The End of the Means: Using the Arab Spring Revolutions as a Case Study for Machiavelli’s The Prince

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The End of the Means: 
Using the Arab Spring Revolutions as a Case Study for 
Machiavelli’s *The Prince*

A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at 
Syracuse University

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Honors Capstone Project in International Relations

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Abstract

This study sets out to examine if Machiavellian, realpolitik, style repression of unrest by autocratic regimes is still a viable tactic. To accomplish this, the Arab Spring revolutions in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria will be used as a case study. As the revolts were for similar economic and political reasons in a similar population, they present excellent case studies. The Prince itself will be used to develop a “Machiavellian regime,” encompassing a summary of Machiavelli’s prescriptions for rulers. This is done to avoid propagating clichéd or incorrect generalizations of Machiavelli’s work. The result of the study was not kind to dictators, as could be imagined. Globalized media has struck a blow to their stability in two ways: first by providing malcontents a way to interact with otherwise pacified citizens, and second by publicizing news of brutality and crackdowns, thus making hatred for the ruler.
Executive Summary

Whether influenced by the writings in *The Prince* or not, history has seen Machiavelli’s proposed techniques of information manipulation and strategic oppression of the commons replicated by many dictators. While such methods for repression have undoubtedly worked through the Middle Ages, Enlightenment, and Cold War eras, the Contemporary era brings potentially new aspects to political power calculations: grass roots nationalism and technological globalization. These two new phenomena can challenge the traditional political power structure within a state, and when combined can have significant ramifications for the stability of a regime.

My study examines if and how those two phenomena have impacted the Machiavellian style of *realpolitik* governance. To do so, I have taken the Arab Spring revolutions as a case study for the application of Machiavelli’s ideas to current political crises. As the Arab Spring began as a relatively homogenous movement in demographics and ideals, across multiple Arab countries with similar political and economic systems, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria can all act as an effective case studies for Machiavelli’s teachings. Because the government structure is similar to the hereditary monarchy of Machiavelli’s day, and most domestic discrepancies are controlled for, an opportunity emerges to focus in on the decisions of the “prince” in command and how they affected the national landscape. I did not set a hard deadline on when decisions made by an administration before the Arab Spring would be included or disregarded.

After isolating these decisions, I compared them with the prescriptions of Machiavelli for the pacification of a province and preservation of a throne. As Machiavelli also took significant care in explaining the importance of how a prince rose to power, the desirable qualities of princely leadership, and the maintenance of a domain, I will also analyze those factors in my
dissertation. This will be accomplished through the study of academic texts, media reports, speeches, and documents made by or regarding the leaders and nations chosen. With domestic differences controlled and traditional dictatorships established, only Machiavellian principles, modern technology, and the influence of fortuna remain as stimuli.

The results of my research yielded several, perhaps expectable, results. First, the brutality with which a regime tried to quell the popular Arab Spring revolt had little bearing on its actual success in pacifying its citizenry. The country with the most success in preserving its regime, Morocco, used little force to advance its positions, instead relying on svelte assurances of grand democratization at a nebulous point in the future. In contrast, two of the most brutally repressive states, Egypt and Syria, continue to fight the civil war that was started as a result of their oppression. Both regimes, Mubarak and Assad, have lost their former state, as the likelihood of Syria regaining any semblance of the unity it one had under Bashar’s father seems remote. In this respect, Machiavelli’s pronouncements were somewhat correct. Being feared seemed sufficient to dissuade revolt until economic and nationalistic pressures incited it, while being loved was far more beneficial during the revolts as fear quickly turned into hate.

Finally, Machiavelli’s prescriptions for how a ruler should behave and conduct himself to gain renown were perhaps applicable to the reaction protestors had to a prince’s actions. Morocco’s King, Mohammed VI, had his state media portray him as both a successful, benevolent prince, as well as a religious icon. When he spoke his people listened, and protestors were more or less satisfied with his conciliatory offer. Contrast this to Bashar Al-Assad, who had media support regarding his image but sullied it though his past conduct in crushing reform and protests. The people reacted without much respect for his offers of reform, instead choosing to expand their protests. While this could have been a result of the immense pressure for
democratic reform emanating from within the state, Morocco’s already liberalized monarchic governance system, it seems that the reputation of “princes” were important to how their people responded to them.

As for the first question posited by my study, whether Machiavelli’s methods and prescriptions for dealing with repression still hold true today, the answer is decidedly muddy. I find it hard to fathom that Machiavelli would say that brutality and repression is the answer in every case, much as he said himself that the “prince” of Syracuse was to be derided for his ignoble actions, despite them being decisive and ruthless. Like many things in life and political theory, it may just come down to one’s interpretation of the work in question. If one reads the Prince very literally, as a book which lauds decisive, brutal, morally grey actions, then the Arab Spring case study performed clearly shows that they do not bring about the expected results. In that case, Machiavelli’s theories may have reached the extent of their usefulness. However if one reads into Machiavelli’s promotion of virtu, honorable leaders, and the idea that adoration of the masses, although fickle, holds great power, then Machiavelli’s theories remain more intact.

Whereas the greater question was a muddy answer, addressing whether technology has impacted traditional Machiavellian actions produces a more direct answer. Anytime a regime in the Arab Spring tried to exercise brutality or repression to the extent necessary to accomplish a Machiavellian revolt-crushing, i.e. executing all opposition heads and their families, technology was there to blast the word out into the global domain. Twitter was a famous hero of the Egyptian revolutions as it helped protestors organize against police actions, but it also facilitated the Arab Spring movement in the first place. Satellite and cable news helped capture the attention of audiences around the globe to the plight of protestors, especially when governments were attempting to quell the demonstrations. It seems that for the classical “ends justify the
means” translation of the Prince, social networks, the 24 hour news cycle, and internet blogging may have spelled the end for centuries-old methods of ensuring regime continuity.

This project holds several degrees of significance, depending on one’s discipline and interest in the project. First, it offers a relatively congruent environment in which the effectiveness of Machiavellian policies can be observed. This is important for teachers of history and political science who devote time from their courses to Machiavelli, as it could influence their presentation of Machiavellian ideas as viable choices in the current geopolitical climate. Similarly, this holds meaning for supporters of “realist” international relations or of realpolitik, as it represents how their theories might play out if followed in a modern anarchic political environment.
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“For men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse.”

—Niccolo Machiavelli, *Il Principe (The Prince)*
I

Introduction

If asked to identify the most influential work of international relations or political theory, one might be hard pressed to find a more common answer than Niccolo Machiavelli’s *The Prince*. Praised and reviled, honored and disparaged, Machiavelli’s *magnum opus* has been dissected and interpreted countless times since it was first written. Within its pages, one scholar might find allusions to the power of ruthlessness and oppression, while another, an ode to *virtu* and honorable rule. Regardless of such ethical and philosophical interpretations, Machiavelli makes very clear political prescriptions to princes and conquerors alike. He offers advice on a variety of topics, a great deal of which involves the suppression of revolts and management of public opinion as a leader.

Whether influenced by the writings in *The Prince* or not, history has seen Machiavelli’s proposed techniques of information manipulation and strategic oppression of the commons replicated by many dictators. While such methods for repression have undoubtedly worked through the Middle Ages, Enlightenment, and Early Modern era, the Contemporary era brings potentially new aspects to political power calculations: grass-roots nationalism and technological globalization. These two new phenomena can challenge the traditional political power structure within a state, and when combined can have significant ramifications for the stability of a regime.

With that in mind, arguably the most consequential international event of the past decade took place during the spring of 2011. The whole event began as the result of a Tunisian man’s self-immolation in protest of government corruption. News of the action spurred solidarity among others in the community, and soon the Tunisian uprising was well on its way to success.
After witnessing that protests were a viable tactic towards democratic change, other movements sprang up throughout the Arab world, as long repressed populations rose up against their dictators. Some populations came out into the street to angrily protest the existing regime, while others wished for a more Islamist state; but many protestors began the Arab Spring with a fervor for democratic principles. In many places these good intentions have been replaced by extremism and unremitting civil war, while a lucky few states managed to emerge from the experience with some sort of progress towards democratic principles. Driving these results were the actions of dictators, both during the protests and before any trouble had become evident.

Perhaps the reason why the Arab Spring was so successful and so well covered in the West, was the extent to which the uprisings relied on internet communications. Organizing protestor movements and meetings, receiving real-time intelligence on police movements, and broadcasting atrocities to the global community was made possible with a smartphone and proxy software. Without such means of dialogue, it is hard to fathom the Arab Spring spreading so far, or raising so much public sentiment in support of its goals, both in the west and in the countries themselves.

Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria,: all had different style regimes at the beginning of the Arab Spring, and as such, all had differing outcomes. Assuming that the domestic culture within each state is more or less alike, these discrepancies can be attributed to the decisions of the prince and to “fortuna” herself. Additionally, all of these regimes would satisfy the definition of a principality as described by Machiavelli, despite Morocco being the only true hereditary principality. The “prince” in each of these states refers to the dictator acting as the executive of the state. Machiavelli saw power shared by other figures, military, advisors, etc., as power forfeited by an inept or controlled prince. While these other, more modern style dictatorships
have their own quirks of power management, many of the issues they face are similar to more traditional kingdoms. That being said, the designation of “prince” may also suit dictators, as placating the state military commanders, wooing or subjugating the aristocracy, and ensuring the domination of the masses were just as important in Contemporary Syria as they were in 16th century Milan or 1st century Rome.

It is these regimes which I will examine in this paper. As the Arab Spring began as a relatively homogenous movement in demographics and ideals, across multiple Arab countries with similar political and economic systems, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria can act as effective case studies for Machiavelli’s teachings. Because the government structure is similar to the hereditary monarchy of Machiavelli’s day, and most domestic discrepancies are controlled for, an opportunity to focus in on the decisions of the “prince” in command and how they affected the national landscape emerges. After isolating these decisions, I will compare them with the prescriptions of Machiavelli for the pacification of a province and preservation of a throne. As Machiavelli also took significant care in explaining the importance of how a prince arose to power, the desirable qualities of princely leadership, and the maintenance of a domain, I will also to analyze those factors in my dissertation. This will be accomplished through the study of academic texts, media reports, speeches, and documents made by or regarding the leaders and nations chosen.

With domestic differences controlled and traditional dictatorships established, only Machiavellian principles and modern technology remain as influences over the fate of nations. While fortune always has a part to play, as Machiavelli himself said “it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to
beat her and strike her down.”¹ Repulsive sexism aside, it is clear that Machiavelli believes a strong person can bend fortune to suit their will, a not uncommon notion even today. But like the other issues previously raised, does such a bold prediction still ring true today?

II

On Machiavelli

In the realm of political science, few men have the ideological clout to rival that of Niccolo Machiavelli. Often counted among Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes as the fathers of political Realism and realpolitik, Machiavelli has unmistakably influenced the disciplines of political science, philosophy, international relations, and history itself. The Prince alone touches on all of these subjects through its ruminations on the optimal actions a ruler should take to secure his state, whether new conquests or previously subjugated territories.

Machiavelli was born in 1469 to a well off family of Florentine civil servants. While his early life was not well recorded, it is known that he went to the University of Florence and received “an excellent humanist education.” During that interlude the Medici’s had been expelled from Florence, leaving a republican government in power. As a result, Machiavelli was eventually appointed “Second Chancellor of the Republic of Florence,” after which information about Machiavelli’s actions becomes significantly more plentiful. As he gained favor with the administrators of Florence, and was sent on several diplomatic missions for the city of Florence, including to the courts of France and the Holy Roman Empire. His actions taken to strengthen the Florentine army were also recorded, which showed his disdain for the commonplace reliance on mercenary soldiers at that time, which was later reflected in The Prince.

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4 Ibid
5 Ibid
Unfortunately for Machiavelli, in 1512 the Medici family returned to take back their dynastic seat in Florence. Anyone who had colluded with the republican government was immediately under charge of treason, which lead to Machiavelli’s capture and torture within the following years. After several weeks he secured his release to an estate outside Florence, where he later sought to regain his stature within the Florentine political arena. But this feat would elude him, he would die in 1527 at the same estate.

To revive his political career, and perhaps to occupy himself, Machiavelli spent much of his later years working on various literary works. Besides The Prince, his other seminal text was Discourses on Livy, which examined the history of early Rome. Discourses is perhaps the polar opposite of The Prince, as it is mainly concerned with discussing the best manner of establishing and ruling a republic. Throughout the work Machiavelli constantly references political machinations from his day to that of ancient Rome, specifically comparing the institutions of the absolutist French court to the administration of the Roman Republic. His conclusions were resoundingly republican, a fact which may seem contradictory given his most prominent work is an exploration into the ruling of repressive principalities. Along with Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli wrote several other notable political treatises including: The Art of War, which attempted to mesh ancient and renaissance military tactics for Princes, multiple discourses on finance, and backgrounds into the history of French and German political affairs. He also penned several plays and fictional works.

As a result of these conflicting political messages, some philosophes, including Jean-Jacques Rosseau, have argued that Machiavelli’s writing in The Prince was not meant to be taken at face

\[\text{Ibid}\]
value.\textsuperscript{7} Instead, they say that the work was equal parts satire of the Medici’s rule and political commentary on the inferiority of dictatorship to republican government, as “he [Machiavelli] could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's oppression.\textsuperscript{8} Machiavelli’s previous writings in \textit{Discourses on Livy} may have inculcated his true beliefs on this subject, when not under direct duress or writing for another’s approval. Given Machiavelli’s affiliation with the revival of republican government in Florence and subsequent torture at the hands of the following prince, creating such a work in good conscience does seem difficult to fathom.

However, if \textit{The Prince} and \textit{The Art of War} espouse any part of Machiavelli’s actual opinion on political power, imagining Machiavelli risking the ire of the Medici for satire seems equally remarkable. For a treatise which espouses decisive action from positions of power, and diplomacy and cunning when overmatched, writing such a document as satire seem a brash action from Machiavelli. This is perhaps made more irrational given that Machiavelli was subjected to torture by the Medici in the years prior to \textit{The Prince}’s writing, with the risk of continued torture surely not completely assuaged.\textsuperscript{9} It is also common belief that Machiavelli wrote \textit{The Prince} specifically for the Medici family as a means to ingratiate himself with their regime. If this was the case, recklessly snipping at the heels of power for delayed, and rather petty, revenge seems a decidedly un-Machiavellian action. Whatever truth the allegations over satire may carry, \textit{The Prince} has widely been used as a tool to understand politics and government. If it was once a satire, it has now become theory.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid
\textsuperscript{9} Nederman, "Niccolò Machiavelli."
III

Il Principe

*The Prince* was first distributed in 1513, but was not published until 1532, several years after Machiavelli died. The book itself contains 26 chapters, all pertaining to some aspect of rule by a prince, with some chapters roughly grouped together by general topic. While some of these chapters are irrelevant for the previously stated goal of this paper, many have meaning which is relevant and useful for building a “Machiavellian regime.” For some reason, it seems that much of the common knowledge regarding *The Prince* has been comprised of commonly repeated themes of brutality and cruelty. To avoid blindly accepting these perhaps clichéd values, a “Machiavellian regime” will be created from *The Prince* itself. While combing through the chapters of *The Prince*, values, policies, decision-making strategies, and general ideas that Machiavelli endorses will be seized and expanded upon. After which, a hopefully more representative depiction of Machiavelli’s ideal regime, prince, and policy schema in a Contemporary setting will emerge to be used in later stages of this paper.

i

Types of Principalities

To accomplish the building of such a “Machiavellian regime,” it should be noted that the Prince addresses several different types of princes and principalities in each of its chapters all of which hold meaning for the development of our Machiavellian regime theory, excepting the theocratic principality. The two types of principalities primarily discussed are hereditary and mixed principalities, the former being controlled by the same family for generations, and the later recently conquered.

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10 Nederman, "Niccolò Machiavelli".
Hereditary principalities are first addressed in the second chapter. Machiavelli expects that hereditary princes will have significantly less difficulty in controlling their population than republics or religious principalities. He believes that “it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise.”\textsuperscript{11} Given that these rather common requirements of a prince are met, Machiavelli sees it unlikely that power will be wrested from the prince in question unless “deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force.”\textsuperscript{12} He bases this on the assumption that hereditary princes have the enviable position of ancestral tolerance of his rule, stability and support during his transition to power, and forgiveness for any but the most egregious sins. If some force was to usurp the prince’s lands, Machiavelli expects for the hereditary prince to return soon after any significant misfortune befalls the usurper. In this context, hereditary monarchies can be expanded to encompass many dictatorships common to the Middle East during the pre-Arab Spring period.

The clearest example of a hereditary monarchy in the Middle East-North Africa region is the Alawi family in Morocco, who have been well established and enjoy a significant amount of natural goodwill from their subjects. In Syria, the regime under Bashar Al Assad arguably also falls under the proposed expansion of Machiavelli’s hereditary definition, as the Al Assad regime had seen a generation in power over Syria by the time of the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{13} Egypt also fulfills the requirements for a hereditary princedom. Although Hosni Mubarak came into power as the successor to Anwar Sadat, he had previously identified his son, Gamal Mubarak, as the chosen successor to his “presidency”.

\textsuperscript{11} Machiavelli, \textit{The Prince}. 2
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid
The third chapter deals with mixed principalities, which had been conquered and had their government’s reformed into new regimes. Machiavelli sees these types of principalities as significantly more difficult to control than the more traditional hereditary state, simply due to the realities of conquest and reforming government. He believes that men “men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse.”

After such a revolt, the new prince must create some form of soldiery to secure his new territory, as well as instituting “infinite other hardships” to establish a functioning government. Machiavelli imagines these concepts as creating a type of conundrum for any incoming prince. While his enemies from his conquest or rise to power will remain, openly or subversively, those whom the prince allied himself with to secure power will inevitably be dissatisfied with the immediate outcome of the regime change. Yet Machiavelli believes the prince will be unwilling or incapable of taking harsh actions against his former allies, as some debt or bond remains from their past cooperation. In this case, Tunisia would represent a mixed principality, as President Ben Ali took power through an Italian SISMI coup and never intimated plans to transfer power to his son. Because of his ascension to power, it’s possible that he owed a debt to the Italians for installing him as leader. And while his transition into power was rather smooth, likely as a result of his previous history of government service, if he was simply a private citizen installed by a western nation, rebellion against his rule could have been realized.

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14 Machiavelli, The Prince. 2
15 Machiavelli, The Prince. 8
Methods of Ascension

After discussing hereditary and mixed principalities, Machiavelli pivots to discussing manners of ascension for princes who came to power besides hereditary providence. These methods are discussed in chapters six through nine.

Chapter six primarily deals with Principalities acquired through a Prince’s own merit. This could entail those who rose from a position as a private citizen at the head of a popular movement or those who were successful but needed a small push from fortuna to propel their leadership forward; either way is valid as long as the Prince’s abilities played the key role in his success. Machiavelli sees such able rulers as innately more secure than the mixed rulers discussed in chapter three, reasoning that if their ability saw them raised to power, then the same ability would be a key factor in their holding onto that power. However, he does see one key downside to this manner of ascension to power: the fact that the Prince must create a new government and in the process reform the laws which brought about his overthrow of the previous regime. Because human nature is fickle, “he who innovates will have for his enemies all those who are well off under the existing order of things, and only lukewarm supporters in those who might be better off under the new.”¹⁷ The cure for such lackluster support? Machiavelli says coercion under the threat of armed force.

Chapter seven continues to deal with manners of ascension to power, focusing on princes who, through no skill of their own, ascend to power by fortune or the arms of another. Machiavelli believes these Princes enjoy the smoothest transition to power, with their troubles dealt with by those more powerful and skilled than they are. Instead, they are likely to face

¹⁷ Machiavelli, The Prince. 12
significant problems during their rule itself. Machiavelli sees them as lacking the skills of a ruler, being private citizens raised up without: the skills associated with princes in chapter six a steadfast loyalty from their soldiers, whose wage is being paid by another master. Thus, Machiavelli believes that if such a Prince does not quickly find affinity for ruling, he faces turmoil as soon as it faces his reign.

Ascension to power through wickedness and deceit are discussed in chapter eight, and what Machiavelli truly means though this passage is arguable. He offers most of his ideas in this chapter through examples, namely Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliveretto of Fermo, who became Pope Alexander VI. Both men featured by Machiavelli used cruelty and deceit to manufacture their power, particularly Agathocles, who murdered of all of ancient Syracuse’s senatorial class with the help of the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, Machiavelli says that men who come to power through such skullduggery can be very secure in their power, despite not having outright fortune or ability on their side. This is accomplished through a mix of brutality and cruelty implemented at the time of taking power, and maintained throughout the regime. While a discussion on chapter eight’s perspective on the use of cruelty and decisive action is warranted, that will be saved for the section discussing Machiavellian policy more specifically.

Chapter nine discusses civil principalities, specifically princes who are raised as a result of some popular support. However, this does not immediately connote a republic, as the prince in question could still be as much a dictator as before. Machiavelli says that such a prince will run into serious issues defining the base of his support, as if he was raised up by the people then the aristocracy will be set against him, whereas if he is raised up the aristocracy the people will find reason to hate him.
Chapters six through nine offer some interesting conclusions regarding what Machiavelli might have recommended the Arab Spring regimes do when faced with popular uprising. While chapter six perhaps deals more directly with those regimes which rose to power after the Arab Spring, its lessons regarding innovation and the necessity of arms could be useful when examining the prior policies of many states. When combined with the lessons from chapter nine, there is some foreshadowing of the problems awaiting military regimes, as in Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak was a man raised from the officer class based on ability.

iii

Soldiery

Machiavelli touches on how to secure a recently acquired territory in chapter three, focusing on the development of cultural “colonies” in the acquired territory.\(^\text{18}\) While it appears that much of his theory relies on the assumption that it would be too costly to maintain a powerful military force in a territory, which is a moot point given that this study focuses on contiguous states which have not significantly expanded their borders in the modern era, his theories still hold some merit. He sees large garrisons of soldiers as inefficient and costly options, which irritate the constantly deployed and rotating soldiers, as well as the citizenry.\(^\text{19}\) Machiavelli also suggests consideration of the “balance of power” between one’s state and its neighbors, so that no nearby foreign power is invited easily able to assert influence in the new territory. This may be especially poignant in the Middle East given the prominence of tribal loyalties across shifting borders and regimes.

\(^{18}\) Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 4-5
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
Chapter ten sees Machiavelli discuss one way in which the strength of a state should be measured: its defense. Coming from a renaissance mindset, in this chapter Machiavelli focuses on defending one’s principedom from siege at the hands of an invading foreign power. He sees two major parts in this defense, the physical fortifications needed to secure territory, and enough loyalty from the citizenry to avoid rebellion during the siege. As an example, he references the German states of the Holy Roman Empire, which are quite weak individually and offensively, but have enough fortifications and devotion from their subjects to make a protracted siege overly painful for the aggressor. In today’s world, this idea might be more closely associated with the tendency of a state towards lengthy insurgent conflicts and rebellions.

Chapter twelve embodies Machiavelli’s hatred for mercenary soldiers. He initially says this because he sees mercenary forces as mercenary, men who have no qualms accepting payment from a prince then looting both sides after the end of a conflict. Soldiers and leaders who will take money during peacetime with a loose guarantee of service if war occurs. But Machiavelli holds that such mercenary soldiers will likely desert a prince in need before they actually see fighting, as the “paltry sum” which makes up their pay is unlikely to warrant sacrifice of their lives. If they do reach the battlefield, Machiavelli expects them to have low morale, and be a generally insubordinate and inefficient fighting force. And if they do fight and emerge critical to the strength of the prince’s army, they are likely to overthrow the prince and take it for themselves. Machiavelli uses many examples to detail his disdain for mercenaries, ranging from the highly mercenary based armies in renaissance Florence and Venice to the Punic Wars.

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20 Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 34
Machiavelli’s disdain for non-domestic military forces continues in chapter thirteen, where Machiavelli discusses the use of auxiliary forces. In this context, auxiliary is less used in terms of the late Roman military, who eventually made up much of their standing force from tribal levies, but instead is taken to describe the forces of allies called into the country to aid the prince there. Machiavelli sees these allied forces in a similar light to their mercenary counterparts, worthless if the prince loses, but powerful enough to assert outside influence over the country if victorious. Again, he gives historic examples of auxiliary forces commanding the prince they once were sworn to aid, and espouses the benefits of a domestic force.

Finally, Machiavelli deals with a prince’s mental capacity for warfare in chapter fourteen. But he does not limit such training to simply studying histories and strategy, instead promoting a more holistic method for accommodating oneself with the military establishment. Machiavelli says that the prince must remain active with his soldiers, in doing so keeping himself fit and his soldiers recognizant of his commanding presence. At the same time, having the prince accompany his men on drills and patrols will inform him of his land, especially in terms of the best defensive locations, traps, and thoroughfares in times of war. In this exploration the prince also has an opportunity to get to know his subjects and build some manner of rapport with them. Machiavelli takes care to note that these measures should all be taken in times of peace as well as war, so that the prince remains a competent strategist and the state appears cohesive from abroad. While military generalship and methods of staffing one’s army may be less dependent on the sovereign today than in renaissance Italy, Machiavelli’s basic ideas still shine through. A prince should remain knowledgeable in the exercise of military maneuvers, and have an in-depth understanding of his own territory and means of defending it. The appearance of a strong defense and united populace is almost more important than the actual presence of one. The prince should
also be cognizant of dangers from mercenary and auxiliary soldiers to his regime, especially in the religiously-driven foreign fighter environment of the modern Middle East. While Machiavelli may have approved of mercenary fighters in an hour of great need, there is no doubt that he prefers the use of domestic fighters.

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A Prince’s Personality

Chapter fifteen marks the beginning of Machiavelli’s discussion of personality and princely conduct, and with it comes the viewpoints which have made The Prince so enduring yet continually derided. Though the chapter itself is short, it introduces the notion that the Prince should be both made up of goodness and vice, with the ability to act in either manner as he sees fit. It should also be noted that this chapter verges on advocating for some form of public relations, as Machiavelli notes that it is important for a prince to appear good to his subjects and confidents, despite what truly may be in his nature.

Chapter sixteen focuses on two important economic qualities a prince should consider: liberality and miserliness. These two notions are ever at odds with one another, locked in an everlasting struggle between the prince’s reputation and economic policy. If a prince is liberal with his spending and lavishes gifts on his friends, he is likely to be popular and well renowned, but hated by those he taxes as a result. The miserly prince is less well regarded, but can make up for this image by setting reasonable tax policy for his subjects. Machiavelli firmly believes in the later, stating that the frugal prince is the one with the most good will and longevity of rule. In essence, “it is wiser to put up with the name of being miserly, which breeds ignominy, but
without hate, than to be obliged, from the desire to be reckoned liberal, to incur the reproach of rapacity, which breeds hate as well as ignominy.”

Chapter seventeen is perhaps the landmark chapter of *The Prince*, in which Machiavelli discusses whether it is better to be loved or feared, and in doing so, catapulted the book into history. Machiavelli’s argument in this chapter rests on several points. First, love is an emotion which is totally dependent on ones subjects, unable to be directly controlled by a sovereign but easily swayed by the notion of personal gain. Fear, on the other hand, is totally dependent on the actions of the sovereign. Second, fear and love can hardly co-exist with one another. Third, cruelty and fear can sometimes do more good for a country than kindness could. Revolutions, famine, plagues, all of these disasters could catastrophically cripple a state and cause immense suffering to its population. While the kindly king might worry about taking harsh actions to quarantine the damage, a pragmatic prince will accept the shawl of cruelty in order to protect his state from the maximum amount of harm. The same is true when marshalling an army, compassion should be forgotten to instill discipline. Finally, hatred must be avoided at all costs. Machiavelli could not overstate this point, it seems, as he hammered it home with many examples. He said that above all, a prince could avoid hatred if he did two things: “not meddle with the property or with the women of his citizens and subjects.” He says that torture and executions are acceptable when there is reasonable cause or justification, but taking a man’s patrimony from him is much more grievous than taking his father’s head.

Chapter eighteen strikes an interesting balance, mixing how princes should keep their faith through tough times with a rudimentary discussion of public relations management. He

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21 Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 42
22 Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 44
begins the chapter by discussing the need for duplicity in princely dealings. While a prince should be willing to negotiate with their enemies like civilized men, the cunning “beast” should always be ready to solve the situation with guile. Each situation facing a regime could call for a different style of policy, bold or cunning, the lion or the fox. But Machiavelli believes it is unreliable to rely on one type of ruling style over another, assuming that human nature is naturally dishonest. Assuming that treachery and cunning will always have a place in statecraft, and is likely decide the victor, Machiavelli says that a prince must keep a “good colour” on his nature and say nothing which is not virtuous.\(^{23}\) Religion is important in this function, as being an espoused follower of a religion ensures subjects of a prince’s virtues even though they cannot witness them for themselves.

Chapter nineteen furthers the message that Machiavelli put forward in his previous two chapters, but focuses on avoiding hatred rather than the efficacy of cunning action. As previously stated, Machiavelli believed that above all, a prince must avoid taking his citizens women and property. Those cases excepting, a prince must also avoid being seen as “fickle, frivolous, effeminate, pusillanimous, or irresolute,”\(^{24}\) and instead project an aura of wisdom and virtue. The prince who manages to project such an image of himself gains great security in his position. The greatest threat to a prince is conspiracy and revolution, but Machiavelli says that if a prince is well-respected, the initial conspirator risks greatly in involving anyone else in their plot. He puts it plainly, that: “on the side of the conspirator there are distrust, jealousy, and dread of punishment to deter him, while on the side of the prince there are the laws, the majesty of the throne, the protection of friends and of the government to defend him; to which if the general

\(^{23}\) Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 46

\(^{24}\) Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 47-48
good will of the people is added it is hardly possible that any should be rash enough to conspire.”

Machiavelli then goes into examples from Roman Emperors, suggesting that every prince must strike a balance between ferocity and justice to please their soldiers and citizenry respectively. While he says that in the past the soldiers needed to be humored, Machiavelli thinks that the lack of standing armies in Renaissance Italy has swung the balance in favor of the citizenry. That perhaps gives perspective on what factor determines who a prince should favor the most, the size of a state’s standing army.

On Policy and Government

Chapter twenty sees Machiavelli dealing with a variety of topics, including disarmament, using factions to divide subjects, and the building of fortresses in their lands. The first issue he covers, disarmament, is not thought outright wrong or right. Instead, Machiavelli says that it makes sense for new princes to arm their new citizenry. While that may seem counterintuitive, as the ascension of a prince to a throne is likely to create some enemies of his reign, the subjects directly armed by the prince will begin to trust him, while their counterparts see him as trusting their citizenry as a whole. This is in comparison to disarmament, which shows weakness, fear, and mistrust of the citizenry by the new prince. However, disarmament of new territory conquered by a prince is to be lauded, simply because order will need to be enforced by those with unquestionable loyalty to the prince.

Machiavelli then begins to discuss the creation of feuds within the populace as a means of pitting their anger against one another instead of the ruler. He sees this as an incredibly shortsighted policy, as it divides the prince’s resources in the case of invasion, not to mention

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25 Machiavelli, The Prince. 48-49
creates motivation for the weaker faction to join with an invading army. Likewise if conflict is created simply as a means to gain more glory for a prince, then it should be ceased. However, he does make some interesting conclusions regarding the usefulness of advisors who may have been against the prince in the past. Because those who were initially hostile to his rule “have to efface by their conduct the unfavorable impression he had formed of them,” the prince may gain more honest advice from them than from a continual lackey. This beings especially interesting connotations when Machiavelli discusses newly acquired territories which rebelled to another government. Assuming that there was no special love for the prince put in power, such territories inevitably had some violent dissatisfaction with the previous government, and are thus unlikely to be completely pleased with the following administration. In such a case, a prince may be better off shunning those who brought him into power and instead allying with those who sought to preserve the previous status quo.

The last section of chapter twenty is devoted to the construction of fortresses within a princes own territory. Machiavelli approves the construction of fortresses for those princes more afraid of their subjects than of foreign invaders, whereas the opposite is true for those more afraid of foreigners than their subjects. While fortresses offer minor protection from rebellion and foreigners alike, they can be captured and used against the prince in future campaigns. Instead, Machiavelli returns to his point about hatred. If a populace hates the prince, either they or an opportunistic foreign power will defeat the fortress eventually. But by ensuring the dedication of the citizenry, the notion of a state-wide insurgency will thwart conspirators and invaders both.

Chapter twenty-one continues Machiavelli’s lionizing of public relations management and shrewd diplomacy. A prince should show that he is a patron of the arts, cognizant of his
subject’s desires for success in life. Similarly, he should regularly hold shows and festivals during which he shows his “munificence” while ensuring to keep his dignity. That being said, “nothing makes a Prince so well thought of as to undertake great enterprises and give striking proofs of his capacity.”

Thus Machiavelli promotes the use of manufactured *causus belli* as a means to cement a prince’s power. He then goes on to deal with the situation of feuding neighbors. Regardless of how equally matched the sides are, the prince should always align himself with one of the sides in question. Not only does it provide him a chance to appear glorious and honorable, but it also wins him only a steadfast ally at worst, while an alliance and spoils of war come with victory. Machiavelli does caution a prince from allying with a power significantly stronger than his own, or as a conglomerate weaker than their opponent, as the possibility of domination by the strongest state is never truly alleviated. Similarly, the prince should avoid upsetting the balance of power too much in his choice of alliances, as it could end up in his realm becoming the next in a series of conquests.

Chapter twenty two focuses in on ministerial choices available to a prince, and how they represent his personality. In fact, Machiavelli believes that “the readiest conjecture we can form of the character and sagacity of a prince is from seeing what sort of men he has about him.” If a prince can recognize the merit and fidelity of a good advisor, then he is likely a wise man, while the opposite connotation is also true. While this view certainly could have been influenced by Machiavelli’s profession, it seems to have some merit. A prince or ruler who is wise enough to understand that an honest opinion from an advisor is worthwhile will likely perform his job better because of the input. While a prince who listens to appeasers or advisors who put their

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26 Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 59
27 Machiavelli, *The Prince*. 62
personal interests ahead of their liege is likely to be subject to poor advice at best, and treachery at worst. To cultivate the devotion and honesty of ministers, Machiavelli says that they must be treated well, and, when asked, should be allowed to speak their opinions on a subject without fear of retaliation.

As an addendum to this premise, Machiavelli says in chapter twenty-three that flatterers should be avoided to the furthest extent they are possible to avoid. To do this, Machiavelli sees only one prudent course of action, for the prince to show that he doesn’t punish advisors for speaking truthfully to him. While he is within his rights to deny people speaking advice when it is not asked, a wise prince should understand that, if asked for, he should contemplate a spoken truth without clear rage or discomfort. But Machiavelli makes it clear, the prudence of a wise prince is never solely due to his advisors, instead a prudent prince is wise because he listens to counsel.

These chapters are perhaps the most important in all of *The Prince*, as they make up the core of Machiavelli’s non-philosophical ideas. While many of them may seem like common sense, princes both in the past and present have failed to effectively avoid flattering advisors, an overreliance on fortifications, and insufficient propaganda, and have paid the price for their failings. As such, all of these prescriptions are incredibly important to understand in developing the “Machiavellian regime”, even if some, such as the construction of defenses to deter invading armies, have little consequence on the Arab Spring revolutions.

*Ruthlessness versus Virtu*

Arguably, the commonly held belief about Machiavelli is that he espouses brutality over humanity, in that a prince should think of nothing other than his wellbeing and power when
making decisions. This is represented in the word which takes his name “Machiavellian,” which has come to describe an immoral, underhanded, cunning, or treacherous action. A similar fate has befallen his public persona, wherein Machiavelli has come to represent the most reproachable aspects of statecraft. But a more nuanced reading of his works may open up new understandings of his ideas. As previously mentioned, *The Prince* was not Machiavelli’s only work, simply the one with the greatest longevity. *Discourses on Livy* and *The Art of War* are equally if not more detailed works, but are often forgotten in favor of the more striking *Prince*. That being said, even within the *Prince* there can be some variation in what Machiavelli is taken to mean. While it is undeniable that he endorses brutality as a means to prevent greater bloodshed, a regime culture of fear rather than mercy, and the use of princely diplomacy and nobility as a shield for his more underhanded politics, Machiavelli also has a lot to say regarding *virtu*. *Virtu*, is a difficult concept to define. Some scholars refer to it as a sort of human energy counterbalancing the influence of fortune.²⁸ Actions can be considered *virtu* regardless of their morality or the honor behind them, it is simply a word to recognize the spirit of doing something to empower oneself.

*Virtu* can also be taken to represent honor, as is primarily discussed in chapter eight, where he discusses princes who have seized their throne through some form of treachery. Instead of being outright supportive of such politics, Machiavelli criticizes the actions and policies of the examples in that chapter. He says: “to slaughter fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of honor, pity, and religion, cannot be counted as merits, for these are means which may lead to

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power but which confer no glory.”29 He goes on to say that these actions alone do not make a
man a bad captain or leader, but bar him from inclusion with the “greatest men.” If the traditional
view of Machiavelli is to be taken to heart, this statement makes no sense. Agathocles of
Syracuse, the subject of the example, was a cunning man who managed to seat himself on a
throne through shifting alliances and mass-murder. He was ruthless, cold, and calculating, all
attributes which a pragmatic view of Machiavelli would wholeheartedly endorse. Yet
Machiavelli does the opposite, acknowledging his skill but denying him glory or approval
because of his lack of honor. This idea emerges in other sections, although not as plainly. A
prince should strive to be feared, but should remain just and merciful whenever possible. He
should act with cunning and swiftness to smash revolts against his reign, but also interact with
his people so that they feel some devotion to him. He should become well versed in projecting
diplomatic nobility as a disguise for darker intentions, but should also treat his advisors with
respect and appreciation. These ideas could arguably be pragmatism as well, or could be some
remaining notions of chivalry which had yet to be forsaken, but Machiavelli’s idolization of
Alexander the Great and other ancient rulers as pinnacles of virtu and statecraft could also mean
that Machiavelli believes there is a necessary place for honor in a regime.

As mentioned previously, it is hard to achieve an adroit reading of Machiavelli’s
philosophy in The Prince. Questions of whether he wrote the work as satire, contradictions in
how fortuna and virtu seem to be interrelated, artistic license in translations, and Machiavelli’s
clearly limited political position when writing all have an influence on how the work is to be
understood. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that Machiavelli may not have been quite as
“Machiavellian” as we consider he was today.

29 Machiavelli, The Prince. 21
The Machiavellian Regime

Taking into account all of the chapters previously mentioned, a rough conglomeration of ideas should start to appear. By applying these concepts to the scenarios of the Arab Spring, a picture of if they were followed and how well they succeeded should become clear. Several distinctions can be made to inform the qualities of the regime. Which distinctions apply to which regime will have to be decided individually, regime by regime, as they hold different drawbacks and advantages based on one’s membership.

The first distinction can be taken as the divide between regimes which were hereditary versus mixed. Hereditary princes should have the easiest time controlling their population, assuming they take care not to offend any traditions in the exercise of their regime. It should also be possible for hereditary regimes to maintain power through misfortune, as familiarity with their rule should ensure greater dedication despite what may occur. Such an attribute should be especially valuable to regimes during the Arab Spring. But as mentioned before, Morocco, Syria, and Egypt all had some form of hereditary monarchy at the beginning of the Arab Spring, yet have seen wildly different events as a result of their actions.

Mixed principalities reference regimes which were created from conquest, rather than dynastically formed. These regimes have less freedom of action, lacking the generational familiarity the hereditary regime enjoys, as well as more reason to anger their people during the process of setting up a government. Machiavelli also believes a prince in a mixed principality will have a difficult time controlling his former allies. Thus the Tunisian regime will naturally have a significantly more difficult task in placating their populace than those in a hereditary regimes.
The second distinction is specifically for mixed principalities, and revolves around the method used by the prince to ascend to power. If a prince ascended through his own merit, i.e. using his talent to empower himself, then Machiavelli sees him as likely to succeed by way of the same talent and dedication. The only major downside comes from the fact that he must begin a new government, and likely initiate some reform as to satisfy those who deposed his predecessor. Princes who come to power through the strength of others are expected to be less skilled, lacking loyalty from their soldiers and ruling elite. They must quickly learn to be a prince or risk being easily deposed or controlled. Civil principalities, princes raised up by the people, are also dangerous, as the classes who didn’t take part in raising him to power will likely be set against him for his rule. These distinctions in how a prince must act based on the nature of his ascension to power perhaps lack outright direction, but do present a roadmap of potential dangers to regimes of that ilk.

Regardless of ascension or type of regime, the ideal sovereign personality Machiavelli describes through *The Prince* remains largely the same, built around a duplicitous nature. On one hand, the ideal prince should act diplomatically, ensuring to project his honor and morality to all those under him. The idea of *virtu* should not be foreign to a prince, and he should be willing to take his own fortune into his hands. He should also strive to be recognized as a just lord, avoiding arbitrary decisions and bad counsel whenever possible. Similarly, he should be educated, not only in matters of military importance, but also in matters of history and topography. He should also be willing to listen to truths from his advisors, never jumping to anger if he is displeased by their comments. Yet, he should be ruthlessly pragmatic about his regime. While he is negotiating and presenting himself as honorable, a prince should always be working to find a solution through cunning, and always guarding against the treachery of other
men. The prince should also be willing to commit cruel or inhumane actions to quell revolts and ensure peace, his justification for doing so is that more people would die if war or revolution is allowed to occur. A prince should understand that fear should be preferred to love, as the love of subjects is fickle. Above all, a prince should understand that hatred of the people must be avoided at all costs, and that sacrificing an ally or friend is well worth the stability of a placated populace.

Machiavelli’s suggested policy for princes follows in a similar manner. Princes should be frugal, as excessive liberality with public funds invites outrage over higher taxes. Internal political parties, fortresses, and overreliance on individual advisors is to be avoided as they can all be turned against the prince by an outside power. The prince should have a working knowledge of the military and his territory, and should avoid the employ of mercenary and allied forces if at all possible. The appearance of a strong state military is important to dissuade outside forces from invading, and it allows for the prince to influence the balance of power among his neighbors. The use of harsh tactics to maintain order in a state is acceptable, as long as the actions are only sustained for as long as necessary. The use of public relations and propaganda is wise, as it will ensure the people of the prince’s morality and enable him to act in manner which might otherwise be unacceptable. Those who might plot against the prince will be hard pressed to succeed if the population does not hate him and is convinced of his righteousness.
To begin analyzing how regimes dealt with the Arab Spring Revolutions, perhaps the best place to start is with the only regime which survived the revolution, the Moroccan Monarchy. The Al-Alouwi Monarchy is a perfect example of one of Machiavelli’s hereditary principalities, with a continuous reign by one family stretching back until 1664, and independence from French occupation since 1956. The longest running monarch since gaining independence was Hassan II, who kept peace in the nation as neighboring states began to unravel, but at a high cost. Until his reign ended in 1999, “a truth commission set up to investigate human rights violations during his reign confirmed nearly 10,000 cases,” also confirming that Hassan II was not afraid to shy away from brutality to keep power. After Hassan II came Mohammed VI, the monarch in power during 2011. Along with this tradition of rule, there are several key differences in the Moroccan economy and political system which differentiated them from their North African neighbors.

Firstly, the Moroccan economy was relatively stronger than other regimes in the region. While common North African issues with unemployment and underemployment of graduates remained at around nine percent, they were not nearly as crippling as in other countries. An IMF report in 2010 said that:

“The direct impact of the global crisis on Morocco has been limited, primarily affecting Morocco through real channels. Exports, tourism receipts, remittances, and FDI have all

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31 Ibid
declined this year, due primarily to the slowdown in Europe. Nonetheless, with a strong starting position, reflecting in large part the range of macroeconomic and structural reforms introduced over the last decade, Morocco has been well-positioned to weather and respond to the crisis. In particular, Morocco’s financial system is sound, with little exposure to international markets.”

While tourism was identified in that report as a sector that suffered from some decline, it continued to be successful in a way that no other North African nation enjoyed. The Moroccan government had identified tourism as a means of expanding their economy through “Vision 2010” and “Plan Azur”, which jointly called for an increase in tourism advertising and identified six new locations for coastal development. Additionally, there was investment in Moroccan tourism and real estate by Gulf Nations, pouring even more money into the countries burgeoning tourism sectors. And as a result, Morocco’s agricultural sector decreased between 2009 and 2010, while service and industry grew to replace their loss.

Morocco’s relatively strong economic position leading up to the Arab Spring revolutions may have softened the initial blow in comparison to less prosperous nations. Instead of protesting the availability of bread, protestors in Morocco were first more interested in democratization of government. While there was some records of protests regarding the cost of

utilities and unemployment in the country, comparing those isolated incidents with the economics focused protests in Tunisia is impossible. Thus, the reforms necessary to quell the protestors may have been more focused than for other nations. However, it should be noted that as the effects of the Eurozone crisis became more pronounced in Morocco’s tourism-based economy, protesters became more interested in economic failures. This may not have manifested itself fully until after the King’s referendum.

Secondly, the Moroccan political system and Monarchy prior to the Arab Spring was unlike any other regime in the region. Instead of an outright absolute monarchy or military junta, Morocco had maintained a form of absolute-constitutional monarchy since its constitution was ratified in the early 1960’s. In 1996, a push for reform led Hassan II to shift towards a bicameral parliament, expanding the supposed democratization of the state. This created a unique fusion of constitutional monarchy and theocracy. The King retained the right to “appoint the Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet, as well as the powers to dissolve parliament, arrange new elections, and rule by decree.” Basic human rights were also enshrined within the Moroccan constitution, including equal protection under the law, political rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, although those rights had been limited by royal decree on a case by case basis.

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40 Ibid
dynastic contention that they were descended from the Prophet Muhammad. While the King still held nigh-absolute power in the state, the bicameral nature of the constitutional monarchy promoted some representation and a structure for social stability. The lower house would be directly elected by the citizenry of Morocco, while the upper house would be elected by professional organizations. While the legislatures had the ability to determine the budget and potentially impeach the government, corruption and influence by the King firmly controlled the institutionalization of party democracy. This potentially gave the King more flexibility when faced with the demands of pro-reform protestors, as he not only gained ministerial scapegoats for any actions or inactions, but it also gave him a foundation from which to develop his reform platform. And with such an enshrined religious pedigree, removal of the king from power would be a difficult proposition to many of Morocco’s faithful.

Those two defining features established, moving to examine the qualities and actions of Mohammed VI, Morocco’s monarch during the Arab Spring, is the logical next step in contrasting his actions with those suggested by The Prince.

To begin, it’s important to understand the distinction between Mohammed VI and his father, Hassan II. As previously mentioned, Hassan was notoriously prone to brutality, repressing revolts with disregard for international pressures. With such a history of brutality in the past, one might’ve expected Mohammed VI to continue on a similar trajectory, especially when confronted with the eruption of large scale protests during the Arab Spring. Instead he took a more controlled approach to governing. Mohammed VI had become known as a reformer, far

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41 Ibid
42 Ibid
43 Ibid
44 Ibid
less brutal than his father, and was generally loved by his people.\textsuperscript{45} He had developed a wide ranging propaganda network, allowing him to push his image as a reformer and religious figure out to the general public en-masse. Ritualistic military and religious traditions helped to cement this image of the King, especially in lower class and rural areas.\textsuperscript{46} Soon after his rule, he formed the Equity and Reconciliation Commission which sought to document his father’s abuses and to offer reparations to their victims. However, Mohammed’s regime has also been identified as particularly corrupt. In the famous “WikiLeaks” diplomatic cables, Mohammed was said to have attempted to reform the corruption present in his father’s regime, but had inadvertently presided over its institutionalization.\textsuperscript{47} While North Africa is no stranger to corruption, it did provide protestors with a source of outrage against the ruling family.

Through these actions it’s clear that even before the protests, Mohammed VI had a clear base of support behind him. In the battle between being loved and feared, Mohammed was certainly more loved, and had unquestionably managed to avoid hatred from the majority of the population. He had also managed to establish control of the country after his father’s death, avoiding any extraordinarily powerful advisors or generals. He also understood the value of a public persona, spending a significant amount of time working to reinforce his image as a reformer and beneficent monarch through propaganda. By Machiavelli’s theory, all that was required of Mohammed to retain a firm grasp on his throne was the honoring of dynastic


traditions, a willingness to use cunning if necessary, and the continual avoidance of actions which could incite public hatred.

Protests

For Mohammed VI, the Arab Spring began in earnest on February 20, 2011, when a Facebook-organized protest of around 10,000 citizens marched through the streets of Rabat. Unlike the brutal reprisals quickly enacted by other regimes, the Moroccan police stayed removed until that night, when they persuaded remaining protestors to return to their homes. Nevertheless, several groups including the “February 20 Movement for Change,” emerged from the protests and quickly gathered a large online following. Through Facebook and Twitter, protests spread to Marrakech, Casablanca, and many other Moroccan towns. But unlike in Egypt and Libya, protestors mainly called for a new, more democratic, constitution rather than the outright removal of the King.

In response to the protests, Mohammed VI made a landmark speech on March 9. In it, he announced the creation of a commission to develop constitutional revisions, promising an unveiling in June. The March 9 announcement was taken with optimism by most protestors, but protests continued after its announcement. This period also saw an uptick in the amount of police repression and arrests made on the protestors, although whether that was an isolated

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incident or directive from the government is hard to determine.\textsuperscript{51,52} On June 1, Mohammed announced his reforms for a new constitution, chief among them: the replacement of the King as head of government and chief policymaker by the elected Prime Minister. Other reforms were also included in his proposal, including: the election of the Prime Minister by the party who wins the most seats, parliamentary oversight of civil rights, civic and social equality for women, an independent judiciary, and high-governmental appointments made jointly by the Prime Minister and King. Yet Mohammed retained some of his previous powers, including total control over the military, the ability to appoint judges, and a slightly reworded, yet still significant proclamation of his religious importance to the nation. While the reforms were not broad enough to satisfy all of the protestors, the July referendum which ratified the changes to the constitution was passed with a turnout of 73%, with 98.5% of voters approving the changes.\textsuperscript{53}

Soon after the changes were ratified, an election was held to determine the makeup of the new government. A moderate Islamist party emerged victorious, nominated their own prime minister, and set about appointing their own government ministers. But contrary to what might’ve been expected after such a referendum and free elections, protests continued well into 2012 and 2013 with turnouts similarly sized to those prior to the referendum. But these protests were different in that they focused more on economic issues such as unemployment, literacy, utility costs, and a growing agricultural crisis. The protests were also different in that they often

found less fault with the king and his regime than with the ruling parliamentary party. 54 Whether Mohammed VI meant to accomplish such a maneuver is debatable, but even if coincidental the maneuver evokes direct correlation with the act described in the prince. Similarly, if such a move was calculated at some point by Mohammed, it would certainly not have been in his best interest to publicize its execution.

There has also been some debate over whether the King’s transfer of power to the civilian government has actually changed anything about the Moroccan governing structure. Whereas some experts claim that the reforms made to the Moroccan constitution have created the beginnings of a strong popular democracy, there is a real argument that the King’s position in Morocco is even stronger than before the protests. Because of the party structure and coalition requirement of the Moroccan parliamentary system, infighting between powerful moderate Islamist groups has been weakening the monarchy’s main opponents. And as mentioned before, while that infighting occurred external blame for the countries lack of progress fell more on the shoulders of the ruling parties, instead of the King. This has given Mohammed the chance to expand his soft power within his nation. Instead of spending all his hours ruling from the palace, he has instead waded into his people’s problems as a sort of protective, advocate figure for the public good. 55 The dysfunction of the Moroccan parliament has also given Mohammed a substantial amount of power not reserved to him by the constitution. With his religious standing

and public persona, the King’s now has a formal and informal method of vetoing legislation. In a way, the King has become the nexus of political power in Morocco, representing a single authoritative figure with the power to work on matters of economy, politics, military, and law, with the public support to actually affect change in those areas.

### Analysis

Mohammed VI’s actions in pacifying Morocco were perhaps not in line with traditional notions of Machiavellian actions. He shied away from violent confrontation with the protestors, as the police were mainly used to keep order rather than break up protestors. The military was never called out into the streets, and political imprisonment was restrained. He also willingly ceded some of his powers to a newly formed legislative branch, willingly weakening the strength of his dynasty and showing weakness by submitting to the demands of the mob. These actions have allowed him to become more loved by his subjects, but love is, as made clear by Machiavelli, a fickle emotion at best.

But from a different angle, it is hard not to identify some of Mohammed’s decisions with actions in *The Prince*. Again, it is difficult to realize whether Mohammed had planned to scapegoat the legislature for Morocco’s problems in advance. Nevertheless, it is just as difficult to argue that he has not taken advantage of the circumstance after it presented itself. This act, transferring power to another then using their failures as a means to ingratiate oneself with the masses, is quite recognizable of what Cesare Borgia did to Remiro d’Orco in Chapter Seven of

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57 Al-Tagi, Mohammad, trans. Pascale El-Khoury. "Despite His 'Absence,' Moroccan King Maintains Total Authority."
The Prince. Remiro was tasked with quelling a recently conquered province, and in doing so had become a figure of hatred by the people of that area. After he succeeded, Remiro was publically executed by Cesare to gain favor with the town Remiro had pacified, thus exhibiting the Borgia’s power and brutality to all those who heard of it. Mohammed’s actions were certainly less violent, but they were no less cunning. He had dumped the work of governing on his opposition, elevated himself to become the people’s defender, and maintained control over the religious establishment and military, arguably the two most influential organizations in the Moroccan government.

Additionally, Mohammed masterfully portrayed his position throughout the Arab Spring. His addresses to the public were humble, full of hope, and neglected to take blame for any failing of government. News of his “good works”, mingling on street corners with the people and promising to work for their betterment, reached far into the Arab world, leading him to be named the 5th most influential Muslim leader out of a pool of 500 leaders, comprised from Iran to sub-Saharan Africa. Instead of being seen as a tyrant, he is lauded for his “domestic reform policies and pioneering efforts in modernizing Morocco and countering terrorism. He tackles issues of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion at home, and has improved foreign relations.”

Mohammed VI’s actions were not directly in line with the typical idea of Machiavellianism, but they did fit in with the “Machiavellian Regime” established previously. Mohammed found himself in charge of a hereditary regime precariously poised at the peak of a precipice, one threatening the very existence of his regime. Instead of overreacting and risking

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59 Ibid.
violation of his dynastic customs, hatred, and the violation of his subject’s private property, Mohammed ceded some power to maintain stability. He then worked through powers ceded to him as a multi-generational ruler to inspire adoration in his subjects, passing their hatred onto the popular government while maintaining control from behind the scenes. He has showed significant cunning, political aptitude, and understanding of the value a positive public persona affords a leader. His decisions were similarly apt, and while he didn’t rely on repression, they certainly aligned with the realpolitik idea of duplicitous diplomacy and the importance of propaganda. If Mohammed had relied more on repression, it’s likely that he might’ve met a similar fate as other North African leaders did. Therefore, it seems that The Prince would have been successful in Morocco, to an extent. To what extent depends on the balance between supporting repression and cunning in The Prince, which can be read subjectively to support either position.
V

Tunisia

Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring, and as such managed to draw the attention of the entire world based on the intensity of its protests. It’s President, Zine Al Abedine Ben Ali, was a democratically elected leader in name only, ruling since the late 1980’s at the head of an unequivocally repressive and authoritarian regime.

While he entered office seen as a reformer and initially began to loosen the repressive tendencies of his predecessor, he soon continued a legacy of press censorship and suppression of dissent. Ben Ali created a systemic secret police apparatus, formed around the suppression of political dissidents and rigging elections. His political party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally, was the only major party in Tunisian politics and filled almost all positions of government. Tunisia was also a relatively prosperous country, enjoying increasing foreign investment in the years preceding the revolution. It was even labeled as one of the “African Tigers,” singled out for its rapidly increasing GDP and political stability when compared with the rest of Africa. But an unemployment rate of nearly 15% and food availability remained points of economic hardship for much of the country, with the worst economic conditions focusing on overeducated youths. Somehow, this coalition of economic malcontents ousted

President Ben Ali from his position within a month of the beginning of protests. Given the position of his regime, and the prosperity of the elite within his country, how did such a stable prince lose his hold on power so easily?

Protests

The protests in Tunisia mainly began as a response to economic hardship. On December 17, 2010, a young fruit vendor was assessed a fine by the police in his rural town. Outraged and humiliated, he set himself on fire in front of the police station. His story encouraged others suffering from economic hardships to protest as well, and the first stories of police crackdowns began to emerge on social media around December 20.64 After more suicides of young adults protesting unemployment and homelessness, protests finally reached Tunis on the 27th of December. At some point during their spread to Tunis, the protests took on a substantially more anti-Ben Ali message, in addition to the prior messages of economic hardship.

The reaction to these protests by police, secret police, and “security forces” was brutal. Protestors were beaten by police, shots were fired directly into crowds, and mass arrests began to take place.65 A press blackout was implemented to halt images of the crackdown reaching the outside world, and access to many popular websites was restricted around the country. On January 3rd, 2011, President Ben Ali gave a speech in which he said that the law would be used “in all firmness” to punish the protestors.

On July 9, reports of black-uniformed “security agents” emerged from areas around Kessarine. These agents carried military grade weapons, but were not outright affiliated with

64 "Riots Reported in Tunisian City." - Al Jazeera English.
65 Ryan. "Another Tunisian Protester Dies."
either the military or royal guard, and shot at protestors on sight. While these stories might have been nothing more than fabrications, especially considering the black-clad agents reported on were specifically mentioned to include a blonde female, the escalation of violence after the President’s January 3rd speech was not. Soon after the speech, security forces stepped up the use of both non-lethal teargas and baton assaults on protestors, as well as the use of rubber bullets. At some point outright firing into crowds developed, with the use of “dum-dum” bullets specifically mentioned, which expand after impact for maximum killing potential. While the press blackout made confirming casualties and stories difficult, reporting over social media enabled news of the crackdown to reach beyond Tunisia. International organizations such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch have since condemned the use of force by the Tunisian police and security forces during the protests.

Perhaps sensing that the attempted suppression of the protests was ineffective, President Ben Ali returned to television on January 10. In his address, he promised that 300,000 new jobs would be created in Tunisia, all universities and schools would be officially closed until further notice, and that “masked gangs” and terrorists were responsible for the mass protests sweeping

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his nation.71 Far from quelling the protests, Ben Ali’s speech seemed to have an opposite effect, drawing reactions from opposition political parties as well as renewed efforts from the protestors. Ben Ali would return to television a final time on January 14, in a speech which covered a broad base of topics. In it, he pledged not to seek re-election in 2014, cease the use of firearms against protestors by security forces, increase subsidies on food, and open the internet for free use.72 Interestingly, he then went on to say that his advisors had deceived him, that he was a member of the Tunisian people at heart. Finally, he called for a state of emergency to be implemented across Tunisia, and for elections to be scheduled in six months. Despite these concessions, Ben Ali would flee Tunisia later that day, shortly before the military came out to support the protestors.

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Analysis

Where did Ben Ali go wrong? He had developed a state centered on his power and personality, supported by a massive secret police organization. He had led Tunisia into relative prosperity for an African nation, even though the spiraling world-wide depression. He had subsidized food, cracked down on outright opposition, and censored the press so information hostile to his regime was unable to be spread. While Ben Ali’s government was corrupt, sometimes to the point of dispossessing other’s property, it was not excessively tax heavy. All of these actions are what one would expect from a typical dictatorial prince, using fear and repression along with subsidies to avoid hatred. He even had a secret police and national press to

supply him with positive propaganda. Yet a street protest in a rural town over unemployment spiraled to the point where he was unable to continue his reign as president.

Even his actions once the protests started were defensible using ideas from *The Prince*. The crackdown on protests, escalation from non-lethal dispersion tactics to outright firing into crowds, attempting to limit the flow of information from protest zones to other potential revolutionaries, Machiavelli likely would have endorsed all of these actions using a simple cost-benefit analysis of brutality vs. potential damage if protests were to continue. Machiavelli certainly wouldn’t have shied away from cruelty or human rights abuses in the face of revolts calling for a prince’s resignation. Additionally, Ben Ali was a prince who had proven his ability over 50 years of military and government service, heading a mixed principality which had grown accustomed to his rule. Once he recognized that repression was unlikely to work, he turned to concessions, hoping that the love of the people would keep him in power where fear had failed. It was also at that moment that he said something curious about being deceived by his advisors, although it’s effectively impossible to know exactly what that was in reference to, Machiavelli would likely have questioned how a king ceded so much power to his advisors that they were able to deceive him. But by that point, hate had already been fostered in the populace and his reign was effectively over.

By the “Machiavellian regime” standard previously created, Ben Ali acted in a rational fashion. He sought to quell his population using both fear and love, coming from an initial position of not-hatred, and failed to secure his throne. Reasoning why such a failure occurred could be difficult. Looking at it from a strictly “Machiavellian” sense, perhaps Ben Ali had simply not gone far enough in his repression of the protestors. If he had been even more brutal, reaching levels of violent repression commonly held in infamy, perhaps his people would have
retreated. Another reason for his failure could be the evolution of mass media and social networking. As in many other Arab Spring countries, protestors in Tunisia relied heavily on proxy servers and the internet for organization. The internet also gave them a route to distribute their stories and images to the greater public, drawing scrutiny to the crackdown from both people within and without the borders of Tunisia. Or perhaps the poor economic situation in Tunisia simply outweighed whatever success Ben Ali might’ve initially had in suppressing the protestors. The media and internet could’ve also worked against him in this capacity, as it allowed malcontents information on the economic situation outside their country. Whatever the exact reason, Ben Ali was deposed, and following a pragmatic “Machiavellian regime” style rule failed to secure his power.
VI

Egypt

Egypt prior to the Arab Spring represented a mixed principality with ambitions of moving towards a hereditary monarchy. Hosni Mubarak became president of Egypt after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and ruled for thirty years after gaining the presidency. Some referred to him as a modern day pharaoh, ruling Egypt in an authoritarian style regime with full intention of passing the presidency onto his son after retirement. But Mubarak’s presidency was upended in an incredibly short time, and against an incredibly repressive response from the government.

Mubarak’s reign in Egypt until 2011 had been characterized by stability at the expense of freedoms. His regime was extensively supported by western countries, and the military establishment from which Mubarak had risen to power was constantly at the forefront of Egyptian politics and society. Mubarak also benefitted from martial law as per the “Emergency Law” enacted in Egypt as a response to the Six Day War. Originally thought of as a temporary measure, the “Emergency Law” was perpetually renewed by the regime. It became a mainstay of domestic Egyptian governing, as it gave “greater powers to the police, suspends certain constitutional rights in the name of security, allows the state to detain individuals and censor and close newspapers more easily and allows authorities to try civilians in front of military and security courts under certain circumstances.”73 In 2010, Amnesty International estimated that

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somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 people were imprisoned under the “Emergency Law,” all in detention without a clear charge or plans for trial.  

Police brutality also became a staple of the Mubarak regime under the perpetual “Emergency Law.” The US State Department released a report in 2009 decrying the human rights record of the Egyptian regime, and confirming the commonality of torture against detainees by the Egyptian police. The torture included horrific acts of physical violence, and even went as far as to include domestic journalists accused of anti-regime ideas. There were also secret police organizations active under the Mubarak regime, tasked with suppressing protests, torturing dissidents, and domestic information gathering. As protests began to emerge, the “Emergency Act,” torture and unlawful detentions, and the secret police would all become major issues for the protestors.

Despite the stability of the country, the economic status of Egypt was in flux before the emergence of protest. Vast population growth had compressed the amount of available arable land, while compressing populations into increasingly crowded cities. As this demographic bulge generation has reached the workforce, “unemployment in Egypt is almost 10 times as high for college graduates as it is for people who have gone through elementary school.” These urban poor tended to be young, educated, and unemployed, matching problems similar to other North African countries at the outbreak of protests. While Mubarak had achieved some success in

growing Egypt’s tourist industry and GDP, there were simply not enough positions available for the educated youth. Food availability also became scarce in the run up to the protests, leading to calls for greater subsidies on foodstuffs. Corruption from Mubarak and his advisors also placed an increased burden on the economy, with bribery and fraud a common aspect of life.77

Protests

The protests in Egypt began as a direct result of those in Tunisia. Seeing the success that the opposition protests had in deposing President Ben Ali, oppositional groups in Egypt organized a day of protests on January 25, 2011. The protests were organized by a conglomerate of oppositional movements, and were focused on protesting the police, lack of term limits on the presidency, and head of the Interior Ministry. Again, instrumental in the organizing of the protest was online social media, which likely allowed oppositional groups to spread their message to a much wider audience than through word of mouth or pamphlets.78 Nevertheless, the police stepped in to disperse the protests during the night, firing tear gas into Tahrir Square to discourage overnight occupation. Protests continued through January 28, with six protestors killed and around 1,000 detained by the police.79

Then on January 28, also known as the “Friday of Rage,” protestors turned out in great numbers across the country. In Cairo specifically, the reprisals against the protests turned more

violent. Hundreds of protestors died and thousands were detained or injured in clashes with police. Nevertheless, the protestors managed to arrive at Tahrir Square, prompting a withdrawal of police forces and the deployment of army units. That night, Mubarak gave a speech in which he dissolved the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, promised “new steps to face unemployment and increase the standard of living and services ... new steps to stand by the poor and those with limited income,” and expressed regret at the violence which had broken out between Egyptian youths and the police. Another notable event was the near total disconnection of Egypt from the internet that night, an event which was unprecedented since the expansion of a global internet.

The speech was not as convincing as Mubarak may have hoped. February 1st saw the biggest turnout of protestors in Cairo yet, by some estimates comprising a million individuals. The protest was focused in Tahrir Square, which was still policed by the Army at that time. Seeing that his previous speech was unsuccessful in dispelling the wide public displeasure with his rule, Mubarak issued another speech in which he swore off running for another term as president, called on the parliament to consider constitutional amendments relating to presidential term limits, and spoke at length of his long service to the Egyptian people and devotion to reform. He also made a point of praising the “noble youth’s…noble and civilized phenomenon of practicing freedom of expression,” blaming the violence of the protests on dissident

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individuals seeking to destabilize Egypt for their political gain. This was perhaps a thinly veiled reference towards the Muslim Brotherhood, who had long been outlawed by Mubarak over their involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

The public reaction to this speech was not much better than the one given on January 28. Instead of dispersing, protestors continued to rally in Tahrir Square, calling for Mubarak’s resignation as president. A group of pro-Mubarak supporters mounted on camels and horses then charged into the protestors on the square in an attempt on clearing the crowds. While it is difficult to correlate such action with a direct government order, given that many government officials accused of organizing the event were later found innocent, it’s worth noting that neither the police nor army who were standing guard around the square intervened. Protests continued in similar fashion, with rallies in the square and daily marches met by police and regime-supporter violence, until February 10th, when Mubarak ventured to make yet another speech. This speech was unique as many protestors and opposition members thought that Mubarak may officially announce his resignation, instead he went forward with more promises. He reiterated that he would not seek election again, and that the Presidency would be awarded to whomever the people choose in a September election, that six amendments to the constitution had been sent to the parliament including a repeal of the emergency act, and that he would delegate significant powers to his vice president, something which Mubarak had steadfastly avoided throughout his reign. Again, instead of quelling protests, Mubarak’s speech incited anger in the protestors

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who were expecting his removal. The next day, dubbed “Defiance Friday,” saw thousands of protestors march on the Presidential Palace and state television building demanding Mubarak’s resignation. It was at this point that Mubarak finally relinquished his office, thus ending his reign in Egypt.

Analysis

Much like President Ben Ali in Tunisia, President Mubarak was a conservative leader who valued stability over his citizens’ rights. He had led Egypt through difficult international times, avoiding conflicts with Israel and had suppressed the burgeoning Islamist political movement for many years. But he was unsuccessful in ultimately unsuccessful in his attempt to maintain power.

Much of what Mubarak did to quell the Arab Spring in Egypt was well within the boundaries of the “Machiavellian regime”. He had developed a sophisticated authoritarian regime where his power was unquestionably absolute. He used state censorship and control over media to promote his agenda and to silence his enemies, including the protestors during the early stages of the revolt. He had control over the military and police establishment, with a dedicated force of secret police clearly willing to torture and violate the rights of their fellow citizens on his behalf. He used all of these advantages against the protestors, and furthermore showed few qualms about resorting to brutality as a means of quelling the uprising. While he didn’t outright

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slaughter the people in the streets, hundreds died and many thousands more were detained or injured, certainly enough to satisfy Machiavelli’s pronouncement that cruelty in the face of an uprising is a justified and wise action. He also clearly relied on a culture of fear to keep peace in Egypt, but was pragmatic enough to try love when it became clear that fear no longer worked to keep his people in line. The duplicitous nature was there, although it may be safe to say that Mubarak was not an especially learned or cunning man, just one skilled at repression.

Nevertheless, Mubarak was clearly a ruler of some aptitude, and understood propaganda well enough over the course of thirty years to warrant the loyalty of those he commanded.

So why did the “Machiavellian Regime” fail in Egypt? Like Tunisia, defining a clear reason for the failure of authoritarianism is difficult. Certainly the trying economic times played a part, as unemployment in a large youth population is a classic recipe for anti-government insurgency. Perhaps Mubarak’s corruption and lack of economic reforms finally fomented hate from the population when food became scarce and jobs scarcer. The internet also played a substantial part in Mubarak’s failure. Social networking was heavily involved in organizing the protests from the very beginning, and gave the protestors a “place for venting the outrage resulting from years of repression, economic instability and individual frustration,” likely leading to radicalization against the regime.⁸⁸ Even when the regime went as far as to disconnect Egypt from the internet, somehow reports and pictures from Tahrir Square still made it out to the general population. Because they were no longer able to control the message, and Mubarak’s already disliked regime became seen as a totally repressive force, any propaganda the government produced was simply written off as false and hate for the regime further mounted.

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⁸⁸ Vargas, Jose. "Spring Awakening."
An interesting connotation to this phenomena involves Mubarak’s several speeches during the revolution, as he tried to backpedal from his initially repressive stance towards the protestors. Instead of becoming satisfied with promises of reform and smaller concessions, the demand for Mubarak’s resignation simply became more prevalent. Whether such a scenario would have occurred without the availability of social networking and global media is questionable.
VII

Syria

The authoritarian regime in Syria was based around the hereditary rule of the Al-Assad family. Hafez Al-Assad ruled as a virtual dictator until July of 2000, when his son Bashar took over the Presidency. Bashar had been educated extensively in the United Kingdom, and initially hopes of his platform as a reformist President were high. Instead, Bashar quickly cracked down on any outspoken, pro-reform Syrian intellectuals and continued in his father’s tradition of political repression. This same theme of hope for reform, followed by brutal oppression, manifested itself again during the rise of the Arab Spring. More than any other nation so far discussed, Syria was, and continues to be, the most violent byproduct of the Arab Spring protests. Bashar spared no thought for international perception of his actions, at some point giving up hope of a negotiated settlement in favor of pure brutality. Still, his regime was unable to effectively put down the Arab Spring protests.

Politically, the Bashar Al-Assad government closely followed in the footsteps of his father’s regime. The Syrian state under Bashar was a single party state, where the ruling Ba’ath party was enshrined in the Syrian constitution as the “leader of the state and society.” Similar to Egypt, the Al-Assad regime had continually used and upheld an emergency measure enacted during the 1960’s well into the beginning of protests. The emergency measure banned public gatherings of more than five individuals, effectively throttling public dissent until the Arab Spring. Bashar also had a substantial secret police apparatus in the “Al Jawiya,” a group which

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90 Ibid.
also played a part in the regime’s substantial propaganda output.91 Human rights were also subject to violation by the Al-Assad regime, denying citizens their freedom of expression and torturing dissidents. While Bashar did not reach the same levels of butchery that his father did prior to the outbreak of Civil War, as Hafez reportedly killed 10-20,000 civilians in the suppression of riots, the political and human rights abuses were significant in the beginnings of protests.

As in many of the previously discussed countries, demographics and economics played a significant factor in beginning the Syrian Arab Spring protests. Firstly, the ruling Alawite sect is Shia, while the majority of the country is Sunni. This inevitably created some tension and resentment among the Sunni population over preferential treatment Shia were receiving in the government. This religious tension helped feed into a second point, rising socio-economic difficulties. Majority Sunni cities such as Daraa and Homs were some of the poorest and worst employed cities in Syria leading up to 2011, and were consequently integral locations for the spread of protests.92 Many of the rural Sunni areas in Syria had also been subjected to a four year long drought, destroying previously arable lands.93 This was partially a consequence of Bashar and Hafez Al-Assad’s modernization plans for the Syrian economy, which in actuality

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concentrated wealth at the hands of Baath party members at the expense of the lower classes.94 And as always, there was significant unemployment specifically in the educated youth demographic in the decade prior to 2011. Internet and social media access was also restricted in Syria, especially after the integral part they both played in other revolutions. Between systemic youth unemployment, an oncoming agricultural and water crisis, and religious tensions, the previously stable Syrian state was primed for confrontation.

Protests

The actual civil uprising in Syria began on March 15, mainly in Damascus, Aleppo, and Daraa. As previously mentioned, these cities all had significant unemployment, especially among youths, and had large numbers of disenfranchised Sunni citizens. They began in response to the arrest of several adolescents who spray painted pro-Arab Spring slogans onto a wall. The protests were highly political, demanding more freedoms and democratic government.95 Police spared little time, and quickly turned to teargas and live rounds to clear the mobs. Instead of curtailing the revolts, the crowds grew larger in many cities. Facebook groups supporting the new “Syrian Revolution” began to appear, calling for renewed protests in the face of police brutality.96 By March 25, Al-Assad attempted to give concessions to the protestors, offering a repeal of the emergency act and the discussion of more political freedoms in return for de-escalation of the protests. He also had released a statement saying that he specifically ordered the

94 Ibid.
police not to shoot into masses of protestors, but the very next day they did just that.\textsuperscript{97} But the propaganda machine in Syria continued to remain strong, as foreign reporters were banned from Syria and television news stations only reported on pro-Bashar crowds.\textsuperscript{98} This pattern of police repression through beatings and live ammunition coupled with assurances of statewide peace by state news networks continued well into April.

On March 30, Bashar gave a televised speech on the Syrian government network. Instead of offering further concessions to protestors, as other leaders did, Bashar instead played up the strength of his regime and his resolve to overcome the saboteurs who want “to fragment Syria, to bring down Syria as a nation, to enforce an Israeli agenda.”\textsuperscript{99} This effectively heralded in a new phase of the Syrian regime response to the protests, with a greater reliance on military action. On April 25, Daraa, one of the beginning cities of the protests, was occupied by tanks supported with infantry. Reports of shootouts in the streets quickly spread, as the Syrian Army sought out protest leaders.\textsuperscript{100} The city was effectively put into siege, as the army shut off utilities, water, and internet from the beleaguered townspeople. Even reports of shallow mass graves uncovered by townspeople began emanation out of the occupied Daraa zone.\textsuperscript{101} And by May 5, Daraa had been


\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.


quelled, and the military moved to occupy Homs and towns across the Syrian countryside in a similar manner. By May 24, an Egyptian human rights organization said that they could account for over 1,000 civilians killed by the Syrian army, with more than 10,000 more detained during the protests. It was at this point that the first mentions of armed resistance fighters emerged from the growing Syrian warzone. Since then Syria has been mired in civil war, with atrocities committed by all sides in the conflict, and foreign fighters playing a key role in maintaining manpower for the religious proxy war.

Analysis

Did Bashar Al-Assad’s government follow the “Machiavellian regime”? If nothing else, he certainly followed Machiavelli’s prescriptions for a hereditary monarchy, following directly in his father’s footsteps in terms of repression and denial of basic human rights. He also clearly meant to inspire fear with his continual repression of protestors. A duplicitous nature also emerged from his various offers of vague concessions and reforms, showing a willingness to use cunning where direct force had not managed to secure a desirable result. Bashar even had a well-established propaganda arm to his regime, and had managed to achieve an almost complete ban on foreign reporters from his territory until the civil war truly began. Media and internet access was supposedly similarly controlled, although reports on regime brutality and protest organizations managed to find their way around Syria thanks to proxy sites.

But Machiavelli never endorsed cruelty beyond what was barely necessary for the fulfillment of a goal. In The Prince, cruelty and regime brutality were depicted as loathsome acts

meant to be limited if at all possible. Similarly, avoiding hatred from interfering with citizens loved ones and personal property was a key tenant of *The Prince*’s core policy. By ordering his military to essentially lay siege to his own people and directing police to shoot into crowds during the very beginning of the protests, Bashar galvanized the hatred against him. What was a previously stable “Machiavellian regime” faced with economic issues and some democratic fervor quickly became a people united against a government which sought to kill them and their loved ones. Do such actions still fit in with the notion that the Al-Assad regime was a follower of a “Machiavellian regime” style policy? While not in as much as other regimes previously discussed, but it would be somewhat hypocritical to say that the type of decisive authoritarian repression pursued by Bashar wasn’t rooted at least partially in Machiavelli’s teachings.

So why did an arguably “Machiavellian regime” fail in this case? Hatred seems to be the clearest answer. The uninhibited brutality exhibited by Bashar Al-Assad in trying to crush the protests simply made his people more willing to fight. *The Prince* says that cruelty in moderation can actually be better for a society in that it creates a utilitarian outcome, but in Syria the amount of violence may have been more than what Machiavelli would’ve held as moderate. There’s also a legitimate question of whether Syria would’ve experienced such an expansion of the revolution if the regime had managed to segregate Daraa and other starting locations from the rest of the state. Again, technology and media must have played a part in inciting more unrest.
VIII

Conclusion

From the analysis conducted on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, it’s clear that The Prince can no longer be taken as a literal policy treatise. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria where the authoritarian regimes in power closely adhered to the tactics of the “Machiavellian regime,” frugality, fear over love over hatred, repression, propaganda, duplicitous negotiations, and cunning, the regimes failed. It did not matter how repressive the regime was, how the regime justified their decisions to the people, or how quickly the regime offered concessions to the protestors, the authoritarian realpolitik model of state government was unable to maintain clear dominance. Morocco was a different beast, as it had a distinctly different political structure and past history than the other three regimes. And where fear and repression failed elsewhere, Morocco’s tactics of conciliation worked perfectly. The protests were quelled, the people shifted their anger towards another political figure, and Mohammed VI has been able to continue significantly influencing events in his country from his position of religious and economic power.

Then again, was The Prince truly ever supposed to be used in this manner? While it had a significant amount of time and space devoted to suggesting the best policies and personalities for a prince, it never outright gave specific methods which must be taken to achieve success in an endeavor. Machiavelli’s questionable relationship with despotic regimes and the potential satire contained within The Prince raise even more questions about the actual applicability of the prince to politics.

Nevertheless, The Prince does give a good indication of what would’ve been considered good realist politics during the Renaissance. And from that comes another question, would
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have been successful in their repression of protests in Machiavelli’s time? It would seem likely. If these regimes had been able to quarantine news of unrest just to towns where it began, then quick brutality would likely have been enough to smash the protests and continue ruling as if it had never occurred. And even if news did somehow spread, there would’ve been no way for protestors to organize across the city without significant skullduggery, and there certainly wouldn’t have been any way to coordinate protests across a country. The rebels could have been crushed in their towns, and nobody in other cities or outside the country would’ve known anything about it. In fact, this style of authoritarian regime has been seen for generations since Machiavelli, and was especially used by Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar’s father as late as the 1970’s and 80’s.

So what changed? In this case, certainly not the people or economy, as rural North Africa and Syria is perhaps as close to Medieval as it gets nowadays. It was technology. Technology in the form of social media, online forums, online news, uploading photos, the 24 hour media cycle, satellite phones, mobile internet, satellite television, proxy websites, and telephone communications. All of these technologies played some part in ruining the authoritarian response to the Arab Spring. Because of social media, protestors were able to organize protests and avoid police blockades. Because of online forums, unemployed youths and malcontents could whip themselves into hatred of the government by bouncing stories off of one another. And because of the online news media, stories of repression and brutality made it out to the wider population within minutes of their occurrence.

*The Prince* was not primarily about how a prince should think, it was about how he should conduct himself through public relations to avoid being hated. When propaganda can be refuted by outside sources available to all, and when stories of a princes injustices becomes viral,
there is no way to hide from hatred, no amount of fear or love can overwhelm such widespread knowledge. Thus, the end of the “end justifying the means” has come, and the internet has brought it about.
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