Economic Integration in East Africa: The Case of Ethiopia and Kenya

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Abstract

This study answers the question of which of the four economic integration areas, that is, trade, security, roadways, and energy, can help both Ethiopia and Kenya to speed up their integration more effectively. It hypothesizes that trade and security accelerate integration more than roadways and energy. The results of this study support this hypothesis. However, empirical evidence about the road that connects Ethiopia and Kenya modify somewhat the hypothesis by revealing that roads have contributed more than expected, to the integration of the two countries.

Even though the volume of trade is quite small and there are many more obstacles to trade, there is progress in trade between Ethiopia and Kenya. The energy sector has many challenges, and the findings show that energy production in Ethiopia is not very conducive to integration. Security has a far-reaching impact on economic integration. It appears to be the number one concern for both Ethiopia and Kenya since the Horn of Africa is synonymous with war, violence, and conflict. Concerns about security have helped the two countries make some progress in their integration efforts, despite the recent spike of protests and brutal repression by governments. Overall, there is a bright prospect for integration in East Africa and the realization of African renaissance in the years to come.

The empirical part of this study was conducted in the summer of 2016 in Addis Ababa. Data for the research were obtained from interviews, archives, and document analysis. Ten informants were interviewed and selected on the basis of snowball sampling. Secondary sources were also used.

The study is among the first to assess integration areas in both countries that can lead them to quick integration. It helps organizations such as IGAD, COMESA or EAC to revise or reassess
their policies and their organizational strengths and weaknesses for the successful accomplishment of their goal of integration.
Economic Integration in East Africa: The Case of Ethiopia and Kenya

By

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M.A., Addis Ababa University, 2011

Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the master of Arts in Pan African Studies.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... i

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ v

List of Figures .............................................................................................................. ix

List of Tables ............................................................................................................... ix

Acronyms and Abbreviations ..................................................................................... x

Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1

I. Statement of the Problem ....................................................................................... 1

II. Research Questions ................................................................................................. 9

III. Significance of the Study ..................................................................................... 9

IV. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses .............................................................. 10

V. Hypothesis ............................................................................................................. 11

VI. Research Methodology ......................................................................................... 12

   1. Document Analysis ............................................................................................. 12

   2. Archives .............................................................................................................. 13

   3. Interviews ........................................................................................................... 13

   Interview Data Sampling .......................................................................................... 14

VII. Limitations .......................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 2. Literature Review ..................................................................................... 16

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 16

2.1. Perspectives on Regional Economic Integration ............................................ 16

   2.1.1 Benefits of Regional Economic Integration ................................................. 18

   2.1.2 Disadvantages of Regional Economic Integration .................................... 22
2.2. Africa’s Position in World Economy ................................................................. 23

2.2.1. The liberal, Marxist (Neo-Marxist) and the Structuralist theories/ Perspectives of Economic Development for the South ........................................... 26

2.3. Economic Integration in Africa ......................................................................... 30

2.3.1. The Driving Factors of Regional Economic Integration .............................. 31

2.4. Economic Integration in East Africa .................................................................. 36

2.4.1. Lack of Success in Regional Integration Efforts in East Africa .................... 38

2.4.2. Specific Obstacles to Regional Integration in East Africa ......................... 45

2.4.2.1. Multiple and Overlapping of Membership ............................................. 45

2.4.2.2. Fair Distribution of Burdens and Gains ................................................. 47

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 47

Chapter 3. Road and Energy as Areas of Potential Integration ................................. 49

3.1. Energy as a Means of Integration ..................................................................... 50

3.2. Roads as a Means of Integration .................................................................... 53

3.2.1. The LAPSSET Project ................................................................................ 58

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 58

Chapter 4. Trade and the Potential for Integration between Ethiopia and Kenya ................................................................. 61


4.2. Huge Population ............................................................................................. 64

4.3. The Private Sector .......................................................................................... 65
4.4. Overlapping of Membership.................................................................67

4.5. Economic Nationalism ........................................................................67

Conclusion .................................................................................................70

Chapter 5: Security and Integration .............................................................72

5.1. Political Stability in Ethiopia and Kenya ..............................................73

5.2. A Historical Backdrop of Security Cooperation between Ethiopia and
Kenya ..........................................................................................................76

5.2.2. Ethiopia and Kenya’s Role in South Sudan .....................................84

5.2.3. Borders Conflicts between Ethiopia and Kenya .............................87

Conclusion .................................................................................................91

Chapter 6. General Conclusion and Recommendation ............................93

Appendix ......................................................................................................99

Interview Questions Prompt .......................................................................99

Bibliography ...............................................................................................101
List of Figures

Figure 1. Ethiopia’s Import from Kenya: 2004 to 2013 ................................61
Figure 2. It shows Ethiopia’s export to Kenya from 2004 to 2013 ..........63

List of Tables

Table 4.1. Goods exported to Kenya and the income earned from each good form 2004-2013` .................................................................62
Table 4.2. Kenyan investment in Ethiopia (Between Jan.1992-Aug.2012) .....66
Table 5.1. Pastoralist groups involved in cattle rustling in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia and their targeted areas of raid .............................................88
# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECs</td>
<td>The Africa’s Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>The African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel -Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>The East African Community</td>
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<td>EAPP</td>
<td>The East African Power Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEPCo</td>
<td>Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERCA</td>
<td>Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERD</td>
<td>Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVDC</td>
<td>High-Voltage Direct Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
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KETRACO: The Kenya Electricity Transmission Company
LAPSSET: The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFED: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
NAFTA: North Atlantic Free Trade
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OAU: Organization of African Unity
OLF: The Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
OSPB: One Stop Border Post
PTA: Preferential Trade Area
REC: Regional Economic Communities
RTA: Ethiopian Road Transport Association
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SPLM: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (A Party in South Sudan)
U.A.S: The Union of African States
UMA: Arab Maghreb Union
UNECA: United Nation Economic Commission for Africa
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
Chapter 1. Introduction

I. Statement of the Problem

One of the main objectives of the African Union is to promote sustainable development in the continent. This Pan-Africanist vision is believed to be realized through regional integration. As a result, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are taken as the building blocks of the Continental Union. Out of the eight economic groupings in Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) represents the Eastern part of Africa while COMESA constitutes the Eastern and Southern Africa (Sako 3).

IGAD was established in 1996 to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), which was established in 1986. In April 1995, the Heads of State and Government of IGADD signed another document to renew and enlarge the mandate of IGADD. This new mandate, therefore, meant to broadening IGADD’s work and, among other things, it tries to include “food security and environmental protection, promotion and maintenance of peace and security, and humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation and integration.” As a result, IGAD was born. Its members are Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea ("IGAD")

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1 Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel -Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community(EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community(SADC)

Concerning COMESA, it was formed in December 1994 in Lusaka. The chief focus of COMESA is enabling the formation of a large economic community and lifting trading barriers. Both Ethiopia and Kenya are members of this economic grouping. Ethiopia’s peace and security effort in IGAD, and Kenya’s trade liberalization efforts in COMESA and East African Community (EAC) are appreciable (UNECA, “COMESA”).

There are many policy areas of integration such as trade, security, roadways, and power. However, there is insufficient research to identify which policy areas are important for speeding up integration between the two countries. The existing literature has tended to focus on advantages and disadvantages of regional economic integration rather than assessing the contribution of various policy areas of integration. The impacts of these policy areas might be determined by membership to different economic groupings. For instance, Ethiopia’s involvement in IGAD and COMESA affects its policies concerning security and trade. As a result, I found it problematic to study the role of the above policy areas by focusing on a particular block: IGAD, COMESA or EAC. Recently, COMESA, EAC, and SADCC have merged to become COMESA-EAC- SADCC, which is a tripartite agreement that has further complicated their role. Consequently, this study assesses the effects of those four policy areas in the East African regional organizations than focusing on one block.

This research explores the roles of Ethiopia and Kenya in Economic integration between themselves and other East African countries. East Africa is the most unstable region in Africa because of internal conflicts and intrastate wars. However, Ethiopia and Kenya are found in a relatively peaceful condition with a significant population. Moreover, their economy and military are stronger than any other country in the region (“USAID East Africa” 1-32).
If we look at the 2014 world bank data, Ethiopia’s GDP is $55.61 billion with a total population of 96.96 million; Kenya, with a status of low, middle income, has a GDP of $60.94 billion, with a population of 44.86 million; Djibouti’s GDP is $1.589 billion, with a total population of 876,200; Uganda’s GDP is $27 billion, with a total population of 37.78 million; Somalia’s GDP is $5.707 billion, with a total population of 10.52 million; South Sudan’s GDP is $13.28 billion, with a total population of 11.91 million and Sudan’s GDP is $73.81 billion, with a total population of 39.35 million. Finally, Eritrea, under the category of low income, has a GDP of $2.608 billion (2011) with a total population of 5 million (World Bank, "Ethiopia/Kenya/Djibouti/Somalia…”).

I chose Ethiopia and Kenya because they are particularly determined to implement the economic integration agreements signed between them at various times. For instance, in 2012, they signed Special Status Agreement to enhance trade and investment. Concerning the trade sector, they put much emphasis on textiles, agricultural goods, and food complexes. There is a steady growth of trade between Ethiopia and Kenya. If we take, for instance, the 2012 data, Kenyan exports to Ethiopia account for 56.4 million US dollars while Ethiopian exports to Kenya were 4.3 million US dollars (Alemayehu,"Ethio-Kenyan Commercial Ties"). Since commerce and exchange of goods among Africans are poor, the above figure is not insignificant. Officials of both countries also agreed to attract investors by building infrastructures. Positive, continuous consultations between the two states at Ambassadorial, ministerial, and heads of state levels show their determination to the realization of their agreements on trade, investment, food security,
infrastructural building, tourism, power, curbing human trafficking and illegal trade, peacekeeping, and building a green economy.³

I believe that the two countries can be a starting point for regional economic integration. It is important to safeguard one’s country from the impact of neocolonialism as well as the balkanization or breakup of the state. Africa is regarded as the poorest continent with uneven regional development. Thus, the economic integration of Ethiopia and Kenya would solve such a problem. Nkrumah opposed the systematic balkanization of African countries and the formation of new African states, which are strongly dependent on foreign contribution and could not stand by themselves and, thereby, perpetuate the colonial relationship (Nkrumah 184). Thus, economic integration will be a tool for avoiding further breakup. Two nations have been formed in East Africa within 25 years: i.e., Eritrea and South Sudan in 1991 and 2011, respectively.⁴ If there was economic as well as political integration, the breaking up of today’s so-called “failed states” like Somalia would not have occurred.

My research assesses four thematic areas of economic integration between the two countries. First, concerning regional security, both Ethiopia and Kenya are playing significant roles in bringing lasting peace to the region under the umbrella of IGAD. They are also working to settle conflicts along their international bordertowns. For instance, they had signed an 185-million-euro agreement in Moyale to end the unemployment-driven conflict and to foster development. They are determined to create jobs, reduce poverty, and encourage trade in their restive borderlands.


This is a great step for a localized interconnectedness (Mukoya, “East Africa: Kenya”). Moreover, it shows that economic advancement is important to stabilize a particular region. The two countries are also working to defeat Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is trying to disturb the peace of Ethiopia and Kenya; Ethiopia and Kenya are collectively playing a great role in the IGAD's peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia by supporting the existing transitional government (IGAD; Elmi and Abdullahi 32-54).

Berhe shows the great roles of Ethiopia and Kenya in the peace process between North and South Sudan, in the boundary dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, and the periodic bouts of unrest in the Ogden, and in Northern Uganda. There is also border cattle raiding and trading that cause conflict among pastoralists of the two countries. Kenya and Ethiopia are trying to solve these kinds of problems frequently (Berhe 105-131). As a result, their collaborative work in the peace process will undoubtedly contribute to local and regional peace and security. They also have an active role in conducting successive workshops that aim to harmonize laws related to money laundering, organized crime, drugs, and arms trafficking (IGAD).

In Africa, regional economic organizations were established to tackle economic problems. Over time, they expanded the mandate to deal with security threats, particularly in relation to terrorism. Terrorism became the number one issue in the twenty-first century following the September 11 terrorist attack in the USA. The internationalization of terrorism following this tragic event urged IGAD to pay considerable attention to preventing and combating terrorism in the Horn in general, and Somalia in particular. However, IGAD member countries have done or achieved little in their fight against terrorism. Though individual states’ efforts are massive, over-dependence on military power has made their labors less successful (Demeke et el. 216-29).
Second, I have studied trade (including border trade) relations, their challenges, and benefits in facilitating economic integration between Kenya and Ethiopia. Strong trade ties between Ethiopia and Kenya would strengthen the economy of the two countries and decrease the cost of imports from the outside world.

In addition to the regular export and import trade, border trade also plays a significant role in integration. Livestock marketing is by far the biggest item in the cross-border trade. Some researchers show the discouraging role of the government of Ethiopia by levying a high tax on goods. Contrary to this tax policy, Pavanello argues that both countries are working jointly to facilitate this trade because they know the very constructive role of border trade for their national economy. However, they seek to curb the contraband (illegal) trade (Pavanello 1-15).

Third, the other major point for viable integration is infrastructural development such as roadways. It is important to not only transport industrial and agricultural goods but also facilitate the movement of people to enhance the growth of the tourism sector of the economy. These days, exchange of goods among Africans is weak. A fully integrated transportation system is, therefore, essential. It is a good network of roads that facilitated the political and economic unity of the United States. The same network of roads should be done in Africa to transport goods produced in one area to consumers (Nkrumah 146).

The road project is part of the grand Trans African High Way that stretches from Cairo to Cape Town. Within Ethiopia and Kenya, the road is expected to link Addis Ababa to Nairobi. The road passes through the Ethiopia – Kenya border at Moyale. The Ethiopian section of the road, which stretches from Hawassa to Ageremariam, is roughly 197 km long, while the Kenyan side of the road that extends from Turbi to Moyale is almost 122 km in length. The Ethiopian side is now completed thanks to a loan of $125.6 million from the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the
money drawn from Ethiopia’s own treasury. The construction and completion of these two-road links would undoubtedly improve their trade contact and regional economic integration. The construction of the road between Ethiopia and Kenya will also strengthen people-to-people interactions and enhance cross-border trading relations. In so doing, the two countries will register a quick economic development (Ministry of Transport 1-5). Indeed, as Pavanello contends, one of the primary constraints of livestock trade between the two countries is roads. The absence of a good network of roads lengthens the distance to markets, consumes one's time and energy, and increases the price of goods. Good infrastructural development such as roads is necessary to integrate the two countries economically. Road, for instance, will facilitate livestock marketing, which is by far the biggest item of the cross-border trade (Pavanello 25-27).

Fourth, even though the Horn of Africa is rich in agricultural resources with significant power generating potential using rivers to supply for hydroelectric plants, still it is a less industrialized area of the world (Nkrumah 24-26). The Ethiopian government is now working hard to produce a significant amount of electric power to meet the demand of the industrial sector, which is highly dependent on power. If Ethiopia and Kenya integrate themselves regarding power supply, this would help them to advance their mutual industrial growth and speed up their economic integration.

Concerning power interconnectedness, the German-based multinational corporation, Siemens, in association with Isolux Corsan (a construction company) was asked by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and the Kenyan Electricity Transmission Co. to develop a 1,000km high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission line between Ethiopia and Kenya. The total cost of the project is estimated to be $450 million. The World Bank and the African Development Bank will finance the project. It is scheduled for operation in 2018 (“Reducing Energy Loss: HVDC”).
To this end, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation CEO entered into an agreement with China’s Electric Power Equipment and Technology to advance the Eastern Africa interconnector named the Ethio-Kenya transmission line project. It is evident that there is no a well-developed transmission infrastructure in the region. As a result, the Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO) expressed its acknowledgment because this project will create a transmission capacity and will avoid the shortage of electricity in Kenya (“Transmission: Ethiopia is set to launch”).

The research assumes that the two countries can serve as an important starting point for the integration of East Africa. Assessing the role of both Ethiopia and Kenya as to whether they are playing a positive role or a negative role in the integration effort of IGAD and COMESA in East Africa is vital. I believe that the two countries are going in a good direction, and this gradually but inevitably lead them to integrate economically.

As mentioned above, one of the primary objectives of IGAD is to realize a viable economic integration in East Africa. In spite of the high hopes, optimism, and aspirations placed on the creation of IGAD, its member states do not delegate significant powers to IGAD to meet its objectives. As a result, IGAD does not work as was expected. I was interested in assessing how Ethiopian and Kenyan efforts for integration fit in with the main pillars or the broad integration objectives of IGAD and COMESA.

To this end, I pay attention to the Ethio-Kenyan relations concerning power interconnection, trading relationships, common highway projects ("Construction of Ethiopia-Kenya road in progress"), and collaboration in security areas to pacify conflicts along their international border and in the Horn (Mboya). Nevertheless, the four pillars of integration between Ethiopia and Kenya are not equal contributors to IGAD’s broad integration objectives. I seek to
investigate more effective means that can be adopted by Ethiopia and Kenya to help IGAD’s and COMESA’s objectives of integrating East Africa.

II. Research Questions

Ethiopia and Kenya rely on trade, interstate road construction, power interconnection, and security as a means of integration of the two countries. Yet, not all four-policy areas will effectively help accelerate their integration and that of IGAD or COMESA in general. In light of this, my research question is:

Which of the four integration areas (trade, security, roadways, and energy) have the potential to help Ethiopia and Kenya integrate more effectively and, thus, help the broad integration objectives of IGAD and COMESA?

III. Significance of the Study

The implication of this research will be wide because it might clearly show what should be the role of individual countries in bringing a tangible economic integration in East Africa. As a case study, the findings of this research may serve as a model for other East African countries or various regional organizations across Africa to discern their problems and find effective means of integration. Since this study deals with identifying policy areas that speed up the integration efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya, its findings may help IGAD, COMESA, or EAC to revise or reassess their policies and their organizational strengths and weaknesses for the successful accomplishment of their integration scheme. They will advance the goal of Pan Africanism.
IV. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

IGAD is an attempt by East African countries to develop themselves. COMESA is also an attempt by Eastern and Southern African countries for economic integration. However, the former economic grouping gives more priority to security while the latter to trade. Ethiopia and Kenya seek integration for the same development goals. Therefore, my theoretical framework is first informed by development theories.

My research is based on the theory of integration of Nations. This theory shows how Western Europe has applied regional integration as a tool to hasten economic growth. Proponents of this theory indicate that regional or bilateral integration is important for the third world countries whose share in the international market is small (Afesorgbor 2010; Lee 2003).

Economic integration is defined as a process of implementing a set of preferential policies to stimulate exchange of goods and services among a group of countries (Afesorgbor 3-6). According to Margaret Lee, economic integration should embrace three stages. First, market integration, which involves removing any trade barrier between countries. It is an excellent indicator of the initial stage of integration. Second, regional cooperation, which is another form of integration among countries that have similar socioeconomic and political interests. Regional cooperation is a strategy based on constructing infrastructures to hasten economic growth and decrease the level of poverty. A case in point is the construction of the West African gas pipeline that would transport gas from Nigeria to ECOWAS member countries. Another example can be drawn from an electric transmission line that stretches across North Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya to integrate them into the main power source of Ethiopia. Third, the developmental integration, which is aimed at working on equitable distribution of costs and benefits among member countries (Lee 2003).
My main interest is economic integration theory with its six stages of integration. Since the eight economic communities of Africa do not go beyond the three stages of PTA, FTA and the Customs Union, I will focus on these three stages in assessing the performance of Ethiopia and Kenya.

This study uses some aspects of modernization theory and Kwame Nkrumah’s ideas on the nature of economic integration in Africa. I believe that Ethiopia and Kenya can register a satisfactory economic growth if they put into practice some positive aspects of the western political, economic and social models. The West has stable governments, strong institutions, genuine democracy, advanced technology, and good living standards. If Africa is trying to modernize itself, ethnic, social, and economic problems might be solved. Nkrumah’s ideology in *Africa Must Unite* helps to envision economic integration based on the African reality. His idea is built on the importance of forming the Union of African States (U.A.S) to safeguard the continent against neocolonialism and the balkanization of African states (Nkrumah 147).

**V. Hypothesis**

East Africa needs integration. It is difficult to know exactly which integration areas are more important than others. However, I believe that of the four areas of integration in security, trade, road, and energy, **security and trade** between Ethiopia and Kenya are more likely to accelerate their economic integration and, hence, that of East Africa as a whole.

First, working in security area is a matter of life and death. Even though there are so many twists and turns on their way, Ethiopia and Kenya will have to make a concerted effort to bring

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5 The six stages of economic integration are Preferential Trade Area (PTA), Free Trade Area (FTA), the Customs Union, Common Market, Economic Union (Single Market) and the Political Union.
peace and stability in their territories and neighboring countries rather than suffering from the ongoing security problem. Without peace and security, development would not be forthcoming.

Second, concerning trade, I believe that trade undoubtedly plays a faster role for economic integration. Africa’s share in the global market is far smaller than any part of the world. Thus, the improvement of the internal volume of trade improves the level of regional trade in Africa, and thereby transforms Africa’s position in the global market.

The completion of a road that links Addis Ababa in Ethiopia with Nairobi in Kenya increases the volume of trade and people-to-people ties. Previously, the transportation cost hampered trade. Now, the infrastructural deficiency is being addressed and is no longer a major obstacle to integration. The recent population estimates show that Ethiopia has more than 100 million people while Kenya has almost 50 million citizens. Both sides will have 150 million people, and this is half of the American population. It enables them to create a large internal market. As the purchasing power of the two people increases, the demand for both agricultural and industrial goods will increase.

VI. Research Methodology

In order to answer my research question and to prove whether my hypothesis on security and trade is correct, I used three methods of data collection. These are document analysis, interview, and archival sources.

1. Document Analysis

Both primary and secondary data are employed. I used the reports of COMESA and IGAD. I also used books, published and unpublished materials, newspapers, and audio and video records from television and radio that principally show the activities of Ethiopia and Kenya in security and
trade. Through these sources, I assess intentions of the officials of the two countries in relation to integration.

2. Archives

I used archival sources that shows trading ties between the two countries. These are the bilateral treaties on joint border controls, procedures, facilities, and management, agreed minutes of joint ministerial commission meetings and other related documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Trade, and Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA). To know the most important trading items and the amount of income generated from this sector, I took data from the archival centers of ERCA and the Ministry of Trade in Addis Ababa. I had access to these documents via workers of public relations of each institution.

3. Interviews

I interviewed 10 people who are knowledgeable and able to give detailed information on issues related to economic integration. When I went to five institutions, namely MOFA, Ethiopian Road Transport Association (RTA), Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), and ERCA, it was the personnel in the public relation offices of each institution that contacted me with knowledgeable informants.

I conducted interviews with four government officials. Since they are influential people, they explained their relations with other related organizations and provided me valuable and detailed information about their organizations’ performance concerning security and trade. I also asked rank and files (six respondents) about the activities of their organizations. Their scholarly knowledge in their field of study helped me to know their activities and political attitudes toward economic integration and regional peace and security. I did not disclose the name of some
informants because of confidentiality. I coded their names by their request because they assumed that the information that they gave me might put them behind bars.

I used semi-structured in-depth interviews frequently used in qualitative analysis. I had already formulated core questions, but modified and changed them depending on the direction of the interview (see the appendix). Most of the time, I stayed with the informants for more than 30 minutes. The individual-based semi-structured interview allowed me to ask about social and personal matters freely and then went deeper into the main issue. I wanted to record the interview to keep the original data and to avoid the difficulties of taking notes while interviewing. However, the informants were not willing to have their voices recorded. Thus, I was forced to take notes.

**Interview Data Sampling**

My key informants were selected purposively because of their specialized knowledge and the positions they occupy in their respective fields. However, I used snowball sampling on those participants who were conveniently available among the population to participate in the study. Snowball sampling is a non-probability method that uses the first available person without any strings attached to it. In other words, I used participants wherever and whenever they were conveniently available to participate in the study.

In snowball sampling, sufficiency is not determined before conducting the interview. The interviewer learns in the process how many informants are necessary for conducting the interview. I found 10 informants willing to answer questions; few other potential interviewees were not willing to give information. They often said, “we have no additional information besides what others said but if you miss some major points and find gaps, call us anytime you want.”
VII. Limitations

Many factors limit this research. First, I was not able to collect data on the Kenyan side for financial reasons. Second, I did not get many passionate informants. The issues that I raised require individual opinions, and many informants were not collaborative. I suspect that informants did not reveal to me very sensitive data. Third, the interview did not include the Kenyan informers that might have enough information on security and trade. The data collection was practical only on the Ethiopian side. The information about Kenya was supplemented from the Ethiopian perspective. To minimize bias, over-generalization, and information gap on the Kenyan side, I used the available literature.

When I was in Ethiopia for a month and a half, it was difficult for me to get all relevant materials for my research on time due to the following reasons: first, different institutions were not willing to provide data to those Ethiopians who came from outside the country. They regard them as opponents of the government who may use social Medias to publicize the many flaws of the existing government. Second, the most knowledgeable informants were often not available in their offices. Generally, the bureaucratic nature of the government limited my access to data.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I review the broad literature that discusses the general features of economic integration. There are different aspects of regional integration: economic, social, and political. Here, the concept of integration from the economic perspective is applied. This study basically supports the notion that regional economic integration plays a significant role in the development and growth of Ethiopia and Kenya by helping them get out of their lower position. I discuss the various theoretical orientations about Africa in general and the two Horn countries. The chapter has three major sections. In the first section, the various scholars’ viewpoints on the advantages and pitfalls of regional economic integration are presented. In the second section, the literature that discusses Africa’s position in the world economy is reviewed. In the third section, I assess the leading factors that caused Africans to dive into regional groupings and the reason for the little success that the movement has achieved so far.

2.1. Perspectives on Regional Economic Integration

One of the current debate in achieving greater economic success is implementing the idea of economic integration by prioritizing regional cooperation over the continental union. Many scholars of regional economic integration wrote upholding the numerous advantages of economic integration (Seid 2013; Saku 2006; El-Affendi 2009; Mwasha 2011), while few others such as Geda and Haile (2008) wrote concentrating on its drawbacks, and quite a few scholars (Biningo 2012; Zelalem 2015; Reddy 2010) take a middle ground position to discuss both the fruits and side effects of regional economic integration for countries involved.
According to Abdi et al. and Thompson, a regional economic integration is the coming together of two or more countries that are dotted around a closer geographic area and work to avoid all trade barriers for mutual economic prosperity and peaceful coexistence (Abdi and Seid 1-5; Thompson 1).

The essence of regional economic integration according to the 2016 report filed by Africa Economic Commission is:

About getting things moving freely across the whole of Africa. It means getting goods to move more easily across borders; transport, energy, and telecommunications to connect more people across more boundaries; people to move more freely across frontiers, and capital and production to move and grow beyond national limits. (ARIR 1)

Others regard regional economic integration as a union of different countries in a given geographic area so as to use their natural resources efficiently and properly and to advance their common good (Rizwanulhassan 95-100; Morgan 1).

Africa is the poorest continent in the world, but arguably, also the richest. It is valid to ask, ‘why the wealth of Africa does not make the people wealthy?’ Of course, the answer is not black and white as there are multiple factors that contribute to this predicament. However, one of the major reasons is that Africans are not using their resources efficiently and appropriately. Africa is endowed with valuable mineral and agricultural resources, but its resources in many countries become a curse rather than a blessing. At times, they have become the source of disagreements, conflicts, oppression, and dictatorship rather than a source of wealth, prosperity, and a better life. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in precious mineral resources (in Katanga province- diamonds, gold, and tantalum) worth of trillions of dollars. However, Kabila and then
his son Joseph licensed international companies to tap their country’s resources, and they used this opportunity to enrich themselves and the Congolese political elites. According to Financial Times investigative journalist Tom Burgis, in his book ‘The Looting Machine: Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa’s Wealth’ discusses that the multinational companies and African dictators are exploiting African resources in the system what he calls “modern colonialism” (Monk 1-2). His study in a dozen of resource-rich countries displays that multinational companies hold enormous commercial and political power in Africa. This gives strength for governments in Africa to do not want a free and fair election, nor acknowledge the consent of people. This has witnessed the transition from colonial exploitation to modern exploitation since independence. Similarly, the Panama Papers talk about the sophistication of bribery, the feature of secret and controversial trade deals. A case in point is the close relationship between the Israeli businessman Dan Gertler and DR Congo’s President Joseph Kabila that made the former a billionaire and chief exporter (almost a monopoly) of a diamond\(^6\). Such realities cry out for the need for sound integration among African countries.

2.1.1 Benefits of Regional Economic Integration

The focus of recent research has been on the benefits of regional economic integration. Most of them agree that its benefits should be measured in relation to the level of integration and the degree of commitment and willingness to implement agreements signed by member countries. The deeper the integration, the bigger the benefits to member countries will be. Moreover, the higher stage of integration member countries reach (out of the following steps - free trade area,

\(^6\) \textit{Ibid}
customs union, common market, monetary union and political union), the more significant benefits
will be generated (Johnson 209-35).

Some scholars (Saku 2006; Reddy 2010; Mwasha 2011) mention the success of the EU
since the 1950s as a strong testimony or epitome to the merits of regional integration. EU is often
used as an example of how the regional integration starts and ends up with a strong union. Nugent
describes the steps in a vivid way. First, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) formed
by six countries. Second, the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957,
and its apparent success resulted in the proliferation of integration schemes in many parts of the
world. Third, the establishment of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960. Fourth, the first
direct election to the European Parliament in 1979. Fifth, the European single market became a
reality in 1992. Sixth, the Treaty of Maastricht established the EU in 1993. The EU countries have
common currency known as Euro. This makes doing businesses, travelling, selling, buying and
saving so simple and also enhancing a sense of belongingness to the region (Nugent 36-48).

According to Reddy, regional integration can increase competition, investment, political
stability, bargaining power, and market size. Accordingly, there will be a significant success in
infrastructural development, environmental management, and defense and security (Reddy 3-19).
Along similar lines, Biningo argues that economic integration is supposed to increase trade and
investment, generate economies of scale, promote peace and security, and improves the bargaining
power of small countries in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations (Biningo 10).

El-Affendi describes integration mainly from a peace and security perspective. Following
the end of the cold war era, there come a great shift to regionalism. And he portrays how regional
groupings play a significant role in peacekeeping which is really supported by the UN. He
summarizes his argument by asking whether regional integration intensifies or generates regional conflict. He puts the answer as plain and simple. It avoids conflict (El-Affendi 1-19).

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s study shows that after the signing of agreements at a regional or continental level, a significant amount of money would require establishing competent institutions and infrastructures. Thus, regional agreements urge countries to borrow money to the development of infrastructures such as road, energy, airways, and communication technologies in every country. Moreover, regional integration leads countries to work together on human development to equip their people with the necessary knowledge and skills to run their institutions at the national level as well as produce individuals that can staff institutions at regional and continental level. In other words, countries will compete to have skilled workforce that can advance or help their transformation in any sector as well as capacitate their nationals to be able to move across integrated areas and get employed (UNECA 4).

The other advantage of regional economic integration is a wider selection of goods and services. Since different countries come together, they will supply a variety of goods that were previously unavailable. In opposition to this view, Mwasha’s study shows that since adjacent countries integrate each other, they have common interests and tastes. Therefore, they are unlikely to provide a great variety of goods for consumers (Mwasha 69-92)

Lower tariff reduces the cost of production and the cost of goods for producers and consumers respectively. It encourages buying more goods and services. Since the distance between these countries is short, the transportation cost of goods will also be lower. This further boosts more transaction and consumption. As Thompson (2011 1) puts it, “businessmen in the member countries will be motivated to trade and invest within the region because of the lack of tariffs or
regulations.” As a result, there will be an extensive employment opportunity. Investors establish industries, different business organizations flourish across the region, and workers can have many opportunities to get employed (Zelalem 1-34). An added benefit is that a group of countries in a region can easily and quickly come to a consensus and have a powerful voice in the global arena than individual countries. As they might share a similar history, challenges, and prospects in their region, they can have the great opportunity to harmonize their policies.

Thompson sees regional integration as a major instrument for countries that have smaller economies and in need of high foreign investment and trade around their region. If economically bigger countries become involved in the highest level of integration like the EU, it makes them less strong because of the concept of “shared wealth.” Member countries at a lower stage of economic development tend to cause those which are economically more developed and better performer to lag behind other international competitors in the global trade. A case in point is the largest economic performer in EU, Germany; high integration implies her chance to become the leader of the world might be destructed. Conversely, for the lower level of economic integration (such as Free Trade Area or the Customs Union) as is the case in Africa, some relatively well-developed countries will be the beneficiary at the expense of others within the region because they sell mainly industrial goods. An example in point is Kenya in East Africa (Thompson 1-3)

To sum up, the ultimate objective of all RECs has been to enhance economic growth through cooperation in many areas of economic activity, such as trade and infrastructure. Since most African countries are too small, getting access to the markets of partner countries is essential to maximize production, generate immense income, and get a wide variety of goods.
2.1.2 Disadvantages of Regional Economic Integration

There is no shortage of disagreements concerning regional economic integration. Some scholars (Zelalem 2015; Thompson 2011; Elliot 2017; Teunissen 1996) frequently mention the following disadvantages of regional economic integration. Firstly, countries would lose some part of their national sovereignty to strong supra-national bodies. In a big regional organization like the EU, individual countries have limited financial capabilities. When Greek was plunged into financial (economic) crisis, the country did not regulate its currency to suit the nation’s economic condition. The mandate of printing currency belongs to the EU. It controls each country's financial situation so much so that member countries are unable to fix their own financial problems. Thus, if countries reach the stage of monetary union, they might not decide things individually (Elliott, "Greece’s Problems” 1-2).

The comprehensive study of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa shows in depth and length both the challenges and remedies related to monetary union. Even though the monetary union has advantages concerning reduction in transaction costs, eradication of the risk of exchanges, and harmonization of prices at a regional level, it exposes countries to asymmetry shocks. Asymmetry shocks are stemmed from the use of same monetary policy, which is unsuitable for all member countries. Thus, it will have an adverse effect in solving country-specific macroeconomic shocks. The remedies for these asymmetric shocks are allowing the flexibility of prices and wages across countries, and a high degree of product diversification and fiscal integration (UNECA 7).

Second, since the culture of the majority will be entertained, there might be a loss of unique minority cultures. It is called cultural centralization. For instance, in EU, the major working languages are Spanish, French, and German. As a result, minority languages might be repressed as
they will no longer function for official communication. Or other unique cultural manifestations will be affected since the dominant cultures increasingly overshadow them (Berry 2-6).

Third, there will be a shift of employment. Investors usually prefer to establish their companies in a lower wage rate area to maximize their profit. As a result, there will be a shift of employment from a high wage to a low wage area and causes employment gain in one area while employment loss in another area. This outsourcing of job hurts one country while benefiting the other in the region (Zelalem 1-34). Fourth, there is trade diversion. The previous trading relation with nonmember countries will be replaced by member countries (Thompson 1-2; Teunissen 1-7).

2.2. Africa’s Position in World Economy

This section discusses the overall condition of Africa with regard to its relation to the other parts of the world. The discussion helps shed light on why Africa needs integration. The views of Marxist, liberalist, and structuralist from the vantage point of North – South relations are analyzed. Moreover, the literature (Amin 1990 and Rodney 1972) that focuses on the importance of South-South trade alone are reviewed.

The global North and the South are linked together in the global capitalist system. According to Shivji, finding Africa’s geopolitical space in the global south is important. Africa’s population number is not equivalent to either India or China, the so-called ‘locomotives of the South’. Economically speaking, Africans are pulled by China, India, and Brazil on the train of the global South. They are much better than each country in Africa (Shivji, “Whither Africa in the Global South”).

Amin, who is one of the most outspoken dependency theorists, opposes unequal development between the west and nonwestern society. Accordingly, he supports disconnection
from the global capitalist system and the strengthening of a South-South interaction. He coined the term “delinking,” as an instrument of regionalism to oppose the western capitalist system, and fosters self-reliance. He favors disconnection from western technology, trade, and finance (Amin 1-20).

Rodney also presents Africa's position in the world economy from a historical perspective. He discusses first the precolonial time of Africa’s status in the global economy. The African continent was connected to Europe and America through the triangular slave trade. Slaves were shipped to Europe and America. Thus, African chiefs were receiving finished goods and weapons in exchange for slaves. Later, the seven European colonizers came to Africa, made Africa dependent on their will, and determined what Africans should buy and sell to Europe. As far as foreign trade is concerned, Africans were not acting in unison to protect themselves from this disparity (Rodney 75-76). According to Rodney, slavery has contributed a lot to the underdevelopment of Africa. Equally, colonialism also contributed a lot to the impoverishment of the continent. As past underdevelopment is linked to slavery and colonialism, present underdevelopment is ascribed to different forms of exploitations and dominations. After independence, Africans have been reduced to mere suppliers of raw materials. This unfair relationship could not enhance the growth and prosperity of Africa.

Maathai raises prominent issues such as the unfair trade practices in the fishing industry in West Africa as an example of injustice committed in the import-export trade deal between African countries and advanced nations. She also mentions the chronic heavy debt burden and the tradition of paying it to lenders on a yearly basis with a high-interest rate. Furthermore, she describes cultural globalization that has manifested itself in the cultural invasion of Africa. For Maathai, it contributes a lot to the deterioration of one’s traditional African cultural elements that include
“respect, compassion, and forgiveness” of one to the other (Maathai 56). Furthermore, neocolonialism (bad economic policies of IMF and World Bank) has been negatively affecting Africa since independence. According to Maathai, the relation between Africa and advanced countries would be good if the West help Africans to get education in science and technology.

Unfortunately, the West and African dictators are jointly working to exploit Africa and fulfill their own respective interests in the name of supportive development programs and economic aid. She explains the Africa’s leadership deficit that should be filled with individuals who are ready to abandon their personal interests for the masses. She describes how incompetent African leaders use nominal elections as a Machiavellian strategy to legitimize their power (88-93).

Concerning the relation of Africa with the global north, some scholars (Ndulo and Seattles 1996) wrote about the contribution of slave trade and colonialism to the underdevelopment of Africa. However, after independence contrary to the higher expectations and beliefs about the rise of Africa and improvements of the lives of its people, Africa has gone down in many scales of measurement. This is generally true in sub-Saharan Africa because of the existing prevalence of ecological degradation, hunger, and a remarkably lower per capital income than it was four decades and so ago. Life expectancy is the lowest in the world. Primary school enrollment is still low in some countries. To fight against the severe economic crisis and to avoid further marginalization of the continent, different economic communities are formed within Africa.

In order to change the existing low share of trade at the world stage, Caroline insists that economic integration is a must in Africa. The continent continues to register the lowest percentage of trade within the region). The total foreign export of each Africa country shows that only about
12% of trade takes place inside Africa. But, the figure is so tiny compared to ASEAN and EU which have registered 25% and over 60% respectively. Despite numerous commitments to create an integrated zone, the data show that the continent has still not met its objectives (Ko 2014).

According to Moges, highly industrialized regions with advanced economies such as EU, North America (NAFTA), and East Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China) are dominating the three-fourth of the world trade. The volume and direction of trade are also highly skewed for them. They have also dominated the manufactured trade, which accounts for 80%. Trade among themselves is large. Since Africa’s share of world trade and intra-African trade is so small, much attention is now given to strengthening a South -South trade as a mechanism to get rid of such marginalization at a world stage. This horizontal approach avoids the vertical dependence of developing countries on the north (Moges 2).

2.2.1. The liberal, Marxist (Neo-Marxist) and the Structuralist theories/ Perspectives of Economic Development for the South

Spero and Hart discuss the two theories of liberalism on the one hand and Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, on the other hand, from the vantage point of the North -South system of international economic relations. They counterbalance the two theories by using the structural theory that falls between liberalism and Marxism (Spero and Hart 188-198).

According to the liberal theories of economic development, the South has many opportunities to benefit from the existing international market structure. Protagonists of liberal theory blame the south in that global income is reduced significantly because of the Southern inability to diminish the gap in average incomes. This incapability stemmed from the inefficient domestic policies of the developing countries. They list out some manifestations of this pitfall. These are market imperfections that automatically “reduce the productivity of land, labor, and
capital and intensify social and political rigidities” (193). They suggest elements of market-oriented domestic reforms as a remedy for lack of rapid growth and economic development. These are “increased levels of trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid flows,” and privatization of state enterprises, and deregulation of overregulated markets (194-95).

Marxists and Neo-Marxists have a significant similarity in defying the liberal perspective. The political north subjugated the southern countries previously through imperialism. Now they are regarded as subordinate elements. This mistreatment persists as long as they are integrated into the world capitalist system. The international market is controlled and regulated by monopoly capitalists. The free flow of trade and investment in the south is for safeguarding the interest of the capitalist classes of both the Northern (developed) and Southern (underdeveloped) countries. It ends up with the impoverishment of the people of the third world. This is because the capitalists are manipulating everything for their own advantage under the name of free trade. They do not care about the mass. They care much about their profit or capital. They decide about the price of raw materials produced by the South. As a result, we see the skyrocketing of the price of finished goods while raw materials have registered a significant decline. This theory goes against the idea of comparative advantage as a misnomer designed by capitalists to favorably divide the world into multiple centers of productions based on the division of labor or specializations using the available abundant resources including skilled work force. For instance, some particular parts of the world will produce coffee, cocoa, coal, gold, petroleum and the other parts produces cars, airplanes, ships, and tanks. Thus, international trade, which is monopolized by advanced countries, support the South to focus on the traditional form of production that does not help prosperity (Spero and Hart 195).
Concerning investment, they defy the liberals’ argument that private financial flows from the north are helpful to finance investment in infrastructural development and other facilities. Opponents of liberal theory contend that foreign investment is a bottleneck for the Southern development. Foreign investors take control of the most vital industries in a given country, expropriate their profits, and send the net capital back to their country. Thus, there is the outflow of capital from the developing to the developed world. Moreover, foreign investment increases the rate of unemployment because it encourages capital-intensive production or export-oriented production, lopsided income distribution, and dislocation of local entrepreneurs. It also endorses unwanted consumption patterns. Thus, Liberals believe in the inflow of capital from advanced to developing countries while the Marxists and Neo-Marxists claim the outflow of net capital from the developing to the developed world\(^7\).

Liberals advocate trade as the main engine of growth while Marxist and neo-Marxists suspect the importance of trade with advanced countries. It is through trade and investment that the international financial system works and contributes a lot to the perpetuation of underdevelopment in the South. In order to create capital, the southern borrow money from the northern financial institutions and expose themselves to a perennial repayment of debts that ultimately drain their wealth. Similarly, foreign aid contributes a lot to extracting wealth through debt service. It avoids actual development. It rather creates a capitalist class within the third world countries that would work in collaboration with international capitalist elites and reinforce dependence on the external market structure (194-95).

However, liberals refute the argument by arguing that foreign aid is essential to fill gaps in resources in developing countries by providing three things: capital, technology, and education.

\(^7\) Ibid
For Marxists and Neo-Marxists, two obstacles hamper development under the international capitalist system: international market operation and the clientele elite. As a result, they would like to change the global capitalist system into the international socialist system to bring real development to the south.

The structuralist school of thought has a profound influence on policy makers of the South about the international economic policy. Even though it falls between liberalism and Marxism, it concentrates on explaining the demerits of the international market that works in favor of the North. In this regard, there is no difference with Marxists in critiquing liberalism. Trade does not bridge the gap between the North and South but actually widens it. Many countries produce primary goods for the international market. The price of raw materials is low while the price of manufactured goods is high. The current international trade is geared towards enriching the North at the expense of the South. Trade only creates an export sector that has no significant effect on the rest of the economy. It generates less income for developing countries since they do not decide on the price of primary goods (194-96).

The second major point of the structural bias is foreign investment. Investment in the South is based on export sectors, thereby aggravating the adverse effects of trade and outflow of profit from the South. Structuralists, therefore, prescribe four types of policy changes in the south. These are imported substitution industries, the South -South trade and investment, regional integration, and population control. According to Structuralists, specializing in specific raw material and agricultural goods and supplying them in world market affect the economy of the South when the price on those commodities declines. Hence, they advise diversifying of goods by moving into manufacturing and service industries, in addition to imposing high tariff on goods coming from the north. Structuralists also advise that the South should reduce trade barriers among themselves.
so as to compensate the small size of their domestic markets and to enjoy similar economies of scale like North America, Europe, and Asia. The vehicle for doing this is promoting an impartial regional trade agreement among developing countries, unlike the North-South agreements. They also argue that South-South trade is crucial to building the capacity to develop technologies appropriate for the south and to increase the competitiveness of businesses headquartered in the South. They finally advise the third world countries to reduce the rate of their population growth to achieve a high standard of living for their workers (193-96). Thus, the structural weakness of Africa requires a response. Therefore, as proposed by the review literature, trade among African countries is one solution. However, as the literature also suggests such trade is best practiced within an integrated project that involves regional groupings in Africa.

2.3. Economic Integration in Africa

One of the few scholars who gave a clear picture of what economic integration should look like in Africa was Dr. Nkrumah. He reveals past and present African problems and suggests the importance of an infrastructural development such as road for economic advancement and interconnection among people of the continent. He puts forward the importance of a strong organization to formulate a comprehensive economic policy in Africa. It helps to lift up Africa and move it from poverty to industrial greatness (Nkrumah 157). He advises other African countries to follow Ghana and Upper Volta (BurkinaFaso) to trade each other by removing customs barriers at entry and exist points. He criticizes Western organizations such as the European Common Market that were working for the benefit of Europe at the expense of Africa. These organizations used to fix the price of African raw materials and reduced what Africa had to get from the world trade. He advised Africans to fight against any attachment to Europe or the West for the sake of aid that affects fidelity to the African interest (161). He proposed the importance of an African
Common Market to defend African interests. He also proposed a standard policy towards foreign trade and inter-African trade on the continent. Since Europeans regulate foreign supplies, Africans must do likewise for their common good (162).

Concerning intra-African trade, he encouraged countries to have a common currency that would eliminate the difficulties of exchange rate and enable them “to reserve the foreign currency made from export trade for essential imports” (163). This will also force the establishment of a common banking system. In other words, he magnified the importance of regionalism.

He mentioned the exemplary role of the USSR and the USA for the importance of political unification for lifting up Africa. He believed that this protects Africa from neocolonialism. The political and economic unification of the African continent should be undertaken in three ways. Firstly, there should be an overall economic planning or a continentally planned development. Building a common market in Africa will increase industrial and economic power. Agricultural, mineral and water resources should be exploited under the “Unions Government” for the benefit of African people by Africans and to Africans. He also stressed the importance of a single currency, a monetary zone, and a central bank. Secondly, he proposes the establishment of a unified military and defense strategy and a unified foreign policy and diplomacy. Thirdly, there should be a common constitution. As a result, a united, great and powerful Africa will be formed that transcends colonial boundaries (232-34).

2.3.1. The Driving Factors of Regional Economic Integration

Biningo and Saku point out that the idea of regionalism began to get prominence after World War II with the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). Since then it has become the dominant feature of the international political economy. Soon similar integration
schemes started to get acceptance in other parts of the world (Biningo 1-20; Saku 1-30). However, Geda and Haile extend the time of integration initiatives in Africa long before EEC or before WWII with the establishment of South African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910 and the EAC in 1919. And many other groupings have come to the fore since the 1970s. It is, therefore, imperative to look at major developments that happened in Africa immediately before and after the formation of a big regional bloc known as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Geda and Haile 357-394).

Njoroge explains the politics of regional economic integration before the formation of OAU in 1963. There was a substantial debate over the nature of continental integration and cooperation, and it resulted in the formation of three groups. The first camp was the Brazzaville Group which had a minimal approach to coordinating national economic policies. The second camp, which was promoted by Nkrumah, was the Casablanca Group aimed at establishing a political union of all independent African states with the purpose of an immediate union. The third camp was the Monrovia group of African leaders who supported loose organization of African states. This confederalist gradualist approach backs up a gradual loss of their sovereignty. Gradualists presented silly reasons like lack of psychological preparedness to delay an immediate unification. Many leaders had no appetite to sacrifice their national sovereignty and won their case with the establishment of OAU in 1963. Nkrumah suggested an immediate union instead of procrastinating it by stressing that a united Africa makes them strong while a divided or fragmented Africa under loose union makes them weak (Njoroge 1-7).

Concerning the reason for the formation of OAU, Saku presents it from a nationalist perspective. The need to fight against colonialism, to promote the unity of African states, to improve the living conditions of the people of the continent, to remove the vestiges of colonialism,
apartheid and other forms of external oppressions and dominations in Africa caused the then freed states of Africa to establish the OAU in 1963 (Saku 8-9).

Njoroge, who shares Saku’s idea, further elaborates the cause for the establishment of OAU from the economic perspective. He has three main arguments. First, the need to effectively compete in the international economic system dominated by USA, Japan, and Europe. Second, the great enthusiasm to build self-sustaining economies with the establishment of large-scale industries. Third, to avoid dependency rooted in colonialism. In other words, the lopsided dependence on the west for import and export goods and the need for strengthening intra-regional trade were the driving force for the establishment of OAU (Njoroge 1-7).

However, OAU remained weak and “a toothless bulldog” because it was dependent on the will of individual states than its supranational legal entity. It did not stop the negative influence of European’s and other powers’ interference in African affairs. It necessitated a rather strong organization. To this end, several efforts had been made starting from establishing RECs to unite the whole continent. This effort made the creation of the Africa Union (AU) possible in 2001. However, AU like its predecessor OAU relies on the clause of noninterference in other member countries’ internal affairs (3-6). No big change has been registered since the date of its establishment.

There is a debate about whether Africa should be integrated at the level of African Union or the level of regional communities. The question of where to start has been settled now. There is a consensus that the movement starts from each regional economic community as building blocks, and then makes to a larger union at the continental level.

According to Omoro, since the 1990s, regional integration has become a catchword and regarded as the best solution to all economic and social problems in Africa. The Abuja Treaty in
1991 established the African Economic Community. Out of the already existing fourteen RECs, eight\(^8\) of them were selected as the building blocks for the formation of the United States of Africa or continental integration (Omoro 42).

The main aim of AEC is enabling the socio-economic and cultural transformation of Africa through the wise use of human and material resources in each region to maximize self-sufficiency. The Abuja Treaty set a timetable for the continental integration that will be fulfilled in six stages and completed by 2028 with a step-by-step process. This gradualist approach has the following stages: “Stage 1: creating new RECs and strengthening the existing RECs (by 1999); Stage 2: stabilizing barriers to regional trade (by 2007); Stage 3: establishing a free-trade area (FTA) and a customs union for each REC (by 2017); Stage 4: coordinating tariff and non-tariff systems among RECs (by 2019); Stage 5: Establishing an African Common Market and common policies among RECs (by 2023) and Stage 6: Establishing an African Central Bank, creating a continental monetary union and electing the first Pan-African Parliament (by 2028).”\(^9\)

The establishment of AEC coincided with the rise of regionalism in the world. After the Cold War era, from major world economies (core countries- North America and Europe) to emerging economies (semi-peripheral & peripheral countries: East Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa), the idea of regionalism or economic integration gained

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\(^8\) These eight RECs in Africa’s five sub-regions are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

\(^9\) Department of International Relations and Cooperation (RSA), 2017
ground. The reason for its acceptance in developed and developing countries is the need to put themselves in a better position and to use regionalism as a main development strategy especially under globalization (Monyoncho 47-49).

Saku underscores that integrating into a world economic and financial system is necessary to sustainable economic growth and get out of the dragons of poverty. To this end, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established with the objective of helping African countries achieve people-centered development by keeping democratic values and principles for Africa’s renaissance. NEPAD is working to address fundamental problems that RECs are facing and monitoring them to implement their programs. It regards RECs as the leaders of regional cooperation and integration. By conducting trade relations, countries need to avoid the decline of their economies because of the decline in trade (Saku 1).

Biningo and Kaisi argue that in the last two decades, the idea of rethinking development strategies and revitalizing the available RECs focusing on intra-African trade has gained ground because of the success story of economic integration in Europe, Asia, and America. Biningo points out that the idea of economic integration has been given serious attention recently by African countries as a strategy to enhance their development process. They also tried to show the challenges and weaknesses of the regional integration schemes (Biningo1-25; Kaisi 1).

Many reasons urged Africans to come into integration. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s study on the economic integration efforts in Africa with particular emphasis on the creation of a continental free trade area shows that a free trade area improves the efficiency and capacity of manufacturing industries in Africa. The government runs the industrial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa as government monopolies. These inefficient national enterprises are maximizing
their profits at the expense of other legal firms. Economic integration brings a stop to such abnormal practices. Regional integration enforces an atmosphere of regional competition and enables to build an efficient industrial structure that can best fit in with other firms in a given geographic setting (UNECA 3).

2. 4. Economic Integration in East Africa

East Africa is a region widely known for civil war, migration, and drought. Regional governments are also known for their rivalries, alliances, and anti-alliances among themselves. Since there are diverse peoples, within-country politics is also affected by ethnic conflicts, administrative problems, and inequality. Its history is complex and largely influenced by local and global powers from around the world (Bruce 1-10).

There are different economic groupings in East Africa namely EAC, IGAD, and COMESA, which also embraces Southern African states. However, these groupings raise many questions: Are these groups dynamic integrationist institutions? Are they functional? How could they learn from other institutions from Africa and other continents? What impacts have these organizations? Do East African values facilitate integration? What kind of integration should East Africans pursue- home grown or taken from others? Integration is not only about the exchange of goods and services, but it also includes the interaction of peoples, their interests and their movements from one country to another. It is not the aim of this work to address all these multifaceted questions. However, the issues raised are those that any integration project must address.

There is a very unsatisfactory progress in regional economic integration effort in East Africa. African leaders have to translate political will into pragmatic action. We should not only
discuss trade linkages. Other factors should also be involved: energy, road, and security as drivers of integration. African policy makers seem to be unaware of the national and regional reality, and the strengths and weaknesses of each government. They do not prescribe the right medicine to the right problem. To make matters worse, leaders lack the determination to curb all recurring problems, and East Africa continues to be a fragmented region of Africa with smaller economies and as the epicenter of many challenges.

In order to contribute positively by assessing the overall performance of each regional economic community and their member countries, every year the African regional index report is published with the collaboration of African Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The main aim of the report is to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps of each regional groupings with five parameters: trade integration, productive integration, free movement of people, regional infrastructure, and financial and microeconomic integration and then suggest solutions to build up an integrated Africa. In the case of East Africa in 2016, Kenya has been identified as a top performer in its economic integration efforts in EAC in terms of trade integration, productive integration, and free movement of people. In COMESA, Kenya scored high on trade integration, productive integration, and free movement of individuals. Within IGAD, Kenya performed well on five of them except in free movement of people. Ethiopia is not regarded as a high performer in both COMESA and IGAD (ARIR 24).

Stefan paints a complete picture of the role of each member states of EAC. He provides a deep insight into the organizational strength and weaknesses of EAC and the specific role of Kenya in transforming this organization. The major slogan of the EAC is ‘one people, one destiny.’ Stefan appreciates EAC, more than any other well-known federations like COMESA, ECOWAS, and
SADCC, for it has enshrined political union in its founding treaty. He, however, criticizes EAC’s ambitious plan such as setting a timetable for a common currency by 2012 and an early introduction of the common market in 2010 inspired by EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN. Moreover, Stefan mentions how EAC is strong on paper but weak on the ground. He shows the big gulf between aspirations and reality and theory and practice. Huge promises with the lack of awakening of the society, lack of work to the desired level, and little tangible results might jeopardize the process of integration. Of course, regional integration requires a strong institution, broad mass support, and strong commitment of political elites. EAC is the best organization that can serve as a model for other organizations. It was established by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It, however, ceased to exist in 1977 because of lack of steering function, irreconcilable differences of opinion between leaders (Julius Nyerere and Idi Amin), and the unequal distribution of burdens and benefits (Kenyan supremacy). It was reestablished again in 1999 (Stefan et el. 91-93).

2.4.1 Lack of Success in Regional Integration Efforts in East Africa

There is a disjuncture between the objectives and organizational capacity of different groupings. A close examination of many regional economic organizations in Africa shows that their failure outweighs their success. Omoro in his dissertation provides an in-depth assessment of the regional organizations’ ineptness by concentrating mainly on the EAC. He associates it with internal and external factors (Omoro 2).

Saku who equally shares Omoro’s idea, discusses the different reasons for the lack of success in regional integration efforts. These are underfunding and overlapping of membership. His assessment clearly indicates that the overall progress has been sluggish compared to the integration schemes of the other parts of the world, such as EU (Europe), NAFTA (North America),
and MERCOSUR (Latin America). Africans’ failure to meet their stated objectives is because of lack of complementarity in production, lack of political will to mainstream regional agreements into national plans, and institutional weaknesses in harmonizing policies. An equally significant aspect of the failure to meet the primary objectives of regional groupings is the failure in involving other stakeholders (private sector and civil society), a disproportionate allocation of resources to conflict-related issues, inadequate infrastructure, recurrent conflicts, and poor assessment of costs and benefits of integration (Saku 5-6).

Many agreements remain unimplemented because of weak enforcement and commitment, and poor capacity to take measure over defaulting members. Serious conflicts among member countries destroy infrastructures that would be good for the free flow of trade and investment and hence, hinder development activities and integration (6).

In the same vein, leaders’ determination can also be mentioned as a big obstacle to the success of regional integration in East Africa. The idea of integration is widely known only by higher officials and bureaucrats. Rank and files are less informed about it. My field experience in Ethiopia clearly shows the information gap between the government and people since the latter are not aware of the importance of integration. If the people (including the private sector) are not included as part of this massive project, it is hard to make it happen within a short period. It is leaders that take the people into integration. Yet, leaders have no clear-cut timelines, and deadlines or guidelines for their activities. Leaders are famous in feeding their people with false promises just to buy more time to stay long in power. A case in point is the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. He is a self-proclaimed ‘Bismark of East Africa’ with a dream of creating a large East Africa market through EAC to increase the power of the sub-region in its negotiation with external powers. He insists on a political union because the subregion shares a common language of
Swahili. Nevertheless, the 140 million of EAC are not well informed about the merits of integration for prosperity and security. On the issue of presidential term limit, he had earlier in his life criticized African leaders for their long stay in power. Nevertheless, he has led his nation for over three decades now. The former unpopular general of Nigeria, Obasanjo, has pointed out his opinion recently about integration. His three major ideas were abolishing visa for the free movement of Africa’s 1-billion people, planning at a regional level and not at national level, and avoiding the negative role of external actors in sabotaging African integration efforts (for example, France). A determination is required for African integration. African leaders do not discuss with each other to solve the main obstacles to trade in their respective regions. Meetings are held only for making a pile of reports (Adebajo, “Determination required ...”).

Sangmpam compared and contrasted the different nature of the West and Nonwestern society and state. He put them in an imagery representation known as “Apples and Mangoes” referring to the West and Non-western society respectively. The unsuccessful condition of integration in the Non-west society might be linked to the unique nature of their politics, economic, and social makeup when compared with the developed part of the world. This symbolism of Mango with African states in general and the Horn in particular clearly shows how they are unfit for this kind of arrangement than Apple states (Sangmpam 1-20). How could the European model work out in Africa? There should be a way of formulating local policies, and strategies or use others’ theories in the context of Africa. It is crystal clear that the African integration scheme is a carbon copy of the West.

Actually, economic integration is an essential tool to face the twenty-first challenges of Africa. Maathai in her “the Challenge for Africa,” helps us to understand in-depth the major challenges of Africa in the twenty-first century. These multiple African problems are related to
environmental, governance, educational, economical, and social issues. She begins by discussing the challenges that most African peasants share. They depend on a small plot of land, seasonal rainfall, and poor farming techniques. She also elaborates on the exacerbating factors for the desertification in East and West Africa, such as slash and burn agriculture, deforestation, and global climate change. One of the main aims of the today’s IGAD is to solve the problems of desertification and its related problems. Maathai suggests solutions that address these problems. One of these prescriptions is crafting sound policies and legislation for proper utilization and sharing of natural resources. However, having good policies and strategies by itself do not solve African problems (Maathai 9).

African leaders do not give full attention to agriculture and the protection of the environment as opposed to consuming the whole budget for defense and internal security. Most regional communities in Africa are busy with solving regional conflicts than working on solving socio-economic problems in their respective regions. It is a major reason for the failure of successful integration in Africa. Africa is known for the largest share of wars in the world. Africa has been synonymous with insecurity, violence, and ethno- national conflicts rather than cooperation and unity for development. For instance, IGAD is busy with solving border problems between South and North Sudan, tribal conflict in Somalia, and internal political turmoil in South Sudan. ECOWAS has been consuming its energy in solving long civil wars in countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Other regional organizations also do the same thing (Johnson 209-28). Previously bad colonial masters and now dictators, military juntas, and kleptocracies have been mistreating Africans by creating division among their people and triggering civil wars (Maathai 26). In addition to battling internal turmoil out, fighting against terrorism is now a time consuming and expensive venture.
The primary concern today for Africa is global terrorism. Gibert assesses the EU’s intervention in Africa in general and Sudan and Somali in particular. According to her, after the disastrous attack on the world trade center on September 11, 2001, EU has been giving much attention to the Horn of Africa, particularly Somali to gratify the US. EU has shifted its primary focus from developmental assistance to solving security problems (Gibert 142-50).

Without security, the intended development programs through NGOs or donors cannot be achieved in East Africa. Since EU countries are giving precedence to security issues, they may not bother with political stabilization and democratization as essential conditions for the realization of development in Africa. Though Marie appreciates EU’s support to IGAD’s and AU’s peacekeeping efforts as an important way to solve Africa’s crisis by Africans through the regional or continental organizations, she undermines EU’s reliance on the weak regional and continental organizations of Africa to end African problems at this time (Marie 142-50). IGAD’s and AU’s capacities are too limited. Leaders use the money to strengthen their muscle and suppress internal opposition. It simply shows that the Western countries tend to give the great assignment of fulfilling their interests in a particular region through the existing financially and structurally weak organizations at the cost of the lives of the peripheral countries. African dictatorial leaders are ready to fulfill the interest of core countries as long as they stay long in power (Gibert 142-50).

Ndulo has identified the following specific challenges that make economic integration much more difficult. First, economic nationalism, which means lack of readiness to lose some part of national sovereignty. Second, the lack of a common bank and currency to stimulate the success and growth of inter-African trade. The issue of payment and the regulation of the financial system must be settled. Countries have to enhance the convertibility of their national currencies. Third, conflicts related to border and ethnicity, racial suspicion between Arab Africans and black
Africans, and linguistic rivalries between Francophone and Anglophone countries might hamper economic integration (Ndulo 7-8).

Sangmpam provides an in-depth analysis how integration in Africa does not work through the AU, an organization that supervises the integration activities of eight economic groupings in Africa. He believes that AU does not bring a solution to the limitations of its predecessor, OAU. The previous problems such as the lower level of trade exchange among African countries, unpaid money by member states, the perpetuation of political instability and conflicts, and strong attachment to national sovereignty remain unresolved. He found no reason for the North African countries to unite with the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). SSA are found at a lower stage of socioeconomic development, and hence, they should find the ways and means of formulating their own grouping. He has proposed the dismantling of AU and the formation of a unifederation of SSA as the best way of creating a “new geospatial space.”\(^\text{10}\) For him, the death of Gaddafi is a metaphor for the death of AU because he is certain of the fact no one contributed more to the rise of AU than Gaddafi. He cites many challenges that are frequently mentioned by the integrationist scholars below (Sangmpam, "Why the African Union Should Be Dismantled” 1-7).

One of the biggest challenges for integration in Africa is the concept of micro-nation. Africans tend to stick with their narrow boundaries of micro-nations (ethnic or clan identity). This has caused a significant bloodshed. Cases in point are the Darfur crisis in Sudan, the Rwanda Genocide, and similar problems in Chad and Somalia. Africans put their clan or ethnic identity first rather than their broader identity for political and economic gains (Maathai 184-93&214-220).

\(^\text{10}\) It does not demand ‘complete sovereignty’ nor ‘residual sovereignty’ unlike AU and USA respectively. “Rather, local and subregional entities are decentralized under the complete and unified sovereignty of a newly constituted SSA multi-territorial state”
All these challenges can have a negative impact on the success of regional or continental integrations.

The other noticeable reason for the lack of success for regional economic integration efforts in Africa is insufficient involvement of the civil society. Stefan et al. clearly show that EAC countries do not involve and inform their population about integration. This inadequate mobilization of the masses will have serious consequences for the legitimacy and continuity of their power. In Burundi, only 40% of the population knows about the very existence of EAC. Failure to get the society involved in EAC and the absence of transparency and accountability within EAC undermine the unification process and put it on a shaky foundation. The people might oppose unfair distribution of benefits and free movement or settlement of other people from the EAC as was seen in Tanzania. Tanzanians are not happy with the initiative taken by EAC for a free movement of people in the region in fear of Kenya’s economic superiority, the spread of ethnic animosity, and the possible loss of land. Other smaller member countries (Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda) are also demanding land from their giant neighbor (by surface area), Tanzania, for their large populations. Eyster, however, explains the importance of free movement of people in the region because of the vast potential of the area for tourism. The region has earned international fame for having the “big five” game: lion, leopard, elephant, buffalo and rhino. Moreover, various bird species, beautiful landscapes, and different types of weather conditions are appealing to many tourists to go to this region (Stefan et al 26-27; Eyster 29)

Stefan cites one study which was conducted in EAC countries about peoples’ ideas about the benefits of a single market. 58 percent of Tanzanians and 65% of Kenyans believe that they would take advantage of a common market for growth. Still, some people do not know much about the essence of the common market. Coupled with the overall low regard of the people towards
national politicians in each country, the fear of losing some part of their national sovereignty cause people to oppose the integration process (Stefan 100-101).

Eyster associates the reason for the lack of success in economic integration with politicians. He brings the worries and weaknesses of politicians at the heart of the discussion. Politicians are not confident enough to implement their agreements because of the fear that reforms to a common market in EAC might create job losses, weaken economic competitiveness, and intensify societal problems due to the potential migration of peoples within the region (Eyster 23).

The other bottleneck for the lack of success in regional economic integration effort in Africa is corruption. According to Eyster, corruption and bad governance are two faces of the same coin in affecting the development and growth of East Africa. The region is highly affected by corruption. The Transparency International data clearly shows that most of the East African countries face this problem. It vividly reveals the different consequences of corruption from a socio-economic and political perspective. From the political dimension, it significantly affects democracy and the rule of law. Public institutions and offices lack legitimacy when they work in favor of governmental officials. It kills equality, popular participation, political competition, and over all the democratic system at large (28-30).

2.4.2 Specific Obstacles to Regional Integration in East Africa

2.4.2.1. Multiple and Overlapping of Membership

Most countries in Africa are members of more than one regional organization. For instance, Ethiopia is a member of two economic groupings, namely COMESA and IGAD while Kenya is a member of three economic groupings, EAC, COMESA, and IGAD. As documented in many studies (Saku 2006; Reddy 2010; Geda and Haile 2008; Easter 2004), the following disadvantages
can be mentioned in connection with membership to multiple groupings. First, different membership fees are expensive to pay and hence difficult to maintain paying on a monthly basis. There are also administrative costs. Second, governments’ failure to meet their financial obligations make them less committed to their obligations, and this weakens the continuity of these groupings because they do no work in their full capacity. As my informants told me, their efforts are fragmented or dispersed by many groupings. In other words, there is a duplication of activities. Third, there is inadequate preparation before meetings. They do not discuss pressing matters both in depth and in length, and this forces them to resist matters frequently. In addition, there is a failure to accept and implement decisions made by heads of state at regional meetings by sectoral ministries. Fourth, varied memberships make members careless and bring conflicts of interest, and it is confusing in fulfilling their obligations. It has become clear that conflicts of membership need to be resolved, but it seems politically difficult. Since there are three groupings in East Africa, it is hard to know which one represents the region correctly. Thus, it complicates East Africa’s relation to the rest of the world (Nudomo 10-17). In order to avoid the overlapping of membership, the Lagos conference in 1980 reduced the 14 economic units into five (Morisho 16).

However, the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Abuja in 1991 officially announced the establishment of the Africa’s Economic Communities (AECs) and eight regional groups were identified as the main building blocks for continental integration and the Africa Union (AU) was formed in 2001 (Sako 3).11

11 It is difficult to know which grouping is well representing the people of the Horn.
2.4.2.2. Fair Distribution of Burdens and Gains

In economic integration, there are gainers and losers. Integration is a union of different countries that are found at different levels of economic development; the strongest country might take advantage of the others. A case in point is Kenya in EAC. It is also visible in SADC and ECOWAS where some countries dominate others. As a result, countries usually do not dare to jump into integration and be bound by the agreements and protocols of the regional groups. They give priority to what matters to them. They make sure that they take advantage of tariff arrangements (Johnson 22-26).

According to Kibret, leaders should agree on how to calculate gains and losses, and which country should be compensated more. These kinds of questions should be addressed adequately to avoid weak performance in regional agreements. The gains from integration should not be disproportionate. Kibret also discusses the concept of fair distribution of profits and gains in connection with the lack of political will in the effort of regional integration. Leaders should be held accountable if they do not respect the treaties they signed. They have to compel reluctant governments to acknowledge their commitments or help them out with designing policies that foster credibility and cooperation (Kibret 12).

Conclusion

Based on the literature I have consulted, economic integration has multiple advantages. First, it causes the construction and expansion of infrastructures such as roads, power plants, airways, and communication technologies. Second, it is crucial to the wise use of natural and human resources. Third, it increases healthy competition among countries. Fourth, it brings about low tariff and hence, companies can produce goods at a lower cost, and the society able to access a wider variety of goods and services cheaply. Thus, integration boosts more transaction between
producers and consumers. Fifth, it creates extensive employment opportunity since investors establish industries and business organization across the region. Sixth, since a group of countries around the same geographical location comes together, they can harmonize their policies in environmental management, defense, and security. Moreover, it improves the bargaining power of small countries in bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

The literature has also shown the disadvantages of regional economic integration. These include the loss of some parts of national sovereignty, repression of minority cultures, a shift of employment, and trade diversion.

Regional integration requires a strong institution, broad mass support, and strong commitment of political elites. However, the major problems that cause the different groupings to register a lower success in integration across Africa are institutional weaknesses of various economic units, financial problems, overlapping of membership, and lack of planning or over-ambitious plans. Moreover, lack of awareness of the people, weak implementation, and lack of commitment of leaders negatively affect the integration efforts. Leaders have no strong passion. They quarrel with each other. Ethnic tension among the people, corruption, and bad governance also slow the pace of integration.
Chapter 3. Road and Energy as Areas of Potential Integration

Introduction

This chapter shows how roadways and energy have less potential for integration of Ethiopia and Kenya. Although many scholars believe that the two variables can speed up bilateral and multilateral integration efforts, the reality on the ground shows that these infrastructures have faced many challenges. Infrastructure is a means to an end. Road construction, for instance, is highly valued because it facilitates the movement of goods and people. However, there are many problems related to this sector.

Informants from MOFA and ELPA argue that those countries in East Africa (especially Kenya) which have access to sea ports are benchmarking far east countries in harmonizing operational standards, and incorporating best practices to handle goods (cargo) and invest in new technologies and enhancing port logistics. The region’s economy is growing. Many countries would like to import and export as many goods as possible. Thus, in addition to road transportation, maritime transport is a necessary means for conveying import and export goods to their destinations. Kenya has now developed Lemu port. It is to offer extensive marine services to Ethiopia and other neighboring countries. Kenya has also earmarked her small ports to compete with other port service providers of the region such as Djibouti and Eritrea (Port Aseb). If peace is restored between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the port of Aseb might help Ethiopia to trade with COMESA countries or the whole Africa in general. As mentioned above, road connectivity is
providing additional capacity to easing the movement of goods and persons from the port to their intended destinations.  

3.1. Energy as a Means of Integration

Industrial renaissance is highly linked to the cost of energy. If the cost of energy is high, the industrial sector does not grow well. Partner states have recognized the need to accelerate investment in power generation, distribution, and efficient energy markets. As a result, the East African power pool (EAPP) was established in 2005. It aims at creating the mechanisms, regulations, and standards for energy trading and marketing. EAPP is a regional effort to supply energy to member countries. Its main goals are reducing energy cost in the region by using the interconnected power system, increasing power exchanges between countries, finding money to construct large dams for the common benefit of citizens, and providing efficient coordination of multiple power systems.

Supplying power with the least cost to Kenya and neighboring countries is crucial. Low-priced power supply minimizes the cost of production, and the price of goods, and hence goods in the region will be cheaper and more competitive in and outside Africa. As a result, a lot of investment is sought in trans-border transmission lines. The private sector’s involvement in the required services is extremely crucial. The private sector should be assisted by the government in order to better respond to the problems related to energy production and distribution. If so, the business people will play a central role in resolving the shortage of energy and bringing down its cost.

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13 Ibid.
However, the government owns and run many projects. Ethiopia and Kenya were in discussion over power purchase for an extended time in the past, and they agreed to work together as supplier and buyer/client of energy.  

Nevertheless, it is evident that the energy sector will not contribute a lot to the integration efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya. Here it is instructive to mention the case of the Akosomo Dam in Ghana. The dam was built under the direct order of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. The major objective of the dam was to satisfy both commercial and domestic needs. It provided energy to the growing factories, supplying electricity to Ghana's growing population, and exporting power to other West African states. But unfortunately, the dam was not successful as anticipated. Siltation (the increased concentration of suspended sediments due to flooding) and the high cost of maintaining it (which amounts to 800 million dollar) reduced the power generation potential of the dam. It was a total failure to integrate the region in terms of power (Miescher 341-366). In short, the dam was not successful as it was intended because of excessive sedimentation. Thus, the Volta project remains as an imagination of development and modernity. Unless utmost care is taken, the same fate is likely to fall on the Ethiopian dam.

The Ethiopian government is now constructing a huge dam known as the Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD), formerly known as the Millennium Dam. This dam is located at Benishangul-Gumuz, which is 40 km east of Sudan and it is under construction over the Blue Nile River and owned by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO). The building of the dam started in April 2011, and is expected to cost about $4.7 billion dollars, and is supposed to be completed in 2017. The contract was awarded to Salini, an Italian construction company. The dam

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14 Mr. Fikiru. Personal interview at the hall of the head office of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. July 2016
is expected to produce 6000 megawatts, which makes it the largest dam in Africa. It is to supply electricity to the people who are suffering from a shortage of electricity to the growing industries, to sell to neighboring countries, and to earn foreign currency by facilitating regional economic integration at the same time.\textsuperscript{15}

Even though the government of Ethiopia has announced the 70\% completion of the dam, the reality on the ground shows that half of it is not yet completed. The dam will not be completed at the scheduled time, and cannot accomplish its intended objectives of integration due to the following problems. First, there are financial constraints. The government of Ethiopia has taken a bold step to construct this dam without getting money from usual sources such as the IMF and World Bank.\textsuperscript{16} It depends on domestic sources, that is, from the Ethiopian masses. There are also other money-raising programs such as the national lottery dedicated to the project and the sale of government bonds to Ethiopians. Recently, Chinese banks have provided a loan to the government of Ethiopia to finance for the dam’s turbines and other equipment (Jennifer, “the Most Important Dam…”).

Second, there are poor transmission lines. The transmission line that needs to be constructed along with the construction of the dam is not yet completed. The national grid should

\textsuperscript{15}Anonymous. Personal interview at the head office of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. July 2016. If the dam is completed, it will have many positive impacts such as changing the image of Ethiopia, increasing electric supply and booming the industrial sector. Ethiopia, the so-called the "water tower of East Africa," will also become the "powerhouse of Africa." It increases the negotiation power of Ethiopia over the Nile River with Egypt and other riparian countries and make Ethiopia’s geopolitical influence greater than before. Moreover, it creates employment opportunity as it has currently embraced over 9500 workers who are laboring around the clock.

\textsuperscript{16}Anonymous informants; & Yishaq Tekaligni. Director of Bilateral and Regional Trade Relations and Negotiations. Personal interview at his office on the third floor of the Ministry of Trade. June 2016
be maximized. If the high voltage carrying capacity of the transmission line is not upgraded, it will hurt the distribution of electricity for external and domestic purposes.\textsuperscript{17}

Third, filling the dam will take more than five years as the dam holding capacity is 74 billion cubic meters. Filling the dam within a short duration is unthinkable, as it will create a shortage of water for the Egyptian Aswan Dam.\textsuperscript{18} Fourth, there are technical problems. Many scholars cast doubt on the design of the project. It was made very quickly, and the project was announced immediately after the Arab Spring broke out in North Africa in 2012. The government used the concept of a huge dam without much preparation to divert the attention of the people from socio-economic and political demands to the dam project. Others say that the dam was constructed to take advantage of the weakness of Egypt because of internal turmoil. Fifth, it is about siltation. If the project comes to its completion, there will be high siltation and sedimentation and avoiding this will be very expensive in the future.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, the project might not be successful just as was the Akosombo Dam in Ghana.

\subsection*{3.2. Roads as a Means of Integration}

Concerning the socioeconomic transformation of Africa, the AU has designed a 50-year program known as Agenda 2063. It is designed to create and see a prosperous and peaceful Africa with sustainable people-driven development in multiple sectors, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and democracy (good governance and the rule of law), and having a shared heritage and value with substantial power that truly shows real African Renaissance. It can

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{17}] Anonymous informant
  \item [\textsuperscript{18}] Anonymous. Personal interview at the head office of the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. July 2016
  \item [\textsuperscript{19}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
be achieved with the fulfillment of many factors. A case in point is the construction of roads that connect one end corner of Africa to the other. For the growing economies, better infrastructural facilities to smooth the flow of goods and persons across Africa in general and between Ethiopia and Kenya in particular is important (Agenda 2063 1-24).

It is the AU’s best interest to connect major towns of Africa. The African highway is expected to link 26 countries and 590 million people. Both Ethiopia and Kenya are constructing a highway that is supposed to connect Addis Ababa to Naïrobi. It is part of the Trans-African highway that stretches from Cairo to Cape Town. This road passes through the border town of Ethiopia and Kenya, Moyale. Both Ethiopia and Kenya are working to connect the two-missing links from Ageremariam to Moyale, which is the Ethiopian section of the road and from Moyale to Mombasa which covers the Kenyan side of the road. It amounts to 666km long. The Ethiopian side is relatively complete at this point than its Kenyan counterpart. Comparatively, most of the Kenyan side of the road is still under construction (Ministry of Transport 1-8).

Constructing roads is essential to facilitate economic integration. The government of Ethiopia is highly effective in this regard. It has built roads that link the rural society with urban populations and production centers with markets. Because of lack of experts, the road construction is run mainly by Chinese companies. This kind of dependency has helped the transfer of technology in road construction20. However, it should be short lived, and Chinese contractors have to be replaced by local ones to save a hard currency. The government should also think about maintaining the quality of roads for a long time since the lack of drainage and overflooding has been reducing the lifespan of roads in the country.

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20 Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD Affairs, interviewed at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016
I have put the overall activities of road construction on the Ethiopian section in the following table.

**Table 3. The Overall Road Corridor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Name of the Project</th>
<th>Length of the Project</th>
<th>Accomplishment by the end of December 2016 (Completion until asphalt layer)</th>
<th>Expected date of Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lot I: Hawssa-Chuko</td>
<td>60km</td>
<td>22km</td>
<td>27 April 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lot II: Chuko-Yirgachafe</td>
<td>66km</td>
<td>23km</td>
<td>27 April 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lot III: Yirgachafe-Agreemariam</td>
<td>72km</td>
<td>45km</td>
<td>Sep 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Contract1. Ageremariam-Yabelo</td>
<td>94km</td>
<td>94km (completed)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Contract2. Yabelo-Mega</td>
<td>98km</td>
<td>98km completed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Contract3. Mega-Moyale</td>
<td>109km</td>
<td>109km completed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>One stop border post</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>499km</td>
<td>391km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the table, most projects from number four to seven are completed. However, projects in the first three sites are not yet complete. First, the Hawassa-Chiko road that costs about 958,985,720.78 Ethiopian Birr had to be accomplished by April 2016, but the contractor of the Italian company called AIC Progetti Spa managed to accomplish only 34% of the project by the end of April 2016. Second, the Chicko-Yirag Chafe road construction that covers 60km is so far
only 41.6% complete. Third, the Yirgachafe-Agrenariam upgrading project, run by domestic contractors, covers a length of 72km, and is only 33.1% complete (Ministry of Transport 3-20).

In order to enable the cross-border movement of all forms of traffic, persons, and goods, One Stop Border Post (OSBP) is crucial. The government of the federal democratic republic of Ethiopia and the government of the Republic of Kenya have signed a bilateral agreement on joint border post controls, procedures and facilities, and management in 2014 (Ministry of Transport 1-32). OSBP at Moyale border would minimize the transit time to cross the border from Ethiopia to Kenya and vice versa. Moreover, it widens and deepens Ethio-Kenya relations and the global competitiveness of the two sisterly countries. OSBP is designed for both sides of the border with similar facilities, and their completion status is as follows: terminal building (72%), immigration booth building (78%), custom warehouse (63%), scanning and verification buildings (45%), quarantine animal warehouses (none), impounded goods office (no data), generator room (73%), traffic office, and holding ground (no data)\(^\text{21}\)

The construction of roads by itself does not guarantee the movement of goods and services. Other factors should also be given greater attention. For an effective transportation to take place, avoiding high transit charges through the reduction of multiple border crossings and stoppages, and evading non-traffic barriers and high insurance costs is essential. OSBP is a big idea to tackle these problems. At border point(s), there is only delay at exit and entry points. One-stop border concept is combining two stops in one to consolidating functions in a shared base. The idea is that shortening it by making one country for entering and the other for existing to reduce travel time for passengers and vehicles. Drivers and the people do not waste much time in different stoppages.

\(^{21}\) *Ibid*
One of the common problems in Africa with regard to road construction is the lack of interest by leaders to invest billions of dollars in roads. Even though roads are constructed, the transportation facilities are not enough to supply the required service to the wider population.\textsuperscript{22}

There are also other problems related to road construction between Ethiopia and Kenya that are serious challenges to integration. First, the time to construct or maintain old roads is long due to difficult terrains such as valleys, gorges, and steep slopes. Second, it is hard to construct in the months of April, May, September, and October because they are rainy seasons and activities such as base course and asphalt surfacing will be postponed to the dry periods (Ministry of Transport I-32). Third, the failure to timely clear obstructions delays constructions. Since the standard highway needs clearing electric poles, optic fibers, unplanned constructed houses, and hotels, the job was quite difficult when the road construction was started. For instance, in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Telcom Authority (ETA) had repeatedly communicated with zonal and regional leaders for the removal of government offices or other buildings put on the main highway, but none of them had truly collaborated to reach the fulfillment of the project. Fourth, frequent breakdown and insufficient utilization of equipment have been encountered. Both domestic and external contractors were not happy for their failure to accomplish their tasks on time. However, they did not escape from criticism because few of them made designing problems that sought revision. Moreover, there is no close monitoring of the project by supervisors who could conduct regular site visit from the head office. Lack of coordination on all site activities due to a shortage of skilled expertise and high staff turnover has also affected the project very seriously. In this regard, the government should be blamed for not maintaining the old staff (2-20).

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}
3.2.1. The LAPSSET Project

It is a massive project with $30 billion and is known as the Lappet corridor. Its main objective is to make transport linkages among Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. Moreover, it is part of the big plan that aims to connect an East African coast (from Lemu Port) to the West African coast (at Douala Port) by highway. The program encompasses main components such as ports, oil pipelines, new roads, airports, cities, and standard gauge railways. The project focal areas are Lamu and Isiolo in Kenya, Juba in South Sudan, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Kenya has allotted $5 billion to construct the Lamu port as an alternative to Mombasa. There is a construction of oil pipeline to transport oil from Lamu to Isiolo, Isiolo to Juba, and Juba to Addis Ababa. Railway lines will be stretched from Lamu to Isiolo, from Isiolo to Juba, from Isiolo to Addis Ababa, and from Nairobi to Isiolo. There is also a program to construct three international airports and resort cities in three places: Lamu, Isiolo, and Lake Turkana. The project has no timeline or dead line though it was launched in March 2012. The lion share of the project is run by Kenya to fulfill her 2030 vision of becoming a middle-income country; it has got problems due to the conflict in South Sudan. Data show that the Kenyan side of the project is run effectively. This project needs huge money from international creditors but Kenya is running this largest game changer infrastructural project without external assistance (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 1-7).

Conclusion

Power and roadways are important variables to speed up integration. Concerning power connectivity, the Ethiopian government is now trying to build different dams. A case in point is the big dam known as the GERD. It is highly expected to integrate the two countries. However, it has its own problems that impede its integration role in East Africa. First, security problem on the dam and transmission lines. Government opposition groups, Eritrea, and Egypt are more likely to
play a deterrent role to raze the dam to its foundation like what they have been trying at the very outset of the dam construction unless the government is taking a serious action to avoid such potential threats. Second, sedimentation and the high cost of removing it may dwarf its power generation potential in the decades to come. Third, the power that will be generated by the government might not fully satisfy the local demands. Still, many areas are facing blackouts, and people get electricity by shifts. Moreover, if the industrial growth gets momentum, it might not be enough to sell power to neighboring countries. Fourth, the cost of building a dam is so immense that it is hard to build additional dams soon. I strongly believe that power will have less potential in speeding up integration between Ethiopia and Kenya.

However, there is a better prospect with regard to road construction since the government of Ethiopia and Kenya have done a lot so far to fulfill their obligations set by AU. The AU is struggling hard to help link Africa by road and increase people-to-people contact, and the flow of goods and services across the continent. The trans-African highway that stretches from Cairo to Johannesburg will soon become a reality if others do their job like what Ethiopia and Kenya are doing now. It is in the best interest of Ethiopia and Kenya to keep up their road systems given the importance of road transportation for their economies.

And if the two countries can complete the construction of the roads and can maintain the roads well, roads will have a better potential to contribute the integration of the two countries than power or energy connectivity. Still, roads have problems that may not accelerate integration. The time to construct or maintain old roads is long due to difficult terrains such as valleys, gorges, and steep slopes. In addition to the aforementioned technical and ecological problems, roads can be integrative only when they are secured. Because of this, security remains priority for integration.
Furthermore, roads are more or less a done deal. To accelerate integration between Ethiopia and Kenya, the emphasis should shift to trade itself, which is the main reason for road construction.

Generating power from water is a clean energy project. It helps to reduce air pollution. Therefore, it contributes a lot to avoiding climate change. It, however, creates minor problems since there will be removal of trees to build huge dams. Generating electricity can be challenged by the persistent drought and famine in the Horn. If there is no rain, enough water may not be stored in the reservoir. As a result, greening project should be given attention to cover an area with vegetation and maintaining the existing ones.
Chapter 4. Trade and the Potential for Integration between Ethiopia and Kenya

Introduction

This chapter assesses the bilateral collaboration between Ethiopia and Kenya with regard to trade for the growth of their economy. Cooperation in this area might step up integration schemes of both countries in the decades to come. For any meaningful integration to move forward, it must be embedded among the people, and the sense of integration must transcend political leaders. The move towards integration should not be forgotten at one time and then becomes a fashion when one leader is immediately replaced by another leader. The people should own the scheme of integration. The passion for regional integration seemed to have got momentum during the premiership of Meles rather than during term of the current Prime Minister, Hailemariam Dessalegni. Meles (1991-2012) laid the foundation for many projects that have been implemented up to now. Many of the trade agreements between Ethiopia and Kenya were signed before Hailemariam. Trade could play a crucial role in speeding up the economic growth of Ethiopia and Kenya.


Let us look at the trade relation between Ethiopia and Kenya over ten years’ period.

Figure 1. Ethiopia’s Import from Kenya: 2004 to 2013

Source: Ministry of Trade (2016)
From the trade data, we can see that Ethiopia’s import from Kenya increased from 21.7 million US dollars in 2004 to 32.4 million US dollars in 2013. It increased by 49%. The largest increase occurred in 2006. The major imported commodities from Kenya are ballpoint pens, exercise books, polishes, creams for footwear, household articles, kitchenwares, plates, powdered milk, and printed books. Since the Ethiopian economy is agrarian, most of the export commodities are agricultural.

Table 4.1. Goods exported to Kenya and the income earned from each good form 2004-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Exported Products to</th>
<th>Total Export (in USD): From 2004-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidney Beans, Peas and other Beans</td>
<td>30,602,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chat</td>
<td>4,892,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot Wear</td>
<td>3,619,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Medicine</td>
<td>1,478,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>952,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coriander Seed</td>
<td>634,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17,946,423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Trade Archive (2016)

As we look at the table, cereals are by far the largest export commodities from Kenya and the largest exports after that are chat, footwear, veterinary medicines, cement, and coriander seed from 2004 to 2013. The line graph below shows the amount of income earned every year in US dollar
From the trade data, we can see that Ethiopia’s export to Kenya increased from 2 million US dollars in 2004 to 16 million US dollars in 2013. It rose by 800%. It is a dramatic change. The largest increase occurred in 2013. The lowest revenue was registered in 2004. The revenue remained unchanged from the mid of 2008 to the mid of 2010. However, from the mid of 2010, there is a sharp increase. Ethiopia’s export to Kenya is growing every year, and it is at a promising stage.

If we look at ten years’ worth of data, it is possible to calculate the income and expenditure of Ethiopia. Ethiopia imported 319 million US dollars’ worth of goods from Kenya while it only exported 60 million US dollars between 2004 and 2014. It shows that about 84% of the trade balance goes in favor of Kenya (Ministry of Trade 2016).

In order to avoid the trade imbalance and to increase the volume of trade, Ethiopia has to maximize the quality of its agricultural commodities by exporting semi-processed agricultural products for which it has a comparative advantage. Moreover, the two countries should settle the problem of unfair trade between themselves. Kenya highly benefits from trade while Ethiopia does not. On the other hand, the trade relation with IAGD countries displays an advantage for Ethiopia.
Somalia, Uganda, Djibouti, and Sudan rely heavily on Ethiopian goods, and the balance of trade is in favor of Ethiopia. IGAD countries (except Kenya) need Ethiopian goods more than Ethiopia needs goods from them. The volume of trade has increased since 2002, although it has fluctuated at different times.23

According to the 2012 import and export data from the Ministry of Trade, Ethiopia exported 576 million US Dollars’ worth of goods to IGAD countries while its import was 201 million US Dollars. The most important trading partner, or by far the largest export destination of Ethiopian goods, is Somalia, particularly after the conflict with its former largest trading partner Eritrea since 1999 (Zelalam, 9). The major export items are food (such as vegetables, seed potatoes, onions and shallots, tomatoes, oranges) and live animals which account for 96% while machinery and equipment cover 4% of Ethiopia’s export to IGAD countries. The major import items of Ethiopia from IGAD countries are the following: Chemical products (39%), various goods (21%), manufactured goods (20%), transport equipment (6%) and undisclosed (15%) (9-12).

4.2. Huge Population

The size of a country’s population profoundly matters to trade and investment. All things being equal, the larger the population, the larger the market size. With about 100 million consumers, according to the 2017 demographic data, Ethiopia alone creates one of the most significant domestic markets in Africa. It has been recognized that Ethiopia and its East African neighbors Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, together have almost 227 million consumers. It clearly shows that one-fourth of the African population lives in the region (Zelalem 1-34). If Ethiopia and Kenya combine their populations together, they amount to 150 million, which is half

23 Yishaq Tekaligni. Director of Bilateral and Regional Trade Relations and Negotiations. Personal interview at his office on the third floor of the Ministry of Trade. June 2016; Ms. Wodereyleshi. Personal interview at her office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relations. July 2016.
of the American population. The current population of Ethiopia is estimated to be 103\textsuperscript{24} million while Kenya is assumed to be 49 million\textsuperscript{25}. It is a remarkable opportunity because it can be an enormous economic force.

Nonetheless, my informants do not foresee the movement of workers, talents, and services between Ethiopia and Kenya in formal ways. Who is going to be blamed? It is political elites. The top officials of each country have the capacity to facilitate the movement of workers, talents, and services instead of making a lot of consultations, electrifying speeches, lots of paperwork, and entertaining lots of ideas. Of course, as leaders, they must see the long-term sustainability of their union, but they do not double check its output. They are not intensively informing their people. A political marriage between Ethiopia and Kenya might not be broken up if they fully agree and become aware of the life changing implication of unity. The growth of the middle-income family in both countries is also a great opportunity to advance their trading ties. The people that would be able to buy industrial goods is increasing\textsuperscript{26}.

4.3. The Private Sector

The private sector is not involved in big projects such as power generation. The government of Ethiopia does not consider them as the main agents of growth and development. There is a disconnect between them. The private sector has no voice on what needs to be done. They are not getting the chance to be involved in many projects of COMESA and IGAD. They feel like they are not regarded as development partners. The private sector should get involved in lending,

\textsuperscript{26} Anonymous. Personal interview at the Kenyan desk office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relation. July 2016
financing, and directly participating in the running of projects. The people also can contribute their money and labor for the success of many developmental activities.

The data generated from informants about the role of the Ethiopian government in involving the private sector in various projects is inconsistent with the information obtained from the Ministry of Trade. The latter increases the number of the private sector while the former lessens their involvement in many projects.

The following table indicates Kenyan investors’ involvement in Ethiopia in various projects over a ten-year period between Jan1992 to Aug 2012.

**Table 4.2. Kenyan Investment in Ethiopia (Between Jan.1992-Aug.2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Phase</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>Capital in Ethiopian Birr</th>
<th>Permanent employment to be created</th>
<th>Temporary employment to be created</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Implementation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-Implementation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under- Operation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>1,559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table made from data taken from the Ministry of Trade (2016).

According to the above table, Kenyan investors have received a license for 45 projects between 1992 and 2012 with a capital of 564 million birrs (Ethiopian currency), and it is expected that there will be 1,580 permanent employments and 1,559 temporary employments. Kenyans have invested in manufacturing, construction, education, agriculture, and software service.
4.4. Overlapping of Membership

Africa has many regional groupings. The availability of such organizations gives to different countries the opportunity to become members of at least one regional group. For instance, Ethiopia is a member of IAGD and COMESA. All IGAD members are also COMESA members. The level of commitment varies among them. Kenya, Sudan, and Djibouti are members of COMESA FTA, while Ethiopia has agreed only to implement COMESA PTA. Kenya is on its way to joining the COMESA’s customs union, but Ethiopia is not willing to do that. Kenya has reduced the tariff by 80%, while Ethiopia is succumbing to 10%, only for all goods coming from COMESA Countries (Zelalem 8).

The level of integration of various groups is also different. The EAC countries have successfully created customs unions, while COMESA countries are still at the level of FTA. The same goes for IGAD that strives to create FTA though it actually puts more emphasis on security. Kenya has surpassed Ethiopia in playing a central role in the EAC, which has registered better performance than COMESA and IGAD. EAC created a customs union in 2005, a common market in 2010, and a monetary union in 2012 (Economic Commission for Africa 8). However, all these levels of integrations do not necessarily guarantee integration. There are many other necessary preconditions to be met.

4.5. Economic Nationalism

On the idea of economic nationalism, some informants of the ministry of trade hold a different opinion. They stated that the government needs to protect its national economy from being affected by outsiders. Thus, the government of Ethiopia must pay a serious attention to every tiny matter while taking an economic integration trajectory. It requires careful assessment of the potential costs and benefits in the context of the economic performance of the country. As
they said, a lot of issues should be observed, discussed, and settled before getting into such a big scheme.\textsuperscript{27}

Even though Ethiopia is a member of COMESA, it is not abiding by the rules and regulation of this economic grouping because the country never wants to lose its income by reducing taxation or importing quality and cheap goods from these countries at the expense of local industries. The mode of integration depends on the development strategies and strong external linkages adopted by the countries participating in the process.\textsuperscript{28}

Supporters of the government’s restricted activity argue that the government particularly fears Kenya and a few other contestants from COMESA countries. The country’s manufacturing sector is still in its infancy and cannot yet supply the region with high-quality goods at competitive prices. Past experience suggests that some African countries were unable to replace lost trade taxes with revenue from other sources.\textsuperscript{29} Case in point are EAC countries. As one flashes back to three decades ago, he/she can see the problem of tariff reduction on EAC countries even though that put Kenya in a relatively better position as discussed in chapter two.

Most agricultural goods are not complementary nor competitive, and hence no one needs the other. In addition to Ethiopia and Kenya, other COMESA countries should diversify their products in order to facilitate trade relations among themselves. If they produce and supply the same products in the market, they will not trade each other, rather they will project it to advanced countries. Ethiopia has a comparative advantage over Kenya in terms of all food, leather, and

\textsuperscript{27} Yishaq Tekaligni. Director of Bilateral and Regional Trade Relations and Negotiations, interviewed at his office on the third floor of the Ministry of Trade. June 2016; and Ms. Woderyeleshi. Personal interview at her office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relations. July 2016.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid
mineral products while Kenya has a comparative advantage over Ethiopia with regards to chemical products, matches, tobacco, and other industrial goods.\textsuperscript{30}

Some of my informants argue for regional economic integration as an important tool for industrial growth. In the first place, countries that are at a similar level of economic development come together and compete for each other given the fact that their existing technology cannot significantly affect each other’s existence, unlike trading with advanced countries. In East Africa, there is not a far-reaching difference among member countries, even between Ethiopia and Kenya. The industry’s share of the economy is minimal for Ethiopia, and it accounts for 4 %, and this rate is almost the same with Kenya’s 9%. If there is a difference, it is only a slight disparity in the production and supply of some industrial goods, but that can be bridged as time progress.\textsuperscript{31}

Ethiopia produces and exports goods within a protected safe zone. However, it should also dare to trade with COMESA countries. Some of my informants argue that IAGD and COMESA countries should combine their similar goods and supply them to the world market at a price fixed by themselves in an effort to challenge the core and semi-peripheral countries. However, they have to trade those goods for which they have a comparative advantage among themselves. The transportation cost, as well as the price of goods, will be cheaper than for goods coming from advanced countries. It strengthens the production capacity of local industries.\textsuperscript{32}

Informants used in this study mention some lessons that can be drawn from other regional groupings in and outside Africa. It is the regional value chain. It signifies the production of goods

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{31} Mr. Bonsa. Personal interview at his office that facilitate the bilateral and regional trade relations and negotiations. June 2016; Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs, interviewed at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016

\textsuperscript{32} Mr. Tesfaye Berhanu and Mr.Tamirat Yishaq (senior experts). Personal interview at the office of the COMESA Virtual Trade Facilitation System. July 2016

69
and services with the participation of several companies located in several countries of the region rather than one company in a single country. For example, country A supplies raw materials to country B, and country B will add value and exports to C, and country C will produce the finished good and exports to consumers instead of all producing the same kind of goods. Creating production clusters is also important in certain goods. It can be a car assemblage etc.\(^{33}\) It will be important for not only Ethiopia and Kenya but also for other developing countries to fight against the domination of the global North. However, the government of Ethiopia is not using this opportunity. It does not allow COMESA goods to freely enter into Ethiopia through various trade barrier mechanisms (e.g., high tariff) since the government regards it as one of the efforts of protecting its industries from unnecessary competition. Two informants from the ministry of trade and MOFA commonly argue that in the regional economic integration arrangement, there will be an increased volume of trade for export and import goods and this, in turn, will increase in the use of technology for productivity. Moreover, government institution’s monopoly of internal trade might be stopped.\(^{34}\)

**Conclusion**

Trade relations between Ethiopia and Kenya have greatly increased, but still it is smaller than what Kenya has with EAC Countries. Given that Kenya has made industrial progress in comparison to Ethiopia, Kenya takes advantage of such ascendancy to sell industrial goods with a relatively high price, and benefits from this while Ethiopia does not. However, the trade sector plays a significant role in bringing the two countries close to each other. Because of the fast growth

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\(^{33}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{34}\) Mr. Bonsa. Personal interview at his office that facilitate the bilateral and regional trade relations and negotiations. June 2016; Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs, interviewed at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016
of their economy, the completion of the road that connects them, the presence of large population (a massive consumer), and the involvement of the private sector investment in manufacturing, construction, education, agriculture, and software services, it is anticipated that exchange of goods will increase.

The government of Ethiopia has not opened its door to Kenya and COMESA countries because of the principle of economic nationalism. It attempts to protect local industries from an “absurd” competition. It, however, supplies many goods to IGAD member countries that are low economic achievers in comparison to Kenya. The trade balance between Ethiopia and Kenya goes in favor of Kenya while the trade balance between Ethiopia and other IGAD member countries always goes in favor of Ethiopia. Ethiopia is expected to be a giant economy in East Africa by overtaking Kenya in the few years to come. It might balance not only their trade relationship, but also improve the distribution of benefits and burdens.

However, the government of Ethiopia does not give much room to the private sector. Ethiopia has a huge potential of attracting the private capital. It should encourage the Kenyan businesspersons to work in partnership with Ethiopian counterparts for mutual benefits in terms of cheap labor, technology transfer, and new market access.

The state companies’ monopoly in the production and distribution of goods and overlapping of membership to different groupings have a negative impact on the trade sector in terms of speeding up integration. Nevertheless, there is a bright prospect in a strong trade relationship that will result in the back and forth flow of goods, ideas, services, and people along with the prevalence of peace over the Ethio-Kenya road via Moyale.
Chapter 5: Security and Integration

Introduction

East Africa is widely known for its destructive and complicated wars. To put it mildly, it is a rapidly changing and unpredictable region of the African continent. As a result, security has become a big concern for Ethiopia and Kenya (Makonnen & Halelujah 7). Informants from MOFA argue that since Ethiopia shares a common border with the neighboring countries, other than Uganda, any tiny issue is taken seriously. Ethiopia is the only country in the Horn to have long and porous borders with conflict-ridden countries such as Somalia and South Sudan. The literature also supports this idea by stating that Ethiopia is more affected by regional issues than any other state in the Horn as it is bordered on the North by Eritrea (566 miles), on the East by Djibouti (216.8 miles), on the South-east by Kenya (535 mile), on the South by Sudan (520 mile), on the South-west by Somalia (994 mile), and on the West by Sudan (477.8 mile) (8).

Second, many ethnic groups that live in Ethiopia also live in neighboring countries. For instance, the Afar of Ethiopia is also found in Djibouti and Eritrea. The Issa of Ethiopia also lives in Djibouti and Somaliland. The Tigrinya-speaking people of Ethiopia are also found in Eritrea. The Borna Oromo of Ethiopia is also found in Kenya. The Anuak and Nuer of Southwestern Ethiopia are also found in South Sudan. These people are living in a closer geographic setting, yet an artificial boundary separates them (8-9).

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35 Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs, interviewed at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016; Ms. Wodereyeshe. Personal interview at her office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relations. July 2016
The West knows the geographic, territorial, historical, and ethnic connection Ethiopia has with neighboring countries have made Ethiopia a strategic ally in the Horn. Moreover, Ethiopia’s military strength made the US and EU regard Ethiopia as a reliable and relatively stable force to be reckoned with. They have confidence in its capability to battle extremism and terrorism in the Horn. It also made Kenya look to Ethiopia for security matters along their border. This section gives particular emphasis to Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s cooperation to soothe conflicts along their international borders with Somalia and South Sudan.

5.1. Political Stability in Ethiopia and Kenya

In retrospect, if we look at the political economy of Ethiopia, it was under the feudal economic relation for thousands of years that advocate for the existence of feudal lords in the countryside and a centralized feudal monarchy. This system was quite oppressive and exploitative by nature. For instance, Emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974) introduced modern bureaucracy in the country, but he was not good at expanding trade and facilitating regional economic integration. There were myriad rebellions throughout the country. Students, soldiers, teachers, peasants, and Muslims were in the forefront of fighting against the regime. The imperial regime was later put down by the military junta that declared itself the Provisional Military Administrative Council (Derg), which unleashed a Marxist-Leninist ideology starting in 1974 (Makonnen & Halellujah 6).

The Derg declared Ethiopia a communist state under the leadership of Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, and he started a reign of terror that lasted for 17 years. There was no room for any political party or independent press, and opposition to the regime was brutally repressed. His government did not encourage free trade and private property. The country was unstable because of clandestine coups and civil war which finally toppled the regime in 1991 by the alliance of rebel
forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). EPRDF made the country more peaceful and stable than the previous governments up until 2015 (6-7).

Democracy at the initial stage of the current government seems to have gained ground because few printing media and political parties came into being. The introduction of democracy in Ethiopia coincided with the changing political climate of the world after 1991. Some democratic principles began to get acceptance in Africa than any other time because “big men,” such as Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Mobutu Sese Seko (Congo) and Sani Abacha (Nigeria), were swept away in 1991, 1997 and 1998, respectively. In some other places where autocrats were still in power, some changes were exhibited, but it was all later proved a “pseudo-democracy.” (“Africa’s Fragile Democracies” 1)

Likewise, the actual nature of the Ethiopian government has become known as time progress. Data obtained from interviews show that there is no genuine democracy in the country. There is no freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to write against the government.36

The government of Ethiopia tries to fool the people of Ethiopia and the international community by conducting nominal elections. Democracy has become a luxury in the country. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) tries to control the people by multiple draconian laws that forbid the fundamental human rights enshrined in the national constitution. So many people in the country do not accept the existing government. As a result, a civil war that destroys the basic infrastructures in the country is imminent. Due to the mercurial nature of the government, actual peace has not been flourished on the ground, particularly after the 2014 election fraud.37

36 Three anonymous informants
37 Ibid
Most informants in this study hold in common the belief that the government has turned into a dictator since 1997. Though EPRDF received internal hate, it has a good relationship with neighboring (except Eritrea) and overseas countries. Though there was much hope that Ethiopian and other leaders in the Horn would contribute something to the advancement of regional cooperation and eventual economic integration, they are not honoring their promise to their people.\textsuperscript{38}

Recently, the domestic problem that has been simmering since 1997 has boiled over to affect the current integration tendency. The country is now under a state of emergency that has lasted for months. Though Ethiopia has never been colonized, a colonial type of administration is being installed. Based on the data collected from my few informants and oppositional sources, it is possible to deduce that power is in the hands of a few Tigrean born elites. They are dominating other ethnic groups in the socio-economic and political sphere. The Tigrean led government is a replica of a colonial form of administration which is known for its discrimination. Since they took power in 1991, they have been working for the interest of their group. Ethnic bias contributed a lot for the uninterrupted oppositions across the country at this point, and the way of handling this crisis has become increasingly brutal. Governmental change cannot be conducted smoothly. Government change always occurs through bullets rather than the ballot box. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have been experiencing these kinds of problems. Unless this predicament is handled in a subtle way, the great economic transformation that they are experiencing now might fade away.\textsuperscript{39}

For instance, some militant groups, such as the Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement, in the country are ready to engage in destructive activities against transmission lines

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
and big dams. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is believed to integrate the region by power, cannot meet its intended goals unless the security of the country is maintained. Recently, Ethiopian officials accused the government of Eritrea and some elements in Cairo of financing an aborted attack against the dam by twenty members of the Benishangul Gumuz People's Liberation Movement. This militant group’s attempt clearly verifies that the government is failed to provide a definite answer to the question of various ethnic groups.

These two countries have similar development goals. Kenya wants to become a middle-income country in 2030 and Ethiopia in 2025. This will be achievable if the two countries can strengthen peace and stability. Even though the government of Ethiopia has announced that it is a democratic developmental state, there is not a real democracy in the country. Democracy is just a lip service. In fact, the government is trying to abuse democracy to legalize its rule. However, it contradicts with the idea that “democracy is the ultimate guarantee of freedom of movement, goods, and capital.”

5.2. A Historical Backdrop of Security Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya

Ethiopia has had warm relations with Kenya for more than half a century. Their relationship started during the time of colonialism. Throughout the 1950s’ during Mau Mau rebellion against the British colonial rule, Kenyan freedom fighters had been going to Ethiopia for fear of complete elimination. They had a military base in Ethiopia and hung around there for a

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while when pressure mounted in Kenya, and then they went back to fight their British colonizers when things cooled down. However, I found no one who knows the exact location of the Mau Mau fighters in Ethiopia.42

They have common security problems associated with the state of Somalia. Following the independence of Somalia in 1960, Ethiopia and Kenya were exposed to the arduous ambition of irredentists. Somalia is a country born with the agenda of ‘Greater Somalia’, which aims at blending all Somali speakers in Ethiopia and Kenya. The rationale behind this is the separation of all Somali speaking people during colonialism into different countries. It became a great security concern for Ethiopia and Kenya and brought the two states close to each other. They saw some verbal aggressions from within the ruling circle of the newly independent Somalia in 1960. Seeing a growing danger and the imminent Somalia incursion into their territory, both parties signed a Military Pact in 1964 to come to each other’s aid against the then Somalian government. This pact was based on the notion that helping each other if either was attacked (Merhatsidk 28-29).

An informant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs places the time of unofficial support between Ethiopia and Kenya before the 1950s. He flashed back to the 1930s to help us recall the untold history of Ethiopians’ fight against the Italian troops using Kenyan soil, and even Ethiopia managed to secure medical and military aid from Kenyan colonial government (1936-1941).43 In 1970, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to Kenya. This visit gave further impetus to their relation. The emperor and Jomo Kenyatta agreed to strengthen their bilateral ties in terms of social,

42 Ms. Woderyeleshi. Personal interview at her office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relations. July 2016;
43 Anonymous. Personal interview at the Kenyan desk office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relation. July 2016
economic, and cultural fields. To this end, the two heads of states pledged to take tangible measures in the advancement of trade between themselves. Their immediate cooperation, however, seen when Somalia occupied South Eastern part of Ethiopia in 1977. Kenya supported Ethiopia by giving advice (38).

Kenya supported Ethiopia in return for what Ethiopia did to Jomo Kenyatta’s family when he was imprisoned sometime in the 1950s. Haile Selassie is believed to have taken good care of his children. After 1977, I did not see a culture of helping each other. Their relationship was renewed again in 1991 with the change of leadership in Ethiopia. Kenya’s President Moi made a state visit in the same year to meet the new Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi. The Ethiopian government gave him a red-carpet welcome, and the visit was arranged and requested by Meles. Moi’s visit witnessed the rejuvenation and continuity of their relationship. They are now cooperating in many of IGAD’s peacekeeping missions (Onyango 44-45). Ethiopia and Kenya are the only countries in East Africa that did not fight each other or enter into severe conflicts. Rather, they have worked together to ensure their collective security and maintain an indissoluble friendship.44

5.2.1. Ethiopia and Kenya's Role in Somalia

Muhammed who did his thesis on the role of external actors in the Somalia conflict has given us a complete image of the involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia. According to him, in addition to warlords (i.e. internally), Somalia has attracted the attention of large hosts of external actors who have a religious, political, and security agenda in Somalia. He also indicated the role of regional players, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, in curbing the spillover effect of the

44 Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs. Personal interview at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016
Somalia conflict in the Horn. He believes that internal and external actors have made Somalia a haven for conflict and military intervention (Muhammed 7-15).

Eritrea is also involved in the conflict in Somalia, a bid to counterbalance the dominant role of Ethiopia in that country. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have an unsettled border dispute between themselves. Military and political competition between the two has forced Ethiopia and Eritrea to wage a proxy war. While Ethiopia supports the Somalian government, Eritrea supports the Jihadists. This seems to have made finding a solution for the problem almost impossible (Merhatsidk 30).

Somalia is always claiming the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northern territories of Kenya, and this violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia and Kenya. The convergence of the two countries’ national interests against Somalia’s claim has been a substantial issue in regards to their cooperation since the 1960s (30-32). Currently, security more than trade can bring the two countries together.

Kenya’s relation with Somalia is sometimes amicable, and at other times, it is inimical. If we go back to colonial times, Kenya was fighting against the Somali irredentists who claimed its northern Somali inhabited territories. Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya did not make a large-scale war with the Somalian government except her fight with the Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA), which strived to liberate its Somali speaking territory. Since the 1960s, the Somali government morally and materially backed up the NFLA. Kenya and Somali made an agreement in 1967 that stopped the Somalian government from backing the northern secessionist groups (Onyango 204-220). Since then, Kenyans have maintained friendly relations with the Somalian people, unlike the relationship between Ethiopians and Somalians. Kenya is a place where a hundred thousand of Somalians have taken refuge since the civil war broke out in 1991. Kenya accommodated more
than half a million Somalian refugees in its territory. Even though the conflict in Somalia is acute and its negative impact is high in Kenya, Kenya remained neutral for many years (Muhammed, 43).

Recently, the Somalian problem changed its form when the Al-Shabaab has turned its face to Kenya using the northern Somalis’ resentment of Kenya for the underdevelopment of their region, unlike other parts of Kenya. Al-Shabaab began to destabilize Kenya by organizing many attacks and targeting its major tourism centers. To make matters worse, Al-Shabaab began to recruit ethnic Somali and other Kenyan Muslim nationals in Kenya, and most of them are youngsters. The Al-Shabaab abducted and killed many tourists. The biggest event so far is the assassination of 70 Kenyan civilians who were shopping in a large mall in 2013. The Kenyan government has now made security a big concern, and it has brought Ethiopia and Kenya much closer since their interest has converged. Kenya used to send troops to fight against terrorist groups to dry up the problem from the source. Instead of taking a unilateral action for self-defense, the Kenyan government has now integrated its troops with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is a peacekeeping force of AU through in UNSC resolution 2036 of 2012. The UNSC’s resolution provides legal entity, mandates, and invaluable financial and material support to Kenyan troops since the problem is not limited to Kenya (Anonymous Informants and Onyango 44-45). Both Ethiopia and Kenya are now working with the UN-mandated African Union force, AMISOM. Recently, Ethiopian Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn and the Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta renewed the six decades old military pact.

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46 Ibid; Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs. Personal interview at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016
The Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement in Somalia in general and the US preoccupation, in particular, have not made the Somalian beneficiary. Harper gives us a general picture of the crisis in Somalia as well as its broader impact on Somalia, its neighbors, and the world. She undermines the renewed US involvement in Somalia long after September 11, 2001, through the myth of connecting the place to the international network of the Al-Qaeda. Somalia has now become a new global ‘southern front’ against terrorism. Harper warns that viewing Somalia from the perspective of Al-Qaeda further aggravates the crisis in the region. She cites, for instance, the pirate’s problem as something unique to Somalia and not connected to the global terrorist network. Similarly, the local fundamental Islamic group maneuvers its own resources, and does not depend on any financial assistance from other terrorist organizations. Escalating the problem by taking harsh measures would close other alternatives and increase the demographic and geographic size of pirates and Al-Shabaab to freely run their agenda. Thus, Somalia would become a breeding ground for jihadists. Taking harsh measure cannot be a solution. For Harper, even though Somalia is a failed state, it is not a “failed society.” The community must be respected and should be the central element in solving their problem (Harper 5-30).

On the one hand, Berhe shows us the weaknesses of IGAD and on the other hand, the support of big financial and regional organizations to end the Somali problem. Berhe’s assessment is so vital because he shows the disagreements among member states of IGAD in their foreign policies. The absence of commonality has hindered them not to act uniformly rather than making a bunch of unsuccessful dialogues and meetings. The US’s interest in strengthening alliance against terrorism in the Horn has created a great opportunity for them to have a shared security concern under the US-led global war on terror (Berhe 105-131).
Ethiopia is the dominant force in IGAD. It manipulates the organization for its security purposes. Similarly, the AU recognizes IGAD's role only in facilitating its regional peacekeeping mission. It is not fully living up to its major objectives of creating a Free Trade Area (FTA), harmonizing fiscal and monetary policies, building regional infrastructure, advancing the information technology, energy, agriculture, environmental and natural conservation (Abdi & Seid 1-32). Its security concern outweighs its economic integration role. IGAD has its own sub-organ known as the Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) and plays a mediation role (Bruce 10-11).

Bereketeab discusses how the involvement of external actors in Somalia has lengthened the humanitarian crisis rather than shortening it. This “endless conflict” did not come to a conclusion though several reconciliation conferences have been conducted in and outside Somal. Moreover, Bereketeab mentions the failure or hindrance in some instances of solving the Somali problem by the Somalians through external involvement. A case in point is when the government established by the United Islamic Court (UIC). UIC successfully brought unity and law and order in Southern Somalia in 2005 for the first time since 1992. However, Ethiopia involved siding with notorious elements within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and ousted the UCI in 2006. The chance to restore peace in Somalia did not come to pass. Ethiopia left Somalia divided under different warlords. During these many instances, Ethiopia did not manage to change its military victory (over some dissident groups) into political success. Thus, instead of solving the problem, Ethiopia escalated the crisis among factious groups (Bereketeab 68-70).

Further research in this area shows the negative role of Ethiopia. Muhammed cited one instance that brought a massive humanitarian crisis due to Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia against insurgent groups in 2006-2009. This military intervention ensued the outflow of ten thousands of Somalians to neighboring countries (Muhammed 39).
Similarly, Elmi and Abdullahi associate the escalation of the problem in Somalia with Ethiopia. Ethiopia does not want a strong Somali that might claim its Somalia-inhabited region, Ogden. In an effort to maintain a weak and divided Somalia, Ethiopia is believed to have hampered any agreement like the Cairo Accord in 1997 and the Arta Peace Agreement in 2000 by presenting silly reasons such as not all factions and personalities were represented. Ethiopia buys individual negotiators to disrupt the negotiation process. Besides, after an agreement has been reached, Ethiopia gathers different warlords and dissidents in Addis Ababa, create another group (usually puppet figures) by replacing the previous ones, and show herself as a key player in the Somali crisis than accepting solutions coming from other sources. These are the main characteristics of the Somali politics under Ethiopian domination (Elmi and Abdullahi 32-54).

Elmi and Abdullah argues that if the US government stops helping Ethiopia not to orchestrate Somalian politics as she pleases, peace will be rampant throughout Somali. Ethiopia receives billions of dollars from the American government to punish any threat to the global peace in Somalia. To show the degree of hatred in Somalia, Elmi and Abdullah wrote that no amount of charitable work by the Ethiopian government could win Somalia’s heart (34-50).

Few informants used in this study seem to validate the view that Kenya will also benefit from the destabilized Somalia because no one uses Somalian ports for external trade, and hence, the port of Mombasa can always remain as the main passage to export and import goods of East African landlocked countries. Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan have a big project dubbed LAPSSET. The completion of this project, not only it makes possible the construction of railway
and supply of oil but also gives access to port Mombasa for the two landlocked countries of Ethiopia and South Sudan. This will contribute a lot to the development of Kenya.  

Concerning Ethiopia’s role in Somalia, the information on the Ethiopian government side shows the opposite. The government believes that Ethiopia is helping Somalia. It appreciates the Somalian government’s effort to pull Somalia out of this chaos. Moreover, the EPRDF government values its collaboration with IGAD, AU, UN, US, EU, and Somali groups for two decades for the establishment of a stable central government in Somalia. Their effort is so much so that the Somalia government can assert full control over its territory and assume the multi functions of a government in the near future. Henceforth, it is evident that the presence of a central government in Somalia means the reduction or end of cross-border incursions including terrorist attacks, migration of people (the rate of refugees will minimize), and the end of instability in Somali-inhabited provinces of both Ethiopia and Kenya. For me, carving a positive image seems to be an attempt to win the support of the international community to extend their financial and diplomatic support to the government of Ethiopia and Somalia.

5.2.2. Ethiopia and Kenya’s Role in South Sudan

Ethiopia plays an active role in the seven-member IGAD, which attempts to resolve regional conflicts and promote regional economic integration. Both Ethiopia and Kenya did their best to assist the Sudan government and the South Sudan people’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to reach an agreement in 2006, a signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and it finally led to a referendum that was conducted in Southern Sudan in 2011. People who voted for

independence over unity accounted for 98.8%, and the fate of the South Sudan was decided. The CPA heralded their secession from the North. Also, the two-state formation was finally accepted by the Sudan government, and a new nation and state was formed in East Africa next to Eritrea in 2011. That is the short story of the emergence of South Sudan. It was soon followed by conflict over border and sharing of oil revenue between the two Sudanese people. To make matters worse, internal conflict soon erupted in South Sudan between the Dinka president Salva Kiri who amassed excessive power over the new vice president Rik Machar. Ethiopia tried to solve the former problem by sending troops and played a vital broker role in mediating the two conflicting parties and the country has earned almost a universal praise by the global community. But in the case of internal division within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Ethiopia has not done a great job.49

Some scholars believe that ethnicity is a driving force for the conflict in South Sudan and other reasons for them are outlandish. However, few informants from IGAD’s office in MOFA saw ethnicity from the perspective of a personal power struggle between the president and the vice president that caused South Sudan to plunge into a huge crisis. There is no difference between the government and the party. The government of South Sudan failed to provide space for the people to make active participation in politics. The underlying reality is that pervasive corruption and patronage system are widespread throughout the country. Corruption is ubiquitous in South Sudan.50

Four conflict aspects are affecting the country: 1) South Sudan vs. SPLA; 2) Uganda vs. the Lord Resistance Army; 3) The Sudan Revolutionary Movement, a unified armed group for

49 *Ibid*
unity; and 4) Sudan itself. Uganda blames South Sudan for helping Lord Resistance Army. I do not discuss the role of these actors in South Sudan, but I will attempt to show the role of Ethiopia and Kenya to resolve problems in this IGAD member country.\textsuperscript{51}

Members of IGAD are not unifying their arms to stabilize South Sudan. They are taking unilateral actions. Ethiopia and Kenya are neutral and have nothing to do with this problem. However, they would not be able to stop Sudan and Uganda from destabilizing South Sudan. We cannot see any big action being taken by Ethiopia and Kenya to aggressively settle the problem. We do not see a big role for the AU either. The Africa Union Commission of Inquiry itself is not playing its part to investigate the problem there. The report itself is not functional.\textsuperscript{52}

The instability of South Sudan affects Ethiopia and Kenya in the following ways: First, Ethiopian and Kenyan nationals who engage in many business activities such as banking, aviation, insurance, construction, and information and communication technologies (ICT), transportation, hospitality, and wholesale and retail trade are highly affected. Second, mega projects such as the LAPSSET highway (that was jointly launched by Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan in 2012) and the standard gauge railway will be delayed. This instability will significantly affect the construction and completion of the above projects. Third, it will affect the contribution of a stable and secure South Sudanese government to the regional organizations such as IGAD, COMESA, and EAC (Odhiambo and Augustus, “Impact of Prolonged South Sudan Crisis”).

The two countries are now taking the following measures: First, they are trying to support the two conflicting parties to come to a negotiating table. Second, they have persuaded Uganda to withdraw her troops in South Sudan slowly. Third, both countries are willing to contribute soldiers

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid
to the proposed 5,500 troops to join the UNs Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Fourth, Ethiopia and Kenya are working to facilitate the release of political prisoners and bring down the magnitude of the conflict.  

5.2.3. Borders Conflicts between Ethiopia and Kenya

A. Militant Groups: The presence of Ethiopian opposition groups at the northern part of Kenya close to the border is a source of disagreement between the two countries. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has made Kenya a safe zone for its military confrontation with the Ethiopian government since it is ethnically linked to Kenya’s Oromo. There were some occasions that the Ethiopian government crossed over the Kenyan border and attacked this militant group. Some Kenyan police officers have been killed. The OLF is a secessionist group targeted to secede Oromia from the mainland of Ethiopia. The problem seems to be under control. They are no longer a great threat to Ethiopia. However, its past deeds are continuing to affect Ethiopia. OLF has successfully inculcated secessionist ideas in the minds of the younger Oromo generation like the existing government of Ethiopia. The latter is propagating a hatred propaganda toward the Amhara community for the wrongs of the past Amhara led governments. Now many youngsters, who have been charged up by these notions, have come to believe that they were previously treated like sub-humans with derogatory names and forced to hold a subordinate position by the Amhara group. Actually, the Oromo are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia in terms of demographic size. They have enormous resources since they own a big part of the country, territorially, and the Oromifaa language speakers are the largest linguistic group. They believe that they have been strongly mistreated and dominated by the past the so-called Amhara governments of MenelikII (1889-1912):

53 Ibid
conservative groups often see him as a colonizer) and Haile Selassie I (1931-1974) and currently by the Tigrean lead coalition EPRDF (Merhatsidk 39-40). The other problem is the Ogaden National Liberation Movement (ONLF) that wants to secede Ogaden from Ethiopia. This group fights for the recognition of its separate identity, has inflicted heavy causalities on Ethiopian soldiers, and attacks many development projects in the Somali region of Ethiopia up until recently. ONLF attacks and hides in Kenyan Somali land. However, a division within the movement has significantly reduced its full capacity (39-41).

**B. Cattle Rustling:** The practice of killing each other while stealing cattle is common among different pastoralist groups in the border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. Sometimes clan chiefs solve the problem through traditional ways. Other times the combined army of Ethiopia and Kenya address the problem. The way of curbing this among these societies has its own impact on economic integration. The pastoralist communities of the two countries also compete for resources (water and pastoral land) and clash at different times. Merhatsidk has identified pastoralist groups who are involved in cattle rustling in Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia and their targeted areas of raid. The practice of livestock raiding and counter raiding is a norm between Ethiopia and Kenya (Merhatsidk 47-48).

### Table 5.1. Pastoralist groups involved in cattle rustling in Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia and their targeted areas of raid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Targeted Areas of Raid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Korom, Nyangatom</td>
<td>North-Eastern Kenya, South-Eastern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Marakwet, Turkana, Sabiny</td>
<td>North-Eastern Uganda, Southern Ethiopia, South-Eastern Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Ethiopian pastoralists invade, they sometimes kill hundreds of pastoralists and take their cattle, occasionally in the ten-thousands. They go as far as North-Eastern Kenya and cover a larger space. Kenyan pastoralists, who live closer to Turkana and Borana in South Eastern Ethiopia, do the same. Though the severity and intensity of the conflict is noticed, it is often unreported.

D. **Contraband trade:** it is regarded as an illegal act that sets back the socio-economic development of Ethiopia. Different cross-border meetings have been conducted between Ethiopia and Kenya and raised the issue of contraband trade. The participants usually suggest the establishment of common custom offices at various checkpoints. However, since there is a long porous border between Ethiopia and Kenya, common custom offices do not help to curb the contraband trade. However, strengthening cross-border trade between the two countries will ultimately contribute to solving this problem. If legal trade is not encouraged by reducing taxes, then many will resort to contraband as the only means of selling goods without paying taxes, and consumers will also enjoy from accessing goods cheaply. This significantly affects the competitiveness of legal merchants and industries that produce the same good enter into the country through contraband.

Contraband trade has been negatively affecting the two countries for a long time because they do not collect revenue from this informal type of transaction. Here, contraband means goods produced in or outside the two countries sold by legal merchants (who receive goods in secret and mix it up with normal goods) or illegal smugglers (who bring goods across border areas) without paying tax for goods. People usually conduct this activity at night.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) ERCA. Front page accessed at http://www.erca.gov.et
On its front-page website, the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) highlights the type of goods seized while smuggled into the country. They are manufactured goods, namely electronic and electrical appliances, garments of various kinds, perfumes, cosmetics, pornography, habit-forming drugs, armaments, and other products. The main sources of these goods are Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, and Djibouti. We can also see the type of goods that are smuggled out of the country and which neighboring countries they go to. These are main export items from Ethiopia like coffee, cereals, animal skins, and fuel. This trade violates the law of the land because the government did not issue permits, licenses, or registration. The smugglers directly violate the import, export procedure, which affects the amount of revenue collected from tax for imported and exported goods. The web comments on the need to collaborate with Kenya to minimize or end the life span of contraband trade.\footnote{Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs. Personal interview at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016; Ms. Woderyeleshi. Personal interview at her office that facilitate Ethio-Kenyan relations. July 2016; and http://www.erca.gov.et}

The study conducted by ERCA has identified the following major factors that cause contraband trade: the need to avoid high taxation from the government and get enormous profit; to escape long and tiresome bureaucracy at checkpoints; a way of living in a country that is suffering from unemployment caused poverty; it is an act of disobedience to the government; those who involved in this business particularly in smuggling guns would like to commit crime ranging from destroying public infrastructures to killing government security forces; and the weaknesses of neighboring countries to get these contraband goods into their country.\footnote{ERCA. \textit{Contraband}. Accessed at http://www.erca.gov.et/index.php/customs/others/101-contraband}

The best solution that I have obtained from ERCA’s website is working in collaboration with the community by creating awareness about the harmful effects of contraband trade to the
national economy and the need to stand against it; using the media teaching aggressively about its
demerits to the mass; and allowing border trade with the neighboring countries. As it is explained
at ERCA’S web (http://www.erca.gov.et)

The objectives of the border trade are to let the residents in the border area fulfill
their demand for consumption goods, to let them use border trade as a means of
securing the necessities of life, to decrease the activities of contraband and to
promote legal trade. By opening the door to border trade, the government
anticipates some smugglers will abandon their vicious practice and turn into
productive citizens of the country.

Border trade between Ethiopia and Kenya is not strengthened well. They should work hard to
consolidate this form of trade. Fourth, taking severe punishment ranging from forcing smugglers
to paying large amounts of money to the forfeiting of the goods seized and imprisoning them up
to 20 years. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have now harmonized their policies on controlling
contraband trade, drug, human trafficking, and armed robbery.

**Conclusion**

Conflicts, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Horn have had a tendency of breaking up states.
Cases in point are the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, the independence of South Sudan from
Sudan, and the establishment of Puntland as an autonomous state of Somalia. Ethiopia has now
become an ethnically divided state under a dictatorial regime which is working hard to further
divide the country into different ethnic fiefdoms. There are strong demands from opposition groups
about forming an independent Oromia, Somalia, and Belishangual states within Ethiopia. The
government should treat the various ethnic groups equally for sustainable peace. The country is
sinking into a sea of ethnic animosity.
Conflicts within a country or among different countries have the potential to involve neighboring countries either to pacify or exacerbate the problem. Ethiopia and Kenya are actively solving conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan, and along their international border using their amicable long-lived relations. Based on the results of this study, it can be concluded that Ethiopia and Kenya are wittingly or unwittingly exacerbating the problem in Somalia. Ethiopia’s goal is to put a puppet government in Somalia, and Kenya’s goal is to supply a port service to major landlocked countries in the region, will probably cause them to weaken Somalia by destabilizing it.

Ethiopia and Kenya quarrel along their border because the Ethiopian government opposition groups are moving around Kenya. There is cattle raiding among pastoralists of both countries. Moreover, contraband trade has been affecting the normal trade for a long time. Ethiopia and Kenya conducted a series of discussions to solve their problems along their border lines. They harmonized their policies with regard to controlling contraband trade. Moreover, they are continuously creating awareness among conflicting clans about the negativity of killing and stealing each other’s property. Kenya also agreed with Ethiopia for the evacuation of anti-peace elements of the OLF and ONLF in its northern territory. By doing so, they tried to ensure the propagation of peace in the region so much so that economic integration might get momentum. The opinions of informants used in this study clearly show that a lot of work still remains.

It is useful to solve the underlying common social, ethnic, security, economic, and political problems in order to guarantees peaceful coexistence and economic interdependence for lasting harmony. If peace is widespread in the Horn, the major intended integration projects in trade, power, and road transportation will be fruitful.
Chapter 6. General Conclusion and Recommendation

Since the current global trend is in favor of the creation of regional economic groupings, Africa’s move towards this direction looks imperative, but a lot remains to be done for quicker integration. In order to curb balkanization, neo-colonialism, underdevelopment, and the adverse effect of globalization, pan-Africanist scholars prescribe economic integration. The Horn is highly affected by militants, drought, and famine. These have made the idea of strengthening African economic communities both indispensable and irreversible. In order to strengthen the integration process, Africans have made a transition from OAU to AU.

Though everything seems unattainable and the future is gloomy because of different conflicts here and there, I have hope for a freer, safer, and more prosperous Africa thanks to the role played by social media and the increase of educated people in Africa.

Key influential current leaders and thinkers, former leaders, civil society representatives, the private sector, and the academic community should work wholeheartedly on the issue of what needs to be done. If Africans had integrated before coming into contact with Europeans, they would not have been colonized because they would have acted in unison. Though Africans are latecomers to genuine integration, it is good to start late than never.

Concerning the infrastructural sector, my hypothesis is somewhat modified by the empirical reality. Contrary to my low regard for the role of road infrastructure, the data I used revealed to me that roads have helped economic integration between the two countries. Ethiopia has already constructed a network of roads for domestic and foreign needs. Roads facilitate the movement of goods and people both inside Ethiopia and outside with its neighboring countries. The Road that links Ethiopia with Kenya is almost completed. Roads that connect farms with
markets are constructed. Farmers can sell their products quickly and efficiently since they are integrated into the urban centers through roadways.

Transport costs in East Africa are still the highest in Africa, particularly for landlocked countries like Ethiopia. The poor state of road and energy sectors has been a challenge to a significant number of African nations. As a result, it has made the intra-African trade very expensive. Ethiopia is now battling to get it right.

Roadway is not an end in itself. Roads exist to stimulate trade. Economic cooperation and the ultimate integration cannot be achieved without the advancement of trade between the two countries. Based on the available trade between Ethiopia and Kenya and based on the findings of the interview I carried out in Addis, the trade between Ethiopia and Kenya is small compared to Kenya’s trade with EAC countries. Thus, it is possible to argue that trade has contributed to a small extent to the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. However, there are multiple advantages at hand such as a large number of consumers due to an enormous population, fast economic growth, and the completion of a long-asphalted road, which enable trade connectivity between the two countries. Moreover, Ethiopia’s policy change towards an industrialization led economy and high sources of foreign aid through loans, would stimulate high economic development and thereby high volume of trade between the two countries. As a result, trade will speed up economic integration.

The growth of trade might cause Ethiopia and Kenya to use a common currency that would eliminate the difficulties of exchange rates connected with export and import items. Moreover, the trade relation between Ethiopia and Kenya would ultimately lead them to harmonize their trade policies and work together to sell high quality products to their neighbors and the world, and increase their competitiveness in the international arena. It would later force them to establish a
common bank, common customs, and markets. Thus, they would be able to fight against the negative impact of the free market economy and economic globalization.

The data yielded by this study provide strong evidence that security plays a significant role in speeding up integration than trade and road combined. Security is the base for everything, and all other variables are dependent on it. For any integration to be successful, there should be peace and stability internally among various ethnic groups and externally with neighboring states. Internally, division among different ethnic groups should be solved. It is plausible to argue that without keeping internal unity, it will be an embarrassment to try to get to an economic or a political union with a neighboring country. Both the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments should work hard to address ethnic tensions in their respective countries. My redemptive suggestions will be conducting dialogue, promoting national reconciliation, bringing controversial matters to a bargaining table, establishing a fair distribution of power and resources, opening new opportunities, and reimagining one’s community. The redemptive strategies mentioned by Maathai such as stopping propaganda that forces ethnic groups to see each other as enemies, and avoiding unjust treatment among micro-nations are necessary to a lasting peace (Maathai 184-93 &214-20).

As far as regional peace and security are concerned, there should be a common policy and interest between Ethiopia and Kenya. They are working hard to end many conflicts in the Horn. While involved in conflict resolutions, they should also contribute their respective armies during the initial stage and then move to creating a common army that would help them to be immune from any outside threat. As a result, the prevalence of peace will benefit them to exchange goods and also sell their commodities to neighboring countries and the world without a problem.

Ethiopia and Kenya played a significant role in the establishment of a powerful regional force known as the East African Standby Force (ESAF) in 2005 in Addis Ababa. This kind of
regional force can be a good starting point for the formation of a continental army like NATO in Europe. ESAF is believed to keep the interests of Ethiopia and Kenya. But it is not working as it was intended. Concerning applying the same laws in resolving multiple problems along their common borders, Ethiopia and Kenya are successful in harmonizing their laws related to drug trafficking and contraband trade.

Radio and TV news are reporting about IGAD’s meetings and their great accomplishments in keeping peace and security in the Horn. The two countries are striving to become a powerful force in the region by building a giant economy that would enable them to punish any disruptive force. They, however, should take big actions like passing sanction on IGAD members that go against its objectives. IGAD should fully and actively be involved in taking a military intervention. Ethiopia should translate her friendly relationship with Kenya into meaningful positive results. Thus, building a common army and having a harmonized security policy will be the sine qua non of any bilateral or multilateral integration.

The geo-political significance of Ethiopia and Kenya is alluring. Ethiopia has a common border with almost all East African countries. Kenya is also found in a very important place for landlocked countries of the region to depend on her ports. Both Ethiopia and Kenya are found in a place where superpowers and global issues find their way to them. Turkish and Saudi Arabians investment have increased from time to time. China is giving many loans to Ethiopia to use it for the construction of basic infrastructures and the other main projects stated in the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of Ethiopia.

For the success of economic integration, there should be three players: the government, the people, and the private sector. About Ethiopian government, at the very beginning, it seemed democratic, but now it has turned out to become an absolute dictatorship. It is very unlikely that the government will resort to democracy. A far-reaching political reform is important to have a great impact on economic integration. The government has exaggerated the negative side effects of regional economic integration by announcing economic nationalism. It is better to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of integration. However, it is widely accepted that the advantages are greater than its disadvantages for many countries within the integration arrangement if a fair distribution of benefits and burdens could be ensured.

Integration is a political process. Leaders should respond to the expectations and perceptions of their people. The global reality is that if one country does not integrate, it will fragment its market, making it too small to be competitive, and then its transaction costs will be high and lags behind the other developing countries and it will not benefit. Leaders have to put a mechanism in place so as to accelerate economic integration in their region. Regional groupings have to have a mechanism to identify the slow actors, help them to catch up, and then get rid of the ineffective ones from the union. Screening and taking action on low performing members from those who are high performing is a thwarting task.

With regard to the unhealthy political environment, leaders, who are harming their opponents by putting in jail for their power, should not go unchallenged. The only solution is organizing and mobilizing the people to fight against their respective leaders who have been committing deliberate mass killing in their country, and as a result, the shackles of the masses will be broken. Establishing strong institutions is a master key to kicking all kinds of power abuses out of the society.
The idea of pan-Africanism is not well known by the majority of Africans. Fortunately, all the transportation and communication systems are improving and swiftly propagating in Africa. Transformations in these sectors would play a significant role in disseminating the philosophy of pan-Africanism as well as accelerating people to people interaction that ease mobilizing of the people into action and thereby economic integration will be prevalent (Agenda 2063 3-5).

From the evidence currently available, it seems fair to conclude that the likelihood of bringing the two countries together under one regime is slim. The same can be said for EAC countries which have clearly stated in their preamble to bring political union among themselves. One can expect them to gradually lose some parts of their sovereignty with which they can bridge the gap of differences in terms political, cultural, linguistic, and historical backgrounds. Leaders’ lack of interest even to sacrifice a small portion of their sovereignty is affecting the move towards a political union. However, two interview subjects from COMESA believe that through a federal state approach, it is easy to implement this idea.

The available evidence about the status of integration in East Africa shows that integration is resonating rhetorically without a substantial pragmatic impact on transforming the life of society. There are big plans and high hopes, most of them have never been fulfilled. It is crystal clear that no far-reaching political will has brought meaningful mobilization of the society, the private sector, government actors, and partners for sweeping change to come.

58 Mr. Bonsa. Personal interview at his office that facilitate the bilateral and regional trade relations and negotiations. June 2016; Mr. Gebre. Directorate General of IGAD affairs, interviewed at the directorate office of IGAD affairs. June 2016
59 Mr. Tesfaye Berhanu and Mr. Tamirat Yishaq (senior experts). Personal interview at the office of the COMESA Virtual Trade Facilitation System. July 2016
Appendix

Interview Questions Prompt

Based on the recommendations of Seidman (2013) and Mosley (2013), I have formulated my interview questions and arranged them into two separate categories of interviewees.

I. The first interview questions relate to information on the contribution of Ethiopia in the trading relations. These questions apply to workers and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kenyan Desk), Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ethiopian Road Transport, Ethiopian Electric Power Authority (ELPA) and Economic Development and ERCA in Addis Ababa.

1. Could you please tell me about your occupation?
2. How long have you been engaged in this work?
3. What are your contributions to your profession?
4. What are the main trading items of Ethiopia and Kenya?
5. How important are these items in strengthening trade relations between Ethiopia and Kenya?
6. What are the major benefits of trade relations between Ethiopia and Kenya?
7. Do you believe that the government is facilitating the trade relations between Ethiopia and Kenya?
8. Do you believe that the economic integration between Ethiopia and Kenya will make Ethiopia a beneficiary or a loser? Would you prefer the existing situation to continue or would you like to see a change?
9. Do you have anything that you would like to tell me about your profession or the trading relations between Ethiopia and Kenya?

II. The second types of Interview Questions were helpful for assessing the contributions of Ethiopia to security. Here, I used it to explore the activities of Ethiopia and Kenya to bring peace and stability along their international borders and the Horn of Africa for the success of
their integration. I interviewed workers and officials of the different units of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs- IGAD Desk Office, Kenya Desk and Horn Affairs in Addis Ababa.

1. Could you please tell me about your responsibilities in your institution?

2. What are the sources of conflicts along the international borders between Ethiopia and Kenya? Why?

3. What are the roles of your organization in facilitating peace and stability in Ethiopia and Kenya as well as the Horn of Africa?

4. Do you believe that the collaboration between Ethiopia and Kenya in peace and security areas facilitate or impede the bilateral or multilateral integration? Why?

5. What are the benefits of working jointly in peace and security for cross-border trading relations between Ethiopia and Kenya and for East Africa in general?

6. What are the major strengths or weaknesses, successes or failures of IGAD, Ethiopia, and Kenya in security areas?

7. Do you have anything that you would like to tell me about IGAD or the roles of Ethiopia and Kenya in peace and security areas?
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Curriculum Vitae

Education

- **Syracuse University, Syracuse**, NY, USA
  Master’s Degree in Pan African Studies, June 2017

- **Addis Ababa University**, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
  Master’s degree in History, January 2011

- **Debub University: Dilla College of Teacher’s Education and Health Science**, Dilla, Ethiopia
  Bachelor of Arts in History, June 2005

Skills and Languages

- Certificate in Microsoft Power point, Excel, Word, Higher Diploma, IELTS, BSC, Coaching & Mentoring & Team Building
- Proficient in English and fluent in Amharic and lower level in French

Work Experience

**Teaching Assistantship from 15 August 2015 to 14 May 2017 Syracuse University, NY, USA**
- Facilitated courses on societies, politics, cultures, and economies of Africa
- Evaluated students’ performance to measure their understanding
- Provided feedback on regular basis about questions related to their field of study
- Advised students on how to study effectively and achieve better academic success

**Teaching Assistantship from September 2005 to September 2008 Debub Ethiopia College, Hawssa, Ethiopia**
- Taught undergraduate students
- Prepared teaching modules on ancient and medieval history of the world

**Lecturer and Head of the Department of History and Heritage Management October 2012 to July 2015 Debre Berhan University, Debre Berhan, Ethiopia**
- Taught undergraduate students and lead the department
- Organized seminars and workshops to inform and educate on major Ethiopian and African issues
- Worked as Contributor and Editorial Chief of the college magazine to raise historical awareness
- Conducted vital research towards project on “Identifying Tourism Resources and Potentials in Angolela and Tera District”
- Facilitated the development of new Water-Based Tourism that the local
community, entrepreneurs, and private sector could participate in
• Taught the historical and cultural value of preserving local heritages by training community members on conservation, writing on the history of local patriots and helping to establish a memorial park
• Advised the Faculty Executive Board on the leadership and management of the faculty, using aptness in Social Sciences
• Rallied student participation in decision-making fora within the department that affected their academic success

**Lectures and Presentations**

• Ancient, Medieval and Modern History of Ethiopia
• Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial History of Africa
• Ancient, Medieval and Modern History of the World
• Introduction to Civics and Ethical Education
• Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial History of Africa
• The life and history of Nelson Mandela
• The Battle of Adwa and its major Outcomes
• Ethiopianism and the Ras Teferian Movement

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Available on request