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Abstract

This thesis serves to substantiate the critical importance of language and cultural training for our nation's military leaders, particularly those in the U.S. Army, in the ever-changing global security environment. Beginning with an overview of the inseparable relationship between language, culture, and society, the first chapter introduces this study surrounding two Army Reserve Officer Training Corps training programs that focus their attention on developing leaders capable of transcending linguistic and cultural boundaries. The second chapter presents a case study of post 9/11 military operational deficiencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and delves into current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army policy surrounding language and cultural training for our armed forces. The following three chapters outline in depth the two programs in question - Project Global Officer (Project GO) and the Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program - and analyze their progress towards meeting DoD targets for language capabilities. These chapters include surveys and interviews with past program participants from Syracuse University, as well as select ROTC staff members, in order to analyze the programs' viability moving forward. Finally, by considering the current ongoing operations of the U.S. military, the final chapter brings into focus the importance of language and cultural training as a strategic necessity for an adaptive and responsive joint force in the 21st century.

Towards a Multilingual and Cross-Cultured Officer Corps:
A Study of Language and Culture Training Programs for Army ROTC Cadets

by

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M.A., Syracuse University, 2016

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Master's Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in *Linguistic Studies*

Syracuse University

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I am both humbled and honored to be commissioning as a Military Intelligence Second Lieutenant in the United States Army on May 12, 2017. It is my hope that through service to this great nation, my footprints in the field of language and cultural training for the force can one day have a global impact — distancing us from hatred and violence, and bringing us closer to a world of peace and understanding with our fellow humans

Table of Contents

1. Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1. Defining the subject	1
1.2. Literature review	7
1.3. Methodology	12
2. Chapter 2: History	19
2.1. Cultural and linguistic barriers on the battlefield in the post 9/11-era	20
2.2. Policy	23
3. Chapter 3: Project Global Officer (Project GO)	35
3.1. History and overview	35
3.2. Program goals	36
3.3. Program structure and application process	37
3.4. Research outcomes	38
4. Chapter 4: Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) Program	44
4.1. History and overview	44
4.2. Program goals	46
4.3. Program structure and application process	47
4.4. Research outcomes	51
5. Chapter 5: Synthesis	57
5.1. Overarching research findings	57
5.2. Recommendations	67
6. Chapter 6: Conclusions	75
6.1. Reflections	75
6.2. Areas for expansion of research	77
7. Appendices	80
8. Bibliography	82
9. Vita	85

List of Illustrative Materials

Figures

1. Selected chain of command related to language policy and implementation	24
2. Current Cadets Questionnaire (a)	58
3. SU ROTC Alumni Questionnaire (a)	59
4. Current Cadets Questionnaire (b)	61
5. SU ROTC Alumni Questionnaire (b)	61
6. Current Cadets Questionnaire (c)	64
7. SU ROTC Alumni Questionnaire (c)	64
8. Current Cadets Questionnaire (d)	65
9. Current Cadets Questionnaire (e)	66
10. SU ROTC Alumni Questionnaire (e)	67

Chapter 1: Introduction

“Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice”.

(“Defense Language Transformation Roadmap” 1)

1.1 Defining the study

1.1.1 Language, society and culture

For adult learners of a second language, speaking with a native speaker can be highly intimidating. It requires a great deal of effort on the part of the non-native speaker: simultaneously listening for words and expressions they know, as well as decoding grammar and potentially translating into their native tongue. This mental processing is demanding a lot simultaneously from the learner. Not only is a learner grappling with linguistic features of the new language, they must cope with any anxiety and self consciousness about public speaking, and they must analyze the appropriateness of their response for the social situation at hand. Speaking and listening encompass much more than whether a learner’s grammar is correct — it also concerns whether what they are saying is socially appropriate and transcends cultural or social boundaries. It is this bridge between language, society and culture that I will begin to explore in this study.

Within linguistics, the field of sociolinguistics considers the large role that language plays in society. We use language to understand much more about our fellow interlocutors than just the string of words they are producing. According to the Linguistic Society of America, “we use language to send vital social messages about who we are, where we come from, and who we associate with,” and we use this knowledge to, “judge a person's background, character, and

intentions” (“Sociolinguistics”). In many ways, the society in which we live determines the way we use language with one another, as well as the way we perceive other languages/language variations. Some linguists believe the connection works in the other direction as well: that the language we speak has the power to shape the way we perceive and interact with others in society (“Language and Thought”). It can be stated, then, that society shapes our language and language, in turn, shapes our societies.

The role that culture plays in both society and language, particularly the ways in which we use language, is indisputable. Our various cultures have such a strong grasp on the rest of our lives that they bleed into our societal norms and the way we speak with one another. The intersection of these three domains is of particular interest to my research as I will argue throughout this study that they are inseparable of one another in many ways. Through the lens of language and cultural training programs for military leaders, I will be reinforcing the importance of incorporating cultural and societal considerations into language curricula in order to address the challenges language learners face when they finally interact with native speakers outside the classroom walls. While culture encompasses a great deal about our daily lives, from the way we dress to what we eat, I will focus more on the unspoken cultural norms than the visual representations. However, it is important to note that this training can not purely overlook the important role that dress, gestures and mannerisms play in cross-cultural interactions.

To return to our initial example of speaking with a native speaker as an adult second language learner, sociolinguistics considers these many challenges as the development of a speaker’s *communicative competence*. Communicative competence is not only the ability of a speaker to produce grammatical sentences and thoughts, but also to produce sentences that are socially appropriate for each situation (“Goal: Communicative Competence”). It is easy for a

native speaker to think of a sentence that is grammatically correct but largely inappropriate for a given situation. For example, if you are consoling someone whose dog had recently passed away, it would not be considered appropriate to say, “I’m so excited because I just got a big raise at work!”. Our ability to determine if an utterance is appropriate for a given situation comes from our communicative competence as a speaker — something that must be developed over time for adult second language learners. Particularly if the language learner comes from a society or culture with largely different values and norms than that of a their native-speaking counterpart, decoding interactions takes a great deal of knowledge beyond the grammaticality of a sentence. Language ability alone, then, can not grapple this situation by itself. For a military leader who has recently learned a new language, the importance of understanding the societal and cultural influences on what a native speaker is saying can quickly become life or death. Developing the communicative competence of multilingual leaders, being the ones who have some of the most critical interactions with foreign nationals, must be prioritized in the language classroom. For many new commissioned officers, this starts with the experiences they had learning about language and culture prior to formally entering the ranks.

1.1.2 Army ROTC

While the focus of this study is more broadly on the importance of language and cultural training programs, it is also a case study of two of these types of programs offered to future Officers in the United States Army. My particular interest in this area stems from my participation in the United States Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The purpose of ROTC is to prepare college students to be commissioned as Officers in the U.S. military upon

receipt of their degree.¹ In the Army, your rank while in the ROTC is that of a Cadet, meaning that you are training in preparation to become a second lieutenant. Cadets can be awarded competitive, merit-based scholarships that cover some or all of their college expenses. Signing an enlistment contract with ROTC, regardless of scholarship status, results in required service upon commissioning. In the Army, this can be served on active duty, in the Reserves or in the National Guard. While it varies depending on branch of the military, ROTC programs commission over 70% of second lieutenants into the active Army and commissioned 40% of the current active duty Army General Officers (*U.S. Army Cadet Command*).² As a U.S. Army Cadet, my research and thesis focused solely on the U.S. Army unless otherwise noted.

While ROTC is typically a program for undergraduate students working to receive the required Bachelor's degree for a commission, graduate students like myself are also able to enroll in ROTC. Additionally, while the program typically consists of 18 to 22 year-olds with no prior service in the military, there are also cadets who were enlisted soldiers and now wish to receive a commission and become officers. As with graduate students, the age range of "prior service" cadets, as they are called, tends to be slightly higher than that of the typical ROTC cadet. ROTC cadets encompass a wide range of backgrounds as they hail from different regions of the United States, come from various socioeconomic backgrounds and religions, and may even have a native language other than English. There is even a possibility for some foreign nationals, including those with dual American citizenship, to become a U.S. Army Cadet. When considered as a segment of the college student population, ROTC touts a lot of diversity.

¹ The Reserve Officer Training Corps is but one path for someone to become a commissioned officer in the U.S. military. The other most common paths are: attendance at a U.S. service academy (for example, the United States Military Academy) or at Officer Candidate School for their specific military branch. While less common and carrying specific restrictions, direct commissioning is also possible in all branches of the U.S. military except the Marine Corps.

² Air Force ROTC commissions a similar amount of officers into their ranks through this program, while less Naval officers come from ROTC. Naval ROTC programs commission officers into the U.S. Navy, Marines and Coast Guard.

Army ROTC cadets are awarded a plethora of opportunities to broaden their horizons on both personal and professional levels. From internships and extracurriculars to specialty schools (Airborne School, Mountain Warfare School, etc.), the opportunities abound. As volunteer future leaders of the world's most powerful Army, cadets tend to be intrinsically motivated to take advantage of these opportunities to better themselves. Be it one weekend a month, the entirety of a semester or the stretch of their summer vacation, cadets maintain a busy schedule preparing themselves to be professional leaders. Advertising itself as the "best leadership course in the world", Army ROTC offers various kinds of Cadet Professional Development Training (CPDT) to provide "a deeper look into what it means to lead America's Soldiers" (*U.S. Army Cadet Command*). Due to their focus on language and cultural training, two CPDTs offered to cadets under US Army Cadet Command (USACC), the governing body of ROTC, are of particular interest to this study.³

The two programs we are considering in this study aim to develop a more open-minded and culturally aware Army Officer through exposure to other languages and cultures from the earliest stage of their military career. Historically speaking, linguistic and cultural training are not new to the Army. However, as I will outline later in this chapter and in chapter two, this type of intensive language training has been typically reserved for enlisted personnel as opposed to commissioned officers. In the wake of their 9 and 10-year anniversaries in 2017, this study aims to shed light on how these groundbreaking initiatives intend to create a more culturally and linguistically sensitive Army Officer.

³ The relationship between USACC and ROTC will be further clarified in chapter 2.

1.1.3 The bridge between sociolinguistics and Army Cadets

While it may not be expressly clear how officer preparatory training in the Army relates to linguistics, the two are linked in a number of ways. Within the field of sociolinguistics, for example, there are a number of fundamental concepts that are being considered throughout this study. These include but are not limited to: speech communities, social networks, learner motivations (integrative versus instrumental learners), multilingualism and language attitudes. More broadly, as mentioned above, my research focuses on the inseparable linkage between language, culture and society.

It could be said that the Army (and its fellow military branches) has its own unique language, society and culture. The language consists of many acronyms and technical terms, as well as a great deal of slang that can be branch-specific or job-specific. The society it encompasses aims to be representative of the U.S. population in regard to its diversity. Today's Army is accepting of all genders, religions, races, sexual orientations, native languages and social classes. It is their hope to utilize all Americans in our all-volunteer force to their full capacity and strengths in service of our nation. Finally, the culture of the Army is officially based on its seven core values: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage (*Army.mil*). The Army culture, and military culture more broadly, is arguable even more global than these seven tenants suggest. This study will look broadly into the Army in order to see what kind of changes may surface as the officer corps becomes more multilingual and cross-culturally competent in the years to come through programs such as these.

On a lower level, this study considers ROTC as a subset of the Army population. In particular, I am interested in future commissioned officers and the language and cultural training they receive as cadets. One of ROTC's biggest goals is to train their leaders to be adaptive. The

word “adaptive” appears regularly in the study of military science, particularly as it pertains to modern warfare and our need for “adaptive leaders” on the battlefield. With a constantly evolving enemy and the nature of warfare becoming more and more unpredictable, every branch of the military is looking for ways to train their leaders to think critically, problem solve and take disciplined initiative. Adaptability is an example of one of the Army’s “21st Century Soldier Competencies” that are stressed amongst ROTC cadets (*The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*). As it happens, this is also a skill trained in the language classroom as instructors attempt to prepare students for the various situations they may encounter when using the language in real life. Cadets are students in their own right as well as students in the study of leadership. In order for them to be responsive when they are faced with real-life situations, they must have been trained to be agile and to think outside the box. This level of versatility and higher-order thinking is imperative for military leaders and is simultaneously reinforced in the language learning classroom. Playing off one another, ROTC leadership classes try to make cadets be okay with feeling uncomfortable in new situations, while their language training programs are doing the same in return.

1.2 Literature review

As noted above, language and cultural training are not new to the U.S. military. They have long been integrated into training cycles, particularly pre-deployment, amongst all branches of the service. The necessity of cultural training in particular has been linked to unit readiness and mission success repetitively by civilian researchers and members of the military since the early 2000s. Cultural training for the military has gained credible ground in the post 9/11-era, as I will discuss in chapter two.

Despite this progress, great strides still must be made in the field of language and cultural training for the warfighter. As our wars continue to involve non-state actors as well as nations with highly diverse cultures and societies, it is mission-critical that our training programs adapt to these asymmetric wars through new perspectives of the multi-cultural battlefield in order to assure not only success, but force protection. Similar to many of the military personnel and academics I highlight below, it is my belief that this cultural training will continue to be inherently lacking so long as it continues to ignore the role that language plays in cross-cultural understanding. In order to get closer to truly understanding a foreign culture and society, one must see it through the lens of its own language(s). Language training, then, needs to be further integrated into the Army's cultural training cycles. The two ROTC programs in this study are some of the ways to accomplish this.

One body within the Department of the Army that has contributed an extensive amount to this research is the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). The institute, located in Monterey, California and established in 1963, provides on location instruction in over two dozen languages to members of the armed forces, civilian government employees and foreign military students (*DLIFLC*). A highly sophisticated and evidence-based learning center, the DLIFLC has two academic journals, *Applied Language Learning* and *Dialog on Language Instruction*, that hope to advance the fields of linguistics, education and more (*DLIFLC*). Attendance at the institute is not available to cadets until they commission, however, and attendance remains limited within the greater Army. One must be assigned a job that requires a certain language in order to be considered for acceptance to the institute in Monterey. With that being said, most officers will not have to privilege to attend a DLIFLC language course while they serve, save a few specialty positions. Their teaching methodology and

military-infused curriculum, though, serve as an excellent foundation for these two cadet training programs to consider.

In a review of the literature regarding language and cultural training as it exists within the U.S. Army, I was able to find many articles published in the last few decades assessing the value of this training for specific operations and, more globally, mission success. In this section, I will highlight some of the articles that will be referenced throughout the study as they underline the significance of this training as well as identify our current deficits in the force.

In the March-April 2006 edition of the *Military Review*, “The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army,” Major (Retired) John W. Davis of the U.S. Army Reserve stated in his article that, “a lack of foreign language skills is our Army’s Achilles’ heel. Timeliness and accuracy is everything in intelligence, and thus, a linguist’s skills are more important than firepower. With the former, you might not need the latter” (Davis 110). His article, entitled “Our Achilles’ Heel: Language Skills,” stresses that we can not rely solely on linguists to provide our soldiers and leaders with the linguistic and cultural interpretations they need in the line of duty. One of the major reasons for this, as he points out early in his article, is that we often fail to have a requisite number of linguists available to assist the whole force. Rather, we are forced to employ whoever is readily available when we deploy. To give an example from recent history, which we will discuss at greater length in chapter 2, “Army officials predicted a need for hundreds of Arabic speakers before Operation Iraqi Freedom [March 2003 - December 2011]. The Army ended up with 42. We deployed 140,000 troops to Iraq with 42 interpreters!” (Davis 110). Published in 2006, Davis’s beliefs that, “foreign language skills are mission-essential for an expeditionary army” continue to reign true in today’s Army and will for the foreseeable future (Davis 110).

The writings of Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov, the U.S. Army's Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (LREC) Program Manager, were the source of a great deal of my research into how the Department of the Army approaches LREC training.⁴ A 2011 article of his that I considered, "Operational Culture in the U.S. Army: The Fires CoE CFL Strategy Sets the Standard for the Rest of TRADOC", discusses the importance of cross-cultural competency for leaders in U.S. Army Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery, in particular. However, I believe his points can be applied to Army leaders, and particularly commissioned officers, at large. He states that leaders, "must have an understanding of how other people think and act, as well as an appreciation of cross-cultural diversity and beliefs" (Ibrahimov 19). An interesting and highly relevant word choice, he highlights that it is not only a deeply rooted understanding of others that is needed to excel in a constantly changing operational environment, but also an appreciation of all that these cultures bring to each unique situation. Recognizing these differences as such — as welcomed additions rather than detractors — brings the necessity of cultural training into full view. Noting that LREC training not only benefits leaders and soldiers when it comes to defeating the enemy, Dr. Ibrahimov continues that, "this cultural sensitivity is just as important within a Soldier's organization and with other sister services and allies," as it will help them develop a sense of empathy and compassion that births respect for others in and out of uniform (Ibrahimov 19-20). To be truly adaptive leaders, he states, we need not only understand the culture and language of the peoples with whom we interact, but also "the implications these considerations have on how operations are conducted" within that operational environment (Ibrahimov 20). Recognizing the implications of cultural and linguistic barriers on our missions

⁴ Some organizations within the Army (for example, the Combined Arms Center) have recently (2017) begun referring to LREC as CREL or "Culture, Regional Expertise and Language". This change has not been effectuated across the Army of the DoD as of this time. As the literature and policy pertaining to these matters is all written regarding "LREC," this is the terminology I have maintained for the purposes of this study. In chapter 2, I will go into greater detail on the background of LREC as well as how it is managed within the Department of the Army and Department of Defense.

will shed light on the gaps in our strategy that must be filled by more training in order to increase our potential for mission success.

Another article authored by Dr. Ibrahimov, this time in conjunction with Colonel Monty L. Willoughby, gives a more recent overview of the Army's take on language and cultural training. Published in the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* in their July-September 2014 edition, "Army Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Program" gives an overview of the necessity of further LREC training, current methods used by the Army and an assessment of where we currently stand. The article goes into great detail regarding the degree of proficiency required in language, regional expertise and cross-cultural understanding depending on if the soldier/officer is a part of the conventional force or special forces, and if their specific job (such as a linguist or a Foreign Area Officer) requires it (Willoughby 13). As pointed out in the article, LREC training and education have benefits that extend beyond the surface, "to build on the foundation of an individual's existing leader attributes which in turn reinforces the core leader competencies of leading others, developing oneself, and achieving results" (Willoughby 13). This is all to say that we are not only creating a more multilingual and cross-cultured officer, but we are creating a better leader overall through LREC training as we reinforce the core principles of what it means to be a leader.

While a great deal of literature regarding language and cultural training in the military (and the Army in particular) exists, there is less literature that pertains specifically to commissioned officers as opposed to enlisted personnel. Furthermore, the study of officer preparatory programs as a subset of language and cultural training is scarce. There have been no comprehensive studies thus far on the impacts that culture and language CPDT programs in ROTC will have on the Army Officer Corps. For this reason, I believe that this study will

contribute to the literature available on officer preparatory programs, language and cultural training in the Army in general, as well as the persistent value of cross-cultural competence and multilingualism as it pertains to military readiness and success.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Research approach

Research for this study consisted of a review of literature published in the civilian and military sectors, particularly those published by linguists in both domains. I found it to be particularly valuable to consider journals such as the *Military Review* and the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* as their contributors come from civilians as well as military personnel engaged regularly with the force. Easily accessible online, I was able to find a number of volumes from each of these two journals whose themes hovered around our central question of cultural and linguistic training in the Army. I also considered military policy put into effect by the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army (particularly their Training and Doctrine Command), and U.S. Army Cadet Command. While policy does not always line up perfectly with history, in chapter 2 I will discuss the post-9/11 wartime era and how our actions, or lack thereof, drove policy changes regarding language and culture training. Last, for civilian publications, I considered readings pertaining to sociolinguistics and some of its major concepts such as social networks, high and low prestige languages, multilingualism and learner motivations.

While not the primary interest to this study, of secondary interest is the way in which the Army trains all soldiers on cross-cultural competency and foreign languages. As I will describe in chapter 2 when I give an overview of the Department of the Army's command structure and

responsibility of LREC capabilities, there are specific organizations within the Army that plan and implement this training for the force at large. As ROTC's primary focus is to train the whole officer and not just crosscultural/language training, there is a great deal that ROTC can learn from how it is done in the larger Army.

The two Army ROTC programs that I am considering in this study are Project Global Officer (Project GO) and the Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) Program. Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, will give in-depth overviews of the histories, goals and outcomes of these two Cadet Professional Development Training programs. For the purposes of this chapter, Project GO is a language-intensive program while CULP is a more culturally-immersive option. They are both optional training for cadets and typically take place in the summer.

In addition to my literary review, I conducted research with a target group of alumni of the two CPDTs above. Surveys were disseminated via email to cadets who are currently enrolled in Army ROTC at Syracuse University, as well as those who have graduated in the last two years and are currently serving in the U.S. Army. The only provision was that they had participated in Project GO and/or CULP. The decision to include only Syracuse University cadets and alumni was based on practicality and access, in addition to my desire to limit the scope of this study. My survey participants consisted of 23 subjects: 15 current Army ROTC Cadets at Syracuse University and 8 alumni who are serving as lieutenants in the active Army.⁵ While few Cadets participated in both programs, 19 of 22 surveyed participated in CULP (including all alumni) and 8 of 22 participated in Project GO (only 1 alumni). As these numbers are small in comparison to the number of cadets that participate in these programs nationally every year, as I will discuss in

⁵ These numbers include all 15 current Syracuse University Army ROTC cadets who have completed Project GO and/or CULP. There are 13 alumni who graduated in the last two years after having completed these programs. After attempts to contact them all, I received 8 responses to my alumni survey.

chapters 3 and 4, the conclusions drawn in this are limited in their scope. The implications of this will be considered at large in chapters 5 and 6 as I synthesize my research and draw conclusions on the effect on the Army in years to come.

After voluntarily agreeing to take the survey, cadets and lieutenants were asked a series of questions via a Google Form. The first two sections of the survey consisted of personal information and questions regarding their linguistic background prior to departure for Project GO or CULP. The third section addressed the learner's motivations for studying language, and their attitudes pertaining to language and cultural training for officers. The following two sections asked specific questions about their participation in both programs and their language study thereafter. The survey concluded with general questions pertaining to whether they would suggest these programs to other cadets and whether they believed such training should be mandated for all future Army officers. Participants were given an option to leave any final comments regarding Project GO, CULP, and language and cultural training in general as it pertains to developing adaptive Army leaders. An option was given for participants to remain anonymous should they so wish.

Reflected in the surveys taken by the cadets and lieutenants, there are a number of secondary subjects I will consider in my study. A portion of these questions were intended for an additional research study on learner attitudes and motivations. These additional findings give depth to this study in a number of ways and will be covered in chapter 5. A number of these questions aim to determine how and why cadets are motivated to learn about another language or culture, and if they see personal career value in this training. It is my hope that an analysis of these results will provide further insight into the potential for multilingualism and cross-cultural

competency within the cadet ranks — and later the officer ranks — and how we can best harness this energy to promote language and cultural training programs.

After having reviewed the results of my surveys, I chose two current cadets at Syracuse University to interview about their experiences in Project GO and CULP. Cadets Lynn Chui and Jacqueline Page contributed a great deal to this study through their stories, experiences and opinions regarding CPDTs in general, as well as language and cultural training for cadets and Army officers. Cadet Page also provided a written reflection on her CULP mission that will be cited largely in chapter 4.

In addition, I interviewed ROTC staff, known in ROTC as Cadre, on their experiences with the programs from an advisory position. The two staff members I interviewed were our Human Resources Assistant, Christopher Shultz, and a Military Science Instructor, Sergeant First Class Michael Whiteley. Mr. Shultz plays an integral role in the advertising of both programs and was a member of the ROTC staff while all of our survey participants were in the program. Mr. Shultz aids cadets in completing the application process and preparing for departure to their training. A retired Army Signal officer and graduate of ROTC, Mr. Shultz sees a great deal of value behind these CPDTs and heavily promotes them to freshmen and sophomores. SFC Whiteley has been at Syracuse University since 2015 and has noticed the development of some of our younger Cadets first-hand following their return from Project GO and/or CULP missions. His insights throughout this study, particularly in chapter 5, will shed light on the importance of this development from the perspective of a Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) — and one in the combat arms, at that.⁶

⁶ A Non-commissioned Officer, or NCO, is an enlisted Sergeant (E-5 or above) in the U.S. Army.

1.3.2 Goals of this study

This study aims to consider the United States Army Officer Corps on a large scale in regard to its social networks, and the effects that more language and cultural training for commissioned officers will have on the Army community, unit readiness and mission success. I will address the power of these social networks to promote this type of training, both at a high level through policy and at the lowest level in ROTC: an individual university. On a smaller scale, I will also consider individual learner motivations in future Army officers for language/cultural learning, whether the specific language they are studying affects their motivation(s), and how cadets feel they have been personally shaped by their experiences in Project GO and/or CULP. While this study is not intended to prove or disprove any specific hypotheses, it can be summarized into the following three goals. First, I will present a background of our deficiencies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era as a proposed argument for the recent uptick in military policy regarding expanded language and cultural training for our armed forces. Next, I will consider the Department of Defense and the Army's goals for language and cultural capabilities in the years to come, and to assess if CULP and Project GO are helping us meet these targets. Finally, I intend to analyze both programs more closely, proposing any changes to their design based on feedback from cadet participants and ROTC cadre.

There are a number of overarching questions guiding my research for this study. While I may not be able to answer all of these in the scope of this study, they have driven both my methodology and analyses. Some of my more global questions pertaining to the Army at large, and particularly the Army officer corps, include:

- What deficiencies did the Army have in post 9/11 wars in regard to language and cultural training? How were these deficiencies recognized and what plan of action was created?
- What are the Army's current goals for language and cultural training amongst the force? Are there specific goals for the officer corps?
- In what ways will these two ROTC CPDT programs help the Army reach their goals for language and cultural training, and are they sufficient in training the officer corps?
- In what ways would multilingualism and cross-cultural understanding affect the Army community, unit readiness and mission success? Is there a relationship between this type of training and force protection?

Other questions of a more limited scope that pertain to these specific ROTC programs and the individual officer include:

- Are these two CPDTs meeting the goals they initially set out to reach? In what ways do they need to be ameliorated or expanded, if at all?
- Are future Army officers intrinsically or extrinsically motivated to study language and culture? Is language prestige a factor? Does this affect the ways in which we place value on language and cultural training?
- In what ways does language and cultural training affect the individual officer? What kind of officer are we developing through this training? What are the individual benefits of this training, both in and out of uniform?
- How can our social networks promote and place value on language and cultural training at our ROTC units?

These questions will be discussed throughout this study and answered to the best of my ability in chapter 5. Many of these questions are intentionally broad and can not be answered within the scope of study. However, they serve a distinct purpose of drawing our attention to the many ways in which LREC training can and will affect the future of the Army.

In the following chapter, I will outline the recent history leading up to the creation of these programs. I will start by giving a broad overview of the challenges met by some American soldiers and leaders in the post-9/11 wars. Limiting the scope of the study in this way allowed me to focus my attention on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many believe, including myself,

that these wars sparked an uptick in interest of how we prepare our forces for battle in culturally and linguistically diverse environments. After discussing the ways in which our language and cultural deficiencies failed us in these wars, slowly demanding that our attention be refocused on appropriate training, I will give an overview of the current Department of Defense policies that gave way to the creation of Project GO and CULP.

Chapter 2: History

“Absent a culturally astute, trusted linguist, we are forced to rely on whomever can help us muddle through. Ours, the most thoroughly trained, best-equipped Army in history, relies on virtually unknown foreigners vulnerable to insurgent death threats”.

(Davis 111)

As Major (Ret.) John Davis highlighted above in his aforementioned article, “Our Achilles’ Heel: Language Skills,” our military is forced to rely on whomever is available to deploy with our troops when an operation begins. Far too often, as noted in chapter 1, this number falls drastically short of what is required for our soldiers and leaders. Additionally, security concerns arise as we hire civilians, both U.S. and otherwise, to fill these gaps in our military. After a potentially expedited vetting process, the real-time abilities of a contracted linguist to interpret local dialects and cultures may remain to be verified at deployment time. Moreover, a civilian linguist would also likely struggle to understand the inner workings of the military, their role in combat operations, and the military culture/language at large. Consider now how many conversations a soldier may overhear on a patrol in a city or village, absent the appropriate linguist. What are the locals saying? Do they support our presence or are they against it? Does their conversation contain critical intelligence that our soldiers need; potentially information that could save their lives, but the insurmountable language barrier between them is an impediment? If the soldier does understand some of the language, would they be able to interpret the important cultural and sociological undertones in the exchange? If there is a linguist, do they recognize them? All things considered, how much are we disadvantaging and potentially endangering our troops through insufficient and/or inefficient culture and language training? Through a brief history of our recent pitfalls in these domains, paired with policies over the last

15 years to remedy them, I will highlight how we have gotten to a point in our military's history where the critical nature of language and culture on the battlefield are finally being discussed more than ever.

As mentioned in chapter 1, language and cultural training are not new to our armed forces. However, language training in the Army, our branch of focus for this study, has been primarily reserved for enlisted personnel such as interpreters and linguists. Due to the nature of their ever-changing assignments, only a small number of Army officers ever receive intensive language training, save specialty positions such as Foreign Area Officers and Defense Attachés whose careers are tracked to include it. Despite this lack of language training, cultural training is mandatorily implemented on a large-scale line of effort throughout the Army in order to create a more cross-culturally sensitive force. Time-consuming training that can often be resented and viewed as minimally valuable, both by soldiers and officers, language and cultural training in the Army is a challenge that remains to be surmounted. In order to mandate LREC programs throughout the force, the Army currently implements policies and strategies from the strategic to the tactical level. An overview of these policies will be given in the section 2.2, preceded by examples in our nation's recent history of these shortcomings in action. Additional quotes from high-ranking Army officials will be given in section 2.2 as they highlighted these historical deficiencies when they implemented new policy measures.

2.1 Cultural and linguistic barriers on the battlefield in the post 9/11-era

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are fresh in the minds of Americans: the accomplishments, the failures and the ongoing aftermath. A strategy popularized in the United States during the campaign in Vietnam under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the expression "winning hearts and minds" is well-known to those who participated in Operations Enduring

Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the latter to be renamed Operation New Dawn (OND) in September 2010.⁷ The battle for “hearts and minds” resurged particularly at the onset of the Iraq War. A combination of public relations and psychological operations that stretch all the way to the tactical soldier, this overarching strategy is an attempt to gain the confidence of local nationals in hopes that they will look favorably upon our troops and our mission, subsequently resulting in a higher chance of operational success. In order to win the coveted hearts and mind of locals, however, one must be able to communicate with and understand them. As we fell short of doing so, from lower-level individual soldier and leader interactions to those of higher command, we slowly garnered the opposite of what we wanted: a local body that was dissatisfied with Americans and our presence in their homeland.

In June 15, 2004, almost one year after the capturing of Saddam Hussein, a hearing before the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform’s subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations was held entitled: “Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds”. Opening remarks by Mr. Kucinich, the ranking official from the subcommittee, highlighted that, “recent polls of Iraqi people show that 80 percent have negative views of the United States, and that a majority of Iraqi people want U.S. military forces to leave immediately” (“Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds” 2004). In his prepared statement, he wrote that, “we should have been thinking about how to win Iraqi hearts and minds long before now, for it is clear that we have failed this mission” (“Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds” 2004). Rend Al-Rahim, then Iraqi representative to the United States, gave a powerful testimony before the committee. Noting both successes and failures of the coalition forces, Ms. Al-Rahim stated that,

⁷ “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) is the operational name for the War in Afghanistan from 7 October 2001 to 28 December 2014. “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (OIF) is the Iraq War from 20 March 2003 to 18 December 2011. As of 1 September 2010, the name of OIF was officially changed to “Operation New Dawn” (OND) to reflect the drawdown of troops and mark an official end to OIF (CNN).

“the military forces did not have the personnel, the language skills, the intelligence capacities, or the social understanding to be an effective police and security force” in a liberated Iraq (“Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds” 2004). Calling attention to U.S. failures in strategizing properly for this part of the operation, she spends most of her discourse stressing that, “the paradigm of occupation has to be abandoned in favor of a paradigm of a true partnership” (“Iraq: Winning Hearts and Minds” 2004). As we all know today, the war in Iraq was not close to being over and a massive surge in troops was only a few years away. In this early stage in the operation, however, our strategic failures were already coming to light.

Just a month later, former deputy commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Major General (Retired) Robert E. Scales gave a testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on July 15, 2004 that precluded widespread guidance for language and cultural training within the armed forces. His discourse was based largely on our shortcomings in the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his testimony entitled, “Army Transformation: Implications for the Future,” Scales described the importance of grand changes to the way intelligence is prioritized, collected and shared; of developing and supporting highly educated non-commissioned and commissioned officers, particularly as it pertains to the study of war and foreign cultures; and finally, the importance of recognizing and rewarding the value of learning in a future of asymmetric warfare.

Scales began his testimony noting that more than a year after the war in Iraq had begun, a consensus was appearing that despite advanced technology, the “human element seems to underlie virtually all of the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories...most glaringly, intelligence, from national to tactical” (Scales 2). He continued that, “the

American military is not accustomed to finding collective solutions to address human failures,” but that, “this war has shown that the development of such an approach is absolutely essential and long overdue” (Scales 2). MAJ (Ret.) John Davis would later echo these same concerns over the lack of not only interpreters, but basic cross-cultural understanding, in his aforementioned 2006 article in *Military Review*. Orienting listeners to an important perspective, Scales states that providing every soldier cultural and language instruction is not in the goal of making every soldier a fluent linguist, but “to make every soldier a diplomat in uniform equipped with just enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen of the street” (Scales 8). He stresses that this acculturation is often diminished to pre-deployment training, as noted above, while policy regarding it should be, “devised, monitored and assessed as a joint responsibility” (Scales 8). His suggestion would later be heeded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as outlined below, and then the individual branches of services.

2.2 Policy

To return briefly to the field of sociolinguistics, there is a concept largely at play here that must be discussed. This is the topic of “language planning”. Language planning can be defined as a governing body (e.g., a government or government organization, like the Army) creating specific policies that encourage or discourage the presence of one or more languages present in their community. Governments have used language planning as an attempt to eradicate multilingualism in preference of a single language to bring national unity, such as in China. This practice has also been used, in Quebec for example, to ensure the continued presence of a second language and the heritage it brings to the area. The policies outlined below regarding language

training in the military could be considered a smaller example of language planning in its own right.

As there are multiple bodies governing the implementation of language policy in the Army, it is necessary to delineate where the chain of command begins and all of the avenues by which it passes before reaching ROTC. See Figure 1 below for a flow chart demonstrating the organizations that are involved in this policy making for the Army and ROTC. This chart only models the entities of interest to this study, as the actual size of each commanding body is too large to model and not all of organizations have relevance herein.⁸




Figure 1. Selected chain of command related to language policy and implementation

⁸ The full organizational charts of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army and U.S. Army TRADOC can be found in the bibliography of this study.

The figure above highlights that these policies typically start at the highest echelon, with the Department of Defense (DoD) (“DoD Organizational Structure”). Guidance at this level is often open-ended so that specific branches of the military can make a plan that suits their force’s needs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), a unique body within the DoD, also issues policy that affect all branches of the military. Below the Department of the Army (DA), the only organizations noted above are ones who are charged with LREC strategy/training or are related to Army ROTC.

Shifting from the DA, responsibility for implementation of LREC training falls under the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), located at Fort Leavenworth, KS, who is responsible for recruiting and training all soldiers that enter the U.S. Army. TRADOC is home to numbers Centers of Excellence, commands and other sub-organizations, two of which are of interest to this study. The first is the Combined Arms Center which focuses on force modernization, education (both professional military and civilian), and lessons learned. The Combined Arms Center is host to the TRADOC Culture Center, located in Fort Huachuca, AZ — the home of U.S. Army Intelligence. The Culture Center works closely with the Defense Language Institute, housed in Monterey, CA, to provide language and cultural training to the Army at large. While not of primary interest to my research, the center provides insight into the Army’s large-scale model for LREC training across the force.

The second sub-organization of TRADOC that is of interest to this study is U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) who is responsible for commissioning more than seventy percent of Army second lieutenants through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) (*U.S. Army Cadet*

Command).⁹ For the remainder of this study, USACC can be considered synonymous with ROTC. Created through the National Defense Act of 1916, ROTC “has a total of 275 programs located at colleges and universities throughout the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam with an enrollment of more than 30,000” (*U.S. Army Cadet Command*). While some cultural training is integrated into the ROTC curriculum, the largest portion of language and cultural training that cadets receive is through voluntary participation in a summer CPDT. The two CPDTs we have mentioned as the focus of this study are Project Global Officer (Project GO), and the Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program. In chapter 3 and 4, responsibility for the maintenance of these two programs will be further outlined.

Project GO and the CULP program were created roughly ten years ago in a direct response to multiple initiatives by the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later the Army in order to increase linguistic, cultural and regional expertise among the forces. This need was recognized through a combination of testimonies such as those cited above, feedback from commanders on the battlefield, and reviews of Department of Defense guidance and procedures at the time. The baseline for much of the policy to be explored below, the 2004 National Military Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff notably recognized that we are and will be fighting a wider range of adversaries in the years to come. Recognizing that intelligence personnel and systems need to be largely expanded moving forward, the paper notes that, “long before conflict occurs these intelligence systems must help provide a more thorough understanding of adversaries’ motivations, goals and organizations to determine effective deterrent courses of action” (*The National Military Strategy of the United*

⁹ For further clarity: U.S. Army Cadet Command is governed by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and it is the governing body of the Reserve Officer Training Corps. At the university level, we refer to ROTC programs which all fall under USACC.

States of America 5). Subsequently, other departments in Figure 1 above and beyond began looking for ways to meet these targets for better understanding our various enemies.

2.2.1 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, January 2005

The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR), published in January 2005 in support of the 2004 National Military Strategy, provided the goals for meeting the linguistic needs for the Department for the years to come. It gives specific deadlines and tasks to offices within the DoD for the increase in force capabilities in the domains of language, cultural and regional expertise. It states the current situation to be one where, “language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills, and are not sufficiently incorporated into operational or contingency planning” (*Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* 3). It continues that, “language skill and regional expertise are not valued as Defense core competencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems” (*Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* 3). Major (Ret.) Davis echoed this belief in 2006, as quoted in chapter 1 of this study: “[A] linguist’s skills are more important than firepower. With the former, you might not need the latter” (Davis 110). Once the highest echelon of the command structure had recognized how invaluable language and cultural training are for our military, this sentiment would hopefully begin to trickle down through the rest of the organizations.

After a historic reliance on the linguists and foreign area specialists to support the whole force, the Roadmap states that our abilities must be expanded beyond the intelligence community to better suit the needs of the whole force. While outlining the current situation, the following quote from the document acknowledges both how we got to this point and where we must go from here:

“Language skills are insufficient to meet the requirements of the changed security environment. The technological revolution of the 1990’s requires much greater language capability than the stereotyped activities of Cold War opponents. A higher level of language skill and greater language capacity is needed to build the internal relationships required for coalition/multi-national operations, peacekeepings, and civil/military affairs”.
(Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 10-11)

This change in perspective would be critical to implementing new strategies; responsibility now fell on the whole force, not just a part of it. One of the four major goals outlined in the document aimed to remedy the grievance mentioned above regarding an additional lack of requisite linguists within our ranks: “Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities” *(Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 1)*. This capacity to rapidly grow our resources is necessary, as it states that, “robust foreign language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions especially in post-conflict and other than combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations” *(Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 3)*.

Of final importance to this study, the Roadmap required the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to create the Defense Language Office by May 2005 to "ensure a strategic focus on meeting present and future requirements for language and regional expertise" *(Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 4)*. In February 2012, this office would be merged with the National Security Education Program (established 1991) to become the modern Defense Language & National Security Education Office (DLNSEO). In chapter 3, it will be highlighted that the DLNSEO is the office of primary responsibility for Project GO. Additionally, one of the many other required actions in this document, it directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to work with the Policy office and publish an annual “strategic

language list” that, “will outline prioritized languages for which DoD has current and projected requirements and for which training and testing will be provided, incentives applied, and other resources allocated” (*Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* 5). It is from this yearly list that Project GO programs would later be designed. Potentially leading to the creation of CULP, the document tells services to “exploit ‘study abroad’ opportunities to facilitate language acquisition” and to incorporate “regional area content” in all language and pre-deployment training (DLTR 7).

2.2.2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Initiative 3126.01, January 2006

On 23 January 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published their Initiative numbered 3126.01 entitled, “Language and regional expertise planning”. The purpose of the instruction was to, “provide policy and procedural guidance” to support the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap above (CJCSI 3126.01 1). In the background information, it is openly recognized that language ability and regional expertise, “are critical ‘warfighting skills; that are integral to joint operations. Lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) prove that this force-multiplying capability can save lives and ensure mission accomplishment throughout confrontation, conflict, and stabilization operations” (CJCSI 3126.01 A-1). The document also gives valuable definitions to the various branches of the military. A “language skilled” person is defined as someone, “who possesses a foreign language capability in one or more foreign languages” and regional expertise is defined as having, “graduate-level education or 40 semester hours of study focusing on, but not limited to, the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or specific global region” (CJCSI 3126.01 D-1). Later in the instructions, guidance and

definitions are given for all levels of language ability and regional expertise, ranging from novice to advanced. This will later allow the various branches to better measure the capabilities within their own ranks.

An important aspect of this instructive document is the degree to which it stresses that we must train our own military to be able to meet our need prior to looking elsewhere, such as the civilian sector, for skilled linguists. It states that, “military personnel are the desired primary and essential source of employable foreign language and regional expertise capabilities in combat operations” (CJCSI 3126.01 D-7). Meanwhile, the Chairman does not fail to recognize that this is not something that can be fixed overnight. The guidance candidly reads that, “it takes 2 to 3 years to develop a person with the necessary level of proficiency in a language, and up to 5 years for someone to obtain a certain knowledge level of the region or area of operations” (CJCSI 3126.01 D-7). Better planning and measuring of our needs, then, will need to happen farther in advance.

2.2.3 U.S. Army Policy, 2008-2009

In the year that CULP was created (2008), only a year after Project GO began, further guidance was given at higher echelons as to the continued importance of LREC training. In the 2008 U.S. Army Posture Statement, the “Strategic Context” notes that the Army, “must adapt to meet the changing world security environment. We are in an era of persistent conflict which, when combined with our on-going global engagements, requires us to rebalance our capabilities” (2008 U.S. Army Posture Statement). One of these capabilities to be reassessed was our ability to communicate efficiently and effectively with foreign nationals, be they friendly or enemy, as it was believed that the Army, “will confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries who will

exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. interests” (2008 U.S. Army Posture Statement). An information paper entitled “Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities” was attached to the posture statement, and stressed the necessity for the Army to transform the way it prepares its force to grapple with these linguistic and cultural barriers on the warfront not only to ensure mission success, but also as a form of force protection, which will be elaborated on later in this study (2008 U.S. Army Posture Statement).

In December of 2009, the DA issued the “Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy” (ACFLS) for the years to come. The first two sentences, found in the Executive Summary, read as follows:

Operational experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have highlighted critical gaps in the Army capability to influence and operate effectively within different cultures for extended periods of time. Battlefield lessons learned have demonstrated that language proficiency and understanding of foreign culture are vital enablers for full spectrum operations.
(*Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* ii)

The summary goes on to note that both leaders and soldiers have a “limited understanding of how culture considerations influence the planning and execution of operations,” and that there is, “insufficient foreign language capability across the Army” which results in limited effectiveness of the individual and the force at large (*Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* ii). The third and most critical point made, as it pertains to this study, is that, “there is no significant development of a bench of future leaders who have an increased understanding of cultures and foreign languages around the world” (*Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* ii). Later in the document, it is suggested that pre-commissioning programs target foreign language competence in future officers (*Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy* 16). It is this exact gap that Project GO and CULP had already begun to attempt to remedy.

2.2.4 2010-present

In January 2014, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) published CJCSI 3126.01A, “Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing,” as an elaboration of their initial instructions from 2006. Providing further definitions of the topic, “core cultural competencies” is defined herein as consisting of, “understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, and cultural adaptability” (CJCSI 3126.01A F-1). Adding to the prior guidance for language and regional expertise, the updated document included a great deal more information about measuring cultural understanding and how it relates to regional expertise and, largely, language. Again emphasizing that this type of training can not be done overnight and that we should be training our own force in LREC capabilities, the instructive document recognizes that, “recent support and sustainment operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to extensive reliance on contractors who have become the source of primary expertise rather than military personnel. Services and commanders in particular must weigh and stress the importance of LREC skills as critical competencies that are an integral part of the warfighter’s skill set” (CJCSI 3126.01A J-6). Working from the highest level of leadership down, recognizing LREC abilities as valued in a warfighter suggest that we must place a higher value on these skills

Of critical importance to this study, this document targeted accession programs, such as ROTC, to, “increase the LREC capabilities and proficiency of the Total Force,” which is to say, in the officer corps these programs produce (CJCSI 3126.01A 8). Accession programs were specifically instructed to, “increase the percentage of new active duty officer accessions who are identified (tested or self-professed) as possessing a foreign language skill from 4.4% in FY11

[Fiscal Year 2011] to 6.0% by the end of FY16 [Fiscal Year 16]” (CJCSI 3126.01A 8). For USACC, who is responsible for commissioning more than seventy percent of all Army officers, this meant creating new programs that would train future officers in linguistic and cultural competencies (*U.S. Army Cadet Command*). This guidance strengthened the necessity of these programs within the Army moving forward and ensured a future path for them to grow.

More recently, in COL Willoughby and Dr. Ibrahimov’s 2014 article on the Army LREC program, BG Christopher P. Hughes, the then-Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, made a statement concerning the necessity of LREC to having a globally responsible force. Interesting for the points of this study, BG Hughes is currently serving as the Commanding General of U.S. Army Cadet Command and has made many changes to the ROTC curriculum since he took on this role in the summer of 2016. Willoughby and Ibrahimov quote BG Hughes as stating the following:

Developing and maintaining a Force that has an understanding of other Cultures and their Languages is Regionally astute and critical to our strategic security requirements...Now more than ever we must be able to understand, communicate, and conduct operations with a variety of partners...To do anything less would be to disregard the single most important lesson we have garnered in the last 13 years of war!

(BG Hughes qtd. in Willoughby 12)

I included this statement as it not only shows support of LREC training by the Commander of USACC, but a recognition from the highest ranking person within USACC of the necessity of this training for the future of the force through recognition of our downfalls in OEF and OIF.

In the following two chapters, I will go into greater detail on the history of each program — Project GO and CULP — to include their goals and objectives, application process and program structure, and their outcomes as identified by alumni of the programs. As noted in

chapter 1 section 3 on methodology, the cadet and officer alumni interviewed are all current cadets at or alumni of Syracuse University's Army ROTC. My survey results and interviews will be integrated into the final section of each of these chapters, with literature and policy being referenced as needed.

Prior to starting the next two chapters, I would like to clarify some terminology I will be using. As Army ROTC cadets are typically in the program for four years, there are four class standings they may hold: MSI (freshman year), MSII (sophomore year), MSIII (junior year) and MSIV (senior year). "MS" stands for Military Science and it corresponds to the required leadership course in which they are enrolled that year. As I mentioned earlier, graduate students are able to join ROTC. As a graduate program typically lasts only two years, a graduate student would start ROTC as an MSIII, completing only the MSIII and MSIV years. In order to receive a commission, you must have signed a contract by the end of December of your MSIII year. This means that college sophomores and juniors (prior to December of their third year) can join ROTC late as well.¹⁰ In order to be as clear as possible, I will refer to cadets by their MS-class rather than by their class standing in university.

¹⁰ If cadets join with only two years remaining, they have 4 weeks of mandatory training to attend at Fort Knox, KY to make up for the two first years of ROTC. This is in addition to their 4 weeks of mandatory training before their MSIV year.

Chapter 3: Project Global Officer (Project GO)

3.1 History and overview

Since its inception in 2007, Project GO has worked toward building greater LREC capabilities amongst future military officers as a collaborative initiative between reserve accessions programs (service academies are exempt while senior/junior military colleges may participate) and the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO). The DLNSEO is also known for its Boren Scholarship and Language Flagship programs, aimed at increasing foreign language capabilities in university students through scholarship, resulting in a commitment to work in government service after completion of their degree. Project GO, in particular, is open to cadets from Army, Navy and Air Force ROTC whether they are contracted or not. For this reason, it is an excellent option for cadets new to ROTC who may not have signed a contract yet, as many other training options are not yet available to them. Aligned with DoD LREC requirements and the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (2005) in particular, Project GO was designed, “to improve the language skills, regional expertise, and intercultural communication skills of future military officers through domestic language study and domestic and overseas language and cultural immersion” (*Project GO*). One of few fully funded language study programs available to college students, their scholarships for ROTC cadets hope to promote, “critical language education, study abroad, and intercultural dialogue opportunities” for their participants (Project GO, “Objectives”).

Project GO is unique from the CULP program in a number of ways. One of the major distinctions is that at Project GO, cadets are functioning as a civilian student and are not undergoing any military training. In fact, they are not usually required to bring a uniform and

their packing list typically consists of only civilian clothing.¹¹ Cadets are intermingled not only with participants from other branches of the military, but with civilian students as well. As we will describe further in section 3.2 on the program structure, these are academic programs for which students receive college credit to study a foreign language. Cadets, then, are functioning in their capacity as a university student rather than as a future Army officer.

Now in its tenth year, Project GO has continually grown in its scope and nature. Initially and primarily intended for summer study, the program now offers semester-long options as well as a potential option for the entire academic year. In spring 2017, cadets could apply to study Chinese in Tianjin, China through Norwich University or Arabic in Meknes, Morocco through the University of Arizona. Online options are now available as well, such as the option to study two semesters worth of Korean online through the University of Montana during the spring semester. Particularly for cadets who do not have a scholarship through ROTC, Project GO is an excellent option to receive college credit through a fully funded program.

3.2 Program goals

According to the DLNSEO, “Project GO is a grant program aimed at improving the language skills, regional expertise, and intercultural communication skills of future military officers” (*DLNSEO*). According to the program’s website, their primary goal is to, “develop future military officers within all of the U.S. Armed Forces who possess the necessary linguistic and cross-cultural communication skills required for effective leadership in the 21st century operational environment” (*Project GO*). There are currently 25 institutions across the nation who receive grants from the DLNSEO to host Project GO programs at their school (*Project GO*).

¹¹ There may be specific situations in which cadets are asked to bring their uniform. For example, if an event is planned that would involve meeting with a General Officer or foreign military officials. As Project GO is for civilians as well as cadets, though, these situations not part of the standard curriculum.

Their most recent statistics state that as of 2014, they have reached 3,500 ROTC cadets (from the three services) with 544 participating in 2014 alone.

Languages offered through this program are considered critical to national security and are less commonly taught (“Critical Languages”). They are selected from the annually published list, mentioned in chapter 2. They range from Portuguese and Russian to Pashto and Swahili. With no prior language proficiency required, programs are offered from beginner through advanced levels, depending on the language. Not only do cadets apply to Project GO due to personal interest in language learning, they can also use it to complete their foreign language requirements at their home university, as they receive college credit for the classes they take. Credits can range from 2 to 10+ credit hours, depending on the program. With opportunities continuing to expand every year, coupled with the degree to which Project GO is helping reach DoD LREC goals across the services, this program is unlikely to be cut in the years to come.

3.3 Program structure and application process

In regard to its structure and admissions process, Project GO is rather decentralized from USACC as it is run by the DLNSEO. Programs are stood up by individual universities who then select the cadets they wish to admit independently from USACC. ROTC programs are responsible for advertising Project GO at their university and encouraging cadets to apply. Applications are between November and January, with each program setting its own deadline. Participants are generally notified of their acceptance in February, but this would vary depending on if they are applying for the summer, spring, academic year, etc. With the majority of programs being conducted in the summer, they begin in May and run through August, ending prior to the start of fall semester at most universities.

Each Project GO program is individually designed by the host university. Some universities host one specific program or language, while others host a variety of languages and program types. Hosting the most programs for 2017, University of Kansas, University of North Georgia and University of Wisconsin-Madison each sponsor seven unique programs of study. As each program is specific to its university's language department regulations and the professors designing the curriculum, it would be impossible to identify the degree to which culture is integrated into this linguistically-intensive scholarship series. However, with the intent of Project GO being language proficiency rather than cross-cultural competency, it can be assumed that language is stressed more than culture. As I will discuss in the next section, some instructors do decide to incorporate cultural excursions in their curriculum when applicable and feasible. Worth noting, as Project GO is academically-intensive and requires interest in pursuing a foreign language, it tends to attract a more limited population of cadets than CULP does. For those desiring an option more focused on cultural exposure and less linguistically or academically intensive, CULP tends to be the better option.

A select number of these schools are a part of The Language Flagship program, a separate but related national program that promotes specialty, intensive language programs at select universities around the country. Should a cadet attend one of these programs, Project GO will likely be more intensive and have higher final standards, as the Flagship program wants all of their students to reach a certain proficiency level by graduation.

3.4 Research outcomes

My surveys and interview results provided a great deal of insight into the unique experiences of Project GO participants. Of those interviewed from Syracuse University, 8 of the

22 surveyed participated in Project GO, including only 1 alumni. Selected results from these surveys will be provided in this section, with the remaining results presented in the synthesis of chapter 5 as they pertain to both Project GO and CULP. I also conducted interviews with two current cadets — Cadet Lynn Chui and Cadet Jacqueline Page — regarding their experiences. I decided to interview Cadet Chui as she has participated in two distinct Project GO programs, and Cadet Page as she participated in both Project GO and CULP. Also participating in this interview was the Syracuse University Army ROTC Human Resources Assistant, Christopher Shultz. Mr. Shultz is responsible for promoting both Project GO and CULP within our battalion as well as helping cadets with the application and pre-training processes. The results of these interviews will be discussed below as well as in chapters 4 and 5. In this section, I will divide my results into those coming from surveys and those from my in-person interviews.

3.4.1 Survey results

Of the current cadets at Syracuse University, 7 have participated in Project GO. Of these 7, two of the cadets did Project GO twice, on two separate occasions. Overall, 3 of the cadets went on domestic programs while the rest went abroad for either part of or the whole program. The languages they studied include Arabic, Swahili, Turkish, Russian, Korean and Chinese. When asked to provide qualitative remarks about their experience, comments were overwhelmingly positive. One cadet who participated in a domestic Russian program through Boston University shared the following statement about her experience:

After only a year of studying Russian in America, I felt that I had been well equipped to take my language skills abroad to Moscow State University. I can proudly say that the reason I am studying in Moscow at this moment was because of the opportunity I was given to partake in Project GO at Boston University.

(Source: Questionnaire Current Cadets).

Another cadet noted that, “Project GO was not only great for learning, but networking as well” — a skill critical to a career in the military (Blowers, “Current Cadets”). The only potentially negative comment that surfaced was regarding the difference between two Project GO programs, coming from someone who participated in two unique sessions. The cadet noted that “Flagship schools”, such as University of Arizona, seemed to offer a better program and have more resources than the other program. This disparity points to the fact that each Project GO option is curated by its host university and no two programs are the same.

The one alumni surveyed that participated in Project GO went to Moscow for 2 months with Georgia Institute of Technology between his MSII and MSIII years. A major in Russian at Syracuse University, now Lieutenant Brendan Finlay identified as being more professionally than personally interested in the language at first, but fell in love with it over time. When asked if he believed there was career value for an Army officer to study a language, he responded “absolutely” (Source: Questionnaire SU ROTC Alumni). He continued studying the language once he returned to Syracuse and noted that he has used it since commissioning two years ago into Army Field Artillery. A participant in both Project GO and CULP during his time as a cadet, LT Finlay encourages all cadets to seek out this type of training and believes that cultural training should be mandated as a pre-commissioning requirement.

3.4.2 Interview results

At the beginning of my group interview with Mr. Shultz, the Human Resources Assistant at Syracuse Army ROTC, and Cadets Chui and Page, Cadet Chui explicitly stated something I had been suspecting throughout my research. She said that as a freshman, she had heard of CULP but knew very little about Project GO and felt that it was not as heavily advertised. She

searched the internet for more information about the program. Having personal interest in other languages and cultures, coming from a bilingual Chinese and multicultural background herself, she was more interested in this type of CPDT than a physically challenging training, such as Airborne School, for which she did not yet feel prepared. Not having signed a contract yet, Cadet Chui was excited to learn that she could participate in Project GO as she was not able to participate in CULP for this same reason. Before doing the program, she was not aware that she would be paid, receive points towards her accessions or receive college credit for her participation in Project GO.¹² Cadet Page, on the other hand, found out about Project GO at the bottom of a forwarded email chain from her ROTC command team. It was advertising an introductory Chinese program. Already having a baseline in Chinese from Syracuse University, Cadet Page went to Project GO's website and found a program that was more suiting for her advanced level. Agreeing that Project GO is much less advertised in their unit, Cadet Page also did not know that she would receive accession points or college credit for the training.

Cadet Chui's first Project GO experience was through the University of Arizona — a Flagship program. The program had only 7 students and began on Arizona's campus for 7 weeks, followed by 4 weeks in Ankara, Turkey. She had hoped to find a program that would take up the majority of her summer between MSI and MSII year, which this option did. In regards to socializing and meeting locals, she noted that every student was assigned a language partner in Ankara with whom they met regularly. She stated that she felt they met a lot of locals their age during the trip. On the weekends, the students were free to do what they wished. The amount of schoolwork required was manageable and they were all placed within host families — an

¹² In Army ROTC, cadets compete locally for a ranking on the national Order of Merit List. It is their ranking on this national list at the beginning of their MSIV year that will decide if they are selected for active duty or the Reserves or National Guard, the branch of their choice, and the duty station of their preference. Considerations for their rank include physical fitness test scores, academic GPA, extracurriculars and training, and more. Participation in Project GO and CULP give cadets "points" that potentially move them up the national Order of Merit list.

experience from which Cadet Chui has very positive memories. However, she mentioned that culture was not expressly integrated into the curriculum and she wishes she could have learned more about Turkish history and customs. This summer was the first time that she had studied Turkish and she would continue to do so upon return to Syracuse University.

The second time Cadet Chui participated in Project GO was through James Madison University between her MSII and MSIII year. This time around, she would be studying Swahili in Tanzania for 10 weeks. The program was originally scheduled for Kenya, she remembers, but was changed before departure for security concerns. This time with 30 students total, the program was more rigorous and academically-motivated. In addition to their course in Swahili, participants were enrolled another course regarding the local area, as well as an elective for which they had the choice of political ecology or engineering. Knowing that she would have to take these two other courses, Cadet Chui used them to fill general degree requirements at her home university. She remembers that the academic workload was much heavier than her time studying Turkish and included daily journals (in English) they turned in for grades. She appreciated that the work gave her a deeper understanding of the culture and area she was in, but believes that the homework became overwhelming and impeded her ability to get out and see the area. Finally, it is also important to mention that participants were not housed with local families for the duration of their stay. However, they did stay with a family for 3 to 4 days on a trip. These two experiences lived by a single Cadet show just how different one Project GO program can be from another.

Cadet Page went to a far different part of the world for her Project GO program between her MSI and MSII years: China. She did the Georgia Tech Language, Business and Technology program for 9 weeks that summer. While abroad, she was enrolled in 3 language credits in

business Chinese, 3 credits on conducting business in China, and 3 credits of a technology course that visited local companies. All three of her classes were taught in Chinese, but only 6 of her credit hours were transferred back to Syracuse University. Able to enroll at the intermediate level and take more advanced courses while abroad, Cadet Page feels that her language ability was taken to a new level while abroad that she feels would not have been possible in a domestic program. She had class 4 days per week in Shanghai followed by excursions on the weekend to villages and local festivals. Cadet Page felt that the workload varied based on each student's background in Chinese, being harder for those with limited prior studies. The participants lived in a hotel on campus and were able to meet some local students in the process. Having participated in CULP as well, Cadet Page highly encourages other Cadets take advantage of these while they are in ROTC so that they can learn more about other cultures and learn to surmount potential culture shock abroad. Having a unique perspective from her participation in both Project GO and CULP, Cadet Page provided invaluable information to this study.

Chapter 4: Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency Program (CULP)

4.1 History and overview

The Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program was created in 2008 in a direct response to a Department of the Army Executive Order: DA EXORD 230-15. Since their first “deployment” in 2008, CULP has sent cadets to 95 different countries ranging from Senegal to Argentina and Vietnam. While the size of the program varies annually, it has expanded continually over the past nine years and is on track to continue growing. Unlike Project GO, CULP is Army-specific and only for ROTC cadets (i.e. it is not open to cadets from the United States Military Academy or Officer Candidate School). Responsibility for the CULP program goes from the DA, to TRADOC, to USACC and finally to specific ROTC programs. USACC has the most control over the design and implementation of CULP missions, with minimal regular influence from TRADOC other than to ensure they are meeting their intended goals for language and cultural training. In order to gain more knowledge regarding the planning and execution of CULP missions, I interviewed Mr. Doug Kadetz, the CULP Deployment Coordinator for USACC at their headquarters in Fort Knox, Kentucky. Mr. Kadetz provided a great deal of valuable information to this study, particularly through a program overview entitled “International Programs Division (aka CULP)” created by the Program Chief, Mr. Russ Stinger.

CULP missions abroad were not created due to a lack of cultural training availability within the United States, as we have seen above that these types of training centers do exist. Rather than sending cadets to the TRADOC Culture Center for cross-cultural training, though, Cadet Command wanted to provide cadets with a unique opportunity to be exposed to other cultures in a foreign land. According to the Cadet Command website, “Overseas immersions help educate future leaders in ways the classroom cannot” (*U.S. Army Cadet Command*). The

guarantee to go abroad is a primary reason cadets are attracted to this option as opposed to Project GO. As many study subjects with demanding, pre-determined course sequences, they may not have the option to spend a semester abroad. CULP is an all-expenses-paid option for them to do so without disrupting their academic cycle.

An interesting facet of CULP is that its intent is not solely to benefit the cadets, but it also carries benefits for the larger Army as well. Army Service Combatant Commands, for example US Army Africa, place requests to the Department of the Army for cadets to come train with foreign militaries. The countries are all places where the Army is trying to maintain a presence and grow a deeper political-military relationship. They are also countries where we tend to have less frequent contact with their military or where we have less of our own troops stationed. The DA establishes priorities for deployment based on these requests. Factoring in any potential safety concerns, they choose what specific countries we will send cadets to the following summer. Interesting for the purpose of this study, cadets are far less likely to have visited the countries of CULP missions. There is a high potential that they have never been exposed to the language, culture or societal norms of the country to which they will travel.

Cadet Command makes it a point in CULP to intentionally send cadets to countries with decidedly different cultures than that of the United States. No anglophone countries and not many western nations host cadets through this program. Additionally, as mentioned above, if the U.S. military already has a large presence in that nation (e.g., Japan and Korea), we also do not tend to send cadets there.¹³ In 2016, 1,278 cadets went to 43 different countries in 130 unique teams for month-long (23 days in-country) “deployments”. Overall, 460 cadets were sent to 15 countries in AFRICOM, 406 cadets were sent to 13 countries in EUCOM, 145 cadets were sent

¹³ Other types of CPDT do send cadets to countries like Korea for other types of training. During this summer program, cadets shadow a second lieutenant. This program is reserved for MSIIIs before their MSIV year. These options, though, are more focused on developing officer skills rather than language and cultural training.

to 7 countries in SOUTHCOM, and 267 cadets were sent to 8 countries in PACOM.¹⁴ Last year the most cadets were sent on missions to Thailand (62 cadets) and Madagascar (61 cadets). In the summer of 2017, 957 cadets will be sent to 24 countries. CULP has been so successful, in fact, that the Navy and Air Force are considering starting their own programs within ROTC.¹⁵ Cadet participant numbers in CULP are exponentially higher than those in Project GO, despite Project GO being open to all branches of the service as well as non-contracted cadets. This generalization does not include, of course, the number of civilian students that may participate in Project GO.

4.1 Program goals

In the most recent program overview presentation for CULP, provided to me by Mr. Kadetz, the specific goals of the CPDT are outlined. The majority of the desired outcomes are centered around increased cross-cultural sensitivity, as well as an understanding of the importance of creating and maintaining relationships with diverse organizations. The program does not hope to create leaders simply capable of acknowledging that cultural differences exist, but rather those who are able to see the strategic impacts of these differences and how they impact military operations on a large scale. For cadets, thinking about operations on a strategic level is not a feat that comes lightly due to their lack of experience. Furthermore, multiple program outcomes refer to creating a more introspective leader who is capable of recognizing their own biases and assumptions, as well as understanding how their actions are perceived by others. Overall, these outcomes would serve to create a leader that is not only sensitive to

¹⁴ AFRICOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM and PACOM refer to the Unified Combatant Commands in Africa, Europe, South America and the Pacific, respectively.

¹⁵ During our interview on November 30, 2016, Mr. Kadetz told me he had an upcoming teleconference with the Navy and Air Force to discuss creating their own ROTC programs mirroring CULP.

cultural and linguistic differences, but able to negotiate these differences in favor of the mission. This is exactly the kind of adaptive leader that Army hopes to have on the multicultural and multilingual battlefields of tomorrow.

Globally, CULP aims to implement ACFL and LREC strategies with future officers through their summer programming with Army ROTC cadets. While it is open to all MS classes, CULP is usually preferred by MSIs and MSIIIs who can not yet participate in some CPDTs reserved for MSIIIs. Some MSIIIs may participate before their MSIV year if they have time in addition to their mandatory training and hope to be exposed to another culture before commissioning.¹⁶ All cadets must be contracted in order to apply for CULP, and USACC funds all travel and expenses. Despite the limitation of only being open to contracted cadets, CULP attracts many participants. If a cadet accepts an offer to go on a CULP mission, successful completion of it becomes a requirement to commission. This means that should they fail to complete the training (e.g., are removed from training due to inappropriate behavior), they will no longer be allowed to commission. These cases are rare as the vast majority of cadets complete the training successfully.

An interesting point to note, CULP refers to their training cycles as “missions” or “deployments” so that cadets treat the training as part of their job, rather than a vacation or study abroad opportunity. As they are in nations with little to no U.S. military presence, cadets are working on a daily basis with foreign militaries and civilians to ameliorate U.S. foreign military relations. On the individual level, their missions are intended to expose them to different cultures, to familiarize them with the use of interpreters, and how to interact with foreign militaries/nationals. Unlike Project GO where participants never wear a US Army uniform and

¹⁶ MSIIIs have 4 weeks of mandatory training in Fort Knox, KY in the summer before their MSIV year.

are studying as civilians, CULP participants are functioning under the Department of the Army and are uniformed service members on their deployment.

Contrary to the program title of “language proficiency,” these missions are not language immersion programs by any sense of the word. While some missions carry a linguistic element, which I will address later, their primary goal is not the development of participants’ language skills. Due to the level of cultural training and linguistic exposure that cadets receive, however, CULP is being considered for the purposes of this research as it does inadvertently expose cadets to foreign languages in an immersion setting, and the cultural training they receive plays a role in progress towards ACFL and LREC goals. Additionally, CULP does have the potential to result in continued language/cultural study at a cadet’s home university. Most importantly, participation in a CULP deployment undoubtedly shapes the way these future leaders consider the value of LREC strategies as they play into being an adaptive, empathetic leader. For many cadets, this may be the first time that they are thrust into a 23-day experience where they don’t speak the local language, don’t understand the culture and aren’t a part of the society. Their minimal pre-deployment training will be stretched thin as they attempt to communicate with foreign soldiers over linguistic and cultural boundaries without a constant linguist by their side. This would indisputably reinforce the necessity and value of LREC skills for both them as leaders, and their future soldiers.

4.3 Program structure and application process

CULP is a month-long opportunity that involves 23 days in a foreign country taking part in a multitude of daily activities. There are three overarching types of CULP missions: Cadet English Language Training Teams (CELTT), Military to Military Engagements (Mil-to-Mil),

and Humanitarian Assistance (HA) missions. As for this study I am primarily interested in language and cultural training, the CELTT missions are of the most interest herein. It should be noted that the purpose of these missions is to ameliorate the conversational English of the partner nation participants, not the foreign language abilities of our own cadets. Interactions are conducted in English and contextualized into cultural discussion topics. It is expected that the local military will already have some degree of English language knowledge, as the purpose of these classes is not to teach English but to practice speaking colloquially. While there is a possibility for foreign language learning to occur due solely to exposure (i.e. living in an immersion setting for 3+ weeks), direct language instruction does not typically occur. However, teaching English could potentially make cadets more interested in learning another language or, in the least, it would make them acknowledge the challenges associated with not speaking the native tongue of your foreign counterpart — be they enemy or ally.

The program training cycle involves a great deal of pre-deployment preparations, in-country training and post-program surveys. Cadets apply to CULP in the fall, between September and October, for a mission the following summer. According to Mr. Kadetz, in choosing participants, USACC tries to choose cadets with language backgrounds as often as they are able (Kadetz). While he did not elaborate on this, I imagine that it may be because they have already shown an interest in learning about a foreign culture and/or being more sympathetic to those who are different from us. Selected cadets are typically notified in November with deployments beginning in May and going through September. Cadets do have the option to turn down the opportunity once they are granted it, which my interview participant Cadet Chui did in favor of a second Project GO.

In the months between their notification and departure, cadets are highly engaged in preparations for their deployment. In addition to medical (e.g., region-specific vaccinations) and government requirements (e.g., government passports, visas), cadets must complete some training even prior to departure. Online cultural training regarding the nation where they will be living is a mandatory part of the program. This “pre-deployment training”, as it is called, mimics the training that all soldiers receive prior to deployments with the U.S. Army. This is excellent exposure for these cadets at such an early stage in their career. When they arrive to their first unit as an officer, for example, they will pass this knowledge onto their future soldiers prior to a deployment while explaining how valuable they found it once they were in country. Instilling the importance of cultural and regional expertise in them even prior to departure for CULP, LREC learning is of the utmost importance to this program.

A CULP deployment begins with 5 days of in-processing at USACC headquarters in Fort Knox, KY. During this time cadets meet the other members of their team and receive a series of briefs regarding the cultures they will encounter, potential threats and administrative matters. Final medical screenings are conducted and a pre-deployment inspection assures that all have the required items packed for their mission. Once in country, cadets lodge in hotels and military barracks for the duration of their stay. The type of training they undergo is dependent on their mission type, but many include cultural excursions in an attempt to further expose cadets to the foreign culture outside of a military setting. Examples from Syracuse cadets’ experiences will be given in the next section.

At the completion of their time in country, teams return to Fort Knox, KY to out-process and give feedback on their experiences. Self assessments are done in addition to peer feedback and an evaluation from leadership. Program managers consider the feedback of cadets going into

the following year and make continual adjustments to better their overall experience. In an attempt to learn more about cadets' experiences on CULP, my research surveys asked them to provide critical feedback on how they feel this training affected them as a future leader.

4.4 Research outcomes

The results of my surveys quickly resulted in one of my initial assumptions: more Syracuse University cadets participate in CULP than Project GO. Of 15 interviewed who are current cadets, 11 participated in a CULP deployment so far in their ROTC career. Of the 8 alumni surveyed, all had participated in CULP as a cadet. As in chapter 3 section 4, selected results from these surveys will be provided in this section, with the remaining results presented in the synthesis of chapter 5 as they pertain to both Project GO and CULP. Interviews and conversations with Cadet Page, who participated in both Project GO and CULP, will also be discussed in this section.

4.4.1 Survey results

The majority of those surveyed participated in CULP between their MSII and MSIII year, with a few completing it between MSIII and MSIV year. A likely rationale for none of them having participated between their MSI and MSII years is the fact that cadets must be contracted in order to participate in CULP, and many are not before their sophomore year of college. Participation between MSIII and MSIV year also accommodates for any graduate students or those who may have entered the program after their freshman year of college, such as transfer students. The countries they visited span from Africa to Asia to Eastern Europe. Varying even further, the languages they were exposed to in these countries range from romance languages

largely heard in the U.S., such as French and Portuguese, to languages they are unlikely to have heard before, such as Estonian, Wolof and Thai. The overwhelming majority stated that they did not continue to study the language they were exposed to after returning from CULP, a topic to be covered more broadly in chapter 5.

One cadet who traveled to Gabon between his MSII and MSIII year did, however, continue to study French after returning to the U.S. This cadet is unique in comparison to most of his classmates, as he had already studied French in high school and college prior to his mission. His comments below on CULP as a window into language learning provided a unique perspective from a program alumni:

Honestly, in my experience CULP was not very good at generating interest in languages, in fact most on my team had never spoken a word of French in their lives. Although, this also helped me stand out and allowed me to have a better connection with our Gabonese allies and to practice my language skills with them.
(Blowers, “Current Cadets”)

While this cadet may not believe that CULP overtly encouraged his peers to gain interest in studying another language, he succeeds at pointing out the advantage he had in comparison to the other cadets. For him personally, this experience reinforced that speaking a foreign language helped him build relationships and forge stronger relations with our allies. As his peers likely noticed their deficiency in comparison to his language abilities, they could have potentially gained more interest in or respect for language skills than they had prior to CULP. His final comments in the survey were, “to make CULP longer, even more selective, and blend the current CULP program along with critical language studies,” as he felt this modification would make the program, “more rigorous [*sic*], and Cadets would get more out of it” (Source: Questionnaire current cadets). As I will discuss further in chapter 5, the majority of survey participants suggested that CULP should be expanded. This cadet’s comments on how the program could be

modified, though, suggest a program structure that would benefit cadets even further moving forward, making it more closely aligned with Project GO than it currently stands.

With their perspective slightly differing from those who are still currently cadets, alumni who are currently serving on active duty were able to provide some hindsight comments on CULP that were both candid and calculated. One lieutenant who studied linguistics as an undergraduate student stated that he felt teaching English was a poor use of time on a CULP mission - both for the cadets and foreign military. Recognizing that none of the cadets had teaching experience, his statement below emphasizes that he felt this type of mission was ill-fitting for participants.

Teaching English" is a really poor use of anyone's time on CULP- nobody is a certified teacher, and the whole process is rather pointless. The real purpose is to build relations and have interactions, which is good, but hiding it behind this fake lesson is just a waste of everyone's time, and often the US personnel end up looking bad because of it. If you want lessons, have the Cadets teach something they actually can prepare for and be proficient in, or have discussions that are mutually beneficial.

(Blowers, "SU ROTC Alumni")

With Cadet English Language Training Teams (CELTT) being the most common type of CULP mission, there is a possibility that this participant's sentiment is mirrored by some other program alumni across the globe. While the lieutenant was still able to distinguish the underlying purpose of the English language lessons, there is validity in his opinion that the interactions should be more mutually beneficial for the cadets involved. On the other hand, these benefits would largely range from participant to participant and conversation to conversation. Based on the topic they discussed with their partner, the degree of English of the foreign service member and various other factors ranging from cross-cultural understanding to empathy, some cadets may have found this interactions more pedagogical than the ones of this lieutenant.

Another Syracuse ROTC program alumni echoed similar concerns to those above regarding his CULP trip to Senegal between his MSII and MSIII year. After being exposed to French and Wolof, he wrote, “I think that the program should be more focused in both directions. Most of my trip was focused on teaching English to the Senegalese military but I feel it would have also been beneficial if we could have learned more from them” (Blowers, “SU ROTC Alumni”). He elaborated that it would have been valuable to have been taught, “rudimentary Wolof or French or more cultural norms” by their foreign allies during the trip (Blowers, “SU ROTC Alumni”). While they can not be wholly conclusive, the opinions of these two alumni suggest that more language and cultural teaching, this time from our foreign allies to the cadets, could be a way to grow and better the CULP program for the future.

4.4.2 Interview results

My interview with Cadet Page, an MSIII who has participated in both Project GO and CULP, brought a lot of light to the differences between the two programs. Moreover, she provided me with a written reflection of her experience on a CELTT mission with CULP. She wrote this reflection just after returning from the trip and it provides a great deal of insight as to the ways in which she feels this program has shaped her as a cadet and future leader. After having learned about CULP by seeing pictures in an Army ROTC display case of our cadets in foreign cultures, Cadet Page had this experience come to life in Mongolia between her MSII and MSIII year.

Prior to departing for their mission, Cadet Page underwent the same “pre-deployment training” that all Cadets undergo at USACC headquarters in Fort Knox, KY. She stated in her interview that this training was similar to what her soldiers would go through before a

deployment, and is happy she'll be able to help them with the process one day. In regard to the CULP program design, her reflection shares that they worked one-on-one with Mongolian police officers and officers in training on a daily basis. Starting in the morning and continuing into the afternoon, Cadet Page quickly noticed the, "near impossible language barrier" and stated that, "creativity kicked in as I improved my charade skills often standing up to act out different emotions or complex English words" (Page 1). She remembers that the Mongolians were, "extremely grateful for the opportunity to practice their speaking and were very interested in learning more about American culture and the United States military" (Page 1). Proud of her organization and the work that she was able to do, Cadet Page recognized that she was representing more than just the U.S. Army, but Americans and American ideals in general.

After a few days in country, Cadet Page remembers quickly feeling connected to the Mongolians as she learned more about their culture. She identified with a Mongolian female second lieutenant and learned more about her lifestyle and customs. As she stated in her interview, "you're there to learn that they're people too. It's a humanizing mission [that] makes you view people as human, not a number" (Personal interview: Page, Chui, Shultz). Happy to have been exposed to such a different culture so early in her career, Cadet Page took this opportunity to, "recognize that different lifestyles are not bad" and that there is value in, "trying to see life through their eyes" (Personal interview: Page, Chui, Shultz).

Not only did she reflect on her time learning about Mongolian culture and living in a foreign country, Cadet Page believes she learned a great deal about herself during her CULP mission. She wrote that she learned, "the importance of patience, the ways creativity pays off, and different tactics to break language barriers" (Page 2). She acutely recognized that the ability to break down linguistic barriers would be vital, "in any future joint military missions" (Page 2).

In summarizing her experience, Cadet Page wrote that, “helping these soldiers learn and grow as individuals also allowed me to grow as as a future second lieutenant,” and thus meeting the overarching goal of the CULP mission to produce more culturally astute Army officers (Page 1).

Chapter 5: Synthesis

In conducting research with past program participants, a great number of my questions were broad, applying to both Project GO and CULP. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of my findings as they apply to both programs and, as applicable, synthesize how they relate back to sociolinguistics and relevant aforementioned military policies. As often as possible, I will include graphics and quotes from my surveys to support my findings. Section 5.1.1 provides a number of secondary findings that were additional results of my research. In the final section of this chapter, I will draw conclusions on each of the programs and the progress they have made and are making towards meeting Army LREC standards moving forward.

5.1 Overarching research findings

One of the primary guiding questions for this study, as outlined in chapter 1, was to determine the ways in which language and cultural training affect the individual officer. Outside of the goal of achieving higher LREC capabilities, education on a foreign language and culture has the ability to create a more empathetic and understanding officer overall. From a sociolinguistic perspective, studying another language helps us begin to see the world through their lens. Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf proposed their famous “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” of linguistic relativity in the early 1900s, claiming that language not only has the ability to influence our thoughts and worldview, but also to potentially control them based on the grammars of our given language (“Language and Thought”). This theory tends to have two schools of thought: on the lower end, that language can influence thought; on the higher end, that language determines and limits thought. While this study does not aim to prove one nor the other, it can not be dismissed that there is some sort of relationship between the two. In studying

another language and culture, these Army cadets have undoubtedly been exposed to alternative ways of thinking about and perceiving the world around them. This is particularly true for those of them who had the opportunity to travel abroad, potentially for the first time in their lives, with Project GO or CULP. From a military perspective, as discussed largely in chapter 2, LREC skills for the warfighter have proven to increase our abilities to forge relationships, particularly in non-combat operations. These cadets will then have an advantage over the peers when they enter the force after having been exposed to these other cultures and languages.

To return to the question of how these trainings affect the individual officer, there was a specific survey question that targeted participant's own perception of how they have been changed for the better by their experience(s). When asked if they believed being exposed to other cultures as a Cadet will make them, or for alumni did make them, a more well-rounded and empathetic Army Officer, a large majority answered "absolutely". These results can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 below.




Figure 2. "Current Cadets" Questionnaire




Figure 3. “SU ROTC Alumni” Questionnaire

The overwhelmingly positive responses to this question show that these cadets and alumni were able to recognize the value for them as an individual leader, in addition to the value for the Army in having a better trained officer. While they may not have mastered a foreign language and certainly did not gain the requisite amount of experience as defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to hold “regional expertise,” this preliminary exposure has created cadets and lieutenants who will be able to understand not only their allies and enemies better, but also those within their own ranks.

This was also a question that I brought up in my personal interviews with Christopher Shultz and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Michael Whiteley. In our interview with Cadets Chui and Page, Mr. Shultz stated that he believed it, “just makes people more well-rounded” to have gone through an experience such as CULP or Project GO (Personal interview: Page, Chui, Shultz). After serving in both Korea and Iraq during his career as a Signal Officer, he noted that there was, “value without a doubt” in going abroad as, “you are amongst other people in the world,” such as those you will work with as allies in your military career (Personal interview: Page, Chui, Shultz). Mr. Shultz encountered many cultural barriers for the first time on his deployment to Iraq as he worked with Iraqi counterparts on a regular basis. Charged with building relationships with them in order to facilitate the mission, he noted that his Iraqi counterparts’

pride and ego could sometimes get in the way of asking for help — a cultural difference to which he was not accustomed.

SFC Whiteley echoed these sentiments about interacting with counterparts from a foreign culture. He also added that over his more than a decade and a half of service, he has had various soldiers of his own who spoke broken English or were from a unique cultural background. These were also times where he had to learn to have patience and be more understanding of those who are different from us. When asked if at the time of enlistment he expected learning about other cultures to become such an integral part of his job, the seasoned NCO laughed and stated, “No...It has changed the way I act around different people, including my own soldiers” (Personal interview: Whiteley). SFC Whiteley stated that he highly encourages his ROTC cadets to participate in Project GO or CULP for this very reason, so that they can begin the process early in their career of gaining patience and understanding for cross-cultural and cross-linguistic differences. He recognizes that it gives the future officers, “Firsthand experience...Something they may not have been fortunate enough to do before they came into the SU or ROTC program” (Personal interview: Whiteley). In summary, linguistic research and recent military history both point to the positive results of LREC training, and both cadets and ROTC Cadre seem to be recognizing the benefits for the individual officer as well.

An interesting finding from my surveys was whether or not program participants thought that Project GO and/or CULP should be mandated within ROTC. While 100% of those surveyed, both current cadets and alumni, would suggest that cadets participate in Project GO or CULP, only 40% of current cadets and 12.5% of alumni believe that this training should be mandated as a commissioning requirement. See Figures 4 and 5 below for graphs depicting these results.




Figure 4. “Current Cadets” Questionnaire




Figure 5. “SU ROTC Alumni” Questionnaire

A few of the participants took the liberty to elaborate on their position in the comments section, usually noting that this type of training should be reserved for those who volunteer for it as to not hinder the integrity of the program. These participants believed that with numerous cadets who do not wish to be there, the value of the training could be diminished by low morale and negative views of the mission. Seeing the program alumni be defensive of Project GO and CULP in only wanting those who see value in them to participate was a truly positive result as it points to how much value they saw in the training. Cadets Chui and Page echoed these sentiments in their interviews. From a Cadre perspective, SFC Whiteley believes that cadets should be mandated to

participate between their MSII and MSIII year as they have no other mandatory training that summer and the opportunity should be seized while it is available. He stated that language and cultural learning, “is a big learning curve and [program participation] will help you when you to into the Army, no matter active, guard or reserve duty” (Personal interview: Whiteley). Mr. Shultz also believes that all cadets should be mandatorily volunteering for these opportunities during their time in ROTC. While mandating these programs is not currently on the horizon, it is a potential consideration for USACC.

5.1.1 Additional findings

As stated in the introductory chapter of this study, there were a number of additional survey questions I asked participants as they pertained to another study on learner motivations, in particular. Providing more sociolinguistic depth to this military study, some of these findings will be discussed below.

In section 5.1 the long-term effects of LREC training on an individual officer (i.e., becoming a more empathetic leader) were discussed. Relating more specifically to language training, I was interested in determining whether or not cadets continued to study a language after being exposed to it on Project GO or CULP. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army note in their policy, language learning is not something that can be done overnight. The hope, then, would be that cadets keep studying the language upon return to their university. Of the 7 current cadets who did Project GO, 4 continued to study the language. In the case of CULP where cadets are not expressly taught a language but only exposed to it, no survey participants continued to study the language upon return to the U.S. Rationales for stopping ranged from their university not offering the course at the appropriate

level to the most common answer, that they did not have the time in their schedule. For CULP cadets, many also stated that they did not feel the language had value for them moving forward. As cadets keep an incredibly busy schedule, it is not surprising that they are forced to prioritize their schedule in other ways.

A large factor that I believed would affect why cadets undertake language and cultural studies, including whether they continued to study the language after Project GO or CULP, was the reason for which they were motivated in the first place. Learner motivations for language learning is a concept in sociolinguistics that divides learners into two camps: integrative or instrumental (Center for Open Educational Resources & Language Learning). Originally hypothesized by R.C. Gardner in 1985, integrativeness refers to “an openness to identify, at least in part, with another language community” (Masgoret and Gardner 126). An integratively motivated student, then, has a desire to, “learn the second language, has an openness to identification with the other language community, and has favorable attitudes toward the learning situation” (Masgoret and Gardner 128). As opposed to integrative learners, instrumental learners are characterized as those who strive to learn for more practical reasons, such as attaining a certain job or receiving incentive pay. As they are all volunteers in the United States Army, I believed the majority of participants would self identify as integrative learners. Using a sliding scale, 6 current cadets identified themselves as more integrative learners, 9 as in-between integrative and instrumental, and none as instrumental learners. Alumni tended to favor the instrumental side more, with 3 identifying as more instrumental, 3 in the middle, and only 2 as more integrative. An attempt to draw a correlation between integrative learners and continued language study would be too hard to prove definitively with this small of a sample size.

A related question yielded an interesting conclusion. As demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7 below, when asked if they believed there was career value for a military officer to learn a foreign language, all participants selected “more than likely” or “absolutely”. This informs us that even if the majority identified as more integratively motivated to study language and culture, and if they didn’t continue to study the language, all still believe that there is career value - and thus instrumental value - in studying a language. This shows that all of these current and future military leaders see some degree of value in LREC training, making them hopefully more likely to support these strategies in their own units one day.




Figure 6. “Current Cadets” Questionnaire




Figure 7. “SU ROTC Alumni” Questionnaire

A largely utilized strategy in the Army, ROTC cadets have the potential to receive special pay while on Project GO and while studying certain languages at their university. Beginning in 2008, the Army introduced the Critical Language Incentive Pay (CLIP) program that would pay Cadets a predetermined amount per credit hour to study a critical language at their university. As noted by the title of the program, this pay only applies to languages considered to be “critical” to national security interests (“Critical Languages”). Examples of languages that are covered by CLIP are Arabic, Chinese and Urdu. Some examples of languages not covered by CLIP are French, Spanish and German. When current cadets were asked if they were likely to study a language based solely on the fact that they were paid to do so, 80% said they would likely or definitely study the language, as shown in Figure 8 below.




Figure 8. “Current Cadets” Questionnaire

This draws the rapid conclusion that cadets are far more likely to study a language if they receive incentive pay to do so, as the bigger Army does with soldiers and officers already. Knowing that not all of these cadets identified as integrative learners, incentive pay would make language study more appealing to those in the middle of the spectrum and particularly those identifying as

instrumental learners. Thus, it is suggested that the CLIP program continue and that the Army continue to incentivize LREC monetarily to attract more learners.

The last finding I would like to discuss is that of the role the ROTC community played in the decision making of Project GO and CULP former participants. I was interested to learn more about the degree to which cadets felt these programs were promoted by their peers and cadre, and whether this promotion played an integral role in their decision to apply. Knowing that the organization is rather close-knit, my expectation was that peer influence would play a credible role in the decision making process. All participants noted being somewhat to highly encouraged, the majority highly encouraged, by the ROTC community to take part in Project GO or CULP. However, this was not often one of the deciding factors for cadets choosing to participate in these programs, as seen in Figures 9 and 10 below.



Figure 9. "Current Cadets" Questionnaire




Figure 10. "SU ROTC Alumni" Questionnaire

With this being said, there are many other factors that can contribute to a cadet's desire to take part in Project GO or CULP. These may include a desire to go abroad/travel or to gain points towards their OML accessions. Cadets could also hope to fill their summer with as much training as possible or to master a foreign language. With so many variables to consider, it would be challenging for ROTC cadre and cadets' influence to take the leading role as the deciding factor for their participation. Nonetheless, further encouragement from the ROTC community did not seem to hurt participation as all alumni would suggest these programs to another Cadet.

5.2 Recommendations

Upon completing my research with ROTC-affiliated personnel, I was able to begin drawing conclusions based on what I knew about language learning and DoD/Army LREC policy. As their approaches to LREC training differ so greatly, I will consider Project GO and CULP independently of one another before making recommendations about them as a whole for USACC. I will consider the degree to which this program is advancing LREC strategies in the officer corps, if the programs are meeting their initial goals, and if there are ways in which they should or could be changed moving forward based on my research.

5.2.1 *Project GO*

The more linguistically intensive option available to ROTC cadets, Project Global Officer, is essentially a standard college language class executed by a university. Whether they attend domestically or abroad, cadets are functioning purely in their role as students for the duration of the program. Feedback from cadets suggests that it be more heavily advertised that you will receive both a stipend and college for the program, the latter potentially accelerating their degree completion and saving them time during their busy academic semesters. Additionally, particularly as more Project GO's become available for the academic semester or year, it would be beneficial to advertise these fully funded study abroad opportunities to non-contracted or non-scholarship cadets. From credit hours to a stipend to a free study abroad experience, it is a surprise that more MSI through MSIII cadets are not participating in Project GO. With more encouragement and advertising from ROTC cadre and fellow cadets, this has the potential to change.

As cadets are not functioning as representatives of the U.S. Army during Project GO, military excursions or interactions were rarely mentioned by program participants or in my research. The reason for this is understandable, as both civilians and future officers from all branches of the military can attend the program. From their comments, though, it appears that those cadets who had a military aspect integrated into the program thoroughly enjoyed it. Additionally, there was a highly positive response from cadets who were able to go abroad or go on cultural trips while abroad. However, it should be noted that the ability to take cadets abroad and/or to take them on certain cultural excursions is at times language-specific. For example, we can not bring cadets to Afghanistan to practice Pashto in a native speaker environment. While it

would not be practical for military training and interactions to always be incorporated into the curriculum or as cultural excursions, their inclusion, if at all possible, would likely be viewed positively by the cadets.

In regard to meeting Army LREC standards for more linguistically capable officers, it can be generalized that Project GO does a better job of this than CULP does at advancing our force-wide capabilities in languages. Ultimately, though, this is based on the assumption that cadets are finishing the program with appropriate language levels for the course sequence they took. That is to say, if they do an 8-week intermediate (200-level) Arabic program, they are finishing it with intermediate or higher abilities in Arabic. As conclusive language assessment is not standardized as part of the Project GO curriculum across all universities, it would be impossible to know how fluent the students truly are in the target language when they finish their course(s). If we wanted to better measure their abilities, a possibility would be for cadets to each complete the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) in the target language at the of Project GO. While cadets can take this test before commissioning as an officer, many do not and it would be impossible to relate it directly to Project GO unless they took it as a part of the program. An important fact about the DLPT, however, is that it only tests a service member or DoD employee's ability to understand oral and written language — it does not test their ability to speak or write in the language. This presents another possibility for Project GO, should it wish to be modified: only training service members in their ability to understand oral and written language as this is how the DoD tests their language competency. While this is not advisable from a language teaching perspective, it aligns more closely with how LREC capabilities will be measured down the line.

Overall, since all Project GO programs are unique and not centrally controlled by the DLNSEO or USACC, it would be impossible to comment on their individual curriculums outside of the feedback I received from cadets and lieutenants. Moreover, feedback regarding cultural excursions during their trips was continually positive. Consistent with the ideas presented in chapter 1 regarding the relationship between language, culture and society, it is advisable that Project GO programs incorporate cultural materials and activities as often as possible into their curriculum, be it domestic or international. Additionally, incorporating as many social interactions as possible, particularly with native speakers and foreign nationals, is advisable. These experiences will force the students to confront social and cultural boundaries while they are attempting to produce in the language, mimicking the situations in which they will find themselves on a deployment or working with foreign allies.

5.2.2 CULP

The more culturally extensive and less academic CPDT to choose from, CULP tends to be favored by those who are not linguistically inclined or motivated to learn a foreign language. Serving a separate purpose than Project GO, the CULP program's intent is not for cadet's to master a foreign language, but rather for them to be exposed to a foreign culture and learn to work with foreign militaries. As the program mimics the training cycle leading up to and after a deployment, there is a great deal of military value in CULP for the cadets as well. They will be able to recall these experiences before their first deployment as an officer and impose the importance of cultural understanding on their future soldiers. In a time where coalition forces will likely continue to be the future of warfare, getting accustomed to working with foreign allies is a formative experience for a young college student before entering the Army.

While CULP is intentionally less academically challenging than Project GO, feedback from some cadets suggest that they would have liked to have had more language or cultural instruction while they were abroad. One current cadet who traveled to Gabon last summer on CULP stated that it would be helpful to, “blend the current CULP program along with critical language studies. I think modifying CULP in this manner would make the program more rigorous, and Cadets would get more out of it” (Blowers, “Current Cadets”). While having obvious benefits to LREC strategies, this has the potential to also make CULP less attractive to cadets who are less interested in learning a language and want an escape from academics over the summer. A potential shift in this direction and a positive change from a sociolinguistic perspective, including some small language learning interactions for the cadets to become familiarized with colloquialisms or greetings in the foreign language would be highly beneficial to CULP programming.

One comment that appeared a few times was that participants did not favor the Cadet English Language Training Team (CELTT) mission types. As they are not seasoned English teachers, which one alumni pointed out, this is potentially not the best use of our ally’s time and does not benefit the cadets as much as it could. Expanded in chapter 4 through comments from alumni of Syracuse University, participants felt that the experience was not as mutually beneficial as it could have been. While the guiding questions cadets are given for their practice English conversations do largely centralize around culture, including language and cultural instruction from the foreign militaries more explicitly seems that it would benefit the program.

In considering LREC policies in place by the Army and DoD, it is unclear how much the CULP program is truly contributing to our force readiness. As an example, of all those surveyed, only one program participant kept studying the language he was exposed to on a CULP mission.

In his scenario, he kept studying it as it was his minor in college. Of the 8 CULP program alumni surveyed, none stated that they have used the language they were exposed to since entering the force. It is crucial to note that with languages, attrition rates can be rather quick if the language is not continually used. Despite this fact, cadets all argued that the CULP program should be expanded. This is the track the program is currently on and will likely continue to travel. As the language and cultural exposure cadets gain during the program is neither measurable nor in-depth, the CULP program serves more as a cursory introduction to confronting language and cultural boundaries than it does to advancing standing LREC policy. On the other hand, while this CPDT may not advance LREC standards as rapidly or explicitly as its counterpart, it seems to play a larger role in creating more empathetic and well-rounded leaders through cultural exposure. Program expansion, then, would meet a separate goal of creating a more understanding and cultured officer corps.

5.2.3 Overall recommendations and effects on the officer corps

One of the overarching questions that I asked survey and interview participants regarded their opinion of if Project GO and/or CULP should be mandated for ROTC cadets. Former program participants did not favor this prospect as they felt it would degrade the value of the programs by forcing cadets to be there, as discussed earlier in this chapter. On the other hand, Syracuse Army ROTC cadre seemed to favor the idea of mandatory participation. Their years of experience in the Army speak loudly and cadets tend to greatly respect the advice of the career professionals. From a policy point of view, mandating either or both CPDT would not advance the officer corps towards the LREC standards outlined by the CJCS and DA as there is no formal testing to corroborate the cadets language skills, regional or cultural understanding. Additionally,

it would only be once they commission into the Army that they would count in the number of officers with LREC abilities. From a logistical standpoint, mandating this training reveals the same issue that USACC has with other mandated training: time. Cadets already have mandatory training between their MSIII and MSIV year, and a new training developed in the last three years is on track to be mandated in one of the earlier summer breaks. For graduate and other late entry students, though, they have less time to complete mandatory training and it would be hard if not impossible to complete it all with less than 4 years in ROTC. For these reasons, at this point in time it would not be beneficial to try to mandate CULP or Project GO as they currently stand.

Cadets and lieutenants alike all seemed to agree that they would like to see CULP and Project GO expanded in the years to come. As one alumni wrote, he believe that both programs, “should be expanded to give cadets cultural experience[s] that they’re unable to get at the university” (Blowers, “SU ROTC Alumni”). We can already see this happening for Project GO, as the number of programs each year seems to be growing as well as the diversity of the programs. Now including academic year and online options, cadets have increased opportunities to learn a critical language without sacrificing their summer break. CULP has grown significantly over the years and is on track to continue in this direction. Though the numbers vary from year to year, the current USACC Commanding General supports the foundation of the CULP program and believes it is of value to future officers. My research into the two programs suggests that they are meeting their broader goals of more exposure to critical languages and foreign cultures, and that continuation and expansion would both be recommended.

In regard to the effects we will see on the Army officer corps as a result of these two programs, I believe we are already beginning to see junior commissioned officers who are more empathetic and well-rounded, and more conscious of cultural and linguistic barriers. Cadets Page

and Chui stated in their interviews that they felt these programs made them more, “open-minded... flexible...patient, especially with language and cultural barriers, including concepts of time... [and] self aware” (Personal interview: Page, Chui, Shultz). As one alumni acutely pointed out in their survey, the programs, “gave all participants an incredible experience to grow and develop not just their language skills. It put them in situations that they are vastly unfamiliar with and helps them grow as a person and a leader” (Blowers, “SU ROTC Alumni”). This truly is the goal of CULP and Project GO: for young leaders to become more comfortable with being in unfamiliar situations; to learn to be adaptive in real-time when a situation arises; and to navigate the situation in a way that doesn’t disregard cultural differences, but embraces them and uses them to help the mission.

In the years to come, particularly if these programs are expanded and can reach a higher percentage of cadets, the Army will gain a young officer corps that is potentially more willing than its predecessors to learn foreign tongues and about other cultures. The strategic impact of this willingness is large, as it is only after the value of LREC is recognized for the individual warfighter and mission that it can be seen on the strategic level. As I will highlight more in the closing chapter to this study, the military and world is moving in a direction that will continue to demand more of our soldiers and leaders. Language, cultural and regional expertise are just one of the many strategic needs of the future, and they are not destined to disappear anytime soon.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

6.1 Reflections

Returning to the main goals outlined for this study in chapter 1, I would like to reflect on some of the overarching questions this study aimed to answer. In chapter 5, I provided a synthesis of both Project GO and CULP that assessed both their successes and their shortcomings in regard to meeting DoD and DA goals. In this section, I would like to consider in greater detail the other two goals of this study: how our failures in the earliest part of the wars have lead us to where we are today, and the implications for the current state of our military. Particularly, I would like to highlight the ways in which language and cultural training will be of continued strategic importance to our military moving forward.

The first goal of this study was to provide background of our deficiencies in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and consider how these downfalls lead us to the current recognition that our forces were ill-equipped, in certain ways, for the battlefield. Despite our deficiencies being noticed in the early years of the war, we were not able to make up for all of the “hearts and minds” we lost at the onset of the operation. Further deepening the problem, this type of training could not be done overnight and has been known to meet resistance with many leaders who do not deem it valuable. By the time of the surge in 2007, so much damage had been done to our relationships with local nationals and their militaries that incoming leadership had to try to make up for the mistakes of those before them. While these deteriorated relationships were not solely due to lack of language skills and cultural understanding, as a large part was due to our strategy in the Middle East at the time, it certainly did not help matters on the tactical, soldier level. These wars have served as examples of the ways in which warfare has changed and the ways it will continue to change in the years to come. Pure combat operations are likely a concept of the

past. In adapting to the varied types of operations we will be conducting — be they peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism or otherwise — the entirety of our armed forces must change the way we prepare for and source these types of missions.

In addition to shifts in the types of missions we will be conducting, the way in which we conduct them has changed drastically since the end of the 21st century. Moving towards a more readily engageable joint force and a higher reliance on foreign coalitions, the Army does not act as independently as it did in its earlier days. An example of the types of coalition operations we are conducting, Operation Resolute Support, a NATO mission to which the United States contributes thousands of forces, “was launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions,” according to the NATO website (“Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan”). More than 13,000 personnel from the alliance contribute forces to this mission, with the United States contributing the largest amount. In a mission such as this, U.S. soldiers interact regularly with foreign nationals from Europe and the Middle East. Speaking one of their languages or having a basic understanding of their culture and social norms will help our military work closer with foreign militaries in these joint missions.

The U.S. military has “boots on the ground,” as we often say, in a wide range of countries around the world. We are currently engaged in the longest foreign war in U.S. history — the Global War on Terror, which began in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks — which is in its 16th year with no end in sight (Astora). Starting in 2014, Operation Inherent Resolve, also known as the War on the Islamic State, has been working to bring an end to the terrorist organization continually responsible for attacks around the globe. Since 2015, we have been engaged in a new era of the War in Afghanistan and have halted the downsizing of troops in country. The

commander in Afghanistan and that of Central Command have recently requested more troops to accomplish their mission, and the Congress and Commander in Chief are deliberating their request (Bowman). Moreover, tensions with North Korea and aggression from Russia has boiled higher over the last few years, resulting in more forces being sent to Europe and the Korean peninsula. After years of sequester to shrink the force for budgetary reasons, the new administration is attempting to now regrow a depleted military. All to say that the military will continue to have non-combat and potentially combat missions abroad, and that they will continue to function under the umbrella of joint operations in the years to come. In such an unpredictable global security environment, our military must continue to plan ahead and adapt for enemies both unknown and familiar. As it always has been, it is through our ability to prepare for and decisively engage the enemy that we will ensure the success of our future missions.

6.2 Areas for expansion of research

There are numerous areas where this research could be expanded. These include but are not limited to the ways in which the research was conducted, how each program was analyzed, and the potential for deeper sociolinguistic analyses of certain parts of the study.

Concerning the data collected for this study from alumni of both programs, it is important to recognize that the scope of this project was rather limited. As no database exists with the contact information of all Project GO and CULP past participants, it would have been challenging if not impossible to compile a complete list. For that reason, I decided to limit this study to those who I knew I had access to: Syracuse University program alumni. Even here at Syracuse, I did not have access to contact information for people who completed either program more than two years ago. My suggestion to anyone hoping to further research the impact of these

two programs would be to attempt to compile a wide target group of officers who entered the force since 2007 after having completed one of these CPDTs during ROTC. The ideal target group would include officers in a variety of branches of the Army, ranging from the combat arms to combat support, as well as potentially Reserve or National Guard officers. This would provide a more complete analysis, specifically on whether the officers have found this training useful in their particular branch.

This research could also have been an in-depth study of either CULP or Project GO, rather than both. Each program has many nuances that could have been explored deeper in a consideration to the ways in which they affect the Army at large. For example, CULP is designed as a way to use ROTC cadets as representatives of the U.S. military in order to build foreign relations in our Combatant Commands. Focusing more on this aspect of the program, specifically the implications for the DoD and Department of State, would be intriguing. For Project GO, the effects seen on the officer corps in the other branches of the military could be considered in the context of their own force-specific needs for language and cultural competency. Additionally, the DLNSEO has a number of other scholarship programs to study foreign languages that cadets can apply to, such as the Boren scholarship. Less common and completely separate from USACC, I decided to leave these scholarship options outside of the scope of this study. Finally, for someone interested in the defense budget, a consideration of the costs of each program could also be incorporated as this is certainly a factor as to whether or not these programs will continue and/or be expanded in the years to come.

A great deal more consideration can be given to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) should someone wish to expand upon these findings. Their academic journals, in particular, carry a wealth of knowledge and research to be explored and

incorporated. Moreover, should the program designers of Project GO or CULP hope to consider any revisions to their current curriculum and language instruction methodology, I would highly suggest that they consult with the DLIFLC on ways to best model their proven pedagogical techniques. In particular, I would suggest that both programs consult with the DLIFLC should they wish to implement assessment to the end of their programs, as suggested in chapter 5 of this study. As the federal government's premier source for foreign language instruction, their contributions to this field can not be overlooked.

From a sociolinguistic point of view, this research could be expanded through a closer consideration of the role of language ideologies and language planning by the military. The language ideologies at play in the military, particularly at higher echelons where strategic and doctrinal decisions are made, trickle down through leaders to the lowest level in military ranks. If learning language is valued or if speaking a particular language is valued, this sentiment encourages soldiers and leaders to seek out this training. The opposite is also true if there is a negative connotation associated with language learning, which is the stereotype of the military. In regard to language planning, it would be valuable to see a deeper analysis of Army LREC strategies from a language planning perspective in the way that we consider how a government approaches language planning. I refer to language planning in the broadest sense possible, of promoting or devaluing language learning in general rather than just for specific languages. Moreover, in terms of linguistics, there is certainly room to elaborate on the role of communicative competence, potentially second language acquisition for adult learners and more to add as many perspectives as possible on the study.

Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Non-abbreviated title</i>	<i>Context</i>
CELTT	Cadet English Language Training Teams	CULP mission type
CLIP	Critical Language Incentive Pay	Specialty pay given to members of the U.S. Army for studying a critical language
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chief of Staff	The highest-ranking and senior-most military officer in the U.S. Armed Forces
CJCSI	Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction	Instructions given by the CJCS to all branches of the U.S. military
CPDT	Cadet Professional Development Training	Optional summer professional development training programs for ROTC cadets
CULP	Cultural Understand and Language Proficiency [Program]	USACC CPDT program
DA	Department of the Army	Department within the DoD
DLIFLC	Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Culture Center	Federal government language training center; Responsibility under DA's TRADOC
DLNSEO	Defense Language and National Security Education Office	Specialty office within the DoD
DLPT	Defense Language Proficiency Test	DoD's language test on listening and reading
DLTR	Defense Language Transformation Roadmap	Guidance published in January 2005 by the DoD
DoD	Department of Defense	Department of the U.S. federal government
HA	Humanitarian Assistance	CULP mission type
LREC	Language, Regional Expertise, Culture	DA term used to describe this type of training/strategy

Mil-to-Mil	Military to Military Engagements	CULP mission type
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom	U.S. War in Afghanistan
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom	Iraq War
OND	Operation New Dawn	September 2010 to December 2011 of OIF
Project GO	Project Global Officer	USACC CPDT program
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps	College-based U.S. military officer preparatory program
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command	Command of the U.S. Army responsible for USACC, among other organizations
USACC	United States Army Cadet Command	Sub-organization of TRADOC, Governing body of U.S. Army ROTC

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Curriculum Vitae

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CERTIFICATION	<p>New York State Initial Certification Adolescence Education, French, grades 5-12</p> <p>Certificate of University Teaching April 2016 Syracuse University; Syracuse, NY Graduate School</p>
EDUCATION	<p>Masters of Arts, Linguistic Studies May 2017 Syracuse University; Syracuse, NY College of Arts and Sciences; Dept. of Languages, Literatures and Linguistics Cumulative GPA 3.96; Distinguished Military Scholar</p> <p>Masters of Arts, French and Francophone Studies May 2016 Syracuse University; Syracuse, NY College of Arts and Sciences; Dept. of Languages, Literatures and Linguistics Cumulative GPA 3.89</p> <p>Bachelor's of French and Adolescence Education May 2013 Saint John Fisher College; Rochester, NY Ralph C. Wilson Jr. School of Education; NCATE Accredited Cumulative GPA 3.54; French GPA 3.74</p> <p>Intensive French Language Program, Level B2+ Spring 2011 Université Stendhal Grenoble 3; Grenoble, France Saint John Fisher College Affiliated Foreign Study Cumulative GPA 4.0</p>
ACADEMIC HONORS	<p>Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award April 2017 Syracuse University; Syracuse, NY Graduate School</p> <p>Outstanding MA Candidate, French April 2016 Syracuse University; Syracuse, NY College of Arts and Sciences; Dept. of Languages, Literatures and Linguistics</p> <p>Saint John Fisher College Dean's List Spring 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2012, Spring 2013</p> <p>Alpha Mu Gamma; Eta Chi Chapter National Collegiate Foreign Language Honors Society</p>
ACADEMICS	<p>Syracuse University, Linguistics Master's Thesis May 2017 <i>"Towards a Multilingual and Cross-Cultured Officer Corps: A Study of Language and Culture Training Programs for Army ROTC Cadets"</i> My study focuses on two language and culture-intensive training programs for</p>

Army ROTC Cadets and how these programs will have a positive effect on the officer corps, on an individual level and in regard to overall mission success. My research is both qualitative and quantitative in nature, including surveys and interviews from program participants as well as an in-depth look at DoD and Army policy surrounding language and cultural training for the force. My hope is to promote further training of this nature, particularly for officers, by drawing attention to its critical importance in an era of increasing globalization, ongoing terrorism threats and worldwide political uncertainty.

Syracuse University, French Master's Dossier May 2016
"Des choix lexicaux comme procédé rhétorique dans trois textes francophones"
 The French Master's dossier is a compilation of three papers written and revised over the course of two years. The papers have a guiding principle throughout them, which for my study was the power of authorial word choice in a variety of Francophone texts. My dossier considers this as a rhetorical device used by authors to control their readers' perception of the text. My 55-page dossier was defended to and accepted by a committee of professors in completion of my French Master's degree.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Syracuse University, **French Teaching Assistant** 2014-2017
French II and III Lead Instructor August 2015 – December 2016
 I have taught French II (FRE 102, 3 semesters), French III (FRE 201, 2 semesters), French IV (1 semester) and Intermediate French Conversation (FRE 210, 3semesters) while at SU. I work 20 hours/week preparing, implementing and evaluating the effectiveness of lesson plans for groups of 10 to 20 students. I work collaboratively on a team to constantly improve our program, and to promote program growth within and outside of the department. Additionally, I have served as the Lead Instructor for French II and III, coordinating with the French Language Coordinator, TAs and Part-time instructors in a leadership role to design assessments that meet our learning objectives for the course.

Syracuse University, **French Part-time Instructor** July-August 2015
 I designed a 6-week intensive version of French II to be co-taught by myself and another instructor during Summer Session II. I taught two days a week for 2.5 hours a day to a class of two students at varying levels of proficiency in French. I was fully responsibly for lesson development and assessment, and collaborated daily with my co-instructor to ensure all course targets were being met.

Lycée et Collège Kléber, **English Teaching Assistant** 2013- 2014
 Teaching Assistantship Program in France; Strasbourg, France I created and executed lesson plans for groups of 4-20 students on a weekly basis. I collaborated with the English department to monitor student progress and develop shared goals and benchmarks. I evaluated *terminale* students individually using the BAC Oral Proficiency Rubric and provided regular feedback to teachers on individual and group performance.

Wilson Foundation Academy, **Student Teacher**, Rochester, NY Spring 2013
 I prepared and implemented engaging lesson plans at the 7th and 8th grade levels in French while co-teaching 6th grade introductory courses in Spanish and French. I attended department, specialty and school-wide meetings including professional development seminars for LOTE and TESOL teachers. I proved

student progress through analysis of student work and data. I differentiated lesson plans for students with Individualized Education Plans as well as disabled and gifted children. At WFA I gained experience working in an urban middle school setting as well as a newly approved International Baccalaureate Program.

Fairport Senior High School, **Student Teacher**, Rochester, NY Spring 2013
I developed and carried out standards-based lesson plans for honors and non-honors French 3 and 4 (sophomores and juniors) students. I utilized innovative technologies to increase student achievement and reflected upon each lesson plan with the guidance of a seasoned foreign language teacher. I read and analyzed all of *Le Petit Prince* with French 4 honors and non-honors students, differentiating the lesson plans between the classes. I gained practical experience in a suburban high school setting at FHS while participating in a lively and tradition-driven district.

PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE

Reserve Officer Training Corps, Syracuse University, **Cadet** 2014-2017
I train on a daily basis with the Syracuse University Stalwart Battalion to gain leadership experience and develop physical fitness in preparation for military service as a US Army Second Lieutenant upon commissioning in May 2017. I am always responsible for groups of 4 up to 200+ cadets, and receive regular feedback on ways to improve my leadership skills and thus better my subordinates and myself. I have brought innovation to my position through goal-setting exercises to drive cadets to have attainable short and long-term goals to work towards. I have been recognized with awards and high-ranking leadership positions for my work ethic and desire to better our organization. I rank in the top 10% nationally of all Army ROTC Cadets and will graduate as a Distinguished Military Scholar into the Active Duty force as a Military Intelligence Officer.

Saint John Fisher College, Academic Services, **French Tutor** 2010-2013
Utica College, Academic Services, **French Tutor** 2009-2010
I tutored students in 100-300 level French courses offered at the university. I employed time management skills to design and maintain my own tutoring schedule with 1-5 students a semester. I facilitated and instructed individual and group study sessions, and assessed progress towards individualized academic goals for each student.