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Essays on Global Sourcing under Uncertainty

Shahryar Gheibi
Syracuse University

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ESSAYS ON GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, we study the sourcing policies of global corporations and determine the key drivers of the procurement decisions under different types of uncertainties.

The first essay explores the impact of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty on sourcing decisions of a multinational firm which engages in global sourcing through capacity reservation contracts. The focus of this essay is cost, which is known to be the main driver of global sourcing practices. We investigate the impact of cost uncertainty caused by exchange-rate fluctuations on procurement decisions, and identify the conditions that result in single and dual sourcing policies. Our analysis indicates that although cost is an order qualifier when exchange rate is considered deterministic, lower expected sourcing cost is neither necessary nor sufficient to source from a supplier under exchange-rate uncertainty.

The second essay examines sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor encountering yield uncertainty of the agricultural input required for its offered specialty product and the price uncertainty of the competing commercial product. We show that uncertainty gives rise to a conservative sourcing policy which would never emerge in a deterministic setting. While both studies highlight the significant impact of uncertainty on the business decisions and performance, they demonstrate that the effect of uncertainty may take opposite directions contingent upon the business environment and the type of uncertainty. The operational environment studied in the first essay, provides an opportunity for the firm to benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations, whereas the variation in supply and the market price of the
competing product are shown to diminish the firm’s expected profit in the agricultural setting studied in the second essay. Demonstrating the opposing behavior under different forms of uncertainty, this study recommends managers to think deeply about the impact of uncertainty on their businesses. It also provides various forms of prescriptions to mitigate risk and operate effectively under each uncertainty.
ESSAYS ON GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

by

Shahryar Gheibi

B.Sc. Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, 2006
M.Sc. Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, 2008

DISSERTATION

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, we study the global sourcing policies of a firm and determine the key drivers of the procurement decisions under different types of uncertainties.

The first essay examines the impact of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty on sourcing decisions of a multinational firm which engages in global sourcing through capacity reservation contracts. The focus of this essay is cost, which is known to be the main driver of global sourcing practices. We examine the impact of cost uncertainty caused by exchange-rate fluctuations on procurement decisions, and identify the conditions that result in single and dual sourcing policies. Our analysis indicates that although cost is an order qualifier when exchange rate is considered deterministic, lower expected sourcing cost is neither necessary nor sufficient to source from a supplier under exchange-rate uncertainty.

The second essay explores sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor encountering yield uncertainty of the agricultural input required for its offered specialty product and the price uncertainty of the competing commercial product. We show that uncertainty gives rise to a conservative sourcing policy which would never emerge in a deterministic setting.

While both studies highlight the significant impact of uncertainty on the business decisions and performance, they demonstrate that the effect of uncertainty may take opposite directions contingent upon the business environment and the type of uncertainty. The operational environment studied in the first essay, provides an opportunity for the firm to benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations, whereas the variation in supply and the market price of the competing product are shown to diminish the firm’s expected profit in the agricultural setting studied in the second essay. Considering the opposing behavior under different forms of uncertainty, this study recommends managers to think deeply about the impact of uncertainty on
their businesses. It also provides various forms of prescriptions to mitigate risk and operate effectively under each uncertainty.

1.1 Overview of Essay 1

This essay of the dissertation studies a firm’s global sourcing decisions under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. The firm initially reserves capacity from one domestic and one international supplier in the presence of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. After observing exchange rates, the firm determines the amount of capacity to utilize for manufacturing under demand uncertainty.

This essay makes four major contributions. First, we identify the set of optimal sourcing policies (one onshore, two offshore, and two dual sourcing policies), and the conditions that lead to each policy. Two dual sourcing policies emerge: The first one is a conservative policy where the firm rations limited capacity in order to minimize the negative consequences of exchange-rate fluctuations, while the second one is an opportunistic policy and features excess capacity investment in order to benefit from currency fluctuations. Moreover, our analysis shows how the optimal sourcing policy evolves with increasing degrees of exchange-rate volatility. Second, we find that lower capacity and manufacturing costs are neither necessary nor sufficient to reserve capacity at a supplier. In other words, it may be optimal to source only from the supplier associated with higher (expected) sourcing cost with the proviso that it has the chance to become a low-cost supplier with exchange-rate fluctuations. Third, we show that risk aversion reduces the likelihood of single sourcing (specifically offshore sourcing) and increases the likelihood of dual sourcing. Fourth, our analysis demonstrates that financial hedging can eliminate the negative consequences of risk aversion, and make our policy findings more pronounced as they continue to hold under risk aversion and financial hedging.
1.2 Overview of Essay 2

This essay of the dissertation studies sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor that sells a specialty product targeted toward the quality-sensitive segment of consumers while operating under two sources of uncertainty due to randomness in crop supply and fluctuations in market prices for a similar but inferior product. The firm (processor) initially leases farmland in order to obtain an agricultural input to be converted into the specialty product. At the end of the growing season, the firm observes the realization of both random variables, namely the amount of crop supply that can be converted into the specialty product, and the retail price of the commercial product offered by the global market. The firm then determines the amount of crop supply to be processed into the specialty product and the selling price of its specialty product.

This essay makes three contributions. First, motivated by an emerging agribusiness practice in coffee industry, our study features a new agricultural supply chain framework where the processor engages in Direct Trade in order to be able to offer quality product. We consider the impact of yield uncertainty stemming from Direct Trade as well as the price uncertainty in the commercial market on the sourcing and pricing decisions of the firm, and identify the optimal sourcing and pricing decisions. Second, our analysis indicates that, under certain circumstances, the processor benefits from a conservative sourcing policy, which involves intentionally reducing the amount of leased farmland utilized for growing coffee for the specialty segment. We refer to this conservative behavior as the underinvestment policy. We show that higher degrees of uncertainty in the specialty yield or the commercial market encourage underinvestment. Third, we investigate the impact of correlation between the global commercial yield and the specialty
yield, and demonstrate that it is advantageous for the processor to invest in agricultural regions where the crop yield is highly positively correlated with the global yield.
CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER EXCHANGE-RATE UNCERTAINTY

2.1 Introduction

Multinational firms have dramatically increased their sourcing from abroad in recent decades. Sourcing from other countries provides multinational firms with the opportunity to access low-cost sources, but it can also bring out additional challenges associated with currency fluctuations. When acquisition and operational costs are denominated in foreign currencies, fluctuations in exchange rates can make a source significantly less costly or more expensive. This essay explores the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on the sourcing decisions of multinational firms. Recent literature has identified various reasons for multinational firms to engage in dual sourcing, including unequal and positive lead times under demand uncertainty, or when the delivery reliability is random. Our work adds to this list by investigating the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing decisions, and in particular dual sourcing policies. Our study determines the key drivers behind single and dual sourcing, and shows how uncertainties in exchange-rate and demand influence the firm’s optimal sourcing decisions.

Our work is motivated by global sourcing practices of a furniture company in the United States that specializes in school and library furniture. Selling in a domestic market, this company outsources most of its products from either a domestic or an international supplier. In this industry, the firm faces three seasons of demand (corresponding to each semester). The company prepares for each selling season by first reserving capacity with its suppliers well in advance. Depending on the product, the international supplier may be located in Europe or in Asia. After capacity reservation contracts are signed, the firm observes the realization of the random exchange rate, then determines how much to order from each supplier to prepare for the selling
season. Fluctuating Euro and appreciating Chinese Yuan in recent years motivated the managers of this firm to revisit their sourcing policies.

Our model applies to a variety of manufacturing settings with long lead times where one firm outsources its production activities to contract manufacturers serving as suppliers. In addition to the furniture industry that motivated our problem, capacity reservation contracts are extensively used in other industries such as telecommunication, electronics and semi-conductor equipment manufacturing (Cohen et al. 2003, Erkoç and Wu 2005, Özer and Wei 2006, Peng et al. 2012). Long lead times and the fact that custom-designed products may not possibly be procured from a spot market, force the buying firms (e.g., original equipment manufacturers) to decide on production quantities well in advance of the selling season. Capacity reservation provides a guaranteed amount of capacity for the buyer and also allows the supplier to more efficiently plan its production and capacity expansion when necessary. Our model helps such buying firms in determining the most effective use of the domestic and foreign suppliers, and when to engage in dual sourcing.

Our analysis considers sourcing agreements made with four types of costs. The firm initially pays a per-unit capacity reservation cost to the supplier in order to reserve capacity for production in the future. Later when the season approaches, there is another per unit operational cost paid to the supplier for production. The production cost at the foreign supplier incurs in the foreign currency. In addition to the production cost, the buying firm incurs a transportation cost which is considered to be inclusive of duties and other localization costs. Using the common theme of free-on-board shipments in global logistics, we consider the case that the buying firm pays for the transportation cost from the supplier, and therefore, our model features a transportation cost in the domestic currency of the buying firm. The fourth cost term involves
unused capacity; the buying firm pays penalty cost for the reserved but not utilized capacity, and in the case of the foreign supplier, this payment occurs in the foreign currency. Thus, the total landed cost is the sum of capacity reservation, production, transportation (inclusive of duties and localization costs), and if any, the unused capacity penalty costs. It is noteworthy that transportation costs made in foreign currency and/or penalty cost from unused capacity in the domestic currency do not alter the structural properties in our model, and thus, our results apply to these other cost settings.

This essay makes four main contributions. First, we show that the set of potentially optimal decisions includes five distinct policies with one onshore sourcing, two offshore sourcing and two dual sourcing policies. The two dual sourcing policies are characteristically different. In the first dual sourcing policy, the firm takes a conservative action that mitigates the negative consequences of currency fluctuations by splitting a constant total capacity between the domestic and foreign suppliers. In the second dual sourcing policy, the firm reserves extra capacity in order to benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations. We also show how the firm switches from one optimal sourcing policy to another with increasing degrees of exchange-rate volatility. Second, our analysis shows that exchange rate uncertainty can drive a firm’s sourcing decision. In particular, we find that a firm may source only from the high-cost foreign supplier under exchange-rate uncertainty, and this can be optimal even if the expected cost of sourcing is higher than the selling price. This finding complements earlier literature that has characterized the role of cost and lead time in sourcing decisions. Third, the introduction of risk aversion makes dual sourcing a more desirable policy structure. It reduces the likelihood of single sourcing by reducing the likelihood of featuring an offshoring policy; these policies switch to dual sourcing when risk aversion is introduced into the model. Fourth, financial hedging helps the firm to
mitigate the negative consequences of risk aversion, and more importantly, it enables the firm to replicate the expected profit from each policy identified in the risk-neutral setting. Therefore, we conclude that our results are robust as the policy findings continue to hold under risk aversion and financial hedging.

The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the most related literature to our study. Section 2.3 presents the model, Section 2.4 analyzes it and discusses the results. Section 2.5 examines the impact of increasing exchange-rate uncertainty. Section 2.6 introduces risk aversion and Section 2.7 analyzes the influence of financial hedging. Section 2.8 presents numerical illustrations from the furniture maker that motivated our study. Section 2.9 provides concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2.2 Literature Review

This essay studies global sourcing policies in the presence of uncertain exchange rate and demand. There is vast literature that investigates different aspects of sourcing decisions with an emphasis on dual sourcing. Most recently, Jain et al. (2014) establish the potential benefit of dual sourcing by empirically showing that switching from single to dual sourcing policy reduces the inventory investment by almost 11%. One stream of research shows that the asymmetric lead time among suppliers is one of the drivers of dual sourcing. Fuduka (1964) is one of the earliest studies that shows a dual-base-stock policy is optimal when there is only one review period difference between the lead times of the two sources. Whittemore and Saunders (1977), Moinzadeh and Nahmias (1988), Moinzadeh and Schmidt (1991), Tagaras and Vlachos (2001), and Veeraraghavan and Scheller-Wolf (2008) extend this stream of literature by optimizing and/or evaluating the performance of given dual sourcing policies in more general settings with regard to lead time. Allon and Van Mieghem (2010) examine the cost-responsiveness trade-off
when splitting the supply base between a low-cost offshore and a responsive near-shore supplier. Wu and Zhang (2014) show that when two sources are equally costly, sourcing from the long-lead time supplier may still be optimal under Cournot competition. However, their study does not allow for dual sourcing. Our work differs from this stream of literature focusing on sourcing policies under lead-time differences in several ways. While these studies assume deterministic exchange rate, our study does not feature asymmetric or stochastic lead-times. More importantly, our work complements this literature by showing another reason (i.e., exchange-rate uncertainty) for dual sourcing among optimal policies.

Another stream of literature explores the impact of reliability on sourcing decisions. Yano and Lee (1995) present an extensive review of the early dual sourcing literature addressing the reliability aspect of sourcing in terms of both supply uncertainty and lead-time uncertainty. More recent studies include Tomlin and Wang (2005), Dada et al. (2007), Burke et al. (2009) and Kouvelis and Lee (2013). Particularly, Dada et al. (2007) investigate the cost-reliability trade-off in choosing the portfolio of suppliers with random capacity. Their main finding is consistent with Hill’s (2000) strategic note and conclude that cost is an order qualifier. Burke et al. (2009) reach the same conclusion in a similar setting. They point out that supplier’s cost is the key criterion and thus the lowest-cost supplier always receives some order quantity share. Our results substantially differ from theirs as we show that, in the presence of cost uncertainty, the most-expensive source may receive even the entire order.

Our focus of study departs from these streams of literature as we analyze the impact of cost uncertainty caused by exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing policies. From this perspective, our work is also related to the global supply chain literature. Within this body of research, Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) investigate the benefits of the flexibility to shift production between
geographically-dispersed facilities based on exchange-rate fluctuations. Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996) use a global supply chain model in order to analyze the value of operational hedging including holding excess capacity and production switching option. Kazaz et al. (2005) examine the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty in the revenues generated from sales in multiple markets using a single manufacturing facility. These publications also feature a recourse function that benefits the firm in its distribution to markets. These earlier studies do not explore the cost implications of various sourcing policies in depth, whereas our study focuses on sourcing decisions. Gurnani and Tang (1999) examine the ordering decisions of a retailer under demand and cost uncertainty where the retailer has two instants to order from a manufacturer prior to the selling season. The unit cost at the second instant is uncertain and the retailer has to evaluate the trade-off between a more accurate forecast and a potential higher unit cost at the second instant. They show that regardless of the value of information, the retailer never utilizes the cost-certain option (first instant) when its associated unit cost is higher than the expected unit cost of the cost-uncertain option (second instant) (propositions 3.1. and 3.2.). Our problem setting, however, features dual sourcing (sourcing from both cost-certain and cost-uncertain suppliers) even if the cost of sourcing from the domestic (cost-certain) supplier is higher than that of the foreign (cost-uncertain) supplier. Chen et al. (2015) as well explore the implications of uncertainty in operational costs for global supply chains. While they study the optimal inventory policy in a periodic-review inventory system, our study examines the optimal sourcing policy in a single-period setting.

The major driver of global sourcing practice is well acknowledged to be seeking for cost reduction. As a consequence, the common assumption in this stream of literature is that the offshore supplier is the low-cost source. Li and Wang (2010) and Chen et al. (2014), for instance,
examine the trade-offs between the expensive domestic sourcing and low-cost offshore sourcing under exchange-rate risk. The models in these two papers feature a different setup as demand uncertainty is realized at the same time as exchange-rate. The firm, in our model, continues to make its second-stage decisions under demand uncertainty. As a consequence of the difference in their modeling approach, these papers do not develop dual sourcing policies with the characterization of rationing capacity between the two suppliers in order to mitigate exchange-rate risk and/or investing in excess capacity in order to benefit from currency fluctuations. Shunko et al. (2014) study the role of transfer pricing and sourcing strategies in achieving low tax rates and low production costs, respectively. While they investigate how transfer pricing decisions impact sourcing decisions of a local manager and, thus, a multinational corporation’s profits, the main focus of our study is the impact of exchange-rate fluctuations on sourcing policies of a multinational corporation. Feng and Lu (2012) investigates strategic perils of low-cost outsourcing and find that low-cost outsourcing may result in a win-lose outcome under competition. However, only single sourcing policies can be adopted in their model. Kouvelis (1998) justifies the use of an expensive supplier when the firm does not want to incur a switching cost. Our study, on the other hand, shows that the expensive foreign supplier might be the only source utilized in the absence of switchover costs. Fox et al. (2006) and Zhang et al. (2012) focus on a different aspect of global sourcing costs by distinguishing between fixed costs and variable costs of sourcing in an optimal inventory control study. Zhang et al. (2012) introduce an order size constraint which leads to dual sourcing becoming a potentially optimal policy. In the absence of this constraint their model does not feature dual sourcing as the optimal solution. Contrary to the common belief that offshore sourcing is utilized because of low sourcing costs
associated with foreign suppliers, we show that lower cost is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for optimality of offshore sourcing under exchange-rate uncertainty.

Finally, our results provide insights into the ongoing debate on whether offshore sourcing is still economically viable (Ferreira and Prokopets, 2009; Ellram et al. 2013) even after the recent growing costs in emerging markets.

2.3 Model

The model considers a firm that sells a product in its home country at price $p$, and outsources its manufacturing to two suppliers, one in the home country (denoted $H$) and the other in a foreign country (denoted $F$). The random exchange rate is denoted $\tilde{e}$, its realization is denoted $e$ with a probability density function (pdf) $g(e)$, a cumulative distribution function (cdf) $G(e)$ on a support $[e_l, e_h]$ with a mean $\bar{e}$. Random demand is denoted $\tilde{x}$, its realization is denoted $x$ with a pdf $f(x)$ and cdf $F(x)$ on a support $[x_l, x_h]$ where $x_h > x_l > 0$ with a mean of $D$.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the setting and notation, and Figure 2.2 describes the sequence of decisions. In the first stage, the firm determines the amount of capacity to reserve from the two suppliers, denoted $Q_H$ and $Q_F$, in the presence of exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. A per-unit capacity reservation cost, denoted $k_i$ where $i = H, F$, is incurred in order to reserve capacity at each supplier in advance.

The first-stage objective function maximizes the expected profit $E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]$ and is as follows:

$$\max_{Q_H, Q_F} E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)] = -k_HQ_H - k_FQ_F + \int_{e_l}^{e_h} \pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, e) g(e) de$$

(2.1)

where $\pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, e)$ is the optimal second-stage expected profit over random demand for a given set of capacity reservation decisions $Q_H$ and $Q_F$ and realized exchange rate $e$. 
Figure 2.1. Two suppliers and one market network.

After observing the realized value of the exchange rate, correspondingly in Stage 2, the firm determines how much to order from each supplier in the presence of demand uncertainty, denoted $q_i$, subject to the constraint of first-stage capacity reservation decisions, i.e., $q_i \leq Q_i$ where $i = H, F$. In Stage 2, the firm incurs three different kinds of costs. First, the firm pays an operational cost associated with production processing, denoted $c_i$ where $i = H, F$, denominated in the local currency. Thus, $c_F$ is paid in the foreign currency for each unit produced by the
foreign supplier, and therefore, it can be seen as a random cost as its value changes with exchange-rate fluctuations. Second, the firm incurs a transshipment cost that is inclusive of duties and localization costs in the home country currency denoted $t_i$ where $i = H, F$. Third, the firm is penalized by the supplier to pay an additional fee for unused capacity (reserved from Stage 1, but not utilized in Stage 2) paid in the supplier’s currency denoted $u_i$ where $i = H, F$. Like the processing cost $c_F$, the penalty cost for unused capacity $u_F$ can also be perceived as a random cost as its value changes with exchange-rate fluctuations. The second-stage objective function maximizes the expected profit over random demand, denoted $E\left[\pi_2(q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e)\right]$, for a given set of first-stage capacity reservation decisions $(Q_H, Q_F)$ and realized exchange rate $e$:

$$
\pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, e) = \max_{q_H, q_F \geq 0} E\left[\pi_2(q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e)\right] = -c_H q_H - c_F e q_F - t_H q_H - t_F q_F
$$

$$
- u_H (Q_H - q_H)^+ - u_F e (Q_F - q_F)^+ + \int_{e_i} p \min\{x, q_H + q_F\} f(x) dx
$$

s.t. $q_i \leq Q_i$ for $i = H, F$  

where constraint (2.3) ensures that the production order quantities do not exceed the first-stage capacity reservation decisions.

We note that the above formulation can be transformed into an equivalent formulation where the first-stage objective function is expressed as:

$$
\max_{Q_H, Q_F \geq 0} E\left[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)\right] = -(k_H + u_H)Q_H - (k_F + u_F e)Q_F + \int_{e_i} \pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, e) g(e) de
$$

and the second-stage objective function is written as:
\[ \pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, e) = \max_{q_H, q_F > 0} E \left[ \pi_2(q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e) \right] \]
\[ = \left( c_h - u_H + t_H \right) q_H - \left( (c_F - u_F) e + t_F \right) q_F \]
\[ + \int_{x_i}^{x_h} p \min \{ x, q_H + q_F \} f(x) dx \]
\[ \text{s.t. } q_i \leq Q_i \text{ for } i = H, F \]

This formulation can be interpreted as follows: The buying firm pays the penalty fee for the unused capacity upfront (at the same time with reserving capacity) and receives a credit for each unit of utilized capacity when ordering production. It is also beneficial to state that if the unit penalty cost from unused capacity is paid in the buying firm’s domestic currency, then \( u_{Fe} \) is replaced with \( u_F \) in (2.5) and \( u_F \) with \( u_F \) in (2.4); the change does not cause any changes in the structural properties of the problem.

We introduce additional notation in order to simplify expressions: \( m_H \) is the margin in the second stage when the product is sourced from the domestic supplier, i.e., \( m_H = p - c_H + u_H - t_H \), and \( \tilde{m}_F \) and \( m_F \) describe the random and realized second-stage margin if the product is sourced from the foreign supplier, i.e., \( \tilde{m}_F = p - c_F \tilde{e} + u_F \tilde{e} - t_F \) and \( m_F = p - c_F e + u_F e - t_F \), respectively.

We denote the first stage profit margins of the product sourced from the home market and foreign market as \( M_H \) and \( M_F \), respectively, and assume that sourcing from both suppliers is economically viable (i.e., to avoid the trivial case of not reserving capacity):

(A1) \( M_H = p - c_H - t_H - k_H > 0 \), and

\[ M_F = E \left[ (p - c_F \tilde{e} + u_F \tilde{e} - t_F) \right] - k_F - u_F \tilde{e} = E \left[ \tilde{m}_F \right] - k_F - u_F \tilde{e} > 0 \]

The superscript “+” indicates the maximum of zero and the value of the term, and we use “increase”, “decrease”, “concave” and “convex” in their weak sense throughout this essay.
Note that assumption (A1) is not a restrictive assumption for the foreign supplier as its value is less than the expected margin (when the firm reserves and utilizes its entire capacity) \( M_F \geq p - c_F \bar{e} - t_F - k_F \).

Our model provides the firm with the flexibility to alter its production orders based on the realized value of the exchange rate as long as the firm has reserved capacity. The order allocation flexibility enables the firm to utilize the lower cost supplier. Such variations in the optimal second-stage decisions influence the first-stage capacity reservation decisions. Thus, both first-stage capacity reservation and second-stage production decisions are affected by exchange-rate uncertainty.

The optimal second-stage production decisions can be classified in three regions of exchange-rate realizations. In the first region the realized exchange rate is so low \((e_1 \leq e \leq \bar{e} = (c_H - u_H + t_H - t_F)/(c_F - u_F))\) that sourcing from the foreign supplier (i.e., offshore sourcing) is less costly than sourcing from the home supplier (i.e., onshore sourcing). In other words, for these realized values of exchange rates, offshore sourcing is more desirable than onshore sourcing (i.e., \(m_F \geq m_H > 0\)). In the second region, the realized exchange rate is higher but not sufficiently high to cause offshore sourcing to be eliminated from consideration. Specifically, in this region we have \(e_1 \leq e \leq \tau_2 = (p - t_F)/(c_F - u_F)\) corresponding to exchange rate realizations where onshore sourcing is more profitable than offshore sourcing but offshore sourcing is still profitable, i.e., \(m_H > m_F \geq 0\). In the third and final region, the realized value of the exchange rate is so high that offshore sourcing is no more a viable alternative, i.e., \(m_F < 0\). In this region, the firm does not order the product from the foreign supplier even if it has already reserved capacity in the first stage.
The threshold point \( \tau_1 \) can be lower or higher than the mean of the exchange rate \( \bar{e} \) depending on the relative magnitude of the cost terms. Throughout the manuscript, we do not impose any assumptions regarding their relative magnitudes. Figure 2.3 illustrates the three regions for an example where \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_2 \) are located within the support of \( \bar{e} \), i.e., \( e_l < (c_H - u_H + t_H - t_F) / (c_F - u_F) \) and \( e_h > (p - t_F) / (c_F - u_F) \).

2.4 Analysis

2.4.1 Demand Uncertainty

We begin our analysis by focusing on the influence of demand uncertainty. We consider the special case when the exchange-rate random variable is replaced by its deterministic equivalent, its mean \( \bar{e} \). When uncertainty is only associated with demand, the problem becomes a single-stage Newsvendor Problem with two suppliers. We define the total unit sourcing cost as the sum of unit capacity reservation, production, transportation, duties and localization costs: \( c_H^T = k_H + c_H + t_H \) and \( c_F^T = k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F \). It is easy to verify that the firm would choose the supplier with the lowest total unit sourcing cost in this special case. Thus, the firm always chooses the single-sourcing option. This observation is formalized in following remark that the firm would not engage in dual sourcing in the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty in our model.
Remark 2.1. Demand uncertainty by itself does not lead to dual sourcing in the operating environment modeled by (2.1)–(2.3).

2.4.2 Demand and Exchange-Rate Uncertainty

The second-stage problem conforms to the standard newsvendor structure with the first-stage capacity constraints. With no capacity constraints in the second stage, the optimal order quantities from each supplier can be determined easily by solving two independent Newsvendor Problems.

2.4.2.1 Onshore Sourcing

If the firm restricts its sourcing activities to an onshore supplier, the problem becomes a single-stage Newsvendor Problem and exchange-rate uncertainty becomes irrelevant. In Stage 2, if the firm ignores the first-stage capacity reservation contract, it would order $q^0_H = F^{-1}((p - c_H + u_H - t_H)/p)$ units of products from the onshore source. The optimal amount of capacity reserved in Stage 1 is:

$$Q^0_H = F^{-1}\left(\left( p-k_H-c_H-t_H \right)/p \right) < q^0_H$$

(2.7)

In other words, when the domestic supplier is the only alternative, the firm utilizes the reserved capacity in its entirety in the second stage.

2.4.2.2 Offshore Sourcing

If the firm utilizes only the offshore source, then its second-stage production amount is limited by the amount of capacity reserved in stage 1 (denoted $Q_F$) as well as the amount established by the Newsvendor fractile (denoted $q^0_F(e)$). In the absence of a limitation caused by capacity reservation, the firm would prefer to produce $q^0_F(e) = F^{-1}((p - c_F e + u_F e - t_F)/p)$. We describe the exchange rate threshold value where the firm’s first-stage production amount equals the desired level of second-stage production amount as $\tau(Q_F) = (p[1 - F(Q_F)] - t_F)/(c_F - u_F)$. If
the realized exchange rate is less than $\tau(Q_F)$, the firm utilizes the entire capacity reserved from Stage 1 despite the preference to produce more than reserved. If the realized exchange rate is greater than $\tau(Q_F)$, however, the firm does not make use of the entire capacity reserved in Stage 1 and produces less than $Q_F$. We describe the exchange-rate threshold that equates the second-stage margin to zero as $\tau_2$; when the realized exchange rate is greater than $\tau_2$, the firm does not produce in Stage 2 because of the guaranteed loss from the negative margin. Thus, the second-stage order quantity can be described as:

$$q_F^*(e) = \begin{cases} 
Q_F & \text{if } e_l \leq e \leq \tau(Q_F) \\
q_F^0(e) & \text{if } \tau(Q_F) < e \leq \tau_2 \\
0 & \text{if } \tau_2 < e \leq e_h 
\end{cases} \quad (2.8)$$

The optimal capacity amount to be reserved from the offshore supplier is denoted $Q_F^0$. There is no closed-form solution for $Q_F^0$, however, it has a unique value that satisfies the following first-order condition (FOC):

$$-(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_l}^{\tau(Q_F^0)} (\tau(Q_F^0) - e) g(e) \, de = 0 \quad (2.9)$$

2.4.2.3 Global Sourcing

We next analyze the optimal capacity reservation decisions for the general problem described in (2.4) – (2.6). In Stage 2, if the realized exchange rate is low, below the threshold $\tau_1$ that equates the second-stage returns from the domestic and foreign suppliers, then the firm prioritizes sourcing from the foreign supplier. If the realized exchange rate is high and above the threshold value $\tau_2$ that equates the second-stage returns from the foreign source to zero, then the foreign source is not utilized at all. The following proposition provides the optimal second-stage production decisions at each realization of exchange rate.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal second-stage production decisions are:

\[
(q_H^*(e), q_F^*(e)) = \begin{cases} 
  \left( \min \left\{ Q_H, (q_H^0 - Q_F)^+ \right\}, \min \left\{ Q_F, q_F^0(e) \right\} \right) & \text{if } e \leq e < \tau_1 \\
  \left( \min \left\{ Q_H, q_H^0 \right\}, \min \left\{ Q_F, \left(q_F^0(e) - Q_H^0\right)^+ \right\} \right) & \text{if } \tau_1 \leq e < \tau_2 \\
  \left( \min \left\{ Q_H, q_H^0 \right\}, 0 \right) & \text{if } \tau_2 \leq e \leq e_h
\end{cases}
\]  

(2.10)

In the remainder of the essay, we suppress the exchange rate parameter in the optimal second-stage production functions unless necessary for clarity.

We next establish that the objective function is jointly concave in its decision variables.

Proposition 2.2. The objective function in (2.4) is jointly concave in $Q_H$ and $Q_F$.

From Proposition 2.1, it can be seen that the optimal amount of capacity reserved from the domestic supplier cannot exceed $q_H^0$. The optimal capacity decisions in the first stage can be classified into the following three sets: Region $R_1 = \{ Q_H, Q_F \mid Q_H + Q_F \leq q_H^0 \}$, region $R_2 = \{ Q_H, Q_F \mid Q_H \leq q_H^0, Q_F \leq q_H^0 \text{ and } Q_H + Q_F > q_H^0 \}$, and region $R_3 = \{ Q_H, Q_F \mid Q_H \leq q_H^0 \text{ and } Q_F > q_H^0 \}$.

These three regions are illustrated in Figure 2.4.

![Figure 2.4. Optimal regions for the general case of the problem.](image)
We can determine the optimal capacity decisions in each of the three regions depicted in Figure 2.4. From Proposition 2.2, we know that the problem is jointly concave in $Q_H$ and $Q_F$. Therefore, we can identify optimal decisions in each region through the FOC. The optimal capacity reservation decisions in region $R_1$ satisfies the following system of equations:

\[
\int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{e_h} \left( e - \tau(Q_H) \right) g(e) \, de = \frac{\left( k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F \right) - \left( k_H + c_H + t_H \right)}{c_F - u_F}.
\]

(2.11)

Defining the values of $\tau(Q_H)$ and $\tau(Q_H + Q_F)$ that solve the system of equations (2.11) as $\tau_H^*$ and $\tau_{HF}^*$, respectively, we can express the optimal capacity choices as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_H^* &= F^{-1}\left( \frac{p - (c_F - u_F)\tau_H^* - t_F}{p} \right), \\
Q_F^* &= F^{-1}\left( \frac{p - (c_F - u_F)\tau_{HF}^* - t_F}{p} \right) - F^{-1}\left( \frac{p - (c_F - u_F)\tau_H^* - t_F}{p} \right).
\end{align*}
\]

(2.12)

The optimal solution is never located in region $R_2$; this is formalized in the following proposition. Considering the fact that it is never optimal to reserve more capacity than $q_H^0$ at the home country, this proposition guarantees that the capacity to be reserved from the foreign supplier is either greater than $q_H^0$, or it is sufficiently low that the total amount of capacity to be reserved is not more than $q_H^0$.

**Proposition 2.3.** The optimal solution does not lie in region $R_2$.

The optimal capacity reservation decisions in region $R_3$ satisfies the following system of equations:
\[
\begin{align*}
\int_{\tau(Q_{H})}^{e_1} \left( e - \tau(Q_{H}) \right) g(e) \, de &= \frac{E\left[ (m_H - \bar{m}_F)^+ \right] - k_H - u_H}{c_F - u_F}, \\
\int_{\tau(Q_{F})}^{e_1} \left( \tau(Q_{F}) - e \right) g(e) \, de &= \frac{k_F + u_F \bar{e}}{c_F - u_F}.
\end{align*}
\] (2.13)

Describing the values of \( \tau(Q_{H}) \) and \( \tau(Q_{F}) \) that solve (2.13) as \( \tau_{H}^* \) and \( \tau_{F}^* \), respectively we can express the optimal capacity choices as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_{H}^* &= F^{-1} \left( \frac{p - (c_F - u_F)\tau_{H}^* - t_F}{p} \right), \\
Q_{F}^* &= F^{-1} \left( \frac{p - (c_F - u_F)\tau_{F}^* - t_F}{p} \right).
\end{align*}
\] (2.14)

2.4.3 Optimal Sourcing Policies

We next show that there are five potentially optimal policies: one onshore sourcing, two offshore sourcing, and two dual sourcing policies. We describe them as follows:

(1) Policy H: Onshore sourcing with \( Q_{H}^* = Q_{H}^0 \) and \( Q_{F}^* = 0 \),

(2) Policy FL: Offshore sourcing with a smaller capacity reservation \( Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 \leq q_{H}^0 \) and \( Q_{H}^* = 0 \),

(3) Policy FH: Offshore sourcing with a higher capacity reservation \( Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 > q_{H}^0 \) and \( Q_{H}^* = 0 \),

(4) Policy DR: Dual sourcing featuring a rationing perspective with \( Q_{H}^* + Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 \),

(5) Policy DE: Dual sourcing featuring excess capacity with \( Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 \) and \( Q_{H}^* < Q_{H}^0 \).

Policy H is the onshore policy where the firm reserves capacity only at the domestic supplier. The optimal amount of capacity to reserve is equal to \( Q_{H}^* = Q_{H}^0 \) where \( Q_{H}^0 \) is determined through (2.7). The next two policies, FL and FH, are offshore policies where the optimal capacity reservation decisions are \( Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 \) where \( Q_{F}^0 \) is determined through (2.9). Recall that \( Q_{F}^0 \) can
be less than or greater than $q_H^0$. We denote the offshore sourcing policy that leads to limited
capacity investment $Q_F^* = Q_F^0 \leq q_H^0$ as $F_L$, and the offshore sourcing policy with a higher
capacity commitment $Q_F^* = Q_F^0 > q_H^0$ as $F_H$.

The set of potentially optimal policies features two dual sourcing policies that differ
classically. Policy $D_R$ is an intermediate solution in region $R_1$ and the optimal amount of
total capacity reserved can be obtained through the set of equations in (2.12), i.e., $Q_H^* + Q_F^* =
Q_F^0$. Depending on the cost parameters and the distribution of the random exchange rate, the total
capacity is rationed between the two sources. This is a conservative and a defensive policy where
the firm mitigates the negative consequences of currency fluctuations by distributing the total
capacity investment between the two sources. The second dual sourcing policy is denoted $D_E$ and
it is aggressive and opportunistic as it features excess capacity in order to enjoy the benefits of
fluctuating exchange rates. The optimal capacity decisions are obtained through the set of
equations in (2.14). Under $D_E$, the firm commits to the level of capacity investment that it would
have invested in the offshore sourcing policy $F_H$ (i.e., $Q_F^* = Q_F^0$) and it reserves an additional
amount of capacity from the domestic source. However, this amount is strictly less than the ideal
amount it would have reserved under the onshore sourcing policy, i.e., $Q_H^* < Q_H^0$. Figure 2.5
illustrates the five potentially optimal policies.
Figure 2.5. Set of all possible optimal solutions.

The above set of potentially optimal policies can be obtained by reviewing four optimality conditions. These four conditions provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for each policy to be the optimal decision. These four optimality conditions are:

(OC1): \[ E \left[ (\tilde{m}_F - M_H)^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} > 0, \]

(OC2): \[ E \left[ (\tilde{m}_F - m_H)^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} > 0, \]

(OC3): \[ m_H - k_H - u_H - \left( E \left[ \tilde{m}_F^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} \right) > 0, \]

(OC4): \[ E \left[ (m_H - \tilde{m}_F^+)^+ \right] - k_H - u_H > 0. \]

Proposition 2.4 shows how the five potentially optimal policies are obtained through the above four optimality conditions.

**Proposition 2.4.**

(a) Policy H is optimal iff (OC1) does not hold;
(b) Policy F_L is optimal iff (OC2) and (OC3) do not hold;
(c) Policy F_H is optimal iff (OC2) holds and (OC4) does not hold;
(d) Policy D_R is optimal iff (OC1) and (OC3) hold and (OC2) does not hold;
(e) Policy D_E is optimal iff (OC2) and (OC4) hold.

Table 2.1 presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for each policy to be the optimal solution for the problem modeled in (2.4) – (2.6). Dual sourcing is the prevailing policy under certain conditions. The following proposition shows that a quick comparison between the optimal offshore capacity with the desired level of second-stage order quantity from the domestic source reveals which one of these two dual sourcing policies can be featured in the optimal solution. We also observe that Q_H^0 establishes a minimum total capacity reservation amount for the global sourcing problem (see Lemma 2A.5 in the appendix).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optimal Sourcing Policy</th>
<th>Onshore Sourcing</th>
<th>Offshore Sourcing</th>
<th>Dual Sourcing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(OC1)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OC2)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OC3)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OC4)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the first-stage optimal decisions. A check mark (“✓”) indicates that the corresponding inequality (i.e., optimality condition) holds when a particular sourcing policy is optimal, and a cross mark (“×”) indicates that the opposite inequality holds.

Proposition 2.5. (a) If Q_F^0 < q_H^0, then policy D_E cannot be optimal, leaving policy D_R as the only viable dual sourcing policy; (b) If Q_F^0 > q_H^0, then policy D_R cannot be optimal, leaving policy D_E as the only viable dual sourcing policy.
Dual sourcing policies $D_R$ and $D_E$ exhibit completely different characteristics. We next provide a discussion of these two policies.

### 2.4.3.1 Rationing Dual Sourcing with Policy $D_R$

In policy $D_R$, the firm reserves capacity from both sources where the sum of these reserved capacities equals the amount of capacity it would have reserved from the offshore source, i.e., $Q_{H}^* + Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0$. The firm’s allocation of capacity can be perceived as rationing capacity in order to mitigate cost uncertainty stemming from currency fluctuations. In this policy, the firm does not necessarily benefit much from currency swings. Thus, it is a defensive and a conservative policy that can be perceived as mitigating the negative consequences of currency fluctuations. Under $D_R$, the firm always utilizes the home supplier to its maximum, i.e., $q_{H}^* = Q_{H}^*$ at every realization of the random exchange rate. However, it utilizes the foreign supplier up to its limit only when the realized exchange rate is desirable, i.e., $e \leq \tau_1$.

According to policy $D_R$, the firm diversifies its supply base between a cost-uncertain and a cost-certain supplier in order to mitigate the negative consequences of exchange-rate uncertainty. However, it cannot capitalize completely in the event that exchange rate makes the foreign supplier an economically desirable source; this can be seen from $q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0 - Q_{H}^* < Q_{F}^0$ when $e_l \leq e \leq \tau_1$.

### 2.4.3.2 Excess Dual Sourcing with Policy $D_E$

Two observations can be made regarding policy $D_E$. First, the firm considers the foreign supplier as its primary source and reserves the exact amount of capacity it would have reserved under the offshore sourcing policies, i.e., $Q_{F}^* = Q_{F}^0$. Second, the firm reserves additional capacity from the domestic source. However, this amount is strictly less than what it would have reserved under the onshore sourcing policy, i.e., $Q_{H}^* < Q_{H}^0$. The domestic supplier appears to
serve as a backup source in this policy. The amount reserved at the domestic source $Q_H^*$ is utilized only when the realized exchange rate makes the foreign source an expensive supplier. Similarly, the foreign source is not always utilized at its maximum reserved capacity. By reserving a total capacity that exceeds the optimal amount that would be reserved from the offshore source, the firm always ends up wasting some reserved capacity, but in turn, takes advantage of the swings in the exchange rate. Thus, additional capacity reserved at the domestic source leads to an opportunist behavior and provides the flexibility to enjoy the benefits of cost fluctuations.

2.5 The Impact of Exchange-Rate Uncertainty

In this section, we compare the optimal sourcing decisions under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty with those obtained under deterministic exchange rate and stochastic demand by replacing the random exchange rate with its deterministic equivalent. The comparison provides insights regarding the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on capacity reservation decisions. It is shown earlier that the firm does not engage in dual sourcing under demand uncertainty in isolation in our model; it utilizes either the onshore source or the offshore source depending on the lower total cost of sourcing. We examine the capacity choices under the cases with one source featuring the lower total sourcing cost.

Case 1: Lower expected cost at the foreign supplier: $k_F + c_F\bar{e} + t_F < k_H + c_H + t_H$. When the foreign supplier has the lower expected total sourcing cost, the firm always chooses offshore sourcing under deterministic exchange rate. However, this is not necessarily the case if the exchange rate is uncertain.
**Proposition 2.6.** *When the foreign supplier has the lower expected total unit sourcing cost, the firm utilizes either an offshore sourcing policy (FL or FH) or the dual sourcing policy DE under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty.*

The above proposition implies that lower expected cost of sourcing is not a sufficient condition for offshore sourcing. More specifically, when the exchange-rate uncertainty is taken into account, it may be optimal for the firm to utilize dual sourcing, rather than offshore sourcing, under specific conditions even if the expected total unit sourcing cost is lower for the foreign supplier.

**Case 2:** Lower cost at the domestic supplier: \( k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F \geq k_H + c_H + t_H \). When sourcing from the domestic supplier is less costly, the firm always chooses onshore sourcing under deterministic exchange rate. The next proposition indicates that the offshore sourcing policy can be optimal despite featuring a more expensive foreign supplier.

**Proposition 2.7.** *When the domestic supplier has the lower total unit sourcing cost, offshore sourcing policies (FL or FH) can be optimal under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty.*

Proposition 2.7 shows that it is not necessary to have the lowest total sourcing cost in order to reserve capacity at a single source. It shows that lower sourcing cost from the domestic supplier does not eliminate the possibility of offshore sourcing. Alternatively said, offshore sourcing does not need to feature the lower expected sourcing cost to be the optimal policy. This result contrasts the common rationale behind offshore sourcing practices that often justify working with foreign sources because of the lower cost feature. In our finding, however, foreign source is utilized only when the exchange rate is lower, and thus, the effective cost of utilizing the foreign source is lower than its expected sourcing cost.
Table 2.2 illustrates how introducing exchange-rate uncertainty can significantly influence the optimal sourcing policy when compared to the case where uncertainty is associated only with demand. In other words, ignoring the exchange-rate uncertainty may result in decisions that are far from optimal.

Through propositions 2.6 and 2.7, we conclude that lower unit costs are neither necessary nor sufficient to reserve capacity at a supplier. We next show that exchange-rate uncertainty can be influential in offshore sourcing even if the foreign source has a negative expected profit margin in the second stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Structure</th>
<th>Demand Uncertainty</th>
<th>Optimality Conditions</th>
<th>Exchange-Rate and Demand Uncertainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1 $k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F &lt; k_H + c_H + t_H$</td>
<td>Offshore Sourcing</td>
<td>OC2</td>
<td>OC4 Excess Dual Sourcing (D_E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC4 Offshore Sourcing (F_H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC2</td>
<td>OC4 Offshore Sourcing (F_L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2 $k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F \geq k_H + c_H + t_H$</td>
<td>Onshore Sourcing</td>
<td>OC2</td>
<td>OC4 Excess Dual Sourcing (D_E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC4 Offshore Sourcing (F_H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC2</td>
<td>OC1 Rationing Dual Sourcing (D_R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC3 Offshore Sourcing (F_L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OC1</td>
<td>Onshore Sourcing (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2.** The impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on sourcing decisions. An overscore implies the reversed condition.

**Proposition 2.8.** The optimal sourcing policy may be dual sourcing (D_R or D_E) or offshore sourcing (F_L or F_H) when $p - (c_F - u_F)\bar{e} - t_F < 0$.

The consequence of the above proposition is that the firm can choose offshore sourcing even if it is expected to lose money in the second stage with $p - (c_F - u_F)\bar{e} - t_F < 0$. Note that this is a stronger condition than negative expected margin in the first stage with $p - c_F\bar{e} - t_F - k_F < 0$.

Under deterministic exchange rate, the firm may not even consider the foreign supplier when the
second-stage return is negative. Thus, exchange-rate uncertainty creates the opportunity for the firm to reserve capacity at a supplier even with negative expected margin in the second-stage. Proposition 2.8 implies that the firm may benefit from giving up a deterministic positive profit margin from sourcing through the domestic supplier, and instead engage with a single foreign source even if the expected unit cost from the offshore source (in stage 2) is higher than the unit price. In this case, postponing the sourcing decision until the revelation of the exchange rate provides the benefit of potentially high profit margin caused by low exchange-rate realizations. It also comes at the expense of incurring a potential loss (the sum of capacity reservation cost and penalty cost of unused capacity) at high realizations of exchange rate. This flexibility can increase the desirability of the foreign supplier so much that the firm prefers to utilize offshore sourcing without a domestic supplier even if the foreign supplier has an expected unit cost in Stage 2 higher than the market price.

We next investigate the impact of exchange-rate volatility on the optimal sourcing policy, and the expected profit.

**Proposition 2.9.** (a) The optimal foreign capacity \( Q_F^* \) always increases in exchange-rate volatility. But the optimal domestic capacity \( Q_H^* \) may increase or decrease. (b) The expected profit increases in exchange-rate volatility.

This proposition formally establishes the opportunity that exchange-rate fluctuations along with the flexibility to postpone the production decisions until realization of the exchange rate can provide for a firm to improve its expected profit. It is worth noting the asymmetry between the downside consequences and the upside potential of exchange uncertainty in this business environment. While lower realizations of the exchange rate lead to higher profits, the amount of loss due to high realizations is restricted to the total amount of capacity reservation and penalty
costs corresponding to the case where the firm does not order production to the foreign supplier. This asymmetry is key to creating the opportunity to benefit from the higher exchange-rate volatility.

As for the sourcing decisions, one would intuit that higher degrees of exchange-rate volatility create the incentive to invest in additional flexibility through domestic capacity. However, Proposition 2.9 indicates that the optimal domestic capacity does not behave monotonically in exchange-rate volatility as it may exhibit a decreasing behavior as well. The next proposition establishes the condition under which the firm indeed reduces its domestic capacity investment under a uniform exchange-rate distribution.

**Proposition 2.10.** When the exchange rate is uniformly distributed, under policy $D_E$, the optimal domestic capacity $Q_H^*$ decreases in exchange-rate volatility iff $k_H + c_H + t_H < (c_F - u_F)\bar{e} + t_F$.

The condition in Proposition 2.10 seems counter-intuitive at first sight as it suggests that when total unit cost of sourcing from the domestic source is lower than the expected cost of sourcing from the foreign source, the domestic capacity decreases in exchange-rate uncertainty. We note that this proposition does not imply that reducing the cost of onshore sourcing leads to lower optimal capacity at the domestic source. In fact, when $k_H + c_H + t_H < (c_F - u_F)\bar{e} + t_F$, the firm reserves higher levels of domestic capacity at any degree of exchange-rate volatility compared to the opposite case (i.e., $k_H + c_H + t_H > (c_F - u_F)\bar{e} + t_F$). The condition in Proposition 2.10 requires that the cost of sourcing from the domestic source is low, and thus, the firm has already reserved a sufficiently high level of domestic capacity under policy $D_E$. Consequently, the domestic capacity becomes a substitute for the foreign capacity which increases in exchange-rate volatility (according to Proposition 2.9). As a result, the firm reduces its high capacity
commitment to the domestic source in order to capitalize more on the prospects of sourcing from
the foreign supplier.

The following proposition sheds light on how the optimal sourcing policy evolves with
exchange-rate volatility.

**Proposition 2.11.** *As the exchange-rate volatility increases:*

(a) if \( k_F + c_F \tilde{e} + t_F < k_H + c_H + t_H \), then the optimal sourcing policy changes according to the
following path (or a continuous portion thereof): \( F_L \rightarrow F_H \rightarrow D_E \);

(b) if \( k_F + c_F \tilde{e} + t_F \geq k_H + c_H + t_H \), then the optimal sourcing policy changes according to the
following paths (or a continuous portion thereof): \( H \rightarrow D_R \rightarrow F_L \rightarrow F_H \rightarrow D_E \), or \( H \rightarrow D_R \rightarrow D_E \).

Proposition 2.11 establishes the optimal policy paths that the firm follows as exchange-rate
volatility increases. Specifically, when the foreign supplier is associated with lower expected unit
sourcing cost, the firm either keeps offshore sourcing or switches to policy \( D_E \) utilizing excess
capacity. On the other hand, when the unit cost of sourcing from the domestic supplier is lower,
the firm switches from onshore sourcing to the dual sourcing policy exhibiting rationing
behavior (\( D_R \)). With increasing exchange-rate volatility the firm either directly switches to the
excess dual sourcing policy (\( D_E \)) or first adopts offshore sourcing policies before implementing
the excess dual sourcing policy. We observe that as the degree of exchange-rate variation
increases, the foreign supplier becomes a more desirable supplier. As mentioned before, this is
because there are higher chances of a large savings due to low realization of the exchange rate
while the possible loss due to the appreciation of the exchange rate—which is as much as the
capacity reservation cost plus the penalty cost of unused capacity—remains unchanged.
Consequently, high volatility of exchange rate results in choosing the foreign supplier as the
primary source (corresponding to policies \( F_L \), \( F_H \), and \( D_E \)).
2.6 Risk Aversion

This section presents the influence of risk aversion on the part of the buying firm. We utilize the value-at-risk (VaR) measure to limit the risk associated with the realized profits in the global sourcing problem under exchange-rate and demand uncertainty. VaR is the most widely employed risk measure in practice and is the prevailing risk approach in the Basel II and III Accords specifying the banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). There are two parameters that describe the firm’s risk preferences in VaR: $\beta \geq 0$ represents the loss (value at risk) that the firm is willing to tolerate at probability $\alpha$, where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$. For a given $\alpha$, if VaR is more than the tolerable loss $\beta$, then first-stage decisions ($Q_H$, $Q_F$) correspond to an infeasible solution. We incorporate the firm’s VaR concern into the model in (2.1) – (2.3) by supplementing the first-stage problem with the following probability constraint:

$$P_{(\hat{\epsilon}, \hat{i})} \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F) < -\beta \right] \leq \alpha$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.15)

where

$$\Pi(Q_H, Q_F) = -k_H Q_H - k_F Q_F - (c_H + t_H) q_H^* (\hat{\epsilon}) - (c_F + t_F) q_F^* (\hat{\epsilon}) - u_H (Q_H - q_H^* (\hat{\epsilon}))^* - u_F (Q_F - q_F^* (\hat{\epsilon}))^* + p \min \{ \hat{x}, q_H^* (\hat{\epsilon}) + q_F^* (\hat{\epsilon}) \}$$

is the random profit from the optimal second-stage decisions and first-stage capacity reservation decisions ($Q_H, Q_F$) and $P_{(\hat{\epsilon}, \hat{i})} \left[ \right]$ represents the probability over the exchange-rate and demand random variables. Constraint (2.15) states that the probability that the realized loss exceeds $\beta$ should be less than or equal to the firm’s tolerable loss probability $\alpha$.

Before proceeding with the analysis of risk aversion, it is important to make several observations. In the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty, the introduction of risk aversion through a VaR constraint as in (2.15) does not lead to dual sourcing. It is already pointed out
earlier that when random exchange rate is replaced with its certainty equivalent $\bar{e}$ in the risk-neutral setting, the firm works with only one supplier and reserves capacity at the lower cost source. Moreover, the second-stage production amount is always equal to the amount reserved from Stage 1 as long as the firm operates with positive margins. When the optimal capacity reserved at the low-cost source (let us denote it with $Q^N$) violates the VaR constraint due to the stochastic demand, then the firm would reduce its initial capacity reservation to satisfy the constraint at the tolerated loss. Specifically, let $x_\alpha$ denote the value of the demand random variable that corresponds to $\alpha$ probability in its cdf. It is sufficient to check the value of the realized profit at $x_\alpha$ from reserving $Q^N$ units of capacity at the low cost supplier $j$: If $p \, x_\alpha - (k_j + c_j + t_j)Q^N < -\beta$, then the firm reduces its initial capacity investment from $Q^N$ to $Q^d = (p \, x_\alpha - \beta)(k_j + c_j + t_j)$ where $Q^d$ describes the amount of capacity reserved in Stage 1 due to risk aversion. Thus, in the absence of exchange-rate uncertainty, the firm reduces its initial capacity reservation commitment as a result of risk aversion but does not switch to dual sourcing.

We next examine the impact of risk aversion in the presence of exchange-rate uncertainty. Let $e_\alpha$ denote the exchange rate realization at fractile $1 - \alpha$ (i.e., $[1 - G(e_\alpha)] = \alpha$). Because demand uncertainty in isolation does not lead to any policy change in our model, but rather a reduction in reserved capacity, we focus on problem settings where exchange-rate is a source of uncertainty in violating the VaR requirement with $e_\alpha > \tau_2$. Exchange-rate realizations greater than $\tau_2$ are most detrimental to the firm because it would waste the entire capacity reserved at the foreign source due to the fact that $q_F^*(e) = 0$ for $e \geq \tau_2$.

In the presence of exchange-rate uncertainty, incorporating risk aversion encourages the firm to engage in dual sourcing. This can be seen when the optimal policy in the risk-neutral setting is an offshore sourcing policy as in the case of policies $F_H$ and $F_L$. When risk aversion is included
and the VaR constraint is violated, the firm can decrease the level of capacity investment in the foreign source in order to comply with the VaR constraint in (2.15). Let us define \( Q_F^4 \) as the level of capacity reserved at the foreign source that yields realized profit equal to \(-\beta\) at exchange-rate realization \( e_\alpha \), i.e.,

\[
Q_F^4 = \frac{\beta}{k_F + u_F e_\alpha}.
\]  

(2.16)

We use the following two conditions in Proposition 2.12, which characterizes when the firm switches from single sourcing at the foreign source (i.e., offshore sourcing policies \( F_H \) and \( F_L \)) to dual sourcing:

(RA1): \[
M_H \left[ \frac{c_F - u_F}{k_F + u_F e} \right] \tau(q_F^l) \int_{e_i} G(e) \, de - 1 > k_H + u_H - E \left[ (m_H - \tilde{m}_F^+) \right],
\]

(RA2): \[
M_H \left[ \frac{c_F - u_F}{k_F + u_F e} \right] \tau(q_F^l) \int_{e_i} G(e) \, de - 1 > E \left[ \tilde{m}_F^+ \right] - M_H - (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i} G(e) \, de.
\]

Proposition 2.12. Suppose the risk-neutral optimal solution violates the VaR constraint, and \( e_\alpha \geq \tau_\alpha, u_F > 0 \).

(a) When the optimal sourcing policy in the risk-neutral setting is \( F_H \) and \( Q_F^4 > q_H^0 \), the firm switches to dual sourcing under risk aversion if RA1 holds;

(b) When the optimal sourcing policy in the risk-neutral setting is either \( F_L \) or \( F_H \) with \( Q_F^4 \leq q_H^0 \), the firm switches to dual sourcing under risk aversion if RA2 holds.

From Proposition 2.12, we see conditions that cause the firm to switch from offshore sourcing policies that are optimal in a risk-neutral setting to dual sourcing. Condition RA1 is a stronger condition because the right hand side (RHS) of RA1 is greater than that of RA2 when \( Q_F^4 > q_H^0 \). In this case, when RA1 holds, condition RA2 also holds. Thus, RA1 can be perceived
as a sufficient condition that, when an offshore sourcing policy is optimal in the risk-neutral setting, then the firm switches to dual sourcing as a consequence of risk aversion. It can also be shown that when dual sourcing policies are optimal in the risk-neutral setting, they continue to be optimal under risk aversion in our model. In conclusion, our analysis shows that the introduction of risk aversion through a VaR constraint leads to a higher likelihood of dual sourcing.

2.7 Financial Hedging

We next examine the impact of introducing the flexibility to purchase financial hedging instruments on the firm’s risk concern and expected profit. We consider the case when the firm obtains a certain number of currency futures contracts, denoted $H$, in stage 1 along with its capacity reservation decisions $(Q_H, Q_F)$. Each unit of financial hedging contract has a unit cost of $h(e)$ (also referred to as the premium) and a strike (or, exercise) price of $e_s$. We assume that the financial institution sells the hedging instrument at cost, i.e.,

$$h(e_s) = \int_{e_s}^{\infty} (e - e_s) g(e) de - \int_{e_s}^{\infty} (e_s - e) g(e) de. \quad (2.17)$$

In Stage 1, the firm now determines the optimal values of $(Q_H, Q_F, H)$ in order to maximize the expected profit subject to the same VaR requirement:

$$\max_{Q_H, Q_F, H \geq 0} E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F, H) \right] = -k_H Q_H - k_F Q_F - h(e_s) H + \int_{e_s}^{\infty} \pi'(Q_H, Q_F, H, e) g(e) de. \quad (2.18)$$

In Stage 2, all financial hedging contracts purchased in Stage 1 are exercised. Subject to the same capacity reservation constraint in (2.3), the second-stage objective function in (2.2) is then revised as follows:
\[ \pi^*(Q_H, Q_F, H, e) = \max_{q_H, q_F \geq 0} E \left[ \pi_2(q_H, q_F, x | Q_H, Q_F, H, e) \right] \]
\[ = -c_h q_H - c_f e q_f - t_h q_H - t_f q_F - u_H (Q_H - q_H)^+ - u_f e (Q_F - q_F)^+ \]
\[ + (e - e_s) H + \int_{x_l}^{x_u} p \min \{x, q_H + q_F\} f(x) \, dx \]  
\[ (2.19) \]

The objective function in (2.19) adds the term \((e - e_s)H\) into (2.2). The advantage of employing financial hedging in Stage 1 enables the firm to eliminate the negative consequences of the VaR constraint in (2.15), which can now be expressed as follows:

\[ P_{(i, \hat{i})} \left[ \begin{aligned} -k_H Q_H - k_F Q_F - h(e_s) H - (c_H + t_H) q_H^*(e) - (c_f e + t_f) q_F^*(e) \\ -u_H (Q_H - q_H^*(e))^+ - u_f e (Q_F - q_F^*(e))^+ \\ +(e - e_s) H + p \min \{x, q_H^*(e) + q_F^*(e)\} \end{aligned} \right] < -\beta \leq \alpha . \]  
\[ (2.20) \]

The firm’s tolerated loss probability \(\alpha\) is not exceeded when the firm is ensured to have realized profits greater than or equal to \(-\beta\) when the exchange-rate random variable takes values in the range \(e_l \leq e \leq e_\alpha\). For any given \((Q_H, Q_F)\), if the VaR constraint in (2.15) is violated, then the firm determines the number of hedging contracts that would satisfy the same risk concern expressed in (2.20) even at the lowest second-stage revenues occurring at \(x = x_l\). This is formalized in the next proposition.

**Proposition 2.13.** If the first-stage decisions \((Q_H, Q_F)\) does not satisfy the VaR constraint in (2.15) then

(a) the firm can purchase the following number of financial hedging contracts with a strike price \(e_s \leq e_\alpha\) and premium \(h(e_s)\) as defined in (2.17)

\[ H^*(e_s) = \left\{ \begin{aligned} k_H Q_H + k_F Q_F + (c_H + t_H) q_H^*(e_\alpha) + (c_f e_\alpha + t_f) q_F^*(e_\alpha) \\ -p \min \{x_l, q_H^*(e_\alpha) + q_F^*(e_\alpha)\} - \beta + u_H (Q_H - q_H^*(e_\alpha))^+ + u_f e_\alpha (Q_F - q_F^*(e_\alpha))^+ \\ (e_\alpha - e_s - h(e_s)) \end{aligned} \right\} \]  
\[ (2.21) \]

and satisfy (2.20); and
the expected profit $E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F, H^*(e))]$ under risk aversion and financial hedging is equivalent to $E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F, 0)]$ of the risk-neutral setting in the absence of the VaR constraint (2.15).

Proposition 2.13(a) shows that financial hedging enables the firm to satisfy the VaR constraint. The number of hedging contracts specified in (2.21) accounts for the losses that can incur at all of the undesirable exchange-rate realizations in the range of $e_a \leq e \leq e_h$ corresponding to $\alpha$ percent in the cdf. Thus, the number of financial hedging contracts in (2.21) guarantees that the firm’s losses exceeding $\beta$ is less than or equal to the firm’s tolerated loss probability $\alpha$.

Proposition 2.13(b) shows that financial hedging is also beneficial in terms of protecting the expected profit. For any capacity reservation decisions $(Q_H, Q_F)$ in stage 1, financial hedging enables the firm to obtain the same expected profit it earned in the risk-neutral setting without having to sacrifice initial capacity reservation in order to satisfy the VaR constraint. The consequence of Proposition 2.13(b) is that the firm’s set of potential optimal policies under risk aversion and financial hedging is identical to the set of policies developed in Section 2.4 for the risk-neutral setting. Thus, we conclude that financial hedging not only eliminates the negative consequences of risk aversion, but also makes our five potentially optimal policies to hold under more general settings.

In sum, we find that our insights into the role of exchange rate uncertainty on optimal sourcing decisions are robust; we find that the introduction of risk aversion via a VaR constraint can make dual sourcing more likely and that our conclusions are unaffected by the use of financial hedging to mitigate risk.
2.8 Numerical Illustration

In this section, we provide numerical illustrations from the operating environment of the furniture manufacturer that motivated our study. For this furniture company specializing in school and library furniture, there are three selling season, each representing a four-month time window (following the traditional school semesters). The furniture maker develops a forecast for its products for each selling season (for four months). The firm makes capacity reservation decisions one selling season in advance. Book carts, one of the firm’s best known products, are sourced from small suppliers that charge a unit capacity reservation cost ranging from 1% to 5% of the selling price. The firm has other products where the unit capacity reservation cost is between 5% and 10% of the selling price (e.g., office desks and chairs). We present the results associated with surprising insights, and ignore the expected results associated with product with higher unit capacity reservation costs.

The capacity reservation payment is made at the spot exchange rate one season before the selling season approaches (equivalent to four months). Thus, it can be converted to domestic currency using the spot exchange rate at the time of the initial payment. Four months later, corresponding to the beginning of the selling season, the furniture maker specifies the exact amount of products to be manufactured at each supplier. It is important to note that the firm continues to operate under demand uncertainty during the selling season; schools and libraries continue to place orders during the selling season.

We next describe the data used to represent exchange-rate fluctuations. Our analysis uses data on the daily Euro-Dollar exchange rate from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2012 (3-year period), corresponding to the planning period for the furniture maker that motivated our problem. We first analyze the rate of change in the exchange rate in four months. We accomplish
this goal by examining each daily exchange rate (or, spot rate), denoted $s_t$, and comparing it with the daily exchange rate of four months later, denoted $s_{t+120}$, within our three-year data set. Specifically, for each day over the 3-year period, we calculate the proportion of the exchange-rate four months into the future relative to the current exchange rate, i.e., $e_t = s_{t+120}/s_t$. The comparison of the daily exchange rate with its counterpart in four months results in an empirical distribution which we use in our analysis. Figure 2.6(a) provides the histogram of the empirical distribution representing the fluctuations in the Euro-Dollar exchange rate used in our numerical illustrations. Figure 2.6(b) shows the frequency distribution of the change in the value of the exchange rate in four months. As can be seen from Figure 2.6(b), there would not be a well-fitting statistical distribution to represent the change in exchange rates in four months. Therefore, we use the entire data set of the changes during the period of 2010 – 2012 as our distribution in the analysis.

In order to provide a meaningful and comparative analysis without revealing costs and prices, we normalize the selling price to $100, and scale the capacity reservation and transportation costs accordingly. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the optimal decisions with changing values of the second-stage operational costs, $c_H$ and $c_F$, as described in horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. The unit capacity reservation costs, $k_H$ and $k_F$, are smallest in Figure 2.7(a), at 1% of the selling price, and their values increase in figures 2.7(b) and 2.7(c) up to 5% of the selling price. The same policy indicators, \{H, FL, F_H, D_R, D_E\}, are used to designate the five potentially optimal policies identified in Section 2.4.
Figure 2.6. The Euro-Dollar exchange rate between 2010 – 2012. (a) Histogram of the actual values representing the variation in the Euro-Dollar exchange rate. (b) Frequency distribution of the proportions representing the change in the value of the exchange rate in four months.
Figure 2.7. Optimal sourcing policies with changing second-stage operational costs \( (c_H, c_F) \) between $60 and $90, with varying unit capacity reservation costs \( (k_H, k_F) \), with unit transportation costs \( t_H = $2 \), \( t_F = $4 \), and zero penalty cost of unused capacity \( (u_H = u_F = 0) \). The "---" sign means the cost terms do not satisfy assumption A1. The values of \( k_F \) and \( c_F \) are equivalent to their corresponding dollar values at time 0.
Several observations can be made from the comparison of figures 2.7(a) – (c). First, it is easy to see that when the operational cost of the home (foreign) source is significantly less expensive than that of the foreign (domestic) source, then the optimal policy is a single source policy H (F).

Second, dual sourcing policies are optimal in a region where the second-stage operational costs are relatively similar. This region of dual sourcing (see the diagonal axis) is larger when the unit reservation costs, $k_H$ and $k_F$, are relatively small. The region of dual sourcing shrinks with increasing values of $k_H$ and $k_F$ (as can be seen from the comparison of figures 2.7(a) – (c)). This result indicates that when the unit capacity reservation costs are small in comparison to selling prices, the firm can enjoy the benefits from the fluctuations in exchange rates by adjusting the production levels in Stage 2. Thus, dual sourcing policies $D_R$ and $D_E$ are more desirable. On the other hand, if the unit capacity reservation costs are higher in value relative to the selling price, then the firm is less likely to commit to two suppliers upfront. Thus, single source policies H, F_L and F_H are more desirable. In terms of the products offered by the furniture company that motivated our study, dual sourcing is more desirable for products such as book carts (with lower capacity reservation costs relative to the selling price), and single sourcing is the preferred sourcing policy for office furniture (with relatively higher unit capacity reservation costs).

Third, the region for dual sourcing shows an increasing and a decreasing behavior with increasing values of the second-stage production costs ($c_H$ and $c_F$). There are two opposing drivers for this phenomenon. First, higher operational costs in Stage 2 diminish the relative magnitude of the unit capacity reservation costs of Stage 1. Therefore, the firm perceives reserving capacity to be less expensive in sourcing decisions; this leads to a wider range of second stage operational costs that feature dual sourcing policies as the optimal choice. On the other hand, higher operational costs reduce the value that can be gained from dual sourcing
policies. Specifically, as the operational costs increase, sourcing from both suppliers become less profitable, and thus the potential gain from dual sourcing policies declines with higher second-stage operational costs. As a consequence, the region of dual sourcing shrinks as the operational costs continue to increase in relative to the selling price.

Fourth, policy $D_R$ is more desirable than policy $D_E$ at higher values of $k_H$ and $k_F$ as in Figure 2.7(c). This is because there is not a sufficient degree of exchange-rate volatility to benefit from having excess capacity in place. Similarly, policy $D_E$ is more often the desired dual sourcing policy (over policy $D_R$) in the bandwidth representing dual sourcing preferences at lower values of $k_H$ and $k_F$ as in Figure 2.7(a). With lower capacity reservation costs (relative to the selling price), the firm has a higher degree of benefit from exchange rate fluctuations under policy $D_E$ in Stage 2, without having to make a significant payout in Stage 1. While not presented in these numerical illustrations, the range of dual sourcing increases with a higher degree of variation in exchange rates. The Euro-Dollar exchange rate is perceived to be the most stable exchange rate by industry professionals, and our data represents a conservative impact of exchange rate variations in capacity reservation decisions. Higher variation in exchange rates would be observed in other currency conversions. A higher degree of variation in the exchange rate increases the benefits from recourse, and specifically increases the value gained from adjusting production levels based on the realized values of exchange rates. Thus, a higher degree of exchange-rate variability makes dual sourcing a more desirable alternative over single sourcing policies.

2.9 Conclusions and Managerial Insights

This essay examines the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty on capacity reservation decisions for a global firm. We develop an analytical model for a firm that sources from two
suppliers, one domestic and one foreign, and sells in a single market. While demand uncertainty in isolation (i.e., ignoring the impact of exchange-rate uncertainty) does not lead to dual sourcing in our model, exchange-rate uncertainty creates the incentive for the firm to engage in dual sourcing.

This study makes four contributions. First, we identify the set of potentially optimal policies and the conditions that lead to these policies. Five potentially optimal sourcing policies emerge: One onshore sourcing, two kinds of offshore sourcing policies, and two characteristically different dual sourcing policies. One dual sourcing policy commits to a total capacity amount that would equal the amount it would have reserved under the offshore sourcing policy, but it rations this total capacity investment between the domestic and foreign suppliers according to the exchange-rate uncertainty. This dual-sourcing policy can be perceived as a defensive and a conservative approach as it is motivated to negate the detrimental consequences of an appreciating exchange rate making the foreign supplier an expensive source. The same policy foregoes the benefits of a lower cost foreign supplier under realizations of exchange-rate devaluation. The second dual sourcing policy features excess capacity. The same amount of capacity is reserved at the foreign supplier as with the offshore sourcing policy, and there is additional capacity reserved at the domestic supplier. However, the amount of capacity reserved at the domestic supplier is less than the amount that would have been reserved under the onshore sourcing policy. Thus, the domestic supplier capacity is perceived as a backup capacity, and is intended to be utilized in order to benefit from exchange-rate fluctuations. We show that these five policies can be located by checking four optimality conditions. The conditions clarify how the firm switches its optimal policy choice from one sourcing policy to another with increasing degrees of exchange-rate volatility.
Second, our analysis shows that a lower sourcing cost is neither a necessity nor a sufficient condition to reserve capacity at a supplier. Under exchange-rate uncertainty, lower unit sourcing cost does not necessarily qualify a supplier as a potential source. It can be optimal to source only from a foreign supplier that has a higher expected sourcing cost. This finding goes against the common practice of low-cost sourcing and suggests that managers should think more deeply about their sourcing policies under exchange-rate uncertainty. Moreover, our results show that the firm may reserve capacity only at the foreign supplier even if the expected operational cost (inclusive of production, transportation, duty, and localization expenses) is higher than the selling price. This result makes our finding associated with reserving capacity only at the more expensive supplier even more pronounced as it exemplifies the opportunity gains from the currency fluctuations.

Third, we show that risk aversion makes dual sourcing more desirable. In particular, when the firm’s optimal policy is offshore sourcing in the risk-neutral setting, the introduction of risk aversion with a VaR requirement can trigger a policy switch to dual sourcing. Thus, under risk aversion, dual sourcing becomes more pronounced over single sourcing.

Fourth, financial hedging can help eliminate the negative consequences of risk aversion and enable the firm to replicate the expected profit of the risk-neutral policies. Thus, the firm obtains the same set of five potentially optimal global sourcing policies in the presence of financial hedging. As a consequence, our policy findings are robust as they continue to hold under risk aversion and financial hedging.

In addition to the above four contributions, our study provides insights into the impact of exchange-rate volatility on capacity reservation decisions. While the reserved capacity of the foreign supplier increases with volatility, capacity reservation decisions at the domestic supplier
can exhibit both an increasing and decreasing behavior. The conditions for the increasing and
decreasing behavior are described under increasing exchange-rate uncertainty. Greater degrees of
exchange-rate volatility do not always increase domestic capacity and do not regularly lead to
higher flexibility. The firm may prefer to give up some of its allocation flexibility under policy
$D_E$, for example, by reducing its domestic capacity and capitalizing more on the foreign capacity.

We have stated earlier that our work is motivated from the challenges faced by a specialty
furniture maker. Our work demonstrates numerically how our model applies to the products of
this firm. The firm’s prior sourcing decisions have ignored exchange-rate uncertainty, and have
relied on utilizing a single supplier which is selected based on the lower cost. Incorporating
exchange-rate uncertainty, our analysis shows that, when unit capacity reservation costs are
smaller relative to the selling price as in the case of book carts, the firm prefers dual sourcing
policies. When the unit capacity reservation cost is higher in comparison to the selling price as in
the case of office desks and chairs, then a single-sourcing policy is desired. The firm now
engages in dual sourcing for some of its products. We also report that both the rationing dual
sourcing policy and dual sourcing policy with excess capacity are currently being utilized among
the firm’s product portfolio.
CHAPTER 3: GLOBAL SOURCING UNDER YIELD UNCERTAINTY

3.1 Introduction

Coffee is one of the most popular beverages worldwide. The United States Department of Agriculture, forecasts the global annual coffee consumption at a record of 150.8 million bags (60 kilograms, or approximately 132 pounds, per each bag) in its 2016/2017 forecast review\(^1\). While the coffee consumption is expected to continue to experience a steady growth, the consumers seem to increasingly demand high quality coffees around the world (Stabiner 2015, Craymer 2015). There are a few coffee roasters in the United States which have already targeted this trending specialty coffee market, and are believed to be reshaping the coffee industry (Strand 2015). The pioneer coffee roasters in the specialty coffee industry are Intelligentsia, Stumptown, and Counter Culture, which are called the Big Three of the Third-Wave Coffee, an initiative aimed at enhancing the quality of the produced coffee. Third Wave Coffee is considered as a specialty food product rather than a commodity. This is exemplified by the recent acquisitions of Intelligentsia and Stumptown by Peet’s Coffee at high prices, indicating an increase in the interest and practice in the specialty coffee market.

In order to be able to offer superior coffee, these leading coffee roasters rely heavily on direct communication and close collaboration with the growers, which has given rise to a new form of sourcing practices called Direct Trade. Through Direct Trade, specialty coffee roasters can improve the quality of coffee beans by providing guidance and resources to the growers, and closely monitoring the growth of coffee beans and the harvesting process. Direct Trade is different from the traditional sourcing practice in the coffee industry which involves sourcing through coffee traders and exchanges as described in Figure 3.1.

Inspired by the business model of the Big Three, a growing number of coffee roasters have started to leave the coffee exchanges and engage in Direct Trade. The departure from the traditional sourcing practice results in two separate coffee markets according to Wernau (2015), which we refer to as specialty (superior) coffee market, and commercial (inferior) coffee market. Our study is motivated by the recent trend of engaging in Direct Trade in the coffee industry. We focus on the specialty coffee supply chain where a coffee roaster adopts Direct Trade sourcing in order to target the quality-sensitive segment of consumers. Our analysis captures the interaction between the specialty coffee market and the commercial coffee market from the consumer choice perspective. We explore the impact of the supply uncertainty caused by engaging in Direct Trade.
Trade, and the uncertainty in the global commercial coffee market on the coffee roaster’s sourcing and pricing decisions.

We provide insights into managing a specialty-coffee supply chain, which is an emerging phenomenon in the coffee industry, by addressing the following research questions:

1. What is the impact of yield uncertainty stemming from Direct Trade on sourcing decisions of agribusinesses in a specialty coffee supply chain?
2. How does the uncertainty in the commercial coffee market influence the coffee roaster’s level of investment in Direct Trade?
3. How should a coffee roaster set the price for its specialty product based on the market price of the commercial coffee considering the consumer choice between the specialty and the commercial coffees?
4. What is the impact of correlation between the specialty and the global commercial crop supply?

Our study makes three contributions: First, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to develop a mathematical model capturing the main driving forces that influence the sourcing and pricing decisions in a specialty coffee supply chain. Incorporating the uncertainty in commercial coffee market as well as the variation in the Direct Trade yield into our model, we identify the optimal sourcing and pricing decisions of a specialty coffee roaster.

Second, we show that a conservative sourcing policy may emerge as an effective policy under uncertainty, which would never be optimal in a deterministic setting. Our analysis demonstrates that either yield uncertainty or the fluctuations in the price of the commercial coffee may lead to a conservative sourcing policy where the coffee roaster intentionally underinvests in Direct Trade. This sourcing policy—which we refer to as the “underinvestment”
policy—can be considered as an operational hedging approach that helps the coffee roaster mitigate the negative consequences of the potential uncertainties. This result complements the earlier literature on global production planning, which identifies “production hedging” (deliberately producing less than demand) as an effective operational hedging policy (Kazaz et al. 2005, Park et al. 2016) under exchange-rate uncertainty in manufacturing settings. Our work shows a similar hedging approach for agribusinesses that operate under uncertainty pertaining to crop yield and market-price of a competing inferior product. In our findings, the emerged hedging policy can be interpreted as “capacity hedging” which involves underinvesting in agricultural farmland. Under this conservative behavior, the firm utilizes its pricing lever in order to shrink the market size at all realizations of the two random variables. Thus, the market size served is smaller than what the firm would have served in the absence of a supply constraint.

Our third contribution relates with the impact of correlation between the specialty Direct Trade supply and the global supply of commercial coffee beans. We observe that the specialty crop supply would typically be negatively correlated with the market price of the commercial coffee. Our analysis suggests that higher degrees of negative correlation between the two random variables representing the specialty yield and the price of the commercial coffee improve the expected profit, and therefore, the specialty coffee roaster benefits from investing in agricultural regions where the specialty coffee yield becomes more strongly correlated with the global commercial yield.

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes how our work departs from the current literature. Section 3.3 introduces our model, Section 3.4 presents its analysis; it identifies the optimal investment and pricing decisions, characterizes the underinvestment policy, and examines the impact of uncertainty on Direct Trade investment.
decisions. Section 3.5 provides concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the online appendix.

3.2 Literature Review

This study examines the sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural firm under random yield and market-price for a similar (and inferior) product. We begin our discussion with yield and supply uncertainty. The supply chain management literature on sourcing strategies under supply/yield uncertainty is extensive. Yano and Lee (1995) and Tang (2006) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on managing yield/supply risk in manufacturing environments. Our study is related with the stream of research in operations/supply chain management literature which explores operational hedging strategies for managing supply uncertainty. In this literature, supply diversification is proven to be an effective approach toward mitigating supply risk. Gerchak and Parlar (1990), Parlar and Wang (1993), Anupindi and Akella (1993), and more recently, Tomlin and Wang (2005), Dada et al. (2007), Burke et al. (2009), Jain et al. (2014), and Tan et al. (2016) demonstrate the benefits of dual/multiple sourcing in managing supply uncertainty. However, in these studies the firm (buyer) does not have pricing power, and thus, the selling price is considered as exogenous. In addition, our work characterizes an operational hedging policy that differs from supply diversification and involves underserving the target market by lowering the level of investment in farmland capacity in the presence of monopolistic power.

There are a few studies that consider a firm’s price-setting ability in the presence of supply uncertainty. Li and Zheng (2006), and Feng (2010) investigate joint inventory and pricing policies in multi-period manufacturing settings. Kazaz and Webster (2015) consider a single-period Newsvendor model under supply and demand uncertainty and explore how the source of
uncertainty influence the tractability of the problem and the optimal decisions. Our study departs from these papers by considering the consumer choice between two products and the effect of uncertainty in the competing market on sourcing, production and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor.

The most related body of research to our work includes studies that focus on agricultural supply chains. Within this stream of research, a common sourcing framework is procuring agricultural products through lease contracts (Kazaz 2004, Kazaz and Webster 2011) by which an agricultural firm leases farmland at the beginning of the growing season and harvests the realized crop yield at the end of the growing season. Our study uses a similar framework in modeling sourcing decisions. However, it departs from the earlier studies. Kazaz (2004), Kazaz and Webster (2011) examine the impact of yield-dependent trading cost on sourcing and production planning of an agricultural firm which sells a single product. Our study, however, considers two products—one superior and one inferior product— with two associated consumer segments. Although our main focus is exploring the sourcing and pricing decisions of the superior product, our analysis captures the consumer’s choice between the two products, which affects the demand for the superior product.

Noparumpa et al. (2011) examine the interrelationships among downward substitution, price setting, and fruit trading under supply and quality uncertainty. While we do not incorporate quality uncertainty into our model, we capture the impact of uncertainty in the price of an inferior product determined by the global market on sourcing and pricing of a superior product by an agricultural processor.

Our model’s structure is similar to that of Noparumpa et al. (2015). Our study, however, differs from their work in terms of the decisions, and the environmental factors influencing
sourcing and pricing decisions. They investigate a winemaker’s decisions on how to allocate a single product between advance selling in the form of financial futures contract and retail distribution. Our study, on the other hand, explores the impact of the interaction between two different consumer segments on allocation decisions of an agricultural processor. Our study also captures the farmland investment decisions made by the processor prior to the selling season and incorporates the yield uncertainty stemming from such a sourcing practice.

There is a recent stream of literature that considers simultaneous sourcing of agricultural inputs (Boyabatli et al. 2011, Boyabatli 2015). However, this body of research investigates multi-product supply management where the crop yield is assumed to be deterministic using two or more different agricultural inputs. Our study is structurally different from these papers as we emphasize the effective policies for sourcing a single agricultural input under yield and market-price uncertainty.

In sum, motivated by an emerging agribusiness practice in the coffee industry, our study features a new agricultural supply chain framework. In order to target the fast-growing niche segment of quality-sensitive consumers, a small number of coffee roasters have drastically changed their sourcing policy and engaged in Direct Trade, which in turn has led to exposure to supply risk. Our study investigates the sourcing and pricing decisions of such agricultural processors and provides insights into managing the supply chain of the associated agricultural products.

3.3 Model

In this section, we describe the problem and present the model developed to explore the global sourcing decisions of a firm operating in an agricultural environment where yield uncertainty influences the firm’s crop supply. The firm sells a finished product (i.e., roasted
coffee) which requires processing an agricultural product (i.e., coffee green beans) as input to be converted to the final product. The main target market of the firm (processor) is the quality-sensitive segment of consumers who prefer specialty coffees and are willing to pay a premium price (hereafter “specialty segment”). The processor (coffee roaster) engages in Direct Trade (DT) in order to be able to source quality coffee beans and offer superior processed (roasted) coffee to the specialty segment. An inferior alternative for consumers is the Non-Direct-Trade (NDT) roasted coffee which is extensively offered by a large number of coffee roasters, and is desired by a massive population of consumers who consider coffee as a necessity product. As such, we consider the NDT coffee as a commercial/commodity product whose price is exogenously determined by the enormous global market.

We develop a two-stage stochastic model with recourse to examine the processor’s sourcing and pricing decisions in the presence of yield uncertainty of the DT crop and price uncertainty of the commercial coffee. The operating environment and the sequence of decisions can be described as follows: Prior to the growing season, which corresponds to stage 1 of our model, the processor engages in DT by going straight to the growers and leasing farmland, denoted $Q$. Along with the leasing decision, the processor provides instructions to the growers in order to ensure the desired quality of the specialty coffee crop. This initial investment costs $l$ per unit of farmland. At the end of the growing season, corresponding to stage 2 of our model, the processor realizes (1) the DT crop yield to be processed and sold as a specialty coffee, and (2) the global market price for the commercial coffee. The DT crop supply harvested at the end of the growing season is expressed as $Q_y$ (stochastically proportional to the lease quantity) where $y \in [y_l, y_h]$ is the realization of a random variable $Y$ with mean $\bar{y}$, standard deviation $\sigma_y$, probability density function (pdf) $g(\nu)$, and cumulative distribution function (cdf) $G(\nu)$. The market (retail) price of
the commercial coffee, \( \Phi \), is considered random with realization \( \phi \in [\phi_l, \phi_h] \), mean \( \bar{\phi} \), variance \( \sigma_\phi \), pdf \( h(\phi) \) and cdf \( H(\phi) \). The uncertainty in the price of the commercial coffee represents the uncertainty in the commercial market which stems from the fluctuations in the global yield of the coffee beans and other uncertain economic factors. In our base model, the DT crop yield and the price of the commercial coffee are considered as independent random variables, because the amount of crop yield from DT is assumed to be relatively small compared to the amount of the commodity coffee’s global yield, which implies negligible correlation between the two random variables \( (Y, \Phi) \). We later relax this assumption and analyze the impact of correlation on the investment decision and the expected profit of the processor. We also assume throughout the essay that the support of \( Y \) and \( \Phi \) remain unchanged as the level of uncertainty associated with each variable alters (except for the case of no uncertainty where the random variable is replaced with its mean).

Upon the realizations of the DT yield and the market price of the commercial coffee, the processor uses its monopolistic power within the specialty segment, and sets the selling price, denoted \( p \), for its offered specialty coffee targeted toward this segment. An equivalent interpretation is that the processor determines the quantity of the specialty coffee to be sold, denoted \( q \), in this stage. The processing (roasting) cost is \( r \) per unit of product. The extra DT crop is processed and salvaged at \( s \) where \( s \geq r \) (i.e., the salvage value of the processed crop is higher than the processing cost), and the shortage in the DT supply cannot be compensated by sourcing from the spot market, as the offered coffee would not be considered a DT product. We note that our conclusions do not depend on the inequality \( r \leq s \); if \( r > s \), then the firm salvages prior to processing with corresponding adjustment to relevant expressions, leading to no change in the structure of the profit function. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sequence of decisions and realizations.
The first-stage objective function in our model maximizes the expected profit, denoted $\Pi(Q)$, from the leasing decision $Q$ in the presence of yield ($Y$) and market-price of commercial coffee ($\Phi$) uncertainty. It can be expressed as follows:

$$\max_{Q>0} \Pi(Q) = -\log Q + E_{Y,\Phi} \left[ \pi^* (Q, Y, \Phi) \right]$$

where $\pi^* (Q, Y, \Phi)$ is the optimal second-stage profit for a pair of realized values $y$ of $Y$ and $\phi$ of $\Phi$. The second-stage profit depends on the pricing decision of the processor, which affects the demand for the specialty product.

We utilize a multinomial logit (MNL) model to capture the consumer choice between the DT specialty (superior) coffee and the NDT commercial (inferior) coffee based on the prices and the consumer’s valuation for each product. At the beginning of the selling season (end of the growing season), which corresponds to the second stage of our model, the consumers of the specialty segment consider three options: (1) purchase specialty coffee at price $p$, (2) purchase commercial coffee at price $\phi$, (3) do not purchase.
The utility associated with each purchasing alternative is driven by the difference between the valuation of the consumer for that particular product and the price of the product. Specifically, the consumer’s valuation for the specialty coffee is $V_s = v_s + \epsilon_s$ where $\epsilon_s$ is a random variable with $E[\epsilon_s] = 0$, and the consumer surplus – the difference between valuation and the price – determines the random utility of purchasing the specialty product, i.e., $U_s = V_s - p = v_s + \epsilon_s - p$. The average utility of purchasing the specialty product among consumers is then $u_s = E[U_s] = v_s - p$.

Similarly, the random utility of purchasing the commercial coffee can be expressed as $U_c = V_c - \phi = v_c + \epsilon_c - \phi$, where $\epsilon_c$ is a random variable with $E[\epsilon_c] = 0$. Thus, the average utility of purchasing the commercial product is $u_c = E[U_c] = v_c - \phi$. In order to reflect the preferences of the specialty segment, we assume $v_s > v_c$.

Finally, the random utility of no-purchase option is $U_0 = \epsilon_0$, which results in zero average utility of this alternative among consumers, as $\epsilon_0$ is a random variable with $E[\epsilon_0] = 0$.

Among the three options, the consumers of the specialty segment choose the one associated with the highest utility. Therefore, the probability of purchasing the specialty product is

$$P[U_s > \max\{U_c, U_0\}] = P[\max\{\epsilon_c, \epsilon_0\} - \epsilon_s < v_s - p]$$

Assuming that $\epsilon_s$, $\epsilon_c$, and $\epsilon_0$ are i.i.d. Gumbel random variables with zero mean and scale parameter $\beta$, we note that $\max\{\epsilon_c, \epsilon_0\}$ is a Gumbel random variable with $E[\max\{\epsilon_c, \epsilon_0\}] = \beta \ln 2$, and $\max\{\epsilon_c, \epsilon_0\} - \epsilon_s$ is a logistic random variable. As a result, the probability of purchasing the specialty coffee is

$$P[U_s > \max\{U_c, U_0\}] = \frac{e^{(v_s - p)/\beta}}{1 + e^{(v_s - \phi)/\beta} + e^{(v_s - p)/\beta}}$$
which corresponds to the fraction of consumers in the specialty segment who purchase the specialty coffee. Thus, the demand for the specialty coffee is determined by the MNL model as follows:

\[
q(p | \varphi) = MP \left[ U_s > \max \{ U_c, U_o \} \right] = M \frac{e^{(v_s - p) / \beta}}{1 + e^{(v_c - \varphi) / \beta} + e^{(v_o - p) / \beta}}
\]  

(3.1)

where \( M \) is the specialty segment size (i.e., the maximum consumer population who may potentially buy the specialty product).

Consequently, the inverted demand function can be expressed as:

\[
p(q | \varphi) = v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - q}{k(\varphi)q} \right)
\]  

(3.2)

where

\[
k(\varphi) = 1 + e^{(v_c - \varphi) / \beta}
\]  

(3.3)

The second-stage optimal profit can then be expressed as:

\[
\pi^*(Q, y, \varphi) = \max_{q \leq Q_y} \left[ \pi(q | Q, y, \varphi) \right]
\]

where

\[
\pi(q | Q, y, \varphi) = p(q | \varphi)q + s(Q_y - q) - rQ_y
\]

\[
= \left( v_s - s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - q}{k(\varphi)q} \right) \right)q + (s - r)Q_y
\]  

(3.4)

is the second-stage profit function.

### 3.4 Analysis

#### 3.4.1 Pricing and Processing Decisions

We begin our analysis by investigating the pricing and processing decisions of the firm after realization of the DT crop yield and the market price for the commercial coffee (i.e., stage 2 of
our model). We determine the optimal price \((p^*(\varphi, y))\) for the specialty DT product, which provides the corresponding quantity to be sold \((q^*(\varphi, y))\). These results utilize the Lambert W function (Coreless et al. 1996). All proofs are relegated to the appendix.

**Proposition 3.1.** Let \(\alpha(\varphi) = \frac{W\left(e^{(v_r-s)/\beta-1} / k(\varphi)\right)}{1 + W\left(e^{(v_r-s)/\beta-1} / k(\varphi)\right)}\), then

\[
(p^*(\varphi, y), q^*(\varphi, y)) =
\begin{cases}
  v_y + \beta \ln \left[\frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi)Q_y}\right], Q_y & \text{if } Q_y < M \alpha(\varphi) \\
  s + \beta \left[1 + W\left(e^{(v_r-s)/\beta-1} / k(\varphi)\right)\right], M \alpha(\varphi) & \text{if } Q_y \geq M \alpha(\varphi)
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
\pi^*(Q, y, \varphi) =
\begin{cases}
  Q_y \left(v_y - r + \beta \ln \left[\frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi)Q_y}\right]\right) & \text{if } Q_y < M \alpha(\varphi) \\
  M \beta W\left(e^{(v_r-s)/\beta-1} / k(\varphi)\right) + (s-r)Q_y & \text{if } Q_y \geq M \alpha(\varphi)
\end{cases}
\]

The value of \(\alpha(\varphi)\) is the optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by the processor, and the value of \(M \alpha(\varphi)\) is the optimal market size to be served (optimal demand). We observe that the processor sets different selling prices for the specialty coffee contingent upon whether the crop supply \(Q_y\) is sufficient for serving the optimal market size.

The next proposition shows how the optimal price of the specialty coffee (optimal “specialty price”, hereafter) changes with the realized market price of the commercial coffee (realized “commercial price”, hereafter). Throughout this essay, we use “increase”, “decrease”, and “concave” in their weak sense.

**Proposition 3.2.** The optimal specialty price \((p^*(\varphi, y))\) increases in the realized commercial price \((\varphi)\). However, the magnitude of the increase is less than that of \(\varphi\), i.e., \(0 < \partial p^*(\varphi, y)/\partial \varphi < 1\).
The processor charges a higher specialty price at higher levels of realized commercial price. We note that the demand for the specialty coffee depends on both the specialty price set by the processor \((p)\) and the realized commercial price determined by the global market \((\varphi)\). Proposition 3.2 states that the optimal specialty price takes the same direction as the realized commercial price. That is, if the commercial price increases (decreases), the specialty price should increase (decrease) as well. Consequently, they have counter-balancing effects on the demand. The next proposition identifies the dominant effect and clarifies how the optimal target market size changes with respect to the realized commercial price.

**Proposition 3.3.** *The optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by the processor \((\alpha(\varphi))\) and thus the optimal processing quantity \((q^∗(\varphi, y))\) increases in the realized commercial price \((\varphi)\).*

Even though the processor raises the specialty price as commercial price increases, its effect on the market allocation is dominated by the effect of commercial price. Consequently, the optimal targeted fraction of the specialty segment expands if the realized commercial price increases. This implies that the processor benefits from targeting a larger specialty market while charging a higher price as the commercial coffee becomes more expensive.

### 3.4.2 Investment Decision

We next explore the processor’s investment decision at the beginning of the growing season (i.e. Stage 1 of our model). From Proposition 3.1, we use the optimal second-stage profit expressions to write the first-stage expected profit function as follows:

\[
\Pi(Q) = -(1 + \delta\varphi)Q + \int_{U(Q)} Qy + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\varphi)Qy} \right) g(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi \\
+ \int_{V(Q)} \left[ M \beta W \left( \frac{e^{(v_{y-1}/\beta - 1)}}{k(\varphi)} \right) + sQy \right] g(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi
\] (3.5)
where \( U(Q) = \{(y, \varphi) \mid Q_y < M\alpha(\varphi)\} \), and \( O(Q) = \{(y, \varphi) \mid Q_y \geq M\alpha(\varphi)\} \).

The following proposition indicates that there is always a unique optimal amount of farmland to be leased for any given probability distributions of yield and commercial price.

**Proposition 3.4.** (a) The first-stage expected profit function \( \Pi(Q) \) is concave in the leasing amount \( Q \), and the optimal amount of farmland to lease, (denoted \( Q^* \), is the unique solution to the below first order condition (FOC):

\[
\int_{Q_y} \int_{\varphi(\Pi)} \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi)Q_y} \right] - \beta \frac{M}{M - Q_y} \right) g(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi + \int_{\varphi(\Pi)} s_yg(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi = l + ry
\]

(b) The optimal expected profit is

\[
\Pi(Q^*) = M\beta \left[ \int_{Q_y} \frac{Q_y}{M - Q_y} g(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi + \int_{\varphi(\Pi)} W\left( \frac{e^{(v_s - s)}y^{-1}}{k(\varphi)} \right) g(y)h(\varphi)dyd\varphi \right]
\]

Note that the main objective of engaging in DT is to serve the quality-sensitive specialty segment, because sourcing through DT allows the processor to ensure the desired quality by providing instructions while closely collaborating with the growers. The growers, on the other hand, have to have sufficient incentives to take part in DT. The processors typically pays the farmer a premium price\(^2\) in order to ensure the availability of farmland in the long term. As a result, sourcing through DT is costly for the processors, which creates a downward pressure on the leasing decision and prevents the processor from overinvesting in DT. On the other hand, the flexibility to charge a premium price for the specialty coffee segment creates an incentive to increase investment in farmland associated with DT. The FOC (3.6) captures the tradeoff in these opposing driving forces, and it helps determine the optimal leasing quantity. The two terms on the left-hand side express the marginal revenue of leasing farmland when the crop supply falls

\(^2\) Intelligentsia Coffee website (http://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/content/direct-trade)
short of the optimal target market (i.e., \( Q_y \leq M \alpha(\phi) \)) and when there is sufficient supply (i.e., \( Q_y > M \alpha(\phi) \)), respectively, while the right-hand side is the (expected) marginal cost of sourcing and processing the crop supply of coffee beans.

Before proceeding with the optimal policy structure pertaining to the leasing decision of the processor, we establish two benchmarks that serve beneficial in characterizing optimal behavior. We begin with the first benchmark associated with the amount of farmland that would be leased in the absence of uncertainty. It should be observed that when there is no uncertainty associated with the DT crop supply nor with the commercial market, the processor invests in the exact amount of farmland yielding the amount of supply that fulfills the optimal target market \( M \alpha(\bar{\phi}) \).

Our first benchmark, \( Q^D \), establishes the lease amount of farmland for the processor that ignores uncertainty by setting \( Q_{\bar{y}} = M \alpha(\bar{\phi}) \), and thus,

\[
Q^D = \frac{M \alpha(\bar{\phi})}{\bar{y}}.
\]

We establish a second benchmark that helps characterize the processor’s potentially conservative behavior. It should be observed that the lowest market size occurs when the commercial price random variable takes its lowest value at the lower support of its pdf, \( \phi_l \). It should also be observed that the highest crop yield for the processor is observed when the random yield variable takes its highest value over the support of its pdf, \( y_h \). Our second benchmark establishes the minimum amount of leased farmland that results in just sufficient crop yield at its highest realization (\( y_h \)) to cover the minimum market demand (equal to \( M \alpha(\phi_l) \)). We describe this benchmark as:

\[
Q^T = \frac{M \alpha(\phi_l)}{y_h}.
\]

**Remark 3.1.** \( Q^T < Q^D \).
We note that, for $Q < Q^T$, the processor is guaranteed to operate under limited supply. This can be seen from the fact that the maximum realized crop supply that can be attained at $y_h$ is less than the minimum market demand at $\varphi_l$, i.e., $Q_{y_h} < M\alpha(\varphi_l)$ for $Q < Q^T$. Thus, when $Q < Q^T$, the firm operates under limited supply at all realizations of crop yield and market price uncertainty.

Next, we analyze the conditions leading to the conservative behavior as described above. We then explore how the processor’s investment decision is affected by the variation in specialty crop yield stemming from DT and the fluctuations in the price of the commercial coffee.

### 3.4.3 Underinvestment

In order to analyze the impact of uncertainties associated with the specialty crop supply and the commercial price, we first identify an optimal sourcing policy under yield and commercial price uncertainty, which would never be adopted if the yield and the commercial price were deterministic. Specifically, under yield and commercial price uncertainty, our analysis shows that the processor can deliberately underinvest in DT under certain conditions. We describe this sourcing behavior as the “underinvestment” policy because the processor reduces the leasing amount of farmland to the extent that it ensures at any realization of the yield and the commercial price random variables, (1) it increases the selling price of the specialty coffee in order to reduce the demand for specialty coffee and match the realized crop supply; and (2) it serves a market demand that is smaller than what it would have served under an unconstrained optimal price. In other words, by lowering the investment level below a threshold according to the underinvestment policy, the processor chooses to always operate under supply shortage, and it never fully utilizes the potential specialty coffee demand at the realized market-price $\varphi$, but rather uses its pricing flexibility to reduce the market demand to match the realized crop supply.
It is worth noting that when there is no uncertainty associated with the DT crop supply or the commercial market, the processor invests in the exact amount of farmland equal to $Q^D$, yielding the amount of supply that fulfills the target specialty coffee demand that is equal to $M \alpha(\overline{\varphi})$. Therefore, the processor has no incentive to underinvest in DT when the supply and the commercial market conditions are deterministic. Our analysis, however, shows that the underinvestment policy can be optimal under either of yield and commercial price uncertainty.

In the global manufacturing network literature, Kazaz et al. (2005) are the first to introduce an effective operational hedging policy—called “production hedging”—that involves producing less than the total demand and thus underserving the markets. Park et al. (2016) build on this work by showing that the production hedging policy is a viable risk mitigation approach. While in both of these studies exchange-rate uncertainty is the main driver of underserving the markets, our work indicates that yield uncertainty as well as price uncertainty in the competing market can result in a similar operational policy in an agricultural environment. The underinvestment policy explored in this essay can be considered as a “capacity hedging” policy where the low amount of leased farmland proactively restricts the processing (production) quantity such that the firm serves a market demand for specialty coffee that is strictly less than what it would have served under an unconstrained optimal price, regardless of the realizations of yield and the commercial price.

We first identify the condition that leads to underinvestment and then explore the impact of the uncertainty associated with the specialty yield and the commercial market on the processor’s investment policy.

**Proposition 3.5.** Let $A$ represent the two-dimensional support of $y$ and $\varphi$ (i.e.,

$$A = \{(y, \varphi) \mid y_1 \leq y \leq y_h, \varphi \leq \varphi \leq \varphi_h\}.$$
(a) It is optimal for the processor to underinvest in DT if and only if the below condition holds
\[
\int_{\theta} y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi) y}{k(\phi) \alpha(\phi) y} \right] - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi) y} \right) g(y) h(\phi) dy d\phi < l + r \bar{y}
\]  
(3.8)

(b) When it is optimal for the processor to underinvest, the optimal leasing quantity \((Q_U^*)\) is the unique solution to the below FOC:
\[
\int_{\theta} y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\phi) Q_y} \right] - \beta \frac{M}{M - Q_y} \right) g(y) h(\phi) dy d\phi = l + r \bar{y}
\]  
(3.9)

(c) The expected profit for the underinvestment policy can be expressed as:
\[
\Pi_U (Q_U^*) = M \beta \int_{y} y \frac{Q_U^* - Q_U^{*y}}{M - Q_U^{*y}} g(y) dy
\]  
(3.10)

(d) The optimal amount of farmland under the underinvestment policy is less than the minimum farmland space; specifically, \(Q_U^* < Q^*\).

Proposition 3.5 establishes the conditions under which the processor is better off by lowering its investment level such that it ensures the specialty crop supply falls short of the optimal market size to be targeted by the processor at any realizations of the yield and the commercial price. Note that according to Proposition 3.3, the smallest portion of the specialty segment is targeted by the processor when the commercial price is realized at its lowest level \((\phi_l)\). In addition, we observe that when the processor faces supply shortage, it charges a market clearing price.

Condition (3.8) implies that the processor benefits from operating under supply shortage and charging market clearing price than investing more on the DT when the marginal cost of additional supply (right-hand side of the inequality) overweighs its expected marginal revenue (left-hand side of the inequality) even when the highest possible realization of the DT supply \((Q_{yh})\) can barely fulfill the lowest possible level of optimal demand (i.e., \(M \alpha(\phi_l)\)). Proposition
3.5(d), along with Remark 3.1, indicates that the optimal leasing quantity under underinvestment policy is significantly lower than the optimal leasing quantity under deterministic setting.

Next, we examine the impact of yield and commercial price uncertainty on the investment policy.

3.4.3.1 Impact of uncertainties on the investment policy and profit

In this section, we investigate how the investment policy is affected by the yield variation and the commercial price fluctuations. We particularly study whether these uncertainties encourage or hinder underinvestment policy, and whether their effects reinforce or counterbalance the opposing forces in the optimal lease decision.

**Proposition 3.6.** (a) If for a given level of commercial price uncertainty (yield uncertainty), the underinvestment policy is optimal under two-point distribution of random yield (random commercial price), there exists a threshold for the degree of yield uncertainty (commercial price uncertainty) above which underinvestment is optimal. (b) When the underinvestment policy becomes optimal at a higher level of yield uncertainty (commercial price uncertainty), the expected profit decreases compared to the case with lower levels of yield uncertainty (commercial price uncertainty) where the underinvestment policy is not optimal.

The above proposition implies that both types of uncertainties faced by the processor leads to the underinvestment policy becoming a more viable sourcing policy. Specifically, as long as the underinvestment policy is optimal under the highest level of yield or commercial price variation (under a two-point distribution), the processor eventually implements the underinvestment policy. The firm continues to implement this policy as the variation increases. In addition, the fact that underinvestment is associated with a lower expected profit suggests that this policy is
adopted under unfavorable circumstances caused by the uncertainty in yield and commercial price.

We note that, under the underinvestment policy, the marginal revenue in the left-hand side of (3.9) decreases as yield or commercial price variation increases. Consequently, at higher levels of yield or commercial price uncertainty, the processor eventually restricts its DT investment amount to such low levels that result in serving a specialty coffee demand that is strictly less than what it would have served under an unconstrained optimal market demand. Essentially, the underinvestment policy allows the processor to exercise its monopolistic power over the entire specialty supply (by charging a market-clearing price) and at the same time save on the opportunity cost of facing overage at higher investment levels, as the operating environment becomes more uncertain.

Now that we observe the variation in the specialty yield as well as the uncertainty in the commercial market encourage the adoption of the underinvestment policy, we investigate which uncertainty is the main driver of this behavior. Are both yield and commercial price uncertainties necessary for the underinvestment policy to become an effective sourcing policy? Can either of these uncertainties by itself result in the underinvestment policy?

**Proposition 3.7.** *Either yield uncertainty or commercial price uncertainty by itself can lead to the underinvestment policy.*

Our analysis demonstrates that either source of uncertainty in this operating environment can cause the processor to adopt the underinvestment policy. In other words, neither yield nor commercial price uncertainty can be considered necessary or the primary driver of the underinvestment policy; they both contribute significantly to the optimality of this sourcing policy.
The next proposition identifies how yield and commercial price uncertainty affects the DT investment level of the processor when implementing the underinvestment policy.

**Proposition 3.8.** *When the processor adopts the underinvestment policy, as the degree of yield uncertainty or commercial price uncertainty increases, (a) the optimal leasing quantity decreases, and (b) the expected profit decreases.*

The above proposition, along with the findings in propositions 3.6 and 3.7, suggest that the optimal leasing amount and the expected profit exhibit a diminishing behavior under an increasingly uncertain operating environment. This is important because we note that when the underinvestment policy is not optimal, the analytical investigation is inconclusive about the exact behavior of the leasing quantity and the expected profit with respect to uncertainty. Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 imply that higher degrees of uncertainty eventually lead to the underinvestment policy with lower levels of DT investment and expected profit. Proposition 3.8 complements these findings by analytically showing that when the underinvestment policy is optimal, additional uncertainty reduces the optimal amount of investment and the expected profit. We can, therefore, conclude that the leasing quantity and the expected profit decreases in yield and commercial price uncertainty from a general perspective.

Next, we relax the independence assumption between the two random variables describing the yield and market price uncertainty, and explore the impact of correlation between the crop supply obtained through DT and the price of the commercial coffee set by the global market.

**3.4.3.2 Impact of correlation**

It is potentially likely to have negative correlation between the specialty coffee (DT) yield and the price of the commercial coffee. This is because the global yield of the commercial coffee beans negatively impacts the commercial coffee price, and therefore, any (positive) correlation
between the specialty yield and the global yield results in a negative correlation between the random yield and the random commercial price. In order to study the impact of correlation, we compare two cases (in which the support for the two random variables \( Y \) and \( \Phi \) remain unchanged): (1) perfect correlation (denoted by the subscript “pc”) and (2) less-than-perfect correlation (including independence; denoted by the subscript “lc”).

In case of perfect (negative) correlation, the commercial price is deterministically related with the yield. Therefore, we consider the realization of the commercial price (\( \phi \)) as a decreasing function of the realization of DT yield (\( y \)) (i.e., \( \phi(y) \) is a decreasing function of \( y \)) such that \( \phi(y_l) = \phi_h \), and \( \phi(y_h) = \phi_l \). Consequently, the optimal fraction of the specialty segment to be targeted by the processor (i.e., \( M\alpha(\phi(y)) \)) becomes a decreasing function of \( y \). Therefore, for any given leasing quantity (\( Q \)), there exists a threshold, denoted by \( \hat{y}(Q) \), for which we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
Qy &< M\alpha(\phi(y)) \quad \text{if } y < \hat{y}(Q) \\
Qy &\geq M\alpha(\phi(y)) \quad \text{if } y \geq \hat{y}(Q)
\end{align*}
\]

The second-stage optimal profit can be expressed as in Proposition 3.1 (except for \( \phi \) is replaced with \( \phi(y) \)), and we can write the first-stage expected profit function as follows:

\[
\Pi_{pc}(Q) = -\left(l + r\overline{y}\right)Q + \int_{\hat{y}(Q)}^{\hat{y}(Q) + Q} Qy \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi(y))Qy} \right) \right) g(y)dy
\]

(3.11)

In the case of less-than-perfect correlation, \( \Phi(y) \) denotes the random commercial price with \( E[\Phi(y)] = \phi(y) \) for a given realization of \( y \). Accordingly, the first-stage expected profit function can be expressed as:
\[
\Pi_k(Q) = -\left(1 + rt\right)Q + \int_{U_q(Q)} Q_y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\phi)Q_y} \right) \right) \omega(y, \phi) dy d\phi \\
+ \int_{O_q(Q)} \left[ M \beta W \left( \frac{e^{(v_y - \gamma)/\beta - 1}}{k(\phi)} \right) + sQ_y \right] \omega(y, \phi) dy d\phi
\]

(3.12)

where \( U_k(Q) = \{(y, \phi) \mid Q_y < M \alpha(\phi)\} \), and \( O_k(Q) = \{(y, \phi) \mid Q_y \geq M \alpha(\phi)\} \) when there is a less-than-perfect correlation between \( y \) and \( \phi \), and \( \omega(y, \phi) \) is the joint distribution of \( \Phi \) and \( Y \).

The next proposition provides insights into how the correlation between the specialty yield and the commercial price affects the sourcing policy.

**Proposition 3.9.** (a) If the underinvestment policy is optimal under perfect correlation, it is also optimal under less-than-perfect correlation (including the case of independence between the two random variables), and (b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal under all levels of correlation, the expected profit is higher under the perfect correlation than that under less-than-perfect correlation (including the case of independent random variables), for a given leasing quantity.

This result implies that the underinvestment policy is less likely to be optimal under perfect correlation than under less-than-perfect correlation. The finding suggests that the correlation between the yield and the commercial price allows the processor to invest more freely in DT. Recall that propositions 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 imply that either type of uncertainties faced by the processor is undesirable in this environment and negatively affects the processor’s expected profit and the overall investment amount. Proposition 3.9 suggests that correlation mitigates the adversarial effects of the variation in the specialty yield and the uncertainty in the commercial market, and it improves the expected profit from a general perspective. We note that, as the degree of negative correlation increases, the set of possible pairs of yield and commercial price realizations shrinks, and thus, the operating environment becomes “less uncertain”. Therefore, it
is conceivable to infer that correlation raises the level of optimal investment and improves the profit.

The consequence of this result is that it is beneficial for the coffee roasters to invest more in the agricultural regions with the crop yield that is more strongly and positively correlated with the global commercial coffee yield. It is well known that Brazil has the highest share of coffee beans supply in the global market. Our analysis suggests that investing in agricultural regions with strong correlation with Brazil’s coffee yield—as much as the geographical properties necessary for high-quality coffee allows—is advantageous to the DT coffee roasters.

3.5 Conclusions and Managerial Insights

This essay examines sourcing and pricing decisions of an agricultural processor under yield uncertainty of the agricultural input required for the offered specialty product and the price uncertainty of the competing commercial product. Our study is motivated by a recent trend in the coffee industry and makes several contributions.

First, we develop an analytical model which captures a trending supply chain framework where Direct Trade is an emerging sourcing practice. In order to target the quality-sensitive segment of consumers, a small number of coffee roasters have drastically changed their sourcing policy and engaged in Direct Trade, which involves direct communication and close collaboration with the growers, but results in increased exposure to crop supply risk. We identify the optimal sourcing decision under yield and commercial price uncertainty in the first stage of our proposed model, and the optimal pricing policy upon realizations of the specialty crop supply and the commercial product’s price.

Second, we analyze the impact of yield and commercial price uncertainty, and demonstrate that a viable sourcing policy—which would never be adopted in a deterministic setting—
emerges as a result of uncertainty. This policy requires the processor to deliberately underinvest in farmland of the specialty segment by lowering the level of investment in Direct Trade. This conservative sourcing policy highlights the significant impact of the variation in the specialty yield as well as the uncertainty in the commercial market on the investment decisions of the processor.

Third, our analysis indicates that the correlation between the specialty yield and the global commercial yield improves the expected profit from a general perspective. Consequently, our study suggests that the specialty coffee roaster benefits from investing in agricultural regions where the yield is more strongly correlated with the global yield.

In sum, our study provides insights into managing a specialty-coffee supply chain which is an emerging phenomenon in the coffee industry.
Appendix to Chapter 2

Proposition 2A.1. The first-stage expected profit function for offshore sourcing is concave in $Q_F$; (b) $Q_F^0 > 0$.

Proof. (a) The objective function in (2.4) can be written as follows:

$$
E\left[ \Pi(Q_H = 0, Q_F) \right] = -(k_F + u_F e) Q_F + \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \left[ pD - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) Q_F - \int_{Q_F}^\infty p(x - Q_F) f(x) dx \right] g(e) de + \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \left[ pD - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) q_F^0(e) + \int_{Q_F}^\infty p(x - q_F^0(e)) f(x) dx \right] g(e) de.
$$

The first-order derivative of the profit function with respect to $Q_F$ is:

$$
\frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H = 0, Q_F) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F e) + \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \left[ -(c_F e - u_F e + t_F) + p(1 - F(Q_F)) \right] g(e) de + \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \left[ pD - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) q_F^0(e) + \int_{Q_F}^\infty p(x - q_F^0(e)) f(x) dx \right] g(e) de.
$$

Recall that $\pi(Q_F) = (p[1 - F(Q_F)] - t_F)/(c_F - u_F)$ and observe that $\frac{\partial \pi(Q_F)}{\partial Q_F} = -pf(Q_F)/(c_F - u_F) \leq 0$. Substituting $\pi(Q_F)$ into the above first-order derivative provides the first-order (FOC) condition in (2.9):

$$
\frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H = 0, Q_F) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F e) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \left( \pi(Q_F) - e \right) g(e) de.
$$

Because $\frac{\partial \pi(Q_F)}{\partial Q_F} \leq 0$, the second-order derivative is non-positive and the objective function is concave in $Q_F$:

$$
\frac{\partial^2 E\left[ \Pi(Q_H = 0, Q_F) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2} = (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{e_1} \frac{d\pi(Q_F)}{\partial Q_F} g(e) de \leq 0.
$$
(b) From Assumption (A1) we have $E[\bar{m}_F^+] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} > 0$. Observe that at $Q_F = 0$, we have

$$\tau(Q_F) = \tau_2 = (p - t_F)/(c_F - u_F).$$

We can see that the first-order derivative is positive at $Q_F = 0$ due to Assumption (A1):

$$-(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau_2}^{\tau_2} (\tau_2 - e) g(e) de = -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + \int_{\tau_2}^{\tau_2} (p - c_F e + u_F e - t_F) g(e) de$$

and therefore, the solution to (2.9), denoted $Q_F^0$, is positive, i.e., $Q_F^0 > 0$. \(\square\)

**Lemma 2A.1.** In a Capacitated Newsvendor problem, the optimal solution is $\min(q^*, Q)$ where $q^*$ is the optimal quantity for the typical newsvendor problem (without capacity constraints) and $Q$ is the capacity level.

**Lemma 2A.2.** For a newsvendor who is initially granted an initial inventory of $q_I$, it is optimal to order $(q^* - q_I)^+$ where $q^*$ is the optimal quantity for the typical newsvendor problem (no initial inventory).

**Proof.** The problem becomes

$$\pi^*(q_I) = \max_{q} \left\{ (p-c)D - (p-c)E[(\bar{x} - (q + q_I))^+] - cE[((q + q_I) - \bar{x})^+] \right\}$$

thus at the optimal solution, $q + q_I = q^*$ as long as $q_I$ is smaller than $q^*$. Otherwise, the newsvendor does not order any more inventory. \(\square\)

**Proof of Proposition 2.1.** When there are two suppliers each associated with a different set of second-stage costs, and given capacity level (i.e., $Q_H$ and $Q_F$), the firm prioritizes sourcing from the less costly supplier. Therefore, by Lemma 2A.1, $q_H^* = \min\{Q_H, q_H^0\}$ when $m_H \geq m_F$ and $q_F^* = \min\{Q_F, q_F^0(e)\}$ when $m_F > m_H$.

If the desired level of second-stage production is not completed then the firm continues to source from the expensive supplier. We present the proof for $q_H^*$. The proof for $q_F^*$ is analogous.
When \( m_F > m_H \), if the foreign supplier is in short of capacity (i.e., \( \min\{Q_F, q_F^0(e)\} = Q_F \)), we know from Lemma 2A.2 that the domestic source can still be utilized as long as \( q_H^0 > Q_F = q_F^* \). In this case, the optimal production quantity would be \((q_H^0 - Q_F)^+\) if there were no capacity constraints. It follows that \( q_H^* = \min\{Q_H, (q_H^0 - Q_F)^+\} \) when \( Q_H \) restricts the production quantity.

Proposition 2A.2. The first-stage expected profit function in region \( R_1 \) is jointly concave in \((Q_H, Q_F)\).

Proof. The profit function in region \( R_1 \) can be expressed as follows:

\[
E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right] = -(k_H + u_H)Q_H - (k_F + u_F\bar{e})Q_F + \int_{Q_H}^\infty \left[ pD - \left( c_H - u_H + t_H \right)Q_H - \left( c_F e - u_F e + t_F \right)Q_F \right] g(e)de + \int_{Q_H}^\infty \left[ - \int_{Q_H + Q_F}^\infty p\left( x - Q_H - Q_F \right) f(x)dx \right] g(e)de + \int_{Q_F}^{\tau(Q_H + Q_F)} \left[ pD - \left( c_H - u_H + t_H \right)Q_H \right] g(e)de + \int_{Q_H}^{\tau(Q_F)} \left[ \left( c_F e - u_F e + t_F \right) (q_F^0(e) - Q_F) \right] g(e)de + \int_{Q_H}^\infty \left[ pD - \left( c_H - u_H + t_H \right) Q_H \right] - \int_{Q_H}^\infty p\left( x - Q_H \right) f(x)dx \right] g(e)de
\]

(A.1)

The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the capacity decisions are

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1)]}{\partial Q_F} = -\left( k_F + u_F\bar{e} \right) + \left( c_F - u_F \right) \int_{\tau(Q_H + Q_F)}^{\tau(Q_H + Q_F)} \left( \tau(Q_H + Q_F) - e \right) g(e)de
\]
\[
\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + c_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) \bar{e} + t_F - (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_Q}^{e_Q} \left( e - \tau(Q_H) \right) g(e) \, de \\
+ (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_h}^{\tau(Q_H + Q_F)} (\tau(Q_H + Q_F) - e) g(e) \, de
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H^2} - \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2} = -pf(Q_H + Q_F)G(\tau(Q_H + Q_F)) < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H^2} - \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2} = -pf(Q_H + Q_F)G(\tau(Q_H + Q_F)) - pf(Q_H)[1 - G(\tau(Q_H))] < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H^2} - \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2} = pf(Q_H)[1 - G(\tau(Q_H))] < \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2}.
\]

We note that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H^2} - \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F^2} > \left( \frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H^2} \right)^2
\]

Therefore, the determinant of the Hessian is positive, and thus the objective function is jointly concave in \(Q_H\) and \(Q_F\) in region \(R1\).

**Proposition 2A.3.** The first-stage expected profit function in region \(R2\) is jointly concave in \((Q_H, Q_F)\).

**Proof.** The objective function in region \(R2\) can be expressed as follows:
\[ E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)] = -(k_H + u_H)Q_H - (k_F + u_F \bar{e})Q_F \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(q_H)} \left[ pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H)(q_H^0 - Q_H) \right] g(e)de \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(q_H)} \left[ - (c_F - u_F e + t_F)Q_H - \int_{q_H^0}^{\infty} p(x - q_H^0)f(x)dx \right] g(e)de \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(q_F)} \left[ pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H)Q_H - \int_{q_H}^{\infty} p(x - Q_H)f(x)dx \right] g(e)de \]

(A.2)

The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to \( Q_H \) are

\[ \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + u_H) + \int_{\tau(q_H)} \left[ - (c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F e + t_F) \right] g(e)de \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(q_H)} \left[ -(c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) \tau(Q_H) + t_F \right] g(e)de \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_H^2} = \int_{\tau(q_H)} \left( c_F - u_F \right) \left[ - pf(Q_H) \right] g(e)de = -pf(Q_H) \left[ 1 - G(\tau(Q_H)) \right] < 0. \]

Therefore, the objective function is concave in \( Q_H \). We next show that the objective function is linear in \( Q_F \). We have

\[ \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + E \left[ \left( \overline{m}_H^+ - m_H \right) \right] \]

(A.3)

which is constant and independent of \( Q_F \) and \( Q_H \) implying that

\[ \frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_F^2} = \frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_H \partial Q_F} = 0. \]

The determinant of the Hessian for the objective function in \( R2 \) is 0, and thus the profit function is jointly concave in \( Q_H \) and \( Q_F \) in region \( R2 \).
Proposition 2A.4. The first-stage expected profit function in region R3 is jointly concave in \((Q_H, Q_F)\).

Proof. The objective function in region R3 can be expressed as follows:

\[
E\left[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)\right] = -(k_H + u_H)Q_H - (k_F + u_F\bar{e})Q_F
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_F)}^z pD - (c_Fe - u_Fe + t_F)Q_F - \int_{Q_F}^\infty p(x - Q_F) f(x) dx \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_F)}^z pD - (c_Fe - u_Fe + t_F)q^0_F(e) \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\bar{e}_h} \left[ pD - (c_Fe - u_Fe + t_F)q^0_F(e) \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
- \int_{Q^0_F(e)}^\infty p\left(x - q^0_F(e)\right) f(x) dx \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
(A.4)
\]

The first- and second-order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the capacity decisions are:

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F\bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i}^{\tau(Q_F)} (\tau(Q_F) - e) g(e) de
\]

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + u_H) - (c_F - u_F) \int_{Q_H}^{\bar{e}_h} (e - \tau(Q_H)) g(e) de + E\left[\left(m_H - \tilde{m}_F\right)^+\right]
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)]}{\partial Q_F^2} = (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i}^{\tau(Q_F)} \frac{-pf(Q_H)}{c_f - u_F} g(e) de = -pf(Q_H)\left[1 - G(\tau(Q_H))\right] < 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)]}{\partial Q_H^2} = (c_F - u_F) \int_{Q_H}^{\bar{e}_h} \frac{-pf(Q_F)}{c_f - u_F} g(e) de = -pf(Q_F)\left[1 - G(\tau(Q_F))\right] < 0
\]
\[
\frac{\partial^2 E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F | R^3) \right]}{\partial Q_H \partial Q_F} = 0.
\]

We note that the determinant of the Hessian is positive, leading to joint concavity in region \( R_3 \).

**Lemma 2A.3.** The objective function (2.4) is continuous.

**Proof.** Note that

\[
\lim_{(Q_H + Q_F) \rightarrow q_H^0} E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F) \right] = \lim_{(Q_H + Q_F) \rightarrow q_H^0} E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F | R^1) \right] = -(k_H + u_H) Q_H - (k_F + u_F e) Q_F
\]

\[
+ \int_{q_H^0} \left[ pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H) \left( q_H^0 - Q_F \right) - \left( c_F e - u_F e + t_F \right) Q_F \right] g(e) \, de
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_H)} \left[ pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H) \left( p \left( x - q_H^0 \right) f(x) \right) Q_H - \left( c_F e - u_F e + t_F \right) \left( q_F^0 - Q_H \right) \right] g(e) \, de
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_H)} \left[ pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H) Q_H - \int_{Q_H} p \left( x - Q_H \right) f(x) \right] g(e) \, de
\]

where by definition, \( \tau(Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0) = \tau_1 \). This expression is equal to

\[
E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F | R^2) \right] \bigg|_{Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0} = \lim_{(Q_H + Q_F) \rightarrow q_H^0} E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F) \right] = E \left[ \Pi (Q_H, Q_F) \right] \bigg|_{Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0}
\]

where the first equality holds by definition. Hence, the objective function is continuous along the boundary line of \( Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0 \).

Similarly, along the boundary \( Q_F = q_H^0 \),
\[ \lim_{Q_F \to q^0_F} E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F) \right] = \lim_{Q_F \to q^0_F} E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3) \right] = -(k_H + u_H)Q_H - (k_F + u_F\bar{\epsilon})q^0_H \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(Q_F)}^\infty pD - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F)q^0_H - \int_{q^0_H}^\infty p\left( x - q^0_H \right) f(x) dx \] \[ g(e) de \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^\infty pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H)Q_H - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F)\left( q^0_F(e) - Q_H \right) \]
\[ + \int_{\min(e)} g(e) de \]
\[ + \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^\infty pD - (c_H - u_H + t_H)Q_H - \int_{Q_H}^\infty p\left( x - Q_H \right) f(x) dx \] \[ g(e) de \]

where by definition, \( \tau(Q_F = q^0_H) = \tau \). This expression is equal to

\[ E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2) \right] \]
\[ = \lim_{Q_F \to q^0_F} E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F) \right] = E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F) \right] \]

which implies that the objective function is continuous along this boundary line as well. As a result, the objective function is continuous everywhere. \( \square \)

**Lemma 2A.4.** The profit function (2.4) is differentiable.

**Proof.** Along the boundary line of \( Q_H + Q_F = q^0_H \), the left derivative of the objective function with respect to \( Q_F \) is

\[ \lim_{Q_H + Q_F \to q^0_H} \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F\bar{\epsilon}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau}^{\infty} (\tau_1 - e) g(e) de \]
\[ = -(k_F + u_F\bar{\epsilon}) + \int_{\min(e)}^{\tau} \left[ (c_H - u_H + t_H) - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) \right] g(e) de \]
\[ = \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2) \right]}{\partial Q_F} \mid_{Q_H + Q_F = q^0_H} \]

where the last expression is the right derivative of objective function along the same boundary line.

The left derivative of the objective function with respect to \( Q_H \) is
\[
\lim_{Q_H \to q_H^0} \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1)]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + c_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) e + t_F
\]

\[
-(c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\tau} (e - \tau(Q_H)) g(e) de + (c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau}^{\tau-\epsilon} (\tau_1 - e) g(e) de
\]

By rearranging the terms, we can rewrite the above derivative as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1)]}{\partial Q_H}_{|_{Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0}} = -(k_H + u_H) + \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\tau} \left[ -(c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
+ \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\tau} \left[ -(c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) t(Q_H) + t_F \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
= \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_H}_{|_{Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0}}
\]

By definition, the above derivative is equal to the right derivative of the objective function along the same boundary line. Thus, the objective function is differentiable along the boundary line of \( Q_H + Q_F = q_H^0 \).

Along the boundary line of \( Q_F = q_H^0 \), the right derivative of the objective function with respect to \( Q_F \) is

\[
\lim_{Q_F \to q_F^0} \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_F} = \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3)]}{\partial Q_F}_{|_{Q_F = q_F^0}}
\]

\[
= -(k_F + u_F e) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{\varepsilon}^{\tau} (\varepsilon_1 - e) g(e) de
\]

\[
= -(k_F + u_F e) + \int_{\varepsilon}^{\tau} \left[ (c_H - u_H + t_H) - (c_F e - u_F e + t_F) \right] g(e) de
\]

\[
= \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R2)]}{\partial Q_F}_{|_{Q_F = q_F^0}}
\]

where the last term is the left derivative of objective function along the same boundary line.
The right derivative of the profit function with respect to $Q_H$ is

$$\lim_{Q_F \to q_H^0} \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3) \right]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + u_H) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau(Q_H)} (e - \tau_1) g(e) de$$

$$+ (c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau(Q_H)} (\tau(Q_H) - \tau_1) g(e) de$$

$$= -(k_H + u_H) + \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau(Q_H)} \left[ -(c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F + t_F) \right] g(e) de$$

$$+ \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\epsilon_u} \left[ -(c_H - u_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F + t_H) \right] g(e) de$$

By definition, the last expression is the left derivative of the objective function along that same boundary line. Therefore, the objective function is differentiable along the boundary line of $Q_F = q_H^0$ as well. In sum, the objective function is differentiable everywhere. $\square$

**Lemma 2A.5.** Onshore sourcing (H) is the optimal policy if and only if $Q_F^0 < Q_H^0$.

**Proof.** From Proposition 2A.2, we observe that in $R1$ the shadow price of $Q_H$ monotonically decreases in $Q_H$ as long as the total capacity is fixed. Note that this shadow price is positive at solution $(Q_H = Q_F^0, Q_F = 0)$ due to concavity of the profit function in $Q_H$. Moreover, the shadow price of $Q_F$ in $R1$ remains the same as long as the total capacity is unchanged. Therefore, the solution $(Q_H = Q_F^0, Q_F = 0)$ dominates all solutions along the line $Q_H + Q_F = Q_F^0$. However, this dominant solution corresponds to onshore sourcing which itself is dominated by the optimal onshore sourcing policy H ($Q_H^* = Q_H^0, Q_F^* = Q_F^0$).

Consequently, below the line $Q_H + Q_F = Q_H^0$, the optimal solution is the onshore sourcing policy H. $\square$
Proof of Proposition 2.2. From differentiability (lemmas 2A.3 and 2A.4) and piecewise concavity of the objective function (propositions 2A.2, 2A.3, and 2A.4), it follows that the objective function is jointly concave in \( Q_H \) and \( Q_F \) everywhere. \( \Box \)

Proof of Proposition 2.3. The first derivative of the objective function in \( R_2 \) with respect to \( Q_F \) is given in (A.3) as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R_2) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + E \left[ (m_F^+ - m_H^+) \right].
\]

The above derivative is constant and is independent of \( Q_F \) and \( Q_H \). Therefore, the objective function in region \( R_2 \) is linear in \( Q_F \), which implies that there is no interior solution in this region. \( \Box \)

Proof of Proposition 2.4. We have already shown that the objective function in (2.4) is jointly concave in \( Q_H \) and \( Q_F \), and that there is no interior solution in region \( R_2 \) where the shadow price of \( Q_F \) is constant (independent of \( Q_H \) and \( Q_F \)). Therefore, the sign of this shadow price given in equation (A.3) leads us to the region where the optimal solution is located. If it is positive (negative), the optimal solution lies in region \( R_3 \) (region \( R_1 \)) and that the optimal solution is an interior solution if the solution to system of equations in (2.13)(system of equations in (2.11)) exists. Suppose the shadow price in (A.3) is positive, i.e.,

\[
E \left[ (m_F^+ - m_H^+) \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} > 0
\]

(A.5)

The proof for parts (c) and (e) of the proposition requires analyzing region \( R_3 \).

Region \( R_3 \): In this region, it can be observed from (2.13) that the second equation (first-order condition for \( Q_F \)) is a rearrangement of equation (2.9), and results in the same optimal solution \( Q_F^0 \).
In order for \( Q_H^* \) to be positive, we must have \( \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi\left( Q_H, Q_F | R^3 \right) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H=0} \) as positive. It is shown in the proof of Proposition 2A.4 that this derivative does not depend on the value of \( Q_F \). Hence,

\[
\frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi\left( Q_H, Q_F | R^3 \right) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H=0} = -(k_H + u_H) + \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} m_H g(e) \, de + \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau_2} (m_H - m_F) g(e) \, de
\]

must be positive, implying that

\[
\frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi\left( Q_H, Q_F | R^3 \right) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H=0} = E\left[ (m_H - m_F^+)^+ \right] - k_H - u_H > 0.
\] (A.6)

Therefore, \( E\left[ (m_H - m_F^+)^+ \right] - k_H - u_H \) must be positive for \( D_E \) to be optimal. Otherwise, the first-order derivative with respect to \( Q_H \) is negative and \( Q_H^* = 0 \), which results in the offshore sourcing policy \( F_H \).

On the other hand, defining \( \tau' = \tau(Q_H + Q_F = Q_H^0) = (c_H + t_H + k_H - t_F)/(c_F - u_F) \), we have

\[
\frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi\left( Q_H, Q_F \right) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H=Q_H^0} = E\left[ (\tilde{m}_F^+ - m_H^+) \right] - E\left[ (\tilde{m}_H^+ - M_H^+) \right] < 0.
\] (A.7)

As a result, \( Q_H^* \) is lower than \( Q_H^0 \) in this region.

For parts (a), (b) and (d) of this proposition, we investigate Region \( R_1 \).

Note that OC2 is identical to inequality (A.5). Therefore, if OC2 does not hold (i.e., the first-order derivative of the objective function in (A.2) with respect to \( Q_F \) in region \( R_2 \) is negative), the optimal solution must lie in region \( R_1 \).

Region \( R_1 \): In this region we can observe from the system of equations in (2.11) that the solution to the second equation (corresponding to the first-order condition for \( Q_F \), i.e., \( \tau_{HF}^* \), is
identical to the solution in equation (2.9), i.e., $\tau^*$. Therefore, an interior optimal solution must satisfy

$$Q^*_H + Q^*_F = Q^*_F$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.8)

From (A.8), we have

$$\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H + Q_F = Q^*_F} = 0$$

at the optimal solution. In order for $Q^*_H$ to be positive, we need

$$\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = 0, Q_F = Q^*_F}$$

to be positive. We have

$$\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = 0, Q_F = Q^*_F} = \left( \frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = 0, Q_F = Q^*_F} - \frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H = 0, Q_F = Q^*_F} \right) \bigg|_{Q_H = 0, Q_F = Q^*_F}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.9)

Thus, $m_{H} - k_{H} - u_{H} - \left( E \left[ \tilde{m}_{F}^+ \right] - k_{F} - u_{F} \bar{e} \right)$ must be positive for $D_{R}$ to be optimal. Otherwise, $Q^*_H = 0$ corresponding to the offshore sourcing policy $F_{L}$.

On the other hand, from Lemma 2A.5, in order for $Q^*_F$ to be positive, $Q^*_F > Q^*_H$ must hold.

Equivalently, the derivative of the objective function in (A.1) with respect to $Q_F$ along the line $Q_H + Q_F = Q^*_H$ (i.e., \[\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H + Q_F = Q^*_H} \]) must be positive. We have

$$\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H + Q_F = Q^*_H} = E \left[ \left( \tilde{m}_{F}^+ - M_{H}^+ \right)^+ \right] - k_{F} - u_{F} \bar{e}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (A.10)

Hence, $E \left[ \left( \tilde{m}_{F}^+ - M_{H}^+ \right)^+ \right] - k_{F} - u_{F} \bar{e}$ must also be positive for $D_{R}$ to be optimal. Otherwise, $Q^*_F = 0$ corresponding to the onshore sourcing policy $H$. 

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Furthermore, as \( \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = Q^*_H, Q_F = 0} = 0 \) by definition, and \( \frac{\partial^2 E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_H \partial Q_F} < 0 \), we have

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = Q^*_H, Q_F > 0} < 0,
\]

which implies that \( Q_H^* \) must be lower than \( Q_H^0 \) in region \( R1 \).

The Special Case of Low Volatility in Exchange Rate and/or High Profit Margin:

This is the special case where the volatility in exchange rate is so low, or the profit margin is so high, that \( m_F > 0 \) for all exchange-rate realizations in the second stage (i.e., \( \tau_2 > e_h \) in Figure 2.3). First, the set of potentially optimal solutions remains the same. This is because the expected profit function in the first stage does not depend on \( \tau_2 \) in any of the regions. Consequently, the system of equations in (2.11) and (2.13) remain the same, which results in the same set of potentially optimal solutions. Second, the optimality conditions also remain the same. The reason is as follows: First, inequality (A.5) is independent of \( \tau_2 \). Second, in the derivations of equations (A.6), (A.7), (A.9) and (A.10), \( \tau_2 \) is replaced with \( e_h \), which causes \( \hat{m}_F^+ \) to be replaced with \( \hat{m}_F^* \).

Therefore, if \( m_F \) is always positive, then we can simplify all of the optimality conditions by replacing \( \hat{m}_F^+ \) with \( \hat{m}_F^* \). However, keeping \( \hat{m}_F^+ \) leads to the general conditions.

Therefore, the set of potentially optimal solutions and the optimality conditions are robust to the magnitude of exchange-rate volatility and to the variation in profit margin. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.5.** Note that the first-order derivative of the objective function in an offshore sourcing policy with respect to \( Q_F \) evaluated at \( q_H^0 \) is equal to the derivative of the global sourcing objective function with respect to \( Q_F \) evaluated at the same point. i.e.,

\[
\frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H = 0, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H = q_H^0} = \frac{\partial E[\Pi(Q_H, Q_F)]}{\partial Q_F} \bigg|_{Q_H = q_H^0} = E \left[ \left( \hat{m}_F^+ - m_H \right)^+ \right] - k_f - u_f \bar{e}
\]
Hence, $Q_F^0 > q_H^0$ is equivalent to the optimal global sourcing policy being in region $R_3$, and $Q_F^0 < q_H^0$ is equivalent to the optimal global sourcing policy being in region $R_1$. Moreover, for part (b), $Q_F^0 > Q_H^0$ ensures that the optimal policy is not $H$. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.6.** If $k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F < k_H + c_H + t_H$, then $p - c_F \bar{e} - t_F - k_F > p - c_H - t_H - k_H$, which means $E[\tilde{m}_F] = k_F - u_F \bar{e} > m_H - k_H - u_H$. This has two implications: First, the opposite of OC3 holds (i.e., $E[\tilde{m}_F] > m_H - k_H - u_H$), which in turn implies $D_R$ is never optimal in this case. Second, OC1 holds because

$$E\left[\left(\tilde{m}_F^+ - M_H^+\right)^+\right] = E\left[\tilde{m}_F^+ - M_H\right] = E\left[\tilde{m}_F^+\right] - (m_H - k_H - u_H) > E\left[\tilde{m}_F\right] - (m_H - k_H - u_H) > k_F + u_F \bar{e}$$

Therefore, from Table 2.1, if OC2 does not hold, then $F_L$ is the optimal policy. Otherwise, if OC2 holds but OC4 does not hold, then $F_H$ is the optimal policy. Finally, if both OC2 and OC4 hold, then $D_E$ is the optimal policy. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.7.** The inequality $k_F + c_F \bar{e} + t_F \geq k_H + c_H + t_H$ by itself does not imply that the optimality conditions hold or not. If OC2 holds and OC4 does not hold, the optimal policy is $F_H$. Moreover, if OC2 and OC3 do not hold and OC1 holds, the optimal policy is $F_L$. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.8.** The inequality $p - (c_F - u_F) \bar{e} - t_F < 0$ does not eliminate the possibility of the optimality conditions associated with dual sourcing and offshore sourcing to hold. Thus, they may still be optimal sourcing policies. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.9.** (a) In region $R_3$, the shadow price of $Q_F$ is

$$\lambda^{R_3}_{\tilde{\xi}_3} = \frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R_3) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -\left(k_F + u_F \bar{e}\right) + (c_F - u_F) \int \left(\tau(Q_F) - e\right)^+ g(e) \, de$$
Let us define \( n(e) = (\tau(Q_F) - e)^+ \). Then, the shadow price can be expressed as

\[-(k_F + u_F e) + (c_F - u_F) E\left[ n(\bar{e}) \right].\]

Note that \( n(e) \) is piecewise linear and convex in \( e \). Therefore, by the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, \( E\left[ n(\bar{e}) \right] \geq E\left[ n(\bar{e}) \right] \) if \( \bar{e} \) is a mean-preserving spread of \( \bar{e} \). Consequently, the higher exchange-rate volatility, the higher the shadow price, and the higher the value of \( Q_F^* \) in this region.

In region \( R1 \), the shadow price of \( Q_F \) is

\[
\lambda_{Q_F}^{R1} = \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1) \right]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F e) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i}^{e_f} (\tau(Q_H + Q_F) - e)^+ g(e) de
\]

By similar argument \( Q_F^* \) increases in exchange-rate volatility in this region as well.

Note that in region \( R2 \), the shadow price is constant, and its sign, positive or negative, determines that the optimal solution is whether in region \( R3 \) or region \( R1 \), respectively. This shadow price is

\[
E\left[ \left( \tilde{m}_F^+ - m_H \right)^+ \right] - k_F - u_F e = E\left[ (c_H - u_H + t_H - c_F e + u_F e - t_F)^+ \right] - k_F - u_F e
\]

where \( (c_H - u_H + t_H - c_F e + u_F e - t_F)^+ \) is convex in \( e \). Therefore, this shadow price increases in exchange-rate volatility, which implies that as volatility increases the location of the optimal solution may switch from region \( R1 \) to region \( R3 \) but not in an opposite way. Since \( Q_F^* \) is always higher in region \( R3 \) than in region \( R1 \), it follows that \( Q_F^* \) always increases in exchange-rate volatility.

For \( Q_H^* \), the shadow price in region \( R3 \) is

\[
\lambda_{Q_H}^{R3} = \frac{\partial E\left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_F | R3) \right]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + c_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) e + t_F + (c_F - u_F) E\left[ n(\bar{e}) \right]
\]
where \( n(e) = [\tau_1 - e] - (e - \tau(Q_H))^{+} \) is piecewise linear but neither convex nor concave in \( e \),
which leads to an inconclusive result regarding the behavior of the domestic capacity in
exchange-rate volatility.

(b) From (2.5) using the Envelope Theorem, we have

\[
\frac{\partial \pi^*}{\partial e} (Q_H, Q_F, e) = \frac{\partial E}{\partial e} \left[ \pi_2 (q_H^*, q_F^*, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e) \right]
= \left( \frac{\partial E}{\partial e} \left[ \pi_2 (q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e) \right] \right) \bigg|_{q_H = q_H^*, q_F = q_F^*}
\]

(A.11)

where

\[
E \left[ \pi_2 (q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e) \right] = (c_H - u_H + t_H)q_H - ((c_F - u_F)e + t_F)q_F
+ \int p \min \{x, q_H + q_F\} f(x) dx
\]

We note that \( \frac{\partial E}{\partial e} \left[ \pi_2 (q_H, q_F, x \mid Q_H, Q_F, e) \right] = -(c_F - u_F)q_F^* \). Thus, from (A.11),

\[
\frac{\partial \pi^*}{\partial e} (Q_H, Q_F, e) = -(c_F - u_F)q_F^* \text{ which implies } \frac{\partial^2 \pi^*}{\partial e^2} (Q_H, Q_F, e) = -(c_F - u_F) \frac{\partial q_F^*}{\partial e} \text{ which is positive because } q_F^* \text{ decreases in } e.
\]

Consequently, \( \pi^* (Q_H, Q_F, e) \) is convex in \( e \), which by the definition of second-order
stochastic dominance implies \( E \left[ \pi^* (Q_H, Q_F, \tilde{e}) \right] > E \left[ \pi^* (Q_H, Q_F, \hat{e}) \right] \) if \( \tilde{e} \) is a mean-preserving
spread of \( \hat{e} \). As a result, the first-stage expected profit increases in exchange-rate volatility. ❑

Proof of Proposition 2.10. From the first equation of the system of equations in (2.13) for
uniformly distributed exchange rate (\( \tilde{e} \sim U[\overline{\tau} - d, \overline{\tau} + d] \)), we have

\[
(c_F - u_F) \int_{\tau(Q_H)}^{\tau(Q_H) + 1} \frac{1}{2d} \int_{\tau_1}^{\tau(Q_H) + 1} \left( (c_F - u_F e + t_F) - (c_H - u_H + t_H) \right) \frac{1}{2d} de + k_H + u_H = 0
\]
which simplifies to
\[
\frac{(c_F-u_F)}{4d}((\bar{e}+d-\tau(Q_H))^2 - \left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right]^2 + k_H + u_H = 0
\]
or
\[
(\bar{e}+d-\tau(Q_H))^2 = \left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right]^2 - 4d(c_F-u_F)(k_H + u_H).
\]

The feasible solution to this quadratic equation is
\[
\tau_H^* = \bar{e} + d - \frac{1}{(c_F-u_F)} \sqrt{\left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right]^2 - 4d(c_F-u_F)(k_H + u_H)}.
\]

The square root term is guaranteed to be positive by OC4 which is required to hold under policy D_E. It follows that
\[
\frac{\partial \tau_H^*}{\partial d} = 1 - \frac{\left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right] - 2(k_H + u_H)}{\sqrt{\left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right]^2 - 4d(c_F-u_F)(k_H + u_H)}}.
\]

The root of the above partial derivative occurs when
\[
\left[\left\{\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right\} - 2(k_H + u_H)\right] - \left(\left[\frac{(c_F-u_F)((\bar{e}+d)+t_F-\left(c_H-u_H+t_H\right))}{4d(c_F-u_F)}\right]^2 - 4d(c_F-u_F)(k_H + u_H)\right)^2 = 0
\]
which reduces to \((c_F-u_F)\bar{e} + t_F - (k_H + c_H + t_H) = 0\). As a result, when \(k_H + c_H + t_H < (c_F-u_F)\bar{e} + t_F\), we have \(\frac{\partial \tau_H^*}{\partial d} > 0\) which by definition \(\tau^*_H = \tau(Q_H^*) = (p [(1 - F(Q_H^*)) - t_F]/ (c_F-u_F))\) implies \(\frac{\partial Q_H^*}{\partial d} < 0\).

**Proof of Proposition 2.11.** In case 1, by Proposition 2.6, the potentially optimal policies are FL, F_H, and D_E. From Proposition 2.9, we know that the left-hand side (LHS) of OC2 and \(Q_F^*\) increase in exchange-rate volatility. As a result, the optimal policy can switch from FL in region
R1 to FR in region R3, and not in the opposite way. Depending on whether OC4 holds in region R3, the optimal policy may change to DE.

In case 2, all policies can potentially be optimal. At sufficiently low degrees of exchange-rate volatility, the firm adopts policy H due to the lower cost of onshore sourcing. Note that under policy H, when OC1 does not hold, OC2 does not hold either. Moreover, if OC1 does not hold, OC3 holds because

\[
E\left[ m_F^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} - (m_H - k_H - u_H) = E\left[ m_F^+ - M_H^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} < 0. 
\]

(A.12)

Higher levels of exchange-rate volatility cause the LHS of OC1 to increase (by similar argument as presented in proof of proposition 2.9) until OC1 holds. Observe that due to inequality (A.12), at this switching point, OC3 still holds. This is where DR becomes the optimal policy. As exchange-rate volatility increases, the LHS of OC2 increases and the LHS of OC3 decreases. The latter is because \( m_F^+ \) is convex in \( e \), thus

\[
E\left[ m_F^+ \right] - k_F - u_F \bar{e} - (m_H - k_H - u_H) \]

increases in exchange-rate volatility by a similar argument as mentioned in proof of Proposition 2.9. Depending on whether OC3 does not hold or OC2 holds first, the optimal policy path is different. If OC3 does not hold first, FL becomes the optimal policy first and similar to case 1, the next optimal policies are FH (when OC2 holds) and DE if OC4 holds as well. Otherwise, if OC2 holds before OC3 is reversed, the optimal solution moves to R3. But this also causes OC4 to hold because the LHS of OC4 is the summation of the LHS of OC2 and that of OC3. Therefore, if both OC2 and OC3 hold, OC4 holds as well. That implies that the optimal solution may directly switch from DR to DE.

**Proof of Proposition 2.12.** (a) For \( e_\alpha \geq \tau_2 \), we have \( q_F^*(e_\alpha) = 0 \). By supposition, we have

\[
P_{(\varepsilon, z)} \left[ \Pi(0, Q_{F}^*) < -\beta \right] > \alpha.
\]

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Furthermore,
\[ \Pi(0, Q^d_e | e_a) = -\beta, \quad \Pi(0, Q^d_e | e) < -\beta \] for all \( e > e_a \), \( \Pi(0, Q^d_e | e) > -\beta \) for all \( e < e_a \).
and thus, \( P_{(\alpha, \beta)}[\Pi(0, Q^d_e) < -\beta] = \alpha \).

Define
\[ Q^d_e(Q_H) = \frac{(p - k_H - c_H - t_H)Q_H + \beta}{(k_f + u_f e_a)} = \frac{[M_H Q_H + \beta]}{(k_f + u_f e_a)} \quad (A.13) \]
and note that \( P_{(\alpha, \beta)}[\Pi(Q_H, Q^d_e(Q_H)) < -\beta] = \alpha \) for all \( 0 \leq Q_H \leq x_L \).

(a) If \( Q^d_e = Q^d_e(0) > q^0_H \), we can substitute the capacity investment in (A.13) into the first-stage objective function associated with R3 and take its first-order derivative with respect to \( Q_H \).

The total derivative of that function with respect to \( Q_H \) can be expressed as:
\[
\frac{dE \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q^d_e(Q_H) | R3) \right]}{dQ_H} = \frac{\partial E \Pi(Q_H, Q^d_e | R3)}{\partial Q^d_e} \bigg|_{Q^d_e(Q_H)} \cdot \frac{dQ^d_e(Q_H)}{dQ_H} + \frac{\partial E \Pi(Q_H, Q^d_e | R3)}{\partial Q_H} \bigg|_{Q^d_e(Q_H)}
\]

From Proposition 2A.4,
\[
\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q^d_e | R3) \right]}{\partial Q^d_e} = -(k_f + u_f \bar{e}) + (c_f - u_f) \int_{e_i}^{e_f} (\tau(Q_f) - e) g(e) de, \quad \text{and,}
\]
\[
\frac{\partial E \left[ \Pi(Q_H, Q_H | R3) \right]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + u_H) - (c_f - u_f) \int_{e_i}^{e_f} (e - \tau(Q_H)) g(e) de + E \left[ (m_H - \tilde{m}_F)^+ \right].
\]

Thus,
\[
\frac{dE\left[\Pi\left(Q_H, Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\right)\right]}{dQ_H}\bigg|_{Q_H=0} = \frac{M_H}{k_F + u_F e_a} \left[ -\left(k_F + u_F \bar{e}\right) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} \left(\tau\left(Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\right) - e\right) g(e) de \right] \\
- \left(k_H + u_H\right) - \left(c_F - u_F\right) \int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} \left(e - \tau\right) g(e) de + E\left[\left(m_H - \tilde{m}_F\right)^+\right]
\]

Because the last two terms simplify to \(E\left[\left(m_H - \tilde{m}_F\right)^+\right]\), we can rewrite the derivative as

\[
\frac{dE\left[\Pi\left(Q_H, Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\right)\right]}{dQ_H}\bigg|_{Q_H=0} = \frac{M_H}{k_F + u_F e_a} \left[ -\left(k_F + u_F \bar{e}\right) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} \left(\tau\left(Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\right) - e\right) g(e) de \right] \\
+ \left(k_H + u_H\right) + \left(c_F - u_F\right) \int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} \left(e - \tau\right) g(e) de + E\left[\left(m_H - \tilde{m}_F\right)^+\right] - k_H - u_H
\]

Note that the first term is positive since \(Q_F^A < Q_F^0\), and the last three terms form the LHS of OC4 is negative because of the definition of policy \(F_H\). Because \(\int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} \left(\tau - e\right) g(e) de = \int_{e_i}^{e_i\prime} G(e) de\), the above condition is equivalent to RA1. Therefore, when \(Q_F^A > q_H^0\), if RA1 holds, the firm satisfies the VaR constraint and increases expected profit by increasing \(Q_H\) from 0 to any \(Q_H \in (0, x_L]\) while simultaneously increasing \(Q_F\) from \(Q_F^A\left(0\right)\) to \(Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\), and thus engages in dual sourcing under risk aversion.

(b) If \(Q_F^A = Q_F^A\left(0\right) \leq q_H^0\), regardless of whether \(F_H\) or \(F_L\) is the optimal policy in the risk-neutral setting, we can substitute the capacity investment in (A.13) into the first-stage objective function associated with \(R1\) and take its first-order derivative with respect to \(Q_H\):

\[
\frac{dE\left[\Pi\left(Q_H, Q_F^A\left(Q_H\right)\right)\right]}{dQ_H} = \frac{\partial E\Pi\left(Q_H, Q_F\right)}{\partial Q_F}\bigg|_{Q_F^A\left(0\right)} \cdot \frac{dQ_F^A\left(Q_H\right)}{dQ_H} + \frac{\partial E\Pi\left(Q_H, Q_F\right)}{\partial Q_H}\bigg|_{Q_F^A\left(0\right)}
\]
From Proposition 2A.2,

\[
\frac{\partial E[\pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1)]}{\partial Q_F} = -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} (e + \tau(Q_H, Q_F)) g(e) \, de, \quad \text{and,}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial E[\pi(Q_H, Q_F | R1)]}{\partial Q_H} = -(k_H + c_H + t_H) + (c_F - u_F) \bar{e} + t_F - (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H)} (e - \tau(Q_H)) g(e) \, de + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} (\tau(Q_H + Q_F) - e) g(e) \, de
\]

Thus,

\[
\frac{dE[\pi(Q_H, Q_F^d(Q_H) | R1)]}{dQ_H} \bigg|_{Q_H = 0} =
\]

\[
\frac{M_H}{k_F + u_F \bar{e}} \left[ -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} (\tau(Q_H, Q_F) - e) g(e) \, de \right] + M_H - E[\tilde{m}_F^+] + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} [\tau(Q_F^d(Q_H)) - e] g(e) \, de
\]

Therefore, when \(Q_F^d \leq q_H^0\) and dual sourcing is the optimal sourcing policy under risk aversion if

\[
\frac{M_H}{k_F + u_F \bar{e}} \left[ -(k_F + u_F \bar{e}) + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} (\tau(Q_H, Q_F, e, \beta) - e) g(e) \, de \right] + M_H - E[\tilde{m}_F^+] + (c_F - u_F) \int_{e_0}^{\tau(Q_H, Q_F)} [\tau(Q_F^d(Q_H, e, \beta)) - e] g(e) \, de > 0
\]

due to submodularity of the expected profit function, LHS of RA2 is larger than that of RA1.

Thus, under risk aversion, it is more likely for dual sourcing to be adopted when \(Q_F^d \leq q_H^0\) than when \(Q_F^d > q_H^0\). □
Proof of Proposition 2.13. (a) Recall that $e_\alpha$ denotes the exchange rate realization at fractile 1 – $\alpha$ (i.e., $[1 - G(e_\alpha)] = \alpha$). The realized profit is greater than or equal to $-\beta$ when the exchange-rate random variable takes values in the range $e_l \leq e \leq e_\alpha$, and the probability of loss greater than or equal to $\beta$ is less than or equal to $\alpha$. In (2.20), we can equate the profit at $e = e_\alpha$ inside the probability expression to $-\beta$ in order to determine the number of hedging contracts necessary to warrant profitability that satisfies the VaR requirement:

$$\left\{-k_H Q_H - k_F Q_F - h(e_s) H - (c_H + t_H) q_H^*(e_\alpha) - (c_F e_\alpha + t_F) q_F^*(e_\alpha) \right\} = -\beta.$$

Solving for $H$ at the lowest demand realization $x = x_l$ provides the minimum (optimal) number of hedging contracts satisfying VaR at $e = e_\alpha$:

$$H^*(e_s) = \frac{k_H Q_H + k_F Q_F + (c_H + t_H) q_H^*(e_\alpha) + (c_F e_\alpha + t_F) q_F^*(e_\alpha)}{+u_H (Q_H - q_H^*(e_\alpha))^+ + u_F e_\alpha (Q_F - q_F^*(e_\alpha))^+ - p \min \{x_l, q_H^*(e_\alpha) + q_F^*(e_\alpha)\} - \beta}.$$

(b) Taking the expectation of the term $(e - e_s)H$ in (2.19) over all exchange-rate realizations provides the expected return of $H \left( \int_{e_l}^{e_s} (e - e_s) g(e) de \right)$ in stage 2, which is equal to the first-stage payment of $h(e_s) H = H \left( \int_{e_l}^{e_s} (e - e_s) g(e) de - \int_{e_l}^{e_s} (e_s - e) g(e) de \right) = H \left( \int_{e_l}^{e_s} (e - e_s) g(e) de \right)$ for $H$ units of hedging contracts in (2.18). Thus, the expected profit for any given $(Q_H, Q_F)$ decision made in stage 1 in the risk-neutral setting can be replicated through purchasing $H^*(e_s)$ units of contracts in (2.21) under risk aversion to satisfy VaR. □
Appendix to Chapter 3

Proof of Proposition 3.1. The first- and second-order derivatives of the second-stage profit function (3.4) with respect to $q$ are respectively:

$$\frac{d\pi(q)}{dq} = v_s - s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - q}{k(\varphi)q} \right) - \frac{\beta M}{M - q}$$

$$\frac{d^2\pi(q)}{dq^2} = -\frac{\beta M}{q(M-q)} - \frac{\beta M(M-q)^2}{q(M-q)^2} = -\frac{\beta}{q} \left( \frac{M}{M - q} \right)^2 < 0$$

Thus, as shown in Proposition 1 in Noparumpa et al. (2015) for a similar problem, $\pi(q)$ is concave in $q$. The unconstrained optimal processing quantity $q^0(\varphi)$ can then be obtained from the first order condition (FOC) (We use superscript “\text{op}” for the optimal decisions associated with the problem where there is no supply constraint). That is, $q^0(\varphi)$ solves

$$v_s - s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - q}{k(\varphi)q} \right) - \frac{\beta M}{k(\varphi)q} = 0 \quad \text{which implies} \quad \frac{M - q}{k(\varphi)q} = e^{\frac{M}{M-q} \frac{v_s - s}{\beta}}. \quad \text{We rearrange to get}$$

$$\frac{q}{M - q} e^{\frac{M}{M-q} \frac{v_s - s}{\beta}} = e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \quad \text{which conforms to the Lambert W function structure. Thus,}$$

$$\frac{q}{M - q} = W\left( e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \right) \quad \text{which implies}$$

$$q^0(\varphi) = M \frac{W\left( e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \right)}{1 + W\left( e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \right)} = M \alpha(\varphi) \quad \text{(A.14)}$$

Substituting (A.14) into (3.2), we get

$$p^0(\varphi) = v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{1}{k(\varphi)W\left( e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \right)} \right] = v_s - \beta \ln \left[ k(\varphi)W\left( e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi) \right) \right].$$

Note that by the definition of the Lambert W function $W(z)e^{W(z)} = z$, which implies $k(\varphi)W(z)e^{W(z)} = k(\varphi)z$, and thus $\ln[k(\varphi)W(z)] + W(z) = \ln[k(\varphi)z]$. Let $z = e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1} / k(\varphi)$. It
follows that \[ \ln \left[ k(\varphi)W\left( e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \right) \right] + W\left( e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \right) = \ln \left[ e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1} \right] = (v_s-s)/\beta-1. \]

Therefore, we can re-write \( p^0(\varphi) \) as

\[
p^0(\varphi) = v_s - \beta \left[ \frac{(v_s-s)}{\beta-1} - W\left( e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \right) \right] \\
= s + \beta \left[ 1 + W\left( e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \right) \right]
\]

Therefore, if \( Q_y \geq q^0(\varphi) \), \( q^*(\varphi) = q^0(\varphi) \), \( p^*(\varphi) = p^0(\varphi) \), and the optimal second-stage profit is

\[
\pi^*(Q, y, \varphi) = M \beta W\left( e^{(v_s-s)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \right) + (s-r)Q_y
\]

which results from substituting (A.14) into (3.4).

Otherwise, if \( Q_y < q^0(\varphi) \), due to concavity of \( \pi(q) \), \( q^*(\varphi) = Q_y \), and equations (3.2) and (3.4) yield \( p^*(\varphi) \) and \( \pi^*(Q, y, \varphi) \), respectively. \(\square\)

**Proof of Proposition 3.2.** If \( Q_y < M \alpha(\varphi) \), taking the first-order derivative of \( p^*(\varphi, y) \) expressed in Proposition 3.1 with respect to \( \varphi \), we get

\[
\frac{\partial p^*(\varphi, y)}{\partial \varphi} = \beta \frac{-k'(\varphi)}{k(\varphi)} = \frac{e^{(v_s-y)/\beta}}{1 + e^{(v_s-y)/\beta}} = 1 - \frac{1}{k(\varphi)} \quad \text{if } Q_y < M \alpha(\varphi) \quad (A.15)
\]

where the last two equalities use the definition of \( k(\varphi) \) by (3.3).

If \( Q_y \geq M \alpha(\varphi) \), we have

\[
\frac{\partial p^*(\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} = \beta \frac{dW(z)}{dz} \frac{dz(\varphi)}{d\varphi} \quad (A.16)
\]

where \( z(\varphi) = e^{(v_s-y)/\beta-1}/k(\varphi) \). In order to find \( dW(z)/dz \), we take the derivative of both sides of \( W(z)e^{W(z)} = z \) with respect to \( z \) (Noparumpa et al. 2015) to get \( W'(z)\left[ e^{W(z)} + W(z)e^{W(z)} \right] = 1 \)

which yields

\[
\frac{dW(z)}{dz} = \frac{W(z)}{z[1 + W(z)]} = \frac{\alpha(\varphi)}{z(\varphi)} \quad (A.17)
\]
We then find the derivative of $z(\phi)$ with respect to $\phi$ as

$$
\frac{dz(\phi)}{d\phi} = -k'(\phi) \frac{e^{(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2)/\beta - 1}}{k(\phi)^2} = -k'(\phi)z(\phi) = \frac{z(\phi)}{\beta} \left(1 - \frac{1}{k(\phi)}\right)
$$

(A.18)

Therefore, substituting (A.17) and (A.18) into (A.16), we get

$$
\frac{\partial^* p(\phi, y)}{\partial \phi} = \alpha(\phi) \left(1 - \frac{1}{k(\phi)}\right) \text{ if } Qy \geq M \alpha(\phi)
$$

(A.19)

Note that by definition, $\alpha(\phi) < 1$ (Proposition 3.1), and $k(\phi) > 1$ (equation (3.3)). Therefore, (A.15) and (A.19) imply that $\frac{\partial^* p(\phi, y)}{\partial \phi} < 1$. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.3.** From Proposition 3.1, we can re-write $\alpha(\phi)$ expression as

$$
\alpha(\phi) = W(z) / \left[1 + W(z)\right]
$$

where $z = e^{(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2)/\beta - 1} / k(\phi)$. By chain rule, we have

$$
\frac{d\alpha(\phi)}{d\phi} = \frac{d\alpha(W)}{dW} \cdot \frac{dW(z)}{dz} \cdot \frac{dz(\phi)}{d\phi}
$$

(A.20)

The first derivative on the right-hand side (RHS) is

$$
\frac{d\alpha(W)}{dW} = \frac{1}{\left[1 + W(z)\right]^2}
$$

(A.21)

Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we substitute (A.21), (A.17), and (A.18) into (A.20) to get

$$
\frac{d\alpha(\phi)}{d\phi} = \frac{W(z)}{\beta \left[1 + W(z)\right]^3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{k(\phi)}\right)
$$

which is positive. The results follow. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.4.** (a) The first-order derivative of the expected profit function (3.5) with respect to $Q$ is
\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(Q)}{\partial Q} = -(l + r\bar{y}) + \int \int_{\mathcal{V}(Q)} y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M - Qy} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi \\
+ \int \int_{\mathcal{O}(Q)} syg(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi
\]

and the second-order derivative with respect to \( Q \) is:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi(Q)}{\partial Q^2} = \int \int_{\mathcal{V}(Q)} -\beta y \left( \frac{M}{M - Qy} \right)^2 g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi < 0.
\]

Consequently, the expected profit function is concave in \( Q \) and (3.6) is the FOC which yields the unique optimal leasing quantity.

(b) By substituting \( Q^* \) into (3.5) and rearranging, the optimal expected profit can be expressed as:

\[
\Pi(Q^*) = -(l + r\bar{y})Q^*
\]

\[
+ Q^* \left[ \int \int_{\mathcal{V}(Q^*)} y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Q^*y}{k(\phi)Q^*y} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M - Q^*y} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi \\
+ \int \int_{\mathcal{O}(Q^*)} syg(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi \right]
\]

\[
+ M \beta \left[ \int \int_{\mathcal{V}(Q^*)} \frac{Q^*y}{M - Q^*y} g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi + \int \int_{\mathcal{O}(Q^*)} W \left( \frac{e^{(v_y - s)/\beta - 1}}{k(\phi)} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi \right]
\]

Substituting the FOC (3.6) into (A.22), the first two terms cancel out, which results in (3.7).

\[\square\]

**Proof of Remark 3.1.** \( Q^D = M\alpha(\bar{\phi}) / \bar{y} \) is larger than \( Q^r = M\alpha(\phi_l) / y_h \), because \( \bar{y} < y_h \), and according to proposition 3.3, \( \bar{\phi} > \phi_l \) implies \( \alpha(\bar{\phi}) > \alpha(\phi_l) \). \[\square\]

**Proof of Proposition 3.5.** (a) Note that according to Proposition 3.3, the processor targets the smallest portion of the high-end segment when the commodity price is realized at its lowest level \( (\phi_l) \). Therefore, the processor underinvests in DT if and only if \( Q^* y_h < M\alpha(\phi_l) \), i.e., the first-order
derivative of the (first-stage) expected profit function with respect to \( Q \) evaluated at \( M\alpha(\phi)/y_h \) must be negative (Note that in this case \( Q_y < M\alpha(\phi) \) for all realizations of \( y \) and \( \phi \)):

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi(Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{M\alpha(\phi)/y_h} = -(l + r\bar{y}) + \int_A \int_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)\alpha(y)}{k(\phi)\alpha(\phi)\alpha(y)} \right] - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)\alpha(y)} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi < 0
\]

which results in condition (3.8).

(b) When the processor adopts the underinvestment policy, the crop supply always falls short of the optimal demand and the processor sets a market-clearing price in the second stage, which results in the optimal second-stage profit as expressed below:

\[
\pi_U^*(Q, y, \phi) = Q_y \left( v_s - r + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\phi)Q_y} \right] \right)
\]

Therefore, the first-stage expected profit function can be expressed as:

\[
\Pi_U(Q) = -(l + r\bar{y})Q + \int_A \int_y Q_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\phi)Q_y} \right] \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A.23)

From Proposition 3.4, we can infer that \( \Pi_U(Q) \) is concave in \( Q \), and thus the below FOC yields the optimal leasing quantity (\( Q_U^* \)).

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_U(Q)}{\partial Q} = -l - r\bar{y} + \int_A \int_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\phi)Q_y} \right] - \beta \frac{M}{M - Q_y} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi = 0  \hspace{1cm} (A.24)
\]

(c) Note that by substituting \( Q_U^* \) into (A.23) and rearranging, the optimal expected profit can be written as:

\[
\Pi_U(Q_U^*) = -(l + r\bar{y})Q_U^* + Q_U^* \left[ \int_A \int_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_U^*}{k(\phi)Q_U^*} \right] - \beta \frac{M}{M - Q_U^*} \right) g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi \right] + \int_A \int_y M \beta \frac{Q_U^*}{M - Q_U^*} g(y)h(\phi)dyd\phi
\]

Substituting (A.24) into (A.23), the first two terms cancel out, and we get (3.10):
\[ \Pi_U(Q^*_U) = \int_{\phi} M \beta \frac{Q_{U}^* y}{M - Q_{U}^* y} g(y) h(\phi) dy d\phi = M \beta \int_{y_1}^{y_2} \frac{Q_{U}^* y}{M - Q_{U}^* y} g(y) dy. \]

(d) \( Q^*_U < Q^T \) directly follows from part (a). \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 3.6.** (a) Condition (3.8) can be expressed as

\[ -l - r\bar{y} + E_{\varphi} \left[ E_Y \left( n(Y, \Phi) \right) \right] < 0, \]

where

\[
n(y, \varphi) = y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y}{k(\varphi)\alpha(\varphi_h)y} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} \]

(A.25)

Note that \( n(y, \varphi) \) is concave in \( y \). This is because

\[
\frac{\partial n(y, \varphi)}{\partial y} = v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y}{k(\varphi)\alpha(\varphi_h)y} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} + y \beta \left( \frac{-\alpha(\varphi_h)}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} - \frac{1}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} \right) \]

and thus,

\[
\frac{\partial^2 n(y, \varphi)}{\partial y^2} = -\beta \left( \frac{\alpha(\varphi_h)}{y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y} + \frac{1}{y_h} + \frac{\alpha(\varphi_h)y_h}{\left( y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y \right)^2} + \frac{2y_h^2\alpha(\varphi_h)}{\left( y_h - \alpha(\varphi_h)y \right)^3} \right) \]

which is negative because by definition, \( y_h > y \), and \( 0 < \alpha(\varphi) < 1 \) (Proposition 3.1), and thus \( y_h > \alpha(\varphi_h)y \) which implies the first and the last term within the parenthesis are positive. As a result, by the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, \( E_Y[n(Y_2, \Phi)] < E_Y[n(Y_1, \Phi)] \) if \( Y_2 \) is a mean-preserving spread of \( Y_1 \). This implies that, as the degree of yield uncertainty increases, the left-hand side (LHS) of (3.8) decreases, which means (3.8) eventually holds as the variation increases, if it holds when the random yield features the highest possible variation, i.e., two-point distribution.
We take an analogous approach to prove the LHS of (3.8) decreases in commercial price uncertainty. We rewrite condition (3.8) as 

\[-l - r \bar{y} + E_y \left[ E_\psi \left(n(Y, \Phi)\right)\right] < 0,\]

where \(n(y, \varphi)\) is defined by (A.25), and show that \(n(y, \varphi)\) is concave in \(\varphi\). We have

\[
\frac{\partial n(y, \varphi)}{\partial \varphi} = \beta y \left(-k'(\varphi)\right) = y \left(1 - \frac{1}{k(\varphi)}\right)
\]

and thus,

\[
\frac{\partial^2 n(y, \varphi)}{\partial \varphi^2} = y \frac{k'(\varphi)}{k(\varphi)^2} = -\frac{y}{\beta} \left(1 - \frac{1}{k(\varphi)}\right) < 0
\]

which is negative since by definition, \(k(\varphi) > 1\) (equation (3.3)). Therefore, the results follow.

(b) We demonstrate that \(\Pi_U (Q_U^*) < \Pi(Q^*)\). Rewriting (3.7) and (3.10), we express the difference as:

\[
\Pi(Q^*) - \Pi_U(Q_U^*) = M \beta \int_{\phi_1}^{\phi_2} \left[ \int_{y_1}^{\gamma_1} \frac{Q^y}{M - Q^y} g(y) dy + \int_{\gamma_1}^{\gamma_2} W \left( \frac{e^{(v_{Y-y})/(\beta_k - 1)}}{k(\varphi)} \right) g(y) dy \right] h(\varphi) d\varphi
\]

\[-M \beta \int_{\phi_1}^{\phi_2} \left[ \int_{y_1}^{\gamma_1} \frac{Q_U^y}{M - Q_U^y} g(y) h(\varphi) dy \right] d\varphi
\]

\[= M \beta \left[ \int_{\phi_1}^{\phi_2} \left( \int_{y_1}^{\gamma_1} \frac{Q^y}{M - Q^y} - \frac{Q_U^y}{M - Q_U^y} \right) g(y) dy \right] h(\varphi) d\varphi,\]

and make two observations. First, the first term within the bracket is positive because \(Q_U^* < Q^*\).

Second, the second term within the bracket is also positive, because \(Q_U^* y < M \alpha(\varphi)\) for any realizations of \(y\) and \(\varphi\) by the definition of underinvestment, and thus,

\[
\frac{Q_U^* y}{M - Q_U^* y} < \frac{M \alpha(\varphi)}{M - M \alpha(\varphi)} = \frac{\alpha(\varphi)}{1 - \alpha(\varphi)} = W \left( \frac{e^{(v_{Y-y})/(\beta_k - 1)}}{k(\varphi)} \right)
\]
As a result, $\Pi(Q^*) - \Pi_U (Q_U^*) > 0$. \qed

**Proof of Proposition 3.7.** When the commercial price is deterministic and the processor encounters only yield uncertainty, we can replace $\varphi$ with $\bar{\varphi}$ in all expressions of Proposition 3.1 including the optimal second-stage profit function expressions as follows:

$$
\pi^* (Q, y, \bar{\varphi}) = \begin{cases} 
Qy \left( v_s - r + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Qy}{k(\bar{\varphi})Qy} \right] \right) & \text{if } Qy < M\alpha(\bar{\varphi}) \\
M \beta W \left( e^{(v_s - r)/\beta_1} / k(\bar{\varphi}) \right) + (s - r)Qy & \text{if } Qy \geq M\alpha(\bar{\varphi})
\end{cases}
$$

Consequently, the first-stage expected profit function can be written as

$$
\Pi_{\sigma} (Q) = -(l + r\bar{\varphi})Q + \int_{y_L}^{y_H} Qy \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Qy}{k(\bar{\varphi})Qy} \right] \right) g(y)dy \\
+ \int_{M\alpha(\bar{\varphi})/Q}^{y_H} M \beta W \left( e^{(v_s - r)/\beta_1} / k(\bar{\varphi}) \right) + sQy \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Qy}{k(\bar{\varphi})Qy} \right] \right) g(y)dy
$$

and thus,

$$
\frac{\partial \Pi_{\sigma} (Q)}{\partial Q} = \int_{y_L}^{y_H} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Qy}{k(\bar{\varphi})Qy} \right] - \beta \frac{M}{M - Qy} \right) g(y)dy + \int_{M\alpha(\bar{\varphi})/Q}^{y_H} syg(y)dy
$$

Therefore, the processor underinvests if and only if $Q^* y_h < M\alpha(\bar{\varphi})$, or

$$
\frac{\partial \Pi_{\sigma} (Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{M\alpha(\bar{\varphi})/y_h} = -l - r\bar{\varphi} + \int_{y_L}^{y_H} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{y_h - \alpha(\bar{\varphi})y}{k(\bar{\varphi})\alpha(\bar{\varphi})y} \right] - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\bar{\varphi})y} \right) g(y)dy < 0. \quad (A.26)
$$

When the yield is deterministic, and the processor encounters only commercial price uncertainty, the optimal second-stage profit function becomes (note that $\alpha(\varphi)$ is an increasing function of $\varphi$):

$$
\pi^* (Q, \bar{\varphi}, \varphi) = \begin{cases} 
M \beta W \left( e^{(v_s - r)/\beta_1} / k(\varphi) \right) + (s - r)\overline{Qy} & \text{if } \varphi \leq \hat{\varphi}(Q) \text{ (or } \overline{Qy} \geq M\alpha(\varphi)) \\
\overline{Qy} \left( v_s - r + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - \overline{Qy}}{k(\varphi)\overline{Qy}} \right] \right) & \text{if } \varphi > \hat{\varphi}(Q) \text{ (or } \overline{Qy} < M\alpha(\varphi))
\end{cases}
$$
The first-stage expected profit function can then be written as:

\[
\Pi_\tau(Q) = -(l + r\overline{y})Q + \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} M \beta W\left(\frac{e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}}{k(\phi)}\right) - s\overline{Qy} \left[\ln \left(\frac{M - Q\overline{y}}{k(\phi)Q\overline{y}}\right)\right]h(\phi)d\phi
\]

and,

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_\tau(Q)}{\partial Q} = \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} s'\overline{y}h(\phi)d\phi + \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} \left[v_s + \beta \ln \left(\frac{M - Q\overline{y}}{k(\phi)Q\overline{y}}\right)\right]h(\phi)d\phi
\]

Therefore, the processor underinvests if and only if \( Q' \overline{y} < M\alpha(\phi_1) \), or

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_\tau(Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{M\alpha(\phi_1)/\overline{y}} = -l - r\overline{y} + \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} \left[v_s - \beta \ln \left(\frac{1 - \alpha(\phi)}{1 - \alpha(\phi)}\right)\right]h(\phi)d\phi
\]

\[
= -l - r\overline{y} + \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} \left[v_s - \beta \ln \left(\frac{k(\phi)W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi)\right)}{-1 + W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi)\right)}\right]\right]h(\phi)d\phi < 0
\]

Note that by the definition of the Lambert W function \( W(z)e^{W(z)} = z \), which implies

\[
k(\phi_1)W(z_1)e^{W(z_1)} = k(\phi_1)z_1, \text{ and thus } \ln[k(\phi_1)W(z_1)] + W(z_1) = \ln[k(\phi_1)z_1]. \text{ Let}
\]

\[
z_1 = e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi_1). \text{ It follows that}
\]

\[
\ln \left[\frac{k(\phi_1)}{k(\phi)}\right] + W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi_1)\right) + W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi_1)\right) = \ln[\overline{e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}}] = (v_s - s)/\beta - 1, \text{ or}
\]

\[
\ln[k(\phi_1)W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi_1)\right)] = (v_s - s)/\beta - 1 + W\left(e^{(v_s - s)/\beta - 1}/k(\phi_1)\right) - \ln[k(\phi_1)/k(\phi)]. \text{ Thus, we can simplify the above condition to}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_\tau(Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{M\alpha(\phi_1)/\overline{y}} = -l + (s - r)\overline{y} + \int_{\phi_0}^{\phi(Q)} \overline{y} \beta \ln \left[\frac{k(\phi_1)}{k(\phi)}\right]h(\phi)d\phi < 0. \quad (A.27)
\]
As a result, conditions (A.26) and (A.27) show that uncertainty in either yield or commercial price by itself can lead to the underinvestment policy. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.8.** (a) The FOC for the underinvestment policy (3.9) can be re-written as:

\[-l - r\bar{y} + E_{y,y} \left[ n_U(Q,Y) \right] = 0 \tag{A.28}\]

where \( n_U(Q,y,\phi) = y \left[ v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M - Qy} \right] \). Due to a similar argument presented in the proof of proposition 3.6, if we show that \( n_U(Q,y,\phi) \) is concave in \( y \) and \( \phi \), the LHS of (A.28) decreases in yield and commercial price uncertainty, respectively, and thus, the optimal leasing quantity must decrease in the level of uncertainty in order to satisfy the FOC (due to concavity of the expected profit function).

We observe that \( n_U(Q,y,\phi) \) is indeed concave in both \( y \) and \( \phi \), because

\[
\frac{\partial n_U(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial y} = v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M - Qy} + y\beta \left( -\frac{M}{y(M - Qy)} - \frac{MQ}{(M - Qy)^2} \right)
\]

\[
= v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M - Qy} - \beta \left( \frac{M}{M - Qy} \right)^2
\]

\[
= v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M - Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M(2M - Qy)}{(M - Qy)^2}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 n_U(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial y^2} = -\beta \left( \frac{M}{y(M - Qy)} + \frac{MQ(3M - Qy)}{(M - Qy)^3} \right) = -\beta M^2 \frac{(M + Qy)}{y(M - Qy)} < 0
\]

and,

\[
\frac{\partial n_U(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial \phi} = \beta y \left( -\frac{k'(\phi)}{k(\phi)} \right) = y \left( 1 - \frac{1}{k(\phi)} \right)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 n_U(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial \phi^2} = y \frac{k'(\phi)}{k(\phi)^2} < 0.
\]
(b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal, the first-stage expected profit function in (A.23) can be expressed as:

\[-(l + r\gamma)Q + E_{T,Y}[m_u(Q,Y,\Phi)],\] where \(m_u(Q,Y,\Phi) = Qy \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M-Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) \right).\]

We show \(m_u(Q,Y,\phi)\) is concave in both \(y\) and \(\phi\), and thus due to a similar argument developed in the proof of proposition 3.6, the first-stage expected profit decreases in the yield and commercial price variation. Note that

\[
\frac{\partial m_u(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial y} = Q \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M-Qy}{k(\phi)Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M-Qy} \right),
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 m_u(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial y^2} = -Q\beta \left( \frac{M}{(M-Qy)y} + \frac{MQ}{(M-Qy)^2} \right)
\]

\[= -Q\beta \left( \frac{M}{M-Qy} \right)^2 < 0\]

and,

\[
\frac{\partial m_u(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial \phi} = \beta Qy \left( - \frac{k'(\phi)}{k(\phi)} \right) = Qy \left( 1 - \frac{1}{k(\phi)} \right),
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 m_u(Q,y,\phi)}{\partial \phi^2} = Qy \frac{k'(\phi)}{k(\phi)^2} < 0
\]

Hence, the results follow. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.9.** (a) The first-order derivative of the first-stage expected profit function (3.11) with respect to \(Q\) is

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{pe}(Q)}{\partial Q} = -l - r\gamma + \int_{y_l}^{y(Q)} y \left( v_y + \beta \ln \left( \frac{M-Qy}{k(\phi(y))Qy} \right) - \beta \frac{M}{M-Qy} \right) g(y)dy + \int_{y(Q)}^{y_u} s_y g(y)dy
\]

and thus, the processor underinvests if and only if \(Q_{pe,y_h} < M\alpha(\phi(y_h)) = M\alpha(\phi_l),\) or
\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{pc}(Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{\frac{\mu_{\alpha}(\phi)}{\gamma_h}} = -l - r\bar{y} + \int_{y_h}^{\phi_h} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)}{k(\phi)\alpha(\phi)} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)} \right) g(y) dy < 0 \, \tag{A.29}
\]

Next, we compare (A.29) with its corresponding condition in the case of less-than-perfect correlation where \( \Phi(y) \) is the random commercial price with \( E[\Phi(y)] = \phi(y) \). Note that the LHS of (A.29) can then be written as:

\[
-l - r\bar{y} + \int_{y_h}^{\phi_h} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)}{k(E[\Phi(y)]\alpha(\phi)} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)} \right) g(y) dy > -l - r\bar{y} + \int_{\phi_{l}}^{\phi_h} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)}{k(\phi)\alpha(\phi)} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)} \right) \omega(y, \phi) dy dy < 0 \, \tag{A.30}
\]

where the inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the term

\[
y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)}{k(\phi)\alpha(\phi)} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)} \right)
\]

within the integrals is concave in \( \phi \). We note that under less-than-perfect correlation (including the case of two independent random variables), it is optimal for the processor to underinvest if the RHS of the above inequality becomes negative. i.e.,

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{lc}(Q)}{\partial Q} \bigg|_{\frac{\mu_{\alpha}(\phi)}{\gamma_h}} = -l - r\bar{y} + \int_{\phi_{l}}^{\phi_h} y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left( \frac{y_h - \alpha(\phi)}{k(\phi)\alpha(\phi)} \right) - \beta \frac{y_h}{y_h - \alpha(\phi)} \right) \omega(y, \phi) dy dy \, \tag{A.31}
\]

As a result, (A.30) implies that if underinvestment is optimal under perfect correlation, it must be optimal under less-than-perfect correlation as well.

(b) When the underinvestment policy is optimal, denoting the first-stage expected profit function under perfect correlation by \( \Pi_{pc}(Q) \), and that under less-than-perfect correlation by \( \Pi_{lc}(Q) \), we have
\[ \Pi_{uc}(Q) = -(l + r_y)Q + \int_{y_y}^{y_s} Q_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi(y))Q_y} \right] \right) g(y)dy \]

\[ = -(l + r_y)Q + \int_{y_y}^{y_s} Q_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\mathbb{E}[\Phi(y)])Q_y} \right] \right) g(y)dy \]

\[ > -(l + r_y)Q + \int_{\varphi}^{\varphi_y} \int_{y_y}^{y_s} Q_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi)Q_y} \right] \right) \omega(y, \varphi)dyd\varphi = \Pi_{uc}(Q) \]

where the inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the term

\[ Q_y \left( v_s + \beta \ln \left[ \frac{M - Q_y}{k(\varphi)Q_y} \right] \right) \] within the integrals is concave in \( \varphi \). \( \square \)
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VITA

Shahryar Gheibi is joining the School of Business at Siena College as an assistant professor of quantitative business analysis. He has conducted research in the areas of global supply chain management, operations-marketing, and operations-finance interfaces. His studies have been invited for presentation in premier academic conferences such as the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) annual meetings, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management (MSOM), and Production and Operations Management Society (POMS) conferences. During his PhD program, he has served three times as an instructor of the undergraduate core supply chain management course at Whitman School of Management.

Shahryar has earned his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in industrial engineering from Sharif University of Technology. Prior to joining the PhD program at the Whitman School, he worked at Schneider Electric for more than three years. He is an APICS Certified Supply Chain Management Professional (CSCP).