CHRONOS

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The Syracuse University Undergraduate History Journal

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS...

We are delighted to have completed our fourth issue of the journal. We continue to be amazed at the enthusiasm of both the faculty and students for this project. We've come quite a long way since our first issue and we're hoping that with another year under our collective belts, the journal has found a solid footing in the history community here at Syracuse.

This certainly wouldn't be the case if not for the unwavering support we receive from the faculty of the History department. Our faculty have always been engaged in our efforts and supportive of our goals. The faculty look forward to each issue as eagerly as we do. This kind of involvement is what truly keeps us going each year. We are also fortunate to have the constant and enthusiastic encouragement of the chair of our department, Professor Craige Champion. As we continue to grow each year, more faculty become interested in these endeavors and work to encourage us, as well as their students to submit their work. We appreciate all of their efforts on our behalf. We would like to thank the administrative staff of the History department, Patti Blincoe, Patti Bohrer, and Fran Bockus. It is impossible to express just how much these wonderful ladies do for us. Without their continued help, we would be lost. We also thank the College of Arts and Sciences for their continued financial support, which has allowed us to grow and expand. Without their support, there wouldn't be a journal.

In this issue, we have tried to include papers on a very broad range of topics, which show their scholarship, uniqueness and creativity. The papers are the work of undergraduates, but are not limited to graduating seniors and, therefore, have been written for a variety of projects and assignments, and each year it becomes more difficult to limit our selections to what our resources can produce. This is a dilemma that we don't mind facing. We are delighted that each year more students submit their work. We hoped to be overwhelmed with submissions for many years to come. To all those who submitted papers, we thank you for your part in this project. Without you, the journal would wither away. To our undergraduates, we hope this journal will encourage you to strive to excel and see your own potential. To our departing seniors, we wish you a bright future and hope you depart with a happy history here at SU.

The Editorial Staff...

Cassandra Austin
Kelly Bogart
Kari Foley
Ashley Rossettie
Brad Rice
Michelle Austin

NEW FACULTY

Carol Faulkner

A new addition to the History department is Professor Carol Faulkner. Her concentration is in nineteenth century United States History. Her dissertation was on the Freedman's Aid Movement which she further expanded upon and turned into a book called Women's Radical Reconstruction: The Freedman's Aid Movement. The thesis of this book is how female activists viewed reconstruction as an opportunity to secure rights for themselves and the newly freed slaves. As of right now she is working on biography of Lucretia Mott because she has done a lot of research on her and feels that there is a gap in the information on her. Prof Faulkner really wants to demonstrate how Lucretia Mott shook up the standard narratives in women's rights and anti-slavery. Prof. Faulkner also is the book review editor for and online journal called Women and Social Movements.

This coming fall she'll be teaching two courses, HST 200, which is History of Sexuality and HST 300, which is Women's Rights in American History. In regards to future courses Prof. Faulkner is creating two new courses. One is for the social movements in American History from the 1800's until now; she wants to make it a 300 level so that more history majors can get into it. The other course she is working on is a HST 401 on researching sexuality for history.

Prof. Faulkner is a bright, intelligent, interesting woman who believes that history is very relevant for thinking about contemporary issues. She realized that she wanted to study history when she was young because she was a big mystery reader and she saw a relationship between mystery and history. In the classroom, Prof. Faulkner engages her class with in depth discussions and witty comments. In an attempt to keep history interesting and relevant she tells jokes, shows clips from YouTube.com, screens films and provides a variety of historical sources to her students.

Welcome to SU Professor Faulkner, we are glad to have you.

Michelle Austin

Albrecht Diem

Albrecht Diem is a professor in the history department at Syracuse University; born, raised and educated in Europe. Diem describes himself as a wandering scholar who is "culturally Dutch, legally German, most at home in Toronto." His area of interest lies in the early middle ages with his area of expertise being in western monasticism. He is fascinated by the role of monasteries in the middle ages and the rise of the concept of monastic communities. The question of the role that monasteries played in the development of communities, in developing systems of discipline and law, and how monasteries eventually grew into large institutions deeply intrigues this scholar of history.

After earning his Ph. D in history, Diem worked as a lecturer at different universities and then worked as a research fellow at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. He also threw himself into the job market, applying for a multitude of teaching positions in New Zealand, Australia, England and the United States. He stayed in the job market for three years before finding a job at Syracuse University. And he says, "it was worth the wait," describing Syracuse as one of the best jobs he could have found.

Currently, Diem is working on several projects. Eventually, one of the main projects that he would like to do would be to produce an English translation of his Ph.D. It's currently written in German and very few people in the United States can read it. But he still has other obligations to finish which he describes a "couple of rotting corpses in his closet." Although he has other projects to do, he can only work on them part time as he is currently teaching. He describes this as a "time battle between research and spending the necessary time with your students."

Although Diem misses the time to do research, he enjoys teaching. But he notes that there is a difference between students in the United States and Europe. In America, teaching is more challenging as students expect more guidance and have much more contact with their professors. Diem recalls as a student in Europe, "I spoke five minutes with the professor when I handed in my paper and that was all the contact I had." Although the teaching styles between Europe and the United States are different, Diem enjoys his job at Syracuse.

Since arriving at Syracuse University, Diem has taught three classes: Early Medieval Europe, Origins of western monasticism and is currently teaching Saints and Sinners in the Middle Ages. Although he has a lot of freedom in what he can teach Diem believes it is logical that he start with his area of expertise. He would eventually like to teach a class on the history of opera and even a class on gay and lesbian people in the middle ages.

While Diem's classes look fascinating, the real interesting experience for any student will be Diem's way of teaching. Diem says he's not interested in pouring facts into students' brains, but rather being a teacher that can spark curiosity. He wants to teach students questions that will make them more inquisitive about the subject. The best learning experience will come with an exercise of curiosity. Any class with Professor Diem is sure to be a challenge most students won't forget.

Welcome to Syracuse, Professor Diem!

Kari Foley

MARRIAGE, SUCCESSION AND ELIZABETH I

Jennifer Gramer

In an official petition decreed February 1, 1563, England's House of Lords made a desperate plea to Queen Elizabeth I: "If God shall call your highness without heir of your body, be in more dangerous state and condition than ever it was that any man can remember."[1] This distressed, and finally futile, plea for the 30-year-old Queen to "dispose [herself] to marry where it shall please [her]...and as soon as it shall please [her]"[2] reflected the growing concern of the governing class as to securing the future of the country. Although the numerous appeals of the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and Elizabeth's privy council did not fall upon deaf ears, the Queen at last decided against the wishes of her governing bodies, a decision that many feared would entail dire consequences for England. The question remains whether Elizabeth ever really planned to marry in the first place, or whether her final decision reflected one made at the beginning of her reign in 1559. Although hypotheses abound, historians may never discover the true answer to this query. But the vital role that marriage endeavors, negotiations, and ultimately deflections played in Elizabeth's reign, persona, and popular and historical legacy demonstrate the magnitude of the marriage and succession questions in Tudor England.

According to Elizabeth, the reasons for the failure of potential marriages to suitors ranging from the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester to François De Valois, varied from a fear of discord within the country caused by new alliances to issues of religious conformity to trepidation over a loss of power and forced submissiveness in the case of a male head-of-state. In the end, it seems that Elizabeth's failure to marry may have stemmed from a deliberate desire to keep the fate of her country in her own hands, and thus retain the confidence of her people in her, and only her, as monarch. It is also vital to take into account the role that her privy council played in marriage negotiations – indeed, their inability to fully unite behind any single suitor made rejecting proposals an easier task.[3] Elizabeth's decision caused much strife within her private council, the government, and amongst the people of England and beyond; most of who saw marriage as the only means of securing a smooth transfer of power after her death. In the words of Matthew Parker, the archbishop of Canterbury in 1560, Elizabeth's increasing capriciousness regarding the marriage issue was met with "[a great fear] that this continued sterility...be a token of God's displeasure towards us."[4]

Historically, the two most crucial issues facing the monarchs – and country – of England were succession and religion. The crises involved with succession were engraved in the minds of the English before Elizabeth became queen – during the fifteenth century, the country faced continual friction and upheaval as rival contenders vied to gain control of the throne through military means. Much of this turmoil took the form of the War of the Roses (1455-1487), which ended with the accession of Henry VII.[5] Although this all took place well before the reign of Elizabeth, it fostered an environment in England that left not only the country vulnerable to foreign invasion (an issue that Elizabeth would later have to address with Spain), but also planted a genuine fear in the minds of the English subjects concerning the consequences of a succession crisis. This fear manifested itself in the minds of later monarchs as well, becoming a key concern governing the minds of future regents, famously including Henry VIII, whose drive to produce a viable heir to the throne culminated in a break with Rome in 1531.[6]

Thus, when Elizabeth finally took the throne in January 1559, it was as a direct result of a succession crisis that began after Henry VIII's death in 1547. Indeed, the attitude at the time towards a female regent was fearful – as Matthew Parker's quote attests, many regarded the prospect of a sole female ruler as punishment from God. Moreover, "most believed a female ruler to be, if not an unnatural monstrosity, an unusual, and in principle undesirable exception to the regular rule governing human affairs."[7] Initially, Elizabeth appeared to bow to pressures from her council and governing bodies to seek a husband; at no time during the first half of her reign did she ever publicly rule-out the prospect of marriage, and according to Anne Somerset, there are numerous instances between 1558 and 1568 in which the Queen "said that she had already informed the Commons...that she intended to take a husband, and she could not understand why so little weight had been attached to this assurance."[8] As a woman of her time, the Queen must have been well aware of the importance of marriage and childbirth as solutions to the issue of succession. The skepticism on the part of the Commons, however, was well-placed, as Elizabeth's dealings with the marriage issue had been notoriously ambivalent and her ability to settle on a decision, nonexistent. Her apparent strategy of irresoluteness began as early as 1559, when the Commons, including all of her privy councilors, first asked her to take a husband as means of dealing with the threat posed by Mary Stuart. Elizabeth's response remained open to the possibility of marriage; however, it concluded with the prediction that ultimately, it would be sufficient that a marble stone state 'that a Queene, having raigned such a tyme, lived and dyed a virgin.'[9] This petition was

1 Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller and Mary Beth Rose, eds. *Elizabeth I: Collected Works,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 86.
2 Marcus et. al., p. 86.
3 Susan Doran, "Why Did Elizabeth Not Marry?" *Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana,* ed. Julia M. Walker, London: Duke University Press, 1998, p. 41.
4 Doran, p. 30.
5 Class notes, 1/17/08.
6 Anne Somerset, *Elizabeth I.* New York: Anchor Books, 1991, p. 34.
7 Patrick Collinson, "Elizabeth I (1533–1603)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, Sept. 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8636, 16 Feb 2008.
8 Somerset, p. 186.
9 Collinson.

repeated by Parliament three times between 1563 and 1576 as the need to secure a successor grew more and more pressing.[10] The petition delivered in 1566 addressing the questions of marriage and succession "implicitly censured the Queen for lack of action despite her promise to marry," and led Elizabeth to respond reproachfully "a strange order of petitioners, that will make a request and cannot be otherwise ascertained but by the prince's word, and yet will not believe it when it is spoken."[11]

The pleas of the Commons and the Lords were justifiable. As noted previously, crises of succession were embedded in the memories of the English. What is more, Elizabeth's precarious relationship with Mary Stuart, and the Scottish Queen's claims to the English throne immediately following Elizabeth's coronation further compounded the sense of urgency for Elizabeth to marry and name a successor. To begin with, following Mary's claim to the throne, Spanish King Philip immediately rallied in favor of Elizabeth's legitimacy. This support left Elizabeth, at least initially, in a strong position: France wanted to create an alliance against Spain, and Spain and the Hapsburgs wanted to form one against France. Thus, Elizabeth's potential future husband would tip the entire balance of power in Europe. The urgency of this decision is clearly reflected in the 1563 petitions from Parliament, as the House of Lords noted that the threat posed by Mary from abroad could be dealt with in Elizabeth's marriage and production of an heir: "Th'assenting to and performing of those petitions [marriage and succession] cannot...but breed terror to your enemies, and therefore must of necessary bring private surety to your person."[12] In the same petition, the House of Lords even went so far, using classical and religious allusions, to suggest that Elizabeth's failure to marry would put her people in danger: "...the not doing of this...cannot by [our] judgment but be the occasion of our evident and great danger and peril to all states and sorts of men of this realm by the factions, seditions and intestine war that will grow... [and] much innocent blood is like to be shed."[13] England's – and the Queen's – precariousness for lack of marriage and the naming of a successor are further exposed in Parliament's 1571 Treasons Act, which explicitly forbade anyone to affirm that "our said sovereign lady...is not able to make laws and statues of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown of this realm and the descent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof..."[14]

In her direct responses to these particular petitions, Elizabeth's exasperation with her Parliament was evident. To the Commons, she stated that "I know...I am mortal...and that I must seek to discharge myself of that great burden."[15] Though, she does slyly consent that "if I can bend my liking to your need, I will not resist such

10 Doran, p. 30.
11 Doran, p. 31.
12 Marcus et. al., p. 82.
13 Marcus et. al., p. 85.
14 "Treasons Act, 1571," www.gunpowder-plot.org/archives/eliz2.htm.
15 Marcus et. al., p. 71.

a mind."[16] This phrase is telling: Elizabeth did not publicly, until her last suitor of François De Valois, Duke of Alençon in 1585, commit to remaining unwed. Instead, a series of more than two dozen suitors came and went through her court. There are even indications that she harbored a deep desire to marry a few of them, wishes that were eventually quelled by her councilors. As Susan Doran notes, "it is doubtful that her public statements were merely cynical gestures to her parliamentary critics...[for in the 1560s] she well knew that marriage and childbirth provided the best route for resolving that thorny issue of succession."[17] Although, there are accounts from Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and Sir William Pickering that "ever since her years of understanding, [she] concluded that spinsterhood would suit her best." Thus, in Somerset's words, "since there is evidence which suggests that she had formed [an unfavorable view on marriage] long before she became Queen, political considerations cannot on their own account for her attitude."[18] Regardless, before choosing Elizabeth also had to take numerous questions into account, in spite of the House of Lords' request that she just marry "with whom it shall please you."[19] First, there was the vital issue of religion: if Elizabeth married a Catholic, such as François d'Anjou, she must decide to what extent he would have to conform to English law. In the case of a Catholic suitor, Elizabeth and her council had to keep in the back of their minds the fact that many would be fearful and suspicious of secret clauses in the marriage treaty that could be detrimental to England. In general, the predominant view of the council towards marriage between Catholics and Protestants seems to have been that "Christian intermarriage was acceptable provided there were sound expectations of a future conversion to Protestantism."[20] Additionally, there was the ever-present issue of Elizabeth's gender, for as a woman and a wife, albeit a monarch, she would inevitably have to bow to the requests of her husband. This held great potential to disfavor England. Furthermore, if she chose to marry someone who was also in line to inherit their own throne, their resulting heir would be a monarch of two kingdoms, leaving the possibility that England would be abandoned in favor of the other.

One of Elizabeth's first notable and seriously-considered marriage proposals came from King Philip II of Spain in 1559, who saw an alliance with England as means of putting him in a position to guarantee that the country remained in the hands of the Catholic Church under Elizabeth. Upon the proposal, however, "Elizabeth did not seem in the least elated...and she made difficulties about the fact that Philip had previously been married to her sister."[21] Politically, it is easy to see why his proposal was rejected: as both Elizabeth and her council were well-aware, the marriage would prove incompatible with the radical alterations in religion that

16 Marcus et. al., p. 79.
17 Doran, p. 39.
18 Somerset, p. 95.
19 Marcus et. al., p. 82.
20 Doran, p. 47.
21 Somerset, p.108.

the Queen was prepared to enact. Thus, she told the Spanish ambassador that "she could not marry your Majesty as she was a heretic."[22] Nearly all of the remaining candidates early in her reign were simply deemed not good enough for a reigning monarch. Even the Catholic Archduke Charles of Austria, who, from the English point of view was enticing, elicited only a "non-committal" reaction from the Queen in 1566, and was ultimately rejected after much delay on account of his refusal to convert to Protestantism. There is something to be said for the fact that the Queen knew her country's stability could be wrecked if she married someone of a different faith – though she also knew that the "religion issue" would provide the public with a "sufficiently weighty impediment" as to her failure to secure a husband yet again, and "was confident that it in no way reflected badly on her if she declared it to be an insuperable bar to a union."[23] Religion proved to be an insurmountable obstacle too in other Catholic suitors, Henri d'Anjou to Charles' brother, Ferdinand.

There does exist evidence that Elizabeth may have been favorably inclined towards marriage in the case of two individuals, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and François De Valois, Duke of Alençon, although neither worked out due to an unfavorable response from the Privy Council, or a sense of futility that arose with Elizabeth's passing of child-bearing age. Dudley and the Queen cultivated a close relationship, and even while his wife Amy was still alive, courtiers swapped scandalous stories about his relationship with Elizabeth.[24] In spite of Elizabeth's apparent infatuation with the Earl, he was far from popular as a potential husband to their contemporaries. Thus, even when his wife died (under suspicious circumstances, which further aggravated his poor reputation at the court), Dudley's viability as a suitor was low. Not only was his character doubted by Elizabeth's council, but "hostility to the match also owed much to political self-interest,"[25] no doubt fueled by the perception that in marrying Dudley, the Queen would have "gone down in the estimation of foreign courts, and England's standing within the international community would have been grievously diminished."[26] Thus, it seems that in the case of Dudley, Elizabeth's rationality and political instincts overruled those of her emotions. As for Alençon, after the failed marriage negotiations with his brother, Henri d'Anjou, due to once again to the religion issue, "the Queen [had] assume[d] the guise of injured maidenhood."[27] When Alençon sent his servant to England in 1578 to begin marriage negotiations with Elizabeth, the 45-year-old queen seemed swept off her feet. When he became the sole foreign suitor to visit Elizabeth later that year, her feelings apparently intensified, and she took to calling him her "frog."[28] However, this match proved divisive amongst her council-

22 Somerset, p. 108.
23 Somerset, p. 201.
24 Collinson.
25 Doran, p. 45.
26 Somerset, p. 133.
27 Somerset, p. 264.
28 Collinson.

ors and in the country, and many lampooned the match for the wide age discrepancy between the Queen and Alençon, as well as the Frenchman's staunch Catholicism (including a widespread propaganda campaign mobilized by Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham[29]). By late 1579, "councilor argument against the marriage prevailed"[30] in spite of the political boons that an alliance with France may have provided, and as it grew clearer that Elizabeth was past heir-producing age, negotiations were finally desisted. Still, there is evidence that suggests Elizabeth was pleased with this final, failed negotiation, as she had provided Alençon with unfair terms in negotiations, "allow[ing] her to make out that it was [the French] who were being unreasonable, and that it was no fault of hers if Alençon and she did not become man and wife."[31]

Her numerous courtships, and notably her last – and much-ridiculed – attempt at marriage with Alençon were damaging to Elizabeth's reputation both at home and abroad. To deal with her deliberate failure to marry (and failure that was aided in large part by the inability of her council to rally completely behind one candidate for marriage), she began to modify her public image to fit her emerging status as an unwed queen, an image that reached its height in the "Virgin Queen" iconography propagated after 1579. With this imagery, Elizabeth was able to eschew her role as a mere unmarried woman in favor of an image that presented her as an "exceptional woman whose purity made her worthy of devotion, even adoration."[32] This notion is clearly in display in her Sieve Portraits, which were painted between 1579 and 1583, coinciding with her unpopular marriage negotiations with Alençon.[33] These images, and others depicting her as a powerful, near-divine ruler helped to ensure that even without a successful marriage, Elizabeth's authoritative and popular status would remain ensconced in the minds of her people.

Ultimately, it is clear that a number of circumstantial and imperfect conditions fatally harmed Elizabeth's marriage negotiations from the time of her accession to the last failed attempt in 1579. In spite of Parliament's numerous pleas to the Queen to settle on any husband for the safety and future of the country, from issues of religion to court status to disagreements within the privy council as to the qualifications of a potential mate, there were a fair number of obstacles that blocked the path to marriage, not the least of which was the failure of Elizabeth's councilors to fully back any one of her suitors. However, it is also clear that many of these failures were abetted by Elizabeth's ambivalence towards marriage, an attitude that had been honed since childhood. Even though she was a woman of her time, and no doubt knew the importance of marriage and succession to her country (a façade that she proliferated to the public for at least the first half of her reign), Elizabeth's irresoluteness seemed to mask a desire to remain unmarried until her death in 1603.

29 Doran, p. 49.
30 Collinson.
31 Somerset, p. 329.
32 Doran, p. 35.
33 Strong, p. 97.

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THE LITTLE RED PAPER: A BRIEF SKETCH AND ANALYSIS OF THE THOUGHT AND ACTION OF CHAIRMAN MAO

Abram Brown

Mao Tse-tung was "a genius at not sinking."[1] At countless points in his life, Mao seemed to be facing the certain death of his cause and even his own demise. However, Mao single- handedly carried China into the twentieth century, out of the quagmire of warlord politics and imperialist threats. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) survived and grew because of Mao's pure will power and his ability to harness the masses. A large part of this innate talent was the publishing and distribution of Maoist literature. Mao found it was much easier to effectively govern an informed nation, with a population that knew his political philosophy and goals, than it was to lead an uninformed nation. There is a general rule both to Mao and to Maoist thought. All of Mao's actions can find substantiation in his contemporary and earlier writings. Still, many in the West would label Mao a dictator, as they would any communist leader; he was, however, considerably more enlightened intellectually than the average head of state. In fact, an ideal leader to Mao would "take the ideas of the masses and concentrate them (through study) then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action."[2] He certainly endeavored to carry out this ideal.

Mao was born in 1893, and he did not arrive on the national stage until the early 1920s. Mao was a "member of the May Fourth generation,"[3] the generation of revolutionaries who would replace Sun Yat-sen and Li Tai-chao. They were inspired by the revolutionary thought of the past and present communist thinkers. Mao and others were especially influenced by the newspaper *New Youth*. This paper encouraged "political mobilization,"[4] and the exploration of any "radical ideals of foreign origin."[5] It was with socialism and communism that Mao found his intellectual niche and greatly influenced his political thought.

First, he participated in the mobilization of his rural home province of Hunan. During this mobilization Mao first put his thoughts on paper. His writings from Hunan are the cornerstone of his political thought and are applied over and over again in his

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1 Jonathon D. Spence, "Mao Zedong," *Time,* 13 April 1998
<http://www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/mao.html> (accessed February 25, 2008).
2 Mao Zedong. "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership."
3 Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13.
4 John E. Wills Jr., *Mountain of Fame: Portraits in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 336.
5 Ibid, 338.

actions. In Hunan, he described the "peasant movement...[as] a colossal event."[6] He established the necessity of including poor peasants in the revolution, saying that there "can be no revolution"[7] without them. Here the rule of Mao is first evident; he wrote about the crucial role of the peasants in the revolution and he then set about using them in the initial opposition to the Kuomintang[8] and Chiang Kai-shek. Later, during the Long March, Mao further demonstrated his leadership abilities. This was a massive retreat of the communist forces through the monotonous countryside of China, with Kuomintang forces in close pursuit.

While the Long March is no carefully reasoned policy, Mao's leadership would never be put on a finer stage. He single-handedly led the CCP through this retreat from "near certain annihilation" with "extraordinary courage, discipline, and skillful leadership."[9] After the retreat, Mao would emerge as leader of the party. He continued his fight against the Koumintang, with a perfectly reasoned strategy. Military activity and violence was justified because the nationalists "deprived [the peasants] of all political freedoms and rights to take any peaceful action."[10] Mao would later brand them traitors for their complicity in Japanese invasion and occupation, a sentiment that would grow amongst the people. The CCP gradually continued to build up resistance to the Kuomintang by playing to anti-Japanese sentiments and demonstrating a marked respect for the land and property of the peasants. Again, Mao recognized the peasants as important cogs in his revolutionary machine just as he did first in his writings in Hunan.

The communists fought the Japanese when the inevitable invasion and occupation occurred. When WWII ended, the CCP emerged with a stronger hold over China than at the beginning of the war. They had entered the war a depleted force, but exited it stronger than ever. The continued conflict between the two parties from 1946-9 resulted in an outcome that was predicted in the West. The CCP, under the leadership of Mao, triumphed over the war weakened Kuomintang and on October 1, 1949, Mao declared the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).[11] The formation of the republic was the concrete fulfillment of the aspirations Mao first formulated in Hunan, "the peasant association becom[ing] the sole organ of authority."[12] Mao believed that he was creating "a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all Chinese

6 Mao, "Report on an Investigation of the Hunan Peasant Movement," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition,, Vol. II*, William Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, Chester Tan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 205.
7 Ibid.
8 The Chinese Nationalist Party, headed by Chiang Kai-shek. They had been uneasy partners during the 1920's, a relationship held together by the wishes of the Comintern. However, in 1927 a schism occurred which separated the two permanently and weakened the CCP.
9 Wills Jr., *Mountain*, 342.
10 Mao, "Report", 219-20.
11 Wills Jr, *Mountain*, 349.
12 Mao, "Report," 205.

revolutionary classes headed by the Chinese proletariat."[13] Mao's theory of government was becoming reality; his actions were grounded in the political philosophy he wrote about years before.

The PRC quickly developed a system of reconstruction for their homeland. In fact, the "Communist[s] showed amazing zeal and political competence...[and] in many ways they followed common-sense reconstruction policies that were pragmatic."[14] However, the American war in Korea and the fortification and protection of Taiwan forced Mao to change the direction of his country. Mao implemented a strict culture that did not tolerate any behavior that could be considered seditious. These constraints, however, meant the restriction of opposition parties and many intellectual pursuits. Mao recognized the need for complete support of his government without damaging criticism. He previously stressed that "the public can only praise the association and must not condemn it."[17] As leader of the PRC he now required obedience to this rule.

This was not the only public policy that the Korean War and the threat from the nationalist state of Taiwan inspired. Land distribution to the masses was quickened, and the villagers became emotionally invested in the process. This allocation led to violence in the countryside as "local bullies and bad gentry and lawless landlords"[18] received their communist comeuppance, actions that Mao had supported since his youth. His writings advocated "adopt[ing] certain necessary measures to confiscate the land of landlords and distribute it to those peasants having no land or only a little land."[19] There were also impressive steps made in mass education and public health. This new emphasis on education, again, was not surprising. Mao had already recognized the need for an education during his early years, where he supported the founding of "peasant schools."[20] Now, he supported an education system that would allow the peasants to adjust and learn his new policies. Mao's commitment to learning changed to a more radical form in the Socialist Education Campaign.[21]

13 Mao, "On New Democracy," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. II*(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 223.
14 Wills Jr., *Mountain,* 350.
15 Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang had escaped here after Mao's coup. The Americans used Taiwan as their Isle of Wright and used it as a base of operations in the Korean War.
16 Wills Jr., *Mountain,* 350.
17 Mao, "Report," 206.
18 Ibid, 205.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 215.
21 This policy would be a facet of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It was first mentioned in 1963, and it was designed to be part of the recruitment tool to return the people to Maoism. It stressed the ongoing nature of class struggle, which was a major part of the Cultural Revolution, and the return to the works that Mao felt were the basics of socialist and communist thought. These works, namely his own, would aid in the restoration of communism in China.

Maoism further developed in the late 1950s. Mao's previously theorized concept of communal agriculture manifested in the Great Leap. It was a policy of rapid economic growth in both industry and agriculture. There was mass land cultivation and creation of thousands of land communes. Mao believed that the future lay with these communes, where the workers labored together. Industry was supported in each of these communes, making them fairly self sufficient. Mao's theory of "collective leadership"[22] came to bare here. This was a decentralized policy; each of the communes had its own local government. He supported this new policy by citing previously existing successful communes in "On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture."[23] Mao also stressed the notions of "diligence and frugality,"[24] in "Running a Co-Operative Diligently and Frugally." Here his previous writings on the importance of the peasant communities, the redistribution of land, the system of government and infrastructure came to facilitate his actions.

The Great Leap was apparently not the best plan for the PRC. In fact, the policy was an unmitigated failure. Mao himself had predicted that there would be problems, but he felt that they would be overcome by "positive help."[25] However, it was enacted too fast, which resulted in poor administration and results in the communes. There were "early optimistic production figures,"[26] but the first year of good crop weather was followed by several poor years. The reason for the Great Leap's failure was simple mixture of bad weather and planning. Though Mao was a careful thinker, who wanted to revolutionize China through socialism, he apparently could not properly execute his ideas. He did not create the proper administration in the countryside, even though he knew that it was necessary.[27] In 1958, in the midst of the success of the Great Leap, Mao's popularity reached an intense fervor. By the end of the year, his policy was branded a disaster. Mao resigned as head-of-state of the PRC shortly thereafter, and he was succeeded by Liu Shao-ch'i.

Mao retained his position as chairman of the CCP, an organ distinct from the PRC, and so kept a large modicum of potential influence. The new government started to move away from the policies of Mao, who quickly struck back against the "revisionist" government. The "Maoists believed that...Shao-ch'i [and others] had used their high offices to support anti-proletarian ideas."[28] His successors, Mao felt, only "pa[id] lip service to Marxism."[29] In response, Mao initiated the Great Proletarian

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22 Mao *Quotations from Chairman Mao* (Peking: Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1966).
23 Mao "On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture," trans. David J. Romagnolo (Peking: Peking Foreign Language Press, 1977).
24 Mao, *Quotations*.
25 Mao, *Quotations*.
26 Wills Jr., *Mountain,* 355.
27 Mao, "On the."
28 Manoranjan Mohanty, *The Political Philosophy of Mao Tse-Tung* (Delhi: MacMillian, 1978), 78.
29 Mao, *Quotations*.

Cultural Revolution in an attempt to return China to Maoism. He targeted the "superstructure"[30] of the PRC, which he felt was not properly consolidating the socialist system, and giving way to bourgeois interests. Mao publically disparaged and accused the government of not properly excluding the bourgeois, the very people he had called "undesirables,"[31] decades ago. His long held belief that even after the defeat of the bourgeois, they would "engage in sabotage and create disturbances in various ways and [would] try every day and every minute to stage a comeback,"[32] appeared to be fast approaching a reality, at least as Mao viewed it.

The Cultural Revolution was largely a youth based movement,[33] a factor not lost on Mao who remembered the role of the youth in the fight against the Kuomintang. Once again, Mao recognized the need to harness the people by information. *Quotations from Chairman Mao* was published in the early 1960's during the Cultural Revolution. It was designed to educate every citizen as to what Maoism was. The book contained thousands of quotes and extracts from Mao's speeches and treatises on socialism and communism. Mao believed that if the people knew what he believed in and would do for them, they would flock to his cause.

The entire country soon felt the effects of this revolution as disorder and chaotic behavior swept the countryside. Violence raged against those who were still considered an elite class in Chinese society. In fomenting the Cultural Revolution, Mao was clearly motivated by what he felt was a perversion of the PRC he envisioned, and the return to the socioeconomic order he fought against. Finally, in 1967, the PRC government yielded to the pressure of Mao and his revolutionaries and conceded to a new system of government that "would consolidate the gains of the Cultural Revolution and prevent the revival of centralized system of authority."[34]

Mao died in 1976, mourned by many of the Chinese people. He once accused the bourgeois of "doing whatever they like and turning everything upside down."[35] It is ironic that his own actions merit the same criticism, for the China of the mid-twentieth century looked nothing like China of centuries or even decades ago. His policies, which were so fundamentally grounded in his political thought, left deep marks on the "new" China. Mao was a great political theorist and scientist. However, even the best reasoned public policy, theorized on paper, does not always translate into prosperity in the forum. Mao's policies and actions did not always achieve the intended goals. They were always, however, reasoned and based on his political theorizing. His works and life embodied his own statement, "We communists never conceal our political views."[36]

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30 Mohanty, *The Political,* 78.
31 Mao, "Report," 206.
32 Mao, *Quotations*.
33 Wills Jr., *Mountain,* 357.
34 Ibid.
35 Mao, "Report," 208.
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"CHOLERA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN AMERICA"

Suzanne Vroman

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Civil War in 1865, Americans could finally look forward to a peaceful summer for the first time in five years. However, as news swept through the nation of a prevailing cholera epidemic already present in much of Europe, the country once again prepared for battle. Unlike the cholera outbreaks of 1832 and 1849, in 1866, the United States was prepared for the arrival of the third pandemic. Largely in part to European influence, the nation understood the dangers of the unsanitary conditions present in the city slums during the mid 1800s. However, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 hindered any hopes of nationalizing public health in the United States. Despite these setbacks, advocates of public health reform felt a new surge of confidence in the winter of 1865 to 1866. During this time the combination of the known success of the European sanitation movement as well as the threat of another pandemic led to a rapid incorporation of European public health standards in American cities. The following decade would mark an interesting period in American medicine as empirical science would gradually take the place of traditional medical practices that focused on religious values and the cleansing of moral impurity. The founding of Johns Hopkins University in the following decade exemplified theses changes and would define the extent at which the nation would accept or reject this new influx of scientific ideology sparked by the onset of the 1866 cholera epidemic.

The purpose of this paper will be to answer two questions resulting from the changes in American health care following the Civil War. The first will focus on how the cholera epidemic escalated the rapid assimilation of American cities to the European public health standards. The second will be a case study of the launching of Johns Hopkins University and how it transformed medical education in the late 1800s. Drawing from Charles Rosenberg's writings in The Cholera Years and Explaining Epidemics, I will explain how Europe gradually became center of intellectual and scientific thought in the early 1800s. I will use the response to the earlier epidemics in this time period to show the transformation of public health in Europe and how their new scientific methods were later incorporated into methods used during the 1866 epidemic in the United States. In keeping with the same theme, in the second part of the paper, I will be drawing form John M. Barry's novel The Great Influenza. Barry argues that the founding of Johns Hopkins University marked a new decade in American medicine as it became the first American university to follow the same scientific curriculum as the best European insti-

tutions. Therefore, my argument will show that the cholera epidemic not only reshaped the way public health authorities handled disease in America but also influenced the way medicine was taught a decade later.

EARLY EUROPEAN INFLUENCE

The revolutionary ideas of nationalized medicine and systems of public health were primarily fostered by the works of English physicians. As early as 1842, Englishmen such as Edwin Chadwick, William Forr, and John Simon were well aware of the dangers associated with poor drainage, foul water, and crowded tenements.[1] In his report on the poor living conditions of British workers, Edwin Chadwick made his countrymen aware of the dangers associated with England's current sanitation system and was largely responsible for the creation of England's national board of health. More importantly, these physicians pioneered a new way of combating disease suitable for their time period. For the first time they realized that diseases that could not be cured, had to at least be prevented through cleanliness and sanitation. This new idealism, which focused on finding the cause of disease and then treating it though prevention, came at a time when the general community began to mistrust the physician's ability to cure. The older theories of miasmic causes to disease began to dwindle and therefore the older medical treatments of "cleansing" the body also declined. The state of medicine was placed in a unique position as it advanced to the point where physicians began to comprehend how disease was spread, but it was still too primitive for health officials to understand how to devise a cure for these diseases. As a result the medical profession saw the implementation of a new growing field of public health.

While the sanitation movement was making immense progress throughout Western Europe, very little advancement was seen in the United States. The relatively late rise of American cities helps to account for this explanation, but by the 1830s, other American reform movements were already growing rapidly. The most important among these included temperance, the abolition of slavery, and woman's rights.[2] Government officials were preoccupied with these larger concerns of political unrest and therefore found little time to be concerned with what seemed to be the smaller issue of public health reform.

Another explanation to the unwillingness of the United States to conform to the public health standards in Europe presides in the inefficient contributions of church authorities. The American religious movement of the early 1800s emphasized the importance of individual salvation compared to the movement in Britain, which focused more upon social concerns. As a result, public health that focused on community involvement

1 Charles E. Rosenberg. *The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), 143.
2 John Duffy. *The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health.* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 66.

did not receive the support and leadership necessary to make it a major concern in the United States.[3] While health and diet reforms were present within this time frame, the influence of the church led the reformers to emphasize the health of the individual rather than the community. Moreover, the religious leaders in America played a more prominent role in shaping the way Americans responded to the cholera epidemic. Clergymen claimed that cholera was an exercise of God's will and was to be seen as a disease of filth and sin. Therefore, the church accepted the early cholera epidemics as God's punishment in response to the corruption of the cities.[4]

The connection between moral impurity and cholera and the observation that it affected a greater number of people present in the city slums, allowed for the public to target the usual victims. The church blamed the increased poverty levels on the moral failings of immigrants and wage workers rather than the lack of social programs.[5] They rejected the idea that it was a civil duty to improve the lives of the poor, and therefore they were not responsible for the polluted and diseased streets present in the major cities. Consequently, as European cities worked to control cholera through improvements in public health and sanitation, cities in the United States continued to suffer from the uncontrollable cholera outbreaks in the early 1800's.

Even throughout Europe, which possessed the most forward thinking physicians of the time, there were still many skeptics who clung to the older notions of religious and miasmic theories of disease. To change their opinions it would take the father of epidemiology, John Snow, to set forth greater measures of preventative medicine that were initiated by his predecessors. As early as 1849, Snow suggested that cholera was a contagious disease caused by a poison present in the bodies of its victims. More importantly, he claimed that this "poison" was most frequently obtained through contaminated water supplies.[6] Snow's initial advance in the field of epidemiology was extremely innovative for his time period. Following the work done by Chadwick, Snow's argument still required a greater understanding of chemistry, pathology, and public health than any scientist had previously suggested. As a result, his findings did not receive immediate recognition. However, by the 1860s, as the next cholera epidemic appeared in Europe, Snow was beginning to acquire more converts. Eventually, more public health authorities began to accept Snow's notions of disease and by the 1870s the municipal government was promoting the necessary change required to control these outbreaks.

In spite of this, the United States continued to lag behind in terms of world science. Understandably, internal conflicts present throughout the mid-1800s may have

3 *Ibid.*, 67
4 Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years*, 121.
5 *Ibid.*, 133-143
6 Charles E. Rosenberg. *Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of Medicine.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 117.

distracted Americans as the British parliament passed the Public Health Act in 1848. This may have also been the reason why health leaders failed in 1853 to take notice of John Snow's discovery that if he removed the pump handle on a contaminated water supply, he could slow the cholera epidemic in nearby neighborhoods. Consequently, as Americans continued to focus on the Civil War in 1862, more soldiers were dying of disease and infection than they were of battle wounds.[7] On the civilian front, the war also heightened tension between immigrants as the outbreak of disease escalated American resentment toward the influx of more poverty stricken wage workers. Especially in New York, the board of health was doing very little besides increasing the amount of corruption and turmoil present in the overcrowded city.

Ironically, New York would become one of the first cities to eventually conform to the European standards of health. As the Civil War was raging in America, Europe was entering another great intellectual revolution that would make disease definable and, with that, elevated to the status of problems humanity might solve. In 1862, Louis Pasteur published his theory on the existence of germs that he argued were the key to fermentation, resolving some of the great debates of the past.[8] As Science became the forefront of medical practice, theories of spontaneous regeneration and miasmas eventually died down as the majority of Europeans began to accept the germ theory of disease. As a result physicians in America and more specifically public health officials in New York began to generally accept Snow's theories at the end of the Civil War.

Following the war, America's larger cities had no choice but to duplicate Europe's public health policies. Every major city was overflowing with disease and it was obvious that the country was in need of dire reform, but the only model they had for reshaping their health care policies came from Europe. As the cholera epidemic was raging through Europe in the 1860s, there was no doubt it would eventually find the shores of North America. The fear of facing another cholera epidemic similar to the ones seen in the United States in 1832 and 1849 was enough to force the public health authorities to think rationally about the threat of the 1866 pandemic.

Starting in New York, the medical profession gradually began to accept Snow's discoveries, which would initiate the creation of the Metropolitan Board of Health that would be qualified to combat the coming epidemic. During the war, New York was filled with corrupt public health officials that allowed the city to become one of the worst areas of disease in the country. However, New York also contained a large number of the social elite represented through doctors and lawyers that clung to any solution to the problems present in their city. Therefore, by creating the Metropolitan Board of Health, they provided a strong influence in support for Snow's theories of sanitation. A group of

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7 Laurie Garrett. *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health.* (New York: Hyperion, 2000) 285-287.
8 *Ibid.*, 291

these high class physicians would initiate the first response to the disease present in the cities by developing a survey to measures the unsanitary conditions. In their final report they remarked on the disturbing images of disease and filth they saw throughout city. Within the publication they concluded that only a complete reordering of the city's sanitary arrangements would seem sufficient enough to protect the city's health.[9] Therefore, the city needed to act quickly if they were going to be prepared for the next outbreak of cholera. As a result even before the first case of cholera developed in New York, the new board of health was already supplying the city with an influx of chemicals and disinfectants to sanitize the streets.[10] When the cholera epidemic docked on the shores of New York, the city ensured through their new sanitation efforts that they would be ready.

For the first time in 1866, the American community had successfully organized itself to conquer an epidemic. As Rosenberg claims in his novel, *The Cholera Years*, "In the history of public health in the United States, there is no date more important than 1866, no event more significant than the organization of the Metropolitan Board of Health.[11]" By 1866, there were few intelligent physicians who doubted that cholera was spread through contamination as many of them were readers of European medical journals. In a city so full of disease and corruption, the first board of health looked to solve society's problems instead of blaming society for the problems. Finally health officials were able to convince the laymen and the government to be open to the idea that cholera might be caused by microorganisms, and the Metropolitan Board of Health was willing to put this assumption into practice. As the first signs of cholera appeared in New York the board was quick to act, not through fasting and prayer, but through disinfection and quarantine. The board was met with some resistance as many citizens still clung to their traditional values and did not comprehend the methods of cleaning, waste disposal, and quarantine. The lower class citizens opposed the control of the board filled with elites and felt that this was another attempt forcing them into submission. However, although New York greatly increased in size since the last epidemic in 1849, there were a tenth as many cholera deaths from the epidemic in 1866. The new methods of the board seemed to be success as other cities such as Chicago and Cincinnati, which did not have a board of health, did not escape the cholera epidemic so easily.[12]

The Metropolitan Board of Health's success introduced to America what Chadwick had introduced to Europe in the early 1800s, which was the idea that diseases that could not be cured had to be prevented. The board of health successfully met the specific challenges of America's new industrialized society and after the epidemic had passed, eventually gained acceptance from many of their critics, including both laymen and gov-

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9 Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years*, 188.
10 Rosenberg, *Explaining Epidemics*, 121.
11 Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years*, 193
12 *Ibid.*, 209-211

ernment officials. More importantly Americans began to realize that their nation was like other nations, while it may perhaps be better than most, it was no longer any different. The problems they had fled from in the Old Word, such as corrupt government officials, diseased city slums, and crime became the problems of the new. They were not immune to the diseases and corruption that they had accused England of centuries ago, and while their pride may have been hurt, they came to the understanding that it was only with the help of the English scientists that they were able to protect themselves from the 1866 epidemic. In the thirty-four years between 1832 and 1866, the idea of disease in America had changed from a moral dilemma to a social problem. Disease was now considered a consequence of man's interaction of his environment rather than of moral choice and salvation.[13] In 1849, religious officials dominated the response to the cholera epidemic as seen through President Zachary Taylor's declaration of a national day of fasting and prayer as the major means of fighting the outbreak. However, in 1866, it was clear to most that a fast day at best was useless and at worse another source of additional disease. As a result the traditional Christian metaphors of the soul's health were widened to include biological causes of disease in their now less clear metaphors. While these metaphors were still present within the "sinful" society, they were no where near as influential because it was science and not theology that could interpret these new biological causes.[14] Therefore, at least in terms of public health, medicine was developing into more of a science than it had ever been before.

MODERN MEDICINE AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Following the epidemic, public health in America reached a high enough level to compete with some of the best public health systems in Europe. However, medicine in the United States remained relatively the same. Not many doctors bought into the scientific ideology in terms of medical education, which would have required students to understand theories of basic science before entrance into medical school. To the general physician in America, science was only undermining therapeutics, and therefore relatively few doctors supported the study of physics and chemistry as a means of treating disease.[15] This was seen within the educational system as neither a college degree nor knowledge of the basic sciences was required for entrance into medical school. In the 1870s, as European medical schools were giving their students rigorous scientific training subsidized by the state, religious practices of universities in the United States still hindered medical students from routinely performing autopsies or seeing patients.[16] Due to the state of medical education in the United States, perhaps the most important contribution of the cholera epidemic was to shed light on the inferiority of medical advance-

13 *Ibid.*, 228
14 *Ibid.*, 121-132
15 John M. Barry. *The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History.* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004) 31.
16 *Ibid.*, 32

ment within the country. Following the epidemic there were a few wealthy physicians from America whose curiosity led them to Europe to learn through scientific research.

Of the physicians who were able to venture to Europe, the laboratory research experience was incomparable to anything they had seen in America. Unfortunately American universities were not ready to accept these advancements upon the return of these physicians. The technology and research present in Europe was supported through the government and the universities, however neither was to be expected in the United States. In 1870, not a single institution in the country supported any kind of research. In 1871, the first laboratory for medical research was established in the attic of a Professor's home at Harvard, which was funded by his father.[17] Therefore, there still seemed to be no clear future for scientific research in the United States. Without financial support from the state or universities it would be almost impossible to build a proper laboratory at a respectable institution.

However in 1873, the problem with financing a respectable university was solved as a wealthy Quaker would die and leave behind $7 million to endow a university and hospital bearing his name. This man was Johns Hopkins, and at the time his donation became the largest gift given to any university.[18] Precisely what Johns Hopkins meant by university was debated long after his death owing to discrepancies in his will, but the definition of the University's mission was left up to twelve trustees whom Hopkins named. These were all trustees who Hopkins 'believed to be free from a desire to promote, in their official action, the special tenets of any denomination or the platform of any political party'.[19] As a result, in an age when all prestigious American universities were affiliated with some form of religious denomination, Hopkins' trustees determined that the new University would be nonsectarian. In this way Johns Hopkins University was already becoming revolutionary, but that was only the beginning, because the trustees' next ambition was to make the University like no other university America.

To help the trustees in their ambition they hired Daniel Coit Gilman as the first president of the University. In their plans they chose to go against the advice of presidents from many of the major institutions of the time including Harvard, Yale, and Cornell, as they decided to model Johns Hopkins University after the greatest institutions in Germany.[20] There decision was based on the account that they wanted to make this university strictly a place where men consumed with creating knowledge could gather, without the fear or influence of religion upon their practice. In the 1870s, the University would determine the degree to which the nation would accept or reject modern science in replace of the traditional religious theories.

17 *Ibid.*, 32-33
18 Maryann P. Feldman and Pierre Desrochers. "Truth for its Own Sake: Academic and Technology Transfer at Johns Hopkins University." *A Review of Science, Learning and Policy* Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004): 105-126.
19 *Ibid.*
20 Barry, *The Great Influenza*, 33

Therefore, on September 12, 1876, the launching of Johns Hopkins University would test the ability of the public to once again accept the influence of Europe's scientific and medical practices. To honor Hopkins' vision, Thomas Huxley, a respectable English scientist who believed in the creation of this new University, came to America. As the keynote speaker, he personified the goals of the University in his opening remarks as he argued that Johns Hopkins University would be unlike any other university in America. He claimed that the purpose of Johns Hopkins University would not be to rival the universities of Harvard or Yale, but the greatest medical schools in Europe[21] For the first time, America would place a value on scientific research, and Johns Hopkins University would eventually allow American medical science to catch up to that of Europe.

With the recruitment of some of the finest European scientists to Johns Hopkins faculty, the University would meet and exceed its expectations as a respectable scientific institution. When Robert Koch finally discovered the bacterium *Cholera vibrio* in 1883, it was not only naturally accepted by the United States, but by that time it was expected.[22] The extensive studies of John Snow, along with the launching of Johns Hopkins University, allowed for American scientists to comprehend Koch's discovery of the bacterium, which most likely would have met a considerable amount of controversy two decades earlier. By the end of the century Johns Hopkins revolution was complete, and the United States was well on its way toward becoming a powerful competitor in modern science.

As Physician Bertram M. Bernheim states in his opening chapter of *The Story of Johns Hopkins*, "If you are a doctor in these United States, you have been affected by Johns Hopkins Medical School and Hospital.[23]" His argument, as bold is it may be, has a great amount of validity. There is no doubt that the United States would have eventually raised their standards to those of the European nations without the launching of Johns Hopkins University. It would have only been a matter of time before the United States realized that the study of basic sciences required of the European schools were essential for any respectable medical practice. Perhaps this phenomenon would have resulted only a few years later when Koch discovered *Cholera vibrio*, or maybe it would not have occurred till the early 1900s with Alexander Fleming's discovery of Penicillin. Nevertheless, the quick and efficient success at which University was founded on would have been difficult to duplicate. Barely a decade before, the country's public health system was a disaster with no system of sanitation to combat the coming epidemic. At the time the nation was unprepared to accept such a drastic change from their traditional beliefs of the miasmic and moral theories of disease. However, through the success of

21 J. Vernon Jenson. "Thomas Henry Huxley's Address at the Opening of Johns Hopkins University in September, 1876." *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jul., 1993): 260.
22 Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years*, 199-200.
23 Bertram M., M.D. *The Story of the Johns Hopkins: Four Great Doctors and the Medical School they Created* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1948). 1

the Metropolitan Board of Health and their general acceptance of John Snow's writings, the county's ideas of disease began to slowly change. As a result, the cholera epidemic of 1866 allowed Americans to follow the European standards of public health, which would eventually lead to the adoption of the European structure of medical schools as well.

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FOREWORD: My Name Is Red *is a novel by Turkish Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk. In 16th-century Istanbul, an elite group of miniaturist painters secretly toil over a book, ordered by the Sultan himself, to be rendered in the "heretical" Frankish style. Each chapter is told from a different character's perspective, sometimes even from the lips of a drawing displayed in one of the city's notorious coffeehouses. This piece is an attempt to replicate Pamuk's distinctive style, and to humanize one of history's more elusive cultural identities.*

I AM A BEDOUIN RAIDER

Spencer J. King

No doubt that in your current state of mind, stimulated as you are by the rich coffee steaming in your cup, you are induced to seek out much merriment and sources of joviality. But look no further, friend, than to the eloquent drawing before you now as it is displayed by that graying miniaturist with such pride. Behold the regality of my turban, the sure step of my disciplined camel, the noble ferocity with which I tote my ornamented spear. Surely to your prying urban eyes I must appear somewhat of a novelty, or even rather buffoonish, especially due to the bizarre manner of my rendering. But rest assured, friend, that in my native desert I am the master of all that I can see. Also know that I wasn't always confined to this simple piece of parchment as you see me now, but that once I felt the wind in my hair as you feel it, and loved women as you love them.

In truth, I was once a brave warrior of the Juhayna tribe and won many battles. Our herds were vast, with sheep stretching as far as the eye can see and the noblest camels in all the deserts; alas, in my day my brothers knew greatness. Our herds provided us with food, shelter, fuel for burning, and all the necessities of life. When we were in wont of rich fabrics, weapons, or jewelry for our women, we took them in great number from the caravans who traversed the dunes. Now, understand that as I have traveled to all corners of your Sultan's glorious empire within the confines of this fading piece of parchment, I am quite familiar with much of your esteemed literature. Try to contain your surprise as I quote that fork-tongued Mustafa Ali, who held my brothers in an even lower regard than he did those plundering Tatars:

> Ready to commit the most abominable acts [are those] Bedouin horsemen... Other packs, even while evil footed, content themselves with stealing property as their daily bread. [The Bedouin] are indeed of evil character, injurious, and corrupt (Ali 54).

As poisonous as are these words you may be shocked to find that I take no offense, for a Bedouin tribe confined to horses is likened to your Sultan confined to an

outhouse. Only a tribe lacking in strength or pride would forego the camel in favor of a common horse, and what room is there for a galloping horse when your home is a mountain of shifting sand? So I know Ali cannot have been referring to me or my noble brothers. As for the charges of banditry among the Bedouin, let me ask you this: when your woman expresses her desire for a fine cloth or a new piece of jewelry, do you not pursue her object of interest with the utmost fervor for fear of her mighty Temper!

You see, we are not so different, you and I. You are bound to the banalities of urban life, and so come to commit sin in the coffeehouse out of the necessity of your being. I am bound to the hardships of the unforgiving desert, and so come to commit sins on the Pilgrimage Route out of the necessity of mine own being. But I'll stop boring you with my pleas for your sympathy, at least for the time being, and tell you of how I came to reside upon this parchment as you see me now. This, of course, was long before I murdered my brother, that coward, and became the greatest *sheikh* the Juhayna had ever known, before my accumulation of the fine drawings I came to treasure so dearly, before my heinous execution at the behest of your illustrious scholars.

When I was a young man, I had no equal in all the deserts under the gaze of Allah, may He be exalted. Naturally you must think me a braggart for making this declaration so assuredly, but let me explain. I fought many battles with sword and spear, and no man of any size or temperament ever bested me. I drove the herd of my father the *sheikh* and never lost a single sheep to bandit or jackal or for lack of water. The camel I chose as my steed was the most ill-tempered camel that ever strode the desert, but he bowed to me as I was his master. My wife was the most beautiful vision of Allah that ever did grace His earth, and when she would remove her golden mask it was as if the sun were rising for the very first time. So take your scoffs elsewhere, friend, and know that I once was a great man.

Upon a certain glorious day, my elder brother and I had led a party of Bedouin out to a remote reach of the Pilgrimage Route where we intended to procure some trinkets for the women. After a brief period of idleness, we caught sight of a small and poorly-guarded caravan treading across the way. Immediately we descended upon them with great speed and ferocity, easily dispatching the guards with mighty throws from our spear arms, until we had the whole of the caravan under our quarter. This is something you city dwellers often fail to understand, as demonstrated by your disposition to flee on foot from we Bedouin raiders: a properly trained and well-fed camel can easily outrun a man when spurred by a rider that has mastered it. We dismounted our steeds and proceeded to examine the contents of the wagons.

Imagine our surprise, though, when we found one wagon to be populated not by Arabs or Turks, but by white-faced Infidels! An old man and his daughter, a fine specimen by all counts, sitting amidst wagon filled with useless inks, brushes, and parchment. Now, this Frankish beauty was like nothing the men had ever seen, inciting a lustful frenzy, and after my brother nodded his approval they proceeded to have their way with her.

"Stop!" cried the old man, standing up and extending his pale wrinkled arms. His voice was surprising in its depth and confidence, and he spoke in the tongue of my brothers and cousins. "I beg of you to stop! Please spare the girl her honor, as she is all I have left at the end of this long life. I beg of you, allow the girl to pass freely and take me in her place." Now, friend, join with me in a chuckle when I point out that the anus of an old man is a very foul thing indeed and hardly a substitute for the softness of a young woman. We recounted this to him, and here is what he had to say: "In my homeland which is very away, I am praised as the greatest of painters. Let the girl pass, and I shall bind myself to you and paint great works to glorify your people, if it should please you."

My elder brother, the great imbecile, considered this and thought how it might please my father to have the greatest of the Frankish painters as his retainer. Though I objected that there was little room to display such works even in the large tent of our father, my brother ordered that the girl be spared and proceeded to tie some of our beasts to the Frank's wagon. We then let the caravan pass on, as is our custom, the girl with them and the old man with us, and rode back to our encampment.

Upon our return we found that my father was dead. This may seem a very melancholy turn for a simple coffeehouse yarn, but he was an old man and had nobly struggled against the fever for some time, so his death did not come as a surprise. My brother, being the eldest, was the rightful successor but I cringed at the thought of my people falling under the sway of such a weak and short-sighted man. I challenged him, and we rode out to the desert that very day. Only I returned, as *sheikh* of the greatest tribe in the domain of Allah, may He be exalted. As the Bedouin say, "I against my brothers, I and my brothers against my cousins, I and my brothers and my cousins against the world" (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedouin).

Naturally, I busied myself with the many duties of my new position but summoned the Frank to my tent each day, as I had inherited him into my charge. On the first day he brought me a bizarre rendering of a camel in the desert, with all manner of minute trees dotting the horizon. Upon receiving this I exclaimed, "This is not the manner of painting to which I am accustomed; I wish for you to try again." And the

old Frank said with a shrug, "I do not know to which manner of painting you are accustomed, my lord," to which I replied: "I wish you to see the camel as Allah would see it."

The Frank and I carried on much like this the second day, and the third day, and again the fourth day and so on for fifty days. At this time he began to bemoan and weep, not knowing whether his daughter were alive and unable to let her know that he was still alive. Seeing him so weak filled me with disgust, and I let out upon his ears fifty days' worth of my frustrations. Who was he to put himself on the plane of Allah by depicting the world from his eyes rather than through His own? How dare he insult the tent of the great *sheikh* with such blasphemy? I spit fire upon him in my wrath.

The old Frank was careful and respectful with his reply, which pleased me. He said, "God gave me this brush so that I might recreate the joys of His children, not for His own joy; for the beauties He has known are too great for me to ever express." I was taken aback, as the words of this wise old man had truly stirred me. Promptly I sent him away and pondered in my tent. Laid out before me were fifty bizarre camels to keep company. After an eternity of bafflement, finally I saw my herd as I knew them, smelled their musk and relived our journeys. I wept for my happiness.

And so, up until his death, the old Frank brought me much delight with drawings of all manner of things. He even drew the becoming portrait you see before you today. When the herd moved I bound them up in skins and kept them with me, and they were my greatest sources of gladness and reminiscence.

When I was an old man, my raiding party was captured by a squad of brash janissaries. Searching my person their captain found my drawings, including the portrait of myself I often gazed at to remember what it felt like to be young and strong. Naturally he found them highly offensive and heretical, and so I died by his sword that very day. He gave the drawings to a miniaturist, who happened to be in accompaniment by request of the Sultan, and ordered that they be destroyed. But the miniaturist served his art more than he served the Sultan, and hid the paintings away for their novelty. When times were tough the drawings had to be sold, and it is after a most long and arduous journey that I arrive here before you today in this dim coffeehouse.

So, friend, I do not implore or expect you to gaze upon me with the same loving glare you show the beardless boy on your knee. I know what I am, a bizarre depiction by Frankish Infidels, and I used to see myself in the same way you must be seeing me now. But know at the least, my friend, that once I was a great man.

UNDERNEATH THE BERET: THE REALITY OF THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES IN VIETNAM

Alex DiGregorio

The many branches of the United States military have always challenged individuals to push their own limits. Join up, they say, and be a part of something big, powerful and unique. "Be All You Can Be," the Army asks its prospective soldiers. "Aim High," the Air Force challenges pilots. "Semper Fi," vow the Marines. All claim to be able to push a man beyond his normal abilities, to hone him and make him something more. All have reputations for being able to do just that. But, since the 1960s there has been one military group whose reputation surpasses the rest. This group has been able to hold the interest of all kinds of people, from war buffs and conspiracy theorists, to simple video gamers and moviegoers. A mystique has been built around them and so, to many who would hear of them later, their actions would become exaggerated into legend. This group is the U.S. Army's Special Forces, and Vietnam was the setting for their activities. But, what is the truth about what happened there? Where can we draw the line between actual military operations and exaggerated pop culture nonsense? What were these people *really* capable of? The answers lie in the accounts of the soldiers themselves.

FACT OR FICTION?

Looking at the reality of the situation, one can easily see why the Special Forces became iconic. For a moment, imagine a group of six men moving silently through a dark jungle. They are predators, despite being far away from home and deep in enemy territory. They are camouflaged to the point of being invisible, and quiet as ghosts. They hunt the enemy, despite being outnumbered and outgunned, and they are known to be lethally dangerous. In 1990, Tim O'Brien novelized this through the eyes of regular infantry in Chu Lai. "Secretive and suspicious, loners by nature, the six Greenies would sometimes vanish for days at a time, or even weeks, then late in the night they would just as magically reappear, moving like shadows through the moonlight..."[1] There was an air of mystery about them, even among the rest of the military who were, for the most part, oblivious to their orders. For some time that knowledge was kept tightly sealed. Stars and Stripes, the military newspaper, admit that at the time they would not have published anything regarding the activity of the Special Forces. However, despite the secrecy and general ignorance of the public, the popularity of these units skyrocketed.

For years following the peak of Special Forces activity in Southeast Asia, American culture spawned numerous imitations of their actions. In film, Sylvester Stallone's Rambo character (1982) perpetuated the image of a super soldier who could do anything and may as well have been able to win the Vietnam War alone. Francis Ford Cop-

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1 Tim O'Brien, The Things They Carried (New York: Broadway Books, 1990) 92.

pola's <u>Apocalypse Now</u> (1979) was also highly regarded and accepted. Re-released in 2001, it still garners praise about being an accurate depiction of the war and a cinematic triumph.[2] However, the image that prevails in the minds of moviegoers is that of Martin Sheen riding into battle on a helicopter blasting "Ride of the Valkyries" under a CO who is more concerned with surfing the ocean than with the gunfire exploding overhead. Even later, video games like those in the <u>Metal Gear</u> series or Tom Clancy's <u>Splinter Cell</u> would allow players to assume the role of a Special Forces operative who can tackle terrorists and prevent destruction on a global scale apparently single-handedly. G.I. Joes take on fictional enemies without sustaining injury. The list goes on, and such mediums do not really depict the role these men took in very real conflicts.

In 1965, in the midst of the war, Robin Moore released what would probably be the most influential piece of material about the topic, his book, <u>The Green Berets.</u> Unlike the fantastic accounts which would come later, Moore's work was an accurate depiction. He had spent time training and in combat with the Special Forces in Vietnam. What he wrote, though published as a work of fiction, would be the first firsthand account of Special Forces activity in the war, and it would tell the story well. His accurate information about the scope of such activity irritated both the CIA and the Army, but his revelations were devoured by the readers. Moore sold an estimated 3.5 million copies and would follow this up by contributing to a film adaptation of the same title (starring John Wayne), and the hit song, "The Ballad of the Green Berets."[3] Though the popularity of these early works may have contributed to the perpetuation of "Rambo" stereotypes later on, they also mean that people did want to know the truth about the Special Forces in Vietnam.

So, what is the truth? By the time Vietnam exploded, the U.S. Special Forces were indeed well prepared and exceptional soldiers, but they were not war gods. They were the product of a great deal of forethought and field testing for which it is almost impossible to find a starting date. The United States has always leaned on special force teams when conducting war, going back to colonial times. In every war since before the American Revolution, such teams have been created and maintained to perform the odd jobs that each conflict would require. However, Vietnam was the first instance in American history where such teams were already in existence and active before the conflict escalated.[4] Through decades of trial and error, the military had come up with something specialized that worked in this kind of an atmosphere, and was prepared to deploy even before regular infantry would be sent to Vietnam.

2 Peter Travers, "Apocalypse Now: 2001 Redux," <u>Rolling Stone,</u> 20 Jul. 2001, 27 Nov. 2007
<http://www.rollingstone.com/reviews/movie/5947625/review/5947626/apocalypse_now_2001_redux>.
3 Special Forces Association, "Biography of Robin Moore," Robin Moore's Library, 2003, 26 Nov. 2007
<http://robin.sfa38.org/robin_moore.htm>.
4 Reynel <u>Martinez, Six Silent Men</u> (New York: Ballantine Books, 1997) xvii.

THE MODERN SPECIAL FORCES: CREATION AND EXPANSION

The first Pacific Special Forces teams were created under President Eisenhower in 1952. By 1956, there were several small groups, many based out of Okinawa, Japan, and deployed to all parts of the Southeast Asia region. Some, like the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment, would be so covertly created that the unit was even given a false name and disguised as regular army.[5]

Under Eisenhower, the Special Forces were very much a product of the Cold War. The 14th, again for example, was a 16-man group, which existed primarily to counter a possible Sino-Soviet invasion into Southeast Asia. The unit would be expected to collect what information they could on the enemy and keep them tied up and engaged, preparing for the eventuality of one or more nuclear strikes.[6] Their purpose was primarily disruption, and their first major fields of activity were Korea and Taiwan. Though the chance to fight Soviets would never come, their smaller scale activities in Asia would be more successful than anyone expected. Chuck Allen, a commander in Project Delta, claimed, "Special operations, if done right, can tie up a large enemy force or paralyze guerilla operations with a few small teams...You can tie up one province with an outfit like Project Delta with only thirty or forty Americans in it. And that's all you're exposing to the enemy."[7] In a way, it was like taking the guerilla tactics enemies like the Viet Cong used against Americans and turning the tables on them.

In order to do what they did, U.S. Special Forces really needed to be the best the military had to offer, and their training regimen shows it. Though in the 1950s and 60s there was no set procedure for training new recruits, there was a 14-week time period in which they went through all manner of preparation. We can get some insight into what was done by looking at the modern training procedure still used by Special Forces. Not only is selection rigorous, but training consists of two intense segments. Phase I training is intended to ensure the applicant is capable of wilderness survival on his own. It encompasses map reading and patrolling, as well as basic Special Forces tactical training.[8] This is on top of the fact that units are expected to train together. As such, when new members join a unit, it is not uncommon for the unit to be put through basic training again and again. Some claim to have done it more than half a dozen times, and after enough of this, responses to many combat situations become second nature.[9]

Phase II is intended to specialize each soldier into a unique part of the team. Special Forces teams are expected to have a diverse array of skills, and Phase II training encompasses five basic fields: command, engineering, weapons, medicine and

5 Shelby L. Stanton, <u>Green Berets at War</u> (New York: Ivy Books, 1985) 3.
6 Stanton, 3.
7 Al Santoli, <u>To Bear Any Burden</u> (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999) 151.
8 "Phase I Training," <u>Special Forces Search Engine,</u> 2007, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://www.training.sfahq.com>.
9 Santoli, 151.

communications.[10] Also during Phase II, soldiers are trained for proficiency in certain infiltration methods. Underwater insertion and High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) parachuting are common examples. Recruits are also expected to be able to speak one language besides English.[11]

Despite the high level of instruction and specialization, there was a serious drawback to becoming a part of the Special Forces in the 1950s. The common view was that, in the nuclear conflict that seemed inevitable during the Cold War era, the need for such units as the Green Berets was questionable at best. Though skilled, their use in such a war could not feasibly be seen as anything more than an interesting but ultimately useless attraction. As such, to most officers early on, the beret was synonymous with the death of one's military career.[12] However, their usefulness in the Southeast Asian conflicts would change that.

Throughout 1960, Special Forces units enjoyed numerous successes in the Southeast Asian region, and the newly elected President Kennedy took interest. On March 25th of the next year he presented a special message to Congress. Though the message encompassed many proposals for advancement and modernization, particularly in the military, he included a clause for the advancement of the Special Forces projects in Asia. "...our special forces and unconventional warfare units," he said, "will be increased and reoriented. Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations."[13] By June, Army cooperation allowed a 3,000 man increase to "counterinsurgency forces" in the region.[14] President Kennedy then made a visit to observe the operations himself and was impressed with what he saw. In September, the 5th Special Forces Group, the unit which would eventually encompass almost all Special Forces activity in Vietnam, would be activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[15] Following their activation, resources would be directed more and more away from the early theaters of the Southeast Asian conflicts, and into South Vietnam.

EARLY ROLE IN VIETNAM

In studying the Special Forces it is imperative to distinguish their role as soldiers from their role as instructors. "Emphasis is usually placed on the role the Special Forces played as soldiers in Vietnam," the Army admits. This is in line with their gung-ho, overblown reputation. But, the scope of their activities encompassed so much more.

10 "Phase II Training," Special Forces Search Engine, 2007, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://www.training.sfahq.com>.
11 Stanton, 6.
12 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 79.
13 John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, 30 Nov. 2007, <http://www.jfklibrary.org>.
14 Stanton, 14.
15 Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989) 5.

"They were soldiers and good ones. But they were more than soldiers; they were, in a way, community developers in uniform too."[16] Throughout the course of the war, Special Forces members took up positions as military advisors and instructors to two particular groups in South Vietnam.

The first group America was looking out for was, plainly, the South Vietnamese. Soldiers in South Vietnam's "Army of the Republic of Vietnam" (ARVN) would work with American military advisors from their initial arrival in the 1950s until the last troops were pulled out in 1973. However, Americans never thought very highly of the South Vietnamese and, in fact, it is a commonly given suggestion that they were much more responsible for the loss of the war than the American military. This is due to accusations that the ARVN was a poorly trained military group, and that they were afraid to fight.[17] These reasons are probably why many Americans saw the eventual need to take the war out of their hands later on.

Much of the American influence was spent on groups of tribal mountain people, called Montagnards. The Montagnards had had an excellent relationship with the French, who had gone to great lengths to ensure Montagnard land rights during their reign in Vietnam.[18] As such, Montagnard appreciation of Caucasians carried over when the Americans began to appear in the 1960s. Complimenting this appreciation, the Montagnards had a severe dislike for the Asian Vietnamese. The relationship between these two races is commonly compared to that of Native Americans and European settlers earlier in American history. However, the Americans were able to use this dislike to their advantage. "The Americans discovered that Yards needed little inducement," ex-Green Beret George "Sonny" Hoffman recalls. "It was enough to say, 'We'll show you how to kill lots of Vietnamese.' The challenge then became keeping the Yards pointed north."[19]

It was this racial prejudice that gave birth to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program in late 1961. Until the Americans arrived, the South Vietnamese, for reasons of such prejudice, made no attempt to enlist the Montagnards as allies. This was unacceptable in the eyes of Americans, for three reasons. First, the Montagnards were a powerful and untapped resource. Second, their tribal lands in the mountains could be useful strongholds against Viet Cong infiltration. Third, if the VC got to them first, they would become an incredibly dangerous enemy.[20] With these concerns in mind, the Special Forces got permission from the Vietnamese government to conduct

16 Vietnam Studies, 18.
17 Robert K. Brigham, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, Apr. 2006, 4 Dec. 2007 <http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/briarv.html>.
18 Stanton, 42.
19 George "Sonny" Hoffman, "Mountain People," Sonny Reflections, 1994, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://www.vietvet.org/mountain.htm>.
20 Vietnam Studies, 19.

the "Buon Enao Experiment." The experiment offered to exchange training and equipment to the Montagnards in that region for their loyalty to the government, and it was a success. CIDG built off this model and started here.[21]

The program expanded to defend outposts and villages throughout South Vietnam from VC insurgency. Once a village was brought into the program, it would serve as a training ground for several other villages, and CIDG worked outward that way. The Green Berets trained their new Montagnard allies in many of their stealth and combat tactics, and let them loose in the jungle. As it turned out, the natives were quite adept at this type of guerilla warfare. "The jungle is where the Yards really shined," Hoffman said. "The jungle was home. Watching them operate in that environment was awe inspiring...They could tell if people were nearby—hiding, moving, or sleeping—simply by the sounds the animals and insects made."[22] Perhaps it was because the Montagnards were such adept guerillas that they became such an integral part of the American Special Forces effort. Not only did they make up the primary body of CIDG, but the Yards were intertwined in other Special Forces bodies, like MACV-SOG (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Groups).

It was not until later in the Vietnam War that the Special Forces expanded on their roles as trainers and defenders to actually become aggressive. In late 1966, the Green Berets were called on with their CIDG allies to attack interior Viet Cong infiltration routes, and began to set up camp in enemy occupied territory.[23] In this time period, their duties became more and more dangerous and diverse, and we can begin to see a turn toward the activities that earned them their reputation.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND ESPIONAGE

As the Green Berets became more aggressive, other specialized programs were put into place, which were designed solely to operate in a more aggressive manner. In October of 1965, the first Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) was formed.[24] LRRPs were more along the lines of Tim O'Brien's secretive and shadowy units than the typical Green Berets; volunteer groups within the Special Forces who assembled teams of only six men. These six men would enter jungles in enemy territory alone and attempt to locate and map out Viet Cong patrol locations and strongholds. Once found, these strongholds would become the targets for air strikes and bombing runs, catching VC completely off guard and never presenting more than six American soldiers to the enemy.

Not only were the LRRPs extremely successful in their reconnaissance, but the units as a whole took an incredibly few number of casualties throughout the entire course of the war. There are both procedural and technical reasons for why this was

21 Vietnam Studies, 25.
22 Hoffman, "Mountain People."
23 Stanton, 131.
24 Martinez, 2.

the case. From a procedural standpoint, the units worked out remarkably well. There was nothing in history to lay down precedent for how units like LRRPs should operate, except Delta Force which had not been in existence itself very long before this. The first LRRPs practiced their own techniques and came up with their own solutions to problems they expected to find in the field.[25] Over the course of time, tactics became solidified more and more, and Delta Force eventually produced a recon manual to be distributed amongst operatives that offered tips and advice about all aspects of unconventional warfare. This manual helps illustrate realistically how a competent Special Forces recon team not only operated, but survived.

The first key aspect of Special Forces reconnaissance was movement. These men had to keep in mind that they were not the only trackers in the jungle. The Viet Cong often had patrol units operating in the areas Delta Force or the LRRPs were looking to infiltrate. So, it was important that movement be erratic, to make their trails harder to follow. Several techniques were put into place that had a team moving in boxes, circles, or figure eights. By constantly changing direction, not only might a team disorient anyone trying to follow them, but they were also constantly crossing over their own path. This increased their ability to spot such individuals, and allowed them to prepare their own ambushes in the event that they were necessary.[26]

Patience was a virtue among Special Forces in Vietnam, so reconnaissance missions could not be rushed. As such, it was important to lay down procedure about remaining in position overnight (RON). Competent teams would move into an RON position in the aforementioned way, circling it first so they make sure they were not being followed into an area where they intended to spend the night. From these positions they would not be able to eat food or smoke, lest the smells give them away. They would not be able to make transmissions back to base, lest the transmissions be monitored and their position compromised. Delta Force did not overlook any detail. Sleeping would be in shifts. A buddy system would be in effect. If a team member spoke in his sleep, he would be gagged. The team would leave the RON site before the sun rose so as not to be caught with their pants down.[27] Tactics like these allowed recon teams to remain effectively invisible.

Patrolling in search of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong camps was one way of getting information on the enemy, but there was another large aspect of recon life. The best source for such information was the enemy themselves, and so Delta Force had extensive protocol as far as seeking out potential prisoners of war (PWs). First, there is a 9-step procedure for how to actually go about abducting a prisoner, which covers everything from blindfolding and cleaning his wounds, to extraction to the landing zone (LZ).[28] The pros and cons of different "snatch sites" were also

25 Martinez, 12.
26 Project (B-52) Delta, Special Forces Combat Recon Manual: Republic of Vietnam, 27.
27 Project (B-52) Delta, 16.
28 Project (B-52) Delta, 19.

covered, which suggest the circumstances under which a PW should be taken from either a road or a trail. Protocol seriously advised against ever snatching a PW from a village unless serious preparations had been made, serious reason existed, and immediate infiltration was available.[29] For the most part, it was difficult for such a team to continue their operations while at the same time looking after a PW. So, usually after obtaining one, extraction would immediately become the next objective.

These tactics, as well as dozens more (how to survive a firefight, how to procure an LZ, etc.) set a standard that doubtlessly helped countless men survive against the odds in the Vietnamese jungles. The other aspect of the American advantage, though, was their technology. There is no question of training or procedure here; this is just a clear cut distinction the American forces had over the North Vietnamese. Special Forces used this advantage in many ways to strike at the enemy in ways they couldn't take advantage of.

The most significant technological advantage used by recon teams was the helicopter. This machine allowed for insertion or extraction without maintaining anything on the ground that might become a target for enemy fire. At first, these maneuvers were a quick and convenient way to move Special Forces teams around, but as the war progressed the enemy became sharper about what the choppers were doing. For obvious reasons, it was standard operating procedure for LRRPs and other such units to leave LZs immediately after insertion. But, later on, these precautions were not enough and new, innovative ways of planting teams into enemy territory became necessary. Eventually, it became common that helicopters not even touch down on the ground, but rather allow recon teams to bail out on low passes. The VC retaliated against this by planting punji stakes in tall grass and areas that would be likely American LZs.[30] Americans also began sending multiple helicopters that would touch down multiple times to keep the enemy confused about where a drop would actually occur. Deception was an absolute necessity. Other methods of insertion were used of course, including watercraft and parachute drops, but helicopter insertions were the most versatile, the most common, and unfortunately, the most expected. Operations were thus usually undertaken at sunset, so the ensuing darkness would then contribute to the survival of both chopper and recon team.[31]

Though enemy contact did occur (and more frequently than was usually desired), this is where the real Special Forces can be distinguished from mock-ups like Rambo. Hoffman likened combat in Vietnam to an automobile accident. It can either be head on, or you can be blindsided. It happened most often in the rain and in the dark, and when it did communication and coordination were near impossible.[32] As such, LRRPs

29 Project (B-52) Delta, 21.
30 Vietnam Studies, 143.
31 Vietnam Studies, 143.
32 George "Sonny" Hoffman, "Combat 101," Sonny Reflections, 1994, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://www.vietvet.org/combat.htm>.

and other recon teams did not do their best work in open combat, and were usually encouraged to use tools like white phosphorous (WP) grenades and claymore mines to cause havoc and disengage when confronted by the enemy.[33] Teams would either retreat into concealment, or return to an available LZ for removal. However, though the option for emergency helicopter removal was available (and always required to be by Special Forces command) it is true that the vast majority of special operations, until the later years of the war, would not suffer from hasty or forced evacuations.[34]

The Special Forces' greatest technological weapon would often be called into play in order to assist in such retreats. This weapon was the air strike, and it was more pivotal to jungle combat than any tactic or maneuver that Special Forces units knew themselves. The ability to call in an air strike allowed for an entire arsenal of explosives and machine guns to suddenly reinforce the few men who found themselves stranded in the jungle surrounded by hostiles. Helicopters or planes would then be able to open a path for a unit under siege to escape into cover or retreat.[35] Air strikes were also used when a recon patrol managed to stumble onto a VC army or base. They were capable of removing the enemy without ever requiring the patrol to engage, and thus, not endangering the men's lives.

Like any good Cold War battlefield, combat was not always an open confrontation. Espionage was prevalent on both sides, and played a major role in the war. Reconnaissance efforts also existed within the Special Forces to place spies into Viet Cong units, and to root out those placed in South Vietnam.

Throughout the 1960s, a major thorn in the side of the joint American-South Vietnamese forces was Hanoi's VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) cadre. The cadre was active in many South Vietnamese towns, and actively recruited to the northern side. They also tended to cause problems by assassinating local southern politicians and leaders, as a way of driving the South Vietnamese from certain regions. By 1967, it is estimated that they numbered between 70,000 and 100,000 members.[36] Needless to say, Special Forces did not leave this problem unchecked. In 1967, the military formed the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX), which a few months later would be reorganized and renamed Project Phoenix. Phoenix's goal was to establish a presence in towns and regions that the VCI had been procuring over the previous years, to gather evidence against suspected VCI members, and to "neutralize" (capture, arrest or kill) them. Operating hand in hand with a mirror organization in the

33 Project (B-52) Delta, 17.
34 Vietnam Studies, 146.
35 Project (B-52) Delta, 18.
36 Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future", Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Apr. 2006, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr06/Andrade-Willbanks.pdf> 17.

South Vietnamese military, the Phung Hoang, Phoenix managed to neutralize a total of 81,740 Viet Cong between 1968 and 1972 (when they were most active), killing 26,369 and dealing serious damage to the VCI.[37]

Project Phoenix, however, was surrounded in controversy. Some claim that the program did not do enough to target high level VCI, and didn't neutralize anyone of great value. Others accuse it of being an "assassination bureau," committing murders and moral atrocities without significant reason or payoff.[38] It really is uncertain how well Phoenix performed in the grand scheme, but there are two indicators that it was a success. First, the statistics speak for themselves. Secondly, ex-leaders of the Viet Cong have admitted at this point that Phoenix was both effective and "extremely destructive" to their cause in the south.[39]

On the other hand, American spy efforts were not particularly organized or extensive. The racial differences between Americans and Vietnamese made it difficult to do that kind of thing, but Delta Force had access to the only ARVN Airborne Ranger battalion in existence, and did actually use it for some espionage. They would dress their soldiers in Viet Cong garb and send them out to mingle with the enemy and gather information. There is no real documentation of the effectiveness of such programs, but Delta Force commander Chuck Allen recalls having to strip careless soldiers of provisions like chocolate bars and oranges that had given them away to the Viet Cong in the past.[40] If this is any indicator, these endeavors were not particularly successful.

TAKING THE FIGHT TO THEM

SOG arguably was the most aggressive Special Forces group to be introduced into the war. Taking members from other Special Forces programs, this group was actually responsible for crossing the borders and fighting the NVA in their own country, Cambodia and Laos. Because of some of these locales, SOG's operations remain some of the most secretive in Vietnam. But, these missions presented the opportunity for a bit of a role reversal among the two militaries, and the Americans enjoyed the opportunity to be on the offensive for a change.

SOG first got the opportunity to prove itself through Operation "Shining Brass" in 1965. Shining Brass had patrols along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos tagging NVA outposts for air strikes, in an attempt to stop their movement down into South Vietnam. The bombing runs were a great success.[41] This also marked another landmark in American strategy in Vietnam. Before this point, recon teams had not been used to do

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37 Andrade and Willbanks, 20.
38 Andrade and Willbanks, 20.
39 Andrade and Willbanks, 21.
40 Santoli, 148.
41 John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1998) 39.

this sort of cooperative work with bombers. It began here, and would be widely used in future campaigns throughout all the theaters of the Vietnam War.[42]

SOG was also responsible for attacks on camps, weapons caches and coastal defenses that otherwise would have gone unhindered in enemy territory. They, more than anyone else, tried to do to the NVA what the Viet Cong were doing to Americans in the south. The argument has been made that the Special Forces' greatest strength was not in brute force, but in diversionary and indirect means. Here, SOG thrived. The practice is called "psy-ops," or psychological warfare. In the south, the Viet Cong did this in many ways. They would hide among and strike from the common population to hide their numbers and membership. They would lay booby traps to terrorize American patrols and kill morale. In the north, though, Americans played this game. Hoffman recalls his stint with SOG as such:

> We did recon, of course, but in addition we gave the enemy a dose of their own medicine. We mined their trails and planted false orders that moved units under B52 strikes. We found ammunition stockpiles and doctored rounds to explode in mortar tubes or in gun barrels. Some of their grenades blew up in their hands. We also destroyed much of their stockpiles and poisoned their food. We showed them how it is done by true professionals, and they hurt from the lesson.[43]

The effort to booby trap NVA weapons and ammunition was called Operation "Eldest Son." Eldest Son had SOG operatives carrying tampered ammunition into the field and leaving it not only in the caches, but more frequently on the bodies of KIAs who the enemy was sure to search for equipment. The rifle rounds were designed to backfire into the head of the person shooting the rifle, and were usually hidden among a cartridge of fully functional rounds. The mortar rounds were designed to explode in their tubes.[44] As it turns out, these rounds were near impossible to detect among functional ammunition, and the NVA distributed it widely. SOG celebrated when they would hear reports of regular infantry coming across an enemy who prematurely lost a firefight when his rifle exploded in his hand. The regular American military never understood why these things happened. The NVA were also not keen to the sabotage, and believed the faulty ammunition was the result of Chinese manufacturing errors. That, of course, was the work of SOG propaganda as well.[45] Vietnamese faith in their weapons and in their officers was greatly shaken by this project until the sabotage efforts were called to a halt in February of 1970.[46]

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42 Plaster, 50.
43 George "Sonny" Hoffman, "The Loudest Noise," Sonny Reflections, 1994, 30 Nov. 2007 <http://www.vietvet.org/noise.htm>.
44 Plaster, 133.
45 Plaster, 135.
46 Stanton, 219.

Another successful psy-op used by SOG was the creation of a radio station which made disheartening broadcasts to NVA soldiers. They believed these transmissions were coming out of Hanoi, but it was really a masquerade hosted out of Saigon. The Special Forces distributed dummied radios called "peanuts" in much the same way they did their tampered ammunition. Peanut radios tended to tune into SOG's station over just about anything else, but SOG pirated common radio frequencies as well, so they could be heard from any radio. They would talk about topics like the government sending northern students abroad for "advanced study." This served to disillusion their soldiers, who were the same age but, instead of enjoying scholarships to foreign countries, were enjoying a brutal war in the south. They made soldiers long for home on the Tet holiday, and killed morale. This tactic even served to earn them defectors.[47]

Other operations spanned from forging counterfeit money and documents (which served to place blame on northern officers who were probably trustworthy) to kidnapping fishermen off the rivers and turning them into spies in an American run organization (called the "Sacred Sword of the Patriot League").[48] Though success of these programs is obviously difficult to measure, there are some indicators that psy-ops were effective, mostly from the mouths of NVA officials themselves. When later asked about the biggest threat the U.S. offered during the war, the southern NVA force commander admitted that it was the border teams like SOG. They forced him to divert 100,000 men to protect supply lines that would have been better used for other jobs.[49] Also, before Hanoi would agree to peace talks with the U.S. at the close of the war, they specifically demanded the immediate halt of psy-ops projects, with particular emphasis on the Sacred Sword of the Patriot League.[50] All indicators point to SOG causing significant harm to the northern war effort, enough to be recognized by the north, and to be considered a serious problem.

WHY DID WE LOSE?

In light of the efforts made by the men in the Green Berets, as well as the great successes of the regular infantry in circumstances like Tet '68 when conventional fighting occurred, it seems absurd that the U.S. military could not have come out on top in Vietnam. However, this failure ties very tightly into the very nature of the U.S. Special Forces. It has been suggested that their greatest strengths did not lie in their actual soldiering, but in a number of other means of spying, deceiving and misleading. Such activities were necessary because that was the nature of this war; a guerilla war which thrived on the unconventional. But, the U.S. government did not

47 Plaster, 130.
48 Plaster, 123.
49 Hoffman, "The Loudest Noise."
50 Plaster, 138.

embrace this sort of combat as its primary war effort. North Vietnam did, and while the U.S. military might have been comprised of 90% conventional army and 10% Special Forces, the NVA and Viet Cong would have been just the opposite.

North Vietnam ran their own psy-ops projects, which were made infinitely more successful by the already irritated attitude of the American public toward the war. Truong Nhu Tang, the NLF Minister of Justice, claimed, "...the American media is easily open to suggestion and false information given by Communist agents. The society is completely hypnotized by the media.[51] Negative sentiment was turned into a weapon used by the enemy against the U.S. By feeding America information that further reduced the popularity of this war, they could directly increase the pressure to remove the military. The U.S. was a nation that could, at any time, say "to hell with this," and be removed from the situation. This was not the case with the North Vietnamese. They had a vested interest in the war, and they had the resolve to keep it going despite the hindrances caused by programs like SOG and Phoenix.

Dan Pitzer, a former POW of the Viet Cong, recalls a certain tactic they used. They would show him and his fellows anti-war publications made in the United States. *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post* provided constant source material. They also forced them to listen to Radio Hanoi each night, which broadcast American anti-war speakers as a morale booster to the citizens of North Vietnam. "What was being published in the U.S.," Pitzer says, "was much better propaganda than anything the Viet Cong could write. And while it was disheartening for us, it was a real boost to their self-confidence."[52]

The activities of the U.S. Special Forces ranged from trainers, to intelligence collectors, to saboteurs and soldiers. Their efforts took place on and off the battlefield, sometimes behind the scenes, sometimes behind a desk. Though they were capable of armed combat, often the successes attributed to them were usually a result of their adaptability and creativity. While the Special Forces were not the gung-ho, super soldiers they would be made out as later, they were still excellent at what they did. But, their role in the war was that of support; support for a military that was not on target as best as it could have been, and was not appreciated by the citizens at home. They came out popular because of the nature of their work, and the secrecy that allowed people to use their imaginations when considering them. They would be overblown into an action phenomenon that intrigued millions. But, as successful as the Green Berets, SOG, the LRRPs and the other programs all were, the reality is that they were not enough to turn the tides in this very unpopular, very unconventional conflict.

51 Santoli, 165.
52 Santoli, 160.

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INOCULATING THE FUTURE GENERATIONS: A LOOK AT THE NAZI EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Evan Weiss

INTRODUCTION

There has been a lot written on and taught about the era of Nazi rule in Germany. Many areas of Nazi rule have been looked at rather extensively. Many people know of the racist policies of the Nazis. Many have also learned of the systems of propaganda used by the Reich. One aspect that has been talked of less is how the government went about convincing the German youth of their policies. Through an educational system revamped under Nazi rule, the Reich turned schools into factories of indoctrination. The sole stated purpose of schools was to convince the youth of National Socialist ideology. Within that ideology are teachings on German racial superiority. Science was used to "prove" such theories. The educational rhetoric also stressed uniformity among all students in the framework of the ideology. Perhaps most pervasive in the schools was the preparation of the youth to die for the German cause. All throughout schooling, and the supplementary Hitler Youth Group, there was a constant reminder that everything the students did was for Germany and for Hitler. By looking at several accounts of people who went through the schooling at this time we can see that the education system did have an effect on the children.

OVERVIEW OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

When the Nazi party came to power there was a reorganization of the state educational system. This was achieved through a series of laws and decrees. One notable aspect of the education system was the rigid separation of genders in schools. There were separate schools for boys and girls, and very few exceptions were granted. This was affected because there were separate goals for men and women. German boys were being raised to be soldiers for Germany. German girls were being raised to be mothers and homemakers. Accordingly in girls' schools classes like home economics were being stressed.[1] In boys' schools German character and physical exercise were being stressed. This separation of sexes was not entirely new for Germany. In fact, different educational goals for the two sexes were a theme throughout German history. "One fact is strikingly evident in the early history of women's education in Germany -- that women were educated always (when they were educated at all) merely that they might be a more efficient helper of man."[2]

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. V. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946 p 190-91
2 Dane, Anna. "The Education of Nazi Women." Australian Educational Studies. Toronto, ON: Melbourne UP, 1940. p 177.

Traditional schools were divided into Kindergarten schooling, elementary schooling, high schooling, and university schooling. Children from two to six were enrolled in Kindergartens. These children, even at such a young age, were given systematic training in the ideology of the Nazi party. In elementary schools physical training, history, and German racial culture were emphasized. In history topics such as the shame of the Treaty of Versailles and German rejuvenation under the Nazi's were taught. In high schools many of the same subjects were emphasized. In high schools there were a series of decrees issued with the intention of making the schools "instruments for the teachings of Nazi doctrines." Again universities stressed similar topics (physical education, history, racial sciences). Beginning in the early 1930's the colleges of physical education and politics became the largest at the universities. Also around this time all the textbooks used were re-written to fit the message of the National Socialists.[3]

As a supplement to the formal education system there were mandatory youth groups for young Germans. These groups also progressed with age like formal schooling. First up for German youth was the stage of the *Pimpf*, or little fellow. A Nazi youth was a *pimpf* from the age of six to ten. In this stage of youth group the groundwork for later youth group stages is laid. As part of this stage all youths were given a record book. In this book physical and ideological developments are tracked. Before moving on to the next level a *pimpf* had to pass a rigorous test.[4] If that test was passed the youth became a *Jungvolk*. The *Jungvolk* stage saw a child from the age of ten through fourteen. The initiation into the *Jungvolk* involved swearing to give up their lives for Hitler. *Jungvolk's* also had to continue tracking their progression as they did as *pimpfs*.[5] After being a *Jungvolk* the German boy became a member of the Hitler Youth. This saw the child from the age of fourteen through eighteen. In the Hitler youth German children became the secondary army of the German state. The Hitler youth had an internal hierarchal system. Nazi leaders were constantly reminding the Hitler Youth of their importance to the state. In essence the Hitler Youth operated like its own army, preparing the youth to once and for all die for Hitler and the Reich.[6]

Through this framework we can now look at the different methods used to teach students. Although the individual lessons changed, the subjects that were emphasized stayed largely the same throughout the educational process. Further, the same things were taught in both the schools and in the youth groups. Learning about physical education, German history (insofar as history could be used to justify German expansion), and racial sciences were the foci of the two. As will be shown these

3 NCA, Vol I, p 313
4 Ziemer, Gregor. Education for Death. New York: Oxford UP, 1941, p 55
5 Ziemer, *Education*, p 103
6 Ziemer, *Education*, p 145-6

subjects were used not only to justify many Nazi policies, but to prepare the younger generation to be the next generation of Nazi soldiers, and be the next generation to die for the German state.

REJECTION OF CLASSICAL METHODS

It is clear the Nazi aims for an educational system do not fit in with traditional ideals. A classical educational system calls for students to question claims and actively involve themselves in the educational process. In questioning claims classical education also involves testing those claims to verify, or disprove, them. In Nazi Germany this kind of educational system was not the case. Dr. Bernhard Rust of the Ministry of Education said:

> "Class discussions too often raise the egos of some, and make others inarticulate...consequently the lecture is the only safe method of instruction. Youth too often abuses freedom; hence there should be less freedom."[7]

The manual for high school teachers gave a rhetorical justification for rejecting classical methods. It reads "such form of education is not aimed at man with all his realities but is aimed at some purely rational being."[8] In other words a classical education neglected to take into account what young German's truly needed to learn. This is in essence a policy of anti-intellectualism. Gregor Ziemer was an American educator at the American school in Berlin. Ziemer was granted permission to observe German education in action. Observing the schools he said of them "every phase of culture aside from political culture remains a mere abstraction and a chimera, because it makes appeal only to the intellect."[9] The Reich rejected a well balanced education and favored a different kind of education. The education used in Germany more resembled propaganda.

The aim of the Nazi educational system was largely to promote state ideology. "National socialistic ideology is to be a sacred foundation. It is not to be degraded by detailed explanation or discussion."[10] By promoting a single ideology the Reich wanted to indoctrinate the German youth to believe in their political point of view. Alfons Heck was a student at the time of the Nazi rule. He writes of the penetration of the ideology into his psyche.

> "When I was sworn into the *Jungvolk*, I had been thoroughly conditioned, despite my Catholic upbringing, to accept the two basic tenets of the Nazi creed: belief in the innate superiority of the Germanic-Nordic race, and the conviction that total submission to the welfare of the state...was my first duty."[11]

7 Ziemer, *Education*, p 22
8 NCA, Vol V, p. 195
9 Ziemer, *Education*, p 19
10 *Ibid*
11 Heck, Alfons. *A Child of Hitler.* Frederick, CO: Renaissance House, 1985. p. 8

The same aim was reached for at the university level. In *Education for the Greater German Reich* Dr. Rudolph Benze wrote, "the party demands that institutions of higher learning should become, more than in the past, places of indoctrination for the coming generation."[12] Gregor Ziemer observed, "all classes have the same ultimate purpose – to create National Socialists. This can be affected in one class as well as another. Students are to be discouraged from departmentalizing knowledge."[13] This goal was enacted through a series of reforms. One of these reforms was executing national control over who could teach. "Nazi conspirators thoroughly [reexamined] all German teachers and [removed] all 'harmful and untrustworthy' elements."[14] Ziemer further observed "Hitler and his instructors know boy psychology; they avail themselves of every instinct, every budding emotion to pour the souls of Nazi boys that are soon set for life."[15] In a speech delivered by Adolf Hitler in 1937 the intention of the education system was made clear.

> "The youth of today is ever the people of tomorrow. For this reason we have set before ourselves the task of inoculating our youth with the spirit of this community of the people at a very early age, at an age when human beings are still unsophisticated and therefore unspoiled."[16]

In rhetoric the promotion of state ideals was sold as a benefit of the new educational system. The manual used for high schools said the Reich's system "molded the strength of [Hitler's] people into one single political will, one single penetrating ideology, thus making great and sensible education again possible."[17] The system was so pervasive in indoctrinating youth, and the Reich so confident in its results, that challenges to the system were flatly ignored. In a speech, Hitler described his reaction to such opposition.

> "When an opponent declares, 'I will not come over to your side, and you will not get me on your side', I calmly say 'Your child belongs to us already'...In a short time they will know nothing else but this new community."[18]

Perhaps most indicative of just how different the Nazi educational system was from the traditional educational system came from the observations of Gregor Ziemer. Ziemer wrote, the schools "have produced a generation of human beings in Nazi Germany so different from normal American youth that mere academic comparison seems inane."[19] In order to further look at the treatment of subject matter in

12 NCA, Vol V. p 178
13 Ziemer, *Education* p 22
14 NCA, Vol I, p 313
15 Ziemer, *Education* p 103
16 NCA, Vol V., p 196
17 NCA, Vol V., p 194
18 NCA, Vol. V, 198
19 Ziemer, *Education*, pp. 193-4

Nazi Germany it is important to understand how different educational theories were from that of contemporary America.

TEACHING RACE

Theories of race were central to the Nazi ideology. If ideology was at the center of the schools, then, by transitivity, teachings of race would be at the center of education. *The Nazi Primer* was a text used in the Hitler Youth groups as an educational tool. The opening sentence of the primer reads "the foundation of the national socialist outlook on life is the perception of the unlikeness of men."[20] Thus, a large part of education, both in schools and in the Hitler youth, was teaching the differences among different races. The textbooks take a rather subdued, scientific tone to this pursuit. *The Primer* discusses differences in races based on such details as sizes and shapes of skulls. It also matter-of-factly points out differences in character among the races. It does this by alluding to scientific reasoning without actually justifying the reasoning. In discussing the Nordic race, considered the purest of the German races, the Primer reads "there are, for example, differences in the structure and size of the brain and the bodily glands. Mental and spiritual difference are naturally related thereto."[21] This matter of fact approach appears throughout. It treats a statement as evidence. Then it makes a conclusion based on that evidence. However these conclusions are often a *non sequitur* from the evidence. Or, at the very least, no valid explanation of the connection from evidence to conclusion is offered. This appears to be at the design of the ministry of education. In a memo Bernhard Rust wrote that in teaching race teachers should "impress the pupils with the importance of the science of heredity and race."[22] Clearly the overuse of supporting facts and the clumsy connection to a conclusion is designed to impress the impressionable youth. Further evidence of this comes later in the same memo. Rust writes that the teaching "is to be accomplished early enough so that no child shall leave school without a conviction of the necessity of pure blood."[23] One reason for wanting to educate at such an early age would be that the students would be more apt to buy into the party line being fed to them. Another example of the oversimplification comes with a discussion of the Mendelian laws. The Mendelian laws, still taught in schools today, deal with the laws of heredity. The Primer has a factual discussion based on the laws. It then follows this discussion by using it as a justification for racist laws. It reads "We, however, shape the life of our people and our legislation according to the verdicts of the teachings of genetics."[24] It makes no effort to connect the discussion of heredity with the proposed claims of German genetic superiority.

20 Childs, Harwood L., trans. The Nazi Primer. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938, p. 13
21 Childs, *Primer*, p 19
22 Mann, Erika. School for Barbarians. New York: Modern Age Books, 1938. p. 78
23 *Ibid*
24 Childs, *Primer*, p 48

While subtleties may have existed in the texts teaching race, intra-party rhetoric was not so subtle. The same memo from Rust written about above said of racial teachings "the German schools consider no method that may carry out this wish of the Fuhrer too superstitious, too brutal or clumsy."[25] The attitude espoused by teachers in classrooms was also slightly different than that in the texts. They were still committed to the absolutism of German racial superiority. As shown in a previous section, there was no room for questioning or discussion in German schools. However, the German teacher was more adamant than the subdued tones of the texts. This was true both in style of lecturing and in the messages brought forward. Ziemer tells one story of a particularly vibrant history lecture on a German figure from World War I. The figure, Albert Leo Schlageter, was executed by the French. Ziemer writes of an impassioned lecture on the character, very different from the tone common in the German texts. Of the reaction Ziemer wrote "concentrated fury was written on the faces of the youngsters. They expressed the desire to hang all Frenchmen, to go to Paris and drop bombs."[26] A similar example relating to race was witnessed by Ziemer. Going beyond the rather straightforward messages of superiority contained in the texts one reading teacher offered a poem. The end of the poem read:

'Please,' begged the victim, 'let me go,
For I am such a little foe'
'No,' said the victor, 'not at all,
For I am big and you are small!'[27]

The message to the students was clear. Germany was stronger and thus would be the victor, and could not show mercy. The straightforward scientific discussion in the texts combined with the impassioned pedagoguery of the teachers made for an effective way to teach racial superiority to young Germans.

When it came to teaching race, even in cases where it was disguised, the message that Germans (specifically the Nordic Germans) were of a superior race was clear. The characteristics children were taught belonged to Nordics ranged from the physical to the emotional. In comparing Nordics to other races the matter-of-fact approach typical of texts shows itself. "[The Nordic] has, according to our discoveries, limbs which are large in proportion to the body. That suits our sense of beauty. Peoples with another racial makeup apparently have quite another ideal of beauty."[28] By not explicitly stating Nordic superiority the text is implying the superiority should be assumed. When read by a child already pre-indoctrinated to believe in racial inequality they will then thus assume Nordic superiority must be assumed. In other

25 Mann, *Barbarians*, p 78
26 Ziemer, *Education*, p 65
27 Ziemer, *Education*, p 67
28 Childs, *Primer* 18

words, texts dealing with race don't explicitly make the argument for racial superiority, but rather treat it as an assumed fact. There is further evidence of such racial teachings. As seen in the previously discussed poem a position of leadership was closely related with ideas of racial superiority. Therefore children would be trained to view people in position of leadership as being superior. So, saying "[Nordics] are predisposed to leadership by nature"[29] is equivalent to saying the Nordics are of superior makeup to other races.

With all the discussion of the Nordic race it is interesting to point out that not only are other races discussed, but other German races are discussed in the educational system. Nordic was considered to be superior to other German races, however as many as 6 different races were to be considered German. Discussion in the Primer says half of the German racial identity is Nordic.[30] This is not to say half of all Germans are pure-bred Nordic, but half of German genes are Nordic. This discussion leads into the previously mentioned discussion of the findings of Mendel. The findings of Mendel involving dominant and recessive characteristics had significant consequences on Nazi policy. Firstly it leads to a conclusion about how important heredity should be viewed. The Primer says the evidence concerning genetics leads to the conclusion that "all arguments and political demands which are founded on the belief in the power of environment are therefore false and weak."[31] This is significant in that it establishes the principal that non-Germans can never become equal to Germans.

Another consequence of applying Mendel to German racial views involves German ideas about procreation. By showing that one can appear to be pure German but have recessive genes that are not German means people should be vigilant about making sure no future infiltrations to the gene pool occur. The Primer says "it is important for us to remove those injuries we know about from the heritage of our people."[32] A guide of "racial science" used in medium level schools has a section on "racial hygiene." In that section students are told of the German ideal "when choosing a mate, for marriage, we also take the obligation, to keep in mind the racial composition of our national substance."[33] The implication here is clearly keeping breeding within the race. After establishing the superiority of the Nordic race the discussion shifts to breeding.

> "Today, we have relatively many Nordic people among the leading strata of our people. If, therefore, an increase of these strata is helped along, the share of Nordic blood within, it will become a greater one. But it is very

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29 Childs, *Primer* 20
30 Childs, *Primer*, p 34
31 Childs, *Primer*, p 59
32 *Ibid*
33 NCA, Vol V, p 177

essential, that we avoid, as best as we can, the penetration of elements of alien races into our national body."[34]

In other words, by encouraging people of the highest social order to breed only with each other, future generations will have a larger and stronger highest order. The consequence of this understanding was German policies that proactively tried to prevent procreation by less than desirable members of society. These policies were justified to the children in a different section of the same book.

> "These measures, of course, cannot show their results immediately, but in the course of many years, the health of the heritage of our people will improve, and the tremendous burden, which is placed today on the community by taking care of the inferior ones, will decrease more and more."[35]

This is a clear example of a direct policy consequence of German teachings of race.

Another consequence of racial teaching was the convincing of the youth of the German right to expand their territory. In schools students were taught of the holiness of German soil. They were further taught that other countries have stolen their land and that German's must reclaim it.[36] Being of a superior racial makeup, of course, they could take their land back and expand. Looking back at the poem previously referred to, teaching students of their position of superiority along with the wrongs done to Germany had a significant effect in convincing the youth of the need for German expansion. In observing a class lectured on the need for German expansion – a lecture containing discussion of German racial superiority – Ziemer observed an overwhelmingly convinced class. "I scrutinized the faces of the boys. The teacher had been remarkably successful. The lads stood there with eyes bright and shining. Their faces were glowing. Their souls were hero-worshipping."[37] This is another example of how racial discussions had consequences on what the German teachers were able to convince the youth.

Attempts to trick young students were no accident. German educators were well aware of the effect their tactics had. Further, they were aware that what they were doing was, in fact, a trick and not just a regular teaching method. One German educator in a handbook used to instruct teachers wrote of a method of teaching racial superiority over the Jews. In it, Professor Ernst Dobers suggests showing pictures of prominent German figures, such as athletes, next to prominent Jews of a less celebrated status (such as Bolshevist leaders). The idea was to get the children to asso-

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34 *Ibid*
35 *Ibid*
36 Ziemer, *Education*, p 106
37 *Ibid*

ciate good things with the Nordics and bad things with the Jews. Dobers writes "it will naturally result that the children will feel kinship with the one side, and, quite naively passionate rejection on the other."[38] The reference to the children's naïveté shows the educators were well aware the arguments did not truly hold water, but that young students could be fooled into believing in them. Heck writes of similar tactics being used in a class of his. He writes of his "racial science" instruction how to be able to identify a Jew by sight. "'Just observe the shape of their noses,' he said. 'If they are formed like an upside-down 6 that's usually a good indication of their Jewishness.'"[39]

While the previous examples show they were discussed in class, Jews are conspicuously absent from the texts used. Although mentioned the Jews were not a featured part of the German education on race. This is not to say they were absent from discussion. At university there was a class offered called "History of the Jewish Menace."[40] As shown, teachings of race are central in convincing the younger population of German policies. This raises the question of how a policy like the Holocaust could be justified with out much discussion of the Jews. One possible explanation for this is that education was in fact priming the German youth to accept the Holocaust. But, something like the Holocaust could not be directly justified without significant indoctrination happening first. A clue that this might be the case can be found in earlier writings of Hitler. The Holocaust is often referred to as "the final solution." In Mein Kampf Hitler wrote of using education to ready the population for such a solution. "The racial state will have to see to it that there will be a generation which by a suitable education will be ready for the final and ultimate decision on this globe."[41] This at the very least shows Hitler thought it necessary for educational systems to convey racist messages to the younger generation.

While discussion of the Jews was not featured in textual discussions, superiority over the Jews was brought up in classrooms. We know this from the observations of Ziemer. Ziemer writes of an encounter with a German school teacher. The teacher says to Ziemer in the encounter "we teach our students that the Jews are our greatest enemies."[42] This lesson was not lost on the children. Another scene observed by Ziemer was a teacher talking about America. Firstly, he blamed America's shortcomings on a "lack of racial purity."[43] Then, after explaining the evil status of Democratic government he asks the class what a Democracy was. One of the first answers from the class was "a democracy is a government by rich Jews."[44] This

38 Mann, *Barbarians*, p 79
39 Heck, *Child* p 13
40 Ziemer, *Education*, p 190
41 NCA, *Vol I*, p 316
42 Ziemer, *Education*, p 6
43 Ziemer, *Education* p 69
44 *Ibid*

response shows an equation of Jews to Democracy. Democracy was fundamentally opposed to National Socialist ideals. So, by transitivity Jews were opposed to National Socialist ideals. Further connections were made between Jews and established enemies of the German state. In a handbook for high school teachers, teachers were told to teach of "Jewish world-domination in Germany and in Bolshevistic Russia" during the period since World War I.[45] This draws upon German hatred toward the way they were treated after World War I, and on the stated enemies of the Bolsheviks in Russia. From these comparisons we can see the groundwork being laid for acceptance of racist policies towards the Jews. With young Germans being taught of their superiority, the natural laws dictating superior people overtake inferior people, and the enemy status of Jewish people, there is evidence that young Germans were being primed to accept something along the lines of the Holocaust.

CREATING THE NEXT GERMAN ARMY

Ziemer wrote it in its simplest terms. "Education is training for a life of might."[46] The education system in Nazi Germany, in addition to its ideological purposes, had one clear practical purpose. That purpose was to raise the next generation of soldiers that would fight and die in the German army. Preparation for this began at an early age in the schooling.

The first evidence of this is the heavy emphasis placed on physical training and education. A German commissioner of education went so far as to say physical training was the most important subject in the upbringing of a German youth: "Physical education, education for action, is alone worth of the Nazi teacher's attention. All else can be dismissed as non-essential."[47] He also said, "the education of the body must be paramount."[48] We already know from earlier discussions that the emphasis on physical training began with elementary school. Elementary school began at six years old, so rigorous physical education started as early as six years old for German youths. Further, in boys' high schools, physical education was one of the three classes all students had to take.[49] In the youth groups that children had to belong to there was perhaps even a heavier emphasis on physical training. Long marches were the norm, even for the pimpfs who were also as young as six years old. For a pimpf graduation (at age 10) the children hiked 50 miles to get to the ceremony. This served as part of their final examination to graduate to a Jungvolk.[50] Once in the Jungvolk the children are exposed to more rigorous, and longer, marches. They also have more stringent overall requirements.[51] Again, once promoted to a Hitler Youth,

45 NCA, Vol V. p 196
46 Ziemer, *Education*, p 17
47 Ziemer, *Education*, p 15
48 *Ibid*
49 NCA, Vol V, p 191
50 Ziemer, *Education*, p 56
51 Ziemer, *Education*, p 103

the physical requirements were increased. Ziemer writes of a Hitler Youth "Jamboree" where Hitler Youth had to hike to a historic site from all across Germany.[52] It is clear the heavy emphasis on physical education fit into Nazi plans to use the schools to create the next generation of the Nazi army.

The classroom and youth group structure also promoted ideas of the military. In the Hitler Youth this structure was obvious. "The Hitler Jugend, HJ, as it is known, has its own system of ranks and promotions. It maintains its own leadership schools and camps. The uniforms resemble those of regular storm troopers."[53] Rituals of the Hitler Youth also pointed toward training for the military. The Hitler youth anthem contained ample militaristic imagery:

Forward, forward call the bright fanfares...
We march for Hitler through night and suffering with
The banner for freedom and bread...
Our banner means more to us than death[54]

Furthermore, demonstrations put on by the Hitler Youth were largely militaristic in nature. Heck describes one such demonstration on the "Day of the Hitler Youth":

"It began early in the morning with a carefully timed march into the Stadium. There was a march-past by hundreds of flag bearers and a precision presentation...they now fit together like a jigsaw puzzle. Their grand finale was a drill in the grandstand, spelling out the name 'Adolf Hitler'"[55]

In the Hitler Youth, as well as throughout German rhetoric, emphasis was placed on the importance of being a leader. In the Hitler Youth the emphasis is placed specifically on being a military leader. A song recited by the Hitler youth reflects this:

"The world belongs to leaders,
They alone command the world.
And we are marching, marching
No one can stop our flag unfurled."[56]

There were also structural biases toward a military structure in the schools. The first of these biases involve the way a teacher is viewed in the school. By looking at the names used for German teachers under the Reich we can see a shift toward the military structure of the schools. . "A teacher is not spoken of as a teacher (*Lehrer*) but an *Erzieher*. The word suggests an iron disciplinarian who does not instruct

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52 Ziemer, *Education*, p 147
53 *Ibid*
54 Heck, *Child* p 9
55 Heck, *Child* p 21
56 Ibid

but commands, and whose orders are backed up with force if necessary."[57] This was intended to simulate an army-like atmosphere. In addition the absence of the ability to question the education, discussed earlier, contributes to this feeling. The idea that a teacher was an absolute leader, who could not be questioned, trained the student to be submissive. This would further prepare the student to be a good soldier. Further structural bias existed in what segments of education the children were told to pay more attention to. Teachers were told activities including military parades were more important than class:

"All classes must be flexible in their schedules. Should military parades or Party duties take students out of class, they are not to be molested with any form of review or make-up work later; teachers are not to stress class attendance."[58]

All of these schooling structures helped prepare the young generation to be in the army.

In addition to conditioning children to be submissive to leadership they were also conditioned to suppress any sense of individualism. This was also taught in the context of being a good soldier. Ziemer observed "The chief purpose of the school is to train human beings to realize that the State is more important than the individual, that individuals must be willing and ready to sacrifice themselves for nation and Fuehrer."[59] This kind of uniformity was supplemented by the way ideology was taught. As already pointed out, National Socialism was taught as a "single, penetrating ideology." Students were told to accept this ideology, and were not allowed to question it. Through this they were taught to put state above self in all respects. Throughout the youth groups students were instructed to wear matching uniforms. By the time they got to the Hitler Youth these uniforms were similar to that of a fully outfitted Storm Trooper. Uniformity was stressed across all aspects of school and youth life. This emphasis was initiated in order to prepare children to be good soldiers for the state. Without a destressing of individualism it would be impossible for teachers to convince the children "that they had to be hard, ready to fight and die for Hitler at any time."[60] Throughout the youth programs, repeated pledges to die for Hitler and Germany were required to advance through the stages of the youth groups.

Perhaps the most telling sign that schooling was primarily for military preparation was the way in which military ideals permeated into all different kinds of subject matter. This comes first in the teachings of history. History was not only used to raise German anger at the rest of Europe by discussing the Treaty of Versailles. In

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57 Ziemer, *Education*, p 15
58 Ziemer, *Education*, p 17
59 Ziemer, *Education*, p 20
60 Ziemer, *Education*, p 6

history classes there was an emphasis placed on the "glorification of German war heroes."[61] In fact it was legislated that certain figures be taught in classes.[62] Stories of German soldiers dying in war were often fancifully told to the children. This glorification of dying for the state was intended to prepare the youth to be willing to die for Germany. This permeation went beyond history as well. Geography classes were constantly changing in curriculum throughout the course of Nazi rule. The classes were changed based on what area of the world the Germans wanted to invade next. "The schedule in a geography class must be so adjusted that new parts of the globe can be discussed as they become objects of interest subsequent to new conquests."[63] In these ways traditional subject matter was used to express the ideas of a German military state. Through methods both overt and thinly disguised the education system was turned into a breeding ground for German military fervor. Ziemer made an observation summing this point up. He wrote, "On the whole, student life in Nazi Germany is more military than academic."[64]

TREATMENT OF HITLER IN EDUCATION

It is worth discussing the way in which Adolf Hitler was treated in educational settings. From a young age reverence toward Hitler was taught. In an elementary school reading book stories were told of Hitler's youth. He was presented as a model for what students should aspire to be. This highly fanciful story speaks of Hitler as a pedagogue. "But [Hitler] rather played around with the other boys in the meadows and the forests. They liked to obey him, and he frequently was the gang leader in their games."[65] Hitler was also portrayed as being interested in history. Specifically Hitler loved learning about war heroes. "During history classes, his eyes shone with enthusiasm during the teaching periods. That was something for him, to hear about war and heroes."[66] Perhaps most importantly in the context of education, Hitler looked forward to one day being a soldier for Germany. "[He] was glad that he was a boy and could also become a soldier one day."[67] These three ideals were clearly three of the ideals espoused by the educational system. This combined with the reverence directed at Hitler would mean that such a reading in an elementary school book would have an undeniable effect on the youth. In addition to stories about Hitler taught in schools, Hitler himself spoke to youth gatherings. In these speeches Hitler's status as a pedagogue was used to rally the youth. In an impassioned speech Hitler declared to a group of young Germans "You are Greater

Germany!"[68] He went on to say "when I see you my faith in the future of Germany has no bounds."[69] This kind of rhetoric would surely instill a German pride and sense of duty in German youth.

Beyond direct stories of and speeches by Hitler, rhetoric involving Hitler was frequently brought up. In youth organizations children were required to swear to give up their lives for Hitler. The pledge was not to give up their life for the state, but rather for Hitler himself.[70] Throughout texts and classes and youth groups references to giving one's life for Hitler were made. Students were also taught of all the great things Hitler had done for Germany. He led them out of the period that came as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. Students were taught "'Stability which in reality can be obtained only through the political deeds of a great personality.' These deeds, of course, are conquests, the great personality is Hitler."[71] The effect this Hitler rhetoric had on the children was best described by Heck. He wrote about a rally where Hitler spoke: "we shouted at the top of our lungs, with tears streaming down our faces: 'Sieg Heil'...From that moment on, I belonged to Adolf Hitler body and soul."[72]

It wasn't just the students who were supposed to model themselves after Hitler. The teachers, too, used Hitler as a model. This fit into the authoritarian class structure desired by the Nazis. "The teacher is to be a miniature Hitler and Fuehrer in his own classes. He is to brook no opposition, and must demand blind obedience."[73] Teachers were supposed to be the authority in their class. This characteristic of them was to be drawn from Hitler's example in German society. By looking at the way Hitler was dealt with by both students and teachers in education we can see the spot Hitler held in Reich rhetoric. Hitler was a model for all Germans to aspire to be. He had all the characteristics that a Nordic German should have. Hitler was eager to be a soldier, he was a leader, and he loved all things German.

EDUCATION V. PARENTING

Regardless of the tactics used in education, they would be relatively meaningless if they had no impact. But, from looking at memoirs of the time there is evidence the education system worked. Furthermore, it appears the uniformity preached created an equality among classes in the educational system. This equality created a real sense of separation from the generation in school and the generation of their parents. The ability to create this very real disconnect shows the educational system had an effect on the youth. Further, it shows the educational system was more re-

61 NCA, Vol I, p 313
62 NCA, Vol V, p 195
63 Ziemer, *Education*, p 17
64 Ziemer, *Education*, p 190
65 NCA, Vol V, p 181
66 *Ibid*
67 *Ibid*

68 NCA, Vol I, p 197
69 *Ibid*
70 Ziemer, *Educati-*
71 Ziemer, *Ed*
72 Heck.
73 Zi*

sponsible for instilling ideals in the young generation than their parents or societal changes as a whole.

Even a superficial reading of Alfons Heck's memoir shows that Heck truly bought into the ideology of the time. What is not so clear is if it was the educational system that resulted in it. By looking at Heck through the lens of breaking down social distinctions we can see he was more affected by his education than by his family values. Heck writes of the breaking down of class distinctions in the youth groups:

> "Ironic as it may seem, a youth movement spawned by one of the most intolerant ideologies the world has ever known, was surprisingly democratic in the treatment of its members, in that most had an equal chance to succeed regardless of family background. One of my first leaders was the son of day laborers."[74]

By doing this children associated with other children they otherwise wouldn't have in their family life. Another child at the time, Melita Maschmann, talks of the National Socialist ideology in these terms. "No catchword has ever fascinated me quite as much as that of the 'National Community'...I felt it could only be brought into being by declaring war on the class prejudices of the social stratum from which I came."[75] The new ideal of class equality, which was affected in the schools and youth groups, was a serious shift from the Germany just a generation before.

This shift created more than just a disconnect between the generation of the children and of their parents. It can be argued the shift created a tension between the two generations.

> "Many of our parents did not like the idea of that all-encompassing camaraderie with social inferiors; but that only heightened our sense of alienation from our elders, who eventually became afraid of us, or more correctly, of the power we wielded."[76]

> "Maschmann also talks of this tension between the generations. For me [the Nazi's taking power] turned the scale. I wanted to follow a different road from the conservative one prescribed by my family tradition."[77]

This is clear evidence that the National Socialist education being given to the youth was having an effect on the attitudes of the children. Moreover, it shows this effect outweighed the effects of their family upbringings.

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74 Heck, *Child*, p 10
75 Maschmann, Melita. Account Rendered: a Dossier on My Former Self. Trans. Geoffrey Strachan. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1964. p 10.
76 *Ibid*
77 Maschmann, *Account* p 10

It was more than just the stressing of class inequalities that serves as evidence the educational system was replacing parenting as the major source of values for the children. The stressing on the importance of leadership in the youth groups also created this effect. Jurgen Herbst, an 11-year-old at the time the war broke out, talks about this conflict.

> "As I grew older and rose in the Jungvolk...I found it increasingly difficult to steer my way between what appeared to me as ever-growing, conflicting demands...I had war duties to carry out, I told my mother, such as standing fire watch during air raids and helping with clean-up work thereafter. Such tasks made I seem somehow inappropriate that I ask her for permission or promise to be back home at a certain time in the evening."[78]

It is clear from these examples that when we talk of the educational system having this effect on the youth that the Youth Group separated the children from their parents more definitively than formal schooling did. However, since we are considering the Youth Group as part of the education received by young Germans the analysis holds water. Herbst put the sentiment best about the role of the youth group in the lives of the children. "This was our world," he wrote, "and not school nor church nor home could offer competing alternatives."[79]

CONCLUSION

From this look into the educational system we can derive several conclusions. First, the educational system was an extension of the Reich. It was used as a tool to implement National Socialist policies among the youth. First among these ideas was that of a German racial superiority, and all the policies associated with this. Second, the schools were a breeding ground for the next generation of the Nazi army. The main focus of the school, after indoctrinating youth with Nazi ideology, was to prepare them physically to fight and psychologically to die for Hitler. These aims were achieved through the use of schools and the supplementary youth groups. They were also achieved through the use of a glorified Adolf Hitler as a pedagogue and a model for all the German youth. Perhaps most important is the conclusion that the aims of indoctrination really did work. There is ample evidence from memoirs that children of the time bought into the National Socialist ideals with enthusiasm. The combination of formal schooling, youth group activities, and German rhetoric created a generation ready to live and die for the Nazi cause. The world will never know what would have happened had the Reich stayed in power long enough for this generation to be given that opportunity.

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78 Herbst, Jurgen. Requiem for a German Past. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin P, 1999. p 89
79 Herbst, *Requiem*, p 95

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