A Subcontinent's Sunni Schism: The Deobandi-Barelvi Rivalry and the Creation of Modern South Asia

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Abstract

*A Subcontinent’s Sunni Schism* presents the first-ever history of the 150-year religio-political rivalry between the Deobandis and the Barelvis—arguably the most important schism in the “Muslim world,” and certainly the most significant within Sunni Islam. More recently, that rivalry has often been expressed by means of bullets and bombs, especially in Pakistan. But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the Deobandi-Barelvi schism lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious antagonism: at first over converts, later for competing visions of the political future, then for a place within a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political structure. For Deobandis, the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a “pure” Islam, as opposed to the Barelvi deviation (plus an unmitigated hatred of the British presence in India); for Barelvis, their right to speak for the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a privilege that the Deobandis had long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout the rivalry’s history, too, were the two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on the subject of how to get there. Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state.
A SUBCONTINENT’S SUNNI SCHISM:
THE DEOBANDI-BARELVI DYNAMIC AND
THE CREATION OF MODERN SOUTH ASIA

by

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PREFACE

The words of Nehru, in reference to relations between “Englishmen and Indians,” might just as well be applied today to those between “the West” and “the Muslim world”:

“What a great gulf divided the two…and how they distrusted and disliked each other!

But more than the distrust and the dislike was the ignorance of each other; and, because of this, each side was a little afraid of the other and was constantly on its guard in the other’s presence. To each, the other appeared as a sour-looking, unamiable creature, and neither realized that there was decency and kindliness behind the mask.” On another occasion, the Pandit remarked, “An average Englishman, if he were frank, would probably confess that he knows some quite decent Indians but they are exceptions and as a whole Indians are a detestable crowd. The average Indian would admit that some Englishmen whom he knows are admirable, but, apart from these few, the English are an overbearing, brutal, and thoroughly bad lot. Curious how each person judges of the other race, not from the individual with whom he has come in contact, but from others about whom he knows very little or nothing at all.” Apart from any academic aspiration, then, it is my hope that the telling of the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, its long transformation, and its ripples within the politics of pre-Partition India, independent Pakistan, and beyond might in some small measure peel away another layer of that “ignorance”—Nehru’s “great gulf”—yet separating hundreds of millions of Muslims in the East from hundreds of millions of non-Muslims in the West.

W. KESLER JACKSON

New Delhi,

28 April 2012/6 Jumada II 1433
Note on Dates, Names, and Transcription

Dates are generally presented through Chapter 3 of this work according to both the Gregorian and the Hijri calendars, respectively, separated by a forward slash symbol (/). Thus, 1857/1273 refers to the Gregorian year 1857 AD, or the Hijri year 1273 AH. The “old” AD signification has been retained (instead of the “new” CE) to add emphasis to both calendars’ religious underpinnings. Where only the Gregorian year is employed, the acronym “AD” is used to so signify. Hijri dates are meant as a reference and are only approximations. From Chapter 4 onwards—chronologically, with the establishment of the Pakistani state—the Hijri references are dropped and only the Gregorian system is used.

When introducing proper nouns, where possible I have chosen to use spellings either already in common use or preferred by the person, institution, or organization in question (as shown, for example, on their official websites or in their own correspondence, etc.). The name “Muhammad,” however, has been spelled consistently throughout to avoid confusion. Titles and descriptives, often lumped with names (as if they are part of the name) in Western and Islamic literature have been written, with a few exceptions, in transliterated format to distinguish them from the actual name. Thus “Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli” has been rendered “ṣayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli,” ṣayyid being a title denoting descent from the Prophet.

The system of transcription in this dissertation is, generally speaking, purely phonetic. However, since more than one Urdu letter may correspond to a single Roman one, a number of modifications have been made, essentially along the lines of the system devised by Mumtaz Ahmad in his Urdu Newspaper Reader (Kensington, MD: Dunwoody
Press, 1985), who himself more or less followed the system created by Muhammad Abd-
Al-Rahman Barker in the 1960s/1380s. All Urdu words are transcribed into Roman
letters and/or symbols, except for proper nouns, and written in *italics*.

The reader may refer to the following chart for the Urdu equivalent of all Roman
letters or symbols.
INTRODUCTION

When twenty-one-year-old Muhammad Siddiq, a village-born Deobandi from what
is now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and a recent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi recruit, waded
through the crowd of Barelvis celebrating the Prophet’s birthday (mawlyd) at Nishtar
Park on 6 April 2006/7 Rabi I 1427, attendees could not have known that the young
man was concealing a jacket packed with two pounds of explosives and three thousand
ball bearings underneath his coat. Just as the gathering’s leaders closed the maGryb
prayer, human bomb Muhammad Siddiq detonated in an act of destructive suicide,
jointly claiming the lives of scores of celebrants (including the entire leadership of a
Barelvi militant organization called the Sunni Tehrik) and injuring hundreds more.
The attack signaled the opening of a new chapter of violence in the long-standing
rivalry between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of Sunni thought. How it had come
to this—how a theological debate that had once been carried out via books, public
debates, and juridical rulings now routinely made use of bullets and bombs—is one of
the chief subjects of this study. But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the
Deobandi-Barelvi schism also lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious
antagonism: at first over converts, later for competing visions of the political future,
then for a place within a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political
structure. For Deobandis, the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a
“pure” Islam, as opposed to the Barelvi deviation; for Barelvis, their right to speak for
the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a privilege that the Deobandis had
long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout the rivalry’s history, too, were the
two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic
state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on the subject of how to get there (and who should lead the charge). Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state.

Though the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427 is only one of hundreds of similar attacks—most far smaller, some of comparable scale—to stain the now bullet- and bomb-ridden history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, the enmity between these two schools of Sunni Islam was, as aforementioned, not always characterized in such a blood-stained manner. In fact, Nishtar-esque murderous outbursts are a rather recent animal, wreaking havoc on the unity of Muslims (and especially their religious leadership) within Pakistan in particular, with similarly divisive results in India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and within South Asian Muslim communities across North America, the British Isles and continental Europe, East Africa, South Africa, and beyond—indeed, wherever the rivalry has spread in recent decades.

Despite the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s pivotal role in the politics of South Asia (indeed, as this work argues, the central part it played in pre-Partition independence politics in India and the literal shaping of the political structure of Pakistan), both schools are relatively unknown in the West (even among academics) and their rivalry one with another remains mostly unexamined. Barbara Metcalf’s *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (1982/1402) is the only full-length, scholarly, published work dealing specifically and primarily with the Deoband school, drawing heavily from sources in Urdu and Persian. (The 2010/1431 doctoral dissertation of one of her students, Najeeb A. Jan—“The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, The Deoband
'Ulama and the Biopolitics of Islam” [University of Michigan]—might be included here, too.) The Deobandis are given serious consideration in Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi’s short *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (1963/1383), too. In *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India* (1996/1417), Usha Sanyal devotes half a chapter to the Deoband school of Islam. M. Reza Pirbhai’s *Reconsidering Islam in a South Asian Context* (2009/1430) devotes a small but detailed section on the Deobandis, and Stephen Cohen devotes approximately four pages in *The Idea of Pakistan* (2004/1425) to the group. Pirbhai’s and Cohen’s treatment—devoting a few lines to a few pages—seems to be the norm, if the Deobandis happen to be mentioned at all. But Metcalf’s survey, already almost thirty years old, ends with the turn of the twentieth century/late thirteenth century (and concentrates mostly on doctrinal developments and the establishment of the actual *dar ul’ulum* at Deoband), while Faruqi’s, almost fifty years old, is somewhat brief (148 pages) and fails to cover any period after Partition. Sanyal’s work likewise deals only with early Deobandi thought and organization, scarcely reaching beyond 1900/1318, while Pirbhai and most others, too, examine only the group’s founding years. Of the aforementioned, only Cohen focuses on more recent times, but the mention is brief (and almost entirely within the context of fundamentalist violence and terrorism, like most other works that mention modern-day Deobandism); the same might be said about most any other serious academic work in which the Deobandis are momentarily featured. In other words, no serious scholarly study (of significant length) on the Deobandis beyond 1947/1366 (or, more accurately, beyond the 1920s/1340s with the death of Mahmud Hasan) has been published. Apart from the obvious sixty- to ninety-year omission in the research, such a gap is especially yawning since Deobandism has continued to grow and to spread far beyond its *qaṣb* beginnings in
the rural upper Doab. Besides, the period after 1920/1338 would witness a surge of Indian and later Pakistani nationalism—a critical phase in the formation of the current political framework on the subcontinent, and one in which the Deobandis played a highly significant role (generally in opposition to Partition, then within the Pakistani state as a champion of an Islamic order as interpreted by the Deobandi scholars).

Considering the school’s relevance to current world events, too, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan (including its entrenchment among the Pathan people of the north-west frontier), the need for scholarship on the Deobandis, post-1920/1338, seems greater than ever.

If the subject of the Deoband school of Sunni Islam suffers from a lack of scholarly attention, then its rival out of Bareilly has fared far worse in this regard, despite the latter’s significant numerical superiority. The only academic study of note on the movement is Sanyal’s *Devotional Islam*, which, like Metcalf’s, draws heavily on Urdu- and Persian-language sources. But even this work is more of a biographical one, focused on the movement’s guiding light, Ahmad Riza Khan, rather than on the Barelvis as a whole. In any case, the book stops around 1921/1339, the year of Ahmad Riza’s death, leaving the next ninety years nebulous (Sanyal would follow up, in 2006/1427, with another completely biographical book: *Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the Prophet*, in essence a condensed version of *Devotional Islam*). True, other works have devoted a few pages specifically to Riza’s movement out of Bareilly (including Metcalf’s *Islamic Revival*), but, like its Deobandi counterpart, the school suffers from a distinct lack of scholarly notice from around 1920/1338 to the present. Such a void in South Asian history is unfortunate, especially since the Barelvi school claims a large majority of South Asian Muslims—making it likely *the largest Muslim sect in the world.* (It should be
pointed out that Barelvis don’t consider themselves as belonging to a sect at all; they are, simply, “Sunni,” like “most Muslims” around the world; it is the Deobandis, in their view, who form a breakaway sect. In addition, the Barelvi school, which has been known as a primarily rural movement as opposed to the allegedly urban Deobandis has, over the past half-century, “extended to towns and cities,” according to Hamza Alavi,¹ a highly significant development (especially within the context of Pakistani politics) that has never, to the author’s knowledge, been studied by scholars. On yet another note, the Barelvi school has always been viewed as just another Muslim revivalist movement of the late nineteenth/late thirteenth century, of which there were several. But the very term “revivalist” may not be accurate at all in describing the Barelvis, since, unlike the Deobandis and other Muslim reform movements of the period, Ahmad Riza Khan and the ‘alšma associated with him were not organizing anything new—not initiating any “revival” per se. On the contrary, their actions were a defense of the conventional in the face of what they viewed as a radical challenge. Tradition-wise, they upheld the status quo and viewed only religious innovation (byd’at) as abhorrent—and to them, the Deobandis were in the business of byd’at. (This is ironic, since the Deobandis view much Barevi practice in the same light.) While Deobandi leaders like Muhammad Qasim and Mahmud Hasan were introducing what might arguably have been deemed “new” concepts into Islamic practice (Qasim and Hasan, of course, would have characterized such “new” concepts as those originally upheld and practiced by the Prophet and his companions but subsequently forgotten, ignored, abandoned, or erroneously replaced by the majority of South Asian Muslims), Ahmad Riza Khan crusaded to protect the old. The Barelvis, then, held that their version of Islam—the “true,” “Sunni” version—had existed all along; it did not take the career of Ahmad Riza Khan to resurrect it (though
it may very well have required the man’s life’s work to preserve it, a sentiment echoed by some of his supporters); this was the Barelvi line of thought. It may be argued, then, that Ahmad Riza Khan was neither a reformer nor the founder of any movement, but rather a defender of what was, a protector of existing Sufi and pir tradition, an anti-reformer (or, as he would have seen it, simply anti-byd’at) who happened to be a charismatic teacher. (Barelvis admire him most for his intense love and respect for the Prophet, most of the Barelvis’ grievances against the Deobandis stem from the latters’ perceived disrespect towards Muhammad.) In a sense, then, the great majority of South Asian Muslims were “Barelvi” long before the designation existed. In any case, after 1920/1338 (and with the rise of Indian, then Pakistani, nationalism), it seems the Barelvis by and large favored Partition and an independent South Asian Muslim homeland.

But it is the dynamic between the Barelvi and Deobandi sects of Sunni Islam in South Asia, so the thesis of this project goes, that played a critical role in the debate over the partition of India, the creation of a separate Muslim state (Pakistan), and the (continued) shaping of the political order in Pakistan (and even surrounding states, particularly Afghanistan). From the early days (during the lifetimes of their founding figures), the two schools forced South Asian Muslims to examine their own religious practice, to scrutinize their own theologies, and to identify with one or the other (there were other schools of thought, too, of course, but the vast majority of South Asian Muslims gravitated toward one or the other category, either formally or informally). During the run-up to Partition, the schools often could be differentiated purely by political position, as the Pakistan debate added fuel to the rivalry and acted as a venue for various scholars to descredit and otherwise defame their religious nemeses. It is unlikely Jinnah would
have gained the support he needed in the final years before the birth of Pakistan without the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s divisive power, preventing as it did any sort of joint Deobandi-Barelvi action (despite Deobandi attempts to win Barelvis over to their “side”). Barelvi pirs and scholars (and a few Deobandi rebels, too) were instrumental in the Muslim League’s meagre “victory” in the Northwest Frontier, where loss might have spelled an abrupt end to the Pakistan dream. In Pakistan, it was the Deobandi and Barelvi parties (along with, at times, the Deobandi-inspired Jama’at-e-Islami, as well as some other Deobandi or Barelvi groups) who led the charge for an Islamic constitution, often spearheading the Opposition. Here again, though, it was the divisiveness that the rivalry engendered—and the subsequent inability of either party to combine in any sort of sustained joint political action—that prevented the “religious parties” from ever dominating Pakistani politics. With the militarization that followed the breakaway of Bangladesh, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rush of millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, the flood of Saudi and American cash along Pakistan’s western border, the continued struggle for Kashmir (and the ISID’s covert machinations in the region), Zia’s “Islamization,” the emergence of the Taliban, and the U.S. Government’s own invasion of Afghanistan—all combined with the politicization of Deobandi and Barelvi parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, among others—the rivalry took on an entirely new character. Eventually this led to seemingly constant violence, with attacks increasing in regularity and scale. All the while, the rivalry spread across the globe through the sizable South Asian diaspora, transforming, almost, into a microcosmal battleground for the soul of Islam between “fundamentalist” revivalists and “fundamentalist” preservers. Despite this, and despite the fact that the combined population of these sects numbers in the hundreds of
millions, an academic study of any significant length dealing with the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry has never been published by a Western academician as far as this writer is aware. The author submits this work as the first, hoping that its premises might be examined, built upon, corrected, and expanded in order to increase understanding of this highly important phenomenon in the Muslim world and beyond.

Chapter 1, “Historical Background: Islam in South Asia to the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” looks backwards—to the early days of Islam, tracking developments especially pertinent to the rise of Deobandism and Barelvisn all the way to 1860s/1270s-1280s India. Some of these developments include the precursor rivalries and power contestations through which the Deobandi and Barelvi schools can trace their ideological genealogy (like the tug-of-war between the court scholars and the Sufi mystics, or the schism that developed between court scholars and “other-worldly” scholars, to borrow a term from Robinson). In other words, the chapter attempts to ground the Deobandi and Barelvi positions (especially those of the political variety) within a historical context. Along the way, questions like, “What does the ideal Islamic state (and ruler) look like?” and, “What is the role of the ‘alama and the Sufi shix within the state apparatus?” are posited and, hopefully, answered, if briefly. Most of the information presented here is not new, but it has never, to the author’s knowledge, been arranged within the context of the Deoband-Barelvi rivalry in so comprehensive a fashion. The focus of Chapter 2, “Genesis of a Rivalry: The Deobandi and Barelvi Schools, 1866-1921/1283-1340,” is the founding epoch of the two schools of thought—first the Deobandi school (1866/1283) and then the Barelvi response, running into the mid-1920s/late 1330s. The ground for most of this information has been broken by previous scholars, though its presentation as specifically focused on the Deobandi-
Barelvi rivalry (not simply on one or the other) may be a first, as, too, might be the chapter’s more overtly political concentration.

Chapter 3, “A Muslim Homeland: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition Politics, 1921-1947/1339-1366,” attempts to shed light on the rivalry between the two schools within the pre-Partition politics of British India, from the 1920s/1340s right up to Partition in 1947/1366. Here, perhaps, some new ground has been broken, as most every Western or scholarly work on either school tends to peter out by the early twenties AD. The chapter documents the rise and fall of the Khilafat Movement, the role of the Jami’at Ulema-e-Hind, the political divisions that developed within the Deoband school, the organization of the All-India Sunni Conference, the relationship between the Deobandi religious leadership and the Indian National Congress, the rise of the All-India Muslim League and its co-opting of the Barelvis (plus an influential Deobandi faction), and the jockeying for position of various Barelvi and Deobandi leaders as the prospect of Pakistan loomed. Then, in “A New Islamic State: The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics, 1947-1977/1366-1397,” the focus shifts almost entirely to the political rivalry as it pertains to the first several decades of Pakistan's existence (for most of this period, this included present-day Bangladesh). Both schools formed political parties during this era that operated within the structure of the Pakistani state (and even, especially in the beginning, within other, more overtly political parties). These organizations (most prominentaly the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan) at times worked “together” toward a common cause (though typically employing a form of cooperation this writer terms “separate unity”)—like the institution of an “Islamic” constitution, the struggle against the Ahmadis, or wars with India over Kashmir—but typically stood at odds with one another, competing for constituents, their votes, and
the patronage and power that came with them. Perhaps the most important aspect of
the rivalry during this period was the way in which it prevented the two major Sunni
sects in the country from ever mounting a truly united assault against the forces of
secularism and socialism.

The great transformation of the rivalry (initiated partly via its politicization within
the context of pre-Partition independence politics and post-Partition Pakistani party
politics, and partly thanks to its confrontation with the modern, total state) took its
most significant turn during the period that followed, covered in Chapter 5:
“Islamization and War: Militarization of the Rivalry, 1977-2001/1397-1422.” The
chapter focuses on the political rivalry during the years of “Islamization” under Zia ul-
Haq and afterwards. This period, this work argues, is vital to understanding the
Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s metamorphosis from juridical rulings and religious tracts to
suicide bombers and assassinations. With an “Islamic Revolution” in Iran (and the anti-
Shi’a militancy it fostered in Pakistan), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
intervention of the American and Saudi (and Pakistani) governments (among others) in
the conflict, the participation of mostly Deobandi jiyādis in the “war against
communism,” the US- and petro-dollar-funded (via relatively new fiat currency systems)
mushrooming of mādārys in South Asia, the institution of a new “Islamic” order in
Pakistan, the rise of the Deobandism-inspired “Taliban,” the rapid spread of both
schools’ ideology to other centers across the world, and the coming of the so-called
“War on Terror”—all of this taken together had a profound effect upon the dynamic in
question. Finally, chapter 6 (“Epilogue”)—truly an epilogue in both scope and
brevity—attempts to bring the historical narrative, as far as is possible in a few short
pages, up to the present day.
And so we return to the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427, and the mega-attacks that have followed. Such is the situation as of the time of this writing, even as Western governments’ armies occupy Afghanistan and drop bombs from drones in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and as intelligence agencies from around the world (and from Pakistan itself) meddle in Pakistan’s (and Afghanistan’s) internal affairs for information and covert action purposes. U.S. Government troops, together with a smattering of others, occupy Muslim lands where the rivalry is well known among locals and highly influential both today and historically—yet scarcely understood by the relatively small group of American policymakers in Washington deciding the fate of billions of dollars in military expenditures and foreign aid, not to mention military and strategic policy in the region.

And far from South and Central Asia—in Durban and London, in Chicago and Kuala Lumpur, in Singapore and Dar es Salaam, in Houston and Cairo and Johannesburg—the rivalry increasingly divides Muslims, continually forcing a reevaluation of belief and practice, and, in essence, drawing battle lines for a near-inevitable, future Islamic struggle for the very spirit of the faith.
1 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The ‘ālma, the Sufi shîx, and the “Muslim” State in South Asia

The ‘ālma are the successors of the Prophet.

Abu Dawud Sulayman, 9th century a.d.

Just after noon on 24 January 2010/8 Safar 1431, a three-day conference—dubbed the “Biswa Ijtema,” or “Global Meeting”—came to an end outside of Dhaka, Bangladesh. The banks of the Turag river had provided the backdrop to the event, attended by anywhere from two to five million devotees (under the watchful eye of almost twenty thousand security personnel), including Bangladesh President Muhammad Zillur Rahman, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and leader of the political opposition Khaleda Zia, among many other high-profile participants. The pilgrims that made up the massive crowd had come from all over the world (from France and Palestine, from the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia, from Algeria and Iraq, and more), descending upon the town of Tongi to offer prayers, hear sermons and the recitation of the Qur’an and hâdis (translated into Chinese, Tamil, Arabic, English, Bangla, and other languages), and to partake of the edification of brotherhood, at night sleeping in the cold fog of
winter under makeshift tents or the bare sky. There was even a mass, dowry-free wedding, featuring one hundred forty couples. Due to space constraints, thousands took part in the proceedings upon nearby rooftops or along surrounding roads. The gathering was organized annually by a proselytizing Deobandi group called the Tablighi Jama'at (tablīGi jāma‘at, “Assembly of Proselytization”)—and the only Muslim gathering on the planet bigger was the ḥaj to Mecca itself. Meanwhile, Barelvis branded the Tablighi Jama'at, with its missionary efforts and mega-conferences, “an effective instrument” used by “the enemies of Islam” to “prevent the emergence of a true Islamic movement in Europe and elsewhere in the world.”

Two-and-a-half-weeks earlier, in the north-central Indian city (and traditional Barelvi stronghold) of Moradabad, some one hundred miles east of Delhi on the banks of the Ramganga, a sizable conference of “Sunni” religious leaders—under the ageis of the All-India Ulema Mashaikh Board, or AIUMB—issued a formal demand to the Indian government. Deobandi usurpers, they claimed, had stealthily taken control of “more than one lakh [100,000] madrassas, dargahs, graveyards and other historical monuments.” soyyid Muhammad Ashraf Kichowchhwi, a mwlana and the general secretary of the AIUMB, described the Deobandis as a “13% miniscule, manipulative minority,” that had “hijacked” the state’s minority bodies (like the Central Haj Committee and the Urdu Academy, to name just two) both in Uttar Pradesh and within the central government of India. “Since [the Deobandis] do not have faith in patron saints of ‘dargah’ or ‘mazar’ and have condemned the practice, logically they must not be considered for management of Ajmer Sharif or Deva Sharif [two of the most important Muslim shrine centers in India],” he argued, pointing out that the Barelvi religious leadership, on the other hand, spoke for “80%” of India’s Muslims. AIUMB
secretary Babar Ashraf explained the power of the Deobandis and their ilk as emanating from the financial support of Wahhabi states like Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, an unnamed Deobandi cleric interviewed by the *Times of India* responded by speculating that the Barelvi conference “could [have] been just a pressure tactic to influence the…government.”

A few days after the Moradabad conference, a West Point military academy report published by one Imtiaz ‘Ali argued that Karachi, Pakistan might be transforming into a “Taliban safe haven,” and linked a number of Deobandi seminaries, by name, not only to the Taliban but to several anti-Shi’i, anti-Barelvi militant outfits as well.

The next month armed Deobandis attacked (mostly Barelvi) *mawlid* processions in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan, “causing death, injuries and mayhem”; a Deobandi preacher at a Faisalabad mosque was subsequently arrested for “inciting people to violence,” prompting observers to wonder if a “cure” to the country’s sectarian ills might best be focused on the “steady diet of dogmatic preaching” that “is to be found wherever such violence occurs.”

Two months before the attacks, the UK-based *Guardian* published an article entitled, “Here, everyone is a minority,” highlighting (among other things) South Asian immigration to Britain and concentrating on the so-called “Muslim city” of Leicester. One of the dominant images painted in the article presented a ten-year-old Deobandi *masjid*, packed every Friday with over five hundred people, facing a one-hundred-year-old Edwardian church with a congregation numbering only thirty. The *Guardian* piece also underscored, however, the divided nature of the immigrant population, separated by ethnic, linguistic, as well as religious barriers. The author, Andrew Brown, asked his
readers, “Is this...city a model for our future? Or is it proof that mass immigration brings unmanageable strains?”

A few weeks after the Guardian piece, a joint American and Pakistani raid (conducted by the states’ respective intelligence agencies) captured top Taliban leader mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi, though the elusive, Deobandi-trained mullah Muhammad Omar remained yet out of reach—while Barelvis vacillated between animosity for the mostly Deobandi Taliban movement and hatred for the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and the American Central Intelligence Agency and military.

The above exercise merely provides a snapshot, of course—restricted to a couple months’ time, randomly selected—of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic as it plays out across the world within religious, social, and political spheres. What is this apparent Deobandi-Barelvi schism, and how has it become so centrally connected to such broadly unrelated phenomena as the world’s second-largest Muslim gathering (in Bangladesh), the largest missionary organization of any faith on the planet in the Tablighi Jama’at (a position disputed by the Barelvis’ own Dawat-e-Islami), minority disputes over government influence in north-central India, reports issued by West Point researchers in the United States, “Muslim” immigration to Britain, outbreaks of sectarian violence in Pakistan, and the machinations of intelligence agencies vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban movement? To answer this interrogative, it may be necessary to go back to the beginning, to the days of the Prophet Muhammad, and trace the development of the ideologies and belief systems and political philosophies, as far as is possible, that would eventually coalesce and emerge into the separate schools now classified as “Deobandism” and “Barelvism.” Along the way, perhaps, the reader might gain an
improved understanding not only of the tangled roots of the past from which these schools’ draw inspiration and sustenance, but also of their separate visions for a future, glorious Islamic order.

**Medina: the First Islamic State.**

The beginnings of an overtly political Islam can be traced all the way back to the days of the Prophet Muhammad and the Emigration (ḥijrā; 622 AD/1 AH) to Medina. Before this watershed, Muhammad had been, simply, a “messenger” (pījāmbūr) of God; each revelation (later to become a chapter [ṣūrā] of the Qur’an) that he received was memorized and recited both by him and his followers as part of their religious ritual. The Meccan revelations, too—usually significantly shorter than their subsequent Medinan counterparts—tended to possess a more “spiritual” (as opposed to temporal) nature, communicating ideas about the greatness of God, warning of God’s judgments, expressing the significance of showing gratitude, conveying the importance of charity, and underscoring Muhammad’s calling as a messenger of Allah. These early revelations seemed to avoid, for the most part, the mundane or the worldly (though there is a subtle undercurrent of hostility against the wealthy merchants of Mecca, many of whom belonged to clans opposed to Muhammad’s own Hashimite clan and its allies).

But after Meccan opposition drove the Muslims from the holy city and into the desert, Muhammad and his followers became, for the first time, a community set apart. From this point forward, Islam denoted not just a religious philosophy but also an identifiable, explicitly political phenomenon. Indeed, the Prophet assumed the role not only of spiritual leader but political ruler as well (not to mention political arbiter
between the various Medinan tribes)—and the change was reflected in the swrats received in the Muslims’ new oasis center. Here, the Prophet’s revelations became longer and dealt with a much wider range of everyday community issues. Within six months of his arrival, Muhammad was sending out “expeditions” to plunder Meccan caravans (though their first successful raid didn’t come for another year) and make alliances with nearby nomadic tribes—both overtly political moves. And within the first five years (though probably around the time of his arrival in the oasis), Muhammad had drawn up a “Constitution of Medina,” outlining a political alliance between the eight Arab clans of the town (each of whom had pledged to embrace Islam) plus the muhajyrwn, or “emigrants,” that Muhammad had led out of Mecca; the Jews and pagans (i.e. all of the non-Muslims) were allotted allied status vis-à-vis the “main” community.

Meanwhile, as a political leader, Muhammad continued to govern his own clan of émigrés, order raids (taking his one-fifth when they returned successful), make alliances, and position himself politically within Medina, all the while acting as a judge of sorts between the various Medinan groups when necessary. The political structure of Arab society in Muhammad’s time did not befit a single despot, thus the Prophet’s use of such indirect means of control, at least during the initial Medina years, is hardly surprising. Indeed, one mid-nineteenth/mid-thirteenth century commentator described the political system of the Arabs during this period thus:

The representative of the common ancestor of each tribe possessed a natural authority over it; but, having no support from any external power he could only carry his measures by means of the heads of subordinate divisions, who depended, in their turn, on their influence with the
members of the family of which they represented the progenitor. The whole government was therefore conducted by persuasion and there was no interference with personal independence unless it directly affected the general interest. [Italics added.]

As time passed and Muhammad, based in Medina, consolidated power, this “persuasive” form of government evolved into something more coercive, setting the stage for the even more top-down system established by his successors and, eventually, the “Islamic” states that would emerge later. Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina plus his early years in the oasis might therefore justifiably be described as a transitional period—from the almost wholly “persuasive Islam” of the Meccan era to the more coercive version of the faith (including coercion via the threat of violent reprisal against members of the community and military action against enemies) that later developed in Medina. It was to this later, more compulsion-based (at least as it compared to the early Meccan period) epoch that future Muslim scholars would look for the ultimate example of righteous Islamic government. Both the Deobandis and the Barelvis would draw inspiration from Muhammad’s example as a political leader, and from the ideal Islamic state that he instituted in what had once been the minor desert town of Yathrib.

After a Muslim victory over far superior Meccan forces at Badr (624/2)—during yet another raid—the political prestige of Muhammad skyrocketed. Several assassinations (in which he may or may not have had personal involvement) quickly ridded him of critics and political opponents, to boot. He oversaw a siege against one of the Jewish tribes (mostly goldsmiths and armor-makers) of the oasis before expelling them completely from the area. The concept of *jihad* (or holy “struggle,” strictly against non-
Muslims) developed, too, perhaps as a way for the various tribes to continue their traditional raids while simultaneously preserving the peace of the Muslim community at large (\textit{ummat}). The Muslims survived a close call against the Meccans at Uhud (625/3) before driving a second Medinan Jewish tribe (keepers of palm orchards) away. A third major engagement against Meccan forces—the Battle of the Trench (627/5)—saw the Muslims victorious, and was followed by the murder of all of the men of the remaining Jewish tribe in the oasis (and the sale of the tribe’s women and children into slavery) for alleged conspiracy with the enemy. Each of these overtly political actions eventually led to the Prophet’s emergence as unchallenged leader in Medina. He was, in effect, both spiritual and political head of an oasis state. Meanwhile, the task of building alliances with nomadic tribes continued.

By 628/6, Mecca was no longer in a position to destroy Muhammad or his followers; indeed, the city’s leaders signed a treaty with the Prophet allowing for Muslims to make pilgrimage there the following year. Truly, Muhammad’s political power had grown tremendously in the mere six years since the great merchants of his hometown had more or less driven him out of their midst. Meanwhile, the Muslims had captured a Jewish oasis (named Khaybar), significant in that its inhabitants were allowed to remain as long as they paid tribute to the Muslim state; the seeds of an Islamic empire had been planted.\textsuperscript{13} By 629/8, Muhammad’s forces had taken Mecca with minimal bloodshed. Subsequently, Muhammad’s gentle treatment of his erstwhile enemies quickly won many of them over. Following a victory over a group of tribes east of Mecca soon afterwards, Muhammad’s polity and its martial forces were recognized as more than a match for any other tribe or group of tribes in all of Arabia; deputations from many of these tribes now traveled to Medina to formally ally with the
Muslims. One condition underlying each alliance: the acceptance of Islam. For the first
time that anyone could remember, the feuding Arabian tribes of the vast desert
peninsula were more or less united under a single banner (indeed, one scholar described
the political situation of Arabia at this time as “pax Islamica”). Toward the end of his
life, Muhammad led a major expedition (comprising tens of thousands of men) outside of
Arabia into Syria, where he contracted treaties with Jewish and Christian communities,
laying the groundwork for the later Islamic empire’s “dhimmī” (ṣīmi) system. The
expedition opened the door, too, to external conquest, taken up with a vengeance by the
Prophet’s successors, and made additionally possible by the recent collapse of the
Persian Empire and the sheer “exhaustion” of Byzantium.

Even examining these earliest early years of Islam, it is possible to identify the roots
of both the scholarly ‘alma (“jurist-theologians,” to use the descriptive of M. Ahmad;
singular: ‘alym) and the Sufi mawshayx (“elders,” “leaders,” or “great men”; singular: shix),
both of which, in different forms, would play a central role within the development of
the Deobandi and Barelvi schools and within the progression of their mutual rivalry. As
mentioned previously, though the Prophet recited the Qur’an as revealed to him by
God, the Prophet’s Companions became known as qurra, “reciters of the Qur’an”
(singular: qari), too (as revealed to them by the Prophet). Some modern-day scholars
trace the beginnings of the ‘alma to the qurra of Medina, though a distinct class of
Muslim scholars appears not to have been identifiable until the period of hadis-collection
and Qur’anic law codification (c. eighth-tenth centuries/second-fourth centuries).
More certainty about historicity is expressed by the various Sufi orders, each of which
traces its spiritual genealogy—their “initiatic chains,” or sylsola—all the way back to the
Prophet himself. Of course, no one in Muhammad’s day was likely thinking about

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documentation for the benefit of establishing historical legitimacy in the eyes of future scholars, and as a result such “hard proof” is lacking. Still, for Sufis, their particular brand of religious practice “begins...in a real and important sense with the origins of Islam itself.”\(^{17}\) Each of the major orders in South Asia, whose ranks include both leading Deobandis and prominent Barelvis, can name each and every link in the chain, stretching back one-and-a-half millennia to Muhammad’s Arabia. The Prophet, according to Sufi doctrine, is the founder of the Sufi orders—not any other individual. (For example, the Naqshbandis identify their sīla as having been introduced during the ḥijrāt, when Muhammad evidently initiated Abu Bakr while they were hiding in a cave from Meccan enemies). In a sense, then, all Sufism is revivalist, as the initiatory pledge necessary to gain admittance to a Sufi order becomes a key to “gain access,” to quote Algar, to the “‘auspicious age’ which it is the purpose of the Sufi to relive.”\(^{18}\)

Upon the death of Muhammad in 632/11, his Companions at once selected a successor and “deputy” (xālifah, or “caliph”): Abu Bakr. What is remarkable is that, according to tradition, this reorganization took place more or less unanimously (despite some initial rumblings in ‘Ali’s favor) and immediately—even before the Prophet’s body had been laid in the earth. This episode in the history of Islam has been interpreted by many of the ‘alama as demonstrating the religiously obligatory nature of the caliphate (xylafat), an institution so important that the Companions “preferred it [this obligation] over the burial of the Holy Prophet” [italics added]. This act, strengthened as it was by the consensus of the Companions, thus became “a permanent source of [shari‘at],” in the words of one prominent Pakistani mufti.\(^{19}\) The selection of Abu Bakr as caliph is considered a textbook example of how a board of responsible, intellectual people (ahl
typically ‘alma, of course—possess the responsibility (and power) to appoint the next viceroy of the Prophet.

Over the next three decades alone (the period of the “Rashidun” [rashydin], or the four “rightly-guided” caliphs after Muhammad; 632-661/11-40), the new Muslim polity spread rapidly, annexing territory from the Arabian peninsula in the south to what is today Turkey and the Caucasus in the north, from northern Africa and southwestern Europe in the west to Persia and much of Central Asia in the east. The ‘alma and Muslim historians, even of the early twenty-first/mid-fifteenth century, write of these conquests as glorious affairs, the crowning achievement of an era of greatness since unrivaled. As one Muslim commentator has described this phenomenon, “Muslims [throughout the ages] could not forget the memory of their early triumphs” (italics added).20 This period and (perhaps especially) those that followed after it illuminate several key ideas connected to the present work—including that of the ideal Muslim ruler, the role of the ‘alym as well as the Sufi shix vis-à-vis such a ruler, and the religio-political vision of the ‘alma for the future. Identifying and understanding these historical roots is vital to comprehending the long-standing rift between the religious schools born of Deoband and Bareilly, including their more modern-day manifestations within the political framework of pre-Partition India and post-Partition Pakistan. Both schools are driven in large part by visions of the distant past and, shaped by that past, of Islamic revival and a more glorious future.

From the Rashidun period to the present, Muslim rulers (and the scholars and Sufis inhabiting their realms—some as legitimators, others as contestors of legitimacy) constantly harked back to the original Muslim empire established by Muhammad and expanded by his first four “rightly-guided” deputies. Here, then, lies the key to
establishing righteousness upon the earth—a true Islamic state ruled by a legitimate caliph of the Prophet. As a reputable Muslim scholar in Pakistan has pointed out, taking his inspiration from this early period, the ideal ruler within an Islamic order must (a) always strive to act according to God’s will, (b) respect the ‘al‘ama and the mashayx, (c) ensure the fair treatment of the people by his subordinate officers, (d) show equal justice to both “high and low,” (e) snuff out immorality, (f) encourage commerce, (g) show charity to the poor, and (h) handle the financial affairs of the realm such that surplus money might be allotted to deserving charities, scholars, divines, and artists.21 Perhaps the verse of eighteenth-century/twelfth-century Urdu poet Mirza Ahmad Rafi Sauda describes this ideal well, too. The following comes from Sauda’s ain-e-dawri (“Rules of Good Governance”):

Once a beggar, we are told, to a king did pray:

“I would like to say something, if you heed my say.

Of good and wise governance this is the foremost rule
That a ruler should be kind to the destitutes.

When a king delivers justice from his regal seat,
Both the great and the small he should with even hand treat.

Only to such advice should he lend his ear,
Which contributes to the public welfare.

He should treat his subjects as tender blooms and buds,
And like a vernal cloud his gentle shade spread,
His kindness with even course flows for one and all,
His grace, on boss and worker, in equal measure falls.
How tragic that the men considered God's vice-regents,
Should be unacquainted with the rules of governance!

[Italics added.]²²

Sauda's verse is pertinent on a number of levels, though his obvious emphasis on justice, equity, and mercy, common themes for great rulers within Muslim historiography (even those considered brutal, piratical, or bloodthirsty by, for example, Western standards), is perhaps the most relevant here. The final lines of the poem indicate, of course, that Muslim observers recognized that the ideal not infrequently remained just that—an ideal, all-too-often unrealized in the temporal world.

Hand-in-hand with the ideal Muslim ruler is the ideal Muslim state. In the words of leading (Deobandi) Islamic juridical scholar Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Islam is “a complete way of life” dealing with “political, economic, and social problems,” not just “theological issues.” The ‘abma point both to Qur’anic injunctions concerning such earthly matters as loans, business, mortgages, contracts, penal law, marriage, war, peace, international relations, politics, and inheritance, as well as to interpretations related to these and other issues gleaned from the sunna, as proof that the domain of Islam extends beyond the wholly spiritual to the day-to-day mundane details of mortal life.²³ For Muhammad, as Watt reminds us, religion was a “total response” to the “total situation” confronting him in seventh-century/first-century Arabia; it thus extended beyond the realm of the intellectual or the strictly spiritual or the “religious.” “[I]t is impossible,” Watt concluded, “for any occidental to distinguish within [Muhammad’s] achievement between what is religious and what is non-religious or secular.”²⁴

Returning to the question of an Islamic socio-political framework, then, it is not enough
to enjoy the freedom to carry out Islamic ritual, worship, and study within a given geographical area—not enough to possess the autonomy to live one’s religion as one pleases without the interference of the state. This individualist, more libertarian outlook, both the Deobandi and Barelvi religious scholars agree, simply will not suffice. Islam, as a “complete way of life,” must be established within the apparatus—indeed, as the very bedrock—of the State. Since the days of the Messenger, one scholar has explained, it was “the possession of power” that “was seen to be essential to upholding the shari’a…” [italics added]. Perhaps it is unfortunate that something akin to a more classical liberal approach rarely, if ever, seems to have been considered, for once shari‘at is to be established via the guns of government—and the threat of violence, whether implicit or explicit, by which government fundamentally operates—the question of who’s version of shari‘at is to be applied becomes especially critical. This phenomenon was to embed itself centrally at the heart of the Deobandi-Barelvi dispute.

**Muslim Footholds in South Asia.**

In South Asia, contact with Islam seems to have first been initiated by Arab merchants, plying their trade along the coasts of what are today southern Pakistan, western India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (though several abortive Muslim raids had penetrated the subcontinent as far as Multan within the first half-century of the Islamic era, too). Eventually considerable-sized Muslim settlements developed in many of the trading ports ringing the Indian Ocean. Here Islam spread more or less non-coercively, as local populations (and, at times, local rulers) adopted the foreign traders’ faith as their own. Muslim merchants journeyed far beyond India, too, regularly conducting commercial activity up and down the Southeast Asian coast, in China, and even in
Korea. In fact, the Muslim merchants of Korea would play what might be considered a
decisive role in the spread of Islam in South Asia. For it was here that, upon the deaths
of a number of these merchants, the Korean king commissioned a group of Persian ships
to convey the deceased trader's wives and children to Iraq so that this husbandless and
fatherless collection might be reunited with its coreligionists. The convoy experienced
little trouble sailing south from Korea, past China, Vietnam, Cambodia, around the
Southeast Asian peninsula and into the Indian Ocean, past Ceylon and up the western
Indian coast. But as the widows and their families were sailing on the waters south of
Sindh, they were attacked—either by pirates or the naval forces of the local Brahmin
king; historians aren't certain which. Immediately upon hearing the news, the Muslim
viceroys in Iraq requested that the Sindhi ruler intervene, but he refused. In fact,
according to Muslim sources, the women, children, and shipmen in question were even
at that moment being held prisoner—not by pirates, but by the wily ruler himself.
(Other historians point to the Brahman king’s stated reason for non-compliance with
Arab demands: namely, that the city wherein the Arab ships had been seized lay outside
of his jurisdiction).

The Iraqi viceroy's response was to send the young Muhammad bin Qasim at the
head of a mighty army into the subcontinent, and by 712/93 the conquest of Sindh,
briefly attempted before bin Qasim (but never successfully), was complete. The move
not only opened up increased trade with the rest of India, clearing the sea lanes for Arab
merchants, but it also convinced many of west India’s rulers that friendship and
commerce with the new conquerors was prudent. The aforementioned development of
Muslim communities up and down western India’s coastline mostly occurred after the
Sindhi conquest of Muhammad bin Qasim.
The description of Muhammad bin Qasim handed down by history (or “through Muslim eyes,” as contemporary descriptions of the man, his victories, and his rule are inevitably garnered from Muslim pen) is an interesting one—and relevant to the topic of this work. Far from being painted as a tyrannical invader who conquered town and city only to rule and reign as plundering despot, Muhammad bin Qasim is described as just, tolerant, and kind (even, however reluctantly, by at least one prominent nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century British writer, who characterized him as “prudent and conciliatory”). Muslim historians insist that he preserved Buddhist and Hindu places of worship and that he went out of his way to show respect to Brahmins. “His main mission was to punish a willful aggressor [the erstwhile ruler of Sindh],” not forcefully convert a country. In fact, his policy vis-à-vis his vanquished foes was one of forgiveness and “friendship for all.” He even authored a proclamation that one Pakistani historian has dubbed “the Charter of Liberty of Brahmanabad,” in which, among other things, he declared freedom of worship for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Perhaps most interestingly, he raised the status of Buddhists and Hindus so that they stood on equal footing with Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians “in the true spirit of Islam.” This was an ideal type, a true Muslim conqueror: one whose arrival was veritably forced by political expediency—by justice, even—and whose conquest, though swift and militarily inspiring, was nevertheless followed by merciful rule (including a strong tendency toward forgiveness), equity, tolerance, patronage of the arts, and strong central administration. The ideal ruler broke the bonds of evil or inherently unjust local tradition and custom, too; in Sindh, Muslim rule brought with it the breakdown of “the coercive caste-ridden alien rule of the Brahman dynasty.” Muhammad bin Qasim becomes for us the first example of the Muslim ideal ruler type in South Asian history.
Such a portrayal is certainly not universally accepted, of course, but most Muslim historians—and thus most Deobandi and Barelvi scholars—seem to paint bin Qasim in such strokes.29

Sizable “Muslim” forces arriving from the outside wouldn’t make an appearance in the subcontinent again until the late tenth century AD, amidst the “age-old” Indo-Turkic rivalry of Hindustan’s northwestern frontier.30 Muslim historians insist that the aggressors were the Indian states, more or less confederate, to the east (or, at the very least, that they [the Indians] fell behind on promised tribute payments); it seems, however, that the conflict was focused, as ever, on land (eastern Afghanistan) and that each side aggressed upon the other. After a series of attacks, the conflict between Ghazni, ruled by the Turk Sabuktigin, and the Indian states came to a head in 988/378.

It was in that year that the Indian Jaipal, said to have been leading a host culled from the various north Indian states and numbering one hundred thousand, marched on Ghazni. The Ghaznavids were growing too strong, and Sabuktigin (who had “started vigorously to expand his dominions”)31 had already conducted several raids as far as Lamghan and Multan; in fact, these very raids had precipitated the alliance of “Hindu” kingdoms against the Ghaznavid threat, an alliance that would only grow with time. Now Jaipal was bent on putting the Turks in their place. Meanwhile, from the walls of Ghazni, the teenaged son of Sabuktigin, Mahmud, likely watched the oncoming horde with not a little trepidation. And so the battle commenced, and a furious clash it was, but Sabuktigin prevailed, crushing the aspirations of his Indian rivals and extending the Turkic king’s domain to Peshawar. Evidently he could have taken more, but Sabuktigin, ever a noble Muslim ruler, was forgiving and interested in peace above all—and thus he agreed to the terms aforementioned, trusting in Jaipal to honor them and
thereby assure the survival of his (Jaipal’s) kingdom. But the Hindu raj, we are told, continued his machinations against Ghazni in spite of the latter’s good faith. Young Mahmud, a witness to this history—the battles against the invading Indians, their perceived intrigues and scheming—almost certainly made mental preparation to prevent a similar set of circumstances when his own time came to inherit his father’s kingdom.\(^\text{32}\)

That time came in 997/387. Upon ascending the throne of Ghazni, Mahmud vowed to keep the Indian kingdoms in check through consistent and calculated aggression that would keep them too busy at home to execute any sort of westward invasion. In 1001/391, he faced Jaipal in battle again; Jaipal’s loss was so humiliating that the Indian king took his own life by fiery self-immolation. By 1008/398, Mahmud had defeated a second confederacy of Indian states—this one led by Jaipal’s son—in a battle at Peshawar. Much of the Punjab fell into Mahmud’s hands as a result, and a Ghaznavid governor was installed at Lahore. By the time of his death in 1030/421, Mahmud had conquered cities and states across northern India (typically leaving them in the hands of Hindu vassals) as far east as Somnath (1024/415), and raided forts, towns, and Hindu temples enough to fill his treasury. After all of these expeditions into the plains, however, the son of Sabuktigin really only incorporated the Punjab into his empire.

Despite his reputation among many western historians as a raider and plunderer, Mahmud of Ghazni is described by Muslim histories as not only a military genius, but a just ruler as well. Writes Qureshi, “He was neither a mere robber nor a bloodthirsty tyrant, as some modern writers have called him, and shed no blood except in the exigencies of war.”\(^\text{33}\) It had been the Indian states that had aggressed first, and often—and when they had lost and agreed to pay indemnities, they had defaulted. Mahmud
had thus done what was necessary to prevent further Indian incursions against his
dominions. The Hindu temples he destroyed, though many, were not those of his own
Hindu subjects (which he preserved). Mahmud is, in fact, credited with considerable
broadmindedness, evident in his apparent attempt “to reconcile the Hindus and
integrate them under his government and polity.” This last he accomplished by
recruiting Hindus into his civil administration (even in Ghazni, where a few rose to
considerable heights), incorporating Hindu divisions into his army, and even minting
coins depicting local mythical figures and Sanskrit script. And as a patron of the arts
and scholarship, his “reputation has remained undiminished throughout the ages”; it
was under his sponsorship that polymath Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni
(considered by some as the father of Indology, geodesy, and anthropology) labored, and
Hakim Abul Qasim Ferdowsi Tusi wrote the epic *Shahnama* under his patronage.
Mahmud of Ghazni thus joins Muhammad bin Qasim as an ideal Muslim ruler within
the South Asian context. Eighteenth-century/twelfth-century political philosopher and
revivalist Shah Waliullah (on whom more later) would describe Mahmud as the greatest
Islamic ruler after the original Muslim caliphate (and point out that his victories—all
fought for with the express aim of propagating Islam—were in part a result of his
sharing a horoscope with the Prophet). “In Afghanistan he is regarded as a
philosopher prince, the conqueror of infidels,” writes one British historian, while “in
India he has left a bitter legacy for his violent conquests.”

Several other Ghanzavids might also be included in this category, including Ibrahim
(r. 1059-1099/451-492), whose peace settlement with the Seljuks to the west made
possible further conquest east into Hindu India, and his son Masud (r. 1099-1115/492-
The rule of Ibrahim and Masud, Muslim historians insist, facilitated an impressive flowering of culture in Lahore.

Throughout the Ghaznavid period, the relationship between the rulers and the ‘alama remained close, a political feature that was more or less inherited by the Ghaznavids as quasi-successors of the Samanids. These Muslim scholars not only advised their political masters on matters of shari’at, but also were active as impeders of Shi’a (and particularly Ism’aili) influence. Maintaining Sunni orthodoxy through the guns of government was the rule, thus it makes sense that the ‘alama were concentrated in Ghazna and, later, in Lahore—the seats of political power in the realm. M. Ahmad singles out shīr Ism’ail Bukhari (d. 1056 AD), based in Lahore, and Safiuddin Kazuruni (d. 1007 AD), who established himself farther south, in Uchch, as particularly noteworthy ‘alama of the age. Bukhari pioneered the study of hadis in South Asia—a theme that later reformers, like Shah Waliullah and the Deobandi fathers, would adopt—in addition to his missionary efforts; Kazuruni, a generation earlier, had likewise proselytized for the faith in the subcontinent.

Indeed, perhaps the most important dynamic then being established in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent was not military (i.e. the Ghaznavid conquests) or scholarly (i.e. the efforts of the ‘alama), but centered on Sufi proselytizing. Since as early as the eighth/first century, when Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sindh, Sufi missionaries had been penetrating the subcontinent—and by the time of the Ghaznavids, many had been established in northwestern Hindustan (and further south, along the western coast) for many years. To borrow from Robinson, “Sufis were the prime agents in the long process of slowly drawing people [east of the Hindu Kush] of a
myriad local religious traditions into an Islamic milieu” (italics added).\textsuperscript{40} M. Ahmad described the genesis of Sufism as follows:

Some of the ‘ulema’ who preferred to dedicate themselves to the missionary work of Islam or devote themselves exclusively to rigorous spiritual self-discipline were called by the names of sufiya, awliya, mashaykh and pir. In order to preach Islam among the people at large, they adopted the ‘mass contact’ technique and developed for this purpose a separate ‘code of ethics’ and a body of ‘doctrines’ based on the esoteric interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In contrast with the ahl al-Shar’iah [People of the Law], they are known as the ahl al-Tariqah [People of the Way]. In fact what the mighty Muslim rulers could not achieve by the sword, these sufis achieved with love and tolerance. They were miraculously successful in pushing the frontiers of Islam to the farthest extent through peaceful conversion.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus while the approach of the ‘alma to things political was to exert direct influence on policy-makers as members of the political class and components of the sultan’s court, the Sufis, generally speaking, adopted what could be considered in modern parlance a more libertarian method—one that relied on persuasion, preaching, long-suffering, selfless service, and personal example to effect change, without direct systematic recourse to the levers of the State (though such recourse was taken indirectly at times). The ‘alma were the guardians of Islamic law—and it was through the law, enforced by a just Muslim ruler within the domains of an Islamic state, that righteousness could be
established upon the earth. The Sufi saints, on the other hand, while sharing the goal of establishing righteousness, sought its realization by “acting as a common source of inspiration both to the rulers as well as the ruled.” Indeed, some scholars have argued that Sufi influence resulted generally in a more “passive” subject population, less disposed to unrest and rebellion. But their sway did not flow downward only; the Sufis regularly, through advice-giving and sermons, are reported to have curbed the tyranny of those less just rulers whose actions towards the common people might have required attention.\textsuperscript{42}

It should be noted that Sufi and ‘\textit{al\textsl{ym}} are not by any means mutually exclusive terms (indeed, one scholar has called them “complementary,” while obviously “nonetheless distinct”).\textsuperscript{43} In fact, many of the greatest ‘\textit{al\textsl{uma}} were and are members of at least one Sufi order, and often several. At times, and particularly in the contemporary news media in the context of South Asian (especially Pakistani) Islam and politics, the term “Sufi” is presented as being almost synonymous with “Barelvi” (a term far less employed), while the Deobandis are considered part of an ‘\textit{al\textsl{uma}} movement. Such views are entirely erroneous, however, and may be attributed to the Deoband school’s reputation as a “puritanical” institution (and a slight, gradual trend since its founding towards a greater emphasis on scholarship), opposed to the assumed historical Sufistic tendency to adopt local, possibly unorthodox ideas and practice—commonly associated with the Barelvis. For the Sufi preachers’ missions of conversion by persuasion “meant accommodating local needs and customs,” explained Robinson; such “accommodation” meant
incorporating worship of trees, or fish, or crocodiles, or cults relating to St George or Khwaja Khidr, into local sufi piety. It meant tolerating a range of ritual practices: the lighting of candles, the smearing of sandal paste, the tying of a piece of cloth to a shrine to remind a saint of a request.\textsuperscript{44}

This sort of “accretion” has indeed been the target of much Deobandi criticism, but one must realize that there exists a wide spectrum of Sufistic thought and practice, from the highly esoteric to the more orthodox; the Naqshbandiyya, for example, would probably fall into this latter category. In any case, even within a single order, great variation in practice and even doctrine has historically existed. Another potential source of this misunderstanding may lie in what Sanyal observed as “one of the ways the Ahl-e-Sunnat [i.e. Barelvi] movement has changed in the course of the twentieth century,” namely “the leadership’s increased emphasis on the role of Sufism.”\textsuperscript{45} Simultaneously, a de-emphasis on Sufism as a central tenet of religious practice occurred among the Deobandis, whose focus slowly shifted towards the study of traditional Islamic sources and shari’at. In the northwest frontier area, for example, where Deobandism quickly gained a major foothold, Haroon has pointed out that “accounts of religious pedagogy in the region” from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century AD “all note madrasas aimed at imparting a formal Quranic education. The centrality of tariqa [\textit{tariqat}, or the Sufi “way”]\textsuperscript{2}…began to diminish.”\textsuperscript{46}

The fact of the matter is that both the Barelvi and Deobandi founder figures held membership in multiple Sufi orders while simultaneously having attained the scholarly rank of ‘alym. (Indeed, the Naqshbandi order has itself been dubbed by some as “one of
ulema.”)⁴⁷ “Sufis are the dignity of Deobandism,” one of the school’s adherents, a local dignitary in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s Mansehra district, informed the writer, “and [the] faith would be incomplete” without the belief that Sufis represent those closest to God, “the most perfect” of all people.⁴⁸ The mistaken scholar-Sufi binary characterizing the two schools’s relation to each other may also be attributed to the fact that while the Deobandis revere the Sufis and continue to be initiated into their spiritual lines (albeit less and less), they believe that the “route to Allah” is discovered through emulation of the Prophet’s life—in other words, living according to the shāri‘at (what Robinson calls “this-worldly piety”). The Barelvis, on the other hand, place added faith in ṭahrīqāt—“the Sufi route to Allah”⁴⁹—which, in the words of one Deobandi, “cross[es] the boundaries” which “Allah has set for his creatures” (and thereby approaches Robinson’s “other-worldly piety”).⁵⁰ The “Sufi route to Allah” involves the suggestion that the intercession of a pir for man with God could have efficacy, an approach still clinging to life in some Deobandi circles but very much alive within Barelvis. Thus only in approach to Sufism and the Sufi orders, then, do the two schools differ. Sufism itself plays a major role in both Barelvism and Deobandism. Still, perhaps in this admittedly blurred dichotomy—between the ‘alama and the Sufis—can be observed, however faintly, one of the historical roots of what would become the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry. Taken alone this would, in light of what has been written above, constitute a gross oversimplification. But the difference in approach towards both religious orthodoxy and the exertion of political influence that at least partly defined these two groups certainly merits recognition as a significant thread in the fabric of modern-day Deobandi-Barelvi dynamics.
Ghazni was burned to the ground in 1150/545 by a new power in Central Asia: that of the Afghan Ghurids. And though the Ghurids would suffer a setback of their own at the hands of the Seljuks, yet another group—the Oghuz Turks—finally drove the Ghaznavids from their capital. They found refuge in Lahore, where their dynasty continued. Meanwhile, the Ghurids, now recovered from their previous setbacks, took Ghazni, Multan, and Uch (1175/571) under their leader Muhammad bin Sam, and made an abortive attempt at conquering India through Gujarat in 1178/574. Though the latter failed, another expedition was launched following the more well-worn path to the north; in 1179/575 Muhammad bin Sam took Peshawar, in 1181/577 Sialkot fell, in 1186/582 he seized Lahore (thus effectively ending the Ghaznavid dynasty), and by 1191/587 he had taken Bhatinda, threatening Ajmer and, ultimately, Delhi. In response, the Hindu rulers of those two citadel cities joined forces and marched on Bhatinda, where a temporary victory could not shield them from their fate; both Ajmer and Delhi fell to Muhammad the next year (1192/588). But the Afghan conqueror wasn’t finished. Within a handful of years, Muhammad bin Sam had added Varanasi and Kannauj to his empire, while one of his generals (Muhammad bin Bakhtyar Khalji) conquered Bihar and Bengal. For the first time, “Muslim” rule extended across northern India, and further expansion was only prevented by troubles in Central Asia. He and his successors were known to “favour the ulema, by being generous to them and paying attention to their words” (and by “bestowing on them large amounts of money”), according to one Muslim chronicler. Simply “paying attention” to the ‘alma was requisite for the ideal ruler; in the modern era, in Pakistan, the perceived discounting of both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars was one of very few things that might cause the ‘alma to temporarily shelve their own dispute and oppose this or that regime as “un-
Islamic” or “anti-Islam.” On the other hand, political rulers that were wise enough to meet with the ‘alma and consider their point-of-view, to give them a voice—even if their advice might be ultimately decided against—tended to meet with the scholars’ approbation (at which point the Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership could return to jockeying for power between themselves).

The Ghurids, like previous dynasties, patronized the ‘alma with plunder gained through the administration of their empire and the conquest of new lands. As political rulers are wont to do, the Ghurids discriminated between the various schools of Muslim thought, identifying and financially supporting this or that ‘alym, much to the chagrin of those excluded (one of the many dangers of state patronage). In the end, the Shafi leanings of the early Ghurids gave way to the Hanafi majority of Afghanistan (the empire’s base of control) and the Ghurid soldiery that would go on to conquer India, with great consequence for South Asian Islam. 

Muhammad of Ghur himself was “reputed to be a mild and benevolent man,” the Muslim historian tells us, and “a good general and a just ruler.” Like Muhammad bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni, the example of Muhammad of Ghur is celebrated today by millions of Muslims. The Ghurid conqueror is considered a hero, possessing many attributes of the ideal Islamic ruler type, despite the nature of his conquests (as “invasions”; after all, as Wood notes, it was a “combination of brutality and high civilization” that characterized “medieval Islam”).

**Delhi Sultanate.**

A former slave of Muhammad of Ghur, Qutbuddin Aibak, became the first sultan of Delhi in 1206/603, ushering in a new era in the history of the subcontinent: that of
sustained “Muslim” rule over vast Indian territory. Under the Mamluks (1206-1290/603-689), the Delhi Sultanate expanded across much of north India. Their successors, the Turko-Afghan Khaljis (1290-1320/689-720), extended the sultan’s domains into central India while simultaneously holding back Mongol would-be invaders—one of the few polities successful in this regard. The next dynasty (the Tughluqs, 1320-1414/720-817, of Turkic origin), after some initial military success, including the extension of the sultanate to its territorial height (almost conquering all of the subcontinent under Muhammad bin Tughluq [r. 1325-1351/725-752]), ultimately experienced a series of crippling setbacks. These obstacles included the loss of much territory and, devastatingly, the invasion of Timur the Lame in 1398/801—an event that resulted in the eight-day plundering of Delhi and the massacre of an estimated one hundred thousand of the sultan’s subjects. Within a decade-and-a-half, the Tughluqs had been replaced by the Sayyids (1414-1451/817-855), whose short rule ended with the abdication of the last Sayyid sultan to a new dynasty: that of the Lodis (1451-1526/855-933). The Lodis, ethnic Pathans, held the throne for three quarters of a century, finally falling to a new power in South Asia—the Mughals—in 1526/933.

One might generally say, as Qureshi does, that the Delhi sultans “adhered to the legal conception of the position of the sultan which was common throughout the Muslim world.” And though, as Metcalf and Metcalf (and others) assert, “it is…misleading to speak of this era as the period of ‘Muslim’ rule,” since other, “non-Muslim” Indian states were organized and behaved in much the same way (Hardy describes the Delhi sultanate as, for example, merely “pious policemen”—the sultans—collaborating with “pious lawyers”—the ‘alma), the fact remains that the period has for centuries been regarded by Muslim scholars as distinctly Muslim, complete with several
ideal or at least near-ideal rulers (with a few rotten eggs thrown in). Gohar writes, for
example, that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq (r. 1320-1325/720-725) “reigned for five years
with justice and equity, restoring order and peace,” and that his son, too (Muhammad
bin Tughluq), though his rule would be marked by several major mistakes and
disappointments, nevertheless was “himself highly learned” and “greatly respected the
‘alɔma” (though the same cannot be said about his position vis-à-vis the Sufi shixs); this
sultan’s setbacks are often glossed over as the result of natural impulsivity (and even
bad luck), despite his being pious and highly intelligent. On the other hand, Alauddin
Khilji (r. 1296-1316) saw his role as sultan as “separate from [shɔri’at] and religious
tradition,” urging a sort of church-and-state separation that a few Pakistani leaders have
attempted to advocate, with mixed results. To Alauddin, shɔri’at was the domain of
judges and muftis; as sultan he should be more concerned with “grain, cloth and basic
necessities for the people…” This dichotomy might justifiably be compared to the
competition, seven centuries later, between the religious parties on the one hand and
Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s PPP (especially during that organization’s early period) on the
other. At its heart, the issue was the role of government: was it to implement shɔri’at
(which would, many of the ‘alɔma argued, bring about prosperity and equity on its
own)? Or was it to act as a sort of paternal provider of temporal welfare (with the
scholars and muftis operating within their own sphere)? This is not to suggest that the
‘alɔma themselves were not somewhat divided on this issue (they were, then as now), but
rather to underscore the long tradition of political rulers who have attempted the
construction of a wall between their own earthly responsibilities and those supposedly
more otherworldly tasks of the ‘alɔma.
Like all good Muslim rulers, the Delhi sultans, often at the behest of their advising ‘alāma, typically sought legitimacy for their rule from the generally accepted caliph of the Muslim world. For the early sultans, this meant applying for recognition from the Abbasids in Baghdad. And even after the Mongols sacked that great city on 10 February 1258/7 Safar 656, and had the last Abbasid caliph wrapped in a carpet and trampled to death by horses, the sultans in Delhi continued to more or less recognize the dynasty for another four decades. One or two sultans later claimed that they were caliphs (albeit only within their own domains), but this didn’t last long. Muhammad bin Tughluq was convinced, perhaps by the ‘alāma counseling him, that recognition from the reigning caliph was necessary to make his rule legitimate; this time application was made to Cairo, from where the “shadow caliphate,” a line drawn from an Abbasid survivor installed by the Mamluk Sultanate, sent Muhammad bin Tughluq a diploma in 1344/744. Feroz Shah received one, too, as did the breakaway Bahmani Sultanate in the Deccan (though this last is debated). The Sayyids and Lodis also recognized the caliph (at least on their coinage), and the former, as their name indicates, additionally claimed to be descendants of the Prophet. All of this was consistent with the Muslim notion of “singleness and political unity” defining the pan-Islamic world (a concept that “resonate[s] among some Muslims even now,” says one modern Muslim writer; this is certainly true of the two schools about which this work is concerned). Though the reality on the ground might have reflected anything but a politically unified polity, religious legitimization was important if the ruler wanted to exercise the “right” to such plunder as land taxes. Such was the importance of the ‘alāma stamp of approval.

Official state positions for the ‘alāma during the Delhi Sultanate era were plentiful and prominent. Throughout this period, religious affairs fell under the Sadr ul-Sudur,
head of the Religious Affairs Department. Under the Sādār ul-Sudwār fell the shīk ul-yṣlam, an ‘ālīm responsible for handling state patronage of Sufis and other Muslim divines. The position of qazi-e-māmālik—Chief Judge—was probably the most powerful next to the Sādār ul-Sudwār; indeed, often both offices were combined in one individual. The Chief Judge appointed all other judges in the realm (effectively making him the head of the Justice Department), and additionally appointed ymāms to lead prayers in all mosques. To these highly significant responsibilities must be added the Department of hysba—in essence, a Department of the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This morals-enforcement agency of government was, more or less completely, a creature of the ‘ālīma, and though its practical strength fluctuated over time, it often enjoyed real power (as, ironically, during the reign of Alauddin, whose supposed separation-of-church-and-state philosophy was evidently more separation-of-church-and-sultan, granting the scholars free reign without interference from the political ruler). Thus there was ample room within the political structure of the Delhi Sultanate for the ‘ālīma to make their influence felt. “[E]ven when they could not influence a sultan,” A. Ahmad informs us, their place within the state apparatus ensured that “they could not easily be influenced by him.” In addition to their political role, the jurist-theologians with the title mufti also acted as issuers of fatwa, or juridical rulings, and studied, analyzed, and wrote about the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and Islamic law (fuqh).

One might generally say that the ‘ālīma “occupied a position of great prestige” under the Mamluks, reaching a peak in authority under Bahram Shah (r. 1240-1242/637-639) thanks in part to matrimonial ties to the sultan’s house. This was followed by a quieter influence during the latter half of the dynasty’s rule, though the ‘ālīma continued to enjoy a close personal relationship with the sultan. Their authority
waned some during the short Khalji period, only to pick up again under the house of Tughluq (especially during Feroz Shah’s reign: 1351-1388/751-790). Unfortunately for the scholars, this coincided with the aforementioned decline of the Delhi Sultanate’s power, specifically towards the end of the Tughluq period and throughout the Sayyid period. This would change with the arrival on the scene of the Lodis, under whom the Delhi Sultanate would experience somewhat of a resurgence—and the power of the ‘alāma, too, despite Sikander Lodi’s personal distaste for the scholars’ orthodoxy.61

Such authority often set the ‘alāma at odds with the Sufis. Indeed, it was not uncommon for the court scholars to accuse the Muslim mystics of committing the great sin of innovation (byd’at)—adding to or changing pure Islam as revealed to and by the Prophet. This is the central accusation leveled by the Deobandis at the Barelvis. Typically such an accusation would be made through the levers of the state, with formal charges written up against an individual Sufi, resulting in a trial before a panel of ‘alāma and Sufis. Sufis were dragged before such juries on a variety of charges—from listening to music to adultery—though as often as not the verdict was decided in the Sufis’ favor (and, sometimes, to the injury of the ‘ālym from whence the charge originated).62 By prohibiting an act by means of state-enforced legislation or mandate, a scholar’s nemesis might be destroyed or otherwise marginalized. This mechanism was simply another means by which the ‘alāma-Sufi rivalry played out.

A related phenomenon of this period was the establishment and proliferation of the xanqah, or Sufi shrine center—especially, during this period, of the Chishti and Surawardy orders.63 From the thirteenth/seventh century, the Sufi shi‘rs, or pirs (a term prevalent in South Asia; in much of the rest of the Muslim world “pirs” are known as walis—“friends of God”) had begun establishing themselves in many of the Islamic
kingdoms, centered around such xanqahs. Though these saints and their followers considered God the omnipotent ruler of all, Allah was, for all intents and purposes, “inaccessible to the common man.” And so God had spoken through prophets. The last and greatest of these had been Muhammad, through whom the Qur’an had been revealed for the benefit of humankind. But there were to be no more prophets after Muhammad; the final great revelation for the world had been communicated. What, then, of the rest of humanity—all of the billions born after Muhammad, who would never have the benefit of a prophet to guide them? The pirs and their disciples had an answer. Rather than leave His creatures with naught but the words of the Qur’an, as sacred and perfect as they were, Allah in his mercy continued to provide living “guides and guardians,” “friends of God” whose role was to maintain “the smooth operation of the entire world” and continue to impart blessings to humanity. These pirs, all syyids (descendents of the Prophet), could trace their authority back to an “original saint” (the qaṭb, meaning “pole” or “axis”; one of these, for example, was the great Abdul Qadir al-Gilani [d. 1166/561] of Baghdad, “founder” of the Qadiri order), and from thence to Muhammad himself; thus by virtue of their place in the spiritual chain (sylsyla) and by blood the pirs were to be vehicles of blessing to humankind. In northern Hindustan (mostly in the northwest, in modern-day Pakistan) and neighboring Central Asia, the xanqahs came to wield significant political as well as spiritual power in the region round about. Oftentimes a tribal chief or other leader would approach the pir on behalf of his entire group and submit to conversion through a ceremony of allegiance (bi’at). Each year, the bond between pir and those communities tied to him would be bolstered when he undertook a circuit of his spiritual domain, collecting donations for the maintenance of the shrine center. In return, the pir was to act as a mediator between his
followers and God. It was through him that the surrounding communities were blessed; their supplications to him were made in turn by him to the quṭb, and by the quṭb to the Prophet Muhammad—who himself enjoyed direct access to God. Even after the pir had been taken by death, his tomb continued to pour out blessings upon those tied to the xanūqāh, and worshippers of God made pilgrimages there to ask for help and pray for guidance. In the meantime, his hereditary successor, or sajjada-nishin (in essence, as Ewing points out, a “hereditary pir”), continued to act as the regional spiritual mediator and maintainer of the shrine.64

Many a Sufi shīx made temporal claims, too—to territorial wālayāt, that is, the pir asserted authority (i.e. spiritual authority, though this often translated, of course, into political authority) over a given area. A constant (though often subtle) struggle, about which Digby has written much, was thus waged between the sultan and the Sufi shīx for control and dominance. Indeed, the contest had to be subtle, for many believed that the very temporal survival of the empire, or at least of the territory over which the shīx claimed wālayāt, depended on the Sufi shīx’s personal attendance, well-being, and blessing. His words could, it was believed, literally bring a curse upon the land. Prosperity (and even the enthronement of kings) might be attributed to his very presence or promise, and natural calamity, foreign invasion, the impoverishment of a city, the death of an emperor, or even the fall of a dynasty to his departure or spoken words. The sultans endeavored to patronize the Sufis, and were largely successful vis-à-vis those of lesser status (the greater māshayx could not, by virtue of their claims, accept official patronage); this fell under the purview of the aforementioned shīx ul-yṣlam, whose duty was to keep the Sufis in check through the distribution of state-garnished plunder and other material favors. Much that was involved in this patronage betrayed
what was, perhaps, its true purpose—emphasizing, as it did, the supremacy of the sultan’s authority over that of the Sufi shīr. Land grants and religious endowments from the state ensured the shīr’s political support as an influencer of opinion (and even as a military recruiter in times of civil strife). Sufis who refused the sultan’s largesse were considered potential threats to the sultan’s authority (and their xanqahs potential hotbeds of political rebellion). Thus we are told by one Pakistani historian that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, for example, was “fearful of the reach and influence of Nizamuddin,” the most prominent Sufi (Chishti) shīr of the time (perhaps Tughluq had it right; some Muslim scholars later ascribed that sovereign’s untimely death—by collapsing pavilion—to a pronouncement of this Sufi shīr, thereby illustrating the Sufis’ perceived power over temporal affairs). Such suspicion was not entirely unfounded, as from time to time, both during the Delhi Sultanate period and afterwards, a Sufi shīr would be involved in a political conspiracy against the sultan himself. Often the family of a shīr and that of the powerful Muslim landlord (zamīndar) class would join forces through marriage, thereby further buoying the pir’s power and influence. Even under the Mughals, emperors from Jahangir to Aurengzeb continued to employ the mostly effective “payoff” tactic, granting these regionally influential divines cash, lands, and imperial authority, all in an attempt to influence the politically powerful pirs—and keep them in line; the pirs had a history, after all, of organizing revolts against the emperor (like the Pathan pir Roshan’s anti-Akbarian rebellion). Thus the supreme temporal ruler and this host of lesser spiritual ones played a delicate game for political control.

During this long period of predominantly “Muslim” rule in north Hindustan, the ‘alūma generally provided religious legitimization to the Muslim ruler, whether or not the ruler in question actually strove for piety. Often dependent upon the state for their
livelihood—indeed, as a class of veritable spiritual courtesans—the ‘alma remained generally loyal to the sultan under whom they lived. For his part, the sultan—even if he generally favored the Sufis over the ‘alma whenever the two found themselves at odds—respected the scholars as a means of consolidating his own power over the Muslim elite and the army, over whom the ‘alma held much sway. Despite numerous rebellions, on numerous grounds, against kings and rulers from Morocco to Bengal, “there is hardly any example available,” writes Mushir Haq, “of the uprising of the ‘alma against the ruler on the ground of his irreligious activities.” No, the religious scholars tended to need the court—and the plunder it gathered by threat of violence from its subjects—too much to raise a fracas over issues of religious legitimacy. “In Muslim history the [‘alma] generally remained loyal to the throne so long as the ruler professed to be a Muslim,” wrote M. Ahmad, “irrespective of the quality of his administration.” Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the majority of the ‘alma were associated in some way with state (with “the court, the ruling elite and the administration”). As long as the ruler acted in conformity with Islamic law, the ‘alma, according to Ahmad, “did not bother whether he was a despot or a tyrant or an unjust ruler.” When questions of justice (i.e. tyranny and/or despotism) threatened the unity of the ummat, the latter (unity) took precedence; indeed, Muhammad himself had exemplified this principle when he developed the concept of jihād to preserve internal unity among the Muslim tribes while still allowing for conquest and expansion externally. In short, if the ruler was a Muslim, that ruler could typically count on the ‘alma to support him, minor religious disagreements notwithstanding, for the sake of union. It is easy to see, then, how a “pattern of dependence on princes,” as Metcalf characterized it, naturally developed between the religious scholars and the court. This
being a general rule, there were, of course, several notable exceptions. Indeed, some of
the most eminent ‘āl‘ma in history were imprisoned or tortured for their opposition to
the ruler of the day. (Several foundational scholars of fiqh—Abu Hanifa [d. 767 AD],
Malik ibn Anas [d. 795 AD], Ahmed ibn Hanbal [d. 855 AD]—fall into this category.)

By and large, however, the ‘āl‘ma “were content with official careers” within the
political structure of the state.76

One result of this scholarly dependence on the court (apart from the Sufi-scholar
rivalry, aforementioned) was the development of a distinction between “other-worldly”
scholars (‘āl‘ma-e-axyrā, or those devoted to study for study’s sake, or for the sake of
the glory of God, with an eye towards the afterlife) and “worldly” scholars (‘āl‘ma-e-
dunia, i.e. those “professional” ‘‘alims who “preferred a worldly career”).77 Both the
Sufi/‘āl‘ma and the ‘āl‘ma-e-axyrā/’āl‘ma-e-dunia dynamics are relevant to the
Deobandi-Barelvi phenomenon that would emerge centuries later. This will, it is hoped,
become more obvious as the reader proceeds. At times, both schools have accused
members of the other of getting mired in “worldly” affairs unfit for the truly pious ‘alim
or shīx. Ahmad Riza Khan, the “founder” of Barelvislams, would himself level such an
accusation at the Deobandis, of whose anti-British machinations (including critical
involvement in the Khilafat Movement) he strongly disapproved. Meanwhile,
Deobandis have sought to defend their leaders as righteous men caught up in the
expediency of politics for the greater good, even as the Barelvi leaders mingled and
sided with the secular Aligarhs or even the British themselves (many Deobandis still
believe that Ahmad Riza was a British agent). These events and themes will be
presented at greater length in subsequent chapters.
Some scholars give the South Asian ‘alamä credit for enjoying “unchallengable authority” when it came to interpreting shari‘at (and therefore the “formulation of the policies of the realm”). One South Asian historian noted that “[no] ruler could ever defy the shari‘ah, or enforce any law that was repugnant to the shari‘ah”; in addition, the ‘alamä “had always resisted the attempts of rulers to deprive them of their legislative veto power.”78 Though this is probably an exaggeration, it nevertheless underscores the important political role played by the Islamic jurist-theologians within the “Muslim” Indian state. The religious scholars more or less maintained this position into the early Mughal period (indeed, some of the ‘alamä from the Lodi dynasty were kept on by the new Central Asian dynasty).

But such status wasn’t to last.

**The Mughal State.**

The first Mughal ruler, Babur, defeated the last Delhi Sultan in 1526/932, ushering in the last major era of “Muslim” rule. But it wasn’t until Babur’s grandson, Akbar, consolidated power as the third Mughal emperor that the dynasty truly established itself as a durable polity with staying power on the subcontinent. And it was under Akbar that the position of the ‘alamä was to change substantially, and not in the scholars’ favor. It should be remembered, however, that for the first phase of Akbar’s long reign, the ‘alamä, ironically, may have enjoyed more power than ever before. Indeed, the young shahanshah likely started out as an orthodox Muslim, and he appears to have shown great (even exceptional) respect for the religious scholars in his court. “For some time,” Al-Badauni recorded, “the Emperor had so great faith in [his Sadr ul-Sudur] as a religious leader that he would bring him his shoes and place them before
his feet,” before listening to the ‘al‘ym expound upon the life and teachings of Muhammad. This particular scholar, Abdul Nabi, had earlier “abandoned” the Sufi traditions of his fathers for the “rule of the traditionalists,” demonstrating, again, the dichotomy between the two. It is noteworthy that Akbar would appoint such a man as his Sadr ul-Sudur, seemingly bespeaking a traditionalist bent of his own. The traditionalist-Sufi schism, though certainly not an exact Deobandi-Barelvi match, nevertheless reveals the early rumblings of both schools’ emergences. In any case, the appointment of Abdul Nabi came in 1565/972, when the Mughal ruler was still in his early twenties; he was yet to develop the religious positions for which he would be long remembered. Surely Abdul Nabi did not foresee the transformation that would occur, especially considering that, for a time, this venerable scholar was considered “so powerful” that “never was there in the reign of any monarch” a Sadr ul-Sudur his political equal.79

Whatever Abdul Nabi’s own qualities (whether personal and academic), however, over time Akbar developed a severe disenchantment for what he considered the “arrogance, petty-mindedness, intolerance and mutual rivalries” of the ‘al‘yms at court.80 Badauni concurred, describing them as “time-serving muftis and stirrers up of strife.” Akbar appears to have both lost patience with their wrangling over the meaning of Islamic law and felt tied down by the seemingly constant reliance on their juridical opinions. “Why do you not free me from dependence on these mullahs?” he reportedly entreated one prominent advisor. And “at last,” Badauni lamented, “owing to the disagreements of [Abdul Nabi] and all the other ill-dispositioned [‘al‘ma] the Emperor’s opinion of him changed completely.” The situation inspired the historian to compose the couplet,
All those who see for pride
Of place are fools,
Aye, those who style
Themselves the ‘aloma.

Subsequently the ‘aloma were commanded to gather together, many “against their will,” and “forcibly seized and compelled” to attest to an imperial decree “affirming the religious supremacy of the Emperor”—including “his superiority to all ecclesiastical dignitaries.” Both Akbar’s Sadr ul-Sudur and his shix ul-yslam were so disgraced that they followed the assembly and attestation with long pilgrimages to Mecca. One not-so-impartial turn-of-the-twentieth-century German academic would characterize the display as part and parcel to the emperor’s more general “struggle against the most destructive power in his kingdom, against the Mohammedan priesthood.” The jurist-theologians would never regain the prestige and influence they had once enjoyed within the state apparatus.

Some Muslim historians have attempted to explain the politico-religious aberration that was the Akbarian period by blaming it on the emperor’s upbringing. He had, after all, spent his childhood in Kabul in the care of an uncle, where, we are informed, “no religious teaching was arranged for him.” After assuming the title of badshah as a young teenager and then, at eighteen, finally taking the reigns of power, he spent much of his early reign on military expeditions. He was thus “deprived of knowledge and a religious education.” Others have asserted that Akbar’s turn from orthodox Islam was politically motivated—meant to shore up Hindu (especially Rajput) support against his chief
political rivals, the (Muslim) Pathans. Whether or not there is merit to these arguments, one phenomenon that was at the center of the emperor’s spiritual transformation was his deep personal admiration for the more mystical strains of the faith (and, eventually, even for the divines of other faiths). What he saw as the narrow-mindedness of the court scholars had sowed doubt in his mind, at least as it pertained to their traditionalist, orthodox path; he allegedly “would pass entire nights sitting out of doors on a stone,” so tormented was he about his ‘al taşı dilemma. Not so with the pirs. With “regularity,” he made “yearly” pilgrimages to the graves of Muslim saints—and in battle, he would vow to make a pilgrimage to a certain shrine if victory could be achieved. The great emperor was said to have once walked two hundred miles, from Fatehpur Sikri to Ajmer, as a show of gratitude towards a pir for the birth of his son Selim (later the emperor Jahangir). It was during Akbar’s reign, too, that Baqibillah (d. 1603 AD), who is credited with introducing the Naqshbandi Sufi order into India, arrived on the subcontinent, eventually initiating several of the emperor’s military leaders and courtiers into the order.

Among the “great” Mughal rulers, Akbar’s reign was thus marked by a sharp decline in the influence of the ‘al tas—who and his son and successor, Jahangir, inherited the political structure that Akbar had built (one in which the scholars played little direct role). Unwittingly, perhaps, Akbar’s downgrading of the scholars’ importance in favor of Sufi pirs and others naturally exacerbated the rivalry between the two, as the demoting of any previous recipient of government preference is wont to do. Though Jahangir was not particularly religious personally, his reign did allow for some scholarly influence on the state, albeit indirectly—a phenomenon that had all but vanished under his father. The influence of Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624 AD), for example,
may have been particularly significant. It should be noted that Sirhindi, a disciple of
Baqibillah, is perhaps most accurately described as a Naqshbandi Sufi (though he’d
received training in the Suhrawardy, Qadiri, and Chishti paths as well) first, and as an
‘alym second, well-known in his day for his opposition to the “peace above all” policy of
Akbar. The author of hundreds of letters, many of them written to the Mughal ruler,
Sirhindi is often credited with almost single-handedly steering South Asian Islam back
into orthodoxy, thereby “saving” it from falling victim to the syncretistic milieu of
Indian religious philosophy. It is through the Sirhindi line (the “Mujaddidi” branch,
which subsequently spread from South Asia into Central Asia and the Middle East) of
the Naqshbandi order, established partly in opposition to Akbar’s religious policies,85
that such future South Asian Muslim luminaries as Shah Waliullah, ṣuyyid Ahmad of
Raebareli, ʿUbaidullah Sindhi, and virtually all of the founding fathers of Deobandism
(as well as many Barelvi guiding lights), trace their spiritual lineages. It might be
argued that the tradition that he established (or at least shored up) of scholarly
opposition to a regime’s perceived unorthodoxy continues to run strong as of the time
of this writing, especially as far as the Deobandis are concerned within the political
context of Pakistan. In any case, Ahmad Sirhindi’s efforts did not save him from prison,
where Jahangir eventually threw him; the scholar-Sufi died shortly after his release.
But in the day-to-day affairs of state, such influence was mild—and informal, in any
case. Still, after the Akbar aberration, the Mughal state under Jahangir regained much
of the “Islamic character” that it had once enjoyed—restoring, for example, the kalymah
to Mughal coinage (which Akbar had erased), and reinstituting the hyjrāt-based
calendar.86
Even under Shah Jahan, Jahangir’s more religious son, the scholars “did not have any say in the policies of administration”; the emperor’s relationship with the most eminent ‘alām of the time, one Abdul Hakim Sialkoti, was merely “one of distant patronage” (though, admittedly, he did have the man weighed in gold, and he did patronize the scholar’s literary talents). Still, modern Muslim historians tend to see Shah Jahan as a great ruler, for many of the usual reasons. He was pious—a practicing Muslim who observed fasts and regularly said prayers. He was a man who patronized the arts, particularly architecture; under him the Red Fort and jam’y masjid in Delhi and the Taj Mahal in Agra were all built, and the Agra Fort reconstructed. He governed “firmly,” leaving a legacy of “magnificence, justice, and prosperity,” to quote one Muslim scholar. He looked upon his subjects with a paternal eye, a contemporary chronicler informs us, ever striving for the welfare of peasants and ridding the land of criminals via harsh punishment. He successfully quelled rebellions, expanded the empire into much of the Deccan, and played the crusader in punishing the newly arrived Portuguese for their alleged Christian “depredations” against the local populace. “It can be fairly said,” a Pakistani scholar writes, “that [Shah Jahan] surpassed all the Mughal rulers in organization and public works and in protecting the life and home of the peasants and in suppressing profiteers, exploiters and tyrants.” Shah Jahan thus joins the ranks of the ideal Muslim rulers in the context of South Asia—and for centuries the magnificent structures he left behind would (and continue to?) whisper to the ‘alâma and others yearning for a return to Islamic political and cultural greatness.

Shah Jahan’s successor, Aurengzeb, is similarly looked to as an ideal type, despite the disparagement heaped upon his memory by western observers and historians over the centuries. Under this emperor, almost the entire subcontinent—indeed, more
territory than in any other South Asian regime from “the dawn of history to the rise of British power” (to quote Sarkar)—fell under the Mughal banner. Muslim historians insist that he “never shed unnecessary blood,” but was actually a model of piousness, administrative acumen (a trait dominating the first half of his rule), and military competence (a trait headlining the second half of his rule). He is described as having lived an austere private life (differentiating himself thereby from his predecessor Mughals, especially his father), as a “staunch” Muslim of the Sunni persuasion who endeavored to govern as befitted a true Muslim ruler. He successfully fought off pirates from Southeast Asia, settled eastern Bengal (Bang; this policy would have major historical consequences in coming centuries), and heroically battled (though ultimately without success) against the infidel Hindu Marathas. He went from “assured administrator” in the pomp of Delhi to “embattled old man” in the military camp of the Deccan, gradually assuming the role of “ascetic and sage, spending long hours in prayers, fasting, and copying the Holy Qu’ran.” Where many in the west see Aurengzeb as a battle-hardened symbol of intolerance (even incompetence), many Muslim historians insist he was “both a most able statesman and a subtle character” more than worthy of ideal Muslim ruler status.

Even though the door for the ‘alama to enjoy some limited role within government had re-opened slightly under Jahangir and Shah Jahan after the Akbarian low, it wasn’t until the reign of Aurengzeb, in the words of H. Khan “the most orthodox of the emperors,” that the jurist-theologians somewhat regained their “traditional” political role as a sort of Islamic council approving or rejecting policy based upon its compliance with shari’at. Still, this role was greatly curtailed by the emperor, upon whom the scholars enjoyed virtually no control nor significant sway. “No doubt [Aurengzeb]
made use of the [‘al oma],” A. Ahmad writes, “but there is no evidence that he ever allowed them to make use of him even in the slightest degree.”

Upon gaining the throne after defeating his rivals (including his much more religiously open-minded older brother), Aurengzeb—typically regarded as the last of the “great” Mughals (though his son Bahadur Shah probably deserves a place, too)—instituted a program of Islamization, attempting to rule strictly within the confines of Islamic law. This included the appointment of censors to keep public morals in check (in particular to restrain prostitution, drinking, and gambling), the abolition of non-şari’at-approved taxes, and even the forbidding of music at his court. One would assume the ‘al oma would have played a prominent role in this effort, but the emperor appears to have set at the task through the secular hierarchy of the state rather than through the religious scholars or the mosques. Things become a little clearer, perhaps, when one realizes that Aurengzeb’s Islamization included, as a major component, the re-introduction of jyziḥ—the traditional tax on non-Muslims; though apologists of this tax are quick to point out that the Mughal ruler’s sole purpose in this regard was “to allow non-Muslims to buy exemption from military service,” those non-Muslims forced by threat of violence to turn over a portion of their property to the state might have regarded it in a different light.

Regardless, it is easy to see why the institution and enforcement of the jyziḥ required the participation not of the scholars but of provincial and local officers of the state. The ‘al oma under Aurengzeb were used by him, and not vice-versa; when he needed his brothers dead, for example, the ‘al oma, “ever ready to oblige,” helped lend the murders religious sanctification. And though the ḥātawā-e-şalāmgiri, a collection of Islamic juridical statements with which the ‘al oma obviously played a vital role, was compiled under his patronage and by his order, the work bears his stamp as much as any
scholar’s; it was, in the words of one South Asian academic, “the theoretic crystallization of Aurengzeb’s theocratic policies.” Still, the emperor seemed to possess a great respect for the religious scholars, even if he didn’t accord them much in the way of political power; whenever the ‘alâma compiling the fûtazâ-e-âlâmãgiri entered his court, for example, Aurengzeb is reported to have arisen as a show of esteem.

But with Aurengzeb’s death and the subsequent decline of the “Muslim” empire in India (particularly following the short reign of his son, Bahadur Shah), new threats to the faith began to emerge in the sub-continent. Indeed, the 1700s/1100s were a watershed for Islam in South Asia. The crisis was interpreted both politically and spiritually. To the west, the newly emergent Sikh state threatened Mughal dominance, and to the south the Hindu Marathas were eating away at one-time Mughal territory at an alarming rate. All the while, pesky foreigners whose significance was not yet understood (in particular the French and the British) were beginning to make waves in the south and east. In addition, the ever-widening political vacuum of the once-mighty Mughal Empire was filling up with the fragmented polities of a multitude of “Muslim” states (independent in all but name, and sometimes that, too), threatening the unity of the ummât. As a result, a revivalist spirit began to manifest itself, based at first, perhaps predictably, in the waning old center of Delhi. Here the religious scholars, especially influenced by the Naqshbandi Sufi order, attempted to standardize correct religious practice and belief (for the ruling and religious elite, it should be noted) and reassert (or at least re-emphasize) the proper relationship, as they saw it, between the ‘alâma and the Muslim ruler. By the early eighteenth/twelfth century, Sunni scholar ‘Abd ur-Rahim (d. 1718 AD) had established a madrasah in Delhi, the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya, that would eventually play a vital role in India’s Muslim revivalist wave. This wave, in turn, would
spread to other Muslim lands, and provide a source to which later revivalists across the Islamic world could turn for guidance and inspiration. “Thus,” Weismann notes, “as political decay was faster and deeper in South Asia than in other parts of the Muslim world during the past several centuries, it was here that ideas of religious revival and reform were first conceived. When other Muslim countries followed suit, their men of religion could draw on the already available reformist ideas of their Indian counterparts.” Let us look, then, at the sources, as far as can be ascertained, of Weismann’s “ideas of religious revival and reform”—in particular those which the Deobandi and Barelvi schools claim as intellectual and spiritual forbears.

**The Waliullahi School.**

What made ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s Delhi madrasah unique, among other things, was its focus on original sources. To return to the original purity of the first generation of Muslims—and to avoid the pernicious dangers of accretion—knowledge by the ‘alma of the Qur’an and the sunnat was absolutely essential. ‘Abd ur-Rahim particularly emphasized the study of the latter. Between the Qur’an and the hadis, one could find the answers to life’s questions, great and small. Such renewal—for renewal was what it was, a striving to restore Islam to its initial spiritual (and, subsequently, political) glory—was nothing new; the faith had gone through periods of decline and renewal before. “Islam was always...being re-discovered after being neglected,” one twentieth-/fourteenth-century Muslim commentator opined. “…The sense of déjà-vu which permeates Muslim society is not so much a reliving as the recreating of the past.” Such a recreation was necessary, ‘Abd ur-Rahim insisted, if the Muslims of India hoped to witness a restoration of Muslim power. The problems facing the ummat were internal
ones, and the answer, as always, lay in the revelation of the Qur’an and the personal example and teachings of Muhammad. It was precisely because Muslims had looked elsewhere for answers—to the pagan traditions of their neighbors, to legalisms, to the false philosophies of men—that Indian Muslims found themselves in their present situation in the first place. Deobandi scholars would later point to the establishment of the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya as a major stepping-stone toward the “religious emancipation of Muslim India” (as well as the “breeding ground” of heroic mujahydn like Syed Ahmad and his followers, on whom more later).99

Foremost among the revivalist ‘alama in Delhi to be found at the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya was Shah Waliullah (d. 1762 AD), ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s son. Waliullah seems to have imbibed an appreciation for original sources both from his father as well as from his studies in Medina, a hub for hadis-research at the time.100 But in order to study the original sources, Shah Waliullah contended, one must be able to read and understand them. To this end, he bravely translated the Qur’an into the lingua franca of the time—Persian—despite the outcry of many of his fellow scholars. His sons would follow in his footsteps in this regard, translating the revelations into Urdu. This emphasis on original sources (called mengkaplat, or the transmitted [or traditional] disciplines) was important, for it would serve later as a major dividing line between Barelvis and Deobandis. Generally speaking, there are two types of Islamic learning to be imbibed at a Muslim seminary. First, there is the aforementioned mengkaplat, including commentaries (tafsir) on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (hadas), and jurisprudence (fycl). Second, there is the mquelat, or the rational disciplines. These include instruction in grammar, logic, philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy. Shah Waliullah considered this second type of Islamic learning (mquelat) potentially
confusing for students and instead emphasized the first (particularly the Qur’an and the ḥadīṣ, as previously mentioned). The Deobandis would follow suit, while the Barelvis would lean toward the maqṣūlat (plus fiqh), just as their spiritual predecessors (particularly the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group, about which more later) had before them. For his emphasis on and elaboration upon the idea that the Qur’an, ḥadīṣ, and shārī‘at were to be the definitive guides to Islamic practice and the attaining of knowledge, Shah Waliullah is regarded as the “spiritual and methodological successor” of Ahmad Sirhindi; both helped establish a means by which Sufism could be reconciled with a scholarly stress on the maḥnqulat (and fiqh).

To Shah Waliullah, maqṣūlat could never be anything more than a means by which to “provide rational proof” to “strengthen faith” in what one would learn studying the far more important maḥnqulat. As such, he did not advocate scrapping maqṣūlat altogether, but merely using it as a tool in the far more valuable study of maṇqulat. (He evidently hoped, too, that this synthesis might unite Muslims in the face of the Maratha onslaught; it wouldn’t be the last time scholarly revivalism failed in an attempt to unify Muslim “schools” in the face of common danger—indeed, to some this may be the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.)

Perhaps more importantly, Shah Waliullah propagated several powerful ideas vis-à-vis the ‘alāma and government. To more fully appreciate the context of Shah Waliullah’s ideas in this regard, however, one must understand the history that the revered ‘alām lived through. When Shah Waliullah was born, the empire of the Mughals, Aurengzeb at its head, was still vast and militarily mighty. But before he was even three years old—and in the final days of the emperor’s life—Mughal armies were already suffering humiliating defeats in the wake of the Maratha wave. Over the next
several decades, the losses—both military and territorial—continued to pile up.

Throughout his teens, too, Shah Waliullah would have watched anxiously as various claimants for the throne plotted, killed, and wrangled for power. Then, when he was thirty-four, Maratha forces finally reached the Mughal capital—and plundered it. Just two years later, in 1739/1152, the Persian conquistador Nadir Shah sacked the city, too, dealing what might be considered the deathblow to the once-hegemonic political entity founded by Babur over two centuries before. Henceforth if the Mughal “empire” extended beyond the city of Delhi itself, it did so in name only. “Not an earthen lamp is there where once did chandeliers glow,” lamented one eighteenth/twelfth-century Urdu poet on the desolation of once-mighty Delhi. To add insult to injury, in 1748/1161 the founder of the new Afghan dynasty, Ahmad Shah Abdali, raided Delhi, too. (Significantly for this narrative, Ahmad Shah later convinced a group of Ahmad Sirhindi’s descendants to relocate to Kabul, from where they firmly established the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi line in Afghanistan, enjoyed official patronage, and were granted land in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kohistan. The sūlah was able to gain something like pre-eminence among the Pathans of what is today southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, setting the stage for that people’s easy acceptance of Waliullahi revivalism and, later, Deobandism).104

It is easy to see, then, why at least one scholar has dubbed Shah Waliullah the “Thinker of Crisis.” At the very least, it places his political ideas in historical context. As shapers of Waliullah’s political philosophy should be added his time on pilgrimage to Mecca, where he likely mixed with such Muslim revolutionaries as Abdul Wahhab and, Deobandi historians insist, he “was inspired by a vision to replace the imperialist and corrupt administration [of “European imperialism” and “oriental rulers” alike] by
establishing a government based on principles of equality and justice.” For Shah Waliullah, the man who had seen the rapid and violent fall of a once-vast empire, two caliphates existed in the world. There was, first, the “outer caliphate” (xylafšt al-zahyr), ruled by a caliph or, under less ideal circumstances, a sultan or some other Muslim leader. Its purpose was practical: to maintain social order in the physical world. Second, there was the “inner caliphate” (xylafšt al-batin). This far more critical realm was presided over, crucially, by the ‘alōma. It was the task of these religious scholars to ensure that the sons of Adam and daughters of Eve conducted their lives “in harmony with God’s created nature.” Political decay didn’t occur in a vacuum; no, it was a direct result of corruption on the part of the guardian ‘alōma. Spiritual decay led to political decay. It followed, then, that in order to witness a return of “Muslim” political power in the physical world, the ‘alōma must lead the charge. After all, it must have been the scholars’ “neglect in performing their duties properly” that had brought about the decline in the “Muslim” political position in the first place. Shah Waliullah would identify some of these areas of neglect, pointing his finger at (among other alleged scholarly follies) opportunism, claiming a monopoly on truth, unjustified severity, misplaced intellectualism, and disunity.107

Little did he know, surely, that he was to be the “grandfather” of a whole host of revivalist Islamic movements that would crisscross the subcontinent and, eventually, much of the world, though he did consider himself “a champion of political Islam.”108 Notes one Muslim historian: “…Shah Walyullah appeared as the saviour of Muslim culture and religion,” “a great reformer of law, morals and politics” who “paved the way for the great Jihad movement against the Sikhs and later against the British rule.”109 His ideas on the role of the ‘alōma in the purification of the ummāt (including the
preservation of Islamic knowledge in times of crisis and the impartation of that knowledge within the community of the learned), the restoration of Muslim political greatness, and the maintenance of the Islamic state would be seized later by the Deobandis, not to mention a whole host of other movements. The dar ul’alwm at Deoband would later claim to be the “inheritor” of the “rich legacy” of Shah Waliullah;¹¹⁰ its scholars would even interpret the time of his birth—almost exactly one century after the advent of the British on the subcontinent—as a token signifying that his life was to be dedicated to “the purpose of opposing [the British].”¹¹¹

The great man’s spiritual successor was his son, Shah Abdul Aziz (d. 1824 AD), who, together with his brothers, studied, taught, and preached in Delhi, enlarging the Waliullahi school and serving students from all over India and Central Asia. In the tradition of their father and grandfather, Shah Abdul Aziz and his brothers stressed the study of hadis, and their translation of the Qur’an into Urdu has already been mentioned. But perhaps Shah Abdul Aziz’s greatest tool for disseminating knowledge and judgment based on shari’at was through the many fatwa that he authored. The translation of the Qur’an into Urdu and, especially, the issuance of fatwa in answer to the queries of the faithful marked a turning point in the relationship of the ‘aloma with the people. Heretofore the norm had been for juridical decisions to be issued within the context of the court (i.e. by a mufti for the benefit of a qazi, and all within the framework of the state, thereby excluding many issues of everyday concern for the masses), or at least to be asked, answered, and circulated among the learned; even Shah Waliullah had acted according to this standard. With Shah Abdul Aziz at the head of the Waliullahi school, however, scholarly knowledge and interest gained, in the words of Metcalf, a “more popular focus”—a perhaps not surprising development given the political and social
changes then taking place in India. The new British power was then engaged in what appeared to be a relentless swallowing up of “vast stretches of the Indian countryside.” In 1803/1218, Delhi fell in all but name when the British replaced the Marathas as protectors of the Mughal emperor. Over time, these aliens took over the government (and land revenues) and the courts, seemed to favor a rising Hindu business community over the old Muslim elite, allegedly wiped out the revenue-free grants enjoyed by Muslim religious institutions in Bengal, and disbanded local armies so that they might be replaced by British-trained forces. In the midst of such upheaval, Muslims of all classes appear to have increasingly turned in on themselves as a community—and the fatawa provided a means for preserving cultural identity and living religion in the absence of the state apparatus. Of course, by using fatawa in such a way, the ‘alâma had assumed the role of popular guide. This was somewhat new, and it was perhaps Shah Abdul Aziz’s most lasting legacy.\textsuperscript{112} Shah Abdul Aziz also inherited and further developed Shah Waliullah’s hostility towards the British, allegedly claiming that the foreigners would not be satisfied in merely “taking” the Muslim’s “world, but[\textsuperscript{113}] also seize [\textsuperscript{their}] religion” (italics added).

Muhammad Ishaq (d. 1846 AD), Shah Abdul Aziz’s grandson (from a daughter) and a master of hadis, oversaw a continued spread of Waliullah’s reform movement before relocating permanently to the Hijaz in the early 1840s/late 1250s.\textsuperscript{114} Before his departure, however, he instituted, according to ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, the agenda he had inherited from Shah Abdul Aziz. The general plan, evidently tracing back to Shah Waliullah, might be broken down (as Faruqi does) into two main parts: first, it called for the strict adherence of the ummat to the Hanafi school of Islamic law (necessitating, of course, a core social and political role for the ‘alâma). Second, it proposed an alliance,
however ambiguously defined, with the sultans of Ottoman Turkey. The first aspect of Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda dealt with the role and power of the ‘alma in South Asian Muslim society. The second carried implicitly anti-British (and pan-Islamic) meaning. Even the great man’s departure to the Hijaz, often depicted as a simple emigration to Islam’s “Holy Land,” was actually an attempt to establish contact with the Ottoman authorities; indeed, it was in Turkey that Muhammad Ishaq died in 1846/1262.115

But he left behind a remarkable circle of students—a core group whose actions would shape the destinies of millions of Muslims across South Asia. This group included Ishaq’s successor, Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi (d. 1878 AD), sayyid Nazir Muhaddis of Delhi (d. 1902 AD), Imdadullah (d. 1899 AD), and sayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli (d. 1831 AD). Along with this core group, Muhammad Ishaq’s associate and friend, Mamluk ‘Ali, would also play a pivotal role in coming events. Indeed, Mamluk ‘Ali had been left as the chairman of a four-person committee, organized by Muhammad Ishaq, to continue the propagation of his aforementioned agenda. It was in following Mamluk ‘Ali’s example, too, that the man’s distant nephew, one Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, journeyed to Delhi to pursue his education. In Delhi, Muhammad Qasim befriended a fellow pupil, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and together they studied under both Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi and Mamluk ‘Ali, among others. Under the latter they would adopt Muhammad Ishaq’s two-pronged program as their own and eventually institutionalize much of it within the school they would found in Deoband.116 They would also become xalif of Imdadullah (indeed, many among the dar ul’alum’s founding generation would count themselves his disciples), who himself had been Mamluk ‘Ali’s student, and who had similarly imbibed Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda therefrom.117
Another defining movement should be mentioned here: that of sayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli. Ahmad Khan, who was at least in part, as mentioned above, a product of the Waliullahi school, chose military jihād as his method of cleansing the subcontinent (in contrast to Shah Abdul Aziz’s gradualist emphasis on teaching, the dissemination of knowledge, and right practice; Deobandis insist, however, that Shah Abdul Aziz not only supported sayyid Ahmad, but personally encouraged and inspired him in his efforts as well). After years imbibing the teachings of scholars and shīhs in Delhi, gathering followers across northern India, and learning and teaching in Arabia, sayyid Ahmad set up a base of operations on India’s northwestern frontier with around a thousand fighters drawn from his tens of thousands of disciples.118 From here, he launched an ultimately unsuccessful jihād against the Sikh state of Ranjit Singh. Today Deobandi historians are quick to point out that sayyid Ahmad’s targeting of the Sikh polity in the Punjab was motivated first and foremost not by an animosity to the adherents of the faith of Guru Nanak at all; no, it was an anti-British move. Their contention is that Ranjit Singh had only been made “governor of the Punjab” with the consent of the British—and that his government had gone on to steal Muslim land, kill Muslim scholars, and rape Muslim women. This was why sayyid Ahmad had chosen to throw his jihādis against the Sikh state first—wholly motivated by a determination to “take steps against the British.”119

Ahmad’s exploits—first as a student under the Waliullah family, then as a cavalryman in the band of Amir Khan, then as a Sufi shīh (with both Waliullah’s fiery grandson Muhammad Ismail [d. 1831 AD] and Abdul Aziz’s son-in-law Abdul Hayy [d. 1828 AD] acknowledging him as their pir), then as a pan-Indian missionary, then as a haji, and finally as a jihād-waging mujahyd—are well-known. What may be less recognized is that sayyid Ahmad’s activist movement continued through his successor in
jihad, Nasiruddin Dihlawi (and others; see endnote after next paragraph), who would later initiate Imdadullah into his Sufi order. Thus it was through this Sufi line (ṣuyyid Ahmad—Nasiruddin—Imdadullah) that the two most prominent founders of the Deoband school, Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, themselves traced their spiritual lineages. In addition, several of the dar ul’alwm’s founding figures boasted relatives who had fought with ṣuyyid Ahmad on the frontier. Over the last century-and-a-half, prominent Deobandis have continued to invoke the memory of ṣuyyid Ahmad (for one especially obvious example, see pp. 408-409). In addition to this first “genealogical” line to the Deobandis, ṣuyyid Ahmad was able to establish, during his time in the northwest, a second line: through the very powerful Akhund of Swat, Abdul Ghaffur. The latter took to the Waliullahi emphasis on mawqelat and extra-dorgah religious practice and generally helped spread the great Delhi ‘alym’s revivalist ideas among his people, where they were warmly received. Thus ṣuyyid Ahmad of Raebareli, thanks in large part to his association with Akhund Ghaffur, was able to lay the groundwork for the future dominance of the Deobandi school of thought among the Pathans (especially among the eastern tribes) of northwestern Pakistan and, later, southern Afghanistan.

ṣuyyid Ahmad’s headquarters in the northwest were at Sittana (about three miles northwest of present-day Haripur in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province—and now completely covered by the Indus-fed waters of the great Tarbela Dam). After his death in battle in 1831/1246, two of his disciples (who’d survived because they’d been sent to Kashmir on a diplomatic mission) continued the Sittana-based jihad movement to destroy the unbelievers and establish a true Islamic state. The first of these disciples was Qasim Panipati, who went on to fuel the idea that ṣuyyid Ahmad had not, in fact,
perished—but had been preserved by God and would return; this inspired many of his followers (particularly in Patna, an erstwhile base on the plains) to make the long journey to Sittana, where Qasim Panipati was engaged in organizing a regrouped military force. The second disciple was none other than Nasiruddin, mentioned previously as әyyid Ahmad’s successor (and through whom the Deobandi fathers trace their spiritual lineages); instead of remaining at Sittana, he traveled back to the plains and in 1835/1250 led another force against the Sikhs. This force was waylaid for six years in Sindh, however, only to answer a call by the Afghans for assistance in their struggle against the British; about fifty survived the fighting—and these were all executed by the puppet king installed by the British in Afghanistan, Shuja Shah.

Meanwhile, a council of sorts in Patna, initially led by one Shah Muhammad Husain, continued to run operations from the plains, recruiting fighters and clandestinely sending supplies and cash for the camp at Sittana. For decades, the Sittana group (or “Hindustani Fanatics,” as they were known by some of the locals and the British; the latter also simply referred to them, erroneously, as “Wahhabis”), with assistance from the Patna group, continued to wage war from the frontier. The movement would later play a prominent role in the British debacle at Ambeyla Pass and be linked to various assassinations and assassination attempts. The legacy of әyyid Ahmad within the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should not be sidelined, as it injected into Deobandism’s very roots the active spirit of ʿjihad and initiated a tradition of militarism based in the subcontinent’s Pathan northwest.
The Farangi Mahalis and the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group.

Around the same time Shah Waliullah was active in Delhi, another movement was taking root to the east, in Lucknow (the capital of Awadh, an ascendant successor state to the Mughal polity). Here the 'alma of Farangi Mahal, under the leadership of Abdul 'Ali (respectfully known as bhar ul'alwem, or “Ocean of Knowledge”), similarly strove to preserve religious learning in an era of waning patronage, at the same time mirroring their Delhi contemporaries’ efforts at emphasizing the proper relationship between the religious scholars and the temporal ruler. A crucial difference in the Farangi Mahalis’ approach, however, was their emphasis, not on māqālát, but on māqālāt; indeed, Shah Abdul Aziz would criticize the Farangi Mahalis for their perceived ignorance when it came to the Qur'an and hadīs, alleging that their time was misguidedly engaged instead in the study of such free-thinking philosophers as Ibn 'Arabi and al-Razi. The māqālāt emphasis was especially marked in the Farangi Mahalis’ creation of the dōrs-e-nyżami, a standardized curriculum that underscored the rational disciplines (in order to prepare students to be administrators within the state apparatus, argues Robinson). An important 'alym named Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (d. 1861 AD) later adopted the Farangi Mahali emphasis on māqālāt, as opposed to Shah Waliullah’s emphasis on the original sources like the Qur’an or hadīs. (The Deobandis would later adopt the Farangi Mahali dōrs-e-nyżami, too, but would greatly augment its hadīs offerings.) And perhaps no other family in northern India, apart from the Farangi Mahalis, had a greater impact on the spread of this emphasis than the Khairabadis. A third family, that of the Badayunis, might justly be combined with the latter and more accurately be identified as the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group. By the second half of the 1800s/1200s the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group had distanced itself significantly from the Delhi scholars, thus laying
the groundwork for the future Barelvi-Deobandi schism. While Shah Waliullah’s espousal of *mawqulat* would be taken up later by the Deobandis, then, the Barelvis’ emphasis, following the example of the Lucknow scholars and the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group, fell upon the *mawqulat*. (In truth, these emphases, highlighted significantly by modern scholars, may have been less important than the more base rivalry between different scholar-groups over power and influence, certainly not an uncommon phenomenon within the domains of both academia and theology. In any case, the split and subsequent coalescence around these two groups set the stage for the more pronounced Deobandi-Barelvi schism of the next generation.)

Both of these phenomena—the establishment of the Waliullahi School in Delhi and the Farangi Mahals in Lucknow (then that of the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group offshoot from the latter)—not only signaled a type of regenerative effort, but also bore witness of the role the religious leadership, and particularly the *ʿaloma*, potentially could play even without the patronage of princes, kings, and emperors. It should be noted that there yet remained a few enclaves of Muslim power on the subcontinent where religious scholars might obtain direct patronage, like the courts at Awadh, Rampur, and Kabul. And while opportunities for employment in the courts on the plains would mostly shrivel up by the mid-nineteenth century AD, the *madrassas*-trained *qazis* among the Pathans of the northwest continued to find patronage within the Afghan state into the twentieth.

While the *ʿaloma* in the cities, near the seats of fading power, strove for renewal, the landed Sufi *pirs*, based around the shrines, also asserted themselves politically; for them the struggle was against local leaders who no longer enjoyed the protection of the fading Mughal empire. This rise in local political power and influence naturally propped up their own religious authority as spiritual guides. Picking up where their
predecessors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD had left off, these Sufi masha'y x grasped political power as soon as it became available in the absence of imperial authority. The religious scholarship in the cities and towns thus occurred at the same time as the renewal of the political power of the pirs rurally. In the northwest, for example, among the Pathan tribes of what is today southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the pirs became especially powerful. Among the western Pathans, the pirs continued to be used, by virtue of their socio-religious (not to mention political) position on the regional level, within the framework of the Afghan state; and in a sort of feudal arrangement, the Kabul court even paid some of the pirs among the eastern Pathans (technically located outside of the geographical boundaries of the king’s practical, temporal authority) in exchange for their contribution of fighting men when called upon. Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and some of the twentieth centuries AD, pirs were used by the Afghan state for a wide variety of purposes, from mobilizing opposition to Chinese incursions into Turkestan in the 1700s/1100s and establishing a standardized legal code for the country in the 1800s/1200s to creating and enforcing law at the local level and recording births, marriages, and deaths as official registrars. In the 1830s/1240s-1250s, for example, Afghan ruler Dost Muhammad called upon Abdul Ghaffur (later famously known as the previously mentioned Akhund of Swat) to help recruit soldiers to fight in his war against the Sikhs of the Punjab. In this the latter was successful and was, in turn, granted large tracts of land. But by the late 1840s/mid-1260s the Akhund of Swat had established his own independent Islamic state in the Swat valley, propping up his chosen amir (Akbar Shah, who had acted as a secretary to sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli) for almost a decade before, upon the amir’s passing, he personally took over command.128 And though, by the early
twentieth century AD, the Afghan state from the west had begun to significantly encroach upon these local religious leaders’ political sway (especially during the reign of Abdur Rehman [r. 1879-1901 AD], when Afghanistan experienced a major increase in centralization and bureaucratization), not to mention the ever-encroaching British from the east, the pirs continued to wield considerable power.129

It is perhaps easy to see, then, how Barelvisim, born of a Khairabadi-Badayuni tradition less focused on the puritan revialist study of the Qur’an and hadis, would (generally speaking) eventually envelop the more syncretist Sufi pirs of South Asia (with rare, Akhund of Swat-esque exceptions, of course), too, in opposition to the orthodox, mawlawat-focused Deobandis.

*Shi’a Inroads in South Asia.*

Another look at Awadh is warranted here. Like Bengal, Awadh was *de facto* independent by the early eighteenth century AD. Though most of its Muslims, like the Farangi Mahalis, were Sunni, its rulers were not—they adhered, rather, to Shi’a Islam (as did Bengal’s, for a time). Throughout the century in question, Shi’a *`aloma* from what is now Iran and Iraq migrated to Awadh, fleeing the instability then rocking Central Asia and the Middle East. Safavid Iran—where the government had been their patron, lavishing a monetary endowment upon the *`aloma* and enforcing sectarian favoritism by the barrel of the gun—had fallen, and uncertainty plagued many Shi’a scholars in Iraq’s shrine cities, too. The result for Awadh, where Shi’a Islam was the state religion, was what one scholar has described as a “constant influx” of Shi’a *`aloma* to the court and the region at large.130 The Awadhi state would decline rapidly by the end of the century, but the influence of the Shi’ism that it helped more firmly establish
in South Asia would live on, with major consequences. In the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, the presence of a significant population of Shi’a on the subcontinent always gave the two schools a “bigger fish to fry,” so to speak; Deobandi thinkers from Muhammad Qasim to Ashraf’Ali Thanawi and Barelvi guiding lights like Ahmad Riza Khan and Naimuddin Moradabadi saved their sharpest barbs, perhaps, for this particular sect (one might argue that this specific designation should be attributed not to the Shi’a but rather to the Ahmadis, but that is another discussion). The presence of millions of Shi’a contributed, too (after the Iranian Revolution of 1979/1399), to the organization of militant (mostly Deobandi) anti-Shi’a outfits—groups that would subsequently set their sights on Barelvis, too.

_The ‘aloma, the mashayx, and 1857/1273._

The half-century following the Company takeover of Delhi witnessed the rapid consolidation of British power on the subcontinent and the fall of the last mighty indigenous kingdoms to these foreign invaders. The Marathas fell in 1818/1233, Sindh was taken in 1843/1259, and by 1849/1265 even the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab had fallen under the Company’s banner. With these victories came a decreased need to rely on local alliances—with the result that the British absorbed some of this territory, too, sometimes in violation of treaty arrangements. The British annexation of Awadh in 1856/1272 was a particularly grievous act in the eyes of many Indians. One contemporary Muslim witness remembered, for example, that this move on the part of the Company “was a cause of dissatisfaction to everybody, and gave rise to a general conviction that the Honorable East India Company had violated treaties” (though this particular commentator did not believe the Awadh annexation was itself a root cause of
the following year’s “revolt”). The annexation would have been especially difficult to swallow for Muslims, since Awadh’s government, as mentioned previously, was a Muslim one. One third of the Bengal army—among whom the 1857/1273 uprising fiercely manifested itself—actually hailed from Awadh. Such dominance, augmented by what were seen as flagrant violations of the Company’s legal obligations, “loosed,” in the words of Stein, “a deepening anxiety at the core of Indian civil society.” These military and political triumphs were coupled with what many Hindustanis regarded as British arrogance, as missionaries, administrators, traders, and soldiers seemed to be attempting to make Englishmen out of Indians. There was also an undercurrent of resentment among both the Indian peasantry and the alienated landed gentry over the new British system’s perceived facilitation of the “unmitigated usury” of a new class of moneylenders (dubbed bøndia ka raj, or “rule of moneylender-traders”). Indeed, almost a century later Jawaharlal Nehru would trace the very “beginnings of the new Hindu-Muslim problem” to the loss of land and position in Bengal by the Muslim landed gentry to a mostly Hindu monied and business class in the years after Company rule had been established there. Similarly, Faruqi blamed the “uneven and unbalanced development” of Hindu and Muslim middle classes, beginning in Bengal (i.e. the growth of a Hindu middle class concurrent with “the absence of the growth” of a Muslim one). Perhaps the verse of renowned Urdu poet Mir Taqi Mir, writing in the 1700s AD, could have applied equally in the minds of many Muslims a century later: “men of means and money have joined the beggars’ fold.” Thus there was room by 1857/1273 for discontent on all sides—but, the argument could be made, especially from within the Muslim camp.
The conflict came to a head in 1857/1273, when many of the sepoys—the backbone of British power on the subcontinent—revolted, followed by a general civil uprising that spread to much of India (though mostly in the north) and lasted into 1858/1274. For a time the revolt looked like it would succeed—and the British would be pushed out of India forever. In the end (and after the loss of much life), the “Mutiny” was unsuccessful, thanks in large part to the Company’s local allies. After the uprising (or, according to Indian nationalists, India’s “first war of independence”) was over, both the British and their Indian subordinates began looking for answers. One result of the failed rebellion was that the Mughal line was finally severed, its last emperor, an old man, shipped off to a Burmese prison, and his sons murdered. Another was that Company rule in India ended, as the responsibility for the administration of the subcontinent was shifted directly to the Crown. (In many ways East India Company rule had been indirectly administered by the Crown, too—a point all too often forgotten—but now the Company had been removed from the political landscape altogether.)

The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is in part characterized by a contest over the memory of 1857-1858/1273-1274. Both schools lay claim to having played a major—even leading—role in the uprising, despite the haziness of the historical evidence or the misgivings of Western scholars. Historians from both traditions proudly proclaim that “the historic revolt of 1857 was led by the ‘aloma,” though they argue over which ‘aloma played leading roles. The Barelvis single out “their” political and spiritual “forefathers,” particularly Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Fazl-e-Rasul Badayuni, and even Riza ‘Ali, as heroes of the period (and, in the case of Khairabadi, as the leader and chief instigator of the revolt itself). Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged actions
of those whom they consider their political and spiritual forebears, especially Imdadullah (though Barelvis, significantly, today claim that he was “one of ours,” and that it was his two students who went astray), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi. The idea that a jihād had been proclaimed against the British by the spiritual leaders of South Asia’s Muslim community held sway for some time after the Mutiny had been suppressed (and still does, among both Barelvi and Deobandi historians), especially in the weeks and months immediately following the fighting. Both traditions, however, consider the same fāṭwa to mark the beginning of the 1857/1273 “war of independence”: that of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi.

But there was another fāṭwa, issued a half-century earlier, that is likewise important in this regard, and it is here that we must begin. Indeed, some scholars have identified the seeds of 1857/1273 in this 1803/1218 fāṭwa issued by Shah Abdul Aziz, in which Shah Waliullah’s son characterizes north India as no longer dar ul-ḥisn:

> In this city [Delhi] the Imam al-Muslimin wields no authority. The real power rests with Christian officers. There is no check on them, and the promulgation of the commands of [disbelievers] means that in administration and justice, in matters of law and order, in the domain of trade, finance, and collection of revenues—everywhere the [disbelievers] are in power. Yes, there are certain Islamic rituals, e.g. Friday and Id prayers, azan [the call to prayer] and cow slaughter, with which they brook no interference, but the very root of all these rituals is of no value to them. They demolish mosques without the least hesitation, and no Muslim or any ḍhimmi [“dhimmi”] can enter into the city or its suburbs but
with their permission. It is in their own interests if they do not object to the travelers and traders to visit the city. On the other hand, distinguished persons like Shuja ul-Mulk and Vilayati Begum cannot dare visit the city without their permission. From here to Calcutta, the Christians are in complete control. There is no doubt that in principalities like Hyderabad, Rampur, Lucknow, etc., they have left the administration in the hands of the local authorities, but it is because they have accepted their lordship and submitted to their authority…¹³⁸

Faruqi describes this ʿfātwa as “a landmark in the history of India in general and in that of Muslim India in particular. It amounted to a call to religously conscientious Muslims to mobilize themselves, in the absence of any powerful Muslim warlord, under popular leadership and rise in defiance of the foreign power.”¹³⁹ Deobandi historians of today likewise place great emphasis on this particular juridical pronouncement, attributing many later movements (from ʿayyid Ahmad’s “Balakot Movement” and the 1857/1273 Mutiny to the Silk Letters Conspiracy and the anti-British independence movement in general) to Shah Abdul Aziz’s ʿfātwa.¹⁴⁰ But later scholars have argued that a stance like Faruqi’s erroneously places the ʿfātwa’s initiative too decidedly at Shah Abdul Aziz’s feet. In reality, they contend, the learned ʿalim was merely responding to a question, in the manner of a ʿmufti, not making a statement originating with himself. Others disagree for a different reason: that the ʿfātwa being issued during this period were actually “ambiguous” when it came to India’s political status; their purpose was to help people live righteous lives despite the less-than-ideal circumstances then extant on the subcontinent, and thus Shah Abdul Aziz’s 1803/1218 ʿfātwa must be read in context.
Moreover, if he had been calling for war, would he not have identified a neighboring Muslim state from which *jihad* should be launched (or a Muslim ruler to whom the faithful might swear political allegiance), as Muslim law required? A third argument posits that Shah Abdul Aziz’s *futwa* was actually written so that Muslims, many of whom were suffering in terms of livelihood, could gain in that sphere, for many of the economic restrictions by which the *ummah* was expected to abide within a condition of *dar ul-yslam* (prohibitions related to employment, interest earnings, and slavery, for example) were lifted within *dar ul-harb*. 141

Whatever the ‘alym’s intentions, the *futwa* makes evident that, at least for Shah Abdul Aziz—one of the most powerful and influential of the ‘ulama’ in the world at the time—the British presence was more than just a serious concern; it was to be regarded as a call to action. The *futwa* is especially thick with expressions lamenting the loss of Muslim political power—indeed, on almost every line; though Shah Abdul Aziz acknowledges Muslim freedom to carry out worship and ritual, political “control” has been wrested from the faithful in every meaningful respect. Political power was the issue. Though the *futwa* may not be Faruqi’s “watershed,” it certainly merits attention as a gauge, so to speak, on the attitude of arguably the most influential ‘alym (particularly in terms of the movements he inspired) in Indian history. Perhaps most importantly, many Muslim historians (and especially those of the Deoband school) trace the beginning of India’s “freedom struggle” directly to the 1803/1218 Azizi *futwa* (and, consequently, interpret the *jihad* of sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli almost thirty years before the Mutiny as the first attempt to execute Shah Abdul Aziz’s edict). 142 Other Muslim-led uprisings (of the Faraizis in Bengal in 1804/1219, by the soldiers at Vellore in
1806/1221, of the Faraizis again throughout the 1830s and 40s AD) were similarly interpreted.143

Company employee (and later Sir) Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in his 1860/1276 essay *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, rejected the notion that a call for jyhad had played any serious role in the uprising of 1857/1273, even resurrecting the memory of the famous mujahyd Muhammad Ismail (the grandson of Shah Waliullah and the chief lieutenant of sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli). Sir Sayyid’s argument was that when Muhammad Ismail had called for volunteers to wage jyhad, it hadn’t been to fight the Christian foreigners from the British Isles—no, it had been to destroy the Sikh state in the Punjab. (Many Barelvis go one step further, insisting that, far from being anti-British mujahydin, sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and Muhammad Ismail were actually working for the British; the same accusation is directed later towards both Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, who “from the start” actually “fought for the British” as agents of the Empire).144 If jyhad against the British-led government hadn’t been lawful then, Sir Sayyid posited, why would it suddenly be so now? Later Deobandi historians, however, would themselves insist that this was not the case—that, in fact, Shah Abdul Aziz himself had requested that sayyid Ahmad join forces with ‘Ali Khan (who had allied with Maharaja Jaswant Rao) to fight against the British. It was only six years later, after ‘Ali Khan’s plans to come to an agreement with the British were uncovered, that sayyid Ahmad split with the bandit chief. His subsequent jyhad against the Sikhs should not be disassociated with the struggle against the British either, for, we are informed, the Sikh state was itself “an ally of British imperialism.”145 Whatever the truth of the matter, Sir Sayyid’s 1860/1276 tract confirms that, at least after the revolt had already begun, “certain wicked persons” used the call to jyhad to rile up “ignorant people”—with the
result that “large numbers” answered. In other words, *jihad actually did* motivate a significant number in northern India to war against the Company, even if it hadn’t been one of the initial causes of the revolt (and even if Sir Sayyid himself was loathe to admit it). Deobandi historians claim that a quarter of all those killed by Company forces during the course of the revolt were ‘*alāma* (the figure given is 51,200)—and that five hundred ‘*alāma* were hanged in Delhi alone.¹⁴⁶

Even in the face of these debates over the role of a *fātwa* calling for *jihad* in the Revolt of 1857/1273, the Barelvis unstintingly point to the *fātwa* of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (as do the Deobandis, though for different reasons) as the uprising’s true commencement. Fazl-e-Haq allegedly played the leading role in the issuance of this *fātwa* calling for *jihad* against the British. Almost three dozen Islamic scholars and Sufis in Delhi affixed their names to this famous ruling, including several of the Deobandi founding fathers (hence its importance to them). Almost a century later, during the 1940s/1360s—at the height of pre-Partition nationalist politics in India—many within the Barelvi leadership began to publicly trace “their” role in the independence movement to the *fātwa* of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (“Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi was [a Barelvi],” one ‘*ālim* of the Barelvis’ largest Indian madrasah informed the author, handling a copy of Fazl-e-Haq’s famous autobiography *bagi* *hindustan*, required reading for hundreds of the school’s students). There are multiple problems with this, not least of which lies in the fact that Fazl-e-Haq was, at the time, in the employ of the British (the East India Company) and, reportedly, “had hardly any sympathy for the freedom fighters.”¹⁴⁷ In any case, Barelvi recollection of Fazl-e-Haq’s judgment clearly illustrates the movement’s *preferred* political pedigree, whatever its historical accuracy.
Intellectually and philosophically, however, Fazl-e-Haq should certainly be considered a forefather of the Barelvi movement, for several reasons. First, he was perhaps the strongest critic of the “Wahhabis” during his lifetime (sometimes applying the term to men whom the Deobandis revere as their intellectual and spiritual forbears), a role Barelvis would later see themselves as assuming (and often they, too, would label Deobandis “Wahhabis”). Second, he had famously written much against the idea of ymkan-e-nażir (the possibility that God could create, if He so wished, another prophet equal to Muhammad; his own position he called ymtina’e-nażir: “the impossibility of an equal”), in opposition, again, to scholars that Deobandis would later consider their own religious forefathers (specifically Muhammad Ismail). Decades later, when the debate heated up once again, Fazl-e-Haq’s ideas were taken up and given voice by Ahmad Riza Khan’s father. Ahmad Riza was in turn influenced by his father as he, too, adopted more or less the same position on the matter. After the quelling of the “Mutiny,” Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi was arrested by the British, put on trial (famously) in Lucknow, and sent to prison on the Andaman Islands, where he died.

It should be noted that while many Western, Barelvi, and even some Deobandi scholars credit Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi as the chief instigator of the fatwa against the British in 1857/1273, others point to Deobandi predecessor Shah Abdul Qadir Ludhianvi, who had been serving as Shahi Imam of the Punjab since 1800/1215. According to these voices, it was the venerable mowlana out of Ludhiana who was actually the first to issue a fatwa in 1857/1273 against the Company Bahadur. And Shah Abdul Qadir Ludhianvi was no stranger when it came to anti-British machinations, either; he’d previously been involved in efforts to rid Afghanistan of the British presence, and several past Afghan rulers could be counted as his personal
disciples. To this day, his descendants insist that he not only issued a juridical ruling against the British before Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, but actually led the fighting in and around Ludhiana against the European menace, successfully driving the foreigners out of the city and holding it for a considerable period. An engraving on the side of the mosque in old Ludhiana, erected in the 1890s/1310s, bears an inscription celebrating his deeds, including, among other things, the following: “He led the forces in the Punjab for the freedom movement in 1857. British troops were forced out from Ludhiana. He is remembered as one of the greatest freedom fighters.” His successor’s successor’s successor: Habib-ur Rehman Ludhianvi, one of the most renowned Deobandi “freedom fighters” in the years leading up to independence (about whom more later).\footnote{150}

Alongside the towering figure of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Barelvis remember Fazl-e-Rasul Badayuni—and even Barelvi founder Ahmad Riza Khan’s own grandfather, Riza ‘Ali Khan, is spoken of in terms of 1857/1273 and its aftermath. According to one story, told by Zafaruddin Bihari, despite the “atrocities” being perpetrated by the British in the aftermath of the “Mutiny,” unlike so many others Riza ‘Ali refused to abandon his home for “the village”; the same applied to his daily routine, which involved prayer five times a day at the local \textit{mosjid}. Bihari notes that one day several Englishmen showed up at the mosque with the intent to “beat up” (\textit{pyTna}) any Muslims they found there. When they looked inside, peering “this way and that,” they saw nothing but an empty room, despite the fact that Riza ‘Ali was there, engaged in prayer, at the same time. God had thus made Ahmad Raza Khan’s grandfather invisible to his would-be attackers.\footnote{151} Sanyal attributes accounts such as this one to Barelvis’ attempts to establish both Riza ‘Ali’s piety as well as his “distance from the British;”\footnote{152} indeed, the story paints Riza ‘Ali as the latter’s “fierce opponent.”\footnote{153} Incidentally, Riza ‘Ali was also
a “fierce opponent” of șayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and, especially, his disciple Muhammad Ismail, and even urged one of his own disciples, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, to write a book disputing Ismail’s teachings, which Muhammad ‘Ali did—certainly a precursor to the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.\(^{154}\)

Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged exploits of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, among others. According to Deobandi historians, both of these ‘alāma affixed their names to Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi’s 1857/1273 ʿfatwa calling for ʿjayhad against the British, as well as an 1856/1272 pronouncement (signed by the “remaining ‘alāma,” i.e. those who had not been killed or chased away by the British or their stooges) that had called for “steps” to be taken against the East India Company. According to the Deobandi narrative, some of the ‘alāma at the 1856/1272 meeting had voiced concern about the plausibility of success; after all, their numbers were so small compared to the might of the British. It was at this juncture that young Muhammad Qasim is reported to have leapt up and asked, “Are our numbers smaller than that of the heroes [Gażī] of Badr?” He had thus invoked the 1,200-year-old memory of a key battle—a crucial turning point for the early Muslims, in fact—in which the Prophet’s forces had bested a far greater army; this victory over a numerical superiority had reversed the fortune of the Muslims. Upon hearing Muhammad Qasim’s words, “the fire of martyrdom was lit in the hearts” of the wavering ‘alāma and it was agreed that a ʿjayhad against the British should indeed be declared.\(^{155}\) This was accomplished the next year. Two other names were also included among these ‘alāma: the Deobandi-revered Hafiz Zaman (of whom it was written, “From martyrdom he was made great”; killed in battle, his corpse was reportedly carried by Muhammad Qasim to a nearby mosque, where the latter read from the Qur’an over his fallen comrade’s body)\(^{156}\) and J’afar
Thanisri.¹⁵⁷ What happened later, at Shamli and Thana Bhawan (north of Delhi and not far from Deoband), is shrouded in uncertainty, though the Deobandis insist that their aforementioned forefathers became veterans in the freedom fight there against the British. They have even given the struggle its own name: the War of Shamli Field.¹⁵⁸

Thana Bhawan today is non-descript among the highway towns around Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur. Its single main street is crowded and lined with food-sellers peddling biryani or curried vegetables as a seemingly endless stream of rickety buses, three-wheeled autos, and bicycle rickshaws pass by. On either side, the old town is mostly hidden within a maze of narrow alleyways, and beyond this cultivated fields, punctuated by tall trees, stretch as far as the eye can see. It was here that Imdadullah and his disciples, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, relocated, fleeing Delhi around August 1857/Dhu’l Hijja 1273. Allen speculates that this move may have been motivated by “doubts about Delhi’s religious status as a seat of [ṣyḥad],” as well as a waning faith in the ability of the city to withstand the British onslaught.¹⁵⁹

In any case, it was in Thana Bhawan that Imdadullah (upon winning over a powerful local landlord named Inayat ‘Ali) established, briefly, an independent government, after a council of local ‘alṣma had elected him ʿamir ul-mawmynin (“Commander of the Faithful”). Rashid Ahmad was appointed a qazi within the new village-sized “independent Islamic regime,” settling several cases according to shari’at during his brief tenure.¹⁶⁰ Muhammad Qasim, who evidently played a crucial role during the aforementioned council in having ḥyḥad against the British declared, was appointed a military commander (and some say, too, that despite his being the youngest, it was Nanautawi who eventually emerged as the “real leader” of the group).¹⁶¹ Deobandi historians insist that Imdadullah had to be convinced by others to take up this position
of “worldly guidance,” in particular by Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, who not only acted within their appointed positions but also as assistants to Imdadullah in the everyday affairs of the village-state. Meanwhile, the Thana Bhawan group retained contact with the Delhi rebels via a go-between named Rahmatullah Kairanawi.

The seeming concerns of these Deobandi founding fathers about the Delhi rebels proved accurate; by mid-September/late Muharram, the old Mughal capital was burning, retaken by the British. Around the same time, the British (actually a force of Afghans and Sikhs led by Muzaffarnagar’s British Collector and Magistrate, a Mr. Edwards) attempted to take Thana Bhawan, but were repelled after incurring both human and material losses (at least one source dates the “outbreak of the Thana Bhawan rising” to the end of August/early Muharram). This initial attack having failed, Edwards’ force turned to nearby Shamli, which he occupied and left in control of about a dozen of his soldiers. When he returned to Shamli later, he found that the Thana Bhawan fighters (described by Deobandi historians as “a Muslim army” led by Imdadullah himself) had “stormed the government buildings” in the town, and killed all of the troopers Edwards had left to defend it. And so the Collector attacked Thana Bhawan, to which more than a thousand fighting men had flocked, a second time—but once again he was driven back, with heavy losses. Along their retreat back to Muzaffarnagar, Imdadullah’s men (it is supposed) continued to harass Edwards’ party, and a number of his Muslim soldiers deserted. Finally the desperate Magistrate ordered his men to turn around and charge directly at the Thana Bhawan “insurgents.” The ploy worked; the sudden charge scattered Imdadullah’s soldiers and resulted in the deaths of many of them (one British witness attested that there were “a hundred” Thana Bhawan dead). Afterwards, Imdadullah (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued)
and Rahmatullah made their way out of India for the safety of Mecca, while Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim went into hiding. Later, Rashid Ahmad would be imprisoned briefly as a suspected rebel, but eventually released for want of evidence.\textsuperscript{168} The Thana Bhawan state and the War at Shamli Field were, to Deobandis, “the last great attempt…to establish an Islamic government [in a long line of attempts, from antiquity] to 1857.” Afterwards, the English, victorious and thirsty for retribution, hunted down many of the country’s ‘\textit{alma}’.\textsuperscript{169}

Scholars like Metcalf argue that the account of these Deobadani fathers’ revolutionary struggles at Thana Bhawan—including their setting up of an independent government, their appointments to position, and their battles against the British—are likely a fabrication borne of excitement surrounding “the nationalist movement after World War I.” As evidence, Metcalf argues that such accounts of these figures’ involvement in actual fighting didn’t appear until after 1920/1338; before that, she points out, Deobandis were arguing the opposite—namely, that while Rashid Ahmad had been imprisoned, he had also been set free, and Muhammad Qasim had never been arrested at all, both evidence that they had \textit{not} in fact taken part in the 1857/1273 fighting. Pre-1920/1338 biographies actually argue that those accusing these men of involvement in the “Mutiny” were simply the enemies of the Deobandi movement attempting to stain the reputation of the school and its mission.\textsuperscript{170} Of course, both positions need to be taken in historical context. The position that the individuals in question did \textit{not} participate in the rebellion may be attributed to the fact that, in the decades immediately following the quashing of the uprising, many in India were bent on proving they had not taken part so as to avoid prison, the confiscation of property, death, or exile. Later, especially after the First World War, such threats had become
obsolete. Even Metcalf admits that “[i]t is possible that the nationalist accounts are
correct, and that some of the ‘ulama did play an important role in the Thanah Bhawan
disorders.” Indeed, Assistant Magistrate H. D. Robertson, a witness of and
participant in the violence in the Thana Bhawan area, like many British officials firmly
believed the revolt had been instigated by Muslims as an overtly political act. “Such
investigations as it was possible to make,” Robertson wrote not two years after the
Rebellion commenced, “…proved that the Mahomedans in this tract were throughout
the instigators to revolt.” According to Robertson, the Muslims recruited Hindus who
were in debt to moneylenders, who “ swelled their ranks, rendering the rising
universal…”

To this day, Deobandis and Barelvis from Karachi, Pakistan to Azamgarh, India and
beyond debate the historicity of the 1857/1273 exploits of such figures as Fazl-e-Haq
Khairabadi, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fazl-e Rasul Badayuni, Imdadullah, Riza ‘Ali
Khan, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi.

* *

The decline (indeed, fall) of “Muslim” political power was only one—and perhaps
not the most significant—test facing South Asian Islam in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries AD. For it was during this period that several “new” strains of the
religion began making waves among the Muslims of the subcontinent. Such strains
might be classified generally into two principle groups: (1) the purifiers—reformists,
often erroneously lumped together and labeled “Wahhabis,” who blamed political
Islam’s decline on the corruption of the ummat, especially in the subcontinent, in part via
the accretion of pagan ritual and philosophy and other false traditions, and (2) the
modernists—apologetics who sought to reinterpret Islam in light of “modern” (Western)
science and philosophy. The latter, one might safely assume, appeared as a direct result of British rule in Hindustan, as mostly British-educated, upper-class Indian Muslims suddenly found themselves questioning certain aspects (or at least traditional interpretations) of their faith. This second category is perhaps best represented by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Oriental Muslim University at Aligarh and the cadre of Muslim modernists/secularists that it produced. Eventually the Deobandis, it appears, would be considered by a majority of South Asia’s Muslims as falling within the first category, despite the inaccuracy of the term “Wahhabi” as applied to them.

And rising from this milieu, this diversity of opinion and wide spectrum of interpretation, would come the “torch-bearer” (Pakistani scholar Mujeeb Ahmad’s term)\textsuperscript{173} of the aforementioned majority, crusading against both the Deobandis’ alleged “Wahhabism” (not to mention that of actual, bona fide Wahhabis) and Aligarh’s blasphemous modernism: Ahmad Raza Khan, “founder” of the Barelvi movement.

But first, a school would be founded at Deoband.
2 - GENESIS OF A RIVALRY:

The Beginnings of the Deobandi and Barelvi Schools (1866-1921)

I’ll tell you, it is easy to pursue asceticism, and live the life of a recluse for years, and enjoy its ecstasy. It is easy to opt for the study of voluminous books for years, and demonstrate the power of deep knowledge. …I’ll tell you, it is difficult to submit before God and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creations, always nursing within the heart the desire for people’s wellbeing; that is to say, to have a passionate and restless heart that sometimes takes you to the mosque, that sometimes takes you to a study circle, that sometimes takes you to the pulpit to preach and caution people—[and] that sometimes also takes you to the political platform, for the greater well-being of your community and for upholding the truth.

Sayyid Muhammad Mian, in Asrān-e-Malṭa¹

In the months and years after the violence of 1857/1273, the Muslim communities of South Asia were generally considered enemies of the British, a sentiment perhaps best expressed by Henry Rawlinson in 1875/1292; Muslim enmity in India was, he said, a
“seething, fermenting, festering mass.”² The irony is that Rawlinson’s “festering mass” of hostility—the Muslims of India—not seventy-five years later would be referred to often by British civil servants as “loyal people” (i.e. loyal to the British) whose friendship was to be nurtured and whose allegiance must be maintained.³ Bamfield Fuller, Lietenant-Governor of newly created East Bengal, even described the Muslim community as the government’s “favorite wife.”⁴ By then it was the Hindu, represented (at least in the eyes of many Britishers) by the Congress, who had become entrenched as the Empire’s enemy. And it wasn’t just in the eyes of the British government that this transformation had come about; Abul Kalam Azad speaks of the early twentieth century AD revolutionary movements in India, too, as “all...actively anti-Muslim. They saw that the British Government was using the Muslims against India’s political struggle and the Muslims were playing the Government’s game… The revolutionaries felt that the Muslims were an obstacle to the attainment of Indian freedom and must, like other obstacles, be removed.” Abul Kalam Azad blamed at least a portion of this resentment upon the fact that the government had “imported” a number of Muslim political officers from the United Provinces to man the police’s Intelligence Branch, evidently out of a mistrust of Hindu officers after the partition of Bengal; this highly unpopular move had provoked what he described as an “awakening among the Hindus,” and illustrates clearly the relational shift that had by then occurred vis-à-vis the Muslim-British paradigm.⁵ One prominent Indian nationalist, writing in 1917/1335, put it more succinctly: “The British wished for and tried to create an Ulster among the Mohammedans of India.”⁶ Times had certainly changed from the days of Thana Bhawan.
In any case, the period under consideration in this chapter covers the transitional era described above, from Rawlinson’s perceived “seething, fermenting, festering mass” to Fuller’s allegedly “favorite wife.” It was within the context of these macro-phenomena—of the “Muslim” search for a place in the new British order as well as the perceived British policy substitution of enmity for India’s Muslims for enmity for the rising Hindu—that the Deobandi school (grounded in Waliullahi thought) was founded and developed, and the Barelvi counter-reformation (a continuation of the Khairabadi-Badayuni tradition) launched.

**A School is Founded: the Birth of “Deobandism.”**

After the short-lived founding of the village-sized Islamic state at Thana Bhawan, Imdadullah escaped by quickly emigrating to the Hijaz, where he lived out the rest of his days (though his connection to the narrative at hand is not quite ended)—but Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad stayed behind. The former, erstwhile military commander of Thana Bhawan’s anti-Company forces, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued,7 evaded British capture, hiding as a refugee about eighty miles north of Delhi in a picturesque qaṣba named Deoband. The town was a natural hiding place, as the one-time rebel enjoyed not only several family connections in the area but also had spent time in Deoband as a student; later he married into a family native to the town, too.8 It was likely during this period that Muhammad Qasim became familiar with the new (i.e. immediately post-Munity) venture of his cousin, Mahtab ‘Ali,9 and two other Deoband residents (‘Abid Husain and Nihal Ahmad): the founding of a small school (māktāb), connected to a local mosque. At least Mahtab ‘Ali had run a school before; in fact, it had been to Mahtab ‘Ali’s (previous) “primary school” that the young
Muhammad Qasim, before studying in Saharanpur and eventually Delhi, had carried out a portion of his own religious instruction, mostly in Arabic. Regarded as “among Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,” Mahtab ‘Ali had studied himself at Delhi College with the likes of Mamluk ‘Ali and Sadr al-Din Azardah (leading poet, Arabic specialist, and, at the time, the longest serving member of Delhi’s judiciary). In any case, Mahtab ‘Ali’s new school met in “small and dark rooms” and was of the traditional type: a simple appendage of the masjid, operating under the guidance of informal teachers to whom students, usually with some kinship connection to the teacher or the mosque, would come for temporary instruction. According to one Deobandi historian, Mahtab ‘Ali and his companions had entertained ideas related to the further development and expansion of the little madrasah, but such thoughts had been “limited to their hearts and their tongues.” It would take the efforts of another to bring them to life—and vastly transcend them.

It is unclear just when Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi took a personal interest in the school, but it seems likely that, beyond preventing his own imprisonment by the now seemingly invincible British, he would have been most concerned with carrying on the struggle based upon the original aims imbibed by him from his teachers, in particular from Imdadullah and, earlier, Mamluk ‘Ali. The same was almost certainly true for Rashid Ahmad, who, though he languished for a period in a British prison as a suspected rebel, must have counted the days until he could resume the fight, though in a necessarily adapted form. But Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad couldn’t do it alone; they needed the help of others not explicitly connected to the rebellion of 1857/1273. For years after the Mutiny, the ‘alim from Nanauta, whose name was included among those of other known mutineers on official government lists, had
“passed through thousands of temporary resting places” in an attempt to escape capture by the British. But after a general amnesty was announced by Governor-General Canning (January 1859/Jumada II 1275) for all who had taken part in the 1857/1273 revolt, Muhammad Qasim felt free enough to travel between Nanauta and Deoband out in the open, expressing passionately the need for a new kind of religious seminary. He would have to found it through others—individuals not on the British radar—because he suspected that British plainclothes police monitored his movements, even after the amnesty. Indeed, Muhammad Qasim feared that if he were to found the school himself, the government would persecute it relentlessly. No, he would need intermediaries. Thus it was that, at some point in the decade after the Mutiny, Muhammad Qasim, by now a highly respected religious figure, approached the tiny, traditional school’s three founders.

His vision was simple, grand—and highly unusual. Nothing like it had ever been done before on the subcontinent. But Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi was adamant; this would, with time, be the fulfillment of his original purposes. It would bring to fruition the legacy of his teachers, Imdadullah and Mamluk ‘Ali, who had themselves imbibed “the program” (Faruqi’s term) from Muhammad Ishaq, şeyh Ahmad and Muhammad Ismail, and Shah Abdul Aziz—the latter, of course, having succeeded his father, Shah Waliullah himself. What was Muhammad Qasim’s grand vision? To the 21st-century AD mind it seems anything but revolutionary, but within the context of his time and place, of local tradition and South Asian Islamic custom, it represented a radical departure.

Muhammad Qasim proposed that the small, mosque-connected school be moved into a large new building, that it be independent of the masjīd entirely, that it stand on its
own as an autonomous institution beholden to no government, no rich guiding patron, no princely court; he would later write, somewhat unambiguously, that the “participation of government and the wealthy is harmful.”\(^{19}\) Its teachers were to be professionals, and regular, who were to be equal (in the sense that all of their opinions were to be valued and weighed). It was to be run, true to Waliullahi principles, by a majlis-e-shura (or advisory council)—not according to the dictates of one man or a single clique. It should have classrooms set apart for the teaching of specific subjects, and it should have a large, central library. It should have a fixed curriculum, including a fixed course of study and yearly examinations; this latter was important, for it established a system of meritocracy. In short, the proposed institution should be not only independent, and not only far larger than any other Islamic institution of learning in southern Asia, but it should be organizationally based on, of all things, the British model (to which the Deobandi founders had been exposed in multiple forms, whether at Delhi College, or in observing Christian missionary organizations, or as employees themselves within the British government apparatus).

From such an institution, the ummat in South Asia (and beyond) might be preserved, the greatness—both spiritual and political—of the Muslims might be restored, and the Waliullahi vision might be spread far and wide as the school developed a growing network of affiliated institutions. Indeed, the school should represent, in the words of its official twentieth-century/fourteenth-century historian, “the greatest religious achievement of the Muslims in the modern period,” preserving “the lamp of the prophetic knowledge…in spite of the gusts of a contrary wind.”\(^{20}\) “A fundamental orientation of Shah Waliullah’s work,” one scholar has written, “…had been the hope that Muslim political leadership would be restored, with the ‘alma’ carrying on their
collective role of teaching and advising the ruler of the state”; later ‘alāma were indebted to Shah Waliullah “for a manifold legacy” that included “a sense of their importance as leaders.”

According to Muhammad Qasim’s vision, Deoband was to be the center of a vast network of madārys (and indeed, almost from the outset of the school’s founding, Muhammad Qasim was anxiously engaged in founding or inspiring the founding of several other, affiliated institutions). The dar ul’alām would thereby be able to realize the original aims of its founders and their spiritual predecessors, including Mamluk ‘Ali, Muhammad Ishaq, and Shah Abdul Aziz. (Thus, as Faruqi concludes, Deobandism’s anti-British roots trace to the very foundation of the institution, in harmony, so the Deobandis assert, with the Waliullahi tradition). M. Ahmad agrees, describing the establishment of the dar ul’alām at Deoband as “founded on the ideals of Shah Walyullah” and thus “destined to play a prominent part in the political struggle of the Indians against the British rule.”

Faruqi describes this phenomenon in the following words:

The part played by the Darul-Ulum in religious, social and political life of the Indian Muslims can be legitimately interpreted in terms of the aims and objectives that lay behind the actions of its founders during the days of the Rebellion. Shamli and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and the same picture. The difference lies only in weapons. Now the sword and spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue. There, at Shamli, in order to secure political independence and freedom for religion and culture, resort was made to violence; here at Deoband a start was made to achieve the same goal through peaceful means. There, for the cause of religio-political
freedom individuals were used; here for that purpose individuals were to be produced. The roads, though diverging from each other, led towards the same destination.\(^{25}\) [Italics added.]

It should be noted that, at least in the beginning, such black-and-white characterizations (i.e. freedom through violent means at Shamli versus freedom through peaceful means at Deoband) were likely not so clear. Still, in the early years some mockingly referred to the school as the madrasah-e-harbiyah (or “military school,” a pun on the institution’s common name, the madrasah-e-‘arbibiyyah) on account of its unique physical education curriculum, which included military-like drills and exercises.\(^{26}\) Perhaps Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad still harbored some lingering hope that a cadre of soldiers might be developed with the power to oust the British. Even so, within a few years such martial displays had been more or less dropped from the curriculum entirely, and viewed from within the context of Muhammad Qasim’s other pronouncements around this time, it appears that the drilling was genuinely introduced as a form of physical education after all. Such echoes of the transitory Islamic state at Thana Bhawan also included a shari’at court set up by Muhammad Qasim, through which was settled a wide range of community disputes. The one-time military commander himself served as qazi in the court, and for a time the official government court of Deoband tehsil “had a real rival in it.” Though the court, like the army-esque drills, would fade with time, its establishment further underscored “the spirit of non-cooperation” that the school’s guiding lights had displayed in the years leading up to its inception.\(^{27}\)

Earlier in this work, the two-pronged agenda passed on by Muhammad Ishaq to his disciples, and in particular Mamluk ‘Ali and his committee-of-four, was mentioned.
This, the Deobandi fathers insisted, was the Waliullahi vision. Indeed, over a century after the founding of the institution, in 1978/1398, the *dar ul’alzm*’s vice-chancellor, Muhammad Tayyib, would confirm the perpetuation of these original aims, identifying two key issues addressed by the Shah Waliullahi program and dealt with via the school: (1) the preservation of Muslim faith and practice and (2) the deliverance of India from the foreign yoke.28 Muhammad Tayyib’s two-pronged mission statement for the school more or less mirrors that of Muhammad Ishaq’s charge to Mamluk ‘Ali, passed on to Imdadullah, Rashid Ahmad, and Muhammad Qasim, and built into the core philosophy of the *dar ul’alzm* at Deoband. The school’s official history likewise frames the institutional mission of the *dar ul’alzm* within the context of these early visions and this “original” agenda, writing that the school “has been a dauntless standard-bearer of Islamic life, calling people to *ymam* Abu Hanifa’s *māslḥāk* [the first of Muhammad Ishaq’s two-part program], the preacher of the thought of Shah Waliullah of Delhi, the commentator of Shah Abdul Aziz’s knowledge, and the greatest trustee of *mwlana* Muhammad Isma’il *shāhid*’s sentiments of liberty [the second of Muhammad Ishaq’s two-part program].”29

The Deobandi argument that the two-pronged “Waliullahi” mission was largely fulfilled—first via the institution, its graduates’ influence, and the subsequent network of affiliated schools, and second through its leadership’s role in the independence movement—is a strong one. The first half of the program was in a sense carried out via the school’s adoption and adaptation of the Farangi Mahali-inspired *dārs-e-nyzāmi* curriculum, which contained both *mānquwilat* (which, as previously mentioned, was the specialty of the Delhi scholars, including the Waliullahi line) and *maqwilat* (the special domain of the Lucknow scholars and the aforementioned Khairabadi-Badayuni Group).
The Deobandis, true to their Waliullahi leanings, placed far more emphasis on *hādis*-study, however, substituting the one text of *hādis* selections in the traditional curriculum with all six authoritative collections, in their entirety, in their own version. Indeed, *hādis* was considered “the crowning subject” to be studied at the institution—and only the best and the brightest were encouraged to pursue it. The other, more political prong of the agenda was met through a series of anti-British political schemes spearheaded by university leaders, and by the heavy involvement generally of the school’s teachers, administrators, and students in the pre-Partition politics of independence in India, which shall be addressed later in this work.

Some historians and other scholarly commentators, perhaps within the context of a post-“nine eleven” world, have seen in the founding of the school and the projection of its mission a layer of foreboding. Allen writes ominously, for example: “The end result [of the establishment of the school at Deoband] was a seismic shift in the Sunni Islam of South Asia, which became increasingly conservative and introverted, less tolerant, and far more inclined to look for political leadership to the madrassah and the madrassah-trained political leader committed to the cause of leading the umma back to the true path.” But however it’s founding has been interpreted, it is clear that, even for Allen, the event represented more than the construction of a new kind of Muslim school; it was the birth of a paradigm-shifting movement—or, rather, the continuation of said movement via much more effective means. Faruqi, M. Ahmad, even the school’s detractors (like Allen), and others thus see in the school’s founding—and by means of its operation—an endeavor with overtly political ends. The *dar ul'alum* was, in the words of Goyal, “the offshoot of the inspiration that had motivated the [‘ulom] to actively participate in the 1857 uprising to throw the British out of the country.”
But there are formidable scholars who oppose this view outright, and some mention of their reasoning should be included. Barbara Metcalf, without question Western academia’s leading scholar of Deobandism, has argued that the school’s political ties have been “distorted” by scholars and others due to the later role many of its ‘alma’ would play in independence politics. The result of such distortion has been that, in the context of academic writing, the dar ul’alwm has come off as “anti-British and revolutionary” in character. With more than a little finality, Metcalf stated unequivocally in a 1978/1398 article, “[T]he school’s concerns were entirely a-political.” Other scholars, like Francis Robinson, have faithfully towed this line as they cast doubt on (or simply outright deny) any militant motives on the part of Shah Abdul Aziz, any political (much less militant) role for the Deobandi fathers in the events of 1857/1273, or any political motivations in the founding of the school—all the while citing “the conclusions of Barbara Metcalf’s deep study of the school…” As evidence, Robinson points out that the school’s founders “were careful to steer clear of government” and “stressed that it should not accept government help and that its associates should not have recourse to government courts of law.” In so doing, however, Robinson only demonstrates the very political nature of the Deobandi endeavor; the British government was, ultimately, the enemy (however one might be forced to “work with,” or at least tolerate, such an entity in the short run)—thus the school would “steer clear” of it as far as practically possible, refrain from accepting, much less soliciting, financial or political aid, and set up a righteous alternative to its inferior (even wicked) legal system.

By the early 1980s/1400s, however, Metcalf would characterize the early Deobandi movement (in her masterful Islamic Revival in British India) as “quasi-sectarian,”
concerned more than anything else with “issues of the Law,” and involved in a struggle of “identifying popularly based ‘ulama as the foci of religious leadership.” In addition, the Deobandis, while “discreet in their political stance,” nevertheless “in fact held the foreign rulers in deep contempt.” Even Robinson admits that “[p]ossibly the ‘ulama of Deoband, having noted the problem of resisting British military might, were biding their time.” Taken together, it is difficult not to interpret at least one strand of the early Deobandis’ motivations in political terms, even when one is limited to using the Metcalf-Robinson interpretation only. After all, it is widely recognized that the Deobandis represent a successor movement to the Shah Walliulahi tradition, whose own reformist movement, as Robinson himself has pointed out, was directly motivated by the great eighteenth-century AD Delhi scholar’s “distress” at “waning Muslim power”—and the hope that with such reforms in place “divisions would end and power would return” (italics added). Indeed, Robinson rightly framed the founding of the school at Deoband as representative of the shifting focus of the madrasah—from a place to train scholars for work within the state apparatus (up to the eighteenth century/twelfth century) to a place wherein “training for Islamic survival in a world where Muslims had no power” was the goal (an echo of Metcalf). The madrasah had always been political to one degree or another, and Deoband was no different. In fact, the university there stood as a symbol—even the symbol—of the “institutionalization” of the above-mentioned focus change, standing on that shift’s “leading edge.” “The training for empire built up over 800 years faded away,” Robinson wrote, to be replaced by an emphasis on survival and internal, even individual, reform. And while it might be true that the Deobandis’ “were coping with the challenge of an infidel government by turning inwards and fashioning the machinery of an Islamic community which need owe nothing to the
state,” it would be absurd to think that the political goals of the madrasah simply disappeared altogether, especially given the Muslim religious leadership’s general disdain for their alien rulers. No (and Deobandi historians are adamant on this point): the goal was always political—and nothing less than the eventual establishment of Islamic government. “After the failure of the 1857 uprising,” wrote Muhammad Mian Ansari, a close associate of Mahmud Hasan (d. 1920 AD), “the desire arose to establish a center under whose influence people would be prepared to exact retribution for the 1857 failure” (italics added).

It likewise would be absurd to interpret the university’s very limited (perceived) cooperation with (or, more accurately, some perceived lack of explicit hostility towards) the British government as proof of some sort of apolitical position, a kind of approving toleration, or any kind of endorsement on the part of the Deobandi movement’s leadership. On the contrary, the focus shift that certainly took place within the institution of the South Asian madrasah never removed the seminaries’ overarching objective—that is, the propagation of Islamic Law (within the framework of an Islamic order), facilitated by able, moral, wise ‘alāma, with the purpose of establishing righteousness upon the earth. The difference was that now Muslim society had to be reformed first, from within, before political power could be obtained. This goal in no way transformed the ultimate aim; rather, it inserted an additional step in that aim’s achievement. “Islam envisages its adherants as a religious and political community,” wrote Mujeeb Ahmad, “therefore, [‘alāma] claim for themselves a socio-political role along with their religious functions.”

Combined with the above, one final point (previously touched upon in Chapter 1) might be repeated briefly here. That is: Islam is an inherently political system, a definition
offered by its very own intellectuals. From the days of Muhammad, this was so. To quote religious scholar Karen Armstrong at length:

In Islam, Muslims have looked for God in history. Their sacred scripture, the Quran, gave them a historical mission... A Muslim had to redeem history, and that meant that state affairs were not a distraction from spirituality, but the stuff of religion itself. The political well-being of the Muslim community was a matter of supreme importance. Like any religious ideal, it was almost impossibly difficult to implement in the flawed and tragic conditions of history, but after each failure Muslims had to get up and begin again.

Muslims developed their own rituals, mysticism, philosophy, doctrines, sacred texts, laws and shrines like everybody else. But all these religious pursuits sprang directly from the Muslims' frequently anguished contemplation of the political current affairs of Islamic society. If state institutions did not measure up to the Quranic ideal, if their political leaders were cruel or exploitative, or if their community was humiliated by apparently irreligious enemies, a Muslim could feel that his or her faith in life's ultimate purpose and value was in jeopardy. Every effort had to be expended to put Islamic history back on track, or the whole religious enterprise would fail, and life would be drained of meaning. Politics was, therefore, what Christians would call a sacrament: it was the arena in which Muslims experienced God and which enabled the divine to function effectively in the world. (italics added)
Afghan outfit Jamiat Islami mujahidin leader Burnhanuddin Rabbani would later illustrate this concept when he told western reporters that he preferred the term “Islamicist” to the oft-repeated “fundamentalist.” “For us,” he explained, “Islam is a dynamic that concerns all aspects of human life.” With this understanding, and set within the context of the decline and fall of “Muslim” power on the subcontinent, the very political Shah Waliullahi tradition, the political violence of 1857/1273, the university’s obvious contempt—from the very beginning—for dependence upon the British government, and the subsequent, undisputed major role of many of the school’s students and teachers (if not that of its founders) in the pre-Partition politics of India, perhaps scholars can take the university’s leaders at their word when they proclaim the founding of the great dar ul’ulom at Deoband to have been motivated in large degree by the highly political Imdadullahi “program.” Indeed, Mahmud Hasan—more familiar than perhaps anyone when it comes to the school’s founding and early development, as the nephew of one of its founders, its very first student, personally the disciple of Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, and the undisputed leader of the university’s “second generation”—once stated that, as far as he knew, “this institution [the dar ul’ulom at Deoband] was established after the failure of the 1857 uprising with the aim of preparing a cadre for avenging that defeat.”

The local reaction to Muhammad Qasim’s grandiose vision was, perhaps predictably, not entirely positive. ‘Abid Husain, who more than anyone else actually ran the little maktab that Muhammad Qasim proposed to transform, rejected the scholar’s vision entirely. But the maulana from Nanauta eventually convinced even ‘Abid Husain, and the project commenced.
So it was that the school that would become the great *dar ul'alwm*, originally known popularly as *madrasah-e-‘arabiyyah,*⁴⁶ was founded in one of Deoband’s six mosques built by the Delhi kings over the centuries, the *mosjid-e-chhottah,* “where,” Metcalf informs us, “the great Sufi Hazrat Baba Fariu’d-Din Ganj-i Shakar was said to have meditated.” Deobandis still proudly motion visitors towards a pomegranate tree within the original mosque’s grounds, said to have been the very one under whose shade the school’s first instruction took place.⁴⁷ But the school quickly branched out from this more traditional setting to realize the Qasimi vision, acquiring a library, classrooms, and a permanent, professional staff of administrators and teachers. Its students need have no familial tie to the school in order to attend; all were welcome and invited to study there. The institution was dependent on no government, court, or wealthy family, but relied, instead, on private donations (typically as annual pledges) from a wide variety of people—some rich, some poor, some socially connected, others virtually unknown outside of their own neighborhoods; donations might be given in kind too—in food, clothes, books, etc.⁴⁸ (This same pattern of financing continues to this day; the grandson of the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Shafi proudly displayed the donation boxes in the main offices of the *dar ul'alwm* Karachi to the author in the summer of 2012/1433, while the grandson of Barelvi great Muhammad Hussain Naeemi did much the same in the front office of the Jamia Naeemia in Lahore that same year). Donations didn’t flow one-way, either; monies garnered via these collection efforts allowed students to receive a religious education at the *dar ul'alwm* (plus clothes, laundry money, shoes, medical care, a quilt, and oil and matches for light) more or less *gratis,* and multitudinous are the stories of generous teachers or administrators, whose own salaries were purposefully kept small, donating money, books, or other gifts to needy...
students. Eventually (by the 1890s/1310s) a boarding house was established, replacing the old system of housing students in family homes or mosques; the new arrangement facilitated the formation of bonds that transcended kinship or geography, bonds based upon common experience within the *dar ul’alwm* system. Metcalf sees in the boarding house brotherhood preparation for the “mutual cooperation” required for, among other endeavors, future political undertakings.\(^5\)

An organized hierarchy, drawn up along British-inspired lines, included the *sərpərəst* (which Metcalf equates with “rector,” but which might also be translated as “guardian”), a sort of “patron and guide” with no direct administrative role; a *muhtəmim* (Metcalf: “chancellor,” though the school as of this writing refers to the *muhtəmim* as “rector”), the institution’s head administrative official; an *ərbəb-e-yhtymam* (or “vice-chancellor”), perhaps the most important administrative officer in terms of day-to-day decision-making; a *Sədər mədərys* (or “principal,” though a more exact translation would be “head teacher”), upon whom lay the chief responsibility for the school’s instruction (and scarcely less important in decision-making than the vice-chancellor); a *mufti* (from 1892/1309), responsible, of course, for the juridical rulings emanating from the *dar ul’alwm* (a *dar ul-yfta*, or center for juridical rulings, was formally established in 1893/1310, and between 1911/1329 and 1951/1370, almost one hundred fifty thousand *fətəwa* emanated from the school);\(^5\) and, perhaps most importantly of all, a *majlys-e-shwra* (or “advisory council”) composed of administrators, teachers, and seven others. This last was given a central role in major decision-making for the school, thereby preventing a single individual, family, or clique from dominating its affairs (with mixed success).\(^5\) Still, though the school was organizationally British, the old personal ties between teacher and gifted student—the *shix*-disciple relationship, the heart and soul of
the traditional mosque-centered schools—were maintained, as students became disciples of Sufi shiis (often their teachers). The Sufi shiix especially cared for his disciples thereafter; both shared a lifelong bond.54

Interestingly, neither Muhammad Qasim nor Rashid Ahmad held official posts within the newly founded institution at Deoband for its first three years; indeed, in the case of Rashid Ahmad, he never held any sort of permanent, day-to-day position at the school. Rather, Muhammad Qasim is credited with informally though firmly guiding the school’s founders during this early period from his printing house in Meerut fifty miles away, in particular through his good friend Rafiuddin (d. 1890 AD), who held top posts within the dar ul’alum’s administration for almost two decades. His influence was likewise felt through several other family connections he enjoyed with the school, including his cousins, Muhammad Ya’qub (the institution’s principal from 1867-1886/1284-1303), Zu’l-Faqar ‘Ali (a member of the advisory council for forty years), Muhammad Munir Nanautawi (the school’s chancellor from 1894-1895/1311-1312), and, of course, Mahtab ‘Ali (who also served as a council member).55 "Leadership in Deobandi institutions has traditionally been influenced by clan and family loyalties,” wrote one scholar, and this was true from the beginning; such a phenomenon was not uncommon (and remains so) in the subcontinent among educational institutions of all stripes.56 It should be noted, however, and evident from the aforementioned description of the school’s genesis, that despite this role of informal influencer, Muhammad Qasim was, in the words of Faruqi, “the guiding spirit of this venture,”57 and he did hold the somewhat informal position of wazir until his 15 April 1880/5 Jumada I 1297 death (perhaps to keep a healthy distance so as not to potentially “taint” the school in the eyes of the British authorities, considering his 1857/1273 actions). Even with this family
clique fully invested in the school, the administrative mechanisms set in motion by Muhammad Qasim himself prevented the institution’s out-and-out “takeover” by the family.

Meanwhile, Rashid Ahmad lived as a jurist, Sufi shīr, and teacher of ḥadīṣ in Gangoh (about thirty miles from Deoband); his opinions about the dar ul’alām, however, “were followed,” particularly as they pertained to the “organizing and shaping of the school,” and he would “succeed” Muhammad Qasim as ṣororast after the latter’s passing. Not infrequently the aged mawlawā made visits from Gangoh to the university at Deoband, counseling teachers and students and generally guiding the institution’s direction. When students desired more advanced instruction in fiqīḥ or ḥadīṣ, they would often travel to Gangoh to learn at the feet of the old scholar. It was here, too, that Rashid Ahmad continued to initiate the best and the brightest into the four great South Asian Sufi orders, as he had been initiated years before by his own murshyd, Imdadullah.

Present during the weeks and days of Muhammad Qasim’s final illness was the dar ul’alām’s first student, who had studied ḥadīṣ under Muhammad Qasim in the Meerut printing houses: one Mahmud Hasan. After the subsequent death of Rashid Ahmad (who, along with Muhammad Qasim, had represented the dar ul’alām’s “first generation” of leadership), it was Mahmud Hasan—born in 1851/1267 and head of the institution from 1890/1307—who would be considered the undisputed leading personality of the institution’s “second generation.” In time, the young student-turned-mawlawā would become arguably the school’s most celebrated political activist and one of India’s most revered Muslim shīrs; indeed, his title, by which he was and continues to be known to millions: shīr ul-hynd, or “The Scholar-Jurist of Hindustan.”

Meanwhile, the old agenda, passed on down the Shah Waliullahi line, and inherited by
Mamluk ‘Ali, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim, and Rashid Ahmad, was taken up now with a vengeance by the dar ul’al’w’s first ṭalyb when his time came to lead. The “program” may have been passed on as far back as 1877/1294, when Mahmud Hasan accompanied Muhammad Qasim on the ḥajj to Mecca. In the holy city the future shix ul-hynd met with Imdadullah himself, receiving bi’at under his hand—thereby “vowing allegiance” to the one-time leader of the short-lived Islamic mini-state at Thana Bhawan—and becoming his xālīfah. Around a hundred men, including Rashid Ahmad as well as Muhammad Yaqub Nanautawi (Mamluk ‘Ali’s son and, at the time, the principal of the dar ul’al’w; Mahmud Hasan would succeed him a few years after his 1884/1301 death), and Ahmed Hasan Kanpuri likewise participated in this special ḥajj journey.62 We shall return to Mahmud Hasan and the political initiatives he spearheaded shortly.

As the school developed throughout its formative decades, students began to flock to the institution from all over the Muslim world. One observer (writing around 1917/1335) noted of the dar ul’al’w, “[S]tudents from Russia, China, Balkh and Bukhara, Kabul, Turkey, Syria and Arabia and Persia—indeed, from every country and city—are present there. By now more than a thousand scholars, graduated from the dar ul’al’w, have spread throughout the country…”63 By the early twentieth century/fourteenth century, the Muslim religious leadership had attained such elevated status that even Muslims educated in the West began taking on religious titles (such as mOWLanA), and were addressed as such by the public at large.64 And thus it was that, along with its growing prestige, the school’s teachers and graduates began to exert a noticeable influence on the day-to-day Islamic practice of the subcontinent’s Muslims, especially concentrating on stamping out the “impurities” that had crept into the faith.
through its centuries-long contact with (indeed, through Deobandi eyes, the near-complete encirclement by and infiltration of) local, mostly Hindu customs and ritual. Practices of which the Deobandis were critical included the charging of interest on loans, the array of rites and ceremony associated with the tombs of Muslim saints, the forbidding of widow remarriage, and extravagant feasts and weddings. (For the Deobandis, as discussed in Chapter 1, this did not include a rejection of Sufism, though the movement clamped down, as mentioned previously, on what it considered the inappropriate spiritual elevation of Sufi saints, among other sufistic “excesses”). For Metcalf, for a group to qualify as an “Islamic reform movement” it must accept the “period of the life of the Prophet and the first decades of Islam as providing the fundamental examples of behavior and belief; all [Islamic reform movements] seek self-consciously, by a wide variety of means, to relive that pristine time.”65 This is precisely what the ‘alāma of the dar ul’alwām sought to achieve—the very aim of Muhammad Ishaq’s two-pronged program—through these criticisms, in the tradition of their spiritual forbears, going back to Shah Waliullah and beyond. The “accretions” that had developed within South Asian Islam had to be removed, as they clearly represented post-Muhammad, post-Rashidun innovations. Many Muslims in India and even beyond became adherents of the new, more puritan (or “reformist”) school based in the little qābi Shāh north of Delhi.

Others, however, pushed back.
Counter-Reformation: The Birth of “Barelvism.”

The same year that the dar ul’atwem in Deoband was founded under the direction of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, a Muslim holy man approached the dwelling of a noted (but far from famous) ‘alym in the small western-U.P. town of Bareilly, one hundred fifty miles east of Delhi. His knock brought the ‘alym’s ten-year-old son to the door; the boy opened it. He looked up into the face of the faqir, at which, Zafaruddin Bihari informs us, the holy man abruptly placed his hand upon the boy’s head and said, “You are a great scholar.” The ten-year-old boy was the young Ahmad Raza Khan, son of mwlana Naqi ‘Ali Khan and grandson of mwlana Raza ‘Ali Khan. The incident with the holy man wasn’t the first time a pronouncement of spiritual or scholarly greatness had been made about the child, either. Indeed, a decade before, shortly after Ahmad Raza’s 1856/1272 birth, his venerated grandfather had laid him on his lap and uttered very nearly the same words. “This son of mine will be a great scholar,” he had said about the newborn.

Ahmad Raza Khan was of Pathan stock, his ancestors hailing from the Kandahari region of what is today southern Afghanistan. During the Mughal era, some of the family had moved to Lahore, then Delhi, eventually settling at the qaSb of Bareilly in Rohilkhand. Throughout their migrations, Ahmad Raza’s ancestors benefitted from Mughal rule by fulfilling various government appointments, both military and civilian. In Bareilly, the family continued to benefit from state employment, as well as the income derived from government-endowed properties. Beginning with Ahmad Raza’s grandfather, Raza ‘Ali Khan, however, a new family tradition was initiated: that of the attainment of religious scholarship. Raza ‘Ali Khan was known in his day, according to one Barelvi historian, as not only an “unparalleled scholar” but a “perfect saint,” thus juxtaposing Ahmad Raza’s predecessors with those of the Deobandi fathers and
declaring the former’s spiritual heritage the superior one. (It was Raza ‘Ali Khan, too, who, it was said, had been made invisible to British thugs following the repression of the Mutiny.) His son, Naqi ‘Ali Khan, a contemporary of Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, followed in the footsteps of his father, and was likewise recognized as a “glorious, holy scholar” and, significantly vis-à-vis his Deobandi counterparts, an “unequalled writer and critic [of deviant practices within Islam].” Thus the foundation was laid by his fathers for Ahmad Raza not only to become a great scholar and teacher, but also a critic, reformist (or counter-reformist), and opponent of “the enemies of Allah and the Prophet.”

Ahmad Riza’s father tutored him in religion at home; the two enjoyed a close relationship. Stories abound concerning Ahmad Raza’s childhood and youth—about how he had memorized the entire Qur’an by age four, that he was addressing worshippers at the mosque by age six, that he had surpassed his scholarly and distinguished father in knowledge and wisdom by his early teens (when he was already issuing fatwa). By age twenty Ahmad Riza was debating with and contradicting (and, according to his followers, soundly defeating) several of India’s most prominent ‘alma, including those representing the Deobandi wave. When he was twenty-one years old, Ahmad Riza (along with his father) became the disciple (murid) of Sufi pir and sayyid Shah Al-e-Rasul of Marehra, a small town southeast of Aligarh. Shah Al-e-Rasul was affiliated with the Baghdad-born Qadiri order, belonging to the Barkatiyya branch of that sylsala. The Barkatiyya, renowned for its spiritual heritage, had sprung up in the United Provinces town of Bilgram, about sixty miles southeast of Badayun, and was named after the Aurengzeb-era Sufi master Shah Barkatullah, based in Marehra. Marehra was one of several proto-Barelvi centers in what is today the northwestern
sector of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh—centers that included Badayun, Rampur, Pilibhit, and, of course, Bareilly itself.\textsuperscript{68}

Shortly after attaining official discipleship under Shah Al-e-Rasul (and being named his \textit{xālīfah}), Ahmad Riza went on pilgrimage to Mecca, visiting Medina as well and receiving recognition and authority from several powerful Muslim leaders and scholars. By 1900/1318, Ahmad Riza was being referred to by most non-Deobandi \textit{\'alāma} in India generally (and even by some \textit{\'alāma} in the Middle East) as the \textit{mujaddid} (or “renewer”) of the present (fourteenth) Islamic century.\textsuperscript{69} In 1905/1323 he went on a second pilgrimage to Mecca, spending several months there; during this visit, he was treated with the utmost respect—as one of the Muslim world’s leading scholars and teachers.

By the turn of the twentieth/fourteenth century, then, Ahmad Raza Khan was in a position to seriously compete, as the leader of a rival “movement” that had “come into its own,” with the Deobandis for the spiritual supremacy of the subcontinent’s Muslims. Indeed, the counter-reformational sect had been identifiably distinct since the 1880s/1300s, “when,” explains Sanyal—certainly Western academia’s most renowned scholar of Barelvism to the time of this writing—“the movement began to take shape.” Throughout the 1890s/1310s, too, its core principles solidified, its tenets spread, and the number of its adherents “grew steadily” across India (especially in the north).\textsuperscript{70} Ahmad Riza certainly viewed himself as the leading Muslim authority in India, too. Once, he unilaterally appointed Amjad \textacute{`}Ali A’zami the judge of Islamic law for “the entire Indian nation,” subsequently appointing his own son, Mustafa Riza Khan, and Burhan ul-Haqq as the new judge’s assistants.\textsuperscript{71} (Amjad \textacute{`}Ali A’zami will be further scrutinized later in this work.) Ahmad Riza’s disciples established several notable
seminaries in which the Barelvi point-of-view was promulgated. The Barelvi counter-reformation, like its Catholic predecessor, was itself reformist, but “central to the formation of Ahl-e-Sunnat [i.e. Barelvi] ideology” was the “debate and rivalry amongst the ['alma'],” particularly the populous Deobandis; this is what made it a counter-reformation. That debate was carried out in person and in print, in the case of the latter via the Barelvis’ numerous journals, newspapers, and books. Indeed, during this period (the turn of the century to 1921 AD, or from about 1318 to 1339 AH), the Barelvi-Deobandi rivalry was characterized almost exclusively by the presentation of arguments via the written word or the formal debate. Nothing like the political battles of later years (and certainly not the murderous enmity displayed in 1990s and 2000s AD Pakistan) surfaced during these early years, when the debate, though heated, remained nevertheless “gentlemanly.”

**The Early Disputes I: fatawa War of 1902/1320.**

Since the days of Shah Abdul Aziz, the fatawa had been used as a popular form of intercourse between the ‘alma and regular Muslims—and also as a means of discrediting, or striving to discredit, rival scholars and their schools of thought. Perhaps no one ever wrote more fatawa than Ahmad Raza Khan, however, who used the juridical ruling as his chief weapon of choice within the context of his many scholarly battles. At the same time, Ahmad Raza’s fatawa earned him an unprecedented reputation among thousands of South Asia’s Muslim scholars (as well many from Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond) as an eminent ‘alym, all the while serving to expand his influence far and wide among ordinary Muslims across the subcontinent. “Fatwa-writing was to be Ahmad Riza’s single most important scholarly activity,” noted
Sanyal, who elsewhere described the pursuit as the “hallmark” of the man’s ʿalymi career; indeed, the Barelvi “founder” was said alone to have produced the work of ten muftis. If one were forced to place Ahmad Raza within a single occupational category, that of fatwa-writer might be the most accurate, as he was to spend the majority of his days engaged in the activity. He is said to have interrupted his work composing fatwa only rarely, and then only to attend religious (and especially “Barelvi”) ceremonies like ʿurs.

In 1902/1320, Ahmad Riza Khan kicked off a fatwa war between the Deobandis (based around the university) and the newly dubbed “Barelvi” ʿalɔma (based around Ahmad Riza). The initiatory event was the publication of a fatwa, authored by the tireless scholar out of Bareilly. Certainly, he’d previously published pronouncements condemning this or that idea, or even this or that group or movement, as heretical, Satanic, or otherwise erroneous. But in this ruling, Ahmad Riza did something he hadn’t done before; that is, he named names. In all, he listed five individuals—all prominent Indian ʿalɔma—and declared them kafyr (“infidel” or “unbeliever”). Of the five men listed, fully four were Deobandi. The fifth, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan, was the founder of the much-maligned “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement (more on this movement later). Thus not only had Ahmad Raza singled out four of the Deobandis’ most renowned scholars as infidels, he’d grouped them together with a man who was, quite possibly, the most detested “Muslim” leader in all of South Asia.

The four Deobandis (all described using the catch-all term “Wahhabi”) thus singled out included the school’s very “founders,” Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. Muhammad Qasim, Ahmad Riza asserted, had denied the finality of the Prophet (ṣətəm-e-nəbəwət, i.e. that Muhammad was the last, or “seal,” of the prophets); all who followed Muhammad Qasim, then, must have allowed Satan to plant
“deceit in their hearts.” And Rashid Ahmad, in the tradition of Muhammad Ismail (against whom Ahmad Riza had already written many fātwa), believed that Allah could lie—and additionally held that Satan’s knowledge (in particular his “knowledge of the unseen” [ylm-e-Gaib]) was greater than had been Muhammad’s. These were obviously very serious allegations, and clearly stemmed from the enormous emphasis placed by Barelvis on respect—bordering on worshipful adoration—for the Prophet, as well as for God. To lay such a juridical ruling at the feet of the Deoband school’s two greatest guiding lights was akin to throwing down the gauntlet. “He who doubts that they are kafyr is himself a kafyr,” declared Ahmad Riza, with some finality. But the deceased Muhammad Qasim and the still-leading Rashid Ahmad weren’t the only Deobandi targets of Ahmad Riza’s ire. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who would go on to become one of the school’s most prolific writers (and who Robinson has described as “the most influential Sufi of his day”), also attracted the Bareilly scholar’s literary darts. His alleged crime: refusing, like Rashid Ahmad, to grant Muhammad ylm-e-Gaib, thus, in Ahmad Riza’s eyes, equating the Prophet’s knowledge with that of any other human or beast. (The Barelvi divine would author at least three book-length treatises specifically denouncing Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, condemning the Deobandi for the content of his juridical rulings and for his alleged disrespect of the Prophet). Along the same lines, a fourth Deobandi scholar, Khalil Ahmad, was charged with believing that Satan’s knowledge was greater than that of the Prophet. Both Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Khalil Ahmad, the fātwa severely declared, confused Satan with God.

As in his allegations against Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, Ahmad Riza’s emphasis in these last two anti-Deobandi decisions rested entirely on perceived disrespect toward the Prophet (of whom they “decrease[d] the glory”) and, to a lesser
degree, to Allah (to whom they “ascribed lies”). Thus was put into words the very foundation of the theological Deobandi-Barelvi conflict; “it was the differing conceptions of the Prophet,” wrote Sanyal, “…that lay at the heart of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvi] denunciation of the Deobandis.” After Barelvi bodyguard Mumtaz Qadiri assassinated Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011/1432, he admitted that he had been motivated to do so after listening to the speeches of Barelvi cleric Hanif Qureshi Qadiri; in his description of the speech, which he evidently heard in person, he described the scholar’s behavior as well as the audience’s response—a perhaps powerful demonstration of the Barelvi devotion to Muhammad. “Delivering the sermon, Hanif Qureshi expressed his love for the prophet so passionately that his turban fell off, his hair got dishevelled, and the microphone, too, fell off. The congregation was overwhelmed by grief and burst into tears. Carried away by their love for the holy prophet, I, too, was in tears.” To the Barelvis, emotionally and spiritually invested as they were in the Prophet as an object of devotion, the Deobandi position seemed to smack of the worst form of disrespect.

Heretofore, however, the proto-rivalry had been played out mostly indirectly, as the two loosely organized scholarly groupings vied for influence and the right to speak for truth and righteousness among South Asia’s Muslims. Now, finally, it had come head to head.

It is interesting to note that these original arguments against Deobandism’s leading figures have remained potent barbs within the Barelvi arsenal to the present day. For example, observe the very same accusations, against the very same individuals, in the following paragraph, taken from one Barelvi publication published over half a century
after Ahmad Riza Khan’s original ruling (and consistently published in updated editions to the time of this writing):

*mwlewi* Ashraf ‘Ali sahyb Thanawi, in [his book] *hafiz ul-iman* [equated] the knowledge of the Holy Prophet with the knowledge of animals. *mwlewi* Khalil Ahmad sahyb Anbitwi makes the knowledge of Satan and the Angel of Death [mawlak ul-mawl] greater than the knowledge of the Holy Prophet in his book *borahin qat’aaa*. *mwlewi* Ismail sahyb of Delhi wrote that, during prayer, the thought of the Holy Prophet is worse than the thought of a donkey or an ox. *mwlewi* Qasim sahyb Nanautawi, in [his book] *tahzir ul-nas*, denied the finality of the Holy Prophet—and said that if other prophets come after the Holy Prophet, it would in no way contradict that finality; “final” denotes the “True Prophet,” while other prophets would only be temporary [‘aarrzī]. On this, even Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani said, “I am a prophet.” Thus [even] Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is their student when it comes to this issue.⁸⁰

In this modern-day Barelvi denunciation of Deobandism, the scholar (in this case a learned and well-respected Pakistani) has accused both Ashraf ‘Ali and Khalil Ahmad of disparaging the knowledge of the Prophet Muhammad, just as Ahmad Riza Khan had done in his groundbreaking 1902/1920 ruling. Similarly, Muhammad Qasim here stands accused of denying the Prophet’s finality—the same indictment directed toward him by Ahmad Riza. Additionally, a characteristic jab is taken at *sayyid* Ahmad’s companion, Ismail (more on this later), while the final insult lies in the grouping of the
four men named with the Ahmadiyya prophet-founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; in this last, too, the scholar has followed the lead of Ahmad Riza, who had done just that many decades before. Not long after the publication of his 1902/1320 fatwa, Ahmad Riza applied for confirmatory signatures from esteemed ‘alôma in Mecca and Medina. The signatures came. Perhaps with such an indictment, confirmed by the greatest scholars of the holiest sites in Islam, the scourge of Deobandism might be finally stamped out.

But the Deobandis responded. Deobandi ‘alôma across north India were recruited to gather signatures of their own in an attempt to countermand Ahmad Riza’s original juridical ruling; the list of signees was impressive. This prompted a counter-response from the Barelvis, who, in turn, gathered Indian signatures of their own to nullify the opinion of the Deobandis.\textsuperscript{81} The fatwa war drew thousands of Indian Muslim scholars into its orbit, more or less compelling them to take a stand: either behind famed ‘alym Ahmad Riza and the Barelvis or behind the ‘alôma trained at the great Deobandi dar ul’alêm. Thus the line was drawn between the two camps, as scholars of various stripes stood in support of one or the other position. Surely neither side would have guessed that the same division, over the same issues, utilizing the same arguments, and leveling the same accusations, would exist largely unchanged over a century later.

\textit{The Early Disputes II: the Battle for History.}

For the Deobandis, the years after the fall of Muslim power on the subcontinent literally represented a dark age, when “paganism and apostasy” (shôrk wî by’dât) rose up to engulf the land in the east and the west, in the north and the south.\textsuperscript{82} True religion had only been saved—and not in a figurative sense—during the long night of Muslim political fragmentation and British rule by the Deobandi fathers and the university they
had established. Without these towering personalities and the institution that they
created, Islamic knowledge would have ceased to be a force in the lives of South Asia’s
Muslims (later Deobandi writers would interpret non-Muslim victories over Muslim
populations in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo in much the same way). Fortunately for
religion in the subcontinent, however, figures like Shah Waliullah, Ṣayyid Ahmad of
Raebareli and his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim,
Rashid Ahmad, and the dar ul’alim as an institution—perhaps not unlike the monks of
Ireland’s crag-clinging monasteries after the fall of Rome (or, later, the Muslim Arab
conquerors of Iberia)—had served as critical cultural and theological preservers.

“Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi,” one dar ul’alim Deoband graduate told the author,
“was greater than your Voltaire.” Whether Muhammad Qasim can be compared to the
witty French writer-philosopher (let alone whether or not Voltaire qualifies as “the
author’s”) is up for debate, yet the fact remains that to the Deobandis, men like
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi were not just pious religious scholars but among the
great movers and shakers of human history. To the Prophet Muhammad the final great
Revelation had been revealed, but it had been the founders of Deobandism who had
preserved the purity of the faith during a time of crisis that had threatened the very
existence of true religion. The university at Deoband played a redemptive role within
Islamic history; “this was certain—that here there was a way, a place where Muslims
could go to dispel the darkness from their hearts and minds”: thus proclaims the
Deobandi historical narrative.

Moreover, Deobandi historians insisted that not only was their tradition the
standard-bearer for the rightful Sunni position, but that the Barelvis, and especially
Ahmad Riza Khan, should be equated with the ever-present opposition to the truth—
with “groups originat[ing] from amongst the Muslims themselves whose distinction was to deny the faith…” (italics added). From the very days of Muhammad, there had always been those who, despite their own great knowledge and understanding, yet turned from pure religion and persecuted its faithful adherents. The inhabitants of Mecca—the Prophet’s own people—had rejected that greatest of men virtually wholesale. Not many years later, the Shi’a sect had broken away from the ummat and criticized the righteous Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Usman. The Khawarij and the Nawasib sects had, in turn, sharply condemned ‘Ali—then murdered him in cold blood, all the while sure that they were in the right. “Intellect-defying deviance like this,” proclaimed one Deobandi writer, “can be found in abundance in the later periods of Islam also. And such people, who made it their chosen pastime to oppose, [criticize] and offend the best and the most pious people of their time continued to appear in different eras.”

Ahmad Riza Khan and his followers, then, were just the latest in a long line—even a tradition—of “deviancy” that stretched all the way back at least as far as seventh-century/first-century Arabia.

To buoy up this claim, the Deobandi historians dug deeply into Ahmad Riza Khan’s past, where they emphasized the allegedly dubious ties of his genealogy (which, it is pointed out, certainly did not include any of “India’s great families”) to the Persian pillager Nadir Shah and, more importantly, the Shi’a sect. For Ahmad Riza Khan’s family, so the Deobandi narrative asserts, descended from actual members of Nadir Shah’s “Shi’a army”—an army responsible for numerous and sundry wicked acts, including the sacking of Delhi and the murder of tens of thousands. Perhaps worse than the mayhem meted out by his troops, however, was the fact that Nadir Shah was himself a Shi’a, and his foray into Hindustan had been carried out not only in a quest for booty
but out of a desire to crush the dominant Sunni faith of the subcontinent. Ahmad Riza Khan’s family “was included among the Shi’a heretic’s [rafl] army”—indeed, “they came to fight”—and thus deserved a share of the ignominy associated with the Persian raider’s Indian invasion.88

And in the Deobandi narrative, the alleged links to Shi’ism don’t end with Nadir Shah. Deobandi historians also claim strong connections between the Shi’a nawabs of Awadh and Ahmad Riza Khan’s ancestors. The Shi’a dynasty that ruled Awadh after the fall of the Mughals has been briefly addressed already in this work, but Deobandis emphasize that the royal family had displaced Sunni rule, besides exhibiting an administrative style characterized by “unfair governance.” Most significantly of all, however, they interpret the still-strong presence of the Shi’a minority in South Asia as a distinctly Awadh-driven phenomenon; it was during this period that “this sect [the Shi’a] was disseminated more than during any other time,” one Deobandi historian declared. The Shi’a nawabs, in effect, had opened a floodgate and were thus directly responsible, perhaps more than any other group or institution, for the “spread of the Shi’a sect.” And in the midst of all of this, the Deobandis argue, Ahmad Riza Khan’s family remained “highly sympathetic” to the Awadhi ruling family; the Bareilly scholar’s great-grandfather, Kazim ‘Ali Khan, is particularly singled out in this regard as a Shi’a sympathizer and a beneficiary of the Awadhi state.89

The Barelvi ‘alema, of course, look at Islamic history through a very different lens. Among western academics, Sanyal has perhaps written the most concerning Barelvism, though others, including Metcalf, have also touched upon the movement at some length. Metcalf’s work focused on what she called “the reformist ‘ulama,” the “most important” of which were the Deobandis. But she adds the following:
Their opponents, the Barelwi ‘ulama or the Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jama’at adhered to a more custom-laden religious practice and a more intercessory style of religious leadership linked to the pirs of the medieval tombs. In fact, however, they also thought of themselves as reformist (that is, as scholars engaged in tajdid or renewal) and indeed—even if I and the Deobandis begrudge them the title of reformers—in their self-consciousness and their concern with disseminating familiarity with the Law, they were, in the end, close to those they opposed.  

Thus the Barelvis, too, saw themselves (and particularly their movement’s guiding light, Ahmad Riza Khan) as reformers and renewers of the faith. But their interpretation of the historical threats to South Asian Islam differ significantly from that of their Deobandi counterparts. For starters, Ahmad Riza Khan looked upon the Deobandi guiding lights in much the same way as they looked upon him—as “the latest in a line of kafırs that went all the way back to the Prophet’s and ‘Ali’s own time.” Ahmad Riza and his followers attacked those movements and personalities considered by Deobandis to be integral parts of their religious heritage.

Perhaps their most notable proto-Deobandi target: the jihād movement of sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his top lieutenant and most trusted disciple, Muhammad Ismail. The Barelvi narrative particularly singles out the latter as a deviant and a kafyr—and an unabashed convert to the clearly un-Islamic Wahhabi movement launched in Arabia under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. As proof, the Barelvis point to Ismail’s book tawqīf ul-īman (“Strengthening of the Faith”), published in Urdu in India,
claiming that Ismail simply plagiarized and summarized (xulasəh kia) Abdul Wahhab’s own kytab al-twhid (“Book of [God’s] Oneness”), a fundamental Wahhabi text. The long-held assertion that Deobandis are nothing but Wahhabis in disguise is thus buoyed by associating one of their predecessor-heroes directly with the Nejdi movement. Ismail is further denigrated by the Barelvi assertion that he was not martyred in a sacred struggle with the infidel Sikhs at all, but rather died unjustly fighting fellow Muslims, in this case Pathans, who had rightly taken offense at his aforementioned book.

Meanwhile, şeyyid Ahmad is pilloried as a fraud whose first jyhad was not targeted against the Sikhs, but against the Muslims “of Yaghistan” (i.e. the Pathans). 92

Both schools likewise tend to view their own historical roles—essentially that of the ‘aləma—quite differently. While the Barelvis point to the heroic deeds of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi and others during the Mutiny, this is rarely emphasized. The ‘aləma are not portrayed, generally speaking, as political heroes, but rather as saints—and particularly as anti-“Wahhabi” crusaders. This is the emphasis, mostly devoid of any overarching “liberty” narrative (as opposed to the Deobandis, who tend to stress their scholars’ pivotal roles in the “independence movement”). The direst threat to Islam was from within (i.e. not from the British), and it is thus the struggle against apostate groups like the Deobandis, as well as the Ahl-e-Hadis, out-and-out Wahhabis, and the Shi’a sect, that takes center-stage in the Barelvi (post-Mughal) “political” history of the ‘aləma. On the other hand, the Deobandi histories and biographies tend to support a radically different worldview, one in which it is a “fact [that] cannot be denied” that in the “effort for independence in Hindustan, no other group can boast of being a rival to the proud position held by the ‘aləma.” Indeed, the scholarly divines’ struggle stretched back to the “first war of independence” in the mid-nineteenth/mid-fourteenth century:
After the turbulent revolution of 1857, only this party [the ‘alɔma] kept the concept of independence alive. In the end, their continual endeavors spread the spirit of freedom across the entire country. hożrat

[Muhammad Qasim] Nanotvi was the greatest instigator of [the spread of] this concept, and the greatest preacher of this movement. With this enthusiasm he nurtured this concept [India’s liberty]. It is a pity that the writers of the history of the war of independence have not done justice to him.”

The Deobandi perception of India’s history thus places the ‘alɔma, from Shah Waliullah, not only at the center of the much-needed South Asian Islamic revivalist movement, but also—and just as critically—at the very head of the subcontinent’s liberty struggle against the tyranny of Britain. According to this Deobandi narrative, it is thanks to the ‘alɔma that those who traditionally have received credit for liberating India from its British rulers (by leading the nationalist movement) were inspired to do so at all—the “passion for freedom” kept alive by Muhammad Qasim after 1857/1273, infusing into much of Muslim India (and beyond) by Mahmud Hasan, and, having “passed over from the Muslims to the [‘other’] sons of the nation [əbna’-e-ṣawtәn]” in the course of the Khilafat movement (italics added). This is perhaps aptly illustrated by the cover art of one Deobandi history, entitled təhrık-e-rishmi-e-ʁwmal (“The Silk Handkerchief Movement”), a tome chronicling the shîx ul-hynd’s attempt to mount a Muslim-led invasion of British-controlled India from that country’s northwest frontier (covered later in this work). A map of the subcontinent is shown weighed down by four massive
chains, while the Union Jack waves over it triumphantly from atop a flagpole planted in
the middle of India. Only one place-name (apart from the Indian Ocean and the Bay of
Bengal) graces the cartograph: Deoband—and flames are rising therefrom. Deobandis
see themselves, their scholar-jurist leaders, and the revivalist movement out of the dar
ul’al’wm as the liberty spark that eventually set fire to British machinations on the
subcontinent.

**The Early Disputes III: “Rationalist” versus “Transmitted” Traditions.**

Meanwhile, both schools continued to espouse different emphases when it came to
the various Islamic sciences (as reflected in the curricula of their respective madārys).
An introduction to maqāwalat (the “transmitted,” or traditional, sciences) and maqāwalat
(which Sanyal calls the “rational position”) was given previously. While the Deobandis,
like Shah Waliullah and the “Delhi Group,” emphasized maqāwalat (and especially the
study of ḥadīṣ), Ahmad Raza Khan and the Barelvis, like the Khairabadi-Badayuni
Group, favored an emphasis on maqāwalat (plus the study of fiqh). The debate over which
group of subjects should take precedent in a given curriculum had flared up repeatedly
over the years, long before the establishment of either school, with scholars like Fazl-e-
Haq Khairabadi carrying the maqāwalat standard in the 1820s AD (1220s and 1230s AH),
especially against his Delhi-based academic opponents. By the 1850s and 1860s AD
(from the mid-1270s to the mid-1280s AH), Ahmad Raza’s father, Naqī Ṭal‘i Khan, had
entered the fray, echoing much of what Fazl-e-Haq had said several decades earlier.
From the 1890s/1310s into the early twentieth/fourteenth century, the mantle, so to
speak, of leadership among the maqāwalat scholars had fallen upon the formidable
shoulders of Ahmad Raza Khan himself, despite his family’s relative obscurity—even
when it might “naturally” have been carried by the sires of, say, the Khairabadi or Farangi Mahali families. But it just so happened that Ahmad Raza’s light shone brighter; it was Ahmad Raza, after all, who is said to have bested the more senior ‘Abd ul-Haqq Khairabadi, son of the great Fazl-e-Haq, in a debate at the Rampur court when he (Ahmad Raza) was only twenty years of age.⁹⁶

In any case, the same debate over curricula and emphases that had raged among scholars for years was inherited by the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and taken up by its divines. Deobandis continued to battle perceived Barelvi disregard for hadis instruction by augmenting the traditional dars-e-nizami curriculum with half a dozen hadis collections of their own, in their entirety, and continued to hold up mastery of hadis as the crowning achievement of one’s education.

**The Early Disputes IV: Other Points of Doctrine.**

True to the reformist spirit of their time, the early ‘alima associated with the dar ul’alwm at Deoband opposed a number of doctrines and customs that had, they asserted, crept into the practice of many Muslims on the subcontinent. Such allegedly impure elements were condemned as innovations or as synthesized Hinduism. One of these was the celebration of the anniversary of Muhammad’s birthday. Deobandis renounced such events as encouraging “the belief that a dead person was actually present.” Celebrating mawlyd, these scholars noted, “elevated the importance of a fixed day” and “resembled practices of the Hindus.”⁹⁷ Though Deobandis and other reformists opposed many “Barelvi” practices, such as ‘urs (literally “wedding” [Arabic], but in South Asia a ritual observance of the death anniversary of a pir), controversy over mawlyd was the most heated.⁹⁸
What did a Barelvi *mawlyd* celebration look like during this formative period?

Employing as her source a Rampur-published newspaper (*dābdāba-e-sikandari*), Sanyal describes a *mawlyd* celebration in 1916/1334 as commemorated by Ahmad Riza Khan. After dawn bathing and the donning of new clothes, Ahmad Riza’s disciples, admirers, and others “hurried to the mosque to greet him,” hoping for a chance to kiss the man’s hand. Thereafter began a poetic recitation of the Prophet’s qualities, after which the crowd all stood in remembrance of Muhammad’s birth. Ahmad Riza then delivered a sermon in which many of the doctrines embraced by Barelvis (but reprehensible to Deobandis) were uttered; in particular, he spoke of Muhammad as the first of Allah’s creations, formed of the very light of Allah himself—and, as the first light, the originator of *all* light, including that of the sun. In this, one might observe the mystical sheen Barelvis place upon Muhammad, much to the chagrin of their Deobandi counterparts. After Ahmad Riza’s sermon, another poetic reading “calling down Allah’s blessings…on the Prophet” concluded the meeting and was immediately followed by a feast.99

The concept of *naw-e-muhommadi*—positing Muhammad as pure light, or a “being with his own natural light”100—is distinctly Barelvi, as opposed to the Deobandi position that Muhammad, though God’s true and greatest Messenger, was yet a man (however perfect he might have been). Echoes of the Barelvi stance, however, can be heard in Ibn Ishaq’s eighth-century/first-century biography of the Prophet, later encapsulated by Lings in his *Muhammad*. “Aminah’s [the mother of Muhammad] one consolation was the unborn child of her dead husband,” we are informed,
and her solace increased as the time of her delivery drew near. She was conscious of a light within her, and one day it shone forth from her so intensely that she could see the castles of Bostra in Syria. And she heard a voice say to her, “Thou carriest in thy womb the lord of this people; and when he is born say: ‘I place him beneath the protection of the One, from the evil of every envier’; then name him Muhammad.”

Ahmad Riza would write several book-length treatments on the subject of Muhammad as a source of light (and hence a being without shadow); some are listed in the footnotes to this work.102

In any case, from the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi adherents over doctrine in the late nineteenth/early fourteenth century, it has been the sects’ relative stance on the attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most widened the divide.103 The ritual of the Barelvis compounded this doctrinal difference, particularly as they celebrated the birth of the Prophet. Indeed, *mawlid* is often characterized by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of religious poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date has traditionally been marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by high government officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the screening of films with “morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”),104 much of which is considered “innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion. More recently, several deadly clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place on this significant date of the Islamic calendar.
But Barelvi rituals associated with *mawlid* were not the only ones with which the Deobandis took issue. The Barelvi celebration of ‘*urs* also sparked the ire of the school out of Deoband. A typical Barelvi ‘*urs* celebration, centered on the saint’s *dargah*, lasted three to five days and included night-long reading of the Qur’an, the recitation of *n’ats* (poetic compositions praising the Prophet) and other verse lauding various religious figures, sermons delivered by the ‘*alima*, and possibly a pilgrimage to visit relics of the Prophet, saints, or other Sufi predecessors. The last day of the ‘*urs* celebration included *Gwāl*—the washing of the saint’s tomb (though, outside of the context of ‘*urs*, *Gwāl* refers to a full-body ablution necessary in some circumstances before prayer, among other rituals). Barelvi observation of ‘*urs* as of this writing follows much the same pattern. The ninetieth ‘*urs* of Ahmad Riza Khan himself, for example, for which his *dargah* served as venue, took place between 20 and 22 February 2009/24 and 26 Safar 1430. The celebration involved numerous speeches from some of Barelvism’s greatest guiding lights and boasted some five hundred thousand attendees gathered in the UP town of Bareilly.

On the other hand, the Barelvi denunciations of the Deobandis mostly rested on theological matters rather than ritual or practice. Some of Ahmad Riza Khan’s objections vis-à-vis the Deobandi founding fathers and their disciples—dealing with the finality of the Prophet and the Prophet’s “knowledge of the unseen”—have been touched upon briefly, above. But the issues brought up in Ahmad Riza’s 1902/1320 juridical ruling were not the only ones dividing the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought. Some other points at which the Barelvis took offense include:
• The issue of *māsābīḥ ymkan-e-kāzhb*—that is, whether or not God can tell a lie. Barelvis point to several works, notably Khalil Ahmad’s aforementioned *bārahin qaṭ’aah*, as well as Mahmud Hasan’s *jahād ul-maqāl*, as evidence that the Deobandis do indeed believe that it is possible for God to lie. The Barelvis hold that a lie, being “an evil, like theft,” could never be associated with God. Besides, God’s attributes are constant and unchanging (*wajyb*), thus the idea that He might “possibly” lie is absurd.

• The issue of the Prophet’s place as the most excellent of all mankind.

Barelvis claim that the Deobandis believe that any member of the *ummāt* may attain the same level of excellence in deed that Muhammad enjoyed—and even excel beyond the Prophet’s level in this regard. In this, Barelvis point to Muhammad Qasim’s *tāḥīr ul-nas*.

• The issue of referencing the Prophet. Barelvis insist that Muhammad must not be called by “ordinary names,” but should always be referred to as *ya rasul allah* or some similarly respectful designation. The Deobandis, they claim, teach that Muhammad, being just “a man,” may be referred to as “brother.” The writings of Muhammad Ismail, as well as Khalil Ahmad’s *bārahin qaṭ’aah*, are often used to support this claim.¹⁰⁶

• The issue of the application of the classifications *dar ul-harb* and *dar ul-yslam*.

For Deobandis, Hindustan had been *dar ul-harb* since at least the days of Shah Abdul Aziz, whose famous 1803/1218 *fatwa*, it will be remembered, had more or less propagated this view. It should be noted that the issue is not black-and-white, and differences have existed even within the most elite of Deobandi circles on this issue. For example, while Muhammad Qasim had
ruled that India was *dar ul-harb* (or at least “gave preference” to such a position), both Rashid Ahmad and Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi indicated that India was in fact *dar ul-yslam* (though in the context of other questions rather than in answer to direct queries concerning India’s status). Later Deobandi opinion (especially from the first decade of the twentieth century AD) clearly indicated that India was *dar ul-harb*. Meanwhile, Ahmad Riza Khan was consistent and unambiguous in his ruling that India was absolutely *dar ul-yslam*; since Muslims could freely worship according to *shari’at*, it must be so. The Bareilly divine would write several books on this subject alone (some of which are listed in this work’s endnotes). Thus the early Barelvis, generally speaking, did not support either the *hyjrәt* or *jyhad* movements in which Deobandis and others took active part.

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**Muslims, Hindus, and Politics: c.1875—1916/c. 1292—1334.**

The seemingly endless speculation surrounding the great 1947/1366 partition of a subcontinent began years before the event itself even occurred, and continues to fascinate scholars to the present day. Was the episode that gave birth to Pakistan, ripping two wings off of India—West Pakistan in the west, East Bengal (later East Pakistan, then Bangladesh) in the east—inevitable? If not, what event or series of events are to blame for setting in motion the greatest schism of the twentieth century? Was it the refusal of the princes to join the All-India Federation, provided for under the constitution of 1935/1354? After all, it was this decision that caused the British government to place its hopes, previously invested in the princes, firmly in the lap of Jinnah and the League, certainly a major turning point that receives relatively minor
notice. Or was it the resignation of the Congress’s provincial ministries in
1939/1358? This move, in hindsight almost certainly a major blunder, created a power
vacuum in the country—of which Jinnah took full advantage (and which pushed Viceroy
Linlithgow to lean ever more heavily on the League). Speaking of Linlithgow, was it
the Viceroy’s conviction, and actions to that end, that Jinnah should be built up as the
“sole spokesman” of all of India’s Muslims that led, eventually, to India’s great split?
Linlithgow himself had stated, after all, that his goal was to “shepherd all the Muslims
into the [Muslim League] fold.” Along these lines, was it the British tactic of playing
off the Muslims, in the form of the League, against the Congress, thus “[creating] the
conditions on the ground that made partition possible” just a few years later? Or was
partition born, as some scholars insist, of the British need to preserve an imperial
foothold in South Asia (one that could protect India from Soviet influence and Central
Asia from Soviet designs on oil), a need that led to the Anglo-Muslim League alliance
and, eventually, the emergence of a separate (British-friendly) state called Pakistan?

Whatever the answer to this highly controversial interrogative, one thing is certain:
at least some of the more significant roots of Partition can be clearly identified several
decades before any of the above-mentioned phenomena—within the politics of Hindu-
Muslim unity (and disunity) in the quarter century between about 1890/1307 and
1915/1333, and particularly in the year 1905-1906/1323-1324. For it was over the
course of that brief latter period that several major developments emerged,
developments that would push Muslims of varying stripes into a seemingly single
“Muslim” fold in the name of sticking together against what was perceived as a rising
and even militant Hindu tide. Indeed, one could make a strong argument (and many do)
that the “Hindus” of “Hindustan” were largely indifferent “towards Muslims as
Muslims,” until the very period in question—when “a separateness began to be asserted by the Muslims themselves.” Enter Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Barelvi guiding light Ahmad Riza Khan, poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, and, eventually, League head Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah. This alleged prior Hindu indifference “suggests that [the] political question of whether ‘Muslims are a separate nation’ was fundamentally misplaced, which is why it became and still remains so divisive.”

In any case, something happened over the course of this period (c. 1890/1307 and c. 1915/1333) that abruptly made Muslims highly aware of their own “separateness.”

In the Deccan, Tilak’s “strictly Hindu” cultural nationalism had roared to life in the 1890s/1310s through a combination of his Marathi-language political paper (Kesari, meaning “The Lion”) and the revival of a centuries-old Hindu festival commemorating the birth of one of India’s most popular figures of worship: Ganesh, Shiva’s elephant-headed son. The latter became an annual affair lasting ten wild days, as rural peasants poured into central India’s towns and cities to sing, dance, eat, and experience “patriotic” presentations based on stories from ancient Hindu scripture. The dark side of these “Ganapati festivals,” however, lay in the communalism that they fostered, particularly in the form of the “Ganesh guards,” organized groups of armed young Hindus who sought to disrupt the worship of Muslims by means of raucous demonstrations outside of mosques. Such displays obviously alienated the local (and sizable) Muslim communities. Things got worse for the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity after 1895/1312, when Tilak inaugurated a second major festival, this one commemorating the birth of the great Maratha soldier-king Shivaji, who had fought so relentlessly against both the Bahmani sultans of the Deccan and the Mughals to the north. Shivaji was cast as a heroic warrior for Hinduism crusading against the evil
forces of Islam (like the British cast as invading aliens), and while millions of Indians became caught up in the nationalist movement by means of such symbolism, millions of Indian Muslims—a quarter of the subcontinent’s population—found no comfort, and more than a little trepidation, in this explosion of stringently Hindu nationalism. In 1897/1315, that nationalism produced its first act of violent terrorism when one of Tilak’s disciples, almost certainly inspired by Tilak’s appeal to Hindu scripture as potential justification for killing, assassinated a British official.

Similar Hindu nationalist surges were then occurring in Bengal, where, by the turn of the century, “bānde mātārām” (“I bow to thee, Mother”)—an explicitly Hindu equivocation of India with the Hindu goddess, or “Mother,” Durga—had become the clarion call for Hindu nationalists both in Bengal and beyond to struggle for independence against the British yoke. “Bande Mataram…was the cry of the day,” wrote one Indian nationalist of prominence. “It was chanted in schools, in colleges, in streets, in houses, in public squares, almost everywhere.”114 (In 2009, the dar ul’alwm at Deoband issued a fatwa forbidding Muslims to utter the phrase, despite its patriotic symbolism, setting off a firestorm of controversy and prompting some Indians to call for the Deobandis’ immediate expulsion from the country).115 Meanwhile, members of the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj (a phenomenon one British observer predicted could become “the most important religious movement in the whole of India”), founded in 1875/1292 in Bombay, were highly active across Hindustan—and often regarded as the bane of both “the Musulman Mullah and the Christian missionary” as a result of their often successful efforts aimed at the “reconversion” of formerly Hindu (and now mostly Muslim) populations.116 By the first decade of the twentieth/fourteenth century, the
movement would motivate Hindu nationalist political activists, too, particularly in the Punjab.

Set within this context, perhaps the divided “Muslim” reaction to the organization of a pan-“Indian” entity challenging (however gingerly at first) British authority is not so surprising, especially given the fact that the entity in question was widely regarded as a Hindu one. In 1885/1902, less than two decades after the founding of the dar ul’al’wm at Deoband, a group of sixty-nine British-educated Indians (mostly Hindus from the Madras and Bombay presidencies), one Englishman, and two Scots gathered together at Bombay’s Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit College. Their purpose: the founding of an organization that would stand as a voice (nay, the voice) of the Indian people; they called it the Indian National Congress. The group attracted scant attention at first, relative to its later importance, but by 1888/1905 its activities had elicited a response—highly negative—from the great Islamic reformer and founder of the Muslim university at Aligarh, the aforementioned Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Decidedly a man of action, the modernist Muslim leader—who had supported the British during the 1879-1882/1296-1299 Ahmed Arabi-led Egyptian revolt, and would do so again when the British more or less backed the Greeks in their quarrels with the Ottoman empire in 1897/1315—created his own organization, clearly meant to be a “Muslim” alternative to the mostly Hindu Congress, which he named the United India Patriotic Association. The group was explicit in its opposition to the Indian National Congress—and, just as importantly, was committed to actually “strengthen[ing] British rule in India.”¹¹⁷ “The bulk of the educated Mohammedans has opposed the Congress,” wrote Lala Lajpat Rai, “in order to please the Government and win their gratitude.”¹¹⁸
The Deobandis responded to the INC-UIPA division quickly. In an 1888/1306 ḥudūd written by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and despite the communalist tensions brewing in various parts of India at the time, the aged Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn declared that, when it came to worldly affairs (like politics), cooperation with the Hindus was permitted. As long as said cooperation did not cause “damage to the faith,” the Deobandi leader could find no fault in it. Additionally, Rashid Ahmad warned the Muslims of India that they “should not unite [themselves] with Sayyid Ahmad,” his organization, or his political movement and philosophy. The Deoband-Aligarh breach that grew mostly from this incident would create in the minds of historians and scholars of later generations the idea that the major political rivalry within the pre-Partition Muslim community was between these two parties. There is some truth in this, certainly—but the divide foreshadowed the political schism between Deobandi and Barelvi that was soon to follow (and which, it could be argued, would have far more significant and lasting implications). After all, it was from the ranks of the Aligarh school that the leaders of the Muslim League would come, and the Barelvis would throw their weight, however reluctantly, behind them. The Deobandis, by and large, chose to cooperate with the Congress; by 1916/1334, J. T. Sutherland could write that the INC was “the most important political organization in the country.” It might be said that the seeds of the Deobandi-Barelvi political rivalry were thus sown when Sayyid Ahmad Khan decided not to embrace the INC, but to oppose it.

(Incidentally, if any group could claim political leadership of India’s Muslims in the early twentieth century/1320s, it was, thanks to their position and organization, probably the Aligarh party, whose stance, generally speaking, was one of loyalty to the British regime and aloofness from the nationalist movement. But the tenuousness of the
Aligarh group’s position was revealed beginning in 1912/1330 with the publication of *Al Hilal*, Abul Kalam Azad’s highly nationalist Urdu journal; its high circulation—reportedly twenty-six thousand per week after only two years—and popularity were evidence that a significant number of educated Muslims did not, in fact, feel politically represented by the Aligarh party.)

In any case, and even in the face of a rising Hindu consciousness enmeshing itself into the pan-Indian nationalist movement, the Deobandis had proclaimed that cooperation with the Hindus, however limited by appropriate bounds, was the proper course of action. This was to mark the first major political schism between Deobandi and Bareli, for though the very name “Pakistan” wouldn’t emerge until 1933/1352, Bareli leader Ahmad Riza Khan was a staunch advocate of his own “two-nation theory,” one predating Jinnah’s, Iqbal’s, and even Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s by several decades. In the words of one of his supporters, “[Ahmad Riza] raised the voice against composite nationalism at a time when Iqbal and the Qaid-e-Azam were captives of [the idea]… One might say that Imam Ahmad Riza was the leader while these two noble individuals were the followers with the respect to the Two-Nation Theory.” In the midst of Tilak’s politicization of Hindusim, the founding of the mostly Hindu INC, the Deobandi call for Hindu-Muslim unification within the political realm, and Sayyid Ahmad’s plea against any sort of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation, Ahmad Riza Khan argued that India was essentially composed of two very distinct groups: (1) the idol-worshippers (*but pərəst*) and (2) the idol-breakers (*but shykən*; incidentally, this title is popularly applied to Mahmud of Ghazni as the destroyer of a major idol at Somnath). In so doing, Ahmad Riza was applying a term that had been used to refer to India’s pagan population since ancient times. Indeed, the term *but pərəst* had
probably first been applied by the Central Asian Zoroastrians, in reference to Buddhist (hence but) penetration into the region. By the time Muslim armies began pouring into the subcontinent via the northwest, but parast had come to refer to an “idol-worshipper” generally, without distinction between sects or religions. Unification of these two diametrically opposed groups into a single polity, Ahmad Riza argued, would be impossible—indeed, it violated shari’at, since Hindus were clearly to be looked upon as a people with whom to be at war, making any sort of united front with them forbidden.

When, decades after Ahmad Riza’s death, the call came for just such a division (and despite its source), perhaps it was only natural for most Barelvis to interpret the League’s demand for Pakistan through this lens—and lend their voices to those advocating Partition. After all, their movement’s greatest teacher had promoted something similar. It may not be an overstatement to say that Ahmad Riza’s own political philosophy had thus laid the groundwork for a general Barelvi acceptance of the demand for Pakistan a quarter-century after his passing. The challenge, of course, is that, should Ahmad Riza Khan and Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah ever had had the chance to sit and chat about their separate visions for a Muslim homeland on the subcontinent after winning the Partition battle, they likely wouldn’t have agreed on much at all. Still, to the time of this writing, Barelvis continue to accuse Deobandis of “generally being with the Hindus”; Deobandis, according to the Barelvi argument, literally “hate” (nafiat karna) Muslims, against whom “their attacks” are “always” aimed. This position traces back to the original political positions taken by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Ahmad Riza Khan. To this day, too, a common Barelvi claim is that the Pakistan Movement may never have been born if not for Ahmad Riza’s original denunciation of composite nationalism—and any meaningful cooperation with Hindus whatsoever.
In any case, Ahmad Riza’s stance was strictly communal, forbidding Hindu-Muslim political cooperation. But his reasoning went beyond the idea that the two communities were simply too different—indeed, opposed—to ever practically unite within the context of politics. Indeed, Ahmad Riza’s definition of religious community was spelled out in “cultural rather than political terms” (italics added), according to Sanyal. Within this cultural framework, Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly advised his followers not to engage in political action against British rule in India. The British, he argued, had not interfered in the internal affairs of the Muslim community over which they governed. He pointed out that Muslims were still free to practice their religion, in private and in public. And he backed up his arguments with examples from classical Islamic sources. Ahmad Riza’s teachings in this regard naturally rubbed up against strong opinion to the contrary, even among his own followers, and, sure enough, a schism developed; some followed his entreaty while others rebelled.\textsuperscript{128} Despite this, Ahmad Riza maintained what one renowned scholar of South Asian Islam described as “his normal stance of support for government…”\textsuperscript{129} But many Muslims disagreed with Ahmad Riza’s assertion that the British had not interfered in the Muslim community’s ability to practice their faith. This was particularly true when it came to the law. Early company officials (under Warren Hastings), like well-known Orientalist Sir William Jones, for example, strove to specifically delineate “Mohammadan” law as a basis for its practical application within British courts. Whatever the intention of such efforts, this almost certainly had a rigidifying effect on what had most likely been a far more fluid system, with the several Islamic legal schools and their variants being variously applied across the subcontinent according to local conditions. Indeed, the British invested “almost exclusive authority” in a small handful of medieval Islamic legal texts that they
Later, an 1860/1277 penal code effectively prevented Islamic criminal law from being applied in British courts altogether; the move was justified in the name of “unity, precision, and simplicity,” as central authorities are apt to do. Many Indian courts went without a Muslim qazi, or judge of Islamic law, forcing some ‘alāma (both Deobandi and Barelvi) to create their own shadow court system.

In any case, Ahmad Riza Khan’s assertion that “there was no religious justification for Indian Muslims taking an anti-British stand” drew hisses from many rival ‘alāma, who accused him of being pro-British. Many Deobandis even came to regard Ahmad Riza as an out-and-out British agent, a charge consistently leveled against the Bareilly scholar to the time of this writing, despite the lack of any hard evidence. These allegations aside, Sanyal describes Ahmad Riza’s more complicated relationship with British authority as follows:

Ahmad Riza indicated his distance from the British Indian state in a number of small but nonetheless significant ways. He himself cited some of these. He had written anti-British poems, he said, in some works he named; he had spoken out against the Nadwa [who were close to the Deobandis], which enjoyed British support; he had opposed ‘Abd ul-Bari’s fatwa on the Kanpur mosque affair of 1913, in which ‘Abd ul-Bari had said that the demolition (by the British civil authorities) was permissible as it had taken place outside the mosque proper, and so on. When mailing a postcard he would deliberately affix the stamp (which had a picture of Queen Victoria on it) upside down as a mark of disrespect to the Queen. More importantly, his refusal to attend a British-run court
in 1916 showed that he did not acknowledge its authority over himself. But he never made the British a target of his writings—as he did numerous contemporary Muslim movements and even, to some extent, Hindus—because they did not really matter to him. Had the British had an active anti-Muslim policy in terms of interference in religious affairs, however, Ahmad Riza would undoubtedly have become very anti-British.\textsuperscript{133}

Thus, according to Sanyal, Ahmad Riza’s aloofness to the politics of British rule in India was rooted in the fact that he and all Muslims remained free to practice their day-to-day religion. British interference here would likely have driven him to agitate against the government, though, unlike the Deobandis, such agitation would almost certainly not have included any sort of joint effort with India’s Hindu communities. It is possible, too, that Ahmad Riza’s seemingly gentler attitude towards the British had something to do with the political situation in which he was raised—circumstances that were quite different from the Deobandi fathers’. After all, Ahmad Riza’s home territory of Rohilkhand had fallen under British East India Company rule more than half a century before he had even been born (1801/1216; Ahmad Riza was born in 1856/1272). Perhaps British rule was, for him, “normal”—or at least the only sort of government he had ever known, as opposed to the experience of military and political loss felt firsthand by the founders of Deobandism.

It was also during this period that the Indian Councils Act (1909/1327)—known commonly as the Morley-Minto Reforms—was passed, among other things granting Indians (of privileged class) a layer of self-government, however thin. Such Indians
could now elect other such Indians to seats on provincial legislative councils, where previously such seats had been either held by a British person or by an Indian appointed thereunto. Crucially, the Act granted Muslims reserved seats on these provincial legislative councils out of proportion to their population, a decision borne of the Muslim fear that without such safeguards, they would be reduced to second-class citizen status in a Hindu-dominated country. The reforms are relevant to this study in that they paved the way for further reforms in 1919/1411 and 1935/1354, galvanizing the ire of Indian (mostly Hindu) nationalists who viewed separate electorates as a communalistic measure that would prevent the sort of Hindu-Muslim Indian nationalism they were ostensibly trying to foster. By institutionalizing separate electorates, the Act pushed the Congress, in 1916, to accept the arrangement in the Lucknow Pact—and when, with the coming forth of the Nehru Report, the separate electorates system was dismissed, it led to a permanent breach both between many Hindu and Muslim political leaders and their parties and organizations and between Muslims who had, up to that time, been supporting the Congress.

Meanwhile, events overseas contributed to the development of a sort of pan-Islamic resurgence among Muslims of otherwise diverse political worldviews. In particular, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913/1330-1331), which saw various once-Ottoman polities attacking the Ottoman empire (claiming that their territory, based on ethnic considerations, should extend further into the Ottoman domain), motivated Muslims around the globe to rally to the cause of the Turks against what was interpreted as a mostly Christian attempt to hack away at a once-proud Muslim empire. Deobandi leaders enthusiastically united their voices with those advocating pan-Islamic solidarity
in the face of non-Muslim incursions; Mahmud Hasan and other divines of Deoband were particularly vocal in this regard. On the other hand, Ahmad Riza and many of his Barelvi acolytes shied away from such advocacy, and indeed, many of the subcontinent’s ‘alma followed suit. Several fatwas began circulating around India, arguing against any sort of pan-Islamic intervention into the affairs of the Turks. These dissenting scholars saw the conflicts then embroiling the Ottoman Empire as more of a civil war—one that certainly did not affect Indian Muslims. In any case, they argued, the war was a political one, not a religious one; not even Islam’s holy sites (over which the caliphs had long been the guardians) were in danger. Finally, these juridical rulings pointed out, as did Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly in 1913/1331, that the Ottoman sultanate was not the true Islamic caliphate—and thus Muslims were under no spiritual obligation whatsoever to go running to its defense. On multiple occasions, Mahmad Hasan harshly criticized such fatwas (in particular one written by ‘Abdul Haq and signed by many others, which was brought to his attention several times and evidently received wide publicity); their writers criticized back, and the issue remained divided. Still, for millions of Muslims around the globe, including in India, the events rocking the Ottoman regime drove solidarity more than division.

The next year (1914/1332), Turkey entered the Great War and Sultan Mehmed V issued a proclamation of jiyad against the Allies (including the British, of course)—a call that the British tried to squelch by assuring the Muslims under its rule that Islam’s holy sites would under no circumstances be harmed. In India, Muslims of all stripes rushed to affirm their fealty to London (though, in the case of some who did this—like ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi—such affirmations should be taken with a grain of salt, especially considering their political machinations at the time, not to mention their subsequent
anti-British activities). Once again, too, the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic was made evident when the British government induced leading loyal ‘alma, including Ahmad Riza Khan, to issue juridical rulings supporting loyalty to the British government, in opposition to such “extremists” as Mahmud Hasan and Farangi Mahal’s ‘Abdul Bari. The rulings echoed those of previous years advocating for Indian Muslims to leave the Turkey issue well enough alone. Still, such events drove millions of Muslims into a more explicitly anti-British camp, one that would facilitate cooperation even with Hindus in order to rid the subcontinent of its foreign overlords.

Perhaps the greatest force influencing Barelvi rejection of Muslim-Congress cooperation was the ardent devotion that its founder demonstrated towards the self-reliance of the Muslim community. In fact, according to one fatwa, written in 1913/1331 (one which Sanyal asserts may have been his only juridical ruling, from among thousands, dealing strictly with practical, political issues rather than purely religious ones), Ahmad Riza encouraged the adoption of a four-pronged program aimed at insulating the Muslim community of India from both potential Hindu predators and the British Raj. In effect, he was offering an alternative to the Deobandi approach. The fatwa suggested Muslims should: (1) boycott British Indian courts, instead relying on local Muslim law; (2) purchase what they needed only from fellow Muslims (and never go into debt to Hindu moneylenders); (3) if wealthy and city-dwelling, open up interest-free banks for the use of fellow Muslims; and (4) acquire additional light and knowledge pertaining to their faith, thereby strengthening the Muslim community as a whole. If the fatwa represents Ahmad Riza’s political philosophy vis-à-vis the political situation facing the Indian Muslim community of the time, it may be highly instructive. For it reveals, first, a desire to see the Muslim community function separately from all others;
in other situations, as previously mentioned, Ahmad Riza and his followers would go further, refusing to work even with fellow Muslims if they belonged to “lost” groups or espoused “bad” doctrine. Second, it suggests that Ahmad Riza did not feel that the Muslims were in any state to take an active role in the politics of the time; they needed first to shore themselves up, both temporally and spiritually. Third, it demonstrates a desire on the part of Ahmad Riza to see a restoration (even elevation), however slowly, of the traditional role of the ‘ulama within the Muslim community. A boycott of a major pillar of the British Raj—that of the court system—was a bold move, one that he would take himself in 1917/1335. All of this goes a long way in explaining Barelvi opposition not just to standard Deobandi political positions, but to Deobandi involvement in nationalist politics in the first place.

But perhaps the most important event in its long-term ramifications for the possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity came in 1905/1323. It was in this year that the great partition of Bengal into more or less Muslim and Hindu sections took place. The action, described by Gokhale as “concocted in the dark and carried out in the face of the fiercest opposition,” would foreshadow the far greater partition that would follow around forty years later. Viceroy Curzon insisted that the move was strictly practical, meant to deal with what otherwise represented the bureaucratic nightmare of administering a province of almost ninety million inhabitants. But to the Bengali-speaking Hindus of Bengal, and particularly the bhadralok of Calcutta, whose fearless opinion had so long irked the Crown’s representatives on the subcontinent, the move was clearly meant to isolate and nullify any influence they might have enjoyed as a majority constituency. By dividing the province down its middle, with the new border just to the east of Calcutta, the British—whether by coincidence or by design—had neatly created a Muslim
majority province to the east (in Eastern Bengal and Assam) and a Hindu-majority province to the west in which Bengali-speakers suddenly found themselves a minority in their own bifurcated country (outnumbered by the combined Bihari- and Oriya-speaking peoples inhabiting the newly created political zone).

While Hindus across Bengal and Hindustan protested vociferously, the Muslims of newly created Eastern Bengal and Assam, previously dominated politically by Calcutta, suddenly found themselves un-beholden to the Hindu moneylenders and landowners to the west, and their one-time backwater of Dhaka abruptly elevated to provincial capital status. Indeed, to these millions, it was difficult not to interpret the hotly contested partition of Bengal as a very good thing. But beyond the political freedom that came with the move, it was the Hindu reaction across India that really isolated many Muslims, causing them to band together in opposition to their fellow Indians of Hindu persuasion. Muslim leaders in Dhaka and Aligarh reached out to one another as a result, and in October of 1906/Sh’aban of 1324, a delegation of said leaders under the nominal headship of the twenty-nine-year-old third Aga Khan—ostensibly representing the community of Islam in Hindustan—met Viceroy Minto. Their purpose: to lobby for the political rights of India’s Muslims. This initial delegation would later evolve into what the world would come to know as the All-India Muslim League, officially organized and founded (significantly, in Dhaka) two months later, on 30 December 1906/14 Dh’ul Q’adah 1324. The partition of Bengal had thus awoken the Muslim minority—or at least the most financially, socially, and politically elite among them—and provided the stimulus necessary for their initial political organization. From now on, the fate of the independence movement would, in large measure, be dictated by the dynamic between these two now-politically-organized groups. The battle lines had
been drawn, and the Deobandis and the Barevis, by and large, would choose to stand on opposite sides.

With the annullment of the Bengal partition in 1911/1329 under largely “Hindu” pressure, “Muslim” disappointment only increased. Indeed, the British decision to restore Bengal “annoyed the Muslims” and was “a clear breach of assurances and commitments made by the British regarding the inviolability of the partition.” And the following years clearly demonstrated that a sort of political “turning point” in the history of Indian Muslims had occurred. “It could be argued,” one Pakistani legal commentator would opine decades later, “that the seeds of Pakistan were sown by this one event.”

With the passing of a couple years, however, there were signs that the communalism might actually be ebbing in the face of a common enemy. A younger cadre of Aligarhists (whence came the core of the League), disaffected by Sir Sayyid’s old loyalist policy, pushed a more ardently anti-British agenda. Many of these had been influenced by a rationalist-traditionalist scholar from Azamgarh, maulana Shibli (d. 1914 AD), whose passion for the glorious Muslim past seemed veritably contagious and whose politics lined up more or less with the Deobandi leadership’s. Under this pressure from within, in 1913/1331 the Muslim League adopted a position much like that of the Congress’s, advocating for a level of self-government in India, albeit still under the auspices of the British Crown. This shift in stance opened the way for a brief period of communal unity, generally speaking, exemplified by the Lucknow Pact of 1916/1334 (according to which the Congress agreed to the League demand for separate communal electorates) and the subsequent cooperation of the Muslim League with the Indian National Congress. One of the most dedicated proponents of Hindu-Muslim unity was
a young London-trained lawyer named Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah. Ahmad Riza Khan and many of his Bareli followers, meanwhile, were fierce opponents of the Pact; the divine out of Bareilly characterized Deobandi cooperation with the Hindus as nothing more than a disgraceful “sell-out.”

**Spreading the Rivalry: the Proliferation of mādarys Networks.**

Rashid Ahmad Gangohi passed away in 1905/1323, and with him the last of the major “first generation” founders. The Deobandi university’s first student, Mahmud Hasan, easily slipped into the role of the revivalist movement’s leader. Described by one of his more illustrious students as “of spare frame, unassuming” (and even “skeletal, frail,” though in his capacity as a teacher or lecturer reportedly able to assume the presence of “a lion of God”) Mahmud Hasan had, to quote Faruqi, “drunk deep in the spirit and the ideas underlying the foundation of the [**dar ul’alum**]” and was a “man of action.” Virtually since birth, Mahmud Hasan—by virtue of his family—had been tied to the institution at Deoband and the movement that grew out of it. His father, Zulfiqar ‘Ali (d. 1904 AD), had studied at Delhi College with the great Mamluk ‘Ali and Sadr al-Din Azardah, as had his uncle, the aforementioned Mahtab ‘Ali. Later, Mahtab ‘Ali would be numbered “among Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,” while Zulfiqar ‘Ali, who worked as a professor at Bareilly College and as deputy inspector of mādarys in Meerut before relocating to Deoband, would gain a significant reputation as a great scholar himself, particularly of Arabic (but also of Farsi and even “western knowledge”). At Deoband, Zulfiqar ‘Ali’s family acquired a sort of scholarly distinction in the area, despite the proliferation of both noted local ‘alama and great families for whom religious scholarship was a long tradition; his three younger brothers, mawlana Hakim
Muhammad Hasan (who worked in the service of Rashid Ahmad in Gangoh, studied at the *dar ul’alw*m in Deoband, and later served as a teacher there for over four decades), *mawlana* Hamid Hasan, and *mowlvi hafiz* Muhammad Mahasan, all achieved impressive levels of scholarship. Both Mahtab ‘Ali and Zulfiqar ‘Ali had served as teachers to the young Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, both were among the Deobandi university’s most distinguished and active founders, and both became “pillars” of the *dar ul’alw*m’s *majlisy-eshwra*. In fact, Mahmad Hasan’s “entire household participated in this scholarly movement [*the founding of the *dar ul’alw*m at Deoband*].”¹⁴³ Thus it was perhaps only natural that under Mahmad Hasan—evidently the *wali* of Imdadullah himself—the Deobandi movement would enter its first explicitly political, even anti-British, phase. Concurrent with that development was the establishment and spread of a Deobandi “network” of associated *mardarys*, typically run by former students of the *dar ul’alw*m at Deoband and dedicated to the spiritual (including political) vision of the school’s founders and current leadership. During Mahmud Hasan’s tenure as the university’s *sadr mardarys*, the student population is reported to have tripled, from around two hundred when he first took office to over six hundred when he passed away. Around a dozen schools associated themselves with the institution at Deoband by 1880/1297, ten years before Mahmud Hasan began as principal. By 1900/1317, a decade into his tenure, there were around forty.

Indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century AD (a decade after Mahmud Hasan was made principal) the *dar ul’alw*m had associated schools established as far east as Chittagong, and in Dhaka, Calcutta, Patna, Arrah, Darbhanga, Benares, Ghazipur, Mubarakpur, Jaunpur, Fatehpur, Shahjahanpur, Karnal, Lahore, Gujranwala, and as far south as Madras.¹⁴⁴ In the northwest (especially in Peshawar) among the Pathan tribes,
Deobandism quickly established itself, too. Thanks in large part to the groundwork laid by the combination of Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidi dominance (set in motion after the 1748/1161 Afghan raid of Delhi) and the influence of sayyid Ahmad and, later, the powerful Akhund of Swat, many among the tribal ḍālūma—and particularly those of the eastern Pathan, in what is today northwestern Pakistan—looked to Deoband for religious inspiration and spiritual guidance. After all, Akhund Ghaffur had acted as a major player in what might be considered a nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century microcosmic precursor to the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry: the feud between the divine of Swat and the Kotah Mullah, Muruf Bey. The latter had supported the British (as did, in the eyes of many Deobandis as of the time of this writing, Ahmad Riza Khan, however tacitly) even as the Akhund actively fought against them. In addition, the Akhund was a dedicated revivalist, while the Kotah Mullah, according to Abdul Ghaffur, incorporated un-Islamic ritual into his religious practice (the same charge, of course, leveled by Deobandis against Barelvis a few years later). Later, too, the pir of Manki Sharif would split with the Hadda Mullah, by far the Akhund’s most prominent spiritual successor, over similar religious differences; the schism would foreshadow the divide, half a century later, between the pir of Manki Sharif (now classified as Barelvi and a hard-core Muslim League supporter) and the (mostly Deobandi, INC-supporting) “Red Shirts” in the years before Partition. As the Akhund’s “pedagogic line” was the “dominant one” among the eastern Pathans, perhaps it was only natural that Deobandism would find such ready acceptance there. Thus, to quote Haroon, the pirimuridi line of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mulla, unified by the bait and directed by the Hadda Mulla into the twentieth century, became
the vehicle for the dissemination of a revivalist ideology of religious practice through the eastern Pakhtun regions, and, with its creation, the Tribal Areas.¹⁴⁶

The continuity that existed between the Akhund Ghaffur’s line of authority and the *dar ul’alwm* at Deoband—a continuity that resulted in the widespread establishment of Deobandi *mādārys* among the Pathans—may be demonstrated by the example of the Hadda Mullah’s “most important” disciple, Fazal Wahid (d. 1937 AD), later known as Haji Turangzai. Fazal Wahid initially studied under one of the Akhund’s *murids*, then in a Waliullahi *mādārsh* in Tehkal, before relocating to Deoband in order to study at the now-famous university there. Just the fact that he chose to make the long journey to the UP to study at Deoband demonstrates, perhaps, the institution’s powerful pull in the Pathan northwest. In any case, at Deoband he became friends with Mahmud Hasan, with whom he performed the *hāj* to Mecca. While in Arabia, Fazal Wahid met with and received *bi’at* from none other than Imdadullah, to whom he swore to carry on the legacy of *sāyyid* Ahmad of Raebareli—to “promote revivalism and opposition to the British,” specifically among the Pathans. After returning home, Fazal Wahid became a student of the Hadda Mullah, only to become a famous *‘ālīm* himself, helping to spread Deobandism in the tribal areas.¹⁴⁷

A number of other prominent Deoband graduates moved to the Pathan northwest after the completion of their religious training, along with several Pathan *‘alīma* who likewise received their education at the *dar ul’alwm*. Many of these former students established Deobandi seminaries of their own in the frontier region. One of these Pathan Deobandis (described by Haroon as “the most important”) was Saifur Rahman,
from Mathra. After studying at Deoband, Saifur Rahman taught for some time in an ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi-founded school near Delhi, where he (Saifur Rahman) recruited many other Pathan students to join him. After 1914/1332, he moved back to the northwest frontier (followed by many of his students) to carry on the revivalist endeavor among his fellow Pathans.\textsuperscript{148}

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From the very beginning, the Barelvis lagged behind their Deobandi counterparts within the domain of \textit{m\=adr\=as\=h}-building. Sanyal attributes Ahmad Riza Khan’s seeming lack of emphasis on the religious seminary (at least in its revivivalist form, as in the case of the Deobandi \textit{dar ul’al\=um} or even Sir Sayyid’s college at Aligarh) to his own educational experience, gleaning as he did the vast majority of his own knowledge by himself from books, or at the feet of a small handful of teachers in the traditional, one-on-one setting. Still, by 1920/1338 the movement could claim a number of institutions as adhering strictly to the “Ahl-e-Sunnat” (i.e. Barelvi) way. In 1904–1905/1322–1323, with Ahmad Riza Khan’s personal approbation, one of the great man’s students—Zafaruddin Bihari (later to become one of Ahmad Riza Khan’s authorized biographers)—together with Ahmad Riza’s young son Hamid Riza (d. 1943 AD) and brother Hasan Riza (d. 1908 AD), founded the \textit{m\=adr\=as\=h} Manzar al-Islam. It would never become a great \textit{dar ul’al\=um} (in this early period the school graduated a mere four to ten students per year), much less the institutional hub of the movement, but as Ahmad Riza Khan acted personally as its \textit{s\=ar\=e\=r\=e\=r\=a\=s\=t} and his son Hamid as its chief administrator (with their descendents—to this day—running the school attached to the \textit{mosjyd} Bibiji), the seminary quickly acquired, from the beginning, a sort of symbolical
status as an Ahl-e-Sunnat center. Indeed, as early as 1908/1326, its graduation ceremony was attracting scholars and Sufis from hundreds of miles away.\(^{149}\)

But there were other, grander schools (mostly in northern India), which, by the early twentieth/fourteenth century, had established themselves as belonging to the movement. These included the centuries-old madrasah 'Aliyya in Rampur, where, perhaps appropriately, Barelvi predecessors Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi and 'Abd ul-Haq Khairabadi (d. 1899 AD) both had taught; the madrasah al-Hadis in Pilibhit, founded in 1893/1310 by Wasi Ahmad Muhaddis Surati; the madrasah Shams al-Uloom in Badayun, founded by 'Abd ul-Qayyum (d. 1900 AD) in 1899/1317; and the madrasah Hanafiyya in Patna, established by 'Abd ul-Wahid Firdausi Azimabadi (d. 1908 AD) in 1900/1318. Other schools, too, associated with Ahmad Riza Khan and Barelvis, proliferated across the subcontinent, especially from the 1920s/1340s (like the Jamia Naeemia in Moradabad, about which more later). Each of these institutions was formulated with an express purpose: to combat the pernicious spread of “Wahhabism,” including more than any other sect that of the Deobandis. To illustrate the point, one Barelvi commentator, lauding the efforts of Didar 'Ali Alwari (who founded the dar \(Ul' a\\atw m\) Hizb al-Ahnaf in Lahore in the 1920s/1340s), wrote that, if not for his (Didar 'Ali’s) endeavors, “the whole Punjab would today be full of ‘Wahhabis’.” Such sentiments reinforce the status of Barelvis as a counter-reformational movement. In any case, as Sanyal concludes, these early-twentieth-century AD Ahl-e-Sunnat seminaries were nonetheless “instrumental in creating a network of personal links between ‘ulama’ and in producing new leaders.”\(^{150}\) Still, the early characterization of Barelvi efforts to build madarsas as trailing that of the Deobandis would continue to be an
accurate portrayal through Partition, in Pakistan, and into the twenty-first/fifteenth century to the time of this writing.

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Given the now-established preponderance of Deobandism in the northwest frontier region—plus its long history of insurgency against the encroaching British leviathan, especially via Deobandi forebear ʿuyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his various jyhadi successors—perhaps it is only natural that the Deobandi leaders, no longer fearful of being associated with a long past “Mutiny,” would select this very area as the staging ground for their first major anti-British scheme since the school’s founding. After all, Mahmud Hasan himself had long been establishing “rapport” with the religious scholars of the northwestern frontier regions, many of whom were former students of the dar ul’alwm. Remarked one official at the Deobandi university in 1947/1366 of Mahmud Hasan and his compatriots,

[T]he passion of these great men against British power was neither for rank nor station, was not for ministerial chairs, was not for the power of any one party, but it was only for this: that the oppressed country be taken out from an oppressive nation’s grasp…

The principal pastime of these great men was always talk and anxiety—[about] how to throw from [their] shoulders the yoke of the British. This was the focus of their predictions and revelations…
In addition, “large groups” of the Sādār mādārī’s associates, including teachers, former students, disciples, and other contacts, many of whom had taken part in the countless clandestine meetings held in the dar ul’ātem principal’s own house, had already “fanned out in India and abroad…striving ardently and with temerity to put into action [Mahmud Hasan’s] prepared plan.” Present at those secret meetings were “some men of the northwest border.”153 The future president of the tens-of-thousands-strong Pathan xuda-e-zydnatgar (also known as the “KKs”), Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (later dubbed the “Frontier Gandhi”), would visit Deoband in 1914/1332 after receiving a personal invitation by letter from Mahmud Hasan. In Deoband he met with several of the university’s most eminent scholars to discuss the establishment of a base (or “center”) within one of the northwest frontier’s “free areas”—a base from which to launch the movement that would finally free Hindustan from British tyranny and pave the way for an Islamic resurgence.154

The Deobandi leader’s idea was simple, grand, and infused with the hope of generations for the return of Islamic power on the subcontinent. Today it is described by Deobandi historians as more or less naturally occurring within a succession of political action whose players included, in order, “ḥāẓrat Shah Waliullah, ḥāẓrat Shah ‘Abdul ‘Azīz, ḥāẓrat sayyid Ahmad shahīd, and ḥāẓrat Shah Ṣ[Muhammad] Isma‘īl shahīd…and ḥāẓrat Nanautawi and ḥāẓrat Gangoli.”155 This was to be shīr ul-hynd’s contribution to the great struggle as the spiritual and political successor of the aforementioned freedom-fighting scholars. Mahmud Hasan’s plan (evidently in incubation since at least 1905/1323);156 to start a tribal insurrection against British authority among the Pathans of the frontier, with the aid and support of Britain’s enemies—namely Afghanistan, Ottoman Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, imperial
Germany, and even Russia. Islamic law demanded that military *jihad* be launched from the base of a Muslim state; in this case that state was to be Afghanistan. The British, fully invested in the violence of the Great War, half a world away, would be unable to quash the seemingly spontaneous militant movement, and Muslims across India would thereby be inspired to join the ranks of their frontier brethren in a pan-Indian Islamic revolt that would ultimately drive the foreign scourge from the subcontinent altogether. The “banner of Islam” would be planted in Hindustan once again, and Muslims would finally be free to practice their religion—including, essentially, the institution of its political structure. This was the plan. But first, the governments of Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, and Germany would need to be convinced of its feasibility.

With this in mind, in October 1915/Dh’ul Hijja 1333 Mahmud Hasan sent one of his most trusted disciples, the “highly trained” and indefatigable ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, to Kabul. Sindhi was a converted Sikh who had worked on political projects before—like the mysterious *jam‘aiyat ul-‘onsar,* and the establishment of the Nazaratul Ma’ariful-Quraniyya school in old Delhi. The latter endeavor was designed to increase the *‘alma’s* influence among the more Westernized segment of Muslims. Working under Mahmud Hasan’s direction, Sindhi (who, according to one London newspaper, had “infected some of the [*dar ul’alwmi’s*] staff and students with his own militant and anti-British ideas”) would spend the next seven years in Afghanistan’s capital city, meeting with disaffected Indians and other enemies of the British presence in Hindustan (by December 1915/Safar 1334 he had already met with the Berlin-Indian Committee), organizing them into an effective resistance, helping to establish an Indian government-in-exile (including individuals tied to the Ghadr Party), and even setting up a branch of the Indian National Congress, himself at its head and officially affiliated with the
main organization in India. (It is interesting to note—and characteristic of the Deobandi *modus operandi*, that the head of the Sindhi-organized provisional government featured a prominent Hindu, Mahendra Pratap, as its president). On the way to Kabul, too, Sindhi had met with the still-active remnants of the Indian fighters originally organized by *sayyid* Ahmad of Raebareli around eighty-five years previously—the “Hindu Fanatics” as they were known by some (or, as a British report put it, “the fanatical India party of fighters”), originally based around Sittana. Sindhi hoped that from his Kabul base, he would be able to organize a great Muslim army, headquartered in the Hijaz (more specifically Medina, where Mahmud Hasan was to be commander-in-chief) but with regional command centers in Istanbul, Tehran, and Kabul (where he himself would act as regional commander). And though the *amir* of Afghanistan never fully committed himself to out-and-out supporting an anti-British uprising among the Pathans—crucial to the success of Mahmud Hasan’s original plan—’Ubaidullah Sindhi was able to build very warm relations with the royal court, and played a significant role (sometimes directly, often indirectly) as an influencer of Afghanistan’s India-related foreign policy.

Meanwhile, Mahmud Hasan (some say to avoid arrest) traveled to western Arabia, to Islam’s holiest cities, ostensibly to perform the *haj*. The Hijaz was mostly intended as a springboard, however, from where he might journey to Istanbul to meet with representatives from the Turkish government. Such travel became unnecessary when, in 1916/1334, Turkish War Minister Anwar Pasha met with the Deobandi leader in Arabia. Mahmud Hasan also met with Ghalib Pasha, the Turkish governor of the Hijaz. Both officials seemed open to the idea of supporting Mahmud Hasan’s plan to incite insurrection in India’s northwest frontier areas. In fact, the high-ranking Anwar
Pasha even penned a letter, subsequently distributed widely by ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi and others (including one of Mahmud Hasan’s traveling companions, Muhammad Mian Ansari, who had acted as messenger in actually bringing the letter back to the subcontinent from Arabia and who was later charged with “inculcat[ing] jihad”164 amongst the Pathan tribes)165 in Afghanistan and northwestern Hindustan, promising Turkish support and calling for a general Muslim uprising against the British in India. All seemed to be going according to Mahmud Hasan’s original plan. It was now time for him to return to India’s borderlands to resuscitate the old ḥyḍah of sayyid Ahmad.

Unfortunately for the movement, the whole anti-British scheme—which would have been hard-pressed to work anyway without full support from Kabul, let alone help from a soon-to-be ousted government in Istanbul—went up in smoke when the the British government in India, through its secret police network (the CID), intercepted communications from Sindhi meant for Mahmud Hasan, relating to his progress in Afghanistan. Thus the great pan-Islamic plan was discovered in 1916/1334, almost as soon as it had been set in motion, and a flurry of arrests followed in India. Later that year, Sherif Hussein bin ‘Ali launched the Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turk rule in Arabia; and through the Arabs—for now, allies of London—the British were able to capture Mahmud Hasan (in fact, he and four of his associates were first arrested by the Arabs themselves, and only later handed over to British authorities).166 Eventually he was interned at St. Clement’s Barracks, a British prison on the island of Malta, where the old Deobandi cleric and anti-British activist was “among the world’s most renowned political prisoners.”167 Here he received some comfort through letters from home, particularly those written by his little brother, Muhammad Mahasan, who kept him apprised of goings-on in the outside world.168 The whole affair was painted by the
British media as a Berlin-directed conspiracy (the headline screamed, “German Plots in India”); the one-hundred-fifty-page “Rowlatt Report,” too, commissioned by the Government of India, characterized the “Silk Letters’ Plot” as “an amazing story of sedition” that “equaled any romance of Robert Louis Stevenson”—behind which lurked the inciting Germans.¹⁶⁹

Khilafat: Ephemeral High Point of Hindu-Muslim Unity.

By 1920/1338, when the British set Mahmud Hasan free in Bombay (the old man, suffering from a debilitating case of tuberculosis, evidently no longer seemed like much of a threat), most signs indicated that the future would be characterized by united Hindu-Muslim activism. For long, many Muslims, as members of a minority community, had remained at least implicitly loyal to the British, more wary of the perceived threat of the majority Hindu population. But the first two decades of the twentieth century AD saw the British government’s foreign policy continually ostracizing its Muslim subjects, especially as the Russian threat—for long the British impetus for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—began to subside in the wake of a new, German one. During the 1911-1912/1329-1330 Tripoli War, London had been more interested in good relations with Rome than the negative repercussions its actions might induce across Muslim communities worldwide (despite Viceroy Hardinge’s warning of “considerable effervescence” on the matter among India’s Mohammedans), and similar results came of Britain’s overtures to Greece in the subsequent Balkan Wars (Hardinge: “In all these wars against Turkey, it is we out in India who in reality have to pay the piper”).¹⁷⁰ Indeed, one prominent Indian nationalist would write in 1917/1335, “Turkey’s war with Italy followed by her struggle with the
Balkan States, has done wonders in nationalising the Indian Mohammedans. At the
present moment the Mohammedans perhaps feel even more intensely than the
Hindus”—certainly a wind change in Indian politics. Later, during the Great War,
Turkey made the disastrous decision to forego neutrality in order to side with the
Central Powers, prompting a secret 1916/1334 agreement between London and Paris
(with the consent of St. Petersburg) to carve up a post-war Ottoman empire between
them; this, of course, famously contradicted previous British promises to the Arabs of
the Hijaz, who expected to inherit a large, independent Arabia when the fighting was
over. After the war, the “hated” Treaty of Sèvres (1920/1338) threatened the
geographical integrity of Turkey by adding once-Ottoman territory to several
neighboring states, including Greece; the agreement also tore all non-Turkish
territories from the empire. These incidents caused trepidation among Muslims
worldwide, who feared not only for the caliphate, but also for other Middle Eastern
“Muslim” lands then under the control of non-Muslim powers. As a result, Muslims in
India launched the Khilafat (xylafat) Movement, protesting these developments, calling
for the preservation of the integrity of the caliphate, and generally rallying Muslims
against non-Muslim intervention in Muslim lands. The movement, organized in large
part by the ‘Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad, joined forces with the Indian National
Congress; Gandhi agreed to support Khilafat and the Khilafatists agreed to support the
INC’s non-cooperation movement. (Jawaharlal once opined that, though there was
certainly “no lack of vulgarity” when it came to the addresses of Congress leaders to one
another during their various conferences, “some of the minor Khilafat leaders probably
led the rest” where the use of the expletive was concerned). Thus by “declaring his
support for the Khilafat, Gandhi secured the allegiance of an impressive array of Muslim
ulema and political activists for his policy of non-violent non-cooperation.” One western newspaper correspondent observed that the British were by now “so unpopular…among Indian Mahomedans…that if an Indian Musulman cannot find an obvious cause for a political evil he [n]aturally blames it on Lord Curson [sic] as a sort of fons et origo of the evils that beset the Mahomedan world.”

At the same time, the British government had created a detested common enemy for both Hindus and Muslims alike to hate (i.e. itself) through a succession of highly unpopular domestic moves. The generally detested Press Act of 1910/1328 (recalling smoldering memories of the Vernacular Press Act of 1878/1295) had threatened the forfeiture of a press’s security deposit as well as the seizure of all copies of any offensive (i.e. “allegedly seditious”) publications. Meanwhile, newspapers considered loyal to the regime were subsidized in order to provide “wholesome literary food for the masses.”

The result, according to one Hindu commentator of the period, on Muslim newspapers: “All the independent Muslim papers have either been wiped out or are dragging on a lifeless and miserable existence.” Many of these publications were Deobandi, or at least tended to be Deobandi-leaning in tone and political philosophy. “The Comrade is gone. The Hamdard has been strangled to death, the Muslim Gazette ceased to exist long ago, Al-Hilal is no more, the Zamindar is carrying on its colorless existence with a sword of Damocles always hanging over its head.”

Then, during the Great War, the government passed the Defence of India Act (1915/1333), legislation that greatly curtailed civil liberties, among other things bypassing due process. The act was an attempt to deal with pesky nationalist “schemes” during a time of war (similar legislation was passed in Britain itself), and its “emergency powers” were to remain in force for six months after the war ended. It was during this period that the
aforementioned Lucknow Pact, uniting Muslim League and Congress efforts, was forged. Perhaps the words of the League’s newly elected president Mazhar ul-Haq, spoken on the occasion of the party’s December 1915/Safar 1334 conference in Bombay, best exemplify the wind change in Indian politics during this period. “We are Indian Muslims,” he said.

These words, “Indian Muslims,” convey the idea of our nationality and of our religion, and as long as we keep our duties and responsibilities arising from these factors before our eyes, we can hardly go wrong. Indian Muslims are Indians first!178

Considering the party’s major course adjustment only a few years later (not to mention its hard-line separatist position later on), such sentiments may seem out of place at a Muslim League conference, yet they are illustrative of the sort of united, nationalist feeling then extant within such circles during and immediately after the Great War. For now, the pendulum was swinging the Deobandis’ way, even if the League’s pronouncements stopped far short of denouncing its loyalty to the British government.179

When, with war’s end, the time came for normalcy to be restored after the imposition of the Defence of India Act, the Imperial Legislative Council refused to enact the promised restoration (despite Montagu’s 1917/1335 assurances to the contrary), and on 10 March 1919/7 Jumada II 1337, the tyrannical measures enacted four years previously (including indefinite detention sans trial, two years’ incarceration for those merely suspected of being terrorists, warrantless arrests, juryless trials, and a curtailment
of freedom of speech vis-à-vis the press) were extended indefinitely. The 1919/1337 legislation—known as the Rowlatt Act, named after the chief of the committee who had recommended the measures—prompted wide criticism from Indian political leaders and activists, and Gandhi organized a nationwide fast and strike (the “Rowlatt सत्याग्रaha,” the latter meaning “truth-force”), to be held on 6 April/5 Rajab, in protest. But the Mahatma, an integral part of whose strategy was the use of non-violence as a moral means of struggle, was unable to contain the pent-up frustration felt by millions of Indians at these political developments; a series of riots in the Punjab caused him to suspend the सत्याग्रaha only days later. Then on 13 April/12 Rajab, one hundred fifty troops led by British General R. E. H. Dyer opened fire on a crowd of around twenty thousand Indians gathered in Jalianwala Bagh, Amritsar, to protest the Rowlatt Act; the volley continued at least six minutes without pause, resulting in piles of bodies: over three thousand civilian dead and one thousand five hundred wounded. If the nationalists—Hindu, Muslim, and otherwise—hadn’t been fired up and united before, this event (and the follow-up violence meted out by the British government in the Punjab in the days following) fueled the movement like none before it. Even many Barelvis joined the fray, despite their leader’s stance to the contrary. “The most significant development of Nationalism,” wrote Arya Samajist and Indian activist Lala Lajpat Rai three years after the end of the Great War, was “the unity between Hindus and the Mohammedans on the question of self-government.”

When Mahmud Hasan arrived in Bombay, then, it was this show of unity that greeted him. The news of his freedom had been published in “all the great newspapers of Hindustan,” and immediately Khilafatist and Cogressite leaders alike scrambled to arrange a grand reception for him upon disembarkation. Indeed, Gandhi himself
traveled down from Ahmedabad just to meet the Deobandi leader—and to explain the political situation, much to shix ul-hynd’s approbation. Soon thereafter, Farangi Mahal’s ‘Abdul Bari likewise met with Mahmud Hasan, outlining for him the joint Khilafatist-Congressite plan. In response, Mahmud Hasan penned a fatwa (whose “each and every word spilt fire,” opined one Deobandi commentator)\textsuperscript{182} in support of Khilafat and non-cooperation; it would be signed by almost a thousand Muslim scholars.\textsuperscript{183} The Deobandis were officially on board the Khilafat/non-cooperation program. To continue to garner support, Mahmud Hasan—despite his worsening condition—embarked on a tour of the United Provinces, delivering speeches and meeting with Muslim political and religious leaders to encourage them to buoy up the Khilafatist (and non-cooperation) effort.\textsuperscript{184} Mahmud Hasan had no problem working with Hindus (and others) in accomplishing the shared goal of bringing down the British government. “If the people of another community come forward and help in your pious mission and extend support in crisis, you should cooperate with them,” he urged fellow Muslims in 1920/1338. “You should be equally courteous to them. [In fact], you should act more generously.”\textsuperscript{185}

But the Barelvi guiding lights did not support the Deobandi position on the Khilafat issue. Indeed, Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly had a completely different take on the situation then embroiling what was once the mighty Ottoman Empire. The Barelvi divine opposed the Khilafat movement outright—though not necessarily because he disagreed with its aims. Instead, Ahmad Riza, who interpreted the actions of the Khilafatists as mere “political fuss and noise,”\textsuperscript{186} approached the matter practically (as he saw it); he felt that, given the state of the Indian Muslim community, there was not much it could do to really help its Turkish counterpart in any functionally useful way
(eventually he would admonish Indian Muslims to donate a month’s salary to Turkish relief). Mostly the Ahl-e-Sunnat leader thought all of the Khilafatists’ travels and meetings and goings-on were a big waste of money. Indeed, once he himself had been charged by a Deobandi political organization (called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind; *jām‘āyat ‘alāma-e-hynd*, or “Assembly of Indian Clergy,” hereafter JUH) of doing nothing for the cause of the Turks or the Muslim holy sites; in reply, Ahmad Riza countered that, simply put, neither had the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind—the difference was that the latter had taken large sums of money from Muslims in the process!\(^{187}\) He also took issue with the general Muslim defense of the “caliphate,” arguing that the sultan of Turkey, not even of the Quraysh line, could not rightfully enjoy the title of caliph. Besides, Ahmad Riza argued, the whole Khilafatist issue was a front; its members were insincere at best and manipulators at worst—for, said he in one 1920/1338 *fīta‘a*, the movement’s leaders were merely using the issue of the Ottoman caliphate as a smokescreen for their *real* aim: political independence from the British.\(^{188}\) Gandhi was a charlatan anyway; after all, how could a man embroiled in a nationalist cause genuinely adopt an internationalist movement with explicitly pan-Islamic aims? The Barelvis interpreted the Mahatma’s maneuverings vis-à-vis the Muslim Khilafatist leaders as nothing more than shrewd politics—and shame on the Deobandis and their cohorts for being so easily duped into the Gujarati’s game. Some amongst the Khilafatist leadership even seemed, through Barelvi eyes, to lavish praise upon Gandhi fit only for a bona fide prophet of Islam; once, Ahmad Riza is reported to have compared the esteem which Khilafat leaders granted Gandhi to that which the leaders of that most apostate group, the Ahmadiyya, accorded their own false prophet. “Neither can Gandhi be an *ymām*, nor [Mirza Ghulam Ahmad] Qadiani a *mujāddād*,” he reportedly told one Deobandi with whom he was acquainted.
Of course, any perceived affront to Muhammad (as the Khilafatist attitude toward Gandhi was interpreted) only further alienated the two groups politically.189

Most of all, however, Ahmad Riza opposed the Khilafat movement because he refused to work together with many of those associated with it. In his view, a significant number among the Khilafat leadership were “bad” Muslims, or those who had “lost their way.”190 Such exclusion would characterize the Barelvi attitude towards Deobandi cooperation with the Indian National Congress through the Partition period; such a united front was simply unacceptable “Hindu-Muslim unity.” In the words of Sanyal,

Ahmad Riza Khan believed that the relationship between Hindus and Muslims being advocated by the non-cooperators was one of love, intimacy, even unity, all of which, being forms of muwalat, were forbidden; while, on the other hand, worldly or social relations with the British were being forbidden although they had shari’i approval.191

Once again, Ahmad Riza’s exclusionary social worldview was made manifest, an outlook perhaps best illustrated by one incident involving the INC’s most famous icon. At the advice of several of his high-ranking Muslim counterparts—including the ‘Ali brothers and ‘Abdul Bari—Gandhi reportedly tried to arrange a meeting with Ahmad Riza to attempt to win the Barelvi divine over to the Khilafat cause. Upon hearing that the INC leader was looking to meet, Ahmad Riza is alleged to have said, “What would he speak about? Religion or worldly affairs? If it is worldly affairs, how could I partake—for I have [chosen to] abstain from the world, and have no interest in it.”192 In fact, Ahmad Riza took a great interest in the world, but refused to meet with Gandhi or align himself
with his allegedly Hindu-dominated movement. To Ahmad Riza and his followers, the Khilafatists were striving for “nationalist” (qawm pəɾəst) goals while ignoring the potential such action possessed—the potential, quite literally, to “destroy the true faith.” In such a threat to Islam they were playing an active part, since, in the words of one Barelvi commentator, “swəraj means Hindu Raj.”

It is interesting to note the difference in philosophy here, generally speaking, between Ahmad Riza Khan and his disciples and the Deobandi leadership. The latter saw no contradiction in their position as ‘alboma, dedicated to the acquisition and communication of religious knowledge, and their participation in Ahmad Riza’s “worldly” (i.e. political) affairs. On the other side of the rivalry, Ahmad Riza emphasized his own personal detachment from such things—an implicit jab at his scholarly rivals who participated in the political arena. But Muhammad Mian would later justify the Deobandi position in this regard in his book əsirən-e-malTa (“Prisoners of Malta”), in his preface to the work’s mini-biography of Husain Ahmad Madani. To Muhammad Mian, the elders of Deoband had taken the more difficult road, while the Barelvi head and his kind had elected for the path of least resistance. It is obvious, reading Muhammad Mian’s words, whose path he considers worthier of praise. “It is easy to opt for the study of voluminous books for years…[but] it is difficult to submit before your Creator and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creation…” Often, Muhammad Mian argued, such submission involved going to the mosque, or leading a study group, or preaching from the pulpit. But sometimes, too, it meant standing upon “the political platform, for the greater well-being of your community and for upholding the truth.” Such action often earned such men “abuse” from their “own people” (an obvious reference to the literary barbs of Ahmad Riza and others)—and even “fetters
and a dark cell from your oppressive enemy.” Such a man, willing to selflessly endure
the privations heaped upon him by both friend and enemy: *this* was “the true follower of
the Prophet,” Muhammad Mian insisted. After all, religious leaders had always played a
political role in Islam, from the beginning. For a religious scholar to become a recluse
(a form of “asceticism”) when his community needed him far more urgently in another
capacity was, certainly, the less noble path.\footnote{195}

Thus, as one scholar of political Barelvism has noted, in 1920/1338—the very
height of the Khilafat movement—“no one was ready to listen \([\text{to}]\) any anti-Khilafat
and anti-non-cooperation statements,” even from the likes of Ahmad Riza Khan.\footnote{196}
While this statement is obviously an exaggeration if taken literally, it nevertheless
captures to a degree the general feeling of the period, or at least the way the political
winds were blowing. In time, however, that wind would change, as many Muslims
became disillusioned with Khilafat, the politics of the Congress, the Congress’
leadership, united political efforts with the Hindus, and/or the Deobandi political
leadership—and turn to voices like Ahmad Riza’s. In a sense, over the coming decades,
the denunciations by the Barelvi “founder” of both Khilafat’s ineffectuality and a united
Hindu-Muslim India would be more or less vindicated by history; whether or not such
vindication was “natural” or merely self-fulfilling is, of course, open for debate.

In any case, as Deobandis rallied behind the anti-British Khilafat-INC banner,
Ahmad Riza and his followers more or less supported the British government of India
throughout the Great War years and throughout the Khilafat movement period.\footnote{197}
(Remember, Ahmad Riza considered India, without question, a *dar ul-yslam*. At least the
British were Christian; would it not be worse to be led by a government of pagans—i.e.
Hindus?) And though Nehru would later describe the Khilafat Committee of 1920/1338
as “powerful and far more representative” than the League (which also opposed Khilafat), it must be pointed out that the Barelvīs, by and large, were not represented therein. On the contrary, they would form their own Turkish relief groups and organizations; the most prominent was the Ansar al-Islam, an association made up of Ahmad Riza’s inner circle, including Muhammad Mian Marahrawi, Zafaruddin Bihari, Naimuddun Moradabadi, and Didar ‘Ali Alwar. The organization was formed according to the admonition of Ahmad Riza Khan (outlined in his 1913/1331 juridical ruling): to avoid association with Muslims who had, in their view, spiritually lost their way—and, of course, to avoid “unity” with Hindus outright. Most of its tenets involved the implementation of Ahmad Riza Khan’s (predominantly economic) reforms. But unfortunately for the Ansar al-Islam, the group was constantly fighting off the charge of being a British front organization. In fact, Barelvi self-imposed insulation from other groups during the 1910s/1330s and 1920s/1340s, at that time centered mostly around helping the Turks, foreshadowed the movement’s general behavior during the late 1930s/1350s and 1940s/1360s. Over the course of the latter period, too, Barelvi organization—even whilst supporting the call for Pakistan—tended to include only other Barelvīs (or at least Barelvi-leaning scholars and pirs—the “proto-Barelvis” of today’s Barelvi majority among South Asian Muslims), and certainly not Deobandis or, heaven forbid, Hindus. This would have serious political consequences for the movement later, in the new state of Pakistan, despite its numerical majority.

When, in 1919/1337, the Congress held its special session in Calcutta, partisans of the Khilafat movement, fueled by the admonitions of the Deobandi ‘alāma, played a major role in propelling Gandhi into the position of uncontested leader of the INC. Indeed, thousands of the Mahatma’s Muslim Khilafatist supporters flocked to the
gathering, making up a considerable portion of the approximately fifteen thousand observers present (five thousand official delegates from across the country additionally were in attendance). This groundswell of popular support, made up in part by Deobandi or Deobandi-leaning Muslims seeking to protect the Ottoman caliphate, marked a turning point for the Indian National Congress; henceforth the party’s base would be swelled with Indians of the lower classes, not just those of the upper-middle-class elite. By December of the same year (Rabi I 1338), the new-look Congress (during its Nagpur conference, attended by fourteen thousand delegates) was shouting down the aristocratic Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his warnings about әtyagrәha. Politics was a gentleman’s game, as the League leader was apt to say, and Gandhi had dirtied the party with his appeal to the unwashed masses, not to mention his infusion of religion into what should be preserved as a strictly secular arena. (Ironically, this is, in effect, precisely what Jinnah would do from the late 1930s/1350s as League head.) The Khilafat movement, which had “swamped the politics of the Muslim League,” together with the ascent of Gandhi and his quasi-spiritual form of resistance, had changed politics, dragging it out of the smoking rooms and marble chambers and onto the streets.200 Thanks to Khilafat, wrote one Indian commentator in 1917/1335, “the political influence of the Muslim League among the people was…little as compared with the influence of the Pan-Islamic party.”201 That party had already alienated the Barelvi religious leadership, and this new political development alienated the more secular-minded elites like Jinnah.

After the December/Rabi I conference, the future qayd-i-ә’әzәm abruptly left the Congress “in disgust,” never to return.202 Khilafat, wrote one noted South Asian
historian, “by one of those quirks of Indian history had put the Mahatma into the saddle of the Indian National Congress.”

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The Barelvis had a difficult time jumping onto the non-cooperation bandwagon, too; Ahmad Riza’s attitude towards Gandhi has already been mentioned. Such involvement, after all, would be unacceptable Hindu-Muslim unity. It would also mean working with those (Muslims) of “bad” faith, in particular the Deobandis. In 1920/1338, leading Barelvi alim Naimuddin Moradabai—who would, in the coming decades, play a major role in the political promotion of the Barelvi religio-political agenda—issued a fatwa that out-and-out forbade Muslims from participating in the non-cooperation movement (warning the ummat, for example, of the dangers of working together with the Hindu majority). That year Ahmad Riza Khan did the same, accusing the non-cooperation-supporting Muslims (like the Deobandi leadership) of confusing that which was neutral (represented by the Christian British) with that which was expressly forbidden (represented by the pagan Hindus). After all, the Muslim non-cooperationists were loudly denouncing a government that was not interfering in Muslim worship (the British one) in favor of one that would invariably be led by those already meddling in that worship (the Hindus; this was a reference to the cow slaughter controversy then rocking the subcontinent, in which some Hindu groups sought strict legislation banning the sacrifice of cows, a regular Muslim ritual). It should be noted, however, that such declamations as these were not unanimous among Barelvis; there were a handful of dissenters. For example, xawajāḥ Muhammad Ziauddin Sialvi went along with Gandhi’s program, at least as far as non-cooperation was concerned; the xawajāḥ went so far as to reject all gifts from any of his disciples working for the police or the British
Indian Army, a move that clearly supported the Congress-led non-cooperation movement. Another Barelvi leader, Abdul Majid Badayuni (elements of whose family had been involved in a sort of power struggle with Ahmad Riza for some time) actually helped found the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind. Similarly, powerful pir Jama’at ‘Ali Shah, who would later help found the mostly Barelvi All-India Sunni Conference, supported the Khilafat movement with his time, money, and speeches—and went so far as to characterize anyone who didn’t do likewise as “non-Muslim.” But generally speaking, Barelvis fell in line behind Ahmad Riza and his disciples. (This went both ways; one of the Deobandi greats, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, evidently opposed non-cooperation along lines similar to those of Ahmad Riza Khan).

The heads of both schools (Deobandi and Barelvi) would issue at least one highly circulated fatawa supporting their positions on the Khilafat issue, including views on non-cooperation. Mahmud Hasan’s 1920/1339 juridical ruling (though technically he did not consider it to be a true fatawa; “I am not a mufti,” he wrote, “[thus] to write a fatawa is the work of other ‘alma [who are muftis]”) has already been mentioned, but it is worth examining at greater length, revealing as it does much in terms of Deobandi political philosophy and worldview. Ahmad Riza Khan’s own 1920/1338 ruling likewise sheds critical light on the general Barelvi approach to politics and British rule—and on their position vis-à-vis the Deobandis, who, in supporting the “Hindu” Congress, according to Ahmad Riza, were merely “running from the rain only to enter the drainpipe.” It may be useful, then, to compare and contrast these two diametrically opposed fatawa.

To buoy up his argument that cooperation with the Hindus was futile (not to mention haram) Ahmad Riza emphasized what he described as the “oppressive
viciousness” of Hindus generally. As examples, he pointed to recent communal tragedies in Katarpur, Arrah, “and elsewhere.” Three years earlier, Katarpur—a two-third Hindu, one-third Muslim village where tensions had long been simmering on account of the cow slaughter issue—had been the scene of a brutal mass killing. The Hindu perpetrators, allegedly motivated by the report of a Muslim individual who had assaulted a Hindu untouchable, had set fire to a mosque and houses after burning thirty Muslims alive; a later court decision confirmed the Hindus’ guilt when one hundred forty-two of them were convicted for the crime, their punishments ranging from a couple years’ imprisonment to the death penalty.\(^{210}\) Around the same time, the cow slaughter issue had likewise ignited an anti-Muslim riot in Bihar’s Arrah district (as mentioned earlier, a Barelvi stronghold, and thus naturally on Ahmad Riza’s radar), where, in the words of nationalist leader M. A. Ansari, “Muslims…suffered untold miseries” at the hands of the hooligans.\(^{211}\) Deobandis and other composite nationalists insisted that such incidents were the work of individuals, anomalies vis-à-vis the general Hindu whole. Ahmad Riza rejected this. The individuals and groups involved in the Katarpur and Arrah riots, and countless others, were most certainly representatives of a larger “Hindu nation.” The Deobandis were kidding themselves if they believed otherwise.\(^{212}\)

Both Deobandis and Barelvis cited the Qur’an as the ultimate proof that their respective positions were God-sanctioned, and, of course, such citations could be found in abundance in their respective fatāwa. Mahmud Hasan cited Surah 60 (Al-Mumtahanah), verses 8-9:
8 Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from their homes—from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.

9 Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion—that you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is those who are among the wrongdoers.

Ahmad Riza answered back with another Qur’anic reference, earlier in the scripture but chronologically received by the Prophet later—and thus, according to the most generally acceptic theory, considered more authoritative and, in the case of contradiction with earlier revelations, possessed of an annulling power. The reference was Surah 9 (At-Tawbah), verse 73:

73 O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.

The trouble was that such verses held an entirely distinct meaning for the Deobandis, who interpreted “disbelievers” in a different light altogether. Observe, for example, the following Qur’anic citations, used by Mahmud Hasan in his fatwa.
O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is any ally to them among you—then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people. (Surah 5:51)

Let not believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers. And whoever [of you] does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the [final] destination. (Surah 3:28)

Give tidings to the hypocrites that there is for them a painful punishment—Those who take disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. Do they seek with them honor [through power]? But indeed, honor belongs to Allah entirely… O you who have believed, do not take the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. Do you wish to give Allah against yourselves a clear cause? (Surah 4:138-139, 144)

These examples, cited by Mahmud Hasan to buoy up his argument against cooperation with the Christians (i.e. the British), clearly illustrate the disconnect between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Indeed, for Ahmad Riza, the above citations would only strengthen his own position; “disbelievers,” after all, referred to pagans like the Hindus, not the Christian British. As for the verse from Surah 5, few Barelvis would have considered the British an “ally” in any true sense of the term; a lack of desire on their part to agitate against British rule did not make them the Christians’ “friends.”
No, their motivation lay strictly in action based on šari‘at (as they interpreted it). The same interpretational disengagement could be applied to the other Qur’anic verses cited by Mahmud Hasan in his ruling; “how wretched” that “many of them [become] allies of those who disbelieved” (Surah 5:80), “[y]ou will not find a people who believe in Allah and the Last Day having affection for those who oppose Allah and His Messenger” (Surah 58:22), “O you who believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies” (Surah 60:1)—and so on. Each of these verses might be used by both groups, the Barelvis interpreting “disbeliever” as “Hindu” and the Deobandis interpreting “disbeliever” as “Britisher.” When Mahmud Hasan asserted that “cooperation with infidels [kuffār, which might also be translated as “idolaters,” “deniers,” or “unbelievers”] is not permissible,” Ahmad Riza would have agreed wholeheartedly. The question revolved around the identity of the kuffār—the British or the Hindus? The Deobandis insisted on the former (especially given the political situation of the subcontinent; had not the British made war upon the Muslims?), while the Barelvis vehemently pointed to the latter.

Mahmud Hasan considered Muslim quietism in the face of British tyranny a refutation of the “the first duty of every Muslim.” Indeed, Muslims who harbored such positions (like the Barelvis) had simply been fooled by “a cunning trick”—one that, without shame, would steal the “most precious wealth of the Muslims”: that is, their very faith. Thus Ahmad Riza and his ilk were only playing the British game, like pawns. The great threat to Islam wasn’t Hinduism; Hinduism could be dealt with peaceably over years of proselytization. Islam’s greatest threat was the theft of its faith, led by the British by means of tyrannical government. A cursory look at the Muslim world (and the vast portions of it then under the direct sway of London) should have
been enough to convince any Muslim of this reality. Amongst a Hindu majority for a thousand years, Islam had yet experienced major growth; under the British yoke for barely a century-and-a-half, the faith had been battered and beaten by a waide variety of forces, including political and social ones. And now, Mahmad Hasan lamented, “Iraq, Palestine, and Syria” were “the targets of greed of the enemy of Islam,” while “the honor of the caliphate” lay “in tatters.” Truly, there was no doubt in his mind about who the real enemy of Islam was; that enemy certainly wasn’t the Hindu, however religiously misguided Hindus might be. Was it because of the Hindus that the Muslims had “lost their dignity, their honor, and their self-respect”? No—the British were the enemy, combined with the Muslims’ own “ignorance and over-indulgence in frivolities.” That Mahmud Hasan’s stance in this regard was adopted generally by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind was expressed at that party’s October 1920/Muharram 1339 conference; during the event the organization declared unequivocally, “The greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims is the British.”

And now Barelvi Muslims like Ahmad Riza Khan and Naimuddin Moradabadi had the audacity to forbid their brothers from assisting fellow Muslims—“the eagerness to earn the goodwill and friendship of a kafyr has led a brother to chop the head of his own brother. Muslims have drunk the blood of Muslims.”

Indeed, the condition of the caliphate had much to do with Muslim collaboration with, of all things, the British behemoth.

You know it better than me that the thunder and fire that burned the tents of the Islamic world and set fire to the castle of the Islamic caliphate came from the hot blood of Arabs and Indians. And a great portion of...the wealth with which the Christians have succeeded in
subjugating Muslim nations came from your hard labor. Thus, is there any stupid and thick-headed Muslim who won’t understand the results of cooperation with the Christians? (Italics added.)

Among Mahmud Hasan’s “stupid and thick-headed” was the Barelvi leadership. To them he said, “[This] is the time to act with Islamic spirit for the honor and prestige of our religion.” And then the olive-branch: “I fear that differences, big or small, among ‘alɔma might dampen [our] spirit and courage.” Despite those differences, then, they should work together—not necessarily by “grab[bing] a sword and go[ing] to Iraq and Syria for jyhad,” but to prevent at all costs the “strengthen[ing of] the hands of [the] enemies of Islam.”

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* Non-cooperation and Khilafat enjoyed initial success, organizing demonstrations, strikes, protests, and general civil disobedience across Hindustan. When Mahmud Hasan died on 30 November 1920/18 Rabi I 1339 (eleven months before Ahmad Riza Khan, his true contemporary), things were looking up. The passing of shix ul-hynd, leader of the second generation of Deobandi scholars and the inheritor of the Qasimi program, occurred just months after his being released from prison and in the midst of carrying out the political agitation for which he was known. He was buried at the small cemetery adjacent to the school that had played such a central role in his life, next to the grave of his own mentor, Muhammad Qasim. But shix ul-hynd didn’t give up the ghost before presiding over the second annual conference of the JUH in Delhi, and traveling to Aligarh to lay the foundation of the Jamia Millia Islamia.217 The latter school would later move to Delhi, where it is located at the time of this writing.
The meeting in Delhi was momentous; an estimated five hundred scholars from all over India—hailing from as far afield as the northwest frontier and border areas, Sindh, Punjab, Bihar, Bengal, and Assam—there resolved to call upon Muslims across the subcontinent to cease any form of support for the British government. This was clearly a move inspired by the non-cooperation program, tied up in the efforts of the Khilafat movement. The presence of the old Deobandi head, who served as the assembly’s presiding officer, added to the meeting’s importance; for those assembled it must have been thrilling, injecting a psychological boost to morale, to see the aged Mahmud, fresh from his Malta prison but now free and politically active once more, seated on the platform before them (little did they know, surely, that he would pass away only days later). In the end, the November 1920/Rabi I 1339 Delhi conference of the JUH produced a juridical ruling, signed by four hundred seventy-four religious scholars, forbidding Muslim employment in any capacity whatsoever within the British government structure—whether as a municipal council member, a soldier, or even a businessman engaged in a transaction with the “enemies of the faith.” The ruling was distributed far and wide across Hindustan. (The next year, 1921/1339, the British government reportedly confiscated all copies of the fatwa that it could find, while many of its signers were arrested and incarcerated, sentenced to two-year imprisonment.)

Immediately after the Delhi JUH conference, in an initiatory speech at the Jamia Millia Islamia inauguration at Aligarh, Mahmud Hasan described the institution as “an independent university which has nothing to do with government subsidy and interference” [an obvious jab at Sir Sayyid’s school, as well as some Barelvi educational institutions then accepting grants from the British ruling power as Ahmad Riza had instructed] and whose organization is based on Islamic principles and national
aspirations.” He may as well have been describing the *dar ul’alzm* at Deoband. It was fitting, perhaps, that he would eulogize such an establishment—like the one around which his own life had revolved—in the final hours of his life.

Accompanying him on this, his final journey, was one of the leaders of Deoband’s “third generation”—a middle-aged ‘*alym* who had helped him write his masterwork (a multi-volume commentary on the Qur’an) and who had been as politically active and ardently loyal as anyone at the university in Deoband. His name was Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.
3 - THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition Politics, 1921-1947

‘See for yourself,’ Bakshiji said. ‘In our group there are Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. There stands Aziz. Here is Hakimji.’

‘Aziz and Hakim are the dogs of the Hindus. We do not hate the Hindus, but we detest their dogs.’

Excerpt from Bhisham Sahni’s *Tamas*

The year 1921/1338-1339 was, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, “a year of great tension,” with “much to irritate and annoy and unnerve the official” and “a strange mixture of nationalism and politics and religion and mysticism and fanaticism.” Such was the atmosphere when the political aspect of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry came into its own within the context of pre-Partition independence politics in India. In order to facilitate an in-depth examination of the rivalry during the period in question, the reader will be presented with the brief biographies of four *alama* (two Barelvi, two Deobandi) in addition to the continuation of the central narrative. Each of the four scholars was born between 1879/1296 and 1886/1303, and each passed away not long after the
subcontinental Partition, between 1948/1367 and 1957/1376. Most importantly, each played a major role within their respective communities in the religio-political battles waged across the Indian subcontinent before 1947/1366. It is hoped that their histories might bring the political contest between Deobandi and Barelvi—and the intra-sect divisions that accompanied it—to life.

By the early 1920s, “it was Hindu-Musalmān ki jai everywhere,” according to one eyewitness, though behind the ambiguous Indian nationalism “could be distinguished a Hindu nationalism” and “a Moslem nationalism partly looking beyond the frontiers of India,” though “for the time being they overlapped and all pulled together.”2 As Britain pushed back the implementation of any meaningful reforms in government that might allow for “Indian governance over India,” the “feeling against Great Britain” was “aggravating…every day.”3 The frustration over seeming British intractability was thus the glue holding the two communities together. Meanwhile, the JUH continued to campaign for the protection of the caliphate. In December 1922/Rabi II 1341, the JUH held a conference at Gaya, conferring upon Mustapha Kemal the grand title of “Savior of the Caliphate,” at the same time passing a resolution requesting the Kemalists to “try to keep the Caliph’s prestige and power intact.” Critically, the JUH officially acknowledged Sultan Abdul Medjid as Islam’s one and only ālīfah (in stark contrast to the Barlevi position, aforementioned).4 The JUH may have truly believed that Atatürk would protect the caliphate (though it was clear from some of the conference’s speeches that Mustapha Kemal’s curtailment of the sultan’s powers had the ālāma worried), but it seems more likely that the organization was simply hoping that an ego-stoke might soften the Turkish leader’s attitude towards the sultan. In any case, the JUH enjoyed
the Congress’ support in these efforts. Indeed, the “Moslem Conference” (as it was
known) of December 1922/Rabi II 1341 was more or less a Congress meeting for
Muslims only; its resolutions were even submitted afterwards to the Congress “for final
decision.” The arrangement underscored the Muslims’ resolve for joint action with
Hindus against the common British threat. Indeed, along with the conference’s Turkey-
centric agenda, the Muslim assemblage advocated “the formation of a national pact to
secure Hindu-Moslem unity.”

And Muslim members of the Congress weren’t only interested in the caliphate issue.
Some of the most radical elements within the Congress were Muslims—like
Muhammad ‘Ali (at the time, Deobandi-leaning, though this would change later when
he “repented” at the feet of Barelvi leader Naimuddin Moradabadi). On 1 January
1924/23 Jumada 1342, for example, Muhammad ‘Ali declared that “a demand for swaraj
is impossible without complete independence,” and that independence was “essential
whether Indians were within or without the British Empire.” India must, ‘Ali
contended, “cut the cackle”—in other words, stop all the chattering and actually do
something. ‘Ali was tired of all the talk; it was time for action. “By merely shouting for
liberty Indians [make] themselves the laughing stock of the world,” he said. Perhaps it
was time to “walk out of their [the British] Empire” for good. With this position,
Muhammad ‘Ali had surpassed even Gandhi in his demands. Just over a year after the
JUH’s December 1922/Rabi II 1341 Conference, the party met again (1 January
1924/23 Jumada I 1342) for a conference in Cocanada (present-day Kakinada) on India’s
east coast, where delegates continued to express confidence in the new Turkish regime.
Still, it was clear that patience was running thin—shouldn’t this issue have been put to
rest by now? An idea was presented: the ‘aloma, as guardians of the ummat, should hold
a global conference “of Muslim divines and leaders from all parts of the world” in order to finally settle the question of the caliph’s political position “in light of the injunctions of the Koran.” This was necessary because the caliph “must be a link between Moslems throughout the world” (a position that obviously flew in the face of Ahmad Riza’s rulings). The Muslims of India, too, “must owe him allegiance.” In all of this, and despite the pan-Islamic nature of Khilafatism (including their calls for allegiance to a technically foreign politico-religious figure), the Congress continued to support the Khilafatists and the JUH. Had the caliphate been preserved, it likely would have remained a hot-button Deobandi-Barelvi issue, widening the gulf between the two schools.

But this soon became a moot point—as did Hindu-Muslim unity, which unraveled quickly when Khilafat became a non-issue. On 9 March 1924/2 Sh’aban 1342, the New York Times headline, TURKS STIR ALL ISLAM BY DEPOSING CALIPH, signaled the abrupt removal of the Khilafat phenomenon’s central purpose; just like that, the movement to protect and restore the caliphate came crashing down. There was no caliphate. This meant, of course, that the hoped-for world conference of Muslim scholars proposed by the JUH never took place, and it was soon made evident that any confidence in the Turkish government had been seriously misplaced. In the end, Barelvi leader Ahmad Riza Khan’s warnings about the practical inability of the Indian Muslims to affect the Ottoman caliphate situation proved annoyingly correct.

The 1924/1342 collapse of the Ottoman caliphate pushed Muslim politics in India into a state of confusion. The Muslim League was still more or less a non-entity, made seemingly insignificant by the Khilafatists over the previous several years. With the Turkish sultan’s fall, the Khilafatists themselves lost the proverbial wind in their sails.
As for the Congress Muslims, these were “in disarray” without the propellant of the Khilafat issue driving their base. It was a time of regrouping, of licking wounds and figuring out where to go from here. For many, the zeal of the last several years wouldn’t return until Gandhi’s relaunch of the non-cooperation movement in 1930/1348. The “falling apart” of 1920s/1330s-1340s national Muslim politics was helped in part, too, by the Government of India Act of 1919/1337, which institutionalized the concept of diarchy, shifting politics away from the center (and from pan-Indian issues) to the provinces. The shift helped bring local issues to the fore, issues that were less likely to be split along broad, communal lines—which might have resulted in less communal politics at the national level. But with separate electorates, elites continued to stress their “Muslimness.” After all, the reforms that had granted the Muslims an official, state-sponsored separateness motivated such individuals to step forward and claim to be the legitimate representatives of the community (and thus deserving of the new government’s “patronage”). And while it may be exaggerating the effect of the 1919/1337 Act to say, as some scholars of South Asian history do, that it was the legislation that was mostly responsible for terminating the united Hindu-Muslim political activism of the 19-teens/19-thirties (Khilafat remained a force, for example, years after the act was made law), the Act did pander to influential Muslim elites, many of whom continued to be—or quickly became—loyal to the British government.

Even before this, however, the joint Hindu-Muslim movement engineered by the Khilafat Committee and Gandhi’s Congress had suffered a set of debilitating losses from which it would never recover, at least in terms of presenting a unified front. The Mahatma’s own languishing in prison (arrested for “sedition”) for almost two years,
from early 1922/mid-1340 to early 1924/mid-1342, removed a key facilitator of Hindu-Muslim cooperation; for years after he emerged, too, the symbolic leader of the nationalist movement distanced himself from politics significantly (despite his being made president of the Congress in 1925/1343), preferring instead to concentrate on local, internal efforts for social reform rather than on grand, nationwide political agitation. Then there was the Muslim League; it had never embraced Khilafat, and held fast to its position. Some Hindu organizations, too—including the now-powerful Hindu Mahasabha—were critical of the Khilafat movement’s goals and of the Congress for seeking out partnership therewith. Meanwhile, Muslim scholars like Ahmad Riza and his disciples had continued to criticize both the effort itself as well as the movement’s cooperation with Hindus; their arguments struck home to many, who watched new developments—like the highly successful recovation efforts (usually from Muslim to Hindu) across India of Swami Dayanand Saraswati’s disciples engaged in shuddhikərən and əŋəTən (popularly known as the Shuddhi Movement, and considered by many Muslims as nothing more than an “armed terrorist” phenomenon). In 1921/1339, Muslim peasants in India’s Malabar region (known as Mohplas), who “became convinced that the rule of the Khalifa had been established in India,” violently rioted against their Hindu landlords; thousands died, mostly among the Moplahs themselves, during the six-month-long government attempt to quell the uprising. This was a period, too, when the Urdu-Hindi conflict was flaring up again (provoking Gandhi to push for a single, merged language—Hindustani—written in either script; his efforts failed). The Muslim ḥyjrət movement, in which thousands of Muslims had migrated out of India to Afghanistan only to be turned back, penniless, by the Afghan government, had resulted in numberless cases of Muslim families returning home only to find their
property occupied by erstwhile (and mostly Hindu) neighbors; tension over the issue turned violent in several instances. To top it off, many of the Hindu and Muslim leaders who had helped foster inter-communal unity—and might have continued to do so had they been free—were locked up in British prisons, having organized demonstration after demonstration in the wake of the highfalutin November/Rabi I visit to India of Britain’s Prince of Wales. Indeed, by year’s end some twenty thousand Indians had been imprisoned in the British backlash to these and other anti-government protests.11

But worst of all, just before Gandhi’s March 1922/Rajab 1340 arrest, two dozen policemen were burned alive by a mob at Chauri Chaura; the event prompted Gandhi to completely suspend his non-cooperation movement, a move that stunned thousands of already-jailed non-cooperation activists and led to bitter criticisms against the Mahatma from Khilafat leaders like the ‘Ali brothers. Indeed, after the Chauri Chaura incident, the ‘Alis disassociated themselves from Gandhi altogether (they would later join the League—and many Muslims would follow their lead in this regard). Later that year, the police and military were forced to occupy Multan, where the “tension” was “acute,” in order to stop the deadly communal riots rocking the city;12 many Hindus would subsequently rally to the cry of “Malabar and Multan” as part of this revitalized “communal resurgence.”13 Indeed, almost a full year before the Ottoman caliphate was scrapped, W. G. Tinckom-Fernandez, a New York Times correspondent who had been born in India and toured the subcontinent between 1921 and 1922/1339 and 1340, described “Moslem Indian” support of Gandhi as “half-hearted,” anyway. “Even as I write,” said Tinckom-Fernandez, “Moslem and Hindu communities at Ahmedabad, at Multan and other places in India are being kept from doing each other violence by
British troops and police.” The subtitle of his May 1923/Shawwal 1341 article: “Bonds With Hindus Weakening.”

Indeed, Atatürk’s abolishment of the caliphate was simply the deathblow to any comparable future Hindu-Muslim cooperation. In the words of Tinckom-Fernandez, “the Treaty of Sèvres wrecked Gandhism.” He was half-right.

*Naimuddin Moradabadi: father of political Barelvism.*

Many of Ahmad Riza Khan’s inner circle (his *xalifahs*) would, in the decade following his death, play leading roles as representatives of the Barelvi movement during Khilafat’s heyday, in the face of a surging Indian nationalist movement. Sanyal describes this group as Ahmad Riza’s “lieutenants or right-hand men who could be counted on to debate with an opponent, run a newspaper or school…and generally promote the goals of the movement in their hometowns.”

One of these men was Naimuddin Moradabadi. Born in 1882/1299 in what is today the northwestern corner of Uttar Pradesh (about a hundred miles from Delhi) in Moradabad, young Naimuddin had, by age twenty, memorized the Qur’an, learned Persian and Arabic, trained in traditional medicine (*tybb*), completed the *dars-e-nyżami*, and trained as a writer of *fatawa*. Most of his education had taken place in a school called Madrasah Imdadia, located within a stone’s throw of the Muhammad Qasim-founded Jamia Qasimia Madrasah-e-Shahi; “what impact this proximity to a Deobandi school may have had on the young Na’im ud-Din is unknown,” writes Sanyal. What is known is that his father was a disciple of Muhammad Qasim—until, so the story goes, he read Ahmad Riza Khan’s 1902/1320 juridical ruling harshly condemning the chief founder of Deobandism. It is likely that Naimuddin Moradabadi played a role in his
father’s rejection of the Deobandi school, considering that he (Naimuddin) was in his twenties at the time and already a devoted follower of the Bareilly divine. In any case, Naimuddin early on published works in defense of Muhammad’s knowledge of the unseen, in addition to works attacking “Wahhabism,” and thereby quickly gained the notice and admiration of Ahmad Riza Khan. Naimuddin also rapidly developed a reputation as a skilled debater, taking on Deobandis and others as his opponents.

Indeed, just as the fatwa was Ahmad Riza Khan’s forte, the debate became Naimuddin’s, and Ahmad Riza would often ask the young Moradabadi, a quarter-century his junior, to represent the Barelvi side in such contests all over India. But by the time of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s 1948/1367 death, he would be known for much more than his semantic skill.

After the passing of Barelvism’s “founder,” Naimuddin Moradabadi quickly moved into a powerful position of leadership within the movement, partially (some would say mostly) filling the vacuum left behind by the larger-than-life Ahmad Riza. One of his first moves was to found the Jamia Naeemia (around 1920/1338, perhaps before the divine out of Bareilly died), arguably his most long-lasting legacy, and certainly so outside of the political realm. (This was around the same time that Naimuddin had issued the famous Barelvi fatwa, aforementioned, opposing non-cooperation, forbidding Muslims from participating in it, and warning them of the dangers of Hindu-Muslim cooperation.) The school was located in Naimuddin’s hometown of Moradabad and became a regional center for Barelvi activism. At least three years before the founding of the school however—in 1917/1335—Naimuddin organized the Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa, a group whose mission was to curb, and if possible reverse, the tide of reconversions threatening the Muslim community in the wake of the Shuddhi...
movement;\(^{18}\) it would also act as a quasi-political organ when required (as in opposition to the Deobandi-dominated JUH, for example). The Jama'at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa is credited with preventing around four hundred thousand reconversions to Hinduism, especially among the poor Muslims of the eastern UP and in the area known today as the Indian state of Rajasthan.\(^{19}\) His reputation as a Barelvi divine was such that both ‘Abd ul-Bari and Muhammad ‘Ali—major Muslim religious and political figures in their own right, of course—came to him to perform *tawbah*, or repentance; this was partially to absolve them of sins they had ostensibly committed as leaders of the Khilafat movement.\(^{20}\) Indeed, on this occasion ‘Abd ul-Bari explained that he had “accepted the viewpoint of Ahmad Riza Khan,” and his statement in this regard was published on 20 May 1921/12 Ramadan 1339 in a Lucknow newspaper. Muhammad ‘Ali’s own “repentance” came almost a decade later, in 1930/1349, towards the end of the year.\(^{21}\) This is significant in that these two well-known leaders, in denouncing their “old ways” (including intimate cooperation with both Deobandis and Hindus), came to one of the most visibly “Barelvi” figures (perhaps *the* most “Barelvi,” along with Ahmad Riza’s own son, Hamid Riza Khan) in all of Hindustan. In the mid-1920s/1340s, Naimuddin Moradabadi—who warned his fellow Muslims that the rising Hindu generation would, in the coming decades, “play Holi with [Muslim] blood”—invited “Sunni” (i.e. Barelvi and Barelvi-leaning) religious scholars and *pirs* “from all parts of the country” to gather together in a grand meeting in his hometown.\(^{22}\) It was time to deal with the Deobandi threat to the *ummah*.

But before examining this meeting, a quick note on what might be called “the Hindu-Muslim political spectrum” may be in order. Over the coming years, the various parties populating the Hindu-Muslim political spectrum might generally be classified
into four groups—two Muslim, two Hindu (see figure 3.1). The first Muslim group
(M1) might be called the “Islamic exclusionists,” made up of the retooled Muslim
League (especially from the 1930s/1350s), most Barelvis, and generally any Muslim
who refused to work with the Hindus in any political capacity. At first, this group
sought power and security by means of its relationship with the British; as long as the
latter were in charge, the Muslims’ vulnerability as a minority people surrounded by the

majority Hindu population remained more or less a non-issue. Later, as the
independence movement heated up and it became clear that the expulsion of the British
from the subcontinent was no longer a wishful nationalist dream (but was, in fact, a
likely scenario), this group would advocate the partition of Hindustan into completely
independent Muslim and majority-Hindu zones as the solution to the minority-majority
problem. This first Muslim group would be mirrored on the other end of the spectrum
by a similar Hindu one (H1), the “Hindu exclusionists,” made up of Hindutva-inspired
entities, the Hindu Mahasabha, its offshoots, and other explicitly Hindu nationalist

**Figure 3.1.** The Muslim-Hindi political spectrum within the context of pre-
Partition independence politics.
organizations—groups that would, like their Muslim counterparts in M1, refuse to work with Muslims. It was largely the actions of these two groups that fueled each other, driving Hindus and Muslims alike (who otherwise might have found a place among the “inclusionists” of their spheres) into the exclusionary camps. In the middle, M2 and H2 represented the “Muslim inclusionists” and the “Hindu inclusionists,” respectively; the former was made up of Congressite Muslims, most Deobandis, and other Muslims who felt that the risks of working together with Hindus were far outweighed by the danger posed to Islam, the Muslim community, South Asian Islamic culture, and the future prospects of Islam on the subcontinent by the creation of Pakistan. At first many of these Muslims would be driven by a hatred of the British, deep-seeded and passed on over several generations since the collapse of Muslim power in the eighteenth/twelfth century. Later that animosity would be supplemented by a belief that Islam could flourish (and her cultural centers be preserved) best in a united India, as well as by the resolution that if a “Pakistan” were to be created in South Asia, it would only give the British a continued foothold in the region.

Sentiments expressed by Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza Khan, illustrate well the early position of the Muslims of M1, and it is here that we return to Naimuddin Moradabadi’s seminal meeting. The year was 1925/1343, and the occasion was the All-India Sunni Conference’s first summit; the AISC was a Barelvi-dominated organization whose aims included the unification of “the Sunni majority” under a single political, economic, and socio-religious platform. The four-day gathering, from 16-19 March/20-23 Sh’aban, was held at Naimuddin Moradabadi’s recently founded Jamia Naeemia, and, as previously mentioned, the more than two hundred and fifty religious scholars in attendance (like the influential Punjabi pir Jama’at `Ali Shah) came at his personal
invitation. Just a few months before, Moradabad had been the scene of serious communal riots, as “a large number of Mohammedans” had attacked and seriously injured a group of Hindus, then desecrated several Hindu temples. This communal schism only served to reinforce what seemed to be the consensus of the conference.

Facing the voluminous crowd of religious scholars gathered together in this volatile district, Hamid Riza argued that political independence from the British for India would only lead to Hindu domination over the Muslim minority. As long as British power was secure, so, too, was Muslim security in an India populated mostly by Hindus. Remove that power and the Hindus would lord over the Islamic community, among other depravations enacting legislation—enforced by the guns of government—repugnant to shari‘at. No: Muslim religious leaders should stop wasting their time working with the nationalist movement in the vain dream of pushing out the British (in essence digging their own graves) and instead focus, as Ahmad Riza Khan had always admonished, on bettering the economic situation of and improving education within the Muslim community. Hamid Riza’s statements at the 1925/1343 All-India Sunni Conference meeting clearly reveal M1’s loyalist preferences—a loyalty not borne of any sense of real fealty to the British, but rather out of a practical anxiety for what a Hindu-dominated Indian state might do to Islam’s prospects on the subcontinent. For now, independence was far from a certainty; once that changed, however, the Barelvi call, like that of the rest of M1, would be for complete political and territorial partition. Other themes prevalent at the gathering included the Muslim migration option, the Khilafat movement, right-wing Hindu groups, and “the final fate of the Muslim community’s independent identity.” Barelvi scholars and pirs were determined to set up branches of
the All-India Sunni Conference, as well as a ṭədarys network to rival their Deobandi counterparts, all over India.

The All-India Sunni Conference (or, as it was officially known, the Jamiat-e-‘Aliyah al-Markaziah) arose as a mostly Barelvi response to the Deobandi-dominated JUH and the Khilafat movement. The group was “the first political platform of the Barelvi [‘alɔmar].” Membership criteria were kept strict so as to prevent any Deobandi from becoming one with the party; indeed, only a true (or “orthodox”) “Sunni” could join its ranks, with orthodoxy explicitly defined by the group on the organization’s membership form. A true Sunni, the AISC held, was one who followed the ṭəslɔk of the great Jahangir- and Shah Jahan-era Islamic scholar and Sufi Abdul Haqq Dehlavi; seventeenth-century/tenth-century Farangi Mahali scholar Abdul ‘Ali (the aforementioned bɔhɔr ul’alɔm); the aforementioned Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi; Fazl-e Rasul Badayuni (who, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, was a contemporary of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, a chief “Barelvi” Mutiny figure, and a fierce opponent of Wahhabism); and, of course, first “Barelvi” Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly. The Conference admonished Muslims everywhere against joining the Indian National Congress. And though Hamid Riza Khan would participate as a speaker, and influential Muslim leaders like Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (the pir of ‘Alipur Sayyidan Sharif) take prominent roles (the sɔyyid was elected the organization’s president at the 1925/1343 meeting), the true founder of the organization was Naimuddin Moradabadi, at whose institution the conference took place. Naimuddin would be elected the group’s first general secretary (nɔzyym-e-‘alɔh).

The All-India Sunni Conference came away from its first meeting with a set of specific objectives, touched upon by Hamid Riza and outlined in the organization’s six official aims. First and foremost, the Conference would strive to act as a vehicle of
unification for the subcontinent’s Sunni community. “Sunni” here was, as always, a (Barelvi) catchword for the Barelvis themselves, or “Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat” (defined by one Barelvi group as “the largest group of Muslims and the only group whose beliefs and teachings are truly in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnat of the Holy Prophet”);28 perhaps more accurately, though, the label might be considered an exclusionary term, discounting not only the Shi’a but also Sunnis possessed of a more “Wahhabi” bent—by far the most prominent (and populous) among them the Deobandis. By using the term, the Barelvis were pushing the Deobandis and others out of the Sunni umbrella altogether. The goal to unite Indian “Sunnis” was to be brought about through a variety of means. These included the establishment of regional and local religious organizations, active in their areas but linked to the subcontinent-wide All-India Sunni Conference; the organization of proselytizing efforts (especially aimed at Muslims who might otherwise fall under Deobandi sway); and the founding of religious schools—certainly a reaction to successful Deobandi efforts in this regard. The rest of the Conference platform dealt with the improvement of Muslim social conditions vis-à-vis the promotion of intra-community (i.e. Muslim community) business and trade, the fulfilling of the employment needs of Muslims, and the freeing of Muslims from the shackles of debt.

The AISC would meet at least four more times between 1925/1343 and 1930/1349, with conferences in Bihar (16-18 May 1927/14-16 Dh’ul Q’adah 1345; it was during this gathering that Hamid Riza was elected the organization’s next president), again in Moradabad (in August 1928/Safar 1347), a month later (September/Rabi I) in the same city, and in Bengal (20-21 May 1930/21-22 Dh’ul Hijja 1348). The September 1928/Rabi I 1347 conference in Moradabad was particularly significant in that the
AISC came out strongly and formally against the Nehru Report (about which more later). The Congress-produced document was proof, alleged the Barelvis, that the Hindus were only manipulating their Muslim co-activists for their own political advantage. A resolution passed ("unanimously") by the conference on this regard stated, "This meeting considers the Nehru Committee Report as dangerous for the interests of the Muslims, and condemn it."\(^{29}\) The 1930/1348 Bengal conference went further, admonishing Muslims to stay away from the INC, out-and-out condemning the JUH for its pro-Congress stance, and describing its (the JUH’s) leadership as "working like puppets in the hands of the Hindus." The Deobandis, the Sunni Conference had officially asserted, had lost any mandate it might have once possessed as representatives of Islam or the *ummāt* in South Asia.\(^{30}\) By 1930/1348, then, it can be accurately stated that the Barelvis and the Deobandis, heretofore engaged in what might be called a political cold war among the subcontinent’s Muslim communities for religio-political supremacy and "sole spokesparty" status, now faced one another as explicit political enemies.

In December of 1930/Rajab of 1349, the Muslim League held its all-India conference at Allahabad, none other than Muhammad Iqbal presiding. The poet-philosopher emphasized what would become the underlining facet of the League’s Pakistan pitch: "The principal of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified." Indeed, Iqbal went on to call for just that—and got specific, proposing the creation of a separate, Muslim state on the subcontinent, carved out of the northwestern regions (more or less equivalent to Pakistan’s present-day boundaries). “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West
Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State.” This, he said, was “the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.” Around the same time, of course, Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali and his friends—students at Cambridge—used the designation “Pakistan” for the first time. Their fantasy state, like Iqbal’s, essentially included what one would recognize as Pakistan as of the time of this writing. Interestingly—and perhaps significantly—neither Iqbal nor ‘Ali included Bengal in their hoped-for scenarios for a new Indian Islamic state. And at least one Pakistani historian has identified Naimuddin Moradabadi as “most probably” the first Barelvi scholar to embrace the propositions of Iqbal’s 1930/1349 Allahabad address.

Thousands would follow suit, even if their collective vision for the exact nature of a future Pakistan almost assuredly differed from that of Iqbal himself. (One historian has deftly observed that “there is no quintessential national culture, only mythic images of it,” an idea that seems to aptly describe the various “images” of a future Pakistan; the big question was this: whose “mythic images” would serve as the true reflection of Pakistan’s “quintessential national culture?”) Most Pakistan supporters seem to have been driven less by an animosity against the British (one Pakistani scholar has noted that even into the early 1930s/1350s, the Muslim League continued to be “dominated by pro-British elements”) than anxiety about how Muslims might fare in a Hindu-majority (and therefore Hindu-controlled) western-style democracy—just as Iqbal had said. Some, too, were driven to support Pakistan despite opposition to the League (and to Congress, for that matter). “Already there is no justice and much faction,” one Muslim subedar near Shewa told an English observer in 1946/1365. “We don’t want either League or Congress. What we want is tranquility, so there must be division” (italics added).
Speaking of Iqbal and the League, it should be noted that later Barelvi scholars would appropriate the legacies of Iqbal and even Jinnah as part of their own narrative. While Deobandi histories write of the “freedom movement,” expounding upon the religio-political exploits of figures like Mahmud Hasan, Husain Ahmed Madani, and even (in Pakistan) Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, they remain mostly quiet when it comes to Iqbal and Jinnah (and, of course, any of the Barelvi leadership). Meanwhile, Barelvi historians write of the “Pakistan movement,” granting space to Iqbal and Jinnah as well as Ahmad Riza Khan, Naimuddin Moradabadi, and the All-India Sunni Conference.

Iqbal’s positions vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as well as his two-nation theory, are prominent and underscored in the Barelvi narrative (often including verse he composed to communicate his political views). Jinnah’s role as a model Muslim—a devout Sunni, it is insisted, not a Shi‘i—who has unfairly been labeled a secularist is also highlighted in the Barelvi histories. The Aligarh movement revolving around Sir Sayyid’s Anglo-Oriental University is similarly treated as part and parcel of the Barelvi story.

Deobandi historians are less kind to Jinnah, the League, and the Aligarhists—a phenomenon that is especially true in India.

The rumblings for a separate state surely lent added political emphasis to the All-India Sunni Conference’s second subcontinent-wide gathering in 1935/1354 at Badayun, a town that, as previously mentioned, had long been a seat of Barelvi influence. It had been a decade since the organization’s first gathering in Moradabad, and five years since Iqbal’s statements to the Muslim League, but the AISC under Naimuddin Moradabadi (and pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, who was again elected the organization’s president on this occasion) had decided the time had come to make several formal pronouncements. First, the Barelvi organization officially declared its
support for the “two-nation theory” (though the gathered scholars were apt to trace the idea to Ahmad Riza rather than to Jinnah or Iqbal). Second, and perhaps more importantly from a political point-of-view, the Sunni Conference called for outright independence for the subcontinent’s Muslims—indeed, independence not so much from the British as from Hindu-dominated India. Geographically, that independence should resemble the proposition put forward by Iqbal and subsequently adopted by the All-India Muslim League. Though the Conference kept its distance, technically speaking, from the League (not declaring itself, for example, an official ally of the secular AIML, nor seeking out Jinnah to organize united efforts in support of their joint political goals), it unambiguously fell in line with the League’s political agenda, even as the Deobandis, under the leadership of the JUH, were striving for “composite nationalism” and a united India. Such “falling in line,” however, was not done without reservation—and conditions. Yes, the Barelvis at Badayun had articulated their vision, however broadly, of a South Asian Islamic state. But they would support the League “only to the extent that, in one part of Hindustan, the free governance of the Qur’an, of Islam, will prevail.” Should the League pursue a different course, “no Sunni [Barelvi] will accept it.” The League’s secular roots obviously clashed with the Barelvi ‘alɔma’s goal of the establishment of an explicitly and unambiguously Islamic state. Such fears were articulated at the conference, too; those “professing the [k̡alymah]” yet are “irritated by the thought of an Islamic authority” should meet with disfavor in Pakistan, it was argued. Thus the AISC’s support of the League was conditional, even if its call for Pakistan was officially unequivocal. In a formal resolution adopted at the Badayun conference, the Barelvi guiding lights announced that the AISC “fully supports the demand for Pakistan,” an “Islamic state” for which the Barelvi ‘alɔma and məʃhəyə were
“prepared for whatever sacrifice may be necessary.” Pakistan, they maintained, would be guided by “the Qur’an, ḥadīs, and the principles of fiqh.”39 These were the Barelvis’ “mythic images,” the symbols of their “quintessential national culture,” whatever the League’s might be. (Jawaharlal Nehru would touch upon the ambiguous idea of “Moslem culture” around this time, too, writing, “Is [Muslim culture] a kind of racial memory of the great deeds of the Arabs, Persians, Turks, etc.? Or language? Or art and music? Or customs? I do not remember any one referring to present-day Moslem art or Moslem music. …[T]he influence of Persian has no element of religion about it. …[Persian language and culture] is a common and precious heritage for all of us in India. I have tried hard to understand what this ‘Moslem culture’ is, but I confess that I have not succeeded… The Moslem peasantry and industrial workers are hardly distinguishable from the Hindu.”40

After the Congress’s landslide electoral victory in 1937/1356, the face of Indian politics began to change quickly. This was, in some part, the fault of the INC itself, which, flush with victory, rejected Muslim League participation in government (actually, the League had demanded that any Muslim considered for governmental position be vetted by itself—as self-appointed spokesparty of India’s Muslim population—but the Congress had refused to recognize this foundational League claim). Muslim leaders and their parties all over India looked on with mounting trepidation at such developments, which seemed to confirm Jinnah’s long-time assertion that the Hindu majority would be an abusive ruler. In the face of this perceived “Hindu” arrogance, one by one these influential figures (among them “large numbers” of Barelvi or Barelvi-leaning pirs, ālōma, and other religious leaders) and Muslim parties began to align themselves with Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his party. All-India Sunni
Conference leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, for example, in 1938/1357 launched a tour of the largely Congress-controlled northwestern frontier in support of Jinnah, the League, and Muslim separateness, addressing “huge gatherings” in Rawalpindi, Kohat, Sialkot, and Peshawar. This major figure within the predominantly Barelvi AISC condemned the Deobandi ‘alma who had sided with the Congress, praying “to God to unite the Muslims and save them from the clutches of [the] pro-Hindu coterie of the so-called Muslim scholars.” (By 1945/1364 he would characterize the Congress, with direct allusion to its Muslim supporters, as “the party of infidels and apostates” and “the worst enemy of the Muslims.”) Thus, and thanks in significant measure to Barelvi support, the great electoral loser of 1937/1356 was transformed into “the champion of free Islam against Hindu dominance.”

Thus, and thanks in significant measure to Barelvi support, the great electoral loser of 1937/1356 was transformed into “the champion of free Islam against Hindu dominance.”

From the late nineteenth century/thirteenth century, the division between the Barelvis and the Deobandis was, in the words of Jaswant Singh, “exploited by the British to neutralize the Deobandis and to entrap the Barelwis in the loyalist camp: Quad Erat Demonstrandum.” This may have been true, but became more complicated after the October 1921/Safar 1340 death of Ahmad Riza Khan, when a Barelvi split—which had commenced in the volatile political climate in the decade before the great man’s passing—saw many younger Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders move to the overtly anti-British camp. But the British soon found an answer for that, too. In August 1938/Jumada II 1357, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah met with India’s acting British viceroy and offered his foreign overlord a deal. Simply put, the League leader promised that his organization would remain loyal to the British—if the government recognized the League as the sole mouthpiece of India’s Muslims (something Minto had agreed to back in 1906/1324, when the League was founded, but had subsequently carried little weight
due to realities on the ground, until recently). It was a wry move, but one that would pay off, despite the viceroy’s initial dismissal of the offer, for after the breakout of World War II the government of India readily agreed to Jinnah’s proposal, in line with its long-established policy of setting up “the Muslim minority” as “the hope of the British Government in India,” in the words of one Indian commentator writing many years before the Jinnah-Linlithgow meeting. For decades, the British government had been rewarding loyal Muslims with educational grants, a disproportionate number of government posts, titles, honors, disproportionate representation in the councils, and separate electorates, to name a few. Now the government had identified what it viewed as the premier Muslim organization in India (or at least the one it preferred the most) and offered its patronage in order to ensure its loyalty. Jinnah thus won his place as the “sole spokesman” of South Asia’s Muslims—a position on which he would never compromise, despite South Asian Islam’s multiplicity of communities, interests, and divergent parties, and despite the fact that others claimed to possess similar status (or at least a more legitimate claim to it); among these could certainly be counted the AISC Barelvi leadership, who saw themselves as the standard-bearers of Indian Islam’s majority (their foundational claim), as well as the JUH, who had long viewed itself as the premier ‘alma party in South Asia and who pointed to its central role in many a national (and even pan-Islamic) movement for almost twenty years as compelling evidence. (The idea that Jinnah could be the sole spokesman of India’s Muslims could only have been motivated by political considerations, since it was obviously a ludicrous claim. Even within the League, there were powerful voices opposing Jinnah’s separatism. In fact, the Muslim League premiers in the two major provinces claimed by Jinnah for Pakistan—the Punjab and Bengal—both stood adamantly against the idea;
the Punjab’s Sikandar Hayat Khan mockingly referred to it as “Jinnahstan.” Right up to independence, in August 1947/Ramadan 1366, the League was unable to win absolute majorities in any of the Muslim-majority provinces. In the words of one historian personally close to these events, “Jinnah’s scheme would foist Pakistan on those not interested in it and leave out those who might welcome it.” The terms of the League head’s offer fit more squarely with the general Barelvi political position, obviously, than with the Deobandi one. From the beginning, Ahmad Riza had preached Muslim reform from within, and had identified the subcontinent’s Hindus (and its apostate Muslim collaborators) as subcontinental Islam’s greatest threat. Viewed from this perspective, Jinnah’s proposition entailing loyalty to the British was justifiable, and it was therefore natural that so many Barelvis would fall into line behind the wiry Karachi-born politician (something many of their leaders had done at the 1935/1354 Badayun conference of the AISC), while so many Deobandis, reared within the context of a virulently anti-British tradition, would reject him entirely, especially after this latest treachery.

That so many Barelvis, including several of its most notable leaders, had in fact done exactly that vis-à-vis Jinnah and the League (that is, fallen in line behind them) was demonstrated powerfully on 22 December 1939/10 Dh’ul Q’adah 1358, when Muslims across India observed the Jinnah-inspired “Day of Deliverance” in celebration of the resignation from provincial and national government office of Congress position-holders across the country. The Congress move—supported strongly by Nehru but only reluctantly by Gandhi—was meant as an INC protest against both not having been consulted before Indian resources and military forces were committed to participation in the Second World War as well as for the usual lack of any sort of independence promise
from the government. As usual, Jinnah (who was reportedly “overjoyed” at the news of the INC’s decision) took full political advantage of what was probably a rash move on the part of the Congress, utilizing the situation to consolidate his position relative to the British by promising “honorable” Muslim support while calling for an increase in protection for Muslims by the government. His call for a Day of Deliverance—that is, deliverance from Congress “tyranny”—was hailed by a segment of Muslims (including many Barelvis) but condemned strongly by others (notably, the Congress’s Deobandi supporters).

On the occasion of the controversial Day, two-time AISC president and influential pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah addressed a crowd in his hometown of ‘Alipur. “There are two flags [in India],” he said, “one of Islam and the other of kufār.” This would be the sharp diametric presented by advocates of Pakistan in the months running up to Partition. “O Muslims,” the great pir continued, “under which flag will you stand?” The crowd reportedly answered, “Under the flag of Islam!” Jamaat ‘Ali then asked, “If anyone standing under the flag of kufār died, [would] you bury him in the Muslim graveyard? [Would] you pray at his funeral?” “No! No!” came the multitude’s answer. And then the critical statement: “The flag of the Muslim League,” proclaimed the eminent pir, “is the flag of Islam.” His final enjoinder: “We must all join the League.”47 (Jamaat ‘Ali Shah reportedly made similar statements even before the “Day of Deliverance.” On 22 April 1938/21 Safar 1357, he had addressed a crowd in Sialkot thus: “Dear Muslims, today there are two banners. One belongs to Islam and the other to infidels. Which will you choose?” The gathering allegedly “vowed to close their graveyards” on Deobandis and other “co-religionists who have gone under the non-Muslim banners.” Several other reports confirm that the old pir routinely equated rejection of the League
with *kufur*, or “disbelief.” “It is binding,” he told a gathering on 11 May 1938/11 Rabi I 1357, “on all the Muslims of India to join the Muslim League.” Such language would be repeated by Jamaat ‘Ali in the critical years leading up to Partition, from 1945/1364 to 1947/1366). The effect on public (Muslim) opinion by such calls is difficult to measure, of course, but was likely considerable. Indeed, without the League’s change of strategy—without the co-opting of the *pirs* and *mashaiks*, of men like Naimuddin Moradabadi and Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (not to mention, later, some key Deobandis like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani)—it is difficult to see how Jinnah would have secured the victory he eventually won.

General Barelvi support for the League was further cemented by that organization’s formal adoption, in March 1940/Safar 1359, of the Lahore Resolution—a clear-cut statement of purpose on the part of Jinnah and his party. As Hindus and Muslims were two different nations, “the only course open to us,” Jinnah declared on the occasion of the resolution’s passing, “is to allow the major nations separate homelands.” The goal was now an unambiguously separate, absolutely independent (i.e. from Hindu India) Muslim polity (or polities) on the subcontinent; “*[t]he Muslim-majority provinces in North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States,***” the Resolution announced, “in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.” Before this momentous resolution, the idea of Pakistan had been the domain of a small group, and the destiny of India’s Muslims had remained a hotly contested topic possessed of a long spectrum of opinion voiced by a wide variety of both secular and religious leaders. Post-Lahore Resolution, however, an increasing number of Muslims appear to have been drawn to the League’s new, simple, and infinitely measurable aim. This trend continued despite efforts by the JUH, the Ahrars,
Shi’a political groups, and others to challenge the League’s claim to represent all Muslims. In April 1940/Rabi I 1359, for example, the JUH—together with the Shi’a Political Conference and the Majlis-e-Ahrar—organized an Azad [“Free”] Muslim Conference, accusing the AIML of ignoring the real Muslim minority in the Hindu-majority areas of India in favor of the Muslims who already enjoyed majority status in their respective areas; Jinnah responded that these minority Muslims would be minorities whether Pakistan was created or not—it was a choice between all Muslims under Hindu Raj, or only some.51 Perhaps these challenges from within the Muslim community didn’t matter, since the British had already selected the League as its approved Muslim voice.

Most Barelvis, it seems, could be counted among those supporting the League, at least as far as the organization’s call for a separate homeland (i.e. separate from the Hindu majority) was concerned, however their visions of a future subcontinental Islamic state might have diverged from Jinnah’s in other respects. The AISC, under the direction of Jamaat ‘Ali Shah and Naimuddin Moradabadi, sent delegates to the League’s annual session on the occasion of the Resolution’s passing (Abdul Hamid Badayuni and Abdul Ghafur Hazarvi, both actually League members), and Jamaat ‘Ali himself issued a statement in the decision’s favor: “The Muslim League is the only Islamic organization,” he said, taking a swipe at the Deobandis and their JUH. “Therefore, I advise the Muslims [of India] to join it [the League], as no other party is a well-wisher of the Muslims.” And then the final jab, a la Ahmad Riza: “It is futile to think that the Hindu-dominated Congress can be sympathetic to them and support their cause.”52 For his part, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution, Naimuddin Moradabadi crisscrossed north India, delivering speeches in favor of Pakistan and the
In April 1941/Rabi I 1360, the Lahore Resolution’s call for, essentially, the creation of Pakistan (Jinnah would say as much in an April 1941/Rabi I 1360 statement) was strengthened and clarified by the Madras Resolution (as it was passed in a session of the League in that city), demanding “completely independent States” carved from India’s northwest and eastern regions that together would constitute “Muslim Free National Homelands.” Two years later (April 1943/Rabi II 1362) Jinnah would specifically admonish the pirs of India “to pray and exhort their followers” to be willing to lay down their lives, if necessary, for the attainement of an independent Islamic state on the subcontinent. The League’s appeal motivated many a Barelvi leader to take to the road to campaign for Jinnah and Pakistan; Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, for example, “despite old age and deteriorating health [being over a hundred years old at the time],” toured eastern Punjab in 1944/1363 on just such a platform. The next year he and other Barelvi scholars and shiaxs stumped for the League in, among other places, Amritsar, where their party (dubbed by followers “the caravan of light”) was greeted with the slogan-shout, “Long live әmir-e-myllәt [Jamaat ‘Ali Shah’s honorary title], long live the Muslim League, and long live әyәd-i-ә’әmәt [Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah]!” An AISC meeting at the Jama әsәйәd in Amritsar saw Naimuddin Moradabadi, along with several other powerful scholars (plus pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah), deliver “forceful” addresses in support of Pakistan.

In January 1946/Safar 1365, thousands of Barelvis, including many scholars and shiaxs, traveled to Bareilly in order to commemorate the death anniversary of Ahmad Riza Khan (who had passed away exactly twenty-five years before). It was normal, of course, for throngs of disciples to assemble for the great divine’s әurs, but this particular gathering in Bareilly evolved into a political meeting of sorts. The massive assemblage
produced a formal expression of support for Pakistan. Perhaps more significantly, the meeting clarified just what that meant—a state in which *shari'at* must be established and enforced. Anything less was unacceptable. A similar meeting, this time officially under the aegis of the AISC, took place the next month in Etawah district, about ninety miles due south of Badayun. Its call matched that of the Ahmad Riza ‘urs gathering.\(^57\) The spontaneous nature of the political meeting brought forth by the annual ‘urs gathering in Bareilly makes clearly recognizable the way the religio-political winds were blowing among Barelvis across India. The general support for Pakistan was there, yes—but for Pakistan as an explicitly Islamic state established according to the Sunni (i.e. Barelvi) interpretation of Islamic law. Such powerful expressions underscore, perhaps, the future disappointments of the Barelvis and their leaders when the Deobandis were given an official place at the constitution-crafting table in independent Pakistan—while the Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alıma were left seemingly out in the cold. That perceived exclusion would be even more painful given the fact that, four months later, on the occasion of the All-India Sunni Conference’s largest gathering to date, Naimuddin Moradabadi would be appointed chairman of an official AISC committee created to formulate a plan for enshrining Islamic law within the Pakistani constitution. The result of this committee’s work, largely undertaken by Naimuddin himself, was known as the “Eleven Points.”

The mega-gathering took place four months after Ahmad Riza Khan’s ‘urs and the spontaneous political meeting that had accompanied it. According to Barelvi reports, some five hundred Sufi *shixs* were joined by around seven thousand Barelvi or Barelvi-leaning ‘alıma and not less than two hundred thousand other attendees. Led by Naimuddin Moradabadi, as well as Zafaruddin Bihari and Ahmad Riza’s younger son Mustafa, the conference’s focus was familiar to those who had attended the
organization’s first two India-wide gatherings: on the spiritual uplift of Indian Muslims through, among other things, preaching and missionary work (tablīg) and the extension of the Barelvi (or “Sunni”) madrasah network through the establishment of more madarys. But what made this mega-conference different, apart from the sheer number of its attendees, was its enunciation of a hoped-for goal, the very purpose of such self-improvement efforts. That goal was “Pakistan,” or a land of purity—a play on the meaning of the word that would shortly become the name of a new Islamic state. “The meaning of ‘Pakistan,’” newly elected AISC president Muhammad Ashrafi Kachhuchhavi (d. 1961 AD) told the assembled thousands, “is an independent state of Islam and the Qur’an, in a small part of India…” And then the crux of Muhammad Ashrafi’s point: “[B]ut we [the AISC] are working for a grand ‘Pakistan’…the rule of Islam all over the world.”58 This was where Muslim League goals diverged from those of the Barelvis (and where Deobandis, in a future independent Pakistan, could later find some common ground with their long-time theological rivals). What debate may have occurred at the conference vis-à-vis Pakistan we may never know (there were, after all, some Barelvi scholars and pirs who opposed the establishment of Pakistan, and certainly cooperation with the Muslim League; support of the latter, according to one scholar of Barelvism, was “the subject of considerable controversy” among Barelvi ‘alāma),59 but the overarching message of the Varanasi (then called Benares) gathering was that the Barelvis had much more revivalist (or, depending on one’s point-of-view, anti-revivalist) work to do, especially in light of Deobandi and other “Wahhabi” gains among South Asian Muslims; all this was to be done with the goal of “Pakistan” in mind. If the League was to be the vehicle to accomplish the latter, it seems most Barelvi leaders were willing to accept it as such. In any case, the resolution in favor of Pakistan at the
1946/1365 Benares AISC gathering represented, in the words of M. Ahmad, “the climax of support of the Sunni [Barelvi] [‘aloma] for the cause of Pakistan”—though the Barelvi contribution on the frontier and in the Punjab (two crucial provinces the League could ill-afford to lose) might arguably lay claim, too, to the Pakistani historian’s classification.\(^6\)

Naimuddin Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” showcase what might be considered the general Barelvi point-of-view, at the time, vis-à-vis Pakistan as an Islamic state. The document defined “Pakistan” as a “free Islamic government” in Hindustan, established “according to shari’at and the principles of fiqh.” What this meant in practical terms was outlined in Moradabadi’s eleven points, which underscore not only the role of the ‘aloma in government, but also the right kind of ‘aloma. In fact, the first nine points, if implemented, would have effectively shut out any meaningful Deobandi participation in Pakistan’s governance. Point #1 (“This government will be ruled by a Sunni әmir”) would have placed a “Sunni” (read: Barelvi) әmir at the head of the state. That an әmir of the proper sectarian persuasion be elected would be ensured by Point #2 (“This әmir will be elected by the majority of the Sunni [әhl-e-sunnat] Muslims”), which not only excluded non-Muslims, but also Shi’a Muslims and, potentially, all “Sunni” Muslims who failed to meet a state requirement of orthodoxy. Based on the AISC’s membership criteria, the Deobandis would have fallen far outside such a requirement and may therefore have been unable, under Naimuddin Moradabadi’s constitution, to vote for the әmir. Once a Barelvi (or “Sunni”) әmir had been elected, he would create a shwra (“advisory council”), as per Point #3 (“That әmir will appoint a group of pious [Muslim] people and statesmen for a shwra”), almost certainly, of course, stacked with those of the Ahl-e-Sunnat persuasion—and traditionally made up mostly of ‘aloma.
Point #4 (*The jama‘at-e-shwra will be directed by the a‘mir*) and Point #5 (*The suggestions of the jama‘at-e-shwra will be considered final after the a‘mir’s acceptance*) assured the Barelvi religious leadership a powerful place within the political apparatus— that is, direct access to the ear of the head of state, with that head’s general compliance with their suggestions (as implicit in Point #5) constitutionally binding. Point #6 further ensured that a Pakistani government would be in good “Sunni” hands by having the (almost certainly Barelvi) a‘mir in charge of appointing a Prime Minister with “responsibility” (*nāżam w nāgrānī*) over “all internal and external affairs” (according to Point #7). Department heads would be nominated by the Prime Minister (as per Point #8)— but only after approval by the a‘mir himself (Point #9). Rounding out the “Eleven Points,” #10 and #11 dealt with taxes and the status of non-Muslims, respectively.

Moradabadi’s constitutional framework underscores the Barelvi leadership’s belief that they did indeed represent the “Sunni majority,” and could thus rest easy that in a true Islamic state like the “Pakistan” they envisioned, one incorporating democratic mechanisms (like voting), they would naturally emerge electorally victorious and thus occupy high places of power. The draft made no mention of bicameral or unicameral assemblies, provincial assemblies, or any other republican-style entity, emphasizing instead rule by a righteous a‘mir (under the firm guidance of his ‘alama-filled shwra) or a‘mir-approved officers and their respective departments.61

Na‘imuddin Moradabadi never migrated to Pakistan, either at the time of Partition or afterward. He did visit the new Islamic state, however, meeting with Barelvi leaders and others in Lahore, Karachi, and elsewhere.62 (Na‘imuddin Moradabadi’s activities in Pakistan during his final months are addressed at some length in Chapter 4). But lasting influence within the Barelvi school even in Pakistan is
demonstrated by the achievements of his many students there, hundreds of whom went on to establish schools of their own in the new “Muslim” state. Muhammad Hussain Naeemi, for example (born in Uttar Pradesh’s Moradabad District in 1923/1341), was one of those disciples. Muhammad Hussain’s father had died young—at only nineteen years of age—so Muhammad Hussain had been left in the care of his sister and her husband, who had eventually enrolled him into Naimuddin Moradabadi’s Jamia Naeemia madrasah in Moradabad. He was ten years old, and the Jamia Naeemia, as aforementioned, was one of Barelvism’s most influential institutions on the subcontinent (and still listed, as of the time of this writing, on the Raza Academy’s list of “Prominent Sunni [Barelvi] Madresas in India”). Muhammad Hussain would have witnessed Moradabadi’s many pro-Pakistan activities over the years first-hand, and the impression that these early years under Moradabadi’s tutelage made on the young man is difficult to overstate. But the critical moment came when Naimuddin Moradabadi asked Muhammad Hussain to move to Lahore, despite the fact that all of his (Muhammad Hussain’s) siblings and his parents opted to remain in the Moradabad area (even after Partition; Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Muhammad Hussain’s grandson in Lahore, lamented in 2012/1433, “We are alone here”). For a while he stayed at the old Chowk Dalgirah mosque, about a quarter-mile west down the road from the Lahore train station, but eventually he would found his own institution. Within six years, however, space at the newly established school no longer sufficed and he was forced to publish an advertisement asking for land to build something bigger. His efforts were rewarded when the real estate upon which the Jamia Naeemia of Lahore (named, of course, after Naimuddin Moradabadi’s school) currently resides was gifted to him. Work began on the new site in 1959/1378. The madrasah’s alumni would eventually be
found leading prayer or otherwise filling positions in mosques and madarys across the world, while the Jamia Naeemia is considered one of the most important Barelvi institutions of learning in Pakistan (and even the target of deadly Deobandi violence). Hundreds of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s other students followed paths similar to Muhammad Hussain Naeemi’s.

Naimuddin Moradabadi died in 1948/1367. In his early years, his reputation had been that of a great debater. But by the end of his life, he was described by one of his followers as “haqīqat, priest of Islam, the dignity of religion…unparalleled learned man, incomparable orator, the embodiment of inward and outward virtues…and the Defender of a strong religious code of life.” One eulogy included the following: “The eye of India had never seen such an eloquent speaker…whose every word captivated the heart.” Unfortunately for the old Barelvi ‘ālim, his organization, which would basically become the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (on which much more later), as well as his thirteen-point draft for a Pakistani constitution would be sidelined in the new “Islamic” state in favor of a mostly western, quasi-secular system—one that tended to favor Deobandism, anyway.

* 

**Husain Ahmad Madani: Taking up the Mantle of Mahmud Hasan.**

In 1879/1296, Husain Ahmad Madani was born in Bangar Mau, a village fifty-five miles west of Lucknow where his father, Habibullah, was working as school headmaster. Habibullah set him upon the path of religious scholarship and imbued within him a hatred of the British government. From his mother he learned Arabic and a love for the Qur’an. Both brought him up in an environment of strict discipline; despite his “inclination to playfulness” he was not allowed to frolick with the other village children
and only occasionally was able to steal a few minutes for marbles or playtime with a nearby cousin. Even these tiny infractions were enough to worry his father, who eventually sent him to the *dar ul'alwm* at Deoband to keep him out of trouble. He was twelve or thirteen years old, but due to his “weak constitution and short stature” the boy didn’t “look more than eleven.” In time millions would know him as *shix ul-yslam*: “the Spiritual Leader of Islam.”

Husain Ahmad Madani’s ancestors (led by one Shah Noor ul-Haq) were *sayyids* who had come to India sometime around the beginning of the sixteenth/tenth century, subsequently establishing a *xanāqaḥ* on the banks of the Ghagra River about a hundred miles east of Lucknow (near present-day Tanda in India’s Uttar Pradesh). For several generations Shah Noor ul-Haq’s descendants enjoyed prominence, wealth, and the notoriety of being a *pir* family, living off of generous revenue grants from the Mughal government (garnered from no less than twenty-four villages) and generally enjoying the patronage of the state. But the family’s fortunes began to decline in the nineteenth/fourteenth century, and by the time of the Mutiny, the number of villages from which the house drew revenue had been reduced almost by half. The downward trend continued late into the century, underscored by the drowning in the Ghagra of family head Akbar ‘Ali, the deaths of several of his heirs, and the loss of virtually all of their property. As a result, little Habibullah—Akbar ‘Ali’s grandson and the future father of Husain Ahmad Madani—grew up very differently than had his ancestors, raised on the earnings of his adoptive mother, who herself spun cotton to put food on the table.

Habibullah possessed the natural inclinations of the scholar. As a student, he memorized the Qur’an, learned Persian, and composed poetry in Persian, Urdu, and
Bhasha. After the completion of his studies, he took up a job as a primary school teacher in a small town a few miles outside of Tanda. Some time later he earned a teaching diploma from a school in Lucknow and won a headmastership at a middle school in Safipur, a village fifty miles west of Lucknow. In time he was transferred to Tanda, where he was able to slowly but surely re-possess some of his ancestral land and build an independent house for himself. At one point he was “tempted” to learn English—a move that likely would have opened up more lucrative career opportunities—but, he told his son later, a dream in which his hands were covered in excrement (which he interpreted as a sign that learning English was “dirty”) convinced him not to embark on such a path. The story hints at a hatred for the British, then recently and firmly established as a more or less invincible power on the subcontinent (his choice to send his sons to the university at Deoband also suggests such an aversion). Apart from the dream, he’d been told by his mother and other family members since he was a boy that it was largely due to British machinations that the family’s land had been lost around the time of the Mutiny. Much of Habibullah’s animosity towards the British would be passed on to his son. Once, he told Husain Ahmad and his brothers (at the time all adults), “I have brought you up with the aim that you should perform *jihad* in the path of God and attain martyrdom in the process.” Not long after this pronouncement (probably in 1898/1316), Habibullah migrated with his entire family to the Hijaz, never to set eyes upon India again.

Speaking of Husain Ahmad’s brothers, each of them attained prominence as religious scholars—just as their father had hoped. His oldest brother, Muhammad Siddiq, attended the *dar ul’al’wem* at Deoband, impressing Mahmud Hasan and becoming a disciple of old Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. (Later, the British would imprison Muhammad
Siddiq’s son, Wahid Ahmad—who had also attended the *dar ul’alzm*—with his uncle Husain Ahmad and Mahmud Hasan on the island of Malta after the latter was caught up in the “Silk Letters Conspiracy”). Another brother, Ahmad, attended the university at Deoband, likewise became a disciple of Rashid Ahmad, and was later imprisoned during the Great War in Turkey while his brother and nephew were languishing in Malta; afterwards, he set up a combined orphanage-school in the Hijaz. A third (and Husain Ahmad’s younger) brother, Mahmud Ahmad, would become *qazi* of Jeddah, and Mahmud Ahmad’s son Habib Ahmad would go on to run the orphanage-school set up by his uncle. Still, some of Habibullah’s five scholar-sons, including Husain Ahmad Madani, would re-migrate to India from the Hijaz, a move that would have major consequences for the political situation in Hindustan, the political dynamics within the Deobandi school, and the history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.71

As a student at the *dar ul’alzm*, Husain Ahmad Madani studied under Mahmud Hasan (reportedly receiving considerable personal instruction therefrom on account of his exceptional abilities as a promising young scholar) and, like his older brother, eventually became the disciple of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. The latter is significant in that the brothers had first requested that Mahmud Hasan be their Sufi *shix*—but Mahmud Hasan had recommended them instead to the much-revered Rashid Ahmad. Such a turn of events was rarely seen, but in this case Rashid Ahmad, on Mahmud Hasan’s personal and fervent recommendation, agreed to be the brothers’ mentor.72 Afterwards, Husain Ahmad migrated with the rest of his family (at his father’s request) to the Hijaz. But the continuity he’d already experienced with the Deoband movement’s founders continued even in Arabia, for it was here that Husain Ahmad trained for a time under Muhammad Qasim’s and Rashid Ahmad’s own spiritual mentor: Imdadullah. The
great shix died just weeks after making Husain Ahmad’s acquaintance, but the
connection had been made between Deobandism’s grandfather figure and a leader from
its “third generation.” The period was financially a rough one for Madani’s family, but
Husain Ahmad was able to obtain work as a religious teacher in Medina. Eventually he
achieved some renown as a lecturer at the Mosque of the Prophet—probably Islam’s
most sacred site apart from the holy sanctuary in Mecca—where, for ten years, he
reportedly taught hadis for twelve hours a day; the fact of his position at such a
prominent location would hold significance for the entire Deobandi movement later on,
after his return to India. “The reason for such powerful attraction toward and general
popularity of an Indian religious divine in the holy land of Hejaz especially in the
Prophet’s Mosque,” explains one official biography of Madani, “should be attributed to
[the peculiar method] of teaching that he had imbibed and inherited from the teachers
[from] the [dar ul'alum].” Upon receiving an invitation from Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi to visit him in India, Husain Ahmad and his older brother Muhammad Siddiq
returned to India. While in Gangohi visiting their aged shix, Rashid Ahmad
distinguished the brothers as among his foremost spiritual successors. Soon
afterwards, Husain Ahmad returned to the Hijaz, where he remained between
1913/1331 and 1916/1334.

And it was during this three-year period that Husain Ahmad Madani’s world
changed. He would later identify the very year; “I have been associated with
Hindustan’s freedom movement since 1914,” he reportedly said. What drove
such an association? In short: a determination to expel the British entirely from the
subcontinent. “I consider it the religious duty of every Muslim to oppose the British”
(italics added). It was no coincidence, either, that this stage saw Husain Ahmad pick
up the anti-British charge; Mahmud Hasan, it will be remembered, arrived in the Hijaz during the same period. One official historian of the JUH would later record that Husain Ahmad “took to revolutionary activities” while Mahmud Hasan was in Mecca; it seems, too, he accompanied the great ‘alym when the latter met with Turkish War Minister Anwar Pasha and Medinan governor Jamal Pasha. 77 Indeed, when, in 1916/1334, the shix ul-hynd was arrested by British authorities and eventually placed in the Malta prison, Madani went with him—despite his not being charged of any crime. The move was a voluntary one, a demonstration of support for his teacher and political mentor. It would cost him three years and seven months confined to a prison cell. 78

Upon his release (together with Mahmud Hasan) and return to India, Husain Ahmad Madani quickly agreed to the Khilafat and, especially, non-cooperation platform. In June of 1920/Shawwal of 1338, Husain Ahmad agreed to back Khilafat at the movement’s pre-launch conference in Allahabad; Khilafat officially commenced that August/Dh’ul Q’adah. When Mahmud Hasan passed away in November/Rabi I, Husain Ahmad Madani “was unanimously acknowledged,” according to one official biography, as the shix ul-hynd’s successor. 79 Then in 1921/1339, this time at a conference organized by Muhammad ‘Ali in Karachi, Husain Ahmad earned a reputation as a particularly passionate champion of collective Hindu-Muslim action. Indeed, after the Karachi meeting, the up-and-coming mwlana was praised not just by Muslims within the Khilafat movement but Hindu religious and political leaders as well, including the Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri, Swami Bharati Krishna Tirath. But the British were none too amused; for his sentiments of “sedition” (and for his distribution of the now-banned Mahmud Hasan-authored juridical ruling in support of non-cooperation and Khilafat, discussed earlier) 80 Ahmad Husain Madani, so recently a

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British prisoner on Malta, was put behind bars, this time in his own land. He was locked up for two more years.\textsuperscript{81}

Imprisonment seemed only to drive the one-time student of Mahmud Hasan to further pursue his anti-British purposes. Indeed, upon his release one of the first things Husain Ahmad did was address the fifth annual conference of the JUH at Cocanada (over which he served as president; this was the same meeting mentioned previously at which confidence was expressed in the Turkish regime and the idea of a worldwide conference of Muslim scholars put forth), in January of 1924/Jumada I of 1342. The mawland's message hadn’t changed; it had only gained in strength. An excerpt from his presidential address to the assembled Muslim clergy and others aptly demonstrates this.

Hindu-Muslim unity is a prerequisite to freedom in this country. It is the religious and political duty of the Muslims that they should work for the freedom of India and continue this struggle until the government accedes to their demand. It is their duty, which they must do with or without companions—it is the order of the Almighty. If non-Muslims extend to you the hand of friendship, you too must extend yours, for compromising for the right cause will establish you as true believers in God. And, if they [non-Muslims\textsuperscript{7}] turn their back on you and leave you alone, you should not complain about it because God is your biggest supporter.\textsuperscript{82}

The general Deobandi point-of-view, borne of the juridical ruling of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (and alive and well, some Deobandis would argue, since the days of Thana Bhawan, when Hindus had fought side-by-side with Muslims against the British to
defend Imdadullah’s mini-state) and developed by Mahmud Hasan, had now come into its own, and Husain Ahmad Madani was its standard-bearer. In March 1926/Sh’aban 1344, the JUH officially adopted Husain Ahmad’s position when it passed a resolution at its seventh conference (in Calcutta) for India’s complete independence.

Madani and the majority of his Deobandi brethren cultivated a nationalism tied as much to the land as to the faith. This allowed Deobandis to identify with both Islam and India. “Our religion tells us that Adam descended in India,” he would write later, in a booklet well known in its time called “Our India and Its Glories” (हेमारह हंडस्तान और उसके फोजाईल). Adam, then—the father of the human race—had been sent by God to India first. “He inhabited this land and it was from here that his race spread… It is necessary for the Muslim to understand that this country is his ancient home.” “Our India” reminds the South Asian Islamic community that Muslim remains have been buried in Indian soil since time immemorial—and while Hindus and other Indian communities cremated their dead, the Muslim dead still lay in the Indian earth (and would till the Day of Judgment). Indeed, “it is an unchallengable fact that from the very beginning India has been the land [वेतन] of Islam.” Even from a historical point-of-view, Husain Ahmad argued, and taking into account all of the subcontinent’s invading populations (Aryans, Greeks, Parthians, Huns, etc.), Muslims could stake a more ancient claim to the land, as so many Indian Muslims were descended from the subcontinent’s aboriginal, pre-Aryan populations, subsequently converted to the one true faith. Husain Ahmad and the Deobandi fathers thus strove to tie Muslims to India specifically; a Muslim could be as strong and fervent an “Indian” as any Hindu—indeed, stronger. In any case, Deobandi support for the Congress and a united India came not from “ideas of parliamentary democracy” or faith in some other “modern” political system. No—the
scholars “still thought in terms of the self-regulated millat. In direct continuation of the position of the earlier ‘ulama, they believed that with independence they could in fact form their own community, with their own shar’iat-based courts and their own educational institutions, inhabiting the same space as Hindus but culturally apart—until such time, at least some of them thought, as their example would win the Hindus to Islam at last.”

The (general) Deobandi view of the Muslim place vis-à-vis the Indian subcontinent, elucidated above, stood in stark contrast to that of the Barelvis, who by and large saw “nationhood” in more ummat-based terms—as a space (any space) governed by shar’iat. The emphasis for the self-styled Ahl-e-Sunnat was not geographically demarcated, bordered on the north and south, the east and west, by mountains, deserts, and seas. No, Barelvi “nationalism” was based soley on the Islamic concept of the pure society (as interpreted by Barelvis). It was defined by faith, existing in the minds of its people, however scattered amongst the non-Muslim population they might be. Possessed of such an emphasis, it was only natural for the Barelvis to look not towards cooperation with Hindustan’s non-Muslim communities but rather towards a sort of strict self-segregation. In time, of course, that self-segregation would evolve into a more complete separation—and culminate in the Indian subcontinent’s extraordinary Partition. Ironically, it was out of the Barelvi, ummat-based conception of “nationhood” that the necessarily geographically demarcated Pakistan call would emerge.

Now recognized by many as Mahmud Hasan’s most likely heir, Husain Ahmad was appointed Sador madarys, or head teacher, of the university at Deoband in 1927/1345 (when Anwar Shah Kashmiri resigned amidst a political rift that saw several of the school’s teachers expelled, followed by scores of its students, addressed later in this
work), as well as head of the hadis department (a decision that did not come without consequences for intra-Deobandi unity, either), in 1924/1342.\textsuperscript{85} (It was tradition at the school that the head teacher also teach hadis).\textsuperscript{86} He would hold both of these positions until his death in 1957/1377. (Husain Ahmad taught off-and-on, too, at the Jamia Qasmia Madrasah-e-Shahi in Moradabad for a decade-and-a-half—the school mentioned previously as being only a stone’s throw from the institution attended by Barelvi leader Naimuddin Moradabadi, the Madrasah Imdadia.) As Mahmud Hasan’s seeming political heir, as well as the head of the Deobandi movement’s central religio-educational institution, Husain Ahmad Madani, all in a few years, abruptly and fortuitously found himself poised to finally institute Mahmud Hasan’s political vision (one he’d inheriited, in large degree, from his own spiritual mentors) for India’s Muslim millions. This position was strengthened when his own faction within the school at Deoband won out, in 1927/1345, against the Anwar Shah Kashmiri-led faction (the latter allegedly seeking an apolitical stance for the institution); teachers belonging to the Kashmiri group were expelled (or resigned), and scores of students followed them, many to a new school in the village of Dabhel near the Gujarati coast.

From 1924/1342 to 1929/1348, in addition to the numerous duties connected to his positions at the dar ul’ilm in Deoband, Husain Ahmad led “hundreds” of public meetings across India (not to mention literally thousands of political discussions with smaller groups; the teacher of hadis was known for rarely eating dinner with less than “ten or fifteen guests” at his table).\textsuperscript{87} His emphasis, as always, was communal unity against the subcontinent’s number one threat: the British. These two emphases—(1) Hindu-Mulsim cooperative action and (2) the British as Islam’s biggest threat—were fully in line with the political philosophy of Husain Ahmad’s mentor, Mahmud Hasan.
(The Barelvis, of course, differed with Madani and the Deobandi mainstream on both counts.) At one JUH conference in Saharanpur, Husain Ahmad elucidated on the British threat. London’s policy in India, he explained, was to divide and rule; as long as the major communities remained divided, the British could rule. Thus parties like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League played right into the hands of the British authorities. Such groups actually served the British purpose, prolonging the English presence on the subcontinent and ensuring Indians’ continued subjugation. The British political method of divide-and-rule was, Madani insisted, the single greatest danger facing India. The only way to fight it was to make such division impossible—and that meant Hindu-Muslim political unity. Interestingly, both Gandhi and Jinnah made similar appeals during this period—at least in terms of the importance of Hindu-Muslim joint action—calling for a revitalization of the spirit of 1916’s/1334’s Lucknow Pact. But the two leaders’ own incompatibility vis-à-vis one another symbolized the deaf ears with which their calls were met by their own constituents, not to mention the Hindu and Muslim communities at large, and such a revitalization never took place. As if to make the point, Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta were at one another’s throats for weeks in 1926/1344; the riots were so bad that around a hundred were either killed or injured and the city ground to a halt for a month-and-a-half. Incidentally, the violence happened to coincide with the arrival of Lord Irwin, India’s new viceroy.

Nationalist tempers flared across India in 1927/1345 after the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, announced the makeup of a special commission charged with the task of making recommendations for the establishment of a more “responsible government.” Part of that task entailed finding ways to further develop the country’s representative institutions. Perhaps the establishment of such a commission might have
brought nationalist Indians hope that much-needed change was on the way, but the group’s makeup suggested that the British weren’t interested at all in what Indians thought about their government, let alone hoped; all seven members of the commission, led by Sir John Simon, were British. It was, to borrow a phrase from Motilal Nehru, simply “eye-wash,” nothing more. Husain Ahmad Madani agreed wholeheartedly, and said as much at the JUH’s Peshawar Conference that year. He urged fellow Muslims and “composite nationalists” to boycott the commission—to refuse to speak or otherwise cooperate with its members. In this, the Congress eventually followed Husain Ahmad’s lead, organizing black flag demonstrations and strikes all along the commission’s path after it arrived in 1928/1346; “Simon go back!” was the slogan of the day. Many of the demonstrations were joint Congress-JUH affairs; many demonstrators were arrested, imprisoned, and beaten—some even killed. Mounted police charged into Indian crowds, hammering at demonstrators with metal-tipped bamboo lathis or trampling them down. (This was Nehru’s first personal experience with physical injury at the hands of government; at least one of his own wounds, sustained at the time, would ail him for the rest of his life). Meanwhile, ever prepared to fill a vacuum left by the Congress, the Muslim League (albeit only a section), plus several smaller parties, did meet with and make recommendations to the commission.

After the Simon Commission left India, having earned the abhorrence of millions of Indian nationalists (though its recommendations would largely be used as the foundation for the Government of India Act of 1935/1354), the British government turned the tables. If the Indians didn’t want their European overlords to recommend an improved government for India, perhaps they themselves could offer one. Of course, British authorities were confident that such a challenge would never be met, divided as
Indian politics remained. The differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, the Hindu/Muslim nationalists and the composite nationalists, the Deobandis and the Barelvis, the Congress and the League—all of these schisms would virtually guarantee that any Indian attempt to come up with their own constitution (and one that they would all agree to) would end in colossal failure. The Indians needed the British. Much to the dismay, perhaps, of the colonial government, however, Indian political parties representing a wide variety of opinion—from the Hindu Mahasabha to the Muslim League, and including the Congress and the JUH—met in an All-Parties Conference in mid-May 1928/late Dh’ul Q’adah 1346 in Calcutta. But British worries soon evaporated; Indian schismatics did win the day, for the result of this brief episode was the Nehru Report—a document which, to the relief of the British government, did indeed fail to bring the subcontinent’s divergent communities together. (Indeed, it was probably the last real chance for Hindu and Muslim leaders to restore the unity of the Lucknow Pact era—and that opportunity had been lost.) Unfortunately for the Deobandis, the report was not to their satisfaction, either. The biggest complaint among the Deobandi leadership was that the Nehru Report failed to include any substantive provisions safeguarding the rights of minorities. Thus something of a split occurred, however temporary, between the two parties (Congress and JUH) for the first time, almost, since the days of Khilafat.

What provisions was the JUH actually seeking in an Indian constitution? For starters, the party insisted upon a truly federal system possessed of highly autonomous states. Certain specifically enumerated powers would be granted to the center, but all residual powers would be reserved to the states and the people. The JUH additionally desired a sort of US Bill of Rights-style constitutional guarantee that the federal
government would never interfere in the realm of Muslim education, Muslim religious institutions, religious traditions, and Muslim personal law. Muslim religious cases should only be decided by Muslim religious officers, they maintained, and Muslim areas like Baluchistan and Sindh (both singled out by name) should receive state status, on par with any other Indian state. The autonomy of the states was to be further reinforced by a provision that any change to the federal constitution must be approved not by a majority or a super-majority but by full-fledged unanimity. Interestingly, the JUH did not demand reservations for Muslims in either Bengal or Punjab, a major policy difference between the Deobandi party and the League.\textsuperscript{92} (Compare this to Jinnah’s reaction to the Nehru report: the League leader stormed out of Calcutta and traveled straight to Delhi—the venue of the Aga Khan’s All-India Muslim Conference. This latter gathering resolved absolutely to stand firm on its bid for separate electorates.)\textsuperscript{93}

The JUH-INC divide was somewhat bridged on Christmas Day 1929/23 Rajab 1348, when the Congress passed a resolution calling for complete independence. (In 1927/1345, Nehru had visited the Soviet Union—on invitation from the Stalinist regime—to celebrate the Russian Revolution’s tenth anniversary. The experience evidently thrilled him, and he returned to India seemingly charged with added vigor, energizing the leftist elements within the Congress.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, the next year, and together with quasi-communist Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru organized the Socialist Independence for India League, which quickly demanded complete Indian independence, as opposed to the official Congress demand—including that of Gandhi and Nehru’s own father, Motilal—for Dominion status within the British Empire. Astutely measuring the way the political tides were turning, however, Gandhi and the Congress later adopted Nehru’s position as the party’s goal.) In such a declaration the JUH, “largely
due to the efforts of Madani,” could offer its strong support. After all, the JUH’s official stance—since 1926/1344—had been to demand complete independence.

But after the Nehru Report, things were never quite the same between the Congress and the JUH. Indeed, even at the Jamiat’s ninth conference (at Amroha), in May of 1930/Dh’ul Hijja of 1348, there were considerable murmurings against a continued alliance with the INC; the Nehru Report had sown the seeds of mistrust among some within the upper echelons of Deobandism. Despite the opposition, the party was able to pass a resolution for full cooperation with the Congress, moved by Hafizur Rahman and supported loudly by Husain Ahmad Madani. Once again, Husain Ahmad demonstrated through his actions that he really did consider Hindu-Muslim unity in the quest to free India from the British the number one priority. Despite the reservations—some quite vehement—that plagued several of his brethren, Husain Ahmad had argued that the overarching goal was worth a rapprochement. Most Deobandis would follow him, but the rumblings of dissent within the movement had begun to sound, as a small faction of the school began agitating for Muslim separatism. Some of the loudest Deobandi dissidents were Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and his two students, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and Muhammad Shafi (on whom more later), a split that would have major repercussion for both Deobandism and the political structure of South Asia. Thus even the Congress’ adoption of complete independence as its goal didn’t fully heal the wounds inflicted during this brief period of division. The Congress had gone back on its word (in 1916/1334, it should be remembered, it had committed to separate electorates, for example, but the Nehru report had run roughshod over the idea, dismissing it completely), and for some Deobandis their trust in the mostly Hindu INC had been permanently removed.
On 12 March 1930/11 Shawwal 1348, now sixty-one-year-old Mohandas Gandhi left Sabarmati Ashram with seventy-eight personally selected men and set out on what would become a twenty-four-day, two-hundred-forty-mile journey to the sea. It didn’t take long for the whole world to notice. In the end, the prolonged demonstration resulted in the “Gandhi-Irwin Pact” (through which the government agreed, among other things, to release all non-violent political prisoners, lift the ban over the Congress, and restore confiscated property to political activists), the eventual repeal of the Salt Act, and the galvanization of tens of thousands of nationalists in their opposition to the British. The Gandhi-led “Salt March,” supported by Husain Ahmad and the JUH, did much to rekindle the fire of Indian nationalists, including some Deobandi Muslims. The JUH did much to publicize the event, especially through its newspaper, *al-jom’āiāt.* Many respected Deobandi ‘alāma actively participated in the Salt March (like Hafizur Rehman, who would, a couple months later, help pass the resolution affirming JUH cooperation with the Congress at the Jamiat’s Amroha conference, and who marched to Dandi from the village of Dabhel—home to the recently erected Deobandi *madrassah* mentioned previously. Some Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning leaders were arrested and imprisoned for their involvement in the Dandi march, including Abul Kalam Azad, Hafizur Rehman, Fakhruddin, Muhammad Mian, and Bashir Ahmad Bhatia. Other Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning figures, notably Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were arrested in other parts of India, having participated in or organized demonstrations connected to the march; indeed, in the northwest, between two hundred and two-hundred-and-fifty Muslim Pathans were massacred as British troops and armored cars opened fire on a crowd of non-cooperators demonstrating in support of Abdul Ghaffar and Gandhi. (The agitation was so effective—and the ire of the Pathans so white hot—
that British control over Peshawar didn’t resume until May/Dh’ul Hijja.) But the march also demonstrated that a large section of Muslims (including, generally speaking, the Barelvis) were not interested in any Gandhi-led resistance; as a result, Muslim participation in the Salt March and its aftermath has been described by some historians as “paltry.” Such descriptions, however, ignore the involvement, active participation, and support of many notable Deobandi leaders, the JUH, Abdul Ghaffar’s Servants of God (xuda-e-xydmətgar) organization, and the hundreds of Muslims who perished in Peshawar on 23 April/24 Dh’ul Q’adah.

At the same time, Gandhi launched a massive civil disobedience operation—his first major attempt at non-cooperation since the “embarrassingly abrupt withdrawal” of the original campaign after the Chauri Chaura incident of 1922/1340. Indeed, the Salt March had only been the launch event of the new round of non-cooperation, agitation that would last (with a temporary hiatus in 1931/1349) through 1934/1353. Churchill’s “half-naked fakir” was able to energize hundreds of thousands who hadn’t readily taken part in the first non-cooperation efforts a decade before, including women, populations in central India, and Indians from the south (by the mid-thirties the INC would replace the Justice Party as the latter region’s foremost political organization), and the period saw the emergence, too, of the “Red Shirts”—or, more correctly, the aforementioned xuda-e-xydmətgars (sometimes referred to as the “KKs”) in the Pathan Muslim northwest. These last were led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the “Frontier Gandhi,” and his brother Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan (or “Dr. Khan sahyb”). The brothers and their organization (which, by 1930/1348, counted around fifty thousand members) worked closely with the Congress; its supportive action connected to the Salt March has already been mentioned, and in 1931/1349, Abdul Ghaffar was even offered the position
of Congress president, but he humbly refused. (Ironically, KK envoys had previously been sent to the Muslim League in an attempt to obtain support from that body for Red Shirt endeavors in the northwest frontier areas, but the ML rejected Abdul Ghaffar’s organization and the opportunity to bring it into the League fold; League leaders likely regretted this decision after their party’s overwhelming loss to the Congress in the Muslim-majority NWFP, thanks largely to KK efforts. At the same time, the Congress embraced the movement—as long as its members joined the INC—and for the next decade-and-a-half the two parties worked hand-in-hand.) But the Gandhi-led civil disobedience campaign of 1930-1931/1348-1349 also led to around one hundred thousand arrests (including Gandhi’s own). Both JUH president Kifayatullah and party general secretary Ahmad Sayeed Dehlawi were likewise arrested and imprisoned for civil disobedience. While the Deobandis actively participated in non-cooperation, the Barelvis played little to no meaningful role, relatively speaking, in Gandhi’s India-wide movement to paralyze the British Indian machine.

In November 1930/Jumada II 1349, the first Round Table conference on India’s fate took place in London. But devoid of even a single Congress representative (Gandhi was in a British prison at the time as punishment for the aforementioned civil disobedience campaign, then in full swing in India), the gathering was almost certainly doomed to failure from the start. Indeed, the whole affair was rather “like trying to stage Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark,” in the words of one historian. Muslim princes, the Aga Khan, and Jinnah participated (indeed, the League’s delegates outnumbered those of any other party by a large margin, not counting those of the many princely states), but neither the Barelvis nor the Deobandis could claim any real place at the conference’s table. In terms of political demands, at least the Barelvis could mostly count on the
League to push for “their” general positions. Even if they’d wanted to attend, many of the Deobandi leadership were in prison for their participation in the salt satyagraha earlier in the year. The only result of the first Round Table conference was a vague resolution to work out an All-India Federation plan.

In early 1931/mid-1349, Gandhi met with Viceroy Irwin. The result of these deliberations would be known to history as the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, aforementioned. According to their agreement, the government would set all political prisoners free in exchange for Gandhi’s assurance that the Congress would call off the civil disobedience campaign. Gandhi additionally agreed to act as the INC’s lone representative at the second Round Table conference later that year. Many celebrated the pact as an Indian victory, but others viewed it as an unnecessary concession to the enemy. Indeed, to some the agreement was nothing less than a betrayal of Congress’ bedrock principles, not to mention its official position in support of outright Indian independence. Nehru reportedly shed tears of grief upon hearing news of the pact.  

And so the second Round Table conference (held in late 1931/mid-1350) did include a Congress representative—Mohandas Gandhi himself. Before leaving to attend the deliberations in London, Gandhi sought earnestly for a compromise with Muslim leaders. The Mahatma was convinced that unless Muslims and Hindus (or, in this case, the Congress and other Muslim parties) could arrive in Britain under the banner of a joint platform, the talks would be useless—even an embarrassment. Indeed, he made this his motto in the run-up to the London talks: that “London was out unless unity was in.” As such, Gandhi attended the JUH’s annual conference in Delhi, emphasizing the futility of any Round Table discussion without “a communal agreement,” and essentially handed the non-Congress Muslims “a blank check”; let them name their demands, and if
it meant unity, Gandhi would accept. Even so, the communal oneness that the Mahatma sought was not forthcoming, in part thanks to the intractability of some Congress Muslims. In the end, the loincloth-clad “fakir,” who claimed that the Congress was the political voice of India, was alone at this second London gathering—and the INC’s political rivals easily shouted him down. This second round table attempt was a non-success like the first. A year later, a third conference was attempted, but without any Congress representative (not to mention the absence of Jinnah) the meeting ended in yet another failure. Perhaps the only development of significance was Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s use of the term “Pakistan” during the conference’s proceedings—a first.

After Gandhi returned to India from the second Round Table talks, he decided to relaunch the civil disobedience campaign, which had been put on hold under the terms of the Gandhi-Irwin pact. Civil disobedience would thus resume from January 1932/Ramadan 1350. As part of the effort, the Deobandi JUH set up a sub-organization called the *daira-e-harbiyya*, or “Circle of War,” to recruit activists and generally organize resistance in support of the nationwide non-cooperation movement. The Circle’s first president, former JUH head Kifayatullah, was arrested after leading tens of thousands of demonstrators (Deobandis claim a full one hundred thousand) in procession through Delhi. Leadership then fell on Husain Ahmad Madani, but he was arrested in turn on his way to Delhi from Deoband. The pattern continued, too; Ahmad Saeed Delhawi, Hafizur Rahman Ludhianvi, and others were all arrested soon after becoming *daira-e-harbiyya* chief. Most were jailed for one to two years, along with thousands of their followers. To add to the loss of these influential men, in September 1934/Jumada II 1353 Gandhi himself resigned from the Congress; he would go on to suffer a set of
nervous breakdowns, become estranged from his wife, and move to a one-room hovel in the middle of nowhere in central India.

The year after Gandhi’s resignation, the British enacted the 1935/1354 Government of India Act—legislation that was viewed by many Deobandi nationalists and others as simply one more British exercise in delaying the inevitable. The Act produced no new preamble, instead retaining the ambiguous introduction to the old 1919/1337 Act (which had vaguely defined the purposes of the Act as the “gradual” establishment in India of self-governing institutions and responsible government—all as an “intergral” part of the British Empire, of course). To Madani and other Indians of similar political bent, the Act smacked of insincerity and the usual British deception. And despite the Act’s dismantling of the dyarchy system in the provinces and its veneer of increased democracy, it actually granted the Viceroy and his appointed (British) provincial governors the authority, when considered necessary, to seize the government within their spheres and act, for all intents and purposes, as quasi-dicatators (something some governors did from 1939/1358, after the Congress ministries resigned). As part of its divide-and-rule strategy—meant to curb the influence of parties like the Congress while simultaneously increasing the power of “collaborator” groups—the British via the 1935/1354 Act widened the voter base and, crucially, granted separate electorates not only to Muslims, but also to Sikhs and Christians. Of course, only members of the community tied to those reserved seats could vote for them, thereby fostering both a dependence on government among minorities and a communal spirit in politics. The League, many Barelvis, and others applauded such measures as necessary for the protection of minority populations; the Congress, most Deobandis, and their allies did not.
The 1935/1354 Government of India Act also set the stage, to the dismay of Husain Ahmad Madani, for a very brief alliance between the All-India Muslim League and the JUH, signaling a win (however brief) for the aforementioned Deobandi faction opposed to the Congress. This faction was led by Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who was not only known for his support of the League and League positions, but had, the same year the Government of India Act came into being, cancelled his patronage of the dar ul'alam—a major act of dissent. His reason? In a resignation letter sent at the time of his cancellation, he explained that he deemed unacceptable the “Madani group’s” introduction at the school of “the Congress ideology.” But since the Act had widened the voter base and further institutionalized separate electorates for Muslims, it made little sense for the JUH to continue to campaign with the Congress, as the majority of Congressites were Hindu and thus could not vote for its candidates. Seeing that only Muslims could vote for Muslims where the reserved seats were concerned, the JUH leadership reluctantly agreed to join forces with the League after passage of the Act. Signs of a JUH-League rapprochement had been visible as early as November 1932/Rajab 1351, when the working committee of the JUH met with the Council of the AIML in Delhi. The occasion was the repudiation of a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh “Unity Conference” organized, at least in part, by the Congress in Allahabad to demand joint electorates. But the repudiation of the Allahabad meeting was less important than this rare show of solidarity between the Deobandi ‘alma and the Muslim League. It was, wrote one newspaper correspondent covering the event, “the most impressive demonstration of Moslem unity seen in India for many a long day.” The reporter’s remark is telling in that it speaks not only of the sudden appearance of apparent unity among two of that community’s most politically relevant organizations, but also of the politically,
regionally, theologically, and even linguistically fractured nature of the state of affairs among South Asia’s Muslims previous to the Delhi conference.

In any case, the period of League-JUH unity, throughout which the latter worked under Jinnah’s leadership, was short-lived. At a JUH conference in April 1936/Muharram 1355, Jinnah addressed the JUH personally, urging its members to “organize separately” from “the Hindus,” and then—only after this separation—could the two groups “together tread the path of cooperation.” What this meant in practice was unclear, but the new separate electorates system naturally engendered a new level of political mudslinging between the League and the Congress that weakened the strength of Jinnah’s call, much less any contrivance of Hindu-Muslim unity, however “separate” their organization. For many in the JUH, the blatant communalism of the campaign became too much to bear. Jinnah, too, disapproved of the JUH’s continued ties with the INC. Eventually, the Deobandi ‘alama leading the Jamiat, fearing that they were being used, decided enough was enough, and after the 1936-1937/1355-1356 elections (in which the Congress came to power in every province but Bengal, Punjab, and Sindh, and in which the League failed to form a government in any province, including a pathetic showing in the Muslim-majority provinces) the short-lived alliance was broken. The exact date of the fateful break may have been 15 July 1937/6 Jumada I 1356, when Congress leaders formally asked League leaders, via an Abul Kalam Azad-delivered letter (dubbed a “death warrant” by some), to consider dissolving their party and uniting with the INC; the JUH subsequently broke with the League—an act later Pakistani historians described as “a political abduction,” and its participants as “political turncoats.” Jinnah had thus lost both the election as well as the support of the influential JUH.
Perhaps as a reaction to the League’s non-success, as well as the JUH’s passing stint as ML ally (a move he had almost certainly opposed loudly), in 1938/1357 Husain Ahmad Madani published his groundbreaking muttәhydәt qaәmilәt әwr yslam (“Composite Nationalism and Islam”). The book prompted “an instant reaction” from Muhammad Iqbal and produced a years-long controversy over the nature of South Asian Muslims’ separate identity. Madani’s position, in his own words, was that in “the modern age, nations are founded on homelands; nations are not founded on the basis of race or religion. The dwellers of England are recognized as one nation, whereas they have Jews and Christians as their citizens, and such is the case with America, Japan, and France.\textsuperscript{118}

Iqbal would compose his own refutation—in verse, of course—directed unswervingly at Husain Ahmad Madani:

Hasan from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhayb from Rome;
Deoband produced Husayn Ahmad, what monstrosity is theirs?
He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by homelands;
What an ignorance regarding the position of Muhammad!
Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is the totality of Faith;
And if thou [dost] not reach him, all [thy knowledge] is Bulahabism.\textsuperscript{119}

(Bulahab was a wealthy Arab man whom the Prophet cursed for rejecting the message of Islam; he is a symbol of rejection.) One of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s students (his
nephew, in fact), one Zafar Ahmad Usmani, in the late 1930s/1350s put together an attempted refutation of the concept of composite nationalism, too, highlighting the intra-Deobandi schism in this regard. The effort, included in Zafar Ahmad’s *yla al-sunan* (a legal commentary on hādis), was evidently undertaken under the direct guidance of Ashraf ‘Ali himself and reportedly motivated, at least in part, by a dream he (Zafar Ahmad) had had in which he had seen the Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad had given him “glad tidings” of a “near victory for the Muslims,” which Zafar Ahmad’s admirers have interpreted as an obvious allusion to the creation of Pakistan ten years later.\(^{120}\)

Thanawi himself was so opposed to Madani’s decision to work for composite nationalism (and that *with* the Congress) that he issued a juridical ruling in 1939/1358 stating that the only *shari‘at*-worthy course for Muslims was to join with the All-India Muslim League; thereafter the prolific Deobandi scholar, as mentioned previously, resigned from the *dar ul‘alwām* at Deoband—and immediately joined the League. His *fatwa*, wrote one Pakistani scholar, “had a far reaching impact on Muslim politics.”\(^{121}\)

Probably thanks to this faction’s continued influence within Deobandi circles, JUH leaders were attempting, as late as 1940/1359, to find some sort of common ground with the AIML—a shared overarching goal, *something*—but Jinnah insisted that the only way such cooperation could be forthcoming was for all JUH members to resign from the Congress. This was too much, of course, and the gulf dividing the two parties remained permanently unbridged.\(^{122}\)

Incidentally, Thanawi’s break with the main *dar ul‘alwām* was a permanent one. His grave lies within the grounds of his old Thana Bhawan *madrasah* on the outskirts of town, surrounded by cultivated fields. A small blank slab of stone marks the muddy mound, nothing more. Outside of the diminutive cemetery, affixed to the wall of the dilapidated seminary, is a plaque engraved in Farsi
lettering. Ashraf‘Ali Thanawi lived a modest life, it declares, and he left this world in similarly humble circumstances. When asked about any remnants of the scholar’s life that might remain in and around the old madrasah, the aged custodian informed the author that, after all, in terms of material possessions Husain Ahmad Madani’s political nemesis, Ashraf‘Ali Thanawi, never had much.

In any case, the tide turned relatively quickly for the League when, in 1939/1358, the Congress ministries across India resigned over Britain’s committal of India to the war effort without consulting Indian leaders, as well as the British declaration of Dominion status as India’s goal—something to be discussed as soon as the war was over. More vague promises were not what the Congress leaders had had in mind, and so the Congress ministries stepped down in protest. With no ministries, under the terms of the 1935/1354 Government of India Act the provincial governments fell into the hands of the British governors. Jinnah couldn’t have been happier, and celebrated this turn of events on 22 December/10 Dh‘ul Q‘adah as the aforementioned “Day of Deliverance.” Combined with the League’s new emphasis on wooing the ‘ulama and pirs to its side, an endeavor for which the party had made “serious efforts” since 1937/1356, the move marked the turning point of the League’s fortunes as a political force in India. By March of 1940/Safar of 1359, newspapers were describing “Moslem India” as being “on guard” against the alleged “dangers of Hindu ‘democracy,’” painting “Mr. Jinnah” and his League as a veritable catch-all for India’s Muslims. (British newspapers like The Times of London jumped at the League position, decrying Congress control of the provinces under its ministries as “a dictatorship.” The INC’s electoral victories, winning eight of eleven provincial ministries, had “warped the judgment of Congress leaders,” whose subsequent attempts, via its “mass contact” campaign, to
attract Muslims to the Congress fold had only succeeded in pushing them further away. The Congress was *trying* to divide the Muslims—this was the allegation, and for many Muslims it was enough to drive them to the League and its Pakistan demand. The effect was to deligitimize the JUH and place the erstwhile loose-knit and hapless League, abruptly, on a pedestal as the chief representative organization for India’s Muslims.)

On 11 March 1942/22 Safar 1361, Winston Churchill announced another special mission to be sent to India, this one led by Sir Stafford Cripps. Its mission: to “rally the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader” (by promising each province the post-war opportunity to remain united with or secede from British India, the latter as independent Dominions within the Empire). Considering the independence agitation then extant in India against what was perceived as the long-entrenched British invader, Churchill’s choice of terminology seems odd indeed. But the invader of which he spoke, of course, was of the Japanese variety. A “crisis in the affairs of India” had arison “out of the Japanese advance,” and thus the time had come to solve the Indian question once and for all, and then get to work defeating the enemy. One contemporary Indian commentator described Churchill’s statement as merely another “sweet nothing,” and most Indian nationalist leaders were likewise skeptical. Husain Ahmad Madani no doubt fit within this latter category. Still, he would listen to what the old man had to say. Several weeks later, Cripps arrived in Hindustan.

Stafford Cripps met in turn with Abul Kalam Azad (then serving as the president of the Congress), then Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, then Mohandas Gandhi. It is interesting to note that Cripps’ choice of audience vis-à-vis the Muslim political leaders—meeting with both Azad, a Congress-supporting (and Deobandi-supported) Muslim and Jinnah,
the (generally Barelv-supported) League leader, was a tacit acknowledgement of the schism that existed within South Asia’s Islamic community. Soon afterwards the British representative proposed (via radio broadcast from Delhi) that India obtain representation on both the British war cabinet and the Pacific War Council, then offered Indians (once again) a chance to write their own constitution—along the road to Dominion status, of course. But the general reaction to Cripps’ proposal was one of “too little, too late.” Gandhi famously described the offer as a “post-dated check,” and at a conference of the JUH in Lahore, Husain Ahmad likewise rejected the proposal, characterizing it as a last, futile British attempt to meddle in purely Indian affairs. On 10 April/23 Rabi I, the Congress formally rejected Cripps’ proposal, a move followed by most every other Indian political party (though each for their own reasons). Cripps left India in shame, having utterly failed in his quest, two days after the formal Congress rejection. But the event, underscoring as it did the opposition from seemingly every quarter to Britain’s belated attempts to preserve some vestige of empire on the subcontinent, left London and Delhi more dependent than ever on Jinnah and the League. It also gave “greater strength to the Pakistan demand in that the offer of the British government brought discussion of partition into the open,” in the words of one Pakistani historian.

During the Second World War—and despite Gandhi’s admonishments to assist the British against what he perceived as the greater, Nazi evil—the JUH, led by Husain Ahmad Madani, condemned the war effort, vehemently opposing any support from the Indian quarter for Britain in her struggles against Hitler in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and Tojo in Asia and the Pacific. The crippling of British power was a good thing; let the great colonialist powers pound themselves to dust. The greatest
threat to India wasn’t Hitler—it was the British foreign policy of imperialism. The call for independence must not be suspended out of deference to yet another war. Besides, the memory of broken British promises dating back to the first Great War still smoldered in Indians’ collective memory. The JUH’s Bachar Ayun conference (23-25 April 1942/6-8 Rabi II 1361)—convened as the Japanese were making serious headway in British-occupied Burma, German subs were sinking British vessels in the Atlantic, and British bombers were flying missions over Germany, and just days after Cripps left India—saw Husain Ahmad call, once again, for Hindustan’s complete independence. Such a declaration, in the middle of the war, was certainly not welcomed by British authorities, who by now had been monitoring JUH activities for years. As a result of his independence and liberation rhetoric and obvious sway over a large population, Madani was arrested (during the conference’s very proceedings) and thrown into prison. (Ironically, the arrest occurred on the same day that Churchill, addressing the British House of Commons, declared that the “main war plan” of the country was the liberation of Europe.) Except for a very brief moment of release six months later, Husain Ahmad would remain behind bars until August 1944/Sh’aban 1363—almost two-and-a-half years.\textsuperscript{128}

Between late June and early July 1945/mid- to late Rajab 1364, British Viceroy Wavell met with Indian leaders at Simla to discuss his future plans for India. The Muslim League delegation, led by Jinnah, made discussions all but impossible when it demanded recognition as the sole spokesparty for India’s Muslims. The Congress, in a wily move, had sent its delegation (the Congress working committee) under the personal leadership of a Muslim: Abul Kalam Azad. To further buoy up the Congress’ own claim that it, too, represented a sizable proportion of Muslim opinion—and should
therefore be regarded as representative of not one Indian community but all Indians—the JUH, in the form of its president, also attended at least a portion of the conference, specifically the deliberations of 4 July/23 Rajab. (This was the same day that, quite by accident, Jinnah and Nehru crossed paths in the Hotel Cecil lounge nearby; evidently these two political opponents “had a couple of minutes’ friendly conversation” before moving on to their separate business.) In any case, the intractability of both sides led to the breakdown of the talks, and on 14 July/3 Sh’aban Wavell announced that his attempt at negotiating a plan with India’s leading political parties had failed.129

In September of 1945/Shawwal of 1364 (just over a year after his release from prison), Husain Ahmad tried to address the League threat by hosting a conference of Muslims on an all-India level. One hundred fifty Muslim representatives of other political parties and organizations (i.e. non-League) reportedly attended the gathering. The conference produced what Husain Ahmad called the Muslim Parliamentary Board, a body (ultimately of little significance) meant to reinforce to the now many wavering Muslims that they were not alone—that a strong section of the South Asian Islamic community was, in fact, made up of composite nationalists. But the divide between Leaguers and composite nationalists was apparent even in Deoband. One prominent Deobandi cleric remembered joining a “children’s Muslim League” in the town at the age of eleven, a group that was composed of some six hundred kids. “Every Friday,” he recalled years later, “we took out a procession through the bazaars and important places.” But the youngest composite nationalists—or “children from the Congress”—would come out in full force, too, marching through the streets and competing with the young Leaguers for decibal supremacy. “Sometimes we hurled stones at one another,” the League-supporting cleric remembered. One or the other procession would
raise “faith-inspiring slogans,” stopping in front of the police station or the revenue office to chant raucously. “The officers of the British Government locked the gate from the inside on hearing the slogans from a distance which prompted us to become more vociferous and we stayed there for a long time.” The composite nationalists would shout, “Hindu, Muslim, brother, brothers!” to which the Leaguers would answer, “Muslim, Muslim, brother, brothers! We will not stop till we divide India! We will create Pakistan! At the cost of our head, we will create Pakistan! Will bear the bullet on our chest, but create Pakistan! Rivers of blood will flow, but we will create Pakistan! Pakistan, zyndabad!” Both sides practiced the South Asian martial art of club-fighting (bynnwat) in preparation for the coming violence (according to Muhammad Shafi’s son, bynnwat was even incorporated into the dar ul’alwm’s curriculum during this period); apparently the local Hindus “stood in awe” of their Muslim neighbors’s skills in this regard.¹³⁰ For the adults, however, the Pakistan-India tug-of-war was more than a competition to see who could shout the loudest, and even in the children’s words more than a mere hint of future violence might be clearly discerned.

Given Husain Ahmad’s uncompromising position when it came to preserving a united India, it came as a shock to the old ‘alym when, on 14 June 1947/25 Rajab 1366, the Nehru-led Congress formally accepted a plan of partition. The sense of betrayal must have been acute, for Madani—long a staunch supported of the INC, even in the face of opposition from his Deobandi brethren—railed against it.¹³¹ But it was too late. On 14 August 1947/27 Ramadan 1366, the state of Pakistan came into existence, sawn asunder from the now-separate state of India. As for the latter, it officially emerged from under British paramountcy the next day.
That night (15 August 1947/28 Ramadan 1366), the vice-chancellor of the dar ul’al’um at Deoband addressed the students and faculty of that institution. Mention of Pakistan was brief. The focus, as always, was on the freedom narrative based on the Waliullahi program kept alive and, eventually, spread far and wide by the Deobandi movement. “It is the mujahyd party of Shah Waliullah’s daring disciples that, for two hundred years, has been lighting the path in this effort [to bring freedom to India]—not only with pen and ink, but also with sword and blood.

hożrat Shah Abdul Aziz gave a fətwa against the British and [therein] declared that Hindustan was dar ul-hərb. hożrat haji Imadullah sahyb and hożrat mwlana Muhammad Qasim sahyb Nanautawi used this fətwa, and drank this prescription for recovery, [albeit] their own special mixture—and gave [it to others] to drink. hożrat shix ul-hynd preserved this same prescription, [this] compounded medicine, and made it so that anyone could use it. Thus, having begun to be used, [such use] became widespread. In the Khilafat movement, too, everyone used it despite [the fact that] the prescription was bitter. And anyhow, having begun to be used generally, the passion for freedom passed over from the Muslims to the [other] sons of the nation and they too became zealous, and [the fruit of] the sacrifices and joint Hindu-Muslim efforts [is] before us in the form of the independence of the country...

The Deobandi worldview—with the (Deobandi and proto-Deobandi) ‘aloma playing the central role in the Indian independence struggle—is clearly evident here, but so, too, is an emphasis on its culmination: the “efforts” and “sacrifices” of a joint Hindu-Muslim
front. Such a speech would have been highly unlikely to be uttered from a Barelvi *xutluh gah*, but even now, in the midst of only a half-victory, Deobandi leaders underscored Indian independence as a product of Hindu-Muslim unity (albeit inspired originally by their own tradition).

But the issue of Pakistan was yet to be addressed. “The independence of India is the independence of the entire Islamic world,” the vice-chancellor continued. And then the delicate topic was broached: “Both the states of India and Pakistan deserve our congratulations,” he said, in conciliatory fashion. Now that Pakistan was a reality—and the fight for a united India finished—a paradigm shift was in order. The League, with the help of its mostly Barelvi supporters, not to mention a handful of key Deobandi dissenters, had prevailed; it was time to move on. “We congratulate Pakistan as Muslims and India as our native land.”133 It was possible to celebrate both the expulsion of the British (and the subsequent independence of India) as well as the emergence of Pakistan, whatever the “Deobandi” position might have been before this momentous day.

After India won its independence from the British, Husain Ahmad Madani withdrew to a large extent from politics, preferring instead to concentrate on his routine at the *dar ul'alwm* (prayer, *zykr*, fulfilling chancellor duties, Qur’an reading, tea and breakfast, *ḥadīs*-teaching, lunch, prayer, answering mail, entertaining guests, prayer, more *ḥadīs* instruction, recitation of the Qur’an, prayer, dinner, prayer, and still more *ḥadīs*-teaching until midnight). In 1957/1377, while traveling in Madras, Husain Ahmad suffered a heart attack, but survived. Upon his return to Deoband, he was seen by doctors, experienced what seemed to be a general improvement in his health, and then suddenly passed away in his sleep on 5 December/12 Jumada I.134
Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi: Chief of Islamic Law.

Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s educational pedigree was impressive—and very Barelvi. Apart from his blood tie to both a scholar-grandfather and a scholar-brother, it was the connection to his renowned teacher, the great Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri (d. 1908 AD), which stood out most. Hidayatullah had studied at the feet of none other than the famous spiritual forefather of Ahmad Riza’s movement, Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi, and during Amjad ‘Ali’s formative years taught in Jaunpur. The journey from Azamgarh, where Amjad ‘Ali lived, to Jaunpur, where the young man studied—a distance of about forty-five miles—was one bereft of any sort of regular transportation option, so Amjad ‘Ali made the trip mostly on foot, catching a camel cart part of the way when he could; but the arduous back-and-forth, spread out over years, foreshadowed the redoubtable ‘alym’s future career, marked as it would be by much journeying in the cause of the Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat, often on the errand of its spiritual head, Ahmad Riza. After completing the dars-e-nyżami under Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri’s supervision, Amjad ‘Ali studied under another distinguished scholar, Wasi Ahmed Surti (d. 1916 AD), in Pilibhit, just over twenty miles northeast of Bareilly. Ahmad Riza Khan had once referred to mawlana Surti as Hindustan’s premier expert on ḥadīs (a compliment that doubled as a jab at the ḥadīs-emphasizing Deobandis)—a good thing, since Amjad ‘Ali aspired to follow in Wasi Ahmad’s footsteps in this regard. Thus Amjad ‘Ali’s education brought him progressively closer, both academically and geographically, to the spiritual guide whose impact upon his life would be greatest.

Indeed, it didn’t take long for the separate paths of Ahmad Riza and Amjad ‘Ali not only to cross but to unite; soon after Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s 1902/1320 graduation at
Pilibhit, Ahmad Riza selected him to fill a teaching position at his fledgling Bareilly seminary, the aforementioned “
*dar ul’alzwm*” Manzar-e-Islam, and Amjad ‘Ali was only too happy to accept. His responsibility at the school quickly widened to include the issuance of juridical rulings (including at times the writing of *fatwa* at the dictation of Ahmad Riza himself; the Barelvi leader would later describe Amjad ‘Ali as his “most skilled” student in the writing of juridical rulings)\(^{136}\) and a supervisory position over a major Barelvi printing press, and he soon developed a reputation for being a “work machine.” But it was his purely spiritual responsibilities, obtained during this period, which held deeper meaning for the Azamgarhi; he took *bi’at* at the hands of Ahmad Riza Khan, helped the latter produce his translation of the Qur’an (under the title *kanz ul-āiman*), and then, after some time, was honored as the Barelvi founder’s *xalifāh*. One Muslim scholar later characterized Amjad ‘Ali as “probably the best loved and most erudite *xalifāh* of [Ahmad Riza Khan].”\(^{137}\) Over time Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi thus earned the title by which he would be known by future generations: *Sādēr ul-shārī’at*, meaning “Chief of Islamic Law”; many of his rulings would be gathered and published as the four-volume *fatwa* *āmjādiāḥ*, and his *bhar-e-shāri’at* (written over the course of three decades and only completed after his death by family members and former students) is considered by Barelvis to be a veritable encyclopedia of Hanafi jurisprudence.\(^{138}\)

It was here in Bareilly, too, where Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi became politically active, faithfully towing the line of his mentor, Ahmad Riza Khan. Part of that activism was manifest in his capacity as president of the education wing of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s aforementioned Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa. For example, one Thursday in March 1921/Rajab 1339, the Deobandi-Barelvi political antagonism came to a head in Bareilly—where the JUH had decided to hold its convention in this, Ahmad Riza’s
hometown. The gathering was dubbed “the Khilafat Conference,” and Congress stalwart Abul Kalam Azad (who, two years later, would become the Congress’s youngest president) was just one of many prominent “nationalist” Muslims in attendance. Of course, Deobandis dominated the organization itself. Four months before, it should be remembered, the JUH had held its second major gathering in Delhi, with none other than Mahmud Hasan presiding. On this day, the old Deobandi head had been dead for three months, but the party very evidently lived on. By now a leading Barelvi scholar, Amjad ‘Ali (following the example of his shîx) strongly opposed the sort of “Hindu-Muslim unity” espoused by the Deobandi jîm’àîât, and his ire may have been exacerbated by the fact that one of the Barelvis’ own, mîzâlînâ ‘Abd ul-Majid Badayuni (whose rivalry with Ahmad Riza has already been touched upon), was at that moment acting as the conference’s secretary. In any case, on this occasion the Sâdîr ul-shârî’î’t Amjad ‘Ali personally approached the JUH convention with a seventy-point questionnaire dealing specifically with the communal issue—and demanded a reply. The Barelvis would later insist that the JUH “failed to send even one reply to the questions posed,” despite “repeated reminders.” According to Naimuddin Moradabadi (who considered Amjad ‘Ali’s questionnaire so “inspired” as to leave the Deobandis with “[no] room for a convincing reply”), Abul Kalam Azad himself addressed the issue of the questionnaire at the Bareilly train station before his departure. “All the various objections raised in the questionnaire are real and correct,” he is purported to have said, before allegedly admitting that the JUH had made indefensible “errors” that the Barelvis could now “seize.” Amjad ‘Ali’s opposition to cooperation between Muslims and Hindus clearly demonstrated continuity with the views of his aged teacher, Ahmad Riza Khan, who, as mentioned previously, felt strongly that “political alliances forged with
Hindus for the sake of overthrowing the British were misplaced.” As previously mentioned, too, Ahmad Riza Khan had just appointed Amjad ‘Ali ‘Azami qazi for all India, with Ahmad Riza’s son Mustafa and Burhan ul-Haqq Jabalpuri to assist him as muftis. His formal and highly visible opposition to the JUH on this occasion, therefore, was significant—and appropriate, given his new appointment.

But the Deobandis were intent on convincing their Barelvi counterparts that political unity, at least within the context of opposing the British, was necessary. The next month, another meeting was called by the JUH, likewise in Bareilly—this time chaired by none other than Abul Kalam Azad (casting some doubt, perhaps, onto the details of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s train station story). The JUH delicately invited a group of Barelvi dignitaries, including the aforementioned mwlana Muhammad Burhan ul-Haqq Jabalpuri, mwlana Sayyid Sulayman Ashraf, and Ahmad Raza Khan’s own grandson, mwlana Hamid Raza Khan. It is likely Amjad ‘Ali attended as well. This invitation was a more or less unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to come to some sort of rapprochement. But the Deobandi effort to win over these pious scholars failed, in part because the Barelvis seemed intent only on proving the other side wrong. To make the point, mwlana Sulayman Ashraf addressed the gathering personally, contending that the JUH and others of their ilk were acting without religious sanction—and that, in fact, no such sanction existed justifying cooperation with Hindu people. Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations—an idea promulgated by Ahmad Riza and even at this early stage ingrained into the political philosophy of the movement—and thus Barelvi historians continue to label the Deobandi scholars and leaders of the JUH “pro-Hindu.” Meanwhile, Amjad ‘Ali stood as a stalwart even at this early date for “Muslim nationhood” and the “Muslim entity,” having “defended and
extolled the Islamic nation.” Thus the meeting ended without resolving the issue; or, rather, resolving in the minds of both parties that the respective differences dividing them were more or less irreconcilable. The Deobandis apparently made no effort, either, during this second Bareilly conference to answer Amjad ‘Ali’s seventy-point objection delivered to them at the first, though the very fact that they invited the Barelvi scholars indicates some desire on their part to develop warmer relations with their Barelvi brothers. Unfortunately for the Deobandis, and perhaps for the history of the subcontinent, the opportunity was squandered and no rapprochement was forthcoming. When the conference ended, the Deobandis and the Barelvis were as divided as ever. For Amjad ‘Ali’s part, he left the next year (1922/1340) to perform the hajj to Mecca. He would return to Bareilly almost every year afterwards (for the ‘urs of Ahmad Riza Khan), dutifully met and welcomed at the train station on each occasion by Ahmad Riza’s son (and eventually spiritual successor), Mustapha Riza.

In 1924/1342, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi left Bareilly to accept an appointment as head teacher at Ajmer’s dar ul’alum Mu’iniyah Usmaniyyah. The desert town of Ajmer, long a pir center and place of Muslim pilgrimage (remember Akbar) in Rajasthan, would be his home for almost a decade. Here the mufti’s talents as an organizer and administrator were put on display, both in his capacity as head teacher and, especially, in his spearheading of an impressive tabliGi movement whose purpose was to revitalize and reform the “nominal” faith amongst the region’s formerly Hindu descendants of Prithviraj Chauhan (d. 1192 AD). Evidently this specific population practiced Islam only superficially, having kept on or adopted many of the old Hindu worship customs (a charge, ironically, leveled by Deobandis against the Barelvis). Many in the community were falling prey, too, to the seemingly ever-present Shuddhi movement. Apparently
the efforts of Amjad ‘Ali and his cohorts had “pleasant effects,” in that the Muslims of the area “clustered around these enthusiastic preachers” and “resolved to act upon [their admonitions].” Such action is instructive in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, as it illustrates that both groups were reformist in nature (often the Barelvis are portrayed as statically traditional and thus not revivalist in the true sense of the term), seeking to reinvigorate the subcontinent’s Islamic community, rooting out innovation and revitalizing the faith. One aim of Amjad ‘Ali’s missionary endeavors, certainly, was to prevent Muslim communities like Ajmer’s from falling prey to such “deviant” sects as that represented by the Deobandis.

A quick note on the place of the anti-shuddhi activities of the Muslim scholars and their students and disciples is in order here. The Barelvi historians, in particular, tend to place a heavy emphasis on the efforts of the Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alma in combating Hindu reconversion. Interestingly, such activism on the part of the Barelvi fathers is set within the context of the pre-Partition “Pakistan movement.” (Such placement stresses, perhaps, the religious lens through which the Muslim scholars viewed history in general, even what was otherwise strictly political history.) Deobandi histories may make mention of the Shuddhi movement, but it is typically given short shrift, if it is treated at all. The reason? Perhaps the Deobandis have plenty of other political material to cover—from their front-and-center involvement in the Khilafat movement to the organization and activism of the JUH, not to mention the life stories of political crusaders like Mahmud Hasan, ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, and Husain Ahmad Madani. Indeed, Deobandis would later look back on this period—this time of pre-Partition political struggle—as a badge of honor, particularly vis-à-vis their Barelvi opponents. After Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi’s great-grandson, speaking to the author, had finished
extolling the sacrifices of the Deobandis as an integral part of the freedom movement, he asked rhetorically (and sarcastically), “How many Barelvis spent time in prison?”

This, according to many Deobandis, is why the Barelvi histories of the freedom movement spend so much time dealing with seemingly non-political things like combating the *shuddhi* movement. But to Barelvis such activities were wrapped up with the renewal of the faith in the subcontinent along the road to establishing Islamic government in a free and independent Muslim state.

Another issue that features prominently in the Barelvi version of the “Pakistan movement” (as opposed to its near-absence in the Deobandi “freedom movement” narrative) is the Shahid Ganj *masjid* incident, which took place while Amjad ‘Ali was back in Bareilly on a brief three-year teaching stint (1933-1936/1352-1355). The incident stands as another example of a less explicitly political issue being inserted by Barelvi historians into an (or “their”) explicitly political narrative. Built as a Muslim mosque in Lahore in the early eighteenth/twelfth century during the Mughal period, the compound was captured forty years later—along with the rest of the city—by victorious Sikh troops of the western Punjabi Bhangi *mysal* (a state within the Sikh Confederacy), trading hands again (though those hands remained Sikh) in the wake of the establishment of Ranjit Singh’s empire. Muslims were subsequently forbidden to worship at the *masjid*, and soon it had been converted into a Sikh *gurdwara*, the main mosque edifice serving as housing quarters for Sikh priests. When, in the mid-1800s/mid-1200s, the British in turn conquered Lahore, some Muslims began agitating for a restoration of the mosque, but the Sikhs were allowed to retain the property.

Then, in 1935/1354, Muslims got wind of Sikh intentions to demolish the mosque (“owing to its dangerous condition”), and Muslim groups around the country, led in
large part by Barelvis, but including important (usually Barelvi-leaning) pirs (including erstwhile Sunni Conference president Jamaat ‘Ali Shah) and religious scholars from both sides, rallied around the issue of saving Shahid Ganj from destruction. One Barelvi group, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf—connected to Lahore’s Wazir Khan mosque, tied to a number of powerful Sufi pirs, and set up as an opposition organization to the JUH and other Deobandi groups active in the city—played a prominent role in the affair. As per the general Barelvi position, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (which typically reserved its activities to internal behavioral and spiritual reform within Lahore’s Muslim community) “seems to have been far more sympathetic to the British administration,” but in the case of Shahid Ganj came out strongly against it (or, perhaps more accurately, against the Sikhs whose claims were supported by the government). In particular, Barelvis point to the involvement of Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza, as well as “other Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alama” including Amjad ‘Ali (who was with Hamid Riza at the time) in the movement to restore Shahid Ganj masjid to Muslim control. “The effort to recover the mosque,” Hamid Riza is reported to have proclaimed, “was, from an Islamic point of view, a…[religious] duty,” one for which it was worth laying down one’s life; such a potentiality would, “with certainty,” earn one holy martyr status. This may be compared to the position of the major Deobandi leaders and organs in the city, who seemed to cultivate more of a hands-off policy when it came to the issue of the mosque. The heavily Deobandi Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam (hereafter MAI), for example, “shied away” from the spirited agitation that centered around Shahid Ganj; once, hundreds of Muslim demonstrators amassed threateningly outside the party’s Lahore office, protesting the organization’s lack of enthusiasm—indeed, its perceived complete indifference—on the issue. Lahore’s leading Deobandi scholar, the famous Ahmad ‘Ali
Lahori (who had been imprisoned by the British in 1914/1332 for his role in the Mahmud Hasan-led “Silk Letters Conspiracy”), likewise played no active role in the campaign. Neither did his Anjuman Khuddam al-Din, a group (still functioning as of the time of this writing, under the leadership of Ahmad ‘Ali’s grandson) not unlike the Bareli Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (but which more strongly focused on the personal application of the message of the Qur’an). Notable MAI/Deobandi leaders like Ataullah Shah Bukhari did not, like their Bareli counterparts, come running to Lahore to take part in the Shahid Ganj campaign, but stayed away. Such leaders would later explain their actions by enunciating a desire to have seen the issue dealt with via constitutional means. (By 1937/1356, it should be noted, the MAI had caved to pressure and joined in the fray over the mosque, very much on the table as the issue had stubbornly remained; the party’s non-interference had evidently been causing it real political damage). In any case, the attitude of the Ahrars vis-à-vis the Shahid Ganj episode, in the words of one commentator of the time, “lessened its prestige among orthodox Muslims.”

Led by such parties as the Bareli Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf, Muslims gathered in front of the one-time mosque by the thousands (between four and five thousand, to be more precise, many of them armed with sticks and hatchets), creating an armed human wall protecting the edifice. The British governor of the Punjab did attempt a Sikh-Muslim negotiation—and even obtained Sikh assurances that the demolition would be postponed—but to no lasting avail; a week later some Sikhs involved with the gurdwara began demolishing it by night, much to the shock and dismay of the city’s Muslims, as well as Muslims around the country. Communal riots, Muslim versus Sikh, erupted in Lahore’s streets, prompting a quasi-military response from the British. Indeed, by the 8th of July/6th of Rabi II, planes were “circling the city,” British soldiers were “patrolling
the streets with armored cars,” and a curfew “proclaimed by the beat of the drum” had been enacted. In mid-July/mid-Rabi II, a march was organized, beginning at Lahore’s mighty Badshahi Mosque and culminating in the procession’s arrival at Shahid Ganj. Unfortunately for the demonstrators, however, the British met the crowd with bullets; by the time the Royal Scots had stopped firing, around a dozen Muslims lay dead in the streets, and several British soldiers lay wounded or dead as well, victims of stoning, trampling, beating—or some deadly combination. By 21 July/19 Rabi II, the crowd was still “menacing” and “refused to leave the streets” despite the curfew, though the next day the multitude reportedly dispersed (after “sitting in the same place for 36 hours”) at the injunction of their religious leaders. By the 29th/27th the British Official Wireless could report that “the situation in Lahore was…quiet,” and that the Muslims had decided to pursue the matter via “constitutional methods.” This last referred to a plan to appeal through the British Indian court system. (This had been tried before, for years directly following the British occupation of the city; British authorities had ruled in favor of Sikh ownership). In any case, the most serious phase of the crisis had passed.

After his three-year residence in Bareilly, Amjad ‘Ali took up another head teacher position, this time at the dar ul’alum Hafiziah Shervani in Aligarh. He worked in this capacity for seven years (also serving as a curriculum advisor at Sir Sayyid’s Anglo-Oriental College), and one of his fellow teachers would later describe him as one who had “full command over the profession of teaching.” Even as a writer of fatawa (it was in Aligarh that he came to be known as Sadr ul-shari‘a), a debater, a Sufi shi‘a, and a political agitator, Amjad ‘Ali was first and foremost a teacher; many of the religious scholars, on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, would likely view themselves in
much the same way. Even so, and despite his multitude of responsibilities, the political questions facing Muslims in India weighed heavily on the mufti’s mind. In 1939/1358, on the occasion of a major All-India Sunni Conference gathering, Amjad ‘Ali—like hundreds of other prominent Barelvi ‘alama—made the trip to Naimuddin Moradabadi’s hometown of Moradabad, where the meeting took place. None other than Ahmad Riza’s son and šāliṣh ul-ʿawwal (“number one successor”) Hamid Riza Khan chaired the conference on this occasion, while “ḥāẓrot Sādār ul-shari‘a [Amjad ‘Ali],” wrote one Barelvi historian later, “was prominent by his august presence.”162 The respected Azamghari was now sixty years old.

In 1943/1362, Amjad ‘Ali moved to Varanasi for a year before returning once more to Bareilly. In 1946/1365 another major All-India Sunni Conference convention took place (the organization’s last pan-Indian gathering) in Varanasi. This last assembly, as previously mentioned, was the Sunni Conference’s largest by far, with an estimated five thousand scholars and pirs in attendance, plus another two hundred thousand of their students and disciples. Of course, Amjad ‘Ali (now sixty-seven and beginning to suffer from a series of serious physical ailments) attended, too, weighing in often on the topic about which the conference mostly revolved: the practical creation and functioning of an Islamic government on the subcontinent, now that the real emergence of an independent Pakistan glistened on the horizon. In order to facilitate the production of a formal resolution, the Conference created a committee to draft a blueprint for an Islamic state. Naturally, Naimuddin Moradabadi served as a member of said committee, along with Ahmad Riza’s son, Mustapha Riza—and Amjad ‘Ali.163 Their production—Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”—has already been mentioned.
The mega-conference in Varanasi was in large part organized by mwlana Abdul Hamid Badayuni (d. 1970 AD), a scion of the famed Khairabadi-Badayuni Group and a forty-eight-year-old Barelvi leader whose association with the Muslim League dated back to 1918/1336. In March of 1940/Safar of 1359, Abdul Hamid had voiced his support for the League’s Lahore Resolution—when the ML, that same month, had called for the creation of a federation of “autonomous and sovereign” Muslim states in the subcontinent, later interpreted as the League’s first formal demand for Pakistan. Thereafter Abdul Hamid had campaigned hard within the Barelvi community of South Asia in a highly successful attempt to see the idea of a separate Muslim state accepted generally.164 Perhaps it was natural, then, for the AISC to appoint him as its Secretary of Propaganda.165 A fatwa out of Bareilly’s Manzar-e-Islam supporting the League, authored by a murid of Hamid Riza named Ijaz Wali Khan (a future head of the hadis department at a major Barelvi school in Lahore), had also experienced significant circulation at that time.166 To see so many scholars, pirs, and regular “Sunnis”—Amjad ‘Ali among them—now gathered together in Varanasi signified the culmination of Badayuni’s years of effort. Significantly, on the occasion of the Varanasi conference the Badayuni mwlana endeavored hard to convince his fellows to actually merge the AISC with the League—a move that would likely have had major consequences vis-à-vis direct Barelvi influence in the future Pakistani state (and especially in a constituent assembly), particularly as it was measured against that of the Deobandis’. But Abdul Hamid Badayuni’s efforts were in vain, his idea batted down by the many Barelvi guiding lights who looked to the League only circumspectly (not to mention a few whose attitude thereunto was nothing short of hostile), and valued their trademark holy separation.167 (Even Naimuddin Moradabadi, in a letter to a fellow AISC leader in the
Punjab around 1946/1365, wrote, “Jamhurriyyah-e-Islamiah [a name adopted by the Conference in the 1940s/1360s, though the organization continued to be referred to as the All-India Sunni Conference] in no circumstances can give up the demand for Pakistan, \textit{whether Mr. Jinnah himself remains its supporter or not.}” The statement illustrates the distinction in the eyes of some Barelvi leaders between support for an Islamic state and support for the political means to create it. The end was to be Pakistan.) In any case, it is perhaps a testament to the lack of unity on the issue of Jinnah and the League among Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders that Badayuni’s proposal was rejected. “We did not think it proper for [the \textit{‘alāma}] to come on the platform of the Muslim League,” Naimuddin Moradabadi explained, of the AISC’s decision in this regard, “but we countered the activities of the opponents of the League [i.e. predominantly, among Muslims, the Deobandi JUH].” (“\textit{This was not to oblige the League},” Moradabadi would add, somewhat tellingly, “as our attitude was always governed by the dictates of Islam.”) The decision to deny Abdul Hamid this additional victory (and the AISC’s general attitude of maintaining some distance, however small at times, from the League) cleared the way for Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and the better-organized Deobandi network to assume a more powerful (not to mention official) political role within the soon-to-materialize Pakistani state. Still, the general assembly’s decision not to officially join with the League didn’t stop a core group of fifty-six scholars and \textit{pirs} at the Benares conference from issuing a joint statement supporting the ML.

Perhaps it is not coincidental, then, that that same year two other events occurred which helped bring the Muslim League and the Barelvi \textit{mashaykh} and \textit{‘alāma} together. The first was the sending of an official AISC delegation overseas—to the Arabian
peninsula and elsewhere within the Islamic world—to present the pro-Pakistan argument to fellow Muslims abroad and thereby garner an increased base of international Muslim support for the cause. Abdul Hamid Badayuni led the delegation himself. When the group returned to India, it met with Jinnah (on 3 May/1 Jumada II), who lauded its international efforts. (The meeting with Pakistan’s qayd-e-qāzām seems to have fired up Abdul Hamid, who, just three days later, reportedly declared before a sizable Lahore audience, “For us, Pakistan is a matter of life and death.”)\(^{171}\)

The second event was the organization, spearheaded by the Muslim League, of a committee of mashayx made up of prominent Muslim religious figures to help drum up support for the party and for Pakistan (a move in line with the League’s now Islam-centric policy, a policy that made it possible for ML leaders to go over the heads of regional politicians and admonish religious power-holders across the country); the committee included powerful individuals like the pir of Manki Sharif, Makhdum Riza Shah of Multan (whose father had been mayor of Multan, and who himself served, from 1946/1365, as a member of the provincial legislative assembly after beating out the Unionists),\(^{172}\) AISC leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (who, among his many other pro-League activities, was heavily involved in the “condemnation of pro-Congress Muslims and Muslim groups,” like the Deobandis),\(^{173}\) and the powerful pir of the far western Punjabi shrine city of Taunsa Sharif. Other influential pirs or sajada-nishins, especially in the Punjab (a province where League victory was vital to the establishment of any sort of meaningful “Pakistan”), were likewise swayed to Jinnah’s side, including those tied to the shrines at Sial Sharif, Golra Sharif, Pakpattan Sharif, Jabalpur Sharif, and Chura Sharif.\(^{174}\) The next year, of course, all this effort would pay off, and the Sunni Conference’s political goals—if not its spiritual ones—would see fruition. “The Sunni [‘aloma] fully

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participated in the freedom movement,” wrote M. Ahmad, with particular emphasis on the AISC, “and played an important role in the last and final phase of the Pakistan Movement.”

Unfortunately, it was around this time that, combined with his advancing age, a series of personal setbacks (the deaths, in a short three-year span, of eleven of his family members) took a serious toll on Amjad ‘Ali. Indeed, by 1946/1365, the Azamgarhi scholar had lost his sight completely; for the first time since childhood the prolific scholar was bereft of the ability to read and write. His published works thus all pre-date this pivotal year. His condition prevented him, too, from traveling to the northwest frontier during the controversial “Frontier Referendum,” but many other Barelvi ‘alma‘ and pirs made the trip (joining those already based in the region) in order to garner support—and critical votes—for the League. The Referendum will be discussed in more detail in the following section (following the career of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani), but it should be noted here that, if not for Barelvi support, it is doubtful that Jinnah would have been able to eke out a victory in the NWFP (indeed, minus fervent Barelvi cooperation a victory would have been almost certainly impossible). One Barelvi whose participation remains legendary was the pir of Manki Sharif who, in October 1945/Shawwal 1364, organized the Jamiat al-Asfiah, an organization made up of hundreds of scholars and masha‘y. That organization’s support of the Muslim League was critical in the region; without it, opined both M. Ahmad and K. Sayeed, “the Muslim League could not have [built] up its position in the Frontier,” let alone gone on to win. It is clear, too, from Jinnah’s letters that he had used promises hinting at the implementation of shari‘at in a future Pakistan to woo the pir and his party to his side; this was in line with League policy aimed at the Muslim religious leadership since the
1937/1356 election debacle. Notice the wily politician’s ambiguous, non-committal language, from an oft-reproduced November 1945/Dh’ul Hijja 1364 letter to the abovementioned pir: “It is needless to emphasize that the constituent assembly which would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the Un-Islamic laws.” Other big-name “Sunnis” played a similarly major role in stumping for the League, including the aged but seemingly indomitable Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, whose “whirlwind tours” helped mobilize considerable support for Jinnah and Pakistan.

The League’s Referendum victory was a critical stepping stone in the achievement of its ultimate aim—the establishment of Pakistan—and Barelvi backing, with the perhaps equally critical help of some dissident Deobandis, made that win possible. The issuance in both the Punjab and the NWFP of a handbill containing a juridical ruling in favor of Pakistan and the League and signed by thirty-five ‘alama illustrates this phenomenon well. The pamphlet, entitled ḥāżrat-e-Sufī-e-khydr ḳā ṣ al-ṣan-e-hawk: Muslim League ki hymayat ḳārīn (“Eminent Sufis’ and Honorable Ones’ Declaration of the Right Way: Support the Muslim League!”), included mostly Barelvi signatories; however, three Deobandi ‘alama could also be found among the scholars listed thereon. A Frontier Referendum loss in this critical Muslim-majority province would have been a crushing blow to the League—an organization claiming to be the sole spokesparty for India’s Muslims; in the end, the support of the (mostly Barelvi) ‘alama and pirs ensured victory. Barelvi leaders likewise helped secure a League win in the east, where a referendum at Sylhet (in what is today the far eastern corner of Bangladesh) decided, in early July 1947/mid-Sh’aban 1366, in favor of joining East Bengal; here Barelvi notable
Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example, campaigned hard for the ML, delivering passionate speeches in favor of Pakistan.¹⁸⁰

Even in Amjad ‘Ali’s debilitated state, the old ‘alym set out with his wife and a small party (including Ahmad Riza’s son Mustapha Riza Khan) on 1 September 1948/26 Shawwal 1367 for Mecca to perform his second hajj. Hundreds gathered at the railway station to see him off, surely wondering if this might be the last they’d set eyes on the great mufti. Unfortunately for Amjad ‘Ali, the fever that developed soon after embarkation turned into full-fledged pneumonia by the time his party reached Bombay. He remained mostly unconscious for a year. Before Mustapha Riza continued on to the Arab peninsula he is reported to have recited an Ahmad Riza-authored poem of praise for the Prophet to the ailing and unresponsive Aza’mgarhi; Amjad ‘Ali evidently opened his eyes immediately, was propped up by means of a pillow, and listened intently to Mustapha Riza’s words. When he finished, Ahmad Riza’s son is said to have whispered, “Go on [to the next life], I shall follow behind you.”¹⁸¹

Then, a year to the day, almost, since his departure from home, Amjad ‘Ali Khan passed away on 2 September 1949/9 Dh’ul Q’adah 1368, aged seventy-one. His dargah is in Ghausi, near Azamgarh, and every year, as of this writing, pilgrims continue to flock to the spot on the anniversary of his death to pay the crusading ‘alym homage.

Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: Jinnah’s Gamechanger.

Previously it was suggested that the dar ul’alwm at Deoband could boast first-generation leadership under Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad and second-generation leadership under Mahmud Hasan. With the latter’s death, a third generation of leaders was now pushed to the forefront, most notably including Husain Ahmad
Madani, hafiz Muhammad Ahmad, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (the latter aided by his indomitable relative, mufti Muhammad Shafi). Of this group, it was perhaps Shabbir Ahmad whose actions would have the most lasting effect on the movement—and on the political evolution of South Asia. Despite Husain Ahmad Madani’s tireless efforts to keep Deobandism firmly beneath the Congress umbrella, it was Shabbir Ahmad’s breakaway Deobandi faction that would eventually ensure the emergence of Pakistan and, ultimately, dominate Deobandi politics in the new “Muslim” state.

Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was born on 27 September 1885/17 Dh’ul Hijja 1302, about one hundred miles from Delhi in the north Indian town of Bijnor. His father, Fazl al-Rahman Usmani, was a gifted poet and “a great Islamic scholar of his time.” After completing an elementary Islamic education in Deoband, Fazl al-Rahman especially excelled at Persian and poetry while at Delhi College, where he was a stand-out student of the venerable Mamluk ‘Ali (whose acolytes, as previously mentioned, also included founding fathers of the Deobandi school Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi). As a result of his scholarly gifts, Fazl al-Rahman was appointed deputy inspector of schools in the town of Bijnor and other towns across the United Provinces—a pensioned position. But “the movement of Muhammad Qasim” beckoned, and Fazl al-Rahman united with it. As such, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s father helped found the dar ul’alawm at Deoband, and served on the school’s majlly-e-shwra until his death in 1907/1325. To this day Fazl al-Rahman is considered one of the university’s “Six Great Ones” responsible for the institution’s very establishment. One twentieth-century Pakistani historian would write of him, “He remained a pillar of the madrasah to his last breath.” He was married three times, two of the unions producing children—
and it was one of Fazl al-Rahman’s sons who would go on to change the course of history for hundreds of millions of people.

But even apart from the towering legacy of his father, Shabbir Ahmad’s own mark on the university at Deoband was significant—indeed, far greater. From early in his childhood, Fazl al-Rahman’s son had seemed possessed of a serious nature. “Games and amusements evoked no apparent interest in him,” wrote one biographer, adding that, since boyhood, “he had a boundless interest in study.”\textsuperscript{185} As such, six-year-old Shabbir Ahmad was placed in the hands of hafiz Muhammad ‘Azim Deobandi for religious education, and the next year he was accepted at the dar ul’mah\textperiodcentered where his instructors included the indefatigable Mahmud Hasan (a teacher of all-important Arabic). After graduation, the young, newly minted mawlana moved to Delhi, where he taught at a local “Arabic” \textit{madrasa}; during this period, too, the young teacher was married (1905/1323). It didn’t take long, however, for the university at Deoband to decide to avail itself of Shabbir Ahmad’s special talents (\textit{asa\textperiodcentered mashGelb}) as a teacher-lecturer; he was hired in 1907/1325 at a salary of 35 rupees a month.\textsuperscript{186} The man’s ability to give a great speech would come in handy later within the context of independence politics.

But first he would be tested within the administration of the \textit{dar ul’alm}. As an administrator, Shabbir Ahmad appears to have been especially involved in the university’s fundraising efforts (a duty especially pertinent to one possessed of the talents aforementioned), once journeying all the way to Dhaka—a distance of almost a thousand miles, as the crow flies—to help secure a sizable sum from the city’s ruler.\textsuperscript{187} He also played a role, about six years later (1927/1345–1346), in facilitating a substantial increase in the annual donation of the Nizam of Hyderabad.\textsuperscript{188} In fact, it was later reported that the Nizam had only pledged the monthly donation that he did after
hearing Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s religious lectures. The ruler of the Deccan even
offered the now-famous scholar a very lucrative position in Hyderabad—but Shabbir
Ahmad, apparently fully invested mentally and spiritually in the life of the *dar ul’alwm*,
turned down the powerful Nizam in favor of his modest university salary. “’alamāḥ
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani,” wrote of his biographers, “was a soldier of Islam.”

But he was active politically, too, in cooperation with others at the school, in the Khilafat
movement of the early 1920s/late 1330s–early 1340s. As part of the latter, his
reputation for delivering “impassioned sermons” with the capacity to energize his
listeners (and, indeed, the “Muslim nation” at large, according to some) grew, along
with his standing within the Deobandi movement and his general fame throughout
India. These early years saw Shabbir Ahmad as an “avid” member of the Deobandi
school’s political organization, the JUH, which had been organized, as aforementioned,
in the wake of the Khilafat movement in 1919/1337. Indeed, Shabbir Ahmad was
among its founding figures, along with such luminaries as Abul Kalam Azad and ‘Abd
ul-Bari of Farangi Mahal.

But his greatest contributions to the Deobandi movement during this earlier period
fell within the realm of scholarship. When the king of Afghanistan visited the
university in 1939/1358, it was the work of Shabbir Ahmad, along with that of Mahmud
Hasan, which was displayed most prominently (the Afghan government would go on to
translate it from Urdu to Persian). When a new section of the university library was
added in the mid-1960s/mid-1380s, Shabbir Ahmad’s works were specially arranged
and showcased along with those of other leading scholastic luminaries at the school.
Leading *mufti* Muhammad Shafi would later compare Shabbir Ahmad during this time
to the great Sunni theorists, philosophers, and mystics Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–
1111/450-505) and Fakr al-Din al-Razi (1149-1209/543-606), a tribute of very high order. Indeed, Muhammad Shafi likened the level of saintliness, learning, and scholarship then extant at the university at Deoband to “an assembly of angels” that included, by name, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. (Just as significantly, Muhammad Shafi added that this assembly “[ultimately] broke up”). Muhammad Shafi’s son, a prominent Islamic scholar in his own right, would later describe Shabbir Ahmad as having achieved “complete mastery of every science.”

When shīr al-ḥynd Mahmud Hasan, principal of the university at Deoband since 1890/1307, was called to lay the foundation stone of the Jamia Millia Islamia at Aligarh—despite his exceedingly frail condition at the time; he would pass away one month later—it was Shabbir Ahmad, among a few others, who accompanied him.

One of the most prolific Islamic scholars of the last century would write that God had “blessed haẓrat ʿalamah Shabbir Ahmad sahyb Usmani with both writing and speaking ability unique in the world.” Then in 1934/1353 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was appointed acting vice-chancellor, only to be made chancellor the next year. From 1935 to 1942/1354 to 1361, he occupied this exalted post. According to one official source, the school’s advisory council had decided to appoint him to this supreme position on account of his “esteemed personality, knowledge, and integrity” (ʿaẓim shaxSi ʾar ʿalm ʾazal). Despite his newfound position, Shabbir Ahmad’s biographers insist that he continued to live humbly, materially speaking (and even later, when he obtained significant political power)—“to the end living modestly.”

It is not without some irony, then, that of all the Deobandi ʿalma to reject the position of the school’s main political wing, rupturing friendships and associations and splitting the movement, it should be Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Perhaps a hint of
contrarianism on Shabbir Ahmad’s part might have been perceived when, in the mid- to late 1920s/mid-1340s, he sided with a raucous student group at the university against school administrators; many of the students and a handful of teachers and administrators were consequently expelled or otherwise let go, though Shabbir Ahmad retained his position (in name, at least).\textsuperscript{200} Perhaps an intimation of fickleness might have been detected, too, in his spending most of his time as university chancellor not in Deoband at all, but seven hundred miles away in Dabhel, a village on the southern tip of modern-day Gujarat (about 20 miles south of Surat), where a Deobandi seminary had recently been founded.\textsuperscript{201} In fact, the Dabhel school—Jamia Islamia Talimuddin Dabhel, still functioning and, at the time of this writing, boasting around a thousand students—might offer a key to understanding Shabbir Ahmad’s somewhat mysterious (and “sudden”) quasi-break with the institution which his father had helped found and which he himself had led.

The “Dabhel Jamia Islamia,” as the Dabhel school is commonly known, was founded in the late 1920s/mid-1340s—just after students and, crucially, some teachers at the university at Deoband had been expelled or otherwise let go on account of their agitation-related activities, aforementioned. Shabbir Ahmad had sided with them, at least for a time, as stated above. It seems that some of these dissenters, led by Anwar Shah Kashmiri, decided to establish an institution of their own (though certainly still Deobandi in organization and philosophy \([ \text{maslak} ] \), and even affiliation). Shabbir Ahmad would rationalize the situation in terms of “divine will” when he wrote, shortly after becoming chancellor at the university in Deoband in the mid-1930s/mid-1350s, that the contention a decade previously might be compared to a “storm” or a “squall” which, though raging, in the end becomes “the immediate cause of the freshness and
greenness of the earth,” despite “partial losses” incurred during the storm itself. In other words, “by the arrival of the ‘alma of Deoband there the magnificent madrasah that came into existence at Dabhel…is today watering every part of Gujarat…” Thus the removal of rebel faculty and students at Deoband had providentially resulted in the founding of a sister institution at Dabhel—run by the same. And it was as dean of the latter that Shabbir Ahmad spent the vast majority of his time as chancellor of the former.

But what had been the reason for the agitation in the first place—agitation that had been so serious as to drive a luminary like Anwar Shah Kashmiri from Deoband itself? The dar ul’alwm’s official history remains vague on the issue, and, when the author visited Dabhel in August 2012/Ramadan 1433 specifically to inquire as to the reason for the schism, no one at the school seemed to know much about it. At least one scholar has identified some rumblings of dissent within the Deobandi movement in the 1920s/1340s over the school leadership’s sanction of, participation in, and cheerleading for the “Hindu-led” non-cooperation movement (a deal chalked out with Gandhi in return for his support vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as previously noted); evidently there were those who felt that working with the Hindus was too steep a price, whatever the cause. Could it have been this issue that eventually led to the exodus of teachers and students from Deoband to Dabhel? Ashraf ’Ali Thanawi, once singled out by Ahmad Riza Khan as an apostate, and head teacher Anwar Shah Kashmiri had, at least since the Khilafat days, spearheaded a faction within the school that felt that the dar ul’alwm’s “primary objective” should be the pursuit of scholarship and religious learning (i.e. not politics or even relgio-political “movements”). (As early as 1920/1338, Abul Kalam Azad had made reference to two factions present at the school within the ranks of the Deobandi leadership, each vying for influence over the other, thus providing a clue as to how early
an intra-Deobadi political schism had begun to materialize). In other words, direct political involvement should be avoided. Shabbir Ahmad, despite his own personal involvement in the JUH, evidently agreed that the school itself should adopt an apolitical stance—and for years he had acted as one of the faction’s chief spokesmen. In the end the other faction, governed by the thinking of Mahmud Hasan and ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi and lead most prominently by one Husain Ahmad Madani, won out, and in 1927/1346 the Kashmiri faction was expelled from the institution altogether. Noting Shabbir Ahmad’s personal support of this group (indeed, his part as an active member of it), it is not surprising that he should hold a similar view a couple decades later over the JUH’s alliance with the INC. In this context, Shabbir Ahmad’s repudiation of the mainline Deobandi political position—indeed, his active struggle against it—perhaps loses some of its mystery, for he’d been associated with a more dissenting element within Deobandism all along. In 1928/1347, Shabbir Ahmad left Deoband, too, pushed out by Husain Ahmad; the latter apparently had opposed the proposition, put forward by some within the school’s administration, that Shabbir Ahmad be promoted to higher office. The idea had sparked “controversy,” and Madani’s viewpoint prevailed. Between 1928 and 1934/1346 and 1353, Shabbir Ahmad taught at the madrasah in Dabhel, acting as head of the school’s hadis department for several years.

Another theory, explained to the author by one of the dar ul alim’s top officials in 2012/1433 and backed up later by one of the university’s other old-timers, holds that Shabbir Ahmad expected to become head of the hadis department after Anwar Shah Kashmiri but was snubbed by the appointment of Husain Ahmad Madani, whose experience teaching hadis in Medina reportedly granted him an aura of respectability with which even Shabbir Ahmad could not compete. Shabbir Ahmad was considered the
school’s preeminent authority on *ḥadīs* before Madani arrived; it was customary, too, at
the university for the head teacher to augment his duties with *ḥadīs*-teaching, thus
combining the position with added prestige. Apparently, then, somewhat of a rift
developed between the two men as soon as Madani began working at the school.

“Husain Ahmad Madani, when he started teaching here [at Deoband],” explained the
great-gransdon of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, “Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had
differences with him.” If Shabbir Ahmad did indeed feel unfairly treated vis-à-vis
Madani and the *ḥadīs* department position, it would have only been exacerbated by the
fact that Husain Ahmad was also widely seen as the head of the highly politicized,
overtly anti-colonial (Mahmud Hasan-inspired) faction within the school, opposed to the
Thanawi- and Kashmiri-inspired group of which he (Usmani) was a vocal member.
(The animosity, if such a strong word can be used, didn’t flow one-way, either, as
Madani’s push for Shabbir Ahmad’s ouster in 1928/1347 appears to demonstrate). Such
“differences,” it seems, proved too much, and the resultant Usmani-Madani split would
seem to define both men’s political careers (not to mention that of the JUH and the
future Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, or JUI) from that period forward. Over the five to seven
years after Shabbir Ahmad’s departure from Deoband, his difference with Madani did,
however, “lessen” to an extent, allowing him to return and take up the post of vice-
chancellor and, a year later, chancellor.205 (The real impetus behind his return to
Deoband, however, might have been the “pressure from his supporters within the
executive of the School,” supporters who rallied in his behalf and ultimately opened up a
way for his 1934 reinstatement and official elevation.)206 But even this *rapprochement*
wasn’t to last.

In the meantime, Shabbir Ahmad remained an active and high-ranking member of
the JUH, fought politically for the rights of Muslims as he understood them, and maintained a reputation for religiously inspired ardor throughout. “But when [he] realized,” writes one of his biographers, “that the Jamiat Ulema-e Hind had become the Jamiat Ulema-e Congress”—a reference, of course, to the “Hindu-dominated” INC—he broke away from the organization and formed his own. The biographer’s characterization of the JUH-INC relationship as one of domination on the INC’s part, and humble obedience on the JUH’s, is inherently unfair. But for those ‘alɔma, like Shabbir Ahmad, who had opposed the union from the beginning, such a characterization was to become more and more compelling. The Hindus were dominating the Deobandi ‘alɔma, they argued; the brightest Muslim scholars on the subcontinent were being taken for fools. This had to stop.

But whatever Shabbir Ahmad’s personal ruminations, between 1942/1361 and 1943/1362 another major schism occurred among the faculty and students of the university at Deoband, a divide that was not so much theological as political—inherently tied to the tumultuous events then rocking India and the world. The British Empire, of course, was engaged at the time in a fight for its life against Hitler’s forces at home and against Tojo’s forces abroad, the latter of which were threatening to conquer the entire Southeast Asian peninsula; by mid-year, the Japanese were knocking on the doors of India and Burma. Meanwhile, on the subcontinent itself, millions of Indians were outraged that the British Government had committed Indian forces to war without so much as a consultation with Indian political representatives. The British quickly dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps to try and assuage the affronted Indian parties—particularly the Congress; Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru were, after all, somewhat close—but the “Cripps Mission” failed. It had, in fact, only served to further distance all
major parties involved (the Congress and its allies, the League and its allies, and the British Government) from one another. One historian put it thus: “1942 was the moment of political and mental alienation on all sides.” Gandhi’s reaction, despite the wartime situation, was to launch the “Quit India” movement, a massive civil disobedience campaign whose stated aim was complete political separation from Britain.

But not everyone in the Congress greeted Quit India with enthusiasm (indeed, some prominent Congress leaders even quit the party in protest); still, most Congressites rallied behind their leader, reservations or no. Jinnah would famously refer to Gandhi’s decision to launch Quit India as a “Himalayan blunder.”

Naturally, then, Jinnah and the League called on the Muslims of the subcontinent not to support Quit India. Instead, Jinnah took full advantage of the subsequent imprisonment of many of the Congress leaders, quickly securing positions for Muslims in India’s several provincial governments. What’s more, as the non-violence-supporting wing of Congress, including Gandhi, found itself behind bars, a more violent set of revolutionaries in the party quickly seized control. Within weeks of the mass arrest, this more radical group had organized and carried out the destruction of an estimated two hundred fifty railway stations, ripped up large sections of railroad, cut telegraph lines, and devastated over two hundred police stations and post offices, mostly in Bengal and Bihar. Indeed, supplies and communications to the British eastern front were for a time obstructed completely. In the violence that accompanied the British attempt to restore order, around sixty thousand Indians were arrested and an estimated one thousand were killed, some by aircraft-borne machine gunners firing desperately into crowds. Viceroy Linlithgow would describe the uprising as the most serious since 1857/1273. It was against this ferocious backdrop, then, that Shabbir Ahmad’s break
with most of his fellow Deobandis occurred, with students and faculty often acting as full participants in the struggle—and lining up behind the Congress or the League.

Not surprisingly, the number of students attending the university that year was considerably smaller than usual. Some were involved in the Quit India movement and had put off their studies for the time being. Others considered travel unsafe due to the destruction of the railway lines; this was particularly true for many of the school’s Bihari and Bengali students, many of whom opted not to make the journey. (A severe famine in Bengal might also be added to this list of interferences). All of this disruption to the university’s regular operations, combined with the overwrought mood then pervading the country, made for a tense atmosphere at the dar ul’alum. The official history commissioned by the school several decades later would describe the rift as a “difference of political ways” (siasi məslək ki yxtylaf) among the school’s administrators, largely fracturing any unity that had previously existed between them—and leading to a general state of aloofness (kəshidagı) and serious confusion at the school. But the official history fails to supply much in the way of details vis-à-vis these various factions, stating simply that the infighting “finally ended in the resignation and separation of the chancellor [Shabbir Ahmad] and five teachers.” An estimated sixty students also left the university in response to this rupture.211

But what was Shabbir Ahmad’s contention? Why did he feel the need to tender his resignation, even as he occupied the university’s top position? Why did five fellow teachers—including mwlana Muhammad Ibrahim, mwlana mufti Muhammad Shafi, and mwlana Zahoor Ahmed—leave, too?212 What could have been so compelling that a full sixty students would follow them? The official history of the school is not especially enlightening here, either. According to its version of events, Shabbir Ahmad simply felt
that the university should have no political position, or at least no practical involvement in the politics then rocking India and the world. What resulted, the official history insists, was non-cooperation—causing Shabbir Ahmad ultimately (and prudently) to sever himself from the institution. Thus ends the official version of events. But considering the man’s later activities (not to mention those of Muhammad Shafi, one of the teachers who left with him), it seems clear that this is a whitewashed story. Indeed, far from advocating some sort of non-alignment for the university, Shabbir Ahmad and his associates were actively involved themselves in a rival movement—one calling for the creation of a separate state for Muslims. Thus while most Deobandis, including the movement’s then-imprisoned leader, Husain Ahmad Madani, called for cooperation with the Congress and preservation of a united (though independent) subcontinent (Madani supported his idea of “united nationalism” by pointing to the “pact of Medina” [see Chapter 1], in which Muhammad had included non-Muslim tribes of the oasis), Shabbir Ahmad, like Jinnah and the Muslim League, was striving for Partition. Shabbir Ahmad felt that cooperation with India’s Hindus would inevitably lead to a “kind of twisting of Islamic teachings or Islamic customs for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity.” Additionally, supporters of the “two-nation” theory argued that working with the Congress (or even just within a united India) was tantamount to putting “the fate of the Islamic community into the hands of the Hindu majority.” Thus the argument for Pakistan (or, perhaps more accurately, the argument against working with the Congress for a united India) possessed both religious and political aspects. This, and not some nebulous call to be apolitical, was what actually led to the schism of 1942-1943/1361-1362. Indeed, Muhammad Shafi’s son, himself a highly respected mufti, would write later that his father had resigned from the dar ul’alawm at Deoband “due to his active
involvement in the Pakistan movement” (italics added). Shabbir Ahmad had been no apolitical observer. He had, instead, led the opposition, making an eventual break all but inevitable.

By 1944/1363, Madani, freshly released from prison, was railing against the oppression of the British and, characteristically, calling for “the independence of India and the Islamic countries,” which “alone can satisfy our hearts; as long as it is not achieved, our duty will remain and the struggle for independence will continue.” At the same time, Madani’s erstwhile Deobandi rival was being welcomed with open arms by the JUH’s fiercest political opponent: the Muslim League. Indeed, in time Shabbir would been hailed as the latter organization’s “most eminent ‘alym.” Another scholar described him as “foremost” among the pro-Pakistan ‘alma.” To politically secede from his Deobandi brethren, however, Shabbir Ahmad had to separate politics from religious discipleship. Just as one Deobandi scholar could say, “I am a political disciple of Maulana Azad and a disciple of Hazrat Maulana Syed Hussain [Ahmad] Madani at Deoband”—clearly drawing a line between the temporal and the spiritual—Shabbir Ahmad could claim to be a disciple of the Deobandi school despite his political alignment with the League (or, more to the point, against the JUH). These seemed to be separate and distinct, at least in his apparent worldview.

Long before this schism, however, the JUH had been expanding across the subcontinent, including within what would become the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan; here the JUH was represented (from 1924/1342) by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Sarhad (“Assembly of Frontier Clergy,” hereafter JUS). The ‘alma of the JUS, in keeping with Deobandi “policy,” attempted to set themselves up as an alternative to the state court system. As part of their aim to implement shari‘at, the JUS encouraged
Muslims in the area to “come to the ulema of the JUS for settlements” instead of “turning to the state-run courts for justice.” Other localized organizations, while not explicitly defined as branches of the JUH, nevertheless expounded a mostly Deobandi philosophy vis-à-vis Islam, the mainstream Deobandi position vis-à-vis independence (namely: pro-independence but anti-Pakistan), and employed markedly Deobandi methods (including mosque-based activism and the garnering of voluntary support in the name of Islam) in carrying out their objectives. For example, in the Punjab the leadership (and membership) of the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam included several notable Deobandi scholars, Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi and Ataullah Shah Bukhari among them; the latter served as the party’s first president and was dubbed ṣamīr-e-ṣhārī‘at by Anwar Shah Kashmiri, who would himself serve as president of the JUH in 1926/1344. Samina Awan, in her groundbreaking 2010/1431 in-depth treatment of the MAI, described the party thus: “Many of those who joined the MAI were inclined towards the Deobandi school of thought.” The organization’s ranks were swelled with erstwhile Khilafatists, whose movement had, as previously mentioned, been fueled in large measure by the Deobandi leadership. In addition, “some of the party’s leaders and workers” had been “actively associated with the INC,” another Deobandi trademark. The MAI agitated for the rights of Muslims (especially in Kashmir, just to the north, where Muslims lived under what was considered the repressive rule of a Hindu prince, and in the former princely state of Kapurthala, now within the boundaries of Indian Punjab). Like the JUS to the northwest, the Deobandi-leaning MAI acted as a sort of JUH on the local level in the Punjab, paving the way for increased Deobandi influence in politics later on; “the protagonists of the Deobandi school of thought,” writes Kamran, “owe a good deal to the Majlis-i-Ahrar” which “acted as an instrument of
political articulation for them in the Punjab.” The party was headquartered in Lahore (and was, as Kamran noted, by far most active in the Punjab), but also ran branches as far afield as Peshawar, Delhi, Lucknow, as well as in the princely state of Bahalwalpur. Other groups, some explicitly linked to the JUH, some not, did the same within their respective spheres across the subcontinent. Certainly, the Deobandi political machine was a force with which to be reckoned, much to the chagrin of the Barelvians—and, of course, to the organization which they had selected as their “vehicle” for Pakistan: the Muslim League.

What Jinnah and the League needed, then—perhaps desperately—was a religious leader who could throw “theological weight” (in the words of one Pakistani historian) behind the idea of Pakistan to counter the efforts of the anti-League Muslim parties like the JUH. True, the Barelvi leadership provided this on a certain level, but their lack of organization and unity was an issue, not to mention the fact that it was the highly organized Deobandi opposition, aforementioned, that represented the League’s greatest Muslim threat. Jinnah’s answer came in October 1945/Dh’ul Q’adah 1364, when Shabbir Ahmad Usmani founded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (“Assembly of Islamic Clergy,” hereafter JUI) in Calcutta, over which he (Shabbir Ahmad) presided as the group’s first president. According to some, it was the League itself that organized the JUI—to be a “parallel organization” to the JUH; the League then “called upon” Shabbir Ahmad Usmani to lead the new party. One historian goes so far as to claim that the leaders of the League intentionally sought out Pakistan sympathizers among the Deobandis, since it was the Deobandi JUH that was the standard-bearer when it came to the political organization of Muslim religious leadership. Evidently mawlana Zafar Ahmad Ansari (a future member of independent Pakistan’s national assembly) was
tasked with the mission to “establish contact” with the Deobandi ‘alma and organize this opposition-from-within.\textsuperscript{227} Zafar Ahmad eventually found success with Shabbir Ahmad. But whatever the circumstances of its coming into existence, the JUI was clearly organized along the same lines as the JUH, but as a League-backing clerical party to oppose its Congress-supporting rivals. Of course, the JUH was being led by Shabbir Ahmad’s erstwhile friends and associates from the \textit{dar ul’alwa} when he organized the JUI to oppose them.

It wasn’t two months before Shabbir Ahmad had arranged his party’s first major conference of Indian ‘alma—in Meerut in December/Muharram. The next month, January/Safar, saw Shabbir Ahmad, together with Ghulam Murshid, organize and lead a similar conference, this time in Lahore, where a branch of the JUI had been set up the month before. Though some variety of ‘alma attended (along with a large group of politicians), they mostly represented urban centers in the Punjab. A poster issued by Shabbir Ahmad afterwards indicated the participation of around three hundred religious leaders.\textsuperscript{228} In March/Rabi II, the \textit{Bombay Sentinel} announced “the first Provincial Conference” of the JUI, a three-day event to be convened “under the presidentship of His Holiness Sheikul Islam Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Sahib Usmani” in Bombay; the ardently anti-League, pro-Congress paper declined, however, to cover the actual event.\textsuperscript{229} Despite his sixty years of age, Shabbir Ahmad had literally traveled “the length and breadth of the country” for four months, campaigning for Pakistan at the grass-roots level.\textsuperscript{230} His “passionate speeches” injected “zeal” into “the Muslim nation,” one historian has written—and his “great renown spread across all of Hindustan.”\textsuperscript{231}

The JUI had been created to carry out several purposes, chief among them (1) the organization of the League’s supporters among the Muslim religious leadership and (2)
the lending of religious credibility to a party (the League) that was often seen as secular (and even, according to some Muslim detractors, un-Islamic). But whatever the talents of the JUI leadership vis-à-vis organizing conferences, it seems that most of the League’s religious support chose not to avail itself of this particular political vehicle, opting instead for involvement at the local level. The JUI, according to Gilmartin, “was in fact ill-suited for the organization of the rural religious leaders who formed the backbone of the League’s religious support [“mostly Barelvis”], and whose influence remained diffuse and centered on the shrines.”

232 It was true—the JUI and the JUH, though almost identical in terms of organization and modus operandi, were meant to accommodate very different groups of ‘ulama and mashaiq. The JUH appealed to Deobandi scholars and teachers as well as other educated, mostly urban Muslim religious leaders. On the other hand, the JUI, though a carbon-copy Deobandi organization led by a Deobandi, was, broadly speaking, expected to rally a largely Barelvi corps of scholars and pirs drawn mostly from rural areas. It isn’t surprising, then, that so many among the (often Barelvi) League-supporting religious leadership in South Asia remained more or less aloof from the Muslim League’s political machine. The fact that the JUI was led by a prominent Deobandi almost certainly played a major role in dissuading the Barelvi religious leadership from flocking to its banner, too.

(These circumstances would have major consequences for this latter group after Partition; see Chapter 4.) In any case, if Jinnah’s purpose had been to divide his most formidable Muslim rivals, the JUI seems to have served this goal well, despite its inability to act as the League’s chief political organ for most Pakistan-supporting Muslim scholars and pirs.

As for lending religious credibility to the League and its cause, it would be difficult
to argue that the JUI didn’t largely succeed; indeed, it was for Shabbir Ahmad’s vital efforts in this regard that later historians, particularly in Pakistan, would characterize him as “included among the highest order of the architects of Pakistan,” not light language. In the words of Al-Mujahid, between December 1945/Muharram 1365 and March 1946/Rabi II 1365, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and his party “activiz[ed] the religious groups across the subcontinent,” mobilizing the ‘alšma and məshəyx for Pakistan “as never before.” Arshad explains that Shabbir Ahmad “amassed support and power for the Pakistan movement from the religious element,” his relentless campaigning creating “a new enthusiasm among the Muslim masses” (italics added). The aged scholar’s efforts were “extremely critical” among “the semiliterate” of the latter category, previously swayed as they had been by the “Congressite”  ‘alšma—a reference to the Deobandi JUH—and the Deobandi-leaning MAI and other parties. Thus Shabbir Ahmad’s JUI fanned out across Hindustan, categorizing its Muslim political opponents as blatantly “un-Islamic.” And though the scholar’s rhetoric took aim at his fellow Muslims, one Muslim League poster of the time, described by Gilmartin, attempted to portray Shabbir Ahmad as a great proponent of unity. “For Muslims to be agreed and unified on a true purpose is a magnificent gift,” the erstwhile Deobandi chancellor declared, going on to explain that Harun (Aaron) had placed the danger of division above even the suppression of idolatry when he had gone along with the children of Israel as they worshipped the golden calf. “I worried that you would blame me if I caused division without waiting for your word,” Harun is reported to have told Musa (Moses). Those Muslims who attacked the League, the JUI, and others struggling for a Muslim homeland were thus guilty of divisiveness, of attacking Pakistan “with narrow sectarian arguments.” No—it was the Muslim’s duty to become “of one heart and one
voice” and “raise the Pakistan slogan.” Of course, part of that duty entailed fighting corruption within the Muslim community itself. As such, the approximately two years between the founding of the JUI and the partition of India witnessed a furious exchange of fatwas between the Deobandi ‘alma supporting the Congress and the Deobandi ‘alma supporting the League—in essence, between the JUI, Shabbir Ahmad at the head, and Madani’s JUH. For every fatwa issued by the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad “answered…in the light of the Qur’an and the Shariat,” as he saw it. Meanwhile, the Barelvis looked on, not sure whether to be more agitated about the anti-Pakistani activities of the Deobandi JUH or about the rising status of the Deobandi JUI within Jinnah’s pro-Pakistan coalition.

The JUI was thus organized in the run-up to the 1945/1364 central and provincial elections, described by one Pakistani scholar as “by far the most critical” elections “at all levels in all the annals of subcontinental history.” The breakdown of the Simla Conference in July/Sh’aban after Jinnah’s posturing as the Indian Muslims’ sole spokesman provided “a shot in the arm” (to quote Hodson) for the League and set the stage for his call for general elections, later seconded by Cripps and even Abul Kalam Azad. On 21 August 1945/12 Ramadan 1364, elections were announced by Viceroy Wavell, to be held over the winter of 1945-1946/1364-1365—and abruptly “election fever gripped India,” with Nehru even announcing, “A revolution is inevitable.” But what made these elections so potentially groundbreaking were the “two critical issues at stake,” questions that the contest might finally and definitively answer: Was the All-India Muslim League really subcontinental Islam’s “sole” political spokesparty? and Did Muslims support the creation of a separate, “Muslim” state called Pakistan? In Jinnah’s efforts to emerge victorious from the 1945-1946/1364-1365 elections, Shabbir Ahmad “played an
extremely important role in the success of the Muslim League in the central and
provincial elections.” “Defined structurally as an arena of public competition,” writes
Gilmartin, “the electoral arena encouraged…the depiction of the League’s opponents as
enemies of the community in a great electoral battle”; Muslims were fighting a
constitutional war, Shabbir Ahmad insisted, “a war not of guns, ditches, and bullets but
of votes, a war in which the life and death of India’s Muslims” was on the line.241
Metcalf writes that, by now, the Muslim League “was supported by some of the
religious scholarship, some ‘ulama, and many of the pirs of the shrines”; these last
“brought the old ideal of Shah Waliyu’llah into play, for they wanted a Muslim state
with all that symbolized and devoutly hoped to establish the religious leadership as
advisers, even partners, to a ruling class whose political goals (as they perhaps failed to
see) were largely secular.”242 Metcalf’s assertion, as far as it pertains to the ‘al略ma, is
certainly true (though her application of the Waliullahi program to the pirs seems less
so), and may have motivated many—including, perhaps, Shabbir Ahmad—to rally
behind Jinnah and the AIML. In the end, the League scored far better than its
detractors anticipated, winning big in the crucial Punjab and Bengal contests (as well as
sweeping the central assembly’s Muslim seats). Though the Congress walked away
with most of the non-Muslim seats in the elections, the Muslim League obtained almost
all of the Muslim ones (the only glaring League loss had come in the Muslim-majority
NWFP, where the Congress-supporting and Deobandi-leaning KKs won the contest for
the Congress—and while the League had won big in the Punjab, Bengal, and Sindh, it
yet failed to win absolute majorities in any of these provinces). Still, Jinnah celebrated
11 January 1946/7 Safar 1365 as a “Day of Victory”; after all, in 1937/1356 the League
had barely managed to win a third of Muslim seats, and now, less than a decade later,
the party had captured nine out of every ten. Congress had won big, yes, but not where it counted—i.e. among India’s Muslims. “Jinnah had campaigned to secure a mandate for Pakistan,” wrote one historian, “and in this he was successful.” But it may not be an exaggeration to say that the Muslim League, in the words of one historian, “should interpret its historic success in the elections as the momentous result of the efforts of ’allama Usmani.” The Barelvi scholars, pirs, and their supporters would meet a few months later in Varanasi by the hundreds of thousands, but their importance by then had been overshadowed by a Deobandi and his JUI.

Soon after Mountbatten’s arrival in India in March/Rabi II, the last Viceroy proposed partition for India. But what this meant for the North-West Frontier, which had voted majority-Congress despite its Muslim-majority population, was still nebulous. The Mountbatten plan called for a referendum to be held in the NWFP to determine whether the province would end up affixed to India or to Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress, perhaps surprisingly, agreed to Mountabatten’s partition scheme—arousing mixed feelings among the Pathans of the northwest, particularly those who had been loyal Congress supporters. Had they not voted for the Congress just one year previously? Had Jinnah’s Pakistan mandate not failed soundly in the frontier province already? To many of the NWFP’s Congress-supporting Muslims, Nehru’s accord smacked, at best, of abandonment—and, at worst, of betrayal. “We Pakhtuns stood by you and [endured] great sacrifices for attaining freedom,” Abdul Ghaffar Khan famously remarked afterwards, “but you have now deserted us and thrown us to the wolves.”

How had the Congress won so much influence in so Muslim a province as the Northwest Frontier? The Deobandi layer of this history has already been mentioned.
Based on his contact with local residents over several decades combined with his experiences traveling through the region on horseback just months before Partition, Englishman Malcolm Darling reported, too, that “all agree that it began with the Red Shirt movement in the late twenties, when to challenge the established order was automatically to be pro-Congress, Congress being then the only nationalist organization of any importance. In Abdul Ghafar Khan, too, the movement had a born leader, who succeeded in rallying round him the poorer and more discontented elements in the province. After the fashion of those days he gave them red shirts to wear and a semi-military organization. This, of course, led to violence, and the organization was drastically dealt with. A legacy of bitterness is the result” (italics added).\textsuperscript{246} Darling’s supposition is doubtless at least partly accurate, but fails to explain why, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, when the League was gaining ground among Muslims in, say, the U.P., it yet failed to win a majority in mostly-Muslim provinces like the North-West Frontier. Of course, a knowledge of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s history, including Deobandism’s success in establishing itself among the Pathan, could have provided Darling with some answers in this regard. Still, the League’s popularity in the region should not be underestimated; “What we want is Pakistan—to be free of the Hindus, because of their greater numbers,” one local told an English observer, just months prior to Partition. “Here we are cent per cent for the League.”\textsuperscript{247} Especially after Nehru’s October 1946/Dh’ul Q’adah 1365 visit to the Northwest Frontier—when, according to Darling, the “sight of a Hindu addressing them as the spokesman of the Government of India made the tribesmen realize, as nothing before, the reality of the impending change and convinced them that it meant Hindu Raj”—League ranks began to swell more rapidly.\textsuperscript{248} By 1946, according to a British observer, Hindu domination was an
“obsession” haunting the minds of most Muslims in the Punjab. Still, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his KKs were the dominant party in the frontier regions, despite these developments.

Muslims in general feared minority status within an independent but mostly Hindu India. Now, and similarly, many Pathans were afraid that unification with the far more numerous Punjabis, Muslim or not, would “destroy the Pashtun nation,” in the words of Abdul Gaffar Khan. Thus the brawny Pathan and his Congress-supporting KKs requested that, at the very least, the creation of an autonomous “Pashtunistan” be included as an option for which the people might vote in Mountbatten’s referendum. Exactly what such autonomy meant, much less where exactly “Pashtunistan” began and ended, remained hazy; Schofield has described the request, however, as “a demand for self-rule whilst maintaining relations with both India and Pakistan.” But the request was denied (at Nehru’s personal appeal, according to Mountbatten—an interesting tidbit), leaving Abdul Gaffar, his KKs, and other Congress supporters no choice, in their eyes, but to boycott the referendum completely. As a result, only half of all registered voters—just over seven percent of the population—participated, casting their ballots between 6 and 17 July/17 and 28 Sh’aban. With no Pashtunistan on the ballot, virtually no Congress supporters voting, and almost certainly significant election fraud, the League managed, however scarcely, to emerge triumphant when the referendum’s results were published on 20 July/2 Ramadan.

Most histories of the northwest, Partition, or Pakistan now leave the referendum alone, moving along instead to the emergence of the Pakistani state and the gathering of that polity’s constituent assembly in Islamabad. This version of the referendum narrative paints the League as lucky to have squeezed out a victory, with “an absence of
any real political creativity and pragmatism on the part of the Muslim League and Congress towards the Tribal Areas” during the contest. Arguably there is some truth to this idea, to be sure. But the situation was quite a bit more complicated. Among the Pathans, in the run-up to the ballot casting, emotions ran high. For years, of course, the League had been framing the India-or-Pakistan question in terms of loyalty to Islam. With the coming referendum, however, the Muslim League “mobilized all their resources,” sending for “leaders from every corner of India,” in the words of one KK leader, “to foment hatred.” (Future Pakistani historians would paint things a little differently, pointing to the “intense animosity from hard-line [mostly Deobandi] Muslim clerics” of “the ultra right-wing,” and their “vile propaganda.”)

The indefatigable Jamaat ‘Ali Shah was one Barelvi divine (of many) who heeded the call; just one year before, the AISC leader had stood in Peshawar, in the old gardens of Shahi Bagh—near the home of Abdul Ghaffar himself, not coincidentally—and issued a fatwa declaring that “no Congressman will be allowed to be buried in a Muslim graveyard, as it is impermissible.” Another of these religious leaders was Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Shabbir Ahmad and his colleagues crisscrossed the province, declaring resistance to Pakistan as opposition to an Islamic state (Jinnah had used similar language when he toured the NWFP in 1945: “Every vote against the Muslim League...means Hindu Raj”). Shabbir Ahmad’s “speeches and campaigning” produced “a great enthusiasm” for Pakistan and the League among many of the province’s Muslims. Such a spark was critical, as will be demonstrated. As a result of the renewed contest, however, “tensions and violence” were “simmering in the Province,” especially “among the would-be [jihadis] in the Tribal Areas”—and by design. For ill feeling and hostility had reached such an extent that a vote in favor of unification with
India “would be tragically divisive and risk unleashing unbridled violence” in the region. The result of such a contest would be, in the words of Wali Khan, a “confrontation between anti- and pro-Pakistan elements at a time when the situation was highly explosive.”

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters hadn’t boycotted the referendum out of pride or resentment, then; no, they feared what the contest itself (let alone a win for their side) might do to the Pathan population. It was, in the words of Banerjee, “Badshah” Khan’s “final great act of principle.” And the League, with the “especially decisive” help of Shabbir Ahmad, had created the very state of affairs that had “forced” Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters—whose party, the year before, had won provincial elections in landslide fashion; was this not a referendum?—to sit at home during the crucial vote of 1947/1366. Perhaps the League should be credited with some creativity after all, more than a little thanks to the energetic though aged former chancellor. It was that organization’s strategy of “Islam in danger!”—with Shabbir Ahmad as a lead spokesperson, “visiting the entire frontier province”—that turned the tide. (Perhaps, too, the Congress-supporters should be credited with a little creativity as well; they did, after all, come up with the League-alluding tappā, “The stick that used to beat us now has a flag on it”). Speaking of flags, it has been written that before Jinnah and Liaqat ‘Ali Khan arrived at the time of Partition, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani “was the first to wave the Pakistani flag in western Pakistan.”

In the end, the Muslim League won a mere 0.5% more than half of the vote; would that crucial 0.5% have come but for the efforts of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, to say nothing of Jinnah’s Barelvi supporters who arrived from across India? The result of the dubious frontier referendum: the North-West Frontier Province became a part of
Pakistan and the realization of the dream of an independent Pashtunistan vanished—some might say, with more than a hint of irony, at the hands of a Deobandi cleric. To this day the fiery cleric from Uttar Pradesh is considered by millions to have been the real game-changer for the destiny of the League and Pakistan; perhaps the words of one of the man’s scholarly biographers best illuminate this particular point-of-view: Shabbir Ahmad Usmani “made the impossible possible.”

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There are several observations one might make via an examination of the four individuals whose exploits were touched upon in this chapter: Naimuddin Moradabadi, Husain Ahmad Madani, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. It should be noted, for example, that while each was politically active in the independence politics of pre-Partition India and/or Pakistan, none was chiefly so. In other words, both Deobandi and Barelvi leaders were primarily scholars first—teaching Islam, running schools, authoring juridical rulings, mentoring students one-on-one, writing tracts and books on Islamic topics, and otherwise engaged in such religio-educational activities. Others in their respective movements, too (like Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example), might have played a more crucial part in the politics of independence rocking the subcontinent before 1947/1366, than some or all of the four selected here. Even so, each played an important role within the context of pre-Partition independence politics and in the development of a more overtly political Deobandism/Barelvism. True, the ‘alōma (or at least a powerful segment among them) had always been political creatures, from the days of the Abbasid empire to the Indian Mughal period and beyond. But it was during the period covered in this chapter that the foundation was laid for the emergence of distinct ‘alōma parties, in the western political tradition. These parties—
most notably the JUI (after the creation of Pakistan, most Deobandi JUH remnants in
the new “Muslim” state would gravitate towards the Shabbir Ahmad-founded
organization) and the Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or JUP), the latter built upon
the ashes of the AISC—would, with one or two others, dominate clerical politics in
Pakistan.

Divided as they were, however, might it be said, as Metcalf did, that the role of the
‘alāma in the pre-Partition politics of the twentieth/fourteenth century, “was in fact
modest”? She goes on: “Indeed, one can argue the very success of their inward-looking
strategy developed during the nineteenth century was a hindrance to them in the
twentieth.” Sanyal, in turn, would characterize the Barelvi impact as “small.” This
author contends that the words “modest” and “small” are probably far too feeble to
decribe the impact of the ‘alāma and pirs during this period, of either sect, despite the
latter’s perhaps waning influence (just months before Partition, one English observer
traveling across the Northwest Frontier noted that “all along my route people agree
that the influence of the Pir is nothing like what it was twenty years ago”).

Elitist histories shine the spotlight on individuals like Nehru and Jinnah and their parties, but
it was grassroots elements that propelled Gandhi to power, and it was this unheralded
base that subsequently pushed Jinnah not only out of the Congress but also into the
arms of the League—where the one-time “Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity” went on
to craft that organization’s Pakistan agenda. The Deobandi ‘alāma played a critical role
here, fueling the Khilafat movement and populating the base responsible for the decisive
state of affairs described above. This alone represents, perhaps, a more than “modest”
role. Thousands of Islamic scholars, many of whom in turn greatly influenced hundreds
or thousands of other Muslims each, on a local level, were politically active—attending
conferences, agitating for or against the League, delivering sermons in favor of the two-nation theory or for composite nationalism, and writing, publishing, and distributing juridical rulings “proving by the light of the Holy Qur’an and sunnat that the Muslim League was the representative party of the Muslims”—or that the opposite was true.

Obviously, any claim to measure the practical effect of these diverse efforts, expended by thousands and tens of thousands over the course of years across a large geographical area, would be futile. But could Jinnah have mustered the support he needed, especially after 1937/1356, without Barelvi backing? Thousands of influential scholars and pirs stumped for the League all across India—is this a “small” thing, their efforts ultimately trivial? On another note, could Pakistan have come about without the “consent” of the NWFP in that province’s 1947/1366 referendum? Here, again, it was the ‘ulma—mostly Barelvi, but including Deobandi dissident Shabbir Ahmad and his party—who actually turned the tide. The League’s victory came by a mere half-percent, despite the KK boycott! Does not this, too, represent a more-than-“modest” role for the religious scholars? The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry itself, by the early 1920s/late 1330s, had developed a strong political aspect, and this probably played a key role in dividing Muslims and thereby protracting the pre-Partition political conflict. Throughout the period, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, in the form of his Deobandi opposition and reluctant Barelvi support, helped push Jinnah into a corner, to a mountain over which he simply could not climb alone—and, it could be argued, only the sudden emergence of a League-supporting, dissident Deobandi faction led by Shabbir Ahmad finally saved the day for the Pakistan dream, pushing the League leader over the stubborn mountain’s summit. Had the Barelvis lined up behind the Deobandi position, it seems highly unlikely Jinnah could have carried the day at all—and India might be a single, united
political polity today, with all that that entails. (Indeed, Jinnah may never have become an advocate of the “two-nation theory” at all.) Had the Deobandis joined forces with the Barelvis behind Ahmad Riza’s position, on the other hand, Jinnah might have achieved sole-spokesman status years earlier, or the Congress might have been forced to accede to League demands in the 1920s-1930s/1340s-1350s, likely resulting in an independent though united India operating under a highly federal system with separate electorates. Instead, their rivalry ensured a protracted pre-independence battle among Muslims over the meaning of Islam, nationhood, citizenship, heritage, and culture on the subcontinent. Surely the weak “modest” is a descriptive that fails to apply when it comes to the impact of the ‘aləma, the pirs, and the Deobandi-Barelvi religious leadership in general in the context of pre-Partition politics.
4 - DEFINING A NEW ISLAMIC STATE:

The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics, 1947-1977

To achieve a country is easy, but to run a country is very difficult. May Allah bless you with the ability to run the country.

JAMMAT ‘ALI SHAH, IN A LETTER TO MUHAMMAD ‘ALI JINNAH

The Ulema would like to reproduce a society which no longer exists and a polity which was suited to the early days of Islam.

G. W. CHOUDHURY, 1955

With the creation of Pakistan, the religio-political Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, while still vigorous from a theological point-of-view among Deobandis and Barelvis in India, shifted to the new “Muslim state” of Pakistan. (The political aspect of the rivalry in India was there, too, of course, particularly as the Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership based in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar contested for power and place within the various local, provincial, and central government bodies dealing with minorities, religion, and culture; a statist system of government recognition and
patronage thus exacerbated the conflict.) That the rivalry had more or less shifted to Pakistan was underscored as early as India’s independence day: 15 August 1947. That evening, the central Deobandi dar ul’alwm’s vice-chancellor, Muhammad Tayyib, told a large assemblage of students and faculty that with the achievement of political freedom, a new opportunity had presented itself (with respect to intra-Sunni sectarian strife, foremost that of the Barevis and the Deobandis) to “forget past events,” to “desist from the cycle of reviling and mocking” and to “stop intending to lay blame [on one another].” It was time now to rid the ummat of sects and division and unite under a single ymam and a single āmir. “In my opinion,” declared the mulana, grandson of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi himself, “the chances of our being united are better now than ever.” Why? According to Muhammad Tayyib, the winning of independence, including the successful utilization of revolution, had “turned upside down” (munqalylb) the parties involved in petty disputes.\(^3\) Now that the political side of the schism had been removed, Muhammad Tayyib reasoned, the two schools would surely be able to work out their differences. This was one Deobandi position (and, as it turned out, not a very accurate one, given the events that followed), but it signaled a slight wind change in India alone. In Pakistan the story was much the same as it had been before independence was won, only exacerbated now that an actual place at the seat of power was at stake. Indeed, with the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic added a new dimension to the sectarian rivalry. Within the context of pre-Partition politics, the Barevis had, by and large, fought for the establishment of an Islamic state, complete with a constitution that they would have a hand in designing (along the lines of Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”) and a government that they would help lead as the spiritual guides of the Sunni majority. On the other hand, except for
dissidents like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the Deobandis’ goal had revolved around British expulsion, not constitution-making for some Muslim “homeland,” nor position within a subcontinental Islamic state. But now, in Pakistan, the Deobandis in the form of the JUI—and thanks in large part to that organization’s willingness (unlike the Sunni Conference’s) to be officially associated with the Muslim League—abruptly had a place at the political table. The political game had not only shifted geographically; it had shifted goal-wise, such that now the political wings of the Deobandi and Barelvi schools were fighting over the same thing: that is, official (government) recognition, and the power and patronage that comes with it. In a sense, the birth of Pakistan instantly turned them into direct enemies in a contest that, in the end, could have only one victor. One result of this new dynamic was that the clerical parties consistently failed to unite in truly joint action, even when they appeared to be fighting for (or against) the same thing (a phenomenon the author calls “separate unity”). A unified “Sunni” party, populated by a unified base and led by a unified Deobandi-Barelvi leadership, might have presented a serious force with which to be reckoned—but this never happened; the rivalry was too strong, too deep-seeded. Over time, then, and even taking into account the vacillations of power and prestige characteristic of politics, the dynamic generally helped only to marginalize both the JUI and the JUP within Pakistan’s political structure.

_Constitution-Making: A Cold Alliance._

Four days before Muhammad Tayyib’s remarks at Deoband (and thus several days before Pakistan had actually come into being), Jinnah addressed the new constituent assembly of the future “Muslim” state in Karachi. He had just been elected that body’s
first president during its 10-14 August inaugural session, and took occasion to elucidate upon the assembly’s two-pronged purpose. “The constituent assembly has got two main functions to perform,” he told the gathering of newly minted representatives. “The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan.” The assembly’s purposes, then, were (1) to formulate a constitution and, in the meantime, (2) to act as the national legislature. (This had been previously stipulated, too, in the India Independence Act of 1947). And though Muslim Leaguers (now the Pakistan Muslim League, or PML) largely dominated the assembly, the body would prove to be quite clearly split on the question of what Pakistan’s “Islamic” character was to be. That religio-political battle—together with the suddenly ever-present tug-of-war between eastern Pakistan and western Pakistan for recognition, influence, and power—largely characterized the next nine years of the constituent assembly’s existence. Since the debate more or less separated the secularists from the Islamists, the Deobandis and the Barelvis abruptly found themselves on what appeared to be the same side. A cold alliance, however reluctant and superficial (certainly in light of what was brewing beneath the surface, on which more later), was implicitly struck. Over the years 1947 to 1956 (when a constitution was finally adopted, however short-lived), though disagreements were many and resentment ran high, the Barelvi and Deobandi ‘ālama-politicians’ main targets were those seeking to implement a more secularist form of government in the new country. For the first time on a general basis, both groups were forced to work together, in the spirit of Jinnah’s call, during the same address, to “[forget] the past,” and “bury the hatchet.” “I cannot emphasize it too much,” he said. “We should begin to work in that spirit,
and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence, and but for this we would have been free people long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls, in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State… We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State. The people of England in [the] course of time had to face the realities of the situation, and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country; and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and
Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain, and they are all members of the Nation.

It seems clear from Jinnah’s words that his vision for Pakistan did not include the implementation of an Islamic state like that proposed by Naimuddin Moradabadi in his “Eleven Points.” While a constitution like that put forward by the All-India Sunni Conference would have underscored the “angularities of the majority and minority communities”—for the most part excluding Deobandis from the state’s highest seats of power, for example, to say nothing of other Sunni sects like the Ahl-e-Hadis and the Ahmadiyya, the Shi’a, nor the country’s twelve million non-Muslims—Jinnah seemed to be pressing for a strongly secularist system, one in which “caste or creed” had “nothing to do with the business of the State.” As one Pakistani scholar noted, Jinnah’s presidential address seemed to strongly indicate that “Pakistan would not be a theocratic state” and that “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter.”

The Pakistani founder’s reference to England’s “Roman Catholics and Protestants” was particularly apt, given the Deobandi-Barelvi rift then characterizing the vast majority of the country’s Sunni Muslims. Whatever Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan, whether for a secular modernist state after the Western model or a democratic-Islamic amalgam harking back to more traditional “Muslim” regimes, his remarks set the stage for a protracted battle over Pakistan’s Islamic character.

At this early stage, the main religious “parties,” described by one Pakistani scholar as the “persistent, vocal and durable protagonists” of the struggle for an Islamic state in Pakistan, were five. There was the Deobandi JUI, of course, led by constituent assembly member Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, well organized and working mostly within
the Pakistan Muslim League party framework; this phenomenon would phase itself out as differences with the League surfaced and eventually became irreconcilable. The JUI “wielded great influence on the government immediately after independence,” in the words of one Pakistani scholar. After the creation of Pakistan, the party was reorganized (December 1947) with its new headquarters at the home of Deobandi scholar Ihtisham al-Haq Thanawi (d. 1980; more on Thanawi later) in Karachi. The JUI—whose post-Partition purpose now clearly evolved around the implementation of an explicitly Islamic government, an “Islamic order,” in which the Deobandi religious leadership might play a key role—would eventually be resuscitated and molded into a political party in its own right rather than a religious wing of the Pakistan Muslim League. For now, however, the Deobandi organization’s strategy lay more in gaining influence over power-holders rather than directly weilding that power itself. The same could be said for another influencial party, active especially in the Punjab: the heavily Deobandi Majlis-e-Ahrar. Apart from these two, there was also the newly organized JUP—a Barelvi party, borne of the now defunct All-India Sunni Conference, whose strategy was similar to that of the JUI: to gain influence and sway over the overtly political parties in order to bring about the implementation of an Islamic government in which they might rightfully weild influence and power as the representatives of the Sunni majority. The approach of the JUI and the JUP in this regard, which shaped their separate policies “for a long time” (roughly over two decades) after Partition, was in harmony, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, with their leaders’ historical role as ‘alma—as influencers rather than direct power-holders. Though the JUP enjoyed no official seat within the constituent assembly, the party did have a representative present during the assembly’s deliberations: a lawyer named Hakim Ahmad (d. 1976 AD) from Pilibhit, a
town less than twenty-five miles northeast of Bareilly. In additional to the JUI and the JUP, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded by Deobandi-trained Abul Ala Mawdudi, with its program of Islamic revivalism not unlike that of the Deobandis, was also gaining prominence in the country. While the JI’s official membership count was small, numbering only a few hundred (due in part to very strict membership requirements), its sympathizers and supporters reportedly numbered in the tens of thousands. Over the first two decades of Pakistan’s existence, the JI would experience significant growth in terms of both membership (especially among students and in the government sector) and influence, eventually setting the stage for the party’s high point, during the Zia ul-Haq years. Finally, a somewhat influential segment of the Pakistan Muslim League itself possessed strong religious leanings—mostly Deobandi or Barelvi, but others, too—and likewise played a role, often crucial, in supporting the clerical parties’ admonitions for an Islamic constitution and an Islamic government.

And while the constituent assembly was supposed to be devoid of party conflict, different from a typical legislative body made up of elected representatives, the truth was that such divisions existed from the start and were evident throughout. “[I]n the actual working of the constituent assembly,” wrote one Pakistani historian of the period, “the presence of political parties was as conspicuous as in any other political field,” despite the Pakistan Muslim League’s possession of forty-nine out of the original sixty-nine seats (this would later increase to sixty out of a total of seventy-nine). Naturally, the Deobandi and Barelvi parties sought out those individuals and parties within the assembly with which they might be able to work—and, hopefully, institute Islamic government at last. The religious political parties “vitaly affected the process of constitution-making,” wrote Afzal, “especially the Islamic character of the
This was to be the scholars’ great struggle.

Perhaps a quick note here on Mawdudi and the JI is appropriate. The Jamaat-e-Islami was itself borne of the Deobandi movement—a distinctly Deobandi creation. Over time, however, the organization would distance itself officially from a strictly Deobandi stance (leading Deobandi ‘alama would do the same vis-à-vis the JI). The JI was founded by Abul Ala Mawdudi, who himself had been educated in the Deobandi tradition before working as editor of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind’s newspaper during the 1920s. By the thirties, however, Mawdudi found himself less concerned about ridding India of the British colonial administration than of Western ideas in general; his preoccupation centered around those ideas’ corroding influence, as he saw it, on Islam. In 1941, Mawdudi founded the JI as a sort of vanguard party—to cleanse Islam of Western influence in preparation for the establishment of a truly Islamic state. Though he remained, like most Deobandis, a staunch opponent of the Muslim League, Mawdudi migrated (or, as some claim, was forced to migrate) to Pakistan after Partition—where the JI “soon turned to directly political concerns,” its aim toward an Islamic state intensifying. Mawdudi focused on the rural population, dispatching JI preachers carrying JI literature out into the countryside to fire up the bucolic masses. According to one Indian scholar, writing in 2005, “many of the roots of Islamic terrorism sweeping the world today lie buried in the partition of India.” Indeed, both the Taliban administration of Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden were influenced by the ideas of the Jamaat-e Islami founder, himself heavily influenced by the Deobandi movement. Mawdudi’s ideas inspired Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, as well as its intellectual guiding light, Sayyid Qutb (who would go on, of course, to encourage “more militant Islamic groups” that grew out of the Brotherhood). The Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, despite his belonging to the Shi’a sect of Islam, translated several of Mawdudi’s works into Persian. Yusuf Azzam, the Palestinian scholar, was heavily influenced by Mawdudi (and it was through Azzam that bin Laden, his young student, would inculcate much of the Jamaat leader’s thought). In Pakistan, the JI would exist as a “religious party” alternative to either the Deobandi or Barelvi parties.

While the Deobandi JUI’s transition from pre-Partition party to post-Partition party had been accomplished smoothly, without even the need for a name-change, the All-India Sunni Conference’s transition to Pakistani politics was not so seamless. Indeed, on Thursday, 4 March 1948, mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi—a well-known Barelvi scholar born in Amroha (now in India) and an active Muslim Leaguer in the southern Punjab—was upset. From his base in Multan, where he’d migrated as a young twenty-something, Ahmad Saeed had watched as other religious sects—Islamic parties representing small minorities—were honored with titles by the League or high posts in the new government. The appointment of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had particularly bothered him. In League circles, that Deobandi mwlana was being addressed as shix ul-yslam, and he had been appointed a member of the constituent assembly, to boot—the body that would draft Pakistan’s new constitution (and few things were more important to the Barelvi ʿalama than seeing the installation of a truly Islamic constitution, as they interpreted it). As a former member of the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad had been a “Congressite” ʿalym, once (though not really, as previously explained), and others, besides, were receiving similarly high posts. These men weren’t genuinely interested in an Islamic constitution, Ahmad Saeed was sure. “In fact, they are working to usurp the rights of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvis], and crush them forever”—and this he wrote in a letter to mwlana “Abu’l Hasanat” sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri that very day. The
duty—nay, the right—to protect and maintain the “rights of the Sunnis” was theirs, not the Deobandis’ or the followers’ of Mawdudi (the latter cut from the same cloth as the former, anyway). Ahmad Saeed stressed that he was not targeting any particular sect—only claiming what was rightfully his, and that of all other Barelvi ‘alîma and religious guiding lights. They were “the majority,” thus they should lead. All others were pretenders and must not be allowed to grasp the reigns of power. The Muslim League had ridden to victory on the false promise of an Islamic state; the League had betrayed the Barelvis. And now it was time for the Barelvis to organize a party of their own—and take back the country from its usurpers. Kazimi’s letter, and subsequent actions, demonstrate that, whatever forced alliance the Deobandis and Barelvis were then experiencing in their quasi-joint fight for an Islamic constitution, underneath the surface the rivalry continued with vigor. The goal was still the supremacy of one sect over the other within the framework of the (hopefully Islamic) Pakistani state.

In fact, mawlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi had already begun. Before ending his letter to Muhammad Ahmad, the ‘alîm from Multan informed his friend that he and other Barelvi ‘alîma in the city had formed what they called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or JUP), the first religious party to be born in Pakistan after the country’s founding. As far as Kazimi was concerned, the fledgling JUP he had inaugurated was only the beginning, only temporary—until all of the Barelvi ‘alîma and pîrs and other religious leaders could gather together and form a countrywide party. Whether or not this future mega-party was called the JUP mattered little to him (though the name would stick); what mattered was that the party came into existence to stand for the Barelvis, the Ahl-e-Sunnat. The great initiatory meeting was to be held at the end of the month, from 26-28 March. Come to Multan, Ahmad Saeed insisted. The invitation was sent far
and wide, to “all the leading Sunni ṭāma and masha’īkh.”

After the realization of its chief goal—the creation of an Islamic state in South Asia, namely Pakistan—the All-India Sunni Conference had formally disbanded within the hall of the ẓar ul’ul’alw in Multan in 1948, but the dissolving of the Conference did not rid the Deobandis of its politico-sectarian opposition. Thus, in place of the Conference, and at the insistence of scholars like Ahmad Saed, its (the Barelvis’) leaders had now established a new organization, a new party: the JUP. “Abu’l al-Hasanat” Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, the man to whom Kazimi had addressed his 4 March letter, was selected as the party’s first president, with Ahmad Saed Kazimi himself as secretary-general. A new era for Barelvi political involvement was thus born with the passing of the All-India Sunni Conference. Over the next 22 years, the JUP would act as a sort of religious influencer of (and legitimator for) political elites; perhaps it is not inaccurate to say that it played a similar role to that of the AISC during the heydey of pre-Partition independence politics. During this period it acted less as a traditional political party than as a loosely-organized interest group, often used by politicians and other power-seekers to lend an Islamic veneer to their otherwise secular pursuits. When religio-cultural issues of alleged import found their way into the national spotlight, the JUP would weigh in, often vociferously, supporting or rejecting this or that position, according to its interpretation of Islamic law. (The JUP wouldn’t break out of this mold and emerge as a serious political contender until the 1970s, when it commanded considerable support in the towns and cities of Sindh as well as the rural Punjab, made up an important part of the opposition, and played a major role at the provincial level in Sindh.)

The party’s objectives were very similar, of course, to those of the AISC. It sought
to convert Pakistan into a “true Islamic state,” one in which the political framework was
designed specifically to eradicate “social and moral evils.” This was the culmination of
shari‘at—its destiny and purpose. The JUP would not only strive to spread the “true”
message of Islam throughout the country (“by initiating the spirit of religious-cum-
political awakening and the spirit of jihad among [Muslims]” and thus “divert[ing]
their attention from Western culture and civilization towards Islamic culture and
civilization”), but also fight for actual assembly seats at both the national and provincial
levels for the ‘aloma. The party would help maintain and improve mosques, shrines, and
xanqahs, yes, but also demand that the country’s centralized education system make
hodis, Qur’anic commentary, fiqh, and the history of Islam mandatory subjects in
schools for all students, regardless of religion. The JUP was to be an active
organization—actively striving, for example, for “pan-Islamism” (the fulfillment of
which promised “peace in the world”) as well as “the spirit of jihad” via the organization
of “Muslim militia.” The JUP resolved to organize branches of the Barelvi party across
Pakistan. Interestingly, given the party leaders’ anti-Deobandi motivations for
establishing the organization, one of the JUP goals specified a resolve “not to indulge in
any activity against other religious and political organizations.” Still, membership in
the party was, like its predecessor, restricted only to “Sunni” ‘aloma and other
“religious-minded” Barelvis.17

One of the party’s first acts was to send a delegation, headed by none other than
mwalana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi, to East Bengal to participate in the deliberations of a
committee of “Sunni elite.” Their purpose: to draft an Islamic constitution, to be sent to
government leaders and legislators as a guide in their constitution-formulating task.
Such a draft constitution was indeed produced by the gathering—and was subsequently
presented to Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah by the “Sunni” committee head, mwelana Muhammad Abdul ‘Alim Siddiqui. Muhammad Abdul was a highly educated (both in traditional Muslim disciplines as well as the Western tradition) disciple of Ahmad Riza Khan from Meerut who had traveled the world as a preacher of Islam. According to Barelvi sources, the learned Muhammad Abdul spoke with Jinnah for a full three hours, and in the end obtained a promise from the gayd-e-‘azəm that the draft would indeed be adopted by the constituent assembly. Considering Jinnah’s secularist sentiments, this seems unlikely—but likewise considering the Pakistan founder’s apparent penchant (like most any politician) for making contradictory promises based on the audience at hand, the account might indeed be based in truth. Some Barelvis continue to believe that, had Jinnah not suddenly passed away, the constitution that their religious leaders had drawn up in East Bengal would have been implemented. ¹⁸

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Pakistan’s first decade of independence was an uncertain one. After the death of Jinnah in 1948, the apparent cohesion of the Pakistan Muslim League gave way to reveal a party divided, even as provincial leaders battled for power with the central authorities. The constituent assembly was marked by “varied interests and conflicting views,” as described by Afzal.¹⁹ These schisms actually granted the ‘aloma parties, both Deobandi and Barelvi, even greater power, since the various political factions attempted to co-opt them and thereby gain the confidence of the masses, just as the League had done with the JUI (and, to a lesser extent, the AISC) in pre-Partition days. With the support of the ‘aloma on the line, the country’s opening years were marked especially by the debate over the role of Islam within the new political structure.

Thus the conflict over the constitution—to be Islamic or secular?—really picked up
steam on the moment of the qayd-e-ʻazam's death. With the great man gone, a new period in the young state's history opened up, characterized by one Pakistani constitutional historian as “a fierce competition for influence, wealth, power, and prestige” between the various parties then engaged in constitution-making. Of course, the constituent assembly (and those lobbying its members) were constantly dealing with the tug-of-war between East Bengal and West Pakistan, the former home to the majority of the country's population and the latter to the vast majority of its territory as well as its capital city. But two other issues likewise loomed large throughout the decade from 1947 to 1956 as a constitution was being formulated: (1) the question of implementing an Islamic state versus a secular one, and (2) the struggle by, among others, religious leaders for “recognition of their claim to power and influence.” The Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership were at the forefront of the struggle over these two issues, sometimes at odds (as in the latter issue) but often fighting side by side as reluctant partners. The Barelvis tended to be particularly reluctant to work with their Deobandi counterparts, whom they felt were being granted undue position despite their (Barelvi) position as “representatives” of the “majority,” but circumstances demanded joint action—and so their erstwhile nemeses were tolerated for the time being. In any case, the death of Jinnah marked the beginning of this new phase, this period of more conspicuously jostling for position and influence, of fighting over the definition of “Pakistan.” Ironically, Muhammad ʻAli Jinnah, who might have held such a power struggle in check, had laid the foundation of the now out-in-the-open political contest—through his various (and often conflicting) pre-Partition promises to a wide variety of (often conflicting) groups.
In the beginning, both the secularists and the ‘alima won separate battles, maintaining a haze of uncertainty over the nature of the future Pakistani government. Despite Jinnah’s personal and then lingering influence (he died on 11 September 1948), at first the ‘alima seemed to seize the upper hand. For starters, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, at the time probably the most powerful Deobandi ‘alym in the country, and to the ire of many barelvis a prominent member of the constituent assembly (on the Pakistan Muslim League ticket), more or less personally drafted the “Objectives Resolution”—a declaration meant to outline the “aims and objectives” of the constitution and thereby formally lay its foundations. But since debate over the resolution was heated, both Deobandi and barelvi, however reluctantly, were forced to side one with the other. On 7 March 1949, Liaquat ‘Ali Khan introduced Shabbir Ahmad’s Objectives Resolution before the constituent assembly. Interestingly, given the contents of the resolution, the Prime Minister’s speech pointed out explicitly that the proposed system was designed to eliminate “any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.” This assurance was likely provided as comfort for the non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly, for next Liaquat ‘Ali explained that, in Pakistan—and in part through government—“Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the tachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an and the sunnat.

It is quite obvious that no non-Muslim should have any objection if the Muslims are enabled to order their lives in accordance with the dictates of their religion. You would also notice, Sir, that the state would be the very negation of the ideals which prompted the demand of Pakistan, and
it is these ideals which should be the corner-stone of the state which we want to build. The state will create such conditions as are conducive to the building up of a truly Islamic society, which means that the state will have to play a positive part in this effort.21

To the ears of the Deobandi and Barelvi ḍalāma involved in the constitution-making process (or following said progress), the Prime Minister’s words likely sounded like sweet music—a fulfillment of Jinnah’s perceived promises to them and a culmination of their efforts (and those of their forbears) to establish an Islamic state on the subcontinent. Surely, when Liaquat ‘Ali Khan declared that “the state will have to play a positive part in [the] effort” to build up “a truly Islamic society,” he meant the institution of Islamic law and, thus, the elevation of the ḍalāma to their proper religio-political role. This was the spirit of the resolution, and it seemed Liaquat ‘Ali Khan understood this.

According to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty “over the entire universe” belonged to “God Almighty alone”; insofar as the state of Pakistan possessed authority, that authority was merely “delegated” from God “through [Pakistan’s] people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him.” The “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice” were to be “fully observed”—but, importantly, “as enunciated by Islam.” The resolution stressed that Muslims should be able to lead their lives “in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the sunna,” thereby implicitly hinting at a positive (i.e. actionary) role, as Liaquat ‘Ali Khan had stated, for the state to play in this regard. Minority (i.e. non-Muslim) rights were to be protected and equality maintained “subject to law and public
morality.” The Objectives Resolution made it clear that the guiding spirit of Pakistan—its essence and core—was to be the spirit of Islam. Such concepts as “freedom” or “justice” were to be affected through an “Islamic” medium. In this, both Deobandi and Barelvi *alama* hoped for a restoration of their traditional role as influential advisors to the state, chief propagators of religion in the country, and interpreters of the law. The resolution seemed to embody that original “promise of Pakistan,” enunciated by one high-profile Deobandi leader as “a promise that on this land…a brotherhood would rule[,] believing[,] in ‘Allah’s rule on Allah’s land[,] considering[,] it a great honor…to obey Allah and His Messenger… [We] would establish a society and a system of government that would be based on the teachings of the Quran and the sunnāt.”

But there were some who opposed the Objectives Resolution vehemently, holding fast to promises they felt certain Jinnah had made to them regarding the state’s secularism; “I certainly do not propose to hand over the field to Ulema,” he once reportedly said—and yet the Objectives Resolution, at least in spirit, seemed to do just that. Certain non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly wanted more debate over the resolution, which they deemed too overtly Islamic. Its language must be toned down, they argued, and proposed replacing specific words and phrases (those deemed especially “Islamic” or exclusionary) with other, more broad-based terms—or excising them altogether. A speech by one non-Muslim constituent assembly member, Birat Chandra Mandal, made clear that no one was under any illusion as to the source of these Islamocentric sections. “Sir, I hear that [the *alama*] are insisting on this principle of Islam.” Jinnah, he reminded the assemblage, had “most unequivocally said that Pakistan will be a secular state,” and had “never said that the principles of constitution will be based on Islam.” Another non-Muslim assembly member, Bhupendra Kumar Datta,
addressed his fellow lawmakers as well. “Sir, I feel—I have every reason to believe—that were this Resolution to come before this House within the lifetime of the great creator of Pakistan, \( qayd-e-o'azam \), it would not have come in its present shape.”

(Datta worried, too, that “justification” for a usurpation of power by a power-hungry executive might be found “in this Preamble.”)²⁴ What of Jinnah’s secular state, one in which “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter”? Just as the religious parties contended that the \( qayd-e-o'azam \) had made promises to them regarding the establishment of Islamic government in Pakistan, these non-Muslim members—mostly Hindus from East Bengal—had clung to what they had considered promises, from the same source, of Pakistani state secularism. “We thought that religion and politics would not be mixed up,” one member said in a speech before the assembly. “That was the declaration of \( qayd-e-o'azam \) Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah in this House.” Several of the assembly’s other non-Muslims made similar speeches from the house floor.

Meanwhile, Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters within the assembly held firm, clamoring for adoption of the resolution.²⁵ A large group of constituent assembly members came out forcefully against all of the proposed amendments to the resolution in its original form. Barelvi Hakim Ahmad of the JUP, though not an official constituent assembly member, was on hand to lend support to the resolution, too.²⁶ Pakistan was always going to be a Muslim state, the resolution’s supporters argued; this was, after all, what millions of Muslims had fought for in the years leading up to Partition. “Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private affair between man and his creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political relations of human beings,” said Shabbir Ahmad from the House floor.
Some other religious systems may expound this theory and may, incidentally, be too idealistic to possess a comprehensive and all-embracing code of life. But Islam has no use for such false notions and its teachings are in direct contradiction to them. The late qayd-e-ā’ẓām made the following observations in the letter he wrote to Gandhiji in August 1944:

“The Qur’an is a complete code of life. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, economic or commercial. It regulates every act, speech and movement from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of such individual, from the punishment here to that in the life to come. Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in my mind all physical and metaphysical standards and values.”

Here, again, the idea of Islam as an all-encompassing politico-religious order, an idea that undergirded the very founding of the dar ul’alāam at Deoband itself, is made further evident. And by striving to incorporate that system into a national government (an entity that, by its very nature, operated via monopoly, force, and blanket provision), Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters were also advocating that such a comprehensive system was to be enforced by the guns of government (i.e. not assume the form of, for example, a voluntary association). Non-Muslims, Shabbir Ahmad argued on 9 March, “cannot be trusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the state,
Such words were, of course, a slap in the face of the Objectives Resolution’s non-Muslim opponents, but this was Pakistan; this was what the Muslim freedom struggle had always been about. Now that an Islamic state had been won, were the people to throw it all away? What, then, had been the point of a political split with India at all?

In the end, under the leadership of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan (who had argued for a strong state role in “establishing an Islamic order”), the motion to further review the Objectives Resolution was defeated as each of the secularists’ proposed amendments was voted down. Religion and politics were to be “mixed up” after all. The constituent assembly passed the Deobandi-authored Objectives Resolution, outlining the fundamental principles upon which the new constitution would be based, on 12 March. All of the constituent assembly’s Muslim members (save one) “vociferously” supported the resolution. The document’s presence would loom over the constituent assembly as “the center-piece” of the constitutional debate, defining “both the state and idea of Pakistan,” as one scholar has noted. As of the time of this writing, the resolution was still in effect (see Article 2A of the current Pakistani constitution). Thus the first constitutional battle between the secularists (or at least those wary of the institutionalization of an “Islamic” system in government) and the ‘alōma-led theocrats (under the leadership of Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad) ended in clear victory for the latter. The situation was such that one modern Pakistani detractor of the clerical parties lamented how “Jinnah’s secular Pakistan” had “drifted into the hands of his enemies.”

In any case, as developments continued, things might have seemed, in the eyes of the ‘alōma (especially those of the Deobandi persuasion), to be going their way. The constituent assembly appointed a Basic Principles Committee (which in turn organized
several subcommittees) to formulate a report on “basic principles” undergirding the future Pakistani constitution. Such an important task, the ‘alôma reasoned, should not be undertaken without the advice and direction of the Islamic scholars; fresh off of their Objectives Resolution victory, the ‘alôma took advantage of their powerful position to press for increased influence. Some of the now-emboldened ‘alôma now demanded not only that Pakistan withdraw from the British Commonwealth (after all, if Pakistan were to be a true Islamic state, how could it owe any sort of fealty to a non-Muslim sovereign?) but also that all non-Muslims be removed and henceforth banned from important government posts. That the demands were taken seriously was evidenced by the government’s taking “some steps” to at least partly meet the second demand. The first, of course, was entirely in the hands of the constituent assembly and the constitution they would create.\textsuperscript{33} Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in particular, and beginning as early as February 1949,\textsuperscript{34} demanded the appointment of a committee of ‘alôma to advise the constituent assembly as the new constitution was being crafted.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, at the insistence of the Islamic scholars, the Basic Principles Committee created a Teachings of Islam (talimat-e-yaslamiôh) board to advise the committee on matters from a religious (Muslim) perspective (specifically, based on the Qur’an, the sunnat, and the principles of Islamic law).

Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad had gotten his way, yes—but the Barelvi leadership was not so fortunate. When Abdul Hamid Badayuni demanded JUP representation on the Basic Principles Committee, he was more or less ignored, never receiving an answer.\textsuperscript{36} In any case, five scholars were chosen to sit on the talimat-e-yaslamiôh’s board: Deobandi mufti, relative (and right hand) of Shabbir Ahmad and fellow JUI stalwart Muhammad Shafi; Muslim Leaguer and Islamic scholar Zafar Ahmad Ansari (whose leanings tended
toward Deobandism); ‘Abdul Khaliq, a professor from East Bengal; Gunjranwali Shi’a mufti Jafar Husain, who would later organize the Shi’a political party Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (təhrɪk-ə-nafaz-ə-fıyq-ə-ʃajridh or TNFJ, meaning “Movement for the Implementation of Shi’a Law,” founded in 1979) and be recognized as the leader of Pakistan’s considerable Shi’a community; and Muhammad Hamidullah, the Osmania University-educated doctor of philosophy from the princely state of Hyderabad. The board was to be chaired by the aged ‘alām and ʃayyid Sulaiman Nadvi, who had replaced the famous Azamgarhi muğūl Shibli at the (Deobandi-leaning) dar ul ʿalām Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow after Shibli’s 1914 death. (To illustrate the relationship between the นะดวะต scholars and their Deobandi brethren: perusing the wares of a นะดวะต ‘าลमa bookshop not far from the dar ul’alām at Deoband in 2012, the author was informed by the store owner that the นะดวะต were, for all intents and purposes, aligned with their brethren at the great Islamic university at Deoband; indeed, he insisted they were Deobandis in all but name. “They are the same,” he assured me. Then he said, pointedly: “The ones who are different are the Barelıvs.” Several moments later he added: “And Shi’a.”) Nadvi had been part of the Deobandi majority who had opposed the creation of Pakistan, supporting instead the idea of a united India; this had been reflected in his desire to change the name of the Urdu language to “Hindustani,” a term more suggestive of the tongue’s joint Hindu-Muslim genesis. After Partition, Nadvi had opted to remain in India, probably in part due to his old age, and was only coaxed into coming to Pakistan after being offered a princely sum as a salary; even then, he didn’t arrive until late 1950. It is clear, then, that the Deobandi school of thought and its scholar-leaders (especially in the form of Muhammad Shafi and the board’s chair, Sulaiman Nadvi) dominated the board of talimat-e-yaslamidh, a fact that did not go
unnoticed by Bareli leaders; indeed, the latter could boast not a single obvious place at that particular table, whatever the leanings of men like Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah or Professor ‘Abdul Khaliq. Basic Principles Committee sessions, as well as those of its subcommittees and the talimat-e-yaslamiyah board, were held in “complete secrecy.”

For its part, the Shabbir Ahmad-organized and Deobandi-dominated talimat-e-yaslamiyah board produced several recommendations for the Basic Principles Committee. The president of Pakistan, the board insisted, should be “elected” by the “learned and pious representatives of the people” (i.e. not directly by the people themselves). This was important, since in this context “president” was a term virtually interchangeable with amir, the head of state. This one suggestion, if adopted, may have granted the ‘alma—naturally the most “learned and pious”—a strong hand on the reigns of power, though the directive referred to the state’s duly elected legislative assembly. The board also suggested that the president be advised by a shari’at committee; the committee should likewise function as an advisory unit for both the federal and provincial legislatures. This was in keeping with the ‘alma’s more traditional role as on-hand religious advisors to the state (see Chapter 1). Pakistan’s legislative system should be unicameral, with three major powers invested in the house of representatives: that of declaring war (or concluding peace), of passing a national budget, and of removing, if necessary, the president from office. The talimat-e-yaslamiyah board thus envisioned a unicameral, presidential system led by an indirectly elected president and advised at every level by the ‘alma.37 The board duly turned in their recommendations to the Basic Principles Committee.

When the committee submitted its interim report on 7 September 1950, both Deobandi and Bareli ‘alma involved in one way or another in the process were,
generally speaking, very disappointed, both by its contents as well as the general reaction to it. The talimat-e-yslamish board members, in particular, were “shocked” at the report, as it “did not reflect any trace of the [their] recommendations.” All around, the response from the religious leadership seemed to be that the interim report was simply far too weak in terms of its Islamic provisions. While the report did seem to favor a powerful executive, the committee had opted for a parliamentary system (i.e. with a Prime Minister as head of government and a president as head of state) and a bicameral legislature. The powerful ṣādir (or ṣādir-equivalent)-led system espoused by many of the ‘aloma, exemplified in Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points,” and proposed (in the form of a powerful head of state who could issue ordinances and even abrogate the constitution) by the interim report was rejected almost immediately. Though at the time the Governor-General (to be a temporary office) did possess sweeping powers left over from the office of (British) viceroy, the propositions within the Basic Principles Committee interim report were deemed “undemocratic and unpopular”—particularly its suggestion that the head of state should wield the power to suspend some or all of the constitution should circumstances dictate such a course. At this stage, then, the idea was not to be entertained that such dictatorial powers might be wielded by the president (or, if the Moradabadis among the ‘aloma had their way, ṣādir) of Pakistan. The ‘aloma were further snubbed by the setting up of a federal court and two high courts, formulated almost entirely after the Western model. Far from requiring a degree in fiqh or experience administering Islamic law, the criteria for membership on either court level rested mainly on one’s service as a barrister, pleader, or district judge (the latter combined with experience in the civil service). Years of education at a dar ul’alwm, then, would mean next to nothing within the new judicial order. The interim
report did propose the setting up of a board of Islamic scholars appointed by the head of state to ensure that legislation on both the federal and provincial levels was in line with the teachings of the Qur’an and the sunna. Despite this last, however, the report seemed to signal to the “‘alma parties” that secular “democracy” was to be the name of the game; both Deobandi and Barelvi religious leaders dug in, prepared for another political battle. At the same time, many East Bengalis opposed the report, too, arguing that the proposed system failed to grant their majority population position the weight it deserved (more on this later).

The reaction to the report from Islamic scholars and the East Bengalis caused it to be withdrawn. The Basic Principles Committee immediately appointed yet another subcommittee—this time with the express purpose of considering “proposals on the Islamic character of the constitution.”

Earlier, Shabbir Ahmad had convened a conference of ‘alma at his own residence to work out a plan for a governmental Ministry of Religious Affairs. According to the plan, the Religious Affairs Minister “would be under the Head of the State and not subject to ordinary votes of confidence in the legislature.” The Ministry would act as a censor of all government activities, supervise government officials, and control the country’s mosques, religious institutions, religious endowments, and Islamic courts—a role that more or less mirrored that of the ‘alma in most other “Muslim” governments since the medieval era (see Chapter 1; of course, within the structure a modern, centralized “total” state, such a role would necessarily carry with it considerably more power). All the while, the Barelvi ‘alma remained, in the words of Binder, “practically oblivious of the new changes and pressures in Islam,” interested in “recognition rather than power.” This author would argue that there were, in fact, plenty of Barelvi
‘alṣama anything but oblivious to the new changes—and very interested in power.

Indeed, “recognition” and power were two sides of the same coin to these self-appointed spokesmen of the “majority.” It wasn’t just their idea that their tradition represented a “historical continuity” (one that, they felt, the Deobandis and others had vainly sought to usurp) that drove the Barelvi scholar-leaders; it was also the very fact that their long-time rivals, not representative of that tradition, were seizing the levers of state and thereby threatening to displace them (the Barelvi ‘alṣama) as the legitimate guardians of South Asian Islam. Binder argues that as long as their place as the legitimate successors within this “historical continuity” was recognized, the Barelvi ‘alṣama seemed far less interested in real politics than their Deobandi counterparts, but perhaps the reality wasn’t that the Barelvis were less interested—just less organized and politically experienced, and certainly less united. The Deobandis operated within the framework of the JUI, an organization formulated after the JUH. Its leaders had been politically active for decades and were far more experienced as political organizers. As such, scholars and politicians of the Deobandi persuasion were able early to seize a disproportionate degree of political power. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute this to a Barelvi lack of interest in politics. For example, erstwhile AISC leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, together with the pir of Manki Sharif and mwlana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, around this time spearheaded a new movement, the tbrisk-e-nyfaz-e-shrī‘at (“The Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law”). As its name suggests, the organization was designed to promote the implementation of shrī‘at (as the Barelvis interpreted it) in Pakistan. For his part, Jamaat ‘Ali felt that he had been promised by Jinnah himself that such an implementation would take place with the establishment of the new “Islamic” state. When that didn’t happen—and, perhaps worse, when the
Deobandis seemed to be granted official patronage instead of the majority Bareli parties—Sunni leaders like the very aged Jamaat ‘Ali resumed their political agitations. But unfortunately for them and their Bareli colleagues, the Deobandi ‘alama always seemed a step ahead of them.

Efforts by the Deobandi and, less successfully, the Bareli religious leadership toward the establishment of “true” Islamic government in Pakistan were not limited to the halls of the constituent assembly and that body’s endeavor to formulate a constitution. No, the JUI, the JUP, the JI, the Ahrars, and elements within the PML each (separately) organized in-the-streets demonstrations to rally the country behind their (similar but separate) points-of-view. The JUI, the JUP, and the JI in particular organized shari’at Days and shari’at Weeks, observed across Pakistan, in protest over the secularist drive for a Western, non-Islamic state—and, more importantly, in demonstration of their demands for the implementation of Islamic law into the political/judicial system. For example, the JUP’s Day of shari’at was set for 7 May 1948; the occasion was “successfully celebrated” in urban centers across West Pakistan, from Karachi and Quetta to Rawalpindi, Dera Ismail Khan, and Peshawar. The JI organized a “Constitution Week” (14–21 November 1952), demanding “early promulgation of an Islamic constitution.” The JUI hosted a massive conference in Dhaka (attended by around fifty thousand ‘alama and one hundred thousand others); the gathering’s overarching demand was for an Islamic constitution. Even the Pakistan Muslim League got into the game, at one point attempting to form a “shari’at Group” pushing for much the same thing; the effort, however, was short-lived. From 9-10 February 1949, the JUI hosted a conference in Dhaka (the party was actually significantly better organized in East Bengal than in the country’s western wing); the
meeting was an admonishment to Pakistan’s political leaders to adopt an Islamic system—and a warning that “attempts to introduce an un-Islamic order would be resisted.” Meanwhile, the JUP continued to hold up Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” as the best model for a future Pakistani political system. The JI, too, pushed for Mawdudi’s own “Four Points”; these were the acknowledgement of (1) God as sovereign, (2) shari‘at as the constitutional bedrock, (3) “un-Islamic” legislation as in need of amending, and (4) shari‘at as the boundary for the national government’s activities. The JI, too, propagated Mawdudi’s call for Pakistanis not to take an oath of allegiance to the state “unless it became Islamic.”47 Though some shari‘at-inspired laws were passed at the provincial level, they were typically not enforced. Still, Barelvi pride was somewhat assuaged when, in Punjab, the Department of yslamiat was created. This branch of the provincial government included a six-member board of Islamic scholars and a cohort of department lecturers (sent to educational institutions and prisons to preach Islam). Many of those lecturers were Barelvi (including JUP president Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri), and the department’s deputy secretary was a noted Barelvi ‘alym, too.48 In addition, the Deobandi and Barelvi parties exerted influence through their virtual monopoly over the country’s (Sunni) mosques and religious schools. Friday sermons focused on the need for an Islamic constitution, and copies of these speeches were often sent to Jinnah or Liaquat ‘Ali Khan.49 Such street-level agitations and the provincial legislation that sometimes resulted provided high visibility for their cause, yes, but eventually the religious parties realized that the key to the accomplishment of their goals lay in the constitution—and ensuring it was an Islamic one. This was where their efforts should be concentrated.50
In January 1951, about four months after the Basic Principles Committee had submitted and then hastily withdrawn its interim report, a Deobandi-led meeting of ḍalūma was convened in Karachi, organized by the aforementioned Iḥtishām ul-Ḥaq Thanawi. Thanawi, educated at the ḍar ulʿalām at Deoband as well as Punjab University (and who once claimed not to have “participated in the local politics of ḍar ulʿalām during the era of [his] education,” nor ever to have taken “interest in domestic politics”), had been a reluctant immigrant to Pakistan, only opting to come after witnessing the mass killing that went along with the mass migration to and from both countries.51 The scholars present were by no means limited to the Deobandi school of thought; several other sects (including the JI in the person of Abul Ala Mawdudi himself) were represented, too—and indeed, their number even included five Barelvi pirs and ḍalūma. Of the latter, two were official JUP delegates, including Abdul Hamid Badayuni. Deobandi sāyyīd Sulaiman Nadvi (the aged head of the Basic Principles Committee-appointed talimat-e-ʿislamiyyāh board, who had recently arrived in Pakistan in order to reinvigorate the JUI after the December 1949 death of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani) presided over the gathering. The interim report had greatly worried the ḍalūma. It was obvious that the secularists needed a lesson in Islamic government, and so the meeting had been called. The juridical scholars and mashāyḵ present hammered out a document later referred to as the “Twenty-Two Principles”: a list of twenty-two core “principles of an Islamic state.” The “Twenty-Two Principles” included a requirement that the head of state (the “President”) be a Muslim male, that no law contradict the Qurʾān and sunnat, and that the state be directly involved in the propagation of Islamic education. Pakistan should be a welfare state, its non-Muslim citizens should be protected from discrimination (except, evidently, when it came to
holding the state’s highest office), and the president should have the authority to suspend the constitution (but could only then administer in his office with the help of an [‘alɔma-led] šhra. Perhaps most importantly, any ideas deemed destructive to the core principles of an Islamic state should be prohibited. The twenty-two principles listed by the mixed-sect gathering in Karachi were often vague, but the heart of the issue was that Pakistan be an explicitly, unambiguously, unequivocally Islamic state. Islam, as a political system, must be woven into the very fabric of the political system, must be more than just a “guiding force”—must be the very bedrock of the country’s political structure. The state was to be a highly interventionist one: intervening in the market according to Islamic principles of money, banking, trade, interest, and finance, intervening in matters of “public” morality and immorality according to Islamic values (i.e. promoting the positive role of the state in promoting virtue and eradicating vice), and intervening as a taxer and redistributor according to Islamic ideals of equity and justice.52 The 1951 Karachi meeting and the consensus-driven document that it produced was more than a little astonishing; the “gathering of so many [‘alɔma] with such a variety of viewpoints,” wrote one Pakistani scholar, “was in itself an historic event and the consensus they arrived at lent an unprecedented force to their proposals.”53 After their formulation, the “Twenty-Two Principles” were handed over to the Basic Principles Committee and were “duly noticed in…government circles.”54 It may be argued that the creation of this document represented the high-point of Deobandi-Barelvi cooperation, however lacking Barelvi representation might have been, considering their “majority” status.

In December 1952, the Basic Principles Committee’s re-write was finally submitted. This draft, referred to as the “Nazimuddin Report” (since Prime Minister Khwaja

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Nazimuddin—a Bengali career politician who had served as Governor-General after Jinnah, replaced Liaquat ‘Ali Khan after his assassination, and was known for “his religiosity and close contact with the [‘alāma’]”—helped formulate it and then presented it personally to the constituent assembly), drew heavily from the Basic Principles Committee’s do-over. And fortunately for the ‘alāma, with whom Khwaja Nazimuddin and other members of the Basic Principles subcommittees had negotiated, this time the committee seemed to have taken their input seriously, incorporating aspects of some of the “Twenty-Two Principles” into their report. The reaction of Zafar Ahmad Usmani of the JUI captures, perhaps, the general feeling among the Islamic scholars; the Nazimuddin Report was, he said, “seventy-eight percent Islamic.” 56

Among other things, the new constitutional blueprint granted the ‘alāma and religious (Islamic) leadership significant sway within the country’s political framework. The Objectives Resolution was to be the constitution’s preamble. The state was to take an active role in “helping” Muslims live their lives in accordance with Qur’anic principles and the sunnāt (“with due safeguards for sectarian interests”); what that “help” might look like was demonstrated in some of the report’s other provisions—for mandatory teaching of the Qur’an, for example, or prohibitions on alcohol consumption, or the organization of a proper zākāt system. Perhaps most significant were the draft’s “repugnancy clauses,” outlining a constitutional process for ensuring that all laws remained within the bounds set by the Qur’an and the sunnāt (by setting up a board of Islamic scholars, operating under the head of state, which could vet all new legislation). 57

Though the report opted for a parliamentary bicameral system, the head of state was required to be a Muslim.

Just weeks later, in mid-January 1953, another ‘alāma gathering—much like the one
in Karachi two years previously that had produced the Twenty-Two Principles—occurred, this time in Lahore. Just as the Karachi conference had been organized to weigh in on the Basic Principles Committee interim report, the Lahore conference was organized to critique the Nazimuddin Report. Though this second draft was met with far less criticism than the first from the religious quarter, there were nevertheless parts that, in the eyes of the assembled scholars, required amending. Perhaps most important, the conference proposed that the Supreme Court include five ‘alṣma, not just “regular” judges after the Western model. For JUP members Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri and Abdul Hamid Badayuni, even this was not enough; they wanted to replace the Supreme Court entirely with an “ʿalṣma board” that they hoped the Barelvis would dominate. (Khwaja Nazimuddin did, in fact, suggest this last—an ʿalṣma board to “rule upon the repugnancy of legislation”—to the constituent assembly, but after weeks of debate it was decided that only the Supreme Court should be vested with such authority.)

Indeed, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was more than a little conspicuous at the Lahore conference, as the Barelvi ʿalṣma present sought to gain “official” status for their position as the religious leadership over the “majority” Sunnis (i.e. Barelvis). That status, they insisted, and “their organization” (the JUP) should be recognized in the Pakistani constitution itself. Of course, the Deobandis resisted this Barelvi attempt to assert an allegedly superior authority.

The meeting underscored the fragility of any sort of joint Deobandi-Barelvi political action, and, unlike those of the previous multi-sect ʿalṣma conference (which the Deobandis had organized and dominated), its suggestions were mostly ignored. Besides, the January 1953 Lahore meeting of scholars, in which the Deobandi-Barelvi rift was so evident, quickly degenerated less into a discussion about the Nazimuddin Report and more into anti-Ahmadi agitation (on
The meeting ended in failure. Once again, the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had prevented the Islamic scholars and their supporters from mounting a powerful lobby for the institution of an Islamic order. And despite the general support of the ‘albma for the Nazimuddin Report, the draft was received badly by many in the Punjab, who felt that it gave undue power to the Bengalis at the expense of every other unit in the country; “the country seemed to face a constitutional deadlock of great magnitude,” wrote one Pakistani constitutional historian.

On 21 September 1954, amidst continued opposition from both the non-Muslims in the constituent assembly and the Pakistan National Congress (established in 1947 from remnants of the Indian National Congress and made up almost entirely of East Bengali Hindus), the re-submitted Basic Principles Committee report was adopted by the constituent assembly—with all of its Islamic provisions. It was the latter to which the assembly’s non-Muslims and Congress members had been opposed, after all; Hindu members of the constituent assembly even boycotted the meeting at which the constitution draft was adopted in protest of its overtly Islamic content. But the religious parties had played a critical role in seeing this adoption occur—despite their own disunity—as the constitution’s Islamic character was debated from October to November 1953. Thus the ‘albma politicians and their organizations had been pivotal in not only shooting down the interim constitution (together with the East Bengali opposition) but also in seeing the Nazimuddin Report become the official blueprint for the law of the land.

Victory, however, was short-lived. Just days before the constitution report was scheduled for consideration by the assembly as Pakistan’s new constitution, “tall, dapper 59-year-old” Malik Ghulam Muhammad—who’d been serving as Governor-General
since Khwaja Nazimuddin had left the office in 1951 to take up the post of Prime Minister—a abruptly dissolved the constituent assembly, evidently unhappy at the prospect of a new constitution that placed significant checks on the Governor-General’s (i.e. his own) power. The move took place on 24 October 1954. Despite opposition to the “constitutional coup” from some on the Supreme Court, the move stood when the judiciary upheld the assembly’s dismissal in a split decision.

Most of the ‘alāma opposed Ghulam Muhammad’s action (which the Times in London referred to as a “palace revolution”), and those close to the events tried to prevent it when news of an impending dissolution leaked out just prior to its unfolding. But their efforts were in vain. The JUI’s top leader described Ghulam Muhammad’s move as “mischievous,” designed “to destroy the Islamic character of the constitution to whatever extent it is.” Other Deobandi leaders, like Muhammad Shafi and Ihtisham ul-Haq Thanawi, called the coup “a tragic deviation from the basic ideology of Pakistan.” The JI general secretary similarly slammed the Governor-General, characterizing his actions as “cheap and highly deceptive.” Perhaps it is not surprising, however, that some Barelvi ‘alāma actually supported the assembly’s dissolution, given their belligerence at the Lahore conference, their strong opposition to parts of the Nazimuddin Report (particularly as it concerned the judiciary), and the failure of the draft to recognize them in any way, shape, or form as the Sunni Muslims’ “official” spiritual leadership. Indeed, Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent Ghulam Muhammad his personal congratulations on the occasion of the constituent assembly’s forced disbanding. The most protest the JUP put up was at its annual conference on 9 October during which the party “expressed satisfaction over the progress in constitution-making.” The Barelvi leadership wasn’t giving up on the idea of an Islamic
state, of course; this was their goal, and their demand for a “totally Islamic constitution” held firm. But it seems the Barelvi leadership hoped that, in beginning again, their claim to represent the majority “Sunni” position stood more of a chance of being codified into law than in it did in supporting any previous constitution report. As for the military, Ghulam Muhammad had ensured its support when he offered key cabinet positions to military leaders; Major-General Iskander Mirza became Minister of Internal Affairs and General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, was granted the office of Defense Minister. (Prime Minister Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra was asked to stay on as head of the newly reconstituted cabinet, which he did.) Iskander Mirza was particularly hostile to the Islamic scholars, warning the ‘alima after the 1954 coup that there would be “trouble” if they continued to meddle around in politics. “We can’t run wild on Islam,” he said. “It is Pakistan first and last.” For his part, Ghulam Muhammad would justify the coup, marked by “troops pouring into the capital, armored cars patrolling outside,” and a ban on public assemblies, by blaming the constituent assembly itself. If not for its “internal strain, bickerings, and personal, sectional, and provincial rivalries,” he insisted, he never would have been forced to such measures. A new era in Pakistani politics had been born—one in which the country’s elected representatives would play underdog to a bloated government bureaucracy and the military.

Within a few days, Pakistan seemed to be on the verge of a full-scale military coup. “Pakistan, the world’s fifth largest country, is in a bad way,” wrote newspaperman Douglas Wilkie, at the time. “Its Government is in the melting pot, its Parliament already dissolved and a state of emergency proclaimed, forbidding any assembly of more than five persons.” Combined with a veritable revolt in East Bengal against federal
authorities in Karachi, events seemed to be heating up. And though Wilkie’s
prognostication would ultimately come true, the real military coup wouldn’t come for
another four years. Indeed, by June 1955, five months after Ghulam Muhammad’s
dissolution of the first constituent assembly, a new one was elected led by a coalition
PML-United Front government. (The United Front was a Bengali party made up itself
of a coalition of parties determined to ensure that the eastern zone be allotted proper
representation in government.) The dominant United Front party was the Awami
League, but the organization also included a JUI-breakaway called the Nizam-e-Islam
Party (NIP), an independent political party created out of the East Bengali JUI during
that organization’s 1953-1954 falling out with the Pakistan Muslim League, and whose
name literally meant “The Implementation of an Islamic System Party.” The NIP had
been induced to join the Front when the NIP leadership became convinced that the
PML “had taken advantage” of their party “by misleading the people in the name of
Islam.”

With the convening of a new assembly, the work of constitution-making
began again from August 1955.

The new assembly appointed a new committee to produce a draft constitution. After
years of effort, then, they were beginning all over again—the “work for an Islamic
constitution…to be done afresh.” Meanwhile, the ‘alma continued to clamor for the
institution of an Islamic government. The mostly Deobandi NIP members of the
constituent assembly in particular pressed hard for the institution of an Islamic
constitution. Their demands became more vocal after the first draft of a constitution
formulated by the committee was presented in early November 1955—devoid of much
of the old drafts’ Islamic provisions (including the critical “repugnancy clause”). In
protest, NIP constituent assembly members boycotted the meeting in which the draft
was presented. Both JUI and JI leaders met with Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad ‘Ali and Law Minister Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar to lobby for their position and urge
the scrapping of the committee’s allegedly “un-Islamic” constitution. The Deobandi
JUI and Deobandi-leaning JI thus worked together in this regard, conspicuously absent any (Barelvi) JUP assistance.

The (mostly Deobandi) ‘al‘ama demands resulted in the committee’s abandoning of the constitution draft. Between November and December, that body worked on a new draft—as the ‘al‘ama parties’ agitation for an Islamic constitution reached a new height.

“Hardly any day passed without a meeting being organized to voice the demand,” wrote one Pakistani scholar. The JUI and JI, and separately the JUP, led the charge. From 19-25 December, the JUI observed “Constitution Week,” their demands enunciated in public meetings and during sermons in thousands of mosques across the country. On the occasion of the JI’s annual conference on 22 November in Karachi, the party demanded specifically that not only should the Objectives Resolution and the Islamic provisions from the old constitutional drafts be incorporated into the new one, but also that the amendments formulated during the January 1953 ‘al‘ama conference be made effective, too. The JI conference additionally warned the state’s leadership that a secular constitution would tear Pakistan apart—that the only thing holding the eastern and western zones together was Islam. To the Barelvis, the situation appeared as a second chance to get the constitution of Pakistan right—meaning the document would recognize them as the country’s Sunni majority and their leaders as the spiritual guides of said majority. As such, a “Sunni” conference was held from 11-12 December in Lahore, led by the JUP and dubbed the “All-Pakistani Sunni Conference,” a name hailing back to the organization’s pre-Partition days as the All-India Sunni Conference.
The Barelvi 'alma at the gathering produced a three-pointed resolution, demanding (1) that the constitution be “Islamic” in “character,” (2) that the head of state “must be a Muslim,” and (3) that Hanafi fiqh be declared “state law.” Islamic state meant Islamic state, not some pseudo-Islamic-Western fusion. The conference warned the constitution-drafting committee that the Pakistani people would not accept a secular constitution.

The Barelvi conference ended about a month before a new draft of the proposed constitution was presented (in January 1956) before the new constituent assembly for its approval. As deliberations in that body were underway, yet another 'alma conference took place in Dhaka—a mixed-sect affair like the previous assemblies in Karachi and Lahore—on 8 February 1956. Participants included representatives from the Deobandi JUI, the Barelvi JUP, the JI, and the NIP. The conference aimed to formulate amendment proposals for the new constitution. Most of the proposals put forth by the various parties assembled were adopted, and their resolutions presented to members of the constituent assembly for consideration. When Prime Minister Choudhary Muhammad 'Ali finally introduced the draft constitution on 9 January 1956, several of the provisions suggested by this conference had been incorporated into Pakistan’s supreme governing document. Indeed, the new constitution draft (to the relief of many of the 'alma) seemed to have met most of their long-fought-for demands, and was thus “welcomed by the religious-political parties and their leaders.” Leaders of the JUI and the JI generally praised the new constitution. The document fulfilled “the requirements of Islam as well as democracy to a considerable extent,” said Mawdudi on the occasion, while Ihtisham ul-Haq added that it was “commendable on the whole.” Such sentiments, while mostly positive, obviously betrayed a sense that the constitution was
far from perfect, however acceptable it might be. Still, it was “Islamic” enough. On the other hand, the Barelvi leadership of the JUP demanded more; though the party sent a twelve-man delegation to personally congratulate the Prime Minister on the draft, it also sent a memorandum suggesting amendments, including a proposition that Arabic be Pakistan’s official language, that a Religious Affairs Ministry be formed, and that an ‘alōma board to vet legislation according to its Islamic soundness be created. Once again, the JUI and the JI seemed to be on the same page politically, while the Barelvi JUP took a somewhat different approach.

Within days, however, the JUI and the JI, unwilling to be left out of amendment negotiations, adopted the Barelvi call for still more constitutional alterations. Soon a list of seventeen proposed amendments, formulated jointly by five different religious parties (the JUI, the JI, the NIP, the JUP, and the West Pakistan Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis), was produced, reiterated, and backed by a resolution passed during a massive ‘alōma (and pir) conference in Dhaka on 8 February. The conference added some additional amendments to those seventeen already proposed, including a demand that Pakistan’s head of state be a Muslim, Pakistan’s official name be “the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” and East Bengal be officially called “East Pakistan.” Apart from this resolution, the conference organized a committee (called the All-Parties Islamic Constitution Committee) with the purpose of spearheading the organization and observance of “Constitution Days” throughout the month of February.

The assembly formally adopted the constitution on 29 February, and the Governor-General granted his official consent on 2 March. Generally speaking, the constitution was “welcomed” by the ‘alōma, at least “as a first step.” The Objectives Resolution served as the document’s preamble. The constitution included a provision requiring
that the head of state be “a Muslim and at least 40 years of age” (and a “he,” if the
gendered pronoun was to be literally interpreted), and it officially bestowed upon the
state the name suggested by the ‘alṣama conference: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The state’s “directive principles” included the strengthening of “bonds of unity among
Muslim countries”; the taking of “steps” to “enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually
and collectively to order their lives in accordance with” the Qur’an and the sunnā; and
the prevention of gambling, prostitution, the use of “injurious drugs,” and the
recreational drinking of “alcoholic liquor.” The constitution’s “Islamic Provisions”
required that the President establish an “organization for Islamic research and
instruction” that would “assist in the reconstruction of a Muslim society on a truly
Islamic basis” (a revivalist sentiment if ever there was one, with clear Waliullahi
undertones). The provisions also called on the President to appoint a commission
whose purpose was to proffer advice on how best to implement “Islamic law.” Most
important of the “Islamic Provisions,” perhaps, was article 198—the “repugnancy
clause,” which stated that no law could be enacted “which is repugnant to the
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah...” Interestingly, this
last was to be applied to each sect according to its specific understanding of the term “Quran
and Sunnah.” The document tasked provincial government with the administration of
Islamic tax systems, including ḥaṭ, as well as the overseeing of Islamic “charitable”
(i.e. mosque- and ṭaqf-centered) giving. The state, then, was to be an active, coercive
means of enforcing Islamic moral standards.

Exactly three weeks after the Governor-General granted his official consent, the
new constitution went into force—on 23 March, the same day, according to the
Gregorian calendar, upon which the pivotal Lahore Resolution had been passed sixteen
years before.

**Distractions from Constitution-Making.**

Of course, the near-decade of Pakistan’s first go-around at constitution-making didn’t occur in a vacuum; several events temporarily distracted the parties involved. Often the Deobandi and Barelvi parties played an active role in the development of these phenomena, at times seemingly united in purpose but virtually always separate in organization and action. Besides the riots against Hindus and Sikhs in the Pakistani Punjab (a reaction to similar riots targeting Muslims in Indian Punjab), there was the fight over Kashmir (over which, though full-scale war was avoided, significant military action on both sides did occur); the constant tug-of-war between Pakistan’s eastern and western wings (including the Urdu-Bengali language controversy); the refugee problem (twelve million people had, after all, migrated either to Pakistan or India at the time of Partition, a phenomenon that some describe as “the largest transfer of population in recorded history”); the death of the unifying figure of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah; the death of Pakistan’s official shix ul-yslam and Deobandi great Shabbir Ahmad Usmani; violent anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore and elsewhere (resulting in the deaths of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Ahmadis and the ouster of a Prime Minister); and constitutionally ambivalent changes in government (like the assassination of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, the removal of Khwaja Nazimuddin from office, and the “constitutional coup” of Ghulam Muhammad) all combined to steal attention away from the process of formulating a constitution.

Pakistan’s first war with India over Kashmir (1948) naturally “strained the internal political situation,” as some of the country’s more militant generals argued with some of
the country’s more pacifist politicians over what course of action should be pursued.\(^8\) With the British withdrawal, Jammu and Kashmir maharaja Hari Singh had failed to declare his polity part of India or Pakistan, vainly hoping that the princely state might remain independent. Since the majority of Kashmir’s population was Muslim (but despite large Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist minorities), the Pakistani government began (unofficially) organizing local fighters and volunteers—with regular Pakistani soldiers mixed in—mostly from the NWFP. Their mission: to invade Kashmir and possess it for Pakistan. The princely state’s local defense forces gave way rather quickly to these assailants from the west. This development quite naturally led Hari Singh to hastily opt for union with India—which abruptly gave the Indian government the green light to send troops to defend the state from its Pakistani invaders; Indian troops were immediately airlifted into Kashmir, soon thereafter halting the Pakistani advance. By the end of 1947, the invasion had mostly subsided, and over the following months Indian troops won back much of the temporarily conquered territory, until a cease-fire was called on 31 December 1948. Each side lost around one thousand five hundred killed; Pakistan ended up with a chunk of western Kashmiri territory (now Azad—or “free”—Kashmir) while India secured the rest, including the Srinigar valley.

Throughout the conflict, marked at home by “a contest of abuse in the Press and on the radio and in political speeches,” the religious parties in Pakistan weighed in, too.\(^8\) Some Muslim leaders were offended by Liaquat ‘Ali Khan’s seemingly non-violent strategy, interpreting it as weakness on his part—a weakness that reflected badly on Pakistan as a nation and Muslims as a people.\(^9\) The Barelvis were particularly militant in this regard, and the 1948 Kashmir War proved to be a stimulant for the JUP to shore up its organization across West Pakistan. Partly at the insistence of Naimuddin
Moradabadi and Mustapha Riza Khan, who together visited Lahore in March 1948, new branches of the party were inaugurated across the country (though especially in the Punjab) as the organization was tested with its first large-scale challenge of organizing for a cause. (One of these was the Sindh and Karachi branch of the party, opened in January 1949 and headed by one Abdul Hamid Badayuni). Led by their ‘alwāma, the Barelvis collected food and distributed it to military and volunteer forces in Kashmir, provided other relief for jiyādis and refugees in the high mountain region, and strove to “invoke the spirit of jāhīd” within Pakistan’s military units stationed there. The JUP additionally organized and observed a countrywide “Day of Kashmir” (15 April 1949) and a “Day of Pakistan” (14 August 1950) to force attention onto the issue and their demand for “a free and fair plebiscite.” (A U.N. commission had called for a plebiscite soon after the original cease-fire, a future measure ostensibly agreed upon by both the Indian and Pakistani governments. But negotiations broke down after this initial “agreement,” and the Nehru regime, not eager to have Kashmir’s eighty-percent-Muslim population vote between India and Pakistan, “[did his] best to delay negotiations.” Eventually India rejected a plebiscite altogether, as Nehru declared, “Kashmir must form part of India.”) A fatwā was released, too, authored by JUP president Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri and other noted “Sunni” scholars, declaring jāhīd in Kashmir.

But some other religious scholars, notably Abul Ala Mawdudi, had condemned the use of the term “jāhīd” in the case of the Kashmir War (since the national government had “hypocritically” characterized the fight as a jāhīd to the paramilitary fighters it unofficially supported while officially observing a cease-fire with India; jāhīd, Mawdudi and others argued, must be declared openly by the government for it to be justified and
correct), but the Bareli \textit{fatwa} denounced such points-of-view. The fight for Kashmir, they insisted, was absolutely a holy war for Islam. For his part, Mawdudi was thrown in prison by the Pakistani government for alleged “sedition.” Meanwhile, many Deobandis, too, supported or were active participants in the “sacred \textit{jihad}” in Kashmir. They generally saw the intervention of “the non-Muslim world powers” in the form of the United Nations as a “cunning” move to prevent the imminent takeover of Kashmir by the \textit{mujahydin}. The Deobandis tended to possess a more universal \textit{jihadi} mentality, too; for example, Muhammad Rafi remembers, as a boy, playing only those games “which could be useful in \textit{jihad}”—like horseback riding, the long jump, and the high jump. (He even avoided hot water, either for ablution or bathing, as it might declimatize him from conditions at some future front.) The Deobandi penchant for macro-\textit{jihad} (as opposed to regional or local conflict) would gain added significance later, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Still, this Deobandi proclivity was illustrated around this same time when JUI officials met with the leaders of several other Muslim states—including Egypt (whose ambassador described the liberation of Kashmir as “as dear as the freedom of the Nile”), Syria, and Saudi Arabia—to obtain support over Kashmir.

The refugee issue loomed large as well. Most of the more than six million refugees (some say eight million) who flooded into Pakistan wound up in the Punjab; indeed, the state’s population numbered around 1.7 million \textit{more} than it had before the great schism, and this unprecedented increase had to be dealt with if it wasn’t to spiral into a serious law-and-order situation. Meanwhile, Karachi had been flooded with refugees from Delhi—hundreds of thousands of them—and tensions in the city between its original inhabitants and the newcomer influx ran high. There would be serious
ramifications for this phenomenon in the future, as the mostly Barelvi, Urdu-speaking refugees from north-central India (and, later, their children) clashed with local Sindhis and the mostly Deobandi Pathans, the latter pouring into the city from the 1970s. To combat these forces and ostensibly to protect their own rights, the Urdu-speakers organized politically (about which more later), with serious (and often bloody) consequences for the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.

The “sudden” 11 September 1948 death of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad ʿAli Jinnah (who’d long been keeping his debilitated condition—and terminal diagnosis—a secret), opened a floodgate that naught but the ḥāʾid-e-ʿaẓīm’s towering personality could have held strong (though historians can only speculate as to how long even that might have lasted). As was touched upon previously, a furious jostling for power took place almost immediately afterwards, as various parties and their leaders vied for position. The religious parties were certainly not exempt from this power struggle. Liaquat ʿAli Khan, a close personal friend of Jinnah and one who had worked at the ḥāʾid-e-ʿaẓīm’s side for years before Partition, commanded some respect as Prime Minister (concurrent for years with other positions, including Minister of Defense, from August 1947 to October 1951, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, from August 1947 to December 1949). But on 16 October 1951, while addressing a meeting in a Rawalpindi park, an Afghan assassin shot Liaqat ʿAli twice in the chest. Though the killer’s motives remain, many decades later, somewhat of a mystery, scholars speculate that it may have had something to do with his “soft” solution to the Kashmir war—unpopular especially among the religious parties—as well as his negotiations with Jawaharlal Nehru of India over the resettlement and treatment of refugees and religious minorities in the two countries. Evidently some of the ʿalqama even pointed to Liaqat ʿAli Khan’s wife’s
apparent reluctance to observe purdah. The assassin himself was reportedly a Pathan “ultra-nationalist” and may have carried out the deed in the hope that a “united Pakhtunistan” might result. The official report of the “Commission on the Assassination of Mr. Liaquat ‘Ali Khan,” issued ten months after the killing, found only that “it had not been possible definitely to decide whether the assassin…had acted as an individual or as the agent of a conspiracy.” Whatever the true motive of the murderer, the assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister has been attributed—again, without hard evidence—to such frustrations and differences in religious interpretation. If nothing else, the tragic event may have shored up the position of the ‘alɔma, whether or not they were to blame at all—a sort of warning to those who would transgress the order propagated by the Islamic scholars and their parties.

Shabbir Ahmad Usmani died in December 1949. The passing of the great ‘alim was a blow for the Deobandi school’s position as the dominant one in government, as no other Deobandi leader in Pakistan then commanded the sort of respect and adoration that Shabbir Ahmad had. Of course, the Barelvi leadership naturally felt that one of their own should assume the official mantle of shix ul-yslam; it was rumored that perhaps Muhammad Qamarruddin Sialvi (d. 1981 AD) would be given the nod in this regard. JUP leaders were “confident,” in fact, that something like this would, in fact, take place—that the “Sunni” ‘alɔma might finally be given their due. Muhammad Qamarruddin Sialvi, a Sufi of the Chishti order and descendent of the famous nineteenth-century Sufi saint Shamsuddin Sialvi (known as “Pir Sial,” of whose one admirer has written that “the number of those associated with it…is countless and [they] are spread throughout the country of Pakistan”), had studied in Ajmer at the Madrasa ‘Uthmaniyya Dar al-Khayr under Muinuddin Ajmeri (a
scion of the Khairabadi family) and then in Sial Sharif under mawlana Muhammad Din Budhwi, another Khairabadi luminary. (As previously mentioned, the Khairabadi family, from whom xawajah Qamaruddin Sialvi received his religious instruction and training, possessed strong connections to the Barelvi movement.) During pre-Partition days the xawajah had defied British rule, and as a consequence had spent time in prison. He had also served as a local Muslim League leader (in Sargodha) and been among those Barelvi mashayx who had traveled to the NWFP in 1947 to help win the province for the League in the run-up to the critical Frontier Referendum. But unfortunately for the JUP and Pakistan’s Barelvi ‘alma, and perhaps out of the fear of sparking a low-level sectarian war, the government opted not to bestow the coveted shix ul-yslam title upon anyone; the name, at least as it was officially granted by the Pakistani state, would die with Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. This did not, however, stop the Barelvis from later addressing xawajah Muhammad Qamaruddin Sialvi as “shix ul-yslam” anyway, a title he would hold on to for the rest of his life. For the Deobandis’ part, Sulaiman Nadvi (about whom more later) played the role of respected Deobandi ‘alym in an attempt to replace Shabbir Ahmad, thereby restoring some of the party’s “country-wide influence.” But Nadvi himself passed away in 1953 AD. At that point the mantle, though not nearly as powerful as the one shouldered by Shabbir Ahmad, would be taken up by his erstwhile right hand, Muhammad Shafi.

Muhammad Shafi was only the latest in a long line of scholars and teachers in his family, stretching back on his father’s side at least to the late 1700s AD; and from his mother he inherited a lineage allegedly going back to the Prophet himself. His great-great grandfather Karimullah, who had completely memorized the Qur’an and was thus afforded the title hafz, had been the first to establish himself in Deoband, allegedly after
being unjustly dealt with at his previous residence by his Hindu neighbors.

Karimullah’s son, Imam ‘Ali—known by all as mian ji, meaning “schoolmaster”—was a scholar of much renown in Deoband, where, it has been written, “there was not a house but he had a student therein.” Imam ‘Ali also increased the family’s land holdings, subsequently dividing them up between his five sons, most of whom were able to secure government posts. One son, Tahsin ‘Ali, was not so lucky, however; poor eyesight negated any possibility that he would find the kind of employment enjoyed by his brothers, and eventually he was forced to sell some of his land inheritance just to make ends meet. Still, Tahsin ‘Ali loved to learn—and he loved to teach. He transformed his home into a virtual schoolroom, instructing his two sons in the memorization of the Qur’an, Urdu, Farsi, and mathematics. One of his sons, Muhammad Yasin—born a year before the founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband—showed especially great promise, and Tahsin ‘Ali decided that his home school wasn’t enough. He thus enrolled him in the new Muhammad Qasim-inspired mәdәrәsh, hoping that Muhammad Yasin might gain a religious education in the Arabic language. At the dar ul’alwm, Muhammad Yasin labored under some of the great founding Deobandi fathers, eventually learning at the feet of the school’s first student and eventual leader, Mahmud Hasan himself. Muhammad Yasin had three daughters and two sons; one of his sons died young, leaving him one male heir: Muhammad Shafi, the future “Grand Mufti” of independent Pakistan.97 As noted previously, Muhammad Shafi would join with his cousin, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, as a pro-Leaguer in the struggle for Pakistan. Now he was the man’s political successor, opening up a new chapter in Deobandi politics.

On 18 May 1952, Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs and noted Ahmadi scholar Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (d. 1985 AD) delivered a speech at Karachi’s Jahangir
Park. The occasion, though public, had been organized by an association of Ahmadis—members of perhaps the most generally deplored (and “heretical”) sect of Islam in South Asia. Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908 AD) of Qadiyan (and thus referred to as the “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement), the Ahmadis held that their version of Islam was the one true variety, with Muhammad and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as true prophets. The latter had claimed to be Muhammad reappeared—but also the Christian savior, the Muslim *mahdi*, and even an incarnation of Krishna. (There is a split within the Ahmadi community, dating back to 1914 AD and the post-Mirza Ghulam Ahmad succession crisis, that revolves around the Ahmadi founder’s status—was he a prophet, a messenger, or simply an inspired guide? A Lahore-based group, originally led by Ahmad’s son, rejected Mirza Ghulam’s claims of prophethood, while the other group, based at first in Qadian and then in Rabwah in the Punjab, continued to revere Ahmad as a prophet). In any case, it was the Ahmadi’s alleged claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a post-Muhammad prophet (this despite the generally held Muslim belief that Muhammad was the “Seal” or “End” of the prophets [*xatam-e-nabwiyat*], meaning none would come after him) that stoked the most ire among other Muslims. (There was also a widespread belief, however unfounded, that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had been a British agent and the Ahmadi movement a British-designed creation “for fulfilling their own political ends.”)\(^98\) Then-Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin had reportedly attempted to dissuade Zafarullah Khan, as a member of his cabinet, from speaking at a “sectional” meeting, but the Foreign Affairs Minister was adamant that he attend. Amidst efforts by anti-Ahmadi demonstrators to disrupt the meeting, Zafarullah Khan declared that “Ahmadiyyat was a plant implanted by God himself, that this plant had taken root to provide a guarantee for the preservation of Islam in fulfillment of the promise contained
in the Qur’an, that if this plant were removed, Islam would no longer be a live religion but would be like a dried-up tree having no demonstrable superiority over other religions.” According to the official report of the Court of Inquiry, set up after the violence that would ensue, this meeting—and these sentiments—“provided occasion for riots in Karachi.”99 Within the socio-political context of 1953 AD Pakistan—food shortages going on several years that “created want and unrest among the impoverished masses,” economic controls by government that stifled business, and, according to Pakistan visitor and erstwhile U.S. presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, “extremist mullahs…[who] have fanned discontent for political ends”—perhaps it was just a matter of time before a spark ignited the lake of gasoline.100 Incidentally, Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan was no stranger to persecution from fellow Muslims—and even, specifically, the Deobandi-leaning Majlis-e-Ahrar. As far back as December 1931 AD, when he served as president of that year’s All-India Muslim League conference in Delhi, the Congress-supporting Ahrars had agitated against him, reportedly creating “disorderly scenes” outside of the League conference. A procession was held, black flags were waved, anti-Ahmadi speeches were delivered at the Jama Masjid, and a “mob prevented the League from assembling in accordance with its program.” The AIML blamed the demonstrations on the Congress, who had “engineered” the agitation “among uneducated Moslems.”101 Now, twenty-two years later, the same outfit—the Majlis-e-Ahrar—was agitating against the same man. This time, however, there would be blood.

Immediately the ‘alɔma of the usually feuding sects—including both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars—banded together to stamp out the Ahmadi “menace” once and for all, forming the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat (tehrik-e-tahaffuz-e-xatam-e-
organization was created to defend Muhammad’s place as the last of the prophets—and to strike down all notions that any other prophet, including the “heretic” Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, could have come after him. The Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat made three official demands to the Pakistani government: (1) that Ahmadies be officially declared a “non-Muslim minority,” (2) that Zafarullah Khan be removed from office forthwith, and (3) that all other Ahmadies be fired from important government positions, too. The three demands were officially presented at an All-Pakistan Muslim Parties conference in Karachi in July. The conference appointed a committee, tasked to put pressure on the government to meet their requests. With their demands formulated, the mostly Barelvi and Deobandi Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat leadership stood divided on how best to agitate for those demands to be met. One section of the organization favored a constitutional approach and the avoidance of “direct measures” (*rast yqdam*); one of those favoring such a legal approach was JUP leader “Abul Hasanat” Qadiri. But the Ahrars, who had long been engaged, under the leadership of Deobandi clerics like Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi, in anti-Ahmadi campaigning, and now at the urging of great Deobandi scholar-leaders like Ataullah Shah Bukhari, went into action mode, stirring the rest of the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat to just such “direct measures.” Mawdudi’s JI as well as the JUI did much the same. (Both the Ahrars and the JUI had supported the Pakistan Muslim League in the 1951 AD provincial elections in Punjab; the League won a majority of the available seats—and some scholars speculate that perhaps it was this victory that emboldened the Ahrars and others to now act on their long-held anti-Ahmadi sentiments.) Despite Qadiri’s reservations, most of the JUP would come on board the Ahrar-, JUI-, and JI-inspired
“direct measures” bandwagon, especially after numerous attempts to gain assurances from Khwaja Nazimuddin, as well as provincial leaders, that their demands be met ended in disappointment. The committee appointed by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties conference to “pressure” the government thus officially called for “direct measures,” and furthermore threw down the gauntlet, so to speak, at the feet of the Prime Minister—in the form of an ultimatum granting him one month to comply with the ‘alɔma demands. On 26 February 1953, nine months after Zafarullah Khan’s speech, at a meeting over which Qadiri himself presided, the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat adopted “direct measures” as the movement’s official policy. Upon receiving the news of the ‘alɔma group’s decision, and guessing its intentions, the government descended upon its leadership in full force, arresting many of its guiding lights, including (perhaps ironically) Qadiri, Abdul Hamid Badayuni, and JUP vice-president Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi. Perhaps more than anything else, the arrests sparked violent riots across the Punjab (and especially in its urban centers) throughout the month of March. Martial law was imposed on Lahore from 6 March. Much Ahmadi property and some of the group’s mosques were destroyed, and anywhere from two hundred to two thousand Ahmadis lost their lives as targets of the rioters. The chaos was so widespread and its perpetrators so determined that martial law didn’t end in Lahore until mid-May. The government blamed the ‘alɔma for the riots, and Qadiri’s own son, mwlana Khalil Ahmad Qadiri, was among those sentenced to death by hanging. In all, five ‘alɔma were sentenced to death by martial law courts for their involvement in the violence. (These sentences would be commuted later to life in prison; all of the ‘alɔma thus convicted were subsequently released in 1955 AD.) Mawdudi was sentenced to death, too, for his “connexion with the anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Punjab,”
sparking protest in Karachi, where “most” shops remained closed in a demonstration of solidarity with the JI chief. Protests were also held across the city; proclaimed one press notice issued by Karachi chief commissioner A. T. Naqui, “Demonstrators at certain places indulged in acts of hooliganism.” On 13 May, the death sentence on Mawdudi was commuted to “14 years rigorous imprisonment.” The rapid commuting of Mawdudi’s, Khalil Ahmad’s, and the others’ sentences illustrates the perceived political power of the ‘alɔma-supporting religious element in Pakistani society, at least at the time. (One reporter, writing fifteen years later, described the religious clerics’ power thus: “The daily prayer meetings in more than 10,000 mosques provide [the ‘alɔma] with a political platform that overshadows any party machine.”) The anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953 stand out as a rare example of joint Deobandi-Barelvi action.

It should be noted, however, that the anti-Ahmadi agitation was not launched without reservation on the part of some of the Islamic scholars (like that of “Abul Hasanat” Qadiri)—and even outright opposition, especially among a segment of the Barelvi spiritual leadership. For example, after Naimuddin Moradabadi disciple Muhammad Hussain Naeemi participated “very actively” in the agitation, the administrators of the (Barelvi) mədrəšə in which he taught actually asked him to leave. “You are in politics,” they argued, complaining that his focus had fallen outside the bounds of religion—and demonstrating disagreement among a segment of Barelvis over the methods adopted by the xatm-i-nəhəwət movement. On the contrary, Muhammad Hussain countered, “involvement in xatm-i-nəhəwət is not a political matter, it is a religious matter.” (This original accusation leveled against Muhammad Hussain—that he was “in politics”—turned out to be undeniably true, as he continued to actively participate in and support the JUP.) In the end Muhammad Hussain Naeemi left the
seminary, only to found one of the most prominent Barelvi schools in all of Pakistan: Jamia Naeema in Lahore. But his experience illustrates the disunity amongst the Barelvi religious leadership over the events of 1953.¹⁰⁷

Almost immediately after the riots had diminished, the Pakistani government launched a formal inquiry into their root causes (as well as the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the state’s response). The Court of Inquiry’s (nearly four-hundred-page) report, presented in April 1954 and entitled “Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953” (but popularly known as the “Munir Report” after the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court and president of the inquiry committee, Muhammad Munir), came down hard upon the ‘alɔma, mincing no words in its condemnation of the clerics or of their varying and often contradictory conceptions of an Islamic state. The report began by quoting Jinnah’s 11 August 1947 speech to the newly formed constituent assembly of Pakistan (“You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State,” to cries of “Hear, hear!”). “We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State was acceptable to them,” the report’s authors wrote, “and every one of them replied in an unhesitating negative…” Since the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the Muslim scholars contended, Jinnah’s “conception of a modern national State” had become “obsolete.” But, the report asked bluntly, “[w]hat is then the Islamic State of which everybody talks but nobody thinks?” The report lambasted the ‘alɔma for being “hopelessly disagreed among themselves” about even fundamental questions like “What is a Muslim?” and “What is Islam?” Among other definitions, Deobandi mwlana Ahmad ‘Ali Lahori, head of the JUI in West Pakistan, defined a Muslim as “A person…[who] believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet. Any person who
possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim, without his being required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.” The definition of Barelvi and JUP head Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri differed in several respects: “He must believe in the unity of God,” “He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet, as well as in all other prophets who have preceded him,” “He must believe in the Holy Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets,” “He must believe in the Qur’an as it was revealed by God to the Holy Prophet of Islam,” and “He must believe in the resurrection [qiamat].” Interestingly, Qadiri failed to mention many of the criteria listed as requirements for membership of both the JUP and the old AISC. Such demonstrations, of course, implicitly underscored a complete incapacity on the scholars’ part to formulate a workable framework for an Islamic state straddling the subcontinent and composed of a diverse group of ethnicities, languages, and geographies; if a simple definition of a “Muslim” could not be agreed upon, how could a constitution be produced? “Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama,” the report’s authors queried, “need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental?

If we attempt our own definition, as each learned divine has done, and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold is Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that [‘alim], but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else.
The report further criticized the ‘alóżma for their positions vis-à-vis apostasy—or, more particularly, their “practically unanimous” position that within an Islamic state apostasy deserves the death penalty. But who was an apostate? The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was brought into sharp relief by the report’s findings in this regard:

According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis and Wahhabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, Board of Talimat-e-Islami attached to the constituent assembly of Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a beautiful tree in the fatwa, Exhibit D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic State.

And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State, he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come within the definition of murtad, namely, if they have changed and not inherited their religious views.

Clearly, the conclusion of the report’s authors was far from complimentary to the ‘alóżma, whether Deobandi, Barelvi, or of any other stripe. “The net result of all this,” the report concluded, “is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-e-Hadis
nor Barelvis are Muslims, and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be *kafirs.*” Then: “And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine, when it is remembered that no two *ulama* have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.”

Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that, after issuance of the Munir Report (ever thereafter “an intellectual weapon in the hands of those who wanted to deride the concept of an Islamic state”), the power of the ‘*al*āma to influence politics was never quite the same again. Indeed, one Pakistani scholar would conclude just that: “Squabbling over the constitutional status of the Ahmadis, the religious parties frittered away much of the advantage they had gained since November 1950.” From this point on, the issue of Pakistan as an Islamic state faded into the background, at least for a time.

One of the other side effects hemorrhaged by the anti-Ahmadi riots was the “bureaucratic-military coup” that booted Khwaja Nazimuddin out of office. The action took place on 17 April 1953, and was probably brought on by the Prime Minister’s decision, amidst tight financial circumstances, to cut the defense budge by one-third, a move Pakistan’s military leaders were loathe to embrace. The Governor-General could cite any number of issues plaguing the state under Khwaja Nazimuddin’s leadership as justification for his decision, including the growing schism within the Pakistan Muslim League between the party’s East Bengal and West Pakistan branches, the related intensification of the Urdu-Bengali language issue (and, subsequently, the death in Bengal of demonstrators at the hands of police)—and the violent anti-Ahmadi unrest
then rocking Punjab.\textsuperscript{111} Invoking section 10 of the Government of India Act, Ghulam Muhammad removed Nazimuddin and his cabinet from office, despite their initial resistance. (Nazimuddin’s replacement: Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra, a Bengali like his predecessor and a former Pakistani ambassador to Burma, Canada, and the United States.) Of course, as aforementioned, just one-and-a-half years later Ghulam Muhammad would be at it again, dissolving the constituent assembly before it could adopt a constitution restricting his powers and forming a new, military-heavy cabinet.

By inciting, in various degrees, the 1953 riots, the ‘alɔma parties had thus played a significant role not only in the violence that followed, and not only in getting Khwaja Nazimuddin dismissed as Prime Minister, but also in ushering in what would become Pakistan’s long cycle of coups by the bureaucracy-military establishment.

The Ahmadi riots also gave the opponents of an Islamic constitution a chance to launch an anti-‘alɔma backlash. High-powered politicians like former PML president and governor of East Bengal Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, new Punjab governor Piroz Khan Noon, and NWFP chief minister Sardar Abdur Rashid launched a campaign for a purely secular constitution. This was in line, they argued, with what Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah had envisioned for Pakistan in the first place. New Prime Minister Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra got into the game, too, almost immediately attempting to derail the passage of any Islamic constitution by introducing an “interim constitution” devoid of the Nazimuddin Report’s Islamic provisions. The JUI, in particular, came out strongly against the Prime Minister’s move, and in a joint statement with the JI, the board of \textit{talimat-e-yslamiah}, and some constituent assembly members, characterized Bogra’s efforts as a “clear deviation” from the legal path heretofore trod by the constituent assembly. The JUI subsequently organized and hosted a conference, attended by a
variety of religious parties; the gathering condemned the secular constitution in a joint resolution on 28 September 1953, with support from a segment of PML members. Under this intense pressure, then, Prime Minister Bogra’s “interim constitution” idea was scrapped.\footnote{112}

The spirit of *jihad* was inflamed again in 1953 during the Suez Canal crisis, when Israel, Britain, and France squared off against Egypt for control over the great waterway linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. According to one Deobandi ‘alym, “every child in Pakistan was eager to help the brotherly country of Egypt” as events unfolded in the Middle East. The *dar ul‘alim* in Karachi actually chartered a plane to transport students, “restless to take part in the jihad,” to Egypt. The school additionally organized classes on “civil defense” and first aid with the *jihad* in mind. But Nasser quickly restricted Pakistanis’ travel to Egypt; Deobandis attributed this to the Egyptian leader’s being stricken with “the Arab nationalism malady,” something with which many Arab heads of state would be “afflicted.” The sad result of this spiritually degraded leadership, reasoned Deobandi mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani, was the subsequent Arab loss of control over the Gulf of Aqaba, much of the Sinai desert, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem.\footnote{113}

Right from the start, representatives of the majority Bengali population, whose people might have seemed quietly tucked away thousands of miles across India (and far from Karachi) in East Bengal, found cause to worry that, despite their constituents’ numbers, they would ultimately be left holding the proverbial short end of the stick. This anxiety was only exacerbated by the seemingly ever-present Urdu-Bengali language controversy. The constitutional deadlock between East Bengal and West Pakistan was finally, if temporarily, overcome with the introduction of the “Muhammad
‘Ali Formula” (having been introduced by Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra after becoming Prime Minister). The “Formula,” placed before the constituent assembly in October 1953, granted equal representation to each unit in the House of Units—thereby placating those units in the west (particularly Punjab) who were demanding equal representation within a federal system—but population-proportioned representation to each unit in the House of the People. This last made the deal acceptable to the Bengalis, whose population outnumbered that of all the other units combined. Thus in the upper house, both Punjab and East Bengal were to enjoy ten votes, but in the lower house the latter would have one hundred sixty-five seats to the former’s seventy-five. Both houses were to enjoy equal powers (this had been another bone of contention), and in joint sessions (where the more controversial issues were likely to end up) both zones would have the same number of seats (one hundred seventy-five). As for the language issue, in May 1954 the constituent assembly adopted a measure declaring that Pakistan’s official languages should be both Urdu and Bengali—but also that “the state should take all measures for the development and growth of a [i.e. one] common national language” (italics added). This measure could only be a temporary fix, of course, since it still foresaw the adoption of a single national language at some point in the future. “It was clear,” wrote one legal commentator, “from the day of its adoption that the formula could satisfy no one.”114 The ‘alima and their parties were affected by the East-West quarrel, too. The JUP was always far more active as an organized party in West Pakistan, though plenty of “Sunnis” lived and labored politically in the eastern zone. To facilitate the different positions and perceived needs of the Bengalis, the JUI actually spawned a new party: the aforementioned NIP. (Even the Pakistan Muslim League had split based on zone, the PML in the west and the Awami Muslim League, also called the
“Awami League,” in Bengal; the latter would eventually lead the charge against Pakistan’s central government that would result in the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Both Deobandis and Barelvis used the divergence between Pakistan’s two wings to emphasize the need for an Islamic political framework. After all, they reasoned, striving to unite East Bengal and West Pakistan—two geographical entities separated not only by thousands of miles but also by ethnicity, language, culture, political philosophy, and history—would be all but impossible via some secular constitution. Only Islam—the one thing binding east and west—could hold the country together. It was thus incumbent upon those formulating a constitution and those leading the country to make sure that this one, single uniting force be fused into the very fabric of the state. Without it, an eventual east-west schism was inevitable. As for the language issue, some of the Islamic scholars suggested making Arabic the country’s official national tongue, in part to avoid official preference of either Urdu or Bengali.

“Secularist” Patron of pirs: the Ayub Khan Years.

The JUI reaction to the new (1956) constitution was perhaps predictable, given what had become the ‘alɔma parties’ typical response to constitution drafts and reports. In December of 1956, this group produced a set of proposed amendments to the document. The ‘alɔma hoped that, given the apparent flexibility of the new constitution, they would be able to transform it into the “Islamic constitution” that had been their goal from the beginning. But it soon became obvious that what Islamic provisions were there had only been included to placate the Islamic scholars and their followers; “those in power were not serious about implementing…the Islamic provisions of the Constitution.” Iskander Mirza, who had earlier warned the ‘alɔma to stay out of politics
or face “trouble,” was particularly reluctant to acknowledge—let alone enforce—any of the ‘alma demands.\textsuperscript{115}

Absent from the 1956 constitution, too, was any provision stipulating either joint or separate electorates. This had, of course, been one of the most contentious communal issues plaguing the political scene during pre-Partition days. Evidently the matter was to be left up to future provincial and federal legislatures; the decision not to specify one or the other was probably calculated to get the constitution passed, as the issue of electorates was so divisive that partisans of one or the other system might have stalled the constitution’s adoption. Now a decision regarding electorates had to be made. Most of the ‘alma took the position of Mawdudi: that separate electorates were absolutely necessary in order to protect Muslims from Hindu political usurpation. After all, the call for joint electorates had originated with the Hindus, and after independence it was the Hindu parties who had carried on the demand within Pakistan. Mawdudi estimated that in a joint electorate system, Hindus could control, either directly or indirectly, up to one hundred forty-two of the East Pakistan assembly’s three hundred nine seats, as opposed to the seventy allotted to them there under a separate electorates system. The politically active Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership came down in strong favor of separate electorates. (For their part, the advocates of a joint electorates system argued that, among other things, separate electorates would only engender communalism.) The final decision was to be made in sessions of the East and West Pakistan provincial assemblies, and then in the National Assembly.

In West Pakistan, the vote came down (August 1956) in favor of separate electorates. But in East Pakistan—despite the efforts of a joint “emergency committee” including delegates from the JUI, the JI, the JUP, as well as the PML, all dispatched to
Dhaka to lobby for separate electorates—joint electorates won the day (early October). This presented a somewhat delicate situation for the National Assembly, which was scheduled to meet in Dhaka, too. Finally, the assembly adopted an unwieldy Iskander Mirza-formulated system, one that attempted to please all parties. Under Mirza’s plan, the West was granted separate electorates and the East was granted joint electorates. The system failed, of course, to address the ‘alôma’s primary concern: that Hindus in East Pakistan would be able to manipulate a joint electorates system to the disadvantage of the Muslim population. But in the end, the Islamic scholars and their parties were defeated; joint electorates were adopted in both wings of the country in August 1957.

Having lost the electorates debate, the ‘alôma parties turned their focus on the upcoming general elections. If they could no longer influence the parties in power (as had been recently demonstrated in Dhaka), then they would contest them for real votes. They would aim for direct power. Thus the JUI, the JUP, and the NIP (the latter in alliance with the JI) all put forward their own candidates in the general elections.116

But none of these parties—or any of the others—ever got a chance to try their luck in the elections; on 7 October 1956, Iskander Mirza, ever an enemy of the ‘alôma-politicians (and politicians in general!) and eager to retain his position of power despite the growing popularity of his political enemies, instituted Martial Law under General Ayub Khan, dissolving both the federal and the provincial legislatures, dismissing their respective ministries, and banning all political parties. To the ‘alôma, and especially those of the Barelvi persuasion, Iskander Mirza was a panderer to the West, unappreciative of the rich Muslim heritage and legacy. (Indeed, as one eyewitness remarked, “Iskander Mirza’s pro-Americanism often embarrassed the Americans.”)117 Mirza envisioned a Pakistan closely tied to the West, a prosperous, modern, secular state. On 27 October,
however—three weeks after Iskander Mirza’s virtual government takeover—General Ayub Khan carried out a bloodless military coup, removing Mirza (he was sent into exile in Britain) and assuming for himself the responsibility of the state’s political head. Pakistan’s inaugural constitution, “prepared,” in the words of one South Asian scholar, “after tortuous labours of a succession of Prime Ministers and Presidents” over a period of almost a decade, had lasted a mere two-and-a-half years. This “new” role for the military seemed to fly in the face of Jinnah’s original vision for Pakistan; once, on 14 August 1947, the frail qayd-e-’azam had approached two young military officers at a reception in Karachi and reportedly admonished, “Never forget that you are servants of the state. You do not make policy. It is we, the people’s representatives, who decide how the country is to be run. Your job is only to obey the decisions of your civilian masters.” (Ironically, one of the two officers being addressed was leftist Akbar Khan, who, against this advice of Pakistan’s founder, would later become infamous as the mastermind of the ultimately unsuccessful Soviet-backed “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” of 1951 to overthrow the government of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan).

In the succinct words of Afzal, “The Martial Law regime of October 1956 was not enthusiastic about religion.” Indeed, Ayub Khan assaulted the “Islamic” aspects of the old constitution from a variety of angles. First, on 10 October he scratched out the word “Islamic” altogether—that is, from the country’s official name (changing it from the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” to the more succinct but far less religion-specific “Republic of Pakistan”), then three days later disbanded the constitutionally mandated commission that had been tasked with figuring out how to Islamize Pakistan’s current legislation. The regime’s unfriendliness to the religious scholars was further underscored when Muslim Leaguer and high-profile jurist Manzur Qadir (d. 1974 AD),
Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister from 1958-1962 (and a trusted advisor on domestic affairs as well), embarked on a tour of the country to assess the reaction of the people to the coup. Qadir identified Muslim sectarian division (“the existence of 72 sects among the Muslims”) as the greatest hindrance to creating an “Islamic” constitution; he would later head the committee to formulate the country’s new (1960) constitution himself. (Qadir’s remark underscores the impact that the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic played—and continues to play—in Pakistani politics, preventing as it does the nation’s two largest sects from any hope of strong, united action.) Much like his Foreign Minister, Ayub Khan saw the ‘almā parties as not only lacking in cohesiveness but also as advocates of a medieval system, one that failed to take into account the realities of the modern age. “[I]f being a Muslim meant going back to the world of 1,300 years ago,” he remarked brazenly in January 1960, “then [I am] not for being a Muslim.”121 Given his positions vis-à-vis Islam and politics, Ayub Khan was widely regarded as a “modernist”; in the Field Marshal’s view, Islam was “subject to the conditions of contemporary nationhood.”122 Khan criticized the (mostly Deobandi) ‘almā who had opposed Pakistan during pre-Partition days but now sought to impose their version of an Islamic order on everyone via an Islamic constitution of their creation—and this in a nation they had once denied a chance for existence! He (perhaps correctly) saw the (mostly Deobandi) ‘almā as the most vociferous critics of government (and his government, in particular); without their insidious influence, he reasoned, the people would be happy. “[T]hey succeeded in converting optimistic and enthusiastic people into a cynical and frustrated community,” he once said of the Islamic scholars.123 Foreign policy-wise, too, Ayub Khan was, like Iskander Mirza, more or less pro-Western, though he was less conspicuous (some would say less gushing) than his
In any case, Ayub Khan’s political positions reinvigorated many of the ‘alıma in their ire against the secular state (and even united them for a time, as the reader shall see).

On 2 March 1961, the regime put into effect the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, legislation that promised more freedom to women. In this, Ayub Khan was part of a trend affecting several modernizing states within the Muslim world characterized by heavy government legislative intervention vis-à-vis women and the family. Indeed, many aspects of the ordinance merely reflected the suggestions, offered to the Pakistani government during the previous decade, by a commission set up specifically to consider reform in this area. In any case, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in addition to stipulating that a man could only take on a second wife with the permission of his first (in the form of approval by an Arbitration Council), also required that, in the case of divorce, the husband must first inform a local government representative, then wait ninety days. In effect, the ordinance required ninety-day “notice” on divorces, during which time an Arbitration Council would strive to reconcile the parties involved. Many of the ‘alıma regarded this last—the “introduction of notice”—as contrary to the procedure set forth in the Qur’an and sunna.125 Most of the country’s Islamic scholars (but especially those of the Deobandi persuasion) opposed the ordinance vigorously; one observer described the cleric-led campaign against Ayub as both “sustained” and strong ever after.126 In response, the Ayub Khan regime confiscated publications promulgating the opinions of the ‘alıma opposed to the ordinance and even imprisoned some of the more vocal scholars involved in the debate.

Ayub Khan continued his opposition to an “Islamic” constitution by rejecting the suggestions of the very Constitution Commission that he had created to formulate a
new document. The commission (an eleven-person body from which, not surprisingly, the ‘alḥama had been conspicuously excluded) had interviewed almost six hundred individuals and mailed close to twenty thousand questionnaires to people and organizations of consequence across Pakistan. What the group discovered did not lend support to Ayub Khan’s secularist, modernist aims. The vast majority of respondents had indicated strongly that the overtly Islamic Objectives Resolution should be incorporated into the new constitution. The same held true for the old constitution’s Islamic provisions; these, too, should be included, according to most respondents. In its presentation to the regime, and based on its findings, the commission even went one step further, advising an active role for the state in regulating the training of Muslim teachers and preachers “to enable them to present Islam to those of a Western way of thinking.” The group also sided with the vast majority of the ‘alḥama on the electorates issue, supporting the call for a separate electorates system.127

On 8 June 1962, the new, Ayub Khan-created constitution of Pakistan (which had been approved by the dictator in early May) came into effect. As previously mentioned, the regime opted to ignore most of the recommendations of its own Constitution Commission; the group’s suggestions were veritably absent within the new document. Still, the constitution’s Islamic provisions were similar to those of the 1956 version. The descriptive “Islamic” was not restored to Pakistan’s official name (“The State of Pakistan shall be a Republic under the name of the Republic of Pakistan”), and Ayub Khan had instituted a presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) system in which the very powerful President (i.e. Ayub Khan) must be a Muslim. Indeed, one commentator described Ayub Khan’s new constitution as leaving “almost impotent” his political opposition, while making for “an impregnably strong executive.”128 The document’s
preamble was indeed based on the Objectives Resolution, though it offered a controversial watered-down version of the same. The government was charged with the duty to assist Muslims in the day-to-day living of their faith, a repugnancy clause was included, and teaching of the Qur’an and Islamic studies was made mandatory (though only for Muslims). Furthermore, the government was to take an active (though unspecified) role in eradicating (or at least “discouraging”) such un-Islamic evils as gambling, prostitution, the consumption of alcohol, and usury, and the federal government should be guided, on the foreign policy front, by a desire to strengthen ties with and promote peace among the world’s Muslim nations. The document also mandated the creation of two “Islamic” bodies: (1) the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, meant to advise the government on both the Islamic soundness of legislation as well as on how the state might more fully facilitate Muslims’ religious practice, and whose members were to be directly appointed by the president; and (2) the Islamic Research Institute. The latter, to become an object of much controversy, was tasked with the undertaking of “Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.” The 1962 constitution would stand until the end of the Gregorian decade (specifically, March 1969, when martial law was again declared), then officially replaced by a new one in 1973.

The same day that Ayub Khan’s constitution went into effect (8 June), martial law was lifted and Pakistan’s new National Assembly met for the first time. With the Assembly’s adoption of the Political Parties Act in July, the JUI, JI, NIP, and others (including the Khwaja Nazimuddin-led anti-Ayub Council Muslim League party, or CML; after the lifting of Martial Law, the Pakistan Muslim League had split into two
parties: the CML and the pro-Ayub Convention Muslim League) began agitating for amendments to the 1962 constitution. Specifically, the aforementioned parties demanded a restoration of the word “Islamic” to Pakistan’s official name, as well as a restoration in full of the old constitution’s Islamic provisions. This pressure led Ayub Khan to partially concede on some points; on 24 December 1963, the word “Islamic” was finally restored. The old Islamic provisions were restored, too, however slightly altered. But the religious parties, in particular those under Deobandi leadership or influence, were not convinced that the Ayub Khan government was being genuine in its concessions on the constitution’s Islamic nature. It was one thing to include Islamic provisions, and quite another to actually enforce them. And the regime rejected most of the suggestions proferred by the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology—a body it had created by mandate of its very own constitution. Indeed, the Ayub Khan government’s true colors were seemingly revealed when it jailed several Muslim scholars for contesting the regime-run committee in charge of announcing the sighting of the new moon (for Eid; the new moon marks the beginning of the month of Shawwal and the commencement of the Eid holiday, after the month-long Ramadan fast); evidently the committee had altered the date in order to help the President avoid being the subject of a bad omen. In addition, Ayub Khan, whose lack of respect for most of the ‘alāma was by now well established, seemed to support more Western-leaning modernist Islamists (like Dr. Fazlur Rahman, whose work—in particular his 1966 book Islam—was the subject of much controversy). The Islamic Research Institute, which his own constitution had established, seemed bent on interpreting Islam through a distinctly modernist lens, to the deep resentment of the ‘alāma (though, perhaps predictably, embraced by many in academia in the West). That perceived lack of respect could be
applied to some of Islam’s most revered figures, too; once, Ayub Khan’s government portrayed the “rightly guided” caliphs via actual illustrations on national television—a shocking innovation for many Muslims (to whom religious images were forbidden). To top it off, the President sought (ultimately unsuccessfully) to meddle in Friday sermons. All of this seemed to indicate that, whatever might have been included in Pakistan’s new constitution, the regime was not serious about establishing an Islamic order, and it certainly wasn’t interested in obtaining the opinions of the ‘aloma in that regard. The scholars were thus shut out of their traditional role as influential advisers to the state—a role many of them felt they had fought for during the years leading up to independence. All the while, Ayub Khan continued to consolidate his own position by temporarily neutralizing one of his most dangerous critics, the aged and highly vocal Bengali mawlana Bhashani (who, just months previously, had been “thundering about blood and liberty, fair shares or secession”), by making him leader of a Pakistan delegation to China—a journey that evidently had a transformationary effect upon the man. Concurrently, Ayub attacked the religious and political legitimacy of the JI.

The Deobandi and Barelvi spiritual leadership often took strikingly different positions during the Ayub Khan decade. Many JUP leaders actually supported the regime, like some of their Sufi predecessors who had upheld a monarch’s rule to the chagrin of the realm’s ‘aloma. Indeed, Ayub Khan was known to be especially close to two Barelvi divines: the pir of Deval Sharif (West Pakistan) ārāwajh ‘Abdul Majid and the pir of Sarsina (East Pakistan) mawlana Abu Jafar Muhammad Saleh. Once, the former pir was reported to have publicly implied, during a meeting of Muslim League members at Manki Sharif, that Ayub Khan’s leadership had been sanctioned by God, and that dramatically; after all, in a vision the pir of Deval Sharif had seen a “divine light” on the
dictator’s forehead. Ayub Khan was known to consult with the pir frequently, often stopping for a visit while out hunting in the countryside. Perhaps this was not surprising, as the pir was reported to have once told Ayub Khan, “Every word you utter is put in your mouth by God. You are His servant, and whatever you do is done on God’s instructions.” Meanwhile, the pir of Sarsina, who had been a part of the Barelvi deputation led by JUP leader Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent to lobby Khwaja Nazimuddin against the Ahmadis in the early 1950s, likewise supported Ayub Khan and was sometimes even referred to as “President Ayub Khan’s pir.” In November 1963 the President inaugurated the first sessions of the All-Pakistan mashaix Conference “to mobilize [the JUP and other Barelvi mashaix] in favor of his regime.” During the 1964–1965 elections, many of the Barelvi leadership supported Ayub Khan. (In this they were joined by a small segment of JUI leaders, too, on account of the opposition’s undesirable gender; Fatima Jinnah was, after all, a woman). Among the ‘alama, Abdul Hamid Badayuni was known to be especially supportive of the Ayub Khan government.

On the other hand, the Deobandis tended to gravitate towards a strong opposition to the former Field Marshal’s regime. During the Ayub Khan years, the JUI was veritably revived under mufti Mahmud. The catalyst? The regime’s attempts to “modernize” Pakistan, elements of which the JUI found repugnant to Islam as they interpreted it, mobilized support for the party against the Ayub Khan government. In 1962, both the NIP and the JI had come out strongly, and officially, in opposition to the government in power. Indeed, these two Deobandi-leaning parties made up the leading segment of the regime’s political opposition throughout the 1960s. In 1962, that opposition came in the form of the National Democratic Front, in 1964 as the Combined Opposition Parties, and in 1967 as the Pakistan Democratic Movement; in each of these
alliances, the NIP and JI led the anti-Ayub charge. During the 1964–1965 (indirect) elections, most of the Deobandi ‘alāma supported the seventy-one-year-old Fatima Jinnah, sister of Pakistan’s deceased founder and considered by many to be the “Mother of the Nation” (madar-e-myllot). Their support probably had less to do with Fatima Jinnah’s specific platform (which revolved around a restoration of democracy and the elimination of Ayub’s presidential system) than with her position as the chief opposition figure contesting Ayub Khan for power. In their opposition to the regime, the Deobandi scholars were joined by disenfranchised politicians (thousands of whom had been disqualified by Ayub’s Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, or EBDO, from participation in politics), East Pakistanis who felt ostracized by a “West Pakistani soldier-President,” lawyers who opposed Ayub’s tight control over the judiciary, Frontier Province inhabitants following Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his quest for Pathan autonomy (and thus his opposition to a single, West Pakistani unit), and refugees who felt that their claims for property compensation had been ignored. Each of these parties, in one way or another, resented Ayub Khan’s dictatorial position. He had, after all, “EBDOed” around seven thousand of the country’s most influential (and oppositional) politicians, had enacted the Press and Publications Ordinances to muzzle the press, and had enacted the University Ordinance to keep students and faculty out of politics (by threatening them with degree removal), among other actions.139

Even so, Ayub Khan won the election (which was widely believed to have been rigged by the regime). Countrywide, 63.3% of the vote allegedly came down for Ayub Khan, with 36.3% voting for Fatima Jinnah. The only Division won by Jinnah in the western zone at all was Karachi, the stronghold of her base; much of Ayub’s success in the rest of Sindh was attributed to the role of his loyalist Barelvi and landlord network.
“Sind...was safe for Ayub as the pirs (spiritual guides) and mirs (landlords) could not possibly defy the Government,” wrote one academic commentator a year later. In East Pakistan, the “vote” was closer, but Ayub still eked out a victory. Some of his supporters—including his son Gohar—stoked the flames of opposition by parading through the more anti-Ayub neighborhoods of Karachi (again, Fatima’s Jinnah’s base of support) with the alleged intention to “kill, burn, and loot”; at least thirty people died in these post-election “Black Monday” clashes (and Gohar Ayub Khan himself was charged with fatally shooting a man, though essentially nothing came of it as the “inquiry” was “halted”). Still, the JUI didn’t openly oppose the regime until 1968, when the party officially joined the opposition. One of the JUI’s leaders would later be seriously injured in a police-instigated clash during a joint JUI-Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) gathering in Lahore; government forces had charged attendees with batons, brutally beating many. The JUI’s joint action with the socialist PPP vividly illustrates how overarching the issue of the ruling government’s perceived hostility to a truly Islamic order was to the Deobandi ‘alόma. To anyone who remembered the JUH’s joint struggle in concert with the Hindus during pre-Partition days, however, against the British common enemy, such action seemed to fall neatly within the Deobandi political tradition. In any case, in response to the government’s harsh actions, the JUI carried out a protest march—joined by several other, non-religious parties—demanding freedom from such tyranny and the long-promised (at least in the eyes of many among the ‘alόma) Islamization of Pakistan. During this period, leading Deobandi ‘alym mufti Mahmud was particularly vocal in his criticism against the Ayub Khan regime. Mahmud was a graduate of the dar ul’alwem at Deoband, and like most Deobandi ‘alόma had opposed the call for Pakistan’s establishment, opting to cooperate instead with the JUH and the
Indian National Congress. He had joined the JUI in 1956 on the occasion of a large party conference, together with future NWFP JUI leader *mawlana* Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, and (with Ghulam Ghaus) is generally considered the figure responsible for the JUI's transformation from a "purely religious movement" to a "political party."¹⁴³ (This author would contend that the JUI was always political; what changed under the leadership of Hazarvi and Mahmud was strategy. Whereas before the organization was more of an *influencer*, it would now function as a political party in every sense of the term, among other things directly fielding election cadidates. The Barelvi JUP would undergo much the same transformation around the same time.) Both Hazarvi and Mahmud served as JUI representatives within the National Assembly and the West Pakistan provincial assembly during much of the Ayub Khan era. Such pronounced differences, generally speaking, between the Barelvi and Deobandi spiritual leadership in regards to politics during this period make statements like Qureshi’s, who wrote that by the early 1960s “in the modern context sectarian differences have lost their importance,” more than a little puzzling.¹⁴⁴

Only once was Ayub Khan able to distract the oppositional (predominantly Deobandi) *‘alāma* enough to mostly suppress their dissent against his rule. This distraction took the form, predictably, of a war—specifically, the September 1965 Kashmir War with India. Pakistanis and some Kashmiris had waited for more than a decade for any sort of plebiscite (mandated, it will be remembered, after the first Kashmir War by the United Nations) to settle the matter by popular vote. Throughout that time, India had gradually but inexhorably tightened its grip on the region, more or less “absorbing” it as a part of the Indian state, despite frequent bursts of militant infiltration coming from the direction of Pakistan’s western zone. (Meanwhile, Indian
government officials blamed just such infiltrations for the delay in solving the dispute. “The threats of violence which have been [coming] from Pakistan must cease,” stated the Indian representative to the UN Security Council in 1964. “Once better atmosphere prevails, it would be possible—we are prepared to discuss with Pakistan all our outstanding differences.”

The most flagrant Indian assault on Kashmir’s “disputed” status, however, came in 1964 and early 1965, when India changed its constitution so as to “make Kashmiri administration essentially the same” as other Indian units. The move seemed to signal to many Pakistanis that India had decided to out-and-out ignore the Pakistan government’s claim, throw out any UN mandates connected to it, and simply seize Kashmir for itself once and for all.

As these events coincided with Pakistan’s elections and Ayub Khan’s campaign against Fatima Jinnah, it makes sense that the President (with the help of his Foreign Minister—one Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) would throughout the contest stress Pakistan’s struggle for Kashmir as a diversion from “democracy and Islamicity.” Along this same tack, and in response to growing opposition at home (led to a considerable degree by the JI and the NIP), Ayub Khan had launched a minor war with India over the Rann of Kutch. (According to Ayub Khan’s son, Gohar Ayub Khan, speaking in 2005, his father had purchased a “Secret Plan” to attack Pakistan from an Indian Army Brigadier in 1965 for twenty thousand rupees; the purchase was later denied by an ex-Pakistan Army chief). If the conflict was a power-consolidating ploy, it worked. Thousands of Pakistanis, of both the Deobandi and Bareli persuasion, were suddenly gripped with Islamo-patriotic fervor. One recounting of events, from the pen of a well-known Deobandi mufti, is illustrative in this regard:
In 1964 or 1965, I had accompanied my father to Makkah to perform the Hajj. One day, one Arab shopkeeper disclosed to me that war had begun between Pakistan and India at [the] Rann of Kutch. I cannot describe my feelings on hearing this news. When we returned home after Hajj, the war was over. Every child recounted the brave feat of our courageous armed forces and the faith-inspiring stories of Allah’s help. The laughable episodes of the cowardice of the Indian forces were the topic of every assembly. The Pakistan armed forces had routed the enemy much before the volunteers [i.e. jyhadis] could participate.\textsuperscript{149}

Absent from the memoir is any trace of enmity toward the Ayub Khan regime, or any doubt about the Pakistani government’s righteousness. The writer, instead, is wrapped up in the “faith-inspiring” struggle, and animosity is preserved for the unbelieving “Indian forces.” The twenty-nine-year-old son of Muhammad Shafi even remembered being “inspired” by the President’s 6 September speech to the nation—a speech that included a recitation of the \textit{kālīmah} and an admonition both to the military and “the common man” to participate in \textit{jyhad}. “Those who…heard his speech,” Shafi’s son wrote, thirty years after Ayub Khan’s homily, “may be remembering its appeal even today.” Though Pakistani volunteers were generally not permitted to fight at the front, many received civil defense and first aid training. Deobandi \textit{mufti} Muhammad Rafi Usmani, who was teaching at the \textit{dar ul'al\=wm} at Karachi at the time, remembers watching the Pakistan Air Force planes zooming through the sky, “chasing the enemy aircraft,” and described how spectators shed “tears of joy,” their “hearts full of prayers,” caught up in the deep feelings of the moment.\textsuperscript{150} Briefly, then, Ayub Khan not only
secured his own position but also brought Deobandi and Barelvi scholars and their followers together, in a sense, against a common enemy.

Pakistan slightly outperformed India throughout the April and May fighting on the Rann before a June cease-fire (and a promised arbitration between the two enemy states) brought an end to armed combat. Meanwhile, however, an uprising had broken out in Kashmir (almost certainly instigated by agents taking orders from the Ayub Khan regime itself), prompting Indian troops to occupy strategic positions across the cease-fire line (or CFL, later called the “Line of Control,” or LoC) in Pakistani territory. This was in August. Ayub Khan’s response was to invade Jammu (1 September), which elicited a counter-invasion of Pakistan by India. Some of the worst fighting took place on the very outskirts of major cities like Lahore and Sialkot. The conflict was prevented from escalating into an all-out war after a 23 September UN-proclaimed cease-fire made possible by pressure from both Washington and Moscow. Throughout the conflict, Ayub Khan worked hard to win the ‘al¾ma to his side. Verses of the Qur’an were printed on the front page of newspapers, urging “believers” to fight.151 Long-time nemesis Mawdudi even called for a jyhad in Kashmir (thus reverting his earlier position, aforementioned), and after the 23 September cease-fire was invited onto Radio Pakistan to “speak on jihad in peacetime.” The ‘al¾ma parties organized relief efforts for the border areas most affected by the conflict, all the while hoping that now a plebscite might be forthcoming.152 “There is a considerable reservoir of religious emotions,” wrote one commentator shortly after the war, “that a Pakistan Government can draw upon for purposes of national unity during a time of crisis.”153 In conducting the war, Ayub was seen as possessing an “independent foreign policy” (however engineered by Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto)—i.e. independent from the West. This sat well with most of the
‘alma. In addition, many ‘alma looked on approvingly as other Muslim countries (notably Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia) offered military and/or moral support for Pakistan’s Kashmir fight (several Arab countries passed a joint resolution supporting Pakistan, too). But with the war over and Ayub Khan’s status temporarily repaired (he had fought the Indians despite pressure from the U.S. Government, and had won an “election,” to boot), the government abruptly seemed less interested in placating the religious scholars and their parties.

But after the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration, which officially ended the India-Pakistan conflict (at least for the time-being), any renewed popularity that Ayub Khan might have enjoyed began to wane. Many were greatly unsatisfied by the agreement’s provisions; it seemed to some as a document of acquiescence on Pakistan’s part, restoring as it did the 1949 cease-fire line combined with a commitment by both states not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another. Was this not a surrender of the original Kashmir claim? (One of Ayub Khan’s most powerful critics: Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto, his own very aggressive Foreign Minister; Bhutto would resign in June 1966.) Disillusionment over the Declaration combined with a debilitating sickness that ailed Ayub Khan from 1967 until the spring of 1968 (at one point the President was even “unconscious for a time”); though he would continue to wield the powers of his office, he was “never his old self again,” depending far more heavily on advisors of dubious ability and qualifications. Allegations that the 1965 elections had been rigged by the government, of widespread corruption within the regime and within Ayub Khan’s own family (said to be worth tens of millions of dollars), and a perceived widening socio-economic disparity between the super-rich and the poor likewise affected the President’s popularity. Protests against the regime began to make noise again throughout the
country, which the increasingly desperate Ayub Khan attempted to quash using brutal force—resulting in the deaths of several students and an array of arrests amidst the subsequent rioting. An (unsuccessful) attempt was made on the President’s life on a foggy day in mid-November (on the same day, incidentally, that four Yemeni would-be assassins tried to terminate the life of American President Richard Nixon, an early example of “blowback” for U.S. government intervention in the Muslim world). Still, Ayub had managed to consolidate his position so well that, even with this growing surge of opposition, he remained more secure than not. By October 1967, the President’s main opposition came in the form of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), which included both the JI and the NIP; despite achieving “visible unity” after five months of inter-party bickering, however, PDM leaders admitted they held “bleak hope” of actually seizing the reigns of power from Ayub. The President “is entrenched and secure,” the alliance conceded, with a wide base of support in the Army and across sections of West Pakistan. The role of the opposition “under the present restrictions,” said NIP head (and former Prime Minister) Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, was to at least “maintain the country’s conscience.” Despite the president’s perceived “entrenchment,” however, it was clear that public opinion against the regime was spreading.

By 1969, even the Barelvi spiritual and political leadership that had remained loyal to the regime had ascertained the direction of the political winds. JUP leaders and their supporters had spoken out strongly against the government’s interference in the “purely religious matter” of the moon sighting for Eid (subsequently two Eids were celebrated in 1967, one according to the regime’s schedule and the other according to that of the ‘alɔma); when their criticism became too much to bear, the Ayub Khan government
imprisoned five of the most vocal Islamic scholars, including the aforementioned Barelvi acolyte of Naimuddin Moradabadi, Muhammad Hussain Naeemi. This, combined with a general Barelvi sense that Ayub Khan had not delivered on the promises he had made to them (regarding amendments to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and the enforcement of *shari‘at*, for example), caused the JUP to unhitch its wagon from the regime’s sputtering train. Indeed, sensing that continued support of the Ayub government would injure their status, as well as their continued claim to represent the Sunni majority, the JUP joined the opposition to Ayub Khan—but only after purging Abdul Hamid Badayuni (whose aforementioned support for the government was characterized as “continued and unconditional”) from party leadership. (Two breakaway groups resulted from this move: one led by Badayuni and another led by Faizal Hasan, both of which actually released statements supporting Ayub Khan.)

The move to rid the upper echelons of the JUP of Abdul Hamid Badayuni was led by *sayyid* Abul Barakat Ahmad, and accomplished on 5 January 1969. Thus the Ayub Khan government’s continued rejection of ‘*al‘ama* demands for an Islamic state, plus external political pressure from both religious and non-religious quarters across the country, combined to briefly unite the positions, again, of the Deobandi and Barelvi parties, at least in terms of their rejection of Ayub Khan and his government.

In January 1969, an alliance of eight parties—including both the JUI and the JI—was formed under the name Democratic Action Committee. The organization’s overarching goal was to effect the restoration of “democracy” by coordinating a “mass movement” against the Ayub Khan regime. Within the Committee, JUI leader *mufti* Mahmud continued to urge his fellow anti-Ayub agitators that any amendments to a future Pakistani constitution should be based on the aforementioned and ‘*al‘ama*—
formulated “Twenty-Two Principles.” Whether motivated by the Democratic Action Committee or borne of local, “spontaneous” dissent, demonstrations sprung up all over the country. In response, the flailing regime sent military units into Pakistan’s major cities, including Lahore, Dhaka, Khulna, Karachi, and Peshawar, and imposed a curfew. But these actions were largely ineffective, and especially in rural areas the people mostly ignored the curfew. The next month (February), Ayub Khan, sensing a lack of confidence in him even from some of his own generals, attempted the conciliatory route aimed at the politicians, inviting the Democratic Action Committee to a round table conference in Rawalpindi. There he agreed not only to the introduction of a new constitution in the foreseeable future, but also not to stand for reelection in 1970. But Ayub’s gamble didn’t pay off; on 25 March 1969, Martial Law was once again declared, its chief administrator Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, and the 1962 constitution was officially abrogated. After the subsequent resignation of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan became President of Pakistan, vowing National Assembly elections (not of the indirect, Ayub Khan variety, but based on adult franchise) and a new, Assembly-formualted constitution.

After the 1965 Kashmir War, opposition to the Ayub Khan regime seemed to be colored less and less by Islamist tones and more and more by socialist ones. This, of course, greatly concerned the ‘alma on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi aisle, who began to sense that perhaps the greater threat to the establishment of an Islamic order in Pakistan wasn’t the waning dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan at all, nor the President’s modernism—but a growing wave of socialist ideology. Indeed, much of the opposition to the Ayub Khan regime had far less to do with Islam than with socio-economic factors like poverty and food shortages. The ‘alma had long blamed such
things on the failure of government to institute an Islamic order, which, they theorized, would put an end to such misery by instituting a God-inspired politico-economic system. But the socialists were offering an alternate plan, one that was attached to grand promises of prosperity, equality, justice—and an end to hunger and suffering at the hands of greedy power-seekers. In addition, while the religious parties stressed Islam as a unifying force, thereby underscoring an overarching “nationalism” and the unity of Pakistan, the left appeared far more sympathetic to “ethnic and linguistic sentiments” and “socioeconomic cleavages” that the ‘aḻma, generally speaking, seemed to ignore altogether.\textsuperscript{161} It was with such promises on his lips that Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto left the government to form the Pakistan People’s Party, promoting the image of Ayub Khan as a symbol of inequality; the failure of the old PDM, with all of its pessimism, to garner widespread popular support in West Pakistan thus set the stage for the PPP’s rise, with its far more positive outlook and fantastic assurances based on “democratic socialism.”\textsuperscript{162} By the time the round table conference in Rawalpindi between the Democratic Action Committee and Ayub Khan had ended, the relevance of the former had been eclipsed by the rising—and now clearly more powerful—(moderately socialist) Awami League, based in the eastern zone, and the heavily socialist (even quasi-communist) Pakistan People’s Party, based in the western zone. Bhutto was, proclaimed a somewhat adoring Western media, “Asia’s new champion of socialism.”

As such, the invective of the ‘aḻma parties, while still aimed at the crumbling Ayub Khan regime, turned against the leadership of the Awami League and the PPP—and the socialist ideology that they espoused. Mawdudi was particularly irritated by the aforementioned parties’ attempts at “mix[ing] Islam with leftist ideas.” On 27 February 1969, the ‘aḻma of West Pakistan, representing both Deobandis and Barelvis,
launched a campaign “to condemn socialism and communism.” The campaign’s microphone was the mosque: indeed, “almost every mosque in the western province.” This effort, not coincidentally, coincided with ‘aid ul-әžha (the lesser of the two Eid holidays, celebrated in remembrance of the willingness of both Ibrahim and Ismail ['Abraham and Isaac'] to submit to the will of God)—meaning that tens of millions of Muslims would be attending the mәsjyd as part of the festival’s observance. Pakistan had been established on the foundation of Islam, warned the ‘әlәma of Rawalpindi (where, just 24 hours before, Bhutto himself “received a rousing welcome”), but the “socialists...would undo the fabric of Islamic law.” By 1969, the anti-Ayub campaign of the ‘әlәma had been overshadowed almost completely by the new conflict between the religious scholar-jurists and the “militant leftists” and their “champion,” Bhutto. The situation reached a breaking point in March, when even the Ayub Khan regime “threatened firm action to suppress lawlessness” in reference to the newly emerged rivalry. On the 14th, Mawdudi had reportedly admonished his followers to “silence the tongue that utters the word socialism.” This was succeeded the next day by a failed attempt to kidnap and murder aforementioned pro-Mao and pro-Bhutto NAP leader mәwlana Bhashani while the eighty-six-year-old was traveling by train from Lahore to Karachi (though the old man was slightly injured, the attempt failed). The agitation against Ayub Khan had resulted in at least one hundred fifty deaths between November 1968 and March 1969, and it was clear now that the regime’s days were numbered; the ‘әlәma parties now vied with Bhutto and the leftists for political supremacy.

When Ayub Khan resigned, ‘әlәma party leaders called on the Awami League and the PPP to “demobilize” now that their chief target—Ayub—had been defeated, an admonition that Bhutto and Mujib failed to heed, of course. No longer cooperatively
opposed to the now-defunct regime of Ayub Khan, parties like the JI on one side and the Awami League and the PPP on the other hit the streets to campaign against one another.\textsuperscript{165}

\textit{Yahya Khan, the 1970 Elections, and the Birth of Bangladesh.}

After the fall of the Ayub Khan administration in March of 1969, political activity more or less ceased in Pakistan for about ten months. Martial law had been established. This would last until early January 1970. It was during this short apolitical interregnum that the Barelvi luminaries guiding the JUP, \textit{mwlana} Abu'l Barakat \textit{sayyid} Ahmad Qadiri at the helm, decided to focus on that party’s most pressing problem: unity. For it was quite obvious to even the most unobservant party insider that, since years—even decades—before Partition, the great ‘\textit{alma} and \textit{pirs} who claimed to represent the vast majority of Sunni Muslims had lacked not only the support of the people, but also of one another. After the resumption of political activities (from 1 January 1970, with general elections scheduled for 5 October), the JUP made several efforts to bring the party’s many apparently disparate parts together. This was necessary in order to restore a government \textit{of the people}—the majority of whom, they insisted, certainly looked to them, their spiritual guides, for direction and leadership. Just as the Deobandi JUI had done in the days leading up to Partition, and just as the Deobandi-leaning JI was doing now, rival religious parties—better organized, more determined, and far more unified—were hijacking the political process and threatening to institute their apostate versions of Islam via the guns of government. For the sake of the “eighty percent,” whose religious guardians they were, the “Sunnis” \textit{must} demand the representation they deserved. “Secularism” and “Socialism” and “Capitalism”—these
were significant menaces, certainly. But always present, too, was the threat posed by “rival religious sects” (especially if their political wings seemed to experience more electoral success than that of the Barelvis). It was time to fix the problem and stand as one.

All of this served as the backdrop to mwlana Abu'l Barakat sayyid Ahmad Qadiri’s call for a meeting in Lahore. The day was to be 25 January 1969. After some discussion, the assembled religious scholars and dignitaries decided to form a thirteen-member committee to act as a sort of central coordinating organ for the various scattered and disjointed JUP groups across the country. The committee met again ten months later in Gujranwala (November) and then again in Lyallpur (December). Try as they might, however, the Barelvis simply could not unite under a single, cohesive platform, despite the recognized fact that such unity would be necessary “in order to check the activities of Secularists, Socialists and rival religious sects” (italics added). Barelvi leaders condemned the fragmentation that seemed to plague their party—but this was typically followed by placing blame on one or another of their own members, leading to further division. Perhaps another committee, another board, another “high command,” composed of the “Presidents and [general secretaries] of every group” was the answer. But such suggestions were never brought to fruition, and the original committee remained the only one. Such a proposal was agreed upon at one January 1970 meeting of JUP officials at Sangla Hill, presided over by xawajh Qamaruddin Sialvi, only to be rejected by a faction led by mwlana Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi. To make matters worse, sahybzada qazi Muhammad Fazl-e-Rasul, president of the Hazarvi faction of the West Pakistan JUP (the provincial branch of the JUP), who had been appointed to that office a year before, stepped down from office; the reason he provided
at the time of his resignation: the “other groups [within the JUP]” were “working for
their own interests and had damaged the unity among the Ahl-e-Sunnat.” The next
month Hazarvi himself resigned, too, though he was later “forced” to withdraw his
resignation. Meanwhile, yet another JUP faction, this one led by Mahmud Shah
Gujrati, functioned more or less on its own, only nominally tied to the greater party.
Despite all of the JUP leadership’s efforts, the party’s disunity appeared quite
insurmountable.166

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Yahya’s regime superceded the civilian government bureaucracy more than any of
its predecessors, severely straining the unspoken bureaucracy-military partnership that
had marked previous administrations. But even with the military assuming such a
dominating role, in the words of one standard history, “Yahya Khan and his military
advisors proved no more capable of overcoming the nation’s problems than their
predecessors.”167 At least part of this lay in Yahya Khan’s dictatorial nature, one that
conflicted with the seemingly “democratic” demands of the opposition. All this did not
mean that the new state head wouldn’t try to solve Pakistan’s woes, however. On 28
November 1969, he announced his plan to see the country return to constitutional
government, a bone thrown to those who feared he might be a military dictator.
National Assembly general elections were fixed for 5 October 1970, later pushed back to
December; this would have major political consequences, as the “Bhola Cyclone”—the
deadliest tropical cyclone ever recorded—would strike East Pakistan in November,
killing as many as half a million people. (The Yahya regime’s handling of relief efforts
in East Pakistan was harshly criticized by Bengalis and likely contributed much to the
Awami League’s overwhelming electoral victory the next month.) Yahya’s announced
plan was for the National Assembly, once elected, to have one hundred twenty days to formulate a constitution; there would be no undue delay, no years-long squabbling over the state’s ruling document. In addition, Yahya Khan promised the eventual institution of a truly federal system, characterized by “maximum provincial autonomy,” almost certainly an attempt to assuage nationalist Bengalis (and, specifically, the Awami League), who had been pressing for their “Six Points” (see endnote) for several years already. On the issue of taxation, however—one of the “Six Points” demanded that the power to tax be vested only in the provinces, with the federal government then entitled to a certain share—Yahya Khan put his foot down, claiming for the central government the all-important taxation power. Not surprisingly, given his authoritarian tendencies, Yahya vested in himself final authority to approve, or disapprove, the future constitution as formulated by the National Assembly. This, in a nutshell, was the Yahya plan for fulfilling the promises of Pakistan’s founding.

The JI, however tacitly at first, supported the Yahya Khan regime. Yahya had vowed, after all, to destroy any party opposed to the “ideology of Pakistan”—a politician’s phrase that allowed various parties to interpret its meaning through their own particular lenses. For the JI, the “ideology of Pakistan” clearly meant an espousal of the country’s Islamic identity. Just as importantly, though, the “ideology of Pakistan” was interpreted as a hostile statement aimed at the leftist parties like the PPP and the Awami League. The JI, then, essentially threw in with Yahya in order to cleanse Pakistan of the greater evil of socialism/communism. To a lesser extent, the JI’s support for the regime was also based on the “ideology of Pakistan” as an ideology of unity—meaning that the policy demands of such traitors as provincial nationalists, especially Bengali nationalists or, worse, would-be secessionists, should be stamped out.
Thus, in the words of Nasr, “Political exigency had led Islamic constitutionalism into an unholy alliance with the very regime it had fought against.” In this, the JI had adopted the unified-state stance of the majority of Barelvi leaders, as opposed to the more province-level outlook of the Deobandis. For their part, the JUI distanced itself quickly from the JI, a rift that continues to the time of this writing. (Part and parcel to this distance was the behavior of many among younger-generation JI members and supporters, particularly those of university age; on the University of Karachi campus, for example, those belonging to this latter category were mockingly referred to by some students as “Disco mwlvis”—“modernly attired and beardless” members of the JI’s student wing who liked pop music and had girlfriends, to boot, but who nonetheless proscribed to the Jamaat’s religio-political philosophy.) Indeed, the schism would play a major role in the development of the “Taliban” (about which more later).

But the JUI itself, like the JUP (though not quite to the same extent), was during this period afflicted with division, and that division centered around the issue of socialism. Some Deobandi leaders saw socialism as a potential vehicle for arriving at the Islamic egalitarian ideal—though only a vehicle; Islam was, after all, a “complete way of life” that needed no substitution, either by socialism or any other ideology. Those calling for the Islamic parties to divert their attention to the destruction of socialism, this faction argued, were merely “imperialist agents” working, whether knowingly or not, for the Anglo-American establishment. Those arguing in this vein included JUI leaders mufti Mahmud and mufti Hazarvi, who were instrumental in forging alliances between their faction (the All-Pakistan JUI, the bigger faction of the two; hereafter, for the sake of continuity, the author will continue to refer to this faction as the JUI) and several left-leaning political parties. Other Deobandi scholars viewed socialism as a
western philosophy that would only serve to steer Pakistan further from becoming an Islamic state. The faction espousing this latter philosophy (the Markazi JUI [MJUI], along with elements of the NIP) was perhaps led most prominently by Muhammad Shafi and Zafar Ahmad Usmani, who in February 1970 both signed a juridical ruling (along with one hundred eleven other ‘alama, mostly Barevis but including several Shi’a clerics, too) flatly declaring socialism “apostasy” and its proponents unbelievers. The MJUI at times worked with the JI in condemnation of both socialism and those Deobandi clerics who had thrown in their lot with it. An August 1969 attempt to reconcile the two factions succeeded only in getting each to agree not to malign the other. The main party, led by mufti Mahmud, campaigned on a platform that included both Islamic and welfarist/socialist thrusts. The former included a call for the institution of the old “Twenty-Two Points” for an Islamic constitution, the exclusion from the definition of “Muslim” of any who did not believe in the finality of the Prophet, the requirement for the head of state to be a Sunni, the banning of non-Muslim missionary efforts in Pakistan, and the institution of mandatory congregational prayers.171 True to the traditional Deobandi opposition to imperialism—which, by now, included the American variety (and mufti Mahmud, as aforementioned, was strongly anti-American for this reason, condemning the U.S. Government’s interventions in the Middle East)—the JUI’s manifesto called for an independent foreign policy, devoid of alliances with western powers.172

Eight months after the announcement of his plan for elections and a new Pakistani constitution, Yahya dissolved the “One Unit Plan” then in place for West Pakistan, restoring its four original provinces to their former status. At the same time, the parity system (under which East and West had enjoyed equal representation at the federal
level) was discontinued in favor of a population-based system; under the latter arrangement, former West Pakistan was allotted a total of one hundred thirty-eight seats in the National Assembly, compared to the more populous East Pakistan’s one hundred sixty-two.

The religious parties threw themselves forcefully into the elections of 1970—the first “one person, one vote” elections in Pakistani history. The Muslim scholars of both schools were convinced that, given the choice, the vast majority of Pakistanis would elect candidates from the religious parties, pious and committed to Islam. Some of the repressive laws that had been put in place under the Martial Law administration were lifted or softened for the sake of the election; the press was mostly de-muzzled and a relaxing of free speech and assembly restrictions occurred, too. As such, National Assembly seat contestants and their parties campaigned hard to win voters—and lambast their opponents. In this, the JUI and JUP (as well as the JI) were not nearly as effective as their left-leaning opponents. In recognizably communist fashion, Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto promised “bread, clothes, and a house” (rūtī, ḫopra, awr məkan) for all (simultaneously—and, some economists might say, contradictingly, pledging Pakistan to a “thousand year war with India,” a point he tried to backtrack from a few months later). His campaign and those of other PPP National Assembly hopefuls was focused almost entirely on Pakistan’s western wing, with strong support in Punjab and Sindh. Meanwhile, the Awami League, based and focused almost exclusively in the eastern zone, continued to dominate Bengali politics, riding the “Six Points” program with help from the general Bengali perception that West Pakistan was indifferent to them. As mentioned previously, this feeling was greatly exacerbated after the apparent failure of the federal government, led mostly by West Pakistanis, to send sufficient aid to cyclone
ravaged areas of Bengal. Even the National Awami Party (a “successor” to the old KK movement of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan),\(^\text{174}\) with which the JUI would later form coalition governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan (again, siding with a lesser evil in the name of defeating the greater), ran on a platform of “socialism, democracy, nationalization of industries, [and] a welfare state.”\(^\text{175}\) The campaigns of both the PPP and the Awami League, as well as that of the smaller NAP, underscored both parties’ strategy of appealing first and foremost to the public’s socio-economic grievances (in the West focusing on poverty and government corruption, in the East on poverty, East-West financial disparities, and government negligence).

The ‘\textit{albuma}’ parties (including the JI) failed to tap into such grievances, focusing instead throughout the 1970 election campaign season (and as always) on the Islamization of Pakistan as the panacea for the country’s many problems. Indeed, the main thrust of the Barelvi and Deobandi religio-political organizations tended strongly, as ever, towards the establishment of an Islamic order. Apart from Islamization, most of the ‘\textit{albuma}’ stressed opposition to provincial nationalist (and secessionist) movements, as well as a resoration, in time, of “democracy” (by means of this last maintaining a veneer of opposition to the regime). (It should be noted that a large faction of the JUI supported greater autonomy—and even outright independence—for the Pathan northwest, or “Pakhtunistan.”) The PPP’s economic “solutions,” insisted the JI, were based on false premises; only “Islam” could serve as a “rememd,” to Pakistan’s so-called social justic issues. In East Pakistan, JI activists literally clashed with Awami League workers and sympathizers; one member of the JI’s male student wing was killed in a confrontation at Dhaka University, prompting Mawdudi to demand “that the [student group] cleanse Pakistani universities of the left.” More died—on both sides—in other
clashes across the country’s far eastern province. Indeed, the JI’s activities, and in particular the party’s observation of what it dubbed “Glory of Islam Day” (yw’m-e-
eshwkat-e-yislam) on 30 May, brought the Deobandis and Barelvis, in the shape of their respective political parties, together in another show of “separate unity.” JI members, workers, and sympathizers celebrated “Glory of Islam Day” via demonstrations, parades and marches, speeches, and protest rallies; their goal was to throw the spotlight onto Islam as the most important political issue (as opposed to the left’s emphasis on economics-related promises).

But to the JUI under mufti Mahmud (who by now had consolidated his power at the top of the party structure by taking over the “Pashtun faction” of the JUI), the celebration smacked of opportunism, and represented an attempt on Mawdudi’s part to set himself up as a sort of religious head. In this the JI chief was usurping the traditional role of the ‘alama and thereby “monopolizing religious thought.” The JUI thus opposed yw’m-e-shwkat-e-yislam and a schism ensued. The JUP, too, demonstrated its opposition to the JI when it contested the party directly in forty-two National Assembly seat races—effectively splitting the religious vote and more or less ensuring PPP victory in those particular races. Meanwhile, the JUI put forward its own candidates as well. It is interesting to note that while both the Deobandi JUI and the Barelvi JUP opposed the JI, and for the same reason, no alliance between the two—even in the name of advancing the cause of an Islamic constitution—ever took place. Rather, they contested each other, especially in Punjab and Sindh. This only accomplished in watering down the religious vote. The Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had weakened the religious parties’ political chances yet again.
Perhaps it is not surprising that no united Deobandi-Barelvi effort took place during the 1970 elections. Apart from their long-standing religious rivalry, the JUP in particular could scarcely unite within itself. One segment of the Barelvi leadership even sided with Bhutto’s PPP, remaining seemingly unmoved in their decision despite calls (and even juridical rulings) condemning their position. After all of the failed attempts over the previous months to bring the various factions within the party together, a “grand meeting” of Barelvi ‘ulama was convened on 4 April in Lahore. Only one major JUP faction—that of Mahmud Shah Gujrati—failed to attend. One of the key stumbling blocks to achieving intra-party harmony was the seemingly perpetual state of disagreement and mutual mistrust displayed by its several leaders. The Lahore meeting took drastic steps to combat this, accepting or forcing the resignation of five key officials (including party president Abdul Hamid Badayuni, who, though not personally present, had wired his approbation both of the meeting and its decisions) within the JUP. “After all these resignations,” wrote one JUP historian, “the differences of the Sunni Ulama were bridged…” A twenty-five-person committee was appointed to act as the party’s “executive supreme council.” Another committee, this one composed of six members, was also appointed—with the task of composing an official JUP manifesto. Combined with the JUP’s direct contestation of the elections later that year, this marked the completion of the transformation of the JUP from quasi-politico-religious movement to full-fledged religio-political party.

The JUP platform would highlight the “cause of Islam,” blaming the Ayub Khan regime as well as the newly ascendant socialist parties for twisting the faith, at the same time condemning “Regionalism” and those “threatening guerilla war” (these last two referred especially to the separatism brewing in Pakistan’s eastern wing). One JUP
leader, Mahmud Ahmad Rizvi (the convener of the newly formed party central
commitee) even suggested that the party form its own army to stamp out the threat of
would-be secessionists and/or advocates of guerilla war, though nothing official appears
to have come of it. JUP candidates demanded not only that *shari‘at* be strictly and
immediately instituted in Pakistan, but that ninety percent of the armed forces should
be comprised of “Sunnis.” The JUP promise: “As long as a single Sunni is alive, no
other ‘ism’ can establish its roots in Pakistan.” Like the JI and the JUI, the JUP focused
on placing Islam and the establishment of a truly Islamic government in Pakistan atop
the political pedestal, ahead of the PPP’s socio-economic emphases. As to the latter, the
long-overdue institution of an “Islamic” economic system, the JUP insisted, was the
answer to such problems. A mostly united front had been created behind the Barelvi
religious leadership, though it wouldn’t take more than a few months for some major
cracks in its foundation to appear.

Calls for Islam to remain the front-and-center issue on the political stage, emanating
from the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, went mostly unheeded. The religious parties’ own
divisions, not to mention their rivalries one with another, further eroded their ability to
contest the elections as major players. Indeed, during the election period there were
some who even proclaimed the “consummation” of the “process of political
secularization” trail-blazed by Sir sayyid Ahmad Khan; from now on, these
commentators asserted, “economic issues will determine the dynamics of politics”—not
questions of theology. And as aforementioned, economic issues certainly *did*
dominate the 1970 elections, pushing the issue of an Islamic state into the background,
despite JUI, JI, and JUP efforts to wrest it back into the spotlight. Another factor that
seemed to be contributing to the eventual seeming irrelevance of the ‘*alima* parties may
have been the couching, by virtually every party, of political terms in Islamic ones. Party propaganda—and not just that of the ‘aləma parties, anymore—was marked by a vaneer of “Muslimness,” of “the ideology of Pakistan.” This was perhaps most famously demonstrated in Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s slogan for the PPP, first uttered in a political speech four months after his resignation as Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister: “Islam our Faith, Democracy our Policy, Socialism our Economy.”179 In this vein, Bhutto called his economic program “Islamic socialism.” “We [the PPP] would lay down our lives for Islam,” Bhutto told a crowd in Rawalpindi in February 1969, at the same time condemning “the rule of capitalists” and the super-rich.180 (Perhaps another, far more consequential example of Bhutto’s political maneuverings vis-à-vis the “Islamic” element of Pakistani society came in 1974, when his government declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.) The ‘aləma thus no longer held a corner on the political market in this regard. For many, the PPP’s allusions to Islam were genuine—simply the natural result of their operating in Pakistan, a state borne of Muslim dreams. “The significance of an Islamic state in Pakistan’s political culture,” wrote Pakistani scholar Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, “is so dominating that even parties committed to a socialist way of life mention an Islamic system of government in their manifestos.”181 To many among the ‘aləma, however, the PPP and other socialist parties were merely cloaking their own genuinely godless ideology in Islamic terms to fool the masses.

Even though the major rivalries evident during the 1970 general election season revolved around socialism and its opponents, and East Pakistani autonomy and its opponents, animosity between the Deobandi and Barelvi camps flared up considerably, too. At a major JUP conference at Toba Tek Singh in June (a location selected to counter the effect of another Toba Tek Singh conference, held earlier in March and led
by erstwhile JUP head Mahmud Shah Gujarati; the earlier gathering, dubbing itself a Farmer’s Conference, had been pro-PPP, condemning those who condemned socialism and using hadis to demonstrate support for communist China), the Deobandi JUI was lambasted right along with “Socialism and Capitalism.” More than three thousand ‘alama and mashaix attended the Toba Tek conference, during which, M. Ahmad tells us, “almost every speaker” opened his remarks with a scouring of both “Socialism and the Congressite Ulama.” The Deobandis, maintained mwlana Arifullah Qadiri, were out to destroy Pakistan once more—a country born despite their (the Deobandis’) best efforts to prevent the Muslim state from coming into being in the first place. During the conference’s final session, mwlana Muhammad Sharif Noori, after condemning Mawdudi and the JI, took aim at two Deobandi heroes: sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his disciple and friend Muhammad Ismail. sayyid Ahmad and Muhammad Ismail, Noori said, were British agents. JUP leader Mahmud Ahmad Riza blasted the JUI during his Friday sermon at the same location, similarly lambasting mwlna Bhashani (head of the Awami League)—seen as a socialist and a regionalist—and Bhutto. JUI ‘alama were, Rizvi argued, “the followers of Gandhi and Nehru” and thus did not truly have the best interests of the ummat in mind. Some of the Barelvi pirs used their significant social and religious influence to sway—indeed, almost compel—disciples and murids to vote according to their (the pirs’) dictates; xawajh Qarauddin Sialvi, for example, threatened with expulsion from the dargah any of his followers who failed to heed his political counsel. During the election, Barelvi cadidates in the Punjab regularly spoke out against other Islamic parties; in Sindh, though, candidates tended to avoid such contention, focusing on the PPP instead. Thus Barelvi leaders were divided as to how to confront socialism vis-a-vis the Deobandis, some opting to work “together” (or at
least not to directly oppose one another, concentrating instead on Bhutto), others
directing their opposition towards the JUI, in the tradition of Ahmad Riza Khan—who
had been quite clear in regard to working with “bad” Muslims. Electoral opposition to
the JI would perhaps have been understandable, given that the JI was not, strictly
speaking, an ‘al‘āma party, but even the overarching joint goals of the JUI and the JUP
(specifically, for an unambiguously Islamic state, complete with an Islamic constitution
and a shāri‘at-based judiciary) were not enough to cause the two groups to forge ahead
on a united platform. This was, perhaps, the greatest weakness of the ‘al‘āma parties in
pursuance of their electoral aims, and certainly the most significant political result of
the dynamic between the two schools of thought.

National Assembly elections were held on 7 December, with provincial elections
following closely on the tenth. The results spelled a staggering victory for the Awami
League in the eastern zone, where it won all but two seats in the National Assembly
(compared to none in the western zone). Still, this gave the party an actual majority in
Pakistan’s federal legislature, meaning it could legitimately form a government.
Meanwhile, the PPP dominated the results for Punjab and Sindh. For the Islamic
parties, the election represented an overwhelming dissapointment—even a disaster.
“The results of the 1970 National and Provincial Assembly elections,” wrote one
Pakistani scholar, “highlighted the inadequacy of Islam as the sole basis for political
legitimacy and support.”184 The only victory for the ‘al‘āma parties came in the NWFP
and Baluchistan, where the Deobandis through the JUI, in a coalition with the NAP,
were able to win pluralities. (Perhaps one JUI victory meant the most, however; in the
National Assembly’s Dera Ismail Khan constituency, mufti Mahmud beat out Zulfikar
‘Ali Bhutto himself.) All told, the JUI (operating in former West Pakistan only) won
almost four percent of the total vote (3.98%), translating to seven National Assembly seats. (This doesn’t include one seat won in East Pakistan by combined MJUI-NIP efforts.) The JI (operating in both wings) won 6.03% of the total vote but just four seats in the National Assembly. The JUP (campaigning mostly in the western wing) obtained 3.94% of the vote total, plus seven National Assembly seats. The election results, besides illustrating the relative weakness of the ‘ulama parties (failing as they did to unite within a coalition), reveal, to an extent, the geography of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry. In the NWFP and in Baluchistan, for example, the JUI won twenty-five percent and twenty percent of the vote total, respectively, while the JUP scored zero percent in both provinces. But in Sindh and Punjab, the JUP took home seven percent and ten percent, respectively, almost double the JUI count in both provinces. Sindh and Punjab were Barelvi areas, with a significant Deobandi minority mixed in, but in the NWFP and Baluchistan, Deobandism clearly dominated. On the provincial level, results were similarly proportioned; the JUI won four seats in the NWFP assembly and three in the Baluchistan assembly, but only two in Punjab and none in Sindh, while the JUP walked away with four seats in Punjab and seven in Sindh, but none in the NWFP or Baluchistan.

Things began to break down politically after the release of the 1970 election results. Possessing a majority all on its own in the National Assembly, the Awami League under shia Mujibur Rahman did indeed demand the right to form a government. Predictably, Bhutto rejected this outright, and self-appointed mediator Yahya Khan was helpless to bring the two to an accommodation. Bhutto further assured the impossibility of any attempt at establishing civilian government when, in protest of the Awami League’s perceived power grab, he announced that the PPP would not attend the National
Assembly’s inaugural session. Of course, this would have effectively voided anything the National Assembly might have attempted to do, prompting Yahya Khan—now in a very delicate position—to dissolve his cabinet and postpone the sitting of the National Assembly indefinitely. The move garnered an unsurprisingly hostile reception in Pakistan’s eastern zone, where riots, demonstrations, and strikes combined with an Awami League-led refusal by Bengalis either to pay their taxes or abide by Martial Law restrictions. Their party had won fair and square—and now it was being pushed out of power by petulant West Pakistanis. The JI, formerly a supporter of the regime, temporarily broke with Yahya over the Awami League government issue, understanding that Yahya’s non-compliance with the Bengalis likely meant more power for Bhutto and the PPP—the greater enemy.¹⁸⁷

Deobandi leaders tended to blame the gaping schism between East and West Pakistanis on the “weakening of Islamic ties.” “The two wings,” wrote Muhammad Rafi, “…became distant because the strong Islamic ties became weaker.” The subsequent state of affairs made it easy for Pakistan’s—and Islam’s—“enemies” to take full advantage of the situation. Bengali Hindu teachers, for example, were among those blamed, as well as the ever-meddling Indian and American governments. Of course, provincial and linguistic differences played their parts, too, but these were mere symptoms. What had brought on the “weakening of Islamic ties” in the first place? Muhammad Rafi blamed the systematic emptying from “the Muslim mind” of “the spirit of Muslim Nationhood.” Such Islam-centered nationhood had been fundamental to the creation of Pakistan in the first place, but it had been corroded as the younger generation confronted western culture and fashion, laziness, immorality, “nudeness,” and “wasteful expenditure.” All took their toll, and politicians had predictably exploited
the growing divisiness that naturally resulted in order to cultivate party spirit. This, Muhammad Shafi’s son warned, would split the nation. (It was also why, as the reader shall see, universities were among the first institutions targeted by the anti-secessionists.) Like the JI, Deobandis in the Western zone were disappointed in the “luxury-loving” Yahya Khan and his clumsy efforts at arbitration.\(^{188}\)

Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto flew to Dhaka to attempt a negotiation with Mujibur Rahman before things could get any worse. But this eleventh-hour move to fix the situation quickly broke down, in part because West Pakistani troops were at the same time being flown into Bengal complete with a contingency plan for militarily taking over the province to enforce order by the barrel of the gun. (As early as March 1969, Ayub Khan had sent West Pakistani troops and tanks to East Pakistan “to deal with internal unrest…”)\(^{189}\) In such an atmosphere, negotiations were useless, and on 25 March both Bhutto and Yahya flew back to the western zone. The next day, the President banned the Awami League, made political activity illegal, and put back into effect the old press, free speech, and assembly restrictions. Worst of all for the Bengalis, the West Pakistani contingency plan went into immediate effect, targeting East Pakistani universities, throwing up checkpoints, erecting roadblocks—and shooting resisters. Mujibur Rahman himself was arrested and flown to Pakistan’s western wing to stand trial for treason. Within days, a full-scale war of secession was underway; one Major Ziaur Rahman proclaimed Bangladeshi independence from Chittagong, and a government-in-exile was set up in Calcutta.\(^{190}\) To many of the ‘ulama, Yahya had crossed an uncrossable line in pitting his Muslim army against fellow Muslims. It seemed that that non-violent, diplomatic approach had been abandoned far too abruptly—and that the suppression of the “rebellion” had been far too brutal. Whatever
happened to seeking a political solution? Suddenly some among the religious leadership were even missing Ayub Khan; he’d had his flaws, yes, but at least he’d been a “powerful” and strong personality. Perhaps, they reasoned, old Ayub would have been able to avoid armed conflict against fellow citizens through sheer force of character.191

Whatever Ayub Khan’s reaction might have been had he been in command, it was Yahya Khan who was now calling the shots—and his crackdown was shockingly brutal, producing something in the range of ten million refugees fleeing to India. Reports of rape and mass murder proliferated. Images surfaced of dead bodies—civilians—scattered along riverbanks or half-buried in the mud, of female corpses with their necks tied to metal posts as if they’d been tortured to death. As the scale of the fighting increased, local Bangladeshi forces (including some former Pakistani military units) battled their erstwhile co-citizens from the western zone. “Islamic” imagery was used by the Pakistani military both to justify its actions and to rally Pakistani soldiers; passages from the Qur’an and admonitions from the sunna were “quoted copiously” before the troops, while the memory of the great battles of the past—from Badr and Uhud to the more recent mostly Deobandi stand against the British at Khyber—served as a rallying cry.192 While the JUI played no role in support of the Yahya regime in East Pakistan, the JI (which had broken with the JUI earlier over the “Glory of Islam Day” scenario) and the JUP were granted “semiofficial role[s]” within the military-imposed regime in Bengal, as was the Deobandi-leaning NIP. It should be remembered that while the JUI had not really contested the 1970 elections in East Pakistan, the NIP, JI, and JUP had lost big to the Awami League. Members of the aforementioned parties, in the words of Haqqani, “formed peace committees throughout Pakistan’s eastern wing, at district and even village levels. These parties functioned as the intelligence network
of the Pakistan army…” The JI was an active supporter of the Pakistani army in its mission to suppress the nationalist-secessionist ambitions of the Bengalis, the Mawdudi-led party even calling the rebel Bengalis “the enemies of Islam.” (Supporters of the JI and others whom the Western media derided as “right-wing religious fanatics” claimed that it was the “socialist leaders” who were the real fanatics, inciting “urban upheaval” and “partisanship” and causing “economic damage.” “It was Bhashani, the Maoist leader,” five Muslim students reminded a British newspaper in late April 1969, “who said that they were prepared to burn down the homes of those who would take part in any elections. His supporters even broke into some Jamaat Islami [JI] offices and desecrated the Qur’an. Is this not being fanatical?” The JI sent delegations overseas to lobby on Pakistan’s behalf in Europe and the across the Middle East. More ominously, from March 1971 educated JI members along with members of the party’s male student wing participated significantly as the core of al-baḍr (“The Moon”), more or less a paramilitary unit (some even say “death squad”) masquerading as a “volunteer [rażkar] force,” put together by Pakistani military intelligence and responsible for the murder and/or humiliation of an unknown number of Bengali “intellectuals, journalists, student leaders and politicians” on regime-formulated hit lists. This was the first example in Pakistan’s history of the government exploiting religion by creating militant groups out of clerical parties in support of its agenda (though its activities vis-à-vis Kashmir had come close); it certainly wouldn’t be the last, but it marked the beginning of a new era in Pakistani government-Islamic party relationships. Another Pakistan military-organized volunteer force, al-shams (“The Sun”), though made up of a mish-mash of individuals and groups, also included a number of Deobandi-leaning NIP activists. According to one Deobandi source, the motivation behind their
participation in the suppression of the “rebellion” was the entrance in the war of the Indian state. Once India had picked sides, the conflict took on the color of *jihad*.

Muhammad Rafi describes how the students and teachers at the Deobandi *dar ul’alwm* Karachi were given rifle training; “the spirit of *jihad* motivated every child and adult to obtain training in warfare” in order to serve at the front. But before this “service” was really possible on a mass scale, Yahya ordered “the shameful surrender.”

December was the deciding month. In retaliation for Indian assistance to the “rebels,” including Indian military movements along (and even across) the East Pakistani border, Pakistan (on 3 December) attacked a number of military targets in northern India. The next day India invaded East Pakistan by land, sea, and air. With the fall of Dhaka to Indian might seemingly imminent, Pakistani forces surrendered to India on the sixteenth (instantly transforming approximately one hundred thousand soldiers into prisoners of war), and within twenty-four hours Indira Gandhi proclaimed a (unilateral) cease-fire. Amidst the humiliating cry of angry demonstrators, Yahya Khan stepped down on 20 December. Those ‘*alama* who took part in the attempt to suppress East Pakistani secessionist efforts remember this time as one in which “the ‘*alama* and the students of [*madrasahs*] and volunteers of East Pakistan who had fought with their lives for Pakistan were subjected to untold torture which outdid [*Genghis*] Khan.” Meanwhile, Pakistan had been seemingly abandoned by its fellow Muslim nations, which Deobandis, at least in part, blamed on the worldwide-*ummat*-weakening phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Both sides in the Bangladeshi War of Independence had felt entirely justified in their separate struggles, and completely victimized by the other. But it was the West Pakistanis who had to now live with humiliation.
Bhutto took the reigns of government in Yahya’s stead. The JI marked the PPP’s assumption of power by observing a “Black Day” in Lahore (December 1971). This Islam-focused opposition to the Bhutto regime was to be characteristic of the years to come. “The loss of the eastern wing in 1971,” wrote Jalal, “was a watershed with a transformative effect on the Pakistani psyche[...]


With the 1970 elections, the departure of Bangladesh from the Pakistani polity, and the takeover of Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, the trend towards secularization—toward a marked de-emphasis on Islam as the guiding force in Pakistani politics—appeared to be in full swing, despite the best efforts of the Muslim scholars and divines. Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto, who, unlike Ayub or Yahya, had barely reached adulthood when Pakistan was born, represented a new generation of Pakistani leadership. The influence of the “old guard”—those who had served for years in the civil service or army under the British Raj—was waning, partly by attrition, while young forty-somethings like Bhutto, whose worldviews were shaped less by the pre-Partition dream of a “Muslim homeland” in South Asia and more by postcolonial nationalism, were increasingly taking center stage. Bhutto himself had visions of a grand alliance of Asian and African nations, a transcontinental zone he considered “a world of the proletariat.” He and others of his
ilk thus fit into the secularist, left-leaning, and highly statist mould of many of the post-colonial world’s new leaders. It was a mould that neither the Deobandi nor Barelvi religious leadership were willing to tolerate steering the Pakistani ship of state. And like so many who have ridden to power on a wave of “democratic” promises, Bhutto would ultimately depend on the guns of government to assure his ascendancy (utilizing personal ties with the Army), not to mention his rule, where, like many “socialist” leaders before him, he exhibited a “near-monopoly of decision-making power.”

In reference to the latter, one contemporary described Bhutto as a “populist-authoritarian type of leader and a cosmetic democrat.” This was not the sort of political head that the ‘alima could trust to further along their goal of Islamic government—nor even of a democratic restoration.

But the prognostications of the pundits predicting the supremacy of economic issues (over religious ones) did not pan out, though Bhutto’s domestic program for Pakistan did indeed stress the socio-political situation. In 1972 and again in 1976, the PPP government took over all of the country’s banks and lending institutions, all of its insurance companies, and scores of its industrial enterprises, effectively nationalizing them. Despite all of this, and perhaps as a result of Pakistan’s geopolitical and self-identifying reorientation after the traumatic 1971 loss of Bangladesh, Islam over the next half-decade regained its dominant position within the framework of Pakistani politics, culminating in the highly politicized Islam of the 1977 general elections; even Bhutto (a wily politician who understood how to employ religion for political ends) pushed forward a number of shari’at-conforming laws (including the replacement of Sunday with Friday as the weekly day off and bans on alcohol consumption, gambling,
night clubs, pornography, and horse racing, though these were all last-ditch efforts instituted in 1977 to win over the opposition).

It was during this period, too (1973), that Pakistan adopted a new Constitution (still current, as of the time of this writing) pervaded with religious provisions. Martial Law had been lifted in April 1972, after which the National Assembly had been restored. Within that body, after the PPP, the most powerful political parties were the NAP and the JUI. Once again, the National Assembly’s main task was to hammer out a constitution; this represented Pakistan’s third major go-around in this regard, and like previous attempts it was marked with tension and disagreement, especially between the PPP on one side and the NAP–JUI on the other. But with previous constitution-making efforts having laid the groundwork, a new document eventually emerged. On 31 December Pakistan’s third constitution was submitted in the National Assembly; it was approved in April and went into effect on Independence Day: 14 August 1973.

Throughout the deliberations, political parties like the JUI, the JI, and the JUP stressed their Islamic orthodoxy, while economic issues tended “to be manifested in the search for a truly Islamic economy as well as for an Islamic polity…”205 Islam was again recognized as the core of the nation’s identity, the single abiding force holding a polity of disparate ethnicities, languages, and backgrounds together.

Part IX of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan contains the document’s specifically Islamic provisions. With the exception of a brief preamble confirming the “Holy Quran and the Sunnah” as the standard by which “all existing laws” must be measured (“no law shall be enacted which is repugnant” to the injunctions therein), Part IX pertains entirely to an official body within the Pakistani polity identified as the Council of Islamic Ideology, though otherwise referred to simply as the
Islamic Council (IC). Qualifications for appointment to the Council, made up of between eight and twenty members, are broad; one member must be a woman, at least four must have at least fifteen years of “Islamic research or instruction” under their belts, and at least two must have been (or currently be) Supreme Court or High Court judges. Apart from these specifics, the President may appoint anyone “having knowledge of the principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or understanding of the economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan.” One other requirement: “so far as practicable various schools of thought” must be represented within the IC, an obvious reference to the theological divisions plaguing the ummat in Pakistan, foremost among them the Deobandi-Barelvi split. A member could serve on the Council for three years, barring resignation or eviction from the body by a majority of the total membership.

The principal function of the IC has been to act as an advisory body on proposed law (i.e. its adherence to Islamic injunctions), mainly to the Majlis-e-Shoora (majlys-e-shwra, or Parliament) but also to the President, provincial assemblies, and provincial governors. However, the IC is also charged with two additional functions. First, the IC presents recommendations (to each of the bodies and offices aforementioned) “as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and sunnah.” Second, the IC must prepare regular reports, to be discussed annually within both Houses and each provincial assembly, recommending various Islamic injunctions that might be turned into future legislation. The IC thus provides a high-level state role specifically for the ‘alama. The competition between the various schools of Islam (primarily those of the
Barelvi and Deobandi variety) was now on for control of this and other bodies within the state apparatus.

During the 1970 elections, it had been generally assumed that the National Awami Party—which performed well in the NWFP and Baluchistan—would hammer out some sort of joint program with the PPP (which dominated Punjab and Sindh) after 1971; they were both, after all, explicitly socialist parties. As it turned out, however, the PPP’s Bhutto and NAP chief Wali Khan (son of aforementioned Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) butted heads to such an extent that any sort of joint agreement quickly transformed into more or less an impossibility. Indeed, the NAP joined the opposition, and Wali Khan himself was elected Opposition Leader in the National Assembly. In keeping with its long-held policy of siding with a lesser opponent in order to focus on a greater one, the Deobandi JUI formed a coalition government in the NWFP and in Baluchistan with the NAP in early April 1972.206 Addressing a crowd in Peshawar, Wali Khan announced the formation of the NAP-JUI coalition and named JUI chief mufti Mahmud the province’s Chief Minister. Any decision made by the PPP-controlled central government-appointed provincial administration would, Wali Khan said, “not be acceptable.”207 That same year, mufti Mahmud announced the official launch of alcohol prohibition in the NWFP. The setting he chose was significant in that it hailed back—much to the disapproval of the Barelvis—to the movement of sàyyid Ahmad of Raebareli (see Chapter 1), student of the Walliullahi tradition and renowned jyhadi of the early nineteenth century. After the forces of sàyyid Ahmad had captured Peshawar in 1830, his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail (whom the Barelvis would loathe as an out-and-out “Wahhabi”) had stood before a crowd in the city. The date, on the Gregorian calendar, was Sunday, 1 May. Facing the multitude, sàyyid Ahmad’s acolyte publicly
declared alcohol a forbidden substance in the newly established Islamic state. Now, one hundred forty-two years since that act, *mufti* Mahmud—likewise on Sunday, 1 May—was making the very same declaration (even standing in the exact spot, as far as could be ascertained).\(^208\) Here in the NWFP, at least, if not in the rest of the country, Islamic law (as seen through a Deobandi lens) would be respected and established—a step towards fulfilling *sayyid* Ahmad’s original, and unrealized, dream. That *mufti* Mahmud’s symbolism harked back to such a controversial figure—indeed, possibly the *most* controversial figure—of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry could not have been missed by the province’s (and Pakistan’s) Barelvi religious leadership.

But the Bhutto government remained strongly opposed to the NAP-JUI provincial administrations. In late September 1973, an unidentified shooter attempted to assassinate Abdul Wali Khan. The latter blamed the incident on the “[central] Government and members of the Pakistan People’s Party.” The Bhutto regime, through their ambassador in London (one Mumtaz Daultana) claimed “shock and horror” at the alleged assassination attempt and blamed it instead on the peasants’ discontent with the NAP-JUI government’s seeming preference for “the local entrenched landlord interests.”\(^209\) Each side thus took advantage of the murder attempt to try to politically cripple the other. The PPP government was more successful later, when it utilized the apparent discovery of “a massive cache of Soviet-made arms,” ostensibly meant for Baluchistan, within the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad as a pretext for completely dismantling the NAP-JUI government in that province.\(^210\) (Since 1973, Pakistan’s Baluchistan province had been the scene of a hard-fought Baluchi war of independence. The war would last for four years—and flare up from time to time afterwards—until the independence movement was finally and brutally surpressed by
the mostly Punjabi Pakistan Army.) In protest of Bhutto’s dramatic action, the NAP-JUI government in the NWFP resigned, too. This move only strengthened Bhutto’s immediate position, however, as the wily PPP head quickly replaced both province’s governors with his own picks.211 Thus ended the JUI’s brief stint as co-ruling party in Pakistan’s westernmost provinces, once more revealing Bhutto’s autocratic style of rule; opposition was not to be tolerated, and power was to be strong in the center—despite the state’s alleged federal structure (with residual powers left to the provinces) mandated by the constitution. After the dissolution of the NAP-JUI governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the Bhutto regime continued to harass opposition parties using the state’s law enforcement agencies (together with enthusiastic PPP supporters). At one NAP event in Rawalpindi several NAP members were killed by such action. The response from the opposition, both to the Bhutto regime’s harassment as well as its specific role in toppling the Baluchistan and NWFP governments (where the PPP had lost badly), was to form an eight-party alliance: the United Democratic Front, which included the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, as well as the Deobandi-leaning Khaksars.212 The alliance’s goals were to “restore democracy, check dictatorship, and work for an Islamic and parliamentary constitution, [, as well as,] the release of political prisoners.” For the Barelvis and the Deobandis, the alliance represented another temporary partnership with one another, once again borne of political expediency and characterized by “separate unity.”

Despite the formation of the new alliance (indeed, perhaps because of it), the harassment continued, forcing the Deobandi and Barelvi leadership, generally speaking, to band together (though, as always, as separately as possible) against what was perceived as a hostile, repressive, and anti-Islam regime. Meanwhile, the Bhutto
government consolidated its power both from within and without. From within, consolidation was achieved by purging the party of “the more leftist elements” in its midst (most notably in 1974, when Bhutto “cleansed” his cabinet of such individuals), as well as by the purging of almost fifteen hundred military officers whose loyalty was deemed less than desirable. (One of the generals he did advance, over several more senior personnel: Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who became Army chief-of-staff in 1976, replacing erstwhile director of the brutal 1971 West Pakistani crackdown in Bengal General Tikka Khan.) In addition, Bhutto organized the Federal Security Force, a militant entity that functioned outside of the military and oftentimes acted as a sort of Praetorian Guard for Bhutto himself. From without, the PPP government secured its position through media censorship, aggressive “policing,” and the harassment and imprisonment (and even murder) of political enemies. Perhaps characteristic of his transition from “democrat” to despot, Bhutto had campaigned throughout the 1970 elections for a parliamentary system of government—only to change his mind later (conveniently when he himself was in power) in favor of a presidential one (with Bhutto as president, of course). When he eventually lost the presidential system battle after the National Assembly adopted a parliamentary order instead, Bhutto ensured via provision that, even so, it would be near impossible for the legislature to remove the Prime Minister (himself).

When PPP co-founder and leading propagator of socialism Hayat Khan Sherpao was assassinated in a bomb blast at Peshawar University (8 February 1975), the Bhutto government’s action was swift; the NAP, immediately blamed for the incident, was banned and its leaders arrested (including party head Wali Khan, as well as his son Asfandyar Wali Khan—the latter accused of masterminding the murder). Though the
accused were later acquitted, they remained in prison until Zia ul-Haq released them three years later. Any other political party that the administration deemed a recipient of aid from a foreign quarter was likewise banned. Several JI leaders were also harassed, arrested, and imprisoned; one of the party chiefs, Nazir Ahmad—a National Assembly member described by one scholar as the JI’s “most vociferous” representative in the federal legislative body—was shot dead by government forces. “Never before,” wrote Nasr, “had any Pakistani government gone so far to silence its opposition,” and this under a supposedly democratic, civilian regime. Nasr goes on to mark the assassination of Nazir Ahmad as “the beginning of the rapid radicalization” of the JI’s male student wing, an indication of the role of government in the radicalization of religious parties.

Indeed, together with the regime’s role in the formation and arming of so-called “death squads” out of religious parties during the Bangladeshi war of independence, Bhutto’s harassment and targeting of the religious parties during his presidential tenure initiated a process of militant transformation among the religious parties, or at least among a segment therein.

March 1977: “Zenith” of Islam’s “Politicization.”

The year 1977 was one of major significance in the history of Pakistan. “The politicization of Islam,” wrote Esposito in the early 1980s, “reached its zenith in the general […] elections of March 1977.” When elections were first announced by Bhutto in January, the anti-PPP parties leapt into action mode; this was their chance to finally and democratically oust the strongman regime. Standing in opposition to the ruling PPP government of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto was a newly formed nine-party coalition of political parties: the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Though the union included
parties representing a variety of positions across the left-right political spectrum, its platform seemed to revolve distinctly around the watchword “Islam.” Mosques and religious seminaries—thousands of them—doubled as hubs of political activity. The alliance advocated for the institution of the “System of the Prophet” (nyzam-e-mustafa), meaning the establishment of a truly Islamic order after that founded by God through Muhammad in the opening days of the Muslim era. This was the very reason Pakistan had been created—and Islam was the only answer, as a unifying force, to the ethnic and linguistic schisms plaguing the country. Bhutto was cast as anti-Islam, the ‘alqama and other PNA members pointing to both his regime’s policies as well as his own personal way of life as proof. The PPP government was corrupt and sick to the core, and the remedy lay not in the political philosophies of the world (whether socialism or capitalism) but in the just and egalitarian system God had instituted in Medina and spelled out in the Qur’an and sunnat. And like the old, pre-Partition Muslim League, the PNA warned of “Islam in Danger!” Despite the philosophical differences between the various parties constituting the PNA, then—economic, political, even religious—the politically eclectic alliance’s “direction and leadership” undoubtably emanated from the Islamic parties, namely the JUI, the JUP, and the JI. This was a rare testament to the power the religious parties could have had acting jointly for some political purpose. That same year the Barelvi JUP was instrumental in forming the Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa (töhrik-e-nyzam-e-mustafa, or “Movement of the System of the Prophet”), an anti-Bhutto outfit. The organization would become a JUP front group after Zia ul-Haq banned political parties in October 1979.

Meanwhile, the Deobandi JUI under mufli Mahmud campaigned passionately against the Bhutto regime, especially in the western provinces, combating the PPP’s
socialism with the publication of Mahmud’s own *socialism kufar he*. This phrase—meaning “Socialism is Disbelief”—had been the anti-Bhutto slogan of the JUI, the JI, and the JUP years before, during the 1970 elections, when the rising star that was Bhutto first appeared to threaten the religious parties’ success in West Pakistan. Now, seven years later, the issue of atheistic socialism’s alleged takeover of the Pakistani polity (including the widespread belief that the PPP represented a Marxist front party with aims of instituting one-party Communist rule) remained a central one. *mufli* Mahmud played a leading role within the PNA as an anti-Bhutto agitator and later was appointed a member of the PNA delegation that met with Bhutto to attempt a negotiation.\(^{218}\) The opposition parties pointed out that Bhutto’s promises of bread, clothing, and shelter for all had failed miserably in their fulfillment; Bhutto had fallen especially short when it came to land redistribution—another broken PPP promise. Indeed, after India had successfully tested its first nuclear device (1974), Bhutto had sworn that Pakistan would catch up with neighboring India even if Pakistanis were forced to “eat grass” in the process.\(^{219}\) So much for bread!

But Bhutto refused to be sidelined either by the opposition’s defaming of his economic record (he pointed to rising GDP and falling inflation rates) or by the PNA’s appeals to Islam. Indeed, the opposition coalition’s pressure on the PPP forced the ruling party to take a more “Islamic” stance in order to garner electoral support; Bhutto’s party, previously an explicitly socialist entity, replaced the word “socialism” with the more Islamic-sounding phrase *musawat-e-muhammad* (“equality of Muhammad”) in its literature. Meanwhile, the PPP’s opposition, most visibly in the form of the PNA, asserted its own service to the Islam. Both sides promised that their proposed version of government was the one most suited to ultimately bring about the
realization of a truly Islamic order. Thus the heated elections of 1977 helped foment a competition between the major political parties of Pakistan, both secular and religious, over dedication to the religion of Allah. To offset the PNA’s number one platform item—the institution of Islamic government in Pakistan—the PPP, too, vowed to work for increased Islamization; it promised, for example, to make Friday the weekly holiday in place of Sunday. It should be noted that while the JUP did form part of the PNA, this was in no way representative of the vast majority of Barelvis, whose individual loyalties fell on both sides of the political divide. Meanwhile, the Deobandis leaned heavily against the PPP.

With the support of the upper class and the poorer classes (who, as always, rallied behind Bhutto’s promises of bread, clothing, and shelter for all), however, and combined with the PPP’s now well-established ability to politically co-opt religious symbolism, Bhutto won an “impressive victory” in the March 1977 general elections. All told, the ruling PPP had won an overwhelming one hundred fifty-five seats in the National Assembly, compared to only thirty-six for the PNA. Sensing that the lopsided win was likely to spark protest, Bhutto immediately banned political assemblies throughout the country. He was right, of course; the PPP win did spark outrage among the regime’s opposition. The government was charged with election fraud, and the PNA launched a campaign of agitation, using the mosques as venues for anti-Bhutto political speeches as well as staging grounds for rallies and marches. Specifically, the PNA demanded another election. When Bhutto refused to hold such a do-over, demonstrations against the government only increased in number and severity. Bhutto tried to assuage the opposition by instituting a shari’at-inspired ban on gambling, prostitution, and alcohol (as was promised as part of his Islamic makeover during the campaign), but this only
succeeded in throwing the spotlight on Islam and thereby strengthening the position of the ‘alɔma-directed PNA. Wrote Esposito, “Islam and Pakistan’s Islamic identity had reemerged as the dominant theme in Pakistani politics in a manner and to a degree that had not been seen since Pakistan’s establishment.” The situation deteriorated to such an extent that in July Bhutto declared Martial Law. Then, on 5 July 1977, the Army took over, proclaimed Martial Law itself, and forcefully placed all political leaders—including the Prime Minister—in military custody.

Deobandis and Barelvis stood divided on the change in management. Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto would not come out of the regime-change situation alive.
5 - ISLAMIZATION AND WAR:

**Militarization of the Rivalry, 1977-2001**

Even though he tried his best to steer it toward a secular democracy, Jinnah did not live long enough to see it become one. Over the coming years, Pakistan took a very troubling turn. In a matter of nine years, it became an “Islamic Republic,” and in a little over two decades, it had essentially become a theocracy. The same extremist clerics who had opposed Jinnah and his struggle for Pakistan gradually claimed ownership of the State. They formed political groups that used religion to amass public support. Their demonstrations of street power, frequently violent, meant that sectarian hatred and intolerance was the order of the day.

Kashif Chaudhry, *The Express Tribune*, 19 September 2011

On page 141 of Husain Haqqani’s *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (2005), the author addresses Pakistan’s “sectarian issues” vis-à-vis the creation and political evolution of the state.

Sectarian issues had played little part in the campaign for Pakistan’s creation and Pakistan’s official census figures did not report sectarian identities of Muslims in an effort to keep the lid on sectarian differences among Muslims. The demand by Shiites, in the aftermath of the 1980 *Zakat* controversy, for effective representation at higher levels of the state and recognition of their sectarian interests laid the foundations of bitter
Shiite-Sunni conflict, which later led to the creation of terrorist militias within both sects. (Italics added)

Here Haqqani lays out the generally accepted narrative of sectarianism in Pakistan, defined within the context of the Shi’a-Sunni rivalry—and, importantly, denying any significant role “sectarian issues” might have played in the struggles leading up to Partition (an assertion at least partially debunked, it is hoped, earlier in this work). (If “sectarian issues” were so insignificant, too, then why—pointed out in Haqqani’s very next sentence—would the Pakistani state go to so much trouble to “keep a lid” on them?) Developments that occurred during the rule of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, in particular, insists Haqqani, laid the groundwork for future Shi’a-Sunni conflict. This is certainly true, but equally important (and perhaps more so) were similar developments within the Sunni community itself, mostly between the minority Deobandi and majority Barelvi sub-sects, each of which separately (and considerably) outnumbered Pakistan’s Shi’a population. This Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry would erupt into steady violence in the 1990s, 2000s, and into the 2010s—violence that would sometimes mistakenly be attributed to the more publicized (at least internationally) Shi’a-Sunni conflict. Indeed, it was in the period between 1979 and 1988—the years of Zia ul-Haq’s regime—that Pakistan underwent a major socio-political “Islamization,” of which the Deobandis, though significantly smaller in number, were able take advantage far more efficiently than their Barelvi counterparts. Of course, this was no new phenomenon to the politically minded Barelvi ‘ulama, who had often felt ignored by the Pakistani state they and their theological forebears had helped create, in comparison to their Deobandi rivals. And it was within the political framework of the Pakistani state
that the formerly civil, if bitter, rivalry between Deobandis and Barelvis—once fought via juridical rulings, public debates, and books, then via “all-India” Muslim organizations within the context of pre-Partition independence politics, and now represented by political parties vying for real money and real power—evolved into something far more brutal in character.

**Consolidating Power: Zia, Democracy, and the ‘alma**

Shortly after carrying out his coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq described his actions as those of a concerned citizen, nothing more. Bhutto had been on the verge of unleashing the Army on the opposition and executing or imprisoning its (the opposition’s) leaders; this had to be stopped. (The Army’s name for Zia’s July 1977 military coup: Operation Fair Play.) Zia vowed that the 1973 constitution, currently suspended, would be restored, and that free and fair elections would be held within ninety days; political parties would be free both to file nominations and to carry out their campaigns. The promise of elections was to the PNA’s liking, as the alliance fully expected to assume the reigns of government now that the PPP flame had been extinguished. But Zia’s promises quickly evaporated. The reason, insisted Pakistan’s new dicator, was the unexpected discovery by the regime of a wide range of abuses perpetrated on the Pakistani people by the Bhutto government. There must be accountability, Zia argued, before the state could move on. A flurry of “white papers” was produced by the government, on topics ranging from Bhutto’s illegal utilization of his Federal Security Force to the previous regime’s muzzling of the press. All of this was used as a pretext for postponing elections. The fawning and multitudinous reception that Bhutto received in Lahore (during a brief stint of freedom) convinced
many within the PNA that perhaps Zia was right after all—perhaps the PPP was still a threat, a force with which to be reckoned yet. Suddenly, too, the PNA was far less sure about its own electoral prospects. But Deobandi and PNA president mufti Mahmud discounted the alleged “resurgence of support” for Bhutto and his erstwhile party; the pro-PPP demonstrations, he said, were “all propaganda. Once you get to the top and fall down you never come back. That’s the history of Pakistan.” The mufti further asserted that rumors that the PNA was united “only in opposition to Mr Bhutto” (and thus devoid of any coherent platform) were untrue—and being spread by “the Western press and broadcasting media.” Still, the promised elections were pushed back again, with the possibility of a PPP resurgence (and, subsequently, another East Pakistan situation—in Baluchistan, for example) cited as Zia’s chief justification. Zia’s pushing back of the elections, even if it was ostensibly to “clean up” the mess left by the previous administration, was not greeted with favor by mufti Mahmud. Indeed, the Deobandi mwlana delivered to the General a public ultimatum of sorts in early November, declaring that unless elections were held “next March” (1978)—at this point Zia was saying that even next November appeared unlikely—Pakistan “could be plunged into chaos again.” Despite Zia’s assurances that the election postponements were justified, mufti Mahmud did not understand why this should be so. At one point Zia told the press that the PNA itself had requested the election delays, but mufti Mahmud vehemently denied this allegation.

Eventually elections were postponed indefinitely. Bhutto himself was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the murder of a political opponent. In early March 1978, Zia banned political activity (though not political parties, yet), promising elections the next year. Ironically, given his white paper concerning Bhutto’s illegal manipulation of
the press, the regime shut down several papers itself that same month, simultaneously arresting around two hundred journalists. In April, despite pleas from international leaders for the commuting of his sentence (but with the strong support of the JI), the Zia government hanged Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto. In the meantime, Zia organized a quasi-civilian government (two-thirds of which would be made up of PNA people, with the remaining third direct Zia appointees); of the religious parties, the JI benefitted most from this arrangement, scoring several cabinet positions. But this government was dissolved in April 1979 as the PNA parties prepared for the upcoming elections.

Perhaps predictably, however, the promised 1979 national and provincial elections, scheduled for November, never took place, though the regime did carry out non-party local elections (during which PPP candidates ran under the pseudonym “Friends of the People” [awami dwst]; the religious parties did much the same—the JUP continuing to operate, for example, under the name of the anti-Bhutto organization it had created, the tork-e-ny zam-e-mustafâ).  

Eventually (October 1979) Zia banned political parties altogether.

Both the Barelvi and Deobandi religious leadership were caught off guard by Zia’s sudden takeover, and the continued breakdown of “democracy” that followed. On the one hand, the General seemed little interested in restoring the old constitutional, party system, a goal for which they had ostensibly been struggling when Zulfiqar ‘Ali had been in charge. On the other, Zia had gotten rid of Bhutto, and also boasted a reputation as a practicing, observant Muslim, one who retained the humility demanded by his faith even in his own exalted politico-military position.  

Their confusion as to how best to react characterized the ‘alɔma parties’ relationship with the new regime in general, as they strove to come to terms with a ruler seemingly far more amenable to
the establishment of an Islamic state but also even more authoritarian than his predecessor—indeed, than any previous head of the Pakistani polity. Journalists and some historians would later characterize the Zia regime, in black-and-white fashion, as one that favored the religious parties, but this is only partly true, as shall be demonstrated. In the end, Zia’s actions seemed indicative of a man in power who sought to retain that power, however personally devoted he might have been to Islam.

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*mufit* Mahmud died in 1980. His son, Fazlur Rehman, was subsequently elected JUI general secretary, thus illustrating the dynastic, “family fiefdom” character of parties in Pakistan—what Lodhi called “the primacy of personalism over organization” (and while this phenomenon is more pronounced in organizations like the Bhutto-dominated PPP or the Sharif-led Muslim League, the religious parties have also developed this attribute; in another example, Fazlur Rehman would later nominate his own brother, *mawla* Attaur Rehman—already the JUI’s vice-president—to join the Gilani cabinet as Minister of Tourism). In any case, it didn’t take long for the new party chief to find himself behind bars for his opposition to the Zia regime. Early in February 1981, a student dispute with bus drivers in Multan quickly ballooned into a countrywide anti-government protest. For five days, students across Pakistan (but especially in Multan, Lahore, Quetta, and Malakand) demonstrated—often violently—against the regime. On 16 February the government arrested Fazlur Rehman, along with three other political party heads, all of whom were partly blamed for the unrest. (The other arrested leaders: Masrullah Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party, former NAP head Mehmud ‘Ali Kasuri of the surging Tehrik-e-Istiqlal Party, and M. A. Gohir of the PPP). It seems that the student violence had presented Zia with a plausible chance to
rid himself of opposition—a chance he readily seized. Only ten days earlier, after all, Fazlur Rehman and the JUI, plus almost a dozen other parties, had formed an opposition alliance (what would become the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, or MRD) demanding “an end to military rule and the holding of parliamentary elections within three months.”

Prominent among the MRD parties was the PPP. The imprisoning of the opposition helped Zia stem any sudden MRD tide, but the real event to cripple the latter’s efforts (at least for a couple years) was the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines flight by the militant group Al-Zulfiqar—an outfit led by Bhutto’s sons (Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto). Despite the indirect nature of the “link” between Al-Zulfiqar and the MRD (and daughter Benazir Bhutto’s own condemnation, while under house arrest, of the hijacking operation), the alliance took a hit as mass declamation of the event forced the MRD to back down, at least for the time being.

By 1983, though, the opposition was able to reassert itself. This was especially true in Sindh (from the beginning the PPP’s base of support; the Bhuttos were, after all, an aristocratic Sindhi family). The MRD sent people onto the streets to “court arrest, Gandhi-style.” Among the organizers were the Barelvi pir of Hala (in Sindh) and his sons, whose illustrious ancestor, Makhdoom Lutuf Allah (known as Makhdoom Nuh), a Sufi saint of the Suhrawardy order and a “great scholar in Islamic traditions and laws,” is remembered for courageously standing up to several tyrants of his own day.

But the demonstrations involved more than simply daring the police to make arrests. In a clash with government forces near Moro (in west-central Sindh), the MRD claimed twelve dead at the hands of Zia’s troops (“local reporters” would say five: two soldiers and three civilians). Agitators burst the retaining wall holding the Indus River back from a
national highway passing through Sindh, flooding the road with water and making it virtually impassable. Government troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators in the village of Khano Bula Khan (less than forty miles west of Hyderabad, in Sindh), killing at least one.\textsuperscript{10}

But by late August, the “revolt” against Zia’s Martial Law regime had stagnated enough that the General felt secure in leaving the country altogether on a state visit to Turkey. Still, the fires hadn’t been entirely squelched. Limited protests in Sindh continued. Police broke up a march from the shrine of Z. A. Bhutto, only to be stoned by demonstrators before the latter were scattered by rifle shot. In Hyderabad, several hundred students burned Zia ul-Haq in effigy on a university soccer field. In Quetta, a general strike was announced in which many of the city’s shops took part. During this period, the JUI and the JUP were united insofar as their opposition to the regime was concerned, though the latter’s opposition seems to have been less outright. By the end of September, the MRD agitation had been ongoing for six weeks—most fervently in Sindh, but with notable moments in Punjab and Baluchistan, too. But there were clear signs that enthusiasm was beginning to wane. New support was needed, a fresh infusion of passion and numbers. At this critical juncture, the Barelvi JUP promised to “join in.” Meanwhile, Zia remained adamant that he would not negotiate with the MRD until the agitation ceased completely. One headline of the time read: “Pakistan: stalemate or fateful spark?”\textsuperscript{11} Had the regime and the MRD reached gridlock—or was something about to catch fire?

Whatever their differences with the Zia government, it seemed that perceived Indian aggression was often enough to ensure both Barelvi and Deobandi loyalty to the regime, however temporary, just as it had in 1965 over Kashmir. After Indira Gandhi
and her Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao voiced controversial statements regarding the Sindh unrest, for example, JUP head *mwlana* Shah Ahmad Noorani—rather than making a statement himself against India—urged the Zia regime to “lodge a strong protest” against Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.¹² This turning to Zia came despite Shah Noorani’s general opposition to Zia ul-Haq. Indeed, the JUP under Noorani, as aforementioned, supported the MRD, though—unlike the Deobandi JUI—that support stopped just short of the JUP’s officially joining the alliance. (In typical Barelvi fashion, the JUP organized its own civil disobedience campaign in another show of “separate unity.”) After the broohaha over the Indian leaders’ Sindh-related comments had passed, Shah Ahmad was back to publicly opposing the military government. Indeed, Noorani held a press conference in late September 1983 to protest against the regime’s “continuing censorship of the Pakistani press.” One of the items addressed at the meeting, too, was the alleged cover-up by the government of the police massacre of forty-five villagers who had been mourning the death of an anti-Zia demonstrator. The allegation was made by PPP head (and widow of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) Nusrat Bhutto, then dying of cancer in France, and was distributed in written form by Noorani himself.¹³ Thus both the Deobandi JUI and the Barelvi JUP cooperated with the PPP during this period, the JUI overtly via political alliance and the latter less directly, as in settings such as the September 1983 Noorani press conference.

Amidst the MRD-piloted agitation, non-party elections to Pakistan’s local councils in all four provinces took place (October). Zia had abolished the local government system put in place by the Bhutto regime in 1979, replacing it with his own “local bodies” scheme focusing on rural development. It was for these bodies that the elections were organized.¹⁴ In Sindh, one observer dubbed these local contests “the bloodstained
elections” as violence continued to rock the country. Another commentator described the “violent agitation in Sind over the past two months” as resulting “in heavy loss of life and damage to government and private property.” But the fact that Zia had held local elections across Pakistan at all gave him “room to manoeuvre,” at least—a lifeline amidst the storm of protest in which he found himself. Despite the agitation, Pakistan’s news media (“under Government instructions,” of course) the day after the local elections proclaimed, “Elections were held in a completely peaceful and disciplined atmosphere. Turnout of the voters at the polling stations was quite satisfactory and up to the mark.” This low-level chance for the masses to vote had bought Zia some time. He would use it in an attempt to shore up his position—by trying to win over the Barelvis.

After all, the Deobandi JUI was too far gone, officially allied as it was with the other MRD parties. But the JUP had remained more ambivalent; perhaps it could be wooed. (Zia’s enthusiasm for the JI, strong when he first came to power, had by now cooled somewhat; perhaps he saw in the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic an opportunity to “divide and conquer” by co-opting the less vociferous Ahl-e-Sunnat religious leadership.) The same month that Zia allowed for local elections across Pakistan, then, he summoned the JUP leadership to Rawalpindi for talks. Shah Ahmad Noorani led the party’s delegation. The Barelvi party’s invitation appears to have been facilitated by a sympathizer in the military, former NWFP governor (and future JUP general secretary, then president) Lieutenant-General K. M. Azhar (d. 2006 AD), an Aligarh-educated former Leaguer, present at the passing of the Lahore Resolution and veteran of both the 1948 Kashmir war with India and the Rann of Kuch operation against India in 1964 (as well as the British campaign in Burma during World War II). Shah Ahmad arrived in
Islamabad, from where he would travel to Rawalpindi, on 10 October. No one was quite sure what the “talks” would entail, but the move proved to be a wry one on Zia’s part; the JUP promptly withdrew its pledge to join the agitating MRD and called off its own civil disobedience program. Indeed, Shah Ahmad had apparently met with the pir of Hala in late September (probably after the “talks” with Zia were put on the table), and observers wondered if the JUP had tried to dissuade the pir and his sons from their political activities, further buoying up the wisdom of Zia’s move to reach out to the Barelvi politico-religious leadership.

The impact of the JUP-Zia meeting seems to have gone both ways, at least initially, for it was in the very midst of the talks that the President abruptly informed a group of Pakistani editors that he was “willing to advance the date of general elections by a year if political conditions were favorable.” Of course, unfavorable “political conditions” was a reference to the MRD-led agitation. Still, Zia’s announcement opened up the possibility of general elections as early as March 1984. Meanwhile, the attempt at conciliation with the JUP signaled Zia’s unwillingness to meet with the PPP leadership. He hoped, it seems, that by reaching out to the “right-wing” Barelvi party he might consolidate a base of support among the Sunni “majority,” especially against his PPP rivals and their Deobandi allies in the JUI. Essentially, the JUP was to be used as a pawn in the President’s constant battle with the late Z. A. Bhutto’s party. In just a few days, then, Zia had allowed local elections, reached out to the Barelvi religio-political leadership, and offered a more palatable timeline for elections. The President’s game may have eventually dawned on Shah Ahmad, too, as the cleric later accused Zia and his government of “misleading” the public “by circulating its own version of the [JUP-Zia] meeting.” Indeed, in the end, Zia’s attempt to win over the Barelvis was only
temporarily successful; within a year-and-a-half, the President, long an imprisoner of political opponents, would be putting JUP leaders behind bars, too.

Elections for state head wouldn’t come until Zia was dead; to push such an election back, in December 1984 the Pakistani dictator organized a “referendum”—one, however, that never specifically asked the people whether or not they “wanted” Zia to remain in charge. Zia used the results of the poll as a legitimizing tool to prop up his own personal position “for another five years.”21 The long-promised general elections, then, would only be for national and provincial legislative bodies. Even so, when those elections finally came (late February 1985)—for the national and provincial assemblies—the various leaders of the MRD parties were confined to house arrest by the government. Shah Ahmad Noorani (though the JUP was still not officially part of the Movement) was placed under house arrest, too. In protest, Barelvis across the country wore black armbands as they attended Friday prayers. JUP vice-president Shafi Abdullah admonished Barelvis to boycott the upcoming elections entirely, and his call was “broadcast to the street through the mosque’s loudspeaker” despite Zia’s ban, via martial law order, on all “political activity in a mosque.” Meanwhile, police waited around the corner in vans, together with hordes of plainclothes officers—just in case the agitation escalated into something more than loudspeakers and armbands. “This is not an Islamic regime,” complained one Pakistani at the time. “A purposeless election is not allowed in Islam. If the people are not taken into confidence, then it is anti-Islamic.”22 To further control the election, Zia banned not only all political parties but also “loudhailers, processions and outdoor meetings,” translating into one of the quietest contests in recent memory. The results of the 1985 “partyless” elections were summed up succinctly by one reporter on the scene: “Despite the ban on political parties
contesting the election, the successful candidates include a large number of members or former members of parties wholly opposed to the Zia regime.” Meanwhile, the JI—the “one party that had sided with General Zia in the past”—experienced a series of major electoral losses. The contest’s big winners were the PPP and the Barelvi pir-led Muslim League (headed by sayyid Shah Mardan Shah II, or “pir Pagaro,” head of the Hurs of Sindh, who had previously been viewed as a Zia “lackey” and whose own pir father had been hanged by the British for his opposition to their regime).23

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In May 1988, Zia ul-Haq pulled off another “constitutional coup,” restoring his former powers as Pakistan’s Chief Martial Law Administrator after dismissing the government of Muhammad Khan Junejo and the national assembly. Zia cited corruption within the Junejo government, as well as its failure to secure law and order in Pakistan, as justification for his action. The CMLA promised a “caretaker cabinet” within twenty-four hours; it took ten days, and was headed not by a Prime Minister but by Zia himself. As per Zia’s own 1985 Constitution, upon dismissing the national assembly an announcement of elections must be made within ninety days (though whether this meant that elections must be held within ninety days, or merely an announcement, was unclear). In any case, the situation did not present a rosy picture to those who had been agitating for the restoration of “democracy.” As one observer noted wryly, “The last time President Zia promised elections within 90 days was in 1977. He held them 90 months later, but banned political parties from participating.” (The acronym for Zia’s position as Chief Martial Law Administrator, too, was sarcastically referred to by many as meaning “Cancel My Last Announcement.”) If Zia’s election announcement was to be trusted, it would mean that he would need to reformulate a
party for himself—a new Muslim League. (Some speculated that the dictator would select rising star Nawaz Sharif as the re-tooled party head; Nawaz was Chief Minister of the Punjab and popularly regarded as “a fixer,” controlling as he did Punjab’s police force, its powerful landlords, and its beaurocratic machine.) Meanwhile, the MRD continued to lead the opposition (the alliance itself led, however weakly, by the PPP under Benazir Bhutto) as it attempted to use the recent turn of events to its favor by wooing “disgruntled” Muslim Leaguers, the JI, and even Junejo himself.\textsuperscript{24}

Elections were set for 16 November, though they were to be “partyless” once more. But whatever might have happened—whether Zia would have pushed elections back indefinitely, as he was wont to do, or not—fate stepped in on 17 August 1988 (or perhaps, as many speculate—like the subsequently organized official inquiry committee—some other more sinister, and very human, force) when the CMLA’s C-130B Hercules aircraft took a nosedive not long after taking off from little Bahawalpur headed for Islamabad. The crash killed over thirty people, including Zia himself, as well as the US Ambassador to Pakistan. Pakistan’s long-serving dictator was buried in Islamabad two days later, with a million mourners crowding the city’s streets.

Though there were calls to push elections back, the provisional government under interim president Ishaq Khan decided to hold them on the date previously set. In addition, Zia’s requirement that they be “partyless” was dropped; political parties would be permitted to organize and put forward their various candidates.

\textit{Zia’s “Islamization” Push.}

Zia was determined to win over the ‘\textit{al\text{"o}ma} and religious parties. As such, he adopted the old PNA slogan, “System of the Prophet” (\textit{nyzam-e-mustaf\text{"a}}), as his own.
But this was easier said than done; after all, one need only remember the findings of the
Munir Report, which had underscored the virtual impossibility of instituting such a
system in Pakistan, divided as its Muslim community was between various sects (the
most prominent among them the Deobandis and the Barelvis, not to mention the Shi’a).
Which sect’s “System” would be adopted? Whose interpretation of the Prophet’s *ny zam*
would be implemented? From the very beginning (1977), one of Zia’s own cabinet
ministers, *mwlana* Kausar Niazi (d. 1994 AD), warned him of the dangers of such a
policy. A political opportunist, Niazi (known by many as “*mwlana* Whiskey” due to his
alleged habit of being either “drunk or surrounded by dancing girls”) was a former JI
member who in 1969 had quit the Jamaat to join the PPP (and eventually Bhutto’s
cabinet), before quitting that, too (in 1977) to unite with the ‘*alma*-led opposition to his
erstwhile political master.25 While *ny zam-e-mustafa* might function as a highly effective
campaign slogan, the shrewd *mwlana* warned, its actual implementation would only
result in sectarianism.26 Should a Deobandi interpretation be implemented, this would
be unacceptable to the Barelvis, and vice-versa. Meanwhile, the Ahl-e-Hadis would
likely find fault with either, as would, certainly, Pakistan’s Shi’a population.

Whatever its future implications, the immediate opportunity for religious parties
and the ‘*alma* to play a more significant role within the political structure of the
Pakistani state did appear to have increased considerably with the July ascension of
General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia utilized the state to initiate a program of
“Islamization” throughout the country. “If one can bring back Islam in its purity, it
would be a good thing,” he told the BBC in April 1978.27 Pakistan’s new military
dictator seemed to view Islam in Pakistan as having been corrupted and in need of
purification, of *restoration* to its original form; this was an implicitly revivalist—and
Deobandi—point of view. Zia introduced a wide variety of “Islamic” laws, governing everything from business hours to television censorship to the wording of government documents.28 But underneath the surface, perceptive observers might notice that the Islamic frills of the new regime may have been just that—mere frills, veiling just another run-of-the-mill military dictatorship. He remained, after all, Chief Martial Law Administrator from July 1977 until December 1984 (retaining the position even after assuming the office of President after the September 1978 departure of Fazal Elahi Chaudhry). From December 1984, the General ruled as simply “President” of Pakistan, but even this was accomplished via a questionable referendum (in which a negligible percentage of the Pakistani population participated, with an overwhelming majority voting in Zia’s favor). His presidential leadership would last from 1984 until his mysterious death by plane crash in 1988.

A core facet of Zia’s Islamization program was his adorning of Pakistan’s judiciary with the trappings of an Islamic system, one through which “the supremacy of Islamic law” could be “established over the law of the land”—his words. To many among both the Barelvi and Deobandi ‘alɔma, of course, such a pronouncement was music to the ears. The religious scholars, however, had learned to be skeptical when it came to the promises of political leaders; Zia would have to prove himself by transforming his words into action. Such doubts turned out to be prophetic—though many at the time failed to realize this. Zia’s judiciary promise (and the “reforms” he enacted connected to it) was merely for show, an attempt to placate his ‘alɔma foes and reassure ‘alɔma allies. These trappings took the form, in 1978, of the “Shariat Appellat Bench,” one of which was attached to each of the state’s four High Courts. Citizens were now free to appeal to these shari’at courts regarding the verdicts reached in the secular ones. In 1980, a
“Federal Shariat Court” was established, too, with original jurisdiction to hear shari’at petitions (and to include up to three ‘alôma “having at least fifteen years experience in Islamic law, research or instruction”). Even the Supreme Court was supplemented by a five-person Shariat Appellate Bench, made up of three Supreme Court judges and two others—the latter, significantly, selected from among the ‘alôma or the Federal Shariat Court. All of this seemed transformational indeed, a major step towards the establishment of a long-overdue Islamic state in South Asia. But even with Zia’s Shariat Appellate Benches and his Federal Shariat Court, the Martial Law Administrator’s incorporation of a shari’at-based structure into Pakistan’s judiciary was a veneer, nothing more. According to Article 203B of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat Court’s jurisdiction did not include “the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or tribunal or...any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure...” Islam’s all-encompassing nature, prominent in the Qur’an’s concern with the seemingly mundane (to say nothing of the thematic scope of the sunnat and centuries of Islamic juridical tradition) has already been discussed; obviously this constitutional provision significantly curtailed the jurisdiction of Zia’s so-called shari’at courts. In addition, the secular Supreme Court maintained its position as the highest and “final court of appeal for all criminal cases,” and shari’at court judges were made up mostly of regular judges of the secular system anyway—i.e. not of the ‘alôma (the constitution still mandated that Supreme Court and High Court judges possess credentials and experience within the Western, British legal tradition). At the District level, too, these new trappings were more or less a moot point, since district judges could already try someone either according to civil or shari’at law. Finally, the existence
of a shari‘at system side-by-side the secular one was illusory in that “laws were decreed as conforming to Islamic Shari‘a, but no attempt was made to derive the legal system directly from the Shari‘a.” In other words, the shari‘at system was still an afterthought that in no way either replaced the secular system or formed a new basis for a reformed system; only when a law or decision was deemed anti-Islamic could a Shariat Bench intervene. The Benches thus functioned only when a challenge to a law’s “Islamicness” was raised. And perhaps most telling of all, Zia ensured that the decisions of his regime’s military tribunals as well as his own “Regulation[s] and Order[s]” remained above both the shari‘at and secular courts. The regime acted outside of, or at best above, the law. Zia’s supposed “Islamic” judiciary reforms were thus mostly cosmetic, doing little to functionally change the previous system.29

The same held true for many of his other “reforms.” For example, another major part of the regime’s Islamization program was its institution, in October 1984, of a “new” Law of Evidence (qanwn-e-shahadat). Through this law, Zia claimed to have replaced the “un-Islamic” 1872 Law of Evidence (obviously on the books since the early British Raj period) with “an Islamic law.” But the reality was that both laws were functionally more or less identical; “[t]he only change,” wrote Kennedy, “was that the 1872 Law of Evidence had been declared to be Islamic” after all. The promulgation, in February 1979, of the so-called hudud ordinances, stand out as another example. There were four such ordinances: a Prohibition Ordinance (chalking out punishments for alcohol consumption and the use and/or possession of illegal drugs), a zyna Ordinance (zyna means “adultery” and/or “fornication”; the ordinance established punishments for sex-related offenses like adultery, rape, prostitution, sodomy, and kidnapping), a qazaf Ordinance (“for the wrongful imputation of zyna”; the ordinance laid out the punishment
for those who wrongfully accused an innocent man or woman of adultery), and a Property Ordinance (spelling out punishments for theft). Punishments ranged from fines and imprisonment to whipping, “sourging” with “stripes,” and death-by-stoning.

But the *hudūd* ordinances, too, appear to have been implemented mainly for show, as most every “crime” in the *hudūd* laws was already listed in Pakistan’s existant criminal code (and many of the punishments were exact matches, too). Additionally, the more severe punishments were rarely or *never* employed during Zia’s tenure, and the only two “major sin” convictions passed during the entire period were ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court anyway.⁹⁰

Given the superficial nature of Zia’s reforms (however difficult it might have been to initially perceive this), and keeping in mind the sectarian divisions extant among Pakistan’s ‘*al‘ama* (remember the Munir Report), it is not surprising that reaction to Zia’s reforms was mixed. The ‘*al‘ama* “interpreted each law in the light of their own school of thought.” Some did not agree, for example, with the punishments the regime had attached to various “crimes” in the *hudūd* ordinances.⁹¹ Others felt that the government had usurped the role of the ‘*al‘ama*, while still others derided the continued central position of the western judicial model.

Ostensibly for inspiration, spiritual guidance, and to aid in his implementation of Islamization (but probably also to shore up a base of support), Zia ul-Haq seemed to favor the JI. This organization, previously hailed as a mainstream Islamic party whose principle platforms had included a respect for constitutional law, was actually represented on Zia’s cabinet (as ministers of information and broadcasting, water, power, and natural resources, and production). To spearhead the country’s Planning Commission, Zia appointed the JI’s Khurshid Ahmad—with the express purpose of
“Islamizing the economy.”JI representatives on Zia’s cabinet would resign in 1979, but the party continued to mostly support the regime. (There were some within the party, it should be noted—like Abdul Ghafoor Ahmad—who were vocal critics of the Zia government.) Meanwhile, the government’s patronage allowed the JI’s student wing, the Jamaat-e-Taliba, to virtually take over many of Pakistan’s universities, intimidating professors and students alike—sometimes at gunpoint in classrooms.

Later, government patronage was extended to both the Barelvi JUP as well as, later, the Deobandi JUI. Some within the JUI approved of Zia for his Islamization efforts, while others disapproved entirely. As a result, a split within the JUI developed that continues to the time of this writing. Those who supported Zia were led by Sami ul-Haq (the JUI-S), while those opposed to the regime followed Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). The latter might be considered the “original” party and Sami ul-Haq’s faction a “breakaway.” After the schism, the JUI-F continued to enjoy its dominance in Pakistan’s western provinces, while JUI-S influence was more or less restricted to a handful of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s districts.

But where Zia enjoyed perhaps the most success in terms of Islamization was in creating a culture of ḥyād in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the arrival of large amounts of American and Saudi cash that followed (of which more later). He gradually replaced more “liberal” military officers with “conservative” ones of a more traditionally Islamic background (mostly Deobandi-leaning), and changed the Army’s motto from the more neutral, Jinnah-inspired “Unity, Faith and Discipline” to the religious-sounding “Faith, Piety and Jihad.”

But before delving into the Soviet invasion, a look toward Iran is in order.
“Islamic Revolution”: Deobandi-Barelvi Response.

The arrival (on 1 February 1979), after a decade-and-a-half-long exile, of the aged Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran, to the welcoming shouts of hundreds of thousands of Iranians celebrating in the streets, signaled the culmination of the Iranian revolution—and the beginning of the Ayatollah’s “Islamic Revolution.” Over the next ten years, Khomeini (as Supreme Leader) would establish a new government in Iran allegedly based on the Shi’a version of Islam. But it was the revolution’s ability to topple a Western-backed (indeed, Western-installed) regime—that of the Shah—that inspired Muslims everywhere, and especially Shi’i, both to shake off the chains of neo-imperialism and of Sunni oppression. The Shi’a and Sunni in Pakistan, too, would be profoundly affected by these developments in neighboring Iran.

The “Islamic Revolution” to the west seemed to infuse a new sort of political energy into Pakistan’s Shi’a population. When the Zia regime attempted to introduce an ordinance dealing with ṯaqat and ‘ushr (June 1980), for example, the Shi’i organized and protested vigorously. The new scheme attempted to institute a state-run system for the regulation and collection of ṯaqat and ‘ushr. But unlike the Sunni, the Shi’a are not required to pay ‘ushr at all; they thus naturally rejected this ordinance. In addition, the Shi’a objected to the ṯaqat law, as their version of Islam rejected the notion of a state-run ṯaqat system. Under pressure from this abruptly mobilized minority, Zia eventually agreed to exempt Shi’i from the payment of both ṯaqat and ‘ushr. Of course, such an exemption only angered some of the ‘alama and their followers among the various Sunni sects, who watched with some trepidation as the political status of the Shi’a seemed to be on the rise. Just the year before, after the introduction of the hudud ordinances, the Shi’a under aforementioned mufti Ja’far Husain had, in April 1979, established the ṭahrir-
e-nyfaz-e-fyqh-e-j’afaria (“Movement for the Implementation of J’afari Law,” hereafter TNFJ) in protest; the crimes and punishments as laid out in the ordinances did not line up squarely with those prescribed by the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic law. Though Ja’far Husain, appointed by Zia as the Shi’a representative on the constitutionally mandated Council of Islamic Ideology, was himself more or less a moderate interested in safeguarding Shi’a rights during the era of (Sunni-dominated) Islamization, the TNFJ quickly took on a life of its own. In particular, it adopted the goal of the JUI, the JUP, and the JI: the formulation of an Islamic constitution—but one, of course, that would be distinctly Shi’a in character, “as expounded by Ayatollah Khomeini.” (This was ironic, given that the organization had been founded in protest of Zia’s attempt to implement a Sunni system upon them; now the TNFJ would struggle for the implementation of a Shi’a system upon Pakistani Sunnis!) Many TNFJ members were trained directly by Shi’a activists sent from Tehran for this purpose. By the early 1980s, too, the “most militant force on Pakistan’s campuses” was the Iran-connected Shi’a student outfit Imamia Students Organization (ISO), with its green-and-red flag and branches in every province of Pakistan. (It was about this time that, it is alleged, Zia “threw the resources of the state” behind the mostly Deobandi scholars and their organizations in a bid to contain the newly invigorated Shi’a minority; significantly for the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, it was not only the Shi’i who were forced to “mobilize” against the growth of Deobandi power—including militant outfits—that followed, but the Barelvis as well.) After the 1983 death of Ja’far Husain, the TNFJ’s leadership fell upon the shoulders of the young NWFP-born ʻArif Husayn al-Husayni (d. 1988 AD), an Iran-trained disciple of the Ayatollah far more confrontational in his political approach than
his predecessor had been. Such developments, inspired by the successful Iranian Revolution, worried the Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership.

There were other happenings related to events in Iran that were likewise troubling to the Sunni ‘alma. Iranian literature friendly to Shi’a Islam seemed suddenly to be flooding into Pakistan, and the success of the revolution seemed to inspire Muslims of even the Sunni persuasion. If Sunnis were convinced to look upon a Shi’a revolution with approbation and even admiration, could full-on conversion be far behind? The Ayatollah Khomeini’s use of the term “Islamic Revolution” (rather than, say, “Shi’a Revolution” or “Iranian Revolution”) irked many Deobandi and Barelvi scholars. “Neither Oriental nor Occidental—Islamic and only Islamic,” went the Iranian slogan. “Neither Shi’a nor Sunni—Islamic and only Islamic.” But how could a movement be an “Islamic Revolution” if it wasn’t endorsed and led by the Sunni (i.e. the majority)? Surely this was a Shi’a attempt at usurpation. The term drove deeper the wedge between many Sunni ‘alma and their Shi’a counterparts, the former resenting as they did such a pan-Islamic interpretation of the Iranian Shah’s overthrow and the establishment of a government under Khomeini. One of these resentful scholars, from the Punjabi district of Sufi-founded Jhang, at the confluence of the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, was named maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. 

Militant wings of Deobandi or Barelvi organizations, or of those parties which the Deobandi or Barelvi religious leadership tended to support, were nothing new. Even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s quasi-spiritualist KK movement, which leaned Deobandi, had sprouted a militant outfit, organized by the “Frontier Gandhi’s” sons, Pashto poet Abdul Ghani and his younger brother, Abdul Wali. Its name was the Zalmai Pakhtun,
and it was ostensibly established for the “defence of the non-violent people.”

Meanwhile, the provincial Muslim League, supported by many Barelvis, organized an armed wing of its own: the Ghazi Pakhtun. But these groups had been short-lived and the actual violence they meted out had been negligible. It took the Iranian Revolution, the politicization of the Shi’a, and the Sunni backlash (and, perhaps, a taste for blood garnered in Kashmir and Bangladesh) to militarize the Pakistani ‘alɔma. This would be exacerbated later by Russian and American invasions of Afghanistan (and the Saudi inroads into Pakistan that resulted), but that will come later. Perhaps it was just such militarization that led JUI party workers and supporters in Jacobabad (home to several thousand of Pakistan’s one million Hindus) to ransack and deface nine Hindu temples there. The demonstration-turned-riot was a response to an Indian court’s decision to authorize the operation of a Hindu temple in Uttar Pradesh on the site of a Muslim mosque, a decision that had subsequently resulted in communal clashes in India—and over a dozen dead, eliciting “great emotion” among the Muslims of Pakistan. Still, the incident represented the first time such violence against a non-Muslim minority had been exhibited in Pakistan since 1948. Perhaps something had changed.

In 1985, four members of the Deobandi JUI—Zia-ur-Rahman Faruqi, Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi, Azam Tariq, and, most importantly, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi—established what would become a militant offshoot: the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP; originally the group was called the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba). Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-Sahaba’s first leader, had been educated at the Jamia Khair-ul-Madaris in Multan, a Deobandi institution founded under the patronage of JUI guiding light Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi. By his early twenties, when he worked as ymam and xətib of a Deobandi məsjid, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi had gained somewhat of a reputation in his native Jhang for
his passionate speeches, both against the Ahmadis as well as the Barelvis. As a JUI member and a Deobandi, he had been an opponent of Ayub Khan (1969), active in the \textit{x\textbar t\textbar m-e-n\textbar b\textbar r\textbar w\textbar w\textbar at} movement (1974), and a staunch advocate of the “System of the Prophet.” Later (after the Iranian revolution and the rise of the Shi'a “threat”), his pro-
\textit{S\textbar habah} (a term referring to the Companions of the Prophet) speeches likewise gained notoriety. This was significant, since some Shi'a used the mockery of the \textit{S\textbar habah} as a means to demean the Sunni version of Islam (it had been some of the \textit{S\textbar habah}, after all, who, according to the Shi'a version of Islamic history, had usurped the caliphate from its rightful heir, ‘Ali). With Jhang's powerful and controlling landlords prescribing mostly to Shi'ia Islam and its populace mostly to either the Deobandi or Barelvi Sunni version of the faith, the sermons of Haq Nawaz in fervent praise of the \textit{S\textbar habah} took on special meaning.\textsuperscript{45} Within the politically charged context of the Iranian Revolution and its spillover effects in Pakistan, Jhangvi's animosity towards the Shi'i took on even greater connotations. Concerned that the Shi'a, prodded by the new regime in Iran, were making excessive inroads in Pakistan, Haq Nawaz formed a committee, comprised of two \textit{\textbar al\textbar ma} representatives from each major Sunni sect in the country (Deobandi, Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadis), with the express purpose of combating Shi'a Islam. This is significant; far from being a militant Deobandi organ targeting Barelvi gatherings and shrines, the SSP was originally formed as \textit{a joint effort} between Deobandis and Barelvis (plus the Ahl-e-Hadis) in and around Jhang. Indeed, Haq Nawaz argued that differences arising from the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should, for the time being, be buried—in order to fight a “great and most dangerous challenge”: the surging Shi'a.\textsuperscript{46}

Jhangvi's anti-Shi'a rhetoric, formerly couched in pro-\textit{S\textbar habah} terminology, now became much more explicit. To his followers, Haq Nawaz had become a near-
redemptive figure. “Every Firaun [Pharaoh] will meet his Moosa [Moses],” wrote one of Jhangvi’s disciples later, in an obituary. “Allah Ta’ala created a Moosa in this very town [Jhang], to defeat the Shiite Firauns.” His following was passionate in their faith—and in their certainty that not only were the Shi’i kufar (“unbelievers”), but “the worst brand” of kafyr.⁴⁷ For his open anti-Shi’a speeches, Haq Nawaz was arrested by the local assistant superintendent of police, a man named Tariq Khosa. Khosa would later testify (in September 2012) before a Senate Committee that he was called soon after making the arrest by Zia ul-Haq himself concerning the matter; according to Khosa, the President allegedly ordered that Jhangvi be released.⁴⁸ Tariq Khosa’s testimony demonstrates the Pakistani state’s continued use of religious elements, including (perhaps in particular) those of a more militant nature, to patronize sectarianism. Barelvis (and the Shi’i, for that matter) have long asserted that that patronage has more often than not flowed the Deobandis’ way, a charge supported, however circumstantially, by Zia’s actions following Jhangvi’s arrest. In any case, the SSP was officially launched in 1985 with its original goals revolving around halting the perceived Shi’a doctrinal (and political) onslaught. Its aims included (1) the revival of the caliphate as instituted during the era of the rashidun; (2) the declaration of Pakistan as a Sunni state; (3) the observance by the state of holidays in commemoration of the first four caliphs (marked on their respective death anniversaries); (4) action to curtail Shi’a mourning processions commemorating Husain’s brutal murder at Karbala; (5) restrictions on the Iranian Council Centres in Pakistan, claimed by the SSP to be front organizations for the arming and training of Shi’a “agents” and preachers; (6) the death penalty, or at least flogging and imprisonment, for “maligning verbally” the “revered elders of Islam”; and (7) legislation declaring all Shi’i kufar.⁴⁹ The SSP’s initial victories
came not in any militant fashion but in the form of promises by Shi’a Muslims not to mock the Prophet’s Companions. And though the group had begun ostensibly as a joint Sunni effort, comprised of both Deobandis and Barelvis, among others, such intra-Sunni unity was impossible to maintain. By 1987, it was shattered completely. In that year, in Jhang, a brawl erupted between Barelvis and Deobandis that resulted in two Barelvi deaths. The SSP, including Haq Nawaz himself, was implicated in the murders. Jhangvi and most of his arrested associates were subsequently released; two spent three years behind bars before being set free, too. During the interim, it appeared that the Deobandis and Barelvis of the region had settled their differences. But this was to be an illusory peace only.

On 22 February 1990, Jhangvi fell to an assassin’s bullet (actually six, to the chest) in front of his house as he was leaving to attend the final daily prayer (‘ysha). Several attempts had been made on his life before (the SSP blamed unspecified Shi’i on each occasion), but all previous efforts had failed—until now. He would be succeeded as SSP chief by his biographer and SSP co-founder Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi. The Ayatollah’s “Islamic Revolution” had politicized the Shi’a and militarized the (mostly Deobandi) Sunnis—with major consequences for the future of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry. Thus, while the SSP was originally borne of the strongly anti-Shi’a sentiment of its founders (particularly after the Iranian Revolution and “increasing Shia militancy in Pakistan”), its attacks (or at least those attributed to the group) were subsequently aimed just as often (and, in the last two decades immediately previous to this writing, perhaps more) at Barelvi Sunnis. As of 2010, the violence had not abated, as gunmen from the SSP and affiliated groups attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlyd in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack by the crowd on a Deobandi madrasah; in July,
scores of Barelvis were killed when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data Durbar shrine in Lahore; and these are merely two incidents among many.

But even the SSP wasn’t militant enough for some within its ranks. As sectarian tensions within Pakistan mounted (especially after Jhangvi’s own 1990 assassination), three SSP members (Akram Lahori, Riaz Basra, and Malik Ishaqul), claiming to be acting in fulfillment of the martyred Jhangvi’s original wishes, organized what would become one of the country’s most deadly outfits. This was the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—“Jhangvi’s Army.” Meanwhile, the machinations of the state continued to play a role in intensifying the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic; according to B. Rahman of the South Asia Analysis Group (in a report issued by SAAG in July 2002), the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate had been “inciting the [Deobandi] SSP and the [LeJ] to counter [the] activities” of several Barelvi groups opposed to its (the ISID’s) strategic objectives. How did the state, especially under the aegis of the ISID, become so involved in patronizing these mostly Deobandi outfits? To answer this question, it may be necessary to turn west, again—not to Iran, though, but to Afghanistan.


Since its 1947 birth, Pakistan had always had somewhat strained relations with Afghanistan. This is typically explained away as either a strategic issue or an ethnic one. Strategically speaking, the partition of the subcontinent left Afghanistan caught in the Cold War game, with India independent and leaning pro-Moscow and the very anti-Soviet United States Government allied with Pakistan. Afghanistan had previously enjoyed a mixed relationship with the USSR, but since 1946 had established “good relations” with the Soviet Union; within the new context of the Washington-Moscow
tug-of-war, however, would such relations pose a problem to the country’s security? What about the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship? On the ethnic front, it is pointed out that, with Pakistani independence, Afghanistan naturally repudiated the legally ambiguous Durand Line—and demanded that the Pathan-dominated region of Pakistan’s west and northwest be given the opportunity either to become part of Afghanistan (thereby uniting the heretofore Durand-divided Pathan people) or to become independent itself (as a free “Pakhtunistan,” as aforementioned). After all, almost half of Afghanistan’s population was Pathan, for centuries the country’s largest and most dominant ethnic group. Such explanations for the rocky Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, while certainly important, fail to acknowledge a third aspect: the Deobandi position. For it was the Deobandi position, speaking generally, that dominated Pathan Afghanistan. Most Deobandis in India had been opposed to Pakistan’s creation; is it not natural, then, that the same position might be taken by Afghanistan’s leaders? The Deobandis had, by and large, supported the Pathan call for autonomy or independence (something the Barevis, generally speaking, would ardently oppose for decades afterward); is it surprising that Afghan leaders would feel the same way, too? Perhaps the “Deobandi position” should not be disregarded on this question. (This is not, of course, meant to disregard the complexity of Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic as well as religious makeup, which includes a strong contingency of Dari-speaking Tajiks, Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, and Hazaras, not to mention Hanafi Sunnis of many stripes, plus Jafari Shi’i, Ismaili Shi’i, and more.) In any case, the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship was to experience significant developments in the decade after 1979: the year the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.
Ever since Partition, and especially after the United States Government began cultivating ties with regimes (like Pakistan’s) ostensibly opposed to the expansion of the Soviet Union’s circle of influence, Afghanistan, though officially neutral in Washington’s and Moscow’s feud, had turned more and more to the Soviets for support—a perhaps natural phenomenon, given the USSR’s proximity compared to the USA’s geographical position on the far side of the globe. The Afghan and Soviet governments signed trade agreements and peace treaties, and Moscow loaned large sums of money to Kabul for a variety of projects. From 1965, the two states were connected via regular flights from Kabul to Tashkent (later extended to Moscow). In the mid-1950s, the Afghan government asked the U.S. Government for military equipment; when it was turned down, it turned to the Soviet Union instead, and Moscow was happy to comply. Along with these supplies, however, the Soviets sent military and technical advisers by the thousands to the central Asian state, and thousands of Afghans subsequently left for Russia to be trained, too. This all allowed Afghanistan’s Prime Minister, Muhammad Daud, to stage a coup in 1973—made possibly by Daud’s left-wing, mostly pro-Soviet supporters. As a result, the (unpopular) monarchy was toppled and a republic established. But Afghanistan’s communists weren’t satisfied. Just five years later, in April 1978, Daud himself was toppled (and murdered) by the People’s Democratic Party—a Marxist outfit—and a new Afghan government under Nur Muhammad Taraki was established. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Crucially (and unsurprising, given the new regime’s political ideology), Nur Muhammad invited Soviet advisors to come to Afghanistan and “assist” the new government “in all branches of government.” Just as
crucially, the regime concluded a treaty with Moscow that December providing for military and economic assistance.  

The coming of the Nur Muhammad regime brought with it particular challenges to the country's traditional Islamic religious leadership. Zaeef describes how, from the late 1970s, many students from Afghan madrassas left to continue their studies in Pakistan (especially after some of their teachers became vocal supporters of the Communists). After the coup, though, many religious leaders and teachers (including, Zaeef writes, "my instructor, and all the other scholars") fled to Pakistan as well. "Sayyeds, Khans, Maliks, and Mullahs were all being persecuted by the government." Some were imprisoned, others taken and never heard from again. Opposition to the regime grew. The ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras were especially opposed to Nur Muhammad. The situation was so unstable by March 1979 that the Soviets refused to send more military aid to the Marxist regime in Kabul, despite the latter's direct request, for fear of the general Afghan reaction (that same month, citizens of the Soviet Union living in Herat were slaughtered by mutinying Afghan troops, and the month before, the U.S. Ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by militants and killed during a controversial rescue attempt).

But after Nur Muhammad Taraki was overthrown (and executed) in September 1979, replaced by his erstwhile Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Moscow reconsidered—and the Soviets, fearing the fall of a communist regime to the forces of Islam (an "Islamic Revolution" was underway in next-door Iran, after all), not to mention their wariness at Amin's meetings with representatives in Kabul of the United States Government, sent in a "Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan" (LCSFA). The USSR's troops (specifically, the Soviet Fortieth Army) crossed the
Afghan border on 27 December 1979. In a week, around fifty thousand Soviet troops were stationed in Afghanistan, from Kabul to Herat, from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar and Jalalabad. (At the war’s height, that number would skyrocket to around one hundred forty thousand.) Before the year was out, Hafizullah Amin himself had been killed (by Soviet commandos, no less), and Babrak Kamal, backed by Moscow, was installed as head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Over the course of 1980, meanwhile, the anti-communist insurgency only grew. By now the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United States—and, of course, Pakistan—were all involved in the conflict, funneling cash and arms to the mujahydin. Despite Washington’s concerns about Pakistan—its continued development of nuclear weapons, its involvement in the drug trade, the ISID’s sponsorship of “Islamic fundamentalists,” and Zia’s own apparent reluctance to re-institute representative government—the United States Government gave billions in military and economic aid directly to Pakistan, too. In 1980, Washington spearheaded a boycott of the Olympic Games, held in Moscow. One of the Cold War’s most significant (and costly, in terms of human life) proxy wars was in full swing, despite the fact that the details on the ground were more than a little blurry for the major powers involved—and perhaps even insignificant in view of the conflict’s “big picture.”

By mid-decade, the war in Afghanistan had displaced over five million Afghans. Many fled to Iran. Most fled to Pakistan. Mikhail Gorbachev, newly minted head of the USSR, increased troop levels in Afghanistan in order to bring about a quick end to the war (a “surge” that the American government would mimic later in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)—but this merely resulted in the bloodiest year of the conflict up to that time (1985). By that year, journalist Edward Mortimer was asking the question, “Can
the Afghans find their Arafat?” The answer seemed far from certain. Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar had lost credibility both in the west (where he was generally viewed as “ferociously uncompromising”) as well as among fellow Afghans; the reason for this latter phenomenon stemmed from the engineer’s apparent tendency to direct his wrath “more against rival resistance groups than against the Russians.” Erstwhile Kabul University philosophy professor Buhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Jamiat Islami, failed to garner any real support among the Pathans, and the Jamiat’s “rising star” of the resistance, the Persian-speaking Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud, likewise failed to command a Pathan following. The head of the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, mawlana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, had the support of a broad coalition of Pathan 'alma, mullahs, and students in southern and parts of eastern Afghanistan and along Pakistan’s western border, but could not meaningfully reach out to the country’s non-Pathan (not to mention non-Sunni) population.58 Afghanistan’s “mujahdin” resistance was thus fractured along strongly ethnic and sectarian lines, with the Jamiat Islami dominant in the north and west (among the non-Pathans), the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami in the south and east, and the Hizb-e-Islami commanding pockets of support in the north, east, and south. Meanwhile, in the center, some of the most dominant groups were actually Shi’a.59 (It is perhaps interesting to note that Mortimer’s question is still being posed by foreign interventionists today, years after the mysterious mullah Omar probably came closest to establishing himself as an “Afghan Arafat” and the unpopular Hamid Karzai was propped up by the U.S. Government as its own version of an Afghan uniter.)

The Pathans formed “the core of the anti-Soviet struggle,” in the words of one veteran journalist who covered the war from Afghanistan and Pakistan.60 The
The dominating position of the Deobandi school of thought among the Pathan (especially in Pakistan but in Afghanistan, too) has already been discussed. In this, they were assisted to a large extent by volunteers from Pakistan, mostly students, teachers, and administrators from religious (and mostly Deobandi) seminaries. Indeed, the Deobandi contribution to the Afghan war effort should not be overlooked. Not only did these Deobandi fighters help turn the tide against the Russian occupiers, but it was here, too, that the seeds of the future “Taliban” movement would be planted. The word țalyban means, simply, “students” (the plural of țalyb, or “student”); by the thousands, then, these religiously trained students were referred to by their less religious-minded brothers-in-arms as țalyban. It was common, too, for the țalyban to fight side-by-side with their mentors and teachers, the ʿalma. For many of the Deobandi Pathans in northwestern Pakistan, the contribution of Pakistani Pathans with the help of American and Saudi financial and other support in the fight against communism in Afghanistan was a phenomenon worthy of celebration, a noble act in the face of foreign tyranny. To some Pakistani scholars in the west, however, the “blending of Saudi Wahabism with the neo-Deobandi ideology...made for a witch’s brew of religious bigotry and sectarian hatred.” A more accurate picture probably lies somewhere in between these two extremes, as many ordinary Pathans of all ages sacrificed much to drive out a brutal invading force in their own land—but were armed and militarized in the process, setting the stage for more violent sectarian clashes (in which a minority participated) in the future.

Many of the țalyban at the Deobandi dar ul'alwm in Karachi (probably the most worthy Pakistani successor to the dar ul'alwm at Deoband, and the largest dar ul'alwm in the country—far bigger than the “original,” in fact) would journey to Afghanistan
during their school vacations to “participate in the jihad.” Many never returned, injured or killed in battle. Many who did return did so wounded. Mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani, the son of Muhammad Shafi, demonstrated this on again, off again participation (not unlike seasonal volunteer work) in his own memoirs. In April 1988, Muhammad Rafi left Karachi for Afghanistan’s Paktika province, where he took part in a skirmish at Urghun. After that, he returned home—only to go again three-and-a-half years later in August 1991, participating in a battle at Gardez. For these Deobandi fighters, jihad was a religious experience, a “faith reviving” phenomenon, bringing “back to our minds the stories of the first generation of Islam.” Many of the mujahydnin would bathe (and even apply perfume) before going into battle, mindful of Sahih Muslim’s hadis in which the Prophet enjoins those preparing martyrs for burial not to wash either the fallens’ clothes or their bodies. On the Day of Judgment, Muhammad promised, the wounds “will be the color of blood but have the fragrance of musk.” In this same vein, these Deobandi talyban and ‘alima saw the fight against the Soviets as more than a struggle to evict Afghanistan of its Russian invaders; the jihad (which one of the most prominent Deobandi muftis in Pakistan has defined as “war against the infidels for the sake of Allah”) was to be the “beginning point” of a more “universal jihad,” with fronts in Tajikistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, East Turkestan (or “Xinjiang”), Chechnya, and elsewhere. Afghanistan was to be the great training ground where the mujahydnin could learn courage, could learn to overcome “fear of the battlefield,” in preparation for the larger jihad to come. This was all very revivalist in spirit, of course—very pan-Islamic in nature—and very Deobandi.63

Barelvis, on the other hand, generally did not actively involve themselves in the Afghan conflict. Unlike its stance on Kashmir, where it had proclaimed jihad and
organized relief and preaching missions, the JUP did not support the *jihad* in Afghanistan. The Pathans (especially in Pakistan) were, after all, mostly Deobandis, and the *jihad* itself had been launched by Zia ul-Haq, a Deobandi-leaning dictator (or, at worst, an out-and-out “Wahhabi”). Ahmad Riza Khan’s rules of conduct vis-à-vis “bad” Muslims were thus followed and the war in Afghanistan failed to mobilize either the Barelvi religious leadership or their base.

The vision of the Afghan *tāliban* for themselves was distinctly Deobandi, too, both in its emphasis on reform and on its own importance vis-à-vis society at large. When one prominent Afghan commander saw the dead bodies of young *tāliban* fighters laid out before him, he addressed a *tāliban* commander, reportedly lamenting, “Fear God! You should not sacrifice our young Taliban to the Russians.” We have no choice, came the answer from the other, for the Russians cannot be allowed to stay—to which the original speaker replied, “I don’t mean that we should not fight the *jihad*, but I am concerned about the Taliban and the Ulema, for they are the spiritual heart of our country….” His own fighters knew little of Islam, smoked hashish, and shaved their beards; let them fight and die. “The Taliban have a greater role in society.”

The memoirs of one Deobandi ‘alām demonstrate the broad, personal participation of the Deobandi ‘alāma in the anti-communist *jihad*. Listing the seventeen members of his “caravan” traveling from Karachi to Multan to Dera Ismail Khan to Afghanistan’s Paktika province, he identified three school administrators (from the *dar ul’alwam* in Karachi), three principals or assistant principals (of the Jami Farooqiya in Karachi, the madrasah Ashrafiyah in Sukkur, and the Jamiat-ul Uloom al-Islamiya in Karachi), six teachers (from the *dar ul’alwam* Karachi and the Jami Farooqiya), a chief administrator for Pakistan’s official organization overseeing the country’s thousands of Deobandi
madarys, a religious newspaper editor, one ymam and xatib from a mosque in Karachi, two administrators of the Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami in Karachi, and only one student. Of course, students organized their own “caravans” to the front (often immediately upon earning their degrees), but the ‘alym’s memoirs paint quite a different picture from that delivered by many in the western media of evil “mullahs” conniving their students into harm’s way while they themselves plot further mischief tucked safely away in their madrasahs. Of the seventeen travelers, a full eleven were degree-holding mwelanas. Their zeal, and that of their students, was inspired not only by fellow teachers and administrators but also by veteran mujahydin who would visit the dar ul’alwm in Karachi regularly to share their spiritual experiences as jyhadijs.⁶⁵

One famous Deobandi mujahydm was named Irshad Ahmed. In his early twenties he had formed the Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami to facilitate the recruitment, transportation, and supplying of Pakistani fighters on the Afghan front against the Russians. Irshad Ahmed was killed several years later (1985) in battle. Among the other mujahydin killed that night were six students from the dar ul’alwm in Karachi. It is interesting to note that not one of these students was actually from Karachi; three were from Gilgit, one from Iran, one from Afghanistan itself, and one from Burma. (The author experienced this diversity firsthand at the Karachi seminary, where he met a Kashmiri refugee a thousand miles from Kashmir, born and raised on the plains; a Karachi businessman whose grandparents had fled far-away Uttar Pradesh in 1947; and the son of a Burmese Indian run out of Southeast Asia by General Ne Win’s 1962 expulsion of all those of Indian descent from that southeast Asian state—to name a few.) Thus the Deobandi fighters who participated in the anti-communist jyhad in Afghanistan hailed from all over the South Asian subcontinent and its fringes. Significantly, Irshad Ahmed’s
Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami would later play a part in the militarization of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.\textsuperscript{66}

The development prompted the U.S. Government to initiate its now-famous Stinger missile program in 1986. The \textit{mujahy�in} now possessed the means to shoot down and destroy the dreaded Soviet helicopter gunship. This was the turning point of the war; Karmal was sacked and Muhammad Najibullah installed in his stead. But now the violence was spilling over into Pakistan. In February 1987, for example, the mostly non-Pathan Jamiat-e-Islami became the target of a bomb blast, set off in front of the group’s Pakistan-based office south of Peshawar. A bus parked in front of the recruitment center had exploded, killing eleven people (including several young schoolchildren), injuring fifty more, and collapsing a nearby primary school and several houses. After the bombing, dubbed “one of the worst bomb blasts in Pakistan,” locals repeatedly fired at the Jamiat office—a foreshadowing, perhaps, of the Taliban-Northern Alliance battles to come.\textsuperscript{67}

For the “Islamists,” even in the midst of this violent scene, the goal was the institution of Islamic law and the establishment of a truly Islamic state. Warlords fought for territory—and the money and power that came with it—yes, but thousands of \textit{mujahy�in} fought simply for the institution of an Islamic system after so many years of atheistic communist regimes. One eyewitness to Afghan resistance to the Russians in the south and southeast regions of the country (the heart of Pathan territory) described how the first order of business in an area cleared of Soviet forces (even if the latter continued to attack from afar) was the extension of an Islamic judicial system. Indeed, even with continued Russian heavy artillery and assaults by air threatening a newly
liberated region, “the courts were working well and started to settle disputes among the communities.” The establishment of an Islamic state was underway.

The conceptualization of a “brotherhood” is one that resounds within Islam, of course—but especially within Deobandism, a phenomenon hailing from the school’s beginnings to the present day. One future high-ranking Taliban fighter, who claimed to have stood not twenty feet from Muhammad Omar when the latter’s eye was ripped out by “a shard of metal shrapnel” during a fight with the Russians, described the events that followed the incident thus:

On that same night we held a marvelous party. The late Mullah Marjan sang and we accompanied his sweet voice with percussion on whatever we had to hand. I can remember the ghazal that Mullah Muhammad Omar Akhund sang:

*My illness is untreatable, oh, my flower-like friend*

*My life is difficult without you, my flower-like friend.*

…May God be praised! What a brotherhood we had among the mujahedeen! We weren’t concerned with the world or with our lives; our intentions were pure and every one of us was ready to die as a martyr. When I look back on the love and respect that we had for each other, it sometimes seems like a dream.”

For many of these fighters, the struggle against the Soviets and their allies, or the “Jihad…against communism,” was one of the most elevated spirituality, with an ultimate goal of unquestionable sanctity. “Many great battles were fought against the
Russians and government forces,” remembered one Muslim fighter. Many would die, and they would be forever hailed as martyrs. For the living, the only redemptive political system was that of Islam. *This* was how peace could be won, however hard-fought it might be. Over time, the mujahedin’s war of attrition wore away at the Soviet occupiers, demoralizing the Russian troops and contributing significantly to virtual Soviet bankruptcy. By 1988, peace accords had been signed between the governments of Afghanistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan.

On 15 February 1989, Moscow announced that the last Soviet soldier had left Afghanistan. One million Afghans (some say two million), as well as some thirteen thousand Soviet troops, had been killed in the decade-long Soviet war in Afghanistan.

*Proselytizing Deobandism: the Rise and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at.*

Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944 AD), the founder of the Tablighi Jama’at, was trained in the Deobandi tradition; indeed, he had been born into it. His father, Muhammad Ismail (d. 1898 AD), was from the *qaṣba* of Jhanjana, and his mother from the *qaṣba* of Kandhala, both “*alima* towns” in which Deobandism had taken firm root. One of his most influential teachers was his own older brother, Muhammad Yahya, a student of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (as a teenager, Ilyas himself reportedly developed a strong bond with Rashid Ahmad, too). He had additionally studied, beginning in 1908, under the direction of Mahmud Hasan (to whom he would later swear an oath of *jihad* against the British), and would become a disciple, too, of the eminent Ashraf’Ali Thanawi while completing his education at the *dar ul’al_PARAMS* at Deoband. After completing his studies there, Muhammad Ilyas continued to train and teach at another Deobandi *dar ul’al_PARAMS*, in nearby Saharanpur (from 1910 to 1917).
But it was in the 1930s that Muhammad Ilyas really began his now-famous tablighi efforts. The setting was Mewat, a region that straddles the modern-day Indian units of Rajasthan and Haryana. Here he organized jama’ats (or “assemblies”) assigned to specific villages in the area with the explicit mission to preach Islam to Muslims viewed as either weak in the faith or victims of Hindu or some other influence; this included, of course, the Barelvīs. The goal was revival (and numbers, as the British began during this period to open up junior government posts to Indians apportioned by religion, and Hindu groups like the Arya Samaj were reacting with “reconversion” campaigns claiming success by the hundreds of thousands). Muhammad Ilyas’s gift was in organization. Each jama’at was tasked with reporting to the movement’s center in Delhi (where its world headquarters remained even after Partition—and to the time of this writing), and members were to differentiate themselves in deed, belief, and even look from their Hindu neighbors. The accretion must stop, and the jama’ats would use the power of persuasion combined with strict discipline and a commitment to “motion” (i.e. movement, as in from house to house and from place to place, preaching Islam) to make sure that it did. It didn’t take long for enthusiasm for Muhammad Ilyas’s organization to spread, especially to Delhi, where the proselytizing group became popular among the city’s Muslim merchants. The organization was called the Tablighi Jama’at (hereafter TJ).

After the 1944 death of Muhammad Ilyas, his son, Yusuf (d. 1965) took the reigns in his stead. Unlike the JUH or, later, the JUI, both of which played an overtly political role within the context of the pre-Partition struggle for independence and Pakistan, the TJ began presenting itself during this period as a completely apolitical entity, especially after 1947. (Within Islam this is, of course, arguably impossible, at least on a certain
level; Yusuf here was simply keeping his organization at a distance from the specific political webs of India and Pakistan, despite its overtly political end game.) The group especially distanced itself from the JI (Muhammad Ilyas’s nephew, Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi, who had taught at the same Saharanpur *dar ul’alwom* and was Yusuf’s father-in-law, wrote a fiery and influential diatribe against the JI in the early 1950s, for example). In any case, the TJ’s policy became one of political non-alignment, a position it ostensibly holds to the time of this writing (but which, as earlier demonstrated, is practically impossible within the framework of Islam, and especially Deobandi Islam; in the words of Sikand, despite the group’s “immediate focus” on “reform of the individual,” the TJ “can hardly be said to be apolitical”). Under Yusuf, the TJ completely transformed, from a local phenomenon with little influence beyond north-central India to a worldwide organization. TJ *jama’ats* were organized throughout the subcontinent, in the Middle East, and in Western Europe, spreading as well to the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Throughout Yusuf’s tenure as TJ head, the organization held major—and highly attended—conventions in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, often counting a million or more attendees. Significantly, too, the TJ under Yusuf expanded its mission to include preaching to non-Muslims, and like the Christian missionaries of previous centuries the TJ proselytizers traveled far and wide by whatever means they could manage. Muhammad Ilyas would perhaps have preferred a comparison not to early Christians but to the first generations of Muslims, who “traveled all the time, both on land and in the water…traveling and reciting the Qur’an, traveling and offering *salat*, traveling and doing *zikr*” (again emphasizing the necessity of “motion”). Yusuf died in 1965 in Lahore, having led the movement for over twenty years.
His successor, the quiet and reserved In’amul Hasan (d. 1995), had known Yusuf since childhood (when they had been classmates) and had personally studied under both Muhammad Zakariya Kandhlawi and Muhammad Ilyas himself. The expansion of the organization that had taken place under Yusuf continued under In’amul—especially, and significantly, within the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, and the Pakistani intelligence agencies. In 1990, prominent TJ member Javed Nasir became head of the ISID, and during the Prime Ministership of Nawaz Sharif (whose own father was an active member and generous financier of the TJ) the Pakistani government patronized TJ members with significant government positions. TJ inroads in the Army, which surged under Zia as the dictator tended to appoint Deobandi-leaning officers into the armed forces, allowed members to preach to soldiers in the barracks. Meanwhile, the organization’s worldwide spread gained a renewed vigor, especially given Muslim grievances in Afghanistan, the central Asian states (including East Turkestan), Russia, and the Middle East over foreign interventionism and domination.

After In’amul Hasan’s June 1995 death, the organization underwent some media scrutiny when, in September, a large group of mostly Deobandi Army officers (including a major-general, some brigadiers, and several colonels) attempted to oust Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. By 31 October, up to seven hundred officers were under investigation “for possible complicity” in the failed coup attempt. All of the plot’s participants were later linked to the TJ, raising fears that the organization had indeed turned a political corner and now sought to take over governments in order to institute an Islamic order. (Some were also shown to be members of the aforementioned Deobandi militant group Harakat ul-Mujahidin, of which more later.) After In’amul Hasan’s tenure as TJ head, the group was led by a shura that was itself headed by two
leaders: Zubair ul-Hasan and Saad Kandhlawi. By now the TJ had grown especially
strong roots in the UK, where the group supported almost half (some six hundred or
more) of Britain’s mosques—and where the debate has become particularly heated;
Muslims in the UK are mostly of South Asian descent and are overwhelmingly divided
between the Deobandi and Barelvi sects. The situation of one twenty-one-year-old
Deobandi man may be indicative of the general situation, and illustrates the manner in
which the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry plays out amongst regular Muslims on a personal
level. The role of tablīg is also evident. Addressed to the muftis of the dar ul’alām in
Deoband, the young man wrote the following:

i am very strong…follower of [the ‘alma of Deoband] i am very much
influenced by them… but where i live here is large sect of brelvis [sic]
who follows ahmad rida khan [Ahmad Riza Khan] bidati…i know all the
brelvis are bidati. all ulemas of brelvis use dirty languages of our
respected ulema's they call em to be kafirs… one of my friend is also
brelvi he tells me not to follow deobandis they are kafirs, i ignore him
every time, he gives me proofs of kitaabs writen by ulema e deoband, like
our respected ulema, [mwlana Qasim Nanautawi], Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi… Last Time i Met Him Was When i was going to perform
jummah prayer… he was telling me not to go for prayer behind
deobandis, come here, with me in our [masjid], you will not have your
salah behind them, i ignored him…

In answer to the query (which went on to describe his proselytizing efforts vis-à-vis the
Barelvi individual in question, and ask if such proselytizing was appropriate), the Deobandi mufti advised the young man to “try [his] best to take [the Barelvi] to the right path,” despite the Barelvis’ “abusing and blaspheming the elders of Deoband”—which, it was explained, was done “out of ignorance” only. The mufti’s advice falls in line with the behavior of the early scholars, who chose to carry out the struggle by means of persuasion, not compulsion.  

By 2003, around one in twelve Muslims worldwide was a member or direct supporter of the TJ, and the Deobandi group represented “the largest group of religious proselytizers of any faith” on the planet, as well as “the largest Islamic movement in the world today.” In 1998, thanks again to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (who, in April, had engineered the removal of the President’s ability to sack a government, thereby consolidating his own power), a prominent TJ member (but otherwise virtually unknown figure, apart from his stint as an associate judge on the Supreme Court), Muhammad Rafique Tarar, was appointed to the office of state head as Pakistan’s ninth President. On the one hand, scholars have pointed to such appointments as evidence of the TJ’s successful efforts to infiltrate governments like Pakistan’s. On the other, it may be useful to remember that, with so many millions of TJ members and supporters, the appointment or nomination of a TJer to some important government office did not necessarily signal some secret tabliGi plan to take over the state.

One 2010 sociological study out of the University of Johannesburg found that the TJ system was able to tap into Muslims’ “shared experiences and interrelations,” despite cultural differences or geographical distance, thereby “inform[ing] identity” and deriving “legitimate meaning”; the study’s prognostication concerning the group’s future: “the success of the Tabligh Jamaat is not likely to wane.” The TJ’s explosive
growth and success (including the conversion of many Barelvis to the Deobandi school of thought) caused Barelvi scholars more than a little trepidation for the welfare of the “Sunni majority.” (The same anxiety—though not for the Barelvi masses—might be displayed by U.S. foreign policy “experts” like Washington, D.C.-based Center for Security Policy vice president Alex Alexiev, who described the TJ’s “15,000...missionaries reportedly active in the United States” as “a serious national security problem.”) Barelvi ‘alâma and Western neo-conservatives alike found it difficult to “attack” the TJ since Muhammad Ilyas’s organization eschewed any sort of transparency; it published no financial reports, seemed to keep no official (or at least public) membership records, appeared devoid of any formal structure, and even shied away from the Internet. (This “shying away from the Internet” is a reference to the TJ as an organization; individual members seemed to employ the World Wide Web prolifically, uploading Islamic books, talks, videos, and blog posts.) Indeed, trying to find any “official” information about the TJ proved a somewhat elusive endeavor, and as a result scholars and other researchers were forced to rely on formal or informal interviews directly with TJ “members.”

One major donor to the TJ: Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf states), adding fuel to the Barelvi premise that Deobandism is nothing more than another strain of Wahhabism. When Barelvi leaders in Uttar Pradesh complained to the Indian government about the alleged Deobandi usurpation of tens of thousands of religious sites and institutions, they explained that the steady, gradual seizure of Barelvi properties (as well as the infiltration by Deobandi clerics of Indian government minority bodies) had been fueled by Wahhabi “petro-dollars.” Meanwhile, the Deobandis cultivated links with Saudi Arabia in Britain through the UK Islamic Mission, dubbed “the embodiment of the
Riyadh-Islamabad axis.” The TJ also played a role in procuring Saudi cash for tabligi efforts in the United States, as the group worked through organizations like the Jama’at ul-Fuqra, founded by the New York-based Deobandi shīx Mubarak Gilani and funded by both the TJ and wealthy Saudi contributors. The Barevis attempted to counter these highly bankrolled Deobandi efforts through their own World Islamic Mission (presided over by none other than JUP head Shah Ahmad Noorani). In between these groups stood men like Hyderabad-born Dr. Syed Pasha, whose Union of Muslim Organizations was set up, at least in part, in an effort to “see [Deobandi and Barevi] reconciled.”

**ISID Patronage: Growth of madarys Networks, Militant Outfits.**

The autobiography of Taliban leader Abdul Salam Zaeef is seething with hatred for the ISID, and though the focus of his work doesn’t lend itself to details in this regard, it clearly fingers the Pakistani intelligence agency as a backer and manipulator of the Taliban. In the early 1980s, for example, the ISID ran a special weapons training program for Afghan mujahyin targeting Russian tanks and helicopters. In the end, according to this Taliban source, the ISID betrayed their Afghan brothers in deference to the Americans and their money. In any case, it was through the mechanism of the state, especially that of its intelligence wing, that stimulus for the (mostly Deobandi) madary networks along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was distributed. In the words of Jalal, “State sponsorship of the Deobandis for strategic purposes upset the sectarian balance in predominantly Barevi Pakistan.” Not only did money collected via Zia’s new zākat bureaucracy find its way into the hands of mostly Deobandi groups and parties, but some two billion dollars of U.S. Government covert “assistance” (combined with an even larger sum from Saudi Arabia and various Gulf states) was funneled—
through the Pakistani state intelligence wing—in large part to these same groups.\textsuperscript{89} This enormous inflow of mostly American and Saudi cash triggered a massive upsurge in the construction and spread of new m\textit{adarys}. The Deobandi school, already old hat at organizing large (even transnational) education networks, was thus provided the means to spread its revivalist ideology across the country. Zia did little to prevent the financial disparity between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools from growing, favoring as he did (by this time, anyway) the Deobandis; after all, the General himself would personally receive Muhammad Tayyib, head of the \textit{dar ul'al\textsuperscript{w}m} at Deoband, at the airport every time the latter paid a visit to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{90} (As mentioned previously, the Barels, under the JUP, had had their chance to curry favor with the Zia regime, but had opted to form part of the opposition; had the party taken advantage of Zia’s offer—and the state patronage that would have naturally flowed from it—might things have been radically different vis-à-vis the subsequent mushrooming of Deobandi m\textit{adarys} and militant outfits?) In any case, the ISID’s collaboration with Saudi intelligence, plus Zia’s liberalizing of visa requirements for Islamic activists and missionaries, opened the door for the introduction of a more austere version of Islam into Pakistan—one that favored a Deobandi approach rather than a Barelvi one. Saudi Wahhabi preachers and activists by the thousands entered Pakistan from the 1980s, operating up and down the western border areas and in every major city.

The now-famous \textit{dar ul'al\textsuperscript{w}m} Haqqania in Akora Khatkatt (where almost all of the Taliban’s senior leadership, including Mullah Omar, were educated) provides a general example of how state patronage worked to promote incredible (and incredibly rapid) growth within one Deobandi educational network. A former teacher from the \textit{dar ul'al\textsuperscript{w}m} at Deoband founded the school in 1947.\textsuperscript{91} With the invasion of Afghanistan by
the Russians, students from Haqqania (many of them Afghan) were caught up in the *jihad* against the USSR; indeed, one of the original *fatwa* calling for holy war in Afghanistan originated from Haqqania. Soon money from the combined *zaokat*-U.S. intelligence-Saudi intelligence pot was liberally dumped into the school, and hundreds of sister schools were quickly constructed, mostly within the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan—each school autonomous within its own local sphere but run as part of a larger network from Haqqania. Since Zia’s time, the school’s network has continued to mushroom, and today its funding still originates primarily from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The dramatic increase in the number of *madar*ys, exemplified by the rise and spread of the Haqqania network of schools, represented yet another victory of the minority Deobandis over the majority Barelvis; by 1988—Zia’s final year as head of state—Deobandi *madar*ys outnumbered Barelvi *madar*ys approximately 2.6 to 1, with especially significant numerical advantages in the NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and the Northern Areas.92 Over the years, scholars of the Deobandi persuasion continued to find positions in influential mosques (some formerly Barelvi) and religious posts in government, out of proportion to the two groups’ relative populations. Barelvis resented this and responded with organizations of their own, dedicated to “protecting” Barelvi “articles of faith” (*aqaid*), “mosques,” money, and “rights.”93 These were the express goals of perhaps the most important Barelvi reactionary political organization, the Sunni Tehrik, founded in the early 1990s.

But ISID patronage didn’t end with the (mostly Deobandi) seminaries (and, it is alleged, mosques; Sunni Tehrik head Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri, for example, claimed in 2010 that “thousands of mosques and madressahs across the country which belonged to Barelvis were forcibly taken over by the Deobandis” during the Zia years—a
phenomenon that would have bloody repercussions from the 1990s when Barelvis attempted to win them back).\textsuperscript{94} The intelligence organization adopted a number of (mostly Deobandi) militant groups, too, which were subsequently used by the agency as proxy armies, mostly in Kashmir but also against rival sects. Previously in this work, Deobandi \textit{mujahyd} Irshad Ahmed and his Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami were mentioned. After Irshad’s 1985 death, his organization splintered into two groups. Fazlul Rehman Khalil and \textit{mzelana} Masood Kashmiri led one group, which they called Harkat ul-Mujahideen. But differences between Khalil and Kashmiri resulted in a further fracture, dividing Harkat ul-Mujahideen into the Fazlul Rehman Khalil-led Harkat ul-Mujahideen (hereafter HuM) and the Masood Kashmiri-led Jamiat ul-Mujahideen (hereafter JuM). Meanwhile, the second group to coalesce after Irshad Ahmed’s death, organized by several Deobandi ‘al\textit{m}a (including Muhammad Shafi’s son Muhammad Rafi Usmani) from old Harkat-ul Mujahideen remnants in 1993, was renamed Harkat ul-Ansar. The \textit{jihad} against the Soviets was largely transferred to the \textit{jihad} against the Indians over Kashmir. The conflict intensified beginning in the late eighties and throughout much of the nineties as Indian and Pakistani leaders hurled insults and challenges at one another. In August 1994, for example, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto pledged her country’s support “always” to those “Kashmiris fighting Indian rule.” The next day Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao demanded that Pakistan relinquish its hold on “Azad Kashmir” and turn it over to India immediately. On Kashmir, Bhutto insisted, Pakistan had an “unfinished agenda,” which Rao threw back by agreeing—“the one unfinished task,” he said, was for Pakistan to terminate its “occupation” of western Kashmir and give it to India. Meanwhile, for years soldiers from both countries continued to shoot at one another across the Line of Control on
almost a daily basis, while “Islamic mercenaries” (members of mostly Deobandi and JI groups—plus some Barelvi outfits, too—with backing from the ISID) constantly made incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. “With you, without you, in spite of you, Kashmir will remain an integral part of India,” Rao promised, even while the conflict continued to sap India’s resources as the government’s troops were supplied by helicopter high in the Himalayas (Pakistani soldiers and paramilitants, on the other hand, made the trip to the front “by lorry and mule”).95 Rao’s use of the term “integral,” echoing similar (and even more dubious) claims on Tibet by the Beijing regime, demonstrated the Indian government’s intractability; gone were the days of possibility, of hopes for a meaningful plebiscite, in the years immediately after Partition. Of course, Rao’s comments were made just a year-and-a-half after the deadliest and most destruction bomb blasts in the history of India (12 March 1993), when coordinated attacks in Mumbai—that the Indian government alleged were linked both to the Pakistani ISID as well as “Islamic groups” backed by the intelligence agency, among others—left more than two hundred fifty dead and over seven hundred wounded. (The blasts were evidently motivated, at least in large part, by the Hindu-led destruction of Babri masjid in Ayodhya.)

Meanwhile, Deobandism spread with the growth of its educational network—and the help of Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia. Barelvi animosity towards “Saudi” Arabia goes back as far as that kingdom’s founding (1932)—and even further, when the Saudis were fighting for control of the peninsula against fellow Muslims. In his presidential address on the occasion of the All-India Sunni Conference’s founding in Moradabad in 1925, for example, Jamaat ‘Ali Shah had commented on the political situation in Arabia before condemning “the massacre of innocent Muslims” there “carried out by the
descendents of King Saud.” He also took the opportunity to slam the major tenets of Wahhabism, “fast spreading in India,” and the emergence of “other minor sects” within the subcontinental Muslim community. (One of these “minor sects” was Deobandism.) The house of Saud, of course, had long embraced Wahhabism—that school of Islam with which the Barelv had been bitterly opposed from the beginning, and which they (the Barelv) commonly associated (however erroneously) with their Deobandi counterparts. A decade later (in 1935), at another AISC gathering in Badayun, Jamaat ‘Ali Shah again condemned Ibn Saud’s “policies in Arabia.” Since the early 1980s, Barelv had watched on, too, as the Saudis funded the proliferation of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Sunnat mādārīs, concurrently bankrolling Deobandi militant outfits in Pakistan—outfits that targeted Barelv, among others. One 2003 study found that the JUI alone ran more than sixty-five percent of all of Pakistan’s mādārīs.

Thus, while the Deobandis “enjoyed increasing influence and state patronage during the Afghan [jihād],” as well as the seemingly endless beneficence of hopeful Wahhabis from the Gulf, the Barelv “remained sidelined during this period.” Such “sidelining,” however, would garner a response.

**Barelvi Response: Sunni Tehrik, Dawat-e-Islami, et alia.**

The Sunni Tehreek, “an aggressive version of the Barelvi faith” mentioned previously as a “Sunni” response to Deobandi dominance in government as well as the perceived Deobandi capture of traditionally Barelvi mosques, was born in Karachi. The organization would strive to amass a network of Barelvi groups throughout the country to combat what it saw as “the armed madrassa followers”—the Deobandis. Founded by one Muhammad Saleem Qadiri in 1990, the Sunni Tehreek is generally considered an
“offshoot” of the JUP, and was (and is) funded by both foreign and in-country contributors. At first, Karachi’s business-savvy Memon community helped finance the outfit as it was initially getting off the ground; throughout the 1990s, too, money from Baghdad helped buoy the Barelvi cause—an Iraqi attempt to counter the influence of Saudi cash in Pakistan.\(^{100}\) (Thus we see the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict being co-opted by foreign governments in their own rivalries.) As of this writing, the Sunni Tehrik enjoys the general support of Barelvis across Pakistan.

The Sunni Tehrik’s initial mission was to win back the mosques it claimed had been usurped by Deobandi clerics and their followers—“the battle over houses of God,” as journalist Salman Siddiqui described it. (Interestingly, the Deobandis make the same claim about the Barelvis. For example, prominent Karachi cleric mufti Naeem, head of major Deobandi madrasah Jamia Binoria, claimed to have “a list of 27 mosques such as Jamia Noor where we [the Deobandis] can prove that it belongs to our people belonging to the Deoband school of thought.” Meanwhile, Sunni Tehrik (hereafter ST) chief Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri claimed that “thousands” of [Barelvi] mosques across Pakistan had been taken over by the Deobandis during the Zia years.)\(^{101}\) The takeover, the ST asserted, had been accomplished with the help of two Deobandi militant organizations: the Lashkar-e-Taiba and, especially, the SSP.\(^ {102}\) For its first twelve years of existence (until the end of 2001), the Sunni Tehrik’s operations revolved around this very specific goal, focused almost entirely on mosques in Sindh (mostly Karachi) and the Punjab. The first Sunni Tehrik-Deobandi clash occurred in 1992 in Karachi, when members of the Barelvi group attempted to take over the Noor masjid (located off M. A. Jinnah Road at Ranchor Lines). Deobandis insisted the mosque had always been Deobandi—that it had been built, after all, by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani himself. But the
Sunni Tehrik were adamant, and on 18 December—in its “first show of strength”—the
ST organized a massive rally along M. A. Jinnah Road in protest of Deobandi
possession of the mosque.¹⁰³ The rally turned ugly, and by the time it was over, dozens
had been injured, a number of vehicles burnt, and several killed. A few months later,
another ST attack occurred, this time targeting the Ibrahim Raza mosque in Karachi’s
Burmi Colony, resulting in more deaths and the masjid’s sealing off by police. Between
1992 and 2002, a purported sixty-two mosques from all over Pakistan were wrested
from Deobandi possession by the Barelvī Sunni Tehrik.¹⁰⁴

In May of 2001, ST founder Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was gunned down—along
with five others—in his car outside of his Saeedabad, Karachi home as he was leaving
for Friday prayers. The Deobandi SSP was blamed for the assassination, and a new
chapter in the Deobandi-Barelvī rivalry was opened: that of targeted assassinations.
After the attack, the streets of the city were rocked with “murderous sectarian riots”—a
literal battle between Barelvīs and Deobandis.¹⁰⁵ Saleem Qadiri’s successor, Abbas
Qadiri, accused the Musharraf regime of “patronizing terrorists” and, significantly,
“standing between us and the murderers.” The ST’s new leader was, in effect, charging
the government of patronizing and protecting the Deobandis at the expense of the
Barelvī majority. “After Abbas Qadiri’s death, one thing is clear,” wrote Indian
journalist Praveen Swami, who covered the 2006 Nishtar Park blast mentioned at the
beginning of this work. “Someone, sooner or later, will seek to settle the Sunni
Tehreek’s unfinished business with his [Saleem Qadiri’s] murderers.”¹⁰⁶ Once the
Deobandi-Barelvī back-and-forth had been one of juridical rulings and religious books;
now it was bullets, bombs, and ball bearings.
Even the state’s 1992-1994 Army-led operation against the MQM possessed a Deobandi-Barelvi layer of significance. The MQM, as previously mentioned, was predominantly made up of Urdu-speaking Barelvis (originally immigrants from north-central India who had arrived around the time of Partition) who not only lined up against the local Sindhis but also against the perceived encroachment of mostly Deobandi Pathans. The latter had been flooding into Karachi, and other cities, for years on account of the unstable situation in Afghanistan. Wrote one observer in 1995, “War has allowed a drugs and gun culture to spread across the [Afghanistan-Pakistan] border, which is behind the virtual collapse of Karachi, the commercial capital.”

Meanwhile, Operation Clean-up was led by the Deobandi-leaning, Taliban-supporting (and Pathan) Naseerullah Babar. In June the Army launched the operation, seizing the MQM’s Azizabad headquarters within twenty-four hours and prompting the party to quit the government a week later. Over the course of the next two years, thousands died, disappeared, were kidnapped, or were injured in the Army action (and the MQM response) in Karachi alone. By mid-1994, MQM leader Altaf Hussain (and others) had been sentenced to almost thirty years in prison for the 1991 kidnapping and torture of an Army major (this was the famous “Major Kaleem Case”); in 1998, however, the High Court of Sindh found all of the accused not guilty, and the exultant MQM described the whole affair as “politically motivated.” The contest highlighted, too, the role of the Afghan war in the militarization of the Deobandi and Barelvi outfits pitted against one another.

The Barelvi religious leadership responded to the proselytizing success of the Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at, too—and in no more obvious fashion than in the formation of the Dawat-e-Islami. Founded in 1980 in Karachi by Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the
Dawat-e-Islami billed itself as “a global non-political movement for the propagation of Quran and Sunnah.”109 Perhaps as a reaction to the Tablighi Jama’at’s success at organizing mega-conventions (including the Bangladeshi meeting referred to at the beginning of this work, largely considered the largest Muslim gathering in the world outside of the hajj), the Dawat-e-Islami organized its own conferences. These had to be bigger than the Deobandi meetings, especially since the Barevis’ foundational claim to legitimacy was that they represented the majority, or “Sunni,” sect. As such, the Dawat-e-Islami’s Multan conference (as of this writing) claims that it—not the Tablighi meeting outside of Dhaka—is the “world’s largest congregation of Muslims after the hajj.”110 In the beginning, at least, the Tablighis were instructed to differentiate themselves from their neighbors not only by means of their pious behavior but also in dress; Dawat-e-Islami members do much the same, most characteristically (at least for the men) by wearing a green turban, green being associated with the Prophet—and it is, again, the Barevi devotion to the Prophet that primarily drives the movement. In 2006, the Dawat-e-Islami came under some fire after a stampede took place in one of its women’s congregations; several women were critically injured—but the organizations leaders refused to allow male medical workers to help them. According to at least one report, “several women died because of the delay in providing medical assistance.”111 As of the time of this writing, the Dawat-e-Islami world headquarters are situated adjacent to a fairly well manicured plaza called Askari Park. Even so, most of the building’s surroundings are marked not by greenery but by the narrow gullies and cramped housing of lower-class Karachi. Spray-painted generously onto the walls and shop-fronts of this and surrounding neighborhoods are the initials “ST”—the acronym for the Sunni Tehrik; one shop declares, in thick black paint, “DOWN WITH USA.” To enter the
Dawat-e-Islami’s central building one must walk down a side street that is little more than an alley, green-turbaned pedestrians walking up and down its length, before reaching the main gate. The gate is manned by four gun-toting guards and sports cement road barriers, barbed wire, and a metal detector; the compound’s walls are high and barbed, too. The whole presentation betrays the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s relatively recent descent into militarism.

Even as regards the formation of overtly militant groups—as opposed to the ST, which was more of a (sometimes thuggish) defense league—the Deobandis were not to enjoy a monopoly over the Barelvis. The Ansar-ul Islam (AuI), for example, founded by the Afghan pir Saifur Rehman (about whom more later), was formed in Khyber Agency (in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in 2004, primarily to fight against a Deobandi group in the area led by mufti Munir Shakir called Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI). The Sunni Jihad Council (SJC) was active (as of this writing) in Kashmir (and a supporter of another Barelvi group, Al-Barq) in response to Deobandi activities there.

“It is regrettable,” said SJC Supreme Commander Said ‘Ali Reza in 1999, “that some people have tried to spread their false beliefs on the pretext of jihad in Kashmir.” That Said ‘Ali was talking about Deobandis was made clear when he added, “They have even torched shrines and tried to occupy mosques. This is a conspiracy against Muslims. We know how to defend territorial as well as religious borders. God willing, Kashmir will be freed by Sunni Jihad Council, because it is a representative platform for the majority of Muslims.” This last was plainly a reiteration of the Barelvi claim to speak for South Asia’s “Sunni majority.” Perhaps the point is that the oft-uttered Barelvi claim that religious militancy (including the targeting of fellow Muslims) is solely a Deobandi game should be taken with a grain of salt. It is undoubtedly true that in the Deobandi-
Barelvi war in Pakistan from the 1980s to the present, the Deobandi outfits appear to have far more blood on their collective hands—but the Barelvis have entered the game, too. The oftentimes violent methods of the Sunni Tehrik, the militancy of pir Saifur Rehman’s outfit, and the Barelvi fighters in Kashmir (and, later, the religiously motivated assassination of Salman Taseer by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, of which more later) demonstrate that the contest is not by any means completely one-sided.

Other Barelvi organizations that might be considered responses to the perceived Deobandi onslaught include the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party, founded by Hanif Tayyab (former general secretary of the JUP’s Karachi branch, three-time National Assembly member, and federal Minister with several different portfolios)\(^\text{114}\); the Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, a religious organization of Barelvi leaders founded in Karachi in 1956—the very one, in fact, that organized the \textit{miyād} celebration at Nishtar Park in April 2006—that sometimes dabbles in politics (as, in 2011, when it admonished its members not to offer funeral prayers for murdered governor Salman Taseer);\(^\text{115}\) the Riza Academy, based in Mumbai, a major propagator of Barelvi books and pamphlets and the organizer of the August 2012 protest rally in Mumbai that ended with several dead and scores wounded;\(^\text{116}\) the UK-based World Islamic Mission, founded in the early 1970s by Mustapha Riza Khan’s \textit{xalifah} Qamaruzzaman Azmi (among others), and credited with being the first international Barelvi missionary organization;\(^\text{117}\) and student groups like the Hanif Tayyab-founded Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam, created in 1968.\(^\text{118}\)

\textit{After Zia: Deobandi-Barelvi Politics, 1988–2001.}

As aforementioned, Ishaq Khan opted to respect the 16 November 1988 date for general elections set by Zia ul-Haq before the latter’s sudden death. By early October,
then, four main groups had emerged as major electoral players: (1) the “hard-left” Left and Democratic Front, a six-party alliance that was by far the weakest of the four; (2) the PPP-led MRD (which included the Deobandi JUI); (3) the Muslim League (Fida group)-led nine-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (yslami j胺hwi ri 핫히 had, meaning “Islamic Democratic Alliance,” hereafter IJI); and (4) the Muslim League (Junejo faction), allied with the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and the Barelvi JUP. Over the proceeding month, much political jockeying and rearranging occurred, and with just a week to go before election day two main rivals had emerged from this milieu as the contest’s frontrunners. First, there was the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP (which had split with the MRD, including the JUI, making the formerly imposing alliance largely insignificant, despite the fact that the remaining parties had agreed to work together “loosely” in the elections); now the PPP would stand on its own. Second, there was the Muslim League-led IJI, which included the up-and-coming Punjabi Nawaz Sharif. The IJI reportedly made generous use of “state patronage” to win over voters, forming, as it did, the caretaker governments in Pakistan’s provinces (indeed, its very creation had been facilitated by the head of the ISID itself, Hamid Gul, who later admitted to having arranged the funneling of state money to the failing Mehran Bank in order to procure millions in loans from the institution for the IJI—a revelation dubbed “Mehrangate”). One member of the IJI: the JI, which had joined only on the condition that the Qur’an and sunnat be granted supremacy within the political order, among other demands. Meanwhile, a distant third contender was the Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA), of which the JUP was a part. Once again, the JUP had opted to “go it alone” rather than join forces with other like-minded (in terms of constitutional hopes and dreams) parties. Even the JI had sided with an alliance apart from either the JUI or the JUP. One other
party that had emerged over the previous three years and was now contesting the
elections on its own as “potentially the most important of the smaller parties”: the
Sindh-based Mohajir Qaumi Movement, as aforementioned created to protect the
interests of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs, or immigrants from India.\textsuperscript{122} The emergence
of the MQM is significant in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, as the largely
Barelvi MQM was created in the first place in order to protect the Mohajirs from the
largely Deobandi Pathan influx into Sindh’s cities (and especially Karachi). The first
decade-and-a-half of the twenty-first century would see much bloodshed in clashes
between these two groups.

When the elections were over, the PPP had won a total of ninety-two seats in the
national assembly, far outdistancing anyone else (the IJI came in second with fifty-four).
And though results for the national assembly elections spelled a clear victory for the
PPP (and a “historic step for women,” according to the headlines, as Benazir Bhutto—
who was expected to claim her place as Prime Minister—would become not only the
first female leader of Pakistan but also of any other Muslim state), they also failed to
give Bhutto’s party an absolute majority in the nation’s highest legislative body. (This
set the stage for the decade-long tug-of-war between Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif that
would define Pakistani politics until the 1999 military coup of Pervez Musharraf.) In
Baluchistan, the JUI emerged as that province’s most dominant party, while in the
NWFP the IJI took eights seats, the PPP seven, the Pathan nationalist Awami National
Party three, and the JUI three. In Sindh, of course, the PPP dominated, with smaller
victories, too, for the three-year-old MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. Even in the
Punjab, Bhutto’s party beat out the IJI, winning fifty-two to the latter’s forty-four
seats.\textsuperscript{123} The elections confirmed the Deobandi JUI’s continued significance in
Pakistan’s western provinces (where it had obtained seven national assembly seats), and additionally signaled the arrival of a strong, mostly Barelvi force with which to be reckoned in the MQM. The latter party’s newfound political clout (after its winning thirteen national assembly seats) even prompted President Ishaq Khan to meet with party head Altaf Hussain to discuss issues relating to Pakistan’s future government. Meanwhile, the JUP won no seats at all.

The PPP’s dominance at the national elections was somewhat dimmed soon thereafter by the IJI’s own dominance in Pakistan’s provincial elections, with Nawaz Sharif’s alliance winning three out of four provinces (the JUI won eleven provincial seats overall). Still, the People’s Party had won the national polls, and Bhutto fully expected to be given the go-ahead to form a government. But JUI leaders, representing what had now grown to become “the largest religious party” in Pakistan (as well as “the fourth largest national party” overall), who suddenly found themselves facing the possibility of a woman as Pakistan’s leader, opposed the idea. As previously mentioned, the demand that the state’s head be a Muslim *male* had been a staple within the constitutional blueprints created and proffered by both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars for Pakistan, from pre-Partition onward. It should be noted, however, that this demand seemed to refer to the head of *state*—i.e. the President—as opposed to the head of *government*—i.e. the Prime Minister. But the Deobandi leadership vowed that, despite a history of on-and-off cooperation with the PPP (especially during the Zia years), they could not accept a female head of government (interesting, considering their overwhelming support years before for Fatima Jinnah; might the issue have revolved more around politics—or, at best, preference for a certain political system—than religious doctrine?). When asked by journalist Karan Thapar about the JUI’s refusal
to accept a woman-led administration, Benazir Bhutto underlined the 'alɔma’s
aforementioned lack of clarity, historically speaking, on the issue. “At times they have
said that they will not accept a woman as head of state,” she said, “but that they will
accept her as head of government. Now they are saying something different. But we
will…find out exactly what they mean.”

Despite the JUI’s refusal, Bhutto’s most pressing obstacle at the time was not the scholars’
repugnance to the idea of a female Prime Minister, but President Ishaq Khan’s apparent reluctance to allow her to form a
government at all, especially amidst the protest of her rival Nawaz Sharif. Still, the
opposition of the ‘alɔma was serious. By 26 November, the JUI had officially declared
that it was “ready to sit in opposition” to Bhutto and the PPP. Significantly, the MQM
made a similar pledge. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley met with Bhutto in
late November, a clear indication that she enjoyed Washington’s support (a detail that
could not have been lost on the Deobandi ‘alɔma in particular). Bhutto finally became
Prime Minister on 2 December.

Less than three months later, in late February 1989, a major gathering of ‘alɔma—
reported as including more than two thousand scholars—took place in Rawalpindi. The
Barelvis and the Deobandis had once again come together in opposition to what was
perceived as an obvious and imminent threat to Pakistan’s Islamic character; wrote one
observer, “It is significant that all these sectarian groups which had been at loggerheads
on important religious issues have found a single platform against Miss Bhutto.” The
conference criticized Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* (demanding the author’s
immediate extradition and execution, by hanging, in Pakistan), and accused the Bhutto
government of not taking proper measures to prevent the book’s publication. The
government was also berated for “encouraging obscenity” on state-funded television via
“musical and dancing programmes.” Most importantly, though, the two thousand ʿalma declared that Bhutto’s position as government head flew in the face of the Qur’an and the sunna. They would, conference participants promised, “launch countrywide agitation” in response to this state of affairs. The scholar-jurists also warned Bhutto not to repeal any of the constitution’s Islamic provisions, particularly the eighth amendment (dealing with, among other things, Islamic laws affecting the status of women). The most vocal groups present: the Deobandi JUI (led by two senators: new dar ul’alām Haqqania head Sami ul-Haq and Qazi Abdul Latif), the Barelvi JUP (led by national assembly member Abdul Sattar Niazi, the same who had been arrested in 1953 in connection with the anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore), and the JI. Each accused “Western countries” of actively “patronizing” the newly organized Bhutto regime. (One opposition leader, national assembly member Syeda Abida Hussain, perhaps said it best when in August she wrote: “It has been her singular achievement that in the past eight months Benazir Bhutto, while confirming her support abroad, has steadily lost good will at home.”)128 In this context, Benazir represented the encroachment of a “Western” value system on the “Islamic” one, a fear harbored by the ʿalma since the days of the British Raj and now, seemingly, coming to fruition. PPP leaders’ reaction to the ʿalma conference was to label the scholars and their parties “obscurantist elements” and underscore their electoral mandate from “the people.”129

By June, at last some of those “obscurantist elements”—specifically, the JUI—had allied with several former MRD members (including the ANP), plus a number of other parties and the entire IJI to form a united opposition to the Bhutto government. But by 1990 President Ishaq Khan—described as “a cold, dispassionate bureaucrat with an austere lifestyle”—fired Benazir Bhutto from the prime ministership anyway, amidst
allegations of corruption (among other state woes), and as a result the PPP boycotted the October general elections. This paved the way for the victory of Nawaz Sharif’s IJI. The JUI, though it had been part of the opposition, ran separately, as did the JUP. The Deobandi party won six National Assembly seats, the Barelvi party three. But the JUP was at this point experiencing serious internal divisions, ultimately resulting in the splitting of the party into multiple factions. One was led by mowlana Ahmad Shah Noorani (called the JUP-N), another by Fazal Karim (the JUP-F); after the 2003 death of Ahmad Shah, the JUI-N faded somewhat in the wake of a power vacuum and the JUP-F emerged as the more powerful group. The effect of this split was to more or less guarantee, at least as of the time of this writing, the future insignificance—on a national level within the realm of electoral politics—of the Barelvi party from the early 1990s onward. (For example, Fazal Karim, the very head of the JUP-F, would serve as a National Assembly member—but on the PML-N ticket). The political pendulum swung again in 1993, when national elections (characterized by heightened security and low voter turnout) garnered Nawaz Sharif’s party more votes—but Benazir Bhutto’s more seats. Just before the elections, too, the JI had left the IJI, winning a handful of National Assembly seats as well as a couple NWFP provincial assembly seats on its own; in order to maintain its purity, the JI had pledged from that year forward never again to officially join any political alliance. The party had vociferously opposed Benazir Bhutto, often protesting her policies in the streets; at one demonstration, police shot and killed several JI members. Such oppressive measures, aimed at the political opposition, contributed to Benazir’s waning popularity and eventual dismissal. But this wasn’t enough for the JI, which demanded accountability—and, specifically, an investigation into the corruption charges that had been leveled at her. Crucially, the JI
demanded the investigation take place before new elections could be held, but this
demand was not met and elections were held anyway. The JI tried to stop them,
however; the party’s modus operandi was to stage sit-ins at voting sites—and perhaps the
low voter turnout that year was a direct result of JI efforts in this regard, combined
with an MQM elections boycott. Even so, the PPP eked out a win, and, having won
more National Assembly seats than Nawaz Sharif and his allies, formed a government
under Benazir Bhutto.

Perhaps as a means of currying favor with the Deobandi ‘alāma and their followers
(to the chagrin of the Barelvis, who tended to vote for Nawaz Sharif’s PML or for the
MQM), Benazir Bhutto’s government appointed Deobandi leader Fazlur Rehman as
Chairman of the foreign affairs committee in parliament—interesting and perhaps
enlightening, given the JUI chief’s anti-Western, pro-Taliban position. In any case,
Bhutto wouldn’t conclude this second term regularly, either; beset on all sides with
charges of corruption, as well as a host of other issues (including the use of brutal force
by the police under her administration, with no apparent effort to curb such official
violence), President Farooq Leghari dismissed the PPP government in early November
1996. In early February 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory over the
PPP (the former obtaining an astounding one hundred fifty-five of the National
Assembly’s two hundred seven seats, compared to the PPP’s meager eighteen). The
Deobandi JUI won only two seats (both JUI-F victories; the JUI-S won zero) and its
Barelvi counterpart none. The latter, especially, seemed to have fallen far after its 1970
peak, when it had won more seats in Sindh than any other party except the PPP.

*Post-Soviet Afghanistan and the Establishment of Taliban Rule.*
Though the Russians were gone, the Communist regime in Kabul lived on. But with the USSR out of the way—the chief goal of American involvement in the war—U.S. government cash began to dry up. This was a serious issue for many Afghan commanders, whose funding depended on the U.S. taxpayer, as well as for thousands of mujahydn foot soldiers, many of whom actually drew salaries, however irregular, as members of one fighting force or another. Najibullah therefore developed a new strategy: he would fill the void caused by disappearing dollars by buying off the various commanders himself. Of course, he would need help. Where else to turn but the Kremlin? Kabul’s venture was enthusiastically funded by the Soviet Union, and within a short period of time—and to the dismay of the talyban fighters and others—the very commanders and their mujahydn who had kicked the Russians out had abruptly landed, one degree removed, on the Russian payroll! The stratagem eroded alliances between one-time allied commanders and turned entire armies previously engaged against Najibullah into defenders of the Kabul regime. The ‘aloma and talyban’s goal of an Islamic government—and peace, in their eyes—seemed further away than ever. “The Taliban had carried out many military operations against the Russians and had been one of the most important pillars of the jihad,” one Taliban leader said of the period, “sacrificing their lives and sustaining thousands of casualties, but we had been betrayed.” In the end, “most” of the talyban at this time returned home to continue with their religious studies, resigned to their fate. Mullah Omar’s conversion of the talyban’s original Sangisar base into a madrasah aptly embodies the movement’s retreat, however reluctant, from the battlefield back to the seminary.131

Meanwhile, the chaotic scenario playing itself out in Afghanistan was too much for the governments and intelligence agencies of the world to resist. Each saw an
opportunity to pursue its own regional interests—and seized it. The USSR’s continued meddling, vis-à-vis the Najibullah regime, has already been mentioned. Pakistan’s government (and, more particularly, the ISID) backed Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami (directly contributing, in the words of one commentator, to the destruction of “half of Kabul”). As early as July 1989—just five months after the Soviet withdrawal—Hekmatyar’s outfit (mostly Pathan) had slaughtered a group of Jamiat Islami commanders (almost entirely non-Pathan), casting an ugly light on the shrinking possibility of cooperation between Afghanistan’s various “mujahidin” parties. Meanwhile, Iran’s government, in a bid to out-influence the Saudis in the region, supported Abdul ‘Ali Mazari’s Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat (a Shi’a outfit), while the regime in Riyadh backed the Ittihad-e-Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (a Wahhabi group). Through the eyes of the Pathan religious scholars and talyban, traitorous commanders raped the country from within while equally traitorous foreign regimes raped the country from without. “The idea of being ruled by westernized technocrats produces a gut reaction among many Mujahidin,” wrote journalist Lieven from Peshawar. “Revolt against this class has, after all, been an underlying theme of their holy war. This has been in part a struggle of all those traditionalist forces—tribesmen and Islamic clergy—excluded and impoverished over the past half century by the modernizing and westernizing state.” The role of foreign governments in the Afghanistan mess was especially underscored in 1992, when Kabul was captured from the Russia-backed communist regime only to see the various warring factions turn on one another; one observer reported, “As darkness fell yesterday [26 April], superpower weapons given in another era thundered over Kabul.” The situation conjured up the “prospect of permanent civil war.”
Seeing all of this destruction, this petty tug-of-war between great powers and power-hungry warlords, what did the talyban have to show for their years-long anti-communist jyhad that had costs thousands of lives and ravaged their homelands? Of a truth, the situation could scarcely have appeared bleaker. The streets of Kabul were a warzone, the government was plagued by infighting, and the entire country (especially the southern half) was crawling with gangs: some mere bandits, others mujahydin-turned-robbers-and-rapists. Travel meant risking one’s life, not to mention the monetary cost involved. It is ironic that many of the talyban who had returned from Pakistani exile to fight Russians in Afghanistan now opted, long after the Russians had been ousted, to leave Afghanistan—despite the risks of long-distance movement—for refugee status in Pakistan once more. Meanwhile, for those who remained, the fighting between the various mujahydin parties “became so intense that it was impossible to live a normal life,” according to one Afghan commentator who experienced the commotion firsthand. The period became known as twepokiyán: “the time of the men with guns”—a poignant title given that it describes circumstances after a war. One ymam at a small mosque not far from Kandahar remembered, “Many of the people who went to the city would come back with tales of anarchy and chaos, and often I heard artillery fire in the distance. The stories made me feel uneasy; I remembered the jyhad and the sacrifices we had made. It seemed that it had been for nothing, but I still remained patient and gave the same advice to my congregation.” But the situation continued to deteriorate, until regular Afghans were holding demonstrations against the mujahydin they had once so esteemed; such protests often ended with the local commander firing into the crowds with machine guns—or even with tanks. These demonstrations of public outrage often took place, perhaps significantly, after Friday prayers. To the talyban (many of whom
were now full-fledged ‘alāma), these acts of defiance were nothing less than calls for the establishment, finally, of Islamic government and the order, security, and peace that such a regime would, God-willing, surely provide. The Russians, the Afghan Communists, and now the traitorous “mujahydin” government had all failed; all ignored the injunctions of God and the people had reaped the whirlwind as a result. Holy war had been waged against the unbelievers—but this had not been enough. “The events after victory [against the Soviets],” wrote one Deobandi ‘ālīm, “[teach] us that it is not the known disbelieving enemy alone against whom we must wage jihad. Rather, we must wage jihad against our own base soul…” It was this failure—failure to continue from the lesser to the greater jyhad, from the physical fight against communist atheism to the spiritual struggle for personal purity—that had deprived the ummat of the “fruits” of the anti-communist struggle.137 Just as spiritual corruption on the part of the Muslims had led to their political downfall and misery in India from the later eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, sin and impiety now prevented Afghanistan from taking its place as a proud and prosperous Islamic state. The road was thus paved for an Islamic revivalist movement to offer a popular solution to Afghanistan’s political and social ills.

When many of the tālyban regrouped in mid-1994, then, it was in response to the law-and-order situation in the country. American-born writer Eric Margolis, an eyewitness to post-war, pre-Taliban Afghanistan, described the scene. Along with the deaths of between one and two million Afghans, villages “were razed in reprisals, livestock slaughtered, ancient irrigation systems destroyed, and millions of mines, some in the form of exploding toys, were scattered across Afghanistan.” Some of the worst perpetrators were the leaders of the Northern Alliance, including Mohammed Fahim
(erstwhile Afghan Communist Secret Police chief) and Rashid Dostam (an Uzbek warlord). Their crimes included the “frightful massacres and the most abominable crimes against real and fancied opponents, including flaying, impalement, burning and burial alive, acid baths, freezing to death in refrigerators, as well as more conventional tortures of electrocution, beatings, drownings, and the ripping out of eyes, beards, and fingernails.” (It should be noted that these very same communist war criminals would, ironically, later become allies to the U.S. Government in its post-September 11th fight against the Taliban.) In addition, the hated Russians were still backing the Northern Alliance (with help from Iran and India; the meddling of the Saudi and Pakistani governments, too, has already been mentioned), and the Alliance’s traitorous leaders had become “the nation’s leading drug kingpins,” to boot. Meanwhile the illegal checkposts, the rapes, murders, kidnapings, and looting continued unabated. The perpetrators of these crimes had to be punished. This, along with (indeed, via) the institution of an Islamic order, would finally bring both justice and peace to Afghanistan.

Thus, in response to the security situation, several dozen erstwhile tāḥyban got together at a mosque in little Pashmol to come up with a plan. Something had to be done. Over the coming weeks, the small Pashmol group was able to gather many more to its cause—including mullah Muhammad Omar, though he was evidently reluctant at first to take the reigns of leadership (it was only after he had conferred with “some of the [Deobandi] Ulema” that the one-eyed cleric agreed to take command). Finally, in late autumn, four to five dozen men gathered at the old Sangisar base-turned-mosque to officially launch the rebooted movement. Significantly, the tāḥyban this time around were to be organized the traditional Islamic way, just as Deobandi precursor Ṣyyid
Ahmad of Rae Bareilly had done it, and just as the “Hindustani Fanatics” of Patna and Sittana. There must be a spiritual leader, or ymam (in this case a scholar named Abdul Samad) as well as a commander, or әmir; Muhammad Omar was sustained in the latter position. All present swore on the Qur’an to stand by their әmir, “and to fight against corruption and criminals.” “The shari’a would be our guiding law,” according to one who was present at the gathering, “and would be implanted by us. We would prosecute vice and foster virtue, and would stop those who were bleeding the land.”

One of the first actions of these тalyban, so the story goes, involved a local “governor” who had kidnapped and facilitated the rape of two teenage girls; some commanders in the area had also kidnapped a boy, with the intent to sodomize him. The тalyban apparently freed the girls and the boy, and the governor was hanged from the barrel of a tank. In April 1996, Mullah Omar famously donned the Prophet’s mantle in Kandahar and proclaimed himself “Commander of the Faithful.” All present swore allegiance to him. The meeting bypassed the customary Pathan tribal structure (i.e. this was no loya jirga), instead being organized along traditional Arab lines as a shwәra, or religious council, made up of ‘alama. In this way, mullah Omar and his тalyban (hereafter designated as Taliban, denoting their official and organized group status) could bypass the tribal chiefs. This was significant, for, as Ahmed Rashid pointed out, “The Deobandi tradition is opposed to tribal and feudal structure and the clan chiefs.” Thus even here at the beginning—or, more accurately, especially here—the Taliban’s politico-religious foundation in Deobandism is evident. Within weeks it would be even more pronounced, as the Taliban’s manpower, initially numbering in the hundreds, was augmented by the arrival of thousands upon thousands of students from Pakistani (mostly Deobandi) мәдрәсәхәs and dar ul’атәms. Indeed, the vast majority of these
students’ erstwhile schools were operated by the Deobandi JUI (run separately by either the Fazlur Rehman faction or Sami ul-Haq faction), their construction made possible by Saudi and American cash during the days of the anti-Soviet *jihad* and facilitated by the Pakistani government through the military and the ISID.

The success of the Taliban was to fuel the increasing militancy and *jihadi* zeal of at least one strain of Deobandism, once again making Afghanistan a training ground for future operations (often anti-Barelvi) in Pakistan. The Barelvis, meanwhile, had no parallel theater in which to develop similar elements apart from its relatively minor activities in Kashmir. But to the Deobandis following the events in Afghanistan, the rise and initial successes of the Taliban, driven as they were by their faith in Islam and the transformational effect it could have on Afghan affairs, was a phenomenon worth celebrating. Here, perhaps, was the promise of true Islamic revival—a revival that could subsequently spread throughout the Muslim world. “[T]he power that has emerged as the Taliban,” wrote one high-level Deobandi cleric in Pakistan, “gives us hope that the sacrifices offered in the [anti-communist] *jihad* against disbelief would bring their result. May Allah preserve the Taliban from every mischief of self and the devil and from the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, and may He make them worthy of [the] rennaissance of Islam.” It is interesting that this particular *mufti*, who had himself taken part in the anti-Soviet *jihad*, invoked God’s blessing first and foremost that the Taliban would be preserved “from every mischief of self.” This had been the mistake of the earlier *mujahydin*. Perhaps the Taliban would remember.

Not long after the Pashmol and Sangisar meetings, the Taliban won Kandahar (1994). Immediately a new government was installed in the city and surrounding areas. “The city was at peace,” one Taliban member remembers. “The old habits of keeping
boys, adultery, looting, illegal checkpoints and the government of the gun were over.

An ordinary life was given back to the people, and they were satisfied for the first time in years.” Of course, one of the first institutions established by the movement was an Islamic judicial system. One American journalist, who was intimately aware of the goings-on in Afghanistan at the time and whose warnings and prognostications about Afghanistan had gone mostly unheeded (despite their uncanny accuracy) by his mostly Western audience, described the peace the Taliban brought to a war-torn country thus: “It was frontier justice at its harshest and most medieval, but Mullah Omar’s cure worked, bringing peace and security to southern Afghanistan.” Indeed, it was the Taliban’s very “strict Islamic agenda,” among other things, that gained the group widespread popular support in the first place. One of the Taliban’s first acts to gain recognition outside of Afghanistan was its freeing (in November 1994) of a Pakistani trade convoy that had been hijacked by warlords near Kandahar. Deobandi-leaning Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar (d. 2011 AD), a retired two-star general and Pathan member of the PPP who had experience dating back to the 1970s training Afghan mujahydin (and who had led the aforementioned two-year anti-MQM operation in Karachi called Operation Clean-up), expressed support for the Taliban, admitting “a closeness” between the group’s goals and “our [Pakistani] perceptions.”

By early 1996, the “student warriors” had “cut [a] swath through [its] Afghan opposition” and sat perched on the edge of the country’s chief city. “Taleban, the Islamic students’ army, is sitting on the outskirts of Kabul,” wrote one London Times reporter in Islamabad, “with enough artillery, tanks, rockets and heavily armed men to blow the Afghan capital to pieces, after sweeping across the country, defeating its enemies and astounding neutral observers.” By late September the Taliban had won
Kabul, too, driving out Ahmad Shah Massoud and establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The government that the Taliban set up in Kabul was “a bizarre combination of ninth-century Islamic political and legal thought mixed up with the most backwards and primitive customs of isolated Pashtun mountain tribesmen.” It was this combination that differentiated the system that, say, the ‘alma of the dar ul’alw and the dar ul’alw Karachi might have instituted from that of the Taliban. The latter was infused with local Pathan custom—most apparent, perhaps, in the regime’s quick and often brutal forms of punishment, as well as its apparent aversion to the education of women. Both of these—the Taliban’s harsh punishments and its lack of “women’s rights”—could be explained, if not justified (in the context of twenty-first-century Western sensibilities, that is), as a reaction to Afghanistan’s recent war experiences. Hadn’t the country been torn asunder by crime—robbery, looting, rapine, murder—and hadn’t the Taliban, via admittedly severe “frontier justice,” mostly eradicated these problems? Even the growth of the poppy seed had been mostly wiped out, something at which later regimes (under the protection of the mighty U.S. Government, no less) failed miserably. Surely an element of the Taliban’s harsh idea of justice can be traced, too, to the exalted place enjoyed by both protection and revenge in the Pathan tribal code—again, not a part of Islam itself, despite the faith’s shades of the old Arab tribal code. And as for women’s rights, hadn’t it been the evil communists who had attempted to destroy the fabric of Afghan society by striving to blur the distinctions between the sexes, primarily through the education (or propagandizing) of women? The Taliban’s reaction on both counts was to send no mixed messages. These were sub-issues, anyway; the most important thing was that a truly Islamic government
finally take the reigns of state in Afghanistan, and the Taliban, for all its provincial “boorishness” and lack of urban grace, had at least accomplished this overarching goal that had so long eluded the war-torn Central Asian country.

True to its Deobandi roots, the Taliban saw itself as merely the vanguard of a grand Muslim liberation movement, with its sights set, crucially, by and large on communism (i.e. not “Western” values, unless one includes communism itself in that category). This was not a nationalist movement, neither Pathan nor Afghan per se, but the springboard for Muslim repossession of all of Islam’s lands and peoples languishing under foreign/infidel subjugation. Muslims had watched as one great Central Asian Muslim city after another—from Samarkand to Bukhara—had fallen to the Soviets, only to be “liberated” and placed under the thumb of yet another communist or socialist government. For a while, it appeared that even Afghanistan had fallen, with Pakistan next on the list. But the Taliban had ensured that the wave of oppression had stopped at Afghanistan—and had pushed the communists out almost entirely, reversing the tide. Outgunned, poorly armed Pathan tribesmen had defeated the world’s most powerful land army. Couldn’t other Muslims do the same, in the spirit of the warriors of Badr? Indeed, yes—and now it was time to reverse the wave and win back the Muslim world for Muslims. (During the Afghan jihād against the Soviets, Zia ul-Haq—perhaps betraying Deobandi leanings—had reportedly planned to use the nascent Taliban movement and its “foreign” helpers to liberate the Central Asian republics from their communist regimes. He would not be the last foreign politician to entertain the idea of using these “freedom fighters” as a proxy army, either.)

As “a gesture of pan-Islamic solidarity,” then, the Taliban invited freedom fighters from around the world to come to Afghanistan and train for just such an effort in
specially designed camps set up for this purpose (as they were taught by the Pakistanis and Americans during the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Pakistan). Students and teachers alike came from across the globe, but especially from the conquered “Muslim” states of central Asia, both to experience Islamic solidarity and to prepare for their own freedom struggles. Uighurs from East Turkestan (now “Xinjiang,” a Chinese term meaning, tellingly, “New Frontier”) hoped to eventually rid their country of communist China’s domination. Members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan sought to topple “Central Asia’s most brutal and savage Communist dictatorship” (that of Islam Karamov). Muslim Filipinos hoped to acquire the means necessary to defend Muslim rights in their country, or at least establish a free Muslim base in the Phillipine south. Chechens sought to wrest their homeland from Russian rule. Others—Thais, Bengalis, Tajiks, Turkmens, and more—had similar, regional concerns. But the most populous group were the Pakistanis, preparing to fight in Kashmir. Pakistan’s very government (a U.S. Government ally) backed these last. For the most part, then, these volunteer *jydahis* were not driven by some seething hatred for “the West”; their concerns were far more local and/or regional, centered on the liberation of their own countries and peoples, mostly from communist regimes. In early April 2001, a massive Deobandi gathering at the village of Taro Jaba (near Peshawar) was organized by Fazlur Rehman in celebration of the *dar ul’alawm* Deoband’s many achievements. According to some sources, over a million people attended. Critically, the Deobandi assemblage declared its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as for all other Muslims fighting for their identity or independence, anywhere else in the world. The two speeches (both taped recordings) that reportedly garnered the most acclaim during the Taro Jaba conference: one from Taliban head *mullah* Muhammad Omar, the other from *mujahydin*
leader and financier Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{148}

The mostly anti-communist aims of the aforementioned groups—from the Taliban to the Uighurs to the Chechens—fit in so neatly with the U.S. Government’s interventionist foreign policy that some American policy-makers before September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001 even considered “using” these various benighted groups for their own regional interests, just as they had the Afghan \textit{mujahydin} during the 1980s. The Taliban were, after all, both ardently anti-communist and passionately anti-Iran/anti-China, positions that some elements within the U.S. Government found highly appealing. (This at least partly explains how, until just four months before the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks, Washington actually provided clandestine—and even some overt—financial support to the Taliban regime.)\textsuperscript{149} Wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Steve Coll: “In history’s long inventory of surprise attacks, September 11\textsuperscript{th} is distinguished in part by the role played by intelligence agencies and informal secret networks in the preceding events.”\textsuperscript{150} It was within the context of the Soviet fall, of the “cleansing” of Afghanistan, of the rise of the Taliban, and of the preparation of a wide range of “Muslim freedom movements” for the reclamation of Muslim lands, then, that many Deobandis celebrated the collapse of the World Trade Center at the hands of bin Laden’s Al-Qaida.
EPILOGUE

Be warned, you are not prepared for Afghanistan!

ABDUL SALAM ZAEFF, 2009

To most Deobandis, the response of the Bush regime in Afghanistan to the Taliban’s harboring of Osama bin Laden was repressive and brutal. Interestingly, for many Barelvis—and many other Muslims, too, around the world—the initial US Government response was a legitimate one, however frustrating—a justifiable reaction to a major criminal act. The Barelvis, by and large, had neither supported the Afghan jihād against the Soviets in the 1980s nor the Taliban movement in the 1990s. As for the American intrusion into Central Asia and Pakistan, the militant Deobandis had had it coming. The Barelvis would actively campaign against the Taliban in Pakistan for years afterward.

Meanwhile, Deobandis across the country protested Washington’s Afghan invasion. After all, the Americans had teamed up with the Northern Alliance, many of whose leaders had been pro-Soviet during the Russian occupation era. Indeed, men like
General Muhammad Fahim and Rashid Dostum had been among that earlier conflicts’s worst war criminals (not to mention their continued crimes against humanity after the war had “ended”). These post-September 11th alliances with some of the most infamous names connected to Afghanistan’s communist era fomented especial enmity among the Deobandis of Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose blood had been spilt over the previous decades against these very same individuals. To the Deobandis who had participated in the 1980s jyhad, the American occupiers of Afghanistan were simply the Soviets reincarnate. Perhaps Margolis’ description of the Soviet-American parallels clarifies this attitude:

“[The US Government-orchestrated] fixed elections [of 2004 and 2005] underlined the unsettling similarities between the Soviet and American occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 citing internationalist duty and the need to fight Islamic terrorists. Washington’s slogan was fighting terrorism and spreading democracy. Both allied with the minority Tajiks and Uzbeks. Both were interested in carving out a corridor to and from the Arabian Sea coast in Pakistan… Both claimed they were fighting medievalist Islam, nation-building, liberating women, and bringing the benefits of modern education and democracy. Both claimed victory was just around the corner. …Suffice it to say that once the US bested the USSR in the Cold War, and saw its old enemy collapse, it lost little time in assuming the role and aggressive behavior of the former Soviet Union…”
It was clear to many Deobandis that the Americans—who had by now proven themselves as interventionists and meddlers in the Muslim world for decades—were no better than their Soviet predecessors in Afghan occupation. The Pathan/Deobandi reaction to both invading forces had thus been consistent.

But as the war wore on, and it became evident that U.S. Government ambitions extended beyond simply finding and punishing Osama bin Laden—as drone strikes devastated villages in Pakistan, as American forces continued to occupy a Muslim country, as a corrupt regime and its corrupt allies were propped up by Washington’s guns, as Pakistan’s apparently weak-kneed leaders continued to bow to U.S. pressure, and as the fruits of the invasion, including the militancy of the so-called “Pakistani Taliban,” hit closer and closer to home—Barelvi opinion about the war changed. “By 2005,” wrote one journalist on the scene, “[the] consensus [was] that the US had taken advantage of the 9/11 attacks to implement long-prepared plans to seize the Muslim world’s energy wealth and establish new bases in its most strategic regions.” Whether or not there was truth to this version of events, it was widely believed, and the Barelvi religious leadership, while not supporting the Taliban, came to despise the United States Government and its meddling ways.

In any case, the war would have a devastating effect on the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, further militarizing the schism (and especially the Deobandi groups, who happened to be the most operative along Pakistan’s border regions and within Pathan Afghanistan). When jihadiis from Iraq came to Afghanistan to assist in the struggle against perceived American neo-imperialism, they came armed with the knowledge necessary to build roadside bombs, truck bombs, and suicide bomber vests—all devices that were “previously unknown” in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is it any wonder that
Deobandi attacks on Barelvi processions or shrines from this period on were often committed using just such devices? This was a new development in the rivalry, and it had been brought on by the American war in Afghanistan. The rise of the “Pakistani Taliban,” too, pitted what was considered a quasi-Deobandi force against the Pakistani government, a conflict that the Barelvis utilized in order to demonstrate their own reasonableness as compared to Deobandi “militarism” and “terrorism.” Here was an opportunity to crush their long-time opponents—by branding them terrorists and using the power of the state to finally bring them low. As such, Barelvi leaders railed against “Pakistani Taliban” attacks on government forces as a Deobandi phenomenon, even as many Deobandis wondered who, exactly, the “Pakistani Taliban” really were. “We don’t know who they are,” one Deobandi Waziri physician told the author in 2012. “They are foreigners.”

* * *

In 2001, the focus of the Sunni Tehrik changed. The timing was not arbitrary, as it was in that year that ST founder and director Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was assassinated. Within months the organization became overtly political, organizing itself as a full-fledged party and abruptly butting heads with Karachi’s heretofore most dominant local party, the likewise Barelvi-dominated MQM. According to the ST itself, between 2004 and 2006 alone some seventy-five of its members (one report calls them “militants”) were killed in the politico-religious war that followed, the ST mostly blaming the MQM and the Deobandis for its losses. These targeted killings soon became mass killings—in particular with the execution of the deadly Nishtark Park blast of April 2006. Now mass murder was the order of the day.
This brings the reader, then, to the transformational event. Of course, it is perhaps presumptuous of any historian to claim to have identified the “transformational” moment in any years-long historical process, and there are, admittedly, many such “transformational” points in time that one might justifiably point to as equally or more important as regards the process at hand. In terms of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and the process of its militarization, one might point to the founding of the dar al'alam at Deoband by Muhammad Qasim, or Ahmad Riza’s very specific 1902 juridical ruling against Deobandism, or the formation of the JUH, or the organization of the AISC, or the entrance of the JUI into Pakistani politics, or that of the JUP, or the phenomenon of the Iranian Revolution, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or that of Washington, or even the American invasion of Iraq—these could all vie as candidates for the transformational moment within the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s evolution from theological schism to violent contest. However, the Nishtar Park bombing was the first mass killing of Barelvis by Deobandis, and it did seem to initiate a string of similar mass killings over the years that followed it, suggesting that the rivalry had moved into a new era in its development. Let us look closely, then, at the Nishtar Park bombing, and see if it cannot shed additional light on the topic at hand.

**The Suicide of Muhammad Siddiq: 11 April 2006.**

On the evening of 11 April 2006, a nondescript man made his way through a shoulder-to-shoulder mass of Barelvi celebrants in Nishtar Park, Karachi, and approached the rickety wooden stage upon which the multitude’s spiritual leaders were seated. Seconds later the C-4 strapped to the man’s chest exploded, propelling thousands of ball bearings at bullet-like speed in every direction. Within moments the
gruesome remains of almost sixty dead were scattered among the splintered vestiges of the stage, the carnage underscored by the moaning of approximately one hundred and fifty wounded. The bomber was publicly identified more than a year later by Pakistani authorities; he was a village-born twenty-one-year-old named Muhammad Siddiq.

Most international news organizations would, in knee-jerk fashion, immediately report the incident within the now-familiar Sunni-Shi’a framework. Even without explicitly stating that the attack had likely been perpetrated by a Shi’i fanatic, this was the implicit message; several paragraphs devoted strictly to the event narrative would generally be followed by the statement of a Shi’a leader (like, for example, ‘allamā ḥassan Turabi, who was subsequently assassinated himself by a Sunni Bangladeshi three months later), placing the one in the context of the other.

Only a few scraps of information, loosed piecemeal by the government and police of Pakistan (admittedly dubious sources at best), exist concerning Muhammad Siddiq. Problematizing matters, a specific context to the man (and, particularly, his April 11th actions) has been pre-constructed before the historian has had a chance to assemble one of his own. It is within a similar vein that Guha, in that Subalternist classic “Chandra’s Death,” notes that a critical condition of historiography is “contextuality”—a framework that directs the historian in terms of the text at hand. 8 Guha’s concern lay with “fragmentation,” those anecdotes “with no known context [that have] come down to us simply as the residuum of a dismembered past.” Might the scattered snippets about Muhammad Siddiq be approached the same way? Though contextuality has already been provided, it just may turn out that the “torn fabric” to which this event has been linked is the wrong one. Contextuality must therefore be restored, as far as is possible, to the fragments available, then work from this potentially new vantage point. In the
process, it is hoped, the meaning behind the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq might be revealed.

I

Perhaps the discourse of space-time provides an appropriate starting place. Of all the places Muhammad Siddiq might have selected in which to end his life (not to mention those of many others) he chose Karachi’s Nishtar Park, and of all the times he might have selected, he chose 11 April 2006—or, perhaps more correctly, the 12th of Rabi I 1427. According to Sunnis the world over, the 12th of Rabi I is the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet (what South Asian Muslims call mawlyd, as aforementioned). As previously noted, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry revolves in large part around the two school’s separate understanding of the “traditional” South Asian Islamic “rituals.” Foremost among them is mawlyd, and the controversy of the holiday goes back to the very beginning, to some of the first anti-Deobandi rulings of Ahmad Riza Khan and his disciples.

From the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi adherents over doctrine in the late nineteenth century, it has been the sects’ relative stance on the attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most widened the divide, as noted. The ritual of the Barelvis has compounded this doctrinal difference, particularly as they celebrate the birth of the Prophet. Indeed, mawlyd is often marked as of the time of this writing by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of religious poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date is marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by high government officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the screening of films with
“morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”), much of which is considered “innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion. Several deadly clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place on this significant date of the Islamic calendar.

It is no wonder, then, that on this date Muhammad Siddiq carried out his deadly attack.

II

According to the bomb disposal squad dispatched to the grisly scene at Nishtar Park, the explosive used in the violence was of “the same type” used in earlier attacks—in particular, on the ‘Ali Raza Mosque (31 May 2004; 23 killed, 37 injured) and on the Haideri Mosque (7 May 2004; 26 killed, 98 injured). Both of these previous attacks had likewise taken place in Karachi. But explosive type and location weren’t the only elements tying these blasts together; by November 2004, Karachi authorities had identified both the Haideri and ‘Ali Raza mosque attacks as having been perpetrated by aforementioned Deobandi organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, by this time officially banned in Pakistan. On 15 June 2007, the Sindh Home Department issued a statement identifying Muhammad Siddiq as the Nishtar Park bomber and one “said to have had links with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.” This brings us back to the question of location. Why did Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators select Nishtar Park as the place to carry out their attack? At first glance this seems obvious; a massive Barelvi gathering was taking place there, one that would include much of the sect’s leadership. But digging deeper, it seems clear that, in fact, the location’s significance goes beyond this. The similar attack on ‘Ali Raza Mosque—the one that the bomb disposal team had
identified as having employed “the same type” of explosive—had taken place less than fifteen hundred feet away, just across Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah Road near the intersection of Madina and Zainabla Roads. The Haideri Mosque is located not much further down M. A. Jinnah Road, placing all three easily within the southwestern quadrant of Karachi, between Saddar and Jamshed (parts of Karachi described as possessing many “sensitive areas” revolving almost entirely around mosques). Thus Nishtar Park seems not only convenient for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi elements on account of its being the venue of a major Barelvi gathering, but possesses additional significance as falling within the radius of what was apparently the killers’ “turf.”

The consequence of the perpetrators’ selection of Nishtar Park probably doesn’t go beyond this—but it might. For Abdur Rab Nishtar (d. 1958 AD), after whom the park was named, represented much that the Deobandi school had once abhorred: he was an active and high-ranking Muslim Leaguer, a graduate of the modernist Muslim University at Aligarh, and, some years after Partition, served as President of the Pakistan Muslim League.

Whether Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators had any of this in mind when Nishtar Park was named as the fateful site for their deadly plot one will likely never know.

III

With apparent ties to the LeJ (described as “the most dreaded sectarian terrorist outfit in Pakistan”), it behooves one to ask the question: what exactly is the LeJ—and how might a young man allegedly hailing from an obscure village in the far northeastern hill district of Mansehra have wound up in the southern port city of Karachi connected to it? In an attempt to answer this double interrogative, it may be
necessary to examine the beginnings of the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict, in full swing many decades before Muhammad Siddiq was even born. Of course, that is one of the main purposes of the present work; the reader has been introduced to the religious thought of Shah Waliullah and the revivalism that it inspired, the founding of the dar ul'ulom at Deoband, the Barelvi counter-reformation, the fatwa wars of the early 1900s, the early (pre-Partition) political battles between the two schools in the form of the JUH-Congress alliance and the AISC call for Pakistan, the further politicization of the JUI and the JUP within Pakistani politics, and the emergence of militant wings of the two schools from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Already discussed, too, has been the 1985 establishment of what would become the SSP by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and his companions and the emergence of its even more militant offshoot, the LeJ. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, or “Jhangvi's Army,” targeted both Shi‘a Muslims and Barelvis. In one of the group’s earlier operations, LeJ members attacked a congregation of Shi‘i in Lahore while the latter were in the act of prayer, slaughtering thirty; the event sparked a violent response, a “Shi‘a mob” numbering in the thousands smashing cars, setting fire to buildings (including a provincial courthouse), and attempting to storm the Pakistani parliament. It was to this “Deobandi” group—one that the ISID had been using for years to push its own political agenda—that Muhammad Siddiq allegedly attached himself sometime prior to April 2006.

Whatever the stimulus for the now-violent nature of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, what had once been a schism among scholars had mutated over time into a bloody battle between religious parties and their terrorist wings. The century-and-a-half transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had seemingly swept up Muhammad Siddiq in its current.
IV

Four of Muhammad Siddiq’s alleged co-conspirators were arraigned on 4 May 2009: Sultan Mahmood (also known as “Saifullah”), mufti Zakir Hussain Siddiqui, Rehmatullah, and Muhammad Amin (also known as “Khalid Shaheen”); the last of these was exonnerated several months later “for want of evidence.”18 By early September 2009, the other three—“Saifullah,” Zakir, and Rehmatullah—had been indicted (FIR 71/06) by an anti-terrorism court. Such courts, known as “ATFs,” had been established in 1997 shortly after PML-N won its landslide (even historic) electoral victory. The idea was that the ATFs would deter would-be terrorists since they represented the “promise” of “speedy justice, unencumbered by the procedural niceties of the regular court system.”19 Three others, identified by police as Amanullah (also called “mufti Ilyas”), Qari Abid Iqbal, and Khalid (also known as “Abrar”), are thought to have been involved in masterminding the Nishtar Park attack but, as of the time of this writing, remain at large.20 mufti Ilyas almost certainly acted as the leader of the group, with mufti Zakir as a chief lieutenant.

Sultan’s 2007 testimony to police (if it is to be believed), combined with the latter’s follow-up investigation, revealed several details about Muhammad Siddiq’s time in Karachi, and especially the final hours leading up to his suicide. According to Siddiq’s brothers (Shafi and Shafiq), Muhammad Siddiq had been “sent” to Karachi by his “friends” (though these are left unidentified). He would have been about sixteen years old at the time of his arrival in the big city. His (Siddiq’s) goal, according to his brothers, had been to get a job in Karachi, then to save up, “enabling him to marry soon.”21 A tantalizing yet ultimately unanswerable question spurred by this
information: did Muhammad Siddiq know who he was going to marry—or at least who he would like to marry? Did he have plans for a specific life in place that did not include suicide and murder? Whatever the answer, Siddiq moved to Karachi around 2002, where he soon obtained employment at a religious bookstore in Saddar (south of Nishtar Park). Later, he traded his job in Saddar for a similar one at a religious bookstore near prominent Deobandi university Jamia Binoria (northwest of Nishtar Park). It is highly possible that Muhammad Siddiq, up to this point, was engaged in the very pursuits his brothers claimed for him: earning money in the city in order to establish himself for marriage. Still, his choices of employment—both peddlars of Islamic literature—suggest at least a leaning towards religion. Jamia Binoria, too, besides being a sizable Deobandi university, had been the site of several Barelvi-Deobandi clashes, including a 1999 incident involving a Sunni Tehrik procession that engaged in stone-pelting against students of the university (though it is unclear who “threw the first stone,” so to speak), escalating into the shooting deaths of at least two individuals before police broke up the fight using batons and tear gas; perhaps not incidentally, the clash took place during mawlid celebrations.22

And then, for unknown reasons, Muhammad Siddiq abruptly left his place of employment—and went to Afghanistan “to train in jihad.” Not surprisingly, this decision would dramatically change the young man’s life, though just how dramatically Siddiq may not have guessed. For it was in Afghanistan that Muhammad Siddiq met Sultan. The two quickly became “close friends.” What Siddiq probably didn’t know, at least at first, was that Sultan was a recruiter for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi whose task was to “identify, prepare, and brainwash” suicide bomber prospects. When Muhammad Siddiq returned to Karachi, he regained his job at the bookshop near Jamia Binoria, but Sultan
returned with him. According to one of Siddiq’s friends (a co-worker at the bookshop), Sultan would come to discuss “plans” with Muhammad Siddiq often. This continued until that final fateful twenty-four hours, during which events passed, as far as the police reports reveal, in the following sequence:

10 April

[Evening] Sultan and Qari Abid Iqbal arrive at the bookshop outside Jamia Binoria. After a “discussion” with Muhammad Siddiq, all three drive away.

Sultan, Qari, and Muhammad Siddiq arrive at House No. 2, Islamia Colony, Pahari Wali Gali, Qasba Colony, Orangi (Karachi). This is the house of Rehmatullah. mufti Ilyas is there as well, presumably along with mufti Zakir and Khalid (“Abrar”).

11 April

[Morning] The group eats at Rehmatullah’s house, after which Muhammad Siddiq performs two voluntary prayers. Muhammad Siddiq puts on an explosive jacket bearing seven-eighths of a kilogram of explosives and three thousand ball bearings.

[Late afternoon] Sultan and Khalid take Muhammad Siddiq towards Nishtar Park via M. A. Jinnah Road. They make the trip in a taxi, which stops on three separate occasions at police checkpoints; each time it is allowed to pass.

On or near Jinnah Road, the trio joins a rallying crowd on its way to the mawlyd celebration.
Sultan, Khalid, and Muhammad Siddiq remain at the gates of the park (to avoid cameras), the former two “sheltering” Muhammad Siddiq behind them.

mufti Zakir arrives at the park (on orders from mufti Ilyas) to make sure his men are in position. Assured that all is in place, mufti Zakir leaves.

The vehicle of Sunni Tehrik leader Abbas Qadiri enters the park. Sultan and Khalid ask Muhammad Siddiq if he knows who is in the car. Siddiq replies that he does.

[Just after sunset] Moments after Siddiq identifies Abbas Qadiri’s vehicle, Sultan and Khalid leave Muhammad Siddiq alone; their departure occurs just as the māGryb prayer begins.

The prayer ends. Muhammad Siddiq makes for the stage and commits suicide.

IV

Mansehra is Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s easternmost district, bordering (Indian) Kashmir on its eastern edges yet only one hundred miles or so, as the crow flies, from Afghanistan to the west. The district has long been a venue for militant training camps (including at least thirteen “major” facilities responsible for the training of “thousands” of fighters), mostly connected to operations across the LoC into Kashmir. After September 11th 2001, such activities were ostensibly curtailed by the Pakistani government, but by 2005—the year before the Nishtar Park blast—the camps appeared to be humming again, and this time they were alleged to be providing soldiers both for
the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the usual fight in Kashmir. It should be remembered that such agitation, particularly in Kashmir, was nothing new; seventy years before any planes struck the World Trade Center, the Deobandi-led Kashmir Movement (1931) was launched not far from here. Deobandi activists (in particular maulana Ahmed ‘Ali) collected thousands of rupees during this period in order to carry out *jihad* in Kashmir (Ahmed ‘Ali would become president of the West Pakistan JUI in 1956). “Hence,” writes Tahir Kamran, the “Deobandi penchant for *jihad* in Kashmir has a historical context.”

But in the years leading up to the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq, this atmosphere of aggression in Mansehra was compounded by the Barelvi-Deobandi contest. Not far to the west, in Khyber Agency, the doctrinal disputes between two clerics—*mufti* Munir Shakir (Deobandi) and *pir* Saifur Rahman (Barelvi)—had escalated into violence (mostly perpetrated by the former). Both employed the use of illegal FM radio stations to spread their rival theologies and denounce the other (not unlike their debating, pamphlet- and book-producing forbears; it would seem, however, that in this case *mufti* Munir Shakir spent less time discussing doctrine and more denigrating *pir* Saifur Rahman). Such operations were widespread, as the growth of pirated FM stations across the north attested as of late 2006 (when there were an estimated eighty-eight), including two stations in Muhammad Siddiq’s own Mansehra District. In fact, just two weeks prior to the attack on the Barelvis gathered at Nishtar Park, approximately twenty-five people (mostly Barelvi) were killed and twenty-five injured in gun battles after Deobandis (followers of *mufti* Munir Shakir) laid siege to a Barelvi (a follower of *pir* Saifur Rahman) in the Khyber Agency. The event may have been the last major
clash between Deobandi and Barelvi to be contemplated by Muhammad Siddiq before he himself contributed to the conflict.

The violent struggle for Afghanistan and, especially, Indian Kashmir, combined with the ever-present Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, was thus almost certainly simply “part of life” for Muhammad Siddiq from the time of his childhood—a state of affairs that would, perhaps, have allowed for a level of desensitization to violent religious struggle, whether against Indian or American soldiers or the followers of Barelvi clerics.

V

Muhammad Siddiq had at least three brothers. All were likewise named Muhammad: Muhammad Shafi, Muhammad Shafiq (also identified as Shafiqur Rahman), and Mohammed Rafiq. At least the first two (Shafi and Shafiq) maintained their brother’s innocence and blamed the Sindh Home Department for falsely implicating him in the Nishtar Park bombing case. A local paper, *Mehasayb* (operating in northeastern Pakistan), carried their appeal in mid-June 2007. The thrust of the brothers’ petition, however, dealt not with Muhammad Siddiq but with their parents, who had allegedly been taken by a “secret agency” to Karachi, where they were being detained. “Our parents do not know anything about the Nishtar Park carnage,” Shafi and Shafiq asserted, urging the president and Prime Minister of Pakistan to intervene on their behalf.

What is curious about the brothers’ appeal is the absence of the voice of Muhammad Siddiq’s third brother, Rafiq. It was Rafiq, after all, who seems to have first gone searching for his missing brother. On 25 May 2007, about a year and six weeks after the Nishtar Park blast, Rafiq arrived in Karachi, according to his police statement.
Rafiq went immediately to the small bookshop outside Jamia Binoria where his brother had last been employed. Here he apparently met a man named Afzal—a friend of Muhammad Siddiq’s. Rafiq asked Afzal where he might find his missing brother. Afzal replied that he thought his brother might have been killed in the Nishtar Park blast. Rafiq went straightway to the Soldier Bazaar police station, explained his situation, and was shown a photo album of the carnage from 11 April; if his brother had been killed by the blast, his remains would likely be visible inside. Sure enough, the album included a photo of Muhammad Siddiq’s decapitated head, resting on a pillow; Rafiq recognized his brother, despite the fact that a part of the latter’s face, blown off in the blast, was held in place only by a piece of string. Rafiq’s DNA was subsequently tested at the Dr. A. Q. Khan Lab in order to confirm his familial relationship to the alleged attacker. It appears that Rafiq’s arrival at the Soldier Bazaar police station precipitated the Sindh Home Department’s announcement, released just two weeks later, identifying Muhammad Siddiq as the Nishtar Park bomber. Muhammad Siddiq’s head was handed over to Rafiq. Rafiq opted not to carry the head home to Mansehra; “it would not be good for the family,” he told police. He buried it instead at the Edhi graveyard “at Mochko” (assumedly Mowach Goth). The graveyard, owned and operated by the Edhi Foundation (a well-known non-profit social welfare program in Pakistan), had, as of February 2010, acted as the final resting place for almost three thousand unidentified bodies. The remains of Muhammad Siddiq are now numbered among them.

Muhammad Siddiq’s parents survived him, his father identified in June of 2007 as one “Mr. Israel” and his mother as “Zewar Jan.” Both were taken into some sort of government custody within days of Muhammad Siddiq’s identification as the Nishtar Park assailant. The SAG’s allegation that the ISID had been inciting Deobandi groups
to violence against Barelvi ones seems buoyed by the claim of Shafiq and Shafi that a “secret agency” had taken their parents away—and further shored up by their claim that they were being “threatened” over the phone. Evidently, too, an “anonymous caller” had ordered them not to disclose the fact that their parents had been arrested from their home village area.\textsuperscript{32}

Muhammad Siddiq also had two sisters: Safia and Soba Jan.

VI

One newspaper headline succinctly summed up the likely target of Muhammad Siddiq’s suicide attack: \textit{Top Leadership of the Sunni Tehrik Wiped Out}. This was no exaggeration; the dead included

- ST chief Muhammad Abbas Qadiri (whose car Muhammad Siddiq was asked by his co-conspirators to identify when it entered the park, just before the two left Siddiq on his own; Qadiri’s arrival was thus the signal that the attack could move forward, implying that he was the primary target);

- Iftikhar Ahmad Bhatti, a founding leader of the Sunni Tehrik;

- Ikram Qadiri, another Sunni Tehrik founder;

- Dr. Abdul Qadir Abbasi, a member of the Sunni Tehrik’s “legal aid committee”\textsuperscript{33};

- and dozens of other Sunni Tehrik members.

Prominent figures from other Barelvi parties were likewise murdered in the incident, including:
- Muhammad Taqi, a former government official, former head of the JUP in Karachi, and a member of the (Barelvi) Markazi Jamiat-e-Pakistan party;
- Qari Mukhtar Qadiri, of the (Barelvi) dar ul'alwm Amjadia in Karachi;
- Muhammad Hanif Billo, a prominent businessman and president of the Tehrik Awam Ahl-e-Sunnat, a Barelvi party;
- and Faridul Hasnain Kazmi of the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, a large Barelvi religious organization; it was this group that had organized the Nishtar Park mawlid celebrations.

The statement released by the Sindh Home Department on 15 June 2007, however, asserted that “the motive of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi behind committing this offence [the Nishtar Park bombing] was to create unrest and a law and order situation in Sindh in order to avenge the present government’s policy against religious extremism” (italics added).34 A brief glance at Muhammad Siddiq’s victim list makes it clear, however, that despite what the Sindh Home Department might claim, this was almost certainly a clear-cut case of Deobandi-Barelvi sectarianism, even if a side motive might have been served in the process.

VII

Sometime between the old debating days of Ahmad Riza Khan and the carnage of Nishtar Park, Deobandi-Barelvi articulations of power underwent a transformation. Metcalf identifies an early Deobandi sense of әxlaq, or “civility characteristic of
respectable people,” as a check on intolerance—preventing, for example, the Deobandis in Muhammad Qasim’s day from denying others of being Muslim despite doctrinal and ritual disagreements (though, admittedly, this did not seem to have applied to the Shi’a). \textsuperscript{35} \textit{әxlaq} was a foundational concept within Islam, and had been from the beginning; according to one \textit{hәdis} (narrated by Osama bin Sharik), the Prophet explained that the “dearest” of all “Allah’s slaves” is the “One who has the best moral character \textsuperscript{[әxlaq]}.” Another \textit{hәdis} (narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr) presents the Prophet explaining that “the most likeable person to me...who will be the nearest to me on the Day of Judgment” is “he among you who has the best moral character \textsuperscript{[әxlaq]}.”\textsuperscript{36} For those of the Sufi tradition, in particular, \textit{әxlaq} was considered paramount; many Sufis during the period of its genesis literally \textit{defined} Sufism as \textit{әxlaq}, including Abu al-Husayn al-Nuri (d. 908) and Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Kattani (d. 838).\textsuperscript{37} An “English-Hindustani” dictionary published in the 1880s (the formative period of both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements) translated “morality” (defined as “the rule which teaches us to live soberly and honestly”) as \textit{әxlaq}.\textsuperscript{38} It is important to note that both the spiritual masters of the Deobandi tradition and those recognized as the Barelvi guiding lights were also practitioners of Sufism, though this is rarely acknowledged as far as the Deobandis are concerned (certainly in comparison to their Barelvi counterparts). Perhaps this buoys up Metcalf’s assertion that \textit{әxlaq} may have played a significant role in maintaining a semblance of tolerance (and preventing outright violence) between the rival Sunni groups.

The formative periods of both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements took place during the peak of British power on the subcontinent, thereby providing both sects with some form of a common enemy. Neither group engaged in politics for itself but rather
as subsumed parts of larger independence and/or nationalist efforts. Indeed, it wasn’t until Deobandi and Barelvi groups entered politics within the framework of the Pakistani state (and money and political power were on the line) that әxlaq appears to have been knocked off of its pedestal. Concurrently with this development came the dramatic increase, from the 1970s onwards, of a more Saudi version of Islam—one that rejected Sufism and, perhaps along with it, the exalted place which that strain of the faith reserved for әxlaq. Years of desensitization to war, fueled by Russian and American (and Indian) incursions and funded by Pakistani, Saudi, and American (and Indian) intelligence agencies, also doubtless played a role in removing the barrier to certain social behaviors that had previously been thrown up by әxlaq.

The mushrooming of mәdәrys in Pakistan brought about by government support (“or exploitation,” in the words of Cohen, and it appears that the SAG would agree)—from around two hundred fifty at the time of Partition to almost three thousand in 1987 to between ten and forty-five thousand by the mid-2000s—produced, perhaps not surprisingly, a considerable surplus of Muslim scholars, clerics, and teachers, a “religious lumpenproletariat” of mostly young men who may have found it difficult to secure employment in the world outside the mәdәrәsh.39 It isn’t unlikely that young Muhammad Siddiq himself met this description—an erstwhile student in a Deobandi mәdәrәsh, a recent graduate perhaps, yet unable to secure meaningful employment beyond a junior position at a bookshop. Devoid of a foreseeable future as a scholar and well-versed in sectarian vitriol, Muhammad Siddiq may have been targeted as an ideal recruit for the LeJ.

By the time Muhammad Siddiq approached Nishtar Park, minutes before his death, әxlaq was likely the last thing on his mind.
The Rivalry Continues.

The April 2006 Nishtar Park bombing—almost certainly a high-collateral assassination effort targeting Abbas Qadiri—sparked outrage among Barelvis in Karachi and across Pakistan. It also cast a negative light on Deobandism throughout the country, buoyed up a year later by the Lal Masjid incident—during which Deobandis seeking the enforcement of shari’at in Islamabad refused to vacate a school and mosque, resulting in the storming of the facility by government forces. Despite the disavowal by Deobandi religious leaders of the Lal Masjid movement, the incident exacerbated Barelvi fears of an increasingly militant Deobandism and seemed to legitimize Barelvi claims of the same.

Barelvis had political cause to worry, too. Though the JUP had allied with other Muslim political parties—finally; it had only taken half a century for such an alliance to emerge—it had continued its decline in terms of national influence. The JUI, on the other hand, had skyrocketed into prominence. Formed in the run-up to the 2002 general elections, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (or MMA) included both the JUI and the JUP, as well as the JI, the Shi’a Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith. With the religious parties finally forming a united front, the MMA won a large portion of the vote—indeed, the greatest electoral victory for the ‘ulama parties since Pakistan’s birth. All told, the MMA obtained a whopping sixty-three seats in the National Assembly. (The Barelvi-dominated MQM managed seventeen.) But of the five parties that formed the alliance, the JUI emerged as by far the most powerful, especially since JUI (F) candidates alone had garnered forty-one of the MMA’s sixty-three seats. This, coupled with the party’s twenty-nine provincial assembly seats in the
NWFP (MMA seats in the province totaled forty-eight) propelled Fazlur Rehman to the Leader of the Opposition position in 2004, a post he held until 2007.

But the MMA experienced a rapid drop in popularity after its declaration of “loyal opposition” (as opposed to outright opposition) to the Musharraf regime, at a time when Pervez Musharraf was losing supporters on all sides. The declaration was made despite the MMA’s official stance against Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. Government-led “War on Terror.” But by mid-2007, even the MMA could sense Musharraf’s impending fall, issuing a call (together with the PPP and the PML-N) for the President’s resignation. In November 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, pushing elections back “indefinitely.” For a time it seemed that the old pattern of military dictators delaying elections, perfected by Zia ul-Haq, had returned to Pakistan. But a few days later, and perhaps to Musharraf’s credit, elections were announced for January 2008 (later pushed back to February after the killing of Benazir Bhutto). Meanwhile, the MMA broke up before the election took place (2008), and the JUI managed to win only seven seats (compared to the JUP’s zero). The MQM garnered twenty-five seats. The big players in the 2008 contest were the Pakistan People’s Party, now led by Yousaf Raza Gillani (after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto earlier that year), and the PML-N, led by Nisar Ali Khan—both outright opposition parties to the increasingly unpopular Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf’s own Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam) had come in a distant third. The religious parties, it seemed, had thrown away their chance to be politically dominant.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Government-led war in Afghanistan continued to aggravate the Deobandi-Barelvi schism. The Barelvis used the conflict, and the “terrorism” brand, to continue its attack on Deobandism’s image. In 2009, Pakistani Foreign Minister and
Barelvi Shah Mehmood Qureshi (who also happened to be the spiritual custodian of one of Pakistan’s most significant shrines—that of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, in Multan) told a large crowd gathered at the tomb, “The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is emerging across the country.”

Just days later, the Sunni Tehrik—in league with several other Barelvi organizations including the JUP, the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, the A’almi Tanzim Ahl-e-Sunnat, the Karawan-e-Islam, the Markazi Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, the Markazi JUP, and the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party—launched the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an explicitly anti-Taliban alliance. The JUP spoke out, too, against the peace agreement that the Pakistani government had chalked out with the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)—a “Pakistani Taliban” group—that paved the way for the implementation of the TNSM’s version of shari’at over the Malakand region of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was to be played out in the context of the Taliban and international “terrorism.” Opined one Pakistani newspaper around the same time that the SIC was born: “The Taliban are not the distant upholders of true Islam in Kabul being pulverised by the Americans after 2001. They are militants who use terror to subjugate communities, kill innocent Muslims through suicide-bombing, and want to replace democracy with a despotic order.” Whatever the initial Barelvi reaction to the American invasion to the west, the school’s proponents now protested vociferously against it—and, more importantly, against the Taliban, too. Once they might have been described as mere spectators. Not so now. In addition, the Barelvi-dominated MQM joined the fray against the Deobandi-dominated Taliban. “A highly disciplined political entity, the MQM has resolved to stand up to them,” the same newspaper reported. “It may come to regard the Barelvi school of thought as its
ideological base because most of its cadres are old followers of the great Barelvi leader, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan.”

Even with the formation of the SIC and the MQM’s anti-Taliban declaration, Barelvis and Deobandis temporarily united (at least in the old form of “separate unity”) from around November 2010 to mid-2011 to rally against anti-blasphemy law reform. This was, of course, typical of both schools, in light of similar “alliances” against perceived government intrusion into the ‘alama’s purview that had occurred from the time of Pakistan’s birth. Anti-Taliban rhetoric from the Barelvi camp (most conspicuously in the form of the JUP and the SIC, of which the former was a part) noticeably died down during this period. “We had seen the Barelvis getting ready to organize a campaign against the Taliban,” observed analyst Nasim Zehra, “but they got sidetracked by the blasphemy issue and this was forgotten.” Of course, the Barelvi-instigated assassination of Salman Taseer, mentioned previously, was tied up in the matter. The JUP’s Fazal Karim did not mince words, stating plainly that the proposed change in the laws were meant merely to placate Westerners; “We will not allow it,” he said. At the same time, JUI-F senator mwalana Sherani opposed legislation dealing with domestic violence, claiming that it was “not a major issue in Pakistan until women’s rights groups appeared.” Passage of the law would “promote Western culture in the Islamic state,” Fazlur Rehman said, and the JUI would fight it “tooth and nail.” Both the Barelvis and the Deobandis, too, strongly opposed U.S. Government drone strikes in Pakistan.

As of this writing, the direct violence between Deobandi and Barelvi had not abated either. In February 2010, gunmen from the SSP and affiliated groups attacked Barelvis celebrating mawlid in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack
by the crowd on a Deobandi madrasah. In July of that year, scores of Barelvis were killed—and much of the country outraged—when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data Durbar shrine in Lahore. But that same month, local Barelvi leader and Dawat-e-Islami activist Abdus Sattar justified the “severe beating” of a local father of five (a forty-five-year-old named Faryad) on the grounds that the man had committed blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad; “Due to this indecent and blasphemous utterance and adamance of the accused,” Abdus Sattar explained, “we [the residents of the town of Marzi Pura neighborhood of Khanewal, northeast of Multan] decided to teach him a lesson and thrash him.” The same justification would be used by Barelvi leaders in early 2011, when Punjab governor Salman Taseer (who wanted to tone down Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws) was murdered by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, as aforementioned; clerics subsequently forbade their followers from uttering funeral prayers for the slain politician and hailed his murderer as a national hero. In late June 2011, perhaps as a Deobandi reaction to the joint SIC-MQM resolution to resist Pakistan’s “Talibanization,” a “kill list” began circulating in Karachi targeting Dawat-e-Islami head Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the heavily Barelvi MQM leadership, at least one Shi’a cleric, and several anti-SSP police officers; those named, the list explained, had insincerely labeled honest jihadis “terrorists” while ignoring real criminals like thieves and murderers. Dawat-e-Islami leaders had been targeted before, of course; indeed, just four months before the list began circulating, thousands of “angry activists” from the Barelvi proselytizing group had marched along Karachi’s streets, firing guns into the air, burning tires, and forcing shops to close down and people to remain “confined to their homes”—all in protest of the killing of a Barelvi ymam (and Dawat-e-Islami member) on 19 February.
Barelvi mobilization had its consequences, too. The Pakistani government (in the form, perhaps not surprisingly, of its largely Deobandi-leaning intelligence agencies) began to publicly crack down on Barelvi activities in September of 2011 when military authorities decided to “curtail the activities” of the Dawat-e-Islami (now claiming to be active in almost seventy countries worldwide), particularly in reference to the Barelvi organization’s missionary efforts within the ranks of the armed forces themselves. The group was reported to have been so successful in gaining followers from within the military that the Dawat-e-Islami’s “key source of funding,” by 2011, came from this unique section of its membership (more than twenty million rupees were collected from the Pakistan Air Force alone—and that just during the month of Ramadan/August). Intelligence agencies warned the military that the Dawat’s “growing influence” would have “serious implications,” despite the group’s official “apolitical” stance. Evidently, some within the Pakistani government had been reassessing the influence of ostensibly non-violent preaching groups like the Dawat-e-Islami ever since the assassination of Salman Taseer. Indeed, the Barelvi bodyguard who had killed Taseer, a twenty-six-year-old from Rawalpindi who had been working for the police since 2002, was himself “believed to be a follower of Dawat-e-Islami.” During “interrogations,” the bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadiri, even admitted that “Qadiri” was not actually his last name—but that he had adopted it out of devotion to the Dawat-e-Islami founder, Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri. He would later confess to having been inspired to carry out the killing after listening to “the speeches of Hanif Qureshi,” a Barelvi cleric and Dawat-e-Islami leader. To many Barelvis, however, the government’s move to scrutinize the Dawat-e-Islami was just another example (in a long train of abuses) of official patronage reserved for Deobandis over the Barelvi majority; even police officials connected to the
case, after all, had admitted that “no suspected militant out of the 150 arrested from the suburbs of the capital belongs to this religious party [the Dawat-e-Islami].”

* *

It should be noted here, towards the end of this work, that, outside of clerical and political circles (or militant jihadi ones), the typical Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic is more subdued, and varies generally from place to place. In much of India, for example, the rivalry is mostly a scholarly one, barely manifested in the everyday lives of lay Muslims of either stripe (of course, it flares up from time to time as a political issue when matters of government largesse are concerned). The general feeling of the “everyday” Deobandi or Barelvi (at least in the experience of the author, having “mixed and mingled” with Deobandis and Barelvis at various levels on three continents over seven years as of this writing) might best be summed up in the words of a Kashmiri refugee in Lahore named Anjum. Anjum’s father had fled the cool valley of Srinagar amidst the “massacres” that accompanied Partition and the initiation of Indian Government rule there; thus Anjum had been born on the sweltering Punjabi plains. Asked what his feelings were about the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, he explained, “I just want to follow the Qur’an and the sunnah. There are no sects in the Qur’an—all are one.” Rather than shine a light on the schism, he had laid emphasis on the faith’s original purity as well as its ideal of a unified ummah. Pressed further, however, Anjum admitted cautiously, “Some ‘ulama have added a few things to the religion that were not there in the Prophet’s time. This is not good.” This was, of course, a clear reference to the Barelvi scholars and pirs.

“So you are a Deobandi, then?” I asked.

“Yes,” he answered quietly, seemingly uncomfortable affirming that such a division
existed within the *ummat* at all. Most Kashmiri Muslims lean Deobandi, he informed me. Thus Anjum’s inclination was one of toleration, despite his feelings—even strong feelings—against the alleged “accretions” espoused by the Barelvis of the subcontinent. His initial answer to the question of Deobandi-Barelvi animosity had been conciliatory. “I would pray behind a Deobandi or a Barelvi,” he had assured me.55

On a visit to Junagadh in Gujarat, hundreds of miles away from Anjum in Lahore, two Muslim men in their twenties who had previously approached the author and initiated a conversation admitted that they did not belong to the same sect. “I am Deobandi, he is Barelvi,” one of them said, motioning to the other. “But we are both Muslims.” And best friends, at that.

Anjum’s attitude, like that of the Gujarati pair, seems generally representative, in the author’s experience, of the vast majority of Indian Sunnis vis-à-vis their “Others”—whether that Other carries a Deobandi or Barelvi distinction. Perhaps it has been so since the schism first materialized in the late nineteenth century.

* From the days of Islam’s first generation, divisions have plagued the faith—schisms that were serious enough to bring about the bloody murder of caliphs and the fragmenting of nations. In this sense, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide is nothing new. The differences between the great schism of today and the ones of ages past are in large degree tied up in the development, from the late nineteenth century, of the modern “total state” and its underpinning political philosophy: statism. Among Western states, at least, this development was occurring rapidly from the first few decades of the British Raj period (i.e. post-1857), and the nationalist and/or separatist movements that grew up in India were nurtured by these Western ideas of political organization and
philosophy. Both Nehru’s INC and Jinnah’s AIML operated like formal British activist organizations, and each sought to establish strong, “modern” states on the subcontinent—the former advocating for a socialist system, the latter a republican one. The JUH (born of a tradition that had already assumed the British educational model) adopted these same forms, as did (to a lesser extent) the AISC. With the establishment of Pakistan, both groups worked within the new, “modern” system fashioned after the western model, first as “influencer” parties and later as full-fledged political parties. Despite constitutions ostensibly meant to curb the activities of central and provincial regimes (and despite Jinnah’s original dream of a truly federal system), the scope of the (central) government (following the example of Western states) was assumed to be virtually unbounded, and as such presidents and ministers and elected representatives (and dictators) were free to craft legislation of broad scope, creating departments and bureaucracies and agencies and offices touching upon almost all aspects of life. The rulings of government were, of course, enforced by violence or the threat of violence. At the same time, the government collected vast sums in taxes (of a wide variety), borrowed more and more money to fund its activities (and expansion), and printed (from the early 1970s, completely fiat) money when needed, increasing its scope (and ability to, among other things, wage war) even more—and attracting thousands of partisans, lobbyists, and activists.

This all-encompassing patronistic kind of system (i.e. the total state) engendered competition between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools for money and power on a scale never seen before on the subcontinent. True, religious scholars and pirs had been granted salaries or land in the past by sultans and princes, but this had been a patron relationship between a ruler and various individuals (indeed, a mere handful, relatively
speaking). But the modern, near-total state essentially transformed the Deobandi and Barelvi schools into enormous, religio-political lobby groups, each vying for a piece of the colossal government “pie”—and the guns and patronage that such benefaction brought with it; this was no association between a patron and a scholar but rather one of massive government and massive interest group. (Looming at the edge of possibility, too, was the notion of one or the other school actually taking over the reigns of the state as direct controllers.) This contest over the “pie” combined with both direct government manipulation of religious parties for militant ends (as in Kashmir and Bangladesh) and prolonged, brutal persecution of religious parties (as during the Z. A. Bhutto years) to initiate a militarization of said groups that would culminate from the 1980s onward. Thus, with the entrance of both sides into the “modern” (i.e. total) political structure of the Pakistani state (and the contests for power and money inherent therein), a phenomenon that had once been simply a doctrinal division between religious schools had transformed into a fierce political rivalry between powerful religious parties. Indeed, as the struggle for political power became the central focus of the ‘alßma parties as seemingly the only means of implementing an Islamic order, their leaders came to regard their respective co-religionists “as landlords do their constituencies, as political jagirs [fiefdoms],” in turn resulting in an emphasis by said leaders on the differences between the various Sunni schools.56

At the same time, the concept of an “Islamic state” was shoved roughshod into the modern, total-state structure, transforming the shari‘at system into one of all-encompassing coercion and compulsion. To the ‘alßma (if not for the pîrs, for whom the issue is far more complex), the totalitarian doctrine that lies at the heart of “modern” state ideology (specifically, to quote Mises, “that the rulers are wiser and loftier than
their subjects and that they therefore know better what benefits those ruled than they themselves”) seemed nicely suited to their own political philosophy. As an all-encompassing social, political, and religious system, Islam (according to this ‘alόma-led view) must be entrenched into the very bedrock of the state system, its injunctions given the power of state legislation, and its enforcement backed up by the guns of government. Past systems had allowed for such integration before, but the decentralized nature of the old state, the traditional restrictions on its domain, and the individual-to-individual character of ‘alόma-ruler patronage largely mitigated its effects.

The emergence of the modern “total state” presented a prize over which the ‘alόma parties and their partisans would fight more intensely than before.

But the influence of the total state on the transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry didn’t end with the organization of the JUH or the JUI or the AISC, or with the birth and development of Pakistan. Perhaps the most “total” total state yet seen in human history, that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, invaded and occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s, while other near-total states intervened, too—including the Iranian, Indian, Saudi, American, and Pakistani governments, each projecting power through proxy fighters and funding their efforts via mostly fiat printed or borrowed cash (made especially possible after Nixon’s 1971 closure of the gold window, though in progress for years). The effect of these foreign interventions on the rivalry in question was immeasurable. The interventions armed and trained thousands of mujahydin, thus militarizing a segment of the Deobandis. They funded the mushrooming of (mostly Deobandi) Ṽdarys, stimulating later, reactionary growth among Barelvis in this same sphere. They allowed for the centrally planned influx of thousands of Wahhabi preachers from the Gulf. They stimulated the illegal drug trade. They stimulated the
illegal gun trade. They inadvertently led to the birth of Barelvi reactionary outfits like the Sunni Tehrik, and even of the MQM. They buoyed up Pakistani dictators. They patronized one school at the expense of the other. Their interventions in other parts of the Muslim world galvanized members of one school or the other (or both). They led directly to the arrival of foreigners—Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, others—trained in the use of such weapons as the improvised explosive device and the suicide bomb jacket (hitherto unheard of in Pakistan). In short they armed, funded, and provoked Deobandis and Barelvis alike over the course of several decades.

Perhaps it is no wonder that the above-described, intervention-led transformation came to characterize the Deobandis’ and Barelvis’ long-standing rivalry—already politicized by the Pakistani state—with one another. Thus within the context of the rise of total statism, to quote Eric Foner (writing about a different “tragic irony of history”), “each side fought to defend a distinct vision of the good society, but each vision was destroyed by the very struggle to preserve it.”

57
Glossary

 AHL-e-Sunnat: denoting the “people [who follow] the sayings and deeds of Muhammad”

 AMIR: title of a military head or political leader, whose secular leadership was to be augmented by the spiritual guidance of an imam; often Romanized as “Amir” or “Emir”

 AMIR UL-MUMAYININ: “Commander of the Faithful,” a title bestowed both upon proto-Deobandi jihadi Sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and Deobandi-trained Taliban chief mullah Muhammad Omar

 ‘ALMA: pl.; see ‘ALYM

 ‘ALLAMAH: one who is learned/educated

 ‘ALYM (plural: ‘ALMA): a religious scholar

 BI’AT: allegiance or fealty; a covenant between Sufi shaykh and disciple

 BUST PIRAST: one who worships idols (BUT = “Buddha”)

 BUST SHYKHAN: one who destroys idols

 BYD’AT: (forbidden) religious innovation

 BYNNUT: a South Asian martial art form

 DORGAH: the burial site and shrine of a Sufi pir

 DORS-E-NYZAMI: the traditional curriculum featured in most South Asian Islamic seminaries, developed after the decline of Muslim power by the scholars of Farangi Mahall

 DAR UL‘ALIM: a “house of learning,” or a religious university, considered superior to a madrasah
*dar ul-harb*: “house of war,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are not free to practice their religion

*dar ul-yifta*: department within a seminary that issues juridical rulings, or *fotawa*

*dar ul-yslam*: “house of Islam,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are free to practice their religion

*fotir*: a holy man

*fotawa*: pl.; see *fotwa*

*fotwa* (plural: *fotawa*): a juridical ruling, typically composed by a *mufti*

*fyqh*: Islamic law tradition (not unlike the western term “case law”)

*gwrdwara*: a Sikh temple and place of worship

*haj*: the journey to Mecca mandated to all Muslims

*haji*: one who has completed the *haj*

*hajrat*: a title of respect for one who is especially learned and pious

*hadis*: a tradition of the Prophet related by someone who witnessed it firsthand; each *hadis* possesses a chain of authority indicating its trustworthiness or lack thereof

*haram*: denoting something that is forbidden by Islamic law

*hafiz*: one who has memorized the Qur’an in its entirety

*hyjr*: migration, denoting a migration from a “house of war” to a “house of Islam,” as the first Muslims did in leaving Mecca for Yathrib (Medina)

*hysba*: “verification,” denoting the concept of regulating an Islamic order, including the moral behavior of its members

*jamaiat*: organization or party
jām‘āt ‘alūmah-‘hynd: “Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars,” a Deobandi-dominated party that mostly supported the Indian National Congress and “composite nationalism”

jām‘āt ul-‘ansar: “Organization of Helpers,” organized by Mahmud Hasan and run by Obaidullah Sindhi as a network of Deobandi students and alumni who might be called upon to politically or otherwise support the Deobandi leadership in times of need

jīyād: struggle, or “holy war,” either denoting an internal struggle for personal purity or an external struggle against a physical enemy

jīzāh: a tax on non-Muslims, ostensibly to pay their exemption from military service

kālumāḥ: the basic Muslims statement of faith (“There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet”)

kafyr (plural: kuffār): an unbeliever

kufār: unbelief

kuffār: pl.; see kafyr

mādarys: pl.; see mādrāsā

mādrāsā (plural: mādarys): a religious seminary, larger than a simple māktāb but a step below a full-fledged dar ul‘alām

māGryb: denoting the fourth of five daily prayers, undertaken just after sunset

mājlis-e-shārīa: an advisory council; in Pakistan: Parliament

māktāb: an elementary-level religious seminary or school

mānqūlāt: denoting the traditional Islamic disciplines, including commentaries (tāfsīr) on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (ḥadīs), and jurisprudence (fiqh)
mawlawat: denoting the rational disciplines, including instruction in grammar, logic, philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy

maslahā ymkan-e-kożb: the possibility that God can tell a lie

mashayx: pl.; see shīx

molsāk: educational track

mawsīyed: mosque

mufti: one who is trained in fiqh and fatawa-writing

muhajyr: an immigrant; especially applied after 1947 AD to Urdu-speaking immigrants from north-central India who settled in and around Karachi after Partition

muhajyrwān: “emigrants,” originally denoting those who emigrated from Mecca to Medina with Muhammad, but today often applied to those who emigrated to Pakistan (and particularly Karachi) from (mostly north-central) India during and after Partition.

mujaddīyed: a title conferred on one who is considered the “renewer” of the faith for a given Hijri century

murid: the disciple of a shīx

murshyed: a Sufi guide or teacher

musawat-e-muḥammād: “equality of Muhammad,” a term used by the PPP in place of the word “socialism”

muttāhydāh qawmīt: “composite [or “united”] nationalism,” the idea that South Asian Muslims could be (indeed, were) both “Indian” and “Muslim” at the same time

muwlyd: a term denoting the birthday of the Prophet
mysōl: in the context of this work, one of several sovereign states within the Sikh Confederacy (early to late eighteenth century AD/early twelfth to early thirteenth century AH).

n’at: poetic composition praising the Prophet Muhammad

nādwāt: denoting a group of Muslim scholars who established a religious school in Lucknow and who considered themselves heirs to the Shah Waliullahi tradition

nwr-e-muhammadī: the concept of Muhammad as pure light, or a “being with his own natural light”

ny zam-e-mustafa: “system of the Prophet,” denoting an Islamic socio-political order according to the revelations, teachings, and personal example of Muhammad

ptGambār: “messenger,” denoting the Prophet as God’s Messenger

purdāh: the covering of women before the eyes of men

qerShōh: a “Muslim city,” typically a small town connected by patronage or familial ties (at least at some point) to the royal court at Delhi

qayd-i-ʾaẓām: “Great Leader,” a title reserved for Pakistani founder Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah

qari (plural: qurra): a reciter of the Qur’an

qa zi: a judge

qazi-e-mōmālyk: Chief Judge

qiamat: the resurrection (of the dead). CHECK

qurra: pl.; see qari

rashydin (or rashydwan): denoting the first four (or “rightly-guided”) caliphs after Muhammad; often Romanized as “Rashidun”

Sadr ul-Sudōr: a title for the head of the Department of Religion
ṣatyagraha: “soul-force,”
ṣayyid: a descendent of the Prophet
ṣḥāhid: a martyr
ṣḥāri‘at: Islamic law
ṣḥāhanshah: “king of kings”
ṣḥīx (plural: māshāy̱xa): a Sufi saint, or pir; can also denote, simply, “great man”
ṣhuddhiṣṭan: an ancient rite that came to symbolize the early 1900s AD Arya Samajist effort to “reconvert” Muslims and others back to Hinduism and to prevent the conversion of Hindus to either Islam or Christianity
ṣḥūra: a council
ṣunnaṭ: the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad
ṣvaraj: freedom or independence
ṣvarat: a chapter in the Qur’an, often Romanized as “Surah”
ṣylsyla: chain of succession or authority that links back to the Prophet Muhammad
ṭablīG: missionary work or proselytization
ṭafsīr: commentary on the Qur’an
ṭajdid: renewal (of faith)
ṭoppa: a traditional form of song originally born in the Punjab but popular (particularly in the 1800s and early 1900s AD) across north and central India, especially in Bengal
ṭalyban: students, often referring specifically to students of religious seminaries; applied later to the religious students and scholars who took over much of Afghanistan in the early 1990s AD and Romanized as “Taliban”
tybb: traditional (“Greek” or “Yunani”) medicine

tawbah: repentance

ummat: the worldwide Muslim community of the faithful

‘urs: death anniversary of a Sufi saint or pir

waqf: a shari’at-mandated religious endowment, typically in the form of money, land, or infrastructure

welayat: spiritual (and sometimes temporal) authority of a pir over a specific geographical area

wilāyat: “deputy,” often Romanized as “caliph”

waqf: a shari’at-mandated religious endowment, typically in the form of money, land, or infrastructure

welayat: spiritual (and sometimes temporal) authority of a pir over a specific geographical area

wilāyat: “deputy,” often Romanized as “caliph”

xanqah: a pir- or shine-center

xuda-e-xydmātgar: Deobandi-leaning quasi-spiritual political movement founded by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan among the Pathans of India’s northwestern frontier that generally supported the Indian National Congress; often referred to by the acronym “KK”

xawajah: an honorific title meaning “Lord” or “Master”

xutloh gah: a pulpit from which religious sermons are preached

xalafat: “deputyship,” often Romanized as “caliphate”

ylm-e-Gaib: “knowledge of the unseen”

ymkan-e-nażir: “the possibility of an equal”

zakat: a tax mandated by Islamic law

-zamindar: a landowner or landlord
zykr: typically, a ritual form of “remembrance” of God, often performed via the
recitation of the names of God

Żymi: non-Muslims living within the geographical boundaries of an Islamic state; often
Romanized as “dhimmi”

zyndabad: “long live,” commonly used in combination with “Islam” or “Pakistan,” in the
sense of “Long live Islam!” or “Long live Pakistan!”
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Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob. *tərɪx dər ul’aləm diobənd, jyld əvʋəl* (Deoband: ydArəh-e yhatymAm dArul ulu’im dioband, 1980)

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Taqi Usmani, Muhammad. *əkəbər diobənd kia the?* (Deoband: Zamzam, 1995)


6. **WEBSITES**


Allama Azmi: [http://allamaazmi.com](http://allamaazmi.com) (Barelvi)


Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam: [http://atipak.org](http://atipak.org) (Barelvi)

Archaeology Online: [http://archaeologyonline.net](http://archaeologyonline.net)

Banglapedia: [http://banglapedia.org](http://banglapedia.org)
Basharath Siddiqui:  http://basharathsiddiqui.webnode.in  (Barelvi)

Baacha Khan Trust:  http://baachakhantrust.org

Combating Terrorism Center:  http://ctc.usma.edu

Columbia University’s Dr. Frances Pritchett:

http://columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00fwp/

Counter Currents:  http://countercurrents.org

Darul Ifta:  http://darulifta-deoband.org  (Deobandi)

Darul Uloom Deoband:  http://darululoom-deoband.com  (Deobandi)

Darul Uloom Deoband Waqf:  http://darululoomwaqf.com  (Deobandi)

Dawat-e-Islami:  http://dawateislami.net  (Barelvi)

Deoband.org:  http://deoband.org  (Deobandi)

Hazrat.org:  http://hazrat.org  (Barelvi)

Inter-Islam:  http://inter-islam.org  (Deobandi)

International Islamic Web:  http://alahazrat.net  (Barelvi)

Islamic Academy:  http://islamicacademy.org  (Barelvi)

Islamic Encyclopedia:  http://nooremadinah.net

Islamopedia:  http://islamopediaonline.org

Jame Ashraf (Dargah Kichhoucha Sharif):  http://ashrafjahangir.com  (Barelvi)

Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind Mysore:  http://jamiatulamaihindmysore.com  (Deobandi)

Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism:  http://janes.com

Keesing’s Record of World Events:  http://keesings.com

Khanqah Qadiriya Razviya:  http://sunmirazvi.net  (Barelvi)

Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement:  http://muslim.org  (Ahmadi)

Muttahida Qaumi Movement: http://mqm.org

Nadeem F. Paracha Work(s) Archive: http://nadeemfparacha.wordpress.com

Pakistan People’s Party: http://ppp.org.pk

Pakistan Post Office: http://pakpost.gov.pk

Shiite News: http://shiitenews.com (Shi’a)

South Asia Terrorism Portal: http://satp.org

Sunni Tehrik: http://sunnitehreek.net (Barelvi)

Thanawi Masjid: http://thanvimasjid.com

The Persecution: http://thepersecution.org (Ahmadi)

University of Edinburgh Centre for South Asian Studies: http://csas.ed.ac.uk/

University of the Punjab: http://pu.edu.pk

7. NEWSPAPERS (PRINT AND ONLINE)

Advocate (Australia)

Al Jazeera (Qatar)

Apna Karachi (Pakistan)

Bombay Sentinel (India)

BBC News (UK)

Bdnews24.com (Pakistan)

Cairns Post (Australia)

Daily Times (Pakistan)

Dawn (Pakistan)

Herald (Pakistan)
New York Times (USA)

Newsline (Pakistan)

Northern Times (Australia)

Oxford Analytical Daily Brief Service (UK)

Pakistan Herald (Pakistan)

Pakistan Times (Pakistan)

Reuters (USA)

Sri Lanka Guardian (Sri Lanka)

The Advertiser (Australia)

The Christian Science Monitor (USA)

The Express Tribune (Pakistan)

The Guardian (UK)

The Hindu (India)

The Indian Express (India)

The International Herald Tribune (USA)

The Mail (Australia)

The Mercury (Australia)

The Milli Gazette (India)

The New York Times (USA)

The News (Pakistan)

The Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)

The Times (UK)

The West Australian (Australia)

Times of India (India)
Western Argus (Australia)

Winnipeg Free Press (Canada)
Notes


<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/02/leicester-minority-immigration-diversity-faith?INTCMP=SRCH>


<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/world/asia/16intel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

10 One could argue that the beginnings of political Islam should be traced to the very first moment of Muhammad’s first vision, for with this manifestation there was, suddenly, on the Arabian Peninsula an indigenous monotheistic religion that was not Christianity (neither the Ethiopian, Byzantine, nor Nestorian versions), nor the Zoroastrianism of Persia, nor Judaism. By adopting any of these other monotheistic creeds, the Meccans would have placed in jeopardy their precarious position as a merchant hub neutrally connecting the rival Byzantine (mostly Christian) and Persian (mostly Zoroastrian) empires. Thus Islam, in a sense, was “political” (or at least, in the words of Watt, possessed “external political relevance”) from the outset. Another argument is that Muhammad’s very approach—that is, his being a messenger and prophet of God—politically transcended the tribal system in order to deal with the issues of the day.


Elphinstone, Mountstuart. *The History of India* (London: John Murray, 1843), p. 307. Several paragraphs after this quote, the old soldier adds, “Such was the nation that gave birth to the false prophet, whose doctrines have so long and so powerfully influenced a vast portion of the human race.”

Watt, p. 51.

Ibid, p. 53.

Ibid, p. 53.


Interestingly, the question of why the State is needed at all to make religion a day-to-
day system of human action is rarely, if ever, addressed at length.

Robinson, Francis. “Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam and the Islamic

Other historians paint a far different picture of the young Muslim conqueror of Sindh.
According to this alternate version, his attack was unjustified, as the Brahmin
king held no jurisdiction over the town wherein the Arab ships had been seized.
Upon conquering his first Sindhi city, he attempted to circumcise all the
Brahmin males; when they rejected such tactics of “conversion,” he executed all
Brahmins over the age of seventeen and reduced the rest, plus all Brahmin
women and children, to slavery. His later exploits saw him slaughter all
fighting men in each conquered city, followed by the enslavement, once again, of
their families, the destruction of temples, and the confiscation of Brahmin lands.
The latter were restored only when the subjugated towns had agreed to pay regular tribute to their new masters. See Elphinstone, pp. 317-318.

30 If Afghanistan is counted as a peripheral region of a broadly defined “South Asia,” then this statement is not entirely correct; parts of Afghanistan had been conquered and converted to the banner of Islam much earlier than the Ghaznavid invasions.


33 Qureshi, p. 4.

34 Baloch, p. 13.

35 Qureshi, p. 4.


40 Robinson, p. 49.
Ahmad, Manzooruddin, pp. 327-328.


Robinson, p. 49.

Sanyal, pp. 635–636.


Algar, p. 126.


Robinson, pp. 47–49.


Ahmad, Aziz, p. 2.

Qureshi, p. 5.


60 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 4.

61 Ibid, pp. 4–5.

62 Ibid. p. 4. Ahmad provides several examples of battles lost by the ‘alόma against perceived Sufi foes, including Najm al-din Sughra’s attempt to discredit popular mystics Qutb al-din Bakhtiyar Kaki and Jalal al-din Tabrizi during the reign of Iletmish; Iletmish seems to have sided with the Sufis over the ‘alόma as a rule.

63 Hassanali, p. 31.


65 Hassanali, p. 33.
66 Gohar, p. 13. (Urdu)


68 Hassanali, p. 34.

69 Haroon, pp. 34–35.

70 Much of the information in this paragraph comes from Digby, pp. 71–81.

71 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 4.


73 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xiii.

74 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 2.

75 Ahmad, Manzooruddin, p. 328.

76 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 6.

77 Ibid, p. 6.

78 Ahmad, Manzooruddin, p. 330.


80 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 6.


82 Gohar, pp. 88–89. (Urdu)

83 Von Garbe.
84 Algar, p. 143.


87 Ahmad, Aziz, pp. 8-9.


89 Khan, Hussain, p. 48.

90 Ibid, pp. 48-49.

91 Ibid, pp. 50-51.

92 Ibid, p. 44.

93 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 9.


95 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 9.

97 Weismann, p. 116.

98 Ahmed, Akbar, p. 4.


101 Haroon, p. 32.


103 This poet was Muhammad Rafi Sauda, in his poem wirani-e-shahjahanabad. The English translation of the line quoted in this work is from Kanda, K. C. Masterpieces of Patriotic Urdu Poetry (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 2005), pp. 16–21.


106 Qasmi, pp. 3–4.


108 Ahmad, Aziz, p. 10.

109 Ahmad, Manzooruddin, p. 331.
110 Qasmi, p. 3.


113 Naqshbandi, pp. 8-9. (Urdu)

114 Metcalf, pp. 16-86.


116 Faruqi, p. 19, including footnote 1.

117 Metcalf, p. 99.

118 Naqshbandi claims that ʿṣṣyyid Ahmad had one thousand mujahydn and ten thousand formal disciples. See Naqshbandi, pp. 10-11. (Urdu)

119 Ibid, pp. 10-11. (Urdu)

120 Metcalf, pp. 75-80.

121 These included Rafiuddin (d. 1890 AD), who held top posts within the dar ul'alm's administration for almost two decades. His father and uncles were not only present on the frontier during ʿṣṣyyid Ahmad's campaigns, but, in the case of three of his uncles, actually lost their lives in the fighting at Balakot. See Metcalf, p. 92.

122 Haroon, pp. 36-40.


Haroon, pp. 33-35.


From his *The Discovery of India* (1951), as quoted in Faruqi, pp. 2-3.

Faruqi, pp. 15-16.

From the poem *shoḥor ashwb*. The English translation of the line quoted in this work is from Kanda, pp. 24-29.

Qasmi, p. 5.


Faruqi, p. 2.
140 Naqshbandi, pp. 8-9. (Urdu)

141 For both the second and third argument, see Metcalf, pp. 50-52.

142 Qasmi, p. 5.

143 Faruqi, pp. 17-18.

144 Qadiri, Badr al-Din Ahmad. sāvanyh a’alihażrōt (Siddarth Nagar [UP]: Maktaba Qadiria, post-2004), p. 69 (Urdu)

145 Qasmi, p. 5.

146 Khan, pp. 7-8.

147 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xv.

148 Sanyal, Ahmad Riza, pp. 55-59.


151 Bihari, Zafaruddin. hiat-e a’alihażrōt, jyld awzal (Karachi: Maktaba Rizvia, 1938), p. 5. (Urdu)


153 Sanyal, Ahmad Riza Khan, p. 52.


<http://www.hazrat.org/ancestory.htm>

155 Naqshbandi, pp. 13-14. (Urdu)

157 Qasmi, p. 6.


159 Allen, p. 189.


161 Allen, p. 191.


163 Allen, p. 190.

164 Stokes, p. 624.

165 Dindolvi, p. 231. (Urdu)

166 Stokes, p. 615.

167 Dindolvi, p. 231. (Urdu)

168 This account above more or less follows the narrative of Allen in *God’s Terrorists*, which itself takes for granted many of the Deobandi historical claims about Rashid Ahmad’s, Muhammad Qasim’s, and Imdadullah’s involvement in the 1857 uprising against the British.

169 Dindolvi, p. 231. (Urdu)

170 Metcalf, p. 82.

171 Ibid, p. 83.

172 Robertson, H. D. *District Duties During the Revolt in the North-West Provinces of India* (1859), pp. 133-134.
Chapter 2

1 Mian, Sayyid Muhammad. әsiran-e-malTa (Deoband: Kitabkhana Naimia, 2002), p. 108. (Urdu)

2 Rawlinson, pp. 279-280.


7 Dindrolvi, p. 231. (Urdu)

8 Metcalf, p. 92.


12 Ibid, p. 33. (Urdu)

14 Faruqi, p. 22, footnote 1.

15 Adarvi, pp. 34-35. (Urdu)

16 Ibid, p. 37. (Urdu)


18 Adarvi, pp. 37-38. (Urdu)

19 Metcalf, p. 98.


21 Metcalf, p. 43.

22 These included the still-functioning Mazahirul-Uloom in Saharanpur and the appropriately named Qasimul Uloom, likewise still in operation, in Moradabad. See Faruqi, pp. 23-24.

23 Faruqi, p. 19, including footnote 1.

24 Ahmad, Manzooruddin, p. 331.

25 Faruqi, p. 23.

26 Ibid, pp. 36-37.


28 Rizvi, p. 9. (Urdu)

29 Ibid, pp. 13-14 (Urdu)
Some, including Rashid Ahmad, wanted to go even further, completely eliminating much of the *maqullat* material in the curriculum (particularly the philosophy inherited from the classical Greek period). Even Muhammad Qasim had such leanings. In the end the curriculum wasn’t tampered with much outside of the strong emphasis on *hadis*.

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30 Metcalf, pp. 100-101. Some, including Rashid Ahmad, wanted to go even further, completely eliminating much of the *maqullat* material in the curriculum (particularly the philosophy inherited from the classical Greek period). Even Muhammad Qasim had such leanings. In the end the curriculum wasn’t tampered with much outside of the strong emphasis on *hadis*.

31 Allen, p. 211.


37 Ibid, p. 28.

38 Ibid, p. 198.

39 Dindrolvi, p. 231. (Urdu)

40 From Muhammad Mian’s *asyrane-* *malTa*, as quoted in Dindrolvi, p. 232. (Urdu)

41 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xiii.


44 Goyal, pp. 27-28.
Generally speaking, the term *madrasah* might be considered the equivalent of “school,” while *dar ul’alwām* is more akin to “university”—i.e. a step above a *madrasah*.


Rizvi, Sayyid, pp. 17-18. (Urdu)


Mahmud Hasan, the *dar ul’alwām’s* first student and eventually its top administrator, once donated books to Muhammad Yasin, the father of renowned *mufti* Muhammad Shafi, whose poverty was made evident when the boy began skipping school in order to earn some extra cash. The books still retain a place in the Muhammad Shafi family library, Mahmud Hassan’s and Mamluk ‘Ali’s names scrawled on the inside cover (thus revealing that Mahmud Hasan had given up the very copies he had himself used as a student). See Usmani, Muhammad Rafi. *hiat-e-mufti-e-’azām* (Karachi: Ahmad Printing Press, 2005) (Urdu). Another sources claims that Mahmud Hasan gave up as much as a third of his already meager salary each year to the school’s general fund. “*shīx ul-hynd ynam ul-mujahādin mōhmwād hāsān.*” Official Website, Al-Jamia Al-Islamia Darul Uloom Deoband waqf. Last accessed 10 November 2012. <http://darululoomwaqf.com/shaikhul-hind.php>


Faruqi, pp. 41-42.

Such familial relationships within the institutional structure would later give way, Metcalf informs us, to the genealogical and geographical variety “implicit in the organization of the school.”


To this formulation Metcalf adds the leadership of a third generation [see also Chapter 3]: Anwar Shah Kashmiri, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, and Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad. Metcalf, Islamic Revival, p. 108.

“shix ul-hynd ynam ul-mujahdin mohmed haseen.”

Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob. tarix dar ul’akwn diobnd, jyl ṣawwl (Deoband: ydArah-e yhatymAm dArul ulu’m dioband, 1980), p. 249. (Urdu)


Metcalf, Islamic Revival, p. 4.

Ahmad, Badr ul-Din. *sawanyh a’ala hażrat ymam ahmad rażża* (Bareilly: Qadiri Kitab Ghar, 1984), pp. 85-86. (Urdu)


<http://sunnirazvi.net/qadiri/barkatiyya.htm>

Sanyal, Usha. *Ahmad Riza*, p. 65. Ahmad Riza’s ascendency did not come without some opposition from other power centers whose scholars had long enjoyed a sort of preeminence. Some of the ‘alama of Badayun, for example, for a time seemed bent on asserting their own power as leaders; in 1916 AD, a libel case was even been leveled from this quarter against the divine out of Bareilly. One of their number, too, would help found the Deobandi-heavy JUH. Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, p. 297.

Ibid, pp. 111-112.


Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, p. 82.


Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, pp. 231-239.


76 Robinson, The ‘Ulama of Farangi Mahal, p. 37.

77 These works include: ul-qiyadat ul-murâs’ah fi nahr yl-ajwâb ul-arb’ah (1895 AD), an attempt to refute four of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s fâtawa; әl-jâhul ul-shanwi әli kalîjat ul-Thanawi (publication date unclear), an effort to discredit Ashraf ‘Ali by portraying him as disrespectful to the Prophet vis-à-vis the kalimah; and әjhas-e-әxrirah (1910 AD), a rebuttal of Deobandism in general and Ashraf ‘Ali in particular.

78 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, pp. 233-237, including footnotes 18-20.


80 Naeemi, Ahmad Yar Khan. ja ul-haq (Delhi: Khwaja Book Depot, 2012), p. 11. (Urdu)

81 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, p. 233.

82 Dindrolvi, p. 233. (Urdu)

83 Naqshbandi, p. 5. (Urdu)

84 Ibid, p. 5. (Urdu)

85 Dindrolvi, pp. 233-234. (Urdu)


87 Ibid, p. 7.

88 Ghaman, Ilyas. әfaqah-e-әşrilwîst әp o hynd ka әhqiqi javazah (Mumbra: Maktaba Shaikhul Islam, 2012), pp. 34-38. (Urdu)
89 Ibid, pp. 40–41. (Urdu)

90 Metcalf, Islamic Revival, p. 13.

91 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, p. 244.

92 Naeemi, p. 10. (Urdu)

93 Rizvi, tarix dar ul’atwm diobnd, lýdhydrational, pp. 315-316. (Urdu)

94 Ibid, pp. 316-317. (Urdu)

95 See Mian, sayyid Ahmad. ṭhirk-e-rishmi-e-rumal (Deoband: Maktaba Javed, 2002)

96 Sanyal, Ahmad Rıza, pp. 58–60.

97 Metcalf, Islamic Revival, p. 150. Metcalf’s source is a collection of ṭotawa written by Rashid Ahmad, ṭotawa-e-rashidiyyah I.

98 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, p. 5.

99 Ibid, pp. 159-161.


102 These include: hadi ul-hiran fi nāfī ul-fī ‘an sayyid әl-akwān (1882 AD), nāfī ul-fī ‘an әn ystanbe әwrah kәl shәı (1879 AD), and qәmәr ul-tәmәm fi nәfә ul-zәәl ‘an sayyid әl-anәm (1879 AD), each dealing with the issue of Muhammad’s shadow,
or lack thereof; and Salat ul-Safā fi ṣawr yl-maṣṣafā (1911 AD), on the “luminosity” of the Prophet.


106 Naeemi, pp. 411-414. (Urdu)

107 Ahmad Riza Khan’s books on this topic include ā’alam āla ‘alam ban hyndustan dar ul-yaslām (1907 AD) and āfSah ul-bian fi hukūm mɔzɔr’a hyndustan (1900 AD).


111 Singh Sarila, p. 61.


114 Rai, p. 176.


117 Faruqi, pp. 43-45.

118 Rai, p. 224.


120 Rai, p. 2.


122 Niazi, Kausar. *Imam Ahmad Raza: A Versatile Personality* (Alahazrat Network, 1991), p. 16. That Iqbal and Jinnah adopted the two-nation theory from Ahmad Riza has been put forward by some Barelvis in recent times. This may have been so, but doesn’t appear to have been either acknowledged or recognized during the heydey of independence Barelvi politics. For example, Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, long-time head of the predominantly Barelvi All-India Sunni Conference, would, in 1946 AD, describe the genesis of the two-nation theory thus: “Sir sayyid Ahmad Khan put forward the two-nation theory and ‘alama Iqbal impressed the people with his poetry. Now qayd-e-‘azɔm [Jinnah] took upon himself the duty of materializing this two-nation theory, demanding a separate homeland for the
Muslims.” According to this ideological pedigree, the two-nation theory sprung from the mind of Sir Sayyid, and from thence to Iqbal, and finally to Jinnah. See “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.” Ameer-e-Millat (official website of the ‘Alipur Sayyidan Sharif dargah). Last accessed 8 January 2013.

<http://ameer-e-millat.com/svcs.htm>


124 Incidentally, according to Elst, it was the invading Muslims who first applied the term “Hindu” to the non-Muslim inhabitants of Hindustan, hundreds of years before the British essentially codified the practice. See Elst, Koenraad. Who is a Hindu: Hindu Revivalist Views on Animism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and other Offshoots of Hinduism (New Delhi: Voice of India, 2001). This is an “updated and adapted” version of Koenraad’s Ph.D. dissertation.

125 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, p. 269.

126 Naeemi, p. 8. (Urdu)

127 Niazi, p. 16.

128 Sanyal, Ahmad Riza, pp. xi-xii.


133 Sanyal, *Devotional*, p. 298.

134 Mian, pp. 52-53. (Urdu)


136 Sanyal, *Ahmad Riza*, p. 79.


138 Khan, Hamid, p. 10.

139 Faruqi, p. 51.

140 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xv.

141 “shix ul-hynd ymam ul-mujahdin mohmd hassan.”

142 Faruqi, pp. 46-47.

143 Adarvi, pp. 33-37. (Urdu)


145 Haroon, pp. 41-43, 50.

146 Ibid, p. 49.

147 Ibid, pp. 52-54.

Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, pp. 73-74.

Ibid, pp. 75-82.


Rizvi, *tarix dar ul’alwm diobnd, jyld øriol*, pp. 317-318. (Urdu)

“*shix ul-hynd ymam ul-mujuhødin mohnwd hswn.*”

Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar. *ap beti* (Jay Parkash Narain 1969), p. 35. (Urdu)


Qureshi, M. Naeem, p. 79.

According to the Rowlatt Committee, it was Sindhi who acted as the main influencer of Mahmud Hasan, not vice-versa. But Deobandi sources clearly mark Mahmud Hasan as the mastermind of the great pan-Islamic plan to rid the subcontinent of the British, and Sindhi as his loyal associate.

Though little is known of the *jam’aiët ul-ønsar*, reports of several of its conferences, written by `Ubaidullah Sindhi, are preserved within the *dar ul’alwm’s* central library in Deoband (together with Sindhi’s other works). The group appears to have been an organization of *dar ul’alwm* Deoband graduates and teachers who were aware of Mahmud Hasan’s religio-political program. The organization was likely meant to facilitate the political mobilization of the Deobandi “network,”
should events make such a mobilization necessary in the eyes of the movement’s leadership.


161 Faruqi, p. 60.

162 “shix ul-hynd ymm ul-mujahdin mohmd hasn.”

163 See for example Faruqi, p. 59. What seems to have actually happened, however, is that Mahmud Hasan left for his Hijaz mission, unknowingly just ahead of an arrest warrant. Indeed, if not for a man on the inside, who delayed the order reaching Bombay to prevent the great ‘alym’s ship from leaving, Mahmud Hasan would have likely been behind bars before his journey even began. He likewise met with luck on disembarkation, when he was able to mix with the regular Muslim pilgrims and thus avoid arrest. See Mian, Sayyid Muhammad, p. 57. (Urdu)

164 “shix ul-hynd ymm ul-mujahdin mohmd hasn.”

165 “German Plots In India.”

166 Qureshi, M. Naeem, pp. 79-81.

167 Adarvi, p. 282. (Urdu)

168 Ibid, pp. 36-37. (Urdu)

169 “German Plots In India.”
Hardinge would later advocate the following position: “It is most important for us to be able to show to the Muhammadans of India that we have been doing what we can to put an end to the war with Italy which they resent very much and regard as the beginning of the end of Islam in Europe. They think also that we might have stopped it.” Heller, Joseph. *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914* (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1983), pp. 55-56.

Rai, p. 221.


Nehru, p. 76.


Rai, p. 103.

Ibid, p. 94.

Indeed, at the same conference in which the League president had expressed his Indianness, sentiments of “loyalty to the [British] Government and [for] what they have done for India” were likewise uttered—embodying a crucial difference between the Deobandis and the League (as well as the latter’s many Barelvi supporters), right to the end. For example, compare this position vis-à-vis the
British to, say, Mahmud Hasan’s unambiguous anti-British statements. See Rai, pp. 103.

180 Rai, p. 87.

181 Adarvi, pp. 282-283. (Urdu)


183 Faruqi, p. 66.

184 Ibid, p. 66.

185 Mian, *āsiran-e-malTa*, pp. 104–105. (Urdu)

186 Niazi, p. 17.

187 Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, p. 282, including footnote 49.

188 Ibid, p. 287.

189 Derwi, Jalal ul-Din. *tōhrik-e-pakystan min ʿaloma-e-kəram ka kyrdar* (Lahore: Maktaba Nabaviya, 2010), pp. 93–99. (Urdu) Another example of Barelvi assertions against the Deobandi leadership vis-à-vis Gandhi and “the Hindus”: that “Mahmud Hasan paid homage to Gandhi as his first and foremost leader.” See Derwi, p. 199.

190 Sanyal, *Ahmad Riza*, p. 78.


193 Derwi, pp. 99. (Urdu)
The continued importance of the cow slaughter ban to Hindus may be best demonstrated by its being strictly enforced in all but two Indian states. Winter, Robin. “Sacred Cow.” Archaeology Online. Last accessed 16 November 2012. <http://www.archaeologyonline.net/artifacts/sacred-cow.html>
spent twenty years composing *fatwa* (and teaching) at the Mazahir Uloom in Saharanpur before spending an additional fourteen in “the post of principal and *fatwa*-writing” at a seminary in Kanpur. To top it off, his first job at the *dar ul’alam* in Deoband was that of *mufti* in the university’s *fatwa*-writing department! Sayyid Muhammad Mian, in his *asiran malTa*, refers to Mahmud Hasan’s 1920/1339 ruling as a *fatwa*. A collection of Mahmud Hasan’s numerous *fatwa* can be found at the school, bound in twenty-five volumes under the title *fatwa māhmdā dih*. See “The Eminent Muftis of Darul Uloom.” Darul Ifta: Deoband. Last accessed 27 November 2012. <http://darulifta-deoband.org/>

210 Thursby, p. 82.


212 The previous paragraphs citing Ahmard Riza’s 1920/1338 *fatwa* regarding non-cooperation is based on the translation of the same in Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, pp. 294–295.

213 Translation from the original Arabic according to the Sahih International version of the Qur’an. This verse was cited by Mahmud Hasan in his 1920/1339 juridical ruling. Mian, *asiran-e-malTa*, p. 105. (Urdu)

214 Main, *asiran malTa*, pp. 105–106. (Urdu)

215 Ibid, p. 83. (Urdu)

216 All quotes from Mahmud Hasan’s ruling taken from Main, pp. 97–107. (Urdu)
Deobandi domination (indeed, out-and-out leadership and control) of the JUH wasn’t a reality at first. Indeed, the party’s founding members came from a variety of persuasions within the Muslim scholar community, and included such luminaries as Abul Kalam Azad of Congress fame and ‘Abd ul-Bari of Farangi Mahal.

Dindrolvi, pp. 256-258. (Urdu)

Chapter 3

1 Nehru, pp. 70-73.

2 Ibid, p. 73.


4 “Indian Congresses.”


7 Jalal and Seal, p. 417.

8 Ibid, pp. 419-420.


11 Wolpert, p. 320.

13 Thursby, p. 162.


15 Ibid.

16 Sanyal, Ahmad Riza, p. 939.

17 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, pp. 302-306.


19 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xviii.

20 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, p. 306.

21 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxix, footnote 17.

22 Sanyal, Devotional Islam, pp. 307-308.


26 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xix. At least one Barelvi source disagrees that the 1925/1343 meeting represented the “first” major summit of Barelvi (“Sunni”) scholars across India with such aims in mind, pointing to a 1918/1336 gathering organized by


27 Ahmad, p. xix, xxx.


<http://ameer-e-millat.com/svcs.htm>

30 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xx.

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxxi, footnote 35.


Afzal, p. 49.


Derwi, pp. 99-102. (Urdu)

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xx.


Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, pp. 312-313.

Nehru, p. 293.

Jama’at ‘Ali Shah provides a good example of how a *pir* might exert widespread influence politically. In one of his speeches (in 1945/1364), he directly appealed to his disciples, as well as “the people at large,” to vote a certain way. “I enjoin strictly upon my colleagues in the mystic order,” he said, “as well as my disciples, to vote for the Muslim League candidates only…” (italics added). “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.” Ameer-e-Millat (official website of the ‘Alipur Sayyidan Sharif dargah). Last accessed 14 January 2013.

<http://ameer-e-millat.com/svcs.htm>

43 Singh, Jaswant, p. 34.

44 Rai, p. 223.

45 Singh Sarila, p. 57.

46 Ibid, p. 66.

47 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxi.

48 “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

49 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxi.


52 “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

53 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxi.

54 Krishan, p. 75.

55 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxxi, footnote 43.

56 “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

57 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxiv.

58 Ibid, p. xxiv.

59 Sanyal, *Devotional Islam*, p. 311, including footnote 34.

60 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxiv.

61 Naimi, p. 195. (Urdu)


Naeemi, Raghib Hussain. Personal Interview. Lahore. 11 June 2012.


According to the official website of the *dar ul’alum*, Husain Ahmad was born on 6 October 1879/19 Shawwal 1296 and he arrived at Deoband on 3 January 1892/2 Jumada II 1309, making him twelve years and almost three months old when he began his studies there. “Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.” Darul Uloom Deoband, official website. Last accessed 11 January 2013. <http://www.darululoom-deoband.com>

Goyal, pp. 23-24, 29.


Mian, *asiran-e-malTa*, p. 111. (Urdu)


Goyal, pp. 22-23.

Ibid, p. 32.

Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

Mian, әsiran-e-malTa, p. 114–118. (Urdu)

Tabassum, p. 139.

“Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

Tabassum, pp. 138–139.

“Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

Qasmi, p. 12.

Tabassum, p. 141.

As quoted in Tabassum, p. 142.

The booklet was co-authored by Muhammad Mian, who served as general secretary of the JUH. As quoted (with minor changes by the author) in Tabassum, p. 142.


See Qasmi, Khurshid Hasan. dar ul'alom әwr diobәnd ki tarixi shәxSiat (Deoband: Maktaba Tafsir ul-Qur’an, 2003), p. 25. (Urdu) The school’s official website describes the situation thus: “In 1346/1927, when Maulana Syed Anwar Shah Kashmiri resigned from Darul Uloom, there was no such personality among the
group of Darul Uloom, save Maulana Madani, who could fill that momentous
vacancy…” See “Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

86 “Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

87 Ibid.

88 Tabassum, p. 145.

89 Ibid, pp. 145-146.

90 Von Tunzelmann, pp. 85-86.


91-92.

92 Tabassum, pp. 149-150.

93 Wolpert, pp. 326-327.

94 Von Tunzelmann, p. 84.

95 Tabassum, pp. 146-147.

96 Qasmi, M. Burhanuddin, pp. 14-15.

97 Awan, Samina. Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam: A Socio-Political Study (Karachi: Oxford

98 Dindrolvi, p. 263. (Urdu)

99 Tabassum, pp. 148. See also Qasmi, M. Burhanuddin, pp. 14-15.

100 Habib, Irfan. “Civil Disobedience 1930-31.” Social Scientist 25.9/10

(September/October 1997): 55-56.

101 Nojeim, Michael J. Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent Resistance (Westport

102 Habib, p. 43.

116 Qasmi, M. Burhanuddin, pp. 15-17.

117 Ahmad, Syed Nur, pp. 144-145.

118 Pirzada, p. 4.

119 Ibid, p. 4.


121 Pirzada, p. 5.

122 Afzal, p. 55, footnote 172.

123 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxii.


125 Tabassum, p. 155.


127 Ahmad, Syed Nur, p. 156.


131 Tabassum, p. 158.

132 Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob. tarix dar ul’alwm diobnd, jyld өven, p. 318. (Urdu)

133 Ibid, p. 318. (Urdu)

134 “Hadhrat Maulana Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani.”

135 “Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi.”

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"Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi."

Derwi, pp. 103-104. (Urdu)

"Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi."

Ibid.

Sanyal, *Ahmad Riza*, p. 79.

Ibid, p. 84.

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xviii.

"Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi."

Ibid.


"Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi."

Ludhianivi, Muhammad Usman Rehman. Personal interview. Ludhiana. 12 September 2012.

For one example, see Derwi, pp. 130-135. (Urdu)


Awan, p. 86.

<http://ameer-e-millat.com/svcs.htm>

Derwi, p. 138. (Urdu)

Awan, pp. 87-88.


“Racial Disturbance at Lahore.”

The Australian Cable Service reported ten [Indians] shot, but also admitted that “casualties are uncertain.” “Lahore Riots.” Cairns Post 23 July 1935: 12. Print.


“Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi.”

Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xxiv-xxv.


Manzooruddin would later argue that it wasn't until the mwolana from Badayun threw his weight behind Jinnah and joined the Muslim League that the Barelvi school directly aligned itself against the Deobandis of the JUH. See Ahmad, Manzooruddin. “The Political Role of the ‘Ulama’ in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent.” *Islamic Studies* 6.4 (1967): 333.

165 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxv.

166 Ibid, p. xxii.

167 Some Barelvis rejected the League outright—and often, by extension, the AISC itself. Such influential men included Muhammad Mian Marahrawi (d. 1952 AD), who characterized the League as including apostates and hypocrites, prompting him to organize his own party in 1935/1251, the Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat; *pir* Muhammad Sirajul Huda Qadiri, who opposed the League not only for its role, as he saw it, in inciting violent communalism, but also for its acceptance of any Muslim sect (including the Deobandis) into its ranks; Qari Muhammad Tayyib, “[t]he most vocal opponent” of the Muslim League, whose denunciation of the ML was based on its being an unholy mixture of the various Muslim sects—Deobandis included—led by a Shi’a, to boot; and Hashmat ‘Ali Khan, who rejected the League for striving to quell the divisions between the Muslim sects, primarily Barelvis and Deobandis (though he would later change his mind). Note each of these leaders’ arguments was based on Ahmad Riza Khan’s prohibition against working with “bad” Muslims like those out of Deoband.

Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xxiv-xxviii.
Indeed, even Abdul Hamid Badayuni, the very source of the AISC-ML merger proposal, reportedly emphasized, around this time, that “[Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah] is not our yamā or religious leader. He is just a political waqīl [‘lawyer’ or ‘advocate’] in the case of Pakistan.” In fact, Jinnah was often referred to by the Barelvi ‘aloma as their waqīl. See Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xxv-xxvi. Some Sunni leaders, however, were unafraid to paint Jinnah in more elevated strokes. “I call him [Jinnah] a saint,” declared Jama’at ‘Ali Shah on the occasion of the 1946/1365 Benares conference. “[I]n my eyes he is a saint.” See “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. xxvi.

“Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

The Lahore meeting was the 60th annual conference of the Anjuman-e-No’maniah-e-Hind.


<http://www.ppp.org.pk/party/pm.html>

“Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xxiii.

Ibid, p. xxiii. Sylhet holds especial status among Bengali Muslims as the burial place of the great thirteenth- to fourteenth- /seventh- to eighth-century Sufi saint Shah Jalal, credited with first introducing Islam to northeastern Bengal. Indeed, Sylhet, still home to Shah Jalal’s oft-visited dargah, was once known as Jalalabad.

“Mufti Amjad ‘Ali Al A’azmi.”


Rizvi, *tarîx dar ul’alâm diobûnd, jîld ərawl*, pp. 123-125. (Urdu)


Ibid, p. 2. (Urdu)

Ibid, pp. 2-3. (Urdu)

This journey took place in 1914. Rizvi, *tarîx dar ul’alâm diobûnd, jîld ərawl*, pp. 238-239. (Urdu)

Rizvi, *tarîx dar ul’alâm diobûnd, jîld ərawl*, pp. 244-245. (Urdu)

Arshad, p. 4. (Urdu)


Arshad, pp. i-ii. (Urdu)

Rizvi, *tarîx dar ul’alâm diobûnd, jîld ərawl*, pp. 353-354. (Urdu)

Ibid, pp. 392-393. (Urdu)
From a December 1974 article ("dar ul'alwm diobәnd babәt") in the Urdu magazine
*Mujalla*, as referenced in Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld әәрәәl*, pp. 250-251. (Urdu)

Taqi Usmani, Muhammad. “Shayk Muhammad Shafi’: The Mufti of Pakistan.”

Rizvi, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld әәrәәl*, pp. 256-258. (Urdu)

Taqi Usmani, Muhammad. әkәbәәr diobәnd kia the? (Deoband: Zamzam, 1995), p. 76.
(Urdu)

Rizvi, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld әәrәәl*, p. 221. (Urdu)

Shabbir Ahmad apparently never even owned a house of his own. “Until the time of his death he continued residing in two rented rooms… And [he died] without a bank balance, or a personal house, or property.” Taqi Usmani, Muhammad. әkәbәәr diobәnd, p. 76. (Urdu)

Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld әәrәәl*, pp. 269-273. (Urdu)

Shabbir Ahmad described the university at Dabhel as “watering every part of Gujarat with its academic benefits,” illuminating an erstwhile “remote” area “absolutely deprived and destitute of knowledge and…the sunnat.” He would serve as its dean at the same time he was acting as the *dar ul'alwm* Deoband’s chancellor. The official history of the university at Deoband contradicts itself on the matter of Shabbir Ahmad’s time spent at Dabhel as opposed to Deoband. When he was appointed chancellor, the history records that “in the beginning he
would stay at Dabhel for a time and at Deoband for a time. But in the end the
centrality of the *dar ul'alwm* drew him to Deoband.” At the time of his
resignation, however, the history explains that “the chancellor…used to stay
very little in Deoband. He spent most of the year at Dabhel.” Rizvi, Sayyid

202 Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld jәyәfol*, pp. 272-273. (Urdu)

203 Afzal, p. 54, footnote 168.

204 Ibid, p. 54, footnote 168.

Qasim is the great-grandson of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and the son of
long-time (1928-1980/1346-1400) school chancellor Muhammad Tayyib.

206 Afzal, p. 54, footnote 168.

207 Arshad, pp. ii. (Urdu)

208 French, Patrick. *Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division* (London:

209 From Alan Campbell-Johnson’s *Mission with Mountbatten* (1951), as quoted in French,
p. 154.


211 Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld jәyәfol*, pp. 309-310. (Urdu)

212 According to Rizvi, *mwlана* Muhammad Ibrahim and *mwlана* Zahoor Ahmed would
subsequently be convinced to return to the *dar ul'alwm* at Deoband. See Rizvi,
Sayyid Mahboob, *tarix dar ul'alwm diobәnd, jyld jәyәfol*, p. 311. (Urdu)

214 Arshad, pp. ii. (Urdu)


216 Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob. *tarix dar ul’alwm diobәnd, jyld әwәl*, p. 312. (Urdu)


221 Awan, ix-xxix.

222 Ibid, p. 16.


224 Awan, p. 17.

225 Al Mujahid, Sharif. “Jinnah's Team: The Top Ten.”
226 Gilmartin, p. 511.

227 Ahmad, Manzooruddin, p. 333.

228 Gilmartin, p. 512.

229 “Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam Conference.” Bombay Sentinel, 8 March 1946, p. 3.

230 The exact phrase used is țwîl w ’arž. Taqi Usmani, Muhammad. Әkәbәr diәbәnd kia the? (Deoband: Zamzam, 1995), p. 75. (Urdu)


233 Taqi Usmani, Әkәbәr diәbәnd, p. 76. (Urdu)

234 Arshad, pp. ii. (Urdu)

235 Al Mujahid, Sharif. “Jinnah's Team: The Top Ten.”


237 Arshad, pp. iii. (Urdu)


Upon learning of the partition plan and the frontier referendum that it included, Congress president J. Kripalani evidently protested before the Viceroy. There was growing support, he insisted, for an independent Pashtunistan, thus this option must be included on the referendum ballot. But Mountbatten evidently informed Kripalani that it had been Nehru himself who had insisted that voters receive only two options: join India or join Pakistan. Independence would not and could not be allowed. See article by Qaid-e-Azam University professor of history Sayed Wiqar ‘Ali Shah: “Abdul Ghaffar Khan” (Islamabad: Baacha Khan Trust, 2010), p. 26. <http://www.baachakhantrust.org/AbdulGhaffarKhan.pdf>
Jaman ‘Ali may have had personal reasons to provoke Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan; he would claim around 1945/1354 that the Frontier Gandhi’s KK had “threatened me with murder.” To them he announced publicly, “I would like to tell them that I am a sayyid, and a sayyid is never afraid of death.” See “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”


Arshad, pp. iii. (Urdu)


Khan, Wali, p. 148.

Banerjee, p. 189.

Al Mujahid, Sharif. “Jinnah’s Team: The Top Ten.” On top of the 1946/1965 majority vote in their favor, Ghaffar Khan and the Congressites among the eastern Pathans had also managed to pass a move of no-confidence against the short-lived League ministry (in power since 1943/1362) in 1945/1364.

Taqi Usmani, *akabər diobənd*, p. 75. (Urdu)

Kaul, p. 51.

Taqi Usmani, *akabər diobənd*, p. 76. (Urdu)

Arshad, pp. iii. (Urdu)
Chapter 4

1 “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”


3 Rizvi, Sayyid Mahboob. *tarix dar ul’alwem diobₜ̄d, jyld ṣv̄øl*, p. 319. (Urdu)

4 Khan, Hamid, p. 50. In a February 1948/Rabi II 1367 speech broadcast to the American public, Jinnah out-and-out stated that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He said, “Islam and idealism have taught us democracy; it has taught equality of man; justice and fairplay to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case, *Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission.*” See Choudhury, p. 590.


6 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 7.

8 Afzal, *Political Parties*, p. 213.


11 Troll, pp. 125-127.

12 Singh Sarila, p. 11.


14 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 1-2.

15 Ibid, p. xi, 2.

16 Ibid, p. xi.

17 Ibid, pp. 3-4.

18 Ibid, p. 5.


20 Khan, Hamid, p. 64.

21 As quoted in Khan, Hamid, p. 58.

22 Rafi Usmani, pp. 32-33.


24 Khan, Hamid, pp. 60-61.
Those who delivered formal speeches from the House floor in favor of the resolution included Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar, Nazir Ahmad, Omar Hayat Malik, Nur Ahmad, Mohammad Husain, Begum Shaista, and Chaudhry Mohammad Zafarullah Khan. See Khan, Hamid, p. 61.

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 7.


Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 505. The one Muslim member to vote “no” on the Objectives Resolution: Mian Iftikhar al-Din of the Azad Pakistan Party (which never held more than three seats in the constituent assembly). See Afzal, *Political Parties*, p. 219.


Chaudhry, Kashif. “Jinnah’s Pakistan, hijacked by clerics.” Statements like this one, however, tend to clump the ‘alōma together, completely ignoring the diverse spectrum of clerical opinion regarding Jinnah, a South Asian Muslim homeland, and the partition of Hindustan. Such statements also hint at the complexity of the clerical relationship with Jinnah—even of those ‘alōma who supported the
League vigorously, for their visions of a future Pakistan (and their role vis-à-vis the Islamic state and its rulers) probably diverged sharply from that of the *qayd-i-a'zam*—but they would never have been classified in their time as Jinnah’s “enemies” by anyone, least of all by the League leader himself.


34 Afzal, *Political Parties*, p. 221.


36 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 7.


38 Ibid, p. 507.

39 Khan, Hamid, p. 52.

40 Ibid, pp. 52-53.

41 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 8.

42 Binder, pp. 32-33.

43 The organization should not be confused with another of similar name, the *tahrīk-e-nafāz-e-shari‘at-e-muḥammādi*, established in 1992/1412. This latter group is a Deobandi-leaning pro-Taliban outfit, active along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (especially in the Swat valley) and banned by the Pervez Musharraf regime in 2002/1423. One Sufi Muhammad, a one-time member of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami, founded the outfit in order to promote the enforcement of Islamic law. See “Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi.” South Asia Terrorism Portal. Last accessed 14 January 2013.
Jamaat ‘Ali Shah died on 30 August 1951/27 Dh’ul Q’adah 1370—at the ripe old age of one hundred ten. He would be posthumously recognized for his efforts toward establishing Pakistan when, in 1987/1408, the government of the Punjab (Pakistan) bestowed upon him the Tehrik-e-Pakistan Award. See “Services for the Creation of Pakistan.”

Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 4.

Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 509.


Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 5.

Ibid, p. 4.


Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 8.


56 Ibid, p. 510.

57 Ibid, p. 510.

58 Choudhury, p. 591.

59 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 8-9.

60 Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 510.

61 Khan, Hamid. p. 71.


64 Ibid.


66 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 10.


68 Ibid, p. 516.

69 Choudhury, 592.

70 “The Queen’s Man Acts in Pakistan Now.”


74 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 10-11.
75 Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 517.
76 Afzal, Political Parties, p. 132.
79 Ibid, pp. 521.
80 Palmer-Fernandez, p. 176.
81 Afzal, Political Parties, pp. 62-63.
83 Khan, Hamid, p. 68.
86 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 5-7.
88 Ahmad, Syed Nur, p. 309.
90 Khan, Hamid, pp. 54-56.
91 Ibid, p. 68.

<http://www.keesings.com/search?kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_a_id=12426n03pak>


Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. 5.

Afzal, Political Parties, p. 216.

Rafi Usmai, Muhammad. hiat mufti-e-‘aţm (Karachi: Ahmad Printing Press, 2005), pp. 15-18. (Urdu)


<http://www.thepersecution.org/archive/munir/p75.html>


<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pk0121)>

104 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 11-16.


107 Naeemi, Raghib Hussain. Personal Interview. Lahore. 11 June 2012.


110 Afzal, Political Parties, p. 230.

111 Khan, Hamid, p. 72.


114 Khan, Hamid. pp. 73-76.


119 Khan, M. Asghar, p. 3.

120 Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 525.

121 Ibid, p. 525, including footnote 42.


123 Singh, R. S. N., p. 144.

124 Khan, M. Asghar, p. 18.


130 Singh, R. S. N., p. 144.

131 Afzal, “Pakistan,” pp. 531.

132 Bhashani was reportedly so awed by the “achievements of China” that, he said, “he was inclined…to spend the rest of his life in prayer.” See “President Ayub
Weathers His First Storm Of Opposition.” The Times [London, England] 4 December 1963: 10. Print. Many Barelvi leaders would later accuse Bhashani of being a “communist” (as well as a regionalist, of course) and oppose him vociferously.


138 Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 531.


140 Ibid, p. 78.


142 Afzal, “Pakistan,” p. 532-533.

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, p. 189.

Pradhan, p. xvii.


<http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9j49p32d/ >


Nasr, *The Vanguard*.


Ibid, p. 84.

Khan, M. Asghar, pp. 18-19.


Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 32-33.
The “Six Points,” distributed at an Awami League meeting in March of 1966, included a demand that Pakistan institute a truly federal system on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, with the federal government over only national defense and foreign affairs; separate reserve banks for the east and west wings (and, if possible, even separate currencies); a vesting of the power to tax on the provincial level only, with the federal government entitled to a share; a free market between both wings for “indigenous products”; and separate armed forces. For more information, see “Six-point Program.” Banglapedia. Asiatic

<http://www.banglapedia.org/HT/S_0426.HTM>

169 Nasr, *The Vanguard*.


<http://nadeemfparacha.wordpress.com/2011/10/15/maulana-who/>

171 Pirzada, pp. 31-33.

172 Rashid, p. 89.

173 Blood.


176 Nasr, *The Vanguard*.

177 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 42-44.


179 Blood.


181 Pirzada, p. ix.

182 Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 51-52.
There were some Barelvi *pirs* who did not exhibit this sort of behavior. The Pir of Bharchundi Sharif, for example, refused to sign a statement pledging non-cooperation with the JI, urging instead “unity among Islamic forces.” Ahmad, Mujeeb, pp. 52-53.


Pirzada, p. 34.

Nasr, *The Vanguard*.

Ibid.


Blood.

Rafi Usmani, *Jihad*, p. 35.


Ibid, p. 78.


<http://dawn.com/2011/03/13/smokers-corner-violent-ghosts/>
196 Haqqani, pp. 78-80.
197 Rafi Usmani, *Jihad*, p. 36.
198 Blood.
199 Rafi Usmani, *Jihad*, p. 36.
200 Hussain, p. 76.
203 Blood.
205 Richter, p. 548.
206 Mahmud, pp. 145-149.
208 Naqshbandi, p. 11. (Urdu)
211 Mahmud, pp. 145-149.

214 Blood.

215 Mahmud, p. 150.

216 Nasr, The Vanguard.


218 Mahmud, p. 157–158.

219 Blood.


Chapter 5

1 Chaudhry, Kashif. "Jinnah’s Pakistan, hijacked by clerics." The Express Tribune, 19 September 2011.

2 Haqqani, p. 141.

3 Nasr, The Vanguard.


5 Ahmad, Mujeeb, p. xi.

6 Nasr, The Vanguard.


19 Akhtar, Hasan. “Talks to open with opposition party.”


23 Hamlyn, Michael. “Pakistan: can discipline survive democracy?”


<http://nadeemfparacha.wordpress.com/2011/10/15/maulana-who/>


28 Haqqani, pp. 133-134.


30 Ibid, pp. 138-144.

31 Ibid, p. 143.
One friend of the author, attending a Pakistani university’s art school (in Lahore) during this period, reported being harassed by JI student activists who sought to close down the art school. On at least one occasion, the JI student members beat their opponents with hockey sticks.


It should be noted that the TNFJ has “always denied” the allegation that it ever sought the implementation of Shi’a law over Sunnis. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 115.


<http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/18/stories/2006041805780800.htm>

41 Haydar, p. 268.


45 Haydar, pp. 270-271.


<http://www.kr-hcy.com/shaheed.shtml>


<http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php/articles/5203-general-zia-ul-haq-
personally-intervened-for-haq-nawaz-jhangvi-s-release-tariq-khosa-s-revelations-in-the-senate

49 Haydar, pp. 273-280.


<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Ssp.htm>


53 Raman, B. “Pak leaders quarrel as Lahore continues to bleed.” Sri Lanka Guardian. 5 July 2010.


56 Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with the Taliban (Gurgaon: Hachette India, 2010), pp. 8-9.

57 Clements, pp. 18-19.

58 Hussain, p. 104.


60 Margolis, Eric S. American Raj: Liberation or Domination? (Toronto: Key Porter, 2008), p. 196.

61 Swati, Muhammad Junaid. Interview. Baffa (Mansehra Dist.), Pakistan. 8 June 2012.


Zaeef, p. 46.


Ibid, pp. 42–43.

Ibid, p. 44.

Margolis, p. 199.

Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi was, incidentally, one of Muhammad Taqi Usmani’s (son of Muhammad Shafi) main teachers, qualifying him, for example, to teach *ḥadīth*.


<http://tablighijamaat.org/post/2012/10/15/Migration-Motion-and-Collectiveness.aspx>

Alexiev, Alex. “Tablighi Jamaa: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions.” *Middle East Quarterly* 12:1 (Winter 2005), pp. 3–11. It should be noted that such connections to Deobandism—or Barelvism—were often not black-and-white. After migrating
from Amritsar in 1947/XXXX, for example, the Nawaz Sharif family often attended a masjid likewise frequented by the aforementioned disciple of Naimuddin Moradabadi, the Barelvi cleric Muhammad Hussain Naeemi. As a result, a “very close” relationship developed between the Nawaz Sharif and Muhammad Hussain Naeemi families. Nawaz Sharif and Muhammad Hussain’s own son, Sarfraz Hussain Naeemi, would be born not two years apart (25 December 1949/XXXX and 16 February 1948/XXXX, respectively), and the connection between the families would remain strong through the time of this writing.

Naeemi, Raghib Hussain. Personal Interview. Lahore. 11 June 2012.


77 Alexiev, pp. 3-11.


79 Alexiev, pp. 3-11.

80 Sikand, p. 42.


83 Alexiev went on to describe the TJ “problem” thus: “At best, they and their proxy groups form a powerful proselytizing movement that preaches extremism and disdain for religious tolerance, democracy, and separation of church and state.
At worst, they represent an Islamist fifth column that aids and abets terrorism. Contrary to their benign treatment by scholars and academics, Tablighi Jamaat has more to do with political sedition than with religion.” Alexiev recommended that U.S. Government policymakers focus law enforcement efforts on the TJ as the source of “al-Qaeda terrorists.” He closed his article warning that “[i]f the West chooses to turn a blind eye to the problem, Tablighi involvement in future terrorist activities at home and abroad is not a matter of conjecture; it is a certainty.” See Alexiev, pp. 3-11.

84 Alexiev, pp. 3-11.
87 Zaeef, p. xxxviii.
89 Haqqani, p. 142.


98 Shaikh, Riaz Ahmed. “Afghan War—Global Jihad and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan—Internal and External Links.” Manas Chatterji, Darvesh Gopal, and Savita Singh, ed. Governance, Development and Conflict (Contributions to Conflict...


100 Shaikh, p. 255.


103 Shaikh, p. 256.

104 Siddiqui, Salman.

105 Shaikh, p. 256.


<http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/18/stories/2006041805780800.htm>


<http://dawateislami.net/home.do>


Mahmud, p. 156.


Ibid.


Mahmud, pp. 156-157.

Zaeef, pp. 48-52.


134 Ibid.


136 Zaeef, p. 57-60. Zaeef himself describes a demonstration he witnessed several miles east of Kandahar during which the local commander, identified as a former mujahyd named Baru, fired into a crowd with a tank; dozens died, according to Zaeef.

137 Rafi Usmani, Mohammad, Jihad, p. 13.

138 Margolis, p. 199.

139 Zaeef, pp. 64-65.


142 Zaeef, p. 75.

143 Margolis, p. 197.


145 Ibid.

Epilogue

1 Zaeef, p. 233.

2 Margolis, p. 199.

3 Ibid, p. 216.


10 “MQM demands ban on Jamāt.” Dawn. 15 April 2006.


<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Lej.htm>


24 Kamran.


29 “Suicide bomber’s photo released; army deployed in Karachi.” Reuters. 13 Apr. 2006.

30 Khan, Faraz. “Alleged Nishtar Park bomber was thrice stopped by police on the way.” Daily Times. 10 Jul. 2007.


35 Metcalf, p. 152.


39 Cohen, p. 182.


43 Waraich, Omar. “Why Pakistan’s Taliban Target the Muslim Majority.” *Time* 7 April 2011.

44 “Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP).”


47 Raman, B. “Pak leaders quarrel as Lahore continues to bleed.” *Sri Lanka Guardian*. 5 July 2010.


54 “Pakistan: Probe report says Punjab governor’s assassin not ‘religious fanatic.’” *BBC Monitoring South Asia – Political* 10 January 2011.


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History/English substitute instructor; 170+ 90-minute sessions taught

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March 2006 – July 2007
South Asia analyst

Utah State Historical Society (internship) 2005
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Relief Alliance (501(c)3 non-profit), president 1998-1999, 2001-2003
["Others: Head Political Reporter (NextPage News); Globetrotting Correspondent (The NewStandard); Research Assistant (Harold B. Lee Library); Web Developer (Worldwide Organization for Women; Deseret International Foundation); Editor (Adventure Journey)"]
PRESENTATIONS

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AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS & GRANTS
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