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Relocation & Realignment: How the Great Migration Changed the Face of the Democratic Party

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After a history of hostility toward Black people, what motivated the Democratic Party of the 1960s to change its position on civil rights? My dissertation examines one of the most significant developments in American political history—the shift of the U.S. political parties on racial issues. In Relocation and Realignment: How the Great Migration changed the face of the Democratic Party, I argue that increasing competition between the parties for the presidency and the mass movement of Black people out of the South coincided to drive the Democratic Party’s change on racial issues. Through examination of primary sources and a fresh perspective on existing research, I show that the Democratic Party changed their stance in an effort to secure support from Black voters in the North—who often constituted the balance of power (BOP) in important elections. Relocation and Realignment is an important contribution to the study of American politics for its attention to the political impact of the Great Migration and for its focus on Black voters before the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Relocation and Realignment:
How the Great Migration Changed the Face of the Democratic Party

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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Acknowledgments

I was 22 years old, with a freshly minted Master of Public Administration, when Dr. Gary Paul offered me a job as a visiting assistant professor at Florida A&M University. Like many of my classmates, I was a first generation college graduate who had no idea what to do with a strong curiosity about politics and a desire to help others. I was certain I would be a lawyer until Dr. Paul challenged my thinking. His encouraging me to get a Ph.D. and giving me the opportunity to teach changed my life. I will always be grateful to him for that.

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It took a village to make this Ph.D. The Syracuse Alumnae chapter of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Incorporated encouraged me to keep my commitment to service—even when I did not feel like it—and more importantly, exemplified sisterhood. The Bethany Baptist Church was a congregation of cheerleaders. Shakira at Starbucks made sure I was well caffeinated. Kerry and the Deltas (Jackie, Gina and Olivia), Fred, and Var kept me entertained me when I needed an
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Last, but not least, I want to acknowledge and thank my Mama—who practiced spelling with me on the way home from work every night when I was a kid. The older I get, the more I realize how much she sheltered me from various storms. She never let on that the odds were against us. Instead, she worked day-in and day-out to make a better life for me. She taught me to be responsible but fearless, and she never doubted my ability to achieve my dreams.
Dedication

Dedicated to Him, who is able to do exceedingly abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that works in us.
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Americans for Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOP</td>
<td>Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVAP</td>
<td>Black Voting Age Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Electoral College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPC</td>
<td>Fair Employment Practices Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Grand Old Party/Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK</td>
<td>John Fitzgerald Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBJ</td>
<td>Lyndon Baines Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVAP</td>
<td>Total Voting Age Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>Voting Age Population</td>
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</table>
Introduction

If you talk to Black people about politics, many will say the Democratic Party has been supportive of the race for as long as they can remember. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) New Deal programs provided food, shelter and work for many Black people during the Great Depression. Harry Truman desegregated the military. John F. Kennedy (JFK) called Coretta Scott King after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s arrest during a protest in Atlanta, Georgia. At the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) signed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Bill Clinton was so well-accepted by the Black community that many referred to him as the “first Black president.” Furthermore, the actual first Black President of the United States, Barack Obama, is a Democrat. For all these reasons, it makes sense that a Black person living in our times might reflect on American political history and surmise that the Democratic Party is “the party of Black people.” However, the Party has not always engendered such positive emotions in this community.

Before FDR and the New Deal, the Democratic Party was mostly a party of states’ rights. The most powerful faction within the party, Southern Democrats, favored limited government intervention on civil rights, believing each state should decide these issues for themselves. The result was a country with extremely different practices and policies on racial issues. A system of segregation and discrimination persisted in the South, including disparities in housing, employment, accommodations and education. In politics, this faction worked to deny Black citizens their constitutional right to participate in the political system. They employed legal methods, like the White primary, and extralegal methods, like violence and intimidation. In Congress, Southern Democrats worked with northern business interests to constitute a
conservative coalition whose goal was to block all progress on a host of liberal projects, especially anything related to civil rights legislation.

Factional struggles in the Democratic Party intensified as the northern wing of the party became increasingly liberal. Many Democrats in the North were advocating for anti-discrimination and fair employment policies. Outside the South, Black Democratic candidates were running for and winning local and state political offices. The Party’s presidents and presidential candidates were meeting with leaders of the Black community in an effort to understand their concerns and gain their support. Despite having a party power base that was heavily southern and racially conservative, the Democratic Party of the 1960s embraced liberal positions on racial issues. By 1965, the Party had undergone a nearly complete reversal on Black issues.

Why would the national Democratic Party of the 1960s, which still had a heavily conservative base in the South, move to the Left on issues related to race? This question is especially interesting because the Democrats could potentially lose Southern support by taking these liberal positions. In this dissertation, I seek to expand upon our current understandings of the Party’s motivation to change positions on civil rights issues—in spite of this potential for loss—by examining the role of demographic change in shaping party strategy.

Political scientists, historians, journalists, and other informed observers have many explanations as to why the Party changed its position on Black issues. Mary Dudziak (2001) suggests American leaders moderated on civil rights issues in an attempt to save face on the national stage. On this account, support for racism at home made political leaders vulnerable to international claims of hypocrisy. Social movements scholar Doug McAdams argues that the Civil Rights Movement was an important motivator of politicians position change. Calls from
leaders in the Movement and protests throughout the nation forced politicians to evolve on civil rights.

There are also more personal descriptions of the position change. Journalists and keepers of the JFK and LBJ presidential legacies suggest that they changed positions as they experienced changes of heart. For JFK, they point to the 1963 desegregation of the University of Alabama and surrounding protest as the moment that changed everything.¹ LBJ people frequently point to his work teaching Mexican schoolchildren as an indicator that he was sympathetic to civil rights all along. On a different personal note, Caro (2012) discusses LBJ’s ambition for the presidency as a primary motivation for his position change.

The classic political science explanation is that Democrats changed in response to elite replacement among members of Congress (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). In this view, the Party’s position on civil rights changed when liberals replaced conservative members of Congress in the 1958 election. Critiques of Issue Evolution suggest other factors motivated change: they changed their position because of ideological commitments that led to liberal positions on race (Feinstein & Schickler, 2008) and “prodding from the party’s core coalitional allies” (Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein, 2010: 673). Karol (2009) suggests the change occurred after large numbers of Black people joined the party during the New Deal. On his account, many Northern Democrats won their seats in Congress on FDR’s coattails. They shifted positions to support Black issues to demonstrate their liberalism and sustain their election to office (Karol, 2009: 109).

What about this Black population in the North that House members changed to accommodate? Where did they come from, and how did they become important enough to

warrant consideration of elected officials? Although most accounts of Democratic Party development include a brief discussion of demographic changes during the time, none of them thoroughly considers these questions. From the turn of the century through the 1960s, millions of Black people left the South and settled in cities throughout the North in search of economic opportunity and freedom from racial subjugation. This movement occurred steadily over more than 60 years, but sustained considerable momentum from World War II onward. All of the aforementioned scholars acknowledge this mass movement of Black people. However, no works consider the political impact of this movement at length. It is imperative that political scientists and historians recognize the Great Migration as essential to understanding party change from the 1940s onward.

**Why Not Consider The Great Migration?**

Why is the Great Migration missing as a major explanation for change? There are at least two reasons the migration has a diminished role among recent scholarship. One is that movement of citizens throughout the country is not usually cause for major concern or attention at the national level. If migration follows a normal pattern, and abnormal forces do not draw large numbers of people to particular places, parties do not need to think deeply about the movement of citizens because it will not have a strong impact on the way they create electoral strategy. In other words, migration among citizens should not become important to the national party until it starts to affect Electoral College (EC) outcomes.²

² Local politics could be a different situation. The movement of citizens is a concern for states and localities, which are more likely to be affected by shifts in their population. However, if migration proceeds normally—without being skewed by the migrants’ decision to settle in a particular part of the state or locality—it could also make sense that movement into or out of a state is not a major concern for parties at the state and local level.
However, America’s Great Migration was different from all other types of migration in our history because it was not normal and did affect politics. Abnormal forces ranging from boll weevil outbreaks and a struggling southern economy to the search for a life free from discrimination drove large numbers of Black people out of the south.

Further, although citizens of the United States are supposed to have the same voting privileges throughout the country, voting privileges were not widely available to people of color before 1965. It was much easier for a Black person in the North to participate in politics than it was for her southern counterparts. Therefore, the movement caused by the Great Migration would have greater political implications for party politics than would any similar type of movement among another group of the nation’s citizens. A thorough analysis of the Great Migration would serve to strengthen the party change literature by providing a different perspective of the party’s motivations. Also important is that the immigrants effectively gained the opportunity to participate in government for the first time. For these reasons, it makes sense to consider this demographic development as a motivator of party change.

The second reason scholars have neglected the Great Migration is because mainstream scholars systematically ignore Black voters. (For an extensive discussion of the absence of Black people in the study of race in American politics, see Harris-Lacewell, 2003). Specifically, scholars have not considered Black voters as an important and drastically changing part of the coalition during the period. Most make the case that Black alignment with the Democratic Party had stabilized by 1936. They frequently focus on the labor and White Liberal lobbies as the most important forces driving party change. Although these groups are vital to the story, they are not the only groups working for change.
I will explain how the Great Migration, along with electoral instability, motivated the Democrats to change their position on civil rights issues between 1948 and 1964 both at the national and sub-national levels. Two ideas shape my conception of the Party’s change. First, electoral outcomes, especially losses, motivate party change. Democrats faced increasing competition in elections during the post-war period. President Truman won the 1948 presidential election by the narrowest margin among Democrats since 1932 and in both 1952 and 1956 Democrats lost their bids for the presidency. Democrats won the 1960 presidential election by one of the smallest margins in American political history. After 1960, the national party was looking for ways to ensure its ability to win.

Second, change generally consists of reshaping party coalitions—even when the change includes some costs. In this instance, the Democrats were a party divided. The Northern wing of the party wanted to move forward on civil rights while the Southern wing fought desperately to maintain states’ rights. With every step towards civil rights, Democrats faced continuing loss of white voters in the South. From 1948-1964, Democrats tried to balance their desire to gain support from Black voters with their desire to maintain control of the South. However, Democrats found it impossible to keep both of these factions happy.

In the 1948 election, Democrats learned that it was possible to win the presidency without wholesale support from the South. As Democratic presidential candidates looked for ways to win beyond 1948, they realized that migrants could helpful in reshaping their coalitions. The new Northern Black voters were a good source of votes because they were often engaging in

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3 Parties may deviate from their currently stated positions on issues under two conditions: 1) the political party experiences a loss and/or 2) the party determines that a change in position would deliver a new or different and meaningful share of the vote. This view of parties is important because it reinforces parties as active bodies, who use their policy positions to shape electorates for their benefit.
politics for the first time. They also lived in very important places for presidential electoral strategy. Further, Black voters’ support for expansion of government powers put them in line with recent Democratic policy shifts toward support for expansion of federal government.

**My Argument**

The Great Migration provided Democrats with the perfect opportunity to maximize on their relationship with Black voters. The influx of Black voters in the North reached its peak just as Democrats experienced electoral challenges in the post-war period. Further, migrants were geographically concentrated in the largest cities of the largest states, and many of them had weak attachments to the major political parties. These factors made migrants important to Democrats at the local and national level. Locally, Democrats courted Black voters with policy changes that were responsive to their needs and supported Black candidates. The national Democratic Party recognized Black voters’ potential impact and sought to harness that power for the national party coalition during the elections of the 1940s-1960s. They responded with executive orders and outreach to Black voters through their party platforms and presidential campaigns.

To the debates in the discipline between elite replacement (Carmines & Stimson, 1989) and coalition management (Karol, 2009; Pearson, Feinstein & Schickler, 2010), we should add the Petrocik (1981) and Andersen (1979) models, which conceptualize change as a response to transformations in the electorate. *I argue that the development of the Democratic Party’s stance on racial issues is an instance of realignment caused by expansion of the electorate and mobilization of a previously inactive population.* While I acknowledge that there are many other factors in the environment that contribute to the party’s change and to Black voters growing affinity for Democrats, my focus here is the impact of the Great Migration. In the following
section, I outline my idea about party change by suggesting that loss motivates change and that other factors constrain the type of change parties undertake.

**Dealing with Electoral Loss**

Parties have the strongest incentive to change their behavior when they lose elections. Like others before me, I assume that electoral victory is the primary goal of political parties (Downs, 1957; Schattschneider, 1960). “Thus all of a party’s actions are aimed at maximizing votes and it treats policies merely as a means toward this end” (Downs, 1957: 35). In other words, “parties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957: 28). Specifically, parties take positions that will allow them to attract a compatible coalition (Karol, 2009). As they work to construct winning coalitions, parties focus on particular groups of voters whose support they believe will be most helpful toward the goal of meeting the institutional requirements necessary for attaining a position.

**Rules Constrain Parties**

Parties decide to change their positions based on losses, but they do not change arbitrarily. The rules of the EC constrain presidential parties and candidates’ behaviors as they choose which states to target and which voters they should seek. Presidential candidates rarely debate the facts of the EC system on the road to the presidency because the requirements for winning the Presidency of the United States are clear. A presidential candidate must earn a majority of votes in order to be elected president. To obtain these votes, a presidential candidate must win the popular vote of the state. However, if no candidate is successful in reaching a majority, the House of Representatives decides the election. Although presidential candidates may like to win

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4 Maine and Nebraska are exceptions. These states distribute their electors by electoral districts where candidates must win the popular vote in the district to take the Electoral College votes for the district.
as many votes as possible, EC strategy is the basis of their approach to winning votes. Parties make changes to their coalitions that further the goal of achieving a majority of votes in the EC.  

Scott James describes this approach in *Presidents, Parties and the State* (2006). He writes,

“political competition for the presidency induces political parties to give disproportionate political attention to those states that hold the balance of power in the Electoral College. Typically, this means making substantive appeals to disaffected groups either within one’s own party, the major-party opposition, or attached to third-party organizations” (15).

The same logic behind the strategic pursuit of votes applies at the local level. Politicians are constrained by the rules of their election. As vote seekers, they take positions and interact with voters in ways that increase the likelihood they will win their elections. Candidates who are running for smaller, more homogeneous seats—ward or council seats, for example—take positions tailored to suit the concerns and desires of that seat. On the other hand, candidates who have to account for larger segments of the population—in citywide elections for example—may moderate their positions to achieve election.

The Democratic Party’s change in the post-war era fits James’s conception of party strategy. Although Black men were granted the right to vote with the 15th amendment and Black women received the right to vote with the 19th amendment, the vast majority of them were not able to exercise that right. When they left the South, more of them were able to participate in politics. Because many of the migrants to the North were participating in politics for the first time, they fit the aforementioned description of a disaffected group. If Black voters were the BOP for elections in the postwar period, it should follow that the Democratic Party would have

\[\text{equation}\]

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5 As Democrats sought to remain competitive, they faced declining shares of the popular vote in presidential elections. Simultaneously, the flood of Black people into the North created an incentive for elites to take liberal positions on race. The recent revisions to the American politics account of this change acknowledge, but do not explore, the connection between the Democratic Party’s losses and this mass migration.
incentive to become more liberal on civil rights as a way to “make substantive appeals” to this voting bloc. In chapters four and five of this work, I show that Black voters were the BOP in many elections.

The size of the Black voting bloc made them important. Adding to their importance was the fact that migrants poured into states that were extremely important to parties as they sought to compete in the EC. Unlike most of the Southern states, participation from a large group of new voters in one of the major cities could sway the outcome of elections in states like Pennsylvania and Illinois. I show that the Great Migration affected politics because Black people often voted as a swing bloc and lived in electorally important places, thereby affecting calculations of presidential campaigns and having the potential to determine the outcome of those states.

Although they were supporting the Democratic Party in presidential elections by 1936, their support for Democrats was not absolute. At the national level, many Black voters returned to the GOP after the FDR and Truman presidencies. At the local level, they demonstrated the ability to differentiate between their support for the party at the national and local levels—often showing support for local parties who were friendly toward their issues and withholding that support when they felt slighted or ignored by a party organization.

*Parties Make Calculations and Seek Similarities*

Parties are especially interested in reaching groups whose ideological positions most closely align with what they are currently doing. For example, the 2012 Republican Party may have pursued Hispanic voters based on their numbers, but they also considered how the political
views of the group would fit with their existing coalition. In terms of this project, the national Democratic Party of the post-war period was aware that Black voters presented a unique opportunity because of their numbers. Moreover, based on their reaction to the New Deal, Democrats also understood that Black voters might be a group who was amenable to the new positions of the party—which increasingly advocated for expansion in the role of the federal government. While Democrats were very concerned to keep hold of their Southern base, they were also working to increase their numbers of Black voters based on their potential importance in the EC and ideological similarities.

**Methods**

**Data**

My methodological approach is primarily historical analysis, with some simple quantitative analysis. My goal is to show how politicians were motivated to modify their behavior based on changes in their electoral fortunes and demographic composition of states. The best way to understand the electoral considerations of political actors during the period of interest is to analyze information they would have used. The goal of recreating the information environment of 1932-1960 led me to four types of information: popular and EC vote totals, media accounts and analyses of politics, census data and archival data. I argue that political actors are most concerned with winning. Therefore, I examine results from immediate past elections using a dataset of all presidential and congressional elections looking at the party’s percentage of the popular vote as well as its standing in the EC over time. To explain changes in

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6 Republicans thought they might be able to connect with Hispanic voters by tailoring their message on a number of issues, including: religion, jobs, housing and immigration reform (after the Republican primary elections).

7 Although I acknowledge that parties have more considerations than electoral math, the major focus of this project is the impact of a large shift in the population. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on the Democratic Party’s strategic, numerical calculations more than it considers the debates between the party’s factions over ideology.
the Black population, I use the *Detailed Characteristics of the Population* section of the U.S. censes from 1930-1970. To get a real-time account of party strategy and reaction to changes in the environment, I used *ProQuest* to find relevant articles in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *Chicago Defender*. Black magazines, specifically *Jet Magazine*, were helpful toward the goal of locating the names and dates served of Black office holders in northern cities. Archival data from the JFK and LBJ presidential libraries provided insight as to the priorities of presidents as they sought to win re-election campaigns. Finally, a large number of secondary sources were helpful to provide supplementary information as well as context for many of the primary sources.

**Period of Interest**

Although the entire history of Democratic Party stability/instability is interesting, my period of interest is 1948 through 1964.¹ My primary reason for choosing this period is two-fold. First, this timeframe is just before the height of the Civil Rights Movement and the universally accepted marriage of the Democratic Party to Black issues. Second, scholars less frequently focus on this important time in the story of party change. Most of the work about the shift in party interactions with Black voters focuses either on the New Deal era (Weiss, 1983; Sitkoff, 1972) or the period between the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1980s (Edsall & Edsall, 1992; Frymer, 1999). The New Deal is a logical focus of analysis because Black voters’ shift to the Democratic Party began during this period. The period after 1965 is also important in understanding this story of party change because Black people began to participate politically in large numbers after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Although these two periods are

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¹ For a thorough examination of this history see: Sundquist (1983); Ware (2006); Black & Black (2002); Leuchtenburg (2007); and Brewer and Stonecash (2010).
very important, and works about them have greatly contributed to our understanding of Black political behavior, the period from 1948-1964 also merits study. Third, this period is the height of the Great Migration and included more people although it is less frequently studied. In sum, these years are important because of the changing environment caused by the Great Migration and because the competition between both parties to secure Black votes is unmatched in American political history.

Each of the chapters has a different focus, as appropriate for its analyses. To measure Democratic decline in chapter two, I begin in 1900 and go through 1960. That period provides sufficient time to demonstrate the downward trend Democrats faced and sets the stage for the central argument in chapter five that Black people were moving into the most electorally important states in large enough numbers to be important to the Democratic Party’s electoral calculus at various levels. The third chapter considers the two waves of the Great Migration, with a specific attention to the second wave—which takes place from the end of World War II through the 1960s. In chapter four, which is focused on local government, I consider 1946-1962. Chapter five, which is about the national impact of the Great Migration, covers 1948-1964.

**Level of Analysis**

The project deals with Black political interactions at the national and sub-national levels. In the national government chapter, my focus is the behavior of presidential parties and candidates because these actors have the greatest ability to shape national party positions on political issues, especially during campaigns. I also recognize the importance of sub-national elections. Democrats at the local level were first to interact with migrants after they left the South. In chapter four, I will argue these grass-roots interactions changed local election officials’ public positions on racial issues before those changes occurred on the national level.
Earlier, I suggested political parties and presidential candidates in the United States must be strategic in their pursuit of votes because they are constrained by the EC system. This makes some places in the nation more important to parties than others. In the second chapter, I focus on the large EC states (henceforth referred to as large EC states) and states with close margins of victory. In chapter five, I consider the nation as a whole, with some attention to regions.

**Regions**

The concept of region is important to this analysis for a few reasons. First, regions provide a lens through which parties may view their national strategy. Second, they are important as a way to understand the movement and political involvement of Black people during the period of interest. Finally, region is important to consider the group of states Black people choose when migrating from the South. In my discussion of migration, South refers to all confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma. North refers to all states outside the South. In the second and fifth chapters, I further separate regions to include Midwest and West. The regional breakdown of the project is depicted in figure 0.1, below.

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9 Kentucky and Oklahoma are included because they were slave territories.
The Balance of Power

The BOP refers to a group of people who have the potential to change the outcome of an election. Because their votes could affect the outcome, parties have to work harder for the vote of a BOP group. In many instances, people recognized the importance of the Black population and referred to them as the BOP. This reference suggests that when the rest of the population divides evenly, Black voters have the potential to determine the outcome of an election if they vote as a bloc. The idea of Black people as the BOP in politics goes back to their entrance into American politics during the reconstruction era. In a speech where he sought to persuade Southerners to unite, Henry Grady said:

“The very worst thing that could happen to the South is to have her white vote divided into factions, and each faction bidding for the negro who holds the balance of power. What is this negro vote? In every Southern State it is considerable, and I fear it is increasing.”

---

The most extensive work on Black voters as the BOP came later from Henry Lee Moon, in his 1948 book *Balance of Power: The Negro Vote*. Moon and the NAACP calculated the balance of power for the 1940 and 1944 elections. Moon, through his work at the NAACP, referred to the Black population as the BOP as a way to persuade political parties and candidates that the Black population should be top priority (and to argue parties should change their positions to appease this very important group of voters).11

People outside the NAACP also argued that Black voters were the BOP. For example, in a Collier’s article about the 1956 election, Theodore White describes the importance of the Black vote in terms of Black voters’ placement in large cities with large EC counts.

“What suddenly draws all political attention to the Negroes in 1956, however, is their phenomenal concentration in the queen cities of five of the biggest voting states of the country: New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan. These states cast 156 electoral votes, or just 110 short of a Presidential majority. And in the great cities of these states, the Negro population percentage runs from a high of 21 per cent in Philadelphia (Mayor Richardson Dilworth unofficially sets it higher, at 25 per cent) through 19 per cent in Detroit, 17 per cent in Chicago, 11 per cent (excluding Puerto Ricans, who represent another 6 per cent) in New York, 11 per cent in Los Angeles.”12

The Black population was particularly important during the post-war period because of their location and because many of them were entering the political world as new participants. One of my goals for this project was to see whether Moon and the NAACP’s logic about Black voters as the BOP holds beyond the 1944 election he analyzed in his book. If Moon and the NAACP were correct in their assertion regarding the BOP in important elections, it makes sense that parties would be overly concerned with pleasing Black voters. In other words, demonstrating

11 W.E.B. DuBois also referred to Black voters as the BOP.
that Black voters were the BOP in elections would strengthen my argument about migration influencing politics.

I adapt Moon’s formula to determine BOP in presidential elections from 1948-1964. In short, Black voters are the balance of power if the number of Black people in the voting age population is greater than the margin of victory in an election.

\[
\text{Blacks} = \text{BOP if } \BVAP > \text{Numerical Margin}^{13}
\]

Where the numerical margin:

\[
\text{NUMERICAL MARGIN} = \frac{(\text{Actual Democratic Vote} + \text{Actual Republican Vote})}{2} + (1) - \frac{\text{Actual number of Republican Votes}}{2}
\]

or

\[
\text{Margin} = \frac{(\text{ADV} + \text{ARV})}{2} + (1) - \text{ARV}
\]

For the numerical margin, I add the actual number of votes for Democrats to the actual number of votes for Republicans. Then, I divided the total of the actual vote counts by two. The result of the first two steps is the total number of votes needed to attain exactly half of the vote of the major parties. Because candidates must attain a majority of the vote plus one (1) vote, I add one (1) to the sum of Democratic and Republican votes. Finally, I subtract the number of Republican votes. The result is a numerical margin by which the Democratic Party won the election. A negative output represents the numerical margin by which the Republicans won the election.

From the 1940s-1960s, the Democrats faced declining vote shares and losses in presidential elections. Therefore, they changed their behavior to focus on large EC states that might be open to supporting their position. They also mobilized a new group of voters who were the BOP in elections—Black migrants.

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13 The numerical margin is adapted from Balance of Power: The Negro Vote by Henry Lee Moon. See page 240, appendix IV.
Outline of the Dissertation

In the first chapter, I review the literature on change in political parties. I begin by describing the conventional account of political change—realignment. Then, I describe realignment as expansion of the electorate and outline other instances of expansions in American politics. Finally, I describe the Great Migration as an instance of expansion of the electorate and propose it is an important part of the story of realignment in the post-war era.

The second chapter describes the Democratic Party’s electoral position from 1900 to 1960, with a focus on 1932 to 1956. My goal in this chapter is to give a broad sense of how the Democrats performed against the Republicans over a long period, leading up to the party’s position change. I propose that the Democrats’ position as a winning party during the 1930s and 1940s was relatively new to them. Upon seeing their newfound success slip away after the New Deal, they were prepared to do anything to get back to winning—including expanding their coalition to align with Black voters.

The Great Migration is the subject of the third chapter. My goal is to help the reader understand the details of this demographic change. Relying on secondary sources, I describe the total migration, with special focus on the second wave of the migration from 1941-1965. The factors that drove migrants out of the South would become important to their view on and expectations of politics when they arrived in the North. Therefore, this chapter also includes information about the stimuli for migrants’ decisions to move, their expectations for northern life and what they found when they arrived.

Chapter four is about the impact of the Great Migration on local politics. My goal is to suggest that Democrats first felt the migrants’ impact at the local level and that their influence bubbled up to the national party over time. I examine five northern cities: Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Philadelphia to show the increasing influence of migrants. For each of
these cities, I establish whether Black voters were the BOP in state and local elections by using census data to estimate the number of Black people in northern cities who might have been eligible to vote—the Black Voting Age Population (BVAP). I then argue that Black voters would have been influential in some local elections by comparing the BVAP to the margin of victory in elections. I confirm their importance in elections through journalistic accounts and secondary sources. I also consider migrants’ influence on the party in terms of their ability to win elected office.

The goal of the fifth chapter is to show that Black voters were also the BOP at the national level and that the presidential wing of the Democratic Party (Democratic Presidents and presidential candidates) recognized them as such. I refer back to census data to show that Black voters were the BOP in some national elections. Through analysis of popular and EC vote counts, I argue there were enough Black voters living in electorally important states to change the outcome of the EC in the 1948 and 1960 elections. Then, using archival documents from the LBJ and JFK presidential libraries, I show that the Democratic Party was actively working to bring Black voters into their coalition through voter registration efforts and by taking liberal policy positions on race.

Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss other relevant cases of demographic change as a motivator of party change. I pay special attention to the growth and location of America’s Hispanic population as a potential motivator of party position change during the 2012 presidential election. I also briefly discuss the potential political impact of the current return migration of Black Americans to the South.
Chapter One: Models of Party Change

There is renewed interest in the study of politics during the post-war and Civil Rights Era. New scholarship questions the traditional accounts of change in the Democratic Party on civil right issues, which asserts that Democratic Party presidents and presidential candidates moved to the Left on racial issues in response to massive protests and demonstrations during the 1960s (McAdam, 1981). To complement this account, keepers of the JFK and LBJ legacies add that these men were deeply affected by the movement’s events and forced to grapple with their moral convictions (Shogan, 2006; Stern, 1992). Kennedy staffers suggest he began to understand fully the situation in the South after watching events unfold on television. Johnson people talk about his stint with poverty and his time teaching poor Mexican children in Texas to suggest these experiences encouraged a deeper connection to all oppressed people, especially Black people during the 1960s (Caro, 2012). These descriptions imply that these actors experienced an emotional connection that led them to support change in their party’s position on racial issues.

In the political science literature, the conventional account of the Democratic Party’s change comes from Carmines and Stimson (1983). They describe the Democratic Party’s development on racial issues using a theory of punctuated equilibrium, where issues evolve slowly then erupt to produce a rapid change. Elite actors are important in this account and they suggest the Democrats’ change on racial issues was largely a function of Congressional membership replacement (Carmines & Stimson, 1989: 63). A large cohort of liberals, newly elected to Congress in 1958 and 1964, supported federal intervention on civil rights issues and pushed for liberal legislation. The result was rapid progress on civil rights issues in the 1960s.

Recent scholarship challenges several parts of the conventional story including the rate, timing, level and motivations for Democratic Party change. Scholars have questioned Carmines
& Stimson’s use of 1963 as a critical moment. They also question the notion that changes on civil rights issues originated at the congressional and presidential levels. Instead of happening at a critical moment in 1963, revisions claim the change was slow, beginning in the 1940s and continuing through the 1960s. They propose that shifts in the party position began at the state-level, and show state party platforms becoming liberal sooner than national party platforms (Feinstein & Schickler, 2008). The recent scholarship also posits coalition management as motivation for party positions on race (Karol, 2009). According to this line of thinking, the labor and White liberal coalitions increased pressure on the Democratic Party at the local level to liberalize their positions on race (Feinstein, Pearson & Schickler, 2010). Republicans, on the other hand, became more conservative on racial issues in an effort to keep their business lobby happy (Karol, 2009).

Although post-Issue Evolution accounts of party change go a long way in clarifying our understanding of an important moment in American politics, they neglect one of the most important factors in this story—demography. None of these works adequately connects changes in the population of American citizens to developments in the major party positions on race. They only include a brief mention of the Great Migration—seemingly out of obligation, rather than true acknowledgement of the migration’s critical importance.14 Understating the demographic transformations brought by the Great Migration is imperative to the story of party development on civil rights issues. These demographic issues warrant scholarly attention because they add nuance to our understanding of party position change on racial issues.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I review the relevant literature on change in American politics, dealing briefly with the realignment literature—which is usually how political

14 Feinstein and Schickler (2008, pg. 20); Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein (2010, pg. 682); Karol (2008, pg. 106)
scientists understand change in political parties. Next, I discuss other instances of party change caused by demographic factors. I will argue that parties are concerned with demographic changes that have the greatest consequence for their ability to win elections—expansion of the electorate. Finally, I show how the Great Migration fits as an instance of demographic factors driving a party to change—in this case expansion of the Black electorate. I will argue that understanding the Great Migration is necessary to explain Democratic Party change from 1948-1964.

**Realignment and Party Change in American Politics**

The concept of realignment has provided the primary vehicle for thinking and writing about change in American politics. Scholars have argued that realignment is critical, secular, some combination of those two, or none of these. In 1955, V.O. Key described a particular type of election,

> “in which voters are, at least from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate” (Key 1955: 4).

In these “critical elections,” the electorate is knowledgeable about issues and participates in the political process at a heightened level. Key’s first conception of important elections has been useful in helping scholars organize and analyze elections. However, critical realignment has fallen out of favor as the best method for describing party change in the contemporary literature (Mayhew, 2002).

The major problem with elaborations on critical realignment is the expectation that large-scale change will occur approximately every 30 years. Burnham articulated this idea, which made sense at the time, in his 1970 work *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. According to his calculations, there had been three “realigning elections:” 1860, 1893 and 1932 and the next would be occurring soon. However, his expectation for a dramatically
realigning election did not happen in the 1970s and many would argue it has not happened since the New Deal. If anything, change in contemporary American political parties has been an example of Key’s other conception of change—secular realignment.

Key’s revised theory (1959) of coalitional change in political parties suggests change may occur gradually over a series of elections. He writes:

“a secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be independent of peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections” (Key 1959: 299).

Under this idea, political parties’ interactions with coalitions drive change. E.E. Schattschneider (1960) similarly describes realignment in terms of coalitions and is concerned with the shifting interests of political parties.

Petrocik (1981) digs deeper into the role of coalitions in realignment. He outlines three types of behavior as realignment: conversion, mobilization and demobilization (31). His theory includes two dimensions of mobilization: one where independent voters develop a new party preference (31) and another where levels of turnout increase (32). Scholars have applied the concept of mobilization to other groups in the electorate. For example, Andersen (1979) demonstrated that what looked like conversion of large numbers of people to the Democratic Party in the 1930s was actually mobilization of immigrants who had not participated in politics previously or did not have strong attachments to either political party. The Democrats registered these “non-immunized”15 individuals to vote, moved them to the polls and benefitted from this expansion of the electorate.

Although conversion has been the most popular way to describe realignment of Black voters, Andersen’s theory of mobilization instead of conversion fits this case well. Conversion

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15 Non-immunized citizens are those without political attachments as a result of not having participated in politics in the past.
makes sense as an explanation for change in the party affiliation of Black voters because most of them participated in politics as Republicans for the first part of the 20th century, and many of those Republicans “converted” to the Democratic Party during the New Deal. However, the Great Migration transported millions of non-immunized citizens to northern cities, and effectively expanded the electorate to include Black people for the first time since Reconstruction. Therefore, what looks like a wholesale defection by the Black electorate can be better understood as an introduction to politics by the Democratic Party for migrants.

*Expansion of the Electorate*

Earlier, I said that parties change in response to loss, and that how they change is constrained by a few factors: the size of a state, the likelihood that a state shares similar ideological positions and the likelihood that it can reshape its coalition to include a group that might share similar ideological dispositions. One of the ways a party can reshape its coalition to include like-minded groups is to capitalize on expansions of the electorate. Expansions occur in two ways: 1) by formal extension of the franchise or 2) by migration. In this section, I discuss other instances of party change caused by expansions of the electorate that have parallels to expansion caused by the Great Migration.

*Expansion Resulting From Formal Extension of the Franchise*

**The 15th Amendment**

The first large-scale expansion of the franchise came between the 1867 Reconstruction Act and passage of the 15th Amendment in 1870—when the constitution changed to give Black men the right to vote. Both parties clearly understood the potential benefits brought by the presence of these new voters. For a variety of reasons, Republicans in the South supported equal rights for Black people. In addition to their moral convictions, Republicans realized Black voters
would be helpful toward the goal of winning elections. For example, Republican Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts made the case for Black manhood suffrage by saying, “you need votes in Connecticut, do you not? There are three thousand fellow-citizens in that state ready at the call of Congress to take their place at the ballot box” (Keyssar, 2000: 94).

Even some Democrats in the South, known as Cooperationists, conceded the benefits of winning Black support and changed their message in an attempt to court the votes of freedmen. They suggested freedmen and Southern Whites were “best friends,” and that they had been “generous masters.” They even went as far as telling Black men to support the Democratic Party because “we have grown up together; some of you have our blood in your veins” (Foner, 1988: 292). However, Black voters would have no part of the Democratic appeal for their votes. They found it impossible to separate Cooperationists, in their roles as politicians, from their pasts as slave owners. On the topic of possible alliance with the Democrats, a freedman spoke up during a political rally for Democrat Herschel V. Johnson saying, “that old ship, the institution of slavery, is dead and I am glad of it. Shall I employ its captain or its manager to bear me through the ocean again?” (Foner, 1988: 293).

**The 19th Amendment**

The next major formal expansion of the electorate came after the passage of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which granted woman suffrage in 1920. Leaders of both parties believed, rightly, that the addition of women voters would change politics and create an opportunity for parties to obtain a new bloc of voters. The parties prepared for this expansion of the electorate before 1920 by creating space for women to participate in the party organizations. The Democrats created a national women’s organization in 1917 and the Republicans followed suit the next year (Harvey, 1998:112). The parties gave women “nominally equal roles in the
party hierarchy” for the purpose of “efficient mobilization of women voters by women leaders” (Andersen, 1996: 81).

Although a system of discrimination persisted for Black men in America, the 19th Amendment brought with it a limited increase in suffrage for Black women. Despite the fact both parties practiced racial segregation in their women’s organizations, they sought to reach a diverse population of women. The parties worked through Black churches and local community organizations to mobilize Black women. Democrats went further, also working with unions and the Catholic Church to organize and mobilize women laborers and immigrants (Harvey, 1998).

Both parties changed their messages in pursuit of women voters. They addressed issues they believed would be most important to women, which were most frequently homemaking and child rearing. In one example of a direct appeal to women, President Warren G. Harding delivered a speech about civil rights and a maternity policy to five thousand women. He intended the speech to “attach them to the Republican Party” (Harvey, 1998:112). During the same campaign, Democrats recruited female campaign speakers and advertised the party’s positions on women’s issues in women’s magazines.

Expansion Resulting from Migration

In addition to formal extension of the franchise, migration can also lead to expansion of the electorate. Migration includes internal migration and immigration. I define internal migration as any movement of voters within the United States. Immigration, on the other hand, is the movement of people to America from another country. Immigration provides a source of new voters to the parties that would not normally be available except through the birth and coming of age of new citizens. From the arrival of the first immigrant groups, parties recognized the
strategic political potential of these new Americans and worked to encourage their participation—or to limit it—based on the party’s perceived benefits.

**Immigrants**

Scholars frequently turn to rainbow theory to explain parties’ interactions with and attempts to mobilize immigrants (Dahl, 1961; Merton, 1968). Rainbow theory argues that parties work to mobilize various groups of ethnic minorities to build a winning coalition. The party organizations rewarded groups by giving them patronage or supporting their bids for elected office. In a critique of rainbow theory, Erie (1988) contrasts this view. He suggests that party machines, which worked to register and mobilize voters in the past, had deteriorated by the 20th century. Parties did not mobilize voters because they had few resources and mobilizing new groups would require them to have, and expend, benefits that did not exist. Further, Erie says machines often worked to suppress votes as a way to maintain their dominance among their existing base.

Rainbow theory is a helpful lens through which to view the parties’ interaction with Black voters. In the analyses of Dahl, Merton and Erie, the reward to loyal voters is patronage. I extend the idea of party rewards and resources to include a party’s ability to give policy (or a change in its position) as a reward to loyal groups of voters. I make the case that the national Democratic Party behaved as a machine party in the post-war era because it rewarded loyal and/or important groups of voters with liberal policies instead of giving them material benefits.

**The Great Migration as Expansion of the Electorate Through Migration**

Scholars acknowledge Black voters as an important bloc in the Democratic coalition. They also acknowledge the Great Migration, but they do not deal with its role in depth. When people do write about the Great Migration, they do not describe it as a case of electorate
expansion or group mobilization. Furthermore, political scientists who are writing about expansion of the electorate and group mobilizations rarely include a discussion of the Great Migration.

This migration is unique because it engages both types of franchise expansion: expansion based on formal requirements and expansion caused by migration. Unlike other groups of movers in American history, migrants already had a formal right to vote. However, they could not exercise their rights. White primaries, Grandfather clauses, violence and a host of other tactics stood between Black voters and ballot boxes. Second, their movement was different from other frequently discussed migrations. Unlike the European immigrants, participants in the Great Migration moved within their home country. Also unlike other instances of internal migration in the United States—namely the migration to the Western territories—migrants were moving between jurisdictions that had equal authority. In other words, they were not leaving territories to go to states or leaving states to go to territories; they moved between equal sub-national jurisdictions. “The move was more than simple migration and change in folkways for Blacks, it was a move, almost literally, from no voting to voting” (Brooks, 1974: 17).

Conclusion

It is obvious that the Great Migration had a tremendous impact on American Politics. However, the literature in the field does not reflect this fact. Although our understanding of Democratic Party change has evolved tremendously, we could improve it by unpacking the significance of the Great Migration as a driver of party change. In what follows, I seek to fill this void by adding a discussion of demographic change to the recent scholarship on Democratic Party development on civil rights issues during the post-war era.
Chapter Two: The National Democratic Situation, 1932-1964

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the political context for the Democratic Party’s position change during in the post-war era. I argue the Democrats’ compromised electoral position in the late 1940s and 1950s, coupled with growth of the Black population through the Great Migration, led them to change their political positions on government involvement in civil rights issues from supporting states’ rights to one of support for federal intervention on behalf of Black people. My analysis examines the downward trends of the Democratic Party in the period leading up to the party’s position change.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Popular Vote, by Percentage 1900-1960
Source: Compiled by the author, Stonecash dataset

This chapter has three parts. First, I describe and analyze the electoral situation of the Democratic Party’s presidential candidates from 1900-1960 (see figure 2, above). Further, I focus on 1932-1956 to provide context for my larger argument that the Democratic Party needed Black voters in their coalition as a part of their EC strategy for the post-war period. Second, I call

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16 This dataset was compiled by Jeffrey Stonecash and includes aggregate presidential results by state, from 1892-2008.
into question the dominance of the New Deal coalition by describing increasingly competitive elections from 1944-1956. My analysis demonstrates that the Democrats experienced losses and narrow margins of victory at the presidential and congressional levels. I argue that the party’s sustained electoral uncertainty contributed to their willingness to change policy positions on civil rights during this period. Third, I consider the constraints posed by the Democratic Party’s need to win the EC. I find that Democrats faced special challenges in the states with the highest EC delegations, and that where the Democrats did win, they won by small margins. These narrow victories left them feeling the pressure to fortify their electoral chances outside the South, especially in large EC states, where they stood to gain the most.

**How do States Become Important?**

Because candidates’ foremost goal is winning, parties devise strategies to make the EC rules work in their favor. Therefore, we should expect that presidential candidates and political parties would be constrained by their desire to reach the required majority in the EC.

*Figure 2.2: How States Become Important*

![Diagram](image)

In this chapter, I argue that states that met two criteria were most important to the Democratic Party from 1932-1960. Specifically, states with large EC vote shares and states where the vote margin in the last election was +/- five points. First, candidates consider the overall size of the EC vote of a state. Because the goal is to achieve majority, states with many
EC votes become more important than states with few EC votes. Second, candidates consider their likelihood of winning a state. They base decisions about a state’s viability on data collected from past electoral contests, feedback from local party officials, media coverage and polling data. The greatest potential to change the electoral situation comes from states with large EC numbers and small margins of victory, where candidates stand a chance to win.

**Democratic Electoral College Vote**

As previously stated, I argue that large EC states\(^{17}\) were more important to the Democratic Party during the period of interest than other states. Based on this logic, the seven states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, California, Texas and Michigan—meet this criterion from 1932-1960. Together, these states controlled approximately 38 percent\(^{18}\) of the nation’s EC votes during the period of interest. They controlled between 76-77 percent\(^{19}\) of the EC majority/votes needed to win. I base my analysis of party strategy on the idea that candidates who secure most of these large states would only need the EC votes of a few other states to achieve majority.

**Table 2.1: Electoral College votes in Large EC States, 1932-1956**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1948</th>
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<th>1956</th>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>TX</td>
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<td></td>
<td>166</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>202</td>
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<td>131</td>
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<td>149</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>205</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) Where large is defined as 19 votes or more.

\(^{18}\) 202 votes from 1932-1948 and 205 votes from 1952-1960

\(^{19}\) 76.08 percent from 1936-149; 77.21 percent from 1952-1952; 76.35 in 1960
In investigating the Democratic Party electoral position in these states, I find the party did well during the 1932-1944 campaigns but faced increasingly competitive odds in the EC thereafter. By 1948, Republicans had the same number of EC votes in high EC states as Democrats. The Democratic Party was unable to earn any EC votes in large EC states during the elections of 1952 and 1956. Connecting these total losses back to my original argument—that parties change their positions in response to electoral losses—it should follow that the Democratic Party sought to change its strategy to win voters in these states for the elections of the 1960s. See Table 2.1, above.

*The Development of the Democratic Party from 1932-1956*

**Franklin D. Roosevelt- 1932**

The Republican Party experienced success for 12 years before the New Deal during a time of economic prosperity in America. However, when the Great Depression was most harsh in the early 1930s, congressional elections revealed the first signs of an impending Democratic victory in the next presidential election (Brewer & Stonecash, 2008). The American electorate voted the Republican Party out of the White House in 1932 and FDR became President with 63 percent of the popular vote and 472 votes in the EC.

FDR won in 44 states. He carried six of the seven large EC states—all except Pennsylvania, where he lost by less than three points. There were six states-in-play during this election—DE, CT, NH, NJ, OH and MA. Of these, three (CT, NH and DE) were lost by small margins. FDR’s greatest margins of victory were in the South. He won Alabama, Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Arkansas with 70 percent or more of the
popular vote. In other parts of the South, FDR won by margins that were decisive but not as large—FL 49.5%; NC, 40.6%; VA, 38.4%; TN, 34.%; MD, 25.5%; KY, 18.4.²¹

1936

By the 1936 campaign, the New Deal was in full swing, and motivated by outside forces, FDR moved Left on issues (Brewer & Stonecash, 2009: 74).²² Scholars attribute the increase in support for the New Deal to the success of the federal government’s intervention, which stimulated the economy (Luechtenburg, 2006). Consequently, FDR increased his share of the popular vote for 1936 to 65 percent and won 523 of 531 EC votes. The President only lost in two states, repeating the loss of Maine and picking up a new loss in Vermont. However, FDR was able to bring New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Nebraska and Connecticut into the Democratic column after having lost them in the previous election. Like 1932, the most decisive victories were in the South.

1940

The strength of the New Deal is well documented among political scientists and historians. However, the electoral challenges faced by the New Deal coalition after its high point in 1936 are less frequently discussed. The 1940 election was the beginning of a downward trend in Democratic Party fortunes that lasted throughout the 1940s. This decline eventually led to electoral losses in the 1950s and created tremendous uncertainty for the 1960s. Roosevelt’s popular vote majority declined for the first time, by six points to 59 percent, in the 1940 election. Roosevelt’s share of the EC vote declined from 523 votes in the previous election to 449. The

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²¹ He also won 70 percent of the vote in Wyoming.
²² Places where the margin was more than five but ten or less: Michigan, 8%; West Virginia, 10%; Kansas, 9.5%.
²²¹ 1) Supreme Court invalidation of his New Deal policies, 2) differences of opinion with the business community and 3) the influence of other political actors (Coughlin, Long and Townsend).
1940 election was also the first time, between 1935-1960, the Republican Party earned more of the popular vote in any region than the Democrats, with 52 percent of the vote in the Midwest. Although the popular vote margin in the Midwest did not translate into EC success for the Republicans in 1940, it was the beginning of an extremely competitive trend in the midwestern states.

**1944**

The Democratic Party was increasingly concerned about its vice presidential candidate because the sitting Vice President, Henry Wallace lacked support among party regulars during the previous campaign (Milkis, 1993). There was also concern about FDR’s declining health. Though FDR’s health improved before the national convention, leaders of the Democratic Party understood that the 1944 vice presidential candidate stood a real chance of becoming President of the United States of America. Thus, Roosevelt and the national party operatives settled on Harry S. Truman “a moderate from a border state,” as the President’s running mate (Milkis, 1992: 150).

Although the Roosevelt/Truman ticket experienced declining shares of the popular vote in all regions—they were able to win the election in 1944 with 57 percent of the popular vote. Roosevelt’s share of the EC vote also dropped from 449 to 435 votes. A new Republican candidate, Thomas Dewey, got 41 percent of the popular vote and 96 EC votes. For the second election in a row, the GOP won a majority of the popular vote in the Midwest.

**Harry S. Truman- 1948**

In April of 1945, FDR died at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia and Harry S. Truman became the President of the United States through an involuntary act of constitutional law.
Truman served nearly an entire term of office because FDR’s term started only three months earlier in January of 1945. After President Roosevelt’s death, the Democrats worked to balance the diverse interests of the New Deal coalition and mourn the death of one of the most popular presidents in U.S. history.

Between his succession and the election of 1948, Truman and his advisors worked to figure out how he could secure the presidency in his own right (Sitkoff, 1971). In a strategy designed to expand his coalition, Truman’s advisers suggested he appeal to Black voters because they believed Southern voters would be loyal to the Democratic Party regardless of changes in its positions. Further, they realized they needed support from other parts of the country to win the presidency. In response to this advice, Truman took liberal positions on issues related to race (I discuss these issues at length in chapter 5). However, contrary to his advisors hopes, Truman’s posturing made Democrats in the South furious. Also problematic was the fact two third-party candidates ran against him, further stressing his need to get votes outside of the South.

By November of 1948, it seemed certain that the Democrats would lose. However, Harry Truman won the presidency by a plurality of 48 percent, the lowest popular vote percentage since the Democrats took office in 1932. Again, the Democrats’ share of the EC dropped again from 439 to 304 of the available 531 EC votes, with Republicans earning 189 votes and Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond earning 38. Republicans won 41 percent of the popular vote and third-party candidates won 10 percent of the popular vote.

There were 20 states in play during the election of 1948, which further demonstrates that Truman barely won the election. Many of the close states were in the Midwest and West. Maryland and Delaware departed from the rest of the South, which remained Democratic in its behavior and voted for the GOP.
Aldai Stevenson- 1952 & 1956

By 1952, it was clear that Harry Truman did not have enough support in the party to win re-nomination (Leuchtenburg, 2006). It was also clear that Truman favored Aldai Stevenson for the Democratic nomination.23 Truman recruited the Illinois governor to run, believing he had the best shot at retaining the presidency for the Democratic Party. As the President’s top pick, Stevenson inherited some of South’s distrust of Truman. Southern Democratic leaders encouraged Democrats to vote against their party through a “Democrats for Eisenhower” movement (Leuchtenburg, 2006: 221).

Moderate Republicanism also presented challenges for the Democratic Party by the 1950s (Ware, 2006: 187). In 1952 and 1956, Democratic Party candidate Adlai Stevenson lost to Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower. The 1952 loss was the Democrat’s first presidential campaign loss in 20 years. Democrats’ share of the popular vote continued falling from previous years down to 44 percent. On the other hand, the GOP’s share of the popular vote increased to 55 percent. In the EC, Democrats earned only 92 votes compared to the Republicans’ 439 votes. Democrats experienced real competition in the South when Eisenhower won Florida, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia (Black & Black, 2002).

The Democratic Party experienced loss again in 1956, despite changing the vice presidential candidate. Their share of the popular vote decreased further to 42 percent, the lowest point since 1924, while the Republicans maintained 55 percent of the popular vote. The Democrats earned 77 votes in the EC, and Republicans increased their vote share from the previous year to 454 EC votes.

Regional Popular Vote Analysis

Based on the decline in their position, Democrats should have been seeking new coalition partners for the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections. In the previous section, I considered the national position of the Democratic Party to show that their position was steadily deteriorating. In this section, I consider election returns at the regional level to see whether there was a decline across the nation or whether Democrats were struggling in a particular region, which led to their national problems. Figure 2.3 (below) illustrates the downward trend in Democratic popular vote percentages during the period of interest, by region. At the beginning of the period, Democrats drew most of their strength from the South. By the end of the period, most Democratic support came from the North. Declining Democratic support helped the Party know that they needed to look to places other than the South as the foundation of their support.

Figure 2.3: Democratic Vote Percentage, by Region 1932-1956
Source: Compiled by Author from Stonecash dataset

As I mentioned previously, the Democrats reached their lowest level of support in all regions during the 1948 election. The candidacies of Henry Wallace on the Left and Strom

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24 This dataset was compiled by Jeffrey Stonecash and includes aggregate presidential results by state, from 1892-2008.
Thurmond on the Right siphoned votes from both the liberal and Southern conservative wings of the party. The impact of Wallace’s campaign was minimal, but Thurmond’s campaign strongly affected the Democratic Party by taking more than 1.1 million popular votes and 39 EC votes.

In the North, Democrats began the period just below 50 percent in 1932 and were able to increase their popular vote percentages until the 1940 campaign. After 1940, the Democratic share of the popular vote in the North decreased until it reached a low of 37 percent in 1956. By 1940, Democrats lost their footing in the Midwest and the Republican Party was able to win a majority of the popular vote for the 1940 and 1944 elections. The Democrats were able to regain their position in the region by the 1948 election when they won the popular vote by less than one percentage point. However, the Democratic Party experienced the greatest decline in popular vote percentages in the Western region. After the New Deal apex of 1936, the Democratic share of the popular vote in that region decreased steadily from a high of 68 percent in 1936 to a low of 42 percent in 1956.

**Regional EC Vote Analysis**

By 1940, the party experienced a drop in the percentage of EC votes earned in each region, but the decline began in the Midwest earlier than in other regions—starting in 1936. The Midwestern decline lasted through 1944 and the Democrats gained a larger percentage of the EC vote in that region during the 1948 campaign. The West also showed a decline in the percentage of EC votes won by the Democrats starting in 1940, although the party recovered in that region for the next election. Democrats maintained a steady percentage of the EC vote in the West through 1948. By 1952, the Democratic percentage of the EC vote in all states dropped dramatically, resulting in a Democratic loss. The Democrats did not recover from their losses in the EC for the 1956 election. See Figure 2.4, below.
Yet, another way to consider the electoral situation of the Democratic Party during the period of interest is through the party’s performance in Congress. Overall, the Democrats were successful in the House of Representatives during the period of interest. They controlled the chamber for all but two congresses: the 80\textsuperscript{th} from 1947-1949 and the 83\textsuperscript{rd} from 1953-1955.

The Democrats maintained a supermajority of support in Southern states from 1932-1956. Outside the South, most of the Democratic support in the House came from the West where the party maintained a majority for most of the period. The situation was more complicated in the North and Midwest. In the North, Democrats earned less than a majority of votes between 1938 and 1956. The situation was worse in the Midwest where the Democratic Party did not attain a majority of votes in the House at any time during the period of interest.

\textit{Looking Forward to 1960}

\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{25} This dataset was compiled by Jeffrey Stonecash and includes aggregate presidential results by state, from 1892-2008.
By the time of the 1960 election, the ability of the Democratic Party to win the presidential election was highly uncertain. There was some optimism, based on the success of the congressional Democratic Party during the 1958 campaign and an economic downturn in 1958 also provided some hope the party might be able to regain the presidency.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I established that the Democratic Party faced a precarious electoral situation at the presidential level from 1932 through 1956. I argue that this uncertainty led the party to change its positions on issues to attract voters in states in play that had large EC vote counts. Further, I asserted that Democrats would work especially hard to court voters in large urban areas of states with high EC counts. In the next chapter, I describe the movement of Black people from Southern rural areas to Northern and Midwestern urban areas. I will argue that their migration to these places made them attractive coalition partners and was a necessary condition for the Democratic Party’s development of racial positions during the post-war era.
Chapter Three: The Great Migration

The Great Migration—movement of millions of Black people from the South to the North—is one of the most important events of American history. The mass exodus of Black people out of the South would eventually change the American landscape and set into motion one of the most profound developments in recent American history, the Civil Rights Movement. Wilkerson (2010) aptly puts this migration into context writing “this mass relocation would come to dwarf the California Gold Rush of the 1850s with its one hundred thousand participants and the Dust Bowl migration of some three hundred thousand people from Oklahoma and Arkansas to California in the 1930s” (p. 10).

It is important to consider the Great Migration because it affected politicians’ electoral calculus and also because it extended benefits to the movers. Migrants left a region where it was often difficult to vote and settled in places where they faced fewer overt challenges to their participation. The Democratic Party was aware of the changes in Northern constituencies. Mirroring Party behavior at the local level in the North, the national Democratic Party recognized the importance of Black voters and (changed their behavior) to win Black votes.

In the previous chapter, I established that Democrats faced competitive elections and that conditions were ripe for them to seek new coalition partners. In this chapter, I describe the details of the migration. I discuss: 1) when and how the migration occurred, 2) the factors that stimulated migration, 3) the type of person who was most likely to participate in migration and 4) the number of people who moved and how their movement changed the composition of states.

Waves of Migration

Scholars debate the exact start and end of the Great Migration. However, most agree that the Great Migration occurred in two waves, as prompted by World Wars and changes in the
agricultural economy (Gregory, 2005; Johnson and Campbell, 1981; Scott, 1920; Spear, 1967). The first wave occurred from about 1915 until 1920, and the second was from 1940-1965.

During the first wave of migration, boll weevil ravaged Southern farms, destroying crops and making it harder for farmers to recover from the losses caused by market forces. In 1915, Northern industrial labor agents entered the state of Florida looking for individuals who were willing to relocate to Pennsylvania for work (Scott, 1920: 38; Johnson & Campbell: 72). Once it became clear to Black Southerners that opportunities for work were available outside the South, they started moving on their own and the use of labor agents decreased. Eventually, the Great Depression slowed the migration to a virtual halt as opportunities for work disappeared.

The second wave began in 1941 at the start of America’s involvement in World War II and lasted through the 1960s. Scholars estimate that 6.5 million Black people left the South during the migration with five million of them leaving after 1940 (Lemann, 1991).

It would be wrong to suggest that one of these migrations was more important because they affected the Black community and the nation in different ways. Although sociologists and historians tend to focus on the first wave of migration, the second wave is equally important and warrants consideration. I have chosen to focus on the second wave because a larger number of people left the South during that time.

The second wave of the Great Migration is important to the story of change in the Democratic Party because it coincides with the beginning of the long civil rights movement (Hall, 2005: 1240). Politically, migrants would have been an increasingly important consideration of the Democratic Party because of their movement to very populous cities and states, because of their large numbers and because Black people who were already in the North were already beginning to align with the Democratic Party.
Changing Populations in the North

From the nation’s founding through the mid-twentieth century, most of the Black people in America resided in the South. However, the Black population moved throughout the nation rapidly from World War II onward. Whereas 68 percent of America’s Black population resided in the South in 1950, only 53 percent was living in the South by 1970.

Over the course of the 20th century, the number of Black people living outside the South increased dramatically in the large, industrial cities and states. The growth in the percentage of Black voters in Northern states provides insight into the growing political power of the Black community. Table 3.1 below indicates the change in percentage of Black voters as a portion of the total electorate, which ranges from an increase of three percent on the low end in Pennsylvania to an increase of seven percent in New York.

### Table 3.1: Increase in Percentage of Black Voters in Five States, 1930-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proportion of Black people living in the South decreased dramatically over time. At the beginning of the second wave in 1940, approximately 24 percent of the Southern population was Black but that number decreased to 19 percent by the end of the second wave in 1970 (Johnson & Campbell, 1981: 125 & 154). The distribution of Black people in the nation shows a similar pattern.

Why Migrate?
Black people migrated for a variety of reasons. Economic conditions throughout the nation had an important effect on decisions to move (Holley, 2000; Marks, 1989; Scott, 1920). The most revolutionary change in the production of cotton since the cotton gin, the mechanical cotton picker, all but eliminated the need for human labor in the industry in the 1940s. The result was a region that no longer needed Black labor and was hostile toward Black people. Even without developments in agricultural technology, Black laborers in the South were considering ways to attain higher wages and better standards of living. “Most of the migrants were not pushed out by mechanical cotton pickers; they were pulled out in a search for better economic opportunities… they were trying to escape the hard work and low pay associated with Southern cotton fields” (Holley, 2003: 283).

Beyond the economic differences between regions, there were the social, educational and political benefits of living outside the South. In Northern metropolitan areas, Black people could indulge in the luxuries of middle class American life. Although there were some challenges and limits to their assimilation outside Black neighborhoods, within their local communities they could often purchase homes and join civic organizations. They could be a part of substantially sized, upwardly mobile communities of similar individuals—which was different from any type of community they might find in the South, even in the urban areas (Johnson and Campbell, 1981: 145). Northern life also meant educational opportunities for the children of migrants. By contrast, many southern schools lacked resources and maintained abbreviated school calendars so children could work in the fields (Johnson and Campbell, 1981: 109).

Some of the reasons for migration were political—having to do with their desire to exercise the full rights of American citizenship (Woodson, 1970). Another important aspect of Northern life was the ability to participate in the political process. As opposed to their situation
in the South where participation in politics was difficult, in many instances migrants in the North were registered to vote and participated in larger percentages than their white neighbors. The Great Migration is the only instance in American history where a group of American citizens had to leave their homes in one region before they could meaningfully participate in the political process.

Furthermore, many of the reasons they moved were moral—having to do with their sense of fairness, justice and the way they deserved to be treated (Painter; 1977; Wilkerson, 2010). Above all else, migrants hoped their move would bring them a greater degree of freedom and absence of violence and discrimination in their everyday lives (Marks, 1989).26

**Where Did They Migrate?**

For most migrants, the first stop in the journey northward was an urban area in the South. Cities like Memphis, Birmingham, Jacksonville and Atlanta were home to many of the migrants immediately after they left their farming communities (Marks, 1989: 3; Gregory, 2005). Although the economic opportunities presented by urban areas of the South were better than those of farm life, they could not compare to the promises of the North. Migrants who chose to go further north moved up from their Southern starting points in parallel streams (Ciment; 2007; Gregory, 2005; Johnson & Campbell, 1991; Scott, 1920). See figure 3.1, below.

Those leaving Florida, Georgia and the Carolinas went to states along the mid-Atlantic and eastern coast. Many settled in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh), New York (New York City and Buffalo) and New Jersey (Newark, Paterson and Jersey City). Those migrants

26 Although understanding what drove Black people to leave the South is important, coming to consensus on the scholarly debate about push/pull factors is of secondary concern to this work. Most important for the context of this work is that Black people did decide to leave the South in large numbers and their decision had a profound impact on the political environment both locally and nationally.
leaving parts of the South that were further inland migrated to cities that were also further inland. The residents of Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee often went to Illinois (Chicago and East St. Louis), Missouri (St. Louis), Ohio (Cleveland) and Michigan (Detroit). Migrants who lived in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas were most likely to relocate to California (Los Angeles, Oakland and Richmond) (Johnson & Campbell, 1981: 116; Scott, 1920: 55; Gregory, 2009).

Figure 3.1: Streams of Movement in the Great Migration

Who Migrated?

The type of people who participated in the migration is important because it impacted the composition of the electorate. Overall, there were more male migrants than females (Marks, 1989: 36). However, women were over-represented in the population of migrants who moved to
the Northeast and more women moved during the second wave than did during the first (Johnson & Campbell, 1981; Gregory, 2009).  

The average age of the migrants was 20-25 during the second wave of migration. Therefore, most would have been newly eligible to vote at the time of their move. Although many young people left the South in search of work and liberty, most likely to move was the so-called talented tenth—which included the college educated or highly skilled segment of the Black population (Woodson, 1970: 147). The talented tenth included young people who moved to attend private northern colleges and chose not to return or they attended college in the South and decided to relocate to the North when they graduated. Soldiers returning from war migrated in a similar pattern. After military service, many who were born in the South found it difficult to return to their inferior “place” in the Southern social system and chose to live in the North. Based on their socio-economic status, this talented-tenth portion of the population would have been most likely to register and turnout to vote.

**How Did They Migrate?**

**Leaderless Movement**

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27 I think it is important to note that women actively supported migration, even when they could not move, by taking jobs as domestic workers to support their families while male migrants were away. They also frequently took responsibility for younger members of their extended families when both parents decided to move and send for children later (see: Marks, page 45. See also: Hine, D. C. (1991) “Black Migration to the Urban Midwest: The Gender Dimension, 1915-1945” in ed., Joe William Trotter Jr., *The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender* (pp. 127-146) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

28 The idea of the talented tenth originated with Henry Lyman Morehouse, founder of Morehouse College, who thought liberal arts education should be available for “exceptional” Black people. He posited that for every ten Black people, there will be one among them who is exceptional and deserving of a liberal arts education. In his own words “The tenth man, with superior natural endowments, symmetrically trained and highly developed, may become a mightier influence, a greater inspiration to others than all the other nine, or nine times nine like them.” (for more on Morehouse see: Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks (1994) *Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880 – 1920.* Harvard University Press. Cambridge. W.E.B. Dubois made the idea of the talented tenth popular in an essay where he suggests that the race will be “saved by its exceptional men.” From the time of Dubois’ writing until now, many in the Black community have referred to other Black Americans who are of the professional class as the talented tenth.
Scholars attribute the leadership of the initial northbound movements of Black people to Harriett Tubman and the abolitionists of the Underground Railroad, Henry Adams of Louisiana, and Benjamin “Pap” Singleton of Tennessee. However, for the rest of the Great Migration there was no authoritative source in the community working to encourage migrants to leave the South; it was a leaderless movement (Painter, 1977; Wilkerson, 2010). Migration was mostly an individual decision, made by a young person who decided to try making it on her/his own in the North or made by a husband and wife who decided one of them would go North and send for the rest of the family when possible (Scott 1920; Marks 1989). Various methods of communication worked together to drive northward migration.

**Word of Mouth**

Discussions within Southern communities, communication with friends in the North and encouragement from the Black press helped stimulate migration. News from the North, through letters from those who were already gone, recruitment ads from employers, and organizations seeking to help migrants transition, served as the best advertisement for life in the region. Migrants described how they were able to find work, what their living conditions were like and how Northerners treated them (Marks, 1989: 25; Scott, 1920; 34). Churches, civic organization meetings, barbershops and beauty salons in the South were hotbeds of conversation and discussion about whether it was a good idea to go North. Sometimes there was division on the issue. Some advocated staying in the South near family and maintaining the Black community, while others argued that migration was necessary for progress of the race (Scott, 1920; Goodwin, 1990).

**Black Press**
The Black press also played a powerful role in encouraging migration. *The Chicago Defender*, which was read throughout Black America—especially in the South—was most important; the paper was often a very aggressive advocate for migration. For example, in 1917, *The Defender* called for a “Great Northern Drive” to occur on May 15, 1917 and encouraged those who were considering a move to go North on that date (Scott, 1920). *The Defender* was also a source of information for potential migrants. People interested in moving to the North wrote to *The Defender* for various types of information about where they might be able to work or live. An example of a typical letter from a migrant is included below:

Dear Sir: In reading a copy of *The Chicago Defender*…if I get in touch with you, you would assist me in getting employment. I am not employed. I [live on] the Florida East coast. R. R. Service [or] road way department[…]anything in working line myself [and] friends would be more than glad to do so and would highly appreciate it the very best we can advise where we can get work to do, fairly good wages. [A]so is it possible that we could get transportation to the destination. We are working men with families. Please answer at once. I am your esteem. We are not particular about the electric lights and all I want is fairly good wages and steady work. Jacksonville, Florida, 4-25-17 (Goodwin, 1990: 13)

**What Happened When They Arrived?**

In spite of all the stress they encountered through their moves from South to North, migrants found time to be concerned about politics. Along with having a job, political involvement and voter registration were hallmarks of success in the North. Black voter registration and turnout levels matched the White population and, as previously mentioned, in some instances, were even greater (Wilson, 1960: 39; see also: Gosnell, 1967 and Moon, 1948).

Although voter registration was a top priority for many, getting involved with the political process was a challenge for some. Difficulty finding a stable residence sometimes made it hard for migrants to meet eligibility requirements for registration. They were not included in the process in places that did not have well-organized local party systems. On the other hand, migrants in cities with party machines were able to register and participate with an ease unknown
to them in the South. In Chicago, for example, Democrats met registrants at train stations or paid visits to their homes shortly after they resettled (Marks, 1989; Wilkerson, 2010).

[Democrats] went door-to-door to talk up the New Deal and register people. They asked about kids and jobs and convinced [migrants] that the Democrats in the North were different from those in the South. They printed up party slates and passed out palm cards—political crib notes that would fit in the palm of the hand—so people would know who to vote for when they got inside the booth (Wilkerson, 2010: 304).

In addition to shaping their participation, a migrant’s choice of residence also shaped their first party affiliation. Migrants usually aligned with dominant political machines in the cities. They participated as Democrats in cities with a strong Democratic presence, like New York and Chicago, and they participated as Republicans in places like Philadelphia where the Republican Party was dominant. Although migrants’ standing as U.S. citizens and tendencies to vote as a bloc could be beneficial to local political organizations, their desire to participate was met with varying levels of resistance that ranged from ignoring the new residents to diminishing their influence through vote busting schemes (Erie, 1990).²⁹

The next chapter focuses on the political impact of Black voters in five cities. I will argue that Black voters were important at the local level and that their importance eventually translated to the national level.

²⁹ Citizenship was helpful to separate migrants from immigrants, who had to gain citizenship before they could participate in politics.
Chapter Four: Local Balance of Power, 1948-1962

Scholars often take a macro/national approach when analyzing the role of Black voters in the Democratic Party. However, before this influence occurred at the national level, they had a strong impact on their local political environments.

As discussed previously, Southern migrants were potentially important to the political parties because they settled in states whose population totals and locations had the potential to decide the outcome of the EC. When the rest of the population is divided in its support for a candidate, Black voters tendency to vote as a bloc, and willingness to vote for either political party made them the BOP in many elections. In other words, Black voters were the swing vote in many local and state elections.

This new position as the BOP in elections made them an important consideration of both parties. They became increasingly important as migration multiplied their numbers in urban areas of the North, and increased the likelihood they would be elected to public office. Between their strength in numbers and increasing election to office, Black voters were able to influence sub-national politicians—especially Democrats—to take liberal positions on civil rights before partisans at the national level.

My argument in this chapter is that local Democratic Party organizations changed their positions on civil rights issues in response to the growth of the Black population in the North. As the party sought to strengthen its electoral standing, they worked to court, register and mobilize Black voters by taking positions that would be attractive to this newly emerging bloc. In other words, the Democrats’ shift in position on civil rights issues was as much a reaction to the changing demographic context of post-war America as it was a reaction to changes in political
attitudes, the double V campaign\textsuperscript{30}, or pressure from the civil rights movement. Ultimately, the importance of Black voters at the local level drove efforts to make migrants a part of the national Democratic Party coalition.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I discuss the local demographic impact of the Great Migration through a BOP argument and demonstrate the numerical importance of the BVAP. I show that Black voters were able to affect the outcome of some key local elections from 1946-1962.\textsuperscript{31} Second, I describe migrant interactions with local parties in five cities: Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Philadelphia. These cities are important to my work because they were home to a large number of migrants during the period of interest. Further, the Democratic Party strategy of accumulating EC votes in big states heightened the importance of these cities in national politics. I describe the characteristics of each city in Table 3.1, below.

Table 4.1- Governmental and Political Structures in Five Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Party System</th>
<th>Government Type</th>
<th>Election Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong-Mayor/Council</td>
<td>Ward Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Reform, Weak Mayor/ Council</td>
<td>City Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Reform, Weak Mayor/ Council</td>
<td>Ward Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong-Mayor/Council</td>
<td>Ward Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong-Mayor/Council</td>
<td>Ward Based</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, I show the growing strength of the Black electorate by discussing their increasing involvement in the parties through their election to office and participation in local party

\textsuperscript{30} The double V campaign was an effort by Black service members who argued they were fighting for victory on two fronts during World War II—at home against racism and abroad for democracy. Some scholars suggest one of the motivations for changes in race policy in America was that American leaders did not want to be embarrassed by enemies in the war who called them hypocrites for treating their own citizens so poorly.

\textsuperscript{31} I choose to focus on the years 1946-1962 because I want to capture the impact of voters who moved to cities during the second wave of migration. Because the second wave began in 1941, I assume a sufficient number of migrants would have moved and become eligible to participate in local politics by 1946. I end the period at 1962 to remain consistent between chapters. Later, I will argue that presidential candidates JFK and LBJ were concerned about Black migration because it had the potential to affect their chances of winning the Presidency. I assume that national party leaders understood the potential importance of Black voters to the Democratic Party before the 1964 election.
apparatuses. I hope to illustrate a relationship between the number of Black voters, the margin of victory in elections, and the likelihood that local party leaders were sympathetic to Black concerns.

In addition to limited discussion of the Great Migration in the revised understandings of post-war politics, there is little attention to Black politics on the ground in cities and states. Where scholars do consider local politics, their primary concern is often analysis of parties as machines (Erie, 1988) or the development of liberal positions on specific (e.g. housing, fair employment, or public accommodations) policies in cities (Grimshaw, 1992; Sugrue, 1996; Sonenshein, 1993; Lewinson, 1974; Countryman, 2006). If we accept revisions to conventional explanations of party change—that change was slow moving and began at the local, state and congressional levels—then we should unpack the reasons politicians would choose to alter their positions. It is not enough to say parties changed to meet the demands of their coalitions. Who were the individuals and groups in these coalitions? What made their level of influence grow to the point where party leaders felt compelled to articulate the positions of the coalition?

Understanding the relationship between sub-national politics and party position change on civil rights is important to understanding this period for at least two reasons. First, the effects of the Great Migration on the political environment in states and localities gave Black people their strength as coalition partners, capable of demanding change, from their strength in numbers. Their willingness to vote for either party made them a swing constituency and compounded their strength. Therefore, a direct relationship between a local politician’s willingness to take racially liberal positions and an increase in the number of migrants in a location is plausible. Second, the EC’s placement of power in particular states contributed to the importance of Black voters
because they migrated to strategically important states.\textsuperscript{32} Black voting behavior in states and large cities became an important calculation of the national parties as migration continued because of the potential consequences for the EC.

\textit{Expectations}

My goal in this chapter is to show that the growth of the Black population in Northern cities and states was an impetus for position change in the Democratic Party. To show the relationship between migration and party position change, I measure the growth of Black influence in localities. I define influence as: 1) Black voters’ status as the BOP in an election and 2) Black candidates’ ability to win elective office.

First, I measure Black voters’ position as the BOP in elections from 1946-1962. I focus on mayoral and U.S. Senate elections to provide a sense of Black voters’ importance at municipal and statewide levels. I expect that Black voters’ BOP position will depend on the level of analysis. White communities frequently used housing covenants to limit Black people to small, densely populated parts of the central cities. Although this kind of discrimination was wrong—and later deemed unconstitutional—it created a source of political power for Black people in some Northern cities and states. Accordingly, I expect to observe that Black voters will be the BOP in small districts (e.g. ward based, congressional, or state legislative) but that they will not hold the same position in statewide contests. I also expect their influence as a bloc increased as their numbers grew in cities. In other words, it is more likely they were the BOP at the end of the period than at the beginning because by the 1960s, larger numbers of Black people were living in the North. Where Black voters are the BOP, we are more likely to observe local politicians changing their positions to gain their support.

\textsuperscript{32} I further discuss the connection between the EC and Black voters in the next chapter.
Second, I measure the number of Black elected officials in the five cities of interest, with the expectation that Black voters would be inclined to vote for Black politicians—who they believed would best represent their interests—and that the number of Black elected officials increased along with the number of Black voters in cities. I consider Black voters’ ability to attain elected office as a proxy for their growing political influence in cities. In accounting for Black elected officials, I chose to focus on election to local municipal positions and state legislatures. Analyzing municipal posts should make clear the strength (or lack of strength) of Black voters at the local level. I included state legislatures because the literature suggests policy change on civil rights began at the state legislative level (Chen, 2006; Pearson, Schickler, Feinstein, 2010). I expect that states with large Black delegations will lead the pack on civil rights legislation.33

**Balance of Power in Great Migration Cities**

**Calculating the Balance of Power in Local Politics**

I defined the BOP as a BVAP that is equal to or greater than the margin of victory in a given election. Data about the exact number of Black voters registered in states and localities is unavailable before 1965.34 To approximate, I used the *Detailed Characteristics of the Population* section from the 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses to construct a dataset of population information for Black voters in each state from 1946-1962.

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33 I would have liked to consider balance of power in congressional races. However, state data about the number of Black voters in each congressional district is unavailable before 1963.

34 The NAACP has some estimates for larger cities. However, they do not make clear how they obtained their information. In most cases, the other information about the number of Black voters registered in cities or state legislative districts is derived by estimating the number of people registered in predominantly Black precincts.
To estimate how many migrants had the ability to vote or participate in politics, I included all people classified as Negro, age 20 and older—also referred to as the BVAP. Figure 4.1, below, depicts the BVAP in the five cities. I gathered the same information for the total number of voters in the population, regardless of race—henceforth referred to as TVAP. Figure 4.2 shows Black voters as a percentage of the TVAP.

Figure 4.1: Growth of the Estimated Black Voting Age Population by Thousands, 1940-1970
Source: U.S. Census (1940-1970) Detailed Characteristics of the Population

To simulate the normal participation patterns in elections, I compared the entire BVAP, two-thirds of the BVAP, and one-half of the BVAP to the total population. The rationale behind these numbers was threefold. First, as previously mentioned, a party does not need the entire vote of a group for that group to have a positive, important impact on an election. Parties are looking for enough voters to get to their “win number” and understand this will mean drawing on more than one group of people. Second, analyzing a smaller portion of the population than the total allows for analysis of imperfect data about the number of Black people

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35 Although the voting age was 21 until 1976, I have included all persons age 20 and older because this is how the census presents the information; the census breaks ages down into five-year increments. I use voting age population as a proxy for the number of Black people with the potential to register and vote because most states did not keep track of race in voter registration data during the period of interest. Because we do not have official voter registration based on race, it is difficult to say with absolute certainty what would happen with Black voters in an election before that election occurred.
in a city who were registered to vote and/or turned out to vote. I estimated the number of persons who were registered to vote in the BVAP at 67 percent. Finally, to account for the fact that fewer than the total number of registered voters turns out to the polls on Election Day, I analyze the BVAP at 50 percent.³⁶

Figure 4.2: Black Voting Age Population as a Percentage of the Total Voting Age Population, 1940-1960.  

Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes

In determining whether a group was the BOP, the margin of victory is important because it tells us how many votes could change the outcome of the election. However, the margin of victory is not the only important part of understanding how groups of voters affect elections. Parties must also consider that obtaining an electoral majority will require support from more than one group. Therefore, any group that is a sizable portion of the margin of victory should be important to a party for its potential to add to the party’s win number—even if the size of a group

³⁶ Although we might expect different rates of voting among Black people of this period because the history of disenfranchisement, scholars find that migrants to Northern cities were more likely to register to vote than counterparts of their race who were already living in the North or Whites who lived in the North (Wilson, 1960; Gosnell, 1967; Gregory, 2005). Of Black voters in Chicago during the 1944 presidential election, Grimshaw (1992) writes, “black turnout increased by 4 percent, from an already extraordinarily high 91 percent in 1940 to a phenomenal 95 percent” (p. 53). Considering this account, my estimate of 50 percent is very conservative. However, I have chosen this figure because Chicago’s registration and participation are frequently described as an anomaly and because similar information is not available for all of the electoral contests under consideration.
is not enough to win or change the outcome of the election outright. Beyond the sheer size of a group, parties must also consider the costs and benefits of constructing a new coalition. The party’s strategy—either to stay the same or to court new groups—has consequences. If a party remains the same, it may forgo the benefits of incorporating a new group. However, adding new members to the group’s existing coalition might create tension or resistance among current coalition members. The Democratic Party of the post-war period had to weigh the costs and benefits of incorporating Black voters into their coalition.

For Black voters to be worth the risks to the Democratic Party in the North during the post-war period—and positively affect the party’s electoral calculus—there needed to be enough of them in an area they could reasonably and substantially contribute to the party’s win number or to the construction of a viable electoral majority. I assume parties will be particularly concerned with trying to meet the needs of Black voters in cities when those voters had the ability to swing the election. In the next section, I will analyze election returns under the expectations I described earlier in the chapter.

*Were Black Voters the Balance of Power in Cities?*

There were 25 mayoral contests from 1946-1962 in the five cities under consideration. When considering all cities, Black voters were the balance of power in mayoral elections on 20 of the 25 occasions—80 percent of the time. When I adjusted the BVAP to simulate probable registration levels and turnout, Black voters were the BOP on 16 and 12 occasions, respectively. Those totals appear in Table 4.2, below.
Table 4.2: Balance of Power in Elections
Note: Calculated by comparing the BVAP to the margin of victory in elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mayoral Elections</th>
<th>U.S. Senate Elections</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Probable Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 of 25 elections (80%)</td>
<td>16 of 25 elections (64%)</td>
<td>12 of 25 elections (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 of 33 elections (67%)</td>
<td>17 of 33 elections (51%)</td>
<td>13 of 33 elections (39%)</td>
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In senate elections, Black voters were the BOP in 22 of the 33 electoral contests (67% of elections) for the five states under consideration between 1946 and 1962. When I adjust the BVAP for likely voter registration and turnout, they were the BOP in 17 and 13 elections of the 33 under consideration. Black voters’ position as the BOP in elections varies over time and by city, with some places having enough Black voters to overcome the margin of victory on most occasions and others rarely having enough Black people to be the BOP. In the next section, I discuss the variations in Black voters’ position as the BOP and their ability to win elected office in the cities and states of interest.

The Great Migration and Local Parties

Chicago

Chicago is important to understanding the politics of the Great Migration as a city steeped in machine politics. Along with New York, it provides the opportunity to study how machines interacted with migrants. Chicago was home to a relatively powerful Black sub-machine from the 1920s until the collapse of the Daley machine in the 1970s (Grimshaw, 1992; Walton, 1972). The city’s strong party tradition and system of ward-based representation led to greater representation of Black people in elected office than in the other Great Migration cities.

The first Black migrants to Chicago came soon after the Civil War. Many thought of the city as a “mecca” for those wishing to migrate (Johnson and Campbell, 1981: 65). Migration to Chicago increased rapidly as Southerners moved for work in the war industries during World
War I. The rate of movement into the city increased tremendously during World War II. From 1940-1960, the number of Black people in Chicago rose from 277,731 to 812,836—an increase of 535,105 or 192 percent. As a percentage of the total population, the number of Black people in the city grew from 8.18 percent in 1940 to 22.89 percent in 1960. The BVAP percentage also increased between 1940 and 1960; during those 20 years, it increased from 8 to 19.6 percent.

Black people were active in Chicago politics well before the 1940s. They first participated as Republicans, electing Edward Wright as ward committeeman for the second ward in 1920 and Oscar DePreist to Congress in 1929. The masses of Black voters did not begin voting for Democrats at the local level until the 1939 election. However, their relationship to the Democratic Party became unstable in the 1940s as Black voters observed differences in the party at the local and presidential levels. When local Democrats deviated from the national party’s racially liberal lead, Black voters showed their disappointment by withholding support for the local Democratic machine. Their disapproval was evidenced by decreased Black support for Democratic mayoral candidates (Grimshaw, 1992: 57).

**Balance of Power in Local Elections**

Three Democrats served as mayor of Chicago from 1946-1962: Edward Kelly, from 1933-1947; Martin Kennelly, from 1947 to 1955; and Richard Daley from 1955 onward. There were five mayoral elections during the period of interest. Black voters were the BOP in three of the five mayoral elections. They could have been very important coalition partners in three elections: the 1951 election of Martin Kennelly and Richard Daley’s 1955 and 1963 election. Their position as the BOP holds when I adjust for voter registration and likely turnout.

Although the data suggest Martin Kennelly could have benefited from a coalition with Black voters for his 1951 election, history shows he did not. He barely got a majority of the vote.
in the predominantly Black precincts. During his tenure as mayor, he took several positions on
race that made him unacceptable to the Black community. Kennelly’s stance on racial issues,
which were vastly different than the national party, cost Chicago Democrats the support of Black
voters at the local level—even as the city’s Black voters were supporting the Democrats in
presidential elections.

During Richard Daley’s first campaign in 1955, Black voters’ interactions with the local
Democratic Party improved. Partly in reaction to the machine’s decision not to slate Kennelly
again, they gave Daley and the party overwhelming majorities of their support. Their support
extended to Dailey’s second election.

Black voters’ importance to the Daley victory of 1963 was widely reported.37

“Tuesday’s election saw nine predominantly Negro wards account for 77 percent
of Mayor Elect Richard Daley’s 127,199 margin of victory. Five central
Southside wards the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 20th, accounted for a 49,363 edge. The
16th ward (Englewood) gave Daley a 5,840 margin and three Westside wards, the
24th, 27th and 28th, accounted for 42,473 of the bulge.”38

Daley responded by increasing the number of Black people appointed to chairmanships in
the city council (Grimshaw, 1992: 106).

Black voters were less powerful as a statewide constituency in Illinois between 1946 and
1962. In the six senatorial contests during the period of interest, Black voters were the BOP five
times. When accounting for likely voter registration, the BVAP was more than the margin of
victory on two out of six occasions. The BOP only holds in one election after considering likely

turnout as well as likely voter registration—the 1962 contest that produced Republican Everett Dirksen.\(^{39}\)

**Election of Black Candidates to Office**

Black people served on Chicago’s city council beginning with the 1915 election of Oscar DePreist. As the population increased, so did the number of Black elected representatives. Between 1946 and 1962, seven Black men won election to city council (Archibald J. Carey, Sidney Jones, Claude Holman, Ben Lewis, Kenneth Campbell, Robert Miller and William Harvey). By 1959, six of them were serving together on the city council.\(^{40}\)

In summary, Chicago was an early destination for migrants, which led to earlier political involvement by Black people. During my period of interest, the Black population nearly tripled and they were the BOP in three of five mayoral elections. The local Democratic Party was responsive to the Black community through the Black sub-machine and Black elected officials.

**Detroit**

During World War II, Detroit was home to many defense industries. “Sixty thousand Black migrants moved [to Detroit] in the first few years of the war” because of increasing access

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\(^{39}\) Dirksen went on to author the 1964 Civil Rights Act.


JET magazine April 21, 1955 page 7.


to work provided by the federal Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) and anti-discrimination laws (Sugrue, 2008: 66). Further, Henry Ford’s willingness to hire Black workers and “promise of five dollars a day reached black and white workers in the South” and helped stimulate their movement to the Motor City (Thomas, 1992:24). In 1940, Detroit’s Black population was 149,119, a number doubled to 300,506 by 1950 and tripled to 482,223 by 1960— for a total increase of 333,104 (233%) over the span of 20 years. Black people accounted for 9.17 percent of the VAP in 1940. Because of normal population growth, continued in-migration and White flight, their percentage of Detroit’s TVAP was 25.4 percent by 1960.

Detroit’s city charter called for non-partisan elections and a council-mayor system of government. Along with Los Angeles, Detroit had a weaker party system than the other Great Migration cities considered here. The city’s electorate was highly fragmented—with many diverse opinions about the best structure for city government and different approaches to the treatment of Black citizens. However, mayors with conservative racial ideologies successfully retained control of “the Northernmost Southern city” until the 1960s (Sugrue, 2008: 132).

**Black Voters as the Balance of Power**

Four men served as Detroit’s mayor between 1946 and 1962: (D) Eugene Van Antwerp (1948-1950); (R) Albert Cobo (1950-1957); (R) Louis Miriani (1957-1962); and (D) Jerome Cavanagh (1962-1970). There were six mayoral elections during the period of interest and Detroit’s BVAP was the BOP on four out of the six occasions—even when adjusting the population by two-thirds and by half. Black voters could have been an important factor in the elections of Eugene Van Antwerp, Albert Cobo (elected twice) and Jerome Cavanagh. Media reports detail the importance of Black voters and organizations in the 1961 election of Cavanagh.

41 The city had biennial elections until 1953, when the city charter changed the term to four years.
Despite a history of conservative mayors, there were many liberal residents of Detroit. Liberal groups—Black people, White liberal sympathizers, labor leaders and civic organizations—had not been able to translate their beliefs into electoral victory during the 1940s and 1950s. Even when it seemed conservatives would likely be defeated in elections, they were able to remain in power because union workers were often willing to vote against their economic interests for the sake of maintaining segregated neighborhoods. For example, despite the fact the United Auto Workers organized George Edwards’s 1949 campaign for mayor, the incumbent Albert Cobo won in many White, working class precincts (Sugrue, 1996).42

Mayors Cobo and Miriani used race and housing as wedge issues in their bids for mayor. With improvement of central Detroit as his stated goal, Albert Cobo supported an aggressive slum clearance and highway construction program, whose effect was construction of a highway through the Black community and removal of the residents without alternatives for housing (Sugrue, 2000: 48). Louis Miriani became mayor in 1957 after Albert Cobo died of a heart attack. Later that year, he won election to office in his own right. Miriani was more conservative than Cobo on racial issues. Through his anti-crime plan, he dramatically increased police presence in Black neighborhoods. “During the first forty-eight hours of the crackdown, Detroit police arrested more than six hundred people” and many of them were arrested without legitimate cause for suspicion (Turrini, 1999: 12). Miriani began to change his stance on racial issues once it became clear Black voters were a potentially important swing vote in local elections (Sugrue, 1996). Although conservative mayors of the 1940s and 1950s found enough support to win and maintain elected office, by the 1960s it was becoming clear that they would need to branch out if they expected to maintain power in city government.

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42 Cobo was re-elected to office two more times in 1951 and 1953.
The liberal coalition’s fortunes changed along with the composition of the city in the 1960s. By then, nearly one-third of Detroit’s total population was Black. Black organizations like the NAACP, the Trade Union Leadership Organization (TCLU) and the Detroit Cotillion Club organized alongside the Black community at-large to support a liberal candidate for mayor—Jerome Cavanagh. His election was both a referendum from the Black community on the incumbent Miriani’s heavy-handed stance in law enforcement and a show of support for Cavanagh’s liberal positions on civil rights issues. In response to the outpouring of support from the Black community, Cavanagh increased the number of Black employees at City Hall and appointed a new police commissioner who was well accepted by the Black community (Turrni, 1999:15).

On the statewide level, Black voters were the BOP six times in the seven United States Senate elections during the period of interest. They persisted as the BOP even after estimating for voter registration and turnout.

**Election of Black Candidates to Office**

As political science theories would predict, because of the city’s at-large election type and weak party system, Black representation on Detroit’s nine-member Common Council proved difficult to come by for Detroit’s Black residents. Throughout the period of interest, William T. Patrick was the only Black elected official in the city’s legislative body. Before him, Charles Diggs, Jr. ran for a position on the council but failed to win enough votes to obtain a seat.

The challenges of running in a non-partisan, city-wide election are evidenced by the fact Black politicians in Michigan had more success in attaining positions in the state legislature and United States Congress, where the districts are narrowly defined. For example, Charles Diggs, Jr.

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changed his approach and ran for a seat in the Michigan state legislature. He won election to the state Senate in 1951 and then to the Congress in 1955.

Detroit’s migration was shaped by its access to jobs in the defense industry, and its Black population tripled between 1940-1960. I found that Black voters in Detroit were the BOP in most elections, but their position did not translate into political power until the 1960s. However, when the party became responsive, it did so through Mayoral candidate James Canavaugh.

*Los Angeles*

Black migration to Los Angeles occurred later than it did for the other Great Migration cities—with the start of WWII instead of during WWI. Migrants to California moved for work in the defense industries where opportunities were plentiful as a result of the 1942 Executive Order 9066, which confined Japanese immigrants to internment camps and created a severe labor shortage (Jones, et. al., 2008). Thousands of southerners moved to California to fill the void and “took jobs in the shipbuilding and airframe industries” (Flamming, 2001: 292). Before internment, the census only recorded 63,774 Black people in Los Angeles. By 1950, the Black population increased by 167 percent to 170,880 and the Black percentage of the city’s population grew from 4.2 to 8.7 percent. The number of Black people in Los Angeles continued to grow between 1950 and 1960 to 334,763—13 percent of the city’s population, five times the original population. In fact, Los Angeles had the largest growth rate among Black people of any city between 1940 and 1970—a 1,046 percent increase (Sides, 2003: 218). This massive growth of the Black population created problems in race relations for the residents of Los Angeles that would have a tremendous impact on local politics.

Local politics in Los Angeles was conservative, reform oriented, and non-partisan. These factors led to a weak party system, which presented challenges for migrants as they sought to
become involved in the political process. “There were no political party organizations to recruit precinct captains and mobilize minority voters” (Sonenshein, 1993: 33). As we should expect in this setting (Erie, 1988), local elected officials initially chose to ignore Black voters rather than incorporate them because their numbers were too small to influence political outcomes. Local politicians were more concerned with economic development and reform than civil rights issues like providing protections from discrimination in housing and employment to Black residents of Los Angeles.

Black Voters as the Balance of Power

Four men served as Los Angeles’s mayor from 1946 to 1962: (R) Fletcher Bowron (1949-1953); (R) C. Norris Poulson (1953-1961); and (D) Samuel Yorty (1961-1973). There were four mayoral elections in Los Angeles from 1946-1962. The total BVAP was greater than the margin of victory in Los Angeles on four out of five occasions. Los Angeles had more variation after adjustments to the BVAP than other cities. When I adjusted the BVAP to estimate registration rates, Black voters were only the BOP on three occasions. The frequency dropped to two out of five occasions when considering likely turnout. Based on these numbers, it is safe to say Black voters would have been an important consideration in the 1953 election of C. Norris Poulson and the 1961 election of Samuel Yorty. In 1953, Norris was running for mayor against the incumbent, Fletcher Bowron. The margin of victory in that election was 34,898 and the BVAP was 112,780.

In the next decade, the growth of Los Angeles’s Black community would prove important to local politics in mayoral and city council contests. By 1961, large numbers of Black people had settled in Los Angeles and were in a good position to participate in the election—the total Black VAP was 203,597. The California Eagle, Los Angeles’ most prominent Black newspaper,
encouraged Black voters to defy the Democratic establishment and be the swing vote in the 1961 mayoral election (Sonenshein, 1993: 39). Yorty won the election by a margin of 15,725 votes while running against a Republican and without support from the Democratic Party. From the three Black wards of Los Angeles, Yorty earned 20,587 votes. As a result, the new mayor and other observers “attributed his victory to minority support” (Sides, 2003: 155; Sonenshein, 1993: 39). Owing his victory to Black voters, Yorty increased the number of African Americans on the mayor’s staff and on city commissions (Sonenshein, 1993: 39).

In statewide contests, California is different from the other cities in this study because Black voters did not hold the BOP—even when considering the entire BVAP—in any U.S. Senate contest. The findings that Black voters were less frequently the BOP in California elections make sense for two reasons. First, the Black population in the state was not a large, or critical, percentage of the total population until the mid-1960s. Second, California Senate elections had very large margins of victory. The margin of victory in these contests ranged from 260,906 in 1946 to 727,644 in the 1962 contest.

**Election of Black Candidates to Office**

Like the tide of Black migration, Black voters’ ability to hold municipal office in Los Angeles also came later than it did in other cities. Although other Great Migration cities had achieved Black representation by the 1920s and 1930s, Los Angeles did not have representation at the municipal level until 1963 (Sides, 2003: 157). There were several barriers to office holding for Black people in Los Angeles. The first and greatest hurdle was lack of a strong party organization and gerrymandering by current elected officials. Los Angeles had 15 large city

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44 Yorty continued to enjoy support from the Black community until he refused to support the candidacy of Tom Bradley for city council in 1969. Subsequently, Bradley defeated him in the mayoral contest of 1973.

45 These numbers exclude the 1952 special contest of William Knowland, who won by a margin of 3,440,178 votes.
council districts and White politicians worked to divide the Black vote among the White districts of Los Angeles. Eventually, to finally make an impact, minority communities worked together because “everybody who was different from the white conservative mode was excluded [from politics]” (Sonenshein, 1993).

Second, the Black community of Los Angeles struggled to organize because it was more geographically scattered than Black communities in other states. Housing covenants from the 1920s confined Black people to a few discontinuous parts of Los Angeles. Initially, the growing Black population of the city did not generate concern among the White community—their neighborhoods were far enough away from Black communities that the groups did not interact frequently. However, tensions between the races began to flare after the city experienced a tremendous boom in its Black population during the second wave of the Great Migration. By the 1960s, the number of Black people in Los Angeles became noticeable as the traditionally Black parts of the city became over-crowded.

At the local level, a change in the reapportionment process allowed an opportunity for Black people to attain municipal office in 1963. Tom Bradley, Billy Mills and Gilbert Lindsay were elected to city council positions, representing the mostly Black eighth, ninth, and tenth city districts for the 1963-1967 term (Sonenshein, 1993: 44).

Although Black voters were unable to achieve municipal office until the 1960s, they had been serving at the state assembly since 1918. The first Black assemblyman from Los Angeles—Frederick Roberts—served for 16 years as a Republican. During this time he worked for civil rights legislation. In 1934, Augustus Hawkins replaced Roberts as the Democratic assemblyman from the Black area of Los Angeles. In 1959, William Rumford was elected from Berkley and

the California assembly had two Black assemblymen serving together. They worked together with Phillip Burton, a White liberal from San Francisco, for civil rights legislation. In the 1959 session, they helped secure passage of,

“a fair employment act, which established a California FEPC; the Unruh Act, updated civil rights legislation that increased the minimum fine for racial discrimination in public places; and a rather weak act prohibiting racial discrimination in public housing, named after Hawkins” (Flamming 2001: 298).

In 1962, Mervyn Dymally and F. Douglas Ferell—both Black men elected from the Los Angeles area—won seats in the state assembly, which meant there were now three Black men serving the state of California in its assembly. In the first part of their term, the legislature passed the Rumford Housing Act in 1963, which strengthened the Hawkins public housing bill of 1959.

California migration picked up in the late 1950s and 1960—almost doubling within that decade. As California’s population grew, so did its number of Black elected officials and the Democrats’ responsiveness. By the 1960s, migrants had greater representation in city hall and achieved passage of civil rights legislation from the state assembly.

New York

New York has been home to the largest number of Black people living outside the South since the Great Migration began. During the first wave of the migration, migrants settled in Harlem. The first major increase in the Black population was indicated in the 1930 census, when their numbers doubled—going from 198,483 to 412,814. The number of Black people in New York continued to grow tremendously after WWII; there was a net population increase of 346,970 between 1940 and 1950. Also during that decade, Black New Yorkers began to reside in

47 Augustus Hawkins was elected to Congress from a district created for him in Los Angeles.
areas outside Harlem, specifically Brooklyn and the Bronx (Lewinson, 1974). By 1960, there were 1,087,931 Black people in New York City—almost 14 percent of the total population.

**Black Voters as the Balance of Power**

The city charter of New York called for a strong-mayor council type of government. New York City was a machine-dominated city, with a strong party system. The Democratic Party’s Tammany Hall was the most powerful organization in local politics. From 1946-1962, three men served as mayor: (D) William O’Dwyer (1946-1950); (Experience) Vincent Impellitteri (1950-1953); and (D) Robert Wagner (1953-1965). There were five mayoral elections in New York from 1946 to 1962 with these elections showing variation in the relationship between the margin of victory and the BVAP. On three of five occasions, Black voters were the BOP. When I adjusted for voter registration and likely voters, the BVAP was only larger than the margin of victory on one occasion—in the contest between Vincent Impellitteri and Ferdinan Pecora. Impellitteri ascended to the position of mayor after William O’Dwyer vacated the seat to become ambassador to Mexico. In the election to fill O’Dwyer’s seat, the Democratic Party supported Ferdinand Pecora because they did not believe Impellitteri was fit to serve as mayor. Impellitteri won the election by a margin of 225,824. After accounting for likely turnout (half of the total BVAP), there were 262,163 available Black votes—more than enough to change the outcome of the election. However, other than appointing a Black person to the position of deputy commissioner of the police department and slating a Black candidate for borough president of Manhattan, Impellitteri ignored the Black community. He paid little attention to the Black

community’s appeals for justice after racially motivated misconduct by the police department in two separate incidents (Biondi, 2003). 49

There were six U.S. Senatorial elections in New York during the period of interest and Black voters were the BOP five times. After considering likely registration, the BVAP was larger than the margin on four occasions and on two occasions after considering likely turnout.

Election of Black Candidates to Office

Between 1946 and 1962, Black residents of New York struggled to achieve elected positions in the Democratic establishment. New York City was different from other large centers of the population—for example Detroit and Chicago—where migrants were concentrated in a central location under the control of one machine and one political/geographic jurisdiction. New York’s migrants’ ability to participate and hold office became complicated as the growing Black population began to spread across boroughs because each borough had a separate political apparatus (Biondi, 2003: 208). Politicians created gerrymandered districts to reduce the likelihood that Black people were elected to office from the predominantly Black areas of Harlem and Brooklyn. Early on, the best Black politicos could hope for was a position in the Black sub-machine. These posts were either appointed by the White area leader or by the machine-appointed Black community leaders (Bondi, 2003; Lewinson, 1974; Walton, 1972).

Black New Yorkers’ initial response to exclusion from power in the party was to find other ways to impact the political system. Black voters were mobilized by third parties and independent organizations like the American Labor Party (ALP), the Communist Party (CP), the


Harlem Affairs Committee (HAC) and citizen’s aid committees like Bedford-Stuyvesant Political League (BSPL). Although Black third-party candidates for local office were not successful in their campaigns for various positions, their vote shares were notable. For example, Ada B. Jackson ran for a citywide seat on the Brooklyn city council and garnered 23 percent of the vote in her election in 1947 (Biondi, 2003: 51). She lost to the Republican candidate for the office, but the Democratic Party noticed her ability to get votes and they slated a Black candidate for that State Assembly seat in the next election. Later, in a 1949 campaign for Manhattan borough president, ALP candidate Ewart Guiner earned 100,000 votes—38 percent of the total (Biondi, 2003: 211-212).

Eventually, even though the large Black population was not enough to constitute the BOP in most elections, migrants’ willingness to run as third party candidates motivated the Democratic Party to finally respond to pleas for Black representation within the machine (Ali, 2008). By 1964, four Black people had been elected as Democrats to the city council.

**Philadelphia**

Migration to Philadelphia began earlier than it did in other cities. From 1914-1916, labor agents for the Pennsylvania and Erie railroad companies went to Florida in search of men to work on railroads and maintain roads (Scott, 1920). Eventually, their recruitment efforts spread to stimulate migration from states throughout the Southeast. From the 1910s onward, the number of migrants to Philadelphia increased steadily until labor shortages led to a spike in the population during World War II. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of Black people in Philadelphia grew by nearly 50 percent from 250,880 to 375,570. The proportion of Black people in the city’s population climbed to 26 percent by 1960. There was a corresponding increase in the BVAP in the city—it grew from 12 percent in 1940 to 23 percent in 1960. As
Philadelphia’s population changed, parties adapted by taking divergent positions on issues and seeking different types of voters to serve as their bases.

**Black Voters as the Balance of Power**

Philadelphia had two city charters during the period of interest. The first charter ceded power to political parties and machines while the second, enacted in 1951, gave more power to the city’s mayor and created a more professional municipal office. There were five mayoral contests during the period of interest and five men served as mayor of Philadelphia between 1946 and 1962: (R) Bernard Samuel, 1941-1952; (D) Joseph Clark, 1952-1956; (D) Richardson Dilworth, 1956-1962; and (D) James Tate 1962-1977. When considering the entire BVAP, there were more potential Black voters than the margin of victory in every municipal election. Considering likely registrants, the BVAP is more than the margin of victory on four of five occasions. When accounting for those who likely voted, the BVAP is more than the margin of victory on two of five occasions. Therefore, Black voters could have been the BOP in the 1951 election of Joseph Clark and the 1962 election of James Tate. Particularly interesting is the 1951 election, where the Democrats gained control of city government for the first time in 50 years and Black voters turned out in large numbers to vote for Clark (Countryman, 2006: 46).

Until the 1940s, the Durham and Vare Republican machines controlled local politics in Philadelphia. Two-party competition for votes in Philadelphia pushed local parties to opposite sides of the political spectrum on racial issues. The first time race played a major role in Philadelphia politics was the 1943 re-election campaign of Bernard Samuel, who served from 1941 until 1951 and was the last of the Vare organization mayors. Republicans took a conservative stance on race, using it as a wedge issue to garner the support of White, working class citizens—who were chiefly concerned about possible integration of their neighborhoods,
schools and work places. To win white votes, local Republicans campaigned on promises to keep their neighborhoods and work places segregated and “safe” from Black people. The Democrats, with Black voters and labor organizations as their base, took liberal positions on race. They worked to earn Black votes by supporting public housing initiatives and fair treatment for Black employees of Philadelphia industries. During WWII and the post-war period, the parties’ differences on these issues played most prominently during mayoral campaigns.

When speaking to White audiences during that campaign, Samuel and the Republican Party attacked the Democratic candidate, William Bullitt, on his support for Black people and interests. In their interactions with the Black community, Republicans used previously published work by Bullitt to suggest he “hates all colored people and Jews” and uses the word “nigger” (Wolfinger, 2007: 109). Samuel won the election of 1943 and was re-elected again in 1947. By his third term, Philadelphia was changing. Its citizens grew increasingly fed up with machine style politics and Black voters were fighting for fair employment and anti-discrimination legislation.

In 1948, the state legislature, which had been liberal and Democratic for some time, passed a bill to allow a new city charter. Through the work of various organizations, reformers drafted a city charter that established a strong mayor-council form of government and placed a ban on “racial and religious discrimination in city employment, services and contracts.” The charter also specified merit as a requirement for city employment. Voters accepted the Philadelphia municipal charter in 1951. The issues of debate in the lead up to the charter proved a useful frame for the mayoral election that year. Democrats responded to growing weakness in the Republican Party’s position and calls for change in government and by making corruption in
government and support for Black interests central platform points in the 1951 mayoral campaign.

The Black population in Philadelphia continued to grow. By the time Mayor Samuel left office in 1951, Philadelphia’s Black population jumped to 18 percent from 13 percent in 1940. The change in the demography of the city was because of both the migration of Black people from the South and the movement of White families out of the center cities into suburban areas. “Democrats knew that if they could routinely gain two-thirds or more of the black ballots, they needed less than half of the white vote to win” (Wolfinger, 2007: 232). Beyond population differences, the Black electorate was becoming more active in organizations that sought to promote the concerns of Black people by influencing government. Local Democrats in Philadelphia continued to support Black interests in the 1950s and 1960s with support for a Fair Employment Practices Commission as the centerpiece of its strategy.

Black voters were consistently important in Pennsylvania U.S. Senatorial contests. The BVAP was larger than the margin of victory in five of six elections, regardless of adjustments for likely registration and turnout.

**Election of Black Candidates to Office**

The Black community of Philadelphia succeeded in winning election to local office. The progress in enactment of liberal legislation reflects the size of the Black population and the competitive nature of elections in the city and state. As mentioned above, Philadelphia was among the first cities to incorporate non-discrimination clauses into its formal governing structure. Five Black men served on the Philadelphia City Council between 1948 and 1962. The first two, James Irving (1936-1948) and Woodie Armstrong (1948-1952), were Republicans. Following the developments in local politics, related to the city charter, the Black members of
the city commission were members of the Democratic Party: Raymond Alexander (1952-1959); Marshall Shepard (1955-1968); and Thomas McIntosh (1955-1968). Black candidates had greater success in the Pennsylvania state legislature. Twelve Black people, including one woman, served in the state House of Representatives during the period of interest. Despite their progress in state and local politics, Philadelphians did not elect a member of the race to Congress until 1958—following the election of Black Congressmen from Illinois, New York and Michigan.

As previously mentioned, migration to Philadelphia began early; however, Black voters’ ability to impact local politics was constrained by the city charter, which located power in the Republican Party. In Philadelphia, Black folks were elected to the state assembly before they were elected to city offices. The Democratic Party’s responsiveness was related to increases in population and came from the state level instead of the local level. Democrat’s liberal position was also driven by their desire to separate themselves from the Republican Party. They needed Blacks to get in power.

**Conclusion**

I have argued that Black voters affected local politics in the cities where they settled, through their strength in numbers and increasing ability to earn elected office. To support this claim, I estimated the proportion of possible Black voters in Great Migration cities and calculated the extent to which they were likely to influence the outcome of important elections. Considering the total number of people in the BVAP, Black voters were a significant portion of the margin of victory in many mayoral and senatorial elections from 1946-1962. However, when

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I adjust the BVAP to consider possible voter registration and turnout, Black voters were less frequently the BOP. These adjustments are important for a full understanding of the likely impact of Black voters during the period of interest. Even considering the changes after adjustments, it is plausible that the number of Black people in the TVAP was sufficient to encourage local partisans to take positions toward the goal of seeking Black votes.

Black voters were most often the balance of power in Detroit, where their numbers were greater than the margin of victory on four of six occasions. This is an interesting finding because it runs counter to my expectations that liberal politicians would be elected when Black voters are the BOP. Because of the non-partisan election system and cross pressures presented by racial issues, Detroit voters were more likely to elect conservative mayors than their party affiliations might have suggested. In other words, Democratic voters often supported Republicans for office in Detroit, which changed the political calculus of local elections. Detroit’s elections are also different from the other cities in this paper because the margins of victory are much smaller than in other cities. On the other hand, Philadelphia with its competition among parties met my expectations. It produced liberal policies among Democrats earlier and had a decent percentage of Black representation.

Although the numbers of Black people in city populations were growing, so was the likelihood they would be elected to office. By the 1960s—and before the Voting Rights Act—Black people were serving in posts from municipal to congressional levels in all of the Great Migration cities. The likelihood of finding a Black office holder in the city varied over time and varied based on the structure of elections in a city. Chicago, with its large, densely packed Black population, strong party system and ward-based elections experienced the earliest, most consistent Black representation in elected office. On the other hand, Detroit struggled to achieve
municipal representation because of the city’s at-large, non-partisan election type. Los Angeles struggled it lacked a critical mass of Black people until the 1950s. Black voters also faced the challenges of non-partisan systems and district lines drawn to prevent non-white citizens from holding office. Although progress happened differently among the cities, it is clear Black voters increasingly influenced their local communities during the period of interest.

Overall, Black voters’ migration to the North strengthened their ability to affect local elections and was the foundation of party change for Democrats. Among other important developments of the time, careful examination of demographic change brought by the Great Migration is important to understanding party position change on civil rights issues. The increasing presence of Black voters made them important in local politics. Their influence bubbled up to state legislatures and the halls of Congress. Eventually, the national party apparatus began taking note of Black voters’ strength in numbers. The migrants’ impact on national party politics is the subject of the next chapter.
In the previous chapter, I considered the impact of the Great Migration on politics at the local level. I demonstrated that the number of Black people moving to Northern cities was enough to impact local politics in five non-Southern cities. In this chapter, I make the case that Black voters’ importance in politics extended to the national level because Black voters also represented the BOP in important states from 1948-1960. During this time, the national Democratic Party, mirroring party behavior at the local level in the North, recognized the importance of Black voters and changed their positions on civil rights issues in part to win their votes.

In the first part of the chapter, I describe the importance of the Black voting bloc in terms of its national numerical strength from 1948-1960 in five states—California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania. In the second part of the chapter, I describe the Democratic Party’s response to the Great Migration and Black voters’ position as the BOP. I use qualitative methods, including archival data and media analysis, to examine changes in party strategy and policies. First, I focus on the development of liberal positions the party platforms. Then, I consider campaign strategy and describe explicit outreach to Black voters, either through speech, communication with media outlets, or through campaign materials. I observed that the number of

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51 In this chapter, the national party is defined as the President and presidential candidates. One could argue that Congress should be included in a discussion of the national party. However, I have chosen to focus on Presidents and presidential candidates of a party because I believe they have the greatest influence on the direction of the party as a whole. Members of Congress, on the other hand, are foremost concerned with meeting the needs and articulating the positions of their constituencies. Therefore, I include the discussion of Congressional interactions with Black voters in the chapter on local government instead of including it here.

52 I measure Black influence on the Democratic Party in three ways. One, I apply Moon’s (1948) logic to presidential elections and observe whether the number of Black voters in important states was enough to change the outcome of elections. Two, I measure change in Democratic campaign strategy using data from archives and media accounts of the period. I looked to see whether presidential candidates and campaigns were being explicit about their outreach to/strategy around Black voters. Here, I was especially interested in finding changes in the positions or statements of candidates that might have been a reaction to threats by Black leaders that they might not support the party. Three, I consider the Democrats’ policies on race/Black issues. I looked for changes in their platforms and changes in their legislative priorities or executive orders.
potential Black voters grew tremendously in important states during the period of interest and that the Democratic Party platform became increasingly open to liberal ideas over time. Further, the presidential candidates, realizing the importance of Black voters, made race-specific appeals during the period of interest.

**National Numerical Strength**

In chapter three, I showed the growth in the total population of Black migrants.\(^{53}\) In this chapter, I focus on the voting age population of migrants and building on the work of chapter three\(^ {54}\), I argue that how the growth happened is what made Black voters an important target of the Democratic Party. Not only did migrants move to important states, as mentioned in chapter four, they were usually drawn to large urban areas because of potential for work in factories and defense industries. Living in a condensed area increased migrants’ political worth because the outcome of elections in the urban areas often determined the outcome of statewide contests. Further, their concentration in cities made them an easy target of get-out-the-vote or voter registration efforts because campaigns could expend less energy to reach them but benefit greatly from the outreach. In the rest of the section, I describe the growth of the Black population from 1930-1970\(^ {55}\) in five states that absorbed the bulk of migrants and were important to party strategy at the time.

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\(^{53}\) Here, I have specified my reference to migrants as Black because a large number of White people also migrated from the South to the North during the period of interest. However, because Black migrants are the focus of this study, any future reference to migrants should be construed as a reference to Black migrants. For more information on the political and social impact of White migrants, see *Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America* (Gregory, 2005).

\(^{54}\) Chapter three describes the total migrant, and includes a discussion of the factors that encouraged migrants to leave the South.

\(^{55}\) Although my political interest is in 1948-1964, I focus on 1930-1970 in my consideration of the population because this period allows me to sow the change in the population throughout the second wave of the migration. This is especially important for the latter part of the second wave. The population in the North increased dramatically after 1950, and the increase would not show up if I had stopped the analysis at 1960.
Before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the BVAP was effectively limited to the number of Black people living in the North because Black Americans in the South faced a host of legal and extra-legal challenges when attempting to exercise their political rights. Legal barriers included grandfather clauses, literacy tests, white primaries and poll taxes. Grandfather clauses were used by states between 1895 and 1910, and restricted voting to individuals whose grandfather had been able to vote. This practice eliminated the ability to vote for anyone who was a descendant of a slave, which was most of the Black population at that time. Southern states used literacy tests until the 1960s. These tests required potential voters to read and satisfactorily interpret complex documents that ranged from passages of the constitution to advanced academic writing. Beyond that, the potential voter passed based on the subjective assessment of the test administrator. Southern Democrats used white primaries to exclude Black voters from primary elections from 1900-1960. Because the Democratic Party dominated in the South, exclusion from
primaries meant Black voters had no real say in who eventually held political office.\textsuperscript{56} Poll taxes required potential voters to pay a fee to vote. This type of tax existed until the 24\textsuperscript{th} Amendment to the Constitution passed in 1964.

Extra-legal barriers to voting were intimidation and violence. Some white employers told their Black employees they could lose their jobs if they tried to vote. In other instances, white people in a community might stop conducting business with a Black person if they attempted to vote. In terms of violence, many Black people who attempted to vote were beaten, jailed, or even killed.

The Great Migration changed the potential of the BVAP by increasing the number of potential voters who could exercise their right to vote. For example, although the total BVAP in 1930 was 6.8 million, the Northern BVAP was only 1.9 million. Approximately 4.9 million Black voters were shut out of the process just by virtue of their residence in the South. The situation was much different by 1970, when more than half of the country’s Black people were living outside the South. Even without the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the electoral situation would have been much different than it was in 1930 because of the migration. Instead of having the vast majority of Black voters excluded from the process, the tables would be turned in the other direction, with slightly more Black voters being able to participate than not.\textsuperscript{57} Figure 5.2 below depicts this change in the distribution and political power of this population as well as the overall growth in the BVAP for these five states from 1930-1970.

\textsuperscript{56} Democrats greatly outnumbered Republicans in most of the South. Therefore, the winner of the general election was usually a Democrat. The primary election was most important because the winning Democrat, who would go on to defeat the Republican by virtue of having a larger number of supporters in the population, was chosen during the primary from among the field of other Democratic candidates. In other words, the person who was going to win the general election was the person who won the Democratic primary.

\textsuperscript{57} The total BVAP was 12.1 million voters, with 6.4 million of them living in the North. The entire BVAP nearly doubled between 1930 and 1970—growing from 6,821,911 to 12,106,039. However, the BVAP in the North was only 1.9 million in 1930 and 6.4 million in 1970. The Northern BVAP grew by 4.5 million.
Although Black Americans’ exodus from the South impacted all areas of the nation, it was more pronounced in the large, industrial states. In this chapter, I focus on five states—California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania—that were very important to Democratic Party strategy and experienced tremendous growth as a result of the Great Migration. These states are described as key states because of the size of their population and their importance in EC politics. Between 1948 and 1964, these states controlled more than 75 percent of the EC votes needed to win the presidential election.

Black voters’ importance as a target for the campaigns was not based solely on the increase in their numbers; it was also related to their increasing percentage in the total population of voters. As migrants filled the cities, many of the white residents moved out to suburbs. At the

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59 For reports on the importance of these states, see: See Negro vote as the key in election.

60 The actual percentages were:
1948: 76.08 1952: 77.21 1956: 77.21 1960: 76.35
same time, industries in the South were beginning to grow, which encouraged some Northerners to move South and further contributed to the changing composition of northern cities. The end result was an urban landscape with a larger percentage of Black voters than before. Whereas Black voters were only 5 percent or less of the TVAP in five large states in 1930, they were between 6.5 and 11 percent of the TVAP in 1970. Figure 5.3 depicts this growth.

![Figure 5.3 - BVAP as a Percentage of TVAP](image)

My argument for this chapter is that these population changes helped facilitate political action among Democrats and eventually led to benefits for the Black community and the cause of civil rights. In the next part of the chapter, I discuss Democratic presidents and presidential candidates’ interactions with Black voters from 1948-1960. I also explain Democrats’ negotiations on the civil rights plank of the party’s platform.

1948

The midterm elections of 1946 shaped President Harry Truman’s presidential election campaign strategy in 1948. Inflation caused by a fight with farmers was Truman’s problem in
1946. The farmers won the political battle, which centered on farm prices\textsuperscript{61}, and the result was very high inflation that negatively impacted the rest of the nation. In the end, farmers, labor and consumers expressed their discontent by voting against the Democrats in the midterm elections. (Martin, 1979: 69).

On civil rights, Democrats were concerned about what might happen to the Black vote. Black voters supported the Republican Party before 1936, but by the 1940s, a majority of their support went to Democrats. Their loyalties were not clear to either of the parties. Would they remain in the Democratic column, or was their support attached to FDR and New Deal policies? Neither of the parties took Black voters support for granted.

The National Negro Council made demands for President Truman to accept a strong civil rights plank and to reconvene the Congress.\textsuperscript{62} The organization’s executive director claimed to have a petition with 1.2 million signatures to support his position. Walter White made a similar appeal, stating he spoke for organizations whose membership totaled more than 6 million.\textsuperscript{63} White went further, making clear the electoral power of the Black vote. He argued that Black votes were “a vital factor” in 75 Congressional districts and in 17 border and Northern states, where the EC vote count was 295. “In Northern and border states this year, there is a potential of 3,000,000 Negro votes. These are independent voters tied to the apron strings of no party and in the bag of no politician.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{61} FARMERS ATTACK TRUMAN ON PRICES: High Levels Are Not Their Fault, Growers Tell House By WILLIAM S. WHITE Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. New York Times (1923-Current file); Oct 30, 1947; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 9
\textsuperscript{62} FULL RIGHTS PLANK URGED BY NEGROES: Their Leaders Warn Drafters of a Democratic Platform Millions Bar Hedging. By C. P. TRUSSELL. Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. New York Times (1923-Current file); Jul 9, 1948; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 7
\textsuperscript{64} ibid
Primaries/Candidates

Observers and party insiders predicted that Truman would lose the 1948 presidential election campaign. In the fall of 1947, the Clifford Memo proposed a solution. Rowe, political strategist and Democratic ally, described in detail the steps President Truman needed to take if he planned to compete with the Republican Party in the upcoming election. Although James H. Rowe originally wrote it, Clark Clifford, an administration official, submitted the document for the President’s consideration. Rowe suggested the South was a safe bet and could be ignored in terms of effort, writing, “it is inconceivable that any policies imitated by the Truman Administration no matter how ‘liberal’ could so alienate the South in the next year that it would revolt” (Clifford memo, page 3). His advice was to focus the campaign’s efforts on the West, with the idea that if the Party could secure the South and the West, they might be able to withstand losses in the big states (New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio and Massachusetts).

In the discussion of groups—which also included farmers, labor and liberals—the memo describes “the Negro” as an important consideration. He writes:

Theory of many professional politicians is that the northern Negro not only vote in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. This theory may or may not be absolutely true, but it is certainly close enough to the truth to be extremely arguable.

The memo goes on to caution:

Unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures, which are today thoroughly understood and strongly resented by sophisticated Negro leaders), the Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and probably in New York and Ohio, does hold the balance of power, will go Republican” (Clifford Memo, pages 13-14).

The Rowe/Clifford memo set the tone for the campaign. In short, Rowe argued for pursuing Black votes and advised Truman to take liberal positions on race and labor. They acknowledged this could cause some problems in the South, but suggested those problems could be easily overcome...they were wrong.

Truman had been taking liberal positions on race before the 1948 election. For example, he publicly supported the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) in June 1945 and established the Committee on Civil Rights in 1946. When asked about his motivation for establishing the committee, he remarked it was a reaction to violence against Black veterans who were returning from war (Garner, 2002: 20). The committee considered issues surrounding lynching, voting and discrimination. The end result was a report entitled *To Secure These Rights*, which advocated for federal intervention to solve these issues. As another way to appeal to Black voters, Truman addressed the closing session on the annual conference of the NAACP on June 29, 1947 (Garner, 2002: 28).

All of these actions caused concern on the part of Southern Democrats, who believed Truman was more interested in winning liberal and Black votes than with keeping theirs. In response, Southerners worked to recruit a states’ rights candidate for the 1948 election. They found General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who at one point was also popular with liberals. Despite his popularity, Eisenhower bowed out of the race on July 5, 1948—just before the convention. Liberals agreed to support Truman following Eisenhower’s resignation.

**Convention/Platform**

As the convention approached, the President was increasingly concerned about his standing with Southern voters. In an effort to appease the South and show he was not too liberal on race issues, Truman sent a moderate civil rights platform plank to the convention, which did
not differ significantly from the 1944 civil rights plank. As it pertained to civil rights, the administration’s proposal said only that “minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share rights guaranteed by the constitution,” and that Congress should “exert ‘full constitutional powers’ to protect such rights.”

The administration plank met resistance from liberals, who wanted to push the platform beyond what Democrats passed in 1944. Disappointed with the President’s moderate plank, liberals, through the organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), worked to pass their own civil rights platform in 1948. Liberals believed the 1948 plank should explicitly reflect the President’s actions and speeches before the convention, which had been supportive of civil rights (Gardner, 2002: 96).

The ADA submitted a platform that called for the abolition of poll taxes for federal elections, legislation to prohibit lynching, a permanent FEPC and desegregation of the military. Their platform failed to make it past the platform committee because party leaders hoped to prevent increasing tensions with the South. However, liberals used their knowledge of convention rules to circumvent party leadership and requested a roll call vote for the platform on the floor of the convention.

As a reaction to the liberal maneuvering, Southerners, lead by former Texas Governor Dan Moody, introduced the Moody plank. The Moody plank sought to commit Democrats to the idea of “state sovereignty” (Berman, 1970: 84). Moody argued that states had a constitutional

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67 Americans for Democratic Action was created in 1947 as a counter to Southern conservatism in the Democratic Party.

right to “regulate and control local affairs” so long as they were mindful of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. Other Southern Democrats introduced the Sims and Sillers planks, both of which also made a Constitutional claim of states’ rights. The presence of three Southern planks greatly decreased the Southern lobby’s effectiveness. In the end, all three of the Southern suggestions for the party platform were rejected as Southerners split their votes among the planks.

While Southerners were unfocused and divided among themselves, members of the ADA and other liberals were appealing to the labor lobby and machine organizations from the major cities to support the liberal plank (Martin, 1979: 86). They argued two points. First, Democrats needed to choose a new direction on the issue of civil rights so the position of the post-New Deal party would be clear to all. Second, liberals suggested Democratic politicians at the state and local level might be negatively impacted by the convention’s actions with Black voters, whose votes were increasingly important to their ability to win elections. Moreover, even if they had not already, the machines would eventually benefit from the growing population of Black voters in large cities. The liberals who supported the ADA plank were labor and union leaders, like Jack Shelly, and Northern politicians like Jacob Arvey. “They came from states that had absorbed three-quarters of the Black migration that had strong unions and city machines” (Martin, 1979: 86).

In the end, poor planning on the part of Southern politicians and effective lobbying of labor and city machines lead to the passage of the most liberal civil rights plank in Democratic Party history at the time. The plank proposed by ADA passed by a vote of 651½ to 582½. The Southern delegation was so upset by the acceptance of the plank that they walked out of the convention.
General Election

Eventually, in spite of protest by Southerners, Truman was nominated for the presidency. The party division had implications for the general election; two of the three candidates Truman faced in the general election were from his own party. Just after the Democratic National Convention, Dixiecrats met and formed the States’ Rights Party, which chose South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond as its nominee.

Henry Wallace—who was the second-term Vice President of FDR—challenged Truman for the Democratic nomination on the Left. Although Wallace was very popular with Black voters, Truman was more popular.

The Republican presidential candidate was New York Governor Thomas Dewey, who was also popular with Black voters. On Garner’s account, Dewey was so well liked by Black New Yorkers that many supported the Republican Party on other state and local ballots. Building on Dewey’s support from the Black community produced a liberal party platform in 1948 with hopes of encouraging Black support for Republicans.

Although the Republican civil rights plank was strong, it was no match for the sitting President. Because of his position as President of the United States, he was able to take action that his competitors could not on race issues. On July 26, 1948, Truman passed Executive Orders 9980 and 9981. Executive Order 9980 outlawed discrimination in the federal employment and 9981 desegregated the military (Berman, 1970: 124). Next, Truman reconvened the Congress to handle civil rights issues in July of 1948, as he had promised to do in his acceptance speech on July 15.

These actions helped his position with Black voters but damaged his standing in the South. By October of 1948, the Truman campaign changed its electoral focus to large states and
went beyond gestures of Executive Orders and large states and made explicit overtures to win Black votes. For example, he traveled to Philadelphia and Harlem in October to address all-Black crowds. With his Harlem visit, he became the first sitting President to campaign in Harlem. In the Harlem speech, he described the work of the Civil Rights Committee that was established a year earlier and reminded attendees of the Executives Orders he implemented in July to end segregation in the military and employment discrimination in the federal government. He ended his speech by telling Harlem voters that he would “keep moving toward the goal [of civil rights] with every ounce of strength and determination I have.”

Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes

By most accounts, Truman’s final outreach to Black voters and change in strategy to focus on large states paid off. Although most observers predicted a Democratic loss, President Truman beat Republican candidate Thomas Dewey with 49.5 percent of the popular vote. Truman earned 24,179,345 votes to Dewey’s 21,991,291, but he lost the election in 20 states. The election was close, within 5 points, in 19 of those states. The number of Black people in the VAP exceeded the margin of victory in each of the most important states. See Table 5.1, below. Therefore, I argue that Black voters were essential to the victory of Harry Truman in 1948.

72 The NAACP made this claim frequently before and after the 1948 election. Henry Lee Moon (1948) also argued that the Black vote would be crucial to Truman’s potential victory in 1948.
even a fraction\textsuperscript{73} of the Black voters who did vote for Democrats switched their positions to support for the Republican presidential candidates, the Republicans might have won the 1948 election. Black voters’ contribution to the Truman victory did not go unnoticed by either of the political parties. Although they would struggle to deal with attracting Black voters while maintaining white support, from 1948 onward, parties fully understood that the Black voting bloc had great potential and should be considered as a part of party strategy.

Table 5.1: Balance of Power in Five States, 1948

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
State & Total VAP & Total Black VAP & Numerical Margin of victory & Black BOP \\
\hline
CALIFORNIA & 4,994,685 & 92,273 & 8,934 & yes \\
ILLINOIS & 5,516,244 & 269,361 & 16,807 & yes \\
MICHIGAN & 3,463,730 & 141,354 & 17,575 & yes \\
NEW YORK & 9,297,869 & 402,801 & 30,481 & yes \\
PENNSYLVANIA & 14,037,504 & 307,806 & 74,887 & yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{1952}

\section*{Primaries/Candidates}

Although President Truman announced he would not seek the nomination long before the convention, the party had not settled on any person as its heir apparent when the national convention started in August. The men who were most interested in the position represented extremes of the party’s ideologies. Estes Kefauver, a liberal Senator from Tennessee, represented liberal opinions on civil rights and Black voters strongly favored him because of this. Holding the moderate position was the sitting Vice President, Alben Barkley, a New Deal supporter from Kentucky. On the other side was Senator Richard Russell, of Georgia, who supported Southern notions of states’ rights. President Truman, along with other Democratic Party leaders,  

\textsuperscript{73} According to a survey by the NAACP, 69 percent of Black voters in metropolitan areas of the nation supported Truman in the 1948 election (Berman, 1970: 129).
encouraged moderate Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson to seek the nomination because he represented an opportunity for compromise in the party. Although Stevenson took liberal positions as governor of Illinois, he did not support the idea of federal intervention to enforce desegregation (Sitkoff; 1981: 35). Martin writes, “Adlai was by no means racist;” however, he did not align with Northern Democrats on many issues. Despite encouragement from party leaders, Stevenson refused to seek the presidency, citing his desire to finish his work in Illinois and run for re-election as its governor.  

**Convention/Platform**

If the fight over the party platform demonstrates which forces in the party are most powerful, 1952 demonstrated that no wing of the Democratic Party had more power than the other. Democrats did not have a clear picture of what the party would become. The South still opposed progress on civil rights. Northern Democrats still took the opposite position, advocating for federal government involvement on issues related to civil rights. 

Liberals came into the convention touting the slogan “Let the South go.” They sought protection from employment discrimination through a compensatory FEPC, anti-lynching legislation and modification of Rule Twenty-two. The liberal argument was that the 1948 election demonstrated the Democratic Party could win a presidential election without the EC votes of the South. Southern states accounted for 159 EC votes in that election, but they only

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75 STEVENSON ASSERTS HE COULDN'T ACCEPT BID FOR PRESIDENCY: Rejecting pleas of Democrats Governor Bars Contest ‘This Summer” for Another Post. By KALMAN SEIGEL. Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. New York Times (1923-Current file); Apr 17, 1952; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 1.


76 Rule twenty-two was related to the Senate’s ability to bring closure on legislation. Filibuster was the most frequent method employed by Southern legislators who sought to prevent passage of civil rights legislation (Berman, 1970: 212).
gave 110 of those votes to Truman. If it was possible to win the election without support from the South, liberals suggested, the civil rights plank of the 1952 platform should be at least as strong as the 1948 platform—if not stronger.

For a short time, it seemed like the 1952 civil rights plank would be stronger than the 1948 plank. Initial drafts called for enactment of the President’s civil rights program in the Congress and a FEPC with enforcement powers. However, the liberals who wrote the liberal civil rights plank and controlled its destiny from the floor in 1948 were not in control of the 1952 platform proceedings. Moderates controlled the party and the platform proceedings in 1952, and they were principally concerned with preventing another Southern walkout.

The proposed 1952 civil rights plank was stronger than the 1948 plank, although its words were calmer—lending to different interpretations in different sections of the nation. The 1952 platform won praise from some Northerners because it explicitly stated that eliminating discrimination would require action in all parts of the nation by individuals, states and localities, and the federal government. However, the platform lacked compulsory FEPC language, which upset some Black leaders. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who represented the Harlem section of New York City and was one of only two Black members of Congress, was most upset by the lack of enforcement proposed in the Democratic platform. Powell understood the electoral force of the Black voting bloc, and argued that Black voters’ ability to influence the outcome of

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78 For a list of moderates see Martin, 1979: 108.
81 Powell was active in the Democratic Party and, through his massive congregation at the Abyssinian Baptist Church, worked to deliver Democratic votes for the party. However, in 1952, he was unhappy with the Democratic Party’s continued deference to the Southern wing of the party.
elections meant civil rights should be a major consideration of both parties. In a *New York Times* interview, he explained that the Democratic Party should be responsive to Black voters because “Democrats could not have carried California, Florida, Illinois, or Ohio without Negro votes they received in such numbers.” Powell urged Black voters to abstain from pledging their support to any nominee until candidates were explicit about their support for FEPC. He went further, threatening he would lead a boycott of the election as a way to show dissatisfaction with Stevenson and the Party’s moderate policies if the Democratic Party did not take stronger positions on civil rights issues.

In the end, the tone of the civil rights plank of 1952 was less liberal than it had been in 1948, but generally acceptable to both sides. Some Northerners found the plank acceptable while others thought that it could have stronger language. To minimize the likelihood of conflict on the convention floor, the convention chair accepted the plank with a voice vote immediately after it left committee (Berman, 1970: 214). For the first time in years, Democrats had accepted a compromise draft of its civil rights plank without having to consider competing minority reports from the Southern conservatives or Northern liberals.

After settling on a platform, the convention’s next responsibility was choosing a presidential candidate. In 1952, the decision about the Party’s nominee was more heavily with

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84 In 1956, he argued that they should not commit support until candidates were explicit about their support for desegregation. (Berman, 1970: 215) See also: GENERAL APPROVAL GIVEN TO PLATFORM: On Controversial Civil Rights Plank Delegates Appear Willing to Go Along. By C. P. TRUSSELL Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. New York Times (1923-Current file); Jul 25, 1952; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 12.
85 Two states—Georgia and Mississippi—voiced objection to the civil rights plank. However, Sam Rayburn, the convention chair, moved forward to accept the plank and let those states formally express their objections only after it was accepted. See: Berman, 1970 pages 213-214.
party leaders than of the primary election voters. Party leaders sought a candidate who would be acceptable to the South and to liberals. Kefauver was too liberal for acceptance by Southern Democrats and Russell would not be acceptable to Northerners. Barkley, who could have been a viable moderate, was unacceptable to labor. In seeking to avoid a party walkout like the one in 1948, Democratic leaders chose Adlai Stevenson because he was the candidate who was acceptable to most parts of the party.

Unlike contemporary politics, Democratic positions before the primary were closer to the center than their positions after the primary season in 1952. Before the Convention, Democrats took positions that were center-Left, with hopes of maintaining some support in the South. Their foremost goal was to keep Southern voters from defecting to Republican Presidential Candidate Eisenhower. However, Democrats soon realized this positioning hurt their standing with Black voters. Further, they had to contend with the likelihood that Black voters might also defect to the Republican Party. As the general election drew near, the Democrats moved slightly Left on civil rights issues to maintain Black and liberal votes.

**General Election**

Many informed observers and campaign strategists predicted that Black voters might be the deciding factor in the lead up to the 1952 election. Therefore, losing ground with Black voters could be challenging for a Democratic Party victory. In the 1948 election, the GOP won in many of the larger states by margins of 5 points or less. Since then, those large states had absorbed the bulk of Southern migrants, and politicians believed if they could capitalize on this increase, they would be able to win the election.
After the convention, Democrats became increasingly concerned about winning votes in large cities and moved back toward the Left. James Reston of the *New York Times* explains their transition:

In short, Democrats having moved far enough to the right to block General Eisenhower’s bid for the South, are now moving cautiously to the left again in order to try to block Republican efforts to cut into the Negro and other minority votes in the large cities.\(^87\)

Black voters were taking stock of politicians’ civil rights positions, and they promised to vote based on their interests—for candidates who supported civil rights. This awareness and attention to civil rights positions became problematic for Stevenson, who publicly—and repeatedly—stated he did not support civil rights. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Stevenson said he “believ[ed] that the states ought to initiate action to abolish discrimination in employment,” and that he opposed a compulsory FEPC bill because it was unnecessary (Berman, 1970:198).

Stevenson later realized the potential consequences of his comment for his ability to garner Black votes in the North. He changed his public position by August of 1952, saying he would use the presidency to lobby for a change in the filibuster rule. When asked about the possibility of losing Black voters to the Republican Party he responded, “I can hardly see why the Negro would find any refuge in the Republican Party.”\(^88\) The change in tone had a swift and positive impact on his standing with Black leaders and voters. Following the change, Roy

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\(^88\) **STEVENVSON BACKS CIVIL RIGHTS PLANK:** Governor Terms Racial Aims ‘Excellent,’ rejects G.O.P. as refuge for Negroes. By JAMES RESTON Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. New York Times (1923-Current file); Aug 5, 1952; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 1.
Wilkins of the NAACP endorsed him for the presidency. Wilkins commented, “I agree on substance but disagree about his tactics.” The Black media followed Wilkins’ for their 1952 endorsements, which helped Stevenson with Black voters in the end.⁸⁹

On the other side, Republicans also recognized the potential of the Black voting bloc and made appeals for their votes. Liberal Republicans, including Henry Cabot Lodge of MA; Alfred Driscoll of NJ; and Irving Ives of NY issued a statement saying that a Republican victory would be a boost to the FEPC effort.⁹⁰ By October of 1952, both parties created separate campaigns to compete for the Black vote⁹¹ and produced separate literature for Black voters in the states they deemed most important to the election.⁹²

**Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes**

The Democratic Party’s winning streak ended in 1952, when Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson to win the election by 2,972,406 votes (or 10.5% of the vote). Stevenson lost in all but ten states. Of the seven states where the election was close, Stevenson won three.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2: Balance of Power in Five States, 1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHIGAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁸⁹ Stevenson won 73 percent of the Black vote.
⁹² The states with separate campaign literature were: CA, CT, DE, IL, IN, MD, MI, NJ, NY, PA, OH.
Black voters were the BOP in all of the large EC states except California. See Table 5.2, above. Although Stevenson won a majority of Black votes, many of them voted for Dwight Eisenhower. The BVAP of Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania\(^{93}\) exceeded the number and percentage of votes needed to change the election. The number of votes needed to change the outcome of the election was less than the number of BVAP in California. Keeping all else constant, if no Black voters had defected, Stevenson may have won the 1952 election.

**1956**

In May of 1954—halfway between presidential campaigns—the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* case that “separate but equal has no place” in public education.\(^{94}\) The issue of desegregation grew in political importance, as Southerners refused to accept the ruling to integrate their schools and politicians at all levels took no action to support the ruling. Sensing the Republican Party could make progress on this issue in the South, President Eisenhower also decided to take no action to support the Court’s ruling (Sitkoff, 1981: 31). Other civil rights issues of importance during the 1956 election cycle were anti-lynching, Black voter protection legislation and elimination of the poll tax.

**Primaries/Candidates**

Adlai Stevenson was mostly quiet on civil rights issues after the 1952 campaign. When he did speak, he gave speeches that articulated his centrist positions on civil rights and upset Black voters. For example, while speaking to a Black audience in Los Angeles on the topic of

\(^{93}\) The BOP in Texas was of limited utility because of the state’s location in the South and the practice of political discrimination in the region.

Brown v. Board in February of 1956, he advocated for gradual integration. Although many liberals proposed cutting funding for schools that refused to comply with the court’s decision, Stevenson said he would not cut off funding to segregated schools and would also not use the resources of the federal government to enforce integration if he was elected President. As another example, when asked about how Southerners could work toward integration, he suggested to an audience of Black voters in Los Angeles that the approach must be gradual. He went on to say in a different setting “we cannot by the stroke of a pen reverse customs and traditions that are older than the Republic,” and that “true integration requires a change in the hearts and minds of men.”

Estes Kefauver maintained his liberal positions in the lead up to the 1956 campaign, repeatedly stating his support for the Brown decision. Martin (1979:138) quotes his personal papers, “The Supreme Court is the final authority on Constitutional matters. When it rendered its school decision, that decision was and is the law of the land… I think the President ought to exert his own influence and good offices.” Although the Democratic front-runners differed in opinions, and Kefauver was popular in his own right, he chose to end his presidential campaign early in the season. Stevenson was still very popular with the Democratic Party leadership. Kefauver calculated he would have a better chance of getting to the White House if he abandoned his candidacy and pushed instead for the opportunity to become the vice presidential nominee.

Once Kefauver was out of the race, Averell Harriman—who had also declared candidacy in 1952—was alone on the Left. During the Truman administration, Harriman worked as a Special Assistant to the President (1950-1951) and as the director of the Mutual Security Agency\(^97\) from 1951-1953. He was elected governor of New York in 1954. Harriman was the only candidate pushing Stevenson to take liberal positions in 1956. Although he was a Truman appointee, President Truman chose not to endorse Harriman for president because of his far Left positions in 1952 (Berman, 1970: 203). Truman changed his mind in 1956 and endorsed Harriman to show his displeasure with Stevenson’s moderate positions (Martin, 1979: 146).

**Convention/Platform**

Again in 1956, liberals saw the platform as a potential opportunity to articulate the new direction of the party. Support for *Brown v. Board* was the barometer for liberalism in 1956, and Democrats knew they would have to address the Supreme Court’s decision in their platform. Conversely, Southerners hoped for a platform that would suggest moderation and patience as the key to ending segregation. In other words, they wanted the platform to state that compliance with *Brown* should not be mandatory.

The first civil rights plank (the majority plank) from the platform committee was more liberal than the platform of 1952. The drafters’ goal was to address liberal concerns without upsetting the Southern delegation too much. However, Adlai Stevenson faced a nomination challenge from Averell Harriman.\(^98\) Harriman sought to make the platform even more liberal

\(^97\) The Mutual Security Agency was responsible for the development and administration of military assistance as well as economic assistance programs other than those administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed the Director. (see: http://history.state.gov/departmenhistory/people/principalofficers/director-mutual-security-agency last accessed February 25, 2014).

\(^98\) On Martin’s account, Harriman—desperate to get the nomination by any means—reached out LBJ for help wooing Southern voters. Johnson replied that Harriman would have to reverse all of his liberal positions to gain southern support. Harriman agreed
than the committee proposed as a way to separate himself from Stevenson as a “true liberal.”
Stevenson responded to Harriman by moving even further to the Left on civil rights, and stating that the platform should support the court’s decision in *Brown v. Board*. The Democrats ended up with a platform that acknowledged the issues of segregation but did not advocate for implementation of the court’s decision. Harriman’s influence was enough to bring acknowledgment of segregation into the platform but not enough to buck the South and advocate for integration in the platform. In the end, the 1956 plank was stronger than 1952, even without support for federal intervention on segregation. It might have been even stronger if the convention change allowed a roll call vote (Martin, 1979: 151). However, he employed a voice vote, and adopted the mainstream plank, which was not radical, but was progress over 1952.

The South had no favorite representative in the 1956 election. Southerners were unhappy with Stevenson’s shift to the Left, but they realized he was their best hope for any representation in the party. The closest thing they got to a “states’ rights” candidate was Senator John F. Kennedy (JFK) of Massachusetts, who sought the vice presidential nomination. Kennedy expressed opinions on *Brown* that were acceptable to the South—suggesting Southerners move with “deliberate speed” and that desegregation should be “left to the judgment of lower Federal Courts as to when it should be carried out” (Brauer, 1977: 18).

Although there was still much room for progress on the issue, the 1956 party as a whole was much more liberal on civil rights than ever before. There was no conservative candidate on the Right to pull Stevenson back to the center. With no other candidates in the running for the nomination, Stevenson kept moving Left on civil rights until he appeased enough Democratic
delegates to give him the nomination—which they eventually did. However, he was careful not to go too far left because Southern Democrats could defect to the GOP in the general election.

**General Election**

Stevenson’s move leftward on civil rights occurred gradually between 1952 and 1956, with most of the change occurring during the primary season of the 1956 election. After moving to keep up with Kefauver in the primaries, and going even further to keep Harriman at bay during the convention, Stevenson was far more liberal by the general election campaign of 1956 than he had been in the primaries or in 1952 cycle. He went from describing civil rights as something that should be gradual and not happening by force, to saying that he would take action to enforce civil rights if he was elected President. In one post-convention interview, Stevenson remarked that he didn’t know what “moderation” was and told the Black owned and operated *Chicago Defender* that he would “base his campaign on the fundamental proposition that a person’s rights cannot depend in any way on his race, his creed, or his color.”

Republicans always believed they might have won the 1948 campaign if they had just a little more support from Black voters. They understood that Black votes would be a necessary part of their coalition if they were going to win in 1956. Attorney General, Herbert Brownell “calculated that [Black people] held a balance of power in seven states that cast 197 Electoral College ballots, as well as in some 60 Congressional districts” (Sitkoff, 1981: 33).

Eisenhower aides proposed that he begin the work on a civil rights bill as a way to expose the rift on civil rights issues in the Democratic Party. He declined for fear he would lose

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Southern votes. Although he would like to have Black votes, his ultimate goal was to make the Republican Party the home of Southern white voters. Democrats were relieved he decided not to undertake civil rights. The Party was increasingly hurt by the positions of its Southern partisans. Black voters believed Southern Democrats were stifling progress for the race.

While the positions of Southern Democrats hurt the Party’s chances with Black voters, growing numbers were motivated to support the Republican ticket because of the progress on racial issues between 1952-1956. Eisenhower benefitted from the fact that Brown v. Board happened during his first term in office. His administration also touted desegregation of the military and facilities in Washington, D.C. as accomplishments. Eisenhower got a bump in votes from the work of Adam Clayton Powel on his behalf in Harlem. Another consideration is the economy, which was doing well at the time of the 1956 elections and affected the decision of some middle class Black voters (Burk, 1984:169). Based on interviews with Black voters in communities across the country and the list of prominent Black leaders who endorsed Eisenhower for the presidency, media outlets predicted a defection to the Republican Party and they were right.\(^\text{101}\)

Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes

The second match-up of President Dwight Eisenhower and Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson was a more crushing defeat for the Democrats than the first. Stevenson lost in all but seven states, earning only 73 EC votes and 42 percent of the popular vote. Despite the lopsided vote, Black voters maintained a numerical BOP in four large EC states: California, Illinois,

Michigan and Pennsylvania. Only in New York was the numerical margin greater than the Black population.

The elections results from 1956 showed an increased in the number of Black voters supporting the Republican ticket. A Gallup poll, released in January of 1957, said the Black vote for the GOP increased by 18 percent from 1952 (Moon, 1957). By early Republican estimates, they only needed a 5-10 percent shift in Black votes to change the outcome of congressional elections.

[Eisenhower’s] biggest percentage gain – 16.6 percent – came in New York's 16th District (Harlem), which was 86.8 percent Negro in 1950 – the second biggest Negro district in the country. The district's Congressman, Rep. Adam C. Powell Jr. (D N.Y.), broke with his party in 1956 to support and campaign for Mr. Eisenhower's reelection. In the biggest Negro district in the country, Illinois' 1st (Chicago), which was 91.7 percent Negro in 1950, Mr. Eisenhower scored a gain of 10.9 percent. However, in the third largest Negro district, Pennsylvania's 4th (Philadelphia), which was 44.8 percent Negro in 1950, Mr. Eisenhower gained only 1.2 percent from 1952. All three of these districts were carried by Stevenson.

Table 5.3: Balance of Power in Five States, 1960
Source: U.S. Census, Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age and Sex by Race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total # of citizens in VAP</th>
<th>Total Black VAP #</th>
<th>Numerical Margin of victory</th>
<th>Black BOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>7,323,010</td>
<td>313,455</td>
<td>-303,766</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>6,029,705</td>
<td>439,190</td>
<td>-423,822</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHIGAN</td>
<td>4,132,520</td>
<td>292,480</td>
<td>-176,874</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>10,512,395</td>
<td>641,265</td>
<td>-798,780</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>7,097,210</td>
<td>416,310</td>
<td>-301,741</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1960

After the 1956 election, both parties believed Black votes were truly up for grabs and supported civil rights legislation so they could say they were the party that secured the legislation. President Eisenhower’s Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, proposed civil rights legislation as a way to win support from Black voters and highlight the divisions in the Democratic Party in early 1956. However, like the Democrats, Eisenhower was also concerned with the message he would send to the South by advocating for civil rights legislation. He encouraged the Attorney General to hold off on civil rights until after the 1956 election, and soon after their victory, the Eisenhower administration got back to work on civil rights legislation (Sitkoff, 1984: 34). Under the leadership of LBJ, the Congress passed—and President Eisenhower signed—the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 in September. Although the bill lacked much of the power civil rights leaders and liberals hoped it would have, it was the first piece of civil rights legislation in 100 years. The legislation also gave both parties the opportunity to argue their party was committed to civil rights—Republicans for proposing and signing the legislation and Democrats for moving it through the Congress.

Later in September of 1957, President Eisenhower scored another victory in the minds of Black voters when he reluctantly took action to enforce the Brown decision by activating the National Guard to desegregate Little Rock, Arkansas’ Central High School. Eisenhower’s decision increased support for the Republican Party among the Black community and Republicans thought Black voters might continue shifting their votes away from Democrats in 1960.104

Primaries/Candidates

In 1960, the Democratic Party slate of primary candidates included a host of liberals and a Southerner who sought to cast off his roots and be considered as a liberal. Adlai Stevenson—the Democratic presidential candidate of the last two elections—announced he was not interested in the Democratic nomination. However, his supporters built a campaign with the hope he would run again.

Hubert Humphrey was very liberal Senator from Minnesota, who had been instrumental in drafting the liberal civil rights plank of the 1948 Democratic convention. His liberal positions made him very popular with Black voters. He expressed interest in a national political position during the 1956 elections, and hoped that Stevenson would choose him as a running mate. However, Estes Kefauver ended up getting the 1956 vice presidential nomination. JFK followed Kefauver in votes and popularity for the vice-presidential spot—Humphrey, interested though he may be, was not a serious contender for that nomination. Therefore, Humphrey, along with James Rowe, decided he should seek the presidential nomination of 1960 by winning primary elections (White, 1961: 34). However, by the summer, Humphrey dropped out of the presidential race and sought to keep his seat in the United States Senate.

Stuart Symington also served in the Senate, representing Missouri. Symington was not well known outside his home state and had not taken any positions in his time as a Senator that would be problematic to Black voters. In his time on the campaign trail, he made it clear he held liberal positions on civil rights issues. Responding to President Truman’s disapproval of the lunch counter sit-ins, he commented “[m]y basic premise is that every citizen of the United States should have all the rights of any other citizen—all the rights. We can have no second-class
citizens in our country.” He did not believe he could be successful in political primaries and thought he might be able to achieve nomination through building relationships with party leaders. In his estimation, he stood a strong chance of becoming the Democrat’s presidential nominee if, for some reason, the Convention was divided on their candidates (White, 1961: 38).

Senate Majority Leader LBJ also had presidential aspirations, but did not acknowledge his intentions until January of 1960—late in the primary election process (Caro, 2012: 73). Johnson was unpopular with Black voters, who were skeptical of him because of his Southern roots and positions on civil rights during his early political career. Further, many Black leaders and white liberals felt he compromised too much by allowing Southerners to remove the section on discrimination in public accommodations from the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Johnson figured he might be able to overcome his difficulty with Northern Democrats and Black voters if he was able to follow up on his promises to strengthen the civil rights legislation during 1960.

JFK began working on the presidential nomination not long after his defeat for the vice-presidential nomination in 1956. If not for the candidacy of a Southern Democrat—Albert Gore of Tennessee—he might have gotten enough votes to win the vice presidential nomination. Kennedy’s 1956 experience taught him that a good relationship with the South could pave the way for his nomination in 1960. In response, he nurtured relationships with Southern Senators and Representatives. In Washington, he voted with the Southerners on civil rights issues. However, his relationship building extended beyond Washington as he made frequent visits to the South—often speaking on everything except civil rights issues. When he was pressed to talk about civil rights, he expressed a view that moderation was the appropriate course of action.

Kennedy’s statements on civil rights issues grew more liberal as party leaders and Kennedy campaign officials realized the vote would be close and Black voters might be more likely to support the Republican ticket. He used a more liberal tone with Black voters, while he also spoke to Southerners in ways that indicated his support for their position. For example, he made seemingly contradictory statements in June of 1960 during and following a speech to the Liberal Party of New York. He told liberals “moral persuasion by the president can be more effective than force in ending discrimination against Negroes” (Brauer, 1977:33). All along, Southern Democrats and supporters—including Adlai Stevenson at one point—had argued it was impossible to legislate emotions or to use government to change people’s feelings. Kennedy went further trying to create distance from the South and said “he hoped to win the Democratic presidential nomination without a single Southern vote in the Convention.” 106 When Robert Kennedy heard about these comments, he advised that it might seem like he no longer wanted Southern support. Day later, John Kennedy made a revised statement to Southern delegates telling them, “I would be happy and proud to receive support from delegates from any part of the United States” (Brauer, 1979: 34).

Convention/Platform

Concern about getting the Black vote and commitment to liberal ideals worked together through Chester Bowles to produce a strong civil rights plank for the 1960 election. Bowles, one of the Kennedy campaign men, wrote a very liberal platform under the assumption that party leaders would make it more moderate (Brauer, 1971: 35). The 1960 platform was completely re-written from what existed in 1956, although it did carry forward the major themes. Of central
concern were rights related to voting and elimination of discrimination in education, accommodations, housing and employment. The platform also described the need for rule changes in Congress. Southerners submitted a minority plank, but the convention accepted the Bowles plank. In the end, Kennedy won the presidential nomination even though the bulk of support from the South went to LBJ.

Kennedy added LBJ to the ticket as his running mate. There are many accounts of his reasoning. One explanation was that Johnson created a balanced ticket. It was highly unlikely that Kennedy could defeat Richard Nixon without Southern support—especially support from Texas and its large EC delegation. Further, adding LBJ to the ticket would help them appear to be ideologically and regionally balanced (Brauer, 1977). Another account is that LBJ could help Kenney with Congressional battles. He told one of his aides “I won’t be able to live with Johnson as the [minority] Leader” (Caro, 2012: 123). Another argument was that the vice presidential position would be inconsequential because Kennedy was young, and it was very unlikely he would die in office (Caro, 2012: 126).

Black leaders, liberals and important figures in the labor movement were very displeased with Kennedy’s choice of Johnson as a running mate. As far as they could tell, save his work on the 1957 Civil Rights Act, LBJ was not a liberal and did not have progressive views on civil rights issues.

One tabulation found that between 1940 and 1960, Johnson ‘voted as a Southerner,’ with the other Southerners, no less than thirty-nine times on matters of civil rights: six times against proposals to abolish the poll tax, six times against legislation to prohibit and punish lynching, twice to support segregation in the Armed Forces, once against a Federal Fair employment practices commission, once to maintain segregation in the District of Columbia.¹⁰⁷

Some suggest that Johnson was never deeply steeped in Southern traditions (Leuchtenburg 2005). He took positions that were anti-civil rights to represent the beliefs of his white constituents, and maintain his relationships with Southern members of Congress and the Senate. However, Johnson knew he would need to express moderate positions as a vice presidential candidate with aspirations of becoming President of the United States.

**General Election**

Both the Kennedy and the Nixon campaigns recognized the importance of Black voters for the coming campaign. In a 1960 interview with *Ebony* magazine, they both described how important Black voters were to their strategy. Nixon commented:

I am convinced that the future of the Republican Party today lies in pressing forward on civil rights. In any one of the ‘big six’ states (New York, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois and Ohio) our civil rights stand can make all the difference in the world. In the last election we lost the governorship of Pennsylvania by about 50,000 votes. A shift of just 5 percent of the Negro vote would have elected a Republican.¹⁰⁸

Kennedy commented:

I’d be a fool not to consider the Negro vote crucial. We’ve got to carry the key northern and western states or we’re just not going to win…All I ask is that people will look at my views, will look at my record, and will look at my stand.

The Kennedy campaign saw obtaining the Black vote as an essential part of their strategy, and took other steps to make Black voters comfortable with Kennedy. They practiced integration at campaign meetings and allowed the Black press to travel with their press corps (Brauer, 1979: 46). The campaign also had a dedicated Black campaign working-group known as the “civil rights section,” whose goal was to garner Black support through various forms of media and to register and turn out Black voters.

Voter registration was an important component of Kennedy’s campaign strategy. The campaign estimated there were 40 million eligible, unregistered voters, and 70 percent of those were Democrats (Rorabough, 2009). They were also keenly aware of the fact that Black voters participated at a rate that was comparable to their white cohorts, if not higher. On this issue, Louis Harris, a pollster for the Kennedy campaign said “The fact that Negroes…make it their business to vote is a key political fact. For it highlights the intense political feeling among Negroes in America today.”109 By 1960, nearly half of the Black population lived outside the South, and the campaign calculated that increasing the number of Black voters in the base would be helpful towards winning large states.

Kennedy sought to register new voters by working with local parties, but they met resistance in some areas. For example, although the campaign calculated that Black voters would be key to delivering victory in New York, the local Democratic Party was not interested in mobilizing new voters because it would upset the balance of their municipal and state elections. New York Democrats refused to help with the registration efforts. The campaign circumvented the local party machines to register and mobilize these voters by working with labor unions and activating the Citizens for Kennedy organization. In New York, they gained 500,000 (Rorabough, 2009).

During the fall campaign, JFK got an unexpected opportunity to make inroads with the Black community. After Martin Luther King (MLK) was arrested in Georgia, he called Coretta Scott King. JFK scored a political victory because mainstream media did not cover the event, and he won approval from Black leaders for coming to MLK’s aide while evading backlash from

the Southern wing of the party. The campaign used the call to their advantage in their outreach to Black voters. Kennedy’s civil rights section created and distributed a pamphlet just before the election, and framed the event as a public demonstration of JFK’s position on race.

**Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes**

The 1960 competition between Democrat JFK and Republican Richard M. Nixon was one of the closest in U.S. history, with Kennedy beating Nixon by a fraction of the popular vote and 84 EC votes. The BVAP was higher than was needed to change the outcome of the election. In the end, JFK won more Black support than Stevenson in 1956, but not more than Stevenson received in 1952 (White, 1961: 354). “Gallup estimated that Kennedy garnered 68 percent of the Negro vote, a 7 percent improvement over Stevenson’s last showing” (Brauer, 1979; 59).

Approximately 250,000 Black voters supported Kennedy in Illinois and Michigan, where he won by 9,000 votes and 67,000 votes, respectively. Kennedy also carried Pennsylvania and New York. His biggest gains were in four of the five large cities of the states under consideration here, where “his local margin exceeded his national popular vote margin.” (Rorabough, 2002: 179). His margins were 791,120 in New York; 456,312 in Chicago; 331,544 in Philadelphia; and 311,721 in Detroit. Kennedy’s calculations about needing support in big states and increasing the total number of voters were correct.

Following the campaign, Richard Nixon acknowledged that Back voters might have been the balance of power in the election of 1960. In a 1962 interview with Ebony he said, “I could have become president. I needed only five percent more votes in the Negro areas.” He went on,

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Balance of Power, 1960} \label{tab:balance_power_1960}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|l|}
\hline
State & Total \# of citizens in VAP & Total Black VAP \# & Numerical Margin of victory & Black BOP \\
\hline
CALIFORNIA & 9,855,380 & 503,844 & -17,811 & yes \\
ILLINOIS & 6,388,858 & 589,494 & 4,430 & yes \\
MICHIGAN & 4,667,085 & 401,737 & 33,422 & yes \\
NEW YORK & 11,057,832 & 879,774 & 191,834 & yes \\
 PENNSYLVANIA & 7,220,559 & 502,044 & 58,164 & yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{After 1960}

After 1960, Kennedy was sluggish in his approach to civil rights. He did not follow through on the promises of the campaign. Members of Congress, who would have to answer to their constituents in 1962, pressured him to move on civil rights issues. They encouraged him to submit a Civil Rights bill. They also encouraged him to move quickly on legislation to prevent discrimination in housing, something he had promised he could do “with the stroke of a pen.” Other individuals in the administration also suggested that Kennedy should move on civil rights issues. Louis Martin repeatedly wrote to Ted Sorensen that the party was facing tough elections and that Black voters were an important voting bloc. Archival data also confirms Kennedy’s desire to move slowly on civil rights. Sorensen wrote a letter to Harris Wofford suggesting that they “keep civil rights on ice.” However, they were concerned about harnessing the power of Black voters for the 1962 election. Therefore, Kennedy created the Voter Education Project (VEP), which ran from 1962-1964.
President Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963, and LBJ moved at full speed to pass civil rights legislation after his death. The assassination gave Johnson one year to prepare for the 1964 election. Like Kennedy in 1960, one of Johnson’s primary strategic considerations was voter registration for Black people throughout the nation. The DNC looked for places outside the South with Black populations of 10 percent or more. They realized it was possible to win without the South, but they knew that they would have to mobilize more of their coalition in other places to achieve victory without their old cornerstone.

**Conclusion**

My argument in this chapter has been that Democrats might be very concerned about meeting the needs of Black voters if they were the BOP in elections. I found that Black voters were the BOP in 18 out of 20 instances between 1948 and 1960. I also found that the Democratic Party was aware of the strength of the Black voting bloc and made efforts to garner their support. Their efforts included race-based appeals in Black media and seeking support of Black leaders. During the period of interest, Democrats also worked to win Black votes by creating policies that allowed for federal government intervention to end discrimination in a number of areas.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

My dissertation began as an attempt to understand why LBJ was so liberal on civil rights issues after having voted against civil rights measures as a younger politician. I thought the Great Migration might be an excellent explanation. All of the books I read on Democratic Party change during this time alluded to the significance of the Great Migration for the political parties from 1948 onward. However, none of the books had it as the center of their focus. My goal in this dissertation has been to create a space for the Great Migration among the other explanations of Democratic Party change.

Although my idea began with LBJ and 1964, I learned along the way that most of the action in the story of Democratic Party change—and of the Great Migration—took place before 1964. Democrats were slowly becoming more liberal on racial issues long before LBJ made the final push after JFK’s assignation. Likewise, much of the second wave of the Great Migration also came before 1964. I shifted my focus once it became clear to me that local politics was important to motivating the national party’s evolution on this issue and that the real action in this story occurred between 1948 and 1960.

Democrats, who had struggled to attain the presidency before FDR came to office in 1932, won decreasing shares of the popular vote following FDR’s high in 1936. They barely won the 1948 presidential election and failed to win a majority in 1952 and 1956 before winning the 1960 election by the smallest margin in history. After the New Deal, the Democrats were divided on the appropriate direction of the party with Southerners believing the party should stay its course. In their minds, they could keep their commitment to states’ rights and Northerners should be happy with the increasingly active federal government. At the same time, the growing sentiment in the North was that Southerners were wrong in their commitment to states’ rights
and it was the responsibility of the increasingly active government to protect Black Americans from violence and discrimination.

While this war occurred in the Democratic Party, Black Americans left the South in record numbers. Millions of them moved to large, Northern cities with the hope of making a new life for themselves. When they arrived in the cities, they frequently found the promises of the North were more complicated than advertised. In spite of these issues, they were excited about their ability to participate in the political process—often for the first time.

Local parties, who were the first to interact with migrants, dealt with the influx of voters in a number of ways that varied based on the localities. In cities with strong party organizations—like Chicago and Philadelphia—local parties worked to register the migrants and to mobilize them for their benefit. In New York—which also had strong party organizations—the dominant political organization, Tammany Hall, sought to suppress Black involvement in local politics. Therefore, many migrants participated in politics through third parties. In cities without strong party systems—like Los Angeles and Detroit—the parties did not make coordinated efforts to register and mobilize Black voters.

Regardless of party strength, the political organizations in cities quickly realized that Black voters had the potential to change the outcome of local elections and changed their behavior to reflect this fact. In Philadelphia, for example, this meant targeted outreach to Black voters and promises to promote civil rights policies. In Los Angeles, this manifested as public acknowledgement of Black voting power and appointment of Black people to municipal positions. Black voters’ position as the balance of power also had positive impact on their ability to hold elected office. In all five cities, Black people achieved elected office by the 1960s.
Black voters’ involvement at the local level impacted the Democratic Party at the national level. Local politicians were sensitive to positions of Black voters because they had experience with them as the balance of power in local elections. In some instances, at party conventions or via correspondence for example, local politicians beseeched the national party to take liberal positions on race issues. They argued that the behavior of Southern Democrats negatively impacted their ability to maintain Black support at the local level. Based on this kind of encouragement from local Democrats, it makes sense that the national party might be willing to shift its position on civil rights.

On top of prodding from local politicians, the national Democratic Party—especially presidential candidates—had to deal with the reality that migrants constituted a balance of power in national elections. Through migration, they had become a sizeable percentage of the voting age population in states that were important to presidential politics. In most instances, there were enough Black voters living and registered to vote in cities that could determine the outcome of states with large Electoral College delegations. Recognizing the potential of this vote, Democratic presidential candidates were careful to seek Black support while trying not to alienate Southern voters. Their gestures ranged from executive orders to desegregate the military (Truman) to public reversal of positions on the idea of “moderation” (Stevenson) and promises to create policies that would end discrimination in housing (Kennedy).

In this dissertation, I have examined information political actors would have considered during this time to make the case that the aforementioned changes and gestures were partly a response to the mass migration of Black people out of the South. Given politicians’ knowledge of demographic changes and desire to win the Electoral College by winning popular majorities in
large states, it is logical to infer Democrats changed their positions to support civil rights as a way to win over Black voters.

I think it is important to explicitly acknowledge other things were happening in the environment, and I would be remiss not to mention the other pressures on political actors that came from the growing momentum of the civil rights movement. It is also important to note that some of the Democratic Party’s action was driven by the desire for a change on civil rights issues from White liberals in the North. Although these two factors in the environment, along with others, contributed to the Democratic Party’s change, my primary objective has been to make the case that the Great Migration is an equally important consideration. The Democratic Party was looking for ways to expand its base and ensure that they could win in elections of 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960. One way to expand the base was to incorporate Black voters, who could serve as a source of votes, and the Great Migration grew the potential base by millions of voters.

To win these new voters, Democrats needed to change their public positions on civil rights issues to ones that were less hostile to Black interests. Party leaders would have to make statements in support of civil rights. To keep their positions, local party leaders would need to enlist the support of Black voters. Further, the party would need to allow Black people to hold offices themselves. At the national level, the Party would have to articulate support for civil rights in its platform, which served as an official campaign document and was one of the few documents in the Democratic Party that clearly described the party’s position. The Party’s presidential and vice presidential candidates would need to have, or simulate, positions that were supportive of civil rights. In short, my goal was not simply to describe Democratic Party change, but to highlight the importance of migration in contributing to that change.

*What are the Implications of this Work for Political Science?*
Getting back to the political science concept of realignment, we should describe Black voters’ movement into the Democratic Party as a case of slow-going change in party attachment and identification. Alternatively, we could accept that the Black population of voters changed their party affiliations rapidly but we would need to acknowledge that the change was not entirely a result of conversion (See: Andersen, 1979). Just like other movers who came before them, migrants were unimmunized voters. As such, when they registered as Democrats in Chicago or Republicans in Philadelphia, they were choosing a party affiliation for the first time. In other words, regardless of the rate of change, one significant point of this work is that Black voters were not converting from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in many instances from 1948-1964. Instead, their statuses were changing from non-voter to voter from nonpartisan to Democrat.

So What: Why Does This Project Matter?

This study is important for at least three reasons: its period of interest and focus on the Great Migration and on Northern cities. First, it is important because it focuses on an important period of time that, until recently, did not receive much attention from scholars. Many political science volumes focus on Democratic Party change after 1965 (Frymer; Carmines & Stimson, 1984) due to influence by historians who wrote about the “major change” in the party being tied up with LBJ and the second Reconstruction as well as MLK and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s (Sitkoff, 1981). There is also a small body of work that considers Black voters during reconstruction and in the New Deal era. Conversely, this work is a part of a growing body of work that recognizes that the political parties were changing long before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This study calls attention to the post-war era, from 1948-1964, which is important because it serves as a ramping up period for the height of the civil
rights movement of the 1960s and as the foundation for the “Republican realignment/ Southern strategy.”

Second, this study rightly puts the Great Migration front and center in the discussion of Democratic Party change. Scholars should not reduce this movement of millions of people from one part of the nation to another to a few lines in their larger narrative. This study is important because it considers the impact of the second wave of the Great Migration. Where scholars have written about the Great Migration, they have tended to focus on the first wave—occurring from 1900-1930. The second wave is important because it brings far more Southerners to the North than does the first wave. By extension, I argue, the nation could feel the effects of the second wave of migration more than they did during the first wave.

Third, more broadly than the Great Migration, this project is important as description of the political importance of demographic change. All too often, we focus on the actors and organizations and the people en masse without thinking about what might be happening in the lives of those people. Movement is an important part of American life and, therefore, we should consider it thoughtfully as we think about how people shape their political decisions and choose their leaders.

Suggestions for Future Research

I thoroughly enjoyed researching and writing chapter four. As I mention in the chapter, I picked five cities—Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Philadelphia—based on their size, location and dominant political party. However, migrants were similarly integrated into local politics in a host of other cities. I would guess they might have been even more effective in their attempts to be elected to office and participate in politics in medium-sized cities of the North or larger cities in Border States. Future research could examine the impact of the Great
Migration on local politics on cities like Baltimore, MD; Cleveland, OH; St. Louis, MO; Pittsburg, PA; Paterson, NJ; Oakland, CA; and Washington, D.C.

Understanding party change, in terms of migration, is important because the population is always changing. Although not a direct parallel, the influx of Hispanic immigrants into America and of their citizen children into adulthood in some ways resembles the Great Migration. As we observed in 2012, parties must work to interpret these changes in the population. This could mean they have to change their positions on issues, encourage different types of people to run—who look like the new groups—and/or change the way they construct their electoral strategies.

Finally, a different kind of contemporary population change, directly related to the Great Migration, is the trend among Black Americans since the 1980s to return to the South. This “return migration” has political implications for states in the South that turned Republican between the 1960s-1990s. States like North Carolina and Georgia, which thoroughly converted to red states in the 1980s and 1990s, are turning purple as their major cities absorb a Southern moving, Democratic Black population. As Black people continue moving back to the South, politicians at the local, state and national levels will have to change their strategies to account for their movement.

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