of New York found both subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA and personal jurisdiction over Talisman as a foreign corporation doing business in New York.\textsuperscript{116} Reaffirming United States and international treaty precedent, the Court determined that Talisman could be treated as a state actor under the ATCA.\textsuperscript{117} The Court expanded subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA by finding that Talisman’s cooperation with the Sudanese government and Talisman’s role as a co-conspirator in the genocidal acts committed by the Sudanese government against the southern Sudanese populations around oil concessions amounted to acts under color of state law for purposes of liability under the ATCA.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{Rohit Punj}

\section*{V. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS}

\textit{Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov}

\subsection*{A. Introduction}

In \textit{Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov}, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recognized the sovereignty and independence of the United States judiciary in the international arena.\textsuperscript{119} In its decision, the Court acknowledged the pervasive corruption in the Russian legal system and revealed an interest in protecting United States business interests.\textsuperscript{120} In disregarding the decision of the High Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, Russia’s court of last resort, the Court discounted international principles of comity.\textsuperscript{121} In doing so, the Court conveyed intolerance for corruption.\textsuperscript{122} Future opinions will therefore rely on this decision in order to promote United States interests in the international realm and to justify non-recognition of foreign judgments.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[116.] Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp.2d at 319, 331.
  \item[117.] See id. at 308–17, 328–29.
  \item[118.] Id. at 328.
  \item[120.] Id.
  \item[121.] Id.
  \item[122.] Id.
\end{itemize}
B. Background and Summary of Arguments

In an August 2001 ruling, the Court awarded summary judgment in favor of an American film company, Films By Jove [hereinafter FBJ], effectively validating FBJ’s title to over 1,500 Russian animated films created by a state-owned enterprise prior to 1991. On appeal, Joseph Berov, an American vendor of the films in question and a defendant in this action, conceded to violations of copyright law; however, Berov maintained that FBJ was not the proper plaintiff in the action against him. Specifically, Berov alleged that the Court should reconsider its previous grant of summary judgment because of a recent decision by the High Arbitrazh Court in Russia [hereinafter Arbitrazh], which credited ownership of the copyrights to a third party plaintiff, the Federal State Unitarian Enterprise Soyuzmultfilm Studio [hereinafter FSUESMS].

In the instant decision, the Court agreed with FBJ and reaffirmed FBJ’s position as the valid titleholder of the copyrights in dispute. During the trial, the parties offered fundamentally different versions and interpretations of the events leading up to the lawsuit. Although the case involved copyright infringement, the determination of the proper owner of the copyrights at issue controlled the outcome of the case.

FBJ argued that it held a valid title to the copyrights. FBJ alleged that, in 1989, the Russian state enterprise that had been controlling the studio since 1936 was transformed into a lease entity, conferring a new legal status upon it and transferring the ownership of the copyrights. These events occurred during the period of Perestroika, where the Russian government encouraged privatization and liberalization of the economy. When the state enterprise was transformed into a lease entity, FBJ maintained the state enterprise ceased to exist. Accordingly, the copyrights in the films passed to the lease entity, called Soyuzmultfilm Studio, by operation of law. In 1989, Soyuzmultfilm Studio agreed to pay rent to the Russian state in exchange for a ten-year lease on the tangible property owned by the

123. Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 158.
124. Id. at 216–17.
125. Id. at 178, 164.
126. Id. at 217.
127. Id. at 161.
129. Id. at 161.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
In 1992, Soyuzmultfilm Studio awarded FBJ an exclusive license to refurbish and sell the copyrighted films. In 1999, just before the ten-year lease expired, Soyuzmultfilm Studio was reorganized into a private company, also called Soyuzmultfilm Studio [hereinafter SMS]. Upon termination of the lease, the state property that had been leased to Soyuzmultfilm Studio was returned to the state, and SMS, the privatized company, moved to another location but retained the copyrights that had passed to it as a result of the reorganization. During that same year, Russia established a new state enterprise: FSUESMS.

Berov, on the other hand, argued that FSUESMS was the successor to the original state enterprise and the lawful holder of the copyrights. He argued that the copyrights to the films were owned by the state and never legally passed to Soyuzmultfilm Studio; rather, the copyrights "were merely under the 'operative management' of the studio." Accordingly, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio could not have conveyed the copyrights to FBJ because it never had the authority to do so. Berov also denied FBJ's allegation that the state enterprise ceased to exist, arguing instead that the state enterprise experienced a phase of "suspended animation" during the ten-year lease and was subsequently revived as FSUESMS in 1999. Therefore, Soyuzmultfilm Studio could not have legally sold the copyrights to FBJ; instead, the rights passed from the original state enterprise to FSUESMS.

C. Discussion

The Court reaffirmed its previous grant of summary judgment, focusing on the flawed logic of the Arbitrazh's decision and the allegations of corrupt influence by Russian government upon the Russian judiciary.

134. Id. at 160, 162.
135. Id. at 162.
136. Id. at 162.
137. Id.
139. Id. at 163.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163–64.
Logic of the Russian Court's Decision

The Court decided that the Russian decision was relevant to the outcome of Berov's motion for reconsideration because that outcome would be dependent upon an issue addressed by the Russian court: the legal succession of the ownership of the copyrights. Although the Court ultimately rejected the logic of the Arbitrazh's decision, the locus of the litigation in Arbitrazh pivoted on questions of legal ownership necessary for the resolution of this case.

At the hearing, Berov and FBJ each interpreted the significance of the Arbitrazh's decision differently. Berov argued that the Arbitrazh's conclusion that the state enterprise continued to exist throughout the ten-year lease period negated FBJ's ownership in the copyrights. Because the state enterprise retained the copyrights when the lease agreement was executed in 1989, the copyrights never passed by operation of law to FBJ. Berov further argued that according to the Arbitrazh, FSUESMS, as the legal successor to the state enterprise, owned the disputed rights. FBJ responded by claiming that the transfer to FSUESMS applied only to the tangible property mentioned in the lease agreement. FBJ argued that the state enterprise could not have existed because it lost all the qualities of a commercial entity. The state enterprise during the 1990s had no equipment or office space and did not function as an independent commercial enterprise. Therefore, FBJ asserted, the state enterprise did not exist during the lease agreement and the copyrights could not have legally passed to FSUESMS.

In support of his argument, Berov pointed to an information letter issued by the Arbitrazh that rejected the possibility of automatic legal succession to SMS by stating that "legal succession is determined by the content of the property, rights and obligations transferred by the statement." This argument would be "devastating" to FBJ had the

144. Id. at 158, 179, 216.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 179–80.
147. Id. at 179.
149. Id. at 162.
150. Id. at 198.
151. Id. at 180–81.
152. Id. at 161.
court not distinguished the situation involved in the information letter from the one currently in dispute.\textsuperscript{154} The reorganization in the information letter concerned a studio that was "spun off" from an existing state enterprise.\textsuperscript{155} There, the original entity simultaneously existed alongside the new enterprise.\textsuperscript{156} In the current action, the commercial activity of the state enterprise ceased with the signing of the lease agreement.\textsuperscript{157}

The Court found the Arbitrazh's decision inconsistent in several ways. The lack of activity on the part of the state enterprise suggests that the state enterprise did, in fact, cease to exist.\textsuperscript{158} Moreover, the Court found FBJ's expert, Dr. Sergei Pashin, convincing.\textsuperscript{159} Dr. Pashin claimed that the Arbitrazh decision misrepresented the law and ultimately came to a decision that was "unprecedented and illogical."\textsuperscript{160} Dr. Pashin further declared that the Arbitrazh decision was an attempt through collusion to protect state interests, stating that the decision "allowed the organs of the executive branch to interpret this decision in any manner they deemed fit, which would be for the purpose of protecting what is specifically understood to be 'state interest.'"\textsuperscript{161}

At the time the lease agreement was executed, the Russian government had created the Fundamental Principles on Leasing [hereinafter Principles] to encourage privatization of state industries.\textsuperscript{162} According to Dr. Pashin, the ruling of the Arbitrazh conflicted with the purpose of the Principles.\textsuperscript{163}

The Court also found the Arbitrazh decision to be inconsistent because the record established that the copyrights were never state-owned property.\textsuperscript{164} Under Article 486 of the 1964 Soviet Civil Code, which provides that ownership of copyrights rests with the entity that created the films, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio clearly owned the copyrights.\textsuperscript{165} Therefore, the Soyuzmultfilm Studio legally owned the

\textsuperscript{154} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 183.
\textsuperscript{155} Id.
\textsuperscript{156} Id.
\textsuperscript{157} Id. at 184.
\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 197.
\textsuperscript{159} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 210.
\textsuperscript{160} Id. at 198.
\textsuperscript{161} Id. at 199.
\textsuperscript{162} Id.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 193, 197, 204.
\textsuperscript{164} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201.
\textsuperscript{165} Id.
copyrights while the state retained the right to exploit the distribution.\textsuperscript{166} However, during Perestroika, the right to distribute the films combined with the right to hold the copyrights.\textsuperscript{167} Since the Soviet state did not own the copyrights in the first place, the rights could not have been involved in the 1989 lease agreement because the copyrights remained with the studio that produced the films rather than the state.\textsuperscript{168}

According to the Court, the fatal flaw in the Arbitrazh’s decision arose from the implication that the copyrights remained with the state after the state-owned entity ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{169} If the Court adopted the Arbitrazh’s reasoning, there would have been no entity authorized to grant the copyrights during the lease-agreement period.\textsuperscript{170} If the state enterprise was in “suspended animation,” and the lease enterprise did not have the rights to the copyrights, then at no point during the ten-year lease would there have been an entity legally authorized to distribute the copyrights.\textsuperscript{171}

\textit{Judicial Misconduct}

Central to FBJ’s argument is the allegation of insidious corruption in the Russian judiciary system.\textsuperscript{172} Specifically, FBJ accused the state of exerting “improper governmental influence” over the Russian courts.\textsuperscript{173} The decision was depicted as an attempt to protect Russian state interests to the detriment of the American company.\textsuperscript{174} FBJ’s expert, Dr. Pashin, gave a convincing description of the state of the Russian judiciary, revealing that the composition of the Arbitrazh consists mostly of former state employees specifically hired to protect state interests.\textsuperscript{175} Additionally, the Arbitrazh courts lack adequate funding and are dependent upon the state for resources.\textsuperscript{176} This facilitates a relationship in which the judiciary is unduly influenced by pro-state concerns.\textsuperscript{177}

The courts of the United States, interested in protecting citizens

\textsuperscript{166} Id.
\textsuperscript{167} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 201.
\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 202.
\textsuperscript{169} Id.
\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 204.
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 181, 204.
\textsuperscript{172} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 205.
\textsuperscript{173} Id.
\textsuperscript{174} Id. at 205–06.
\textsuperscript{175} Id. at 206.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
\textsuperscript{177} Films By Jove, 250 F. Supp.2d at 206.
and companies of the United States, can reject foreign judgments when evidence exists that the judgment was influenced by corrupt forces.178 Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law supports this conclusion by stipulating that if a foreign court fails to be fair or impartial, the United States court is not bound to follow it.179 Here, FBJ produced evidence of impropriety on the part of the Russian courts. Several documents detailed a meeting between the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation and a representative from the Arbitrazh where the litigation between SMS and FSUESMS, as well as the need to protect state interests, were addressed.180 The documents demonstrated improper influence and justified the United States court’s decision not to defer to the Russian judgment.

F. Holding of the Court

The Court denied Berov’s motion for reconsideration, basing its determination on the flawed logic of the court and viable allegations of judicial misconduct.181

G. Conclusion

In declining to defer to the Arbitrazh’s decision and acknowledging the political corruption of the Arbitrazh, the Court highlighted the paramount importance of United States business interests and the judiciary’s protectionist role in international law. In addition, by refusing to defer to the Russian decision, the Court made a political point and demonstrated its intolerance for judicial corruption.

P. Carey Kulp

VI. NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT

United States of America v. Schultz

A. Introduction

In United States of America v. Schultz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether conspiring to take

179. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987)).
180. Id. at 208.
181. Id. at 216.