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Building the Airplane While it Flies: A Case Study Approach of Police Development in Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the development of police forces during post-conflict reconstruction to determine what makes some police development interventions more successful than others. It addresses three questions: First, does goal incongruence between donors and host states have a negative impact on the outcome of police development? Second, does the structure of organizations, political power, and international agreements predetermine the outcome of police development? Third, does the agency of individuals have an effect on the outcome of police development? The dissertation aims to fill a gap in our understanding of how the international community develops policing institutions by examining the interaction of goals, structure, and agency.

While developing the police is important for the larger concerns of bringing stability in the aftermath of a conflict, the endeavor is futile if the police force is the only sector that develops. Development in areas such as governance, spoiler control, and the economy must coincide with police development, and cannot be assumed to be an inevitable product of establishing security. Also, flaws in certain structures, whether it be constitutional arrangement, international presence, or other unique factors, can have a larger impact on the development of the police than any tactical decisions that anyone can make. Finally, while structure forces agents in a direction, individuals can definitely harm the development of the police more than they can help it. Stated more simply, the power of individual actions to create positive change is less than the power of individual actions to create negative change.
Building the Airplane While it Flies: A Case Study Approach of Police Development in Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ............................................................................................................................... iv

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** ................................................................................................................................... vi

**ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS** ......................................................................................................................... x

**CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION** ................................................................................................................... 1

  - Research Objectives ................................................................................................................................. 3
  - Why this? .................................................................................................................................................. 4
  - Theoretical Perspective ............................................................................................................................ 4
  - Research Questions .................................................................................................................................. 6
  - Scope/Limitations of study ...................................................................................................................... 7
  - Constraints ............................................................................................................................................... 9
  - Assumptions .......................................................................................................................................... 10
  - Definitions ........................................................................................................................................... 11
  - Outline of Dissertation ........................................................................................................................... 14

**CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW** ........................................................................................................... 19

  - Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 19
  - Evolution of Donor Motives- State and Human Security ..................................................................... 21
    - Early Security Motives- State Security ............................................................................................... 22
    - Human Security ................................................................................................................................ 23
  - The Nexus of Human and State Security- Post-conflict Reconstruction .............................................. 28
    - Security Sector Reform ...................................................................................................................... 32
    - Development ....................................................................................................................................... 34
    - Police Training, Capacity & Development ....................................................................................... 36
    - The Concept of a ‘Developed Police Force’ ..................................................................................... 38
    - Legitimacy ............................................................................................................................................ 40
  - Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 43

**CHAPTER 3. METHOD** ............................................................................................................................... 45

  - Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 45
  - Process Tracing ...................................................................................................................................... 47
  - Theoretical Model .................................................................................................................................. 50
    - Goals ................................................................................................................................................... 51
    - Structures .......................................................................................................................................... 55
ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS

Main Body

Figure 2-1. Types of Interventions ................................................................. 26
Figure 2-2. Types of Security .................................................................... 28
Figure 3-1. Ideal-Type Model of Police Development ............................... 66
Figure 4-1. Task Force Falcon Task Organization ..................................... 90
Figure 4-2. UNMIK Military Zones ............................................................. 90
Figure 4-3. UNMIK Policing Structure ...................................................... 92
Figure 4-4. Kosovo Police Directorates and Districts ......................... 93
Table 4-1. Size of KFOR and UNMIK Police ........................................ 94
Table 4-2. UN Special Representatives to the Secretary General ........ 107
Figure 5-1. Former Combatants, by Group ........................................... 129
Table 5-1. Distribution of Liberian Population by Ethnic Group, 1984-2008 130
Figure 5-2. UNMIL Task Organization .................................................... 132
Table 5-2. UNMIL Force Strengths .......................................................... 134
Figure 5-3. Roles of Security Sector Agencies in Post-conflict Liberia ...... 136
Table 5-3. Law Enforcement Agency Registration .................................. 137
Table 5-4. Progression of police stations and magistrate growth ........... 141
Figure 5-4. Selected WGI Indicators for Liberia ................................... 159
Table 6-1. United Nations Missions in Timor-Leste ......................... 169
Table 6-2. Size Progression of UN Police, UN Troops, and PNTL, 2000-2006 186
Table 6-3. Size Progression of UN Police, UN Troops, and PNTL, 2006-2011 188
Table 6-4. Special Representatives to the Secretary General .......... 196
Table 6-5. UN Civilian Police Commissioners ...................................... 197
Table 6-6. GDP per Capita of Timor-Leste, 2000-2012 ....................... 204
Figure 6-1. Select WGI Indicators for Timor-Leste, 2000-2014 .......... 208
Figure 6-2. PNTL Treatment in Crime Resolution ............................. 210
Figure 7-1. Revised Ideal-Type Model of Police Development.........................................................221

Appendices

Table A-1. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Police Development in Liberia.....................237
Table B-1. UNMIL Deployment as of December 2003.....................................................................238
Table B-2. UNMIL Deployment as of June 2006.............................................................................239
Table B-3. UNMIL Deployment as of August 2012.........................................................................240
Table B-4. UNMIL Deployment as of July 2014.............................................................................241
Table C-1. UNMIL Organizational Chart of August 2004.................................................................242
Table C-2. UNMIL Organizational Chart of September 2009.........................................................243
Table C-3. UNMIT Organizational Chart.......................................................................................244
Table C-4. Organizational Chart of UNTAET.................................................................................245
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

There are not enough jails, not enough police, not enough courts to enforce a law not supported by the people.

-Hubert H. Humphrey

Introduction

Though the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan may have harmed the American psyche’s acceptance of “nation-building,” international interventions will still be a major component of US strategy to protect vital interests. The current world environment, coupled with a close reading of history, yields a conclusion that this is inevitable, regardless of current sentiment. This equifinality arises whether the US decides to engage with the rest of the world or isolate itself from it. In the former case, it is evident that the US would inevitably intervene in other states. In the latter case, every time the US has retreated from the global stage, from World War One through World War Two, and the post-Cold War era, that period of isolation has ended with the US intervening in other states. These missions are as expensive as they are inevitable, and the US is not the only state conducting them. Given this, the fact that the track record of such interventions is mixed gives cause for concern about how they are executed.

The broader mission of post-conflict reconstruction places a heavy burden on donors to rebuild a country in the aftermath of violence. Increasingly, the intrastate nature of conflict has shattered old norms of intervention and given rise to extremely complex environments. A primary concern has been security sector reform—building a state security apparatus that
prevents a resumption of violence. In some cases there is little indication that there are clear
goals beyond this, but in many this is seen as a means to allow the development of a peaceful
democratic state. Ideally, this allows for the development of the economy, governance
structures, and civil society organizations that will bolster the resilience of a country’s
institutions and reduce the prospects of a return to conflict.

A common effort in every intervention has been improving the internal policing
capabilities of the host state. Since civil policing is different than military defense, an
investigation of it must involve tenets of security sector reform and development literature.
Improvement of policing is multifaceted and involves training, equipping, mentoring, capacity,
and institution building. The complex nature of policing in post-conflict societies makes analysis
of individual efforts difficult, and requires a holistic appraisal of a case in order to understand
the web of interconnected variables created by donors, the host country, and the society.

Police are a common feature in every government, and donors, including the United
States, have declared a vested interest in their successful development. The police are the
most pervasive security sector institution connecting the state and society. As street level
bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980), the police routinely represent the state in everyday affairs in a way
that the courts, military, and others do not. Donors spend billions of dollars annually across the
globe to develop them. Unfortunately, these interventions deal with many failures and
setbacks that harm their effectiveness. The hope of this study is to better understand police
development, and identify common successful conditions in order to better inform future
interventions. While I am explicitly interested in improving US interventions, the multi-lateral
nature of police development ensures that future interventions are most likely to be international affairs.

Therefore, the general question I seek to answer is: What makes some police development interventions more successful than others? I define success by looking at the legitimacy and sustainability of the police from the vantage of the population, the host government, and the international community. Looking further, I ask: Does goal incongruence between donors and host states have a negative impact on the outcome of police development? Next, I ask: Does the structure of organizations, political power, and international agreements predetermine the outcome of police development? Last, I ask: Does the agency of individuals have an effect on the outcome of police development? I will further discuss these questions later in the chapter.

This dissertation analyzes through the lens of an ideal-type police development. In later chapters I will evaluate the cases of Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste using the framework I will describe in Chapter Three. These cases offer many lessons and, while similar, have particular differences that I believe explain the variance in their outcomes.

**Research Objectives**

The objective of the study is to improve our knowledge of police development through a better understanding of the role of the police and its integration with other institutions of government in providing security in post-conflict reconstruction. I seek to identify the factors that separate successful police development interventions from relatively less successful ones. As an aside, this requires defining levels of success that are possible in police interventions.
Why this?

The development of competent and legitimate police forces remains an overlooked endeavor with a spotty track record of success. While not at the level of a “wicked” problem, it nonetheless poses a conundrum that practitioners and policy makers routinely struggle to overcome. When states intervene in other states, acting in accordance with varying mandates, reforming the security sector is a cornerstone effort. Security Sector Reform (SSR) provides both security to allow political space in the aftermath of violence and an early opportunity to develop a functional institution subordinate to the state. As most recent interventions have been the result of internal failures (rather than external defeats), the internal role of the police is integral to the re-establishment of the Rule of Law.

The study of police development is still young. Not only is its application fairly new, but there are few efforts to address questions related to it in a scholarly manner. I agree with Brzoska, that “while there is no lack of prescriptions for security transitioning, there has been little analysis of past efforts” (Brzoska 2006). Therefore, this is an opportunity to contribute to that analysis, and to find themes common across cases.

Theoretical Perspective

I first approached the topic of police development with a conviction that I could isolate parts of the whole, and clearly tie together the universal prescriptions that could improve how donors develop police forces. The problem is, every time I chose a path, it faltered. Yes, training certain tasks, or dictating certain practices could lead to different outcomes, but they also might not. Contextual factors loomed large behind any theory I could envisage. I became less and less optimistic that I could detach the police force from the environment around it.
The story of police development is one piece of the larger subject of nation-building, and cannot be understood separate from it, along with its component themes of SSR, PCR, and development. From a sociologist’s vantage point, this is a reliance on the classical structural-functional theory. This two part perspective could be contentious as a background to begin analysis. Structural analysis looks at the arrangement of parts in a system and focuses on the integration of the nodes or people in the system (Turner 1991, 548–49). Functional analysis is a term that, though defined many ways, integrates empirical variables into the larger human society in which they reside (Merton 1968, 73–81). Generally, the combination of these argues that organizations cannot be viewed solely based on their formal structures, but must also account for non-rational dimensions, while recognizing the near impossibility of describing an empirical whole (Selznick 1948, 25). This stance is not perfect. There have been many critiques of structural functionalism, arguing that it fails to achieve definitional consensus, and reduces clarity of analysis (Davis 1959, 757–59). Nonetheless, the theory’s appreciation of the complexity of social systems is an important basis from which to view the development of the police.

Studying police development requires a multidisciplinary approach to a problem that is illustrative of the field of public administration. Public administration scholars have generally come to the consensus that public administration is essentially multidisciplinary and should be interdisciplinary as well (Raadschelders 1999). Indeed, the emergence of New Public Governance could be seen as the emergence of a pluralist tradition (Osborne 2006, 383–85) that requires various perspectives in order to better understand the issues researchers intend to investigate. Vincent Ostrom described the complexity required of such analysis succinctly,
saying that “a challenge we face in the social sciences and in the study of public administration is to recognize that our intellectual efforts require recourse to multiple levels, facets, and foci of analysis,” owing to the assertion that “we cannot expect social reality to be any less complex because, to a significant degree, human beings create their own social realities” (Ostrom and Allen 2007, xxviii). This recognition drives the holistic perspective of this study.

**Research Questions**

The main question that drove this research was trying to find what makes a police development intervention relatively more successful. This could lead down many paths, focusing on esoteric technical aspects of the police training plans, or expanding out to connect the police into the ecosystem of nation-building from a more theoretical perspective. This study tends toward the latter, attempting to explain police development in a more holistic manner. Based on the assumption that most police development programs are quite similar based on international norms for curriculum, deployments, and standards, the following research questions focus on larger issues that drive the development of the police.

The first major question this study seeks to answer is what effect goal incongruence between the host nation and donors has on the outcome of police development. Ideally, there should be goal congruence, but in reality, for multiple reasons, there rarely is. Does this predestine failure for the intervention, or is it a surmountable obstacle?

The second major question this study seeks to answer is what effect organizational, political, and international structure has on the outcome of police development. This structure is an expansive concept that includes mandates, hierarchies, and even political constraints that
may not immediately seem to affect police development. Are there structural aspects that lead to better outcomes? Are some aspects of an intervention doomed to failure based on structural deficiencies?

The third major question this study seeks to answer is what effect agency has on the outcome of police development. In other words, how do individual decisions impact the course of an intervention? This addresses the “savior complex.” Can successes be attributed to the guile and expertise of great leaders, and likewise, can blame for failure justifiably fall on the shoulders of leadership?

The last two questions combine into a debate of structure versus agency. Naturally, they both matter, but which matters more? If one does, then improving that should be a priority. Does saving an intervention require rewriting the rules, or is it simply a matter of finding the right person for the job?

Scope/Limitations of study

An important factor limiting the scope of this study is the type of international intervention, as defined by the interveners. In the literature review, I classify interventions by their size and the type of security they involve. Due to the wide disparities between these, I must necessarily limit the scope along these spectra. There are few things you can generalize from small, human security-focused interventions onto large, state security-focused interventions, and vice versa. For example, it is impossible to define this as, say, an intervention force size of 5,000 to 15,000 soldiers or 500 to 1,500 international police. This would ignore other factors such as soldier-to-population ratio or the mandate of the
intervention force. Likewise, focusing on soldier-to-population ratio would ignore the size of the intervention force relative to the donor/invention states. For example, US troop levels in Bosnia were far lower than interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet they enjoyed a far higher soldier-to-population ratio. This is all meant to show how difficult it can be to determine where on the spectrum an intervention may be. As such, the bound of this study is a subjective but generally agreeable defined place along the spectrum.

Another limitation concerned weighting the value of establishing breadth versus depth. Depth refers to the “detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance that is accounted for by an explanation” (Gerring 2004), while breadth refers to a more extensive approach utilizing as many cases as possible. Achieving breadth can help illuminate connections to larger themes of police development that may assist higher level personnel making strategic-level decisions. However, these prescriptions may become vague and hollow without enough depth to inform them. This study aims to achieve breadth, sometimes at the expense of depth, to highlight large failures or successes in police development. At times, it strives to connect higher level actions to tactical level interactions in order to address outcomes.

This study specifically targets post-conflict reconstructions. While that term remains vague, it does require a cessation of major hostilities. The environment in the wake of a conflict is so unique based on the devastation present that it cannot compare to other situations. Unfortunately, post-conflict situations are also among the most prohibitive environments to access. And yet they remain an important topic for study. These are situations that upend societies, require vast resources to conduct, and sometimes expose the
darkest aspects of the human condition. More knowledge would be beneficial for both hosts and donors.

**Constraints**

While the cases represent a narrow selection, there is breadth in the factors I believe affect the outcomes of a police development intervention. This wide net of analysis comes at the cost of depth. There is a heavy reliance on the data collection of other studies, surveys, and reports from each case. I was, in essence, compiling existing data in a new, meaningful way to answer the unique questions of this study. I did not have the time to visit each country to interview people, or access documents that may only be available in that country. Comparing across three geographically dispersed countries made this prospect a near impossibility for me.

This means I took a large risk of omission. There are some doors that I was not able to open. Could that have had an impact? Possibly, but the data compiled by previous researchers is already quite extensive for each of these cases. Many of the events occurred more than a decade in the past—finding actors today was a barrier that favored utilizing the fruits of previous investigations.

The other major issue was finding comparable data across the cases of Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste. For some data, at least at the macro-level, this is simple. The World Bank has some fairly universal variables of interest for each country. However, for many things, one case may have had some information that another case lacked. This could have been published training plans, meeting descriptions, or a litany of other products that simply did not exist for one case but were abundant in another. The best way of combatting this was finding as many
possible overlapping data points to confirm each other and reduce the risk of any missing data having a significant impact on my conclusions.

**Assumptions**

First, I assume that democratic norms are a desirable goal to achieve. There are unending philosophical debates about the balance between liberty and security, tracing from Hobbes through the *Federalist Papers*, to modern day discussions over terrorism. Generally, increasing one comes at the detriment to the other. For example, the added security of passing through a security check before boarding a plane comes at the expense of your individual liberties. Likewise, gun control advocates argue that some restrictions on liberties are necessary to secure people from increased gun violence. Therefore, there may be a conception that very high security—and hence, stability—is possible with the proper restriction of liberty. However, this oppressive state is not an option, as it sacrifices too much liberty to be useful. Hence, this study attempts to evaluate police forces that uphold democratic norms.

The legitimate reasons for one state to intervene in another state have changed over time. Regardless of what those reasons may be, I assume that the intervention is considered legitimate by the majority of the international community along with the elites and population of the state in which the intervention occurs. All interventions bring rise to controversy, but those viewed as especially illegitimate have little to do with the questions I seek to answer. For example, the US invasion of Iraq did not have host consent or widespread legitimacy from the international community, and so brought many more complications to police development than this study can hope to explain.
Next, in each police development mission there is an assumption that ‘trainers’ have skills that ‘trainees’ lack. There is a transfer of knowledge, culture, or skills that is a result of an asymmetry of that information. I generally agree that in many cases trainers learn as much as those they train, but with regard to achieving development of a police force, it is assumed that part of the reason a police force needs development is that it lacks attributes that other police forces already have.

Last, I assume that police are necessary for a state and security. This almost seems obvious today, but police forces are a relatively recent phenomena coinciding with the modern state. For much of human history societies have functioned, and administered some form of rule of law, without a dedicated police force. In many localized contexts this is still a fact of life. However, in the modern era, police have come to be considered a necessary component of a functioning state. In addition, since I focus on democratic policing, I assume that a well-developed police force enforces the law equally and without oppression—to do so would be antithetical to the proper development of a police force that requires quality in addition to capacity.

Definitions

A crucial piece of this study is a thorough investigation to define the concept of a developed police force. Since these multiple narratives and vantage points can offer competing views on what this actually is, I need to develop a concept of what separates a ‘good’ police force development case from a ‘bad’ or less successful one. While a true dichotomy is non-existent, a determination of success relative to others through comparison is possible. A common theme here is determining not only what a ‘developed police force’ is, but who
decides what that is, and who should. As the research questions in this study attempt to
delineate actions with greater or lesser levels of success, the definition of success becomes very
important. The goal of these missions is to provide better outcomes—for the police and the
government, in the interests of citizens, donors, and the international community. I define
success in terms of legitimacy and sustainability.

*International Interventions*- Refers to occasions when one or more countries place themselves
in another country in order to control territory, dictate governance, or enforce agreements.
These may occur with or without the consent of the intervened state, and for noble or
unprincipled reasons. Justifications for international interventions may be debatable, and the
international norms pertaining to their legitimacy have evolved over time. In general, outside
actors will dictate control over some or all aspects of governance in a country as a result of an
international intervention.

*Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR)* - Refers to the re-establishment of the functional
components of society across a wide spectrum in the aftermath of a conflict. PCR begins with
the end of major violence, but does not imply that all conflict is ended. Indeed, embers will
usually be burning long after a fire is put out. There is no definitive point of conclusion for a
period of PCR, and it can last for many years. Typically, outside actors intervene to establish
internal security, write new constitutions, create new rule-of-law systems and security forces,
address transitional justice issues, build civil society and the economy, and repair critical
infrastructure. PCR can occur in the aftermath of an interstate conflict, such as The Marshall
Plan after the Second World War, but occurs more commonly in the wake of intrastate
violence.
Donor- Refers to any actor with a significant presence effecting change in the intervened country. This can include individual states as well as international institutions—such as the UN—as well as nongovernmental organizations.

Recipient/Host country- Refers to the country in which the intervention occurs. This is a simplification of a very complex conglomeration of elites, government actors and the general public that are indigenous to the country. This is also rarely a homogenous block.

Police Development- Refers to the larger process of establishing a police institution that is tied to democratic governance and accountable to the population it serves. This recognizes a need to move the police institution along in parallel to other functions of the state and society toward specific goals.

Police Training- Refers to the transfer of policing skills and competencies from donor personnel to host nation police. This occurs through regimented training programs at an academy, through mentorship, and by advisement in the execution of policing. The focus of training is to achieve measurable outcomes that indicate host nation police can execute specified tasks.

Capacity- Refers to the capability of actions: How well an institution can coerce, administer, or implement.

Quality- Refers to the propensity of officials to conduct their duties fairly, and favor working for the public good over pursuing primarily personal or elite interests.

Stability- Refers to a multi-faceted conception of a state’s ability to resist reversion to violent struggles. One major indicator of stability, and the one most mutually aligned with its
presence, is a lack of violence. However, that only relates to one aspect of stability. The word stability literally means having the strength to endure. Therefore, stability requires prospects for permanence, in which a state is able to move beyond its violent past and settle grievances peacefully.

*Democratic norms*- These are accepted attributes of a democratic society as defined by international consensus. Democratic norms “mandate nonviolent conflict resolution and negotiation in a spirit of live-and let-live” (Rosato 2003, 586). From an electoral standpoint, they dictate that “governments should be chosen through free and fair elections. This includes the concepts that no party or candidate should be unduly or arbitrarily prevented from competing; campaigns should be free to operate without intimidation; all parties and candidates should enjoy equal access to the media; state institutions involved in organizing and arbitrating elections should be impartial; no voter should be arbitrarily denied the right to cast a ballot; and ballots should be counted in a transparent and accurate manner” (Donno 2013, 4).

*Legitimacy*- Deriving from Max Weber’s ideal types, legitimacy refers to what extent people question the right of others to control them and maintain institutions of power. More simply, do people not support an institution or person and prefer a replacement? High legitimacy exists when people turn to an entity above others for guidance or solutions.

**Outline of Dissertation**

In this dissertation, I will conduct a thorough review of the literature surrounding police development in order to inform the gaps in the literature and my method for analysis. After
presenting my typology, I will investigate the experiences of Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste to inform my conclusions.

In Chapter Two, I conduct a literature review for police development. This begins as a broad exercise of describing the interventions that give rise to the need to develop police in the first place. I categorize intervention types along an axis of donors seeking state or human security, and whether that intervention is large or small. The contextual factors separating interventions along this axis are so large that I argue it is important to investigate in only a small band of this universe of possibilities in order to achieve any meaningful results by comparing similar cases. After that I discuss the concept of development more generally, before discussing the literature on what constitutes police development.

In Chapter Three, I present my method for evaluating what factors account for variation on the relative success of police development interventions. First, I provide a brief background of the methods I employed. Next, I offer my model of police development and discuss the relevant variables of interest, along with how to measure them, and my case selection reasoning. Last, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this model.

In Chapter Four, I describe the case of Kosovo and the background that led to the violence and eventual international intervention. Using the model developed in Chapter Three, I then discuss the common and divergent goals of the UN and Kosovars. Then I show how the development of the police was structured, from the UN and Kosovar vantage points, before inspecting how the decisions of individual actors were able to influence outcomes, if any. Then, I establish the outcomes of the intervention and police development, concluding that while it
was relatively successful, it had some overlooked weaknesses revealed in the inability to patrol minority Serb areas.

In Chapter Five, I begin by describing the background leading up to the civil war and eventual introduction of the United Nations into Liberia. I examine the goals of the international community as well as various warring factions in Liberia at the outset of the police development intervention. Next, I discuss the structure of the intervention and the Liberian government, as well as the Liberian National Police Force. Then, I examine the decisions made by various agents over the course of the intervention as well as the quality of personnel involved. This all ties into the outcomes of the intervention, determined by using qualitative and quantitative metrics, which I determine to be not very successful.

In Chapter Six, I begin by describing the situation that led to the international intervention in Timor-Leste in 1999, and discuss the resumption of violence in 2006. I then establish the differing goals between donors and the government of Timor-Leste, and how those changed over time. Next, I discuss the structure of the international intervention, and the police force it established, before addressing any notable actions by actors over time. Finally, I assess what level of success the intervention achieved, noting dichotomies between failures prior to 2006 and more successful results in the period after 2006.

In Chapter Seven, I offer my findings and conclusions based on the cases studied. While I offer many smaller findings of relevance to police development, I find three major themes of concern for police development: First, while developing the police is important for the larger concerns of bringing stability in the aftermath of a conflict, the endeavor is futile if the police
force is the only sector that develops. In other words, similar to ‘whole of government’ approaches, development in areas such as governance, spoiler control, and the economy must coincide with police development, and cannot be assumed to be an inevitable product of establishing security. Second, flaws in certain structures, whether it be constitutional arrangement, international presence, or other unique factors, can have a larger impact on the development of the police than any tactical decisions that anyone can make. There are certain defects that must be addressed in order to have any significant impact. Third, while structure can force the actions of agents in a positive or negative manner, individuals can definitely harm the development of the police more than they can help it. Stated more simply, the power of individual actions to create positive change is less than the power of individual actions to create negative change. So, while my conclusions may be pessimistic about the positive impacts individuals can have, having the right, quality people remains important to ensure success.

These findings imply that interveners must be very cognizant of the structures they impose. In some cases, certain accepted constitutional arrangements may be harmful to some societies, and in other cases, there may be a lack of planning for how to proceed in the aftermath of conflict. In many cases, countries intervene precisely because there is a crisis that requires immediate intervention. This may be true, but sometimes it may be best to wait until goals and plans are better formulated. Once an intervention has begun, these findings indicate two points. First, the level of violence is an easy indicator for stability, but the absence of violence can hide weaknesses in maintaining the peace. Instead, absence of grievances, maturity of institutions, and accountability of public officials are more important to the determination of whether a society is moving beyond its violent past. Second, if an
intervention is failing, then merely replacing individuals will not be enough to save it. Instead, the only way to reverse it is to transform those same structures that are causing its failure, whether that be a rewriting of a constitution, changes in the political control of the police, or altering other structures that are hampering the development of the police. Development of the police will never be an easy task, but there is hope to do it better than we have in the past.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

“Liberty...is usually born in stormy times. It struggles to establish itself amid civil discord, and its benefits can be appreciated only when it is old”

-Toqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 1 Part II Chapter 6 (275)

Introduction

The police are the most pervasive security sector institution connecting the state and society. As street level bureaucrats, the police routinely represent the state in everyday affairs in a way that the courts, military, and others do not. As a dominant effort in contemporary interventions, the transnational development of a police force relies on a myriad of intellectual concepts to serve multiple ends. First, it is not a static endeavor. The legacy of police development is linked to changes in how donors view objectives and measures for success in international interventions. Donors drive development through their application of resources and preferred methods that they derive from their own domestic politics and international agreements. The interests of donors and the methods that intervening forces deem most effective at pursuing ends have changed over time. Second, it is difficult to separate police development efforts from other actions. This is because quality police are both an input and an output of good development. They are a necessary precursor to advancements in the development and capacity building of other institutions—security, which the police deliver, is routinely seen as the first priority in any intervention. At the same time, truly professional police departments require good governance, oversight, and administration in other sectors to develop properly. They operate in a delicate ecosystem that is hard to disentangle. Lastly, measures of success are largely inadequate instruments to accurately compare different cases.
This is because the best measure to assess police development is the most difficult to objectively evaluate: legitimacy of the police—to citizens, donors, and the international system. I argue that the outcome of interest for police development is the level of legitimacy possessed by a policing organization. However, measuring legitimacy accurately can be elusive.

Many different discourses dominate transnational police development: Security Sector Reform, Development, and Police Training. Individually, these each contribute to understanding the development of police. However, they each fail to explain why some endeavors succeed while others fail. This makes analysis difficult, as the development of the police is affected by each of these different approaches.

Analysis of police development has tended toward “stovepiping” between state and human security needs, and along levels of analysis, failing to connect the aims of an improved police force with larger concerns for the purpose of the institution. The institution cannot be separated from the government and population it is meant to serve, and so a holistic, multi-level approach is necessary to better understand how to develop the police.

As a result, the endeavor of police development has changed over time. This is tied to dominant discourses, but also the ends pursued by the states executing the development. Over this evolution there has been a gradual growth in the normative facets of reform that these interventions entail.

In this chapter I trace how policymakers and scholars have thought about the police. I begin by describing the different motives of donors to intervene in another country, which gives rise to the need to establish new or better police. I then describe how the shift from state
to human security motives has coincided with the rise of post-conflict reconstruction, and that
the two major activities of post-conflict reconstruction are security sector reform and
development. I then show how approaches to develop the police combine these two threads
of SSR and development. Finally, I discuss legitimacy, specifically how it pertains to desired
outcomes of police development.

**Evolution of Donor Motives – State and Human Security**

All international interventions vary in size and objective. The justifications for
interventions changed over time, but they are still tied to the interests of the donors involved.
Even the most altruistic cases are still tied to states’ interests.\(^1\) Analysis across interventions is
difficult because each one is so different from another. Over time, types of interventions have
spanned two spectra: They range from small to large, and there are motivated by donors to
secure state or human security.

First, interventions vary in their size and scope. Each intervention lies on a spectrum of
increasing scale. Some are very small, as donors contribute a small amount of resources and
personnel, usually in pursuance of limited objectives. Others are extremely large and entail
large sums of money and people. Large or small, these interventions can be unilateral or
multinational, organized as coalitions or under the auspices of regional or global organizations.
Establishing security is an integral objective to all these interventions. The type of security
favored depends on the intervention. It is rarely a dichotomy between human and state
security, but rather lies on a spectrum between them, favoring one over the other. For

\(^1\) For example, if a state is intervening to aid recovery from a natural disaster, that is still tied to the population
defining that aid as serving their interests of assisting humanity.
example, the 1991 Gulf War was an obviously large intervention that aimed primarily for state security. In another quadrant, the humanitarian mission in Kosovo was not as large and focused more on human security. It is very hard to compare across these quadrants, because each quadrant is unique from the others.

Early Security Motives – State Security

State security refers to the motives of states to intervene in other states based on the tenets of realism that focus on traditional state apparatuses of security, and center on the concept of power – its development, assessment, application. It is based on the assumption that “human conflicts will generally be resolved by the application of superior power, not by appeals of justice” and will be “marked by the use of power, military force and realpolitik” (Lynn-Jones 1999). In this worldview, states strive for gains of power relative to other states, motivated by fear (Jervis 1999). Attempts to define this power tend to rely on traditional concepts: human resources, foodstuffs, physical habitat, population, national economy, military power, and so on (Cline 1977; German 1960; Sprout 1945). Seen this way, states focus on their own security in order to enhance their ability to impose their will on others who would not do something of their own volition. Though this does not predestine coercive tactics, it does rely on dealing with specific state actors.

Along the spectrum of intervention types, state security focused interventions tend to rely on these traditional sources of power and tie directly back to a desire to cause a change in the behavior of another state, whether it is a rival or not. On the extreme end, these interventions are invasions. These types of interventions are by their nature dominated by military power, but other assets of national power are common as well. For example, both US
wars with Iraq focused on this. In the First Gulf War, the US sought to re-establish a balance of power in the Middle East, while in the Second Gulf War, the US sought to eliminate a perceived threat to US national security in the guise of weapons of mass destruction. The pursuit of state security drove the majority of early interventions, and though this realpolitik is still part of donor calculations, the pursuit of human security has progressively replaced it.

Contemporary Security Motives – Human Security

From an individual perspective, the drive for ‘human security’ is innate, and it existence actually dates back a long way. While always present, states historically ignored domestic issues of other states, focusing on other states as opaque nodes in an international arena. However, the advent of a unipolar world at the end of the Cold War changed this. Scholars shifted from Cold War conceptions of security (Baldwin 1995) to a more holistic, individualized narrative for security (Buzan 1991). This new concept criticized old norms as being too narrow and focused on military power to define security. Instead it argued that security means the ability to pursue freedom from threats and maintain independent identities against hostile forces of change. The US, therefore, moved its goals for security beyond the concepts of states. This analysis required the incorporation of new concepts of regional security, failed states, the environment, and societies into security dialogues (Buzan 1991).

The first known document to coin the term ‘Human Security’ is the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. This report expanded the definition of security into seven broad domains—economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political and food. It was critical of past paradigms and insistent upon the need for individual security, stating:
For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (UNDP, 1994: 3)

This document moved security from borders to lives, and placed development over arms as the dominant method to achieve security. In this analysis, a ‘secure state’ untroubled by contested territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people (Mahbub ul Haq 1994).

According to the report, “Sustainable human development addresses both intra-generational and intergenerational equity-enabling all generations, present and future, to make the best use of their potential capabilities” (Mahbub ul Haq 1994, 4). Shortly after publication, the report formed the basis for later development of the Human Development Index as a more comprehensive measure of socio-economic progress of nations than the traditional measure of Gross National Product, offering new analytics to define human security (Haq 1996).

By the turn of the century, scholarship of human security had expanded greatly. There were strong correlations between a lack of human security and the degradation of the security of states. Looking at the first half of the 1990s, "57% of countries experiencing war were ranked low on the UNDP’s Human Development Index, while only 14% were ranked high, and 34% were ranked medium. There may be a causal relationship between lack of material entitlement, health and education, and war" (C. Thomas 2001, 163). In order to prevent or alleviate the increasing number of intra-state conflicts in the world, states had to deal with human security issues. These issues only increased as technological, strategic, and ideological innovations at the end of the Cold War placed a heavy strain on the ability of states to provide
security for their citizens (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). In some discourses, this argument became a campaign to increase state capacities, as the state’s inability to restrain warlords or paramilitaries became a dangerous corollary to violence. In addition, the state itself could be a major threat to its citizens when it ceased protecting citizen’s rights and well-being. The international system had to consider state failure as a threat to deal with (Axworthy 2001, 19). Such threats drew attention to the need to protect human security and made it a fundamental objective of foreign policy (Alkire 2003).

There was debate in the human security literature over what caused insecurity and how best to address it. Authors sometimes attributed actors the roles of abusers and victims. International interveners were “external saviours and external judges, with the moral duty of bringing security and the sovereign rule of law to the benighted borderlands” (Chandler 2012). While poverty and violence correlate, there was debate over the causal link, if any existed. Sen and others argued that the causes of insecurity were not poverty per se, but rather the institutional frameworks through which broader security concerns were managed (Sen 2000). Others argued that crime and violence tend to disproportionately affect the poor, which unresponsive, corrupt, or brutal police behaviors can exacerbate (Shah et al. 2000). Looking forward, the need to engage the nongovernmental sector to promote human security (Axworthy 2001, 22) and move beyond short-term tasks such as ceasefires, DDR, and elections (Conteh-Morgan 2005) became critiques of the dominant discourse as well as starting points for further debate.
Figure 1 shows the categorization of the types of interventions along the axes of size and the type of security that the intervener seeks. Within the matrix are examples of interventions placed where they would correspond in this conception. Size is difficult to define with just one metric. Ideally, this is a conglomeration of the commitment of people—troops, police, and civilian personnel—combined with the cost of the intervention. Costs fluctuate based on the country of origin of the soldiers involved—American soldiers are more expensive—and other factors such as accessibility, existing damage, and inflation. So, while figure 1’s categorization of interventions accounts for costs, it primarily focuses on the size of the troop commitment. For example, the First Gulf War is near the bottom right, as it was very large—consisting of hundreds of thousands of soldiers—and focused almost entirely on the state security objective of maintaining existing borders and securing the flow of international trade, notably oil. On the opposite end is the recovery of Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, which was small and focused on establishing human security for Haitians.
The precise definition of human security has been a matter of debate, as the term elicits different conceptions from different people, allowing the inclusion of an ever growing list of things that affect human security. Indeed, human security can become so broad as to render analytical approaches irrelevant (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). This ambiguity “renders human security an effective campaign slogan, but it also diminishes the concept’s usefulness as a guide for academic research or policymaking” (Paris 2001, 88). These shortcomings drove a need to more precisely define the term. Thomas and Tow argued that not only would this add to the analytical and policy value of the term, it would also reduce the centrality of ‘levels of analysis’—international society, the state or the individual—to the conceptualization of human security (N. Thomas and Tow 2002). And so scholars have attempted to better define human security. Alkire articulates human security as one necessary part of human development and fulfillment, but not the sole piece (Alkire 2003). Thomas describes it as “a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized [and it] cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another” (C. Thomas 2001, 161). King and Murray narrow the indicators of human security to five—poverty, health, education, political freedom, and democracy—as essential and important enough to cause conflict. In an attempt to operationalize the concept, they define human security as “the number of years of future life spent outside a state of ‘generalized poverty” (G. King and Murray 2001, 585). Roland Paris differentiated human security from other types by the source of the threat and for whom security is for:
In this conception, the realm of human security addresses military and non-military threats to societies, groups, and individuals.

In each case, regardless of the source of the security threat, for whom the security is aimed, or the type of intervention, the development of the police occurs. The police, as a source of security, can serve to promote national security. Likewise, in their role as “street-level bureaucrats” conducting community policing, they serve to secure groups and individuals.

**The Nexus of Human and State Security – Post-conflict Reconstruction**

Whether states pursue interventions for state or human security, that intervention will come at the end of a conflict. That conflict may be external or internal to the host state. Regardless, in most cases the intervening states find themselves rebuilding the states they intervene in after a conflict. The duration may be short or long, but even states that want no
part in reconstruction soon find that in order to set the conditions for their withdrawal some level of reconstruction is necessary. The American experience is a good example of this. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, American presidents have declared a desire to get out much sooner than they are actually able to. Reconstruction was necessary even if it was never in the plan.

Authors use the terms Post-conflict or Transitioning Societies with the assumption that their meaning is self-evident. Though the terms seem ubiquitous in the literature, it is difficult to find true attempts to define them. Part of the reason is that it is so hard to determine when a situation is in conflict, peace, or that gray area in between. The murky reality is that all societies lie somewhere on a continuum of violence, with no clear point of delineation between points along the axis. In general, the emphasis is not on what post-conflict reconstruction is, but what post-conflict reconstruction entails. This includes security, social and economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation. For each action, the definitions actors use to describe post-conflict reconstruction can drive the way they perform that function.

Post-conflict reconstruction has been concordant with the end of violence throughout history, but the study of it is relatively recent. Programs such as the Marshall Plan fit under the umbrella of post-conflict reconstruction, though at the time few scholars referred to it as such. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, un-tethered from the realist threat of the Soviet Union, Western countries—driven by realist concerns—saw the opportunity to rebuild societies in order to establish a liberal peace. There was a hope that the rise of liberal
democracies would usher in a new era freed from the shackles of the past (Fukuyama 2006). This was a European and North American liberal peace project “driven by a desire to realize social transformation beyond violent conflict” (Richmond 2010, 41). However, this view suffered from a lack of attention to the complex and interrelated problems of post-conflict rebuilding (Fagen and Uimonen 1995). The attention given to spoilers (Stedman 1997), grievances (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Hirshleifer 1991), greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), and other factors of instability increased as an attempt to highlight the myriad forces exerted on post-conflict societies.

Scholarship on the subject of post-conflict reconstruction has become dually prescriptive and discursive.2 Prescriptively, scholarship merges with ‘best practice’ to determine the efficacy of different actions. For example, Roeder and Rothchild determined that short-term power-sharing arrangements may offer a compromise but come with high longer-term costs, and so conclude that power-dividing, rather than power-sharing, solutions are better routes to more durable peace (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Discursively, questions arise as to the larger contexts in which post-conflict reconstruction efforts reside, and for whom endeavors exist. For example, is the process aimed toward a conservative version of liberalism in which the state is the vehicle for security and regulation over a territorial sovereignty, or toward justice and equity as an emancipatory activity in a societal context, rather than institutions (Richmond 2010, 15).

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2 Discursive analysis in political science argues that understanding processes requires knowledge of cultural and ideological symbols, and interactions of actors that form interpretations of institutions (Schmidt 2011), and better allows critical theorizing (Milliken 1999).
The US military views post-conflict reconstruction as a stability operation.\(^3\) There is a recognition that the pursuit of state security requires an appreciation of human security tenets. The US military definition of a stability operation is:

“An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, V-4).

Stability operations span “disaster response/humanitarian assistance activities, development activities, and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization activities” and aim to “help move...from instability (and particularly the violent conflict that often accompanies increased instability) to increased stability (and reduced violent conflict)” regardless of the type of scenario involved (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b, I-1). The list of military publications associated with post-conflict reconstruction is exhaustive. However, the actual term is not a predominant vernacular in the Department of Defense, even though operations to fulfill or support it are. In this military context, post-conflict reconstruction begins at the end of a conflict and continues until the redeployment of the last US service member.

The Department of State has increasingly come to see itself as the lead US agency concerned with activities that comprise post-conflict reconstruction, even if not directly addressing the term. There has also been an increase in cooperation between the military and the diplomats. This began with National Security Presidential Directive 44 in 2005\(^4\), and

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\(^3\) Another term used is “Peace Operations,” described in Joint Publication 3-07.3. Peace Operations include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, peace enforcement, and peace keeping.

\(^4\) NSPD-44 aimed to better integrate DOD and DOS structures to deal with issues arising in Iraq. The State Department then established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which turned into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, also under State, in 2011.
continued with Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ hospitable relationship and promotion of the State Department. The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in 2010 heavily emphasized the lead role of the State Department in preventing and responding to conflict and failing states. Many State Department initiatives involve contractor support to implement programs, involving more actors in the training environment.

The military and civilian components of donor states that conduct post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) conduct two missions simultaneously: security sector reform (SSR) and development. SSR focuses on institutions that enable the state’s monopoly of violence: the army, police, border patrol, and so on. Development focuses on everything else: governance, the economy, civil society, and so on. Together, these missions encompass PCR.

Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform is a sub-task of PCR. In that light, policymaker’s conception of SSR developed alongside PCR. Actors with any significant presence effecting change in an intervened country traditionally paid close attention to the establishment of security forces in any intervention. This made sense, as war-making and state-making were synonymous (Tilly 1986). Additionally, ability of an intervened state to develop the capacity to project power within its own borders normally advances the interests of intervening states. That being said, the relevance of SSR is as recent as the drive for human security. Similar to human security, the new world order ushered in by the fall of the Berlin Wall brought new focus on the role of the entire security sector on the internal—rather than purely external—stability of the state. Scholars began to note that security studies had traditionally focused on the means to pursue security—specifically military statecraft—rather than the goal of security itself (Baldwin 1995).
And so while SSR may have occurred previously, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was the first development agency to recognize the holistic notion of SSR, encompassing the police and armed forces, as institutions in need of development to increase state capacity for security in 1999 (C. Smith 2001, 9). This makes the SSR discourse newer than the discussions over human versus state security, or PCR.

Like human security, the scope of SSR policy is ambitious – perhaps too ambitious. Good governance in the security sector is tied to the development of good governance in general (Hanggi 2005, 4). Sahin and Feaver define SSR as a policy directed towards: “the transformation of the ‘security system’ which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (Sahin and Feaver 2012, 12). In addition, this governance is observable at the global, regional, national, and local levels of analysis (Hanggi 2005, 8). Others eschew the organizational models of SSR for a more process-oriented approach, conceiving SSR as more of a democratization of the security and justice processes, focusing on citizen/state relationships and democracy as an output process (Knight 2009).

There is criticism that in this light, the United States and other western donors do not ‘do’ SSR very well. This failure is commonly attributed to a weak conceptual understanding of SSR that disregards the complexity of the endeavor. States disregard SSR as an area of activity under the security/development nexus that can address problems of state capacity (Fuery 2005) so that “the subtle but critical distinctions between SSR policy objectives, targets and outcomes are seriously compromised. In other words, there are several gaps in ideational,
organizational, operational and developmental terms” (Sahin and Feaver 2012). In many ways, there is a focus on outputs but an inability to connect them to outcomes. Number of people trained, classes taken, vehicles maintained, and other metrics are easy to count, but processes and democratic norms are harder to quantify.

This matters when attempting to answer the question: security for whom? For example, SSR espouses local ownership of security, but this means different things to donors, recipients, and non-state actors (Bendix and Stanley 2008). Though there are no perfect answers, a good first attempt would be to amalgamate the different perspectives to at least find points of congruence. However, that seems to rarely occur. In the end, SSR should strive for “locally sustainable, professional, and developed force structures that are effective, legitimate, and accountable to the citizens” (McFate 2008). It is an endeavor in institution building that goes beyond simple tasks (McFate, 2010). These outcomes can be beneficial to actors at all levels, and should drive actions.

Development

Prior to the mid twentieth century, the study of development was intertwined with capitalism and colonialism (Gardner 1996, 1–6). Donors developed regions to better extract resources and expand their influence. By the mid-twentieth century, architects of modernization—principally in the West—sought to export their methods of economic dominance to other countries. Economists sought to find the proper sets of levers to pull to achieve economic growth in these societies. Across the globe, these methods were placed into action by international organizations from the end of the Second World War until the 1970s, with the overarching goal of economic growth. Disciples of public administration, inspired by
the work of Taylor, Bennis, and others, likewise saw a role that governments could play in moving society ‘forward.’ Unfortunately, all these models inevitably simplify problems to try to solve them. Of course, as Scott point out, this is a major flaw. Societies are not closed systems, but open and so complex that any planner with the hubris to attempt dictating formal policies from the top by defining happiness, means and desired ends will run into local opposition, informal constraints, and failure in even the best circumstances (Scott 1998). And, even when the best intentions are evident, things can and will go awry, as Scott shows in Tanzania, and Gupta shows in India (Scott 1998; Gupta 2012). So, even if early development advocates may have made their attempts in good faith, their assumptions revealed fatal flaws in their execution.

During the 1980s voices repeatedly declared the development endeavor—theories of modernization, dependency, and so forth—as over (Gardner 1996, 20). Across disciplines, the theme was an acceptance of the complexity of development, albeit addressed in different manners. The Romer model in 1986 expanded on earlier growth theories to add the endogenous accumulation of knowledge contributing to stable growth. The inverse growth model sought to explain the failure of large farms later noted by Scott, by explaining how productivity of a farm decreases past a certain size. Not as sanguine about the power of economic models, Sen argued that while development economics still possessed a central role, it alone is incapable of bringing an adequate understanding of economic development (Sen 1983). Easterly generally felt that people respond to incentives, and growth is good for the poor, although even as an economist he admits that describing the plight of the poor has been far easier than coming up with workable solution (Easterly 2001). Other policy failures, such as
decentralization, had to do with existing cultures and the reluctance of power holders to actually push power to the periphery (Peter Blunt and Turner 2005), which were not taken into account upon implementation. Later, development conversations expanded to the role of economic, social, and cultural rights (Robinson 2004; Rubenstein 2004; Roth 2004).

The main goals of development now focus on capacity and governance. Blunt offers six aspects of good governance—political accountability, freedom of association and participation, uniform applications of legal frameworks, bureaucratic accountability, availability and validity of information, and effective and efficient public sector management (P. Blunt 1995). This moves beyond older models and is more holistic in its vision. Governance has shifted from a goal of good governance to good enough governance—“good enough to create critical improvements in political and administrative systems and that fit country contexts” (Brinkerhoff 2008, 992). This presents a myriad of tasks while at the same time establishing a myriad of criterion to judge the success of development interventions.

**Police Training, Capacity & Development**

The establishment of the police is traditionally nested under SSR. In this section I describe how the literature on police training is actually an amalgamation of SSR and development approaches, and argue that successful police training is really police development.

The police connect the state and society, routinely representing the state in everyday affairs. The actions of the police connect human security and development through their internal and external processes and actions. So, as intervening states focus on these new goals,
the police offer the highest immediate payback for their efforts. However, the focus of missions and the implementation of them lack an overarching concept to ensure successful outcomes.

Democratic policing involves respect for human rights and equal enforcement of the law. It is promoted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and is a major goal of police development interventions (Bayley and Perito 2010; Bayley 2006). Ideally, democratic policing promotes democratic norms and strengthens the connection between citizens and the state. One operational method to achieve this is through community policing, where the police embed themselves closely with the population in order to understand problems and anticipate needs. This has been associated with lower levels of crime in western nations (Zhao, Scheider, and Thurman 2002; Friedmann 1992), which I would argue is synonymous with the concept of stability in weaker states.

The track record of developing the police is spotty at best. Authors have attempted to explain why this happens by focusing on specific cases in order to elucidate causes. In some cases, there are simply not enough advisors and law enforcement to successfully meet the demand in order to achieve these goals (Serafino 2004). Even if there are enough police trainers, the donors themselves can drive what they impart, as the different organizational cultures of donor police forces can influence whether donors prioritize civilian or militarized police assistance (Friesendorf 2013).

The outputs of police training are more accessible than their outcomes. These outputs yield clear metrics to ascertain progress: number of recruits trained, hours of patrolling
executed, arrests made, or amount of properly equipped officers. While important, these outputs are not nearly as important as the outcomes they hopefully produce. Unfortunately, the police’s perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population or the propagation of democratic norms is more difficult to grasp. So, while as a practical matter most analysis focuses on outputs, there is a lack of analysis that addresses the outcomes of police development interventions.

*The Concept of a ‘Developed Police Force’*

I use the term ‘Developed Police Force’ to describe a police force that not only has the capacity to conduct policing, but is also perceived as legitimate to the population and donors, and committed to democratic norms. Striving to build a *developed* police force is somewhat of a misnomer. In reality, no such thing exists; all police forces are continually dealing with challenges and improving themselves. So while the ideal-type ‘developed police force’ is useful as a goal to strive toward, success is not a matter of attainment, but rather a movement along a path. So, while the outcome may be unattainable, it still establishes a basis of measurement for the success of a police force’s development.

Adding to the complication of defining a developed police force is that it may differ based on the vantage point taken. Who determines the purpose of police development, as well as who should, are questions whose answer the police training literature fails to adequately answer. Advocates of human security take the stance that local populations should drive goals, arguing that this best serves all parties. However, the entire endeavor exists because an outside actor has chosen to intervene. Without a compelling state security dilemma, it seems unlikely that donors would mobilize the resources necessary to conduct police development at
a significant level of impact. In addition, local actors are not monolithic: different actors may have different aims that they want police development to serve. This heterogeneity among actors hinders a reliance on local desires to determine the purpose of police development. Instead, efforts to incorporate local desires are actually a byproduct of donor desires to find the most effective way to achieve their aims. Ultimately, donors determine the purpose of police development, though there is a realization that that purpose should align with local desires in order to have any chance of succeeding.

Training is an insufficient term to describe the activities required to improve a police force. First, it focuses on an output rather than an outcome. Improving skill sets through training programs is only one piece of a larger initiative to improve the overall functions and legitimacy of a police force. Second, it implies a knowledge transfer that places the indigenous police in an inferior role. For new recruits this may be true, but for the rest of the police force, the personnel are hardly a blank slate. In some cases, officers may have decades of policing experience under older regimes, which combined with a greater knowledge of local conditions, may actually reverse the relationship between “trainer” and “trainee.” The term ‘development’ is usually paired with other terms to describe phenomena such as economic development, human development, sustainable development, and so on. Authors commonly describe development as a process, activity, or a discourse (Absell 2015). This more holistic concept more adequately describes the tasks interventions aim to achieve with regard to the police.

5 This is not to say that donors would not offer any assistance. Organizations like ICITAP, EULEX, and others routinely operate programs that train the police in a multitude of countries. However, their presence in many instances is small compared to efforts in countries that donors perceive as significantly impacting their own security. For example, in 2009, In 2009, the US spent $3.5 billion providing police assistance to 101 countries, but almost $2.5 billion of it went to just three countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Columbia (GAO 2011, 9–11).
Therefore, police development is more accurate and comprehensive. It aligns with the larger literature on economic development and development more loosely. It also fits the narrative of recognizing the need to move the police institution along in parallel to other functions of the state and society toward specific goals.

Finally, there is a distinction between capacity and quality. Capacity building is now a universal goal of every intervention, from education to governance to security sector reform. Capacity refers to the capability of actions: How well an institution can coerce, administer, or implement. These are important functions, whose absence indicates a weak state apparatus. However, capacity alone forms an incomplete view of an institution. Quality asks “to what extent officials are true civil servants, working for the public good in a fair way, rather than pursuing primarily personal or elite interests” (Taylor 2011). Quality is equally important to capacity in determining the legitimacy of a coercive institution such as the police.

The evolution from state to human security based interests driving police development interventions has driven the process of police training toward development aimed at balancing quality and capacity. This evolution has also raised new concerns beyond the mere capability to exert force to enforce the law. The police must not only have this attribute, but must be accountable to the populations they serve and adhere to international norms, that may in some cases contradict generations of traditional mechanisms that enforced norms.

**Legitimacy**

In a developmental sense, police forces best serve their purpose when their actions contribute to the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens as well as donors. As a desired
goal of police development, “legitimacy determines the transaction costs of political and
governmental power” (Department of Defense 2013). When a government enjoys legitimacy,
the business of governance is easier to execute. From the state-building perspective, locals
retain legitimacy, not foreign forces. Therefore, the most important mission of new security
forces must be to maintain government legitimacy (Sewall et al. 2007). Ostensibly, every line of
effort should strive to this end.

The police develop legitimacy upward to the governing institutions of the state, but the
state’s legitimacy can affect the performance of the police as well as their value to the stability
of the state. The police must be able to enforce laws and encourage obeisance, but most
people also obey the law simply because they view it as legitimate (T. R. Tyler 2006b). The
state’s power is legitimate only when “the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared
by both dominant and subordinate” and that legitimacy serves to maintain political systems
even when they come under serious pressures, up to and including failure (Beetham 1991). The
police operate as an intermediary in this system that develops a sense of legitimacy in the
society.

While the state plays a major part in determining perceptions of legitimacy, the police
also have a part in developing connections with the population. The manner of interactions the
police have with the population has an impact on citizen’s perceptions of police legitimacy.
Researchers have found that to the extent the police exert procedural justice—fair procedures
of law enforcement—citizens will perceive the police as being more legitimate, regardless of
the outcome of that citizen’s interactions with the police, and that will feed back to the public’s
reactions to police actions (T. R. Tyler and Fagan 2008; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). So, as much
as police actions can affect their legitimacy, and as much as their development can affect their actions, legitimacy remains the best determinant to assess police development.

Adding to this, the concept of having a police force that serves the state to enforce the law is a new phenomenon in human history. Until a century and a half ago, the western model of policing did not yet exist. Throughout human history, the state and societies have been able to enforce norms among the population with mechanisms other than a standing police force. This hints at the fact that policing is a spectrum. This spectrum encompasses traditional practices, state dictated forces, and private entities, operating in the name of the state or otherwise. In all instances, these is a core function of enforcing the local or national laws, however they were derived. So, while a police force can confer legitimacy to a state, its own legitimacy is tied to the acceptance of a police force as necessary to the population.

A major problem with legitimacy is the difficulty in defining it. Most discussion relates to categorization of legitimacy, but not measurement. Weber’s three ideal types—traditional, charismatic, or legal-rational, categorize types of legitimacy that leaders or governments possess. Suchman’s three primary forms—pragmatic, moral, and cognitive—also serve to explain why something is legitimate, but do little to offer a means of measurement (Suchman 1995). Legitimate governments enjoy high levels of each of these types or forms to establish a holistic definition of their legitimacy, but this remains hard to operationalize. In addition, since legitimacy cannot be disentangled from other explanations of compliance, such as coercion and self-interest, its very validity remains weak.

Another major problem with legitimacy is that, because it is so hard to define, it is even harder to measure. You need to define: what is the state? Who are the relevant citizens? What
kind of variable is legitimacy? (Gilley 2013, 8). Legitimacy is mainly a latent variable instead of an easily observed one. It cannot be measured directly, so variables need to be chosen to measure it indirectly. Perhaps it is for this reason that Gilley laments how we are so often wrong in measuring it (Gilley 2013). Some attempts to do so include expressions of consent of subordinates to particular power relationships through pertinent actions (Beetham 1991) or using attitudinal and behavioral indicators (Gilley 2013). However, these indicators routinely lack clarity, and the pursuit of measuring legitimacy remains difficult at best.

**Conclusion**

The original aim during this chapter was to describe police training, but I came to settle on a new terminology: “Transnational quality police capacity development.” This seems to be an overly descriptive and needlessly obtuse terminology to describe how donor nations train police forces, but it conveys the difficulty of simplifying these endeavors. More than a set of tasks, police development is an ecosystem that ties together concepts unrelated to security and the police, forcing a holistic vision of the problem. In military parlance, an indicator of success is to train a unit to be tactically and technically proficient, meaning soldiers can maneuver themselves and operate their equipment. In police reform this is not enough. It is more about politics than technique. It requires a “thorough professional recruit training program, vetting, taking action against police abuses, introduction of women into the force, effective financial support and regulation, ensuring regular salaries” (James Wither and Thilo Schroeter 2012). Ensuring that police can maneuver themselves and operate their equipment is only one part of a larger task of institutional development. The majority of scholarship loses relevance in attempts to compartmentalize this complex phenomenon.
Police development spans security sector reform, development, and policing theories. Each viewpoint reveals different pieces of the complex puzzle. Throughout each of these, I find that donors’ objectives and measures for success are extremely important, that quality police are both an input and an output of good development, and that legitimacy in the eyes of all parties is the best measure to assess police development. Paradoxically, while donors set the terms, whole of government reforms need cooperative effort and cannot easily be imposed from the top down (Pollitt 2003). In addition, such reforms will require new skills, changes in organizational culture, and the building of mutual trust relations needing patience, requiring that a project be considered long-term and take time to implement (Christensen and Lægreid 2007).

Metaphorically, the police are a bureaucratic entity much like the knife described in Woodrow Wilson’s “The Study of Administration.” Like the knife, we can attempt to assess the quality of the instrument without tying it to its eventual use. A strong, sturdy blade is successfully built, regardless of whether someone wields it to cut an apple or to murder another person. Likewise, a police force should remain able to be well-trained and legitimate regardless of the government it serves. However, the politics-administration divide Wilson described has proven to be less stark, such that scholars admit you cannot divide the instruments from their masters (Richardson and Nigro 1991). From this perspective, it becomes even more difficult to assess a police force’s development separately from the government it serves. A strong, legitimate, well-trained police force cannot be successful if it serves an oppressive, anti-democratic regime that harms the human security or freedoms of citizens.
CHAPTER 3. THEORY & METHOD

I have lived among people of letters, who have written history without being involved in practical affairs, and among politicians, who have spent all their time making things happen, without thinking about describing them. I have always noticed that the former see general causes everywhere while the latter, living among the unconnected facts of everyday life, believe that everything must be attributed to specific incidents and that the little forces that they play in their hands must be the same as those that move the world. It is to be believed that both are mistaken.

-Toqueville, *Souvenirs*

Introduction

Investigating the development of police forces in post-conflict reconstruction is an examination of development and a particular subset of security sector reform. Therefore, the methodological defects of SSR are inherent in any investigation of police development. I agree with Chuter’s commentary that SSR writing is “too often the product of those without personal experience of, or frequent contact with, the security sector or with politics on the one hand, or without deep regional political expertise on the other” and that it is “too often based on theoretical models drawn from political science, which are of limited use for understanding how the security sector actually works in practice, varying as it does enormously from country to country (Chuter 2006).” In the case of police forces, their localized nature exacerbates these critiques. The challenge is then to create a framework of analysis that can best avoid these common pitfalls.

I study police force development from the multi-disciplinary perspective of public administration. At its core, public administration is the study of public bureaucracies, and police institutions are a bureaucracy—police officers are street-level bureaucrats. A common
question of the field is whether the aim of public administration theory should be more
generalist, or more specific. The answer is both. The middle ground seems like an easy answer
to this question, but it makes sense. Public administration needs to be inclusive and not
exclusive. Spanning levels, approaches and other criteria allow for this. Studies that increase
the coherence of knowledge in the field should be balanced rather than biased toward a
particular narrative. Unfortunately the balance of the literature has skewed away from bold
theory building attempts in favor of more solid empirical tests (Sutton and Staw 1995). While
highly structured empirical tests can achieve the rigor desired for publications, they may lack
the paradigm shifting capability of theory building. Finding balance is preferable, and is the
best way to keep public administration relevant.

The literature surrounding the development of police forces reveals the complexity of
the endeavor. Police forces are organizations, and developing them is an undertaking of
organizational change. This lends credence to an assumption that theories of organizational
change may best describe how to develop police forces. Unfortunately, “organizational
phenomena are much too complex to be described adequately by any single theoretical
approach” (Tolbert, 1985, 12). Therefore, I propose that the investigation of police force
development must be multi-faceted and account for the holistic nature of international
interventions. This method suffers a weakness of precision, in that it is unable to directly tie
one specific variable to another. However, it is able to address the real complexities of police
development. A common narrative of assessing police reform efforts is that ‘if only we had
been able to (or thought of) do X, we could have achieved far more success.’ That refrain has
become so repetitive that it calls into question the validity of the statement. Is there a certain
way to do things that achieves relatively higher levels of success? Possibly, but perhaps the
answer is more complex.

Rather than simply testing a theory, this study is an inductively driven attempt to add
knowledge based on a construct of an existing list of problems in police development. The
endogeneity of the variables in each case of police development requires an approach that
appreciates the complexity of the endeavor. Likewise, the relationship between the
development of the police alongside other structures of democratic governance is such a new
aspect of study that this approach is suitable.

In this chapter I will present my method for evaluating what factors account for
variation on the relative success of police development interventions. First, I will provide a brief
background of the methods I aim to employ in this investigation. Next, I will offer my model of
police development and discuss the relevant variables of interest, along with how to measure
them. I will discuss my case selection reasoning as well. Last, I will discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of this model.

Process Tracing

Process tracing is a method that “examines histories, archival documents, interview
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that
case” (George and Bennett 2005, 6) and “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—
the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable or variables and the
outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). Process tracing has
gained interest in recent years. King, Keohane, and Verba referred to its strength at identifying causal mechanisms and dealing with the small-n issue of case studies by increasing relevant observations while at the same time cautioning that it must remain an extension of “fundamental logic of analysis” (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Since that publication, scholarship related to process tracing—and, for that matter, most qualitative methods—has exploded. In this section I will discuss what process tracing can accomplish, how researchers should go about it, and address concerns related with process tracing methodologies.

Process tracing allows researchers to focus on causal mechanisms. Rather than determining the co-variation in values of specific variables, the ambition of process tracing is “to understand the processes linking the different relevant factors to the outcome” (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2014). Rather than asking whether X causes Y, the primary aim is to determine how X causes Y. “The process-tracing method emphasizes the mechanisms linking the independent and dependent variables” (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2014). This reflects the desire to open up the “black box” of decision making in order to explore what factors can explain why an event occurred. This can help explain historical cases and suggest generalizable hypotheses (Levy 2008). This matters because policy issues are too complex to allow simplification to simple connections. Researchers must account for “the dense web of relationships connecting states, companies, civil society organizations, and individuals as a policymaking system as well as analysis of their mutual influences” (Kay and Baker 2015). Absent this, policy analysis will remain incomplete.

Process tracing is ideally suited for this study because it can simultaneously address multiple perspectives. It offers an opportunity to address agents and structures (Checkel 2006),
and more specifically, to “investigate and test theoretical causal chains that include both structure and agency in ways that determine certain policy outcomes” (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2014). More simply, in policy studies the answer is rarely that structure or agency determines outcomes. Instead, the contingent combinations of structure and agency routinely interact in ways unique to circumstances that produce certain outcomes. This leads to analysis focused on variance between variables, identifying key independent variables with the most leverage (susceptibility to manipulation), and attribution of causal conditions to outcomes (Steinberg 2007).

Process tracing can account for temporal effects that other methods cannot address. This offers an advantage over other methods in the investigation of decision making at multiple levels of analysis (Levy 2008). This requires separating empirical analysis into specific periods in order to move beyond testing co-variation and test how independent and dependent variables are related (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2014). Elaborating this sequence and positioning causes along it helps assess the importance of each cause to the entire chain (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). Ostensibly, earlier events in the chain may irrevocably alter chains of events and form path dependence. This “analysis of critical junctures and path dependence, for example, are extremely sensitive to the accurate identification of the precise timing of these key turning points” (Levy 2008). Some aspects of temporality are: duration, tempo, acceleration, aspect, and timing (Grzymala-Busse 2011). While not apparent in a simple IV-DV relationship, these aspects reveal contingent differences that can open up the “black box.”

Researchers must be careful in their application of process tracing. For example, Gerring recognizes the importance of causal mechanisms, but cautions against dogmatic
reverence for it (Gerring 2010). It is one piece of gaining knowledge. Scholars must be explicit about what the prime interest of their study is. For some that might well be co-variation. But for others, the understanding of the causal pathway explaining certain societal phenomena may be the prime interest (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2014).

Process tracing has serious methodological issues it must address; however, it is ideally suited for policy studies because it allows the researcher to identify how interactions change the processes that connect variables. This is why this study will utilize it. I agree with authors that argue that "Intuitively appealing terms like casual strength and causal impacts only assume meaning when tied to specific analytic goals that serve as axes along which one can array component causes"(Steinberg 2007). In terms of police development, this relates to a better understanding of why some interventions are relatively more or less successful than others.

**Theoretical Model**

This study will present a standard model of police development. By conducting a process trace following cases against the standard model’s process to achieve better success, I hope to isolate those variables and mechanisms with the greatest effect on the outcome of a police development intervention.

The key explanatory variable this study is concerned with regards whether structure or agency predisposes the outcome of a police development intervention. This is important in how we approach these ventures. Are certain interventions doomed to failure by their structure imposing its will, or can placement of the right people ensure relative success? There are so many factors that affect the outcome of a police development intervention that attempting to generalize from one case to others seems impossible. This model acknowledges
that it must simplify in order to investigate, while also recognizing important variables that affect the outcome outside of the key explanatory variables.

The goals, structure, and agency involved in each case will inevitably overlap as they exert influence on each other. For this reason, and because they serve as a categorization of multiple traits, distinguishing between them becomes difficult. Goal clarity is difficult in complex organizations and especially in multi actor network organizations (Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001, 167–70) like the missions that the UN uses to administer development. Adding to that, the articulation of goals may not reflect the operationalization of them. When possible, I discuss the articulation of goals in the ‘Goals’ section, but refer to the operationalization of those goals in the ‘Structure’ and ‘Agency’ sections of each case. This model presents a chain of processes that follows goals, structure, and agency to produce more legitimate police. While this follows a causal chain, its temporal consistency is hard to replicate in reality. That is to say, much like Thomas Dye’s policymaking framework, all steps can occur concurrently. First, there is the establishment of goals by donors and the host nation. In the standard model, these parties achieve goal convergence. Next, the various structures of the intervention take shape, involving many factors which will be discussed later. Finally, individuals on the donor and host side make decisions within those structures, being either constrained by them or able to effect changes on the outcome of the intervention. The result of these processes is ostensibly a more legitimate police force, as judged by both donors and the host nation.

**Goals**

At the start of any intervention, each actor has goals that the police development mission should achieve. Assessment of the goals can be divided into two separate steps: First,
there is the enumeration of the goals. This enumeration can be determined by any part of
government or society that interact with the police—a wide net. These goals identify what
each actor wishes to achieve as a result of the police development intervention. In addition,
there are ideal-type goals that contemporary interventions abide by, normatively assumed by
international actors. Second, there is ideally congruence between the goals of the donors and
the hosts. In practice, donors and hosts routinely disagree on goals of an intervention, and the
level of incongruity of those goals can affect the process of the intervention and eventually the
outcome.

Goals differ from strategies and tactics in that goals are what each groups strives for,
whereas the latter are the actual actions taken to achieve those goals. Sometimes when there
is goal ambiguity, those actions may be the only observations available to surmise what the
actual goal was. In those instances, the manner of implementation can shed light on goals. A
major tie-in to goals is the mandate of the mission, usually articulated in a Security Council
Resolution. Mandates are one of the collective goals of donors. They may or may not reflect
the goals of individual donors. At the very least, mandates constrain actions and give the legal
justification for the police development endeavor.

Donors typically view police development as a means to a greater end. That may be
stability, market access, imposition of norms, or other aims that further the national interests
of the donor. To donors, police provide security in areas that were a vacuum, and the more
proficient the police are at this task, the easier accomplishment of other goals will be. Indeed,
many advocates proclaim that no post-conflict reconstruction is possible without first
establishing strong security. The police represent the first line of that security prerequisite.
There are certain qualities that donors seek to instill in the police that they assume will lead to ‘better’ outcomes. Primary to the democratic western model of police development is the respect for human rights. History is replete with police agencies that were extremely effective at achieving their security function that did not respect human rights or democratic principles. So, while increasing capacity is important, donors are increasingly concerned about the quality of the police as much as the capacity. Another ideal goal of donors is equal enforcement of the law. This indicates that the police objectively polices the population without preference for or against any groups based on religious, tribal, wealth, or other attributes that may divide the population. This is especially true in areas recovering from violence, as unequal enforcement may constitute a serious grievance threatening a resurgence of violence. A final goal donors ideally strive for democratic civilian control of the police. This ties police governance structures with general governance structures, ensuring accountability of the police force to the population.

Host goals are complex and may be heterogeneous. A country may have different sects, ethnic groups, or tribes with diametrically opposed goals. While this may also be true of the donors when multiple donors are present, the proximity of recent violence amongst different host parties adds complexity, such that one group may have diametrically opposing goals from another group. The presence of ethnic rivalries can be a large source of disparity. Taking a page from the human security framework, host population goals extend down to the individual level. So, as donors increasingly strive for human security to achieve their own ends they need

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6 See figure 1.
to understand that individuals in the society may not all want the same outcomes of the police development intervention. Of course, elites may matter most in regard to this. The desires of the population are tied with the norms of behavior in the society. This relates to laws in writing versus laws in practice. There is ample literature suggesting that certain crimes such as corrupt practices may be allowable in some societies, and therefore less important for enforcement than other crimes. Many of these norms relate back to what citizens think the point of their government is. Last, in the standard model illustrated in figure 1, hosts ideally have a goal of freedom of association and participation.

It is important that Donors and hosts have goals that match the standard model in order to increase the likelihood of success. Equally important, there should be congruence between the donor and host goals. Ideally, there is harmony between the donor and the host, which leads to a better chance of success. However, when these goals diverge, programs typically falter, due to either a lack of donor support or local ownership, caused by a disparity in what participants want to achieve.

A caveat to the matching of goals is the feasibility of those goals. A large question, especially in the cases that follow, is how realistic the goals for the mission are. Some have argued that geography may constrain the potential of development, pointing to the costs of accessing landlocked countries or dealing with certain climates (Hausmann 2001). Others have suggested that social capital may be an important prerequisite for successful development (Malik, Lopes, and Fukuda-Parr 2002, 25–31). In these instances, the generic goals put forth by donors may not be feasible. In that vein, there is considerable literature that rejects the Weberian model of state monopolization of security in favor of engaging the larger spectrum of
policing and justice providers (Dinnen and McLeod 2009) and engaging local communities first in order to scale progress to other localities or to higher levels (Manor 2006). Still others claim that none of these goals will ever be feasible, and are so pessimistic as to conclude that externally engineered development will inevitably fail (Ellerman 2006, 240–41). Goal congruence is not a natural expectation in any of these cases. In fact, goal incongruence is the most likely occurrence.

Data for donor goals will rely on UN reports and development plans. The UN Security Council requires the special Representative to the Secretary General to publish constant reports on the missions, and in many cases stated the goals of the mission. Also, international norms are assumed constant across cases, since they occur in the same time period. Host goals will rely on host government legislation regarding the police as well as statements from dominant ethnic or political groups in the host state. Analysis will focus on the desired size and roles of the police in each case.

Structures

Structure here is a simple term to describe an exhaustive and complex set of organizational, political, and international phenomena, to include processes. This identification of structure relies on institutional theory as well as common depictions of ideal structures of host and donor organizations—for the police, trainers, government, and other relevant actors. First, my conception of structure acknowledges major tenets of institutional theory. Next, it operationalizes the standard model by transposing those tenets on structures relevant to police development.
Institutions are “regulatory structures, governmental agencies, laws, courts, and professions” and “institutional constituents that exert pressures and expectations include not only the state and professions, as institutions, but also interest groups and public opinion (Oliver 1991, 147).” Institutions can take many forms, but at their core they exist to organize people in order to distribute goods and services, whether fairly or not; exclusively or not.

Institutions can explain why maladaptive behaviors may persist as a legacy of convention, habit, or obligation even if they do not improve performance (P. S. Tolbert 1985; P. Tolbert and Zucker 1983). This is because practices and rules calcify the institution. While formal organizational structure often reflects institutionalized rules – socially accepted policies and practices – that grant organizations legitimacy, stability, and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan 1977), organizational activity regularly deviates from written procedure (March and Olsen 1976; Weick 1976). In many cases, formal structure is a “window dressing” meant to convey confidence and good faith to external supporters and facilitate commitment from internal actors (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This presents a dilemma whether to rely on formalized texts dictating an organization’s structure, or wonder whether the actual activities of the organization are different from the formal descriptions of its behavior. To take a classroom as an example, there is the mandated curriculum, and then there is how the teacher decides to run the classroom each day. Both the curriculum and the activity of the teacher are important in describing the structure of the class. Taking these two competing methods of institutional explanation into account, it is apparent that any rigorous investigations of institutions should include analysis of both formal and informal structures. The point of an institutionalization perspective is that it can define conditions under which hypotheses
generated by other theories will hold (Tolbert, 1985, 11). Returning to our classroom example, we want to find out if the teacher or the curriculum has the greatest impact on student learning, and to what extent the teacher and the curriculum constrain the actions of the other.

Most important to this study is that institutionalism focuses on structure over agency. I argue that individuals may possess an innovation, but must succeed or fail based on institutional factors exogenous from the innovator, and beyond the novelty of their advancement alone (Hardagon and Douglas 2001). In addition, actions generate texts which embed in discourse which produce institutions, which in turn constrain and enable actions (N. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). In short, institutionalism focuses on the ways that organizational structures predetermine actions, regardless of the actions or desires of actors.

Institutionalism can also help explain why organizations change. One explanation is that isomorphic forces change organizations. Isomorphism can be coercive, whereby political forces mandate change; memetic, whereby organizations imitate peer organizations; and normative, whereby professionalization of the field dictates practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Coercive and normative isomorphism forces convergence to the middle ground, while memetic effects yield more centralization and formalization than private sector counterparts (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004). This makes sense—coercive and normative forces are externally produced, while memetic effects assume internal acceptance of the need to change. These starting points—external versus internal—can explain their varied outcomes.

Last, size matters to institutions. Larger, bureaucratized organizations lead to looser coupling of the administrative apparatus and member discretion, but administrative priorities
are more closely coupled to member discretion in smaller agencies (Mastrofski, Ritti, and Hoffmaster 1987).

Based on this, there are three major components that matter in the structure of a police development intervention: The host police, the donor’s intervention force, and the host governmental structure. Each of these is important to the description of the overall structure of the intervention.

First, police forces vary greatly in their structure. The size of the force matters; there are obvious differences between large and small police forces. Small police forces have reduced overhead and can rely on a ‘jack-of-all-trades’ approach to policing, while larger forces must tackle more burdensome administrative tasks, ensure homogeneity of training, and built specialties such as forensics or sexual assault units that smaller forces lack the size to offer. Organizational structure also matters; this includes command structure as well as special units. Internally, determining the chain of command, presence of enabling forces (forensics, etc.), and how the police force organizes itself are important determiners of how that force maintains accountability and controls how it operates. Externally, how lines of control with levels of government exist can affect how the police operate.

Second, the characteristics of the intervention force comprise another facet of structure. The determination of this relies on domestic politics within donor countries as well as exigencies of circumstance. These forces can vary in their size, disposition, and composition. Once again, size matters—how many international police, contractors, soldiers, etc. affects capability and actions. The composition—what types of forces as well as their capabilities also
affects this. Last, where these forces are located—their disposition—matters. Are they solely placed in the capital city, or are they spread across the country? Are there places they can and cannot go?

Third, the host government mediates the effects of the police and intervention force structure. Simply speaking, the best police force and best international assistance cannot be effective without good governance. A rotten apple is still rotten, no matter what light you place it in. The political system of the host nation matters. Is it democratic or not? Is there a federal, national, or confederation structure of governance? How does government operate? Is there bureaucratic accountability? Is there transparency? Is there uniformity of legal structures? Last, how the police force fits into the governmental structure matters. For example, a police force controlled solely by an executive with no legislative oversight can be highly capable, but easily manipulated to serve nefarious interests.

Therefore, corollary to the notion of quality versus capacity in assessing the police force, the same concept is necessary when evaluating the host government. First, capacity is determinable using quantitative and qualitative data. Government effectiveness metrics are available as instruments to determine government capacity, and assessments are available to evaluate the capacity of the government to conduct operations. Similarly, democracy indicators and third party assessments of government accountability can help determine the quality of governance.
Agency

Agency refers to a categorization of theories that account for how individuals affect the outcome of the police development intervention. Implicit to this conception is that I generally refer to agents as individuals rather than corporate or institutional entities. I am concerned primarily with the decisions people make individually, and how that affects outcomes. Rather than assume actors are constrained by factors of their environment, agency assumes that actors can change the environment around them. In short, variables of concern under this refer to the fact that people and events matter. Beside individual decisions, I focus on whether people’s talents match their jobs. I do this because I assume that matching talent to position will produce decisions that positively affect the outcome of situations that actors face. Therefore, assessing talent of people executing police development is an instrument to measure unobservable day to day decisions that those actors made.

The host nation’s police are the most relevant level of inquiry. The police themselves can vary greatly in their ability. Commonly, the description of this ability is the assessed human capital of the police force. Human capital “represents the economic contribution of an employee offered to the employer” and “consists of educational capital (skills acquired by people both empirical and school environment) and biological capital (physical abilities of people, most often synthesized like health) (Savu 2013).” Due to the extreme situations evident in post-conflict reconstruction, the demand for high human capital routinely outpaces available supply. In addition, the police must usually compete with other sectors of government, the private sector, and even international NGOs to acquire and retain people from among this small pool. Therefore, there is difficulty, especially among the police, to find highly
talented officers. Not surprisingly, it is assumed that police forces that can field officers with higher levels of talent will enjoy better chances to develop a more legitimate police force.

The talent level of the donor forces matter as well. The most qualified people for the job are quite expensive. There is also a big difference between officers knowledgeable in patrolling and specialists in forensics, management, or force development. The latter is routinely in short supply. Even simple questions of language proficiency or pre-deployment training can yield varied responses. Part of this addresses whether higher talent personnel are worth their added cost—could better people make decision that could fix a broken system, or likewise, would putting lower quality police trainers in a situation cause it to fail even if the structure is sound? In economic terms, does the added marginal cost of higher talent donor forces produce a commensurate marginal benefit in producing better outcomes? Last, this definition of talent is conditional—some ‘high talent’ skills may actually hinder development in certain situations, and otherwise ‘lower talent’ trainers may be more effective. A simple example would be language skills. Perhaps a lower skilled trainer who speaks the same language as the host nation could be more effective than even the best qualified trainer that must utilize a translator to communicate.

Professional norms vary along with culture, region, and place. Interactions between peers, subordinates, or superiors may differ based on this. In addition, interactions with the populations the police serve may vary according to the norms of the society and the history of how the government sees its role in relation to the society.
This concept of agency is a conglomeration of these factors. The data for this will consist of identification of decisive actors in the case, and any decisions they made. In addition, the level of human talent in the donor and the host will be assessed. Last, I will note any significant additional factors that affected the course of events.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the prime indicator of the relative success of a police development intervention, and therefore represents the dependent variable of this study. Legitimacy of the police is important from the perspective of the donors and the recipient. While there is overlap, there may also be differences in how the two define and observe legitimacy.

Legitimacy is the propensity of citizens to willingly obey authority or rules, absent any actual coercion from authorities (Lipset 1959; T. R. Tyler 1997). The police specifically develop legitimacy through perceived effectiveness and perceived procedural fairness (Hawdon, Ryan, and Griffin 2003; T. R. Tyler 2004, 2006a). This is hard to measure, but many authors have utilized a combination of citizen trust, respect, satisfaction, and willingness to follow police orders as ways to measure this (T. R. Tyler 1997; Hinds and Murphy 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2015). I focus on trust and corruption, arguing that high levels of corruption will lead to lower levels of respect, satisfaction, and willingness to follow police orders. In addition, I look at the sustainability of the police force, since a police force that is unsustainable will inevitably lose legitimacy over the long term.

Trust is one factor of legitimacy. More than a way to reduce transaction costs, trust underlies the purpose of the police. Do citizens trust the police to be fair and professional? Do
donors trust that the police are reinforcing their development initiatives? Trust remains a human opinion, subjectively determined by individuals. Citizens evaluate their trust based on their perceptions of fairness in dealing with the police (T. Tyler 2001; T. R. Tyler and Huo 2002). Therefore, the main instrument I will use to determine levels of trust will be surveys and interview data. In each case there were numerous surveys that either directly addressed citizen’s views of the police or something similar, such as views on corruption, security, or satisfaction with the government. In addition there are many qualitative studies that yielded rich interview data illuminating the perceptions of citizens and UN personnel alike.

Corruption is another variable that can affect the legitimacy of a police force. Low or delayed compensation, barriers to entry, or other systemic pressures can increase likelihood of a police officer to resort to corrupt practices. How much that corruption affects the legitimacy of the police may depend on norms within the society of what people consider acceptable or not. In addition, this summation of corruption is relative: how corrupt is the police comparable to other institutions in a society?

While legitimacy indicates relative success, sustainability indicates whether that success will last. The intention of an intervention is that the new systems it establishes will remain after the intervention. More importantly, those systems should persist without the continued injection of external support. Host nations must be able to financially and politically support the police forces the intervention leaves behind. If the budget or culture of the host nation is out of line with the requirements of the police force, it will collapse. Exogenous shocks may very well make this occur later on, but at the outset this is a goal of the intervention. In order
to determine sustainability, I compare the costs of the police to the economy, and determine political will to continue support of the police—in a democratic form—absent the intervention.

Assessments by the host and the donor are also indicators of relative success. Donors indicate their determinations in official reports, congressional testimonies, academic consensus, and other documents. The host assessment comes from both official government statements as well as population consensus.

Causal Chains

The causal chains that link each of these are noted in Figure 1. These are malleable and open to modification, as I hope to inductively determine them throughout each case of police development. The goals of the donors and the host combine to determine the structure of the police force and the force that will develop it. This is an interplay of the power relationship between the donors and the host, international norms, and the result of negotiations. The structure constrains the options of the individuals, whose performance ultimate creates the outcomes that determine whether the police are more legitimate.
Hypotheses

So, based on this model, several hypotheses can be tested based upon adherence or divergence from the model. These hypotheses focus on the effects of goal congruence, structure, and agency:

**H1:** *Goal incongruence/congruence between the host nation and donors has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.*

**H1A:** Goal incongruence/congruence among groups within the host nation has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.

**H1B:** Goal incongruence/congruence among donors has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.

**H2:** *Organizational, political, and international structural issues can predetermine the outcome of police development, and deviations from the standard model has a negative effect on the outcome of police development.*

**H2A:** Host Government structures that provoke spoilers will have a negative effect on the population’s perceived legitimacy of the police.
**H3: The agency of individuals has an effect on the outcome of police development.**

**H3A: The presence of highly talented individuals, with skill sets matching their duties, has a positive effect on the outcome of police development.**

These hypotheses are purposely vague. The variables that define ‘goals’ may differ from case to case, but still remain viable instruments to gauge goals. ‘Structure’ remains vaguer, as this can refer to organizational charts, development plans, or even constitutions. While different, each of these are undeniably part of the structural framework of the police development endeavor.

These hypotheses help explain connections across a wide variety of variables that address the theory. Along these lines, these become waypoints to guide analysis while conducting the process tracing of each case.

**Case Selection**

The case study is useful for hypothesis testing and theory building as much as generating hypotheses (Flyvbjerg 2006), and this study conducts testing of hypotheses... A way to reduce vagueness in choosing cases is to define the opposite of the concept (Klotz 2009). For police development that would be a police force in a country with no international presence and no consensus demand for wholesale restructuring. All police forces require improvement, but some merely require reform, not development. This can describe many cases, but restricts many. For example, police departments in the United States have been under increased pressure to reform, but there is little consensus that a wholesale restructuring of the police is necessary.
There are many different strategies for selecting cases. A study need not rely on one case selection strategy, and many case studies have successfully utilized multiple case selection strategies (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 306). Most importantly, case selection should produce “a representative sample and useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). Therefore, this study focuses on cases that exemplify a stable, cross-case relationship in order to better explore the causal mechanisms at work (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296). Additionally, this study utilizes a most similar case study selection strategy by choosing cases that are similar on all the measured independent variables, except the independent variable of interest, presuming that the dependent variable—which for this study is relative success of the police development intervention—covaries across cases with the variable of interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304). Exact matching would be impossible, but approximate matching among the cases is feasible.

Any case selection must avoid case selection based on the dependent variable (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). However, selecting on the dependent variable is not a problem for process-tracing within case studies, which does not involve comparisons and which follows an arguably different inferential logic (Levy 2008). In addition, “selection should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable,” even if selecting on the dependent variable susceptible to selection bias (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124). Therefore, selecting cases should be based on the key causal variable or categories of a control variable in order to avoid selection bias (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 137). These “purist” selection criteria are often unrealistic to attain (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 141), but this study attempts to adhere as much as possible to these methods of case selection.
The selection of the cases in this study was driven by a desire to hold variables constant in order to isolate how specific differences were tied to the outcome of the police development. First, interventions along the bounds tend to be overly skewed toward one attribute at the expense of the police. For example, in the first Gulf War, the intervention was so large and focused on state security that police development was not even pursued. Likewise, small ICITAP missions of a handful of personnel or small disaster relief expeditions are too small to create large changes in the police. Second, this scope is the “most likely” cases of importance to US and international policymakers. Large scale interventions, due to their cost and political infeasibility, are a last resort, while smaller interventions pose little risk and are usually small because they are not tied to vital interests of a donor. Therefore, in the future, this scope of cases will be most applicable to policymakers. Third, this scope recognizes the “middle ground” of interventions that will become the norm, spanning multiple purposes on the part of the donors.

Naturally, every case is different and it is difficult to make generalizable conclusions on any due to the contingent factors involved. That being said, this narrowed scope highlights major differences in interventions that exacerbate issues of comparison, and would constitute an apples to oranges comparison.

Based on this case selection criteria, this study focuses on the police development experiences in Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste. These cases were chosen due to the many variables that could be held constant between them—notably the ability to operationalize size and time. At a basic level, they all span the same continuum of intervention size and the type of intervention involved. They were all roughly similar in geographic size, amount of personnel
involved, and the reasons for their occurrence. As a constant, these were all primarily UN missions. While individual actors may have differed across them, the UN personnel system was responsible for the selection of those people. There is actually a striking similarity to how diverse the UN Police’s composition was in each of these cases. Another commonality among these cases is time frame. The international community intervened in Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste in 1999, 2003, and 1999, respectively. This holds the time period constant to account for the effects of history. Each of these interventions lasted for roughly a decade before the international presence reduced to a small, advisory level.

One major difference between each case is their geographic location. It would be hard to find a more diverse mix in this regard. Spanning Europe, Africa, and Asia, each case involves different regional powers and cultural tendencies. In regard to police development, while in each case the intervention sought to install a police force along the western model of policing, each country had its own unique assumptions of what the role of a police force is within its society.

These attributes allow me to isolate features of each case and tie them to differences in outcomes. The mandates for involvement had many similarities but had nuanced differences that informed the course of the police development. There were varying levels of goal congruence among the actors involved. Additionally, each country had its own unique structural arrangements regarding the security sector that possibly predestined the course of the development.

Each case differed in its outcome. While I refrain from establishing any case a ‘resounding success’ or an ‘abject failure,’ it is quite clear that each case experienced varying
levels of success or failure. These differences in the dependent variable, while not a criteria for selection, allow for a chance to connect some of the differences in each case with more or less favorable outcomes.

**Data**

The data in this is qualitative in nature. That includes historical memoirs, expert surveys, interviews, press accounts, and documents (Checkel 2006, 116). More specifically, these are all historical cases. Therefore, the data in this investigation relies on a range of sources. There is a wealth of reports by the UN and other agencies for each case, and most government documents are readily available. Researchers were present during each case, and where available, I use the results of their interviews to elucidate information. In addition, numerous organizations conducted rigorous, representative surveys in each country.\(^7\) There is such a wealth of information available on these cases that original data was not necessary; of more relevance was organizing that disparate information into a coherent narrative of the police development experience.

George and Bennett advise researchers to ensure that “observations imputed to a theory achieve quality, validity, and relevance (George and Bennett 2005, 175). To achieve quality, data was mined from peer-reviewed literature or well-regarded institutions. Each data point’s relevance is evident in its connection to the theory. The validity will be discussed in the next section.

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\(^7\) To ensure reliability, I only use polls or surveys that published a description of their sampling and coding method, ensuring that the researchers garnered a large, representative sample. While post-conflict areas can be inaccessible, each poll was able to sample across each country, usually conducting surveys in person.
External Validity

Maintaining external validity in this study is significant to the extent that the goal of this research is to better inform future police development interventions. To that end, it is important that the results are able to speak to some universal tendencies, rather than lament the dominance of contextual factors. To be fair, in an endeavor as complex as police development in post-conflict situations, context indeed matters. However, in order to have any meaningful impact, this study must show that the causal relationships it finds can hold over variations in settings.

The paramount question of this method is whether its results will be generalizable to any other contexts than the cases studied. More pointedly, will the results be of use in a yet unforeseen intervention that seeks to develop the police? This method of process tracing against an ideal-type typology allows for generalizability. Insofar as there is a narrow band of settings—medium sized interventions that span human and state security—the causal relationships should reasonably hold. Part of this confidence stems from the diverse geographical nature of the cases. They are each located in different continents, meaning that any causal relationships found were present regardless of those contextual differences. There are dozens of countries with similar sizes and populations as these cases, and not all of them seem particularly stable. It is reasonable that the UN may find itself in similar situations.

One factor this study cannot account for is the passage of time. Though these cases are recent, the world continues to change, technologically and culturally. The rise of the Global South, deliberations over the effectiveness of UN versus regional organizations, and other phenomena have changed the perspective by which the international community will view
interventions. In addition, technology has penetrated the far reaches of the world to a great degree the last two decades. For example, at the beginning of these cases, cell phones were available but not widespread. Now they have become a ubiquitous mode of communication, even in the most destitute areas. How much this would affect outcomes is not within the scope of this study, but is definitely a threat to external validity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the theory that this study aims to utilize. In order to uncover the causal mechanisms and increase validity, I will utilize a process tracing approach to analyze each case. This is a holistic approach to describing police development that extends far beyond just training, and shows appreciation for the entire environment surrounding an intervention.

Each case will address the typology by separately addressing each major variable of the typology. Due to the complex nature of the subject matter, this is not a ‘clean’ delineation of variables, but rather a conscious grouping of factors in order to identify the most important variables of interest.
CHAPTER 4. KOSOVO

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, six centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them

-Slobodan Milosevic

Introduction

The case period for Kosovo begins in June 1999 and ends upon Kosovo’s declaration of statehood in June 2008. The introduction of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo began the police development mission. Though international presence continued beyond 2008, that is the end of the case due to the drastically different role of the UN after that point.

This chapter will begin by describing the background that led to the violence and eventual international intervention in Kosovo. Then I will discuss the common and divergent goals of the UN and Kosovars. Next I will show how the development of the police was structured, from the UN and Kosovar vantage points, before inspecting how the decisions of individual actors were able to influence outcomes, if any. Finally, I will establish the outcomes of the intervention and police development, declaring that while it was relatively successful, it had some overlooked weaknesses.

Background

Though the roots of conflict in Kosovo stretch back centuries, the decades of peace after World War II require more emphasis on the region’s recent history, specifically since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Ethnic divides have been persistent and obvious, but the political conditions changed rapidly at the end of the Cold War. In this section I will briefly
highlight major events leading up to the 1998 violence in Kosovo, the ensuing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, and the eventual peacekeeping mission that followed.

Josip Broz Tito united Yugoslavia’s six disparate republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia—after World War Two and held them together under a socialist state that repressed nationalist sentiment among the various ethnic groups. Under Tito, Yugoslavia remained neutral to Cold War divisions, and Tito kept the country unified. However, Tito was the only person capable of holding together the disparate sections of the country. Upon his death on May 4th, 1980, a shared presidency among the republics meant there was no longer a unifying power in Yugoslavia. In March and April 1981, protests spread throughout Kosovo demanding that Kosovo become the seventh autonomous republic, rather than a province of Serbia, as it had been since Yugoslavia’s formation. Though the status of Kosovo as a part of Serbia did not change as a result of the protests, they began a decade of nationalist movements and reforms that continued to weaken the integrity of Yugoslavia.

Similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the break-up of Yugoslavia was rapid, though some areas experienced much higher levels of violence than others. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Serb dominated Yugoslav federation in June 1991. While Slovenia’s fight for independence lasted only ten days and cost fifty lives, Croatia suffered far more. They fought with Serbia for over a year, lost a third of their territory, and thousands dead before a UN brokered cease fire. Next came ethnically divided Bosnia’s declaration of independence in March 1992 and Macedonia in September 1992 that led to a genocidal war between Bosnians and Serbs that would eventually cause Croatia’s re-involvement in the war.
There are many reasons why this happened, but the domino effect occurred primarily because each side wanted to resolve issues of independence, boundaries, and ethnic tensions. The US-brokered Dayton accords in 1995 led to a peace agreement in Bosnia (Morton et al. 2004, 8–16).

Slobodan Milosevic was the last president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (SRS) as part of Yugoslavia and became the first President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRYS) in 1991. Milosevic’s rise in the 1980s was in large part built on his nationalist fervor, further antagonizing Albanians in Kosovo. His policies contributed to xenophobic reactions in Serbia, and vilified Albanians in Kosovo. Notably, he advocated for amendments to the Serbian Constitution in March 1989 that drastically reduced the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia. Milosevic was later indicted for war crimes in May 1999 by the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity in Kosovo. He was seen as the instigator for genocide against Albanians in Kosovo.

The situation in Kosovo simmered but did not immediately inflame in the early 1990s as the Serbs were pre-occupied with wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo declared independence in 1991, though only Albania recognized it. As Kosovars witnessed the breakup of Yugoslavia, they remained tied to Belgrade. The initial resistance in Kosovo remained largely non-violent,

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8 According to the immediate press release announcing the indictment of Milosevic and four others, “The indictment alleges that, between 1 January and late May 1999, forces under the control of the five accused persecuted the Kosovo Albanian civilian population on political, racial or religious grounds. By the date of the indictment, approximately 740,000 Kosovo Albanians, about one-third of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, had been expelled from Kosovo. Thousands more are believed to be internally displaced. An unknown number of Kosovo Albanians have been killed in the operations by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Specifically, the five indictees are charged with the murder of over 340 persons identified by name in an annex to the indictment. Each of the accused is charged with three counts of crimes against humanity and one count of violations of the laws or customs of war” (UNICTY 1999).
and Kosovar Albanians built a ‘parallel state’ with taxation, representation and services after 1989 (International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 42–48). When proposals for reconciliation with Belgrade failed, this began to shift. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) quickly matured from a loose, unknown organization conducting sporadic attacks beginning in 1996 into a more organized resistance by 1998. The Serbs began to conduct genocidal tactics throughout 1998 to clamp down on non-violent protests. This massive ethnic cleansing resulted in thousands of deaths and displaced thousands more.

The violence in Kosovo eventually drew international attention and precipitated international intervention. Alarmed by the escalating violence, the UN Security Council condemned the violence while US envoy Richard Holbrooke negotiated an agreement for Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo and to permit the entry of a verification mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, these agreements, along with an ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo’ between Serb and Kosovar delegations held at Rambouillet and Paris were unable to halt Serb violence, and the Serbs refused to be signatories to it. In order to force compliance, Holbrooke personally delivered an ultimatum in Belgrade to agree to the interim agreement or face air strikes (Webber 2009). Serbia refused.

The NATO-led bombing campaign from March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999 forced the withdrawal of Serb forces that allowed international ground forces to enter Kosovo (International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 92–7). Under authority of UN Resolution 1244, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) gained near total control of affairs in the province. Among its mandates was “maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police
forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo” (“U.N. Security Council: Resolution 1244” 1999).

The UN Mission in Kosovo

UNMIK’s structure was quite novel. UNMIK was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and organized itself by dividing work among four pillars: Civil Administration (pillar I), managed directly by UNMIK; Humanitarian Assistance (pillar II), initially managed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist in the return of refugees until it was replaced by the Police and Justice Pillar in May 2001 and run by UNMIK; Democratization and Institution-Building (pillar III), managed by the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and Reconstruction and Economic Development (pillar IV), managed by the EU. Each pillar was headed by a Deputy Special Representative (DSR) (Dursun-Ozkanca 2010).

Outside of the civilian mission of UNMIK, the parallel military mission providing security in Kosovo (KFOR) divided Kosovo into sectors led by separate nations. The American operation was Operation Joint Guardian and designated Task Force Falcon, arriving in June 1999 (R. C. Phillips and Center of Military History 2007). The deployment of civilian police throughout Kosovo—UNMIK’s responsibility—occurred much slower, and had filled only three fourths of its authorized strength by June 2000 (International Commission on Kosovo 2000, 111).

The international community built the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) from scratch. Establishment of the police academy and throughput of recruits is well documented, but in depth analysis of the Kosovo Police Service’s training experience is lacking. There is little
discussion of the experiences of civilian police and military units that mentored or advised KPS after graduation and ‘in the field.’

Differences in training based on organizational background and countries of origin were apparent (emphasis added):

As an OSCE Mission, the international instructors were provided mainly from developed Western European and North American nations and thus not marked by the great differences in the quality of personnel experienced by the UNPOL. Yet even among these nations, there were substantial differences in the approaches to and organization of policing, and the conditions under which it is conducted which was reflected in some inconsistencies and contradictions in the training provided (Jayamaha et al. 2010, 109).

The development of the police was not conducted unilaterally by one actor. Work was divided among different organizations. OSCE conducted initial training of the police by running the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) under the Institution-Building Pillar, and UNMIK conducted actual policing, mentoring, and field training under the Police and Justice Pillar. These organizations, as noted above, had differences in personnel and structure that may have affected outcomes.

Goals

In general, the international community had similar goals to develop a police force in Kosovo that respected human rights, executed equal enforcement of the law, and supported the peace building process. The Kosovar people and government universally had these same goals, but with some caveats. The ethnic cleavages between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovar society made the police a potential instrument of Albanian dominance over the minority Serbs.

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9 This is my speculation, but I feel the reason for this gap is the logistical difficulties of doing so. The police academy or staff headquarters are consolidated, secure areas that are easier to access. Embedding into patrols and individual stations requires greater access that may not be permissible, and requires an immersion that may not be possible.
In this section, I will describe the political goals of the international community and the different groups within Kosovar society, and relate those goals to what that meant for the police. I will illustrate the tensions between NATO and Russia within KFOR, and the tensions between Albanians and Serbs within Kosovo.

Donor

The goals donors had for the police building mission were nested under the larger overall goals that each state had for the rebuilding of Kosovo. The two major organizations that conducted work on behalf of the majority of states operating in Kosovo: UNMIK and KFOR. This is not to say that these were the only representatives of donors. There were individual missions from states, NATO, and countless NGOs that received funding from states. However, UNMIK and KFOR represented the largest contributions to the intervention in Kosovo, and therefore receive the bulk of analysis here. While both organizations were somewhat unified in their command structure, many individual states contributing to them differed greatly in their goals for Kosovo. Russia, for example, deployed troops with the goal of maintaining their influence in the region through their traditional allies in Belgrade and as a rebuke to what they perceived as NATO encroachment (Antonenko, 1999), while NATO member states were more likely to be in Kosovo in order to check Serb aggression, and to feel that maintaining the status quo of Kosovo remaining a part of Serbia as untenable (Antonenko, 2007). However, all these states were involved under either the banner of KFOR or UNMIK, which had the most definitive
mandates and largest presences. Therefore, they deserve the most attention when defining donor goals.

Almost every international actor in Kosovo referred to UN Resolution 1244 when discussing their mission in the country. In that document, the UN stated that it was “determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes ("U.N. Security Council: Resolution 1244” 1999).” To this end, it mandated “maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.” In addition to dealing with the immediate humanitarian crisis, the UN strove to foster “the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government ("U.N. Security Council: Resolution 1244” 1999).” The mandate adhered to many of the best practices noted in the method chapter for the outset of an intervention, highlighting desires for respect of human rights and the imposition of democratic institutions for civil and security sector governance.

The strange nature of the mission, however, veered somewhat from the common typology. The UN was not mandating the wholesale intervention of an entire state, which would build new governance structures from scratch. Instead, it was intervening in a specific region within an existing state, awkwardly developing local self-governance while supposedly respecting the sovereignty of Serbia. Hence, in Resolution 1244 the UN reaffirmed “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal

10 These organizations were clearly representative of their more powerful constituent states, namely Western Europe and the United States.
Republic of Yugoslavia” while also advocating for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo ("U.N. Security Council: Resolution 1244” 1999).” This established a pair of diametrically opposed stated goals of the international community: to build an autonomous government while simultaneously respecting the government of Serbia, which had been vilified as the oppressor of the conflict. So, while much of the Resolution discusses the removal of Serb instruments of power, it also states that “an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo,” which is mostly hollow, as no real attempt was made to bring that to fruition (“U.N. Security Council: Resolution 1244” 1999).

UNMIK nested its mission under Resolution 1244 by claiming a mandate to ensure a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advancing regional stability. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN Special Representative for Kosovo, indicated what he felt his mission was in his initial report to the Security Council. Echoing the Security Council’s statements, he declared that “UNMIK will respect the laws of...Serbia insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized human rights standards or with regulations issued by the Special Representative(S/1999/779).” He further narrowed that down to his main goals in regard to the development of law and order, which he felt were “provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS)(S/1999/779).” In order to fulfill these goals, he laid out a three phase strategy to ensure success:

In the first phase, KFOR will be responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task.
In the second phase, once UNMIK has taken over responsibility for law and order from KFOR, UNMIK civilian police will carry out normal police duties...UNMIK civilian police will initiate on-the-job training, advising and monitoring...A cadre of local community liaison officers will be employed as soon as possible to serve as an interface between UNMIK civilian police and the population...It will also be responsible for developing an effective and transparent command structure for KPS in accordance with international standards of democratic policing.

In the third phase, once properly trained and selected local police in sufficient strength are available, UNMIK will transfer responsibilities for law and order and border policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service (S/1999/779).

For the most part, UNMIK was able to adhere to this plan. Much more so than competing cases, UNMIK as the main donor organization was able to follow the plan and adhere to the preferred typology.

KFOR was NATO led, but also included multiple states outside of NATO—notably Russia. So while there was a consensus goal statement for KFOR, most member states had slightly different or competing goals. On the surface, the mission also adhered to the standard model by aiming to “contribute to a safe and secure environment, support and coordinate the international humanitarian effort and civil presence, support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo, and support the development of the Kosovo Security Force.” While that may have been true, Russia’s presence had been a counter to NATO power, and the Russians saw the Kosovar Serbs as surrogates of their allies in Belgrade. NATO countries were also not wholly altruistic, and had issues with tacit support of Kosovar Albanian Nationalist tendencies. By design or not, there was discordance between Russian goals to maintain Belgrade’s influence in Kosovo and NATO’s presumption that Kosovo was now an autonomous Albanian province. However, the effect this had on the police was negligible, as
the Russians focused on the military mission and left the police to NATO and later the civilian police.\textsuperscript{11}

KFOR’S main goal was the establishment of security and reduction of violence. The Rambouillet Accords, negotiated in early 1999 before the execution of the air war\textsuperscript{12}, granted KFOR the obligation of enforcing the cessation of hostilities, contributing to a secure environment, and protecting itself, the Implementation Mission, International Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations (Rambouillet Accords, Ch. 7). Due to the sluggish deployment of UN Police, KFOR spent the early years of the mission engaged in law and order activities as well.

The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was a major executing arm of the institution building pillar of the UN mission. It was a separate entity from UNMIK and KFOR, though under the pillar structure of the mission it reported to UNMIK. It focused on “human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School...democratization and governance...[and] monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights (OCSE Decision 305, 1999).” Again, this fits along the standard model typology for police development.

Though all these organizations operated together in a small country, they generally interacted quite well together. They all embraced common desires to develop a representative,

\textsuperscript{11} This is not to say that the Russians did not engage in police training—they did. However, their contribution was small relative to their military force. For example, in February 2001 the only 93 of the 3,536 civilian police under UNMIK came from Russia, compared to 600 from the US, 318 from Germany, or even 218 from Jordan (United Nations Security Council 2001a)

\textsuperscript{12} Serbia did not initially agree to the Accords prior to the initiation of the air war. However, the outcome of the war forced Serbia to adhere to it.
democratic police force capable of sustainably delivering law enforcement in Kosovo. Due to an overarching goal congruity and organizational tendencies to avoid competition among each other, they displayed signs of functional convergence, a coordinated pooling of resources, and developed niche competencies (Brosig 2011).

Host

It is almost inevitable that a host country will be comprised of a heterogeneous mix of groups that defy universal statements as to the desires of the hosts. Kosovo is no different. While Kosovar Albanians were a persecuted minority as a small province of Serbia, once UNMIK established control of Kosovo, the tables were turned, and the Kosovar Serbs that remained in Kosovo—along with some other minority groups—were vastly outnumbered in a sea of Albanians. Paradoxically, Kosovo is one of the most ethnically homogenous cases for post-conflict reconstruction. And yet, its main issues were related back to ethnic cleavages.

The Host goals differed among the two prominent ethnic groups—Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. Generally this is not itself a major issue, since for the duration of the case these Kosovar Albanians constituted more than 90% of the population. However, it is important to note that their desires were different from the Serb minority, and especially different from the Serbs regionally concentrated in Northern Mitrovica—which was a homogenous area of Serbs. Therefore, the predominant determiner of host nation goals are the goals of the Kosovar Albanians, although the conflicting goals of the Kosovar Serbs account for variance from the standard model. This is important to reiterate: while most Kosovo-wide polling may indicate a certain desire of Kosovars, the large Albanian majority may be drowning out the opinions of minority groups such as the Serbs, who may have very different desires than Kosovar Albanians.
Kosovar Albanians, once the oppressed minority in Serbia, suddenly found themselves the overwhelming majority in a semi-autonomous Kosovo. From the outset, Kosovar Albanians wanted to gain as much autonomy from Serbia as possible, and set a path for independence. In every municipality other than Mitrovica they enjoyed a sizable majority, and countrywide were the overwhelming majority. With the removal of Serb instruments of power, their main goal was to establish government structures independent of Belgrade. Though opinion polls are not available prior to the war, most Albanians did not see the Serbian police in Kosovo as a legitimate, representative force that provided them security. Throughout the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians operated a shadow government inside Kosovo, exemplifying the lack of legitimacy that Kosovar Albanians granted the Belgrade government.\(^\text{13}\) Instead, they saw the Serbs as an oppressive agent. As a newly majoritarian group, they favored popular sovereignty and a representative police force—which would be overwhelmingly Albanian, in sharp contrast to the Serbian police it would replace. It important to note that due to the Albanian’s majority in Kosovo, they were less interested in protection of minority rights and fairness than the minority Serbs. For example, when asked after the first municipal elections in 2002 if “People in Kosovo would not have accepted the result in the Kosovo Assembly Election if it was not administered

\(^{13}\) There is little evidence of law enforcement capabilities, but the size of the shadow government was significant. According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “A [shadow] government was established on October 19, 1991; initially it was based in Ljubljana, but it moved to Bonn in 1992. The Prime Minister was Bujor Bukoshi. “Voluntary” taxes were levied on all Kosovar Albanians. Suggested guidelines were: for employed individuals, 5%, for businesses, between 8% and 10%, and for landowners, according to the productivity of their land; workers in the Diaspora were expected to contribute 3% of their income. Computerized databases were maintained that tracked the “tax” records of individual families; noncompliance was low. As for expenditure, 90% of the funds were spent on the parallel education system and the remainder went on sports, some cultural activities, the LDK administration and some health care. In 1993, the parallel education system employed 20,000 teachers, lecturers, professors and administrative staff; it included 5291 pre-school pupils, 312,000 elementary school pupils, 65 secondary schools with 56,920 pupils, two special schools for disabled children, 20 faculties and colleges with about 12,000 students, and several other educational establishments such as the Institute for Publishing Textbooks. The elementary schools were allowed to use their own buildings but received no finance; the other 204 facilities, such as homes and garages, were donated by Kosovar Albanians” (International Commission on Kosovo 2000).
by the international community through UNMIK and the OSCE," only half of Albanians responded affirmatively as opposed to 95% of Serbs (Thiel 2002, 32). Also, reflecting the Albanian desire for immediate autonomy, 69% of Albanians in the same survey desired fully handing over authority for administering elections from UNMIK and the OSCE to local Kosovo Institutions immediately or within the next election cycle. In contrast 48% of Serbs felt the international community should observe them indefinitely (Thiel 2002, 36). We can derive from this that with regard to police, the Kosovar Albanians had goals of ethnic representation, and fast transfer of authority. The police were indeed ethnically representative, but as we will see later, UNMIK did not transfer authority for the police as fast as Kosovar Albanians wanted—leading to unilateral political behavior that could achieve it.

Segments of the Albanian population that had been members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or other insurgent groups prior to June 1999, wanted the KPS to absorb former fighters as a facet of DDR that would guarantee employment when few other opportunities existed. It would also allow the KLA some level of political influence in the KPS. UNMIK and OSCE tried to avoid politicization of the police, and only three members the first 174 recruits for the KPS were former members of the KLA. However, KLA leadership protested, referencing the demilitarization agreement, and demanded that their members be better represented. In exchange for the KLA leadership’s acceptance of demilitarization (Orr 2004, 201), UNMIK met these demands when around forty per cent of KPS officers were recruited from ranks of former KLA fighters during the summer of 2001 (Stodiek 2001, 334–36). In a country with so few jobs, gaining employment for group members was a very important goal.
The Kosovar Serbs had little inclination to support the new Kosovar institutions, seeing them as illegitimate rivals to the government in Belgrade, and less likely to support their interests. A 2002 UNHCR/OSCE assessment of minorities’ situation in Kosovo concluded that minorities “continue[d] to face varying degrees of harassment, intimidation and provocation, as well as limited freedom of movement,” and that life for minorities was marked by exclusion and fewer opportunities and minorities (UNHCR/OSCE 2002, 5). Kosovar Serbs in Mitrovica sought an annexation of Northern Kosovo with Serbia first, or substantial autonomy within Kosovo. Last, in both Mitrovica and throughout Kosovo, Serbs sought protections in their communities as well as during travel between villages (Gunnar Simonsen 2004, 293). On the first two points this led to the continual refusal to participate in Kosovo’s governance structures, but on the last it encouraged participation in the police force except in periodic episodes. Voter turnout for municipal elections among Kosovar Serbs was quite low, and Serbs refused to participate in municipal councils when UNMIK established them, indicating Serb desires to boycott the new government. Yet, while Serbs may have resented UNMIK and KFOR for intervening and upending their social status, they realized the need for international presence to ensure their protection as minorities. This was particularly important to Serbs outside of Mitrovica, where they felt ‘surrounded’ by Albanians and feared retaliation.

So, the Kosovar Serbs and Albanians had some goal overlap but their desires for the police were fundamentally at odds with each other. Kosovar Albanians wanted a professional police force that legitimized the government and established the seeds to independence. Kosovar Serbs

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14 According to the SRSG, by May 29th, 2000, municipal councils had been established in 27 out of 30 districts, with the exceptions being due to Serb refusal to participate (S/2000/538).
resisted any Kosovar police force because it would harm Belgrade’s influence. Additionally, Kosovar Serbs did not trust that predominantly Albanian police force would adequately protect them from reprisals.

**Structures**

In this section I show the structures of the military, political, and civilian police components that the international community established in Kosovo. Of note, KFOR, OSCE, and UNMIK were the dominant institutions affecting the security sector. I then show the structure of the KPS and how Kosovo’s government developed alongside the police. The size, power, and mandate of these institutions changed over the course of the KPS’ development, and where possible I tie that to changes in the security situation. To that end, this is a discussion of the processes surrounding the development of the KPS as much as it is an articulation of the structures of each relevant institution.

*Intervention Force-KFOR*

Independent from the four development pillars, the military component of the intervention dwarfed the civilian component. In terms of personnel and budget, KFOR, with NATO and non-NATO countries contributing soldiers, had the largest presence in the immediate post-conflict Kosovo. This should not be surprising; military forces are routinely more expensive to deploy and do so in larger numbers than civilian missions. So, while it played an important role, money and numbers may overstate its influence in the development of the police. In a move similar to the post-war occupation of Germany, there were separate zones of control by country. In total, there were five sectors: American, French, Italian, German, and
British. However, within these sectors multiple nations were represented. A cursory glance of Task Force Falcon—the force responsible for the American sector—reveals the presence of Russian, Ukrainian, Greek, and other nations whose objectives for participation differed from the US. The composition of these multi-national brigades and the disposition of forces had as much to do with Serbian/Albanian loyalties as operational requirements. For example, Russian units—which withdrew by 2003—felt their presence secured Serbian enclaves, and placed units primarily in those areas, thanks to their independence from NATO command. Their deployment in the American, German, and French sectors was the result of a US-Russian agreement that placed Russian battalions under KFOR tactical command but allowed Russia to retain political control of its units. In addition, individual deployments of most soldiers in KFOR ranged from two to six months, depending on specialty and nation of origin, which reduced knowledge of local conditions and fostered no relationship-building.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\) I can attest to personal experience from 12 and 15 month deployments, that in the first few months of a deployment, soldiers are just barely scratching the surface of knowledge of local dynamics.
Source: (R. C. Phillips and Center of Military History 2007, 18)

Figure 4-1. Task Force Falcon Task Organization

Figure 4-2. UNMIK Military Zones
Throughout the case period the size of KFOR was massive compared to the UN and OSCE missions operating in Kosovo. At the onset, this was evident; while contributing nations found it difficult to find and deploy UN police, they were able to quickly deploy military formations to fill the vacuum of departing Serb forces. Therefore, police duties fell to KFOR units, who provided initial security. Even once the shortages of UN police were filled, KFOR maintained robust presence, even through independence. KFOR’s roles have changed, but it has never left the country, even remaining in Kosovo to the present day. KFOR remains in the country at the request of the Kosovo government, which recognizes the positive impacts of KFOR presence, to include preventing ethnic clashes that could destabilize the area.

*Intervention Force- UNMIK*

Falling underneath the Police and Justice Pillar beginning in May 2001 and run by UNMIK, the UNMIK Police force deployed slowly at first, and experienced personnel shortages for the first few years of the mission. This is not uncommon. Countries with Formed Police Units (FPUs) such as Gendarmes or Carabinieri are more capable of rapidly deploying and operating in more high risk environments without the need for protection from soldiers. However, UNMIK was the first UN mission that involved FPUs—due to the extraordinary mandate given to the UN—and their numbers never constituted the majority of the UN Police in Kosovo. In addition, many contributing countries do not have a national police force capable of deploying whole units of police. For example, police forces in the United States are locally

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16 This is a common dilemma in post-conflict reconstruction. Military forces are far more capable at conducting rapid expeditionary operations than civilian organizations, and find themselves responsible for much more than security at the onset of an operation. In many cases, they are not trained for these contingencies, and in other cases they refrain from even attempting the tasks.

17 By mid-2016, there were still 31 countries contributing a total of almost 5,000 soldiers to KFOR.
resourced and operated—the NYPD reports to the mayor of New York, and the State Police report to the Governor, not the President. This is why the US routinely relies on contractors such as DynCorp to recruit and vet police for UN missions. This makes the police contribution a piecemeal affair, snatching police officers individually from across the country. Not surprisingly, this can take time, result in a large range of quality, and lead to a selection of officers with training goals that may diverge from the mission. These officers fill roles in the academy training recruits, mentoring patrols, and filling specialty roles such as forensics or management. In addition, once selected, these officers still require screening and training on how to operate as UN Police.

Figure 4-3. UNMIK Policing Structure

Once in country, UNMIK’s role was to initially establish up to 45 police stations. UNMIK police would operate every function of the police stations and integrate recent graduates of the KPS Academy. Transitions varied depending on progression of KPS officers in the district as well as the security situation in the area.
Figure 4-4. Kosovo Police Directorates and Districts

There was no mandated arrangement between KFOR and UNMIK beyond their establishment in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Many efforts were made to coordinate, and in early 2000 KFOR and UNMIK established Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) to better coordinate operations. By September 2000 JOCs were fully established in each region (S/2000/878). This was especially important in areas that remained unsecure, as many police operations required KFOR support to be viable. Not surprisingly, the region whose security continually lagged behind the others was the Serb-dominated Mitrovica region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UNMIK Police</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
<th>KPS</th>
<th>Police Stations</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>3,626</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>794 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>1692 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>4,446</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>3138 (Academy graduates);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500 (independent patrols)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>3847 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>4,604</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>4,392 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>4,492</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>4770 (Academy graduates);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SGT- 203; LT- 20</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>4,481</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>5,240 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>4,476</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5,247 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>4,335</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>(3 KPS Control)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>4,059</td>
<td>26,368</td>
<td>5,407 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td>(4 KPS Control)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>5,769 (Academy graduates)</td>
<td>(6 KPS Control)</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>3,611</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>5,704 (Academy graduates)</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>32 (27 KPS Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>16,189</td>
<td>6,826</td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)(introduction of substations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>17,512</td>
<td>6,208</td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>15,085</td>
<td>7,215</td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>15,713</td>
<td>7,215</td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)(19 sub stations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>15,678</td>
<td>7,106</td>
<td>32 (All KPS Control)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Reports of the SRSG, Monthly Reports to the United Nations on the Operations of the Kosovo Force

**Table 4-1. Size of KFOR and UNMIK Police**

The OSCE’s role in development was mainly capacity building throughout the Kosovo Government. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo concentrated its work in five areas:

1. Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate, the training of
judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at various levels, in co-
operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe;
2. Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, non-
governmental organizations, political parties and local media;
3. Organization and supervision of elections;
4. Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, the
establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, inter alia, with the
UNHCHR;
5. Such tasks which may be requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
or his Special Representative, which are consistent with the UNSC Resolution 1244 and
approved by the Permanent Council.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe Permanent Council 1999a)

Most important to this study is its role as administrator of the KPS Academy. Out of a total first
year budget of EUR 48,023,000, OSCE earmarked EUR 8,577,100 for its Police Education and
Development pillar. This was mainly relegated to administrative functions, as the Department
of Police Education and Development had an authorized staff of only fourteen people in its
budget, who were mostly related to office functions (Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe Permanent Council 1999b).

OSCE’s main tasks in the “formalization of process and structures” were to develop
processes for legislative frameworks, oversee the administration of justice and effective
policing, establish advisory committees on justice support systems and capacity building,
maintain accountability of the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Counsel, and coordinate and
consult with local experts and actors in the criminal justice system. A high priority of OSCE was
to develop a “Scenes of Serious Crime” Unit, including a local forensic pathologist and KPS
officers, for immediate and 24 hour response to serious criminal cases throughout Kosovo
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 2001). This was partly filling a gap in KPS
capabilities, but also a recognition that this capability would not be possible at the station level.
As for the KPS Academy, OSCE claimed that it was “a sustainable, multiethnic institution because regardless of a cadet’s ethnic or religious background the school trains qualified people to be Police Officers, who serve all communities in Kosovo... The goal is that people are seen as teachers or police officers, who may also be political party members or NGO activists without being “stigmatized” as Albanian teachers or Serbian Police Officers” (Ambassador Werner Wnendt 2005).

Police

Over the nine year span that this case covers the KPS progressed from a non-existent entity to an autonomous self-controlled and operating force. Plans for the size and roles of the force understandably shifted over time, but those changes did not represent dramatic shifts. On the contrary, they were minor course corrections dealing with a dynamic situation. The general structures of the KPS developed along a skeleton plan that was set in place in 1999, and took considerable time to ‘flesh out’ with properly trained and vetted local Kosovars.

UNMIK’s initial goals for the eventual size of the KPS began at 5,000 officers—beginning in UNSCR 1244—and eventually ranged upward to 10,000, though the KPS would never reach this size. Given the size of Kosovo’s population, either figure would generate a police to population ratio below the 20:1000 figure generally expected to maintain security in a post-conflict environment. To be fair, the KPS was not the only security force present with the task of maintaining law and order. Initially, KFOR soldiers, and later UNMIK Police, bore the lion’s share of that burden, and continued to supplement the KPS. However, these were foreign personnel meant to constitute a transitional force—not a perpetual body.
UNMIK’s general progression plan for the development of the KPS was for UNMIK police to establish all policing tasks and slowly transition authorities to the KPS, beginning at the lowest levels and progressing upward. The original plan envisioned that 10,000 KPS officer would eventually deploy to 29 (later 33) police stations in five regional commands (S/2000/177). In September 2000, UNMIK began developing a four phase transition plan to convert the KPS into full spectrum law enforcement activities: In the first phase, UNMIK would transfer patrolling responsibilities to the KPS. During phase two transition of tactical functions would occur. At phase three there would be a transition of operational functions to the KPS. Finally, phase four would involve a strategic transition from UNMIK to KPS responsibility (S/2001/218).

This transition would take time. In September 1999, the SRSG reported that “UNMIK faces two simultaneous challenges: preparing for an interim administration and taking emergency measures to restore essential services...staff are deployed in Pristina, the five regions of Kosovo and in 18 of the province’s 29 municipalities. The other 11 municipalities are covered through visits.” At the time of that report UNMIK had 1,100 police officers from 25 nations, and the SRSG stated that more international police were needed (S/1999/987). To rectify the shortfall, in the interim period KFOR soldiers shouldered the burden of daily security patrols while the UNMIK Police began deploying throughout the region.
In September 1999 OSCE began its first course of the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) in Vushtrri.18 Perhaps due to its geographic proximity to Europe, Kosovo received more resources—in money, personnel, and attention—than Liberia or Timor-Leste. OSCE renovated the old Yugoslav police academy building in Vushtrri, allowing rapid use of existing infrastructure. The OSCE provided 181 police trainers from 23 participating States backed by 265 local employees to run the course. The training path for a KPS officer included both academy training and apprenticeship. The academy portion of training was a basic training course that was originally six weeks long but eventually extended to twenty weeks long.19 This portion of training focused on “patrol duties; crime investigation; gathering forensic evidence; traffic control; defensive tactics; use of force and firearms; first aid; applicable laws; and interviewing techniques” (OSCE 2005). After graduation from the basic training course, trainees spent another twenty weeks in field assignments under the tutelage of a UNMIK police officer (and later KPS officers), who conducted evaluations of the officer’s execution of tasks trained at the academy. At the completion of this phase of training the trainee would be eligible for certification as a KPS officer and assignment to a KPS unit. This model of formal training and apprenticeship still continues in the KPS.

18 This fell under OSCE’s five stated areas of concentration in Kosovo, which were: “1. Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate, the training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at various levels, in co-operation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe; 2. Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, non-governmental organizations, political parties and local media; 3. Organization and supervision of elections; 4. Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, the Establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, inter alia, with the UNHCHR; and 5. Such tasks which may be requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his Special Representative, which are consistent with the UNSC Resolution 1244 and approved by the Permanent Council.”(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Permanent Council 1999a)

19 Due to the multi-ethnic composition of the classes, the lessons were taught in Albanian and Serbian. While commendable, it reduced actual instruction time per block of instruction, reducing the actual amount of training time available. This resulted in nine week courses that may have only included four week’s worth of instruction.
As the KPS ranks grew the academy began offering more specialized coursework. In December 2000 it began training of supervisors, and specialized training in driving, criminal investigation, traffic incident investigation, and drug identification(S/2000/1196). The focus of this expansion was to develop competencies in areas beyond routine patrol work that KPS officers could take over from UNMIK police.

While the KPS continued to train more recruits and advance the officers in its ranks, developments in the larger governance of Kosovo affected its command. In June 2001 the Constitutional framework was promulgated, providing a 120 seat assembly with restricted powers, most notably that justice and police would remain under the control of the special representative. At roughly the same time, UNMIK formally launched the new police and justice pillar, combining what had once been two separate pillars, with an objective to "consolidate a law and order structure that is responsive to peacekeeping and peace-building objectives and will contribute to the promotion of the rule of law institutions in Kosovo; to maintain effective international control and oversight over police and justice activities during the medium term...to enable effective police and judicial response against destabilizing serious criminal activity in Kosovo; to establish an unbiased judicial process"(S/2001/565). One main reason for this consolidation was to better coordinate the enforcement of the law with its adjudication, as the two realms tend to be symbiotic. Another reason was staffing; there does not appear to be any increase in UNMIK staff as a result of this shift.

At the same time, training of the KPS and assumption of duties continued. By October 2001, OSCE had already conducted two senior command courses and trained 32 senior commanders, and another 265 officers in supervision and management. By April 2002, the
SRSG reported full integration of officers into KPS in criminal investigation, forensics, organized crime and narcotics as a result of specialized training (S/2002/436). In addition the KPS Service Division was formed and 96 officers were assigned to protect Assembly members. As the focus shifted away from basic training to actual execution of duties, there was a greater call for more international police for the field training program, though it should be noted that the UN reported it was still working satisfactorily.

By 2002, KPS officers had been stationed everywhere in Kosovo except northern Mitrovica (S/2002/1126). This presents a duality of outcomes. On one hand, the mission had been successful in placing KPS officers in almost every area of the country. However, the one place that it had been unable to do so was the only area that was majority Serbian and most in need of a legitimate police force in order to establish governmental control. While most Kosovar Albanians were glad to break away from Serbia, most Kosovar Serbs did not view Pristina as a legitimate government. While the ethnic breakdown of the KPS was admirably in line with Kosovar population’s breakdown, the police was only able to patrol Kosovar Albanian areas, even with ethnically Serbian KPS officers.

In the next year 463 officers completed the first line management course, which allowed them to become leaders at the lowest level of the organization (S/2003/113). This paved the way for the assumption of greater responsibility by the KPS. The KPS began assuming control of police stations and in 2005 had taken over the first regional command center in Gnjilane. At the same time, the KPSS had progressed its training transition to have 80% of instructor, 90% of technical and support and 68% of management positions at the KPS School manned by KPS officers rather than UNMIK or OSCE personnel. Manning in specialized units became a priority,
and a total of 240 KPS officers were deployed in specialized units by the end of 2005 (S/2005/335).

2006 was a pivotal year of transition. In that year, the KPS took operational control of the last of all 33 police stations, including Mitrovica (S/2006/45). In addition, the SRSG reported that “...traditional police and investigative functions are handled almost entirely by KPS” and that he had appointed the first KPS Deputy Police Commissioner and three KPS Assistant Police Commissioners (S/2006/361). While this did not immediately affect the end strength of the UNMIK police force or its retention of overall authority without prejudice to resolution 1244 (1999), the SRSG did note that the mission of UNMIK had “shifted increasingly to mentoring and monitoring the Kosovo Police Service as it assumes additional operational functions” rather than training and operations (S/2006/707).

It remains important to note that throughout all these transitions the KPS remained under UNMIK control even as other ministries began to report to the Assembly. This separate reporting chain continued all the way into independence, noteworthy since KPS was one of the first organizations of Kosovar governance, and the last to report to actual Kosovars rather than the international community. Nonetheless, UNMIK established The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo within Kosovo’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in February 2007 to audit and inspect elements of the Kosovo Police Service, and the Inspectorate assumed responsibility for investigating all complaints against the KPS in October (S/2007/768). While these transfers occurred, much of the operations in the more volatile areas such as Mitrovica still required heavy UNMIK and KFOR presence.
The transition of control of the KPS ended not by the decision of UNMIK, but by the Kosovo Assembly. The Assembly of Kosovo held a session on 17 February 2006 and adopted a “declaration of independence,” declaring Kosovo an independent and sovereign state. This statement began a process of drafting a constitutional agreement that the Parliamentary Assembly of Kosovo passed in June 2008 that changed the name of the KPS to simply The Kosovo Police, and outlined the role for the Kosovo Police and other government institutions. UNMIK found itself in an uncertain status, as it no longer had jurisdictional authority over the KPS. The immediate effect on the KPS was an alienation of Kosovar Serb police officers. The SRSG reported that “…In several Kosovo Serb areas in southern Kosovo, where operational police competencies have been transferred to the Kosovo Ministry of the Interior, Kosovo Serb police officers stated that they would no longer recognize the KPS chain of command and demanded that they be placed under the direct command of international UNMIK police officers….sustained efforts are needed to get the Police Service to accept the Ministry’s oversight” (S/2008/211). This conflict occurred while majority Serbian areas clamored against the independence proclamation.

The balanced ethnic mix and gender integration of KPS reflected the implementation of structures that reflected UNMIK’s goals. At the onset minority and female recruiting met international goals for inclusion. Women comprised between 14% and 20% of the KPS, depending on the reporting period. That was a commendable figure, given gender roles in

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20 UNMIK had no objective criteria beyond perception studies to assess the readiness of the KPS to fully assume control of security. The OSCE Police Inspectorate project conducted four audits before December 2006 and found a lack of written standards or uniformity of operations, as well as gaps in management and strategic vision (Scheye 2008)
Kosovo that routinely relegated women to a more diminutive role. This inclusionary practice allowed for one of very few avenues of advancement for women. Tellingly, the country’s first female president, Atifete Jahjaga, whose term lasted from 2011 to 2016, made her name rising through the ranks of the KPS. The KPS was likewise multi-ethnic throughout its development. In 2006 16 percent of staff in the KPS and 14.5 percent in the Correctional Service were minorities—Serbs or otherwise (S/2006/906). Those figures were typical during the case period and actually overrepresented minorities in relation to their demographic composition in the general population.

**Host Government**

The two main Kosovar governing bodies of concern were the national Kosovo Assembly and the more local municipal governments. They began their existence with little autonomy from their UN mentors. The first elections were held on 17 November 2001 and were generally considered a success, due to a lack of widespread violence or grievances.

Municipal governments played a large role in the daily administration of municipal tasks, but for a long time had little control of the police assigned to that area. It was not until 2006 that a KPS regulation established a role for municipal assemblies in the selection of their local police station commander (S/2006/361). Nonetheless, this devolution of authority was promising in its attempt to bring governance closer to Kosovars.

At the same time, many municipal governments took longer to establish than others. Due in part to the fact that Kosovo was supposed to nominally remain a province of Serbia, at least in word if not practice, many parallel Serbian government structures remained. UNMIK did
not even establish an administration and eliminate these parallel structures in North Mitrovica until 2003 (S/2003/113).\(^2^1\) Throughout this process, UN administrators could overrule decisions of the Kosovar government, a power that continued until independence. This meant that the police were never forced to enforce laws that could have been interpreted as corrupt or biased.

Kosovar Serbs boycotted elections because they rejected the legitimacy of the Kosovo government. In the 2007 elections for the Assembly of Kosovo, the thirty municipal assemblies; and the new position of mayor for each of the 30 municipalities, there were discrepancies in which ethnic groups actually voted. While there was Kosovar Serb participation in areas south of Mitrovica, the Serb dominated areas of Mitrovica and areas north of it had little participation. This was because the Serbian residents of Northern Kosovo “to a large extent reject being administered by Pristina,” while Kosovo Serbs in the rest of Kosovo “recognize the need for practical ties with the Kosovo Albanian majority” (S/2007/768). This highlights the fact that the majority of ethnic tensions were regionally focused.

The legal system in Kosovo was administered by a hodgepodge mix of local and international judges interpreting existing Serbian laws—as of 1989, since laws passed in the 1990s included abuses of human rights.\(^2^2\) This presented challenges and opportunities. The availability of local judges who were competent and not biased was very low. All the old judges had been Serbs loyal to Belgrade; many had fled to Serbia. So, the international judges filled an

\(^{21}\) During the 1990s, Albanians had established parallel structures of government to compete with Belgrade. Since Belgrade still maintained after 1999 that Kosovo was a province of Serbia, it supported civil administration in Northern Kosovo, paying salaries and operating government that reported to Belgrade instead of Pristina.

\(^{22}\) This was not settled upon until December 1999, due to frustrations with applying laws that had been passed in the 1990s. Kosovar Albanians perceived many of the laws to be illegitimate, since they were passed at a time when Serbs dominated the government and were instituting repressive policies. Therefore, UNMIK felt it had to ‘turn back the clock’ on the legal code to before this sequence of events.
immediate need that allowed the judiciary to function, and in a disinterested manner, but international judges delayed any ability to develop competent judges that could establish their legitimacy as honest brokers. However, there was not a large backlog in cases, or controversy surrounding the fairness of cases, that could jeopardize the Kosovar population’s trust in the administration of rule of law.

So, KFOR, OSCE, and UNMIK were the dominant international institutions affecting the security sector while the Kosovar government was kept out of the planning for the police. The size, power, and mandate of these institutions changed over the course of the KPS’ development, but as the Kosovo government took charge of its affairs, UNMIK refused to give up power over the KPS until the declaration of independence.

Agency

In this section, I outline decisions made during the development of the police and discuss the introduction of community policing to the KPS. I look into different rhetoric from each SRSG and see little major differences. Finally, I appraise the performance of the KPS during the 2004 violence and the political responses to it.

Police

The KPS did not seem to have problems acquiring human capital that fit their requirements. Kosovo lacked an educated workforce compared to the rest of Europe, but the KPS remained a small organization that grew at a manageable pace. In addition, the lack of industries providing jobs and the high salary offered by the KPS made it one of few options for
Kosovars to make a living. The first class of KPS cadets had a size of 200, chosen from a pool of 19,500 applicants (S/1999/987). That’s a selection rate of about one percent.

The selection process relied on four criterion to evaluate candidates: There were minimum requirements, a set of preferred qualifications, a battery of comprehensive examinations, and tests of psychological and physical fitness. Once selected, recruits had to undergo a KPS training program that consisted of a nine week, 392 hour basic course, followed upon graduation by a 19 week field training program under the supervision of UN Police mentors (S/2000/177). This is a process very similar to most Western police training models, but with different content than what officers learned in Yugoslav times. To mitigate any conflict that might create, UNMIK initially refrained from recruiting Kosovar Albanians that had been police prior to 1989—former Serb police were not an issue, as they had withdrawn—though they soon scrapped that plan in March 2000 and allowed former police to apply in order to account for the initial shortfall in UN Police (Greene, Friedman, and Bennet 2012). The curriculum was developed by the United States’ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) for OSCE, and bore resemblance to training curricula in other post-conflict situations in the time period—it was no different than other cases that may have produced “less successful” outcomes.

UNMIK training and practices emphasized community policing as the preferred method of conducting policing operations. In addition to being a goal of UNMIK, there are plenty of arguments why this is the preferred method of policing, and how it can increase legitimacy.

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23 Recruits had to be 21 years old, had completed secondary school, passed a background check, and other requirements.
perceived by the population. By December 2000 the SRSG was reporting that those community policing initiatives appeared to be working (S/2000/1196). However, those reports ignored observations that it was more a nuanced response of Albanian Kosovars respecting Albanian KPS officers than responses to community policing. Indeed, many Serbian KPS officers felt threatened patrolling in majority Albanian areas, regardless of the patrolling tactics they used.

The leadership of the UN mission changed seven times over nine years between the start of the mission and Kosovo’s declaration of independence. With a median term of 18 months, leadership turnover may or may not have had an impact—it was a longer time period than most UN Police KFOR soldier deployments, but far less than the three year terms that later SRSGs had once independence occurred. On the other hand, there were few unique initiatives associated with leadership changes, independent from changes occurring in Kosovo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Special Representative</th>
<th>Tenure (months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1999-July 1999</td>
<td>Sérgio Vieira de Mello</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1999-January 2001</td>
<td>Bernard Koucher</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2001 - December 2001</td>
<td>Hans Haekkerup</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002 - July 2003</td>
<td>Michael Steiner</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003 - June 2004</td>
<td>Harri Holkeiri</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004 - June 2006</td>
<td>Soren Jessen-Petersen</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006 - June 2008</td>
<td>Joachim Rücker</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-2. UN Special Representatives to the Secretary General
Priorities of UNMIK did not change greatly over time beyond what would be expected of a mission over time. For example, in 2001, Hans Haekkerup outlined the UNMIK police priorities as he saw them: to “increase success in solving serious crimes against persons, particularly ethnic crimes” (S/2001/218). Then, in 2002, Michael Steiner’s priorities were “laying foundations for economic progress, tackling crime and violence, creating a fair and safe society for all communities” (S/2002/436). Later, Soren Jessen-Petersen’s priorities were “achieving progress on the eight standards” and to “establish the institutions and secure the active engagement of the Kosovo leaders and people for creating a multi-ethnic society” (S/2004/907). Further along, Joachim Rücker started his tenure focusing on four priority areas: “clarification of the role and authority of the Ministry vis-à-vis KPS; the creation of capacity for managing migration and repatriation; improved capability for emergency preparedness and response; and civil registration and documentation” (S/2006/906). While not exactly analogous, none of the priorities represent dramatic shifts in rhetoric. More so, as these priority changes represented ‘change for change sake,’ they may have actually harmed the mission by continually reinventing the mission before the organization could actually begin achieving the priorities of the previous leadership.

While the performance of the majority of KPS officers during the March 2004 violence was encouraging, 100 officers were identified as the subjects of allegations of misconduct (S/2004/613). In Gjilan, there were separate Albanian and Serbian marketplaces; a 78 year old man reported: “I never touched anyone and nobody ever touched me until March” and, when schoolchildren passed by the wreckage of that same man’s housing yelling insults at him, he lamented that he wished “their teachers would tell them not to do this” (Sullivan 2005). In
addition, the fact that so many KPS officers had collaborated with the violence or stood by while it occurred further tore apart any semblance of fraternity.

The backlash of the riots on UNMIK was that it accelerated rather than delayed transitions to Kosovar control. Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide, at the request of Secretary General Kofi Annan, undertook a comprehensive assessment of practices in Kosovo in order to offer recommendations for action. Eide’s report noted that Albanians saw UNMIK as ‘in the way’ of their hope for independence, Serbs still felt threatened, and that the overarching lack of a clear political perspective on Kosovo’s status compounded by an endemic lack of jobs was the clear cause of tensions. With regard to the KPS, the report noted the lack of riot equipment and training given to the KPS, even though plans had existed to do so for three years. The most relevant recommendations were to speed transfer of authorities, devolve power, and to restructure UNMIK to 1) streamline processes, and 2) encourage greater cross-pillar coordination (S/2004/932).

Serb and Albanian leadership from the local to national lever were similarly frustrated—albeit for different reasons—with a political process that they felt was incapable of meeting their desires, ordinarily acted counter to the reconciliation process. Five years into the mission, the SRSG lamented that "local leaders and civil society representatives in Kosovo have by and large failed to support UNMIK actions in support of the rule of law" (S/2004/613). The Serbs boycotted every election,24 and not surprisingly, were underrepresented in the municipal councils and the Assembly. While this protest was meant to delegitimize what they felt was an

24 The 2000 elections had a 79% turnout, which remains the highest ever, and even then most Kosovo Serbs did not participate(S/2000/1196).
unfair process, it only served to further alienate them from the Kosovar government. Similarly, Albanian leaders routinely looked the other way or even openly supported Albanian reprisal attacks against Serbs. In addition, the decision to force former KLA members into the KPS by allowing a fifty percent quota (I. King and Mason 2006, 102) probably served more than any other measure to politicize the KPS and lower the quality of recruits. The actions of both ethnic groups seemed more driven by the existing political structure forced upon them by UNMIK than by independent actions of their own.

The only times local leaders did seem to foster reconciliation was to appease the international community. One such moment was when the Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, “resigned and voluntarily surrendered to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITFY) upon being informed of his indictment on 8 March [2005], and then [called] for full respect of the rule of law made by him and by the other political leaders in Kosovo” after the ITFY investigated his actions while a KLA commander in 1998 and 1999 (S/2005/335). This partly appeased the international community one year after the March 2004 violence by showing that Albanians were willing to adhere to international norms. However it is worth noting that Haradinaj has never been convicted, despite two trials by the ITFY against him.

There is little evidence of exceptional agency in Kosovo, for good or bad. There are few individual decisions that made a decisive difference in how events unfolded, and there is very

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25 This capitulation to allow absorption of former KLA members into the KPS indicates a failure of UNMIK’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program for the KLA. Had the DDR plan found other less politicized avenues of work or education to divert KLA members to, there may have been less demand to achieve a KLA quota into the KPS.
little discussion by other authors of actors whose presence dictated the intervention’s
direction.

**Outcomes**

The final and most important part of the police development process is the achievement of meaningful outcomes. Simply building and equipping the police force is inadequate if the international intervention does not increase KPS legitimacy. This section discusses how legitimate the KPS became by looking at levels of trust and sustainability, their impact on the security situation, as well as relying on donor and host assessments of their legitimacy.

Between 1999 and 2008, ethnic violence resurfaced intermittently. First, in March 2001, ethnic violence—specifically in Mitrovica—prompted by Serb disdain for the political process that they felt was disenfranchising them, required "prompt and coordinated KFOR and UNMIK responses" to incidents that "avoided violent protests in reaction" (S/2001/218). While this was an important event that displayed Serbian grievances two years into the mission, the violence of March 2004 was a pivotal watershed moment that marked as close to a full recommencement of violence as any in the post-conflict setting.

The widespread violence that struck Kosovo on March 17th, 2004 was a "serious setback to the stabilization and normalization of Kosovo” that was an inflection point in UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo. Leading up to the larger violence on the 17th, sporadic explosions had targeted the vehicle of the Kosovo Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning, the UNMIK, headquarters, and the president of Kosovo. In addition, a drive-by shooting of a Serbian youth on March 15th was followed by the drowning of two Albanian children. News of the
drownings, sensationalized by the local press, sparked spontaneous demonstrations that were easily taken over by organized elements. The SRSG described the ensuing violence as an "organized, widespread, and targeted campaign" that was reminiscent of 1999. What was new was that the violence targeted local and international actors. The death toll was 19 Kosovars (11 Albanian, 8 Serb). In addition, 58 KPS officers, 65 international police officers, and 61 KFOR soldiers suffered injuries. Lastly, 730 houses were destroyed. Not surprisingly, a month later the SRSG reported that the situation "remains tense"(S/2004/348).

Arguably, a more effective, democratic KPS should be capable of establishing a more positive security situation for local Kosovars. There does not seem to be any evidence that the violence decreased as the KPS capabilities improved. Instead, reports indicated a steady level of unease alongside sporadic ethnic attacks, punctuated by larger scale violence. In October 2001 there were increased attacks on all minorities, and only an incremental improvement in freedom of movement, driven not by security operations but by UNMIK taking operational responsibility of bus lines between key communities (S/2001/926). In 2003, there remained “a number of violent attacks against Kosovo Serbs and UNMIK law enforcement” in retaliation of the convictions of four KLA members on war crimes (S/2003/421). The next year there remained a lack of progress in return and reconciliation efforts, security conditions and freedom of movement for the Kosovo minorities, in particular Kosovo Serbs. Especially for the Kosovo Serbs the security situation continued to be precarious (S/2004/907). Though the security situation seemed to stabilize and there were fewer overall violent incidents after 2004, “there remain[ed] a discernible underlying volatility in Kosovo” (S/2005/88)(S/2007/582). Crime continued to increase, and the population seemed ready for one small event to reignite
the powder keg of animosity in Northern Kosovo. While daily patrolling may have been
effective, the police were incapable of containing violence without significant international
support.

The KPS—much like the US military in the United States—constantly held a higher status
than any other institution in the country. In 2003, only 9.4% of Kosovars perceived the KPS as
an institution with high corruption—compared with 24.5% and 57% for UNMIK police and
business people, respectively (Spector, Winbourne, and Beck 2003, 9). Kosovars actually trusted
the KPS more than the people tasked to train them. A 2005 survey found the KPS to be one of
the highest regarded institutions in Kosovo by amount of confidence in them—again, even
higher than UNMIK. In addition, the KPS was seen as less corrupt than other rule of law
institutions such as judges and lawyers. Interestingly, that corruption was rarely seen as ethnic
bias, but rather exaction of payments or the influence of gangs or political parties. Of course,
political parties may have influenced matters along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, “users in
Kosovo who self-identify as Serbs have less confidence than Albanians in Kosovo in the police,”
meaning that while the KPS was regarded higher than other institutions, it was unsurprisingly
not immune from the tense underbelly of ethnic rivalry predominant in societal
interactions (Institute for Electoral Systems 2006). Another survey also found the large gap in
how Kosovars trusted their government opposed to the police and international organizations.
Around 60% trusted the KPS and an even greater amount trusted KFOR fully or to some extent
compared to less than 30% for the Parliament, President, Judiciary, and political parties
(Institute for Development Research 2014, 6).
So, given the trust Kosovars had in the KPS, it seems convenient to declare the police
development endeavor a resounding success. However, this conclusion is false. It might be
that this trust in the KPS is the result of a phenomena common to one theory of why the US
military polls so high in America—it is popularly seen as not being in charge of policy decisions,
and support may be given blindly. Authors have noted this by establishing dissonance between
popular and elite trust in the military (Feaver and Kohn 2001). Could the trust in the KPS be
similar to this? Unlike other Kosovar institutions, UNMIK never relinquished operational control
of the KPS, insulating it from local Kosovar politics. In addition, there seemed to be a significant
dissonance based upon ethnicity.

To highlight how pervasive ethnic tensions were upon people’s views of their
government, KPS officers were not able to patrol in ethnically mixed groups or operate in areas
not of their own ethnicity (O’Neill, 2001: 113). Even shortly before independence, there
remained a sharp divide between Albanians and ethnic minorities with regard to confidence in
the government, and optimism in the future. Granted, there remained a greater deal of
confidence in the KPS than other institutions (Abdul-Latif and Serpe 2008), but it does not
appear that the multi-ethnic KPS fully embodied a multi-ethnic Kosovo in ethnically Serbian
areas. Other minorities seemed to have less of a disparity than the Serbs in this regard,
probably due to the recent violent past.

Perhaps this has more to do with how Kosovars categorized democratic institutions,
and popular opinion of what democracy means could shed light on ethnic divisions. Authors
have shown how culture can predict acceptance of democratic norms (Licht, Goldschmidt, and
Schwartz 2007), and it is possible that Kosovar culture influences its concepts of democracy.
Over three times as many Kosovars defined democracy as “protection of human rights” than “all ethnic communities enjoy the same rights.” (Abdul-Latif and Serpe 2008). Perhaps due to the violence of their recent past, Kosovars may have viewed democracy as simply a lack of crimes against humanity. So, in order for the KPS to remain ‘democratic’ in the local sense, it simply needed to refrain from brutality. On this standard it succeeded, but the inability to patrol Serbian areas and continued need for KFOR shows that it was not able to achieve the international conception of democratic policing. One category deserves attention: protection of journalists, arguably an important security mission. A 2003 survey asking what would help journalists to investigate more safely, determined the following issues as most crucial: introduce laws to protect journalists, ensure freedom of movement (marked by Kosovar Serb journalists only), improve the general security situation, provide freedom of expression, create a better functioning police and provide higher salaries (Spector, Winbourne, and Beck 2003).

Crime rates and reports on crime prevalence is another instrument to measure the effectiveness of the KPS. By mid-2004, many NGOs, media and international police reports attested that Kosovo had become an important center for heroin, cigarette and fuel smuggling as well as human trafficking (UNMIK 2004). The international nature of some of these crimes indicates that the problem rests as much with the international community as the KPS. However, at the end of 2003, Kosovars considered the most serious security problem of Kosovo to be killings/murders (31%), poor law enforcement (10 %), unresolved murder cases (6 %) and freedom of movement (5 %) (UNDP 2004, 18). Therefore, the drug trade’s prosperity in Kosovo weakened the legitimacy of the KPS in the eyes of the international community but not to most Kosovars. Also, the perceptions of safety differed drastically along sectarian lines. Forty-six per
cent of the Serbs claimed to have changed their activities due to concerns about crime, compared with only 10 per cent of the Kosovo Albanians (UNDP 2004, 30). On this level of crime, the KPS must improve to ensure that all ethnic groups have equal perceptions of security.

The final outcome of consequence was the events surrounding the Kosovo Assembly’s proclamation of independence in 2008. One year prior to the proclamation, the SRSG foreshadowed the futile situation that had developed in attempting to develop Kosovar institutions, stating that “UNMIK has largely achieved what is achievable under resolution 1244 (1999). At this stage, further progress depends on a timely resolution of the future status of Kosovo. A further prolongation of the future-status process puts at risk the achievements of the United Nations in Kosovo since June of 1999” (S/2007/582). The independence proclamation “fundamentally challenged” the ability of UNMIK to operate as before and perform its functions as an interim administration, and the Constitution did “not envisage a real role for UNMIK,” and related legislation passed by the Assembly assumed legal control and responsibility over areas that were previously reserved to the SRSG (S/2008/211). This, from a case perspective, ended KFOR and UNMIK’s role as significant developers of the KPS. The SRSG noted that “UNMIK can no longer perform as effectively as in the past the vast majority of its tasks as an interim administration.” In addition UNMIK adjusted operational aspects of the international civil presence and reconfigure itself in order to allow for the European Union to take on an increasing role in the rule of law sector (S/2008/211). Though most normal police operations continued with some notable successes, over 300 Kosovo Serb KPS officers refused to work under the recognized KPS chain of command through regional headquarters to main
headquarters in Priština (S/2008/458). Most were suspended with pay, and later returned to service in June 2008 and continued working (Kermabon 2009). This leads into questions of the sustainability of the multi-ethnic KPS. The SRSG reported that “...In several Kosovo Serb areas in southern Kosovo, where operational police competencies have been transferred to the Kosovo Ministry of the Interior, Kosovo Serb police officers stated that they would no longer recognize the KPS chain of command and demanded that they be placed under the direct command of international UNMIK police officers” (S/2008/211). This is no longer the case today, though ethnically Serbian police officers are seen as traitors by many in the Serbian communities they come from. Once stripped of an international sovereign, the same cleavages immediately surfaced that threatened to demolish the legitimacy of the KPS, even after nine years of international development.

**Conclusion**

The police development intervention in Kosovo was moderately successful. It achieved high praise from the international community, and generally kept the police independent from political persuasion. Almost a decade after the declaration of independence, there has not been a collapse of the KPS. It was only moderately successful because the police development intervention in Kosovo had many flaws and did not fully achieve the outcomes it desired. The police are unable to maintain equal enforcement of the law due to their inability to access certain communities, many disenfranchised citizens do not view the police as legitimate, and organized crime has become a problem. At the very least, it does not deserve a moniker of “most successful police development intervention.” At times the intervention strayed from the
typology offered in the method chapter, notably differences between UNMIK’s and Kosovar’s goals for the mission.

The Kosovo example most closely aligned with the standard model for police development, yet still had its issues. I will now revisit each major hypothesis in relation to the results from the Kosovo mission.

**H1: Goal incongruence/congruence between the host nation and donors has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.**

Goal incongruence had a negative effect on the outcome of the police development.

From the outset, it was clear that Kosovar Albanians had one overarching goal: to achieve independent status. This contradicted both the Serbian desire to maintain ties with Belgrade and the language of UNSCR 1244, which maintained Kosovo as an autonomous region within Serbia. For the entirety of the intervention these contradictory goals plagued the mission.

UNMIK was enforcing policies that were out of line with any reconciliation with Serbia. Perhaps this signals goal congruence: the international community was fine with an independent Kosovo, even if it did not explicitly state it. Indeed, the immediate recognition of Kosovo by many countries upon independence seems to verify that. But there was at least a contradiction in how UNMIK operated and what most Kosovars wanted, and an even greater difference among Serbs and Albanians. This difference was continually referenced as a point of dispute and source of tension throughout the case. Therefore, there was incongruence over which sovereign the police should serve. Throughout the case UNMIK retained sovereignty over the police, while disagreements lingered over whether the police should serve Pristina, Belgrade, or neither.
**H2: Structural issues can predetermine the outcome of police development, and deviations from the standard model has a negative effect on the outcome of police development.**

Structural dynamics did not seem to predetermine the outcome of the mission. The structure and process of training, equipping, and improvement of the KPS was not the culprit souring outcomes of the mission; other than early shortcomings endemic to these missions, UNMIK seemed to be developing the KPS in line with the typology. The major weakness was tying the KPS into the rest of Kosovar institutions. The political system lacked universal buy-in and the legal structure lacked uniformity, based on ethnicity. This, more than any other factor, seemed to derail the KPS’ ability to effectively patrol in Serb areas, which is probably the greatest metric of success. Crime rates increased over time, though it is hard to tie that directly to police performance, as increased reporting may actually signal more professional behavior from the KPS. Regardless, the KPS was not going to have trouble patrolling in Albanian areas, since Albanians represented an overwhelming majority of Kosovars. Instead, it was the penetration into minority areas that remained elusive and yet was one of the most important outcomes it was supposed to achieve.

**H3: The agency of individuals has an effect on the outcome of police development.**

It is unclear whether higher talent individuals had a positive effect on the outcome of the mission. There is no evidence of individuals making decisions that dramatically altered the mission. However, it is evident that the presence of highly qualified recruits for the KPS did not harm the mission. Not all UNMIK personnel had skill sets matching their duties, but on the whole this experience was mixed, and did not have any major effect.
CHAPTER 5. LIBERIA

Why are some countries able, despite their very real and serious problems, to press ahead along the road to reconciliation, recovery, and redevelopment while others cannot? These are critical questions for Africa, and their answers are complex and not always clear. Leadership is crucial, of course. Kagame was a strong leader—decisive, focused, disciplined, and honest—and he remains so today. I believe that sometimes people's characters are molded by their environment. Angola, like Liberia, like Sierra Leone, is resource-rich, a natural blessing that sometimes has the sad effect of diminishing the human drive for self-sufficiency, the ability and determination to maximize that which one has. Kagame had nothing. He grew up in a refugee camp, equipped with only his own strength of will and determination to create a better life for himself and his countrymen

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf

Introduction

The case period for Liberia is from 1 October 2003 to 30 June 2016. The case begins upon the assumption of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and ends at the deadline for the Government of Liberia to fully assume its complete security responsibilities from UNMIL as outlined in Security Council in resolutions 2190 (2014) and 2215 (2015).

This chapter will begin by describing the background leading up to the civil war and eventual introduction of the United Nations into Liberia. Next, it will examine the goals of the international community as well as various warring factions in Liberia at the outset of the police development intervention. Next, it will discuss the structure of the intervention and the Liberian government, as well as the Liberian National Police Force. Next, it will examine the decisions made by various agents over the course of the intervention as well as the quality of personnel involved. This will all tie into the outcomes of the intervention, determined by using qualitative and quantitative metrics. Last, I will offer concluding remarks on the Liberia case.
Background

Liberia is unique among African nations in that its existence is a result of American colonization. In the early 19th century the American Colonization Society, convinced that freed black slaves and white Americans could not co-exist, spearheaded efforts to find a suitable piece of land in Africa to re-settle free black Americans. With support from the American government, thousands of African Americans emigrated to Liberia in fortified towns that protected them from the indigenous tribes in the area (Burin 2008). By 1847 the colony declared its independence as the first African republic.

For much of Liberia’s history Americo-Liberians resisted enfranchisement of indigenous groups and maintained a privileged status in the country. They established a social caste system that placed themselves at the top and indigenous peoples at the bottom (Dennis and Dennis 2008). This system lasted over a century.

By the mid-20th century many indigenous people began to move toward the coast in search of economic opportunity, and came into greater contact with Americo-Liberians. The Americo-Liberians were numerically inferior but had control of the government, business, and access to the international community. In April 1980, after a brutal period of suppression by President Samuel Tolbert, rioting arose in the capital of Monrovia, and Tolbert died as a result of a military coup. This effectively ended Americo-Liberian dominance in Liberia.

Samuel Doe became the chairman of the People's Redemption Council and de facto head of state after the assassination of Tolbert, leading the country in various legal manifestations for a decade. During this time Doe aligned himself closely to the US due to his
anti-Soviet stance and received large sums of American aid. His regime was brutally repressive, and there were attempts to overthrow him, which exacerbated his reliance on repression.

On 24 December 1989, around 100 fighters of the previously inconsequential National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, entered Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire to overthrow Doe. This marked the beginning of the First Liberian Civil War and the fall of Doe. Other groups, united by hatred of the regime, joined an advance toward Monrovia. On 9 September 1990, an off-shoot of Taylor’s NPFL captured Doe, publicly tortured him, paraded him naked, and decapitated him (Ellis 1995). Fighting in the ensuing war among the NPFL, the Doe-supporter Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and the mixed exile Sierra Leone-backed United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), lasted until 1994. The war had killed 150,000 people out of a population of only some two and a half million (Ellis 1995) and ended with an election that Taylor overwhelmingly won in 1997.

Less than two years later the Second Liberian Civil War began. The peace process in the wake of the first conflict had failed, and a combination of ethnic scapegoating and human rights abuses by the Taylor government, along with its failure to tackle chronic social and economic problems presented ample grievances. In addition, the international community did not vigorously pursue a robust PCR, DDR, or SSR effort, wanting only to achieve elections and leave. The war began when the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched armed attacks in northern Liberia on April 21, 1999, and the Taylor regime launched counterattacks (Kieh 2009). The war would eventually influence or include conflict in neighboring Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), formed in 2002 and occupied area in southern Liberia. By mid-2003, the combined
forces of LURD and MODEL controlled over 70 per cent of Liberian territory (Waugh 2011). The final months of Taylor’s hold on power included an indictment on Taylor for war crimes by a UN-sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone, a siege of the capital by LURD in June 2003, peace accords signed in Ghana, and increasing pressure on Taylor to step down. Finally, on 11 August 2003, Taylor accepted exile and departed for Nigeria (Waugh 2011).

On 1 August 2003 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1497, to “support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of [Taylor], ...and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance” (United Nations Security Council 2003b).

The framework that guided the post war period was the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the warring parties signed on August 18, 2003. This agreement was also the basis for international intervention in Liberia, as it specifically requested an international security force to deploy to Liberia. In regard to policing, the agreement orders “an immediate restructuring of the National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Service (SSS), custom security guards and such other statutory security units,” and that an interim police monitored by UNPOL would be responsible for maintenance of law and order until the newly trained security force could be deployed (CPA 2003). The main political pathway established by the CPA was to install a transitional government in October 2003 until elections in November 2005 to install a newly elected government in January 2006.
On 19 September 2003 the Security Council authorized the creation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to consist “of up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia.” UNMIL’s mandates were to support implementation of the June ceasefire agreement, protect of United Nations staff, support humanitarian and human rights assistance, and to support security reform (United Nations Security Council 2003c). Of note to the police, the resolution directed UNMIL “to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States” (United Nations Security Council 2003c). The police had lost any semblance of legitimacy in the civil war, committing human rights abuses and using official powers for private gains, effectively supplanting law enforcement with mob justice (Malan 2008, 46).

The Liberian Civil War upended Liberian society, was extremely violent, and was complex in its factionalization, ethnic tensions, and constant international peace negotiations. Many of these issues lingered in the aftermath of the violence, which will receive greater discussion later.

26 The Economic Community of West African States mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) predated UNMIL, having deployed to Monrovia in August 2003. ECOMIL forces “re-hatted” to UNMIL on October 1, 2003 as the first United Nations military personnel. While this was advantageous as it allowed rapid deployment of thousands of soldiers, it suffered from a lack of logistical support and coordination with UNMIL prior to re-hatting.
Goals

The initial goals of the international community and Liberians were broad and varied. UNMIL wanted the same general outcomes for the Liberian National Police (LNP) as UNMIK did for the KPS. The formation of a professional police force, accountable to its citizens and committed to equal enforcement of the law was the desired goal. However, for a multitude of reasons there was less political will to support the effort in Liberia, which sped the process and reduced the financial support available. On the Liberian side, the heterogeneous mixture of groups and tribes each saw the police as an avenue to gain power and influence in the new regime, hoping to commandeer it for their own purposes.

Donor

UNMIL represented a very diverse group of donors. As a UN mission its goals were primarily to enact the provisions of the CPA and fulfill the Security Council resolution. Among those mandates was to build new security sector institutions, including the police. UNMIL’s goal was to establish rule of law through "A restructured LNP, accountable to civilian authority, well led and properly motivated" (UNMIL 2005). There did not seem to be a desire to draw out the process, but rather to search for a quick fix—while retaining control of the experience. One Liberian police chief lamented on this, saying, “They have the money and we have to go along with their ideas ... We go by their training. They didn’t see the need for local ownership” (Baker 2010). The intervention in Liberia occurred a few years after Kosovo and Timor-Leste, which afforded UNMIL some lessons learned, but Liberia was a very different mandate and with constrained resources.
The United States, as the country most responsible for the creation of the Liberian state and most involved in Liberian affairs, should have had the largest influence of any donor state—and while in many ways it did, the US did not contribute greatly to the mission. The crisis in Monrovia in summer 2003 coincided with the early months of the occupation of Iraq. Dealing with insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US had little appetite for a large commitment to Liberia at that time. The US ambassador to Liberia at the time, John Blaney, stated that the White House, and particularly Donald Rumsfeld in the DOD, wanted to give as little support as possible to the mission, considering it a low priority—and he only received some financial support after making personal visits to influential members of the US Senate (John Blaney 2016). Due to the trend of funneling resources to Iraq and Afghanistan, the appetite for US involvement was so low that the US chose to contract out the development of the Armed Forces of Liberia to DynCorp, rather than assigning a US military unit to conduct the task. In Kosovo, DynCorp involvement had only been with the police and not the military training mission. Though individuals worked very hard, the general goal of the US seems evident: to maintain a peace at minimal cost.

Later on, in 2006, UNMIL published its revised benchmark goals for the police development program. There were four: Deactivation of former LNP personnel, 3,500 LNP trained, the LNP support unit trained and equipped, and all county police stations fully staffed and operational by July 2007 (United Nations Security Council 2006f). The fact that these goals came months after the start of the operation shows that the UN’s initial goals were broad and not specific.
In 2008, UNMIL published its Phase Two benchmark goals for the police development program. There were six: Nationwide implementation of administrative and operating procedures, establishment of an oversight mechanism, operationalizing the 500-member Emergency Response Unit, officer integrity and skill-based competency validation/fitness certification by United Nations police with Inspector General of Police and Ministry of Justice, police infrastructure, logistics support and equipment provision at county police stations, and realignment of LNP county police station security coverage, based on threat areas (United Nations Security Council 2008b). The phase two goals were based on a reassessment of the situation in Liberia. In fact, the latter two benchmark goals of phase one never succeeded. These revised phase two goals, along with the initial goals, were not normatively driven, but rather addressed specific problems encountered by the mission.

Host

The number of signatories to the CPA in 2003—over a dozen—speaks to the heterogeneity present in Liberia in this period. The civil war exposed these large cleavages. While the groups changed over time, this section focuses on the major groups at the onset of the intervention: LURD, MODEL, the transitionary government, and the average Liberian.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was a Liberian refugee group consisting of many former Taylor associates, led by Sekou Conneh, which formed in and received support from Guinea. It was multi-ethnic, claiming members from all sixteen ethnic groups in Liberia. There were numerous Krahn and Mandingo members, and Mandingos comprised the main military leadership (Johnston 2008). The official LURD position during the peace negotiations was to appoint a non-elected interim government comprised of LURD
members and other groups that would work with the UN forces during the transition phase to a newly elected government (Brabazon 2003). However, the group did not seem to have any real goal past the ouster of Taylor. Numerous field researchers that interviewed LURD members noted a lack of ideology or political vision, or any grandiose intentions beyond the simple removal of Taylor from power (Brabazon 2003; Johnston 2008).

The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) was a splinter group of LURD consisting of former Doe loyalists and ethnic Krahnos. MODEL’s goals did not differ much from LURD, though they represented elites from different tribal groups.

In total, leadership from the warring factions all wanted some level of power in the postwar era—either in the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NGTL) or in the private sector. An International Crisis Group report on negotiations in Accra noted a persistent focus on jobs, cars and money rather than the challenges confronting Liberia (International Crisis Group 2003). In this goal they largely succeeded: Fifteen out of 21 cabinet posts in the NGTL were allocated between the MODEL, LURD, and the former Taylor government (Mehler 2009).27

Average Liberians simply wanted peace after over a decade of brutal war. One former combatant said after the war that it was time for all Liberians to be ‘free’, but that ‘you have to satisfy the ex-combatants’, because otherwise, people will do things ‘the other way’ and could ‘spoil things’ (Jennings 2007). DDR was important to Liberians, and they wanted a peace dividend. Over 95% of former combatants chose formal education or vocational training over

---

27 The Taylor side retained internal affairs, defense, planning and economic affairs, health and social welfare, and post and telecommunications; LURD got transport, justice, labor and finance, and the Ministry of State; MODEL would have agriculture, commerce, foreign affairs, public works and land, mines and energy.
employment or agriculture (Paes 2005). Unfortunately, there was little absorptive capacity in the economy for higher skilled work. It is difficult to accurately articulate how many former combatants there were. As seen in figure 1, over 100,000 Liberians turned in weapons or ammunition as former combatants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>6,830</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>12,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19,717</td>
<td>13,720</td>
<td>33,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,855</td>
<td>10,283</td>
<td>13,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,107</td>
<td>10,471</td>
<td>15,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,889</td>
<td>16,957</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>27,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,123</td>
<td>51,466</td>
<td>37,604</td>
<td>102,019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 5-1. Former Combatants, by Group**

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NGTL) represented Liberia as its legitimate government until the installation of the elected government in January 2006. Since leaders of the warring factions ascended to so many posts in the NGTL, the NGTL’s goals were an amalgamation of these groups, even after the DDR process caused them formally to cease to exist. Therefore, the NGTL may not have represented the Liberian people, but rather elite interests. While Liberians and the NGTL may have had different views on what they wanted, a recurrent theme in the post war reconstruction was that both population and elites felt locked out of development plans by donors, and that projects lacked any local ownership. This created disunity among Liberians, and between Liberians and donors.
The tribes in Liberia quarreled for power, making it difficult to encapsulate a homogenous set of goals from the population. Table 1 shows the population by ethnicity in 1984 and in 2008. The heterogeneity in Liberia means that no tribe dominates. Moreover, the distribution of the population along tribal lines has not changed much in the last three decades, even as the population more than doubled. Tribal loyalties did have an impact in determining which side combatants fought on in the civil war (Howe 2015). Tribes did want representation in the new governmental institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kpelle</td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>705554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassa</td>
<td>13.85</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>466477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grebo</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>10.03</td>
<td>348758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gio Mano</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>276923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kru</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>237349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorma</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>209993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissi</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>178443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gola Vai</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>167980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krahn</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>152925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandingo</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>140251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbandi</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>139085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mende</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>110596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapo</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>105250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belle Dey</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>46413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Liberian Tribe</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>20934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African Tribe</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>47453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-African Tribe</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>4508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>3476608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services 2011)

Table 5-1. Distribution of Liberian Population by Ethnic Group, 1984 -2008

So, each of these groups had political goals, but few specific goals for the police. The legacy of political control of the police by governing elites probably left many desiring to use the police as a means of acquiring power—either through recruitment of former fighters or
through control of it by controlling the government. In addition, there is evidence that these tribes are self-policing, relying on internal structures to enforce tribal norms. For example, the Kpelle are dominated by the Poro secret society, which has a “role as enforcer, in fear generating ways, of the traditional norms and its punishment of the dissenters from traditional or accepted leadership…and it is felt that only the Poro can act without triggering a series of traditional reprisal incidents” (Fulton 1972, 1226–27). This tradition of self-policing combined with past abuses associated with rival control of the government hindered any universal trust in a national police force.

Each tribe had specific goals tied to self-preservation. The Mandingos and Krahn had achieved political and financial power under the Doe Regime, and then suffered persecution under the Taylor government (Freedom House 2005). Mandingos are regarded as nonindigenous outsiders and feared that the new Constitution that restricted property rights to native born Liberians could harm their claims to property, especially against rival Gio and Mano tribes (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2005). Krahnns had created hostility with other groups during their height of power under the Doe Regime. Each of these groups had fears of reprisals from the other group.

**Structures**

The LNP were just one of many agencies responsible for law enforcement in Liberia. These competing agencies performed redundant tasks and added complexity to the coordination of tasks and jurisdictions. The actual training program was shorter than planned, and once in the field, LNP were ill equipped to deploy far outside the capital.
UNMIL’s command structure was more unified than in Kosovo, but that was not connected to an improvement in planning training or tying it to larger outcomes. The Liberian government’s dire fiscal state precluded indigenous financial support for much of the case period, and it took several years for Liberia to form its own plans for the development of the police.

**Intervention Force**

Liberia was the first time that the UN attempted an integrated mission, meaning the SRSG was the single leader for the entire UN system present in Liberia (Hull 2008). Unlike many previous interventions, there was a clear line of command uniting the military and civilian component of the mission. Under this structure, the police commissioner responsible for LNP development reported directly to the SRSG.

Source: (Hull 2008)

**Figure 5-2. UNMIL task Organization.**
The UNMIL force took almost a year to reach its authorized strengths—not horrible, but also not preferable. From that point, it stayed about the same size for three years before the military component began a gradual drawdown over the next decade. This was possible as the threat of a violent civil war subsided. By June 2014, seven of the fifteen counties of Liberia had no fixed military presence (United Nations Security Council 2014a). Also, the number of Formed Police Units increased over time, possibly replacing some capabilities, such as riot control, that the military component had handled. The UN Police, however, remained at nearly the same strength by the end of the intervention as they had been authorized at the beginning, owing to the inability of the police to effectively patrol the country or execute management functions. Meanwhile, the LNP slowly increased in size, but never surpassed 5,000 officers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UNPOL</th>
<th>FPUs</th>
<th>UNMIL Troops</th>
<th>Academy Trained LNP (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>14,131</td>
<td>530 (Non-Academy trained/enrolled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>14,665</td>
<td>646 (Non-Academy trained/enrolled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>14,541</td>
<td>854 (Non-Academy trained/enrolled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>14,854</td>
<td>1,134 (Non-Academy trained/enrolled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>14,894</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>14,832</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>15,071</td>
<td>1,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>14,794</td>
<td>1,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>14,827</td>
<td>2,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>14,311</td>
<td>2,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>14,832</td>
<td>2,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>14,123</td>
<td>3,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>12,948</td>
<td>3,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>11,728</td>
<td>3,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2009</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>10,231</td>
<td>3,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2009</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>10,186</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>9,360</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>8,052</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2011</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>8,064</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>8,064</td>
<td>4,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>7,629</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>4,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>5,853</td>
<td>4,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>5,876</td>
<td>4,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>4,586</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>4,904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2. UNMIL Force Strengths

Police

The existence of the Liberian National Police (LNP) preceded the civil war by several decades when the National Legislature established it in 1956. On June 6, 1975, the legislature mandated the National Police Force the duty “to detect crimes; apprehend offenders; preserve law and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and enforce all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged” (Malan 2008). The LNP, while being the predominant law enforcement agency in Liberia, is not alone in establishing law and order. There are at least nine agencies in Liberia responsible for law enforcement: The National Security Agency, Liberia
National Police, National Bureau of Immigration & Naturalization, National Fire Service, Bureau of Customs and Excise, National Bureau of Investigation, Drugs Enforcement Agency, Special Security Service, and Monrovia City Police all have duties connected to law enforcement.\(^{28}\)

There is a legacy of rivalry amongst these fragmented agencies, as conflicting demands and loyalties act to form malevolent competition among them (Baker 2009). The LNP nominally falls under the Ministry of Justice, but in practice it has reported directly to the president and the Ministry has had little real authority over the LNP (Malan 2008, 15). This relationship has routinely served to harm any apolitical role for the LNP. This political legacy of the LNP led many Liberians to associate the LNP with the repressive regimes they served—and rightfully so, as many LNP leaders conducted brutally repressive tactics under such orders before the civil war.

\(^{28}\) This is more diverse than Kosovo for a few reasons. First, as a region within a larger country it lacked the need for services to handle customs, national security, and so on. Second, Liberia lacked ocean access to necessitate seaport policing. Third, other functions were simply streamlined under the KPS command structure.
Figure 5-3. Roles of Security Sector Agencies in Post-conflict Liberia

The myriad of agencies that conduct law enforcement creates many overlapping functions and redundancies. Multiple authors cite this structure as not only a source of institutional rivalries, but also confusion over jurisdiction and duties (Gompert et al. 2007; Malan 2008; Jallah-Scott 2008). This did not change significantly from before to after the civil war.

The civil war caused the de facto dissolution of the LNP. Upon arrival in 2003, the UNPOL Head of Operations, made the following assessment: “There were very few officers left in the Liberia National Police; in Monrovia (capital of Liberia) just a few. Most of the (police) depots were abandoned, and in Buchanan and Gbamga they were managed by the rebel groups. We had then an Expansion Unit to try to locate LNP (Liberia National Police) officers ...
was very hard to find suitable people” (Baker 2009). So, while LNP nominally existed, their presence delegitimized them more than if they had not existed at all. In addition, it led to an awkward application of security at the onset. Unlike in Kosovo, the CPA did not have a mandate granting UNPOL the power to arrest. Instead, only the nonexistent LNP had that power. So UNPOL vetted and registered existing law enforcement personnel to patrol alongside them (Malan 2008, 48). The progress of this is shown below. The numbers not only show the rapid rate of registration, but also indicate that the LNP’s size was smaller than the combined size of the myriad other agencies responsible for law enforcement in the disjointed Liberian governance structure—only about one in three registered law enforcers in December 2005 were actually LNP. In addition, the table below simply notes numbers of former law enforcement personnel registered by UNMIL, not the amount that had received training. At the same time, UNPOL began training new LNP at the National Police Academy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Registered Law Enforcers (from all agencies noted in Table 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>3,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>6,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>9,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>10,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>10,335 (3,742 LNP, Academy and Non-Academy trained)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reports of the SRSG.

**Table 5-3. Law Enforcement Agency Registration**

UNMIL reopened the National Police Academy on 12 July 2004 (Ebo 2005). The goal was to provide 1,800 trained officers in time for October 2005 election. That first class admitted
132 cadets, and another 300 enrolled in August, and UNMIL wanted to eventually develop the
capacity to train 600 cadets per session (United Nations Security Council 2004b). There was
little difference in the format of the coursework from Timor-Leste and Kosovo, although early
classes lasted a condensed three months—later, six including field training. In 2006, some
training coordinators determined that this shortened curriculum compromised quality for
quantity (MacAulay 2014), which seems almost self-evident. Much of the program was
determined by that goal to have 1,800 ‘trained officers’ for the 2005 election, which focused
the training program on an arbitrary output rather than an outcome.

Funding for the National Police Academy was, like most of the mission, ad hoc. Each
year the SRSG reported contributions that would allow training to continue for another year.
When these contributions were late, the Academy had to pause training or delay class
commencements. At the beginning the United States funded the Academy, and sustained its
operation in the second year with a contribution of $1.7 million (United Nations Security
Council 2005d).

The curriculum was not static, and changed as the mission matured and reacted to
changing events. The original curriculum was successful in producing the 1,800 LNP in time for
the 2005 election, but did not achieve much beyond creating a quantitative amount of police.
It was a base plan that did not account for local differences or necessary subjects for the LNP.
UNPOL trained 2,000 LNP under this curriculum. In 2006, UNPOL revised the curriculum to
include use of manuals on policies and procedures, report writing, and statement taking. It also
covered subjects on police administration, ethics, discipline, democratic policing, criminal
investigation, and community policing concepts (United Nations Security Council 2006h). While
the Academy revised its curriculum, UNPOL reduced the length of the field training program from 26 to 16 weeks in order to speed accession of LNP (United Nations Security Council 2006f).

In addition to initial entry training, UNMIL created a basic management course in 2005 for 300 Liberian National Police officers to address a serious shortfall in the mid-level ranks of the LNP. UNMIL seemed to push senior leadership training earlier than in other interventions, partly due to their reduced mandate. Less than one year after admitting the first LNP recruits, UNPOL had completed a senior leadership qualification course for twenty LNP (United Nations Security Council 2005e). This did not leave much time for new LNP to be able to learn their trade or establish their merit as UNMIL filled the leadership of the LNP.

The state of LNP facilities mirrored the infrastructure of the rest of Liberia—crumbling or destroyed after more than a decade of war. Most police stations were unserviceable and required basic equipment and refurbishment. The SRSG repeated pleas for funding to address this lack of equipment, uniforms, weapons, vehicles and communication equipment—both in Monrovia and the interior of the country. However, this request was initially only $871,000, and was not enough to meet the dire predicament of the LNP (United Nations Security Council 2006d). Over time, UNMIL sponsored dozens of improvement projects, in addition to tens of millions of dollars spent on road improvement projects with indirect benefits to LNP mobility, but the general consensus remained that the LNP were poorly supported.

Perhaps due to an emerging political mandate that gave the Liberian government more authority after the 2005 election, the structure of the LNP began to change. The Liberian government and UNMIL established reforms in many areas. The Rule of Law Implementation Committee guided the implementation of the police reform program. It was comprised of
ranking officers of UNMIL, the LNP, and officials of the government—including the UNMIL Police Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Security, and the interim Director of LNP (MacAulay 2014). The Committee chose to change the structure of the LNP by standing up a Police Support Unit (PSU) and Emergency Response Unite (ERU) to assist in quelling mob violence or dealing with well-armed gangs. The strength of the ERU was to be 500 officers (United Nations Security Council 2007a).

Once trained, the LNP had to deal with actually policing a very disconnected landscape. For much of the case period, the LNP was incapable of policing the entire country. It took time to get LNP out of Monrovia. First, the logistical burden of leaving the capital (roads, etc.) reduced the capability of moving into the rural areas. Second, Monrovia had absorbed many internal refugees during the civil war, and now constituted almost half the population of Liberia, and required more police just to patrol it. It took almost three years to establish a ‘presence’ in all fifteen counties. Even then, only 454 officers were assigned outside of Monrovia—out of over 2,000. 731 LNP patrolled Monrovia, 208 were assigned to zones and depots within Monrovia, 49 were assigned to Roberts International Airport, 174 were assigned to the Monrovia Central Patrol Division, and 300 were assigned to the PSU (United Nations Security Council 2006f). One year later, that number improved to only 537 LNP patrolling the outer counties, and not all county headquarters had police in them yet (United Nations Security Council 2007a). By the end of 2007, only 676 police patrolled outside the capital (United Nations Security Council 2007b). This was progress, but meant that much of the country had virtually no police presence. UNMIL troops had similar issues getting to inaccessible areas, and
looking at their basing locations in the appendix reveals that they were similarly concentrated along the coast.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Police Stations</th>
<th>Magistrate Courts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>UNPOL- 5 areas</td>
<td>17/138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>UNPOL- 22 areas</td>
<td>50/138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>UNPOL- 22 areas</td>
<td>84/138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>UNPOL-25 areas</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>UNPOL-25 areas</td>
<td>104/145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>62 stations in all 15 counties</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reports of the SRSG

Table 5-4. Progression of police stations and magistrate growth.

The size of the LNP was and remains inadequate to patrol the entire country. As of mid-2016, the ratio of police to the population was over 800 to 1. This is well below UN standards, and by comparison, is far less any area of the United States, regardless of crime rate.

Neighboring Sierra Leone is roughly the same size with population less than twice the size of Liberia but a police force three times the size of the LNP. In 2012, the Government of Liberia diverged from donor desires to keep the LNP size static and stated their objective of nearly doubling the size of the LNP from 4,200 to 8,000 officers (United Nations Security Council 2012). This would have brought the ratio closer to 500 to 1, but funding from donors and the Government of Liberia has been absent to achieve this.

Shortcomings in structuring LNP training and deployment were not addressed until much later in the intervention. It was not until 2010 that the LNP began training police stations in an updated standard operating procedure for operations (United Nations Security Council 2010a). UNMIL also did not train army, police and immigration personnel to promote applicable human rights standards until 2010, and then only at a rate of 300 a year (United Nations Security Council 2012). In addition, the Government of Liberia and UNMIL did not
begin a process to determine the minimum staffing levels of trained and equipped officers necessary in all counties until 2012—nine years after the CPA (United Nations Security Council 2012). These are all structures that have ideally been in place relatively sooner, but were not funded or championed by the international community or Liberians immediately.

Host Government

Liberia’s national government’s constitutional structure is similar to the United States, except that as a unitary republic, it lacks the federalism present in the American Constitution. However, on the national level it has a bicameral legislature with a House of Representatives and a Senate, which, similar to the United States, has two senators from each of the fifteen counties of Liberia. The president is the head of government and head of state, and absent a federal structure the president enjoys greater appointment and executive powers than in the United States. Lastly, the Supreme Court is the highest court of Liberia.

The court system in Liberia is very weak. Shortly before the 2005 elections, the were only five qualified circuit judges—out of the 22 needed to run the system—available (Ebo 2005). Many judges had either fled, been killed, or been corrupted by the civil war. In addition, a lack of security meant that many of them constantly feared for their lives.

The Liberian model of government is based on the American government. One significant structural difference from the United States is the power of the president to appoint leadership of the LNP. This provision was present in the 1986 Constitution, and presidents took advantage of it to place their cronies in leadership positions, resulting in the LNP’s loyalties being exclusively to the president, and routinely committing human rights atrocities on the
president’s behalf. This power of presidential appointment did not change after the CPA. This and other flaws were noted by UNMIL. In 2008, the SRSG determined that “the Government needs to address the longstanding structural challenges facing the justice sector by adopting a comprehensive approach and far-reaching reforms” (United Nations Security Council 2008b).

The newly elected Government of Liberia responded to this and began development of a National Security Strategy in 2006, which the cabinet approved in 2008. This took so long partly because of the overlapping mandates of the different security institutions, and the inability to clearly define the roles for each one (Mehler 2012). It does not seem that the document led to a reduction in security sector redundancies or other large structural changes. This document was not made public. However, it influenced the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) that drove government programming. Therefore, I will use the PRS as an instrument to investigate the host government’s structural variables relating to security.

The PRS was an integrated plan across all aspects of Liberian governance, meant for implementation from 2008 to 2011. The plan established four pillars: Consolidating Peace and Security—under which the LNP fell—Revitalizing the Economy, Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law, and Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering Basic Services. The PRS declares the LNP to be the “primary operational agency responsible for internal security, and will be restructured to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency” (International Monetary Fund 2008). The President oversaw the four separate subcommittees for each pillar. A key Minister chaired each sub-committee and two international partners served as the vice-chairpersons (United Nations Security Council 2006b). In all, the PRS was an outline of goals, but it required Government of Liberia budgets and donor support to enact. Over the time from
2008-2011 budgets routinely were unable to match the needs outlined in the PRS. Hence, only two-thirds of the goals in the PRS were actually achieved by the target date of 2011.

The Government of Liberia followed the PRS with the Agenda for Transformation (AFT), which was a five year plan for 2012-2017. It kept the same four pillars of the PRS. In the AFT, the government aims to “create an enabling national security framework to regulate and coordinate municipal, corporate, concessional private and other investigative security related institution” (“Liberia Agenda for Transformation” 2016). While following a similar structure to the PRS, the AFT acknowledges past failures, and lays out specific priorities for the LNP, which were to: Train and equip an additional 1,500 officers; increase the overall strength of LNP, including backfilling vacancies created when raising ERU (500) and PSU (1,000), expand and strengthen Women and Child Protection Units, significantly increase salaries for LNP officers and personnel, provide additional mobility equipment and link police facilities and patrols via improved communications, and to develop community policing by holding regular community-security forums in every county (“Liberia Agenda for Transformation” 2016). Of note, while the PRS was published by the IMF in 2008, the AFT was developed in 2012 and published by the Government of Liberia. This indicates growing local ownership and capacity from the Liberian government.

In order to better connect the security and justice institutions to the population, UNMIL and the Government of Liberia began constructing five justice and security hubs in 2012—each servicing three counties—with the first in Gbarnga, Bong County (United Nations Security Council 2012). The goal of the hubs is to surround LNP regional command centers with the courts, state prosecution and public defenders and corrections, support to civil society to
extend advisory services to the community, and public outreach civic education programs. The vision is that this enhances the linkages between these various different actors and prioritizes the development of relationships between these institutions and the communities they serve (Keane 2012). In essence, these ‘one-stop shops’ do as much to bring government agencies together as they do to help citizens navigate the bureaucratic governmental structures.

Funding has continually been an issue for the Government of Liberia. This is a financial issue that overlaps the LNP, donors, and the Liberian government. In December 2004, the SRSG complained of shortfalls in law enforcement funding from donors and the Liberian government (United Nations Security Council 2004e). Later, The Government of Liberia only allocated $6.9 million of the estimated $20 million required for operational effectiveness towards the operational budget of the police force, including salaries, during the fiscal year 2008/09 (United Nations Security Council 2009b). On one hand, the security situation in Liberia dictated that a robust police force would be necessary to achieve security and allow economic and human development. On the other hand, the destitute position Liberia found itself in after the civil war—devoid of any significant infrastructure, investments, or human capital—meant that there was no way that Liberia could afford a professional police force of the necessary size and capabilities to achieve acceptable security. This is obviously not an uncommon feature of police development, but the question remains as to whom the bill should go. To some extent, donors need to accept their responsibility to fund the security sector until the economy can expand to a level that can support the security sector. In Liberia, there seems to be mixed results; Donors primarily supported the LNP by funding the National Police Academy, supporting refurbishment of police stations, and the ad hoc delivery of equipment. Operational funding came primarily
from the Liberian government. Both streams seemed inadequate. The National Police
Academy relied on annual contributions, which at times did not arrive, causing shutdowns in
training. Equipment—vehicles, radios, batons, and other essential policing items—were
chronically in low supply. Last, the Liberian government had to cut the LNP budget many times
due to budget constraints. One chronic outcome of this was the common complaint of low pay
for the LNP. The $90 a month salary was not enough to dissuade corrupt practices or attract
higher quality recruits. There did not seem to be any long term funding commitments from the
Government of Liberia or donors that could give predictability to the funding of the LNP.

Therefore, there were few resources to actually conduct policing. In 2010, Bruce Baker
conducted interviews with the police that revealed the dire state of affairs:

“We have no logistics. We have no vehicles so we can’t respond rapidly. So we are more
vulnerable. [Radios are] not enough for one per patrol.”

“We have no vehicles. We have no electricity. When we patrol the beach at night we have no
torchlights so we supply our own.”

“We have no batons; no torches for night. Just the commander has a car. We need vehicles. We
have no uniforms – the uniform I am wearing I had to have made by a tailor and paid for it
myself. We have no handcuffs at all. No communications.”

“We have one motorbike and one jeep. We have a generator but it is old. Officers have no radio;
no baton; no handcuffs.

“We have no vehicles; no communications. We provide our own uniforms. We have no batons,
no handcuffs.”

“I have one vehicle – it can’t cover the whole county. I have 12 districts and I want a motorbike.
But there is not even a budgetary allotment for fuel. No radios. We have to borrow from the
Nigerians [UNMIL]. We have to buy our own uniforms.” (Baker 2010)

The SRSG corroborated these statements, reporting in 2007 that in Cape Mount County, the
police had only one vehicle and a motorbike for use by 42 officers, the county commander paid
for the fuel and maintenance of the vehicle from his own salary, and he also provided the fuel
for a donated generator and food for detainees from his personal resources (United Nations Security Council 2007b). These are logistical issues as much as they are funding-based. UNPOL stated the need to train the LNP in logistics, but never actually managed the logistics of the LNP in order to improve the situation. Instead, UNPOL was able to supply its own officers, who then routinely had to assist LNP to conduct routine patrols due to LNP lack of equipment. What little interaction there may have been between donors and the Liberians did not remedy the logistical failures of the LNP.

Even the payment of the low wages to the LNP was an issue. Partly due to funding and partly to administrative failure, wages were paid sporadically. More alarming, was that paychecks were only disbursed in Monrovia, meaning LNP had to travel to the capital to collect their paychecks—in a country with poor road networks that were impassable for six months of every year. In addition, paychecks were subject to corrupt siphoning, with reports of police officers who demand a portion of subordinates’ checks before they release them (Gompert et al. 2007).

Last, the Government of Liberia has struggled to conduct adequate oversight of its institutions. Early on, the Government of Liberia General Audit Office required UNMIL assistance in auditing finance of LNP (United Nations Security Council 2005b). Over time, this eventually passed from UNMIL to Liberians, but this structural deficiency has weakened trust in Liberian institutions of government.

A general lack of resources dictated much of the structure of the development of the LNP. The mission lacked the will to expend money, forcing a small force that was not deployed
throughout the country. Liberians lacked the resources to fund their own goals, and were beholden to international desires. Time was another resource the mission lacked, as UNMIL reduced training times in order to reach benchmark goals for independence in a very short time span.

**Agency**

This section addresses whether the decisions and actions of actors had an effect on the outcome of police development in Liberia. I will address the levels of human talent in each organization, and whether those skills matched the tasks at hand. Additionally, I will note any significant decisions about the intervention that any actors made.

**UNMIL**

The composition of the UNMIL Police was extremely varied. This caused complications. UNMIL Police came from over thirty different countries, and for many of them, English was not their first language. In addition, their policing methods were foreign to the Liberians they trained. Liberia, with its close background with the US, used an ‘American model’ of policing, different than the ‘British model’ that many UNMIL trainers hailed from—with important implications on the use of force, reactivity, and so on. An LNP officer complained, “...many of these trainers who come have British police training; and only few countries in the world have American training. So this for me is the conflict. For me, mentors should understand that this area is America-specific because of history and they should adapt and not force you any other way” (Weh-Dorliae 2015). Compounded to this dilemma was receiving training one day from a
Nigerian, the next from a Pakistani, and the next from an American, who would teach very differently.

The UNMIL mission made some decisions throughout the development of the LNP that affected the outcome. From the beginning, UNMIL’s UNPOL section primarily focused on the LNP for policing agency restructuring, vetting, recruitment, training, and deployment. The rest of the policing agencies—Special Security Service, Bureau of Immigration and Customs, etc.—were left to the Liberian government’s review for restructuring. This lasted until 2007, when UNPOL began to appreciate the need for a more holistic view of the police. In the realm of the LNP’s development, UNPOL ran the normal playbook of focusing on lower level training for the first few years before transitioning to institutional capacity-building and operations support, placing emphasis on administration, police budgeting, and forensics training (United Nations Security Council 2006d).

UNMIL did not engender local ownership of the development of the LNP, and forced much of the decisions. When investigators queried a member of the LNP in 2015, he complained:

“The Government [of Liberia] does not see the LNP as its responsibility. It sees the LNP as a responsibility of the international community, because it’s the international community that started this whole idea of restructuring and reform and then they put the money into it . . . the

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29 In response to disciplinary matters within the LNP, UNMIL deployed four police specialists in 2008 to serve as professional standards advisers. In addition, UNMIL began to revise the police duty manual, streamline the operational framework for the Police Standards and Practices Unit and verify the numbers and locations of Liberian National Police personnel in order to correct the payroll (United Nations Security Council 2008b).
Government of Liberia through the Liberian National Police had to accept whatever was provided to them based on the funding available by the donating country” (Weh-Dorliae 2015)

Numerous international decisions relied on research that failed to take account the opinions of several prominent Liberians—of note is the 2005 RAND Report that had been commissioned by the US, that many complained did not do due diligence in receiving various Liberian perspectives. A lot of this sounds like goal incongruity, but it also shows a lack of drive to even find out what the goals of Liberians were. This was a decision by omission, failing to fully address the local context of the mission.

Last, the level of human talent possessed by UNMIL Police was varied. A 2007 survey of UNMIL Police found a lack of evidence that they had actually passed pre-deployment and post-arrival tests and requirements (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2009). In some cases they were not even certified to drive vehicles, and therefore could not travel to conduct their duties. This is not to say the UNMIL police were incompetent; many were highly successful police from their home countries. However, it does not seem that there was adequate quality control, or training applicable to their mission, conducted by UNMIL. In 2013, UNMIL updated the five day induction training for UNPOL, shifting focus to more context-specific information about the LNP and the role of UNPOL in Liberia. In an evaluation of the updated training, UNMIL found that “those who attended the old course felt they needed time to understand their role and that it took anything from a couple of weeks to a few months to be effective” (International Security Sector Advisory Team- Liberia 2014).30 While the new training may have

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30 For example, under the old training, topics included individual briefings from UNPOL departments and teams followed by presentations by the Induction Training Unit. Under the new training, the Induction Training Unit
been more effective, these comments show that UNPOL were essentially set up for failure by the lack of adequate training. Even later in the mission, a 2014 audit concluded that UN Police were merely “adequately” training and certifying LNP, but still did not adequately monitor human rights standards (Office of Internal Oversight Services 2014).

UNMIL made decisions about UN Police deployments that favored security over police development. For example, in 2008, the SRSG requested to increase in the number of formed police units from five to seven—from 605 to 845 personnel—while making no changes to the number of police trainers (United Nations Security Council 2008e). While the FPUs were vital in controlling mob violence, they did little to enhance the development of the LNP. Rather, they augmented short term capabilities instead of developing the LNP.

Police

The level of human capital was not strong in the LNP. First, while UNMIL did conduct background checks of police recruits, interviews with LNP and civil society found that those background were not thorough and that the vetting process did not prevent applicants who had committed human rights abuses from being recruited into the police force and many criminals entered the ranks in the early years of the LNP (Weh-Dorliae 2015). As for higher ranking members of the LNP, even the elected Sirleaf-Johnson government continued the Liberian tradition of appointing individuals to senior law enforcement positions on the basis of their membership of political factions, irrespective of their law enforcement and leadership training or experience (Baker 2007). So, from the both ends of the spectrum—lower level facilitated all training, with topics organized into more holistic groupings, such as The Rule of Law System in Liberia, The Liberian National Police, The role of UNPOL in Liberia, and How to work as a capacity builder.
recruits and higher level managers—one must wonder whether UNMIL Police training was even capable of fixing a highly nepotistic manning system. Quality control goes beyond background. Even as UNMIL adjusted their background checks over time, one out of every five members in LNP’s ranks did not have a high school degree, and few in the higher ranks were university graduates (Podder 2013). Retention of the best performers has been difficult.

Some decisions on how to develop the LNP tended to have negative consequences.

Early on, the SRSG was a retired American diplomat and former Major General in the US Air Force, Mr. Jacques Klein. He had wanted to disband the old police force and start from scratch. The UN Police commander at the time, Mr. Mark Kroeker—an American police chief from Los Angeles—felt it best to integrate former LNP officers into the new force (Dyck 2013). In the end, Kroeker’s argument won out and the LNP was not built from scratch. How much that decision affected the outcome of the mission is uncertain, but it did represent a shift from how UN Police had developed the Kosovo Police Force in two ways: First, the Kosovo Liberation Army veterans inducted into the police had not previously been police, nor were they a majority of the police recruits. Second, the force they entered was new with no history while the LNP was simply restarting the same force as before the war.

Another decision with negative consequences was a lowering of entry requirements to meet target numbers. Due to a low number of high school graduate applicants, the minimal entry-requirement was dropped to junior high school and tenth grade dropouts. Additionally, in order to meet the UN goal of 20% women in the LNP, UNMIL developed an eight-month accelerated training program, which resulted in the integration of poorly educated and ill-trained women officers into the police ranks (Dyck 2013). An argument could be made that
unprepared women in the force were a greater detriment to gender issues than not meeting the target goal. In addition, any underqualified recruits inevitably undermined the quality of the overall force. Granted, finding well educated women for the LNP was very difficult. However, it was not impossible. There were other avenues that could have attracted high quality female recruits into the LNP—bonuses targeted at women, longer pre-training programs for women, or a less steep glide path to reach the target goal. Additionally, the target goal of 20% may have been overly ambitious. In Kosovo, where women faced less obstacles than in Liberia, women in the ranks hovered at around 15% of the police force.

The inability of the LNP to patrol the country, due to the aforementioned issues, along with a rise in violent crime, led UNMIL to turn to unconventional sources of security to fill the gap. First, this was done through the development of community police forums in each county, meant to build partnerships between the LNP and restore public confidence in the police (United Nations Security Council 2009a). These tended toward failure, and eventually regressed toward local policing administered through chiefs and assisted by the police (Baker 2009). This ‘outsourced’ policing to local communities. At the level of the county seat, local coordination bodies—county security councils—were established by law, though these did not become operational until the end of 2013 (United Nations Security Council 2013b). It did not seem that UNMIL was able to make decisions that could simultaneously enhance security and the legitimacy of the LNP.

31 The purpose of the Community Policing Forums is to integrate local political leadership, the commander of the local force and representatives from local civil society to monitor local police force performance, set policing priorities consistent with community concerns, and serve as a forum to discuss concerns about police conduct or policies.
The LNP command and control was very weak and the force suffered from low morale, as well as disciplinary problems (United Nations Security Council 2008e). It is difficult to say how much of this was personality based as opposed to a lack of resources causing frustrations. Many of the interview responses seem to display resentment at not receiving basic supplies to conduct patrols. It is safe to say that this continued lack of support eroded the morale of rank and file LNP.

**Government of Liberia**

President Sirleaf-Johnson has received wide acclaim for her actions since ascending to the presidency in 2006. Of note, she heavily pushed to fight corruption in her government. In her first year in office she dismissed a number of senior government officials for corruption, including a deputy minister, an assistant minister, a chief medical officer, a deputy director of the Liberian National Police and a chairman of a public corporation (United Nations Security Council 2006f). She also was the main driving force on the Liberian side in developing the PRS and AFT. She seems to have been the best leader the intervention could have hoped for. Even with this leadership in the government, it seemed that the LNP were unable to effectively develop.

**Outcomes**

**Local Sustainability**

A major challenge of sustaining the LNP is funding. The most recent 2015-2016 budget allocated $15,531,849 to the LNP, of which $13,306,090 was for LNP compensation. The rest of the budget was mostly dedicated to fuel costs, with very little toward operations or equipment.
The National Police Academy received $912,002—about a third of which was for food—to train over 1,600 cadets. The budget for the entire security sector, including the AFL, is just under $100 million, accounting for roughly one sixth of Liberia’s nearly $600 million in expenditures (Government of Liberia 2015). The ability to maintain or grow this figure without donor support is heavily dependent on the growth of the Liberian economy. Though the GDP of Liberia has grown about 5% per year since the intervention, it only recently surpassed $2 billion (World Bank, 2016). As a percentage of GDP, the amount Liberia spends on security is sustainable, but there is not much money to allow an increase of funding as UNMIL draws down and donors wind down funding of development projects.

At the same time, there appears to be a Liberian desire to continue to support the LNP. In fact, Liberian goals for the police have usually exceeded that which donors were willing to support. The question of sustainability of the LNP is not reliant on Liberian support, even if financing continues to be a struggle; the larger question is whether the amount of politicization of the LNP will lead to its demise. The appointment of leadership positions based on political allegiance, coupled with the history of such actions in Liberia, puts into question the sustainability of any semblance of professionalism in the LNP—that is, in terms of maintaining objective enforcement of the law.

32 Liberians continually pushed for LNP numbers more in line with UN guidelines of over two police per thousand population, while UNMIL’s funding only allowed for a size that would be one police per thousand population, citing Liberia’s weak economy as unable to sustain such force numbers.
Donor Assessment

The SRSG’s reports are indicators of the major themes that the international community was focused on over the course of the intervention. Throughout the existence of UNMIL, almost every report describes the security situation as “stable, but fragile.” There is seemingly no change in this assessment, even as the security situation allowed for reductions in UNMIL troops. In some areas of police development, such as trainings conducted or operations led by the LNP, there appears to be progress, but there remained an inability to deal with violent crime. Beginning in 2007, the SRSG reported increases in armed robbery, rape, and mob justice. Alarmingly, there were numerous mob attacks on several police stations and court houses to free suspects or to administer instant justice throughout the entire case period—a clear indicator of a lack of trust in the judicial process. In addition, the SRSG cited attacks on on-duty LNP officers, and cites a” lack of public confidence in the ability of the Liberian National Police to effectively perform its duties” (United Nations Security Council 2008b) (United Nations Security Council 2007b) (United Nations Security Council 2008e) (United Nations Security Council 2009a). This inability to maintain public safety, or even to create the perception of the ability to maintain public safety, continued throughout the intervention. In 2013, the SRSG reported 31 mob violence incidents in a three month period (United Nations Security Council 2013a). Later in 2013, the SRSG reported: “reports of armed robbery continued, with over a third of reported incidents involving firearms. Rates of sexual violence remained worryingly high, with an increase of 25 per cent of reported cases over the same period in 2012, and more than 20 per cent of reported incidents involved victims under the age of 10 years” (United
Based on the SRSG reports, the development of the LNP did nothing to enhance human security in Liberia.

In terms of the capacity of the LNP to conduct operations, the SRSG’s reports are mixed. There are indications of increased LNP capacity to execute complex operations (United Nations Security Council 2010b), though much of that capacity ceased outside of Monrovia. In the counties, they lacked resources, capacity, and professional management (United Nations Security Council 2013b). A report in 2014 is especially doubtful:

Despite some progress, the police struggled with inadequate manpower, limited logistics, particularly vehicles, which fall far short of the requirements, and a centralized organizational structure, which, along with insufficient incentives, perpetuated understaffing outside of Monrovia. In many areas, the police rely on UNMIL for transportation and other operational support (United Nations Security Council 2014b).

The reports seem apologetic, placing the intervention in a historical context and touting improved socioeconomic indicators (United Nations Security Council 2014b).

At the same time, the performance of the LNP in providing security must also be put in context with what UNMIL was able to accomplish. A nationwide survey in 2009 found that while it seemed that Liberians tended to migrate more toward areas of UNMIL deployments—possibly feeling safer near UNMIL deployments—rates of crime reported by respondents did not differ significantly between areas near or far from UNMIL deployments (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2010). This of course poses an endogeneity problem. UNMIL deployed to areas that had experienced the most violence, so perhaps their presence lowered violence to a great extent,
such that it went to a lower level than the counterfactual. This is difficult to determine. At the least, while respondents placed faith in the legitimacy of UNMIL to prevent violence, UNMIL’s presence was not able to eliminate all violence or lower it beyond areas far from its reach. So, for the LNP, we cannot expect much better.

Other international officials have had harsh criticisms of the LNP. In 2007, a state department official said that "the LNP, as it currently stands, is a disaster. Aside from weaknesses in selection, training, and equipment, there is no connection between the LNP and the prosecution personnel within the Ministry of Justice." In the same year, an NGO chairperson stated that “they are not intelligent, polite; they don't give information. They don't do anything about the case when you take it to them” (Baker 2009). In addition, a Wikileaks cable described the LNP as the “weak link” in Liberia’s post-war security efforts, citing the lack of disciplined leadership at the top (command and control) and the social background of the police corps in the lower-ranks (Dyck 2013). Once again, there seems to be little movement of this assessment of the LNP over time.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators, published by the World Bank, are a good snapshot of a country every year. A comparison of the indicators shows that while the political stability has improved over time, there is little change in the rule of law in Liberia since the inauguration of the elected government in 2006. However, the trend for government

34 According to the World Bank, “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”
effectiveness is equally stagnant, indicating that LNP performance does not differ much from the Liberian government.

Source: World Bank

**Figure 5-4. Selected WGI Indicators for Liberia.**

*Host Assessment*

Liberian assessments of the LNP are equally dire and do not seem to change. Researchers in Liberia in 2007 did not find much evidence of LNP capacity amongst the population. A village chief in Bong County said, “They patrol the road – they just pass by. We want them to walk around.” Two men in Kakata agreed: “The police do not go off the main street. There are no patrols.” The Chairman of Tubmanburg’s Community Police Forum complained that “It is not always easy to get the police. Sometimes it seems like a daylight operation” (Baker 2007). Another researcher concluded that “every local resident interviewed by the author in Monrovia complained that the LNP members either
do not respond, or respond far too slowly, to calls for assistance. Sometimes complainants are asked to pay police transport costs to the scene” (Malan 2008, 53). This continued over time—and left citizens especially vulnerable in an increasingly violent Monrovia. Residents complained of armed robbers at night, gangs of twenty men busting through doors, locking their doors no later than 8 pm, and feeling abandoned (Baker 2010). Even on the eve of the security handover in 2016 there were issues. A news report quoted a local business woman saying, “something happens and you carry it to [the] police station, [even] when you are right, [if] you do not have money, [the] police people will free the people that wronged you. The people, we are going [to] worry. [The] police people, they are not going to guide us” (“Are Liberian Police Ready for Security Handover?” 2016). Liberians continued to feel unsafe and displayed a lack of confidence in the capacity of the LNP.

**Trust**

Liberians do not yet seem to have trust in the LNP, and do not see the LNP as a legitimate solution to their security problems. Part of this may be due to the fact that even if a culprit is convicted, prisons are overcrowded and offenders are frequently freed for lack of space, and it is often possible to bribe one’s way out of jail (Ackerman 2009). On a positive note, a 2012 IMF survey found that 64% of Liberians felt crime decreased from 2008-2011, even though reported crime rates were increasing. This possibly indicated a higher level of trust in reporting crimes to the LNP (International Monetary Fund 2012). However, a 2010 survey found that 56% of Liberians had paid to get help from the police, most commonly to file a complaint or start an investigation (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011), so even Liberians that utilized the police may not have come away happy with it. Not surprisingly, Liberians would
overwhelmingly rather call their neighbor than the police when they observe a crime (Weh-Dorliae 2015).

The result is that Liberians lack security, which may further erode trust in the LNP over time. In 2010, 25% of Liberians felt ‘not safe at all.’ That jumped to 37% in Monrovia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011). So, while surveys find that Liberians view the police as less corrupt than before the civil war, they are unable to react to crimes, mainly due to lack of equipment and low salaries (Weh-Dorliae 2015). Liberians pin the blame on the current state of the LNP. 52% of Liberians felt the best way to improve security would be to improve police capacity, second only to ‘educating the youth’(Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011).

A general lack of feeling safe could be due to circumstances outside the control of the police. After all, complete security is more a matter of perception than fact. However, the fact that so many Liberians do not see the LNP as a legitimate solution to their problems means that the development of the LNP has been more of a failure than a success. Any successes that the LNP have made in their capacity has been overshadowed by deficiencies in their quality. Liberians do not view the LNP as legitimate authority figures. For example, in October 2015 the LNP struggled to enforce a regulation instructing traffic officers to arrest, and impound the vehicles of anyone caught using the opposite lane of the Tubman Boulevard road during the rush hours. Speeding officials of the government regularly ignored LNP officers attempting to flag them down (Sieh 2016).

The continued incidents of mob violence and extra-judicial lynching exemplifies the public’s lack of trust in the judicial system, which harms trust in the LNP. There has been no
change in the occurrence of these events from prior to the development of the LNP to after.

Even if the LNP are able to successfully arrest a suspect, the lack of a genuine court system hampers their legitimacy. These mobs are dually troublesome. First, they display the lack of trust Liberians have in their state’s justice sector. Second, it forces violent interactions with the LNP, and place the LNP in situations in which they must quell riots, rather than developing community policing. If the LNP is to become more legitimate, the incidents of mob violence should subside. Recent reporting does not indicate that mob violence has decreased.

**Conclusion**

The development of the LNP has tended more toward failure than success. Reiterating the various flaws in the LNP would be redundant. Few of the goals for the LNP can honestly be assessed as being met. This does not mean that the intervention has been an abject failure. In the area of women’s rights, the LNP has had success. Bacon noted that the LNP has met two goals well: First, *representation*, through the Education Support Programme, as the percentage of female officers rose from 2% to 17%. Second, *responsiveness*, by supporting the Women and Children's Protection Section of the LNP, the LNP improved its response to sexual and gender based violence reports (Bacon 2015). This is one bright spot among failure in other areas.

The international community and Liberians generally agreed on their goals for the police, but goal divergence was evident in the level political control of the LNP elected officials should have. First, although police forces should remain apolitical, it became clear that Liberia’s history of police forces controlled strongly by the executive was not going to change. To what extent this hindered the LNP is unclear—there are few complaints that President Sirleaf-
Johnson has used the LNP as a political pawn. Second, and more pivotal was a divergence in commitment to developing a strong LNP. Liberians wanted tough, robust security forces. The international community did not seem willing to spend the money to deliver that. The intervention must be placed in a global context. In late 2003, the US was heavily involved in Iraq, and unwilling/incapable of providing decisive support. The UN was still involved in its most ambitious interventions yet—Kosovo and Timor-Leste—and was experiencing donor fatigue of its own. Also, European countries have traditionally left the lead for development in Africa to the old colonial power in that region. Uniquely for Liberia, that meant a reliance on a US reticent to engage in another post-conflict state. This meant conducting the intervention ‘on the cheap,’ in contrast to other cases.

Structurally, UNMIL’s inability to take full control of the LNP hindered the development of mid and higher level leadership based on merit. While the NPA was training new recruits for a new LNP, the core of the force began with old members of the LNP, and gave political control to the Liberian government immediately. So, these new recruits—some of which were rushed into service under abbreviated training periods—entered the LNP, they entered an already poisoned organization that had not fully purged the demons of its past.

UNMIL’s UN Police deployments favored riot control over mentorship. The number of UN Police in FPUs routinely outnumbered police advisors. UNMIL occasionally added FPU strength to deal with violence, but did not accordingly change advisor strength to better mentor the LNP. This showed a focus on short term security objective over the longer term need to develop LNP capabilities.
The size and disposition of the LNP set it up for failure. The LNP were too few in number to actually be able to conduct the international community’s goal of community policing; in addition, the lack of any type of transportation—vehicles, motorcycles, or even bicycles—meant that the LNP had no reach into the communities outside of Monrovia. In a country where the rainy season makes most roads impassable, better transportation assets or more LNP to establish a presence off the main road is vital.

The Liberia example did not align with the standard model for police development, and its outcomes were not successful. I will now revisit each major hypothesis in relation to the results from the Liberia mission.

**H1: Goal incongruence/congruence between the host nation and donors has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.**

Goal incongruence had a negative effect on the outcome of the police development. Liberians consistently wanted a police force larger than the one the international community planned for. The difference in goals for the size of the LNP—from UNMIL’s planned 4,200 to the Liberian government’s change to 8,000—represents an almost 100% difference in numbers of LNP between the donors and the hosts. Due to Liberia’s poverty, it was at the mercy of international funding to create and maintain the LNP. Hence, UNMIL was free to dictate the size of the LNP, preferring a smaller force that it felt the Liberians would be more capable of affording. Of course, “affordable” depends on what portion of the LNP budget donors were willing to subsidize, which in this case did not seem to be much beyond what was necessary to stand up the LNP. The logic of both sides makes sense, with the Liberians valuing security and
the international community valuing financial sustainability. However, these two were at odds with one another.

The second area of goal incongruence was the political control of the LNP. The Liberian government—and most Liberian political actors—preferred to have more political control of the LNP than UNMIL was comfortable with. This will continue to be an issue, as the LNP will increasingly have to deal with political manipulations of its hierarchy. Again, both sides are simply valuing two different things—democratic control versus professional autonomy. The difficulty is that both sides disagree on which to value more. This dissonance led to issues in the funding and development of the LNP. Could both sides have found common ground? Possibly, but they did not.

**H2: Structural issues can predetermine the outcome of police development, and deviations from the standard model has a negative effect on the outcome of police development.**

Structural dynamics seemed to have a negative effect on the outcome of the mission. While these structural impediments did not predetermine the outcome, they definitely hindered efforts toward success, and were detrimental.

First, there were too many security institutions. The LNP was the primary provider of security, but its mandate competed with over a dozen other organizations that provided security. This unnecessarily created competition and lack of unity of purpose within a bureaucratic politics paradigm. The fragmented provision of security hindered the development of a unified crime prevention strategy and confused ordinary Liberians as to
where to go for assistance. The ‘security hubs’ alleviated this confusion, but still had to deal with coordination among many agencies.

Of all the security services, paramilitary units such as the PSU and ERU were the ones that received the greatest amount of attention, in funding and manning. While they served important purposes, their growth came to the detriment of the LNP stations, which caused a de facto shift from community policing to more militaristic security provision. The security situation actually worsened, with increases in reported crimes and complaints of police corruption. In the long term, this only harmed perceptions of LNP capabilities. Current LNP re-emphasis on funding community policing initiatives indicates that this was true.

There was too much direct control of LNP by the president rather than the Ministry of Justice. This ties the legitimacy of the police directly to the president. In a country with a history of security services acting as pawns of tyrants, this is detrimental to the legitimacy of the police.

Last, there was never enough funding to adequately develop the LNP. This handicapped the entire endeavor. Pay issues hindered recruitment, equipment shortages hindered capacity, and sporadic funding stalled attempts at long term planning.

**H3: The agency of individuals has an effect on the outcome of police development.**

The effects of the actions of actors involved in Liberia were mixed. The international community made some missteps, but the Liberians elected to power the best person that they could have hoped for.
The talents of the police trainers did not meet the mission’s requirements. UNMIL had issues with trainers that taught the British model of policing rather than the American policing model that Liberians expected. In addition, the decision to lower entry requirements to meet quota targets, and unnecessarily accelerating training to meet said targets, lowered the overall quality of the LNP. This in turn reduced public confidence in the LNP. However, these issues did not seem to inordinately doom the intervention.

In fact, the elevation of Eleanor Sirleaf-Johnson to the presidency shows that the decisions of the president had little impact on the police development compared to goal incongruence and structural deficiencies. Sirleaf-Johnson’s commitment to human rights and democratic values received international praise, and yet, the LNP development was not successful. This shows that her actions were already constrained by the failures in structure and goal congruence that reduced her ability to affect the outcome of the intervention in a significant manner.
CHAPTER 6. TIMOR-LESTE

*If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality.*

Desmond Tutu

Introduction

This case is composed of two unique cases. Overall, this chapter inspects the development of the police in Timor-Leste from the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in June 1999 until March 27, 2011, when the UN handed-off operational control of the police force to the Timor-Leste authorities, and shortly before the United Nations ended its peacekeeping mission on 31 December 2011.

However, the UN conducted five missions over this time span. The first four missions saw a ramp up and drawdown of the UN presence in Timor-Leste, until all but a small international presence departed the nation. Then, a resurgence of violence in 2006 highlighted the intense internal political tensions and led to another UN mission that significantly increased international presence once again, and remained until the end of the case period. So, while this chapter deals with Timor-Leste as a single case, it actually divides it into two cases: the first, from 1999 until the violence of 2006 (UNAMET-UNOTIL period); and the second, beginning at the violence of 2006 and ending when the UN handed-off operational control of the police force in 2011 (UNMIT period). This allows a good comparison across very similar cases with some specific differences in the structures of the intervention.
Table 6-1. United Nations Missions in Timor-Leste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>June 1999-October 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>October 1999-May 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>May 2002-May 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>May 2005-August 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>August 2006-December 2012</td>
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This chapter will begin by describing the situation that led to the international intervention in Timor-Leste in 1999, and discuss the resumption of violence in 2006. It will then establish the differing goals between donors and the government of Timor-Leste, and how those changed over time. Then, it will discuss the structure of the international intervention, and the police force it established, before addressing any notable actions by actors over time. Finally, it will assess what level of success the intervention achieved.

Background

Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony for over four hundred years, separate from Dutch Indonesia. Indonesian control commenced after the fall of Portugal’s dictatorship in 1974 and subsequent Indonesian invasion and occupation in 1975. By 1978 Australia recognized Indonesian control of Timor-Leste, but this never gained support of the local population or the rest of the international community. Violence remained common as groups in Timor-Leste resisted Indonesian authority and Indonesia harshly cracked down on resistance.

Not much would change, until BJ Habibie replaced Suharto as president of Indonesia in 1998. The end of Suharto’s reign began earnest dialogue with the UN and the surprising announcement of a referendum for East Timorese autonomy, supervised by UNAMET (M. G. Smith 2003, 42–45). On August 5, 1998, negotiations began, under the auspices of the UN
Secretary-General, on the possibility of a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for Timor-Leste. The result was an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal that established a constitutional framework that would place Timor-Leste under the Indonesian government, but with substantial autonomy. It also required a UN mission and a local plebiscite on the framework. The alternative would result in independence for Timor-Leste. Therefore, the UN established UNAMET to “organize and conduct a popular consultation in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept or reject the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia,” with an authorized strength of 241 international staff members and 420 United Nations Volunteers, up to 280 civilian police, as well as some 4,000 local staff (UN Security Council 1999a). Leading up to the ballot in 1999 there was observed intimidation from both pro-autonomy and pro-integration groups (UN Security Council 1999b). In April, two churches were attacked, resulting in more than fifty deaths in each instance (Tanter, Ball, and Klinken 2006, xxxiii–xxxv). Later, on May 16th, there was an attack on independence activists in the village of Atara, and in June the UNAMET office in Maliana was attacked, most probably by pro-Indonesian militias, while Indonesia claimed an inability to stop such violence (Nevins 2005, 83–87). Indonesian police remained responsible for security during the interim period, and probably tolerated this violence. On August 30th, East Timorese voted overwhelmingly against being an autonomous province of Indonesia—344,580 to 94,388—paving the way for independence (UN Security Council 1999d). Immediately following that ballot, widespread violence ensued. Within days, violence had caused many local deaths, including four local UN staff, as pro-Indonesian militias swept throughout the country, “firing guns, burning houses and terrorizing” locals and
foreigners alike, leading to the UN evacuation of Ainaro, Same, Lospalos, Lik isia, Aileu, Ermera and Maliana. In many cases, the police had been complicit in the violence, allowing militias to pass by them unhindered (Aglionby and Gittings 1999). This lack of stability necessitated the Australian-led peace enforcement mission, The International Force East Timor (INTERFET). The eventual administration of the country fell on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), organized in three pillars—a military force, which replaced INTERFET in February 2000, humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation pillar, and governance and public administration. The latter pillar oversaw the CIVPOL mission, which began training and establishing the East Timor Police Service (ETPS\textsuperscript{35}). While slow to develop, the East Timorese police eventually experienced many successes (M. G. Smith 2003, 60–63). UN Security Council Resolution 1272 authorized 1,640 CIVPOL and 8,950 troops for UNTAET to accomplish its goals.\textsuperscript{36} The timeline was rapid, as Timor-Leste would gain independence in 2002, before UNTAET could reasonably achieve all its objectives. Instead, UNTAET transitioned to the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET) on 20 May 2002.

Independence in 2002 ceased de facto UN control of Timor-Leste, but did not stop international involvement in the country. Since independence there has been an ongoing effort to train and professionalize the ETPS, now dubbed the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).

\textsuperscript{35} The official name of the police changed multiple times, but is currently the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). In 2002 it had three names: the East Timor Police Service (ETPS), the Timor-Leste Police Service (TLPS) and finally the PNTL. In order to avoid confusion, the Timorese police are referred to generally as the PNTL, regardless of the time period.

\textsuperscript{36} According to UNSCR 1272 of October 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1999, these were: To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; To establish an effective administration; To assist in the development of civil and social services; To support capacity-building for self-government; To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.
The Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) is an initiative of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) that has worked to improve PNTL—in varying forms since 2004.37 The staff has a diverse background, “contributing different perspectives to influence and shape approaches to capacity building” (Security, Development and Nation-Building in Timor-Leste: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment 2011, 151). The PNTL has gradually increased, and there has been considerable assistance and mentorship between international actors and the PNTL.

The security situation during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period was generally stable, though there were signs that the security situation was worse than the international community believed—for example on December 4th, 2002, when riots in Dili caused massive damage, and was followed up by various attacks, and reports of militia bases popping up to foment instability (UN Security Council 2003a). However, the international presence served to contain these events and keep tensions at bay. By 2006, much of that presence had departed—leaving security to the PNTL and the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL).38 These two forces lacked the capacity to provide security and were sullied by political control, pitting each side against the other.

The events of 2006 slowly unfolded over a period of months, eventually leading to a dissolution of the government. On February 8th, 2006, hundreds of members of the armed forces demonstrated against the government in Dili, demanding actions concerning pension payments, alleged discrimination in promotions, and ill-treatment, in particular against

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37 The TLPDP was a bilateral institution between Australia (with UK support) and Timor-Leste, established due to increasing concern over the lack of progress by the UN in institutional development of the PNTL.

38 In Portuguese, F-FDTL is Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste.
members from western areas of the country. In mid-March the government dismissed 591 soldiers—representing almost 40 per cent of the F-FDTL (UN Security Council 2006b). Then, on April 24th, the dismissed soldiers, known as the “petitioners,” led demonstrations again. Though initially peaceful, by the fifth day events became violent when protestors attacked the main government building, causing serious injury to a PNTL officer and the destruction of property and vehicles. The government then mobilized the F-FDTL to restore order, even though the rioters were recently dismissed soldiers and their supporters. In what increasingly became a west/east schism within Timor-Leste, the commander of the military police, Major Alfredo Reinado, hailing from the west of the country, broke away from the F-FDTL on May 3rd. Five days later, protestors in Gleno attacked two unarmed PNTL officers of eastern origin, causing the death of one and serious injury to the other. Reinado then attacked F-FDTL soldiers and PNTL officers in Dili, further separating the security forces along eastern/western lines. Then, on May 25th, members of F-FDTL, attacked and surrounded the PNTL national headquarters and the PNTL Dili district headquarters. After a negotiated agreement brokered by the UNOTIL Chief Police Training Adviser to allow PNTL officers to leave the PNTL headquarters under United Nations auspices, F-FDTL soldiers opened fire on the unarmed group, killing eight PNTL officers and injuring more than 25, including two UNOTIL police training advisers. Law and order broke down in Dili as the national and Dili district headquarters of PNTL disintegrated (UN Security Council 2006c). The government had to call for international troops to quell the violence and reassert authority. While the collapse of the police was the decisive blow, the crisis highlighted the intense internal political tensions that caused the instability (Della-Giacoma 2010).
The violence of 2006 forced the UN to establish the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which remained the UN’s mission until December 2012. UNMIT was akin to pressing a “reset button” on the development of the PNTL. While the government of Timor-Leste remained in control of the country, the PNTL and F-FDTL once again fell under the control of the UN. Since the size of the UN was negligible by 2006, the UNMIT mission constituted a dramatic shift in the intervention.

Goals

In general, the overarching goals of rapid independence and handover of responsibilities were mutual between the leaders of Timor-Leste and the international community during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period. There were differences in more specific policy goals, as neither side was in agreement over what the PNTL would do and be responsible for. However, the rapid handover from the UN to the government eased these differences.

During the UNMIT period these differences became starker, as the UN dictated responsibilities, command structures, and duties in ways different than the government desired. This will be addressed in greater detail later in the chapter.

In this section, I will discuss the international and Timorese goals, noting the incongruities amongst each group. The UN favored short term solutions, but some countries operated outside the framework of the UN to pursue objectives of long term sustainability. The Timorese were similarly divided by goals, along geographic and political lines. Combined, these issues display goal incongruity in the mission.
Foreign governmental donors in Timor-Leste can be divided into two general categories: the UN and bilateral partners. Most prominently, Portugal, as the former colonial power, and Australia, as the regional power, contributed troops, police, and personnel as part of and outside of UN auspices. Where the UN’s actions seemed inadequate, Australia and Portugal created programs they felt addressed the shortfall. The United States’ direct relations with Timor-Leste included some ICITAP training programs for the PNTL and economic development initiatives, but the level of commitment was smaller than US involvement in the other cases. Total annual spending by the US only ranged between $20 million and $30 million, by all US agencies (USAID 2016).

The UN lacked a coherent plan at the outset of the intervention, both in the political transition to independence and especially in the development of the police. Edward Rees, the Political Officer to the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy in Timor-Leste described the process of establishing the police force as “made in a spirit of political and practical expediency rather than with a view to the long-term development of East Timor. A few UN officials in conjunction with a narrow section of the East Timorese leadership guided the process” (Rees 2003). The original plan was to develop a police force of 3,000 by the end of April 2003, though there was no justification for why that figure was decided upon (UN Security Council 2001b). That would soon change to a goal of 2,600 officers, including 180 officers with specialized training in crowd management (UN Security Council 2002a). Underscoring the lack

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39 By design or not, this resulted in the institutionalization of old political rivalries into the military and the police, as competing parties jockied to gain membership in the ranks of each service. I will expand on this thought in the next section.
of strategic planning, it was not until 2002 that the UN explicitly laid out the mission of the UN Police undertaking, which was to “support the development of the East Timor Police Service, ensuring transfer of skills and timely handover of responsibilities, documentation and assets from CivPol to East Timor Police Service and relevant public administration departments,” and to “provide executive policing in cooperation with the East Timorese police and relevant public administration departments” (UN Security Council 2002a). Throughout the early years, it was evident that the UN aimed to develop a police force similar to other interventions at the time, promoting citizen’s rights above the interests of an ethnic group or the state, along the lines of Western models of policing (Peake 2008).

During the UNMIT mission, the urgency of withdrawal was less present, but the overall goal seemed to be maintaining stability rather than the development of long term institutional capacity. In addition, the UN had side goal to ‘save face’ after the disaster of 2006.

Located less than 200 miles from Darwin, the violence in Timor-Leste was especially close to Australia. Australia was asserting itself as a regional power, maintaining relations with Indonesia, and hoping to resolve territorial questions in the Timor Sea. Overall, Australia valued long term stability over shorter term solutions, acutely aware that its proximity to Timor-Leste disallowed it from extracting completely from the region.

Host

The main cleavage in the Timorese government was political parties. These parties traced their lineages back to struggles for independence, and developed strong followings. These parties had opposing goals that can be traced back to their founding.
Political Identity in Timor-Leste is associated with past level of involvement in the resistance to Indonesian occupation. This cleavage, evident in whom actively opposed Indonesian rule and those who tacitly allowed it by not fighting it, underpins the divisions of loyalties. These identities formed after independence, as symbolic claims of recognition for contributions to the resistance or suffering at the hands of the occupation, molded by the legacy being a Portuguese colony for 450 years (Leach 2017, 1–5). Part of the reason for this identity formation is the inability to tie the nation together culturally. In that realm, the future president, Jose Ramos-Horta, described the nation as “at the crossroads of three major cultures: Melanesian, which binds us to our brothers and sisters of the South Pacific region; Malay-Polynesian binding us to Southeast Asia; and the Latin Catholic influence, a legacy of almost 500 years of Portuguese colonisation” (Ramos-Horta 1996). Therefore, politics became the decisive factor of identification, which, due to regional disparities in political affiliation, became an east-west rift during the quarter century before independence in 2000.

The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN⁴⁰) formed as a political party around 1975, in response to the Indonesian invasion and occupation at that time, and The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) formed as the military wing of the party. Originally a Marxist movement, Xanana Gusmao—who became the first president of Timor-Leste—modified its political position to become more inclusive and less traditionally Marxist. This led to a division within the organization and in 1987 Gusmao formally separated FALINTIL from FRETILIN (Kingsbury 2007). Upon independence, FALINTIL members felt they

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⁴⁰ In Portuguese, it is Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, hence the FReTiLiIn moniker.
deserved compensation for their service toward independence and felt that they should constitute the armed forces. FALINTIL members would dominate the parliament of the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, with 55 seats in the 88-seat Assembly. FALINTIL consistently called for full independence as soon as possible. FALINTIL’s control of the government allowed it to dictate policy, and its guerilla origins and violent past favored funding the military—which the party dominated numerically and politically—over the police. However, FALINTIL’s “primary aim was to ensure that future recruitment favour veterans - presumably of their political stripe - thus politicising the police service in much the same way that the defence force had been politicised with Gusmão loyalists” (Rees 2003).

The Committee for the Popular Defense of the Republic of Democratic Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) represented the extreme left of the Falintil movement who rejected elections, the U.N. presence, and the construction of a new constitution, demanding that Timor-Leste return to its original 1975 constitution promulgated by Fretilin. Though they did not join the political process, they operated like a neo-Nazi movement, using intimidation to further their cause (A. L. Smith 2004). As an example of their power, CPD-RDTL celebrations of national holidays were better attended than government celebrations. Scambary notes the rivalries present in 1999, stating that “antipathy between the Government, the military and the CPD-RDTL was intense, and both Timorese political leaders and UNTAET officials also regularly denounced this group in public speeches for its perceived threat to national security” (Scambary 2009). CPD-RDTL favored building a police force from scratch that only included veterans of the pro-independence movements, though their main concern was getting members into the F-FDTL, since Gusmao had populated with his own FRETILIN loyalists. However, lacking membership in
the police, they resented the recruitment of police that previously served under Indonesian rule.

Martial Arts groups were a unique entity in Timor-Leste, especially in the capitol of Dili. There are over a dozen known martial arts groups, comprised of 20,000 registered and 90,000 unregistered members. It is possible that as many as 70 per cent of males in Timor-Leste are members of martial arts groups, and though they are mainly populated by youths, their members also include members of the police, army and political and economic elite (Scambary 2009). Serving purposes such as local protection or civil interaction, some groups became criminal syndicates (A. L. Smith 2004). Acting as an informal security broker, the martial arts groups wanted a police force that would not threaten the free reign they enjoyed in their power centers in the urban areas.

After the 2006 violence, President Gusmao formed the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) to oppose FRETILIN in the 2007 elections. CNRT’s politics are more centered than FRETILIN. The fact that these parties all formed from a common background shows that the differences are as much personal as political.

Structures

The UN deployed a police force that was haphazardly formed, constantly changing, and unable to effectively train Timorese to be police. Likewise, the UN built the PNTL too rapidly and with disregard to local desires. The PNTL did not have a clear plan for how it should execute policing. Exacerbating this, the constitution of Timor-Leste allowed too much political interference of the police, allowing the PNTL to become a pawn of political party rivalries.
Intervention Force

The general structure of international involvement was similar to Kosovo and Liberia, except that frustration with the UN increasingly led to bilateral development agreements, primarily with the World Bank, Portugal, and Australia. These agreements did not begin in earnest until around 2004. Still, the UN remained the lead agency for development in Timor-Leste, especially in regard to the PNTL.

The UN Police Component structure in the UNAMET-UNOTIL period was in such flux that its organization was constantly changing. This is partly due to the constantly changing UN missions, with their own discrete mandates, reflecting a lack of continuity from the highest levels. It never actually settled on a stable basis. This partly explains the lack of coordination within UNPOL during that period. During the UNMIT period, the Police Component’s organization and size was much more stable. The UNPOL Police Commissioner led the Police Component, with deputies for operations and administration & development. The organizational chart shown in appendix B shows the large number of centralized units and departments in UNMIT. The district commanders were assisted by a deputy, but little else. This was a highly centralized structure, which would rely on expertise at the center—more on that later.

The size of the UNPOL force rarely reached stasis during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period. As Table 2 shows, it took about eighteen months to reach peak size, and only remained at that staffing level for another eighteen months before beginning a precipitous decline. How many UNPOL were needed—and by consequence, what their jobs would be—seemed to be a point of confusion. An early report from the SRSG declared that 410 UNPOL were enough to enable the
UN to operate in all thirteen districts, and fifty training personnel could run recruitment and training of the new police force (UN Security Council 1999c). That the size of the force experienced a roughly 50% reduction in size per year after 2002 is then not surprising—it did not seem that outcomes were as important as reducing numbers. However, this was in contradiction to critiques about the development of Timorese security services: “at independence on 20 May 2002, neither the ETPS nor the FDTL were ready to take over full responsibility for public security and external defense” (President and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 135). The UN, pointing at declining violence figures, felt that they were withdrawing from a job well done, while ignoring the lack of real development they had accomplished.

On the other hand, the size of the UN Police commitment during the UNMIT period was roughly stable over four years. Though only slightly larger than during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, the UN Police reached near peak size in only about six months—impressive by most intervention standards. This steady state contrasts sharply with the earlier missions. While this may have frustrated Timorese desires to regain control of their country, it allowed more time for the UN to mentor their counterparts at all levels. Interestingly, in contrast to the large numbers of UN troops that had been present during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, only a few dozen military observers were present during the UNMIT period.

From 2000-2011, the UN utilized FPUs to control riots or quell general disorder. During the UNAMET-UNOTIL period this task usually consisted of one or two FPUs. During the UNMIT period, four FPUs consisting of 125 officers each constituted 500 of the 1,608 authorized personnel (UN Security Council 2006c). FPUs, as large units specializing in riot control rather
than small groups focused on community policing, represented a more military-style stance toward the police intervention, but also accounted for the lack of UN troops during that time.

UN Police began embedding themselves down to the district level as early as 2000, and there was a desire to have representation down to the sub-district level (UN Security Council 2000). However, it is unclear just how much saturation the early missions achieved. The constant fluctuations of missions hindered the ability to adequately staff posts outside of Dili. The UNMIT period was a little more organized; The UN outlined a plan to deploy 640 officers outside of Dili, with three of the twelve PNTL district headquarters outside Dili staffed with up to 17 officers each, and the other nine district headquarters staffed with up to 13 officers each. Additionally, the UN planned for up to eight officers to be located at each of 59 sub-district police stations (UN Security Council 2006c). This more precise delineation of where UN Police would operate stood in sharp contrast from the generalizations of earlier missions merely expressing a desire to operate at the lower levels.

The UN Police force was structured, like most UN interventions, from a diverse mix of contributing countries. This created some problems. First, language was a large barrier. In a country that did not even have a common language of its own, UN Police came with varying levels of fluency in English or Portuguese. Add to that the fact that many UN Police could not even communicate with each other well, then the issue gets even worse. Pre deployment training did not seem very thorough. It is unclear how much some officers received, and the mission had to create courses in country for tasks as simple as driving due to high accident levels. Last, the personnel served short six month tours—some shorter. The UN itself lamented
that “the high turnover of UNMIT police officers through rotation further affects mentoring efforts” (UN Security Council 2008a).

Based on this lack of qualified personnel, it is no surprise that the mission lacked any guiding principles. Unfortunately, there did not seem to be much focus on a unified plan to conduct security sector reform. As previously stated, the PNTL had three names in the space of a few months in 2002: the East Timor Police Service (ETPS), the Timor-Leste Police Service (TLPS) and finally the PNTL. Simple, building block aspects over the name or size of the PNTL were constantly in flux. It seemed that the UN was planning the mission blindly. Indeed, the CIVPOL and UN staff were routinely writing two different development plans being written, often with blissful ignorance of each other (Peake 2008). Ludovic Hood described UN activities as ad hoc, without thorough planning or systematic analysis, and ignorant of doctrine or lessons learned in other interventions (Hood 2006b).

For their part, the UN thought they were succeeding in developing the PNTL prior to the 2006 violence. The SRSG touted achievements in training crime scene investigation and evidence handling, autopsy procedure, defensive tactics and crowd control, and domestic violence awareness. He also reported increasing PNTL capabilities, along with an updating of the PNTL’s standard operating procedures once the Organic Law passed in 2004 (UN Security Council 2004b). The optimistic tone of the SRSG’s reports belied the underlying structural weaknesses in the PNTL, and possibly harmed the mission. Rather than focus on community policing, UNOTIL focused on developing the specialized units such as the Police Reserve Unit, the Rapid Intervention Unit and the Immigration and Marine Unit, teaching forty specialized courses targeting to 893 members of the specialized units (UN Security Council 2006a).
The UNMIT period was slightly different, in that the police development actually began as a multinational civilian policing program by Australia, Portugal, New Zealand, and Malaysia. The 500-600 police these countries provided in the aftermath of the 2006 violence transitioned to UN policing over the last three months of 2006. By the Australian account, this transition “proved problematic,” as the UN struggled to effectively absorb the international police into its structure (Australian Federal Police 2007). The slightly different beginnings did not seem to drastically change the focus of the mission. It still favored training technical expertise over institutional competencies such as change management or the “political expertise necessary to negotiate, motivate, and cajole leadership within the government and the security services” (Yoshino Funaki 2009). In addition, the mission seemed similarly disorganized. Gordon Peake noted that there was almost no continuation documents at the mission, and that most had to be found by google (Peake 2008). It is hard to adhere to organizational principles and actions when most of the organization lacks a doctrinal reference to what those principles and actions actually are.

**Police**

Australia, under the auspices of UNTAET, began the first training class of the police in February 2000 with fifty trainees. Basic training lasted three months and was followed by up to six months of field training (UN Security Council 2000). This was later expanded to six months of basic training in 2004 (UN Security Council 2003c). Recruits only received a portion of that time in training due to translation. UN Police spoke primarily English, though few Timorese could speak it. Therefore, it was possible that they could only complete one month of training
in three months. Until 2004, US government’s International Criminal Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP) provided classroom instruction at the police college (Hood 2006a).

The training program was not uniform. In an effort to speed production of numbers of police officers, ICITAP allowed hundreds of former Indonesian National Police Officers (POLRI) to enter the police. Not only was this questionable—these men represented the old occupying force—but they received special treatment. Their training was fast-tracked so that they went into service after only one month of training and were placed on a career fast track by receiving higher rank than other recruits. Rather than build a force from scratch, the recruitment of former Indonesian government police de facto allowed the re-introduction of the POLRI. A senior international police investigator described it as “a very negative thing to do,” claiming the former POLRI officers found no interest whatsoever in his services. In terms of force development, another trainer commented that “when you don't take the time to cultivate the leaders with the right competence and attitudes, you end up with a force that is unstable and ridden with internal conflict. . . . With the PNTL, this went wrong from the start” (Simonsen 2006).
Table 6-2. Size Progression of UN Police, UN Troops, and PNTL, 2000-2006.

The transition to PNTL control during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period was rapid. Command and control was initially under the SRSG, but force development and administration were left to the nascent police service (UN Security Council 2001c). The actual transition plan did not fully form until independence in 2002. This plan called for the UN to pass operational control at the district level once officers are “accredited,” for the police to reach their full strength by June 2003, and assume the full executive role for policing in January 2004 (UN Security Council 2002b). By November 2002 the PNTL had taken oven in Manatuto, Aileu, Manufahi, Ainaro districts. At the time the SRSG reported no issues with the handover, though there was a lack of transportation, communications, and other equipment (UN Security Council 2002c).

Throughout the transition period it became clear that the focus was on producing the proper amount of PNTL officers rather than ensuring quality capacity development of the PNTL. Much
of the transition was justified by dropping violence rates, though there was little evidence that
the PNTL were the contributing factor to that decrease. In fact, taking into account the rapid
decrease of UN troops, the total number of personnel providing security actually decreased
from 2002 to 2004 even as the PNTL increased in numbers. Instead, lowered violence was
more likely attributable to each political faction attempting to gain power in the government
than police performance—until 2006, when it became evident to many groups that those
attempts had failed.

The transition back to PNTL control during the UNMIT period was far less rapid. The
experience of 2006 made the UN far more hesitant to hand over control of the PNTL. Whereas
the UN handed over security responsibilities in about two and a half years during the UNAMET-
UNOTIL period, it held control of security for five years during the UNMIT period. Rather than
focus on producing quantities of officers—which were still an issue, as they had to re-certify all
officers of the PNTL—the UN was keener to establish criteria more closely aligned with capacity
to justify allowing the PNTL to resume responsibility. The criteria the UN established by 2009
for handover was:

(a) The ability of the national police to respond appropriately to the security
environment in a given district;

(b) The final certification of at least 80 per cent of eligible officers in a given district or
unit to resume primary policing responsibility;

(c) The availability of initial operational logistical requirements; and
(d) institutional stability, which includes, inter alia, the ability to exercise command and control, and community acceptance (UN Security Council 2009b)

As an example of the measured pace and rigorous vetting process that differentiated the UNMIT period from the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, it was not until January 2010 that the PNTL had resumed primary policing responsibilities in four of thirteen districts (Lautem, Manatuto, Oecussi and Viqueque) and the Police Training Center, Maritime Unit and Intelligence Service (UN Security Council 2010a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UN Police</th>
<th>UN Troops</th>
<th>‘Vetted’ PNTL</th>
<th>‘Fully Certified’ PNTL</th>
<th>District control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3,155</td>
<td>4/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>8/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>10/13</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>13/13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reports of the Secretary General.

**Table 6-3. Size Progression of UN Police, UN Troops, and PNTL, 2006-2011.**

The structure of the post-2006 rebuilding of the PNTL was different than before. The development of the force had previously involved building a throughput of recruits from scratch through initial entry training at the Police College. After the 2006 violence there was already a trained cadre of PNTL officers, but some of them had sullied themselves during the violence. Therefore, the reconstitution of the PNTL involved vetting and recertification. The
vetting involved a simple background check, but full recertification required each officer to conduct three weeks of additional training, with topics that included, among others, human rights. Much of the PNTL were eventually certified, but a few dozen were not due to allegations of abuse or human rights violations. There were reports of the UN ‘rushing through’ the certification process in order to complete the training, but there was also frustration in many districts where the PNTL had not evaporated, that they even had to recertify themselves. Overall, 3115 of 3189 PNTLs in service before 2006 were registered by December 2007, and 900 PNTLs were investigated for alleged misbehavior during the 2006 violence, but only fifteen were suspected of serious crimes. Those cleared of all allegations took an additional five-day refresher course at the Police Academy, followed by a mentoring process before applying for final certification (Lemay-Hébert 2009).

The PNTL lacked a coherent doctrine for how it should conduct policing. The UN nominally advocated for ‘community policing’ as a linchpin of the PNTL, but no document actively defines it for a decade. One Asian spin on community policing, taken from the Japanese who contributed to the police development program, was the implementation of suco police posts.41 These were essentially one man police posts intended to act as designated community liaisons that emulated the Japanese Koban (police boxes), where only a few officers are assigned to a post in an area, and usually only one remains on shift at a time. Between 2004 and 2005, the PNTL established 118 suco police posts.42 However, by 2005—perhaps due

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41 Sucos are administrative posts, which are essentially sub-sub-districts (a conglomeration of Sucos would constitute a sub district); there are 442 of them in Timor-Leste.
42 I cannot definitively declare whether the establishment of the sucos was a result of Timorese or international desires. However, Decree Law 5/2004 of April 2004 stated that suco chiefs “should provide for the creation of grassroots structures for the settlement and resolution of minor disputes” and delegated prevention and punishment
to political preferences of the Interior Minister Roger Lobato—the Ministry of Interior began abandoning the suco police posts in favor of developing specialized police units for riot control, shifting the PNTL to a more militaristic style of policing (Wassel 2014). The goal incongruity between and among the UN and the FRETILIN government likely led to this inability to establish a continuous plan for how to conduct policing.

The violence of 2006 forced the UN to revitalize community policing as a tenet of PNTL policing. On February 18, 2009 the government revised the PNTL Organic Decree-Law No. 8/2004, and replaced it with the PNTL Organic Decree-Law No. 9/2009 (Wassel and Rajalingam 2013). The 2009 law enshrined the concept of community policing as both the strategy and approach of the PNTL, and decentralized implementation authority to district commanders. This seemed to come as a result of UN prodding, and lacked buy in from the Timorese. The Timorese government’s early drafts of the organic law appeared to favor a more military style of policing, but came under vocal pressure from donors and UNMIT to include a community policing philosophy and unit. So, while community policing was included, it was copied from other developed nations out of the financial or developmental context of the PNTL (Wassel 2014). This lack of contextual customization reflected a failure on UNMIT to address local concerns. As a result, the Timorese were reticent to put effort toward community policing.

The 2009 law also made structural changes to the PNTL and its place in the government. It transferred the PNTL from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense and Security. It also specifically tasked the PNTL to coordinate with the F-FDTL and the National Intelligence...
Service to fight organized crime. The 2004 law made no mention of interagency coordination. In addition the 2009 law specifically dictates the selection of the PNTL General Commander and his Deputy to be “appointed by a resolution of the Council of Ministers acting on a proposal from the Minister in charge of Security and having sought the opinion of the Superior Council of the Police.” The Superior Council of the Police was comprised of all district commanders and special unit heads, with powers to issue opinions on a wide range of issues. Appendix A depicts the organizational structures described in the 2004 and 2009 laws, as best as can be built. It is apparent that there is much more effort to place capabilities down at the district command levels that allow district commanders to operate more autonomously with their own administrative sections and investigative units. Also, the new law created specialty departments within the General Command—Maritime, Border Patrol, Intelligence, and so on, that do not pose much conflict with the role of district commands. Also of note, the Special Police Unit is now a fully autonomous unit, with a military unit-like structure, which reports directly to the PNTL General Commander.

The lack of an all-encompassing, holistic SSR approach seems to be the most direct cause of the 2006 violence. A major structural weakness prior to the violence of 2006 was a lack of attention to the F-FDTL by the UN. UTAET and UNIMSET outsourced DDR of Falintil to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—which, oddly, specializes in migration issues, but conducted DDR alongside operating the internally displaced persons camps—and the quasi-independent Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD) led the planning and management assistance as well as bilateral military training to the F-FDTL. ODFD was actually created by the Timorese cabinet to do this. The UN also abdicated any role in the selection of
recruits, permitting Gusmao and his allies in the FALINTIL high command to decide upon the selection of recruits to the military (Hood 2006b). As a result of these structures established by UNTAET and UNIMSET, the F-FDTL became an entity independent of the government, completely partisan, and increasingly at odds with the PNTL. Not only did the F-FDTL consist of people hostile to the people that comprised the PNTL, but a lack of guidance on what its duties were inevitably led to jurisdictional conflicts with the PNTL.

The 2004 law on the police mentions The Professional Ethics Office in Article 13, though not much is said about its mandate other than that it is in charge of “inquiries, investigations and disciplinary processes as determined by the PNTL General Commander” (The Organic Law of the Timor-Leste National Police 2004). In 2009, the Office of General Inspection (OGI) replaced the PEO, and was given a more detailed mandate. The SRSG reported that the OGI was present at the district offices in order to respond to an increased need for implementation of disciplinary regulations and code of conduct. However, this was internal to the PNTL. As for community representatives or village chiefs, there was no channel in PNTL to address complaints against police officers who misused their authority or violate human rights (UN Security Council 2010a).

Host Government

The immediate governing body of Timor-Leste established by UNTAET in 1999 was the National Consultative Council of East Timor (NCC). The NCC had fifteen members: seven representatives from CNRT, including future president Gusmão; one from the Catholic Church; and one representative each from the Timorese Nationalist Party (PNT), and the Forum for
Unity, Democracy and Justice (FPDK)\textsuperscript{43}, and the People's Front of East Timor (BRTT)\textsuperscript{44}; seven representatives from UNTAET, and the Transitional Administrator acting as chairman (UN Security Council 2000). Under this arrangement, CNRT held a great deal of power in influencing the future direction of the country. This body was responsible for creating the constitution of Timor-Leste. The National Parliament’s predecessor, the Constituent Assembly\textsuperscript{45}, signed the constitution on March 22nd, 2002. It declared universal suffrage and created a government with a President, who would also be commander in chief of the Armed Forces, a Prime Minister, who would head a Council of Ministers, and a Parliament. The President’s powers would be limited by Parliament, and the President would be required to consult the latter, as well as the Council of State and a Supreme Council on Defence and Security, before declaring a state of emergency or siege (UN Security Council 2002b). When Gusmao became president, it meant that a CNRT leader held the presidency, while rival Falintil dominated the parliament.

The constitution allowed for political interference in the security sector. Of note, Part V (National Defence and Security) of the Constitution is very vague and gives little solid checks on political interference. Section 147 addresses the police, and has only three points: “1. The police shall defend the democratic legality and guarantee the internal security of the citizens, and shall be strictly non-partisan; 2. Prevention of crime shall be undertaken with due respect for human rights; 3. The law shall determine the rules and regulations for the police and other security forces.” The Superior Council for Defence and Security, discussed in Section 148, is

\textsuperscript{43} FPDK was the political conglomeration of pro-Indonesian militias.
\textsuperscript{44} BRTT split form FPDK due to FPDK’s more violent activities, and had supported autonomy under Indonesian rule.
\textsuperscript{45} Members of the Constituent Assembly were elected on August 30th, 2001, with one member from each of the thirteen districts, and seventy five by proportional representation.
“the consultative organ of the President of the Republic on matters relating to defence and
sovereignty...headed by the President,” composed of civilian and military entities, and
organized according to law (Constituent Assembly of Timor-Leste 2016). So, from this
framework, it is easy to see how politicians could erode the ‘non-partisan’ ideals on the PNTL.

In 2003, Luis Manuel Andre Elias, the Deputy Commissioner for Police Development during
UNMISET, seemed optimistic about the development process, but gave a prescient warning:
“Lack of formal mechanisms to protect the police from political interference in areas like
operational command and control, recruitment and promotion may generate instability within
Timorese Police” (Azimi and Lin 2003, 83).

While initially a centralized structure, the government of Timor-Leste began to
decentralize over time. The government encouraged formation of village based security groups
in 2003 and began bestowing increased legitimacy on local leaders (UN Security Council 2003b).
The first local elections were held in two districts in December 2004 (UN Security Council 2005).

The justice sector never developed the capacity to meet the legal needs of Timor-Leste.
Even by 2005, the SRSG reported that UNMISET civilian advisers have had to perform as judges,
public defenders, prosecutors and court administrators at both the Court of Appeal and district
courts (UN Security Council 2005). There was little human capital available to fill the ranks of
the judiciary, and even then the system was plagued by mismanagement and corruption.

Agency

The actions of individuals did not significantly affect the outcome of the police
development mission. The UN personnel in charge of the mission rotated too frequently to
build a lasting strategy, and the decision to favor a more militarized policing model after the flare up of violence may have harmed the popular legitimacy of the police. From a human talent perspective, people were not managed well. Civilian police lacked language, conflict, or cultural skills necessary to succeed, and the recruits taken into to PNTL were former police under Indonesian rule that were not able to shed the alienation of their past affiliation with an oppressive government.

One major event that affected stability occurred outside of any major actor’s decisions. The former military police commander, Alfredo Reinado, refused to come to justice for his role in the 2006 violence, and his presence was a destabilizing force in the country. Then, on February 11, 2008, he was killed while conducting attacks against the President, José Ramos-Horta, and the Prime Minister, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão. The attacks nearly killed the President (UN Security Council 2008b). In one event, the most defiant element of the government had been eliminated—of his own actions—and the president and prime minister became people for the country to rally around. It was a fortuitous event on many accounts and was a major influence on the stability enjoyed during the UNMIT period.

**UN**

The SRSG was the highest ranking official in Timor-Leste. This ranking applied to the UN and the Timorese government, since the UN retained many powers over governance. This role made the SRSG a ‘benevolent dictator,’ being unelected yet making decisions in the best interest of the Timorese people. Like a benevolent dictator, there were few checks on the SRSG’s decisions, so the person serving as the SRSG could exert their influence on the entire process. Disregarding some shorter tenures, the SRSGs served for two to three years. They
were, for the most part, more skilled in diplomacy than organizational management. This may have been a more important trait for the position—agency heads routinely devote more time external to their agency than inside it—the lack of political discord among the interveners meant this was a less complex task than say, Kosovo. It would be speculation to tie the poor management of the UN missions to these individuals, but as the heads of the missions, they must bear some responsibility.

Table 6-4. Special Representatives to the Secretary General

During the UNTAET-UNOTIL period the leadership positions of the UN Police mission were contingent upon the appointees’ nationalities, rather than expertise and experience. The UN seemed eager to hand the reins to countries that had historical ties to Timor-Leste. Poor performance was rarely censured (Hood 2006a). Table 5 shows the Police Commissioners in Timor-Leste. It shows that until Luis Miguel Carrilho served for three years, most Police Commissioners served about eighteen months in their posts. Though this is not extremely short, eighteen months may not have been long enough to fully address the mission. Also, none of the Commissioners were removed early due to any failures—they served their appointed terms with little oversight for performance.
One major decision that changed the development of the police was how it changed its structure after each flare up of violence. In 2003, after riots in Dili, the UN adjusted its strategy to add more international FPUs, and focus on riot training for the PNTL. This occurred again after 2006, when the UN introduced the highest amount of FPUs yet. The majority of UNMIT police focused on Dili, and did not start deploying small elements to the outlying districts until November 2006, months after the violence (UN Security Council 2007a). This necessarily drove the PNTL away from community policing in favor of a more militarized form. Riot control, by nature, is necessary once tensions come to a head; it treats the symptoms of unrest, but community policing attempts to treat the disease through careful preventive maintenance. It is apparent that the UN was more focused on quelling the symptoms.\textsuperscript{46}

The personnel assigned to the police development mission were unprepared for the task. This lack of human capital commensurate to the tasks at hand led to poor decision-making at every level. The lack of preparation can originally be traced to structural flaws in the UN’s provisioning of civilian police, but I assign the resultant talents of officers to the realm of agency. The SRSG conceded the lack of talent, when imploring that “qualifications, rather than

\textsuperscript{46} The UN police training mission has since ended, and in recent years (2014-2016) the Timorese government has substantially increased funding for community policing initiatives. This suggests that the emphasis on riot police was driven more by UNMIT than the Timorese government.
numbers, are crucial” (UN Security Council 2003a). None of the UN Police tasked to ‘support the development of law enforcement’ had either development experience or were capacity building experts (Hood 2006b). This does not mean that all UN Police were incompetent, but it does mean that on an individual level, they were not prepared. Police at the street level were no different. Australian police—who constituted many of the UN Police—were frustrated by the differences in how they had to conduct policing in Timor-Leste. The accounts of two officers are noteworthy:

“‘This is the police, stop’. Well, in Australia, 99.8 per cent of people stop, whereas over there, 99.8 per cent of people basically turn and hoofed it. So it was quite a – quite a shock and very frustrating, because as I said, you were so used to 10 years of people obeying your lawful commands and then you'd go there and, you know, they just basically run down the street and turn around and pelt you with rocks.’” (Goldsmith 2009).

“The actual police work was a lot tougher there, yeah. You felt like you weren't really making much of a difference. You felt like you were just chasing your tail every day. You'd sort out one skirmish where people were throwing rocks at each other and you'd turn up and then they'd throw them at you and then the next day you’d be talking to them and they'd think you're fantastic and not just one nationality or one State or anything like that, but everyone. Then later on that night, they'd be throwing rocks at your police barrier. I just couldn't understand it and it just seemed like you weren't going to achieve anything. You know, it just seemed like a more hopeless sort of mission” (Goldsmith 2009).
These were the accounts of Australian police officers’ experiences in 2006. Though they may have had extensive experience in Australia, it is evident that nothing had been done to prepare them for the situations they encountered. Their skill sets were incongruent with what their job required. The sad part of this is that by 2006, there was ample experience that the UN Police could have tapped into that could have informed deploying officers. Not only from listening to previously deployed officers such as the two accounts above, but from cross referencing similar lessons from Kosovo and Liberia.

The personnel that filled the required billets—if they even filled the billets—was cause for concern. This was a constant across all missions. Early on, nearly all of the UN Police were recruited with no regard to their experience in developing police forces or their ability to develop institutional capacity, and the only two posts concerned with police service development—a training adviser and an institution and capacity building adviser—were filled by unqualified individuals, after being unfilled for the entire first year of the intervention (Hood 2006a). Multiple reports of the SRSG stress the need for more specialized skills in the UN Police, but the refrain never seemed to change. One year into the UNMIT period, the positions of UN Police Advisor, Special Assistant to the Police Commissioner, Administrative Assistant, Civil Affairs Officer, Senior Restructuring, Rebuilding and Reform Coordinator, Training Officer, Planning Officer were all vacant (Office of Internal Oversight Services 2008). The SRSG noted around the same time that “concerns have been raised regarding the inadequate number of UNMIT police with appropriate training skill sets” (UN Security Council 2008a). This was analogous to having an army of privates. Either positions to develop the PNTL were unfilled, or they were filled with personnel unfit for the position. This seems to be a common complaint of
UN missions during the period—UNMIK and UNMIL had similar issues—but UNMIT seemed to be in the worst shape.

Given these backgrounds, it is understandable that they did not do the best job in developing the PNTL. Their attitudes were not conducive to the task. Only 10% talked positively about local capacity of the PNTL, and lacking any context of history, existing resources and previous training, described their PNTL counterparts as “lazy, unmotivated, but generally very good people” (Goldsmith and Harris 2009). In addition, when looking across the UN formations, many expressed strong reservations about the level of operational proficiency displayed by police from other countries (Goldsmith 2009).

Police

Former POLRI officers were the majority of the PNTL. UNPOL created the Police Assistance Group (PAG) of some 800 ex-POLRI in March of 2000, inducting half of them into the formal police service, and giving them a fast-tracked four week training course, rather than the three month course new inductees went through (Della-Giacoma 2010). It is unclear if the former POLRI officers would have benefited from additional training, or if their former service made them resistant to training, or at the very least made them poor candidates to engage a population that recently viewed them as oppressors. The vetting process was not readily transparent, and did not make much effort in engaging communities. The outcome of this is evident in what the UN reported early during UNMIT: only 44 of the first 88 officers who underwent six-month mentoring passed the re-certification process, and 43% failed the firearms training (UN Security Council 2007).
During the UNMIT period, the UN was basically working with broken goods—even if the UN had been responsible for it being broken in the first place. The UN did not give the power to easily fire officers involved in the 2006 violence, and the appeal process and the lack of political will to really investigate the major crimes committed in 2006 made it difficult to aggressively reform the police structure (Lemay-Hébert 2009). Though community policing was more prominent in the Organic Law of 2009, Longuinhos Monteiro—a Gusmão loyalist with few enemies within the force—became the police commissioner in April 2009 and introduced a more paramilitary hierarchy and style of discipline (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015). This decision by Monteiro was probably a dual edged sword—it gave the PNTL greater capacity that led to citizens perceiving it to be a more legitimate force, but it also raised human rights concerns from groups that felt targeted by police sweeps.

One initiative in 2009 that did connect the PNTL to communities was the introduction of Community Police Councils (CPCs). The Community Police Unit commander, Joao Belo, modeled them after successful community councils in Bangladesh. Belo himself is seen as an agent of change in reports by the Asia Foundation. The CPCs consist of an average of seven community members and one police officer responsible for a village, and form as a result of five days of dialogue between the community and the police, identifying and prioritizing security and safety issues (Wassel 2014). Though countrywide implementation by the PNTL did not occur until 2012, they have been seen as successful.

Government of Timor-Leste

The government of Timor-Leste initially failed in efforts to bring the country together. In January 2003, President Guasmaso sponsored a national dialogue meeting to bring together
opposing factions (UN Security Council 2003b). The violence in 2006 shows that it was not successful. Fretilin’s dominance of the parliament reduced the amount of political discourse and reduced its ability to place checks on the executive (UN Security Council 2006c). In a country that culturally disdains disagreement with superiors, this was an issue. In addition, the justice sector was weak, with few quality people comprising it (UN Security Council 2006a).

From an organizational standpoint, the government meddled politically with the security apparatus. The Ministry of the Interior “regularly interfered in policing activities at all levels, including in police operations and personnel decisions” and “often intervened arbitrarily in disciplinary, recruitment and promotion proceedings” resulting in PNTL that lacked actual police skill sets (UN Security Council 2006c). This politicization of the police was perhaps the greatest mistake by the government, as it allowed the PNTL to become a predominant player in the 2006 violence.

Outcomes

The violence of 2006 condemned the UTAET-UNOTIL period as a failure, as the PNTL were party to the violence itself. The UNMIT period fared better, but is still not held up as a rousing success. Authors are near-unanimous in this assessment. Della-Giacoma labels it as “neither a story of success nor failure” due to a decade of “quick fixes, short cuts, and lessons apparently not yet learned leading to modest results” (Della-Giacoma 2010). Funaki observed that the UN “lost the credibility necessary for the current Security Sector Review process to fulfill this role” (Yoshino Funaki 2009); And Kocak concluded that “standardized ‘toolkit’-SSR implementations and insufficient attention to the local context, led neither to a stable security
situation, nor to a legitimate and civilian controlled security sector as the Western security governance paradigm advocates” due to ‘externally imposed and misaligned policies” (Kocak 2013).

Local Sustainability

The sustainability of the PNTL that emerged from the UNTAET-UNOTIL period was obviously precarious, as shown in the participation of the PNTL in the 2006 violence. In 2004, eight out of ten citizens of Timor-Leste turned to community leaders to maintain law and order rather than the PNTL (Yoshino Funaki 2009). The outcome from the UNMIT period, though far from perfect, was more successful than its predecessor. This was primarily due to the positive influence of locally sourced funding and a higher degree of local ownership.

An outlier from the model present in Timor-Leste was the abundance of oil which allowed the government to afford expenditures that the local economy would otherwise have been unable to support. Once production of oil in the Sea began in 2004, the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund began to swell, and now contains $11.7 billion (“Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? - International Crisis Group” 2016). This, more than anything has contributed to a steady rise in the wealth of Timor-Leste, and allowed Timor-Leste to fund the PNTL at higher levels than they otherwise could have. Table 6 shows how GDP per capita has more than doubled over the last decade:
Year | GDP per capita (US$)
--- | ---
2000 | 410
2001 | 493
2002 | 474
2003 | 468
2004 | 471
2005 | 487
2006 | 456
2007 | 534
2008 | 644
2009 | 745
2010 | 818
2011 | 960
2012 | 1,068

(Source: The World Bank)

**Table 6-6. GDP per Capita of Timor-Leste, 2000-2012.**

These rising revenue streams mean that the government is increasingly capable of financing its own security sector without donor support, thanks to the Petroleum Fund. One cause of concern is the lack of diversification in the economy. Though the non-petroleum based economy is growing at around ten percent annually, it is as yet unable to increase in size relative to oil and gas (“Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? - International Crisis Group” 2016). Beside the connection between conflict and single commodity economies, in the long term there may not be a source of reliable funding for the security sector if the Timor Sea deposits dry up. So, while the government of Timor-Leste should be able to fund itself for the foreseeable future, long term prosperity is currently tenuous.

The government’s embrace of the PNTL as a more professional force is reason for cautious optimism. The current administration derives its authority from the revenues from petroleum, the popularity of Gusmão, and its willingness to spend money on popular public works projects (“Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? - International Crisis Group” 2016). The
PNTL, for its part, has embraced community policing as the basis for the 2014-2018 PNTL Strategic Plan by pursuing a hybrid model of reinvigorating the Suco system of small detachments of PNTL officers placed in villages with the western problem-solving philosophy of having specialized officers with tools and methods to aid in the identification, prevention and resolution of small-scale issues (Wassel 2014). This is increasingly coming from Timorese rather than donors. The PNTL are increasingly recalcitrant to UN interference after over a decade of assistance that they felt did not help them (Della-Giacoma 2010).

Last, the increased cooperation with the F-FDTL may counterintuitively be good for the future. Animosity between the PNTL and F-FDTL fueled the 2006 violence. Reducing that animosity is a good thing moving forward. Based on a successful election security mission, the F-FDTL has platoons deployed to almost all districts on two month rotations to increase “familiarization with the terrain” (“Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? - International Crisis Group” 2016). While this would ordinarily be a concern in a democratic state, the increased cooperation it may cause with the PNTL, coupled with successful past cooperation, may bode well for the future of the PNTL.

Donor Assessment

One indicator that should be able to assess the development of the PNTL should be levels of violence or the crime rate. This may be true, but must be taken with a grain of salt for Timor-Leste. Early on in the UNTAET-UNOTIL period the SRSG reported no threat of violence in most of Timor-Leste (UN Security Council 2000) and low crime rates (UN Security Council 2002b). Still, there were indicators of a broken PNTL with reports of police misconduct, involvement in criminal activities, bribery, excessive use of force (UN Security Council 2003c).
The UN felt that the PNTL lacked experience at the operational and strategic level as well as a lack of resources by 2006 (UN Security Council 2006b). Conveniently, the UN placed emphasis on the general security situation rather than the simmering institutional weaknesses of the PNTL. The violence of 2006 proved that the UN relied on the wrong indicators of success.

In the UNMIT period, crime and violence also gradually and continuously dropped, with more accurate reporting as well. In 2007, there were about nine cases of serious crimes such as murder, abduction and rape, down from twenty-nine in 2006 (UN Security Council 2007). This decreased to five per month in early 2008, and four per month later in 2008, to two per month in 2009, and 1.5 per month in 2010 (UN Security Council 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010a). As the PNTL matured, and compiled incidents such as assaults and disorderly behavior, the data showed decreases in these lesser crimes as well, from fifty-four per week in 2007 to thirty-four per week in 2008, mysteriously spike to ninety-seven per week in 2009 before falling to eighty seven per week in 2010 (UN Security Council 2008b, 2010a). That increase may have been due to better and increased reporting than to increased violence, since the general situation was continually described as better every year. That increase may actually be a positive trend, as it may have meant citizens were more likely to seek out the PNTL to solve their security problems than village leaders.47 As the PNTL slowly took over responsibility of districts from the UN during the UNMIT period, there were no spikes in reported crime (UN Security Council 2010b). As the UN handed over full responsibility to the PNTL, the SRSG reported that the security

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47 It is reasonable to assume that people are more apt to report very serious cases such as murder than lesser crimes regardless of how they view the police. This could explain the continual drop in the murder rate and the short spike in assaults and disorderly behavior.
situation “was calm, with general trends showing further progress towards long-term peace, stability and development (UN Security Council 2011).

While violence and crime continued to decrease, actual opinions of the PNTL were more varied, relating to levels of political interference and capacity. Politically, stability during the UNMIT period was probably only possible due to the positive relationship between President Ramos Horta, Prime Minister Gusmão, former FRETILIN Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and Brigadier-General and Commander of the F-FDTL Taur Matan Ruak (Yoshino Funaki 2009). Absent this, there may have been another resumption of violence, since assessments of the PNTL were not so kind. The SRSG reported in 2010 that the PNTL lacked capacity operations, administration and management, and needed to improve in community relations, case management, administration, and weapons storage (UN Security Council 2010a). The International Crisis Group reported in 2013 that there was a reluctance to improve police accountability, that that PNTL still conducted weak investigations, and that the PNTL favored large-scale military style operations to address problems (ICG 2013). Other authors agree that “there is still a serious need for improvement” (Ingram, Kent, and McWilliam 2015).

The WGI indicators seem to confirm this assessment of decreasing violence coupled with stagnation of PNTL development. Figure 1 shows the trend of select indicators for Timor-Leste. After the 2006 violence, the only indicator with a positive trend is political stability and the absence of violence. Meanwhile, indicators on the rule of law and government effectiveness remained unchanged.
Host Assessment

The citizens of Timor-Leste generally trusted the PNTL’s professionalism throughout the case, but other indicators placed the PNTL’s legitimacy in question. In general, the public has remained optimistic, which may trickle down to assessments of the police. A 2001 Asia Foundation survey found that 75% of the population felt Timor-Leste was headed in the right direction, and less than half—38%--were concerned about security (The Asia Foundation 2001). These figures are partly due to the exuberance of independence early on. By late 2002, 67% of the population had become concerned about safety and crime (Hunter 2004), indicating a deterioration in the level of human security in the country. In short, the PNTL formed at a period of high enthusiasm, which tapered off over time.

The PNTL’s performance did not increase its legitimacy in the UNTAET-UNOTIL period. By the UN’s own accounts, they lacked “experience, legal and policy frameworks, logistical capability, and skills in resource management (UN Security Council 2004a). In addition, the UN
questioned the professionalism of the very force it developed, citing increased reports of police misconduct, including excessive use of force, assaults, negligent use of firearms and various human rights abuses (UN Security Council 2005). It is no wonder that by late 2002 a majority of the population did not trust the police to be fair (79% to 13%), felt the police needed reform (77% to 10%), and felt the police did not reflect their community’s values (76% to 14%) (Hunter 2004). Not surprisingly, only eleven percent went to the police for resolution of a dispute, and only half (48%) that used the police said their dispute was settled (Hunter 2004). Additionally, while 61% were satisfied with how the police performed, 46% of those that were unsatisfied said it was because the process took too long (Hunter 2004). By and large, the UNTAET-UNOTIL period created a police force that the population lacked trust in.

The UNMIT period witnessed a better progression in the evaluation of the PNTL. Perceptions of security gradually improved. A 2008 survey revealed that fifty-three percent of the population said the security situation in their locality had improved over the previous year, while 41 percent said it stayed the same, and three percent said it had become worse (Everett and Chinn 2008). In 2013, the situation was about the same or even better. Less than one percent felt that the security situation had deteriorated, and both community leaders (84%) and the general public (72%) felt things had gotten better (Wassel and Rajalingam 2013).

While there were issues with police performance and organization, the public’s perception of the PNTL generally improved during the UNMIT period. In a 2008 survey, 71% felt the performance of the PNTL was much better or somewhat better compared to the previous year, compared to only two percent who thought it was somewhat worse or much worse (Everett and Chinn 2008). Five years later, an overwhelming majority of the general
public (91%) and community leaders (92%) expressed ‘great confidence’ in the commitment of the PNTL to prevent crime in their communities, up from 84% of the general public and 77% of community leaders in 2008 (Wassel 2014). This may not have been due to UNMIT, but in spite of it. In 2013, only 44% of PNYL officers claimed any special training in community policing, but (81%) claimed that community policing principles were being applied in the localities in which they served (Wassel and Rajalingam 2013). Figure 2 shows that on the national level there was a large increase in the percent of the population that felt completely respected by the PNTL when they sought PNTL assistance. In the eyes of the citizenry, there appears to have been a noticeable improvement in how the PNTL performed in public.

Source: (Wassel 2014)

Figure 6-2. PNTL Treatment in Crime Resolution
One source of frustration was connected to the police, but outside their jurisdiction—the judiciary. One district commander expressed frustration that the community loses faith in the PNTL when the same culprits are repeatedly set free by the courts with minimal parole requirements due to insufficient evidence. Then, according to the commander, “they ask whether it is [the police’s] job to do anything at all” (“Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? - International Crisis Group” 2016). While not damning of the PNTL, this shows the symbiotic relationship between developing the police and the judiciary.

Trust

Overall, it is apparent that the citizens of Timor-Leste now trust the PNTL, but they compete with other authorities in society, possibly due to culture mixed with instances of abuse. Eighty four percent of the population has great confidence in the commitment of the PNTL to prevent crime, while at the same time 47% report being treated with minimal respect and professionalism (47%), in a verbally abusive manner (15%), or in a physically abusive manner (19%) (Everett and Chinn 2008).

Not surprisingly, the PNTL, though trusted, are probably not the most trusted institution in Timor-Leste. Everett found that “when citizens did approach someone for help, the first person was most often the aldeia chief (28%), followed distantly by the suco chief (11%). Only 9 percent contact the police for assistance and 1 percent brought the matter to a court,” but that “citizens cite the police as the institution most often responsible for resolving cases of cattle theft” (Everett 2008). In a more violent setting, 81% said they would seek other forms of recourse for domestic violence rather than request assistance from the PNTL (Everett and Chinn
212

Why the difference? Perhaps the cattle, as a form of property dispute are seen as a dispute that opens village leaders to corruption, while other disputes do not.

This battle over primacy of institutions relies on the educational attainment of the people of Timor-Leste. While only six percent of respondents with no formal schooling believe the PNTL has primary responsibility for maintaining security in their locality, thirty-four percent of respondents with a post-secondary education identify the PNTL as responsible (Everett and Chinn 2008). In a country in which only 59% of people report hearing of a court and only 41% had heard of a lawyer (Everett 2008), the introduction of a western policing model is decidedly foreign.

Timor-Leste diverges from western models that assume a state monopoly on the rule of law. People are much more likely to utilize customary than formal law (Grenfell 2009). Adding to that norm, laws are written in Portuguese, and most Timorese—and many lawyers and police—are unable to understand them, and old laws in effect from before independence are written in Indonesian, whose nuances Portuguese speaking judges may not fully understand.

Conclusion

Normally, the army receives far greater attention than the police by donors. Paradoxically in Timor-Leste, this was the opposite. This structural gap between security sector institutions had the greatest effect on the violence of 2006. While the violence of 2006 can be seen as a failure, others argue that “the UN missions in Timor-Leste could be considered partially successful: UNAMET supervised the referendum; UNTAET oversaw internally displaced persons (IDP) returns, maintained a secure environment, and assisted in the country’s first
elections; UNMIS trained local security forces; UNOTIL attempted to maintain security in 2006; and UNMIT assisted in the restoration of security after the violence of 2006” (Pushkina and Maier 2012, 339). That being said, the UN failed on many fronts when conducting the development of the PNTL.

The UN has been heavily criticized for how it handled Timor-Leste, and there have been plenty of explanations. Ludovic Hood blames inadequate planning and deficient mission design, unimaginative and weak leadership; and a lack of local ownership (Hood 2006a). Yoshino Funaki blames the lack of security sector expertise in the UN, failure to balance technical expertise with political acumen, inability to develop a clear strategy for engagement, and a failure to play an advocacy role for wider public interests in favor of maintaining access and good relations with the political elites (Yoshino Funaki 2009). Perhaps a root cause for this can be found in the UN’s own hard learned lesson that it stated in 2009: “the gradual resumption of policing responsibilities should not be bound by an artificial calendar that may not accurately reflect the readiness of the national police in any given district or unit. Instead, emphasis must be placed on the achievement of criteria in order to guarantee the integrity of the resumption process and ensure that any future crisis or pressure does not result in the police service facing further systemic failures” (UN Security Council 2009a). Not only must the focus be on standards over schedules, but the UN must resist creating an environment of haste that would encourage less than honest evaluations of standards for the sake of efficiency.

In some ways, Timor-Leste could have been even worse. Fortuitous events coupled with unique local leaders allowed the mission to save face. However, the structural impediments established were too great for these events to ‘fix’ the police development experience. While
mist citizens of Timor-Leste do not fear the PNTL, the real test will be evaluating how apolitical
the PNTL can remain. This, more than anything, remains a tenuous outcome of the
development.

The Timor-Leste example did not align with the standard model for police development,
and its outcomes were not successful. I will now revisit each major hypothesis in relation to the
results from the Timor-Leste mission.

**H1: Goal incongruence/congruence between the host nation and donors has a**

**negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.**

There was a definite difference in goals for the police between the UN and the
government of Timor-Leste. There were differences in how each side saw the PNTL’s roles in
the new state. These conflicts affected the size and character of the PNTL negatively,
eschewing community policing for a more political, militaristic form. The overall pace of
handover was a common goal during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, but the Timorese were
unhappy that the UN held onto control of the police after handing the rest of the government
to them. This divergence continued in the UNMIT period.

The most important outcome of this divergence was the political role of the PNTL. The
PNTL could not become a truly non-partisan security force, and eventually succumbed to the
violence in 2006 as a result of that.

**H2: Structural issues can predetermine the outcome of police development, and deviations**

**from the standard model has a negative effect on the outcome of police development.**
The police development endeavor in Timor-Leste faltered structurally in two main areas: pace and tenets. First, the pace of the process was far too rapid to allow proper development of the PNTL. The UN focused on raw numbers of police trained rather than capabilities and democratic control. The UN police reduced their presence too quickly in a country that had never existed as an independent state. Next, the tenets of the PNTL the UN pushed forward were devoid of any recognition of the local context. In an effort to achieve the goal of rapid transition, the UN during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period seemed pleased to insert the same policing concepts it had in every other police development experience of the time. This ignored Timorese history, and Timorese desires.

These deviations from the standard model had a negative effect on the development of the Timorese police. The contrast to these failures is that during the UNMIT period the UN police stayed much longer, without any reduction in size for a longer time. Also, the addition of policing methods more apropos to the region, such as the introduction of suco police stations, showed a greater willingness to adjust to conditions on the ground. The UNMIT period has seen reductions in violence and better appraisals of police performance.

**H3: The agency of individuals has an effect on the outcome of police development.**

In this case, there was little evidence that individual actions changed the outcome. The UN did not prepare its officers properly during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period, making changes later during the UNMIT period to initial deployment training that made UN Police better equipped to train the PNTL. In addition, the personnel system of the UN failed the mission by
rotating people too quickly and supplying UN Police that lacked the language, cultural or specialty skills required for the mission.

The effect of agency was so small that the greatest action by an individual that affected the outcome for UNMIT was more an exogenous shock than an actual decision: the attacks by Reinado and his eventual death. It presented a better opportunity to unite the nation than any individual decision could
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

*History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.*

-Winston Churchill

Introduction

US Army doctrine advises commanders of a defense that their preparation will never be complete; they must constantly improve their position until the point of attack. In a sense, the international interventions that require the development of the police are defensive operations in their own right: they defend a peace in the aftermath of conflict, they defend human rights, and enforce international norms. Taken this way, seeing the development of the police as the preparation of a defensive position, recognizes that you never actually complete developing a police force. Indeed, every police force of every nation is continually trying to improve itself.

This continual struggle to improve the police is certainly a complicated affair. It is possible to compartmentalize discrete portions of police development to investigate the production of certain outputs- proficiencies, capabilities, and so on. However, police do not produce a certain good; they provide a service to the communities in which they reside. This makes the development of the police a messy job. However, this does not prohibit exploration of the subject. To take the metaphor of preparing a defense one step further, Clausewitz described the defense as “not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows” (Carl von Clausewitz 1989, 357). This is the goal of studying police development: to identify where these blows should be.
There are many small, nuanced findings of relevance to police development. However, across the three cases studied, I find three major themes of concern for police development. They generally favor an emphasis of structure over agency, and indicate the importance of thinking in advance what your goals really are. First, development of the police must occur alongside development in other sectors and addressment of conflicts and grievances, and not separate from, antecedent to, or in spite of them. Second, structural flaws or defects in major aspects of an intervention have a larger impact on the development of the police than any tactical decisions that anyone can make, and can doom the process before it begins. Last, the actions, or agency, of individuals may not be able to significantly improve prospects for success, but they can certainly significantly deteriorate it.

In this chapter, I will restate the dilemma I sought to address, and disclose the limitations of this study before presenting the findings of the research. I will then offer recommendations for improving police development. Last, I will note the contributions this work offers to the literature and its implications for future research on police development.

Problem Re-Statement

Over time, the United States and the international community has increasingly found itself intervening in the internal affairs of other states. Whether due to the Responsibility to Protect, to neutralize threats such as terrorist sponsors or rogue actors, or to combat ungoverned spaces that breed instability, the mandate for such actions has expanded over the years. In each case, the development of the police has come both a means and an end. Quality police are an end in that they provide security to the populations and promote human rights,
and means in that they are seen as a way to build other institutions of government and enable stability in areas that are recovering from conflict.

This study sought to improve police development through a better understanding of the multi-level ecology of security in post-conflict reconstruction by identifying the factors that separate successful police development interventions from relatively less successful ones. The development of competent and legitimate police forces remains an overlooked endeavor with a spotty track record of success. In addition, much of the literature in the field tends toward prescriptions for actions rather than analysis of past efforts. This study is an attempt to conduct that analysis, and to find themes common across cases.

Limitations

In striving to explain police development from a more holistic perspective and provide a breadth of analysis, this study was limited its ability to provide depth for each case it investigated, trading micro for macro level analysis. It is unable to identify what specific skills police academies are able to train, or how one police station performs better than another. Likewise, elements of institutional transfer are left untouched. The design of the study could not account for these phenomena. This was a conscious decision—the more I looked at these interventions, the more I saw how ephemeral such things could be. Many successes at the local level were possible, but were impacted heavily by the larger weight of the environments around them. Future studies could search for connections by possibly identifying under what conditions successes in one area have been able to spread to other areas. In essence, is there any credence to the “ink-blot” strategies popular in counterinsurgency literature? Perhaps this could be one way to connect the experiences at individual police stations to the larger whole.
Another limitation of this study is related to impact it has. Each case was a UN-led mission of roughly the same size and in the same time period with very similar mandates. These results may or may not apply to unilateral US actions, regional multilateral actions, or with different mandates. Most notably, it is hard to predict the interventions of the future. The experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of competing hegemons in the world order, and appearance of new threats means that there will be differences in the future. However, the conclusions of this study seem to hold some universal truths—much of this subject is about people, and people still continue to act in certain ways. One way to address this in the future could be to look at interventions that did not include any troops, indicating a more permissive environment with less of a mandate. In this environment, would police trainers have to account for a different reality when advising or mentoring the police?

Last, this study’s data is not unique or original to this study. It relies on existing reports, interviews, and studies related to each of the cases. In addition, the various languages spoken in each country reduced the amount of information that I used to that which was in English. It is very possible that in this respect the information I gathered was unable to appreciate all perspectives, in a study that hoped to accomplish just that. However, since many of these studies had already interviewed or polled citizens, elites, police, and others, it is very possible that I would have reached the same conclusions had I been there myself.

Findings

First, I will offer a revised standard model based on the cases. Then I will address the hypotheses that were tested. For each hypothesis, there was little evidence to reject the
propositions tested. Once I have gone through each hypothesis I will discuss further findings common to each case.

The model presented in the Chapter Three was useful to compare each case to, but the linear assumption in it must change. In Figure 3-1 I presented a model that had all the arrows facing in one direction toward the outcome of the police development intervention. The biggest problem this model had was temporal. In many cases goals are changing after structures are in place, or actors are changing structures. There is a feedback between goals, structure, and agency that requires those arrows to point in both directions. This addresses the concern I had of having to readdress goals throughout a case—because they kept shifting.

Figure 7-1 displays a revision to the original model I used to describe each case. In this model, I recognize the lack of linearity across the variables, noting how each can affect the other. This change explains some awkward organization throughout each case, as it was difficult to address a variable without noting how it affected the others preceding or following it.

![Figure 7-1. Revised Ideal-Type Model of Police Development](image-url)
The change to the model is a stark reminder of the complexity that this study strove to overcome. Even with these changes, there is still an ability to comment on the testing of each hypothesis.

**H1: Goal incongruence/congruence between the host nation and donors has a negative/positive effect on the outcome of police development.**

This seems to be true. In all three cases there was goal divergence between the host nation and donors that led to negative outcomes. Cases of goal incongruence within the host nation led to even worse outcomes—most notably returns to violence. Donor goals were generally unified through the UN to the extent that significant differences were hard to isolate.

In the case of Kosovo, goal incongruence had a negative effect on the outcome of the police development. The Kosovar Albanian goal to achieve independent status contradicted the Serbian desire to maintain ties with Belgrade, and the UN stated goal of maintaining Kosovo as an autonomous region within Serbia. These goals did not change over time, and because of that many Kosovar Serbs saw the KPS as representatives of a government they did not feel was legitimate. This hindered the ability of the KPS to provide security in Serbian enclaves with as much freedom as they could police the rest of the country.

In the case of Liberia, goal incongruence also had a negative effect on the outcome of the police development. Liberians and the international community were divided on what size the police force should be, and how to politically control the LNP. Liberians demanded a much larger police force than UNMIL planned for, and preferred greater political control of the LNP, which UNMIL feared could destabilize the police force. Liberia’s poverty left these decisions at the mercy of donors, so the decision for each issue was inevitably up to UNMIL to decide.
However, as these were dictated, the long term viability of them is weak. Possibly due to these rifts, UNMIL found it difficult to foster local ownership in the police.

In the case of Timor-Leste, goal incongruence also had a negative effect on the outcome of the police development. There was a definite difference in goals for the police between the UN and the government of Timor-Leste, and this divergence over the political role of the PNTL led to a partisan PNTL that would eventually succumb to the violence in 2006.

H2: Organizational, political, and international structural issues can predetermine the outcome of police development, and deviations from the standard model has a negative effect on the outcome of police development.

This also seems to be true. In two of the three cases structural deficiencies negatively impacted the mission, while in the third, unique demographics concealed any flaws. In each case, whenever the host government was organized in a way to provoke spoilers, there was a negative effect on the disenfranchised population's perceived legitimacy of the police.

In Kosovo, structural dynamics did not seem to predetermine the outcome of the mission. The structure of training, equipping, and improvement of the KPS was not the culprit souring outcomes of the mission; instead, it was the governmental structure that alienated the Serbian population and hindered the legitimacy of the KPS in Serb areas. The relatively better outcomes for the KPS have more to do with the demographics of Kosovo than initiatives to train the police: It is a fairly homogenous state dominated by Kosovar Albanians. It is evident that the any deviations from the standard model, such as Kosovar government enacted policies to provoke spoilers, were overshadowed by the demographic dominance of the Kosovar Albanians.
In Liberia, structural dynamics had a negative effect on the outcome of the mission. Liberia’s multitude of competing security institutions, emphasis on paramilitary units such as the PSU and ERU over community policing, direct presidential control, and lack of funding were all complicit in harming the development of the LNP.

In Timor-Leste, structural dynamics also had a negative effect on the outcome of the mission. The overly rapid pace of the process and lack of local context in the structures developed during the UNAMET-UNOTIL period contrasted with the more gradual, sustained presence and implementation of structures more suited to Timor-Leste during the UNMIT period. The UNEMET-UNOTIL period resulted in violence, while the UNMIT period has seen reductions in violence and better appraisals of police performance.

**H3: The agency of individuals has an effect on the outcome of police development.**

While it is clear that individual actions and decisions did have an effect, the direction of that effect was more nuanced. While the presence of highly talented individuals, with skill sets matching their duties, had a positive effect on the outcome of police development, the stronger effect was how lower talent individuals and actors with skills not suited to their position had a negative impact on the outcome. Placing the right people in an intervention cannot save it from failure, but placing the wrong people can still adversely affect it. Metaphorically, a great sea captain cannot save a sunken ship, but it is easy for an incompetent captain to crash a perfectly good ship.

In the Kosovo case, it was difficult to determine whether higher talent individuals had a positive effect on the outcome of the mission. The KPS recruits were highly qualified, and
though not all UNMIK personnel had skill sets matching their duties, the results of the experience were mixed. At the least, these people did not harm the mission.

In Liberia, issues with the personnel recruited for the LNP and missteps by the international community mixed with the election of Eleanor Sirleaf Johnson to produce mixed results. UNMIL’s training methods were incongruous with Liberian policing and lowered entry requirements were very harmful to the development of the LNP. On the other hand, Eleanor Sirleaf-Johnson’s commitment to human rights and democratic values yielded the best possible decisions from the president of Liberia in regard to the legitimacy of the LNP, and yet the effect of those actions was not enough to yield a successful development of the LNP in the face of goal incongruence and structural deficiencies.

In Timor-Leste, the decisions about UNPOL preparation, credentials, and training negatively affected the development of the PNTL. While these decisions negatively affected the PNTL, it was the exogenous shock of Reinado’s attacks and eventual death that rallied the country and allowed the PNTL to develop. This was positive, but not related to agency—the exogenous nature of it is not something that could have been predicted.

Other Findings

First, it is evident that developing a police force is a decade-long—or longer—endeavor. In each case, donors did not anticipate the long commitment it would take to develop these police forces. Just properly recruiting new police and processing them through initial training at a police academy takes years. In each case, this was only the beginning—mentorship, writing procedures, and training specialty skills and management takes even longer. It does not seem that this process can be temporally condensed without it eventually harming the development
of the police. Donors must recognize that initial entry training must be six months or longer, and donor police should expect to shoulder the burden of policing for several years while the nascent police force matures.

The development of the police will inevitably be the longest endeavor of an intervention. The security sector should be the first sector to develop and the last to hand control back to the host government. If the security sector can be seized by groups competing over power, it can harm the legitimacy of the police. It is an enticing Pandora’s Box that donors need to keep closed by removing the ability of the host government to gain executive control of the police until governance is established and accountable.

The required skill sets of police trainers differed significantly based on the stage of the intervention. Generally, there are six stages that require different skill sets. In the initial phase, establishing security is paramount and requires police that can provide that in the absence of indigenous police. In the growth phase, trainers with academy experience are needed in order to train the police in a classroom setting. In the culture formation stage, a multitude of skills are necessary to develop routine practices and exemplify good policing techniques. In the handover, drawdown, and advising stages, there is a greater need for mentorship and organizational skills as more and more operational control is ceded to the host government. Many times, well trained international police found themselves utilized incorrectly due to the stage of development they were inserted into the process at.

Political expediencies drove police development efforts more than objective needs assessments. Therefore, the question that most donors should not be whether or not a mission can be accomplished, but whether their constituents want to do it at the cost it will take to
develop a police force. This relates to the findings related to goal congruence: does the goals of donors match with their polities? If not, it is hard to imagine the support for the long term commitments necessary to effectively develop the police.

Local ‘ownership’ is less important than recognition of local context. Many times an intervention was necessary precisely because the locals were not capable of developing a professional police force. Immediately handing the reins to a host government before it is ready can spell disaster. Donors must not fear dictating decisions when the host government is still struggling to establish democratic norms and erase legacies of violence. The caveat to this is that donors must understand that each case is different, and enforcing cookie-cutter solutions to developing the police without regard to local context can damage chances for success. Donors must take the time to adjust plans based on realities of the populations they are trying to protect.

The extent that Kosovo succeeded more than Timor-Leste and Liberia in gaining legitimacy of the police force may rely on the simple fact that as a facet of post-independence, Kosovars saw the KPS as ‘their police force,’ and hence legitimate based on national aspirations. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, when the PNTL was associated with the previous Indonesian occupation, the citizenry held it in less esteem than during the UNMIT period when the PNTL was able to distance itself more from its Indonesian history. In Liberia, perhaps the failures of the police were associated with the imposition of it on the population—it was a potential threat to people more than the incarnation of any national aspirations. This antecedent condition—along with the nature of the conflict that preceded the intervention—has a large impact on how the population will view the police regardless of police performance.
Last, majoritarian structures of governance risk alienating minority groups. Due to the legacy of violence in these countries, victories in purely democratic elections can serve to allow winners to oppress losers. How to prevent this is a philosophical debate reaching back to the Federalist Papers. Balancing majoritarian rule with minority rights requires structures that many of these governments lack. Whether it is the introduction of federalization, quotas for representation, or other designs, donors must be conscious to ensure checks on power and the ambitions of indigenous groups to seize it. Kosovo shows that current efforts produced a situation far from producing a stable, liberal polity—which can be equated with the liberal peace—as hoped for by international actors (Richmond, 2005: 149). Kosovo Albanian officials and actors have been provided with a state-in-waiting and have used the resources they have been offered to co-opt the international community into accepting their claims despite Serb opposition. The strands of the liberal peace in Kosovo — democratization, civil society, rule of law, human rights and economic liberalization — are tangled lines drawn into a Gordian knot of local and regional politics. These lines that resist international liberal governance and its pluralist objectives of a multi-ethnic, rather than mono-ethnic or ethnically majoritarian, polity. Peace-building is caught in a contradiction that supports liberal democracy and pluralism in Kosovo and the region more broadly, but also offers the very institutions that Kosovo’s mono-ethnic independence might rest upon. Indeed, the liberal peace-building process may well have facilitated a move towards partition (Franks and Richmond 2008).

Recommendations

First, development in areas such as governance, spoiler control, and the economy must coincide with police development, and cannot be assumed to be an inevitable product of
establishing security. The police are a quantifiable entity for policymakers that want to report results. It is easy to quantify how many police have been trained or the numbers of violent incidents. It is much harder to answer whether a legislature is able to formulate widely accepted policies or how stable a government actually is. In this ambiguous environment, it is usual that the development of the police becomes a means to achieve these other ends. The problem with this is that a highly capable police force can be misappropriated for mischievous ends by malevolent actors.

Second, donors must structure their interventions from an early point to avoid the extreme flaws in constitutional arrangement, international presence, or other unique factors that traditionally harmed police development.

Third, while it is important to emphasize placing high quality individuals in positions of power, donors should avoid relying on specific individuals as ‘saviors.’ It is easy to fall into the trap of counting on one leader to fix things, but the reality is that no one individual can do that, and to favor one over another is to weaken the meritocratic democratic institutions that donors are trying to instill.

There has been an increased effort in recent years to address UN shortfalls in the early stages of police development by creating standing forces specialized in rule of law and police training (J. Smith, Holt, and Durch 2010, 51–66). The US has also looked into how it could maintain such a force for a capability that it currently outsources to private contractors. Anthony Cordesman bluntly states that “the US needs a far better focused effort to set meaningful goals for stability, military intervention and partnerships, and managing national
security spending” (Cordesman 2013, 24). Unfortunately, it is probable that this will not occur in the US due to the domestic institutional barriers involved (Perito 2004). The reality in the US is that any solution would most likely come from the private sector, but there does not seem to be the incentive for industry to respond. Until there is, we can expect the same issues.

Contribution to Research

*Police Development and the Politics-Administration Divide*

Scholars have debated the relationship between the field of public administration and politics since the beginning of the field in America. While Woodrow Wilson initially called for a clear demarcation between politics and administration, and other early scholars attempted to extract the ‘science’ from the politics that muddied public endeavors. However, over the years scholars have begun to break down the wall between politics and administration. Some have argued that analysis of public organizations cannot be the same as it is for private organizations, precisely because pursuance of the public good is a political outcome that defies simple output measures of efficiency (Appleby 1945). Others have argued whether public administrators should act in strict accordance to the law or in pursuance of the cultural values of the people (Moynihan 2009; Lynn 2009). Recently, the field has struggled to determine where this line between politics and administration should be, if it exists at all (Kettl 2000). At the very least, we can agree that a clear line between politics and administration does not exist.

In the field of security studies, security sector reform as a manifestation of public administration seems mired in the 19th century. Very little scholarship cares to discuss how politics affects SSR. Instead, most literature tends to keep SSR separate from the political structures and influences of the country it takes place in. A common refrain is that an outcome
of SSR is to lower violence to a level that allows a political process to develop. In this narrative, SSR is assumed to be so independent of the political process that it can succeed prior to resolving political discord and grievances. Therefore, interveners have continuously set out to develop the police in as ‘scientific’ a manner as possible: train them at centralized academies and in the field, followed by specialized training in management, forensics, and other areas of expertise. Through these events it is hoped that skills transfer, and hopefully values transfer, will occur.

This investigation shows that the development of police cannot be separated from the political process. In pursuance of an apolitical police force, donors cannot ignore the political arena’s effects on the police. Citizens do not simply evaluate their police in the context of police performance. In many cases, police may be the only representative of the state, and their legitimacy will rely on the perception of the state by each citizen, whether fairly or not. While unprofessional behavior by police obviously detracts from citizen appraisement of their performance, it is not certain that the most professional police force can withstand the pressures of governance perceived as illegitimate by the population.

Researchers and practitioners must shed the belief that security inevitably leads to sustainable stability. Moving forward, the field must seek to unite theories of political development with assessments of the police. Donors must avoid reliance on the easy victory of security sector reform, and focus on the political battles in any post-conflict society.

Implications for Further Research

A major theme in this work has been the primacy of structure over agency in determining the success of police development. Is there something unique to police
organizations that contributes to this, or can this be applied to other organizations? These police forces are certainly unique in that, due to their post-conflict setting, they are built from scratch. Therefore, it would be interesting to look at the building of other new government institutions, both in and out of a post-conflict setting. Stable governments continually start new agencies to address new problems, and in some cases, build those agencies from scratch. Similarly, just as nascent countries build the police, they are also building other institutions from scratch. In each instance, there is an opportunity to investigate if public entrepreneurs can overcome the structures dictated upon their organization or not.

Outside of the post-conflict realm, many of the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics of police development are based on normative assumptions of the best ways to connect police as an intermediary between governments and the population. Finding cities in the United States or Europe with comparable socioeconomic and demographic traits, but different governing structures, could identify which structures are most closely related with the legitimacy of the police and how secure they make the population. Much of the policing literature in these countries tends toward tactics and procedures. Instead, this study has illuminated the need to go further and look at the relationship of the police with the other institutions of government.

Indeed, this relationship hints at the need for further public administration literature to address the police. The police are street level bureaucrats which many authors ignore. Too often studies of the police are relegated to industry specific journals about policing tactics, ignoring the role that police play in the larger society that they serve. There is a politics-administration divide that plagues literature on the police. Future projects must look further at
the connections between police and the politics that create and enable them. Ignoring this connection can yield an incomplete view of the criminal justice system.

One thing I ignored in this study but must be addressed is the increasing role of privatization of security that mirrors the rise of privatization throughout public administration literature. The state increasingly contracts its functions to third parties, and policing is not immune to this trend. We have seen how the United States already uses private contractors to hire its police trainers. What about utilizing private security firms to deliver security to high crime areas? How does this affect the stability of the state? How does any increases in ‘efficiency’ from this conflict with public values? In an era of decreasing resources, this may become a trend, and we are still not sure what the ramifications of it would be.

A constant feature of each case was the presence of the UN. While the UN may be inevitably present in any future police development enterprise, it may not be the principal. In recent years regional organizations have begun to offer a multilateral alternative to the UN in interventions. Their smaller, regional focus has allowed more focused cooperation among donors, but since these organizations are conducting interventions in their ‘backyard,’ it is unclear how their nature presents particular differences in how they approach problems. Investigating how these organizations approach police development would not only shed light on an emerging phenomenon, but could offer insights on how the structure of those organization produced different outcomes than the UN in similar circumstances.

Another question arises with regard to scale. Smaller or larger interventions may have unique attributes that would yield findings different than those found here. In the wake of Afghanistan and Iraq, large scale interventions seem like a task donors are reluctant to partake
in. However, history has shown that an exogenous shock could change that. So understanding police development in that environment is still important.

While studying how we develop police in the wake of conflict, I was cognizant of an assumption that donors are supposed to know what ‘correct’ policing is, and are attempting to transfer that knowledge to the police they are developing. The tumultuous atmosphere that has accompanied the rise of the ‘Black Lives Matter/Blue Lives Matter’ dispute in America shows that police forces in donor states have the same issues with developing legitimacy as the countries they are trying to develop. Similar to the findings of this study, commentators have increasingly re-constructed the debate by advocating that while there are some practices the police can change to mend broken relationships, there are also issues with incarceration, education policy, economic programs, and other government actions outside of the control of the police that affect this narrative on how the police provide security. While this study was more focused on the relationship between structure and agency, it seems equally important to answer what structures surrounding the police can alleviate the struggles of police forces to provide security to the populations they serve and be seen as legitimate to all parties.
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND KEY TERMS

Commonly Used Acronyms

AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia
AFP  Australian Federal Police
AFT  Agenda for Transformation
CNRT  National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction
CPA  Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPD-RDTL  Committee for the Popular Defense of the Republic of Democratic Timor-Leste
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID  UK Department for International Development
DSR  Deputy Special Representative
DV  Dependent Variable
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
ETPS  East Timor Police Service
FALINTIL  Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor
F-FDTL  Timor-Leste Defense Force
FRETILIN  Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FRYS  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
INTERFET  International Force East Timor
ITFY  International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IV  Independent Variable
JOC  Joint Operation Center
KFOR  Kosovo Force
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
KPS  Kosovo Police Service
KPSS  Kosovo Police Service School
LNP  Liberian National Police
LURD  Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL  Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NGTL  National Transitional Government of Liberia
NPFL  National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NYPD  New York Police Department
OSCE  Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PCR  Post-conflict Reconstruction
PNTL  Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste
PRS  Poverty Reduction Strategy
SRS  Socialist Republic of Serbia
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR  Security Sector Reform
SSS  Special Security Service
TLPDP  Timor-Leste Police Development Program
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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Table A-1. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Police Development in Liberia

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council (SC) Resolutions</th>
<th>UNPOL Mandate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCR 1509 (2003)</td>
<td>• Assist in monitoring and restructuring the national police force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop and assist a civilian police training program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR 1836 (2008)</td>
<td>• Provide strategic advice and expertise in specialized fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide operational support to regular policing activities and react to urgent security incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR 1885 (2009)</td>
<td>• Encourage coordinated progress on the implementation of the Liberia National Police strategic plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR 2008 (2011)</td>
<td>• Assist the Government of Liberia to consolidate peace and stability with national institutions that are able to maintain security and stability independently of a peacekeeping mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Improve the capacity and capability of the LNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR 2116 (2013)</td>
<td>• Support the Government to solidify peace and stability in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support the Government’s efforts, as appropriate, to achieve a successful transition of complete security responsibility to the Liberia National Police by strengthening the LNP’s capabilities to manage existing personnel improve training programmes to expedite their readiness to assume security responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate these efforts with all partners, including the Government of Liberia, the national police leadership, and donor partners.</td>
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APPENDIX B. UNMIL FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

Table B-1. UNMIL Deployment as of December 2003
Table B-2. UNMIL Deployment as of June 2006
Table B-3. UNMIL Deployment as of August 2012
Table B-4. UNMIL Deployment as of July 2014
Table C-1. UNMIL Organizational Chart of August 2004
Table C-2. UNMIL Organizational Chart of September 2009
Table C-4. Organizational Chart of UNTAET

**Organization chart**

**East Timor Transitional Administration**

**National Council**
Speaker Xanana Gusmão

**Office of the Inspector General**
Marisa Lopes

**Central Administrative Service**
Richard Warren

**Cabinet Secretariat**

**Office of Defense Force Development**
Rogue Rodrigues

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ Transitional Administrator**
Sergio Vieira de Mello

**Deputy Transitional Administrator**
Jean-Christian Cady

**Central Payments Office**
F. De Faria

**National Planning & Development Agency**
Emilia Pires

**Economic Planning & Project Assessment**

**Donor Coordination**

**Gender Affairs**

**Environmental Protection**

**Census & Statistics**

**Department of Police & Emergency Services**
J. C. Cady

**Department of Justice**
G. Welch

**Department of Political and Constitutional Affairs**
P. Galbraith

**Department of Finance (Central Fiscal Authority)**
M. Farias

**Department of Foreign Affairs**
J. Ramos-Horta

**Department of Internal Administration**
A. Pessa

**Department of Infrastructure**
J. Carrascalao

**Department of Economic Affairs**
M. Alkhatiri

**Department of Social Affairs**
F. Jacob

**Office of the Police Commissioner**

**Office of Civil Security, Fire and Emergency Relief**

**Political Affairs Division**

**Constitutional Affairs Division**

**Office of the Treasury**

**Budget Office**

**Civil Service & Public Employment Service**

**Office of District Affairs**

**Division of Information Technology, Postal & Telecommunications**

**Division of Commerce Industry & Tourism**
S. Shah

**Investment Institute**

**Division of Health Services**

**Division of Education, Youth & Cultural Services**

**Division of Labor & Social Services**

**Prosecutor Service**

**Judicial Reform & Court Admin. Service**

**Public Defender, Legal Aid, Legal Training Service**

** Penal Management & Training Service**

**Land and Property Commission**

**East Timor Revenue Service**

**National Archives**

**Division of Information Technology**

**Division of Energy, Water & Sanitation**

**Power Service**

**Water & Sanitation Service**

**Public Works Service**

**National Institute Cadastre & Geodesy**

**Source:** (UN Security Council 2001a)
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256


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                      Combat tour in Afghanistan

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  o  SS480: Public Policy Capstone
  o  SS473: American Foreign Policy
•  Courses Taught:
  o  SS202: American Politics
  o  SS473: American Foreign Policy
  o  SS360: Political Analysis
  o  SS480: Public Policy Capstone
•  Teaching Assistant:
  o  Homeland Security
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2015  Cadet Cultural Immersion Officer in Charge: Cross Cultural Solutions Bangkok
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