December 2017

Collaboration and Conflict in Transnationally-Dispersed Zimbabwean Families

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Abstract

Approximately one quarter of Zimbabwean adults left their country of birth during the past twenty years. These sojourners are increasingly dispersed as tightening immigration regimes in preferred destinations and fluctuating global opportunities lead them to places with fewer historical links to Zimbabwe. This dispersive process fractures many families between multiple international locations. Nevertheless, the idea of family remains centrally important to diasporans, who work with relatives around the world to care for children and elders, to acquire important documents like passports, and to prepare for an eventual return home. Following from performative and relational theorizations of kinship, this dissertation argues that collaborative projects are crucibles in which families are forged and reconfigured.

This exploration of how dispersion shapes family life deploys three analytical lenses: history, space and technology. Contemporary journeys are historically linked to a century of dispossession and labor-migration in Southern Africa. Colonial governments used onerous “bioinformational regimes” to subjugate Africans and profit from their labor. Today, former colonial powers deploy similar technologies against descendants of subjugated populations in order to restrict access to opportunity that was produced and spatialized through colonial processes. Concurrently, contemporary diasporans build on the “transferable skills” received from previous generations of sojourners. For instance, they use “spatial subterfuge” and “collaborative parenting” to create families of choice—families which may not conform to either indigenous ideals or immigration regimes.

Each of the many places where diasporans live is imbued with unique structures of opportunity and oppression. These localized social and economic conditions powerfully influence migrant outcomes and shape how they are able to engage in family projects. People in wealthy countries like Canada and the UK have more economic power than relatives in South Africa or Botswana. Women also find more plentiful opportunities than their husbands and brothers, while younger diasporans tend to fare better than parents and elder siblings. Emergent economic differences may upset expectations about how money and power should be distributed in families. Such disjunctures—combined with the challenge of negotiating overwhelming family needs in the context of scarcity—often leads to conflict between relatives.

Distance also results in “separate development” as family members in various locations develop individuated friendships, routines, experiences and even beliefs. These new dimensions of life may be poorly understood by loved ones far away. Today, internet-mediated communications technologies are enabling people in dispersed families to salvage some of this lost relational immediacy. Social media like Facebook enable a degree of passive, contextual monitoring; while group chats on platforms like WhatsApp allow multinational conversations to unfold much as they do over the course of a leisurely weekend visit. New discursive registers
like the “meme” even allow pluralistic discussions about important questions of collective interest, as everyone with a claim on being “Zimbabwean” creatively weighs in on the meaning of this identity, and as Zimbabweans of various backgrounds who live in divergent spaces debate whether the spoils of migration are worth its dangers and sacrifices.

This dissertation accordingly examines how families negotiate the marked challenges of prolonged separation and international dispersion, and how these efforts relate to negotiations of identity and belonging in the broader Zimbabwean diaspora. These interlinked questions of collaboration and conflict, continuity and change, proximity and distance are similarly important in many other migrant communities, as increasingly restrictive immigration regimes and the fluctuating global economy shape who is able to move and where they may settle.
COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT IN

TRANSNATIONALLY-DISPERSED ZIMBABWEAN FAMILIES

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.

Syracuse University
December 2017
Acknowledgements

Thank you to my wife Gillian for your patience and unwavering support, and for believing in me when I did not believe in myself.

Thanks Taps and Anesu for not caring.

Thank you to Mom, Dad, Dela, David and Mariya for loving me whatever happens.

Thank you gogo and sekuru wa Tapiwa, without you it would not have been logistically possible.

Thank you Dr. Deborah Pellow for going far beyond the call of duty, for using a carrot and a stick. Your training permeates this dissertation.

Thank you to Dr. Dominic Pasura for showing me what I did not see, for reading everything I gave you with an attentive eye, and for offering unexpected help which proved instrumental.

Thank you Dr. Maureen Schwarz for an extremely careful reading of the first draft with detailed marginalia. It was tremendously valuable. I hope you will read the next iteration!

Thank you to Dr. John Burdick for encouraging, helpful comments which make students feel good about their abilities!

Thank you to Dr. John Western for agreeing to be on my committee at the very last minute, and for catching foolish errors.

Thank you to Dr. Bill Kelleher for the theory. Wish you had made it to the defense.

Thank you to participants in this research study for so generously sharing your lives.

Thank you Paul, Mbizi, Nzou, Givi, Mai Mike, Inno, Mind, Reg, Flava, Rocks and the many other friends I made in the process.

Thank you Mr. Nherera for teaching me a difficult but important lesson.

Thank you to John Crowe and others at Africa University where I spent a month in residence.

Thank you Dr. Ruparaganda, I hope to come to UZ in the future.

This research was done with the assistance of a Fulbright IIE and a Fulbright Hayes grant, as well as a FLAS award for language study. I also received assistance from the Goekjian grant at the Moynihan Institute in addition to generous funding from the Department of Anthropology at Syracuse University.
Dedication:

to not quitting,
and the many people who helped me not quit,
especially Gillian.
# CONTENTS

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
The dispersal of Brian and his siblings ................................................................................. 2
Collaboration and conflict in dispersed families ................................................................. 9
The Spatialization of Opportunity ....................................................................................... 19
Technologies of Relatedness ............................................................................................... 25
A Contextual Approach to Collaborative Family Projects .................................................. 28
Methodology .................................................................................................................... 29
Outline of the Chapters ...................................................................................................... 32

Chapter One: Two Centuries of Migration ......................................................................... 34
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 34
Tamuka ............................................................................................................................... 37
Population Upheaval: 1820-1900 ...................................................................................... 40
Dispossession: 1900-1960 ................................................................................................. 45
Labor Migration: 1920 - 1980 ......................................................................................... 54
Transferrable skills ........................................................................................................... 71

Chapter Two: Contemporary Dispersion ............................................................................ 74
The War of Liberation: 1960 - 1981 .................................................................................. 76
Post-independence Growth & Conflict: 1980s ................................................................. 90
Structural Adjustment and Economic Downturn: 1990s .................................................. 97
Fast Track Land Reform: 2000 - 2004 ............................................................................ 108
Sustained Economic Turmoil and Political Violence: 2005-2008 ............................... 121
Tenuous Stability and Uncertainty: 2009 - Present ....................................................... 137

Chapter Three: Governing Families .................................................................................... 141
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 141
Functionalist Kinship ...................................................................................................... 143
The Invention of Customary Law ..................................................................................... 147
The Europeanization of African Families ........................................................................ 156
Governing families .......................................................................................................... 165
What is a family? .............................................................................................................. 180
Contemporary Immigration Regimes ............................................................................. 185
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 198

Chapter Four: The Spatialization of Opportunity ............................................................... 199
Schubart Park ................................................................................................................... 199
Spring Glen ....................................................................................................................... 200
The Spatialization of Opportunity ..................................................................................... 201
Apartheid Pretoria: ......................................................................................................... 213
  African Areas ............................................................................................................. 213
  White Areas ................................................................................................................ 217
The “Poor White” Problem and the Construction of Schubart Park ............................... 219
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>Collaboration and Conflict</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relational Distance and Separate Development</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispersed Parent-Child Relationships</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispersed marriages</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaps in knowledge about life in distant locations:</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misunderstanding Zimbabwe</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misunderstanding the Diaspora</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiating competing needs in an environment of scarcity:</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collaborative Family Projects</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elder care</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Starting a business</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stewarding property</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building a house</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridging the Divide</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six</td>
<td>Zvirikufaya ku Diaspora 2.0</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Contours of the Zimbabwean Internet</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social interaction on the Zimbabwean Internet</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Online Press</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baba Jukwa</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#ThisFlag</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix A: Interviews</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix B: Archival material</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures

Figure 1: The Contemporary Migrations of Brian's Family ........................................... 6
Figure 2: The Historical Migrations of Brian's Family .................................................... 16
Figure 3: Nearly Two Centuries of Migration in Tamuka's Family .................................. 39
Figure 4: Rhodesian Soldiers in 1977 ............................................................................. 80
Figure 5: Legal entries into South Africa from Zimbabwe, 1983-2010 ............................ 105
Figure 6: The Bioinformational Complex, Materialized as a "Certificate of Registration" ... 170
Figure 7: The Red Ants evict residents in Schubart Park .................................................. 235
Figure 8: Sister Complex Kruger Park on Fire during 2008 evictions ............................... 236
Figure 9: Schubart Park in 2010 showing Block D and the swimming pool on P-level ....... 238
Figure 10: Man burned during xenophobic violence against foreigners ......................... 242
Figure 11: Child runs away from a burning shack ............................................................ 243
Figure 12: Living Room in a Schubart Park flat, 2010 ....................................................... 244
Figure 13: Graffiti in the stairwell reflecting residents’ everyday experience with crime ... 249
Figure 14: Location of serendipitous encounters between friends and family ............... 256
Figure 15: The Architecture of Exclusion ........................................................................ 264
Figure 16: Home in Spring Glen ...................................................................................... 266
Figure 17: Difficult Choices - which sister goes to school? ........................................... 313
Figure 18: “Spot the border jumper” ................................................................................ 376
Figure 19: ShareThis Widgit Icon .................................................................................... 378
Figure 20: Screenshot of Baba Jukwa's Facebook Page .................................................... 403
Introduction

I came to know Brian at a church I occasionally attended with my wife’s parents between about 2010 and 2012. In an outpouring of generosity, my in-laws temporarily relocated to New York from their home in Zimbabwe in order to provide childcare so I could write this dissertation. They enjoyed attending Brian’s church in order to socialize with dozens of other Zimbabweans. For two or three hours each Sunday, the parishioners recreated home within a nondescript conference room of a Holliday-Inn Express under a Newark Airport flight path. As in many immigrant communities, church was a place where they could sing and speak in their own language and access valuable information, advice and understanding relating to their day-to-day experiences as foreigners and minorities in America (Kong 2010; Ley 2008; Pasura 2012b). I got the sense that Sunday morning service was like a sheltered cove in a stormy, largely indifferent city. Two or three such congregations still exist in the vicinity of New York and others dot metropolitan areas across the United States and Canada.

As I came to know Brian—and later, when I interviewed his brother Edzayi in Zimbabwe (2012)—I became fascinated by the large geographical distances separating members of their family. During Zimbabwe’s pronounced economic and political turmoil of the late 1990s and 2000s, Brian’s siblings scattered between five cities, four countries and three continents. Their parents, meanwhile, remained in Zimbabwe, where they provided care for some of their grandchildren—in much the same way that my wife’s parents moved from Zimbabwe to New
York to help us with childcare. Indeed broad spatial dispersion and long-distance collaboration are important features of many contemporary Zimbabwean families.

The overarching task of this dissertation is to examine how dispersion shapes and reconfigures families like Brian’s. Stated slightly differently, it explores how dispersed families negotiate and respond to the marked challenges of prolonged separation. How do scattered siblings coordinate care for elders and children? How do they run border-straddling businesses and respond to emergencies? What happens to circulations of money, power and care as the unique opportunities and obstacles of various destinations result in economic, social and cultural differentiation? These interlinked questions of collaboration and conflict, continuity and change, proximity and dispersal comprise the core focus of this dissertation.

The dispersal of Brian and his siblings

1981 is an appropriate year to begin the story of Brian’s siblings’ dispersal because it is a momentous year in the history of Zimbabwe. After decades of war, Africans finally reclaimed their country from the century-long grasp of a white-supremacist, settler-colonial regime. Sanctions lifted, aid money poured in, and the economy ignited as Zimbabwe reengaged with the global economy (Moore 2016). Tourist arrivals had plummeted during the war to less than 100,000 in 1979, but visitors almost quadrupled within a year of the cessation of hostilities (Child, et al. 1989:54). This recovery energized Zimbabwe’s art sector, with stone sculpture especially in demand by tourists and international collectors alike (Larkin 2014:61).

Brian, the eldest among his siblings, had innate artistic talent and business acumen. Following independence, he tapped into the tourism growth industry by carving and selling
sculpture at the spectacular Victoria Falls, one of the country’s primary attractions. Two younger siblings—Steven and Edzayi—joined him as the business grew. Within a few years, the brothers found a niche in fabricating intricate wire sculpture. This medium was more portable than heavy stone and allowed them to begin marketing their artwork in South Africa and further afield.

Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s economy began to falter after about a decade of independence. As described in Chapter 2, the mid 1990s saw structural adjustment programs which led to massive retrenchment and increased costs of living. Growing poverty exacerbated anger over enduring racial and economic divides. Whites still owned most of the prime agricultural land and dominated manufacturing, mining, banking, tourism and commerce. This led peasants and war veterans to invade dozens of commercial farms beginning in 2001. They summarily evicted the white occupants, just as white farmers had deported many of them from the land when they were children.

This so-called “Fast Track Land Reform Program” quickly gained momentum and largely succeeded in reversing the racist geography established by a century of settler colonialism (Matondi 2012). Unfortunately, it simultaneously triggered economic Armageddon. Commercial farming was the country’s largest employer, and one of the most important sources of forex (Moyo and Chambati 2013:4). However, new black farmers lacked capital and access to credit needed to run these intensive operations. Agricultural production collapsed and the ranks of unemployed swelled as whites exited the country in droves—taking their money and shuttering businesses behind them. Meanwhile, political tensions erupted into sporadic violence, culminating in a series of closely-contested elections which the ruling party manipulated in order to retain power ((Campbell 2003:306-312; Raftopoulos 2009)). By the decade’s end, unemployment was soaring, the infrastructure was crumbling, and supermarket shelves were
barren for long stretches. Economic crisis was exacerbated during 2007 and 2008 as runaway hyperinflation created a “casino economy,” doubling prices on a daily basis which made business virtually impossible and rendered savings accounts and retirement funds worthless (Gono 2008). As an added insult, drought devastated rural livelihoods (Raftopoulos 2009:217).

Political and economic turmoil dealt a blow to tourism, as visitors began to see Zimbabwe as an “unsafe” destination (Chibaya 2013:84). This impacted sales of Brian’s artwork, forcing him and his siblings to increasingly rely on foreign sales. By the late 1990s the two were making regular trips to art fairs and festivals in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 2002, shortly after farm invasions, Brian elected to stay in New England while he was there on a business trip, and Steven remained in the United Kingdom, later resettling to Germany.

The brothers’ hasty departure was not unique, as approximately one in four adults left Zimbabwe during the 1990s and 2000s (McGregor and Pasura 2014). Those with access to capital and travel selected wealthy destinations with abundant work and educational opportunities. People with fewer funds often liquidated their belongings and pooled resources to scrape together airfare—if not for themselves, then for a relative who could send money home or make arrangements to bring them later. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans arrived as tourists in Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and beyond. Upon landing they claimed asylum, enrolled in university to acquire student visas, or sometimes settled for marginal jobs as undocumented workers.

England, the former colonial power, was the most popular overseas destination until 2002, when it slapped visa restrictions on Zimbabweans to preempt a sort of reverse colonization by the children and grandchildren of the Africans who the British so recently dispossessed.
(McGregor 2007). This ostensibly race-neutral policy primarily impacted blacks, as most white Zimbabweans had access to escape routes though ancestral visas, biased consular officials and hefty bank accounts (Andrucki 2010). In the anti-immigration climate following the events of September 11 2001, other wealthy countries followed the UK’s example, introducing visa restrictions that prompted many migrants to go “underground” and effectively preempted all but the most prosperous Zimbabweans from legally reaching their soil. Most people were simply unable to meet the onerous income, employment and educational requirements for securing visas. However—even while wealthy countries slammed the door on low and middle-income Zimbabweans—they aggressively recruited professionals like nurses, doctors, electricians, boilermakers, and other skilled technicians—benefiting tremendously from Zimbabwe’s misfortune (Chikanda 2005; 2006).

Hostile visa regimes prevented Brian’s two younger siblings from joining their brothers in Europe or North America after finishing high school. Instead, they crossed into South Africa—a neighboring country with deep cultural and linguistic ties to Zimbabwe forged through millennia of population movements including more than a century of colonial labor migration. As the continent’s largest economy, South Africa was an “island of prosperity” (Nyamnjoh 2006:18) in the region and had long been the preferred destination for low-income Zimbabweans who could not dream of overseas travel or even, in many cases, afford a passport. Now South Africa increasingly became the destination for middle class Zimbabweans who were unable to access Europe, North America and the Antipodes. By 2008, a million or more people had immigrated legally or slipped across the porous border (Kriger and McGregor 2010). Those with access to financial and educational resources often found good opportunities: Brian sent his youngest brother, Tawanda, to University in Cape Town, while their sister Mirirai had sufficient
educational credentials to secure an office job in Johannesburg. However, the vast majority of Zimbabweans in South Africa are from humble backgrounds, have low-paying jobs in construction, private security, domestic labor, factories, mines, restaurants, commercial farms and informal enterprise. Many are also undocumented under South Africa’s own increasingly restrictive immigration policies—a status which makes them easy targets for crime and police extortion (Vigneswaran, et al. 2010).

Thus, as illustrated in the following graphic, Brian and his siblings scattered across five cities, four countries, and three continents in less than a decade. Only Edzayi remained in Zimbabwe to supervise the production of artwork that Brian and Steven sold overseas:

Figure 1: The Contemporary Migrations of Brian's Family
The broad dispersion that fragmented Brian and his siblings between so many diverse locations is a defining feature of Zimbabwe’s contemporary diaspora. Increasingly restrictive and selective immigration regimes seek to keep out low-income migrants while attracting those with money or talents that will be useful to the host country. Thus, many prospective migrants fail to reach wealthy destinations, even when they have friends and family who would eagerly help them get started. Instead, they are forced to try their luck closer to home—in places like South Africa, Botswana, Kenya and Nigeria. Others follow ebbs and flows in the fluctuating global economy to pursue opportunity in places with fewer historical connections to Zimbabwe including Dubai, China, Malaysia, Nigeria and the Caribbean. I even met one man cycling the dusty back roads of central Zimbabwe who excitedly told me that he was preparing to leave for Afghanistan to work as a bomb disposal agent for an American military contractor. The United States, after all, is one of the largest employers in the world’s war industry which provides lucrative but dangerous opportunities for soldiers groomed on both sides of Rhodesia’s battlefields.

Despite being scattered across the globe, family remains central in the lives of many Zimbabweans. Brian and his siblings rely on each other not only to run their art business, but also to achieve collective relational goals including childcare, eldercare, education, and day-the-to-day provisioning of multiple households. For example, Brian and Steven remit earnings from the United States and Germany to cover their parents’ daily expenses and the cost of hiring a maid to ease the burden of domestic labor in an era without reliable water or electricity. Meanwhile, Edzayi’s on-the-ground presence is critical in accomplishing the hands-on work of eldercare. He checks in on the parents regularly, keeping them company, making sure that they attend medical appointments, and assisting with household errands like shopping and home
repairs. In this arrangement, the successful provisioning of eldercare depends on both funds from overseas and their effective utilization in Zimbabwe.

Similarly, Brian and his siblings collaborate to ensure a high-quality upbringings for each other’s children. Steven, who now lives with his wife in Germany, left a son in Zimbabwe under Edzayi’s care. The parents planned to reunite with their son after a few years, but legal and financial technicalities of bringing him to Europe made this impossible. Meanwhile, Brian’s sister Mirirai left her children with her parents in Zimbabwe when she moved to Johannesburg. The children of a sixth sibling, Ruvimbo, also live in this grandparent-headed household, as their mother passed away and their father works in South Africa. Brian’s family thus distributes the financial and hands-on responsibilities of raising the next generation. Edzayi and the children’s grandparents provide day-to-day parenting, while the children’s “biological” parents remit money for daily expenses of their parents’ and sibling’s households where the children reside. They also regularly communicate with their children in order to provide parental advice and remain emotionally engaged in their children’s lives.

In this way, all of the siblings’ children enjoy a secure, nurturing upbringing. Those whose parents are overseas receive daily care from grandparents, “uncles” and “aunts”1. Meanwhile, children whose parents remain with them in Zimbabwe benefit from remittances from their “uncles” and “aunts” in the diaspora. Brian and his siblings thus exemplify one of this dissertation’s central arguments: Zimbabweans use migration as a way to make their families work.

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1 I use quotation marks around kinship terms here and elsewhere in order to highlight that these European kinship terms do not exactly correspond to indigenous kinship categories. This is explained more fully in Chapter 3
Collaboration and conflict in dispersed families

This dissertation is essentially a kinship study which foregrounds “family” as the primary object of analysis. I follow from contemporary processual and performative approaches to kinship and gender in order to define family primarily in terms of action. *Families are what families do.* People who consider each other relatives become a family when they *perform* this collective identity and actualize their aligned interest through interaction with each other and the world. This somewhat circular definition—where family is a collective identity constituted by the collaborative performance of this identity—is indebted to Judith Butler’s similarly circular understanding of gender as both an *act* and the “social fiction” which this act produces (2007:528).

Butler’s “social fiction” is a playful reversal of Emile Durkheim’s “social fact.” According to Durkheim, social facts are “ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, *external to the individual,* and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him” (1965:3). Butler twists this logic on its head by arguing that individuals are complicit in *producing* the thoughts, acts and feelings which constrain them. This critique points to the roots of the relatedness approach in David Schneider’s seminal deconstruction of anthropological kinship studies (1968; 1984). Schneider argued that since the discipline’s Durkheimian inception, its practitioners projected European understandings of kinship onto the groups they studied. Thus, almost the entire ethnographic corpus took it for granted that everyone in the world understood relatedness through the ethnocentric prism of sexual procreation. Cross cultural differences were merely peculiar cultural overlays on the biological “facts of life.”
Schneider contrarily showed that a great deal of variability existed in ways that people conceptualize relatedness, and that many understandings give sexual intercourse little or no importance. This analysis both destabilized and revitalized kinship studies as a new cohort of anthropologists built on Schneider’s keen analysis in order to replace the “genetical” model with something that could accommodate diverse understandings and practices (Bamford and Leach 2012:8-16). Also inspired by new reproductive technologies like IVF as well as feminist and gay-rights movements, this cohort documented and explored ways of constructing relatedness through such mechanisms as cohabitation (Strathern 1975), sharing (Conklin 2001), naming (Lee 1993; Mashiri 2004), surrogacy (Pande 2009), adoption (Modell 2001) and working the land (Bamford 2012).

Emerging from this body of work is a view of family as a product of relational acts. These can be usefully categorized as monumental or routine. Monumental acts—like weddings and funerals in both European and Zimbabwean families—are more exceptional in nature and often involve the ritualistic gathering of relatives in order to publicly affirm and redefine family boundaries. Such events visibilize a family’s broad contours as new relatives are introduced or certified, and as the departed are remembered. In contrast, routine practices of relatedness are subtle and repetitive. They are, as Carsten writes, “small, seemingly trivial, or taken-for-granted acts like sharing a meal, giving a dish of cooked food to a neighbor, dropping in to a nearby house for a quiet chat, a coffee, and a betel quid” (Carsten 2000:18).

Everyday practices of relatedness are perhaps more important than monumental ones because “social fictions” like genders and families are inherently fragile and must constantly be rehearsed and maintained. This implies, to quote Butler again, “the possibility of a different sort of
repeating” (Butler 2007:520). If families are what families do, then emergent ways of relating will cause the contours of a family to shift and change.

I explore the dance between relational continuity and change through what could be termed a “contextual” lens. This approach locates discerning but capricious individuals and communities within intersecting fields of obstacles and opportunities—proclivities and constraints that shape available courses of action without determining them. In particular, I focus on three intersecting contextual fields that are salient in shaping both the monumental and routine practices of the families I worked with. These are: the historical context from which families emerge, the spatial context through which relatives are geographically positioned, and the technological context that mediates communication and mobility.

The Historical Context: long histories of migration

Families are situated within and emerge from complicated historical contexts that powerfully influence relational practices. As Butler writes, “the act that one does, the act that one performs, is, in a sense, an act that has been going on before one arrived on the scene” (Butler 2007:526). With respect to Zimbabwe, the centuries-long encounter between indigenous people and European colonialists continues to profoundly influence contemporary social, cultural, political and economic formations, both within Zimbabwe and with respect to Zimbabwe’s place in the world community. Throughout this dissertation I seek to understand how families responded and adapted to colonial dispossession and the imposition of European legal technologies and economies of exploitation. I argue that Zimbabweans fought to produce families of their own choosing within and around constraints imposed by the colonial system.
Migration is an increasingly prominent topic of conversation in Europe and North America. One common perception—even among some academics of globalization—is that migratory flows are accelerating and diversifying to encompass a much broader swath of the world’s countries and peoples (i.e. Castles and Miller 2009:10). Such notions have been successfully challenged in order to reveal that the global prevalence of migration has remained somewhat consistent although there have been important shifts in particular migratory populations and corridors. For instance, Czaika et al. very compellingly illuminate the ethnocentricity behind perceptions about the intensification of migration to Europe and North America. She argues that this view actually points to decreased colonial flows of white migrants from Europe towards “an increased presence of phenotypically and culturally distinct immigrants in Europe as well as settler societies of European descent in North America and the Pacific” (Czaika and Haas 2014:314).

Anthropologists are similarly keen to point out that people have relocated their families and communities for millennia (i.e. Wolf 1982). This dissertation echoes assertions that mobility is an ancient phenomenon by showing how migration has been a tremendously important factor in shaping family life in Southern Africa for at least the past two centuries. I also strive to go a step further by showing how the contemporary dispersion of Zimbabweans is inextricably linked to at least three historical “journeys.”

First and most straightforwardly, the predatory journey of European settler colonialists deliberately impoverished Africans, a legacy that continues to haunt contemporary Zimbabweans—many of whom are markedly disadvantaged in global employment, educational
and citizenship markets. Settler colonialism involved the arrival of thousands upon thousands of European farmers, prospectors, industrialists, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and holy men who poured into southern Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries intending to stay and derive a living from the land. This was accomplished through both overt violence and more insidious legal and technological mechanisms designed to enrich the newcomers through theft of indigenous resources, including labor.

Dispossession is a second, interlinked, historical journey which shaped Zimbabwean families. A major obstacle to European settlement was that the land they coveted was already inhabited. Initially, this “problem” was solved by war and genocide through which indigenous inhabitants were killed or expelled from the land. As they fled, these Africans displaced more distant communities in a cascade of devastating wars and refugee movements now known as the “Mfecane” (Cobbing 1988). For instance, as recounted in Chapter One, the mid 1800s witnessed the Ndebele and Shangani flight from Kwazulu Natal in present-day South Africa into Zimbabwe—population movements which continue to have profound ethnopolitical ramifications today.

By the 1930s and 1940s, settlers were more methodical in dispossessing Africans. As described in Chapters One and Three, they gradually assembled a framework which “legalized” the deportation Africans from “white areas” into “native reserves”—remote, over-crowded, under-serviced and infertile rural ghettos that were plagued by diseases like malaria and sleeping sickness. This massive forced migration established resilient racist geographies, tore relatives apart and separated people from venerated ancestral graves (Colson 1971). As described in

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2 Compared to other migrant populations, Zimbabweans are often more qualified educationally and professionally; however, when it comes to competing for top-level jobs against people of European descent, Zimbabweans may fare less well
Chapter Two, this history of dispossession set the scene for the liberation war of the 1960s and 70s as a struggle to recover stolen land, as well as the post-independence “fast-track land reform” as a reaction against prolonged failure to deliver on this promise.

Colonial labor migration is a third historical journey with enduring ramifications for contemporary families. One of the preferred modes of subsistence for settlers was to extract wealth from the soil: gold and diamonds at first, followed by raw materials for assembly lines in England and the United States—from asbestos and chromium to copper and iron. As settlers grew in number they expanded extractive industries to also plunder biological riches, including export-oriented crops like tobacco, mangos and premium grass-fed beef, as well as staple crops like maize for the local markets. Minerals, however, do not easily release themselves from the clutches stone, nor does maize grind itself into meal. Thus, capturing the land’s riches required expropriating a more fundamental form of wealth—the productive capacity encapsulated within human bodies and brains. For centuries, Europeans had spirited Africans overseas, using whips, bibles and laws to seize their labor. By the time Zimbabwe was officially colonized as “Rhodesia” in the 1890s, these methods were unfashionable and illegal. As described in Chapters Two and Three, Rhodesia responded with a more insidious form of slavery premised on programmatic impoverishment through dispossession, taxation and segregation. Destitution drove African men to leave their wives and children in the reserve in order to supplement household subsistence with cash wages earned on colonial farms and mines. The voracious appetite for labor in industrial centers fed upon African men from remote areas of Mozambique, Malawi and further afield so that in 1941, more than half of the African workforce in Rhodesia was born outside of the colony (Scott 1954). Meanwhile, many Zimbabwean-born Africans
illegally left the colony in search of more lucrative employment south of the Limpopo in South Africa.

During my research in Zimbabwe and South Africa I discovered that conducting family history interviews revealed important linkages between the contemporary diaspora and the intertwined historical migrations of settler colonialism, land dispossession and labor migration. Thus, I could have easily begun the story of Brian’s family half a century earlier, with his grandfather and father who were born in Tete Province of Portuguese East Africa, presently Mozambique. Every month, Brian’s grandfather would depart from his village by bicycle in order to catch a bus on the nearby road to the capital Beira. There he worked in a factory for several weeks before returning to his wife and children with cash to keep the tax collector at bay and groceries to supplement subsistence farming. His son would eagerly watch for his father’s return and rush to greet him upon discerning the solitary shape peddling towards the homestead. Tragically, this joyous ritual was put to a cruel end when Brian’s father was about 8 years old. Neither of them noticed a black mamba splayed across the path. Tragically, this venomous interloper joined the embrace, and within minutes life slipped from Brian’s grandfather while he was cradled in his son’s arms. Migration has always been a very dangerous undertaking.

This premature death plunged Brian’s grandmother and her children deeper into poverty—alleviated only by contributions from her late husband’s brothers who were working in Rhodesia. Thus, in approximately 1965, when Brian’s father was fourteen or fifteen years old, his father’s brothers arranged for him to join them. Like Brian’s grandfather before him, Brian’s father remitted money to his mother and siblings in Tete from his earnings as a brick layer—first in the border town of Umtali (now Mutare), and then in Salisbury (now Harare). In those days, long before Western Union, he would send the money with friends or relatives who would also carry
news back and forth between elders and wives in Mozambique and their husbands and children in Zimbabwe.

Brian’s mother met and married his father in Harare, where she was born after her parents immigrated from the rural areas. Her father arrived in Rhodesia during the 1950s, from Malawi, in order to search for work. Her mother, meanwhile, relocated to Harare from the rural areas of Masvingo (in Zimbabwe) to work as a maid for a white woman after her family was evicted to a reserve so that immigrant Europeans could cultivate their rich fields. Thus—as shown in the following figure—at least three generations of Brian’s family resorted to migration in order to

![Figure 2: The Historical Migrations of Brian's Family](image-url)
make their families work: to feed, clothe, and educate loved ones who remained behind; to placate tax collectors; and to escape the acute political and economic crises created by dispossession.

Tracing these deep histories of migration thus highlights continuity in the motivations, routes, dangers and rewards of travel. As Brian’s family shows, generations of Africans were forcibly moved from their homes into barren reserves and made to serve the colonial economy through violence, poverty and economic coercion. This historical exercise shows that the current racial, economic and legal positionalities which disadvantage Zimbabweans in securing visas and in financing travel are not accidental. Rather, today’s diaspora remains subject to many of the same global power structures and technologies (i.e. whiteness, poverty and illegality) which enslaved their parents’ and grandparents’ generations.

In part, this historicization is a political exercise aimed at undermining discourses that pathologize migrants as criminals or freeloaders. Many of today’s so-called “illegals” are heirs to violent disenfranchisement wrought by “illegal immigrants” from Europe who helped enrich the very destinations now seeking to keep them out. Similarly, recounting generations of labor migration and refugee movements on the continent belies South Africa’s simmering xenophobia against foreigners because it highlights the constructedness and porosity of nationality. Many so-called “foreigners” actually have recent South African ancestry, just as many South Africans have parents and grandparents who originated in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and further afield.

Historicizing migration also helps illuminate important relational strategies in dispersed families. In Chapter One, I argue that practices like collaborative child and eldercare can be
understood as “transferrable skills” used by consecutive generations to negotiate similar obstacles. The massive social upheavals wrought by colonialism nurtured a pre-existing tradition of interdependence and relational transitivity that continues to serve contemporary diasporans in their efforts to negotiate new political and economic disasters. In this tradition, a child’s parents include all her fathers’ brothers and mothers’ sisters—so that a large group of relatives pool provisioning and caring obligations and it is not abnormal for a child to be raised by someone who is not their direct, “biological” parent. Thus, Brian’s siblings provide care for each others’ children, just as their grandfather’s brothers helped provide for their father when he was orphaned. Part of caring for their “nephew” (an inappropriate word culled from European kinship because they actually regarded him as a son) included summoning him to work in Zimbabwe so that he could provide for his mother and his own siblings in Mozambique. In the same way, fifty years later, Brian and his siblings collaborate over multiple international borders to ensure a good old age for their parents in Zimbabwe.

As is the case for many contemporary diasporans, Brian grew up listening to how his parents and grandparents traveled to Harare from elsewhere in Zimbabwe and neighboring countries. Other people I spoke with recounted how they themselves spent long periods of time as children with their mothers in the rural areas while their fathers were working in the city, or how “cousins” from the rural areas would join their households in town to avail of superior educational opportunities. Received knowledge about the journeys of previous generations in conjunction with direct, childhood experience of living in dispersed families—as well as the historical momentum of kinship beliefs which prioritize the group over the individual—give contemporary diasporans a repertoire of relational strategies which they redeploy and refine in order to win the survival of their own, newly-dispersed families.
The Spatialization of Opportunity

Space is a second important context which shapes family actions. One irony of using migration as a way to ensure family survival is that this usually entails tearing the family apart. Diasporans often intend separation to be temporary. Parents leave children in Zimbabwe due to the uncertainty and expense of migration—believing that they will quickly summon them abroad when they are settled. Others similarly leave behind spouses or siblings, hoping to reunite after finding stable work and housing. Unfortunately, as noted above, prolonged separation often results from the combination of capricious immigration regimes, fluctuating global economies and the economic marginalization experienced by many diasporans. These factors also contribute to the fragmentation of the diaspora to an expanding array of destinations.

Transnationalism has been a popular area of inquiry during the past two decades (Guarnizo, et al. 2003; Kearney 1995; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Portes, et al. 1999; Schiller, et al. 1992; Vertovec 1999). This concept corrects earlier, simplistic and sometimes derogatory approaches which suggested that migrants either cut off ties with home and completely assimilated to the new society; or alternatively, failed to adapt and isolated themselves in ethnic enclaves, clinging anachronistically to native language and customs. Transnationalism more compellingly argues that many migrant populations engage both sending and receiving societies; they are, “to varying degrees, simultaneously embedded in the multiple sites and layers of the transnational social fields in which they live” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007:130).
This approach has deepened many aspects of migration studies. Rather than being politically disempowered, many migrant communities are able to exert considerable influence over national or regional politics in sending countries (Caglar 2006; Schiller and Fouron 2004; Smith 2006). Other analyses suggest that for some countries, remittances from overseas citizens accomplish more than foreign aid in terms of producing “development” (Orozco 2005). Transnational explorations of kinship, meanwhile, have consistently shown that families creatively responded to migration, for instance, through transnational parenting (Coe 2008; Madziva and Zontini 2012; Parreñas 2013; Uy-Tioco 2007) and innovative marriage practices (Charsley and Liversage 2013; Cohen 2003).

Multi-sited fieldwork is an important methodological tool used by scholars working in this paradigm. Rather than confining studies of migration to singular destinations, it became important to also conduct research in places of origin in order to understand transnational flows. Initially, such studies adopted a problematic, binary framework which juxtaposed monolithic sending and receiving locations. Recently, more nuanced spatializations are being explored, for example in Dominic Pasura’s study of how Zimbabwean communities in England are differently shaped by the various cities in which they live (Pasura 2012a).

This dissertation builds on such studies to examine multidirectional flows and transfers not only with home, but also with many other destinations where friends and relatives have settled around the world. Such exchanges are clearly illustrated in the collaborative care arrangements of Brian’s family. When he remits money from New York to his parents in Zimbabwe, this simultaneously involves transfers to South Africa because his sister in Johannesburg has children who live in the household where he sends remittances. Brian does not directly send money to his sister in South Africa, but he eases her burden just a little bit, which is a type of relational
transfer. Likewise Edzayi—the only sibling still in Zimbabwe—actives family relationships on three different continents every time he checks in on the parents and his brother and sisters’ children.

In Chapters Four and Five, I argue that one important result of dispersion is differentiation. Each location where a family member resides contains a unique array of emplaced obstacles and opportunities that impact economic and social positionalities. Wealthy countries like the United States, Canada, England and Dubai generally offer superior educational and employment possibilities compared to South Africa and Botswana. Each of these wealthy countries, however, differs with respect to the amount of assistance they offer to immigrants and refugees, the ease with which they allow newcomers to regularize their status and attain citizenship, and the legalities through which diasporans may be able to bring relatives. The far distances of these countries from Zimbabwe also makes it challenging for diasporans to visit home—especially those without legal documentation. In contrast, South Africa and Botswana have porous borders which allow even those without papers to visit Zimbabwe relatively easily.

Each destination also presents diasporans with a unique social environment. Zimbabweans in South Africa frequently confront simmering xenophobic sentiment which periodically erupts into violence; while those in North America, Europe and the Antipodes must contend with unique structures of racial discrimination. Some cities, like London, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Dallas have large populations of Zimbabweans who can easily find each other to share social activities and exchange both useful information and hurtful gossip. In other places, Zimbabweans are more atomized and can spend many weeks or months without seeing a compatriot.
I argue that the emplaced structures of opportunity and oppression which inhere in various locations powerfully impact migrant outcomes, concomitantly shaping how they are able to engage in family life. For example, people relocating to destinations with stronger currencies and more work or study opportunities usually (though not always) advance economically compared to relatives in less well-off locations. This can powerfully reorganize economic hierarchies within families, sometimes leading to jealousies and resentments. As an example, when I interviewed Brian’s brother Edzayi about his family’s historical experience with migration, he insinuated that the snake incident was actually a magical assassination perpetrated by rural relatives who were upset about his grandfather’s increased economic standing due to his urban employment. Similar suspicions of sabotage were reported by some of the diasporans I interviewed, with many more reporting friction occasioned by new inequalities. Thus, migration can be both a resource and a relational liability.

The restructuring of a family’s economic and political hierarchies can complicate attempts at working collaboratively. In many cases, emergent economic gradients are not well-aligned with preexisting age and gender hierarchies so that younger people and women may acquire more power than they would otherwise have achieved. Additionally, a person’s economic capacity to contribute to family projects generally corresponds to political power over setting family agendas. Complicating matters is the fact that needs almost always outstrip available resources, so difficult choices must be made about who will benefit from collaborative endeavors, and in which way. It is not unusual for families to weigh the need for children’s school fees against parents’ medicines; or to be forced into situations where equally-qualified relatives enter into competition for a single opportunity. Thus, collaboration is often marked by conflict and family
projects can unanticipatedly attenuate some relationships even while they strengthen others. Collaboration and conflict incrementally but inevitably rearrange a family’s contours.

As described in Chapter Five, a second result of dispersion which is related to differentiation is a phenomena that I term separate development. This has less to do with the specificity of particular locations and more with the inevitable disjunctures occasioned by distance and duration of separation. Geographical respatialization inevitably reconfigures both monumental and routine interactions, exchanges and rituals from which families emerge and through which they are perpetuated. The high cost of travel coupled with hostile documentary regimes make it difficult for diasporans to attend family rituals in person—though they are often involved in planning and financing these events from afar and may also participate via telephone and social media. Dispersion also severs the spatial, temporal and bodily proximity that is prerequisite to many everyday relational activities like sharing meals, chores and bodily fluids. Here too, diasporans seek alternatives, but the immediacy and spontaneity of everyday encounters can be difficult to replicate, especially for separated spouses, and for children whose day-to-day caretakers leave them with relatives in Zimbabwe when they venture overseas.

As time passes, interruptions in ritual gatherings and everyday encounters produce knowledge gaps and misunderstandings about the lives of distant relatives. People in Zimbabwe may find it difficult to imagine what life is like in a place that they may never visit, while diasporans may fail to appreciate the extent to which life in Zimbabwe has changed in their absence. With the passage of time, people in various locations develop new habits, routines, friendships and colleagues that they take for granted but which their distant family members have little direct knowledge or experience. Such disjunctures are exacerbated by conflicting time
zones, schedules and communications barriers. This process of separate development can incrementally translate into relational distance.

In contrast to separate development, the respatialization of families may simultaneously create new relational opportunity for people who suddenly find themselves living in close proximity. It is not unusual for previously-distant relatives who resettle to the same city or country to develop much tighter relationships with each other than they had in Zimbabwe. Moreover, diasporans who are not relatives sometimes create new families based on cohabitation and interdependence in a hostile environment. For example, Chapter Four describes how several women who survived political violence in Zimbabwe and xenophobia in South Africa banded together in a derelict skyscraper as a closely-knit pseudo family unit. Unfortunately, this new proximity-based family dissolved when the refugees were evicted from the skyscraper and scattered throughout the city.

This dissertation accordingly argues that a family’s relational activities are powerfully shaped by the geographic positioning of relatives in relation to each other, combined with the social and economic structures inhering in the localities where they live. In particular, I highlight trends towards differentiation, separate development, and new proximity-based relatedness. I also tie this interplay between space and relatedness on a global scale to the historical project of apartheid in southern Africa. This racialization of space functioned along similar principals — the spatialization of opportunity enabled certain segments of the population to advance economically while discouraging inter-group contact through which counter-hegemonic understandings could emerge to challenge white supremacy. As numerous anthropologists have remarked, places are not neutral containers for human interaction (Bosco 2001; Low 2010;
Pellow 2002; 2008; Richardson 1982; Rodman 1992). Rather, they participate in shaping the human activities which occur within them.

Technologies of Relatedness

Technology is a third contextual force that shapes relational practices in dispersed families. I understand “technology” to be an instrument of social intervention. This differs from the classical approach, where technology is understood to be a tool or method for more efficient intervention in the material world (Pfaffenberger 1992:497). While this may also be true, it is important to keep in mind that technologies emerge from society and dialectally reshape it (Dobres and Hoffman 1994; Franklin and Lock 2003). Arguably, taken-for-granted technologies like vehicles, computers, printing presses and bombs primarily target social ends, albeit vis-à-vis material interventions. Automobiles enable the scalable and efficient transportation of people through their ability to move objects; while computers mix semi-conductors and electricity to conjure calculations that are requested and valued by people. The social implications for the material destructiveness of bombs are, quite simply, explosive.

With respect to these overtly material technologies, this dissertation is primarily interested in telecommunications. As explored in Chapters Five and Six, the concurrent proliferation of broadband internet and smartphones in Zimbabwe beginning in the mid 2000s is transforming how people in dispersed families communicate with relatives around the world and at home. Such technologies enable kin to bridge material separation and salvage some of the everyday immediacy that was lost through migration. Social networking platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp allow multilateral conversations to unroll in real-time, almost as they do over a dinner
table or the course of a weekend visit. Cellphones also allow parents to offer advice from afar and to monitor their children’s activities, while siblings can use this technology to start businesses and plan family events.

Internet-connected smartphones also drastically reduce the costs of international communication, which allows people in Zimbabwe to more easily initiate conversations, whereas they previously had to wait for calls from abroad or “beep” their relatives in the diaspora to let them know that they wanted to talk and then wait for a return call. Even so, digital divides persist. Compared to their relatives in Zimbabwe, diasporans can generally access cheaper, higher-bandwidth internet connections and more expensive, full-featured devices. Meanwhile, although internet is penetrating rural areas of Zimbabwe, people in town still have better connectivity and more available funds to spend on communication.

Furthermore, despite the ability of new communications technologies to create virtual proximity, they are imperfect replacements for in-the-flesh communication and sometimes even produce social distance between people who live close together. Also, although separated spouses and parents appreciate social media, they simultaneously lament how digitally-mediated conversations are open to misinterpretation and make poor conduits for nuanced or sensitive discussions, for instance parental discussions about sex or drugs.

In Chapter Six, I explore how digital communication is transforming dispersed practices of relatedness, not only for individual families, but also for larger social constructs like peer groups and nations. The idea of a national identity remains important to many diasporans, just as they continue to value their families after leaving Zimbabwe. Dispersed nationhood, however, is complicated by many of the same difficulties which characterize collaboration in dispersed
families. For example, the knowledge gaps which arise when people attempt to imagine life in distant locations are especially pronounced when they try to imagine life in locations where family links are more tenuous, or exist primarily through friends and colleagues.

In response, Zimbabweans around the world are increasingly resorting to new discursive registers enabled by social media. For example, as explored in the final chapter, the exchange of mimetic videos enables diasporans scattered across the globe to “show and tell” what life is like for them, thereby bridging the long distances and emplaced differences which separate them. Mimetic discourse enables diasporans and their compatriots at home to engage in multilateral discussion about issues of collective importance, for instance whether the sacrifices of migration are worth the rewards. Indeed, I argue that certain viral memes can function as “collaborative national projects,” collective undertakings that (re)produce the nation as an imagined community in much the same way that collaborative relational projects like coordinating child or eldercare via WhatsApp (re)produces family.

The existence of new space-negating technologies which enable the respatialization of territorially-bound social formations like nations and families should not detract attention from concurrent global trends towards increasingly rigid spatialization of bodies described above. Accordingly, this dissertation also explores technologies of (im)mobility which are less overtly material in form. These are the bureaucratic, mathematical and computational technologies of “governmentality” through which bodies are classified, linked and differentiated in order to strategically spatialize them (Cohn 2006; Foucault 1981; Foucault 1991; Scott 1995). Here, technology is not primarily something that dispersed families use, but something which is used against them. Today—as during the colonial era—technologies of (im)mobility regulate
Zimbabweans’ access to locations with an abundance of opportunity and restrict their ability to reside with family members.

In Chapter Three, I trace contemporary technologies of (im)mobility to the historical system of identity cards and work passes used in southern Africa to exploit African labor through forced migration and to facilitate the racialization of space and opportunity by defining which people were permitted to own, reside or transit through particular locations. An integral part of this project was to incrementally bind Africans to a European kinship framework through defining their families on identity and birth certificates. Although these “certified” families poorly corresponded with indigenous kinship understandings, they nevertheless had profound effects on shaping relational practices because they became the basis for determining taxation, domicile, and a host of other privileges and penalties disbursed by colonial regimes. In much the same way, wealthy countries today leverage these same Eurocentric understandings of kinship to issue passports, visas, birth certificates and marriage certificates which similarly define who is allowed access to opportunities within their borders. I argue that this is not so much a Schneidereian faux-paux of misinterpreting indigenous kinship through an ethnocentric lens as it is a deliberate attempt to Europeanize families in order to render them knowable, calculable and available for intervention through governmental technology.

A Contextual Approach to Collaborative Family Projects

History, space and technology are not the only contextual forces which shape dispersed practices of relatedness. As indicated in the above discussion, economic, racial, and political contexts are also relevant and could have been addressed individually. The important point is
that these and other contextual forces present families with emplaced structures of opportunity and constraint which shape the relational activities they are able to undertake. The peculiarities of individuals and families may lead to divergent actions under similar circumstances, but some broad trends can be observed. For instance, respatialization results in new economic and political formations that may conflict with preexisting age or gender hierarchies as well as the consolidation of relatedness within more “nuclear” formations. Significantly, this dissertation emphasizes that diasporans negotiate contextual forces and work with their relatives in Zimbabwe and around the world to pursue *families of their own choosing* which sometimes do not align with hegemonic understandings or legislated forms.

**Methodology**

This study draws from more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork, primarily in Zimbabwe and South Africa. During this time I lived with low and middle-income Shona families in Harare, Kwekwe and Tshwane, in both low and high-density neighborhoods. I also conducted more than 80 interviews in these locations as well as the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United states. Approximately 50 of these were transcribed and cited in this dissertation (see appendix A). I used pseudonyms due to the precarious political, legal, and economic positions of many people I spoke with. In some cases I also changed minor details of their accounts in order to strengthen anonymity. Zimbabwe is a small, densely interlinked country, so it can be easy to trace people through seemingly insignificant details including place of origin, place of study, and other aspects of family structure.
I chose interviewees largely through what has come to be called “opportunistic” sampling. That is, in the course of meeting many different people, I selected to interview those who could potentially share especially useful insights about dispersed practices of relatedness. In most cases this meant speaking with people who either lived outside of Zimbabwe themselves or who had family members in the diaspora. In a few cases I managed to interview relatives who lived in dispersed locations. With time, I broadened this approach to also include psychologists, therapists and pastors—“experts” who, by nature of their professions had special access to more comprehensive knowledge of the topic.

Many interviews focused on collaborative family projects. As noted in chapter 5—the crux of this dissertation—such projects are important crucibles for shifting family practices and boundaries. Projects like raising children, providing eldercare, building houses, acquiring property, starting businesses and helping family members emigrate involve multilateral exchanges of money, care, information and other types of work and resources. Such projects frequently occur in situations where needs are more numerous than resources. Divergent expectations and understandings of family come into play during the negotiation of scarcity as difficult choices must be made about who should benefit from family projects, who should pay the bills, and who should do the work. These freighted negotiations and performances of relatedness made collaborative projects especially fruitful objects of ethnographic analysis.

One convention in some Anthropological circles is to cite participants as literally as possible. I believe that this does them a disservice, as reproducing all of the stops, stutters, and incomplete starts of normal conversation can convey the impression that interviewees were less intelligent or coherent than they actually were. This effect can be compounded for North American readers who may have difficulty understanding the unique grammar and vocabulary of Zimbabwean
English. Therefore, in reproducing interviews, I sought to preserve the meat of peoples’ assertions and the artistic flair of their word choice while lightly editing their statements for readability to a North American audience.

Interview quotations are contained within red block quotes like this, and are referenced in Appendix A.

Some of the historical data on colonial influx and efflux controls comes from life history interviews. An even more important source of information was the National Archives of Zimbabwe. I collected approximately 600 pages of original documents in these archives during 2013.

In order to emphasize historical linkages between past and present migrations, excerpts from archival sources are set apart from interview quotations within yellow block quotes like this, and are indexed in Bibliography A.

Finally, this study draws from a wealth of published studies about the Zimbabwean diaspora. As this study draws to a close, my foremost regret is that I may have done a disservice to this body of literature by not citing it more comprehensively. Very few of my observations are new, and I am heavily indebted to the scholars who came before me—especially those of African origin.

Excerpts from published sources are contained within green block quotes like this, and are indexed in bibliography B
Finally, it is important to remember that I am married to a Zimbabwean, which has allowed me to observe and even participate in the trials and tribulations of dispersed relatedness for more than a decade. For instance, as noted above, I benefited tremendously from collaborative childcare. My dissertation draws heavily from this experiential knowledge, and is unavoidably shaped by the dispositions and biases resulting from personal entanglement with the population I study.

Outline of the Chapters

The first two chapters are contextual. They introduce the population that this dissertation works with, as well as the most important historical and contemporary spatializations and technologies which they navigate. Chapter One focuses on colonial migration, while Chapter Two explores the contemporary exodus from Zimbabwe. Together, these chapters emphasize historical continuity in the reasons, routes and strategies used by families to benefit from and negotiate dispersion.

Chapter Three underlines continuities between contemporary and historical technologies of governmentality. It also fleshes out my theoretical approach to family as a performed collective identity. This involves a focused criticism of functionalist kinship as an exercise in applied anthropology, through which colonial officials sought to intervene in African society vis-à-vis “traditional” kinship and the imposition of European relatedness.

Chapter Four historicizes and explores the spatial context of dispersion through a comparison of two locations within South Africa — Schubart Park, a high-density informal settlement, and Spring Glen, a low-density suburban security village. These two locations powerfully influence
the relational activities of diasporans living within them. This contemporary respatialization of relatedness is linked to the creation of racist geographies during Apartheid.

The fifth chapter is the crux of this dissertation and focuses on collaborative family projects. It reveals how distance and separation result in “separate development,” whereby people gradually develop divergent routines, experiences and social networks that can be difficult for their family members to comprehend. Nevertheless, diasporans and their relatives in Zimbabwe work across emplaced differences to create families of choice. This involves both collaboration and conflict which is increasingly shaped by internet-mediated communications technologies.

The sixth and final chapter extends the exploration of dispersed families to the dispersed nation. I explore how internet-mediated communication is helping the diaspora-at-large engage in multilateral debates and discussions about matters of collective importance. The bulk of the chapter examines an internet meme through which people in various countries showed off their successes and failures in order to debate the meaning of life and the question of whether the sacrifices of diaspora are worth the rewards.
Chapter One: Two Centuries of Migration

Introduction

This dissertation explores how dispersion to multiple international locations reshapes relational practices in families like Chipo’s. In 2007, Chipo’s family was the target of political violence in Zimbabwe, prompting her and her two brothers to scatter between three neighboring countries:

These are my personal experience that forced me to leave: our house was burnt, my mother was beaten to death, and I had no choice... Me and my brothers, we had no choice. The other one is in Botswana, the other one is in Mozambique, and I am here [in South Africa] and the family was displaced because of that experience. We couldn't face it. (Chipo 2010)

Across the world, millions of people are forced to move by catastrophic events like Chipo described. Zimbabweans brave the crocodile-infested Limpopo River as Syrians navigate the choppy Mediterranean on overcrowded dinghies and youngsters from Central America brave the scorching Sonoran sun to reunite with parents in the United States. Still others relocate within national borders, abandoning the impoverished interiors of Brazil, Nigeria, and Haiti for the unforgiving metropoles of Rio De Janeiro (Goldstein 2013), Lagos (Packer 2006), and Port Au Prince (Farmer, et al. 1993).
In this era of “globalization” scholars across the disciplines increasingly direct attention toward such population movements and accompanying flows of ideas, information, labor and capital. Some of these discussions appear to treat contemporary migrations as almost unprecedented—eclipsing earlier population movements in both significance and scale (e.g. Castles and Miller 2009). In response, a strand of anthropology vociferously reminds academia that mobility is an ancient phenomenon. Contemporary societies are shaped by hundreds of years of European colonization (Escobar 2008; Lowe 2016), while even groups that anthropologists historically portrayed as “isolated,” “remote” or “untouched” were actually in contact with other groups—both near and far—for millennia (Wolf 1982). To give but one example, colonial historiography depicted indigenous Zimbabweans as primitive and provincial. In actual fact, the spectacular ruins of Great Zimbabwe—which predate all the migrations discussed here—bear witness to the tremendous economic power and technological sophistication accumulated during centuries of controlling a central node in the pre-colonial world’s far-flung gold trade (Phimister 1974).

This dissertation concurs with assertions that mobility is an ancient phenomenon. However, it attempts to go one step further by arguing that many of today’s migrations are inextricably linked to previous journeys. This chapter opens the argument—expanded in the rest of the dissertation—by describing three overlapping phases of historical migration and some of the ways in which families responded. In the early nineteenth century, advancing pioneer columns in South Africa sparked massive movements of refugees into Zimbabwe. Subsequently, the arrival of European farmers and miners resulted in the deportation of indigenous people to crowded and impoverished rural reserves. Finally—and concurrently with the previous two processes—the
demand for cheap African labor in extractive industries was met through a migratory system where men from rural areas were coerced to work on industrial mines, factories and farms.

This chapter shows how each of these historical migrations respatialized families and reconfigured relational practices. Refugees from South Africa intermarried with people they encountered during the journey, often adopting local customs and languages. Land dispossession separated Africans from ancestral graves, divided relatives between multiple “native reserves,” and created traumatic situations which exacerbated preexisting family conflicts. Labor migration involved the prolonged absence of men from their wives and children, thus reconfiguring gender and economic relations within families while also nurturing collaborative strategies in which relatives stood-in for each other during absences to care for elders and children.

Reviewing these population movements and the resulting effects on family practices is instructive for several reasons. Most straightforwardly, contextualizing contemporary migration within more than a century of programmatic impoverishment at the hands of colonial invaders helps explain why many Zimbabweans occupy disadvantaged positions in global employment, education and citizenship markets. In addition to being heirs to the poverty bestowed upon their parents and grandparents, today’s diasporans also encounter new iterations of the very technologies and tactics deployed against their forefathers and mothers—often by the very same power formations that colonized Zimbabwe. Political violence and strife which prompted Chipo and her siblings to leave Zimbabwe also motivated previous generations of Africans to leave their homes. Today, as in decades past, sojourners confront police officers and soldiers, thieves, wild animals and raging rivers. Employers exploit them comparable ways to how colonial labor brokers enslaved their parents and grandparents. Contemporary visa and passport regimes are eerily foreshadowed by colonial pass laws and identity schemes.
When juxtaposed to historical data in this chapter, subsequent accounts from diasporans who I interviewed during the past seven years reveal that there is very little which is entirely new about the current exodus from Zimbabwe. Indeed, it will become increasingly clear as this text unfurls that many of the relational and spatial strategies employed by Africans during the colonial era can be conceived of as “transferrable skills” that are inherited, refined and redeployed by contemporary diasporans as they confront similar obstacles. For instance, I use the term “spatial subterfuge” to refer to the art of occupying or transiting through prohibited spaces and places. When placed in the historical context of human trafficking rings and markets for false passes during the colonial era, it is unsurprising that contemporary diasporans also occasionally resort to sneaking across borders, using false bank statements to acquire visas or borrowing each others’ passports to subvert immigration laws which bar them from accessing preferred destinations—often the very same countries whose citizens deported their parents and grandparents to the reserves. Perhaps most instructive, however, is the fact that today as in generations past, strategies like spatial subterfuge and collaborative provisioning of care are often deployed in pursuit of the same, enduring relational goals: winning collective survival, achieving proximity to loved ones, and (re)creating families of choice. In times of turmoil, migration has long been an important way for Zimbabweans to make their families work.

Tamuka

I accomplish the historicization of migration in Zimbabwe by tracing the peregrinations of one patriline (figure 1). This family originates in what is today South Africa, on the wave-beaten costs of Shaka Zulu’s kingdom in Kwazulu Natal. Its first named ancestor, Mahla, was initially
an officer in Shaka’s army, but in the 1840s he fled into present-day Mozambique, where he helped found the short-lived but powerful Gaza Empire. During the late 1800s, Mahla's sons and grandsons ventured deep into present-day Zimbabwe to collect tribute for Gaza. As a result, they accumulated tremendous wealth in cattle, and by the early 1900s they put down roots in the verdant pastures of Zimbabwe’s Save River basin. Within decades of their arrival, the new Rhodesian state stripped them of their wealth and evicted them into overcrowded, rural ghettos in order to clear the land for immigrant Europeans—including many soldiers who fought tyranny in WWII so as to preserve it in the colonies. Upon relocating, the male children and grandchildren of Gaza’s royalty were again on the move—this time venturing to the mines of South Africa and central Zimbabwe, where they worked to raise cash for taxes and provide for their children who remained with their mothers and grandmothers in the rural areas. Eventually Mahla’s great-great grandchildren managed to bring their wives and children to join them in town, but a decade or two later their children fled Zimbabwe’s post-independence political and economic turmoil for overseas destinations including England, Australia, Canada and the United States. This latest exodus—beginning in the 1990s and continuing through the present day—is the primary event which sculpts the relational topography of the families which form the core of this dissertation.

The central figure in this story is a man I call Tamuka, probably a great grandson to Mahla, who was born in the Save River basin circa 1943. I was adopted as a son-in-law into Tamuka’s family and spoke frequently to him and his relatives about their history of migration. I also gathered supplemental information from the National Archives of Zimbabwe and published academic work. Like all life histories that peer so deeply into the mists of time, Tamuka’s account is provisional, incomplete, and occasionally clouded by old age and new family politics.
It also follows a single line of a complexly branching and sometimes murky family tree, largely from the perspective of one person and the highly-gendered lens of patrilineal descent. The peregrinations of Tamuka’s family are thus not entirely representative of all migration stories in the region. Rather, they serve as an orientating thread in a complex tangle of frenzied population upheavals that the subcontinent has witnessed during the past two centuries.

Figure 3: Nearly Two Centuries of Migration in Tamuka's Family
Population Upheaval: 1820-1900

Tamuka’s story begins approximately two centuries ago, on the wave-beaten coast of the present-day South African province of Kwazulu Natal. His great- or great-great grandfather was a man named Mahla, an officer in Shaka Zulu’s army under the command of Soshangane. Shaka consolidated a powerful kingdom between approximately 1815 and 1840. Historians dubbed this period the Mfecane, which means “the scattering” or “the crushing” because it saw a series of wars, famines, and mass migrations that stirred the entire region into haphazard and chaotic movement (Walker 1928:210).

The first European historians to write about the Mfecane depicted Shaka as a bloodthirsty tyrant whose expansionism was the primary cause of the period’s social upheavals (Cobbing 1988; Wright 1989). They argued that Shaka’s armies viciously pillaged cattle and slaughtered the men of vanquished groups, while assimilating women and youths. Whole societies fled his advancing armies, often duplicating his military techniques against those who they encountered in their flight. For example, colonial historian George Stow wrote about the “Mantatee”—an ethnic group ostensibly displaced by the Ngwane as they, in turn, fled Shaka (Stow 1905:460-487). He grandiosely argued that “immense hordes of the victorious and ruthless Mantatees” rampaged across southern Africa, pillaging and cannibalizing their enemies until their reign of terror was stopped by the British (Stow 1905:461).
Stow’s narrative of intra-African violence and Pax Britannica was pervasive in the historiography of the region until the 1980s, when Julian Cobbing’s revisionist account of the Mfecane sparked heated debate by dubbing it “a myth of a cataclysmic period of black-on-black destruction” (Cobbing 1988:487). Cobbing agreed that war and population upheaval was widespread during the 1800s, but he absolved Shaka of primary responsibility. Instead, he compellingly argued that the Mfecane myth was propagated to legitimize Anglo and Boer penetration into Africa’s interior and as an “alibi” to cover up illegal slaving operations.

In this vein, Patrick Wolf compellingly argues that settler-colonial societies endeavor to “erase” indigenous people from the landscape in order to facilitate dispossession (Wolfe 2006). Seen in this light, Theal’s claim that the Transvaal and Orange Free State were “almost depopulated by the Zulu Wars” (Theal 1893:601) enabled white South Africans to conceive of colonization as the settlement of unpopulated territory (see also Schmidt 1995:359). Similarly, Americans often present the conquest of the United States as the taming of a vast, empty “wilderness” when it actually involved frontier genocide, deportation, “civilization” programs and other tactics of erasure.

Thus, Cobbing argues that the “Mantatees” described by Stow were not a single ethnic group, but captives of various backgrounds brought to the Cape Colony in order to meet labor shortages. Missionaries claimed they were liberating Africans from famine and despotism, when they were actually capturing Africans from the interior and branding them as “Mantatees” in order to pawn them to white farmers as indentured labor. According to Cobbing, the conceptual slippage of the term, made it a “humanitarian euphemism” that enabled white farmers to circumvent the British abolition of the slave trade and create an exception to the Cape Colony’s abolition of black farm labor (Cobbing 1988).
In short—Cobbing paints the Mfecane’s unrest largely as a product of pressures brought to bear by the advance of colonialists into the interior. A number of scholars have continued in this vein, for example by tracing the remarkable paucity of academic rigor used to reconstruct Shakian history, and by revealing how liberal historians in the 1960s and 70s co-opted the Mfecane myth as a powerful example of black nation building (Wright 1989). While Cobbing’s line of research has a number of holes that were appropriately subjected to criticism and revision (Hamilton 1991; Omer-Cooper 1993), his exposure of the Mfecane as primarily a product of white expansionism was crucial in furthering the historiography of the region. A much more nuanced and complex understanding of migration in southern Africa during the first half of the nineteenth century emerged from this debate. People were indeed moving en masse—not only in response to Shaka’s expansion, but also in response to white settlers' appetite for land and labor. These insatiable thirsts continuously resurface as important factors prompting Tamuka’s family’s peregrinations for the next two centuries.

Nevertheless, Shaka and his armies cannot be absolved of all responsibility in propelling massive population movements. He was indeed a powerful ruler with expansionist visions and a notorious intolerance for dissent. This led several of his regiments to defect, fleeing as far as Tanzania (Chanaiwa 1980). One of the most famous defectors was Mzilikazi, who led a branch of the Ndebele people to settle in southwestern Zimbabwe after fleeing west through the contemporary Gauteng province (where he had relatives), then turning north through Botswana and Zambia. This journey, which is described more fully in chapter 4, continues to have important political implications as described in chapter 2.

Tamuka’s great or great-great grandfather was a man named Mahla, who was a commander under Shoshangane, another high-profile defector from Shaka. Mahla accompanied Soshangane
on his flight into present-day Mozambique, where his army defeated the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay and continued north along the coast (Bhila 1982; Liesegang 1970). During this journey, Mahla fought in battles against a regiment sent by Shaka to exact retribution for Shoshangane’s defection, as well as groups of Voortrekkers, Portuguese, and other Shakian defectors like Nxaba. Eventually, he became a powerful figure in Shoshangane’s newly-established, though relatively short-lived Gaza Kingdom, with its capital located along the Save River in present-day Mozambique. At its height, Gaza counted a million subjects between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, from the eastern districts of Zimbabwe all the way to the Indian Ocean (Bhila 1982).

Bhila reports that Gaza’s power derived from conquest and tribute:

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the basis of Soshangane's wealth and power were cattle, agriculture and trade in that order. He acquired cattle in two ways: first, from the Thonga, Hlengwe and Chopi, and the Shona whom he conquered; secondly, and on a regular basis, he sent tribute collectors to fetch cattle, among other things, from the subject peoples. (Bhila 1982:172)

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Indeed, Tamuka’s forefathers were likely organizers and benefactors of Soshangane’s tribute-collecting endeavors. Mahla—or, more likely, his children and grandchildren—traveled west along the Save River, deep into present-day Zimbabwe. At some point, they reportedly liked the land so much that they decided to settle permanently. So it was that by about 1890, Mahla’s decedents—including Tamuka’s father or grandfather—came to reside in the lush and verdant area of central Zimbabwe that was about to be annexed by the British South Africa Corporation as the personal estate of Cecil John Rhodes.

The journey of Tamuka’s forefathers from South Africa to Zimbabwe constitute only one example of pre-colonial migration. Indeed, complexly interlinked population upheavals figure
prominently into many of the deep family histories that I collected during my research. Many of these accounts bear witness to intense violence, even while blurring the distinction between perpetrators and victims. For example, a Zimbabwean immigrant in South Africa named Decent told me how his ancestors crossed into southeastern Zimbabwe from present-day Mozambique more than a century earlier (Decent 2013). Upon arriving in Zaka, Decent’s ancestors skinned the local chief alive in order to terrorize his people into fleeing so that they could claim the land. However, careful historical research could plausibly reveal that Decent’s ancestors were themselves refugees, escaping Shoshangane’s newly-established Gaza empire.

The histories of connectivity and exchange which emerge from such accounts are fascinating. Tamuka’s ancestors intermarried with people they encountered in their journeys and adopted many local customs. Meanwhile, Decent told me how his patrilineal origins in Mozambique allowed him to establish a kinship relationship with a neighbor in South Africa. This man was himself an immigrant, but he came from Mozambique—coincidently, the same area where Decent’s chief-flaying ancestors originated before resettling in Zimbabwe. Further conversation led the two men to discover that they shared a totem; which, in turn, allowed them to identify a common ancestor. This relationship allowed these two immigrants—who spoke different languages and were born in different countries—to rely on each other for mutual support in the midst of South Africa’s sometimes hostile xenophobia.

Indeed, African immigrants to South Africa like Decent must contend with pervasive xenophobic sentiment that periodically erupts into violence, as described in chapter 4. However, the Zimbabweans I interviewed often undermined the logic of xenophobia by asserting that “we are the same people!” This claim gains powerful weight by invoking centuries of travel, intermarriage and exchange between all groups of the region and by foregrounding supranational
continuity in history, culture and kinship between perpetrators and victims of xenophobia. For example, Tamuka’s daughter Nyarai related how she was once detained at the South Africa-Zimbabwean border in the 1990s and accused of carrying a fake passport (Nyarai 2014). The border guard claimed that her complexion and facial structure indicated that she was Tswana, not Shona, and should therefore be carrying travel documents from Botswana or South Africa. In relating this incident, she angrily reflected: “We are all mixed up. These borders did not exist until recently!” Deep histories of migration inevitably deconstruct the taken-for-grantedness of citizenship and the nation-state which even this dissertation has difficulty avoiding.

**Dispossession: 1900-1960**

The deportation of black people from their land was the second phase of migration that radically altered the socio-spatial fabric of the region. Entire communities were uprooted, stripped of the land and cattle they depended on for subsistence, and haphazardly recombined with other communities into high-density, impoverished rural “reserves” similar to the “Indian reservations” used by the United States and Canada to dispossess Native Americans. Many families were torn apart in this process. Relatives were often scattered between various reserves, and even the relationships of kin who managed to stay together were strained by the trauma of

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3 The continuity between “native reserves” and the “Indian reservations” of North America was of much interest to Rhodesian administrators. For instance, several articles comparing “native” policy in Rhodesia to “Indian” policy in North America were published in the annual magazine of the Native Affairs Department (Frantz 1960; Howman 1939; Rooken-Smith 1967). For example, one Native Administrator reported on his internship in the Indian Affairs Branch of Canada’s Department of Citizenship and Immigration (paid by the Canadian Government). “I traveled to London, Ontario, where I visited the Cardoc Agency (a District Commissioner type office) under Superintendent Dave Hett. The Caradoc Agency was responsible for the Muncey, Chippewa, Oneida and Moravian Band areas, which bore a remarkable resemblance to our African Purchase Areas in Mashonaland. (Rooken-Smith 1967:20).
dispossession. At the same time, relatedness played a critical role in enabling Africans to survive the travails of dislocation.

The Save River basin where Tamuka's grandfather settled was lush and verdant (Nyambara 2005). Watered by five rivers, it contained some of the most fertile agricultural land in what was about to become the colony of “Rhodesia,” named for the Englishman Cecil John Rhodes who made a fortune in gold and diamonds in South Africa. Rhodes’ company, the British South Africa Corporation (BSAC), was charted by England to colonize the area north of the Limpopo River in 1892. During the first few years of this endeavor, Tamuka’s father’s land was “acquired” by the BSAC and subsequently incorporated into the private “Rhodesdale” estate of Cecil John Rhodes himself (Nyambara 2005).

One of the BSAC's most important colonizing techniques was to promote European mining operations and settler agriculture. Cattle ranching in particular required minimal infrastructure and labor investment, and could parasitically establish itself on the existing expertise and herds of accomplished indigenous pastoralists. By 1923, Rhodesdale counted 40,000 head of company-owned cattle, supplying beef to mines throughout the colony and as far away as South Africa (Nyambara 2005:270). At this point, the bulk of Rhodesdale was sold to the iconic Lonrho Corporation, with private settlers also purchasing lots of 8 to 2000 square kilometers for the sum of 7s 6d per acre—equivalent to a value of £53.11 or $80.50 in the year 2000 (Williamson 2017).

Approximately 12,000 resident Africans were legally defined as “tenants” when Lonrho purchased Rhodesdale. Beginning in 1925, thousands were deported to nearby native reserves,

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4 Much like Canada’s Hudson Bay company, Lonrho is an colonial entrepreneurial venture that retains significant business interests. Today, Lonrho operates throughout Africa in mining, transportation, agriculture, hospitality and information technology.
but some were allowed to remain (Nyambara 2005). This number included Tamuka’s father’s who was using the Shona name “Mabunu” in his daily life and the English name “Jack” in dealings with colonialists. Indeed, the fact that Mabunu no longer utilized a Shangani name speaks to the degree his family had become integrated with the region’s local population, and is another sliver of evidence that Shakian population upheavals were not necessarily as violent as colonial historiography claims. 

African “tenants” were forced to pay rent to Lonrho in the form of labor, produce or money—similarly to how Tamuka’s grandfather’s generation collected tribute from the people they found in the area when they arrived from Gaza. This arrangement was beneficial to early settlers who were undercapitalized and struggled to access the labor required for commercial agriculture. Extracting rent, labor, and fees from tenants helped them begin amassing capital while gaining a toehold in the area. Thus, Jack Mabunu’s family was able to postpone their inevitable eviction, while accessing a small portion of the lands they formerly controlled. In fact, as Nyambara reports, many “tenants were more successful than undercapitalized European farmers because family labor was plentiful and the acquisition of land required no capital outlay” (Nyambara 2005:273). Furthermore, African ranchers had generations of ranching experience and some held large herds of cattle, which constituted one of the most important mediums of exchange in indigenous society. Wealth was measured in herd size, and marriages were cemented partially through the exchange of beasts from the groom’s family to the bride’s. Cattle also provided important insurance against famine as well as heavy labor in the fields. 

In 1947, after failing at tobacco production, Lonrho sold Rhodesdale back to the Crown, which subdivided the property into parcels for European settlers, many who were former British soldiers who received attractive financing under the Ex Serviceman Land Resettlement Scheme.
These immigrants were courted to bolster Rhodesia’s\(^5\) white population, and were unhappy that their new farms were already occupied. They complained that “on Rhodesdale, natives are extremely reluctant to take up Labour Agreements. They are far too well off at present\(^6\)” (quoted in Nyambara 2005:276). Indeed, the agricultural and pastoral prowess of Africans like Tamuka gave them little reason to labor under oppressive conditions for the usurpers. This conflict led to the increased enforcement and strengthening of the Land Apportionment Act which instigated racial segregation and forbade blacks from occupying “white” areas. The African population on Rhodesdale thus became “squatters” as quickly as they had become “tenants.”

Mandatory cattle destocking was a key method of dispossessing black “squatters.” This policy was built on conservationist discourse and limited African ownership of cattle, disregarding the fact that overgrazing was the result of both industrial European ranching as well as the overcrowding of Africans in tiny native reserves. Naturally, destocking infuriated Africans, as it undermined their economic and social structures. Prominent Africans like Mabunu owned *hundreds* of cattle which would make them wealthy men in any country of the world then or today. They observed white-owned herds increase exponentially while their own herds were forcibly reduced. This occasioned outcries such as the one Nyambara reports from a meeting.

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\(^5\) I use the term “Rhodesia” to refer specifically to Zimbabwe’s various colonial regimes, while I generally use “Zimbabwe” to refer to the area of land now known by that name, as well as to its post-independence government. Additionally—in the interest of simplicity—I generally do not distinguish between the various iterations that Zimbabwe’s colonial governments took including Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

\(^6\) This was a common complaint amongst settlers. For example, a contributor to the *Rhodesian Herald* in 1946 argued that the shortage of migrant labor from Nyasaland (Malawi) “all boils down to the fact that the natives have as much money as they need at the moment” (Contributor 1946). The supposed surplus of money in African hands was attributed to high wages in South Africa and in Britain’s Kings African Rifles. Part of the contributor’s proposed solution was to increase exports to Nyasaland. This would benefit Rhodesian textiles and cotton farmers while enticing Africans to quickly spend their money so that they would need to go to work in Rhodesia. Colonialism has been described as a “desiring machine” in the sense that it created and played on sexual desires in colonialists (Young 1995). It was also a “desiring machine” in the sense that it sought to cultivate desires for manufactured goods in subjugated populations.
between 320 black Rhodesdale cattle owners and Kwekwe's Assistant Native Commissioner.

The African “squatters” enumerated their litany of complaints against the colonialists:

(1) … Why force only the natives to destock? Have our cattle got two mouths? (2) Is Rhodesdale a new place that we cannot claim it as home? Were not most of us here present actually born there? (3) Is Rhodesdale not overstocked because farms have been sold to Europeans and we have been forced all together into one corner of it? (4) We are told we will some day be moved. Why should we destock when we are to be moved? (5) How can I feed my children without cattle? What shall I do when famine comes? How can I start herds for my sons? (6) Just who is the Government? (7) Why does the Government change policy so often? ... (10) During [World War II] we were told, "After the war you will all live in freedom." We were told, "Help us to buy aeroplanes and after the war you will all be free." We helped. Now see what happens to us. Is this freedom? (11) Why do you reduce us to ten head of cattle when we see Europeans who live next to us with 100 head of cattle? (12) It is all very well for you to say that cattle prices are to be increased. We are always being told this but we never see it. (13) These cards [permits for occupation of Crown land] are printed in English. We cannot read this. We do not know what is written on them. (Nyambara 2005:286)

Interestingly, Nyambara reports that the man in charge of the African delegation lodging these complaints was named “John Jack”—who owned more than 1,000 cattle and cultivated 500 acres together with his sons. It is entirely possible this man was the very same Jack Mabunu whose family we are following. In any case, Tamuka’s father farmed and ranched on a scale that whites initially envied, but gradually managed to reproduce.
Of course, conflict between settlers and Africans was almost always resolved in favor of the former. Jack Mabunu and his family were among the last remaining Africans on Rhodesdale, but their turn to be evicted came in 1956, when they were assigned to the barren and remote Sanyati area, some 300 kilometers to the northwest. Meanwhile Mabunu’s brothers resettled to the tsetse plagued area of Gokwe, 60 kilometers to the south. These areas, wrongly classified as “uninhabited,” were not desirable to whites primarily because of the prevalence of Malaria, the tsetse fly and their remoteness from urban centers (Worby 2000). This deportation was hastily enacted, poorly planned and underfunded. A dozen families at a time were loaded onto lorries, with each receiving about 10 acres in Sanyati. Anthropologist Elizabeth Colson vividly recorded a similar deportation in the 1950s from areas flooded by the construction of the Kariba Dam in the north of the country:

[The colonial administration] had not realized the weight of food stores in granaries and on drying platforms, the hoards of tobacco hidden away awaiting sale, the large number of highly breakable pots and gourd containers…

[Africans] rode the swaying, open lorries for a hundred miles, over rough roads, in the blazing sun of the hottest period of the year when temperatures may rise to 100° in the shade, to reach an unknown land they dreaded…The misery of the trip was increased by nausea. Vomiting women and children hung over the sides of the lorries…They emerged exhausted and sick to find themselves in what they regarded as a wilderness…They struggled to cook and eat…

[A] man cradled his week-old daughter in his arms the whole of the frightful lorry journey. No one was available to give orders that his family might remain behind until his
wife had recovered…Another woman was in the midst of the funeral of her child, who died the day before the ‘Chisamu war’ [an act of local resistance against the Kariba evictions]. When the men came running from Chisamu to warn all to hide in the bush because the Europeans were coming to kill them, she stayed by the grave. Then the lorries came, and she was ordered aboard…

The [relocated] peoples awaited the arrival of their goods. With the return of the lorries they began to bewail their losses. Precious pots had been thrown aboard and off again, and the grain and seed stored within them were lost amidst the potsherds. Valuables never arrived…Gwembe men commonly bury their cash reserves in the ground. Those unable to reach their hoards before the lorries came had no chance to raise their funds before bulldozers obliterated the homestead sites, already devastated by fires lit by the district messengers. These had been ordered to fire villages as their inhabitants left to discourage any drift back from Lusitu to the old sites before flooding made return impossible. (Colson 1971:43-45)

Colson’s vivid account of the Kariba evictions show how disruptive and traumatic this process was for families. In addition to economic catastrophe, she perspicaciously notices how deportation also entailed violent separation from ancestral graves, thereby rupturing family histories and uprooting localized identities. In most indigenous traditions within Zimbabwe, newly-departed family members are what Mbiti has called the “living-dead,” (Mbiti 1990:69, 82). They remain actively engaged with their living relatives who may turn to them for advice or protection, or to mediate communication with God (Masaka and Makahamadze 2013:134). Ancestral graves and accompanying rituals thus activate people’s connection to their lineage as well as the lineage’s connection to the land. For example, the ceremony of kurova guva, performed approximately a year after a person’s death, welcomes their wandering spirit back
from the bush into the homestead as a *mudzimu* or benevolent ancestral spirit (Rutsate 2010). Indeed, many Shona people describe themselves as *vana vevhu* or “children of the soil,” a phrase which points to the conflation of ancestors with the land and reveals the powerful role of a family’s graves in linking people to place. Separation from these graves during colonial dispossession accordingly interrupted important family- and place-making practices, even while the presence of ancestral graves on alienated land legitimized subsequent anti-colonial campaigns as attempts to repossess a birthright (Fontein 2011:712; Lan 1985; Mujere 2011).

About 180,000 Africans were relocated in Southern Rhodesia by 1963, and an additional 80,000 during following decade. This included 1000 families from Rhodesdale which were sent to Sanyati and Gokwe to live alongside people who were indigenous to the area—whom the newcomers offensively labeled “Shangwe”—and deportees from other areas of the country (Nyambara 2002; Worby 2000). Mabunu had two wives at the time of his deportation, each of whom lived with their children in separate but nearby homesteads in Rhodesdale. Calamitously, he was in the hospital when the lorries arrived, accompanied by his junior wife Yolanda who was taking care of him. The task of organizing Yolanda’s homestead’s relocation accordingly fell her oldest daughter and—Tamuka. The trauma of this event visibly affects Tamuka every time he recounts this part of the story. He was only about 9 years old and his sister was two or three years his senior. All the adults in the community—including Mabunu’s elder wife—were frantically handling their own household’s affairs and afforded them little assistance. Thus, Yolanda charged her eldest daughter with packing up all their belongings and taking her younger siblings on the lorry. Meanwhile, Tamuka drove his father’s cattle to Sanyati all by himself. Along the way he was forced to sell many animals at basement prices, including one especially
painful loss when a prized animal gave birth en route, and he all but gifted cow and calf to a European rancher.

The move very likely exacerbated existing tensions between Jack Mabunu and his wives. Mabunu had quarreled with his senior wife prior to the move. She then took advantage of the deportation to transplant herself and her children to Gokwe where her parents relocated, instead of Sanyati where Mabunu and his junior wife Yolanda resettled. Yolanda was disconcerted by this separation and urged her husband to pursue his senior wife and beg her to return. He followed this advice—but during his absence she had a romantic entanglement with another man. This affair was taboo, but one of Tamuka’s daughters sympathized with her grandmother’s actions. She was nearly 30 years younger than Mabunu and her family had betrothed her to him as a child in order to stave off starvation during a severe famine. Yolanda was thus was raised by Mabunu’s senior wife until she came of age and started her own house. According to Tamuka’s daughter, it was entirely understandable for her grandmother to crave a relationship with someone her own age. Moreover, it was a chaotic time, and she speculated that Yolanda may have been desperate for emotional and material support that was not forthcoming from her troubled husband.

Nevertheless, news of the affair infuriated Mabunu when he returned with his senior wife. In a fit of rage, he commanded Tamuka to drive all his remaining cattle to market. He then took the considerable proceeds from the sale and visited his brother in Gokwe, where he announced that he would take his riches to find their great grandfather Mathla’s kin in South Africa. Tragically, this was the last time anyone heard of Jack Mabunu. Presumably he died, but his body was never found. Some people suspect that he was murdered for the money—an inauspicious end to such an accomplished man.
Yet the possibility that Mabunu did actually make the trip to Natal cannot be dismissed. Indeed, it is revealing that he planned to reactive long-dormant family relationships in South Africa in order to escape crumbling relations in Zimbabwe. Mabunu apparently knew that Mahla left behind relatives who he could find when he fled Shaka—perhaps siblings or adult children. Migration, it seems, almost inevitably results in family fragmentation, as is apparent in the conflict between Mabunu and his wives as well as the geographical separation between Mabunu and his brothers. Family is so ineluctably place-bound that some of it will always remain when some other part of it moves.

Labor Migration: 1920 - 1980

Labor migration was the third historical phase of spatial reorganization that was profoundly significant in Southern Africa. Long-distance labor migration was already underway in the 1800s, while Tamuka's forefathers were escaping Shaka into Mozambique. During this period, Africans traveled hundreds or even thousands of kilometers on foot to seek work with Europeans as farmhands, maids and gardeners. These early migrants usually stayed on the job for months or years before returning to their families. V L Allen argues that the primary motivation for seeking wage labor during this early period was to fulfill immediate goals like acquiring guns for the ivory trade and defense against encroaching settlers, or to purchase agricultural implements needed for more intensive cultivation of dwindling land holdings (Allen 1992:35). Thus, Allen argues, labor migration began not as a sinister plan on behalf of the colonialists to deliberately form exploitable pools of cheap labor. Rather, it began “largely through the determination of Africans to maintain their own institutions and ways of life against the pressures of encroaching
colonial capitalism (ibid).” As in the contemporary exodus from Zimbabwe, labor migration was a strategy that Africans used to preserve their autonomy and provide for their families under extenuating circumstances.

V L Allen’s emphasis on indigenous motivations as a contributing factor in labor migration is commendable. Too often, histories of colonialism ruminate on the policies, economies and atrocities effected by foreign powers while ignoring the myriad of ways in which colonized people creatively exercise their own agency to adapt and improvise within an oppressive system. In the process, they both preserve and transform their communities as well as those of the oppressors.

Nevertheless, the fact that some Africans willingly left their homes to work for Europeans does not diminish the extreme coerciveness of colonial labor policies, which began with the chattel slavery of the Dutch who arrived in the Western Cape in the 1650s. Extractive industries like mining minimized African wages to compensate for the steep costs of transportation, machinery and infrastructure which resulted from operating far from European factories and markets. Commercial farming required large numbers of workers who could be contracted and dismissed with the fluctuation of agricultural cycles. Cheap labor also enabled the opulent lifestyles that whites saw as a significant “perk” to living on the colonial frontier, where even settlers on the lowest rungs of white society employed African nannies, gardeners and housekeepers (Schmidt 1990a:156). I would accordingly argue (and Allen would undoubtedly agree) that the creation and exploitation of cheap labor was the cornerstone of colonial economies in the region.
The scale of labor migration grew in tandem with the expansion and industrialization of colonial economies and was catalyzed by the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold on the Rand during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. These industries had voracious labor needs which could not (and would not) be met by local populations. Recruiters accordingly sought to lure workers from increasingly distant locations, including present-day Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe—just as indigenous people from these areas were attracted to the earnings available on the Rand. Indeed, Africans throughout the region increasingly required cash to pay taxes levied on them by colonial governments.

The long journey south was arduous. Some significant risk came from crossing great distances teaming with wild animals and raging rivers, but the most marked threats came from fellow human beings. Migration routes traversed white-owned farms, which also required labor but could not compete with the mines on wages. Farmers accordingly preyed on migrants they found passing through their fields, extracting fines or labor in exchange for “safe” passage (Allen 1992:54). Labor touts also waylaid migrants to force or trick them into signing work contracts so they could be sold to employers like slaves. Constantly changing influx and efflux polices described more fully in chapter 3 required migrants to attain passes from various administrations which enabled them to enter, transit, reside or look for work in particular areas (Hindson 1987). Those who did not possess the appropriate passes could be fined by real or imposter police officers. Indeed, migrants represented a lucrative customer base for all sorts of entrepreneurial conmen who dressed up as border officials to sell counterfeit passes or posed as doctors to peddle spurious vaccinations (Allen 1992:150).

The trip home, however, was even more dangerous. Cash earnings and acquired goods made returnees targets for highwaymen (Allen 1992:55). With great distances to travel and so many
opportunities to be separated from their money, possessions and traveling companions, some
migrants ran out of strength and resources to continue and wasted away alongside the roads.
Allen quotes two observers from 1894 who described this grisly scene:

skeletons of those who have died are frequently seen, and at almost every store and
dwelling near the road can be found those whom sickness or fatigue has compelled to give up
the road and to either find a friend or perish (Allen 1992:148).

Zimbabweans were among those who risked these perils to find work in Kimberly and the
Rand—especially Ndebele and Venda people who shared a linguistic and cultural connections to
indigenous populations in South Africa. Zimbabwe was also a conduit for migrants who came
from Mozambique and Malawi. Indeed, long-distance migration routes to South Africa that
passed through Zimbabwe were well established by the time that the Rhodesian mining industry
gained a toehold in the early 1900s and hordes of European prospectors swarmed into the
country with the hope of discovering King Solomon’s lost mines, a honey pot that was believed
to eclipse the riches of the Rand (Haggard 1994[1885]; Van Onselen 1976).

At first glance, Rhodesian settlers saw an endless supply of cheap labor in their new colony,
just as Zimbabwe’s expansive hardwood forests initially appeared to offer inexhaustible fuel for
the steam engines that plied the expanding network of railways (Kwashirai 2006). Surprisingly,
labor was more scarce than settlers initially believed, just as the dense forests of Manyicaland
and Matabeleland were quickly decimated by the trains which brought settlers into the country
from ports in Beira and Durban. Europeans found it difficult to convince locals to risk life and
limb drilling for gold in the hot, damp penumbra of the mines. Furthermore, Africans who
managed to cling to their land were often self-sufficient, and some—like Jack Mabunu—were
even better-off than Europeans. These people could generate more cash by selling produce to European mines than by working in them (Van Onselen 1976:74). Meanwhile, those who had been deported to reserves were reluctant to cultivate their stolen fields for the benefit of the thieves (Scott 1954).

However, competition from South Africa’s roaring economy was possibly the biggest threat to Rhodesia’s supply of African labor. Zimbabwe was integrated into a regional economy in which various colonies competed for labor while Africans sought to maximize earnings. Much to their chagrin, Rhodesian settlers were poorly equipped to compete with South Africa. Despite initial reports of abundant gold, the deposits in Zimbabwe proved to be unpredictable and difficult to mine, favoring small and medium-sized operations that were generally undercapitalized. The extremely high transportation costs on the colonial frontier also increased the price of machinery and raw materials like explosives, timber and mercury. Rhodesian miners could only stay in business by keeping costs to an absolute minimum, and expenditures on African labor were the most palatable cuts for managers and financiers (Van Onselen 1976:33). Thus, wages for black workers in Rhodesia declined almost every year in the first half of the twentieth century, while expenditures on non-salary items like healthcare, food and shelter for African employees were also minimal.

By 1937 the Chief Superintendent of Police in Bulawayo remarked that wages in South Africa were three times higher than in Zimbabwe and “conditions regarding food, accommodation and amenities are generally better than here” (Chief Superintendent BSAP Bulawayo 1937:4). Thus, most long-distance migrants opted to pass straight through Rhodesia, or to work in the colony for a few months in order to raise capital to continue south. Many
indigenous Zimbabweans also decided to pursue the better working conditions and higher salaries available in South Africa.

Rhodesia’s difficulty in filling its labor needs increased as commercial agriculture gained momentum and mining operations expanded into coal, mica, asbestos and chromium. The mining industry responded by forming the Rhodesia Native Labor Bureau in 1903, which was subsequently nationalized. In the early years, the Bureau raided remote villages to forcibly enlist able-bodied adults, whipping those who refused to enlist or torching their grain supplies (Van Onselen 1976:105). As its notoriety spread, and as demand for labor grew, the Bureau was forced to recruit from more remote areas beyond Rhodesia’s borders, and even resorted to airdropping leaflets guiding prospective migrants to the colony. It also press-ganged southbound travelers, for instance, by setting up ferries along the Zambezi where migrants availing of this “free” service were subsequently forced to sign contracts with the Bureau (Van Onselen 1976:107).

Increasingly, Rhodesia negotiated agreements with the administrations of Nyasaland (Malawi) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) to recruit directly in these colonies in return for capacitation fees. Thus labor became a key negotiation point in intercolonial relations, as governments sought to protect internal supplies, or exchange political concessions for access to labor in other colonies (Johnson 1992). Colonies where labor originated also sought to derive incidental benefits from outbound workers through hut taxes, capacitation fees, and mandatory remittances.

Rhodesia relied so extensively on external sources of labor that there were more foreign workers in the country than local workers for the first half of the twentieth century. For example,
in 1921, only 35% of registered African employees were from Zimbabwe (Scott 1954). By 1941
Zimbabweans still only comprised 44% of registered workers, with the remaining originating
primarily in Malawi (23%), Zambia (16%) and Mozambique (15%). Indeed, the oldest urban
townships in both Harare and Bulawayo were predominantly populated by foreigners for the first
several decades they existed (Yoshikuni 2007).

By recruiting foreign labor, the Bureau managed to secure a relatively consistent supply of
workers which undercut the wages of all Africans. Recruits from far away had the distinct
“advantage” of deserting less frequently than people whose homes, social networks, and family
obligations were nearby. Bureau recruits received transportation directly to their place of
employment, but upon arrival they received lower salaries than “voluntary” recruits as employers
sought to recuperate capacitation fees from salaries. Bureau recruits were also assigned to the
worst employers whose poor reputations made it difficult for them to independently recruit
voluntary labor. Employers often traded workers under contract as if they were slaves. The
Bureau thus became one of the most hated Rhodesian institutions, as evident in its Shona name
“chibaro,” which plays on the English word “bureau” but also means “slavery.” Even fifty years
after its dissolution, Tamuka once bitterly remarked to me that people contracted by the Bureau
worked only to eat, and had nothing left over after completing their contract.

The Bureau’s coercive practices made it a major liability for European-African relations, so
the state increasingly moved towards bureaucratic techniques of addressing the “labor problem.”
Significantly, this included “influx” controls designed to encourage migrants to come into the
country and “efflux” controls to discourage them from leaving. As described more fully in
Chapter Three, these policies were facilitated by pass laws and identity regimes that required
migrants to procure official identity documents and travel endorsements which had to be
produced on the demand of police officers and other officials. Meanwhile, people under employment contracts were required to show permission from their employer to be absent from work, or else they were considered “deserters.” Those who were unable to furnish appropriate documentation were arrested, deported, returned to their employer or subjected to corporal punishment. However, the most common consequence for violating the pass laws was one or more months of hard (i.e. free) labor for the state.

The intended and unintended consequences of increasingly formalized identification and pass laws are revealed in the aftermath of South Africa’s Immigration Regulations Act of 1913, which classified Africans from north of the 22° South (roughly corresponding with the Limpopo River) as prohibited persons, ineligible to work in South Africa (Kupakuwana 2017). This law was apparently a response to the appallingly high mortality rates in South African mines, where almost ten percent of Malawian workers died each year during the first decade of the century. With its passage, Zimbabweans—along with most long-distance migrants transiting through the country—were technically unwelcome in South Africa and were turned away at the border. However, much to the frustration of Rhodesian officials, the South African government would issue six month “Temporary Permits” for 5 shillings to people who managed to surreptitiously slip across the border (Staff Officer BSAP - Salisbury 1948).

The desperation of South African employers for African labor created an enormous market for human trafficking that can only be described as a slave trade. For example, European adventurers, ivory poachers and fugitives moonlighted as labor recruiters or “blackbirders” in the remote northeastern corner of South Africa where it borders Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Murray 1995). Blackbirders waylaid southbound migrants and raided villages to find “recruits.” Because their unfortunate victims were considered prohibited persons, blackbirders obtained
fraudulent identity documents from Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) in order to sell their captives to licensed brokers within South Africa (Murray 1995). Official reports indicate that few “prohibited” immigrants were present in South Africa during these years. In actual fact, Murray’s research reveals how the Immigrants Act of 1913 simply forced migrants underground, destabilized their position in South Africa and increased their exposure to labor exploitation. Incidentally, the area where the blackbirds were most active is now comprised primarily of wildlife preserves like Kruger Park and remains a key transit area for contemporary Zimbabweans who are headed to South Africa as well as a new generation of illegal labor recruiters. These stories are told in the next chapter.

North of the Limpopo, my research in the National Archives of Zimbabwe reveals how futile it was for Rhodesia to contain migrants within the country in order to meet domestic labor demands. Officials perennially complained about the porosity of the borders:

> Our Southern and South western borders are more than 400 miles in extent and for the greater part of the year can be crossed with ease at any place. It is an impossible task for B.S.A.P. [the police], to cover this distance by day and by night, and so long as the economic advantages of working in the Union obtain, no Police action in S. Rhodesia will stem the flow. (Staff Officer BSAP - Salisbury 1948)

Nevertheless, the state poured resources into hardening its borders, both by hiring and equipping police, as well as through bureaucratic procedures such as the requirement for Africans to attain special permits permitting them to seek work in the border area—in addition to the Registration Certificate which was the basic permit required to work (Chapter 3). This represented a major setback for migrants, who now had to sacrifice additional money and time to
acquire the necessary documentation—just like today’s diasporans invest considerable resources in attaining passports and visas to overseas destinations.

Even so, Africans found a myriad of ways to subvert and circumvent these laws. By 1939, the Assistant Superintendent of the Police in Bulawayo reported that six busses were making multiple trips each week between Bulawayo and Legion Mine in a remote area of Matabeleland close to the border with Botswana (Walker 1939). The busses stopped at a police checkpoint in Kezi, about half way to the border, but passengers almost always had the requisite passes and the busses proceed without delay. Officers quipped that their hands were tied because they were unable to legally arrest people with passes, even though they were obviously intending to illegally cross into South Africa. Meanwhile, Legion Mine was operating at 30% under capacity for lack of workers. In frustration, the Assistant Superintendent of the Police concluded that the pass law actually made his job more difficult: most passengers “obviously have no intention of seeking work, but are merely covering themselves [with passes] prior to reaching the Border” (Walker 1939:3).

Officials responded to this spatial subterfuge by discontinuing the issuance of passes to look for work in border areas. Ironically, and notwithstanding the labor needs of employers in the area, this was done “on the grounds that no work is to be obtained” (Chief Superintendent BSAP Bulawayo 1939). Almost immediately, this reduced the number of passengers on the Railway Road Motor Service by 90%. However, it did little to curb the determination of migrants to reach South Africa, as the same report found “a marked increase in the number of Natives traveling southward on foot (ibid).”
Before long, migrants were back on mass transit, now traveling on “leave passes” issued by mines south of the border, which enabled them to both circumvent South Africa’s Immigrant Regulations Act which classified them as prohibited persons, and also avoid arrest in Rhodesia to the north. A 1944 mail censorship campaign revealed how this form of spatial subterfuge included a rampant black market in counterfeit leave passes. For instance, a man named Pitorosi from present-day Zambia worked on Olifant Farm in the Rhodesdale area. He had the following request for a relative in Boksburg, South Africa:

…I am desirous of coming down there and I beg your most kindness to buy me a pass of that country and after you have bought it, please send it to me very urgently.

I am sure to pay your money back on arrival there. I am here with my two friends, their names are as follows: 1, Sandiresi Ngoma, 2, Taniyere Ngoma. I have written their names as to show that otherwise if possible you may favor them also. (Pitorosi 1944)

Migrants returning home could raise money by selling their passes to people headed south. If they could afford it, they could also find someone who specialized in supplying passes, with prices for passes in 1951 reaching an unbelievable £8, equivalent to several months wages. Officers had little less success in apprehending the European ringleaders of such schemes, but occasionally apprehended their African foot soldiers.

The laws, policies, and enforcement tactics designed to control the movement of Africans were constantly changing. This exacted a significant toll in terms of money, time and safety from people who sought to maximize the value of their labor. Nevertheless, Africans were adept at spatial subterfuge. As soon as one route to South Africa closed, other routes were discovered or loopholes were manufactured. Indeed, the practice of subverting identity regimes and influx
controls continues into the present day. For instance, Chapter 3 explores how Zimbabweans sometimes use false credentials or borrow travel documents to access Europe, North America, and the Antipodes. Such practices are decried as unethical by destination countries. However, Zimbabweans generally see it as entirely legitimate, considering that their families have endured generations of racist restrictions on their movements in order to exploit their labor. Indeed, the spaces that Zimbabweans now wish to access are the very same countries that were responsible for colonialism (in the case of the UK and other European countries) or that were established as settler colonies (in the case of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia).

By the 1950s, when Tamuka’s family was deported from Rhodesdale to the impoverished reserve of Sanyati, it was difficult to hold out against working for Rhodesian employers. Blatantly violent tactics of labor coercion were increasingly replaced by more insidious but effective tactics that constituted a programmatic undermining of indigenous modes of survival. The consolidation of European agriculture eliminated opportunities to earn money by selling surplus produce. Crowding Africans into infertile “native reserves” made it difficult for households to meet basic nutrition requirements through subsistence agriculture and propelled men into wage labor so that they could supplement their families with food and other supplies purchased on the market. Colonial governments also ratcheted up collection of the annual “hut tax” and other levies. These were explained as a way for Africans to pay for their own “development,” but in reality taxation created a pressing, recurrent need for cash which bound indigenous people to the colonial economy. As van Onselen writes:

> to an increasing extent young men in their physical prime had to make their way to the mines to sell their labour, as restricted access to land, taxation and the decline in peasant
markets proletarianised Shona, and to a lesser extent, Ndebele communities. (Van Onselen 1976:123)

Such was the situation that Tamuka and his siblings encountered after arriving in Sanyati during the late 1950s. Like contemporary Zimbabweans who flee the political and economic turmoil nurtured by the ruling party, Tamuka’s brothers fled rural poverty to South Africa and Tamuka himself went to Bulawayo where he found a job in the Dunlop tire factory. He compared this experience to slavery, as he did not even earn enough money to find his way home after falling severely ill. Fortunately he managed to borrow money from friends in order to make the return journey, where he spent months in recovery before venturing out again. This time he traveled to the burgeoning mining town of Kwekwe, where he secured employment at the RISCO steel foundry. Tamuka began work as a boiler boy, feeding coal into the plant’s massive furnaces. His white supervisor jeered that he wouldn't last until the end of the week, but Tamuka stuck with it and gradually ascended the ranks.

Tamuka lived in Torwood, a residential community for African employees of RISCO that was built, owned and maintained by the company. It was a vibrant and diverse community, populated by Zimbabweans as well as immigrants from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and even Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Norwood was tucked behind a mountain near the steel plant, conveniently out of view of Redcliff, the posh, white-only community where the management lived. The social and economic divisions between blacks and whites were thus sustained and mirrored by the creation of racist geographies.

Simultaneously the system of migrant labor entailed a highly gendered geography that divided African men and women, husbands and wives, fathers and children. Urban areas were
male-dominated, as most positions were reserved for men. Women were expected to remain in the “reserves” with their children, where they would take charge of agricultural activities and raise the next generation of laborers. Thus, Tamuka’s wife Gladys remained in the rural area of Sanyati after they got married while he went to the city in order to provide for the family’s financial needs. Paradoxically, sustaining loved ones through migration often meant leaving them behind. In order to make his family work Tamuka had to break it apart.

This respatialization of relatedness required families to devise ways of persevering through separation. One strategy was to lean on a rich tradition of relational practices that emphasize collective wellbeing. For example, as described more thoroughly in chapter 3, the indigenous principal of “classificatory” relatedness collapses various “biological” relationships into singular categories. Through this transitive property of relatedness, a woman is interchangeable with her sisters and a man is interchangeable with his brothers. By extension, a person’s fathers include not only their own “biological” father but all of his brothers, and a man counts all of his brother’s wives and wives’ sisters as his own. In this intricate system, people were rarely left without someone who could fulfill the responsibilities of a “brother” “father” “wife” or “husband”—even in the absence of their immediate father or husband.

Tamuka and Gladys’ daughter Nyarai described one way that this played out in her family. As a newly-married daughter-in-law, Gladys was unfairly burdened with work by her husband’s sisters. Nyarai recounted how her mother was assigned very distant fields and nobody would give her food when her mother was away cultivating them. On several occasions Gladys fled the homestead to see Tamuka, secretly staying with her brother who lived nearby, as Tamuka himself lived in a barracks style dormitory. Each time, she was discovered by the police, and because the couple did not have a marriage certificate she was sent back to the rural areas.
Finally, when Tamuka’s brother visited the homestead from South Africa, he saw the situation of his brother’s wife—who was, by extension, his own “wife” and responsibility. Her dire situation prompted him to coordinate with Gladys’ father in order to procure the marriage certificate—a generous gesture considering that Tamuka had not finished paying Gladys’ lobola (bride wealth) so her father could have refused to authorize this transaction (Nyarai 2014).

Another way that families responded to labor migration was through collaborative parenting. People who went to urban areas often left children in the village with their wives, brothers, sisters or parents. These caretakers were charged with the hands-on work of raising the children, while the children’s parent or parents would remit money, groceries and other supplies from urban employment. In this way, collaborative parenting ensured the sustenance not only of the children, but the broader family unit which would incidentally benefit from remittances.

Alternatively, people in rural areas sent their children to live with family members in the city, where they would be able to access better education and employment opportunities.

Thus, Tamuka and Gladys frequently hosted relatives in town, and Tamuka sometimes succeeded in finding jobs for them. The couple also played a pivotal role in rural life by putting many nieces and nephews through school. In cooperation with his siblings Tamuka developed his family’s kumusha by acquiring cattle and farm implements, erecting new buildings on the homestead and drilling a borehole well. On holidays they sent their children back to the reserve where Yolanda provided childcare in order to reduce their expenses in the city and allow them to focus on income-generating activities. Fellowship and reciprocal exchange thus continuously reinforced the couple’s connection to their rural home. Indeed, their residence in town was tenuous because they would be left homeless if Tamuka ever lost his job. Maintaining good
relationships with people in the village was a strategic way to both prepare for retirement and mitigate the consequences of catastrophe.

Despite Gladys and Tamuka’s success, the unavoidable reality of poverty and prolonged separation presented a number of challenges to collaborative parenting. These challenges are allegorized in one of the folktales collected by George Fortune in the late 1960s or early 1970s, during the height of labor migration. Hare and Lion live in poverty so Lion volunteers to hunt meat in a distant forest (symbolic of the city) while Hare takes care of his three children. Unfortunately, rabbit grows hungry in Lion’s absence and decides to eat one of his children. Lion calls from a distance (i.e. he telephones) and asks Hare to show him his children. Hare shouts back to say that everything is fine, and he lifts up the two remaining children three times to deceive Lion. Satisfied, Lion leaves meat for Hare and returns to hunting. Meanwhile, Hare gives some of Lion’s meat to his friends the Baboons, until he is left with only very tough game. Desirous of soft meat with blood in it, he decides to consume Lion’s second child. Eventually Lion returns but Hare again deceives him into believing his children are well. The third time, Lion is gone for an extremely long time because other great hunters encourage him to go to even more distant forests with abundant game (i.e. South Africa). Here, Lion eats copiously and grows fat, while Hare again suffers hunger and eats the third child. This time Lion figures out what happened. In retribution, he kills the baboons, but when he turns on Hare he accidentally murders Turtle instead due to Hare’s trickery. Hare escapes, but eventually dies in the bush.

I was alerted to this folktale by Godwin Makaudze, whose analysis emphasizes how old stories are still useful in navigating contemporary situations (2013). This tale should not be misinterpreted to indicate that collaborative parenting usually failed. Rather, it must be seen as a didactic tool through which the elder storyteller educated the youth about how to successfully
negotiate this situation by showing them what can go wrong. As Chivisa and Mutswanga assert, “folk tales were mainly concerned with sustaining relationships, maintaining and inculcating peaceful co-existence between individuals and groups within communities” (2014:163).

In this case, the lesson about maintaining peaceful co-existence is driven home by showing what can go wrong. Hare, the caretaker, squanders resources by giving the children’s food to his friends. He also puts his own stomach before the wellbeing of his charges by eating them when he is hungry. Lion, meanwhile, maintains poor contact with home. He hunts tirelessly and has great success but this brings many new friends who distract him from the goal of providing for his children. Abundant food also causes him to forget the poverty of the village. He sometimes sends letters or telephones in lieu of actually visiting, and with time even his few visits grow increasingly sparse. When he finally does return, Hare easily dupes Lion and he neglects to thoroughly investigate his affairs. In the end—wastefulness, irresponsibility, poor communication and deceit cause the family and community to fall apart. Lion kills the neighbors (the baboons), Hare dies alone, and Lion’s hard work is for naught.

The moral of this tale is that collaborative parenting required careful coordination, communication, dedication and commitment from all parties involved. Living in separate locations could cause people to loose touch with each others’ reality. The abundance of the city could make them forget how difficult life is in the rural areas; while people in the village could fail to appreciate how diligently family members in the city were working to provide for them. Letters and telephone calls—the primary methods of long-distance communication during this period—are poor substitutes for in-the-flesh visits and could easily be used to spread lies. The narrator’s hope is that youths listening to this tale will learn from Rabbit and Hare’s mistakes and
not lose sight of family obligations at home when they make new friends and have exciting experiences in the city.

Thus, even though African families were divided through labor migration, they actively and concertedly developed strategies to work within and around countervailing historical, spatial, and technological contexts in order to create families of their own choosing. Men subverted racist geographies in order to better provision their families just as women illegally visited their husbands in town. Families also found ways to use spatial diversification in order to harness the unique, emplaced structures of opportunity in various locations. People in urban areas could benefit from family labor and the lower cost of living in rural areas; while people in the village could access economic and educational opportunities in the city through relatives who lived there. The folktale related above confirms that dispersed relatedness was fraught with difficulties. At the same time, it indicates that these difficulties were active topics of conversation, and that elders sought to transfer skills and strategies they youths would need to maintain strong families when it came time for them to travel.

Transferrable skills

This chapter described how refugee movements, land dispossession and labor migration drastically impacted the sociospatial topography of Zimbabwean communities and families. This revealed striking continuities between historical population movements in Southern Africa and the ongoing exodus from Zimbabwe. Today’s diasporans escape political persecution and economic hardship just as their parents and grandparents sought to mitigate rural poverty and colonial encroachment. They use long-established routes into South Africa, negotiating the same
rivers and wild animals that confronted their parents’ generation, as well as more treacherous human obstacles like security forces, thieves, and unscrupulous employers. Meanwhile, today’s visa and passport regimes eerily resemble colonial pass laws and identity registers.

Historical parallels like these repeatedly surface in the following chapters. Indeed, all of Tamuka’s seven children and many of his grandchildren and even great-grandchildren are now seeking greener pastures in South Africa, Canada, the United States, England, Ukraine and Dubai. Meanwhile, some of the children of these sojourners are living in Zimbabwe with Tamuka and Gladys, just as Gladys took care of her children alone in the village when her husband first went to the city. One of Tamuka’s children who I interviewed in South Africa highlighted this continuity:

The setup [today] is just similar to the setup that our parents went through. Imagine, those guys were coming straight from the rural areas, coming to the towns. The only difference now is that we came from Zimbabwe coming to South Africa in search of work, to feed our children. They came to the towns in search of work. And when they would go back home to their families, it was once in a while—they would go back home for Christmas, you know. We are actually doing the same thing now. I was looking at it, and I was laughing. It's exactly the same setup. I know our parents are worried [about us] in a foreign country. It's the same thing their parents were worried about when they moved from the rural areas getting into the town. (Tinayi 2013)

Tinayi's account underlines the fact that generations of Zimbabweans have used migration as a way to make their families work. Paradoxically, however, he argues that family is also the primary casualty of migration. Migrants sustain their loved ones by leaving them. In order to
make their families work, they must break them apart. The following chapters will show that
today’s diasporans also struggle with many of the same relational difficulties to which Hare and
Lion succumbed during the 1950s and 1960s. Respatialization still results in complicated
inequalities, communication barriers, and knowledge gaps. Interestingly, contemporary
diasporans manage these contingencies with many of the same strategies used by their parents
and grandparents, including spatial subterfuge, collaborative care and classificatory relatedness. I
contend that such practices can be understood as “transferrable skills.” These are strategies
passed from one generation to the next as diasporans build on childhood experiences of growing
up in mobile families, and as elders recount life histories or provide instructive tales that equip
youths to work within and around countervailing historical, spatial, and
technological contexts in order to create families of their own choosing.
Chapter Two: Contemporary Dispersion

The previous chapter traced one patriline over thousands of miles and hundreds of years in order to show how migration shaped the place now known as “Zimbabwe.” Colonization entailed conquest by immigrant agriculturalists, miners and industrialists who crowded Africans into “native reserves” in order to extract riches from their land. Young Africans left these impoverished places to sustain their families through employment in colonial farms, mines, factories and homes. These sojourners remained in close contact with their loved ones, even while working as human cogs in a grinding apparatus. Not all Zimbabweans during the past two centuries packed and transplanted their lives. Nevertheless, everyone was somehow shaped by migration: by the void created when fathers departed for work, by the arrival of deportees from other areas, and by social and economic terrorism wrought by European immigrants who were backed by international finance. Through all this, Zimbabweans developed “transferrable skills” which enabled them to pursue families of their own choosing and equip their children to do likewise.

This chapter examines how migration shaped Zimbabwe more recently. It introduces the people whose voices form the core of this dissertation as well as the political and economic circumstances associated with their departures. I begin with the war of liberation which caused massive new population upheavals as hostilities escalated in the 1960s and 1970s. Many refugees returned following independence, even while others fled incipient ethnopolitical violence. Majority rule also conclusively ended the influx laws designed to keep black people out of cities, resulting in accelerated urban population growth. In the 1990s, structural adjustment programs
brought retrenchment and economic decline that initiated a “brain drain” of professionals and catalyzed informal, cross-border trade. Fast track land reform in the early 2000s finally disassembled the resilient geography of white supremacy, but the economy became collateral damage and a new “exodus” ensued. By 2008, up to a quarter of adults born in Zimbabwe left the country to escape hyperinflation, global economic downturn, political violence and drought (McGregor and Pasura 2014).

Most people whose voices are the foundation of this dissertation participated in these final phases of migration between 1990 and 2015. They comprise what I term the “contemporary” Zimbabwean diaspora, a remarkably diverse group that spans social, economic and ethnic strata. This diaspora is also spatially diverse. Zimbabweans who live overseas have children, parents, siblings and other relatives remaining in Zimbabwe. Additionally, they have loved ones who resettled to other countries around the world. Tightening immigration regimes in preferred destinations and new opportunities in places with fewer historical links to Zimbabwe resulted in global dispersion which fragment both the diaspora at large as well as individual families.

This spatial dispersion differentiates contemporary migration from population movements during the colonial and pre-colonial period. Space-time compression resulting from air transportation, expanding cellular networks, and social media simultaneously transform how today’s diasporans relate with loved ones in distant locations. Yet despite these and other differences, this chapter underlines remarkable continuity in the motives, pathways, priorities and conundrums faced by today’s migrants and their parents’ and grandparents’ generations.

Zimbabweans were never complacent in their opposition to colonialism, but armed resistance subsided after the First Chimurenga (liberation struggle) was quashed in 1897. By the mid 1960s, a new war of liberation was escalating quickly. As with most wars, this Second Chimurenga produced profound population movements. Thousands of freedom fighters assembled in operational camps in Mozambique and Zambia. Some soldiers were even trained as far away as Eastern Europe and China. For instance, the superintendent of my apartment building in New York City was a Serbian military officer in the former Yugoslavia, and he fondly remembers a contingent of Zimbabwean soldiers that he helped train and equip with winter clothing in the 1970s.

Rhodesian efforts to prevent collaboration with the resistance also involved removing 750,000 people from their rural homes into “protected villages” similar to the “strategic hamlets” set up by Americans in Vietnam (Kesby 1996; Weinrich 1977). Conditions were atrocious in these internment camps, with inadequate water supplies, poor sanitation and substandard living quarters. Many internees’ dwellings and crops were set ablaze to discourage them from leaving, just as the government torched villages along the Kariba river to prevent deportees from returning before the reservoir was flooded (Colson 1971).

Scorched-earth tactics like these effectively attenuate peoples' attachment to place by undermining their capability to subsist in their homes and forcing them to search for other places to survive. This violent form of spatial intervention was used extensively in the colonial project. For example, British soldiers decimated Afrikaner farms during the Boer Wars (Lapierre, et al. 2009), General Sullivan’s army razed more than forty Iroquois villages in upstate New York to
punish them for allying with British loyalists during the American Revolutionary War (Mintz 1999), and the Rhodesian Native Labor Bureau incinerated houses belonging to Africans who refused to sign labor contracts as recounted in the previous chapter. In all of these cases, the indiscriminate destruction of peoples’ dwellings and livelihoods forced profound spatial reconfiguration. Rural Afrikaners migrated en mass to cities like Pretoria as described in the next chapter, many Iroquois were displaced into the Midwest where they came into armed conflict with local indigenous groups and thereby facilitated white conquest, and Zimbabweans whose houses were razed by labor recruiters had no choice but to leave their families to find work in the mines.

During the Second Chimurenga, wonton destruction in the rural areas similarly caused massive refugee movements. 150,000 people—disproportionately women and children—found sanctuary in Mozambique, while 50,000 fled to Botswana and Zambia (Adepoju 1982:30). Within Zimbabwe, almost half a million people sought refuge in the comparative safety of the cities. Mai Walter, an elderly Zimbabwean woman I spoke with in the United States, recounted the absurdity and terror that shock-and-awe tactics brought to her community:

I had two children and was in my rural area of Ruwa during the war. I don’t even like to remember it. We were beaten so many times by Smith's soldiers. We slept in the bush to escape them. You couldn’t even cook sadza in a big pot because they would say that you are cooking for the [resistance]. They beat me because I was cooking too much sadza! They would burn our houses, our clothes, everything. That was when I went to Harare.

(Mai_Walter 2014)
Refugees from rural areas helped force the government to relax influx laws which were designed to keep cities as white preserves (Musekiwa 1993; Palmer 1990:166). Many newcomers were women like Mai Walter, whose husbands already worked in town. Rukario, for instance, described how his mother brought him to the Harare's high density area of Mabvuku as a young child during this period:

[My father] worked at Standard Bank for almost 35 years. He was a carpenter. He used to stay in the youth hostels in Mbare. It was bachelors only; wives were not permitted so my mother had to stay behind in the rural areas. When things started to change in the 70s, they moved to a proper house in Mabvuku. Then my mother was able to join him. They were told: “in order for you to have a house, you have to get married first.” They were [already] married [traditionally], but they had to go to the magistrate to get the marriage certificate. (Rukario 2012)
These controversial photographs were taken by journalist Ross Baughman. Baughman was “embedded” with a mounted unit of the Rhodesian army, dressing as a soldier and carrying a gun. Most of his film was confiscated, but he managed to smuggle out one or two rolls. Baughman won the 1978 Pulitzer prize for these photographs.
Rukariro's account emphasizes that his parents were already married in the eyes of their families and communities, but their lack of a certificate meant that the union was unrecognized by the state. Acquiring this credential materialized their conjugal relationship bureaucratically, as reflected on their updated identity cards and in various population databases. This formalization of their relationship qualified Rukariro's parents to receive housing and other opportunities that were apportioned through a framework of legal policies and bureaucratic practices that can be understood of as a sort of "algorithmic" governmentality. This is explained more completely in the next chapter.

By the war’s end, at least 1.4 million indigenous Zimbabweans had been displaced, amounting to about a fifth of the population (Mlambo 2010). Most of the displaced were poor people from rural areas, but some were academics, journalists, activists and other professionals whose training and skills made them highly marketable abroad. This was Gamuchirai’s experience. She and her brothers grew up in the high-density township of Highfield and became some of the first black medical students in the country. During the war, they were poised to enter the small, privileged class of Africans that the colonial regime guardedly cultivated. As a young adult, Gamuchirai thus embodied the benefits that Smith's regime believed it was bringing to Africa: development, western education and upward mobility. In actual fact, relatively few opportunities were available for black youths, while those who managed to secure opportunities were often required to pay a steep price. Gamuchirai explained by recounting a surprise telephone call that she got from her brother shortly after he graduated in the early 1970s:

Ian Smith wanted doctors to be incorporated into the [Rhodesian] army, because it was the only group of blacks that were not discriminated against with respect to salary. Whether
you were black or white, if you were a doctor, you would get the same pay. So they said because of that, you should fight on our side, rather than what they would call the "guerillas"… the “terrorists.” And so, overnight, all the doctors left. I got a call from my brother and I asked: "where are you?" And he says, “oh, I'm in Edinburgh [Scotland].” He couldn't tell anyone he was planning to leave because they would have stopped him at the airport if they found out. A lot of white people as well--including some friends of ours--were also running out of the country because they didn't want to fight in the army. (Gamuchirai 2014)

A few years later, upon finishing medical training, Gamuchirai and her classmates also left the country:

that was the first diaspora group—a lot of nurses, a lot of doctors. England was very supportive of us. For example, my brother got a Birmingham University qualification. But when sanctions were brought on to Zimbabwe, Birmingham cut us off. So we ended up getting a University of Zimbabwe degree, which nobody except for South Africa recognized because of sanctions. England recognized the training because they knew it was good, but not the qualification. So, at the end of the fifth year of medical school, we would write our final exams and literally the whole class would get onto the same plane, and either go to Edinburgh or London to rewrite the exams. (Gamuchirai 2014)

Gamuchirai’s account attests to how opportunity was plentiful for the first cohort of professional diasporans. She practiced medicine in England for three years before marrying and having a child with a former University of Zimbabwe classmate who was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. In 1980, after graduating, her husband landed a high profile job in Washington DC
where they hand a second child. The American medical system required Gamuchirai to restart her career as a first-year resident. She eventually sub-specialized in hematology-oncology and practiced as an attending physician in a major hospital. Sadly, Gamuchirai was disheartened by pervasive racism at work and in her social circles. This was sometimes blatant, but more frequently it was evident in subtle ways, for instance through the endemic tokenization of minorities that occurs in elite American society, often for publicity or public relations purposes, as well as to absolve white guilt for inequities in the workplace (Jackson, et al. 1995; Niemann 1999). As she explained:

Maybe it was because we were in Washington. Everybody is unreal, because it's a cutthroat situation. You have the World Bank and IMF, you've got the government, the diplomats, your lot of lawyers, and young people fighting for jobs. They are political positions, so there is unsettlement every election. It's cutthroat. You get invited to dinner, and they want to use you for something. (Gamuchirai 2014)

In 1990, the couple decided to return home. Like many professionals who left during the war, Gamuchirai and her husband were eager to use their education to help construct the new, free Zimbabwe. They also wanted their children to connect with their roots by being close to their extended family and learning their mother tongue:

One day my husband and I asked ourselves: do we want our children to be brought up as Americans or as Zimbabweans? The answer was: as Zimbabweans. So we packed up, and within a month we were home. We never regretted it. We decided we wanted the children to be taught Shona. We had maids from Zimbabwe come to look after our children in the United
States, but it never worked—the maids ended up speaking better English. Our only option was to return to home. (Gamuchirai 2014)

Gamuchirai’s family expected a magnificent homecoming and a meaningful reunification with relatives. Frustratingly, as described below, the economic situation took a turn for the worse in the 1990s and opportunity dried up for the children even though they graduated from Zimbabwe’s internationally-acclaimed, elite boarding schools. Within a few years they followed in their parents’ footsteps by joining their predominantly white classmates to further their education and careers abroad. Gamuchirai’s children were fortunate compared to most black youths because they were been born in the United States and United Kingdom and had attained citizenship in these countries. Possessing blue and red passports thus facilitated access to preferred destinations where they were entitled to work. Gamuchirai’s privilege reveals the heterogeneity of the Zimbabwean diaspora. Compared to many of the other people I interviewed, her ability to easily afford airfare and her children’s access to multiple citizenships enables Gamuchirai’s family a great degree of transnational proximity. Indeed, people from all walks of life have been affected by events in Zimbabwe, but economic factors result in divergent experiences of migration. Sadly, Gamuchirai’s children’s alternative citizenships are from countries on opposite sides of the Atlantic. The hopscotch spatial dislocation experienced by Gamuchirai during her flight from war fragmented her children between two incompatible "population registers,” thus reproducing their mother's dislocation in subsequent generations. Despite her privilege, Gamuchirai was ultimately unable to reestablish spatial continuity with family and history by retuning to Zimbabwe. Now retired, she divides her time between Zimbabwe where her mother resides, the United States and England where her children work and study, and South Africa and Canada where her siblings live.
Significantly, despite Gamuchirai's jet-setting lifestyle, and even though she now resides in one of Harare's most exclusive neighborhoods, she anchors her identity in the high density location where she spent her childhood years. She is fiercely proud that her mother continues to reside in the house where she grew up, and she visits regularly. Gamuchirai's attachment to Highfield thus reveals the crucial role of enacted relationships and situated early life experiences in producing emplaced identities. The violent spatial interventions of war resulting in the global dispersion her family ultimately failed to sever Gamuchirai's deep connection to the place where she grew up.

The war of liberation also caused upheaval among whites. To the perennial consternation of government officials, there had always been a large degree of turnover in the European population, with thousands of immigrants replacing thousands of emigrants each year (Brownell 2008; Mlambo 1998). Departures increased during the war, and increasing violence reduced the appeal of Rhodesia as a destination for new immigrants with the exception of some 25,000 colonials from newly liberated Angola and Mozambique following independence in 1975 (Mlambo 2010). By the end of the war, white outflows greatly surpassed inflows as it became increasingly obvious that Rhodesia was fighting a loosing battle.

Many whites already held British passports or qualified for ancestral visas to European countries (Andrucki 2010). Others went to South Africa, the last bastion of white supremacy on the continent (Chapter 3), or to mature colonies like Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand where settlers were more secure in their conquest. Emigration continued after independence in 1981, and the white population almost halved during the first seven years of independence. By 1987 only about 110,000 whites were left in the country, the lowest number in forty years (Mlambo 2010:59, 63). Some of the whites who fled majority rule did so because of
their participation on the front lines of Rhodesia’s last stand. I include the following lengthy quotation from Sarah because it provides insight into one strand of European thinking which provides an interesting counterpoint to the primarily African experiences I cite in this dissertation:

My father was English. He came in 1947, when he was a young man. He was with the police in the UK, and they seconded him out to Rhodesia. When I left the country [during the war] I had a Rhodesian passport. I then applied for a British passport, which I got through my father.

I'm actually a fifth-generation Zimbabwean because my [mother’s] grandparents came with the first trek in 1892. Seven brothers all came out together. When they got to Masvingo they split up because of conflict in the family. Some went to Chipinge and then Melsetter. Others went to Kwekwe and Gweru. One uncle started a copper mine in Kwekwe, which doesn't exist any more because it wasn't very good copper, but he was fairly successful at the time. Three of the brothers stayed in Masvingo. One married my great grandmother and became the district commissioner for that area. I've got photographs of them at the fort.

We had 17,000 acres of farm [26 square miles]. He had people coming from Europe to see how he was farming because it was a model farm. We had 3000 head of cattle and 28 permanent laborers with their families. My dad taught them how to farm, and how to look after their crops. They each had their own few cattle that they were allowed to have.

We grew all our own feed which took the cattle through winter. Maize was also grown as extra food for the staff. Because they got paid... well, they got paid money, but every week they also got given food. Every day the wives had to come and collect milk. If they didn't
come, we used to go and find out why: “What's wrong? Is somebody is sick?” That's how you could find out if things were going on. They got their meat and millimeal [cornmeal] every week. And they grew their own vegetables and things.

My father didn't like Mugabe--he didn't like Smith either--he did not approve of Mugabe's… um… policies. My father knew Mugabe from way back. They had quite a few conversations and discussions on politics and everything. He agreed with Mugabe that it should be black majority rule, but he did not agree with his… Marxist policies. He said, “I’m not going to stay in a country where this is going to be enforced.” And that's what made him leave.

I was living in Johannesburg at the time. After my friends and I finished high school, we went all over the place for University. Three went to the UK and continued their education. Two went to America, and four went to Australia. My parents and family were in Zimbabwe up until 1981. Then they came to live with me in South Africa. That really started the down-hill of their health. The move, the transition… They had absolutely nothing because in those days you could only take ZWD $1000 and your furniture. I supported them for quite a long time.

I come from quite a large family. We were five siblings. My eldest brother was blown up in a land mine in the Mutare area. He survived, but it messed up his whole life. He had two broken legs, broken ribs, a broken pelvis, a broken shoulder. All he had left of the vehicle was the gear lever. All the other people in the vehicle were killed. That messed him up, because he was the driver. He came to South Africa, and then started traveling. We never really knew where he was, he disappeared. One time I tracked him down in Germany. Then we tracked
him to Hawaii. That was the last time I knew where he was. We located him though a cousin he kept in touch with, because he actually grew up with us in our household, so there was a bond. We know that he has passed on now, and he was in Mexico when he died.

I've got two brothers still alive. One just relocated to Botswana. In 1980, when independence came, he had to leave the country in a hurry because he was in the Selous Scouts [a terroristic unit of the Rhodesian army]. He got badly messed up with that. They were on the black list for being captured and hung. He came to me in South Africa very shortly for three weeks, and then he went to Australia. He was farming as well, so he worked on a sheep farm for two years… The other brother is in Zambia. And then I have a sister who lives in Johannesburg.

We're not in touch a lot. We probably contact each other once a year. I haven't seen my siblings now for probably four years, five years, because they all live their own lives. They are all over the place and we're not really in touch. It's quite sad actually, because when we were children, we were a big family. We did everything together. We lost that when we started going to different parts of the world. (Sarah 2013)

This account provides a glimpse of white privilege on Rhodesia’s expansive plantations and ranches. Sarah's farm was larger than the Island of Manhattan. She defines it in terms of its acreage, number of cattle, and quantity of “workers”—symbolically reducing these original owners of the land to a form of property. The emphasis on her father's kind treatment of black employees/serfs reveals the deeply paternalistic attitudes which led whites to believe they were teaching blacks how to farm. She apparently sees no irony in owning 3,000 cattle when farm
workers were only allowed to have a few each--allegedly to prevent environmental degradation as explained in Chapter 1.

Sarah's father was a career police officer and had many conversations with Mugabe “way back.” A possible conclusion is that her father was one of Mugabe's jailers or interrogators during the decade he spent in prison. Nevertheless, Sarah disassociates her family from the Smith Regime--a dubious proposition given her father’s involvement in the security forces and her brothers’ service on the front lines, alongside most of Rhodesia's young white men. Sara’s account thus reveals how whites were victims as well as perpetrators of colonialism. Her brothers dealt and received terrible violence during the war which caused severe psychological damage. Participation in white power structures provided prosperity during minority rule, but tore her family apart after independence when they were forced to leave their wealth and flee.

Sarah's father was born in England which enabled his children to acquire emergency get-out-of-Africa-free cards in the form of British passports which enabled them to leave for Australia and Europe after the war. Interestingly, like Gamuchirai, Sarah eventually returned to Zimbabwe after many years of absence. Our interview was conducted in her home, which her mother's grandparents built almost a century earlier. This building is an exquisite physical manifestation of her deeply-felt attachment to the country. Proudly, she emphasizes that her great-grandparents arrived with the very first pioneer column, much as some Americans authenticate their autochthony by claiming an ancestor arrived on the Mayflower. Like many children of colonialism in Zimbabwe and around the world, Sarah grounds her claims of belonging in relational time--the long durations that her ancestors lived and died in the place she calls home. This deep rootedness is a fascinating juxtaposition to her father's immigrant origins.
Sarah had no children of her own. However, like Gamuchirai's family, her siblings are dispersed between several countries. Presumably she shares Gamuchirai's financial ability to travel. Nevertheless, Sarah laments that her family grew apart over the years. She rarely visits her siblings and they seldom speak on the phone though recently they are starting to reconnect through social media. I suspect that part of the reason Gamuchirai's family is more intact than Sarah's involves the way that many African kinship systems prioritize interdependence in contrast to the value that British kinship places on independence and self-sufficiency.

**Post-independence Growth & Conflict: 1980s**

A century of colonialism and decades of war created major problems for the newly independent nation. Existing infrastructure had deteriorated due to sanctions and the ravages of war. People released from fortified villages and refugees returning from abroad had to rebuild their homes and their lives. Racial inequality was acute, with whites firmly in control of most farms, factories, mines, universities, banks and businesses. Upon independence, the new Zimbabwe was thus confronted with the formidable task of building an equitable society in a country that was deeply divided by racial, economic and cultural fissures.

International sanctions lifted after independence and Zimbabwe reengaged with the global economy. Consequently, the 1980s were characterized partly by rising wages and increased production. The government made outstanding progress on improving education and healthcare delivery to the black population (Makoni 2000), and began extending roads and other infrastructure to service high density rural and urban communities. Some progress was also made in redistributing land to black people in the overcrowded “Native Reserves,” now renamed
“Communal Areas.” On many levels, the first decade of independence inspired confidence in a bright future.

Independence also presented some complicated problems, however. Job creation was far slower than expected, and did not keep pace with population growth (Muzondidya 2009:169). The restrictions on rural-to-urban migration which had been eased during the war were lifted entirely and people flooded into cities in pursuit of better wages, living conditions and education (Musekiwa 1993:56). This strained the infrastructure and increased rates of urban poverty. In sum, many—perhaps most—Zimbabweans did not fully participate in the post-independence economic boom of the early 1980s.

Another serious problem confronting free Zimbabwe was an ethnic rift that ran more than a century deep. Recall from chapter one that several generals defected from Shaka Zulu’s kingdom on the eastern costs of South Africa during the 1830s. One of these was Shoshangane, whose people were chronicled in the previous chapter. Another was Mzilikazi, the leader of a branch of Ndebele people who initially resettled in the area of present-day Pretoria after leaving Shaka (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). Within a few years, Mzilikazi’s people were pushed north by Voortrekkers escaping British infringement. They passed through Botswana and Zambia before eventually turning south to settle in the area along the Limpopo River, which (decades later) became the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa, dividing many Ndebele families between the two countries.

The Ndebele established their capital at Bulawayo in about 1840 and became the preeminent military and political power in the region. For several decades Mzilikazi’s son Lobengula held European settlers at bay while simultaneously negotiating with them and profiting from them.
The Ndebele also collected tribute from the people whose land they occupied and conducted cattle raids into areas controlled by other African groups. Much to the chagrin of various colonial parties to the South, the Ndebele Kingdom presented a time and resource-consuming obstacle for the vanguard of explorers, missionaries, hunters and prospectors who wished to ply their trade North of The Limpopo. During the 1880s, Cecil John Rhodes finally managed to dupe and coerce Lobengula into signing a series of treaties, culminating in the Rudd Concession of 1889 which bestowed exclusive mineral rights to Rhodes and two companions for all of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, including areas that the Ndebele did not control (Cobbing 1973).

Mzilikazi’s initial colonization and continued military adventures, as well as Lobengula’s eventual capitulation to the colonialists are bitterly remembered by some elements of Zimbabwe’s Shona majority. These tensions were played upon and exacerbated during years of colonial “divide and conquer” policies. Nevertheless, Ndlovu Gatsheni argues that accounts of extreme violence committed by Ndebele people against neighboring groups are greatly exaggerated, even if they do contain “perhaps a token of the truth” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:17). He argues that early European accounts of the Ndebele became “oral tradition” among later explorers, leading to their unexamined reproduction and proliferation. Furthermore, the trope of a ruthlessly violent people was useful to colonialists because it justified the conquest and settlement of Zimbabwe as a heroic act of salvation for the defenseless Shona from their bloodthirsty overlords (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). Terrence Ranger similarly reconstructs turn-of-the-century society in Matabeleland as ethnically diverse, arguing that the Ndebele ethnicity is a colonial construct born of the bureaucratic necessity to administer a vanquished people. According to Ranger, there were no such thing as ethnically Ndebele people. Rather, the Ndebele state was “a machine for multi-ethnic assimilation of peoples” (Ranger 1999:100). Many
scholars similarly point out that the Shona ethnicity is also a colonial construct which reduced various culturally and linguistically distinct (though related) groups into an undifferentiated “tribe” (Chimhundu 1992; Ranger 1984).

Nevertheless, ethnic tensions between the Ndebele and Shona proved instrumental in shaping political and military action during the Second Chimurenga (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). The resistance was divided into two major factions. One faction, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), was comprised primarily by Ndebele people, while the other was known as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and was comprised primarily by Shona people. Relations between these groups were strained during the war even though they were fighting a common enemy. Historical mistrust and resentment was complicated by the differing political ideologies of their foreign backers. ZAPU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), was aided primarily by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, China was the primary benefactor of ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Each of these armies fought on different fronts, with ZIPRA primarily focusing on the Ndebele-dominated southwest and ZANLA fighting primarily in Shona-dominant areas.

After the war, the new government sought to unify combatants from ZIPRA, ZANLA and their former enemy—the RSF—into a cohesive national army. This “Operation Sausage Machine” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:23) was only marginally successful. ZIPRA complained that the best positions were awarded to ZANLA soldiers. Soldiers from both groups who resented the “negotiated solution” of the Lancaster Accord became “dissidents” by refusing to disarm and remaining in the rural areas where they continued to fight (Alexander 1998). Additionally, covert operations in Zimbabwe by Apartheid forces sought to destabilize the newly independent black government and thereby prolong white supremacy in South Africa. Sometimes cooperating with
soldiers from the former Rhodesian Security Forces (RAF), these operatives committed numerous acts of sabotage that were orchestrated to cast suspicion on ZANLA dissidents and fan the flames of ethnic conflict. As efforts to integrate the army faltered, Ndebele soldiers became disillusioned by widespread discrimination, beatings and even murder. Frustration grew when ZANU won the election and prominent politicians delivered a series of tribalist speeches. Many Ndebele soldiers abandoned the army and returned to Matabeleland.

What “broke the camel’s back,” as Ndlovu-Gatsheni put it, was the discovery of a large arms depots on the ZAPU-owned Ascot farm North of Bulawayo. This provided the government with an excuse to send security forces into Matabeleland—despite evidence of South African involvement (ICCJPZ 1997:33), and even though both sides were well known to keep caches of weapons (Alexander 1998:155). The most notorious unit was the Fifth Brigade, also called Gukurahundi which means “the rain that washes away the chaff from the last harvest before the spring rains.” As Ndlovu-Gatsheni writes,

It seemed the ‘last harvest’ was the achievement of independence, the Matebeleland region and the Ndebele were the ‘chaff’ that was supposed to be washed away and the ‘spring rain’ was the establishment of the one-party state in Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:22).

The Fifth Brigade was a parallel unit to the national army and answered directly to the prime minister. It operated from bases throughout Matabeleland, targeting former ZIPRA combatants, the ZAPU political leadership, and more broadly, anyone who spoke Ndebele. Tactics included intimidation, detention, torture and forced attendance at rallies (pungwes) where people were made to speak Shona, sing political songs in praise of ZANU, denounce ZAPU and even watch and celebrate the killing of their friends and relatives. Indeed, murder and sexual violence were
extensively used as political tools and more than 20,000 civilians were likely killed between 1980 and 1988 (ICCJPZ 1997).

It should be noted, however, atrocities were committed by both sides. Some people in Matabeleland saw the war’s end as an opportunity to reestablish Ndebele hegemony and pursued a succession. A number of Zimbabweans I spoke with also told me that Ndebele people initiated violence against their Shona neighbors after the war and this is what sparked Gukurahundi. In any case, ZANU had the upper hand numerically, politically and militarily and were accordingly able to quash any incipient nationalistic aspirations with devastating force.

Gukurahundi once again forced people to migrate. The tradition of labor migration to the Rand was especially strong in Ndebele communities. Many adults had already done stints south of the Limpopo and had relatives living there. They also spoke one of South Africa’s majority indigenous languages so they were easily able blend to in. One ZIPRA war veteran interviewed by Teresa Barnes in 1991, explained:

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Some people decided to be dissidents [and refuse to relinquish their arms] because of this harassment, torture, things like that. Especially when the Fifth Brigade came to Matabeleland, so many people were killed. If the Fifth Brigade knew you were a former combatant, you were not going to survive. It’s very difficult for me to say why [the army] had that attitude. Even young children, some of them were killed!

Most were killed, those who did not run away. Some went to hide in town where it was safer. Some ran to Botswana or South Africa. I was in South Africa in August. I met so many of them in Johannesburg. Yes! A lot of them, they would tell me, ‘There are thousands
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of us, we are working here.’ I was shocked. Some of the people who I thought died long back, but I met them in Johannesburg. (Adapted from Barnes 1995:130-135)

This soldier described the frustration of fighting a war against a brutal colonial regime, and then being forced to flee the very country that he fought to liberate.

The history of labor migration to South Africa was especially strong in Matabeleland, and many ZAPU soldiers had likely already visited South Africa or had relatives living there. In some ways these historical links, along with the cultural and linguistic affinities between Ndebele speakers in Zimbabwe and South Africa, functioned like the “ancestral visas” which allowed so many White Zimbabweans to resettle in Europe after independence. However—to add insult to the injury of being evicted from the country they fought to make free—Ndebele refugees escaping to South Africa found themselves once again in a country where white supremacy still reigned.

Gukurahundi remains a sensitive topic, with elements in the ruling party denying that it ever happened and many Ndebele people insisting that public inquiries should be made and perpetrators held accountable. The only horror of the incident, coupled with the fact that it was overtly sponsored by the government, left many Ndebele people deeply suspicious of the one party state. Meanwhile, Ethnic tensions continue to be felt in everyday life. For instance, common complaints among Ndebele people include an overabundance of Shona law enforcement in Matabeleland and negligence from Shona people in learning Ndebele even though many Ndebeles speak Shona.

The long conflict between Shona and Ndebele people in Zimbabwe is instructive because it reveals just how complicated and contentious the link between people and land can be. From the
perspective of Shona nationalists, Ndebele people represented a century of colonization. Occasionally, the epithet “go back to South Africa if you don’t like it” is hurled at Ndebele people who complain about ethnic injustice. Meanwhile, Ndebele people feel they rightfully belong in a country they lived in for more than a hundreds of years and suffered greatly to liberate from colonialism. They also point to a long history of cultural exchange to argue that “we are the same people.” While ethnic tensions are real, they should not undermine generations of friendship and intermarriage between all groups in Zimbabwe.

**Structural Adjustment and Economic Downturn: 1990s**

The post-independence boom was short-lived. By 1990 Zimbabwe faced a stagnant economy, growing debt, budgetary deficits, disappointing foreign investment and disappointing exports. In response, the Government implemented an Economic Structural Adjustment Program (known colloquially as “ESAP”) in collaboration with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Proponents of ESAP included the aforementioned International Finance Institutions as well as Britain and the United States, commercial farmers, many development agencies and industry. Drawing from liberal theory, Zimbabwe’s problems were attributed to over-expenditure on social programs, subsidies and price controls on basic goods, restrictions on foreign exchange, a bloated civil service, fiscal irresponsibility and protectionism. ESAP would therefore entail privatization, reducing the government workforce, market-based approaches to pricing and foreign exchange as well as increased “cost recovery” mechanisms in healthcare and education that would raise fees for accessing these service. In theory, this would lead to growth in foreign investment and the expansion of labor intensive industries which would create jobs.
ESAP was implemented in January 1991, and catastrophically resulted in accelerated economic decline (Moore 2016). Food prices soared as subsidies were removed. Local industries had difficulty competing with international players, while subsistence farmers in communal areas were hit by the rising price of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). Cost recovery restricted access to healthcare and education. Indeed, ESAP slashed public health expenditures at the very moment when more services were required due to the exploding HIV/AIDS pandemic. For example, clinics began charging for condoms in 1993 which resulted in a 43% reduction in distribution (Gordon 1997). Workers also suffered mass retrenchment. Civil servants lost jobs through downsizing, employees at parastatals were laid off through privatization, and workers in the private sector were furloughed as their companies slashed jobs to maintain profitability.

Economic downturn negatively affected families. Unemployment and increased prices eroded day-to-day subsistence. Economic hardship forced many families to make tough decisions—for instance, between food or education, or between which children to send to school and which ones to leave at home (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998:64). Many results were gendered. Women and children were especially impacted by new pay-for-service schemes, as fewer mothers were able to deliver in hospitals or afford prenatal care (Gordon 1997:271). Meanwhile, cost recovery in education disproportionately impacted girls whose dropout rate climbed faster than boys and whose new enrollments dropped three times more quickly (Makoni 2000:226). Based on work with women’s rights organizations during the late 1990s, Osirim suggests that underemployment and job loss challenged masculine identities and increased the prevalence of domestic violence (Osirim 2003).
Families used a number of strategies to cope with economic hardship. Some sold property in order to make ends meet (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998:67) or found employment in the informal economy (Gibbon 1995; Mhone 1995). Indeed, the informal sector was particularly appealing to some women who were already disadvantaged in the formal sector, and who increasingly needed ways to top-up reduced effective incomes of male household heads (Muzvidziwa 2001).

Urban-to-rural migration was another way that families sought to cope with the economic turmoil of ESAP. As already observed, many Zimbabwean families maintain tight links between relatives in rural and urban areas for both economic (Potts and Mutambirwa 1990) and social reasons (Andersson 2001). The village is frequently seen as a place where identity is rooted, and where a successful urbanite will return in retirement (Andersson 2001:99). Meanwhile, the city is a place of opportunity where young people can attain better educations or jobs. People in urban areas maintain relationships rural relationships by hosting relatives and remitting money, food, agricultural inputs and other goods that are best acquired in acquired in town. Meanwhile, people in rural areas remit gourmet produce collected from the wild, or help offset city expenses by sending staples like Maize meal. Indeed, for many Zimbabweans, the distinction between urban and rural identity is blurred as they shuttle between locations in response to school and work holidays, or according to seasonal agricultural cycles and demands for field labor (Potts and Mutambirwa 1990:686). Thus, some families responded to ESAP by moving members back to rural areas where living expenses were lower and the possibility of growing food could offset the expense of purchasing it (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998:70). Unfortunately, rural areas were also affected by rising food costs, even while experiencing a reduction in remittances from the city. Meanwhile, the influx of unemployed urbanites put additional strain on rural economies (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998:64). Ultimately, the respatialization of families away from urban areas
was unable to completely mitigate the overwhelming economic turmoil occasioned by ESAP, and poverty increased throughout the country.

As a result of deteriorating opportunity in Zimbabwe, many retrenched workers and new graduates turned their attention to overseas destinations. Countries like the United Kingdom were already recruiting highly qualified Zimbabweans during the war, and thereby benefited greatly from their former colony’s misfortune. Skyrocketing unemployment and economic depression during the 1990s—coupled with the lifting of wartime restrictions on leaving the country—made Zimbabwe an even more appealing recruitment ground. Retrenched trades people eagerly sought out jobs in the expanding economies of Europe, North America and the Antipodes. The neighboring countries of South Africa and Botswana also benefited from recruiting Zimbabwean teachers, technicians and other professionals.

As during the war, healthcare workers were in especially high demand (Chikanda 2005; Gaidzanwa 1999). Headhunting agencies from England to New Zealand opened offices in Harare and Bulawayo, advertising widely and offering packages that included visa fees, relocation expenses and even accommodation. Healthcare workers were not subject to retrenchment in Zimbabwe, but work conditions were deteriorating due to budget cuts and salaries did not keep pace with inflation or rising costs of living. By 1999, a junior doctor in South Africa earned more than double the salary of Zimbabwe’s most senior physicians (Chikanda 2007:48), while doctors in Europe earned considerably more.

Clearly, emigrating was advantageous on an individual level, and people who pursued superior opportunities overseas can hardly be faulted for prioritizing the needs of their families. Nevertheless, the country as a whole suffered greatly from the “brain drain.” For example,
almost 8600 nurses were employed by the public sector in 1996. Three years later, this number had decreased by 20%—even though 1370 new nurses were trained during this period (Chikanda 2007:53). Sadly, this was roughly concurrent with the height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic when healthcare professionals were especially needed in Zimbabwe.

Post-independence Zimbabwe thus became a reserve of surplus labor for the former colonial power (along with other wealthy countries), just as Rhodesia’s native reserves created pools of cheap labor for colonial mines and farms. In both cases, employers avoided paying most of the costs associated with the production of this labor supply. During the colonial period, women in rural areas provided free labor in the form of childcare and agricultural work needed to feed and nurture the next generation of workers. Similarly, following independence, wealthy economies benefited tremendously by recruiting skilled workers whose training was largely paid for by the Zimbabwean state. Indeed, the newly independent nation was recognized internationally for making tremendous progress in expanding educational opportunities through hiring teachers, opening schools and universities, making primary education free for all students and subsidizing secondary and university education (Dorsey 1989). These achievements consumed significant resources, with education accounting for 22% of government expenditure in 1991 (Tumwine 1992).

Economic decline also prompted the departure of people without professional experience or qualifications. This included retrenched laborers as well as young people who could not find jobs or who were faced with the challenge of paying newly-imposed fees to attend university. The prospect of leaving Zimbabwe was also alluring to people in challenging personal circumstances who wanted a fresh start. For example, Belinda told me how her sister restarted her life in England after having a baby as a teenager during the late 1990s.
My sister was young, she was at home [unable to work or study], and she had a child. Things were tough. There was really nothing in Zimbabwe at the time. The baby’s father was one of those older men who have love affairs with school children. The guy started skiving and playing funny. When she left, he also moved on. I think he just collapsed and died. (Belinda 2012)

Belinda and her sister lived with their mother in a high density area of Bulawayo. Their parents were divorced and their father lived in England with a new wife. After Belinda’s sister had the child she flew to London, possibly with her father’s financial assistance. It was relatively easy for Zimbabweans to enter the United Kingdom as tourists during the 1990s because they did not yet require visas. Upon arrival, they would live with relatives or friends, find a job, and gradually work to establish their own residence and “regularize” their legal status, for instance by enrolling in university or claiming asylum. Belinda’s sister thus started out working in a factory before obtaining a scholarship to attend nursing school.

Many diasporans left partners, parents and children in Zimbabwe when they departed. Most intended to quickly reunite with their loved ones, but this usually proved more difficult than anticipated. Fortunately, many families had strong systems of collaborative parenting that enabled survival during decades of colonial labor migration. These systems were remobilized to raise “diaspora orphans” like the four-month old baby that Belinda’s sister left in her care. Belinda was only 15 when she assumed this maternal role:

I was pretty much the hands-on mom, except I was also staying under my mother’s roof, and I was just a child in school. I took her to clinic, I would sleep with her and I would feed her during the night. My mother would look after her while I was at school, because I
was only in Form 4. There would be days I would not go to school to take her to the doctor. I would even take her to meet my friends in town—she sort of became the baby for all of us. I still see her as my firstborn because she was the first child I looked after. Her world revolved around me—if I’m not there her little world stopped. She did not see her mom in nine years. She could see pictures of mom, talk to mom on the phone, but she never really knew her mom. She knew our mother—her grandmother—as mama. (Belinda 2012)

After graduating, Belinda went to university in Harare and her mother assumed the parental role for her granddaughter. Unfortunately, she was not in good health and died a couple of years into Belinda’s studies. Thereupon Belinda reassumed the role of primary caretaker for her sister’s child, who moved into Belinda’s flat in Harare.

It was a difficult situation when my mom passed away. She had to come stay with me in my flat in Harare. She was still only grade 2. All she sees is my young friends—we went out for movies, drives, to the park… I think she was excited for a while, but then the whole identity issue surfaced and she was starting to act out. I think kids at times wonder: “this person is really my mainini [“junior” mother], not my mother.”

The teachers would say: “you kids with parents in the diaspora, the parents are not on the ground so they are not going to morally shape you. All they do is send money, but money does not parent a child.” They told me: “You're not the real mom. Maybe that's why she's acting up. That's why she's being stubborn, lying, not doing homework.” (Belinda 2012)

Belinda’s story reveals how—as in previous generations—contemporary migrants often leave behind loved ones when seeking opportunity further afield. Belinda and her mother remained in Zimbabwe to raise the child of Belinda’s sister when she was in England. Financial
stability was provided by remittances from Belinda’s sister, who also financed Belinda’s university education in Harare. This collaborative arrangement could be difficult at times, as apparent in the child’s identity crisis and Belinda’s parenting challenges. Nevertheless, in contrast to the overwhelmingly negative outcomes presented by some of the literature on transnational families, Belinda’s story had a very satisfactory ending. Her sister eventually qualified as a nurse which allowed her to move to Australia and bring her daughter to join her. Meanwhile, with her sister’s financial support, Belinda managed to graduate from University and find gainful employment.

Belinda’s account thus reveals how the interdependence cultivated by many Zimbabwean families which results in transnational collaboration can have positive outcomes. Furthermore, Belinda’s story reveals how many Zimbabwean families are organized in ways that do not correspond to the Western model of nuclear families or the Zimbabwean patrilineal model that are so frequently adopted by scholars of kinship. The only men to appear in Belinda’s account is her own father, who is divorced and lives in the UK and the father of her sister’s child whose presence is both unhelpful and ephemeral. Thus, Belinda’s family is organized around mothers and daughters who very effectively utilize intergenerational “alloparenting” and reciprocal exchange to provide for each other’s daily subsistence and education, while also raising the next generation.

Not all migrants escaping the economic turmoil of ESAP were so fortunate, however. I heard rumors that people with ties to Malawi were deported in the 1990s after being retrenched, though I have not been able to confirm this. A number of these ostensible “foreigners” had lived in Zimbabwe for decades. Others were born in Zimbabwe and had few remaining connections to the countries their parents or grandparents had left as youngsters (Daimon 2014; Muzondidya
2007). One man from a high density location in Kwekwe told me how tragic it was when several families on his street were dismissed from work, and loaded all of their belongings onto a lorry to return to Malawi (Tamuka 2012).

Additionally, the majority of Zimbabweans living in high density urban areas and in rural areas were unable to raise enough money to acquire passports and purchase airfare needed to resettle overseas. Instead, they traveled overland to seek employment in the mines, farms, stores and houses of neighboring South Africa and Botswana which have long been destinations for Zimbabweans in pursuit of opportunity. The extent to which emigration from Zimbabwe increased during ESAP is evident in the four-fold increase of legal entries to South Africa, from about 200,000 in 1989 to a peak of nearly 800,000 in 1995 as shown in the figure below (reproduced from Crush, et al. 2015). This number began to tail off in 1996, when South Africa imposed strict visa regimes on Zimbabweans, while clandestine immigration increased.

![Figure 5: Legal entries into South Africa from Zimbabwe, 1983-2010.](image-url)
The desperation of some migrants during this period is captured by Barbara Chiedza Manyarara’s short story *The Road to Damascus*, which tells of two young women who walked sixty kilometers in search of work in Botswana after running out of bus fare:

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The middle 1990s were the age of economic structural adjustments, widespread retrenchments, gospel music and the beginnings of the de-veiling of the gauzy wisps of independence euphoria from the eyes of the ordinary Zimba. The country was witnessing the start of many disturbing economic trends and previously uncommon practices. Some were great socio-economic disasters and their ripple effects are still felt today. Black Friday (14 November 1997) when the ZSE [Zimbabwe Stock Exchange] collapsed is one such event.

…Whole banks had imploded, burying fortunes of varying sizes in their vaults. In turn, this had legitimized not only cross-border trade but also hordes of emigrants escaping to neighboring countries, particularly Botswana. Here was an opportunity: relatively easy to enter Botswana, with or without a passport; no visa requirements and, the nearest town, Francistown, was walking distance from the Tunkuru Border Post…They arrived in droves, among them honest young people seeking a better living and others not so innocent. All were making for the friendly neighbour, to work in commerce, industry, education and health, in the mines, on the farms, plain domestic work, or any other (Manyarara 2010:20).

These “droves” of desperate young people searching for opportunities abroad marked an important shift in Zimbabwe’s historical migration patterns. As recounted in chapter 1, Zimbabwe was integrated into a regional economic system primarily as a recipient of foreign labor and a conduit for South Africa-bound workers from Malawi, Mozambique and further
afield. By the 1990s, however, Zimbabwe began “exporting” more workers than it received (Pasura 2014).

This shift is visible in the cultural output of this period, which increasingly takes up the theme of leaving Zimbabwe in order to survive. For example, Oliver Mtukudzi’s song Chara Chimwe is about a cross-border trader who sells knitting in South Africa to feed her children back home (Mtukudzi 2003). This song casts migration in an ambivalent light. The woman presumably succeeds in providing for her family, but only by being absent from the ones she is caring for, and only by enduring the hot sun, humiliation and racism of canvassing white neighborhoods.

The 1990s saw a tremendous growth in this sort of entrepreneurial cross-border trading, as the shrinking “formal” economy created space for “informal” economies to flourish (Mhone 1995). Cross-border traders—primarily women—peddled food and textiles from Zimbabwe in neighboring countries where they acquired consumer goods to resell upon return. Professor Muzvidziwa’s study of cross-border traders in South Africa during the 1990s insightfully reveals how these women developed border-straddling networks of suppliers, clients and associates while nurturing “fictive kinship” relationships that they utilized to reduce expenditures on lodging while in transit. These women leveraged sophisticated business acumen to develop niche markets; negotiate complicated tax, duty and citizenship regimes; and maintain positive cash flow in a trade conducted largely through extending long-term credit to buyers in multiple countries. Some women managed to sustain large, extended families in this way (Muzvidziwa 2001).
Muzvidziwa notes, however, that popular representations of cross-border traders and female migrants were often pejorative, for example insinuating that these women engaged in promiscuous behavior. This imagery is visible in Bongo Maffin’s 2000 hit Mari Ye Phepha (BongoMaffin 2000). In the music video, a poor, modestly dressed young woman announces to her mother *Amai ndoenda kujhobergi kunoita mari ye phepha* (“Mother, I’m going to Johannesburg to make paper money”). Upon arriving in South Africa, she is transformed through sexual violence into a cosmopolitan nightclub dancer. This video thus contrasts the wealth of the foreign metropolis—glamorous clothes, a fast lifestyle and access to valuable paper money—to Zimbabwe’s poverty which is represented by humble attire, rickety public transport and the few coins left in peoples’ pockets after the economic downturn. However, in order to access this paper money, the protagonist must first become a victim. Tragically, this video foreshadows the heightened dangers and difficulties that would face people leaving Zimbabwe following the turn of the millennium.

**Fast Track Land Reform: 2000 - 2004**

The economic turmoil precipitated by structural adjustment in the 1990s gained tremendous momentum in 2001, following the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) Program which involved the forceful removal of whites and black laborers from commercial farms. This “Third Chimurenga” requires careful analysis because it was the single most defining event following independence. Furthermore, the foreign media often fails to examine FTLR in historical context, preferring to gloss it as a gross violation of property rights that was perpetrated by a small kleptocracy for self-enrichment and nearsighted political gains. There are grains of truth in this interpretation,
but it fails to acknowledge the broad support for FTLR among the black majority and it largely ignores the unjust and unsustainable circumstances which created the land problem in the first place. What cannot be contested, however, is that the economic and political fallout of FTLR resulted in a veritable “exodus” of refugees (Crush and Tevera 2010).

Understanding FTLR requires deep appreciation for the enormous scale and resilience of colonial racist geographies. By independence, 6,000 white commercial farmers owned almost half of the country’s agricultural land, while a million African households were crammed into the other half which was of much inferior quality (Moyo 2004:5). Additionally, immense nature preserves were almost entirely depopulated to service the tourism and natural resource industries. European farmers enjoyed generous state assistance through preferential access to markets, subsidies on inputs, favorable financing and infrastructure development (like roads and dams)—not to mention the removal of African occupants to the overcrowded reserves in tsetse and malaria-infested areas where they formed reservoirs of exploitable labor (Palmer 1990). The racist rural geographies constructed by successive Rhodesian regimes—with the financial and technological complicity of agribusiness in Europe and the United States—was so profoundly unjust that land reform became a galvanizing call to arms during the war of liberation.

Britain recognized the need for land redistribution in the lead-up to independence, offering £75 million to buy out commercial farmers who were mostly of British origin (Palmer 1990). This was previously accomplished very effectively after independence in Kenya. However, during the Lancaster House negotiations on the eve of independence, Britain modified its position and agreed to contribute only half the cost of land reform, and only if the new government paid the other half. Moreover, farm sales were to be done at market price, in foreign exchange (rather than in Zimbabwean dollars), and on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis. The
free market was thus delegated to be the primary mechanism for reversing a century of programmatic disenfranchisement (Moyo 2000b:9).

Unsurprisingly, the result was consolidation of white economic power which was especially visible in rural areas. Many commercial farmers refused to become willing sellers, while most blacks—although willing—did not have the capital to be buyers. Indeed, the years following independence were some of the best for commercial farming (Palmer 1990:171). Land prices increased rapidly due to the cessation of hostilities which had ravaged the farms, while the end of sanctions attracted foreign capital and reopened export markets for agricultural produce in Europe.

A quarter of white-owned agricultural land was redistributed to approximately 70,000 black families during the first two decades of independence, though two-thirds was acquired in the first four years (Moyo 2004:6; Moyo 2013:44). Much of this land was undesirable to commercial farmers—either because it was adjacent to Communal Areas (formerly called “Native Reserves”), was only moderately fertile, had already been occupied by the land movement, had not yet been put to commercial use, or had already been vacated by whites due to intense combat during the war (Kinsey 1999). Additionally, a significant portion of the land utilized for this first phase of resettlement was owned by the state, often in remote areas bordering wildlife parks.

Taona was a beneficiary of the first phase of land reform. During the 1950s his parents were deported to Gokwe—the same “native reserve” where parts of Tamuka’s family landed after being evicted from Rhodesdale as related in Chapter One. Due to overcrowding on the reserve, and the prospect that he would inherit little land to farm, Taona's father eagerly enrolled in what came to be known as the “Old Resettlement Scheme,” and in 1984 he received about 50 acres in
Karoi, close to the Mana Pools National Park. This land was much more fertile and expansive than their plot in Gokwe, but it was very remote:

There were virtually no people. If you got lost, nobody would hear you call and you could die there. Three of our neighbors were killed by elephants just meters from our homestead, and there was a lion called Maswera Sei [Good Evening] that terrorized villagers for a long time. Sometimes we got lost coming back from school in pitch darkness. You sort of smell smoke and you think there are people, but you don't know where exactly. I learned how to listen to the birds to give me directions. There are so many things to interpret in the forest because there is no one to ask. (Taona 2014)

Taona's story reveals how the Lancaster Accord inhibited land reform. The Government was forced to resettle many people like Taona's father on remote, state-owned property despite the existence of many vacant and underutilized plots in close proximity to roads, dams and population centers. In addition to being costly, this more desirable land was owned by farmers who were reluctant to sell. Even so, Taona's father succeeded in carving a thriving homestead from this wilderness. The remarkable success of participants in the early phases of land reform was enhanced by governmental support in the form of agricultural extension programs, loans and subsidies that were previously only available to whites (Kinsey 1999; Palmer 1990).

The land issue regained prominence as the Lancaster Accord neared expiry in 1990 and an increasing number of voices called for an end to the willing buyer-willing seller approach. These critics compellingly argued against paying whites for land, as blacks did not receive compensation when they were dispossessed. Instead, they proposed that the government should
only provide compensation for “improvements” to the land, and this should be done in local currency instead of foreign exchange.

In 1992, the government demonstrated sympathy to these arguments by passing the Land Acquisition Act which enabled compulsory acquisition of commercial farms. Subsequent legal challenges prevented deployment of this law. Furthermore, the recently-implemented structural adjustment policies actually entrenched the market approach to land policy; for example by increasing foreign investment in agribusiness and promoting private wildlife ranching for tourism as well as niche, export-oriented luxury products like Ostrich meat (Moyo 2000a). Such developments disproportionately benefited well-capitalized, large scale enterprises, although the 1990s did see some growth in black-owned commercial farms which eventually constituted about 15% of the cultivated area (Moyo 2000b:33).

By 1994, some 4,000 mostly white-owned farms still controlled the lion’s share of the best land, producing 80% of marketed output and counting eight times more irrigated hectares than the communal areas which were farmed by millions (Selby 2007:16). Land prices continued to climb, while the government faced dwindling revenues and growing insecurity. Troublingly, every substantive proposal for land reform was met with obdurate resistance from the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which openly condescended the deep significance of the problem (Selby 2007). Some farmers even brazenly flouted the law, for example by transferring land between each other as “gifts” with off-the-record payments between foreign accounts (Christopher 2008). This enabled them to circumvent laws requiring them to offer the government the first option to buy land before selling to anyone else. Such intransigence caused even moderate politicians to liken the CFU to “a lion that had eaten and eaten but refused to let anyone else near the prize” (Selby 2007:5).
Towards the end of the 1990s—almost two decades after independence—racial inequality was entrenched and poverty was rising in both rural and urban areas. This helped radicalize the land movement, especially vocal elements of the ruling party like war veterans. An uptick in land invasions resulted. These were initially suppressed, but the government gradually began to pivot towards the land reform movement (Alexander 2003; Moyo 2000a). In 1997 it compiled a list of 1471 farms for mandatory redistribution. The CFU responded with a flurry of legal challenges, prompting groups of war veterans, landless peasants, traditional leaders, and retrenched urban workers to invade several of the farms on the list (Sadomba 2013). Land invasions like these had occurred sporadically since independence, but they were usually subdued by the government. This time the occupiers were also ejected, but not before they received extensive media coverage and earned broad sympathy from a population that was reeling from ESAP and witnessing growing racial inequalities.

In 1999, a multilateral commission drafted a constitution to replace the Lancaster accord. In an attempted compromise, the new constitution enabled compulsory acquisition of farms but still required the government to provide compensation. This stipulation provoked anger in the land reform movement, and president Mugabe responded by striking the compensation clause before the new constitution went to referendum in 2001. This unilateral action incensed commercial farmers, international donors and important elements of civil society and the newly-formed opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). To date, whites had maintained distance from electoral politics. Now the prospect of forced evictions—compounded by the consolidation of power within the increasingly authoritarian ruling party—prompted the CFU and many national and international organizations to throw considerable financial muscle behind
the MDC’s campaign to reject the new constitution. Special attention in this effort was focused on mobilizing the hundreds of thousands of farm workers to cast “no” votes.

The new constitution was narrowly but decisively rejected, thereafter farm invasions gained tremendous momentum. This caught the ruling party in a delicate predicament. It had just faced its first major electoral defeat since independence and was under unanticipated pressure from the new opposition party for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Furthermore, it was losing confidence from key players who backed land reform. ZANU-PF responded by beginning to provide material support to the farm invaders, while enacting legislation to protect them. This constituted a reversal of the longstanding practice of providing verbal support to the land movement while legislatively pandering to commercial farmers and international finance. However, some commentators astutely note that this U-turn also constituted a political cooption of the land movement by the ruling party in order to tighten its slipping grasp on power (Sadomba 2013).

Farm invasions swiftly transformed Zimbabwe’s racist geographies in what came to be known as the “Third Chimurenga,” or “Fast Track Land Reform” in more official parlance. Within a decade, upwards of 10 million hectares of prime farmland controlled by about 4,200 primarily white-owned operations reverted to indigenous control. Beneficiaries included almost 150,000 subsistence farmers (and their families) and more than 20,000 small and medium scale black-owned commercial enterprises (Moyo and Chambati 2013:8). Today, about 300 white farmers still cling onto portions of their land, sometimes after negotiating cooperative arrangements with occupiers. Nevertheless, most were summarily evicted—sometimes violently—in a process that still continues (for example, Ackbar 2017; Staff Reporter 2016).
In addition to white farm owners, many black farm workers were also sent packing (Rutherford 2003; Rutherford 2007). This was partly due to occupiers’ perceptions that farm workers were collaborators with white power and supposedly (though this is uncertain) voted against the constitution in large numbers. Additionally, many farm workers had roots in surrounding countries, particularly Malawi and Mozambique. The independence struggle involved the emergence of hegemonic Shona nationalism in opposition not only to Ndebele identity, but also to people with origins in neighboring countries. Furthermore, even after independence, farm workers were often spatially and socially isolated within Zimbabwe, fearful of engaging with trade unions or national politics. For all these reasons, farm workers were considered second-class citizens, and many were forced off occupied farms.

Farm workers were also affected by the 2002 Citizenship Amendment Act which refused citizenship to people of foreign descent unless they could prove that they have renounced their foreign citizenship (Daimon 2014; Muzondidya 2007). This law was targeted at White Zimbabweans, but it also undermined farm workers who often had identity documents marked with the word “alien” even if they were born in Zimbabwe, or who did not have any identity documents at all. This was the position of one woman who watched our children when we lived in Harare. Her father was a farm worker from Mozambique and she was born on the farm where he was employed. Due to poverty she had never secured a birth certificate in Zimbabwe or any other country. Nevertheless, she spoke only Shona and had no connection to relatives across the border. We wanted to bring her to South Africa with us on a family trip, but she was unable to get a passport or even a national ID card.

The international media continues to show a remarkably shallow historical evaluation of Fast Track Land Reform, focusing obsessively on incidences of violence and corruption while
portraying the project as a gross violation of human and property rights conducted by a small cabal of despotic individuals. In reality, scholars like Marongwe and Moyo compellingly argue that growing racial inequity and poverty, unfulfilled claims to ancestral land, slow progress on land reform, and poor relations between commercial farmers and black communities served to mobilize a remarkably diverse body of participants (Marongwe 2003; Moyo 2013). I similarly found that Fast Track Land Reform enjoys broad support in Zimbabwe, even though many people are indeed upset with the logistics of how it was accomplished and the disproportionate benefits accrued to people associated with the ruling party. Moyo and Chambati are probably correct when they predict:

[The Fast Track Land Reform Program] is most likely to be remembered in Zimbabwe and Africa as the culmination of the anti-colonial struggle, despite the liberal democratic deficit and economic policy contradictions that accompanied it. (Moyo and Chambati 2013:2)

What cannot be denied is that the Third Chimurenga had swift and devastating collateral damage. Commercial farming was a cornerstone of the economy, contributing 20% of GDP and 40% of exports while employing 70% of the workforce (Moyo and Chambati 2013:4). The beneficiaries of FTLR were superb small-scale, organic farmers but few had the training or access to capital needed to undertake industrialized operations. Furthermore, the state was no longer in a position to offer the subsidies and other supports extended to participants in the Old Resettlement Scheme. As a result, agricultural output plummeted and hundreds of thousands of farm workers lost their jobs and their homes. Meanwhile, hostility and violence towards Europeans prompted the hasty departure of many whites, even from urban areas. Wave upon wave of white-owned businesses and factories shut their doors, leading to even more
retrenchment. Fast Track Land Reform thus initiated economic free-fall, even as it rectified enduring racial injustice.

Extreme economic turmoil transformed the steady stream of people exiting the country into a torrent of economic refugees that spanned all social and economic classes. Once again, many middle class people followed established pathways to Europe and the Americas, either by joining relatives who were already abroad or by finding work in healthcare and other professional settings. Shamunorwa belonged to this upwardly-mobile cohort which relocated to the United Kingdom in 2001 just as farm invasions were ramping up:

I finished a 4 year program in civil engineering at the University of Zimbabwe. Immediately, I sensed that it wouldn’t work out for me. There were just no jobs at that time. So I said, I'll give it a try in the UK. That's how I found myself here.

It didn't work out initially. First I had to sort out my papers—that took a while. The most immediate thing was my mom's situation, because she had no house of her own, so [my siblings and I] had to build her a house in Harare. The first four years were taken up mostly by that project.

I also had to raise money for my master's in civil engineering. It took about four years to raise the money, and then I went to Coventry for my one year master’s. That's when I got my first real job that gave me the break. (Shamunorwa 2014)

Shamunorwa traveled on a tourist visa, just like many ESAP refugees did during the 1990s. Lucky, he landed at Heathrow just before the UK began requiring Zimbabwean visitors to attain visas in 2002. This move was ostensibly due to Zimbabwe's withdrawal from the
Commonwealth, and New Zealand, Canada and Australia quickly followed suit in slapping visa restrictions on Zimbabweans. However, it should also be understood in the context of increasingly hostile immigration policies developed by wealthy countries in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001. These new visa regimes suddenly made it exceedingly difficult for most Zimbabweans to reach wealthy countries, which were preferred destinations due to higher salaries, better availability of work and stronger educational opportunities, as well as existing communities of diasporans that newcomers could tap into for assistance. Attaining a visa to these countries was out of the question for people like Shamunorwa who could not provide evidence of savings, employment, and property ownership which consular officials typically required as evidence that the applicant would return to Zimbabwe instead of settling permanently.

In addition to enacting visa regimes which restricted access for new immigrants, wealthy countries also tended towards enacting increasingly strict controls on the ability of undocumented migrants to access jobs, education and social services. For instance, it took Shamunorwa four years working low-paying, under-the-table jobs in order to satisfy immediate needs at home and save enough money to attend university which finally enabled him to regularize his immigration status and receive his first “break.” Similarly, a nurse in the United Kingdom, explained how previously lax employers started to closely examine the papers of Zimbabweans before hiring them. She attributes this increased enforcement to the expansion of the European Union and subsequent arrival of Polish job seekers:

In the early years you would rarely be stopped and searched, or have [employers] look at your papers and the like. But maybe after 2004 when these Polish migrants came in, that's when it started to get strict… It was easy to find work, but the expansion of the EU changed
the dynamics in terms of people getting work. Because the Polish people can't speak English, they took all the jobs in construction, in industry, even in the farms. (Precious 2014)

New visa regimes and the increasing difficulty of acquiring legal status prolongs the separation of Zimbabwean families. Many diasporans intended to quickly establish themselves with a job in order to bring their dependents into a stable situation. Subsequently they discovered that new immigration laws and policies made it very difficult to bring loved ones to join them abroad. Meanwhile, those who claimed asylum were unable to visit Zimbabwe because this would nullify their claims, and undocumented immigrants were unable to visit Zimbabwe because they would not be readmitted abroad. Many diasporans were caught off guard by these changing rules, as happened with Venganai's uncle who went to the United States on a tourist visa:

He had started his own thing, but then his son passed away, and his relatives in America agreed that he should go back home to bury his son. He then returned to the States, but when they checked him at the airport they said "no you have overstayed, you were working illegally." So then they sent him back to Zimbabwe. From that moment he never made ends meet. He is struggling in the rural areas, and he has a big family. Everyone is looking down on him like he's a useless person. But then people forget that it's a question of opportunity. He got his opportunity but the funeral messed up his opportunity. Had he been in the United States he could have been looking after himself. (Venganai 2013)

Venganai's account poignantly reveals how opportunity spatialized and how this often has relational effects. After his unexpected deportation from what many see as the “land of opportunity,” Venganai ended up back in the rural areas of Zimbabwe, a place generally
associated with extreme poverty and an utter dearth of opportunity. This transition between places and the concomitant loss of foreign income caused his political position in the family to diminish to the point that he was seen as a “useless person.” Interestingly, his deportation across a fractured global landscape of opportunity also parallels the racialized divides enforcement tactics of colonial Rhodesia. As in past generations, diasporans’ access to places of more abundant opportunity is regulated by bureaucratic regimes which largely seek to regulate labor. Colonial passbooks and influx/efflux laws are mirrored by today’s mercurial visa and passport laws which limit access to education and employment in Europe as well as in North America and the Antipodes—places that were colonized by the parents and grandparents of the people who colonized Zimbabwe.

With reduced opportunities to reach wealthy countries, educated individuals increasingly sought employment in nearby South Africa and Botswana, where it was possible for professionals to achieve a standard of living comparable to that in wealthy countries. These “islands of prosperity” (Nyamnjoh 2006) also continued to receive the vast majority of poor people fleeing Zimbabwe, especially those who were living in rural areas and high density urban locations who were poorly positioned to afford acquiring a visa or passport. However, in response to increasing numbers of Zimbabweans refugees, South Africa and Botswana also began to tighten immigration laws, severely undermining the security of Zimbabweans in those countries as described in the following section.
Sustained Economic Turmoil and Political Violence: 2005-2008

The economic fallout from Fast Track Land Reform spiraled out of control. Unemployment probably reached 90%, manufacturing was decimated, and agricultural output in a country that was commonly billed as the region’s "bread basket" was now so low that Zimbabwe had to import staples like maize and was dependent on food aid. Mining operations, another economic mainstay, were plagued by power cuts and international capital was rattled by an expanding indigenization agenda calling for 51% indigenous ownership in all business.

Hyperinflation was a dramatic feature of economic catastrophe (Coomer and Gstraunthaler 2011; Henke 2008). Zimbabwe was already experiencing extreme inflation during the late 1990s due to unbudgeted payouts to war veterans, a hugely expensive military adventure in the Congo, loss of credit with the World Bank, reduced operations of international aid organizations and the loss of confidence from international investors related to looming land reform. On November 14, 1997, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 75% of its value against the American dollar, an event locally known as “black Friday” which culminated in price controls and food riots. Economic instability increased during the next two years as foreign currency reserves were almost depleted and the government introduced import controls and banned foreign exchange accounts. In 1998 the inflation rate was 30% and by 1999 it reached 57%.

The economic situation worsened following Fast Track Land Reform, as the besieged government resorted to increasingly desperate fiscal policies which included price controls on basic commodities that were effectively below the cost of production and restrictions on foreign exchange which included attempts to peg the official exchange rate artificially low. Most
damagingly, the government began printing money. Between 1999 and 2003, the money increased from 56.6 to 3240.3 billion dollars.

By 2006, yearly inflation passed 1000% for the first time, and in August, the government introduced a new currency that removed three zeroes off of the old notes, so that 1000 of the old dollars were equivalent to 1 dollar of the new “bearer’s cheques.” Prices began to increase rapidly as higher-denomination bills were printed with reckless abandon. In July 2008, a second series of bearers cheques removed 10 zeros, and in February 2009 a third series of bearers checks removed 12 zeros so that one dollar in this series was equivalent numerically (but not equivalent in value) to 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 of the 2005 dollars. Gideon Gono, who presided over the Reserve Bank during the most extreme hyperinflation, pithily summed up hyperinflation by terming it a “casino economy” (Gono 2008).

As Gono indicates, the mercurial dynamics of Zimbabwe’s fiscal policy and its relation to hyperinflation become difficult for even economists to explain. Indeed, the bizarre financial acrobatics of this period can only be understood at an experiential level. The first time I visited Zimbabwe was in January of 2007, at the beginning of hyperinflation. At that point, I used bearers cheques denominated between one and two thousand dollars. By the time I left Zimbabwe seven months later I was using bills denominated between 50 thousand and one million dollars and prices were doubling on a daily basis. During this time, I could not access money from outside of the country, because remittance services like Western Union were paying out at the official rate which was absurdly low compared to the parallel market. As a result, I would go to South Africa to withdraw Rand that I could exchange into Zimbabwean dollars as I needed them. Towards the end of my stay—about 18 months before the end of hyperinflation—I
found someone with a connection to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe who would eagerly buy my foreign exchange in exchange for piles of crisp, newly-minted $200,000 bills.

As a foreigner with access to forex, it is still difficult for me to comprehend how Zimbabweans experienced hyperinflation. Pension, investment and savings accounts evaporated. Salaries were routinely delayed, and the introduction of daily withdrawal limits restricted peoples’ access to cash, creating long bank queues. Even those who received cash-in-hand discovered that their earnings could not cover the cost of transportation to work, making it more economical to quit and stay at home. Hyperinflation made conventional business practices nearly impossible, forcing grocery stores to stop stocking the shelves. People told me that by 2008, long food lines would form, and people were so desperate that they queued for hours without even knowing what they might (or might not) be able to buy.

Decent described how difficult it was to survive in the casino economy. He lived in the rural area of Zaka and earned a living by herding cattle for diasporans in England. By the time he received payment from the person handling his employer’s affairs, hyperinflation greatly reduced the value of his earnings:

If you agree to 10,000 ZWD [for the job], it will be OK on the day of the agreement, but after 30 days that money will be worth [only] 50 rand [~ USD $8]. If I keep it [in ZWD], it's going to be worth almost nothing. (Decent 2013).

As always happens during extreme circumstances, people devised creative ways to survive. Local money was essentially worthless so people immediately converted it into some form that would hold value. Generally, this meant buying Rand or US Dollars on the parallel market. Decent would exchange his Zimbabwean dollars with diasporans visiting from South Africa:
[I would tell those guys:] “All right guys, how are you? You know what, guys? I'm having my money in Zim dollars. May you please sell me some Rands?” They knew the [exchange] rate. I saved my money in the form of Rands. I had 600 Rands (~ USD $80) when I [first departed for South Africa]. (Decent 2013).

Other people converted earnings into durable goods that could hold or even increase in value, especially dry foods like beans, rice and sugar, as well as gadgets like cell phones. When they needed cash, people would sell these alternative stores of value at the new, inflated price and spend the proceeds as quickly as possible. Such transactions were frequently handled by youngsters who learned to navigate multiple, fluctuating exchange rates including not only ZWD:USD and ZWD:ZAR, but ZWD:sugar, ZWD:beans and ZWD:Nokia 6120.

A few people managed to thrive during hyperinflation. Those with bulk access to newly-printed money conducted a brisk—though risky—trade in forex. People who managed to produce food during a time when there was so little food in the country could charge exorbitant prices, as Munashe describes in Chapter 5. The effective closure of legacy remittance providers like Western Union created opportunity for artisanal remittance brokers. Some dishonestly made windfall profits by delaying transactions a day or two, then purchasing the agreed amount of Zimbabwean dollars at a fraction of the previous day’s price. Finally, some savvy diasporans discovered that their earnings in forex could have phenomenal purchasing power in Zimbabwe. This enabled a few people to buy houses, cars and building materials at absurdly low prices. They were aided in this endeavor by the desperation of many Zimbabweans, some of who wanted to liquidate their property in order to raise money to leave the country.
Notwithstanding some success stories, most people suffered tremendously during the 2000s. Hunger was widespread, especially in 2007 and 2008 during the height of hyperinflation. Political violence also repeatedly reared its ugly head. One of the most notable examples happened in 2005, when the government unleashed “Operation Murambatsvina (throw out the trash)” demolishing over 90,000 informal dwellings and businesses in urban areas, thereby displacing more than half a million people and depriving 100,000 people of jobs in the informal sector (Pophiwa 2011; Potts 2006; Vambe 2008). Although the motivations behind Murambatsvina are opaque, some commentators believe that it was designed to retaliate against urban voters who favored opposition candidates in the 2005 election and to reorganize the electorate in a way that would benefit the ruling party. Operation Murambatsvina displaced many people to rural areas, and I encountered several people in South Africa who had left Zimbabwe as a direct result of the Operation.

Several violent local and national elections also occurred during the 2000s. In each case, the ruling party used violence, intimidation and rigging to clinch victory. Elections-related violence overtly targeted people who were suspected of sympathizing with the opposition. Villagers were rounded up to attend the sort of Pungwes that Ndebele people faced during Gukurahundi. In some places, young people were forced into militias where they were subjected to political indoctrination and expected to commit acts of violence. One young woman I met in South Africa—the only person who refused my request to be recorded—described how she fled such a camp after the officers began withholding food from girls who did not provide sexual favors. Another woman in the United States told me how her mother’s home in the rural area of Karoi was torched in a scene reminiscent of labor recruiting in the early 1900s and “anti-insurgency” warfare during the war of liberation:
Her grandson had just come from Harare to help her with the planting season. I don’t know what had been going on there, all I know is that she had kind of heard rumors that she was being watched [by agents of the ruling party]. Her grandson is young and from the city so they thought he was from the opposition party. They just woke up one night and the house was completely in flames. She woke up because a big part of the roof fell onto her when she was sleeping. She just ran outside in her nightie—that’s all she escaped with. They also burned down her granary where she kept her food. Her grandson right away went to Harare because they were threatening to go after his wife. I sent money for her to rebuild the house and the granary. (Vimbai 2014)

Vimbai’s quote reveals how political violence often targeted families rather than individuals. Her grandmother’s house in the rural areas was burnt down because of the suspicion that her grandson was involved with the opposition party. Shambudzai, whose story is recounted below, was raped in retaliation for her father’s support for MDC. Even when political violence retaliates directly against perceived perpetrators the family is often collateral damage. For instance, as recounted by Chipo in the previous chapter, she and her siblings were forced to flee the country after her mother was killed in the run-up to the 2008 elections. In all these instances, a family was punished for the perceived political infractions of one of its members.

Political violence thus compounded economic stress and caused a veritable exodus from Zimbabwe. Thus far I have primarily discussed diasporic destinations in Europe, North America and the Antipodes even though South Africa has always received more Zimbabwean migrants than any other country by an order of magnitude. By the mid 2000s, however, the closure of wealthy countries through new visa regimes and the desperation caused by political and
economic turmoil caused hundreds of thousands of poor and newly-destitute people to pour across the southern border. For example, Shambudzai describes how she and four girlfriends fled to South Africa as teenagers following elections-related violence in 2008:

I'm the first person to tell [my friends], let us go to SA, maybe our lives will be better. It was so easy to convince them, because we were living in a very difficult life. Those ZANU-PF members were beating us in the location where we were staying, they knew this place is for MDC. My relatives are MDC members. I was raped and I got pregnant with [my daughter] Prayer. I know two of [the men who raped me], but I don’t really remember the others. My friends were also beaten by the ZANU-PF members, and one was also raped. That's why they ran away. We were five when we came here. We were all girls. (Shambudzai 2010)

The journey to South Africa was dangerous for poor people, and perilous for young women like Shambudzai. Lacking passports and the financial resources to travel by road, many resorted to making the journey on foot. One popular route was to cross the Limpopo river at Beitbridge and traverse a desolate and lawless no-man’s land to reach the nearest South African town of Messina. This area was patrolled by soldiers, thugs and vigilantes. Shambudzai and her friends were assaulted by the same men they hired to guide them into South Africa:

We met with the guys that said they could take us to the river, so we came through the river. They said we are going to pay R250 ($30) each, but when we were inside the river they changed the price and said we are going to pay R700 ($80) each. We didn’t have that R700, so they took another girl, who they said was going to pay for us. They said, "this one, she’s fat and light in complexion." Even now, I don't know where she is. Because they raped her, and I
don't know if they killed her, I don't know. When we arrived at Messina they took all our clothes and money and phones. They left us without anything. (Shambudzai 2010)

Others avoided the Beitbridge route due to its notorious human terrain. One alternative was to cross the more forbidding natural terrain to the east, where Zimbabwe borders South Africa and Mozambique. This is the same area where illegal labor brokers called “blackbirders” waylaid southbound migrants in the early 1900s, as described in Chapter One. Today, this region is possibly even more remote, as much of it was emptied of people during the colonial period and set aside as national parkland and private safari concessions. This is where Edwin first crossed into South Africa, at the age of 15:

There is a place where there are already some holes in the fence, but we lost our way and ran into live [electric] wires for Krueger Park. So we used our clothes to hold onto the live wire, and jumped inside. After something like 15 to 20 meters there is a road for game cars. The park guides saw us, so we ran into the bushes. After that, we walked and walked and walked until we saw another fence that was written “beware of lions.” We couldn’t go back, and didn’t see lion, but we just saw meat. It was a dead animal, like a kudu. The legs were already eaten, and because we were hungry, we just took that meat and made fire—no salt, we just braaied [barbecued] that meat and eat it. (Edwin 2013)

By the time that people like Edwin, Shambudzai, and Decent reach South Africa they often have very few resources left. As in previous generations they survive or perish according to the

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7 I cannot help but make a comparison to how the construction of border walls and increased patrols along more populate parts of the Mexico-United States border had resulted of displacing undocumented migration to the United States to more remote areas like the Tohono O’odham nation in the Sonoran desert (Cadava 2011)
generosity or malice of people they encounter on their journey. Decent met up with some people who offered help just after he made it out of the Kruger Park area:

I don't know if they were Zimbabweans or South Africans, but they were speaking Shona. So they came to us driving a bakkie [pickup truck]. They said: “Hi guys, how are you? Where are you going? we are going to Louis Trichard.”

We told them: “no we are going to Jo’burg.”

They told us that there was a roadblock just ahead, but if we are having money, they can take us towards the other road, bypassing the police. The normal price of Luis Trichard is R15, but they said R50. So those guys put us in the bakkie and drive on the dust roads towards the other farms. And then they said, the car is just stuck, can you just push us please? So then we push them, and then they go, they make a U-turn and go. (Decent 2013)

Other times, however, travelers are fortunate to meet with people who are genuinely willing to help. Edwin, for example, was helped by a man from Mozambique who had lived in South Africa for many years and showed him tremendous generosity:

I go sleep in the bush alone. The next day, I continued with my journey. It was raining that day, and I see a compound where Farm Workers live. I go there and sit down and shut my mouth. It was weekend, they're dancing and drinking beer. There were some Zimbabweans and I tried to explain, but they said, “where I'm staying, they don't allow visitors so I can't help you.” So I just stay there until the owner of that tavern comes, and he sees me not drinking, not smoking or dancing, just sitting. When the people start going to their homes he said to me: “what is the problem?”
He speaks English, and I say: “I don't know where to go. Because I was with my friends, and the police, they arrest them. And now I am alone.”

And that man takes me, and I take a shower. I sit with his family in the dining room, Watching TV. They cook and we eat, and I sleep there. And he says “don't worry, I come from Mozambique, but I come here a long time ago, and now I have got an ID. there's another old man, and I will try to talk to him, and he will give you a job.”

Decent, meanwhile, encountered a South African woman who provided him food:

I was left with R35 rand, you see. So there was no option, we were supposed to walk. We walked towards the other road which passed through Sibasa. It's a dust road so as to bypass the roadblocks of the police. We were now thirsty, So my friend said: “may you please go and ask water from those people? And if they ask you how many are you, just say that you are alone.” It was for the reason that if we tell them that we are two, they can just even decide to phone the police.

Luckily that person was a good Samaritan, but she was not able to speak English. She was not willing to understand because she is not in trouble. I clearly want to understand what she is saying, so I can just catch some words, and guess the similarities. Because when talking with someone with a different language, mostly you talk by giving signs at the same time. And after that she gave me some food. It was pap and cabbage. Then I go take it to that guy who I was with. That guy, already knew how to speak Venda, so they told some stories.

(Decent 2013)
Decent was fortunate, as many South Africans he encountered were reluctant to help. He explained that South Africans in border areas of Limpopo are fined if they are caught helping or employing Zimbabweans:

Those Venda people are also having great hatred. They can phone the police to say “these Zimbabweans are crossing there that side.” Normally, if a Zimbabwean is found at a home of a Venda person, they were supposed to pay a fine of R1000, and that is a lot of money. So because of that they also have hatred of the foreigners. They know that if they see you, then they are going to pay. So if you are not having papers, they don't even assist you. Even to ask the road, they cannot even tell you the direction. (Decent 2013)

With so few monetary resources and people to ask for help, Zimbabweans making their way into South Africa are vulnerable to violence at every stage in the journey. Edwin narrowly survived one such encounter with a white farmer:

We walked something like 3 to 4 days. Night, day, night, day. There were three of us, and for food, we just went into the farms for bananas. It was something like the fifth day. Around eight or nine we were in the road walking and a police car stops behind us. The way we were dirty, I just knew those police were going to take us, so I ran away.

They took my two friends, and I just walk without knowing where I'm going. About evening I reach another Farm. I eat the bananas, and after that I sleep. Then the owner of that farm found me in that field. He says “hey, wake up!” So I wake up and he has a big gun. “What are you doing here!?”

“Eish. I'm just sleeping.”
He says, “Okay, come with me.” And I go with him to his workshop, and he tells one of his workers: “tell that man to leave my farm.” He was just speaking Afrikaans and Venda. I don't know Afrikaans, but I can hear Venda. So I go out with that worker, and he said “hey you are lucky my friend. Because last week he shot another one, another Zimbabwean who was inside his farm. You are very, very lucky. Just leave here and go.” (Edwin 2013).

Nevertheless, commercial farmers in Limpopo province are some of the primary benefactors of the crisis in Zimbabwe (Bolt 2015; Rutherford 2008). The large number of desperate people trying to get into South Africa enabled Limpopo farmers to hire more people during a time when farms in other parts of the country were reducing their workforce (Rutherford and Addison 2007). In 2007, Shambudzai and Gladys earned about $2.00 per day:

We stayed in Messina for 6 months, and I was earning R14 (~US $1.99) per day. You were going to work from 8 until 6. The owner of that farm was a white guy. Afrikaner. They would only supply us with food for millie meal. 25Kg per month. Then decided to come here to Pretoria. (Shambudzai 2010)

We went to work in the farms in Messina. He was giving us R15 (~ $2.12) per day. We were there for two weeks, and when he give us her salary for a fortnight, we ran away from there. So we went to another farm and they were giving us R16 (~ $2.27) per day. We only worked for one month, and we came here to Pretoria. (Gladys 2010)

Adding to their precarity was the possibility that workers would not receive their wages at all. Employers capitalized on their undocumented status, knowing that they would be unable to report abuses to the police:
That other old man was painting, so I was just cleaning the walls. I was working from 5 o'clock in the morning until 8 or 9, late. But because I have a place to sleep, and I get food every day, I work. He said he will pay me R30 every day, so each and every week he was supposed to give me R150. And I work something like a whole month, with no pay. And I thought What is the problem? And he said: “no, that boss, he didn't pay me. So you are supposed to be patient. He's going to pay us.” I work for something like three months, and then he paid me something like 1050 rand. There was another white man there. He was something like 15 years old. I gave that money to that kid, and I said, “can you hold this for me?” He said no problem. (Edwin 2013)

They were just employing people, and towards pay they go to the police and say "I'm having many Zimbabweans, come take them. Because I was supposed to pay them tomorrow. So I give you so much." So they bribe the police with only R2000 instead of paying those people, maybe more than 50 people, times R600 each. So we were scared to go to the farms. (Decent 2013)

Deportation was a very real threat, as Decent discovered first hand.

We hide in the bush, and then when we heard the sound of a car… So when we moved out to try to stop it [thinking its a taxi] it's the police. They ask papers and everything, we're almost having nothing. We went to the police station which is called Hamakuya Police Station, and I was there for 10 days. They were telling us that “you guys are not arrested, you didn't do anything, it's not a crime, you are just waiting for deportation.” And then on the deportation, after those 10 days I was not supposed to be deported. Then I see life in cells, it's
not a good place to be, so I said “no, I'm not feeling well.” So they asked me, “what is your choice now? To go home, or to go to the hospital?” So I said, no it's better I can go.

And then [at the International Organization for Migration camp in Zimbabwe], IOM said that we are helping people with food. Go into the queue you get food, you go and eat. And then [they gave] 5kg of mealie meal and 2kg of beans to people who volunteer to go home, so that when you get there you'll have something to eat before you can get connected to the community. Others, they were already having two years in South Africa, so the guy just said. We are not forcing you, if you don't want [transportation home], just make your way out, the gate is open.

Because I was not having money, only R29, I see that I could not start again. And because I was a long time in the cells, I was having flu. I was seeing that I am not fit enough to try again. So I go home, I finish something like one full month there, that's when I decide to come back again. (Decent 2013)

Edwin was even less lucky, being deported two times before he reached Pretoria. Finally, on his third trip, the person who he was traveling with missed the bus stop where he had a friend, and they ended up in the city center after dark. This made them easy targets:

We arrive in Pretoria at something like past 7 or past 8. That guy, he lost the way. We were supposed to go to Attridgeville. Then the cops arrest us again. I was left with R80 in my pocket. And those cops said “no, guys, you're supposed to make a plan if you don’t want to go back to Zim.”

We said, “OK guys, we don't want to go.”
And those cops say, “okay, how much do you have? You're supposed to give us R100.”

We said, “hey, we just have R80 in our pocket, and it's our last money. We can give you that R80, but we can end up begging in the street. So if we can give you that R80, may you give us transport?”

They said: “no problem, where are you going?”

So we tried to explain we're going to such and such a place. Those police said “we know that place, let's go.”

We go, and they drop us at the gate. And these places, when they drop you at the gate, there is nowhere you can get inside. We said, “we can't just stand at the gate, other police they can come and arrest us. We are supposed to find somewhere to sleep in the bush.” (Edwin 2013)

Paying off the police is a very common occurrence that I witnessed many times. As undocumented foreigners, many Zimbabweans are unable to access the banking system and carry cash. This makes them “Human ATMs” for police and criminals (Vigneswaran, et al. 2010).

Edwin was fortunate because his friend knew a place to work in Pretoria. However, life remains precarious for many new arrivals to the city, as Decent discovered:

We were staying in Menlyn Park, at the back of Spar. I was jobless, my friend was jobless. During the night, there are people who used to drink beer there, and left empties. We used get up early in the morning and pick those bottles and then we would go to sell them at
the same bottle store. They were buying those bottles for 90c each. With 20 bottles we could get something like R18. Then take that R18, buy 1KG milimeal, that was costing R4.50, and then there is a butcher, they are selling bones there, and they are basically not for the people. They are for the dogs. You see, but that was the cheapest for us. And they were costing R4.
So now we cook and have something to eat. There was no plate, no pot or what. The food was cooked in those paint tins, and then you pour in plastics. And then, in front of Spar there was a marketing place where people could just market for jobs there. I was still young, and I was looking for a job with older guys than me. So it was difficult for me and my friend to get a chance to work. Because people were always looking for strong guys. Sometimes you can get to the car first, but the owner can say, “no, you guys come down. I want that one, and that one, you see. Zvakaoma! Kwete bichana, zvakanyanyisa! (It was really hard, not a little bit but a lot!) It's a real story that I'm telling. Which happened to me, not the next person. (Decent 2013)

Decent arrived in Pretoria during the height of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, his family in the rural areas was desperate:

When I was staying at Spar, it was the time when things were very bad at home. So out of that little money we were sending groceries. I can even get R2 and phone them through a public phone. You are going to talk for something like 3 minutes. They were not even saying, "hello," after the phone rings. They were just saying, "oh, are you alive? we are dying here of hunger." So you were forced to make a plan. Like if I have R300, I can just buy 10KG rice, it was R65 by that time, 10KG of sugar, it was R45, and then I pay the transport, and
then I phone them, "Oh, I just gave the driver to deliver rice and sugar. At least you can try to 123.”

Thus, Zimbabweans from low income backgrounds found life in South Africa to be very tenuous. They struggled to make ends meet financially, while also sending money and food to keep their families alive back home. They were under constant threat of deportation and extortion from the police, while criminals found them easy prey as well. People arriving in the 1990s and early 2000s found more opportunities, but by the time Decent, Edwin, Shambudzai and Gladys arrived in South Africa employment was scarce and competition from other people in precarious positions was steep. By 2008, more than a million Zimbabweans were likely in South Africa (Kriger and McGregor 2010), at a time when the South African economy was depressed and Xenophobia against foreigners was mounting.

With time, Decent and Edwin both managed to find consistent employment as security guards, enabling them to rent accommodation in the high density township of Mamelodi. Shambudzai and Gladys, meanwhile, ended up in Atteridgeville, commuting into Pretoria to braid hair. During 2008 they experienced a Xenophobic uprising against foreigners. They were summarily evicted from the Atteridgeville and eventually found shelter in a neglected high-rise complex called Schubart Park, a narrative to be resumed in Chapter Four.

**Tenuous Stability and Uncertainty: 2009 - Present**

The closely contested elections of 2008 resulted in significant parliamentary gains for MDC, despite clear evidence of rigging. The MDC’s candidate Morgan Tsvangirai even won a majority
of votes in the presidential election, but not enough to avoid a runoff vote. Indications that the second round of voting would involve epic levels of violence persuaded Tsvangirai to withdraw, effectively ceding the presidency to Mugabe. Succumbing to internal and international pressure, the ruling party negotiated a coalition "Unity" Government with the MDC that saw Tsvangirai instated as Prime Minister while Mugabe retained the position of President. 

Shortly after forming the Unity Government, Zimbabwe adopted an innovative multi-currency financial system that involved replacing the national currency with US dollars, South African Rand, Botswana Pula and several other currencies--though in practice the Dollar and the Rand were most widely used. This put a swift end to hyperinflation and brought a modicum of stability to the economy which inched haltingly towards recovery. The Unity Government also made headway on a number of political issues, including a lessening of international sanctions and a slight increase in foreign investment. Emigration slowed considerably and some people returned to Zimbabwe, especially from South Africa, in order to escape poor living and work conditions abroad. This period also saw encouraging evidence of growing production from smallholders on indigenized commercial farms (Scoones 2010).

Disappointingly, the 2013 elections brought an end to the Unity Government. The ruling party regained control of parliament and the presidency amidst new accusations of electoral violence, voter intimidation and rigging. Currently, the president’s advanced age and factional battles within the ruling party--especially related to the issue of presidential succession--are resulting in a climate of political uncertainty. Some pundits predict a smooth transition of power to Vice President Mnangagwa, while others suggest that the president's wife Grace may take over. More than a few ominously predict that this factional battle could result in civil war.
This past November (2017), the government introduced a new pseudo-currency called the "Bond Note" which was deployed in order to address the dwindling numbers of US dollars in circulation. The cash shortage has resulted in withdrawal limits at banks and money transmission locations reminiscent of hyperinflation during 2001s. Bond notes are ostensibly backed by a large US dollar loan from the African Development Bank. In theory, they are pegged 1:1 with the US dollar but in practice many stores have tiered pricing for US dollars, bond notes, and bank transfers. Paying in cash with bond notes is 10% to 15% more expensive than paying with US dollars, while bank transfers incur a 15% to 20% surcharge. These premiums are growing as bond notes are gradually replacing the dollars in circulation. Many Zimbabweans are understandably suspicious of bond notes, a situation that could weaken the ruling party. Another result of the cash shortage is that people are moving increasingly towards various forms of electronic money like debit cards, mobile money (Gabanga 2016a; Gabanga 2016b) and even Bitcoin (Antoni, et al. 2015; Suk 2015; Suk 2016a; Suk 2016b).

Recent months have also seen growing levels of grassroots activism. This has involved both on-the-ground strikes as well as prominent social media campaigns that are described more fully in Chapter 6. These movements are kindling hope in some political observers who suggest that a candidate from the MDC or another of the proliferating opposition parties could clinch the upcoming 2018 elections. Other observers are less hopeful, pointing to the opposition's failure to form coalitions and the ruling party's long history of violence and fraud during elections.

Meanwhile, as many as a quarter of the Zimbabwean-born population of 13 million people continues to live abroad, in an expanding and shifting array of far-flung destinations. Dominic Pasura’s 2014 estimate is 2 million in total, with 1 million in South Africa, 400 thousand in Botswana, 210,000 in Malawi and Mozambique, 200 thousand in the United Kingdom, 65
thousand in North America. Nevertheless, the total number of Zimbabweans in the diaspora or any one country is difficult to estimate and continues to fluctuate in response to evolving political and economic circumstances in Zimbabwe and around the world. The number of Zimbabweans in South Africa is especially variable, due to its proximity and prevalence of circular migration. For example, Pasura’s estimate of 400,000 Zimbabweans in Botswana currently seems high, given recent crackdowns on foreigners reported to me during my research. Accurate enumeration is also complicated by the fact that many Zimbabweans are undocumented. Meanwhile, counting immigrants can be politically fraught, especially in South Africa, where politicians and the media claim up to 3 million Zimbabwean immigrants, while rights groups put the number at 1 to 1.5 million (Kriger and McGregor 2010). In my opinion, it is fair to estimate that approximately a quarter of Zimbabwean-born adults currently live outside of the country, while more have left the country (especially for South Africa and Botswana) and subsequently returned. Today, many diasporans wish to return home, but political and economic instability makes this impractical for most. Unfortunately, the possibility of bringing loved ones into the diaspora also remains a pipe dream for many due to increasing amounts of anti-immigrant legislation in most receiving countries. Indeed, as I put the finishing touches on this chapter, I have received word that some Zimbabweans in California are being targeted by immigration raids. Agents from ICE even showed up at the house of one of my friends. Fortunately she was not there when they arrived. Unfortunately, she is now scared to return home. Being deported would prevent her from feeding her many dependents back home--including not only her parents and children but her nieces and nephews as well.
Chapter Three: Governing Families

Introduction

This chapter has two primary goals: first, to elucidate my theoretical approach to kinship; and second, to examine how technologies and tactics of governmentality shape Zimbabwean families. I begin, more or less in the same place that David Schneider does in his seminal critique of European Kinship studies—by enumerating core failures of the functionalist paradigm and noting its anachronistic durability in contemporary scholarship (Schneider 1984). However, in contrast to Schneider who argues that Anthropology’s cardinal sin was to erroneously interpret indigenous knowledge through an ethnocentric European lens, I suggest that a far more serious crime was the deliberate attempt to reformulate African families to align with European sensibilities. That is, I attempt to replace Schneider’s portrait of a shortsighted academic with that of a calculating and conniving colonial official—the Native Administrator—who used kinship as an important pivot for exploitative intervention into African society. Ultimately, however, I will agree with Schneider that indigenous kinship systems should be evaluated in their own terms. I accordingly draw from the processual and performative frameworks assembled by Schneider’s contemporaries to define family primarily in terms of practice.

Families are what families do. They congeal from everyday interactions between people who consider each other—and behave towards each other—as family.

The second, intertwined goal is to examine how historical and contemporary families are shaped by technologies and tactics of “governmentally,” a form of power that simultaneously
targets populations and individuals. I argue that these technologies were at the center of the applied anthropological project of reformulating African society in order to profit from it. Specifically, Rhodesia (and neighboring colonies) designed onerous identity and pass regimes to commodity immense flows of African labor. Population registers visibilized individual bodies for personalized enforcement through the creation of what I will tentatively term a “bioinformational complex”—a linkage between a particular person and their datafied existence, manifest through official documents that individuals are required to carry or present for inspection in order to authenticate their identity and demonstrate compliance with governing algorithms. At the same time, governmental technologies divided Africans into actionable categories (i.e. tribes, families, provenances and nationalities)—a totalizing process through which large groups could be algorithmically queried, calculated and manipulated.

This thread of analysis leads to the observations that many of the technologies and tactics of colonial governmentality are now being redeployed by contemporary passport and visa regimes—particularly in Europe and the settler-colonial states of North America and the Antipodes. Postcolonial governments also continue to maintain databases of births, deaths and marriages and to issue corresponding documentation. Indeed, they have little choice in this matter, as Eurocentric documentary regimes are now broadly employed by states in order to govern access to nationalized space, employment, education and other opportunities. For instance, when applying for family visas in Europe and European settler states, applicants must provide birth, marriage and identity certificates as well as biometric coordinates which substantiate their nationality and visibilize the contours of their Eurocentric nuclear family.

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8 By glossing Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia as “Europe and European Settler states” I do not mean to diminish the vibrancy and diversity which exists in these places. Rather, I am pointing to hegemonic political and economic structures in these countries which are still largely controlled by European interests.
Subsequently, if a visa is granted, the nuclear family is reinforced as a normative unit of practice and a path to opportunity. This constitutes both a continuation and a refinement of colonial governmental systems of bureaucratized oppression, resulting in the respatializations of relatedness that I begin to explore here and examine more closely in the following two chapters.

This thread of analysis underlines my contention that family practices are shaped by the *technological* contexts in which they are located. However, in difference to the previous chapter’s concluding point on new internet-mediated communications technologies which dispersed families leverage towards proprietary ends, this chapter shows how technologies are also *externally applied*—for instance, in state attempts to bend families and societies into more desirable and manipulable shapes. Once again, Zimbabwean families will be shown to work with and against this contextual force in order to create families of their own choosing.

**Functionalist Kinship**

I began my preparation to research Zimbabwean families in the library, perusing the European ethnographic record for this area of the world. This led me to a body of work on “Shona” and “Ndebele” kinship⁹ written between approximately 1920 and 1970 by social anthropologists working in the tradition of British structure-functionalism (e.g. Bullock 1913; Bullock 1950; Gelfand 1973; Hannan 1961; Holleman 1952). As structuralists, these anthropologists sought to describe collective understandings and modes of interaction that Shona

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⁹ I put “Shona” in quotes to emphasize that it is a problematic term. Tribalism was a colonial construction (Chimhundu 1992; Ranger 1984). For example, the Rhodesian head of state had supreme power to define tribes at his whim. From 1939 statute law: “The Governor shall appoint chiefs to preside over tribes and may divide existing tribes into two or more parts or may amalgamate tribes or part of tribes into one tribe as may be necessary or as the good government of the natives may in his opinion require (Rhodesia 1939)”
and Ndebele people used to form relational units. As functionalists, they believed that kinship was the basis of social organization in African society through which communities found equilibrium and reproduced themselves longitudinally. At the time, I partially understood the problematic nature of construing the world in terms of stability. Nevertheless, I somehow believed that these works would introduce me to indigenous models used by the people I would interview. This belief was partly supported by the fact that many contemporary ethnographers approvingly reference these older works in order to explain Zimbabwean approaches to kinship.10

Functionalist anthropologists determined that several layers of kinship existed in “Shona” society.11 For the purpose of this paper I will elaborate the three that were considered most important. At the most abstract level, “Shona” people were said to belong to exogamous totemic groups. Children inherit a totem from their father and consider themselves related to everyone sharing this totem. Even if they cannot pinpoint the exact relationship, people who share a totem cannot marry. Lineages, meanwhile, are groups of kin that trace descent through fathers to a known patriarch. Functionalist kinship described lineages as corporate groups which collectively own property and serve as elementary political units within larger “tribal” formations. At the smallest level of kinship, the “house” is a domestic unit comprised by a man's wife and her offspring. Functionalist anthropologists were fascinated with polygamy and determined that

10 For example: Schmidt (Schmidt 1990b:635) cites Holleman (Holleman 1952) to explain the “social, symbolic, and material significance of bridewealth,” as do Nyambara (Nyambara 2005) and Zvogbo (Zvogbo 1986). Gleaned is also frequently cited by contemporary anthropologists. Though he was not a colonial administrator, he did publish extensively in the department's journal NADA.

11 In this chapter I primarily deal with the functionalist elaboration of “Shona” kinship, as incorporating their theorizations of “Ndebele,” “Chewa” and other tribal constructions would add a lot of complexity to my analysis without deepening it.
polygynous men have one house for each of his wives, who resides with her children in a separate dwelling within his homestead.

In each of these levels, functionalist anthropologists identified unique relational categories that are unknown in European kinship but were seen to be supremely important in Zimbabwe. For instance, the sister of a person’s father is called “tete.” She acts as an advocate for girls during the marriage process and mediates domestic disputes between her brothers and their wives. Meanwhile, the brother of a person’s mother is called “sekuru” and acts as a confidant and advocate for his “muzukuru” (nephew), who, in turn, is often the executor of his sekuru’s estate.

Finally, functionalist anthropologists identified culturally-specific principles that shape “Shona” kinship. Most notably, the principal of “classificatory” relatedness collapses various forms of biological relatedness into a unified category referenced by a single term. Thus, people use the word “father” (baba) for both their biological father and his brothers (i.e. their paternal uncles). Meanwhile, a person’s “mothers” (amai) include both the woman who carried them in her womb as well as her sisters (i.e their maternal aunts). According to the classificatory principle, a person’s siblings include not only the other children of their biological father, but also the children of everyone they refer to as baba or amai. Age is a point of differentiation within classificatory categories, so that older/younger fathers and mothers are called “babamukuru/babamunini” (big father/little father) and “maiguru/mainini (senior mother/junior mother) depending on their relative age to a person’s biological parent. Notwithstanding internal hierarchies, classificatory relatedness requires a person to behave in the same way to all of the people denoted by a particular term. Thus, a person treats all his fathers with great respect, regardless of whether they are a biological father or a classificatory father.
Working from these family groupings, relational categories and kinship principals, functionalist anthropologists elaborated a model of indigenous society that emphasized social stability with each relationship characterized by predetermined, reciprocal behavior. In the words of Michael Gelfand:

[Every Shona person] knows his proper place and is unlikely to assume the position of another without very careful thought...he knows the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon him; these are clearly defined and taken seriously (Gelfand 1973:29).

Functionals believed lineages to be the preeminent political unit. Interconnected marriage between lineages bound groups together through the practice of *kurovorana*, in which the groom’s lineage provides bride wealth (*lobola*) in the form of cattle to the bride’s lineage in exchange for her future children. These same cattle are subsequently used by the bride’s lineage to secure a wife for one of her brothers. Divorce is supposedly difficult because marriages can only be dissolved through the devolution of lobola cattle which would have already been used in subsequent marriage transactions. Holleman theorized that this contributed to longitudinal social stability:

The interdependence between families is one of the main reasons for the attitude of give-and-take which generally characterizes Shona marriage relations. The fact that one marriage transaction is usually interlocked with so many other marriages is probably the most effective guarantee that the purpose of kurovorana [the exchange of cattle for women] will be successfully fulfilled. It also explains why, at an early stage of the transaction, the parties act as if its purpose had already been accomplished. Failure to do so might render the legal basis of a chain of subsequent marriages insecure. (Holleman 1952:156)
The Invention of Customary Law

Functionalist anthropologists thus endeavored to reconstruct an original and elemental “traditional” family in the form of the patriline, which gained coherence through unambiguous hierarchies and relational categories, and perpetuated social stability through the economic exchange of cattle for women. Beginning my research, I understood that no society was immobile. Yet I observed that functionalist abstractions of kinship principals and relational categories were often cited by well-respected contemporary ethnographers, including ones from Zimbabwe. Moreover, I found these elaborations of “traditional” kinship to resonate with what I encountered in the field. I spoke many people who readily expounded on the proper comportment of a muzukuru towards his sekuru, and their explanations largely coincided with what I learned in the library.

As my research deepened, however, I began to encounter families which appeared not to follow this model. For example, in Chimbuya’s family the patriline seemed irrelevant and women were heads of households. She was about twenty five years old when I interviewed her in South Africa, and was the youngest of five siblings who shared a mother but had three different fathers. Her eldest sibling was born when her mother became a freedom fighter after the Selous Scouts shot up her village:
My mom literally ran off to war. Most of those women got Mozambican boyfriends. Deborah is the first born, and her father is from Mozambique. [My mother] was only 16, so they grew up more like sisters than like mother and child.

Deborah grew up with her grandma [mother’s mother]. My brother Brian who came directly before me was also raised by my grandma. When people think of grandmas, they think poverty. But it's not like that because my grandma has a farm. We had orchards—mangos and guavas—so money was never really a problem. Most of my cousins grew up with my grandma—it was the better option.

My mom was the South African link. I know my cousins quite well because they passed through our home [in South Africa] after they failed in Zimbabwe. Rutendo was a troubled child. She works, but lives in the location. Evelyn was caught with a boyfriend, so they shipped her off to South Africa. My mom helped her find a job in Nedbank. Tinashe finished A-levels [high school] and got pregnant. She went to her father's side of the family but nothing came out of it so she came here. Rudo is my favorite cousin and works in nursing. She didn't even tell her mom—she just packed up her bags and came. Now my mom is in Saudi Arabia. She works in an army hospital and plans to stay there for five years. (Chimbuya 2010)

Chimbuya’s female-oriented family contrasts sharply with the patrilineal-focused kinship described by Rhodesian anthropologists. She and her siblings have no substantial relationship with their fathers and look towards their mother and grandmother for parental guidance. Chimbuya's mother is able to financially support her children as well as her siblings’ children because she trained as a nurse, an impressive achievement considering that she became a single
parent at an early age. Her nursing career enabled Chimbuya’s mother to resettle in South Africa, where she received many of her siblings’ children—who, according to “traditional” kinship would be the responsibility of their fathers’ patriline. Chimbuya’s maternal grandmother—one of Zimbabwe’s first black commercial farmers—was also the head of her household and assisted in raising many of grandchildren. This departure from the patrilineal norm could have fit comfortably within the functionalist paradigm if Chimbuya’s family had roots in one of the region’s “matrilineal” societies which had their own functionalist elaborations. However, this was not the case. Chimbuya considered herself Manyika which is an allegedly patrilineal “Shona” group, and she traced no ancestry to, for example, Malawi or Zambia.

Families like Chimbuya’s made me realize that the functionalist model poorly accounted for diversity in family formations even though it often accurately described certain hegemonic understandings of what families ought to look like. The problematic nature of functionalist kinship became increasingly clear as I learned about colonial history and began to do archival research. As described in the previous two chapters, I discovered that the whole of central and southern Africa was awash in population movements that began well before the arrival of white settlers in Zimbabwe. Ironically, functionalist anthropologists were searching for a perfectly balanced and integrated society during an era when longitudinal stability could have never existed. Indeed, as described in Chapter One, a certain cosmopolitanism predominated in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, characterized by intermarriage and the mixing of customs, identities and languages as people sought refuge amongst other groups or commingled with migrant workers from across the region in industrial centers.
Colonial officials were well-aware of social change and constantly reproduced the trope of a rapidly decaying society cut adrift from its moorings in “tradition.” A representative example can be found in a report written by the Special Committee on Migrant Labor in 1945:

Many of the results flowing from migration to work are, unfortunately, adverse. The marriage tie is strained, not only by the temptations to which the worker—especially in the compounds—is open, but also by the lot of the deserted wife…The whole fabric of the old order of society is undermined when 30% - 60% of the able-bodied men are absent at one time. It is easy to criticize the old order—to say that it subordinated the individual to the community to an undue extent, that it provided little incentive to endeavour and that it resulted in stagnation — but it worked; the community was stable and responsibilities were counterbalanced by rights. There was give and take. Emigration, which destroys the old, offers nothing to take its place, and the family-community is threatened with complete dissolution.

The alleged “dissolution” of indigenous families and communities did initially provoke anthropologists to examine the viability of theoretical models that depicted culture as a finely-tuned machine that tended towards equilibrium. Indeed, more careful reading of functionalist ethnography convinced me that the search for longitudinal stability (characterized in the above excerpt as “stagnation”) was a reaction to the social upheaval wrought by colonialism. Early ethnographers working in Zimbabwe understood their scholarship as an attempt to salvage vanishing customs, a point explicitly stated in the introduction to Holleman’s monograph on Shona Customary Law:
In these rapidly changing times it is of the utmost importance that a record be made of the life and customs of the African people, because as civilization as we know it touches more and more of the population, and as greater numbers gravitate to the towns and industries, as they are bound to do in the march of progress, so will it become more difficult to obtain authentic information of the customs and structures of the tribes. (Holleman 1952:vii)

This functionalist project was not, however, a benign and benevolent exercise in preserving archaic customs for future analysis. Nor was it as encumbered by European understandings of kinship in the obliviously ethnocentric way that Schneider suggests (1984). Rather, the production of tradition had immediate repercussions for the day-to-day administration of indigenous people. Indeed—it turns out that almost all of the functionalist anthropologists were “Native Administrators” and other senior officials connected to the Department of Native Affairs, people who had near dictatorial power over Africans in rural areas. These men spearheaded the design and implementation of colonial policy towards the indigenous majority. Bullock was explicit about this interventionist agenda when he presented his monograph *The Mashona* as an attempt to inform lawmakers about the “mental, moral, as well as the physical

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12 From NADA on the powers of a Native Administrator: “The duties of an official of the Native Affairs Department are many and varied. He collects Native Tax, the third largest head of Revenue in the Colony. He also collects Dog Tax, Crown Land Rents, License Fees, Private Location Fees, Judicial Fines, Vehicle Tax, Embossed Form Fees, etc.

On the judicial side, 15,000 criminal cases per year may be taken by Native Affairs officials [Europeans and Africans], in addition to innumerable civil cases, mainly between natives, which requires an intimate knowledge of Native customs and languages. Chiefs’ courts are under the guidance of the Native Commissioner to whose court appeals may be made.

In addition to the revenue and judicial side, such matters as correspondence, pass work, registration of marriages, Workmen’s Compensation claims, remittances by Natives, issue of cattle permits, registration of Native labour contracts, repatriation of sick Natives to mention a few. Missionaries and officials of other departments work through and in conjunction with the Native Commissioner. His work also includes: control of soil erosion, construction of water supplies, de-stocking and organization of cattle sales, allocation of Native lands and control of immigration, supervision of Native schools, labour disputes, selection and installation of chefs and headmen and famine relief (adapted and condensed from Herbert 1945)"
make-up of the people whose stream of life is intended to be diverted, and whose destiny may be shaped by that potential of progressive aspiration” (Bullock 1950:4).

This is an extremely important point. The anthropological obsession with kinship in Africa was directly related to the belief that it formed the basis of indigenous social organization and could consequently be leveraged to control this population. One way this was accomplished was through codifying a system of “Customary Law” in which ulterior-motivated interpretations of “tradition” formed the basis for subsequent intervention into African families.

The implementation of Customary Law was overseen by the Native Affairs Department. Most cases were heard by chiefs who were appointed, supervised and sometimes removed by the Department. Native administrators also directly tried appeals, divorce and criminal cases. Problematically, they had to supervise and administer “Customary Law” with only a superficial knowledge of African societies, and frequently without any ability to speak African languages. Furthermore, indigenous advice on matters of tradition was suspect because, as one expert opined, "even a Chief may misrepresent the custom of his people, especially where some interest of his own is at stake” (Lewin 1938:19). The orderly application of customary law was thus seen to require impartial, expert knowledge, “of which the best type would be a competent anthropologist at work among the tribe concerned. The obvious advantage of such evidence, which is all too rarely available, is that it would be disinterested” (Lewin 1938:18-19).

Thus, in the context of colonial Africa, ethnography was a way to resolve the insufficient availability of “competent,” “disinterested” anthropologists who could act as “expert witnesses” in native courts. Ethnographic texts provided colonial officials a template for legal intervention. For almost fifty years, Bullock’s horrifically racist and misogynist monograph *The Mashona* was
the primary reference manual to help Native Administrators execute their magisterial functions, until it was replaced in 1952 by Holleman’s *Shona Customary Law* a more discretely problematic volume.\(^\text{13}\) Meanwhile, administrators who believed they knew more about African society than Africans did themselves buttressed their Solomonic dispensations of “justice” with the amateur ethnography penned by Rhodesian farmers, missionaries and enthusiasts that was circulated in the journal *Native Affairs Department Annual*. After two or three years of administering “natives” they could even use this experience to contribute to this body of knowledge, which would subsequently be actualized in courts overseen by their peers. Put simply, in the Rhodesian context, *writing culture was writing law*.

In arguing that “traditional” kinship was an actualized figment of Rhodesian imagination I do not mean to suggest that indigenous people lacked coherent beliefs. Rather, I wish to emphasize that indigenous society—like every human society—possessed a *plurality* of coherent beliefs, traditions and practices that changed over time and varied between groups as well as between individuals. Rhodesian anthropologists simply latched onto one hegemonic set of beliefs as a foundation upon which to build. As numerous contemporary scholars have observed, the “traditional” Shona family was essentially a result of problematic sampling (Chanock 1989; Ncube 1991). Rhodesian anthropologists primarily collected data from adult men in positions of authority and failed to consider the voices of common people, women and minorities (Schmidt 1990b:625-626). As a result, they paid relatively little attention to female-oriented structures of authority and all-but-ignored subaltern practices. Customary Law thus emerged from the

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\(^{13}\) Holleman was a researcher at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute when he did 22 months of fieldwork for this publication. He corresponded extensively with Radcliffe-Browne while in the field who “profoundly influenced my whole concept of Shona kinship.” His codification of customary law was published by Manchester University Press. Impeccable functionalist credentials. (Holleman 1952:xii)
confluence of a patriarchal Victorian worldview and the prevailing patriarchal indigenous power structure which itself was protected and enhanced by colonial policy (Schmidt 1996).

Women were especially affected. Customary Law rigidly institutionalized patriarchal formations—especially the lineage—at the expense of female-centered relational practices. Although patriarchy was indisputably pervasive in pre-colonial Zimbabwean families, it coexisted with, and was counterbalanced to some degree by, female-centered power structures. Spirituality, for example, is a realm where women hold significant authority (Mukonyora 1999). Mbuya Nehanda, one of the most important leaders in the first Chimurenga (anti-colonial struggle), was a female religious leader who is still revered today (Beach 1998). Female ancestral spirits are also very powerful beings, and are invoked in times of crisis with the phrase “maiwee.” Because women have a different totem than their children, a matrilineal ancestral spirit is potentially much more dangerous than a patrilineal one as she “so feels no sympathy when angered” (Makaudze 2015:275). I am familiar with more than one case in which a deceased patriarch chooses to enter a women of his lineage, conveying significant political influence over her entire patriline, as the patriarch will occasionally surface to speak through this female vessel in order to offer advice and guidance to people in the lineage. Zvogbo records one such case that greatly troubled Jesuit missionaries during the establishment of a mission station in Matabeleland:

The Kalanga believed in the existence of a special class of ancestral spirits called izishumba which wandered about in the air seeking to enter into some female member of the clan or family to which they belonged while on earth. When a Shumba spirit wished to enter into a girl, it did so by making the girl seriously ill. When this happened, a diviner was
summoned to find out the cause of the illness. If the girl was afflicted by a Shumba spirit, she would not recover until she was formally possessed by the spirit. In that case, one of the principal Shumba women was sent for to 'raise the spirit' in the girl. According to [a Jesuit priest] a Shumba girl was always under the influence of the woman who 'raised the spirit' in her. She could marry only into the family of this woman, Hence, the more followers a Shumba woman had, the more important she became in the estimation of the people, and hence the anxiety of the Shumba women to obtain as many proselytes as possible. (Zvobgo 1986:46)

Customary law, nevertheless, eschewed the role of matrilines. Nevertheless, their importance in Shona society is evident, for example in the cow that a woman’s mother receives from her son-in-law as part of his lobola payment (mobe yeumai). She maintains complete ownership over this beast, unlike the bride’s father who must often use his larger portion of the lobola for one of his sons’ marriages. For this reason, women can sometimes become even wealthier than men. She may even use this beast to help one of her own lineage’s sons get married (Makaudze 2015). Under Bullock’s reign, women were forbidden to own property. Even after Holleman’s ethnography acknowledged this right, many Native Administrators continued to rule against women in property disputes (Howman 1961).

The matriline also has an important role in raising children. Women give birth at their mother’s house, and a child’s maternal grandmother is often a primary caretaker. Another example of female authority in “Shona” families is the senior position of the Tete (paternal aunt) within lineages (Makaudze 2015; Mester 2008). These women have extensive influence in negotiating and blessing marriages, educating siblings’ children, and resolving family conflict (Aquina 1967). The mother is also an essential part of the process, as she must bless the marriage
and be present at the wedding (Makaudze 2015). Some of these female roles were acknowledged ethnographically, but they were weakly protected by Customary Law which endowed patriarchs with ultimate power over family decisions, including marriage negotiations. Indeed, Customary Law classified women as minors, legally subordinate to husbands and fathers.

In keeping with my argument that technology is an instrument of cultural intervention, this analysis shows how kinship itself can be construed as technological. If kinship is defined as a set of rules and a collection of broadly-shared understandings about relatedness, then this normative framework becomes technological through its enforcement. This is most clearly true in the colonial context described above, when carefully selected rules and understandings were written into law and enacted through courts, forced labor, and—as I will show below—dispensations of opportunity. Functionalist kinship was not primarily an ethnocentric misinterpretation as Schneider seems to argue. Rather, it was a tool of domination—one of the most calculated and successful examples of applied anthropology.

The Europeanization of African Families

Thus, attempts of administrators-cum-anthropologists to reconstruct and codify a timeless African family existed alongside parallel efforts to reformulate African families to align with European sensibilities. The first direct actions toward this end were prohibitions on indigenous practices that Europeans considered “repugnant,” including child betrothals, forced marriages and twin infanticide. Like polygamy, these practices may have been more prevalent than usual during the early era of colonization as an indigenous form of family planning, and a response to
famine and poverty introduced by colonization. Other policies were less direct, but had similar results in discouraging indigenous forms of relatedness. For instance, the policy of calculating hut tax according to a man’s number of wives made it very costly to marry multiple women and may have discouraged this practice.

Non-state actors—particularly missionaries—were complicit in the effort to reformulate African families to coincide with European values. Several denominations established scattered mission stations in central Africa that proliferated with the arrival of settlers and the consolidation of white power. In addition to evangelizing people they considered to be “heathens,” missionaries sought to equip Africans with the things, skills and dispositions that the capitalist economy required. Many mission stations were accordingly at the vanguard of the money economy. “Men of God” mediated between Africans and tax collectors, while their stores supplied manufactured goods like cloth, bicycles, and agricultural implements in exchange for cash (Dachs and Rea 1979). Mission stations also established schools where Africans received instruction in English, accounting, and trades like carpentry, welding and bricklaying. A mission education could thus be a way for Africans to achieve upward mobility, to the limited extent this was permitted. One pioneer missionary explained how the church could use opportunity as leverage to promote Europeanized families:

The defeat and displacement of polygamy will be necessarily slow. You cannot uproot in a day from the life of a nation what is a part of that national life. The nearest way is to get the children, to instill into them a higher and better morality; to keep them, as far as possible,

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14 Polygamy is a useful point of reference for illuminating the Europeanization of African families. However, it is important to realize polygamy was never a standard practice, and was generally practiced only by wealthy individuals. Makaudze’s take on Polygamy is that it was a way of ensuring that everyone could be married in a society “where husbandless-ness and wifelessness are treated with contempt” (Makaudze 2015).
from contact with heathen influences; to form reserves or separate kraals and villages of married Christian couples as these grow up to the responsible age. Even then, in the first generation especially, with nothing but pagan influences around, great care to safeguard them will be necessary. Something also can be done by a system of preference and privileges for monogamists, which yet would be free from all suspicion of purchasing a doubtful acquiescence in Christianity and its practices\(^\text{15}\). (Sykes 1902)

By restricting access to opportunity, missionaries waged a cultural war designed to promote “Christian” standards of morality and the development of monogamous, biologically-delimited nuclear families characterized by a breadwinning husband and a subservient, domesticated wife. Indeed, female education on mission stations was often geared towards creating domesticated, Europeanized wives that would be “suitable” for mission-educated men (Summers 1999). “Home economics” featured prominently in girls’ curriculum with classes in European methods of hygiene, childrearing, cooking, and raising children (Morrow 1986).

Missionaries also reproduced colonial administrators’ belief that African societies were deteriorating under the influence of colonialism, especially through the separation of households resulting from labor migration. Consequently, they suggested that the “Christian home” could function as a bulwark against social erosion:

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\(^{15}\) Missionaries are well-known for using boarding schools as a form of cultural warfare—including in the United States and Canada. As I was writing this chapter in a bar close to my university, a woman sitting next to me explained how she was born on a “reservation” in Northern Quebec and attended a boarding school in the 1970s where she and her classmates received beatings for speaking in their native Algonquin language. “If I knew you better,” she told me “I would show you the scars on my back.”
If the influence of a Christian home is of the utmost importance here in England, it is a matter of life and death in Africa where the old family system is crumbling and so often nothing is put in its place. (Grace 1946:7)

The private sector also participated in efforts to institutionalize Europeanized nuclear families. Settlers conceived of African labor as a natural resource—a form of energy like wood or coal which initially appeared plentiful but suddenly needed conservation like the hunted-out rhino and elephant. This conservationist approach to indigenous people is apparent, for example, in an advertisement by the Natural Resources Boards that ran for several years inside the cover of NADA, in the same slot where the 1945 issue ran an advertisement for researcher positions at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. The advertisement depicts a boot standing on the soil and reads:

> your wealth lies at your feet—for in its soil, water, mineral deposits, fauna and flora, as well as its human inhabitants, lies our country’s wealth. It is the duty of each one of us to ensure that these our natural resources are used with skill and careful husbandry, so that we and our descendants may prosper. Conserve your land and see that your labour does likewise.

(Natural Resources Boards of Northern and Southern Rhodesia 1957: emphasis added)

By midcentury, the expansion of colonial economies throughout Southern Africa put increasing pressure on the labor “resource,” prompting government and industry groups to advocate for boosting worker efficiency:

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16 This conservationist discourse was also an rationale behind tools of economic warfare like destocking.
The quantity and apparent cheapness in terms of wages of African Labour has led to its wasteful use. In view of the rapid development which is taking place … the demand for labor can … only be met by an improvement in quality and an increase of efficiency, combined with an ever-increasing use of labor-saving machinery. (Migrant Labour Committee 1945)

One way to improve efficiency was to keep workers in good health rather than “wasting” labor by breaking bodies through overexertion and subsequently replacing them with healthy recruits. Improving nutrition was one method of accomplishing this. For example, one of the most prominent commercial farmers in Rhodesia, J. M. Moubray (Johnson 1992), observed that many employers skimped on food:

I was standing at a butcher’s shop the other day and saw some ox hoofs being put in the back of a truck, a so-called meat ration. How can you expect efficient work from mealie meal, a pinch of salt, and an ox hoof? (Moubray 1946)

Moubray argued that feeding workers before they began their shift was a “first-class investment” in increasing labor efficiency. Specifically, he suggested serving a “handful of cooked mealie meal [corn meal] on which a spoonful of thick soup is poured.” As for the constitution of this thick soup, Moubray drew from his deep knowledge of technological developments in industrial efficiencies for commercial agriculture, suggesting:

17 Typically, the Native Affairs Department entered the debate with academic articles on "The Native Labourer and his Food" to mediate between employers and underfed workers. (Howman 1942; Jones 1942)
Dehydration is coming into its own. A tasteful vegetable powder containing ground, dehydrated meat, a little each day, and you have a highly nutritious relish. Once we can introduce fat into the mixture with the powder which can be bought at a reasonable price in four gallon tins, it will, with mealie meal [corn meal] and salt, be an almost complete food. (Moubray 1946)

As an alternative to mixing canned lard and meat dust, Moubray suggested serving what amounted to pig feed—a mixture of the commonly-consumed nyimo legume with “tender young lucerne,” known in the United States as alfalfa, which a Rhodesian agricultural textbook described as “excellent grazing or green fodder for all classes of farm livestock” (Topps 1961:33).

In addition to boosting worker health through industrial farming techniques, another method thought to boost output was to have workers live for longer periods in close proximity to their employment. This was calculated to reduce inefficiencies resulting from the long journeys to and from work, while allowing workers to accumulate experience that would increase their output. Such arrangements were first adopted by commercial farmers, who had available land for housing and discovered that allowing workers to bring their families to the farm provided access to free labor from women and children. In urban areas, employers (and municipalities) similarly began to construct detached houses that senior employees could rent for their families in order to capitalize on increased worker “efficiency.” Even so, many settlers opposed African

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18 This textbook—Animal Feeds of the Federation—catalogues the various crops, indigenous plants, and animal byproducts that Rhodesian farmers can use to feed their animals. In the process it notes which of these feeds are also appropriate for human consumption. As it turns out, most foods that can be fed to pigs—including alfalfa, sweet potato, cow peas and dehydrated skim milk (a waste product from producing butter)—are also palatable to humans. The tacit implication here is that employers who were searching for an inexpensive way to feed their African workers need only search for what type of foods pigs eat.
“urbanization” because they recognized that transience inhibited labor organization and the resulting political claims. Nevertheless, urbanization was well underway by the 1930s as Africans from throughout the region fled the rural poverty created by taxation and the monopolization of agricultural markets by commercial farming. Whether they liked it or not, little could be done to slow a process that was already well underway, and the state ramped up attempts to regulate urban areas for longer-term African settlement. As will be shown below, the nuclear family became the primary relational construct through which Africans were legally allowed to enter urban areas.

Initially, most African workers resided in poorly-maintained, filthy, overcrowded “barracks” that were infested with vermin. Although whites prized cheap labor, they infrequently mustered the resources needed to build and maintain humane living quarters. Emphasis on efficiency through health resulted in gradual improvements, but these were informed primarily by mechanical considerations—namely the propensity of machines (bodies) to quickly wear out if abused, improperly lubricated and poorly maintained.

Employers and administrators were also alarmed at the growing numbers of young women who made their way into town (Schmidt 1996). A few of these women became sex workers—a development that worried employers because of the consequent proliferation of efficiency-reducing sexually transmitted diseases. More commonly, however, women found a partner to cohabitate with, sometimes engaging in profitable side businesses like beer brewing and trading which could be tremendously profitable. Cohabitation without marriage was known as kubika mapoto (“cooking pots”) because the women prepared food for their partner and fulfilled other domestic and sexual roles in return for accommodation. This arrangement was increasingly necessary due to prohibitions and ramped-up enforcement of unaccompanied women in urban
areas. However, such extramarital entanglements could also be compared to the contemporary American practice of cohabitation and resource pooling between young adults before getting married, although women were at a distinct social and legal disadvantage in the Rhodesian context. As in the United States, some mapoto relationships were ephemeral as young people experimented with various partners or “traded up” to improve their living conditions (Schmidt 1990b; Schmidt 1996), but others resulted in long-term, socially-acceptable marriages.

Women used mapoto relationships to circumvent legal structures designed to subordinate them to fathers and husbands, and to select their own husbands who may not be able to afford lobola. In addition to alarming missionaries and colonial officials, indigenous male power holders complained of their weakening influence over female kin and a reduction in daughters’ values on the lobola market which had been distorted and institutionalized by Customary Law as an economic exchange. These concerns are evident, for example, in a letter submitted to the government by the “Keep Alive” society:

> We are afraid to command our children that adultery is unworthy and strongly bad, and they reply saying you have nothing to do with us never [worry] us of it, now if you decide to get a stick as to command her she at once stands up strongly and she cries that my father has killed me in the forcement of refusing my husband. She goes to the chiefs, complaining that I am being forced to be occupied by a husband whom I do wish not. The chief decides to arrest the father that why do you force your daughter to be married by a man whom she dislikes[?]

> Then after all she is told to chose for another husband whom she [thinks] is the best one, yet he is [penniless]… Both they go and live in the Compounds, in the Towns and in the
farms and join in those people live in who are considered of bad manners. The water is inside and mealie meal well grounded is present now she never thinks that has got parents at home.

So we hope that we have nothing that we shall gain from our daughters as if we [had] no daughters. They all run away and live in Towns and some in the compounds, then there is no goodness in that, What are we to do now?.

3. Then we decide that all runners prostitutes, all those who have no pass of the marriage from the management of Native Commissioners should be dismissed from all Compounds, Towns and everywhere and sent to their homes by the authority of Government, the more they will keep in the Towne the more worse it will be. So let them be dismissed.

4. Every native female even to those who have been well experienced of running everywhere from place to place should have husbands without that should not be allowed to go in the compounds, until they wish they get married. A girl should not have today’s leave to live in the compounds. One day a woman should have a visiting pass everywhere she wants to go from the N. Commissioner by [law] and to be well approved if she is going to visit for a certain relations not for friends is prohibited. (Secretary J. Muchenje - Compound Police, et al. 1944)

This letter shows how indigenous male power holders were complicit with state attempts to undermine the position of indigenous women. Women used new opportunities in urban areas to improve their lives through migration and select their own partners. This led to increased attempts to use state-certified marriage as the relational format through which urban opportunities were dispensed. Nevertheless, Africans often sought to subvert these new
constructions of family; for example, in order to live in proximity with their loved ones as shown in Chapter one.

**Governing families**

The construction and codification of tradition enabled direct interventions into families through the court system. Evangelization and western education similarly allowed missionaries to influence individual “souls” and promote nuclear families. Nevertheless, the decreasing availability of labor in the context of rapid industrialization created growing needs for the colonial state to intervene on the level of groups and populations—in order to mobilize, retain and trade large numbers of workers; in order to ensure that labor was healthy and happy enough to be efficient; in order to control the gendered demographics of urbanization; in order to promote or inhibit reproduction (Brownell 2011); and in order to ensure that employers paid workers so workers could feed the economy with their wages and taxes.

Large-scale interventions required the production of knowledge about a population’s status—its current location and movements; its health, age, fertility and longevity (Shaul 1946); its social and kinship affiliations. To accomplish this, colonial administrators turned to an array of existing tools and technologies to produce real-time knowledge about indigenous populations and which would simultaneously facilitate population-level intervention. These were instruments and methods that exercised a form of power that Foucault memorably termed “governmentality” which emerged in Europe during the transition from feudalism to large-scale nation states and was perfected by liberal democracies more recently (Foucault 1981; Foucault 1991). I understand Governmentality to be a way of creating knowledge about populations in order to
manipulate them vis-à-vis data. This involves the simultaneous process of totalization (defining and guiding groups) and individualization (visibilizing and acting on particular people) (Scott 1995:32).

Foucault problematically confined his analysis to Europe. However, others have built on his scholarship to show that European colonies were important laboratories for research into governmental techniques, and places where governmental systems could be implemented with little restraint (e.g. Cohn 2006; Cordell, et al. 2010; Scott 1995). Cordell’s explained succinctly:

> Only in the colonial setting, especially in Africa, could the state deploy its powers [of governmentality] with little restraint. The forced recruitment and removal of people, intervention in agricultural and pastoral practices, and imposition of health and sanitary regimes encountered few of the legal barriers imposed by civil society in Europe. Property rights, legal norms, and civil liberties in Europe, although hardly impregnable defenses, provided metropolitan citizens far more protection than colonial subjects had. In Africa and elsewhere in the colonial world and despite resistance, “natives” were more acted upon and more often subjected to demands for change and “development.” (Cordell, et al. 2010:9)

Statistical analysis was a core technology of governmental power because it facilitated counting and partitioning people into groups whose statuses could be queried and manipulated (Foucault 1981). In Southern Africa, counting people was extremely important because it enabled administrators to predict tax receipts (“hut” taxes and other payments levied on indigenous people were one of the principal sources of direct revenue for all the regional colonies), calculate labor surpluses and shortages, and trade humans with neighboring colonies. Advances in probabilistic sampling even allowed administrators to derive population sizes, fertility rates, and
other indices from incomplete information “in areas where complete enumerations were, from the very nature of things, impossible” (Searle, et al. 1950:292).

Rhodesia invested heavily in statisticians, who comprised approximately 5% of white administrative staff in 1950, earning the colony high praise from Lord Hailey at a conference on colonial statistics convened in London (Searle, et al. 1950:291). One point of consensus emerging from this gathering was that incomplete data based on probabilistic sampling was insufficient for producing the high-resolution of knowledge required for efficient governance. This assembly of power-brokers in Britain’s colonial diaspora could have quoted Foucault, who argued that “Government therefore entails more than just implementing general principles of reason, wisdom, and prudence. Knowledge is necessary; concrete, precise, and measured knowledge as to the state’s strength” (Foucault 1981:245). Colonial administrators were thus urged to create and maintain more comprehensive and interoperable population registers, and to move towards individualized enumeration.

The need for more efficient and standardized population databases would have been patently obvious to delegates from Southern Rhodesia. Their early attempts to control labor migration though pass and identity regimes were inchoate and chaotic, with multiple authorities (including private employers) haphazardly issuing, endorsing and surveilling a constantly changing array of work passes, leave passes, transit passes, departure passes, etc. As discussed in Chapter One, this resulted in enforcement difficulties due to duplicate entries, counterfeiting and rampant black markets for documents. Accordingly, midcentury negotiations between Southern Rhodesia and neighboring regimes frequently foregrounded provisions for strengthening and standardizing pass and identity infrastructure (e.g. Migrant Labour Committee 1945; Rhodesia Nyasaland Conference 1950).
Thus, colonial identity and pass regimes were primarily a way to control and trade labor in order to extract value from indigenous populations through economies of scale. For example, Nyasaland (Malawi) had a large indigenous population and few local employment opportunities, requiring the colony to finance itself largely by exporting labor to neighboring colonies while retaining “ownership” of laborers in order to ensure that a portion of their wages entered local circulation, for example through taxation. Meanwhile, Southern Rhodesia had voracious needs for labor. Thus, during the Nyasaland conference of 1945, the two colonies negotiated a deal whereby Rhodesia would have easier access to import workers from Nyasaland in return for paying capacitation fees directly to the government, transmitting mandatory monthly remittances to employees’ families in Nyasaland, and deferring pay\textsuperscript{19} which could only be collected upon a worker’s return home (Migrant Labour Committee 1945).

The efficient operation of large-scale, state-sponsored human trafficking required the creation of indisputable, verifiable links between a person’s “informational” existence in population databases and their material, embodied existence as units of production (labor), revenue (taxes), reproduction (future workers) consumption (food and goods purchased from Europeans), and liability (death and illness compensation). Population registers linked bodies to data, an individualizing process that involved the creation of what I call a “bioinformational complex,” crystallized in the form of identity and pass documents that subjected the individual bearer to population-level interventions. A bioinformational complex is not the pass document itself, but rather the relationship between a body, its datafied existence and the document which

\textsuperscript{19} Deferred pay was a favorite technique for worker retention. For instance, in the early 1940s some Africans were trained by the government to be “orderlies” in hospitals. Much to the consternation of colonial officials, many went to South Africa in search of better wages soon after completing their training. The Chief Native Commissioner suggested that deferred pay could be a solution: “I believe a surer way of retaining the services of these orderlies on completion of their period of training would be to introduce a system of deferred pay or a deferred bonus, which would be drawn on completion of the specified period of services” (Palmer 1942).
manifests this relationship materially. Registration thus compiled bodies into datasets that could be manipulated vis-à-vis laws that were enforceable on a personal level (by a policeman, by an employer, etc.) according to attributes appearing on a Registration Certificate.

Colonial administrators had difficulty establishing this link between data and bodies, as they were unable to differentiate people by name, provenance or physical appearance. As explained in the 1945 report on labor migration, the belief that all black people looked alike necessitated the incorporation of biometrical information into population registers:

> The acknowledged authorities … have for many years stressed that, under African conditions, identification can only be 100% effective if based on a comprehensive fingerprint system… In European Society the problem (of identification) is overlooked since there is seldom any question about particular personality and, even if this should arise, means are available to meet the difficulty. One such means, essential in the event of travel outside one's own country, is the passport based on photographs and signatures. In the case of a largely illiterate and still primitive community, often accustomed to a ready change of name… only fingerprints can take their place in the African passport…(Migrant Labour Committee 1945)

South Africa was at the vanguard of governmental technology, right through the end of Apartheid\(^\text{20}\), but Southern Rhodesia was a close second. This is evident in the colony’s early incorporation of biometrics into population databases. By the 1940s, this sort of database

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\(^{20}\) Between 1960 and 1980 the South African Government invested heavily in IBM and ICL (a British company) computers in order to centralize population registers. Although this project was rife with problems and never fully realized, the goal was to implement a system whereby police officers throughout the country could query a central database in order to find, for example, the names and fingerprints of all Africans on a certain street. This project was conducted under Verwoerd’s Bewysburo (Bureau of Proof), which was later turned into the Department of Home Affairs, which is now the institution tasked with enforcing South Africa’s immigration regime (American Friends Service Committee 1982; Edwards and Hecht 2010; Muller 2011).
catalogued and thereby claimed state “ownership” (rather than “citizenship”) over able-bodied men by issuing them “Certificates of Registration” which were required for legal employment. I discovered one such certificate, reproduced below, in the National Archives of Zimbabwe.
This “Certificate of Registration” was issued in 1940 to a man by the name of Chenayimoyo, which could be translated as “To make to having a clean heart.” Examining this certificate sheds light on how the colonial regime established the bioinformational complex and subsequently deployed it to regulate labor—not only Chenayimoyo’s labor, but the labor of everyone holding such a document.

21 Chenayimoyo’s name in and of itself could be a piece of evidence of “alternative” family forms. Many “Shona” names are deeply meaningful and often reflect a family’s relational topography at the time of naming. When I asked a friend about the circumstances in which such a name could be given, he explained it like this: Perhaps the baby’s parents were experiencing friction with their parents who refused to bless the marriage. Then the couple eloped and named their first born “Chenayimoyo” which means “having a clean heart” or “to make someone have a clean heart.” In a sense, the name could be an affirmation of their marriage against their parents’ will, and invocation of the possibility that the child could heal this rift.
Chenayimoyo’s certificate produced and concretized his identity in several ways. Most prominently, it assigned him a unique identifier (“X8124”) which, like an American social security number, could be used to locate his record in the original population database and cross-reference this record with entries in other databases—for example taxation databases, records of cattle ownership and marriage databases. This system used biometrics to ensure that Chenayimoyo’s registration number was unique to his body and could not be easily used by others. Specifically, it recorded his thumb print and indicated identifying marks on his physical body (“Lt thigh”).

Secondly, this database indicated Chenayimoyo’s place within state-endorsed indigenous power formations. Specifically, it recorded the name of his father, “Nzarayapenga” which means “famine is overwhelming” and points to the poverty and hunger induced by colonialism. By disregarding mothers, these certificates reinforced the patriline as the elementary unit of kinship. Chenayimoyo’s certificate also situates him within nested patriarchal political units by naming “Sherukuru” and “Chinzhowu” as his chief and headmen—the two men endorsed by the state to discipline his social interactions according to Customary Law. Chenayimoyo was also defined as “Manyika” which reveals how population registers facilitated the colonial invention of “tribe” as a unit of identity that could be used to mobilized many people at once, often to pit them against each other.

Third, Chenayimoyo’s Registration certificate spatialized his identity by classifying him as an “indigenous native” which meant that he and his parents were born in the area of land that was defined, recorded, and subsequently named “Southern Rhodesia” by a heavily-armed cartel of European farmers and miners. It furthermore tied him to mathematically-delimited, nested locations within Rhodesia; namely “Unit C23” of the district “Inyanga.” These spatial
indications specified where Chenayimoyo would be “dumped” if he got injured at work.\textsuperscript{22} By extension, they also specified which branch office of the Native Affairs Department was responsible for issuing his certificate, collecting his taxes, and maintaining the portion of the population database holding his record\textsuperscript{23}.

Fourth, Chenayimoyo’s registration enabled the government to monitor and maintain his current state, for example his health and taxation status. Physician endorsements ensured that he was vaccinated, free of communicable disease, and healthy enough to work efficiently. Meanwhile, stamps affixed to the certificate indicated whether or not Chenayimoyo had paid his annual taxes. A similar system was used for mandatory remittances and withholdings for “foreign natives.” This information was available for immediate inspection on the pass itself, and cross-verification in administrative databases compiled by tax collectors (usually Native Administrators) and doctors.

Finally—and this was the system’s primary function—Chenayimoyo’s registration certificate revealed his current employment status and future employability. Employers were mandated to endorse the certificate with details about his start and end date and rate of pay. Chenayimoyo’s pass reveals that he earned £1 4s per month—equivalent to about £43.69 in 2017—working at the Bulawayo branch of the British Empire Service League club, a veteran’s organization similar to the American Legion. His pass also reveals that he quit this employment on July 8, 1943. Furthermore, by categorizing Chenayimoyo an “indigenous native,” the certificate enabled him

\textsuperscript{22} “Dumped” is a word that was commonly used by colonial officials to explain what happened to people who were deported from one colony to another, or when an African was sent home after illness. For example “as regards Repatriation, the Central African delegates were insistent that workers be returned to the countries of origin and not merely dumped across the Southern Rhodesian Border. (Rhodesia Nyasaland Conference 1950:4).

\textsuperscript{23} Population registers were not centralized as this was well before the time of computers. Rather, Native Administrators in each district office were responsible for keeping a register of African workers living in their districts.
to work anywhere within the colony, but prohibited it elsewhere. Put differently, Chenayimoyo’s registration established a form of ownership to the issuing authority—the Colony of Rhodesia. Though colonialists then and academics today refuse to use the word, this was essentially a bureaucratic form of slavery in proto-computational form, involving the datification of human bodies in order to control and manipulate them individually and *en masse*. Indeed, one anti-apartheid tract blatantly described passes as “Badges of Slavery” (Benson 1960).

Thus, Chenayimoyo’s registration visibilized his body in terms of rigid attributes (father, ID, nationality, tribe, etc.) that functioned as pivots for algorithmic intervention. To ensure compliance, this bioinformational construct was crystallized on a piece of paper—the Certificate of Registration—in order to enable efficient authentication of Chenayimoyo’s identity and statuses to security agents, tax collectors, bosses, native administrators and pretty much any white person who was interested in knowing whether Chenayimoyo was legally employable, who had power to discipline him, where he could be dumped when his body was no longer useful, and whether he was allowed to be standing in the place where he happened to be standing upon inspection.

As it happens, the place where Chenayimoyo happened to be standing upon inspection a week after quitting at the BESL club was a railroad station in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), across the border from Mafikeng, South Africa. According to intercolonial labor agreements, Chenayimoyo was indisputably *not* allowed to be standing in that location. For him legally stand in that train station he would have had to be in possession of a *second* pass giving him permission to seek work outside of Rhodesia, a *third* pass enabling him to enter Bechuanaland, and a *fourth* pass granting him permission to enter South Africa. At least one of these passes—the one which would enable Chenayimoyo to leave Rhodesia—only existed.
hypothetically. In practice, these were rarely issued because they cost between £5 and £10 — almost a year’s gross wages and an unthinkable sum for someone in Chenayimoyo’s position (Inspector J. Masterman 1943). This was not an accident—Rhodesia loathed to relinquish the Africans it “owned.” In Chenayimoyo’s case, “ownership” was easily proven. He was duly and legally claimed through the act of registration as an “indigenous native” in the population database of Southern Rhodesia. This could be validated biometrically, and would be upheld by any colonial court.

What was Chenayimoyo doing in Bechuanaland when he was supposed to be in Rhodesia? Obviously, he was trying to get to Johannesburg where he could expect to earn far more than he pocketed each month as a waiter in a Bulawayo country club. According to a police report (Sgt. Boulter 1943), Chenayimoyo had quit his job, telling his employer that he wanted to return to unit “C23” in “Inyanga” where his wife and children were waiting. Instead, he surreptitiously made his way to the tiny railroad station of Loben Siding two kilometers outside of Bulawayo where surveillance was probably lax and a friend-of-a-friend was waiting. This contact assembled six other young travelers who were “owned” by various colonies and brought them to a white man named Celliers, a guard on the train with a lucrative side gig of human trafficking.

Celliers wrote Chenayimoyo and his companions tickets which made it seem like they were coming from various parts of Rhodesia, all perfectly legal trips. The total face value of the all the tickets together was £4, but Celliers charged each of the Africans £2 5s, which have taken Chenayimoyo three months to save, provided that he did not spend any of his salary. Celliers said that they would get change in Mafeking, but he did not issue them the receipt that would have enabled this.
Just before they arrived in Bechuanaland, the travelers probably disembarked, to be quickly escorted across the border on foot in order to re-board the train as it was released from inspection (De Lange 1944). Then they made it all the way across the Protectorate to a train station opposite Mafeking, South Africa. Unfortunately, this is where they were apprehended by a sting operation designed to stamp out the illegal export of Rhodesia-owned slaves. The sting also rounded up Celliers, the likely mastermind, who was convicted of “Theft with False Pretense and Fraud” and sentenced to a fine of £20 or 2 months in hard labor. The court, however, deemed it appropriate to show Celliers leniency by suspending the sentence:

…on condition that the sums of money which the Native complainants and the Railways were defrauded are refunded within One month. In mitigation, the Court took into consideration the fact that the accused [Celliers] would lose his employment and 23 years of pension rights, and that he has a family with six children. (Commanding Officer - Bechuanaland Protectorate Police 1943a)

Chenayimoyo and his friends were not so fortunate, even though they almost certainly had children as well. After being held in Bechuanaland to testify against Celliers, the police in Bulawayo requested that they be returned so that they could be charged:

I consider that these natives should be charged with leaving the Colony without the required pass, and that warrants chargeable to the government should be issued to take them back to Bulawayo, under escort of a native member of the B.P.P. who could give evidence of their being found in the Protectorate. (Officer BSAP Bulawayo 1943)
The Bechuanaland police complied, but Chenayimoyo and two friends “absconded” just before they were set to be deported. Unfortunately, they did not get far and were apprehended the following day (Commanding Officer - Bechuanaland Protectorate Police 1943b). In all likelihood they were sentenced to one or more months in hard labor, the usual penalty for the “crime” of being under-documented.

Actually, it is concerning that Chenayimoyo’s original Registration Certificate ended up in a file that surfaced in the archives some 70 years later. Loosing his certificate severed Chenayimoyo’s bioinformational complex, preventing him from authenticating his identity, attaining employment, and demonstrating his right to stand where he happened to be standing upon inspection. Almost counter-intuitively, delinking his body from its datafied existence in the population database did not free him from the system’s algorithmic machinations, but rather exposed him to more extreme punishment. Undocumented status, as he had just experienced, produced a form of “bare life” (Agamben 1998) that was almost worse than bureaucratized slavery because it made one’s body vulnerable to discipline by a wider range of actors. At best, he would have had to work his month on the chain gang, eating pig feed (if he was lucky), then making his way back to C23 (possibly on foot), only to arrive destitute, begging friends and family for money to pay the District Administrator to issue him a duplicate certificate so he could start over.

Chenayimoyo’s story illustrates cutting-edge 1940s immigration technology in motion. Indeed, colonies in Southern Africa developed, refined and field-tested many of the core biometric, data analysis and enforcement techniques used in contemporary visa and passport
regimes as will be shown below (Muller 2011). While this system was designed to regulate labor, it also had wide-reaching effects on other aspects of indigenous society. For instance, as mentioned above, the pass assigned Chenayimoyo with a rigid tribal identity and helped institutionalize patriarchal power structures like the patriline and the chieftaincy.

Interlinked population registers also increasingly supported efforts to Europeanize African families in order to engineer, regulate and govern a more “efficient,” quasi-settled labor force comprised of nuclear families living in employer-provided housing. Supposing Chenayimoyo eventually found employment where he could gain enough seniority to qualify for married housing, he would then be eligible to apply to bring an “approved wife” and children to live with him (Rhodesia 1946). This was an expensive and complicated undertaking, as it required the cooperation of his wife’s father and various colonial officials. First, he would have to obtain a marriage certificate by persuading his wife’s father to confirm, in the presence of the Native Administrator, that Chenayimoyo completed the payment of lobola. Then he would have to obtain written permission from his employer to bring his wife into town. This he would submit, together with the marriage certificate, to another official who could, at his discretion, approve the application and issue Chenayimoyo’s wife with a pass enabling her to reside with him in town (ibid). Her pass would then serve the same function as Chenayimoyo’s Registration Certificate in demonstrating the right to be standing where she happened to be standing upon inspection.

Such certification processes entrenched the nuclear family as the primary relational unit through which opportunity accrued. An employee could only bring a single wife into town, and

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24 This was true all the way through the end of apartheid, by which time South Africa was using a computerized population register with the help of then cutting-edge IBM computers (Muller 2011). Indeed, during the 1970s South Africa spent more than any other country on computers as a percentage of GDP, apart from the United States and Great Britain (Can’t find source).
only if the marriage was ratified by the state as evidenced by a marriage certificate. Additionally, he could only bring *biological* children, a status that was proved with birth certificates naming him as father. This weakened prevalent co-parenting strategies through which siblings helped raise each other’s children, as children who could not prove biological descent could only enter town on visitors’ passes with a maximum validity of two weeks. Special permission could theoretically be granted on a case-by-case basis, but this would require additional applications, documents, expenses and approvals. Furthermore, because Rhodesian law only recognized patrilineal descent and gave fathers full parental rights, Chenayimoyo’s wife would have had difficulty bringing any children with a different father.

Laws that permitted nuclear families to reside in town were billed as a way to redress the separation of husbands and wives through labor migration. In practice, these laws actually prevented many families from living together by severely restricting the number of people who qualified. Thus, while laws permitting urban residence were already on the books in the 1940s, many gainfully-employed workers were unable to bring their wives and children until the final years of the regime, when influx laws were being relaxed to accommodate the pressure of migration into urban areas to escape war in the countryside (as described in the previous chapter). For example, it took Rukariro’s father more than ten years on the job for Barclay’s Bank before his family qualified:

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It should be the early 60s when my father went to town. He worked at Barclays Bank as a carpenter for almost 35 years. [My mother] had to stay behind because he used to stay in the youth hostels in Mbare. Bachelors only—wives were not permitted.
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In those days, because of that strictness of movement of people, they didn't have so much choice [about being separated]. Every Friday, [he] drove home, because my father used to own a car. Normally, they made a policy that every Friday you have to go to the rural areas. Sunday or Monday morning you drive back and go straight to work. That's why my mother didn't miss my dad—because every weekend he was there.

They moved from Mbare to Mabvuku when things started to change in the 70s. They were told, in order for you to have a house, you have to get married first. So that's when they got married. They were married already, but they had to go to the magistrate to get the marriage certificate. (Rukariro 2012)

In this way, interlinked population databases solidified the patriarchal nuclear family as the default relational form through which labor was harnessed and rewarded. This was not an ethnocentric misreading of indigenous kinship systems; it was a carefully-crafted technology of governance which accomplished its purpose through dispensations of opportunity and the sjambok, coercion and consent.

What is a family?

Theoretical depictions of families as stable social formations derived from a timeless set of external rules are challenged by colonial interventions through the definition of customary law, religious indoctrination, and the creation of a system which dispensed opportunity according to European notions of relatedness. A more compelling formulation can be found in contemporary processual and performative approaches to kinship and gender which describe families as
collaborative identities and units of practice (Carsten 2000; Carsten 2004; Conklin 2001; Schneider 1980; Schneider 1984; Strathern 1992a; Strathern 1992b). Families are co-produced by the relational activities of people who assume this identity. These actions, in turn, draw from and respond to life circumstances, locations, and experience in addition to collective ideals about what a family should be.

Following from Judith Butler, family identities are dynamically produced through repetitive action in a similar way to how gender identities are constituted through performance:

Gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts. Further, gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. (Butler 2007:519)

The notion of families as units of practice and co-produced identities helps explain the impact of colonial interventions. It was not enough for missionaries to promulgate the putative superiority of European kinship. Rather, they sought to ensure that people practiced this ideal by forming settled, nuclear families—an endeavor that was reinforced by state and private policies of dispensing privilege to people in such relationships. Meanwhile, the system of passes and permits required Africans to go through the motions of proving—and thereby performing—the boundaries of Europeanized nuclear families. This governmental regime also shaped relational routines by determining which people could live together and subsequently engage in everyday exchanges.
As Dominic Pasura argues, one enduring result of attempts to Europeanize African families was to instill the nuclear family as a powerful “aspirational ideal” (personal communication). Because of the way that colonial society used kinship to dispense opportunity, people in nuclear families often succeeded in earning relatively better wages and higher social standing. Similarly, churches remain an important part of Zimbabwe’s social fabric, and many (but not all) still require members to form nuclear families. The continued privileging of Europeanized nuclear families is also evident in the large number of pejorative names reserved for mothers and children in female-headed households (Chitauro-Mawema 2003). The aspirational ideal of the nuclear family is thus reinforced in numerous domains.

Another result of colonial intervention has been to reinforce hegemonic indigenous power structures through the institutionalization of patrilineal kinship in Customary Law. Legal intervention in family disputes ensured that people enacted patrilineal relatedness which leant considerable momentum to this gender formation and preserved the interest of fathers, headmen and chiefs. After independence, the new government continued using this system, although it removed the most misogynist provisions, for example by emancipating women from perpetual childhood and allowing them to inherit their husbands’ property or obtain child custody following divorce (Ncube 1991). Nevertheless, other patriarchal dimensions remain intact. For instance, it is difficult to obtain or renew identity and travel documents without the representation of a male father figure using the same last name—either the biological father, grandfather, or father’s brother. This can be frustrating for diasporans who need to renew passports or obtain birth certificates, as this usually involves coordinating with brothers, fathers

25 There are important exceptions. For instance, the popular “mapostori” church condones polygyny.
or fathers’ brothers to travel to Harare in order to pick up the document. In this way people are coerced into enacting the patrilineal norm.

In addition to explaining the power of state interventions into family life, the relatedness approach simultaneously accounts for a remarkable diversity of family practices—including practices which subvert hegemonic norms. As Janet Carsten writes, kinship is “an area of life in which people invest their emotions, their creative energy, and their new imaginings” (9). Thus, the people I interviewed exercised discretion and creativity in apportioning their relational energies—prioritizing certain relatives’ needs over others’ and judiciously selecting which tete or sekuru among various qualified candidates to entrust with requests for advice or to honor as a liaison in marriage negotiations. Taona, for instance, told me how he behaved towards his sekuru as if he were a brother:

> Recently, at a funeral, I was saying to my brother—“you know what, my uncle is god. He's my brother, he's my friend, he's almost everything.” If anything happens to me, I go to him. In fact, if anything happens to him, he calls me first. I was the first one to receive a call when his brother died: “can you look for a ticket for me now?” So the relationship has changed. I don't want to see him as an uncle—that's too distant. I just look at him as a brother, as a friend. (Taona 2014)

Unlike in the mechanistic functionalist model where actions unproblematically flow from external social structures, a relational approach acknowledges that people use discretion in apportioning their familial energy. As Taona’s account reveals, actual configurations of relatedness only partially conform to collective ideals, and sometimes diverge significantly. The approach to kinship as a practice accordingly resolves the slippage between ideals and reality,
structure and agency. *Families are what families do.* They are flexible, overlapping micro-communities of care which congeal from the material and emotional exchanges between people who induct each other into relational routines. Families are inherently fragile because they must be constantly reproduced, like a bicycle which must continuously move in order to remain upright.

When viewed in the light of performance, “alternative” ways of organizing families come into focus. Despite what Holleman believed, divorce is probably as common in Zimbabwe as anywhere else in the world and often results in blended households that defy both patrilineal and European norms. Meanwhile, as shown in Chimbuya’s family at the beginning of this chapter, strong matrilineal practices exist even in predominantly patrilineal societies. External interventions, meanwhile, are often met with subversive responses instead of cooperation, as people pursue families of their own choosing. Wives in colonial Zimbabwe snuck into town to be close to their husbands and even today cohabitation without marriage remains a common way for youngsters to try out partners before committing to marriage or to raise the funds required to legitimize their marriage by paying lobola (bride wealth).26 Formal polygyny is also occasionally practiced and encouraged by some popular religious movements encouraging this (Chitando 2014).

The next section builds on this understanding of family as a performed identity in order to illuminate how contemporary immigration regimes extend colonial interventions by defining who can live together as a family, and by respatializing and fragmenting existing kinship formations with onerous visa and passport regimes. Even so, contemporary families continue to

26 In other cases poverty forces some young women to partner with wealthy men in order to survive. Some wealthy men have “small houses” in addition to a formal wife (Christiansen 2013; Ndlovu 2013). Occasionally, young men establish relationships with “sugar mamas” as well.
exercise their creative energies in order to produce families of their own choosing—families which often do not correspond to either anthropological or hegemonic cultural expectations.

**Contemporary Immigration Regimes**

Contemporary immigration regimes leverage many of the technologies and tactics of population control that were pioneered during the colonial era. These regimes work to attract desirable immigrants—in the form of skilled workers and certain, qualified relatives of established immigrants—while restricting the influx of so-called “undesirables.” As a result, contemporary diasporans must contend with many of the same obstacles to free movement and co-residence that were faced by their parents and grandparents during the colonial era. Formerly colonized countries have thus replaced Native Reserves as pools of readily-accessible, disposable labor for European employers. The passport is the new registration certificate (Richmond 1996; Torpey 2000), and the visa is the new work pass. Moreover, increasingly strict immigration policies and enforcement tactics continue to influence the relational practices of contemporary diasporans in ways that parallel colonial attempts to institutionalize Europeanized nuclear families.

The availability of education and employment opportunities in wealthy European countries—including the European settler-colonies of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia—make these preferred destinations for Zimbabweans. During much of the 1990s, Zimbabweans who could afford air travel found it relatively easy to enter these countries. European countries throughout the world began implementing increasingly restrictive immigration regimes during the 1990s, however, a process that gained tremendous momentum
following the events of September 11, 2001 in the New York City (Akbari and MacDonald 2014:813). By the early 2000s, European countries around the world required visas for Zimbabweans. The stiff wealth requirements, expense and bureaucratic complexity of acquiring visas now preempts access for most Zimbabweans, just as the expense and complexity of attaining marriage certificates and employer permission made it difficult for Zimbabweans to bring their wives and children into the urban areas of Rhodesia.

One of the most overt ways in which contemporary immigration regimes parallel colonial regimes is by using European kinship to determine which people qualify for visas. Diasporans who manage to attain “legal” status in these countries—either through naturalization or acquiring refugee status or permanent residence—may apply for permission to bring relatives under family reunification programs. As a general rule, however, they may only petition to sponsor relatives who fall within the biologically-defined categories of “spouse,” “child,” “parent,” and “sibling.” Thus, the biologically-delimited nuclear family is the primary structure of relatedness which grants access to international employment and educational opportunities, just as the nuclear family granted access to educational and employment opportunities in Rhodesia.

European countries, like colonial regimes, require extensive proof to substantiate biological relationships for the purposes of acquiring visas. For spouses, marriage certificates must be provided in addition to evidence substantiating the relationship as “genuine.” This may include sworn affidavits, evidence of joint finances and co-residence, candid photographs, and interviews where applicants are questioned separately to see if their answers align—questions like “what side of the bed does your partner sleep on?” and “what color is her toothbrush?” These procedures are based upon Eurocentric assumptions about what a marriage should look like with respect to “love” and sexual intimacy (Borneman 2014). Sponsoring children or parents also
requires documentary proof in the form of birth certificates, and DNA analysis is increasingly used (Heinemann and Lemke 2012; Joly, et al. 2016). This can make it difficult for diasporans to bring adopted children because they would certainly fail a DNA test and may not have official documentation of the adoption.

Immigration policies that define admissibility in terms of biological descent frequently disqualify people that diasporans classify as close family members. For example, European kinship classifies “nieces,” “nephews,” “uncles” and “aunts” as extended family, while many Africans consider these relatives to be “daughters,” “sons,” “fathers” and “mothers.” Vimbai, who lives in the United States, explained how this discrepancy prevented her from bringing the family member she felt most responsibility for—her sister’s granddaughter:

Nyarai is the person who is most at risk in my family right now, and she would also benefit the most because she is young. She is not yet a mess because of the situation in Zimbabwe, and if I could bring her now, she would get out unscathed. It would be so meaningful, and such a great gift to my sister because we really worry about this child. I’m having so much difficulty making this happen. In American terms, she is not born of my womb, so it is not possible. Nyarai is actually my grandchild, because she is my sister’s grandchild. In American terms, that is convoluted, but I do not have to explain this where I come from, because everyone knows she is as close as it comes. (Vimbai 2014)

As a general rule, European immigration regimes strive to restrict the number of people eligible for family reunification visas. One way they do this is through delays and waiting lists. For example, in keeping with the principal of biological relatedness, siblings and married adult children do qualify for family reunification visas to the United States. In practice, however, the
waiting period between filing a petition and receiving a visa is upwards of 15 years. Although
she was unable to sponsor Nyarai, Vimbai did manage to petition for a brother from Zimbabwe.
However, he must wait at least another decade before his application will be considered. She
explained how demoralizing this was:

Ten years is a long time for life to happen! People form other attachments, marry
someone that digs them into the life where they are, or they perish in despair. It is so hard on
his spirit, he begins to doubt that things are going to happen. And ten years—by the time he
comes he will now be too old to go to school and get a good job. I’m 35, my brother is older
than me. By the time he gets here, he is almost 50 years old. Like right now we have a women
nanny who is trying to get legal. She is 60 or so, and she can barely keep up with my kids. Do
I want my brother to come here like that? Clearly it’s better to come in your years of
productivity. (Vimbai 2014)

In this way, contemporary immigration regimes often use delay tactics to prevent
immigration or undermine the stability of people already in the country. Vimbai’s sister—the
“biological” grandmother of Nyarai—waited more than seven years for a decision on her petition
for Temporary Leave to Remain. This was twelve years after her arrival in the United Kingdom,
during which time she acquired a nursing degree and found gainful employment with the
National Health Service. By the time her case was approved, her elder daughter had passed away
and her younger daughter—the mother of Nyarai was too old to qualify for immigration to the
United Kingdom on her mother’s visa.

Often, however, it is the expense and bureaucratic complexity of filing for a visa that
prevents families from living together in the diaspora. For example, an older Zimbabwean
woman named Eurita earned below minimum wage working as a nanny in the United States without proper documentation. After more than ten years, she fell in love with a Zimbabwean man at church who happened to have his papers. They married, which provided an avenue to regularize her status and bring her daughter who she left in Zimbabwe as an infant. After a series of interviews, the couple was given an appointment to submit supplemental documentation. However, when they arrived at this appointment, Eurita was detained—probably not for working illegally, but for failing to file income tax. Her husband, who worked in a grocery store, borrowed more than $5,000 for legal fees. About a month into her detention, he got a call from Zimbabwe. It was Eurita, who had been deported in the middle of the night and had been unable to call her lawyer because her cellphone battery was dead when they came to get her. She arrived destitute at R35 Torwood, with nothing but the clothes on her back, and was advised that she would be ineligible to return to the United States for ten years. This restriction could potentially be removed if she filed for a waiver. Unfortunately, this would require thousands of dollars in filing fees, back taxes, and attorney fees. Given the debt just incurred to fight her deportation, the newly-married couple was simply unable to afford reunification.

Diasporans get discouraged because immigration laws are constantly changing, difficult to understand and subject to arbitrary decisions by capricious officials. Eurita did not anticipate that she would be deported by regularizing her status through marriage, as this is generally thought to be a fool-proof path to legal residency. People in her financial position cannot generally afford to hire an attorney who specializes in staying current with the law and the nuances of successful petitions. Such an attorney could have advised Eurita about the necessity to pay her taxes before filing immigration paperwork, but she decided to prepare the application herself to save money.
Occasionally, the unpredictability of immigration regimes works in peoples’ favor. Ironically, two weeks after Eurita was deported to Zimbabwe, her daughter’s visa to the United States was approved. The same petition that caused the mother’s removal enabled her daughter’s entry. This petition, rather than enabling reunion between mother and daughter, resulted in prolonged separation and role-reversal as Eurita’s daughter is now the one sending money to help her family in Zimbabwe.

More often, the inscrutability of immigration regimes makes them extremely dangerous. For instance, I have heard of Zimbabweans who were deported after making a wrong turn and ending up at a border crossing into Canada. In another example, Moreblessings told me about how her friends’ asylum case in the United Kingdom was jeopardized by a parental decision that seemed very prudent when it was made:

My friend and her husband were both here with their children. After some time, her husband said, "I'm going back to Zimbabwe. I can't live here any longer." So, she thought, "how will I cope with the children on my own?"

It's not easy! I am a single mom, and like her I also work as a healthcare assistant. I have two jobs—coming from here, going there—working for 60 hours to pay for my bills. I struggle with childcare as well, and not getting time to spend with my children.

So my friend sent her kids [back to Zimbabwe] with her husband. It didn’t work out because now, they're refusing her asylum, saying: "if you feared persecution that much, why did you send your kids back home?"
It doesn't make sense, does it? They went in 2008, now it’s 2014. She misses them terribly. She’s got no way of going to visit them, and they're growing. The little girl, the firstborn, is now in her teenage years, when they are so difficult. So she has to sort things out over the phone. I'm very close to her and I feel so sad. You just feel hopeless. (Moreblessings 2014)

Thus, as with colonial pass laws, contemporary immigration regimes tend to result in the fragmentation of Zimbabwean families. People like Nyarai’s grandmother leave behind children in Zimbabwe. They intend to quickly establish themselves with a job and independent housing in order to bring their dependents into a stable situation. Subsequently, new visa requirements are introduced and enforcement is tightened, making it almost impossible to reunite with loved ones. Asylum seekers like Matilda’s friend are unable to visit Zimbabwe because returning to the country of persecution will nullify their claims, though they can could look forward to bringing “authorized” children if (and when) their claims are approved. Undocumented diasporans are in an even worse situation, as their “illegality” disqualifies them from both leaving the country of residence and sponsoring relatives to join them abroad. A pastor of a Zimbabwean church in the United Kingdom explained how people in such positions are prisoners in a foreign land:

One of my church members came to the UK while the husband and children remained in Zimbabwe. Later he passed away and the wife could not go for the funeral. There was pressure from his family. They were saying: "it's unheard to bury your husband in your absence!" Yet the wife knows that if she goes to Zimbabwe, she won't come back to the UK because she doesn’t have papers. Immigration will not let her back in. She is forced into a situation—and it's worse, because now that the husband is gone it's imperative that she
continues earning reasonable wages to support her children. Apart from just losing her spouse, she has to deal with the trauma of not being at the funeral, and the kind of accusations that follow a decision like that. (James 2014)

This pastor’s story shows how contemporary diasporans experience the same sort of “bare life” encountered by Chenayimoyo in trying to leave Rhodesia without a permit, and when he subsequently lost his Registration Certificate. In both cases, being undocumented did not grant liberty from documentary regimes, but rather increased vulnerability to them. These accounts also show how the separation resulting from contemporary migration regimes is often more permanent than during the colonial era. Rukariro’s father went home every weekend, but the stories cited above involve separations of decades—sometimes with no prospect for eventual reunion.

Nevertheless, many people find that the choice between poverty in Zimbabwe and liminality in England is easy. Contemporary diasporans eagerly follow in the footsteps of Chenayimoyo in searching for ways to work around or even subvert immigration regimes in order to reunite their families. For example, it was possible to access Europe for a short while by booking flights to other countries where visas were easy to obtain, and then enter London or Frankfurt during the layover to this destination. This form of spatial subterfuge was quickly preempted through the introduction of transit visas needed to board connecting flights through Europe and the United States. Another popular strategy for professionals and academics is to obtain a visa for business or to attend a conference, and then go underground or claim asylum upon arrival. Student visas are probably the best way to enter preferred locations because they provide a way to avoid the scourge of “illegality,” sometimes authorize work, and can even provide a path to permanent residency following graduation. Unfortunately—for all but the very few number of students who
manage to secure scholarships—study at the undergraduate level in Europe or North America is unaffordable.

Another popular form of spatial subterfuge is to acquire “alternative” documentation like the counterfeited leave passes described in Chapter One. For instance, before Canada required visas from Botswana citizens, I know a man who took a great risk in purchasing a stolen Botswana passport from a Nigerian in South Africa in order to escape extreme political persecution in Zimbabwe. The ticket takers at the airport were suspicious when he presented his documents, telling him that they wanted confirmation from the embassy that he would be allowed into Canada. Huge fines are levied on airlines that allow improperly visaed passengers to board flights, effectively outsourcing border control to airlines, and making it extremely difficult for people to claim asylum in wealthy countries as this must be done within those countries’ borders (Frelick, et al. 2016). Daringly, this man actually went to the Canadian embassy under his assumed identity and persuaded the officials that he really was a tourist intending to visit a friend. The following day the airline reissued his ticket and allowed him to board. Unfortunately—just before the plane departed—a security guard demanded to see his ID card in addition to his passport. When this was not forthcoming, the guard quizzed him in Tswana, also commonly spoken in parts of South Africa. Finding him unable to speak this language, this man was removed from the plane and did not make a third attempt to board.

Today’s diasporans also sometimes “borrow” the documents of friends and relatives, just as their grandparents did when trying to access South Africa. Moreblessings told me about a whole family who entered England this way:
My friend used her passport to let her sisters come. She sent the passport back home, and they used it to come into this country. Then she sent her daughter's passport for another relative. They were using like 2 passports for 5 people to come into the country.

One of her friends asked, "I need my daughter to come here, how do you do it?"

Because she [trusted her] friend, she explained: "I used my passport and my daughter's passport." Then the other girl asked her if she could use her daughter's passport to let her daughter come. And she said: "I can't do that. As much as you are my friend, I can't risk it. I can risk it for my family but not for you."

She didn't like that, and ran to the Home Office. The Home Office will let you know who ratted you out: "such and such a person told us, this and that." So she lost her house because she had a mortgage. She faked the pay slips to inflate her salary so she could get a bigger house. It was really nice. She didn't loose her British citizenship, but she lost her job, and she lost her house. (Moreblessings 2014)

This example shows both how risky it can be to use alternative routes into preferred destinations, but also how creative such attempts can be. Indeed, I consider spatial subterfuge to be a sort of “transferable skill” passed from one generation of migrants to the next to the next. Zimbabweans who use false papers and borrowed or stolen passports to enter Europe or the United States grew up hearing stories of how their parents circumvented colonial documentary regimes. Americans and Europeans who make moral pronouncements about the need for immigrants to “play by the rules” ignore a century of European-led exploitation through influx and efflux controls. Zimbabweans suffer few pangs of guilt when subverting contemporary visa
regimes that so obviously perpetuate the racialization of space and the spatialization of opportunity. In the pointed words of one diasporan in England:

Many Zimbabweans take it as legitimate that you can defraud the British system. If you can do it without being caught, it's fair, it's sort of legitimate. They were once in Zimbabwe and they did everything to us. It's our turn now. (Taona 2014)

This argument can compellingly be extended to include not only Britain—the former colonial power—but the rest of Europe, along with the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. All these countries are implicated in financing and benefiting from colonialism in Africa, and many are also entrenched European settler colonial regimes that decimated indigenous populations through genocide and forced assimilation in order to set up a system of rules to play by. As Richmond poignantly writes: “the most economically developed and affluent countries are banding together to protect their privileged position in much the same way that Afrikaners and others of European descent sought to maintain their dominance in South Africa” (Richmond 1996:216).

Nevertheless, sharing passports and using false documents is increasingly difficult to execute successfully due to the computerization and automation of biometric technologies originally developed in the colonies. For example, all applicants for American visas are now required to submit 10-fingerprint scans and photographs. These biometrics are again collected at ports of entry, even for citizens of countries that are exempted from the American visa regime. This biometric data is cross-referenced against biometric databases maintained by the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and various foreign criminal databases provided by state and
local police departments as well as foreign governments who have information sharing agreements with the United States.

Military databases are also queried before visas are issued. Currently, coalition forces make extensive use of biometrics to govern “hostile” populations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and separate “terrorists” from “friendlies (Bell 2013; Gray 2009)” US Military attempts to collect of biometric data comprise several programs, including a partnership with the Afghani government to issue ID cards, the collection of biometrics from displaced citizens as they return to their homes, and at distribution points for coalition-provided services like hunger relief. Meanwhile, “latent” biometric data is collected in the form of fingerprints left behind on battlefields. The secretive nature of military biometric projects makes it difficult to determine how many records such databases contain, the ways peoples’ threat level is determined, and how these records are shared and used. Nevertheless, numerous people have been refused US visas based on opaque data contained in population registers.

Advances in biometric technology portend more ubiquitous and intrusive enforcement of immigration regimes (Lynch 2012). Technologies in development will allow for establishing identity through ear shape (Yan and Bowyer 2007), keystroke dynamics (Rybnik, et al. 2008), armpit odor (Wongchoosuk, et al. 2011). Existing technologies enable real-time, “passive” identification of people in crowds through facial recognition and gait analysis (Junior, et al. 2010; Mustafah, et al. 2007; Öhman, et al. 2001) and research in this area is exploring automated recognition of emotional states (Juth, et al. 2005) particularly on the battlefield (Gold 2010). Facial recognition technology is already used extensively by Facebook and social media sites to identify people in uploaded photographs (Norval and Prasopoulou 2016). With more than a billion users, Facebook holds one of the worlds largest biometric databases, and even compiles
“shadow profiles” for people who are not registered with the service (Aguado 2012; Sarigol, et al. 2014). While this company has no known information sharing arrangement with the US government, all intelligence agencies as well as the Department of Homeland Security are known to “scrape” public data from social media. In the near future it appears likely that attempts to locate and apprehend “illegal” immigrants could include biometric surveillance of video feeds in public areas as well as online photographs.

Such developments are what motivated me to develop a computational vocabulary in this chapter. Indeed, the trend towards automating bureaucratic procedures extends far beyond immigration regimes. Our lives are increasingly mediated by the algorithmic manipulation of datafied bodies. Worryingly, corporations are at the forefront of computational governmentality. The most obvious example is that of social media sites like Facebook which use biometric and algorithmic technologies to surveil, manipulate and monetize human relationships. Algorithmic processes are also being used less visibly, for example to direct law enforcement through predictive policing, to determine admissions into residency programs through “the match,” to automate trading on the stock market in response to social media data feeds, and to help political groups target populations of voters for advertisements and get-out-the-vote campaigns.

Establishing a link between a body and a digital identity is crucial to many of these algorithmic procedures. One pseudo-biometric technology that is increasingly used to create this new, corporate bioinformational complex is the use of cellular phones in two-factor authentication procedures. Indeed, over the next decade, cell phones may become a new form of Registration Certificate, used not only to access websites, but also to interact with banks, grocery stores, and other business. In much of Africa, including Zimbabwe, people already use mobile money to transact, which links digitalized account balances to their SIM card. It will be
important to observe how corporate biometrics interact and share data with the state’s own increasingly technologized population controls. This is a topic for future research.

Conclusion

In this chapter I defined the family as an interdependent micro-community of care and conflict, a co-produced identity which is established through performance. I also showed how colonial and neoliberal states used documentary regimes to govern access to space and opportunity by forcing people to substantiate and enact nuclear families. These technologies of population control are resurfacing in contemporary immigration regimes, subjecting contemporary diasporans to many of the same difficulties experienced by their parents. As in previous generations, contemporary diasporans partially conform and partially work around documentary regimes to create and maintain families of their own choosing.
Consider two places in the city of Tshwane (Pretoria) South Africa. The first is the derelict public housing project of Schubart Park which is located at the very heart of the urban core. The second is a the gated community of Spring Glen approximately fifteen kilometers into Tshwane’s leafy eastern suburbs. Both Schubart Park and Spring Glen are inhabited by diasporans from Zimbabwe, but each of these locations is imbued with radically divergent structures of opportunity and oppression.

Schubart Park

In 2010, I lived with a group of young adults in Schubart Park, a complex of four 21-story apartment buildings surrounding a commons area with a pool, sports facilities and shops. Schubart Park was constructed during the 1970s as a public housing project for low-income white families. Compared to housing “projects” in the United States, Schubart Park was well-appointed, even luxurious. Its towers soared over Pretoria’s Central Business District (CBD): the administrative center of Apartheid South Africa that has great cultural and historical significance to Afrikaner people. The complex began to integrate during the transition to majority rule, as “influx controls” on Africans entering the city were incrementally lifted. Simultaneously, a
number of Schubert Park’s original inhabitants joined the post-apartheid white flight from the inner cities to the suburbs.

Chronic mismanagement caused the facility to deteriorate gradually, then rapidly, so that by the time I arrived, a good 40 years after its construction, the swimming pool was filled with sludge and most of the shops were boarded up. Sewer pipes leaked, electrical and water services were intermittent and the lifts were non-functional. In some places, pipes and wires were gouged out from the walls to be sold as scrap metal. The corridors and stairwells were dark and damp. Water pooled on hallway floors. Pirate landlords had taken over most of the flats, renting them out to the most marginalized populations: the mentally ill and disabled, runaways, the desperately poor, and large numbers of immigrants from across the continent—including many Zimbabweans. In the eyes of the rest of the city, Schubert Park had become “synonymous with crime and grime” and “unfit for human habitation” (Mbanjwa 2008). Thus, the buildings which originally served as soaring monuments to a racist social order had transformed into beacons drawing attention to the ails of the Rainbow Nation. Meanwhile, the immigrant population living there was ruthlessly dehumanized, persecuted, and subject to crime and extortion.

Spring Glen

Apart from four weeks in Schubart Park and a few months in the nearby inner-city neighborhood of Sunnyside, I spent most of my time in South Africa living with various Zimbabwean families in Pretoria’s eastern suburbs, about twenty minutes by car from the CBD. As Apartheid ended, whites fled the inner-city for gated communities with perimeter walls, controlled access checkpoints and private security guards. Such communities are often decried as
a privatization of apartheid, built atop the postcolonial legitimization of ill-gotten gains. High property values keep the demographics of exclusive enclaves skewed decisively towards affording whites.

Nevertheless, gated communities are increasingly popular among all groups. Developers promote a broad array of security villas to suit even middle-income households. Thus, skilled diasporans with professional jobs often choose to reside with their families inside security villages such as the medium-income complex I will call Spring Ridge. This complex was surrounded by a two-meter, brick “durawall” topped with razor wire. Security guards patrolled around the clock, and an armed quick-response vehicle lurked around the area at night. I entered the complex with a remote control that opened a perimeter gate. Within, secondary barriers surrounded each house, in many cases topped with electric wire that emitted ominous crackles. I accessed the garage with another remote, then unlocked a door to the inner courtyard. Finally, I unlocked an iron grate to enter the house. In contrast to Schubart Park—which was easily accessible to any person walking in from the street—gated communities like Spring Glen are protected by nested layers of security that incrementally restrict access through an “Architecture of Exclusion” that insulates residents from crime, xenophobia and the police (Minnaar 2012).

The Spatialization of Opportunity

This dissertation examines how relational practices in dispersed families are shaped by intersecting contextual forces. Here I focus on the spatial context by comparing and contrasting Schubart Park and Spring Glen. Previously I showed how the contemporary exodus from Zimbabwe is marked by global dispersion as preferred destinations enact increasingly hostile
immigration policies and as the fluctuating global economy presents new possibilities in places with fewer historical links to Zimbabwe. I argue that every location where diasporans settle provides a unique, emplaced array of possibilities and constraints, opportunities and oppressions, which powerfully influence individual outcomes and, consequently, the practices of relatedness they are able to undertake. Practices of relatedness are the building blocks of family as a collective identity. Resultantly, the multiple specificities of diverse places conspire to reshape the contours of dispersed families.

Before turning to Schubart Park and Spring Glen to explore this argument in detail, it can be briefly operationalized by reflecting on how divergent social, economic and political structures impact the health and wallets of diasporans in South Africa, Canada and the United States. Asylum seekers in South Africa are able to work from the moment they file their claim, but jobs are scarce and wages are low. They also have many difficulties accessing social services while their claims are being adjudicated—a lengthy process that usually results in denial\(^{27}\). Asylum seekers are also classified as “Private Foreigners” by the healthcare system so they must pay for services out-of-pocket—a difficult undertaking for a financially marginalized population. Socially, Zimbabweans in South Africa contend enduring racism and pervasive xenophobia against foreigners, which is often reflected in the attitude of healthcare workers and occasionally erupts into street violence (Crush and Tawodzera 2014; Nkosi 2014). Some limited social services are available from non-profit and faith-based agencies, but these operations are overwhelmed by large numbers of clients competing for scarce resources.

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\(^{27}\) Crush reports that South Africa approved only 5% of asylum claims in 2006, compared to 11% in the UK, 43% in the US and 68% in Canada (Crush, et al. 2015:373)
In the United States, asylum seekers must wait six months after filing their claims before becoming eligible to work, but jobs are more plentiful and they pay higher salaries in a stronger currency. Asylum seekers are also able to quickly access free healthcare, though this can be difficult in practice due to the complicated, privatized nature of the American system\textsuperscript{28} in addition to class and race-based prejudices of medical professionals (Agrawal and Venkatesh 2016). Compared to South Africa, social assistance from non-profits and faith-based organizations are also more widely available in the United States. Unfortunately for many would-be asylum seekers with rock-solid cases, filing a claim in the United States is far more difficult than in South Africa. This is because claims cannot be filed from abroad. Prospective claimants can easily cross the porous land border into South Africa in order to file. The United States, however, must be accessed by air—an almost impossible feat for the vast majority of Zimbabweans due to the difficulty of acquiring an American visa and strictly-enforced prohibitions on boarding flights to the United States without this endorsement.

Canada is equally difficult to access in order to file an asylum claim. The few people who do manage this feat are also \textit{prohibited} from working until their claims are adjudicated. Nevertheless, asylum seekers in Canada are entitled to a comprehensive range of \textit{state-sponsored} social services including legal services, transportation, housing, financial assistance for day-to-day expenses and nationalized health care (with limitations). Further assistance is available from

\textsuperscript{28} There are many such differences. In Canada, refugee services in the United States are also delegated to non-profit groups like churches in contrast to the federally-organized Canadian system. This ties American refugees to a particular community and can make it difficult to relocate to other places in order to join family already present in the country. While Canada’s refugee policy is more humane in this respect, it should not distract from Canada’s increasing restrictions of immigration. To give only one example, Canada (like the United States and many other countries) only allows asylum claims within the country, but visa restrictions make it almost impossible for people requiring asylum to arrive in Canada in order to file a claim. One such example was recounted in the concluding section of Chapter 3, when a Zimbabwean fleeing political persecution sought travel documents from another country in order to enter Canada. Though this is illegal, it would have not counted against him when making his claim, as the law recognizes that refugees must resort to such pathways to escape oppression. Indeed, this policy actually requires refugees to resort to extra-legal tactics due to the closure of legal routes.
charitable organizations. Racism and classism are prevalent in Canada, but muted compared to the United States, especially in popular destinations like Toronto and Vancouver where foreign-born residents outnumber Canadian-born ones. Canada is thus recognized as a superior destination than the United States. Indeed, much of Michigan’s large Zimbabwean community crossed into Ontario after the United States ramped up immigration enforcement following the events of September 11, 2001.

Canada, the United States and South Africa thus have divergent economies, healthcare systems, social services, documentary regimes, and cultures of exclusion which directly impact on individual migrant outcomes. Broadly speaking, wealthier destinations with more social services enable diasporans to achieve higher levels of income and health—two factors which tend to increase participation and influence in collaborative family projects. This is one important way in which emplaced realities shape the contours of dispersed families. A finer-grained analysis would explore how each of these national contexts also influences possibilities to go to university, purchase a home, travel, bringing relatives, access high-speed internet connections, and other important variables that shape individual outcomes and family endeavors.

Broad dispersion to an expanding number of far-flung destinations prevents a detailed comparison of all the places where diasporans now live. Instead, this chapter focuses more narrowly on Schubart Park and Spring Glen—two radically different locations in close proximity to each other. The primary reason for this choice is because it enables me to abstract-out national differences described in the above comparison between Canada, United States and South Africa.

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29 This possibility was removed by the “third country” rule implemented in 2004 which requires people to claim asylum in the first “safe” country that they enter (Arbel 2013). Nevertheless, this form of spatial subterfuge illustrates how diasporans carefully consider localized structures of opportunity and oppression when selecting destinations.
This opens up the possibility for an analysis which focuses more narrowly on the general modalities of how opportunity is etched into places and consequently shapes the interactions, social networks, economic outcomes, everyday experiences and emplaced understandings of the people who live within them.

I accomplish this comparison by focusing on two distinct forms of spatialized opportunity—economic and relational. Economic opportunity refers, essentially, to survival—to eat, at a bare minimum—or to thrive for a select few. Economic opportunity is shaped by access to resources like land, labor, education, health, physical safety, capital and finance. Unique structures of economic opportunity (and oppression) inhere in various national and sub-national locations, radically influencing diasporans’ day-to-day lives. Many people leave Zimbabwe with the hope that economic opportunity will be more abundant abroad. However, not everyone ends up in destinations “flowing with milk and honey,” to quote one Schubert Park resident. In South Africa, economic opportunity is constricted by hostile documentary regimes, high unemployment and exploitative labor practices. It is further undermined by crime, xenophobia and substandard living conditions which detract from health and safety. People in Schubart Park are especially vulnerable through the intense scrutiny of their documents by police as they walk about the city. In contrast, the “centrifugal” architecture of Spring Ridge shelters Zimbabweans from Xenophobia, crime and stigmatization. Meanwhile, moving about the city in personal vehicles provides some protection from arbitrary policing. Diasporans in security villages thus succeeded in actualizing economic opportunity through academic and professional credentials and obtaining regular, relatively well-paying employment.

Relational opportunity, meanwhile, refers to the possibility of forming and actualizing relationships with others. People who share living or workspace have many such opportunities as
they come into frequent, close proximity and develop aligned interests. The young Zimbabweans I lived with in Schubart Park leveraged proximity to form a tightly-knit group that pooled information, food, labor, love and protection to survive in a hostile environment. Meanwhile, the building’s “centripetal” architecture created a safe space from xenophobia and enabled the residents to meet acquaintances from home and form new friendships with people in similar circumstances. In much the same way, the white youths who lived in Schubart Park when it opened 40 years earlier forged enduring relationships with each other during a time of intense social upheaval. They flirted and invented inside jokes on the very same courtyard benches where Zimbabwean youth laughed and lingered decades later. Conversely, suburbia’s “centrifugal” qualities leads Zimbabweans who live there to lead comparatively insulated lives. Their household size is regulated by rental agreements, facility bylaws and biometric access controls. Meanwhile, the architecture of exclusion circumscribes casual encounters with neighbors, let alone serendipitous meetings with strangers, friends or relatives from home.

**Colonial Pretoria**

Contemporary theory emphasizes that place is *socially* produced. Buildings and urban geographies are manifestations of the ideals and aspirations of architects, contractors and the parties commissioning construction—however coherent, conflicted or latent these may be. The *monumental* reconfiguration of the material environment with bulldozers, bricks, concrete and cranes is situated within networks of power and capital, political inclinations, budgetary constraints and profit motives. Such top-down processes are clearly evident in the development of Tshwane, where both Schubart Park and Spring Ridge are located. As Robinson compellingly observes: “the survival of the apartheid state was centrally dependent upon the geographies that
it created” (Robinson 1997:365). In colonial South Africa (and Rhodesia), Europeans rigorously spatialized economic opportunity by constructing racist geographies geared entirely towards awarding resources and high standards of living to whites, with the cost billed largely to groups. Separation also curtailed *relational* opportunity by inhibiting mixing and the possible formation of—for example, class-based identities which could bridge racial difference.

As social productions, places are *historical* entities that are best understood when contextualized within the processes of their formation. I accordingly begin my analysis of Schubart Park and Spring Ridge’s emplaced structures of opportunity and oppression with an account of how they came to exist in the first place. Examining these spatial transformations is useful in understanding how they are charged with accretions of social and political significance which are important components of spatialized opportunity.

The land around Pretoria was colonized by Voortrekkers—descendants of Dutch settlers who set out by oxcart from strongholds along the coast to escape Anglicization following British annexation in 1795. Working their way into the interior, they displaced indigenous inhabitants and carved out agricultural homesteads on expropriated land. These bloody journeys of conquest, collectively known as the “Great Trek,” had many parallels with America’s “taming” of the west. Both incursions were roughly coterminous, occurring during the early and mid 1800s. Colonialists on both continents—originating from the same European countries—were also propelled by similar religious ideologies about being God’s chosen people. The spatial tactics of conquest used on both sides of the Atlantic also bear similarities—from the establishment of

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30 In the United States this belief was known as “manifest destiny”—the idea that God gifted what was to become the United States to Europeans and it was their inevitable destiny to colonize it from sea to shining sea (Stephanson 1996). In South Africa, the Voortrekkers derived a similar belief of themselves as God’s chosen people from the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination (du Toit 1985)
“native reserves” for vanquished people to the famous “laager formation” in which pioneer wagons were arranged in a circle to protect the settlers within. The prolific novelist and enthusiastic apologist for colonialism, Rider Haggard, vividly recounted what the laager formation may have looked like in his 1899 interpretation of the Great Trek:

Moselikatse was advancing to make an end of us, so we made our laager as strong as we could, lashing the disselboom of each wagon beneath the framework of that before it, and filling the spaces beneath and between with the crowns and boughs of sharp thorned mimosa trees, which we lashed to the trek tows and break chains so that they could not be torn away. Also in the middle of the laager we made an inner defense of seven wagons, in which were placed the women and children with the spare food and gunpowder, but the cattle we were obliged to leave outside. Early on the morning when we had finished the laager we heard that the impi of Moselikatse was close to us... They shouted out the name of their chief and began to charge, whereupon our men dismounted from their horses and opened fire upon them, mounting again before they could come near. So the fight went on until the laager was reached, and many K****s were killed without any loss to the Boers, for in those days the natives had no firearms. (Haggard 1899:380)

Tshwane itself was founded in 1855 by the prominent Boer statesman Marthinus Pretorius, who christened it Pretoria after his father, Andries Pretorius, leader of the campaign against the Zulu king Dingane (Theron and de Wit 2010). Prior to the Voortrekkers’ arrival in the mid 1830s, Pretoria was settled by the Ndebele, under Mzilikazi who is the “Moselikatse” in Haggard’s tale. Mzilikazi, in turn, had wrested political control of the area from the Bakwena clan of the Tswana after parting ways with Shaka in Natal some ten years earlier (Kgwete 2010).
For a time, Mzilikazi’s residence was perched atop the very same hill where the Union Buildings and the President’s state house now stand. Following clashes with Dingane the Voortrekkers, Mzilikazi and his followers fled north through present-day Botswana and Zambia, before turning south and establishing the Ndebele kingdom in Southwestern Zimbabwe, with its capital in Bulawayo.

Church Square—the site of the city’s first Dutch Reformed Church—is the symbolic center of Pretoria (Jordaan 1989; Swart 2011:48). Every three months, Afrikaner farmers from miles around would encamp their wagons in the square in order to receive communion and market their produce (Theron and de Wit 2010). Church Square subsequently became the site of many important historical buildings including the first home of Paul Kruger, the first seat of the Volksraad (parliament), the Palace of Justice and branches of most major South African banks. Pretoria was declared capital of the Transvaal Republic in 1860, and served as the cultural, administrative and commercial center of Afrikaner society, government and church (Theron and de Wit 2010).

Pretoria was a “white man’s city” in the sense that Europeans dominated the economic and political spheres. Nevertheless, it was also home for a significant number of black and “colored” people. The first African residents were inboekselings, slaves captured as children during the Voortrekkers’ wars of conquest (Friedman 1994). In 1870, the Berlin Mission Society purchased land north of Church Square to establish the mission station Schoolplaats and evangelize Pretoria’s growing black population. Many inboekselings resettled to Schoolplaats in order to escape servitude, their numbers augmented by Africans arriving from surrounding areas (Friedman 1994:24).
Pretoria’s growing African population led the government to establish the African “location” of Marabastad in 1888, to the west of Schoolplaats. The “Asiatic Bazaar,” in turn, was established just to the South of Marabastad and was supposed to be reserved for Indians, while the “Cape Location” was to the South of the Asiatic Bazaar and was for the “coloreds” (Friedman 1994:36). However, as early as 1903, only about a quarter of the African population lived within these townships. The other 75% was dispersed throughout town—in company barracks, in shacks behind the residences of white employers, on land leased from slumlords, and in growing informal settlements (Friedman 1994:24). Today, Schubart Park towers over Marabastad, giving splendid, panoramic views of Church square and the rest of Tshwane’s urban core.

In the early 1900s, several “freehold” areas such as Lady Selborne were established in close proximity to the city where black people could own and develop land alongside Indians, coloreds and a growing number of poor white Afrikaners who were fleeing the devastation of rural areas during the Boer War (Chiloane 1990:50). Most Africans living in the freehold areas were tenants, however, renting rooms or yard space from landlords. Subsequently, a number of municipality-managed “townships” were established where Africans could rent houses. More than 19,000 Africans lived within Pretoria by 1921 (Friedman 1994:140), but this number approached 70,000 when accounting for freehold areas and informal settlements—double the population of whites (Chiloane 1990:52).

Pretoria’s white inhabitants increasingly resorted to spatial interventions to affirm and maintain dominance as Africans grew in numbers and visibility. For example, in the early 1900s the town council exerted significant energy in perfecting laws prohibiting blacks and coloureds from walking on sidewalks. Friedman argues that this was a way of spatializing racial
distinctions and ascribing superiority to Europeans (Friedman 1994:24). Whites also grew increasingly vocal in calls for residential segregation, especially advocating for removing Africans from areas like Marabastad which were adjacent to the inner city. A 1917 petition to this effect was signed by 600 residents who complained that the CBD was becoming a “k**** location” on weekends (Chiloane 1990:59). Racism was pervasive throughout colonial South Africa, but within Pretoria it was regarded to be especially virulent (Friedman 1990:69).

As John Western emphasizes, segregationist calls were frequently built on the belief that racial mixing inevitably resulted in “race conflict” (Western 1997:85). Any interracial contact, for instance on the factory floor, accordingly had to occur within an asymmetrical power relation with whites in charge over subservient blacks. This so-called “friction theory” saturated the spatial logic of the colonial state and was increasingly refined as Apartheid approached. I would add that a more latent but equally important justificatory narrative for segregation was the possibility that racial mixing in situations of equality—for example, in mixed-race residential neighborhoods or through so-called “miscegenation”—would produce relational opportunities for new, counter-hegemonic understandings that would challenge white supremacy. This tacit belief is ascertainable, for instance, in the swart gevaar paranoia about black male domestic workers attacking white women, or that African cultural practices would taint the putative “purity” of white society if the groups were allowed to mingle on equal footing or live side-by-side.

In Pretoria, calls to remove blacks from Marabastad and other inner city areas also relied on what Swanson has called the “sanitation syndrome”—a belief that black people were unhygienic and dangerous vectors for disease (Swanson 1977). In this vein, Pretoria’s Medical Officer of Health asserted:
the position of both Marabastad and Schoolplaats is objectionable owing to their proximity to European quarters. This proximity undoubtedly favours the introduction of infectious diseases into these European quarters. (quoted in Friedman 1994:125)

Living conditions in townships were indeed overcrowded and unsanitary. However, while whites restored to “scientific racism” in arguing that this was due to innate deficiencies in the mental and moral constituency of Africans, the reality was that poor living conditions in African areas directly resulted from the refusal of whites to invest in African housing. Whites wanted Africans to be temporary sojourners in the city, and therefore neglected to construct water, sewerage and other permanent infrastructure to accommodate a putatively transitory population. Davies accordingly argues that the squalor and poverty born by South Africa’s urban black population before Grand Apartheid was due more to neglect than design (1981), an argument that holds a grain of truth but diminishes the extent to which racism was the root of neglect. Consensus existed among whites that the urban environment should be their exclusive domain, but this conflicted with dependence on African labor. Attempts to control “non-whites” were therefore inchoate, flexible and could even be pragmatic in nature. This resulted in what Davies terms the “segregationist city” which was deeply fractured along racial lines but “not consciously built to a comprehensive social design and permitted a degree of flexibility in the spatial accommodation of its social groups” (Davies 1981:63). In the segregationist city, zones even existed where racial divisions broke down and people from various groups could mingle, conduct business, and even live side-by-side as was the case during the 1920s, when many poor whites lived in freehold areas alongside Africans (Chiloane 1990:80).
Nevertheless, Pretoria’s town council determinedly worked towards increased segregation. Removals from Marabastad began in 1911, as the city began constructing a major sewer treatment facility in the middle of the location, making what Friedman called “a mockery of the health and sanitation concerns of the Town Council…. [suggesting] that the ‘sanitation syndrome’ was merely ideological propaganda rather than a real concern for the spread of disease” (1994:130). Removals continued with the Urban Areas Act of 1923, but slowed as labor needs grew. Meanwhile, rural-to-urban migration gained momentum with the establishment of the steel industry during the 1930s and rampant industrialization during WWII. In the decade after 1939, Tshwane’s black population almost doubled to 202,000, increasing demand for housing in already-overcrowded townships (Chiloane 1990:19). Just after Christmas in 1942, demonstrations over wages and working conditions flared in Marabastad. These were brutally suppressed by police and white vigilantes, leaving 16 protesters dead and 111 injured (Friedman 1990). This event leant momentum to calls for evacuating black people from town, and by the next year Marabastad’s entire black population was relocated to the new township of Atteridgeville located more than 12 kilometers from the CBD.

**Apartheid Pretoria:**

*Afrikan Areas*

The process of removing black people from urban areas gained momentum after the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948. The National Party, dominated by Afrikaners, campaigned on the doctrine of “separate development” which held that interracial contact leads to conflict.
and social degeneration. Each racial group should therefore be allotted a separate area in which to maintain cultural purity and pursue independent economic and political progress. Hard-line proponents of separate development—including many unskilled and low-income whites who were experiencing stiff competition from Africans in the labor market—often argued that this should entail abandoning the use of black labor entirely. Wealthy industrialists and financiers, meanwhile, argued for increased residential separation along with continued utilization of black labor. Both positions were united in calls for the consolidation of white power and institutionalization of segregation (Posel 1987).

Building on existing legal frameworks which were incrementally assembled over decades, the new government embarked on a systematized, comprehensive and brutal racialization of space in the 1960s. This marked the transition towards what Davies terms the “Apartheid City,” a radical reorganization of urban space according to rigidly-defined racial criteria (1981). These included: moving non-whites to peripheral locations; creating buffer zones and physical barriers between racial areas; eliminating “racial islands” by providing each group area with room for unimpeded outward expansion; and rigorous controls on the movements of non-whites through the proliferation of pass laws and the consolidation of South Africa’s many regional identification systems into a centralized database (Muller 2011). Alan Baldwin estimates that between 1960 and 1970 alone, the Apartheid Regime forcibly relocated more than 1.8 million people, mostly Africans (1975:216).

The Apartheid government generally reserved the inner city and central suburbs for whites, a project that involved wholesale deportation of other groups. Former black townships and freehold areas were requisitioned for industrial use, white residential developments and accompanying water and sewer infrastructure. Black landowners from freehold areas and
certified residents of municipal locations were relocated to the townships of Mamelodi and Attridgeville. Meanwhile, the many Africans who rented accommodation, lived on the property of white employers, or “squatted” in informal settlements were dumped across the borders of newly-created “Bantustans.” The nominally-independent, ethnic “homelands” comprised a fraction of South Africa’s land area but contained the vast majority of its population.

The creation of Bantustans rebranded racial segregation and rural-urban migration into the more internationally-palatable framework of independent nation states and international migration. Indeed, Apartheid resulted in a situation wherein, as Baldwin writes, every black person was a migrant laborer:

> The officially declared policy is that all Africans working in 'white areas' should be regarded only as 'temporary sojourners' [in town]; hence the thrust of legislation has been to turn the black labour increasingly into migratory workers, either in the traditional pattern of yearly migration over large distances, or as daily migrants across the Bantustan borders. (1975:219)

Living in the Bantustans and the new townships meant greatly increased expenditures of money and time on transportation. Attridgeville and Mamelodi were much farther from Pretoria’s CBD than most of the locations where Africans previously lived, some of which (like Marabastad) were adjacent to the urban core. Meanwhile, the nearest border of Bophuthatswana—a Bantustan reserved ostensibly for Tswana-speaking Africans—was thirty miles from the CBD. An enormous population of newly-deported Africans from urban and rural areas assembled just across Bophuthatswana’s border, and by 1982 more than 100,000 people commuted to Pretoria daily, often departing before 4:00 in the morning and returning late at
Some people sough to avoid these costs by living illegally in urban locations or informal settlements which made them vulnerable to summary deportation and lengthy imprisonment. Meanwhile, many Africans who were legally living in more central urban areas were transformed into “illegal” aliens upon loosing their jobs. This left most Africans with the difficult choice between starvation in the barren Bantustans where there were essentially no jobs, or liminal and risky spatial subterfuge in urban areas where they could eke out a minimal existence. One African worker summed it up pithily in 1981:

> When you are out of a job, you realise that the boss and the government have the power to condemn you to death. If they send you back home (and back home now there's a drought) and you realise you can't get any new job, it's a death sentence. The countryside is pushing you into the cities to survive; the cities are pushing you into the countryside to die. (quoted in Savage 1986:205)

Racist geographies were maintained through “influx controls” which, as in Rhodesia, required Africans to secure official endorsements, permits and passes to reside in black townships or enter white areas for work. This system was so convoluted and onerous that problems could easily be found in any person’s documentation, thus subjecting them to arbitrary punishment. Meanwhile, endorsements in a person’s passbook could be canceled at the whim of government officials, immediately rendering the bearer “illegal”. Harry Bloom, in his novel *Transvaal Episode* vividly recounts how influx controls made every black person a “wrongdoer:”

> The inhabitants of the location live like a captured people. They are bound and tethered by laws that have no application to the residents of the white town. There is a mass of prohibitions-and what is not prohibited has to be specially permitted. Wherever a man goes,
whatever he does, he runs the risk of breaking a law. There is a multitude of papers—green papers, pink papers, buff papers—for everything must be written and authorised. Life in the location is stifled by the dense web of bureaucracy. A man in the location goes about with the superintendent’s signature all over his person. He becomes a piece of paper, his family becomes a cluster of papers, his house a number in a register, his job a yellow form; and his life and security exactly as valuable and durable as the scraps of paper that fill his pockets. The work of the police is all too easy, for every man is like a wrongdoer. (Bloom 1982: emphasis added)

White Areas

Meanwhile, Pretoria’s white population was ensconced within exclusive spaces of abundance which were sometimes described as contemporary laager formations. Concurrent with the intensified subjugation of black people, the Apartheid regime made ideological and material interventions in white society. South Africa thrived economically during most of the 1950s and 1960s. The destitution that was cultivated in African areas produced abundant cheap labor that was profitably exploited by mining companies, a growing manufacturing sector, commercial farms and the arms industry to name a few of the major players. Huge investments in infrastructure yielded enviable road and rail networks along with world-class ports and power installations. Economic expansion also transfigured South African skylines with soaring skyscrapers. These exemplars of high-modernist architecture include the 730 foot tall Carlton Centre in Johannesburg which was the world’s highest reinforced concrete building when it was completed in 1972 (Murray 2008:72).
The roaring economy and benefits accruing to whites—including a virtual guarantee of employment and relief from the drudgery of domestic labor—made South Africa an attractive destination for migrants from across postwar Europe. Meanwhile, escalating liberation movements in Kenya, Rhodesia and Mozambique prompted colonials from these countries to seek refuge in Africa’s last bastion of white supremacy. More than a million white immigrants enabled the white population to grow by 20% between 1945 and 1977 (Brown 1987), a feat that was instrumental in preserving white supremacy during economic expansion, for instance by enabling white immigrants to fill requirements for skilled labour, thereby preempts occupational advancement for blacks.

The white, inner-city laager formation experienced a real estate boom during this period in order to accommodate foreign immigrants and the steady influx of whites from rural areas. In Johannesburg, this boom produced the famous Hillbrow neighborhood, with hundreds of densely-packed high-rise apartment buildings. Hillbrow came to be known as the Manhattan of Africa, “a cosmopolitan melting pot of Europeanized identities and cultures” (Murray 2008:140). Pretoria also experienced a housing boom in central neighborhoods like Sunnyside and Arcadia, although conservative building codes capped apartment buildings at modest heights (Donaldson, et al. 2003:10). These areas were developed in the 1930s and 1940s, to accommodate blue collar whites, many of whom worked in the city’s growing steel industry (ISCOR). Following a period of decline during the 1950s, more than 100 apartment buildings were constructed in Sunnyside and Arcadia during the 1960s and 1970s (Donaldson, et al. 2003:24). Even so, Pretoria was one of the only South African cities where there was an acute housing shortage for whites (Department for Community Development 1980:12).
The “Poor White” Problem and the Construction of Schubart Park

Schubart Park was constructed during Apartheid as part of the intersecting projects of creating racist geographies and racializing economic stratification. As John Western put it, “segregation was not the aim…domination through segregation was” (Western 1997:87). During its first few decades in power, the Apartheid Regime successfully elevated the living standards of nearly all whites. These socioeconomic improvements were especially evident among the poor. During the Boer Wars, Britain’s “scorched earth” tactics laid waste to Afrikaner farms. This led to widespread rural poverty, prompting extensive, unskilled migration to urban areas in the first decades of the twentieth century. Many of the destitute newcomers settled alongside blacks in purchase areas and even informal settlements. They were unqualified for most jobs except menial labor, but were out-competed on this front by Africans. In 1929, the Carnegie Corporation—in close collaboration with Columbia University’s Teacher’s College—embarked on a comprehensive study of white poverty in South Africa (Magubane 2008). Strongly influenced by the American eugenics movement, this project was touted as the largest sociological study ever conducted on the continent. Its results were published in 5 volumes and raised alarm by concluding that 1 in 4 whites were “very poor” (Du Plessis 2004:882).

Willoughby-Herard argues that the poor white study became the “lynchpin to the political consolidation of Afrikaner Nationalism” (2007:480). White poverty unsettled white supremacists because it belied the fundamental tenant that Europeans were innately superior in intelligence, ingenuity, industriousness. The National Party responded by forming a network of social clubs, churches, schools and social support programs directed towards uplifting whites—especially targeting Afrikaners (Hyslop 2003:228). This outreach enabled the party to establish a strong
populist base among poor and working-class whites, which was instrumental in the 1948 electoral victory. After assuming power, the Party augmented and expanded these social welfare programs, so that by the 1960s whites had access to subsidized housing, social insurance grants for disability and old age, and a job market that was insulated from competition from black labor. White unemployment was virtually nonexistent in the 1960s and white poverty was nearly eliminated.

Schubart Park was constructed in this context of economic expansion, white immigration, a development boom, and nationalist social welfare programs. The Department of Community Development (DCD)—tasked with building subsidized accommodation for Indians, “coloreds” and Whites, as well as redeveloping centralized urban areas through “urban renewal” projects—was a key player in the project to reshape inner cities as white preserves (Tapscott and Thompson 2012). In Pretoria, the DCD’s program of urban renewal, designated Goedehoop or “Good Hope”, involved the creation of a “frozen zone” between Church Square and Marabastad. This was a “dilapidated” area filled with warehouses, light industry, and “slums” judging by aerial photographs and DCD records. The frozen zone was also a liminal border area that separated the white preserves of the CBD, Sunnyside and Arcadia to the south and east from the former mixed-race (now Indian and “coloured”) areas of the Asiatic Bazaar, Cape Location and Marabastad to the north and west. The DCD’s plan for the frozen area included a recreational park to be called Kruger Square (which was never constructed) and high-density, subsidized

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31 The DCD reported that it had acquired 199 properties in the frozen area for R 8,287,217 by the end of 1971: “91 poor structures in the area have been demolished by the Department and 29 by the local authority and private bodies. As a result of this large-scale slum clearance most of the depressed spots in the area have been cleared. All the occupants of the slum buildings have found alternative accommodation either by way of the Department’s housing schemes or through the acquisition of private dwellings” (1972). This excerpt leads me to suspect that people living in this area were probably poor whites, Asians and “coloureds,” as these were the groups that the DCD was responsible for housing. I suspect that part of the reason this area was considered a “slum” was that it hosted a fair amount of racial mixing between these groups (du Toit 2009).
housing for whites. Schubart Park, two blocks from Church Square, was the first of these housing projects.

Construction on Schubart Park began in 1972. It comprised of four 20+ story skyscrapers with 813 flats and subterranean parking. The ground floor counted a community room for assemblies as well as a fresh produce store, butcher, grocer, pharmacy and other small businesses. The next story up was the “P-level” and boasted sports fields, tennis courts, a swimming pool, and other recreational facilities. An existing preschool relocated to Schubart Park and gave preferential admission to residents’ children. Rentals were to be subsidized by the government and made available on a preferential basis to low-income families with children. Schubart Park was well-appointed and even luxurious compared to projects in the United States.

All flats were reserved before the complex was completed. Block D was completed first, and occupied in August 1976, followed by blocks C, B and A in 1977. This was slightly behind schedule as the DCD’s operations were impacted by South Africa’s growing economic insecurity. Cost overruns due to the expense of land acquisitions led the Secretary raise rents to match lower-end white housing in other areas of the city, and to implement a minimum income qualification. Nevertheless, the monthly rent of a two-bedroom flat in 1983 was only about R198.25 (~$177) and included water and electricity. This was well-within the budget of all but the most marginalized whites. By 1982, the waiting list was almost five years long and reached 3,220 people (Department for Community Development 1980:12; Schutte 1985:15, 18-19).

Schubart Park was so successful, and demand for white housing in Pretoria’s urban core was so acute, that DCD began construction of a sister complex, Kruger Park, in 1981 (Department for Community Development 1982:22). This adjacent facility was only one building, but it towered
above thirty stories and contained more than 300 apartments. According to Schutte’s ethnographic study, 90% of residents in 1984 spoke Afrikaans, more than half grew up in rural areas, and the majority had completed standard ten (high school) or less (1985:27,29). Three quarters of residents earned under R 12,000 (~$10,714 US) per year(Schutte 1985:27,28), which was less than a third of the estimated per-capita income for whites in 1985 (Van der Berg and Louw 2004:11). Schubart Park’s initial population was thus comprised largely of low-income, white (predominantly Afrikaner) families from humble backgrounds.

Schubart Park was one of the tallest structures in Pretoria’s core, sited in close proximity to government buildings and corporate headquarters. This made it a highly desirable location for whites in the lower rungs of the civil service who comprised a fair portion of the early residents (du Toit 2009:161). It was also steps away from important landmarks of deep significance to Afrikaner history and culture like the first parliament building, the Palace of Justice and the house of Paul Kruger. This imbued the complex with deep symbolic import. Its soaring heights seized people’s attention, guiding their gaze towards Apartheid’s political stronghold and the historic center of Afrikaner statesmanship. In a laager formation, the women and children who embody the future generations of settler society are sequestered at the circle’s very center, as far removed as possible from stray bullets and arrows. In the same way, Schubart Park lifted working-class whites high above the regime’s beating heart. Emblematic of the entire white population, Schubart Park was a towering reminder of the state’s benevolent dispensation on the “White African Race”.

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I was unable to access the archives of Pretoria News from the 1960s and 1970s. However, I suspect there may be editorials from this period which would support my claims about Schubart Park’s symbolism at this time.
Compared to other white housing, Schubart Park was unusual in its potent symbolism, its location in a transitional zone between racial areas, and its extreme population density. According to a former resident on Facebook, residents lived “like canaries in cages[,] one on top of the other.” This last factor in particular led the complex to become the object of sociological scrutiny in C.D. Schutte’s study of “social interaction and place perspectives” (1985). Schutte begins her volume by acknowledging that evidence from public housing projects in North America indicate that high-rise, high-density architecture leads to over-stimulation, a loss of privacy and detrimental effects on peoples’ emplaced wellbeing. Her research in Schubart Park, however, revealed that residents in the early 1980s had generally *positive* impressions of the facility. Many reported being invested in the future of the complex, making new friends there, having cordial interactions with neighbors and eating in each other’s houses.

Indeed, although she does not use the word, Schutte essentially described Schubart Park as a “centripetal” place (Hall 1968), drawing residents into interaction with one another and creating a communal sense of shared purpose. Indeed, she may have attained even more enthusiastic endorsements had she interviewed the complex’s youth rather than their parents. While researching this chapter I came across a Facebook Group entitled “Schubart park and kruger park in the days!!!” Most of the 230 members of this group had lived in the complex as children, teenagers and young adults during its early years. According to one former resident:

> It was like a big happy family in the beginning when it was just built.

Another warned me that my research could never convey the great depth of life experience that emerged from the relationships he formed there as a child:
Don't know if your research project could handle the stories I have of my days with the mates, no money could ever teach me about life the way Schubies and real friends did!!

On Facebook, former white residents reminisced about how “glamorous” it had been when it was first constructed:

[ILIVED there since it started till 1982. Block A was a very neat, clean block as the caretaker was very strict. The grass was always green, the tennis courts well maintained and the swimming pool was always clean and supervised. The retail section was well equipped with what was required, a Doctor, milk shop, Spar, Video shop, Spar was the hangout as there were game machines in the back, lots of government employed people lived there,

One of their favorite and most memorable parts of Schubart Park was the swimming pool:

HL: Decembers in the 80’s were the best at that swimming pool

EV: I learned to swim here at the age of 5… good times!

VS: I remember the nights we went skinny dipping and then D and M would switch on the lights so we could see him do a bomb splash. Then the poor caretakers would come while we already sat in the flats laughing at them.

They also reminisced about teenage love and mischief:

EV: Oh yes! And we mustn’t forget about unscrewing the lights in the lifts and then riding from the ground floor to the 21st floor… he he he!

VS: @EV… I won’t even ask!
EV: Do you think we were swapping recipes? Ha ha ha!

Former white residents thus used their Facebook group to reconstruct Schubart Park’s relational geography in virtual space, contextualizing it within a meaningful network of life experiences and the memories of other neighborhood places that have long-since disappeared:

BR: Social places around Schubert Park in those years: Amaros, Crack, Bubbles, Jacqueline’s and Coconut Island. A lifetime ago.

HL: Grog and Grace was on the corner, very close to D block

RS: And Zeplins! Bosman Street

EV: Who can remember Alcatraz? It became Bacaro’s. About half a block from Schubert Park

Most importantly, the Facebook group allowed former residents to reactivate relationships from a shared, sentimentalized childhood:

MM: Hello, everyone. Who remembers A—, M—, D—, U—, H—, E—, D—, R—, C—, P— and Mr. T from the Spar, MV, E— and JW, AV, S—, etc?

VS: Obviously we remember them and all their escapades!

ES: I remember A—. He is now family by marriage. M—, yes. The rest I can’t remember. Lol.

MM: We were all in the group.
VS: C—, J—, M— and YN. RL. Great times.

MA: M—, SV, HO. H— lived in B block with his mother’s blue Passat. P— with his earring.

MA: @MM, we were always scared of your mom. She always came to fetch you with a switch in hand.

OK: Yes, @MA. Your uncle W— always told on us with your mom when we used her car to teach ourselves to drive.

MA: Huge trouble! My mom even took us to the police station.

MM: Where is ZJ?

AA: Last time I heard he was in Lydenburg […]

Thus, even as planners look down on their creations from above, places are simultaneously produced from below, by the people who inhabit and use them, and who create inwardly meaningful places through everyday interaction and inhabitation (Lefebvre, et al. 1996). As Casey writes, “places gather” things, memories, experiences, and in particular people (1996). Schools assemble children and teachers. Parks assemble pensioners (Low 2010), protestors (Bosco 2001) and lovers (L’Aoustet and Griffet 2004). Markets gather buyers and sellers who operate according to localized rules of negotiation and exchange that may be written down, but are more often tacit creations derived from millions of transactions (Richardson 1982). Schubart Park gathered the children of Apartheid into a new laager formation, an insulating sanctuary that gifted them with a “normal” childhood during increasingly turbulent times.
Schubart Park in Transition:

Times were, indeed, turbulent. By the mid 1970s, when the first residents of Schubart Park were moving into the newly-completed towers, pressure was mounting on the Apartheid regime from within the country and abroad. The boom of the early Apartheid years sputtered as the economy increasingly required skilled labor, which was in short supply due to barriers for black advancement. International pressure was also mounting, with growing calls for sanctions and calls for divestment. Sustained, sometimes violent resistance increasingly diverted state resources towards suppressing political insurrection.

In the 1980s, cracks started to appear in racist geographies. Population growth and rural-to-urban migration put increasing pressure on African housing. Large informal settlements appeared almost overnight, first on the fringes of the Bantustans and urban townships, and then in closer proximity to the white core (Sapire 1992). Meanwhile, white immigration slowed to a trickle and economic downturn made youths reluctant to leave their parents’ dwellings. Some of the mounting vacancies in low-income white areas like Hillbrow in Johannesburg and Sunnyside in Tshwane were filled by Indians and “coloreds” who could not find accommodation in overcrowded group areas, and who relished the opportunity to save money on transport by living close to work (Morris 1994). Initially, this spatial subterfuge was met with vocal opposition and brutal crackdowns, but the regime was largely unable to prevent the flow of “non whites” into town. Gradually, it moved towards tolerating—and then legalizing—some mixed-race residential areas, business areas, movie theaters and other spaces (Simon 1989).
Concurrently, residential and commercial decentralization of white communities accelerated. Already during the 1950s and 1960s, a trickle of middle and high-income whites were moving to increasingly distant residential developments to the east of Pretoria and the north of Johannesburg (Hart 1974; Mabin 2005). As in other areas around the world, this was enabled by growing automobile ownership and expanding road and highway networks (Western 1997:101). The growth of suburban areas quickened as the regime’s powerlessness in the face of spatial subterfuge signaled its weakening grasp on power. In preparation for the increasing certainty of independence, the government accelerated initiatives to perpetuate white privilege in the new era. Aided by generous subsidies, many whites transitioned from renting to owning and the legalization of “sectional title” enabled them to purchase individual units in apartment buildings and townhouse developments. Concurrently, many businesses and shops relocated from the CBD to suburban office parks and commercial complexes.

Residents of Schubart Park joined the flight to suburbia if they could afford to, leading to growth in the number of poor white residents who were most impacted by the increasingly shaky economy late Apartheid. By the time of independence, the whites remaining at Schubart Park were largely those who had the most to loose by the regime’s demise. These were pensioners, the mentally and physically disabled, single mothers and others who relied on direct payments and subsidies from the white supremacist welfare state. Happy33, one of the very first black people who moved into the complex just before the end of Apartheid, described Schubart Park’s white poverty during the mid to late 1990s:

33 Happy and her mother are the only two people in this dissertation who I refer to their real name, for reasons that will become apparent below.
It's a sad case. Schubart Park was intense. Beautiful people with beautiful minds, it was just that poverty had taken over. And obviously, with them being white, there was nothing left for them [after Apartheid]. (Happy 2013)

Happy’s mother, I was surprised to discover, was from Zimbabwe—but her dad was South African. They met while he was in Harare as a political exile. Upon Zimbabwe’s independence in 1981, the new government began helping out South Africa’s liberation movement, giving shelter to political exiles and the armed resistance just as Mozambique helped Zimbabwe’s Second Chimurenga after winning independence from Portugal in the mid 1970s. Happy’s father returned to South Africa in the early 1990s, just before the fall of Apartheid, taking along his Zimbabwean wife and two children—Happy and her younger brother. Upon returning, the family temporarily lived in the Salvation Army Church, in the inner-neighborhood of Sunnyside which was populated by bureaucrats as well as working-class whites in the steel industry. This was a neighborhood was similar to Hillbrow, in Johannesburg, which had been called the “New York” of South Africa.

Wealthy people lived around us. In 1992/1993 Sunnyside was full of middle class white people and was absolutely beautiful. You could walk the streets at night, it had that kind of Cape Town Long Street vibe, you know? There was no way we could afford living in normal flats. (Happy 2013)

While in Sunnyside, Happy and her brother went to one of the first integrated schools. This clued Happy into the subsidized flats at Schubart Park:
I had a [white] friend who I was in school with, and I used to visit her at Schubart Park when I was 11 or 12 years old. I asked her how much she paid rent, and because we were extremely poor, I told my dad about Schubart Park, and said “why don't you do your thing?” And because my dad being in exile and all of that, he did his magic, and he got us into Schubart Park. (Happy 2013)

Thus, rather than moving to a township, Happy’s father decided that he would bring his wife and children to be one of the first black families to penetrate the urban Laager formation of Grand Apartheid. After apartheid, the state pivoted its housing policy to accommodate blacks and promote integration. Thus, as whites moved out of Schubart Park in the 1990s, they were replaced by upwardly-mobile black families like Happy’s. DuToit’s ethnographic research conducted in Schubart Park during this period depicts the building as a racially-mixed community in transition. About half of the residents were newly-disenfranchised whites whose community was rife with unemployment and social problems like alcoholism. The other half was comprised by educated and politically-connected black families, especially teachers and people who attained employment in the integrating civil service. They were excited to be living in such a beautiful facility, in close proximity to work. As can be imagined, Happy and her brother—the very first black children in the complex—had some racially-charged encounters when they arrived:

We lived on the 21st floor. It was beautiful! [The apartheid government was] seriously taking care of their people. It was a small Afrikaans community that took care of its own. It had a perfect swimming pool… That’s how I made my name for myself. When [moved in], my dad said “why don't you go downstairs [to the pool]?”
My brother and I had our [swimming] costumes on, just casually walking into the pool. It was *painted* with white. White, just white. And as we walked, they kind of like *looked* at us. There were gangs who took care of the place—big names—and obviously I'm tiny, I'm small. So my little brother starts running to me and says: “this one boy called me a K*****.”

So I said "show me this boy." And this boy is like an Afrikaans rugby player. I physically attacked him, and that's a no-no. That’s just how I grew up--kind of rough. Every single white person saw that, and that’s how I earned their respect. (Happy 2013)

Children have a remarkable capacity for overcoming their parents’ prejudices. After showing her grit, Happy and her brother became fast friends with the white kids at Schubart Park, a group that she described as the “lost generation of the Afrikaans community.”

People tend to look at black oppression—there is that oppression—but there was also a LOT of Afrikaans oppression. I used to go to a friend's house who would go to AWB, a [right-wing, white supremacist group] more like KKK. I was the first black kid who ever knocked at the door, and my friends’ parents would say: "come in Happy!” They were hard core racists, *hard core*, with all these KKK tattoos. They would invite me in, but still have that *rage* against black people. But they wouldn't against me, I'm telling you! They would have an AWB meeting that I'd attend. A lot of them would sort of joke: "when are you and I going to get it together then?" But the guy is *raw*, he hates blacks, but now he's sort of in love with this black girl. He had to bring this girl home and say “dad, this is my girlfriend,” and his dad had to accept it because now he sees who I am as a person.
I grew up like that, being the first black everything. And those are the type of people we were hanging out with--myself and my brother. And none of them gave us a hard time. Obviously they used the word K***** a lot. But these guys didn't do anything to oppress me and my brother, we felt at home with them. (Happy 2013)

Happy describes how the white youth at Schubart Park after independence was caught between their parents’ racism and the new reality of South Africa. When a beautiful, intelligent black girl moved in next door they suddenly had the opportunity to form a genuine interracial relationship that had been proscribed by Apartheid’s racist geographies. Happy’s friends and their parents were surprised by the warmth they felt for her, and one boy even fell in love with her—a romantic entanglement that dangerously portended to break strongly-held miscegenation taboos.

Unfortunately, Happy and her brother arrived in Schubart Park just as hard drugs began tearing through poor white communities (Leggett and Burton 2002). The fall of Apartheid led to the withdrawal of international sanctions and reengagement with the global economy. As a result, the country became one of the most desirable, untapped drug markets on the continent as well as a transshipment point for heroin on its way to Europe. Schubart Park was on the front lines of this epidemic:

There were really dangerous names that were well known, that went to prisons and all of that. They formed a gang, the Original Punks for all of us who were sort of oppressed. It was a very unstable place for lost kids in those days, and [my brother and I] were both lost in the head. In the 1980s and 1990s, if you wanted to see raw, real punks you went into Schubart Park. Everyone knew that we were typical “project scum,” to put it like that. But there was
also good as well. We all made family in a gang. P-level was where we did our drugs and got high. I was popular on the party scene until I started using heroin. I became like a hobo—crazy, homeless. I was *melancholy*! Who does that? Leaves their house to go to the streets? I did that for three years. My mother found my brother [dead of an overdose] at the Schubart Park toilets. It's true.

Now, if you ask, a lot of them are either in the streets or in shelters or you just don't know what happened to them. You ask: "what happened to that one? What happened to that one?" The answer is: "Dead, drugs, dead, street." You know, it's a sad case. Schubart Park was intense. (Happy 2013)

As resources for Schubart Park began to dry up after Apartheid, management shifted from the Department of Community Development to the Gauteng Housing Department, and subsequently, in 1999, to the Tshwane Metro Council (TMC). Tshwane, in turn, subcontracted Schubart Park’s management to City Properties on a five year contract. Unfortunately, the housing subsidies did not transfer, and City Properties more than doubled rents. Many of the poorest residents went into arrears. Meanwhile, City Properties failed to properly maintain the facility (Du Plessis 2013:75; Runciman 2012:208). After this contract elapsed, Tshwane transferred management to Housing Company Tshwane (HCT). Schubart Park always had a history of shady management practices, even under Apartheid. However allegations of corruption and fraud multiplied under HCT’s management, and many residents linked the quickening of Schubart Park’s precipitous decline to this company (Bateman 2008b; Du Plessis

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34 For example, Schutte reports chronic understaffing in the 1980s.
Funds from rentals were not reinvested into upkeep, and the poorly maintained electrical, water, sewer and elevator infrastructure were subject to increasingly acute failures. During the mid 2000s, the quality of life at Schubert Park fell far below the expectations of the upwardly-mobile African teachers and civil servants (like Happy’s parents) who found the complex so desirable during the 1990s. Many of these people relocated and were replaced by increasingly marginalized and transient populations. For instance, the city began to use the complex as a place to “dump” problematic people, including the forceful relocation of some 300 elderly ex-miners to Schubart Park’s community hall after they were evicted from a protest at the Union Buildings35. Other long-time residents remained in their flats—either because they had nowhere else to go, or because they believed the city would deliver on its repeated promises to refurbish the complex or give them subsidized housing in new developments.36 Beginning as early as 2001, residents also organized politically, and with the assistance of non-profit groups37 held demonstrations and filed legal claims against the city and its subcontractors (Du Plessis 2013:80).

In 2007, HCT served many residents with notices threatening evictions for rental arrears, but these cited erroneous amounts that did not correspond with residents’ payment receipts (Du Plessis 2013:81-82). Obviously, HCT’s record keeping was in shambles, though they may have inherited this problem from previous administrations. Subsequently, the city earmarked R200m to remodel the flats (Masemola 2008) and gave all residents until September, 2008 to vacate the

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35 These protestors were impressed by the generosity of Schubart Park’s residents. According to one Willie Fuledi, “The residents of the flats are Christians and they have volunteered to allow our members to stay at the flats and give them food until we have resolved our matters” (SAPA 2006).

36 The post-apartheid government has made the provision of low-cost housing an important project

37 NGOs involved in Schubart Park have included the Dutch Reformed Church’s Participate, Empower, Navigate organization (Du Plessis 2013); Lawyers for Human Rights; and the Anti-Privatisation Forum (Runciman 2012).
premises for repairs (Mosimanyana 2008). As this deadline approached, the mayor toured the complex, reminding residents that they must evacuate for renovations. Residents, however, saw this as an illegal eviction because no housing would be provided in the interim. They accordingly responded with protests, insisting that they would not leave Schubart Park without title deeds to their apartments (SAPA 2008). In response to accusations against non-payment they gave ample evidence of problems in HCT’s books, and argued that the condition of the flats had deteriorated to such a degree that paying rent was absurd. Indeed, by this point Schubart Park was a bare skeleton of it’s former glory. Raw sewage seeped from blocked pipes, water and electricity routinely failed, and none of the elevators were working.

On July 22, 2008 the council embarked to evict 38 residents they claimed were in arrears, seemingly targeting committee members (Yeatman 2008). These evictions were contracted to Wozani security, a shadowy security firm of the type increasingly hired by government intermediaries to empty informal settlements. Many such companies—often run by former Apartheid Forces officers—operate in South Africa’s thriving private security sector, but the Red Ants are particular notorious (Salopek 2002). Dressed head-to-two in crimson riot gear and armed with crowbars, they swarm by the hundreds into informal settlements slated for demolition under the direction of rifle-toting, white supervisors. Wozani’s so-called “Red Ants” have been likened to a mercenary militia, and are frequently implicated in theft, the illegal use of violence and other human rights violations during evictions that are reminiscent of apartheid-era forced relocations (Ramutsindela 2002).
Figure 7: The Red Ants evict residents in Schubart Park. Photo ©2008 Daniel Born
As the Red Ants moved on Schubart, residents responded by throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails (Yeatman 2008). Meanwhile, a fire broke out in a fifth-floor apartment and the police began firing rubber bullets and teargas. Then a second blaze mysteriously started in the adjacent Kruger Park. This caused chaos, with at least five people dying from smoke inhalation and by jumping to their death from the thirtieth floor. Others were rescued from the roof by a helicopter. “The blaze reminded people of America’s 9/11 incident,” reported the Pretoria News, “with the tall building covered in black smoke and the police and South African Air Force helicopters swarming around it” (Otto 2008b). As intended by Schubart Park’s Residents Committee, this debacle attracted extensive media scrutiny and political maneuvering. The Pretoria high court intervened to halt the evictions (Venter 2008), but the city managed to vacate Kruger Park on the grounds that it was unsafe to let residents return after the blaze. Alternative housing was found for only 12 residents, out of a building with more than four hundred units on 30 stories (Khumalo 2008).

Figure 8: Sister Complex Kruger Park on Fire during 2008 evictions. Photo ©2008 Daniel Born.
A few weeks later, water and electricity was shut off to the entire A block, except for a single tap on the ground floor. This outage lasted almost three weeks, forcing residents on upper floors—like Happy’s mother—to navigate dark stairwells with flashlights in order to carry buckets up to twenty stories just to flush the toilet (Du Plessis 2013:52). The city attributed this problem to a technical fault, but many residents suspected that it was using service outages to make the complex uninhabitable in the hope that this would force residents out. Water and electricity in the entire complex failed again on December 23rd, prompting furious residents to protest their ruined vacations. 34 people were arrested on Christmas day—including three minors—and remained in custody for four days before charges of “public violence” were dropped (Otto 2008a; van Marle and de Villiers 2013).
By then end of 2008, the towers which previously served as an emblem for a white-supremacist social responsibility now towered above the city as an unwelcome symbol of what people considered to be the worst ails of the New South Africa. Raw sewage seeped out of blocked pipes, water and electricity suffered regular outages, and rats flitted about piles of garbage that collected in public areas and burnt-out flats. The swimming pool was filled with green sludge, and most of the shops were boarded up. Ambulances refused to service the facility (Bateman 2008a) and at least one woman was forced to give birth in her flat because the
elevators did not function which prevented her from leaving (Otto 2008a). Police also refused to enter the complex, especially at night (Bateman 2009a).

By this time, most long-term residents had departed and D Block was almost completely abandoned. Nevertheless, between 6,000 and 8,000 people still lived in the complex. Indeed, as one Committee member reported, a tactic it used against Tshwane was to ensure that occupancy stayed as high as possible:

Our strategy was, even though people leave...we put others inside for our own benefit. We’re not gonna give them what they wanted, which is; when a unit is empty, they seal it off. And at the end of the day they’ll rush to court and claim that they’ve given people alternative accommodation, [which] they did not do. (cited in Du Plessis 2013:85-86)

The new residents were drawn from the city’s most marginalized populations, including a large number of refugees fleeing political and economic turmoil in Zimbabwe, as well as immigrants from Mozambique, Nigeria and even Pakistan. Included in this number were Gladys and Shambudzai. Recall from Chapter 2 how they braved crocodiles, theft and sexual violence to enter South Africa in 2008, subsequently working on commercial farms for less than $2 per day before finally arriving in Pretoria’s Attridgeville township. Not long after they arrived in Attridgeville, simmering xenophobia against foreigners erupted into violence in early 2008. One of their companions, John, described an incident he witnessed on the train to Johannesburg:

I was with my friend. We were coming from church. I don’t know for sure if the person was from Zimbabwe, but they were thrown from the train while it was moving. That's why you are always scared. He was fighting, but there were six or eight of them. They were
I kept on going until I reached my destination. There was no way I was going to drop off [at the next stop] because the moment you drop off they know you are a foreigner. You have to just stay quiet and pretend like nothing happened. Thrown from a moving train, baba! And you can just imagine, Those trains are very high and they travel almost 60/70/80 kilometers an hour. Nobody knows if he lived or died.

When I have got my monies to start my own things, I will just disappear. I just pray that one day everything in Zim will be fine. Then I will go back. South Africa has got everything: money, cars, whatever. But you can't enjoy your money when you stay here, you can't even show your cell phone in public. (John 2012)

On the night of March 19, Shambudzai and Gladys awoke to gunfire and political songs. A mob was moving from door to door, demanding to see people's identification documents. Those who produced foreign passports or asylum papers were summarily evicted with only the clothes on their back, even if they were legally resident in the country. They were told that they brought nothing into South Africa, so their possessions counted as stolen goods. Then their dwellings were looted and razed. One of Shambudzai’s friends told me of a housemate who resisted—a man from Mozambique who could not bear losing everything he had worked so hard to accumulate. The mob retaliated by locking him inside his house and setting it alight. She recalls him screaming: “help me, I'm dying, I'm dying!” while everyone watched.
Figure 10: The body of a man burned in Attridgeville during xenophobic violence against foreigners. Photo and text ©2008 Herman Verwey
Shambudzai and her friends fled with their children to a police station, where they were given temporary accommodation in a school before being relocated to an abandoned automobile garage in Marabastad. They stayed at the garage for several weeks, with tarps and cardboard boxes providing their only privacy. The portable latrines overflowed in short order, and the women used a small polluted stream to bathe and wash clothes. Here they became vulnerable, visible targets. One woman was raped at the stream and later gave birth to a baby she named Xenophobia.

Fortunately, Shambudzai and her friends discovered Schubart Park just as the Residents Committee was looking to fill newly-vacated apartments. In November, these women moved out of their abandoned parking garage into sun-drenched apartments with kitchens, bathrooms and private bedrooms giving glorious views of the Magaliesberg mountains and Pretoria’s CBD.
Despite the infrastructural problems, this was a marked upgrade to the parking garage, as they enthusiastically recounted when I spent a month living in their flat in July, 2010. This flat had three bedrooms, each of which was occupied by a woman and her spouse or boyfriend. One couple also lived with their two children. I slept in the living room, alongside friends and relatives of these six core tenants—people in emergency need of a bed, who were just passing through, or were arriving in South Africa for the first time.

Figure 12: Living Room in a Schubart Park flat, 2010
Like the previous residents, my flatmates were excited about how close their new home was to the CBD. Unlike most of South Africa’s townships and informal settlements that are relegated to marginal areas, Schubart Park was in the middle of a vibrant economic zone that thronged with people during workdays. Two of the women managed to secure a small grant from a Catholic relief agency, enabling them to establish a thriving hair and nail salon. During the three years it existed, this business provided full-time employment to four or five of my flatmates and their friends, as well as part-time income to several others. Some of the women had exceptional skills in twisting locks or braiding and spent the most time with clients. Others helped with the prep work of removing weave and straightening hair, or went about the critical task of looking for clients in the streets. By holding a portfolio of hairstyles, they tried to convince the CBD’s civil servants and clerks that they could expertly execute the requested hairstyle at a reasonable rate. This required exceptional persuasion skills, as these women had strong competition from
dozens of other saloons. It was also the most hazardous job. As foreigners dealing in cash on the parallel market, these women had to constantly watch out for police officers and others who could confiscate their posters to extort money, or worse.

Business in the salon waxed and waned. At month end, especially before public holidays, they could bring home up to R 300 (~$40) in a single day. During these times, their clients had recently been paid and wanted to look their best for the festivities. Pockets were a lot emptier, however, mid-month and after major holidays when client funds had run dry. During these times, the women made do with less, sometimes skipping meals and relying more on their husbands who had relatively consistent employment as laborers in nearby shops and construction sites. Each woman cooked for her own partner and children (if she had them), though they frequently shared, especially when one of them was out of money.

My flat mates earned a very modest living, but it was enough to survive and even send money to Zimbabwe to feed their parents and pay school fees for their children. Although a few people in Schubart Park managed not to pay rent, my flat mates paid approximately R 600 (~$81) per bedroom to the former occupant. This was roughly a third of the price of accommodation in nearby Sunnyside. Other residents paid to pirate landlords who “owned” entire floors. Many of these syndicates were operated by long-term residents who served on the Residents’ Committee. Indeed, this body had become the major power broker within the complex as the state’s will and ability to manage the complex receded. Thus, in addition to mobilizing an admirable battle against eviction, Committee members simultaneously profited from rent payments and by levying fees for trash removal and maintenance—services that were sparsely provided. More nefariously, people I spoke with linked committee members to criminal
enterprises that operated from the complex. Although proof for these accusations was lacking, it seemed highly plausible the longer I stayed in the facility.

Like all governments, the Committee ruled with a mixture of coercion and consent (Gramsci 2000). It gave legal updates at community meetings in the assembly hall and responded to residents’ complaints. The Chairperson spoke out passionately against xenophobia in one meeting that I attended and highlighted complaints of sexual violence and intimidation within the complex. He urged residents to report such incidents to him or another committee member so that they could solve the issue. Indeed, the Committee maintained a “task team” that dealt with troublemakers and rent defaulters. I heard direct reports of residents who were beaten after failing to pay rent. In 2009 one man fell to his death from the fourteenth floor in an apparent attempt to evade the task team, although the Committee told the press that this was “a renegade group passing themselves off as the officially mandated team” (Bateman 2009b). In actual fact, the line between official and unofficial was pretty blurry at Schubart Park.

Indeed, the committee’s grasp on power was tenuous. With fewer and fewer long-term residents it struggled to mobilize protest participants. The Zimbabwean recent-arrivals who I stayed with explained that they were indifferent about the Committee’s political negotiations because as foreigners and “squatters” they would not qualify for any concessions from the city. They were also dubious about the wisdom of marching in front of police and media, through the middle of a city that marginalized them and occasionally rose up in arms against them. Indeed, the committee sometimes resorted to coercive tactics in order to mobilize participation (Du Plessis 2013:84). For example, one evening as people were returning from work the Committee formed a human chain in front of the entrance to Schubart Park in order to force attendance a ceremony honoring residents who died in the Kruger Park fire during the 2008 evictions. Under
threat of violence (a few people were punched when they tried to bypass the barricade) we were herded to the now-vacant Kruger Tower where Committee members placed flowers, lit candles and sang freedom songs. The Chairman elegized the deceased as martyrs and urged the crowd to persevere in the fight against Tshwane. The mood, however, was subdued and the singing was lackluster. It was the middle of winter and the sun had set so it was very cold. Many of the gathered were newcomers who had not been present during the invasion of the Red Ants, and had little to gain from a negotiated settlement.

Other dangers in the complex included theft, assault and sexual violence. South Africa has one of the world’s highest violent crime rates. Poor populations are most at risk due partly to reliance on walking, a lack of home security systems, and reliance on cash. These factors were readily apparent in Schubart Park. Flats were easily accessible from the street with security hinging almost entirely on the integrity of individual locks. In our flat, a rickety metal grate was secured by an old padlock that would have succumbed to medium-duty bolt cutters. The women in this flat walked long distances as they went about their daily activities, often traversing remote, poorly-illuminated areas of the city. As foreigners, they made especially attractive targets because they were unable to get bank accounts and exclusively used cash. Even the police used them as “mobile ATMs” by leveraging their marginal legal status to elicit bribes. Criminals, meanwhile, took advantage of this adversarial relationship to rob them with near impunity. This everyday reality of crime was graphically illustrated in the graffiti that adorned the stairwell used to access our flat:
Figure 13: Graffiti in the stairwell reflecting residents’ everyday experience with crime. Notice the artist chose a spot with a functional light bulb.
Schubart Park residents were thus subjected to heightened risk of violent crime due to their location in one of the city’s most liminal buildings. Police were loath to enter the complex due to its advanced state of decay and poor illumination, a reluctance that extended to adjacent businesses and bars, where one of my flatmates was stabbed in a robbery. Even I was mugged two times in the area. This liminality made Schubart Park an ideal hideout where criminals could find shelter from the law by disappearing into a transient population—even while being close to areas of operation. Such people apparently preferred the upper floors, which were more remote due to the many flights of stairs that had to be navigated to reach them:

I never went to the top in all the time that I lived at Schubart. It was more unsafe up there because there was no lift. Especially because sometimes the electricity would just go off. And so for those people who are staying up there, to come down, it was a bit tricky because of the darkness. And people would also take advantage of stealing from each other up there. Some flats up there were getting older and older, and no one would love to stay up there. So most people were on floors 15 and going down. (Mai_Domingo 2013)

I personally knew one or two Zimbabweans who occasionally resorted to petty theft, but I heard whispered accounts of much more serious activities. For instance, Gladys—whose two children lived with her in Schubart Park—told me how two South African men in the courtyard told her that children with “small heads” were desirable in costal areas for magic charms that aided in catching sharks. It is impossible to know whether these men were actual human traffickers or were simply intimidating Gladys because she was a foreigner and a mother. However, I became privy to enough ambiguous accounts of kidnapping, drug trafficking and

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38 The baby Xenophobia mentioned earlier was also targeted for human trafficking by “a certain white lady” who promised a huge payment and South African papers if the mother gave her up for adoption.
armed robbery that I have little doubt that some residents were involved in such activities. These suspicions are confirmed by newspaper coverage of crimes linked to complex residents.

Sexual violence was another danger that especially worried the younger, female residents. For instance, one morning on the way to work, Gladys happened upon the naked body of a woman who had fallen to the sidewalk during the night. Other women I spoke with told me about friends who were raped in the complex. They described the stair wells—the complex’s main thoroughfares—as particularly dangerous areas due to stretches of almost perpetual darkness and the possibility of encountering strangers. Sexual violence was confirmed as a problem in one Committee meeting, when the chairman urged victims to report incidents to the task team.

When asked directly, many Zimbabweans told me that their primary reasons for living in the complex was the inexpensive on rent. Only a few people forcefully reported that Schubart Park was a bad place to live. For example, Gladys explained that it was unsafe for her children who could be kidnapped or fall victim to deteriorating infrastructure. She even knew one case where a child had fallen to their death down a ventilation duct. Gladys left her children locked in the apartment during the day so that she could work, and would have preferred for them to be in Zimbabwe but she did not have a viable caretaker there. In South Africa they were unable to go to school because they did not have birth certificates, and attaining this document from Zimbabwe was difficult because Gladys did not know the name of her child’s father. Recall from Chapter 2 that the reason she did not know the father’s name was because she became pregnant after she was raped in Zimbabwe during the run-up to the 2005 elections in retribution for her

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39 This incident was widely reported in the press (Marais 2009)
parents’ support of the opposition. Indeed, it was fear of a reprisal that prompted her to flee before elections in 2008.

Most Pretorians who did not live in the complex associated Schubart Park with crime, illegality and filth. This sentiment was patent in the press, with Pretoria News labeling the complex as “synonymous with crime and grime (Mbanjwa 2008)” and the Daily Maverick arguing that “calling Schubart Park a slum is doing a disservice to slums everywhere” (Wet 2011). Government officials similarly painted Schubart as a “problem,” a “blight” and as being “unsuitable for human habitation” which is a dehumanizing statement in and of itself. Furthermore, despite being home to more than 6000 people, the complex was often depicted as being “vacant” or occupied only by “squatters.” For example, one woman told me she called an ambulance for her sick husband, but when she told them she was in Schubart Park the operator said “you must be mistaken, nobody lives at Schubart Park.” Schubart's marginality was further reinforced through the everyday avoidance of the area by many city residents.

Apart from one or two petty thieves, the dozens of people I met at Schubart Park worked an honest living. Nevertheless, the derogatory meanings ascribed to the complex effected them greatly. One of the most powerful mechanisms for this transference was smell. Blocked sewers, pooled water and piling trash produced an overpowering and inescapable, sickeningly-sweet smell. This receded from my awareness after a few days, but I discovered that it permeated my clothes, even after they were washed, when I opened my suitcase a week after moving out and was hit by the unmistakable smell of Schubart Park. It seems likely to me that this lingering smell negatively impacted residents in their interactions outside of the complex. As Mai

40 The Director of Tshwane housing Mapule Phora reportedly described the complex as unfit for human habitation, though this was not a direct quote (Mbanjwa 2008).
Domingo told me, the mere *knowledge* that someone was a former Schubart Park resident was enough to make people look down on her several years later:

If we go to the [area where the saloon was], where people know us, they say: “but you guys, you were staying in Schubart Park. I didn't like Schubart Park. When I went to visit Schubart Park I felt like my whole body was [retching sound]!”

Even when I move around, and I see people I know from that time, they say “how were you managing there?” They still have that memory, they relate to me as a Schubart Park person. They still define me about where I was staying at that time (Mai_Domingo 2013)

One of the clearest examples I witnessed of the displacement of Schubart Park’s derogatory public meaning onto its residents was when a client at the salon invited herself to give a presentation about a “business opportunity” to my flatmates. The next day, she carried a projector and a portable white screen up to the flat. She grimaced as she began climbing the stairs, where the smell was the worst, causing my flat mates to circumspectly trade offended looks. Although she was clearly struggling to carry her belongings she *refused* to allow us to help her. Then, upon reaching the sixth floor, where we used planks to navigate pools of water that were accumulating on the hallway floor, she spun around as if to bolt away, and only agreed to continue when we assured her that we had almost arrived, and the apartment was on that very floor. Once inside, she gave a presentation on a Multi Level Marketing scam that cost R 1,500 ($201.59) to join. She tried to persuade us that this was a good investment opportunity because the money that would subsequently become available would surely be the “only way for you to leave this place!”
When she left, Shambudzai indignantly exclaimed: “imbava! [Thief!] Why would we want to leave this place!?”

At that moment, the warm afternoon sun was streaming deliciously through the living room’s floor-to-ceiling windows overlooking the Magalies mountains. Mai Domingo agreed, saying: “Where else can we find a place like this?!”

Indeed, even though the women I stayed with sometimes spoke to Schubart Park’s problems, these complaints existed alongside a powerful and empowering attachment to the complex. They were fiercely proud of the apartment itself, which in many ways was far superior to anything they could have found in a township or informal settlement, and far less expensive to a comparable unit in Sunnyside. They each had private rooms to share with their partners and managed to accumulate refrigerators, televisions, beds, clothes and other goods which they were planning to send home. These items were indisputable proof of their success in the diaspora, and would have been far more difficult to acquire if they had to spend triple the rent to live in a nearby inner-city neighborhood or pay for twice-daily transportation to Atteridgeville or Mamelodi. These savings also allowed these women to make regular remittances to family members in Zimbabwe who were taking care of their children. Thus, economic opportunity was emplaced within Schubart Park’s central location and low rentals.

The women I stayed with were also attached to the complex because it was a slice of home and a sanctuary from the simmering xenophobia they commonly encountered in other parts of the city. The Committee spoke out vociferously against xenophobia, and my flat mates confidently spoke Shona in Schubart Park’s public areas—an action that was liable to attract nasty looks and derogatory comments in other parts of the city. They also repeatedly claimed that
violence like they experienced in Atteridgeville could never arrive in Schubart Park because so many residents were foreigners and would overwhelm any attackers. Even to me, Schubart Park felt like a small Zimbabwe. My friends frequently had serendipitous encounters with acquaintances and relatives in the public areas, and I even ran into one or two people I knew from Zimbabwe. News and gossip from home circulated easily within Schubart Park, alongside updates about policing practices, information on job opportunities and other useful knowledge.

As with the first generation of youth living in Schubart Park during the dying days of Apartheid, who wrote on Facebook that “it was like a big happy family in the beginning when it was just built,” the complex once again gathered a marginalized community into what Mai Domingo also described as a “family:”

Schubart was like home. We met a lot of people in Schubert, and we created this family, our family, even though we were not family. We were so many black people from different places in Zimbabwe, even from different places in Africa, but we met there and created one related family. (Mai_Domingo 2013)
This new form of “extended family” was not based on biological descent or patrilineal reckoning, but on *proximity* and shared experience. This relational opportunity was even more pronounced between the people who hosted me in their flat. These women created a new form of “nuclear family” based on co-residence, financial interdependence, and mutual support. They moved around the city as a group and spent all day working together in the salon. *Proximity* and daily interaction and exchange thus incrementally enabled them to develop aligned interests that were continually reinforced and put into practice. As in Shona patrilines and European nuclear families, they even pooled resources. For example, when one of their daughters in
Zimbabwe was sick, everyone contributed a small amount of money to pay for medicine. When another one was hungry she received food from her sister.

**The Dissolution of Schubart Park**

Sadly, these new families were only as durable as the proximity which gave them form. A few months after I left Schubart Park service delivery problems accentuated and residents once again entered the streets. Amidst these protests, on September 21, 2001, two flats in C Block caught fire and residents were ordered to evacuate the complex. As residents arrived from work that evening they became frantic about children who remained trapped inside the complex and the police took hours to evacuate them (Magome 2011) With nowhere else to go, and with all their belongings and identification papers still inside, hundreds of residents slept on the sidewalks outside Schubart Park for weeks, including the elderly and women who had just given birth. Over the next several days residents were allowed back into the complex in small groups to remove their belongings. Unfortunately, many were unable to afford alternative accommodation and had nowhere to stow their possessions. These events caused the dispersal of the new family that Mai Domingo loved so dearly:

> The way we were taken out, that’s why I always say *Zvinorwadza Schubart* [Schubart causes pain]. Some of us never had the chance to say goodbye. We don't know where some people went. There are very few friends from Schubart Park that are here now, and we hardly talk. We are far away from each other. Maybe three or four are still close to me. The rest, I don't know. (Mai_Domingo 2013)
Eviction undermined the financial situation of many residents. By 2011, most people were only paying about R 600 ($75) per room to pirate landlords, and some—like Mai Domingo who lived in a neighboring flat—managed to stop paying altogether. The women I stayed with were in a better position than many residents because they had consistent employment. Unfortunately, the only accommodation they could find was significantly more expensive and living conditions were worse:

Many of us found accommodation in Sunnyside, because it was a bit cheaper than in town [the CBD]. We were staying at this flat. There was a room where you sleep and cook and we were using one bathroom. We were paying about R1600, so we had to look for another accommodation because the living conditions were very poor. Myself and Rebecca, since we had husbands, we were staying each couple in one room. But the other gals…Tsitsi, Gladys, Shambudzai, Rebecca and the other two were also staying in one bedroom. But on that building we were using one bathroom from first floor to third floor. (Mai Domingo 2013)

With drastically increased expenditures on rent, some residents began turning to income opportunities that caused pain to themselves and others:

You know we were not paying rent in Schubart Park, so moving away also made people do some things to earn a living, like prostitution, drugs, stealing… If you could see some other people, the way they are living, we met there in Schubart Park, and they were living a better life. Do you still remember Tsitsi? We were working together, but all of a sudden she just left everything. She said “the money is not enough, I’ve decided to do this shoplifting thing. The rent is so expensive.” But in Schubart Park this kind of thing was not happening. People were just living their life. Now she is in and out of prison. She goes in for
six months, comes out. The daughter is now staying with the elder sister. They are no longer together with the child’s father. It makes me cry sometimes. I don't know how I survived.

(Mai_Domingo 2013)

Tsitsi’s marriage was not the only one to dissolve in the aftermath of the eviction. Mai Domingo attributed this to increased financial pressure. By the time Schubart Park closed, most rents paid to former residents and pirate landlords were about a third of what was charged in surrounding areas, while some tenants like Mai Domingo managed to avoid paying rent completely:

[Eviction from] Schubart Park disturbed a lot of lives. We were all relaxed, we didn’t know this thing of paying rent, paying rates [electricity and water bills]. So now you end up fighting with your man. There is no money. The money that you were sending to your kids, it’s now the money you were supposed to pay rent, to pay electricity. The little that I would get from the salon, and what Baba Domingo was getting from work in the store was fine with us. But now I have to look for another job where they will give me a better salary. And we don't send money to kids only, we have to send even from the family where you are married and the family where you are coming from. Like myself, I will have to send money to my parents, and to Baba Domingo’s father as well. We also need our own money. (Mai_Domingo 2013)

All of the three core couples in the flat where I stayed parted ways a few months after the eviction:
Gladys went back to Zimbabwe. She was staying with her mom, and later she decided to do this trading, buying here in South Africa and selling in Zimbabwe, buying cigarettes in Zimbabwe and bringing them here. But it didn't come out nicely. I was talking to her on WhatsApp. She is now staying in Beitbridge, and she was saying things are not flowing nicely.

Rebecca used to be very close. But those days we fought and were doing our own thing. She came to my workplace, and she said “Mai Domingo, I'm not feeling well.” She really looked sick. I didn't want to talk to her, but because of the situation I had to sit down and we talked and talked. She was complaining that she made a wrong move by going to this other marriage, wasting everything. She finally acknowledged it, but it's far too late because her [former] husband has got another woman and a baby, and they are doing fine. Now she is regretting. Her new husband is violent, even if you try to run away he will follow you. Rebecca’s life is like a movie. (Mai Domingo 2013)

The Residents Committee remained politically active after the evictions, suing the city of Tshwane to allow them back into the complex. The High Court and Appeal Court both ruled against the residents, but on October 10, 2012 the Constitutional Court ruled that the eviction was illegal as it was not ordered by a court (Venter 2012). This ruling paved the way for former residents to return, but only after the infrastructure was restored to proper working condition. In the mean time, the Court ordered Tshwane to provide temporary housing. As of July 2013, 847 households registered as Schubart Park residents at the time of the evictions (Preez 2013). Of these, 457 were approved for housing, out of which 193 had already received accommodation. Meanwhile, 375 households were still being “vetted” to ensure that they qualified. By October,
69 of the 457 approved households were still waiting for accommodation and no progress had been made in authenticating the eligibility of the remaining 375 (SAPA 2013).

Unfortunately, as foreigners and “illegal” residents of Schubert Park, none of the women I stayed with qualified for government-subsidized housing and consequently did not even bother to register. One of the most ironic twists to the Schubart Park saga involves Happy’s mother, Emily. Recall that her family was the very first black family allowed into Schubart Park by the dying Apartheid regime in 1992. Emily thus paved the way for the racial integration, suffering tremendously in the process. Her early years there were marked by racial tensions with some white residents. Subsequently she lost a son to the heroin epidemic that ravaged poor white communities, including her children’s peer group. By the time Schubart park was illegally vacated in 2001, Happy’s mother was undoubtedly one of the residents who had lived there longest. Despite all of this—and despite leaving her life in Zimbabwe to join her husband, a ANC activist who was exiled in the fight against Apartheid—Emily has still not received housing\textsuperscript{41}. Happy, who has succeeded in turning her own life around, told me how angry this made her feel:

\begin{quote}
Even now, my mom doesn't have housing because obviously it says on her passport "Zimbabwean." But this government can't even think that my father left South Africa, ANC, to fight for this country. We were literally in exile. I mean, [my family] started this whole thing. Black people lived in Schubart Park because we started it. Until today [my mother] is not given a house because my dad is late, he's passed away. Obviously they are going to look at my mother's ID and see “Zimbabwean born,” not knowing the whole story line. She was
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} Happy and her mother are the only people in this dissertation whose name I did NOT change. This was done with permission, in the hope that publication of her story could assist in her claim for RDP housing.
there from 1992 until 2011 when it all closed down. It pisses me off. They have given everyone else houses [except for her] because my mom is not South African. But my mom keeps pushing. (Happy 2013)

Tshwane has announced several plans for Schubart Park which alternate between refurbishment and complete redevelopment. However, as of today (2017), Schubart Park still stands vacant, largely stripped of recoverable metal by an army of scavengers. Moreover, a recent corruption scandal embroiled the city when it was discovered that R 97m earmarked to construct housing for evicted residents was unaccounted for (Mudzuli 2014). Frustrated, many of Schubart Park’s evicted tenants continue their calls for housing and compensation.

The Privatization of Apartheid:

In 1992, just as Happy and her parents became the first black family to enter Schubart Park, many of the earliest residents had already departed or were preparing to leave. These were middle-income white families who could afford to participate in the white flight from the inner-city to the suburbs. After independence, the new government legalized the ill-gotten gains of colonialism in a gesture of reconciliation and as a pragmatic attempt to preserve the economy. Unfortunately, this perpetuated and even reinforced racial inequalities, notwithstanding a growing black middle and upper class. Like Zimbabwe on the eve of Fast Track Land Reform, many sectors of the South African economy—from agriculture to mining to finance—remain firmly in the hands of whites and international capital. As a result, most black people continue to live in high-density townships like Attridgeville, inner-city neighborhoods like Sunnyside, and
informal settlements like the now-defunct Schubart Park. Most whites, meanwhile, are comfortably ensconced in the suburbs that comprise a privatization of Apartheid.

If Schubart Park was a centripetal space that gathered residents into communities, suburbia is defined by a centrifugal “architecture of exclusion” that inhibits social interaction (Brindley 1999; Hall 1968). Homeowners in some older suburban neighborhoods collectively erected perimeter fencing and boom gates, illegally restricting access to public infrastructure (Dirsuweit and Wafer 2006; Jürgens and Gnad 2002). Less controversially, such neighborhoods deploy CCTV cameras (Minnaar 2012) or create chokepoints to funnel foot traffic onto the sidewalk, where “undesirables” or “intruders” must enter into public view. However, the most popular type of suburban residence is the “security estate.” Upmarket estates swallow square kilometers of exurban land and boast private golf courses, natural areas with wild game and fishing, air-conditioned fitness centers and shopping facilities. Two-story perimeter walls are sunk deep into the ground to prevent tunneling and are topped with electrical wires and thermal imaging cameras. A limited number of gates restrict access. Visitors often require appointments and must furnish biometric data (like fingerprint scans) and IDs to sign in and out. Movements are tracked by camera and thermal imaging. Automatic license plate readers and keycard swipes feed into central control rooms where around-the-clock technicians monitor data streams. These are algorithmically interpreted for suspicious activity and compiled into auditable records. All the while, armed patrols rove within and around these estates to ensure that no “undesirables” linger (Samara 2010).
In addition to privatized policing, suburban residents’ associations contract companies to provide trash removal, landscaping, road maintenance, clean water, sewer infrastructure and even educational services (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002). Gated communities thus reproduce apartheid’s racist geographies through privatization (Samara 2010). The cost of acquiring property and paying dues within many complexes shifts the basis for exclusion from race to class. Indeed, wealthy black people usually live within security estates alongside white
neighbors. Unfortunately, racial and class divisions largely overlap in South Africa so many security estates remain predominantly white preserves—postmodern, neocolonial laager formations that “protect” the rich [white] from the poor [black].

Today, the architecture of exclusion is available to most social and economic demographics. Mid-tier security villages contain smaller houses with tiny yards and fewer luxuries. Cluster homes gather as few as three or four units behind unmanned, remote-controlled gates with private security hired by neighborhood associations to linger behind blind corners or in thick shade, ready to pounce on people who look out of place (i.e. black men on foot). The proliferation of gated townhouses even makes the architecture of exclusion available for rent to aspiring middle class families. For example, high-rise buildings in inner-city areas like Sunnyside and Hillbrow now use biometric technologies like fingerprint scans and cellphone-activated locks to restrict access and limit occupancy (Murray 2008:207; Reporter 2004).

Zimbabwean Professionals in the Suburbs

During my time in South Africa I lived in three different security complexes at the low-to-middle range of exclusivity and affordability. These complexes were all in the Eastern suburb of Faerie Glen, approximately 25 minutes from Schubart Park if traveling in a private vehicle outside of rush hour. The complex I lived in longest, which I shall call “Spring Ridge,” contained approximately forty detached houses located behind a perimeter wall with an electronic gate and a guardhouse that was staffed around the clock. Approximately 70% of residents were white, 10% were Indian and 20% were black. The three-bedroom home where I lived was about 900 ft²
(83 m²), with a minuscule but well-appointed yard, complete with a tiny swimming pool, detached garage and braai stand (barbecue).

As a driver, living in the suburbs was sublime. Equipped with a remote, I could beam myself in and out of Spring Ridge’s perimeter wall and a detached garage. A small shopping complex was less than a kilometer from the house with a cafe, a fabulous used bookstore and a bakery. Upmarket grocery stores, movie theaters, specialty shopping and fine dining were all within a short drive. I often wrote up my field notes in elite establishments that were patronized almost exclusively by whites and staffed primarily by Africans living in the townships, including many
Zimbabweans. My favorite place was the now-closed Die Werf restaurant. It served typical Afrikaner cuisine from a 19th century farmhouse decorated in the same settler-colonial chic that adorned my Dutch grandparents’ farmhouse in Canada: antique saws and wagon wheels, taxidermy, and blue and white Delft ceramics with the windmill motif. Die Werf contained all the trappings of the colonial era: impeccable gardens, subservient black wait staff and an overbearing white management.

As highlighted in previous chapters, the Zimbabwean diaspora is economically diverse. People with relatively high incomes usually choose to reside in suburban security complexes. This was the case for the Zimbabwean family I stayed with in Spring Ridge. The husband was a robotics engineer whose wife worked as an administrative assistant. They lived with their three children and a nanny, and also usually had siblings or other relatives from Zimbabwe spend extended periods with them in order to establish themselves in South Africa. Like white residents (Lemanski 2004), Zimbabweans who live in security villages frequently cite the fear of violent crime as a motivating factor for choosing this type of housing. However, the fear of police is often more acute, as Believe explained:

[Living in a security village] causes less hassle with the police, because the police in Faerie Glen are not as frequent as in town… They are around, but it's not like you are going to bump into them when you are driving—it's very rare. We feel it's more secure. Especially when violence starts. Like the other time there was xenophobia. So when we are staying in these [suburban] areas it's a little bit safer than other areas like Sunnyside. The police assume that your paperwork is in order because it is not easy to find a place to stay in the eastern suburbs (Believe 2013)
Believe emphasized that even people who earn enough money to cover the monthly rental could be blocked from qualifying for a lease due to other financial barriers and close scrutiny of their immigration documentation:

A lot of people cannot stay here because of the security checks you have to go through to access this place. If you are a foreigner, they require a working visa, or if you are a student they require a student visa. Then you are required to pay three months in advance as a deposit. It's designed in a way so that you cannot afford it. Three months rent in advance is a lot of money (Believe 2013).

The socio-spatial arrangement of the suburbs was another factor discouraging people without private vehicles from living there:

It's very difficult to get around here. If you are on foot you will have a lot of problems with the security guards. We have small private security firms that patrol the area. Every three minutes there’s a vehicle passing up and down, and those guys are armed. If you are going to be on foot, you won’t get mugged, but it is [still] not advisable. [There are too many] security details and sometimes you run into the police. They are going to ask a lot of questions: “where are you going? where are you coming from? where do you stay? Do you have valid papers to be here?” Because if you are black and you are a foreigner they are going to ask a lot of questions. (Believe 2013)

Nevertheless, I did meet several low-income diasporans who lived in the suburbs, usually as guests of a sibling who had steady employment. One man I interviewed in England spent several
years at his sister’s house in Pretoria’s eastern suburbs before emigrating on a student visa. He underlined just how inhospitable the suburbs were for walkers:

I was working as a waiter at some mall in Pretoria East, I would finish at midnight, and it was so difficult to go home because all the public transport that goes to Faerie Glen would end between 6 and 8 pm.

I was making R 30 ($4) in tips per shift. We were paid in tips, there was no basic salary. After working for 10 hours you end up having to take a cab which was costing more money than I would have made that particular day.

Sometimes I was forced to walk at night. I remember one incident when the police ended up stopping me and asking for my ID. They did not believe that I was telling them the truth about where I stayed. They were only satisfied when they took me home and people identified me as a resident of that particular villa.

I experienced [transportation difficulties] on a daily basis. Even if you just went out for a movie and came out 9:00 PM, [the busses] wouldn't be able to drop you off close to where they normally pick you up in the mornings. You would end up having to walk a long distance to your home and that had serious security risks. Not that you would get robbed, but because you are afraid of the police themselves. You don't know what they can do.

The transportation issue made it almost impossible for someone to live in Faerie Glen without a vehicle. The area was not designed to support people that have very low income. In fact, it is designed to keep them out. (Panashe 2013)
The suburban architecture of exclusion made it difficult for Panashe to establish himself in South Africa due to sprawl, heightened surveillance by the police and private security, and a lack of public transportation. He had hoped to use his newly-minted teaching degree from one of Zimbabwe’s top universities to find a position in a South African high school. Unfortunately, money was extremely tight in the household. Despite his middle-class income, Panashe’s brother-in-law struggled to stay current with rent and bills, pay tuition for their two children and keep up with his responsibilities in Zimbabwe. Panashe explained:

Every time I needed to do an application I would have to go to that internet shop in Sunnyside. I would need R 7 ($0.94) to do that, plus transportation in and out of town. That's more than R 20 ($2.70). Just the thought of waking up and asking: “can I have R 20” every morning—it was just crazy. You know those guys who stand at the corners in the morning, just waiting for anyone to pick them up [for piece jobs]? I did that for like 5 days. [My sister] asked me to stop because the work was back-breaking. You'd start at 8:30, and you would just work until 5:00, not stopping for lunch. Then you would get R 100 ($13.40) at the end of the day. Or sometimes [the boss] would tell you after work: “ah, today I have only R50, guys.”

(Panashe 2013)

In hindsight, Panashe believed that living with his sister in the suburbs was a mistake, and wished he would have stayed with a friend in the inner-city when he moved to South Africa:

I would have been staying in a far different neighborhood, full of other Zimbabweans—black people—and I would get that information that I needed. When you are working with your peers, and they have the same drive, and are looking for the same
opportunities, you will definitely catch on to some good leads. When I was at Faerie Glen I would never get any good leads.

I had friends with the same qualifications as me, but they had some access to monetary resources and it made them progress much faster in terms of getting a job, or in terms of converting their qualifications to get certification to be teachers in South Africa. They ended up working, but I just ended up at home, having no money to get a work permit, having no money to go to Johannesburg where this stuff was happening. Every time I would hear of a vacancy—let’s say somebody calls me at 10:00 am, saying that they are hiring teachers in Soweto—my sister would have [already] gone to work, and I had no way to get into town to ask for bus fare. This is how opportunities used to just pass me by. (Panashe 2013)

Living in the suburbs was thus an isolating experience for Panashe, who ended up spending most of his time stranded at home. His brother in England—who later helped Panashe get into graduate school there—would occasionally send money, but after these meager resources were exhausted Panashe would be stuck again:

It was one of the loneliest periods in my life. I was so detached from the world it was unbelievable. Imagine if the only person that you could talk to in a week was your sister and your tsano [brother-in-law] and their kids. Just imagine the psychological impact on your growth as a person! You are not studying, you are not doing anything. You want to find a job but you are [stuck at home]. It was unbelievably destructive to my spirit. (Panashe 2013)

Panashe’s loneliness was accentuated by the centrifugal socio-spatial dynamics of the complex where he lived. Each residential unit had its own perimeter wall that discouraged
socialization with neighbors. People kept to themselves and were busy with their day-to-day lives:

[The complex had] multiple units—good units—but you would barely see people. It was unbelievable that I spent a year living there and never made friends. I can actually count the number of times that I said “hi” to someone. I only saw one Zimbabwean guy, but he worked a professional job so he was not always home. You would probably see him maybe on a Sunday going to church or something like that. (Panashe 2013)

Like Panashe, Believe also experienced social isolation. He exchanged pleasantries with a young couple living next door and he talked with the security guards because they were also from Zimbabwe. Apart from these acquaintances, he experienced little interaction with his neighbors:

It's just greetings—nobody cares what the next person does. There is no social interaction at all. Especially if you are on foot, because the other black people that you bump into—let's say that you are using public transport—they will be just passing by. Most of the black people around here it's either that they are working in the house as domestics, or they'll be garden boys. (Believe 2013)

Believe spoke to how racial tension heightened the social anxiety and isolation experienced by Zimbabweans in security estates.

It's very difficult for you to use common areas freely if you are black, because someone will come and complain about something each and every time. People will be talking and having fun. You won't be really loud, but you can feel the tension, like someone is
going to come and say: “you guys you better keep your noise low.” White people can watch their movies loud. They can even let cigarette smoke get into your house the whole night. But if you do the same, it becomes an issue. (Believe 2013)

Verengai and Sikulekile are a Zimbabwean couple who live with their daughter in a middle-class townhouse complex in the Eastern suburbs near Faerie Glen. Verengai works in the hospitality industry, as a hotel manager while Sikulekile is a university student. Verengai reported similar racial tensions that professional Zimbabweans experience at work:

I'm not a racist, but I was assistant general manager. My general manager was a white lady. I was the only black guy in administration, surrounded by four white ladies. These guys could all speak Afrikaans, and I could not even hear a word of what they were saying. I don’t enjoy working, but I go because I am from Zim and need to make ends meet. (Venganai 2013)

This sort of experience in the workplace was common for middle-class Zimbabweans. When South Africa won independence in 1994, Zimbabwe already had almost 15 years of freedom. Many people earned excellent professional qualifications during the post-independence educational boom. During this time, educational advancement for black people in South Africa was ruthlessly curtailed. Zimbabweans were thus comparatively well-positioned to compete in formerly white-only domains of Africa’s largest economy when it was opened to black participation. As a result, Zimbabweans are prominent in academia, medicine, law and business. In some cases, this evokes resentment from black South Africans. In others cases, Zimbabweans attest to facing the same barriers that confront black people of all backgrounds in an economy still largely in the hands of white ownership and management.
Thus, some middle-class diasporans felt duped or swindled by their subservient positions in South Africa. They had better jobs than most black people, yet confronted deep structural barriers at work. They lived in the best housing, but paid rent to white landlords and had difficulty qualifying for mortgages. Often, they end up living from paycheck to paycheck—unable to purchase homes, acquire savings, or realize the dreams they carried into South Africa when they first arrived. Debt was another complicating factor:

You are bombarded on TV and the shopping malls by new products, information, cell phones… Your brain becomes more materialistic, your priorities suddenly change. Now you want the latest car, the latest gadget. For what? Where we come from, these things are not necessities. The moment Zim guys get permanent residence [and can finally access credit], they buy a brand new R500,000 car. Is that really necessary? You pay through your nose every month for six years.

We initially fell into that trap. I went into a dealership to ask: “I want a loan to buy a car.”

They asked: “do you have any accounts?”

“No.”

“So how do we know you have a good credit record?”

Next thing, we open an account at OK [a large department and grocery store]. Then OK tells you: “we can give you furniture for R50,000.”
So we took furniture for R 15,000. It took two years to pay it back! Then the bed broke. We had to throw it away after paying R 7,000, when we could have bought it second-hand for R1,500 cash. After that we bought cell phones on account—two cell phones and a USB for internet.

Eventually you say to yourself: I think we are going crazy. Because every month they start deducting. OK wants R565, Vodacom wants R150, these guys wanted R180. All of a sudden you have installments of R1500. You start thinking: “I could have used this money for other things.” (Venganai 2013)

In addition to debt and frustration at work, Verengai and Sikulekile felt lonely and isolated at home due to a social isolation that extended beyond their townhouse complex:

Verengai: Life here is monotonous. It's boring. You do the same thing every day. You come from work, you watch TV, tomorrow is the same thing. If I go back home [to Zimbabwe] I can go to town every day, but this side it's difficult. You can't go to town because you're spending money and sometimes you are afraid.

Sikulekile: You don't feel safe [in town]. Because yesterday someone was shot there. You do not have that freedom of going out.

Verengai: Unless we go to Eastgate [Mall], we are always indoors. In terms of social life, virtually we have nothing. We are happy that the soccer league has started now. At least you can watch some TV (Venganai 2013).
Living in a hostile city prompts Verengai and Sikulekile to confine themselves to their home. This was depressing because they grew up in large, sociable families. Unfortunately, many of their close relatives were scattered around the world:

We went to the same schools up to university. But after that, we all dispersed. My brother is in Cape Town. I have three—you could say “cousins”—in the US. Two are in New Zealand, one is in Australia. We would practically share the same bed, the same cup of tea, but we are all over the world now. (Venganai 2013)

Fortunately, other “cousins” from this group lived about thirty kilometers away, in Midrand. These *most proximate* relatives now constituted the core of Verengai’s family:

At least I have 2 cousins and 3 nieces in Midrand. I can say that I am fortunate to be around them. That's what I call family now when I am here. If I am in hospital, those are the people that see where I am—the ones who are here in South Africa. That's what I can call a family now. Right now one of them is having a wedding. Everyone who can afford will come to the wedding in Midrand, because that's what we call home now. (Venganai 2013)

Thus, Verengai’s family evolved to incorporate the cousins who resided near him in South Africa. Nevertheless, it saddened Verengai that he was drifting apart from these cousins, despite their proximity. Road congestion could make the trip to their house longer than an hour, and his cousins did not have private vehicles so visiting was even more complicated for them. Unlike the inner-city where most Zimbabweans travel on foot and often have serendipitous encounters with friends and relatives, the social isolation experienced in the suburbs extends beyond the nested
walls of their complexes to effect relationships with friends and relatives who live in other parts of the city. Verengai observes:

> The moment we cross the borders [leaving Zimbabwe], people become too busy with their lives. I am not sure whether it is working schedules, or our social programs don't meet any more? Maybe I am working a weekend [shift] and they are going to church? It is no longer the same way it used to be back home, when we were teenagers—[I spent] every weekend together with 5 or 10 [cousins]. Now it's each man for himself. We can even spend 6 months without meeting each other.

> The sad thing is the way we view African families, the way we grew up and how we value African families is actually changing now. Everyone is just becoming independent. We are no longer relying on other people where I can call my cousin to help me with this or that. You have to be self-sufficient wherever you are because it's not easy to get to the next person who is very far away from you. We are more becoming independent. (Venganai 2013)

Verengai concluded that new spatialized living arrangements in South Africa, coupled by busy work schedules and stagnation within the lower-rungs of the corporate ladder is causing families like his to grow apart and become more individualistic. Thus, just as spatial proximity caused new forms of family to flourish in Schubart Park, so too does the architecture of exclusion change the relational practices of people living there. While they benefit from better-paying jobs and insulation from crime and xenophobia, they suffer from increased relational distance in their family and social networks.
Conclusion

This chapter showed how structures of opportunity and oppression that inhere within diasporic sites shape the lives of people residing within them. I juxtaposed two very different places where Zimbabweans live in Tshwane, South Africa to show how, as Deborah Pellow pithy puts it: “the social system and its spatial locale are mutually constituted. Social relations are spatialized while the physical environment and its spaces are culturalized” (Pellow 2002:2). The high rise complex of Schubart Park became a refuge from simmersing xenophobia, where diasporans felt comfortable expressing their own language and culture. Close living quarters, common public areas and a reliance on walking functioned as centripetal forces, drawing residents into new forms of “extended” and “nuclear” families characterized by serendipitous encounters, shared activities and experiences, interdependence, and the alignment of interests. At the same time, Schubart Park’s urban decay and proximity to “crime and grime” stigmatized residents as outsiders, “illegal” aliens and criminals, exposing them to violence and extortion. In contrast, Spring Ridge’s suburban architecture of exclusion protected diasporans from crime and xenophobia, while an affluent address and access to personal automobiles helped them avoid dangerous police encounters. This came at the expense of social interaction for they lived in isolation produced through the centrifugal qualities of fortified perimeters, internal divisions and ubiquitous surveillance. Neighbors had little interaction with each other while chance encounters with friends and relatives were almost eliminated. Even while Spring Ridge protected residents from crime and xenophobia, the predominantly white demographics exposed them to stifling racism. By comparing Schubart Park to Spring Ridge I accordingly argued that emplaced realities are instrumental in determining economic relational outcomes.
In a similar vein, Dominic Pasura has shown how various cities within England uniquely mould the social dynamics of resident diasporans. London’s cosmopolitanism leads to more expansive social networks, while the more oppressive racial dynamics of small-town Wigan draws diasporans into tightly-knit communities (Pasura 2012a). Additionally, ethnographic data throughout this dissertation—collected in South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United States and England—reveals how immigration regimes, economic climates and cultures of (in)tolerance shape diasporic experiences on a national level. Broadly speaking, people in wealthy countries earn higher salaries and avail of better educational opportunities than diasporans in South Africa and Botswana. Migrant outcomes are accordingly shaped by nested, emplaced structures of opportunity and oppression.

A main argument in this dissertation is that differing structures of emplaced opportunity shape the life experiences not only of people in the diaspora, but also of their loved ones in other diasporic locations and in Zimbabwe. After migrating, many diasporans remain closely connected to their families. However, participation in dispersed families is powerfully shaped by access to money, travel and technologies of communication. For example, the superior economic abilities of siblings in Europe often give them more influence over family agendas than siblings in South Africa. Meanwhile, the proximity of South Africa to Zimbabwe enables undocumented diasporans in that country to visit home more easily than undocumented Zimbabweans in the United States who have no easy path back into the diaspora if they board a plane. Meanwhile, a lack of awareness about life in distant locations produces knowledge gaps which may result in conflict and misunderstanding. These differences in emplaced understanding were apparent even within Tshwane, as Mai Domingo recounted that her friends could not comprehend why Schubart Park was such a meaningful place for her to live. These experiential, knowledge and
economic disjunctures are the focus of the following chapter which explores collaboration and conflict in border-straddling projects undertaken by dispersed families.
Chapter Five: Collaboration and Conflict

Introduction

This chapter focuses on practices of relatedness in families that are dispersed between locations. As emphasized, Zimbabweans in the past and today use migration as a means to make their families work. By leaving Zimbabwe they seek educational and income opportunities that will help them meet the needs of parents, children, siblings, siblings’ children and others who remain behind. Thus, one irony of migration is that supporting one’s family usually entails leaving it behind. Today, increasingly restrictive immigration laws and fluctuating global opportunities result in prolonged separations and broad dispersion that fragments the diaspora at large as well as individual families.

As a result, many contemporary Zimbabwean families must now negotiate different and distant emplaced realities in their everyday relational activities. This can be difficult for families that are divided between Zimbabwe and a single diasporic location, and even more challenging for those which are divided between multiple locations. Spatial distance often leads to relational distance through a process of “separate development.” Over time, people acquire divergent life experiences, social networks, and daily routines that can be difficult to understand for relatives in distant locations. Economic differentiation also occurs in response to specific educational, employment, and documentary opportunities and obstacles that inhere in each location where family members live. Indeed, the challenge of performing family across long distances,
staggered time zones and differing social and economic contexts can produce conflict that causes family boundaries to shift.

Despite the difficulties, many diasporans continue to work with loved ones in Zimbabwe and around the world in order to accomplish family projects like raising children, caring for elders, starting businesses, building houses, attaining passports, and aiding others to enter the diaspora. Diasporans often derive tremendous meaning by participating in these projects, even though they must work within constrained budgets and are often forced to make difficult choices about who will benefit from their financial contributions. People in Zimbabwe generally have less capacity to participate economically, but their on-the-ground presence is usually instrumental in a project’s success or failure. Indeed, some projects do fail, and even ones that succeed can sometimes result in frayed or broken relationships. Families are what families do, as argued in previous chapters. Thus, collaborative projects provide ideal ethnographic objects of inquiry for understanding relational dynamics in dispersed families.

**Relational Distance and Separate Development**

I have argued that practices of relatedness can be roughly divided into *monumental* and *incremental* actions. Monumental practices of relatedness are similar to spatial interventions that create material places with cement trucks and earth moving equipment. They tend to be planned and coordinated gatherings during which a family forcefully and publicly affirms, reproduces or modifies its contours and links to other families. Monumental events—like weddings and funerals—involve legal and ritualistic invocations that powerfully influence a family’s contours for years to come. Incremental performances of relatedness, meanwhile, build families through
the accretion of everyday interaction and care, in much the same way that material places becomes meaningful places through the routine activities of people who dwell within them and use them. While less remarkable in nature, incremental practices of relatedness are tremendously important in developing aligned interests, shared purpose, and collective identities.

Many practices of relatedness are premised on the spatial proximity of loved ones. Proximity, however, is an early casualty of migration. The expense, time and legalities of travel are often beyond the reach of diasporans and their loved ones at home. Accordingly, spatial distance often results in relational distance. For example, Notando is a South African married to a Zimbabwean. She was pregnant at the time of our interview so the difficulty of bringing her new infant to meet family in Zimbabwe was weighing on her mind:

Births as well as funerals are very important moments for African culture. That’s when the family comes together and mourns or celebrates. That’s when you see the family—cousins that you haven’t seen in a very long time—so it becomes a bit of a social event as well. When that is taken away, it creates a wedge, and we become strangers as the years go by. There are new people who come into the family, get married, and you don’t know them. Babies are born and you don’t meet them. Me and my husband are in a tight financial situation, so we can’t just go over to Zim and say “hey guys” for a weekend. We can’t bring the baby to see mama. I’m left with a month until the baby arrives. What do we do? My mother-in-law says I should come to give birth in Zim, but the hospitals are not up to standard. The other option is to bring her here, but she also has commitments, and then there is the financial elements as well. If you bring someone here, you need to cater for them.

(Notando 2013)
Notando laments how cost of travel complicates her participation in the monumental ritual of introducing a newborn to its grandparents and other relatives. In Southern Africa, this practice may involve giving birth under the parents’ care, but deterioration of the health infrastructure makes her reluctant to do this in Zimbabwe. One partial solution could have been to bring the grandmother to meet the baby in South Africa. Unfortunately, this would also involve expenses that were beyond the couple’s reach, and would have required complicated logistical arrangements because Notando’s mother-in-law was providing care to other grandchildren whose parents were also abroad. Thus, in Notando’s poignant words, separation “creates a wedge.”

Dispersed kin find it difficult to form relationships with new relatives who they are unable to welcome into the family through face-to-face encounters. As a result, they can “become strangers as the years go by.”

Venganai, meanwhile, describes how spatial distance also complicates incremental performances of relatedness. As a child in Zimbabwe, he grew up in a closely-knit group of “cousins” who lived near each other, shared meals, played together, and attended the same schools. He lamented that this everyday closeness and interdependence was unavailable to his daughter in Tshwane, whose own “cousins” lived far away:

[My sister] is working in Cape Town. She's married and has a family. So it is difficult for us to get back together because of financial and work constraints. I was in the hotel industry for the past five years, and I couldn't go home for Christmas. When I finally get leave in January or October, my relatives are no longer at home.

All that stresses the family unit. My sister has two children who have never met my eight year old daughter. If I tell her that I have a sister in Cape Town, she doesn't really
appreciate it. That's my immediate family, but I grew up around my mother's brothers’ and sisters’ children. There was a social support system. We went to the same schools up to university, but after that we all dispersed. Four are in the US, and they have children now. My other cousin is in Australia, and he also has children. Our kids have never met and don’t know to say “those are my cousins.” I think they will never know that we are related. Even if they do know, it won't have the same value that we used to have as a family. I don't know what will happen to our kids—or how their social system will work. (Venganai 2013)

Venganai emphasizes that physical distance produces social distance between dispersed “cousins” because they have no embodied, everyday interactions with each other which will lead them to “value” their relationship. These are children who would have spent a lot of time together if they lived near each other due to their parents’ own close “cousinship” during childhood—which was really “siblingship” according to Shona reckoning. Because they are dispersed across three continents, Venganai’s daughter will never sleep over at her “cousins’” houses, bump into them while walking around the neighborhood, or attend the same schools like their parents did. They may know about each other and understand the technicalities of their relationship, but they will never appreciate the deep significance this relationship could hold. As a result, Venganai laments that they will not avail of the social support that he and his “cousins” still provide each other in times of need.

Relational distance is not, however, simply a product of the discontinuation of relational practices through separation. Differentiation is also at play. People’s worldviews, languages, expectations, incomes and social networks are uniquely shaped by the various places where they live—in ways that may not be understood by loved ones far away. Notando elaborated how this
separate development undermined her attempts to help her firstborn build intimacy with his “cousin” in England over the telephone:

There is a language barrier. [My “nephew”] has a very heavy British accent, and when [he and my son] speak over the phone—which hardly ever happens—there is a disconnect. There is not that “hey, you are my cousin!” closeness like what I have with my cousins. Because we grew up on the streets together [in South Africa], and our children are now playing together. But my sister-in-law’s children are complete strangers to us. And he does not speak Shona. His mother is Shona and his dad is Shona, but he is British. He needs to be British for that environment, but it will cut him off from [my children]. They won’t see a point in connecting on Facebook or whatever… (Notando 2013)

Notando’s attempts to have her son connect with his cousin in England exemplify how diasporans develop strategies to bridge relational distance with distant loved ones. Like Venganai, she notes that separation precludes the accretion of relationship-building interactions. However, she goes one step further to emphasize that cultural and linguistic differentiation add an additional layer of complexity to mitigating spatial divides. Her son’s telephone conversations with his “cousin” are stilted; and, while they could theoretically connect on social media when they are older, she believes that these barriers will be so formidable that this is unlikely.

Through my conversations with Zimbabweans around the world, I have come to believe that relational distance and separate development are key dynamics that shape dispersed families. However, various types of relationships are impacted differently. This is visible by comparing the effects of separation between spouses to the effects of separation between parents and dependent children. Later I will also explore how dispersion influences sibling relationships.
Many diasporans who venture abroad leave children with caretakers due to the expense and uncertainties of travel. These so-called “diaspora orphans” usually (but not always) remain with their grandparents or their parents’ siblings (Kufakurinani, et al. 2014). As the examples above begin to show, young people are particularly susceptible to relational distancing. In this vein, Notando described how the linguistic divide that arose between her son and their cousins in England also affected the relationship with her own son when he spent a year in Zimbabwe with his grandmother:

I met [my husband’s mother] for the very first time when I went to pick her up at Park Station in Johannesburg. When she was here, I sensed that I could trust this woman, that she would be able to look after my son better than what I was doing. She said, “I can see that things are really tough right now between you guys. And career-wise you are trying to find your feet. So just [send] him over to Zimbabwe for a little bit, and when you find some sort of stability then you can take him back.”

She’s such a blessing! I’m forever indebted to that woman. She really came through just in the nick of time and literally saved our marriage. She took a lot of the pressure away, and we definitely needed that.

It was really tough not being able to see him. When he left, we would communicate in Zulu because he didn’t speak English at the time. That became a barrier because he started speaking Shona in Zimbabwe. I would call him, and you would hear someone translating [in the background] “Your mother is saying this so you need to say this.”
I would say “how are you?”

Then someone in the background would tell him “say: I’m fine”

Then he would say “I’m fine” and there was that awkward silence. When he came back to South Africa, I was on the outside. [He and his father] were like a little clique—two peas in a pod. They would speak in Shona all the time, and I was like on the outside. Now the Shona is going slowly but surely… (Notando 2013)

Notando’s story reveals how dispersion can be a tremendous resource for families. She and her husband were able to survive a tumultuous period early in their marriage and careers by sending their son to his grandmother’s house in Harare. Unfortunately, spatial distance can also be a relational liability. Notando’s son forgot Zulu in Zimbabwe which was the language he and his mother used to communicate. This made it difficult for them to connect over the phone—once again revealing how people are shaped by the emplaced routines, languages and social networks of the locations where they live. Indeed, the innate adaptability of youth by which Notando’s son effortlessly learned Shona and forget his mother tongue can lead to situations where children in Zimbabwe form close relationships with caretakers at the expense of preexisting relationships with their parents who venture abroad. This is what happened when Tafiranyika left his daughter with his brother in Zimbabwe when he went to South Africa:

I wasn't able to send money, and phoning was not that common for two years. When I went home and saw her, she didn't know me any more. She was thinking my brother was her real dad, and his wife was her real mother. Then I brought her to South Africa. When my friends asked “where is your father?” she would tell them “my father is in Zimbabwe,”
meaning my brother! Sometimes I got angry. I am the father, but she doesn't want to accept it!

Now she's in grade two, and she knows that I'm her dad. (Tafiranyika 2012)

As Tafiranyika explained, it can be *excruciating* for parents when separation attenuates the attachment between them and their children. John—who also lives in South Africa—felt this pain with his youngest daughter who was born after he departed:

> My wife was pregnant when I left, so it was my first time meeting my youngest daughter. She was suspicious at first. Everyone came running to greet me, screaming: “daddy! daddy!” giving me hugs, except for her. She didn't know who I was. She just stood off to the side and didn't know what was happening.

> I got her a lot of yogurt and ice cream because that was about the only way that she could become close to me. By the time I left, she didn't want me to go. She was crying for me continuously. I was only planning on staying for three days, but I ended up staying for a week because I wanted that bond with my child. I wanted her to know that when I am away, *daddy is there*. I took a picture of us and put it in a frame so that she can see us together. Imagine, she is only 2 years and 4 months. It is difficult for children to remember people at that age.

> I make it a policy to phone home every weekend—Friday, Saturday or Sunday. First I talk to my firstborn child, the girl. I ask, “what is bothering you?” She tells me her problems. I tell her, “I can only manage to solve ABC. Then the rest, I'll come and solve them later.” After that, I tell her to give the phone to my younger son, my second born. I talked to him and he tells me his problems. He says: “daddy, I want this… A laptop… I want whatever…” You know boys. I say, “I cannot afford to buy a laptop, I can only buy a bicycle and books, so you
can go to school.” The major problem is you have to make sure that whatever they want, I have to make sure that I give it to them. It has to be done. (John 2012)

John and Tafiranyika both describe how the parent-child bond develops through routine, everyday contact and provision of care and attenuates through separation. This bond can be entirely absent for children whose parents leave when they are very young. Many diaspora parents accordingly devise ways to establish and sustain relationships with their children when they leave. One of the most straightforward strategies is to reestablish spatial proximity. Tafiranyika thus summoned his daughter to live with him in South Africa, while John made a point of visiting home and staying long enough for his daughter to establish a relationship with him. He helped this process along by showering her with gifts and leaving her a photo of the two of them together. In South Africa, he also makes a point of calling them every weekend. They know to expect this phone call to the extent that a routine has developed where he begins by talking to the oldest and then to the middle child. The three year old, however, is more difficult to communicate with on the phone.

John thus emphasizes that listening and providing council to his children is an important part of parenting in absentia. Another important aspect of his parenting is giving his children the things that they desire—and especially the things that they need. He elaborates:

If I was at home, probably I would just say: " I'll buy it for you later, I'll buy it for you later.” But when you are far away—that loneliness that comes when others are seeing their father at home—I don't want him or her to miss me to such extent. They always go to other people's houses, and find that they are with their fathers, but when they come home I am not there. Especially with my son: he cannot tell everything to my wife. There are certain things
that my son wants, and he can only tell me. I make sure I get him that thing. If I can't, I have to tell him rather than promise something that I can't deliver. If you want to bicycle, I tell him “no problem.” I did buy him a bicycle. Now he is saying “Daddy, I want a laptop.”

I realized that I must give them what they want because I failed one day. Last Christmas I was dismissed from work because my papers were not in order. Then they thought “our father is no longer available for us.” I did not buy them anything that Christmas. In October my son started asking me, “what are you going to buy us for Christmas?”

I said, “I am going to buy ABCD, ABCD. but you have to wait.”

November came. December came. I was fired. They had their worst Christmas last year. I promised them, but I failed. I actually didn't want to call them Christmas Day, but I was forced to call them. My firstborn is 15 now. I didn't have any problem relating my story to her, I told her exactly what happened. But it was difficult for my 7-year-old to understand. Really difficult. But my young brother had already bought something for my youngest daughter, the one that I only knew when I went home last time…

John describes how—in the absence of daily interaction—he and his children feel “lonely.” This is accentuated by observing other families where fathers are present. One way John fills this void is by providing material remittances so that his presence can be felt even when he is absent. Thus, when an unpredictable turn of South Africa’s immigration regime left him jobless at Christmas he felt like a failure as a parent. His teenager took it in stride, and John’s brother jumped in to give a gift to the toddler, but his 7-year old was extremely disappointed and could not understand what happened. Children in this age group are unlikely to “forget” their parents like infants and toddlers. Instead, they are often frustrated by their inability to comprehend the
nuances surrounding their parents’ departure. Kumbirai, a psychologist in Zimbabwe who works with many diaspora orphans, elaborates:

[Diaspora orphans] are really, really, really grieving. Right now I'm dealing with a girl who is 10 years old and the parents are in South Africa. She started to have physiological pathologies. The doctors have tried to look for various things, but they can't find out what is wrong with her. She's also not concentrating in class. Her performance has just gone down. At the end we realize she is suffering from grief.

Most of these children are very angry. They wonder: “why did my dad leave me? Why did they leave me? Why can't I go?” A boy I am working with is with the grandparents here in Zimbabwe. For some reason, his other siblings went with the mother and father to UK. They’ve been trying repeatedly to bring him, but they have failed. The problem is with the British government. This boy is becoming more and more angry at his parents: ‘why did you leave me right from the beginning?!’ He's refusing to eat.”

Children of parents in the diaspora are really struggling. A school in town actually approached me because so many of the children in that school are broken because of their parents who are out. They just miss that parent figure. No matter how well the care givers are doing it, they just feel that their parents would do better. (Kumbirai 2013)

Kumbirai’s work with diaspora orphans reveals how many of them suffer psychological distress and behavioral problems resulting from their inability to wrap their heads around complicated social, political and economic dimensions of migration. For instance, one boy who is unable to join his family in England is angry at his parents because he is too young to appreciate how diligently they are fighting against a rigid immigration regime in order to bring
him to join them. Kumbirai went on to elaborate how the transition to a relative’s household disrupts the daily routines that anchor children’s identity and belonging:

> The children are given to someone else, and restart a relationship, and learn new ways of doing things in a completely new environment. That disturbs children a lot. They are used to sleeping at certain times and eating certain foods. To children, things like food are important. A change in those [small] things, in their child's worldview, and they start to question: “why are we not eating what we used to eat? Why are we not going to where we are supposed to go, where we used to go?” In our African setup, religious issues are very important. Sometimes when the parents leave, the children will have to change even their religious affiliation. Sometimes children even change their schools because they are relocated from Harare to Mutare, because Grandmother is in Mutare. (Kumbirai 2013)

Nokhuthula, another family counselor in Zimbabwe, echoed Kumbirai’s observations of the difficulty that children experience when daily routines of care are interrupted by parents who venture overseas. She used the example of a client whose parents tried—like John—to compensate for their physical absence by sending money and gifts. They had decent jobs in the UK so they provided much more lavishly than John was able to as a store clerk in South Africa:

> A child came to me, very frustrated. I asked him: “what is it that you don't have? Your mother is sending you money. You bought a car. You go to one of the nicest schools…”

> Crying, he tells me: "what I need is not money. I want my mother to come and help me. I want my mother to come and love me.”
When you are a family, and your mother and father are present, there are things that you don't even think about. Then you realize: “I’m on my own. No one is going to support me any more. I'm forced to make decisions, many of which are even bigger than my age. I want these people to be here, to do those things for me. I don't want money, I want them.” Children miss a hug, just to be loved. Most were used to the kind of life where every night before they go to sleep it was: “Goodnight, give me a hug sweetie.” Those things are not there anymore. No one is there to say “good night” before they sleep. They miss that. (Nokhuthula 2012)

Nokhutula described how the well-intentioned expression of love by providing material goods was a poor substitute for daily, embodied demonstrations of care. Her young client yearned for his parents’ presence more than their presents. Indeed, Nokhutula argued that over-providing can sometimes have extremely negative consequences:

A young boy who normally eats food because the mother has put food on the table, doesn’t even know how much money the mother has in the safe. All they know is “If I want food, my mother will put food on the table.” Now it's the boy who is in charge. A 15 year old is now in charge of maybe $2,000 US that has been saved by the mother. That is too much money in your hand, and that destroyed him. Because now he could afford to take girlfriends home and sleep with them, and pay them. So now we saw so many young men getting into prostitution. The money that was supposed to take care of them is the money that is now destroying them. You see, where there is money it attracts many friends. But are they good influence? They are coming for your money, so they do things to please you. They don't tell you things straight in the eye: "you know, what you are doing is wrong" because they want you to give them your money. So they will tell you anything you want to hear. "Oh, you're our
boss. Hallelujah!” The money was supposed to take care of the kids but that money destroyed those children.

Nokhutula’s reflections illustrate how complicated it is to raise children in absentia. Disruptions to the everyday, incremental provision of love and care were often at the root of psychological and behavioral problems experienced by diaspora orphans. Parents, meanwhile, contend with capricious immigration laws that prolong separation—a situation that youngsters are often unable to comprehend. Some parents try to substitute presence with gifts and money. This may help activate the bond between children and parents, but it often has unanticipated negative consequences.

Of course, some diaspora orphans do manage to thrive with their new caretakers. John’s children seem to be relatively well-adjusted, undoubtably benefiting from continuity of care from their mother who remained with them in Zimbabwe. Other success stories include the children in Brian’s family mentioned in the introduction, the daughter of Belinda’s sister in Chapter 2, and Eurita from Chapter 3 who took care of another woman’s children in New York in order to finance her own daughter’s upbringing with caretakers in Zimbabwe—an ironic but lamentably common arrangement in many migrant communities (Fresnoza-flot 2009; Madziva and Zontini 2012; Parreñas 2013; Uy-Tioco 2007). Notwithstanding these successes, it appears to me that children are especially vulnerable to suffering negative consequences associated with family dispersion. Indeed, I know many diaspora orphans with tragic outcomes despite committed parents, dedicated caregivers and the innate adaptability and resilience of childhood.
Dispersed marriages

Dispersed marriages are also a common result of migration. In some cases, partners end up in different diasporic destinations. More commonly—as in John’s family—one partner remains in Zimbabwe while the other ventures overseas. Like dispersed parents and children—dispersed spouses often experience increased relational distance as a result of separation. For example, John—who was distraught by his youngest daughter’s failure to know him when he visited Zimbabwe—also described how difficult it was for he and his wife to be separated:

To be honest, being apart is killing her. I came to South Africa at a time when things were very tough back home. I had no choice, and she understood it. I told her that I had to go and work and try to support the family. The thing is, I grew up with a family which had Christian values. My wife grew up in a children's home. Both of her parents passed away when she was small so she values marriage and family like nobody's business. She sometimes, says: “hey listen: I grew up without a mother and father, both parents. [Now] my kids are also growing up like this, because you are not around. Yes you are [alive], but you are not around.”

There are always issues that pop up that need to be solved. Imagine, if my kid had a fight in school, the headmaster will say “go and bring your parents.” I can't come. Or, my first born, she is doing very well in school, but whenever she gets a prize or an award, it is only my wife who is there. My wife misses me, and always says that she wants me to be there for her. To be honest, she cries a lot [that I am gone]. (John 2012)
John recounted that his wife especially missed his physical presence—his everyday companionship and assistance in helping solve problems as they arose, whether these were parenting conundrums or repairs around the house. He also spoke to the difficulty of maintaining sexual intimacy and exclusivity with his wife during their long years of separation:

Imagine, 3 years [apart], it's not a joke. She is a woman, she is young. She needs a husband. Everyone knows that if you have a wife, she needs her husband to be there. And for me, spending three years without having sex, it's pretty tough to be honest. It's tough on her also. Whenever I phone, she always says: “are you taking care of my things? You're not!”

I say: “Yes, I'm not getting around. You know about AIDS. The children are still young, they need to be taken care of.”

She says, “I grew up in an orphanage. So take care of yourself. I'm taking care of myself here, you should also take care of yourself down there. If you have done that, good.”

Let me be honest. She actually knew that here in South Africa I am going to meet someone. She will even tell me: “I know there are some ladies, at least make sure that you protect yourself.” (John 2012)

John insinuated that he may occasionally have liaisons in South Africa that his wife regretfully sanctions on the condition that he protects himself from STDs. Similarly, I know a woman who co-resided with a “second husband” in Zimbabwe while her “official husband” worked in Qatar and diligently sent home money every month. This “second husband” became the brunt of many jokes in the neighborhood, especially when he mysteriously disappeared from town just before the “official husband” visited home, only to reappear after the latter returned to
the Gulf. Such cases show how divided partners sometimes improvise new forms of commitment that can withstand prolonged separation. Nevertheless, the prognosis for long-distance marriages is often poor, and I came across many cases where distance resulted in divorce. Nokhutola attributed the failure of many dispersed marriages to loneliness and a need for intimacy and companionship in an environment where many diasporans are socially alienated, even from those with whom they live:

The paperwork of most people who went to diaspora was not right. They could not just go there and come back within a month to see what is happening. Most of them even are still working on their paperwork even after 10 or 15 years. We are human beings, we are not made of steel. What are the chances of staying faithful for 15 years of waiting? We cannot deny that some people can stay faithful, but the chances are very slim. In the diaspora, everyone is in their own house, concerned about their own business. They don't talk to neighbors, and there is no social life. People can even live in the same flat, and not see each other for 2 or 3 weeks. That’s life in the diaspora, especially the UK. So a person who goes to diaspora meets someone from Zimbabwe or another African country. “You're from South Africa? I'm from Zimbabwe.” So these people were too hungry for love-making, they don't care if they are married, they don't care if they left families. They start sleeping together, and now they are married. (Nokhuthula 2012)

In another example, Duduzile recounted how a simple misunderstanding between one of her “cousins” in the United States and his wife in Zimbabwe proved to be insurmountable:

So, my cousin-brother bought a house with his wife. He basically worked for all the money in the United States. Wife was here in Zimbabwe with the kids, so he bought
everything in her name, because they were together and everything was fine. Then they start to have some sort of conflict because he is taking too long to bring wife to America. But what wife doesn't understand is he is illegal there so it's complicated to make things happen. I think when he went, things were still easier so he said I'm going to get you soon. But then immigration policy changed quick, and now she is not able to go to America with the kids. But she thinks that he's not bringing her because he’s starting to have girlfriends, so she's angry. She starts planning her own things and ends up going to Australia because she's a nurse. When she goes, she calls her parents to start living at that house to take care of the kids. They live in that house for years taking care of the kids and eventually she sorted it out in Australia and the husband comes back to Zimbabwe thinking they are going to work it out and he will go to Australia. But she said, "there's nothing to work out. I'm just going to take the kids." Now those parents of hers now live in that house and they are refusing to leave, saying “this is our daughter's house.” Now she's the one with capital because she is sending the money. He's stuck back here because he was illegal in the US and can’t go back, and she won’t bring him to Australia, and he doesn’t even have the house that he bought with all that money he made in America. Life's a bitch. I can't believe that happened. (Duduzile 2013)

In this case it appears that Duduzile’s brother and his wife separated not because of actual infidelity but because of the suspicion of infidelity. Duduzile argues that the wife in Zimbabwe was unable to appreciate how difficult it was for her husband to bring her to the United States. Indeed, he himself was caught off guard when immigration controls tightened and made reunification much more difficult. When the wife finally got a job in Australia, her husband returned to Zimbabwe so that he could accompany her down under. Unfortunately, it was too late
to save the relationship. The wife took the children and left him destitute in Zimbabwe. Even the house that was built with his funds ended up belonging to her parents.

In some cases, divorces can have catastrophic consequences for dependents in Zimbabwe. When one partner remarries, this may constrict or even terminate the flow of remittances that they depend on for daily sustenance. This was the case when Decent’s sister’s husband acquired South African citizenship, a drivers license, a firearms permit, and a good job as a private security guard:

He just dumped my sister because now he's now living in better conditions. He took the kids and gave them to his sister. So now my sister is just staying at her place, stuck. He's not assisting even a little bit, even just to send something here and there. All these difficulties are caused by diaspora. Some people end up being married here in South Africa, and married again in Zimbabwe. Then the risk of sexually-transmitted diseases will be high. (Decent 2013)

Unanticipated long-term separation thus prevents spouses from engaging in many of the spontaneous, daily tasks and conversations resulting from sharing localized responsibilities and a common living space, including childcare, sharing meals, home provisioning and maintenance, sex, arguing, making-up, etc. Communication between separated spouses is further interrupted by misaligned time zones, conflicting schedules, and the expense of making international calls. As time passes, each partner tends to develop routines that incorporate tasks, people, places and challenges that are largely unknown to their partners. For example, Lameck is an academic in South Africa while his wife is in Germany and their two children alternate between their households. He explained with exceptional clarity how years of separation caused the couple to drift, with each knowing relatively little about the other person’s friends, jobs and daily routines:
When we first got married, my wife asked me if she could actually work outside the house, and also when the job in Germany came I said to her, “I’m supporting you, I actually think it's a good thing.” Now I'm thinking I made a mistake. Because now she no longer asks me about anything. I'm not important anymore in terms of being consulted and making joint decisions. It comes out that she knows she's leaving on Saturday. But I don't know, because the e-mail comes to her. She won't tell me until maybe Friday evening. “Oh, by the way I'm leaving for Japan tomorrow.”

“Oh, you're leaving tomorrow?”

“Oh yeah—I forgot to tell you.” But she's known, maybe for a week or two. In Germany, on a daily basis she encounters different things and different people. She talks different stories and makes decisions that I do not know about. This is why I keep mentioning “separate development.” (Lameck 2012)

Lameck poignantly used the termed “separate development” to describe the relational distance that arose between him and his wife through separation. Living far from each other restricted the couples’ knowledge and experiences of the others’ daily activities and associations. Lameck resented that his wife did not keep him in the loop about international business trips, and he also complained that she frequently made parenting decisions without consulting him. The difference in emplaced opportunities between South Africa and Germany also equipped Lameck’s wife with comparatively lucrative employment that enabled her to make vastly more economic contributions to the household than her husband, revealing how economic differentiation is often entangled with relational differentiation and reformulated gender dynamics.
As a professor in the humanities at a South African university, Lameck very consciously and deliberately used the term “separate development.” As previously noted, this was the very term used by the Apartheid regime to justify the construction of racist geographies. On a material level, Apartheid’s policy of separate development inscribed white supremacy onto the landscape and thereby facilitated the inequitable distribution of wealth, education and other forms of opportunity. However, separate development was also a social intervention designed to circumscribe interracial contact and communion. The architects of Apartheid understood that people who share living and socializing spaces could be inclined to develop aligned interests and collective identities in the same way that people who share domestic space tend towards becoming a family. They feared, for example, that poor whites living alongside poor blacks in the freehold areas during the 1910s and 1920s would bridge the racial barrier to form class-based alliances. Lameck’s insightful use of the term “separate development” thus emphasizes that migration produces social, relational and economic differentiation between spouses separated by migration vis-à-vis the same sociospatial pathway—geographic separation—that the Apartheid regime harnessed to produce and reinforce racial distance.

Gaps in knowledge about life in distant locations:

As Lameck and other respondents noted, one of the most significant difficulties faced by dispersed families is differentiation with respect to language, daily activities, workplaces, associations, experiences and economic realities. Differentiation produces knowledge gaps: that is, incomplete or inaccurate understandings about the daily life circumstances experienced by
loved ones in distant locations. Taona, an academic in England, explains how these disjunctures sometimes result from the deliberate withholding of information:

People at home don't share the extent of their problems because they think it might make it worse for you. So they might not say exactly how they are coping, or the difficulties. Even the migrants don't share the extent of the suffering in diaspora. You want to protect them from worrying. (Taona 2014)

In addition to protecting loved ones from distress by withholding troubling information, Taona added that sometimes it is simply impossible to translate his new reality to relatives in Zimbabwe, especially for the older generation which has no experience of the academic career path he has chosen in the United Kingdom:

They can't understand why you are not working, or why you are still in school. When I was doing my PhD, my father said “man, this school never ends! Why don't you just go to work?” So there are certain things you can't explain to them. (Taona 2014)

Taona reflects that his father could not comprehend how a thirty year-old man could still be a student. This lack of experiential knowledge of England in general and the academic career path in particular was so acute that Taona actually stopped trying to explain it. This section demonstrates how these sorts of knowledge gaps that arise through separate development can lead to misunderstandings and conflict. In particular, I examine the incomplete knowledge that people in dispersed families often have about their relatives’ financial situations, both in Zimbabwe and abroad.
Knowledge gaps generally become more accentuated over time. As Notando mentioned above, Zimbabweans who are abroad are often unable to attend marriages, births and funerals. Consequently, the longer they are gone, the less familiarity they have with their family’s changing contours as new people are added through birth or marriage, and as the elders depart. Diasporans can also have difficulty keeping up with the evolving interests, friends and routines of loved ones at home. This is particularly evident in the lack of *experiential* knowledge that many diasporans have with the challenges presented by Zimbabwe’s catastrophic economic decline.

For instance, several diasporans returning from their first trip back to Zimbabwe after many years abroad told me about being *astounded* by an infrastructure that had deteriorated almost beyond recognition in their absence. Of course, they knew *about* this vicariously, though online newspapers, discussions with other diasporans, communication with friends and relatives at home, and participation in collaborative family projects. Nevertheless, it was jarring to go home and actually *walk through* barren patches of dirt where they remembered green lawns and verdant fields. When they left Zimbabwe, taking a bath was a simple matter of turning on a faucet; but upon visiting ten years later they found appreciation for their parents’ new reality when they stood in long lines at the communal well to carry home heavy buckets of water that they then had to heat on a wood fire. Returning diasporans also described the dislocation resulting from the absence of so many friends and relatives they associated with home—people who had perished during periods of accentuated poverty and illness, or who had also left Zimbabwe to pursue opportunity in other parts of the world.
Diasporans’ inaccurate or incomplete knowledge of Zimbabwe is especially visible with respect to hyperinflation in 2007 and 2008. For example, Belinda observed that knowledge gaps are characterized by *experiential* disjunctures, not simply informational ones. While taking care of her sister’s child whose mother was in the United Kingdom, Belinda experienced a degree of economic absurdity that she felt was difficult to appreciate from afar:

I don’t think my sister can understand that period. You actually had be here to *experience* having a handbag full of money worth just a loaf of bread! Reading in newspapers and seeing pictures of queues is not the same. If you're coming from a first world country, you take [grocery shopping] for granted. But we had long queues even to buy sugar and milk. Sometimes you would see a queue and just stand in it without knowing what it was for! That time was so crazy. It's like, one of those American countries where they experienced flooding or something. Somebody is trying to explain to you that “I was carrying my child and trying to swim across this street.” And I'm looking at this street, and thinking, “really? water all across this street? Where is it coming from?” So I can listen, but will I really appreciate? I don't think so. It doesn't really hit home. But it's actually happened! I have tried to explain that time to my sister, but she simply laughs. (Belinda 2012)

As Belinda describes, her sister had difficulty appreciate the everyday realities of hyperinflation without actually being in Zimbabwe to *experience* the casino economy. Her sister knew *about* hyperinflation and tangentially participated in the casino economy whenever she sent money home. However, she could no more fathom the absurdity of standing in long queues for an unknown commodity than Belinda could comprehend swimming the flooded streets of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The family counselor Nokhuthula explained that this lack
of experience with new modes of survival and ways of doing business can make it difficult for diasporans to succeed if they return home:

Now have more people in the diasproa wanting to come back. Why? Because now in Zimbabwe we are using US dollars. There in the UK they are using pounds, the difference isn't much at all. Now, the challenge that we are having is those who remained home, they grew stronger. Because if you have challenges—if you have problems—you start thinking, “how can I solve this problem? How can I handle this situation?” At the end of the day we became veterans. We become people who know how to handle situations.

We are survivors, champions. We were forced to go to South Africa [to buy goods], and come and sell in Zimbabwe. Many people even built houses, achieving more than those in diaspora. Some who come to visit find that life is different now. Things have changed.

Like those who could not really afford, now they've got houses. Because you'd find maybe the scheme was to pay maybe $20 per month, unlike paying $15,000 once for a piece of land. So people who were in the country grabbed those opportunities, started building, started acquiring properties. And now the people who are in the diaspora are ashamed to come back home if they didn't achieve anything. Sometimes they don't have enough money to take them back to UK so you end up having to find money to help them go back. So it's now the other way around, at this particular time. (Nokhuthula 2012)

Nokhuthula, who has visited but not lived in the UK, shows a deep understanding of life in the diaspora, where many Zimbabweans work long hours at low-paying jobs. These people may succeed in keeping their dependents alive, even while failing to acquire all of the properties and investments that they anticipated would flow from working abroad. People in Zimbabwe,
meanwhile, developed new modes of survival in response to a rapidly changing economy, including deal-making, cross-border trading, and creative ways of doing business—for instance, involving the extensive use of informal credit and alternative stores of value. They were also better positioned to take advantage of housing opportunities through which they attained properties where many diasporans failed to, even with higher incomes. At the time of our interview, Zimbabwe was enjoying a period of relative economic stability due to dollarization and cooperation between the ruling party and opposition. This prompted some diasporans to consider returning home. However, upon arriving, they found that “life is different now,” and many could not manage in the unfamiliar economic context. Ironically, in order to pay for airfare back to the United Kingdom, some returnees had to request assistance from the people in Zimbabwe who they had previously been helping from abroad. Nokhutula’s observations thus reveal how time and distance produce a knowledge gap about Zimbabwe’s quickly-fluctuating economic realities. Returnees believe that there is opportunity in Zimbabwe’s use of the US dollar, but upon arrival they find themselves ill-equipped to actualize these opportunities due to a lack of experience with new modes of survival.

Misunderstanding the Diaspora

Just as diasporans have knowledge gaps about Zimbabwe’s new economic reality, people in Zimbabwe can have matching gaps in their understanding of the economic realities their loved ones experience abroad. Tichaona is a security guard who has been undocumented for much of his time in South Africa. He explains that his relatives in Zimbabwe do not always appreciate how liminal his existence is:
Those who are in Zimbabwe, if we don’t help, they just say “they are playing with us.”

It's because they don't know the situation here in South Africa, how difficult life is here. But those who are here in South Africa, they know the situation and can understand (Tichaona 2013)

Tichaona earns a consistent but a meager salary. He also experiences xenophobia in his neighborhood and is occasionally subject to extortion by police. He feels that his family in Zimbabwe does not always appreciate these difficulties. Sometimes they act as if he is refusing to help them, when the reality is that he is simply unable to help. He contrasts the frustration of relatives in Zimbabwe with the sympathy of other diasporans in South Africa who have shared in his liminality and financial precarity. Jasper, who also lives in South Africa, described how his relatives have similar misunderstandings:

Every time when I get a phone call from home, my heart will always pound—maybe it's a problem! If they have a problem, they look to you for help not knowing that here as well is difficult. Because when you are kumusha[42] [in Zimbabwe], it's poverty, there's nothing. But maybe they don't understand that my job has changed. I don't make as much as I used to. I used to get a salary every month, but now I depend on my tips from my customers and commission on my sales. (Jasper 2012)

Jasper describes the angst he feels whenever his phone rings and he can see that it is a caller from Zimbabwe. At least until the recent proliferation of relatively inexpensive internet-mediated communication, people at home often waited for diasporans to initiate communication due to the

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42 The translation of kumusha is “village.” People in Zimbabwe use the term to denote their rural home. However, people in the diaspora generally use kumsha to refer to Zimbabwe, as Jasper does in this statement. This is interesting because it shows how today's migrants relate to Zimbabwe in a similar way to how migrants in urban areas during their parents’ generation related to their rural homesteads.
expense of international calls. Thus, when diasporans observe on their caller ID that someone
from Zimbabwe is taking the unusual and expensive step of dialing them directly, they know that
the call likely relates to a pressing emergency and could likely entail a request for financial
assistance. Like Tichaona, Jasper lives a precarious existence in South Africa and is unable to
provide as much help as he wishes or his relatives need. Compounding this misunderstanding,
his relatives do not understand how his income in his new job as a waiter depends on fluctuating
food sales and tips.

Mai Shay, who lives in England, negotiated similar misunderstandings when her husband
passed away. She explained how her husband’s relatives made erroneous assessments of his
wealth which led to significant tension between her and his family:

Almost all my relatives are still in Zimbabwe—my sisters, my brothers. The challenge
is when somebody is ill, and something is needed. They can't get it and expect you to do
something. They don't know that it's also very difficult here. You can't tell them "oh, I can't
help." So you try as much as you can, because some basic medical things are quite difficult to
get there. And you have to pay for everything, even ordinary lab tests.

I think the picture they have of life in the UK—which I blame on the people who came
here first—is they think we are very comfortable. They think we have lots of money, because
in the past... the exchange rate was a lot... But that picture is still in peoples' minds: "oh,
they've got more money." Now if you have got a pound here, they've got two dollars, which is
not as much as it used to be, especially [when they were using the Zimbabwean dollar],
because things have changed.
When my husband died, people [in Zimbabwe] thought he left *thousands* of pounds, which was not true. I'm also tending to think that he was *telling* them he was rich. Ha ha ha! He never said “no” to anyone asking for help. Maybe he also *appeared* rich because he would dress nicely. And when I was home [for a few years], he would buy me nice cars like the Pajero. He also bought me a lorry and two mini busses as well. So really it appeared as if he was very rich. (Mai Shay 2014)

Mai Shay perspicaciously touches on the difficulty that people in Zimbabwe can have in understanding the interaction of fluctuating exchange rates and Zimbabwe’s fluid currency regimes on the value of remittances, as well as their failure to account for the significant expense involved in sending remittances—amounting to £9/kg. She also believes that the demands of her husband’s relatives were due partially to his tendency to demonstrate his success by dressing sharply and (in her opinion) over-providing. Such practices could be attempts to demonstrate that the sacrifices of going abroad and leaving one’s family behind have been worthwhile. Yet they disguise the reality that Baba Shay was a nurse who worked extra shifts to afford these status symbols and to help so many people. Thus, what appeared to be riches was actually a paycheck-to-paycheck lifestyle. Baba Shay died with a modest estate, and possibly had significant debt.

These vignettes illustrate how people in Zimbabwe tend to overestimate the financial position of relatives in the diaspora, while diasporans tend to lack appreciation for new financial realities and forms of survival in Zimbabwe. Below we will see how these sorts of knowledge gap—which extend beyond the economic sphere—can sometimes complicate collaborative family projects.
Negotiating competing needs in an environment of scarcity:

Dispersed families must constantly negotiate impartial knowledge about each others’ economic situations, as giving and receiving are integral practices of relatedness in dispersed families. For many diasporans, giving is not merely about ensuring the survival of loved ones but also about affirming a core component of their identity and reinforcing a deep attachment to their family and their roots. Rudo explains:

You send money not so much for yourself, but for existing. You know how white people give to charities to feel good—that’s not why you do it. I cannot disassociate myself from Zimbabwe—my parents are there, so many fragments of myself are there, and those things have to be in sync for me to exist as a stable human being. That is why you send money home, your existence depends on it. Some of us have that gene to feel connected to Zimbabwe more than others. One of my friends doesn’t give a shit. Her brother is destitute and she says “well, that’s mom’s problem.” I would be devastated to discover that about one of my brothers. It is a central part of my existence to be part of that unit. Regardless of how many vacations I can take here, I also need to be a part of Zimbabwe. To give in abundance is an easy thing to do. If you have a million dollars and someone asks you for $10, of course you are going to give it to them. If someone asks you for $10 and all you have is $20 then that’s half of your budget. It is a lot more of a sacrifice. To give when your budget is not enough has a lot more meaning. (Rudo 2010)

Rudo acknowledges that one of her friends has cut ties with home—a phenomenon that this dissertation only notes in passing but which would make an interesting chapter by itself. In
contrast, Rudo (and most of the people I interviewed) makes remittances to her family in Zimbabwe a core component of her budget, giving not out of abundance, but out of scarcity. She attests that this helps her activate and confirm “a central part of my existence” which she defines as “being a part of Zimbabwe” and her family. Shumirai, a young college student in Zimbabwe who has many relatives in the United Kingdom, similarly describes how giving is an important way for her relatives to sustain a connection to a deeply meaningful social unit, especially in England’s alienating environment:

[Diaporans] all complain that they feel lonely, and that they have all these problems that they are dealing with alone. In Zimbabwe, the next person might not be able to help, but just knowing that there is someone around does help them get by. But being in a foreign land, away from everyone is hard. Even something like a birthday party, or if there is a funeral—they need to send money, but they may not have money. You can't plan a funeral, and maybe it happens when you have no money. I know it's hard for them when they say, "I can't send anything right now." They probably feel even further away. And that definitely happens a lot—when they want to send [money] but they can't because they don't have it. I think that makes them feel farther away because they’re [in the diaspora], but there is nothing to show for it. (Shumirai 2013)

Like Rudo, Shumirai attests that diasporans often give out of scarcity. Sometimes they are caught unprepared for the unpredictable vicissitudes of life and death, and as a result are unable to contribute, even when they desire to. She also describes how diasporans are often overwhelmed by needs that outstrip available resources, resulting in situations where they must actively negotiate which projects to finance and who to help. Do they prioritize funeral insurance
for their parents or use the money to provide extra school lessons for their child? Which sibling, among several interested and eligible candidates, do they petition to bring into the diaspora under a family reunification program? Should they finance a siblings’ business proposal or replace their parents’ broken refrigerator? Rudo elaborates:

For me the biggest dilemma is always to choose between helping a sibling and helping my parents. There is not enough money to go around. It is not like [my parents] have a retirement fund. *I am their retirement fund.* That’s why I never think twice, I help my parents first, always. But my brothers are always needing help to send their kids to school, or help with a business. I do help them when I can, but my parents come first. The only time I would do otherwise is if [a sibling] was on a death bed or homeless. (Rudo 2010)

Rudo is fortunate that she does not have children of her own to support in Zimbabwe, and can focus on helping her parents. However, her siblings also look to her for assistance, especially for their children’s school fees. In response to these conflicting needs, she has decided to prioritize her parents who have no independent source of income or pension plan, and to whom she feels deeper attachment. It can be difficult to decline to help her siblings’ children, but she does not question this prioritization.

Unfortunately, deciding between relatives is not always so straightforward, and can involve rather arbitrary choices. For example, Gift sent me this picture of his brother’s two daughters—his own daughters, by extension—in the rural areas of Zimbabwe.
These sisters’ parents both recently died. As orphans, they rely on relatives to meet their daily needs, and at the moment they needed to pay school fees and buy uniforms. As their fathers’ brother, Gift was their closest relative. Indeed, he was also their father according to Shona kinship reckoning as recounted in Chapter 3. However, Gift had his own children and parents to support in Zimbabwe and was simply unable to provide for everyone with his meager income. He was thus faced with the agonizing choosing of which of his two nieces to send to school:

Figure 17: Difficult Choices - which sister goes to school?
I paid for the older child, because she is going to have big exams coming up soon.
With the little one, you count on her having more time to sort out what is happening with her.
I am hoping she will actually go to school because of some charities. (Gift 2012)

An extra layer of complexity is added to the negotiation of competing needs in marriages where both partners come from families with equal needs. Despite careful precautions to fairly and diplomatically help both families, such situations can lead to accusations from one partner’s relatives that his or her spouse is diverting resources that rightfully belong to them. In other cases, heated arguments can arise between the partners themselves, especially when one believes that the other is prioritizing their family and neglecting one’s own. James, a pastor of a predominantly-Zimbabwean church in the United Kingdom, explained two such cases in his congregation:

In one case, which has amounted to a divorce now—a woman went home to Zimbabwe and bought a house for her mother. As much as [the couple] had bought houses together for their own investment, she went home and specifically bought one house for her mother. That became an issue because the husband felt that the decision was taken without his consent and his position as the head of the family was violated.

I know another family right now who decided to buy a property in Zimbabwe because the husband lost a brother and each month they would send rentals and [living expenses] to the deceased brother’s widow. They decided to buy an investment plot [where they could build a house for his brother’s window to live in]. So the guy went home to Zim, and bought a sizable stand. Then, what I seem to gather, is he did not put the property in his name, but in the name of his brother's widow. It became an issue when his wife, who is actually earning
more than her husband, realized this. As we speak, they are on separation because she is
unhappy that resources have been used to develop the husband's side without her consent,
while she feels that what has gone to her own side is comparatively less. (James 2014)

As a respected religious leader, James is privy to many conflicts within dispersed families
and attests how competing needs can sometimes break relationships apart. In both of the above
cases, one spouse felt that the other made decisions without consulting them, sometimes using
resources that were not sourced from their own earnings. These disagreements led to marital
discord which resulted in separation in one case and divorce in the other.

Gender dynamics appear to be at play in both cases. In the first, the husband is upset that his
wife did not consult him as the male household head. In the other, the wife is earning a higher
salary and resents that her husband used her earnings without permission to buy a house for his
brother’s wife (who traditionally becomes his responsibility upon her husband’s death). Indeed, a
great deal of scholarship examines how migration often shifts gender hierarchies. With respect to
the Zimbabwean diaspora, one general point of consensus is that increased economic
opportunities for women living overseas can challenge preexisting patriarchal hierarchies (Bloch
2006; Chogugudza 2008; Manase 2013; Pasura 2010). This was confirmed by Pastor James:

You will find in a traditional sentiment, when we were still back in Zimbabwe, the
most high-paying jobs were for men. Gender played a very important role in terms of income
levels. And tradition sort of controls that. Even the little income that the wife would bring
home was still managed by the husband. Now moving into diaspora, tables have literally
turned. There's more money in health services, areas that women kind of dominate. Men work
in industry, and all these little jobs, and quite often they are out of jobs, so the one who is
bringing the bulk of family income is the woman. It is difficult to maintain the kind of systems that we used at home, where the husband calls the shots and determines what resources go where. Particularly with the question of how much do we give to the in-laws, and how much do we give to my family, the woman is eventually saying “this is my money” and she cannot afford to keep quiet when resources are plowed to develop the husband's family if her family gets a small share. (James 2014)

James explains that women are often better positioned than men in the United Kingdom’s employment market. In particular, they more readily acquire work in the care industry, while their husbands often have lower-paying jobs. He believes that new gendered disparities in income can accentuate spousal conflict. Indeed, one simple truth of family life is that money may not buy happiness, but it often does buy power. With their new economic might, wives begin to exert relational power in ways that are not always appreciated by their husbands.

Indeed, a number of people spoke directly about the link between money and power within families. As explained by Shumirai, a young college student in Zimbabwe, one of her father’s brothers has disproportionate influence over family projects and decisions for economic reasons:

The person who can have the most impact on the family is the one who can send the most money home. It's never said, but that's how I see it. Like one of my uncles is more feared because he has the money so he makes the decision. My grandmother will listen to him, because he gives her the money. Both him and his wife work really hard, and from what I've heard they live in the nicest place. They have one baby, so it's not so much pressure compared to the other people who have three or four kids. At the end of the day, everyone listens to the person who can provide the most. (Shumirai 2013).
Shumirai explained how her grandmother has several children in England and possibly other destinations. However, she listens primarily to the one who is in the strongest financial position—partially because his household has two incomes and only one child who is not in Zimbabwe, but lives with them in England. As a result of his stronger economic position, this son sends most of his mother’s monthly income, including money for food, bills and other expenses. His mother, in turn, listens most attentively to this son because he subsidizes her daily expenditures.

Economic differentials can also introduce complications into collaborative parenting arrangements where diasporans leave their children with caretakers in Zimbabwe and then support these households though remittances. Caretakers can be incentivized to keep children happy so that they remain in their household and the remittances keep flowing. Meanwhile, the children gain disproportionate power due to their position as the lynchpins of the household’s daily sustenance. As Nokhuthula explains, this can compromise the caretaker’s ability to discipline their young charges:

"Maybe you left your kids to stay with an aunt. But the mother is going to send some money. So the child says: “You have to keep me happy or else I am going to tell my mom not to send the money.” So the authority of the caretaker is compromised. The children gain a lot of power. The mother in diaspora is so hungry to know that their child is well, so whatever the child says, goes. They can even fake crying: “You know what mommy...the way they are treating me, mom, I don't like it. I am as good as a maid. Waaaa!!”

They can say anything, and the mother will say, "What are you doing to my child!?" But they don't even have a clue or any evidence of what is happening on the ground. Anything
that the child will say will touch you. So lots of authority was compromised because of the money that was coming.

So then mom can start fighting with her sister because of what the child is saying. And then, because the sister is now depending on the money, they want to keep the money coming so they must keep the child there. Because if they don't behave well, the child will go and stay with another relative and now the money won't be coming to you, it will go to where the child is. So I have to keep the child here, whether she is doing good or not, but I must somehow find some ways of keeping the child here. Because where the child is that's where the money will go. (Nokhuthula 2012)

I have observed this dynamic in several diaspora families. Children became expert manipulators of their parents’ despair and their caretaker’s patience. In one case, the parents responded by moving the children from household to household. In response, the caretakers became frightened to discipline the children who began to act out at school. In the end, the lack of consistency and discipline were severely detrimental to the children’s wellbeing, while the relationship between the parents and the caretakers—siblings to the parents—were significantly strained.

Pastor James explained how such emergent disparity between siblings can easily become a point of contention in dispersed families:

Diaspora, in spite of its horrors and difficulties, offers an opportunity for emancipation. An economic disparity [arises] between siblings—between those that remain in Zimbabwe and those that make it [abroad]. The scenario where one sibling will have to depend on the generosity of others—or one sibling succeeds compared to the others—is likely
to cause some amount of tension. It's anchored in superstition. Any success is assumed to come from witchcraft or supernatural forces. Those that find themselves in a weaker economic situation will tend to accuse those that have made it of having done some magic or something like that, they will not think that this is sheer luck. (James 2014)

James confirms that people in his church struggle to understand disparities that arise between them and their siblings based on whether or not they relocate overseas or stay in Zimbabwe. He could have also mentioned similar disparities between siblings who relocate to preferred destinations (primarily Europeanized countries) and those who relocate closer to home (South Africa and Botswana). In struggling to come to terms with emergent inequalities, his parishioners and their siblings sometimes arrive at spiritual explanations. I am not an expert in spiritual matters, but it is understandable to me that the absurdity and randomness of opportunity defies easy explanation. The actual distribution of economic resources within many dispersed families depends not so much on smarts, raw talent or hard work, but on accidents: did you graduate before or after 2002 when England started requiring visas? Did you go to university during the three or four-year period when the educational system was basically non-functional due to the desperation of students and professors alike? Were you one of the few people in the township who won a scholarship out of many highly-qualified and industrious applicants? Did an American college grad in a consulate with their hands on the tap of opportunity judge you—out of a thousand other applicants—to be the single person worthy enough to receive a visa? Whatever the reasons for disparities—be they spiritual, sociopolitical, or completely random—the result is the same. Some people land in golden times and places, while their siblings do not. The result is economic differentiation within families (not only between siblings) which leads to
gradients in the ability to sponsor projects, select benefactors and thereby *sculpt the very contours of the family*.

For example, I interviewed Duduzile in Zimbabwe while she was visiting from her home in Australia. When she arrived, she found her aunt—her mother’s sister—at her parents house. Duduzile routinely helped with this aunt’s medicine, but now she was being asked to help pay for the doctor as well. She reluctantly agreed to this, but only because she was *physically* in Zimbabwe which made it difficult for her to graciously refuse. If she had been in Australia, she explained, she may *not* have helped her aunt with such a large expense:

> I don't feel any responsibility towards my aunt. I feel responsibility as a good citizen, a good Christian, but not because she's my *aunt*. I do my part—you know, buy her medicines—but I don't really feel the obligation to take care of her because she is my family. That's why I get upset that taking her to the doctor now is passed on to me, while her grandkids ride free.

> Family is becoming pretty much the nuclear family and whoever else you incorporate as family—like the cousin that you happen to be really close with, or even *friends* who do not have your parents but you grew up with them. Unless there is a tie—like if my aunt takes care of my son, that’s different and I would take care of her.

> People become closer with distant family when you are abroad, but not with extended family in Zimbabwe because it's very expensive. Abroad, I can hang out with my aunt who also lives in Melbourne, and gossip all I want. But over here in Zimbabwe life is just so expensive that instead of becoming closer, I become distant. Yeah she's my aunt—but she's kind of like a *garnish*. It's sad, but it's true. Distance does create distance between people. With the actual parents it's different—you are always talking to them, we send our kids to
them, the nuclear family always kind of stays intact. But not always—look at my brother, he has never called home in all the time that he's in Australia. He's just an asshole.

People in the diaspora feel overwhelmed so we start to put boundaries on who is on the inner circle. That's the honest truth. We sort of think: this person, if they liked me I’ll help them, but we don't necessarily feel that it's horrible not to help. I actually tie my dad's hands, because I say: "look, you have no job. I take care of you. You are going to bring me more people to take care of? Then you and I are going to have problems.”

My father is the father. He's the head. But at the end, I speak my word and he does it. So basically the person who has the money has the power. My dad has to back off even through its his sister and he has an obligation to take care of her. It's very sad, I see that. So she was just lucky that I'm actually physically here. (Duduzile 2013)

As noted above, when negotiating competing needs, Rudo prioritizes her parents over her siblings. Duduzile’s statement reveals how such prioritizations influence secondary relationships, for instance the one between Duduzile’s parents and their siblings. Duduzile provides enough for her own parents to have a relatively comfortable existence, but not enough for them to fulfill their own sense of commitments to their brothers and sisters who have fewer diaspora connections and more needs. Rudo’s remarks thus illustrate how tightly resources are intertwined with a family’s contours. In deciding which projects to support and how much to contribute, Rudo gathers certain relatives into her “inner circle” while leaving others on the outside.
Collaborative Family Projects

I tend to agree with Peter Schweitzer, who argues that thirty years of scholarly debate about the meaning of kinship has diverted attention away from understanding what kinship accomplishes—in Schweitzer’s words: “what people do with or against kinship” (Schweitzer 2000:14). This chapter works towards understanding how people leverage relatedness to achieve collaborative family projects. Despite emergent economic and power differentials, Zimbabweans in the diaspora and their relatives at home still work together across multiple international borders, time zones and currencies to accomplish collective goals. One of the most important collaborative projects discussed extensively throughout this dissertation is raising children who remain with caretakers in Zimbabwe while their parents venture abroad. Such projects involve contributions of both economic resources and daily, on-the-ground care. If families are what families do, then collaborative projects are crucibles from which they emerge. Close examination of families working towards collective goals thus reveals how differences in priorities, needs, abilities and values are negotiated and balanced.

Elder care

Caring for aging parents is another crucially important collaborative projects for sibling. Retirement planning in Zimbabwe does not generally involve investing in the stock market, pension funds or other financial instruments. Indeed—the people who did have such investments saw them become worthless during hyperinflation. Instead, parents invest heavily in their offspring, anticipating that their children will provide for them in their old age, just as they
provided care to their own aging parents in the rural areas by working in Rhodesia’s farms and mines.

Eldercare becomes increasingly complicated as parents age. They begin to need help around the home, more consistent attention, and sometimes require urgent medical care. Diasporans address these contingencies through regular communication, sending monthly remittances, organizing domestic labor, maintaining life insurance policies and scrambling to address emergencies. This generally involves collaboration between a number of siblings, with some contributing financial assistance and others providing hands-on care. Munashe, who we will meet again later in this chapter, explained:

Because of old age, sometimes we have to take my dad for medical checkups. Three weeks ago we took him to town [from his home in the rural areas], to hospital. We got the news [that he wasn’t feeling well], so I went with my brother to get my dad. [As] we got into town, my sister had also got to town and had just received some assistance from my sister in Australia for his medications. (Munashe 2013)

In this case, Munashe’s sister in Australia was the main financial contributor. However, timely provision of care required the on-the-ground presence of Munashe and his other siblings to fetch their father from his home in the rural areas, bring him to the doctor, and attend to his recovery. Munashe’s father was fortunate to have children both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora to fill these various roles, and who had access to a private vehicle to collect him from the rural immediately when they discovered his illness.

Other parents are not so fortunate. Siblings with fewer resources or on-the-ground links in Zimbabwe have more difficulty in provisioning eldercare. Siziba, who lives in the United
Kingdom, only had one brother in close proximity to his mother, who did not own a vehicle and who was not a particularly trustworthy conduit for remittances. Siziba thus preferred to send money directly to his mother when she needed his assistance, but at the time I interviewed him this was proving difficult due to a shortage of cash in circulation. This required Siziba to send money through informal channels and rely on his brother to relay money to his mother:

My mother is actually in the rural areas where you don't have these credit cards and stuff. She needs hard currency. It's the desperate nature of the situation back home. My mother is diabetic and it manifests itself into many diseases if she doesn't get her medication on time. She is in her late 80s, so she waits until the last last last pill, then she's telling you that: ‘I only have enough for today. Tomorrow I don't have anything.’

At the end of the day you find yourself going into that Western Union booth. Then she has to jump on a bus, and it costs about $5 from where she is to get into Harare. She has scrounged around to get the $5 with the hope that [she will repay it with the money she receives from me]. So you get there and they tell you [at Western Union]: we don't have the money. Come back after 3 days. It means she has worked, she has struggled. Somebody is going to do something to [loan] her the $5 to go back home. Then she has to [borrow] some other $5 to go back again. At the end of the day, she uses $15 just to collect the money [plus transaction fees at Western Union].

[The other option is to] talk to Person A here in UK. You tell him: "OK, I want to send $100." Then he'll say: "$100, you give me £80." I'm telling you [it’s a bad exchange rate]! As soon as you do the transaction here, in the next 5 minutes he gives you the details of Person B in Harare, of where to go and collect the money. So you pick your phone. Now, there comes
the element of trust to a certain individual [Person C] in Harare to go and [collect] the money. It's only after he has picked the money that you then raise the alarm to mum to go [to Harare to collect her money]. But now it's no longer from [Person B], but to this person [C] who has gone to collect it.

The fortunate thing is one of my siblings is based in Harare. He is in the police force, so he's the point person from here. When you give an instruction to a relative to collect money specifically for mom, it's these small kinds of money where you know there's very little room for abuse of this money by your relative. Sometimes I blame it on our culture, because it has taught us that I can't go and report my relative to the police for abusing my money. When you are dealing with specific issues like medication money, he knows there's very little room to misuse. (Siziba 2014)

Siziba thus struggled to take care of his aging mother. Her location in the rural areas complicated sending money because there was no nearby Western Union branch. Remitting money accordingly required costly transportation back and forth between Harare and her home. Advanced age complicated travel and made it difficult for her to keep track of her medication. The cash shortage further compounded the difficulty of sending money, forcing Siziba to use an informal money transfer mechanism with a disadvantageous exchange rate. It also necessitated using his brother as a conduit for remittances. Although we do not know the back-story of this relationship, Siziba alludes to previous conflict over resources when he intimates that he cannot trust his brother with discretionary funds.

Indeed, this story indicates that Siziba’s brother was only tangentially involved in their mother’s care, leaving him to both support her financially and to organize the logistics of her
care all the way from the United Kingdom. His complaints are not uncommon. Many diasporans I spoke with felt that they received insufficient financial or logistical help from certain siblings, though I have noticed that these complaints are sometimes focused towards relatives who are less capable of offering financial assistance due to their economic circumstances. Kumbirai echoed this sentiment:

Most of those who are [in the diaspora], who have parents [in Zimbabwe], they normally do their role—they send some things to their parents and so forth. Those who are around here [in Zimbabwe], are the ones who can have problems. They might not even send anything because they will think “someone [else] is [already] sending. (Kumbirai 2013)

Conversely, people in Zimbabwe often complain that diasporans do not understand the reality of life at home which has changed significantly since they left. Diasporans often have unrealistic expectations about the purchasing power of their remittances. They may also fail to account for incidental expenses like transportation or give unrealistic budgets and timelines for projects they want accomplished. All this can exacerbate accusations of money mismanagement. Furthermore, some people in Zimbabwe complained that diasporans believe their economic contributions justify the prioritization of their agenda over all others, as if people in Zimbabwe should immediately drop their own projects and commitments in order to comply with requests from overseas.

Starting a business
Another common family project involves starting businesses in Zimbabwe. This is a frequent topic of discussion among some diasporans, who realize that the only way they will eventually be able to return home is if they have a steady source of income. They understand that Zimbabwe’s new economic reality makes gainful employment unlikely. Entrepreneurship, on the other hand, offers the possibility of being one’s own boss. The list of businesses that I have heard people mull over is very long and includes: farming, starting restaurants and food trucks, internet cafes, Laundromats and other businesses patterned on ones in the diaspora; renting out wedding dresses, mining equipment, and cars; and providing services like event planning and counseling.

In this vein, Knowle used proceeds from a large insurance settlement in the United States to start an ambitious project with his younger brother in Kadoma (Knowle 2012). Zimbabwe has significant gold deposits and has exported the precious metal since long before colonization. Some even argue that King Solomon’s riches originated in Zimbabwe’s ancient workings. During 2010, the price of gold was at record highs and Artisanal mining exploded not only in Zimbabwe but around the world. Knowle bought two top-of-the-line metal detectors and took a long vacation in Zimbabwe in order to establish a prospecting business with his brother. They offered their gold detection services to people who had access to promising land in remote areas of Midlands province in exchange for a percentage of the take. Some of Knowle’s friends had similarly purchased air compressors, pneumatic drills and other mining equipment. Because most clients could not afford to pay up front, Knowle and his brother operated by extending credit. Most of their clients were ultimately unable to make good on the loans so the business quickly folded after Knowle returned to the United States and stopped subsidizing daily operations.

As with many sibling businesses, Knowle’s goal was not simply to establish an income stream that would allow him to return to Zimbabwe, but to simultaneously provide his younger
brother with a job. Thabo similarly invested about US $4000 to set his brother up with a video game shop. He sent money to another sibling in South Africa to procure televisions, and he bought a generator and second-hand game consoles in the United States. This video game shop only functioned for a year before a lack of revenue forced the business to close. Nevertheless, during this time Thabo’s brother had a small independent source of income and a way to stay productive in an environment where there were essentially no jobs. This relieved some of the pressure that Thabo had to provide for his brother, and allowed Thabo’s brother to keep a watchful eye on the parents. Thus, when accounting for the income that the shop generated and the sale of the equipment after closing, this project probably netted more than the original investment.

Indeed, many diaspora businesses are not viable without continual capital reinvestment from abroad. Nevertheless, they serve as a value-added remittance through provisioning employment and some financial independence. For example, another group of siblings in the UK and South Africa helped their mother run a small poultry business. They provided capital for constructing a chicken run and buying the birds and feed. Their mother then raised and sold chickens and eggs. Like Thabo’s project, this venture did not become self-sustaining. Instead, the children continually recapitalized the project by buying more supplies. Yet these investments did enable their mother to make modest returns, provided her with a predictable cash flow, and improved her food security. The child of one of these diasporans lived with her grandmother and commented that the chicken project and other joint ventures that her parents did with their siblings kept them in-touch even though they were in different places.

Thus, most of the businesses I observed were meant as much to provide for people in Zimbabwe as to meet the future or immediate goals of diasporans. The economic situation in
Zimbabwe, however is not conducive to business, so many ventures failed. The video game shop could not attract enough customers willing to pay $1 for 30 minutes of playtime to provide both daily income and the savings needed for capital reinvestment. Although the shop was a popular place for kids in the township to hang out, they just didn’t have much disposable income to actually play the games. Meanwhile, the prospecting business was unable to collect on the credit it extended to customers who were usually gambling on striking a lucrative vein. Zimbabwe is an exceptionally difficult environment for businesses to operate in, let alone thrive. Most sibling businesses I encountered were money-loosing ventures.

People operating these businesses were usually able to chalk up failures to the difficult economic situation. Indeed, money-loosing ventures often strengthened relationships, as diasporans gained more intimate knowledge about the everyday difficulties of living and working in Zimbabwe’s economy. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe-based siblings often felt gratitude towards diasporans for “promoting” them. Occasionally, however, these joint ventures went more seriously awry—due not so much to a poor economy (although this was almost always a contributing factor) but to inappropriate actions on behalf of the involved parties.

This was what happened with Akashinga, who lived in the United Kingdom and earned a good salary working as a nurse. I got to know some of his siblings who lived in Zimbabwe. It was a large, blended family, as his father had children with more than one wife. Akashinga was the eldest in this sibling group, and because he had no children of his own when he left the country, he was able to devote considerable resources to ensuring the welfare of his brothers, sisters and parents who remained behind.
One of Akashinga’s projects was to purchase a large, secondhand 36 passenger minibus which he sent to Zimbabwe via Tanzania. The idea was for his younger brother Kutamba—from the same mother and father—to operate the bus as a passenger transport vehicle in order to support himself and contribute to the family. If this venture was successful, more busses could be purchased and the business would be expanded, possibly even providing Akashinga a way to return.

The transportation business is well-established in Zimbabwe. Even during the colonial era it was one of the few avenues Africans could take towards independent wealth. African-owned busses plied the roads since at least the 1930s, often illegally carrying migrants to and from South Africa (Chapter 1). Today, owning a bus is still a tremendous mark of prestige, and can be profitable. It is thus one of the most frequent modes of small scale investment and I met a number of diasporans who sent minibuses to Zimbabwe as a source of income for their brothers, sisters and spouses.

The transportation business is not, however, easy money. Considerable expenses include fuel, tools, traffic fines, maintenance, the cost of registering the vehicle, and salaries for the driver and conductor. Furthermore, there is extensive competition, and it is not always easy for newcomers to put their vehicles on lucrative routes. Indeed, research into the “diaspora fleet” shows that the transportation business is a money-losing venture for many operators who do not manage to save enough to replace their busses by the time Zimbabwe’s rough roads ravish them within a few years (Mazarire and Swart 2014).

Kutamba did not yet have the required drivers’ license needed to bring the bus into the country, so his half-brother Derek accompanied him to the port in Dar es Salaam where they
took possession of the vehicle. Derek then drove 2,500 kilometers with his brother back to Zimbabwe through Zambia. Knowing that getting the bus into the country was only part of the story, Akashinga sent money to Kutamba in order to register the vehicle and get it certified for carrying passengers. This turned out to be a difficult ordeal, however, as the windows did not have adequate emergency exits and required modification. Furthermore, the brakes needed replacement, for which parts turned out to be expensive and difficult to find. Several weeks after the bus arrived, Kutamba managed to change the brakes, but made little progress on sorting out the windows.

Even so, Kutamba’s popularity among the neighborhood youth skyrocketed. He was regularly seen with the bus at popular hangout spots, along with an entourage of friends and young ladies. He had already begun operating the vehicle during the night and early morning when there were few police checkpoints. This enabled him to generate cash, which he apparently used to further increase his popularity by buying drinks for his companions. Indeed, it appeared that Kutamba had trouble coping with his sudden rise to fame. He began engaging in questionable behavior that increasingly made him a target of the town’s gossip mill. One weekend I observed him drinking at a local watering hole. It was about 10:00 pm, and the bus was parked on a main thoroughfare. It was blaring music and the interior lights illuminated it like a stage, where two very inebriated young women were dancing in their undergarments. A few days after this scandalous incident Kutamba got the bus into an accident coming home late at night from a concert.

Apparently, Akashinga continued sending money because Kutamba managed to repair the cosmetic damage. He was still unable to raise money for the windows, however, which meant that he could not get paperwork for the bus to operate legitimately. Instead, he continued to
operate the vehicle illegally and squandering the income. Bit by bit, the poor-quality roads took their toll on the vehicle. Increasingly frequent breakdowns made Kutamba miss out on contracts to provide transportation for wedding and other events. One day I saw the bus parked on bricks in front of his house. His brothers told me that Akashinga had pulled financial support. With the bus out of service Kutamba had no more access to money. In shame and dismay he fled to the rural areas, not to be seen for months. By then, another brother was reportedly in charge of the vehicle, but it had not moved from the blocks.

Thus while many sibling businesses served to strengthen relationships—even when they fail to thrive—other projects strain and even break relationships. Most frequently, this was due to prolonged misuse of resources, coupled with a dire economic situation in which there was little room for squandering opportunities. Indeed, if he were in the United States, Kutamba would probably have been able to recover and even learn from the misuse of his brother’s resources. In Zimbabwe, however, people do not generally get multiple chances to prove their trustworthiness. Opportunities are scarce so the consequences of abusing resources are often severe. The last time I met Kutamba, more than a year after the bus finally broke down, his brother was still refusing to give him another chance.

Stewarding property

By now it should be clear that collaborative projects are not simply about giving handouts to siblings in Zimbabwe. Rather, these projects are often equally designed to benefit diasporans, for example by caring for aging parents and to prepare for a possible return by creating income opportunities. On-the-ground hands are crucial to the success of these endeavors. Diasporans
also rely on relatives in Zimbabwe for help with necessities like renewing passports which often require relatives to submit documentation in person in Harare. Similarly, attaining a police clearance letter, a long-form birth certificate or a marriage certificate—all necessities when navigating immigration regimes abroad—usually requires the assistance of relatives back home. Indeed, diasporans who do not have close, trustworthy brothers, sisters or parents in Zimbabwe can meet with costly difficulties when seeking to accomplish these tasks from abroad. Collaborative projects must accordingly be seen as multidirectional, involving give and take on all ends.

Diasporans also rely heavily on siblings to take care of their property in Zimbabwe in their absence. For example, in the introduction, I recounted how Brian lived in the United States while his brother Edzayi remained in Zimbabwe. Together, they managed one of the only successful diaspora businesses I have witnessed—the production of art in Zimbabwe and its sale in the United States. Edzayi lived in his brother’s house where he also took care of the child of a third sibling who lived in England. Meanwhile, their business was helping Edzayi build his own house so that he and his wife would have their own home when Brian eventually returned.

This sort of mutually-beneficial arrangement is common. The sibling in the diaspora ensures that their property is well taken-care of, while the sibling in Zimbabwe is able to live in the house for free. Indeed, according to the transitive property of Shona kinship described in Chapters 1 and 3, a man’s possessions equally belong to his brothers, as a woman’s belongings are also her sisters’. This sort of arrangement can raise some complicated family dynamics. For example, one woman told me about her friend Sandra whose sister was living at her house in Zimbabwe while she was working in the United Kingdom. For many years, Sandra was unable to visit Zimbabwe because she did not have proper documentation to travel. Her friend explained:
When [Sandra] got her papers [and was able to return to Zimbabwe], she thought “oh well, I'm going to go home, and since I'm going home for a month, I'd rather stay in my house.” So she gave [her sister in Zimbabwe] three months notice to find somewhere to live—in a nice way. She thought it was a done deal. So she went home, and they were still in the house. And then she thought: “well maybe they are just waiting, just for [welcoming] me home. Maybe they would wait just a week and then they would go.” No, they didn't.

Then she hinted that she wanted a little privacy. [Her sister turned on her and shouted]: ‘I looked after your house, when you were in England and you couldn't even go home. And now you’re telling me that I need to go out. Where would I go?’”

And [Sandra] was thinking, “they've been in that house for seven years, since it was built. Never paid any rent, never did nothing, all they did was just stay in the house for free. And now they are saying, they are telling me now, they've been looking after the house.” So she was so angry, very very angry.

So yeah, they did move in the end. I think they had to exchange words big time. And what [Sandra] did was she left the house to agencies, to put people to rent. She thought: “[my sister] is not even appreciating what I've done for her. I was thinking I was helping her, but she actually thought she was helping me.”

She's not been answering [Sandra’s] calls, she's not been texting, nothing. All because of that [incident]. (Precious 2014)

Sandra built a house in Zimbabwe while living in the United Kingdom and her sister was living in the house in her absence. Both sisters believed they were doing the other an important
favor. Sandra was providing her sister a place to live for free, while her sister was stewarding Sandra’s possessions in her absence. They were both probably correct. If Sandra’s house had been rented (as, in the end, she chose to do) there is a high likelihood that the tenants and property manager would not have cared for it as well as her sister. Many Zimbabweans rent out their property only to discover that it becomes extremely dilapidated within a few years. On the other hand, Sandra’s sister did not have to pay rent or a mortgage and Sandra probably sent money for upkeep. All Sandra asked for in return was a few weeks of privacy when she returned to home. From her sister’s point of view, this was probably a highly-offensive gesture. After being absent for so many years, she likely expected Sandra to be excited about reconnecting and rejuvenating their relationship by living together like they did before she went to England. Instead Sandra took what could be construed as the antisocial route of kicking her sister out—albeit temporarily—so that she could be alone. I speculate that this story may reveal tension between the sister’s expectations of family and new individualistic ideals of family that Sandra cultivated in England. Furthermore, Sandra’s eviction could have been interpreted as an assertion of economic and relational dominance in violation of commonly held ideals of equality and co-ownership between siblings.

An even more tragic story of how collaborative projects can go awry involved Akashinga—the nurse in England who provided Kutamba with a minibus. Before leaving Zimbabwe Akashinga bought a property in a medium density Harare neighborhood and almost completed constructing a house before emigrating. Before leaving, he put another brother, Sam, in charge of looking after the house. Sam was to live in the house for free while Akashinga occasionally sent money for the finishing touches. However, after a few years, Sam began complaining that he was investing so much of his time in taking care of his brother’s property that he himself was not
advancing in life. This was around 2008, when hyperinflation caused prices to double or triple on a daily basis, when unemployment was close to 90%, and when there was so little food to purchase in the shops that even people like Sam with access to remittances sometimes went hungry. In despair, he visited his father in the rural areas, who Akashinga had entrusted with the title deeds. Sam reportedly “bribed” their father to acquire these papers, then posed as Akashinga and sold the house. A relative explained:

Sam thought: I’m taking care of [my brother’s things], but what am I getting? The situation is hard every day. Let me just try to do a quick deal. Let me just cut my relationship (kucheka ukhama) with this brother of mine. Let me just take his stuff and sell... (Sbusiso 2012)

Furious, Akashinga began legal proceedings to recover his property. A warrant was issued for Sam’s arrest so he fled to South Africa. Within months, the proceeds from the house had run out and he was down on his luck—living, incidentally, in Schubart Park. After Schubart Park was closed, Sam returned to Zimbabwe where he was arrested. The police released him a few weeks later, however, because it was almost impossible for Akashinga to pursue the case from abroad. As a relative explained:

The last time [Akashinga] was here was like 6 or 7 years back. And trying to bring an issue like that to court is difficult. The system is going to want money. They will just say ‘that docket is in the archives, we have other, serious cases to bring to the High Court.’ You are going to need to bribe a bunch of lawyers. Then you get to the judge. Then you get to the… Ha, man! You need a lot of money just to recover that [house]. He’s still trying. It’s six years now, but he’s still trying. I just told him: ‘you just need to come here. You present yourself. I
am this person. You just go to that house [in person] and you say this is my house. You present the documents you have, or even just your ID. Then you just bring cops in.’ But you have to be here. There is no way to do that from abroad. When you are abroad and you are trying to do business [in Zimbabwe], you need someone you really trust. (Sbusiso 2012).

Sbusiso observes that diasporans must have people in Zimbabwe that they can “really trust.” Yet as Akashinga’s story reveals, the dire economic situation in Zimbabwe—especially around 2008—poisoned many trusting relationships. People remaining in Zimbabwe had few possibilities of matching the economic success of diasporans. In a broken economy Sam was unlikely to ever build his own home. He felt that Akashinga was taking advantage of his poverty while he was living well in England. By “bribing” their father, he stole Akashinga’s home and ran.

According to the Zimbabwean pastor I interviewed in England, the principle of equality between siblings can result in the belief that any violation of this natural order signifies the use of evil magic on behalf of the successful one. In this way, Sam could potentially have interpreted Akashinga’s success as a supernatural hoarding of opportunity. By this logic, Akashinga would be the original thief and Sam could have justified his actions as the re-appropriation of what was rightfully his. Whether or not this was his actual reasoning, Sam responded to economically-induced despair, jealousy and inequality by severing his relationship with Akashinga. Meanwhile, Akashinga’s attempts to recover his property and ensure that Sam was punished amounted to little. He was unable to accomplish these tasks because he did not have a capable, trustworthy helper on the ground in Zimbabwe—the very reason he needed Sam in the first place.
Building a house

Of all the collaborative projects that dispersed families complete, building a house is perhaps the most complicated. This labor-intensive project can take years to complete, and involves acquiring land and drawing up plans in addition to the actual construction which involves purchasing materials and coordinating builders. Construction is often accomplished in phases as money becomes available. The large sums involved provide opportunities for resources to be misappropriated as well as for misunderstandings to arise in the occasional disjuncture between what is planned and what can reasonably be accomplished. At the same time, the complexity and enormity of this project provides a unique opportunity for dispersed siblings to work together closely over a long period, and thereby build solidarity with one another through the successful completion of an arduous task.

For example, one of the first things that Rudo did after resettling in the United States was to embark on extending her parent’s home with the collaboration of her brother Tatenda who remained in Zimbabwe. Rudo began by sending home a few hundred dollars each month, while Tatenda went about finding builders, procuring materials and supervising construction. Over a couple years she and her brother managed to double the size of the house that they grew up in until it was one of the most well-appointed dwellings in the entire township. Meanwhile, Rudo’s older sister Beatrice lived in the United Kingdom. As the house expansion neared completion she single-handedly re-equipped the living room and three bedrooms at great expense. Then, over the following two years, the sisters bought a new stove and refrigerator and completely remodeled
the kitchen. At this point their brother Nelson who had become established in South Africa began constructing a durawall around the home. When Nelson was unable to complete this project singlehandedly, Rudo jumped in to provide the remaining funds, thus restoring her relationship with Nelson, with whom she had prior disagreements. Indeed, by providing so generously for their parents, the siblings made a powerful statement about their success in the diaspora, while also building solidarity between each other. As Tatenda told me:

> Me and my sister we really get along because of building that house. She was there the whole time, sending money so I could go around and find the buildings. And we really succeeded, the house is so good. With my sister, I get along with her more than anyone else in the family because of that exercise. (Tatenda 2013)

Unfortunately, not all house-building projects run so smoothly. Stories abound of people who send money home to construct a house that never gets built. Their siblings relay photographs of other people’s houses in construction, and the truth only comes out when they return to Zimbabwe to discover that they do not even own a plot of land—let alone a home—or that the home they built is registered in the name of someone else. Other projects get mired in accusations of embezzlement and misappropriated resources. Money is diverted to other tasks or lost in the economic craziness that periodically embroils the country.

These sorts of difficulties arose between Munashe and his sister in Australia when she enlisted him to help her build a house. He initially refused, reminding her about all the complications that could arise in construction projects. They both knew people who had experienced such difficulties, and he suggested that she buy a house instead of building one, or save her money in Australia until she was ready to come to Zimbabwe and oversee the project
herself. She protested, arguing that it was impossible for her to save with a spendthrift husband. Besides, she was close to her brother, and did not question his integrity. Eventually he relented, never imagining that the project would sour their relationship for years to come.

Indeed, Munashe admitted that he was partially to blame for her idea. He had become aware of excellent stands that the municipality was selling on payment plans, and had already acquired one for himself. He suggested that she try to get a stand close to his, as an investment in her family’s future—a place where she and her husband could eventually build a house and live out their best years of retirement close to family and friends. When she couldn’t find the time and money to come to Zimbabwe for the transaction, Munashe suggested she put the stand in her teenage son’s name, who had not yet gone to Australia to join his mother. She agreed, so Munashe took his nephew to the council and helped him close the deal.

After acquiring the stand, Munashe’s sister was impatient to start construction. Because Munashe initially refused to help, she had enlisted the wife of a deceased brother, whom she was close to. This sister-in-law began to lay the groundwork for construction, but Munashe’s sister brought in another brother when she suspected that the sister-in-law was misusing funds. A few weeks later Munashe received a frantic telephone call from Australia:

> She was distressed. She said ‘things are not going far, and I'm not sure of the resources that I am sending, and whether they are being used appropriately. Can you help me please?’ But that time I was busy with my own portion of land where I was running a poultry project. I told her: ‘I’m so busy, why don't you ask your husband's relatives to do that?’ (Munashe 2013)
His sister insisted, however, calling repeatedly to plead with him, at all hours of the day and night. Even her husband called to beg for Munashe’s assistance. Reluctantly, he agreed to step in, although this required great diplomacy because he didn’t want to be associated with the accusations against his brother and sister-in-law. Indeed, it did not take long for Munashe to realize why progress was so slow. The stand was in a remote area so a road needed to be cleared, water and electricity had to be brought in, and plans for the house had to be drawn up and approved by the council and an engineer. Furthermore, the property was on a steep mountain slope in the middle of a mature forest:

It's a mountain, and it's very rocky—to the extent that the engineer who was assisting us with the technical aspects of construction said we should get a grader, or a bulldozer to level the area. But it was so costly, and getting into 2007, things were not working properly. So the [builders] said that they could dig it up manually—physically—using their hands. They did a splendid job. Each time I get there I [marvel at] how these guys did it. But it took long, just digging the foundation. And you know when you are digging a foundation in the mountain it causes problems—you are getting into the mountain and you are also removing stone. Rock. The foundation is just massive. It's a BIG house. And these builders had never built such a big house, so their estimations [on materials] were always wrong. (Munashe 2013)

During the excavation, Munashe began to realize that his sister was unhappy with the speed of the project. She repeatedly called to inquire why it was taking so long. Her husband also called and told Munashe that they had friends who were also building, and they had only taken two weeks to complete the foundation:
That's when I began to think, these guys seem to be comparing, and they may not be getting the details right. But I had no option, I had already tied myself to the project. I wanted to see it through. So we just went on and on. (Munashe 2013)

Munashe also poured his own resources into the project, especially his time and the use of his vehicle:

I used my truck extensively. It was a Mazda [pickup]. We couldn't leave cement and building materials [at the site]. I was staying in town. I would wake up around 4:30 am and go to my brother's house where we were keeping the cement. I would physically load the cement bags into my truck. Cement is not light—it is heavy! If they are mixing concrete, I would put in maybe 10 or 15 bags and drive from town, up the mountain to the construction site, and the guys would help me offload. The wear and tear [on the truck] was unbelievable.

Then [I would] come here, do my work, knock off at 4:30, drive back there to check on the builders’ progress and whether they have done the right things. Sometimes you get there and they tell you there's been a challenge—you have to solve it. Sometimes you need to see someone, [so you] drive around to find that person. By the time you get home it's after 8, after 9, sometimes after 10. And that was happening every day when we were at the peak of the construction. My own projects started to suffer and my truck started to get bad. But you know, when you are doing it for your sister, you always say ‘well, it's fine.’ (Munashe 2013)

Construction quickened after the foundation, but conflict with Munashe’s sister escalated.

The engineer required the foundation to be reinforced with extra thickness because of the steep slope so that most of the bricks were used up by the time Munashe started building the
superstructure. The stand’s soil was also too rocky to be used to make bricks on-site, so they had to be purchased. Unfortunately, no bricks were available locally because of the economic situation, and his sister was upset at the high cost of buying bricks from far away and transporting them to the site. Indeed, this project exquisitely demonstrates how the lack of experiential gaps in knowledge about distant economic realities can play out in unfortunate ways. Munashe tried to explain the absurdity of the situation to me:

2008 was a bad year. And it's difficult to explain to these guys [in the diaspora]. You go to the bank, OK? Your salary has been [deposited] by your employer, and it's all these zeros. You can't even call the figure. And you're told, ‘OK, the maximum you can [withdrawal] is 10 trillion dollars. And then you get 10 trillion dollars, and then the journey back home on the kombi [bus] is 10 trillion dollars. What do you do?

It's difficult to compare that period to now, because as long as we are using US dollars you can produce receipts and say these are my US dollars. But it's very difficult when you have to [report to someone in the diaspora that] ‘I’ve changed 100 dollars, and got 100 trillion Zim dollars. There is no paper to back it up because you did it under some tree on the black market. You can't say to a black mark dealer ‘write me a receipt.’ They will laugh at you.

(Munashe 2013)

Munashe believed that another reason his sister thought he was misappropriating funds was because he had independent sources of income that she did not understand. While economic turmoil was wrecking havoc on the finances of most Zimbabweans, Munashe was among the few who managed to profit during this time. He explained that he had made a fortuitous investment in small-scale commercial agriculture just before food scarcity was escalating:
These guys [in Australia] don’t understand that I made a lot of money [during that time]. When I went to the US [for a conference] I got access to US dollars from my employer. It was easy for me to convert that and buy land. Secondly, I was running a poultry project. I had 1000 layers and was getting 28 trays of eggs every day. And there was no food in the country, so I was calling the price. I was selling eggs for $4 to $7 per tray—US dollars. Or, I would sell in Zim dollars and then go and buy [US dollars] on the black market.

I was also selling maputi [popcorn]. It became a hit because of this trillion thing. Even if you are a manager getting paid trillions, you can't access that money. You're only limited to small withdrawals. You can't go to Nandos [a popular restaurant] because you don’t have the cash. Low value items became a hit, so for lunch you would buy your Coke and maputi.

I couldn't meet the demand. I was popping a ton and a half of maize grain every week. Grain was very difficult to get, so I was buying grain from Mozambique, jumping the border from this side. The cost of bringing a ton to the place where I was going was about $300. Then, after popping, I was getting $600 because I was selling a carton for $1. It was exactly 100% profit. The costs were inclusive of packaging and [labor]. These were the same guys who were taking care of my chickens and the garden. The chickens were producing so much manure [that] I was producing vegetables. Not complicated vegetables—these simple vegetables like muriwo and tsunga [collard and mustard greens]. I was selling 200 bundles a day, three days a week—the big bundles, not those tiny ones.

So money was not a problem for me at all. [Once a month] I would drive to Botswana, Francis Town, to buy what is called premix—concentrated chemicals that you need for the layers. I would buy soya cake for the protein, and buy maize for the carbohydrates. I ended up
with 2 trucks because my wife managed day-to-day operations of the chickens and the garden. [Meanwhile, I was doing] getting the maize and mash. I was just lucky that I invested before the [economic turmoil], and that I invested in the right thing. I was producing food and there was just no food in the country so it was easy to sell. If you had food, you called the price.

Money really wasn't an issue for me that time. And I'm sure that's what also caused [my sister and her husband] to wonder. I never really asked them for money because I had enough. So my family never suffered, and that is why my siblings understand me. They all benefited from the activities I was doing. My other sister is a teacher. At that time teachers were not getting anything that could sustain them. I would buy them groceries, and they would spend time at my poultry project. I took their children. I took my brother's daughter. I took my sister's daughter. And my other brother in town would just go to the project any time to get vegetables or eggs. I would buy groceries for his family. It was not expensive for me.

When I go to buy maize, I would just drop a bag here and there [at my relatives’ houses] (Munashe 2013)

Munashe explained that his sister did not understand the nuances of his business or Zimbabwe’s hyper-inflationary economy. A fortunate turn at work had given him access to forex to attend a conference in the United States. To reduce expenses in the United States, he stayed with a friend and he hoarded the stipend for work. This he savvily converted on the black market when he returned to Zimbabwe and invested in a food production business right when food was in high demand. However, Munashe’s sister was not present to see or appreciate any of this. Indeed, her nagging telephone calls laced with veiled accusations of embezzlement became more direct and forceful. For instance, she noticed that his wife was changing her hairstyle frequently, and assumed that her house money was financing this. Exhausted with repeatedly defending his
innocence, Munashe lost patience and lashed out, giving her what she wanted: an admission of
guilt even when he was innocent:

“OK, I abused your money. So what do you want to do?” Because in the Shona
tradition, what can your sister's husband do to you? Traditionally [he is] on lower ground, in a
weaker position. So I was just being naughty. I said ‘OK, He's my mukwasha [brother-in-
law]. What can he do to me even if I ate your money? Now tell me, how much did I eat? You
are stupid. How can you ask your wife’s brother to build a house for you? What does tradition
say? A husband is the one who is responsible for building the house. So he was supposed to
ask his brother to build the house for you guys. Not to ask me, the wife's brother. [I said:]
“Now that I ate the money, what are you going to do? You can't take me to court, you can't do
anything to me. You can't take me to the chief.” I was just a bit angry. (Munashe 2013)

By the time of this pivotal conversation, the house walls were erected but the roof had not
been started. Munashe’s sister responded to his outburst by handing the project over to an uncle,
a retired school principal. According to Munashe, “he was a very wise man.” He met with the
entire family and told them that his sister had requested that he take over, but that he wanted to
keep them involved. He also spent a whole day with Munashe and observed the building site as
well as Munashe’s own projects. He then reported to Munashe’s sister that her expectations
about the speed of construction were unreasonable, as Munashe was very busy with his own
work:

He tried to explain it to them, but I'm not sure whether they understood it. I think that
they were just excited that he had gotten on board. (Munashe 2013)
Munashe’s uncle sped up the construction because he was able to go to the site more frequently and stay throughout the day. After all, he did not have an agricultural business to run at the same time. This allowed the uncle to address construction issues immediately as they arose, for example, by making runs to the store if additional materials or tools were required. Despite this progress, the uncle also brushed shoulders with Munashe’s sister and her husband:

By the time he completed the work, he was also a very angry man. He was so impatient with them because of the kinds of questions they were asking. I remember one time he said to my brother-in-law, my sister’s husband, “do you know that before you went to Australia I had five houses in Harare? Don't talk to me as if you want to imply that I will use your money for my own person, for my own benefit.” (Munashe 2013)

During their uncle’s tenure at the helm of her project, his small Peugeot was destroyed by the bad roads and he began using public transport, covering the long distance between the drop-off point and the construction site on foot. He confided in Munashe that he wanted out of the project, but felt compelled to finish it to the point where the windows were barred and he could lock it up so that nobody would be able to vandalize it. Upon finally completing this, he was involved in a road accident on his way back to Harare and broke a leg. Sadly, before a year had elapsed, the elderly man had passed away.

It was around this time—when the house was virtually finished—that Munashe’s sister and her husband began to visit Zimbabwe more frequently. They would come for two or three months at a time to complete the finishing touches. By this time their relationship with Munashe had soured to the point that they did not even advise him when they were around. More insultingly, they did not invite him to the housewarming party to show off their completed
dwelling to the parents. On the day of the party, Munashe was out of town and happened to call
his eldest brother on an unrelated matter. His brother then told him that he was on his way to
their sister’s house for a housewarming party:

I didn't even say anything to her. I was out in Marondera [three hours away]. I didn't
even know they were around! So I phoned them the next day. Then I came to town and met
them, just to say "hi, how are you guys doing?" I guess I was angry inside, but my approach
was not to show them that I was angry because perhaps that would make them happy and give
them something to talk about. So yeah, let them stay like that. Let them think that I don't care
about it. But what really bothers me is that they until now think that there is something wrong
with me. (Munashe 2013)

Throughout the project, Munashe felt that one of the most aggravating aspects of his sister’s
behavior, was her lack of respect. When she called, she often launched into criticism, without
even bothering to say hello or inquiring about how he and the rest of the family was doing. Once,
she called their older sister who happened to be at Munashe’s house. A couple of minutes into
the conversation he observed that his elder sister was crying. He took the phone, and putting it to
his ear without announcing his presence he overheard his sister in Australia rampaging about
their older sister’s daughter. This girl had gotten pregnant in high school, but after taking a year
off and being abandoned by the baby’s father, she decided that she wanted a second chance.
Munashe paid the fees, and upon graduation she earned a spot in the University of Zimbabwe, a
very selective institution. Unfortunately, she got pregnant again during the third year, which was
the occasion of the telephone call:
[My sister in Australia] was shouting to my sister [in Zimbabwe], saying ‘why are you letting that girl make so many babies? Do you want to die looking after babies?’

She went on and on and on, and then I said: ‘it's me who is listening to what you're saying.’

And she said: ‘ah, is it? I was telling your sister’—and she repeated [everything she had said].

I said: ‘no, no no, wait a minute. You have girl children. you don't know where they are going to end. Why are you shouting at her like that? She’s crying right now. You think that we enjoy seeing her crying? You got pregnant after form 4, before you went to train as a nurse. But my mother took care of your child.’

And that's when I also hit the roof. And I think that it was because emotions were raised by seeing my sister crying. So I went on and on and on, and I said: ‘you are stupid, you!’

And she said: ‘you can't call me that. After all you are the one who misused the money.’

I was waiting for that. I said: ‘What will you do to me? You are stupid, that's why I ate your money.’

But you know, it was really, it was really out of anger, you know. I felt that it was so unfair. You can't make another sibling cry and shout at them for what the kids have done. If anything, you are supposed to be supporting her. [Our elder sister is] a single parent She
raised these kids single handedly—four of them. And this kid tried her best. I was actually the one paying the fees at the University of Zimbabwe. It wasn't much anyway because it was in Zim dollars. And ultimately she graduated. Now she has 2 babies and she's graduated. And apparently that man ended up marrying her. (Munashe 2013)

Quite possibly Munashe’s sister was upset because she anticipated that the birth of her niece’s (i.e. her daughters’) child would become another responsibility that she would be asked to assume. Nevertheless, she was extremely insulting about how she shared this concern, and when Munashe tried to intervene she fell back on her accusations of embezzlement.

Another thing that bothered Munashe was that his sister in Australia acted entitled to his assistance. She only called when she needed something from him, and she hardly ever showed gratitude for the sacrifices he and his other siblings made to help her. For instance, on her first visit back to Zimbabwe in 7 years, he allowed her to use his vehicle for six weeks. They traveled widely, but did not find time to visit their elder sister. This made Munashe feel like the only reason they visited him was to gain access to his truck. Upon discovering that they were leaving abruptly, Munashe decided to drive to Harare himself and pick up their elder sister to bring her to their farewell dinner. He reported that they acted very happy to see her, as if everything was normal even though Munashe’s action clearly expressed disapproval.

In another instance, the sister begged Munashe to find a place for their son at the university where he was pursuing a degree on the side. Munashe agreed because the boy—although he was very intelligent—was becoming a “nuisance.” During the process of making meetings with the dean, filling out applications and getting the boys transcripts in order, his brother-in-law would call from Australia every day at 11pm to inquire about his progress. Then—after Munashe had
over-extended himself with the dean, just as the boy was granted a spot at the university—word
came that he had also been admitted to an Australian institution. Within days the boy was flown
out of the country and the phone calls to Munashe stopped without so much as a “thank you for
helping my son:”

When they want something from you, they will phone you at every opportunity, and
they will be so nice to you. The moment you are done with that task, [they will not call any
more]. Because after the son went to Australia, I don't remember receiving a call from them
for a space of about 3 or 4 years. (Munashe 2013)

Munashe’s account of building a house for his sister in Australia is instructive about the steep
difficulties that dispersed families must surmount in order to accomplish collaborative projects.
Incomplete information about each others’ financial situation, misunderstandings about
Zimbabwe’s current status, suspicion about the misallocation of funds compounded by
resentment over such accusations all served to destroy the relationship between Munashe and his
sister. As in many such cases, it is difficult to untangle the complete “truth” of what happened, as
I was unable to interview Munashe’s sister for her account of the project. Nevertheless,
Munashe’s account by itself reveals that even successfully-accomplished projects can involve
significant conflict that can boil over into other parts of the relationship, as when the siblings
fought about one of their daughters.
Bridging the Divide

Collaborative projects in dispersed families are complicated endeavors, however diasporans have developed various strategies for bridging distance and differentiation. For instance, a number of diaspora parents (like John) reported establishing routines whereby they would call on a pre-agreed day of the week, and children were expected to be home at that time without fail. Visiting was also an important way for people to fill-in knowledge gaps about distant locations. Even though the possibility of travel is precluded by high costs and hostile documentary regimes, Shumirai explained how it could be helpful when relatives traveled and reported on the situation on the ground in Zimbabwe or abroad in the diaspora:

People on my mother's side have been living in UK for more than 12 years. We thought their lives were nice and smooth and easy until one of my cousins went to visit to see what it was like. She came back and told us: "please stop nagging our Aunt and asking her to send you stuff. She actually does not have the money. She will never actually tell you that, but it's a struggle, and I could tell.”

My cousin said life in the UK is hard, not like what we see on TV which makes us think that their lives are so amazing. They live in such small public housing, and there is no movement, and there is no privacy, and everyone is just in everyone's space. And she was saying how my aunt has to work like a dog, because she goes to school at night and works during the day. (Shumirai 2013)

Shumirai did not visit her mother’s sister in the UK herself, but she benefited greatly from a report brought back by her cousin who went to London for a visit. Her cousin’s firsthand
observations of their aunt’s long working hours and overcrowded housing was helpful in allowing Shumirai to gain perspective on life in the UK where her father lived. Indeed, I get the sense that many Zimbabweans have increasingly nuanced understandings of the range of possible conditions in distant locations. Diasporans have also heard many stories about how Zimbabwe has changed even if they have not been able to visit home to experience for themselves. Meanwhile, people in Zimbabwe have witnessed the positive and negative outcomes of migration in the lives of their friends and loved ones. They have seen some diasporans build houses and return home triumphantly to shower their families with gifts, while others return destitute—or even in coffins.

The recent diffusion of cellular internet and social media in Zimbabwe is an important factor that is also helping to mitigate gaps in knowledge about life in distant locations. Moreblessings, who lives in London, explained how the low cost and low-latency of WhatsApp enabled her to stay in more constant contact with her sister in Zimbabwe.

I’ve had WhatsApp for longer than them, two years? Maybe three years? Last year summer, I sent my old phone to my sister and we WhatsApp all the time. I know exactly what she is doing almost on a daily basis. You know, sometimes even when she eats she sends me pictures. She sends pictures of whoever comes home. It's different from a phone call, where you talk but don't get to see the picture. WhatsApp is quite good. I don't call as much as I used to do, but it saved me a lot of money. I used to use £5 to call almost ever 3-4 days, but now I call maybe once a month. (Moreblessings 2014)

Moreblessings explained how chatting and taking pictures on social media enabled she and her sister to reestablish close communication that included sharing small everyday details like
images of the food they ate or the people they encountered throughout the day. Belinda similarly describes how WhatsApp enables her to recreate some of the intimacy that she and her sister lost through long separation. She lives in Harare but her sister is in Australia:

I love WhatsApp. It’s new. Before that, it was Skype and Facebook. Before that it was phone calls. But with WhatsApp, talking is cheaper. We chat every day, throughout the day. I’m even taking pictures. Yesterday I was in the salon. [I messaged her on WhatsApp] “which hairstyle are you having?”

She sends me a picture: “Oh this one, check.”

I know what’s going on with her at all times. Before, you could go a month or a week without communicating. You could just say "hello, hello" Unless somebody calls you at that right moment. I used to stay in the office for her to call me on the landline because it was cheaper. With WhatsApp it’s more real-time so there is more interaction. You can even share jokes, or say: "I’m so happy."

“Why, what happened?”

“I got flowers.”

“OK, let's see.” Then you take a picture. And it’s virtually at no cost. That’s the beauty of it. I love that technology. It’s a more immediate relationship. (Belinda 2012)

Social media is even transforming the relational calculus of people who do not own cellular phones. For example, Hazvinei explained how he is able to use WhatsApp to communicate with his elderly grandmother who does not know how to use the phone herself:
I can even chat to my grandmother! Not that she knows how to use WhatsApp or anything, but she is with some of her grandchildren, and they know how to operate the phone. I send a message to her—“how are you this morning? How are things?”—and I get the response [through her grandchildren]. She actually knows [that she is chatting with me] (Hazvinei 2014).

In addition to reestablishing relational immediacy, social media is also transforming how diasporans and their loved ones collaborate on family projects. For example, Belinda explained how she and her sister were starting a store in Zimbabwe where they wanted to sell clothes from Australia:

Now, the project that we are working on is to sell clothes in a boutique. She shows me pictures of the dresses that she wants to send [via WhatsApp]. “Do you like those designs? Can you sell them?” I pretty much know what people this side like, so I tell her which ones to buy. It’s instant, and we can literally swap ideas. “No, I don't think that works, I this is better. Either it's this color, or this color. Which one do you like?” I even helped her choose the name of the shop. Unlike before, where she would say: "oh yeah, I've got a concept for a boutique, I've ordered this and this.”

Belinda appreciates how the real-time nature of WhatsApp communication enabled she and her sister to work as a team in order to start a business of importing clothes. Before social media was easily available in Zimbabwe, her sister would have single-handedly made all of the business decisions. Now, the business could be more collaborative. Belinda could contribute her own perspective and the two could efficiently exchange ideas throughout the entire process.
Even while social media bridges distance, it presents some unique challenges as well. For instance, Validity poignantly described how the internet can make people close to distant relatives even while introducing relational distance between people who live in the same house:

The internet can bring you together with family members that are far far away, and then keep you apart from the ones that are close to you. We are all just using our own phones and laptops. If you want to call a meeting in your house, you just go to where the internet is and turn it off. Everyone will just come running! (Validity 2014)

Another ambiguous dimension of social media mentioned by several people is the facility with which it enables misleading or false information to spread alongside accurate depictions of life in distant destinations. Edwin, in South Africa, elaborates:

When people put pictures on Facebook, that is not their real life. They put it up just to be loved, you see. It's a way to show off. They could put a picture so people can think “wow, she’s doing good” when it's not like that.

Like my aunt in Botswana, she always puts nice pictures, in a car, and in a place where it looks so beautiful. But then when I meet her, she told me that this place was where I was working; the car, it was for my bosses. Like if I want to approach a girl who is in Zimbabwe on Facebook, I can tell her that I've got a car. I always am going to take my pictures behind a car or inside a car, you see. So then she's going to be attracted to me and think that this guy has got money. But then when we meet, she will see that this guy is not driving a car. Where is that car now? I'm not going to tell her the truth. "it's got a problem—
it’s in the garage. They're just fixing it" That's why I am saying, most of those stories on Facebook, I don't take them seriously. (Edwin 2013)

Notando, a South African married to a Zimbabwean, similarly commented on the potential for social media to spread inaccurate information. At the beginning of this chapter, she lamented how dispersion makes it difficult to attend weddings, births and funerals. She described how, without meeting face-to-face, it was easy for people to misunderstand the situation of relatives living far away based on representations in social media. This is what happened with her sister in-law in England.

When I started to get to know her—because she didn’t know me—she was trying to present a very glamorous lifestyle. She was trying to show that everything is perfect here in London, it’s better than South Africa, you guys need to come here as well. On Facebook, she would be wearing expensive looking outfits and going to dinner at nice fancy places.

(Notando 2013)

Notando thus observed how social media initially gave her an inaccurate depiction of her sister-in-law’s life in England. She believes that this misrepresentation was deliberate. This may be true to a certain degree, but could also be a degree to which she was unable to contextualize what she viewed online within the lived-reality of life in England—which she had not experienced. In another example, many people in Zimbabwe observe on social media that diasporans often drive personal vehicles. Owning a car is a tremendous mark of prestige and wealth in Zimbabwe, but in the United States (for example), a car is usually a basic necessity for getting to and from work. Also, whereas cars in Zimbabwe are usually owned outright, diasporans often carry car notes. While all this can be explained and intellectualized, a person
who has never resided in the United States, observed the long distances between work and home, experienced the lack of public transportation in many American cities and paid a monthly car note or costly repair bills may still have difficulty appreciating that car ownership in North America often contributes more to poverty than it symbolizes wealth.

Thus, social media moves in two directions—enabling both accurate and misleading information to be conveyed. Indeed, over time, Facebook enabled Notando to forge a relationship with her sister-in-law which eventually blossomed into greater appreciation of the nuances of life in England:

> When we really got to communicating via social media, then she painted the real picture. She told me her flat is social development accommodation, so the rent is subsidized by the government. And she would say things like “thank goodness we don’t have to pay school fees, education is free and it’s good quality,” she would also mention things like it’s free healthcare as well. Where as with us, we have to pay fees, and we have to pay to see the doctor if we don’t want to use state hospital. So initially she really did paint a glamorous picture, but then the husband lost a job, that’s when the cracks started showing. It was pretty tough for her because it was one income, two children, and she still had to maintain people in Zim.

Many parents also spoke about the ambiguity of social media. Dumisani, for example, explained how he appreciates the way that social media and cell phones enabled him to keep in closer contact his their children in Zimbabwe and to keep tabs on his son:
It was difficult at first, because he's a small boy, he's growing up. So you have to look after him, see how he's doing, what type of friends he's into and the like. Because obviously there are people there, but they won’t care like I do. I use my phone. Like when it's late at night—today it's a Saturday—I have to phone on WhatsApp at like 8:00 to make sure he is at home. Is he somewhere where they can see him. I don't call him—he's got a phone, but I don't call him. If I call him he'll tell me “I’m at home” whilst he's not there. So I call my elder sister and confirm. She's always at home. “Where is he?” If he's around I'm fine. If he's not there I have to call him now, “where are you? What are you doing at this time?” (Dumisani 2013)

At the time we spoke, WhatsApp voice calling was not widely available in Zimbabwe. Thus, Dumisani felt that his long-distance parenting was compromised by the high cost of calling home:

What limits us is airtime. I can't put airtime to talk to someone in Zim for about an hour. Let's say that I get a report that he has a girlfriend, and I want to tell him about HIV and stuff. It's a long discussion. It's not something that I will say on the phone. Those things are difficult man. You can't say that in three minutes on the phone or with WhatsApp. You have to sit down face-to-face. When you talk on the phone, someone can lie to you. But when I'm talking to you face to face, I see those expressions. I can tell he doesn't like what I'm saying, or he's hiding something from me. So I have to talk to him face to face and watch him in the eyes. Is this boy saying the truth? Is he actually saying the truth? Those things are difficult. How can you have a discussion about sex on WhatsApp? You never know who he is with at the moment when you're discussing. Maybe it's not even him who you're communicating
with. Maybe it's a friend and they're making a fool out of you. It's very difficult. (Dumisani 2013)

Thus, like Nothando, Dumisani explains that social media can be both help and hinder long-distance relationships. On one hand, it enabled him to remain in touch with what his son was up to. On the other, it failed to replace in-the-flesh parenting where he could look into his children’s eyes and use a parent’s discernment to evaluate the conversation.

Indeed, Nokhuthula, a family therapist in Zimbabwe, argued that cell phones often did more harm to relationships than good, especially in dispersed marriages:

A marriage can’t work over Whatsapp. Yes, the communication is OK. That's technology, things have improved. But you know what, that same WhatsApp is making peoples' marriages break. As soon as they are finished speaking to their wife, they are online speaking to someone else. And their wife is in diaspora, and they can see, "oh, he is online, but he is not speaking to me. Who is he speaking to?" There is a lot of jealousy coming out of social media.

Actually, Facebook and WhatsApp is becoming a problem to many marriages, especially those who are in diaspora. You have been in diaspora for 4/5 years and it is difficult to wait that long, so people go on Facebook and Google about their sweethearts from high school because they need to be loved. Probably they will start the conversation they left long back. I've counseled lots of couples where someone ended up going to their former sweethearts because they are not getting what they are supposed to be getting from their spouse. And it's easy on Facebook, it's easy on WhatsApp.
Last time I had this counseling, where this man was in Zambia, working at a good, well-paying job. His wife is here [in Zimbabwe], and he said “I’ll take my whole family with me later.” But it was just words, he never fulfilled his promise. Back here, this woman got in touch via Facebook with an old boyfriend. And it so happened that this boyfriend also divorced his wife, so he's also now single. She is not single, but her man is far away. They started dating, and when the husband heard that "your wife is almost taken by someone" he came back home. When he came back home, there was a fight between the two, and now this woman is divorcing the husband because now there is plan B.

In most of the above examples it can be seen that social media enables people to peer into the lives of distant loved ones, while simultaneously presenting families with new challenges. Indeed, I find that much of the literature on the internet (especially outside of anthropology) tends to adopt a cyber-utopian framework, in which new communication technologies are seen as almost universally positive and uplifting. In fact—as I will show with more detail in the following chapter—new communications technologies are multidimensional and can be used to convey truth as well as lies. The internet can lead to both emancipation and redoubled oppression.

Meanwhile, many (but not all) of the examples I cited above underline just how important family remains in the lives of many diasporans and their loved ones at home. Dispersion is a resource through which people can access the money and hands that are needed to provision loved ones with care and sustenance. There are many cases in which collaborative projects meet with substantial difficulties and do not pan out as intended. In some cases significant conflict arises in the act of working together. Sometimes the very contours of a family changes in the
process. Nevertheless—despite challenges and frustrations—people *continue* to use migration as a way to make their families work, as they have done for many generations.
Chapter 6: Zvirikufaya ku Diaspora 2.0

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how one of the most significant sources of conflict in dispersed families stems from gaps in knowledge about the day-to-day lives of loved ones in different locations. These disjunctures can lead to relational distance and misunderstandings which complicate attempts to work together. I also noted that people in Zimbabwe appear to be increasingly aware that life in the diaspora can be precarious, and that diasporans are increasingly acquainted with developments in Zimbabwe. I attributed this growing awareness partly to the proliferation of mobile phones and social media in Zimbabwe, which enable dispersed families to assemble in virtual places where they can engage in some of the low-latency, proximity-dependent relational practices that were lost through migration. Here I expand on this analysis by stepping away from the family as a unit of analysis in order to examine how new forms of internet-mediated communication are also used by diasporans to created a dispersed national identity.

Social media present users with novel discursive formats for debating issues of collective interest. Of these new conversational registers, the internet meme is particularly compelling and ethnographically rich. An internet meme is a set of crowd-sourced content (images, characters, words, videos, hashtags, etc.) that incorporates and expands upon an original repertoire of features (Shifman 2014). Some memes “go viral” as contributors create and disseminate new iterations. To-date, one of the most successful memes originated with Korean pop star Psy’s
music video “Gangnam Style”—the first YouTube clip to pass 1 billion views. Psy’s video became memetic because his lyrics, dance moves, rhythms and visual imagery were reused by hundreds of YouTubers as the starting point for unique expression. Examples include an energetic appropriation of Psy’s moves by the Ivorian dance troupe Aaninka, a Jamaican version dubbed “Gangnam Badman Style,” and a painstakingly choreographed interpretation atop American military hardware in Afghanistan.

This paper examines two video memes that went viral within a much smaller slice of cyberspace that I refer to as the Zimbabwean internet. The “Zvirikufaya” meme peaked in July, 2014 and consisted of diasporans boasting on camera about their success overseas and vowing never return to Zimbabwe. People in these videos are seen driving expensive cars, wearing beautiful clothes, tending to fertile gardens and eating delicious food—all while exclaiming “Zvirikufaya!” which means “things are on fire!” Meanwhile, people at home responded by uploading videos using similar displays of wealth or happiness to assert that they would never leave Zimbabwe because that was where things are actually on fire. This engaging, often humorous parlay between Zimbabweans at home and abroad touched on many social and political dilemmas facing this dispersed community including the costs and benefits of migration, the boundaries of citizenship, and the meanings of happiness and success.

Within a year of the Zvirikufaya phenomenon, the #ThisFlag internet meme went viral as Zimbabweans around the world draped themselves in the national flag and recorded videos of themselves giving voice to their frustrations, hopes and dreams for their country. This online activity culminated on the streets of Harare, with some of the largest strikes and protests Zimbabwe has seen in a decade. Ultimately, however, this movement was unable to achieve
political change and appears to have redoubled state attempts to police and surveil online activities.

Analyzing Zvirikufaya and ThisFlag memes sheds light on how the proliferation of internet access in Zimbabwe is reshaping conversations at home and abroad. Such memes can be read as collaborative projects which produce national identities in the same way that collaborative child and eldercare produces a family identity. Additionally, this analysis reveals how online conversations can often have important offline effects; to paraphrase Judith Butler, identities produce the actions through which they are constituted (2007).

The Contours of the Zimbabwean Internet

Much scholarship about the internet focuses on elite European and American users like university students and computer gamers. Such groups are less representative of the internet as it proliferates globally and more users go online from smartphones and internet cafes. Anthropologists like Francis Nyamnjoh (Nyamnjoh 2011), Daniel Miller (Miller 2011), Heather Horst (Horst 2006) and Victoria Bernal (Bernal 2014) accordingly urge scholars to denaturalize the internet as a phenomenon beginning and ending in Silicon Valley. Miller, for instance, argues that there are many different internets, each defined by a unique community of users. “For an anthropologist studying in Trinidad,” he explains (Miller 2011)(xii-xiii), “the internet itself was something created by what Trinidadians do online.” Similarly, Admire Mare laments that the bulk of Western internet scholarship focuses “on what ICTs do to Africans instead of what Africans do with ICTs” (2014:318). I similarly investigate the internet as a quintessentially Zimbabwean phenomenon, about which an interesting questions examines how it is used to
accomplish proprietary ends that may or may not have been anticipated by software and hardware developers.

The fluctuating and fuzzy boundaries of the Zimbabwean internet encompass a population at least as diverse as that within Zimbabwe’s physical borders. Users promulgate conflicting political views, live in scattered geographic locations, hold various citizenships and originate from all economic strata, ethnic backgrounds and racial groups. They often disagree, and some believe that others do not even properly qualify as Zimbabwean. This diversity of backgrounds and perspectives congeals around specific websites where participants discuss, debate, reflect and collaborate on matters relating to a common history, a shared country of origin and issues of mutual interest. Meanwhile, preexisting relationships that were severed through migration rematerialize on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. These connections between people originating in Zimbabwe yield vectors for the circulation of mutually-interesting content like Facebook updates, news articles and internet memes. This evolving stream of content and associated discussion threads comprise a Zimbabwean layer on top of Facebook and other social media platforms. Thus, virtual locations ranging from Zimbabwe-centric news websites to comment threads on Facebook are similar to physical locations in the material world in that they gather people together and draw them into interaction with one other—even when they do not always relate peacefully.

It is useful to sketch the broad counters of the Zimbabwean internet in order to grasp the range of activities located within it, as well as the social and economic fractures which differentiate users and shape memetic discourse. Until the recent proliferation of wireless broadband in Zimbabwe, only a minority regularly ventured online: urban elites, university students, some government workers and select employees of private companies (Staff Reporter

367
20 Oct 2010). Internet access was available a few years earlier in cyber cafes in urban centers, but it was expensive and slow. Thus, the Zimbabwean internet was created and initially populated largely by diasporans who fled political and economic turmoil in the late 1990s and 2000s. These people—constituting approximately a quarter of all people born in the country—had access to inexpensive internet cafes and high-speed residential broadband abroad.

By the early 2000s, websites appeared that specifically catered to diasporans by helping them find each other and reconnect online. These sites—including zimupdate.com, zimsite.com and chirundu.com—apparently used class lists from Zimbabwean schools and universities as a search engine optimization technique. Thus, a diasporan querying their own name would land on pages that published their name in association with former classmates. This enticed people to sign up for these sites in order to connect with friends in other cities and countries, as the exodus from Zimbabwe was characterized by a high degree of international dispersion. Little multilateral interaction was available on these prototypical social networking sites compared to contemporary platforms like Facebook. There were, however, interactive forums, and by 2004 users could create profiles that were searchable by country of residence and contained contact details and information about where they lived, studied or worked (zimsite.com 5 April 2004).

In the mid 2000s, journalists who fled to the diaspora following a crack-down on the independent press began reporting for new, online-only publications. These news sites, including NewZimbabwe.com, ZimDaily.co.zw, and ZimEye.com presented a perspective that was unavailable in the state-controlled press. They also extensively covered diaspora issues as their readership was primarily located abroad. Diasporans who won prestigious awards or committed sensational crimes were frequently profiled and regular columns provided immigration advice, career counseling, and coverage of concerts, beauty pageants and conferences for Zimbabweans.
living abroad. Advertisements marketed groceries and gasoline that could be purchased by
diasporans for delivery to family members in Zimbabwe. These sites also created interactive
spaces in forums and comments sections on articles. Meanwhile, niche websites like inkundla.net
and goffal.com facilitated open discussion of minority ethnic interests that were discouraged in
Zimbabwe. Discussions could be divided along preexisting racial, ethnic and political lines (Peel
2010). Nevertheless, Peel argues that they constituted an “alternative public sphere” where
multilateral, relatively uncensored interaction was possible between Zimbabweans who were
scattered across the world and a few elite individuals at home.

YouTube was also a popular space on the early Zimbabwean internet due to the expanding
availability of music videos, sermons, and clips from classic Zimbabwean TV shows. One
student in the United States explained how listening to religious songs on YouTube in her native
Shona language helped inspire strength and rekindle the feeling of home:

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It is for homesickness. It is for spirituality. I listen to [Shona Catholic Songs on
YouTube] while I study because it reminds me why I am doing this. Otherwise you lose
yourself in the abyss of the world, in the everydayness of life in America. There was a retreat
weekend in high school which was all about prayer and spirituality. I found myself there. I
recreate that weekend every time that I find I don’t have enough strength. I create home for
myself. Everyone else in America goes home to their mom and dad for the weekend when
they feel stressed. I can’t do that. I have no mom to give me chicken soup when I’ve been
beaten up by colleagues telling me I’m stupid, people being racist. I remember: how did I get
here? Why am I doing this? What is the goal? You can only understand God from your own
place of birth, from your own origin. There’s something about Shona mass—prayer in
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Shona—that is authentically about who I am, that reaches me more than other things. It’s painful to know that I’ll never go back to that place, at least in the near future. (Vimbai 2014)

One of the most important events shaping the Zimbabwean internet occurred in 2006, when Facebook opened its platform to users outside of the university system. Facebook’s friend-finding features made it easier to contact distant relations. In addition to email and name searches, social algorithms recommended friends based on mutual contacts or shared profile features like education or employment history. Dispersed school networks, neighborhood cliques, and extended families quickly reconstituted online, where long-lost associates could share and observe important milestones in each others’ lives, air disappointments, and engage in semi-public, discussions or private “inbox” conversations. Before long, Facebook became the preeminent social networking platform on the Zimbabwean internet, forcing most homegrown sites like zimupdate.com out of business.

At this juncture, the Zimbabwean internet was still largely populated by diasporans, joined by a small but growing number of elite users in Zimbabwe. These demographics began to shift in 2010 with Econet’s rollout of cellular internet access in major urban areas. This followed a tenuous stability that emerged from years of political and economic turmoil marked by hyperinflation, massive unemployment and elections-related violence. By June 2011, Econet counted 1.8 million mobile internet subscriptions, representing 30% of its customer base (Staff Reporter 04 Jun 2011). Mobile operators aggressively expanded 3G access, so that by January 2012 Jabulani Chirinda blogged about using his smartphone to access a full palate of internet services from the rural area of Hwedza:
just a few yards away from my parents’ grass thatched kitchen the signal was amazedly excellent; 5 full bars. I got connected to Econet’s Edge network and was able to browser smoothly for 15mins or so. I sent a few pictures to a niece in Bulawayo via WhatsApp. (Chirinda 17 Jan 2012)

The ability to go online from rural areas and high-density urban areas is notable because most of these places were largely bypassed by the colonial and postcolonial telecommunications networks. Thus, many Zimbabweans “leapfrogged” landline telephones, straight to cellular networks that eventually enabled relatively inexpensive communication within the country and beyond its borders.

Falling handset and airtime prices lent momentum to internet adoption. By January 2014, the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) reported 5.2 million subscriptions in the country of 11 million inhabitants, representing 40% internet penetration. Well over 99% of these subscriptions were through mobile devices (Kabweza 10 Jan 2014), a trend that holds strong even after the introduction of fiber optic and DSL service. These numbers can be difficult to interpret, as many Zimbabweans own more than one cellphone line and must have been counted multiple times. On the other hand, devices are often shared by several users, as one person in the United Kingdom explained:

I can even chat to my grandmother [via the internet]. Not that she knows how to use WhatsApp or anything, but she is with some of her grandchildren, and they know how to operate the phone. I send a message to her—“how are you this morning? How are things?”— and I get the response [through her grandchildren]. She actually knows [that she is chatting with me] (Hazvinei 2014)
The rollout of cellular internet in Zimbabwe roughly coincided with new, cellphone-only social networking applications like WhatsApp and Viber. By 2014, WhatsApp was the most important, accounting for 23% of Econet’s data traffic (Mupaso 13 May 2014). WhatsApp enables users to communicate far more economically than via telephone or SMS by piping text, photo and video messages (and recently, real-time voice and video conversations) through a data connection. This functionality transformed communication within Zimbabwe. As one young man explained to me, a few pennies of airtime allowed him to text with his girlfriend on WhatsApp all night long. WhatsApp also enables globally dispersed families to reduce the cost of international communication and even recreate intimate spaces analogous to the home, where conversations can evolve spontaneously, and where relatives can share both important life milestones as well as everyday minutia. Belinda, who lives in Harare, elaborated how WhatsApp enabled her to reestablish intimacy with her sister in Australia:

We chat every day, throughout the day. Now, with WhatsApp, I’m even taking pictures. Before, you could go a month or a week [without talking]. You could just say “hello? hello?” unless somebody calls you at that right moment. Now you can say: “I’m so happy.”

[They can respond:] “Why, what happened?”

“I got flowers.”

“OK, let’s see.”

Then you take a picture. And it’s virtually at no cost. That’s the beauty of it: no cost. So yeah, that I love that technology. (Belinda 2012)
Facebook offers different, though overlapping functionality. Rather than being geared towards private one-to-one or small group conversations like WhatsApp, Facebook pulls people into communities of users through “friendship” relationships. Users-generated content (photos, links commentary, etc) flows through and between these communities in a more public way. This content is also archived, so that as people in Zimbabwe began using social media they could view many years of images and conversations which were not previously available to them. This provided an intimate view of life overseas. Much of this material was flattering, but it also included arguments and links to news articles and other content which revealed the precarity of living in a strange land. Meanwhile, Facebook enabled diasporans to view current photos from Zimbabwe and engage in real-time discussion about these with friends and relatives there—just like they were accustomed to doing with fellow diasporans. One diasporan explained how the arrival of people in Zimbabwe on social media changed how diasporans presented themselves to relatives at home:

Before, we could just go home and lie, show up with some new clothes, and tell some story about how we were doing amazing. Now [people in Zimbabwe] can go online, find stories about Zimbabweans doing this and that in London, Zimbabwean women stripping, being arrested. So now you can’t just go home and lie about how well you are doing and [how] easy it is (Vimbai 2014).

Unlike WhatsApp, which (at the time of research) required late-model phones, Facebook was accessible on lower-end handsets. By July of 2013, there were more than 1.1 million active
accounts in the country\textsuperscript{43}, a number that presumably continues to expand (Kabweza 24 Jul 2013). However, even though internet use is growing among \textit{all} demographics in Zimbabwe, important digital divides persist. Age is one such divide. Younger people tend to be more technologically sophisticated than their parents and grandparents. Economic divides are also pronounced. Wealthier people own costlier handsets with more functionality, enabling them to engage in activities like video calling that are unavailable on lower-end handsets. The price of internet access in Zimbabwe remains high compared to other global markets, and bandwidth is capped. This means that wealthier people can afford to spend more time online and engage in higher-bandwidth activities. Geographic fractures also resurface in digital space. People in the diaspora are on one extreme of this divide, as higher overseas incomes and uncapped bandwidth makes going online an incidental expense. People in rural areas of Zimbabwe are at the other extreme. Although rural internet access is increasingly available, it does tend to be slower and less reliable than in urban areas. Combined with lower incomes, this puts rural users at a significant disadvantage compared to people in urban areas.

The Zimbabwean internet is thus a relatively new and rapidly evolving space where people in the diaspora and those who remain at home can interact across great distances. As Komito writes, “Debates about the social effect of new social media technologies have special relevance for migrants, because, as dislocated individuals who have grown up in one society and now live or work elsewhere, changes in communication technologies are likely to have a significant effect on their lives” (2011:1075). Within the expanding and evanescent realm of the Zimbabwean internet, spatially dispersed users create and populate a variety of virtual places. Some, like

\textsuperscript{43} This number may be inflated. It is based on the Facebook Advertising platform’s reported number of users in Zimbabwe. When I did my own search on 12 Dec 2015, Facebook shows that there were 830,000 users with Zimbabwe as their home, of which 530,000 are men and 300,000 are women.
family group chats on WhatsApp, are relatively bounded, populated by select individuals. Others, like Facebook posts, engage a wider audience of friends and friends-of-friends. Comments on news articles and YouTube videos, meanwhile, are public places where all users can potentially encounter and interact with one another. The Zimbabwean internet—as a shifting and overlapping patchwork of digital places—emerges from the intersection of platforms and connections between people who conceive of themselves as Zimbabwean, who are invested in the affairs of the country, and whose online activities are informed by this identity. Meanwhile, broad socio-economic criteria like age, income and geography shape participation in online activities like the memetic discourse to which we now turn.

**Social interaction on the Zimbabwean Internet**

Digital *architecture* is a crucial factor that shapes online places as well as the actions occurring within them. Platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp are constituted by computer code that creates “affordances” which enable certain communicative acts and make others difficult or impossible. Twitter, for instance, allows users to broadcast messages only up to 140 characters in length, while Facebook was built to allow “liking” content and only recently afforded users a way to express disapproval. Computer code also algorithmically interprets, selects and delivers content to users, thus shaping which conversations they are exposed to and participate in. Like their counterparts in the material world, online places are not inert containers for human action. Rather, the affordances and algorithmic processes that give them form also help shape the human interaction occurring within them.
Sharing is one of the most elemental affordances of all social media platforms. Sharing actions include forwarding emails or WhatsApp messages, “retweeting” on twitter, and clicking on the Facebook’s “like” or “share” buttons. On the Zimbabwean internet, people commonly share prayers, jokes, political cartoons, and interesting or humorous videos and images. Some of this content circulates broadly within global cyberspace, but other content relates directly to the life experiences of Zimbabweans and circulates more narrowly. This latter content in particular can yield exceptionally rich data that can be productively incorporated into ethnographic analysis, as Manganga has shown in an analysis of political cartoons circulating between Zimbabweans via SMS (2012). In another example, I received the graphic in Figure 3 via WhatsApp. It depicts three woven plastic bags in the boot of an SUV—the type of luggage that people often use to transport goods overland between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The caption reads: “spot the border jumper” and leads viewers to realize that one of the bags is actually a person wearing a matching plaid shirt. This image gives a humorous twist to the painful reality that many Zimbabweans in South Africa are undocumented and must resort to risky, illegal border crossings in order to return home or pursue opportunity abroad.

Even though I eventually received this graphic on WhatsApp, I first encountered it on Facebook and later observed it on Twitter. This illustrates how sharing helps knit together all of the various websites, platforms and social vectors that comprise the Zimbabwean Internet into a unified though amorphous and constantly evolving whole. Madianou and Miller use the term “polymedia” to describe this phenomenon of “an emerging environment of communicative opportunities that functions as an ‘integrated structure’ within which each individual medium is defined in relational terms in the context of all other media” (2013:170). In the context of polymedia, sharing activates and reinforces connections between users and incites dialogue, thus
increasing the density of activity in networks and selecting the most interesting content for broad dissemination. Sharing amplifies viewership, as encapsulated by the icon for the ShareThis widget in Figure 1, which provides a seamless way for users to distribute content through a variety of platforms. This icon depicts one node branching into two, implying the potential for shared content to scale exponentially and “go viral” as recipient nodes continue to disseminate across platforms.

Figure 18: “Spot the border jumper” received via WhatsApp (Unknown 2014)
Viral content can be especially fruitful grist for ethnographic analysis because it has been vouched for as interesting or evocative by many people. Of the various genres of viral content, memes can be particularly productive due to the way that their participatory nature elicits a multitude of perspectives. In the Zvirikufaya meme, for example, Zimbabweans around the world share cellphone videos that reveal the unique structures of opportunity and oppression that inhere in the many countries and cities where participants live. Journalist Bruce Mutsvairo elaborates the core repertoire of symbols and rhetorical tactics that comprise this meme:

Videos produced by Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are strikingly similar: nearly all of them carry the words “Hatidzokiko” [We will not return there] as citizens vow never to return to Zimbabwe, while Zimbabweans at home are hitting back by saying “Hatiuyiko” [We will not come over there] suggesting they will never come to the Diaspora.

Both sides use every trick in the book from plates full of sadza and chicken, fridges flooded with food to latest SUV vehicles and posh English accents to show off their splendour of wealth. (Mutsvairo 14 July 2014)
Consider two examples. One was filmed by a diasporan in Australia, and the other by someone in Zimbabwe. In the first video, a man walks through his chic Sydney home, filming his accumulated possessions. He begins by rebuking politicians in Zimbabwe who claim that people in the diaspora are suffering:

Mugabe’s people—they are being given farms—they say “hey, we are going to stay in Zimbabwe, People in the diaspora are not having it good.”

You are lying!
Look at this big kitchen. Look at the tiles, they are shining. Everything is gleaming. Look at the brand: “Bosch.” Oh my goodness, ladies, this is called a “dish washer.” I am going to stay here. We will not return [to Zimbabwe]. Zvirikufaya in Sydney Australia!

Look [at the laundry machine]. It is working right now. You just plug it in, because electricity is always here… This [laundry machine] is the house maid, named “Samsung.” Wait, wait! Look at this little sink, a little toilet, some tissue paper! We do not use newspaper, which cuts your skin. We use 3-ply tissue paper, because Zvirikufaya in Sidney Australia!

(FB:@ZKF 7 July 2014)

Not surprisingly, some internet users in Zimbabwe were upset by such ostentatious shows of diasporic wealth and demeaning portrayals of home. The snide references to using newspaper in the bathroom surely cut in the wrong direction. In response, they joined the conversation with their own videos demonstrating that Zimbabwe is where things are actually on fire. Some took the same boastful tone, as a few people there can display great wealth. More effective videos, however, made subtle but forceful reference to the simple pleasures of life, the joy that comes from being close to one’s family, and the connection with one’s roots that derives from living in the land that you and your family suffered to liberate from colonialism. Consider the following video, masterfully produced by a Harare resident:
Clip opens with a boy outside a tidy, low density home in Zimbabwe

Boy: [beckons to the camera] come here old man.

camera cuts closer to the boy

Boy: [urging] come near.

Camera crops to an intimate close-up of the boy’s face.
Boy: [holds up a graded paper] 10 out of 10 in school! I am smart. The teacher said “good job.”

Camera zooms out

Boy: [Holding up a coin] Daddy gave me two Rand! I am going to buy two bags of Jiggies [chips]. Zvinu Zvangu, Zvirikufaya! [My things are burning up!]

(FB:@ZKF 11 Jul 2014)”

This is a powerful rebuttal to those who claim that the diaspora emancipated them. Here is a child who is thriving, even without flashy possessions. He is excelling in school, and his father is physically present to witness his performance and reward him. This video problematizes what actually constitutes happiness and success. It insinuates that being surrounded by loved ones is more meaningful than being surrounded by gadgets, and it obliquely reminds viewers that academic performance often suffers when parents venture overseas and leave their children behind. The Zvirikufaya meme thus offers a catchy repertoire of symbols, phrases, dramatic devices and talking points though which many different perspectives are explored.

The origins of the Zvirikufaya meme must be understood within the socio-political context from which it emerged. There is a profound sense of ambivalence about whether the suffering that diasporans endure is really worth it. As shown in the previous chapter, people in Zimbabwe increasingly understand the difficulties of life abroad, which can include deskilling, demeaning work, racism, xenophobia, illegality and long separation from one’s dearest relations. Many families have been traumatized by loved ones who returned from the diaspora destitute or in coffins. Indeed, some of the most disastrous effects of migration are easily observable within
Zimbabwe, for example in the poor educational and social outcomes of many “diaspora orphans” who live with caretakers while their parents support them with remittances from abroad. Against this backdrop of overseas precarity, a segment of Zimbabwean society is thriving. Some people have been successful in tobacco farming, in the growing telecommunications sector, in the new “kiya-kiya” economy of deal making, or the recent diamond and gold booms. The government’s indigenization agenda also enables highly educated and connected individuals to secure fertile farms and well-paying positions in industry, mining, and other sectors formerly dominated by whites. Thus, many Zvirikufaya videos from Zimbabwe rebuff conspicuous consumption abroad with conspicuous consumption at home. In one such video, the protagonist notes that Zimbabwe recently earned US $600 million from 224 million kilograms of tobacco exports—more than whites ever produced. He then urges diasporans to collect their remittance-dependent relatives so that he and the other “productive remaining Zimbabweans” can carry on with life (FB:@ZKF 06 Jul 2014). Thus, as the anonymous NewZimbabwe commentator cited above argues: “Diasporans feel there is a narrative that they are not doing well and so they go above and beyond to show that they are in fact doing better than they would be in Zimbabwe” (Special Correspondent 08 July 2014).

The Zvirikufaya meme also directly engages a simmering tension between diasporans and the state. In general, diasporans are committed to Zimbabwe because of the family relationships that they have with relatives who remain behind. Most work long hours to remit money so that their dependents can survive and hopefully thrive. Many yearn to return home, and they prepare for this eventuality by acquiring property, building houses and starting businesses while they are overseas. Unfortunately, the dream of return is repeatedly deferred as political and economic reform fail to materialize. Moreover, many diasporans are angry that the government refuses to
acknowledge the central economic role of their remittances. Instead, the state alienates diasporans politically and ideologically. They are prohibited from holding dual citizenship or voting from abroad, while bureaucratic procedures like renewing passports or procuring birth certificates are excruciatingly complicated and expensive. Senior government officials regularly salt these wounds by chastising diasporans for “abandoning” their country and mocking their sacrifices. President Mugabe forcefully took this tack in a 2006 speech, which lambasted diasporans for shirking their responsibility to the homeland and running away to England where they are inferior beings good only for scratching the backs of decrepit old, white people (Maboreke 2014).

Thus, when then-Vice President Joice Mujuru urged diasporans to return home to help rebuild the country in a speech she delivered just as the Zvirikufaya meme was ramping up in popularity (Mukori 07 July 2014), the protagonists of many videos directly responded to her summons with vehement assertions of how well-settled they are (“ndigere!”) and they surprisingly reversed the widely-held dream to return by claiming that they have absolutely no desire to ever go back to Zimbabwe (“handizokiko”). Although a segment of the population in Zimbabwe is undeniably thriving, many others are withering under catastrophic unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure, an oppressive state and a dearth of meaningful opportunities. Some of the most effective (and viral) Zvirikufaya videos address this grim reality by boasting about the overseas availability of life’s bare essentials rather than by bragging about luxuries. A good example is a video uploaded by a young white man who appears on screen cooking meat, sadza and leafy greens—the quintessential meal of Zimbabwe. Speaking fluent Shona, he exclaims:

44 This policy is in flux and was touched on in Chapter Two
Zvirikufaya ku USA! You see, my sadza here, I just made it very quickly. My vegetables, my meat, see? Right. So here we are: sadza, vegetables and meat…

[He now shows himself turning on a faucet]

We have water—

[The camera turns up to the ceiling light]

—and electricity! Do you know this? It is called electricity. See, I can turn it off and on, off and on. Do you know about electricity? ()

This video does not pretend that life overseas flows with milk and honey. The man’s clothes, appliances and cookware is utilitarian and his light bulb is bare. Yet compared to Zimbabwe—where power cuts are frequent and most people go weeks or months without running water—the simple act of turning on a tap is reason to exclaim that life is on fire. This iteration is also interesting because it portrays a young white man—the face of colonialism. During the past decade, white people have been almost entirely silenced from political discourse in Zimbabwe, so the fact that he is able to participate through Zvirikufaya is remarkable. Memes like Zvirikufaya are fascinating because they are inherently multivocal and can be used to express divergent positionalities. Burgess understands this effect as a “textual hook” whereby each iteration calls forth others (Burgess 2008). Similarly, Shifman argues that popular memes are inevitably “incomplete or flawed, thereby invoking further creative dialogue” (Shifman 2012):187. Through this participatory logic—enhanced by the social architecture and algorithmic proclivities of platforms—memes emerge from networked publics as a mode of collaborative discourse through which multiple viewpoints are expressed and debated.
Thus, many Zvirikufaya videos emanating from the diaspora admit that life abroad is not always on fire. Living in the diaspora can be a dehumanizing and exhausting experience. This discursive reversal is brilliantly accomplished by a Zvirikufaya remash of the popular “Hitler’s Downfall” meme. The Downfall meme—which went viral globally around 2010—is based on the climax scene from the movie Der Untergang (Downfall) (Hirschbiegel 2004) which portrays Hitler’s final days. In the original movie, Hitler’s generals debrief him about the Soviet advance on Berlin and reveal that Steiner was unable to mobilize a counterstrike. Hitler is discombobulated by the news of impending defeat and dismisses everyone except four generals. He then has a nervous breakdown and violently accuses them of being traitors and obstacles to his machinations. Memetic iterations of Hitler’s Downfall overlay this scene with unrelated subtitles so that his rant in German appears to have a completely different meaning than what he actually says. Examples include a video where Hitler learns that he has been swindled by a Nigerian 409 scam (YT:@HitlerRantsParodies 7 Jun 2010) and another where he learns that his real estate investments are going into foreclosure due to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States (YT:@jamnospam 03 Nov 2008). Part of the meme’s humor derives from slippage between the gravity of the original scene and the absurdity of the interposed subtitles. In this way, the Zvirikufaya version of Hitler’s Downfall uses Shona subtitles to describe a nightmare deportation scenario that haunts many diasporans:
**General:** Gentlemen, immigration is deporting everyone who says Zvirikufaya on Facebook back to Zimbabwe [panel 1]. People are put on buses which leave them at Gatwick Airport. Busses are arriving from London and Manchester, and the plane is dropping off people in Harare, via Johannesburg [panel 2].

**Hitler:** What does that have to do with us? We were given citizenship long back, in 2008 [panel 3].

**Generals:** [glancing nervously at each other] Sir… they are saying… their system has changed [panel 4].

**Hitler:** [discombobulated and distressed] Whoever bought a house in Zimbabwe, has a relative in ZanuPF, or married a white person, leave the room right now.

**Hitler:** [after everyone except four generals leave] What do they want me to do?! There is no electricity right now in Zimbabwe. There are no credit cards, so how will we buy petrol for the generator? The only jobs are the ones like Baba Tensen’s [reference to a
previous Zimbabwean viral cited above. My kids do not eat sadza. How do I order pizza in Zimbabwe?—

**General:** [Interrupting, refers to new chain pizza restaurant] I hear that there is Chicken Slice these days…

**General:** They don’t have delivery, stupid! […] Why does life have to be like that? My God, if only we had gone to South Africa… but they also sent people without visas back to Zimbabwe. Oh my…(YT:@AngryZimbabwean 30 Jun 2014)

This mashup between the memetic repertoires of the Zvirikufaya and Downfall memes illustrates how the Zimbabwe Internet is not self-contained but exists as part of the larger, universal Internet. By invoking the historical moment of World War II, this iteration obliquely compares the contemporary plight of Zimbabweans being deported from England to the plight of European Jews during the Holocaust. Rather than arguing that the diaspora is a place of abundance and stability, it ingeniously foregrounds the precarity that diasporans experience. For example, it reflects on hostile and mercurial immigration regimes that can change without warning and thereby undermine what diasporans thought they already achieved. It compellingly alludes to how life abroad is increasingly difficult compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s when it was easier to get papers, when the global economy was stronger and jobs were more plentiful, and when the diaspora enjoyed a major financial advantage through converting their forex earnings into Zimbabwean dollars. Now Zimbabwe uses the US dollar and remittances do not go as far. Meanwhile, immigration regimes are tightening so that even neighboring South Africa increasingly resorts to deportation. This overseas unrootedness is compounded by the
impossibility of going home due to a lack of jobs and cultural alienation as epitomized by children who do not even eat the staple food sadza.

Some of the most effective Zvirikufaya videos from Zimbabwe seize on this precarity and contrast it to the profound cultural and historical rootedness available in Zimbabwe. The socioeconomic divisions that structure access to the internet are visible in the Zvirikufaya meme, with the bulk of iterations originating in the diaspora and from affording, technologically-equipped Zimbabweans in urban areas. There are, however, a few Zvirikufaya videos which were filmed in rural areas which are increasingly connected. For example, the following video shot on a rural homestead contains no sports cars or designer clothes. However, the protagonist revels in a type of emplaced satisfaction that is unattainable for many diasporans:
I’m farming over here. My friend is on the plow. The seeds are in my bag.

[Someone off camera whistles to direct the oxen]
People say “Zvirikufaya ku Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria…” None of that matters.

[He points the camera to his well-constructed and tidy, though humble homestead]

Look at my solar setup over there. Uncle is dancing while he sows the seeds. […] Don’t brag to us. We will not leave the rural homestead. And Zvirikufaya! (FB:@ZKF 5 Jan 2015)

The power of this video derives from the narrator’s enjoyment of many aspects of life that are unattainable for diasporans. He *owns* his house outright, which speaks to the well-known fact that many diasporans rent or pay large mortgages. He is farming his own land, which speaks to the fact that he is enjoying the fruit of what all Zimbabweans—including those in the diaspora—suffered so greatly for during the war of liberation. The persuasiveness of this video thus hinges on the profound rootedness that is available in Zimbabwe, and which many diasporans acutely miss even while they exclaim they will never return.

These points are made even more explicitly by a video shot at Great Zimbabwe—one of the most impressive architectural accomplishments of the ancient world and a place of great spiritual and cultural importance to Shona people. The protagonist is a teacher who films her class exploring the monument in the company of white tourists, as she gives this commentary:

Zvirikufaya at Great Zimbabwe. Yes, school children had their trip fees paid for by their parents, who are based here in Zimbabwe. Do you have the time to go to recreational parks, to go and see such meaningful monuments? Zvirikufaya at Great Zimbabwe! You don’t have time, all you do is go for shifts.
Look, there are white people from the places where you went, zvirikufaya! They have come to visit the Great Zimbabwe, while you are there working shift after shift. Look at how the children are happy.

We are not coming to England, to America. Stay there, we will stay here and work normal hours with humane conditions, not this phenomenon where you work endlessly like a watch or a heart that pumps for a living. We will stay here in Zimbabwe where we can rest, go to recreational parks and national heritage monuments. (YT:@NehandaTV 06 Aug 2014)

The children in this video live in intact homes, with parents who are able to afford school fees and field trips by working in Zimbabwe. The narrator accordingly problematizes the meaning of happiness and success by asking if it is better to spend time with family in Zimbabwe or to live alone and overworked in a foreign land, alienated from one’s culture.

These powerful arguments are poignantly confirmed by a video from England where a man laments that going to the UK has only resulted in dashed hopes and dreams (FB:@ZKF 11 Sep 2014). He initially had the idea of building a house in Zimbabwe by saving money in England. Then he discovered that he was not allowed to work and had to go on benefits. At first he was happy. He bought many second-hand possessions with the money he received for doing nothing, “for just sitting down” like Baba Tensen. In a way, he was claiming reparations from the British for colonizing Zimbabwe. But as time passes, he grows fat and his health begins to fail. He earns just enough to eke out a living in England, but not enough to accomplish anything substantial in Zimbabwe. In this video’s comments, one viewer poignantly elaborates his argument:
Please understand the gist of this story he is not saying getting benefits is good, he means benefits are killing us, you don't work, you don't know your neighbours and gadgets are your friends, your education and experience were not valued, yr dreams to built a house, buy cows and uplift your family not achieved, 15 years later [you are] still here just eating and living for free yet you now hv medical problems, shattered dreams.achieved nothing, lost loved ones at home, missed your children growing up and you want to go back home bt you don't where to start, our life at home was better than this, I miss Zimbabwe

Popular Zvirikufaya videos rack up hundreds of comments as people inspect them closely. This key discursive affordance of social media provides a much simpler way of participating in the meme than producing videos. Indeed, the comments are where meaning and truthfulness is most directly evaluated or contested. One of the most frequent critiques found in the comments is an interrogation of the truthfulness of what is represented. For example, when a woman in England shows off her Ferrari, a skeptical viewer chides:

Muchenjere kudzingwa basa sisi makuswera muchitambira mumota boss arikubasa
ahh imi ka

Smart one, sister. You will be fired spending all day playing with the boss’s car while he is at work. (User 30 August 2014)

Meanwhile, Zimbabweans in Spain who film the aftermath of a delicious meal on the beach are asked:

chikafu ndimi madya here icho or mangotara padiwa nevamwe
Did you eat that food or did you take the food that was eaten by someone else? (User 03 August 2014)

And a woman who shows off high-end makeup in Lagos is told that she probably just works in a beauty salon:

k so yu are a makeup artist good for you. (User 03 September 2014)

Comments such as these reveal a central tension of social media. On the one hand, the internet allows people to display their successes (fancy cars, tasty food, time with family). On the other, it enables them to misrepresent their reality or omit important details. Facebook is like a stage, where Zimbabweans generally present their best face to the world (Goffman 1959). This is possibly a universal tendency in online human sociality that goes hand-and-glove with an awareness that other Facebookers also tend to avoid posting unflattering, backstage information. The tendency to withhold unflattering content makes a very effective joke in itself, as when a woman in one Zvirikufaya video answers a phone call from her mother in Zimbabwe. After perfunctorily enquiring about her mother's health, she explains that she has to hang up because she is very busy at a new accounting job. This impresses her mother, but then the camera zooms out to reveal that the “accountant” is actually a janitor cleaning a toilet: (BlazTV 12 July 2014)

Of course, if social media is a stage, it also allows people to broadcast forceful assertions to a large potential audience. As in the above Zvirikufaya videos which disclose the precarity of life in the diaspora, some participants in Zimbabwe also share their discontent with the situation at home. One suspects, for instance, that the protagonist of the following video
would be very happy to work as a janitor in England if this would allow her to escape dark nights with dwindling candles in Zimbabwe:

I really wish I could. If I could go over there, I would not come back. The candle is almost finished and there is no electricity. We are not watching TV because there is no electricity. If I ever travel there, please pick me up at Gatwick Airport. If I go, I will never return to Zimbabwe except in a coffin.
Thus—notwithstanding the facility that social media affords for misrepresentation and omission—an indisputable complex of truths emerge from the Zvirikufaya meme when all iterations are considered together. Contributions arrived from around the globe, wherever Zimbabweans have settled. Likewise, both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe are represented as well as high and low density neighborhoods. Participants in each location make conflicting arguments about their quality of life, with some insisting that they will never return to Zimbabwe (or go abroad) and others lamenting that they cannot jump onto the next plane to Harare (or London). In the process, they debate politics, education, remittances, welfare benefits, family, citizenship and the meaning of happiness and success. What emerges is not consensus, but an ethnographically “deep” collaborative self-portrait that foregrounds the inconsistencies and ambiguities surrounding migration. I have argued that one of the most complicated aspects of dispersed relatedness is incomplete and inaccurate understandings of the lived realities of distant loved ones. In the Zvirikufaya meme, nuanced depictions of everyday experience help mitigate these knowledge gaps. Participants create knowledge that is useful in imagining what life is like far away by filming daily activities, by showing off successes and regrets, and by discussing and debating various perspectives in the comments sections of each video. In this way, the Zvirikufaya meme reaffirms a collective (though contested) national identity:

Another positive aspect of Zvirikufaya is that it opens a window into the way Zimbabweans are living around the world. As the creator of the [main Zvirikufaya Facebook] page puts it, “I hope my page is going to make people proud of being Zimbabweans wherever they are.” Indeed. Having seen the different things Zimbabweans are doing inside and outside of Zimbabwe, I cannot help but swell with pride at their resilience. In a world where we are
constantly bombarded with negative news about our country, is it so bad that Zimbabweans
have found a way to laugh with each other? (Special Correspondent 08 July 2014)

As this commentator observes, Zvirikufaya videos appeared from "around the world....inside
and outside of Zimbabwe." This includes not only far-flung destinations like Dubai and
Australia, but also low and high density neighborhoods of Zimbabwe's main cities, as well as
rural areas and landmarks of deep cultural and spiritual significance like Great Zimbabwe and
Victoria Falls. Wealthy and poor people participated, and a few videos utilized the minority
Ndebele language or featured white Zimbabweans who have been alienated from the political
sphere for many years. What seemed to be happening was a sort of “collective effervescence—”
a communal outpouring of expression that occurs when all members of a group are assembled
into a specific time and place. Think of the galvanizing chants and dances of the home team’s
fans as the championship game unfolds in their favor, or the outpouring of song and dance at
religious events. Through the Zvirikufaya meme, a globally-dispersed community similarly
assembled within a virtual location—not a church or a stadium, but a fluctuating and evanescent
slice of cyberspace that congealed from a stream of likes, shares and hashtags. Within this space,
diverse people who could express a claim on being Zimbabwean collaboratively produced a
singular cultural artifact, a group self-portrait condensing all the diverse, far-flung and
paradoxical facets of peoples’ global experiences into a coherent series of short films exploring
the meaning of life.
Politics

The internet’s arrival in Zimbabwe thus provides transnational places wherein dispersed communities can convene to debate pressing issues of mutual concern—including both family and national concerns. Thus far I focused on discussions of identity and meaning. These are certainly central aspects of social life, but it is equally important to examine how digital discussions can shape events in the material world. In Zimbabwe, the offline consequences of online activity are particularly apparent in the political arena. This section briefly explores how the internet is presenting stiff challenges to the ruling party’s 30-year reign. Online spaces are largely beyond the reach of state censorship and comprise alternative public spheres where subaltern politics can be explored. Meanwhile, the memetic propensity that makes discussions of meaning go viral can simultaneously proliferate dissenting political views and calls to action which can and do result in both protests and arrests. It is therefore important to avoid falling into a cyber-utopian trap which portrays the internet as inevitably leading towards democratization or other forms of “progress” be these technological, relational, economic or political. Each of the three digital counter-hegemonic challenges I review below—the creation of an independent online press, the leaking of sensitive information damaging to the ruling party, and the hashtag activism that is currently translating into massive street demonstrations—are vulnerable to new forms of state and corporate coercion, surveillance and cooption. If digital protest is to succeed, participants must eventually encounter the very concrete realities of bullets and batons.
Independent Online Press

The proliferation of independent online news publications during the early 2000s was one of the first significant political events to emerge on Zimbabwean internet. Zimbabwe’s highly-literate population avidly consumes newspapers, even while the country is home to an extremely repressive media regime. Following the confiscation of white-owned farms in 2001, the state passed onerous legislation which “essentially criminalized the journalism profession” by subjecting practitioners to jail and severe fines if they worked without a license or if their stories were overly critical of the government (Moyo 2011). Dozens of reporters were arrested under these laws, contributing to the closure of at least four major independent newspapers. Extra-judicial tactics like firebombing also targeted reporters’ offices and homes. Although privately-owned newspapers are making a comeback, the Zimbabwean press remains dominated by the state which rigorously advances the interests of the ruling party through its media outlets (Moyo 2007).

Legislative and extra-judicial attacks on the press, coupled with generalized political and economic turmoil, resulted in “a mass exodus of journalists” during the early 2000s (Moyo 2007, 83). Upon leaving Zimbabwe, some journalists began collaborating on new online papers, blogs and discussion forums including NewZimbabwe.com, Zimdaily.co.za, kubatana.org and thezimbabwesituation.com. These publications, based outside of the country, were well beyond the state’s direct control and routinely published articles critical of the ruling party. Dumisani Moyo’s 2007 examination of these sites concludes that they constituted a significant challenge to the narrative presented by the state media. At the time of his scholarship, most readers were diasporans because internet access inside Zimbabwe was limited. Nevertheless, Moyo argues
that independent online publications managed to “set the agenda” for journalism inside Zimbabwe by breaking stories that would not have made it past censors in the state-controlled media:

Partly because of the speed and instantaneous publishing enabled by new communications technologies…landmark stories that could have remained hidden under the carpet have been exposed through these websites. In a country where the mainstream media have long served as gatekeepers for the rest of society, the role of gatekeepers is fast diminishing, as the news websites enable citizens to find information for themselves. (Moyo 2007:91)

Thus, even though most people within Zimbabwe did not have internet access at the time, the stories published in the independent online press filtered into the country through informal, conversational networks and forced the state media to respond.

Last Moyo’s investigation of kubatana.org, a Zimbabwe-centered blog, concurs with Dumisani Moyo’s study by revealing how the early online media created a space where counter-hegemonic narratives could emerge. Last Moyo interviewed bloggers on this platform during the hotly-contested 2008 runoff election. Kubatana covered political violence, economic turmoil, and anti-government demonstrations during this period—stories that were largely absent from the state-controlled press. In contrast to journalistic convention, bloggers used a conversational tone and reported first-hand experiences which lent authenticity to their activist stance. The independent online media thus constituted an alternative public sphere and “disseminate news that potentially shakes the foundations of Zimbabwe’s hegemonic project by foregrounding the anti-establishment discourses that threaten the survival of the political elite” (Moyo 2011:751).
Some of these online publications—including newzimbabwe.com—remain active, while others have disappeared or appeared. Furthermore, all major newspapers inside Zimbabwe now also offer online editions. In the handful of years following the scholarship cited above, people within Zimbabwe are also now able to access these sites directly. According to Google Analytics, three of the most popular websites in Zimbabwe in 2016 were news sites, while fully half of the visitors to NewZimbabwe.com are now located inside the country. The proliferation of internet access within Zimbabwe thus enables people there to more readily access and participate in counter-hegemonic discourses.

Online editions of both private and state-owned Zimbabwean newspapers also now afford readers the ability to comment on news articles. According to journalists interviewed by Mawindi in 2013, this enables readers to participate more closely in the journalistic process by alerting reporters to sources and stories they may have overlooked (2014). Comments also enable readers to hold journalists accountable for shoddy reporting, poor writing and false or misleading information, arguably raising standards. As observable in the Zvirikufaya meme, the comments sections in the online press frequently include discussions between diasporans and their counterparts within Zimbabwe. This allows diasporans to more fully participate in political discourse—an arena that they have heretofore been restricted from entering.

However, the proliferation of online forums where dissenting views can be explored also enables the dissemination of extremist viewpoints. Some of the most active participants in these forums expound racist and tribalist perspectives that yield intense debates replete with intolerant rhetoric. Online hate speech activates and exacerbates longstanding tensions and arguably poisons alternative public spheres. For this reason, I have heard people speculate that some of the most vociferous proponents of extremist views are actually state-sponsored intelligence agents.
who wish to sabotage counter-hegemonic discourse. This claim is difficult to verify, but its plausibility is supported by the state’s increasing efforts to police online behavior. A number of high-profile arrests following the online expressions of dissent indicates that news forums and social media are actively monitored. These incidents reveal that digital communication does not inevitably lead to productive discourse, but can equally be leveraged by in the service of divisive propaganda and surveillance.

*Baba Jukwa*

![Screenshot of Baba Jukwa's Facebook Page - June 2013](image)

Another major challenge to the ruling party emanating from the online sphere emerged during Zimbabwe’s contentious 2013 elections. A mysterious character using the pseudonym
Baba Jukwa (meaning “the Father of Jukwa”) appeared on Facebook and began leaking prolific accounts of corruption, violence and indiscretions involving key government officials. He (she? they?) also published the personal cellphone numbers and home addresses of implicated officials, urging readers to harass them at home or deny service to their lines of communication by flooding them with calls. Baba Jukwa was privy to sensitive insider information about the ruling party and his torrent of sensational, often-salacious leaks earned his page almost half a million followers on Facebook in a matter of months. Indeed, tech blogger L.S.M. Kabweza linked the growth in Facebook’s popularity during this time to the Baba Jukwa phenomena.

Baba Jukwa became a thorn in the side of the ruling party, which offered a $300,000 reward for his unmasking (Reporter 29 May 2015; Staff Reporter 04 Nov 2014). Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s own version of Wikileaks was a hot topic of conversation in the offices and streets of Harare, where many people personally knew the parties involved and could vouch for the truthfulness of Baba Jukwa’s accusations. Moreover, Baba Jukwa seemingly had a remarkable knack for predicting events like the car accident that killed Edward Chindori-Chininga (Reporter 29 Jun 2013). However, even while these leaks rallied political opposition, they ultimately failed to swaying the election. The ruling party once again clinched the presidency, and actually consolidated its grip on power by winning a majority of parliamentary seats which put an end to the tenuous coalition government of the previous years. Many people were skeptical of the results, claiming that the ruling party once again resorted to intimidation and rigging. Thus, Baba Jukwa’s leaks succeeded in making a strong discursive maneuver, but were largely ineffectual in damaging the coercive machinery through which the state maintained its grip on power. This underlines the fact that digital activism is often insufficient in effecting meaningful change unless it can galvanize meaningful, on-the-ground action.
Baba Jukwa ceased activity shortly after the elections, and several people were arrested for involvement in the affair. To this day, however, his identity has not been conclusively established. If I were to speculate—and this is pure speculation akin to speculating about the pseudonymous identity of Bitcoin’s creator Satoshi Nakamoto—it seems plausible that several people may have been involved, and that the state’s contention that foreign governments assisted in resourcing participants may hold a grain of truth. The cyber-espionage capabilities of states like the US and the UK that are hostile to the Mugabe regime are increasingly well known. Meanwhile, evidence from The Cuban Twitter Project and the wealth of material on the NSA leaked by Edward Snowden as well as the recent CIA leaks confirm the willingness of powerful states to wage digital warfare. Due to Zimbabwe’s own modest resources, the digital communications of the ruling party might have been a vulnerable target for interception and could have provided material to the leaker. Of course, this form of digital sabotage need not have been done externally, and it is equally plausible that someone within Zimbabwe hacked ZANU-PF communications channels, or that material was collected in a more conventional ways by people within the ruling party’s inner circle. Nevertheless, the fact that it is plausible to consider digital sabotage indicates that the increasing prevalence of internet-mediated communication within Zimbabwe opens new avenues for foreign as well as local intervention—a fascinating topic that I anticipate researching in the future.

#ThisFlag

The Baba Jukwa leaks set a president for online activism in Zimbabwe, which subsequently grew in frequency, especially during the past few months. One significant example is the
#Tajamuka/Sesijikile movement led by prominent activists including Patson Dzamara, brother of Itai Dzamara who was abducted in 2014 after vocally and persistently calling on Mugabe to resign and is presumed to be dead. #Tajamuka/Sesijikile movement extensively uses twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms to mobilize activists.

Most recently, the #ThisFlag campaign led by pastor Evans Mawarire helped galvanize massive street demonstrations on a scale not seen in decades. Discouraged by his inability to raise school fees for his son, Pastor Mawarire uploaded to Twitter a moving spoken-word piece that aired his laments about Zimbabwe’s current political and economic situation. Draped in the country’s flag, Dzamara began his video by musing about how alienated he felt from the flag’s symbolism:

Mawarire: “This flag. This beautiful flag. They tell me that the green is for the vegetation and crops, but I don’t see any crops. They say that the yellow is for all the minerals: gold, diamonds, platinum, chrome. I don’t know how much of it is left, who they sold it to and how much they got for it. … They tell me that the black is for the majority—people like me. For
some reason I don’t feel like I am a part of it. I look at the flag sometimes and I wonder: is this a story of my future or is it just a reminder of a sad past? Wherever I go and I put on the colors of Zimbabwe, they mock me by asking: “are you from Zimbabwe!?” Sometimes, when I look at the flag, it’s not a remind of my pride and inspiration. It feels as if I just want to belong to another country. [Excerpts from Mawarire’s video are lightly edited and condensed for readability] (Mawarire 19 April 2016)

One reason Pastor Mawarire’s video was so interesting is because the flag is a powerful symbol for the ruling party, so using it in a protest video was counter-intuitive. As the secretary for information of the Ndebele nationalist organization Mthwakazi Liberation Front argued: “[The flag’s] dominant symbols are representative of Zanuism, Shona supremacism and Shona-centricity (Magagula 2011)” Indeed, public displays of the flag—for instance, in one’s car—is understood in Zimbabwe to be an expression of affiliation with ZANU-PF, as expressed by opposition politician Doug Coltart: “For so long, Zanu PF has almost said that you can only be patriotic if you support Zanu PF, which had taken the flag for themselves as if it was the party’s symbol” (quoted in Buchanan 2016). Thus, Mawarire’s video brilliantly turned this symbolism on its head by reinterpreting the flag as a symbol of resilience, inclusivity and protest. His video continues:

**Mawarire:** And so I must look at [the flag] again with courage and try to remind myself that it is *my* country. The green is not just vegetation, but the power of being able to push through soil, push past limitations, and flourish and grow. That’s me, *my* flag. The yellow is not just minerals in the ground, but minerals above it: me, you, *we* are the minerals—the value of this land. The red is not just blood, it’s *passionate* blood: the will to
survive, the resolve to carry on, to push through to see dreams come to pass. This flag! And the black is the night sky, that what we emerge from and we shine. It is the brilliant colors, it is the wonderful and lovely fruition of everything we have ever hoped for. It needs a black for it to be visible. This flag! It is my country, my Zimbabwe. We go through so much, we don’t look like much, even now, but there is promise in it. I will fight for it, I will live for it, and I will stand for it. (Mawarire 19 April 2016)

Pastor Mawarire’s video went viral almost overnight. It also became *memetic* as people around the country and in the diaspora used it as the starting point to record and share their own hopes and disappointments while draped in the flag. Meanwhile, on Facebook, people began posting pictures of themselves with the flag. This act would have previously been interpreted as an expression of affiliation with the ruling party now silently expressed a desire for change. This co-option of the flag’s symbolism was a powerful political maneuver, as argued by one commentator:

More than anything else, this incident illustrates the sheer absurdity of Zimbabwean politics – and the simple genius of Mawarire’s protest. In reclaiming the flag, #ThisFlag has appropriated the state’s most potent symbol. They have seized the one icon that the state can’t ban or suppress, and made it their own. The flags that fly above government buildings, the flags that are pinned on the chests of government officials, the flags that fly on the bonnets of President Mugabe’s motorcade, these are all now subversive acts that the regime cannot ignore – or does so at its peril. (Allison 2016)
In contrast to Baba Jukwa’s anonymity, many participants in the #ThisFlag meme bravely disclosed their identity as they answered Mawarire’s call to action with which he closed his video:

**Mawarire:** This is the time that a change must happen. Quit standing on the sidelines and watching this flag fly and wishing for a future that you are not at all wanting to get to involved in. Every day that this flag flies, it’s begging for you to get involved. It’s begging for you to say something, it’s begging for you to cry out and say: “why must we be in this situation that we are in?” It’s mine. It’s your flag. This flag! (Mawarire 19 April 2016)

This video catapulted Mawarire to the forefront of activist politics, to which he responded by declaring five days of protest. Each day he released a new video which called on Zimbabweans in the country and abroad to unify across ethnic and racial differences, to join in peaceful protest against the regime, and—importantly—*to not be afraid*. He then extended the protest to 25 days of activism and joined forces with #Tajamuka/Sesijikile and other opposition movements to call for a national stay-away. This wildly successful event led to the arrest of almost a hundred activists, including leaders of #Tajamuka/Sesijikile and Mawarire himself. He was charged with inciting violence, but these charges were dropped when some 200 lawyers appeared at his arraignment to defend him, joined by thousands of protestors. Footage of people draped in the flag and dancing on the courthouse steps began circulating through WhatsApp, which also provided a conduit for videos of police violence against protestors—just as the proliferation of smartphones in the United States is visibilizing long-existing police violence against African Americans. For a time, it seemed like the movement’s momentum might actually succeed in toppling the regime.
Nevertheless, the collective effervescence incited by #ThisFlag dissipated a few days before the 25 days of activism drew to a close. The pastor’s life had been repeatedly threatened, along with the wellbeing of his wife and children. In response, he and his family fled to the United States via South Africa, possibly to claim asylum. This almost immediately let the air out of his movement, disappointing many of his followers. For instance, Blogger Jean Gasho wrote:

Each time I watch your recent videos [recorded outside of Zimbabwe] I feel confused and somewhat betrayed. I feel like you are a different man to the man you were before you fled Zimbabwe. Your style and tone of talking has changed, the humility I once saw in you I don’t see it anymore. I don’t hear you say “hatichatyana” anymore [we are not afraid]. (2016)

The ruling party seized on Mawarire’s absence to paint him as a coward and a fraud. It also began the #OurFlag campaign as a way for people to show support for the government. Nevertheless, the ruling party had difficulty salvaging the flag as a proprietary symbol, and actually ended up banning people from using it, making, selling or displaying it publically (Reporter 2016). The government also responded to the increasing prevalence of digital activism by issuing warnings against “subversive” use of social media and cautioning protestors that security forces were searching for “cyber terrorists” located abroad who wished to pursue “illegal regime change” by fomenting dissent online. WhatsApp service was also blocked for four hours during the stay-away and many suspect that the government was responsible.

Government intervention to raise the price of cellular data has also been interpreted as a way to reign in this medium of expression and political mobilization. See, for instance, the reader comments in response to the explanation given by POTRAZ’s Director General about the 2017 rate hikes. Many readers are upset that Zimbabwe has the third-highest cellular data charges in Africa, and believe that these rate increases are designed to keep people from using social media. Hinternet writes: “[:-] Let us ban th internet guyz we ar forwads elections, social media z a threat these dyz
a cyber crime bill that would ostensibly protects citizens from digital crimes like hacking and revenge porn. However, it also enables law enforcement to intercept communications and confiscate or search electronic devices. Meanwhile, people who “incite violence” online or commit digital acts of “subversion” face lengthy jail sentences and fines. Critics thus compellingly argue that the cyber crime bill is aimed towards stifling free speech online, as “subversion” is a code-word for political dissent, and the electronic search, seizure and surveillance enabled by the bill could be implemented arbitrarily and with very little oversight.

Thus, the increasing prevalence of internet access within Zimbabwe is allowing people there to engage in online activities that go far beyond discussions of identity and debates over the meaning of happiness and success. Additionally, Zimbabweans inside and outside of the country are able to engage in political discussions where subaltern perspectives can be expressed and explored. Increasingly, opposition parties and activists are using the internet to expose corruption and violence as well as to present views that are unavailable in the mainstream media. These online maneuvers are increasingly effective as internet users become willing to discard anonymity and translate digital activism into street protests and demonstrations. The pervasiveness of smartphones also allows protestors to provide realtime coverage of these events and to expose instances of state violence and intimidation. In these ways, the internet is presenting some of the stiffest challenges to the ruling party’s 30 year grip on power.

Other readers mention the fact that the Director General (Dr Gift Machengete) was a former boss at the Central Intelligence Agency (Gambanga 2016)
Nevertheless, these events also reveal that the internet is a contested domain, and online technologies can equally be used by oppressive regimes. Agents of the state may poison alternative public spheres by stoking simmering ethnic and racial tensions. They may also identify people who engage in online dissent in order to arrest or intimidate them offline. The state’s control over network providers also allows it to intervene in the structure of pricing that can encourage or discourage use, and may provide ways for it to access to digital communications for surveillance. Additionally, while I do not explore this in detail here, the increased prevalence of the internet use in Zimbabwe provides new avenues for foreign intervention through digital sabotage. Finally, the concentration of people’s digital communications within a few pipelines run from the United States also potentially gives corporate actors ways to influence political discourse in Zimbabwe, or to sell this influence to the highest bidder as it does in the United States. Indeed, it is worth noting that Facebook now owns WhatsApp—the two most important social media platforms in Zimbabwe. This is an area that urgently need to be researched.

Conclusion

This dissertation began by emphasizing continuity between contemporary and historical migration to, through, and from Zimbabwe. It argued that Zimbabweans today use migration to make their families work, just as their parents and grandparents did in previous generations. It closes by exploring some ways in which contemporary migration differs from past journeys. Today’s diasporans venture to increasingly distant destinations, resulting in the dispersion of their families. Meanwhile, increasingly restrictive immigration policies result in separations that
are often much longer in duration than past sojourners experienced. This concluding chapter broadened the analysis of dispersed families to the nation—showing how new communications technologies and the proliferation of cellular internet access are providing new communicative registers (like memes) through which diasporans and their relatives at home can bridge disjunctures in knowledge and experience about distant locations. Zvirikufaya is a collaborative practice through which a dispersed national identity is constructed, similarly to how dispersed families are reproduced through collaborative family projects. However—even while these technologies present new political and relational opportunities—they also provide avenues for new forms of oppression. This is evident in the state’s deployment of its oppressive apparatuses in cyberspace—including not only the authoritarian apparatus of the Zimbabwean State, but the neocolonial, duplicitous apparatus of my own country.
Conclusion

This dissertation developed a contextual analysis of dispersed families. I argued that families are shaped by historical, spatial and technological fields which present possibilities and constraints for relational practices. Long histories of migration resulting from dispossession and economic turmoil led generations of Zimbabweans to develop and refine “transferrable skills” which diasporans today still use to negotiate prolonged separation from loved ones. Migration thus enables families to access emplaced opportunities in diverse locations. Nevertheless, repatsialization complicates many of the embodied practices of relatedness from which families emerge as performed identities. For instance, knowledge gaps and separate development can result as people in different locations acquire new routines, experiences, values and social networks that may be imperfectly grasped by distant relatives. To an extent, this loss of proximity and social immediacy can be restored with internet-mediated communications technologies which enable diasporans to have multilateral, real-time conversations with distant loved ones. At the same time, technologies of (im)mobility are used against diasporans, preserving longstanding global inequities, impeding movement, and often preempting them from reuniting with their families.

History, location and technology are not the only contextual forces which influence relational practices. Nevertheless, my research shows them to be particularly important. Each of these factors presents a matrix of possibilities and constraints which must be confronted. Nevertheless, these and other contextual forces do not determine which courses of action families choose to undertake. Rather, I argued that Zimbabweans endeavor to work with and against circumstance
to pursue families of their own choosing—families which might not align with either cultural
expectations or regimes of (im)mobility. People subvert laws in order to live in proximity with
loved ones, they discern which relatives to include or exclude from their relational activities,
they form close alliances with some and enter into conflict with others. Diasporans may even
create entirely new families based—for example—on residential proximity.

Importantly, these “families of choice” must not be understood as individualistic endeavors.
Rather, families are collective, multi-faceted identities which congeal from the co-performance
of emplaced relational acts. For the Zimbabweans I interviewed, collaborative projects like
providing eldercare and childcare, starting businesses, and building or extending houses were
crucibles from which their families emerged. Such projects were usually undertaken in an
environment of scarcity, where needs outstripped available resources. Scarcity of money and
time forced them to make difficult decision about who to include and who to exclude from their
families. This involved sensitive negotiations which revealed divergent understandings about
where families should stop and start. Many collaborative projects succeed in reproducing a
collective identity—even when they fail to accomplish more overt goals like establishing a
thriving family business. Sometimes, however, family endeavors reformulate relational contours
in unexpected ways. For instance, some projects result in such acute conflict that enduring rifts
emerge. Indeed, collaboration and conflict are like molecular isomers—mirror configurations of
the same performative “substance.”

I argued that some broad trends can be discerned in how dispersed families are changing. For
instance, negotiating competing needs in the context of scarcity appears to result in increasingly
compact families that align more closely with European ideals which privilege the nuclear
family. This effect is augmented by documentary regimes which naturalize European
relatedness. Another trend is that dispersion often entails economic differentiation, with diasporans in wealthy destinations accruing more capital than relatives in less affluent locations or in Zimbabwe. Access to capital, in turn, conveys increased influence over family agendas. In many cases, this economic and political realignment does not correspond to preexisting configurations or expectations. Women, for instance, often find more opportunity in the diaspora than men; while younger diasporans tend to adapt and thrive more readily than their older siblings and parents. Brothers, husbands and elders sometimes feel uncomfortable or even resentful about these new political and economic formations.

Another propensity that I uncovered was a loose correspondence between spatial proximity and relational proximity as well as spatial and relational distance. Relatives who find each other living close together—for instance, in the same overseas destination—often develop a tighter relational bond with each other than they do with comparable relatives in distant locations. This can occur in both a positive sense, where the relationship is characterized by heightened friendship and mutual support; and/or in a more negative sense where relatives who live in close proximity suddenly find themselves antagonizing each other, competing, or intruding in each other’s affairs. Meanwhile, spatial distance tends to attenuate relational bonds that are premised on embodied interaction and exchange. This seems to be especially prevalent among separated spouses. Over time, divergent emplaced experiences can combine with loneliness and libido in order to lead partners to search out new companions who are more materially available.

Children also tend to be powerfully effected by relational distance. Here it is import to remember David Schneider’s important warning against interpreting indigenous kinship systems through an ethnocentric lens (1984). Western scholars of transnational parenting sometimes make this mistake by drawing from European ideals to pathologize the separation of children
from their biological parents. In contrast, I showed that many Zimbabweans who practice dispersed, collaborative parenting succeed in raising healthy, well-adjusted children. Even so, poor outcomes are also common, especially for older children whose primary caretakers suddenly and inexplicably departs. The abrupt severance of such an embodied relationship—combined with the difficulty of adjusting to new caretakers with different rules and routines—can result in depression, anger, underperformance in school or other behavioral problems. Other children end up developing such intimate relationships with their new caretakers that the relationship with their previous caretaker fades in importance.

Upon completing this project, I realize that I have not answered several important questions relating to the topic of dispersed families. For example, I hardly broached the topic of domestic labor. Nevertheless, many diasporans lean heavily on hired caretakers for elders and children. Thus, a parent who leaves their child with a brother or sister in Zimbabwe may also contract a maid to help this household meet increased labor demands. In such situations, how are parenting duties pooled between the caretaker, maid and parent? What is the average duration of employment, and how is compensation is provided? Do such arrangement shape a child’s understanding of family, and to what degree is the maid herself incorporated?

Another important area of inquiry which this dissertation alluded to but did not explore in great depth is the connection between internet-mediated communication and the technologies which preceded them. What role was played by SMS when it was introduced in Zimbabwe a few years before mobile internet? Before the proliferation of cellular phones—what was the roll of the landline? Going back even further, to the height of long-distance international labour migration in the 1960s, how did workers in Zimbabwe and South Africa communicate with relatives in Malawi and Mozambique when neither party was likely to have access to telephones
of any sort? In the archives, I came across letters from this period which were sent by women in Zimbabwe to native administrators in South Africa in order to inquire about their husbands’ wellbeing. I also found records of international family communications that were intercepted by censors because they contained requests for false papers or other illicit assistance in accessing preferred destinations. These documents suggest that a wealth of fascinating data exists which could help elucidate how long-distance relatedness changed in response to evolving communication technologies.

With respect to social media, this study alluded to emergent areas of inquiry in the field of social computing. Corporate actors like Facebook and Google play important roles as communication conduits in transnational social formations like dispersed families. Increasingly, these companies also direct the flow of information between nodes in the “social graph;” for instance, by algorithmically selecting content for dissemination or censorship, or by sorting which users will see and interact with each other. I anticipate that my research during the ensuing years will explore this growing role of automation in reshaping social formations. In particular, the concept of a bioinformational complex could be useful in evaluating how online sociality is manipulated and mined for profit in the form of views, clicks, likes, shares, and votes and personal data. The potential relevance of this concept is apparent in moves to discourage anonymity on social media platforms, for instance through the proliferation of two-factor identification procedures which tie digital identities more tightly to physical bodies. Indeed, I believe that anthropological studies of “algorithmic culture” are urgently required as automation plays an increasingly important role in determining offline social structures, for instance through predictive policing, high frequency trading and automated killing.
This research about dispersed families is also relevant because the phenomenon of dispersion is not unique to Zimbabwe. Hostile immigration regimes target citizens of many countries, and fluctuations in the global economy create opportunities that are pursued by people around the world. Even privileged families which are not targets of visa and immigration regimes may still end up dispersed between various cities or countries. My own family is a good example, as my siblings are in California, I am in Connecticut, and my parents are in Ontario. Like Zimbabweans, we rely on many of the same communications technologies to create virtual proximity betwixt and between our various locations. To the extent that dispersion is increasingly prevalent in today’s world, this study may provide a useful datapoint for cross-cultural comparison.

In this vein, I anticipate that the framework of collaborative family projects could be useful in other studies of dispersed relatedness. Clearly, the goals of collaboration may vary from group to group. Nevertheless, regardless of origins or objective, dispersed families will inevitably negotiate multiple emplacements and the propensity for separation to complicate embodied interaction. The lens of collaborative family projects is useful in exploring these spatialized dynamics because it targets an arena of practice wherein a family identity is actively and intensely negotiated and refined.

Finally, I believe that this study is relevant to ongoing discussions about immigration in North America, Europe and the Antipodes. All these countries were enriched by settler colonialism. I repeatedly sought to link these movements by drawing on continuities in the tactics, technologies, ideologies and chronologies used to colonize both the United States and Zimbabwe. I furthermore showed how these countries now seek to maintain and extend this ill-gotten privilege by redeploying the very same technologies of (im)mobility against the children
of those whose exploitation produced the wealth which is now being hoarded. Zimbabweans who grew up hearing about how their parents and grandparents surreptitiously crossing colonial borders and purchasing fake identity cards to access opportunity during the 1950s and 1960s have few conniptions about using similar tactics to access opportunity in a global order which preserve historical spatializations of wealth and power.

As part of this task I indicted my professors’ generation of anthropologists, accusing them of producing the scholarship needed by colonial regimes. Perhaps I was unfair in this approach, for instance, by neglecting to mention anthropologists who were advocates for the people they studied and fought to end colonialism. In this respect, Sally Moore’s book on Anthropology in Africa includes a more sympathetic analysis of the Rhodes Livingston Institute, whereas I chose to emphasize its entanglement with colonial ethnography, manifest in its training of Native Commissioners like Hollemen and its use of NADA as a recruitment tool and publication resource (Moore 1994).

The reason for this approach is that I am also implicated. When my “people” arrived in West Michigan one winter in the 1830s, they found shelter in the dwellings of the sugar houses where Native Americans were producing maple syrup for the market in Chicago (Lucas 1989). Then they proceed to chase the owners of this profitable enterprise to Traverse City so that they could carve out farms from their forest. The leader of this group, Albertus van Raalte, went on to establish Hope College and found the city of Holland Michigan, and is still venerated as an important religious leader of the Reformed Church of America. My own ancestral denomination is the closely-related Christian Reformed Church, which monopolized the missions industry on Navajo “reservations” during the last decade of the 1800s, just as Rhodes’ pioneer column was carving out the Rhodesias (Beets 1940).
My grandparents immigrated to Canada about fifty years later, after the second World War, inheriting the fruits of colonial dispossession by establishing profitable commercial farms on recently vacated land, at the same time that British war refugees established farms in “Rhodesia.” Meanwhile, some of my grandparents’ cousins went to Dutch colonies in Brazil where they own enormous plantations and still practice the “tot” system of compensating workers with alcohol. Other cousins went to South Africa, where I am told they own a private game concession bordering Kruger Park, the same area where so many Zimbabweans are still forced to earn slavery wages working for white farmers and ranchers. They followed in the footsteps of an earlier relative (my “second cousin”) who went to South Africa for ideological reasons to fight British imperialists in the Boer War. His name is inscribed on some important monuments from the Apartheid era.

And so, I cannot help but wonder whether I would have been a Native Administrator of some sort if I was born a few decades earlier. I like to travel. Since high school I have found ways to live outside of the United States to learn foreign languages and see different ways of doing things. If I was born in my parents’ or grandparents’ generation, the way for me to see the world would have been as a settler. Perhaps I would have been a missionary, if I followed in the footsteps of my father and his father who were clergy in the Christian Reformed Church. Or, possibly, I could have been a farmer like my mother’s father who escaped the bombed-out ruins of Holland to raise chickens on the Canadian frontier. As it turns out, I am an anthropologist, so I most likely would have been a Native Administrator of some sort. Were it not for the accident of birth which put me in the position to fall in love with and marry one of Tamuka’s daughters, I might have been the man who issued a Registration Certificate to my son’s grandfather so that he could work for slavery wages at the Dunlop tire factory in Bulawayo.
And so, I enjoy the fruits of dispossession even while being so fortunately entangled with the
dispossessed. This paradoxical complicity with colonialism past and present is what prompts me
to write so angrily, but (I believe) honestly, about my disciplinary heritage. It is also what
motivates me to link the colonial past to the colonial present, so that if anyone picks up this dusty
manuscript in the archives one day, they may also pause to consider their complicity with the
source of their own opportunity.
Appendix A: Interviews

I did a total of more than 24 months of fieldwork. In 2010 I did 3 months of preliminary fieldwork in South Africa and Zimbabwe. In 2012 I did 8 months of fieldwork in South Africa and Zimbabwe, sponsored by a Fulbright IIE award. In 2013 I did a further 10 months of fieldwork in South Africa and Zimbabwe, sponsored by a Fulbright-Hayes award. In June, 2014 I did two weeks of interviews in England, a process that was streamlined with the tremendously generous help of Dominic Pasura. I also did interviews in the United States during the duration of this research project. Almost a hundred interviews were conducted in total. This is a list only of the interviews that were cited in this text. Pseudonyms were used for all but one participant.

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<td>Vimbai</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Archival material

Chief Superintendent BSAP Bulawayo

Commanding Officer - Bechuanaland Protectorate Police

Contributor

De Lange, J. J.

Inspector J. Masterman

Migrant Labour Committee

Officer BSAP Bulawayo

Palmer, E.T.

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Vita

William Suk was born in Grand Rapids, MI. He first went to Zimbabwe in 2007 to meet the family of his fiancée. Fortunately, his in-laws endorsed the marriage and now he returns to Zimbabwe whenever possible. Apart from the content of this dissertation, William is interested in mobile money, cryptocurrency and the African art market. He has two children and currently lives in North Haven, CT. Please contact him at william.suk@gmail.com.