientists or technicians who seemed to dominate conversations about rational management of national resources to the exclusion of indigenous peoples.

Thus we can see that indigenous identity tended not to be broadly referenced in inter-ministry or international correspondence, but was more frequently referenced in dialogues within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. That

552 Ramóne Cañas Montalva to Venancio Coñuepán, Jan. 23, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3884.
553 Dir. Gen. Land and Colonization to Juez de Indios, Pitrufquén, Apr. 28, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3840
recognition leads us to conclude that debates about the welfare of peasants in the
countryside, as well as those pertaining to urban migration and economic
development, often neglected to address problems as “indigenous.” Instead, they
glossed over racial and ethnic divisions within Chilean society. Coñuepán recognized
that tendency, and for that reason fought hard for the creation of an official
government agency dedicated to helping indigenous Chileans, and specifically the
large population of Mapuche in the rural south. Within six months of his
appointment as Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán would get the chance
to lead the newly created Office of Indigenous Affairs. In that role he would be able
to expand his efforts to problems faced by his people, and in doing so he would
continue to collaborate with other ministries on a variety of projects, although his
efforts to connect to the broader transnational indigenista network were stymied.

**Government Reorganization of 1953**

In the first year of his presidency Ibañez undertook a substantial
reorganization of the government. In order to carry out his campaign promises of
fiscal responsibility and the reform of bloated and inefficient government agencies,
Ley 11.151 gave the president the power to reorganize all branches of the public
administration for a period of six months, and set the number of employees in each
agency.\(^{554}\) In addition, the law gave the president the power to set certain rents and
prices, as well as regulate interest rates and foreign investment for a period of one

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year. As Ibañez carried out the reform of public administration, a fair amount of chaos and uncertainty ensued on the part of public employees of the agencies being restructured. Over the next several months, numerous personnel had their positions eliminated, consolidated or altered. According to many documents from the Ministry of Land and Colonization, the restructuring of government made it impossible for the Ministry to continue carrying out the normal functions required of them. Capable administrators like Carlos del Rio, Director General of Land and Colonization, were replaced and others simply quit because they found it impossible to do their jobs with the time and resources allotted to them.

As they were appointed and began their duties, the new officers within the Ministry of Land and Colonization began to point out errors in the original plan. Only one week after assuming his charge, the new Director General of Land and Colonization Victor Chaves Dailhe wrote to the Minister to point out that the employees in his service were struggling with low morale and less productivity. Among other things, they did not have access to background information in the cases they were trying to resolve, and in some instances the superiors in the provincial offices were of lesser rank than those they supervised. Two months later, Chaves Dailhe wrote to the Minister again, suggesting that the President should promulgate a new decree law to rectify the mistakes made in the original

555 Ley 11.151, Art. 6.
557 Documents related to personnel and reorganization of 1953, Mar. 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3886.
reorganization scheme. He followed that with a letter detailing complaints against an incompetent boss in the Temuco office, who continued in his post despite his lack of experience and expertise, and numerous infractions of protocol. A year later, those problems persisted. In his letter of resignation in July of 1954, sub-secretary of the Ministry of Land and Colonization Francisco Javier Fermandois complained that the goals of the 1953 reorganization of the ministry had not been realized because it operated with insufficient funds and personnel. He added that he himself often worked outside of the regular business day to fulfill the duties of his position.

Soon after taking over as Minister of Land and Colonization, in January of 1953, Venancio Coñuepán requested a report from the general office of the Ministry of Land and Colonization. That report provided a number of suggestions for reorganizing the offices, personnel and their duties within the Ministry. At that time, there were no specific provisions for staff or functions dedicated to indigenous affairs. But on April 25, 1953, Ibañez promulgated Decree Law 56, which created the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas as a dependency within the Ministry of Land and Colonization. The law charged DASIN with carrying out the settlement and subdivision of indigenous communities, and liquidation of credit according to the provisions of Ley Indígena 4.111 of 1931. Because Ley 4.111 created the Indian

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559 Venancio Coñuepán to Victor Chaves Dailhe, Jun. 6, 1956. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3887.
561 Carlos del Río to Venancio Coñuepán, Jan. 24, 27, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3884.
Courts as a mechanism for carrying out those tasks, Decree 56 effectively placed DASIN in charge of those courts. The agency would be staffed with a total of five employees, including one director and one attorney. In addition, Decree 56 gave DASIN the power to “supervise the rational economic exploitation of agricultural lands” and “establish cooperatives, organizations or associations of an economic character” to carry out that supervision.\(^{562}\) Although simply stated in a one-page decree, those powers were for the first time placed solely in the hands of an indigenous representative, and for Coñuepán it must have seemed like the most significant accomplishment for his people in a generation, at least since the Ley Indígena 1.469 was reformed in 1931.

Coñuepán began his tenure as Director of DASIN with great optimism and vibrant energy. Although headquartered in Santiago, he began making weekly trips to the south and for a time spent Friday through Monday in Temuco, only returning to the offices in Santiago midweek.\(^{563}\) That schedule enabled him to visit the courts, judges and advocates who worked under him in the new bureaucracy. In the field, he endeavored to meet personally with indígenas who sought his help and advice and to remain available for consultation. However, once in the role of Director, Coñuepán struggled to lead an office with a poorly defined mission, shortages of staff and resources, all the while meeting resistance from entrenched interests in the south.

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More than a year after its creation, the functions of DASIN were still being worked out, and Coñuepán found it necessary to delineate the exact role of the office and himself as its Director. In a three-page letter to the new Minister of Land and Colonization, he sorted through apparent contradictions in indigenous law and overlapping roles for DASIN and the Juzgados de Indios under its authority. He went on to characterize the role of DASIN as having a “protectionist orientation,” and argued that such was the intent of President Ibañez when he created it, “because on many occasions (Ibañez) publicly demonstrated his favor for the rights of indígenas, in his first administration and the current one, in a way that indígenas have always had faith in his integrity, patriotism and spirit of justice.” In that way Coñuepán constructed Ibañez as a defender of Indians, the way he had done when he campaigned for him in 1952, “comparing him to Franklin Roosevelt and Mexico’s Lázaro Cárdenas.” Implicit in his statement is the argument that in order for Mapuche to integrate into the political system on a footing equal to white Chileans they required special protections to compensate for a legacy of injustice and ongoing discrimination.

At the national level, Coñuepán’s political clout stemmed from his ability to deliver Mapuche votes to Ibañez in presidential campaigns. Indeed, his ability to do so led directly to his ministerial appointment and also the creation of DASIN. But once in the role of Director, he had little political capital to exchange with other branches of government to get things done. On the occasion of the second

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564 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Aug. 29, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
565 Albó, p. 820.
anniversary of Carlos Ibañez del Campo’s election to the presidency, Coñuepán wrote a flattering tribute to the organizer of a committee to celebrate the anniversary, “by his help and valiant defense...he has always protected our natives, like no other president of Chile has done.” Although he regretted that DASIN could not play a more central role in the celebration given the shortage of time and funds, he did promise to attend along with the Mapuche Diputados Esteban Romero and José Cayupi, and a delegation from the Corporación Araucana.

The Role of DASIN within the State

A large part of Coñuepán’s work in government, first as a Deputy, then as a Minister and ultimately as Director of DASIN, included serving as an interlocutor between individual Mapuche complainants and various branches of the government. The creation of the Office of Indigenous Affairs institutionalized that role, which testified to the trust and credibility he maintained with those he served, and also the fact that indígenas had experienced difficulty having their grievances addressed by the courts and other officials that were supposed to resolve their disputes. That work required his presence in the south, so by October 1953

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Coñuepán requested to close the office in Santiago on Mondays and Fridays, so he could work in Temuco over the long weekend.569

Coñuepán filed weekly reports that detailed the work completed in the DASIN office, which provide insight into the goals and challenges of the agency and his work.570 At the end of the year, Coñuepán submitted an annual report, detailing the agency’s accomplishments and outlining goals for the future. The first of those, submitted in March of 1955, summarized the number and types of communications sent and general schedule of meetings held. It also indicated the type of work undertaken: awarding grants to indigenous students, working to protect indigenous property (especially forests), facilitating the construction of schools, houses and roads, and awarding 55 million pesos in loans for indigenous agricultural efforts. He summarized the work of the various Juzgados de Indios under his jurisdiction. The future plans that Coñuepán identified were ambitious and seemed to require more funds than were imminently available. Coñuepán noted in closing that the important work of the office was hampered by a shortage of personnel and a lack of funds.571

Although his judicial appointments had to be approved by the Minister and President, Coñuepán appointed some personnel directly, for example the Inspectors of Indigenous Affairs.572 That was a new position within the Ministry, and the primary role of the Inspectors was to address land problems and intervene on

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570 Venancio Coñuepán, letters sent Oct.-Nov. 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libros 3894-3897.
572 Venancio Coñuepán to Controller, Oct. 9, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3894.
Indians’ behalf in credit issues with the Agricultural Credit Fund.573 As the Office undertook its work, requests for the appointment of more inspectors were regularly made. In many cases those came attached to other requests, such as in the letter sent to Coñuepán by L. Amaza and J. Cheuquihue in October of 1953. Their letter indicates they had also communicated their request to Esteban Romero as a Diputado representing them and also the President of the Corporación Araucana.574 Those communications show how institutionalized this cadre of Mapuche leaders had become, and how their official roles overlapped with their personal connections and Mapuche identity.

Much of Coñuepán’s correspondence in the first years of DASIN involved receiving and forwarding complaints and requests that indígenas in the south sent him. In June of 1954 he reached out to the Juez de Indios (Indian Court Judge) in Pitrufquén to bring a halt to some logging activity that was unsanctioned.575 He wrote to an official at the National Archives to request a copy of a 1934 Decree Law on behalf of a community who needed it to protect their land.576 Coñuepán also sent two letters to the Director General of Primary Education in the Ministry of Education, first to ask for clarification as to why a request to found a new school had been denied, then to forward a complaint against a teacher who was accused of

trying to usurp land from the comuneros. Coñuepán also used his office to keep tabs on ongoing legal cases, as in the case of Andrés Huaiquimil, where he simply requested an update. In other instances, Coñuepán’s interventions seemed to take on more of a tone of requesting or even dictating certain actions. In the case of Maria Cayupi Neculman, he suggested in a pretty direct way that the judge should evict the offending party. While he had the authority to supervise and manage the courts, telling a judge how to rule would almost certainly have been perceived as overstepping his authority.

Coñuepán regularly received complaints about unjust legal action and requests for legal help. In some cases he simply forwarded the complaint to the appropriate person. In the case of Alejandro Hueichaqueo, who was being repeatedly harassed through the courts, Coñuepán forwarded his telegram to the Juez de Indios in Temuco. In other instances he contacted judges and other officials personally and tried to move things along. When he learned that someone was trying to collect taxes unjustly from Indians in Ranquihue, he wrote the Director General of Internal Taxation to ask him to investigate. In other instances, requests were formulated by groups or communities and sent to Coñuepán, whom they viewed as a representative. He would then forward the requests to the

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appropriate officials in government. In May of 1954, Coñuepán wrote to the Agricultural Department of the Bank of State to request the addition of a staff person in the Traiguén office dedicated to servicing credit to indigenous peasants. In that instance, Coñuepán was forwarding a request from a group of small farmers in the area of Paillahue, who were seeking to increase yields and improve their land.\footnote{Venancio Coñuepán to Bank of Chile, May 28, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4024.}

The next letter he sent (on the same day) was to an official in the Ministry of Education, requesting assistance with a school matter for a group of parents, also from Paillahue.\footnote{Venancio Coñuepán to Juez de Indios, Temuco, May 28, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4024.} Although the original requests that he forwarded are not included in the record, they fit a pattern of indígenas using Coñuepán and DASIN as advocates and go-betweens with the state.

Coñuepán would also attempt to use his influence within the government to encourage officials in positions of specific authority to take particular action. On many occasions Coñuepán brought abuses by court officials directly to the Minister’s attention.\footnote{Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Sep. 4, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.} In 1955, he lobbied the Minister of Land and Colonization to curtail the practice of using the courts to harass Indians through litigation, which caused “recurring distress and expense for members of the community.”\footnote{Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, May 28, 1955. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4176.} In addition, over the years the actual jurisdictional boundaries of Juzgados de Indios were changed. Sometimes those changes were undertaken to make their function more efficient in keeping with natural geographic considerations, which was the
explicit reason given by the Director General in 1952.\textsuperscript{586} However, that practice also presented opportunities to manipulate outcomes and increase or decrease the authority of particular agents. Coñuepán’s work as Director was also hampered by interpersonal conflicts and the failure of some within the courts to adequately carry out their charge to protect indígenas under their jurisdiction.

Coñuepán and the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas were not always able to fix the broken state apparatuses that led to the loss of indigenous land and the ongoing frustration of indígenas seeking restitution through the courts and the government. In 1958, as the Ibañez government was drawing to a close, the account of Doña Rosa Licopan Neculqueo bore witness to that reality. Doña Rosa had travelled all the way to Santiago to request an audience with Coñuepán and the Minister of Land and Colonization personally. In April, Lorenzo Lemunguier, another Mapuche politician and representative of the Corporación who was at the time serving as Acting Director of DASIN, wrote to the Juez de Indios of Temuco requesting that he take action and find a permanent resolution to her case.\textsuperscript{587}

Coñuepán’s intercessions extended to very personal and peculiar needs of his indigenous constituents. In September of 1954 he responded to a complaint forwarded to him by the mayor of the small town of Galvarino by requesting that the director of a psychiatric hospital admit the indígena Manuel Quintriqueo Nahuelñir. He claimed that Quintriqueo’s “freedom in this state constitutes a danger to the people,” and that “in my role as Director of Asuntos Indígenas, I have the obligation

\textsuperscript{586} Carlos del Rio to Minister of Land and Colonization, Nov. 1952-Feb. 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libros 3739, 3844
\textsuperscript{587} Lorenzo Lemunguier to Juez de Indios, Temuco, Apr. 24, 1958. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4520.
to find a solution to this problem." That type of personal care and intervention seems to be what Coñuepán did best in his role as Director of DASIN. He was clearly very invested in it, often working all weekend long to reach out and remain personally accessible to indígenas in the south. Coñuepán’s style of political patronage was indicative of the era in which he operated, and also Mapuche traditions of political leadership inherent to the role of the longko.

Of the personal requests for assistance that he received, land claims and disputes consumed much of Coñuepán’s time at DASIN. Oftentimes, individuals would solicit the aid of the office in prompting action from the Juzgado, which otherwise was slow to act. Interventions often consisted of referring complainants to other branches of government or other offices within the Ministry to stimulate a response, as was the case with Pedro Morales, who had been attempting to obtain redress for ten years following the division of his community in 1940-41. After the reorganization of 1953, DASIN took over much of that work. It seems that Coñuepán thought his role as Director of DASIN would elevate and streamline those efforts. However, in some ways it may have actually served to cordon them off and marginalize his effectiveness. Even though some Mapuche lands had been illegally absorbed into other properties, and though all conditions for the expropriation of those plots were met, the actual carrying out of the restitution was often held up by lack of funds available from the state to compensate those who had usurped the

588 Venancio Coñuepán to Dir. Psychiatric Hospital, Sep. 25, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
589 Carlos del Río to Juzgado de Indios, Temuco, Nov. 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3739.
land in the first place.⁵⁹¹ For example, in order to bring about the expropriation of land, Coñuepán had to request action from the Ministry of Land and Colonization.⁵⁹² Ministers and their Directors General did not have the protection of indigenous interests as their top priority, rather they represented a broad variety of interests, as evidenced by Coñuepán’s own work when he was Minister.

Another significant aspect of Coñuepán’s career was his effort to reform the way in which Mapuche farmers borrowed money. As far back as the 1930s he had created and promoted an indigenous credit fund under the auspices of the Sociedad Caupolicán. The fund facilitated the lending of money between Mapuche.⁵⁹³ Working within the Ministry of Land and Colonization in the 1950s, he interfaced with creditors and tax collectors to ease the burden and diminish consequences of debt peonage.⁵⁹⁴ To an extent, Coñuepán’s efforts to reform lending practices to Mapuche smallholders were also supported by the Ministry of Land and Colonization. In January of 1955, the Minister authorized the vice-president of the State Bank to release 30 million pesos in loans to indígenas to support the “organization of indigenous property.”⁵⁹⁵ Although it is not clear toward what purposes those loans were intended, or whether they enabled communities to keep their lands together or facilitated the division of community land, Coñuepán did find support for some of his efforts from the Ministers under whom he worked.

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⁵⁹¹ Chief Counsel, Ministry of Land and Colonization to Venancio Coñuepán, Mar. 9, 1955. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4173.
⁵⁹² Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, May 12, 1955.
⁵⁹³ Albó, 818.
Coñuepán also communicated regularly with the legal department of the Ministry of Land and Colonization. In early 1954, he requested a legal opinion from the General Counsel on the question of whether or not indígenas could form and/or join agricultural cooperatives, in light of the special protection guaranteed them by the Ley Indígena of 1931. In May, he received a response, stating that yes they could indeed form and/or join cooperatives. Importantly, they could also borrow against their land, counsel advised, so long as they were constituted as limited liability partnerships. Proscriptions on dividing communally owned land established by the 1931 law made unlimited liability partnerships invalid, because land could not be sold or forfeited to pay off debts incurred. Using this line of argument, Counsel affirmed the constitutional equality of indígenas as individual citizens, and neither afforded them special consideration nor special restrictions stemming from their ethnic identity.  

In order to proactively cultivate relationships with leaders in other branches of government, Coñuepán utilized personal connections and relationships developed during his time as an elected official. In April of 1954, he wrote a lengthy and flattering note to Jorge Ardiles Galdames, Director General of the Carabineros, in celebration of the twenty-seventh anniversary of that institution, in which he referenced their long friendship. The following month, Coñuepán wrote Ardiles again, that time to request the appointment of "four men of my race" who wished to

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596 Venancio Coñuepán correspondence with Chief Counsel, Minister of Land and Colonization, May 10, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4023.
join the Carabineros, making explicit reference to their ethnic identity.598 A week later he wrote again, apologizing profusely for the imposition, acknowledging that “although this constantly asking you to fill vacancies in the Carabineros with men of my race is bordering on nonsense, I have no choice but to continue in order to meet the requests of those who ask, and meanwhile the General Office of the Carabineros continues to keep me in its good graces.”599 In June, he sent a fourth request, once again referencing their friendship and the magnanimous gesture that Ardiles’s assistance demonstrated.600 At least some of those requests seem to have been granted, because later in the year he reached out to Ardiles again to relay a transfer request for the Carabineño Domingo Ñanco Huenuhueque from that officer’s father.601

Coñuepán also had the power to grant favors directly. He was involved in securing a property in Loncoche to build quarters for the Carabineros, and then reached out to the Mayor of Loncoche, don Arturo Coñuepán (relation unknown), letting him know that the Minister of Public Works was about to expropriate a parcel there for that purpose.602 He lent his support to a variety of development efforts, including the electrification of the city of Loncoche.603 In November of 1953,

602 Venancio Coñuepán to Arturo Coñuepán, Sep. 8, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
603 Venancio Coñuepán to Governor of Loncoche, Oct. 29, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro
Coñuepán forwarded a request for a subsidy from the director of a school in Puifú directly to the Minister of Education. He noted in his letter that the director asked Coñuepán to write before sending his own request, “so that (the request) would be executed as quickly as possible.” In late 1959, Coñuepán sent several more letters to the Minister of Education, requesting that property be leased to an indigenous community for a school, and that a school in Temuco be subsidized by the Ministry of Education.

Coñuepán also used DASIN to check the power of other branches of the federal government where indígenas were concerned. In September of 1956, he wrote to the Ministry of Public Works to request background documents concerning the seizure of land from a Mapuche community for the construction of a railroad. More significantly, he regularly received complaints about abuse of power on the part of Carabineros in the south. In addition to making many requests of his friend Jorge Ardiles Galdames for the appointment of indigenous Carabineros, Coñuepán also repeatedly asked him to intervene in an ongoing pattern of abuse. Reporting such a case in November of 1954, Coñuepán added,

“I have been made aware of many cases such as these, committed against indigenous citizens, by functionaries who have not upheld the honorable and noble mission of the Carabineros de Chile, that correspond to the carrying out of life in our country. For those reasons I ask one more time, Mr. Director, take appropriate actions...instruct your people in the southern provinces to give greater consideration to the modest indigenous peasants, who are often maligned and mistreated without any cause.”

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In some instances, reports of such mistreatment came to Coñuepán directly and personally. At other times he acted upon more general and public information, for example sending Aldines a newspaper clipping detailing alleged abuses.607

In addition to ongoing social tensions between indígenas and Euro-Chileans in the south, DASIN struggled with the perennial problems related to the meager funds allocated to sustain their operations. Although the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas cooperated with many other officials in the execution of its duties, the overlapping authority and expenses seemed to regularly impede efficient operations. Following the creation of DASIN, employees of the office loaned their services to other branches of government, which had to be reported to the Treasury, presumably so their wages and expenses could be billed out. For example, in October of 1953 four Inspectors were loaned to the Juzgados of Temuco and Pitrufquen.608 In May of 1954, Coñuepán wrote the Jueces de Indios in Temuco and Pitrufquén, informing them of several layoffs in their courts because DASIN did not have enough funds to pay their salaries.609 Shortages of vehicles, drivers and funds for maintenance and repairs also seem to be recurrent themes in Coñuepán’s requests.610

Regional agents also attempted to protect their meager budgets by billing travel costs back to DASIN. When duties carried an Inspector outside the jurisdiction of a particular court, judges would sometimes request that personnel be added or redistributed between courts. In August of 1953, the Director of the Office of National Land and Property Victor Chaves Dailhe formally asked the new Minister of Land and Colonization to order the return of a vehicle that Coñuepán had loaned to the Juzgado de Indios in Temuco. That request prompted Coñuepán to submit a lengthy letter justifying the Inspector’s need for a vehicle to his new boss, and pitting him against his former employee, Chaves Dailhe. Because DASIN’s jurisdiction extended into more aspects of indigenous life, Coñuepán’s role gave him influence into a broader array of options, for example advising judges on particular points of logging contracts. The development of the forestry industry in southern Chile provides a window into the relationship between Mapuche communities and state actors in the 1950s, and shows that DASIN created a unique opportunity to insert indigenous questions into broader narratives of economic development.

Forestry and the Bernardo Ñanco Community

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613 Victor Chaves Dailhe to Minister of Land and Colonization, Aup. 24, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3895.  
614 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Nov. 24, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3897.  
Historian Thomas Klubock has shown that “the spread of the North American conifer throughout southern Chile was largely the result of state-directed development programs and forestry policy before 1973.” As pine plantations penetrated the southern landscape, they also reshaped a complex system of social relations in the rural south, and although indigenous Mapuche were impacted directly, they were caught up in the transformation along with other sectors of society, including non-indigenous migrant laborers, squatters and *inquilinos* (resident estate laborers). Collectively, rural peasants viewed the incursions of the state and private landowners as part of a broader trend of injustice that had displaced and dispossessed them since the nineteenth century.\(^{616}\) Although the Ministry of Land and Colonization clearly played a role in the state’s broader development strategy, DASIN was positioned to check injustice against indigenous communities as the forestry industry grew.

In south-central Chile, forestry was a particularly important industry to the development of the national economy, and also one that disproportionately and negatively impacted Mapuche peasants. From the perspective of the state, forestry practices were conceived as questions of rational scientific exploitation, industry and national wealth. Despite the fact that the growth of privately owned tree plantations impacted Mapuche communities by detracting from their native cultural and material uses of forests as natural resources, and the fact that the land on which timber was harvested was sometimes owned by Mapuche communities, indigenous concerns and questions rarely entered the discourse. In July of 1953, the Chilean

\(^{616}\) Klubock, 2014, pp. 3-4.
Senate and Chamber of Deputies undertook a legal project to reform forestry laws. In the ten-page text of that law, indigenous lands and cultural impacts are not mentioned or considered.617

Forestry was also an issue that prompted collaboration between branches of the Chilean government and a substantial amount of international cooperation and consultation. The Chilean method of planting fast-growing trees that could be harvested quickly borrowed heavily from a North American model of industrial agriculture. Furthermore, most of the trees that were planted in southern Chile were Eucalyptus or Monterey Pine, species that consume large quantities of water and have significant impact on watersheds. They had the effect of drying up watersheds used by Mapuche farmers and other native species. Those effects led to problems with erosion and forest fires. As the Chilean state promoted that model of industrial development, they relied heavily on consultants from the north and cooperation with neighboring countries. For example, in December 1952, Argentine officials proposed a meeting of Chilean and Argentine forestry technicians to reach an “international agreement to combat forest fires” in Patagonia.618

As Minister of Land and Colonization, Coñuepán’s primary role was to determine the effectiveness of projects in developing forests as national wealth. In doing so, he consulted experts like agronomist Jacques Chonchol to determine the suitability of various projects. In April 1953, Chonchol wrote to advise that establishing a farming settlement in the Malleco Forest Reserve would be a terrible

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617 Message No. 2, addressed to Senado and Cámara. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3900.
mistake. First of all, the terrain was too hilly with poor soil, suitable only for trees, he explained. Secondly, neighboring inquilinos (some of whom would have claimed a Mapuche identity) had the practice of using the reserve for collecting piñones and firewood, and also grazing cattle and sheep there. The reserve was also part of the Bío Bío watershed, and therefore held the potential to disrupt the purity of water downstream, not to mention that it was isolated from markets by great distance and poor roads. In instances like this, even though the impact was not specifically identified as one that affected indígenas, Coñuepán was in a position to protect indigenous interests when they aligned with particular projects.

As Minister, Coñuepán found his authority largely sufficient to protect the interests of the state. In January of 1953 he asked the Director General to take administrative measures to stop Don Osvaldo Jarpa Bisquertt from unlawfully harvesting timber from state-owned land in Hueñivales. He instructed the Director General to contact the forestry agent in the region to intervene, and also to ask the Governor of Curacautín to use public force if necessary. At the same time he requested an appellate court in Santiago to intervene to stop the illegal logging. Two weeks later the Director General wrote back confirming that he had instructed the administrator of the forestry reserve to suspend forestry operations, pending the outcome of the legal case. However, as Director of DASIN he no longer had the

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619 Jacques Chonchol to Venancio Coñuepán, Apr. 5, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro3886.
620 Venancio Coñuepán to Governor of Curacautín, Jan. 6, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3883.
621 Carlos del Río to Venancio Coñuepán, Jan. 23, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3884.
authority of a member of the president’s cabinet, which made protecting the interests of indígenas more difficult.

Even though his overall authority had diminished in the transition from Minister to Director of DASIN, Coñuepán was able to more directly advocate for indígenas and protect their interests pertaining to a broader range of issues. Companies engaged in logging on indigenous lands often sought to manipulate the terms of agreements they had made with indigenous communities, sometimes by logging more land than they had contractually agreed to or by felling other species of trees. Coñuepán used DASIN to provide a check on that tendency, writing to remind officials “the appointment of inspectors and regulations...is the exclusive power of this office.”622 The case of the Bernardo Ñanco community provides an example that illustrates the power and limitations of Coñuepán’s role as Director of DASIN, and some of the strategies he employed to overcome them.

In 1947, the Comunidad Bernardo Ñanco signed a contract with the Fresard y Viñuela logging company, which allowed the latter to harvest old-growth timber on the community’s land.623 However, the firm soon began breaking terms in the contract by harvesting species that they were not supposed to and exploiting terrain that should have been off-limits. The timber firm’s activities created ecological problems with erosion and runoff, and the firm also tried to get away with paying the community less than they had agreed to in their contract. Although the troubles began while Coñuepán was still a Deputy, as Minister and then Director of DASIN he

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was able to insert himself into the conflict more directly. In addition, Coñuepán eventually succeeded in implementing new protocols for the awarding of forestry contracts on indigenous lands by instituting a public bidding process and requiring the approval of contracts and payment of monies to be funneled through DASIN.

The Ñanco case involved a broad public debate about the exploitation of Mapuche communities and preferential awarding of contracts, and can be viewed as a victory for Coñuepán and DASIN. While Coñuepán was the Minister of Land and Colonization, his Ministry worked through the courts to resolve the conflict. In November of 1952, Francisco Javier Fermandois, working as an attorney for the Juzgado de Indios of Victoria, wrote a brief for the Director General of the Ministry, outlining the intervention of the Supreme Court and a committee within the Chamber of Deputies that had evaluated the case. He offered assistance and collaboration between the Juzgado in Victoria and the Ministry to resolve the questions pertaining to the Fresard-Ñanco forestry contract.\(^624\)

After DASIN was created, a special investigative committee was formed to help settle the Fresard-Ñanco dispute. That commission met with representatives from both sides in September of 1953, but the session ended abruptly when the community claimed Fresard y Viñuela was out of compliance with their contract.\(^625\)

In addition, the courts held up payments to the community. In January of 1954, Coñuepán sent nine telegrams to the Juez de Indios in Temuco, requesting that 2

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\(^624\) Francisco Javier Fermandois to Dir. Gen, Ministry of Land and Colonization, Nov. 22, 1952. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3740

\(^625\) Special Commission for Indigenous Affairs to Minister of Land and Colonization, Oct. 6, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3894.
million pesos deposited by the logging company be dispersed to the community.\textsuperscript{626} Those efforts illustrate a series of systemic problems inherent to the process of developing indigenous lands for forestry. Primarily, those difficulties centered around the role of the Indian Courts, which were responsible for approving contracts and also receiving and dispersing funds.

As Director of DASIN, Coñuepán was in a position to reform the procedure due to the agency's role in overseeing the courts. He tried to establish a more transparent, public process for awarding logging contracts on indigenous lands, but his efforts attracted the attention of the regional press and the involvement of his former colleagues in the Cámara. Stemming from the difficulties made apparent through the Ñanco case, on August 20, 1954, Coñuepán published a call for bids in \textit{El Mercurio}, the nation's paper of record, for logging on a number of indigenous reducciones in the province of Malleco, including the Ñanco reducción. Then on the 26\textsuperscript{th} of August, a commission within the Cámara de Diputados instructed the Ministry of Land and Colonization to send it all the antecedent documentation associated with Coñuepán's solicitation. They claimed there were a number of problems with it, including the fact that the Ministry of Defense had not been consulted, that the lands in question were covered in snow and therefore impossible to survey in that season, and finally that the firm of Fresard y Viñuela had already been contracted to log the Ñanco community's land, a contract that Coñuepán

\textsuperscript{626} Venancio Coñuepán to Juez de Indios, Temuco, Jan. 4, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4020.
himself had approved.\textsuperscript{627} On August 31\textsuperscript{st}, \textit{El Diario Ilustrado} (a conservative Santiago newspaper) ran a story detailing Coñuepán’s public call for bids and the congressional commission investigating the procedures. The author challenged the validity of the process.\textsuperscript{628} On September 3\textsuperscript{rd} Coñuepán forwarded the requested documentation to the Minister of Land and Colonization and requested clarification on the appropriate next steps to take.\textsuperscript{629}

On September 7\textsuperscript{th} the Minister of Land and Colonization Mario Montero Schmidt wrote to the legal department of the Ministry, asking if he had the power to intervene in logging contracts and negate the contract. They responded that the Ministry did not have special powers to intervene on behalf of indigenous communities, only on public lands. However, intervention could be made by the Juzgados de Indios, but only in the normal course of the application process, which took place under their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{630} Curiously, later that month Coñuepán requested the sum of $4,128 pesos from the Juez de Indios in Temuco to pay for the advertisement he had run soliciting bids.\textsuperscript{631}

The case reached a favorable conclusion for Coñuepán and the Ñanco community in November of 1954, when the Juez de Indios in Temuco ruled that Fresard and Viñuela should pay an increased rate per unit of timber to the Ñanco community.

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\textsuperscript{627} Ernesto Araneda Rocha and Manuel Bart Herrera to Minister of Land and Colonization, Aug. 26, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
\textsuperscript{628} News clipping, \textit{Diario Ilustrado}, Aug. 32 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4029.
\textsuperscript{629} Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Sep. 3, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
\textsuperscript{630} Chief Council, Land and Colonization to Minister of Land and Colonization, Sep. 16, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
\textsuperscript{631} Venancio Coñuepán to Juez de Indios, Temuco, Sep. 23, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4027.
\end{footnotesize}
community. In his summary of the judge’s ruling, Minister Montero Schmidt congratulated Coñuepán, whose intervention “has come to put a final end to a whole class of abuses, giving indígenas a protection that they lacked and securing their well-being for the future. The Office of Indigenous Affairs has attained for the Indians of Ñanco, the use of five million pesos, which no one could have imagined.”

Following the court’s ruling, one of the bidders, Honorio Cortez Orrego, published a lengthy letter to the editor in El Diario Austral (a conservative newspaper in Temuco) claiming that the court had unjustly thrown out his bid and accepted a lower bid. However, in response to an inquiry by the Investigative Commission of Indigenous Affairs in the Cámara de Diputados, the judge explained that Cortez had attempted to “game the system” by bidding just a few centavos higher than the next highest bidder as a closing “discounted” bid. The judge also credited Coñuepán’s new strategy of advertising and implementing an “open bid” system for protecting the indigenous landholders’ rights.

Coñuepán’s intervention in the Ñanco community’s dispute with the Fresard and Viñuela logging company illustrates the existence of counter-currents within the mechanisms of state. Although the primary goal of state policy was to expand the production of agricultural commodities and thereby increase the nation’s wealth, Coñuepán used DASIN to check the irresponsible and unjust exploitation of

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633 Honorio Cortez Orrego to El Diario Austral, Sep. 6, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4029.
indigenous property. Although he was successful in bringing minor changes to the state’s process for evaluating and approving contracts for logging on indigenous lands, the overall expansion of the forestry industry had much greater and far-reaching effects of the ecology of southern Chile, and continues to impact Mapuche communities today. Since the return to democracy in 1992, the Mapuche movement has grown in strength and numbers, and opposition to forestry companies is a key point of contention within the movement. In particular, Mapuche activists frequently vandalize or destroy forestry trucks and other equipment. In seeking to curb that activity, the state has controversially applied harsh anti-terrorist legislation to prosecute Mapuche activists, and routine clashes between activists and Carabineros have led to several deaths, which then became rallying cries for indigenous leaders and activists.

**Evaluating DASIN as an Indigenista Project**

In the first and last decades of the twentieth century, indigenista and Indian-led efforts to valorize and promote indigenous culture and identity dominated discussions surrounding indigenous populations, but in the middle decades the discourse was primarily about economic development and formal political participation. The Chilean case roughly fits that pattern. Although cultural promotion was a lesser element of indigenous affairs in Chile in the 1950s, it was a feature of the discourse. For example, in 1955, Minister of Education Oscar Herrera Palacios helped the Rector of the University of Chile evaluate a collection of indigenous art offered for sale by a private individual. The Minister acted as a
middleman, facilitating an evaluation of the collection by Tomás Lago, Director of the Museum of Popular Art, and suggesting to the Rector that the university acquire the collection.\textsuperscript{635}

The creation of DASIN represented an attempt to institutionalize the protection of indigenous interests within the state. As that agency’s Director, Coñuepán continued to try and expand that institutional protection in a variety of ways. Although he used his office to promote Mapuche culture and art, unlike Manuel Aburto who pursued an agenda of cultural preservation as an end unto itself, Coñuepán tended to promote the commercialization of culture. In November of 1953, Coñuepán requested 150,000 pesos from the Minister of Land and Colonization for costs associated with filming and recording folklore at a “large Mapuche gathering” the following month.\textsuperscript{636} In October of 1954 Coñuepán sent a press release to sixteen radio stations announcing “the Trio Nahuelpangui, composed of indigenous guitarists and singers from Villarrica.”\textsuperscript{637}

Six months after the creation of the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, Coñuepán formally requested 5 million pesos for the creation of an Indigenous Institute. The Minister’s response is not recorded in the archive, but Coñuepán’s letter suggests that he anticipated the request would be approved. He mentioned a personal conversation they had and said that he wanted to announce the creation of

\textsuperscript{635} Oscar Herrera Palacios to Jan Gobez Millas, Feb. 10, 1955.
\textsuperscript{636} Venancio Coñuepán, weekly report, Nov. 28, 1953. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 3897.
\textsuperscript{637} Venancio Coñuepán to various radios stations, Oct. 7, 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4019.
the Chilean Indigenous Institute at a big meeting and celebration five days later. It is not entirely clear what the goal of that institution was to be. It is interesting to note that Coñuepán calls it an “indigenous” institute, rather than an “indigenista” institute. The distinction would not have been lost on him, and although he does not reference the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano in his request, Coñuepán certainly knew that the creation of a national indigenista organ was a criterion for participation in the III because it was established as such at the 1940 Patzcuaro conference, which he attended.

Coñuepán tried to continue formal participation in the transnational indigenista discourse, but his efforts were frustrated. In June of 1954, Coñuepán wrote the new Minister of Land and Colonization to let him know his plans for forming a delegation to attend the third III Congress in La Paz, Bolivia in August of 1954. Coñuepán noted that the previous Minister of Land and Colonization had authorized the trip and empowered the Director of DASIN to form the delegation. He went on to propose that he, in addition to Esteban Romero or José Cayupi as indigenous Diputados, should attend. Alfredo Lea Plaza, a lawyer and Diputado, and two Mapuche professors would round out the delegation. In closing, he indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would cover the expenses incurred. Three days later the Minister of Land and Colonization wrote directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to say that the Chilean delegation would have to decline the invitation because “consistent with the cost-saving policies introduced by the

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government, all types of commissions would be suspended for the current year.”

In that note, the author referenced four previous communications he had received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Combined with Coñuepán’s note on the subject, it seems that many parties were in favor of attending the conference, but that it was blocked at the last minute. It is unclear whether the reason given (austerity measures) were valid or simply an excuse. In the end, a group of IIC members did attend the 1954 La Paz Congreso, but apparently without the support of the state.

Despite Coñuepán’s efforts to support Mapuche interests through cultural means and international collaborative efforts, the primary mechanism by which he could most directly benefit his people remained the Juzgados de Indios. Consequently, Coñuepán focused much of his effort as Director of DASIN to the work of overseeing the courts. However, the Juzgados had existed for decades and so the bureaucratic structure within which they operated was well established and staffed with officials who were not necessarily inclined to embrace new leadership or a revised mission. Additionally, the courts had not been very effective in protecting indigenous interests and agents of the courts often contributed to problems through corruption, ineffectiveness and pressure brought to bear upon them by wealthy landowners in the rural south. It is not surprising, therefore, that Coñuepán struggled to overcome those legacies once supervision of the courts was transferred to DASIN’s authority.

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In many instances, official decrees were missing, incomplete or not officially recorded. In the case of Fundo Lumaco, an official decree was recognized as valid despite the original copy being lost and a facsimile being used in its place. In other cases, officials in the Juzgados de Indios were uncooperative, inefficient or incompetent. In July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Juez de Indios of Pitrufquen requesting that he send a file on a pending case that had either been lost or that the judge was delayed in sending. Coñuepán listed four complaints, including that he had been sent only one-fourth of the file, because the evidence had been folded in half and much of it was missing. That was apparently not his first request for the missing evidence. Other times official documents contradicted one another. In July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Juez de Indios in Temuco to ask for background information to help him reconcile two “certificates of settlement” that contradicted one another. In that instance, the indígena José Miguel Rapimán was trying to confirm the community in which his parents had been settled by examining the original títulos de merced, upon which the entire system of radicación was based. After decades of corruption and fraud, DASIN had dozens if not hundreds of cases to examine and try to resolve. In 1958, the Chief Counsel of the Ministry of Land and Colonization wrote to Coñuepán to inform him that he was recommending a twenty-year-old claim should be paid to the communities of Antonio Rapimán and José Gineo for mining operations that had been carried out on their land by the state.

642 Venancio Coñuepán to Controller General of Chile, Jul. 12, 1955. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4178.
railroad department since 1938. Delays, inaccuracies and other problems with official documentation upon which the courts based their decisions represented a tremendous barrier to their effectiveness.

The courts were also put to more nefarious purposes and were sometimes used to harass indígenas who had little understanding, resources or time to defend themselves in court. In September 1956, Coñuepán wrote directly to the Minister of Land and Colonization to ask him to instruct the Juez de Indios in Pitrufquén to dismiss a case in which an Indian was being harassed. Often, indígenas claimed to have received verbal instructions that later turned out to be false or misleading. In July of 1955, Coñuepán wrote to the Director of Internal Taxation to say that José Santos Colillanca Raipan had been told he did not owe any taxes, but later his land was seized for failure to pay taxes. In requesting a solution to this particular problem, Coñuepán refers to the problem as “maltreatment,” implying that it was intentional, and also claimed that many such cases existed. Coñuepán later requested that all such procedures be cleared through DASIN so that he and his staff could verify that the seizures were valid. Those actions fit the longstanding pattern of fraud and usurpation whereby white settlers in the region attempted to defraud indígenas by using the courts and government officials who were generally unsympathetic or outright corrupt.

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645 Chief Counsel, Ministry of Land and Colonization to Venancio Coñuepán, Mar. 18, 1958. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4520.
646 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization Sep. 6, 1956. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4303.
By 1958, it appears that Coñuepán’s ability to effectively manage DASIN and oversee the Juzgados had declined. In two separate communications, Chief Counsel for the Ministry of Land and Colonization wrote directly to the Minister, complaining first that vacancies in the Juzgados de Indios were allowed to remain open or filled with unqualified personnel and requesting that the Minister appoint qualified people to fill the vacancies, a function that would have previously been attended to by Coñuepán himself. In his second message, the Chief Counsel took aim at Coñuepán directly, asking the Minister to order the Director to visit and supervise the function of the Juzgados de Indios under his charge.

In November of 1959, after Jorge Alessandri succeeded Ibañez as President, Coñuepán was still using his platform as Director of DASIN to press the Minister of Land and Colonization for redress of indigenous grievances. Addressing a case of unjust eviction by a former prosecutor in the Juzgado de Indios, he noted that José Cayupi, the former Diputado, had carried the complaint directly to the President. In a separate instance, indígena Clorindo Ancavil Manqueo delivered a broad indictment of indigenous education directly to the new President of the Republic, which Coñuepán relayed to the Minister. In it, Ancavil claimed that resources for the adequate education of Mapuche were not available and that a number of primary school teachers had begun to agitate students and comuneros for “political

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651 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Nov. 20, 1959. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4618.
interests...provoking confusion and unrest among the rural indigenous population.”

By the late 1950s, Coñuepán was pushing back quite strongly against the Minister of Land and Colonization and the Alessandri government more broadly. In December of 1959, he wrote to the Minister, complaining that Decree number 1051 of October 2, 1959 lacked a clause that would return background files to the Juzgados from which they originated. Instead, files would be kept by the Ministry in Santiago, making it very difficult for the Juzgados to function efficiently and with full background knowledge of the disputes they were adjudicating. The loss or lack of antecedent information had hampered DASIN’s and the Juzgados’ ability to resolve old cases for Coñuepán’s entire tenure as Director.

Coñuepán was also fighting an uphill battle against the Juez de Indios in Temuco, Hugo Figueroa Figueroa. On December 19, he penned two messages, the first to Figueroa directly, nullifying a logging contract with the Comunidad Huaiquillán, which he had the power to do as Director of DASIN. The second missive, sent to the Minister of Land and Colonization, levied a series of charges against Figueroa, ranging from the arbitrary administration of justice, to

652 Venancio Coñuepán to Minister of Land and Colonization, Nov. 20, 1959. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4618.
654 Chief Counsel, Ministry of Land and Colonization to Venancio Coñuepán, May 3. 1954. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4023. By way of example, that was the complaint of the defense attorney in the land claim referenced here.
deliberately stalling the resolution of cases in his court. Ultimately, Coñuepán was successful in bringing about the reorganization of the Juzgado de Temuco, but it did not reverse the decline of his effectiveness as Director of DASIN. In the same letter that called for the reorganization of the Court, Diputado Jorge Lavandero called for Coñuepán’s dismissal, citing his “repeated public appeals, including before the Minister of Agriculture, for the dismissal of the Juez de Indios of Temuco.”

Without the support of Carlos Ibañez behind him, Coñuepán’s leadership of DASIN became less impactful during the Jorge Alessandri administration that commenced in November 1958. As the three sitting Mapuche deputies had lost their re-election bids in the same year, this signaled a monumental shift in the leadership of the Mapuche movement and also its connection to state-level power. Chilean historians Augusto Samaniego and Carlos Ruiz attribute the transition to the fragmentation of the movement on the ground, as well as the failure of Corporación’s long-time political strategy. “The crisis had reached the heart of the Corporación Araucana, marking the end of Mapuche-led indigenismo according to partisan logic and wingka power” (emphasis in original). Coñuepán would continue to lead DASIN until he was appointed to the Board of Directors of Chile’s Banco del Estado in 1961. But his leadership of the Mapuche movement was eclipsed by a new generation of activists in the 1960s.

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657 Jorge Lavandero to Controller Gen. of Chile, Nov. 25, 1959. ARNAD, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, Libro 4618.
658 Augusto Samaniego Mesías and Carlos Ruiz Rodríguez, Mentalidades y políticas wingka: Pueblo mapuche, entre golpe y golpe (De Ibañez a Pinochet), Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2007, p. 250.
Summary

Unlike indigenista projects in other countries, DASIN was created in response to a call directly from Indians and indigenous leaders like Coñuepán, who were chosen for leadership roles within the agency. In contrast, in Lázaro Cárdenas’s Mexico, the official organ of state-led indigenismo was created and supervised by indigenistas, not indigenous leaders. In Mexico, that agency was also called the Office of Indigenous Affairs until 1949, when it was transferred to the Ministry of Education and renamed the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI). One of the INI’s goals was to cultivate indígenas as citizens and therefore it directly served the interests of the state as well as Indians. Although housed within and funded by the Mexican government, the INI was deeply connected to the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. As the Chilean equivalent, DASIN remained largely an organ of the Chilean state and relatively disconnected from the broader Pan-American discourse of the mid-twentieth century, as evidenced by the government’s refusal to recognize or fund a national indigenista institute, officially ratify the Patzcuaro Convention, or even support delegations in attending indigenista conferences. In addition, the goals of DASIN often seemed at odds with the goals of the state, for example the checks that Coñuepán placed upon unbridled expansion of the forestry industry.

However, despite the lack of formal ties, intellectual connections did exist. Through the world of ideas, Mapuche leaders sought to improve conditions for their people by working within and between state bureaucracies, and as they did so they drew from a range of ideas, as Coñuepán’s leadership illustrates. Some were
uniquely Chilean, to be sure, but others came from his knowledge of the emerging relationships between indigenous peoples and other modern nation-states in the twentieth century. Once Coñuepán became an employee of the Ministry of Land and Colonization rather than the Minister in charge, he was required to request resources and petition for action from the Minister. Although the goal of creating DASIN was to establish an office dedicated to the protection of indigenous interests, in some ways his dependency upon the Minister hampered his ability to assist Mapuche in their struggles. Coñuepán himself was marginalized within the Ministry and more and more of his work was rendered ineffective as the 1950s wore on.

Under Coñuepán’s leadership between 1953 and 1961, DASIN represents a uniquely Chilean form of institutionalized indigenismo. As Director of DASIN, Venancio Coñuepán achieved a measure of institutional protection for indígenas that had not been possible before. His work crossed several branches of the Chilean government and enabled him address issues like taxation and credit, legal protections for indigenous lands and development efforts, all of which were in keeping with his personal philosophy that the path toward equal citizenship for Mapuches lay in developing their economic sustainability and prosperity. Those aims were also consistent with the indigenista discourse across the Americas in the 1950s. Even though Coñuepán and DASIN were rarely involved directly in that network, their work can be viewed as an indigenista project in Chile.
Conclusion

After 1959, the access that indigenous leaders had to Chilean state channels of power decreased. In the 1960s, Jorge Alessandri and his successor Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) undertook agrarian reform efforts, but Mapuche peasants did not benefit significantly considering the modest scale and pace of land redistribution. Frustration with those programs and the failure of conservative alliances to produce meaningful change led the next generation of Mapuche activists to align with the left wing of the Chilean political spectrum. Salvador Allende famously signed the “Cautín Pact” with left-leaning Mapuche leaders during his unsuccessful campaign for the presidency in 1964, in which he promised to support and protect historical rights of the Mapuche people. DASIN continued to exist until 1972, although it was less effective without Coñuepán at the helm. Following his election to the presidency in 1970, Allende's government passed a new indigenous law that created the Instituto de Desarrollo Indígena (IDI – Institute for Indigenous Development), which replaced DASIN. But ultimately Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup d’état and ensuing military dictatorship ushered in a renewed assault upon indigenous lands and identity that continued through the 1970s, until the eventual return to democracy in 1990.659

659 For a comparative overview of state institutions dedicated to indigenous affairs in Chile, see Jorge Iván Vergara, Rolf Foerster and Hans Gundermann, "Instituciones Mediadores, Legislación y Movimiento Indígena de DASIN a CONADI (1953-1994), Sciencias Sociales Online, Universidad de Viña del Mar, Chile, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2004, pp. 86-97.
The marginalization of Mapuche organizations and activists in the late twentieth century make the period examined here all the more remarkable. Between 1920 and 1960, Mapuche leaders created a vibrant political movement that carved out space within a state apparatus that was overwhelmingly stacked against them. Despite their small numbers in proportion to the overall population of the country, between 1924 and 1958 the grassroots infrastructure of Mapuche organizations supported the election of six of their leaders to the lower house of the Chilean National Congress. In addition, Venancio Coñuepán secured an appointment to President Ibañez’s cabinet and convinced him to create DASIN. With his own appointment as Director, Coñuepán had the institutional mandate to guide and supervise the administration of justice for Mapuche through the Juzgados de Indios.

This history shows that the connections between indigenistas (traditionally defined as non-indigenous allies of indigenous peoples) and indigenous leaders extended to the very beginning of Mapuche organizations in the early twentieth century. But shortly after the founding of those organizations, Mapuche leaders, not their white allies, steered the movement according to their own determinations about the best interests of their people. Their decisions led them toward inconsistent and sometimes unlikely political alliances. Although the main body of the movement trended toward conservative allies and strategies, especially under the leadership of Coñuepán and the dominance of the Corporación, each time political space opened factions within the movement took advantage of opportunities across the political spectrum. Manuel Aburto courted the Communist Party in the late-1920s and early 1930s, urban youth organizations challenged the
hegemony of Coñuepán and the Corporación during the Popular Front era and allies of the working class began to support Allende's socialist revolution after 1960.

In order to understand how those patterns unfolded, I have argued that we must observe at least three inter-related discursive fields. Beginning on the ground, the persistence of traditional aspects of Mapuche political culture must be understood as significant to the way indigenous peasants in southern Chile selected and followed their leaders. José Ancan has shown that Coñuepán combined important personal qualities of lineage, wealth and charisma as he built a following among Indians, brought the major Mapuche organizations together and maintained their alliance, and convinced them that he could function effectively as a go-between with elite Chilean society. André Menard and Jorge Pavez explained that Manuel Aburto accessed long traditions of alliance making with the Chilean state to cultivate his own authority and also to choose political allies. With that mindset, the strength of his friends as well as his adversaries reflected upon Aburto’s own power, explaining in part why he would have supported Ibañez after being persecuted by him during his first presidency.

The political context of Chile, both at the regional and national levels, represents a second field. In some ways it was obvious that Mapuche leaders would ally with conservative parties because those factions held more sway in the rural southern part of the country, as Corporación leader Carlos Huentequeo explained. In addition, the educational and material support provided by religious leaders in the region, both the Anglican Carlos Sadleir and the Catholic Guido Beck, conditioned some Mapuche leaders and their followers to prefer conservative political views and
eschew communist and socialist principles that cast religious belief and distinct cultural identities as obstructions to the unity of the working classes and the process of proletarianization. Within the Mapuche movement, tension existed between the preservation of cultural traditions and the very real and immediate material needs of the people.

Cultural traditions were indeed important and valuable political tools, but leaders within the main thrust of the Mapuche movement concentrated their efforts on fulfilling the material needs of their constituents. The ever-present specter of dispossession from rightful land and territory haunted Mapuche peasants in their everyday lives and pervaded every layer of the political discourse. The fact that land loss was accompanied by violence and fraud contributed to the weight and significance of the conjoined themes of land, dispossession and injustice that remained central to the movement. The combination of a growing population and shrinking base of land on which to support the people contributed to consistent rural-urban migration throughout the period, which is responsible for other facets of the history we observe.

At times, urban Mapuche populations and organizations threatened to fracture the cohesiveness of the movement. We saw this in 1936, when Aburto broke with the Communist Party over their support of urban organizations that began hosting large “congresos” that he perceived as threatening the centrality of his own annual gatherings. Then again in 1938, the Frente Único de la Araucanía formed at the same time the Corporación consolidated the three major organizations based in the south. The rural-urban divide also helps to explain the
limited influence of Lipschütz and the other indigenistas working in Santiago on the Mapuche movement that was based in the south, and it likely contributed to the generational shift that took place around 1960, as more and more indigenous youth were forced to leave their communities in search of work in the capital and other cities.

The national political landscape of Chile clearly influenced the shape and direction of the Mapuche movement. Throughout the period, state policies prioritized economic development over more integrated efforts that were observed in Mexico, and which the transnational indigenista movement promoted. While national priorities were formulated from a set of options articulated through transnational discourses, in the case of Chile in the mid-twentieth century, the United States’ focus on anti-communism and the promotion of free-market capitalism overshadowed the discourse of social science technocracy. The state’s emphasis on forestry as a vehicle for enhancing the nation’s productive capacity grew out of that discourse, while the broad-based indigenismo supported by the state in Mexico (in the 1930s, at least) never took hold as a priority for the Chilean state. So while ideas circulating through that third transnational discursive field were important to the Mapuche movement and the Chilean state, the indigenista discourse was overshadowed by the free market discourse in southern Chile.

That is not to say that transnational indigenismo had no effect on leaders within the Mapuche movement or state support of their efforts. On the contrary, this history shows that indigenismo provided a powerful lens through which to view the reality of indigenous populations in Chile, and from which solutions to their
problems could be formulated. But indigenismo functioned more like a menu of options from which Mapuche leaders and state actors could choose, rather than a formula to be implemented wholesale. For example, DASIN was clearly the Chilean equivalent of state agencies in other countries, like the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Mexican INI. But the function and purpose of the agency was conditioned by the needs of indigenous people living in southern Chile and the priorities of the state. Although it would be over-simplified to say that Coñuepán and Ibañez determined its structure and function directly, it is not inaccurate to view those leaders as representatives of larger coalitions, who negotiated the terms by which Mapuche could and would interact with and through the state.

Indigenismo also served to connect individuals grappling with similar questions in very different contexts. White Chileans and indigenous Chileans were brought together through the founding of Mapuche organizations. Indigenistas connected with one another across great distances, as this letter to Alejandro Lipschütz from the British biochemist, historian and sinologist Joseph Needham shows.

“Although you were so kind as to say that I need not answer your letter of the 31st of March, I cannot forbear from doing so, since it was the kind of letter which does more good than you can imagine to one who “plows a rather lonely furrow” – at any rate in his immediate environment. I know that very many throughout the world appreciate my work, but I suffer a good deal because there is no recognition of the fact that I have metamorphosed from a biochemist into an orientalist and historian of science, so that I have to carry a particularly heavy burden in performing all the duties of my nominal post. Another thing which touches me very much was your realization that it is possible to fall in love with a civilization, of course to begin with through personal friendships with many people of that race and civilization. We cannot deal any longer with them except on a basis of absolute equality...”

660 Joseph Needham, to Alejandro Lipschütz, Apr. 1955. CAL, Caja 6372.
For individuals working within each of those fields, their labors were a little less isolated as a result of their connections to the indigenista discourse. But perhaps most significantly, Mapuche leaders were able to access circuits of power, knowledge and authority through indigenismo, as when Arturo Huenchullán left Chile to study in the United States, or when Coñuepán attended the Patzcuaro Conference.

Finally, Venancio Coñuepán's life and career illustrate significant crossover and bleed-through between the categories of indigenista and Indian, as well as the fluidity of the three discursive fields. As an “indigenous indigenista,” Coñuepán carved out space within the bureaucracy of the state to provide a check on the unbridled free-market takeover of southern property. DASIN functioned to push back against the broader goals of the ministry in which it was located in defense of indigenous Chileans. In that way it functioned very similarly to the overall indigenista discourse, which checked the unbridled advance of western social, political and economic systems. While Chilean indigenismo did not effectively tackle as broad a range of issues as national efforts in other contexts did, it took on the ones that mattered most to the Mapuche: land, legal rights and material opportunities. Thus we see that while direct ties to transnational indigenismo were relatively weak, their impact was considerable. As with any transnational discourse, the implementation of ideas was filtered through concentric rings of competing interests and unequal power.
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