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A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at Syracuse University

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Honors Capstone Project in International Relations

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Abstract

For my Capstone Project, I compared and contrasted indigenous movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. In my preliminary research of Latin American indigenous movements, I noted that Ecuador and Bolivia have had the most successful indigenous movements at the national level in the region while Peru’s indigenous groups have lagged behind the mobilization fervor. Although Peru has a large indigenous population, even higher than the proportion of indigenous groups in Ecuador, its indigenous movement has not transpired passed the local level.

To help explain this anomaly, I consulted several texts to compare theories about what made indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador successful nationally and about why Peru lacked an indigenous movement. On the basis of the theories I researched as well as lessons learned from prior courses, I drew conclusions that I applied in my thesis.

Most importantly, I found that Peru’s indigenous case is not a result of geographic hindrances or elite oppression since its geography and existent racist attitudes are similar to Ecuador and Bolivia. Rather, the violence caused by Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian military, and the Fujimori regime inhibited indigenous mobilization in Peru because its indígenas did not have the same resources available to indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia (such as funding from transnational actors). Although indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia are not identical, the comparisons between these two movements and Peru’s indigenous peoples highlight the hindrances of its indigenous mobilization.
# Table of Contents

- **Introduction** ............................................................................................................. 1
- **Chapter I**
  - *The History* .......................................................................................................... 6
- **Chapter II**
  - *Indigenous Successes* ......................................................................................... 23
- **Chapter III**
  - *Bolivian and Ecuadorian Indígenas: Analysis of Differences between the Movements* .............................................................................................................. 40
- **Chapter IV**
  - *Peru: The Indigenous Anomaly* .............................................................................. 47
- **Conclusion** ................................................................................................................ 66
- **Works Cited** .............................................................................................................. 72
- **Written Capstone Summary** .................................................................................. 77
Introduction

In 1990, indigenous peoples in Ecuador launched a national, political protest to demand equal rights in the *Intí Raymi levantimiento*, or “uprising.” Two years later, two thousand indigenous supporters affiliated with the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE)* would march from Pastaza province to Quito to demand adjudication of land disputes and constitutional reform that would recognize indigenous land, social, and political rights as well as the plurinationality of Ecuador’s society (Sawyer, 1997: 1). Probably known to be the most successful indigenous movement in Latin America, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement would reach the peak of its power in January 2000 when Antonio Vargas Guatatuca, the president of CONAIE, and Carlos Solózano Constantini, a populist lawyer from Guayaquil, led the Junta of National Salvation’s successful effort to remove President Jamil Mahuad from power (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97).

Meanwhile, evolving from the Katarista Movement that emerged in the Aymara highlands of La Paz in the late 1960s, the Bolivian *campesino* movement would grow into a politicized, national indigenous movement during the 1990s. The Bolivian indigenous movement would achieve success comparable to Ecuador’s movement. Rather than contributing to a coup as Ecuadorian groups had, however, the indigenous movement in Bolivia would help elect an indigenous person, Evo Morales, to the presidency for the first time in January 2006 (Stiglitz, p. 1). Recently, Morales pushed for a new bill of rights, with a
chapter dedicated to Bolivia’s 36 indigenous peoples, to be added to Bolivia’s constitution (Piette, p. 1). It was ratified by Congress in February 2009 (New Bolivia Constitution in Force, p. 1).

The indigenous movement in Peru, however, has lagged far behind the indigenous movements of its two neighbors. Although 38 to 40 percent of Peru’s population is indigenous (versus 60 to 70 percent of Bolivia’s population and only 30 to 38 percent of Ecuador’s population), Peru’s indigenous peoples have barely organized on a local level; whereas indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador have organized successfully on a national level as well as achieved political representation in their countries’ legislative and executive branches of government (Yashar, p. 19). Obviously, these facts demonstrate that strength in numbers is not the only precursor to successful indigenous mobilization at a national level.

Why were Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s environments more conducive for indigenous mobilization than the atmosphere of Peru? For one, according to the Joshua Project, Peru contains 104 distinct ethnic groups (most of which are indigenous) while Ecuador has only 31 and Bolivia, 43 (Van Cott, p. 141). For example, 65 different indigenous groups (who are separated by terrain and incommunicative due to language barriers) exist in Peru’s Amazonian region alone versus only 12 in Ecuador (Van Cott, p. 141). As a result, language barriers and cultural differences impede Peruvian indigenous peoples’ abilities to compromise on issues, to collaborate, and to organize at a national level.
Several historical and political factors, however, are more important impediments to indigenous mobilization in Peru. According to Susan Stokes, the poor of Peru, are disproportionately indigenous, had an affinity for the elite and belief in the capitalist notion that hard work would contribute to “national progress (and, subsequently, individual, societal advancement)” of Peru from the 1930s to 1960s (Stokes, p. 16). Therefore, the poor relied on state officials to represent their needs. During the Velasco Regime (1968-1975), the state ironically strengthened the labor movement by expanding unions, strengthening the Marxist Left, and promoting the Peruvian state in school curricula (Stokes, p. 33). As a result, the indigenous looked to labor unions and the Left to represent their interests rather than organizing on a national level to represent their own demands.

Then, from the late-1970s to 1992, Sendero Luminoso arose in Peru’s political spectrum. Espousing a communist doctrine and the use of brute force to obtain their vision, followers of Sendero Luminoso terrorized the country, especially in the highlands and rural areas of Peru where most of the indigenous peoples are located. As a result, Sendero Luminoso successfully quelled indigenous mobilization unless it was through its communist organization. After Sendero Luminoso fell in 1992, however, the Fujimori Regime continued a reign of terror by targeting and interrogating Peru’s citizens in order to remain in power. Subsequently, the state of fear under the reign of Sendero Luminoso and the regime of Fujimori not only suppressed the mobilization of indigenous
peoples in Peru on a local, regional, and national level, but discouraged NGOs and neighboring countries from intervening in Peru (State of Fear, 2005).

On the other hand, NGOs in Ecuador and Bolivia played a major role in sponsoring bicultural education for indigenous peoples, disseminating democratic ideals, and organizing the indigenous not only locally and nationally, but internationally as well. Similarly, the indigenous movements of Ecuador and Bolivia received support from the state (through agrarian and constitutional reforms and through concessions made by government officials) while Peru’s government was a main contributor to the suppression of indigenous mobilization.

Furthermore, the electoral laws in Ecuador and Bolivia were more lax than the electoral laws of Peru. For example, while Ecuador was enfranchising illiterates and Bolivia’s government was decentralizing as well as sponsoring voter registration reforms that eventually were passed, Peru increased obstacles to ballot access by increasing the number of signatories that a national party had to acquire before registering from 100,000 to 480,000 signatories in 1995 (Van Cott, p. 163). Finally, while Ecuador and Bolivia fostered national leaders to inspire the indigenous masses who were mobilizing, Peru lacked an influential leader to do the same for its indigenous population.

Therefore, an analysis from the top-down and bottom-up will illustrate the factors that complicated indigenous mobilization locally, nationally, and internationally in Peru. Studying the necessary conditions that Peru’s indigenous movement lacked compared to the indigenous movements of Ecuador and Bolivia is important since it demonstrates the effect that political landscapes, terrorism,
state leaders, and institutional structures can have on stigmatized peoples. Similarly, the three cases show the importance that international factors (such as the support of transnational actors, international forums, and other countries) can have on an underrepresented population. In addition, the absence of revered local leaders and strong grassroots mobilization as well as the presence of cultural differences between indigenous ethnic groups are further hindrances to indigenous mobilization at the local level. In other words, the lack of an indigenous movement in Peru was not caused by the omission of one element, but a multitude of factors that were present for the indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador locally, nationally, and internationally.
Ecuador’s indigenous movement is probably the most renown and successful indigenous organization in South America. Prompted by their desires to correct the hundreds of years of marginalization and discrimination promulgated by the Ecuadorian state, indígenas mobilized to induce change in their government.

Unsurprisingly, indigenous marginalization has been documented since the mid-sixteenth century. Two major, stigmatized views that Spanish conquistadors held of indígenas are highlighted by a Franciscan friar, Bartolomé de las Casas, and Spain’s official court historian Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo (Gerlach, 2003: 19). Bartolomé de las Casas believed,

“God created these simple people [the indígenas] without evil and without guile. ...They are most submissive, patient, peaceful, and virtuous. Nor are they quarrelsome, rancorous, querulous, or vengeful. They neither possess nor desire to possess worldly wealth (emphasis added) (Gerlach, 2003:19).”

Bartolomé de las Casas instilled one racial stereotype of indigenous peoples that is still emphasized today—that the indígenas are simple and inferior people who are content tilling small plots of land since they “neither possess nor desire to possess worldly wealth (Gerlach, 2003: 19).”

In contrast, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo viewed the indígenas as,

“...naturally lazy and vicious, melancholic, cowardly, and in general a lying, shiftless people. They are idolatrous, libidinous, and commit sodomy. Their chief desire is to eat, drink, worship heathen idols, and commit bestial obscenities. What could one expect from a people whose skulls are so thick and hard that the Spaniards had to take care in
fighting not to strike on the head lest their swords be blunted (emphasis added) (Gerlach, 2003: 19)?

Over the centuries, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s view—that indígenas are lazy, untrustworthy, slow-witted heathens who practice backwards customs—has become the predominant racial stereotype of indígenas over Bartolomé de las Casas’ perspective (Gerlach, 2003: 19). Nevertheless, both beliefs exist in modern Ecuador; and shape daily interactions between whites, mestizos, and indígenas (Gerlach, 2003: 19).

Subsequently, these views maintained the hacienda system practiced in Ecuadorian society until the 1960s. Under the hacienda system, indigenous campesinos (or farm workers) were systematically tied to the land that was owned by a majority of whites who followed a modern system of feudalism. Due to the hacienda system, being an indigenous person is primarily associated with being a campesino as well (Walsh, 2002: 63).

During the first half of the twentieth century, indígenas organized under a campesino identity to fight for land rights. The campesino struggle for land rights can be traced back as early as 1926 when workers from a hacienda in Cayambe first protested for land. These campesinos’ actions would eventually lead to the formation of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE). In 1936, the Ecuadorian government passed the Ley de comunas (Commune Law). Under the Ley de comunas, the government recognized peasant and indigenous communities outside of haciendas; and permitted communities with fifty or more members to form their own local governments (also known as cabildos) and to collectively own property (also known as comunas). Comunas were then linked institutionally
to the state through local parishes (parroquias). Although the Ley de comunas was an advancement for the campesino movement (for it enabled further organization), indigenous organization was still dependent on permission granted by the state (Van Cott, p. 103).

In the 1940s, the PSE organized highland indígenas through a network of unions under a campesino identity. The PSE enabled these highland indígenas to form the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI) in 1944 in order to demand an end of the hacienda system and the recognition of their land titles. In 1964, the government passed an agrarian reform law that ended the feudal relationship between campesinos and hacienda owners (Van Cott, p. 103).

Due to the reform of the hacienda system, indígenas organized to demand communal lands, autonomous control over natural resources, and access to agricultural assistance programs during the 1960s and 1970s amidst a region-wide economic crisis in Latin America. Despite the economic meltdown in Latin America, however, indigenous mobilization in Ecuador boomed for reasons that will be addressed in Chapter II. In the early-1980s, indigenous leaders would eventually run as political candidates for leftist and center-leftist political parties (Van Cott, p. 103-104).

The success and progress of the social movement can be highlighted by four major events of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement: the 1990 Intí Raymi levantamiento (or uprising), the 1992 levantamiento in Quito, a Quito protest on February 5, 1997, and the coup of January 2000. The Intí Raymi levantamiento of 1990 was the first national protest of the indigenous movement that began to
challenge how *lo blanco-mestizo* (people of white or mixed descent) viewed *lo indígena* (people of indigenous descent) (Walsh, 2002: 68). Since the indigenous peoples were able to organize on a national, political level to directly challenge the white *patrón*, the *indígenas* challenged the assumption that Indians are tied to the countryside, artisan work, or manual labor; and that they were anxious to become “civilized” *mestizos* (Walsh, 2002: 68).

Likewise, the 1992 march from the Pastaza province to Quito also demonstrates the influence of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. On April 11, 1992, two thousand *indígenas* from the Pastaza province marched to Quito to demand adjudication of land and constitutional reform that would recognize indigenous land, social, and political rights as well as the plurinationality of Ecuadorian society (Sawyer, 1997: 1). The *levantamiento* had varied support. *Indígenas* from the highlands graciously housed and fed the lowland supporters while some supporters from the press, police, Red Cross, and *blanco-mestizo* enclaves cheered for the *indígenas’* stance against President Sixto Durán Ballén’s unpopular regime (Sawyer, 1997: 2).

A majority of conservative Ecuadorians, however, viewed the indigenous protest as a threat to Ecuador’s national sovereignty (Sawyer, 1997: 15). For example, two military reports along with an *Acuerdo Territorial* of 1990 stated that the *Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP)* (which funded the *levantamiento*) was associated with “countries linked to international guerrilla groups” that were determined to establish “an indigenous state with its own territory, language, and race” (Sawyer, 1997: 16). As a result, the white elite was
fearful of the indígenas’ rebelliousness and afraid that “they [were] capable of doing anything to [them]” (Sawyer, 1997: 17).

Similarly, the indigenous protest in Quito on February 5, 1997 was another successful extension of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. Indígenas protested on February 5th to demand the impeachment of President Abdalá Bucaram as well as to push for adherence to the 1994 platform of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) (Andolina, 2003: 731). In its Proyecto Político, CONAIE proposed that Ecuador should convert to a consociational democracy that reserves thirty percent of the seats in Ecuador’s National Congress to be chosen by indigenous communities; includes indigenous representation in all government agencies; preserves the autonomy of indigenous regions by officializing indigenous justice systems and languages; grants veto power to indígenas in all affairs concerning their agendas; creates a multicultural, bilingual education system; and establishes a constituent assembly (Andolina, 2003: 729).

According to governmental elites, however, democracy does not guarantee minority rights for it is “rule by the majority” (Andolina, 2003: 241). Since they were influenced by liberal, Orientalist ideals and their own history, elites believed “backwardness” in their society was superimposed by indigenous culture and Spain’s legacy (Andolina, 2003: 732). As a result, the solution to correct Ecuador’s “backwardness” was to adopt Western European and North American systems, such as a neo-liberal market (Andolina, 2003: 732-733). Ecuador’s problems were also attributed to the lack of Protestant values practiced in society
(Andolina, 2003: 733). Individuals with Protestant values were expected to possess a disciplined work ethic, an inclination to save, a respect for laws and political authority, and personal fulfillment through personal effort (Andolina, 2003: 733). As a result, anyone who lacked these values (such as an indígena) was considered to be backward (Andolina, 2003: 733). Similarly, this view does not allow for cultural difference. Rather, it reemphasizes personal responsibility and reinforces the Ecuadorian homogenous, national identity that “everyone is simply Ecuadorian” united through mestizaje (Andolina, 2003: 741).

Despite the predominance of negative racial stereotypes of indígenas, Ecuador’s indigenous movement is still considered one of the most successful mobilization efforts by indígenas in Latin American for various reasons (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 94). For example, the movement achieved a majority of its demands. Due to the 1992 levantamiento, indígenas gained official land rights over ancestral plots that amounted to 1,115,175 hectares (about 2.75 million acres) in Pastaza province (Sawyer, 1997: 4). Similarly, subsequent to the protest on February 5, 1997, the government adopted the indígenas’ demands for a constituent assembly (installed on December 20, 1997) (Andolina, 2003: 743). In addition, the indigenous movement successfully persuaded the government to pass a constitutional reform in 1998 that officially recognized indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians as legal nationalities; established collective rights for these groups; and included that Ecuador was a plurinational, multicultural society (Walsh, 2002: 75).
The constitutional reforms of 1998 sparked a transformation within the indigenous movement as well (Walsh, 2002: 76). Since the indigenous movement achieved national recognition of minority rights, culturally different groups, such as Afro-Ecuadorians and sects of indigenous cultures, deemed their union unnecessary for future goals (Walsh, 2002: 75-76). As a result, indigenous organizations began to divide into specialized organizations that recognized the “micro-identities” of indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians (Walsh, 2002: 76). For example, before 1998, CONAIE only recognized 11 indigenous nationalities (Walsh, 2002: 76). After 1998, however, seventeen new indigenous nationalities emerged that claimed to have existed before the arrival of the imperialistic Incas (Walsh, 2002: 76).

Similarly, CONAIE severed its ties with Afro-Ecuadorian organizations (Walsh, 2002: 76). Likewise, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONPLADEIN) replaced the Development Council of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) (Walsh, 2002: 76). As a result, CODENPE’s goals changed from promoting minority rights to ensuring that all twenty-eight indigenous nacionalidades y pueblos were represented in Ecuador’s government (Walsh, 2002: 76). Naturally, division within the indigenous movement created polarities within the movement that hindered its solidarity and ability to influence governmental policy (Wolff, 2007: 19).

To further debilitate the indigenous movement, the government tried to incorporate indigenous leaders and organizations into agencies of the state (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 100). For example, in 1988, President Rodrigo Borja
officialized bilingual education and appointed an indigenous linguist to oversee the proceedings. Similarly, the Office of Indigenous Affairs was established by President Sixto Durán Ballén and the Ethnic Ministry, by President Abdalá Bucaram (Walsh, 2002: 72). Through clientelist integration, the government wished to weaken the indigenous movement in order to maintain control over the indigenous and black populace, which it achieved after the regime of President Lucio Gutiérrez Barbúa (Wolff, 2007: 26). As a result, clientelist integration can be viewed as a method used by the state to enforce its hegemonic ideals in order to stifle the influence of cultural diversity, a counter-hegemonic value.

In January 2000, the indigenous movement reached the peak of its power when the Junta of National Salvation, Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez Barbúa of the Ecuadorian military, leader Antonio Vargas Guatatuca of CONAIE, and populist lawyer Carlos Solózano Constantini from Guayaquil overthrew President Jamil Mahuad (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97). Although united by a common goal to overthrow the government, each leader had his own agenda. For example, the principle objectives of CONAIE were to transform Ecuador into an intercultural and plurinational society; establish social justice; and ensure the equitable treatment of all citizens (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 97-98). On the other hand, the soldiers wanted to maintain the strength of the Ecuadorian state, but eliminate corruption within government (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 98). The indigenous movement remained allied with the military until Vice President Gustavo Noboa Bejarano came to power (who had similar views to former President Mahuad) (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 98).
When Gutiérrez came to power in January of 2003, he further intensified divisions within the indigenous movement (Wolff, 2007: 25). To contain it, Gutiérrez appointed indigenous groups to head certain social institutions and government agencies in exchange for their allegiances (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 100). Likewise, Gutiérrez rewarded local indigenous communities who supported his policies (Wolff, 2007: 25). For example, he donated pickets and shovels to indigenous municipalities and promised to build new roads in the Amazonian region if the local communities pledged their allegiance to his regime (Wolff, 2007: 25). Similarly, since the indigenous movement had been incorporated into the government through several state agencies and the establishment of Pachakutik (an indigenous political party) in 1996, levantamientos were unthinkable at this stage since they now had to work with the government to meet their demands (Wolff, 2007: 25). As a result, clientelist integration and the Gutiérrez regime weakened the influence of the indigenous movement over state policy and governance (Almeida Vinueza, 2005: 105).

For these reasons, clientelist integration can be viewed as an attempt by the state to maintain control over counter-hegemonic insurgencies, such as the indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians. Although the indigenous movement has weakened since the constitutional reforms of 1998 and the coup of January 2000, it still has had influence over the Ecuadorian state. Given Ecuador’s historic illusion of a homogenous society united through mestizaje, it was a remarkable feat and triumph that the indígenas and Afro-Ecuadorians persuaded the national government to announce publicly and record legally that it was a plurinational,
multicultural society in reality. Its indigenous movement, therefore, has still achieved revolutionary accomplishments.

_Bolivia_

Like Ecuador’s indigenous movement, Bolivia’s national indigenous movement has had great success and influence. As in Ecuador, Bolivia’s indigenous movement began as a _campesino_ struggle during the mid-twentieth century (Van Cott, p. 52-53). For example, after the 1952 revolution, the _National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)_ Party incorporated _campesinos_ (who were mostly comprised of indigenous Bolivians) into a state-sponsored _síndicato_ (or union) structure (Van Cott, p. 52-53). As a result, like Ecuador’s indigenous movement, Bolivia’s highland indigenous organization began as a _campesino_ movement that focused on workers’ rights and land titles.

In 1968, _campesinos_ began to openly criticize the state. Since they did not favor his new tax plan, indigenous _campesinos_ in the highlands openly criticized General Barrientos for the first time. Inspired by their protests, other _campesinos_ formed independent organizations apart from MNR. Eventually, _campesinos_ transformed these organizations into a radical, political movement (Van Cott, p. 53).

As a result, the _Katarista_ movement emerged in the Aymara highlands of La Paz during the late-1960s.\(^1\) Within the _Katarista_ movement, there were two

\(^1\) The Katarista movement took “its name from the late-eighteenth century Aymara leader Julián Apaza who led a rebellion against colonial rule under…Tupak Katari.” Indigenous organizations that bear Katari’s name can be divided into two ideological camps—Indianism and Katarism. While Indianism places an emphasis on indigenous marginalization and is “overly anti-Western and antiwhite,” Katarism “blends class consciousness with ethnic rights claims and calls for the reconstruction of the Bolivian state along ethnic criteria” (Van Cott, p. 53).
ideological camps—Indianism and Katarism—that both had great influence over Bolivia’s indigenous organization and government. For example, in the early-1970s, Kataristas and Indianists took over the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB). Due to the Banzer coup, however, independent indigenous political activity was impeded (Van Cott, p. 53-54).

Nevertheless, Katarist Genaro Flores espoused the Manifesto of Tiahuanacu in 1973 after he returned from exile in Chile in 1972. Similarly in 1973, the massacre of 13 Quechua campesinos in Tolata, Cochabamba served as an impetus for the Katarista movement in the Aymara highlands. In particular, independent campesino activities surged in 1978 (Van Cott, p. 54-55).

In 1979, the Katarista movement strengthened its national activities when the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) convened in a congress. From this convention the COB established the Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), which became a major player in the indigenas’ struggle for land titles and equal rights. For example, in December 1979, CSUTCB staged a roadblock outside of La Paz that paralyzed transportation and the flow of food to cities for over a week (Van Cott, p. 55).

During the mid-1980s, CSUTCB allowed non-delegates of its organization (such as academics as well as representatives of political parties and of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)) to attend its congresses (Van Cott, p. 56). In the late-1980s, member-power of the CSUTCB shifted from the Aymara Katarists to the Quechua-speaking coca growers (Van Cott, p. 57). After the power shift and a road blockade in 1983, the Katarista movement began
mobilizing politically (Van Cott, p. 57). The political influence of the Bolivian highland indigenous movement escalated during the 1990s as CSUTCB leaders began running for office as the heads of their political parties (Van Cott, p. 59).

Similar to Ecuador’s lowland indigenous mobilization, lowland indigenas in Bolivia organized later than their highland counterparts. For instance, in 1976, indigenous organization began demanding indigenous rights for inhabitants of the eastern lowlands. Independent local and regional organizations did not form in the lowlands until two years later (which intensified during the 1980s) (Van Cott, p. 60).

With the help of NGOs that assisted the Indigenous Communities of Eastern Bolivia, the Guaraní held a meeting in 1978. After their organization, the Guaraní reached out to other lowland indigenous groups (such as the Ayoreo, Chiquitanos, and Guarayos) during the early-1980s. Subsequently, the Guaraní, Ayoreo, Chiquitanos, and Guarayos formed the Indigenous Confederation of the East and Amazon of Bolivia (CIDOB) in 1982 (Van Cott, p. 60).

To ensure the durability and success of newly formed lowland indigenous organizations, financial and private development institutions, NGOs, and churches provided financial and technical aid to lowland indigenous groups. As a result, the lowland indigenous organizations grew into a successful, national movement to push for land titles and other demands. For instance, the Indigenous Peoples Central of the Beni (CPIB) organized the “March for Territory and Dignity” in 1990 that achieved CPIB’s main goal—for lowland indigenas to be
granted the collective title of more than two million hectares of ancestral land (which grew to 9 million hectares after a presidential decree) (Van Cott, p. 60).

From 1992 to 1994, CIDOB formed the *Ethnic Coordinator of Santa Cruz (CESC)* to represent the demands of indigenous inhabitants in Santa Cruz nationally and internationally. Subsequently, CIDOB collaborated with CSUTCB (the main highland indigenous organization) and the *Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Colonists (CSCB)* in 1996 to protest the Sánchez de Lozada administration’s agrarian reform law. After its confrontation, CIDOB reached the peak of its political power when it compromised with the Bolivian government that it would abandon its march in exchange for governmental recognition and incorporation of CIDOB’s key demands (Van Cott, p. 61).

Although CIDOB deteriorated as an organization after 1997, the national indigenous movement of Bolivia remained influential politically (Van Cott, p. 61-62). For example, the Quechua Evo Morales became Bolivia’s first indigenous president in 2006 running as a candidate for the *Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)* party (Stiglitz, p. 1). Recently, Morales pushed for a new bill of rights, with a chapter dedicated to Bolivia’s 36 indigenous peoples, to be added to Bolivia’s constitution (Piette, p. 1). It was ratified by Congress in February 2009 (*New Bolivia Constitution in Force*, p. 1). As a result, although Ecuador’s indigenous movement has waned since the beginning of the twenty-first century due to clientelism, Bolivia’s national indigenous movement has maintained its strength to the benefit of its political aims and influence.
Peru

Peru’s national indigenous movement has lagged behind the indigenous political successes of Ecuador and Bolivia. Although Peruvian indígenas have organized on a local level, a mass movement on the national level did not develop at any time in recent decades.

Interestingly, Peru’s early history of indigenous organization paralleled indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia. Like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru’s indigenous organization began as a labor movement. During the militaristic administration of Fernando Belaúnde Terry in the late-1960s, shantytown dwellers cognizant of worker rights began to mobilize (Stokes, p. 32). Under the Velasco regime (1968-1975), the labor movement was strengthened (Stokes, p. 33). For instance, President Velasco legally recognized several unions; passed a job security law in 1970; and persuaded the government to recognize communist-affiliated organizations (such as the General Affiliation of Workers of Peru (CGTP)) (Stokes, p. 33-35). Due to the allowance of labor union formation during the late-1960s through 1970s, it would seem that Peru’s environment would eventually foster a strong indigenous movement at the national level evolved from Peru’s early labor movement activities.

Since it permitted labor unionization, however, the Peruvian government also allowed unfavorable organizations (in eyes of the political elite and establishment) to form and to mobilize support. New parties that professed Marxist ideologies emerged and competed for poblador support. Of course, the Marxist ideals that these new parties represented conflicted with the military rule
of Peru’s government. Subsequently, pobladores organized more demonstrations to demand better welfare and the end of military rule during the late-1970s. When Peru’s real salaries and wages declined in 1975 (which increased poverty among the lower classes that primarily consisted of pobladores), pobladores believed a change in Peru’s system of government would provide better welfare and representation of the lower classes (Stokes, p. 45-47).

Although presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first time in twelve years in March 1980, other organizations believed Peru’s government was still corrupt. In particular, Sendero Luminoso (or the Shining Path) espoused that Peru’s problems could be solved only by a cleansing revolution. During the 1970s, Abimael Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso’s leader, modeled Sendero Luminoso after Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China. Sendero Luminoso claimed that everything must be destroyed since it was contaminated by a system of capitalism and feudalism. Similarly, Sendero Luminoso believed Peruvians who did not support its organization needed to be obliterated as well (State of Fear, 2005).

To limit Sendero Luminoso’s growing influence and reign of violence, the Belaúnde administration sent the armed forces to Sendero Luminoso’s known whereabouts in 1982. Since Sendero Luminoso was head-quartered in the Andes Mountains, the organization was in constant contact with indígenas. When the armed forces arrived, they had trouble distinguishing between Sendero Luminoso members and civilians. As a result, indigenous populations were often terrorized by the military and by Sendero Luminoso throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The
terrorization of indigenous populations escalated in 1985 when the García administration established emergency zones in the Andes Mountains and Amazonian regions that granted the military full control of the areas (State of Fear, 2005).

Due to the violent nature of Sendero Luminoso, democratically-elected President Alberto Fujimori had high approval ratings in the early-1990s despite his autogolpe that dissolved Peru’s Congress (García Calderón, p. 57). When Sendero Luminoso’s popularity waned in 1990 due to a failed attack on Lima, President Fujimori’s justification for absolute executive control over state affairs disappeared (State of Fear, 2005). To maintain his authoritarian rule, President Fujimori established the first media dictatorship in Latin America; and began interrogating Peru’s citizens for fabricated crimes (García Calderón, p. 50).² After Fujimori amended Peru’s constitution in order to run for a third-term as president in the 2000 election, Peruvians were outraged (García Calderón, p. 55-56). Near the 2000 election, the media had recently released the Vladivideos that documented the government’s corruption in Peru (García Calderón, p. 47). Therefore, citizens believed Fujimori’s amendment to the constitution was another instance of political corruption (García Calderón, p. 55-56). As a result, Fujimori fled from Peru to Japan in 2000 when street protests escalated after his re-election (García Calderón, p. 56).

Therefore, although Peru’s indigenous movement began like the national indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador, political and social factors at the

² A media dictatorship exists when a regime exerts direct or indirect control over much of its country’s mass media. As a result, the media becomes a puppet of the rulers in power. In Peru’s case, the media dictator was the Fujimori administration (García Calderón, p. 50).
local and national level interfered with the escalation of Peru’s indigenous mobilization. An in-depth analysis of the progression of each indigenous movement in Chapters II to IV will further explain Peru’s pitfalls as well as Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s successes.
Chapter II—Indigenous Successes

The Cases of Ecuador and Bolivia

Throughout the evolution of their indigenous movements, Ecuador and Bolivia exhibited similar factors that attributed to the successful mobilization of indígenas. The efforts of transnational actors at the international level, the involvement of the state at the national level as well as the influence of leaders and impact of bicultural education at the local level helped the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements evolve to their pinnacles today.

The Role of Transnational Actors

The impact of transnational actors is evident in the twentieth century. As communication increases and technology advances, information is being disseminated at a quicker and easier pace than thirty years ago. Naturally, transnational actors play a role in the mass communication of information. Why, however, are transnational actors important contributors to the successes of indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador?

According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “transnational advocacy provides material and information resources that enable movements to act effectively for change” (cited in Andolina et al, p. 681). For instance, when indígenas in Ecuador and Bolivia were faced with state opposition, they turned to

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3 In Ecuador, indigenous population estimates range from figures of 30 to 38 percent. In Bolivia, estimates of its indigenous population range from 60 to 70 percent (Yashar, p. 19).
international organizations (such as the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazonica (COICA) or the Amazon and the South Meso-American Indian Rights Center (SAIIC)) for support—a phenomenon that Keck and Sikkink denote as the “Boomerang Effect” (cited in Andolina et al, p. 681). Although some indigenous peoples managed to mobilize without any international support from transnational actors, NGOs provided indigenous organizations with an additional impetus to continue protesting for their demands; and with funding that made indigenous mobilization easier to sustain (Andolina et al, p. 682).

Through transnational advocacy, indigenous organizations were able to develop a network of actors highly committed to indigenous rights that promoted ethno-development. As a result, this ethno-development network enabled indígenas to transmit common criteria through NGOs, bilateral agencies, and multilateral organizations. In addition, the sponsored development of ethnicity challenged modernization theory by rejecting the idea that traditional, cultural values were backward practices and obstacles to progress since it valued tradition as the engine for development instead. For example, indigenous culture and demands (such as ancestral and traditional knowledge, land titles, and the practice of collective labor (or mingas)) became important sources of human capital. Through financing, transnational actors helped indígenas to transform their social capital into productivity and wealth; and, therefore, to mobilize (Andolina et al, p. 689).
More importantly, however, transnational actors enabled indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia to network and to form relationships with one another at the transnational level, which strengthened their movements overall. According to Daniel Mato, since the 1970s, the development of transnational relationships has been necessary for social movements in Latin America due to the persistence of political repression (such as military regimes), unfavorable economic conditions (such as external debt crises, structural adjustment programs, and compensatory social programs), and negative global factors (such as U.S. supported coup d’états and regional depressions) (Mato, p. 349). Therefore, transnational networking provided an outlet for indigenous organizations to escape systematic obstacles and for indigenous leaders to participate in events organized by global agents. Daniel Mato also claims that global agents have an advantage in forming networks over local agents due to their “amount of transnational experience in managing information; [and] privileged access to archives, libraries, and other documentation sources that store products of…scholarly research” (Mato, p. 349).

In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, global agents hosted a multitude of networking opportunities for indígenas during the 1990s. In the United States, New York City hosted the New York Amazon Week. Similarly, the United Nations declared 1993 as the “Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples.” The UN Declaration also inspired the establishment of a “Decade of Indigenous Peoples,” which provided further opportunities for indigenous representatives to meet fellow mobilizers from other Latin American countries; to share identities; as well
as to organize and to promote agendas at a national and transnational level (Mato, p. 350-351).

Overall, transnational organizations have promulgated indigenous mobilization by counterbalancing the threat that states and corporations pose nationally and transnationally (Mato, p. 354). Transnational organizations also have strategized with indigenous groups to aid the indígenas in their proposals to the state (Mato, p. 354). For example, in the late-1980s, global-local partnerships between transnational actors and local indigenous groups contributed to broader debates about legal reforms within Bolivia that led to constitutional reform in the 1990s (Andolina et al, p. 685).

In the late-1990s, transnational actors also opened new possibilities for the Bolivian ayllu movement nationally and transnationally in three ways. First, transnational actors protected ayullus as well as offered culturally-appropriate development plans throughout the late-1980s and early-1990s. Although transnational actor involvement was less prominent in the Bolivian highlands since CSUTCB downplayed indígenas’ vulnerability, their involvement still had an impact on Bolivia’s national indigenous movement overall. For instance, international organizations began connecting with Bolivian Indianists post-1985 to form global-local partnerships. The global-local partnerships between Bolivian Indianists and international organizations countered other grassroots organizations sponsoring development plans associated with Marxism, liberation theology, and Western modernization (Andolina et al, p. 685-686).
In particular, the *Andean Oral History Workshop*, established in 1983, strengthened Bolivia’s indigenous movement. Headquartered in La Paz, the *Andean Oral History Workshop* consisted of indigenous intellectuals who were raised in Bolivian ayllus (but received graduate degrees in foreign countries). Since it documented and transmitted Bolivian oral history derived from indigenous languages, the workshop played a crucial role in regenerating indigenous culture (Andolina et al, p. 686).

Then, in 1986, the *Andean Oral History Workshop* collaborated with Oxfam (Andolina et al, p. 686). As the workshop provided advisors and Oxfam administered funds, the two organizations worked together on a development project in North Potosí (Andolina et al, p. 687). Since their co-operation disproved the assumption that development practices and union organization are inherently neo-colonial undertakings, the development project run by the *Andean Oral History Workshop* and Oxfam legitimized indigenous ayllus for the Bolivian state and international community (Andolina et al, p. 687). Since its crux was ayllu, Bolivia’s national indigenous movement was strengthened at the national and international levels of its operation.

In addition, the European Union initiated a development project in North Oruro in 1987. Dubbed the Campesino Self-Development Project, the European Union formed a global-local partnership with Ayllu Sartañani (a local NGO) (Andolina et al, p. 687). Through its involvement, the European Union concluded that ayllus in Bolivia were the basis of its indigenous movement (Andolina et al, p. 687). As a result, it held debates on cultural identity and community
representation that were attended by mallkus (or ethnic authorities) rather than peasant union leaders to represent their indigenous communities (Andolina et al, p. 687). By 1989, the Campesino Self-Development Project helped ayllu members to express their economic concerns through their ayllu network; to organize other ayllus in North Oruro around a Karankas, ethnic identity; and to redefine their land title claims to pre-colonial boundaries after assessing and analyzing colonial land titles (Andolina et al, p. 687). Therefore, through Ayllu Sartañani, a transnational actor (the European Union) strengthened Bolivia’s indigenous movement at the grassroots that evolved into a more formidable regional movement via the provisions of the Campesino Self-Development Project.

Since they protected ayllus and sponsored development projects, transnational actors helped validate indigenous identities and leadership as well (Andolina et al, p. 687). For instance, the Andean Oral History Workshop helped to disaggregate Aymara and Quechua language-based identities in Bolivia by documenting indigenous culture that was then shared with other indigenous communities (Andolina et al, p. 686). As a result, Quechua- and Aymara-speaking indígenas could then form smaller-scale identities based on common local customs, history, and land rights via the network created by the global-local partnership between the Andean Oral History Workshop and Oxfam (Andolina et al, p. 687). Transnational actors also helped affirm ethnicity-based identities over class-based identities through the documentation of culture (by projects such as the Andean Oral History Workshop) as well as through the analysis of the
importance of ayllus (via projects such as the Campesino Self-Development Project) (Andolina et al, p. 687). Subsequently, the validation of indigenous identities and leadership by transnational actors strengthened Bolivia’s indigenous movement at the local, national, and international levels.

Second, transnational actors in Bolivia helped nurture developmentally-appropriate culture through the cultivation of indigenous social capital (Andolina et al, p. 689). For example, international development organizations (such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) implemented their own ethnic policies in Bolivia based on neoliberalism (Andolina et al, p. 689). In the mid-1990s, these multilateral development banks established indigenous affairs teams (Andolina et al, p. 689). This allowed Bolivian indigenous peoples to negotiate with other indigenous representatives and government officials about their demands (Andolina et al, p. 689). Due to open communication between the Bolivian state and indigenous representatives sponsored by multilateral development banks, indígenas influenced their government to reorient its indigenous ministry around development that recognized an indigenous cultural identity (Andolina et al, p. 689). Similarly, the Bolivian state implemented legislation to assuage the plight of its indigenous peoples (Andolina et al, p. 689-690). As a result, since development banks cultivated indigenous social capital and aimed it at the Bolivian state, Bolivian indígenas were able to have their demands recognized by the government—an example that demonstrates the evolution of Bolivia’s indigenous movement from a local to a national operation.
Ethno-cultural agendas were also employed by international development agencies through the Bolivian Indigenous Ministry, Popular Participation Ministry, and Land Reform Institutes. Based on a social, neo-liberal governmentality, these ethno-cultural agendas further opened new possibilities for ayllus. Ultimately, since ayllus were viewed by international development agencies as cultivators of social capital and communal participation on a local scale, ethno-development networks of international agencies believed they could reproduce the successful, organizational model of Ecuador’s indigenous movement via ayllus. For example, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian Lowlands (CIDOB), an organization that identified more than thirty indigenous groups according to language use, local territorial claims, and traditional authority systems of capitanías, was viewed as comparable to the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) for its ability to facilitate dialogue and construct proposals (Andolina et al, p. 690-691).

Similarly, in Ecuador, the Association of Indigenous Workers of Mondayacu (ATIAM) changed its names to the Association of Communities of the Kijus People (ACOPUKI) in late-1999 due to an ethnic revival of culture discovered by foreign researchers. After historians and anthropologists determined that the indigenous groups of ATIAM were descendents of the Kijus (a people thought to be decimated by the Spanish conquest), they influenced indigenous community leaders to embrace their newly-discovered, ancestral culture. As a result, ACOPUKI encouraged its members to relearn Quichua as
well as emphasized organization based on *nacionalidades* and *pueblos* as CONAIE had done in Ecuador (Perreault, p. 79).

Finally, transnational actors helped decentralize multi-cultural categories and nation-state reform in Bolivia. For instance, the government ratified policies that engaged with ayllus more during its indigenous movement than its peasant movement. In 1991, Bolivia’s government ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Convention 169, which recognized peoples according to their maintenance of tradition and attachment to local territory. As a result, Bolivia parted from its uniform credo that disregarded the rise of indigenous identities. In addition, Bolivia’s government also recognized CONAMAQ as a legitimate representative of the highland indigenous peoples. Like CSUTCB, it also granted CONAMAQ consultative space within its Indigenous Ministry (Andolina et al, p. 687-688).

In 1995, the Bolivian government also passed the Law of Popular Participation. Under the Law of Popular Participation, the government recognized ayllus as “territorial grassroots organizations.” The Law of Popular Participation also registered communities as either peasant-oriented or indigenous-oriented. As a result, through the Law of Popular Participation, the Bolivian government dissociated “peasants” from *indígenas*; and, thereby, unraveled the prevailing identity construction of the peasant movement (Andolina et al, p. 688).
Involvement by the State

Like transnational actors, the actions of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state played a substantial role in the success and evolution of their indigenous movements. Through the recognition of indigenous organizations, passage of laws, incorporation of indigenous institutions into government, and constitutional reform, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state legitimized the demands and existence of mobilized indigenous groups. For example, the recognition of indigenous organizations by the state (such as CSUTCB in Bolivia) validated the mobilization of indígenas as well as the role of indigenous organizations as representatives of indigenous demands (Andolina et al, p. 687). As a result, when the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state recognized certain indigenous organizations, the representative power of these institutions grew as well as the strength of their respective indigenous movements.

Likewise, the ratification of laws by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state broke down restrictive barriers for indigenous organizations as well as granted demands advocated by the indigenous movements. As discussed above, the ratification of the ILO’s Convention 169 in 1991 and the Law of Popular Participation in 1995 by the Bolivian state bolstered Bolivia’s indigenous movement since it recognized indígenas by their traditions and territorial claims rather than by their economic status as campesinos (Andolina et al, p. 688). Therefore, the Bolivian state acknowledged that the indígenas were not only protesting for a better economic status, but for state recognition of their culture, of their stigmatization, and of their indigenous identity (Andolina et al, p. 688).
Through recognition of indigenous identities via laws, the state further legitimized the agenda of the Bolivian indigenous movement.

Similarly, agrarian reform by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian state further strengthened their indigenous movements at the national level. For instance, the Bolivian state instituted agrarian reform in 1996 (Andolina et al, p. 688). Although it pressured indígenas to sell their land, the 1996 agrarian reform law created a freer land movement by increasing competition and by permitting the legalization of original community lands (Andolina et al, p. 688). Similarly, agrarian reform in Ecuador in 1964 and in 1973 as well as sponsored rural development programs during the 1980s enabled indigenous mobilization (Perreault, p. 67). As Leon Zamosc explains, agrarian reform during the 1960s eliminated servile relations on haciendas for it made huasipungueros legal owners of their subsistence plots (Zamosc, p. 42).4 Likewise, agrarian reform during the 1970s transferred some hacienda lands to campesinos in a state attempt to modernize society (Zamosc, p. 42).5 As a result, agrarian reform in Ecuador began to dismantle its rigid hacienda system as did agrarian reform in Bolivia.

In addition, constitutional reform passed by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states played a pivotal role in the success of their indigenous movements. With the approval of certain constitutional reforms, the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states granted the demands of the indígenas as well as changed social relations within their countries. Acting in response to the strength of their indigenous movements,

4 Huasipungueros are “peasant families who labored…for landowners in exchange for small subsistence plots and low supplementary wages” (Zamosc, p. 42).
5 For example, the Ecuadorian government redistributed about a quarter of hacienda land plots. Soon, hacienda owners began to sell their remaining plots privately for profit (Zamosc, p. 42).
both Ecuador and Bolivia passed constitutional reforms that recognized their
nations as plurinational, multicultural states during the 1990s (Otero et al, p. 517).
Prior to the 1990s, a big controversy between the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states
and indigenous groups was the social make-up of their countries (Otero et al, p.
518). The Ecuadorian and Bolivian governments asserted that their nations were
homogenous since everyone possessed an Ecuadorian or Bolivian identity (Otero
et al, p. 518). Other identities (such as indigenous, ethnic identities) were viewed
as aberrations of the traditional belief of the state (Otero et al, p. 518). Since the
state believed alternate identities spurred disunity among its citizens, they were
disregarded (Otero et al, p. 518).

A main demand of the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia,
however, was for their states to recognize their nations as plurinational,
multicultural societies (Otero et al, p. 517). To their indigenous peoples, the
Ecuadorian and Bolivian nations were rich with different traditions and
diversified cultures. Since the state ignored the actual make-up of their societies,
however, indigenous peoples asserted that only through state recognition of its
plurinationality could the stigmatization of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and
Ecuador begin to be addressed (Otero et al, p. 518).

As a result, the constitutional reforms in Bolivia and Ecuador are
significant since the state changed an entrenched perspective. Since the Bolivian
and Ecuadorian states recognized that their societies were plurinational and
multicultural in their constitutions, they simultaneously legitimized the traditions
and recognized the demands of their indigenous peoples. Subsequently, their
indigenous movements were bolstered by constitutional reform at the national level since the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states were incorporating the demands of their indigenous peoples into the political process. Constitutional reform also strengthened the Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements at the grassroots level. In particular, Bolivia’s 1994 constitutional reforms fortified ayllus and ethnic authorities (Andolina et al, p. 688).

Finally, the incorporation of various indigenous institutions into the government systems of Ecuador and Bolivia also initially strengthened their indigenous movements. For example, the Bolivian state created the National Agrarian Reform Institute in charge of granting community land titles (Andolina et al, p. 694). Although it invalidated meso-level land proposals (such as markas and suyus) as excessive, it validated micro-level highland land claims as ayllus (Andolina et al, p. 694). As a result, ayllu federation leaders aimed to restructure government through multiculturalism in order to make it conducive to ayllu cultures while the state incorporated indigenous institutions (Andolina et al, p. 694). Ultimately, the incorporation of indigenous organizations into the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states initially bolstered their indigenous movements at the national level since indigenous groups had an outlet to make their demands directly heard by the government. As will be explained in Chapter III, however,

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6 Ayllus are “Andean indigenous communities of extended families, cargo-based leadership patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces.” In a cargo-based leadership system, “community leaders are expected to begin in lower offices to gain experience and recognition, and proceed gradually stepwise to positions of greater prestige and responsibility” (Andolina et al, p. 679).

A marka “is a local but multi-ayllu space [that is] sometimes incorporated into the broader cultural space of a suyu,” which “refers to a highland region of Bolivia [that was] once a key region of the Incan [Empire]” (Andolina et al, p. 683).
clientelist incorporation can also have negative effects for indigenous movements in the long-run.

*The Importance of Leadership*

Leadership at the national and local levels, in particular, impacted the success of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia. In Bolivia, leadership is paramount in ayllus. According to Robert Andolina, Sarah Radcliffe, and Nina Laurie, *ayllu* leaders enact distinct identities through leadership to promote authorities though a cargo system; to maintain *ayllu* and *marka* boundaries and landmarks; and to direct community works and ceremonies (Andolina et al, p. 696). Due to their promotion of identities through leadership, ayllu leaders play a pivotal role in promoting dialogue and indigenous identity as indigenous representatives at the international and national levels (Andolina et al, p. 696). In particular, leadership has built solidarity in CONOMAQ for indigenous leaders have shared their experiences related to community justice, land conflicts, environmental protection, and indigenous rights legislation across networks (Andolina et al, p. 692).

The importance of leadership in Ecuador can be exemplified by two examples—Jumandi and Luis Macas. Jumandi was an Amazonian hero killed by Spanish conquistadors in 1574 (Sawyer, p. 3). Although almost 500 years have passed, Jumandi is still remembered for leading the first successful lowland indigenous rebellion (Sawyer, p. 3). For example, he was an inspiration to a protest led by OPIP, CONFENAIE, and CONAIE during the Borja administration, which influenced the Ecuadorian state to grant indigenous title to
over one million hectares of land (Sawyer, p. 3). As a result, symbolic leaders were important sources of inspiration for the Ecuadorean indigenous movement.

Second, Luis Macas, a prominent leader of CONAIE (which is a “large umbrella organization that includes Andean Indian peasant groups, groups of urban and rural artisans, and Amazonian merchants and hunter-gatherers”) exemplifies a different meaning of leadership (Otero et al, p. 514). During his leadership of CONAIE, he played a pivotal role in the Popular Assembly, a “group of civil society organizations that met to compose a new constitution for Ecuador” (Otero et al, p. 514). Under his leadership, CONAIE demanded that the Ecuadorian government pass its constitutional reforms, which it eventually adopted in 1998 (Otero et al, p. 514). As a result, Macas’ leadership served a different purpose for Ecuador’s indigenous movement—as a facilitator of indigenous demands. As two leaders of Ecuador’s ongoing indigenous movement demonstrate, leaders serve two purposes—one, as symbols of past success and inspiration; and, two, as facilitators of indigenous demands.

The Impact of Bi-Cultural Education

In 1987, a bilingual school (Quichua—Spanish) was inaugurated in Causaimanta Yachana, Ecuador (Perreault, p. 77). The new bilingual school aimed to promote community development and organization; to teach Quichua language and culture; and to incorporate traditional agriculture and medicinal plants (Perreault, p. 78). According to Thomas Perreault, “inter-cultural-bilingual schools have become a source of education and cultural revalorization” (Perreault, p. 78). Ultimately, they have strengthened communal political institutions as well
as become a source for national, indigenous political movements (Perreault, p. 78). As a result, bicultural education has facilitated the evolution of indigenous movements at the national level, especially in the case of Ecuador.

*Political Parties and the Influence of the Left*

According to Donna Van Cott, ethnic parties were able to form in Bolivia and Ecuador as a result of their open institutional environments. She claims that three important changes need to take place within government in order for ethnic parties to become viable. First, the government needs to decentralize. Second, the state needs to improve access to the ballot for aspiring political parties. Finally, the legislature should reserve seats for ethnic minorities (Van Cott, p. 8).

Van Cott notes that due to Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s transitions to democracy during the 1990s, space opened for existing organizations to act and for new organizations to form (Van Cott, p. 10). Especially after indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia influenced the passage of constitutional reforms, indigenous peoples had an impetus to become involved in politics in the form of ethnic parties in order to ensure their new constitutional rights would be protected (Van Cott, p. 11). Similarly, the decline of the Left in Ecuador and Bolivia during the 1990s allowed these ethnic parties to form (Van Cott, p. 8).

Today, the Left is supported by indigenous political parties in Ecuador and Bolivia that grew out of strong social movements during the 1990s (Cleary, p. 38). Since the Left promotes egalitarian ideals, protection of the working class,

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7 Van Cott believes indigenous movements desire to form political parties in order to reinforce their traditional culture and authority via a link between culture and state (Van Cott, p. 4). Ultimately, she believes that political parties are the “primary link between state and society in modern democracies” (Van Cott, p. 1).
and communitarian values similar to indigenous traditions, *indígenas* have increasingly voted for political parties to the Left of the political spectrum (Cleary, p. 36-38). For example, Bolivia’s first-elected indigenous president, Evo Morales, (who is still currently in power) ran under a socialist platform (Stiglitz, p. 1). Similarly, Lucio Gutiérrez received support from indigenous enclaves and leftist groups during the 2003 elections in Ecuador (Cleary, p. 39). As a result, political parties to the Left have provided a mode for indigenous leaders to run for office as well as a method for indigenous groups to represent their needs. Since *indígenas* had another outlet for their demands via the Left, their mobilization efforts were bolstered.
Chapter III—Bolivian and Ecuadorian Indígenas: Analysis of Differences between Movements

Although both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements were successful due to similar factors, there are some notable differences between the progressions of their movements. First, Ecuador’s indigenous movement served as a model for Bolivia’s indigenous movement (Andolina et al, p. 692). Second, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has peaked while Bolivia’s indigenous movement is still growing. Finally, the main strengths of each indigenous movement in Bolivia and Ecuador are different, which have affected their movements respectively.

The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement: A Model for All

One difference between Ecuador’s indigenous movement and Bolivia’s indigenous movement is that the indigenous movement in Ecuador was a model for Bolivia while Ecuador’s indigenous movement did not have a model to emulate. For example, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation both tried to mimic Ecuador’s indigenous organization CONAIE by establishing a national confederation (Andolina et al, p. 692). Similar to the demands of CONAIE, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation wanted state recognition of the causal roots of indigenous problems—colonialism, state neglect, and oligarchic domination (Andolina et al, p. 692). Similarly, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation
demanded territorial rights as the basis of its economic development to export ayllu value-added products; to facilitate ecologically-sound agriculture; and to establish culturally-appropriate education (Andolina et al, p. 695). Finally, CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation (like CONAIE) pressed for the cessation of import-substitution policies (Andolina et al, p. 695).

In addition to the desire of CONOMAQ and the Bolivian Lowland Indian Confederation to emulate CONAIE, transnational actors promoted the confederation of CONAIE as a model for Bolivia’s indigenous movement (Andolina et al, p. 692). For example, Oxfam America and the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) sponsored dialogue between ayllu movement leaders and Ecuadorian indigenous leaders to help indigenous Bolivians during their mobilization (Andolina et al, p. 692). Due to the actions of Oxfam America and IBIS, ayllu council leaders from Bolivia became international representatives of Bolivia’s indigenous movement, which strengthened its cause (Andolina et al, p. 692).

Furthermore, participants in Bolivia’s indigenous movement aimed to replicate Ecuador’s Indigenous Development Project with the help of transnational actors and European states (Andolina et al, p. 694-695). For instance, Denmark funded Bolivia’s 1996 agrarian reform law to facilitate original community land titling as well as Bolivia’s 1995 Popular Participation Law to strengthen local municipalities (Andolina et al, p. 694). The World Bank also sponsored “Innovation and Learning,” an indigenous development program implemented by the Bolivian Indigenous Ministry; while transnational actors
funded the Latin American Indigenous Development Fund, a project headed by indigenous leaders that provided resources for documenting indigenous ethno-development experiences in Bolivia (Andolina et al, p. 694-695).

**Explanation of the Peaks of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian Indigenous Movements**

Since Ecuador’s indigenous movement was promoted by transnational actors and imitated by local indigenous leaders in Bolivia, the indigenous movement in Bolivia was able to adopt its strengths while improving its weaknesses (such as clientelist incorporation). Due to different sources of support that the indigenous movements of Ecuador and Bolivia received, the peaks of each indigenous movement are dissimilar. Unlike Bolivia, Ecuador’s indigenous movement peaked in the early-2000s after the coup d’état that installed Gutiérrez as the chief executive of Ecuador. On the other hand, Bolivia’s indigenous movement is still ongoing.

Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is the individual strengths of each movement. Ecuador’s indigenous movement derived its strength from a single indigenous organization—CONAIE—that operated at the national level (Andolina et al, p. 692). Bolivia’s indigenous movement, on the other hand, was strong due to the base of its movement—ayllus (Yashar, p. 59).

According to Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie, ayllus are “Andean indigenous communities [in Bolivia] of extended families, cargo-based leadership patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces” located primarily in La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí (Andolina et al, p. 679). Although they are highly democratic, their democracies are limited due to communal assembly (in which all community
members must approve major decisions) as well as class, generational, and gender factors (Andolina et al, p. 684). For instance, only married land owners who inherited territory from pre-Hispanic times are considered full ayllu citizens who can be selected to run for top political offices within and outside ayllus (Andolina et al, p. 684). Nevertheless, ayllus have been invaluable to the indigenous movement of Bolivia since they provide a sense of collective identity and spirituality among members, political autonomy, and economic security via land rights, reciprocal change, and collaborative labor (Andolina et al, p. 684). In particular, ayllus are becoming increasingly visible internationally, which envelop them in a “complex, transnational network that challenges representativeness and development potential of contemporary indigenous movements based on authenticity and success” (Andolina et al, p. 679).

Historically, the ayllu movement in Bolivia emerged from a peasant movement (Andolina et al, p. 682). After the 1952 Revolution, the Bolivian government universalized the voting franchise, carried out agrarian reform to create a class of small producers, and organized indigenous peoples into corporatist-union structures as “peasants” (Andolina et al, p. 682). In most cases, however, “individual land titles and local union structures merged [to construct] communal forms of economic and political administration;” which, thereby, created an open-space for the celebration of indigenous ethnicity (Andolina et al, p. 683).

Because the government controlled union organization during the 1980s, indígenas created the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) in
1979 to circumvent government permission (Andolina et al, p. 683).

Subsequently, Kataristas—an ideological conclave—collaborated with CSUTCB to forge an anti-colonial ideology around the colonial rebel Tupaj Katari as well as to tie ethnic-cultural concerns to class-based peasant identities (Andolina et al, p. 683). Although CSUTCB defined highland indigenous ethnicity as only a “generic cultural…heritage” based on language-use (primarily Aymara or Quechua), CSUTCB set the stage for indigenous mobilization during the late-1970s and throughout the 1980s (Andolina et al, p. 683).

Similarly, despite the fall-out of ayllus due to political party intervention, indigenous migration, and territorial advocacy, CSUTCB gained grassroots support to combat the Bolivian state; to access agricultural benefits; and to promote bilingual education during the 1980s (Andolina et al, p. 685). Another authentic, successful indigenous organization in Bolivia is the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Bolivia (CONAMAQ) (Andolina et al, p. 691). Established in March 1997, CONAMAQ signified the culmination of a multi-year process of ayllu movement activists that persuaded highland indigenous communities to reconstruct and create ayllus (Andolina et al, p. 691). Still in existence today, CONAMAQ has remade ethnic identities at various scales by rendering visible the names of community-level ayllus and by recovering identity categories (such the Qhurquii (a marka) and Karankas (a suyu) peoples) (Andolina et al, p. 698).

In other words, ayllus derive their primary strength from grassroots participation at the community-level (which is authentically indigenous).

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8 A marka is a “local ayllu space that is sometimes incorporated into a broader cultural space” (Andolina et al, p. 691).
CONAIE, on the other hand, is a national organization that operates at the national level; and not only represents indigenous Ecuadorians, but Afro-Ecuadorians as well. Perhaps Bolivia’s indigenous movement is still ongoing due to its strong grassroots network of ayllus that enabled the democratic election of its first indigenous president—Evo Morales—in 2006.

On the other hand, perhaps Ecuador’s indigenous movement has peaked due to clientelism under the Gutiérrez regime. According to José Almeida Vinueza, Gutiérrez’s ascension to power had a negative impact on the indigenous movement (Almeida Vinueza, p. 94). Although he claimed to be neutral, he followed neoliberal policies to balance the Ecuadorian government’s finances (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100). Similarly, he collaborated with the Inter-Monetary Fund (IMF) and U.S. embassy—two organizations that indigenous groups wanted to avoid (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100).

To compensate indigenous groups for their support, he made indigenous leaders heads of social institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100). Nevertheless, due to his association with the IMF and the U.S. embassy, the alliance between Gutiérrez and indigenous organizations dissolved (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100). Without the support of indigenous groups, Gutiérrez aligned with right-wing parties in parliament (Almeida Vinueza, p. 100). Subsequently, his collaboration with the economic elite and incorporation of indigenous leaders into the state undermined the indigenous movement by fomenting internal divisions (Almeida Vinueza, p. 104-105). As Almeida Vinueza claims, clientelistic representation bred dispute
among indigenous leaders since, naturally, certain departments of state (such as
the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Foreign Relations) each have different
needs and objectives. Without progress, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement
became wary of national politics; and risks remaining isolated (Almeida Vinueza,
p. 105).

Almeida Vinueza also suggests that Gutiérrez’s embrace of a neoliberal
model of development dismantled grassroots communities as well as inhibited the
development of human capital for it did not address the basic needs of its
population (Almeida Vinueza, p. 106). Rather, it focused on the economic
progression of the state (Almeida Vinueza, p. 106). Therefore, the dissociation of
the state from indigenous organizations’ demands after 2003 and the weakening
of connections between indigenous organizations due to clientelistic incorporation
have caused the indigenous movement in Ecuador to wane.
Chapter IV—Peru: the Indigenous Anomaly

Compared to Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organization in Peru is a perplexing anomaly. Interestingly, several indigenous summits have taken place in Peru. For example, Lima hosted the reconvention of the Amazon Basin Treaty sponsored by the Inter-American Indigenist Institute of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1982 and again in 1984 (which resulted in the creation of the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), a transnational indigenous organization that links together indigenous peoples’ of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Surinam, Guyana and Peru) (Mato, p. 352). Similarly, the first Amazonian Summit of Indigenous Peoples’ and Environmentalist Organizations took place in Inquitos, Peru in May 1990 (Mato, p. 352).

Nevertheless, although around 40 percent of Peru’s population consists of indígenas—an indigenous population higher than Ecuador—its indigenous movement has been stagnant (Yashar, p. 19). Why did successful, national indigenous movements arise in Ecuador and Bolivia, but not in Peru? This is the question that I will answer in this chapter.

Peru—a Deceivingly Similar History

Like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru experienced a similar colonial history and indigenous stigmatization. As a result, race relations succumb to the same hierarchy as in Ecuador and Bolivia where wealth and superiority are associated
with whiteness; and where poverty, simple-mindedness, and inferiority are paralleled with indigeneity or blackness (Otero, p. 330). Similarly, all three societies practiced a *hacienda* system comprised of a white *patrón* and indigenous or black *campesinos*. The *hacienda* system in all three societies was also challenged by workers’ rights, the organization of unions, and the rise of a labor (or peasant) movement; and eradicated by agrarian reforms. Therefore, in theory, Peru’s indigenous movement should have evolved from its labor movement as happened in Ecuador and Bolivia.

*Is it Peru’s Geography?*

In practice, however, Peru’s indigenous movement does not match the indigenous movements of both Bolivia and Ecuador. At first glance, Peru’s geography appears to be the culprit of this discrepancy (see Table 1 below and Figure 1).

**Table 1: Indigenous Population by Region in Peru**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Indigenous Population over Age 5</th>
<th>Aggregate Percent of Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apurímac</td>
<td>404,190</td>
<td>289,904</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>1,268,441</td>
<td>837,171</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>454,797</td>
<td>294,253</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>612,489</td>
<td>392,605</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cusco</td>
<td>1,171,403</td>
<td>622,015</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Áncash</td>
<td>1,063,459</td>
<td>338,180</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huánuco</td>
<td>762,223</td>
<td>221,807</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>161,533</td>
<td>34,083</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madre de Dios</td>
<td>109,555</td>
<td>22,240</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>288,781</td>
<td>57,179</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>1,152,303</td>
<td>19,704</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>375,993</td>
<td>53,391</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Indigenous Pop.</th>
<th>% Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junin</td>
<td>1,225,474</td>
<td>126,224</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>280,449</td>
<td>21,034</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>891,732</td>
<td>63,313</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>8,445,211</td>
<td>557,384</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Coast of Callao</td>
<td>876,877</td>
<td>45,598</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>711,932</td>
<td>34,173</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>1,113,868</td>
<td>25,619</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Martín</td>
<td>728,808</td>
<td>13,119</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucayali</td>
<td>432,159</td>
<td>35,437</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>1,387,809</td>
<td>6,939</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>1,617,050</td>
<td>4,851</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>1,676,315</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumbes</td>
<td>200,306</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2007)

Figure 1: Map of Peru\(^{10}\)

*Provinces with Indigenous Percentages Above 50% Highlighted

When the statistics in Table 1 are applied to a topographic map, we can see that the majority of *indígenas* are located in Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco,

Huancavelica, Puno—regions within the Andes Mountains. Naturally, communities in the mountains are separated from each other; and travel between communities is difficult. Logically, since communication would be hindered in a mountainous region, one could argue that geography hampers indigenous mobilization in Peru.

The indigenous collocation in Ecuador and Bolivia, however, resemble Peru’s dispersed population (see Table 2 and 3 as well as Figure 2 and 3 below).

Table 2: Location of Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Indigenous Population</th>
<th>Aggregate Percent of Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazonian Region (Total)</td>
<td>414,623</td>
<td>140,972</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Region (Total)</td>
<td>4,825,000</td>
<td>43,425</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Oro</td>
<td>455,187</td>
<td>7,283</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esmeraldas</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>4,172</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guayas</td>
<td>2,668,727</td>
<td>29,356</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Ríos</td>
<td>469,200</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manabí</td>
<td>933,886</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Region (Total)</td>
<td>4,394,812</td>
<td>492,219</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimborazo</td>
<td>308,334</td>
<td>114,392</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotopaxi</td>
<td>272,514</td>
<td>64,586</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbabura</td>
<td>277,943</td>
<td>63,649</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cañar</td>
<td>158,528</td>
<td>33,925</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivar</td>
<td>121,853</td>
<td>25,711</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungurahua</td>
<td>368,697</td>
<td>43,875</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pichincha</td>
<td>1,978,896</td>
<td>114,776</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loja</td>
<td>306,394</td>
<td>11,643</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azuay</td>
<td>490,428</td>
<td>17,165</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carchi</td>
<td>118,857</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL POPULATION</td>
<td>9,529,802</td>
<td>676,616</td>
<td>7.1*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sistema de Información Estadística Georeferenciada (2007)
*Statistics reflect self-identification of indigenous nationality by region

Figure 2: Map of Ecuador\(^\text{12}\)

*Provinces with Indigenous Percentages Above 34% Highlighted

Table 3: Indigenous Population by Region in Bolivia\(^\text{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Population Over Age 15</th>
<th>Total Indigenous People Over Age 15</th>
<th>Aggregate Percent of Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>709,013</td>
<td>414,838</td>
<td>347,847</td>
<td>83.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>2,350,466</td>
<td>1,501,970</td>
<td>1,163,418</td>
<td>77.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>1,455,711</td>
<td>900,020</td>
<td>669,261</td>
<td>74.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>391,870</td>
<td>250,983</td>
<td>185,474</td>
<td>73.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquisaca</td>
<td>531,522</td>
<td>308,386</td>
<td>202,204</td>
<td>65.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>2,029,471</td>
<td>1,216,658</td>
<td>456,102</td>
<td>37.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bení</td>
<td>362,521</td>
<td>202,169</td>
<td>66,217</td>
<td>32.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{13}\) Van Cott, p. 51.
As in the case of Peru, when the statistics of Table 2 and 3 are applied to topographic maps of Ecuador and Bolivia, we can see that the majority of indígenas in both countries are located in the Andes Mountains (around the Amazonian region and Chimborazo in Ecuador; around Chiquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí in Bolivia). In theory, Ecuador’s geography should have disadvantaged indigenous mobilization more than Peru’s geography due to the Andes-Amazon split. Cross-nationally, the majority of indígenas located in the South American region follow the line of the Andes Mountains. Therefore, logically, the geographic location of indigenous peoples in Peru does not explain

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why Peru failed to develop indigenous movements to the extent that Ecuador and Bolivia did since all three countries have similar concentrations of indigenous peoples.

Furthermore, the reason for the Peruvian case is not a challenge of multicultural integration (Otero et al, p. 518). According to Gerardo Otero, multicultural integration is a challenge for emerging Latin American democracies due to the ideology of the ruling class (Otero et al, p. 518). During the nineteenth century, Latin American elites adopted the view that their nations were culturally-homogenous for it coincided with their capitalist-development models to assimilate indigenous peoples (Otero et al, p. 518). The ideology of the ruling class, however, was overcome in Ecuador and Bolivia through their indigenous movements’ persistent demands for constitutional reforms (Otero et al, p. 518). Although the view of the elite, ruling class may be hegemonically powerful in Latin America, their ideology is permeable. Therefore, the challenge of multicultural integration may be problematic in the Peruvian case, but it does not explain why its indigenous movement was weaker than the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador.

The Anomaly Unravels…

To help explain Peru’s case, political scientists have offered several explanations. According to Alison Brysk and Carolyn Wise, indigenous peoples were unable to organize due to uncontrolled guerilla activity in the countryside (Brysk et al, p. 91). As explained in Chapter I, Sendero Luminoso, a leftist organization headed by Abimael Guzmán who was inspired by Mao Zedong’s
Cultural Revolution, terrorized the Peruvian countryside and Andean highlands to coerce its inhabitants (mainly indígenas) to join its cause (Brysk et al, p. 92).

Since the Peruvian government was unable to control Sendero Luminoso’s guerilla activity, Brysk and Wise assert indigenous mobilization was impeded.

Brysk and Wise further explain that Peruvian indígenas did not develop an ethnic identity because Sendero Luminoso spurred and exacerbated certain factors that could have facilitated indígenas to mobilize. For instance, Brysk and Wise assert that Sendero Luminoso exacerbated the geographic isolation of Indian communities in the highlands and Amazon. Sendero Luminoso also stirred high migration in Peru by citizens who wished to escape Sendero Luminoso’s sphere of influence. Finally, the inherent racism of Peruvians against its indigenous peoples as well as the presence of the urban Left further inhibited indigenous organization. As a result, Brysk and Wise explain that indigenous peoples in Peru continued to identify themselves on a class-basis. In other words, without an ethnic identity, indígenas’ impetus to mobilize was nonexistent (Brysk et al, p. 91).

Although Brysk and Wise identified a cause that inhibited indigenous mobilization (the influential terror of Sendero Luminoso), their argument is incomplete. When compared to the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, the holes of Brysk and Wise’s assertions are evident. Similar to Peruvian indigenous peoples, the indígenas of Ecuador and Bolivia are faced with intense racism of the white elite, mestizo class, and their indigenous peers as well (McClintock, p. 3). Likewise, the indigenous communities of Ecuador and Bolivia are also isolated
geographically in the Andean highlands (as explained earlier). Therefore, two factors that Brysk and Wise identify as contributing to Peru’s indigenous case are questionable since Ecuadorian and Bolivian indígenas mobilized despite the same circumstances.

One factor that Brysk and Wise identify, however, may offer a more valid explanation as to why Peruvian indigenous peoples did not mobilize successfully at a national level. Due to Sendero Luminoso, there was high migration in the Peruvian countryside to escape its hegemonic influence (Brysk et al, p. 91). Assuming that these indigenous peoples had the money to migrate, the constant upheaval of indígenas may explain their inability to mobilize. Migration may have also been forced by Sendero Luminoso due to its tactic to destroy insubordinate communities (State of Fear, 2005). As a result, indigenous mobilization in Peru would have been stifled nationally since they could not meet across communities and regions locally. Most likely, however, the indigenous peoples who lived in the Peruvian countryside would not have the funds to spontaneously migrate; which would entrap them in and force them to succumb to Sendero Luminoso’s control.

Sendero Luminoso and the Power of Fear

Therefore, the main contributor to the Peruvian indigenous case is fear of violence from Sendero Luminoso and components of the state itself. Although the presence of Sendero Luminoso may have been unfelt by urban dwellers (such as in Lima), Sendero Luminoso’s power was felt by residents of the countryside (State of Fear, 2005).
Sendero Luminoso, however, was not the only promulgator of rural violence. On the contrary, violence was precipitated by the state as well. To control Sendero Luminoso and to attempt to capture its leader Gúzman, the García administration declared parts of the Peruvian countryside as “emergency zones.” In these emergency zones, the García administration granted sole control to the military. As a result, the military could use any means to capture followers of Sendero Luminoso. The only problem, however, was that Sendero Luminoso had covertly infiltrated the Peruvian countryside by absorbing followers from all age groups, classes, and sexes. For this reason, the military could not determine systematically who was a follower of Sendero Luminoso until a guerilla attack was launched; or without interrogation (State of Fear, 2005).

Thus, the Peruvian military often terrorized the countryside, in addition to Sendero Luminoso, to discover its supporters. For example, in the documentary film State of Fear, a former soldier described how his unit interrogated a suspected follower of Sendero Luminoso. From a helicopter, they tied the suspect with a rope and hung him upside down as they flew through the air. They told him that if he did not tell his unit where his supporters’ hide-out was located, they would cut the rope. The soldier, however, admitted that if the suspect had confessed the coordinates of his lair to his unit, they would have cut the rope anyway (State of Fear, 2005).

Indigenous communities were especially targeted by military units (State of Fear, 2005). Since most indigenous communities retained their traditional languages (often Quechua or Aymara in the case of Peru), a language barrier
existed between the military and indigenous peoples, which exacerbated miscommunication (State of Fear, 2005). Naturally, a language barrier might be problematic for the captor and captive during an interrogation session. Due to fear of survival from Sendero Luminoso and the military campaign in the countryside, indígenas’ chose to adhere to authority, rather than challenging the state for equal rights, in order to live.

The Prowess of the Fujimori Regime

Sendero Luminoso is only part of the reasons for Peru’s case. In 1990, Alberto Fujimori was democratically elected to the presidency under the platform of “honesty, technology, and hard work” (García Calderón, p. 47). His Japanese ancestry and immigrant background appealed to the lower classes of Peru for he seemed like “Un presidente como tú (‘A president who looks like you’)” (McClintock, p. 7). Similarly, his platform to end the violence of Sendero Luminoso and the economic plight of Peru gained him the support of the country (García Calderón, p. 48). Under the guise of protecting Peruvians from Sendero Luminoso’s violence and the economy, Fujimori attained tremendous executive power that transformed Peru from a democratic society to an authoritarian government (García Calderón, p. 48).

For example, when Gúzman rushed his plans to attack Lima in 1992 in order to launch his revolution, Fujimori responded with brute force. He staged an autogolpe, an act ironically supported by a majority of Peruvian citizens, in April 1992 in order to take the necessary measures to halt Gúzman’s plot. By suspending Congress, Fujimori gained absolute power to dictate his policies.
Although Gúzman was captured in September 1992, Fujimori still maintained his executive control over the Peruvian state (García Calderón, p. 48).

Without an outlet to justify the necessity of his authoritarian rule, however, Fujimori needed new targets—the Peruvian people. As *State of Fear* documented, an indigenous woman shared her story of life under the Fujimori regime. On her first day attending college, she was abducted under false charges. While being interrogated, she was raped repeatedly by the guards (from which she became pregnant). To stop the torture, she pleaded guilty to her alleged charges against the Fujimori government; and had her current daughter while in prison. Mysterious disappearances (such as this one) were common under the Fujimori regime, which caused Peruvian citizens to live in a state of fear (*State of Fear*, 2005).

Similarly, any institution (such as the media) that acted against the message of the Fujimori administration was dismantled. For example, when *Contrapunto*, a Sunday-morning political show, “aired an investigative report on female intelligence agents who were tortured by their bosses for allegedly leaking information about the *National Intelligence Service (SIN)*” and broadcasted Vladimir Montesinos’ 1996 earnings and tax returns, the Interior Ministry stripped Baruch Ivcher (the major shareholder of *Frecuencia Latina*, the television station that aired *Contrapunto*) of his citizenship. Sympathizers of Montesinios also took control of *Contapunto*. Other media either practiced self-censorship (such as *América television*) or was seized (such as *Red global*) as well (García Calderón, p. 50-51).
The Impacts of Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori Administration

Naturally, other organizations that called for the reform of the state (which was a major demand of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia) were dissolved. Due to constant fear promulgated by Sendero Luminoso and then by the Fujimori administration, indigenous mobilization remained regional rather than growing into a national movement since it lacked factors that contributed to the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador (Yashar, p. 58-59). For instance, Deborah Yashar claims that indigenous movements emerged due to a combination of three factors—changing citizenship regimes, transcommunity networks, and open political-associational space (Yashar, p. 29). According to Yashar, Peru lacked these factors due to the civil war between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state as well as foreclosed political-associational space (Yashar, p. 26).

In the case of Ecuador, Yashar explains that indígenas had the capacity to form transcommunity networks via peasant unions and church networks. Similarly, they had the opportunity to engage in political-associational space from 1978 onward. As a result, Ecuador’s indigenous movement was embodied by a strong national confederation—CONAIE founded in 1985 by ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE (Yashar, p. 58).

In the case of Bolivia, Yashar claims that indigenous peoples could form transcommunity networks via peasant unions, church networks, and NGOs. Likewise, they had the opportunity to engage in political-associational space from 1970 to 1971 and then again from 1978 onward. As a result, Bolivia’s indigenous
movement was constructed through strong regional confederations—such as the Kataristas and CSUTCB as well as CIDOB (Yashar, p. 59).

On the other hand, Peru’s only capacity for transcommunity, indigenous networks was via fragmented peasant unions and church networks. Furthermore, Peruvian indígenas’ opportunity for political-associational space was restricted, especially from 1980-1992 as a result of Sendero Luminoso. Although the end of the civil war in the 1990s provided greater political-associational space, it was still restricted as a result of the 1992 autogolpe. Therefore, Yashar explains that indigenous organization in Peru only became a weak regional movement embodied by Asociación Inter-éttnica para el Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) (which was founded in 1980) and the Unión de Comunidades Aymaras (UNCA) (which was established in 1983) (Yashar, p. 59).

Yashar’s theory further deconstructs the anomaly of Peru’s indigenous movement. Due to the violence precipitated by Peru’s civil war between Sendero Luminoso and the government as well as by Fujimori’s authoritarian rule, political-associational space was restricted in Peru (Yashar, p. 26). In other words, indigenous opportunities to freely associate with other supporters of their cause or to freely express their viewpoints from the 1980s to 2000s were impeded more so than under the Velasco Regime during the 1970s (Yashar, p. 54). Due to a restriction of political-associational space, Peruvian society lacked the environment for changing citizenship regimes (or evolving indigenous organizations); for transcommunity networks due to fragmented peasant unions and church networks; and for grassroots formation as well as networking between
local indigenous groups (Yashar, p. 54). Indigenous organizations also lacked institutional support from the Peruvian state (although not so in the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia) since dissenting opinions that called for government reform were viewed as subversive by the Fujimori regime (and, therefore, were prohibited) (Yashar, p. 59).

In addition, due to fear of violence and retaliation, most NGOs avoided sustained involvement in the Peruvian countryside to facilitate an indigenous movement; and, therefore, indigenous peoples were unable to utilize the resources provided by transnational actors (such as transnational networking and bicultural education). As explained in Chapter II and Chapter III, transnational actors played a huge role in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements to sustain their progress. Therefore, the lack of transnational actor support was a main inhibitor of the Peruvian indigenous movement’s evolution from local to national action.

*The Emphasis of Class*

A third factor that contributed to the case of Peru was indigenous classification by indígenas themselves (McClintock, p. 3). According to Cynthia McClintock, the “political dynamics [of Peru] since 1968 as well as its geography and demographic trends…limit[ed] the establishment of indigenous identities [as evident] in recent decades” (McClintock, p. 2). Referring to historical precedent, McClintock explains that the “repression of indigenous peoples was more concerted and more cruel than in Bolivia or Ecuador” (McClintock, p. 3). For instance, she notes that while certain indigenous elites were granted privileges in
Ecuador and Bolivia, the Spanish conquistadors annihilated the Incan nobility in Peru since Cusco (a Peruvian province) was the epicenter of the Incan empire (McClintock, p. 3).

After Peru gained independence in 1824, an oligarchy ruled the state until the 1930s (McClintock, p. 3). Since the oligarchy, two ethnic poles have arisen in Peruvian society, which coincide with class and geographic location (McClintock, p. 3). According to McClintock, one ethnic pole was comprised of the oligarchy and white population (about 10 percent) who were “Catholic, Spanish-speaking, wealthy, and based in Lima” (McClintock, p. 3). The second ethnic pole consisted of Indians “who were dark-skinned…nominally Catholic, Quechua-speaking, impoverished, and based in the Andean mountains” (McClintock, p. 3).

Post-1968, however, the two poles in Peru began to change. When the military dictator Juan Velasco Alvarado came to power in 1968, he reclassified indigenous communities as peasant communities. As a result, rural communities (where a majority of Peruvian indigenous peoples lived) began identifying on a class basis rather than based on their ethnicity (McClintock, p. 3-4).

Ironically, Peru’s labor movement was strengthened under the Velasco regime. At the beginning of his term, Velasco legally recognized 2,297 unions. By 1977, Velasco had legalized 4,453 unions (a 51.8% increase). Velasco also passed a series of laws to help protect and to appease labor unions, such as a job security law in 1970. Interestingly, Velasco also recognized a Communist-affiliated labor union known as General Affiliation of Workers of Peru (CGTP) in
1971. Soon, 44 percent of labor unions became affiliated with CGTP (Stokes, p. 33-35).

In an effort to gain the support of the working class, Velasco created the *Sistema Nacional en Apoyo de la Mobilización Social (SINAMOS)* in 1971 (Stokes, p. 37). Since the government was unable to control Peru’s labor movement, however, new parties emerged to compete for *poblador* support (Stokes, p. 37). Subsequently, the Marxist Left was strengthened as the government allowed unionization to surge (Stokes, p. 45). In response to the decline of real salaries and wages (which increased poverty among the lower classes) as a result of a hemispheric-wide debt crisis in 1975, *Sendero Luminoso* began its rise to power (Stokes, p. 49-51).

The emphasis of class was also reinforced by the ideology of *Sendero Luminoso* throughout the 1980s (McClintock, p. 4). As McClintock explains, during the 1980s, Peru was believed to have “the strongest Marxist left of any country in South America” (McClintock, p. 4). Therefore, as under the Velasco regime, indigenous communities adopted class (rather than ethnic) identities that the Left emphasized during the 1980s. Without an emphasis on ethnicity, indigenous mobilization suffered in Peru.

As I explain in the conclusion section, Peru has been taking steps to recognize the atrocities that occurred under the Fujimori regime and *Sendero Luminoso*. The outlook for Peru’s future is hopeful, but the fear that the Fujimori regime, military, and *Sendero Luminoso* caused still impacts democracy in Peru.
today. Unlike the late 1970s to 2000, however, *indígenas* have more political-associational space to voice their demands to the government in Peru today.
Conclusion

As has been explored in Chapter IV, Peru’s violent history and identity politics hampered indigenous mobilization. Peru’s indigenous case is not result of geographic hindrances since high concentrations of indigenous peoples are located along the Andes Mountains as in Ecuador and Bolivia. Nor is it an example of elite oppression since indígenas in both Ecuador and Bolivia experienced white and mestizo prejudice as did indigenous peoples in Peru.

Rather, the violence caused by Sendero Luminoso, the Peruvian military, and the Fujimori regime inhibited indigenous mobilization in Peru because indígenas did not have the same resources available to indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia. As explained in Chapters II and III, transnational actors facilitated indigenous organization in Bolivia and Ecuador since they sponsored and inspired indigenous peoples to mobilize. The Bolivian and Ecuadorian states also passed several initiatives, such as constitutional reforms to recognize their societies as plurinational and land titles pushed by indigenous organizations. Leadership and the emergence of indigenous political parties also strengthened indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. Finally, bilingual schools in Bolivia and Ecuador helped educate indígenas as well as valorize their culture.

On the other hand, Peruvian indigenous peoples, who were terrorized by Sendero Luminoso and by the backlash of the Peruvian military and Fujimori regime, focused on surviving instead of demanding equal rights from the state.
An Outlook for the Future

With the capture and sentencing of Fujimori and the reinstallation of a separation of powers system, Peru’s current political and social environment is different for its indigenous peoples today.\footnote{Fujimori was captured in Chile and extradited to Peru on human rights charges in 2005. In April 2009, he was sentenced to 25 years in imprison by the Peruvian Supreme Court for his offenses during his authoritarian rule in the 1990s (Moffet, \textit{Fujimori Sentenced for Peru Killings}; Wall Street Journal: April 8, 2009).} Especially since the founding of its Truth Commission, Peru has been recognizing the atrocities that occurred under the Fujimori administration (McClintock, p. 4). For example, the Truth Commission has found that at least 75 percent of people who were murdered during the reign of \textit{Sendero Luminoso} were indigenous, rural, Quechua-speaking people (McClintock, p. 4). In other words, Peruvian \textit{indígenas} were the most affected by the violence of \textit{Sendero Luminoso} and the military.

Former president Alejandro Toledo, the successor of Alberto Fujimori, also recognized the 5000-page report compiled by the Truth Commission in 2003 (\textit{State of Fear}, 2005). With the founding of an institution that is documenting the atrocities of Peru’s past and monitoring the progression of Peru’s political reform as well as the state’s recognition of the Truth Commission’s efforts, Peruvian citizens have more political-associational space in which they can rally freely. As a result, Peruvian indigenous peoples have more opportunities to mobilize currently than they did 30 years ago when the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements were launching and evolving at the national level.

Developments at the grassroots level also suggest that Peruvian \textit{indígenas} may be mobilizing more successfully now than in the past. According to María
Elena García, bilingual education in the highlands is being pushed by intercultural activists as well as by the Peruvian Ministry of Education in Lima (Elena García, p. 71). Although some Quechua-speaking, indigenous parents reject bilingual education (since Spanish is valued higher as a means to rise in class), bilingual education has been succeeding in the indigenous highlands (Elena García, p. 72). For example, through the efforts of NGOs to promote adult literacy, literacy groups for women have emerged in Peru (Elena García, p. 82). As Peruvian indigenous women explain, if they can learn skills (such as the ability to read and write their own language as well as Spanish), they will be able to teach their children (Elena García, p. 81). Similarly, Peruvian indigenous women in the highlands feel that learning Spanish will help protect their children from marginalization (Elena García, p. 81).

Furthermore, Elena García notes that a Peruvian, indigenous intellectual elite is emerging in the countryside (Elena García, p. 85). As bilingual education progresses, selected indigenous youths, aided by NGOs, are attending masters programs in five Andean countries (Elena García, p. 85). The first class of Quechua intellectuals graduated in 2001 with masters degrees in education and linguistics (Elena García, p. 88). Subsequently, their ability to read, write, and speak Quechua has enabled them to gain a higher status in their communities and Peruvian society (Elena García, p. 88). Likewise, their intellectual status has attracted NGOs to adopt them as indigenous representatives of their cultures (Elena García, p. 88). Not surprisingly, the progression of indigenous youth in Peru mirrors the beginnings of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and
Bolivia. Therefore, Peruvian indigenous peoples have the potential to mobilize at
the national level if they so choose. As García claims, a “more intercultural
education system will better empower and equip indigenous people to demand
equal rights as citizens”—the ultimate demand of any indigenous movement
(Elena García, p. 71).

In addition, indigenous peoples politically have become more self-
determined at the local level. For example, Carlos Ivan Degregori notes that the
number of mayors who can speak Quechua has increased in the Peruvian
highlands since the mid-2000s (McClintock, p. 14). Elena García also
emphasizes that indigenous community leaders have been pushing for schools
controlled by the indigenous community (Elena García, p. 82). As a result,
indigenous peoples are becoming more politically active, which may translate to
the national level.

Of course, there are some complications for indigenous mobilization in
Peru. First, Peru is currently considered a democracy in transition. Since
Fujimori dissolved Congress and the judiciary with his autogolpe in 1992, Peru
has had to revamp its democratic system of government. Although Fujimori
reinstated a pseudo-Congress in the late-1990s, it remained a puppet of the
executive branch of government. With the exile of Fujimori in the early-2000s
and efforts of Alejandro Toledo, Peru has taken the opportunity to proceed with
democratic reforms. Ideally, the push of the Peruvian government to institute
reform would seem conducive for the mobilization of indigenous peoples. In
practice, however, Peru’s transition most likely means its government will be
focused on internal reforms rather than on the concerns of its indigenous peoples
*(State of Fear, 2005)*.

A second complication is the classification of Peru’s presidential candidates since the early-2000s. Technically, Alejandro Toledo is considered Peru’s first indigenous president for he was “born into poverty in a rural mountain community of northern Peru” and “his physical features are...conventionally considered indigenous” by Peruvian standards (McClintock, p. 8). Although he does not speak Quechua, Peruvian citizens consider Toledo a *cholo*, or “an ‘Indian’ who has adopted non-indigenous attire, language, and customs...[to] ascend...the socioeconomic ladder” (McClintock, p. 8). On the other hand, Bolivia’s indigenous movement existed at the national level before the election of its first indigenous president, Evo Morales. Similarly, Ecuador’s indigenous movement existed at the national level before the coup of 2000 to overthrow the president in power.

Toledo, however, was elected without the presence of a Peruvian indigenous movement at the national level. His election is not indicative of ethnic advancement in Peru since his ethnic background was coincidental to his position. Therefore, his identification as the first indigenous president may be problematic for the indigenous movement since his election was not based on a platform to honor indigenous demands. Rather, his indigenous physical features are coincidental to his former political position. Nevertheless, his classification and election may confound some indigenous demands (such as to be represented equally in Peru’s political process) because according to the Peruvian elite and to
some countries of the international community, Alejandro Toledo was Peru’s first “indigenous” president (McClintock, p. 8).

Finally, a third complication that may impede indigenous mobilization is political indifference. According to Ernesto García Calederón, most Peruvians “[do not] care…whether they live in a democracy…as long as their lifestyles were not threatened” (García Calderón, p. 53). Although Peruvian citizens protested Fujimori’s attempt to disregard the constitution and to run for a third presidential term, political indifference may still persist among indigenous peoples in the Peruvian countryside if their current lifestyle is not affected by Peru’s democratic transition.

Due to the upheaval caused by Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori administration that did disrupt indigenous lifestyles, however, indigenous peoples may be more apt to take action under a political system that is currently valuing democratic forms of government (García Calderón, p. 53). Despite Peru’s violent past, indígenas have more political-associational space to speak freely of their atrocities via the Truth Commission. Subsequently, the actions of the Truth Commission may inspire indigenous peoples to speak freely of ways to prevent future atrocities against their communities from happening. How can indigenous peoples prevent Peru’s violent past from repeating? Obviously, one method (as taken by indígenas in Ecuador and Bolivia) may be through indigenous mobilization, organization, and demand of equal rights at the national level.
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Written Capstone Summary

Project Description and Significance

For my Capstone Project, I compared and contrasted indigenous movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. In my preliminary research of Latin American indigenous movements, I noted that Ecuador and Bolivia have had the most successful indigenous movements at the national level in the region while Peru’s indigenous groups have lagged behind the mobilization fervor. Although Peru has a large indigenous population, even higher than the proportion of indigenous groups in Ecuador, its indigenous movement has not transpired passed the local level. This discrepancy in indigenous mobilization across Latin America was intriguing.

Therefore, I formulated my thesis around discovering the causes for the Peruvian case versus the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases. The contributing causes to the Peruvian case were the state of fear caused by Sendero Luminoso, the military, and the Fujimori administration as well as indigenous classification by Peruvian indígenas themselves. The state of fear caused by Sendero Luminoso, the military, and the Fujimori administration discouraged transnational actors and the state to aid Peruvian indigenous groups, which were available to indigenous groups who mobilized in both Bolivia and Ecuador. The current political climate in Peru, however, may help sustain an indigenous movement at the national level in the future.
My Capstone Project is significant for it will show the causes of and inhibitors to successful indigenous mobilization in Latin America. It will also demonstrate how an authoritarian regime confounds facets of democratic participation, mainly social movement in the case of this thesis. This Capstone Project will also offer predictions about whether a future indigenous movement at the national movement will arise in Peru.

Methods of Research

To write my Capstone Project, I consulted several texts to compare theories about what made indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador successful nationally and about why Peru lacked an indigenous movement. On the basis of the theories I researched as well as lessons learned from prior courses, I drew conclusions that I applied in my thesis.

Project Summary

In the late-twentieth century, indigenous peoples in both Ecuador and Bolivia organized successfully at a national level. Eventually, indigenous mobilization achieved more political representation for indigenous groups in the legislative and executive branches of government (Yashar, p. 19). Peru’s indigenous movement, however, has lagged far behind the indigenous movements of its two neighbors. Although 38 to 40 percent of Peru’s population is indigenous (versus 60 to 70 percent of Bolivia’s population and only 30 to 38
percent of Ecuador’s population), Peru’s indigenous peoples have barely organized at a local level (Yashar, p. 19).

For these reasons, it is evident that strength in numbers is not the only precursor to indigenous mobilization at the national level. There must be mitigating factors behind the indigenous movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru that would cause different outcomes in these countries. For example, Peru’s indigenous diversification may be a contributing factor. In other words, language barriers and cultural differences impede Peruvian indigenous peoples’ abilities to compromise on issues, to collaborate, and to organize at a national level.

When comparing Ecuador and Bolivia’s indigenous movements, the reasons for the Peruvian indigenous movement’s complications are more obvious. For instance, the efforts of transnational actors at the international level, the involvement of the state at the national level as well as the influence of leaders and impact of bicultural education at the local level evolved the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements to their pinnacles today.

First, transnational actors provided the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements with resources absent to Peru’s indigenous movement. Although some indigenous peoples managed to mobilize without any international support from transnational actors, NGOs provided indigenous organizations with an additional impetus to continue protesting for their demands; and with funding that made indigenous mobilization easier to sustain (Andolina et al., p. 682). Transnational actors also enabled indigenous peoples in Ecuador and
Bolivia to network and to form relationships with one another at the transnational level, which strengthened their movements overall.

Indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador also enjoyed some state support for their initiatives, which was absent for Peru’s indigenous movement. Through the recognition of indigenous organizations, passage of laws, incorporation of indigenous institutions into the government, and constitutional reform, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian state legitimized the demands and existence of mobilized indigenous groups. For instance, the Bolivian state’s ratification of the International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Convention 169 in 1991 and of the Law of Popular Participation in 1995 bolstered Bolivia’s indigenous movement for the state formally recognized indígenas by their traditions and territorial claims rather than by their economic status as campesinos (Andolina et al, p. 688). Similarly, constitutional reform passed by the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states played a pivotal role in the success of their indigenous movements. Since the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states recognized their societies as plurinational and multicultural in their constitutions, they simultaneously legitimized the traditions of its indigenous peoples as well as recognized a primary demand of their indigenous movements. Finally, the incorporation of indigenous organizations into the Ecuadorian and Bolivian states initially bolstered their indigenous movements at the national level since indigenous groups had an outlet to make their demands directly heard by the government.

Leadership at the national and local levels also impacted the success of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia. In Bolivia, leadership is
paramount in ayllus. Since they promote indigenous identities through their leadership, ayllu leaders play a pivotal role in promoting dialogue and indigenous identity as indigenous representatives at the international and national levels (Andolina et al, p. 696). Leadership in Ecuador is more symbolic. For example, Luis Macas, a prominent head of CONAIE, is a significant leader for Ecuador’s indigenous movement as a facilitator of indigenous demands. Since Ecuador and Bolivia both had inspiring indigenous leaders, their movements were more sustainable.

Bicultural education initiatives also strengthened indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia. Ultimately, bicultural education initiatives have strengthened communal political institutions as well as become a source for national, indigenous political movements (Perreault, p. 78). For these reasons, bicultural education has facilitated the evolution of indigenous movements at the national level.

According to Donna Van Cott, ethnic parties were able to form in Bolivia and Ecuador as a result of their open institutional environments (Van Cott, p. 8). Van Cott notes that due to Ecuador and Bolivia’s transitions to democracy during the 1990s, political-associational space opened for existing organizations to act and for new organizations to form (Van Cott, p. 10). Similarly, the decline of the Left in Ecuador and Bolivia during the 1990s allowed these ethnic parties to form

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16 Ayllus are “Andean indigenous communities of extended families, cargo-based leadership patterns, and occupation of specific territorial spaces.” In a cargo-based leadership pattern, “community leaders are expected to begin in lower offices to gain experience and recognition, and proceed gradually stepwise to positions of greater prestige and responsibility” (Andolina et al, p. 679).
(Van Cott, p. 8). The creation of ethnic, indigenous parties, therefore, sustained indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia.

Compared to Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organization in Peru is a perplexing anomaly. Although a majority of its population (about 40 percent) consists of indígenas—an indigenous population higher than Ecuador—its indigenous movement has been stagnant (Yashar, p. 19). Like Ecuador and Bolivia, Peru experienced a similar colonial history and indigenous stigmatization. Race relations in Peru, therefore, succumb to the same social hierarchy as in Ecuador and Bolivia where wealth and superiority are associated with whiteness; and where poverty, simple-mindedness, and inferiority are associated with being indigenous or black (Otero, p. 330). All three societies also practiced a hacienda system that comprised of a white patrón and indigenous or black campesinos. Similarly, the hacienda systems in all three societies were challenged by the rise of a labor (or peasant) movement, and eradicated by agrarian reforms. Due to these similarities, Peru’s indigenous movement theoretically should have transpired from its labor movement like the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia.

In practice, however, Peru’s indigenous movement does not match the indigenous movements of both Bolivia and Ecuador. At first glance, Peru’s geography and ethnic localities appear to be the cause of Peru’s lack of an indigenous movement. Since high concentrations of indigenous populations in all three countries are located along the Andes Mountains, however, Peru’s geography logically is not a contributing factor.
Gerardo Otero asserts that multicultural integration may have thwarted indigenous mobilization in Peru. According to Otero, multicultural integration is a challenge for emerging Latin American democracies due to the ruling class ideology that their nations are culturally homogenous (Otero et al, p. 518). The ideology of the ruling class, however, was overcome in Ecuador and Bolivia by their indigenous movements’ persistent demands for constitutional reforms, which shows that the view of the elite is permeable (Otero et al, p. 518). Therefore, the challenge of multicultural integration may be problematic in the Peruvian case, but it does not explain why its indigenous movement was weaker than indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador.

A main contributor to the Peruvian indigenous case is fear of violence from *Sendero Luminoso* and components of the state itself. *Sendero Luminoso* was a leftist organization that arose during the 1970s under the leadership of Abimael Guzmán, who emulated Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. Headquartered in the Peruvian countryside, *Sendero Luminoso* often terrorized rural communities to join its organization.

*Sendero Luminoso*, however, was not the only promulgator of rural violence. Violence was precipitated by the state as well. To control *Sendero Luminoso* and to attempt to capture its leader Gúzman, the García administration declared parts of the Peruvian countryside as “emergency zones,” which granted the military sole control of the area. The only problem, however, was that *Sendero Luminoso* had covertly infiltrated the Peruvian countryside by absorbing followers from all age groups, classes, and sexes. As a result, the military could
not determine systematically who was a follower of *Sendero Luminoso* until a guerilla attack was launched; or without interrogating its captives. For these reasons, the Peruvian military often terrorized the countryside, particularly targeting indigenous communities, to discover *Sendero Luminoso*’s supporters (*State of Fear*, 2005).

President Alberto Fujimori also inhibited indigenous mobilization in Peru. He attained tremendous executive power that transformed Peru from a democratic society to an authoritarian regime (García Calderón, p. 48). For example, in April 1992, Fujimori staged an *autogolpe*, or the executive overthrow of the legislative and judicial branches of government, in order to halt Gúzman’s plot to attack Lima and to take over the state (García Calderón, p. 48). Although Gúzman was captured in September 1992, Fujimori still maintained his executive control over the Peruvian state (García Calderón, p. 48). Without an outlet to justify the necessity of his authoritarian rule, however, Fujimori needed new targets—the Peruvian people (*State of Fear*, 2005). He also dismantled any institution, such as the media, that acted against the message of the Fujimori administration (García Calderón, p. 50). Naturally, other organizations that called for the reform of the state (which was a major demand of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia) were dissolved.

Due to constant fear promulgated by *Sendero Luminoso* and then by the Fujimori administration, indigenous mobilization remained regional rather than growing into a national movement for it lacked factors that contributed to the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador (Yashar, p. 58-59). For example,
due to fear of violence and retaliation, most NGOs avoided sustained involvement in the Peruvian countryside to help facilitate an indigenous movement. Indigenous peoples, as a result, were unable to utilize the resources provided by transnational actors (such as transnational networking and bicultural education). Similarly, Deborah Yashar asserts that indigenous movements emerged due to a combination of three factors—changing citizenship regimes, transcommunity networks, and open political-associational space (Yashar, p. 29). According to Yashar, Peru lacked these factors due to the civil war between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state as well as foreclosed political-associational space (Yashar, p. 26).

A third factor that contributed to the case of Peru was indigenous classification by indígenas themselves (McClintock, p. 3). According to Cynthia McClintock, the “political dynamics [of Peru] since 1968 as well as its geography and demographic trends…limit[ed] the establishment of indigenous identities [as evident] in recent decades” (McClintock, p. 2). She claims that indigenous groups in Peru identified on a class, rather than ethnic, basis since the military dictator, Juan Velasco Alvarado, reclassified indigenous communities as peasant communities when he came to power in 1968 (McClintock, p. 4). The emphasis of class was also reinforced by the ideology of Sendero Luminoso throughout the 1980s (McClintock, p. 4). Without an emphasis on ethnicity, indigenous mobilization suffered in Peru.

With the capture of Fujimori and the reinstallation of a separation of powers system, Peru’s current political and social environment is different for its
indigenous peoples today. Since the founding of its Truth Commission, Peru has been recognizing the atrocities that occurred under the Fujimori administration (McClintock, p. 4). President Alejandro Toledo, the successor of Alberto Fujimori, also facilitated the country’s transition back to democracy (State of Fear, 2005). Currently, Peruvian indigenous peoples have more opportunities to mobilize than 30 years ago when the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements were launching and evolving at the national level.

Developments at the grassroots level also suggest that Peruvian indígenas may be mobilizing more successfully now than in the past. According to María Elena García, bicultural education in the highlands is being pushed by intercultural activists as well as by the Peruvian Ministry of Education in Lima (Elena García, p. 71). Due to bicultural education, an indigenous elite is emerging in the countryside, mostly comprised of youth (Elena García, p. 85). Not surprisingly, the progression of indigenous youth in Peru mirrors the beginnings of indigenous movements in both Ecuador and Bolivia. Therefore, Peruvian indigenous peoples have the potential to mobilize at the national level if they so choose.

In addition, indigenous peoples politically have become more self-determined at the local level. For example, Carlos Ivan Degregori notes that the number of mayors who can speak Quechua has increased in the Peruvian highlands since the mid-2000s (McClintock, p. 14). Elena García also emphasizes that indigenous community leaders have been pushing for schools controlled by the indigenous community (Elena García, p. 82).
Of course, there are some complications for indigenous mobilization in Peru. First, Peru is currently considered a democracy in transition (*State of Fear*, 2005). Ideally, the push of the Peruvian government to institute reform would seem conducive for indigenous mobilization. In practice, however, Peru’s transition most likely means its government will be focused on internal reforms rather than on the concerns of its indigenous peoples.

A second complication is the classification of Peru’s presidential candidates since the early-2000s. Technically, Alejandro Toledo is considered Peru’s first indigenous president for he was “born into poverty in a rural mountain community of northern Peru” and “his physical features are…conventionally considered indigenous” by Peruvian standards (McClintock, p. 8). His identification as the first indigenous president may be problematic for the indigenous movement since his election was not based on a platform to honor indigenous demands.

Finally, a third complication that may impede indigenous mobilization is political indifference. According to Ernesto García Calderón, most Peruvians “[do not] care…whether they live in a democracy…as long as their lifestyles were not threatened” (García Calderón, p. 53). Although Peruvian citizens protested Fujimori’s attempt to disregard the constitution and to run for a third presidential term, political indifference may still persist among indigenous peoples in the Peruvian countryside if their current lifestyles are not affected by Peru’s democratic transition.
Due to the upheaval caused by Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori administration that disrupted indigenous lifestyles, however, indigenous peoples may be more apt to take action under a political system that is currently valuing democratic forms of government (García Calderón, p. 53). Despite Peru’s violent past, indígenas have more political-associational space to speak freely of their atrocities via the Truth Commission. Subsequently, the actions of the Truth Commission may inspire indigenous peoples to speak freely of ways to prevent future atrocities against their communities from happening. How can indigenous peoples prevent Peru’s violent past from repeating? Obviously, one method, as used by indigenous peoples in Ecuador and Bolivia, may be indigenous mobilization, organization, and demand for equal rights at the national level.