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The Effects of Settlement Policy on Refugee Political Activism: Sudanese Refugees in Australia and the US

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Abstract: South Sudanese refugees are strongly motivated to effect change in South Sudan. After resettlement to the US, this motivation has resulted in much transnational political activism on their part. In Australia, Sudanese refugees have concentrated primarily on domestic political and social integration. Why? In this project I examine the possible causes of this difference, including the institutions, the policies, and the agents who implement settlement programs. I argue that refugee settlement policies of host countries directly shape the political activities of their refugees. When a host country provides assistance to integrate refugees, the government's policies and the individuals who implement policy (professional service providers and volunteers) influence what activities refugee leaders are likely to pursue. I find evidence that professional service providers are more likely to channel refugees toward domestic political goals, especially when they are implementing specific refugee capacity building programs. In contrast, volunteers are more likely to support refugee leaders in the political activities that the leaders themselves are eager to pursue. Due to different levels of centralization and institutionalization across these two host country contexts, they have different compositions of policy implementers and utilize capacity building programs to differing degrees. These factors play a significant role in shaping the direction of South Sudanese political activities. I use evidence from examination of institutional policies and semi-structured interviews of Sudanese refugees, professional and volunteer service providers, and government officials in the USA and Australia.
THE EFFECTS OF SETTLEMENT POLICY ON REFUGEE POLITICAL ACTIVISM:
SUDANESE REFUGEES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE US

By

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DISSERTATION

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MAY 2011
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Preface

This dissertation project has evolved not from a desire to know about different refugee settlement contexts, but rather to understand more about the politicization of the South Sudanese men and women I first met in the Fall of 2006. At the time I was a political science graduate student and coordinator of a conflict resolution student organization. I was leading a conflict resolution training session with about 30 members of the Lost Boys living in Syracuse, NY. When I met them I was blown away. These young men, mostly between 20 and 30 years old, were more politically charged than any Americans I knew, including those in my program. Our training objectives were to teach them how to listen better, and to assert their feelings and wants more clearly. These young men were not so interested in conflict resolution at this level. Instead they asked to discuss the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement and theories about war and international conflict resolution. They wanted to discuss ways in which Americans could help them protect and develop South Sudan and its people. It was this encounter that catalyzed this dissertation project.

At the time I had no idea about refugee settlement policies, but I was learning about international and domestic politics, including the role of states, institutions, policies and non-governmental actors in politics. So, when I first began interviewing South Sudanese refugees in the summer of 2007, I was fascinated by the fact that the relatives, and fellow Lost Boys, were also being resettled to Australia and Canada. It
was then that I wondered, “What is it like for these South Sudanese refugees in other places?”

Over the course of this research, I understood that although the Lost Boys are unique, their drive to protect and care for their people, and to effect change in South Sudan is common to the broader South Sudanese population. These motivations have played out in the contexts to which these communities were resettled. The work of the leaders of this community, as Chapter 3 underscores, is driven by their heartfelt ‘duty’ to protect and care for their people – a duty that has been instilled by unimaginable hardship and socialization by their country’s past leadership. Sure, there are also ego-related factors in some instances, including the desire for status and power, but this is not the main thrust of the political motivations of the South Sudanese refugees I interviewed.

In each context, these leaders, motivated by these duties, have interacted with the policies and policy implementers they have encountered and have responded by taking the political actions highlighted by the empirical puzzle. Each country’s approach to settling refugees, a result of their social and political histories, has established set programs, rules and structures of policy implementers. It has laid the ground for specific individuals to implement these programs and follow these rules. Refugee leaders, newcomers to these host communities, have taken these different settlement journeys, received divergent resources and met different people. Consequently, their political activities have taken certain nationally specific shapes.
It is important to note that the data pertaining to this empirical puzzle represents social phenomena at a specific point in time. Domestic-focused refugees in Australia, once they are established in the policy and political circles, are quite likely to engage in transnational endeavors. And, I have no reason to think that transnationally focused Sudanese refugees in the US will overlook domestic-related concerns, or will not take organizational steps to remedy them in the future. As each of these communities becomes more and more established in these host countries (and less and less the recipients of settlement policy), it is likely that their social networks and resource reservoirs will be complete and diverse enough to accommodate whatever political action they think is worth pursuing. What “national” patterns this will take will likely depend, like most things, on the specific events of their communities in each country, as well as the situation in South Sudan. These findings, while certainly specific to South Sudanese refugees, also have implications beyond this community, both theoretically and practically.

This project would not have been completed without the support of the many South Sudanese men and women in the US and Australia who welcomed me into their lives wholeheartedly. It is my sincere hope that the new Republic of South Sudan will be led by individuals with as much integrity, smarts and heart as they all have. I am thankful too for the many service providers, government officials and volunteers who spoke frankly about the realities of refugee settlement in their countries. Their work is hard, and goes unnoticed. Thank you.
I have also been lucky enough to be surrounded by individuals whose support exceeds anything imaginable. I am indebted especially to two central advisers, Professors Kristi Andersen and Hans Peter Schmitz at Syracuse University. From the project’s inception, they have been enthusiastic about its potential while simultaneously asking pointed questions to ensure its success. I am grateful not only for their academic support, but also for their friendships. This process was more smooth and enjoyable because I was able to work with them. I am grateful too for the support of Professor Matt Cleary, whose sharp eye and frankness pushed me to be a better writer and communicator. For pointed comments that brought the dissertation into fruition and into its current form, I am thankful for Professors Elizabeth Cohen, Seth Jolly, Sarah Pralle, Audie Klotz, Jennifer Hyndman, Suzanne Mettler, Margaret Hermann and Ann Mosher. Much thanks is extended to Professor Bill Coplin for participating in this research and for chairing the defense of the dissertation. I would also like to thank faculty in the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC), especially Catherine Gerard. I am grateful for her persistent enthusiasm for my life adventures.

I am also incredibly blessed to have the support of so many dear friends whom I met at Syracuse University, including Haley Swedlund, Heather Pincock, Angela Narasimhan, Deepa Prakash, Nadine Georgel, Jessica Boscarino, Seth Fischer, Ryan McKean, Mark Hibben, Rob Alexander, Dana Hill, Carolyn Danckaert, Aaron Smith, Jesse Lecy, Ryan Sullivan, Shawn Rowlin and Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley. Thank you to my teacher, Sri Dharma Mittra and the extended Dharma Yoga community, particularly Lorie Bebber. The struggles of this
dissertation process where mainly in my own mind. I am so thankful to have found a lifelong sanctuary behind the tussle and chatter of the mind with your sincere help.

And finally, I am blessed to be a part of my family. I could not have finished this dissertation without the support of my darling partner and best friend, Jesse Bricker. Thank you for reminding me that this project was interesting and dynamic, and that the person writing it was not only capable of such a feat, but even good at it. To my parents, Sallie and John, thank you for listening through all the ups and downs. Your consistent cheerleading (and expression of worry just amongst yourselves) was essential. I am grateful for the support throughout the many years of my undergraduate and graduate education provided by my grandparents, Philip and Alice May Cordes. These efforts would have been unimaginable without you both. To my late grandmother, Margery Foltz Allerdice, I am grateful for the unquantifiable faith and love she emanated. Finally, to John, my father, editor-in-chief, confidant and counselor, I am so thankful for you. Thank you for accepting it all: the grammatical errors, the unfinished thoughts, the confusing academic jargon, the missed deadlines, the fear and anxiety, and the joy and successes. You took it all in with grace, and returned it always with love. I wish that everyone had a father and teacher like you. What a world this would be.
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Puzzle of Refugee Political Activities

1.1: The Purpose

The settlement policies of host countries directly shape the political activities of their refugees. When a host country provides assistance to enable newly arrived refugees to get on their feet and to integrate into their new society, the government's policies and the agents (service providers) who implement them channel the refugees toward particular political goals. In this dissertation, using evidence from examination of institutional policies and semi-structured interviews of Sudanese refugees, professional and volunteer service providers, and government officials in the USA and Australia, I propose to demonstrate how settlement policies, and policy implementers in these two countries channel them (directly and indirectly) toward different political activities. I argue that due to different approaches to managing the implementation of refugee settlement policy – more institutionalized and centralized in Australia and more laissez faire and decentralized in the United States – refugee leaders interact with divergent policy implementers and are more or less privy to their different specific programs. These policy implementation factors influence the direction of refugee political activities.

On the whole, South Sudanese refugees are quite transnationally motivated. Due to four key factors, they are motivated to contribute to the social, economic and political development of their home country. First, many have known nothing but war and devastation as a part of the decades of civil war between North and South
Sudan. This experience has resulted in unimaginable suffering, but also a strong
desire to establish peace and prosperity for their people and country. Second, due to
mobilization on the part of elites, particularly by former Vice President of Sudan,
John Garang and their elders, these refugees have been socialized to believe that due
to their access to the West (and its education and resources), they will be able to
rebuild South Sudan. Third, the vibrant connections that refugees have maintained
with their families, still residing in the country of their origin, encourage an enduring
relationship with their country. Finally, the recent referendum for South Sudan
independence, a formal act of self-determination reinforces the first three
motivations to effect change in this new country.

My research indicates that this urge to participate in South Sudanese
development is true for refugees no matter where they live. It is no surprise then that
Sudanese refugees in the US have become quite involved in transnational political
activism. In Australia, however, Sudanese refugees have concentrated primarily on
domestic political and social integration.

What explains these national differences? In this project I examine the possible
causes of this difference, including the institutions, the policies, and the agents who
implement settlement programs. The crux of my findings suggests that several
factors specific to the strategies and implementation of refugee settlement policies
directly and indirectly shape the political activities of South Sudanese refugees,
particularly the target of their activities. More specifically, I find that across these
two countries, differences in two areas of settlement policy are quite important: a)
the structure of the policy implementers and b) the relative influence of refugee organization building programs. These institutional factors derive from the general social policy approaches that each country applies to their citizenry. In Australia, refugee settlement policymaking, managing, and funding is centralized at the level of the Commonwealth, while in the decentralized system of the US, the federal government and key non-profit organizations have established a public-private partnership where these roles are shared. Similarly, Australia has a highly institutionalized settlement program. Relative to the US, its program provides more comprehensive services that are funded predominately by the federal government. The laissez faire styled US program provides less social services, leaving refugees more autonomous with regard to meeting their needs. These factors are significant because they determine with whom refugees are likely to interact – professional service providers or volunteers – and the extent to which they will be involved in certain settlement programs that provide material and social prerequisites for political activities.

I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6 that in the US, these policy factors have encouraged South Sudanese refugees to engage in the transnational political activities that they have desired to do. This is due in part to two key factors: a) refugees in the US interact with volunteers who are also interested in transnational activities; and b) refugees have been less likely to have been nudged to engage in domestic political activities. The opposite is true for South Sudanese refugees who have resettled in Australia. These refugees have been supported primarily by professional service providers who are implementing policy programs that channel
refugee leaders toward building organizations that influence the wellbeing of
refugees currently residing in Australia (and away from transnational endeavors) (see
Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Trajectories of Sudanese Refugee Political Paths

<table>
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<tr>
<th>POLICY CONTEXT</th>
<th>REFUGEE SOCIAL NETWORKS</th>
<th>REFUGEE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES</th>
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<td><del>Australia</del></td>
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<td>Centralized,</td>
<td>Professional provider networks</td>
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<td>Institutionalized</td>
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<td>Decentralized,</td>
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<td>Laissez-faire</td>
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<td><del>United States</del></td>
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In the dissertation, I also discuss the broader implications of refugee political activities and political self-determination in this regard. I investigate how policies and policymakers, while seeking to develop the capacities of refugees, may indirectly disempower them. When prevented from participating in the development and realization of the full range of their political aims, refugees can feel unheard, unaccepted, controlled, and invisible. This reduces the efficacy of refugee leaders, generates tension and ultimately strains the process of integration.

1.2: The Empirical Puzzle

I have examined the cases of southern Sudanese refugees living in two main resettlement countries, the United States and Australia. Despite similar political motivations of South Sudanese refugees, the patterns of their political activities in these two different countries diverge. My comparative research, described in detail in the following chapters, demonstrates clear differences in the targets, or directions of the political activities of the refugee groups in these two nations. In the United States I find that 75% of Sudanese refugees’ organizations have as their principal mission effecting change in Sudan, referred to in the literature as transnational political activities. These activities include advocacy toward political officials to stem violence in their country and international development work, such as building schools and health clinics in southern Sudan. In Australia, in contrast, 70% of Sudanese-led organizations primarily aim to effect change within the Sudanese community that is resettled (what I refer to as domestic political activities). Efforts on the part of the southern Sudanese refugees to integrate themselves into their new
host community, such as establishing community centers to support refugees through settlement, are the main types of “domestic” political activity I find.

Why are there these differences, especially if these refugee communities share similar motivations and other key characteristics? The communities in each country consist of over 20,000 resettled South Sudanese, with over half in each population at working age. Most refugees have come in with families and arrived under similar resettlement programs. Transnationally motivated Sudanese refugees are strongly engaged in transnational political activities in one country but not so much in the other. Why? This is the empirical puzzle at the heart of my research.

1.3: Terms and Definitions

To clarify my use throughout this dissertation of key terms crucial to this research I have provided several definitions here. First, this research focuses on refugee settlement, including settlement policies and agents who implement policies. Settlement governs all activities of refugees once they are physically in the host country. These policies are in direct contrast to refugee resettlement policies, which govern the number of refugees that are admitted into the host country, and their pre-travel and travel arrangements.

Every year almost 80,000 refugees are resettled throughout the world. After first leaving their country of origin and finding temporary protection in a second country, refugees finally resettle in their new permanent homeland, the third and potentially final place, the “host” country. These 80,000 are the lucky ones, making up only
about 1% of all the refugees who need resettlement (UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 2008). After years, even decades of living in limbo, these individuals are given permanent residency in a country where for the most part they can be safe and meet their basic needs. Over 20 countries, including the US and Australia, work closely with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to resettle refugees. These host countries have established procedures to process refugees and to transport them to their new home-sites. These host countries also have distinct social assistance policies and procedures to settle refugees: to orient them to their new country; to meet their basic needs of shelter, food, and clothing; to connect them to social services that provide cash and medical assistance, education and employment; and to enable them to reach the ultimate goal - integration into their new society. My research hones in on this act of “settling” refugees to explore how it can influence refugee political action.

With regard to settlement, there are several terms I utilize to describe what is being examined. In general I am looking at the policies that seek to integrate refugees into host countries, explored in great detail in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. I also examine the agents who implement these policies, what I refer to as policy implementers. In this definition, I include both professional service providers and volunteers. To varying degrees, volunteers can play a significant role in providing refugee social assistance and this is why I include them as “policy implementers.”

Settlement policies and policy implementers can influence refugee political activities in an almost infinite amount of ways. In this dissertation I hone in on one
particular way: the target, or direction that refugee political leaders’ political activities take. I examine whether their political activities are targeted toward efforts in their host country, what I call *domestic political activities* or efforts in their origin country, what I refer to as *transnational political activities*. Domestic political activities are activities that aim to effect change in the country they are currently resettled in, such as extending social assistance for their refugee communities, or efforts to more fully socially, politically and economically integrate their fellow refugees into the host country. Transnational political activities are those actions that aim to effect change in the country their home country. Social and financial resources are often acquired from within the refugee’s host country, but are collected for transnational ends. Typical transnational political activities that refugee political leaders are engaged in include increasing public awareness about current conditions in origin countries to mobilize support and resources. They also include creating organizations to do specific development initiatives in their home country or region, including building health clinics, schools and infrastructure. I describe this in detail in Chapter 3 where I present patterns of Sudanese refugee political activities in the United States and Australia.

My work also seeks to highlight specific ways that settlement policy and policy implementers influence the trajectory of refugee political leader political activities. In so doing, I utilize terms to describe influential processes. Both policies and policy implementers can *channel*, or direct and guide, refugee leaders toward one type of political activity over another. This happens when policies or policy implementers extend resources for a certain political activity but not another, what is
referred to as a resource effect in the Policy Feedback literature. Similarly, when resources are withheld for certain activities over others, this too is a resource effect. This channeling or guiding process can also happen when refugee leaders receive certain messages about what is the “best” political goal to pursue, or about the importance of their contribution for certain activities. These more ideational influences are called interpretative effects. Interpretative effects can provide ideas to refugee leaders and can impact their political will, or motivation to achieve certain goals too.

1.4: The Project’s Significance

This project has important practical and theoretical contributions. Theoretically, it is important to examine these questions because the influence of receiving countries on refugee political activities has yet to be comprehensively understood, as I detail later in this chapter. Many scholars have utilized a political opportunity structure approach that has been too broad or vague. Additionally most works fail to examine specific policies and programs targeted toward migrants, with the exception of citizenship and naturalization policies and regulations. These are undoubtedly important, but for refugees in particular, citizenship policies and programs represent a sliver of the entire system that governs their settlement and integration. Current models also assume that refugee leaders’ activities are a natural consequence of their predetermined goals. In this view, the receiving context is solely a political opportunity structure that migrants navigate through in order to implement their goals (Koopmans 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Factors within the context
therefore do not interact with refugees – but rather solely block or allow for certain refugee activities.

I see the political objectives and methods of refugee community as malleable, and likely to take shape according to their current environment. Organizations implementing specific settlement policies can mold the general direction and methods of refugee political action. Indeed, third country settlement sites vary in terms of policy strategies to foster integration – particularly in the degree that newcomer retention of socio-cultural differences is encouraged (Valtonen 2004). Policy programs are built accordingly. My work explores this explicitly.

More broadly, this work engages with theory in political science and sociology that underscores the important role of organizations in mobilizing individuals to be politically active (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Decades ago political parties and labor unions mobilized migrants to participate in domestic-oriented political affairs; more recently non-governmental organizations have taken on this role (Andersen 2008). For refugees, settlement organizations are a part of this mobilizing nexus (Bloemraad 2006). This research draws on this research, but expands the analytical lens to include transnational types of political activities. Thus, I combine insights from the political incorporation (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Andersen 2008; Bloemraad 2006) and international migration literatures (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Basch et al 1994; Portes et al 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt 2001). Several scholars have called for this theoretical move (Morawska 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Settlement actors engage refugees from the moment they are
resettled. They have a distinct role in impacting what resources refugees obtain. They orient refugees toward the receiving country context, and connect them to broader social networks. It is reasonable to assume that they can influence what activities refugees believe are possible and worth engaging in.

Practically speaking, I directly examine migrant activities that are of key concern to policymakers and citizens alike. These activities include igniting violence, or contrarily, encouraging peace and development, in the refugees’ home country despite barriers of physical distance (Shain 2002). It is necessary to investigate the role of receiving country contexts in the formation of these political goals and methods, and to do so by looking at integration strategies, settlement actors and their practices. Secondly, this investigation has the potential to illuminate the unintended consequences of national integration policies on international issue areas, such as post-conflict reconstruction, stability and conflict. In so doing, it unearths ways in which governments and refugee activists collaborate (or not) on shared interests to stabilize and encourage development in the fragile contexts that these recently resettled refugees originate from, or toward their new host country. Yet, this work also examines ways in which receiving country contexts may unintentionally reduce these possibilities. As the international community comes closer the possible creation of a new state, southern Sudan, these political dynamics will be evermore salient. And, this is particularly important given the rising number of refugees whose only form of protection is through resettlement.¹

¹The number of refugees in need of third country resettlement will have increased almost 160%, from slightly over 500,000 in 2009 to over 800,000 predicted for 2011 (UNHCR Global Refugee Trends 2009).
Finally, with both practical and theoretical implications, I aim to broaden the lens that is used to study refugees to include the political nature of refugees and their communities. While much of the refugee studies literature concentrates on how settlement effects the economic and personal wellbeing of refugees, I am interested in the impact of settlement context on refugee collective political goals and the activities they engage in to achieve these goals. This is important because it directly relates to the self-perceived efficacy of refugees – of their own sense of power to change their lives in positive directions. I hope that this research can aid settlement policymakers and providers in creating policies and programs that build and sustain refugee efficacy. This can increase not only refugee empowerment but refugee integration. As refugee integration becomes more successful, host country citizens and migrants will be equally benefited. This could encourage the creation of new resettlement programs or expand on current ones. This research suggests also the importance of further studies of the effects of settlement and other social polices on the development of self-determination and the empowerment of individuals who are being served by the policies.

1.5: Migrant, Immigrant and Refugee Political Activity Literature

How are scholars discussing refugee political activities? What are these activities, and how do they differ among various refugee groups in diverse cities and countries and in distinct time periods? What are the factors that influence refugee political activities? Does any of this scholarship identify whether or not refugee activities differ based upon the contexts of the varying receiving countries into which
they have been resettled? If so, why? Has scholarship addressed how national and local institutions, policies and policy implementers impact the direction of refugee political activities (domestic, transnational, or both)?

1.5.1: Scholarship on Refugee Political Activities

Refugee political activities have received scant scholarly attention. Refugee studies by political researchers have examined the political reasons why refugees have had to escape from invasion, persecution and oppression and the politics of their protection. In the rare instances where refugees are studied as agents, with the ability to effect change in their own lives, rather than as objects created by war-torn nation-states or as service recipients, the scholarship looks primarily at “warrior” refugees who are both refugee and rebel fighter (Loescher 2001). Several notable exceptions prove the rule: scholars have studied Eritrean and Bosnian refugees (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001), Haitian exiles (Basch et al 1994), Kurdish refugees (Wahlbeck 1998), Salvadorans (Landolt 1999: Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003), Vietnamese refugees (Bloemraad 2006) and refugees in Denmark (Togeby 1999).

These studies identify a wealth of refugee political activities directed toward both the origin and receiving countries. Directing their energies to their origin countries, refugees engage in electoral politics (Al-Ali et al 2001, Guarnizo et al 2003), membership in political parties (Al-Ali et al 2001; Guarnizo et al 2003; Landolt 1999) and the creation of organizations to advance socio-economic development in origin country towns and villages known in the literature as Hometown Associations (HTAs) (Landolt 1999; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003).
Political activities directed toward receiving countries include attending political rallies and demonstrations, mobilizing political officials (Al-Ali et al 2001), making public claims regarding minority rights and discrimination (Koopmans 2004), becoming public officials and naturalizing (Bloemraad 2006). Within this literature, political activities have been defined narrowly and more broadly. More narrow definitions do not include financial or economic support for communities in the origin country as a “political” activity, while others do (Guarnizo et al 2003). In this dissertation, I understand political activities in the broader sense, to include activities such as creating organizations with the objective to raise funds for specific development objectives in the origin country (along with more conventional political activities).

The enormous body of literature on immigrant and migrant political activities more than makes up for the limited examination of refugee political activities. These include activities of migrants directed both toward the receiving country known as “immigrant political incorporation” (see Ramakrishnam and Bloemraad 2010 for a review) and the origin country, referred to as “migrant transnationalism” or “transnational political participation” in the literature (Basch et al 1994; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007 and Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003 for reviews). There are good reasons to analytically differentiate refugees from immigrants based upon the differences in their reasons for leaving their countries, the minimal amount of resources refugees bring with them compared to what immigrants can bring (Sherrell and Hyndman 2003), and the higher levels of support received if refugees arrive with formal refugee status (Bloemraad 2006). Nevertheless, migrants, of all types, are
newcomers who are connected to two countries – their origin and receiving countries. This literature therefore offers important insight into what types of factors may impact the political actions of refugees.

Political incorporation scholars ask what explains the domestic-focused political activities of migrants in their receiving countries. They have found that migrants are more politically active in their receiving countries, (1) as the levels of their income and status grow, (2) as the lengths of their residencies increase, (3) when they have previous political experience upon arrival, (4) when they are allowed to engage in political activism, and (5) when they are mobilized by outside agents such as organizations, political parties, unions, etc.

The migrant transnationalism literature arose in part in reaction to the assimilation theory in this former literature, particularly the underlying presumption that migrants would inherently lose the social, political, emotional and cultural ties that they had with their country of origin (Schiller et al 1995). Thus, the lens of transnational scholars has predominately focused on demonstrating the enduring importance of these homeland ties and explaining differences they find between and within migrant communities (Basch et al 1994). This scholarship points to a group of interrelated variables, including individual migrant demographic characteristics, pre-migration experiences, migrant community dynamics, origin country mobilization, legal status and citizenship regimes in the host country and supranational organizations and norms (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Basch et al 1994; Portes et al 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt and Jaworsky 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003;
Faist 2000). Overall, these multiple factors intersect at the point of the individual refugee/migrant to shape the motivations and capabilities with which she/he will engage in transnational activities (Al-Ali et al 2001; Guarnizo et al 2003).

Generally speaking, the Political Incorporation and Migrant Transnationalism literatures there are little synthesis. Ewa Morawska (2003) states that, for the most part, scholars narrow their point of inspection: either looking at immigrant integration (including political incorporation) or immigrant transnationalism. Scholars pose their questions with one of these political activity “targets” in mind.

1.5.2: The Migrant and Context: The Importance of Multiple Levels of Analysis

What can be learned from these literatures? Do any of these theories help explain the higher realization of transnational endeavors of Sudanese refugees in US relative to Australia? According to analyses by scholars in the field, multiple factors drive the political activities of refugees: on the individual, community, national and supranational levels. On the individual level, the personal characteristics of migrants independently and interactively shape levels of migrant political activism. It is not surprising to find that, at the individual level, the evidence from both the political incorporation and migrant transnationalism literatures points out that those with more human and social capital and those migrants who have resided in the receiving country for longer periods are more likely to be among those who are more politically active. These migrants have more resources with which to be politically active – a central hypothesis in the political participation literature (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995). At the community level, the factor of participation (or
not) in a well-established community prior to settlement correlates with a higher (or lower) amount of transnational activity (Al-Ali et al 2001) and with the degree of success in political incorporation (Schrover and Vermuellen 2005). At these levels of analysis, these theories basically suggest that migrants and migrant communities are more politically active if they have more resources.

Do factors at the individual level or community level fully explain the empirical domestic-transnational differences in Sudanese refugee political activities? In other words, do these variations of the “resource theory” provide solutions for this empirical puzzle? To answer my question pertaining to the differences in the direction of refugee political activities, this literature falls short. It is unclear whether or not a migrant would need more resources to engage in transnational or in domestic political activities. It is sensible to assume that a migrant would require more resources to engage in transnational activities as a migrant may need additional support because of the financial and legal hurdles of helping from a distance. Similarly, it could require additional human and social capital to mobilize individuals to support endeavors that are beyond the current physical community and country. Yet, domestic activities like achieving social, political and economic goals in industrialized countries can also be quite costly. Nevertheless, even if it is the case that greater resources are required to engage in transnational activities, this does not help explain the empirical puzzle. It is not the case, that Sudanese refugee leaders who went to the US spoke better English, had better educations or other valuable resources relative to those who were resettled to Australia. In fact, over the course of settlement it is more probable that a larger proportion of Sudanese have acquired
these types of resources in Australia as compared to those in the US because of the more extensive language, educational and other social services provided in the Australian context. In sum, it is not readily evident how exactly individual resources would shape the target of refugee political activities.

Yet, perhaps more Sudanese refugees in one country are motivated to engage in transnational activities. Al-Ali et al (2001) highlight the significance of refugee motivation to engage in political activities. One central difference in the Sudanese cohorts across these two national contexts is the amount of the “Lost Boys of Sudan” present in each country. Although I have found that most Sudanese refugees are quite transnationally motivated, this sub-group of Sudanese refugees was socialized to believe that it was their role to create a new southern Sudan: one free from war, modernized and developed. As I describe in Chapter 3, the particular experiences of this sub-group of South Sudanese refugees has further developed their motivation to engage in transnational activities and provided substantial degrees of human capital.

Do more Lost Boys reside in one context over the other, and does this explain our empirical puzzle? In the early 2000’s, the United States resettled approximately 4,000 of these young men. This specialized resettlement of Lost Boys as a group was in addition to a regular resettlement program that involved other southern Sudanese from Kakuma refugee camp and Egypt (among other places). Australia did not have

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2 This cohort of refugees resided in Kakuma refugee camp for at least a decade prior to being resettled to these third country settlement sites. In this camp, they lived apart from the southern Sudanese families in barracks called “zones.” The boys had specific roles: the oldest boys were often “zone leaders,” others organized the food rations and cooked. They attended school (many even finished high school) and were involved in extracurricular activities such as drama, conflict resolution and health education. These experiences resulted in acquisition of valuable skills that has increased the human capital of these particular refugees. I present a more detailed explanation of the “Lost Boys” in Chapter 3.
a similar “group” settlement scheme specifically for these “Lost Boys” although they did resettle individuals included in this sub-cohort. In fact, the median age of Sudan-born Australian residents (of whom 98% arrived through the refugee program) is around 26 years old, with a male to female ratio of 118:100 (Sudan-born Community Information Summary).\(^3\) Additionally, the majority of southern Sudanese refugees resettled in Australia did arrive from Kakuma refugee camp.\(^4\) This suggests the majority of Sudanese in Australia are these same young males. So, despite the absence of a group program, these same socialized, English-speaking young males make up a substantial part of the Sudanese refugee communities in both countries.\(^5\)

There is no doubt that the Lost Boys contribute greatly to the political activities of Sudanese refugees. They are a vital sub-group of the southern Sudanese community in both countries and are quasi-celebrities in the United States. In both resettlement sites, the Lost Boys have shown high levels of personal motivation to incorporate effectively into their host societies as well as to assist in the development of their country of origin. The effects of their motivation at the “individual level”, given the leadership roles Lost Boys have had and continue to have in refugee

\(^3\) Community Information Summary: Sudan-born.

\(^4\) I do not have specific figures pertaining to where Sudanese refugees came from (i.e. Egypt, Kenya) before arriving in the third country resettlement site but I did find evidence that the majority of Sudanese refugees came from Kakuma. (Browne, 2006).

\(^5\) Refugee leaders in both countries were predominately men. Gender roles and their relationship to subsequent political activities is extremely important aspect of migrant political participation. Although not the focus of my research, I have found that typical gender roles, in which woman engage in less “public” activities and more “private” activities are being reinforced as well as challenged in Australia and the United States. 86 “Lost Girls” (who had similar treks across southern Sudan and eventually found themselves in Kakuma refugee camp) were resettled to the United States along with the roughly 4,000 Lost Boys, and I spoke with women who defined themselves as “Lost Girls” in Australia. I found instances of women both creating organizations (included in my analysis) and of women who preferred to serve in the role of caregiver and homemaker.
community organizations and in the political thrusts of the Sudanese refugees, must be factored in. However, to say that the Lost Boys alone are responsible for the political trajectories of their communities or that a difference in their numbers in the US and Australia provides a solution to the empirical puzzle at the core of this research would be shortsighted.

Another point suggests that these individual-level models do not tell the entire story. I find that leaders who identify themselves as “Lost Boys” in Australia have experienced significant barriers when trying to engage in transnational activities. Due to the institutional factors I discuss below, these leaders, although quite political, have not been able to act on these transnational motivations or to use their human capital toward transnational efforts. In general, resource-based theories do not provide enough leverage to answer questions about the process by which motivated refugees make their political decisions and ultimately take on political activities. Such theories don’t answer: How and why, are similarly resourced and motivated refugee leaders directing their political activities differently? These individual level analytics do not allow for an analysis of national patterns of refugee political activities. Refugee political activities are not simply a result of the sum of their individual decisions. The empirical reality – of national patterns in political activities - directs our attention to examine features of these two national environments.

Do community-level explanations uncover the key factors influencing the differences shown? Perhaps one community had more time to establish transnational
organizations? Or one community’s demographic characteristics, such as the presence of more families, resulted in desires to pursue more domestic, rather than transnational goals once they were resettled? The evidence suggests that these factors do not play a role in the empirical differences demonstrated. Sudanese communities in Australia and the US had their highest levels of resettlement at roughly the same time – the late 1990’s to mid 2000’s. In both resettlement contexts, refugees started without support from previously established Sudanese migrants. Additionally, the communities, generally speaking did not appear to have more resources than those of the other. These community-level theories cannot account for the marked differences in the trajectories of political activism that have been found. It is certainly not the case that Sudanese refugees in the US had reached a degree of self-sufficiency such that they could easily turn toward transnational concerns.

What factors are present at other levels of analysis? One important factor that mobilizes refugees to engage in a political activity is the degree of social pressure exerted by the country of origin and its citizens to remain attached and connected to their origin country, including the provision of resources. This can include extensive pressure to send remittances (Mountz and Wright 1996), to vote, to contribute financially to certain political parties, and to generally remain attached to efforts in the origin country (Guarnizo et al 2003). I find no evidence that in the US Sudanese refugees were pressured more heavily to send remittances (or engage in other transnational activities) relative to those in Australia. Although I have found no specific data on south Sudanese remittances, refugees in both contexts spoke frankly of the high degree of pressure to help southern Sudan and the myriad challenges they
faced in trying to effectively respond to these requests. In both sites, refugees were
sending back funds to family members to help with repatriation processes, education,
health services and more. And, in both contexts I found evidence that Southern
Sudanese political leaders were (and are) mobilizing the refugee communities, but
not in degrees differing markedly one from the other. In both contexts, high-level
Sudanese officials visited the resettled communities, urging the refugees to continue
working on efforts to re-build war-torn southern Sudan.

1.5.3: Host Country Institutional Analyses

In this section I describe and respond to current literature regarding the
influence of host country institutions on migrant political activities. Given the
national differences in Sudanese refugee political activities, despite quite similar
individual and community characteristics, it is necessary to look at how institutional
factors specific to the settlement context influence the political activities of South
Sudanese refugees.

Institutionalist accounts make an important point: individual- and
community-level analytics ignore the influence of social and political institutions on
the political activities of whomever they influence – effectively de-contextualizing
them (Mettler 2002; Bloemraad 2006). Individual-level accounts, while undoubtedly
valuable, seem a-political because they do not acknowledge the specific political
context in which individuals are making decisions. Nor do they factor in whether
specific individual level characteristics interact with context-specific attributes to
influence political activism. Koopmans highlights that within the “literature…[there]
has been a strong tendency to see migrants as free-floating transnational communities…largely independent from the policies of the receiving countries (2004; p 467).” With institutional analyses I turn from a focus solely on the characteristics of refugees as individuals and their communities to a focus on the settlement context in which the refugees seek to realize their political goals. It is within the broader institution-oriented context that individual and community factors can be seen to emerge (or not) as requisites to the refugees’ engagement in political activities.

What institutions or contextual factors influence migrant political activities? And what are the mechanisms through which this influence is imparted? How do current theories help us understand these empirical differences in southern Sudanese refugee political activities?

Current institutional analyses provide much insight into what institutions are important, but I argue they leave something to be desired. Scholars have identified numerous factors that I group into five distinct categories: 1) immigration and refugee policies; 2) social policies; 3) reception; 4) national political factors; and 5) supranational factors. They demonstrate that influential institutions exist at multiple levels, including locally, nationally and globally6 (Sosyal 1994, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) but most work focuses on national institutions (Bloemraad 2006; Faist 2000; Ireland 1994; Koopmans 2004; Mountz et al 2002). In the remainder of this section,

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6 Global structures include human rights discourses and international organizations, as well as the global NGOs that lobby these international organizations using this human rights discourse.
by examining features of the US and Australia, I demonstrate how current literature does and does not help to explain this empirical puzzle.

1.5.3.1: Immigration and Refugee Policies

Policies specifically pertaining to both immigrants and refugees have an enormous influence on migrant political activities. Rules, regulations and programs for incorporating newcomers into the political, social and economic fabric of the host society can encourage or bar migrant access to the policy process. Citizenship and naturalization policies and eligibility requirements with lower residency time limits, and fewer requirements ease this significant prerequisite to engaging in any type of migrant political activities (Koopmans 2004). Furthermore, newcomer legal status that places migrants in limbo, such as temporary protection status, serves to weaken the confidence to engage in political activities (Al-Ali et al 2001; Mountz et al 2002; Bailey, Wright, Mountz, Miyares 2002).

Country political incorporation ideologies, or regimes, are also highly salient. Countries develop strategies that “allo[w] or prohibi[t] various forms of political mobilization within their boundaries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p 771).” And, while Faist 2000 argues that policies encouraging migrant cultural retention can “advance border-crossing webs of ties” and ultimately contribute to transnational practices, Østergaard-Nielsen makes a notable point: strong cultural rights can be a part of a political incorporation system that doesn’t allow some transnational discourses (such as radicalized transnational discourses) (2003). Thus, the influence of political incorporation regimes is not as simple as either promoting transnational social
networks and practices or not promoting them. Ireland (1994) also demonstrates that incorporation regimes can nurture (or not) ethnic-based political mobilization by building consultative structures based on nationality.

1.5.3.2: Social Policies

An additional source of contextual influence identified in the literature derives from the host countries’ social policy, and migrant access to it. This includes policy regulating education, housing, employment and social assistance, among others. The literature is at odds here. It argues that the presence of extensive social services for migrants results in both a diminished homeland focus (Ireland 1994) and as a prerequisite for transnational activities (Al-Ali et al 2001). Ireland (1994) finds that in French and Swiss locales with greater amounts of services, migrant guest workers did not have to rely on previous origin-country sources for socioeconomic support. When this dependency was broken, so too were homeland ties. In contrast, Al-Ali et al (2001) make the argument (similar to the previously discussed resource theory) that without economic security, transnationalism would be nearly impossible because of the “confidence needed to venture into transnational domains (p 588).”

1.5.3.3: Reception

Another significant factor associated with political participation and activities of migrants is the reception from the host country. Many scholars see this in a dyadic way, as either exclusive or inclusive (Koopmans 2004; Guarnizo et al 2003) and reception is generally studied at the societal level. To understand this, Koopmans’ 2004 comparative research project of migrant political claims in the Netherlands,
Germany and the UK examined public discourse about minorities from key newspapers, arguing that in pro-minority contexts, migrants would have greater opportunities to make their political claims toward the host country. Koopmans (2004) argues that more inclusive regimes (as operationalized by high naturalization rates, pro-minority media discourse and low levels of conservatism) provide the opportunities for migrants to gain access to the policy process, to have their messages resonate with the public and appear legitimate. Guarnizo et al (2003) find support for their hypothesis that less inclusive regimes (as operationalized by low levels of economic mobility) result in greater degrees of transnational activities.

Behind this inclusive-domestic and exclusive-transnational theoretical link is the assumption that migrants who are not included into the socio-political fabric of the host country will turn back to their origin country for political validation. Those that are included, with be involved in domestic activities. Morawska’s work complicates this theory by adding an additional state of “reception”: one of being ignored. She finds that Polish immigrants in Philadelphia feel ignored as newcomers which has the effect of encouraging assimilation into the ethnic community rather than the broader US community (2004).

1.5.3.4: National and Supranational Political Factors

Two additional contextual factors scholars have investigated include national political factors and supranational factors. On the national front, Koopmans (2004) finds that conservatism has an indirect influence on migrant political claim-making. When leftist governments hold power, rhetoric pertaining to minorities is more
positive. As for supranational factors, Sosyal (1994) and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) find that international discourses that promulgate universal human rights bolster migrant claim-making and access to political activities. Migrants that gain access to international non-governmental organizations involved in human rights work can magnify the effect of their political activities (commonly referred to as “scaling up”) and gain access to more political gatekeepers (Østergaard-Nielsen). These discourses effectively give newcomers a legitimate claim to attach on to.

1.5.3.5: How do these theories help explain the empirical puzzle?

How do these theories help us understand the empirical differences of South Sudanese refugee political activities? Each of these theories lends an interesting perspective, but leaves something missing. Supra-national discourses and actors, while certainly helpful for refugees interested in engaging in transnationalism, are not likely to be a primary causes for these cross-national differences in refugee political activities. Refugee leaders in the United States engaged in transnational activities certainly draw on human rights discourses for fundraising purposes and some are collaborating with transnational NGOs like Catholic Relief Services, but these supranational tools are utilized after these leaders are already engaged in transnational, rather than domestic activities. National contextual variables are more likely to be the source of these differences. These contextual factors do not explain why similarly motivated, similarly resourced refugees from the same camp, who share such similar pre-migration histories, would engage in different political activities. Neither does the level of political conservatism. In both countries, fairly
conservative national governments were in power during the initial settlement
periods of these refugees – George W. Bush in the United States and John Howard in
Australia.

Of these institutionalist accounts, the next three theories provide the most
important insights, but still do not completely solve the puzzle. A close examination
of the reception/inclusion-exclusion model reveals that it is relevant but incomplete.
Was one country more inclusive or exclusive of southern Sudanese refugees and did
this impact the direction of their political activities? It was found that both countries
had instances of exclusion in their reception toward southern Sudanese, although
Australia’s exclusionary events were more politically salient and influenced the
political activities of refugee leaders. Both countries sought to include and
incorporate the refugees into their societies. The difference in directions of political
activity found was a result not so much of general levels of inclusion or exclusion,
but rather of other institutional causes.

My research also suggests that the transnational motivation found in both
refugee populations was not derived from an aspect in the settlement context. The
motivation preceded settlement. Thus, Sudanese refugees were not directly pushed
by the government in either country through inclusive or exclusive policies toward
transnational endeavors. In fact, it appears that, in Australia, they were guided
through policy initiatives to focus on domestic activities.

The reception/inclusion-exclusion model remains incomplete in that it is
underspecified. Who does the actual including or excluding? And through what
mechanisms does reception impact refugee political activities? The theory as it stands misses the central importance of the institutions and agents who are actively involved in including or excluding refugees. This theory does not factor in the interactive nature of individuals and their environment – it assumes that refugee communities will all respond to exclusionary or inclusive contexts in the same way.

Perhaps the most prominent example of exclusion in Australia came in 2007 when former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews publicly stated that Sudanese refugees were not integrating well. This act could certainly contribute to a feeling of exclusion on the part of southern Sudanese refugees. Using Koopmans’ model, one would predict a turn toward transnational activities after such a high profile event, but the exact opposite happened. Sudanese leaders mobilized, gained media attention and demonstrated that they were integrating as well or better than other similarly situated refugee groups. Leaders I spoke with boasted that their actions helped oust the conservatives. Similarly, despite the anti-minority rhetoric from national officials, local officials were supportive of Sudanese refugees. Indeed, local police officials publicly described the key ways in which Sudanese refugees were integrating.

In the United States, Sudanese refugees received a generous welcome from many communities. Before this refugee group arrived, refugee service organizations, particularly faith-based organizations, engaged in education campaigns to prime potential American supporters. These campaigns involved videos and speeches that described the lives of southern Sudanese refugees and detailed their hopes for
education. The statement made by some of these refugees that “education is their mother and father” became a motto of these refugees and the volunteers that helped them. Newspapers were filled with articles describing their situation (Robins 2003). Refugee service organizations all described that massive financial, material and volunteer support was provided for this refugee group in particular due to media attention and these education campaigns. Given the state of reception, it would be easy to conclude that southern Sudanese refugees would not look back. Upon their arrival, they would integrate and engage in activities that were directed at this new, welcoming country. While it is true that many leaders are engaged in domestic activities, directed at the United States, this has not stopped them from creating organizations, creating networks and mobilizing resources to effect change in southern Sudan.

Is it just the case that for these Sudanese refugee populations outcomes opposite to those predicted by the reception theory model are true? Perhaps an exclusionary environment resulted in a turn toward domestic political activities, and an inclusive one allowed them to focus on their original goals? Australian-based southern Sudanese refugee leaders responded to anti-minority rhetoric by ramping up their involvement in domestic political activities. And many American-based southern Sudanese refugee leaders responded to a pro-refugee reception by eventually engaging in transnational endeavors. From these empirical findings, it would be possible to reason that positive reception brings forth transnationalism while a negative reception brings forth a focus on domestic political activities.
(because the refugees have to focus their energies there). This is plausible but also incomplete.  

As I demonstrate in the following chapters, while reception factors certainly played a role in defining the political events refugee leaders were involved in, they weren’t as impactful as the daily interactions that these leaders had with policy implementers in each context. This evidence suggests that “reception” has influence in more complex institutional ways. Sudanese refugee leaders in Australia with transnational motivations similar to those in the United States were channeled to put these domestic activities ahead of their initial transnational desires. This channeling took place in the context of specific policies aimed to help refugee communities form organizations (Chapter 6). Furthermore, without the support of volunteers, mobilized primarily by faith-based refugee service organizations in the United States, refugee leaders would have been less successful in their transnational endeavors (Chapter 5). In both contexts these policy implementers were key actors ‘receiving’ refugees.

Social policies or specific policies pertaining to immigrants undoubtedly influence the direction of refugee political activities. But again, what policies and ideologies are important and how? Upon third country resettlement to Australia and the U.S., Sudanese refugees share similar legal statuses: they are formal refugees with permanent residency, with little reason to believe that any transnational

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7 It is not likely that all refugee communities would behave in the same way. Some communities may have retreated if such a high profile political official made those claims. And some communities would not have sought out transnational activities after being so warmly accepted into a new country.
connection they may pursue could result in deportation. Australian and US naturalization policies are quite similar as well – the former having a residency requirement of 4 years and the latter 5 years. Additionally, because of their permanent residence status, these refugees are entitled to receive similar basic services to meet their material needs. Yet, in Australia, due to its much more substantial social safety net, refugees actually receive more extensive social services in the long-term (up to 5 years after settlement) than in the US. For example, refugees in Australia are provided with a minimum of 510 hours of English Language instruction and more extensive integration services. This is more than what is offered in the US. In both contexts, refugees are able to work immediately and receive similar material assistance until they are employed (although it is generally longer and more generous in Australia). It would be expected, given the greater material resources made available to the Australian refugees, that they would be more able and more apt to engage in transnational activities, which is not the case. Neither institutionally based laws regarding refugee status nor the difference in material services provided through the institutions of the host countries appear to be the determining institutional factors (among those that Østergaard-Nielsen and other scholars speak of) which account for the differences of political activity that are found in the refugee communities that have been examined in this study.

Social policies and ideologies of incorporating refugees into US and Australian societies are likely more salient institutional factors influencing the target of refugee political activities. But, again, current theories may miss important sources of institutional influences. The literature suggests both that the presence of
multicultural policies can “advance” transnational activities (Faist 2000), and that it is unclear if it will advance these activities or not (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Østergaard-Nielsen makes the point that it is important to investigate a country’s multicultural policies in greater detail because their message can be more nuanced – allowing for some activities but banning others (Ibid). Faist’s notion that multiculturalism advances transnational ties does little to help us understand the differences seen in Australia and the US. Sudanese remain quite connected to their homelands in both contexts despite differences with regard to explicit multicultural policies, and despite these similar ties, more refugees are engaged in transnational activities in the US.

Australia has a formal multicultural policy in which they explicitly target newcomer communities based on their nationality for government intervention including practices such as ethnic community capacity building (Galligan and Roberts 2003; Lopez 2000; Klymicka 1995). In the United States, while there is certainly political acceptance of diversity, it is based on race rather than culture or nationality. This means that ethnic communities and the unique obstacles they face due to different cultural norms and languages are not remedied by large-scale government intervention (see Bloemraad, Chapter 3 for full discussion). Policies and programs that celebrate culture difference are more widespread in Australia relative to the US. Given these realities, it is reasonable to assume that southern Sudanese refugees in Australia would be more heavily supported in retaining their culture.
I find evidence that suggests that both countries’ interventions to incorporate refugees are nuanced and complex. It is the case that both the US and Australia seek to incorporate refugees into their host country rather than to advance transnational ties or activities. Yet, what are the practices of incorporation, and how do they influence? The implementation of settlement policy is in effect a key component of refugee incorporation into the host country. As I describe below, the policy feedback theory can help us understand the more nuanced impacts of reception, political incorporation and social policies on refugee political activities.

These current institutional analyses begin to help us explain the national patterns of Sudanese political activities discovered in my research but leave important questions unresolved. What does influence the direction of refugee political activities? What aspects of settlement institutions – what policies and policy implementers – influence whether or not refugees are included or excluded? What are the interests of these institutions and actors and how do they jibe or not jibe with refugee leader interests? How does this “channeling” of activities occur? In the next section I make the case for utilizing a particular means of institutional analysis, a Policy Feedback theoretical perspective, to examine the national differences of Sudanese refugee political activities.

1.6: **Utilizing the Policy Feedback Theory**

For this dissertation, to investigate Sudanese refugee political activities, I utilize a specific form of institutional analysis: policy feedback theory. This lens provides ample theoretical and practical insight primarily because it is less vague
than the previous institutional analytics. It focuses on how policy designs impact mass politics (or the political activities of “ordinary” people) (Mettler 2002; Pierson 1993; Schneider and Ingram 1993). This analytic’s added value is that it connects specific policy design attributes to the subsequent political behavior of those who are direct recipients of the policy – it is in many ways a political policy analysis. It makes the claim for what makes common sense: that policies are a fundamental part of a policy recipient’s political experience. It is at the level of policy and its implementation where government and individuals who are governed interact. The design of policy will therefore influence the political activities of those individuals who are impacted by it. The policy feedback analytic offers a pointed analysis of the institutions that play such important roles in the newcomers’ lives. The policy feedback model thus differs from the Political Opportunity Model, which takes on far too much of the context at once, rather than specifically focusing on critical aspects of the institutional context. Policy feedback scholars analyze the attributes of policy design and examine each policy’s political effects in terms of the policy’s resource and interpretative influences (described earlier in this chapter) on recipients.

Utilizing this model of analysis has many advantages. First, it is a theory about context, but it targets a critical aspect of the context. Second, it asks scholars to examine unintended consequences of policies, to effectively look beyond the policy.

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8 Much institutional analysis implicitly or explicitly falls into the political opportunity model theoretical camp. These models argue that contextual factors create opportunities or barriers to political activities for migrants, or citizens, depending on the research subject. The institutional scholarship in this chapter has primarily ascribed to this model (Koopmans 2004, Ireland 1994, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003 for example).
Third, it highlights two distinct ways or mechanisms through which policies have these second-order effects: through interpretative and material effects.

By examining how particular government policies influence the political activities of the policies’ beneficiaries this model focuses our awareness. Take for example several policies in the history of the United States that have been studied using the Policy Feedback Theory. It was found that the U.S. G.I. Bill increased the political participation of military veterans (Mettler 2002). The introduction of Social Security benefits resulted in an increase in the political activity of the elderly (Campbell 2002). On the other hand, recipients of welfare benefits in the US were more likely to experience government in ways that lowered their political engagement (Soss 1999). None of these policies were designed with the intention of producing such effects. Despite the relatively apolitical goals of these policies and programs, they proved to have political effects on their recipients.

Such unintended consequences characterize refugee settlement policy as well. Political sociologist Irene Bloemraad has found that the high levels of naturalization among migrants in Canada relative to similar communities in the US are due to the presence of policies and settlement service apparatuses that mobilize migrant communities toward these ends (2006). The types of political activities in which refugees engage in are not only a result of their individual characteristics or goals. As policy feedback scholars pronounce, they are also due to the “interactions between institutions and citizens” (Wichowsky and Moynihan 2008; Mettler and Soss 2004).
Bloemraad’s work, what she calls a *Structured Mobilization* approach, uses an institutionalist account but identifies specific contextual factors that are far narrower than traditional Political Opportunity Structure models. She argues that immigrant (or newcomer) political incorporation is a *social process* that is nested in, or structured by government interventions including bureaucratic procedures, settlement policies, and strategies to managing diversity such as multicultural policies. This social process is one in which immigrants learn about and are mobilized to engage in political activities (or not). Learning and mobilization happens through ethnic and host country intermediaries, including ethnic leaders and community-based organizations. The symbolic and material resources provided by government interventions, put into motion particular learning and mobilization dynamics. These policies send messages about how immigrants should view and value citizenship and political engagement. Through instrumental means, vis-à-vis organizations and programs, government intervention also directly impacts newcomer mobilization and political participation. She finds that for Portuguese immigrants the US system, which does not promote citizenship, nor provide substantive amounts of funding to immigrant communities, promotes newcomer political apathy and alienation. In contrast, the Canadian system, which includes a lively system of citizenship education and mobilization including funding for ethnic communities, encourages political integration. Additionally, she finds that due to greater degrees of services for Vietnamese refugees (due to more substantive settlement services for refugees as compared to immigrants) in the United States,
they are more likely to have received messages and resources that encourage political participation (2006).

My work utilizes Bloemraad’s framework but asks a slightly different question. Rather than focusing on quantity of political participation (more or less political incorporation across these two countries), I ask: do settlement policies and policy implementers influence the direction of Sudanese political activities – toward their home country or toward their host country.

In Australia, the system to settle refugees seeks to ensure full access to the Australian welfare state. Thus the system builds refugee skills for an extended period before expecting them to be self-sufficient. To this end, the country provides more extensive social services including language services, employment skill training and job seeking services, healthcare and longer access to financial assistance. Ethnic community capacity building programs help refugee communities mobilize together, form organizations and help themselves. From this more organized place, these communities are encouraged through various consultative channels to be apart of the policy-evaluating and policy-making processes in Australia. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, these greatly influence the domestic-focused trajectory of southern Sudanese political activities in Australia.

In the United States, economic integration and self-sufficiency of refugees is emphasized. The program does not systematically include migrant organizational development programs. The underlying assumption of this settlement model is that refugees who are on their feet financially will be able to meet other integration goals,
such as physical and financial security, healthcare and connection with citizens and host country institutions. These programs, while present in the United States are not prioritized. Thus, many refugees do not receive government-support to create organizations. One unintentional effect of this lack of management of refugee political organization in the United States is that refugee leaders are free to do what they want with the organizations that they create, so long as they are able to get them off the ground.

Across these receiving country contexts, the nature of actors engaged in settlement services and their relationship with the national government also varies. Australian and Canadian settlement service providers are primarily secular non-governmental organizations that have historically-rooted institutional and contemporary financial connections to the national government, thus providing real and perceived barriers to autonomy in settlement practices. In contrast, the U.S. sector is comprised overwhelmingly by religious organizations, with social networks, funding streams and mandates that expand beyond the purview of the national government (Nawyn 2006). It is possible then, that these organizations (relative to their Australian and Canadian counterparts) may be more open to reconstruction and development goals of refugees. These specific policy and policy implementer attributes will be explored in this dissertation. In the following section, I detail two sets of specific research questions that guide the project.

1.7: Research Questions
To solve this empirical puzzle, I ask several questions. First, what is the institutional structure of host country refugee settlement programs, and what, if any, host country institutions directly impact refugees? Sosyal (1994) suggests that settlement policies and the subsequent activities of refugee and migrant communities “reveal how host states and their foreigners encounter each other (p5).” How does this encounter influence refugee leaders? Does it directly structure their activities, mold leaders and impact what political goals they pursue? Do policies or policy implementers influence the target, or direction (domestic or transnational) of refugee leaders’ political activities? Second, do these institutions also influence the political efficacy of refugee leaders, a critical political pre-requisite? How do these institutions impact refugee leaders’ understanding of their own sense of power and ability to achieve their goals?

With regard to the first research question, I seek to understand settlement institutions in each country and unearth the political effects of these institutions. This is not an analysis of the effectiveness of settlement policies. I do not ask if settlement policies effectively settle refugees. Instead, how do these policies structure, channel or otherwise mold refugee leaders and their political activities? How do settlement programs and policy implementers influence the trajectory of refugee political leaders’ activities? What is their effect on the direction of refugee political activities: toward their country of origin or receiving country? Arguably, it is through these specific aspects of settlement policy that host state-foreigner *encounters* occur and through which the activities of refugees can be shaped.
With this second set of inquiries, I ask whether or not specific policies and policy implementers empower or dis-empower refugee leaders. If institutional arrangements privilege certain refugee activities over others, such as domestic-oriented over transnational activism, how does this influence a refugee’s political efficacy? If pre-established institutional orientations ignore the deep, enduring connections refugees have toward origin country families and communities, and if they somehow dissuade refugees from maintaining these connections, will the political will of refugee leaders be extinguished? And again, could this matter for specific refugee settlement goals such as integration? In the next chapter, I describe the methods utilized to answer these questions. First, I provide a roadmap for the entire dissertation.

1.8: An Overview

In this dissertation, I demonstrate how settlement policy has impacted the direction of political activities of Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia. To do so, I present the empirical puzzle, describe the subjects and contexts of the puzzle, Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia, and then demonstrate two important causal processes in which refugees are shaped toward divergent paths of political activities in each country. In the next chapter I discuss the research design and methods I used to explore the political activism of the resettled Sudanese (Chapter 2). I then describe the empirical puzzle, one that presented itself in the course of my research, in more detail. I discuss the reasons for and processes of southern Sudanese refugee protection, and include an examination of the Lost Boys of Sudan (Chapter
3). This is followed by an in-depth comparative description of the histories and current designs of settlement policy in Australia and the US. I analyze the specific policy design attributes that prove to influence most keenly the political activities of the Sudanese refugees (Chapter 4). After this chapter I turn to the two most influential institutional processes that resulted in the different South Sudanese political activities I identified. In Chapter 5 I discuss the roles of professional and volunteer policy implementers. I examine how the relative influence of these policy implementers results in significant differences in refugee social networks and subsequently, in the refugee political activities. Here I demonstrate how the connections that strong faith-based volunteers have formed with southern Sudanese refugees have been a critical aspect of the high degree of transnational political activity emanating from the refugees in the United States. In Chapter 6, I show how in Australia the prioritization of one specific type of program, what I refer to as Refuge Organization Building programs, has had a significant impact on the trajectory of Sudanese refugee political activities there. These programs and the individuals implementing them have effectively nudged refugee political leaders toward domestic activities. In both chapters 5 and 6, I demonstrate how settlement policy has material and symbolic effects on refugees and upon their ambitions to engage in specific types of politics. I also investigate the deleterious effects of excessive channeling that have resulted in instances of the disempowerment of Sudanese refugees. I conclude the dissertation with a review of the political effects of settlement policy and the significance of these effects on the Sudanese refugees, on the refugee settlement programs in the US and Australia and the connection
between migration and international development. I also discuss the implications of these findings for current theory (Chapter 7).
Chapter 2: Research Design, Data Collection and Analysis

2.1: Introduction

The political activities of refugees have yet to be fully theorized or analyzed, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter. Scholarship has been mainly theoretical (Faist 2000), descriptive (Al-Ali et al) or not focused on refugees and the policies and practices aimed at them in particular (Ireland 1994, Sosyal 1994, Koopmans 2004, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Projects that do have a specific eye toward refugees conceptualize institutions too abstractly and are absent any analysis of causal mechanisms (Guarnizo et al 2003). These research projects contribute to our understanding but lack the research design to understand how institutions targeting refugees impact refugee political activists.

Like Bloemraad, I focus on an “empirical process,” and explore how settlement institutions influence refugee leaders, including settlement policies, programs and policy implementers. I provide evidence based on data about Sudanese organizations, analysis, documentary material and semi-structured interviews. In this chapter, I detail the data collection methods that produced this evidence. The project’s key design consists of two comparisons: a broad comparison of Sudanese refugee activities in the US and Australia, and a more specific comparison of one sub-cohort of Sudanese refugees, the Lost Boys of Sudan, across these two countries.

2.2: Cross-national comparison of Australia and the US

2.2.1: Generating middle range theory using comparative case design
A theory pertaining to the influence of refugee settlement institutions on the target of refugee political activities does not yet exist. Thus, this project utilizes a comparative case research design and inductive methods to generate middle range theories about just how settlement institutions influence refugee political leaders. The case study design allows deep analysis of each country case to explore the mechanisms of influence, thus allowing me to generate new understandings about the specific influences within cases and compare these influences and interactions across cases (Gerring 2004). I am able to “ask whether change in the independent variables in fact preceded change in the dependent variable and more significantly, by what process change in the independent variables produced the outcome” (Munck in Brady and & Collier 2004; p 112). Rich contextual analysis allows me to draw inferences about dynamics and processes that are (and are not) shared across these two contexts. This “fine-grained, contextually sensitive” approach does allow a more extensive analysis into complex social and political dynamics (Brady and Collier 2004; 10).

2.2.2: US and Australian Similarities and Differences

These two countries provide an ideal comparison. The United States and Australia have the world’s largest refugee resettlement programs. Both countries are western, industrialized democracies with institutionalized approaches to managing and settling refugees.9 Both countries’ pasts are based on immigration and each has contemporary experience with ethnic and minority politics. While this is much more

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9 Sudanese refugees have settled in countries throughout the world, including Cuba, Egypt, Sweden, Canada, the United States and Australia.
developed in Chapter 4, it is important to note here that both countries had periods of outright racism in their policies towards immigrants and both struggled to find ways to include ethnic populations into their political fabric. These shared characteristics allow me to examine the more subtle aspects of each country’s settlement policies. As Lipset (1990) notes (and Bloemraad aptly cites), “the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for differences between them (Bloemraad 2006).”

Similar numbers of Sudanese refugees reside in each country (20,086 in Australia and 23,292 in the US) and were settled at similar times (within the late 1990s and early 2000s). Because the size of refugee populations and the amount of time they have had to settle in their new environments can shape the amount of resources that refugee communities have for overall levels political participation, this is an important similarity (Schrover and Vermuellen 2005). Since the two Sudanese communities have been settled for approximately the same amount of time, this variable cannot explain different forms of activism in the two communities.

Despite their similarities, Australia and the U.S. differ in important ways. Their overall approaches to settling refugees vary due to their different historical and political trajectories. Therefore the policy programs employed to enact these approaches and the policy implementers who enact them vary as well. This is the heart of this project, and these differences will be described in detail in Chapter 4.

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10 Both countries also had racist policies against non-whites (African-Americans and other minorities in the US and Aboriginals in Australia).

2.2.3: Limitations of this comparative case research design

There are several key limitations to this case design including those typical of comparative research designs and those specific to this project. The project compares only two countries, which limits the extent to which I can generalize these findings beyond these two cases. This is not simply a matter of depth versus breadth, as it is possible to draw out additional aspects within each context to allow for additional variation in this project. For example, it could be possible to find sub-national locations in the United States where the policy programs look similar to Australian programs, but where the actors remain distinctly American-like. Where possible I have tried to draw out these inferences, but I was not able to systematically do this given constraints on time and resources. For example, it was not possible to speak with settlement staff and refugees in each of the US states where refugees were resettled.

2.3: Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys of Sudan

The choice to compare first Sudanese refugees, and then the Lost Boys of Sudan is a direct response to contemporary methodological weaknesses, and makes the project distinguishable from many research projects within the international migration literature. Much contemporary migration studies examine migrant communities that share a similar national origin but have varied pre-migratory experiences (for example, Basch et al 1994, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans 2994; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The migrant communities that have been researched are comprised of people who came from different origin country communities, with
diverging political, cultural and economic experiences, who had different migration paths and who had different legal statuses once they resettled. These contemporary works draw conclusions regarding refugees’ wellbeing, and the social, cultural, economic and political activities of large groups of refugees (based on their nationality), despite the refugees’ quite divergent histories prior to third country resettlement.

This choice is often made because of the obvious difficulties in both uncovering these divergent pre-migration histories prior to conducting research with these communities and having a large enough samples for certain research designs. Yet, these are quite important. Pre-migrant histories determine the levels of education and resources with which refugees arrive for resettlement. Socio-cultural norms acquired by groups of migrants and refugees who experienced similar trajectories are unique to them and can have significant influences on the newcomers’ settlement experiences. For instance, refugees who have lived in camps may have different political desires and goals, and different attitudes and behaviors, than those who have lived as asylum-seekers in border countries.

To overcome this obstacle, I utilized a cross-national comparison first of the political activities of southern Sudanese refugees and second, the “Lost Boys of Sudan,” in the U.S. and Australia. The majority of Sudanese refugees settled in the US and Australia are from South Sudan, share experiences of migration to several countries before settlement in these final host countries, share similar socio-economic backgrounds (in subsistence farming or cattle rearing) and share an intense
motivation to see independence, peace and development in South Sudan. The bulk of this population living in the US and Australia comes from the same socio-economic background.

By further narrowing the focus to the Lost Boys of Sudan, I can control for even more variables. Obviously individuals still have divergent life histories, experiences in their shared communities and are born with different traits. Yet, this “narrowing” down rules out important alternative explanations, at least in so far as social analysis is able to. The Lost Boys of Sudan do not vary along nationality, political, cultural and economic experiences, migration path and newcomer legal status, and thus, it is possible to rule such factors out as possible explanations for the cross-national variation seen. In so doing, I bypass a prominent methodological difficulty in this scholarship. Narrowing down allows me to separate out the specific influences of receiving country factors from other factors such as refugee community characteristics, origin country mobilization, and migration path experiences.

2.4: Data Collection and Analysis

I utilized three research methods to collect data. First, I collected descriptive data on Sudanese-created organizations in both of these national sites. Second, I did an in-depth analysis of settlement policies, procedures and programs, utilizing policy and programmatic documentation collected during fieldwork and through Internet research. Third, I utilized semi-structured interviews with key players involved in creating policy (government officials), and implementing policy (government officials, settlement administration and staff) as well as those who were the subjects
of the policies (refugees). The data was analyzed in two distinct sections: organizational and interview research.

2.4.1: Organizational Research

Sudanese refugee leaders have created organizations to meet their social, political, economic, and cultural goals. I collected information about these organizations and coded the data according to the specific targets, or goals of the organizations. This provided evidence that there was variation in the patterns of Sudanese refugee activities across these two national settlement sites.

2.4.1.1: Finding Sudanese Organizations

I attempted to collect data on the histories, programs, and the targets of the programming of all organizations of Southern Sudanese in the U.S. and Australia. I found a combined total of over 260 organizations in both countries, which at best represents a sample of entities that are more institutionalized. I conducted a basic search of the Internet for these organizations, utilizing the Google search engine. Straightforward search terms including “Sudanese”, “Sudan”, “Lost Boys” and “Lost Girls” with the terms “Community,” “Organization” and “Association” were used to find these organizations. I examined the first 40 – 50 sites that were found matching the terms. Toward the end of data collection, this dwindled to the first 20 websites because either the sites were repetitive or clearly irrelevant. Most organizations were discovered because they had their own website, or were affiliated with an organization that had its own website. Others were discovered because they were listed as recipients of grants from national or local governments. This was primarily
the case for organizations in Australia (which makes sense, given the nature of the settlement policies and actors there). I found additional organizations from documents or lists found on the websites of other organizations. I first compiled a complete list of all of the organizations and their basic contact information. In an effort to compile the most complete list possible, I crosschecked this list with lists prepared by southern Sudanese refugee groups and informational websites, including The Lost Boys National Network and Gurtong Trust\textsuperscript{12} and with the non-profit data bank Charity Navigator.

Organizational characteristics data was collected on 181 organizations. I could not find any data on the target and purpose of 86 organizations (or 30%). These organizations were not coded because they lacked either a website or information on any other document. A typical organization’s website contained information about their histories and founders (“about us”), their activities (“what we do”), ways that they mobilize volunteers and donors (“get involved”; “donate”) and media about their events and plans (“newsroom”). I also read organizations’ annual reports and other documents found on their websites. Through descriptions of organizational functions found on grant recipient lists posted online by local governments, I was able to discern this information for some organizations without websites.

2.4.1.2: Coding Organizational Patterns

\textsuperscript{12} This is a website made by and for south Sudanese living outside of South Sudan. http://www.gurtong.net/
After the organizational data was collected, I constructed one main variable: the target of the organization. By “target”, the main organizational characteristic of interest, I refer to the aim, or direction of the organization’s activities. I categorize “target” four ways: (1) “transnational,” an organization whose goals were to effect change in southern Sudan; (2) “domestic,” an organization that aimed to effect change in the resettlement country; (3) “both”, an organization with both of the previously discussed goals and (4) “transnational through domestic,” an organization whose goals were “transnational,” but that aimed to do this by bringing services to southern Sudanese in the resettlement country. An organization with goals to build a school, or health clinic in Southern Sudan is an example of a “transnational” organization. Organizations with goals to bring services, such as literacy skill building, integration initiatives or driver’s education to southern Sudanese who reside in the same third country resettlement site as the organization are examples of “domestic” organizations. In this category, I also include organizations with cultural and social purposes, such as bringing the Sudanese resettlement community together to enjoy similar cultural practices and events.

The coding of these organizations was fairly straightforward, and therefore did not present issues of coder validity. The target of an organization’s activities was in most cases clearly domestic or transnational – either geared toward South Sudan

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13 It would certainly strengthen the project to have information pertaining to the organization’s overall assets or levels of membership. Unfortunately this was not feasible, as this data is not systematically available for the majority of these organizations. It is not likely that this data, if available would change the general pattern of the findings. For example, several well-funded organizations with a large membership in one country could be fairly equivalent to many smaller organizations with less financial resources in the other. I did not find this to be the case with these organizations. Most of the organizations in both countries are small and led by a small number of Sudanese refugees.
and its people, or to the US or Australia and the Sudanese living there. Thus, there were not instances of ‘edge’ cases, or cases where it was difficult to discern the target of their activities. In cases where organizational activities were explicitly geared toward both domestic and transnational activities, these were coded as “both.” Additionally when organizations engaged in ‘domestic’ activities in order to effect change in South Sudan, these were coded as “transnational through domestic.” For example, when an organization with goals to reconstruct southern Sudan by providing an education to refugees within a resettlement site, who can then return to their homeland with this human capital, refugees are engaging in a political activity that is transnational through domestic means.\(^{14}\)

2.4.1.3: Limitations of Organizational Research

Gathering data on Sudanese organizations primarily through Internet research has several limitations. These limitations derive mainly from the fact that organizations, (migrant-created or not) often fail to update their websites regarding the status of their programming and organization more broadly. Thus, it is possible that I have collected inaccurate information, and perhaps even included organizations that no longer exist.\(^ {15}\) The first factor is more of a concern, if, for instance, a “domestically-focused” organization has begun to take on transnational activities, but has not yet updated its website. It would still remain categorized as a

\(^{14}\) For these reasons I did not find it necessary to do intercoder reliability checks.

\(^{15}\) Migrant organizations, in general, have precarious histories, so it is highly unlikely that an entire universe of cases (organizations) could be discovered. Migrant organizations arise and dissolve quickly (Schrover and Vermuellen 2005). Some organizations are created but their founders take no further action to implement programs. Although many organizations do have quite sophisticated websites (with detailed information on the mission, history, current programming and contact information), a considerable number of them do not.
domestically-focused organization. Similarly, it is possible that a transnationally-focused organization has started bringing services to its refugee resettlement community, but has yet to note this on its website. I do not have any particular reasons to believe that the data would be skewed toward one target or another, however. The fact that some of these organizations may no longer exist is actually not that important to my argument. Despite an organization’s dissolution, the fact that it was targeting southern Sudan, or its resettlement community in a particular resettlement context is the most relevant empirical data to capture, as it is a data point suggesting what the refugee leaders’ political focus was.

Assessing the organizations that Sudanese refugees have created enabled me to examine the presence or absence of patterns regarding the targets of refugee political activities – i.e. did refugee activities take a definitive shape in different national contexts? These organizations demonstrate most clearly where the refugees place their political energy and political desires. The organizations show what refugees value in terms of where they give time and resources. Their organizations connote quite directly for whom, and for what region the refugees want to effect social change.

2.4.2: Documentary Data

I analyzed Australian and US government documents as well as those produced by policy implementers and some personal and professional documents prepared by refugee leaders. These documents provided two types of information. First, much of the documentary data provided background information about the two
contexts that served to establish a solid understanding about each country’s settlement programs. These documents also served as a review of the discursive focus or emphasis that each country placed on particular aspects of their program. For example, documentary data derived from grant announcements by both the US State Department and Office of Refugee Resettlement repeatedly state the main role of settlement programming is refugee employment. In comparable Australian documents, the significance of employment, while not discursively sidelined, appears just as frequently as other objectives, such as social integration.

I reviewed government-sponsored public papers, published policy reports, refugee community surveys, and documents pertaining to grant announcements, bureaucratic procedures, funding and contract management. I examined the annual reports, programmatic documents and policy responses prepared by policy implementers as well as refugee advocates. I read life histories, reports, presentations and poetry prepared by southern Sudanese refugees.

2.4.3: Semi-structured Interviews

Data from websites and documents offer little information about how settlement contexts and actors influence the goals and methods of refugee activism. For this I sought to identify and understand processes – i.e. how one actor or institutional structure impacted another actor or structure, which then impacted another actor and structure (and so on). In particular, I sought out information about how national settlement policies were implemented on the “ground level” by policy implementers, and how they influenced refugee participation. Through semi-structured interviews, I
sought out evidence of specific mechanisms by which the general settlement approach, settlement programs and policy implementers influenced the political activities of the Sudanese refugees. I utilized an interview protocol created according to the specific type of interview subject (refugee, professional service worker, government official, advocate and volunteer). Although I deviated from the protocol when the interview subject brought up an issue that seemed relevant to the research, I always asked a certain line of questions to each interview subject type. For example, to service providers, I asked questions about the characteristic of the organizations (mission, funding sources, etc), about the types of resources their organization provided to refugees, their interaction with other service providers and with refugees (see Appendices A, B, C and D for all of the interview protocols). I employed semi-structured interviews with key informants to gain deep familiarity with these mechanisms within these two country cases.

In total, I interviewed 56 people in Australia and 43 people in the United States, for a total of 99 interview subjects (see Table 2.1). In Australia, 30% of subjects were Sudanese refugees, 54% were professional settlement service workers, 9% were government officials working on refugee settlement programming and 7% were advocates or volunteers. In the United States, 35% of subjects were Sudanese refugees, 33% were professional settlement service workers, 16% were government officials that dealt with refugee settlement and 16% were volunteers or advocates (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Interview Subjects
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Providers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates/ Volunteers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note 1: In several interviews with service providers in Australia, 4-5 providers were present. I included each individual in the figure listed above.*

*Note 2: In many instances, particularly in Australia, many refugees were also service providers. When I discussed their own experiences with settlement, I included them in the ‘refugee’ category.*

Informants were individuals extensively involved with refugee settlement and often with this particular group of refugees, including members of the Lost Boys, other Sudanese leaders, settlement service workers and administrators, government officials, professors, community members and refugee advocates. I used two strategies to contact informants. Most refugees I interviewed were relatives or friends of an earlier refugee contact. I also met some refugees at settlement service offices. Other refugees were sought out specifically because of their leadership roles in the community. Regarding the other categories of informants, I tried to speak with as many as possible in order to ensure I heard as many perspectives as possible. I often sought out people who worked specifically with Sudanese refugees.

The refugees whom I interviewed included some that were quite active politically (as demonstrated by their leadership roles), some who were only moderately so (were political active but did not hold leadership roles), and some with low levels of political participation (those that directly stated they were not active). It was important to interview politically active refugee leaders as well as members of their
organizations. Through a snowball sampling method, I procured additional refugee interviews. This ensured interviews with both refugee informants who had some affiliation with organizations or participation in other political activities as well as those who had none. Interviewing refugees with lower degrees of political activism can shed light on the barriers to participation in political activity, the presence or absence of relationships with settlement service providers and volunteers, and the dynamics of service provider-refugee relationships.

Policy implementers and policymaker informants were contacted for interviews through various means. First, I sought out settlement service workers and administrative staff with leadership roles and those that were working specifically with south Sudanese refugees, as well as refugee advocates. These participants advised me to speak with specific people, and often had rosters of individuals that were involved in the settlement sector, in many cases with the settlement of Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys. I spoke with as many people as I could and sought to interview people with divergent perspectives due to their different positions in the settlement matrix. Government officials often saw things differently than settlement service workers, whose insights differed from refugees and their advocates. The system of refugee settlement involves a large number of individuals, including social service providers (police, therapists, educators, health department workers, court officials, etc.) and community members. Thus, I was obviously not able to speak with everyone, nor even to sample along all the various types. Instead, I chose to interview those who worked with refugees the most, as it is through policy implementers that policies and approaches make an impact. This research does not
aim to be the definitive statement regarding settlement policies and refugee political participation. Thus, I have sought to develop an understanding of settlement structures, refugee political participation and the relationships between them through a process of “saturation”\textsuperscript{16}. In so doing, my analysis provides an evidence-based interpretation about how settlement institutions and policy implementers influence refugee political activities.

2.4.3.1: Analyzing Processes and Dynamics

After each interview, I prepared memos to identify significant themes of the interview, for example, “domestic channeling of refugee leaders” or “refugee distrust.” The audio taped interviews were transcribed. These memos and interviews were placed into Atlas TI and coded again into themes such as “community capacity building,” “policy implementer competition,” “donor constraints,” “Lost Boy political activities” and “refugee visa status.” Certain themes, because of their saliency among the different types of informants, became the foundation of the dissertation chapters.\textsuperscript{17}

I analyzed the data drawing heavily from grounded theory methods (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In each step of this process, I engaged in what grounded theorists call

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{16} By saturate I mean that I sought to interview informants until what I heard was no longer new to me. This is a specific technique utilized in Grounded Theory practices.

\textsuperscript{17} In two distinct phases of the interview analysis I broke the data into themes. I did this first when I created memos following the interviews, and then again during my review of the interviews in Atlas TI. This saturation process both narrowed my vision, because the data was organized into themes, but also deepened my understanding about specific ways in which policy and policy implementers influenced refugee activities. This provided the necessary structure and focus during different stages of the project. I used ATLAS TI in a somewhat simple way, to code the data into themes, in order to organize the near 100 interviews. This allowed me to see the saliency of the themes, and to organize the themes for the write up.
\end{flushleft}
“constant comparison” – continually ensuring that the data led my conjectures about appropriate themes and categories (i.e. grounding the conjectures, or hunches, in the data). From several interrelated themes, I created categories that were the foundation for the middle-level theories about how settlement institutions influence refugee political activities found in Chapters 5 and 6.

This process was especially useful for this project because it utilizes an inductive analytical process and allows for the development of middle range theories. Using an inductive analytical process was necessary given the lack of scholarship pertaining to the influence of settlement policy on refugee political participation. Additionally, the grounded theory method is structured around the notion that “process” and change are always evident in social phenomena, and therefore middle range theories are about as good as we can get. This is highly compatible with this project, as I am looking at policies, programs, policy implementers and service recipients that influence one another and change. This has two important implications for a researcher. First, it is necessary to look for this “interplay” between conditions and actors/people to examine how these conditions change, and how actors respond to this. Also, it requires the researcher to make only tentative conclusions about the environments and people studied (Corbin and Strauss 1990).

2.4.3.2: Benefits and Limitations of evidence from semi-structured interviews

The semi-structured approach enabled a considerable amount of flexibility in terms of where the interview conversation could lead, and what new factors could be explored. Basic questions provided a structure, but unique follow up questions and
discussions developed out of them according to each informant’s responses. This level of discretion enabled me to become familiar with the roles and practices of each of these actors, as these participants understood them. Ultimately, this allowed me to draw new insights beyond what my original questions would allow. For example, I learned how a settlement service worker’s western style of running meetings caused refugees to feel cut out of some decision-making processes. This example arose out of semi-structured conversation, and could not have been learned through a more structured interview process. Additionally, this format ensured that I did not entirely dictate the interview experience, but enabled greater participation by the informants. The decision to interview in this manner encouraged stronger relationships between participants and me and ultimately facilitated greater understandings.

Nevertheless, there were prickly aspects to the data collection process. I chose to examine the effects of settlement on Sudanese refugees, especially the Lost Boys of Sudan. This population is no longer the central population of concern for settlement actors in either the United States or Australia. The sector’s energy moves quickly from one population to the next- as quickly as a new group of refugees arrives. There can be quite a great deal of turnover in the sector. These factors can hinder data collection. Fortunately, I was still able to speak with many who worked with Sudanese refugees and the Lost Boys. Another factor was that settlement workers and refugees themselves depend in large part upon their memories to relate the ways they interacted with one another; and, memories, can change or fade over time.
2.5: **Conclusions**

To review, I utilize a qualitative, case study analysis of two national contexts: Australia and the U.S. The overall design of the research, which includes an examination of the Lost Boys of Sudan, shares some characteristics with a natural experiment, and therefore is distinguishable from many research projects within the international migration literature. These two host countries also share a similar immigrant-nation history, and social and economic characteristics particular to advanced welfare states. This research design allowed a more pointed analysis of the settlement sector in particular.

To gain deep familiarity with these cases I employed semi-structured interviews with Sudanese refugee leaders, settlement sector staff, refugee advocates and government officials in these settlement contexts. Through these interviews, I found evidence of the specific causal mechanisms and processes through which settlement policies, funding and policy implementers influenced Sudanese refugee political activities. In-depth examination of policies, procedures and programs of refugee settlement across these national and local contexts provided the necessary background of these two contexts and discursively illuminated the main foci of these two settlement programs. These combined efforts have allowed me shed light on the reasons why these two different patterns of Sudanese refugee political activities are seen, and specifically the ways that settlement institutions and policy implementers influence these social phenomena.
Chapter 3: Sudanese Refugees and their Organizations

3.1: Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present evidence of the empirical puzzle presented by this dissertation project and to examine factors relevant to its resolution. First, provide a description of the background of southern Sudanese refugees, their migration paths and the demographic composition of Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia. I review the decades-long civil war, which has dispersed thousands of South Sudanese across the globe and brought many to new homelands in Australia, the US, and elsewhere. Included as well is an exploration of how this experience has instilled in the refugees a desire to effect change in South Sudan and for South Sudanese globally.

The findings in this chapter highlight that while Sudanese refugee groups in the US and Australia do share patterns of political participation, distinct national trends in Sudanese refugee political activities also exist and are quite compelling. Sudanese refugee organizations in both countries are linked to a South Sudan identity by which these activists feel that it is their duty to help their country and their country’s people. Secondly, these organizations are created with the support of nationals in each of these sites. The exchange of ideas, money and time between Sudanese refugees with American and Australian nationals is evident. But, the data demonstrates clear differences across these resettlement sites in the organizational target, or direction of activism toward the homeland or toward the refugee resettlement community. The goals of organizations in the United States are more
likely to be aimed at effecting change in southern Sudan. Roughly 50% of organizations are aimed at providing services solely to their communities in southern Sudan, while another 25% have both domestic and transnational goals. Thus, about 75% of organizations created by Sudanese who have settled in the United States have transnational ambitions. In Australia the efforts of southern Sudanese refugees are aimed primarily at softening the challenges of settling into a new country by providing additional settlement services and support. A very small proportion of organizations are engaged in international development projects to effect change in southern Sudan. Approximately 70% of organizations are formed to provide services to the Sudanese community who was settled in Australia.

3.2: Background of South Sudan and its people

January 2011’s South Sudanese Referendum saw an almost unanimous vote in favor of South Sudanese independence from the Republic of Sudan. This will break up Africa’s largest country, and the 10th largest country in the world (Gurtong Trust 2011). After six decades of conflict and a tenuous peace between the North and South, in July 2011 the international community will welcome an additional country into its club of sovereignties, the Republic of South Sudan.

This is a bittersweet moment in the lives of the more than 8 million South Sudanese, many of whom have known nothing but conflict and struggle for their entire lives (Gurtong Trust). Following the movement for self determination and

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18 The 8 million figure comes from the 2008 Sudanese census that is disputed by the South. Some southerners believe this grossly underestimates the South’s population and is simply a tactic to reduce the South’s share of power and wealth as laid out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Gurtong Trust).
decolonization among colonized African countries, Sudan was free to govern itself after the abolishment of a joint condominium between Great Britain and Egypt that had ruled the area since 1898 (Deng 2010). This was not real independence for southerners. The colonial practices of Britain (and to a lesser extent, Egypt) in Sudan kept intact a widely segmented Sudan, heavily privileging the north and employing strict regulations on interaction between the two regions. These practices include the greater development of economic and political resources in the North. Due to this, political, economic, human capital and political incorporation disparities are vast between the North and other regions throughout Sudan (UK Sudan Country Profile).

It was primarily northern Sudanese who catalyzed the call for self-determination and independence, and they, along with the British discouraged southern Sudanese participation. The lack of political involvement of Southerners meant that the process of independence was essentially dominated by northern political elites. Given vast, untapped resources in the South, Northern elites remained tied to a unified Sudan. Southern calls for increased autonomy were deemed unacceptable and encouraged authoritarian practices on the part of the North to ensure that secession and instability would not occur. This set in motion a dynamic

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19 Roughly understood as an Arab, Muslim north and a black African, animist and Christian south.

20 This resulted in very different social, economic and educational contexts. Please see Archippus 2005 for a description of the extent to which separation policies encouraged disparities. The Sudan Tribune http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article11970

21 This included Jaafar Muhammad al-Nemieri and Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Ideational and material motivations encouraged interest in Sudanese unity, including oil reserves found in the south and the desire to implement fundamentalist Islamist practices statewide.
whereby violent or coercive measures to obtain political authority were utilized rather than non-violent measures (de Waal 2007). These include rebel movements and four military coups (de Waal 2007; Deng 2010).

Almost immediately after independence, the first of two civil wars broke out, following the same issues that would characterize most of Sudan’s conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries: “regional discontent with exploitation, of both people and resources, by the central government in Khartoum (de Waal 2007).” South Sudan was rightfully scared that British colonialism would be replaced by northern Sudanese Arab exploitation. Following independence, northerners implemented Arabization and Islamization policies throughout the country (Deng 2010). This war, lasting from 1956 until 1972, ceased with a North-South compromise, the Addis Abba Agreement. This allowed southern regional autonomy and recognition of their belief systems (Ibid). The second civil war began in 1983 when President Jaafar Nimeiri implemented the September Laws. In an effort to assuage Islamist political elites in northern Sudan, he placed all of Sudan under Sharia law. Southern leader, John Garang, who became the figurehead of an autonomous, developed and educated southern Sudan, led the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and movement (SPLA/M) against Khartoum and its militia forces. Rather than secession, however, the stated objectives of the SPLA were “liberation of the whole country from the Arab-Islamic domination and the creation of a New Sudan in which there would be no
discrimination due to race, ethnicity, culture, religion or gender (Deng 2010, pp 7-8).”

In January of 2005, after 22 years of conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, establishing one country, with two governance systems. This ensured self-governance for south Sudan, including the ability to determine its own development budget and laws and laid out a plan for equitable wealth distribution and demarcation of disputed borders. It created the Government of National Unity in which al Bashir was President and John Garang was Vice President.

These wars wreaked havoc on the Sudanese population and on the political, economic and social development of southern Sudan. All parties were guilty of gross human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killing of civilians, slavery, kidnapping and torture. Land mines were laid; villages were looted and destroyed; land and cattle were stolen. Over two million people were killed or died from causes related to the war and thousands were abducted and enslaved. Millions were internally displaced and became refugees (Deng 2010). Famine and disease due to the civil war amounted to over half of the deaths. In 1994, over 40% of the children were undernourished, a figure “among the highest ever documented” in the region.

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22 The diversity in Sudan makes Arab-Islamic domination untenable. Over 600 ethnic groups (HRW 1994) exist and 400 languages spoken in all of Sudan (Gurtong). Sudanese are generally grouped into Arab-Muslim northerners and African southerners who practice indigenous, animist religious practices or Christianity (following conversions by British missionaries) (Deng 2010).

23 Garang’s SPLA held 28% of the National Assembly and Cabinet votes (de Waal 2007)
Southerners’ main sources of food and income, subsistence farming and cattle rearing, were entirely disrupted.

Following the CPA, large challenges loomed for South Sudan, including lack of stable government institutions, basic human services, navigable roads and other infrastructure and near absence of human capital. The region is acutely underdeveloped. Development statistics demonstrate the dire situation. 90% of its population is impoverished; 48% of children are malnourished; there is an illiteracy rate of 70%, and only a 20% primary education enrollment rate (Sudan Multi Donor Trust Funds First Progress Report 2006). National, regional and local government institutions are being established but remain in their infant stages. Violence still characterizes the country, including the well-known Darfur conflict and in North-South border regions such as Abyei, where untapped oil reserves are a source of conflict. Nevertheless, Sudan, including southern Sudan successfully completed national and state-level elections in April 2010, the first in 24 years (2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Sudan) and a peaceful referendum this past January.

Despite years of conflict, destruction and underdevelopment, there are reasons to be hopeful about the fate of South Sudan. These events, however, have resulted in massive South Sudanese internal and external migration.

3.3: South Sudanese Migration

South Sudanese are scattered throughout the East African region and around the world. Four million Sudanese were uprooted as a result of the wars (United Nations Mission in Sudan). During the second civil war Southerners scattered to Uganda, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly known as Zaire), Ethiopia and Kenya. Hundreds of thousands lived in transition zones between the north and south and millions in the greater Khartoum area in shantytowns. Indeed, an estimated 3 million people are expected to return to southern Sudan from the north or from abroad (UNFPA Sudan General Profile). The UN estimates that anywhere from 500 thousand to 2 million South Sudanese live outside of their country (Sexton 2011). The bulk of South Sudanese living outside of their country are in Australia, Britain, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United States (Ibid). In the following section, I detail the history of the Lost Boys of Sudan, one sub-group of South Sudanese refugees.

3.3.1: The “Lost Boys of Sudan”

The “Lost Boys (and Girls) of Sudan” make up a sub-group of the displaced southern Sudanese. They have been resettled to Australia, Canada and the U.S., among other places. Prior to resettlement, in the mid to late 1980’s, these refugees, aged roughly 4-13 migrated on foot from small villages and towns in southern Sudan to Ethiopia, where makeshift refugee camps were run by the SPLA/M. In 1991, when the Mengistu government in Ethiopia was overthrown, they were forced to Kenya. The Lutheran World Federation, overseen by the UNHCR, established Kakuma refugee camp for the children who survived starvation, conscription into rebel forces, attacks from northern Sudanese forces, Ethiopian fighters, wild animals, and disease (Verdirame 1999). Approximately 7,000 (Verdirame 1999) to 20,000 (U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2002) survived this journey. They include
both females and males, despite the attention placed on “Lost Boys” (McKelvey 2003). Some have been a part of a cohort of roughly 4,000 persons scattered throughout the United States. Others are in Australia, Britain, Canada and Cuba. Of the rest, some remain in Kakuma refugee camp in northwestern Kenya, while others have moved to Nairobi, Kenya or have returned to southern Sudan.

This sub-group of refugees is remarkable in important ways, including their access to and acquisition of human capital and their intense desire to rebuild southern Sudan. First, resettlement in Kakuma refugee camp as children set this population apart from the broader southern Sudanese refugee population. The male children were placed in a distinct housing system, where they lived in zones apart from the larger community. Their housing system was mixed-tribe and mixed-region and mixed-age. Girls without families were taken in as foster children and often were treated like domestic servants.

Kakuma refugee camp, while desolate in many ways, did provide a formal education and other educational experiences that have facilitated the development of refugee human capital. Kakuma is home to 343 youth training centers and primary schools, 21 secondary schools, two high schools and two technical colleges. Individuals are taught a Kenyan national curriculum, which includes instruction in English. Arabic courses are also taught. (Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000). This is incredibly gendered however. Many of the male (and only some female) children completed primary and secondary education sponsored by the UN and Kenya. Children and young adults also participated in extracurricular activities such
as debate club, choir, church activities, drama, health education and conflict resolution. Some held leadership positions in these activities. Many westerners have been quite surprised by the English fluency, educational attainment, leadership capacities and social skills of refugees who came from this camp. Overall, it is incorrect to present the situation of Kakuma refugee camp as being without any social and educative value.

Leadership skills, such as decision-making, problem-solving, advocacy and organization were developed through experiences as zone leaders, leading the choir, developing and coordinating a Young Christian Student Organization, a drama club and debate club and through holding hired NGO and UNHCR positions organizing youth cultural affairs for the camp. These experiences often developed the social skills of the refugees, enabling them to make connections with community members, representatives of NGOs and visitors. The refugees learned important cultural practices. Their training increased the likelihood that they would have opportunities to learn additional skills, such as oratory, computer and IT, as well as to learn the ins and outs of international organization and non-governmental organizational operations on the ground. Awareness of critical issues including gender equality and HIV/AIDS were also developed by these activities. Many of the young refugees acquired advocacy skills and the ability to present their needs to outsiders through making claims to the UNHCR regarding food and physical security in the camp and through interacting with visitors to the camp (see Harrell-Bond 2002).

24 According to the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, in relation to the self-sufficiency goals in the US, males are doing better than the average refugee and national (although there is wage differentiation of course). Females from this same resettlement cohort are not doing as well – and are below female refugees and nationals (2005).
Second, like most Southerners, the Lost Boys have a strong desire to see an autonomous, developed South Sudan. Many in this sub-group are driven by this motivation to unusual heights. As boys, these men were specifically charged by political elites and by elders in their communities with the task of remaking their country. The late Vice President John Garang himself largely initiated this connection of transnational activism with education of the Lost Boys. Garang made this link to Southerners loud and clear, including the thousands of boys living in refugee camps. “Garang was telling each of us, that you have to have education,” noted one refugee, saying that Garang told them that, “we are being defeated by Arabs because of lack of education, but if there were education the war would have been easy (Interview Subject 1, July 2007, Syracuse, New York).” Another interviewee told a story of a spontaneous arrival of Garang to an Ethiopian refugee camp. He describes Garang handing out pencils, and telling the boys that they must gain an education to be the future of southern Sudan. The lack of education, they were told, is the central reason for the civil war, the oppression and the marginalization of the southern Sudanese. The boys should attain an education to become the “seeds” of a new Sudan (Interview Subject 2, August 2007, Syracuse, New York).

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25 Again, to reiterate, this is not to say that the Lost Boys are the only transnational South Sudanese. The wider population of Southerners living abroad is known to be highly politically active. Indeed, some have suggested that Northern political officials didn’t want South Sudanese living abroad to vote in the referendum because they are so politically active (Sexton 2011).

26 Prior to overseeing the SPLA/M, Garang received a doctoral degree from Iowa State University.

27 Although many of these refugees were also seen as soldier-commodities for the SPLA, John Garang also emphasized their education.
This link between education and activism for southern Sudan is epitomized in the saying of so many Lost Boys: “education is our mother and father.” When opportunities for resettlement to western industrialized countries surfaced, third country settlement became an integral part of this mission to remake their homeland. Places like the US and Australia would be the sites for gaining a western education and the necessary starting places to rebuild southern Sudan.

The Lost Boys of Sudan are a unique sub-group. Many of these displaced South Sudanese are better educated than the average South Sudanese, speak English and have unique experiences that bolstered their human capital. It is important to look specifically at their political activism, as well as the activism of South Sudanese in general. I turn to this now.

3.4: South Sudanese Refugees in Australia and the United States

The Sudanese communities in the United States and Australia are quite similar (see Table 1). As is shown below, each resettlement country has settled approximately the same number of refugees from this source country. Differences in the political participation of these communities would not derive from the size and thus relative amount of support within the communities. Second, The sizes of the cases that have been resettled are almost identical: roughly one third of the Sudanese who were resettled to both countries came without any other family members. Furthermore, in both communities, roughly half of the Sudanese are working-age adults. 28 These community characteristics could be quite significant if differences

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28 This does not take into consideration variations in Sudanese health conditions across these two countries.
across these two countries were evident. For example, if one country settled mainly
single men or women, without families, while the other settled families, one
reasonable argument for these empirical differences could be related to differing
interests and obligations of the refugee populations. These characteristics are similar
across these two countries and cannot explain the empirical differences evident
across these countries.

Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sudanese refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Size</td>
<td>20186</td>
<td>23292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual or Family Unit</td>
<td>37% Individual</td>
<td>31% Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>~56% Aged 18 - 64</td>
<td>51% Aged 21 - 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa</td>
<td>74% Special Humanitarian</td>
<td>79% Priority 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note 2: By ‘Individual’ or ‘Family Unit’ I refer to whether or not a person came alone or with family members.

Note 3: All Australian figures derive from DIAC’s Sudanese Community Profile (2006) and from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The one exception is the size of the community, derived from UNHCR global reports.

3.4.1: Resettlement Processes

How did Sudanese get to the United States and Australia? Perhaps
differences in the individuals who were selected for resettlement would account for
these empirical differences. 98% of the Sudanese refugees coming into Australia
come through the Humanitarian Program, specifically aimed at serving migrants in
great need. As depicted in Table 3.1, over 74% of these Sudanese newcomers arrived
under the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP). Individuals living in refugee-like
situations are eligible to be considered for a SHP visa if an Australian citizen
proposes their entry. These individuals are not necessarily refugees, but oftentimes have the same life experiences as refugees. They must be “subject to substantial discrimination amounting to a gross violation of their human rights in their home country” (*Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship*). The other 26% came primarily through the ‘Refugee Visa,’ and were referred by the UNHCR to the Australian government.  

In the United States, 79% of Sudanese were established as Priority 1 refugees. Sudanese refugees entered in a similar fashion to Australia: many were referred to the US government through UNHCR referrals (although NGOs and embassies can also refer refugee cases to the US Refugee Assistance Program). In these instances, overseas State Department officials reviewed these referrals to ensure that each particular case constituted a legitimate humanitarian concern according to US law.

Would these differences in refugee resettlement processes result in this project’s empirical differences? In the case of Australia, although SHP visa holders are not always classified by the UNHCR as refugees, these individuals often have quite similar backgrounds to those who were classified as refugees and referred by

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29 Other visas provided in Australia’s humanitarian (rather than economic migrant) program include the ‘Emergency Rescue Visa’ for refugees who are in need of urgent resettlement and the ‘Women at Risk Visa,’ for females refugees who are referred generally to the Australian government by the UNHCR. See Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s Refugee and Humanitarian Entry to Australia: Refugee and Humanitarian Visas.”

30 For cases in the Priority 2 category, the State Department’s Population, Refugee and Migration’s (PRM) Assistant Secretary determines if a group is of special humanitarian concern to the United States. If a group is designated as a Priority 2 status, the entire group is eligible for processing. Additionally, for Priority 3 cases, the PRM Assistant Secretary allocates which nationalities should have access to refugee admissions processing for family reunification purposes. See US Department of State, PRM, 2006.
the UNHCR. In fact, it is notoriously difficult to take the steps to become a ‘refugee.’ Often individuals who are, for all intents and purposes, a refugee do not have resources to access the process to become a refugee (see Hyndman 2006). Additionally, if the resources are available, because of lengthy processing times, individuals will often engage in several processes to get resettled. They may have a claim for refugee status with the UNHCR while simultaneously being engaged in other paths to resettlement, such as a SHP process applied for by their relative in Australia. Therefore, for this project it is less important to consider what their classification was. Instead it is important to consider whether or not these different visas resulted in different services, and refugee-settlement environment policy implementer interactions.

When comparing SHP-visa holders to refugees settled on any of the priorities, these different visa classifications do not result in a significant level of differences at the service provision level. The 74% of Sudanese refugees in Australia that were processed as SHP visa holders were ‘proposed’ for residency in Australia by a relative. This relative was required to provide much of the short-term support, including airport pick-up, initial accommodation and provision of basic needs. But, SHP refugees have access to key services and providers, including cash assistance, employment services and English Education. Therefore, while there are differences between refugees in Australia, it does not negatively impact our comparison of Sudanese refugees in these two country cases.
In this section, I have demonstrated the shared similarities of Sudanese refugee communities in Australia and the United States. They are alike in size, age, gender and share similar resettlement processes. In the following section, I turn to an examination of the political activities of these Sudanese refugees, the data that lays out the empirical puzzle.

3.5: The Empirical Puzzle: Comparing South Sudanese Organizations

In this section I describe the organizations that Sudanese refugees have created in the United States and Australia. I hone in on the target or the direction of their organizational activities - transnational or domestic.\(^{31}\) I also describe other patterns that arose during the collection of the organizational data, including a) the significance of a South Sudanese identity; and b) the frequent collaboration with Australian and US nationals. I turn first to our main variable of interest (the basis for the empirical puzzle): the target of Sudanese refugee organizations.

3.5.1: Organizational Targets

The targets of South Sudanese organizations take on national resettlement trends: those in the US are predominantly oriented toward transnational goals, while most in Australia have domestic goals. In this section, I present broad trends of the

\(^{31}\) The reader will note that the majority of ‘domestic-focused’ organizations focus on efforts to integrate Sudanese refugees into the settlement country, although there are a handful of organizations whose activities extend beyond only the Sudanese community. I have chosen to name these organizations ‘domestic-focused’ rather than ‘integration-focused’ to avoid confusion for the reader. If the categories were integration- vs. –transnational-focus, the reader may assume that the Sudanese communities are either integrating or seeking to remain tied to their homeland. Generally speaking, Sudanese refugees had strong motivations to both integrate into their new countries and to remain tied to South Sudan. The targets of the organizations they create are not directly associated with the extent to which they are integrated or not.
targets. Before presenting this data, I first turn to a description of organizational goals and activities.

3.5.1.1: Descriptions of Organizational Targets

What are the activities and goals that make up the organizational ‘targets’ that I coded? What are the actual transnational-oriented and domestic-focused activities that Sudanese refugees are engaged in?

3.5.1.1.1: Domestic-focused organizations

On the domestic-focused front, organizations are mostly engaged in work that encourages integration of Sudanese refugees into the fabric of their resettlement country. For example, in the United States, the Southern Sudan Community Association cites as its goals: “building welcoming communities,” and actions that “assist, educate & empower refugees” and encourage “cross-cultural understanding” between Omaha residents and refugees. This particular organization achieves this through offering refugee driving courses, English-as-a-Second-Language courses, Interpretation services, refugee legal assistance and employment services. They also provide orientation and short-term settlement services as well as long-term integration activities such as mentoring with volunteers, tutoring and clothing drives.\footnote{This particular organization, which at first was only servicing Sudanese refugees, has now become a part of the US VolAg, the Ethiopian Community Development Corporation, as an affiliate. They have now opened their services to all refugees.} The Sudanese Community Association of Illinois also provides settlement needs such as housing and employment services, as well as services for educational,
cultural, social and economic advancement and counseling. They have established a community center where refugees can gain information about accessing services and resources. It also provides an advocacy hub for the Save Darfur Network in their area.

Australian-based Sudanese Community Association of Australia focuses on a plentitude of domestic-focused activities. The organization provides settlement services and helps ‘propose’ Sudanese nationals abroad for SHP visas as well as providing loans to reimburse refugee travel costs. They engage in community development work and arrange social events such as cultural festivals and a New Year’s Celebration for Sudanese settled in Australia.\textsuperscript{33} They also see themselves as the advocacy body for the Sudanese community in Australia. To this end, they promote Sudanese culture in Australia and lobby the Commonwealth to increase Sudanese refugee intake. They also communicate with other officials when necessary (such as the police). The Sudanese Jieng Association, another domestic-oriented organization provides settlement services, and developed a Family Law workshop to educate Sudanese refugees about the Australian family laws and norms.

The Sudanese Community Association in South Australia provides similar settlement services to the community in that region with the help of an Australian-led migrant service organization, the Australian Refugee Association. The Bhar El Ghazal Youth Union, established by youth from the Bhar El Ghazal region of South Sudan holds cultural events for the purposes of bringing about unity among

\textsuperscript{33} The first of January is also Independence Day for Sudan.
Australian-settled Sudanese tribes from that region. The Youth Union also prepared an issues report regarding drug and alcohol abuse in the Sudanese refugee community in Australia, among other domestic-focused activities. The Australian Sudanese Students Association promotes education, sports and integration of Sudanese students into Australian multiculturalism by providing tuition and homework assistance, sporting activities, peer mentoring, career advice and academic information for Sudanese in the country.

The Equatorial Association of Queensland, Inc. brings members of the Australian and Sudanese communities together around cultural festivals where South Sudanese (particularly Equatorial) traditional dances and concerts will be performed. They have sought funding to provide three educational workshops, where speakers from a range of areas including law and community services will deliver speeches on similarities and differences of Australian social norms and laws and Sudanese cultural norms. They plan then to have a joint informal recreational gathering “where friends and neighbors come together to develop friendships and share information.”

As is evident in these examples, the South Sudanese refugee organizations have been involved in a plethora of activities focused on integrating South Sudanese into their host communities. In the next section, I describe organizations focused on social, economic and political change in South Sudan.

3.5.1.1.2: Transnationally-focused Organizations

Transnationally-focused organizations work to assist Southern Sudan in a variety of issue areas including healthcare, education, economic development and
political advocacy. The John Dau Foundation has created a health clinic in Duk Payuel in the State of Jonglei, South Sudan that provides basic medical services and training for health professionals. The Lost Boys Rebuilding Southern Sudan organization is currently working on building high schools throughout South Sudan. The group also coordinates donations of clothes, computers, cars, books, furniture, and household supplies. Additionally, members of this refugee organization have partnered with local organizations and donors to send their relatives who are left in the refugee camp to boarding schools outside of the camp, and to assist in providing tutoring and assistance with schoolwork, computer maintenance and car repairs.

The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation has also sought to bring education to regions of southern Sudan. They have created the Mural Bai secondary school, just one part of a larger education center. They seek to create the first high school in the region. They have other community development goals as well, including developing a Community Center, fostering sports and health education, and promoting employment initiatives through micro-credit loans to a small number of Marial Bai citizens. In the US, the founder, Valentino Achak has presented at numerous speaking engagements to increase awareness of the state of South Sudan and have created a '10 things you can do for Sudan' backgrounder for those who seek to help Sudan.

The Sudan Scholarship Foundation seeks to educate southern Sudanese who are refugees living in Kenya and Uganda. In January 2009 they provided scholarships to refugees toward their educational goals. The members of New Sudan
Generation, another US-based organization, have two current projects. First, they are drilling boreholes for harvesting rainwater. They are exploring other areas to access water as well. Second, they seek to create a community resource center equipped with clean water and sanitation, to provide civic education, vocational training, and health education. In the past, they have supported the education of young girls and established solar-powered satellite linkages for Internet access at St. Bakhita School in Narus, South Sudan. They developed a sewing co-op for Sudanese women in Nimule, Sudan, and have conducted trauma-healing workshops in South Sudan and in Northern Uganda refugee camps. Additionally, they conducted trainings for South Sudanese on rehabilitation of boreholes.

Australian Sudanese-led organizations are engaged in similar projects. Timpir, previously known as Panhom, seeks to enhance education and health in Southern Sudan. To do so, the organization plans to develop a primary school and a water hole in the Aweil area. It has also developed a birthing kits drive for South Sudan and a “Christmas gift program” in which South Sudanese children are sponsored by Australians. Another organization, KADI Australia, proposes projects in numerous issue areas, including health, education, environment, spirituality and communication. The Australian Good Samaritan Christian Brotherhood of Orphans of Africa, led by Southern Sudanese men and women in Victoria, focuses on South Sudanese orphans as well as education and health in their homeland. The National Democratic Alliance of Sudan of Oceania engages mainly in high-level political advocacy and seeks to bring Sudanese political parties together to oppose the current Sudanese regime.
3.5.1.1.3: Transnational through Domestic Activities

The Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan: National Network seeks to bring together Lost Boys and Girls in the US and to help them help themselves as well as give back to South Sudan. To this end, the organization, at a 2009 Conference in San Diego, placed much emphasis on a US national bill, to help Sudanese refugees attain their education and return to South Sudan to help in reconstruction efforts. The group also provides resources to South Sudanese refugees to assist with educational attainment and health concerns. In an effort to foster collaboration among South Sudanese organizations in the US, this organization generated a contact list of all organizations.

3.5.1.1.4: Domestic and Transnationally Focused Organizations

Several organizations have both domestic and transnational goals. The South Sudanese Development Association, or SSUDA, is one such organization. Its work includes ensuring the wellbeing of southern Sudanese in Australia and doing humanitarian and community development work in South Sudan. Its domestic-focused activities include integration services such as creating a Youth program called "Moving Forward: South Sudanese Youth Leadership and Mentoring Program" which was funded by the Commonwealth’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship. This was an 8-week program that provided life skills such as awareness of health issues, the role of the police and law, and learning negotiation and conflict resolution skills. SSUDA also seeks to build primary schools and health centers in the Upper Nile region of South Sudan.
The Tomorrow Foundation of Australia has also targeted its activities to both the domestic settlement context and South Sudan. This organization’s main purpose is to provide financial and other capacity-building support to organizations in Sudan as well as Australia. It has provided this support to Australian organizations for travel to Sudan. It helped fund a 2006 Youth Conference and a community dinner program. Another Sudanese-led organization, African Refugee Artists Club and Youth Development developed a 30-day Arts education training for refugees in Kakuma refugee camp. This has promoted the mental health of South Sudan refugee artists in the US as well. The organization has sought out venues to display art in the US and has connected artists in the camp with those settled elsewhere.

Sudanese-led organizations are involved in a variety of activities to effect change for their country and people. They have taken on activities that focus on advocacy, and have sought to educate and build awareness of the state of Southern Sudan. They have also honed in on specific development issues, such as education, employment, health and basic needs. Their organizations seek to remedy these problems by providing the necessary infrastructure, on-going resources and by developing human capital. In each resettlement country, refugees are leading organizations that target the resettlement community, South Sudan and both. I now describe the relative proportion of these divergent targets in each country.

3.5.1.2: The Comparative Differences in Organizational Targets
Despite having organizations of each ‘target’ within each resettlement country, there exists a significant difference in the relative number of organizations focused on domestic versus transnational activities. The majority of organizations in Australia aim to effect change for the Sudanese refugee communities in Australia. Almost 70% of the organizations have these resettlement country goals. In contrast, the majority of organizations in the United States aim to effect change in southern Sudan. Over 40% were solely formed to effect change in southern Sudan, while an additional 26% have goals in their homeland and in the resettlement country. Thus, 66% of organizations created by Sudanese who have settled in the United States have transnational ambitions (see Table 3.2 and Chart 3.1). Finding the whys and the wherefores for these comparative differences will bring us to the resolution of our empirical puzzle.

Table 3.2: Sudanese Organizational Targets
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational through domestic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGS coded</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGS not coded</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ORGs located</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures were derived from the author’s research as described previously.
Chart 3.1: Sudanese Organizational Targets

United States

- Transnational: 44%
- Domestic: 25%
- Both: 25%
- T through D: 6%

Australia

- Transnational: 14%
- Domestic: 68%
- Both: 18%
- T through D: 18%

Note: T through D stands for transnational through domestic activities.
3.4.2: The South Sudanese Identity

Despite the differences in organizational targeting across these two resettlement contexts, Sudanese organizations are, without exception, driven by Southern Sudan national and sub-national identities. They are created by and for southern Sudanese, to better their livelihood, and to change the trajectory of southern Sudanese development for future generations. As previously described, because of experiences and socialization, many south Sudanese refugees believe that effecting change for their country and country’s people is a duty.

Many see themselves as the generation that will bring development, peace and autonomy to the south. Organizations are a natural extension of this sense of national duty. A cursory survey of organization titles illustrates this. These titles all utilize signifiers of Sudan, south Sudan, towns in South Sudan and particular tribes: HOPE for Ariang, Southern Sudanese Community Association, Sudanese Women’s Welfare Association, South Sudan Development Agency International, Dinka Language Institute, River Niles Villages Sudanese Education Project, Children of Southern Sudan Education Fund, and HELP Sudan.

Refugee organizational websites provide a plethora of additional evidence of the South Sudanese identity. Many websites had the South Sudanese map and flag or used the flag colors as the main colors in their website design. There were photos of Sudanese at key national celebrations for the anniversary of Sudanese Independence and of the late John Garang’s birthday. There were photos and pictures of cultural events, traditional clothing and traditional dancing as well as those of current living
conditions in small villages in South Sudan. Some websites included links to other South Sudanese organizations and had a 'Recent news from Sudan' section. Many sites had stories about the South Sudanese civil war and migration.

Political participation of the refugees in both of these contexts focuses on the wellbeing of the people of their nation of origin. Organizations target change for southern Sudanese people living in Africa, such as building schools and health clinics and providing clean water in south Sudan, and caring for Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries. Additionally organizations seek to enable South Sudanese refugees to access social services, to organize as a collective political unit in the resettlement country as well as to increase the literacy of resettled southern Sudanese in their own languages. In the following section, I describe another commonality found in the analysis of these organizations: collaboration with Australian and US nationals.

3.5.3: Collaborating with Australian and US nationals

A second common thread of Sudanese-led organizations in the US and Australia is that they were often created with the help of resettlement country nationals. This duty toward South Sudan renewal could not be fulfilled without the support of American and Australian nationals.

The imprint of the exchange of ideas and resources between Sudanese refugee leaders and resettlement nationals is evident in organizations arising from both of these resettlement sites. Professors, church and community members and settlement service staff sit on organization advisory boards, Boards of Directors and
serve as co-founders in some instances. For example, in the case of the John Dau
Foundation, one of the most successful Sudanese-created organizations, two local
church congregations were critical players in its initial development and continue to
be a source of funds for the organization. The Foundation's Chairman of the Board is
Professor William Coplin of Syracuse University. He has organized students and
part-time workers to complete the main fundraising tasks, including “public
relations, web design and maintenance, donor relations, video design and other
fundraising activities (JDF website).” Hope for Humanity, Inc in Richmond, Virginia
was founded by Maker Mabor Marial (another ‘Lost Boy’) with help from a local
churchwoman, Jennifer Herst. Herst and her husband developed relationships with
Sudanese refugees through their church’s services to newly resettled refugees. This
meeting spurred a trip to southern Sudan and the creation of the humanitarian
organization to support educational scholarships to Sudanese living in the US and
abroad. The Makol Ariik Development Foundation of Utah and Rebuild Sudan, of
Wisconsin, are also the results of Sudanese refugee – American citizen collaboration.
Valentino Achak’s relationship with writer Dave Eggers, and their novel provided
the financial impetus for a subsequent organization. When these relationships
develop, innovative fundraising projects have ensued, such as middle school students
creating projects to fundraise throughout their school and communities. Professors
and church members join the board of advisors of organizations. Community
members travel to Sudan on assessment trips. Schools are built, uniforms are sewed
and southern Sudanese children start their first primary school courses.
Some Americans, after building relationships with this cohort of refugees have created organizations to better serve them in the United States, including Sharon Shivol’s Bridges to Sudan and Joan Hecht’s Alliance for the Lost Boys of Sudan. Although these organizations are obviously not included in the organizational analysis, they are indicative of the degree to which Sudanese refugees and Americans are connecting. As I more fully describe in Chapter 5, these connections are often made because of the way that resettlement policy is implemented in the United States: through a public-private partnership that relies on community members to serve refugees.

In Australia, organizations are also the result of successful collaborations between Sudanese refugees and nationals, especially settlement service staff. These staff members receive funding from the federal government to mobilize and train refugee community leaders to create organizations that will foster integration. I develop this theme in detail in Chapter 6. The following examples make this point clearly. The Ecumenical Migration Centre (EMC), a Melbourne organization that provides social services to migrants and refugees, was instrumental in the development of the Sudanese Lost Boys Association of Australia (SLBAA). When Akoc Manheim, a young, prominent South Sudanese leader in Melbourne began providing services to the Sudanese community on his own, the EMC stepped in and began providing office space to help Akoc and the community. They worked with him and other members of the SLBAA to procure funding for their organization, to plan fundraising events and to ensure the provision of continued services. Anglicare, another settlement service organization was instrumental in the founding and
continued support of the Southern Sudanese Community Association of Australia. A Migrant Resource Center in Sydney, the BHHPMRC helped the SLBAA establish a chapter in Sydney. In so doing, they provided office space and leadership training to Sydney Sudanese leaders. This MRC auspices \(^{34}\) many other refugee organizations, including another south Sudanese organization led by Equatorials. The Southern Sudan Development Agency International was given organizational support, including help with writing initial grants and provision of office space by the New Hope Foundation, a migrant service provider. In the summer of 2008, the Bor Community Association was just beginning the process of incorporation through the auspices of the Migrant Resource Center of Eastern Melbourne. In addition, I located one organization, SAIL, created by Australian nationals to ease Sudanese integration into Australian society.

In both of these resettlement sites, Sudanese organizations are the outcome of collaborations between refugees and nationals. As becomes clear in chapters 5 and 6, this is not coincidental. These connections are driven, directly or indirectly, by social policy relating to the resettlement of refugees in Australia and the United States. In Australia the federal government explicitly seeks to organize refugees through capacity building programming. In the United States, where capacity building remains but a small part in the resettlement scheme, the creation of organizations often occurs as a consequence of the interaction between policy implementers and refugee leaders. These actors include local church congregations and volunteers with

\(^{34}\) This is a word Australian’s use to describe the process of mentoring organizations, both educationally and financially.
humanitarian motivations. Often enough, these encounters, between American
nationals and Sudanese refugees, ignite the goals and passions in both parties.

3.6: **Conclusion: Explaining the Empirical Puzzle**

The empirical evidence presented here highlights the similarities and
differences of Sudanese refugee organizations created in the United States and
Australia. These organizations are outcomes of the strong ties that the Sudanese
refugees have to their original homeland and to its people. As much contemporary
scholarship has shown, refugees’ identity and motivations do considerably shape
their political activities. The organizations are also created and sculpted by the
collaborations that Sudanese have with Australian and American nationals. To be
further explored in Chapter 5: the role of these nationals in mobilizing and
redirecting political participation.

As earlier noted, while Sudanese refugee groups in the US and Australia do share
patterns of political participation, distinct national trends in Sudanese refugee
political activities also exist and are quite compelling. The data demonstrates clear
differences across these resettlement sites in the organizational target, or direction of
activism toward the homeland or toward the refugee resettlement community. The
goals of organizations in the United States are more likely to be aimed at effecting
change in southern Sudan. In Australia the efforts of southern Sudanese refugees are
aimed primarily at softening the challenges of settling into a new country by
providing additional settlement services and support. These findings, in conjunction
with the evidence that the two Sudanese communities share similar demographic
characteristics, suggest that the host country environment of the refugees has
influenced refugee political activities. I now present the settlement environments in
each country to more fully explain and resolve the empirical puzzle.
Chapter 4: Comparative Settlement Environments

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I describe and compare the settlement environments in Australia and the US, including settlement policies, sources of funding and policy implementers. As I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6, these aspects influence who refugees are interacting with, and what programs they are privy to and as a consequence, what political activities they engage in. Despite sharing histories of mass immigration and formal refugee resettlement programs, Australia and the United States have different environments for settling refugees. Each country utilizes a distinct strategy to ‘settle’ refugees, resulting in diverse refugee policies and programs. They differ in terms of amount and sources of funding for their refugee settlement programs. Additionally, the composition of policy implementers is unique in Australia and the U.S.

The plan of the chapter is as follows: first, I provide historical backgrounds of the US and Australian refugee programs, demonstrating how divergent historical paths have led to the development of different settlement environments. Second, using governmental documentary evidence, I detail and compare the three key factors of settlement environment that influence refugee political activities: approaches, funding and policy implementers. This contrast highlights the salient differences in each country that influence refugee political activism. I conclude this chapter by delving into the specific mechanisms through which these settlement environment factors influence refugee political activities.
4.2: Histories of Australian and US Refugee Settlement Programs

The historical trajectories of the US and Australian settlement programs have much in common. Both countries’ programs were catalyzed following World War II displacement. Over several decades of the last half of the 20th century, each country slowly developed, piece-by-piece, formal policy to deal with processing requests for resettlement and for settling refugees once they had arrived. Until the 1970’s and 1980s, these piecemeal approaches were often reactions to specific events rather than a premeditated effort to establish policy and procedures to deal with refugees.

Nevertheless, distinct shapes of refugee settlement policy and procedures took form in each country. An examination of these histories reveals that the Australian program developed mainly through top-down initiatives of the Commonwealth government while in the US, the relatively stronger influence of civil society organizations resulted in a more formidable public-private partnership. Additionally, the US program rallied around getting refugees into work and off the dole, whereas the Australians sought to ensure that their program encouraged equal access to the benefits of the Australian welfare state. These differences continue to shape current approaches to settlement, and subsequently current programs and policy implementers. The more government-managed Australian program and more decentralized US program are significant influences on refugee political activism.

4.2.1 The History of Settlement Policy in Australia
Australian settlement policy has evolved through three different periods including: 1) its assimilationist beginnings in the 1940s; 2) a multicultural turn in the 1970s; and 3) a business-model restructuring in the 2000s. Each of these periods left enduring marks on the demographic make-up of Australia, on the lives of newcomers and on the character of refugee settlement policy. Its historical trajectory has resulted in a government-directed, tightly managed refugee settlement program that seeks to ensure all newcomers, regardless of socioeconomic characteristics, have access to the services of the state.

4.2.1.1: Australia’s Assimilationist Beginnings

The concern with equal access was not present in the beginning of Australia’s program. Like many developed countries during the mid-20th century, Australia sought to control what people entered their country based on race and nationality. From 1901, until the early 1970’s, the country’s immigration policies centered on excluding all non-Celtic-Anglo Europeans, a policy known as the White Only Policy.35 Following the original settlement of aboriginals thousands of years ago, and of European settlement as a penal colony in the late 1700s, it wasn’t until the 1800s that the country had formal policy to encourage migration, or provide assistance to newcomers. At that time, some ‘assisted passage schemes’ for free settlers were provided to immigrants from Britain and Ireland. Only some of these received initial accommodation provided by the government and assistance from voluntary agencies. Most received no support (Review of Settlement Services 2003). During the 19th

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35 This policy did not begin after WWII. Its origins began with the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 (Jupp 2002).
century, an influx of a diverse group of immigrants arrived however due to the Gold Rush (Ibid).

The inception of Australia’s large scale, formal immigration scheme arose out of social and political realities that followed World War II. The demand for labor in Australia and the supply of displaced individuals from Europe coalesced to result in a massive influx of newcomers in the mid-1940s. Following WWII, Australia, having lost 60,000 men in the war, had a significant shortage of labor. Western and Central-Europeans were displaced and unemployed, so many were seeking life opportunities in other places. Australia, as a signatory to international migration treaties, and a collaborator with the International Refugee Organization, was one such destination. Australia’s formal immigration program began with the establishment of the Department of Immigration in 1945, which was charged with overseeing entry and stay of newcomers (The Department of Immigration and Citizenship).

Post-WWII labor shortages induced a relaxation of the White Only Policy, allowing individuals without Anglo-Celtic ethnic backgrounds permanent resident status in Australia. This resulted in waves of Italian, former Yugoslavian, other southeastern European and some Middle Eastern immigrants coming to Australia as ‘honorary whites’ (Adelman, Borowski, Burstein and Foster, eds1994; Lopez 2000).\(^{36}\)

\(^{36}\) This was also due to the reality of mass displacements of Eastern Europeans. Approximately 181,700 from this region were resettled in Australia following WWII.
At this time, in line with White Only policy, the Australian program established two classes of migrants according to their nationality. A non-British newcomer received ‘Alien’ status until they received Australian citizenship. This status came with reduced rights, reduced access to occupations and reduced social security benefits. The British, in contrast, were considered Australian as soon as they entered the country, and were given many privileges, including (in many cases) access to public housing (Jupp 2002). Nevertheless, aliens were still able to thrive in the plentiful Australian labor market at the time.

This post-WWII newcomer selection criterion was coupled with domestic settlement policy that sought to assimilate all migrants. During this period migrants were expected to learn English, adopt cultural norms, and basically become indistinguishable from Australians. Services from government were quite minimal, but included temporary housing at migrant hostels where English language courses were taught. While migrants were expected to take the first job that came their way, a strong economic atmosphere boded well for these newcomers. In 1953, the Department of Immigration started administering services to assimilate migrants into Australian cultural practices. To these ends, the Commonwealth organized regional coalitions of nonprofit organizations called ‘Good Neighbour Councils’ to serve newcomers (Jupp 2002; Good Neighbour Council).

For the majority of the 20th century, Australian immigration and domestic settlement policy was not institutionalized. In the 1950s and 1960s, Australia

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37 This is not to say that all migrants found settlement easy. Some Eastern Europeans even had experiences similar to those of indentured servants for their first 2 years (2003 Report; Jupp 2002).
continued to admit individuals from Eastern Europe, including about 14,000 Hungarians and 6000 Czechs. Nevertheless, an Australian-made comprehensive approach to deal with international refugee protection and a strategy to handle the domestic settlement process was in its making (Hinsliff 2007). The lack of structure and adequate services provided fodder to critics of the Australian immigration system. This eventually resulted in a turn toward policies that were both more inclusive and more responsive to newcomer needs.

4.2.1.2: A Multicultural Turn

Australian immigration and settlement policy went through perhaps its most significant transformation around the late 1960’s and early 1970s which resulted in a system concerned with equity of services and one that is managed from the top down. Like many countries during this era, Australia made dramatic changes regarding minority rights. These greatly influenced immigration and settlement policy. This shift was marked by the establishment of a framework for Australia to contribute to the international refugee protection regime, through establishing procedures to resettle refugees. Additionally, at this time two key domestic policy changes reflected a turn toward multiculturalism. First, with the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, the White Only Policy was formally abolished (Jupp 2002). Determinations of eligibility to immigrate to Australia could no longer be based on race or nationality. British migrant privileges were discarded and the

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38 The Immigration Minister determines the size and composition of the Humanitarian migrant program. Until present-day, Australia bases its selection of refugees on three key criteria. First, the level of need, based upon recommendations that the UNHCR makes and mainly following global conflict trends and particularly egregious situations for refugees. This is followed by the extent to which humanitarian migrants have social links to individuals with permanent
eligibility time limit to wait for citizenship for non-British citizens was reduced to 3 years after arrival.

Second, the Commonwealth created a framework of institutions and programs to integrate migrants including the Special Humanitarian Program and the Special Assistance Category. In so doing, the government publicly recognized that settlement was a difficult, lengthy process and that newly arrived migrants did not automatically relinquish their home country ties. In this way, the strategy to assimilate newcomers was publicly acknowledged as defunct. Instead, government strategies needed to be more responsive to migrant needs by expanding English language education and other services. At this time, an increase in migrants (those originating from Southeast Asia) required increased services from government. Mainstream services were increasingly provided to service a diverse population. The rise of ethnic community councils and organizations in each province provided the opportunity for strong political influence to be exerted by diverse communities. Accordingly, resettlement procedures and bodies were established, including the Determination of Refugee Status Committee and the Thailand Task Force (Hugo 2002).

This turn to policies and practices of multiculturalism was driven by intellectuals and implemented once policymakers were convinced. Several investigations verifying the failure of assimilationist policies underpinned these changes. These were catalyzed primarily by the lobbying efforts of intellectuals who

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residency in Australia and abilities to integrate into the Australian economic and social landscape (Hugo 2002). Sudanese refugees were resettled predominately under the first two selection criteria.
aimed their assault against assimilation toward national political leaders and
government departments (Lopez 2000). Indeed, neither broad public sentiment, nor
ethnic community leadership were catalysts for such a change (Galligan and Roberts
2003). During this period, notions of multiculturalism became embedded in national
political circles and therefore in policy relating to migrant services.

Several investigations uncovered the failures of assimilationist policies. The
of Settlers encouraged policy shifts. These reports highlighted the various
shortcomings of the assimilationist approach, with resultant high rates of poverty,
low rates of naturalization and unresolved issues in schooling, employment and
housing for migrants. It was found as well that complications arose because of low
levels of education and training prior to migration. These reports supported the
notion that the government must intervene in order for migrants to settle successfully
(Jupp 2002).

At this point, the Commonwealth government took an even more active role
in settlement and the contours of a government-managed settlement service system
concerned with migrant access to services began to take shape. The Department of
Immigration put officers in migrant hostels to handle migrant concerns pertaining to
accommodation and welfare. A ‘Child Migrant Education Service’ was established
to help children of migrants succeed. A mechanism to certify migrant qualifications

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39 Broad sociological shifts and Australian political changes, such as anti-Vietnam sentiment, the feminist social
movement and the Whitlam Labor government coming into power further enabled such a shift, but without these more
pointed elite-led efforts it is doubtful that such a shift would have occurred (Lopez 2000).
was put into place. Additionally, migrants were allowed to pursue English language study on a full-time basis with a living stipend. And, in response to low English proficiency, a telephone interpreter service was established.

The Commonwealth also established the ‘Grants in Aid Scheme,” which created an institutional structure for settlement service provision for the first time. The Scheme provided funds to volunteer organizations to provide welfare services to newcomers. The government then looked to these organizations to implement successful settlement through ‘self-help’ programs. New orientation programs were established and linked with migrant hostels. Interest-free loans to help migrants move from hostel to private homes were created. The Adult Migrant Education Program was expanded. Multicultural Education Programs for Australian children were placed into schools. A Special Broadcasting Service was created for migrant education.

Institutions to oversee settlement policy also sprung up. The Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (which later became the Office of Multicultural Affairs) was created to generate policy advice at the federal level. In each territory, an Ethnic Affairs Commission and Migrant Settlement Councils were established. The latter coordinated settlement services of government and voluntary organizations.

At this time, settlement policy became a key priority of immigration governance. It became a tool whereby the Australian government could enact multicultural practices (Galligan and Roberts 2003). Following a review of economic
and social well being of migrants by Frank Galbally in the late 1970s, the government formally wedded multicultural practices with settlement services. This report argued that four guiding principles should comprise the treatment of migrants:

- equal opportunity and access to national programs and services;
- maintenance and appreciation of immigrant cultures;
- general programs should meet the needs of migrants, but special programs and services should be formed if needed to ensure equality of access and provision;
- immigrants should be consulted regarding programming (Galligan and Roberts 2003; Adelman et al 1994).

These four aspects of settlement: equal access, including special services if needed, cultural appreciation, and immigrant involvement in decision-making, still remain potent policy drivers in Australia. As reflected in current government publications the concern for ‘access & equity’ to government services is the cornerstone of Australian settlement policy today (2003 Review of Settlement Services Report).  

New institutions and services were implemented and formalized and the contour of Australian settlement continued to form. Special immigrant programs to ensure equal access to newcomer communities took shape in the form of

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40 Culturally, this aligns with the Australian notion of a ‘fair go’ – the right for all Australians to get an equal chance, or ‘go’ at what it is they desire.
government-funded Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) that spanned the country.\textsuperscript{41} The purpose of MRCs was implementation of Australian federal policy pertaining to multiculturalism and migrant equal access to services and programs. These centers served as service hubs for migrants, regardless of their length of residence in Australia. They provided a variety of services, from meeting a migrant’s initial settlement needs to ethnic community empowerment, as well as funding to help develop the capacities of these communities for self-sufficiency and advocacy (\textit{Australian Refugee Council} Australia’s Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program: Current Issues and Future Directions: 2007-08). As a result of the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS) in 1979, more volunteers were recruited to engender success in settlement objectives. Funding to ethnic communities and community agencies for settlement assistance was doubled. The establishment of MRCs and funding to other private organizations provided the structure through which the Commonwealth funded and managed settlement assistance.

In general this shift to multiculturalism integrated refugee welfare into Australia’s scheme for its citizenry.\textsuperscript{42} Like other social ventures developed to service the poor, disabled and unemployed, this too was a top-down initiative. The Commonwealth government established this program, and continues to determine

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} The Commonwealth also funded the projects of other non-profit organizations that worked closely with migrants and refugees. MRCs, however, were provided ‘core’ funding, which paid for staff salaries and organizational rent and infrastructure. In effect, these organizations were service provision arms of the Australian federal government.
\item \textsuperscript{42} This particular take on settlement services for newcomers has not changed dramatically in terms of its aims, despite the fact that multiculturalism, as a national value has been widely contested (Brown 2006; Galligan and Roberts 2003; Adelman et al 1994; Lopez 2000). The concern for newcomer equal access to the welfare state remains intact today.
\end{itemize}
on-going settlement policies as needed, managing their implementation each step of the way.

4.2.1.3: Restructuring the Settlement Sector

Settlement policy and the programs utilized to implement this policy did not change much until the Howard administration in the early 2000’s. In the decades following the multicultural turn and leading up to the millennium, policies pertaining to access and equity fortified settlement policy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, with reports of settlement service failures, and the change in Commonwealth leadership, the practice of Australia’s settlement became more business-like, tightly managed and more competitive.

The cornerstone of settlement policy, and therefore settlement services has remained intact. The principles of ‘Access & Equity’, as spelled out by the Galbally Report decades ago have continued to guide settlement practice throughout the late 20th century. Migrants are provided with special services to meet their unique demands when they first arrive, and with continuing long-term services from

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Multiculturalism has never disappeared from the agenda or discourse, but it has been amended. Since the late 1980’s an increased attention toward the economic importance of a diverse population, (given globalizing world economic context) has influenced Australian social and settlement policy. This economic objective remained combined with values for cultural diversity and equal access to the welfare state (see the 1989 National Agenda for Multicultural Australia). The late 1990’s saw an increased emphasis on civic engagement and Australian citizenship as a unifying symbol (1999 National Agenda for Multicultural Australia). This civic duty required that all Aussies “support the structures and principles of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity in our society to flourish (31).” Here we see a delicate maneuvering of language to allow for some hierarchy of Australian values. This did not negate cultural respect, social equity, productive diversity, which still “maximiz[ed]… dividends arising from the diversity of our population” (31). Instead, it asserted an importance to maintaining Australian principles in the face of diversity. This was re-asserted in the 2003 – 2004 Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity Commonwealth publication.
mainstream organizations that service the entire Australian population. In 1991, the National Integrated Settlement Strategy (NISS) was established. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, previously known as the Department of Immigration, set up means of coordination between migrant-specific and mainstream service providers to ensure long-term settlement objectives were met. This required of the service providers in mainstream organizations a proficiency in working with culturally and linguistically diverse populations. Central to this mission was the inclusion of mainstream organizations in settlement planning. This goal required that service providers (policy implementers) clarify their roles while being ever more attentive to connecting their clients with migrant-specific and mainstream services.

These efforts resulted in the creation of a framework of best practices, the Charter of Public Service in a Culturally Diverse Society in 1998. The Charter spelled out the practice of settlement service provision: ‘culturally responsive service delivery.” The main purpose of the Charter was to build these practices into core processes of service delivery. This became the primary instrument for implementing the principle of access and equity. All organizations receiving funds from the Commonwealth are required to comply with the charter.

Nevertheless, key developments in settlement policy have occurred since the millennium: the settlement program has taken on a distinct structure, and has become competitive. The federal government tightly manages these settlement practices.

First, settlement services were broken up into two stages: 1) intensive case

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44 This decision arose from reports from Jupp in 1986 and Fitzgerald in 1988. Jupp, an Australian scholar has written both academic and policy pieces on Australian immigrant and refugee policy and practices.
management to ensure basic material needs were met for newly arrived non-English speaking immigrants (primarily humanitarian entrants) in their first six months; and 2) broader settlement services to last for the first five years of the immigrants’ residence in Australia. This effectively reduced the population eligible for services supported by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to only migrants who had arrived within the last 5 years.\textsuperscript{45} This move reflected a broader trend in Australian social policy: “by intervening early to address emerging social issues, government agencies can improve overall outcomes and make downstream savings by reducing later expenditure on entrenched social problems (2003 Review of Settlement Services Report, p. 33).” Obviously, this was connected to the government’s desire to be more outcome-oriented.

Second, the funding framework was also redirected to fund particular projects based on a competitive contracting and tendering process, rather than providing core funding for established Migrant Resource Centers. The formal institutional link between the government and Migrant Resource Centers was ended. ‘Core’ funding to these Centers, which paid for staff and infrastructure was shut off. Instead, these organizations would compete for project-based funding with all other organizations that could make a good case for receiving government funds. Overall, the Australian system turned toward business-like practices to monitor refugee settlement service delivery. The Department implemented a ‘purchaser/provider model’ of service delivery in which “the purchaser is the party who decides what will be produced, and

\textsuperscript{45} This change most significantly influenced older, established migrant communities that continued to receive services at these migrant-specific organizations. Because this happened during the height of south Sudanese settlement, this population was within this 5-year settlement service window.
the provider is the party who delivers the agreed outputs and outcomes (2003 Settlement Services Review, p 35).”

Despite this recent shift, the overarching contours of Australian settlement remain in place. The Commonwealth continues to determine policy and manage implementation. The government continues to focus on providing services in an equitable fashion, despite shifts toward business-like management practices.

4.2.2: The History of Settlement Policy in the US

Unlike the Australian program, the United States refugee resettlement program has never been directly tied to policies of minority rights or to equality of access to services. The US program has not veered far from its original goal of refugee employment. Instead, the biggest changes in the settlement context have been related to the amount of services and funds that refugees would receive, and who would be footing the bill. Additionally, relative to the role of the central government in Australia in servicing refugees, the US federal government has been much less involved in the specifics of service provision. This decentralized approach, coupled with a focus on employment continues to characterize US settlement today.

4.2.2.1: Piecemeal Policymaking & the Public-Private Partnership

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46 I have drawn predominately from the Office of Refugee Resettlement website, the Refugee Council of USA website; and Holman 2006 (in Haines 2006), except where it’s indicated it came from another source.

47 This is not to say the program isn’t concerned with equal access to services. My point here is that this is not the central focus of the US program.
Before the World Wars, the US also went through periods of more and less exclusion of immigrants from non-northern European countries. Due to the desire to control the ‘cultural’ integrity of the US, elites sought to control immigration. In the 1920’s, the country explicitly controlled the entrance of newcomers through the Quota Act of 1921 and the National Origins Act of 1924.\textsuperscript{48} During this time, immigrant aid societies provided newcomer support. These societies were often organized around ethnic identities – Jewish, Catholic, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and others. These immigrant aid societies provided the private structure of support that still characterizes the structure of actors providing US domestic assistance.

Starting with the entrance into the U.S. of over 250,000 Europeans, fleeing from Nazi persecution in the 1940s, formal policies to resettle individuals specifically fleeing their countries from persecution began during WWII, and in the US, this began a series of piecemeal policies pertaining to dealing with refugee-like newcomers (Holman 1996). This catalyzed the Displaced Person’s Act of 1948. An additional 400,000 Europeans were admitted. Another 200,000 Europeans fleeing from communist regimes were admitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Holman 1996). This unintentional piecemeal approach characterized refugee law for the next 4 decades (Holman 1996). Yet, private ethnic and religious organizations footed the bill for all domestic assistance provided to these refugees.\textsuperscript{49} The US government paid solely for entry, transport and processing costs. And even these

\textsuperscript{48} I did not find literature regarding government-funded settlement services during this period. However, the YMCA’s Nationalities Service Center was involved in women (and later men and families) with immigration and naturalization issues, and learning English (Nationalities Services Center).

\textsuperscript{49} Religious communities were critical players in seeing that their co-religious were resettled to the US as well.
were contracted out to voluntary organizations, which received $40 per refugee for these services.

Despite the initial development of a formal public-private partnership, the US government directly stated that this would not lead to further assistance for refugees (Holman 1996). Reluctantly, the federal government had to eat its words when large numbers of Cubans and Southeast Asians sought resettlement in the US. In the 1960’s Cubans entered ‘en masse’ creating the impetus for the 1962 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. This was the first legislation that included funding for settlement services (albeit only for Cubans).

Thus, the American’s decentralized approach, characterized by a long-standing formal public-private partnership between non-profit organizations and the U.S. government made its entrance. Prior to this Cuban inflow, refugees were processed in camps at the site of their initial asylum. This left ample time for voluntary agencies and receiving communities to prepare for refugee arrivals, including finding newcomer residences and employment. In December of 1960, with the large Cuban influx, the US government began paying for resettlement services completed on US soil, and in addition, began providing funds for long-term settlement services through the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami (Holman 1996). Over 1 million dollars came from the President’s Contingency Fund under Eisenhower. Later, President Kennedy created a nine step Cuban Refugee Program. In the early 1970s, a Matching Grant system was created to provide funds for service organizations helping refugees of other nationalities.
Federal intervention was prompted when, due to lack of employment and settlement resources in Miami, Cuban refugees were unable to access key basic services.\textsuperscript{50} Federal funds offset money provided for health and education services by private organizations, and the state, county and city-level governments. Eisenhower’s administration provided an extensive array of services and assistance including a health and dental clinic and a hospital in the Cuban Refugee Center, payment of half of the public school costs, financial assistance, funds for other states and organizations who resettled refugees coming from Miami, English education for adults, vocational training for Cuban doctors, dentists and other professionals and a loan program for those obtaining a college education. Until 1975, this Cuban-centric program was the sole federal assistance program for incoming refugees.

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees necessitated further development of the Federal government’s piecemeal domestic assistance program. The mid-1970’s saw the demise of several French Southeast Asian governments, many of which were supported politically by the US. As a result, over 130,000 Indochinese refugees, mostly from Vietnam, were permitted US entry. The Indochinese Refugee Task Force was set up as an ad-hoc, temporary system to ensure resettlement of Vietnamese went smoothly. In May of 1975, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 was enacted and provided assistance and services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees equivalent to those

\textsuperscript{50} The Cuban program, (as it is called) brought first pro-Batista elite, business elite and upper middle class and then middle and lower-class Cubans to the US. Miami was the key destination, bringing over 150,000 refugees (Holman 2006)
provided to Cubans.\footnote{This was extended to include Laotians in the following year.} Four processing centers were established throughout the US (and closed in December of the same year), and nine voluntary agencies (VolAgs) were charged with settling the refugee group.\footnote{This included four VolAgs already working with Cuban refugees, plus Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, Tolstoy Foundation, American Council for Nationalities Service, American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees and Travelers Aid International Social Services of America. State (Washington, Iowa, Oklahoma, Maine and New Mexico) and county (Jackson County, Missouri; Indianapolis, Indiana) and local (Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Associations of Los Angeles and New York; the Church of Latter Day Saints in Salt Lake City) resettlement agencies also participated (Holman 2006).} The Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (I-RAP) was established as the first nation-wide federally funded program to settle refugees. Funds were given to states to provide medical assistance and social services such as English language and employment services. Funds were prorated according to each state’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children allocation. Refugees were also eligible to receive Medicaid and social security benefits.

The US’s decentralized approach was evident also in their system to settle Southeast Asian refugees. Primarily local sponsors, resettlement agencies and their affiliates did the work to settle refugees, including orientation, acclimating refugees to new communities, and helping them gain employment. The federal government supplemented their work with various services, including a hotline staffed by refugees and other people who spoke Southeast Asian languages for educating refugees and referring them to mainstream services. A journal to help newly arrived migrants, a ‘New Life,’ was also created. Perhaps the most enduring federal service was the creation of a special unit to encourage the growth of Southeast Asian Mutual Assistance Associations. The goal of creating these associations was to promote self-
help – to enable refugees, through increased orientation and effective support to
develop civic participation on their own.

The evolution of the public-private settlement partnership was furthered
when in 1977 and 1978 roughly 21,000 Soviet Jews were resettled through the
auspices of the American Jewish community. As with previous non-profit
organizations, budgets were tight – prompting these bodies to seek federal assistance.
The advocacy efforts of non-profit organizations servicing refugees demonstrated a
somewhat discriminatory system in which VolAgs received assistance for only
certain communities – namely Cubans and Southeast Asians. In 1979, the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act included $20 million dollars to fund settlement work.
VolAgs received $1000 for each refugee who was not already involved in the Cuban
or I-RAP programs; the VolAgs would be expected to provide funds and in-kind
contributions matching this amount.\(^{53}\) his legislation ensured that any and all
refugees were provided assistance, despite their nationality. Thus, ‘the patchwork
quilt of federally funded domestic programs was now complete, if somewhat
jumbled (Holman 1996; p 12).” This also set the stage for the Refugee Act of 1980.

4.2.2.2: The Refugee Act of 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 provided legislative authority for systematized,
nationally managed settlement services. The basic advancements in the refugee

\(^{53}\) This later was known as the Matching Grant Program. This program is still in operation by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. VolAgs such as the Hebrew Immigrant and Aid Society and the Council of Jewish Federations continued to utilize this programming (thus, foregoing the state-administered programming established by the Refugee Act of 1980). At that time, this 20 million was distributed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Holman 2006).
program included standardization of refugee services, definition of the ‘refugee’ in US law (as was previously written in the UN Protocol), establishment of provisions for a regular flow of admissions and emergency admission if necessary, establishment of a legal basis for federal assistance to refugees, and the creation of a legal basis for the Office of Refugee Resettlement. It aimed to “provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted (Holman 1996; p. 13).” This legislation codified international refugee law into the US legal system, established the on-going consultation process for refugee admissions, established federal post-arrival assistance regardless of nationality and set goals for settlement efforts. It also sculpted the institutional landscape in two ways. The acts called for a US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to oversee and create admission and resettlement policy and established the Office of Refugee Resettlement under the Department of Health and Human Services to administer the resettlement program. At this point, Congress expected an annual admission of 50,000 refugees, but within months of enactment over 125,000 Cubans from the Cuban boat lift and 40,000 additional Haitians arrived.

This act also codified relationships between the federal government, states and resettlement organizations that had been functioning informally since WWII. Prior to this enactment VolAgs were already arranging sponsorship, providing basic

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54 The Department of Health and Human Services was responsible for working with VolAgs that provided services for the Cuban Refugee Program. The Indochinese Program was administered by the State Department (Holman, 2006).

55 Although the International Rescue Committee was founded in 1933 to aid victims of Nazism and Fascism.
needs and reception services (clothing, food, shelter) and social services (English-language training, employment services and access to jobs). Three federal agencies were responsible for administering the resettlement and settlement operations. The State Department managed initial settlement, essentially contracting with VolAgs to perform reception and placement of refugees. The Department of Justice through the Immigration and Naturalization Services handled refugee status determinations (and also managed much of the Cuban and Haitian resettlement). The Department of Health and Human Services administered domestic assistance programs (including establishing a Public Health Service for refugees). The act made a point to give states a central role in the management of funds and service provision of domestic assistance programs. To receive federal funding, a state was obligated to assign a State Coordinator to oversee its refugee operations. States received 85% of appropriated funds, which were allocated according to the number of accommodated refugees. States were required to plan settlement, but were not required to adopt an identical package or model of services.

The act spelled out many programs to receive and settle refugees. These included, in order of priority: 1) unaccompanied minors program; 2) cash and medical assistance: this provided 36 months of funding for state AFDC and Medicaid funds provided to refugees (Refugee Medical Assistance, RMA & Refugee

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56 This was in contrast to the previous relationships that the federal government had established with more local entities. Local governments receive federal funds through the Targeted Assistance Grant program, but these funds are first funneled to the state (who must in turn, give localities 95% of the grant money). This program supplements local and state services when an influx of refugees has arrived in a particular locality (Office of Refugee Resettlement).

57 The Office of Refugee Resettlement establishes this figure. They average the number of refugees in a given 3 fiscal-year period.
Cash Assistance, RCA); 3) Social services including English language training and employment attainment and retention to ensure “refugees...become self-supporting and contributing participants in U.S. Society” (Holman 1996); 4) targeted assistance program; 5) preventive health, including medical screenings abroad and funds to states for screenings post-arrival; and 6) Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program.58

4.2.2.3: Assistance and Services to Refugees since the Refugee Act of 1980

Throughout the 1980’s, policy regarding refugee domestic assistance evolved due to the changing landscape of social policy in the US. In particular, a concern for welfare dependency resulted in a sharp reduction of funds and services for refugees, as well as the creation of an additional alternative program. In 1982, Congress added new language specifying that refugee attainment of immediate employment was the key objective of refugee settlement. This redirected social service funds toward employment services and required that English language classes were to be during non-work hours. Additionally, it established a system of case management to see that these ends were met. In 1984, the Wilson-Fish Program was added to the ORR repertoire. Like the Matching Grant program, it was an alternative program to establish employment for refugees to prevent them from having to go on the ‘dole.’ Congress established this, fearing rising levels of welfare dependency on the part of refugees. These funds were directed to VolAgs, rather than states.

58 This originated from the 1975 federally funded program for non-Cuban, non-Southeast Asian refugees. Now it is an alternative to state-administered programs and is given to refugees in the 2nd month of settlement. Basically it provides funds to organizations to provide services to help refugees become self-sufficient without using welfare programs.
Due to these dependency concerns, in the mid-1980s, spending on refugee domestic assistance relative to the number of admitted refugees declined. This shifted costs to the states and, in general, decreased the availability of cash and medical programs for refugees. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 limited spending for many federal programs, including refugee resettlement. This reduced the amount of time that the federal government was required to pay for state cash and medical programs for refugees. This requirement was reduced in 1986 from 36 months to 31 months, and down to 24 months in 1988. This trend continued throughout the 1980s and into 1990, when the federal government withdrew the federal commitment to funding Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) entirely – a move that many states claimed was an “abrogation to a ‘federal compact with the states” (Holman 1996; p. 23). Congress responded, asserting that the original 36-month limit was never an entitlement, but a maximum amount.

The dependency concern may not have been entirely unwarranted. The ORR substantiated these claims and asserted that not only refugees, but service providers too, had thought of the program as an entitlement. The ORR claimed that this resulted in deferment of employment in order for the refugees to gain education and training. Indeed, these findings caused the ORR to reduce payments to 18 months, independent of Congressional action in 1982. The ORR reduced federal contributions to RCA and RMA again in 1988, and once more in 1991, where the current time period of 8 months remains, despite the lack of federal requirement for such contributions. The 1990s saw relatively little change in terms of resettlement
and settlement funding and institutional landscape. The Bush, Sr. administration attempted to drop all federal funding, but ultimately was not successful.

Overall, US settlement policy has not veered far from its original goals or far from its original structure. The program seeks to integrate refugees by helping them attain economic self-sufficiency and achieves this through a decentralized and laissez faire approach of managing the program. More evidence of this is shown later in this chapter.

4.2.3: The Histories Reviewed

Studying the histories of settlement policy in these two contexts provides us with a background with which to examine the settlement of Southern Sudanese refugees in the US and Australia. Clues arise regarding the empirical puzzle I seek to resolve. I note that in each, systems of policies and programs evolved as governing bodies sought to deal responsibly (and as advocates pressured these bodies) with the events and circumstances of immigration as they unfolded through time.

The basic elements of settlement policy have been formed in each country. Welfare assistance at different levels of government to meet refugee needs has been established. In both countries, the public and private sectors have particular roles to play; these roles provide a framework for the distribution of funding and key actions of service-provider personnel. Yet, as shown in the historical descriptions above, given the different historical factors of each nation, different settlement environments have taken shape in the US and Australia. The evolution of US
refugee settlement policy has resulted in a pointed focus on refugee economic integration. In contrast, Australia’s settlement policy history has resulted in a focus on refugee access to the Australian welfare state. Additionally, while the Australian program was created and is managed by the Commonwealth, the US system is marked by decentralization and heavy involvement by private organizations.

The varying influences in these two environments have helped shape different trajectories of political activism of the Sudanese refugee communities in the US and Australia. Within these environments refugees have been privy to divergent social networks and programs which have played a significant role in refugee political activism. Having examined the historical roots of these two differing settlement environments I will now discuss in more depth these key institutional variables: settlement strategies and policies, funding, and policy implementers.

**4.3: Differences Between the Settlement Environments**

Both the US and Australia aim to help refugees become self-sufficient, or self-reliant. Yet, the long-term strategies and the specific settlement programs that they have utilized to realize this goal have important differences. Additionally, the policy implementers, including both service providers and volunteers who do the day-to-day work of settling refugees, vary in significant ways. The Australian model provides generous social services for a relatively extensive time to ensure refugees have access to services in a manner equal to citizens. Thus, more extensive, long-term services including community capacity building, youth programming and civic education as standard programming are in the Australian context. Policy
implementers there are comprised mainly of secular, non-profit agency staff whose programs are funded primarily by government agencies. In contrast, the United States’ key strategy for settling refugees is to see that they are employed quite early on in the settlement process. Additionally, due to the strong public-private partnership in the US, non-profit agencies obtain a substantial amount of material support from private sources, thus supplementing US government funds. US policy implementers include more people from faith-based organizations and a greater number of volunteers. These settlement characteristics, the variables of strategy and programs, funding, and the composition of policy implementation staff, are major factors which account for the differences in terms of refugee political activism found in the two settlement contexts. In this section, I discuss each one of these attributes (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Comparative Settlement Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Settlement Strategy</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Policy Implementers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td>Equal Access to State Benefits</td>
<td>Mostly government-based</td>
<td>More secular, Non-profit staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>Quick Employment</td>
<td>Greater private support</td>
<td>More faith-based, more volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1: Settlement Strategies and Subsequent Programs

The United States and Australia have alternative strategies to settle refugees. These strategies, or settlement policies, are social policies that define the way the country works with or supports refugees to integrate into the social, economic and sometimes political fabric of their new country. In practice, these policies guide the
creation of packages of services provided to incoming refugees to help them meet their short- and long-term needs. When developing these policies, countries make choices about what resources to distribute to refugees and how much will be distributed.

Each settlement country has engineered its unique settlement policies in a way that reflects its basic approaches to meeting its own citizens’ basic needs. In the US settlement policy is centered on finding employment for refugees as soon as possible and is achieved through minimalist support that aims to stimulate refugees to helping themselves. The Australian approach is much softer. Refugees are provided long-term access to health services, cash and employment assistance, and extensive English education. Programs to build the capacity of emerging refugee communities are given greater importance in Australia. These approaches matter significantly when it comes to what services refugees will receive, and with whom they interact with.

4.3.1.1: The Institutionalized Australian Approach

The Australian program combines extensive short-term and long-term services to refugees to help them “rebuild their lives and become fully functioning members of the Australian community (Department of Immigration and Citizenship

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59 Again, each country’s basic social policy approaches set the parameters of refugee settlement environments. In Australia, the government takes a more interventionist social policy approach evident in their national programs for welfare and employment, vocational training and healthcare. The US is much less interventionist. Due to fear of government largesse, individual abuse of government programs and dependency on government rather than individual self-reliance, the US has historically engaged in far less large-scale social interventions. But these social policy approaches are not in and of themselves the only force behind these settlement program differences. These approaches are reinforced and perpetuated through time by the public and private actors involved in planning and implementing refugee settlement policies. Australia’s restructuring of settlement policy is a good example of this.
The Australian program does this by prioritizing a variety of services, rather than focusing in on employment. In general, these programs "focus on building self-reliance, developing English language skills and fostering links with mainstream services. (3)" (New Beginnings: Supporting new arrivals on their settlement journey – 2006 – 2007). This wider breath of services as meant that most newcomer needs are met and provided in full by the settlement system. For this reason, I characterize the Australian settlement system as ‘institutionalized.’

Refugee needs are met through programs were codified under the National Settlement Strategy Scheme and are structured into two key elements: the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy and the Settlement Grants Program. The former provides initial support for at least the first six months of a refugee’s settlement, and if necessary for a year. Refugee needs are assessed and services are provided, including a) case management and referrals; b) reception and assistance upon arrival (housing, orientation, food, clothing, emergency needs); c) accommodation services; and d) torture and trauma services (counseling).

After this initial six-month period, refugees are then referred to migrant and refugee service organizations that are funded through the Settlement Grants Program (the SGP). The SGP is a Commonwealth grant program that funds migrant service organizations to help new arrivals settle. The program aims to support projects to “help clients to become self-reliant and participate equitably in AUS society as soon

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60 In practice, as discussed in Chapter 3, Special Humanitarian Program entrants generally receive less intensive services, as their sponsor is required to serve as the primary caretaker.

61 This began in 2005 after a comprehensive review of settlement services and management.
as possible after arrival.” The main types of projects that are funded fall into 3 categories: a) Australian orientation, aimed to provide “practical assistance to promote [refugee] self-reliance”; b) Developing Communities, or fostering community organization and self-reliance; and c) integration services, which seek to increase refugee inclusion and participation in Australian society (Settlement Grants Programme 2008-2009 Application Information Booklet).

The Developing Communities component of the Settlement Grants program aimed at “develop[ing] [refugee community] capacity to organize, plan and advocate for services to meet [the refugees’] own need[s]”. This is especially important to examine given this dissertation project’s goals. Program initiatives involve connecting refugee leaders with service providers and “foster[ing] the ability of newly arrived communities to organize and engage with governments, service providers and the Australian community at large” (New South Wales: Settlement trends and needs of new arrivals 2007; p.8). My interview research indicates that Developing Community programs include training in leadership, writing grants, fundraising and organizational incorporation. Office space is often provided for

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62 The orientation program seeks to build skills and provide information to enable refugees to ‘operate independently,’ and have access to mainstream services. Funding extends to projects that provide information and referrals and conduct case management. Ethnic community capacity building projects aim to help developing communities to ‘identify common goals and interests and develop a sense of identity and belonging.’ Settlement Grant Program funding is provided to projects that are focused on developing community leadership and skill building, and that help migrant leaders to promote their communities positively to Australian society. Finally, the Integration-Inclusion and Participation funding is given to projects that encourage interaction of arrivals and members of the local community, and broader local community receptiveness and responsiveness to migrants. Initiatives often include interaction in sports, schools, help with starting up small businesses and cottage industries, and driver’s education. Specialist counseling, professional translating or interpreting and multicultural events are not funded because these services are the responsibility of other agencies or specialist services. In practice migrant service organizations administer a variety of programs under these rubrics, including Australian cultural and social training, parenting courses, additional language training, and access to community college courses. They link refugees to ‘mainstream services,’ as well as give material assistance for refugees’ rent and other bills when needed. The package of services varies depending on the expertise of the organization, and refugee needs, as assessed by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
settlement organizations. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, these projects are prioritized in Australia and neglected in the US, relatively speaking.

4.3.1.2: The US’s Laissez Faire Approach

The US program, like Australia, also provides short-term and long-term programming, yet aims to settle refugees by focusing predominately on refugee employment, and leaving most other matters up to refugees and their private supporters. Employment is emphasized almost immediately. Other programs, while present, are sparse relative to the Australian programs, and are not prioritized. Overall, this means that relative to Australia, the US program does not meet all of the needs of newcomers.

The basic structure of the settlement program is similar to the Australian program. It has two components, a short-term program to meet basic refugee needs, the Reception & Placement Program (R&P); and programs for more long-term assistance, Domestic Refugee Assistance Programs. For the R&P program, refugees receive services to meet their basic needs for the first 90 days. Organizations providing these services officially ‘sponsor’ the refugee, do pre-settlement

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63 The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship prioritizes communities with the greatest needs, those who have permanent residence status and that have arrived in the last five years. Programs to assist ‘new and emerging communities’ with needs such as organizing, planning and advocacy for settlement services and who are still receiving new arrivals are also included in the Settlement Grants Program. Objectively, temporary protection visa holders or asylum seekers are in just as much, if not greater need. However, they are not serviced through these programs (except in rare cases, mainly in rural or regional areas). This has been the source of conflict between the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, migrant settlement organizations and the migrant advocacy community.

64 This term is a bit confusing. It means that the VolAg accepts initial responsibility for the refugee. The VolAg is officially claiming that their affiliate organization is able to provide these initial services for them, mainly by having the language capacity and health facilities for incoming refugees.
planning to determine where the refugee will be placed, welcome them at the airport and transport them to their new residence, and provide for their basic needs including housing, furnishings, food, clothing, community orientation, referral to social service providers, healthcare, and employment. Much of this work is also organized around a case management system that tracks the refugee anywhere from 90 to 180 days. This quote, taken directly from the US State Department’s Reception and Placement “Funding Opportunity Announcement” demonstrates the pointed focus on economic integration:

“The purpose of the R&P program is to promote the successful resettlement of all persons who are admitted to the United States under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,” by “assist[ing] refugees to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible.”

The Domestic Refugee Assistance Programs, funded and administered by the Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), are long-term efforts to assist refugees to become “integrated members of American society.” While the majority of funds are provided to pay for refugee cash and medical assistance (through the US states), many of these programs have, as their main focus, economic integration, or at least employment and income generation (Office of Refugee Resettlement). Secondly, funds in the form of discretionary grants are also provided to states and private, non-profit organizations to administer programs that are predominantly geared towards promoting refugee employability. They include the Agricultural Partnership, the Cuban and Haitian Program, 66

65 From the Office of Refugee Resettlement website.

66 The description of the programmatic aims begins with employment: “Program objectives are to support employment services, hospitals and other health and mental health care programs, adult and vocational education services, refugee crime or victimization programs, and citizenship and naturalization services.” Office of Refugee Resettlement.
Individual Development Accounts, the Matching Grant\textsuperscript{67}, Microenterprise Development, the Preferred Communities Program,\textsuperscript{68} the Social Services Program\textsuperscript{69} and the Wilson-Fish Program.\textsuperscript{70}

Although economic integration is the main priority, other programs help with general and specific refugee needs. For example, general programs include the a) Preventive Health program, aimed at providing access to immediate healthcare services to reduce the spread of infectious disease; b) the Health Marriages program, to foster healthy marriages and families; and c) the Repatriation program, which helps refugees return to their country by providing travel loans. Specific sub-populations of refugees are also targeted to meet their specific needs, including unaccompanied refugee minors, older refugees and survivors of torture and trauma.

The US and Australian programs do share the same general mission: to integrate refugees into their new countries, and to do so by supporting them to

\textsuperscript{67} The Matching Grant aims to “assist qualifying populations in attaining economic self-sufficiency within 120 to 180 days from their date of eligibility for ORR funded services. Self-sufficiency must be achieved without accessing public cash assistance.”

\textsuperscript{68} This program’s goal is “to support the resettlement of newly arriving refugees in Preferred Communities where they have ample opportunities for early employment and sustained economic independence and, to address special populations who need intensive case management, culturally and linguistically appropriate linkages and coordination with other service providers to improve their access to services.”

\textsuperscript{69} “This program supports employability services and other services that address participants’ barriers to employment such as social adjustment services, interpretation and translation services, day care for children, citizenship and naturalization services, etc. Employability services are designed to enable refugees to obtain jobs within one year of becoming enrolled in services. Service priorities are (a) all newly arriving refugees during their first year in the U.S. who apply for services; (b) refugees who are receiving cash assistance; (c) unemployed refugees who are not receiving cash assistance; and (d) employed refugees in need of services to retain employment or to attain economic independence.”

\textsuperscript{70} Taken directly from the website: “The purpose of the WF program is to increase refugee prospects for early employment and self-sufficiency, promote coordination among voluntary resettlement agencies and service provider and ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every State where refugees are resettled.
become self-reliant. But, as demonstrated, each country takes a somewhat different approach. Within each country, the levels and sources of funding for refugee settlement also differ.

4.3.2: Funding Amounts and Sources

Refugee settlement policies and programs are funded in both countries by public and private sources. However, the relative levels of funding by these sources differ considerably in the two contexts. Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship oversees both refugee resettlement and settlement services and provides the lion’s share of funds for settlement programs. In the United States funding is more equitably distributed between both private and public sources due to an established public-private partnership. The State Department, through the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, oversees and funds refugee resettlement and partially funds initial refugee settlement services. The Office of Refugee Resettlement, in the Department of Health and Human Services provides funds for limited refugee cash and medical assistance, and longer-term social services.

The federal government provides the majority of support for refugee settlement in both the United States and Australia, but again the private sector provides more support for refugee settlement in the United States relative to Australia. This is demonstrated in the evidence below. Eighty percent of organizations servicing refugees in Australia (Figure 4.1) and only 60% of organizations in the US receive the majority of their funds from federal government sources (Figure 4.2) (as represented by the yellow portion of the figures).
Due to the extensive amount of migrant service organizations that receive funding for refugee settlement work in Australia, I sampled from lists of organizations funded by the SGP grant. By this, I mean that I first divided the group of organizations according to their regions. Within each region, I divided the organizations into 3 equally sized groups according to the amount of funds they received from the SGP grant. I chose 2 organizations on the top-end of the funding list, 1 from the middle and 1 from the end (5 total). Then, I gathered information from their websites about their sources of funding. Most organizations did not have annual reports or specific figures about their funding sources. They did, however, have claims about their sources of funding. For organizations that I labeled as receiving a ‘a lot’ of funding from the government, their websites made claims similar to this: “The centre has a variety of funding sources; however it receives the majority of its funding from the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.” For those in I labeled ‘some,’ they claimed to have wider sources of funding. For example, this organization stated: ” Programs are funded by both the ACT and Australian Governments,” and they had information about receiving revenue from fees and investments too. For those I labeled ‘a little,’ they actually had figures that were under 33% of total funding.
It is likely too that the US figures underestimate the percentage of resources received by private sources because unpaid volunteers provide much of the legwork involved in settlement services there. This is discussed in the next sub-section.

These findings are not surprising given the historical trajectories of the development of settlement policy and the entire settlement system in these two countries. Australia’s top-down approach has resulted in more substantial funding for the program, while the US’s public-private partnership has engendered a commitment on the part of refugee service organizations to establish their own sources of funding.
The general discourse of settlement organizations substantiates this evidence.

While many US organizations publicly display and note with praise their plethora of donors, Australian organizations make different claims. Most are similar to this example:

The Fairfield Migrant Resource Centre is funded principally by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to deliver settlement services to newly arrived migrants, humanitarian entrants and refugees to improve access to services, address special settlement needs and help develop skills and confidence (Fairfield Migrant Resource Centre).

Overall funding per refugee by federal government sources, including the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in Australia and the US’s State Department and the Office of Refugee Resettlement highlight this trend as well (see Figure 4.3).

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72 In the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) latest annual report, 9 pages (of the 38 total) list private donors. Granted, the IRC’s work extends far beyond only refugee resettlement and includes a variety of humanitarian efforts including international development and post-conflict reconstruction, and international refugee protection work.

73 It is important to note that US refugee inflows are much higher than in Australia. The lowest amount of refugees, 26,807 was resettled in 2002, the year following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 – when the US almost completely shut down its resettlement program. Australia’s highest level of refugees resettled during this period, 13,061 in 2004, is still less than half of the US’s lowest amount (see Appendix F for numbers of incoming refugees in each country).
Figure 4.3: Annual Government funding per incoming refugee


Note 2: US data in the year 2000 includes funds to the IOM for transporting and processing refugees to the US.

The US’s per refugee expenditures come close to Australia’s expenditures in only one year, 2003,. In all other years, the Commonwealth far exceeds the US federal government, and in some cases is almost double (2006) and quadruple the amount (2001). These contextual differences influence the political activism of Sudanese refugees. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, these different sources and levels of funding play a role in how settlement policy implementers channel, or guide refugee leaders toward specific political goals. In Chapter 5, I show how these attributes may determine whether or not industrious refugees seek out private support on their own.

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74 In January of 2010, the US State Department increased the amount of funds in the Reception and Placement program. Widely celebrated by the refugee settlement service sector, refugees now have twice the amount of funds given for their basic needs in the first 90 days, and settlement service providers were given additional funds to provide these services. Obviously, this recent change will not impact the Sudanese community explored in this project.
I now turn to a description of refugee settlement policy implementers in both countries.

4.3.3 Refugee Settlement Policy Implementers

The people who implement settlement programs, whom I call policy implementers, vary across these two countries. Two key differences stand out. First, the Australian program includes many more professional policy implementers relative to the US. Second, in both countries these policy implementers are comprised mostly of staff of non-profit organizations. However, in the United States, the majority of organizations servicing the refugees are faith-based, while in Australia they are secular. Examining who these actors are is important because these providers are often the first to greet, and to orient refugees to their new communities; they can also bridge social gaps and expand refugee social networks. They are information sources, linking refugees to resources, which can meet their basic needs. The policy implementers also assist the refugees in the achievement of their longer-term goals, such as education, naturalization and more sophisticated political aims. In many respects they are the key Australian and American nationals with whom refugees interact.

Over 180 organizations implement refugee settlement policy in Australia, including both short and long-term programs. These organizations include generalist migrant service providers and multicultural and community development specialist organizations, ethnic-based organizations and associations, large and small faith-based charitable organizations, and for-profit organizations. Only 10 organizations
do this work in the US, although they oversee the work of over 400 affiliate offices spread through the country. They are Church World Service, Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Hebrew Immigration Aid Society, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigration, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, World Relief, and Kurdish Human Rights Watch (Refugee Council USA). As is clear from this listing, these US actors are overwhelmingly non-secular. These two countries are quite different in this regard (see Figure 4.4).⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ This information was collected individually from Australian and US organizations funded to provide refugee settlement services. I developed a list of Australian organizations by combining all organizations that received Commonwealth Funding for the IHHS and SGP programs.
It is clear that the majority of policy implementers in the US context, and a fairly small portion in Australia, are faith-based organizations. This matters to South Sudanese activism because it shapes the individuals that refugee leaders are interacting with. This is the subject of Chapter 5.

4.4: The Empirical Puzzle and Divergent Settlement Environments
In this chapter, I have presented and compared the settlement environments in Australia and the US, particularly the factors of settlement policies, sources and amounts of funding and policy implementers. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, these variables have significantly shaped the political activities of Southern Sudanese refugees. Though both countries have somewhat similar histories of mass immigration and both have systems for refugee resettlement which have evolved greatly over the past hundred years – Australia and the United States have markedly different environments into which refugees settle.

Australia has a framework of top-down central government management, a concern that government must intervene to ensure settlement needs are met, and an emphasis on equal access to the provisions of a welfare-oriented system. The program is centralized and institutionalized. On the other hand, the US system places greatest emphasis on meeting refugee needs through public-private partnerships, and immediate employment of refugees as a means of preventing welfare dependency. This program is decentralized and takes a hands-off approach. As a consequence, refugees are met with divergent programming and interact with different types of policy implementers. I have found a marked difference in the trajectories of political activism of the Sudanese refugee communities in the US and Australia due in part to these influences.

I describe these factors in detail in the following chapters. I show that through a social networking mechanism, policy implementers influence whom refugees are interacting with, and thus their subsequent financial and emotional
support for particular types of political activities (Chapter 5). I also show how policy implementers direct refugee leader activism toward specific goals. Through implementation of Refugee Organization Building programs, policy implementers channel refugee activism toward domestic-oriented goals (Chapter 6).
Chapter 5: Policy Implementers, Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities

5.1: Introduction

In this chapter, utilizing evidence from semi-structured interviews with refugees, service providers and government officials, I demonstrate mechanisms through which settlement policy influences refugee political activities. My overarching argument is this: the variance in settlement policy implementers – the professional service providers and volunteers, who ‘settle’ refugees – results in different refugee politics. Because refugee leaders’ goals are malleable, the social connections they develop can significantly influence what they do. Given that these policy implementers are the first individuals that refugees are interacting with, these individuals in particular can play a significant role in shaping what political activities refugee leaders decide to pursue.

Two key points are made in this chapter. First, because settlement service organizations are engaged in daily settlement work and thereby have a significant role in determining the contacts refugee leaders make, the make-up of these policy implementers must be examined. The kind of contact made is based upon what type of settlement service organization is servicing the refugee leader. By ‘type’ I refer to the general composition of service providers in each country – whether they are secular or faith-based and if they are more or less supported by the federal government. Whether or not refugees interact with non-professional (volunteer) policy implementers is a matter of importance. The evidence I present suggests that
those policy implementers who support transnational activism are often volunteers. Given the decentralized, laissez faire approach in the US, Sudanese refugees in the U.S. are more likely to have developed relationships with non-professional (volunteer) service providers than those in Australia. Professional service providers are constrained by settlement policy objectives, and thus are unlikely to provide direct support for goals that extend beyond the domestic sphere.

Secondly, the role of faith-based organizations in the US is a particularly salient factor in the transnational political activities of South Sudanese refugees there. Religious communities supported refugee leaders in various ways. In this chapter, I present two ways through which the US settlement environment fosters faith-based social connections. First, it does so in a direct manner: local faith communities across the country provide volunteers for faith-based VolAgs. Valuable and lasting relationships are often developed between these volunteers and Sudanese refugees. Secondly, in some instances, refugee leaders have sought out church communities for support. Some evidence suggests that this is certainly a result of the industriousness of the refugee leaders. Yet, it is also because of the lower levels of social support provided by the more laissez-faire US government programming.

As refugees move through the process of integration into their new society, they connect with the workers involved in their settlement and with various members of the local community. Gradually a network of persons interacting and contacting one another for mutual assistance and support develops. A social network of this sort is vital to the successful achievement of a refugee’s goals, as an individual and as a
group member. The following table outlines the two-stage process that is the focus of this chapter. In this process, first the type of policy implementer composition influences the type of refugee social network that in turn influences the target of refugee political activities (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Policy Implementers, Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Policy Implementers</th>
<th>Refugee Social Network</th>
<th>Sudanese Political Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Private-Volunteer</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>More Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Provider-centric</td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>More Domestic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, I demonstrate this first step of the causal process, in which refugees are interacting with different policy implementers in each context. In particular, I show how volunteers have been more present in refugee settlement in the US context relative to the Australian context, especially during the period of Sudanese settlement. This is particularly true for faith-based volunteers. In the third section, I show first that refugees have developed crucial enduring social relationships with policy implementers, both faith-based and non-faith-based. Then, I present evidence that suggests that these social connections have influenced the target of Sudanese refugee political activities. This completes the second stage of the causal process.

5.2: A Comparison of Settlement Policy Implementers

As described in Chapter 4, in the US, 10 nationally organized non-profit agencies, the majority of which are faith-based, do professional refugee settlement
work. They have a cooperative agreement with the US federal government that requires these organizations to get a substantial amount of private support for their service efforts. To provide the basic services for refugees, professional service providers, most of which as faith-based, in the US have no choice but to seek out additional support. Volunteers, originating from these various civil society institutions, are therefore heavily involved in the daily work of refugee settlement. The US has essentially decentralized policy implementation in their refugee settlement system. In contrast, the Australian settlement system is made up of almost 200, mostly independent and secular locally based organizations. They too contract with the federal government, but as previously discussed, the Australian federal government provides ample settlement support, relative to the United States, and does not specifically require organizations to seek out additional support. The individuals providing the most service, who have daily interaction with refugees, are funded predominately by the federal government.

Due to both historical circumstances and the institutional arrangements discussed above, each context utilizes private support, particularly volunteers, differently.76 I show the more vital role that volunteers in the US context play. Refugee service organizations have established volunteer mobilization schemes. In the case of the Lost Boys of Sudan, VolAgs created specific educational resources to gain community support before their arrival. Given the restructuring of refugee

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76 I refer to policy implementers as both professionals and volunteers who provide social services to refugees. Volunteers in this field often provide a substantial amount of services, even those identical to typical paid social service workers. It makes sense logically and theoretically to see them both as implementers of refugee settlement policy.
settlement in Australia, volunteers have not been utilized or mobilized to the same extent.

5.2.1: Volunteer Engagement in the US

The role of volunteers in the US has shifted over the years, but as I describe in this section, it has always been a central element of the program. In the 1980’s the practice of recruiting volunteers was critical to U.S. refugee settlement, especially with faith-based organizations. At this time, many VolAgs would only accept an incoming refugee case if they had found a community volunteer to ‘sponsor’ them, meaning that they would provide much of the short-term support, including residence with the American family. But, as a current State Coordinator and former service provider notes: “The landscape here has changed radically.” In the mid-1990s, this shifted from recruitment of community volunteers to recruitment of family members and then toward the current ‘agency-sponsorship’ model. This interviewee notes that the last shift was due in part to the on-the-ground realities for African refugees: “African refugees were not as willing or able to assist their relatives as they started coming - so it migrated to an agency-sponsored model” (Subject 41, November 2009). Additionally, several service providers noted that it became increasingly difficult to recruit community volunteers in this manner. Following the events of September 11, the refugee program stalled, volunteer recruitment waned and churches moved on to work on alternate pressing social concerns. Socioeconomic changes (such as the factor of a greater number of families in which both the wife and husband are working and have less free time per family
unit) have resulted in less time spent volunteering, particularly in this sponsorship model. This had institutional effects upon VolAgs as illustrated by this observation by one national VolAg representative: “we also went through budget reductions and we lost our sponsor developer staff, so we are not recruiting sponsors actively - so it is hard to go back to this model” (Subject 52, November 2009).

Despite this decline in the sponsorship model, refugee resettlement is still highly dependent on volunteer support, and thus VolAgs still engage in volunteer mobilization. Central to the US public-private partnership is the reality that these agencies will bring their own resources to the refugee settlement system. Through their own connections, they are charged with raising funds, garnering in-kind donations and mobilizing volunteers to see that these short- and long-term services are provided to refugees. Thus, due to this public-private arrangement, the individuals providing social services in the US, the policy implementers, include not only paid staff but also a variety of volunteers.

For both short- and long-term services, VolAgs and their affiliates have little choice about utilizing volunteers: “…the feds would never be able to fund the program...They would never be able to completely fund all the needs of refugees.

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77 This also has political effects. The extensive use of volunteers from the beginning of the US resettlement has meant that a strong culture of private involvement exists in refugee settlement. This has created a source of a refugee system constituency, as this service provider turned coordinator comments: “this is a viable program reflected in faith based and community work….this is good, [it] brings a resource to resettlement that government isn’t going to get you to. [It] gets community buy-in.” Indeed without this level of community support some believe the system would not function: “Private agencies have made this long-lasting - when government says, maybe we don’t want to settle - these agencies say - we will provide such and such. They represent constituencies in important ways - people get committed to causes, they believe in specific things - they make it happen more than what government does. The private side is what has kept bi-partisanship support for the refugee resettlement program (Former provider, now State Refugee Coordinator).” “Its [this public-private partnership] - that is what US Refugee resettlement needs to be built on - there is no way any government can change that. People are really the backbone - need people to believe in it - if government sanctions it, but communities begrudge it - it won’t work. They need to be in support of it- materially and in the spirit of it…” (Subject 41).
And that is why VolAgs work at getting volunteers - getting with congregations to help,” stated a representative of a US State Refugee Coordinator (Subject 53, November 2009). This partnership, although obviously due to US government resource constraints, is also a result of the historical trajectory of the US program. It has not always been a public-private partnership. Originally, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it was just a private program; it “was just NGOs doing resettlement. Then in 1980, the Act was implemented - then the government got involved in an institutional, structural way (Ibid).” Due to these historical and fiscal reasons, in the present-day US refugee resettlement system, a much wider range of people provide services to refugees. These service providers have previously established relationships with congregations, educational institutions and local non-profit organizations that sustain their volunteer base. Of all US service providers interviewed, 71% identified the central need of volunteers for the refugee settlement program (as compared to only 23% of Australian service providers).

Settlement actors have managed “to learn how to navigate that system” through mobilizing American volunteers to raise money, provide in-kind donations and their ‘time’ to work with refugees (Ibid). For the Matching Grant program, for example, VolAgs are required to match federal dollars at the rate of 50%. This matching of funds and other resources is essential, as this national VolAg representative’s words demonstrate: “It is vital also that we get that support from parishes and community - parishes are our mainstay. Millions of dollars are

78 Before the Reception and Placement grant, the Matching Grant served as the key program supported by the US federal government to provide equal services for non-Cuban, non-Vietnamese refugee populations. This both mirrored and perpetuated the public-private partnership between the US federal government and national Voluntary agencies.
Volunteers are much more engaged in the United States in part because these settlement actors mobilize them. Some VolAgs have specific educational campaigns to engage volunteers, especially through their churches and synagogues. For one national VolAg, World Relief, a key part of their brief is to engage congregation members to serve populations in need. The mission of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) division on Migration and Refugee Services centers on having Catholics live out their Christian faith by providing service: “to serve and advocate for people on the move” (Subject 52, November 2009).

In some cases, members of faith organizations will reach out to VolAg affiliates for service opportunities to help refugees. In this section, I describe various methods of volunteer mobilization.

Many national voluntary agencies had both public education and volunteer engagement procedures. At one VolAg, representatives spoke about specific staff procedures aimed at “work[ing] on church relations, church marketing, church engagement” (National Voluntary Agency Representatives, Subjects 42 and 43, November 2009). Through this initiative the VolAg determines the best materials to use and means of approaching churches and volunteers. This particular VolAg has standard materials, a ‘Good Neighbor Guide’ to engage volunteers and churches. Another also had a guide, ‘People Helping People’ which was given to affiliates to engage church congregations. Additionally, some VolAgs still “strive to get co-sponsorships,” in which the VolAg will partner with the “church to co-sponsor a family” (US Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009). Yet, due to the historical
reasons discussed above, this specific type of volunteer-VolAg relationship, in which
these volunteers almost replace the VolAg in the initial short-term period, is less
frequent now. Many VolAgs are no longer comfortable granting this level of
responsibility to volunteers. Nevertheless, volunteers continue to have substantive
roles in refugee settlement in the US.

Some Voluntary Agencies see this mobilization as a central part of their
mission: “Our mission is to work with the church - there is an intentionality -
working with local congregations.” To engage local congregations, this organization
asks affiliates to be reflective about: “how are you empowering the church? How are
you engaging the church to serve refugees?” (Subjects 42, 43, November 2009).
Furthermore, volunteer engagement is so essential that VolAg affiliate directors
develop specific strategies to engage them. One former director described how s(he)
utilized faith leaders to both mobilize and manage the volunteers in their
congregations: “We decided to…find faith leaders within denominations. [We told
these leaders:] We need this - we need these core volunteers - you, as the [faith]
leader have to get them to be our volunteers - you be our whips - they were our
generals - we always made sure they were in the community. [It was like] if so and
so says it, they’ll do it.” Mobilizing faith leaders created additional benefits,
including garnering “good media coverage, political and business
support…[and]…they were hiring people [refugees]” (Former Director, US VolAg
affiliate, Subject 41, October 2009).

It is fairly obvious at this point that faith-based organizations play an
enormous role in the United States’ refugee resettlement program. This has been true
from its inception. VolAgs educate and inspire local congregations to provide support to incoming refugees. Such congregations are an essential resource for refugee resettlement in the United States. They often provide the lion’s share of in-kind donations that support refugees when they first arrive. They give cash and volunteers. One national VolAg representative notes: “we have a strong relationship with Lutheran congregations, mosques, etcetera. This is the reason why this agency has been so successful at resettling refugees. Without church involvement, volunteers, donations, our resettlement program wouldn’t succeed” (Subject 50, October 2009). And, although many faith-based organizations do draw on a majority of support from populations that follow their faith, the Catholics, Jewish, and Protestants are not only engaging their co-religious. A range of churches from a variety of faith traditions are involved. In Utah, for example, the Mormon Church is greatly involved: “…unless you’ve been out here, it is hard to understand how pervasive the Mormon Church is. …There are all kinds of resources that the church makes available,” such as, “Goodwill-like stores, where refugees can receive vouchers or free stuff and food. And they also employ refugees - although this is limited to one year. They provide beds, mattresses and furniture to resettlement agencies. They help with emergency rental funds. So, the Latter Day Saints church is the one of our best partners” (State Coordinator, Subject 57 December 2009). Interview subjects discussed other examples of church involvement. One Presbyterian Church created art therapy programs for refugees and other churches developed missions to sponsor refugee families.

Refugees themselves also mobilize volunteers. In the following instance, this
volunteer, who developed a strong bond with one Sudanese refugee, Chol, through her church’s relationship with one of the VolAgs, was mobilized to volunteer her services even more: “Chol came to me and said that [the Lost Boys] have nothing - Mom, can you help - I was horrified by what I saw with their resettlement. At that time I was really involved with the church, in the counseling area. I realized that all of the things that were missing we could give them. So, we worked with them for some time - over the first 3 years [of their settlement process]” (Subject 61, January 2010). This quote highlights a central reason that volunteers are utilized more often in the US: governmental services that refugees receive can be less than adequate at times.

5.2.1.1: Volunteer Mobilization for the Lost Boys of Sudan

Public education strategies were highly effective in the case of the Lost Boys of Sudan. One national voluntary agency representative describes the utility of getting the message out about this particular refugee cohort: “We [the Voluntary Agencies] were all very interested in this population because of their story- they were alone, without parents, without guidance. So we’d heard of their great desire to be educated - info like that - just a wonderful story - and as we told that story in the US - the parishes, the communities - a great deal of emotional support was generated… People became really aware of the Lost Boys” (National Voluntary Agency Representative, Subject 52, November 2010). This ‘campaign’ involved a specific video that was “shown in parishes and to other community groups by all agencies. It generated fantastic support for the kids.” (Ibid).” This was reiterated by other professional service providers: “the Bosnians, and other previous populations,
the Vietnamese, they got a lot of support - this has happened traditionally - those that get the most attention, they receive more support...People became really aware of the Lost Boys” (Subject 53, October 2009). These mobilization strategies were ramped up for the Lost Boys of Sudan, whose story was particularly compelling.

5.2.1.2: US Volunteer Roles

In the United States, the ‘private’ component of this partnership would not function without the extensive support provided to refugees by volunteers: …“having these partnerships is an immense contribution to settlement…[Volunteers] will do a clothing drive, donate furnishings, clothes. Also take them to the grocery, teach them about the banking system, about different customs. These individuals serve as a support network…help[ing] beyond what caseworkers are able to do” (US Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009). Indeed, through partnerships with the Latter Day Saints church in Salt Lake City79, refugees receive vouchers for free clothing and food (as described in interview with Subject 57, December 2010). This work involves work to indirectly and directly support refugees: "Americans start by getting the apartment set up - get refugees things, things, things - but what they really need is time, time, time - to become an American” (U.S. volunteer, Subject 65, February 2010). It also includes teaching refugees important skills, such as driving and ESL, or enrolling them in school. Numerous interview participants commented on the nature of volunteers as “pseudo-case managers” (National VolAg representative, Subject 50, in October 2009).

79 Ironically, they work in the ‘global relief’ packing factory, learning job-related skills (such as clocking in).
As is evident, volunteer efforts include more than simply donating material goods. Private sector involvement, as one service provider noted, “is not just fundraising.” In fact, in many instances, the more superficial, short-term work is often completed by caseworkers. Volunteers, in contrast, are connecting with refugees for more of the long-term settlement services: “those that act as proxy-caseworker, that helped them set goals…On the whole, volunteers do a lot of the brunt, long-term work of the agency. Most Caseworkers do the short-term, contractual work. Volunteers get to do the more idealistic work [such as mentoring] (US Service Provider, Subject 31, October 2009).”

Volunteers, of various stripes – church members, college kids, professors and retirees, and the organizations they are involved with, help refugees do a multitude of things. They provide employment services, logistics, help refugees with their school applications and scholarship applications, teach them local transportation services, etc. Through partnerships with churches, service provider affiliate offices sponsor events like an ‘American lifestyle’ course. Volunteers teach English language classes, US orientation, urban living and American cooking. This support, aimed at meeting refugees’ basic needs does not go unnoticed by refugees: “When I came here, [I] observed good people from other churches. [In] Skaneateles – [they] helped us a lot - teach us computers, cooking every Sunday - appreciated it - saying thank you to them is not enough - really helpful, even now still helpful in any way (Refugee, Subject 1, May 2007).

The accomplishments of volunteers often far exceed the tasks laid out for

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80 This can result in volunteer fatigue, if the volunteer does not set reasonable boundaries.
them by affiliate offices. One volunteer, serving refugees through Catholic Charities, an affiliate office of USCCB, is revered throughout the refugee community for her enduring help. The majority of her work involved supporting refugees in their educational endeavors, but her service surpassed even this. She sought out Americans to support and mentor refugees. She did not place typical professional boundaries; she visited the homes of the refugees and allowed them to call her at any time. This refugee describes the volunteer: “… she’s from Catholic Charity. She is just volunteering with Catholic Charity and then she decide[s] this is what she need[s] to do and she has been helping [in] that area and she is not being paid for anything but she has been helping for anything, even at night- many Lost Boys call[ed] her at night and she never got tired of it” (US Refugee, Subject 2, July 2007).

Another volunteer’s efforts make this clear: “I came to the airport, I came to their apartment - some were starving, and sick - and I just sat with [them], and stroke[d] [their] forehead[s], telling [them] ‘I will take care of you.’ And I took them to get their first pair of sneakers - they just had cheap sneakers - I took them to get [their] first pair of good shoes” (Subject 61, January 2010). Another volunteer, after meeting some of the Lost Boys in 2001 in church, stated, “I felt that helping them was not an option, it was a call to my heart from God and I responded. Initially, they needed instruction in the most basic tasks of everyday American life, such as how to cross the street at a red light, how to use electrical appliances and running water, forks and knives etc… However, they had an overwhelming desire to learn and soon mastered such difficult tasks as learning to drive cars” (Subject 62, January 2010).
This volunteer has worked with Sudanese refugees for over 8 years, and considers them “members of my family.” Her work has culminated in a non-profit foundation that assists with their health and education, called Alliance for the Lost Boys of Sudan.

As these quotes exemplify, some volunteers who initially intended to provide these basic services eventually found themselves doing much more – including being a surrogate parent. Another American volunteer, who developed relationships with the Sudanese refugee community through a typical volunteer role with an affiliate office, now often has Sudanese stay with in her home when they come through her town, or are looking for employment. While these volunteer roles are at one extreme of a spectrum, in general, US volunteers are more engaged relative to those in Australia. Given both the decentralized and laissez faire nature of the US program, this volunteer support has been an essential component of US policy implementation. I turn to an examination of Australian volunteers now.

5.2.2: Volunteer Engagement in Australia

In Australia, volunteers were utilized in the refugee settlement program, but not at the same level as found in the United States. I found almost no evidence of large-scale volunteer mobilization, although certain organizations did engage volunteers more than others. Additionally, I found that in general, with the exception of one organization, most of this community-level support consisted of fulfillment of fairly shallow roles. My research suggests that this was the case for several reasons. Due to relatively greater levels of financial support for refugee settlement services,
and the top-down administration of settlement in the Australian context, the country has simply not needed to utilize a high level of community support. Additionally, the utilization of volunteers declined following the restructuring of the sector in the late 1990’s, early 2000s.

While there are many organizations that provide refugee services, in contrast to the US public-private partnership, historically speaking, the Australian government has supported the bulk of the refugee settlement system. Migrant Resource Centres, although now entirely autonomous entities, were created and funded by the Australian federal government for most of their lifetimes. These organizations were charged with providing services to migrants in order to foster the full participation of newcomers into Australian society and to foster multiculturalism by educating communities about the positive contributions of newcomers. Before the 2003 Review of Settlement Services, these organizations received ‘core funding’ from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. These funds were the lifeline of most MRCs – providing job stability for employees and ensuring overhead costs were met. When the Department moved toward project-focused funding, core funding was abolished and MRCs began diversifying funding sources and competing for DIAC funding.81

This is an important part of Australian settlement history because it has left an enduring legacy regarding volunteer engagement. Despite a ‘private-like’ system, in which independent organizations compete for donor funding, in practice, the

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81 Before this system shift, MRCs did compete with ethnic- and community-based organizations for smaller discretionary grants, but these were not significant pots of money relative to the guaranteed ‘core funding’ funds from DIAC.
federal government still tightly manages the refugee system. The government does so through extensive support of the programs for humanitarian migrants and through continued consultation with settlement service providers (although the providers don’t always listen to the government’s representatives). For the purposes of this chapter, this is significant because it means that service providers in practice are supported more and therefore have less need to seek out the same degree of civil society support, relative to the U.S. There is certainly involvement of volunteers, but nowhere near the same extent as found in the US. Refugees are likely to interact predominately with professional service providers that are ‘doing their job.’

5.2.2.1: Volunteer Mobilization in Australia

As I described in Chapter 4, historically, the Australian refugee settlement program did have private involvement but not to the degree found in the US. The restructuring of the program only resulted in a further decrease of volunteer support and increased centralized management of the Australian system. The Refugee Council of Australia’s Annual Consultation Submission described the effects of the IHHS program on volunteers. With the introduction of the IHHS system in the late 1990’s, “most spheres and some groups, in particular community volunteers, were left feeling uncertain about the future (Sec 4.2; 2001).” The Community Refugee Support Scheme, which started in 1979, charged with mobilizing and training highly skilled volunteers, was not added into the new refugee program framework. This scheme helped Indochinese and Eastern European newcomers who weren’t being serviced by the Good Neighbor program (that often focused only on Anglo-Saxon
migrants). The new IHHS system “didn’t recognize the needs to nurture and support volunteers (Refugee Council of Australia 2003 – 2004, p 68).” In a 2007 – 2008 Refugee Council of Australia report, they wrote that only ‘some’ organizations were engaging volunteers (Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program 2007 – 2008, RCOA Submission).

Some organizations servicing Sudanese in particular, and refugees in general, did utilize volunteers. The AMES organization of Sydney, who received the IHHS tender to provide incoming services for refugees in Sydney, utilizes a volunteer force of 1500 – 2000 volunteers and seeks to bridge the divide between refugee newcomers with the local community. SAIL, an organization that brings English education, and mentoring programs specifically to the Sudanese community, links Australian volunteers with Sudanese students. They had about 350 volunteers and almost 450 students in the Melbourne and Sydney areas at the time of the SAIL interview in June 2008. An additional organization, Melbourne-based Ecumenical Migration Centre’s Given the Chance program establishes relationships with refugees and Australian volunteer mentors. Two important points are warranted here. First, these organizations are the exceptions in an environment where private support has been waning. Second, service providers mentioned that volunteers are often individuals who are interested in a career in social services, rather than church members, as is the case in the US context. Again, this is no surprise given the centralized, institutionalized approach of the Australian refugee system. Unlike the US system, a great deal of volunteer support is not necessary to meet refugee needs.

5.2.2.2: Australian Volunteer Roles
In Australia, while I did find evidence that volunteers are utilized to provide services to refugees, relative to the US, their roles are shallower. Staff of service organizations either did not see a key role for volunteers or pointed to a more superficial role, namely as a source for in-kind donations, such as clothing and furniture. This quote by a refugee service professional (and former refugee) highlights this nicely. When asked the role of Australian citizens in refugee settlement, he replied:

“Australians are very, very generous. It happens a lot…It’s like I get second-hand used items. [The Australian tells me] please take this for members of the [refugee] community…they really contribute…Someone I met on the street…asks me how long I have been here, where do I work. And he works at Christian Mission International, [and he says:] we have some bags of clothing or stuff, would you like them for members of the community? The level of generosity is so much” (Subject O, June 2008).

Despite the current situation in Australia, volunteers were much more involved prior to the introduction of the IHHS model, as previously mentioned. In fact, they played similar roles to those in the US, such as “airport ‘meet and greet’ on arrival, accompanying clients to medical appointments and ongoing support and friendship (Evaluation of the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy 2003; p 22). According to some reports, some volunteers are still doing these tasks ( Ibid). Yet, volunteer roles were not considered fully with the IHHS transition, leaving volunteers out of the refugee settlement loop. This happened for several reasons, including some provider’s IHHS contracts specifically barring them from “us[ing]

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82 Other sparse examples of volunteer involvement include one volunteer that helped refugees with their organization’s financial management
volunteers for activities that are part of the IHSS service provider’s role (Ibid, p 23).”

5.2.3: Reviewing Comparative Volunteer Engagement

Relative to Australia, US volunteers are more highly mobilized and involved in substantive ways. Tasks that Australian professional service providers take on, such as picking refugees up at the airport, furnishing and setting up the refugee’s apartment, orientation and mentoring refugees throughout the settlement process are often done by volunteers in the United States. This differentiation in private support is related to historical and contemporary factors of specific to the refugee settlement systems I have previously discussed. Given the public-private policy implementer structure and the lower levels of social services in the US refugee system, this type of support is necessary. Low levels of governmental support are supplemented by private support. But, what does this have to do with refugee political activities? In the following section, I demonstrate the second step in this two-step process of policy feedback. I show how due to these different compositions of policy implementers, refugees are privy to different social networks. These networks influence the political trajectories of refugee political leaders.

5.3: Refugee Social Networks and Political Activism

The nature of these policy implementers -- including their mandates, programs and social networks and their relationship with their national government -- can have material and symbolic effects on refugees and their ambitions to engage in
various types of politics. During the ‘settling’ period - a transformative period in the lives of refugees - it is the policy implementers who shape refugee leaders’ ideas and access to resources, especially because they are often the Americans or Australians with whom the refugees interact the most.

In the US, refugee social networks are more diverse than those in Australia. As highlighted in the previous section, the refugees in the US interact not only with formal service providers, but also a variety of other ‘types’ of people. This results in heterogeneous social networks for refugees, simply because they are meeting a wider swath of citizenry while they are receiving services to ‘settle’ in the US. In this section, I argue that transnationally motivated refugees in the US are more likely to meet people who are interested in helping their ‘cause’ resulting in greater support for transnational political activities. In contrast, refugee social networks in Australia are mainly comprised of professional service providers. These policy implementers are constrained by government mandates and thus transnationally motivated refugees in Australia are not likely to receive much support for their transnational goals. In this section, drawing on interview data, I show how differences in the social networks of refugee leaders have stimulated different political activities for Sudanese refugees in each country.

Why does this connection between Sudanese refugees and American volunteers, particularly faith-based volunteers, factor substantially in refugee political activities? Although, one national VolAg representative rightly notes: ‘the main driver for starting organizations is the individual refugee,’” my research
suggests that the support received by nationals in the settlement context is highly consequential (Subject 51, October 2009). In decentralized contexts, where individuals who implement policy have more diverse interests, refugees with transnational ambitions are more likely to receive the support they need to see these ambitions come into fruition.

5.3.1: US Policy Implementer Agendas, Social Connections and Sudanese Political Activities

Simply put, volunteers do not have the same objectives or motivations in working with refugees as service provider staff. Volunteers are not required to implement certain services nor do they have a material interest in seeing that certain programmatic targets are met. As this US provider notes: “[Volunteers] all have their own agendas… they become so attached to the refugee that they collect goods, services [and] go beyond the expectations of the program” (Subject 40, October 2009). This can include paying for refugees’ college tuitions, for example – and partnering with them for their political goals. This happens so much in the US that one provider, and now State Coordinator stated that “a lot of refugees will tell you that they love their volunteers, but not the government” (Subject 41, October 2009).

These private ‘agendas’ have proven to be helpful for some Sudanese refugee leaders in the United States. The social bonds that refugees have created with volunteers have at times extended to include political partnerships. As one representative of a VolAg describes: “with churches, there are different types of support. Sometimes they provide support for the settlement community, by providing
them with places to worship. Then those that are more involved will empower these refugee groups to do community development in their home countries, some will go to southern Sudan - this is the case in Southern Sudan - really creating these groups. But, it is not just churches - it is also employers, community members” (US National VolAg representative, Subject 50, October 2009). This particular provider (a former Southern Sudanese refugee) knew first hand, as she had begun to create her own transnational-oriented organization with the help of American volunteers.

Undoubtedly, these partnerships are cultivated after a certain level of trust is established, and when refugees and American volunteers identify shared goals. Sally and the Sudanese refugee leaders she works with provide an example of how organizations are catalyzed by these relationships. Sally, a volunteer who started working with Sudanese refugees close to the time when they first began settling in the US in the 1990s, developed such strong bonds with one refugee leader that he moved in with her family. One result of this bond is the development of an organization targeting Lost Boys of Sudan, helping them to organize for their own well being (more domestic-focused political activities) and for the development of southern Sudan. Although the refugee approached her, as this quote indicates, Sally already had the desire to create an organization: “[When he told me that he wanted to start an organization,] I told him - it was ironic - because I wanted to start an organization, a national organization myself - or to find one - I knew that there were wonderful Americans all over the US - and that everyone was figuring out things for themselves. And my main goal was to try to help the Lost Boys complete their education….I wanted to start an organization of Americans helping them get
education. That was my goal” (Subject 65, January 2010).

With the support gained in these relationships, Sudanese refugee leaders are enabled to act on their political intentions. Volunteers have helped refugees with the nitty-gritty of building organizations. Often the motivations of the volunteers have differed from those of the refugee service providers. One law firm, motivated to provide help to Sudanese refugees after meeting them through another volunteer, decided to help the Ayual Community Development Corporation file for non-profit status. The founders of the law firm were European Jews who resettled in the US. In another instance, another volunteer, Jillian, who first met Sudanese refugees when they started attending her church, is now the president of one of their organizations. Professional service providers, given their mission and resources, simply do not have the time or ability to develop these same types of relationships.

5.3.1.1: Faith and Social Connections
One central factor for strong relationships between Sudanese refugees and many American volunteers is a shared Christian faith and religious practices. These connections have been catalyzed by the structure of settlement policy in the US in two ways. First, in some instances, VolAgs directly connect faith-based volunteers with incoming refugees. One refugee describes this connection: “We were sponsored by Catholic Charities and at Catholic Charities there were people from different churches that are working for Catholic Charities and as I came here I was going to church and I met some families who were willing to help me out in the churches” (Subject 1, May 2007). One Refugee State Coordinator, tasked at times to implement long-term social services, described that the extensive connection that a refugee had with the Episcopal Diocese, a connection that was ‘probably’ made by the
resettlement agency, actually impeded the agency’s work because refugees were less inclined to interact with the agency (Subject 53, October 2009).

In other instances, the Sudanese community members sought out church communities on their own. This is certainly due to the broad connections made with particular Christian denominations prior to resettlement, but also a result of the lack of comprehensive social support in the US refugee settlement program. This next quote, worth quoting at length, provided by a faith-based volunteer who was working with Lutheran Social Services when she first became connected to Sudanese refugees, describes this process:

“There is disparity across cities, of different support services. So in the places where there weren’t lots of support - not all had sponsors, or wonderful people helping…Not everyone had someone like me - and in fact those who did, did really well, they had American sponsors. Some didn’t have sponsors - those in D.C. and Jackson, Mississippi. They walked into a church. In Sudan there was the Episcopal Church and Catholic Church - so in DC they simply walked in St. Stevens Church on 16th street and started going to church. And, they stick out -they are very tall, with black skin - and the church members – Ann, she was at the mission’s committee and helped them. And Julie in Mississippi – [when the refugees] showed up in church. And so, it was just a natural thing - they see a church - and everything looks weird and strange - but had a church” (Subject 61, December 2009).

For many Sudanese refugees, the church is the institution that they are already familiar with. Connecting to church members is a ‘natural’ activity, one that continues even in this tumultuous settlement period.

This shared faith, as well as the fact that Sudanese refugees had Christian names, particularly the Lost Boys of Sudan, also helped Americans more easily form social connections. One volunteer describes this: “culturally it helps that they are Christians and [have] Christian names…Being Christian and their Christian names make them more approachable - especially [for volunteers] who haven’t done refugee
resettlement before” (Subject 65, January 2010).

Faith-based volunteers have provided an immense amount of resources, as has been described in the above section. Some examples highlight this fact. The creation of the St. Bhakita’s clinic, in Naru, South Sudan would not have been possible without the funding and organizational support of the members of St. Vincent De Paul church in Syracuse, NY. This particular church effectively ‘auspiced’ this transnational endeavor, allowing all funds to go through the parish first. According to one refugee informant, church involvement was helpful for fundraising purposes at first because it gave confidence to individual donors (Subject 3, June 2007).

The role of a Presbyterian church in central New York in the transnational endeavors of the John Dau Foundation also highlight the significance of the faith-based-refugee leader link. One American volunteer (who met John Dau, a southern Sudanese Lost Boy, at an educational institution) described how once Dau had “sold the church members” on the “vision of the clinic,” “they did it.” Of course Dau’s movie project, “God Grew Tired of Us,” and his national speaking engagements brought attention and funds. But, this volunteer highlighted the essential role of the church. He went on to say that, in general, churches are the key factor in the transnational endeavors of the Lost Boys: “These Lost Boys are usually hosted by

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83 Refugee informants also felt like their connection with churches encouraged church leaders to lobby the US government to help out with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This next quote highlights their perspective: “So, how much does religion play a role in your experience here?” Reply: “It was a key part - played a huge role – it put pressure on the US government … So it made our voice be heard through religious people and they are the ones who focus more and donate more to the people that are suffering - so they played [a] part in [the] peace agreement.” He felt like it was advantageous to be a Christian. Christians are a majority in the US, and they were essential to gaining peace in Sudan because they were able to lobby their Congressmen and Congresswomen after hearing stories in churches (Subject 5, July 2007, Atlanta, Georgia).
some church - if [they] get some churches into [it] - they raise money” (Subject 64, September 2009).\(^{84}\)

This goes back to the varying interests that volunteer policy implementers have. A USCCB (one of the 10 national VolAgs) representative, when asked about linkages between refugee settlement, churches and transnational projects commented that although he did not know of specific projects, that parishes “have that mentality.” He went on to say that these congregations are likely to get involved if they trust who they are working with, if “they are connecting to someone they know - who they have worked with, and love.” His final words are telling: “It feels good.”

The faith-based volunteer policy implementers simply have different objectives relative to professional service providers (Subject 52, November 2009).

Social connections foster many different types of support for Sudanese political activities. This can include direct organizational support as described in the above paragraphs, but also indirect support such as development of refugee skills as well as ideas and models for transnational development. An interchange I had with one refugee a highlights this:

Hannah: “Do you play a role in bringing peace in Southern Sudan?”
Refugee: “We pray for peace. Because our people, they die for freedom. And some people they died because of the hunger, disease, so many things. So, really, we’re struggling. [We are asking,] how can we get our freedom? Now, the majority of us [Sudanese refugees] in the US know people in southern Sudan. The [American] people, the churches - they work with us…Maybe 5 or 10 years, our life is going to be changed.”
Hannah: “What will it be like?”
Refugee: “In the US, you can plan what you want to do. We need schools [in Sudan], [here] we’ll get good ideas. Now, we are looking for what we are going to need…Some people are getting a good education, when people (Americans) are working with them. Like maybe you, you

\(^{84}\) Within the John Dau Foundation, volunteers too play an enormous role. According to one interview subject, over 80% of staff work is completed by volunteers. One key volunteer, who is over 80 years old, works everyday on Foundation tasks, including correspondence, arranging shipments, attaining visas for international employees, and other logistical matters. This same interview subject said that this volunteer is “the glue that holds everything together.”
are working with other Lost Boys, and maybe other people are working with other Lost Boys” (Subject 3, May 2007).

5.3.2: Australian Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities

In Australia, the networks of Sudanese refugee leaders often remain less developed than those in the US. Given the centralized, institutionalized structure of the refugee settlement program in which policy implementers are most likely to be professional service providers, refugee leaders are less likely to interact with a broad swath of Australian citizenry, at least in the initial phase of settlement. Similarly, while there is certainly a connection between the faith-based community and Sudanese refugees, it is not as extensive as it is in the United States, and is not facilitated by the professional service providers there.

The few exceptions, where Sudanese refugee leaders have developed strong relationships with private community members, only prove the point. Some providers, as introduced in the second section, have fostered refugee-civil society connections through programs such as the Ecumenical Migration Centre’s Given the Chance. This program had a marked effect on one young man, who was a well established Sudanese refugee leader. During his involvement in the program, Deng made lasting relationships with university professors who helped him take the steps to eventually get into university, and make additional social contacts. This program also introduced him to his future advisor, a prominent civil society leader in Melbourne. Through these kinds of connections refugees are able to create positive relationships and to build their networks beyond service providers in Australia.

These relationships have contributed to the expansion of support for refugee
political activities, leading usually to greater social and financial opportunities than professional service providers could provide alone. Deng’s advisor, John, has opened many doors for this Sudanese leader. In this next quote, John described how he helped broaden Deng’s social networks and helped him learn some political ins and outs of Australia. He has helped this Sudanese to build social networks with churches, government, and the police. John sees his role as building this leader’s “awareness of how to deal with bureaucracy and government because I have worked with them. I helped tie and solidify him into networks. I help because I am already higher up in the networks (Subject OO, July 2008).” He encouraged the leader to increase his lobbying efforts, and this resulted in him confidently meeting the Minister of the Department of Planning (Subject OO, July 2008). Through these efforts, Deng was able to acquire a $30,000 grant for strategic planning for his domestic- and transnationally-focused organization.

This account begs the question, what is the role of churches in Australia? My research indicates that these institutions are involved with the Sudanese community. They have provided space for the Sudanese to worship, but interactions there have not resulted in the same level of connection as is found in the US. These findings are bolstered by many comments made to me by Sudanese refugees in Australia. They knew about, and commented that they didn’t have the same volunteer ‘support’ that Sudanese refugees in the US had received. One refugee, struggling to get his transnational organization off the ground noted that the lack of private support is one reason why he and others had not realized their educational and transnational goals. This same refugee has worked primarily with two settlement service providers in the
Sydney area.

5.3.3: **Comparative Sudanese Refugee Social Networks and Political Activities**

In this section, I presented evidence regarding the connection between volunteer support and refugee transnational endeavors. In the US, private support has resulted in substantial financial and motivational support for many Sudanese leaders’ transnational endeavors. Faith-based communities provided the bulk of this support. My research indicates that this type of homegrown social connection between private policy implementers and Sudanese refugee leaders is almost absent in Australia. Some evidence suggests, however, that where it is occurring in Australia, Sudanese leaders have been successful at starting to realize their transnational ambitions. This suggests that having social connections to volunteers can play a significant role in spurring transnational political practices for transnationally motivated refugees. I argue that this low level of private support in Australia is a factor has contributed to the relatively lower level of transnational political activities emanating from the Australian context. Because of the more institutionalized practice of settlement in Australia refugee leaders, even those with transnational ambitions engage in domestic related political activities. They do so with professional service providers. In the next chapter I will examine more closely the role of professional Australian service providers in influencing the political choices of the Sudanese refugees.

5.4: **Conclusion**

In this chapter I detailed how settlement policy in both contexts directly and indirectly influenced the political activities of South Sudanese refugees. In the
decentralized, laissez faire US, the historical and contemporary practices of settlement, derived from a strong public-private partnership, has resulted in a greater involvement of volunteers, especially those that are faith-based. In contrast, the Australian system, top-down management and governmental support of refugee settlement, has resulted in a lower amount of private support. There, the private sector has not stepped in to do settlement work because it is not necessary. These divergent sets of policy implementers are part of the reason that the social networks and political activities of Sudanese refugee leaders in each country differ. Naturally, the specific motivations and interests of policy implementers determine how they will interact with refugee leaders, and what projects they will support. In the US, this has resulted in a greater degree of collaboration in refugee transnational activities.

It is important to note that the purpose of this dissertation is not to present one settlement model as being superior to another. Rather, I have sought to understand differences in the contexts that account for the differences in political activism discovered. In the US, the strong role played by the private sector certainly has its fair share of problems, particularly because private groups are relied upon to provide basic human social services. US service providers noted that conflict can arise when providers and volunteers disagree about the appropriate way to ‘settle’ refugees. Also, and co-dependent relationships between refugees and volunteers occur. This can result in less independence and potentially less empowerment of newcomers. Although it was more rare, providers also acknowledged that volunteers and refugees had exploited these relationships at times. For example, one State Refugee Coordinator mentioned that an American asked to host a refugee so that the
refugee could clean her house. At times, faith-based volunteers proselytized as well. Due to the nature of these highly personal relationships, it is likely impossible to eradicate this behavior, and perhaps it is not always harmful, depending on the needs of the refugee. Perhaps most importantly, the heavy use of volunteers and volunteer contribution can have deleterious effects on the overall health of the refugee settlement system when there are downturns in the national economy, as has been felt in the sector over the last 3 years. During this time, volunteer support and financial contributions greatly waned. In this chapter and dissertation, however, rather than making normative claims about what national refugee settlement system is better or worse, I have tried to focus on the consequences of two different models of refugee settlement.

I have also sought to highlight the positive role that policy implementers, professionals and volunteers, as actors on the stage of settlement, can and do play. Some scholars who have examined policy implementers underscore how their efforts can silence service recipients (Soss 1999). They question the levels of dedication of policy implementers, and ask about the ‘real’ motivations of implementing actors. These are important questions, of course. But, a focus and discussion solely on instances where policy implementers have not met high standards loses sight of the many individuals who dedicate their lives to be of service to those who are less fortunate than they are. This chapter has illuminated the positive roles that many of these professional and volunteer policy implementers have played in the lives of Sudanese refugees. In the following chapter, I examine a vital function of
professional policy implementers, that of empowering refugees who have the internal
drive to effect social change.
Chapter 6: Channeling Political Activities through Refugee Organization Building Programs

6.1: Introduction

In this chapter, I have three broad objectives. First, I argue that empirical differences in Sudanese refugee political activities across the United States and Australia are partly due to how much host countries manage refugee political organization through policies and programs. I aim to show how policy programs beget politics in the refugee settlement field. Policy programs are another way in which these two countries’ levels of institutionalization and centralization play a part in shaping Sudanese refugee political activities.

Second, I demonstrate how this channeling process occurs. In these Refugee Organization Building (ROB) programs, participating refugees receive material and social benefits. In order to receive these benefits, refugee leaders must enact political activities that are suitable to the host country. As political learners and strategic actors, refugees adapt to these constraints and go after these benefits. In ROB-heavy contexts, such as Australia, in which host countries utilize these programs extensively, refugee activities will be slanted toward domestic-related activities. In ROB-light contexts, represented here by the US, refugees will engage in political activities more suitable to their own agendas (although many factors will influence their capability to do this) because of greater autonomy.

Finally, I discuss the unintended consequences of channeling refugee political activities. Without sensitivity, these programs may undermine the very
essence of refugee community capacity building. I find evidence that in some instances, these programs created distrust and animosity between refugees and service providers and created barriers to refugee self-determination.

I utilize evidence from interviews and policy data from both countries. First I define what I mean by Refugee Organization Building Programs. I demonstrate that most characteristics of these programs – their purpose, eligibility requirements and other design components – are actually very similar in the United States and Australia. In the third section, however, I describe the key cross-national difference in terms of this policy: its overall prioritization in each context. In Australia this program is a key method to engender self-reliance of refugee communities. It is another tool of this highly institutionalized refugee settlement system. In the U.S. other activities such as finding refugees early employment takes precedence. ROBs are used as a side program. Essentially, Australia manages refugee political organization more extensively than the United States. I then demonstrate specific ways that, when these programs are utilized, Aussie and U.S. Sudanese refugees are guided toward domestic-focused political activities through material and social incentives. I conclude with a discussion of the unintended consequences of channeling transnationally-motivated refugee leaders toward domestic political goals.

6.2: Refugee Capacity Building Programs

Host countries can manage the development of refugee organizations through community capacity building programs. Countries aim to accomplish two goals through such programs: to empower refugee communities, and to deliver necessary
settlement services. By encouraging refugees to help themselves, host countries meet their own goals. In the United States, refugee organizations are funded to provide settlement services for newly arriving refugees. This is similar to Australia’s ‘Developing Communities’ pillar. And, New Zealand’s ‘Settling In’ program aims to ‘build [refugee communities] knowledge and capacity’ to “develop and deliver services identified by the [refugee] communities themselves (Country Chapters, Refugee Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR).” As an example of capacity building, a general tactic now commonly advanced by community-based advocates to provide services to those in need, these programs can be both helpful and harmful, depending on how it is implemented.

In Australia and the United States, Refugee Organization Building programs are utilized to encourage integration of refugee communities and are a part of these countries’ broader community capacity building schemes. These ROB programs target the creation and strengthening of refugee community organizations. In this chapter, I demonstrate how although both countries’ ROB programs have similar goals, but utilize these programs differently according to their overarching institutionalized/laissez faire approach to settling refugees. The US simply does not utilize this tool of integration to the degree that Australia does.

These countries have common qualitative features when it comes to their refugee organization capacity building programs. Each country’s objective with this program is to integrate refugee communities that are struggling to connect with host country community resources and members. Building refugee organizations is a key way to encourage self-reliance and to perpetuate mutual assistance for resettled
refugees. The policies in each country are also both targeted toward refugees that are new arrivals. Each country funnels federal funds toward established refugee community organizations, service providers and local or state-level governments. In the following section I describe these characteristics in more detail. In practice, these funds engender the growth and sustainability of refugee community organizations through material and social benefits afforded to refugee community leaders and settlement actors. In the third section I present evidence indicating that Australia prioritizes ROB programs much more relative to the US. These differences, like the policy implementer differences explained in Chapter 5 are in great part due to differences in the levels of institutionalization and centralization in each countries settlement system.

6.2.1: The Purpose of Building Refugee Organizational Capacity

In this section, I describe these ROB programs, including their purpose, eligibility requirements, and central programmatic activities. In both countries, community capacity building programs have two inter-connected objectives aimed at fostering the broad goal of integrating refugee communities. According to policymakers, refugee organizations are key mechanisms through which refugees are able to make connections with host country community members and services. The first objective is to see that through refugee organizations, communities are able to identify their collective needs (including long-term settlement needs such as housing, employment, health and education) and get linked into local services to meet these
needs. As refugees get linked into mainstream services, their level of participation with the host society increases – the second key goal for these programs.

In the US, these programs are implemented through the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement discretionary grant, the *Ethnic Self Help Grant*. As listed on the grant tender: ‘the objective of this program is to strengthen organized ethnic communities comprised and representative of refugee populations to ensure ongoing support and services to refugees after initial resettlement (*US Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2008*).’ Indeed, as a national US advocate notes, ‘ethnic Community Based Organizations fill in the gaps when funding for VolAgs run out” (Subject 12, November 2009). One settlement policy implementer stated that building refugee organizations was the best way to build refugee capacity (July 2009 Interview US Refugee State Coordinator and Service Provider, Subject 57, December 2009).

In Australia, building refugee community organizations falls under the *Developing Communities* pillar, one of the three domestic priorities of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s broader Settlement Grants Programme (see Chapter 4). This pillar aims to ‘help newly arrived humanitarian communities to identify common goals and interests and develop a sense of identity and belonging” through initiatives to build their organizational capacity (*Australia Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010*).” In practice, as is clear in one service provider’s grant proposal, community development is essentially about creating organizations so that refugees can help themselves: ‘Successful settlement is fostered through the development and funding of refugee community organisations to deliver projects to
communities (*New South Wales Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture & Trauma Survivors* 2008).’ A representative of the Australian federal government’s *Settlement Grants Program* seconds this strategy: “Community development strategies for some groups have consisted of helping people establish CBOs (Community Based Organizations) to help people organize, and advocate for their own needs.” And, another Settlement Grant’s Programme official notes: “we recognize that it is still important to fund small organizations because of the depth of support they can provide – so we try to do this, so long as new refugees are still coming in” (Subject PP, July 2008). As this comparison highlights, the two countries’ programs share similar objectives: to build refugee capacity and to meet refugee settlement needs.

6.2.2: Eligibility Requirements

Perhaps each country services different refugees. Do levels of eligibility help explain why Sudanese refugees are engage in alternate political activities? In both countries refugee communities with populations that are newly arrived are targeted with these grants. In the United States, refugees originating from countries from which refugees are currently being resettled and who are ‘slow to integrate’ and yet to receive citizenship are eligible to receive services through the Ethnic Self-Help Grant (*Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2001, 2004, 2008*). For Australia’s Settlement Grants Programme, only communities that have arrived in the last 5 years, and that continue to receive refugees are eligible (*Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s Settlement Grants Program*).
Eligibility requirements in Australia have shifted over the last decade to center more toward newly arrived, ‘emerging’ refugee communities, who have the ‘greatest need.’ Before 2005-2006, Australia (through the Community Service Settlement Scheme and Migrant Resource Centres) did not have specific targets. In fact, established communities such as the Greek and Italians were receiving capacity building funds. After a 2003 evaluation of settlement services, it was recommended that these funds focus down to only to the newly arrived (2003 Review of Settlement Services). In the U.S., while priorities have generally been on the newly arrived, in 2001, the grant specified particular communities (including the Sudanese), but in 2004, only specified that populations who have arrived in the last 10 years were serviced. In the 2008 standing announcement, this changed to newly arrived communities with significant populations (Office of Resettlement, 2001, 2004, 2008).

The rationale to focus on newly arrived populations derives from the notion that new arrivals have more needs and are less able to fulfill them due to lack of organization, knowledge and connections to do so. The Sudanese are included in this ‘emerging’ designation. As previously discussed, in both countries, the first decade of the 2000’s was the height of their resettlement.

Professional settlement policy implementers support these fledging communities through community capacity building initiatives: “the best way to [help refugee communities] is to have the assistance of another organization that is already gone through that process, that can be supportive through that process” (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject E, June 2008). In both countries, many ‘types’ of organizations are allowed to apply for these grants, including established refugee
communities, organizations, professional settlement service providers and local and state government entities.

6.2.3: Capacity Building Activities

Perhaps each country utilizes different programmatic differences. Would these help explain why Sudanese refugees are engage in alternate political activities?

Building refugee organizational capacity includes many tasks and varies from refugee community to refugee community, but generally involves extending resources to refugee communities to create their organization, linking them into service provider networks, socializing leaders and supervising their efforts.

At its most basic form, this task involves educating the community about just what is involved in starting an organization in a western industrialized context:

“Capacity building with Sudanese was basically how to set up an MAA. How to receive 501(c)3 status, create by-laws - it was basically a 101 set up not-for-profit” (US Service Provider, Subject 57, December 2009). But, it also involves finding or cultivating leadership, getting refugee organization funding and helping communities to meet reporting requirements when funded: “…as the community becomes established, that’s when they start to come to you…They get incorporated; can you help us with this funding application? They get the money. They suddenly realize that they have to do a financial report, so you can see them slowly moving through the stages of development as a community comes established” (Australian Service Provider, Subject HH, July 2008).
What exactly does this involve, however? Australia’s Settlement Grants Programme guides settlement actors with suitable settlement actor capacity building activities, including “assisting community leaders and members to organise, and promote their community positively; assisting community organisations to hire or source venues for meetings, recreation and social activities; raising awareness of how to engage and communicate with relevant organisations and service providers; developing creative strategies to assist communities to strengthen and thrive through sponsorship by more established communities, both ethno-specific and mainstream, including finding sources of funding” (Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s Settlement Grants Program).

In practice, as is implicated above, this work involves an extensive amount of education about logistics and socialization into western ways. Settlement actors are educating refugees about the utility of organization: “the way to access these services is if you form yourself into a structure where there is someone who can organize, or advocate - someone you can go to, and then they can go to whoever the service providers are” (Australian Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008). These actors use information sessions and trainings to “we provide info sessions, letting them know what is available (Australian Service Provider, Ibid).” This involves a certain degree of socializing them into western ways: “So sometimes, it is a whole new ball game. So, it’s not something you [- the refugee leader] can compare and say, oh, I have seen this before. It’s new (Australian Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008).

In order for newly established refugee community organizations to receive grant funds and/or donations, funding bodies often require organizations to have
formal non-profit status, pre-set governing and financial structures. At the refugee organization’s inception, service providers often act as an 'auspicing' agent, meaning that they manage any procured funding, essentially lowering the perceived risk to fund these new organizations. I paraphrase one Australian federal grants manager: “communities don’t have skills to manage funds, so large organizations auspice these organizations. These [refugee] organizations then get experience…One of my roles is to train organizations who are funded [to auspice refugee organizations effectively]…The primary goal is to see that funds are used efficiently and for the clients” (Subject PP, July 2008).

Another key aspect of community capacity building in practice is that settlement service providers coordinate most of this work through refugee leaders. Refugee leaders’ are able to straddle linguistic and cultural divides between their refugee community and host country people and institutions: “most leaders speak English… And they are people who understand the culture, the way of life here much better. [The service providers] might not understand community..[so]…it is better to go through a leader…[and it is] easier to build rapport with a leader rather than with the entire community (Australian Service Provider, Subject O, June 2008).” The strategic benefits for providers to work with refugee leaders are similar for all settlement services, including building organizations.

In both countries, as is evident from above, there are a variety of activities that grant recipients can undertake to build refugee organizational capacity. Within both countries, there are also specific activities that are barred: anything that is considered ‘political,’ activities that are geared toward cultural preservation for a
specific ethnic community and transnational activities. This capacity building program results in specific outcomes: refugee community organizations, with structures that fit western standards and western-like leaders, and can receive funding by western bodies.

In this way, the effect of this social policy program is functional and straightforward. The host country is helping refugees build their ability to help themselves within the host country. As this section demonstrates, I find that the specific qualities, or characteristics, of community capacity building policy programs in Australia and the United States do not vary significantly. These qualitative factors do not explain these empirical differences. I describe in the following section, because the program is used so extensively in Australia, and not so much in the US, two distinct refugee political paths within these two host countries have taken shape. In the next section, I detail the key community capacity building difference across these countries: the level of prioritization. These findings suggest again that the highly institutionalized Australian system manages refugee political organization, while the more laissez faire US is more hands off with their refugee newcomers.

6.3: Differences in policy priorities

As demonstrated in the previous section, the over-arching objectives and practices of creating, building and sustaining refugee community organizations are almost identical across the United States and Australia. For the purposes of this project, one key difference stands out sharply: Australia prioritizes this program much more. This difference matters greatly because when this program is utilized
more often, refugee community organizations and the projects they implement, are managed, or nudged by settlement actors toward settlement actor goals, specifically long-term settlement benchmarks. When they are managed in Australia, they are done so through organizations that have strong financial and historical ties to the government. Therefore, refugee community organizations in Australia, particularly when formed using settlement actor resources are channeled toward domestic-oriented initiatives. Before describing this mechanism, I demonstrate how refugee community organization is prioritized much more in Australia relative to the United States.

In the US, the same amount (or less) of refugee organization building funds are provided to a much higher amount of newly arrived refugees (see Figure 6.1).\footnote{For a review of total funding for Refugee Organization Building Programs and the amount of refugees resettled in the US from 2000-2007, please see Appendix E.}
In Figure 6.1, the difference in distribution of funding for capacity building programs per refugee is clear. Because this is a pillar of Australian refugee services, the government funds it more extensively. Each refugee community, in each settlement city is more likely to participate in these activities. This is not the case in the US, where a smaller amount of funds are scattered throughout many more cities. Thus, while it is likely that many refugee communities will benefit from these services, it will not happen in each city for each community.

The interview data support these conclusions. Service provider comments reiterate how the US federal government is not prioritizing refugee community
organization capacity building. While the act of building refugee organizational capacity was almost taken for granted in Australia – with each provider going into great lengths to describe their programs – it was rare to hear this as a key initiative in the United States. As one US provider notes: “of the federal funding - it is not capacity building funds - they are just program funds” (US State Coordinator, Subject 40, November 2009). The overwhelming majority of settlement actors I interviewed in the US reiterated the basic fact that the US program is geared toward refugee self-sufficiency by means of employment.

6.3.2: Systems to sustain building refugee community organizations

We see these different levels of prioritization play out in the ways that these two countries do, or do not, create the necessary mechanisms to a) keep refugee community organizations going through small grants and b) sustain the institutional knowledge of building refugee community organizations.

In Australia, refugee organizations, once they are off the ground, often acquire new funds through local government funding. The federal government and local service providers often work in sync with these local governments to help build refugee community capacity. The federal government supplements local government funds, and requires service providers to work in tandem with these entities. Consequently, local governments along with settlement service providers end up providing much-needed resources to fledging refugee community organizations:

…. [the] Kingston government, another local government in the area, provided the [settlement service provider] with a number of buildings that
community groups could use free of charge - so [a refugee leader] was provided access to office space where they could meet - and then [the refugee organization] got incorporation status, and we helped [the refugee leader] write funding submissions to the state government… and to local councils in the area - particularly Monash and Kingston - and as a result they got more sums of money – 3 – 5 thousand dollars to do particular projects. (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008)

In the US context, despite getting off the ground, organizations cannot always remain financially afloat: “We developed an Umbrella organization for Africans – [but] it was hard to fund” (US Settlement Service Provider, Subject 53, November 2009). Due to the decentralized nature of US social policy, the federal government does channel refugee service funds through state governments – but these funds are solely for cash and medical assistance. Local-level actors, such as city and municipal governance bodies are not generally involved in funding refugee organizations, or refugee settlement services in general (which is becoming a particularly hot political button in refugee resettlement).

Australia’s extensive federal funding for refugee organization capacity building has also established the necessary institutional structures and knowledge to sustain these programs. Many organizations have specific staff whose sole purpose is to build refugee community capacity. For example, several organizations I interviewed had Community Development Workers or Specialists. This was not the case in the United States. Because this is not a component of their core funding, staff members do not generally do this as their sole task.

6.3.3: Trade Offs
US advocates point out that essentially this is about trade-offs. Due to the large number of individuals receiving refugee status in the US, there just cannot be the same extensive services.

When you are looking at the federal government’s definition of success - we need to be fair and look at the big numbers. The only country that is even close to this number is Canada. There is a huge gap in numbers - US is by far the largest. When that many numbers are being resettled, other countries may be providing more, but it is a tradeoff (*US National Advocate, Subject 12, November 2009*).

On the whole, a supportive culture of refugee organizational capacity building is present in Australia and lacking in the United States. The funding and institutional support for these programs has reinforced and perpetuated programs in Australia, while these elements are missing in the United States context. The overall prioritization of capacity building programs is quite different in Australia and the United States. In this section this was demonstrated through significant differences in levels of funding, distribution of funding to sustain organizations, and in the overall cultures in these countries, as seen through the interview data. In the next section, I demonstrate how due to the high level of prioritization in Australia, the political organization of refugees is ‘managed’ much more than in the United States. In this process of ‘managing’ refugee leaders are guided toward domestic-focused political activities. This management takes place through an educative process in which refugee leaders receive material and social benefits.

6.4: Nudging Refugees
Australian and US bureaucrats aimed to shape refugee political organization with community capacity building programs for purposes that were suitable for both the host country and for incoming refugee populations: they sought to ‘nudge’ refugee leaders toward specific activities, namely settlement issues in their refugee communities. Yet, bureaucrats and providers are not the only decision-makers in this social process. Savvy refugee political leaders, who want to effect change, are incentivized to follow the material and social goods provided through community capacity building policy programs; as one refugee leader describes: “We worked with [a service provider], who connect[ed] us with others, [and who] helps us with grants, trainings” (Subject S, June 2008). That these are necessary political prerequisites are no mystery to refugee leaders. In this section I describe these material and social benefits. I show how in the process of acquiring these benefits, refugee leaders and their organizations are channeled, or nudged toward domestic-related political activities.

6.4.1: Material Nudges

In both countries, refugee organization building programs, through settlement actors provide an obvious, key, tangible political good: material resources for fledging refugee organizations and leaders. These material goods include in-kind support for fledging refugee organizations and pathways to money for organizations and salaries. Through the provision of these goods, settlement actors (or providers) nudge refugee leaders to engage in certain domestic activities over others, and away from transnational political activities.
These material benefits provide support for refugee organization’s infrastructure. This includes places to work, a mailing address, and office supplies and support. For example, when one leader came to the Ecumenical Migration Centre in the mid-2000s, a provider notes that they realized “the need for him to have an office … and then it was a question of, how can we best support him and his organization. And that’s when we offered him space (Australian Service Provider).” Another refugee leader commented that he received office space and furniture through a community supporter through the help of Springville Aid, an Australian settlement organization (Subject Z, July 2008).

Settlement organizations guide refugee leaders through the development of their refugee organization, including helping them receive funding. During this guiding process, refugee leaders are often nudged from one goal to another. Many providers saw this ‘translation’ – from eager refugee leaders’ goals, to something more do-able, something more fund-able, as a common part of community capacity building. “…The communities, they are really keen, but it's a challenge to translate that keen-ness into actually where you want [them] to go,” said a Melbourne Settlement Service Provider (Subject KK, July 2008). This nudging is no surprise: as settlement service providers, these entities are mandated to implement the policies they are being funded for.

This nudging includes shaping what ‘type’ of domestic activity these refugee community organizations undertake. One Melbourne-based provider’s comments reflect a common provider sentiment. She reflected that because refugee organizations need to strategically propose projects suitable to donors, she has had to
redirect refugee leaders away from their original funding proposal ideas: “it might be great to do a cultural event, but increasingly it’s difficult to get funding for that.” She noted that she offers an alternative domestic focus for them: “maybe look at issues of positive parenting” (Subject HH, July 2008). For refugee organizations in Australia, their ‘donors’ are generally local and state governments, who often receive larger grants from the federal governments for refugee organizational activities.

Provider nudging also shifts refugee political leaders’ foci from transnational goals toward domestic-related goals. The development of one prominent Australian-based Sudanese organization epitomizes this nudging process. Another refugee leader initially approached a settlement organization telling the provider: “we are very worried about our community back home, how can we help?” The provider comments that she “explained that as an agency, our focus is on refugees in Australia, so you know, we talked about that with him. We said we understood his concerns with the community back home, but he wasn’t going to be able to - it would be difficult to attract funding for money back home because there were also very high needs within the immediate community here, within the southern region [of Sydney].” This leader “listened to that, and acknowledged that and agreed that there was also a lot of worthwhile work that he could be doing here.” The organization went on to guide this leader through the organizational incorporation process, find office area, link up to other leaders in refugee service provision and write funding submissions. Over several years the organization became more reputable and was able to slowly procure larger grants (as recounted by Interview Subject KK, July 2008).
In order to create a viable organization, refugee leaders are encouraged to follow the funding. They are also nudged by the work opportunities that arise from both doing domestic settlement activities, and getting their organizations funded. This includes traineeships with service providers and “funding for them to work in their own communities” (Australian service provider, Subject O, June 2008).

A final source of nudging through material benefits happens when settlement actors ‘auspice’, or manage the financials of any grants that refugee organizations procure. In Australia, donors are more likely to provide funding to fledging organizations when the funds are secured by an established Australian organization. This too is a critical benefit provided during the community capacity building process and one way that organizations are nudged: “although [the Women’s Refugee Network] have their own funds, and they are incorporated, basically our organization handles the money for them and [we] point them in the direction that this is a better way.” (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject KK, July 2008).

Nudging is an essential part of community capacity building, especially given specific funding constraints – in regard to both funding for settlement actors and fledging refugee organizations. For settlement organizations, helping refugees engage in transnational work is not a part of their missions. My research indicates a dearth of nudging happening in the US context. As demonstrated in section 3, the US does not prioritize Refugee Organization Building programs, and thus refugee leaders and professional settlement actors are often not interacting in this way. While on one hand refugee leaders are missing out on these financial resources to build
community organizations, they do have greater autonomy in creating organizations that suit their particular desires. As seen in Chapter 5, these leaders are creating these organizations with the help of private policy implementers more. Nevertheless, when US refugee leaders are working with professional service providers, this same nudging takes place. For example, when I asked a US provider involved with one Sudanese organization’s development about whether or not she is has supported any Sudanese transnational activities, her comment echoed Australian providers: “I’m focused on America.” Instead, she suggested that refugees are better suited in partnering with organizations already involved in transnational work (a difficult task, especially when a refugee has not developed strong social networks) (Subject 40, October 2009).

This nudging does not entirely preclude refugee organizations from engaging in transnational activities in the long term. Although it is not in the ‘brief’ of settlement actors, once a refugee organization “is on their own, they can look at how they can help others at home. If those group can on their own decide they want to do something specific to their country - they raise funds for building schools over there” (Subject KK, June 2008).

6.4.2: Softer Nudges through Social Network Expansion

Another seminal political prerequisite for fledgling refugee leaders is a social network that is helpful to reach their goals, as discussed in Chapter 5. Through Refugee Organization Building programs, refugee leaders are linked into broader social networks, which leads to more resources, as this quote from a Sydney Sudanese Refugee, Organizational leader and Lost Boy: “In Australia - we have
agencies, and so you connect [with them] - so if I have an idea - these people connect me - they show me the agency - or the way you get the funding” (Subject S, June 2008).

In Australia, these capacity building programs expand refugee social networks with a diverse set of societal members. Refugee leaders are encouraged to attend interagency meetings with multiple social service providers (in one case ‘over 80’), including the police, fire brigade, legal officers, the media and more. They discuss issues such as crime and discrimination, and cultural misunderstandings (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject D, June 2008). Other interagency meetings involve local and state government officials and health care service providers, where participants discuss ways to better work together to respond to specific domestic issues (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject QQ, July 2008). Settlement organizations arrange these meetings with the specific objective of making these social connections for refugee leaders, as they see themselves as “an intermediary” between refugees and mainstream service providers, as the following professional service provider’s quote highlights:

So, I actually started a meeting called the Sudanese Community Action Network - the purpose is to bring leaders together to meet with service providers - so leaders, fire brigade, police, different welfare organizations, the state government, the local government are represented, and sometimes the state government (Australian Settlement Service Provider, Subject QQ, July 2008).

These connections foster relationships between refugees and mainstream actors and deepen cross-cultural understanding. One Australian service provider established a ‘Sudanese Leadership Dialogue’ involving refugee leaders and Australian local and
state officials. This allowed for a facilitated discussion between leaders on key
domestically-related topics such as consequences of not understanding family law
and driving regulations. This resulted in identifying key settlement needs, and
finding innovative solutions. For example, after one family court justice, after
attending one of these Leadership Dialogue sessions, took dowry into account in one
court ruling. Due to these expanding social networks, refugee leaders also became
more and more involved with new projects, or new political activities – issues that
are domestically-focused.

In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that due to different policy implementers, refugee
social connections varied from host country to host country. In the United States,
because of its more laissez faire, public-private structure, settlement providers rely
on volunteers for much of the settlement work. Refugees there, find themselves
connecting with more diverse Americans – including church members. Conversely,
in the more institutionalized Australian system, federal and local governments fund
the program pretty much its entirety. These providers do not rely on volunteers to
implement their projects. The Australian government more tightly manages refugee
settlement. This reduced the scope of refugee social networks. Community capacity
building policy programs are one specific way through which these divergent social
networks develop, and then shape the target of refugee political activities. For
example, when leaders meet with mainstream service providers, they start projects
that these providers also want to pursue. This quote, an interaction between myself
and a representative of a US Refugee State Coordinator, exemplifies this reliance on
private support for refugee capacity building in the case of the Lost Boys:
Hannah: Did you all do any capacity building?
Interview Subject 53: “The people who really built their capacity were really some of the groups that came alongside of them - American volunteers - Friends of the Lost Boys.”

Through community capacity building programs settlement providers connect refugee leaders to a variety of other actors, particularly mainstream service providers. The development of refugee social networks in turn educates and socializes both refugees and mainstream social providers. These are political resources and skills that refugee leaders acquire, and can use to their benefit. In this process of acquiring political prerequisites, refugees are more subtly nudged toward domestic-related political activities. Capacity building policy programs also have unintentional consequences that run contrary to the essence of the program. In this next section, I describe this in more detail.

6.5: Unintended consequences

The entire process of getting a refugee community organization from a group of people interested in effecting social change, to a sustainable and independent organization has multiple consequences. On one level, as I have described in the previous sections, it has a tangible, almost technical effect on refugee political participation: it confers skills, resources and social networks onto refugee leaders and channels these same leaders’ efforts toward domestic-related settlement activities. These are intentional consequences: policymakers hope the policies they create will result in those particular effects. Through this nudging process unintentional consequences also surface. Two particularly salient inadvertent impacts include: a) creating barriers to refugee self-determination through messages that ‘we
know better than you;' and b) generating distrust and animosity between refugee leaders and settlement actors when refugees perceive that settlement actors are more concerned with their funding then refugee well being.

6.5.1: Who knows best?

Settlement actors consciously and unconsciously bring about barriers to refugee self-determination by sending the message that they ‘know what’s best’ for refugees during the capacity building process, a message that may not be the best way to build refugee capacity. Through the process of educating and socializing refugee leaders about how to establish and sustain organizations, settlement actors send these de-motivating messages by unconsciously using their power to take charge. They often define what projects refugee organizations will pursue and how the capacity building process will take shape.

In the previous section I showed that settlement actors are often constrained by what donors (namely Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship and local governments) want; donors do not want to fund cultural events, but do want to fund, for example, refugee community parenting classes. In this way, settlement actors are bound the contracts they tender. Yet, this is not only about donor constraints, but also about the practice of capacity building. Several refugee leaders expressed a concern that settlement organizations do not involve them in the more practical decision-making processes such as what projects to engage in for specific settlement issues. This can unintentionally send the message that refugees do not have their own ideas about how to solve prickly settlement problems. One provider,
seeking to overcome these issues helped establish new systems in which the settlement actors would guide rather than control projects.

This also plays out in regards to refugee leaders pursuing domestic versus transnational activities. Several refugee leaders (one who is now president of a well-established migrant services organization) noted that oftentimes providers do not understand the importance of transnational responsibilities. When refugees bring these concerns to settlement actors, the latter often views this as a ‘mental health’ issue – something for the refugee to ‘get over.’ These refugee leaders see this more as a socio-political problem, and one that they are keen on dealing with. The act of channeling refugees toward specific domestic-related activities, while not inherently bad, can send the message that ‘we – not you – know what’s best for you and your community.’

This message may be sent even more regularly through the daily interactions between settlement actors and refugee leaders when building refugee organizational capacity. As alluded to earlier, educating refugee leaders about creating and sustaining a community-based organization involves both a technical and socializing aspect. Technically, settlement actors will teach refugee leaders the legal and bureaucratic logistics of creating an organization, of “set[ing up] an organization according to Australian norms and the Australian legal system” (Settlement service provider, Subject KK, July 2008) and of “what it means to work with the community, [establishing] a board of directors, responsibilities…then [how to handle] fiscal management, measuring results, [and] raising money” (US service provider, Subject
57, December 2009). They also socialize leaders on how to engage in “appropriate” organizational practices according to western organizational values (such as democratic governance, transparency and accountability).

While it is true that Sudanese refugees often come to western countries with little or no experience with certain institutions – this does not mean that they are ‘uncivilized,’ a term that one settlement provider used to describe them (in front of a Sudanese refugee who worked in the same organization) (Subject E, June 2008). In my interviews, I got the sense that some settlement providers only saw these communities as incapable. One provider commented four times about the lack of appropriate leadership in the Sudanese community – saying that they needed to realize that one person cannot be ‘El Supremo’ or ‘El Presidente’ (Subject HH, July 2008). This same person was frustrated with what she saw as a lack of ability to engage in ‘appropriate’ amounts of dialogue between leaders. Instead, Sudanese leaders were either making all the decisions on their own, or taking ‘ten hours’ to discuss every detail with other organizational members. Helping refugee leaders master these leadership and organizational skills is certainly a laudable aim, but it is not clear whether or not having this attitude toward refugee communities is the best way to effectively build their capacity.

This next provider’s comments, worth quoting at length, describes how she realized that how capacity building was being implemented by her organization was unintentionally de-motivating refugee leaders.
“So we’ve been in this room, and we’re having meetings and we’re talking and they are listening. To the point where I had to stop and say, ‘What is going on here?’ And they would say “We don’t know what you’re talking about.” And the western, or Anglo, the professional way of approaching a meeting is that you go through this, this [pointing, like at agenda items], and this to go through, and if there are no objections, you move on. Where as I think their way of – a cultural difference, that needs to be respected, and acknowledged, and I think we have a lot to learn from them. Because the feedback…was that we weren’t actually listening and we weren’t on the same page. So one of their committee members that was present had not said anything at all and the feedback was that he was the most vocal out of all of them, but the way that the meeting had been run, he had been disempowered. And that’s how they feel out in society, out there – they feel that the power – they felt that the power was with us – we had the power without even realizing. We were thinking, this is for them, this project. But the way the meeting was run, it was saying the opposite (Subject GG, July 2008).

This service provider’s power came from having a better command of the English language, and using certain terminology. Power derived from this provider setting the agenda and the practices of the meetings, of defining the entire process. Unbeknownst to the provider, this served to exclude the refugee participants. After reflection, and extensive feedback with the Sudanese refugees of this group, this same provider took notice to the “cross-cultural aspect” and the power inequities of community capacity building and worked toward “mak[ing] space for them – not in a patronizing way.” This new way was accomplished when the provider consciously chose “not assume that things should be done in a particular way. That’s been a learning experience for us [the provider, my emphasis added].” This involves a continual process of negotiation in which refugees’ practices are respected: “the negotiation aspect is really important, and its about the parties having equal power – so they are a subject of that negotiation – rather than an object of that negotiation.”
In the end, this may not be the efficient process that is more characteristic of the organizational practices in Australia, and any other western industrialized country, but it could be the more effective capacity building strategy: “So, its respecting that the decisions make take longer, but the process was more important than the outcome” (Ibid).

Before establishing new ways of interacting with refugees, this particular provider’s practices sent refugee leaders the message: ‘we know better than you.’ Creating a new practice took effort on the part of the provider – asking and accepting feedback, and making changes; and for the refugee participants – giving honest feedback, despite power differences. My impression from these interviews is that this providers’ transformation - from seeing refugees as objects of negotiation toward seeing them as the subjects of negotiation - is an exception for settlement providers who remain accountable more to the federal government than toward refugees.

6.5.2: Whose side are you on?

Refugee settlement actors, like most service organizations, are constrained by the objectives and regulations of their donors. At times these actors’ concern with donor wishes can overshadow their concern with refugee needs. In this case, I found that these constraints engendered various outcomes that spurned suspicion about whose “side” settlement actors were really on, or in other words, whose interests were they were concerned with. One example includes, when former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews publicly stated that Sudanese refugees were not able to
integrate, most providers did not speak out against these comments. Some providers stating that this was the role of Sudanese organizational leaders; in order to avoid ‘mission creep’ organizations speak out against the Minister’s comments. (Subjects TT, SS, July 2008). Others pointed to specific regulations in their funding contracts that barred them from doing anything ‘political’ in nature (Subject C, E, J, Q, June and July 2008). To many Sudanese leaders, this was an indication that providers were more interested in keeping their funding then being an ally to Sudanese refugees. That providers are often closer to emerging refugee populations than other host country citizens, this was a particularly hard blow to the Sudanese community. One former African refugee noted that if providers are not on refugees’ sides, ‘then who is’ (Subject DD, July 2008).

6.6: Conclusion

Settlement programs, including Refugee Community Capacity Building programs directly shape the political activities of refugees in the US and Australia. In essence, through these educative processes, service providers not only educate, but also channel refugees towards particular political goals. In this chapter I demonstrated how settlement policies channeled refugees toward particular country-specific political goals in Australia, and how the sparse use of similar programs in the US resulted in the absence of professional service provider nudging. US refugee leaders remained more independent from these settlement policy institutions. I also demonstrated how some professional settlement policy actors, utilizing these
programs, indirectly dis-empowered refugees through such processes of political channeling.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1: Introduction

In this chapter I re-examine the empirical puzzle in light of the findings presented in the dissertation. Given these conclusions, I discuss the implications for Sudanese refugees and South Sudan, the practice of refugee settlement in the US, Australia and globally and the connection between migration and international development. I also detail implications for current theory, particularly institutional theories pertaining to migrant political participation. In light of the importance of policy implementers and specific policy programs, institutional theories will benefit from having a more pointed eye toward how policy influences refugee and other newcomer social networks.

7.2: Re-examining the Empirical Puzzle

In this section I return to the main research questions. Why are there such stark differences in the political activities of similarly situated Sudanese refugees in Australia and the US? What institutional structures of host country refugee settlement programs have directly impacted these refugee leaders? And how do these institutions influence refugee political efficacy?

7.2.1: Influential Institutions

My findings suggest that refugee settlement system attributes, derived from each country’s over-arching approach to dealing with social policy, have played a significant role in shaping refugee political activists. Despite many settlement system
similarities, South Sudanese leaders in each country are engaged with different sets of individuals and certain settlement programs.

In Australia, professional service providers charged with establishing refugee community organizations have guided refugee leaders toward domestic-focused activities. In the US, the private sector’s deep involvement in refugee settlement, particularly the involvement of faith-based volunteers, has provided extensive support to Sudanese leaders’ transnational political activities. Generally speaking when these leaders were resettled, they encountered two different settlement environments – the US system that allows, even dictates greater refugee autonomy and the Australian system that manages the lives of refugees more heavily. Within these two environments, refugee leaders met divergent policy implementers, individuals who facilitated their settlement. Over the course of this stage of “settling”, refugee leaders were channeled toward certain goals at times, and at other times, supported toward other goals.

Policy implementer actions toward refugee leaders -- channeling versus supporting – was in great part due to where they were situated within the system of refugee settlement in each country. Professional policy implementers have little choice but to channel ambitious refugees to engage in domestic political activities that will serve the main goal of refugee settlement: refugee integration. These professionals are paid to do exactly this. Volunteer policy implementers certainly have an interest in seeing that refugee needs are met, including needs pertaining to integration, but they are less tied to the state (and many were quite interested in
international development work), and therefore more open to supporting refugee leaders toward their transnational goals.

7.2.2: Institutions and Refugee Political Efficacy

Have these institutions influenced the political efficacy of refugee leaders, a critical political pre-requisite? Do specific policies and policy implementers empower or dis-empower refugee leaders? My research suggests that these policies can empower and dis-empower refugee leaders.86

86 It is quite hard to measure ‘empowerment’ for two reasons. First, the act (or lack thereof) of empowerment is incredibly specific to each person. Second, a seemingly disempowering action can actually catalyze individuals and vice versa.
I find two important conclusions pertaining to this research question. First, when policy implementers try to control meetings, set agendas and speak in terms unknown to refugee participants, refugee leaders have felt discouraged and unheard. When this occurs, despite the presence of capacity building programs, refugees may not actually be ‘empowered’ to take on the necessary responsibilities to effect change in their own lives and communities. Additionally, I find that Sudanese refugee leaders were highly motivated to bring about change in south Sudan. When the refugee leaders were persuaded to disregard these concerns, such actions had deleterious effects, indirectly disempowering them. When these concerns were not taken seriously, refugees were left again with feelings of discouragement.

How does this influence refugee political activities? This is certainly a matter of concern for the key individuals who are seeking to build relationships with newcomers in order to promote their integration. It also matters because these motivations to aid and develop their country of origin are a vital source of strength that can be tapped. Arguably, personal motivation is a key component of self-
sufficiency, the stated goal of both of these refugee settlement programs. These findings have broad and specific implications to theory as well as to the subjects involved in this project. I now turn to a discussion on these more practical concerns.

7.3: **Practical Implications**

This research has implications relating to several different subjects: South Sudanese refugee leaders, the Republic of South Sudan, the institution of Refugee resettlement in the US, Australia and globally, and the intersection of migrants, systems of integration and international development.

### 7.3.1: South Sudanese Refugees and South Sudan

In July, South Sudan, after over roughly half a century of war, will become an independent nation. Most South Sudanese refugees have known nothing but this struggle for autonomy. What insights can be drawn from this project regarding this momentous event?

South Sudanese refugees are highly motivated to effect social change for their people and country. This motivation is a critical component of the economic, social and political development of the world’s newest country. Will current refugee transnational initiatives have a substantial effect? Given the state of South Sudanese development, it is clear that a school, or water pump here and there will not have an enormous impact. The assets of South Sudanese refugee organizations explored in this dissertation are chump change relative to those of the Southern Sudanese Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and of international NGOs currently working in the
country. By the end of 2011, the MDTF will have spent close to 500 million dollars on South Sudanese development (World Bank). The South Sudanese refugee leaders will likely have to scale up their efforts in order to make an enduring impact on their country.

Second order effects of South Sudanese refugee political mobilization, however, should not be overlooked for two reasons. First, refugee leaders are acquiring valuable human capital that they may potentially take back to South Sudan. As one volunteer put it: one of these Lost Boys is bound to be president of the new Republic some day. Second, refugee political mobilization has not only involved South Sudanese individuals. Savvy South Sudanese leaders in both countries understand that in order to generate resources and on-going support for South Sudanese development, the help of US and Australian nationals is critical. This transnational social capital may be an important element of continued financial, emotional and social support throughout the tough years ahead.

These second-order effects are not bound to happen, however. South Sudanese leaders must continue to cultivate skills and networks after the international frenzy about Sudan has died down. These leaders will have to work through volunteer and international community burnout and donor fatigue in an era where people and their money are pulled toward multiple worthwhile ends. One interesting strategy that many leaders in the US have employed can serve as a counterbalance. Enlisting volunteers to travel and spend time in South Sudan may
provide the personal connection necessary to provide support that extends beyond the occasional check.

Nevertheless, none of these efforts will replace a well-governed South Sudan state. Critics of international development rightly point out that international charity does not replace well functioning national governments that are accountable to their citizens. The transnational activities of South Sudanese refugees, such as the creation of schools, health clinics and critical infrastructure like water pumps are beneficial in the short-term. In the coming years, to ensure the long-term development needs are met, these same refugee leaders must enact, or at least participate in, domestic political efforts toward the government of South Sudan. These efforts can include participating in decisions that allocate oil revenue resources toward the social, political and economic development of the people of South Sudan. This dissertation demonstrates that many Sudanese refugees in the West are situated quite nicely for such a role – they have pursued education, are involved in politics and are strongly motivated to effect change in their country. My research also has implications for the settlement programs in the US, Australia and globally.

7.3.2: Refugee Settlement

The findings also suggest recommendations for policymakers in each of these countries, as well as those dealing with global refugee protection. First, policymakers should review the unintentional consequences of the use of professional and volunteer policy implementers. This includes a pointed look at how policies and service provider-refugee interactions foster or impede refugee social,
political and economic activities and their effects on refugee self-determination. Second, evaluation and dialogue about refugee resettlement should be markedly ramped up. In so doing, new and older refugee settlement countries will benefit. These efforts are likely to enhance integration efforts by supporting refugees toward self-sufficiency.

This project has demonstrated that refugees respond to their interactions with policy implementers. Through these settlement-refugee interactions, policy implementers have multiple inadvertent influences on refugee leaders. These can alter the paths of their activities and their political efficacy and hinder the development of overall self esteem and self-determination. Each country’s sincere examination of these unintended consequences is recommended. With regard to the former, the US and Australia would benefit from acknowledging and evaluating how their programs and policy implementers influence refugee social and political practices and how these in turn impact paths to and levels of integration. For example, given differences in centralization and institutionalization of national social policy, will refugee political, social and economic activity be more individualistic in some countries? Will we see more individuals, rather than groups, within a community enact political activities? Unfortunately I was not able to assess this aspect utilizing the data I collected. My hunch is that we are more likely to see individuals prompting these activities in the US relative to Australia. These questions are important questions for policymakers and service providers alike. Given the constraints in government funding (particularly in the US), it is likely that refugee
settlement decision-makers will do best to cultivate relationships with academics to do this type of review.

With regard to the second unintended consequence, I find two specific outcomes of refugee-policy implementer interaction that should be remedied: a) the creation of barriers to refugee self-determination through messages that ‘we know better than you;’ and b) the generation of distrust and animosity between refugee leaders and settlement actors when refugees perceive that settlement actors are more concerned with their funding then refugee well being. In order to reduce the ‘harm’ done to newcomers, US and Australian settlement service providers can become more mindful during interpersonal exchanges and also when channeling or guiding newcomers toward specific activities. These effects are certainly related to limitations of resources available to settlement policy implementers. Some providers would aptly explain that their time is short, and they cannot always spend the extra time explaining things, and reflecting on their own interactions. This is certainly understandable. Nevertheless, the importance of building rapport, ensuring critical information is conveyed and building the esteem of refugees cannot be understated. I recommend that providers receive on-going training in creating proper boundaries with refugees and help in developing coping mechanisms to deal with stress.

I also suggest that settlement countries consider seeking creative ways to empower newcomers’ transnational endeavors by combining them with their own international development initiatives. This is not entirely out of the question. Indeed, Canada, and some European countries have already begun to make this link and
develop the appropriate institutional mechanisms to enact it. With South Sudanese refugees’ overwhelming support of Independence from Sudan, this development-migrant link is only more vital. Transnational political action on the part of Sudanese refugees has not yet reached its fullest potential. Host countries could mobilize these efforts even more and serve their own interests in seeing to the healthy development of future South Sudan.

My research suggests that the policy makers and implementers of these two refugee settlement programs could benefit immensely from a cross-dialogue with one another and that the strengths of these programs combined could be offered as a new “model” of refugee settlement services. To this end, I recommend that the UNHCR increase its evaluative and information exchange resources in the specific area of Third Country Resettlement, and specifically at the level of domestic assistance following the refugee’s arrival in the new host country.

All of these recommendations require action, and therefore funding of some sort. Unfortunately refugee resettlement across these two countries as well as global refugee protection, are under-funded. Although this is already widely known, it would be irresponsible not to recommend that countries extend greater resources for these efforts.

7.4: Theoretical Implications

These findings have interesting implications for scholarship pertaining to refugee and migrant political participation, migrant transnationalism and migrant political incorporation. First, most obviously, the project’s findings suggest that a
closer look at the policies and programs that daily influence newcomers is called for. The Policy Feedback model can be utilized for this end. Second, I argue that scholars would benefit from continued creative synthesis of key theories pertaining to migrant and refugee political activities. This includes cross synthesis within the political incorporation literature and across it and the migrant transnational literature.

7.4.1: Utilizing the Policy Feedback Model

The Policy Feedback model offers new insights and begs new questions. Many scholars have utilized an all too broad or vague political opportunity structure approach to examine refugee and migrant political activity outcomes. They have focused either on institutions governing the processing and admittance of refugees, or on more macro-level institutions within a context (like media rhetoric, and national government leadership). With the exception of citizenship and naturalization policies and regulations, they do not focus on specific policies and programs targeted toward migrants. This work has presented evidence that, as the Policy Feedback model would suggest, settlement policies, programs and policy implementers have political effects. I find that in the first stage refugee settlement, specialized policy implementers and programs guiding the settlement process are the institutions that matter to refugee political activities the most. What implications do these findings have for previous scholarship?

With regard to other institutionalist theories, my findings suggest that the reception inclusion/exclusion model remains overly simplistic and underspecified. Rhetoric pertaining to migrants certainly influences newcomer access to the
policymaking arena, and their resultant political outcomes. My findings, however suggest that the Koopmans model should be revised in two key ways. First, at least in the case of South Sudanese refugees, both pro- and anti-migrant rhetoric spawned political mobilization on the part of South Sudanese. Exclusionary and inclusionary media served to create attention around this particular population that was ultimately used to its favor. Thus, this model would benefit from a slightly more complex understanding of the interaction between societal rhetoric, newcomer political mobilization and newcomer political outcomes.

This brings me to my second point: the reception model is underspecified. Here again, I do not discount the notion that pro- or anti-minority rhetoric influences migrant political outcomes. But how does this happen? What is the process? And for whom does this matter? Is it that in anti-minority contexts media elites will not allow newcomers to voice their grievances? Or do societal members engage in acts of discrimination in multiple public venues, thus generally sending a message of exclusion? My findings suggest two key things. First, in the case of South Sudanese refugees in the US, host country policy implementers played a key role in shaping rhetoric. Second, in both countries, it was these policy implementers (and refugee capacity building initiatives in Australia) that provided refugees with social, financial and emotional resources necessary for South Sudanese political activities. Revised reception models could take these institutions as the central aspects of ‘reception.’

Using a Policy Feedback model, future research could answer other important questions. What other newcomer political activities are influenced by these policies,
and their implementation? How do these policies and implementers influence the issue area on which newcomers focus? Or the ways that refugees group (or do not group) together to realize their political goals? This type of examination requires the researcher to look for the ways in which newcomers and their contexts were changed by their interactions with one another. Thus, the analyst does not see the receiving context as solely a political opportunity structure that migrants navigate through in order to implement their goals. My research findings suggest that this type of approach is beneficial. When material and social support was lacking, Sudanese refugees sought it out. They mobilized volunteers. They endeared themselves to Americans and Australians to achieve their goals. In some instances they also took steps back from their original, transnational objectives, when resources and messages indicated that domestic-focused activities were the best choice for their political trajectory.

Refugees, and all recipients of policies, are not simply navigating through a system (or a ‘political opportunity structure’). They have agency and are malleable – they make the best decisions for themselves, but this notion of ‘best’ changes due to environmental circumstances. This includes changing their goals, and courses of action. A particular context then will not be a maze through which refugees wander, trying to achieve their pre-defined goals. Instead, the refugee and his/her context can be likened to a person making his/her path through life, in which the “whos” and “whats” that are encountered alter the path-maker’s understandings and desires. The “whos” and “whats” are in turn altered by the path-maker.
Additionally, like the policy feedback literature suggests, my research indicates that theories should be sensitive to how these systems and relationships may change over time. Many migrant political participation scholars have noted the correlation between political activity (both domestic and transnational) and length of residence in a context. My research, which focuses on a population that is recently resettled, highlights the potential for different circumstances to shape migrants in different periods of their settlement, particularly because they are interacting with different government institutions over time.

7.4.2: Cross Fertilization

This project’s findings suggest that combining insights from the political incorporation (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Andersen 2007; Bloemraad 2006) and international migration literatures (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001; Basch et al 1994; Portes 1999; Guarnizo et al 2003; Levitt 2001) can be quite fruitful. Along with Morawska 2003, and Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, I argue that much can be gained from bridging these literatures. Strengths from each literature can be utilized. Migrant transnational scholars would greatly benefit from cross national research designs that many political incorporation scholars have utilized, as well as their identification of numerous host country influences on newcomer behavior. Political incorporation scholars would be remiss to overlook the evidence that migrant transnationalist scholars have identified including the role of the origin country state, the migration experience, and the enduring social connections that newcomers have with their countrywomen and men.
New, innovative questions could be answered using bridged literature. As has been done in this project, we can ask more questions about what changes newcomer political goals, or at least their current actions toward these goals. Are there instances where host countries directly or indirectly mobilized newcomers to engage in transnational activities? How does the engagement of transnational activities influence integration? Do specific transnational activities increase newcomer integration, while others do not? Other sets of questions along these lines could examine different qualitative aspects of newcomer political activities. Do certain policy implementers support different types of transnational activities? For example, are host country nationals less open to certain transnational initiatives, like helping to arm rebels?

7.4.3: Refugee Studies

Finally, given my findings, refugee studies can benefit greatly by expanding scholarship that examines the refugee as a political agent. This is important because refugees, like all other populations of humans, have political ambitions. The extent to which communities are able to pursue these ambitions directly relates to the self-perceived efficacy of refugees – their own sense of their power to change their lives in positive directions. This is vital not only for the realization of the refugees’ political goals, but also for the refugees’ wellbeing more broadly. More research could examine how refugee processing, and domestic assistance for refugees independently influence refugee efficacy. Further research could examine as well, in what ways these may (dis)empower refugees.
7.5: Concluding Remarks

Policies have unintentional political effects. Policies and policy implementers, particularly those with whom recipients are directly interacting, can cause unintended political consequences. The political activities of Sudanese refugee leaders were catalyzed, in part, due to policies that had quite different objectives and means of implementation. The goal of settlement in the US is to economically integrate refugees, while in Australia there is more concern with ensuring equal access to Australian social services. In the US, policy implementation is decentralized and the overarching structure of programs can be characterized as laissez faire. In contrast, in Australia, policy implementation is centralized at the level of the Commonwealth and it is highly institutionalized. These policies and the individuals who implemented these policies had second-order effects that the policy implementers themselves often overlooked. Many professional service providers had never made the connection between what they did and the political activities of refugees. Given the policy implications I have described above, making these creative analytical connections, between policies and the political actions of policy recipients is a worthwhile endeavor that more scholars should undertake.
Appendix A: Interview Protocol: Refugee

Refugee Characteristics

1. Name?
2. Where you are from? Briefly tell me history of path to Australia/US? Kakuma refugee camp?
3. Level of education?
4. Job?
5. When did you arrive in Australia/US?
6. Region of Sudan?
7. Connections home? Number of people? Frequency? What type of connection? (telephone, email, postal service)

Refugee Political practices

8. What goals do you have for yourself? Your future?
10. What types of things do you do to help the Sudanese community at home? How much time do you spend doing these things? What is the frequency?
11. What types of things do you do to help the South Sudan? How much time do you spend doing these things? What is the frequency?
12. Do you volunteer for any organizations? Do you vote? Do you engage in protests? Other political activities here in Australia/US? How much time do you spend doing these things? What is the frequency?
14. Do you have any involvement with political officials in Australia/US? If so who? How did you get to know them? What is your relationship? How frequently do you interact?
15. Do you have any involvement with southern Sudanese political officials? If so who? How did you get to know them? What is your relationship? How frequently do you interact?
**Origin of these practices**

16. How did you get involved in practice X, Y, Z?

17. Did you initiate these activities? If so, where did you get the idea? If not, who gave you the idea? How did you meet this person/these people?


19. From where and whom did you learn to do these projects? Activities? Where did you learn the skills necessary for these activities?

20. Where do you complete the logistics? Organization of these projects?

**Resettlement Experience**

21. What resources were you given when you arrived? How long did you receive these resources? (money, tangible resources, skills, edu?)

21. How did you get a job?

23. How did you get into school? Other technological skills?

24. In general, how has the experience of being resettled to Australia/US been for you?

25. What organizations have helped you out? How so?

26. What individuals helped you out? Where and how did you meet them?

27. What has been a barrier to getting a job, education, skills, home?

28. What have been barriers to the goals you discussed above?

29. Fill in the blank – If you accomplish X, you are a successful person.

30. Fill in the blank – I need X from Australia/US to be successful.

31. Australians/Americans generally think X about me, and other southern Sudanese refugees.

32. How have you responded to recent events (AUS: violence, gangs, Immigration Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese community and the media? The state? Different local communities? Why?
Appendix B: Interview Protocol: Professional Policy Implementers

Organizational Characteristics

1. What is the mission of the organization? Central projects? Can you tell me a bit about them?
2. Does the organization provide more services? Advocacy? Both? Percentage?
3. How old is the organization?
4. How many staff members does the organization have? Specifically for migrants? Refugees? Sudanese refugees?
5. What are the primary sources of funding for the organization? State? Membership? Private?
6. What is your position? Role?

Relationship to other organizations servicing/advocating for migrants/refugees

1. What is your relationship to the state?
2. In your opinion, what are the central organizations/institutions that provide services or advocate for/against migrants/refugees? (if not mentioned -- Churches? Universities?)
3. Do you consider your organization a central organization?
4. What, if any, formal or informal relationships does the organization have with these other organizations that provide services or advocate for migrants/refugees?
   a. For example, a contract with Australian/US Refugee Council to collaborate on building language educational capacity for migrants would be a more formal. On-going relationships with certain jobs that employee refugees, or schools that are more likely to admit refugees, churches that can provide services, etc would be examples of more informal relationships.
5. If applicable, can you tell me about some of these collaborations?

Types of resources provided to migrants/refugees

1. What can a refugee/migrant get from this organization?
   a. Funds? How much? Any literature about this?
   b. Skills? What types? How? Any literature about this?
   c. Jobs?
   d. Access to educational institutions?
   e. Political skills? (Lobbying)
2. Does the organization lobby local, state or federal government on behalf of their clients? On behalf of migrant services in general?
3. Does anyone ever encourage migrants to get involved politically? If so, to what extent? What types of things does the organization do to this end? Any canvassing?
4. Does the organization provide office space, technology, funds, time, coordination or logistics help for the development of migrant community organizations? Other migrant projects?
5. Do any staff members, outside of the organization provide funds, training, or time to migrants/refugees for their organizations? Projects? Political lobbying? Etc?
6. Does anything that the organization does bring divergent migrant groups together?
7. Does your organization see a difference between working with the “Lost Boys” v the broader Sudanese migrant community?

Messages from organization to refugees/migrants

1. Fill in the blank -- If a refugee/migrant community does X – your organization has successfully completed its job.
2. What does the organization teach refugees/migrants? Or what do you think refugees/migrants should learn? Know?
3. What are the typical interactions between staff members and clients? Sudanese clients?
5. How has the organization responded to recent events (AUS: violence, gangs, Immigration Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese community and the media? The state? Different local communities? Why?
Appendix C: Interview Protocol: Government Officials

Interview Subject Characteristics

1. Name?
2. What is your occupation with the Australian/US government?

Interaction with Sudanese refugees

1. What does the Australian/US government provide for refugees? Money, skills, other tangible resources? Do you have any literature you can provide?
2. How is this accomplished?
3. What is the objective of resettlement of refugees for the Australia/US government?
4. Fill in this blank – If refugees X, the Australian/US government is successful.
5. What is the perception of southern Sudanese refugees? Has this changed over time? If so, why?
6. How has the Australian state and its officials responded to recent events (violence, gangs, Immigration Minister’s responses) between the Sudanese community and the media? The state? Different local communities? Why?

Involvement in Refugee Political practices

1. What is your specific involvement with southern Sudanese refugees? How much funds do you contribute? Time? Official or leadership role? If you have no involvement – why?
2. If so, did you initiate these activities? If so, where did you get the idea? If not, who gave you the idea? How did you meet this person/these people? Were you lobbied?
4. How long have you been involved?
Appendix D: Interview Protocol: Volunteers

Involvement with the ‘Lost Boys of Sudan’

1. When did you first hear about this group of Sudanese refugees, including the Lost Boys of Sudan?
2. Why did you first get involved?
3. How did you first get involved (through a friend, a church, through another organization?)
4. What activities did you do with these refugees when you first got involved?
   a. Has this changed?
5. What are the key ways that you now connect with the Sudanese refugees?
6. Can you tell me more about this?
   b. How frequently are you in contact with them?
   c. How did you form the projects you are now currently working on (did the Sudanese want to create the project, or was it more your idea?)
7. How has it been to work with the Sudanese refugees?
   d. What have you learned about them? Yourself? The world? The US government?
   e. How has this changed your life?
8. If you have formed an organization with Sudanese refugees, can you tell me more about it?
   f. Why did it form? How did it form?
   g. What are the primary purposes for the organization?
   h. What is the structure of the organization?
   i. How involved are the Lost Boys in the organization? (for example, do they receive services? Participate in decision-making of the organization)
      i. Please provide examples if possible.
   j. How do you fund this organization?

Thoughts on refugee resettlement, particularly with the Lost Boys of Sudan.

1. What are your general thoughts about the resettlement of South Sudanese refugees? (enough money and services; trainings; access to language classes for example?)
2. Did you ever work or interact with any of the resettlement agencies? Any other people in the resettlement field? If so, why? And How was it?
3. Would you have liked anything to be different for South Sudanese settlement experience?
4. What do you think was positive about their settlement?
Appendix E: Funding for Refugee Organization Building Programs (2000-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$7,759,667</td>
<td>$2,680,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$8,024,000</td>
<td>$4,025,994</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$8,225,000</td>
<td>$7,781,202</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$8,869,000</td>
<td>$8,011,363</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$9,044,000</td>
<td>$9,491,874</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$9,190,667</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$9,931,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$10,277,667</td>
<td>$8,481,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Australia’s figures were drawn from Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship (former Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration Affairs) Portfolio Budgets for Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship (former Department of Multiculturalism and Immigration Affairs). Annual reports (years 1999-2000 to 2010-2011) can be found at [http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/budget](http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/budget). US figures were located on each Office of Refugee Resettlement’s Annual Report to Congress.

Note: These figures are found at Australia’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the US’s Office of Refugee Resettlement.
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EDUCATION
Syracuse University (SU) Syracuse, New York
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science 2005 - Present
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HONORS AND AWARDS
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Ketchum Dissertation Writing Award Recipient, Political Science 2009 - 2010
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Research Assistantship, Department of Political Science, SU Fall 2008
Goekjian Scholarship, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, SU 2008-2009
Summer Research Scholarship, Department of Political Science, SU 2007, 2009
Graduate Assistantship: PARC, SU 2006-2008
Full tuition Alumni scholarship, Department of Political Science, SU 2005-2006
Presidential Scholar 6 semesters, Dean’s list 2 semesters, UGA 1999 - 2003
Best Political Science Research Paper 2003
“Micro-credit: One Component of Alleviating Poverty.”

PUBLICATION
“Creating and Channeling Refugee Political Activities: The Role of Refugee Community Capacity Building Programs.” In Migration and the Global City Conference, Edited Volume, Ryerson University, Forthcoming.

CONFERENCE PAPERS
“Creating and Channeling Refugee Political Activities: The Role of Refugee Community Capacity Building Programs.” Presented at Migration and the Global City Conference, Ryerson University, October 2010.

WORK EXPERIENCE
Yoga Instructor, Yoga District Studio and Pure Prana Studio August 2009 – Present
• Instruct beginners, intermediate and advanced students in the eight-limbs of Yoga, including yoga postures, managing the mind through constructive life choices, breathing exercises, concentration and meditation.

Research Assistant, International Rescue Committee January 2010 – May 2010
• Conducted Interpreter Services Needs Assessment. Developed research design and methodology, conduct qualitative data collection, research analysis and write up.
• Produced Final Assessment for grant proposal for new language interpreter IRC unit.
• Established yoga program for staff and refugee clients.

Programmatic Staff then Board Member, YogaActivist.Org August 2009 – Present
• Developed training curriculum and trained members in using Conflict Resolution Skills.

Coordinator, SU Political Science Research Forum September 2008 – April 2009
• Organized bi-weekly research forum for faculty and graduate students.

Instructor, PARC, SU January 2009 – May 2009
• Facilitation Skills & Conflict Resolution for Groups lead instructor for mid-career and undergraduate students.
• Curriculum included developing interpersonal listening and assertion skills as well as facilitating communication skills for groups.

Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, SU January 2009 – May 2009
• Assisted Professor Terrell Northrup with International Relations course for undergraduates.

Research Assistantship, Department of Political Science August 2008 – May 2009
• Conducted literature review, organized and analyzed General Social Survey data and write paper with Professor Kristi Andersen regarding the impact of local contextual factors on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants in the United States.

Director, Conflict Management Center, P.A.R.C., Syracuse University 2006 – 2008
• Directed training and outreach initiatives for this educational project of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflict.
• Spearheaded new training initiatives including Effective Group Relations, Cross-cultural communication, Collaborative Action Research interviewing techniques and Advocacy skills and new outreach programming with the “Lost Boys of Sudan,” Syracuse University New Faculty program and the Hillbrook Youth detention facility.
• Co-Trainer on Workplace Mediation Skills with Dr. Neil Katz for New York State Human Resources Department
• Co-Trainer of Conflict Resolution Skills with Professor John Murray provided to Middle East social activists.

Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, SU 2005-2006
• Assisted with International Human Rights and Ethics in International Relations courses for undergraduates.

Legislative Assistant, Georgia Public Defender Standards Council 2004-2005
• Assisted Lobbyist at the Georgia State Capitol, the 2004 NADCL State Legislature Convention and other meetings.
• Daily correspondence with Circuit office staff, to ensure that State standards, policies and procedures were implemented.
• Created and maintained over 40 judicial circuit budgets through correspondence with state and county officials and responsible for financial aspects of over 60 contracts.
• Created and maintained database for over 140 GPDSC Grant Applications, allocating $3.5 million dollars to Georgia counties.

SERVICE ACTIVITIES
Yoga Activist, Inc., Board Member 2009 – Present
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