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Message from the State: Uncovering Effects of Public Policy on Women's Movements in Chile and the Czech Republic

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ABSTRACT

This study relies on the cases of the Czech Republic and Chile to examine the ways in which state policies affect women’s movements’ emergence under both authoritarian and democratic political regimes. As such, this dissertation provides some important clues into how citizens’ experience with certain policies enhances or delimits their future political action, and how it affects their beliefs and attitudes. Gaining a better understanding about the relationship between policies and civic participation is particularly important in the case of young democracies, which are trying to overcome their authoritarian past, and whose new democratic political regimes are in some instances yet to be fully consolidated.

This dissertation suggests that the policy context within which social movements operate is an important factor in shaping what social movements can do. The research presented here reveals that when grievances are present, such as accusations of gender inequality, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state.

This occurs on both the individual and group level. In-depth interviews with Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state’s role in their lives. They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a
coherent whole. In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women’s participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the state is and how it affects their lives. Furthermore, public policy also affect movements on the group level – complex policies supporting both women’s traditional and public roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to movement fragmentation and demise. In contrast, policies emphasizing women’s traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues and subsequently organize for collective action.
MESSAGE FROM THE STATE: UNCOVERING EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN CHILE AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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DISSERTATION

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I wish to thank my family and friends for providing unlimited encouragement and love during my doctoral studies. My partner Eric Persons kept me on track and provided editing assistance and feedback on different parts of this project. Both of our families patiently supported me during the entire process. My friend Mary Jean Byrne-Maisto was a terrific writing partner and provided me with much needed humor and encouragement. My fellow doctoral students also provided much needed feedback and friendship during my research and writing. Finally, my friends and colleagues at the
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1980’s, Chilean women mobilized in large numbers to provide food for their communities and to demand the return of their children violently abducted by the military regime; they also formed feminist organizations in order to advance their rights as women. In the context of a repressive military dictatorship that was known to strictly punish any form of civil disobedience, Chilean women successfully marched in the streets and fearlessly engaged the government of General Augusto Pinochet. Once the military regime fell, the women’s movement in Chile disintegrated. Even though women continued to face serious discrimination at home, in the workplace, and also in the social and political life of the country, women’s mobilization efforts became more fragmented and less visible.

Around the same time Chilean women were organizing against the military government, Czech women living under a totalitarian communist regime found it difficult to organize on the basis of their gender identity. Instead, responding to poverty and the shortcomings of the inefficient centrally planned economy, Czech women relied on an existing system of bribes and interpersonal networks to obtain the services and goods needed to sustain their families. In response to state terror and widespread violations of human rights by the communist government, women formed alliances with men to take action. And rather than organizing around feminist concepts and ideas in the face of gender discrimination and inequality, they ridiculed them and largely accepted what was defined as a woman’s role in society. Once under democracy, Czech women did not form a broad-based cohesive women’s movement either.
These developments took place in a context where both Czech and Chilean women were experiencing important gender inequalities in employment, politics and in the home. They all had much to lose in the democratic transformation processes (Moghadam 1993). In the Czech Republic, for example, unemployment for women escalated beyond the rates for men soon after the political turnover; social protections established under communist regimes weakened; quotas for holding political office were abolished; and women’s reproductive rights were threatened (see Jaquette and Wolchik 1998).

Therefore, women in the two countries faced gender discrimination and inequality under both authoritarianism and democracy, but the glaring difference being that in Chile, the state attempted to clearly define women in unequal terms to men, while in the Czech Republic, the communist state attempted to elevate their role in society by forcing the appearance of equality in the labor markets and creating seemingly progressive protections for women as both mothers and laborers.

Although Chile and the Czech Republic are two different countries located in very different parts of the world, their patterns of women’s mobilization have been fairly representative of the developments in their respective regions. While in the 1980’s, the military regimes in Latin America typically experienced women’s organized efforts to advance various political, social and economic grievances and promote gender equality, women in communist Central and Eastern Europe showed reluctance to organize as women. Furthermore, the previously intensive women’s mobilization in the Latin American region disintegrated soon after the democratic turnover; in Eastern Europe, women never organized into a cohesive movement to protect or advance their rights

1 More information about the regions will be provided in the research design section of this dissertation.
under the newly democratic regimes of the 1990’s (see Alvarez 1990; Baldez 2002; 2003; Basu 1995; Dandavati 1996; Einhorn 2003; Jaquette 1989; 1994; 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Kaplan 2004; Lee and Clark 2000; Ray 1999; Tripp 2003; Wieringa 1997). 2 Surely, women continued to form a variety of women’s organizations and many still engaged the state from within to advance their agenda, but they did not mobilize into a sustained, broad based movement such as the one seen in dictatorial Chile of the 1980’s.

In this dissertation, I use the cases of the Czech Republic and Chile to examine these differences in women’s mobilization across the two regions and two distinct historical periods. I focus on the processes through which state policies affect women’s ability and willingness to organize for collective action, and I study the relationship between policy and women’s movements under both authoritarianism and democracy.

According to social movement theorists, women’s and social movements more generally emerge as a result of some combination of the following three broad factors: (1) availability of resources; (2) perceived opening of political opportunities3; and (3) existence of perceived grievances associated with issue framing and members’ collective identities4 (see Gamson and Meyer 1996; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; 1996; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 1990; Snow and Benford 1988; Staggenborg 2011; Swidler 1995; Tarrow 1998). In both Chile and the Czech

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2 For the purposes of this paper, I use terms such as ‘women’s mobilization’, ‘women’s activism’ and ‘women’s movement’ interchangeably. In general terms, I employ Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) definition of social movements: “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (4) Based on this definition, I understand women’s movements as social movements where women act collectively as women. Baldez (2002) suggests that all women’s movements invoke their identity as women in order to emphasize their uniqueness in relation to men and their interest in having greater access to decision making. Such norms comprise a set of understandings that reflect women’s widespread exclusion from political power.
3 This has become known as the ‘political process approach’ in social movement theory.
4 Also known as the ‘cultural approach’ in social movement theory.
Republic, I demonstrate, women could draw on a variety of resources and mobilizing structures. As the Chilean case documents, even when a political opportunity was not present, women innovatively created one for themselves. Therefore, the sole presence of resources and broadly defined political opportunities do not seem able to explain the regional and historical difference in women’s organizing across the two regions. Instead, I rely and elaborate on a combination of two of the approaches described above. They are the political process approach which examines the role that politics plays in social movement emergence, and the cultural approach which pays attention to how issues are framed by movement leaders. Rather than focusing solely on the presence or absence of political opportunities, as much of the existing research devoted to social movement emergence has done, I concentrate on the ways in which policy-making affects women’s organizing.

In other words, my research suggests that the policy context within which social movements operate is an important factor in shaping what social movements can do. While Chilean women living under a military dictatorship were successful in framing their grievances and coming together to protest against the widespread violation of human rights, gender inequality and economic injustice, Czech women were not able to find a common voice either under the communist or the subsequent democratic regime. Similarly, women leaders in the newly democratic Chile lost their ability to frame their issues in ways that would resonate with the public as well. An important part of the explanation for these outcomes lies in the policies developed, presented and implemented by these states.
Despite the extensive body of literature devoted to social mobilization, little has been done to date to systematically explore the relationship between policies and social movements. As David Meyer noted in 2005, “public policy (has been) treated as a relatively minor part of the structure of political opportunities that might spur social movements” (Meyer et al. 2005, 6). This research deficit is evident in the case of old democracies of North America and Western Europe (for discussion of this, see Pierson 1993 or Mettler and Soss 2004), but especially in the case of countries in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe that have just two decades ago undergone radical and wide-ranging political transformations.

The general lack of research in this area is puzzling given the possible implications of these ‘policy feedback’ effects for the development and maintenance of democratic citizenship in these nations. In order to understand the complexities of democratic political processes, we need know how “policies transform and expand the identities, political goals, and capabilities of various social groups that subsequently struggle or ally in politics” (Skocpol 1992, 58). In other words, we ought to be able to explain why some policies ultimately promote political action from the mass public while others impede it.

This question is of a particular importance in young democracies which are trying to overcome their authoritarian past and whose new democratic political regimes are in some instances yet to be fully consolidated. It is important to find answers to questions about how citizens’ experience with certain policies enhances or delimits their future political action, how it affects their beliefs and attitudes. Inspired by existing descriptive

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5 Theda Skocpol (1992) defines ‘policy feedback’ as the ways in which “policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes” (cited in Mettler and Soss 2004, 8).
studies about women and their social position in new democracies, and by the literature on policy feedback in the political science literature, this study concentrates on processes and cases that have been understudied the most. Specifically, I focus on:

(a) policy feedback effects in countries that have recently undergone wide-ranging political transformations;

(b) the mass public rather than political elites;

(c) the formation of spontaneous social movements rather than formal political processes.

Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the literature on women’s (and other social) movements and politics and history literature in additional ways. First, studies on women’s activism in democratizing regions have in the past typically consisted of single case studies that have been normally compared to and discussed in opposition to women’s movements in the West. The resulting generalizations and arguments are less convincing when viewed against the developments in other non-Western regions. This dissertation avoids this problem by comparing two non-Western cases - Chile and the Czech Republic. Second, this study bridges literature on social movements, democratization and policy feedback in order to explain the empirical puzzle. Finally, it is one of the first studies to explore policy feedback effects in the context of young democracies.

**Research design**

This project examines the effects of public policies on social movements through a detailed study of women’s movements in two new democracies: Chile and the Czech
Republic. I use the cases of Chile and the Czech Republic because despite some differences, the two countries are similar in terms of population, size, economy and the timing of their transitions to democracy (see figure 1.1). Furthermore, each of the two country cases allows me to study the emergence (and non-emergence) of women’s movements under two distinctive policy regimes – first authoritarian and later democratic (each with its distinctive gender ideology).

Figure 1.1 An overview of basic characteristics of Chile and Czechoslovakia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current regime</strong></td>
<td>Liberal democracy (1989 – current)</td>
<td>Liberal democracy (1990 – current)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian state policies toward women</strong></td>
<td>Traditionalist (emphasis on motherhood)</td>
<td>Mixed: Emancipatory (full employment, education, gender quota) + Traditionalist (pro-natalist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income category (World Bank)</strong></td>
<td>Lower-middle until 1992; Upper middle since 1993</td>
<td>Lower-middle until 1993 (Czechoslovakia); Upper-middle since 1994 (Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>15 million (10 million in the Czech Republic since 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First free elections</strong></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suffrage for women</strong></td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior experience with democracy</strong></td>
<td>Yes (limited democracy, late 19th C -1973)</td>
<td>Yes (1918 – 1939; 1945-1948 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td>Catholic (high participation)</td>
<td>Catholic (low participation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, while Chile and the Czech Republic differ in regard to the prior regime type and their state policies, they are, in regard to these characteristics, relatively representative of the other countries in their respective regions. Certainly, some important intra-regional differences existed (Batt 2007; Bunce 1999; Ekiert 1996; Rupnik
First, the political and social developments in Czechoslovakia and the transitional Czech Republic were fairly typical of the developments in the Eastern European region. By the 1950’s, according to Jowitt (1992), all the communist countries were characterized by the same institutional and ideological mechanisms. An important line of thought in comparative politics represented by, for example, Valerie Bunce and Marc Howard argues that state socialism and post-state socialism were unique compared to other regimes. These scholars suggest that these countries have shared a distinctive combination of political, economic and social characteristics arising from their historical experience (Bunce 1995). These countries also share the low levels of women’s independent organizing experienced under both communism and democracy. The only two countries in the Eastern Bloc that experienced a short period of what resembled a fairly unified women’s movement were those of East Germany and Russia. However, East Germany represents an outlier case due to its political proximity to former West Germany and its movement toward German unification. The Russian case is addressed in more detail in the concluding chapter. Nowhere in communist or post-communist Europe did women organize into a unified movement on the basis of their gender identity.

\[\text{In his study of post-communist civil society, Howard (1999) suggests that the discussion of differences among post-communist countries is primarily relevant for the level of institutions or elites, while one is more likely to find significant similarities on the mass/societal level. The political and economic transformations have brought important changes in existing institutional structure (possible to change quickly), but societal attitudes and behavior change gradually. He builds on some existing survey research that points to some of these similarities on the mass level.}\]
Second, the developments in Chile were relatively representative of the developments in the Latin American region as a whole. Chile, similar to the majority of other Latin American countries experienced military dictatorship in the second part of the 20th century. In fact, by 1980 democratically elected civilian governments in Latin America could only be found in Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Furthermore, while Eastern and Central European women were not organizing to advance their rights, women in Chile and in other Latin American countries did both during the 1970’s and also the 1980’s. In addition to Chile, Latin American women also formed a unified movement in countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Peru or Uruguay (for overview, see Jacquette 1989, 2001; Stephen 1997).

The two cases also present an interesting puzzle. Under both the former authoritarian and current democratic rule, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic faced many inequalities in employment, political representation and division of labor in the home. And yet, women in Chile and Latin America more generally organized in a unified movement to defend and advance their rights during the oppressive authoritarian regime, while women in the Czech Republic and post-communist Europe did not.

The hesitance of Czech women to organize as women during the political window of opportunity in the early 1990’s is especially interesting given that Czech women were exceptionally active in advancing their rights before the communist coup of the late 1940’s. Because of the previously high level of activism, one would expect Czech women, more than women in any other country of the post-communist region, to take up the strong tradition of women’s organizing once democratic transition occurred, but that did not happen. The low levels of women’s activism during and after the democratic
transition in in the Czech Republic and post-communist Europe more generally may also seem unusual in the face of other types of activism that were on the rise during this time. For example, environmental movements have been emerging since the early 1980’s, and have strongly contributed to the democratic transformations in the region (see Jancar-Webster 1993; Pickvance 1998; Sarre and Jehlicka 2007). Czech women had a strong presence within these alternative movements, but they never came together on the basis of their gender identity.

While being similar in a number of ways, Chile and the Czech Republic are undeniably two different countries, each identified by a particular history, culture and geography. Notably, they differ in their prior regime type (authoritarian vs. totalitarian) and consequently also in regards to the specific type of public policies (policy regimes). This variation in authoritarian/totalitarian state policy also became reflected in the public policies subsequently developed and implemented under the new democratic regimes. One might argue that these two cases represent what Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers (1980) once called “contrast of contexts”. As such, they “bring out the unique features of each particular case included in their discussions, and show how these unique features affect the working-out of putatively general social processes” (178).

Methodology

The evidence presented in this dissertation has been collected primarily by using secondary data in the form of historical studies and newspaper articles. To ensure the accuracy of the information and to entertain alternative points of view and interpretations of different events, I supplemented this material with information from archival
documents, with available survey and other statistical data, and also with personal interviews I have conducted with activists, policy-makers and researchers in the two countries. These additional sources of data allowed me to question the information offered in the secondary evidence sources, and they also provided additional information and thus contributed to the development of new lines of argumentation presented in this study.

During my research in Czech and Chilean archives and libraries, I focused on studies, newspaper articles, surveys and other documents that provided information about policy-making under both authoritarianism and democracy. I also collected historical and current information about women’s groups and about the formation of women’s movements in both countries. To get a better understanding of the general social, political, economic and cultural context under which policies provided opportunities and obstacles for women’s mobilization in Chile and the Czech Republic, I also paid attention to studies providing reliable information in regard to these topics, especially those that took gender differences into consideration.

While I have obtained some of the survey and other statistical data from publications available in U.S. libraries, I have collected the majority of the material in research centers and local libraries I visited during my field trips to Chile and the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, these included the National Library of the Czech Republic, Central Library of Charles University in Prague, the library of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic, and the Gender Studies library in Prague. In Chile, I conducted my research in the library of the National Library in Santiago, in the library of
Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO-Chile) in Santiago, in the library of
the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and in the National Archives of Chile.

Because I was particularly concerned with the reliability of the survey and other
data collected under the communist and authoritarian regimes, I have consulted local
social scientists and researchers to verify the accuracy of the information accessed in
specific survey studies and other reports. I have done this during personal interviews I
conducted in both Chile and the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2008.

In terms of archival documents, I relied on primary documents compiled mainly
by women’s organizations. These included meeting minutes, public statements, project
proposals, letters and other relevant documents. Namely, in the Czech Republic, I have
been able to access a large numbers of materials produced under the communist regime
by the state run women’s organization Union of Women. I have accessed this
information through the Czech National Archive in Prague and through the Gender
Studies Center library.

I supplemented this evidence with information gained through interviews with
activists, experts and policy-makers in the two countries. I have conducted a total of 43
interviews. I completed a total of 34 interviews between 2005 and 2006 in the Czech
Republic, and a total of 9 interviews in Chile in 2009. The reason for conducting a
significantly higher number of interviews in the Czech Republic lies in the fact that
unlike in Chile, very little literature exists on the emergence (or lack of thereof) of Czech
women’s movements. Therefore, I was forced to look for alternative sources of
information. Admittedly, the number of Chilean interviews is also lower because it
proved to be much more difficult for me, as a foreigner, to gain access to Chilean respondents.

During these interviews, I used purposive rather than probability sampling to select respondents (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996). Both in the Czech Republic and in Chile, I started my selection with a list of names I compiled based on available secondary literature. The main goal of this selection was to find individuals who were either particularly active around women’s issues or who were viewed as ones knowledgeable about the position of women in the society and about public policy making as it pertained to women. I continued to update this list through a snowball method as the interviews progressed and respondents recommended others to be contacted. I purposely asked respondents to recommend not only others who share their views and beliefs, but also those who were likely to disagree and hold different views.

Influenced by the feminist methodology of Shulamit Reinharz and Lynn Davidman (1992) I conducted open-ended, in-depth interviews. The open-ended approach to interviewing allowed the respondents to emphasize, in their own words, the aspects of their life choices and strategies that they assigned greatest importance (Spradley 1979). These interviews allowed greater flexibility in terms of follow up questions and therefore fuller understanding of various motives within the lives of the individual respondents who were interviewed (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996).

I compiled a different set of questions for the different types of respondents; activists, policy-makers and academics. In each category, the same set of basic questions was followed during each interview (see Appendix A). These served as a basic guideline
that intended to motivate the respondents to freely talk about their experiences, recollections and opinions. Additional questions were asked depending on the individual respondent and his or her narrative. Respondents were asked not only about their own lives, but also about their views regarding certain general trends and patterns. All interviews were transcribed in their entirety. First I considered the interviews in their full length and later extracted quotations from the larger texts. I then sorted these quotes according to different themes into clusters. In sorting the quotes, I paid attention to any trends that would stand out.

Outline of the Argument

Both in Chile and the Czech Republic, levels of women’s mobilization have been intimately linked with the changing nature of the two states and their policies. The relationship between policies and women’s action found in Chile and the Czech Republic is similar to that illustrated in the policy feedback scholarship in American politics. My research confirms that citizens’ level of political participation is influenced by their experience with public policy (see Mettler and Soss 2004). Namely, my research suggests that whether women will be requesting a public role will depend on a particular policy context. If public policies provide support for the reconciliation of women’s maternal and public roles, women will be less likely to mobilize into a cohesive women’s movement.

This relationship between policy and social movement development becomes clearer when one explores the nature of state policies toward women in the four cases presented here: Chile under the military regime, Chile during democratic transition,
communist Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic during the democratic
transition.  

Under the totalitarian regime, the Czechoslovak communist state introduced many
policies which Western women typically view as progressive. For example, the
Czechoslovak state made an effort to include women in the job market, raise female
educational levels and incorporate women into formal politics. At the same time,
through its pro-natalist policies, the state reinforced women’s roles as those of mothers
and housekeepers. These policies have enabled women to reconcile their maternal and
public roles. At the same time, the mixed messages regarding women’s position, women
could not identify a clear ideological stance they could use to advance their grievances.
Furthermore, because of the state rhetoric regarding women’s emancipation, Czech
women have over time come to associate emancipation and women’s rights with the
totalitarian political regime (Heitlinger 1996; Wolchik & Jaquette 1998). This combined
with a lack of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime resulted in a situation where women
were willing to join men and organize around non-women’s or non-feminist issues, but
not on the basis of their gender identity. 

7 Note that Czechoslovakia as a sovereign country came to its end in January 1993 when the independent
states of Slovakia and the Czech Republic were formed. In this work, I focus on the Czech Republic region
of the formerly federal republic of Czechoslovakia when I discuss the developments that took place under
the communist regime. I use this simplification because as a result of the capital city of Prague’s political
and geographical position, much of the relevant policy-making and women’s activism under the communist
regime took place in the Czech lands.

8 For the purposes of this paper, the terms formal and mainstream politics encompass office holding on
federal or national level, and more specifically leading posts in the main legislative and executive decision-
making bodies.

9 By the 1980’s, public opinion polls documented that citizens blamed the regime for worsening living
standards, worsening environmental pollution, problems in healthcare, long-term existence of failing
economy and other (Forst et al. 1989). In a 1988 opinion poll conducted by UVVM, over 90% of
Czechoslovak citizens suggested a need for further democratization of the Czechoslovak society (Misovic a
kol 1988).
Later, after communism fell in 1989, the Czech Republic experienced an overwhelming public enthusiasm for a capitalist economy and right-wing parties – the traditional targets of criticism from women’s movements in countries that did not undergo the long period of state socialism. The new state emphasis on individualism and free market participation continued to encourage women to participate in the labor market and the public sphere more generally. At the same time, the remaining protectionist policies of the communist state have continued to provide support for women’s traditional roles in the home. As a result of these policies, Czech women still find it difficult to identify a common language that would allow them to organize on the basis of their gender identity. While women are active in the newly formed civil society, by using the rhetoric of Marxism and equality, the communist state alienated women from using this common ‘frame’ for articulation of gender inequalities. The concepts of equality and women’s rights could not resonate with women or the mass public in post-communist countries because these were terms and notions earlier used (and abused) by the communist states. This situation has been further exacerbated by a lack of available information about the feminist achievements in other countries, and by an intense misinterpretation of women’s movements and demands in the media.

Unlike the Czech totalitarian regime, the Chilean military dictatorship was very clear on where the role of women was. Here, the combination of the traditionalist gender ideology and the neoliberal economic reforms played out differently than they did in the Czech case. In Chile, the state made it clear that women were not welcomed in the public sphere. The traditionalist gender policies aimed to exclude women from political life, and through these policies, the state removed some of the earlier accomplishments of the
Chilean women’s movement. In a very paradoxical way, these were the very same measures that also created political space for women to return to the public arena. Framing their issues in terms of their roles as good mothers and wives, women responded to the economic and human rights crises by engaging the state through its own rhetoric and policies (Baldez 2002; Waylen 1994). Similar frames remained unavailable to Chilean men.

Avoiding ‘Western feminism’, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues in Marxist terms. Again, through its repressive measures against labor unions and other traditionally leftist groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular frame available for women to utilize. Furthermore, as a result of these processes and women’s demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy from the old authoritarian political model. Not only in Chile, but in Latin America generally, women’s issues then became “congruent with and symbolic of a larger political transformation” (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, 8).

Upon return to democracy, the message of the Chilean state toward women and their position in the society changed. The first democratically elected Chilean government (at least formally) supported women and their demands. It established the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of national and international treaties and documents including the United Nation’s Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This has led to a greater professionalization of the Chilean women’s movement as a number of women leaders were co-opted by the state. Even though the SERNAM’s relationship with women’s groups has remained problematic and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet’s regime
continues to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution of 1980 as well as through other policies and bureaucratic rules, women feel the state is providing them with more support to reconcile their maternal and public roles. These developments have caused division within the Chilean women’s movement until it disintegrated.

In brief, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic have experienced important gender inequalities in the private as well as the public sphere. Despite the state repression of civil society under the authoritarian regimes, women in both countries had the opportunity to draw on an extensive set of family, friendship and organizational networks. Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity, but Czech women did not. In the late 1980’s, a political opportunity to organize presented itself as a result of the political transformations in both nations. And yet, Czech women did not use this opportunity to advance their rights. Instead, they became active participants in the newly developing civil society as they proceeded to advance other issues. With a similar outcome, the Chilean movement disintegrated soon after the transformation took place. Why?

What the developments in these two countries (and regions more generally) seem to suggest is that when grievances are present, such as accusations of gender inequality, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state.
This occurs on both the individual and group level. In-depth interviews with Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state’s role in their lives. They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a coherent whole. In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women’s participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the state is and how it affects their lives. Furthermore, public policy also affects movements on the group level – complex policies supporting both women’s traditional and public roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to movement fragmentation and demise. In contrast, policies emphasizing women’s traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues and subsequently organize for collective action.

*Organization of chapters*

The chapters that follow are organized in the following way. The second chapter situates this project in the existing scholarly literature. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the case of the Czech Republic. Specifically, chapter 3 outlines relevant state policies introduced under Czechoslovak state socialism during two distinct time periods. It also describes the impact these policies have had on women’s lives in general and on women’s activism in particular. Chapter 4 discusses the policy changes brought about by the overturn of the political regime in Czechoslovakia, and the way these affected the lives of Czech women. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the Chilean case, and the organization of these chapters follows a similar structure to the Czech cases. Chapter 5 provides an
overview of the state policies toward women in authoritarian Chile, and it analyzes their effects on the Chilean women’s movement of that period. Chapter 6 discusses the situation as it developed in post-authoritarian Chile of the 1990’s. Finally, the dissertation ends with a conclusion which summarizes main findings, outlines possible limitations and contributions of the study and suggests some possible directions for future research.
Chapter 2
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS RESPONSE TO STATE POLICY

Drawing on three dominant trends in the existing social movement literature – resource mobilization, political process and framing – I propose that contemporary policy theory and particularly the literature on policy feedback (Pierson 1993) can serve as a useful tool in explaining why women protest in some instances but not others. In other words, this study works with the assumption that women’s movement emergence cannot be adequately explained without paying attention to pre-existing state policies.

Social movement theory explains the emergence of women’s movements and social movements more generally as a result of some combination of three broad factors: (1) availability of resources and mobilizing structures; (2) perceived opening of political opportunities and/or an emergence of a threat; and (3) existence of perceived grievances associated with issue framing and members’ collective identities. These factors then constitute three distinct approaches to the study of social movement emergence known as the resource mobilization model, political process approach and collective identity approach (sometimes also referred to as ‘new social movements theory’).

1. Resource Mobilization Model in Social Movement Theory

Supporters of the resource mobilization model argue that the study of resources and organizational bases is crucial to understanding why and when social movements occur. In this view, resources are key to social movement emergence because they provide constituents with the capacity to act. According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) such mobilizing structures represent “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (3). Although
this approach is often criticized for its lack of conceptual clarity regarding the definition of resources, these are typically thought to include financial resources, meeting places and labor, communication networks, leaders and members (McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977). In particular, the resource mobilization approach stresses the importance of pre-existing social and organizational networks for the formation of social movements because those already participating in established networks and groups are more likely to turn their attention to other issues and re-organize around them. (McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). While the early resource mobilization models are thought to exaggerate the role of deliberate strategic decisions in social movements formation and continuance, today scholars still view resources as important (but not sufficient) factors in explaining the formation of social movements.

What does this mean for the mobilization of women on the basis of their gender identity? According to the resource mobilization model, for a women’s movement to emerge, women need to be able to draw on pre-existing resources. These can take on any number of forms – from informal friendship ties to networks of well established formal organizations. While existing studies of women’s movements rarely rely on the presence or absence of resources alone to explain women’s mobilization, a number of key studies do take the availability of resources seriously. For example, in their 1999 analysis of the emergence and outcomes of women's collective action in the United States between 1956 and 1979, Sarah A. Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Yang Su found that resources – both monetary and organizational – were crucial for collective action to take place. More specifically, the authors found that collective action by women increased with higher numbers of organizational structures and also with greater levels of female
labor force participation. In their study, Soule, McAdams, McCarthy and Su offered
evidence to suggest that resources were more important for social movement emergence
than were political openings.

Similarly, studying the women’s movement in 1970’s and 80’s Brazil, Sonia
Alvarez (1990) found that the opposition Left provided women with the necessary
organizational basis for the development of their feminist movement. Lee Ann
Banaszak (1996) and Lisa Baldez (2002; 2003) also noted that organizational networks
were necessary (but not sufficient) for the formation of vibrant women’s movements
around the world. Finally, resources also played an important role in Anne Costain’s
1992 study of the women’s movement in the United States. Here, Costain (1992) found
that women’s higher educational achievements and workforce participation provided
important resources to those looking to mobilize.

While they have represented an important aspect of women’s mobilization (or a
lack thereof) in Chile and the Czech Republic, the presence of resources and mobilizing
structures alone cannot explain the variation in women’s organizing across the two
regions and across the two historical periods. In both countries, first under
authoritarianism and later under democracy, a variety of mobilizing structures were
available to women. Women in the two countries already participated in informal or
formal networks they could use to organize a movement. In authoritarian Chile and Latin
America more generally, the Catholic Church provided meeting spaces and social ties
that women were able to use to further their demands. This was especially the case prior
to the political overturn but also later during the democratic transition. Responding to the
economic crises that took place under the military regime, poor women united in
neighborhood associations which later enabled them to utilize their newly gained organizational skills in order to politicize their demands and mobilize on the basis of their gender identity. Furthermore, especially after the military regime ended, Chilean women were also able to draw on their participation in political parties.

In the Czech Republic and Eastern Europe more generally, women could rely on the existing networks of state-run women’s organizations. My interviews with women active in these organizations reveal that even though the organizations were formally under the patronage of the Communist Party, the individual branches of the Czech Union of Women were fairly autonomous and focused primarily on non-political activities such as organization of cultural events, delivery of goods to elderly citizens and planning of children’s activities. Furthermore, because of the omnipresent state repression, citizens and women in particular relied on tight and carefully built networks of trusted friends and relatives. These friendship networks and even many of the local groups organized under the patronage of the state run Women’s Union survived the political transformation and continued to provide potential bases for social mobilization for years to come. Because important resources were available to women in both authoritarian and later democratic Chile and the Czech Republic, they alone cannot explain the variation over time and across the two cases.

2. Political Process Approach

Complementary to the resource mobilization model, the political process approach within social movement theory emphasizes the interaction between social movements and the state. According to scholars in this area, movements develop in
response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to change (McAdam 1982). In other words, whether supporters are mobilized or not, and whether a movement advances or not, depends on the relevant political context. If potential movement participants view political conditions as favorable, they are more likely to organize.

Here, the concept of “political opportunity structure” has been found particularly useful in describing the properties of the external environment as they relate to social movement emergence (see Meyer 2004). More specifically, movements are thought to emerge in response to political openings resulting from changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given political system (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1998). Specifically, the stability of political coalitions, tolerance of opposition from governing elites, conflicts among political elites, and openness of the formal political access seem to matter the most (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1983). Recent scholarship has further broadened this political process model in that it has somewhat downplayed the significance of objectively existing political opportunities for movement emergence, and instead emphasized the role of participants’ perceptions of these opportunities and of potential threats (Banaszak 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996).

That political context matters in the process of forming social movements has been confirmed by a number of case studies, perhaps most notably represented by Doug McAdam’s (1982) well-known analysis of the American civil rights movement. In *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930 – 1970*, McAdam explains the rise and decline of the black protest movement in the United States.
Focusing on black churches, black colleges and Southern chapters of the NAACP, McAdam concludes that “movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to change” (40). Specifically, he suggests, political opportunities together with a heightened sense of political efficacy and the development of these three institutions played a key role in shaping the American civil rights movement.

That the political process model transcends borders has been documented in a number of comparative studies. For example, Gay Seidman (1994) applied the model to militant labor movements in South Africa and Brazil. As both countries were undergoing an ‘economic miracle’ resulting from the governmental intervention in the 1960’s, South African and Brazilian workers continued to experience a lack of basic social services and a decrease in real wages. Seidman documented how these worsening living conditions of workers, combined with the weakening of the state-capitalist alliance due to subsequent economic problems, created a political opportunity for workers to organize in trade unions, giving rise to new social movements.

The political process approach has also been applied in studies of women’s mobilization. For example, Sonia Alvarez (1990) relied on the combination of the political process and resource mobilization approaches to examine the development of arguably one of the largest and most successful women’s movements in Latin America – which occurred in the 1970’s and 80’s in Brazil. In her study, Alvarez analyzed how women’s interests were shaped in the political system. Furthermore, she examined the importance of state building and regime change for women’s mobilization in Brazil. She found that the context of gradual political liberalization opened up space for Brazilian
women’s mobilization. As such, the regime allowed women to organize while still actively repressing other sectors of civil society.

Generally speaking, it is the premise of this political process model that women are likely to organize when a window of political opportunity opens up. In contrast, women are expected to be reluctant to organize or it may be impossible for them to do so when such a window is closed. This seemingly simple theory is, however, laden with serious conceptual and measurement issues. The political opportunity concept has over the years been criticized for conceptual stretching as “virtually anything that, in retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement mobilize or attain its goals becomes labeled a political opportunity” (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 36). And similarly, Gamson and Meyer (1996) warned that “The concept of political opportunity structure is ... in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (275). Nevertheless, the concept of political opportunity can increase our understanding of the conditions under which women’s movements are likely to emerge in countries such as the Czech Republic and Chile.

If the concept of political opportunity is used in a very generic sense – as a major elite realignment within the given political system – and is correct, then women’s movements in Latin America and Eastern Europe should have been springing up during the early stages of the political transition. However, that was not the case. Ironically, Chilean women formed a powerful movement at a time when the repressive military regime put strong limits on many forms of civic participation. Then once the country transitioned to open democracy, the movement disintegrated. Czech women have not taken advantage of the political opening associated with the transition either. Therefore,
using the concept of political opportunity in its broader sense does not prove effective in understanding the emergence or decline of women’s activism in the two countries. This is why in this project, I seek to look beyond the general explanations of partisan realignment and other broad changes in the relevant political system when considering the interaction between the state and social movements formation.

I find that the type of political regime a country has is important for explaining the variance of women’s mobilization across the cases I study. First, history has shown that movements often arise or disappear when political regimes change. For example, a number of powerful women’s movements arose in the context of repressive authoritarian regimes in Latin America, but they disappeared once these countries transitioned to a democratic political regime. Second, and more importantly, the importance of political regimes as causal factors for women’s mobilization is supported by the existence of regional differences. For instance, the Eastern European and Latin American regions demonstrated very different patterns of women’s mobilization under the non-democratic regimes of the 1970’ and 80’s.

Identifying the special characteristics of political regimes that might be conducive to women’s mobilization can be a tedious process. However, it is possible to rule out a number of possible factors. First, one may assume that women’s status improved as a result of the larger political transformation, and therefore women no longer had a reason to organize around their gender identity. That is unlikely in light of available research suggesting that during and after the process of the democratic transition, both Chilean and Czech women continued to face important inequalities in both the private and public spheres. This included inequalities in the workplace, in political life and also at home.
Second, it is possible to rule out broader cultural or geographical differences as main causal factors because they cannot account for the variation in women’s mobilization in one country, such as Chile, over time.

Therefore, one needs to look at other regime characteristics to examine why women organized in some countries but not in others and why they mobilized in the context of one political regime but not others. Specifically, my research points to a combination of factors that have so far been neglected in the social movement literature. Namely, I suggest that the particular combination and implementation of policies as they pertained to women is of utmost importance for explaining women’s movement emergence. I refer to these as ‘gender regimes’.

3. Collective Identity Approach

While the political process model in the form of gender related policies and their implementation tells an important part of the story behind women’s mobilization in the two regions under study, it does not provide information about the particular processes through which policies impacted women. This is where the concepts of ‘framing’ and ‘identity’ come into play because shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation mediate between opportunities, organization and action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).

By the 1980’s, social movement theorists recognized that both the dominant resource mobilization and political process models had major weaknesses. Namely, the resource mobilization model could not account for the development of social movements over time, and it was difficult for the political process model to address new ‘identity
movements” whose goal was not to change state structures. As a result, a new ‘culturalist’ strand of research and literature developed within the social movement scholarship with the objective of explaining why movements arise and fall (see McAdam 1994; Johnston 1994; Swidler 1995). It is this body of literature that provides an important piece of the puzzle for uncovering the reasons behind the differences in Chilean and Czech women’s mobilization patterns.

In this relatively new perspective, the formation of social movements is viewed as an effort to shift the direction of social change by controlling societal symbols. What this suggests is that (a) grievances alone are not sufficient for social movement mobilization; and (b) that the perception of grievances by potential recruits is as important as their objective existence. The proponents of this model recognize that social problems are subject to change and that the ways in which organizers frame these problems, and whether the issues resonate with potential recruits and the public, is crucial for determining whether social groups will mobilize or not (see McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Swidler 1995; Snow and Benford 1988). This cultural approach thus emphasizes the importance of emotions, symbols, solidarity and perceived grievances in the formation of social movements. In other words, according to these authors, whether a movement forms or not depends on how activists define the issues they are concerned with and how they convey them to the public.

Over time, it has become increasingly common for scholars to recognize that the understanding of social movement emergence does not rest in any one of the three broad approaches (resources, political opportunities or collective identity) already described

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10 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) define framing as “the conscious, strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” (6)
above, but in their confluence (Banaszak 1996; McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 1997; Baldez 2002). In fact, many recognize the effects of the three types of approaches as mutually reinforcing (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 1997; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). For example, relying on a synthesis of resource mobilization, political process and collective identity approaches, Lisa Baldez (2002; 2003) studied the conditions under which, in the process of democratic transition, women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity. Examining primarily two historical examples of the Chilean women’s movement but in her later work also adding the cases of Brazil, Poland and East Germany, Baldez argued that women would protest if multiple conditions were in place. She referred to these as tipping, timing and framing. Specifically, she suggested that women in all four countries relied on a variety of organizational networks to build a movement. She emphasized the notion of ‘framing’ proposing that contact and alliances with activists in other countries were also of importance. Finally, she argued that for women to mobilize, they needed to be excluded from the political negotiations through which democratic opposition formed new alliances with one another.

Similarly, in her book Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and Struggle for Woman Suffrage Lee Ann Banaszak also utilized a combination of the resource mobilization, political process and cultural approaches when she asked why women’s suffrage in Switzerland was more than fifty years behind the United States. Her book expands our understanding of the role that political opportunities play in the formation of social movements, and of how the opening of these opportunities interacts with the beliefs and values of movement participants. Namely, Banaszak proposed that “While (women’s) tactical choices were affected by available resources and the political
opportunity structure in both countries, collective beliefs and values played an even larger role in those decisions” (36). Furthermore, she discovered that “Culture and beliefs allowed for the explanation of activists’ perceptions, internal decision making and strategies” (41). In other words, even when resources were available and a political opportunity opened up, the values and beliefs of Swiss activists prevented their utilization. Specifically, the Swiss suffrage movement’s belief in consensus politics and local autonomy limited their tactical choices while the American suffrage movement, influenced by the abolition and progressive movements, utilized a wider set of confrontational tactics.

The framing of social issues and the formation of collective identity is important for explaining the formation of women’s movements in some regions and their absence in others. Furthermore, framing is also a useful tool for explaining variation over time as well. Specifically, a number of students of Latin American politics have in the past described the ways in which women of the region framed their issues so that they would resonate with the public. To demand political, economic and social changes, women utilized their gender roles as they were defined by the state. They framed their demands and issues from the position of concerned mothers and wives. Additionally, as Lisa Baldez (2003) reminds us, Latin American women were able to use such framing successfully as they draw a link between feminism and greater democracy. However, it is less apparent why women in this region were not able to come together and continue to press the governments for women’s issues once democracy took place. In other words, the question remains; why did the formerly utilized frames not produce similar results upon the demise of the military regime?
In communist and later post-communist Europe, women were not able to use a shared identity to form a movement and demand their rights either under totalitarianism or democracy. To explain this, some point out to the role that the rhetoric of the communist government played in these processes. In this region, the Marxist frame successfully utilized by women in Latin America has already been appropriated by the communist governments. Terms such as ‘emancipation’ took on a different meaning under the patronage of the totalitarian regime (see Baldez 2003). However, it remains unclear why citizens in the Soviet Bloc did not use this same state rhetoric to their advantage. With many rights formally incorporated into the law, why didn’t Czech and other Eastern European women deliberately utilize the state approach to women’s issues and demand that women’s and other democratic rights be respected not only in writing but in reality as well? In other words, while the framing/culturalist approach seems to explain why feminist and other women’s movements emerged in some regions but not others, it is far too vague a concept to capture the particular mechanisms in play. The question that remains is: Why were women able to utilize particular frames in some countries and in some historical moments but not others? And is there one particular mechanism that explains the success or failure of these framing strategies in all cases?

**Gender and Transition Literature**

While social movement theory and research speaks to the issue of women’s movement emergence in general terms, the more specific question of regional differences in civic participation has been addressed by feminist and other scholars studying democratic transitions. While this literature says little about the nature of civic
participation and social movement formation prior to political turnovers, it provides important insights into the conditions under which citizens participate in civic associations and mobilize for social change in new democracies.

One strand in the transitions literature compares the strength of civil society in post-authoritarian Latin America to that of post-communist Europe. It argues that civil society in post-communist Europe is distinctively weak compared to other regions. Marc Howard’s 2003 study is of particular importance in this respect. Here Howard identifies three causal factors and proceeds to explain how mistrust in communist organizations, the persistence of friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment have had mutually reinforcing negative effect on civic participation in post-communist countries (26). If Howard is correct, one would assume that women’s movements were less likely to emerge in democratic Eastern Europe (and more likely in democratic countries of Latin America) because of historical differences in the regions’ developments.

However, Marc Howard’s study does not provide any insight into the variation in civic participation over time. In fact, the independent variables Howard uses are specific to post-totalitarianism and post-authoritarianism. Therefore, Howard’s findings are not able to address the surprising demise of the Chilean and other Latin American women’s movements in the context of new democratic regimes. Furthermore, the author measures the strength of civil society through citizens’ membership in formal organizations only. This does not directly translate into participation in informal social movements.

Howard’s work was not alone in neglecting alternative forms of civil society. Initially, much of the literature on democratic transitions paid surprisingly little attention to women’s forms of participation that fell outside of the formal politics realm (Waylen
1994). More recently, however, feminist and other scholars have since generated an extensive body of work offering a variety of possible explanations for women’s movement emergence or absence in a variety of settings (see, for example, Baldez 2003; Banaszak 1996; Einhorn 2003; Jaquette 2001; Jaquette and Wolchik eds. 1998; Siklova 1997; Rios-Tobar 2003). The literature on women’s activism in Latin America is particularly well developed, whereas much of the research devoted to the developments in post-communist countries has been collected in edited volumes, and with few exceptions remains empirically thin. Most of these studies explicitly or implicitly extend social movement theory to the examined country cases by putting forward a wide range of additional context-specific variables. In other words, rather than attempting to identify individual or a combination of mechanisms that could explain the formation or absence of mobilization around gender issues in a variety of settings, these scholars typically identify a variety of variables specific to the cases they study. As a result, much of the literature in this area cannot be generalized across different regions and cases.

In Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have typically referred to some combination of three factors that were thought to prevent women’s mobilization during the early stages of democratic transitions. These included

a) association of gender issues with the discredited Communist regimes and not with women’s understanding of their own interests

b) women’s lack of experience with organizing and civic participation

c) the rejection of international feminism as a result of pressures from Western feminists to have women in the region conform to their views

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11 For an exception, see Valerie Sperling’s (1999) account of women's organizing in post-communist Russia.
In particular, feminist scholars conducting research in post-communist Europe have emphasized the effects of the so called ‘forced emancipatory policies’ on women in the region. These authors have provided some anecdotal evidence documenting that when faced with the state’s appropriation of women’s equality, Eastern European women reacted by rejecting the goal of gender equality itself (Wolchik 1998a). These works have, however, done little to adequately support their arguments with empirical evidence and link their findings to general social movement theory. In addition, the concept of ‘communist legacies’ has in the works of transitologists and other scholars changed time into a residual category used to collect variance which could not be explained through other factors.

While the Central and Eastern European literature focuses on the absence of autonomous women’s activism during the early stages of the democratization process, in Latin America, existing research explores the occurrence of women’s movements as they formed under the formerly authoritarian regimes. In examining the origins of these often powerful movements, scholars have emphasized the effects of state economic policy and ensuing economic crisis, the state repression of human rights, and also the ways in which international feminism affected women’s identities in the region (see Baldez 2002; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Jaquette 1989).

Although all of these studies and essays speak to the question of women’s movement emergence in transitioning countries, they have not been successful in providing a general theoretical argument applicable to a variety of cases across different
regions. An important exception to this rule represents the above noted Lisa Baldez’ (2002) theoretically and empirically rich account of two Chilean movements taking place under two different political systems. Baldez argues that aside from resources, two conditions need to be in place in order for a women’s movement to emerge. In her own words these include; “partisan realignment, understood as the formation of new coalitions among political parties, and women’s decision to frame realignment in terms of widely held cultural norms about gender difference” (5). She further clarifies that women will respond to partisan realignment in gender terms if they and their interests are excluded from the discussions during such process of partisan realignment (11).

While persuasive in light of the two Chilean cases she analyzes, and to some extend even in light of the additional Eastern European cases she brings in in her concluding chapter, Baldez’ argument does not hold in other instances. Namely, her theoretical framework would incorrectly predict the mass mobilization of women in transitioning Czechoslovakia. Here, women were able to draw on informal networks, a political realignment did take place and women and their interests were excluded from the political agenda. And yet, women’s groups and organizations were not able to frame their concerns in ways that would resonate with the public.

One can also identify a second weakness in Baldez’ otherwise convincing argument. Much of the literature on Latin American women’s movements during the third wave of democracy actually assigns women’s movements great importance in aiding the democratizing process (and hence indirectly or directly contributing to the occurrence of the partisan realignment). The causal relationship between Baldez’ dependent and independent variables is therefore difficult to decode.
This dissertation builds on the research conducted by both transition and social movement scholars. While the existing regional studies have in broad terms recognized the importance of state ideology and public policies for women’s subsequent organizing for collective action, to date there exists little empirical evidence to uncover the particular processes through which state policies in combination with a particular state ideology affect various social groups and women in particular. Furthermore, this dynamic has been almost exclusively addressed in relation to the developments in post-communist Europe, and less is known about the policy effects in the case of Latin American countries. The effects of state policies on social movements also remain relatively unexplored in the literature generated by the political process theorists. This has been recently reiterated in a volume devoted to this topic by David Meyer: “public policy (has been) treated as a relatively minor part of the structure of political opportunities that might spur social movements” (Meyer et al. 2005, 6).

Drawing on all three dominant trends in the social movement literature – resource mobilization, political process and framing – I propose that contemporary policy theory and particularly the literature on policy feedback (Pierson 1993) can serve as a useful tool in explaining why women protest in some instances but not others. In other words, this study works with the assumption that women’s movement emergence cannot be adequately explained without paying attention to pre-existing state policies.

That political processes are influenced by political institutions as they develop over time is an idea incident to the ‘historical institutionalist’ approach in American
political science (see Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984; Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999; March 1984). Scholars employing this method of inquiry have for over three decades been exploring the ways in which both formal and informal types of institutions matter for political and economic behavior of citizens and for societal change. While the overwhelming majority of studies of politics concentrates on political processes at a given point in time (whether past or present), historical institutionalists argue that our understanding of these processes is likely to be incomplete and distorted when they are taken out of their temporal context. Instead, they suggest, “historical investigation focusing on unfolding processes can greatly illuminate our understanding of the present” (Pierson 2005, 49).

The idea that policies restructure subsequent political process has been around for a very long time (see Schattschneider 1935). However, until the early 1990’s, it was largely ignored by students of political science. Since then, this concept of ‘policy feedback’ has drawn renewed attention. In 1992 Theda Skocpol identified two basic types of such policy feedback dynamic. First, she argued, new policies may transform state capacities by creating, building upon, or undercutting administrative arrangements. And second, she suggested, they may affect the identities, political goals, and capabilities of social groups. Elaborating on Skocpol’s classification, Paul Pierson (1993) outlined the numerous ways in which identities, political goals and capabilities of social groups could be affected by preexisting policies. Most notably, Pierson (1993) suggested that

12 For the purposes of this study, I adopt Peter Hall’s (1986) definition of institution: "the formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy" (19).

13 It was not until the late 1960’s and 1970’s when the state was ‘brought back’ into the study of politics, and came to be viewed as an agent capable of influencing political processes (see Nettl 1968; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985).
policy feedback may affect government elites, interest groups and mass public through two basic types of mechanisms. First, particular policies provide individuals with specific resources and incentives (such as education). Second, policies may also affect individual citizens by conveying certain meanings about their status within the system.\(^{14}\)

As stated above, public policies affect politics through a variety of actors. Furthermore, political scientists seem to agree that policy feedback effects differ for policy-makers, interest groups and the public (see Pierson 1993; Soss and Schram 2007). And while scholars from various streams of the new institutionalism have addressed how pre-existing public policies affect the political goals and actions of political elites and organized interests (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hacker 2002; Heclo 1974; Lowi 1964; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Skocpol 1992), little is known about their consequences for the political attitudes and behavior of the mass public. Only recently has a handful of empirical studies addressed these dynamics as well (see, for example, Campbell 2003; Mettler 2005). These works have placed special emphasis on the ways in which policy design type conveys various messages to citizens and affects their civic engagement as a result (see Schneider and Ingraham 1993; Soss 1999). In short, policies have been shown to be powerful determinants of citizens’ participation in political life.

Policies set political agendas and shape identities and interests. They can influence beliefs about what is possible, desirable and normal. They can alter conceptions of citizenship and status. They can channel or constrain agency, define incentives, and redistribute resources. They can convey cues that define, arouse, or pacify constituencies. (Soss and Schram 2007, 113)

Unfortunately, the studies tracking policy feedback effects on mass public remain sparse. This led Mettler and Soss (2004) to argue that the effects of public policies on

\(^{14}\) see also McDonagh (2009) and Schneider and Ingram (1993)
mass opinion and behavior remain remarkably under-theorized. This research deficit is evident in the case of old democracies of North America and Western Europe (Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004), but especially in the case of countries in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe that have recently undergone radical and wide-ranging political transformations.\(^{15}\)

Furthermore, because they focus almost exclusively on the developments in the West, students of policy feedback have been studying the effects of public policies in political environments which are democratic and that have been relatively stable over time.\(^{16}\) Such conditions, however, are not the norm when one looks beyond the borders of Western Europe and North America. If preexisting policies have, indeed, the potential to produce long-term effects on citizens’ participation in public life, one cannot but wonder about the ways in which policies matter for political processes in authoritarian countries or how preexisting authoritarian policies continue to shape the political processes in countries that are newly democratic.\(^{17}\)

While little is known about the implications of public policies for the political participation and behavior of the mass public, even less has been done to systematically explore the relationship between policies and social movements (Meyer, Jenness, Ingram et al. 2005). To be sure, the topic is not entirely new. In the early 1970’s, Piven and

\(^{15}\) Lauren Morris MacLean’s work on the effects of state policy on informal networks in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire represents an important exception in this trend.

\(^{16}\) For an exception, see Valiente 1996

\(^{17}\) The idea that the authoritarian past may matter for subsequent political and other developments in new democracies has appeared in the literature devoted to the ‘third wave’ (see Huntington 1991) of democratic transitions. While one stream of the transitions literature devoted to post-communist Europe and Latin America emphasizes the changes and opportunities brought about by the political and economic transformations, a second one highlights the role of historical legacies for the contemporary development of these societies. These two approaches were outlined and hotly debated in *Slavic Review* by Valerie Bunce (1995) and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1994; 1995). See also Bunce 1999, Offe 1991; Howard 2003; and Ekiert and Hanson eds. 2003.
Cloward (1971) considered the ways in which government uses its social policy to prevent the poor from organizing against the state. To date, however, much of the existing research focuses on the ways in which social movements affect the formation of public policies rather than vice-versa (see Piven and Cloward 1977; Gamson 1975).

The general lack of research in this area is surprising given the possible implications of these ‘policy feedback’ effects for the development and maintenance of democratic citizenship in these nations. In order to understand the complexities of democratic political processes, we need know how “policies transform and expand the identities, political goals, and capabilities of various social groups that subsequently struggle or ally in politics” (Skocpol 1992, 58). In other words, we ought to be able to explain why some policies ultimately promote political action from the mass public while others impede it. This question is of a particular importance in new democracies which are trying to overcome their authoritarian past and whose political regimes are in some instances yet to be fully consolidated.

To sum up, by comparing two countries during two distinct historical periods, I am able to rule out a number of grievance related, cultural and geographical differences as main predictors for movement emergence or decline. Furthermore, as I document, both Chilean and Czech women had a variety of resources and mobilizing structures available to them under both the non-democratic and democratic regimes. Therefore, in this study, I build on the political process, collective identity and policy feedback models to uncover the specific characteristics of political regimes and framing processes that have mattered the most for the formation of women’s movements in these two regions.
Defining terms

Social and Women’s Movements

Terms such as ‘public policy’, ‘political regime’ or ‘women’s movements’, many of which I have used in the preceding part of this chapter, call for further specification. We as social scientists far too often avoid clear definitions and operationalization of the basic terms we employ. This creates much confusion over the exact nature and boundaries of the phenomena we are looking at, and as such, it makes further comparisons very difficult.

In this project, I rely on Sidney Tarrow’s definition of social movements (SMs). According to Tarrow (1998), social movements are “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (4) I understand women’s movements as a particular type of social movements. As in the case of other social movements, women’s movements come in a variety of forms and sizes, and they differ in regard to the grievances they address as well as to the goals they aim to achieve. As Saskia Wieringa (1997) noted, “Women’s movements have never spoken with a single voice” (7). They represent a variety of interests, issues and identities (Basu 1995).

This presents a difficulty for those seeking to develop a single definition of women’s movements that could be applied and remain relevant in a variety of historical and spatial settings. Scholars of comparative politics have typically addressed this issue by developing definitions of women’s movements in relation to the individual movements in particular countries they study. For the purposes of this dissertation,
I understand women’s movements as social movements where women act collectively as women. Baldez (2002) suggests that in all women’s movements, women invoke their identity as women in order to emphasize their uniqueness in relation to men and their interest in having greater access to decision making. Therefore, women’s movements can be those organized around feminist issues but also those where women come together as women to, for example, demand the state’s greater adherence to international human rights norms.

Karen Beckwith’s (2001) distinction between ‘women’s movements’, ‘feminist movements’ and ‘women in political movements’ is particularly useful in this respect. In Beckwith’s view, ‘women’s movements’ are those where women’s action is based on their identity as women. A narrower term, the ‘feminist movement’ refers to those instances of social movements whose primary concern is women’s challenge of patriarchy (Beckwith 2000). Finally, ‘women in political movements’ is an expression typically associated with any social movement where women participate (Beckwith 2000; Molyneux 1985). At the same time, it is important to recognize that the divisions among these three types of movements are not clearly drawn because there typically exist strong links among them all that make it difficult to separate them analytically (Waylen 1994).

This dissertation focuses on the effects of public policies on women’s movements. Because feminist movements are a specific type of women’s movements, they are also addressed here.

A second type of confusion one may encounter in the women’s movement literature relates to the difference between women’s organizations and women’s movements. While not all analyses of women’s movements are transparent about the
meaning of these terms, and there exists no consensus regarding this issue, for the purposes of this dissertation, I understand women’s organizations as formalized groups where women invoke their identity as women as they associate around particular issues. These issues may be very diverse, and they can include both feminist topics and issues related to women’s traditional roles as caregivers. What distinguishes women’s organizations from other types of organizations is the gender nature of the membership and also the emphasis on gender specific identity. In some instances, women’s organizations form women’s movements, in others, they remain independent. In cases where women’s organizations do form a movement, one can expect to see a broad-based collaboration around particular issues sustained over a significant period of time (a month or more).

Those new to the literature on comparative women’s movements may also be puzzled by the variety of terms scholars use to describe similar phenomena. These typically follow the adjective “women’s”, and they include expressions such as women’s movement, mobilization, activism, organizing, and/or civic participation. Other authors work with “women’s collective action” or an “emergence of women’s groups” (see Odoul and Kabira 1995). In the social movement literature generally, “mobilization” typically refers to the “unplanned or planned gatherings of people… organized by organizations or not… (in order to) further … short-to-long term social change.”\(^{18}\) It is therefore a somewhat narrower term in comparison to “social movement”. However, while this particular distinction is also used – to some extent – in the women’s movement literature, the differences among all of these terms seem to be much blurrier, and they are

\(^{18}\) This quote comes from an email exchange between the author and a social movement scholar John Burdick (11/13/2005).
often used synonymously to refer to “women’s movements” and their emergence. In this
dissertation, I choose to use terms such as ‘women’s mobilization’, ‘rise of women’s
activism’ and ‘emergence of women’s movement’ interchangeably.

Public and Women’s Policy

Two other terms I employ frequently are those of ‘public policy’ and ‘state
policy’. I understand public policy as “the sum of government activities, whether acting
directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens” (Peters 1999).
While public policies are typically embedded in laws, regulations and recommendations
issued by democratic governments, in the case of non-democratic regimes, these rules
and regulations may also be unwritten, but nevertheless known to the citizens. I include
these unwritten rules into my understanding of ‘public policies’. In this dissertation, I use
the terms ‘state policy’ and ‘public policy’ interchangeably. However, I prefer to use the
term ‘state policy’ in respect to non-democratic political regimes because here, the
‘public’ value of these policies is often questionable.

The concept of ‘women’s policy’ plays a particularly important role in my
research. My understanding is similar to that of Hoskyns (1996) who defines women's
policy as "The area of political action and activity which particularly concerns (or targets)
women or groups of women, or where issues are forced onto the agenda by women” (6).
Women’s issues are then those that "disproportionately become the responsibility of
women as a result of the sexual division of labor" and "where policy consequences are
likely to have a more immediate and direct impact on significantly larger numbers of
women than of men” (Carroll 1994, 15).
Finally, although intuitively evident, the term *policy legacy* deserves some specification as it is crucial for the story presented here. I understand policy legacies as (1) policies introduced in the past which continue to influence citizens today and (2) the material, institutional and cultural factors deriving from state policies introduced in the past but no longer in existence.

*State and Regime*

I follow Theda Skocpol’s (1992) understanding of *state* which draws on the definitions of Max Weber and Otto Hinze. Skocpol defines the state as “any set of relatively differentiated organizations that claims sovereignty and coercive control over a territory and its population, defending and perhaps extending that claim in competition with other states” (43). These organizations consist of administrative, judicial and policing organizations whose functions are: (1) the process of administration, (2) institutionalization of sovereignty, (3) sectoral autonomy, (4) law enforcement, and (5) social goal attainment and representation (Nettl 1968).

States and *political regimes* are, in my understanding, not synonymous concepts. I understand regimes to be “the formal and informal organizations, relationships, and rules that determine who can employ state power for what ends, as well as how those who are in power deal with those who are not” (Goodwin 2002, 12). In his famous typology, Juan Linz (2000) distinguished among three basic *regime types*: authoritarian, post-totalitarian and democratic.

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19 Although as I note below, one of the primary characteristics of the communist totalitarian regime are the blurry boundaries between state and regime as the dominant political party penetrates key state organizations. Similarly, in the case of military authoritarian regime, the boundaries may be crossed when the military takes over the executive power (for more on this, see for example Goodwin 2002, 12-15).
Democracy

To date, there seems to be little agreement among students of democracy and transitions as to what exactly the definition of democracy ought to be. Perhaps the most often employed definition is the so called “minimalist” one as presented in the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1947). There democracy is defined as “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (250). A minimalist and procedural definition was also adopted in the works of Robert Dahl whose theoretical work on democracy is probably the most influential in political science. In Polyarchy (1971), Dahl suggested that there are two dimensions to democracy: public contestation and political participation. Suggesting that democracy in its ideal form does not exist, he adopted the term polyarchy which he defines as a regime that “ha(s) been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (8)

However, I too follow those who argue that these institutional definitions are too narrow, simplistic and consequently insufficient as they fail to account for certain aspects (such as the presence of civil rights and liberties) usually associated with democracy and which are important to marginalized groups such as women. For this reason, in this project I consider a regime to be democratic when it fulfills all conditions outlined by Larry Diamond in his definition of ‘liberal democracy’. Here, Larry Diamond’s (1999) three characteristics of a liberal democratic political regime are helpful:

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20 For a debate of what democracy is... and is not, see Schmitter and Karl (1991)
i. a democratic political system: It enables citizens to choose their rulers in free and fair elections and to participate and express themselves in other political processes;

ii. a liberal political system: It limits the power of the state to encroach on the basic rights of its citizens, thus affirming civil liberties and minority rights; and,

iii. a republican political system: It provides the rule of law and good government through institutions of horizontal accountability that check and balance the executive (and other forms of) power, while holding all actors, public and private, equal before the law.” (xx).

**Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism**

There seems to be more agreement among scholars as to when a regime is authoritarian. Juan Linz’s classification has become a classic in the field. Linz (1964) defines authoritarian regimes as

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones (255).

Furthermore, Linz argues that there exist two basic types of non-democratic regimes.

The first one is the authoritarian type defined above, while the second is a type of regime he calls *totalitarian*. According to Linz, three characteristics are dominant in totalitarian regimes:

1. There is a monistic but not monolithic center of power, and whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center…

2. There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborate ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimize them. … The ideology goes beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality.

3. Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive
obedience and apathy … characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers. (70)

Therefore, what distinguishes the totalitarian from authoritarian regimes is the presence of a totalist ideology in totalitarian regimes, dominance of a single party, importance of the secret police and the existence of monopolistic governmental control over civic organization, economy and mass communications (Linz 2000).

So far, I have discussed three basic types of political regimes: democratic, totalitarian and authoritarian. However, not all regimes within these three groups share the same characteristics, and for this reason, it is also important to think in terms of regime subtypes. Most importantly for the purposes of this project, it is necessary to specify the communist totalitarian regimes that I (and others) also sometimes refer to as state socialism. Here, Valerie Bunce’s definition is helpful. According to Bunce (1999), state socialism as a type of political regime that existed in Central and Eastern Europe (but also in other parts of the world) and which was distinguished by four principal characteristics: (1) ideological mission of the ruling elite which emphasized anti-capitalist economy, equality and a transformation of the society; (2) communist party monopoly over the economy and political regime resulting in a fusion of the political and the economic; (3) the fusion of the party and the state apparatus; and (4) the strong institutional penetration of the party-state resulting, among other things, in the destruction of an independent civil society. As Bunce explains; “mass publics were rendered dependent on the party-state for jobs, income, consumer goods, education, housing, health care, and social and geographical mobility. … party-state held sole responsibility for the allocation of power, money and status” (24).
Region

Finally, there has been some debate in the democratization literature over whether a region is a meaningful category in the study of democratic transitions (see, for example, Batt 2007). Aware of the dangers associated with understanding a region as a causal variable on its own terms, I employ Valerie Bunce’s definition (2000) that describes region as a “summary term for spatially distinctive but generalizable historical experiences that shape economic structures and development and the character and continuity of political, social and cultural institutions” (Bunce 2000, 722). When referring to Eastern Europe, I typically mean countries of East Central Europe (geographically) which fulfilled the condition of liberal democracy definition after 1991, and which remained democratic since. These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, but also Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Although the experiences of other former Soviet Union countries are often also relevant, unless referred to specifically, I choose to exclude them from the analysis because their complicated political trajectories make them problematic for the study of social movements.
That Czech women did not organize around their grievances during the period of the communist regime is surprising in light of previous historical developments. Namely, it is puzzling because Czechoslovakia had a strong tradition of women’s mobilization dating back to the pre-World War II period. Czech and Slovak women were also active in the dissident movement of the 1970’s. Furthermore, despite a variety of gender oriented state policies introduced by the communist state, Czech women continued to face important inequalities in the home, in the workplace and also in formal politics.

Czech women’s activism can be traced back to the end of the 19th Century. Namely, the Czech women’s movement became particularly visible during the final stages of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire as women struggled to gain the right to vote. In the context of passionate intellectual and political disputes between those in support of the quickly spreading German language and those aiming to save traditional Czech culture, women began to establish female educational clubs. From the beginning, “it was clear the motive behind the club activity was women’s desire to get away from the confined environment of family life, and to participate in public life” (Horska 1999, 72). These clubs enabled women take part in religious and charity related activities, and as such, they served as substitutes for general political clubs that were closed to women. Around the same time, a number of Czech women became also visible as writers.

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21 The Austro-Hungarian Empire was a union between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire. During this time, Hungary and Austria maintained separate parliaments, each with its own prime-minister. The empire lasted for 51 years, dissolving on October 1918.
Through writing and organizing educational meetings, Czech women were for the first time able to get involved in public life.

At the same time as Czech feminists were fighting for the right to suffrage, they also became publicly active as patriots struggling alongside men to maintain Czech national heritage in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As Wilma Iggers (1995) pointed out, “The history of the emancipation of Czech women is closely linked with the history of their national awakening and of their philanthropic activity.” (Iggers 1995, 8) Therefore, the struggle for Czech national identity under Austrian government served as an opportunity for women to become publicly active while working alongside men.

Middle class women first focused on helping the poor through their participation in education clubs. Later, their attention shifted to women of their own class. And similarly as in the United States, several distinguished men lent their helping hand as well. Among others, Vojtech Naprstek (1826-1894) who returned back to Prague after a ten years long exile in the United States, came to symbolize the male contribution to the women’s emancipation of this time. The club he organized soon became known as the American Ladies Club because “Naprstek had become convinced that American women were much freer than Czech women to pursue their own interests, that they were more respected and that in America there was more educational equality between the sexes.” (Iggers 1995, 18)

As a result, the growing numbers of education and other philanthropic clubs organized by women in the late 19th Century had important consequences for Czech women’s position on the labor market. While poor women always worked, this concept
was fairly new to middle class women. By 1880, about 30% of women in the Western part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were receiving their own wages working primarily as laborers, servants or daily workers. A few also became teachers and clerks (Horska 1999, 75).

But the main goal of the early Czech women’s movement was to improve women’s qualification and education. Wilma Iggers (1995) reminds us that what the vast majority of Czech women had in common at this time was their low socio-economic position and their lack of formal education. Furthermore, the large numbers of women left widowed and without an income after the 1866 war against Prussia provided an additional incentive for the development of various educational and training opportunities (Kotlandova-Koenig 1999). As a result of these efforts, Czech women were the first in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to establish a “gymnasium”, an equivalent of an American senior high school for girls in 1890. By 1900, women were also attending Czech universities. Clearly, cultural norms were changing and higher numbers of women were able to receive further education.

The increasing access of women to higher education had further implications for women’s involvement in public life. This is because the Election Act of 1861 derived the right to vote in the parliamentary elections from the amount of personal tax paid and a type of one’s occupation. Therefore, because large numbers of women were now working, they could no longer be prevented from voting when the time of the 1908 election came about.22

22 At the same time, women were still barred from voting on different levels such as the Imperial Council, for example.
Given these developments, the public began to understand that the women’s movement needed “to be taken seriously as an important part of the overall social progress taking place at this time.” (Horska 1999, 80-81) Both the vehement demonstrations of the suffragists and the increasing amount of information about growing access of women to Western universities contributed to public understanding of the need for a women’s movement. Even Tomas Garrique Masaryk (T.G.M.), the future first President of independent Czechoslovakia, influenced by his American wife Charlotte, expressed his support for women’s emancipation in his speech given the night before the World War I started (Kotlandova-Koenig 1999).

Czech women today can also build on a strong tradition of women’s political participation and mobilization for greater political rights. The Czech women’s movement was notably active between 1905 and 1907, and it gained a clearly political character as the struggle for women’s suffrage intensified (Vosahlikova 1996). Until the end of the 19th Century, women were prohibited from taking part in existing political clubs. But despite the prohibition, the Social Democratic party has always been accepting women as members. Then in 1905, the Council for Women’s Suffrage, an informal club under the leadership of Frantiska Plaminkova, was established in Prague.

Surprisingly, in the Czech lands, female candidates to the Parliament preceded women’s suffrage. In the 1908 parliamentary elections, women’s votes suddenly became important. As Horska (1999) points out, “several Czech political parties attempted to take advantage of the situation by introducing female candidates”(72). The first woman to be elected into the parliament was Bozena Vikova-Kuneticka who replaced a deceased parliamentary member in 1912. She campaigned on patriotic ideals rather than a
feminist agenda. By 1918, the year when Czechoslovakia became officially independent from the Austrian Hungarian Empire, female representatives on different administrative levels were no longer an exception. After two decades of intensive lobbying, Czech women finally gained a full right to vote in 1919 setting a strong precedent for future women’s activism.

**Women and the Communist State: 1948 – 1989**

By World War II, women’s activism was well established in the Czech lands and nothing seemed to stand in way of women’s rights advancement. After the Second World War, in the context of a short period of democratic rule, a number of Czech and Slovak women’s activists gathered to revitalize the active women’s movement that was in existence during the pre-war period. Women were once again active in labor unions, and political parties established branches just for women (Uhrova 1990). Each political party even published a magazine for women. By 1947, the non-partisan *Women’s Council* united about forty women’s organizations. They worked together to achieve equality for women and improve women’s participation in public life in post-war Czechoslovakia. The *Women’s Council* also followed the pre-war tradition of collaborating with women’s organizations abroad.

But these efforts were interrupted by the Communist coup in February 1948. To establish the new totalitarian system, the new Czechoslovak government began to systematically outlaw all independent political or civic activity and brutally repress any potential opponents. Czechoslovak citizens disagreeing with the new system and its policies were jailed and even executed after they were sentenced in the many ‘show
trials’ prepared and run by the government. The leaders of the earlier women’s movement were not spared as documented on the case of Milada Horakova, the leader of the Women’s National Council who became a victim of a conspiracy prepared by the newly established communist regime, and was executed in 1950. 23

Soon, the Communisty Party united all permitted social and political activities under the National Front, an umbrella organization comprising a variety of political organizations, trade unions, and so-called voluntary social organizations. “The centralized system of state power thus autocratically permeated areas of private interests or citizens needs and did not permit alternative forms of association to develop independent of the National Front” (Fric 1999, 4). But did this mean that the window of opportunity for women’s organizing closed?

The state repression of independent organizations and movements had undoubtedly important consequences for women’s activism. In 1950, the regime replaced the independent Women’s National Council with a centrally coordinated Czechoslovak Women’s Union (CWU) that was closely connected with the Communist Party. 24 After February 26, 1948, this was the only women’s organization operating in the Czech lands. Its motto was “By building the nation, you will strengthen peace”. In its resolution in November 1949, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party defined the mission of the CWU:

It is its mission to lead activities for women, especially the fight for peace and to perform those tasks that are not peculiar to labor unions or other mass organizations. (Archival UKZ6_37-40).

23 The Women’s National Council was an umbrella organization for a number of women’s liberal clubs during the time of the “1st Republic” (1918-1938). This organization was a successor of the earlier established Women’s Czech Club which since 1901 represented a center of emancipation efforts and by which was the Council for Women’s Suffrage established in 1905 (see Buresova 2001, 41-42).
24 For a detailed overview of the events leading to and surrounding this transformation, see Skalova 2004.
In 1952, the state once again reorganized the state-controlled women’s organization when the Communist Party temporarily dissolved the Czechoslovak Women’s Union (CWU). It was reasoned that based on the premises of Marxist scholarship, the ‘woman’s question’ did not exist, and therefore there was no need for women to organize. To replace CWU’s activities, local city governments also known as the National Councils began to establish local Women’s Councils. Their goal was to actively engage women in ‘building the socialist society’, ‘building peace’, ‘improving productivity in factories’ and many others (Uhrova 1990). It took 15 years before the Czechoslovak Women’s Union was re-established and the significance of gender recognized by the state again.

It would seem that by eliminating all independent forms of organization, the state removed important mobilizing networks and resources from Czech and Slovak women. However, my interviews with women active in these organizations reveal that the individual branches of the Czech Union of Women were fairly autonomous and focused primarily on non-political activities such as organization of cultural events, delivery of goods to elderly citizens and planning of children’s activities. As one of the interviewed women noted; “The Union of Women was not very political on the local level. There were people who showed up when there was no one to clean windows or organize a Children’s Day. It was very hands on.” (personal interview). Therefore, unconsciously, the state created alternative mobilizing structures for women. Czech women, however, did not take an advantage of these.
State Ideology toward Women: Conflicting Messages

In the context of the post World War II period, both women and men had high hopes for the future. During this time, the state introduced a number of new policies that women expected to have a positive impact on their lives. In other words, it is possible that early on, women did not organize because they felt their grievances would be addressed.

After the Communist overthrow of 1948, Czechoslovak women as a social category became gradually central to the development of communist ideology. This did not mean, however, that emancipation and advancement of women’s rights was an issue of interest for the state that based its ideology on a simplified interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. In her 1976 (pro-regime) publication, Bauerova explains the foundations of the state’s attitude towards women’s liberation: “... the classics of Marxism conditioned the liberation of women by the following three factors:

a) existence of socialist economy,

b) participation of women in economic activity,

c) formation of an extensive net of services and commerce, and abolishment of small-scale production.” (Bauerova 1976, 29)

The state policy towards women was derived from the government’s interest in developing a socialist society, and explicit concerns about inequality were typically reduced solely to issues of social class.

Therefore, rather than focusing on women’s issues per se, the communist regime used its policies to systematically address the three conditions summarized by Bauerova. Point number one regarding the necessity of a socialist economy was addressed soon
after the 1948 coup when the regime headed by the Communist Party began to nationalize all enterprises, collectivize land and when it established a system of a centrally planned economy. Given the situation in the rapidly developing national economy after the war, the country soon began to lack in qualified labor force. In response, the regime began to systematically draw women into the labor force. Finally, the communist government also quickly realized the need to address the necessity for services and goods that would ease women’s transition into the labor force, and began to respond it by introducing a variety of social services targeting women and mothers in particular. While early on the public shared the post-War excitement surrounding the idea of building a new socialist society, the enthusiasm diminished in light of further developments.

*The ‘Women To Work’ State Campaign*

First, the relationship between the Czechoslovak state and women was throughout the 1950’s and early 1960’s defined by a powerful state campaign aiming to increase the participation of women in the communist labor market. The idea that there was plenty of work (and jobs) for everyone as a result of a rapid growth of the heavy industry and of the displacement of ethnic Germans was very prominent at this time.

In this context, the state came to view and define women primarily in terms of their working capacity. In a personal interview, a former employee of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs explained: “A non-working woman did not have much value for the government and state officials. The idea of that time was a woman who was willing to do anything – even if it was at the expense of her family.” The state encouraged
women to participate in the labor market in order “to build socialism and peace”. It primarily targeted middle class women who had been staying at home until this time, and it used a variety of means to bring women into the factories. The authorities worked to reach women through the media, advertisements in the public transportation system, through the movie industry, and through the newly established network of branches of the Central Women’s Committee of the Communist Party. Later, it also used the state-controlled Czechoslovak Women’s Union.

The documents of the Central Women’s Committee of the Communist Party collected in the Czech Central Archive detail how the Communist Party placed little emphasis on actual ‘women’s issues’. Arguably, the Czechoslovak family law introduced in 1950 did guarantee gender equality within the family, but what the Communist Party emphasized in reality was the importance of women’s contribution to ‘building the socialist state’ (Archival 20/2-3). The state was drawing women to jobs in construction, heavy industry and distribution of goods. It established quota for women in these areas. In his 1954 address, President Antonin Zapotocky also turned attention to women’s role in the socialist economy when he pointed out that “During the Five-year plan, the number of those employed in industry and construction/building has increased by 36%. Women represent a large portion of these growing numbers” (Rude Pravo, 2/37).

In 1951, the Central Women’s Committee conducted a survey examining the ‘Experiences in Recruiting Women to Employment’. The study describes in detail the ways in which women were recruited into the workforce:

... the Czechoslovak Women’s Union... establishes information centers called Service for Women. To date, we have 117 of them. ... The centers have lists of
open jobs and daycare facilities available to women. ... Otherwise, the recruiting takes place directly. Most often, after a campaign and promotion in the newspapers, radio, posters and through meetings, a couple of working women go and visit women at home. Mailmen provide a good service because they have a good idea about which women are not involved in the working process, and they can point to any remaining workforce reserve. (Archival 1261/1/17 KSČ Ústřední komise žen, Unit 134).

As a result of these state efforts, the numbers of working women were growing. And they continued to grow even faster as a result of decreasing living standard. In June 1953, the Czechoslovak Currency Reform did away with the devalued currency, food and product stamp system, and the black market. Consequently, prices increased and the standard of living declined. According to Jiri Vecernik, a Czech sociologist, the currency reform “made people dependent on the state. That was the point.” (personal interview)

The declining standard of living together with the state’s campaign to bring women to paid employment led to a significant increase of the female workforce. A leading demographer explains that by the 1950’s, “it was socially unacceptable for women not to work” (Kucera, personal interview). As documented in Table 3.1, by 1970 over 80% of women were economically active (Kucera 1994, 77). By 1976, women represented 47.8% of all employed persons in Czechoslovakia (Bauerova 1976, 111).

Table 3.1. Trends in economic activity of Czechoslovak women 1950-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economic activity of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hamernik 1976
However, despite the overall growing trend in women’s employment, the numbers looked very different in various industries (see Table 3.2). Throughout the communist period, there remained a fairly strong gender segregation within the existing ‘labor market’.

Table 3.2 Proportion of women among Czechoslovak workers in selected branches of the national economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building/construction</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation (non-production units)</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and research</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare and social work</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and culture</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary and public administration</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foret & Illner 1976

Most noticeably, the percentage of women working in industry, building/construction and business/food industry grew over time, while the proportion of women employed in agriculture was decreasing. The formerly feminized agricultural sector came to be dominated by male workers. Construction and transportation were the least feminized industries. In contrast, healthcare, trade, education and culture represented the most feminized spheres.

Striking were the high numbers of employed women who had children. As Marie Cermakova, the director of the Czech Sociological Institute and a leading expert in the area of women and labor force suggests “What was really new was that women with small children started working in large numbers” (Cermakova, personal interview). However, the intensity of women’s economic activity decreased with the number of
children. Of married women with one child, 78.5% were employed in 1980. 76.7% of women with two children worked and the number is 62.4% for women with three or more children (Bauerova and Jancovicova 1983).

To assess whether women were dissatisfied with their situation or not, and whether they had a reason to organize and protest, it is helpful to look at some historical data. Bauerova and Bartova (1987) examined the reasons why individual women entered the labor force. According to the surveys of the 1980’s, only 3.3% of women preferred to stay at home under any conditions (Vitek et al. 1983). Sixty percent of women between the ages of 21 and 35 wanted to stay at home temporarily – one to three years while they care for small children. Thirty-six percent of women did not want to stay at home at all (Bauerova and Bartova 1987, 198). Bauerova and Bartova (1987) noted that those supporting women’s traditional role were typically older persons and men in particular, people with lower education and those living in rural areas.

Women proposed three primary motives for entering the workforce: economic, social and work related. Financial reasons dominated the answers in the 1960’s survey. A 1965 survey conducted by the Czechoslovak Commission of People’s Control and Statistics revealed that over two thirds of newly employed women entered the workforce for financial reasons (Srb 1966). However, by the 1970’s and 80’s, women emphasized social and career oriented motives. Here, women suggested that work provided them with important social contacts, support and encountering interesting people and problems. Less frequently, women suggested that the work they did was interesting, useful or that they liked using their qualifications (Bauerova and Bartova 1987).

25 Vera Kucharova, a Czech sociologist has to say the following about the reliability of the data collected under the totalitarian regime: “The Statistical Office was controlled by the Communist Party. The data they produced are reliable, but something else was presented to the public” (Kucharova, personal interview)
To ease women’s transition to the labor force, the communist government recognized the necessity of introducing a variety of services and programs (see Table 3.4 below). First, the government worked to expand women’s qualifications and skills through education. Educational levels of women rose steadily during the communist period; “While in 1955 every third girl who left school directly joined the labor force, by 1961 only every tenth girl left school without pursuing some further education” (Heitlinger 1979, 150). By the end of the 1980’s, the percentage of women with a high school diploma was higher than that of men. And while in 1948/49, women represented only 23.2% of university students, by 1989/1990, the number rose to 45% (Cermakova 1992, 54).

Table 3.4 Proportion of female students in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized secondary school</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bauerova and Jancovicova 1983

To enable women to carry full time jobs, the totalitarian communist state also began to introduce a seemingly generous network of social services available to women, namely a range of daycare facilities for children. The Czechoslovak Women’s Council pledged to construct additional day nurseries, kindergartens and other programs and facilities for children. As a result, the number of day nurseries for infants and children under 2 years of age grew from 511 in 1950 to 1,155 in 1970 (Kucera, personal

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26 In 1991, 24% of women as compared to 21% of men had high school diploma. However, only 5% of all women compared to 9% of men received education at the University level (Stasova 2000, 9).
The numbers of state and company kindergartens for children between the ages 3 and 5 also grew as documented in Table 3.427

Table 3.4 Total Number of State-operated Kindergartens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of institutions</th>
<th>No. of spaces</th>
<th>% of children 3-5 yrs of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4,359</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,732</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,582</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kucera 1994, 77

“The trend of the 1950’s was to get children into day nurseries, no one worried about its possible implications for these children” (Kucera, personal interview). At this time, “Daycare facilities were a necessity not an achievement or a luxury” (Krejcova, personal interview).

The official paid maternity leave continued to enable women to stay out of work during the last four weeks of pregnancy and then the subsequent fourteen weeks after giving birth. A survey conducted by the State Population Committee in 1962 revealed that once the official maternity leave was over, only one third of women opted to return to work.28 Another third asked the employer for an unpaid leave and the remaining third left paid employment altogether (Prokopec 1963).

During the first post-war years, the Czechoslovak Women’s Council under the patronage of the Communist Party also promised women that their housework would be made easier in order to enable them to enter the labor market. The state worked to supply families with various kitchen and other appliances in order to decrease the burden of housework and childcare. Specifically, the government began to establish Free

27 These numbers somewhat differ from author to author. According to Bartosova (1979), for example, there were 1,120 daycare facilities for children between the ages of 3-6 in Czechoslovakia in 1945, and this number grew to 6,633 in 1960 (30).
28 The respondents were 6,176 randomly selected women.
Household Cooperatives that offered a variety of services such as dry-cleaning, laundry and ironing (Uhrova 1990).

Over time, the artificial full employment, centralized income scales affecting all employees, as well as extremely strong redistributive social policies, led to relatively low income inequality. 29 This is well documented by the extremely low levels of GINI coefficients in communist countries. For example, the GINI coefficient for persons was 0.158 in 1988 Czechoslovakia (Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1998, 355).

But despite the state policies resulting in low income inequality and small gender differences in educational levels, women did not gain an equal position with men in the official working sphere. In other words, important grievances remained. Most notably, the fact that the regime supported women’s entrance to the labor market did not become reflected in women’s status and salaries. A prominent Czech demographer of that time explains:

Talking about the gender wage gap… this information was secret, little research was done. Even the number of citizens was kept secret. Equality was established by the law, but the gender wage gap was huge in some industries. (Kucera, personal interview).

Bauerova and Bartova (1987) also confirmed that the average salaries of women were lower than those of men, and they attributed these differences to the disproportionate numbers of men in heavy industry but also in leadership positions. According to Krizkova and Vohlidalova (2009), in the 1960’s the average female salary in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was around two thirds of the average male salary (44).

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29 Although this has been to a great extent the case in all communist countries, the equitability of income was especially profound in former Czechoslovakia (Atkinson & Micklewright 1992; Milanovic 1997; Potucek 2001).
Furthermore, while the public accepted many of the employment and social provisions favorably in the context of the post-war enthusiasm and pro-socialist mood in the society, it was often dissatisfied with their implementation on the ground. Despite its ambitious goals in the first phase of its state-building, the Czechoslovak state had limited resources to fund these various programs. Consequently, the state soon transferred some of the responsibility for building childcare facilities and providing other services to factories and companies. Typically, local labor unions took over and began to organize a variety of services for families with children. A survey conducted by the State Population Committee in 1962 found that the number one reason for women not to return to work after giving birth was the acute lack of childcare facilities or other options available to them (Prokopec 1963).

A prominent Czech sociologist Marie Cermakova refers to a ‘myth about socialism’. She refers to the disconnection between the state propaganda regarding the availability of childcare facilities and what actually was available to parents. According to Cermakova; “not everyone had access to daycare facilities, you often had to rely on nepotism to get a spot” (Cermakova, personal interview). This situation was further exacerbated by the 48 hour working week which was an official state policy that lasted until 1960, and by the omnipresent shortages of basic goods. Eva Uhrova, a former editor of the Vlasta magazine comments: “I remember a cover page of Vlasta – there was a picture of pregnant women standing in a line for goods. Women considered standing in a line the norm”. (Uhrova, personal interview)

Therefore, despite the formal provisions and promises made by the state, women with small children continued to struggle to combine childcare with paid employment.
And yet, these topics quickly retreated from the public agenda. “The (Czechoslovak Women’s) Union really tried to deal with some of the initial problems facing women in the 1950’s, but they had very little power” (Uhrova, personal interview). In fact, in a personal interview, the former chief editor of Vlasta, a key women’s magazine during communism, stated that during communism, the heads of factories and other businesses avoided the active leaders of the Czechoslovak Women’s Union because they did not want to respond to their demands!

This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of governmental institutions addressing gender inequality. As the supporters of state socialism believed that social problems would disappear, they even eliminated the Ministry for Social Affairs in the early years of the Communist Regime. The Ministry was not reinstated until 1968. Meanwhile, social problems did not disappear with the arrival of communism. In fact, a number of new problems arose. It becomes clear that while the Czechoslovak state pushed women into the labor market, it sent women conflicting messages when it did little to ensure gender equality in regard to pay and access to leadership positions. Furthermore, women continued to struggle to combine motherhood with paid employment. While the state propaganda declared the ‘women’s question’ solved, women in Czechoslovakia continued to experience long working hours, lack of available childcare facilities and also all-pervading shortages in basic goods including groceries and hygienic products (Moghadam 1993).

Renessaince of Motherhood: Pro-Natalist Policies of the 1960’s
The message about their desirable societal role as it was communicated to women by the Czechoslovak state changed profoundly with the introduction of pro-natalist policies in the 1960’s. Until then, the state emphasized women’s role in building socialism through women’s participation in the economy as the heavy industry grew rapidly in the 1950’s and 1960’s. During this time women were viewed primarily as workers and the ‘woman’s question’ was considered irrelevant in light of Marxist teaching. But this view began to change in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s as a result of declining fertility rates. Suddenly, through state policies, women were asked to devote themselves to traditional, childrearing roles again.

While in 1947 there were 23.6 children born per 1,000 persons in Czech lands, this number declined to 14.1 by 1964 (Bartosova 1979, 19). By 1969, Czechoslovakia had the lowest birth rate among all European nations. In response, the socialist propaganda began to call for women to become "good mothers" in addition to being "good workers” in order to continue building a "free and prosperous socialist society" (Castle-Kanerova 1992), and the communist government started to expand the already existing set of policy provisions aiming at supporting young families and mothers in particular.

A number of developments contributed to this decrease in the fertility rate and to the subsequent reconsideration of state social policy toward women and families. First, the census of the late 1960’s revealed that employed mothers had fewer children. The data were not conclusive, but they led officials to ask questions about this relationship. It became clear that while the state persisted in drawing women into the labor force, the development of childcare facilities and housework related services for families promised
by the state continued to stagnate. Despite the growing number of state and company established day nurseries and daycare facilities, the supply never caught up with the demand. Furthermore, women continued to be disproportionately burdened by housework. According to Milada Bartosova, a former employee of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and of the Czechoslovak Women’s Union, “by the 1960’s, we began to collect data documenting that women’s position is really not as good at it should be” (Bartosova, personal interview). As families continued to be dependent on two incomes, women found it increasingly difficult to combine motherhood with paid employment. As a result, the average number of children per each woman began to decline.

Second, the 1957 abortion law made it legal for women to interrupt their pregnancy for social reasons. While in Western countries women had to fight for the right to abortion, in Czechoslovakia it came from ‘above’. Dana Musilova, a Czech historian, suggests that “the reason for this new policy was not related to women’s rights but rather it was perceived as a health issue” (Musilova, personal interview). David Delia (1992) concurs when he says that the new abortion law was put in place in response to problems with illegal abortion. Ideology was less of a factor in the development of these policies (80). This led to an additional decrease in fertility rates because abortion was used as birth control which was slow to arrive in the socialist countries (Bartosova 1979; Delia 1992).

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30 Abortion was legalized in Czechoslovakia in 1920. In 1936, it was legally restricted to cases where mother’s health was threatened (Delia 1992, 82).
31 By 1960, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and China allowed abortion on request, or on the basis of social need (Delia 1992, 82).
In response to the declining birth rates, the 1962 Convention of the Czechoslovak Communist Party gave an impetus for the creation of state population policy. Milan Kucera, a demographer and a policy advisor during this era describes the situation:

During 1962 and 1963, an interdepartmental commission was created to design a program of social assistance for families with children. This commission conducted an analysis of population growth, and it also studied living conditions of Czech and Slovak families. However, the proposals were deemed too expensive, and were put aside for several years. … When the 1968 Prague Spring came, the political leaders needed to calm the nation down and redirect people’s attention from politics to their families and private lives. The family policy program had been already prepared, so they started to implement it (Kucera, personal interview).

In response, the state established the State Population Commission in 1962. The Commission assisted in gradually expanding the number of social provisions protecting women during the childbearing stages of their lives. These programs and policies consisted mainly of relatively generous schemes of maternity allowances and maternity leave in which women were guaranteed their jobs.

A new Labor Code was introduced at the beginning of the 1960’s in order to unite a variety of policies aiming to protect women during the maternity period. In 1964, the official maternity leave was prolonged to 22 weeks of paid leave. At this time, women could also request unpaid leave from their employers until the child reached one year of age. Official maternity leave was further prolonged in 1968. After 1970, women were able to take advantage of additional non-paid leave. By the late 1980’s, women were entitled to a standard three year long paid maternity leave during which the employers were obliged to hold their jobs open.

32 It is interesting that only two out of the sixty members of the Lehr’s Commission had three or more children (Kucera, personal interview).
Another important measure introduced at this time was the differentiation of the retirement age according to the gender of the worker, and for women also according to the number of children born by them. As a result, while the legislation would allow men to retire at the age of 60, it could have been as early as at the age of 53 for women (see Kucera 1968). Demographer Milan Kucera describes the ad-hoc origins of this policy:

The idea of the differentiated gendered retirement was invented in 1965. Women would retire earlier. This was considered a pro-natalist policy. It was not something that went through some public debate, it was simply an idea developed by the women who worked at the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Central Women’s Union. They came up with it because they wanted to retire early. (Kucera, personal interview).

Milada Hrda, an employee of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs during communism, confirms that “Policy-making was much easier during communism, you only had to satisfy one party” (Hrda, personal interview).

During this time, the Labor Code also defined acceptable working conditions for pregnant and breastfeeding women. These included regulations regarding safety conditions at work, over-time work, night work and breaks. Regular breaks were introduced for breastfeeding women. Furthermore, following the recommendations of the International Labor Organization, Czechoslovakia included provisions protecting female workers in mines, established weight limits that could be safely carried by women, and as the only communist country, it also laid out the conditions under which women could work at night.

Other pro-population measures included a massive increase in new apartments built and made available to young couples, lump sums of money given to parents of a newborn child (birth grants) and paid leaves for the parents of sick children. In 1973,
the state began to offer zero interest and other beneficial loans to young couples. These programs included significant financial contributions for each child born to eligible couples under the age of 30. At the same time, the state also increased child allowances.

The politically more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1960’s enabled Josef Langmeier and Zdenek Matejcek (1968) to conduct a study of day nurseries for the newly established State Population Committee. It was discovered that these institutions tended to have a negative impact on children’s development. It was the first time an authority had openly suggested that institutional care may not be ideal for child’s development. In other words, while in the 1950’s everyone was trying to get their infants into day nurseries, during the 1960’s, the role of mothers as caregivers was rediscovered. Dana Musilova, a Czech historian concludes in this context: “The renaissance of motherhood was peaking (in the 1970’s)” (Musilova, personal interview). The importance of mothers was further underscored through the introduction of the SOS Village project which advocated for the replacement of institutional care for children with foster family placement.33

These political developments and policy discussions on the issue of population developments were interrupted in 1968 after a reformist Alexander Dubcek came to power in January that year. He worked to partially decentralize the economy and democratize politics as well. To provide context for the development of public policy and social movements during this time, it is important to note that under his watch, the Czechoslovak government loosened restrictions on the freedom of speech and freedom of travel. He also established a federation of Czech and Slovak Republics.

33 In 1968, the Circle of Friends of SOS children's villages was founded in Czechoslovakia in response to the visit of the founder of the first SOS village in the world, Hermann Gmeiner.
In August 1968, the invasion by the Soviet military and forces of the Warsaw Pact put an end to these democratizing processes. What followed was a period of ‘normalization’ - a return to previous ways of doing things. The government maintained control by imprisoning and intimidating opponents of the regime, by conducting house searches, denying appropriate employment to thousands of people, denying educational opportunities to children of political opponents, and not allowing citizens to travel abroad. The government led by Gustav Husak also worked to redirect citizens’ attention from public affairs to private life. A set of new state policies targeting women and families with children was introduced in the 1970’s with the objective of pacifying the public by providing additional benefits to families and by improving the state of the economy.

As a result of these changes, people retreated into the safety of their homes, since the private sphere was least affected by the strict political control exercised by the communist state. Milan Kucera, a prominent Czech demographer of this period explains:

After the summer of 1968, in the Czech lands alone, 327,000 people were expelled from the Communist Party, and some 400,000 lost the opportunity to fully participate in employment and public life. Many turned to their families and friends. … This is where the phenomenon of the weekend homes started. During weekends, people retreated to their weekend homes where they could spend time with their family and friends and there they could exercise freedom of speech. (Kucera, personal interview).

Fertility increased dramatically as a result of these developments as young people were being driven away from public life into the private sphere, and the state introduced new family policies supporting young families with children.

At first, women welcomed the pro-natalist policies introduced by the communist government, but soon it became clear that the laws and state rhetoric did not always align
with reality. In a personal interview, Eva Uhrova, an editor of Vlasta, the most popular women’s magazine under communism explains:

We were seeing completely different working conditions than what the communists were promising to people. Take for example the work of pregnant women. They were supposed to be protected but they had to climb up the weaving loom to tie the thread all the time.

There was a clear disconnect between what the state was communicating to women and the actual working conditions women encountered in their jobs.

This shift in government policies and rhetoric towards women’s role as mothers (as opposed to the earlier emphasis on their role as workers) reinforced traditional division of labor in the family (Heitlinger 1979; Scott 1974; Wolchik 1979). “The pronatalist policies… reinforced the idea that childrearing and domestic work are ‘by nature’ women’s work” (Heitlinger 1996, 83). That none of the experts or government officials involved in preparing the population policy questioned women’s exclusive responsibility for caregiving and housework within the family is well reflected in the exchange within the State Population Commission and in academic articles and discussions of this time (see, for example, Srb 1960). The experts of this time were concerned with the development of policies that would enable women to “successfully fulfill all functions expected of her by the family and by the society” (Ulrych & Wynnychuk 1961, 19).

Overall, the pro-natalist policies had a profound effect on women’s lives. Delia (1992) explains:

The unparalleled power of the state in countries ruled by a single party, its great organizational ability, and the general acceptance that individuals’ interests should be subordinated to national ones, meant interventionist population policies had a tremendous impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, and especially women. Policy makers did sometimes pay lip service to women’s welfare in justifying
policy. But arguments couched in these terms, that abortion or contraception were bad for women’s health, or that repeated child-bearing exhausted women and was a barrier to sex equality, tended to change conveniently to match the prevailing wind (80).

Despite the legislative changes and formal promises made by the Czechoslovak government, the implementation of some of these policies continued to lag behind. In reality, many families continued to face a lack of daycare facilities and housework related services (Bartosova 1979). In 1976, a public opinion poll suggested that about one-third of families with small children were not able to find an opening in daycare facilities (Cakiova 1979). The situation regarding the delivery of housework related services was also improving only slowly. Additionally, no one started questioning the traditional stereotypes and the role of women as primary caregivers and of those responsible for vast majority of household tasks. In fact, a closer look at Vlasta, the government-sponsored women’s magazine of this time, reveals that the communist government continued to deliver the message that outside of paid employment, women ought to carry on their traditional roles. Without contest, Czech women took on what Arlie Hochschild later called The Second Shift (1990). Research conducted in the 1970’s estimated that Czechoslovak women were on average devoting 3-5 hours a day (and 6 hours during weekends) to housework (Bauerova and Bartova 1987).

Furthermore, it would be misleading to believe that women gained an equal position with men in the official working sphere. Public opinion polls from the 1970’s and 80’s document a significant gender gap in the salaries received by women and men, discrimination in employment of women with small children as well as an inadequate use of women’s qualification and education (Bauerova and Bartova 1987). In 1972, while salaries were computed according to official governmental scales, women working in
industrial enterprises continued to receive 64% of the salaries received by men (*Mineni zen* 1972).

While as early as the 1960’s the state declared the ‘women’s question’ solved, women’s understanding of their position in the society was far less optimistic. In a survey conducted by UVVM of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in 1972, only 22% of female respondents reported that the equality of genders had been reached in Czechoslovakia at that time. In contrast, 55% believed that equality had not been reached (*Mineni zen* 1972). When asked about their reasons for their responses, women emphasized inequalities in the home, lower economic status and inequalities in wages, and also lower status of women in political life and in general.

In short, the message regarding women’s desirable role in society as it was communicated by the communist state shifted conveniently along with state ideology and economic strategies. While early on the state emphasized women’s role in ‘building socialism’ through women’s participation in the economy, by the 1960’s, the state focused on women’s maternal roles. At the same time, Czech and Slovak women were left frustrated with their unequal position at home, in work and in public life. Surprisingly, unlike women in Chile and other Latin American countries, Czech women did not use the resources available to them to organize to protest these conditions.

**Absence of Women’s Mobilization**

In communist Czechoslovakia, women never organized around the numerous gender inequalities they continued to face, and they never organized on the basis of their gender identity around other issues either. This is puzzling considering women had a
strong presence alongside men in the political opposition movements both in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc (Jancar 1985, 168). In fact, under communism, women played a prominent role in all key civic initiatives and groups including the Czechoslovak Charter 77, the Committee for Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), Czechoslovak Helsinki Federation and the Society of Friends of the U.S.A. For example, women represented about 20% of those who signed the Charter 77 Manifesto, a document calling for the Czechoslovak government to live up to its commitments in terms of international agreements. Women also represented 30% of the Charter’s spokespersons. About 30% of the Committee’s for Unjustly Prosecuted members were women. Furthermore, about one quarter of those imprisoned by 1981 for their activities within VONS were women (Einhorn 2003, 158).

A set of personal interviews conducted with both female and male dissidents reveals that women played an even more important role within the opposition movement than the existing data suggest. As Kveta Jechova, a historian and author of a study about Charter 77 pointed out; “The share of the actual work conducted by women within the Charter 77 activities is much larger than the share of women who signed the manifesto.” (personal correspondence with Jirina Siklova 2002). The relatively low number of female signatories of Charter 77 can be partially explained by the particular gender division of labor within the movement which allowed women to remain less visible.

34 The Czech Sociological Dictionary (1996) describes the main characteristics of political opposition or dissent as the following: “... persistent public defense of civil and human rights, criticism of the totalitarian regime and of its societal impacts, active citizenship involving common responsibility for the societal situation, defense of the principle of indivisibility of freedom, and solidarity with everyone who was limited in his or her civil and human rights.” (Velky sociologicky slovnik 1996, 212).
35 VONS, the Committee for Unjustly Prosecuted was established in 1978 by a group of Charter 77 signatories. The Committee’s mission was to collect and publicize information about cases of police and court persecutions committed for political reasons.
First, women’s roles as mothers sometimes implied different treatment from the secret police and other authorities. Such “special” treatment could take on different and often contrasting roles, but it always led to women’s greater invisibility within the movement. In some cases, the authorities used children and family members to blackmail women. This by no means stopped women in their opposition activities, but as Siklova (2001) suggests, it made women more secretive and ultimately less visible. Other times, women’s maternal role prevented the authorities from instituting further persecutions and especially long-term imprisonment, and thus rendered women less visible: “… members of the StB made a decision not to imprison me, because I was known as a poet and a woman with two small children” (Jirousova, personal interview).

Second, though dissidents disagree about the specific nature of the gender division of labor in the opposition movement, they agree that women were more likely to do certain activities over others. For instance, Siklova (2001) suggests that women copied political essays, translated documents, wrote open letters, wrote books that were later published in “samizdat”, organized secret meetings, circulated petitions, coordinated money delivery for those who needed them and provided support for those in jails and courts. Many of the secret meetings, seminars, religious services and lectures could only take place in dissidents’ apartments and they would not have been possible without the support and work of women. All of these activities were illegal under the totalitarian regime and therefore required strict operational security. In contrast, men dissidents were more likely to design Charter 77 statements and other documents – an open activity that

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36 Because of a strong state censorship of both old and new literature, those active in the opposition movement manually copied (through typing) books that were forbidden, and started new journals and magazines. After all these materials were typed in several copies, they were further circulated among the dissidents themselves and among public. This became known as the ‘samizdat literature’.
did not necessarily lead to immediate imprisonment. This division of labor partially explains why many of the most active and later persecuted dissidents never became Charter 77 signatories. This is also why women were somewhat less visible within the opposition movement, and their roles were interpreted by some outsiders as secondary.

Third, signatories of Charter 77 faced a number of risks that included “questioning by secret police (75%), interrogation (61%), forced change of employment and occupation (44%), house searches (36%), worsened health (30%), impossibility of further study either by themselves or by their children, … different limitation of personal freedom, physical attacks, forced emigration…” (Klimova quoted in Cisarovska 1997, 83). Therefore, women and men often described an unwritten agreement between husbands and wives in which they would put only one name under the Charter 77 manifesto. One of the female dissidents described in a personal email: “After our mutual arrangement, we had decided that only one of us should sign Charter 77 in order for the other one to remain relatively impregnable (because of a child).” This was a deliberate strategy that provided at least partial protection for dissidents’ children and which ensured that at least one member of the family stayed employed and continued to secure basic family income. Due to their more traditional roles, women were usually the ones to take on this role.

These were all factors that contributed to women’s relative invisibility within the Czechoslovak dissident movement. To prevent themselves from being caught, women also applied a number of innovative tactics and methods that were based on their traditional female roles. They held meetings in laundromats, and they carried illegal documents, books and photographs in their children’s baby carriages. They designed
clothes with hidden pockets where they would hide money and documents. Siklova (2001) remembers:

… books to be sent to Brno were kept under piles of clothes waiting to be ironed, or… in broken washing machines, and … secret messages were passed through garbage bags hanging on a balcony… And again, they were women who came up with the idea that it was possible to hide vitamins in bags with M&Ms and this way they could be smuggled into the prison. (2)

These activities carried on by women were invaluable to the functioning of the movement. Indeed, women’s presence in the opposition movement was crucial to its survival and its achievement. As Dagmar Battekova, a wife of a dissident and an economist who has been tracking the role of women in opposition for years, puts it: “It is my view that dissent could not have existed if it was not for women” (personal interview).

To summarize, it is surprising that Czech women did not organize on the basis of their gender identity when it is clear that women played an important role in the Czechoslovak opposition (though it was less visible than that of men). Making a case for why something did not happen is tricky. It is, however, possible to eliminate alternative explanations. Czech women were not satisfied with their position as revealed in the public opinion polls from that time. Between the local branches of the state run Women’s Union, tight friendship networks and even the Catholic Church, women had numerous mobilizing resources available to them. The dissident movement built on international networks, and so could the potential women’s movement. Furthermore, the existence of the strong political opposition movement suggests that despite widespread state repression, the political space was not fully closed for mobilization and just like in Chile, women could carve political space for themselves.
What makes the Czech (and Eastern European) situation different from the one in Chile (and Latin America in general) are the particular state policies and rhetoric associated with women’s issues. *Women’s Memory\textsuperscript{37},* a Czech oral history project which has collected close to 200 interviews with ordinary women living under state socialism in Czechoslovakia reveals an acute absence of women’s reference to the Czechoslovak state and government. Describing their daily lives and experiences, these women focus on their jobs, families and relationships, but do not mention the state and they rarely bring up specific policies. This is in stark contrast to the interviews I have conducted in Chile where women articulated their lives in relation to Pinochet’s regime and the Chilean states as well as its policies (see Chapter 6). While further research is needed, this possibly suggests that the contradictory messages and policies of the communist state left Czech women disoriented and unable to easily identify the source of existing inequalities they could organize against.

**Conclusion**

While Czech women played an important role in the political opposition movement, neither female dissidents nor any other women organized into a cohesive women’s movement under the totalitarian regime. This was not because women were satisfied with their position in the society. It is true that formally the Constitution of 1948 and Family Law guaranteed women and men equal rights. While the official rhetoric continued to suggest that the women’s question had been solved, only a small minority of Czech and Slovak women felt that gender equality had really been reached.

\textsuperscript{37} For more information about the project, its history and its methodology, see the project’s website [http://www.womensmemory.net/english/](http://www.womensmemory.net/english/).
In a 1972 survey, only 21% of female respondents thought that gender equality was in place. Close to one quarter of respondents suggested that existing gender inequality was a result of women’s disproportionate responsibility for housework and childcare, one fifth of respondents connected inequality with women’s lower salaries and lower position in paid employment (Mineni zen 1972).

The low levels of women’s mobilization in the Czech lands cannot be attributed to women’s lack of experience with organizing as described in the resource mobilization theory or to the repressive nature of the political regime as proposed by the political process model in social movement theory. After all, Czech women could have built on the strong pre-war tradition of women’s activism. While some of the earlier movement leaders did not live long enough to renew the mobilization efforts, many remained. Furthermore, while the state repressed civic participation that did not take place under the umbrella of the National Front, it is a fact that women continued to come together and discuss their issues. Marie Cermakova, a prominent Czech sociologist, explains: “Women in rural areas were normally socializing, it did not matter under what name or umbrella. It started with crocheting but then it developed…” (Cermakova, personal interview). Furthermore, the fact that women were active in the political opposition suggests that they had mobilizing resources available to them – but they decided not to make a use of them to organize on the basis of their gender identity.

The evidence presented in this chapter points to the importance of policy feedback effects for explaining women’s mobilization. These effects were not straightforward, however. While state policy enabled women in Czechoslovakia to reconcile their maternal and public roles, gender equality was never a priority for the Czechoslovak
The inherent assumption behind the state socialist ideology was that with the change of societal context, the woman’s and social question would no longer be relevant. As Jaroslava Bauerova (1976), a proponent of the regime, described in her book:

In the socialist societies, women have the same opportunities as men in regards to work, working and living conditions, education, habitation, utilization of culture, political activity. However, in consequence of former traditions as well as of some hitherto unsolved socioeconomic circumstances, they have so far asserted themselves less than men. (116)

According to Petr Visek, a former employee of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Affairs, “Women never represented a target population for the state. Instead, families did” (Visek, personal interview).

Furthermore, women’s interests were not directly represented in the communist government. It is true that the Czechoslovak state included women in the legislative branch of the government - the numbers of women in the communist parliament rose from 12% in 1948 (national assembly) to 25% in 1971 and 29% in 1981… (Bartova 1976; Bauerova & Jancovicova 1983). But this was merely a formality, and as Castle-Kanerova (1992) notes, “Women were involved in the political apparatus in purely formal terms, and their inclusion was based on crude quotas” (115). While women represented nearly 30% of all parliamentary deputies, the numbers of female members of the Communist Party and of the Central Committee apparatus were much lower than those of men. Simply put, policies in communist Czechoslovakia were decided by men.

Despite these shortcomings of relevant policies and of the policy-making process, Czechoslovak women felt that the existing policies provided them with enough resources to combine their traditional and public roles. For this reason, they were less likely to
organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state. Early on the state emphasized women’s roles as that of workers and state-builders. But the state used government sponsored media and later its pro-natalist social policies to reinforce women’s traditional roles as well. And while the poor implementation of social services left many women juggling housework, childcare and paid work outside of home, Czech women were proud that they could manage it all. While the strength of the Czech dissident movement and the high numbers of female participation within it document that citizens had the organizational and other resources to organize against the state, I suggest that the particular nature of communist public policy prevented women from addressing the prevailing gender inequalities and forming a cohesive women’s movement.
The early 1990’s brought along many important changes for Czechoslovakia, and these changes had major consequences for women’s lives, rights and activism. After 1989, the totalitarian way of governing was abandoned, and the country embarked on its way to democracy, a change that has occurred almost overnight. The state also embarked on an ambitious journey to transform its inefficient communist centrally planned economy. “When Central and Eastern European countries emerged out of the red in 1989, they fell into a world dominated by liberal and, in economics, neoliberal discourse (Orenstein 2001, 1). After decades of socialist governance in Czechoslovakia, there was an evident rise of public support for liberal and non-interventionist policies of the state. As a result, Czechs gradually replaced their command economy with a free market.

In this environment, the highly centralized system of social security soon became seen as highly inefficient, static and costly. As Andrew Roberts (2003) noted, “…within a year of the transition, housing, healthcare, and pension systems changed almost beyond recognition” (7). The artificial full employment practiced under communism was no longer an option as the country struggled to make its economy more efficient. Newly, the right-wing government of economist Vaclav Klaus began to emphasize individualism as a positive trait in navigating the new economy.

It soon became clear that these political, economic and social changes would affect women and men differently. Women clearly became the “losers” in the transition

38 Central and Eastern European countries did not use one path to arrive at capitalism and democracy. For a description of the different strategies used by post-communist Poland and Czech Republic, see Orenstein 2001.
process (Beckwith 2005; Moghadam 1993). Soon after the political turnover, unemployment for women escalated beyond the rates for men\(^{39}\); the gender pay gap increased, social protections under communist regimes weakened; quotas for holding political office were abolished\(^{40}\); and women’s reproductive rights were threatened (see, for example, Bosnicova et al. 2009). As gender quotas in decision-making bodies were removed, women effectively disappeared from the country’s political life as well. The remaining social policy provisions protecting women during the time of pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing turned, in the environment of free market economics, into an excuse for the discrimination against women based on stereotypes. Furthermore, despite the continuing high rates of females in the workforce, Czech women continued to be almost exclusively responsible for childcare, elderly care and housework. As Zdena Krejčová, an activist and a former member of Parliament, recalls “women’s work at home was considered a given” (personal interview).

Given the continual gender inequalities, it is surprising that Czech women have not taken advantage of this political, economic and societal opening associated with the post-communist transformation to organize for action. While under the communist regime, Czech women actively participated in the public protests against the regime and in other pro-democratic activities, female dissidents never organized on the basis of their gender identity and/or around gender issues either before or after the revolution of 1989. Furthermore, the few women’s groups that emerged during the transition process of the 1990’s found it difficult to frame their concerns in ways that would resonate with the Czech public.

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\(^{39}\) see for example Watson 1993

\(^{40}\) Across the region as a whole, the decline in women’s political representation was from an average of 33 percent to 10 percent (Waylen 1994).
State Ideology toward Women: Conflicting Messages

After the collapse of communism, the Czech state’s position regarding women’s role in society followed three distinct paths. First, the economic and political transformation overshadowed the societal one, and especially in the early years of the transition, there was little public discussion on issues pertaining to women. The government pointed to legal provisions guaranteeing gender equality and emphasized the importance of the general transformation over minority issues. Second, in contrast to the previously described absence of state’s interest in women’s issues, it was clear from the rhetoric of the government of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus that women were expected to return to their traditional sphere of home and private life. Third, during the later stages of the democratic transition and economic transformation, women’s issues gained in importance as a result of the European Union’s (EU) encouragement during the EU accession process.

First, in the context of the 1990’s democratization, liberalization and privatization, a number of newly formed women’s groups began to express concerns about a variety of issues regarding women. However, their efforts were disregarded on the grounds that there were enough provisions in the Czech legislation to protect equality between women and men. Without a doubt, gender equality was of a minimal importance to political leaders during the 1990’s. Vera Kucharova, a researcher working at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs remembers: “I saw a letter from Minister Vodicka who said that this (gender inequality) is not our problem” (personal interview). Similarly, Marta Hubova recalls: “The state understood women to be equal to men. They
felt there was no need to fight for equal status for women within the law… I was in the parliament at that time and there, this was in opposition, these ideas were not welcomed there…” (personal interview) And Zdena Krejčová, a former member of parliament similarly remembers; “I felt no need to fight for women’s rights. It wasn’t something female members of parliament talked about… there (in the parliament) was a lot of political fighting going on at that time, no space for women’s issues.” (personal interview).

While gender equality was, at least to a great extent, present in the law, it was by no means practiced in reality. Referring to mid-1990’s, Vera Kucharová, a researcher from The Czech Research Institute for Labor and Social Affairs recalls;

At the time of the Peking conference, all states were invited to follow a set of questions and topics to write a report about the status of women. My colleague and I were responsible for this. So I can tell you that as I saw the questions, I kept going down the list saying ‘this is not a problem, this is not a problem… and as I was working on the report, I came to realize that women had equal rights legally but it did not work in reality. … but then I realized that even the legislation was not straightforward (personal interview).

What Kucharová suggests is that despite a number of legal provisions, Czech women continued to face important inequalities in the workplace, in the education system and at home.

Second, during the time of the political transition and economic transformation, the state policies of the 1990’s and beyond continued to affect women and men differently. In reality, women’s traditional role within the family and their assumed responsibilities in the private sphere meant that economic and social policies had varying impacts on the two genders. On the one hand, women found it increasingly difficult to combine formal employment with their traditional roles as wives and mothers. The
arrival of capitalism meant that women were no longer able to rely on the unspoken ‘gender contract’ (Cermakova 1997) with the state that enabled them to have jobs and families while men had ‘careers’. Instead, growing unemployment and price liberalization resulted in a situation where women had to compete on the labor market just as men did. These developments took place in an environment where the state was reducing many social programs and as well as, for example, the number of state run childcare facilities making these facilities inaccessible to many women (Potucek 1999).

At the same time, the state continued to take women’s traditional role in the family for granted, and even reinforced a traditional gender division of labor through its policies. The state has done this by implementing more conservative ‘re-familization policies’ which supported women in their roles as mothers and made it more difficult for women to remain in the labor market (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). As Hana Marikova, a researcher in the Department of Gender and Sociology of the Czech Sociological Institute recalls, “It was (prime minister’s) Klaus’ explicit rhetoric that women should return into the household” (personal interview). Similarly, other politicians including former Prime Minister Marian Calfa called on women to become housewives – something seen as a sign of progress in light of the communist era when women were de facto obliged to work (Sokacova 2009).

Therefore, for the first ten to fifteen years after the fall of communism, the Czech government did not seriously question this ‘re-familization’ policy (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). Partly because of financial necessity and partly because Czech women did enjoy the independence associated with their own income, the rates of female

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41 For an overview of the family and social policy transformation in the early 1990’s, see Hrusakova 1993 and Potucek 2001
employment continue to remain high in Central and Easter Europe. Rather than exiting the labor market, demographic data tells us, women have decided to have fewer children in order to be able to combine work and family life.

Third, in the past ten years or so, the significant decline in the birth rate combined with Czech Republic’s integration into the European Union (EU) has led the government to start reconsidering its family and general gender policy. The first institutional changes took place in response to international commitments (e.g. United Nation’s Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and European Union’s requests to coordinate legislation in the area of gender equality and ensure their implementation. Hana Haskova and Alena Krizkova (2006) quote a number of Czech women’s groups leaders and other experts to say that it is unlikely that the issue of gender equality would have received as much attention if it were not for the Czech Republic’s integration into the European Union. In other words, it was the EU’s commitment to advancing women’s rights in the region that brought gender equality to the forefront of Czech governmental attention.

As a result, in 1998, the Czech Minister of Labor and Social Affairs established a Department for Gender Equality within the European Integration Bureau at the Ministry of Labor of Social Affairs. The Department’s primary goal was legislative coordination with the EU directives concerning gender equality. The Department remained small (three workers) and largely played a formal rather than a real role in forming and implementing its mission. Other, primarily formal, institutional mechanisms established during this period included the Inter-resort Coordination Committees (1998) and later the

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42 For a chronological overview of the institutional structure development, see Pavlik 2004
more active Government Council for Human Rights, one of which goals was to monitor
the fulfillment of international commitments in the area of human rights.

In 2001, the state showed further formal commitment to women’s issues by
establishing the Government Council for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. The council’s task was to advise the government in the area of equal opportunities for
women and men. It works through the so called ‘gender focal points’ which were
instituted in January 2002 at each ministry as part-time positions. The persons in these
posts were responsible for the implementation of equal opportunities in each resort. Two
years later, the part-time positions were turned to full-time ones. After January 2008, the
Department for Equality of Women and Men was moved from the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, and it now falls under the responsibility of the Minister for Human Rights
and the Office of the Government.

While many welcomed these changes, women’s advocacy groups and others
interested in gender equality issues continue to question the government’s real
commitment to gender issues given the minimal number of workers assigned to these
institutional bodies (Kralikova 2009). Therefore, despite the initial excitement on the
part of Czech women’s groups, these institutional changes have so far been primarily
formal, and they have done little to eliminate gender discrimination and improve the
position of women in Czech society (Pavlik 2004; True 2003).

To summarize, while the surviving communist social policies combined with the
new EU related anti-discriminatory policies continue to enable women to reconcile their
maternal and public roles, the Czech state has not been clear on where the expected and
desirable role of women in the society is. During the early years of the democratic

43 The Council was established through government decree N. 1003.
transition, the state used social policy and programs to support women’s traditional roles in the home. At the same time, government officials emphasized legal achievements in the area of gender parity, dismissing any public attempts to rectify existing gender inequality. Later on, to formally comply with the requirements of the European Union, the state introduced a number of administrative offices and regulations dealing with gender issues. However, these recent steps have been accompanied by a lack of real commitment from the state to improve the status of women.

**Women's Rights: Prevailing Inequalities**

It has become clear that the democratic transition did not automatically translate into equal rights for Czech women. It is true that women, as all Czech citizens, benefited from the general advancement of basic human rights in the Czech Republic. At the same time, however, throughout the 1990’s, Czech women continued to struggle with gender discrimination in employment and politics and they were also uniquely negatively affected by the social reform. Furthermore, Czech women continue to balance their private and public responsibilities as existing cultural norms make them almost exclusively responsible for childcare, elderly care and housework. In other words, as the following section suggests, there are numerous important grievances Czech women could be expected to organize around.

**Gender Inequality in the Workplace**

The economic transition of the 1990’s affected women and men differently. Namely, women have been disproportionately affected by rising unemployment rates,
and they also continue to face important gender inequalities and discrimination in the workplace. Unemployment, virtually unknown under state socialism, was just one of the phenomena that Czechs had to start to cope with. Prior to the transition, full employment represented an integral part of the communist state policies. Job opportunities were created artificially, and the right to work was turned into an obligation. Wages were set centrally and together with social benefits were allocated through the workplace. With the emergence of free market economy, however, guaranteed employment was abandoned. Employment became gradually marketized and contingent upon labor contracts. This consequently reduced the security of obtaining employment, security of durability of employment, and also security of the real income level (Offe 1993) in the context where Czech families were financially fully dependent on two incomes.\footnote{Note that class divisions were to a great extent eliminated by the socialist regime, and Czechoslovakia began the transformation with what could be understood as a very strong middle class.}

While the unemployment rate was only 0.7% in 1990, it rose to 4.1% in the following year, and by 1999, it reached almost 10% (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs cited in Potucek 2001).\footnote{Note that in 1990, women represented 44 percent of the total Czechoslovak workforce (Havelkova 1997).} Between 1989 and 1995, 21% of those economically active experienced losing their jobs, and 5% of these had done so more than once (Potucek 2001, 14). Although the female labor force participation rates did not decline significantly in the early 1990’s, the growing unemployment was beginning to affect women more than men. For example, by 1999, the unemployment rate was 10.5% for Czech women as compared to 7.3% for Czech men (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2000, 129).\footnote{By 2007, the rate declined to 6.7% for women and 4.2% for men, but significant gender differences remained (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008, 35).} The situation was particularly serious in the case of women of color whose unemployment rates skyrocketed in the first years of the transformation.
As unemployment levels continued to rise, Central European countries initially chose to temporarily cushion the lay-offs of workers by implementing extensive unemployment insurance schemes (World Bank 2000). But by 1993, all Central European states reduced the earlier generous unemployment benefits while the unemployment rate continued to rise. As the gross domestic product in the individual states began decreasing, real wages also experienced decline, and wage inequality increased (World Bank 2000).

While facing higher unemployment, women also continued to experience discrimination in the workplace. In 2008, the gender pay gap was 19.8% as women were on average earning 80.2% of men’s average wages (Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008, 46). Available statistics have led Marie Cermakova (1997), a renown expert in the area of labor market research, to note that the status of Czech professional women had not improved since the fall of communism.

Surprisingly, there was little public discussion in regards to existing discriminatory practices on the Czechoslovak and later Czech labor market throughout much of the 1990’s. The topics of gender pay gap and discrimination in hiring practices appeared on the public agenda only slowly, and this happened primarily through media appearances of such experts as Marie Cermakova of the Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Appeltova 2009). Later, this topic was also taken on by the new Department for Equal Opportunities established at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. But it was not until 2000 when the problem of gender discrimination became recognized by the Czech law through a new amendment to the Labor Code.
In response to the Czech accession to the European Union and a subsequent legislative coordination, the Czech Labor Code was amended once again in 2004 to reflect the strengthened commitment to integrate the principles of equal opportunities for women and men into the national legislation. For the first time, the amendment included a definition of and provisions against sexual harassment in the workplace. Finally, a new anti-discrimination law was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic on 17 June 2009.47 One hundred and eighteen Members of the Parliament voted for this law, while 16 were against. The President strongly opposed this piece of legislation, but his veto was overridden. As a result, the Czech Republic became the last EU member state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic background, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, age, handicap, religion, faith or world view – all of this in access to employment, education, health or other services or social benefits.

Despite all of these formal modifications of the law, public perception of gender discrimination in the workplace continues to change very slowly. The public discussion surrounding the ratification of the antidiscrimination law of 2009 provides an important insight into these developments. In the summer 2009, as the law was being discussed in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament, Czech media offered a series of articles devoted to the topic of gender discrimination. While many in the national media used reliable statistics and data provided by experts, one could also find a number of articles with headlines such as “We All Discriminate” and “About The Right To Discriminate”

47 This is referring to law N. 198/2009 Coll., on equal treatment and on legal remedies of protection from discrimination and on amendment of certain laws, and N. 349/1999 Coll., on the Public Defender of Rights. The law was published in the collection of laws under N. 198/2009 Coll. on 20 July 2009, and it came into effect as of 1 September 2009.
(Khorel 2009; Sima 2009). On the whole, gender discrimination in the workplace continues to be widespread, but the Czech government has done little outside of formal steps required through international commitments to rectify the situation.

**Gender Differences in Political Representation**

In addition to facing higher unemployment rates and discrimination in the workplace, with the emergence of democracy, Czech and Slovak women also effectively disappeared from the political life of the country. Under the communist regime, women and men played only a formal role in political decision-making as the actual decisions were made on the level of the Communist Party. In the post-communist Czech Republic, the situation has not improved for women all that much. “… while the Czech public was very well aware that the 30% share of parliamentary seats occupied by women under communism was a mere formality, it was nonetheless surprised at the fall in this share to 10% after 1989 when the quotas were abolished.”(Havelkova 1999, 145) Until recently, women have been largely excluded from politics (see Table 4.1).

When *Civic Forum*, the umbrella organization established to negotiate with the communist officials and to lead the country to its first free elections, was formed, seventeen of its eighteen leaders were men (Honajzer 1996, 52). Additionally, approaching the first free elections in 1990, none of the forty newly formed political parties had a program specially targeting women. A woman has never been seriously considered for President or Prime Minister. For years, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of the Czech Republic consisted purely of men. The cabinet had no female ministers between 1992 and 1996, and between 1998 and 2002. The two governments
between 1996 and 1998 had only one woman minister. Today, the Czech Cabinet consists of a Prime Minister and fourteen Ministers with a portfolio – none of the fourteen cabinet members are women.\footnote{The current government was elected in the last legislative election in 2010.}

When the crude quotas in federal and state legislative bodies were abolished after the fall of communism in 1989, the share of the federal parliamentary seats occupied by women instantly fell to 10.7\% as a result of the June 1990 elections, and further to 8.7\% during the 1992 elections (Wolchik 1996)\footnote{The Czech electoral system is based on proportional representation, and it uses a closed list ballots. The multi-member districts are relatively large, ranging between 12 and 39 electoral seats.}. Furthermore, as Vrabkova (1997) points out, these numbers are “… hardly an advancement for women. These legislators are recruited from church circles or represent their party’s interests or both. They intend to make a political career rather than promote women’s rights. They therefore must adjust their behavior to a male way of doing things.” (Vrabkova 1997, 73)

| Table 4.1 Female parliamentary representation in the Czech Republic\footnote{Refers to the lower house of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.} |
|-------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Country           | First election | Second election| Third election | Fourth election| Fifth election | Sixth election | Seventh election|
| Czech Republic    | 10\%           | 10\%           | 15\%           | 15\%           | 17\%           | 16\%           | 22\%           |

Source: Montgomery (2003) and Interparliamentary Union

Czech women are best represented in local politics, where they currently hold 26\% of seats (Zeny v politice 2011). But this number is not impressive either as the bigger municipalities tend to have the smallest number of women representatives.

Those studying women’s political representation struggle to find a single cause to these trends.\footnote{Many point to gender discrimination and to the fact that women’s}
continuous disproportionate responsibility for childcare and housework prevent them from running for public office. For example, in 1996, 88 percent of Czech citizens agreed that “family responsibilities make it harder for women to enter politics” (*Focused on Women* 2001, 96). However, others propose that the low political representation of women is one of the many legacies of communism. Referring to the latter, Jirina Siklova (1993) explains;

In the West political experience is derived from a democratic parliamentary system, where political parties and participation in them have great significance. We, on the other hand, are the product of a system that reduced membership in a party to obedience and the loss of individuality. Through personal experience we know that the establishment of quotas for various social groups or other forms of so-called “positive discrimination,” which have been so politically important in the West, often become a tool of oppression of the very groups they were designed to support. It is clear to us from our experience that the interests of women, workers, and farmers do not necessarily have to be defended by women, workers, and farmers. (79)

In this view, a different historical experience accounts for gender differences in political representation. But regardless of the reason, important gender inequalities prevail in Czech political decision-making bodies and provide women with important grievances to organize around.

**Women and Social Policy Reform**

The state emphasis on the ‘triple transition’ (Offe 1991) of the political regime and state economy had major consequences for the post-communist welfare state. This has, in turn, shaped the relationship between Czech women and the state because social policy is one of the key areas through which states define women’s position in society.

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51 For a discussion of this in the Czech context, see for example, Rakusanova 2003
Without doubt, the changing nature of social programs affected women and men differently.

Under state socialism, the citizens of Czechoslovakia had access to an extensive network of social programs and services. These were designed and controlled by the socialist state. Vecernik (1993) described this phenomenon as the ‘over-institutionalized socialist paternalism’. These programs included free healthcare, extensive maternity leave and allowance, retirement benefits, generous sick pay, access to state run childcare facilities and even free vacation packages. Prices of basic products were subsidized by the state, and so was much of the housing. Since the fall of communism, this system of social protection and universal benefits has undergone significant changes.

At first, Czech women were not concerned about losing the generous benefits introduced under state socialism. Zdena Krejcova, a former member of parliament describes “(In the early 1990’s) nobody talked about state run daycare facilities or family policy, women were not afraid of losing it” (personal interview). But soon it became apparent that the free market ideology would have an impact on these programs. Namely, there were visible trends toward tightening eligibility conditions for various social benefits, replacing some universal benefits with means-tested ones and reducing social expenditure in general (Potucek 2001, 6).

Today, social benefits in the Czech Republic are derived from one’s employment status and more specifically from the worker’s actual income level. Benefits have been transformed to match the collected contributions. Therefore, social insurance no longer covers those with little or no contribution payment history. Women have been disproportionately affected by these developments because they constitute the majority of
low-income earners in the Czech Republic and because they frequently (temporarily or not) opt out of the labor market to fulfill their parental roles.

Between 1990 and 1992, the federal government developed and passed a proposal for a social reform. This document became known as the "Scenario of Social Reform". It was clear that the government selected the ‘corporatist’ or ‘conservative welfare state’ path (Esping-Andersen 1990) existing, for example, in the neighboring countries of Austria and Germany. The new Czech(oslovak) plan included the creation of a universal system of social welfare including universal compulsory health and social insurance and means-tested state social assistance serving as a last resort safety net when other forms of assistance have been exhausted. Despite the decline in social programs, the neoliberal government of Vaclav Klaus relied on these social protections to guide the country through the economic transformation (see Orenstein 2001; Tucker et al. 1997).

Aside from this transformation of the general social policy provisions, the social functions characteristic of public enterprises of the communist rule also underwent significant changes. Prior to transition, social benefits were in Czechoslovakia as in other communist countries distributed almost exclusively through employment. Citizen’s employment status was critical to the allocation of various services and benefits ranging from healthcare and housing to childcare and vacation packages. As the centrally planned economy was replaced by the capitalist economy of free market, new businesses began to emerge and previously state-owned enterprises were privatized, this system gradually disintegrated as individual businesses redefined their social policy functions.52

52 In the case of post-communist countries, Rein and his colleagues (1997) discovered an important distinction between state-owned and privatized enterprises on one side and new private enterprises on the other. They argued that all three types of firms may provide social benefits for their workers, but the new enterprises differ profoundly in respect to the types of benefits offered. They documented on a study carried
While private enterprises in Central Europe have not completely dealt away with their social policy functions, the amount and importance of these benefits provided by state-owned and recently privatized firms has decreased significantly.

These changes have had a significant impact on Czech women in particular. Sasa Lineau, a women’s activist, recalls: “A lot of state run daycare facilities were closed … they were closing them quickly. There was this discourse that women should stay at home around 1992 and 93.” (personal interview) For example, the number of public nurseries declined from 1043 in 1991 to 54 in 2007 (Haskova, Marikova and Uhde 2009, 105). But other aspects of women’s lives were affected as well. For example, in 1995 “the statutory retirement age for women, originally 53-57 was raised to 57-61 (the actual limit continues to depend on the number of children), while for men it increased from 60 to 62.” (Potucek 2001, 17).

At the same time as it was eliminating social provisions, the state used the introduction of other programs to reinforce the traditional gender division of labor prevalent in Czech homes. As documented in Table 4.2 below, Czech women continue to be responsible for the vast majority of housework and childcare (Marikova 2000).
Table 4.2 Survey Results Regarding the Division of Labor in Czech Families. Responses to the following question: “According to you, who in the family should...“

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>take care of children?</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be the breadwinner?</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cook?</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shop for groceries?</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do the cleaning?</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a career?</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public Opinion Research Centre of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 07/2000

In the 1990’s, the state reinforced this gender division of labor through the newly reformed social policy in a number of ways. For example, the state actively assisted in the introduction of a large number of private ‘family schools’ that were assumed to prepare girls for their future responsibilities as housewives. The state also prolonged the existing maternity policy allowing women to stay out of the labor force until their children were four years of age. Haskova, Marikova and Uhde (2009) clearly link these policies to the ‘reaffirmation of family conservatism and the traditional definition of gender roles in the 1990’s” (102). Today, women stay at home with children longer than they did under the communist regime (Haskova, Marikova and Uhde 2009, 104). While the legislation was later changed to refer to ‘parents’ rather than just ‘mothers’, it at least temporarily reinforced the women’s traditional caregiving role.

Women’s Activism Lacks Unity

Despite the prevalent gender inequalities in the workplace, in politics and at home, Czech women have not mobilized to protest or resolve the prevalent gender

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On January 1, 2001, the Czech Labor Code was amended to enable all men to benefit from the parental leave policy. A variety of sources suggest that about 1% of men choose to take a parental leave (see, for example, Zeny a muzi v cislech 2008).
inequalities described above. Twenty years after the fall of communism, it is not possible to talk about a unified Czech women’s movement. Hana Marikova, a Czech sociologist describes the situation in the 1990’s “It is not possible to talk about a movement. … A movement should have a vision but here it was just several women’s organizations and each had a different goal. There were no overarching topics” (personal interview).

Similarly, Czech feminist Mirek Vodrazka argues that a women’s movement in the Czech Republic does not exist today. He also suggests that the area of women’s rights is overall weak and lacking participation (Ciprova and Sokacova 2009, 94). Why do these efforts to improve women’s position in society remain so fragmented?

After the fall of communism, almost all women’s organizations had to be formed from “scratch” because under the communist regime, the centrally organized Czechoslovak Women’s Union was the only functioning women’s organization. In the early 1990’s, the Czechoslovak Women’s Union was transformed into Czech Women’s Union keeping its old leadership, resources and estate gained during the communist era. It remains the largest women’s organization in the Czech Republic. Only a small number of other women’s organizations formed during this period. In 1991, less than forty women’s organizations were registered in Czechoslovakia (Wolchik 1998b). This number did not change significantly in the first few years after the fall of communism. For example, Altos and Sopranos – The Pocket Handbook of Women’s Organizations in the Czech Republic (1994) lists the total of 27 women’s groups during this time.54

Jirina Siklova (1997) described these groups in the following way:

The small, politically uninterested women’s organizations, which are established and dissolved in the course of a few months, frequently make

54 Note that these numbers are solely for the Czech Republic since the country of Czechoslovakia disintegrated by then. This explains the seeming drop in the number of women’s groups compared to 1991.
Western European women politicians smile. They have no ideology, they lack political profiles, and they defy all examination and sociological analysis. Their protagonists are not interested in the philosophy of feminism and will not play any role in future political elections. (Siklova 1997)

Furthermore, the handful of new groups did not unite around any particular issue. Eva Hauserova, one of the activists explains “There wasn’t one large problem we could unite around. Instead, there were a lot of little problems” (personal interview). Similarly, Eliska Jancova a female activist from this time points out, “(women’s activitists) couldn’t agree on anything” (personal interview).

These individual issues taken on by these small groups (often consisting of only one to two members) included domestic violence, the environment, and family oriented topics such as childbirth and childcare. Feminism was rarely discussed; “In the 1990’s, women were bringing up individual topics to be discussed. They did not talk about feminism” (Sasa Lineau, personal interview). Some of these small groups defined themselves in opposition to the (formerly state run) Czech Women’s Union which continued to be viewed in a negative light. According to Zdena Krejčova, a former member of Parliament and an activist; “(some) women’s groups started because some of us were tired of the fact that there was only one organization – Czech Union of Women – that took the right to speak on behalf of all of us” (personal interview).

It was not until the second half of the 1990’s that a small number of more formalized women’s groups began to appear. Only slowly they began to make contact with each other “Prior to 1990, the only connections that existed were with the Czech Union of Women. … After 1989, individual women’s organizations started making connections, there was an understanding that it was important to get connected” (Hubova,
personal interview). These connections were further formalized through funding. Because a local culture of ‘giving’ was destroyed during the communist regime, the few organizations that became more institutionalized depended on financial support provided by foreign donors, primarily those from Germany and the United States.

It is important to understand these trends within a broader context of the development of the civic sector in Central and Easter Europe. Here, the work of Marc Howard (2003) is particularly relevant. Howard argued that civil society was ‘weak’ throughout post-communist Europe. However, Howard’s data do not always support his argument. For example, Potucek (1997) documents that while there were approximately 2,000 organizations in 1989 communist Czechoslovakia (including individual branches of the National Front), this number increased to 20,000 by 1992 and further to almost 40,000 by 1996. Therefore, the small number of women’s groups in post-communist Czechoslovakia is in stark contrast to the developments in other areas of the country’s social and civic life.

Even today, the sphere of women’s organizing consists of a relatively small number of small organizations, and the women’s movement remains weak and fragmented. What has contributed to this situation is a legislation introduced in the mid-1990’s. The goal of this piece of legislation was to provide a legal framework for the functioning of civic organizations, and it has had a significant impact on the functioning of women’s and other groups within civil society as it provided financial advantage to larger and more formal organizations (Marksova-Tominova 1999). But activists in other areas, such as the environmental movement, have been able to overcome this

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55 In 1997, after the introduction of this legislation, the number of civic organizations fell significantly – at this time, there were less than 1,500 registered groups in the Czech Republic (Potucek 1997).
institutional obstacle, so it is highly unlikely that this is the main reason for the lack of women’s movement in the Czech Republic.

By 2005, only about one third of the original women’s groups established after the fall of communism were still in existence (Haskova & Krizkova 2006). Furthermore, it is not clear what impact these fragmented groups have had on Czech society. While some progress in remedying gender inequalities has been made, the activists themselves are sometimes skeptical when they are asked to evaluate their work. One of them, Zdenka Holcmanova summarizes “There was an effort to influence policy making as early as in the 1990’s. We were getting proposed bills but we were usually just given two or three days to do it. It was quite demanding… I am not sure if we managed to influence anything” (personal interview). These developments are especially surprising given the long tradition of a vibrant women’s movement in pre-war Czechoslovakia I described in the previous chapter.

**Distaste for Feminism**

In the context of the post-communist Czech Republic, one cannot address women’s mobilization and the articulation of women’s issues without turning attention to the concept of feminism. It is ironic that while the ideology of the communist state actually opposed feminism, the citizens came to associate feminism with communism. Because of this association, the terms feminism and women’s emancipation maintain an extremely strong negative connotation among Czech women. As Linda Sokacova (2009) points out, “(In the Czech Republic), the 1990’s were characterized by an intensive rejection of feminism”(8). Similarly, Zdenka Holcmanova, the director of the Czech
Association of Businesswomen and a former activist explains “Feminism was an ugly word in the 1990’s. Nobody knew what it meant” (personal interview).

Two issues stand out here. One, women themselves knew very little about what feminism meant – both throughout communism and during the transition to democracy. Sociologist Hana Marikova explains “We knew almost nothing about Western feminism. Also, women in Prague had a different point of view than those in small towns or even blue collar women” (personal interview). Second, both Czech women and men associated feminism with the ‘forced emancipation’ policies introduced under communism. Given the lack of legitimacy of this regime it may not be surprising that Czechs rejected any concepts associated with the communist regime; “(In the 1990’s) feminism was a no, no. Even when it came to such topics as violence, it had to be degendered. People talked about ‘violence in the family’ rather than ‘violence against women’” (Sasa Lineau, personal interview). A number of prominent Czech intellectuals, journalists and politicians, of which the most well known is writer Josef Skvorecky, have contributed to this public distaste for feminism when they used anecdotal evidence from abroad to highlight possible negative consequences of feminist movements.

This situation has led to some misunderstandings and tensions between Eastern European and Western women’s activists. A number of Western feminists who arrived in Czechoslovakia during the democratic transition attempted to interpret Czech women’s attitudes and current status in terms of the prevalent liberal-feminist arguments (Watson 1993; Einhorn 2003; Wolchik 1996, 1998a, b). In their view, Czech women were ‘conservative’ and they regarded them as ‘second class citizens’. But while the Western feminists seemed to be right about some aspects of the current Czech society such as
existing gender and racial discrimination and prejudice, the application of the liberal feminist framework failed to capture and adequately explain the situation in its full complexity.

The work done by Western feminists soon aggravated a number of Czech feminists who suggested another explanation for the lack of tolerance for feminism among Czech people, and charged those from the West with ‘not paying enough attention to the unique post-communist social context’, and thus, ‘misinterpreting’ the situation (Havelkova 1997; Siklova 1993; 1997). According to Czech feminists, women’s identities, views and life strategies are products of the specific socialist ideology of the past. “The world view of Czech women is informed by the social legacy of communism” (Heitlinger 1996, 90). As a result, these scholars concluded that women in Eastern Europe were neither conservative, nor second-class citizens. Eva Kanturkova (1981 cited in True 2003) explains;

Feminism has been eradicated in our society by having been brutally transformed into a new form of woman’s slavery: obligatory work. Thus, if in Czechoslovakia there is one thing that a woman wishes to obtain for herself, it is to recover her feminine essence rather than to promote herself. (51)

This negative perception of feminism has not changed much since the 1990’s (Ciprova and Sokacova 2009, 91).

Czech women’s groups and organizations have responded to this negative image of feminism by framing the issues concerning women in different terms. Rather than ‘feminism’, the media frequently discuss ‘equal opportunities for women and men’, ‘discrimination’ or ‘parenthood’. For example, Linda Sokacova, a director of the Prague Gender Studies Center describes the struggle for gender equality:
While about five years ago, the media and Czech public were primarily negative, given the reaction toward the work of a number of non-profit organizations, it is possible to say that the Czech public is beginning be open and even support the topics of discrimination and equal opportunities for women and men. Things have changed in regards to employers as well. Around the year 2000, companies explicitly rejected cooperation on programs addressing equal opportunities for women and men. Today, they seek it out or they remain neutral. (Sokacova 2009, 9).

Therefore, even today, feminism as a term continues to be associated with the communist past. As Jacques Rupnik argued in 1989: “For the people of Central Europe, the past, to use Faulkner’s phrase, ‘is never dead. It’s not even past’” (36). Today, two decades after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, communist state policies continue to shape ongoing political processes by influencing the identities, goals and actions of both Eastern European political elites and of the mass public.56 This is happening even though many of these policies had been abandoned long before the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. In the case of women’s issues, for example, the state employment policies of the 1950’s still serve as a dominant reference point against which many Central and Eastern European citizens form their attitudes and actions.57

As a result, any public discussion of women’s rights remains highly controversial in these nations where words such as ‘emancipation’ and ‘feminism’ still invoke memories of female workers on cranes and those of Soviet inspired slogans calling for women’s involvement in heavy industry in order to “build a more prosperous socialist society”. However, while these associations have undoubtedly contributed to the

56 On the general importance of historical legacies for subsequent political developments in Eastern Europe, see Barany and Volgyez eds. (1995); Bunce (1999); Ekiert and Hanson eds. (2003); Grzymala-Busse (2002); Howard (2003); Lane eds. (2002). In Latin America, the effects of liberal reform on later developments were addressed by Mahoney (2001). The specific effects of communist legacies on women’s movements in Central and Eastern Europe have been brought up in some edited volumes and exploratory articles and essay-type pieces. See for example Heitlinger (1996); Jacquette and Wolchik (1998); Kligman 1994; Siklova (1995, 1997).

57 see Heitlinger 1996
difficulties that women’s activists have experienced in mobilizing the public and finding a common voice, it is not clear why they have not been able to frame their issues in a different way to ensure that their demands resonate with the public.

**Conclusion**

While Czech women played an important role in overthrowing the communist government and bringing down the totalitarian regime, neither the former female dissidents nor any other women organized into a mass women’s movement during or after the democratic transition. While Czech women never organized as women, other movements and groups have managed to overcome the communist past. The Czech environmental movement, for example, was very vibrant throughout the 1990’s proving that low civic participation is not a cultural phenomenon.

However, women are by no means absent from the Czech public sphere. Even though Czech women have not organized as women, they have become active players in the newly formed civil society. In fact, existing research suggests that women represent between 50 and 70% of participants in the Czech non-profit sector (Fric 1998; Havelkova 1997; neziskovky.cz).58 Therefore, women are using their skills to engage a variety of issues within the growing civic sector. They do this through movements other than women’s movements or through fragmented, individual groups and organizations.

The regime and leadership change in the 1990’s presented a textbook example of political opportunity for women. However, women did not take advantage of it. This was not because women were satisfied with their position in the society. Existing research documents that women continued to face important inequalities at work, in the
home and also in the country’s political life. It was not because women did not have resources available to them either – they could rely on the existing women’s, church and other groups and organizations to formulate their demands. But they did not do so.

The change of political regime and introduction of free market economics after 1989 situated Czech women in a new political, economic and social environment. Although the majority of Czech women still saw their full involvement in the family and in the labor market as a natural way of things, they also became aware of the increasing tension between the two roles. Despite overall public support for women’s participation in the labor market, nobody came to question the traditional gender roles that supported the notion of women’s exclusive responsibility for childcare, elderly care and housework. The remaining social security provisions protecting women during the time of pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing clashed with the emphasis the Czech state was placing on individuals’ role in the newly established capitalist economy and labor market.

Today, the lasting traditional view of appropriate gender roles continues to affect family and social policies. Until recently, the state used the parental and maternity leave and allowance scheme to de facto encourage women to temporarily leave the labor market and provide care for children. Requalification programs making transition for parents back to the workforce easier are still rare. Even when social policies seemed gender neutral on paper, in reality, they often disadvantage women. At the same time, the rising disparities between women and men were overshadowed by the omnipresent emphasis on the economic and political transformation. Milada Hrda, an expert in social and family policy who worked at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs prior to 1989 explains: “After 1989, there was some continuity (in social policy), but
economic liberalism was too invasive” (personal interview). Influenced by neo-liberal economics preached by Western experts who arrived to offer advice on how to handle key aspects of the economic transformation, the newly elected Czech politicians continued to emphasize citizens’ position in the newly established free economy and labor market. In this environment, the surviving social policies established under state socialism have often turned into an excuse for statistical discrimination of women (Cermakova 1997). To date, employers continue to fear hiring young women in particular, worrying about the financial impact a possible employee pregnancy may have on their company.

Despite these challenges, female labor force statistics demonstrate that Czech women continue to balance their maternal roles with full-time jobs. Gender inequality is still prevalent, but women view these problems as ‘individual’ problems rather than social ones and as a result, they seek ‘individual’ solutions. A divorce functions as an individual solution to the problem of domestic violence. Finding a new job serves as a response to discrimination in the workplace. As Hana Havelkova (1999) reminds us, while Czech women do not complain much, it does not mean that they are content with their situation.

The state actions and rhetoric are surely not the only reason for the weakness of the women’s movement in the Czech Republic and throughout post-communist Europe. Other factors, such as the legacies of communism in the form of anti-feminist ‘mood’ make it difficult for women’s groups to frame issues in ways that would resonate with the public as well.
Chapter 5  
CHILE 1973 - 1990  
Protecting the Nation: Pinochet’s Traditionalist Policy

During the period of military rule, Chilean women organized around a variety of social and economic issues, and also to protect their rights. While this may be surprising given the oppressive nature of Pinochet’s government, it is less so in the light of previous historical developments.

Chile has a rich tradition of female activism dating back to the 19th Century. For the first time, Chilean women gained greater visibility in the country’s public life when, at the end of the 19th century, a number of suffragists attempted to register as voters (Valenzuela 1998). These were primarily women from middle and upper classes. As in Czechoslovakia, late 19th century Chilean women first framed their efforts around their maternal identities (Franceschet 2005, 35). They aimed to improve social conditions for themselves as well as their children, but they also wished to gain greater political rights. These efforts took place in the context of legislation that was making Chilean women fully dependent on their husbands. In fact, the civil code of 1855 gave married women no control over their bodies, children or assets (Lavrin 1995, 193).

At the beginning of the 20th Century middle class women began to fight for the right to vote. As a result of these pressures, Chilean women first received the right to vote in municipal elections in 1934. During the following decade, Chile experienced a rapid growth in the number of women’s groups, networks and women’s political parties of which the most notable was the national Movimiento Pro-Emancipacion de Mujeres de Chile. As a result of these activities, in 1948, a bill was passed that granted Chilean women the right to vote in presidential elections as well.
These dramatic events were followed by what Julieta Kirkwood (1982) once referred to as ‘Period of Silence’ for Chilean’s feminist and women’s movement. After they achieved suffrage, Chilean women became increasingly incorporated into the existing political system. Party politics and internal disagreements replaced the previously cohesive nature of the women’s movement. The women’s political party Partido Femenino Chileno fell apart as a result of a scandal surrounding its leader and a Senate member Maria de la Cruz. As women became incorporated into party politics, Chilean women’s movement disintegrated.

This period of silence was interrupted with the presidency of Eduardo Frei in the mid 1960’s. According to Fiona Macaluay (2006), the Frei government was the first to consider women as a political constituency (115). The government emphasized women’s roles as those of mothers, defenders of the homeland, housewives and community managers. The new president was looking to set up a wide network of local organizations to distribute a variety of social and other services and to seek support for the extensive social and economic reforms his government was about to undertake59. As a result, a large number of community based organizations of which the most relevant to women’s issues were the Mother’s Centers (Centros de Madres also known as CEMA) began to appear throughout the country.

Dependent on the state for funding and presided over by the First Lady, the Mother’s Centers were established in the 1940’s with the aim to involve women in political life but also to support the Christian Democratic Party that initially established them. They were specifically created to organize and educate low-income women

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59 These included an agrarian reform, a state intervention into the copper industry, improving access to education and lowering income inequality. The government also enacted important electoral changes and strengthened the presidency through constitutional reforms.
(Frohmann and Valdes 1995). The centers became further institutionalized in the 1960’s. While they partially served the purpose of mobilizing women and increasing their political participation, the Centers also served the important function of teaching Chilean women practical domestic skills such as sewing and home economics (Valdes et al 1989). Furthermore, as Baldez (2002) describes: “While women’s participation in this program\(^{60}\) tended to reinforce women’s traditional gender roles, it also enabled women to develop leadership skills and to learn how to organize at the grassroots level” (40). As such, CEMA became an institution that carried on from regime to regime, and it played an important role throughout the history of the Chilean women’s movement.


Between 1970 and 1973, Chile experienced a crucial social and political crisis which had profound implications for Chilean women and their activism. In September 1970, Chile elected the Marxist government of Salvador Allende through democratic elections. Allende’s Popular Unity (Unidad Popular – UP) government was elected with only 36.9% of the popular vote, and his party controlled less than one quarter of the seats in Congress (Oxhorn 1995). Allende’s presidency was later confirmed in a runoff election in October 1970.

In line with its socialist ideology, the government of President Allende did not consider women to be a social group in need of special consideration. Instead, women were perceived as an integral part of the exploited working class (Cleary 1996).

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\(^{60}\) Baldez refers to the Popular Promotion program introduced by President Frei in order to mobilize previously disenfranchised groups such as women, peasants and youth. Mother’s Center (CEMA) were formed as a part of this program.
Similarly as in communist Czechoslovakia, the state considered women to be workers, mothers and citizens also.

Salvador Allende’s government turned the network of Mother’s Centers established under the previous regime of President Frei into the National Confederation of Mother’s Centers (COCEMA). Between 1970 and 1973, the number of Mother’s Centers and the number of women participating in them doubled (Franceschet 2005, 52) and by 1973, they had around one million members (Macaulay 2006, 116). Under the new socialist regime, the centers were put in charge of implementing a variety of public and social policies: they worked to open new parks, assisted the government in building new houses, opening and maintaining daycare centers, as well as helping with health campaigns. In addition to COCEMA, the government also proposed a new organization to address a variety of issues facing women in 1972: the National Secretariat for Women. This organization was supposed to tackle such issues as healthcare, childcare and education as it related to women, however, at the time of the coup, the bill was still being revised (Valdes and Weinstein 1993).

President Allende’s path to socialism was highly controversial. Under Allende’s rule, Chile nationalized large scale industries such as banking and copper mining, the government took over the healthcare and educational systems, and it also continued to collectivize land. Primarily through employment in public work projects, the government also worked to improve living standards and eliminate poverty. As a result of Allende’s new redistributive policies, public expenditure rose dramatically. While initially the Chilean economy grew and inflation declined, soon the country’s fiscal deficit began to plummet. In response, Allende’s government decided to default on debts owed to foreign
creditors and governments. In the end, the socialist government was opposed not just by Chilean landowners, businessmen and the Catholic Church, but also by foreign corporations and even governments.

While Allende’s government increased wages several times, the impact was negated by soaring inflation rates. The prices of basic goods and groceries also continued to rise. Furthermore, the price of copper, Chile’s most important export material, fell dramatically on international markets. Dependent on food imports, the declining export earnings combined with the outcomes of these other socialist policies resulted in economic and social crisis. At the same time, Allende’s regime was also undermined by the U.S. government, which viewed the President’s socialist policies and close relationship with Cuba as a political threat (Kornbluh 1999).61

Women and existing women’s organizations on the left were particularly concerned with the economic situation resulting in shortages of food and other basic products, and they organized to defend Allende’s government. Meanwhile, women on the right were concerned with Allende’s policies which they viewed as a threat to traditional family values (Dandavati 1996).62 As a result, women (and conservative middle and upper middle class women in particular) played an important role in the 1973 military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet resulting in the overthrow of the Allende’s government. Within the first two years, Augusto Pinochet concentrated political power in his hands and became the President of the Chilean Republic.

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61 The Hinchey Report documenting CIA’s activities in Chile documents, for example, that in September 1970, President Nixon authorized 10 million U.S. dollars to stop President Allende from coming to power. [http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp](http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp)

62 For a detailed account of the role women and women’s groups played in the opposition movement against Allende’s regime and policies, see Baldez (2002), pp. 49-97.

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military led by General Augusto Pinochet staged a coup against Salvador Allende and his government. After a farewell speech on the national radio, Allende committed suicide. As a result of the coup, a right-wing military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet took power, leading the country with a bureaucratic, technocratic approach (Collier 1979). In December 1974, the military appointed Pinochet as President of the Republic. Pinochet’s power was then further strengthened by the Constitution of 1980. The subsequent political and economic changes had important implications for the lives of not just women, but all Chileans. One would assume that given the repressive nature of the military regime, political opportunity for any form of independent activism closed. But that was not the case.

The direction in which the military government chose to move Chile was determined by “the military government’s national security doctrine and its concepts of maintaining order, reinforcing the patriarchal system and limiting the role of the state in dispensing social services” (Dandavati 1996, 6). The government quickly privatized the economy, opened borders to enable free trade, centralized political power and limited the role of government in economic affairs.

As soon as they took power, the military junta dissolved Congress and replaced government officials with military appointees. Within days, General Pinochet and his supporters suspended the Constitution and severely limited civil and political rights. Elections were forbidden, and so were political parties that earlier supported Allende’s regime. The new military government eliminated any political opposition and autonomous forms or organization, and military officials took control of educational
institutions. From the first days after the military coup in 1973, the state placed particular emphasis on repressing leftist supporters of the Allende regime and it also targeted such organizations as trade unions. Former elites were often detained, interrogated, tortured and some even executed. The 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (also known as the Rettig Report) determined that over 2,000 people were killed for political reasons during the military dictatorship.

Radical economic transformation directed by the military leadership soon followed the political transformation. Pinochet handed power over the economy to ‘Chicago boys’, a group of young libertarian economists influenced by the teachings of Milton Friedman while undergoing their studies in the United States. Relying on the assistance of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the military government followed what they referred to as a program of ‘national reconstruction’. The primary features of this economic overturn included privatization, cuts in government spending and strong reliance on the theory of open and free markets and comparative advantage.

In 1975, the government began what has become known as the ‘shock treatment’ (Oppenheim 1999). As a part of this treatment, the government set off deflation through dramatic cuts in public expenditures. Government expenditure was cut by 27% in 1975. Meanwhile, unemployment rose, and wages were frozen while prices soared (O’Brien and Roddick 1983). Furthermore, in 1980 the government proposed what it referred to as ‘seven modernizations’. These included a new labor code, privatization of health care and social security and the decentralization of education and local government (Winn 2004, 31).
The situation of those already disadvantaged by the changes was made worse by the government’s strong repression of labor unions. Whereas unions were not made illegal, the 1979 Labor Plan effectively decentralized and weakened the existing ones. This is documented by available data; while approximately 40% of the total labor force was united in labor unions in 1972, the membership rate decreased to 10% in 1987 (Chuchryk 1989, 152). Peter Winn (2004) describes the situation as one where “Neoliberalism was imposed by the Pinochet dictatorship during the late 1970’s in a highly ideological version that made it a vehicle for an aggressive attack on Chile’s workers and the labor rights they had acquired during decades of struggle” (3). In other words, the regime was supporting businesses, but not freedoms for workers (Winn 2004, 22).

Because Chile experienced economic growth, economists around the world viewed these policies as an ‘economic miracle’ to be admired. However, others emphasized the catastrophic social consequences of these reforms. They saw the dramatic increase in poverty and income inequality rates. In Chile, the GINI index, a standard indicator of income inequality, grew from 47.4 in 1971 to 58.5 in 1990. Similarly, the share of households living in poverty grew from 17 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in 1987 (Huber et al. 2006). Many Chileans began to experience a lack of public services such as electricity and drainage. Increasing poverty rates and poor living conditions also increased the rates of illness (Collins and Lear 1995).

During this time, it had also become increasingly clear that different social groups were affected by these reforms differently. Most notably, those already disadvantaged (the poor, women, and the elderly) became disproportionately affected by the growing
levels of unemployment, decreasing real wages and rise in prices (see Chuchryk 1989; Winn 2004). The new economic strategy also brought along with it a significant reduction of public spending and cuts in social programs. Many areas of social policy previously handled by the state were privatized. This, combined with growing unemployment and poverty, had a disproportionate impact on Chilean women.

**State Ideology toward Women: Emphasis on Tradition**

From early on, the military headed by Augusto Pinochet placed great emphasis on the importance of family and traditional gender values (see, for example, Valenzuela 1991). Trying to depoliticize women, the state founded its gender ideology on the values of “Catholic traditionalism”, emphasizing the role of religion, family and the nation. In Pinochet’s words, “Women and the Armed Forces are inextricably united through a spiritual bond that allows them to generate, maintain and promote the Great Chilean Family” (Giselle Munizaga cited in Macaluay 2006, 117). Pinochet’s regime used its rhetoric, organizations and policies to encourage women to stay home, take care of their families and raise their children for the fatherland. Chilean sociologist Alexandra Bach explains, “The official discourse toward women was conservative, women were portrayed as saints, as good housekeepers” (personal interview).

The government drew a strong link between the need to protect the nation and the need to protect the Chilean family. This was done through the constitutional acts passed in 1975 and 76 and through other documents (Thomas forthcoming). Pinochet then presented himself as the protector of the nation and the family. Gwynn Thomas describes how the government worked to construct a positive image of itself through the
introduction of a variety of policies and propaganda campaigns surrounding these policies. Fully controlled by the government, Chilean television stations in particular used peak viewing times to run advertisements by government agencies. These were repeated over and over again (Hojman 1992). For example, television spots prepared for a propaganda campaign entitled Somos Millones were used by the government to highlight its social and economic accomplishments. They were also designed to send the public the message that Chilean families were living a better life under the new political regime.

Notably, as Gwyn Thomas (forthcoming) documents, this life was presented along the ‘ideal’ of the traditional family. As Thomas explains;

The spots were replete with images of happy and successful traditional families. Thus, on a visual level, the ultimate message presented was that Pinochet and his government had strengthened traditional families. His policies were framed as having provided good jobs for Chilean men, thus enabling them to fulfill their role as heads of households and provide for their wives and children. Furthermore, the increased prosperity meant that Chilean women were content to stay at home and manage the house as a refuge for their husbands and nurture their children… (Thomas forthcoming, 179)

Indeed, the model of family and gender roles as portrayed by the government was very patriarchal, resting on a rigid sexual division of labor. The military regime looked to ‘homogenize’ the role of women in society (Munizaga and Letelier 1988). “… The official discourses of the military regime regarded women as a homogenous group on the basis of their role as mothers, which transcended all other characteristics of women such as class, status and education” (Dandavati 1996, 28) These gender differences were seen as basic and constituted an integral part of the military government’s national security doctrine.
This cultural model was further reinforced through the influence of the Catholic Church. The narrow traditional view of women’s role in society was clearly reflected in Chilean law. The Civil Code declared that wives must live with their husbands, be faithful to them and be obedient (Dandavati 1996, 46). The husband owned all property; women were only in possession of the salary they earned. The control exercised by the husband was strong. Women were not allowed to travel abroad with their children without the permission of the husband or without the authorization of the court. The husband was also in charge of the children and could determine their future. The Penal Code sanctioned adultery committed by married women. Divorce was not legal. The military government opposed abortion, sterilization and contraception, and any access to contraceptives was limited (1979 document by the Office of National Planning).

In line with these policies, soon after the coup in October 1973, the military government set up the National Secretariat of Women. It also reorganized the already existing Mothers Centers (CEMA). The National Women’s Secretariat was formally established to oversee programs and policies for women, but both the Secretariat and the CEMA “became political tools to disseminate images of the traditional woman” (Kohl 2008). The Secretariat’s activities included “talks and seminars to possible volunteers on being a good mother, wife, and housewife” (Canadell 1993, 49). Directed by Pinochet’s wife Lucia Hiriart, the National Women’s Secretariat targeted primarily upper-middle class and upper class women.

In contrast, the Mother’s Centers (CEMA) were targeting lower class women, and the government maintained control over the centers by appointing the wives of military officials and other supporters of the regime to higher ranking positions. Some of
the primary activities of these organizations included courses for women and the production and sale of artisan goods; the Centers also provided some health, educational and housing services. Poor women frequently depended on the Centros for economic support (Dandavati 1996). By 1983, the Mothers Centers (CEMAs) had over 10,000 centers around the country (Valenzuela 1991) with a membership of about 200,000 (Valdes et al. 1989, 41). While these organizations resulted in some tangible benefits for Chilean women, it is important to keep in mind that their goal was to promote women’s role as mothers who bring up patriotic citizens supporting the Chilean fatherland – with the long-term aim to keep women away from politics (Chuchryk 1989). Together, the existing gendered laws and government expectations created ground for women to pursue their grievances.

**Family Life and Social Policy**

Under Pinochet’s government, social policy became subordinated to economic policy. The cuts in social spending were particularly reflected in such areas as housing, healthcare and education (Richards 2004). “By 1978… Public spending was slashed to one-half its 1973 levels as a percentage of GNP, amid a new round of privatizations. Prices were freed and the banking system and financial markets deregulated. A new pro-business labor code was decreed and social security was privatized” (Winn 2004, 52).

The provision of some services was delegated to the private sector. This happened through the privatization of some social policy schemes and services, as well as through subcontracting specific services to private companies. The social costs of the economic and social system reform were high. “Increasingly, workers were left to
confront their social problems – illness, retirement, education – as individual consumer choices within the marketplace, not as objects of social solidarity or collective action” (Winn 2004, 52). The decentralization and privatization of health services was reflected in higher cost for these services for Chilean citizens. The military government almost eliminated government provided social services as well as the safety net for the poor (Dandavati 1996).

These social and economic changes introduced by the military regime affected women and men differently. “Although Gen. Augusto Pinochet's liberalizing project was not explicitly gendered, the reforms had gendered consequences” (Pribble 2006, 99). When combined with the market-oriented reforms, the regime’s gender ideology was soon reflected in the erosion of protective labor legislation for women. A new law introduced soon after the military takeover enabled employers to discriminate against women in the hiring process, and to fire pregnant women; it also took childcare subsidies provided by employers away from working women. Changes in the educational system led to a significant increase in the cost of childcare and lowered its availability (see Chuchryk 1989). Gender stereotypes were prevalent in all levels of the educational system, and despite having a formally equal access to education, women were educated only in traditional areas.

Pinochet’s government used social policy strategically as a propaganda tool. To do this, the formerly universalistic social programs were replaced with ones targeting specific social groups, primarily mothers and children. For example, soon after he took power, Pinochet vowed to support Chilean families by improving their security of housing. He developed his housing policy with the aim to show his dedication for
Chilean families. Rather than a social right, housing was presented as a gift from Pinochet to Chilean families (Thomas forthcoming, 174). The ongoing lack of housing available to families did not make it an easy task (Que Pasa, 25 January, 1974, no. 144, p. 18 cited in Thomas), and the government struggled to follow through with its promises.

Despite the widespread social cuts, “traditionalist benefits were never touched by the dictatorship” (Rios Tobar, personal interview). As a result, women were both victims and beneficiaries of the social and economic changes introduced under Pinochet’s rule (Tinsman 2004). From the beginning, social legislation in Chile included provisions for protecting women in their role as mothers. Minister Jorge Mardones explained in 1954: "When women work at home, they exercise a social function that deserves to be recognized" (cited in Arellano 1985, 83). In accordance with its traditionalist rhetoric, the state increased such contributions as a family welfare allowance covering pregnant women and children that had been excluded from the previous program (Montecinos 1994).

Similarly, the military government also sought to maintain its emphasis on health care for mothers and children (Montecinos 1994). As did previous Chilean governments and in accordance with the regime’s pro-family propaganda, Pinochet chose to place particular emphasis on the importance of declining infant mortality and improving maternal care. At the same time as the government was cutting healthcare and other social expenditures, Pinochet expanded public policies for infants and mothers living under poverty. Specifically, the Corporation for Infant Nutrition provided care and nutrition for needy infants and education for their mothers (Collins and Lear 1995). All of these policies painted a clear picture of the position that the state desired women to
have in the society – a very traditional one where women were excluded from the public sphere.

**Employment**

Soon, unemployment in Chile soared as a result of the economic stabilization steps made by the military government. In the Santiago metropolitan area alone, economic unemployment increased from 3% at the time of the coup to over 10% in June 1974 (O’Brien and Roddick 1983, 45). By 1975, overall unemployment soared to 17% Winn 2004, 28) and further to 19.8% in 1976 (O’Brien and Roddick 1983, 63). Furthermore, if one adds the number of people working through the government emergency working programs, the 1976 figure stood at 28%. Estimates suggest that the unemployment rates reached 80% in some of the country shantytowns (Chuchryk 1994).

At the same time, the rising unemployment and declining wages led the government to introduce several new programs targeting ‘heads of households’. These included the Programa de Empleo Minimo (PEM) and the Programa de Ocupacion para Jefes de Hogar (Dandavati 1996). The goal of the Program de Ocupacion para Jefes de Hogar (POJH) program was to provide employment opportunities for the heads of households. “The terms ‘heads of households’ meant men, since women could not be legally regarded as heads of households, despite the fact that many women with children did not have husbands, or were the primary income providers in the family” (Dandavati 1996, 42). As a result, women often relied on the PEM program which provided half the salary offered by the POJH program. In fact, women represented about 80% of the PEM beneficiaries.
Ironically, while the state encouraged women to stay at home, the poor economic situation meant that more and more women were entering the labor market. While 25% of women aged 15 and over worked outside of home in 1976, the number increased to 32% by 1990 (Valdes and Gomariz 1995, 38). While unemployment rates for women became only slightly higher than those of men, in 1985 women were on average making just little over half of the average male wage (Leiva 1987; Valenzuela 1991).

Furthermore, some of the decrees in the new Labor Code (Plan Laboral) eliminated most of the rights enjoyed by sick and pregnant workers.

**Women Organize**

Under Pinochet’s regime, the Chilean state allowed little space for citizens’ political activism. In the language of social movement theory, political opportunity for social mobilization was closed, or so it seemed. But perhaps surprisingly, Chilean women were able to frame their issues in ways that created political opportunity for women’s mobilization despite the repressive nature of the Chilean military regime. How did they accomplish that?

Especially in the early years of the dictatorship, the government targeted (through arrests and harassment) men much more than women. This was in part due to the fact that men represented a disproportionate number of political party members of existing political parties, labor unions and other primarily leftist organizations viewed unfavorably by the regime. In contrast, women were often ignored and seen as unimportant and harmless. This presented an important opportunity for Chilean women to organize around their issues.
After the coup in 1973, the Chilean military government channeled women’s civic participation into government controlled organizations such as the Mother’s Centers (CEMA) and the National Women’s Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de la Mujer) in order to depoliticize women. These organizations were not autonomous and they only further perpetuated the patriarchal cultural model (Lechner and Levy 1984). The state strategy was not to empower Chilean women. In fact, just like Sonia Alvarez describes in the case of Brazil “In the context of military rule, the authoritarian State was, of course, viewed as the chief enemy of feminism and of all other progressive social movements that emerged during the 1960’s and 1970’s” (Alvarez 1994, 14). Instead, the state de facto depoliticized women by defining them as those with greater morality and asked them to serve and protect the fatherland.

Ironically, this combination of state traditionalist ideology and policies toward women combined with state repression of traditional forms of resistance provided women with political space for action. A strong Chilean women’s movement re-emerged primarily in response to these changing conditions and shifting powers within the newly dictatorial regime. As the power of political parties was getting weaker, alternative forms of civic participation were being developed (Rios Tobar et al. 2003). The regime’s numerous and often brutal violations of human rights together with the growing economic crisis provided women with grievances against the state. In fact, women led the first organized resistance to the repressive regime. They had a strong sense of who and what they were opposing. “Early 1980’s, that’s when you begin to see a lot of women’s groups” (Carmen Torres, personal interview).
In response to these pressures, Chilean women organized both around feminist and non-feminist issues. Writing about women’s movements in Latin America, scholars came to recognize three dominant strands of the movements: (1) human rights groups, (2) community-based groups responding to the worsening economic situation and (3) feminist groups (Waylen 1994). By the early 1980’s, three women’s federations emerged: the committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CODEM), Women of Chile (MUDECHI) and the Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO) (Chuchryk 1994, 76). These groups soon formed a cohesive social movement (Kirkwood 1986).

First, a number of groups emerged in response to the serious human rights abuses under the authoritarian regime. As in the case of the Argentinean ‘Madres de Plaza de Mayo’, Chilean women – mothers, wives and sisters – used their traditional roles to organize and demand the return of their “disappeared” children, brothers and husbands. To do this, women initially sought the protection of churches (Frohman and Valdes 1995). Despite the repressive nature of the regime, the state found it difficult to suppress these efforts because women strategically used their maternal roles assigned to them by the state and its policies to protest. Steve J. Stern (2004) explains

In a Catholic society whose military rulers proclaimed fidelity to Christianity as a basic principle and where political polarization and bitterness had run deep, a social referent that questioned official truth on the basis of religious conscience was culturally and practically feasible. Religious conscience framed the question of violence and human rights as transcendent. There were themes beyond mundane political calculations, rules, and fault lines. Those who insisted on defending fundamental human rights had a right to do so because they were acting not as a political opposition, but as Chileans of conscience. Theirs was a moral insistence legitimized, organized, and partially protected by the Santiago Catholic Church. (Stern 2004, 119)
This ‘unintended politicization of the private sphere’ (Valenzuela 1991, 166) became clear as early as 1975 when women went into the streets to demand the return of the disappeared and to protest the authoritarian state.

Second, women represented a disproportionate number of those organized in a variety of urban community groups that appeared in response to the economic crises that were particularly harshly affecting the urban poor (pobladoras). According to the organization Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (1988), by 1986 there were 1,383 popular organizations in the Santiago metropolitan area, with a total of close to 50,000 active members. Three groups stood out in their dedication to these issues: Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (CODEM), Women of Chile (MUDECHI), and the Movement of Shantytown Women (MOMUPO). While CODEM and MUDECHI were nationwide federations of women’s groups association with political parties, MOMUPO was a Santiago-based group independent of political parties (Baldez 2002, 138).

These groups were set up to pursue new survival strategies (see, for example, Chuchryk 1989), and they often sprung up from church related base communities (see Stewart-Gambino 2005). Waylen (1994) describes these in terms of women’s involvement in “the politics of daily life” (336). Here, women organized grocery co-ops and communal soup pots, set up and tended community gardens, collected and sold clothing and organized workshops to generate incomes or community-based provision of various social services and organized child care cooperatives. The Chilean Catholic Church often supported these initiatives and helped to coordinate and expand them (Stewart-Gambino 2005, 51).
While these groups were established with the aim to ensure family survival on a daily basis, they also provided environments where women could discuss political issues, educate themselves and express doubts about the social and gendered division of labor. Here, as Chuchryk (1989) notes, women also discovered that they were capable of political action: “By creating the need for alternative economic survival strategies, the regime’s economic policies have impelled women to organize” (155). Because women’s activities were not seen as dangerous or political, women were able to use their traditional roles to utilize this space outside of the realm of conventional politics. Excluded from formal politics because of societal patriarchal norms, women moved political activity from the mainstream institutions to community-based action (Waylen 1994).

The third general type of women’s organizations – feminist ones - grew out of these two movements, as women realized that gender constrained their lives in ways not shared by the men of their class (Alvarez 1994). As Chuchryk (1989) notes, “… the process of engaging in political activity often encourages women to begin to question those very same roles which provided the initial impetus for political organizing” (159). Women active in the trade unions began to demand equal pay and organizing on the basis of their gender identity, Chilean women began to press for furthering of women’s rights and gender equality. “Democracy in the country and in the home” became the slogan of the Chilean feminist movement of this time. Some of the key groups included the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer – CEM) and LaMorada. In 1983, MEMCH83 an umbrella group for a wide range of both feminist and non-feminist groups began to play a prominent role as well.
International influences came into play as the International Women’s Day of 1978 provided basis for an emerging women’s political platform. Western feminism was, as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, rejected as irrelevant and as hurtful to the relationship between women and men. Chilean, as well as other Latin American feminists, largely accepted (but not without discussion) Marxist feminism to frame their grievances and demands. Chilean women eventually drew a link between their subordination and capitalism (Kirkwood 1986; Rios Tobar 2003b).

In short, Chilean women’s groups organized into what many perceived as a relatively cohesive women’s movement, and as such played an important role in the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and in the revitalization of the civil society. Using the authoritarian state’s rhetoric and policies, Chilean women were among the first to publicly challenge the military states in these countries, and women’s movements joined broader opposition coalitions to end military rule (Jaquette 2001). To do so, women strategically used the political space available to them in the context of the authoritarian regime. As a result of these developments, feminist issues came to be positively associated with democratization and human rights (Jaquette 2001).

**Conclusion**

During Augusto Pinochet’s rule, thousands of people were tortured, murdered and made disappear simply because of their political affiliation or beliefs. Therefore, it is remarkable that Chilean women were able to organize around a variety of social issues, human rights and gender injustices. To do so, women used the Catholic Church as an important resource and a mobilizing structure. Furthermore, they framed their grievances
in ways that created a political opportunity within the existing societal structures. Finally, they were able to form a unified movement in response to the gendered ideology of Pinochet’s government.

The Chilean military dictatorship was very clear on what the role of women was. The combination of the traditionalist gender ideology and of the regime’s social policies toward women led to a situation where Chilean women were sent a clear message that they were not welcome in the public sphere. In a very paradoxical way, these were the very same measures that also created political space for women to return to the public arena. Framing their issues in terms of their roles of good mothers and wives, women responded to the economic and human rights crises by engaging the state through its own rhetoric and policies. Similar frames remained unavailable to Chilean men.

Avoiding ‘Western feminism’, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues in Marxist terms. Through its repressive measures against labor unions and other traditionally leftists groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular frame available for women to utilize. Furthermore, as a result of these processes and women’s demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy from the old authoritarian political model. In Latin America, women’s issues then became “congruent with and symbolic of a larger political transformation” (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, 8).
While in Czechoslovakia democracy arrived almost overnight, the Chilean transition to democracy was a product of long, careful negotiations. These took place between (1) the outgoing government of General Augusto Pinochet, and (2) the new democratic forces, namely the anti-Pinochet Coalition for Democracy (that subsequently emerged as a winner in the 1989 elections). The compromises that emerged out of these talks had important implications for the development of gender policy in post-dictatorial Chile. Surprisingly, despite ongoing gender discrimination and inequalities, Chilean women did not take advantage of this political opening to organize around their grievances.

In Chile the first wave of pro-democratic protests began in 1983. A 14% decline in GDP led copper miners’ unions to declare a National Day of Protest, to express Chilean workers’ dissatisfaction with the current situation. During the same year, the Catholic Church in Chile also declared its opposition to the military regime. As opposition parties began reviving, Christian Democrats joined forces with the Socialists, forming a National Accord for Transition to Full Democracy. The Accord demanded free and fair elections and rejected the 1980 Constitution.63

By 1985, the Chilean market was recovering from an earlier crisis. In this context, Augusto Pinochet regained confidence and also some popular support. Public demonstrations organized by the opposition were having little impact on Pinochet’s

63 The Constitution of 1980 replaced the Constitution of 1925. Approved by Chilean voters during a heavily controlled plebiscite under the military rule of General Augusto Pinochet, the new Constitution was very controversial because it significantly increased the power of the Chilean President.
government and the Chilean political regime. A subsequent 1986 attempt to assassinate Pinochet gave the dictator a much sought after justification for the new imposition of a State of Siege. Throughout the year, the opposition forces continued to lack a clear strategy for ending Pinochet’s rule and returning Chile to democracy. Meanwhile, the Chilean society remained divided between those opposing Pinochet’s rule, and those who supported the military government in order to achieve greater political stability.

Things began to change in 1987. First, with the exception of the Communist Party, political parties were once again made legal in Chile. During the same year, the new U.S. Ambassador Harry Barnes also began to work with Chile’s political opposition to advance democratization. Barnes added his influential voice to those who reasoned that the opposition ought to accept a referendum on Pinochet’s rule as set in the 1980 Constitution. Pinochet considered declaring the Ambassador *persona non grata*, but the General remained optimistic about his chances of winning given his continued control of the mass media, of much of the government and because he felt he had the support of a significant part of the population. Augusto Pinochet also expected the economic and social context would play in his favor as the economy was growing and the Chilean standard of living was improving.

The opposition discussions resulted in Concertacion por el No, a center-left alliance of sixteen political parties led by Christian Democrats and Socialists. Supported by a broad based grassroots movement, the coalition made every effort to register as many citizens as they could to vote. And they were successful. In the October 5, 1988 referendum, the Concertacion por el No won a decisive 55%-43% victory, with a voter turnout at a record 90%. Pinochet had to accept his defeat which by the 1980 Constitution required free elections for President the following year. The Concertacion coalition then
subsequently won presidential elections in 1989, 1993, 1999 and 2005/06.\textsuperscript{64} The Christian Democratic government of Patricio Alywin took power peacefully on March 11, 1990. The outcome of the earlier negotiations between Pinochet’s government and the opposition parties was, among other things, a political compromise on sensitive issues which inhibited future investigation and made it possible for the proponents of the military regime to avoid future personal and institutional responsibility for crimes committed prior to 1989. Overall, as a result of these political negotiations, the military regime has been able to shape the future transformation in unprecedented ways. For years, Chile was left with what has become known as ‘protected democracy under military guidance’ (Winn 2004, 30).

For two decades after 1990, the governing center-left Coalition for Democracy (later renamed Concertacion de Partidos Por la Democracia) “pursued an agenda of intensified global economic integration at the same time as a political programme focused on greater equity, claiming to be making a concerted effort to reduce poverty” (Schild 2002, 170). Surprising to many was the fact that the newly elected governments continued to reinforce the neoliberal economic reforms initiated under Pinochet’s regime, which they formerly criticized. For the next decade or so, Chile experienced high growth rates and increased productivity. The eleven year long growth has become known as the \textit{Chilean miracle}.

However, at the same time that Chile was showing signs of good economic progress in the early 1990’s, it was also faced with high levels of inequality and poverty. In other words, not all Chileans have benefited from the ‘Chilean miracle’ equally. In

\textsuperscript{64} While the presidential elections took place in 2005, run off elections had to be called and those were held in 2006.
1987, 45% of Chilean population lived below poverty level (Schild 2002, 177), and the figures did not improve much despite the economic boom. In 1990, some 39% of Chileans were still living in poverty (Schild 2002).\textsuperscript{65} Aware of the situation, the first two Concertacion governments implemented what they referred to as ‘Growth with Equity’ strategy to balance the negative effects of neoliberal economy with social life.

Formally, the new democratic government in Chile expressed support for women and their demands. It soon established the National Service for Women (SERNAM), and it committed itself to adhere to a number of national and international treaties and documents relevant to women’s rights. This included its continuous support for the United Nation’s \textit{Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women} (CEDAW).

At the same time, however, SERNAM’s relationship to women’s groups remained problematic and Chilean women continued to face important gender inequalities in the workplace, at home and in regards to their reproductive and other rights. In 1999, the Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee of the United Nations concluded that; “Chile's women had played a leading role in the battle against the dictatorship and for human rights, yet they had no divorce law, were under-represented in decision-making positions and faced severe constraints in reproductive health, expert members of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women said this afternoon”\textsuperscript{66}. To this date, all forms of abortion in Chile continue to be penalized, making Chile one of the most restrictive regimes in the world in this regard.

Surprisingly, despite these inequalities, the Chilean women’s movement broke up

\textsuperscript{65} But note that poverty rates have further decreased to 22% by 1998 (Schild 2002, 177).
\textsuperscript{66} Women's Anti-Discrimination Committee - 1a - Press Release WOM/1145 443rd Meeting (PM) 22 June 1999
and went largely silent once the new political regime was in place. On March 8, 1989, about 20,000 women came to the Santa Laura Stadium to celebrate the return to democracy (Rios Tobar 2003a). But even though Chilean women and women’s movements played an important role in “ending fear” and bringing the Chilean authoritarian regime down, it is paradoxical that they began to disappear from the public realm soon after the country shifted towards democracy.

**State Ideology toward Women**

In democratic Chile after 1990, the government’s position on women’s desirable role in society has been inconsistent. On the one hand, the democratic government declared support for women’s issues when it created The National Service for Women (SERNAM) in 1991. During the presidency of Michele Bachelet (2006 – 2010), the executive branch also fought for greater inclusion of women into formal politics and for women’s advancement in other areas of social life. At the same time, however, the state’s strategy of economic neoliberalism combined with the enduring adherence to restrictive reproductive rights left women’s activists cynical about Chilean state’s commitment to furthering women’s rights and issues.

The National Service for Women (SERNAM) was formally put in place with the passage of Law No. 19.023 in January 1991.67 This only took place after a political struggle since the Chilean Right (UDI and PRN political parties) opposed its establishment, fearing that he agency would be a feminist establishment. Once in place, the mission of SERNAM was to “promote the participation of women in national life and equality of opportunities between the sexes” (SERNAM 1994, 1). In other words,

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67 For more information on the establishment of SERNAM, see Matear 1997; Waylen 1994.
SERNAM’s task was to oversee and improve the status of Chilean women. Its focus was shaped by the demands the *Concertacion Nacional de Mujeres por la Democracia* and also by the objectives of the United Nations’ *Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW). 68

In practice, SERNAM has been overseeing legal reforms and their implementation and it has also organized a number of educational campaigns pertaining to women’s issues. Veronica Schild (2002) explains that “In addition to proposing legal reforms, advising other relevant ministries on gender-sensitive policies, and initiating educational campaigns, SERNAM channels government funds and foreign aid to gendered social programmes intended to integrate women fully into the development process” (173). The agency formally belongs under the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (a ministry responsible for social issues), and it works through thirteen regional offices responsible for executing its agenda on local level (Dandavati 2004). Therefore, while SERNAM has the ability to propose and influence gender related legislation and offer educational programs in the area of gender issues and rights, it does not have the power to fund or implement its own programs. To carry out its programs, SERNAM has to turn to other ministries for financial backing (Richards 2004, 185).

The agency has been critical for the advancement of Chilean women’s rights in a number of ways. For example, SERNAM has established Centers for Information regarding women’s rights and the agency also played a critical role in passing a law making domestic violence illegal in Chile. In 2000, SERNAM introduced what has become known as the *Equal Opportunity Plan for Women and Men* (plan de igualdad entre mujeres y hombres) to be reached by 2010. The plan has become a key tool in

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68 The CEDAW Convention was ratified by the government of Augusto Pinochet in early December 1989.
implementing gender equity policies in Chile. According to the response of the Chilean delegation to the CEDAW Committee, the Plan focuses on six main priority areas: 1) promoting a culture of equality; 2) promoting women’s rights and their full enjoyment; 3) promoting women’s participation in power structures and in the decision-making process; 4) guaranteeing economic independence for women and reducing poverty; 5) improving women’s day-to-day well-being and quality of life; and 6) integrating gender perspective into public policies (CEDAW responses 2006).

Furthermore, SERNAM proposed important amendments to the Civil Code that would improve the legal rights of married women in regards to their estate. The agency also worked with the Ministry of Labor to update the Labor Code by providing rights for domestic workers and by eliminating articles that excluded women from certain professions (Dandavati 2004). Finally, by updating the Labor Code, SERNAM also contributed to the provision of increased rights for working parents.

Therefore, it is without doubt that using SERNAM to institute these legal and institutional reforms, the Chilean government has expressed some level of commitment to gender equality. At the same time, however, the state has been communicating other messages in regards to women’s position in the Chilean society. This has been taking place both through SERNAM and by using other channels as well.

First, while the National Service for Women (SERNAM) has always looked like a progressive institution on paper, it has not always been so in reality. It is true that Chilean women have succeeded in institutionalizing some of their demands through the agency. At the same time, however, Marcela Rios Tobar (2003) and others have noted that SERNAM’s relation with women’s groups and other civil society actors has from its
inception been rather problematic (see also Richards 2004). A common criticism of the agency includes charges that it is too conservative and that it has been co-opted by the state. Some suggest that concerned about the strength of the women’s movement, the democratic government used SERNAM to exert control (Baldez 2001). Others go as far as to argue that especially in the early years of the political transition, SERNAM only protected and advanced women’s rights as they related to the traditional family. For example, Chuchryk (1994) writes

Unfortunately, SERNAM has replaced the women’s movement as the key interlocutor in the public discourse on women’s issues. It is a government agency that consistently frames women’s issues in the context of the need to preserve and harmonize family life. (88)

Similarly, Franceschet (2005) suggests that SERNAM developed “a potentially irresolvable tension at its core: to pursue women’s equality while strengthening the traditional family” (119).

This charge that SERNAM focuses primarily on women’s familial roles as opposed to women’s rights more generally seems to be supported by governmental actions and reports. For example, in its 4th periodic report to the United Nations’ CEDAW Commission, when referring to the Convention’s articles on equality before the law and elimination of discrimination in legislation, the Chilean government places the following pieces of legislation at the top of the list of laws recently put in place to advance women’s status in Chile (in order listed): amendment to the law concerning family abandonment and payment of alimony and support to ensure timely and equitable alimony provisions, and their effective enforcement; the introduction of amendments to regulations regarding domestic violence; the creation of the Family Courts and the establishment of the Mediation System providing people with appropriate opportunities
to reach cooperative solutions through mediation; amendment to the Constitutional Organic Law of Teaching embodying the right of access to educational establishments for female students who are pregnant or are nursing mothers (CEDAW 2006). In 2000, newly elected President Ricardo Lagos named Adriana Del Piano SERNAM’s minister. “Six months after assuming her post, Del Piano participated in the UN Beijing Plus Five conference, where she not only stayed clear of any commitments towards improving the country’s track record on reproductive rights but explicitly state that her government would pursue a ‘pro-life policy’” (Rios-Tobar 2003a, 262).

Indeed, throughout much of its existence, SERNAM remained neutral in its position toward a number of controversial issues pertaining to women. Among these were access to abortion, divorce, and birth control. According to Annie Dandavati (2004) SERNAM was defending its neutral position on these issues, “claiming that it is a technical office which is not permitted to intervene in the moral issues of society and, therefore cannot initiate legislation on either divorce or abortion” (102). Dandavati suggests that “SERNAM’s emphasis on moderation and avoiding conflict, together with the overwhelming influence of the Catholic Church, which does not support any of these issues, has resulted in the maintenance of the status quo for several women’s issues” (102). It may not be surprising then that some continue to view the agency as one that “plays a confusing, symbolic role in the government” (Obach interview).

The second way in which Chilean women sense and experience an anti-women mood from the state is through some of the important legacies left behind by the military regime. According to Molina (1998), “… lingering authoritarian legacies manifested, for
example, in the organization of the structures of the state bureaucracy” (132-3). Namely, the Catholic Church and the Constitution of 1980 have played key roles in the Chilean transition to democracy and beyond. The situation is somewhat ironic. While Chilean women found an ally in the Catholic Church during the time of the transition, these ties between pro-democracy forces and the Church also ensured an important political role for the traditional Catholic Church in post-transition politics. This has, in turn, weakened the impact of the Chilean feminist movement (see, for example, Htun 2003). Ironically then, the same organization that helped to bring democracy and increased rights for millions of Chileans later joined forces with the Chilean state in curtailing the extension of rights for women.

The effects of the traditionalist ideology associated with the Catholic Church continued to be reinforced through the Constitution of 1980 drafted by Pinochet’s government. As Leiva (2005a) notes “To ensure the success of the negotiated transition, the Concertacion had to provide ample evidence of its commitment to both the neoliberal economic model as well as Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution” (75). This Constitution has become known primarily as the one which ordered a gradual transition from the military dictatorship to a civilian government. It introduced significant changes into Chilean political and legal system. In this way it has had a profound influence on Chilean politics throughout and after the 1990’s.

For example, the Constitution of 1980 provided incentives that resulted in the transformation of the traditional Chilean multiparty system into a two-party system. It did this by introducing new organization of electoral districts and rules. As a result, the members of the new political coalitions have been reluctant to address even remotely
divisive social issues fearing that voters will turn to opposition. These changes in the electoral system then led to overrepresentation of conservative forces in Congress (Galleguillos 1998 cited in Schild 2002). In this way, Chilean coalition politics has impeded policy changes favoring women’s rights (Baldez 2001).

Furthermore, the Constitution strengthened the institution of the President and it ensured that a significant number of seats in the Chilean Senate were set to be appointed, not elected. Appointed for life, the Senators chosen during the Pinochet regime have continued to shift Chilean politics in a conservative direction. The Constitution also introduced a lasting legacy of the military regime when it made future governments accountable to the National Security Council. The Constitution was written in a way that made it difficult for any future government to incorporate changes, and its future legitimacy was ensured when it was ratified in a country-wide referendum.

In these ways, the Constitution represented the primary force through which the military regime continued to reinforce traditional social forces. It did this by including institutional protections which safeguarded the representation of conservative interests through the creation of the binominal electoral system and the appointment of "senators for life." (Pribble 2006, 19). It was not until 2005 that some of these rules were removed from the document. Given that progressive and leftist forces, and women in particular, had very little access to political posts prior to 1989, this has clearly had important consequences for women’s rights in post-dictatorial Chile. In other words, through the electoral, legislative and party politics system, the former authoritarian regime continued for years to affect gender policy in newly democratic Chile.

70 The provision was finally abolished by constitutional reforms in 2005.
71 The National Security Council is a quasi-governmental institution which convenes to discuss threats to national security. As such it has not only factual powers, but perhaps more importantly, symbolic ones.
The third and final way in which the state influenced the lives of Chilean women was through its economic policy. Carmen Espinosa Miranda, a director of the Chilean Programa de Economia del Trabajo summarizes, “During the last decade, the government has been supporting policies that strengthen the market. The opening started under the military government, but it’s under the democratic government that most free trade agreements have been signed” (personal interview). Over time, it has become quite clear that Chilean neo-liberalism has affected women and men differently. Studying seasonal fruit workers in the Aconcagua valley, Heidi Tinsman (2004) has argued, for example, that women have been both victims and beneficiaries of these reforms. According to her, some women have become empowered through paid work while others have been exploited in the workplace.

**Women’s Rights: Enduring Inequalities**

The democratic transition and governmental commitment to human rights did not automatically translate into equal rights for Chilean women. It is true that during and after the democratic transition, women in Chile did witness some advances in their rights. As I describe above, they have benefited from a variety of family oriented policies supported by SERNAM. At the same time, however, throughout the 1990’s, Chilean women continued to struggle with gender discrimination in employment, politics and they were also uniquely affected by the legal restrictions in regard to divorce and reproductive rights. Finally, the United Nations’ *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) concluded in 2006 that Chile was
still facing serious problems in regard to family law, health and reproductive rights, political participation, and work and social security (CEDAW 2006).

**Women and the Labor Market**

In Chile, women's participation in the labor force has risen significantly over the last few decades, from 22% in 1970, to 28.06% in 1992, to 31.5% in 1995 all the way to 35.57% in 2002 (CEDAW 2006; SERNAM 2000). In 2008, 41.6 percent of Chilean women of working age were economically active (Estrada 2009). By contrast, the labor force participation rate for men declined by 1.49 percentage points over the same period. Despite this significant increase in the numbers of women working outside of the home, the Chilean rate of female labor participation still lags behind that for Latin America as a whole, which stood at 45.2% in 2004 (CEDAW 2006).

Furthermore, Chilean women continue to face serious inequalities in the labor market. Namely, they encounter discrimination when they work on temporary contracts with little access to social and health benefits; they are faced with sexual harassment in the workplace; they experience lower wages for work comparable to that of men; and they also have limited access to childcare. This situation seems to reflect cultural and social attitudes in Chile. According to the World Values Survey, in 2006, 30% of Chileans agreed that if jobs are scarce, man should have more right to a job than a woman (World Values Survey).^72^

One of the areas where women are negatively affected more than men is that of informal employment. According to Carmen Espinosa Miranda, “It is estimated that

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^72^ In the same survey, 46% of respondents disagreed with the statement and 23% neither agreed or disagreed.
about 40% of workers in Chile are employed informally. This is in opposition to
government statistics that say it is about 30-35%” (personal interview) Women
constitute the vast majority of these informal workers. The largest number of women
works in agriculture, typically in temporary work. There are still very few possibilities in
stable employment in Chile. “Women often enter workforce informally and are reported
to work in unsafe, terrible conditions where the wages are decreasing” (Espinosa,
personal interview). Furthermore, as Espinosa notes, those employed informally are
rarely protected by the existing social policy and labor legislation. For example, the only
maternity policy instituted in Chile is for workers with indefinite contract – this is the
case for very, very few Chilean women (Espinosa, personal interview).

Another area where Chilean women encounter gender inequalities is the
segregated job market. According to the 4th period report to the United Nation’s
CEDAW Committee (2006), employment in Chile is still segmented by sex and most
women continue to hold jobs that society considers as “women’s work” (para. 40). This
feminization of the labor force is particularly prominent in the seafood, fruit and textile
industries. The report also indicates that that the female labor force is better educated
than the male labor force; yet women have higher unemployment rates than men, and
their jobs are more vulnerable in times of economic difficulty (paras. 206 and 207,
CEDAW 2006).

Finally, Chilean women are more likely to be unemployed than Chilean men73,
and women also continue to be paid less for equal work in comparison to men. In 2003,
the unemployment rate for Chilean women was 9.9% compared to 8.7% for men (Selame

73 According to the organization Programa de Economía del Trabajo in Santiago, Chile, the lowest
unemployment Chile has experienced after the political transition was 5% in 2005. It was 15% in 1995.
(Espinosa interview)
2004). In terms of pay, according to the National Institute of Statistics, women workers in Chile earn on average 31.1 percent less than men. The wage gap is even higher among professionals – in fact as high as 49.8 percent (Estrada 2009).

It took 20 years from the time of the democratic transition for the Chilean government to take action to eliminate the existing pay gap. Finally, in May 2009, the Parliament approved and President Bachelet signed a law attempting to close the wage gap, introducing the principle of equal remuneration for men and women into the Labor Code. And while the law contains specific provisions for businesses with more than 200 workers, requiring them to specify positions, functions and qualifications, smaller businesses are exempt. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the legislation may be effective in fighting the wage gap since small and medium size business represent about 80% of all Chilean companies (Estrada 2009).74 Journalist Daniela Estrada (2009) explains that behind the wage gap are cultural beliefs that assume that women are less productive, and go out to work so that their family can have a "second income." But in Chile, she notes, working women are the chief breadwinners in 31.5 percent of households.

Women in Chilean Politics

Even with the reemergence of democracy, Chilean women have also continued to be marginalized in formal politics (Franceschet 2005). This pattern was particularly prominent during the first fifteen years after the political overturn. Despite the election of the first female President in 2006, it is still rare for women in Chile to hold elected

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74 In response, SERNAM launched a program to support the creation of organizational charts and job descriptions in these smaller businesses.
posts. Only nine women were elected in the 1989 legislative elections. Furthermore, President Aylwin angered women’s groups when he appointed an all male cabinet. The situation did not change significantly during the following years (see Table 6.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Lower House (% women)</th>
<th>Senate (% women)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-parliamentary Union

According to the Inter-parliamentary Union, Chile takes 80th place in the world in regards to the percentage of elected female parliament members (2010 data). It also ranks among the Latin American countries with the lowest political participation of women. While the combined rate for female legislators in both houses is currently at about 12%, the average for the Americas (excluding Canada and the United States) is 20%. After the December 2009 congressional election, women hold 17 out of the 120 seats in the lower house of the Chilean Parliament (14.2%) and 5 out of the 38 seats in the Senate (13.2%).

That Chilean women’s access to formal politics is restricted as a result of prejudice and discrimination is supported by survey data. For example, the World Values Survey found in 2006 that almost one half (46%) of Chileans believed that men made better political leaders than women did. This compared to 24.2% of respondents in the United States who agreed with the statement. In addition, this number was significantly
higher for male respondents in Chile than it was for Chilean women. In fact, almost two-thirds of men agreed with the statement that men made better political leaders.\textsuperscript{75}

Even as women now enter electoral and bureaucratic politics in greater numbers, they continue to be divided by ideology, specific interests, and unequal access to power (Fransceschet 2005). Soon after 1990, Chilean women were faced with what Maria Elena Valenzuela refers to as the ‘dilemma between autonomy and subordination’ (Valenzuela 1998, 48). In other words, as the political context changed with the arrival of democratic regime, women’s groups and individual women had to decide whether to continue to press for their rights from within or outside of the formal political process. The general trend was to favor greater integration of women into mainstream politics.

\textit{Reproductive Rights}

In Chile, women continue to be uniquely affected by the legal restrictions on reproductive rights and until very recently also on divorce. Until 2004, Chile was one of only two countries in the world where divorce was illegal, and even today, it is still one of very few countries where abortion is banned even to save the mother’s life (Htun 2003, 3).\textsuperscript{76} This situation is a result of the cooperation between the Catholic Church and the Chilean state. This alliance has grown out of the special role that the Catholic Church played in the transition to democracy. During the political transformation, the opponents of the military dictatorship considered the Church a legitimate social actor as it built important relationships with the democratic forces. Therefore, it has remained powerful

\textsuperscript{75} For comparison, the World Value Survey data show that in the United States, 27\% of men agreed with the statement that men make better political leaders.

\textsuperscript{76} In Chile, the permission for therapeutic abortion was withdrawn by a 1989 law (Htun 2003).
throughout the period of democratic consolidation, and it continues to affect, directly or indirectly, the lives of Chilean women.

After the emergence of the Coalition for Democracy (the anti-Pinochet coalition that won the 1989 elections), abortion and divorce became topics of public and later also parliamentary discussion. In the fall of 1995, a proposal to reform rules concerning civil marriages was placed on the legislative agenda and presented to the Congress. However, the first two attempts to legalize divorce after 1990 failed. It was not until May 2004, some fifteen years since the reemergence of democracy in Chile, that President Ricardo Lagos signed a bill legalizing divorce in Chile.

In Chile, women also continue to struggle with access to abortion. In fact, to this date, all forms of abortion remain penalized in Chile. This is despite the estimated 170,000 back-street abortions carried out every year throughout the country (Acuna Moenne 2005, 159). Some argue that this socially conservative stance is a result of a situation where active feminists have been co-opted by the new governments, and have lost their distinctive voice (Alvarez 1998; Olea 2000; Rios-Tobar et al. 2004). It is evident that despite the Chilean economic miracle and the political environment of consolidated democracy, women in Chile continue to face important gender inequalities. It would be difficult to argue, then, that the lack of women’s activism reflects women’s satisfaction with the status quo.

Social Policy and Family Life

The story of Chilean family and social policy development after 1989 is a complicated one. On the one hand, the Concertacion governments expressed
commitment to reducing widespread poverty and inequality. On the other hand, the state also made it clear that social policy was not to be made at the expense of economic growth and development. This new social policy as developed and implemented by Chilean state agencies also paid little attention to applying a gender-sensitive approach to policy development. As a result, Chilean women, and especially poor Chilean women, have had to pick up where the state left off. As Veronica Schild (2002) notes, “The state’s redefinition of responsibilities of social spending, in the name of a redefined active citizenship, continues to be accomplished on the backs of women.” (183)

Under the military regime, social expenditures were significantly reduced in size in the name of economic neo-liberalism. The ideology of neo-liberalism also continues to play an important role in policy formation in Chile today (Beneria 1996). After 1990, the Concertacion government focused on targeted policies and employment policy. Namely, the state has been supporting individual participation in the labor market by assisting with job training programs, community development and social services delivered by businesses and other organizations.

The government responded to the social cost of the economic transformation by focusing on poverty and inequality. In 1990, a governmental agency The Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversion Social - FOSIS) was established to provide support for the social policy pushed forward by the new democratic government. Its mission was to "participate in the country's effort to overcome poverty, contributing original proposals that complement those offered by other governmental services." (FOSIS website) Furthermore, all ministries dealing with
social issues assigned a portion of their spending to ‘fondos concursables’ accessible to non-governmental organizations.

Surely, women did benefit from some of the developments and reforms in the family and social policy area. Namely, SERNAM headed a number of efforts to improve the status of women in the labor force. For example, it supported a law passed in 1998 which made it illegal for employers to request pregnancy tests for female job candidates. Several modifications were also made to the Labor Code to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace. In 1994, family violence legislation was passed in the Chilean Congress, and in August 2005, Chile adopted the Domestic Violence Act, which recognized habitual abuse. In addition, a new law introduced in 1998 granted mothers equal parental rights (Htun 2003).

However, men and women have been affected by these developments differently. In its response to poverty and inequality, rather than returning to the post-Second World War era and its emphasis on the role of the state, Chilean governments have instead emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations in the delivery of social services. In this ‘new social policy’ paradigm (Bienefeld 1997), women have been both the dominant providers/workers and clients in these efforts. Veronica Schild (2002) explains how these reforms affected Chilean women:

There is a (…) problem with this trend in social provisioning. Implicit in the innovative framework, for policy-making as a modernizing force in the social policy field, both in Chile and beyond, and endorsed today by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank, are some very old, gender-biased notions about the private-public divide that discriminate against poor women. For claims for more effective and efficient social spending, through a partnership of state and civil society organizations, take for granted that communities and households can take up the slack for what the state no longer invests in. Ultimately, this means
that women, who have traditionally been responsible not only for the well-being of family members but also of their communities, pick up where the state leaves off. .. (Schild 2002, 184)

More specifically, the Chilean state continues to rely on women’s volunteer work in its efforts to reduce poverty rates. For example, Schild (2002) documents a case where even the National Service for Women (SERNAM) – a supposedly progressive state agency set up by the state to protect and advance women’s rights – relied on the services of a group of primarily female experts who were not salaried. This trend of the ‘new social policy’ reliance on women’s unpaid or underpaid labor is prominent throughout much of the Chilean non-profit sector.

What further exacerbates this situation is the traditional division of labor within Chilean homes. Despite their growing levels of economic activity outside of home, Chilean women are to date the ones primarily responsible for the vast majority of housework and childcare. Survey data provide ample evidence of this situation. In 2007, Knud Knudsen and Kari Wærness (2008) tallied hours of housework performed by women and men in 34 countries. The survey was done under the auspices of The International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and around 18 000 couples from the age of 25 to 65 answered questions on how much time they spent weekly on cooking, washing, tidying up, shopping and care. The researchers have found that out of the 34 countries studied, the women who perform most housework of all are the ones in Chile. Chilean women reported spending 38 hours each week on housework. Furthermore, the research reveals that the greatest difference between men and women is also found in Chile where women spend about 28 more hours on housework than men do.
Chilean women not only disproportionately compensate for the limitations of the social welfare system, but in some instances, they are also negatively affected by the policies themselves. For example, Chile has a private pension system often used as a showcase of good practice by international organizations. What is less known, however, is the fact that throughout the 1990’s, close to one half of the Chilean population did not pay contributions to the system. Women represent the majority of these who cannot contribute. Feminist critics argue that the system discriminates against women (Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos 1999). For example, Leiva (2005b) claims that gender discrimination on the labor market is transferred to the pension system. In comparison to their male counterparts, Chilean women receive lower wages, work in more insecure jobs and have lower density of contributions. As a result of these factors and because their life expectancy is about six years higher than that of men, women’s pensions end up being significantly lower.

Overall, the social policy strategy employed by the Chilean government has had important consequences for Chilean women. While women do disproportionately benefit from some of the social programs implemented by the state agencies, they are also the ones who bear some of the negative effects of the ‘new social policy paradigm’ when they pick up where the state left off -- both in the home and through their volunteer work outside of the private sphere. As Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) note, “… perhaps unintentionally, the Chilean reform has hurt women’s interests by ignoring the fact that men’s and women’s lives follow different cultural and institutional patterns” (1).
On March 8, 1989, some 20,000 women came to the Santa Laura Stadium to celebrate the return to democracy (Rios Tobar 2003a). But while Chilean women and the women’s movement played an important role in “ending fear” and bringing the Chilean authoritarian regime down, it is ironic that they did not take advantage of the political opening after 1989. In fact, women began to disappear from the public realm soon after the country shifted towards democracy. Still in 1998, some 5,000 women gathered under the slogan “Democracy is in debt to women” but after that, the Chilean women’s movement entered into another phase of what some call ‘feminist silence’ (see Rios Tobar 2003a; Rios Tobar, Godoy Catalan, Guerrero Caviedes 2003; Blofield 2006).

This situation is even more puzzling given the new government’s emphasis on the importance of civil society, social capital and civic participation (Leiva 2005a). The decline in women’s activism was less a sign of women’s satisfaction than of the movement fragmentation. Some have argued that the new democratic regimes in Chile and Latin America in general are not conducive to the emergence of social movements and women’s movements in particular (see, for example, Rios-Tobar 2003a). However, others have documented that the environment did not prevent other types of movements from emerging. For example, Deborah Yashar (2005) has found “a burst of widespread protest among indigenous peoples in the region” (5). Therefore, the lack of women’s activism in post-dictatorial Chile remains a puzzle.

The formerly unified women’s movement in Chile has lost its cohesion. In a personal interview, referring to a book she co-edited (2003b), Marcela Rios Tobar documents this when she says, “The question in our book was, ‘why the movement
disappeared but the number of women’s organizations went up”. According to Elena Valenzuela (1998), “The women’s movement, which had developed outside the party system, lacked sufficient internal cohesion to confront the system, to bring a substantial number of women into leadership positions, or to press its demands on government agencies, including the newly established women’s ministry, Servicio National de la Mujer (SERNAM)” (48)

This fragmentation took place over a number of topics. In their comparison of grassroots women in Brazil and Chile, Carol Ann Drogus and Hannah Stewart-Gambino (2005) describe the importance of the class divide for post-dictatorial Chilean women’s movement. They argue that while popular and middle-class women recognized the benefits of working together while resisting the military regime, by mid-1980’s “middle-class and professional women’s organizations split into several tendencies that distanced them from popular women’s groups.” (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 174).

Similarly, Blofield (2006) and Prible (2006) document how the country’s continuing high level of income inequality has become an important source of division and dissent within the women’s movement.

Organizations such as Casa de la Mujer La Morada that was formerly associated with political parties gained a strong radical, feminist identity. By late 1980’s, academic and professional women associated with the political center organized in the Concertacion de Mujeres por la Democracia that eventually led to the creation of SERNAM. In contrast, popular women (pobladoras) felt their interests were betrayed by these middle-class groups, and they have continued to work toward community and individual survival on their own (Drogus and Stewart-Gambino 2005, 174). Furthermore,
strong rifts have grown between groups of poor women as well. While some began to organize around a feminist agenda through the Movimiento de Mujeres Pobladoras, others have continued to address class and human rights issues. The return of exiled women and former activists has served another divisive force. In a personal interview, Carmen Torres of Fundación Instituto de la Mujer de Chile explains, “Feminism was first seen as something foreign. Everyone was critical of women who brought feminism into the country. Women who were in exile were told they had no right to preach.”

Another discussion, already mentioned here, focused on the question of whether women should be working within or outside of the formal political system to achieve their goals. Some of the women’s activists got co-opted by the state and moved into SERNAM or other agencies to continue their work from within. A number of women’s groups remain active around a variety of issues, but they rarely come together to press the state to respond to their demands.

**Conclusion**

To this date, Chilean women continue to face important gender inequalities and discrimination at home, in the workplace and also in the public life of the country. One would expect that women would utilize the large number of women’s groups and organizations as well as the political opening associated with elite realignment and the new democratic regime to mobilize around their grievances. Surprisingly, that has not been the case.

Upon return to democracy, the first newly democratically elected Chilean government continued to (at least formally) support women and their demands. It
established the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of national and international treaties and documents relevant to women’s rights. It also furthered its commitment to the United Nation’s *Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW). At the same time, however, SERNAM relationship to women’s groups has remained problematic, and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet’s regime continued to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution of the 1980 and through other policies and bureaucratic rules. The democratic forces agreed to respect the Constitution introduced by the government of Augusto Pinochet. This established, for example, the existence of eight institutional senators appointed for life by Augusto Pinochet (called *designados*). Their presence then increased the power of socially conservative forces in the Chilean Senate, making gender reforms very difficult (Londregan 2000). In other words, the Chilean democratization process has been constrained by “the constitutional, legal, and institutional framework left in place by the outgoing regime” (Schild 2002, 174). The Catholic Church also continues to have a disproportionate effect on policy-making in the country. As a result, Maria Elena Valenzuela (1998) argues, “The political dynamics of the democratic transition in Chile encouraged the resurgence of an elitist, male-oriented establishment.” (47-48)

Therefore, although Chilean women continue to be affected by what Mala Htun once referred to as a “puzzling combination of economic modernization and social conservatism” (Htun 2003, 3), the Chilean democratic governments have continued to show significant levels of commitment to the advancement of women’s rights. Even though SERNAM’s relationship to women’s groups has remained problematic and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet’s regime continued to creep into democratic politics
through the Constitution of the 1980 and through other policies and bureaucratic rules, the state’s position toward women’s issues has gradually loosened up. Over time, as female labor force participation of Chilean women increased and women faced less state-created obstacles in reconciling their traditional and public roles, the Chilean women’s movement slowly disintegrated.
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION

Both in Chile and in the Czech Republic, women’s movements have been intimately linked with the changing nature of the two states and their policies. However, the effects of the past regimes and policies have not been straightforward. The Chilean traditionalist gender policies aimed to exclude women from political life, and they often eliminated the prior accomplishments of the Chilean women’s movement. In contrast, the Czechoslovak communist state used its policies to include women in the job market, raise female educational levels, include women into formal politics and enable them to be both mothers and workers. While women continued to experience a number of growing gender inequalities in both countries during and after the fall of the authoritarian regimes, Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity to demand a variety of rights and protest the regime while Czech women never mobilized into a mass women’s social movement. At the same, the Chilean women’s movement died out soon after the political transformation.

What my research seems to suggest is that in the context of authoritarianism and post-authoritarianism, the policy context within which social movements operate is an important factor in shaping what social movements can do. Namely, when grievances are present, such as accusations of gender inequality, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public roles, women are less like to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state.
As this dissertation documents, the Czechoslovak totalitarian state introduced a number of policies that Western women continue to unsuccessfully demand from their own governments. These included generous maternity benefits, access to affordable childcare and safe working conditions for female workers. These changes in their educational and employment status represented important gains for Czech women. Despite the ongoing gender segregation of the labor market, gender pay gap and varying access to and quality of the new social benefits, Czech women felt empowered to reconcile their work and family lives.

This notion was further reinforced by the growing importance that family life played in the lives of Czechoslovak citizens. While the country experienced a general liberalization in the 1960’s, the state continued to restrict many aspects of public life: the borders were still closed to travel, media and literature were censored, independent civic participation was outlawed and all aspects of the political and cultural life of the country were under strong state supervision. Elections and political posts existed only formally and offered little self-actualization as the country continued to be run solely by the communist apparatus.77 By introducing an official scale according to which workers were rewarded, the state also took away motivation and incentives for self-realization at work. In this context, and without the possibility to travel abroad, the private sphere of the family was becoming increasingly important as it began to represent the only “safe” environment where opinions could be freely expressed and individuals could find self-fulfillment.

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77 In a public opinion poll conducted at the end of the communist regime, 74% of respondents agreed with a statement that civic organizations have no power, and that the communist party decides everything anyways” (Forst et al. 1989).
Through the introduction of a variety of ‘emancipatory policies’ and implicit emphasis on women’s traditional role within the private sphere, the state was sending conflicting messages to women in regards to their role in the society. This situation was further exacerbated by the introduction of the pro-natalist policies that reinforced women’s roles as those of mothers and housekeepers. Because of these mixed messages regarding women’s position within the public and private spheres, women could not identify a clear ideological stance they could use to enter the public sphere.

Finally, two generations of Czech women grew up in a context where any mention of women’s equality and emancipation was associated with the policies and rhetoric of the communist state. More specifically, using a twisted Marxist-Leninist argument, the communist state propaganda had been brainwashing women for decades making them believe that they have been made equal to men simply by adding eight-hour shifts to what were seen as their duties within the family life. The women’s movement has also been discredited when the state appropriated all independent organizing under the umbrella of the state-controlled Czechoslovak Union of Women (CUW), and the organization further damaged its reputation when it sided with the totalitarian government upon its brutal repression of the student demonstration in November 1989. As a result, Czech women have over time come to associate emancipation and women’s rights with the totalitarian political regime (Heitlinger 1996; Wolchik & Jaquette 1998). When by the 1980’s the communist regime was fully discredited and ridiculed by Czechoslovak citizens, there was little public enthusiasm among women to organize around an ideology associated with the totalitarian government and its policies.78

78 By the 1980’s, public opinion polls documented that citizens blamed the regime for worsening living standards, worsening environmental pollution, problems in healthcare, long-term existence of failing
Upon the fall of communism in 1989, there was an overwhelming enthusiasm for a capitalist economy and right-wing parties in the Czech lands – the traditional targets of criticism from women’s movements in countries that did not undergo a long period of state socialism. Women also began to experience open gender discrimination on the labor market (partially resulting from the remaining protectionist policies of the communist state). While the state emphasis on individualism and free market participation has been in direct contrast to some of the traditionalist assumptions presented in much of the social legislation, Czech women continue to balance their maternal and public roles.

Furthermore, despite the new programs and policies emphasizing gender equality that have been ratified as a consequence of the Czech Republic’s accession to the European Union, Czech women still find it difficult to find a common language that would allow them to organize on the basis of their gender identity. By using the rhetoric of Marxism and equality, the communist state “stole” the most likely frame for the articulation of gender inequalities. The concepts of equality and women’s rights could not resonate with women or the mass public in these countries because these were terms and notions earlier used (and abused) by the communist states. This situation continues to be further exacerbated by the public lack of information about the feminist developments in other countries and by the intense misinterpretation of women’s movements and demands by public media.

Unlike the Czech totalitarian regime, the Chilean military dictatorship used public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. The economy and other (Forst et al. 1989). In a 1988 opinion poll conducted by UVVM, over 90% of Czechoslovak citizens suggested a need for further democratization of the Czechoslovak society (Misovic a kol 1988).
combination of the traditionalist gender ideology and of the neoliberal economic reforms led to a situation where women were sent a clear message that they were not welcome in the public sphere. In a very paradoxical way, these were the very same measures that also created political space for women to return to the public arena. Framing their issues in terms of their roles of good mothers and wives, women responded to the economic and human rights crises by engaging the state through its own rhetoric and policies. Similar frames remained unavailable to Chilean men.

Avoiding ‘Western feminism’, Chilean women subsequently framed their issues in Marxist terms. Again, through its repressive measures against the labor unions and other traditionally leftists groups, the Chilean military dictatorship left this particular frame available for women to utilize. Furthermore, as a result of these processes and women’s demands, the commitment to equality helped differentiate the new democracy from the old authoritarian political model. In Latin America, women’s issues then became “congruent with and symbolic of a larger political transformation” (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, 8).

Upon return to democracy, the first democratically elected government continued to (at least formally) support women and their demands. It established the National Service for Women (SERNAM) and ratified a number of national and international treaties and documents including the United Nation’s Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. While SERNAM’s relationship to women’s groups has remained problematic and the traditionalist ideology of Pinochet’s regime continued to creep into democratic politics through the Constitution of the 1980 and through other policies and bureaucratic rules, the state’s position toward women’s issues
gradually loosened up. Over time, as female labor force participation of Chilean women increased and women faced less state-created obstacles in reconciling their traditional and public roles, the Chilean women’s movement slowly disintegrated.

In sum, women in both Chile and the Czech Republic experienced and continue to experience important gender inequalities in the private as well as in the public sphere. Despite the state repression of civil society under the authoritarian regimes, women in both countries had the opportunity to draw on an extensive set of family, friendship and organizational networks. Chilean women mobilized on the basis of their gender identity, but Czech women did not. In the late 1980’s, a political opportunity to organize presented itself as a result of the political transformations in both nations. And yet, Czech women did not use this opportunity at all while the Chilean movement disintegrated soon after the transformation took place. Why?

What the developments in these two countries (and regions more generally) seem to suggest is that the political context within which social movements form and operate is key for understanding these mobilization processes. Rather than focusing solely on the presence or absence of political opportunities, as much of the existing research devoted to social movement emergence has done, I have found that focusing on specific policies is more useful for explaining women’s mobilization patterns. This is congruent with the findings of the policy feedback strand of research in American Politics. Namely, it confirms Pierson’s (1993) findings that policies affect citizens by providing individuals with specific resources and incentives (such as education) and by conveying certain meanings about citizens’ status within the system.79 In the case of women’s movements in Chile and the Czech Republic, state policies provided with women with varying

79 see also Schneider and Ingram (1993)
resources and meanings. Women received resources in the form of maternity leaves, allowances, birth grants, subsidized childcare and employment protection policies. The states also conveyed a variety of meanings ranging from assigning women strictly traditional roles to enabling them to combine their maternal and public roles. Overall, this dissertation suggests that in the case of authoritarian and post-authoritarian regimes, women are more likely to mobilize in protest in situations when the state uses public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. In contrast, if public policies are enabling women to reconcile their maternal and public roles, women are less likely to organize on the basis of their gender identity to protest the state.

This occurs on both the individual and group level. In-depth interviews with Czech women reveal that if the state provides policy support to women to reconcile their traditional and public roles, women become less conscious of the state’s role in their lives. They tend to view the state as a diffuse set of actors and ideas that do not create a coherent whole. In contrast, if state policies provide little support for women’s participation in the public sphere, individuals find it much easier to articulate who the state is and how it affects their lives. Furthermore, public policy also affect movements on the group level – complex policies supporting both women’s traditional and public roles are likely to create multiple camps within a formerly unified movement and lead to movement fragmentation and demise. In contrast, policies emphasizing women’s traditional roles only make it easy for movement leaders and actors to identify key issues and subsequently organize for collective action. However, given the role that good leadership, available resources and even historical context play in the formation of social
movements, it is clear that traditionalist state policy is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the development of a cohesive women’s movement.

The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation deserves comparison across other cases. Given the findings of this study, one would expect to find women’s movements only in environments where the state uses public policy to define women’s role narrowly in terms of traditional division of labor. To confirm the credibility of the findings presented in this dissertation would require a detailed knowledge of not only women’s activism in particular countries, but also of a wide range of state policies and policy implementation. In the vast majority of Latin American and Eastern European cases, these complete data are not readily available. To test the findings of my study, I relied on the few existing empirically rich examples of secondary literature. Specifically, Russia presents an interesting case because during the democratic transition, women came the closest of all women in the Eastern European region to forming a women’s movement. Therefore, in comparison to the Czech case, one would expect to find some differences in state policy resulting in an increased activism of women.

While Russian women have never formed a broad based mass social movement, they have established several hundred women’s groups and organized these into multiple large networks. They have also engaged the state on a variety of topics with sometimes successful results. In Russia, women’s groups began forming in the 1980’s as a result of Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. The move away from state repression presented a political opportunity for women to organize. The first feminist groups and organizations were concentrated in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersbourg. Subsequently, more self-help type organizations were formed in response to economic
crisis and reductions in social programs in the mid-1990’s. By 1994, there were some 300 women’s organizations formally registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice and the number rose to 600 by the year 2000 (Women 2000; Sperling 1999, 18). By 1995, these groups formed four distinct networks: the Independent Women’s Forum, Women’s League, Union of Russia’s Women and the US-NIS Consortium.

Russian women’s groups were addressing a wide range of existing grievances including domestic violence, discrimination of women in the labor market, and the lack of women in formal politics among others. This rise in women’s activism was taking place in a context of democratic transition and economic transformation. Most notably, as a result of these changes, Russian women (in comparison to Russian men) were being disproportionately affected by rising unemployment. According to the Russian State Statistics Committee, by 1994 women represented approximately two-thirds of the registered unemployed (Sperling 1999, 43). Aside from widespread discrimination in politics and at work, women were finding it also more and more difficult to combine professional and family roles (Women 2000 2000, 374), partially as a result of the newly democratic state dismantling a system of state subsidized childcare facilities provided under communism.

The rise in women’s activism was taking place in a policy context dominated by traditionalist rhetoric of the state. While sexism has always been prevalent in the Russian society, the transition to democracy and the introduction of the market economy made it more visible. The Russian state rhetoric and policy was communicating to women that their place was primarily in the private sphere. Valerie Sperling (1999) cites the chair of the Union of Russia’s Women as she described the effects of newly introduced market
economy on women: “They are crowding us into the house, into the kitchen, to our ‘natural’ destiny” (56). A quote by the 1993 Labor Minister Gennadii Melikian proves this point when he states, “There is no point in creating jobs for women, when there aren’t enough jobs for men” (Sperling 1999, 57). The implied assumption was that Russian women’s place was in the home. Raising children and taking care of the family were also clearly represented in the rhetoric of new institutional mechanisms targeting women and families. In 1990, a Committee on the Affairs of Women and the Protection of the Family, Motherhood, and Childhood was created within the Russian Supreme Soviet. This was followed by the establishment of The Committee on Family and Demographic Policy (Women 2000 2000). These institutional mechanisms remained in place upon the dissolution of USSR. From the beginning, the work of these committees was accompanied by controversy and clashes with the forming Russian women’s movement. Most notably, in 1992, a Supreme Soviet committee was asked to draft a family law code. The bill entitled “Protection of the Family, Motherhood, Fatherhood, and Childhood” united Russian women’s groups and networks when it proposed to make the family (and not the individual) the sole subject of rights (Sperling 1999, 114). The bill drew vast criticism from the women’s movement because it was seen as infringing on woman’s reproductive rights. According to Sperling, the law also made it mandatory for women with children under the age of 14 to work a shortened 35-hour workweek, de facto reducing women’s income. The women’s movement’s powerful response led to the failure of the second reading of the proposed bill. The women’s groups also rallied around the new labor code proposal in 1994. Russian women’s groups were particularly critical of a number of openly discriminatory articles that they viewed as reinforcing
existing gender stereotypes and traditional family roles. For example, one of the articles listed occupations that women were by law forbidden from obtaining.

While the state rhetoric surrounding women’s issues was to a great extent unified in supporting women’s traditional roles, women’s groups in Russia did find allies in some state institutions. Most notably, the Minister of Social Protection Liudmila Beslepkina was publicly pointing out the worsening position of women in the labor market, and she and her staff cooperated with women’s groups to improve the status of women. Russian women also found an ally in Ekaterina Lakhova, the head of the Presidential Commission on Issues of Women, the Family, and Demography, as well as in President Yeltsin himself (Sperling 1999). But even these alliances and relationships proved to be problematic as the allies and institutional mechanisms were constantly changing. In this environment, women’s groups found themselves excluded from some of the discussions accompanying the preparation for the Beijing Conference and they lost their ally in Beslepkina when she was removed from office in 1996. Furthermore, the President’s message regarding women’s rights was questioned on a number of occasions when the actual implementation of the pro-women’s decrees he introduced was lacking.

The Russian case then presents a story of a fragmented women’s movement that came together on several short lived occasions to protest a set of openly traditionalist and discriminatory policies. During much of the 1990’s, however, Russian women’s groups were receiving contradictory messages from different state institutions. In fact, Valerie Sperling (1999) describes instances where, for example, the representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Social Protection presented a dramatically different vision for women’s position in the society as they took turns on the podium during the
same event. In light of the findings presented in this dissertation, it may not be surprising that Russian women found it difficult to identify a common frame that would resonate with the mass public and consequently assist them in forming a more unified, mass movement.

The four cases presented in this dissertation – Chile under military regime, Chile under democracy, Czechoslovakia under totalitarianism and Czech Republic under democracy – point to the importance of state policy in the formation of women’s movements. It is without a doubt that such a small number of cases cannot confirm the plausibility of the framework outlined here. Hopefully, future empirical studies covering a greater variety of cases will provide further information in regards to the possible generalization of these findings and suggestions.
APPENDIX

Appendix A
Interview questions: policy makers, activists, experts

1. Policy-makers

1.1. Experience

How long and in what position have you worked at the Ministry (of Labor and Social Affairs)?

Are you still active in the policy-making process? In what way?

1.2. Women’s Policies and policies disproportionately affecting women

Did the communist state introduce any policies that only targeted women?
- What were they?
- What was the goal of these policies (officially and unofficially)?

In your view, did the communist state introduce policies that were not targeting women specifically, but which over time affected women more then men?
- What were they?
- What were their goals?
- In what way did they affect women more than men?

How have these various policies changed over time?

1.3. Policy-making process in authoritarian setting

How were policies made during communism?
- Where did the ideas for the new policies come from?
- How were they selected?
- Who had the main decision making power (formally)? What about informally?
- Who were the different public actors who had some input into this process?

I understand that research and public opinion polls were conducted at that time.
- Do you remember who conducted polls/research regarding the policies you mentioned earlier?
- In the case of policies targeting specific social groups (e.g. women, Roma etc.), did the group’s opinions or the public’s as a whole was taken into account?
- Were the outputs of these polls/research taken into consideration when policies were made? If yes, in what way?
- Can the research outputs still be found somewhere? Do you know where?

Who was in charge of implementing these various policies?
- How much power did local communist parties/national unions/social workers have in delivering these policies?
- Were there typically any subsequent studies conducted that looked at citizens’ satisfaction with these policies once they were implemented?

1.4. Post-1989

*Questions in this section will relate back to the particular policies the respondents mentioned in the first part of the interview, and the questions will differ depending on whether the respondent is still active in the policy making process or not... But here are some preliminary topics...*

How have the policies we have just talked about changed after 1989? In your opinion, how have the changes affected the public? How have they affected specific social groups, in your opinion? How has the government been responding to the new grievances of different social groups?

The policy-making process has formally changed in a number of ways since the political overturn. What changes have you experienced in the everyday work of the Ministry? How have they affected how policies are selected, made and implemented?

1.5. Other

Can you recommend other administrators, researchers or experts I should contact about this topic?

Is there anything you would like to add?

2. Academics/Researchers

2.1. Experience

How long and in what position have you worked at (research institution)?

To what extent has you work concerned women’s activism and/or social and employment policies before and after 1989?

2.2. Women’s policies and policies disproportionately affecting women

As a researcher, do you find that the communist state introduced policies that only targeted women? Which ones?
In your view, did the communist state introduce policies that were not targeting women specifically, but which over time affected women more/differently than men? Which ones? In what way did they affect women more/differently than men?

How have these various policies changed over time?

What impact have these policies had on:
- the lives of individual women
- women’s status generally
- family life in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic
- society as a whole?

Are you aware of important research and/or public opinion polls regarding these policies conducted during communism? Do you know where they can be found now?

2.3. Women’s Activism

Who, in your opinion, were the main actors in the development of women’s activism after 1989 in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic?

In your view, was the general (legal, cultural, political, economic) environment conducive to (1) activism as a whole and (2) women’s activism in particular? What where the main obstacles these activists have faced in their work?

What changes has women’s activism in the CR undergone over time? How has the environment in which activists operate changed?

2.4. Other

Can you recommend other administrators, researchers or activists I should contact about this topic?

Is there anything you would like to add?

3. Activists (women’s groups)

3.1. Experience

How long and in what position have you taken part in the Czechoslovak/Czech women’s movement?

Are you still active in the movement? In what ways?

3.2. Actors and topics in Czech(oslovak) women’s activism
Who, in your opinion, were the main actors in the development of the Czech(oslovak) women’s movement after 1989? How many of these are still active?

What topics were emphasized by women’s activists after 1989?

3.3. Environment

After 1989, how was the general (legal, cultural, political, economic) environment conducive to
- activism as a whole
- women’s activism in particular?

Some say that Czech and Eastern European feminism in general have been very weak. Do you agree with this statement? If yes, why? What do you think is the source of this weakness? If no, why not?

What where the main obstacles you/activists have faced in their/your work?

How has women’s activism been accepted by Czech(oslovak) public? Were any topics more acceptable to the public than others? Which ones were they?

Has any of this ever affected the topics you pursued in your work?

Has any of this ever affected the ways in which you presented the problems/themes to the media, government officials or the public?

3.4. International Feminism

What role, if any, did international feminism play in the work of your organization(s)?

If you wished to, would you have had access to sources and outputs of international feminism?

3.5. Development over time

What changes has women’s activism in the CR undergone over time?

How has the environment in which activists operate changed? In what ways?

Have the public perceptions toward women’s activism changed over time?

3.6. Other

Can you recommend other researchers or activists I should contact about this topic?

Is there anything you would like to add?


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