December 2016

The Role of ICTs in Social Movements: The Case of the Honduran National Front Against the 2009 Coup

Fatima K. Espinoza Vasquez
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd

Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/573

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.
ABSTRACT

There is an important academic conversation happening about how social movements adopt, use, and configure Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for political participation. This dissertation contributes to that conversation by taking a holistic look at ICTs, throughout a social movement's emergence and development, while considering its context, its organizational structures and sense-making processes.

I explore the case of the Honduran National Front Against the Coup (NFAC), a relevant case due to its similarities with other movements, like the use of social media, the support from the international community and its geographically dispersed networks; but also, particular in its political and ICT context.

Guided by the Contentious Politics Model (CPM) asked an overarching research question: What is the role of Information and Communication Technologies in the emergence and development of the National Front Against the Coup?

I also asked three second-level questions: (1) How does the Honduran Resistance Movement relate ICTs to political Opportunity Structures? (2) What role do ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement's organizational structures, and in preparing and carrying out visible movement episodes? (3) How does the NFAC use ICTs to shape its attitudes, identities and competences?

I conducted a single embedded exploratory case study guided by the extended case method where I studied the NFAC in a sequence of interconnected time periods called Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFEs). Data were reconstructive narratives from primary and secondary sources.
The movement's use of ICTs for mobilizing social support for their cause can be considered an improvised subversive response to the institutionalized political environment.

The movement's regional affiliates formed a loosely coupled extended organization, which allowed the affiliates a degree of autonomy to do their oppositional work while remaining fully aligned with the movement's priorities. ICTs allowed the movement to broadcast its messages across the network to "socialize" the affiliates and ensure they were all on the same page. This lose confederation, coordinated through ICTs allowed the NFAC to dynamically reconfigure and rearrange its regional affiliates as needed.

I found instances of resourcefulness and improvisation, both in the way individual media platforms were used, and in the way these platforms were combined and recombined to move ahead.

Thus, the intellectual contribution of this study is twofold: The first one is an expansion of the CPM (Contentious Politics Model). I propose that ICTs don't drive revolutions, but neither are they simply tools. There is a dynamic relation as environmental conditions (OS) like policies, institutions, ICT ownership, media centralization, shape the way social movements configure ICTs, and ICTs configurations by social movements can influence environmental conditions. The same way ICT configurations can be determined by the availability, collaboration and connectedness of civil society organizations within the movement (MS), and their relations can be influenced by ICT configurations. Therefore, by playing a reflexive role in the process of frame creation, ICTs are embedded in every level of the social movement emergence and development.

The second contribution is an operative framework and analytical tool to study the interactions between social movements, institutions, and ICTs. The model uses CAFEs (Collective Action Framing Episodes), a composed construct that allows integrating several levels of analysis into one unit of analysis.
THE ROLE OF ICTS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN NATIONAL FRONT AGAINST THE 2009 COUP

by

Fátima K. Espinoza Vásquez

B.S., Universidad Tecnológica Centroamericana, 2000
M.S., Syracuse University, 2006

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Information Science and Technology

Syracuse University
December 2016
Copyright © Fatima K. Espinoza Vasquez 2016
All Rights Reserved
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all the people along the long path of this dissertation who helped me one way or another.

I will start by thanking my advisor Professor Murali Venkatesh for his rigorous intellectual guidance. Thanks for helping me answer the complex questions I ask in this dissertation, and for motivating me to strive for academic meticulousness.

To my committee members Jason Dedrick, John Burdick, Adam Worrall and Bryan Semaan, thank you for your valuable feedback and ideas. They helped me build this interdisciplinary dissertation.

Thanks to the professors who inspired me and encouraged me one way or another since I arrived in Syracuse. To Gisela vonDran for putting the PhD bug in my heart. To Liz Liddy for seeing something in me and helping me land my first graduate assistantship. To Martha Garcia-Murillo for her academic and personal mentorship. I will always be thankful to Ping Zhang for her support as PhD program director during my first two years in the PhD program.

Thanks to the iSchool and Slutzker center staff members who helped me sort through the complexities of academic and US immigration bureaucracy. Especially to: Maureen O’, Bridget Crary, Ellen Hobbs, Jennifer Pulver, Sue Nemier, and Jose Tavares.

To my informants in Honduras, gracias por su ayuda y espero que su lucha de frutos.
To iSchool colleagues who became close friends: Angela Rammarine-Rieks (and her husband Stephen Rieks), Anand Natarajan, Johanna Birkland, Michael Scialdone, John D'Ignazio, Patricia Vargas, and David James.

To my other friends who made Syracuse my second home: Kafui, Libertad, Vincent, and Rodrigo. Thanks for the wonderful good times and the warm parties in the cold Syracuse winters. To the Westcott nation, for providing such a welcoming environment.

Tambien quiero agradecer muy especialmente a mis padres Ramón Espinoza y Gloria Vásquez de Espinoza por siempre confiar en mí, respetar mis decisiones, y apoyar mis sueños. Pero sobre todo, por el ejemplo de lealtad, trabajo, e integridad que siempre me han dado.¹

También quiero agradecer a mis hermanos Daniel Espinoza y Erick Josue Espinoza por su apoyo incondicional y por cuidar a Gaspar en mi ausencia.²

And to my husband and academic muse Carlos Gardeazabal Bravo. Gracias por ser mi compañero ideal y mi fuente de inspiración. I adore you every day and can't wait for the next phase of our lives.

¹ I would like to thank my parents Ramon Espinoza and Gloria Vasquez Reyes for for putting education first, but above all, for the example of love, hard work, and integrity they provided throughout my life.
² I'd like to thank my brothers Aaron Daniel Espinoza and Erick Josue Espinoza for their unconditional support and for taking care of Gaspar in my absence.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.......................................................................................................................... i
Copy Rights Notice........................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
  1.1. Introduction............................................................................................................... 2
  1.2. Progress in the Study of ICTs and Social Movements............................................ 3
  1.3. Problem Statement................................................................................................. 6
  1.4. The National Front Against the Coup as a Case Study ......................................... 8
      1.4.2. Relevance....................................................................................................... 11
  1.5. Research Questions ............................................................................................. 13
  1.6. Theoretical Framework and Concepts .................................................................. 14
  1.7. Overview of Methods ......................................................................................... 17
  1.8. Rigor and Value .................................................................................................. 19
  1.9. Outline of this Dissertation ................................................................................. 20
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework .............................................. 21
  2.1. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ...................................................... 22
      2.1.1. The Study of Social Movements .................................................................. 22
      2.1.2. A Guiding Theoretical Framework: The contentious Politics Model ........ 38
      2.1.3. Gaps in the Literature ................................................................................. 54
Chapter 3. Methodology and Methods ........................................................................... 55
  3.1. Methodology and Methods ................................................................................... 56
      3.1.1. Ontology and Epistemology ....................................................................... 58
      3.1.2. Protocol and Procedures .......................................................................... 72
      3.1.3. Rigor and Quality of Research .................................................................. 96
Chapter 4. Findings And Analysis .................................................................................. 105
  4.1. Findings and Analysis ......................................................................................... 106
4.1.1. Recap of Research Questions and Unit of Analysis ..................................107
4.1.2. Before Zelaya ..........................................................................................113
4.1.3. Before the Coup ......................................................................................127
4.1.4. During the Coup .....................................................................................151
4.1.5. After the Coup .........................................................................................184
4.1.6. Summary of CAFEs ...............................................................................189
4.1.7. Impact on ICTs .......................................................................................194

Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusions .............................................................201
  5.1. Reconstruction of the Contentious Politics Model .....................................202
    5.1.1. Reconstructing Opportunity Structures .............................................203
    5.1.2. Reconstructing Mobilizing Structures ................................................214
    5.1.3. Reconstructing Frames and Other Practices ......................................221
    5.1.4. Improvisation Behavior .................................................................235
    5.1.5. Future Research ...............................................................................240
    5.1.6. Limitations ......................................................................................243
    5.1.7. Conclusions ......................................................................................243

Appendices ..............................................................................................................250
  6.1. Appendix 1: Geographic Distribution of Civil Society Organizations .......251
  6.2. Appendix 2: Protocol ...............................................................................252
  6.3. Appendix 3: Political Parties and Their Candidates in 2013 ....................259
  6.4. Appendix 4: Presidents and Heads of State in Honduras from 1933 to 2013..260
  6.5. Appendix 5: Types of Local Civil Society in Honduras .........................261
  6.7. Appendix 7: Television and Radio Ownership in Honduras 2008 ..........265
  6.8. Appendix 8: Politician's Social Media Presence in Honduras 2013 ........266
  6.9. Appendix 9: Codebook ..........................................................................268
  6.10. Appendix 10: Timeline .........................................................................273
  6.11. Appendix 11: Illustration of single case design .................................274

Bibliography ..............................................................................................................275

Curriculum Vitae .......................................................................................................299
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. 1915 Mexican revolution lithograph ................................................................. 4
Figure 2. 1963 poster promoting the March on Washington .............................................. 5
Figure 3. ICT Availability in Honduras in 2008 ................................................................. 10
Figure 4. CAFEs as a unit of analysis ................................................................................... 16
Figure 5. Movement life cycle, with recycling phases ......................................................... 36
Figure 6. Visualization of the interconnectedness of the Contentious Politics Model ...... 39
Figure 7. Scope and dimensions of opportunity structures ............................................... 43
Figure 8. Mobilizing structures types, object, direction, and mode ................................. 45
Figure 9. Illustration of frames as products of framing processes .................................... 47
Figure 10. Types of frames produced in framing processes ................................................. 49
Figure 11. Steps in framing processes ................................................................................... 51
Figure 12. Three levels of analysis (OS, MS and FP) ........................................................... 69
Figure 13. Depiction of the composition of collective action framing episodes ............... 70
Figure 14. Illustration of the operationalization of CAFEs .................................................. 72
Figure 15. Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFE) ....................................................... 108
Figure 16. NFAC organizational structure ........................................................................... 112
Figure 17. Honduran FM Radio station ownership ............................................................. 119
Figure 18. Honduran AM Radio station ownership ............................................................. 120
Figure 19. Honduran TV stations ownership in 2008 ........................................................ 121
Figure 20. Comparison of ICT availability in Honduras ..................................................... 123
Figure 21. Timeline depicting the span and relatedness of each CAFE ............................... 131
Figure 22. YouTube screenshot with Zelaya’s cabinet’s wiretap ........................................ 140
Figure 23. Cover of Poder Cuidadano (Citizen Power) newspaper ....................................... 142
Figure 24. Screen Capture, Poder Ciudadano (Citizen Power) website ........................... 143
Figure 25. Photo of labor union members in a Cuarta Urna rally ....................................... 144
Figure 26. Photo of Radio La Voz Lenca operator ............................................................... 145
Figure 27. Screen capture, TV spot promoting Cuarta Urna ............................................... 146
Figure 28. Sample of contrasting logos ................................................................. 147
Figure 29. A caricature depicting Chavez’s control over Zelaya ......................... 149
Figure 30. UCD’s demonstration rejecting Cuarta Urna ...................................... 150
Figure 31. Protesters improvising a stove and tent to camp .............................. 153
Figure 32. Spontaneous demonstration against the coup ...................................... 154
Figure 33. Roberto Micheletti giving a speech during UCD Demonstration ............ 155
Figure 34. UCD Demonstration in favor of the coup .......................................... 156
Figure 35. Photo of Cuarta Urna poll question .................................................... 161
Figure 36. News clipping from 1993 .................................................................. 167
Figure 37. News clipping of a newspaper correction of photography .................. 168
Figure 38. Screen shot of video showing Isis Obed’s death ............................... 169
Figure 39. Military police officer confiscating equipment from Radio Globo ......... 172
Figure 40. Screenshot video showing Zelaya at the Honduras-Nicaragua border .... 179
Figure 41. Man holding a sign that reads “total rejection of the electoral farce” ...... 182
Figure 42. Photographies published deouncing absenteeism .............................. 183
Figure 43. Screenshot of the NFAC’s website ..................................................... 187
Figure 44. Screenshot of the LIBRE party website ............................................. 188
Figure 45. Cellphone density in Honduras 2008-2012 .................................... 196
Figure 46. Timeline depicting the span and relatedness of each CAFEs ............... 200
Figure 47. Contributions of this study to Opportunity Structures ....................... 203
Figure 48. Contributions of this study to Mobilizing Structures ......................... 214
Figure 49. Contributions of this study to Framing Processes ............................... 222
Figure 50. Visualization of CAFEs as analytic tools for ICTs and Social Movements 229
Figure 51. Depiction of the composition of CAFE construct ............................... 231
Figure 52. Transitions and practices over the life of the movement ..................... 236
Figure 53. Contributions of this study to the Contentious Politics Model ............ 244
Figure 54. Proposed dynamic relationship CPM, practices and ICTs .................... 248
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Official 2008 ICT Indicators in Honduras ........................................... 10
Table 2. Distribution of radio operators by number of stations they own ............ 11
Table 3. Burroway's model of three conversations of research .......................... 19
Table 4. Summary of two traditions of social movement research ....................... 25
Table 5. Number of new civil society organizations in Honduras by decade ........... 32
Table 6. Key social movement approaches brought together by the CPM ............... 38
Table 7. Burawoy's three levels of conversation research model .......................... 57
Table 8. Data collection technique per data required for each level of analysis ....... 77
Table 9. Classification of informant types .......................................................... 79
Table 10. Interview guide ................................................................................. 84
Table 11. Description of informants ..................................................................... 85
Table 12. Summary of document types ............................................................... 89
Table 13. Honduran AM and FM radio operators and their stations .................... 118
Table 14. Internet penetration in Honduras from 2002 to 2007 ............................ 122
Table 15. Cellphone Penetration in Honduras from 1996 to 2008 ......................... 122
Table 16. Elements adopted from the Pink Tide Democracy discourse ............... 129
Table 17. Table summarizing CAFEs ................................................................. 193
Table 18. Honduran ICT indicators 2008-2010 .................................................. 195
Table 19. Use of ICTs by type ............................................................................. 200
Table 20. CPM Opportunity Structures Coincidences and Anomalies ................ 208
Table 21. CPM Mobilizing Structures Coincidences and Anomalies ................... 219
Table 22. CPM Framing and Framing Processes Coincidences and Anomalies ....... 227
Table 23. Frame Identification ........................................................................... 232
Table 24. Sample of Timeline ............................................................................ 234
Table 25. Types of improvisation practices and transitions ................................. 237
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to this dissertation. It starts by addressing some of the challenges faced by the research on social movements and information and communication technologies (ICTs). Then it explains why the NFAC is an ideal case to address these challenges, as it is a representative yet particular example of a social movement.

Then it introduces the overarching research question that guides this study: What is the role of ICTs in the emergence and development of the Honduran Resistance Movement? It explains that to answer it, it is necessary applying an overarching theoretical framework to study the role of ICTs in the multiple dimensions of the movement: the provisions in the political environment, their organizational infrastructure, and the way they create understanding and strategies around their issues. To do this, it used McAdam et al., (1996) Contentious Politics framework, which allows me to integrate three levels of analysis and ask three accompanying research questions: How does the Honduran Resistance Movement relate ICTs to political Opportunity Structures? What role do ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement's organizational structures, and in preparing and carrying out visible movement episodes? How does the movement use ICTs to shape its attitudes, identities and competences?

Finally, it briefly introduces the case study methodology chosen for this study, and gives an overview findings. The chapter closes by discussing the contributions and significance of this research and the organization of the remainder of this dissertation.
1.2. Progress in the Study of ICTs and Social Movements

Social movements are contentious challenges to authorities, with symbolic construction and maintenance of collective identity and the ensemble of interconnected organizations striving for similar goals (Donk, 2004; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McCarthy, 1996; Melucci, 1996; Melucci, Keane, & Mier, 1989; Tilly, 1979; Tilly, 1978). Some examples of social movements include: the US civil rights movement in the 60s, the Occupy movement in the United States and the NFAC in Honduras.

There is a large amount of knowledge about social movements, research has been done on many of the aspects of movements around the world: their goals (Buechler, 1995; Habermas, 1987; Melucci et al., 1989; Pichardo, 1997), their motivations (Abeles, 1976; Boggs, 1983; Marx, Engels, & Smelser, 1973; Nielsen, 2000; Steinmetz, 1994), their interactions (Blumer, 1971; M. Granovetter, 1978; LaPiere, 1938; Park & Turner, 1967), individual rationalization processes (Archer & Tritter, 2000; Chong, 2000; Lichbach, 1996; Olson, 1971), their success or failure (McAdam, 1982; S. G. Tarrow, Tarrow, & Cornell University, 1989; Tilly, 1978), their conditions for development (Smelser, 1963), the way collective action happens (Buechler, 2000; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Snow, Zurcher, & Eklandolson, 1980), and the way movement participants interpret issues (Benford & Snow, 2000; Benford, 1997; Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986a). Within Latin American studies in particular, there is also a strong tradition in social movement research (Haber, 1996), which focused on two approaches; the first is a structuralist approach, which focuses on the environmental conditions that foster social movement emergence (Motta, 2009). The second approach focuses on movements' identity and attitudes (Haber, 1996; Roberts, 2009; Rubin, 2004).

It is also known that throughout history, social movements and their activists everywhere have used tools for delivering information, educating, mobilizing and promoting their values (Briggs & Burke, 2005). Activist from the French revolution used pamphlets (Margerison, 1998), Mexican revolutionaries used lithographs (Ades, McClean-Cameron, Campbell, & McDonald, 2009), and activists in the civil rights movement in the United States used posters and radio (Kasher, 1996; Ward, 2004). These information tools
and their relation to the emergence and development of social movements is the main interest of this dissertation. Particularly Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), defined as electronic and computer based technologies and networks that allow capturing, storing and exchanging information (ITU, 2010) (e.g. radio, television, cell phones, fixed telephones, Internet, social media, etc.)

Figure 1. 1915 Mexican revolution lithograph recruiting volunteers to join Emiliano Zapata’s arm

With the emergence and proliferation of ICTs, the social and political processes in which movements engage are increasingly played in the space of ICTs (Castells, 2009; Castells, 2000). Therefore, researchers have moved their attention to this phenomenon, focusing particularly in three areas: (1) the reform movements within ICT-related scientific fields (2) ICTs scientist who become activists to collaborate with social movements and,
(3) the adoption and reconfiguration of ICTs by social movements (Garrett, 2006). This study focuses on the third area, which has developed very quickly in the last few years.

![Image of 1963 poster promoting the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom organized by the Civil Rights Movement]

Figure 2. 1963 poster promoting the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom organized by the Civil Rights Movement

This area of research is very prolific, especially in the last few years. The literature indicates that ICTs help social movements at several levels; at a national and international level, they make it difficult for governments to repress, censor and control the flow of information (Bratich, 2011; Garrett, 2006; Garrett & Edwards, 2007; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; Pickerill, 2009; Spaeth, Haefliger, von Krogh, & Renzl, 2008), increase transnational activity and their network of influence (Bennett & Toft, 2009; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Vinthagen, 2011) and ultimately allow movements to influence the political system they are struggling to change (Aalto-Matturi, 2005; Bratich, 2011; Castells, 2009; Cortina, 2011; Garrett, 2006; Garrett & Edwards, 2007; Gladwell & Shirky, 2011; Howard & Hussain, 2011; Howard et al., 2011).
At the organizational level, ICTs have an influence on participation levels, contentious activity and organization structure (Garrett, 2006). They make it cheaper to spread content to more people over larger geographic areas (Nagel & Staeheli, 2010; Shumate & Pike, 2006), facilitate new ways to participate and collaborate (e.g. Online communities, forums, etc) (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Capling & Nossal, 2001; Daniel, 2007; J. Earl, Kimport, Prieto, Rush, & Reynoso, 2010; Earl, Jennifer, Kimport, Katrina, 2011; Garrett & Edwards, 2007; Hsu, 2009; H. K. Klein & Myers, 1999; Riemer, 2003; Sadaba, 2012; Van Laer, 2010; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer, & Breunig, 2011; Weissberg, 2003); increase the control people have over their information (Garrett, 2006; Pilisuk, McAllister, & Rothman, 1996), and help create decentralized organizational structures (Aalto-Matturi, 2005; Castells, 2000; Garrett, 2006; Juris, 2012; Morris & Mueller, 1992).

At the understanding level, ICTs make it easier to create and disseminate content to internal and external audiences (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Bratich, 2011; Cheong, 2011; Daniel, 2007; Donk, 2004; Hogan, Nolan, & Greco, 2010; Wollenberg, Colchester, Mbogu, & Griffiths, 2006) and has facilitated a participatory culture. Media skills, persuasion and socialization are fundamental for members (Bennett, 2012; Biddix, 2010; Bratich, 2011; Dunbar-Hester, 2010; Postigo, 2012).

Due to the diverse nature of movements and the large number of academics looking at them, the research has shed light on many important aspects of social movements and how they use ICTs; however, there are several questions that still have not been answered. These gaps are addressed in the next section.

1.3. Problem Statement

This dissertation addresses three important theoretical gaps and practical problems in the study of social movements and Information and Communication Technologies.

First, because each movement is unique, and there are many different disciplines studying them, researchers are concerned there is no theoretical consensus about the role of ICTs in movement’s emergence and development (Garrett, 2006; Motta, 2009). There is a need for a holistic theory to explain ICTs at each phase of a movement's life, and at its various structures and processes (Ameripour, Nicholson, & Newman, 2010; Carty, 2010;
Donk, 2004; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Garrett & Edwards, 2007; S. Tarrow, 2011). Since the operation design and use of ICTs is moderated by context, social relations, and language (Hoffman, Jones, & Young, 2013; Howcroft, Mitev, & Wilson, 2004); this framework should bring together three components: the structures that facilitate or hinder movements, the potential to mobilize resources and the way these conditions are transformed into competence, identities and attitudes that facilitate or hinder collective action (Haber, 1996). This will help explain how movements engage ICTs to make sense of and shape institutions, participate in politics and foment social change (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Espinoza-Vasquez, 2013; Haber, 1996; Oxhorn, 2001; Roberts, 1997).

Second, the emergence of recent movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, the United States, Honduras, Chile, Colombia Spain, Mexico, etc (Cleaver, 2000; J. Klein, 2012; Le Dantec, 2012; Moghadam, 2012; Singerman, 2004) has ignited a valuable conversation about social movements' ICT adoption and reconfiguration. However, most of those studies focus heavily on social media, emphasizing on movements' use of Twitter, Facebook, Blogs and other Internet-based technologies (Milan, 2013). While these ICTs are vital, it is important to note that other ICTs, like television and radio, continue to be more widely available than social media, particularly in developing countries like Honduras (ITU, 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to also pay attention to those technologies because they are still relevant.

Third, regarding the study of ICTs and social movements in Latin America, there are two concerns. On one side, most of the recent studies on social movements and ICTs focus on the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall street and other European Movements (Bennett, 2012; Bratich, 2011; Gerbaudo, 2012; Howard et al., 2011; Juris, 2012; Rodriguez-Giralt, 2011). On the other side, even though there is a standing tradition of Latin American social movements studies (Haber, 1996), most of the research focuses either on movement identities or on the environmental conditions that foster movements (Motta, 2009; Rubin, 2004). Except for a few, there are not many studies looking at the role of ICTs in Latin American social movements.

As ICTs become increasingly important for social movements (Carty, 2011; Castells, 1999; Castells, 2009; Castells, 2000; Costanza-Chock, 2010; Shirky, 2011), there are
consequences to their nature, organizations, goals, political processes, and actors (Bennett & Toft, 2009; S. G. Tarrow, 2011). Thus, there is a need to take a look at all these interactions through a case study. The next section introduces the case of the NFAC and discusses why it is relevant to addressing the gaps in the literature.

1.4. The National Front Against the Coup as a Case Study

The National Front Against the Coup d'état (NFAC) rose after the 2009 coup that overthrew president Manuel Zelaya in 2009, and interrupted Honduras' thirty-year-old democracy. The NFAC used ICTs heavily to conform an unprecedented coalition of diverse civil society organizations, and create a political party, LIBRE (Libertad y Refundación: Freedom and Refoundation); which changed Honduras politics and weakened the prevailing two-party system.

Shortly after his inauguration in 2006, Zelaya, from the liberal party, became widely unpopular amongst the conservative sector, politicians from the two major political parties (National and Liberal), the private sector, and the mainstream media. He implemented several measures to enact his government plan entitled "Proposal for Citizen Power" (Plan de Poder Ciudadano). Some of them included the country's accession to ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas) the integration alliance initiated by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, the fifty percent increase in the minimum wage, and a national opinion poll to change the constitution (Argueta, Huhn, Kurtenbach, & Peetz, 2011; Brewer-Carias, 2009; Grandin, 2010; Peetz, 2009; Prevost, Gary., Campos, Carlos Oliva., Vanden, Harry E., 2012; Salomon, 2010; Salomón, 2009; Taylor-Robinson, 2009).

Zelaya's opposition feared he intended to remain in power, so in June 28, 2009 the day the poll was scheduled, the military seized him and expelled him to Costa Rica via the US airbase in the Comayagua valley. That same day the National Congress met in an emergency session, declared Zelaya was no longer president, and swore in president of congress Roberto Micheletti, also from the liberal party, as the new president of the republic. Micheletti replaced all members of cabinet who did not accept Zelaya's

---

3. Labor unions, indigenous groups, LGBTQ organizations, human rights, feminists, artists, etc
expulsion. While the OAS, the UN General Assembly and the rest of the international community, unanimously declared the events constituted a coup d'état against a democratically elected government (Frank, 2011; Legler, 2010; Peetz, 2009). Meanwhile in Honduras, those who disliked Zelaya celebrated his expulsion. The days following the coup, tens of thousands of citizens who, either approved of Zelaya's measures or repudiated the coup, went to the streets to protest. Many became victims of police and military brutality, who were also crucial in Zelaya's overthrow and on Micheletti’s government’s ability to maintain power afterwards (Ruhl, 2010).

Zelaya supporters, coup protesters, political activists, independent media and civil society organizations, formed the Frente Nacional Contra el Golpe de Estado (National Front Against the Coup d'etat. NFAC). Micheletti’s government conducted elections four months after the coup, and president Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated in January of 2010. Though Zelaya was not reinstated, the movement continued its fight to promote a new constitution. In 2012 they created a branch within the movement for a political party, Partido Libertad y Refundación: LIBRE (Freedom and Refoundation), which allowed them to participate in the presidential elections in November 2013.

1.4.1. ICTs in the Context of Honduras

The NFAC was the first one in a recent wave of revolts around the world, which used ICTs to organize and get the world's attention. It precedes well-known movements like the Occupy Movement in the United States, The Arab Spring and Los Indignados in Spain. However, ICTs in Honduras and the way the movement used them differentiate it and makes it an interesting case. Before the coup, social media like Facebook and Twitter were not very popular in Honduras. Moreover, the Internet was available only in 4% of homes, just 11% of the population had access to internet, people were going online at work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Women's right groups, LGBT organizations, Peasant Unions, Labor Unions, and Indigenous Organizations
The most prominent ICTs were: radio, available in 81% of homes, cell phones in 70%, and television in 68%. Radio and television were not only widely available, but they were run by a variety of operators.

Though there were two large corporations that operated some of the most popular television and radio stations, Televicentro and Audiovideo there were a large number of "alternative" television and radio stations, operated by independent journalist, churches,
peasant unions, labor unions and ethnic organizations. Out of the 279 AM stations throughout the country, Televicentro operated 6% and Audiovideo operated 5% concentrating in urban areas. The other 89% were managed by alternative operators and were distributed throughout the country, reaching some of the most distant communities. FM radio and television operators were distributed similarly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Total Stations</th>
<th>Total Operators</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13-15</th>
<th>16-18</th>
<th>19-21</th>
<th>22-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>32-34</th>
<th>35-43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both (AM and FM)</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Distribution of radio operators by number of stations they own. Source: Honduran National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL)

Cell phones were widely available and were easier to obtain than a landline, there were four operators, which in a country of 8 million people meant plenty of competition, low prices and high attainability. At some point after the coup the cell phone penetration was of 118%.

In this study I argue that the characteristics of the ICT environment in Honduras, and not a particular technology, were crucial in the emergence and development of the movement. The same way, I argue that the ICT environment was influenced by the movement's activity.

1.4.2. Relevance

This case shares similarities with other social movements in Latin America like: the use of social media, the support from the international community and its geographically dispersed networks; focus on democratic processes, fight against neoliberalism and globalization, the inclusion of new social movement actors (LGBT, Environmentalists, Feminists), the still prominent role of labor unions and indigenous people, conversion of "street politics" into "successful electoral outcomes"(Almeida & Cordero, 2015).
However, the case of the NFAC is particular in the political and ICT circumstances that surrounded it. For instance, the NFAC was the only social movement in Latin America focusing on removing authoritarian regimes and it had repertoires heavily focused on fighting repression. Thus this case sheds light on the interactions of ICTs, social movements, and political practices during a political crisis in the context of the wave of social democratic governments in Latin America; the so-called Pink Tide (Tockman, J., 2009; Allen, B.S., 2008; Remmer, 2012). These insights contribute to the literature on Honduras, Latin American Studies, Social Movements, and Information Studies.

From an U.S.-centric political and economic perspectives, this case is relevant as Latin America has become commercially independent from the United States, while the United State has become more dependent on Latin American imports. The region grows at twice the rate of the United States, while US continues to depend in Latin American imports (Council of Foreign Relations, 2015). What’s more, in the context of the 2016 US presidential elections, the Honduran coup has become a reference point to candidates’ stance on Foreign policy and an insight into U.S.-Latin American relations. Moreover, the coup’s had a direct impact on US immigration, particularly in 2014, when thousands of

5. Hard choices: Hillary Clinton admits role in Honduran coup aftermath

The Murder That Exposed Hillary Clinton’s Grim Legacy in Honduras
By Adam Johnson Foreign Policy in Focus http://fpif.org/murder-exposed-hillary-clintons-grim-legacy-honduras/

Before Her Assassination, Berta Cáceres Singled Out Hillary Clinton for Backing Honduran Coup
Democracy Now! http://www.democracynow.org/2016/3/11/before_her_assassination_berta_caceres_singled

The Hillary Clinton Emails and the Honduras Coup By Alexander Main http://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/09/24/hillary-clinton-emails-and-honduras-coup

Hillary Clinton’s Link to a Nasty Piece of Work in Honduras, By Marjorie Cohn, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/hillary_clintons_link_to_a_nasty_piece_of_work_in_honduras_20160315

Hillary Clinton Needs to Answer for Her Actions in Honduras and Haiti, By Karen Attiah https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/10/hillary-clinton-needs-to-answer-for-her-actions-in-honduras-and-haiti/

Hillary Clinton Sold Out Honduras: Lani Davis, corporate cash, and the real story about the death of Latin American Democracy, By Matthew Pulver http://www.salon.com/2015/06/08/exclusive_hillary_clinton_sold_out_honduras_lanny_davis_corporate_cash_and_the_real_story_about_the_death_of_a_latin_america_democracy/
Honduran unaccompanied children were detained at the US-Mexico border. These children were escaping the wave of violence triggered by the coup, prompting a humanitarian crisis that became a central point of discussion between President Obama, US Congress, the media and US civil society organizations. Finally, as latinos are expected to become the largest minority group by 2065, the political conditions behind these migration waves are important to understand, because their countries of origin are maintained as their political and economic impact continues to grow (Cohn, 2016).

1.5. Research Questions

This study is guided by the following overarching research question: What is the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the emergence and development of the Honduran Resistance Movement?

In order to give this inquiry focus, while still allowing it to generate a highly descriptive study (Simons, 2009), it asks a set of second-level research questions:

Question #1

The first question asks: How does the Honduran Resistance Movement use ICTs to create political Opportunity Structures?

I answered this question by exploring how the official provisions that afford opportunities for political participation, ICTs and social movements influence each other.

Question #2

In the second research question asks: What role do ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement’s organizational structures, and in preparing and carrying out visible movement episodes?

I answered this question by looking at the way ICTs are strategically integrated into formal-internal structures of mobilization and informal-external structures of mobilization.

Question #3
The third research questions asks: How does the NFAC use ICTs to shape its attitudes, identities and competences?

I answered this question by exploring how the movement collectively conceived and made sense of ICTs and their issues, and how they adapt their mobilization repertoires to transmit their ideas and attitudes.

1.6. Theoretical Framework and Concepts

This study was guided by the Contentious Politics Model (CPM) (McAdam et al., 1996). The CPM is a theoretical framework that assumes a dynamic relation between the structures that facilitate or hinder movements, the potential to mobilize resources the way these conditions are transformed into competence, identities, experiences, attitudes (Haber, 1996). It helped undertake the "need to bring together (a) a focus on structures that delimit but also create the range of possibilities for social movements at any particular historical moment; (b) attention to mobilization of potential resources and exercise of them; (c) the analysis of the micro-level that asks how 'conditions' turn into competence, identities, experiences, attitudes that facilitate and/or hinder collective action" (Haber, 1996; Latour, 2004; Wellman et al., 1996).

The CPM assumes a dynamic relationship between movement structures and processes. It incorporates three levels of analysis; the first one is a macro level called Opportunity Structures (OS), which consist of the institutionalized provisions in the political environment that constrain and enable political expression and participation. These are the set of structures that transgressive politics confront (Della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; S. Tarrow, 2011). In other words, Opportunity Structures are official provisions that afford opportunities for voting, campaigning, forming political parties, public assembly, etc. Some examples include: governmental policies and institutions, legislation, changes in the economy, historical precedents, and changes in public policy (Meyer, 2004). At this level, I explored how the current institutional environment and ICT configuration influence the movement's emergence and capacity promote social change.
The second level is a meso-level called Mobilizing Structures (MS). Mobilization is more likely to happen if there is an existing organizational infrastructure or associational networks in the onset of contention (McAdam et al., 2001). This organizational structure enables individuals and groups to organize and engage in collective action (McCarthy, 1996). Mobilizing Structures can be formal groups, like civil society organizations, churches or labor unions (F. D. Davis & Zald, 2005; G. F. Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; McCarthy & Zald, 1977); they can also be informal organizations like activists' networks, neighborhood organizations or friendships (Kriesi, 1989; Kriesi, 1995). At this level I studied how ICTs are strategically integrated into internal movement structures such as decision-making processes and mobilization repertoires (G. F. Davis et al., 2005; M. S. Granovetter, 1973; McAdam et al., 2001; Reitzes & Reitzes, 1987; Schwartz & Paul, 1992).

The third level is a micro-level named Framing Processes (FP), it deals with the strategic effort groups make to create shared understandings of reality, it allows them to legitimate and motivate collective action (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986b; Snow et al., 1980; Snow, Zurcher, & Eklandolson, 1983). They are considered the cultural dimension of social movements and the mediator between opportunity, organization and action (McAdam et al., 1996). Social movements create frames by adopting and shaping discourses relevant for the social environment, in a way that they mobilize participants, garner bystander support and demobilize antagonists (Ricoeur, 1971; Snow & Benford, 1988; Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; McCammon, 2013).

At this level I examined the process through which social movement actors collectively conceive opportunities for action in their current institutional (OS) and ICT environment; it helped understand how they defined and established their organizational structure (MS); and how they made sense of themselves and their ideologies. Movement actors construct their opportunity and mobilizing structures based on how they conceive them. Thus, framing processes is the driving force of movements therefore, the driving component in this study.

The process of framing happens throughout the various phases in a movement's life cycle. So I took a recycling approach to the movement life cycle, where each phase may
repeat according to how a movement interacts with its institutional environment, organizational structures, and framing processes.

I observed OS, MS, and FP simultaneously in specific sequentially connected time intervals through a movement's recycling phases. I called these units: Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFEs). They are relevant periods of interest identified and defined as such by movement actors. There can be several sequentially connected CAFEs in each recycling phase and many the course of the emergence and development of the social movement. They happen at the micro-level but interact and influence the meso-level and macro-level. Using CAFEs as unit of analysis allowed identifying the relationship between the OS, MS and FP and role that ICTs play at each level.

![Figure 4. CAFEs as a unit of analysis that integrates three levels of analysis through the life cycle of the social movement.](image)

Using CAFEs as unit of analysis allowed providing holistic explanations of the role of ICTs through the NFAC's life cycle, its processes and structures. What's more, beyond just using it as a guiding structure, CAFEs as unit of analysis is one of the main contributions of this study by extending the CPM using the Extended Case Methodology (ECM) (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy, 2003; Yin, 2009). The next section provides and overview of this process.
1.7. Overview of Methods

I conducted this research using a single embedded exploratory case study methodology guided by the Extended Case Method (ECM). The Extended Case Method is a theoretical model for social research which reconstructs theory by deploying multiple "conversations" between the researcher and participants, data, and theory, to reach explanation of empirical phenomena.

"It starts out from dialogue, between researcher and participants, embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue between local processes and extralocal forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself" (Burawoy, 1998 p.5).

The ECM focuses on discovering flaws in theory, to improve it. This is done by using data, examining and mapping it, and then synthesizing it onto the guiding theory (Lichterman, 2002; Samuels, 2009), thus allowing to generalize to theory rather than to populations. It also embraces researcher engagement as the road to knowledge, as opposed to suspending our participation in the world (Burawoy, 1991; Burawoy, 1998). It allows converging several lines of inquiry, implementing multiple data elicitation techniques, corroborate findings, and consequently reaching more convincing and accurate conclusions (Babbie, 2005; Feagin et al., 1991; Lichterman, 2002; Snow & Trom, 2002).

This method helps understand the complexities of the NFAC’s interactions with ICTs and how it engaged and influenced public life (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Burawoy, 1998; Garrett, 2006; Haber, 1996; Roberts, 1997). In the ECM data collection and analysis happens in three "conversations."

First Conversation: Collecting Reconstructive Narratives Through Interviews

The extended case method "sets out from a dialogue between us and them, between social scientists and the people we study" (Burawoy, 1998 p.5). The first conversation is a dialog between the researcher and the informant; the informant narrates reconstructions of about their past experiences (J. E. Davis, 2002). Thus, I conducted semi-structured
interviews to a broad set of informants, including: members of the resistance, government employees, members of international and local NGOs and members of independent media. This allowed obtaining a broad set of perspectives. At first I selected them purposely, but later I relied on snowball sampling; this reduced the possibility of coercion, researcher bias, and helped gain informants’ trust. I asked about their experienced with the movement and ICTs before, during and after the coup. Reconstructive narratives are the main source of data in this case study, however I also relied on publicly available documents, records and audiovisual material collected from online sources. They include: official ICT records, newspapers, official reports, blogs, websites, videos, photographs, official reports, etc. This data provided ways to corroborate and triangulate data from the interviews (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009).

Second Conversation: Reading, Memoing and Coding

The second conversation happens among interviewees through the data: As the process of data analysis and collection is usually concurrent, this phase started during data collection and ended once coding was done. I transcribed interviews immediately, this gave the opportunity to read them carefully and write memos.

"Here the purpose of the comparison is to connect the cases. Instead of reducing cases to instances of a general law, we make each case work in its connection to other cases" (Burawoy, 1998).

In this phase I inductively identified emerging themes within the data and started organizing them into broad categories (Corbin, Strauss, & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Then I generated descriptions of the setting, people, the themes and the categories. These descriptions were converted into a qualitative timeline and a narrative of interconnecting themes (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993). This process allowed me to elaborate a codebook that was applied to the interview transcripts and the documents.

Third Conversation: Interpreting Data

The last conversation is between the data and the theory: In this step I "identified the coincidences, and more importantly irregularities between the data and the guiding theoretical framework" (Burawoy, 1998) (i.e. The Contentious Politics Model). I compared
data to the CPM to identify anomalies that the underlying theory missed (Burawoy, 1991). These discoveries challenge the conceptual framework became my contributions (Lichterman, 2002). The next step was the theory reconstruction or extension. I reconstructed the CPM based on the data collection so that it can accommodate the particularities of this case (Burawoy, 1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Research Steps</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Conversation: Dialog between the researcher and the informant</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Reconstructive Narratives Through Interviews Collecting publicly available reports documents, images, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Conversation: Dialog between the informants through the data</td>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>Reading, Memoing, Describing, Coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Conversation: Dialog between data and theory</td>
<td>Data interpretation and reporting</td>
<td>Identify coincidences and anomalies Extending theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Burroway’s model of three conversations in research applied to the case of the NFAC

To analyze the NFAC from its emergence to its stabilization, I established the timeframe of this phenomenon from January 2009, a few months before the coup, to January 2010 when president Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo was inaugurated.

1.8. Rigor and Value

We ensured the quality of this research by employing case-study measures for enhancing reliability. We followed a protocol, set up a secure database, triangulated data, and linked the research to theory.

The value of this research lays in:

- An analytic account of the role of ICTs in the emergence and development of the NFAC (Pickard, 2007)
- Generalizing the findings to theoretical prepositions in the CPM, as opposed to populations (Yin, 1989)

Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, we took measures to protect informants by anonymizing their identities, and obtaining their informed consent.
The limitations of this study are associated mostly with the reliability of data particularly with documents collected online (Creswell, 2013; Gillham, 2000; Merriam, Sharan B., Merriam, Sharan B., 2009; Simons, 2009).

1.9. Outline of this Dissertation

This dissertation is organized in five chapters. The current chapter (Ch1) is an introduction and overview to this study. Chapter two provides a review on the literature of Social Movements and ICTs with focus on Latin America and Honduras. It addresses important gaps and then introduces the Contentious Politics Model (CPM) as guiding theoretical framework for this study. Chapter three provides a detailed description of the methodology of this study starting from its ontological and epistemological positions, the role of the researcher, data collection protocols, data analysis, preliminary findings, rigor and quality of the research and close it by discussion the study’s limitations and work plan. Chapter four provides the analysis and main findings of this study through a chronological narrative of the coup and the emergence and development of the National Front Against the Coup (NFAC). Chapter five provides the conclusions and discusses the theoretical contributions of this dissertation to the CPM and the disciplines of Information Studies and Latin American Studies.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This chapter has two parts. In the first part, I briefly discuss the evolution of the study of social movements in the world and Latin America. I identified several of the challenges that these approaches still face. These included the need for holistic constructivist studies that look at the complexities of social movements' interactions with ICTs, their political context, and their organizations and ideas. I also discuss the importance of studying all ICTs in the context of social movements, as opposed to only focusing on social media.

In the second part, I propose the Contentious Politics Model by McAdams et al., (1996), as a holistic framework that will allow me to study the NFAC while addressing challenges identified in the literature review.

2.1.1. The Study of Social Movements

Social movements are contentious challenges to authorities, with symbolic construction and maintenance of collective identity, and the ensemble of interconnected organizations striving for similar goals (Donk, 2004; McCarthy, 1996; Melucci, 1996; Melucci, Keane, & Mier, 1989; Tilly, 1978). The study of social movements has a long, multidisciplinary history that started in the late 1800’s. The first theories of social movements emerged from Psychology and Economics. Theories based on Psychology, such as Collective Behavior, explained the conduct of people in social movements (LaPiere, 1938). Theories emerging from Economics, like Marxist Theory (Boggs, 1983; Marx, Engels, & Smelser, 1973; Steinmetz, 1994; Steinmetz, 1983), Relative Deprivation Theory (Abeles, 1976; Gurr & Ruttenberg, 1967; Gurr & Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, 1970) and Rational Choice Theory (Lichbach, 1995; Lichbach, 1996; Olson, 1971), argued that social movements are fueled by inequality, economic gain, and the dynamic of class relations.

Later researchers asked questions regarding the necessary conditions for social movements to exist such as Social Strain Theory, which argues that conditions in society pressure people to participate in social movements (Smelser, 1959; Smelser, 1963a; Smelser, 1963b). Resource Mobilization on the other hand, argues that social movements depend on their access to resources to succeed (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). As more disciplines investigated social movements incurred into the study of social movements, so did new perspectives that focused on movements' internal processes, as well as contextual elements. As I elaborate below, the European perspectives / called New Social Movements theorizing / (Buechler, 1995; Buechler, 2000; Habermas, 1987; Habermas, 1991; 1989; Melucci et al., 1989; Steinmetz, 1994; Watkins, 2010) and Framing processes (theorized by American scholars like R. D. Benford & Snow, 2000; R. Benford, 1997) for instance, argue that movements are motivated by participants' ideologies, beliefs, identities, and culture. On the other hand, more structurally oriented American perspectives like the elaborated in early work of McAdan, explore how movements access to decision making processes and elite allies, the conflict between elites and state's repressive capacity (Tilly, 1979; Tilly, 1978; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). These theoretical strains evolved side-by-side into two main schools of thought; however, eventually their approaches became so interconnected that today they are often used in combination.

Movement scholars from various countries and nominally representing different theoretical traditions emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of factors in analyzing the emergence and development of social movements. These three factors are (1) the structure of political opportunities; (2) the form of organizations (formal and informal) available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of social construction. The emerging consensus among movement scholars regarding the importance of these three factors belies the very different and oftentimes antagonistic perspectives in which they developed. (McAdam et al., 1996).
The CPM, which is a hybrid of the two approaches, is what I'm using for this work. I explain its evolution in the following section.

2.1.1.1. Two Traditions

Two main traditions evolved from the study of social movements; the American tradition and the European tradition. Before the 1960's, the European tradition considered the working class to be the foundation of movements, with material benefit being their goal; meanwhile the American tradition argued that social movement participation was caused by alienation (Klandermans & Tarrow, 1988). After the 60's the European tradition started emphasizing cultural content and identities, while the American tradition focused on political structures and processes (See Table 5).

However, in the following years, there were many studies on social movements. These studies exchanged and cross-fertilized ideas, resulting in both sides incorporating the each other's concepts. After the early 90's, it became nearly impossible to tell the approaches apart, thus creating the need for a more sophisticated theoretical framework to bring consensus amongst the community studying social movements, and to address the dynamic relationship between movements organizations, their political structures, cultures, and identities (Della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Questions and Issues</th>
<th>Authors/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European: Reached prominence in the 1980s-1990's. This tradition brought awareness to the change of objectives, targets and repertoires of post-1960s movements.</td>
<td>New Social Movements</td>
<td>The goal of social movements is to make social rather than just economic change. Ties the people's identity (race, gender, culture, etc.), to their motivation to participate in a movement</td>
<td>Buechler (1995, 2000); Pichardo (1997); Habermas, (1987); Melucci (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marxist Theory</td>
<td>Motivation of social movements (e.g. struggle of classes or human nature)</td>
<td>Marx, Engels &amp; Boggs, (1983); Steinmetz, (1994); Nielsen, (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relative Deprivation Theory</td>
<td>Motivation of social movement participants is based on sense of deprivation and inequality.</td>
<td>Abeles, (1976); Geschwender &amp; Geschwender, (1973); Gurr, (1970); James C. Davies (1963, 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Behavior / Collective Action</strong></td>
<td>Describes the interactions between groups of people. Examines collective actions and their reactions to social control. Explains social problems as collective reactions to social control. Predicts discrepancies in collective behavior.</td>
<td>Richard LaPierre’s (1938); Robert E. Park (1967); Herbert Blumer (1971); Granovetter (1978)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rational Choice</strong></td>
<td>Argues on a rationalization process in individuals to explain the reasons they participate in social movements. Suggest they select to participate to obtain (economic) benefits.</td>
<td>George Homans (1961); Archer &amp; Tritter (2000); Olson (1971); Lichbach, (1995,1996); Chong (2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Process Theory / Political opportunity structure</strong></td>
<td>Examines the successes or failure of movements. It argues it is affected by the access the movement has to political processes or opportunities.</td>
<td>McAdam (1980, 1982); Tilly (1978), Tarrow (1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Behavior / Collective Action</strong></td>
<td>The interactions between groups of people. Collective reactions to social control. Explain social problems as collective behavior. Predict discrepancies in collective behavior.</td>
<td>LaPierre’s (1938); Park (1967); Blumer (1971); Granovetter (1978)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value-added Theory (Social Strain Theory)</strong></td>
<td>Studies the necessary conditions for the development of social movements. Argues participants in social movements are &quot;forced&quot; by their circumstances.</td>
<td>Smelser (1963, 1959)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>Studies how collective action happens. Argues it depends on the access and control groups have over their resources to mobilize.</td>
<td>McCarthy &amp; Zald (1977, 1973); Buechler (2000); Snow &amp; Zurcher (1980)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame Analysis</strong></td>
<td>SM participants understanding and interpretations of issues. How people make sense of their world.</td>
<td>Bendford &amp; Snow (2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**American:** Focused attention in processes and mechanisms within and across movements and other forms of political contention.

**Table 4.** Summary of characteristics of the two traditions of social movement research.
Bringing together the European and American traditions, McAdam et al. (1996) devised the Contentious Politics Model (CPM), which can be used across different social movements.

"The study of social movements has clearly emerged as one of the scholarly "growth Industries" in the social sciences in both Europe and the United States. Working from a variety of perspectives, sociologists, political scientists and historians have produced over the past twenty years a wealth of theoretical and empirical scholarship on social movements.... Within this profusion of work we think it is possible to discern clean outlines of a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements that transcends the limits of any single theoretical approach to the topic" (McAdam et al., 1996).

This framework addresses the need for more holistic social movements in the area. This framework and the reasons why I chose it to guide this study are explained in detail later in this chapter. Next, I discuss the need for a holistic framework to study social movements in Latin America.

2.1.1.2. Social Movements in Latin America

The study of Latin American social movements followed a similar trajectory, with two main schools of thought. The first school had a structuralist approach; like the American tradition, it focused on external or environmental conditions for social movements to emerge, and on elites as key agents of social transformation (Motta, 2009). The second approach focused on identity, movement motivation, and the diverse components of representation, and meaning (Haber, 1996; Roberts, 1997; Rubin, 2004).

Though they focused on different issues, these approaches shared two assumptions. First, the state is the central site for political power, and elites are the driving force of social transformation. Second, that social change requires the formation of revolutionary political parties with strategic programs and ideologies guiding their actions (Camacho & Menjívar, 2005; Motta, 2009). The discipline is in need for more relational approaches that go beyond either structuralist or identity, with focus on cultural interpretations (Almeida & Cordero, 2015)
2.1.1.2.1. Evolution of Social Movements

Social movements in Latin America started by focusing their efforts on influencing the state government. Latin America saw a high incidence of movements in the 50's, 60's, and 70's, protesting colonialism, military dictatorships, transnational companies, and more (Calix-Rodriguez, 2003; Touraine, 1985). In the early 80's, dozens of Latin American countries made a transition to democracy; most of which were "elite-driven," influenced by the military, and giving priority to the right at the expense of the left (Oxhorn, 2001; Touraine, 1985). Consequently, political parties became the protagonists in politics, partially superseding social movements and marginalizing popular sectors (Hipsher, 1998; Mattiace, 2005). By the late 90's, there were ruptures in democratization and economic development processes, with rampant political and economic inequality (Motta, 2009, Brockett, 1991). The demands that gave rise to movements in the first place remained unsolved, contributing to the continuation of movements (Mattiace, 2005; Almeida & Cordero, 2015). In the early 2000's, as a response to governmental neoliberal measures, poor performance, and the evolving international context; there was a rise of left-wing governments that sought to create new models for development, justice, and social inclusion within a democratic agenda (Cameron, 2009; Haarstad, Amen, & St Clair, 2012; Ortiz, 2012; Almeida & Cordero, 2015), they were called the Pink Tide (Cannon & Hume, 2012, Beasley-Murray, et al., 2009; Tockman, 2009; Allen, 2008; Fischer & Karin 2013). Several of these governments relied on the ongoing mobilization of their followers. Meanwhile, many original social movements were revived, and other new ones emerged (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, & Hershberg, 2009; Bellinger & Arce, 2011; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Escobar, 2010; Monteagudo, 2011; Rogalski, 2007).

Today, social movements in Latin America can no longer be characterized by their focus on just one concern (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Almeida & Cordero, 2015). Though the last twenty years, traditional national liberation movements, labor unions, and peasant movements have dominated the landscape; and there has been an emergence of non-traditional movements like indigenous peoples, Christian base communities, LGBTs,
feminists, urban popular movements, squatters, and ecological movements (Camacho & Menjívar, 2005; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Ameida & Cordero, 2015).

National states used to be the focus of Latin American movement activity, that is, they were the primary entities seeking change (Oxhorn, 2001). Many of these movements, particularly those related to indigenous peoples, are rethinking their relations with the state and society; effectively reconceptualizing themselves (Mattiace, 2005; Motta, 2009). Today, they are fashioning their own democratic cultures, along with alternative ways of democratic participation and economic development. This allows them to have their demands met, be represented, and influence economic systems without relying on the state (Cleaver, 2000; Motta, 2009; Rivero Santos, 1997; Almeida & Cordero, 2015).

Among other measures, they are:

- Devising new ways to achieve economic development or independence, by starting their own businesses (Burdick, Oxhorn, & Roberts, 2009; Oxhorn, 2011; Roberts, 2009; Selwyn, 2011), starting cooperatives (Safa, 1990; R. Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, & Kuecker, 2007; Stahler-Sholk, Richard., Kuecker, Glen David., Vanden, Harry E., 2008; Yashar, 1998), forming federations, negotiating access and control of resources from the state, and recovering administrative authority over their space (Bebbington, 2004; Conill, Castells, Cardenas, & Servon, 2012; Novy & Leubolt, 2005).

- Combining contemporary ideologies with their own traditional ones, so they won't be alienated from their roots, or lose their sense of personal worth or confidence to bring about change (Castells, Caraça, & Cardoso, 2012; Conill et al., 2012; Dagnino, 1998; Eckstein & Merino, 2001; Levine, 1993; Nash, 2001).

- Creating their own alternative organizational structures and institutions to challenge the prevalent way of doing politics (Avritzer, 2008; Burdick et al., 2009; Vanden, 2007). They do this by creating new localized and linked self-governing communities. This way they emphasize direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy (Motta, 2009).

- Creating transnational networks to appeal to international authorities and extra-national influences; and seek allies, additional resources, and support (Brysk, 2000;
Gallardo, 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Mattiace, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001). At the international level, this helps them mobilize information more broadly and to bring issues to light outside of their country, while facilitating the introduction of alternative visions and voices. At the local level, this helps them apply pressure on officials to overcome their governments' unwillingness to cooperate (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Oxhorn, 2001).

In conclusion, new political opportunities brought up by democratic transitions, a move towards the left, globalization, and ICTs have made Latin American social movements reconsider their organizational structures and mobilization strategies (Mattiace, 2005; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Cannon & Hume 2012; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013, Tockman, 2009). Therefore, I argue there is a need for a theoretical approach that expands out from focusing on movements' identities or environmental conditions alone to include cultural processes (Almeida & Cordero, 2015). Instead, I needed to create holistic explanations accounting for their dynamics. Despite the lack of attention in the literature, a holistic framework would be especially relevant to study the NFAC because it can provide valuable insights into the study of social movements and ICTs in Latin America. In the next section, I expand on this idea.

2.1.1.3. Social Movements in Honduras

In Honduras, social movements have mostly been peaceful, peasant, and labor-based; traditionally focused on influencing the state (Bootha & Richarda, 1999). Until the 70's, their role was more significant in state-society dynamics than in political parties (Calix-Rodriguez, 2003). The first social movements developed due to land disputes over unequal and exploitative rural structures (C. D. Brockett, 1991; Lapper & Painter, 1985). In 1954, inspired by the Cuban Revolution, labor unions at the multinational banana plantation enclaves on the north coast organized a great general strike; which was effective in fostering change of social structures and labor laws (C. D. Brockett 1946, 2005; Morris, 1984; Sieder, 1995; Taylor, 1996). Moreover the strike was crucial for movements to gain legitimization and official recognition (Lapper & Painter, 1985; Norsworthy, Kent., Barry,
Tom, 1993; Sieder, 1995). As a result, powerful peasant movements emerged, and became some of the best organized movements in Latin America (Brockett, 2005; 1991).

Motivated by Liberation Theology, these movements conglomerated in the National Federation of Honduran Peasants (FENACH) and led a hunger march to the capital in 1972, and a campaign of land occupation in 1975. These mobilizations brought about important agrarian reforms and land redistribution (Astorga Lira, 1975; C. D. Brockett 1946, 2005; Morris, 1984; Shepherd, 1993).

The United States government grew concerned about the movement's "communist influence," and to counteract it, supported the creation of the National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH), an openly anti-communist organization. Some of the international labor organizations that played a role in the creation of the ANACH included the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the American Federation of Labour (AFL), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (C. D. Brockett, 1991; Lapper & Painter, 1985; Norsworthy, Kent., Barry, Tom, 1993). They were effective in undermining the leftist militancy labor and gaining control over the union movement (Lapper, 1985).

Military governments ruled most of the 60's and 70's; nevertheless, there were important cycles of protest and government-supported changes such as agrarian reforms, the labor code, social-protection measures, and social security (Morris, 1984; Norsworthy, 94). These reforms largely decreased mobilization (Astorga, 1975; Brockett, 2005; Shepherd, 1993; Norsworthy & Barry 1994), and by the end of the 70's, social movements were weakened or disarticulated due mostly to internal division, corruption (Calix, 2003; Norsworthy & Barry 1994), and decreased government support. Opponents of reform within the military rule were to blame (Brockett, 2005; 1991).

As the 80's brought about democracy, the newly elected government implemented several structural and ideological changes. First, the government put into effect a set of neoliberal economic measures (Calix-Rodriguez, 2003; Haber, 1996; Hale, 2011;)

---

6. A religious movement that rose from Latin America. Based on Roman Catholicism it interprets religious faith from the experience of the poor and oppressed, and promotes their involvement in political and civic affairs.
Norsworthy, Kent., Barry, Tom, 1993; Cannon & Hume, 2012) which created conditions for a new wave of local oligarchs, Opus Dei ideologues, and right-wing Christians to roll back Liberation Theology's influence (Grandin, 2009a; Grandin, 2009b). These groups strongly opposed contentious popular action (Brockett, 2005); moreover, the new government allowed Honduras to become the staging area for the US's anticommunist operations against Nicaragua. The country saw the creation of School of the Americas-trained death-squads, who were responsible for human rights violations and the disappearance of hundreds of people (Boussard, 2003; C. D. Brockett, 1987; C. D. Brockett, 1988; Grandin, 2009a; Rathzel, 1985). So, despite the democratic progress, the government's capacity for repression increased, as the armed forces remained authoritarian throughout the decade and well into the 90's (Ruhl, 2010; Brockett, 2005).

However, the worsening of human rights and economic situations brought another wave of protest organized by students, human rights organizations, women's organizations, community groups, peasant, and labor organizations (Norsworthy, 1994; Boussard, 2003).

By the 90's, Honduras had a "strong civil society" (Booth & Bayer, 1998), with two distinctive types of organizations: formal entities with legal status (e.g. trade unions) and informal associations like neighborhood groups. Formal civil society (composed of membership unions, civic associations, churches, cooperatives, and professional groups) played an important role in campaigning and informing people of favorable democratic causes. On the other side, communal level or informal associations (composed of membership in schools, church-related, local self-help and development groups, and neighborhood organizations) contributed to contacting public official to convey specific economic or social demands (such as public services and the like) (Booth & Bayer, 1998; Cannon & Hume, 2012) (See table Table 5). Presidents Carlos Roberto Reina (1994-1998) and Carlos Flores (1998-2002) reduced the military by more than half, which had a positive impact on revitalizing social movements because repression decreased. After hurricane Mitch hit in 1989, many of these organizations focused on rebuilding the country (Cruz & Espinoza, 2003; Ruhl, 2010).
Table 5. Number of new civil society organizations in Honduras by decade N=281. Adapted from: Cruz-Espinoza 2003 Civil society organizations in Honduras: from consultation to participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social movements in Honduras evolved into an ideologically diverse and complex civil society composed of lesbian gay bisexual and transgender (LGBT), peasant, ethnic, labor, women, human rights, and youth groups among others (Cruz & Espinoza, 2003; Sosa, 2015). These organizations have become important "agenda setters" and strong forces that either support or oppose the government (Boussard, 2003) as they are concentrated in the capital region (See appendix 1). They became the foundation of the NFAC.

Despite sharing characteristics with the rest of the social movements around the world, and having interesting particularities, Honduran social movements have not received a lot of attention in academia, especially in the last 10 years. They have been scarcely mentioned in literature about civil society or the coup (Argueta, Huhn, Kurtenbach, & Peetz, 2011; Arias & Ungar, 2009; Farr, 2010; Leonard, 2011; Neill, 2011; Stone, 2011; Taylor-Robinson, 2011). However, the 2009 coup, has awaken new academic interest in Honduras and its social movements (Attiah, 2016; Bueso Montoya, 2010; Cohn, 2016; Euraque, 2010; Farr, 2010; Grandin, 2009; Main, 2014; Martínez B, 2010; Phillips, 2015; Salgado, 2010 Cannon & Hume 2012; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013, Tockman, 2009; Sosa, 2015).

2.1.1.4. ICTs and Social Movements

Research on ICTs and social movements has become very prolific in the last few years. In this section I provide a summary to classify it in three areas: ICTs and institutional context (Opportunity Structures), ICTs and organizational structures (Mobilizing...
Structures), and ICTs and the processes of meaning making and ideology creation (Framing Processes). Then I discuss how heir often-deterministic approach, and their focus on the Internet and social media motivated the approach I took for this study.

The literature indicates that ICTs influence the institutionalized provisions in the political environment (OS) by: increasing the reach of movements from local to global (Bennett & Toft, 2009; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010); increasing awareness of elite allies (Hess, 2007; Loudon, 2010; Vinthagen, 2011), increasing transnational activity and their network of influence (Vinthagen, 2011; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Bennett & Toft, 2009), improving movement's ability to acquire information (Bratich, 2011; Garrett, 2006; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; Pickerill, 2009; Postigo, 2010; Riemer, 2003; Spaeth, Haefliger, von Krogh, & Renzl, 2008), making it difficult for governments to repress, censor and control the flow of information (Bratich, 2011; Garrett, 2006; Juris & Pleyers, 2009; Pickerill, 2009; Spaeth et al., 2008), and ultimately allowing them to change and open the political system and institutional environment (Aalto-Matturi, 2005; Bratich, 2011; Castells, 2009; Cortina, 2011; Garrett, 2006; Gladwell & Shirky, 2011; Howard & Hussain, 2011).

Because it is cheaper to spread content, ICTs help promote collective identity across larger regions in a shorter period, making more people aware of similar struggles across their region (Nagel & Staeheli, 2010; Shumate & Pike, 2006). Thanks to internet-based ICTs, there are new ways of participating in social movements through online communities, forums, citizen journals, and the like (Daniel, 2007; Riemer, 2003; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer, & Breunig, 2011; Weissberg, 2003). Furthermore, they facilitate the maintenance of disperse face-to-face networks, reinforce existing social networks, and provide access to people with different views; (Bennett, 2012; Garrett, 2006; Hsu, 2009; Sadaba, 2012; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010).

With respect to contentious activity, ICTs have helped accelerate and extend the diffusion of movement information and mobilization patterns (Olesen, 2004; Riemer, 2003; Van Laer, 2010; Vinthagen, 2011). ICTs have also helped increased the control people have over information exposure, allowing them to be more selective of the information they access (Garrett, 2006; Pilisuk, McAllister, & Rothman, 1996). ICTs facilitate new forms of contentious activity, increasing the repertoire of contention
They also have the possibility of increasing the number of causes people can be a part of (Walgrave, et al., 2011), as well as the diversity of members a movement can have (Juris, 2012). Additionally, they help create and maintain direct interpersonal and inter-organizational ties (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Della Port et al., 1999; Walgrave, et al, 2011).

ICTs have an impact on the nature and structure of their organizations. They are adopting decentralized non-hierarchical organizational forms, which make them more apt and prone to collaborative activities (Juris, 2012; Castells, 2000; Morris & Mueller, 1992; Garret, 1996; Aalto-Matturi, 2005). ICTs also help reinforce real-life social networks, while also facilitating the creation of new communities (Bennett & Toft, 2009; Cheong, 2011; Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; B. Wilson & Hayhurst, 2009).

Finally, ICTs influence framing processes by making it easier for movements to create and disseminate content to internal and external audiences. This is because the required resources to produce and disseminate content have been reduced, and because information can be made available indefinitely (van de Donk et al, 2004; Rucht, 2004; Bratich, 2011; Cheong, 2011; Wollenberg, Colchester, Mbugua, & Griffiths, 2006; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Daniel, 2007; Hoga, et al., 2010). ICTs have also made it possible to bypass the distortion introduced by mass-media filters, achieving new levels of editorial control (Juris & Pleyers, 2009; Scott, 2001). Accordingly, they have created a participatory culture where media skills, persuasion, and socialization are fundamental for members (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Biddix, 2010; Bratich, 2011; Castells, 2000; Dunbar-Hester, 2010; Postigo, 2012).

2.1.1.4.1. Themes in the Literature

There are two main characteristics in the literature on ICTs and social movements. The first is that most of it takes a technological deterministic approach; that is, the suggestion that ICTs dictate social movement outcomes. Many of these studies focus on a causal
relationship between ICTs and social movements, and ask how ICTs influence them. These technological deterministic approaches suppose that ICTs cause the largest widespread changes in society, assuming: (1) ICTs have an impact on society and that there are no unintended consequences; and (2) technology is an autonomous entity which develops according to internal logic and in direction of its own and then has a determinate impact on society (Russell & Williams, 2002). I agree that as political processes happen around ICTs; the nature, organization, characteristics, and goals of social movements may change. However, I argue this is a dynamic rather than deterministic relationship. This dissertation assumes that ICT use by the movement is the result of a series of strategic choices influenced by social relations, values, context, and power relations. It is people who give importance and meaning to ICTs (Bates, 2006), and it is people's points of view (situated in a given context) that determine how they are used (Capurro & Hjorland, 2003). Thus, to study ICTs and social movements, we need a nuanced theoretical approach that takes into consideration context, social relations, and values (Hier, 2008; Murthy, 2012; Sismondo, 2004; T. D. Wilson, 2003).

The second common characteristic in these studies is the focus on Internet-based ICTs such as websites and social media. I argue that though Internet-based ICTs afford the creation of new ways to mobilize, and the building of coalitions, communication, and campaigns (van de Donk; 2004; Garret, 2006); social movements are also using "older" technologies like radio and television. Therefore, I also need to pay attention to their use and impact.

Next, I will address the literature on movements' life cycle, and propose an approach derived from the exploratory study findings.

2.1.1.5. Life Cycle of Social Movements

Cycle of protest according to Della Porta & Diani, (2006) have four phases: "social ferment," "popular excitement," "formalization," and "institutionalization." I used these phases as a guide to inductively explore the relation between institutional environment, organizational structures, and creation of shared understandings through the movement.
The first phase, social ferment, is when the social movement has not been organized yet, but there is widespread discontent about social and political conditions. At this stage, the political environment has a combination of open and closed elements that are causing discontent.

During popular excitement, the reasons for discontent are cleared and more defined amongst people. Members of the social movement start recognizing each other based on their ideology. Here is where networking, strategy, and organization starts happening. The social movement begins growing and demonstrating dissent.

In the formalization stage, the social movement has achieved a higher level of organization, and has established important coalitions with influential allies. It may have more political power, and has increased need for strategy and personnel to run its bureaucratic processes. At this stage, opportunities and constrains are no longer independent from the actions of the moment.

Finally, movements institutionalize in five ways: through success, failure, co-optation, repression, and establishment within society (Macionis, 2007).

Though the original framework proposed by Della Porta & Diani, (2006) defines a linear approach to mobilization in movements. My data suggests a less linear developmental path traversed by the NFAC. In place of a phasic model, I offer that popular excitement, for example, can occur at various points through the movement life cycle. The movement’s developmental path stems from its interaction with the institutional environment, its internal organizational infrastructure, and the collective interpretations of their own discontent and formulation of strategies for action.
The changing institutional environment (Opportunity Structures) can influence social movements’ dynamics and vice-versa (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). To illustrate this point, I can think of a social movement that is in its formalization phase, thus it has a clear organizational structure, goals, and strategies for action. However, there is a change in legislation that brings new reasons for discontent among movement actors, and causes a popular excitement episode. This means that the social movement will need to re-conceptualize the problem, create new alliances, and think of new solutions to address this new opportunity for action.

The same way, groups within the social movement (Mobilizing Structures) may influence the life cycle. For example, new allies can bring new issues to the table, causing a social movement that is already institutionalized to re-conceptualize its problems and organizational structures; thus, promoting new popular excitement or formalization episodes in order include this new group into its structure. Therefore, the interactions of groups within the movement influence the social movement's evolution.

Finally, the process of social movement evolution is heavily constrained by ideas, collective identities, and world-views (Moore, Kleinman, Hess, & Frickel, 2011). As the process of creating shared understandings (framing) is also cyclical, social movement actors are in a constant process of recognizing their problems, seeking solutions, diffusing ideas, and motivating for action. This in turn influences a social movement's motion through their life cycle.

To conclude, I propose that a recycling approach to the social movement life cycle will help explain how their interaction with its institutional environment, organizational structures, and framing processes shapes its evolution. In the next section, I will discuss the Contentious Politics Framework, a guiding theoretical framework that addresses the various gaps I identified in the literature. This allowed to take a holistic look at the NFAC, and to consider the complexities of ICTs in the environment, organizational structures, and process of identity and ideology creation throughout the movement life cycle.
2.1.2. A Guiding Theoretical Framework: The contentious Politics Model

The Contentious Politics Model (CPM) by McAdams et al., (1996) is an effective "sensitizing device" (Klein & Myers, 1999) to guide this research. It is the result of a consensus among researchers of social movements in the European and American traditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Key Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource Mobilization</td>
<td>Organizational Structure and linkages/mobilization of members and other resources. Professionalization/Institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opportunity</td>
<td>Structural Conditions and reference groups in the movement's environment, interaction shaped by both structural and contingent factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures and Political Process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology, identity, persuasion</td>
<td>Core values, collective identity, management of frames and perceptions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Key social movement approaches brought together by the CPM

Thus, addressing the need for an approach to conduct holistic studies of ICTs. It will especially help undertake the need to bring together (a) a focus on structures that delimit but also create the range of possibilities for social movements at any historical moment; (b) attention to mobilization of potential resources and exercise of them; (c) the analysis of the micro-level that asks how 'conditions' turn into competence, identities, experiences, attitudes that facilitate and/or hinder collective action (Haber, 1996).

The CPM assumes a dynamic relationship between movement structures and processes. Thus, it allowed me to provide holistic explanations of the movement's emergence and development. Moreover, it allowed me to include ICTs and their relation to the social movement at every stage and level. What's more, beyond just using it as a guiding framework, I also expanded it (Burawoy, 1989; Yin, 2009) by incorporating insights.
2.1.2.1. Opportunity Structures

The first component of the model is Opportunity Structures, which consist of the institutionalized provisions in the political environment for political expression and participation. These are the set of structures that transgressive politics confront (Della Porta et al., 1999; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; S. Tarrow, 2011). In other words, Opportunity Structures are official provisions that afford opportunities for voting, campaigning, forming political parties, public assembly, etc. Opportunity structures can be: governmental policies, institutions, legislation, media ownership, changes in the economy, historical precedents, and changes in public policy (Meyer, 2004). Movements aim to change and influence Opportunity Structures as they can be altered or reconstructed to be more welcoming to cultural pluralism and contentious politics (Kriesi, 1995).

This concept is based on Tilly (1979; 1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow's (1989) Political Process theory from the American tradition; and on Kriesi (1989) and Kitschelt's
(1986) New social movements theory from the European tradition. Both traditions concur that social movements are shaped by a broad set of political constrains and opportunities unique to the context in which they are embedded (Tarrow, 1996).

2.1.2.1.1. Scope of Opportunity Structures

Opportunity Structures can be classified based on their "proximity" to the movement. The local or proximate opportunity structures are those structures at the subnational or group level. They are concrete institutions, specific political processes, and changes in a group's position in society (S. G. Tarrow, 2012). There are also state-centered opportunity structures. Under this view the state political institutions and processes shape collective action. The state is a sphere of competition where class, status, and conflict are at play (S. Tarrow, 1996a). The state-centered approach can take a cross-national or a dynamic statism approach.

- The cross-national approach is useful in studying opportunity structures across countries. It looks at the state as a "national grid of institutional regularities." This view takes a snapshot of the state to explain how the political system influences the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action (Eligür, 2010; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Even though it is useful in comparative studies, it only focuses on the state and does not consider changes in the overall environment and how those influence collective action.

- The dynamic statism approach on the other hand, considers that "contentious processes both define the state vis-à-vis other social and economic institutions and continually remake the state itself" (Tarrow, 2011). This approach finds it improbable that different forms and strategies of social movements can be limited to single types of states. It explains movement rise, fall, retreat, or revival by looking at the political conditions of the moment. Thus, this approach also looks at factors like government centralization, strength of civil society, and impact of the private sector to explain influence, emergence, shape, and outcomes of social movements. Dynamic statism allows the specification of opportunities for different actors in a
movement, and to track changes over time (S. Tarrow, 1996b). This study takes the dynamic statism approach.

2.1.2.1.2. Dimensions of Opportunity

There are four dimensions of opportunity that are useful in describing the way the movement relates to opportunity structures through ICTs:

The first one is the openness or closure of the political system, that is, the degree to which groups are likely to gain access to power and manipulate the political system (Kitschelt, 1986; Koopmans, 1999; Kriesi, 1995). In other words, the degree to which one may influence the institutions and decision-makers who exercise power. The following are examples of things that can open or close a political system: elections, referendums, number of political parties, independence of the legislative system, intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch (lobbying/petitioning), procedures to build policy coalitions, and government control over market (Kriesi, 1995; Koopmans, 1999, Kitschelt, 1986; Brocket, 1991). Protest is likely to emerge when either there is an opening or a closing in the system. Protest flourishes in a system marked by this paradox, so neither full access nor its absence encourages the greatest amount of protest; protests are more likely in a system characterized by a mix of open and closed factors (Eisinger, 1973).

The second dimension is the stability of political alignments. Political alignments are the affiliations that people or groups may have to a political party or ideology (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; S. G. Tarrow, 2011; S. Tarrow, 1996a; Wahlström & Abby Peterson, 2006). Elites and those with immensely disproportionate control over and access to economic, social, cultural, political, or knowledge resources (Castells, 2000; Hartmann, 2007; Rahman Khan, 2012) generally align themselves with specific political parties, and usually support the current political system. The political or economic environment can cause them to shift their alignments, and this instability of affiliations may be perceived as a window of opportunity for social movements.
The third is the availability of influential allies. Allies can be crucial in social movements' emergence, strategy making, and success (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977); and they can provide support by warranting protection, giving legitimacy, and providing resources. Influential allies make it difficult for authorities to deal with the movement. Their availability creates a window of opportunity for action for social movements. Examples of influential allies include civil society organizations, political and public figures, and international organizations (S. Tarrow, 1996a; S. Tarrow, 2011).

The fourth dimension is a government's capacity and propensity for repression. Repression is an exploitative means of social control by the government that is expressed through: human rights violations, surveillance abuse, police brutality, imprisonment, involuntary settlement, and stripping of citizen's rights. It can also include lustration and other violent actions such as the murder, summary executions, torture, forced disappearance, and other extrajudicial punishment of political activists, dissidents, or general population (Brockett, 1991; Carey, 2009; Davenport, 2005; Davenport, 2007; Davenport, 2000; Johnston, 2011). An increase in the will or ability to repress tends to be related to the rise of non-institutionalized protest movements. Decline in repression, however, does not guarantee institutionalized access to the system (Tarrow, 1996). Thus, in this study repression or any of the dimensions of opportunity for that matter, are considered as describing mechanisms.
2.1.2.2. Mobilizing Structures

Mobilization around an issue is more likely to happen if, at the onset of contention, there is an existing organizational infrastructure, or associational network that enables individuals and groups to organize and engage in collective action (Garrett, 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; McCarthy, 1996). This set of organizations constitutes the second element in the Contentious Politics Model; they are called Mobilizing Structures (MS). Mobilizing structures can be formal organizations, such as NGOs, civil society organizations, churches or labor unions (F. D. Davis & Zald, 2005; G. F. Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; McCarthy & Zald, 1977); or informal organizations such as activists' networks, neighborhood organizations, or friendships (Kriesi, 1989; Kriesi, 1995).
2.1.2.2.1. Mobilize What?

Social movement studies have traditionally focused on studying mobilization of people or constituencies who invest time and labor to advance the cause of the movement. They have asked questions about how movements obtain their support, and what motivates them to take committed actions for the movement (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Other perspectives have also included mobilization of resources; asking questions about the source and access to resources, and the effect of monetary and infrastructural resources from established institutions (e.g., government, media, businesses) on the movement (Schwartz & Paul, 1992).

The CPM construes mobilization as cultural diffusion composed of “collective processes of interpretations and attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action” (McAdam & Scott, 2005 p.16).

Most diffusion processes are likely to be the result of influence processes operating in multiple overlapping networks of varying density and reach (Hedström, Sandell, & Stern, 2000). Thus, this view focuses on the spread of ideas and practices from one group to another (diffusion of frames); as McAdam and Rucht (1993) put it, movements get ideas about organization structure, action, tactics, strategies, and ideological goals from other movements.

The diffusion of ideas can occur through direct and indirect channels. Direct channels presuppose the existence of direct (formal and informal) relational linkages, while indirect channels are based on the transfer of information through mass media and cultural linkages (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Della Porta et al., 1999; Meyer, 2004). The diffusion of ideas can be done inwardly among movement members and outwardly to reach non-members or other organizations globally. (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Della Porta et al., 1999) (See figure 8).
2.1.2.3. Framing Processes

The term frame refers to schemas of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and world at large. Frames help organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Snow and Benford (1986) borrowed this concept from Goffman (1974) and brought it to the study of social movements, as they deemed frames crucial to understand mobilization and participation in social movements (R. D. Benford & Snow, 2000; Zald, 1996). However, different from Goffman's definition, frames in social movements are not pre-determined, standardized, or fixed. Instead they emerge from movement participants' interactions, and are malleable, changing according to the
situation (R. Benford, 1997). Thus, under the social movements' perspective, frames are defined as socially constructed shared understandings that legitimize social movements actors' motivations, identities, persuasions, ideology, and actions (Benford, 1997).

"Mobilization depends not only on the existence of objective structural disparities and dislocations, the availability and deployment of tangible resources, leaders' organizational skills, political opportunities and a kind of cost-benefit calculus engaged in by prospective participants... but also on the way these variables are FRAMED and the degree to which they resonate with the targets of mobilization." (Snow & Benford, 1988)

Frames are useful for social movements because they help produce mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings (Benford & Snow, 2000). They are useful for researchers as objects of analysis as they shed light on movements' emergence, character, and development. After Snow and Benford (1986) introduced the concept of frames in the study of social movements, most of the research focused on describing and classifying social movement frames. However, this activity only yields descriptions of frames categories, rather than enhancing our understanding of movements' framing processes (Benford, 1997). The list of frame types became long and exhaustive. Some examples of frame types included: justice frames, oppositional frames, rights frames, free market frames and state terror frames, Benford (1997) argues that having such a long list of frames diminishes their utility and trivializes the framing perspective. Instead, he says that we need to focus on the dynamics associated with frames' social construction, negotiation, contestation, and transformation. In other words, rather than describing frames, we need to look at process of frame creation and diffusion.

The process of framing is defined as the conscious strategic effort by movement actors to develop shared understandings of the world and of themselves, legitimatizing and motivating collective action (Lebert, 2003; McAdam, 2003; Snow et al., 1986; Snow, Zurcher, & Eklandolson, 1980; Snow, Zurcher, & Eklandolson, 1983). Simply put, framing processes produce frames. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the frame process that concern this dissertation.
2.1.2.3.1. Discourse and the Strategic Construction of Frames

Discourse is a system of representation, a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a topic at a historical moment (Foucault, 2012). Discourses are pervasive in a society and supply the macro level ideas and interpretive frameworks in a culture (Taylor, et al., 2001). Discourses are the linguistic expression of a society's system of thought, a group of concepts, vocabulary, associations, a standard of arguments connected to their perspective of the world (Ricoeur, 1971; Rochon, 2000). Social movement actors take ideas from discourses and combine them in frames to fit their situation.

Thus, frames are created strategically, their construction is influenced by the political, cultural and historical discourses in the environment, they are embedded in larger discursive structures (Snow & Benford, 1988; McCammon, 2013; King & Hustig, 2003). For example, in the case of the NFAC, there was a frame I call "Citizen Participation," which was created by the NFAC drawing from democracy, citizenship discourses, which were pervasive in Honduras before the coup. I will explain these in detail in chapter four.
Frames have a symbolic and a practice aspect, thus meaning and meaningful practices are constructed within discourse. Social change happens when the social and political discourse in a particular subject area is altered (Rochon, 2000; Taylor, et al., 2001) that is when the meanings and practices change.

Thus, social movements intend to exert change, and are constantly in the process of generation and diffusion of meaning about events and conditions, in a way that they mobilize participants, garner bystander support and demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988). For these meanings to exert their intended effect, movements need to adopt a coherent blend of existing discourses that resonate with intended supporters (Snow & Benford, 1988 Rochon, 2000).

There are several requirements for a discursive message to be "successfully" adopted and diffused. First, it needs resound and be relatable to potential participants in the public sphere. This can be achieved by making sure the frame's values fit its audience's real world experiences (McCammon, 2013). Some discourses are used by activists because they tap into powerful emotional undercurrents (Bröer and Duyvendak 2009; McCammon, 2013). Resonance can also be achieved by making sure the frame connects existing groups through values and beliefs (Rochon, 2000). Second, the discourse in the frame must be repackaged in a way that connects participants together or provoke a reaction by antagonists (Rochon, 2000; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004).

McCammon (2013) identified three levels in which discourse is adopted, shaped and disseminated by social movements. The first is the world-historical discourse that span national borders. These are high-level discourses relevant in the social environment that help shape social movements' frame. (e.g. Enlightenment, Islamism, Neoliberalism, Democracy). The second level the discourse of the social movement, it is more specific and it consists of a mix of large discourses that help shape the values of the social movement organization. The last level, is an individual-level, here is where the production of text and speech happens. It is important because the social movement organization is composed by these individuals who collectively create the organizational frames. Their adopted views ultimately become the frames through which the social movement give meaning to their world.
A movement's discourse is framed in relation to a given period in time (S. Tarrow, 1996b; Tilly, 1978). Depending on their circumstances, movements can create **anti-system frames**, which challenge the foundations of a political system. They advocate for the radical transformation of the political system, and for changing dominant cleavages (political divisions), identities, and the system's capacity to accommodate heterogeneous and conflicting interests. There are also **realignment frames**, which emphasize restructuring the political system. These happen when the traditional alignments have failed to support collective action, thus the movement forms new collective identities for action. A realignment frame doesn't aim to delegitimize the established members and procedures of the polity, but rather to reorganize it.

A third type of frame is **inclusion frame**, which emphasizes the need for new political actors to be recognized as legitimate members of the polity. The definitions of the major
cleavages are not challenged. Finally, there are revitalization frames, which are created to enter established political organizations to redirect their goals and revitalize their structures from within. These frames are created because these structures don't provide, or are not creating opportunities for independent action (S. Tarrow, 1996b; Tilly, 1979; Tilly, 1978).

2.1.2.3.2. Process of Frame Creation and Diffusion

As stated earlier, frames are created consciously and purposefully by members of the social movement. The process of frame creation is iterative and has several steps; the first step is the collective recognition that there is a problem. It involves identification of the individuals, groups, or institutions responsible for the aggravated situation. To participate in a social movement, people need to feel both distressed about some aspect of their lives, and hopeful that through acting collectively, they can address the problem. It is very unlikely that people will mobilize if they don't feel hopeful and distressed. In this phase, movement actors adopt a common interpretation and collective meaning of the problem (Della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999). In this sense, even though Opportunity Structures are objective phenomena (e.g. government institutions, laws), they are subject to actors' interpretation and construction (Brockett, 1991). So, rather than looking upon "opportunities and threats" as purely objective structural factors; they are seen also as subjected to attribution. No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is visible to potential challengers who consciously identify a given opportunity (McAdam, 2003; McAdam et al., 2001). Therefore, attribution of opportunity or threat is an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert groups (McAdam, 2003; McAdam et al., 2001).
The second step involves seeking solutions and strategies to solve the problem and influence opportunity structures. Here, the social movement hypothesizes new social patterns and new ways to create or regulate relationships between groups (Della Porta et al., 1999; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Diani & Eyerman, 1992). The collective account of threat or opportunity turns into the animating frame for an organizationally able collective (McAdam, 2003). Seeking solutions is also selective process, which may limit the possible sources and solutions of the problem. Once a problem has been identified, movement actors neglect those sources of protest that might not fit the adopted interpretation, thus limiting the availability of resources for mobilization to include only those that fit the adopted collective view. This causes the movement to overlook other potential sources of protest and resources for mobilization (Della Porta & Diani, 1999).
The third step consists in finding motivations for acting. In this stage, the social movement produces incentives for action. The purpose is to convince people that there is an opportunity for action and that the opportunity is legitimate. They do this by (1) generalizing problems and showing individuals how they connect to their condition for them to feel connected to the collective experience; (2) they demonstrate that the problem is relevant to their own individual experience; (3) and they produce new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity to transform actors' identities in order to favor action (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Contentious action is likely to develop when these shared perceptions of threat or opportunity come, and they serve as the motivating frame of an established group (McAdam, 2003).

Finally, once frames are created and people are motivated, they need to be distributed or diffused through the movement. Frames are diffused through language, narratives, cultural links, or media (McAdam, 1986; McAdam et al., 1996). The diffusion of frames determines the success of mobilization. There needs to be congruency between individual and social movement's interpretative orientations (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Frame diffusion is done through several strategies: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986). For diffusion to work, the mobilization messages need to be linked to an aspect of the movement actors' cultural heritage. Movements often use references to cultural currents, draw on own traditional heritage, re-elaborate codes and symbols from the mainstream culture, and references to the past (Snow, et al. 1986).

As environmental and organizational conditions change, social movements need to reformulate their ideas, identities, and tactics. Frame creation and diffusion is an iterative process that may happen throughout the emergence and development of social movements. Their function is different at each stage of the social movement life cycle. During emergence (social ferment and popular excitement), framing is amorphous and less strategic; yet equally collective, and the outcomes are less predictable (McAdam et al., 1996). During maturity (formalization and institutionalization), the purpose of the process is to reaffirm the existing ideological consensus; therefore, it is a more strategic procedure
that is constrained by previously adopted ideas, identities, and world views. Therefore, it has more predictable outcomes (McAdam et al., 1996).

2.1.2.3.3. Importance of Frames and Framing Processes

The process by which frames are created (framing processes) is considered central to understanding the character and course of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). It enables movement actors to attribute meaning to events and shapes behavior both at the group and individual level (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Diani & Eyerman, 1992). Since frames are socially constructed and shared amongst social movements' actors we need to examine actors' interactions to understand how frames emerge (R. Benford, 1997).

2.1.2.3.4. What does a Frame Look Like?

Based on the frame definition discussed in this dissertation, frames have a set of characteristics. These characteristics help identify them.

- They are based on a discourse or combination of discourses.
- They intend to provoke a reaction.
- They touch upon 3 levels of discourse. They appeal to the masses, to groups, and to individuals.
- They can have the purpose to complaint against the political system, advocate for the realignment of elites, ask for inclusion of the social movement into the political system, or attempt to reinvigorate civic participation.
- They recognize and articulate a problem.
- They Propose a solution to said problem.
- They motivate social movement members for action.
- They provoke discussions.
2.1.3. Gaps in the Literature

In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on social movements and addressed several gaps. First, I looked at the history of Social Movement Studies, discussing the differences between the two reigning traditions of American and European research. Then, I explained how both traditions have merged and adopted elements from each other, thus making them indistinguishable. This convergence raised the need for an overarching theoretical framework that can be applied across cases, resulting in the CPM.

I examined literature on social movements in Latin America, and identified two trends. First, existing research has focused on either movement structure or cultural makeup, neglecting analysis on the embedding political environment and its influence on movement form and function. Secondly, there is a lack analysis on the role of ICTs in Latin American movements.

Furthermore, I explored the literature on ICTs and social movements. I discussed how despite ICTs becoming increasingly important for social movements, the academic literature fails to relate technology to a movement’s internal processes and external environment. Second the literature fails to examine ICTs beyond social media or internet-based technologies. In the present study, besides these technologies, I show that older media like alternative radio and television played a key role.

In addition, I discussed social movements’ lifecycle framework, and argued that rather than looking at their evolution in a linear fashion, I should adopt a recycling approach. This would allow explaining a social movements’ interactions with their institutional environment, organizational structures, and collective creation of understandings.

Finally, I introduced the Contentious Politics Model as a holistic guiding framework that allowed me to conduct a comprehensive study of ICTs and the NFAC. This framework brings together the American and European traditions; and takes a constructivist approach by integrating the structures that constrain movements, the potential to mobilize resources, and the way these conditions are transformed into competence, identities, and attitudes (Haber, 1996). In the next chapter I will describe the extended case methodology I employed to study the case of the NFAC.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND METHODS
3.1. Methodology and Methods

This chapter is divided in three parts. In the first part I address the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices made to conduct this study. I argue that a phenomenon like this is unique, complex, embedded in the real world, and thus requires an approach that allows multiple sources of evidence and analytic techniques. Thus I part from an inductive constructivist stance, I explain I chose a single embedded case study guided by the Extended Case Method (ECM) in order to focus on explaining meanings, and giving significance to events and relations (Braybrooke, 1969; Gutting, 1980; Kuhn, 1970; Merriam, 2009; Pickard, 2007). I consider it is the most appropriate method to understand how the NFAC relates to ICTs and engages and influences public life (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Burawoy, 1998; Garrett, 2006; Haber, 1996; Roberts, 1997). The ECM because it focuses on discovering limitations in theory, in order to improve it, moreover It is a data-driven process where evidence is closely examined and mapped, and then synthesized onto the guiding theory in a reiterative concurrent process (Lichterman, 2002; Samuels, 2009). It allowed me to:

- Generalize to theory rather than to populations
- Converging several lines of inquiry, implementing multiple data elicitation techniques, corroborate findings, and consequently
- Embrace researcher engagement as the road to knowledge, as opposed to suspending our participation in the world
In the second part of the chapter I describe the protocol in a step by step fashion, even though data collection and analysis were a concurrent and reiterative process. Also, guided by the ECM, I explain how data collection and analysis happened in three intertwined levels of "conversations." The first level is a "conversation" between the researcher and the informant. The second is among informants throughout the data, where I looked inductively for interesting and relevant themes, organizing the data into manageable, labeled categories. The third conversation is between the data and the theory, which allowed for reconstructing and creating theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Research Steps</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Conversation: Dialog between the researcher and the informant</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>Reconstructive Narratives Through Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collecting publicly available reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>documents, images, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Conversation: Dialog between the informants through the data</td>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>Reading, Memoing, Describing, Coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Conversation: Dialog between data and theory</td>
<td>Data interpretation and reporting</td>
<td>Identify coincidences and anomalies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extending theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Burrawoy's three levels of conversation research model

My data elicitation included two main techniques. The first consisted of semi structured interviews which were conducted to informants selected first purposefully and then through snowball sampling. This allowed for a wide range of informants, reduced the possibility of coercion, reduces the possibility of researcher bias, and helped gains informants' trust. The second one, purposeful collection of public online documents and records (official records, newspapers, governmental documents, blogs, websites, videos, photographs etc) which helped to triangulate and validate the information gathered in the interviews. Finally, following Golden-Biddle & Locke's (1993) principles for writing
convincing research accounts (authenticity, plausibility, and criticality), I generated rich
descriptions, a qualitative timeline, and a narrative of interconnecting themes and
extension of the CPM.

In the third part I address research rigor and quality, and discuss the limitations of this
embedded case study, particularly when it comes to collecting secondary data, like online
texts and governmental documents. Moreover, I also discuss ethical issues like the
protection of informants and the researchers in dangerous settings.

3.1.1. Ontology and Epistemology

To conduct this study, I started from a constructivist position that the social world is a
product of meaning-making (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Therefore, there is no single,
tangible reality, but complex, multiple realities that are embedded in their context
(Gillham, 2000; Merriam, 2009; Pickard, 2007). Under this perspective, social movements
are complex entities characterized by their interactions with structures in the environment,
their ability to mobilize resources, and their capacity to create shared ideas (Donk, 2004;
McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Melucci, 1996; Melucci, Keane, & Mier, 1989; Tilly,
1979; Tilly, 1978). Social movements are composed by organizations embedded in
institutional, political, and social contexts; thus, there are no clear boundaries with the
environment. They are also composed by people, who give meaning to the phenomena
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Rosenberg, 1988). To holistically understand social
movements and the role of ICTs within them, I needed examine them within their context,
and look at them from multiple perspectives.

This meant I needed a flexible research methodology that allowed me to incorporate
three levels of analysis. A macro-level where I could look at the institutional environment,
a meso-level where I can examine the organizational infrastructure, and a micro-level
where I can see how the social movement made sense of their reality. This allowed me not
only to describe phenomena, but provide "fruitful analogies and new perspectives"
(Hacking, 1999; Merriam, 2009), and to explain and interpret human action (Cassirer,
1944; Merriam, 2009).
### 3.1.1.1. Why a Case Study

There are several reasons why studying social movements requires a multidisciplinary/multi-method approach like the case study (Haber, 1996; Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002). First, they are embedded in a natural setting and are shaped by contemporary circumstances; meaning that precise boundaries between the social movement and its environment are difficult to draw (Gillham, 2000; Simons, 2009; Yin, 1981; Yin, 2009). Second, researchers cannot have any control over actual social movement behavior, phenomena or context. Third, they have complex social relations, meanings, activities, and ideas. Case studies are an all-encompassing method that covers logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis (Yin, 2009; Gillham, 2000; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009). I deemed the case study a pertinent method to study social movements and ICTs.

Theory has several roles in case studies. In this study the Contentious Politics Model helped: (1) specify and define the object of study; (2) define a complete and appropriate description of the phenomenon; (3) and ultimately allow to generalize the results to other cases through further expansion of the model itself (Yin, 2009; Merriam, 2009).

Furthermore, in studying a broadly defined topic like the use of ICTs by the NFAC, a case study methodology allowed me to document multiple perspectives, rely on multiple sources of evidence, and triangulate multiple methods and data collection techniques (Babbie, 2008; Burawoy, 1991; Burawoy, 1998; Denzin, 1989; Feagin et al., 1991; Lichterman, 2002; Merriam, 2009; Perecman & Curran, 2006; Simons, 2009; Snow & Trom, 2002).

Additionally, case studies foment analysis techniques that made it possible to do in-depth analysis of the phenomenon, demonstrate the influence of key actors, and explain how the NFAC engaged ICTs into its organizations to mobilize, create shared understandings, influence institutions and accesses power (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Gillham, 2000; Haber, 1996; Lincoln, 1985; Pickard, 2007; Roberts, 1997; Simons, 2009). It helped generate richly detailed descriptions of the social movement, its nuances, and
the context in which it is embedded (Snow & Trom, 2002, Perecman & Curran, 2006; Merriam, 2009; Gillham, 2000) and ultimately create analytic and theoretical generalizations (Yin, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009).

Thus, considering this study's research questions, object of study, and epistemological stance, a case study was the most appropriate approach. This method empirically investigates the movement within its "real-life context" (Yin, 2009; Simons, 2009; Merriam, 2009), yielding findings that "understand and illuminate how the events and processes are produced and reproduced or changed, by examining their ongoing interaction with other elements within the particular context" (Snow & Anderson, 1991: 153; Merriam, 2009).

3.1.1.2. Why a Single Embedded Case Study

I established that a case study is the most appropriate method to understand the internal complexities of social movements' interactions with ICTs and formal arenas to influence public life (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Carty, 2011; Carty, 2010; Garrett, 2006; Haber, 1996; Roberts, 1997). However, each social movement is unique as they are bound by time and circumstances; therefore, it is essential to also understand their context as well. Single embedded case studies allowed this exploration of internal and external dynamics (Yin, 2009) of the NFAC and ICTs. Considering the NFAC's circumstances and objectives of this study, a single embedded case study is appropriate for this endeavor.

The NFAC's, like many social movements around the world, focuses on influencing the government to produce social change. Also, like social movements in Egypt, the United States, Chile, Iran, and Tunisia; it relied heavily on ICTs to organize and mobilize. Much like those movements, it also received considerable attention from international media, and support from the international community (Warren, 2001). Moreover, Honduras, like many other Latin American countries, has gone through many dictatorships and military governments, and retuned to democracy in the early 80s. This social movement was the first one in a recent wave of revolts around the world that relied on new ICTs to organize and get the world's attention. Unlike other movements in Latin America (e.g., El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, or Colombia), the NFAC was peaceful.
These characteristics make it contextually unique and intrinsically interesting from a research perspective. What's more, though it precedes other well-known social movements like the ones in Egypt, the United States, Chile, Iran, and Tunisia; it has not received much attention in academia, until recently (Main, 2014; Phillips, 2015; Sosa, 2015). The NFAC's uniqueness sheds light on Honduras and Latin America in the context of the Pink Tide movement; new insight in Honduran ICT infrastructure and history of social movements. This knowledge would have not otherwise been produced if it wasn't for an embedded case study approach (Simons, 2002; Merriam, 2009;).

Three objectives guided this study's design: First, to bring the NFAC's and Latin American social movements and ICTs case into the Information Studies spotlight. Honduran social movements have not been studied, moreover, the use of ICTs by Latin American social movements has not been holistically explored, nor has the CPM been used to study social movements and ICTs in that region. Second, to influence policy by informing researchers, policy makers, and social movement activists. Third, to generalize to theory, by disseminating findings in the shape of theoretical contributions (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy, et al. 1991; Yin, 2009; Simmons, 2009).

Embedded case studies are broad, yet focused, describing contextual characteristics, and the processes of the phenomenon (Yin, 2009). This allowed for the integrating of the three levels of analysis proposed by my theoretical framework (Contentious Politics Model): Opportunity Structures, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes (See figure 6). Moreover, an embedded case study guided by the Extended Case Method (ECM) allowed the reconstruction of theory, by focusing on specific instances within the case and comparing them to the underlying theoretical framework (CPM) (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy, et al. 1991; Yin, 2009).

3.1.1.3. The Extended Case Method

The Extended Case Method is a theoretical model for social research which reconstructs theory by deploying multiple "coverations" between the researcher and participants, data, and theory, to reach explanation of empirical phenomena.
"It starts out from dialogue, between researcher and participants, embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue between local processes and extralocal forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself" (Burawoy, 1998 p.5).

The purpose of the ECM is to discover flaws in a theory, in order to improve it; thus it provides a mechanism to generalize to theory rather than to populations. It is based on a "reflexive model of science" which embraces researcher engagement as the road to knowledge, as opposed to suspending our participation in the world (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy 1991). Concerns about researcher subjectivity are addressed by focusing heavily on theory; which allows insights into questions that interest scholars (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 1999; Lichterman, 2002). Burawoy says this method "extracts the general from the unique to move from the micro to the macro" (1998:5). Because the ECM generalizes to theory rather than to populations, these generalizations come from observations, that is, micro irregularities (anomalies in everyday life) to the macro (theories). Theory is improved using data, examining and mapping it, and then synthesizing it onto the guiding theory (Lichterman, 2002; Samuels, 2009).

The researcher starts with a theory and then asks: does my data support the theory that I started with? An extended case is largely based on observations and interviews, however in an extended case study they are never "raw or innocent of concepts," they are heavily rooted in theory (Lichterman, 2002). Then, the researcher generates rich chronological descriptions that situate the case in the context to explain the phenomenon (Sullivan, 2002). Sommers (1998) argues that "explanation must be embedded in time and move though time...the success of any explanation resides in its accounting for temporality and sequence." (p. 769)

Finally, a discovery happens when evidence reveals "anomalies" that the underlying theory missed (Burawoy, et al 1991); these discoveries challenge those conceptual starting points (Lichterman, 2002), and then the reconstruction or extension part begins, based on the data collection so that it can accommodate the anomalous case (Burawoy, 1991). In the ECM, data collection and analysis happens in three "conversations" they are three ways in which data is compared to itself and to theory.
3.1.1.3.1. First Conversation

The extended case method “sets out from a dialogue between us and them, between social scientists and the people we study” (Burawoy, 1998 p.5). The first conversation is a dialog between the researcher and the informant; where the informant narrates reconstructions of their past experiences (Davis, 2002). The researcher “unpacks those situational experiences by moving with the participants through their space and time” (Burawoy, 1998 p.5). These reconstructive narratives are the main source of data in a case study guided by the ECM, however it is possible to also rely on publicly available documents, records and audiovisual material collected from online sources. This way it is possible for the researcher to corroborate and triangulate data from the interviews (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 1999; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009).

3.1.1.3.2. Second Conversation

The second conversation happens among interviewees through the data. As the process of data analysis and collection is usually concurrent, this phase starts during data collection and continues through the coding process.

"Here the purpose of the comparison is to connect the cases. Instead of reducing cases to instances of a general law, we make each case work in its connection to other cases" (Burawoy, 1998).

Interviews are transcribed right after the end of the interview; this gives an opportunity to read them carefully and write memos. Here emerging themes are identified in the data and they are organized in broad categories (Corbin, Strauss, & Strauss, 2008; Rossman & Rallis, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Then descriptions of the setting, people, the themes and the categories are generated. These descriptions are then converted into a qualitative timeline and a narrative of interconnecting themes (Golden-Biddle & Locke's, 1993). This process allows elaborating a codebook.
3.1.1.3.3. Third Conversation

The last conversation is between the data and the theory. In this step "coincidences and more importantly irregularities between my data and the theoretical framework are identified" (Burawoy, 1989). A discovery will happen when "repeated observations reveal "anomalies" that the underlying theory missed" (Burawoy, et al 1991); these discoveries challenge those conceptual frameworks (Lichterman, 2002), and then the reconstruction or extension part begins. Theory then is reconstructed based on the data collection so that it can accommodate the anomalous case (Burawoy, 1991). The specific procedures for this study will be described in the Protocol section of this chapter.

3.1.1.4. Assumptions

For this study, I took an interpretive epistemological approach, in which knowledge is socially constructed as result of interactions. Through this approach, I assume that knowledge is best acquired through a dialog between the researcher and the social movement within its context (Motta, 2009; Burawoy, 1989). Movement-relevant research entails developing research questions and objectives through dialog between the researcher and the movement (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; Motta, 2009).

Thus, the researcher is the most appropriate instrument for data collection and analysis (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Burawoy, 1998; Gillham, 2000; Motta, 2009; Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009). By interacting with the object of study in its natural setting, the researcher, as a human, has the capability of interpreting facts and phenomena in terms of the meanings people give them. Moreover, the researcher has the capability of expanding her understanding through verbal and nonverbal communication, through processing information instantly, clarifying and summarizing material, and checking for accuracy of interpretation (Merriam, 2009).

The interpretive approach assumes that all humans are subjective creatures, and that all inquiry is guided by theory; which reflects the researcher's standpoint, who lives and has an impact on the social world that is being studied (Denzin, 2001). In the ECM,
researchers' personal biases, experiences, and identities, are considered a valuable lens, not a liability or bias to be controlled or otherwise accounted for (Samuels, 2009).

Moreover, the ECM attempts to overthrow the traditional understandings of theory development, as confined to an elite or distanced scientific community, by presenting research as a dynamic exchange in which informants and knowledge are transformed (Samuels, 2009; Burawoy, 1989). Burawoy (1989; 1991) favors collaborative knowledge construction, arguing that engagement, rather than detachment, is the road to knowledge. Thus, under the ECM, the conceiver of research is simultaneously the executor, and theory is the foundation, guide, and goal of the research (Burawoy, 1989). Therefore, objectivity under this view is measured by the growth of knowledge throughout the imaginative and parsimonious improvement of theory to accommodate anomalies (Burawoy, 1989). Thus, this study is rooted in the Contentious Politics Model to guide the research process and to ultimately extend it.

3.1.1.5. The Role of Technology

A second set of assumptions for this study is related to the nature of technology. I regard technology as the product of social interactions, as opposed to as the source of social interactions. Initial studies of technology and society struggled with "causality dilemmas" and asked questions like: does technology shape society, or does society shape technology? Can technology exist without society? Can society exist without technology? Some of these first approaches were rooted in technological determinism, which assumes that science and technology cause widespread changes in society. These perspectives consider that: science and technology have an impact in society and don't have unintended consequences; and that "technology is an autonomous entity which develops according to internal logic, and in direction of its own and then has a determinant impact on society" (Russell & Williams, 2002). These technological-deterministic approaches do not include political, social, and cultural complexities; thus, they were not appropriate for this study.
Conversely, a social constructivist approach argues that technology never determines social change (Bijker, 2009; Bijker & Law, 1992). It sees technology as a part of the social context (Russell, 2002; Sismondo, 2004); a consequence of a series of biased choices that are influenced by social relations, value sets, and power relations (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987). Therefore, technology does not have an autonomous role. In other words, it can be interpreted and used differently by different social groups depending on their context (interpretive flexibility). There are multiple ways design and use a technological artifact (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). The social meaning and use of technologies, like radio or the Internet, varies depending on the social context in which they are employed.

In the context of Honduras for instance, members of the social movement might not use radio the same way as those in government or international organizations. Moreover, these individuals might have changing interpretations about the meaning and/or use a given ICT before, during, or after the coup. What’s more, governmental policies or ICT penetration may have had an impact on the way people interpreted and used ICTs. For instance, before the coup the Internet had very low penetration, and the government provided no incentives for its promotion; on the other hand, radio, cell phones, and television were widely available after the market liberalization in the 90’s. There were many independent journalists; business people and civil society organizations were operating their own alternative radio and TV stations.

Under the social construction of technology approach, the sociocultural and political circumstances of the group shape the way members of the movement gave meanings and used ICTs and, in turn, how their use and interpretations had an impact on the sociocultural and political context (Pinch & Bijker, 1987).

Thus, did not look at the technologies themselves, but also at the social, political, and economic circumstances, to understand how ICTs and their content were interpreted, created, and used. Interpretations were drawn from the data, and particularly from interviews of people (members of the NFAC, civil society organizations, media, international organizations and government) who used ICTs before, during and after the coup. I relied on thick descriptions of the technical, social, economic, and political aspects of the case (Russel & Williams, 2002), and generated "fruitful analogies and new
perspectives" (Hacking, 1999), that shape how I see the relation of ICTs and social movements.

3.1.1.6. Level and Unit of Analysis

The NFAC is composed by people and organizations who are influenced by, and attempt to influence their environment. To explore it holistically, it is necessary to explore the features in the context (macro-level), their organizational structures (meso-level), and internal processes of creating and sharing understandings (micro-level). The Contentious Politics Model allows integrating those three levels of analysis.

Opportunity Structures (macro-level): They are institutions in the wider social environment that delimit but also create the range of possibilities for social movements at any historical moment (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Though they are real, they are also subject to movement actors' construction; thus, I needed to look at how opportunities are identified, and how these guide movement actors and their behavior.

Mobilizing Structures (meso-level): Organizations and groups that shape social movements and influence their mobilization-based potential resources (McAdam, et al., 1996). They are also subject to movement actor's construction, so therefore, I had to explore how social movements define them and shape their infrastructure.

Framing Processes (micro-level): They are not structures, but a collective process where conditions are transformed into competence, identities, experiences, and attitudes that facilitate and/or hinder collective action (Haber, 1996). I needed to look at how the NFAC made sense of the OS and MS to define themselves, organize, and engage in collective action (McAdam & Scott, 2005).

These three levels come together when members of the social movement make sense of them. The process through which the NFAC evolves is constrained by ideas, identities, and worldviews (Benford & Snow, 2000; A. D. Morris & Mueller, 1992). In other words, the way that those three levels interact with each other throughout the movement life cycle is shaped by the way social movement actors define them. Even though OS and MS are objective criteria (government institutions, laws, civil society organizations), they are
subject to movement actors' construction (FP). The social movement will organize and act according to how its actors define the environmental opportunities for organizations and organizational infrastructures. Thus, the micro-level framing is where the three elements of the CPM come together because this is what guides movement actions. This is what determines social movement actions, strategies and mobilization, including how they get involved with ICTs across time (See appendix 11. Illustration of single case design with multiple levels of analysis).

Since these three levels need to be observed simultaneously, the most effective unit to observe them is specific snapshots that are bounded by frames throughout the life cycle of the social movement. Therefore, the unit of analysis brings together two constructs, the first one is **Collective Action Framing**, which is the process through which social movements make sense of the environment, their actions and themselves. Drawn from the literature on Social Movements is defined as the cooperative practice of creating meaning (frames) to guide movement action (Benford & Snow, 2000; A. D. Morris & Mueller, 1992).

There are three characteristics that help identify of Collective Action Framing:

- It is a purposeful process to help constrain and guide movements' evolution.
- It is a negotiated collective process in which many members of the movement participate.
- Its outcome are frames (ideas, identities, world views)

The second one is **Episodes**, which I define as “sequentially connected events and practices that occur over time and have a beginning and an end.” This construct is a combination of Somers (1994) and idea that “the connectivity of parts...turns events into episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced in anything resembling a chronological order”. (p. 616); and from Miles & Huberman's (1994; 2011) methodology to bound data that extends over periods of time where they propose condensing data into manageable units or episodes in a process that involves “selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and/or transforming the data that appear in the body of field notes, interview transcripts, documents and other empirical materials” P.12 (2011). This combination of constructs allows capturing the characteristics of the settings, events
and processes in long-term complex processes involving organizations, groups and information technology.

Thus, the emergence and development of the NFAC was observed in specific sequentially connected time slots called Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFE). A framing episode is an appropriate unit of analysis in this study; it is defined as a relevant period of interest as defined by movement actors.

There are several episodes during the emergence and development of the social movement. They happened at the micro-level but interacted with, and influenced the meso- and macro-levels. Using CAFEs allowed identifying the role that ICTs play in framing, mobilizing structures and opportunity structures.

CAFE is a combination of two concepts: Collective Action Framing and Episodes. Bringing together these two concepts for studying a social movement allows bounding framing processes and its interactions with OS and MS in manageable units, by focusing on specific events that occur over a period of time.
3.1.1.6.1. Operationalizing CAFEs

Having established that CAFEs are periods of time bounded by relevant events, identified as such by movement actors, where actors create frames to guide movement's actions. It is important to stress that several CAFEs can happen simultaneously throughout the lifespan of a movement, the resulting frames can be recycled or reused. CAFEs are triggered by events in the environment, not just any event, but events that affect the social movement. Once the event happens, members of the movement engage in framing practices to respond, anticipate, or react to the event. Through this process they create frames that allow them to build arguments, call for action, provide a prognosis or a solution related to the event. Frames are loaded with meaning, and their content changes according to the context and movement's desired outcome. To identify CAFEs, I needed to
identify the events that trigger them, the practices that social movement actors engage in during the episode, and the ideas or frames that guide those practices.

**Events** are occurrences in the environment that pertain to the social movement; they ranged from statements by international organizations, to presidential inaugurations. Events were identified in the news, blogs, legislations, coup reports and interviews.

**Practices** are activities carried out by movement actors with the intention to support or propose movement goals. Instances of practices were found in interviews, blogs, and official documents from the resistance movement.

**ICTs** are any communication device, application and services and applications associated with them in the Honduran context. They may include but not limited to: radio, television, cellular phones, computer and network hardware and software, satellite systems, media outlets videoconferencing, social media, etc.

**Frames** are negotiated set of shared beliefs and meanings embedded in larger discursive structures, meant to: keep the movement together, give meaning to events, keep morale, set objectives, inspire, garner support, guide action, organize experience, and legitimize activities explain the situation, explain reasons for outrage, call people to action, propose solutions, and explain movement stances, objectives and culture. Since they are deliberate strategic process, they possess the attribute of having a clear purpose, being utilitarian and/or goal directed.

Thus, they call for recruitment, mobilization, and acquisition of resources. They are not promoted by just one person, but rather are negotiated, thus they will be counteracted or disputed by the opponents. Frames are expressed in messages, utterances, or statements consistent throughout the movement. However, movement actors adapt them based on changes in instructional, governmental, cultural, audience and activists’ conditions (events, actors and activities). Changes on any of these areas may trigger a new frame or the modification of existing frames. Movement actors diffuse them through their oral and written discourse in blogs, news and interviews, and especially the resistance movement's official documents.
3.1.2. Protocol and Procedures

Achieving a complex, multifaceted exploration requires multiple data elicitation techniques that complement each other (Anderson & Snow, 1991; Feagin et al., 1991; Yin, 2009). The selection of data elicitation techniques depended on the units of analysis and the study's objective. I conducted a combination of data collection techniques that allowed converging several lines of inquiry, corroborating findings, triangulating data sources, and reaching more convincing and accurate conclusions; thus, making the case stronger (Gillham, 2000). These multiple sources additionally provided multiple measures of the same phenomenon, strengthening the validity of the study (Gillham, 2009). I implemented two types of data elicitation techniques: reconstructive narratives through interviews and (2) collection of publicly available documents, records, and audiovisual material. The scope of this project is delineated by the research questions (Fetterman, 1989). Thus, I explored the role of ICTs in the way the movement relates with environmental institutions and civil society through the its emergence and development. This project spans from the months before the coup in June 2009, to January 2010 when president Porfirio Lobo was inaugurated.
In this section I discuss collection started since before entering the field, the way I met my gatekeeper and the challenges of conducting this research as a Honduran. Then I organize the data collection and analysis per Burawoy’s (1998) three conversations of research. In the first conversation, I discuss the possible contributions of reconstructive narratives from informants, as well as publicly available documents for data-driven research such as this. I discuss the data selection criteria and data collection procedures and storage. In the second conversation, I discuss concurrent activities like reading and memoing, as well as the inductive development of codes and categories for a codebook that guided the third conversation. I conclude by addressing the third conversation, where I explain the procedures for data interpretation by comparing findings to the theory in order to extend it. They will be explained next.

3.1.2.1. Entering the Field

I collected interview data in Tegucigalpa the capital of Honduras, where most of the ICTs, Government, Civil Society, and International Organizations activity is concentrated. It is the place where I could reach people with access into the NFAC.

Gaining access to the site did not represent a challenge, because I understood the society and the culture very well. However, I realized that gaining access to my target informants (e.g. acquaintances, professional contacts, professional organizations, previous work, current associations, etc) would be challenging because, given the heavy persecution they faced, members of the NFAC were weary of outsiders.

Nevertheless, I was fortunate to meet my gatekeeper by chance, as often happens in this kind of study. They were a member of the NFAC who visited Syracuse as part of a tour through the United States denouncing human rights violations in Honduras during the coup. They were the first informant whom I interviewed, and they introduced me to several NFAC members and civil society organizations. As recommended by Yin (2009) and Gillham (2000), I shared with them information about the goals of my research, my plans for field research in Honduras, and talked about how the results would be reported, as well as what they would gain from the study.
As I planned my field trip, I received the Goekjian Summer Research Grant from the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. This grant allowed me to travel to Honduras, stay for several weeks, and conduct interviews and observations; as well as to expedite my IRB application, and obtain approval for this research. This also helped me be better prepared for my trip and have access to resources to conducting my research like transportation, equipment, housing, and the like. I created a database for the data, a plan and schedule for data collection, and took field notes. I also prepared for unanticipated events, which happened a lot. In many cases, interviews and meetings were changed, or moved. I had to learn to integrate real-world events and interviewee's schedules with the needs of the data collection plan (Yin, 2009). In the next sections, I provide further details of my data collection and analysis.

3.1.2.2. First Conversation: A Dialog with Eyewitnesses

The first conversation is a dialog between the researcher and the informant; the informant narrates reconstructions of their past experiences (Davis, 2002). Thus, I conducted semi-structured interviews to a broad set of informants, including: members of the NFAC, government employees, members of international and local NGOs and members of independent media. I obtained a broad set of perspectives. At first were selected purposely, but later I relied on snowball sampling; this reduced the possibility of coercion, reduce researcher bias, and gain informants' trust. They were asked about their experienced with the NFAC and ICTs before, during and after the coup. Even though reconstructive narratives are the main source of data in a case study guided by the ECM, I also relied on publicly available documents, records and audiovisual material collected from online sources. They include official ICT indicators, newspapers, official reports, blogs, websites, videos, photographs etc. This data provided ways to reliably corroborate and triangulate the interview data (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009). I brought together three levels of analysis to elicit data that allowed me to describe the interaction of the movement's institutional context, organizational structures, and ICTs through various framing episodes.
At the macro level, I needed to understand how the NFAC related to ICTs and to the institutions that constrained its access to politics. Therefore, I needed descriptions and reconstructive narratives from movement actors, about the openness or closure of the political system, the government’s capacity and propensity for repression, the stability of political alignments, and availability of influential allies. I also collected data on legislation changes, regulations, changes in infrastructures or laws, news about repression, country reports on human rights, and official ICT use and ownership reports.

At the meso-level, I needed to understand the role that ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement's organizational structures. Thus, I collected descriptions and reconstruction narratives of those structures from movement actors and informants from civil society organizations, government, the media, and international organizations. Additionally, I collected data to support those narratives through data such as the content of official websites, official movement documents, news, and official reports.

Framing happens at the micro level, and therefore, I needed to explore the process through which movement actors made sense of ICTs, opportunity structures and mobilizing structures; and how they adapted their strategies and identities accordingly. These insights are also accessed through reconstructive narratives from movement actors. To triangulate these accounts, I collected NFAC's official foundation and mobilization documents.

### 3.1.2.2.1. Reconstructive Narratives

Reconstructive narratives are accounts organized according to temporal order, told by informants about past experiences or social objects of investigation (Davis, 2002; Ricoeur 1981). Everything we study is constrained within a storied or narrative representation; the self is a narrative production and there is no separation between it, the material, and society (Creswell, 2013; Denzin, 2001). Therefore, they were an appropriate source of data for this research. Framing processes and reconstructive narratives allowed me to have access to movement actors' constructions of their environment, organizations, and themselves through time. Narratives are a way to access movement discourse and a crucial
analytical concept; they offer analytical insights and understandings that extend the recent constructionist and new social movement scholarships (Davis, 2002; Johnson 2013).

There are several advantages to using reconstructive narratives in this study: because they occur within a specific place and situation, they integrate context into the analysis. Because they tell individual experiences, they shed light on the process through which movement actors create their identities and make sense of the social movement. Moreover, since frames are socially constructed amongst movement actors, narratives shed light on the collective construction of OS and MS (Creswell, 2013). Reconstructive narratives integrate actors' past and present with other actors, themes, events, and organizations in a chronological fashion, thus making it possible to understand the relation between cultural and structural factors of the movement (Davis, 2002). Because they are shaped into a chronology, they allow understanding the emergence and development of the NFAC and its various framing episodes. Finally, using reconstructive narratives addresses several limitations in the framing perspective by illuminating core features of identity and sense-making in social activism; shedding light on social movement's emergences, internal dynamics, and public persuasion, while also addressing cultural aspects of activism that get short shrift in movement research (Davis, 2002). However, there are some potential challenges from this approach. First, the researcher needs to collect extensive information about the participant and needs to have a clear understanding of the context of the individual's life. This approach requires active collaboration between the informant and researcher. It also calls for heavy reflection about the researcher's own biases. Finally, there is a risk of story distortion from informants, like exaggerations or embellishments (Creswell, 2013). I took measures to manage these risks like triangulating data and sources, researcher reflection, communicating, and sharing the research results with informants. I address these measures more comprehensively throughout this chapter.

Reconstructive narratives are essential, they provide interconnectedness (Somers, 1994), they can be gathered through interviews, documents, pictures, and other sources of qualitative data. In this case, I relied on interviews and publicly available documents and records (blogs, newspapers, videos, photographs, etc). The protocol for their selection, collection, and analysis is described in the next sections of this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Required Data</th>
<th>Data Collection Technique</th>
<th>Data Analysis Technique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Reconstructive Narratives about the openness or closure of the political system, the government's capacity and propensity for repression, the stability of political alignments and availability of influential allies.</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislation changes, regulations, changes in infrastructures or laws, images and news about repression, country reports on human rights, official ICT use and ownership reports.</td>
<td>Collection of publicly available documents</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso</td>
<td>Reconstructive narratives describing organizational structures from civil society organizations, government, the media and international organizations.</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content of official websites, official movement documents, news and official reports.</td>
<td>Collection of publicly available documents</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro</td>
<td>Reconstructive narratives of how movement actors made sense of ICTs, opportunity structures and mobilizing structures</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement's official foundation and mobilization documents.</td>
<td>Collection of publicly available documents</td>
<td>Inductive text analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Data collection technique per data required for each level of analysis

3.1.2.2.2. Collecting Narratives Through Interviews

Interviews are essential sources of information (Yin, 2009), best suited when seeking qualitative, descriptive, in-depth data to help reconstruct current and past events in the shape of reconstructive narratives (Pickard, 2007). They allow accessing what is on the interviewer's mind, moving back and forth in time to reconstruct the past and interpret the present (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Usually, the content of the inquiry is somewhat sensitive,
so developing trust with the informant is important. Interviews allow building thrust through face-to-face interaction (Gillham, 2000).

This study proposes conducting semi-structured interviews to ask informants conversational questions about facts of a matter, as well as opinions and recollections (Yin, 2009). These types of interviews yield rich data, which is what drives this research. Semi-structured interviews are flexible and fluid enough to allow exploration about the role of ICTs in the NFAC; yet structured enough to yield useful information to answer the research questions (Merriam, 2009; Creswell, 2013; Pickard, 2007). I will discuss next the informant selection strategy, recruiting, and interviewing protocol.

3.1.2.2.1. Selecting Informants

Key informants were critical to the success of the study as they provided insights into the phenomena and initiated access to corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). I initially selected key informants using purposive sampling. Then, I resorted to snowball sampling. My initial sampling criteria to select informants was based on how well they could inform the research problem, and how much they could help meet the objectives of this study (Merriam, 2009; Fetterman, 1998; Creswell, 2013). I required that all informants were physically in Honduras during the coup. Because I wanted to obtain a diverse set of perspectives regarding the emergence and development of the movement, I also required them to be from heterogeneous sectors of society; first and foremost to have an official position within the social movement, but also to be members of civil society organizations, members of the media, members of international organizations, and members of government.

Then, once I located and interviewed initial informants who meet the criteria, they referred me to other informants who they though could provide rich insights as well (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2009). My gatekeeper was crucial in introducing me to other members of the NFAC, however in order not to become dependent on her, I also relied on additional sources through snowball sampling. Snowball sampling allowed me to obtain a wider range of informants, corroborate interviewees' statements, and reduce the possibility
of coercion (Yin, 2009). I believed that it also helped me reach saturation early as I analyzed interview data simultaneously as I collected it (Meriam, 2009; Creswell, 2013). Snowball sampling also reduced the possibility of researcher bias, while allowing access to informal networks of communication, thus increasing recruitment options while gaining trust from informants (Yin, 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Informant</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of Informants</th>
<th>Number of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Someone who identifies themselves as member of the resistance movement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Employee</td>
<td>Someone who worked for the government before and after the coup.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Someone who works in an international organization.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Members of non-corporate media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Someone who works in local civil society organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Classification of informant types

Ultimately I conducted 16 interviews to 15 informants. Due to the circumstances, in two occasions two interviewed two or more informants at a time. I conducted second interviews with two informants, at two different points in time to corroborate initial emerging themes. In order to confirm my findings and share the data with informants, I had a second round of interviews with some of my key informants; they were selected based partly on specific criteria and part on convenience. First and most importantly, they needed to have access to movement’s leadership. Second, they needed to be conveniently selected based on their access and willingness to conduct the interview online via
videoconferencing software or phone. In the next section I explain the initial recruiting protocol used.

Informants were approached via telephone, email, text-message, or private message on Facebook. The English translation of the scripts that were used to approach them and ask them for an interview are available in appendix 2.

### 3.1.2.2.2. Interview Protocol

There are a series of measures that I took to prepare for the interviews. First, I practiced interviewing my informant in Syracuse several months before arriving in the field, allowing for the protocol to be refined and implemented through improved procedures (Creswell, 2013). These included deciding to audio record the interviews upon approval from informants and designing an interview guide. While it is recommended that the researcher familiarize herself with the setting (Creswell, 2013); as mentioned earlier, this did not represent a large challenge as she is from Honduras. My biggest challenge was dealing with my assumptions about informants based on what I already knew about the culture and society. I documented these in my field notes, and integrated them into the data analysis phase. The researcher’s nationality and gatekeeper were also very helpful in establishing credibility and rapport amongst informants, considering the success of an interview is highly dependent on the rapport built between the interviewee and interviewer (Merriam, 2009; Pickard, 2007).

Understanding Honduran culture was also key to understanding in advance what settings would make people comfortable to talk about their experiences during the coup (Creswell, 2013). I understood that I would need to visit people at their work places or meet them in public places like coffee shops or libraries. I also estimated that one hour was an appropriate amount of time that people would have available, and would allow me to collect enough information (Pickard, 2007).

#### 3.1.2.2.2.1. During the Interview
Upon arrival at the meeting places, informants completed the consent form and decided whether they wanted the interview to be recorded or not (Creswell, 2013). I anticipated they wouldn't be too keen on signing a consent form, which turned out to be true. Nevertheless, they kept a copy of the form, and interestingly, none of them had any objection to being audio recorded. I proceeded to conduct the interview using the guide, which covers all relevant areas of the topic while still allowing exploration, identifying key topics, probing, asking new questions, paying close attention, and keeping the interview moving (Pickard, 2007).

3.1.2.2.2.2. Interview Guide

I followed the guidelines provided by Merriam (2009) and Pickard (2007) for designing my interview guide. They were articulated colloquially, and adapted for each informant; nevertheless, each interview covered the same grounds. They were organized chronologically to flow naturally through the social ferment, popular excitement, formalization, and institutionalization phases of the movement; and they were also addressed the research questions by shedding light on the operational definitions of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Related Constructs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introductions, objectives of the study, informed consent.</td>
<td>Ensure participant's protection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Could you tell me about yourself?</td>
<td>Understand their background, their role in society and within the movement. Role of informant in the movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What information and communication media have you traditionally use to obtain information and communicate at a</td>
<td>An ice-breaking question that will also help establish how people understood and used ICTs before the movement. Understand the conditions under which people use each ICT. State and use of ICTs before the movement.</td>
<td>ICTs, ICT Ownership, Framing Processes, Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What ICTs did you use during the days of the crisis to have access to information and communicate? What do you think about the quality of information you accessed during the crisis? Where did you get your news?</td>
<td>Establish ICT use patterns. Determine whether was media polarized or there was censorship. How public opinion about the coup and the movement was shaped. Find out whether they looked for alternative sources of information. Relation of media polarization with ownership. ICT Ownership, Political Alignments, Capacity for Repression,ICT Opportunity Structures, Practices, Framing Processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Can you narrate how you first found out about the coup? What was your experience during the days of the crisis?</td>
<td>Understand if information was being controlled and what were the different ICTs communicating. Determining whether people had trouble accessing information. How they identified political alignments. The level of control government had over ICTs. Determine how people responded to repression or control of ICTs. Framing of opportunity structures. Understanding ICT use and information flow.</td>
<td>ICTs, Political Alignments, Capacity for repression. Practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Based on your experience, why did the coup happen?</td>
<td>Establish the political and social circumstances under which the movement happened. The role institutions like government, legislation, political parties, media etc., played in triggering and fostering the coup. Dissatisfaction with institutions. Dimensions of OS: Openness or Closure of Political System, Capacity for repression, Stability of Political Alignments. Role of civil society organizations.</td>
<td>Opportunity Structures, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes, Events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Why do you use these technologies?</td>
<td>Understandings and ideas people have of ICTs. ICT use and preferences before, during and after the coup.</td>
<td>ICTs, Framing Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>personal and professional level? At home/At work/</td>
<td>The state of ICTs in Honduras. What media people use and for what. Before.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
<td>Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>How did you find out about demonstrations and social movement activities?</td>
<td>Understand how the NFAC convoked people and to mobilize ideas. Use of ICTs as mobilizing structure. The role of civil society organizations in mobilizing ideas. How they circumvented repression.</td>
<td>Mobilizing Structures, ICTs, Capacity for repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Did you participate in them? How? Who else did?</td>
<td>Determine how/why participants joined the social movement. Individual and Organizations that became part of the movement. Influential Allies. Determine how people demonstrated outrage. Identify ICT use for political participation.</td>
<td>Mobilizing Structures, Frames, ICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>What has been the role of Civil Society in the movement? (Does your organization collaborate with the NFAC? How?)</td>
<td>Role of civil society in the movement. Availability of influential allies. What's the role of ICTs in their collaborative practices?</td>
<td>Mobilizing Structures, Frames, Practices, ICTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>What role do you think ICTs played during the crisis? How did information and communication technologies influence movement?</td>
<td>Identify the importance that they give ICTs in helping or hurting the movement. To what degree ICTs were used strategically (Fight censorship, surveillance). Determine whether they collaborated using ICTs. ICT frames and use of ICTs. The control government and civil society have over ICTs. Use of ICTs to fight repression. ICTs as mobilizing structures.</td>
<td>Framing, ICTs, Mobilizing Structures, Capacity for repression,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Is the way you use ICTs now different from before the coup? How?</td>
<td>Determine if people changed their media habits. The impact that the coup had on the use of ICTs. ICT understanding and strategic use. ICT control and Ownership. ICTs as identifiers for political alignments and elites after the coup.</td>
<td>ICT Ownership, ICTs, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>What do you think is going to happen with the movement?</td>
<td>Determine the possibility and availability of mechanisms to participate in politics. Openness or closure of the political system,</td>
<td>Opportunity structures. Framing, Mobilizing Structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wrap up the interview, establish ways to follow up.

Table 10. Interview guide

3.1.2.2.2.3. Recording and Transcribing

I recorded all interviews using the iPhone voice memo app this had the best audio quality, I were familiar with it, and it proved to be inconspicuous. Moreover, the digital format allowed me to make several copies and protect them using passwords and encryption. I transcribed the interviews verbatim without translating them, as this provides the best database for analysis (Merriam 2009).

I took strict measures to protect identifiable information; I password-protected interview recordings, transcripts, and codebooks; as well as used pseudonyms for informants. Moreover, informants had the option of obtaining a copy of the recording and/or the transcript at their request. Next I will explain the process of selecting and collecting publicly available documents and records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Type of Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Activist 1</td>
<td>An activist who was not involved in activism before the coup. One of the founder of the &quot;Front of Lawyers Against the Coup&quot;</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Activist 2</td>
<td>A community organizer and politician. One of the founders of the &quot;Front of Lawyers Against the Coup.&quot; One of the first members of the resistance movement. Has participated actively in the structuring of the resistance movement.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Activist 3</td>
<td>Active member of the liberal party who supported Mel Zelaya during the elections. Became an activist for the Resistance Movement after the coup.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Activist 4</td>
<td>Member of &quot;youth in resistance&quot; organization. Though they protest the coup, they don't participate actively in the resistance's organizing meetings.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Activist 5</td>
<td>Member of teacher's union who is also an active member of the resistance movement in a rural community.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Activist 6</td>
<td>Member of the liberal party, community organizer and active member of the resistance in a rural town just outside of Tegucigalpa.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Activist 7</td>
<td>An activist member of &quot;artists in resistance&quot; organization. Participates actively in protests and meetings.</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Activist 8</td>
<td>Member of the liberal party, organizer of &quot;liberal youth&quot; and member of the resistance.</td>
<td>Government Employee / Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Activist 9</td>
<td>A community organizer in a rural town outside of Tegucigalpa. An active member of the resistance. Protests against &quot;Charter Cities&quot;</td>
<td>Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International 1</td>
<td>A Honduran, who works at a large transnational organization. Due to her position, she works closely with the local government as well as with local NGOs.</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>International 2</td>
<td>A Honduran, who works at a large transnational organization. Due to her position, she works closely with the local government as well as with other large international NGOs.</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Media 1</td>
<td>Journalist who has a TV show in one of the most important independent TV and Radio stations during the coup. He identifies himself as part of the resistance, though he doesn't have a formal position there.</td>
<td>Resistance Member / Independent Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Media 2</td>
<td>An independent journalist. He has his own online newspaper. He is critic of the government. His newspaper was target of the military. He identifies as member of the resistance.</td>
<td>Resistance Member/ Independent Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Civil Soc 1</td>
<td>Works in local human rights NGO. He helped members of the resistance movement fight repression and human rights violations.</td>
<td>Local NGO / Resistance Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Description of informants

3.1.2.2.3. Collecting Publicly Available Documents, Records and Audiovisual Material

Publicly available documents and records provide ways to reliable corroborate and triangulate data from the interviews and observations (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009). This study relies on publicly available documents produced for purposes other than this research, including: official records, newspapers, governmental documents, blogs,
websites, videos, and photographs. These served as evidence about the role of ICTs during the emergence and development of the movement. These types of documents are valuable sources of data; they provide insight into a phenomenon from both the perspectives of those who experienced the phenomenon firsthand, and from those who did not have a direct experience with it (Merriam, 2009). In the next pages, I discuss the criteria for selecting documents as well as the measures I took to establish their authenticity.

3.1.2.2.3.1. Document Selection

I used purposeful sampling as a form of document sampling; a variety of documents were selected with the intention to document diverse perspectives within the social movement. However, some opportunistic sampling also happened, as I discovered and followed new leads from websites and social networks (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2009). This data was collected and stored in the project's database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Document</th>
<th>Selection Criteria</th>
<th>Potential Data to be Collected about Related Constructs</th>
<th>Related Constructs</th>
<th>Type of Document Collected</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td>They need to be written by people and organizations based in Honduras. They might have originally been created for a purpose but during the coup they focused their attention on those issues.</td>
<td>They will provide first person narrative describing individual's experiences and actions before, during and after the coup. They will provide an insight into different perspectives within the movement. Insight into people's attitude towards institutions and their roles during and after the coup. Though they might provide a complete historical</td>
<td>Opportunity structures, Capacity for Repression, ICT Ownership and Framing Processes</td>
<td>Content from Blogs by: Resistance Movement, Independent Journalists, Expatriates living in Honduras, Artists</td>
<td>19 Blogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Web Pages</strong></td>
<td>Official movement and movement-related sites and social networks. Those that provided an alternative to the mainstream and identified themselves as being part of the resistance movement and against the coup.</td>
<td>Useful to observe online interactions among individuals and organizations. Official movement documents. A window to the movement’s ICT strategy and ideology.</td>
<td>ICTs, ICT Ownership, Capacity for Repression, Influential Allies, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes, Movement Life Cycle</td>
<td>Official Resistance Movement Website, Twitter Accounts from the movement and members of the Facebook pages from: the movement, and other movement-associated organizations. Alt. Media Websites</td>
<td>Content from 6 sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Videos, Photos and Images</strong></td>
<td>Representative videos and images of the movement taken or generated by supporters of the movement and available through social media.</td>
<td>Will provide an insight some aspects of society before, during and after the coup. They will help tell stories of what the photographers considered important during and after the crisis. Have an insight into the movement's identity, cultural values, strategies and ICT use.</td>
<td>ICTs, ICT Ownership, Capacity for Repression, Framing Processes, Movement and Alternative media Youtube videos during and after the coup.</td>
<td>276 images 15 Videos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>Representative mainstream and alternative news source.</td>
<td>Will help triangulate accounts from interviews. Will give an insight into the ideology of mass and alternative media and their position respect to the coup.</td>
<td>ICTs, ICT Ownership, Opportunity Structures, Opening of the Political System, Capacity for Repression, Stability of Political Alignments, Influential Allies, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes, Movement Life Cycle</td>
<td>Local mainstream and alternative news clippings.</td>
<td>15 News Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Reports and Public Records</td>
<td>Official government and international organization-generated ICT Indicators, census data, &quot;public use files&quot; like statistical data available by state and local governments, organizational records like the official</td>
<td>Since they were not produced to answer my research questions, they provide a source of balance for my other data (Gilham, 2000). Though their accuracy and completeness might not be a hundred percent reliable they will provide official accounts of the events. This gives insight into government's version of events.</td>
<td>ICTs, ICT Ownership, Opportunity Structures, Opening of the Political System, Capacity for Repression, Stability of Political Alignments, Influential Allies, Governmental &quot;Truth Commission&quot; report. Human rights Watch Report, UNDP International Cooperation Honduras,</td>
<td>6 Reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstracting data from statistical records over time will be useful to make sense and evaluate what I have been told. Will help conduct pattern matching to predict or identify interventions of the movements and ICTs before and after the coup. (Gillham, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official NFAC Documents</th>
<th>Official statements and documents produced and distributed by the NFAC.</th>
<th>Insight into the framing processes inside the NFAC. Access to the discourses adopted and used by the NFAC to build their frames.</th>
<th>Frames, Framing Processes, Ideology, Mobilizing Structures, Press releases, communiqués, resolutions, calls for action, open letters.</th>
<th>233 documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laws and Legislation</td>
<td>Legislation mentioned by participants in interviews or news reports that represented an OS for the NFAC.</td>
<td>Triangulate accounts from interviews and new reports. Provide insight into Opportunity Structures.</td>
<td>Opportuninty structures, Capacity for Repression, ICT, Opening of the Political System, bills, regulations, agreements, law proposal, and laws</td>
<td>16 documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Summary of document criteria, data, constructs and type of publicly available documents, records and audiovisual material

### 3.1.2.2.3.2. Establishing Authenticity

A challenge of online data collection is establishing the authenticity of documents, their sources, and their creators. However, this was not a major concern for this case, because as shown in the selection criteria, the documents were chosen because they can
purposely inform my understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon. In other words, these sources are mostly evidence about how ICTs were used by members of the movement to get organized and mobilized through their emergence, development, and consequent institutionalization. Nevertheless, I did document and collect, to the best of my knowledge, documents from credible sources that were providing authentic content (Picard, 2007). I found out as much meta data as possible about each document, like why it was written, its author, context, the conditions under which it was produced. I also documented how I found it, if it was complete, if it was genuine, the purpose of the document, and what was the author's bias? (Merriam, 2009). These questions informed the analysis.

3.1.2.2.4. Storing the Data

To facilitate concurrent data collection, memoing, reading and analysis; I created a password protected data repository (Gillham, 2000) where I stored the interview transcripts, content from blogs, content from websites, images, videos, memos, etc. I made an inventory of the data, which was shown on the pervers tables. According to the Syracuse University's Institutional Review Board standards, I backed up the data in two separate encrypted zip files, one in the cloud (Dropbox) and another one in an external drive (Merriam, 2009). I developed data collection matrix as a visual means of locating and identifying information (Creswell, 2013). Interview transcripts, blogs, images, official documents, news articles, and reports were included into a qualitative data analysis software (Atlas.ti) that helped me conduct the "second conversation" of data analysis, which I explain next.

3.1.2.3. Second Conversation: A Dialog Between Informants and Documents

The second conversation is an ongoing dialog between the informants and documents through the data.
"Here the purpose of the comparison is to connect the cases. Instead of reducing cases to instances of a general law, we make each case work in its connection to other cases" (Burawoy, 1998).

It started as I conducted interviews and collected documents. The process of data storage gave me the opportunity to read them carefully, write memos, and look inductively for recurrent themes and patterns (Corbin et al., 2008; Rallis & Rosman, 1998; Rossman & Rallis, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). I generated descriptions of the setting, the people, and the emerging themes as explained by informants. These descriptions were converted into a chronological narrative of interconnecting themes (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1993), which is organized in three phases as identified by the movement: before, during and after the coup. Each phase has one or more collective action framing episodes where I describe the relation between movement, its organizations, environment and ICTs. From this narrative, I inductively identified emerging themes in the data and organized them into broad categories and codes (Rossman & Rallis, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Merriam, 2009). These classifications informed the codebook and guided the data interpretation (Golden-Biddle & Locke's; 1993) I will explain each of these phases in more detail in this section.

3.1.2.3.1. Reading and Memoing

While in Honduras, I started transcribing the interviews and reading the entire dataset (interview data, blogs, images, videos and official reports) to get a sense of repeating themes. I wrote memos about recurring themes, descriptions of the places where interviews took place, and emerging ideas. I uploaded the interview transcripts on a qualitative data analysis software called Atlas.ti for analysis. Inductively highlighted substantive elements, while ignoring repetitions, digressions and irrelevant material. This gave me a first general sense of the information and the chance to reflect on its overall meaning (Creswell, 2003). I identified how informants organized events into a chronology, how they talked about specific events that marked their actions, the ideas and shared understandings of what was happening, the role of civil society organizations, media polarization and the way they engaged ICTs throughout the life span of the NFAC. This
allowed me to generate an initial description of the phenomenon and the themes and a codebook. They will be explained in the next section.

3.1.2.3.2. Describing Data into Themes

Once I identified several of the themes continued to repeat across informants' accounts (Babbie, 2005). I drafted chronological narrative of the case based on the repeating themes, activists' practices, changes in the environmental conditions, organizational structures and movement objectives and frames (Neuendorf, 2002; Yin, 2009).

Informants identified three "phases" during the movement life cycle, each phase has several connected episodes where members of the movement identified their issues, organized and used ICTs accordingly. The phases are: before the coup, during the coup and after the coup.

- Informants describe the "before the coup" phase as driven by heavily polarized media. They discuss instances where they could associate those in favor or against Zelaya, with specific media. During this phase, they identified political alignments were shifting dramatically against Zelaya.

- The second phase is called "during the coup" by informants, here is where the social movement saw more repression and started organizing, this phase lasted from June 18, 2009 to January 2010 when a new president was inaugurated after the elections in November 2009. Informants indicate ICTs afforded collaboration among civil society organizations, and improvisation of technologies and strategies. There were episodes where Civil Society (LGBT community, ethnic organizations, human rights organizations, women's rights organizations, labor unions, peasant unions) pooled their ICT and organizational infrastructure to support movement activities. There were also periods of ICT improvisation, particularly during heavy repression, movement actors found new ways to use ICTs to communicate. This allowed them to mobilize ideas, fight repression and circumventing surveillance. They abandoned these improvisations after the risks have passed.
• The third phase is referred to as "after the coup," this is when the movement created a political party, during this phase their ICTs helped the coup supporters repress and conduct surveillance on movement actors. Nevertheless, the movement integrated ICTs into their strategy, thus implemented them more purposefully, especially once they became a formal inclusive organization with a political party branch.

This first narrative allowed me to continue to identify themes and consequently create a lean list and of codes that helped seek evidence from the code in the rest of the data during the "third conversation" (Creswell, 2013; Burawoy, 1989).

3.1.2.3.3. Classifying the Data into Codes

The process of coding consists of classifying data into themes and codes through close examination of the data (Babbie, 2005). The purpose of this process is to achieve new discoveries by exploring my own ideas about the phenomena, comparing them to theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990 in Babbie, 2005). I went through several rounds of data reading and organization; I explored the data from various angles. I was able to break the data into discrete parts, in order to compare it for similarities and differences (Creswell, 2003). This process was reiterative and concurrent with data collection and analysis; thus, several rounds of coding were needed; the first one focused on the interviews and the second to the whole dataset.

The first round was inductive open coding, and started as I transcribed interviews. I created a list of emerging theme and potential codes related to this study’s research questions. I labeled them using descriptive names and in some cases, the actual language of the informants (Creswell, 2003). This list of potential code was then cleaned of redundancies and aggregated into seven broad categories consisting on several codes aggregated to a common idea. The result was a codebook that helped identify relationships between codes and help me organize and retrieve data easily (for full codebook refer to appendix 9).
1. The first category is ICT characteristics; it helps identify the polarization, ownership and type of media, as they seemed to have played an important role throughout the movement life cycle.

2. The second category is CAFEs, consists of the several sequentially connected collective action framing episodes throughout the social movement life span.

3. The third category is Actors; it classifies the various players in Honduran society and the NFAC.

4. The fourth category is "cycles of protest," it is based on the phases of the movement life cycle, as identified by informants: before, during and after the coup, but also on the Contentious Politics Model cycles: Social Ferment, Popular Excitement, Formalization and Institutionalization.

5. The fifth category refers to the actions that members of the NFAC engaged in according to informants in order to reach their goals and strategies. They include the typical repertoires of contention, but they also include new types of practices identified in this dissertation like: Improvisation.

6. The sixth category is based on the three levels of analysis, OS, MS, and FP, this will allow me to identify them throughout the data.

7. The seventh category is a classification of the significant events in the life span of the NFAC.

The codebook evolved over several rounds of coding. I had two objectives to developing the codebook, first as an organizing act, in order to put the data into the emerging categories, second to code the levels of analysis, macro (OS), meso (MS) and micro (FP) and CAFEs. Classifying individual pieces of data this way made it easier to retrieve relevant data related to each theme, but more importantly to identify relations amongst concepts (Babbie, 2005). Overlapping codes indicated conceptual relationships, and were subject to further analysis using Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software that allows relationship visualizations, and more.

I constructed timeline of events, which became the starting point for the "third conversation" of the analysis. Events were classified into various types: Changes in Legislation, Zelaya Measures, Zelaya's Political Moves, Movement Actions, etc. Event
actors were also identified: politicians, government institutions, members of the movement, the military, non-governmental organizations, etc.

3.1.2.4. Third Conversation: Dialog Between Data and Theory

Data interpretation is an ongoing and concurrent process, though it started during data collection, after the second round of coding, we focused on abstracting beyond the codes and themes to the larger meaning of data, identifying learned lessons and finding discrepancies with theory (Creswell, 2013). This is what Burawoy (1989) calls the "third conversation" is about, where the data speaks to the theory.

"coincidences and more importantly irregularities between my data and the theoretical framework are identified" (Burawoy, 1989).

Here we got a sense of coincidences and discrepancies between the data and the contentious politics model (Burawoy, 1998). This step helps the analyst to demonstrate anomalies in the theory in order to improve it.

I focused on the relations between the movement's three levels of analysis to explain their interaction and the role of ICTs in those interactions in each CAFE. Thus, the interoperation became relational, in other words, I made sense of informants experiences in terms of their relations with the environment, ICTs, organizations and themselves through each time snapshot (Denzin, 2001). I relied on the concept maps built during the first and second round of coding.

Discoveries happened when repeated observations revealed "anomalies" that the underlying theory missed (Burawoy, et al 1991); these discoveries challenge those conceptual starting points (Lichterman, 2002), and then the reconstruction or extension part began through a chronological narrative I recount in chapter four.

Theory then was reconstructed in chapter five, based on the data collection so that it can accommodate the anomalous case (Burawoy, 1991) This method facilitate conducting generalizations form a unique case and generalize to theory rather than to populations. Generalizations came from observations micro irregularities (anomalies in everyday life) to
the macro (theories). This way I could connect the present with the past and anticipate the future by building on persisting theory.

3.1.3. Rigor and Quality of Research

I took the following measures to ensure the rigor and quality of this research:

3.1.3.1. Reliability

I employed several case-study specific tactics to ensure that the methods employed in this study, if repeated, would yield the comparable theoretical results.

- Used a protocol: This research employed a data selection and collection protocol to ensure tracking the research steps back and forth. This guaranteed they can be repeated with the same results, reducing bias error. These procedures are documented in a protocol section of this chapter (Yin, 2009).

- Built a database: I created a database that contains all the data, the protocol and instruments (such as recruiting scripts, interview guide and codebook) (Yin, 2009). The database reveals both the actual evidence and indicates the circumstances under which the evidence was collected (time and place of an interview, etc).

- Triangulated data sources: Using multiple sources of evidence and collecting various types of data strengthens the case study (Perecman & Curran, 2006; Snow & Trom, 2002). Findings and conclusions are more convincing and accurate if based on several sources of information.

- Triangulated among evaluators: I corroborated findings through reporting and review with colleagues (publications, advisor, peers, etc) and informants.

Preliminary results of this research were presented and evaluated in several conferences: iConference 2016, The Research Conference on Communications, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC) 2014, InfoSocial 2013, and the Latina American Studies Association (LASA) Annual Meeting 2015. I discussed and shared the result with several of my informants, nothing was disregarded; everything was weighted, sifted, checked, and/or corroborated (Gillham, 2000; Yin, 2009).
• Linked the research to theory: The study maintains a chain of evidence from beginning to end. The protocol indicates the link between the content of the protocol and the initial study question. The initial report of findings makes sufficient citation to the relevant portions of the study database (for example by citing specific documents, interview, or observations), as will the final report (Gillham, 2000).

3.1.3.2. Value of This Study

The value of this study can be determined in two ways. First, it can be appraised by how successfully and truthfully it describes the role of ICTs in the emergence and development of the NFAC (Pickard, 2007). I have implemented the following measures to ensure its value:

• Through construct validity: Constructs were defined in terms of existing theoretical concepts and are related to the original objectives of the study. Operational measures were built to match the concepts (citing published studies that make the same matches). Triangulation also addresses construct validity, because multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon. (Yin, 2009; Pickard, 2007)

• Ensuring generalizability through theory: Realities vary in nature and bound by time and context. Accordingly, each social movement will be different due to the conditions under which it arises. Therefore, it is very difficult to generalize to all social movements (Mattiace, 2005). Case studies however, allow analytic and theoretical generalizations (Burawoy, 1998) as they "expand and generalize theories, not enumerate frequencies... they are generalizable to theoretical prepositions, not populations or universes" (Yin, 1989: 21). The purpose of this study is to generalize to theory rather than to populations, these generalizations come from observations micro irregularities (anomalies in everyday life) to the macro (theories) (Burawoy, 1989; Yin, 2009). This way it helps connect the present with the past and anticipate the future by building on persisting theory (Burawoy, 1989).
The second way this study's validity can be judged is based on its contribution to the NFAC's strategy and general contributions to the struggles of social justice. This study assumes that "knowledge can be produced in dialogue between the researcher and the movement" (Motta, 2009). Thus, I took measures to include the voices of those in the moment throughout the process by engaging in a dialogical relationship with them, and sharing ideas and report so that theory building will become a more democratic process.

3.1.3.3. Ethical and Safety Concerns

There were several challenges that rose from this case and site. One of them is related to what Le-Treweek and Linkogle (2000) call ethical danger, which refers to the risk of having a positive or negative effect on the groups being studied. The second set of challenges is related to the researcher's personal safety.

3.1.3.3.1. Protection of Informants

Studying a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context engenders ethical practices, especially because of the political implications (Fetterman, 1998). I had several ethical concerns related to this study; some of the measures I took to address them have also been explained earlier in this chapter, so there might be some repetition.

The risks and protection of informants was a concern from the beginning. To minimize these risks, I conducted the following practices: I protected them from harm and deception by explaining them the benefits and risks of participating in this research through the informed consent form. Considering the risk associated with the topic and environment, I took strict measures to protect identifiable information like password-protect interview recordings, transcripts and codebooks; as well as to use pseudonyms for all forms of reporting that may arise from this research (e.g., articles, talks, books, thesis work, etc.). Finally, I had the protocol reviewed and approved by Syracuse University's Institutional Review Board (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2009).

With regards to impact on the community, researchers must remain mindful of the negative impact that their research may have upon the wider community, or those who are
targets of intimidation or violence. (Lee-Treweek, et al., 2000). Members of the NFAC were already under repression, I expect that by focusing this study on the use of ICTs, the negative impact on the movement such as continued repression will be reduced (Feyerabend, 1994).

### 3.1.3.3.2. Protection of the Researcher

Researchers like (Paterson, Gregory, & Thorne, 1999), Le-Treweek, et al. (2000), and (Howell, 1990) note that few researchers take the time to anticipate the dangers they may encounter and to discuss how they may respond to them. They argue that as researchers, it is our duty to identify these risks; in fact, they argue, "personal safety considerations need to become a composite part of the research design" (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 2000).

Risks can arise from the nature of the research topic; some research topics are associated with more risk for the researcher. Interviewing potentially aggressive and volatile informants about politically charged topics (Paterson et al., 1999), for instance, can be very dangerous.

According to the Human Rights Watch 2014 report, in Honduras 29 journalists have been killed since President Lobo took office in January 2010. There are 20 documented cases of excessive use of force and killings by security forces during the coup, and there has been very little progress prosecuting the abuses in 2013. Moreover, violence against activist, protesters, and members of the movement has been widely reported in the media. Since people tend to associate the research conducted by the researcher with the researcher (Paterson et al., 1999), a researcher may face threats to their safety when conducting research on highly political or controversial research subjects like is the case of the Honduran coup and the resistance movement. There is a risk that those holding an opposing view believe that the researcher is a partisan; resulting in threats, intimidation, and/or physical assault (Sluka, 1990).

Few researchers have addressed the issue of researcher safety as a methodological concern, which is why there are minimal guidelines available to prevent physical danger to researchers (Paterson et al., 1999). Nevertheless, I established a safety protocol into my
research strategy, which I implemented during the study. It focuses on measures for my arrival and stay in the field, as well as for conducting interviews and observations.

Patterson et al., (1999) argue that researchers who are strangers to the field, and those with little previous field experience, are more at risk than those who know the field well because they are unable to anticipate many of the dangers that might confront them. As a Honduran, I know the country well, this allowed me to understand (better than an outsider) the dangers in the country's environment. My familiarity with the country's language, culture, and social groups allowed me to know my way around, and to communicate confidently, to be perceived as a local, and to know who were key players of the phenomenon.

I understood that the danger that I should be most concerned with wasn't any that came from the social movement itself, but from me being associated with the movement by those sectors who rejected it. Therefore, I focused on measures proposed by Patterson et al., (1999) and Lee-Treweek, et al. (2000) that would help me minimize this risk.

First, I was introduced to members of the NFAC by a gatekeeper, who later became an informant. However, as explained in the protocol section, I not only interviewed people from the NFAC, but also from Civil Society, Government, Media, and International Organizations. This created the perception that I had an objective attitude towards the phenomenon. It is recommended that during interviews and observations, the researcher should be accompanied by another member of the research team (Paterson, et al., 1999). In my case, I made sure interviews and observations were conducted in public places, and I made sure an acquaintance or friend was always aware of my whereabouts. I also avoided attending demonstrations that, in most cases, turn violent.

I also used a "pay as you go" phone, which allowed me to change sim cards: one dedicated only to the research, and another for personal matters. It also allowed me to program emergency phone numbers and keep in touch with acquaintances, friends and relatives for support.

During interviews, informants narrated on several occasions how they were victims to harassment, persecution, and surveillance. I met one woman who had just been harassed by men in a car with tinted windows. She said they may have mistaken her for someone
else, throwing urine at her while calling her the name of another activist. Another participant told me he was mugged while in his car, and that even though he had other valuable items, the burglars asked specifically for his laptop and called him by name. A member of the NFAC told me how his wife had received death threats on her cell phone; and several other informants said they had received strange phone calls, and suspected being under surveillance. Moreover, several informants warned me that I might also be under surveillance due to my pattern of phone calls. I had no way of confirming this, as nothing suspicious happened to us, so I conclude that my safety measures were useful. These experiences enriched this research, but may have also constrained it considering my intention to conduct a second round of interviews.

3.1.3.3.3. Researcher Bias

As researcher's engagement is encouraged, bias is not avoided but observed and recorded (Denzin, 2001; Yin, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009). The researcher of this study identified their biases, as they provided valuable insight (Denzin, 2001) by writing reflexively about their motivation to conduct this study (Simons, 2009; Gillham, 2000). I also reflect on how the researcher might shape data collection and interpretation (Merriam, 2009). "Researchers of integrity are constantly challenging and scrutinizing themselves" (Gillham, 2000); so I kept an eye on my own prejudices and preferences. I did this by documenting my feelings and thoughts in memos throughout the whole process (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009). I constantly reflected on my identity, my previous knowledge about the country, its history, politics, and members of the movement. But during the process, I found out there were indeed several realities that I had not known before. So, I learned not to take anything for granted, build clear explanations of what people knew, be open to contrary findings, and to select a research method that allowed me to incorporate my biases (Yin, 2009; Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

I also meditated on how being an insider (Honduran) and an outsider (who lives abroad) made informants have assumptions about us. I found myself thinking about those during the interviews. I realized I needed to question my own "privileged theoretical
position" (Motta, 2009) as an academic coming from the United States. Thus, I decided to have a democratic and dialectic approach to the research. This meant that I would have conversations with informants, not only "hearing" their voices, but also acknowledging their judgment and perspectives throughout the research process and the presentation of the final story (Midgley, Danaher, & Baguley, 2013). This idea guided the sample selection, reliability, and validity measures; as well as data analysis and writing. Sampling was done so that I could triangulate data sources and methods. I interviewed people from private, public, and civil society sectors; and collected public documents and records from various online sources. This allowed me to have a diversity of perspectives, experiences, and a comprehensive coverage of important issues around the use of ICTs during the coup (Daly & Lumley, 2002).

During the data analysis, I questioned whether I have a preferred outcome, thus I continued to check emerging ideas with those in the culture. Nothing was disregarded; everything was weighted and corroborated against theory, and informants (Gillham, 2000). Moreover, as explained earlier findings were reported not only to colleagues, but also to members of the movement and informants (Yin, 2009).

3.1.3.3.3.1. Researcher's Reflective Statement

I became interested in the Honduran not only because I am Honduran, but also because I am as an international student living in the United States when the coup happened. I spent a lot of time and effort trying to understand it. On Sunday June 28, while living in Syracuse, NY, I woke up to a text message from a friend in Honduras who told me there had been a coup, and that the president had been expelled. My first reaction was to call my parents' house, but the phone call did not go through. Then I tried reading the most popular Honduran newspapers online, but they had no information about the coup. I finally went to the largest corporate (mainstream) radio stations websites, some of which had music, while others were streaming live and said there had been a "presidential succession." They were interviewing a lawyer who was explaining how it was "legal" for the military to expel the president.
This brought back to my mind stories I heard growing up, from relatives and friends, about how during past coups, communications and mass media were cut off, biased, or broadcasted non-related content. I realized that finding reliable information was difficult through the usual channels (mainstream media). Thus, I started a quest for information sources that would provide varied approaches. I went to social media, particularly blogs and Facebook, as Twitter was not popular in Honduras at the time. I did find different points of view there, and I also discovered a group of alternative media that had a different perspective about the coup than did the mainstream. Alternative radio stations broadcasted online due to repression, Facebook groups and blogs, were created and repurposed. For instance, artists who had personal blogs stopped talking about their art and started reporting about the coup. So my motivation is rooted in that though remotely, I felt I were experiencing what I had read about in books about the country's history of dictatorships.

While conducting my literature review, I found out that this topic was interesting not only to us, but a community of researchers; particularly those studying in the intersection of social movements, information technology, and Latin America. This realization helped frame the research problem, while being open to findings that could be different from what I had experienced during the months of the crisis.

During data collection and analysis, many of the experiences I had as a Honduran citizen were repeated in informants' accounts. I made sure informants had different backgrounds yet the ICT-related experiences were very similar. This helped validate my own experience as Honduran and avoid bias as researcher.

Self-reflection also helped me recognize that I expected this research to contribute not only to the body of literature in information science and technology studies, as well as Latin America studies and social movements; but that it will also have "validity (which will be judged in relation to its contribution to movements' strategy and the multiplicity of struggles for social justice)" (Motta, 2009).

The next section narrates the findings of this study chronologically through life span of the National Front Against the Coup. It starts by providing an overview of Honduras'
political and ICT environment before Zelaya, to help contextualize the crisis, the Frames, actors, and NFAC activities.
CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Findings and Analysis

This chapter presents the findings of this study. It starts with a reminder of the research questions, and the definition and operationalization of the constructs that bounded this study: Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFEs).

The rest of the chapter is a reconstruction of the CPM through a narrative that is the first step at identifying similarities and discrepancies with the CPM.

It is divided in four sections that are based on participants' reconstruction of events: Before Zelaya, Before the Coup, During the Coup and After the Coup. The sections are structured to:

- Provide a historical account of Honduras' political and ICT history, to help contextualize governmental symbolic and physical discourse, measures, social polarization conflict, actors, and the origin of the resistance movement.
- Provide a narrative of the coup, the emergence and development of the National Front Against the Coup d'état (NFAC) by using interconnected collective action framing episodes (CAFEs) as the unit of analysis.
- Explain the relation of CAFES and describe chronologically each one of them, with their respective activities, ICTs and events. The CAFE chronology starts by describing how President Zelaya's proposed the idea of "Citizen Power" (Poder Ciudadano) adopted from discourse of the Pink Tide. It explains how it shaped the resistance movement's emergence and evolution.

Then it focuses on the crisis during the coup and explain the raise of the National Front Against the Coup (NFAC) supported by civil society organizations that advocated Zelaya's
initiatives. It explains the evolution of the NFAC and how its collectively negotiated understanding of the coup shaped their organizational and ICT practices.

It is followed by a narrative of the consequent elections, which marked the end of the crisis and provide a summary of the NFAC’s evolution into a national front of popular resistance (NFPR) and a political party (LIBRE).

It concludes with a summary of the coup impact on ICTs as it introduces the discussion of theoretical similarities and discrepancies that will follow in chapter 5.

4.1.1. Recap of Research Questions and Unit of Analysis

The overarching research question of this study is: What is the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the emergence and development of the Honduran Resistance Movement? Starting from this question I ask three second-level research questions.

1. To understand the institutional environment that constrained mobilization, the first question asks: How does the Honduran Resistance Movement use ICTs in relation to political Opportunity Structures?

2. The second research question allows me to understand the role ICTs played in bringing together organizations in order to mobilize. I ask: What role do ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement’s organizational structures, and in preparing and carrying out visible movement episodes?

3. The third question will help me determine how the movement understands ICT and use them to create a common understanding of their issues. Therefore, I ask: How does the movement use ICTs to shape its attitudes, identities and competences of its constituents?

To understand the movement holistically, OS, MS and FP should be observed simultaneously in specific timeframes through the movement life cycle.

The dynamic between Opportunity Structures (OS) and Mobilizing Structures (MS) is moderated by Framing Processes. The movement will organize and act according to how its actors define the environmental opportunities and political actions. OS and MS interact
when members of the movement frame them in light of changing circumstances to take the movement forward. Different from OS and MS, Framing Processes are not structures, but a collective process where conditions are transformed into frames (e.g. competence, identities, experiences, and attitudes) that facilitate and/or hinder collective action (Haber, 1996). Even though OS and MS are objective criteria (government institutions, laws, civil society organizations), they are subject to movement actors' active construction through framing process. In other words, the way that OS and MS interact with each other over the course of the movement life cycle is shaped by the way movement actors frame them.

Considering frames are what guide movement action, the most effective way to look at this phenomenon is by tracking framing processes over time. Thus, my operational framework brings together Framing Processes and temporally defined Episodes through a composite unit of analysis I call Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFEs). CAFEs thus are a combination of two concepts: collective action framing sequences and temporal episodes.

Figure 15. Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFE) is the product of the intersection of the practice of creating frames and related events and practices in time.
**Collective Action Framing:** Drawn from the literature on Social Movements is defined as the cooperative practice of creating meaning (frames) to guide movement action (Benford & Snow, 2000; A. D. Morris & Mueller, 1992).

There are three characteristics of Collective Action Framing:

- It is a purposeful process to help constrain and guide movements' evolution.
- It is a negotiated collective process in which many members of the movement participate.
- Its outcome are frames (ideas, identities, world views)

**Episodes:** Drawn from Miles & Huberman's (1994; 2011) methodology to bound data that extends over periods of time where they propose condensing data into manageable units or episodes in a process that involves "selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and/or transforming the data that appear in the body of field notes, interview transcripts, documents and other empirical materials" P.12 (2011). Moreover, Somers (1994) proposes that "The connectivity of parts...turns events into episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced in anything resembling a chronological order". (p. 616).

Thus I define episodes as "sequentially connected events and practices that occur over time and have a beginning and an end." This allows capturing the characteristics of the settings, events and processes in long-term complex processes involving organizations, groups and information technology.

**CAFEs** thus are periods of time bounded by relevant events, identified as such by movement actors, where actors create frames to guide movement's actions. Several CAFEs can happen sequentially over the lifespan of a movement, and the resulting frames can be recycled or reused. CAFEs are triggered by events in the environment, event that are framed by the movement as relevant by its cause. Members of the movement engage in framing practices to respond to or anticipate an environmental event. Through this process they create frames that allow them to build arguments, call for action, provide a prognosis.
or a solution related to the event. Frames mobilize meaning, and their content changes corresponding to context and movement goals.

### 4.1.1.1. Operationalizing and Identifying CAFEs

CAFEs can be delineated by identifying Events, Practices and Frames across the life of the movement.

**Events**

Events are occurrences in the embedding environment and can range from public statements by international organizations, to presidential inaugurations. In the present case, events were identified from news reports, blogs, legislations, and interviews with informants. I constructed a timeline using the events and actors: politicians, government institutions, members of the movement, the military, non-governmental organizations, etc.

**Practices**

Practices are activities carried out by movement actors with the intention to support or propose movement goals. Instances of practices were found in interviews, blogs, and official documents from the resistance movement. Activities performed by movement actors over the life span of the movement included: Collective Action Framing, dissemination of information, collaboration with allies, securing resources and improvisation.

**Frames**

Frames are negotiated set of shared beliefs and meanings embedded in larger discursive structures, meant to: keep the movement together, give meaning to events, keep morale, set objectives, inspire, garner support, guide action, organize experience, and legitimate activities explain the situation, explain reasons for outrage, call people to action, propose solutions, and explain movement stances, objectives and culture. Given that they are deliberate strategic process, they possess the attribute of having being purposeful and goal directed. The collective action framing episodes were strategically directed by the core leadership of the NFAC. They are not promoted by just one person,
but rather are negotiated, thus they will be counteracted or disputed by the opponents. Frames are expressed in movement's official documents, public messages, pronouncements, declarations or statements, consistently over the life of the movement. However, movement actors adapted them based on local contingencies. Changes on any of these areas may trigger a new frame or the modification of existing frames. Movement actors then diffuse the frames through their oral and written discourse in blogs, news and interviews, and especially the resistance movement's official documents.

The next section narrates the findings of this study chronologically through life span of the National Front Against the Coup. It starts by providing Honduras' political and ICT environment before Zelaya, to help contextualize the crisis, the Frames, actors, and NFAC activities.

4.1.1.2. Structure of the NFAC

The NFAC was composed by a wide array of grassroots, political, and civil society organizations, many of whom had supported Zelaya's Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) initiative.

Labor Unions were considered the backbone of the NFAC due to their membership structure and leadership, they had influence and representatives throughout Honduras and were capable of reaching the most remote areas (Sosa, 2015). They included the Federation of Teachers Organizations, the General Worker's Central, Worker's Central, STIBYS, SITRASANAA, SITRAMEHYS, SITRAUNAH, STENEE. Leaders of these organizations occupied leadership roles in the NFAC organizational structure and helped collectively craft frames and direct the episodes.

---

8. Union of Workers in the Beverage and Similar Industries
9. National Water and Sewage Service Workers Union
10. Union of Workers of Medicine of Honduras
11. Union of Workers of the National Autonomous University of Honduras
12. Workers' Union of the National Electric Power Company
There were also other organizations throughout the country that were crucial allies, they included: COPIHN,\textsuperscript{13} Bloque Popular,\textsuperscript{14} groups within the Liberal Party, UD Party,\textsuperscript{15} PINU Party,\textsuperscript{16} campesino indigenous and ethnic organizations, local and community organizations, women's organizations, feminist organizations, student organizations, environmental organizations, human rights organizations, Tegucigalpa neighborhood organization and non-organized citizens. They became the supporting structure of the NFAC and though they were guided by the NFAC frames, they had autonomy to adapt the message and adjust the strategy to address local contingencies and environmental constraints.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{nfac organizational structure.png}
\caption{NFAC organizational structure composed by formal and informal organizations and associational networks, lead by labor unions and supported by affiliates.}
\end{figure}

Through its life span, the NFAC adapted their organizational structure to adapt to the increasing number affiliates. As it became a country-wide organization it was restructured

\textsuperscript{13}. Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras
\textsuperscript{14}. Popular Block
\textsuperscript{15}. Democratic Unification Party
\textsuperscript{16}. Innovation and Unity Party
to include a wider variety of affiliates. It took a hybrid organizational structure, with a hierarchy of labor union leaders in the role of coordinators; and flat structure of local autonomous affiliates. As the coup crisis passed, and more organizations joined, they changed to an issue-wide national resistance organization.

4.1.2. Before Zelaya

This is a summary drawn from the data of the 80's and 90's decades in Honduras; two crucial decades that set the foundation for the emergence of the NFAC. After Honduras’ return to democracy, the country struggled to establish itself as a democracy. It adopted neoliberal practices required by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States. This changed the country's institutional system (Opportunity Structures) in many ways. As the telecommunication markets were liberalized, the opened the door for new alternative ICT operators to participate. On the other side, despite clear laws, people did not have the ability to impact the country's political environment. Thus, mobilizing structures were reinvigorated, as new civil society organizations emerged to protested US-backed contras, school of the Americas, forced political disappearances, and neoliberal measures. These organizations later became the backbone of the NFAC.

4.1.2.1. 80's: Back to Democracy

After a long history of coup d'états, Honduras returned to democracy in 1981. It was established as a democratic constitutional republic, where the supreme power lays in citizens eligible to vote for representatives. There are three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch is led by a president, who is elected to a four-year term by a majority vote. The president, whom most of the government is dependent on, defines and structures policy. The president's powers include development and financial planning, supervision of insurance and banking companies, policy development in the areas of education and health, and improving the living conditions and social quality for Honduras. Under the Honduran Constitution, elected officials are term limited to one
term. The legislative branch consists of the unicameral National Congress elected to a four-year term at the same time as the president.

The Congress is responsible for legislative activities, including the adoption of laws, electing government officials, such as the comptroller general, commander in chief of the armed forces, and the attorney general.

The legislative branch consisted of 128 principal deputies elected proportionally by department. The judiciary branch consists of a Supreme Court of Justice, courts of appeal, courts of first instance, and justices of peace. The Supreme Court has the powers to declare laws unconstitutional, try for impeachment high-ranking governmental officials, and publication of the courts official documentation. The civil, criminal, and labor chambers make up the three chambers of the court. The courts of appeal hear appeals from the lower courts.

Trial courts for serious civil and criminal cases are what the first instance courts deal with. At the lowest level are the "judges for peace," who handle the minor civil and criminal cases and act as investigators.

Despite creating clear and strong democratic rules, Honduras struggled to establish itself as a functioning democracy with independent institutions. One reason is that the two traditional parties have historically had few ideological differences, continued to rule. Another reason is, the military continued to be the most powerful force in the country. As Honduras became the "staging area" of the US war against "insurgencies" in Central America; particularly Sandino's leftist government in Nicaragua (Ullman, 1983; Garreton, 2003), the US government through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), trained and provided extensive supplies to the Honduran military and the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary group "Contras." School of the Americas' alumni ruled throughout the Honduran military thus increasing its combative and repressive capacity (Gill, 2004; Brocket, 2005, Ullman, 1983). Between 1982 and 1984, these organizations were responsible for the emergence of death squads, the disappearance of over 179 people, and a long list of human rights violations (Valladares, 1994).
This environment set the stage for the emergence of robust formal and informal civil society. However, formal civil society organizations had the highest impact on the state, their activism has focused on:

- Limiting and monitoring the state's actions;
- Promoting democratizing and modernizing laws, institutions, and reforms;
- Stimulating political participation;
- Promoting associational life particularly for minorities and excluded groups;
- Fostering the emergence of new leader amongst excluded groups;
- Diffusing information about citizen rights;
- Raising awareness about governmental policies and their implications; and
- Serving an alternative source of information (Calix-Rodriguez, 2003).

Meanwhile informal civil society (e.g. neighborhood organizations) activism focused on promoting organizing and finding solutions to local problems (Booth & Richard, 1998; 1999; Ruhl, 2010). (See appendix 5).

During this decade, international organizations, like the World Bank, the United Nations and the Organization of American States had a strong presence in Honduras, and even stronger influence on the government than local civil society, with whom they did not have strong ties (Calix-Rodriguez, 2003). They pressed the government for the creation of laws that conform to international agreements in matters of peace-building, protection of democracy, protection of fundamental liberties and human rights (Tascan, 1997, Passalacqua, 1974). What's more, towards the end of the decade, the International Monetary Fund and the World bank prescribed a set of economic measures aimed at promoting economic activity, increasing government revenue, improving roads, education, and healthcare (Thomas, 2011). Through a set of "Structural Adjustment Programs" the government (under conservative president Callejas) liberalized trade, opened borders for direct foreign investment, deregulated, and attempted privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These measures had their greatest impact through the next decade, specially in the telecommunications sector and the political party structures in the mid-nineties.

4.1.2.2. 90's: ICT Liberalization and New Political Parties
In the 1990s, Honduras entered the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative governed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Consequently, the government started a second round of "Structural Adjustment Programs." Neither political party opposed the measures; in fact, they created close alliance to support it (Almeida, 2015). However late in the decade a new left wing oppositional party emerged; Unificación Democrática (UD), who challenged the traditional two-party system and alliances in congress. Concurrently, local civil society formed coalitions to fight the measures from the "Structural Adjustment Program." Two of the most important coalitions were Bloque Popular and the National Coordinating Committee of Popular Resistance (CNRP) (Prevost, et al., 2012; Boussard, 2003).

From their foundation, these multi-sectorial alliances defined collective demands against the state, privatization, price hikes, and the Central American Free Trade Agreement, and provided political education throughout the country (Almeida, 2015), thus preparing the way for the NFAC.

In addition to the new party dynamics and civil society coalitions, structural adjustment programs impacted the ICT sector significantly. Telecommunications in Honduras had been primarily operated and owned by Hondutel, the state run/military operated organization founded in May of 1977. At the time, Hondutel was created to establish a telecommunication system with a central body that could regulate and authorize the installation and operation of the radio stations, television stations, and the remaining services of telecommunications in general. Initially its policies did not allow private entities to participate as providers of services like telephone or cellphone; making it possible for Hondutel to monopolize the market. With the purpose of fostering investment and increasing quality of service, Callejas' government approved in October 31st of 1995 the "Ley Marco del Sector de Telecomunicaciones" (Framework Law on the Telecommunications Sector). This law promoted deregulation of some markets in the telecoms sector, allowed opening the sector to private investment, and set the stage for Hondutel's future privatization (Tabora, 2007).

First, it removed military control over Hondutel, and transferred all policy responsibilities to congress, and later in 1997 to the president of the republic (through
Second, most of the telecommunications sector was liberated; opening the door for several new local and transnational companies to provide cellphone service; and creating the need for an entity to support new telecommunication policies. Thus, creating the National Commission for Telecommunications (CONATEL), whose role is to regulate and oversee the development and operation of telecommunications. Also under the umbrella of the "Ley Marco de Telecomunicaciones," Hondutel's original organic law (Ley Organica de Hondutel) was modified to allow its privatization. This way HONDUTEL turned into another telephone, Internet and cellphone provider legally called COHDETETEL. The state had 47% equity, workers had 2%, and operator or international strategic partner 51% (Tabora, 2007). Hondutel was supposed to compete with the new privately owned providers, and was expected to be fully privatized within ten years. However, these plans changed due to the devastation and economic impact of Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Hondutel was opened for private capitalization instead. In 2000 the international bidding process failed as the only propositioning company's (TELMEX) bid was significantly lower than the government's asking price. A new deadline was set for Hondutel to relinquish its exclusivity on landlines in 2005. Hondutel’s exclusivity was expected to end in 2005. However, the 2005 deadline for its privatization was not met. Moreover, its future remained undefined as governmental bidding guidelines and goals were lacking and unclear. (CVR, 2011)

Despite the failure to privatize and capitalize HONDUTEL, the telecomm market liberalization in the 90’s had a great impact in Honduras’ ICT environment. Suddenly in the late nineties, there was a significant increase of operators, stations, services and media17 organizations. (See appendix 7).

4.1.2.2.1. Radio

Data indicates radio has been a very important means of communications for Hondurans. For a long time, it was the only mass communication media that reached far

17. For this dissertation are defined as organizations devoted to delivering news and do so through the use ICTs like Television, Radio and Internet (Newspapers, Magazines, Blogs, etc)
away communities. Emisoras Unidas and Audiovideo, the two corporations who owned
the first Honduran radio stations (HRN, 1933 and Radio America, 1948)\(^\text{18}\) had traditionally
dominated the AM and FM airwaves. They were the only ones reaching most of Honduras's
territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Total Number of Stations</th>
<th>Total Number of Operators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both (AM and FM)</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Honduran AM and FM radio operators and their stations

After the telecomm liberalization, small local stations owned by cooperatives,
indigenous people, labor unions and civil society organizations emerged throughout the
country, specially in remote small communities.

"Radio "La Voz Lenca" and radio "Guarambala" in (the department of) Intibuca, are
strictly tied to indigenous organizations, specifically COPINH (Popular Counsil of
Indigenous Organizations) and the ONIL (National Lenca Indigenous
Organization)" (Activist 8)

In most cases, their mission is socially focused. They represented an alternative to
Emisoras Unidas and Radio America.

"Radio Globo is the only radio that, in the last seven years, has opened its
microphones to ordinary people, workers, campesinos and indigenous people"
(Blog: Mirada de Halcon Aug 10, 2009)

By 2008, Honduras had a total of 950 radio stations owned by 453 operators. While
Emisoras Unidas and Audiovideo continued to be the biggest operators owning a total 129
stations, there was a large number of "alternative" stations (822) throughout the country

---

\(^{18}\). The first radio station in Honduras was owned by the Tela Railroad Company, a subsidiary of the United States' corporation United Fruit Company. Radio Tropical was founded in 1928.
(See figures 17 and 18, and appendix 7) This widely spread network of small radio stations played a very important role for the NFAC during the coup.

Figure 17. Honduran FM Radio station ownership. After the liberalization Audiovideo and Emosoras Unidas owned only 12% of FM radio stations in Honduras. Total number of FM radio stations: 671

4.1.2.2. Television

Television had a similar history as radio. It was brought to Honduras in 1959 by the same founders of HRN. So, the same as radio, they created a country-wide network of stations that were consolidated into the Televicentro corporation in the late eighties. After market liberalization, many small, locally focused television station emerged throughout the country. These "alternative" stations were owned by independent journalists, small business and religious organizations.
However, unlike radio, after the market liberalization, Televicentro continued to have the strongest presence in television. Data indicates that by 2008 Televicentro owned 24% of the TV stations. Nevertheless, alternative TV stations also played an important role for the NFPR during the coup (Fig. 19).

4.1.2.2.3. Internet

Internet arrived in Honduras in the early 1990s. Initially Hondutel was the only Internet service provider, however shortly after, there were dozens of operators mostly through telephone modem. A month of access cost $25 plus telephone usage fees. This made Internet not easily accessible for most people. In the late nineties, the service expanded and cheapened as cable and cellphone companies entered the market. Cybercafes or Internet Cafes proliferated through the country, they could be found throughout neighborhoods and communities. Those who do not have computers or
Internet at home, can access the web at about $0.65 dollar per hour, at a bandwidth of 512 kbit/s (Tabora, 2007; CVR, 2011).

Figure 19. Honduran TV stations ownership in 2008. Televicentro Owns 24% of the Television stations in Honduras. Total number of TV stations: 306

Nevertheless, by 2008, Internet penetration remained low; only 8.5 percent of the population (distributed among households, business, schools, universities and services such as cyber cafes and community access services) could access the web. What's more, newspapers, TV, and Radio's online presence was still scarce. There were just a few blogs, YouTube, Twitter, and/or Facebook accounts.

As I will show later in this dissertation the Internet allowed various national media, people, and organizations transcend borders. During the coup, many national radio and television stations started transmitting via streaming. Several newspapers started uploading video to their sites thus slowly becoming multimedia organizations.
### Table 14. Internet penetration in Honduras from 2002 to 2007. Source: Honduran telecomm regulator CONATEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Subscribers</th>
<th>Users</th>
<th>Users/100 habitants</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dic-02</td>
<td>16,856</td>
<td>168,560</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-03</td>
<td>18,551</td>
<td>185,510</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-04</td>
<td>22,227</td>
<td>222,273</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>19.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-05</td>
<td>25,820</td>
<td>258,187</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>16.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-06</td>
<td>28,965</td>
<td>337,300</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>30.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-07</td>
<td>35,741</td>
<td>424,160</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>25.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.1.2.2.4. Cellphone

ICT indicators from the Honduran regulator show the first mobile phone company in Honduras started operations in 1996. Subsequently other companies also entered the market, increasing competition and lowering prices. Cellphone quickly stopped being a luxury item and became almost a necessity. Penetration grew consistently over the first decade, so by the end of 2008, 79% of the population had a phone and texting became more popular.

### Table 15. Cellphone Penetration in Honduras from 1996 to 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cellphone Penetration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dic-96</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-97</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-98</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-99</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-00</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-01</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-02</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-03</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-04</td>
<td>10.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-05</td>
<td>18.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-06</td>
<td>30.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-07</td>
<td>55.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dic-08</td>
<td>79.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown previously, before the market liberalization mass media like newspaper, television and radio had traditionally been owned by a small group of corporations. The opening of the markets represented a big opportunity for independent journalists, labor unions, churches and indigenous peoples' organizations to own their own TV and radio stations, website, or online newspaper. It also represented an opportunity for the usual media owners to expand and acquire more stations (Tabora, 2007).

By mid 2008 radio continued to be the most prevalent ICT in Honduras (81% of homes had a radio), followed by cellphone; with 79% penetration, and television which was present in 69% of homes (See figure 20) Comparison of ICT availability in Honduras in 2008). Computers and telephone landlines, on the other side, were scarce, present only in 10% of homes. Only 8.5% of the population were Internet users (distributed among households, business, schools, universities and services such as cyber cafes and community access services).

![Figure 20. Comparison of ICT availability in Honduras](image)

Thus, the ICT environment changed. The years before the coup TV and Radio went from an Oligopoly to a large network of big and small stations. Cellphones were easier to
obtain than a regular landline and became part of people's daily life. While the Internet was slowly being accessed (Espinoza Vasquez, et al., 2005).

4.1.2.3. 2000's: Disgust with Politics

By the early 2000s Hondurans had become disgusted with politics and politicians in both traditional parties. There was an environment of pervasive economic, political, and institutional dissatisfaction. People complained about the inefficiency of governmental institutions, and the corruption within politics and the party system (Cannon & Hume, 2012; Ruhl, 2010; Peetz, 2009). The military though deprived of their official power continued to be a strong force, as a big portion of the national budget continued to be assigned to them. Civil society though active and well organized, did not have a strong influence on policy and legislation.

“There are no institutions, processes break down, there are bad intentions, you realize politicians are the only ones benefiting. Why would you defend that? Economic indicators get worse each year, children are starving. Even school lunches are politicized. The list goes on.” (International 2)

Despite having "strong democratic norms and healthy voting behavior" (Booth & Bayer Richard, 1998), Honduran institutional system did not facilitate citizen participation in politics or decision-making; nor did it allow addressing to the demands of contentious actors. Instead of being a forum for discussing and addressing the country's problems, state institutions were dependent on political and business interests; they became partisan institutions working outside national interests (Salomon, 2010; Taylor, 1996; Taylor-Robinson, 2009). They lacked the capacity of producing social benefits for the people; this had a negative impact on popular faith and democracy (Calix, 2003).

"the economic power of the traditional families helps them monopolize party structures and decision-making positions in government" (Report: CVR)"
Since the most distinct way of citizen participation was voting, election turnout was usually high (J. A. Morris, 1984; Norsworthy, et al., 1993; Taylor-Robinson, 2009); however, the country's general population of almost 8 million remained in the ideological control of a few oligarchic families, locked into a two-party patronage system by the Liberal and National parties (Frank, 2010). What's more, the sense of partisan affiliation that Liberal Party and National Party leaders expected from voters was fast eroding. Neither the National Party nor the Liberal Party has ever focused heavily on ideology or a consistent political program. (Norsworthy, et al., 1993; Ruhl, 2010ñ Garreton, etal, 2003). Although the Liberals have a small progressive wing that the National Party lacks, both parties are considered center-right in political orientation (Ruhl, 2010). Moreover, instead of producing policy and representation, the system's electoral and party institutions interacted to perpetuate clientelism and caudillo politics by allowing leaders to appoint a younger generation of leaders thus preserving the usual methods of accessing power (Taylor, 1996).

"If you have money, you also have political power which, through corruption and favors, allows you to grow your business. This dynamic is common in countries like Honduras; where power is sequestered by a few who claim to invest in Honduras, but in reality, act as mercenaries. Bipartisanship, is a deception so people think they have control over who has access to power. The reality however is they don’t, they are voting for the same people. The National Party has infiltrated into the Liberal Party, this way both political choices defend the conservative oligarchy’s interests (Blog, Realidad Nacional).

Those who intended to make political and structural changes realized their most feasible option was to do it from within government. Thus, they focused their efforts on creating new political parties (Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU) and Union Democrática (UD)). Though they could not compete with the two big parties, they were able to gain small representation in congress as well as the support of many civil society organizations.

---

20. Clientelism is a political approach that emphasizes or exploits social relations of patronage over merit.
21. A political approach based on a charismatic military or political leader. Caudillo politics are associated with military leaders that rule Latin American countries in the XX century.
Our town is composed by nacionalists, liberals, UDistas, and PINUistas. That means dissatisfaction exists, despite political affiliation. We have realized that all these years we have been fooled and used. They are only interested in us every four years, the only thing they care about is our vote, thats all.... They show up every four years, whenever they needed our vote, with bags of coffee, bags of rice, a bit of sugar, and piñatas for the kids. Then they’d disappear (Activist 6).

Moreover, Hondurans were unhappy with the unintended outcomes of neoliberal measures. The market failed to improve the living standards, adjustments stripped away the lower and middle class (Garreton et al, 2003). People did not get the change they were promised, and this contributed to the general dissatisfaction.

Despite their dissatisfaction, Hondurans were unmotivated to protest. Civil society's potential to foster change and set the government's agenda, was compromised by the lack of institutional mechanisms for citizen participation, internal organization problems, and the military's coercive practices. Worker's and indigenous organizations' leaders' personal differences, political differences among groups, and complications in their arrangements with allies (political parties, government institutions, the armed forces, and foreign funding organizations) hindered their efficacy and made people disenchanted with them as well. Some have accused them of opportunism and myopia for pursuing short-term goals and focus on economic demands (Norsworthy 1994; Boussard, 2003).

"Because there are political union leaders, who have been stuck in the past. The Berlin Wall fell over 20 years ago." (Activist 8)

What's more, the government and the military limited them through police infiltration, interceptive violence, and control of their funds and politics (Norsworthy 1994; Boussard, 2003). Given the prominent role, the military played in Honduran history, they evolved as a strong political force, governing, influencing policy, and controlling national security affairs (Merrill, 1995). Despite being reduced by half, and losing control of Hondutel in the nineties, the military remained one of the most respected/feared institutions by the private sector and the mainstream media (Ruhl, 2010). On that account, by the time

---

22. 24 of the last 80 years have been ruled by military dictatorships (See Appendix #????: List of presidents in Honduras).
Zelaya was a presidential candidate, people felt helpless and into a vicious circle where they were unable to provoke change.

4.1.3. Before the Coup

Interview, blogs and official reports data indicate that Zelaya was elected in November, 2005 in an environment characterized by disgust with politics, high criminality, economic inequality, impunity, poverty, and gang-related violence (Cannon & Hume, 2012; Gordon & Webber 2013). Having a clear government plan that goes beyond a campaign slogan, was not common practice among Honduran presidential candidates. Nevertheless, Zelaya presented a government plan ahead of the elections; it was a fifty-one-page document was called Proposal for Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano). The proposal delineated Zelaya's government plan and revealed a move to the left through the adoption of Democratic discourse and measures aligned with the Pink Tide movement (Rochon, 2000; Taylor, et al., 2001; Sosa, 2015).

The wave of leftist governments in Latin America are called Pink Tide. Pink refers to the idea that though they are leftist yet, they are not entirely radical. The Pink Tide is difficult to categorize specifically as Pink Tide governments are more of a center-left spectrum, given the variety of approaches. However, they do share some common traits in the symbolic and practical aspects of their discourse (Beasley-Murray et al, 2009; Allen, 2008; Webber & Carr, 2013).

They all accept democracy, though in varying degrees. They have all came to power through the ballot box and in some cases reaffirmed their legitimacy through reelectons and referenda (Allen, 2008). Democracy is their fundamental source of legitimation, they argue the political parties and leaders of the left, best represent the interest and desires of the clear majority of people (Beasley-Murray et al., 2010; Cannon & Hume 2012). They have a desire to reform the republic and revive nationalist and popular projects, while reconsidering the nature of political representation, thus promoting constitutional reforms (Beasley-Murray et al., 2010) to "make the state public" and ensure it is better able to defend the public interest. (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012)
Pink Tide governments declare disillusion towards the political system, rejection towards elite and dislike for U.S. hegemony (Allen, 2008; Tockman, 2009; Remmer, 2012). They see themselves as the response to structural inequality created by neoliberalism (Cannon & Hume 2012; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013, Tockman, 2009). However, they don’t entirely reject capitalism; they assert governments should have a role in the pursuit of development (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012; Webber & Carr 2013); thereby they are a blend of neoliberal policies that seek to retain the export-led growth model, mixed with statist welfare, regional cooperativist initiatives, and communitarianism (Allen, 2008; Beaseley-Murray et al., 2010; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012; Tockman, 2009). Moreover, some scholars argue they are in fact a "reconstitution" of neoliberalism in a new form (Webber & Carr 2013), as they attempt to rebuild states and deliver a democratic and inclusive social contract within more participation and justice within the confines of market-oriented, export-led growth (Beaseley-Murray et al., 2010; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012).

Pink Tide governments focus on increasing popular participation in decision-making processes which went beyond mere electoralism. They have reoriented relations with civil society and facilitated their influence over policy-making processes (Cannon & Hume, 2012). This way they have gathered and generated support of historically disadvantaged groups, like indigenous and mixed-raced sector, LGBT, labor unions, etc... (Allen, 2008), and given them autonomy to pursue their developmental goals (Tockman, 2009).

Zelaya’s government share the characteristics of pink tide governments on several levels, he came to power through elections, rejected U.S. Hegemony, joined regional trade agreements, gathered the support of civil society and implemented social welfare measures. These are explained in the next sections.

4.1.3.1. The Glue that Binds CAFEs

Our data indicates that the Pink Tide (Beasley-Murray et al., 2010; Cfannon & Hume 2012) democratic and market-based discourses adopted by Zelaya became the foundation for the frames that guided the practices of the NFAC. I identified six prominent CAFEs
through the emergence of the NFAC: Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano), Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), It's a Coup, Reinstate Zelaya, and Electoral Farce. I found that all episodes were connected at the discourse level, and framed using values articulated initially by Zelaya’s Proposal for Citizen Power, which in turn is consistent with the Pink Tide Democracy (Sosa, 2015. The values were based of refounding the country to promote human development, economic development, and democracy as citizen participation and as a source of legitimacy, while rejecting U.S hegemony.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pink Tide Democracy Discourse Elements</th>
<th>CAFEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power legitimized by citizen participation and elections</td>
<td>#1 Citizen Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalism, Country Restructuring</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist-Neoliberal Economic Prosperity</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of US hegemony</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Collaboration</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Communitarianism</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Elements adopted from the Pink Tide Democracy discourse to frame each episode

---

23. Foundationalism is defined by Beasley_Murray, et al. (2009) as the desire to reform the republic and revive nationalist and popular project that have been thwarted in the past, but also to reconsider the nature of political representation.
Consistent with Benford & Snow (1988) and Rochon's (2000) assertions about the parity of symbolic and physical aspects of discourses, the NFAC’s frames were represented physically through social movement practices throughout each CAFE. As the movement progressed and circumstances changed, CAFEs went from very broad with consistently broad goals and practices, to narrower with more specific goals and strategic practices, to broad again (See Table 17). While all CAFEs are based on the democratic idea of refoundation, a new type of relationship with citizens, and a new view of democracy; the NFAC’s practices vary.

In CAFE #1 (Citizen Power/Poder Ciudadano) the goals and practices were aimed at raising awareness about this new conceptualization of democracy. Conversely while the Cuarta Urna CAFE was also framed as the need for a new participative Honduras, it was narrower in the sense that its related practices were focused towards changing their opportunity structures by conducting a referendum and later changing the constitution. A similar narrowing happens in CAFE #3 (It's a Coup), as the goal and practices were aimed having local, national and international actors to recognize that Zelaya was illegally removed from the presidency. Simultaneously, the fourth CAFE (Reinstate Zelaya), focuses on restoring Zelaya to the presidency, and the fifth CAFE (Electoral Farce) at rejecting the elections conducted by the de facto government. Then the sixth CAFE (Refoundation) becomes broad again, as actions are aimed at creating a new Honduras by accessing power through elections and a political party (See figure 21).

In the next sections I provide a detailed description, drawn from the data, of the events and conditions (OS), actors and organizations (MS) and frame content of each episode.

4.1.3.2. CAFE #1: Citizen Power

The presentation of Zelaya's government plan, which he entitled Proposal for Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadadano), marked the beginning of the first Collective Action Framing Episode (CAFE), which later influenced the NFAC. The document started by emphasizing the Liberal Party's tradition of social reforms, and the need to transform Honduras' "precarious situation."
"As candidate of the Liberal Party committed to our country, I present before the nation the proposal of Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano) to transform Honduras. It poses a new relationship between rulers and ruled. It banishes corruption forever, the principal scourge that impedes national development." (Zelaya, Proposal for Citizen Power)

Consistent with Pink Tide discourse (Cannon & Hume 2012; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013; Fischer & Plehwe, 2013, Tockman, 2009), the proposal, which was drafted by Zelaya's advisors, a group of academics and liberal politicians, proposed addressing six areas of concern within Honduran Opportunity Structures (OS): governance and participative democracy, economic growth, human development, government administration, the
environment, and international relations. Regarding "participative democracy" it proposed new transparency and anti-corruption laws to address inefficiencies and corruption in the current system. What's more, it proposed the Citizen Power Act, a mechanism to establish a citizens' assembly that would "bring together all civil society organizations and ensure that public authorities are accountable for their actions" (Proposal for Citizen Power, 2004). Data indicates that for many citizens, this meant that at last, Hondurans would have a mechanism for true participation and government accountability:

"Citizen power is a new form of governance that will promote a genuinely participatory democracy, in which citizens have, for the first time, an opportunity to exercise social auditing, access to public information, discussion, identify their needs, plan their own development and demand their rights, legal holds that will go on view and knowledge of the nation clear rules of national coexistence" (Proposal for Citizen Power, 2004)

The proposal implemented a coherent blend of existing discourses that resonated with many Hondurans (the underprivileged, academics, left-wing politicians, and the disenchanted with politics), who embraced it. It focused on human development through economic development, people's empowerment, and political participation. Its formula for "sustainable human development" included: the promotion and development of the human person, a "frontal attack" on corruption, and a transparent government through direct citizen participation. The content of the "Citizen Power" (Poder Ciudadano) frame would later become a very important construct throughout the life of the National Front Against the Coup (NFAC). For some, it meant finally being able to participate in the country's decision-making:

"Mel Zelaya charted his own path towards empowering traditionally marginalized sectors. The Citizen Participation Act was passed the same day he took office. Manuel Zelaya perhaps without noticing it, had set in motion a powerful spring. He put to display the right of people to participate in decision-making on issues of their interest... According to those who promoted false democracy and spurious elections with imposed candidates, this was Zelaya's ultimate sin. Nevertheless, the Citizen Power was underway. The underlying philosophy in these two words
(citizen power) permeated the consciousness of the sectors that, for centuries, have endured marginalization and oppression." (Blog: Arlequin, Helen Peña)

For others, it meant a new way of to govern:

I supported the government's policy of openness and independence. The citizen participation act was very important, because it matched our goal for all Hondurans to participate in designing their own culture and identity. It was a mechanism for empowerment...." (Government 1)

The Citizen Participation Act was approved the day of Zelaya's inauguration. The signing of the act opened the door for Zelaya to start enacting his proposal and disseminating the "citizen power" (Poder Ciudadano) frame.

4.1.3.2.1. Zelaya's Measures

I infer from the content of Zelaya's plan that he attempted to address the population's generalized discontent by influencing Honduran opportunity structures, and implementing new economic, commercial, telecommunications, and political measures under the umbrella of Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano). Most of those measures were not supported by the legislative and judicial branches of government and made him unpopular amongst the corporate sector and the catholic church, thus destabilizing political alignments. Data shows these measures also helped him obtain new influential allies by gaining the support from labor unions, activists, alternative media; I explain this next.

4.1.3.2.1.1. Cabinet Selection

Zelaya's decisions destabilized his political alignments, his presidency started with a serious disagreement with his party leaders, over the appointment of his cabinet. Eager to set his Citizen Power Proposal (Plan de Poder Ciudadano) plan in motion, he refused to appoint officials who didn't share his country vision (frame). After weeks of debate, he reluctantly appointed Roberto Micheletti as president of congress, and Elbyn Santos as vice-president, both from the Liberal party's right wing. Later in 2009, against his party's wishes, he appointed Patricia Rodas as foreign minister. Patricia Rodas is a known
Historian and liberal politician. She is also the daughter of Modesto Rodas Alvarado,\textsuperscript{25} an influential liberal politician who drafted the Honduran Constitution of 1957.\textsuperscript{26} She has a long political career that started as a university student when she joined university student movements and later held various positions within the Liberal Party. Patricia Rodas shared Zelaya's ideological positions and became a crucial ally.

4.1.3.2.1.2. Energy, ALBA, and Chavez

I infer from news records, participant accounts and official reports indicate Zelaya's statist energy and environmental measures had mixed results. After declaring the national energy company (Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica, ENEE)\textsuperscript{27} in state of emergency, he appointed several consecutive managers, committees, and at some point, even himself as CEO. Some of those he appointed left after accusations of corruption, or because of disagreements with Zelaya himself. One of the most important measure was an initiative to capitalize ENEE and reduce dependence on thermal energy. This was done through the promotion of hydro and wind power. A new law facilitated the entrance of domestic and foreign clean energy investors. Thus, there was an increase of subscribers, and the revenue from energy sales improved, however at the end of the administration, the financial situation of the company remained profoundly impaired and thermal power remained the main source of electric energy. Zelaya also attempted to reduce oil consumption and address vehicular traffic congestion. He signed an executive order that implemented a

---

\textsuperscript{25}. Modesto Rodas Alvarado was president of congress during the government of Ramon Villeda Morales (1957 - 1963), one of the most celebrated Honduran presidents due to his reforms to promote social change. Among his achievements are the labour code, the agrarian reform law, the Honduran Institute of Social Security, and the Hydroelectric energy system. As president of congress Rodas Alvarado was key in all these reforms, and was nicknamed the "lion of liberalism". He became the Liberal Party's presidential candidate for the 1963 elections. He won and was expected to be inaugurated in 1964. However, Villeda Morales was dethroned by a military coup in October 1963, preventing Rodas Alvarado from becoming president. The coup against Villeda Morales shares many similarities with the coup against Zelaya. Both presidents enacted measures to promote social change, both counted on the support of labor unions, and they were both accused of bringing communism to Honduras.

\textsuperscript{26}. The 1957 constitution is regarded as an highly advanced charge magna which brought back democracy after twenty years of conservative and military dictatorships. It warranted individual and social rights and the basic democratic principle of regime alternation.

\textsuperscript{27}. National Electric Energy Company
vehicle use restriction law called "Hoy no circula." This measure was widely rejected, people considered it a hassle they were not willing to take. Corporate media, already dissociated with Zelaya’s government, encouraged people to disobey the law and drive their cars as usual.

"Zelaya invested a lot of state emergency funds on 'hoy no circula', but people drove their cars anyway" (International 1)

Two of the most controversial measures proved to be his negotiations with Petrocaribe, to purchase oil at low prices; and the incorporation of Honduras into ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América). Zelaya recruited the support of popular organizations and used their mobilizing structures to push his initiatives forward. Organizations like trade unions, activist groups, indigenous, and peasants readily mobilized to show support these deals.

"Either as victims of government co-option or guided by fundamentalism, several activist organizations mobilized to the sound of “Citizen Power.” They marched to Tegucigalpa to be present at the signing of ALBA. Two weeks before the signing, President Zelaya and his team had summoned them to negotiate demands. These demands (repeal privatization of water, public utilities, and discussion of various agrarian issues) had been the motive of demonstrations over the last five years. Up to this point, neither Zelaya’s nor the previous government had paid any attention to them. Zelaya’s intention was to create an atmosphere of euphoria and grassroots support ahead of the arrival of the Latin America’s leftist presidents to Tegucigalpa." (Ismael Moreno, Hibueras Blog, 2008)

Many of these same organizations would show their support for Zelaya later by rejecting the coup. They would ultimately provide the mobilizing structure to form the National Front Against the Coup. Nevertheless, Chaves’ visit and the ALBA signing

---

28. Translation to English: Today it does not circulate.
29. Petrocaribe is an oil alliance of many Caribbean states with Venezuela to purchase oil on conditions of preferential payment. Their founding statement reads: It is an integration initiative of the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean, which is expressed today in concrete achievements, through energy cooperation, founded on a favorable and equal exchange scheme between the countries. Petrocaribe promotes the social and economic development of the region, having as guiding principles union, solidarity, cooperation, complementarity, and view towards the south. Created June 25, 2005, with 14 participating nations. Today, it has 18 members. http://www.petrocaribe.org/interface.en/database/fichero/free/742/57.PDF
30. Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the agreement proposed by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA an agreement proposed by the United States) It is composed by socialist and social democratic governments in Latin America
made Zelaya’s opponents uncomfortable. They argued these measures were signs he intended to “implement communism” and remain in power.

“Chavez came to stir Honduras with ALBA. A businessman who opposed ALBA went on to state that the real president of Honduras was called Hugo Chavez. His statements were confirmed with photographs where Patricia Rodas, president of the Liberal Party, anointed the new savior of the Honduran homeland with hugs and kisses. It was also confirmed by the speech and behavior of the leader of the so-called Twenty-First Century Socialism during his fleeting visit in Honduras. A few hours were enough to raise a lot of dust: Some defended ALBA with passion and fury, and others rejected it as if it were the devil in person” (Hibueras Blog, 2008)

This discomfort was evident in most corporate media, but also expressed in blogs like Hibueras, written by independent journalists.

4.1.3.2.1.3. Minimum Salary

The approval of over sixty percent increase to the minimum wage on Dec 2008, further hurt relations with elites. Zelaya became very unpopular amongst the legislative and judicial branches, the military, private sector, the mainstream media, and his own party (Liberal Party). Zelaya took this populist measure given that the tripartite committee composed of government, workers and private sector couldn’t reach an agreement after a month of negotiations. He approved raising the minimum salary from $181 to $290 monthly in urban areas, in rural areas increased $33 to reach $213 (decree 374-08).

“The minimum salary increase was not a unions’ fight, it was a struggle between the president and the private sector. The law establishes that when an agreement cannot be reached, the state has the right to set the minimum salary. So, Zelaya took advantage of the law. The private sector, however, refused to implement it because they argued they had no means to do it” (Activist1)

The private sector was outraged both at the high increase percentage, and because this constituted a precedent of government intervention on decisions that had historically been made by employers. They argued it was not sustainable, it would cause losses and layoffs, and thus a nationwide social crisis.
Late in 2009, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tegucigalpa (CCIT) published data showing losses of almost 120,000 jobs between late 2008 and September 2009. They linked them to the international financial crisis, the political crisis (coup d'état) and the increase in the minimum wage (CVR Report). Meanwhile workers and labor unions applauded and embraced the salary increase. When the private sector refused to comply, they went on a strike that was supported by Zelaya.

4.1.3.2.1.4. Telecommunications

Per the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2011), Hondutel has historically been one of the most profitable state-owned companies, thus it has played an important role supporting the central government's finances. However, by 2005, it had lost the capacity to do so. What's more, Hondutel's exclusivity period also ended in 2005, and a new law was expected to be drafted by the end of 2007 in order to open the landline market. Thus, Zelaya's Proposal for Citizen Power (Plan de Poder Ciudadano) proposed strengthening Hondutel through measures that included a socially focused and competitive strategy (Elner, 2012; Beasley-Murray, 2009; Gordon & Webber, 2013) that would: expand its service to underserved populations, and would improve its operation to make it more efficient and competitive.

"We will strengthen Hondutel as a competitive company with a social function. We will provide service in areas that are not attractive to private companies. Likewise, we will modify its policies to streamline its operations akin to its private competitors, while keeping its social-public company character. We will provide more people with cheap, efficient, and accessible telephone services; both fixed and mobile." (Proposal for Citizen Power, 2005)

While the number of landlines and cellphones did increase, the impact of the proposal for citizen power's measures is difficult to determine due to a series of corruption scandals resulting from Zelaya's opposition counter-framing measures.

31. As per CAFTA
On Sept, 2007 A report, drafted by Robert Carmona-Borjas and his Washington D.C.-based NGO the Arcadia Foundation, blew the whistle on an extended network of corruption within Hondutel. In it Hondutel's functionaries, including general manager Marcelo Chimirri and legal advisor Oscar Danilo Santos, among others, were accused of conducting a gray trafficking scheme in which they received bribes from Honduran and US companies. The report was published in the Mexican newspaper El Universal. Mainstream media covered it widely while emphasizing on Chimirri's close relation with Zelaya, a previous accusation of murder, complaints of threats to female journalists, and his increased wealth. On the other side, both Chimirri and Zelaya argued this was a slanderous campaign promoted by their political adversaries in government and the United States. Chimirri defended himself by arguing that it was in fact him the one tackling gray traffic and that Carmona Borjas had specific motives to attack him, as stated in a 2009 interview with Libertad de Expresion:

"According to the nephew of the first lady (Chimirri), when he joined Hondutel he discovered the company LatinNode (a U.S.-based telecommunications carrier of international telephone calls) owed Hondutel US $ 4.7 M. So, he decided to denounce it and cut off its network immediately. Chimirri said he found 63 cases of telephone gray trafficking, in which 'officials and businessmen who financed the coup were involved'. Per Chimirri, this interfered in the affairs of Otto Reich (former secretary of state for Latin America during the Bush era), and the Venezuelan Robert Carmona-Borjas who used his company (LD Telecom) to wiretap communications from Chile to Mexico." That's the reason Camona-Borjas denounced that Zelaya and his nephew had received bribes from Latin Node in Miami." (Freedom of Expression, 2009)

32. Robert Carmona-Borjas is a Venezuelan expatriate lawyer, exiled in the United States. He requested political asylum after the failed 2002 coup d'état against Hugo Chavez. He is the founder and current director of the Arcadia Foundation. According to his website, he is part-time faculty at Georgetown and George Washington University.
34. Gray Traffic: In telecommunications gray traffic, is that that is legal for one country or the party on one end, but illegal on the alternative end. (Grey routes are arrangements that fall outside the regular course of business between the licensed telecoms companies in each country.)
35. Marcelo Chimirri is the nephew of Xiomara Castro, Zelaya's wife. Blab la. Chimirri is Zelaya's nephew... and has a history of problems with the law including... accusations of the murder of a woman.
36. He was cleared of those charges.
37. Chimirri actually sued El Universal for slander. The case was dismissed by Mexican courts.
Chimirri added that Carmona-Borjas' company owed over twenty-five thousand Dollars to Hondutel. According to classified diplomatic cables leaked on Wikileaks, Zelaya supported these claims and brought them up in meetings with the U.S. Ambassador Charles A. Ford. The ambassador, however denied any relation with Carmona-Borjas and Otto Reich. However, they did deny Chimirri entry to the US as anti-corruption measure in February of 2008. Chimirri was ultimately investigated, accused and judged by Honduran courts. Hew was exonerated on extortion and charges.39

There was another scandal due to a series of wiretapped conversations between members of Zelaya's cabinet. The recordings were disseminated on YouTube by an anonymous user. Functionaries can be heard discussing strategies to control the media and influence the process to create the new Telecomm law, to keep Hondutel's exclusivity. The Arcadia Foundation also made public on YouTube a recorded conversation between two Hondutel employees discussing bribes.

These scandals had an impact on people's notion about Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano), and interfered in the drafting of the new Telecom law and the application of the Proposal for Citizen Power measures. Moreover, they hurt Hondutel's operational capacity. By early 2008 the number of Internet subscribers had decreased and Hondutel had incurred in losses. The CVR reports a drop-in revenue, and a progressive increase on spending, which left Hondutel at high financial risk. What's more, due to these scandals mainstream media raised concerns about Zelaya's honesty and generated rumors he was attempting to control telecommunications and the media. These concerns increased as Zelaya set in motion his "Cuarta Urna" (Fourth Ballot) initiative for a national referendum, which I will explain next.

39. Chimirri was found guilty of abuse of authority and illicit enrichment, he either served short sentences or paid a bail.
4.1.3.3. CAFE #2: Cuarta Urna

Cuarta Urna⁴⁰ (Fourth Ballot) is a sub-frame of the Proposal for Citizen Power (Plan de Poder Ciudadano). It was consistent with the Pink Tide democratic discourse (Elner, 2012; Webber, 2013) on the idea of creating a new constitution to make government decision making more "inclusive and participative." In official communications and in the media, Zelaya argued the current constitution did not allow for participative and truly representative democracy, and thus needed to be modified. He proposed conducting a non-biding referendum to consult people whether would like or not to have another referendum to decide on a national constituent assembly. This second referendum would take place simultaneous to the November 29, 2009 elections. Honduran elections traditionally carry three ballot boxes, one for major, one for congress and one for president. The referendum would use a fourth ballot box. On March 2009, through executive order PCM-05-2009, Zelaya approved a law to conduct the referendum on June 28, of the same year. The questions it would ask was: Do you agree to instal a fourth ballot box during the 2009 elections, in which people will decide convocation of a national constituent assembly?

⁴⁰ Cuarta urna means fourth ballot box in English.
4.1.3.3.1. Promoting Cuarta Urna

Narratives and documents show that Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) was framed as the "path to democracy" and the "highest expression of democracy." These ideas were disseminated through an intense propaganda campaign that included print, radio, television, rallies, and counted on the support of large mobilizing structures that included labor unions and alternative media.

Since may 2007, President Zelaya had been implementing regular mandatory governmental programming on all media. He demanded a 2-hour weekly "cadena nacional" in all radio and television stations to discuss the progress of the proposal for citizen power (Plan de Poder Ciudadano). A "cadena nacional" (national broadcast) is a mandatory national coordinated broadcast, transmitted simultaneously in all television and radio stations. It is much like the US national emergency broadcast system, except it is used for official governmental announcements, not just for emergencies. Zelaya's imposed cadenas nacionales provoked more criticism amongst local media, who in a counter-framing strategy, compared it to Hugo Chavez's measures in Venezuela. International organizations like Freedom House called attention to these measures, labeling them media control, in their 2008 Freedom of the Press report.

Another dissemination measure Zelaya took to support his Proposal for Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano) and Cuarta Urna, was the acquisition of a television channel (Channel 8). The Citizen Power Information Network of Honduras (Chanel 8) began operating in August 2008. There was a string of accusations in mainstream media regarding the legality of this acquisition. Official reports argue the frequency assigned to Channel 8 (180 a 186 MHZ), had already been previously assigned to a private operator. There were also questions regarding the purchase of equipment without the required bidding process. The supreme court disallowed the acquisition, however the channel continued operating.
A third official medium of the Citizen Power campaign was the Poder Ciudadano weekly newspaper. Which also faced accusations of irregular management from mainstream media and other branches of government. All these media were all available through a web portal that is now closed. Activists and independent journalist however, argue that acquiring all these communication media, was a counter-framing measure to counteract "the string of lies against the president, uttered by extreme-right-media" (Juan Carlos Rivera, Journalist. Blog: Mirada de Halcon).

"...the presidential decision to publish a Poder Ciudadano weekly newspaper, to publicize his works and opinions, enhanced the installed capacity and coverage of TV Channel 8. Both functioned as propaganda organs, and Channel 8 in particular became the broadcaster of a sort of "President Zelaya’s reality show"." (Manuel Calderon Torres, Hibueras Blog, 2010)

In addition to the new dissemination infrastructure, there was a heavy investment on media campaigns to promote the Citizen Power measures (mostly Cuarta Urna).

Participants report both mainstream media and alternative media were happy to receive
the revenue for transmitting these campaigns. Alternative media became an important ally covering Cuarta Urna initiatives in a more favorable light than mainstream media did. Participants argue this was due to the alignment (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977) of alternative media’s ideals with Zelaya’s.

“Zelaya made smaller media like Cholusat, Radio Progreso and Chanel 36 his allies… he counted on their support, because he was focusing on development and these media also focused on popular causes… they liked his discourse about development and giving to the people" (International 1)

Figure 24. Screen Capture, Poder Ciudadano (Citizen Power) website. A centralized portal that provided access to all the Poder Ciudadano and Cuarta Urna information. It is no longer available. Retrieved on Dec 1, 2015 from http://www.archive.org

These measures allowed Zelaya to gather the support of numerous labor and trade unions (artists, teachers, listar sindicatos, indigenas, COPINH). They played an important role disseminating Cuarta Urna ideals. After the coup, they became key players in the National Front Against the Coup.
These organizations showed their support through several means. They would draft public demonstration endorsing Cuarta Urna, and they would promote Cuarta Urna through conferences, rallies, demonstrations and word of mouth.

"...I got involved socializing the idea of the fourth ballot box, I was a monitor and covered the San Lorenzo corridor. I kept a certain part of the population informed about the events that were happening around Cuarta Urna" (Activist 5)

Activists report that members of these organizations helped disseminating the idea of Cuarta Urna. They used word of mouth, or as they call it "correo de hormiga"\(^{41}\) which consists of discussing the issues privately in one-on-one conversations. It is a personal way to persuade one individual, hoping he/she will in turn persuade someone else, and so on. They argue social media became very useful for this purpose, specially because the idea of the Cuarta Urna was very complex. They argue social media and instant messaging allowed complementing the Radio or TV spots through one-on-one online conversations. This way they could explain the objectives of Cuarta Urna in simpler terms.

"I would send a message via social media to a friend saying: Look, Cuarta Urna suits us because at the end we’d have a national constituent assembly that is not

\(^{41}\)Correo de hormiga means: Ant mail in English
just representative, but participatory of all sectors of society. Then if she still had any doubts, we could discuss them through chat. In the end, she'd transmit the same information I provided to another person, and thus it had a multiplier effect."
(Activist 1)

These organizations also lend their communication resources to Cuarta Urna campaign. Activist 8 expressed:

“At the time we had the opportunity to use media like Voz Lenca (radio), and Radio Guarambala in the department of Intibucá. These radios were strictly linked to indigenous people's organizations, specifically COPINH (People's Council of Indigenous organizations) and ONIL (National Indigenous Lenca Organization). We had a deep bond with them, to the point our most prominent collaborators belonged to these organizations."

Figure 26. Photo of Radio La Voz Lenca operator. This radio is owned by the Lenca People in Honduras, it was crucial in promoting Cuarta Urna and Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano) initiatives.

42. A department in western Honduras. It is populated by the Lenca people, and has traditionally been neglected by governments.
The campaign focused on stating the Cuarta Urna initiative was a way to solve many of the country's current problems. It also emphasized it was people's right and duty to participate in the referendum. In one of the television spots Zelaya can be seen saying:

"We need to ask people if they want a new constitution, because we don't like what we have in place right now. Because there is too much violence, too much poverty, too much corruption, too much exclusion in this development model. People need to examine what is happening"

Figure 27. Screen capture, TV spot promoting Cuarta Urna in Youtube. It was produced by an artists’ collective called "Los Tercos" (Stubborn ones)

4.1.3.3.2. Counterframing Cuarta Urna

While Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) was supported by new allies in favor of the ideals of the Proposal for Citizen Power (Plan de Poder Ciudadano), it was strongly rejected by several elite actors and institutions with immense control over political, economic, and cultural resources including:
• Members of the government's cabinet, particularly those with whom Zelaya had had conflict at the start of his term.
• The corporate private sector, who had opposed the minimum wage increase and the signing of ALBA.
• Members of mainstream media, who rejected the weekly Cadena Nacional imposed by Zelaya, and argued he had abused his power.
• Thus, the Legislative and Judicial branches took actions to stop the referendum.

On May 8th, 2009, the Attorney General requested executive order PCM-05-2009 (Cuarta Urna referendum) to be declared null. Congress complied in June 17, eleven days before the referendum. Later, on May 22, 2009 the Superior Electoral Court ordered all Honduran media to suspend all print and broadcast that promoted the referendum, including state-owned Channel 8. However pro-Cuarta Urna campaign continued in alternative and state-owned media (See appendix 10)

Figure 28. Sample of contrasting logos. The one on the left is the original logo promoting Cuarta Urna, the one on the right is a modified version created by the opposition to reject Cuarta Urna

Meanwhile there was another coordinated campaign crafted by Zelaya's opponents, to counter-frame Cuarta Urna and Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano). Zelaya was accused of populism, of having an "off-the-cuff" management style, but mostly of attempting to remain in power, bringing Communism and opening the doors for Hugo Chavez to take control of
Honduras. Their motto was "Fuera Zelaya," which foreshadowed the ousting of the president and promoted rumors of a coup. Alternative journalists said this was a brainwashing campaign.

“These men, embraced by the manipulation and brainwashing propagandist machinery. They went so far as to announce almost apocalyptic forecasts, to frighten Hondurans who supported President Zelaya Rosales' administration. ‘Chavez is coming!’, ‘Communism and dictatorship are coming!’, ‘Communication media will be shut down!’, ‘Human rights will be violated!’, 'Mel is populist!’ shouted like jesters expelled from court these so-called ‘analysts’” (Juan Carlos Rivera. Look Halcon, 2009).

The shake-up of Honduran opportunity structures resulted from the unstable political alignments, the mobilization of influential alliances and both a framing and counter-framing campaign caused heavy social polarization. On one side groups who embraced the idea of a refounding Honduras through Cuarta Urna and Citizen Power (Poder Cuidadano) initiatives. On the other, a group who had "fear of communism" and rejected Zelaya’s narrative, which they deemed "extreme." The first group continued to mobilize to support Zelaya. The second group created in June 23 2009, an organization called Civic Democratic Union (UCD. It was formed by forty organizations (per their website), among them: The National Anticorruption Council, the Archbishop of Tegucigalpa, the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP), the National Convergence Forum, National Federation of Commerce and Industry of Honduras (FEDECAMARA), Media and Communication Association (AMC).

Three days later, on June 26, 2009, they published their manifesto and organized their first demonstration, they all wore white shirts, rejected Cuarta Urna and asked the Organization of American states not to participate as observers during the referendum. They continued promoting the "Fuera Zelaya" slogan, moreover they brought up accusation of Zelaya illegally withdrawing money from the Central Bank to promote the referendum, and repressing them during demonstrations.

43. As of Dec. 2015, Zelaya was under investigation for this.
Given that Cuarta Urna had been declared illegal, the armed forces withdrew their support and adopted repressive measures against Zelaya supporters. On June 25th, they confiscated the poll ballots and ballot boxes and stored them in the Hernan Acosta Mejia airbase. The same day, Zelaya's response was to: remove the head of the Armed Forces, General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, and gather his supporters to storm into the airbase and retrieve the poll ballots.
The referendum continued to be schedule for June 28. Activists and supporters continued preparations despite the turmoil. They thought of Cuarta Urna as a sign of progress towards a stronger democracy, where the people would collaborate with the executive to imagine and plan a new future.

*Cuarta urna was "a measure to reform the country's foundation through a new constitution that would correspond with the Latin America of the XXI century: open to a participative, multicultural, and multiethnic democracy." (Arlequin, 2009)*

4.1.3.3.3. Unrest and Polarization

The months leading to the coup, Honduras' institutional, social and economic environment (OS) was of unrest, dissatisfaction with the political environment, increased will to repress, and deep polarization of political alignments. Elites and the military aligned against the president, and labor and indigenous organizations supporting him.

Nevertheless, civil society on both sides of the debate were reinvigorated. Particularly those in favor of Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), as they were collaborating with the executive power for the first time. Changes in the country's structures and the participation of international organizations in the referendum had filled them with enthusiasm.
Meanwhile, the opposition organized to protest the referendum and bring attention to concerns regarding human rights issues and abuse of power during Zelaya's term. After all, the mandatory Cadena Nacional, corruption scandals in Hondutel and the Supreme Court, repression of protesters, and inhospitable environment for investigative journalists had been heavily criticized by local and international human rights organizations.

This heavy polarization was reflected and exacerbated in local media who played a determinant role disseminating the Cuarta Urna or Fuera Zelaya ideas. Alternative media supported and corporate media rejected Cuarta Urna. Civil Society thus, despite the low Internet penetration, had started exploring alternative means of dissemination, communication and socialization. Some had started their own websites, blogs, YouTube channels, and Facebook pages. Activist had started using emails and instant messaging as spaces to persuade people to vote in favor of Cuarta Urna.

4.1.4. During the Coup

On June 28, the day the Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) referendum was scheduled, people woke up to the news that the president has been expelled out of the country. The poll never took place, instead at 4am members of the military had sequestered Zelaya at gunpoint, and took him out of the country via the US airbase in Comayagüa. Informants declared that during the following hours it was difficult for people to know what had happened exactly. They report not having access to reliable information because most communication media had been cut off, and mainstream media broadcasted movies or music in lieu of their regular programs. Trying to find information, people then had to recourse to their cellphones to talk to other people, or access the internet.

"I was one of the first people to find out, someone close to the president called me.... During the next few hours we did not know how to proceed. There was no electricity, so we couldn't watch news on TV. My only source of information was my smartphone. It allowed me to be in touch with all my contacts." (International2)
Through conversations with acquaintances and friends, people realized there had been a coup. Cuarta Urna activists feared for their lives and had to hide, keep out of sight, and conceal the campaign material.

"I woke up at 4 am that morning, I turned on the TV to Channel 8 the official government channel. Suddenly, they interrupted their regular programing and said there had been an attempt against the president. They talked about how phone calls to his house were not going through and they did not know exactly what was happening. Then the channel went off the air. That's when I understood there had been a coup...... I removed all the propaganda from my car." (Activist 5)

Later that morning in a Cadena Nacional the National Congress argued Zelaya had officially renounced his presidency and presented a letter with Zelaya's forged signature. Then, president of congress Roberto Micheletti (Liberal Party) was sworn in as interim president of the republic. They called it a "Presidential Succession." Micheletti immediately replaced all members of the cabinet who did not agree on their procedure. These events mark the beginning of the third and fourth Collective Action Framing Episodes.

4.1.4.1. CAFE #3: It's a Coup

Informants narrated how those people who believed there had been a coup were forced to go out to the streets to find out what was happening. Activists, and non-activists gathered in front of the presidential house to demand an explanation. People would run into their acquaintances, and Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) activists. Soon there was a mass of people who demanded the reinstatement of Zelaya. Though the military soon arrived to control the protest, the protestors camped out in front of the presidential house, improvising wood stoves and tents.

Leaders of the organizations that had supported Cuarta Urna also met in front of the presidential house and decided to peacefully challenge the de facto regime through a resistance organization, thus they founded the National Front Against the Coup d'état (NFAC).

44. The NFAC was later in 2011 called National Front of Popular Resistance (Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular: FNRP)
In their first official statement, they denounced Zelaya’s removal to the international community and declared it a Coup d’état, not a presidential succession. They argued the Honduran people only recognized Zelaya as legitimate elected president. Thus, demanded his reinstatement in order to restore constitutional order. They reaffirmed their support for the values of Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano) and the initiative to change the Constituent Assembly. They invited people join them and protest peacefully in public spaces. The same way some local civil society organizations and labor; ethnic and professional organizations issued their own statements aligning themselves with the National Front Against the Coup.

Figure 31. Protesters improvising a stove and tent to camp in front of the presidential house during the first day of demonstration against the coup. June 28, 2009 (Source: Informant)

Their statement tapped to the broader discourse of democracy adopted by the Citizen Power Proposal (Plan de Poder Ciudadano), on democracy legitimized by elections, rather than coup or de facto regimes. They stated they would only accept a regime change by ballot. Thus, they (1) called it a coup, (2) demanded Zelaya’s reinstatement, and (3) continued to support the constituent assembly. These ideas framed the NFAC’s strategies
and practices for the following five months, and much later for the creation of a political party.

Figure 32. Spontaneous demonstration against the coup in front of the presidential house in Tegucigalpa. June 28, 2009. (Source: Informant)

The international community almost unanimously also declared it a "coup d'état against a democratically elected government." A portion of them not only condemned the coup but also adopted economic sanctions against Micheletti's de facto government. These networks, like other citizen movements in Latin America, played an important role supporting the NFAC by mobilizing (Garrett, 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; McCarthy, 1996) resources and calling attention to events in Honduras.

4.1.4.1.1. Counterframe: It's a Presidential Succession

45. . OAS, the Inter- American Development Bank, the Central American Integration System, the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American Nations, as well as individual countries. Legler, 2010
Data shows that meanwhile the Democratic Civic Union (UCD) organized demonstrations in favor of the coup, they called them "Marches for Peace and Democracy." Members of the de facto government were scheduled to give speeches simultaneously in central plazas of major cities. People wore their now characteristic white shirts with "peace and freedom" and the UCD logo written on them. These white shirts became another way coup supporters identified themselves, thus people started calling UCD members "white shirts."^{46}

Figure 33. Roberto Micheletti giving a speech during UCD Demonstration in favor of the coup on June 29, 2009. Source: UCD Facebook Page

UCD argued Zelaya's expulsion was necessary to defend the constitution, they said Zelaya had lied, and the referendum was not about a fourth ballot, but it was actually to

---

46. Camisas blancas or camisetas blancas.
have a constituent assembly. They argued Zelaya's expulsion was a constitutional succession of powers, moreover they argued Zelaya was a threat to democracy.

During demonstrations, they carried signs that read: "Peace and Democracy," "Proud to have a true democracy," "Zelaya is not democracy," "We support our new government," among others.

Figure 34. UCD Demonstration in favor of the coup. Participants can be seen wearing white shirts and carrying signs with the words "Peace and Democracy." June 29, 2009 Source: Facebook page UCD

Aside from confirming their support for the "presidential succession," they stressed they were different from the "rabble" who rejected the coup. De facto government officials would often refer to coup protesters as scum, savages, rabble, or unruly. These terms were readily adopted by UCD and coup supporters, and repeated in their personal interactions face to face and in social media.

"The coup regime discriminates against Zelaya's supporters because of their racial and social status. They are are mostly indigenous, Afro-descendants and mestizos. This segregation was highlighted by de facto Foreign Minister, Enrique Ortez Colindres, when he called "rabble" those who defended of the constitutional president." (Blog: Mirada de Halcon, July, 2009, by Juan Carlos Rivera)
4.1.4.1.2. Am I Resitencia or Golpista?

Informants narrated how while protesting on the streets or via social media, they started identifying themselves and their stance regarding the coup. They had diverse backgrounds and most did not have any affiliation. However, there were also many members of labor, ethnic and professional organizations who had participated in the promotion of Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot). Both groups agreed 1) to call it a coup, (2) to demand Zelaya's reinstatement, and (3) to continue to support the constituent assembly.

"We'd see each other during protests... and we realized we needed to get together to get organized. In our meetings, we had members of labor unions, politicians, teachers, housewives, among others... even people who had never participated politically" (Activist 5)

We identified two types of NFAC members. Based on their motivation to join the movement, protesters can be classified in two groups, "Resistencia Pura" (pure resistance) and "Resistencia" (just resistance). Those who identify themselves as "Resistencia Pura" are people who were Zelaya supporters; they were in favor Poder Ciudadano and Cuarta Urna referendum. Conversely, "Resistencia" are people who did not agree on the coup; they might or might not have supported Zelaya's measures; however, they did reject the coup, and joined the resistance movement to protest against it.

"I am a member of the resistance, but I am not "Melista" (Zelaya Supporter), I've never been a Liberal Party partisan and I did not vote for Mel; but we must recognize that what they did to him was wrong" (Activist 1)

These people usually clarify they are not "Resistencia Pura," and emphasize that they don't necessarily agree on Zelaya's measures ("Melista"). People in both groups have various levels of participation. Those who identify themselves as "Resistencia Pura" became active in the movement's organizing structure.

On the other hand, we found the term "golpista" was starting to be used to refer to coup perpetrators and those who supported it. "White shirts" and "golpistas" were used interchangeably to refer to coup supporters. However, coup supporters re-appropriated

---

47. Golpista means coup perpetrator.
these slurs and started proudly identifying themselves as "golpistas" or "white shirts." Soon it also became evident for people that media, much like institutions and citizens, were also polarized. Media could also be "resistencia" or "golpista." Mainstream media were in favor of the coup, given that they called it a "presidential succession," and refused to cover resistencia demonstrations or interview those who called it a coup. A member of civil society reported being shunned by mainstream media, once he had expressed his position against the coup.

"A journalist from Chanel 10 (Telecentro Corporation) invited me to his debate show. I told him I was against the coup, so he said: 'I have instructions from the station to support the new government, so we should leave the interview for some other time.' He never invited me again to his show. The same thing happened when I expressed my rejection for the coup to Radio America (Emisoras Unidas) and Canal 5 (Telecentro Corporation)." (CivSoc1)

In the meantime, data indicates that alternative media questioned the decision to expel the president from the country, condemned it as a coup d'état and covered resistencia demonstrations around the country.

"We were some of the first ones to call it a coup, no one on TV was calling it a Coup yet. People had stopped trusting journalists; they were considered robots who followed instructions from the media owners." (Media 1)

What's more, people started identifying each other's stance regarding the coup based on the TV or Radio stations they tuned in. Those who tuned to mainstream media were "Golpista," and those who tuned to alternative media were "Resistencia."

"I think the media was split in two standpoints. Those who were in favor, and those who were against the coup. Each side focused their coverage based on their perspective.... The same with international media. CNN showed one story and Fox another one. They had two completely different perspectives. Fox's view coincided with some local news media, whereas CNN coincided with Telesur and TV Globo." (International 2).

---

49. TV Globo, Canal 36, Radio Gualcho, La Voz Lenca, etc.
In this sense, I infer the coup exacerbated media polarization and vice-versa. While it became easier for people to identify the two dominating political alignments; it was harder for them to adopt a balanced opinion and to know who was telling the truth. Thus they started searching for other sources of information.

4.1.4.1.2.1. Seeking Alternative ICTs

In addition to media polarization, people and media reported they faced an imposed curfew in which they were not allowed on the street after 6pm. This made it difficult for them to shape their opinions and decide their stance on the events. Moreover, informants express not only having thirst for understanding what was happening, but to have an informed position, expressing their opinion and having a voice. While trying to find information about the legality of the coup, and the de facto government's actions, they found the traditional channels were no longer reliable as they only showed one version of the story.

"The largest communication media in Honduras are "Golpistas" (pro-coup) .... They influenced people's opinion in favor of the coup. But we also have independent radio stations ...and a large network of community radio throughout the country who rejected coup, these radios did divulge what was really happening. Authorities and the police immediately closed these stations. All their equipment was destroyed or dismantled" (Activist 1).

Therefore, they started actively seeking for alternative ICTs. They started changing their media habits and looked at other sources like international news media.

"So, what did we do to find out the truth? Well, we found out everything through social networks. Because obviously, mainstream media were blocked, and they were biased, showing us only the white shirts' demonstrations. They did not show..."

50. Previous research indicates ICTs help disseminate identity more effectively (Nagel & Staeheli, 2010; Shumate & Pike, 2006). In this study, we also found that ICTs can become identity artifacts. Associating with X or Y media or technology can indicate political preferences. The use of ICTs can become a political statement. The same way people identified each other as "resistencia" while protesting on the street, they identified each other as resistencia based on the radio and TV stations they used. This way they could spot resistencia members and potential allies amongst national civil society and international organizations. Those who tuned to mainstream media were "Golpistas," and those who tuned to alternative media were "Resistencia". Moreover, members of the NFAC talked about how they would proudly listen to Canal 36, and loath those who watched Televicentro. As ICTs embody political alignments of those who configure and re-configure them, they can become mechanisms for identification.
the violence against coup protesters, nor the assault on alternative media. People did not know what was going to happen. When someone neutral like me wanted to have the whole picture, we’d have to watch: Telesur, CNN, etc. to know what the red ones were saying, and local channels to see what “white shirts” were saying. Whenever I reached a point of disbelief, my first choice was the Internet. I could see what both sides were saying and what the international newspapers were saying. We even made jokes about the coup and the curfews. Cellular phones and technology really helped, because I was warned to my cell in real time about curfews, or about demonstrations going on the streets. Everybody was informed by phone, by Message, the Internet.” (International 1)

ICT indicators and collected narratives indicate that at the time Televicentro, Emisoras Unidas, and Audiovideo were the most popular television and radio operators. However, after finding out their stance regarding the coup, people started switching to alternative stations.

“So when people saw their cynical behavior hiding the truth, and learned that hiding the truth causes death, they rejected them and began to look for another media... There was then a generalized rejection of control of the press and lack of press freedom. They became aware for the first time that when choosing an information source, it is very important to consider the way in which information is handled... It was extraordinary, people changed the dial and stopped listening to Radio America and HRN, they rejected them. Instead they tuned to a small radio station: Radio Globo, where they rejected the coup and covered protests. It was the station with more coup coverage in Tegucigalpa. In San Pedro Sula and the region of Cortez there was Radio Progreso. And thus, through the country we could find small local radio stations beginning to generate buzz.” (Cit Soc 1)

Since they stopped trusting mainstream media, they decided to "look outside to know what was happening inside." They looked at international news channels on cable television and the Internet. Many of them were surprised to find "Fox News had the same stance as Honduran mainstream media and CNN the same stance as alternative media" (International 2). Thus, they figured out that more important than getting information, was to providing it and bringing the world’s attention to Honduras. Independent journalists and activists understood "the world reads online, and given Honduras' low Internet penetration, websites would not have an immediate impact inside the country, but they would have a huge multiplying effect in the rest of the world" (Media 2). Therefore, they
used their websites and blogs to show the world what the de facto government did not want them to see.

“We received so many comments on our website. A story would get 60 thousand comments. Some of our stories reached over a million comments” (Media 2)

They found that their blogs and websites could be used to counterbalance the de facto government’s statements, and provide their own analysis of the coup. Many bloggers repurposed their blogs, usually dedicated to hobbies, to cover the coup. Journalists helped refute rumors stated by the de facto government; like the one about the Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot) referendum being really the constituent assembly poll. They took pictures of the ballot papers and uploaded them to their blogs to show the ballots asked about the fourth ballot, not the constituent assembly.

Figure 35. Photo taken by informant of Cuarta Urna ballot. The picture shows the Cuarta Urna poll question: Do you agree to instal a fourth ballot box during the 2009 elections, in which people will decide convocation of a national constituent assembly? Yes/No.
People also explored online spaces to have political discussions. Bloggers provided their point of view to analyze and criticize UCD activists and government officials.

"In Honduras, they created the "white shirts," which were first used as shock troops against the constitutional government of Manuel Zelaya, and later as shock troops against resistance and tried to be used to legitimize the de facto government" (Blog: Realidad Nacional)

People used social media to disseminate their thoughts, and thus they met with like-minded people and created groups. Informants argue “Facebook groups made it easy for people to join the resistance movement. It also made it easy for a conglomerate of organizations to join the resistance movement.” (Media 1)

People also disseminated their analysis and refutations amongst those they already knew, through email and text message. Activists recount how some NGOs’ listservs were useful to reach thousands of people:

"Los Necios forward information about anything that happened to their thousands of contacts. I received an incredible amount of information through those lists. I could easily spend three to four hours reading all the information generated about the coup" (Activist 10).

Ultimately, many people joined the NFAC. They had to change their media habits first, to have an informed opinion. But this way they "discovered" new capabilities of ICTs. They found they could use social media (Blogs, Facebook) to fight rumors, get the world’s attention, find other perspectives, deliberate, and create new communities. They found they could spread information to a lot of people more quickly over email and instant messaging.

This newly created Resistencia ICT network, allowed them to compare the "presidential succession" position disseminated through mainstream media, and the "it's a coup" position found in alternative media and online, and ultimately reach the shared understanding there had been a coup d'état. Having understood the country's constitutional order had been broken, bringing Zelaya back and having a Constituent Assembly became the next important goals to pursuit.

51. A political organization, their name means "the stubborn ones"
4.1.4.2. CAFE #4: Reinstate Zelaya & Constituyente

A fourth CAFE is framed on the democratic idea of legitimation by elections and the need to refound the country. Thus, their practices were aimed at framing the negotiation process around these values, in order to reinstate Zelaya, gather support from citizens and the international community.

This CAFE is concurrent with CAFE #3, it is marked by Zelaya’s expulsion and the resistance movement’s first official statement where movement leaders “demand to unconditionally restore the constitutional order in the country” while reaffirming their “willingness to continue the process that leads to the installation of a National Constituent Assembly that will allow refunding Honduras” (FNRP, 2009) The resistance movement insisted the constituent assembly was the only way to create a new Honduras, and the return of Zelaya as the only way to reinstate constitutional order. “Reinstate Zelaya” and “Constituent Assembly” became the mottos in all demonstrations and official communications activities.

“The crisis in Honduras has only one way out: the return of the constitutional president, Manuel Zelaya Rosales. There is no other solution. The coup leaders know this. Hondurans, are demonstrating on the streets every day against military and civilian usurpers of power, demanding the return of the president they elected at the polls in November 2005” (Blog: Mirada de Halcón, 2009)

Thus, to bring him back they continued to harness the newly found power of their ICT network. They became increasingly skilled at disseminating information and mobilizing protesters locally. All communications from the resistance movement were distributed through the Resistencia’s ICT network of blogs, emails, websites, television, radio and cellphones.

Strategically more important though, like other movements like the Zapatisas (Olesen, 2004; Cleaver, 2000; Rondeldt & Arquilla, 2001), they used their ICTs to gather the support of the international community by stating importance of Zelaya’s return and the Constituent Assembly, and highlighting the heavy repression of Micheletti’s de facto
government. Consequently, international organizations\textsuperscript{52} and the international community prompted the de facto government to reinstate Zelaya, and applied sanctions like Honduras’ withdrawal from OAS and economic measures like the suspension of the WB disbursements.

4.1.4.2.1. First Attempt to Return

Activists informed me that the sanctions legitimized the resistance movement’s quest. So, they continued to demand Micheletti’s expulsion and Zelaya’s return, and organize large and well-attended demonstrations every day in all major cities. The support gathered by the resistance movement locally and internationally encouraged Zelaya to return to Honduras. On July 5th, the resistance mobilized thousands of people to welcome him at the Tegucigalpa airport. However, the armed forces occupied the landing strip, preventing Zelaya’s plane from landing. This angered protesters, who became vociferous. In response, the military fired teargas and bullets at them, killing a young man called Isis Obed Murillo.

"I was a few meters from where they killed Isis Obed... When I heard the first teargas canister explode, I thought to myself: ‘we are dead.’ I feared there would be a genocide. I could see the bullets flying over our heads. I dropped to the floor, and over twenty people ran over me, then I stood up and ran about a mile, but the teargas reached me anyway. Luckily we escaped to safety, but many people were affected by the teargas. They grew more outraged, that’s why they went back to the streets to protest” (Activist 8)

Zelaya’s plane was forced to return to Nicaragua, while the resistance movement grew more outraged and increased the frequency, intensity and number of protests demanding Zelaya’s return and the Constituent Assembly.

4.1.4.2.2. Increased Repression

As protests increased, the de facto government took harsher measures to subdue protesters and the resistance movement. This period was very turbulent, and data shows

\textsuperscript{52} OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Central American Integration System, the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American Nations, as well as individual countries (Legler, 2010)
that national and international human rights organizations expressed their concern about human rights violations against members of the resistance. They reported a very steep decline in the human rights practices in Honduras during this time. However, the resistance movement responded by adopting new organizational forms and improvising new ways to use technology. They could obtain help locally and internationally, document repression, have ideological discussions, counter-frame, make influential allies, and fight repression.

4.1.4.2.2.1. Getting Help and Denouncing Repression

Informants narrate how they started using their technology differently to fight repression, prevent being illegally detained or even killed. Informants report on the power of radio and text messages to convey information quickly.

"I was detained by the police for protesting, they put me in prison without following the appropriate protocol, so I feared for my life as I was never officially booked. Luckily they did not take away my cell phone, so I called and texted a Human Rights NGO. They helped release me... I'm sure if I didn't have a cellphone with me I wouldn't be here. In a way, a text message saved my life" (Activist 7)

This tactic became so effective that lawyers and journalists published their cellphone numbers in the radio or websites to make it easier for people to get help.

"I gave my personal cellphone number to Radio Globo, so they could give it to people. A few days later the police had captured a teacher that was participating in demonstrations. A neighbor called Radio Globo and said this teacher had been captured. In less than five minutes, over twenty people had called me, asking me to take this case. I arrived ten minutes after he was captured. Three lawyers and an advocate for Human Rights from a Human Rights organization were also there. We were able to save his life, because the police had clear intentions of killing him." (Activist 1)

This caused a wave of citizen reporting. Media 2, who runs an alternative news outlet explained:

"They sent me messages saying: "Right now the police are cracking down on the inhabitants of the X neighborhood" And bam! I'd upload it to the web. They also..."
sent Facebook messages saying: "In Y neighborhood the police are beating women" or "they threw tear gas at students in their classroom." Regular people became our reporters, in a way I had thousands of correspondents." (Media 2)

4.1.4.2.2.2. Documenting and Counter-Framing

Informants argue that while mainstream media did not cover these acts of repression, members of the resistance denounced them widely through alternative media and the Internet. They became very effective at: Documenting and disseminating reports of violence, counter-framing de facto government's attacks, and sharing resources to improve their coverage. The data provides evidence of heavy governmental repression. There are numerous accounts, videos, and photos of protesters, activists, and journalists being beaten, captured and killed. There are also reports of bombs, harassment, rapes, and kidnaps. These numerous reports helped highlight the regime's human rights violations locally and internationally.

"New ICTs make it easy to divulge any information in Honduras and in the rest of the world. Response was usually immediate, once international organizations heard there was a political murder, they published their reaction statements and sent them to the government to pressure them into stop committing these abuses. We now have this advantage that we didn't have before. When I was assaulted, members of human rights NGOs responded in less than fifteen minutes...In the 80's I was member of a student organization, we did not have access to mass communication media to denounce police or military abuse, nor did we have cell phones...If we had this technology in the 80's there would have been less extrajudicial killings" (Activist 1)

They were also able to respond to the opposition with facts, and bring light on the background of people involved in the coup. For instance, the case of General Vasquez Velasquez, head of the armed forces during Zelaya's presidency and the coup. Resistance members circulated through social media (blogs, Facebook), and email, a 1993 newspaper clipping, where he is shown being captured by the police for being involved with a car-smuggling band.
Figure 36. News clipping from 1993, showing General Vasquez Velasquez being arrested as member of a car-smuggling ring (Headline reads: Colonel Leva and Major Vasquez Velasquez will be detained at the National Penitentiary) This news clipping was retrieved by a librarian at the national newspaper archive and widely distributed online in blogs, emails and social media. The librarian was fired by the Micheletti regime.

They tried to raise awareness of elite and media alignments, as well as their information control and manipulation. A pivotal event was the death of Isis Obed Murillo on July 4. He was a young protester who was killed during Zelaya's first attempt to return to Honduras. The military shot against thousands of protesters who waited for Zelaya's return outside of the national airport. One of the bullets hit Isis Obed Murillo killing him.
A mainstream media newspaper (La Prensa) published a photoshopped image where they had deleted the blood from his shirt and head. However, people and journalists in the resistance movement had already posted their own photos and videos online, in which he is clearly seen bleeding. Due to general outrage, La Prensa had to apologize, and argued it was an error in the printing process (See figure 37).
There were dozens of similar images and video taken by protesters online. The images circulated worldwide, and Isis Obed became a symbol of Michelleti's government oppression. The death of this protester as well as La Prensa's actions encouraged activists to continue protesting and demanding Zelaya's return.

4.1.4.2.2.3. Making Allies and Collaborating

Data indicates, the NFAC's network of support grew very quickly. In addition to the organizations that supported Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), independent journalists, and the citizens who rejected the coup, the resistance movement harnessed the support of other local and international civil society organizations. What's more, many organizations that had never collaborated before became important allies.

“We have worked with feminist organizations. Before the coup these organizations would only work around women’s rights issues, after the coup they have broadened their area of focus and have conducted studies on the attacks against women during and after the coup. The same thing has happened with LGBT organizations, which had never participated in these kind of mobilizations, and now thanks to information and communication technologies they have gained conscience and are

53. e.g. Witness for Peace, Amnesty International
now participating actively against the coup with the resistance movement." (Activist 1)

Many of these organizations were influential and had large infrastructures.\textsuperscript{54} Their organizational resources, skills, listservs, emails, cell phones, websites, radios, blogs and Facebook pages were put into the service of the movement.

"The owner of a small local radio station gave the resistance a time slot; he broadcasted all the movement's official statements and covered all the events." (Activist 7)

Participants argue ICTs allowed them to collaborate more easily, build social networks, and strengthen weak ties.

"Through the Internet I was able to make contacts from international organizations. The human rights organization I collaborate with uses the Internet heavily to increase their outreach network." (Activist 7)

The resistance movement created a multi-stakeholder transnational ICT mobilizing structures, the likes of which Honduras had never seen. A member of the Front of Lawyers Against the coup explains:

"The coup has awakened a lot of feelings amongst several organizations. The Front of Lawyers has worked with COFADEH,\textsuperscript{55} COHDEH,\textsuperscript{56} CIPRODEH,\textsuperscript{57} CRPT\textsuperscript{58} and other organizations dedicated to advocate for human rights. In addition, we have worked with feminist organizations such as CDM,\textsuperscript{59} Visitación Padilla. Before the coup these feminist organizations would only work around women's rights issues. After the coup, they broadened their area of focus and have conducted studies on the attacks against women during and after the coup.... The same thing has happened with LGBT organizations, which had never participated in these kinds of mobilization. Now thanks to communications and information, they have gained awareness and are now participating actively against the coup with the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular (National Front of Popular Resistance) ... We have also collaborated with CIPRODEH.... They have helped covering meals and gas expenses for forty (40) lawyers who monitored police stations in case of detainees. In addition, we had a consultation with lawyers from Colombian lawyers' collective

\textsuperscript{54}\textsuperscript{.} e.g. labor and peasant unions
\textsuperscript{55}\textsuperscript{.} Committee of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared in Honduras
\textsuperscript{56}\textsuperscript{.} Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Honduras
\textsuperscript{57}\textsuperscript{.} Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights in Honduras
\textsuperscript{58}\textsuperscript{.} Center for Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and their Families
\textsuperscript{59}\textsuperscript{.} Women's Rights Center
who shared his experiences in Colombia. We intend to adopt the same model; so all these activities have been very useful to educate us as Lawyers Front members given our new role as human rights advocates."

Now they had local and international labor unions, news media, NGOs, activists and citizens working together to fight and denounce repression and to bring Zelaya back.

4.1.4.2.3. Increased Information Control

Given that the NFAC's communication and outreach strategies were effective, and there were so many alternative media broadcasting their information, the de facto government implemented several repression tactics curtail them.

One of the first measures was to appoint General Romeo Vasquez Velazquez as general manager of Hondutel. He militarized Hondutel, which activists denounced widely.

"The day after the coup I went to work. There were crowds outside of the presidential palace, and Hondutel was militarized. Telecommunications were not working, we couldn't communicate. Cell phone companies' personnel had occupied Hondutel's building and were tampering with the equipment" (Media 1)

Harassment and persecution persisted, they militarized stations, confiscated, and destroyed their equipment and regularly shut down electric power to alternative media. The de facto government even took measures to legalize such persecution and harassment. Through the state of siege declared on September 26, they suspended civil warranties for 45 days. The regime used this as an opportunity to shut down alternative ICTs, interrupt transmissions, confiscate equipment, and ultimately shut down entire stations. Human Rights organizations' reports, informants' testimonials, and blogs, indicate, only those stations who supported the NFAC and rejected the coup were targeted.

"It is prohibited: any spoken, written or televised broadcast or publication that offends human dignity, public officials or attempts against the law, government resolutions; or in any way threatens peace and public order; CONATEL through the National Police and the Armed Forces, is authorized to suspend any radio station, television station or cable system that does not fit their programming to these provisions."

(Diario Oficial “La Gaceta,” Tegucigalpa, MDC, 26 de septiembre 2009. No. 32,024. Sección A. Acuerdos y Leyes.)
CONATEL ordered confiscating equipment from several radio stations. Members of the military, the police, and technicians from CONATEL participated dismantling them.

"People were distressed, because the streets were empty, you could only see the police or the military. Some TV stations, like TV Globo and Cholusat were intervened or shut down. We could only watch what the government wanted us you watch" (Activist 3)

"...During the coup community radio stations bore the brunt of the repression. For example, Garifuna radio was destroyed, so did the Voice of Zacate Grande, La Voz Lenca was not militarized but they blocked their signal. (Activist 7)

The Sustainable Development Network (RDS), manager of the .HN (Honduras) domain name, reported through the resistance's ICT network that CONATEL attempted to intervene their equipment and ordered them to suspend registration of .HN domain names. They were also ordered to hand over their .HN domain name database including names and IP addresses.

60. Radio La Catracha, Cholusat Sur, Radio 104.5 and Canal 36
61. National Preventive Police, Criminal Investigation Command, special operations Police (Cobras), members of the Army
Honduran and international journalists were harassed in several ways (equipment confiscations, death threats, wrongful terminations, torture, kidnaps and death). There were repeated instances like the one below:

"The regime brutally attacked Julio Umaña, a photographer for Diario Tiempo. After hitting him several blows with batons, uniformed captors seized him and confiscated his camera. He was released after an hour. They gave him his camera back on an empty chip, without the pictures showing the savagery perpetrated against thousands of citizens demanding the return of Manuel Zelaya Rosales." (Blog: Mirada de Halcon, 2009)

Informants argue the de facto government became "the number one threat for alternative media" (Activist5). Cellphone companies however, were not intervened by the military during the coup. In fact, informants insist cellphone companies aligned with the de facto government and supported the coup. They argue that while cellphones were very useful instruments to fight repression, they were also used against the members of the resistance movement.

"...we have three mayor companies: Tigo, Claro and Digicel. All of them supported the coup, some more than other. The ones with fewer customers were not so outspoken about their support for the coup. The largest one, Tigo, was very clear about their position, in fact a lot of our communication was intercepted by them. But on the other side, cell phone services have been useful for the resistance movement. They (the government) wanted to cut the service, but that would mean a big monetary loss for the company, they would lose millions and the government couldn't persuade them to cancel the service." (Activist 1)

Activists report losing cellphone signal during demonstrations and having their picture taken by the military and the police. Many activists suggest they were victims of surveillance, arguing their cellphones behaved strangely after they joined the resistance movement. Numerous activists were also harassed constantly over their cellphones and received death and rape threats.

---

62. This extended to after the coup in Pepe Lobo’s government, the report by the Human Rights comission indicates had been 25 journalist killings related to their position on the Coup d’état. In 2010 Honduras was declared the most dangerous country for journalism.
4.1.4.2.3.1. Improvising

To retaliate the unstable environment, heavy repression and information control; members of the NFAC engaged in creative improvisation practices to make the most out of the resources they had at hand. Informants talk about how they engaged in a bricolage-like behavior in which they deliberately re-used existing ideational, material and institutional elements at hand incorporating bits and pieces to continue communicating despite having their equipment confiscated or destroyed.

"we have re-arranged the way we use ICTs; we did not use them the usual way.... We keep thinking about ways to use technology in our favor" (Media 1).

Radio and television stations tinkered and repurposed ICTs to continue broadcasting. Activists and citizens used ICTs in unintended ways to share information. And some resorted to old fashion strategies to circumvent surveillance.

4.1.4.2.3.1.1. Tinkering and Repourposing

First, they rearranged their equipment and went from relying only on analog broadcasting technology to a digital-analog hybrid. Independent radios, TV stations, and newspapers that had their equipment dismantled or seized by the military and the police, started relying on Internet to broadcast their programs and news.

"All the equipment from Radio Globo and Radio Progreso was destroyed, the same way, Canal 36 was dismantled. However, they could broadcast news through the Internet. (Activist 1)

They collaborated with other radio stations to pick their broadcast from the Internet and retransmit it to the rest of the country using their antennas. Thus creating national and international hybrid internet-radio networks.

"Thanks to new technologies like the Internet, the radio stations whose antennas had been dismantled by the government were able to broadcast through the Internet. The information that Radio Globo broadcasted here in Tegucigalpa, was re-broadcasted in El Progreso by Radio Uno. Though radio repeaters and the Internet we could reach even the most remote areas of Honduras." (Activist1)
This way community radios in Honduras connected to each other and to other radios in Latin America. They obtained the signal from the Internet and re-transmitted it via radio waves and vice-versa.

"163 community radios in South America broadcasted news about the Honduran coup. They received signal from the Internet and broadcasted it over the radio waves" (Activist 1).

The same way, newspapers and TV stations had an outlet thanks to the Internet when their offices were closed by the military. In some cases, they temporarily changed to online only, but came back to this hybrid/blended approach.

4.1.4.2.3.1.2. Personal to Public

Another way in which the NFAC improvised was by turning personal devices (like cell phones or personal computers) into public technologies. Lawyers and journalists made their private phone numbers available at TV or radio stations so that people who had been detained would call them for help or to report unlawful activity by the police or the military. Moreover, cell phones became a sort of mass media, members of the resistance movement reported using the text message forward function extensively, to disseminate information. They would not only forward messages they received to their contacts, but added the new recipients of the message to their list of contacts. This way they could report events, convene, spread news, and forward information to a very large audience of friends and strangers.

"Even though the cell-phone companies supported the coup, and would cut the cell phone signal for long periods of time, people would use their cell phones to transmit news. Whenever I got a text message, I would forward it to people I knew, this would cause a chain reaction. (Activist 1)"

A similar phenomenon happened with their emails.

"I'd add people to my list of contacts even if they were strangers. This is how I was able to have amongst my contacts important international organizations" (Activist 7)
Personal computers were also used this way, people would bring them out of the house on the curb and connect them to loud speakers so that their neighbors could read the news, or listen to local radio stations online.

"Whenever I went to poor neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa, people had found out ways to be informed, they would put a computer on a chair outside and would be online listening to Radio Globo or reading news. They would connect them to loud speakers." (Media 2).

4.1.4.2.3.1.3. Back to Basics

Members of the resistance movement took cautionary measures to make sure their communication was effective. In many cases, they resorted to what they call "human mail" which is communicating important messages face to face in order not to leave a trace.

"We are also using an old communication method, which has been used in all Latin America to convey coded messages: The so-called human mail. I'd receive a message orally and I'd carry and convey it orally, the message is not transmitted or recorded any other way. This way it cannot be traced." (Activist 1)

They also spoke in code during their conversations over the phone, even some radio journalists resorted to conveying coded messages through radio, as Activist 1 explains, it was not a predetermined code, but people tried to understand it.

"Radio Gualcho’s owner created a show in which he spoke in code, and people got interested trying to decipher what he was trying to say...He would send coded messages about various events, like the return of President Zelaya. They were short but effective messages." (Activist 1)

Another measure they took is to open alternative email and Facebook accounts, and to have several cell phones or SIM cards.

"...those of us who thought our phones had been tapped; sometimes took some preventing measures, not in an organized way though. I have two cell phones with four different phone numbers. Only one of those numbers is under my name, the others are under other the names of people who have nothing to do with the resistance. This is not a long-lasting measure, but it helps temporarily divert police phone call tapping." (Activist 1)
Resorting to analog and techniques was useful. Thinking that they were under surveillance, did not stop members of the movement from organizing and continue to demand Zelaya's return.

4.1.4.2.4. Return and Scheduled Elections

Due to increased repression and information control, the demands and practices in the Reinstate Zelaya episode were more focused. However, the NFAC failed at reinstating Zelaya; despite having mobilized local supporters, international organizations, and improvised new ICT-based strategies to bring attention their struggle, fight repression and counter-frame Golpistas. Nevertheless, they continued to demand Zelaya's reinstatement as was the only legitimate president as he had been democratically elected.

Collected narratives indicate that on July 7th, former Costa Rican president and Peace Nobel Prize laureate Oscar Arias started mediating around of negotiations between Zelaya and Micheletti. Both parties had delegates to represent them and Zelaya appointed members of the resistance movement to participate in the negotiation. After several attempts, on July 22nd, Arias presented a final agreement draft entitled: San José Accord for Reconciliation and Strengthening of Democracy in Honduras. The accord's most important terms required:

1. The creation of a government of unity and national reconciliation
2. Amnesty for political offenses (crimes) before, during and after June 28
3. Renunciation the convening a National Constitutional Assembly or reforming of the constitution
4. Moving up the general elections and transfer of government
5. Returning Zelaya to the presidency of the republic until the conclusion of the present governmental period on Jan 27th 2010
6. Appointing two boards, one to foresee the whole process, and a second one to investigate the coup

The proposal was rejected by both parties, the de facto regime argued Arias was biased by the international community, given he had included Zelaya's reinstatement in the
proposal. Meanwhile Zelaya and the NFAC didn't agree to point #3 and argued they wouldn't renounce to the Constituent Assembly. A communique from the Resistance Movement stated:

"We will not give up participatory and inclusive democratic processes that are aimed at the creation of a National Constituent Assembly" (Communique #13)

Thus, Zelaya made plans to enter Honduras through the Nicaraguan border on July 24th to retake his position as president. To support him, the Resistance Movement called "the Honduran people to join the caravan to receive our legitimate president Manuel Zelaya Rosales" (Communique #13). Zelaya attempted entering in two occasions but the military prevented him from doing so. Meanwhile, the caravan of protesters walking from Tegucigalpa, were stopped and repressed by the military.

Micheletti stated Zelaya's attempt to enter Honduras annulled the San Jose accord, so he ordered the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to proceed planning the November 29th elections and invite national and international observers to witness them. Later, on Sept 21st Zelaya secretly entered the country and, given that an arrest warrant against him was still active, the Brazilian ambassador gave him political asylum. He stayed as "distinguished guest" at the Brazilian embassy until his situation was resolved in January of 2010.

Members of the NFAC camped out of the embassy in support of Zelaya. They continued demanding "restoration of constitutional order and a constituent assembly" through peaceful resistance, highway blocking, demonstrations, workers' strikes, etc. They encouraged people to "actively reject the electoral farce" scheduled for November (Communique #23). Once again they were repressed heavily, therefore, UN Condemned human rights violations in Honduras and UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon determined Honduras did not meet the conditions to conduct elections and withdrew UN assistance.
Between Oct 8th and 30th the OAS mediated a second round of negotiations baptized "Guaymuras Dialogue." The starting point was the San Jose Accord, so for the most part the terms were the same except that elections would take place on November 29, and "rolling back Executive Power to its status prior to June 28th, 2009, until the end of the current governmental period" was to be "resolved" by congress. On Oct 30th, both parties signed the new agreement called San Jose-Tegucigalpa Accord.

However, the section of the accord referring to Zelaya's reinstatement was interpreted differently by both parties. While Zelaya expected to be reinstated immediately, the de
facto government delegated the task of reinstating him to congress, who had expelled Zelaya in the first place.

At the international level the OAS and most of the international community argued the terms were clear, and Zelaya and a "government of national unity and reconciliation" should be established by Nov 5th. However, the U.S. Department of State's sub-secretary Ian Kelly, argued that it was up to the Honduran congress to decide.

Consequently, Zelaya and the NFAC rejected the Guaymuras Accord and rejected the upcoming elections, as they were driven by Micheletti's government, which he argued did not guarantee broad participation and were illegal. Zelaya distributed an open letter in which he stated that due to the coup, there was no freedom in Honduras and called people to reflect and consciously challenge and denounce electoral fraud. He declared there would not be reconciliation and the elections were a "farce."

Congress delayed the decision until after the elections by going on recess until December 2nd, to "discuss" whether Zelaya should be restituted. On Nov 29th, elections took place amidst large absenteeism. Porfirio (Pepe) Lobo Sosa from the National Party was declared president elect. The international community's position was split, some of them recognized the new government and some rejected it as it was elected while Zelaya was still ousted. On Dec 2nd, the National Congress decided to reject the proposal to reinstate Zelaya and keep Micheletti in power until the inauguration of the new government. At this point Zelaya was still in the Brazilian embassy and the arrest warrant was still in place.

4.1.4.3. CAFE# 5: Electoral Farce

The failure of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose agreement marks the start of the fifth CAFE. The elections were labeled "Electoral Farce" by Zelaya and the NFAC. This episode was framed on democratic principles like the popular vote as legitimate access to power. They reiterated the importance of reinstating Zelaya as the only way to maintain constitutional order, and declared the upcoming elections were not legitimate. Practices were aimed at raising awareness about the illegality of the elections, and preventing people from voting.
Their rejection of the upcoming elections was expressed in an official communique and distributed throughout alternative media.

"Having reached the November 5 deadline without restoring the legitimate president Manuel Zelaya Rosales, we declare our active rejection of the electoral process on November 29 this year" (Communique #34).

The NFAC explained reinstating Zelaya was not achieved through the accord because

"...most members of Congress legitimized the coup perpetrated by the military and the oligarchy, and closed the possibility of reinstating Manuel Zelaya Rosales" (Blog Mirada de Halcon, 2009).

Therefore, they mobilized to make citizens, politicians, and the international community aware the upcoming elections were a "farce" and "illegitimate" because they were "organized by a de facto regime, who represses and crushes its citizens' human and political rights." They argued that supporting them would "validate the coup and would perpetuate their exploitative system." They also reiterated the "only way to return to institutional order is Zelaya's reinstatement and the National Constituent Assembly" (Communique #36).

The resistance movement felt confident they could make elections fail, as they had achieved a higher level of organization. Other organizations, and thousands of citizens in addition to the organizations that supported Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), had joined the resistance movement.

"The passage of time demanded more organized and planned activities from us. Thus, emerged the departmental fronts of resistance, municipal fronts resistance, and neighborhood fronts of resistance." (Activist 5)

At this point they counted on a large interconnected organizational and ICT infrastructure of resources working for their cause. Internet, cellphones and social media were fully integrated into their mobilization and dissemination strategy, and alternative media had become very popular.
Thus, they planned a series of nation-wide actions against the "electoral farce." First they organized a boycott of the elections; urging people not to vote, the international community not to recognize them, and political candidates not to participate in the elections.

"We call on political candidates running for office on November 29, to display an attitude consistent with their earlier commitments, and publicly withdraw from the electoral farce." (NFPR: Communiqué #34)

They coordinated more non-violent marches to protest the elections, which continued to be repressed.
"Members of the Honduran armed forces who supported Roberto Micheletti’s coup regime, repress protesters peacefully marching in San Pedro Sula in protest against the fraudulent electoral process taking place this Sunday." (Blog: Hibueras, 2009)

Finally, they scrutinized them through neighborhood observer commissions, who reported absenteeism, irregularities and fraud.

"Did you know that the coup regime and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has not yet published the “election” results of each town?" (Blog: Arlequin, 2009)

Many of their reports were covered in alternative media and independent journalists' blogs.

Figure 42. Photographies published in a blog, deouncing absenteeism through an empty ballot box, and electoral fraud through an image of national ID cards held by members of the polling station. (Blog: Guachas Red)

The NFAC openly questioned the elections' procedures and results. Independent journalists reported “there were no massive elections," they argued that "contrary to scenarios observed in past elections, abstention had triumphed in these elections." They stated the atmosphere on Nov 29 "was marked by desolation, repression and tension," and that "there would have been more attendance had elections been held in democratic conditions" (Blog: Mirada de Halcon). Thus, the resistance movement publicly declared that given the conditions and results of the elections they were illegal and a failure.
"We have witnessed the failure of the "electoral farce" due to low turnout at polling stations. Despite the campaign of intimidation, threats and harassment the de facto government and part of the private sector mounted to make people vote." (Communique #39)

They stressed that given their illegality they would not recognize the elected president. Moreover, they called "on honest and democratic governments and social movements around the world, to reject the results of the electoral farce and to ignore the fake government to be installed on January 27." (Communique #41)

However, for the de facto government, a portion of Hondurans and a section of the international community argued the elections marked the "end of the crisis." They celebrated and stated the inauguration of Pepe Lobo in Jan 27th was a step towards democracy.

4.1.5. After the Coup

Lobo's "government of unity and reconciliation" was inaugurated in January 27th 2010; while the resistance movement "reiterated the decision to ignore the regime of Porfirio Lobo, considering the continuation of the dictatorship imposed by the oligarchy through the coup on June 28." They called their proposed dialogue a "farce" and their government plan a "continuation of the failed neoliberal model and a means for maintaining the privilege of the minority class." (Communique #46).

Lobo's first executive action was signing a safe passage for Zelaya to leave the country and get political asylum in the Dominican Republic. The resistance movement organized a large demonstration to bid him farewell at the airport and vowed to keep fighting for the Constituent Assembly.

At this point the NFAC went through an institutionalization phase where they recycled the original Citizen Power (Poder Ciudadano) values to fit their current situation. Thus, they had also to rethink their organizational structure and practices to achieve a new set of goals. I will detail this process in this section.

4.1.5.1. CAFE# 6: Refoundation
The sixth CAFE started when Porfirio Lobo won the elections, and the NFAC realized Zelaya would not be reinstated. However, the NFAC continued to call for the reconstruction the country, therefore, they reinvigorated the original "refounding" idea from the Proposal for Citizen Power (Plan de Poder Ciudadano). They argued Honduras' problems were so deeply rooted that the country needed to be restructured from within.

The leaders of the NFPR determined the best course of action to influence the Honduran political system and conduct structural changes such as the Constituent Assembly, was by reaffirming their existing ideological consensus, and creating their own mechanisms for participation. Hence, their actions became more strategic, and constrained by their common ideas, identities and worldview.

"Despite disagreements (among the members of the Resistencia and Resistencia Pura), our ties are stronger. We agree on the Constituent Assembly and on refunding Honduras" (Activist 5)

Consequently NFAC entered into formalization and institutionalization phases. They took on the refoundation of the country by first refounding themselves. They adopted practices to adapt their mobilizing structures and strategies for their new goals.

4.1.5.1.1. New Organizational structure

The NFAC went through large changes in their organizational structure. Since the NFAC was constituted by a variety of organizations, it had taken on several other causes, including human rights violations during the coup, scrutinizing Lobo's governmental measures, denouncing corruption, and prosecution of "golpistas," environmental issues, struggle for land, among others.

First in January 2010, they changed the name from National Front Against the Coup (NFAC) to National Front of Popular Resistance (NFPR) to make evident the number of causes they worked on and the large number of organizations that were part of it.

Later in 2011 the NFPR had another transformation and changed their name to "Broad Front of Popular Resistance." As indicated in their documents, it was a new organizational structure that would serve as an umbrella for all the organizations associated to the
resistance movement (Artists in Resistance, Youth in Resistance, Teachers in Resistance, Lawyers in resistance, COPINH, COFADEH, etc.) to continue collaborating. But would but more importantly, allow the organization to have a branch for political party. The party was called LIBRE (Free), which stands for Freedom and Refoundation (LIBertad y REfundacion), and participate in the 2013 elections.

"Most civil society organizations are part of the movement. They will all be represented through the resistance's party" (Activist 1)

Civil Society organizations in the FNRP played an important role mobilizing people and information during the campaign. During the primary elections, LIBRE's candidate, Xiomara Zelaya, Zelaya's wife, received the highest number of votes amongst all candidates. This made members of the movement optimistic about the possibility of winning the presidency. Their major concern though was the possibility of electoral fraud.

"We have a good chance of winning the presidency. We have challenges though; they are planning on committing fraud." (Activist 1)

Xiomara Zelaya did not win the elections of 2013, and Juan Orlando Hernandez from the conservative party (Nacional) was inaugurated in 2014.

4.1.5.1.2. ICTs for Refoundation

Like their overall strategy, the NFPR's ICT strategy was carefully crafted to reflect their ideological consensus and their common goal towards Honduras' refoundation.

Alternative radio and television stations were part of this strategy. Their increased popularity after the coup made them an important part of FNRP and LIBRE campaigns. Listening to these stations became associated with a stance regarding the coup and later the socialist ideology of FNRP and LIBRE.
Their online presence had a unified look and feel, and consistent content throughout. It was a transparent portal that provided official documentations on their organization structure, action, tactics, strategies and ideology and goals. It also provided tools for discussions, exchange of ideas, dissemination of information, and connections to their large network of organizations. The NFPR and LIBRE used ICTs to support the campaign as well as to educate people on reporting irregularities in the elections. Such type of educative campaign had not been done in Honduras before.

Their websites, blogs, Facebook profiles, twitter accounts were coordinated and the product of a joint effort by individual and organizational members of the movement.
Leaders of the movement and LIBRE's candidate were amongst the most popular politicians on social networks like Twitter or Facebook. Xiomara Castro was the most popular politician on Facebook amongst Honduras with over 107 thousand local followers. Followed by a television personality who founded a new party after the coup called "Anti-Corruption Party." The LIBRE party was third with 72 thousand local followers. The candidates of the National and Liberal parties were fourth (65,977) and fifth (50,1180) respectively (See appendix 8).

During the 2013 elections ICTs, social media were used to monitor the validity of the elections. People twitted and posted irregularities via twitter and Facebook. The movement also reported them on their websites. Media polarization continued, with mainstream media supporting the candidates of the two traditional parties and alternative media supported the movement and its party LIBRE. As mainstream media talked about transparent elections, alternative media like Canal 36 and TV Globo reported irregularities. Despite the irregularities reported by activist, journalist and regular citizens, Juan Orlando Hernandez from the National Party was declared the winner. LIBRE and the anti-
corruption party appealed but the elected president Juan Orlando Hernandez was inaugurated in January 2014.

4.1.6. Summary of CAFEs

This table summarizes CAFEs throughout the life span of the NFAC. It shows the events, frame content, authors, intended audience, practices, related ICTs and the source of data to support it. As we explained earlier CAFEs are periods of time bounded by relevant events, identified as such by movement actors, where actors create frames to guide movement's actions. It is important to note that some CAFEs were simultaneous and that the frames were recycled or reused to fit the situation and to fit practices. The events that triggered CAFEs were important occurrences that affected the social movement. Once the event happened, members of the movement engaged in various practices to respond, anticipate, or react to the event. Through this process they create frames that allow them to build arguments, and engaged in improvisation activities to call for action, provide a prognosis or a solution related to the event (e.g. Fight repression, denounce human right violations). Frames are loaded with meaning, and their content was adapted by members of the NFAC to fit the context and movement's desired outcome.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No/Date</th>
<th>C.A.F.E.</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Frame Content</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>ICTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar'09</td>
<td>Cuarta Urna</td>
<td>Approval of referendum</td>
<td>Cuarta Urna is the &quot;path to democracy&quot; and the &quot;highest expression of democracy.&quot; The current constitution does not allow for a truly participative and representative democracy; it needs to be modified.</td>
<td>Zelaya and a group of academics and liberal politicians.</td>
<td>Zelaya's cabinet. Mainstream, alternative, and government media. / Civic Democratic Union</td>
<td>Frame dissemination. Counter-framing UCD.Civil society, alt. media, &amp; government alliances &amp; collaborations.</td>
<td>Mainstream, alternative and governmental newspapers, websites, television, radio. (Paid campaigns by Zelaya's government, free news coverage in alt. media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun'09</td>
<td>It's A Coup</td>
<td>Zelaya's expulsion</td>
<td>Zelaya did not renounce his presidency; he was illegally deposed</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations (Labor, Indigenous)</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Frame dissemination, Seeking Alternative ICTs, Email, alternative media, blogs,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
through a coup d'état. The Honduran people only recognizes Zelaya as legitimate elected president. Thus, demand his reinstatement in order to restore constitutional.

| 4 Jun'09 | Reinvest Zelaya | Zelaya's expulsion | Zelaya needs to be reinstated, he is the only legitimate president. His return is the only way to reinstate constitutional order. Out with Micheletti and the "Golpistas", bring Zelaya back. | Civil Society Organizations & NFAC | Fighting and denouncing repression, Mobilizing People, Frame Dissemination, Counterframing, Documenting and denouncing Human Rights Violations, Making Alliances, Collaborating, Pooling Resources, Tinkeing and Repourposing ICTs. | Email, alternative media, blogs, Facebook, instant messages, Internet. |

<p>| 5 Aug'09 | Electoral Farce of Guaym | Actively reject the electoral farce organized by | NFAC | Civil Society Organizations (Labor, Indigenous unions), Independent Journalists | Blogs, Alternative Media, Email, alternative media, blogs, Facebook, instant messages, Internet. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>uras Accord</th>
<th>Golpistas. Elections were organized by a de facto regime, who represses and crushes its citizens' human and political rights. Supporting them would &quot;validate the coup and would perpetuate their exploitative system. People should abstain from voting.</th>
<th>Indigenous unions), Independent Journalists</th>
<th>Counterframing, Documenting and denouncing electoral fraud, Collaborating</th>
<th>Websites, Facebook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Dec' 09</td>
<td>Refoundation Election 2009</td>
<td>Pepe Lobo's &quot;reconciliation&quot; government should be ignored; it is the continuation of the dictatorship imposed by the oligarchy through the coup on June 28. Perpetuation of the failed neoliberal model and a means for maintaining the privilege of the minority class. The Constituent Assembly and LIBRE</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations (Labor, Indigenous unions), Independent Journalists</td>
<td>Mobilizing People, Frame Dissemination, Counterframing, Documenting and denouncing electoral fraud, Collaborating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are the only way to transform Honduras' social foundations.

Table 17. Table summarizing CAFEs frame content, related practices, audience, actors, events and ICTs
4.1.7. Impact on ICTs

The resistance movement's information-seeking, collaboration, improvisation, and adoption practices aiming at refounding Honduras, reinstating Zelaya, and fighting repression, had also an impact on the country's ICT infrastructure.

During Zelaya's the annual growth rate of Internet users increased significantly. Though the number of users had been growing consistently, the year before the coup the growth rate jumped from 25% to 55%.

During the crisis, the number of users and subscribers grew from 658 thousand to 892 thousand. This could be explained by people's adoption of alternative sources of information to: get informed, circumvent surveillance, denounce and fight repression. As seen in the accounts through this dissertation, they had to adopt Internet-based technologies to carry on their agenda. However, the number of Internet service provider decreased in 2009, perhaps because of de facto government's measures to repress the flow of information.

"The Internet played a very important role. During the coup, our website traffic increased from 25 thousand people to 80 million." (Media 2)

Moreover, despite supporting the coup, cell phone companies saw a growth in cell phone and cellphone line sales during the crisis. During the heaviest unrest between July 2009 and January 2010, there were more phones than people. Cellphones were also a source of information to access the Internet, but also to disseminate information about mobilizations and became a sort of public good used to denounce repression. Moreover, activists reported having more than one cellphone to circumvent surveillance.
Alternative media like Community Radios, Canal 36, TVGlobo, or Radio Globo saw a tremendous growth in popularity since the coup. Though supported Zelaya's initiatives like Cuarta Urna (Fourth Ballot), it wasn't until the crisis when people change the dial to find other perspectives, that they became popular, to the point that people using as an ideological identification mechanism. Moreover, when they realized the reach and power of alternative media, activists reported they attempted to open more community radio stations.
"I remember in my town before the coup, on my walk home at 6pm, I could hear people's TV on Ariendo Brecha (a mainstream media news show). Not anymore, people are embarrassed to watch that show. The same happens with Radio America and HRN. They all lost their audience... ...we are fighting to create more community radios under the International Labour Organization's convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples', because community radios have been crucial in our struggle. Honduran law states in convenio 169 that indigenous cultures."
(Activist 7)

4.1.7.1. Strategic Use of ICTs by Type of Media

The resistance movement harnessed ICTs in unusual ways to organized, mobilize, fight repression and campaign. The following is a summary of how various types of ICTs were used to support movement activities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICT TYPE</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cellphones</td>
<td>The resistance used cell phones widely to spread news by sending or forwarding text messages to people’s list of contacts. As happens in every coup, during the first few days of the crisis, the government attempted to control telecommunications by requesting cell phone companies to suspend the service, this had an economic backlash for those companies who collaborated with the government, therefore, they had to reinstate the services. Members of the resistance now fear that cell phone companies are helping the government monitor their conversations and texts messages. They reported their cell phones to have a &quot;strange&quot; behavior, they say they can hear echoes or that a third person is listening. Activists think communication through cell phones, telephones or email is insecure; in fact, &quot;truly important&quot; issues are always discussed face to face. They don't discuss mobilization information, like time or place of demonstrations nor strategies over cell phones. Nevertheless, cell phones have played a crucial role in helping activists report human rights violations by calling to radio stations, mobilize and share information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text Messages</td>
<td>Text Message was used in a similar way as email. People would distribute news and information to their list of contacts the same way they did with emails; phone numbers were added to cell phone's lists of contacts and then used to distribute news. Activist 2 explains, &quot;... even though the cell-phone companies supported the coup, and would cut the cell phone signal for long periods of time, people would use their cell phones to transmit news. Whenever I got a text message, I would forward it to people I knew, this would cause like a chain reaction.&quot; Like email, people would receive a lot of information, in some cases it was overwhelming and phones would run out of battery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio played a determinant role helping mobilize people, distributing information and denouncing human rights violations. Radio is very popular in Honduras. People argue that while there was a cloud of misinformation and silence in the corporate radios, community radios discussed openly the events of June 28 and opened their microphones to allow people to share their experiences and report events. In many cases, activists argue, radio saved their lives, as people would call the radios to inform lawyers and human rights advocates about people being detained by the military. In addition, they covered news about the coup, demonstrations, police and military brutality and would interview political players who</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were being shunned by the corporate media. As a consequence the military attacked and dismantled several of these radio stations, seizing destroying their equipment, but they reconfigured themselves to be able to broadcast over the Internet, other community radio would pick up the signal through the Internet and broadcast it through the airwaves to the rest of the country, as Media 1 explains "Radio Globo and Radio Gualcho were the only radios that did not interrupt their transmission, though they were sabotaged and their owners were threatened." Before the coup, corporate radios Radio America (founded in 1948) and HRN (founded in 1933) had the largest audience, but once people who rejected the coup realized they pretending that nothing was happening or advocating for the de facto government, changed the dial and listened to community radios.

Television

Television use was like radio. From before the coup television was polarized, however people switched from large media to smaller independent channels after the coup, when they felt their information needs were not being met. Large TV corporations even shunned human rights activists who protested the coup, even though they had once been regular guests in their shows. CivSoc 1 explained how he was invited to a debate show as they expected he would have arguments in favor of the coup, however when he expressed he had "received emails and messages from people requesting this show to allow both side of the story, not only the people who support the coup" he was never again invited to comment.

Email

People and organizations who had access to email also used it strategically and profusely to get in touch with international organizations, to build social networks, to distribute news and photos, to promote websites and blogs. Informants claim that during the most critical days of the crisis, the flow of information was extraordinary and people and organizations took advantage of the fast and broad distribution of information quality of email; for instance, NGOs generated newsletters, which were distributed to their automated mailing lists, some of which would contain up to 15 thousand emails; these newsletters would be forwarded by their recipients to their own contacts. In addition, people seemed to understand the multiplying effect of email and used it consciously to build their own networks, as pointed out by Activist 7:

"I would receive from 300 to 500 emails daily on my Yahoo account. I added the senders to my list of contacts, even if they
were strangers. That's how I built my list of contacts and got in touch with important international organizations."

Informants also reported having extensive conversations via email; they argue this was particularly helpful to talk about the legality of the coup and the reasons it was necessary to participate in protests especially with friends. They seemed to have transferred their "hormiga" method to the virtual world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Though few people have access to Internet in Honduras, organizations associated with the resistance movement took advantage of social media (Facebook, twitter, blogs, YouTube) as a platform to report on human rights violations. People posted their own videos or photos, they took the role of "reporters" as Media 2 explains:

"I would get posts on my wall denouncing police repression of protesters, I would immediately post them on our website, people would also post photos of policemen beating women, or throwing gas bombs to students inside their classrooms. I felt as if I there were thousands of reporters on the streets".

The resistance movement used social media to further their agendas, and most of all to form conglomerates of organizations, as Media 1 explains

"the number of groups who belong to the resistance movement has increased tremendously in Facebook, they have taken advantage of this media."

In addition, social media sites like Facebook were used as a space for discussions/debate amongst coup supporters and protesters. They used it to voice their own opinions and identify themselves either as "resistencia" or "golpista".

"I would send a message to a friend saying... ‘look, Cuarta Urna is good because it would allow us have a representative national assembly, all sectors will be able to participate’, and he would then understand it and support it, it helped clarify" doubts (Activist 2).

In many cases these conversations were very passionate, people's friends and relatives would get involved. The family dinner political quarrel was now taking place on the Facebook wall. After people realized these conversations were very public, and that the military was tracking them, some of them stopped making comments on online
forums. Other people used it to broadcast what the mainstream media would not show.

"We were feeding the web with videos, and putting pressure on the web master to finish our website. We adapted the structure of our website to include current information about the coup, to fight against the media siege that hid crime, repression, persecution, and the systematic violation of our human rights" (Media 2)

Finally, for many people, the Internet and social media were a place to find truth, since media was polarized, some people found either side of the media hard to believe, thus they relied on searching information online and on social media, to read both sides of the story and to find out what international media said, International 1 says "one way of finding out the truth was to search on Internet or to check Facebook".

Table 19. Use of ICTs by type

4.1.7.2. CAFEs Timeline

In the next chapter I will discuss these findings and present the conclusions and theoretical contributions of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1. Reconstruction of the Contentious Politics Model

This chapter explains the contributions of this study, which were developed through a reiterative empirical process that involved three types of "conversations" (data analysis), where the researcher "converses" with data and informants, data "converses" with itself and finally data converses with the theoretical framework.

As per the Extended Case Method, the "third conversation" looks for "coincidences and more importantly irregularities between the data and the theoretical framework" (Burawoy, 1989). This chapter engages in the final "conversation" and provides an extension to the CPM. In the first section I identify coincidences and anomalies between the findings of this study and the underlying levels of analysis of the theoretical framework that guided this study (the Contentious Politics Model). I provide three tables that illustrate coincidences and anomalies identified in the study of the NFAC. The first table addresses Opportunity Structures, the second Mobilizing Structures, and the third table addresses Framing Processes.

After identifying the anomalies, I discuss how the anomalies help extend the Contentious Politics Model and provide visualizations of the CPM using the figures I provided in chapter 2. This way I show how the CPM can accommodate the anomalies and take ICTs into account during the emergence and development of social movements.

In the next section I provide a brief discussion of future research directions inspired by the findings of this dissertation. Followed by an acknowledgement of the limitations of this study. I conclude by answering the original research questions of this study.
5.1.1. Reconstructing Opportunity Structures

Social Movements are shaped by political constraints unique to the context in which they are embedded. In the present case, the NFAC asserted its agency in its effort to democratize democracy by targeting the political opportunity structure for change.

![Figure 47. Visualization of the contributions of this study to dimensions of Opportunity Structures. Red represents contribution. Modified visualization from figure 7: Scope and dimensions of opportunity structures](image)

This case showed that social movements improvise their own opportunity structures. Economic factors -in addition to ideology- can influence the stability of elite alignments. Presence of allies is not enough; allies have to be victims of intersecting ways of systematic oppression. The state's capacity and propensity for repression may represent an opportunity for social movements' emergence, and at the same time, social movements' actions can influence the state's capacity and propensity for repression. ICTs influence all the other dimensions, and can be considered an Opportunity Structure. The research so far
has said that ICTs influence Opportunity Structures by increasing the reach of movements from local to global increasing awareness of elite allies increasing transnational activity and their network of influence improving movement's ability to acquire information, making it difficult for governments to repress, censor and control the flow of information, and ultimately allowing them to change and open the political system and institutional environment.

### 5.1.1.1. Coincides and Anomalies in Opportunity Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>COINCIDENCES</th>
<th>ANOMALIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Openness or closure of the political system.</td>
<td>There were institutional provisions that either opened or closed the political system for citizen participation. The most salient provisions, in this case, are the constitution and the new law for citizen participation. The Constitution from 1982 had provisions for voting, freedom of organization, independence of the legislative system, and three power state that would oversee each other. Though it facilitated inscription of new political parties, it did not provide for civil society input into policy-making, nor addressing the demands of contentious actors. It did not grant provisions for referendums, lobbying nor petitioning. The most efficient way to influence policy was through political party alliances. In fact, this lack of regulations was the central issue of contention for Zelaya and the NFAC's. People could not participate because the constitution wouldn't provide for it. The coup was the result of this vicious circle. The Citizen Participation law proposed by Zelaya, which provided mechanisms like plebiscite, referenda, public town meetings, and other citizens' initiative, were deemed illegal</td>
<td>The Contentious Politics Model establishes that Opportunity Structures are mechanisms for participation provided by the state. However, this research indicates that the social movement improvised new Opportunity Structures. They created new ICT tools to press for greater accountability and transparency. They set up a political party (LIBRE) to participate in elections. They promoted constitutional changes and challenging two-party dominance. A second discrepancy has to do with ICTs centralization. The CPM considers government control over the markets as a dimension of political system openness. However, it does not include ICT infrastructure control and concentration as an aspect of system openness. This research indicates ICTs can open or close the system depending on who owns or controls them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
because the constitution did not provide for it. His "disobedience" was the excuse for his ousting.

2 Stability or Instability of Political Alignments
Political alignments were unstable. The traditional families who controlled the Liberal party rejected Zelaya and his citizen power plan. From the start, Zelaya had conflicts with the party as he did not comply with their guidelines for cabinet and governmental functionaries. (e.g. there was conflict in the appointment of Chimirri, Micheletti, and Rojas).
He lost the support of the private sector and the military after approving the minimum wage increase.
Mainstream media antagonized him due to the imposition of mandatory national government broadcasts.

3 Presence or Absence of Influential Allies
Given Honduras' long history of civil society, there was a strong presence of influential local allies that pooled their resources and supported the NFAC's cause.
For the first time in history Honduran LGBT groups, Feminist Organizations, Labor Unions, Indigenous Organizations, etc., joined forces and worked together in the NFAC. Labor unions played a significant role mobilizing people and providing the scaffolding for the movement's organizational structure.
International organizations like the OAS, Witnesses for Peace among others were crucial to support transparency, warranting protection, giving legitimacy and spreading the word. However, it was the local civil society that carried most of the load.

This study shows that some alignments were not, as the CPM suggests, determined by political affiliation nor ideology. In this case, some organizations aligned themselves in favor or against the coup based on their economic interest. For instance, cell phone companies did not openly support the coup. They did not align themselves with the de facto government, as that would mean complying with cellphone network shutdowns, which would cost them the loss of customers and income. The same way, many alternative media aligned themselves with Zelaya due to the monetary support provided by his government.

This research indicates the availability of allies is not enough to influence Opportunity Structures. There also need to be an extensive infrastructure of disadvantage and willingness to collaborate from the allies. The Honduran political structure had overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination, which affected members of the organizations that became part of the NFAC. In other words, indigenous people, like gay people, and women, were systematically marginalized.
The NFAC created willingness to employing an intersectional strategy that framed the constituent assembly and the return of Zelaya as opportunities to overcome disadvantage. They
argued that refounding the country would create a system where all voices would be heard, and all groups could participate in decision-making. These intersectional frames allowed traditionally right-wing organizations like the Lawyer's Union to collaborate with traditionally leftist groups like the Movimiento de Mujeres por la Paz (Women's Movement for Peace).

| 4 Capacity for Repression | Despite having "strong democratic rules," Honduras' history of coup d'états and military control makes the state highly capable and inclined for repression. The military is highly involved in political issues. Before and during the coup, the military played a role in the polarization of public opinion. As showed in chapter four, they were vocal about their position on Zelaya's measures, confiscated the Cuarta Urna poll ballots, and ultimately forcibly removed Zelaya from his home at 4 am and flew him out of the country. This dissertation provides evidence of the many ways in which the state aided by the military repressed and persecuted the NFAC. Media censorship, shutdowns, harassment, destruction of equipment, power shutdowns, protesters harassment, beatings, rape, among others. | The NFAC reacted to state and military repression by improvising ways to circumvent surveillance, denounce and document repression, get help, make allies. In response, the state and the military caught up with the movement's tactics by adopting new tactics of repression, to which the NFAC adopted new tactics as well. Facebook groups created by the NFAC were infiltrated by the military. NFAC websites and email accounts were hacked. Cell phones were put under surveillance. New legislation was approved to prevent alternative media proliferation. To circumvent these measures, the NFAC adopted additional strategies like the "ant mail," installed new operative systems like Linux, spoke in code, went back to analog communication, etc. Thus, social movement's response to repression also influences the state's capacity for repression, because the state catches up and responds, and so on. |
| 5 New Dimension of Opportunity | An OS is an institutional provision that enables or curtails |
political participation. Depending on who owned them or controlled them, ICTs either hurt or helped the NFAC. ICTs whose owners aligned with the de facto government collaborated with government surveillance and promoting misinformation. Independently owned decentralized ICTs supporting the NFAC by helping denounce human rights violations, facilitating collaboration among allies, promoting the flow and availability of information, circumventing repression, creating transnational networks to undercut the de facto government, enabling spaces for political dialog, improvising new tools for transparency and accountability, and creating a political party. All these accomplishments were possible because the neoliberal market liberalization of the 90s decentralized Honduran ICTs. As shown in Ch. 4, the state lost control over the country’s telecommunications allowing the entrance of a high number of radio and television stations, Internet services providers, and cell phone companies into the market. Thus, creating a large decentralized network of telecommunications despite mainstream media dominance. Participants of this study argue that despite surveillance and other tactics adopted by the de facto government, these technologies helped them significantly. They argue that the NFAC wouldn’t have been able to evolve the way it did without ICTs.
Evidently, the highly decentralized ICT environment in Honduras was crucial for NFAC political expression and participation. Given that ICTs are increasingly embedded in socio-political structures, I suggest including ICT infrastructure attributes like centralization, institutionalization, and ownership as another dimension of Opportunity Structure in the Contentious Politics Model.

Table 20. CPM Opportunity Structures coincidences and anomalies found in the case of the NFAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.1.1.2. Openness and Closure of the Political System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CPM states that institutional provisions can open or close the political system. Institutional provisions include governmental policies, institutions, legislation, changes in the economy, historical precedents, and changes in public policy. Their existence or absence may help or hinder social movement emergence, participation, and success. This research indicates, however, that social movement emergence and development does not just depend on the already existing institutional mechanisms for participation. In other words, social movements create their own opportunity structures. As I showed, when the institutional environment does not provide opportunities for political expression and participation, social movements create their own institutions to be able to participate in the political system and to oppose it from the inside. In the case of the NFAC, they created an alternative political party. Even though Honduras counted on a healthy and active civil society, the institutional environment (political party system, laws and governmental institutions) did not provide mechanisms for them to have influence over governmental and policy decision making. After failing to change the constitutions, reinstate Zelaya, and delegitimize the 2009 elections, the NFAC realized the most effective way to influence policy and &quot;refound&quot; Honduras was by taking advantage of the few</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. These similarities and differences can be found in detail in the Ch. 4 narrative.
electoral openings and accessing power formally through election. Therefore, they created a branch within the movement for a political party (LIBRE).

Unlike other social movements in Latin America, who basically withdrew from the institutional environment and created their autonomous governing structures, the NFAC chose a different path, to promote its values by formalizing itself in LIBRE, contesting elections and joining the political environment this way. There is a great deal of evidence of other social movements strategically improvising alternative opportunity structures that match their frames and challenge the prevalent way of doing politics. Social movements that emphasize direct democracy create alternative economic models, (Oxhorn, 2011; Burdick et al., 2009; Selwyn, 2011; Safa, 1990; R. Stahler-Sholk, et al. 2007; Yashar, 1998), alternative forms of representation and self-government (Bebbington, 2004; Conill et al; 2012; Novy & Leubolt, 2005), and new transnational networks of allies to appeal to international authorities and extra-national influences (Bryske, 2000; Gallardo, 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Mattiace, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001; Oxhorn, 2001). For instance, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas set up a structure for autonomous rule, independent from the Mexican central government and supported by a powerful network of international allies (Inclan, 2009, 2015; Cleaver, 2000).

Frames have symbolic and material aspects, and these two tend to be aligned with each other. Without opportunities to participate it is pointless to have ideology. Social movements need opportunities to enact their alternative vision and priorities. If the institutional environment does not provide these opportunities, they can either withdraw from the system or hey can join it. Through improvisation practices the NFAC:

- "Hacked" the political system by creating new mechanisms to press for greater accountability and transparency. Exposing military corruption in social media allowed the NFAC to gain "unauthorized" access to government accountability mechanisms through international community networks.

- "Joined" the system by creating a political party. This means that social movements can take advantage of some openings to create new ones and "join" the system. So rather than starting a new political system from scratch, they create mechanism to participate in the current system.
• They also "democratized" the system by promoting constitutional changes and challenging state rigid institutions.

Social movements engage in "improvisation behavior" to create new opportunities. They seize the current OS configuration to create opportunities for themselves. This speaks to social movements' agency and resilience.

5.1.1.3. Stability of Political Alignments

The CPM states that political alignments are the affiliations that people or groups may have to a political party or ideology. The stability or instability of their alliances may represent a window of opportunity for social movement action. This study confirmed that elites and those with immensely disproportionate control over and access to economic, social, cultural, political, or knowledge resources generally aligned themselves with specific political parties, and supported the current political system.

However, this study indicated that in addition to ideology, economic interest was a decisive factor in elites' alignment shift. This may explain why cellphone companies refused to shut down their services. Loosing movement's large clientele, would have represented a huge loss for the cellphone company. Thus, the stability of political alignments does not depend on ideology only. Elites can align themselves with social movements based on economic dynamics, which I argue need to be further explored.

Finally, considering that the stability of political alignments may be influenced by economic factors, it is important to think about the influence social movements may have on elite alignments as customers of elites. How does the economic power of the masses play a role in the stability of political alignments?

5.1.1.4. Presence of Influential Allies

The CPM states that the availability of influential allies is also a signal of opportunity for social movements. Allies can be crucial in social movements' emergence, strategy making, and success and they can provide support by warranting protection, giving legitimacy, and providing resources. Influential allies make it difficult for authorities to
deal with the movement. Influential allies may be civil society organizations, political and public figures, and international organizations.

It should be noted that while presence is important, institutional and cultural disadvantage against members of the social movement and its potential allies is also crucial for allies to work together.

Thus, presence is not enough. There must be a system and culture of disadvantage and recognition by allies, that the system is oppressing members of the social movement and its collaborators. Allies need to have intersecting interests to collaborate in order to change an intersecting system of cultural and institutional disadvantage. While their agreement is a collectively constructed frame, they system of oppression and disadvantage is an objective reality that can be identified.

5.1.1.5. Capacity and Propensity for Repression

The CPM indicates that repression is a dimension of OS. This means that an increase in the will or ability to repress tends to be related to the rise of non-institutionalized protest movements. However, the CPM does not account for the dynamic relation between state capacity and propensity for repression and social movements' practices.

In other words, how social movements respond to state repression, and in turn, how do states respond to social movements' anti-repression tactics. Some states respond with more repression, while other states respond with programs to promote participation. This dynamic should be further explored, because as this this study indicates, social movements influence the states' capacity and propensity for repression.

5.1.1.5.1. ICTs and Increased Repression

In this case study, as people improvised and found new ways to use ICTs, the government, the military and the police also found new ways to control information. Informants argue that the same way the resistance movement became more strategic, the government, the police and the military have slowly adopted more sophisticated repression and surveillance tactics. Informants recognize ICTs were crucial for their cause,
but found out eventually they were also used against them. Alternative media and civil society reported cyber-attacks to their websites and surveillance to their emails.

“Our website has been hacked, we are still trying to rebuild it.... We suspected our email and phone calls were being monitored. They had our private information. In fact, the government threatened the director of an International NGO. They told her they had all her personal emails and if she continued to reject the coup, they would make them public. She was very distraught by that.” (CivSoc1)

They argue they were also victims of surveillances through their cell phones. They argue that while “technology helps fight impunity,” they suspect “they intervene it, because there is a sort of echo when you speak on the phone. It is as if there were three lines, you can hear a void, and your voice echoing” (Activist 7).

They suspect many of their demonstrations were broken down by the police because they “knew in advance where we were going” (Activist2).

Per informants, Facebook became a window into activists' personal lives, that was used to harass them. They feared “the photos or information that we upload can be used by the police to track us.” (Activist1) Many activists closed their accounts, Activist1 argued “the police use these photos to know whom you associate with and to figure out the networks of social movement members in Honduras. They have the human, financial and time resources to monitor Facebook and find out what each one of us are doing, who we are talking to. I decided I didn't want the police to know about me through this media, so I closed my account.”

Moreover, part of the government's strategy was implementing new legislation to curb the emergence of alternative media. First on Dec 2009, they change the rules for frequency allocation (NR13/09 & NR14/09) to make it more difficult to acquire a license for radio or television. Then in 2010 and 2011 they suspended new applications for Television channels' licenses (NR07/10 & NR08/10/). Finally, in august 2011 the suspended new permits and licenses for new FM stations in 88-108mhz (NR03/11). According to the Committee from Freedom of Expression (C-Libre) there were over 40 community and alternative radio stations using this frequency range throughout the country.
There are several emergent questions that would be worth exploring in future projects. How do regimes incorporate ICTs either to prevent or foster political or civic participation? What is the evolution of ICT-related practices of social movements, for how long do they use the new configurations? Do they become institutionalize? Are regime ICT interventions helpful or are social movements better off creating their own ICT structures.

5.1.1.6. ICTs as a New Dimension of OS

Findings from this study suggest that ICTs and the way they were regulated by the government and the way they were socially mediated by the social movement, influenced political expression and participation. Characteristics of the ICT environment, like centralization, ownership, and control, should be taken into consideration in the CPM.

"The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts." (Langdon Winner)

As explained earlier in this dissertation, the Honduran ICT configuration of highly decentralized ICTs in rural areas, as well as the highly networked nature of the Internet were crucial for the NFAC to collaborate, mobilize, fight repression, find allies, disseminate information, and ultimately create new opportunity structures for themselves. The decentralized and liberalized nature of ICTs also allowed a diversity of groups to tinker, repurpose and pool resources to create a wide range of possibilities like making influential allies locally and internationally, fighting repression, and changing people’s political alignments. ICTs had an impact on all the dimensions of Opportunity Structure, and as such they should be considered another dimension of Opportunity Structure. And future social movement & ICTs research should include ICTs as Opportunity Structures due to their role in facilitating or hurting social movement expression and participation.
5.1.2. Reconstructing Mobilizing Structures

The CPM states that mobilization around an issue is more likely to happen if, at the onset of contention, there is an existing organizational infrastructure, or associational network that enables individuals and groups to organize and engage in collective action. NGOs, civil society organizations, churches, labor unions, activists' networks, neighborhood organizations, or friendships can all be mobilizing structures.

![Figure 48. Visualization of the contributions of this study to Mobilizing Structures. Red represents the new contribution. Modified visualization from figure 8: Mobilizing structures types, object, direction, and mode.](image-url)

Findings from this study suggest that, as with opportunity structures, availability is not enough. Thus, the same way social movements improvise new opportunity structures, they
improvise new forms of Mobilizing Structures to allow broader and more diverse participation of members.

Another finding from this study indicates that while Mobilizing Structures are used to move social movement's resources and ideas (outwardly, inwardly, directly, and indirectly), they are also used to create such ideas. Social movements engage in information-seeking behavior to create the frames that will mediate their practices, structures, and ICT use. This section provides these theoretical contributions to the CPM.

### 5.1.2.1. Coincidences and Anomalies in Mobilizing Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>COINCIDENCES</th>
<th>ANOMALIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structures:</strong> Formal and Informal (availability and willingness)</td>
<td>At the onset of the NFAC, there was a significant number of social movements and civil society organizations in Honduras. Many of these organizations were created during historical, political events in Honduras, like the 1954 strike, the agrarian reform, military governments, the Contra guerilla, and globalization. Thus, Honduran civil society was ideologically diverse and complex. It was composed of LGBT, peasant, ethnic, labor, women, human rights, and youth groups among others. Despite strong democratic rules, however, their influence on policy was limited to: • Monitoring state's actions • Promoting democratizing laws, institutions and reforms. • Stimulating political participation. • Promoting associational life among minorities and excluded groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Fostering emergence of new leaders
• Diffusing information about citizen rights
• Raising awareness of policies and their implications
• Serving as an alternative source of information
• Promoting organizing and finding solutions to local problems

Many civil society organizations had supported Zelaya’s measures from the beginning. They mobilized their people in support of minimum wage increase and cuarta urna among other. As the CPM signposts, these organizations became the scaffolding of the NFAC.

On the other hand, international organizations, like the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States who had the strongest influence on the government. They successfully:
• Pressed the government for the creation of laws that conform to international agreements in matters of peace-building, protection of democracy, protection of fundamental liberties and human rights
• Prescribed economic measures. Consistent with the Contentious Politics Model, this research shows the NFAC relied on international organizations for accountability and to disseminate information. They called it a coup d’état while mainstream media called it a succession. They supported hierarchy of labor union leaders in the role of coordinators; and flat structure of local autonomous affiliates. As the coup crisis passed, and more organizations joined, they changed to an issue-wide national resistance organization.

This behavior is repeated in other social movements, however; it has not been theorized. (See: New Organizational Structures, Institutionalized Political Provisions)

The same way they adopted new ICTs that allowed them to collaborate and improvise these new organizational shapes.
reinstating Zelaya, and sanctioned Honduras. They were important part of the agreement's negotiations to end the political crisis.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Mobilize People</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The improvised structures which were built to incorporate the inclusion principles of the movement allowed for mobilization of people across the country. Labor Unions were considered the backbone of the NFAC due to their membership structure and leadership, they had influence and representatives throughout Honduras and were capable of reaching the most remote areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3 | **Mobilize Information and Ideas** (*inward, outward, directly indirectly.* |
|   | The NFAC was effective mobilizing collective social constructions, about the cause of their problems, and potential solutions. These ideas encompassed notions about organization structure, action, tactics, and strategies. The 5 CAFEs were driven by specific ideas about the need for a structural change to give "power to citizens." The first step to promote this change was to educate people about democracy and the possibility of change through the "Cuarta Urna" campaign to conduct a poll about a future referendum. The NFAC explained Zelaya’s ousting as a coup d'État, while the opposition called it a "legal presidential succession." The NFAC disseminated the "It's a Coup" frame arguing Zelaya's overthrowing was a |
|   | This study confirmed the notion that mobilizing information is a critical resource to mediate social movement behavior. Disseminating frames allowed the NFAC to identify its issues, allies, build strategy, and motivate the adoption of practices. However, paired with dissemination, there is another salient behavior I identified in this case. Concurrent with engaging in disseminating information, members of the social movement also actively engaged in information seeking. Throughout the emergence and development of the NFAC, activists continuously looked for information to build their frames. They did not just wait for information to reach them, they found innovative ways to find it |
constitutional violation and the only way to restore constitutional order was to "Reinstate Zelaya" to the presidency. This frame determined the tone and course of negotiations. However, the de facto government delayed the talks and continued planning for elections, which the NFAC called an "Electoral Farse" and vowed not to acknowledge the results. When a new conservative president was elected, the NFAC returned to the original idea of "Refounding" Honduras.

All these frames and ideas were persistently and consistently disseminated through the extended NFAC's ICT and organizational network. Consistent with the CPM and previous research, the NFAC's use and adoption of ICTs allowed them to mobilize ideas within the movement, outside the movement, directly and indirectly. They could:

- Spread information cheaply over large regions on shorter periods of time over the alternative radio and TV network, as well as blogs and Facebook groups.
- Maintain links with groups and communities who would draw from the NFAC's frames, but maintained editorial control to appeal to their constituency.
- Create and sustain online local and geographically dispersed communities.

This indicates that mobilizing structures, in addition to helping disseminate frames and ideas, should work to find information in order to collectively create frames.
Table 21. CPM Mobilizing Structures coincidences and anomalies found in the case of the NFAC

5.1.2.2. New Organizational Structures

Evidence from this and other studies indicates democratic social movements improvise and adapt their organizational structures according to their organizational goals. As detailed in chapter four, the NFAC changed their organizational structure in several occasions throughout their life span, to adapt to the increasing number of people, organizations, and causes they took on. I identified three ways in which the social movements can improvise new Mobilizing Structures: Expanding, Flattening, and Formalizing.

A. Expanding: Social movements improvise new organizational forms to harness the support of local and international NGOs. In the beginning the social movement was called Front Against the Coup and was composed by prominent hierarchical organizations like General Workers' Central, STIBYS, COPIHN, Bloque Popular. These organizations became the the decision-makers and strategists

66. These similarities and difference can be found in detail in the Ch. 4 narrative.
67. Union of Workers in the Beverage and Similar Industries
68. Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras
69. Popular Block
(Sosa, 2015). As the NFAC grew and became a country-wide organization it was restructured to include a wider array of civil society organizations, its name was changed to National Front Against the Coup (NFAC). This was a hybrid structure, with a hierarchy of labor union leaders in the role of coordinators; and flat structure of local autonomous branches of the movement (e.g. Artists in Resistance, Youth in Resistance, Teachers in Resistance, Lawyers in resistance, etc.) and civil society organizations (Los Necios, COFADEH, LGBT, etc.).

B. Flattening: Social movements create flatter, less hierarchical organizational structures and communities to foster collaboration. Improvising new flatter organizational structures helps them become more apt to enact the collaboration, communitarianism, inclusion, equality, and citizen participation values of their frames. Flat organizational structures have the potential to allow the creation of self-managing units which require little supervision and allow a broader span. These units have more responsibilities and autonomy in decision-making, thus promoting participation, and higher satisfaction of group needs (Ostroff & Smith, 1992, Agarwal, 1982). Strategy-wise, they help them to adapt and cope more quickly to changes in the environment, especially in environments with high uncertainty (Ostroff & Smith, 1992; Agarwal, 1982). In the NFAC’s case, as the coup crisis passed, and more organizations joined, they changed to an issue-wide national resistance organization. Their name was changed once again to National Front of Popular Resistance (NFPR), to make evident the number of causes they worked on and the large number of organizations that were part of it.

C. Formalizing: Social movements can also establish formal organizations to take advantage of the open opportunity structures in the political environment. For example, the NFAC, later in 2011 the NFPR had another transformation in order to participate in the 2013 elections and continue to serve as an umbrella for all the units. They added a branch for a political party called LIBRE. Their name was once again change to reflect their broader scope: “Broad Front of Popular Resistance."

Other studies have also documented social movements' practices where they adapt their organizational structures to expand their reach, to collaborate across large networks
of diverse groups, and formally participate in politics. This improvisation activity is aided by ICTs to reinforce real-life social networks, while also creating of new communities (Bennett & Toft, 2009; Cheong, 2011; Maireder & Schwarzenegger, 2012; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; B. Wilson & Hayhurst, 2009 Castells, 2000; Morris & Mueller, 1992; Garret, 1996; Aalto-Matturi, 2005).

Moreover, there is evidence that the shape of organizational structures is not only influenced by the capabilities ICTs provide, but also by the content of the social movement's adopted frames and discourses. For instance, Latin American social movements, which had traditionally been more radical and had hierarchical structures, create flatter organizational structure as they adopt a less radical discourse with more democratic values (Cleaver, 2000 etc; Alvarez-Rivadulla, 2015; Sosa, 2015; Motta, 2009; Martí I Puig, 2015; Ortiz, 2015). Some of those cases include: the Zapatistas' networked organizational structure (Cleaver, 2000; Inclan, 2009; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2001; Olesen, 2004; Rubin, 2005), Brazil's networked Landless People's Movement (Carter, 2010; Gohn, 2015; Arias & Ungar, 2009; Gilmore, 2012; Novy & Leubolt, 2005), and Bolivia's non-authoritarian indigenous organizations and mining communities (Vanden, 2007; Escobar, 2010).

Improvised organizational structure reconfiguration allows social movements to adapt to their unpredictable environment, be inclusive, fashion their own democratic cultures, create new ways of democratic participation & economic development, have their demands met, and be represented.

5.1.3. Reconstructing Frames and Other Practices

The CPM states that frames are schemas of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and world at large. Frames help organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. Based on findings, however, this study proposes the following extensions to the CPM:

Evidence confirmed that frames are created strategically drawn from larger cultural and historical discursive structures. However, not only in the NFAC, but on other social
movements around the world, are constructing frames that appeal to a great variety of actors. Social movements are increasingly using intersectional approaches to framing. This possibility is aided by the affordances of ICTs to create large hybrid (centralized/decentralized) networks (see chapter four, pp. XX)

When social movements engage in collective efforts to create shared understandings, they engage also in active and collective information seeking behavior. This behavior needs to be included within the process of collective frame creation.

![Figure 49. Visualization of the contributions of this study to Framing Processes. Red represents the new contribution. Modified visualization from figure Figure 11: Steps in framing processes.](image)

This study also shows that since there is a symbolic as well as a material aspect to discourses. Moreover, it showed that meaning and meaningful practices constructed in light of the embedding discourses extend to the use of ICTs. Therefore, frames influence social movements' mobilization strategy, but also the way ICTs are used, configured,
repurposed, and tinkered with by social movements. In other words, framing is a practice that generates other practices, including the practice of ICT strategic improvisation observed in this case study across the tree levels of analysis (See figure 52).

Finally, frames are also the object of improvisation. Frames are improvised in a complex framing and re-framing episodic process, where social movements collectively change and adapt their frames to fit their objectives or to respond to their environment. Thus, I argue that process of frame creation, needs to reflect the episodic and adaptable nature of the activity of framing, and that adding a framing analysis methodology to the CPM will help study the dynamic relationship between social movements, their institutional provisions, ICTs, and framing processes throughout the emergence and development of social movements. These recommendations are drawn from the following discrepancies in the CPM and this case.

### 5.1.3.1. Coincidences and Anomalies in Framing Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>COINCIDENCES</th>
<th>ANOMALIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> What are they? Socially constructed shared understandings which legitimate social movements actors' motivations, identities, persuasions, ideology, and actions.</td>
<td>This study, consistent with the CPM, showed frames have several characteristics Explain their circumstances, recognize a problem, identify their mission and its implications: The initial &quot;Citizen Participation&quot; and &quot;Cuarta Urna Cafés&quot;, explained inequality and lack of citizen participation in policy. &quot;It's a Coup&quot; made clear the constitution had been violated through Zelaya's expulsion. &quot;Reinstate Zelaya&quot; explained the country was in state of chaos. &quot;Electoral Farce&quot; explained that the negotiations and the elections carried out by the de facto government were illegitimate. &quot;Refoundation&quot; explained that the</td>
<td>I identified two discrepancy regarding frame nature and characteristics. First, frames had to appeal to a wide variety of groups. Thus, they relied on theses that resonated with a diverse group of civil society organizations. They touched upon common themes (which I will explain in the type of frames bellow) like: inequality, poverty, governmental corruption, neoliberalism, and the opportunity to participate in the country's political decision-making. These themes identify the root all those organizations' struggle. Second, I found frames have malleability. While they were</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
country’s political foundation needed to be rebuilt. Seek a solution: each frame proposed a solution for each problem identified. "Citizen Power" proposed a more participative country through coalitions. "Cuarta Urna" proposed implementing a new constituent assembly that would refound Honduras. "It’s a Coup" insisted on reinstating constitutional order through peaceful protest. "Reinstate Zelaya" proposed putting Zelaya back in power. "Electoral Farce" proposed annulling the scheduled elections and rejecting their results. "Refoundation" proposed infiltrating the political system through a new political party. Frames had symbolic aspect which were embedded on the larger democratic discursive structures of the Pink Tide movement. They included: Power legitimized by citizens and election, country restructuring, statist-neoliberal economic prosperity, rejection of US hegemony, regional collaboration, and local communitarianism.

Motivate and legitimize actions. All frames identified in this study had specific calls for action. In the case of "Citizen Participation" they called people to get informed about the constitution and join local organizations. "Cuarta Urna" called people to vote yes on the poll. "It’s a Coup" asked people to go to the streets and protest, to boycott right designed to resonate with participants, in this case, the diversity of groups collaborating made it necessary to build frames that would be adaptable to all those groups (labor unions, indigenous, LGBT, etc). Organizations within the NFAC, adopted frames and adapted them to fit their own specific goals. This allowed organizations to remain part of the movement but also conduct themselves independently. Thus, this research found that frames are built using values that resonate to a wide variety of people, but they need to be flexible enough to allow organizations to used them independently. They can be recycled and reshaped to fit the group's circumstances. This seems to be a trend with other social movements around the world, these movement was composed by a variety of groups that had different goals. For example, the Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Black Lives Matter Movement.
wing's businesses, etc., "Reinstate Zelaya" called for demonstrations and building stronger coalitions. "Electoral Farse" asked people to boycott the elections. "Refoundation" asked them to join the movement and to support the new political party and help it be elected.

Resonated with members, and reaffirmed their association to the movement through common identities, persuasions, and ideologies: All frames appealed to movement actors' values and struggles. In this sense though it is important to note that the frame content appealed to a wide variety of groups, motivating them to collaborate for the first time. This is an anomaly on which I expand on the adjacent column.

Consistent with the CPM, frames were packaged to provoke reaction by antagonist. They used language and proposed actions that provoked the de facto government to retract their actions. They hoped that by recognizing Micheletti as president, protesting, etc., the de facto government would reinstate Zelaya. The de facto government did react, however did not back down, and in turn, they increased repression.

Finally, consistent with the CPM, frames were diffused throughout the movement. As the data shows, the NFAC used all kinds of face to face and ICT methods to spread framers (See Table 19).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>How are they created. Framing Process: Consistent with the CPM, NFAC frames were created consciously and collectively by its members. This dissertation shows activists accounts of the NFAC strategic meetings, as well as widely distributed NFAC position statements. The data gives us an insight into the collective process of NFAC frame creation and dissemination by various labor unions and civil society organizations. Each frame strategically raises awareness, mobilizes resources and ultimately aims to change Honduran circumstances.</th>
<th>The CPM left out an aspect about the process of frame creation. This research suggests that frames can be created in specific time episodes called Collective Action Framing Episodes (CAFÉ). CAFÉs are periods of time bounded by relevant events, identified as such by movement actors, where actors create frames to guide movement's actions. Cafes have several components. 1. Events 2. Practices 3. ICTs 4. Frames See timeline. See figure 46 CAFÉ: They are created/shaped in episodes. Some times as a response to the environmental conditions, and sometimes to cause an impact on the political context. It is important to note that CAFÉs can happen simultaneously throughout the lifespan of a movement, the resulting frames can be recycled or reused.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What are the types of frames? Finally, the CPM identifies four broad categories of frames. They include: Realignment, inclusion, revitalization, anti-system (See figure 11) Each NFAC frame was a combination of these type of frames. For example, the &quot;Citizen Power&quot; frame was an inclusion and anti-system frame. &quot;It's a Coup&quot; and &quot;Reinstate Zelaya&quot; were anti-system and</td>
<td>In this study, however, I identified another type of frame. A type of frame that I am calling &quot;Intersectional Frames.&quot; Consistent with the first frames discrepancy in this table, these frames emphasize in bringing together a diversity of organizations into the social movement. Their purpose is to change the structure of the political system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
revitalization frames. "Electoral Farse" and "Refoundation" were anti-system and realignment frames. through collaboration, and appealing to as many organizations as possible. All frames had in common the Intersectional frames: for collaboration across diverse groups.

Table 22. CPM Framing and Framing Processes Coincidences and Anomalies found in the case of the NFAC

5.1.3.2. Intersectionality as a Framing Strategy

The central frames that guided the NFAC's emergence and development (Citizen Power, Cuarta Urna, It's a Coup, Reinstall Zelaya, Electoral Farce, and Refoundation) are all tied to the democratic discourse of PinkTide Governments. This discourse is based on six values that targeted the intersection of discrimination and marginalization that several civil society groups have in common. Labor Unions, LGBT organizations, Feminists, Youth, and artists, among others agreed that a way out of their precarious situation was through:

- Foundationalism and country restructuring, they emphasized on rebuilding a system that they all think is broken.
- They agree that power is legitimized by citizen participation, and promote giving voice to people through formal mechanisms to achieve true democracy and social justice.
- They reject US hegemony and traditional power structures. They stress the need for new ways to govern to have autonomy, equality and inclusion.
- They don't stay entirely away from neoliberal tools and mechanisms. Instead, they repurpose them to promote social justice and equality.
- They emphasize on regional collaboration to counteract traditional power structures and promote partnerships with organizations who share similar values.

---

70. These similarities and difference can be found in detail in the Ch. 4 narrative.
71. The wave of left-wing government that sought to create new models for development, justice, and social inclusion within a democratic agenda were labeled Pink Tide. Zelaya's government share the characteristics of pink tide governments on several levels, he came to power through elections, rejected US Hegemony, joined regional trade agreements, gathered the support of civil society and implemented social welfare measures, they are explained in the next sections. For more detail refer to chapter 2 and 4.
• They believe in local communitarianism to promote inclusion of disadvantaged and discriminated groups.

Intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1991; Chow Crenshaw & McCall, 2013) has the potential to explain how the social movement used the Pink Tide discourse to frame the coup as an intersectional problem that resonated with diverse groups (e.g., LGBTQ groups, feminist organizations, trade unions, professional organizations, alternative media, etc.), motivated them to join the movement, and engage in collaborative ICT improvisation practices.

These intersectional narratives used by the NFAC and other social movements like the Black Lives Matter, need to be further analyzed to identify the relation between intersectional frames, strategy, and collaborative improvisation practices.

5.1.3.3. Episodic Framing Process: CAFEs as Unit of Analysis

Frames in social movements are not pre-determined, standardized, or fixed. Instead they emerge from movement participants' interactions, and are malleable, changing for fit the situation (R. Benford, 1997). The CPM states that the process of frame creation is a cycle where social movements recognize the problem, seeks solutions to the problem, diffuses strategy and motivates members for action. This research showed that the frame creation process repeats itself several times through the life of the movement. During this repetition frames are collectively recycled, reused, and recombined in time episodes by the social movement.

Thus, we propose that the frame creation process include Collective Action Framing Episodes CAFEs.
Moreover, I propose utilizing CAFEs as a unit of analysis to study the dynamic relation of OS, MS, FP, and ICTs in social movements. Analyzing complex interactions between groups, their environment, ICTs, and meaning-making practices can be a challenging task; especially given the wide array of data sources involved. Using CAFEs over time:

- Allows to connect micro-level social processes and meso-level structures in an inhospitable macro-level.
- Tracking collective action framing allows the analyst to attend closely to the resourceful and improvisational agency shown by movement leaders and activists when confronted with systemic constraints.
- Tracking CAFEs allows the analyst to examine the meaning-making strategies used by the movement to persuade opponents to inform the world at large and rally the membership to sustain its momentum.

This approach was developed reiteratively and refined over the course of this study. The framework allows integrating several levels of analysis into one unit, the Collective Action Framing Episode (CAFE).

CAFE is a composed construct drawn from social movement and information systems theories. It is a useful tool to analyze the how the interactions between social movements, their environment, their practices and ICTs are mediated by meaning. CAFEs are defined as periods of time bounded by relevant events, identified as such by movement actors, where actors create frames to guide movement's actions. CAFEs can happen...
simultaneously throughout the lifespan of a movement; the resulting frames can be recycled or reused.

It is composed of two constructs, the first one is Collective Action Framing, drawn from the literature on Social Movements. It is a practice by social movements to build shared understandings to guide social movement action (Benford & Snow, 2000; A. D. Morris & Mueller, 1992). There are three characteristics of Collective Action Framing:

- It is a purposeful practice to help constrain and guide movements' evolution.
- It is collectively negotiated; many members of the movement participate.
- Its outcome are frames (ideas, identities, world views)

The second construct is episodes, drawn from Miles & Huberma (1994; 2011) methodology to bound data that extends over periods of time. They proposed data to be condensed into manageable units or episodes in a process that involves "selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and/or transforming the data that appear in the body of field notes, interview transcripts, documents and other empirical materials" P.12 (2011).

This allows capturing the characteristics of the settings, events and processes in long-term complex processes involving organizations, groups and information technology (Annabi et al., 2008). Thus, we define episodes as "sequentially connected events and practices that occur over time and have a beginning and an end".

Framing happens around events in the environment, not just any event, but events that affect the social movement. Members of the movement engage in framing practices to respond, anticipate, or react to events. Through this process they create frames that allow them to build arguments, call for action, provide a prognosis or a solution related to the event. Frames are loaded with meaning, and their content changes according to the context and movement's desired outcome. Focusing on specific events that occur over a period allows bounding framing processes and their interactions with OS and MS in manageable units. Bringing together these two concepts together allows examining social movements' complex sociotechnical systems over a period.
5.1.3.3.1. Step One: Identifying CAFEs

To identify CAFEs, it is important to first identify the constructs that comprise CAFEs separately: Frames, Events, Practices, and ICTs. Frames are negotiated sets of shared beliefs and meanings meant to call and guide social movements practices. They are meant to: keep the movement together, give meaning to events, keep morale, set objectives, inspire, garner support, organize experience, and legitimize activities explain the situation, explain reasons for outrage, propose solutions, and explain movement stances, objectives and culture. Since they are deliberate strategic process, they possess the attribute of having a clear purpose, being utilitarian and/or goal directed. They may be counteracted or disputed by the opponents. Frames are expressed in consistent messages, utterances, or statements throughout the social movement’s. However, movement actors may adapt them based on changes in instructional, governmental, cultural, audience and activists’ conditions (events, actors and activities). Changes on any of these areas may trigger a new
frame or the modification of existing frames. Movement actors diffuse them through their oral and written discourse, thus they can be found first in official social movement documents, like statements and foundational record. Members of the social movement articulate then, thus they can be identified through interviews. They can also be found through the information outlets related to the social movement, in for instance: blogs, websites, news articles, Op-eds, social media, etc. Example: The NFAC’s "Reinstate Zelaya" frame was expressed in their first official communication. They said:

"The Honduran people and the international community only recognize Manuel Zelaya Rosales as the current and only President of the Republic of Honduras. We have organized the National Front Against the Coup, in coordination with all municipalities in the country, to create an active and peaceful resistance to restore constitutional order and respect for human rights."

As the frame was adopted it disseminated through the social movement network, it was repeated by informants, alternative media, and blogs. Aside from frame content, it is important to also identify the author(s), the intended audience, the dissemination technique.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Name</th>
<th>Reinstate Zelaya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Honduran constitutional order has been broken. Zelaya is the only president recognized by the Honduran people. His return is the only solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Reinstating Zelaya and his cabinet. Obtain support from national and international organizations to pressure the de facto government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Founding leaders of the National Front Against the Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended Audience</td>
<td>Honduran citizens and the international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of creation</td>
<td>June 28, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>Official communiqué, Email, alternative media, blogs, Facebook, instant messages, Internet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 23. Frame Identification**

**Events** are occurrences in the environment that pertain to the social movement; they range from statements by international organizations, to presidential inaugurations. Events
can be found in news reports, blogs, legislations, coup reports and interviews. For example, in the emergence and development of the NFAC, the coup was a pivotal event that triggered action. Another important event was the approval of elections while Zelaya was still ousted, this event triggered the creation of the "Electoral Farce" frame, where people were called to abstain from voting.

**Practices** are purposeful activities carried out by movement actors with the intention to support or propose movement goals. An example of a practice can be convoking people to a rally, distributing information, fighting repression, and framing. Instances of practices can be found through in interviews, blogs, and official documents from the social movement.

**ICTs** are as electronic and computer based technologies and networks that allow capturing, storing and exchanging information (ITU, 2010) (e.g. radio, television, cell phones, fixed telephones, Internet, social media, etc.).

### 5.1.3.3.2. Step Two: Coding and Classifying Data

Knowing how to identify Frames, Events, Practices and ICTs, the next step is to code and classify them to establish how they relate to each other. That helps establish the relation of social movements with their environment (namely Opportunity Structures, Framing Processes and ICTs), and how Frames are meant to either respond to events, anticipate to them or provoke them.

Frames are coded by their names, authors, audience, dissemination, date. Events are also coded by date, type and source. The same goes for Practices and ICTs, which can be further classified by type and characteristics.

### 5.1.3.3.3. Step Three: Building the Story

Building a timeline depicting the CAFEs is very useful to identify the relations and construct a narrative. The timeline can be built using the coded events and frames (as their dates were identified). Once their relation is established, it is possible to also identify the related practices and ICTs involved in each episode.
The timeline will list the CAFEs and clearly identify the events, frames and activities. Looking at these three elements in the life span of the movement through a timeline allows identifying how frames influence movement activity, including the way they use ICTs. This way findings can be chronologically narrated, while highlighting the relations between frames, ICTs, events and practices throughout each episode.

5.1.3.4. Collective Information Seeking

Collective Action Frames help organize experience and guide social movement action. Moreover, they legitimize social movements actors' motivations, identities, persuasions, ideology, and actions (Benford, 1997).

Early in the coup, when telecommunications where shut down and people needed to know "what was really happening" to shape the "It's a Coup" frame, they engage in information seeking behavior. They improvised new ways to find information by going online, changing the dial, going to the streets.

This is an extreme example of information seeking during a moment of crisis. However, as frames are important to enable groups to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences it is reasonable to assume that information seeking is part of the collective action framing process. Other social movement researchers have identified this behavior as part of the educational process in which social movement actors engage to create
frames (Neidig & Rintamaki, 2002; Shaheen, 2008; Savolainen, 2007). Along with improvisation, it is a type of behavior that should be included in the CPM.

5.1.4. Improvisation Behavior

Improvisation happens at every level. It is a social movement behavior shaped by frames in which social movements use the resources they have at hand to create new political opportunities, organizational forms, strategies and ICTs. It is part of the framing process but it also affects the process itself.

The movement's improvised practices were akin to bricolage. Bricolage is the creation of objects using the materials at hand, re-using existing artifacts, and incorporating bits and pieces when available (Levi-Strauss, 1966). It is a modality of thinking and a behavior, which is common in developing countries or places where there is a hardship, and where resources and opportunities are limited (Silva, 2002). The products of bricolage stem from creative resourcefulness not from uninformed or awkward decisions (Ciborra, 1992); such products reflect rational and adaptive behaviors in uncertain or volatile environments (Njenga & Brown, 2012). Bricolage involves review and collection of the resources at hand, determination of use, and rearrangement including new uses of the existing resource as response to the environment (Hatton, 1989). This way, NFAC strategically made do with the technological, organizational and political resources they had available, to respond to the crisis caused by the coup and to engage in sustained counter-framing and mobilization against the regime.

A noteworthy finding is the movement's resourceful use of available materials, including the institutionalized opportunity structures, the organizational affiliates, and ICTs. The movement's resourceful and improvised use of ICTs -namely tinkering pooling and repurposing- is also evidenced in the successively new organizational forms it assumed as it formalized itself; which was both more relationally expansive and flatter in its internal structure. Furthermore, as I mentioned, the movement used ICTs to get some purchase on the institutionalized opportunity structures to move the cause forward.
Frames produce the adoption of improvisation practices that result in new rearrangements/reconfigurations of OS, MS, and ICTs that share the characteristics of the frames themselves (See figure 52). The NFAC's frames were based in democratic values, thus the resulting reconfigurations that shared the characteristics of those frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Structures</th>
<th>Types of Improvisation Practices and Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Opportunity Structures** | **Hacking:** Creating autonomous governments and new mechanisms for government transparency  
**Joining:** Creating formal participation mechanisms like an alternative political party  
**Democratizing:** Promoting constitutional changes and challenging the two-party system |
| Mobilizing Structures | Expanding: Harnessing the support of local and international NGOs and creating new organizations  
Flattening: Creating flatter, less hierarchical organizational structures to be more apt for collaboration, communitarianism, etc.  
Formalizing: Establishing the movement formally through an issue-wide national resistance organization with a political party |
| Framing Processes | Recycling: Adopting and adapting frames to fit new situations.  
Reusing: Using an old frame.  
Recombining: Mixing and matching frames to create new ones. |
| ICTs | Tinkering: Reconfiguring equipment to create hybrid analog-digital radio networks of community radios.  
Pooling Resources: Grouping together listservs and radio stations.  
Repurposing: Making personal cellphones into public broadcasting stations. |

Table 25. Types of improvisation practices and transitions on Opportunity Structures, Mobilizing Structures, Framing Processes and ICTs

5.1.4.1. ICTs: Using and Improvising

When social movements engage in improvisation practices to challenge authorities, they reshape the current ICT configurations to match their frames. The literature\(^{72}\) demonstrates a wide array of ways in which social movements use ICTs, and the way the outcomes help them influence the institutionalized provisions in the political environment (OS) through new structures and organizational forms, Influence mobilizing structures by creating and reinforcing networks and communities, and help accelerate diffusion of frames, information and identities, etc (Bennett & Toft, 2009; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; Hess, 2007; Loudon, 2010; Vinthagen, 2011; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Garrett, 2006; Pickerill, 2009; Postigo, 2010; Riemer, 2003; Spaeth, et al., 2008; Aalto-Matturi, 2005; Castells, 2009; Cortina, 2011; Gladwell & Shirky, 2011; Howard & Hussain, 2011; Nagel & Staeheli, 2010; Shumate & Pike, 2006).\(^{73}\)

I go a step forward and propose a relationship in which social movements employ ICTs. My argument is threefold: first, ICTs are also the object of social movement improvisation; second, the shape social movements give ICTs corresponds to their frames;

\(^{72}\) See chapter two.

\(^{73}\) For a comprehensive review refer to Chapter 2
and third, the current ICT configurations may represent an opportunity to engage in this behavior. (See figure 50)

Improvisations practices have been studied in anthropology, organizational studies, political science and more prominently in information systems, mostly in organizational and business settings. Researchers in these fields concur that:

- People who engage in improvisation behavior do so as a response to an environment in crisis or that is resource-poor. (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Njenga & Brown, 2012; Silva, 2002; Hutton, 1989; Doherty et al, 2012; Heeks, 2002)
- Improvisation is a purposeful, strategic, rational and adaptive behavior, which is the product of alternative ways of thinking (D’Atri 2005; Levi-Strauss, 1974; Njenga & Brown, 2012; Ciborra, 1999; Sliva, 2002)
- Those who engage in improvisation practices "make do" with the limited resources they have at hand (Hutton, 1989; Baker & Nelson, 2005).
- The result of improvisations includes new uses, rearrangements, or reorganizations. (Levi-Strauss, 1974, Hutton, 1989)

Interestingly, the practice of improvising has not been adequately studied in social movement settings. Results from the present study indicate that social movements can engage in improvisation practices as a response to the presence or absence of opportunities. Initially, Honduran ICT sector reflected the dominant political economic power structure; during the coup, the NFAC pooled, re-arranged, tinkered, and repurposed them through improvisation practices to embody their frames. The same way the NFAC intended to "refound" Honduran society as whole by democratizing democracy, first by modifying the constitution through a constituent assembly and later through a political party, they attempted to challenge the conservative foundations of ICT sector by building alliances with alternative media organizations in the service of a culturally plural, inclusive, and participative political order society. Despite market liberalization\(^\text{74}\) and the entrance of new alternative operators, the Honduran ICT environment still reflected its social inequalities. Though there were many alternative AM and FM operators, they were

\(^{74}\) Refer to chapter four for a detailed account of Honduran telecommunications policy and infrastructure environment.
the smaller and poorer stations. Meanwhile corporate media continued to have the largest presence and political/economic power (See figures 19, 18, and 20 in chapter four). Thus the NFAC counteracted this inequality through new collaborative and innovative reconfiguration practices:

In this study, I identify three types of ICT improvisation: Tinkering and reconfiguring, repurposing, and pooling resources.

- I define tinkering as deliberately reconfigure existing resources at hand, incorporating bits and pieces to create new assets. When alternative media that rejected the coup were repressed and shut down, the NFAC made hybrid analog-digital radio networks of community radios across Honduras and Latin America.

- The second type of improvisation is pooling resources; it refers to grouping together to maximize capabilities. The NFAC pooled their television and radio stations, listservs, emails, cell phones, websites, blogs and Facebook pages to service the movement's objectives and to create a large network of information sources composed of LGBTQ, campesinos, workers, indigenous, artists and human rights organizations (among others).

- Repurposing refers to adapting a resource and using it for a different purpose. Members of the NFAC turned personal technologies like their personal cellphones and PCs into public goods. PCs became public broadcasting stations and cellphones transmitters of messages to large groups.

- The ICT environment in Honduras was impacted by these practices in that during the crisis cellphone penetration rose to 118 percent (See figure 47 in chapter four); and while the number of Internet service providers decreased from 86 to 68 due to new repressive regulations, there was an increase of over 250 thousand internet users in the same period (See Table 19 in chapter four)

---

75 Refer to chapter four for a more detailed description of these practices.
5.1.5. Future Research

This dissertation yielded a wealth of qualitative data and raised several new research questions at the intersection of Information Studies, Social Movements and Latin American Studies.

**Intersectional Frames, Collaborative Improvisation, and eParticipation**

The first one is a question related the relation between frames, strategy and collaborative improvisation practices. While researchers have proposed the idea of "technological frames" (Orlikowski, 1994; Davidson, 2006), my approach defines frames beyond technological systems, and includes a holistic view of actors' realities. Moreover, I propose using Intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1991; Chow Crenshaw & McCall, 2013) to explain how the social movement framed the coup as an intersectional problem that resonated with diverse groups (e.g., LGBTQ groups, feminist organizations, trade unions, professional organizations, alternative media, etc.), motivated them to join the movement, and engage in collaborative ICT improvisation practices. Insights of this work have the potential to contribute to the Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) discipline.

The second insight is related to the emerging trends in the use, adoption and study of electronic political participation (eParticipation). Since ICTs are increasingly playing an important role in citizens' participation in politics around the world, there is great interest among academics, and therefore, a large amount of research overlap among disciplines (e.g. Political Science and Communications). It is important to start a conversation about the Information Studies discipline contribution to the study of eParticipation.

Thus, the next stage of this research should focus on two areas, first to understand improvisation behavior and its outcomes to produce a model to foster inclusive social practices. Second, to explore of how regimes incorporate ICTs into their official structures either to quell or foster political participation.

**Characterizing, Modeling, and Replicating the Conditions for ICT Rearrangements and eParticipation**
Honduran activists engaged in improvisation practices that resulted in innovative ICT arrangements. As previous research indicated (Levi-Strauss, 1974, Baker & Nelson, 2005; Silva, 2002; Njenga & Brown, 2012; Heeks, 2002; Ciborra, 1996), this behavior was purposeful, strategic, rational, adaptive, and emerged as a response to a crisis or lack of resources. My research, however, showed there are several types of ICT rearrangements:

- **Tinkering** consists of physically reconfiguring ICTs to create alternative ways to use them.
- **Pooling Resources** occurs when different actor groups join and bring together their separate resources in service of the larger organization.
- **Repurposing** happens when actors shift ICTs’ manufacturer-intended purposes, for example, turning personal cellphones into public broadcasting stations.

It is important to note the circumstances under which these re-arrangements happen. Improvisation happened throughout the NFAC’s emergence and development. However, data indicates that improvisation activity increased during episodes in which the social movement needed to circumvent surveillance, fight repression and information control, etc. Other research indicates that improvisation practices seem to be common in states of precarity (Gallie & Paugam, 2002) caused by political persecution (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008), poverty (Cossens & Kaplinksy, 2009), natural disruptions (Semaan & Mark, 2011), sexual identity (Hollibaugh & Weiss, 2015), and disability (Goggin, 2008). Thus, due to the implications of this behavior in innovation and inclusion, it will be important to characterize the necessary conditions to replicate improvisation practices and innovative ICT rearrangements, and create practical guidelines transferable to other contexts. The result will be a model based on empirical data and the multidisciplinary literature on improvisation, innovation, resilience and activism that will include frames and attitudes, technical capabilities, organizational structures, and policy environment behind each type of rearrangement. The model will be tested against a selection of new cases like Black Lives Matter, Argentina’s "Ni Una Menos" (Not one less) movement, or the Dakota Access Pipeline. This research's potential to enhance our ability to promote collective innovation processes is valued by a diversity of funding programs like the National Science Foundation's Infrastructure Management and Extreme Events (IMEE) program, Science of Science and Innovation Policy (SciSIP) program, and the Latin
American and Caribbean Network Information Center (LACNIC)’ Regional Fund for Digital Innovation in Latin America.

State-Activists’ dynamics vary with the context. On one side, while activists improvised and found new ways to use ICTs, the state also found new ways to mitigate these non-sanctioned uses of ICTs. State-Activist dynamics vary with the context. On one side, while activists improvised and found new ways to use ICTs, the state also found new ways to mitigate these non-sanctioned uses of ICTs. My informants argued that the same way they became more strategic, the state slowly adopted more sophisticated repression tactics like Internet and media repression and surveillance. Activists recognized that while ICTs were crucial for their cause, eventually these technologies were also used against them, forcing them to engage in the further improvisation of their rearrangements resulting in additional state reaction in the form of regulation to inhibit the social movement. Thus, creating a vicious circle of action, backlash, and reaction (Espinoza Vasquez, 2015a). Meanwhile, however, other regimes around the world are adopting eParticipation to enable enhanced civic participation in administration, democratic debate and deliberation, public opinion formation, and policy-making (Espinoza Vasquez, Hagen, Lee, 2016; Espinoza Vasquez, et al., 2015b; Petrik, 2009; Sanford & Rose, 2007; Macintosh, 2004). Considering those two scenarios, my work on eParticipation will inquire about the conditions that make regime ICT interventions helpful for civic participation. Should governments provide platforms for eParticipation if they have the potential to become tools for surveillance, or are social movements better off improvising their own ad-hoc ICT structures? What kind of sociotechnical environments translate online activity into real change? How does a click on a state-run eParticipation platform translate into real action and change? Is political participation impacted by limited versus abundant ICTs infrastructure? What other types of political participation and civic engagement are made possible through ICTs?

This research will require a critical approach and a collaborative in-depth mixed-method comparative case analysis of social movements in different contexts. It can potentially be funded by the NSF’s Innovation Corps National Innovation Network Sites Program and Team program, and the International Development Bank (IDB) Initiative for the promotion of Regional Public Goods.
5.1.6. Limitations

The limitations of this study are associated mostly with data collection, particularly with the documents collected online.

- Not all critical interactions are available through one media.
- Not all media are rich (for example, documents provide fewer communicative cues that videos)
- Because people may adopt online personas, authenticity of sources could not always be verified.
- Some websites were deleted or the content changed, making it difficult to corroborate.
- When connecting data online, the researcher is not the primary instrument for data collection.
- Because of the requirements for sources to have access to Internet, technical skills, reading and writing proficiency; my samples may be unrepresentative.
- Official reports and public records cannot capture the reality as lived, and might have built-in bias that I cannot identify
- Considering the level of corruption in Honduras, government-provided data, like ICT indicators may have flaws.
- Some documents may not afford a continuity of unfolding events.

5.1.7. Conclusions

This study was guided by the question: What is the role of ICTs in social movements? I committed to describing this role as a dynamic relation and relied on the Contentious Politics Model to guide us through the case of the Honduran National Front Against the Coup.

In the process, I designed and propose an operative framework and analytical tool to study the interactions between social movements, institutions and ICTs. The model uses CAFEs (Collective Action Framing Episodes), a composed construct drawn from social
movement and information systems theories that allows integrating several levels of analysis into one unit.

Using this framework, I conclude that ICTs don't drive revolutions, but neither are they simply tools. I propose that ICTs play several roles in the structural, organizational, and ideological levels of social movements. Moreover, ICTs influence every level of the CPM. There is a dynamic relation between framing processes, Mobilizing Structures and Opportunity structures, where the content of the frames (symbolic) affects social movements' practices and ultimately the OS, MS, ICTs and FP. (See figure 54).

Figure 53. Visualization of the contributions of this study to the Contentious Politics Model. Red represents the contribution. Modified visualization from figure 6: Visualization of the interconnectedness of the Contentious Politics Model

Thus, there is a dynamic relation as environmental conditions (OS) like policies, institutions, ICT ownership, media centralization, shape the way social movements configure ICTs, and ICTs configurations by social movements can influence environmental conditions. The same way ICT configurations can be determined by the availability, collaboration and connectedness of civil society organizations within the movement (MS), and there relations can be influenced by ICT configurations. Therefore, by playing a
reflexive role in the process of frame creation, ICTs are embedded in every level of the social movement emergence and development.

I expand this notion next, by answering the three second-level research questions that guided this dissertation.

5.1.7.1. How does the Honduran Resistance Movement use ICTs to create political Opportunity Structures?

ICTs alone do not determine the outcome of social movements. Considering how the National Front Against the Coup interacted with ICTs throughout the political crisis; ICTs can be considered a dimension of Opportunity Structure.

Opportunity Structures (OS) are defined as institutionalized provisions in the political environment that facilitate or impede political expression and participation (voting, campaigning, forming political parties, public assembly, etc.). They are the set of structures that transgressive politics confront, which are unique to the context in which they are embedded. Based on the evidence from this study I argue ICTs meet this definition.

First, the ICTs sector is institutionalized in the sense governmental policies define how they are structured and regulated in a society. In the case of Honduras, the market liberalization policies of the 90s' allowed the proliferation of many alternative stations and access to the Internet and to several cellphone companies, thus creating a large network of communication with many choices for citizens. The NFAC could use this network strategically to mobilize effectively.

Second, depending on who owns them or controls them, ICTs can hinder or facilitate political expression and participation (voting, campaigning, forming political parties, public assembly, etc.) along four dimensions: stability of political alignments, openness of the political system, availability of influential allies, and state's capacity for repression. In the case of the NFAC the state caught up with the movement and began using mobile technologies (e.g. mobile phones) to monitor the movement and orchestrate repressive measures. Conversely ICTs were an indispensable tool for the movement to rally state repression and publicize human rights violations. Access to alternative media and
independent sources of information helped promote a shift in political alignment to reject the coup, by facilitating the flow and availability of reliable information. On the other side, mainstream media allowed the state to broadcast propaganda with its official version of events to counteract the movement’s messages. Synchronous and asynchronous collaboration technologies made it easier to find and make influential allies (e.g. local and transnational NGOs). For the state’s part, the authorities relied on ICTs to mobilize allies like the U.S. and sympathetic think tanks to oppose the movement.

These findings are validated by other studies that have also shown how social movements use ICTs to open the political system and institutional environment by increasing their reach from local to transnational thus facilitating new allies, improving their ability to acquire and control their information, making it difficult for governments to repress, censor, and control their flow of information, and facilitating new forms of contentious activity and new ways of participating.  

Thus, political expression and participation can be constrained or facilitated by ICTs. I argue that the NFAC subversive use of ICTs like community radio, TV, print media, mobile and internet technologies can be considered an instance of hacking the institutionalized opportunity structures in order to join them and democratize them.

Finally, ICTs are increasingly becoming the structures that social movements confront. In other words, these ICTs are becoming objects of contention themselves. Regimes are increasingly being challenged over their ICT policies and infrastructures. In Honduras, access to information has become a "hot topic" of contention. The Micheletti and Lobo’s administrations attempts to curtail information flow and prevent new alternative media from emerging are being challenged by civil society organizations (Sosa, 2014).

So, in addition to just looking at specific tools like Twitter or Facebook in political participation; we must observe and study the use of ICTs in its totality in the socio-

76. For a comprehensive review refer to Chapter 2
77. I define hacking as the practice of skillfully and purposefully manipulate and modify features of a system (in this case an institutional/political system) in order break through and gain access to it.
78. These regulations are discussed in Chapter 4
79. A second example is the movement for net neutrality in the United States, "Save the Internet," which aims to influence the FCC to have open Internet rules under Title II of the Communications Act (Benkler, et al., 2015). A third example would be the American Librarian's Association's mobilizations to protest the Patriot Act signed by President George w. Bush and extended by President Obama (Shaffer, 2014).
historical moment, by looking at their configuration, ownership, centralizations and interaction with society.

5.1.7.2. What role do ICTs play in creating and supporting the movement's organizational structures, and in preparing and carrying out visible movement episodes?

As ICTs become integral to organizations and society, they are also are an integral part of social movements' contentious strategy.

ICTs are a resource that helps mobilize people, money and information. ICT availability and malleability as channels for information dissemination can help or hinder mobilization of resources. Moreover, as social movement actors engage in information seeking behavior to create collective frames, they rely heavily in ICTs. Thus, in addition to frame dissemination, ICTs have a crucial role in the creation of frames. For instance, the present case saw the movement using a variety of ICTs ranging from community radio, television, print media, mobile and internet-based technologies. Because the movement was constrained by lack of access to mainstream media, I found instances of resourcefulness and improvisation, both in the way individual media platforms were used, and in the way these platforms were combined and recombined to move ahead. Thus, the movement's use of ICTs for mobilizing social support for the cause can be considered an improvised subversive response to the institutionalized OS.

ICTs also supported the improvisation of new organizational forms to support diverse geographically distributed collaboration. The NFACs regional affiliates formed a loosely coupled extended organization, which allowed the affiliates a degree of autonomy to do their oppositional work while remaining fully aligned with the movement's priorities. ICTs allowed the movement to broadcast its messages across the network to "socialize" the affiliates and ensure they were all on the same page. This lose confederation, coordinated through ICTs allowed the NFAC to dynamically reconfigure and rearrange its regional affiliates as needed.

80. Socialize is a term used by NFAC activist to refer to recruit potential members through discussion.
5.1.7.3. How does the NFAC use ICTs to shape its attitudes, identities and competences?

The CPM argues the mediator between social movements (Mobilizing Structures) and their political and institutional environment (Opportunity Structures), are the shared understandings the social movement members construct collectively (Frames).

Social Movements negotiate the meaning, use, and configuration of ICTs through the construction of collective frames of thoughts, practices, and actions. While other researchers have proposed the idea of "technological frames" (Orlikowski, 1994; Davidson, 2006), my approach defines frames beyond technological systems, and includes a holistic view of actors' realities. In other words, social movements' collective action frames determine their organizational, political, and ICT strategy.

![Proposed dynamic relationship between frames, mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, practices and ICTs.](image)

Thus, the role of ICTs is mediated by social movement's frames. Social movements collectively adopt frames that give meaning to their goals and practices. Frames affect the way social movements interact with Opportunity Structures and Mobilizing Structures; and it also affects the way they interact with ICTs. (e.g. Democratic social movements pursue
democratic causes, by adopting democratic organizational structures, and reconfiguring ICTs to support those democratic practices)

At the same time, however, frames are shaped collectively through a process of problem definition, information and solution seeking, diffusion, and motivation. All these activities are carried out through ICTs. Moreover, I add that social movements' improvisation practices are part of the material aspect of framing. Improvisation can take three forms: tinkering or reconfiguring the resources they have at hand, pooling or grouping their resources together to maximize capabilities, and repurposing or adapting resources to use for a different purpose. These improvisation practices allow social movements to reconfigure Opportunity Structures, ICTs and Mobilizing Structures in a way that matches their frames.
APPENDICES
### 6.1. Appendix 1: Geographic Distribution of Civil Society Organizations in Honduras

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number of Organizations and Networks</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Morazán</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortes</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olancho</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paraíso</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlántida</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choluteca</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoro</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comayagua</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other departments</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cruz-Espinoza 2003 Organizaciones de la sociedad civil en Honduras. De la consulta a la participación.
6.2. Appendix 2: Protocol

1. Approaching Potential Contacts for Interviews

Potential participants will be approached via telephone, email, text-message or private message on Facebook. They will be selected via snowball sampling. The following are the scripts that will be used to approach them and ask them for an interview.

1.1. Scripts in English for contact via Telephone E-mail Text Message and Facebook

a. Telephone

Hello, my name is Fátima Espinoza Vasquez, and I am a doctoral student at Syracuse University. I am conducting a research project for my dissertation, and I am interested in understanding the role that ICTs played during the constitutional crisis of 2009 when president Manuel Zelaya was deposed. Your name was mentioned by ________ (someone, a newspaper, in a blog), and I think you may be able to provide me with very valuable contributions to my study. Thus, I would like to know if you would be interested in participating in my study by participating in a one-on-one interview. This should take between 30 and 60 minutes and will be held at a place and time most convenient to you. If you are interested in participating, we can schedule an appointment through this media or you can contact me via email to fkespino@syr.edu or via phone to ___________(local number).

Your participation will be very valuable for me.

a. E-mail

Subject: Interview on the use of information technologies during the crisis of 2009

Hello Mr./Ms._________,

My name is Fátima Espinoza Vasquez, and I am a doctoral student at Syracuse University. I am conducting a research project for my dissertation, and I am...
interested in understanding the role that ICTs played during the constitutional crisis of 2009 when president Manuel Zelaya was deposed.

Your name was mentioned by ________ (someone, a newspaper, in a blog), and I think you may be able to provide me with very valuable contributions to my study. Thus, I would like to know if you would be interested in taking part in my study by participating in a one-on-one interview. This should take between 30 and 60 minutes and will be held at a place and time most convenient to you.

If you are interested in participating, we can schedule an appointment through this media or you can contact me via text message or phone to __________(local number).

Your participation will be very valuable for me.

I look forward to hearing from you.

---

**a. c. Text Message**

Hello Mr./Mrs. _______,

My name is Fatima Espinoza Vasquez, I’m a doctoral student at Syracuse University. Your name was mentioned by ________ (someone, a newspaper, a blog). I would like to interview you about the role of ICTs during the constitutional crisis of 2009.

Would you like to schedule a phonecall so that I can give you more details about this Project? We can also schedule an appointment through this media or vie email to fkespino@syr.edu.

Your participation will be very valuable for me.

I look forward to hearing from you.

---

**a. d. Facebook (Private Message)**

Hello Mr./Ms__________,

My name is Fátima Espinoza Vasquez, and I am a doctoral student at Syracuse University. I am conducting a research project for my dissertation, and I am
interested in understanding the role that ICTs played during the constitutional crisis of 2009 when president Manuel Zelaya was deposed.

Your name was mentioned by ________ (someone, a newspaper, in a blog), and I think you may be able to provide me with very valuable contributions to my study. Thus, I would like to know if you would be interested in taking part in my study by participating in a one-on-one interview. This should take between 30 and 60 minutes and will be held at a place and time most convenient to you.

If you are interested in participating, we can schedule an appointment through this media or you can contact me via email to fkespino@syr.edu, text message or phone call to _____________(local number).

Your participation will be very valuable for me.

I look forward to hearing from you.

1. 1.2. Script in Spanish for contact via Telephone, E-mail, Text Message or Facebook

a. a. Telephone

Hola, mi nombre es Fátima Espinoza Vásquez. Soy estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Syracuse. Estoy llevando a cabo una investigación para mi tesis doctoral titulada: "El uso de tecnologías de información y comunicación (TICs) durante la crisis constitucional del 2009". Mi estudio intenta identificar el rol que jugaron las TICs durante la crisis del 2009 cuando el presidente Zelaya fue depuesto. Me entere de su nombre por medio de__________ (nombre de persona o periódico), y me parece que usted podría proveer valiosas anécdotas que enriquecerán este estudio. Me gustaría invitarle a participar en mi estudio mediante una entrevista, la cual durará entre 30 y 60 minutos y será llevada a cabo en un lugar de su conveniencia.

Si le interesa participar podemos establecer una hora y lugar para la entrevista por este medio, otra alternativa puede ser al email: fkespino@syr.edu o al teléfono: ______________ numero local).

Su participación será muy valiosa.
Espero su respuesta.

**a. b. E-mail**

Subject: Entrevista sobre uso de tecnología durante la crisis del 2009

Saludos Sr./Sra______,

Mi nombre es Fátima Espinoza Vásquez. Soy estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Syracuse. Estoy llevando a cabo una investigación para mi tesis doctoral titulada: "El uso de tecnologías de información y comunicación (TICs) durante la crisis constitucional del 2009". Mi estudio intenta identificar el rol que jugaron las TICs durante la crisis del 2009 cuando el presidente Zelaya fue depuesto. Me entere de su nombre por medio de_________ (nombre de persona o periódico), y me parece que usted podría proveer valiosas anécdotas que enriquecerán este estudio. Me gustaría invitarle a participar en mi estudio mediante una entrevista, la cual durará entre 30 y 60 minutos y será llevada a cabo en un lugar de su conveniencia.

Si le interesa participar podemos establecer un hora y lugar para la entrevista por este medio, otra alternativa puede ser (email: http://fkespino@syr.edu o al teléfono: ______________ numero local).

Su participación será muy valiosa.

Espero su respuesta.

---

**a. c. Text Message**

Saludos Sr./Sra______,

Mi nombre es Fátima Espinoza Vásquez, soy estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Syracuse.

Me entere de su nombre por medio de_________ (nombre de persona o periódico). Me gustaría entrevistarlo sobre "El uso de tecnologías de información y comunicación (TICs) durante la crisis constitucional del 2009". ¿Podemos concertar una llamada telefónica para darle mas detalles?
O podemos establecer un hora y lugar para la entrevista por este medio, o por email http://fkespino@syr.edu.
Su participación será muy valiosa.

a. d. Facebook (Private Message)

Saludos Sr./Sra______,

Mi nombre es Fátima Espinoza Vásquez. Soy estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Syracuse. Estoy llevando a cabo una investigación para mi tesis doctoral titulada: "El uso de tecnologías de información y comunicación (TICs) durante la crisis constitucional del 2009". Mi estudio intenta identificar el rol que jugaron las TICs durante la crisis del 2009 cuando el presidente Zelaya fue depuesto. Me entere de su nombre por medio de_________ (nombre de persona o periódico), y me parece que usted podría proveer valiosas anécdotas que enriquecerán este estudio. Me gustaría invitarle a participar en mi estudio mediante una entrevista, la cual durara entre 30 y 60 minutos y será llevada a cabo en un lugar de su conveniencia.
Si le interesa participar podemos establecer un hora y lugar para la entrevista por este medio, otra alternativa puede ser al email: fkespino@syr.edu o al teléfono: ________________ numero local).
Su participación será muy valiosa.
Espero su respuesta.

1. 2. Semi-Structured Interviews

Once the participant accepts to an interview, we will set up a time and a place. Interviews will be conducted in Spanish in public places, such as cafés or plazas. Neither the site nor the places where the interviews will take place require permission to access. Before the interview starts participants will be read and given an informed consent form. They may choose to sign it or not. Consent forms are attached. Interviews will be recorded upon authorization of the participant.
1. **Questions in English**
   
a. What media have you traditionally used to obtain information? (Newspaper, television, cell phone, radio, Facebook, twitter)

b. Why did you select that media?

c. What other information and communication technologies do you use on a regular basis? (Newspapers, television, radio, Facebook, twitter)

d. What do you use them for?

e. How did you first find out about the constitutional crisis?

f. During the crisis, what media did you use to get information and communicate?

g. Why did you use that media in particular?

h. What helped shape your opinion about what was happening?

i. During the crisis, there were several demonstrations to support or to reject President Zelaya. How did you get informed about these protests?

j. What do you think about the quality of information you accessed during the crisis?

k. Do you think information and communication technologies helped or hurt the resistance movement?

1. **Questions in Spanish**
   
a. Que medios ha usado tradicionalmente para comunicarse y/o informarse? (Periódicos, celular, televisión, radio, Facebook, Twitter)

b. Por que ese medio en particular?

c. Que otras tecnologías de información y comunicación usa regularmente? (Periódicos, celular, televisión, radio, Facebook, Twitter)
d. Con qué propósito en particular las usa?

e. Como se enteró que el presidente Zelaya estaba fuera del país?

f. Que medios utilizaba durante la crisis para informarse y comunicarse?

g. Por qué usaba ese medio en particular?

h. Que le ayudó a formarse una opinión acerca de lo que estaba pasando?

i. Durante la crisis hubo muchas manifestaciones públicas. ¿Cómo se enteraba usted de estas manifestaciones?

j. Que piensa de la calidad de la información a la que usted tuvo acceso durante la crisis?

k. En qué forma cree usted que las tecnologías de información y comunicación ayudaron o dañaron al movimiento de resistencia popular?

1. 3. Data Handling

Recordings will be transcribed, both the recordings and transcriptions will be saved into a password-protected computer using a codename to protect participant's identity. For transparency purposes, participants will have the option of obtaining a copy of the recording and/or the transcript at request.
### 6.3. Appendix 3: Political Parties and Their Candidates in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2013 Presidential Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Anti-Corruption Party or PAC</td>
<td>Salvador Nasrila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Christian Democratic Party or DC</td>
<td>Felicito Avila Ordóñez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Freedom and Refunding Party or LIBRE</td>
<td>Xiomara Castro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Democratic Unification Party or UD</td>
<td>Cesar Ham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Liberal Party or PL</td>
<td>Elvin Santos Brito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 National Party of Honduras or PNH</td>
<td>Ricardo Alvarez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Social Democratic Innovation and Unity Party or PINU</td>
<td>Jorge Rafael Aguilar Paredes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Broad Political Electoral Front in Resistance or FAPER</td>
<td>Andres Pavon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.4. Appendix 4: Presidents and Heads of State in Honduras from 1933 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>President/Head of State</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tiburcio Carías Andino</td>
<td>1 February 1933</td>
<td>1 January 1949</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Juan Manuel Gálvez</td>
<td>1 January 1949</td>
<td>5 December 1954</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Julio Lozano Díaz (Supreme Head of State)</td>
<td>5 December 1954</td>
<td>21 October 1956</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ramón Villeda Morales</td>
<td>21 December 1957</td>
<td>3 October 1963</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Oswaldo López Arellano</td>
<td>3 October 1963</td>
<td>7 June 1971</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ramón Ernesto Cruz Uclés</td>
<td>7 June 1971</td>
<td>4 December 1972</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Oswaldo López Arellano (Head of State)</td>
<td>4 December 1972</td>
<td>22 April 1975</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Juan Alberto Melgar Castro (Head of State)</td>
<td>22 April 1975</td>
<td>7 August 1978</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Manuel Zelaya Rosales</td>
<td>27 January 2006</td>
<td>28 June 2009</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Roberto Micheletti (acting)</td>
<td>28 June 2009</td>
<td>27 January 2010</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Porfirio Lobo Sosa</td>
<td>27 January 2010</td>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.5. Appendix 5: Types of Local Civil Society in Honduras

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Main Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and grassroots</td>
<td>They use basic mechanisms for participation and organization at the community level. They present specific demands to government.</td>
<td>Patronatos, boards of neighbors, health and emergency committees, local development movements, and urban population movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church-based and religious</td>
<td>They are related to the religious sector, many of them conduct projects and community activities focused services or welfare.</td>
<td>Pastors' associations, churches' associations, churches' social committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid and welfare</td>
<td>Assistance, care and services for: low-income sectors, population groups and less benefited needy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Corporate, business and trade associations</td>
<td>Organizations working primarily for the interests of their members. And constitute economic interest by industry or profession, occupation or trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>7,755,825</td>
<td>7,869,089</td>
<td>8,041,654</td>
<td>8,200,795</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Homes</td>
<td>1,654,754</td>
<td>1,690,775</td>
<td>1,737,262</td>
<td>1,737,496</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population in Urban Areas</td>
<td>3,531,270</td>
<td>3,582,796</td>
<td>3,661,419</td>
<td>3,733,876</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population in Rural Areas</td>
<td>4,224,555</td>
<td>4,286,294</td>
<td>4,380,236</td>
<td>4,466,919</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>Homes with a television</td>
<td>1,136,918</td>
<td>1,180,546</td>
<td>1,260,215</td>
<td>1,259,375</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Homes with a TV</td>
<td>68.71%</td>
<td>69.82%</td>
<td>72.54%</td>
<td>72.48%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cable Providers</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cable Subscribers</td>
<td>686,646</td>
<td>736,641</td>
<td>886,271</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Homes with a radio</td>
<td>1,348,647</td>
<td>1,368,852</td>
<td>1,371,973</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Homes with a Radio</td>
<td>81.50%</td>
<td>80.96%</td>
<td>78.97%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer s/Internet</td>
<td>Homes with a computer</td>
<td>181,875</td>
<td>204,400</td>
<td>246,573</td>
<td>305,875</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Homes with a Computer</td>
<td>10.99%</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
<td>14.19%</td>
<td>17.60%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Service Provider</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Users</td>
<td>658,470</td>
<td>737,610</td>
<td>892,050</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Subscribers</td>
<td>58,927</td>
<td>72,360</td>
<td>89,774</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Users per hundred habitants</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Subscribers per 100 habitants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellphone</td>
<td>Homes with a Cellphone</td>
<td>1,162,915</td>
<td>1,345,310</td>
<td>1,398,332</td>
<td>1,478,462</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Homes with a Cellphone</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Cellphones</td>
<td>6,131,984</td>
<td>8,390,755</td>
<td>9,505,071</td>
<td>8,062,229</td>
<td>7,370,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellphone Operators</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Cellphones</td>
<td>6,131,984</td>
<td>8,390,755</td>
<td>9,505,071</td>
<td>8,062,229</td>
<td>7,370,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephon e (Landline)</td>
<td>Homes with a Landline by HONDUTEL</td>
<td>528,877</td>
<td>521,957</td>
<td>521,276</td>
<td>520,814</td>
<td>513,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Homes with a Landline</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>9.90%</td>
<td>8.32%</td>
<td>7.48%</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Honduran telecommunications regulator CONATEL
### 6.7. Appendix 7: Television and Radio Ownership in Honduras 2008

#### Radio Operators Station Ownership (# of stations by operator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both (AM and FM)</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Operators Ownership of TV Stations (# of stations by operator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>Operators</th>
<th>1-3 stations</th>
<th>4-6 stations</th>
<th>7-9 stations</th>
<th>10-12 stations</th>
<th>13-15 stations</th>
<th>17-19 stations</th>
<th>20-22 stations</th>
<th>23-25 stations</th>
<th>26-28 stations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Top 10 Politicians's Facebook Pages in Honduras

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>HN Local Fans ↓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Xiomara Castro De Zelaya</td>
<td>107813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xiomara Castro De Zelaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Salvador Nasralla Salvador Nasralla</td>
<td>100751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partido Libre Partido Libre</td>
<td>72459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Juan Orlando Hernández Juan Orlando Hernández</td>
<td>65977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mauricio Villeda Bermúdez Mauricio Villeda Bermúdez</td>
<td>50180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa U.S. Embassy Tegucigalpa</td>
<td>13533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tribunal Supremo Electoral - ...</td>
<td>11115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribunal Supremo Electoral - ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iniciativa Emprende Iniciativa Emprende</td>
<td>10899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>El Salvador Impressive! El Salvador Impressive!</td>
<td>4091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Banco Mundial Banco Mundial</td>
<td>3005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Most Popular Presidential Candidates on Twitter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Name</th>
<th>Followers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salvador Nasralla (@SalvadorNasrala)</td>
<td>110195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiomara Castro (@XiomaraCastroZ)</td>
<td>25158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Orlando H. (@JuanOrlandoH)</td>
<td>24083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauricio Villeda (@MauricioV2014)</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 6.9. Appendix 9: Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/Categories</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Sub-Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICT Characteristics</strong></td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify the owners of media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of media polarization. Like differing messages, or comments by informants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>Classification of the types of ICTs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Computers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Email</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Television</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cell phone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAFEs</strong></td>
<td>Citizen Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zelaya's proposed new form of governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuarta Urna</td>
<td></td>
<td>The proposed path to democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It's a Coup</td>
<td></td>
<td>The idea that Zelaya did not renounce his presidency, he was illegally deposed through a coup d'état. Hondurans only recognizing him as legitimate elected president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinstall Zelaya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zelaya's return is the only way to reinstall constitutional order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Electoral Farce</td>
<td>Refoundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active rejection of the elections organized by Micheletti</td>
<td>Honduras needs to be rebuild from the ground up. The best course of action to influence the Honduran political system and conduct structural changes such as the Constituent Assembly is creating new mechanisms for participation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream Media</td>
<td>Mostly corporate media who dominate opinions and holds most of the audience.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Media</td>
<td>Media not in the mainstream.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Wide range of non governmental and non for profit organizations. (e.g. labor unions, NGOs, etc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Official institutions and individuals that represent the Honduran legislative, executive or judicial branch, or any of the ministries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Media</td>
<td>Organizations or individuals members of international news and ICT outlets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations</td>
<td>International civil society and governance organizations. (e.g. OAS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>A person who writes for newspapers or magazines or prepares news to be broadcast on radio or television</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military / Police</td>
<td>Members of the armed forces or police.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Private business (mostly corporate).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycle of Protest</td>
<td>Social Ferment</td>
<td>Stage where there is widespread discontent about social and political conditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Excitement</td>
<td>Demonstration of dissent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>Movement has higher level of organization and has established important coalitions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>When the movement establishes itself within society.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before the Coup</td>
<td>Events before June 28, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the Coup</td>
<td>Events between June 29 and November 29, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the Coup</td>
<td>Events after November 29, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices / Activities</td>
<td>Fight Repression</td>
<td>Instances where ICTs helped fight repression.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvisation</td>
<td>Re-appropriation</td>
<td>Instances where they re-appropriated ICTs that did not belong to them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinkering/Bricolage</td>
<td>Instances where they physically reconfigured ICTs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repurposing</td>
<td>Instances where they gave a different use to ICTs than the originally intended.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooling Resources</td>
<td>Instances where they shared resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumvent Surveillance</td>
<td>Practice to circumvent surveillance or around repression.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Framing</td>
<td>Practices to counteract ideas from the opposition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denounce Repression</td>
<td>Practices aimed at denouncing repression.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminate Information</td>
<td>Actions to disseminate information.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek Information</td>
<td>Actions related to seeking information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilize People</td>
<td>Actions and strategies to mobilize people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliances</td>
<td>Creation of alliances among individuals or groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Alternatives</td>
<td>Creating alternative processes, technologies, mechanism or institutions in order to achieve their goals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Use of ICTs to collaborate within the movement or with organization outside the movement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Dimensions</th>
<th>Opportunity Structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System Openness</td>
<td>The degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and manipulate the political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for Repression</td>
<td>Actions taken by authorities, meant to control or eliminate those confronting them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential Allies</td>
<td>Allies are organization or individuals whose presence and availability creates a window of opportunity for action for social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Alignments</td>
<td>The affiliations that people or groups of people may have to a political party of ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilizing Structures</td>
<td>These are the formal and informal organizational infrastructure or associational networks that enables individuals and groups to organize and engage in collective action, including civil society organizations, activist groups, friendships, churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing Processes</td>
<td>The process through which the movement recognizes the problem, seeks solutions, diffuse ideas and find motivations for action; and the ways they create collective identity and identify themselves, and are recognized by other actors as part of a broader group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>Suppression of speech.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zelaya’s Measures</td>
<td>Zelaya’s economic, political, environmental, etc. initiatives. Changes in legislation to support them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelleti’s Measures</td>
<td>Michelleti’s government political measures and the changes in legislation to support them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with International Community</td>
<td>Interventions, connections, alliances, bonds, etc. with the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Instances of percussion, oppression, threats, and violation of human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>Close illegal observation of members of the NFAC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Codebook shows the six broad categories based on the CPM and CAFEs with their respective sub-categories*
6.10. Appendix 10: Timeline

Given the size of this document, I placed it as an .xlsx file in a Dropbox folder. To download it please go to http://bit.ly/1pHWwCW
6.11. Appendix 11: Illustration of single case design with multiple levels of analysis.
Bibliography


BERMAN, S. E. The primacy of politics: Social democracy and the making of europe's twentieth century (paperback).


C-Libre. (2010). *Honduras: informe de las organizaciones de sociedad civil sobre la situación de los derechos humanos Al consejo de derechos humanos de la ONU novena sesión del grupo de trabajo del EPU*. Honduras: C-Libre.


Howard, P. N., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W., & Mazaid, M. (2011). Opening closed regimes: What was the role of social media during the arab spring?


Hsu, J. C. (2009). Internet and the new civil society movements in taiwan. Hermes, (55), 97-+


Johnson, A. (2016, March 16, 2016). The murder that exposed hillary Clinton's grim legacy in honduras. Foreign Policy in Focus,


Rivero Santos, A. (1997). Grassroots and the state: Perspectives from the neighbors' movement in caracas, venezuela. (Ph.D., Syracuse University). *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses,


Shirky, C. (2011). Political power of social media-technology, the public sphere sphere, and political change, the. *Foreign Aff.*, 90, 28.


Webber, Jeffery R.,Carr, Barry,. (2013). The new latin american left : Cracks in the empire


FÁTIMA K. ESPINOZA VASQUEZ
Ph.D. Information Science and Technology
School of Information Studies
7 Prospect St. Apt 5
Stafford Springs, CT 06076
1 (315) 450-7024
fkespino@syr.edu
C. (315) 450 7024
Twitter: @fkespino
http://ischool.syr.edu/fkespino
http://syr.academia.edu/FatimaEspinoza

EDUCATION
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies. Syracuse, NY 2016
Ph.D. Information Science and Technology
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies. Syracuse, NY 2007
M.S. Information Management, Specialization in Project Management
Central American Technology University (UNITEC). Tegucigalpa, Honduras 2000
B.S. Communications

RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP

Research Experience
Visiting Scholar (Fall 2016-Summer 2017)
El Instituto: Institute of Latina/o, Caribbean, and Latin American Studies
University of Connecticut (UCONN)
• Work on project analyzing narratives to determine how social movements use intersectional frames to resonated diverse groups (e.g., LGBTQ groups, feminist organizations, trade unions, professional organizations, alternative media, etc.) to motivated them to engage in collaborative ICT improvisation practices.
• Drafting grant proposals

Dissertation Research: Dissertation committee, advisor, title of dissertation
The role of ICTs in Social Movements: The Case of the National Front Against the 2009 Honduran Coup.
• Advisor: Murali Venkatesh Ph.D.
• Dissertation Committee: Martha Garcia Murillo Ph.D., Jason Dedrick Ph.D., Bryan Semaan, Ph.D. John Burdick Ph.D.

Research Fellow (Fall 2008 – Summer 2010)
Center for Research on Collaboratories and Technology Enhanced Learning Communities (COTELCO). iSchool, Syracuse University
• Conducted qualitative data collection and analysis of NSF-funded research (VOSS & NY-AGEP\(^81\)).
• Developed a shared dataset and qualitative meta-analysis of the virtual organizations literature.

---

\(^{81}\) Virtual Organizations as Sociotechnical Systems and New York Alliance for Graduate Education and the Professoriate
• Drafted research and workshop proposals. Supervised 5 research teams and 17 graduate assistants.
• Trained new graduate assistants, and ensured Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) compliance.

Research Practica (FALL 2009/Spring 2010)
• Conducted qualitative and quantitative data analysis on innovation in the Argentinean telecommunication sector.

Graduate Assistant (2010-2011)
• Conducted literature reviews on the state of research and policy on Secondary Markets for Spectrum Trading.

Refereed Journal Articles

Refereed Conference Papers
Espinoza Vasquez, F. K. (2013). More than tools II: ICTs influencing social Movement’s opportunity structures. the 41st Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC), Arlington, USA

**Organized Panels**

**Posters and Other Academic Activities**


**Invited Talks**


**TEACHING**

**Survey of Telecommunication and Information Policy (Graduate Level)**
Adjunct Instructor
Public policy issues of the digital age: freedom of expression, intellectual property, regulation, privacy, security, access, and public information.

**Information and Information Environments (Graduate Level)**
Adjunct Instructor
Intensive project-based course on ICT Innovation and management.

**Introduction to Information Based Organizations (Undergraduate Level)**
Adjunct Instructor
Organizational communication, groups and leadership, management, interactions between people and technology in organizations, impact of ICTs on org. effectiveness.

**Survey of Telecommunication and Information Policy (Graduate Level)**
Teaching Practicum
Public policy issues of the digital age. Evaluated and revised syllabus design.

**Information Reporting and Presentation (Undergraduate)**
Teaching Practicum
Introduction to basic concepts in the presentation of information, in oral, printed and digital form.

**Distributed Collaboration and Emerging Technologies (Graduate)**
Teaching Practicum
Online course on social practices and cyberinfrastructure for geographically distributed collaboration in organizational contexts.

**Management Principles for Information Professionals (Graduate)**
Teaching Assistant
Discussion about management issues for information professionals from an interdisciplinary perspective.
GRANTS AND AWARDS
2011 Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Goekjian Summer Research Grant, Maxwell School
2012 Summer Research Grant. School of Information Studies
2007 Graduate Leadership Award, School of Information Studies, Syracuse University

UNIVERSITY SERVICE
2013-2014 Student Representative, Personnel committee, School of Information Studies, Syracuse University
2008-2009 Student Representative, Ph.D. Committee, School of Information Studies, Syracuse University
2005-2007 Student President, Women in Information Technology Organization, School of Information Studies
2009-2010 Instructor. Reference Management Software. Professional Doctorate Students. School of Information Studies, Syracuse University

RELEVANT NON-ACADEMIC PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Project Manager
SYSDYNE Corp. Stamford, Connecticut (2007)
- Oversaw the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of projects. Managed budget, schedules and documentation. Analyzed risks and worked with vendors.

Information Resources Center Director
State Department, Public Affairs Section, United States Embassy. Tegucigalpa, Honduras (2002-2004)
- Designed and implemented the center’s annual plan, outreach agenda, and Internet strategy to ensure support of public diplomacy goals.
- Conducted literature reviews of bilateral issues (e.g. democracy, human rights, corruption, etc).
- Managed online catalog and public’s access to online databases. Managed the embassy’s website.

Information Assistant and Web Manager
State Department, Public Affairs Section, United States Embassy. Tegucigalpa, Honduras (2002-2004)
- Designed the embassy’s official website and online presence strategy. Drafted press releases, and official statements.
- Organized cultural and press events. Designed audiovisual material to support the mission’s programs and goals.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

- Student Volunteer: Conference on Communication, Information, And Internet Policy (TPRC) Conference 2013
- Pro-Bono Web Designer. TapRoot Foundation, New York City, NY (2007)
- Pro-Bono Project Manager. eGovernment project: “Building Capacity for Transparent Administration of Rural City Halls” Honduras (1999)

LANGUAGES

- English (Fluent)
- Spanish (Native)