Competing Sovereignties: Corporate Social Responsibility, Oil Extraction, and Indigenous Subjectivity in Ecuador

Emily Billo
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/geo_etd
Part of the Geography Commons

Recommended Citation
Billo, Emily, "Competing Sovereignties: Corporate Social Responsibility, Oil Extraction, and Indigenous Subjectivity in Ecuador" (2012). Geography - Dissertations. 78.
https://surface.syr.edu/geo_etd/78
Abstract

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs developed in recent years as the business response to social and environmental criticism of corporate operations, and are most debated in those societies where neoliberalism emerged most prominently, the United States and the United Kingdom. My dissertation expands these debates investigating the CSR programs of a Spanish-owned multinational oil company, Repsol-YPF operating in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. It explores CSR programs as institutions that can facilitate ongoing resource extraction, and particular technologies of rule that serve to discipline indigenous peoples at the point of extraction. I conducted an institutional ethnography to examine the social relationships produced through CSR programs, and contend that the relationships formed within CSR programs enable ongoing resource extraction. This dissertation argues that CSR programs produce entanglements between state, corporate and indigenous actors that lead to competing and conflicting spaces of governance in Ecuador. These entanglements reflect the Ecuadorian state's attempts to 'erase' indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership in the nation-state. In turn, CSR programs can both contain indigenous mobilization and resistance in Ecuador, but also highlight indigenous difference and rights and access to resources, predicated on membership in the nation-state. To that end, the dissertation is attentive to the ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous actors produced through engagement with corporate capital, and suggests that ambivalence can also be a productive space.
COMPETING SOVEREIGNTIES: OIL EXTRACTION, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND INDIGENOUS SUBJECTIVITY IN ECUADOR

by

Emily Ruth Billo

B.A., Middlebury College, 2000
M.R.P., Cornell University, 2006

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Geography.

Syracuse University
December 2012
Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of friends and colleagues in Ecuador and the United States. It is not easy to open oneself up to discussions about both life and work, and I learned a lot speaking with participants in my research project, who challenged me to reflect critically on my own life. They are not named in the text, but I am especially indebted to the people of Pompeya, staff at FEPP-Coca, the vicariato in Coca, the mission in Pompeya, and others in Coca and Quito, Ecuador who helped make this research possible.

In Syracuse, I owe a great deal to my advisor and mentors, in particular Tom Perreault. Tom patiently guided me throughout my time in Syracuse. He never showed his frustration when it took me awhile to catch on. I could not have done it without him, nor without the wonderful meals and weekend skiing days with Meredith. Alison Mountz offered hours of her time at Syracuse, and necessary grounding when I started to unravel. Don Mitchell and Tod Rutherford helped me refine my writing and ideas in the classroom, which I tried to apply in the dissertation. I am grateful to Gabriela Valdivia for her comments and feedback on my dissertation, and for stepping in at a crucial moment. Finally, I want to thank Diane Grimes for long conversations about teaching, research, and the academy, and for her willingness to chair my defense.

Research was generously funded by an Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Grassroots Development Fellowship, a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (#0825763), and by various funds through the Maxwell School at Syracuse University: a Roscoe-Martin Fellowship, a Program on Latin American and the Caribbean Summer Research Grant, and the Department of Geography.
In the Department of Geography at Syracuse University, special thanks goes to Jake Bendix, Matt Huber, Susan Millar, and Bob Wilson for great conversations, and especially to Joe Stoll for his help with the map in the dissertation. Moreover, Chris, Janet, Jackie, and Margie’s daily support made it possible to keep going.

At Bucknell University I want to thank the Environmental Studies Program, the Geography Department, and new colleagues across the university for support and advice in the lead up to the dissertation defense. I am especially grateful to Kim DiRocco for helping me copy and mail the dissertation to committee members.

Graduate students at Syracuse University provided important conversations throughout my time in Syracuse, and releases from the daily grind. I especially want to thank Kate Coddington, Nancy Hiemstra, Serin Houston, Anna Lumsden, and Katie Wells who helped me learn to have confidence in my ideas over long dinners and walks. The support from the ‘nature-society’ graduate students in the department was also invaluable, including Mitul Baruah, Parvathy Binoy, Beatriz Bustos, Alejandro Camargo, Elvin Delgado, Matt Himley, Keith Lindner, Brent Olson, Sandra Sanchez, Marla Torrado, and Evan Weissman. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Patricio Castro who patiently sat with me to practice my Spanish, and Alejandro Camargo who painstakingly corrected all the English-Spanish translations in the dissertation.

Kafui Attoh was a wonderful roommate and provided hours of long laughs. Returning from Ecuador, Evan Weissman, Joaquin Villanueva, and Anna Lumsden helped me to delve into the writing process. In those final days of writing in the heat of the summer, I couldn’t have survived the Maxwell basement without Flavia Rey de Castro Pastor, Emily Mitchell-Eaton, and Sean Wang.
Many friends have supported, distracted, entertained, and laughed with me over the years: all of the wonderful dancers at Wacheva, the cardio-salsa crew, Avery Ouellette, Allie Lack, and Meredith Schmidt. In Ecuador, I am grateful to Juli Hazlewood, Emma Kohn, Kate McConnell, and Dana Hill. Finally, I thank my family, my parents and brothers who unconditionally support and encourage me, and Rafael Castro who has taught me, above all else, about love.
# Table of Contents

Abstract i.

Title Page ii.

Copyright Notice iii.

Acknowledgments iv.

Table of Contents vii.

List of Figures ix.

**Chapter One – Introduction**
CSR programs and neoliberal policies 1
Neoliberal natures?
CSR programs as discourse and practice
Oil, Ecuador, and CSR
CSR programs as disciplinary institutions
Outline of chapters

**Chapter Two – An Institutional Ethnography of CSR**
Introduction 38
Institutional ethnographies
Accessing the everyday
Positionality, identity and the everyday
Participant observation and power
Conclusions

**Chapter Three – Indigenous Subjectivity and the Space of Pompeya**
Introduction 74
Indigenous movement organization in Ecuador
Lowland Kichwa livelihood practices
The space of Pompeya
Daily lives in Pompeya
Micro-credit project
Development, politics and CSR programs
Understanding deficiency, moving toward rights
The politics of CSR
Conclusion

**Chapter Four – The Duplicitous Nature of the State**
Introduction 118
Outline of the chapter
Petro-states
Ecuador’s political economy of oil
Development, indigenous peoples, and oil
The ‘political carnival’ or the ‘two-faced state’
Reforming the hydrocarbons law
Indigenous organizations, CSR programs, and the governance of oil
State Institutions and Oil Governance
Conclusion

Chapter Five – The Zone of Influence
Introduction
The 'zone of influence' and Pompeya
Encounter One: Community Relations
Encounter Two: Fundación Repsol
Negotiating sovereignties
Conclusion

Chapter Six – Conclusions
Introduction
Spaces of resistance
Contributions
Contradictions in overlapping spaces of governance
A story of the state

Appendix One: Abbreviations

Bibliography

Biographical Data
List of Figures

Figure 1. Map of Ecuador

Figure 2. Map of Oil Blocks, Northern Ecuadorian Amazon Region
Chapter 1

Introduction

Returning to the northern Ecuadorian Amazon region (Orellana province) in November of 2008 (Figure 1), I was struck by how little had changed since the first time I arrived in the region in 2004. It was still a mix of paved and unpaved roads following a smaller series of pipelines from oil fields to the larger trans-Andean private (Oleoducto Crudo Pesado, OCP) and state run (Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano, SOTE) pipelines that would take oil across the country to the refinery on the coast. Large trailers hauling pipeline segments, busses, motorbikes and pedestrians all shared the road, weaving in and out, lurching to stops at randomly placed speed bumps, or to pick up passengers. In 2008, I often took the bus from Coca (formally known as Puerto Francisco de Orellana), the capital of the province of Orellana, to Pompeya, an indigenous Kichwa community on the bank of the Napo River, and the end of the bus service. From Pompeya, only boat travel is possible. At an hour-long stop in La Joya de la Sacha, commonly shortened to Sacha, I had time to observe the bustle of traffic flying by, and pedestrians darting across the two-lane road; the horizon marked by gas flares. The scene is the epitome of a region dominated by an extractive industry since the early 1970s. Sacha, like Coca, is a frontier-like town that developed with the oil industry. It consists of a mixture of company employees, indigenous peoples, and internal colonists, mestizo populations migrating from the Ecuadorian highlands to the lowlands, who moved into the region as it opened with oil

---

1 I use this spelling of Kichwa, rather than Quichua, to denote the non-Hispano origins of the word.
2 Through the dissertation I use the term indigenous as one articulated identity that is contested and negotiated among groups of people, and does not to fix them as 'naturally' indigenous, or substitute for other aspects of identity (see Valdivia 2005). Other terms, such as Indian, or Indio are often derogatory labels placed on native populations in certain contexts in Ecuador, and today, within the space of the community of Pompeya, indigenous was used by residents as a form of self-identification. However, others (see Sawyer 2004) have used the Spanish indígena as a translation for Indian.
3 This translates as the Jewel of the Jungle. Sacha is a Kichwa word meaning jungle.
exploration in the 1970s. The infrastructure that does exist in these cities facilitates additional oil extraction, including roads, electricity, and the pipelines. As we turned off the main road in Sacha, we began a dusty, often muddy, but always bumpy ride on the dirt road to Pompeya.⁴

Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, an oil block currently operated by the private, Spanish-owned multinational oil company, Repsol-YPF. The entire Ecuadorian Amazon region is divided into oil blocks based on known oil reserves. Extraction rights are rented by the state to private companies (Figure 2). NGO staff and other outsiders, including oil workers, often refer to the area in which they work by the oil block number. This titling trumps other claims on the land, including indigenous communities and ancestral territory. The port of entry starts at the

---

⁴ Eventually, during the 17 months I was in Ecuador, this road to Pompeya was also paved. The state provided the funding to pave the road, allowing for more rapid access to the river, and in turn to the barges and boats to transport oil personnel and infrastructure downriver.
Napo River, and workers must continue another 160 kilometers down a dirt road to reach Repsol-YPF’s drilling platforms. Block 15, where Pompeya is located, is currently operated by Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of Petroecuador, the state company. The bus to Pompeya drops passengers on the north side of the river, in the barrio of Pompeya known as San Francisco, where the Saturday market is held. Despite the long delays on the bus, this chaotic scenery along the way always fascinated me. Arriving in Pompeya on a Saturday, market day, was especially exciting. This was the moment that one could witness the mixing of the different individuals and organizations in one space.

On Saturdays, Kichwa communities further downstream and the Waorani, an indigenous group that lives deeper into the jungle to the south, some inside Yasuni National Park, arrive by dugout canoe or oil company speedboat to buy material goods, including food and clothing, and to partake in the freely flowing sugar cane-based alcohol, aguardiente. The Pilsener beer truck, selling a popular Ecuadorian beer in 1-liter bottles, was a constant presence at the market. Cases of beer were unloaded, and exchanged for the empties brought back on the dugout canoes. The market is also where community members are able to sell agricultural products and bush meat. Mestizo buyers come from other parts of the Amazon region to snap up the underpriced meat.

Many animals are valued for their healing properties, including snakes, armadillos, tortoises and monkeys, and mestizos and indigenous peoples alike often consume these in soups, stews, or even dried. Walking around the market, Kichwa and Waorani peoples are wandering along with Repsol-YPF’s community relations personnel, nuns from the Catholic mission in Pompeya, non-

---

5 Block 15 was previously operated by Occidental (Oxy), an American company. In 1999, the Ecuadorian state claimed Oxy violated the terms of its contract, and the company was pushed out of Ecuador. Signs of the company’s presence remain however, in the multitude of communal buildings built by the company, for example (see Kimmerling 2006).

6 The ride from Pompeya to Coca usually took about three hours in a bus. By private car it was only half this time. Travel along the Napo River between Coca and Pompeya is even shorter.
governmental organization (NGO) staff from both international conservation organizations and local, Ecuadorian organizations, and sometimes the occasional, international or national tourist. Seemingly absent from this scene is the state. There was, and continues to be very little state presence in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region. While I was aware of local state representatives elected to positions in the local *junta parroquial* (parish council) office, based in Pompeya, these actors played a secondary role to that of the company in the region. In fact, state representatives are often folded into corporate projects. Yet, while everyday relationships at the local level revolved around the company, the state continues to play a strategic role in the region that ensures resource extraction. Indeed, this became more evident when I crossed the river to enter Repsol-YPF’s guardhouse, and the state was visible as military presence. Companies will often call on the state to protect their extractive interests in the region, and military personnel often accompany extractive industries in Ecuador.

This chaotic mixing of different groups seems to belie the facilitation of oil extraction, and yet, extraction continues. What, then, are the social relationships that emerge in the region to facilitate additional oil extraction? I suggest that the relationships formed within corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, implemented at the local level in the form of development projects enable ongoing resource extraction. While CSR programs are designed to ensure ongoing resource extraction, they also produce certain contradictory outcomes. This dissertation argues that CSR programs produce entanglements between state, corporate and indigenous actors that lead to competing and conflicting spaces of governance. These entanglements reflect the state's attempts to 'erase' indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership in the nation-state. In turn, CSR programs can both contain indigenous mobilization and

---

7 I use the term erase cognizant of long histories of policies designed to discursively eliminate indigenous difference as a basis for membership in the nation-state. Here I am drawing on Hale (2011) to signify erasure through
resistance, but also highlight indigenous difference and rights and access to resources, predicated on membership in the nation-state. To that end, I am attentive to the ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous actors produced through engagement with corporate capital, and suggest that ambivalence can also be a productive space, or a space “in which tensions, contradictions and paradoxes can be negotiated fruitfully and dynamically” (Bondi 2004: 5). In the rest of the chapter I outline my theoretical and methodological approaches to analyzing CSR programs. I begin by discussing the rise of CSR programs within extractive industries.

*CSR programs and neoliberal policies*

As a special report in the *The Economist* (2008) indicates, CSR programs have developed in recent years as the business response to social and environmental criticism of corporate operations. Doane (2005: 23) defines CSR as “the efforts corporations make above and beyond regulation to balance the needs of stakeholders with the need to make a profit.” CSR programs can be categorized into three broad “layers” that build up, one on top of the other. The first layer is traditional corporate philanthropy where companies allocate a small portion of their profits to “worthy causes,” because it is deemed the “right thing to do.” However, this is often not considered sufficient, and shareholders in particular want to know that their money is being used appropriately. Thus, the second layer of CSR falls under risk management, and became more dominant in the 1980s, responding to environmental disasters such as the Bhopal explosion, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (The Economist 2008: 4; Watts 2005). Companies established CSR programs in response to criticisms that emerged from this type of social and environmental harm, neoliberal/post-neoliberal paradigm that can both highlight difference, but also erase it through incorporation of indigenous peoples into dominant development paradigms. Hale argues that we must be critical of these programs that are rooted in difference, because this can also lead to cooptation as indigenous communities become entangled in the very structures they intend to resist.
a result of their operations. Nike and Gap, for example, also came under fire for their labor standards, including child labor, and established CSR programs to respond to these criticisms (cf. Love and Love 2003; Doane 2005). Often belatedly, companies attempt to manage risk by talking to NGOs and governments, establishing codes of conduct, and addressing corporate transparency (Watts 2005). In turn, companies collaborate to set rules and standards through which they operate, spreading the blame and influencing opinions of others. *The Economist* (2008: 4) also points to a third layer, one where CSR programs can “create value.” Rather than merely ‘green-washing’, corporations are engaged in changing their own operations to incorporate CSR programs as part of their business strategies that contribute to their competitive advantage (Porter and Kramer 2006). In other words, CSR programs are “embedded” in corporate operations, and influence decision-making. My research corresponds with the second layer of CSR programs, and considers Repsol-YPF’s programs in the context of deflecting blame, and responding to social and environmental criticisms of corporate operations.

CSR discourse often includes the language of wanting to be a 'good neighbor,' seeking 'mutually beneficial relations between the company and society,' and 'sharing the same objectives of economic growth, social development, and the preservation of the environment' (Repsol-YPF, Annual Report 2008). Sadler and Lloyd (2009: 613) define CSR as “the notion that companies should accompany the pursuit of profit with good citizenship within a wider society…” As Doane (2005: 25) argues, though, there is often a “wide chasm between what’s good for a company and what’s good for society as a whole.” In turn, the focus on the shifting roles of corporations and the state in processes of neoliberalism, suggests that there is a clear relationship between the roll out of neoliberalism in the 1990s and the rise of CSR programs (cf. Watts 2005). If neoliberal policies are premised on market-based regulations and privatization, while
the state’s role is reduced to that of a manager, then CSR programs are institutions that can further these goals while shaping society in this model.

“The capitalist world stumbled toward neoliberalism” as a response to the capital accumulation crises that emerged through the 1960s and 1970s, writes Harvey (2005: 13). Unemployment and inflation were on the rise, which ushered in a global phase of ‘stagflation.’ No longer could the fixed exchange rate tied to gold be managed successfully due to the movement of goods across borders, and the increasing connectedness of states through capitalism. In 1971, fixed exchange rates were abandoned. In other words, the ‘embedded liberalism’ that had allowed advanced capitalist countries to prosper was no longer working, and ultimately abandoned. In response to this crisis, some countries turned to additional state control and regulation through corporatist processes, including, in some cases, curbing labor and social movements, additional austerity measures, and wage and price controls. This was the direction that socialist and communist parties moved toward in Europe. Thus, divisions emerged between those who backed social democracy and centralized planning, and those in favor of liberating corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms (Harvey 2005). By the 1970s, though, the latter group was dominant.

As Harvey (2005) asks, how is that neoliberalism emerged as the single answer to the crisis of capital accumulation, and perhaps most coherently in the 1990s through the Washington Consensus? Despite a convergence on neoliberalism, it remains an uneven and lopsided process, which Harvey (2005: 13) argues is representative of the “tentativeness of neoliberal solutions” and the political forces, histories and institutions shaped by the geographies of particular places. In broad terms, neoliberalism is defined as an economic and political project that aims to
liberalize trade, privatize certain state-controlled practices, reduce the public sector, and introduce management practices through the market (Jessop 2002).

Prior to its emergence though, the movement toward neoliberalism highlighted how crises of capitalism in the 1970s affected everyone. Discontent emerged on a global scale and labor movements joined other social movements leading states toward socialist alternatives. Communist parties were advancing across Europe, and protests in the United States sought out state reforms. Harvey writes that these social processes had clear political challenges to economic elites and ruling classes around the world, both in advanced capitalist countries and in developing countries. In addition to the political challenges to ruling elites, economic challenges also emerged. Post-war settlements curbed the economic power of the ruling elites in favor of additional distribution to labor. While this shift worked in periods of prosperity, it challenged upper classes in periods of crisis, such as during the 1970s. Thus, as Chile moved toward neoliberalism, the forced privatization policies demonstrated that capital could be revived, even if the benefits were highly skewed. In other words, increased inequality is a persistent outcome of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). Therefore, we might interpret neoliberalism as either a “utopian project” that can help restore international capitalism, or a “political project” that is designed to restore the conditions for capital accumulation and the power to economic elites (Harvey 2005: 19). For Harvey (p. 19), the latter holds true and he uncovers the ways in which neoliberal policies are often “twisted as to be unrecognizable” all in an effort to sustain the power of the ruling elite.
Neoliberal natures?

Studies of environmental governance in the context of neoliberal institutional shifts focus on market-led resource regulation, privatization and the ‘roll-back’ and ‘re-institutionalization’ of the state (Bakker 2002; Bridge and McManus 2000; Jessop 1995; Liverman 2004; McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Peck and Tickell 1992; Perreault and Martin 2005; Prudham 2004; Robertson 2004; Tickell and Peck 1995). CSR has been most debated in those societies where neoliberalism emerged most prominently, the United States and the United Kingdom. These debates over CSR have entered the popular press, including The Economist (2008), which argues, “companies are having to work harder to protect their reputation” (p. 4). In turn, increases in voluntary international reporting standards equate CSR programs to a company's goodwill.

Sadler and Lloyd (2009) discuss the ways in which “in-between” spaces have been created for corporate regulations, setting new policy standards for corporations. For example, in 1997 the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and later in 2000 the UN Global Compact emerged, along with the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). Together these organizations set a series of environmental standards for corporate activities. In 2001 the World Economic Forum (WEF) established a Corporate Citizenship Initiative. A year later, corporations pledged support for development projects, including the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” established at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg. All of these organizations and agreements are voluntary, but set new standards for corporate investment in social and environmental issues (cf. Watts 2005). As Sadler and Lloyd (2009) suggest, these programs demonstrate that corporations have the ability to shape social and environmental outcomes, including establishing 'appropriate outcomes.'
However, emphasizing CSR in the context of voluntary reporting standards draws attention away from creating the legal rules that might prevent oil spills or protect human rights, argues *The Economist* (2008) (see also, Watts 2005; Welker 2009). In particular, the magazine notes the desire of firms to fill a void left by an ‘absent’ state, and the patchwork of rules that results in its place. Moreover, critics note the obvious attention of corporations to their shareholders, and the importance of not only increasing profits, but also focusing on social welfare. As Porter and Kramer (2006) conclude, it is now necessary to see the 'shared value' of CSR operations, or benefits for both business and society. In turn, companies are working with NGOs to implement on the ground operations and to demonstrate their commitment to action. Large firms often take on a more 'paternalistic' role providing basic services in local communities (*The Economist* 2008). For example, mining corporations often operate in communities located at the point of extraction (Himley 2010; Kirsch 2006; Rajak 2010, 2011; Welker 2009). Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that multinational presence at the local level is mutually beneficial when a company works directly with small farmers who source basic commodities that the company needs. The investment in local infrastructure and the company's “transfer of world-class knowledge and technology” leads to social benefits such as “improved health care, better education, and economic development” (Porter and Kramer 2006: 89).

Corporate operations at the local level, however, do not take into account the impacts and effects on local communities from these so-called improvements to livelihoods (Welker 2009). To explore these multi-scalar impacts and effects, scholars have undertaken ethnographies of CSR programs.

Recent ethnographies of CSR programs have focused on extractive industries (cf. Himley 2010; Welker 2006, 2009). Furthermore, Shell Oil's operations in Nigeria have provided
important contributions to CSR literature (see Livesey and Kearins 2002; Tuodolo 2009; Zalik 2004). Indeed, Shell Oil is often cited as the first company to implement CSR programs. In the Niger Delta, Shell Oil promotes a discourse of sustainable development in the face of environmental and social criticisms surrounding its operations. However, more than just discursive framing, the company also shifted its operations toward a concept of sustainability made visible through its CSR programs (Livesey and Kearins 2002).

Other studies, however, have more critically examined CSR programs in the context of political economic relations in the Delta (see Watts 2005, for example). Zalik (2004) outlines Shell Oil's community development plan based on 'partnership development.' This plan relies on social structures that exist in local communities, to promote “non-confrontational, respectful negotiations with authority” (Zalik 2004: 409). Instead of corporate handouts, “consent-based regulation” marked Shell Oil's community-based programs. This emphasis changed public perceptions of the Niger Delta, and today Shell Oil receives awards for its CSR programs (Zalik 2004: 409). Zalik (2004) explores CSR discourse and projects that move communities away from activist interventions, toward a focus on development, or the depoliticization of company operations. Because CSR discourse focuses on solutions, rather than problems, combined with ‘helping’ infrastructure, rather than rules, this makes it more difficult for local populations to bring legal claims against companies.

Furthermore, as corporations seek additional rights and responsibilities in resource extraction processes, they implicitly question the state’s role in distribution of resources from extraction (cf. Frynas 2005; Welker 2009). Indeed, corporations insist that the state’s role should be limited in industrial regulation (Bebbington 2010). Bebbington’s (2010) analysis of CSR programs in the context of Latin America argues for an examination of the 'institutional effects'
of these programs on the state. He suggests that CSR programs actually limit the productive role between conflict and formation of a development and welfare state.

In other words, CSR programs prevent the formation of the institutions that are necessary to avoid the resource curse effects. In brief, the resource curse (see Ross 1999, Klare 2001 and, for a critique, Watts 2001), and in particular oil extraction is examined for its 'rentier effect' or the way states restructure their economies to promote ongoing oil extraction, which ultimately prevents democracy. The resource curse also includes a 'repression effect' that refers to state control over oil extraction to fund military expenses and security forces. Finally, the 'modernization effect' is the process through which industrial and service sector jobs make states less likely to pursue democracy. Together these effects contribute to the state’s inability to enact economic policies, despite production of significant wealth.

Yet, literature that explores the resource curse is critiqued for its failure to examine the resource itself, and the differences that emerge between oil, for example, and the extraction of diamonds (LeBillon 2001; Watts 2001). LeBillon (2001) argues that we must consider the social construction of resources, along with their material variation. Constructing a typology of resources along different axes, such as those that are spatially diffuse vs. those that are spatially concentrated, and those that are proximate to population centers vs. those that are distant, LeBillon analyzes resource conflict. Yet, as others have argued we also have to consider the ways in which meanings and identities are also produced within resource politics (Moore 2000; Perreault and Valdivia 2010).

We might consider, then, how resource struggles reflect broader struggles of “citizenship, the nation, rights and identity” (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 3; Watts 2001). In turn, others have argued that oil makes up the ‘natural body’ of the state that is linked to its political body.
Political decisions, then, hinge on the economic performance of the oil industry (Coronil 1997; Karl 1997). CSR programs are designed to resolve conflicts in the context of business strategies linked to securing ongoing extraction. CSR programs, then, can link the state’s natural body to its political body, and “cultivate less turbulent relationships with the population” (Bebbington 2010: 112).

The discourses and processes of modernization through oil resources, or the linking of a political body to a state’s natural body (cf. Coronil 1997) through la Patria, defined as the “conjoining of nation and nature” or a “fatherland” (cf. Martz 1987; Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 3) is made more complex by indigenous relationships to a private company that provides ‘modernization’ in the form of material resources and infrastructural improvements. Neoliberal processes of privatization challenge state sovereignty and links between a territory and oil resources (cf. Perreault and Valdivia 2010). My dissertation explores the ways in which oil serves as the ‘physical body’ or territory of the state. In turn, subject identities are produced through a sense of belonging to this physical body (Valdivia 2008).

Indigenous embodiment of the state through its physical body highlights both membership in the nation-state through oil resources, but also an ambivalent response to that membership. While oil extends the state’s sovereignty to its subterranean resources, indigenous populations that are within, and make up the same space as oil extraction are also subject to its negative, poisonous impacts. Oil produces illness within indigenous communities and bodies, and CSR programs can only cover up that illness, but not remove it completely. My analysis, therefore, reveals an implicit challenge regarding the duality of the state’s bodies (see Nelson 2001). I argue that embodiment of the state through indigenous populations challenges the binary of political and economic, or social and economic. By focusing on indigenous ‘bodies’ through
indigenous subject formation, new ways of understanding the state and its inherent contradictions emerge. If the state emerges through a series of networks and relationships, then “knowledge and power can be located in a time and a place” (Mountz 2010: xxv). Thus, my dissertation aims to uncover alternative narratives of the state, through indigenous subject formation tied to relationships with CSR programs that can challenge the self-imaginings of Ecuador as a petro-state.

Others have argued that CSR processes produce “geographies of incorporation and exclusion” (see Rajak 2010, 2011: 214; Himley 2010). More specifically, Himley (2010) notes the way in which the “community” serves as project recipient; CSR programs determine who is part of a community, but cannot account for complex social relationships within the community. This often leads to disputes, and new patterns of development and livelihoods at the local level. Rajak (2010) also explores the community through CSR programs, and argues that CSR discursively constructs the corporation as benefactor, and community members as recipients. She suggests that the geographies defined by CSR programs not only demarcate a corporation’s responsibility, but also serve to mark its authority. In turn, these distinctions within CSR discourses lead to structures of control and dependency. Similarly, Welker’s (2006, 2009) study of the Newmont Mine in Indonesia describes the way in which powerful elites in local politics called on the company to provide local development projects, exploring a discursive notion of modernity promoted by the state. Often these petitions would involve violent responses, but they also usually procured the aid of Newmont. In turn, local community members supported this process, despite the uneven distribution of aid programs. Welker explores the dual notions of dependency on these local elites – the downward dependency of village members and the upward dependence of the corporation – as provider of goods.
My analysis of CSR programs, then, explores the internal contradictions inherent in neoliberal development programs revealed through the contested nature of identity, and the ambivalent response of indigenous peoples to CSR programs. On the one hand, CSR programs might suggest the opportunity to engage in development processes rooted in questions of self-governance, and to work within corporate frameworks and CSR programs. On the other hand, though, the programs demonstrate the further entrenchment of development discourses and professionalization in daily practices at local, regional and national levels. Thus, CSR programs can undermine local state control over resources, while simultaneously ensuring state control from afar through neoliberal processes of professionalization, that serves to entrench neoliberal ideologies into the farthest corners of the state (see Bondi and Laurie 2005 and Nightingale 2005).

**CSR programs as discourse and practice**

My research builds on ethnographies of CSR programs to explore corporate programs and projects that contribute to ongoing resource extraction in Ecuador. I conceptualize CSR programs as institutions that emerge through and within the messiness of everyday practices of state, corporate and, in the case of Ecuador, indigenous actors. In turn, I argue that CSR programs operate as a ‘technology of rule’ to shift social relationships that govern resource extraction in Ecuador, and challenge state sovereignty and indigenous rights and representation in the nation-state.

In the case of Ecuador, Repsol-YPF implements CSR projects intended to better the socio-economic conditions of indigenous peoples living at the point of extraction, complying with corporate norms and objectives. Corporate policies ensure that the company follows

---

8 In the rest of the dissertation I often use ‘Ecuadorian state’ to refer to the Ecuadorian nation-state.
international standards set by the UN Commission for Human Rights, as well as International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions. Repsol-YPF carefully crafts corporate discourse that states company plans to invest in sustainable development to benefit not only the company, but also the communities impacted by its operations. Repsol-YPF also evaluates and conducts studies on environmental and social impacts of its operations. In particular, though, Repsol-YPF establishes norms for its operations in indigenous communities, working with anthropologists to conduct studies that minimize impacts in spaces of potential non-contacted indigenous groups, and ensuring that no project will displace indigenous peoples from their ancestral territories (www.repsol.com). In 2009, the company invested € 843,000 in social programs, in 2010 € 1,576,000 and in 2011 € 1,495,000 in Ecuador. For example, the company funds micro-credit programs, implemented by NGOs, and designed to employ women in projects to produce and sell chickens in local markets. Other projects have included a small sewing business, and computers and internet for a distance learning high school.

Yet, many of these projects suffer from lack of interest on the part of people in Pompeya, and often disintegrate after one or two years. In some cases, the corporation chooses to end funding for projects. In Ecuador, CSR programs often include infrastructural improvements, such as electricity and drinking water systems - things the state might normally provide. In turn, because the company often fills a role the state might normally play, indigenous rights and claims to citizenship at the local level are made through the company. Despite CSR project 'failures', though, most people in Pompeya continue to turn to the company for ongoing material resources. At times, even local parroquial (parish) representatives look to the company for additional project funding. Others have argued that the corporation “authenticates” its power and influence through the state's development agenda (Rajak 2011).
By exploring these relationships within CSR programs through ethnographic research conducted in Pompeya, as well as in regional provincial capitals, Coca and Puyo, and in Quito, the capital of Ecuador, this dissertation illuminates the way in which relationships formed within CSR programs produce narratives that enable ongoing oil extraction. These programs are often described as inclusionary and participatory, while in practice CSR tends to eschew questions of distribution, rights and justice (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Rajak 2011). Mobilization and resistance to corporate operations is often framed through the company’s own language of being a good neighbor, as indeed indigenous cultural norms dictate that a more powerful neighbor should distribute wealth in the form of material things. My analysis, however, also points to the way in which CSR programs create an outward “façade” (Mountz 2007: 40), produced by individuals and organizations engaged in the daily practices of CSR programs. I draw on Wendy Wolford's (2010) ethnography of the MST in my analysis. She writes that a focus on social movements as “things” with quantifiable characteristics, such as number of members, demonstrations, and the like, risks ignoring other aspects of movements as a set of discourses, or narratives, ways to understand social justice, and imagining change. Furthermore, an institutional analysis questions the role of the state in an extractive regime. In what ways is corporate capital able to dictate the relationships that form at the point of extraction? Who is impacted in this model, and who reaps the benefits? While CSR programs offer many of the material benefits of development, these programs do little to address, and often reproduce and reinforce relationships of power that facilitate resource extraction, and uneven development processes tied to ongoing capitalist expansion. CSR programs (re)produce ongoing patron-client relationships, following years of outsider presence that continues to undermine the relationship between indigenous citizens and a nation-state that is only partially and strategically present.
Oil, Ecuador, and CSR

Oil was discovered in the Ecuadorean Amazon in 1967, and commercial extraction began in 1972 with the completion of the Trans-Andean pipeline (Kimmerling 1993). At the same time the state created the country’s first hydrocarbons law, which established the state’s legal right to the country’s natural resources. The state also established a national oil company, today known as Petroecuador (Martz 1987). About 85 percent of all extracted oil in Ecuador is exported, and the United States receives over 50 percent of those exports (EIA 2010). In recent years, the Ecuadorian state has relied on oil for about 50 percent of its economic revenues (Gerlach 2003; Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2005; EIA 2010). While a large part of the Ecuadorian population does benefit from oil extraction, only a small proportion of oil profits remain in the Amazon region (Perreault 2001; Fontaine 2005, 2007). Roughly 400,000 people live in Ecuador’s Amazon region, and just over half are indigenous (Carolina Population Center 2005). There are eight indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon - the largest are the Kichwa and Shuar peoples, with approximately 40-60,000 people in each group (Becker 1998; Yashar 2005). The state’s economic reliance on oil revenues, combined with the region’s low population density has facilitated the continued extraction of oil, while ignoring infrastructural improvements and social programs that would support indigenous populations (Kimmerling 1993; Sawyer 2004). This lack of infrastructure is common to extractive industries operating in ‘frontier regions,’ like Ecuador’s Amazon region. Extractive industries often restructure a region to facilitate additional extraction, leading to the region’s ‘underdevelopment’ (Bunker 1985). Indeed, many indigenous communities still lack sewage and potable water systems. Moreover, resource extraction

---

9 This pattern of property rights is not unique to Ecuador, but rather many states in Latin America recognize the state as a landholder with control over natural resources. Often this leads to nationalization of extractive industries, but in the case of Ecuador the oil industry has never been fully nationalized (Martz 1987; Coronil 1997).

10 The Amazon region is about half of Ecuador’s total landmass, while only 2.5-4% of Ecuador’s total population lives in the region (Yashar 2005).
programs since the 1980s, under pressure from international lending agencies, have included the continued privatization of oil operations to increase production (Carrière 2001). These changes, characterized by Sawyer (2004) as the neoliberalization of the oil industry’s operations, resulted in conflicts between indigenous peoples and private multinational oil corporations.\footnote{In Ecuador, neoliberal shifts in the oil industry are associated with changes in contracts between the state and private corporations, leasing marginal oil fields to corporations, and limiting government oversight in extraction (Sawyer 2004).}

The environmental and social impacts of the oil industry’s operations in indigenous territory in Ecuador have long produced national and global criticism by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activists, and indigenous peoples themselves have participated in these protests (Kimmerling 1993; Sawyer 2004). Of particular concern is the fact that the growth of the oil industry in indigenous territory opened the region to colonists from other parts of Ecuador, prompting indigenous peoples to formally claim rights to their territory as indigenous citizens of Ecuador. In turn, an indigenous movement grew from local, community-based organizations into regional and national indigenous federations, during the 1980s and 1990s (Valdivia 2005). The movement organized around indigenous peoples’ political rights as citizens of Ecuador, while also protesting the oil industry’s operations (Perreault 2003 a,b; Sawyer 2004; Yashar 2005). Following an indigenous march from the Amazon region to Quito in 1994, the state formally recognized indigenous territory, and indigenous peoples were granted political representation in electoral politics in the 1990s (Sawyer 2004; Yashar 2005). Despite these political advances for indigenous peoples, the state still maintains ownership of the sub-surface resources beneath indigenous territory, and the rights to those resources continue to be leased to private corporations (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).

CSR programs emerged in Ecuador during this climate of nation-wide indigenous marches and neoliberal shifts in the regulation of oil production as a way for oil firms to take part
in, and influence resource regulation (Sawyer 2004). In Ecuador, CSR programs include, for example, scholarships for youths, electricity and transportation. While oil companies have long offered ‘gifts’ in exchange for extraction, CSR programs are now actively promoted by the state. Until recently, resource extraction laws in Ecuador required that companies include CSR programs in their operations (Fontaine 2005; Benalcázar 2006; Veintimilla 2006). As such, CSR programs not only provide a positive image of oil extraction, but also serve to dampen indigenous protests (Morales 2007). In turn, CSR programs have replaced state-led efforts as a leading example of grassroots development in Ecuador’s Amazon region today (Kimmerling 2006). Insofar as CSR programs represent a reconfiguration of the roles of the state and private actors in processes of local development, these programs generate new social relationships between the Ecuadorian state, corporations, and the indigenous communities where these projects are implemented, contributing to new forms of environmental governance.

My research is designed to address the shifting spaces of extraction in Ecuador through the lens of CSR programs, conceptualized as institutions that link oil development with indigenous populations and the Ecuadorian state. Through the dissertation I explore contradictions between corporate aims to promote neoliberal tenets of ‘self-help’ through grassroots development projects, and the everyday realities of CSR programs in the space of an indigenous community that highlight a return to the clientelism and patronage of earlier decades (cf. Li 2007; Rajak 2010, 2011; Zalik 2004). Indeed, my ethnography of CSR programs uncovers uncertainty and ambivalence in indigenous populations that leads to additional corporate control, but also highlights implicit challenges to corporate rule, and to state sovereignty. In other words,

---

12 With the election of Rafael Correa in 2007, the state began a process of changing laws governing resource extraction, including eliminating CSR programs from contracts with multinationals. I explore these shifts in some detail in Chapter 4.
corporations facilitate global expansion of capital by linking their programs to local development projects, and blurring the boundaries between a state and its marginalized citizens.

During a 17-month period, I studied the CSR programs of Repsol-YPF in Pompeya, an indigenous Kichwa community of about 650 people in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region split by the Napo River. I carried out my research in Pompeya because I had done several months of work there from June to August 2005 for my master’s project on indigenous social movements. Furthermore, it was a community that was easily accessible overland, rather than solely by boats or canoes. During preliminary research in Ecuador in July 2007, I identified Repsol-YPF as a company I might be able to study, precisely because its staff was accessible in Quito and in the Amazon region. This also made Pompeya an ideal choice because of its location at the entrance to Repsol-YPF’s oil block.

Repsol-YPF is a multinational corporation, composed of Repsol, a Spanish company established in the 1980s, and YPF, an Argentine company. Repsol absorbed YPF in 1999, during a period of rapid growth for the Spanish company (Gavaldá 2003).13 As Gavaldá (2003) characterizes it, the majority of Repsol’s newly acquired oil concession blocks in this period were in Latin American countries, including Block 16 in Ecuador’s Amazon region. Block 16 is accessed via a road that runs through the community of Pompeya.

Block 16 became operational in 1973, and was initially under the control of US-based Conoco and Maxus. In 1991, Conoco sold its interests in Block 16 to Maxus, and a year later Maxus signed an agreement with indigenous communities within the block to construct the 160 kilometer access road. The company built schools, funded medical programs, and provided generators and motorboat gasoline (the majority of travel in the region is by boat) in exchange

13 In May 2012, though, Argentina ‘nationalized’ YPF, taking back control of Repsol’s holdings (Romero and Minder 2012)
for continued oil extraction.\textsuperscript{14} Despite protests by indigenous communities, the state approved construction of the road. In 1993, a Community Relations Agreement was signed with these same communities, which formalized Maxus’ presence in the region. However, these agreements were met with violent protest, and indigenous groups took over Maxus’ operations for periods of time, slowing production (Gavaldá 2003).

In 1999, when Repsol acquired YPF, it also took formal control of Block 16. Soon thereafter, Repsol-YPF signed an agreement with then Ecuadorian president, Jamil Mahuad, to begin construction on a privately owned and operated pipeline (to supplement the SOTE). The new pipeline, \textit{Oleoducto Crudo Pesado} (OCP)\textsuperscript{15}, was constructed between 2001 and 2002 in conjunction with five other private companies operating in Ecuador (Gavaldá 2003). In turn, Repsol-YPF continued its operations in Ecuador, signing a contract with the state to continue operations in Block 16 through the year 2012 (Morales 2007).\textsuperscript{16}

To begin my study of CSR programs, I had initially planned to carry out most of my research at the local level, in the community of Pompeya. However, I quickly discovered that I could not live in Pompeya for long periods of time (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). I did not feel safe, and there is no drinking water. During the initial months of my research period, Pompeya also lacked a sewage system. I was to live alone, in a house maintained by a social and environmental NGO, Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), but the house was grimy and excruciatingly lonely. I quickly realized I would not be able to sustain long visits to Pompeya, and I had to shift my research plan. I started to conduct more interviews at the regional

\textsuperscript{14} Maxus signed accords with Waorani communities, another Amazonian indigenous group. Gavaldá does not discuss agreements that might have also been signed with the Kichwa people in Pompeya.

\textsuperscript{15} In English, this is the ‘Heavy Crude Pipeline,’ which has political significance in Ecuador. I explore this significance in more depth in Chapter 4, but in brief, privatization policies that led to the construction of a second pipeline challenged national identity and sovereignty (Valdivia 2008).

\textsuperscript{16} Recent shifts in production contracts abolished this contract, and Repsol-YPF signed a new contract with the state through the year 2018 (see Chapter 4).
and national levels to understand social relationships in CSR operations at these scales. At the regional level I interviewed NGOs engaged in implementing CSR programs and learned that many of their programs in local communities were funded by the company’s foundation, Fundación Repsol. At the national level I interviewed state and company officials who signed contracts to implement CSR programs and were tasked with overseeing projects at the local level, even if this oversight did not occur. This expanded study of CSR programs illuminated the institutional relations of CSR programs.

**CSR programs as disciplinary institutions**

My research asks about the relationship between CSR programs and indigenous subjectivity, and the ability of corporate presence in the Amazon region to limit indigenous resource access and control, calling into question indigenous rights and representation in Ecuador. I conducted an ethnography of CSR programs. I conceptualize CSR programs as institutions, rather than organizations (see Smith 1987), to investigate development and environmental governance in Ecuador. Institutions have been defined in the environmental governance literature as the social norms and relationships that sustain resource extraction processes (Bakker 2007, Perreault 2006). Other studies have focused on institutions as organizations, including conservation organizations (King 2009), indigenous organizations (Perreault 2003a,b), and development institutions (Bebbington, et al. 2004; Goldman 2004; Moore 2000). Still others have conceptualized the state as an institution (Mountz 2004, 2007, 2010).

It is important to understand how geographers have conducted socio-spatial analyses of institutions. Among geographical approaches, there are perhaps two distinct spatial
understandings of institutions. The first conceptualizes institutions as entities with clearly defined boundaries, populations, policies, and cultures to be penetrated and interpreted by researchers. A spatial representation of this geographical imagination would involve the containment of an institution in a building or campus with defined boundaries and would understand organizational charts as capturing the general structure of the institution. This first approach generally understands researchers themselves as not part of these institutions. The second approach understands institutions as more dispersed as networks, language, architecture, sets of effects, policies, and daily practices (Mountz 2010) that extend into daily social bodies and practices, well beyond the borders of the institution. This more dispersed approach has more permeable boundaries dividing what and who lies inside and outside of the institution, and therefore, a more inclusive and flexible understanding of membership, which may or may not include researchers themselves (see Mountz and Billo manuscript in progress).

Scale offers a key distinguishing factor in geographical approaches to institutions (e.g., Brenner 2004). As Philo and Parr (2000) note, there were various forays into analyses that could shift from larger macro-theoretical structures to empirical micro-level theories, and institutions were deemed useful in facilitating a ‘middle way.’ Following Anthony Giddens (1984) and the structure and agency debates of the 1980s and 1990s, institutions offered an ‘interim’ level of social systems, or the social practices which regulate daily life.

This ‘meso-level’ approach became significant in the subdiscipline of economic geography. Economic geographers responded to the “institutional turn” within geography with an understanding of economic decisions as rooted in social institutions (Martin 2000). Regulation theory served as a catalyst for this institutional approach, with the so-called “mode of social regulation” (rules, norms, customs, for example, that regulate capitalist production) as an
organizing concept. The institution within economic geography refers to informal norms and customs, and more formal laws and rules or regulations. In turn, institutional arrangements dictate economic production. Here path-dependence determines institutional arrangements, and histories of institutional formation are crucial for understanding existing institutional arrangements (Martin 2000). Philo and Parr (2000) suggest that institutional approaches outlined within the “institutional turn” argue for a return to the notion of sociological institutions such as kinship, religion, family and community.

These approaches triggered a focus on social aspects of capital accumulation. Regulation theory is used to assess urban landscapes, but has also been applied recently to environmental regulation, and the institutional configurations that overcome capitalist crises of production, linked to continued resource extraction. Periodic upheavals in institutional regulation occur because institutions are no longer effective. Certain institutions, or portions thereof are abandoned, and new institutions are produced in their place. Thus, periods of relative stability are usually accompanied by periods of upheaval. This process is especially relevant in the shifts toward post-Fordist landscapes of capitalist production (Martin 2000).

For example, Erica Schoenberger (1997) focused on the cultural crisis of the firm, examining the failure of American corporations to act in their own best interest. Her analysis examined the firm as an institution embedded in production systems and addressed the failure of firms to respond to changes in these systems. She examines the roles of individuals within the firm, such as managers engaged in strategic decision-making, and historical documents to understand emerging crises in Lockheed and the Xerox Corporation. She challenges notions of

---

17 Institutionalism in this sense draws on sociological conceptualizations, including Granovetter (1985, 1993) to focus on the embeddedness of institutions through social networks, given certain historical constraints. Institutions emerge at the nexus of networks, which depend on relationships of trust.

18 See for example, Bridge (2000), Bridge and McManus (2000).
firm competition, and the “cultural crisis” of the firm as it attempts to adapt to changing external environments.

Institutional analyses that address specific, everyday moments within and between institutions, and their relationship to larger economic, political and cultural relationships can help scholars understand how institutions come into being and how they complement wider geographies (Philo and Parr 2000). Indeed, institutions have typically referred to the built environment, or asylums, hospitals and the like, which seek to control and regulate, restrain or treat human minds and bodies. Other approaches have focused on the geographical arrangements within institutions. Philo and Parr (2000) argue that the geography of institutions and their relative location to people, land uses, and resources contribute to understanding social and spatial relationships that can challenge this disciplinary process.

As already noted, though, it is the epistemological approach that contributes to how institutions are defined and studied.¹⁹ For Del Casino and co-authors (2000), there are three distinct frameworks for institutional analysis: spatial science, critical realism, and post-structuralism. Each approach represents different historical moments in knowledge construction in human geography. In spatial science, we see the belief that social relations can readily and literally be mapped onto the landscape through a series of rules and patterns that govern and explain human behavior. Critical realists similarly believe in the material realities and ramifications of institutions. Post-structuralists, conversely, look beneath the surface to

---

¹⁹ Philo and Parr (2000) question the interchangeability of organizations and institutions, noting geographers who have focused on the organization as an institution with agency and a clearly delimited structure. Del Casino et al. (2000) suggest that the market can be an institution and organizations are defined as business enterprises. The authors suggest that institutions represent a “coalescing” of structural relations that emerge from innovation, or habituation of actors that exist within “concrete organizations” (2000: 525). Alternatively, the authors explain that other approaches have disrupted this notion of institution and organization as separate concepts. Del Casino and co-authors (2000) conclude that the debate between organization and institution is inconclusive, and the differences, if any, between organizations and institutions remain fluid.
understand the underlying conditions, social relations and discourses that brought such material relations into existence (Mountz and Billo manuscript in progress).

Furthermore, so-called processes of deinstitutionalization and a Foucauldian approach (1995, 1997) point to the entrance of mechanisms of social regulation into the realm of the social body. Institutional processes connect people through webs of relationships, legal, medical or social through which the landscapes of power shift outward, their power operating in more dispersed fashion and highlighting the relationship between social and spatial relations. Drawing on Foucault (1970) and Gibson-Graham (1996), a constructivist approach focuses on discourses, such as economy, society and politics “that bring forth objects and events and determine their relationship to one another” (Del Casino et al.: 526). In other words, there are no previously existing conditions that suggest existence or conceptualization of institutions. Instead, discursive frameworks construct them; they become objects with particular social significance (Del Casino et al. 2000).

My dissertation develops a methodological approach (detailed in Chapter 2) that explores CSR programs as institutions. In turn, I argue that as institutions, CSR programs also operate as a particular technology of rule that can regulate the “relationships through which life takes place” (Valdivia 2008: 458; Agrawal 2005; N. Rose 1999), including an examination of individual actors and power dynamics that produce dominant discourses and practices (Bebbington 2000; Bebbington et al.2000; King 2009; D. Smith 1987). In the case of CSR programs in Ecuador, I examined the relationships between the state, the private multinational oil company Repsol-YPF, and indigenous peoples in the space of the northern Amazon region. My research builds on ethnographic approaches to understanding development processes rooted in the local level (see Escobar 1995; Bebbington 2000; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003; Watts 2003, 2004), and argues
that CSR programs are not autonomous bodies that “affect social relations” they are instead a set of “daily practices” (Mountz 2010: xxiv, 2003; Herbert 2007). Holstein (2006: 293) writes that institutions are the “coordinated and intersecting work processes and courses of action” that the ethnographer aims to discover and describe.

Conceptualizing CSR projects in this way, rather than as monolithic practices, point to ways in which actors engaged in CSR projects are confronted with constraints, and can begin to challenge and change the way in which CSR projects are implemented (Rajak 2011). Indeed, it is crucial to understand the social networks in which CSR programs are embedded in particular places, and to locate CSR projects in a time and a place. This process enables a framework that can challenge taken for granted narratives produced by CSR programs, or those that have become normalized about indigenous populations, and expose inconsistencies in state and corporate governance of oil extraction. In turn, my dissertation considers the particular spaces of governance through which processes of resistance might emerge, and that these connections might open the space for social change (see Ferguson 1990; Mountz 2010; Rajak 2011). My dissertation, then, contributes to ethnographies of development by employing Smith’s (1987) use of institutional ethnography (IE) and arguing for the formation of institutions through a series of networks and practices. Furthermore, Smith asks where the researcher herself is in the institution. In turn, Smith challenges the notion of the institution as something to be penetrated. She asks who has the ability to penetrate the institution, and how is the institution bounded, and who are the actors engaged in producing institutional discourse and practices? I also reflect on what geography can bring to IE by arguing for a spatial analysis of institutions. Rather than flattening the institution, a geographical approach to IE can point to the ways in which institutional dynamics vary between the center and margins.
Throughout the dissertation, I argue that CSR programs intervene in, and adjust relationships of government-discipline-sovereignty, or processes of rule and interacting forms of power explored through Foucault's (1991) concept of governmentality to understand how power emerges within historical configurations, and in particular cultural and geographic contexts (Agrawal 2005; Foucault 1991; Moore 2005; Rutherford 2007; Valdivia 2008). This “triad” of government-discipline-sovereignty is constantly in motion, leading to different forms of power, and producing different ruling relations (cf. Moore 2005: 7; Smith 1987). Sovereign power is concerned with control over territory and the subjects that live within a territory. Discipline refers to mechanisms of regulation that produce conformity in individuals, and shape their awareness of their relationship to the sovereign. Government is defined by the practices, techniques, and rationalities, or tactics that together shape behaviors, or conduct of others or oneself, to produce a particular end goal (see Dean 1999; Valdivia 2008). These interactions of power, sovereignty, discipline, and government, together govern the relationship between people and things (Foucault 1991). Things, according to Foucault (1991), refers to a complex of 'men' (sic) imbricated with things such as wealth, resources, subsistence or territory, or men in relation to customs, habits, irrigation, famines and death. Foucault describes this “imbrication” as the “conduct of conduct,” or how people and things come together in the “right disposition” that makes them “amenable to administration” (Li 2007: 9; Bridge and Perreault 2009; Foucault 1991; Moore 2005; Valdivia 2008).

In turn, Moore (2005:6) argues that governmentality can “displace” power from the state and capital to explore how subjects participate in “projects of their own rule.” The state becomes one of many institutions that engages in forms of power, rather than the only sovereign. This “management of bodies in space” secures a political economy of rule (Valdivia 2008: 458).
Indeed, following Moore (2005: 6) and others (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Li 2007; Watts 2003, 2004b), “governmentality works through the agency of subjects” - it encourages self-discipline that contributes to a population's wealth and security. Subjects can both sustain and challenge forms of rule. Thus, the positioning of subjects is crucial to understand the way in which power relations lead to subjection to government, as well as agents capable of taking action (Agrawal 2005; Moore 2005; N. Rose 1999). As Agrawal (2005: 9) argues, attention to the “practices of regulation” can trace connections between subjects and power, and institutions and identity, for example. If we merely “read the politics of subject formation off the social categories of gender, class, occupation and caste” then we risk ignoring how power works to create the subjects who make up these categories.

Governmentality can produce new forms of rule that might expand the state's capacity, but also allow space for a new, self-regulating process of the social. In turn, the emphasis here is on the technologies that emerge in processes of development that lead to certain norms and behaviors (Goldman 2004). As Li (2007: 5) argues, “government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs.” Its goal is to “improve the economy of life by intervening in the relationships between people, territory, and wealth” (Valdivia 2008: 458). Practices of rule include maps, taxes, and censuses, for example (see Mitchell 2005). These 'micro-politics of power' help scholars understand ways in which rule is accomplished, or attempted, through particular governable subjects and objects (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Dean 1999; Hart 2004; Moore 2005, 1998; N. Rose 1999; Stoler 1995).

Rose (1999: 31) argued that there are certain “governable spaces” that are produced through various processes of government, or the relation between what authorities want to happen and existing problems and objectives. In turn, government is “territorialized” at different
scales and through particular social practices. These processes of territorialization and governable spaces are dependent on political economy (Rose 1999:34; Watts 2003). Drawing on Rose (1999) and other studies (see, for example, Watts 2003, 2004b and Valdivia 2008), my project aims to expand on considerations of petroleum as a “subterranean territory” that can shape people's belonging to the nation-state as a particular political body, and its ties to territory, and shape questions about who is a valuable member of such a political body. If we build on Foucault's analysis that suggests government consists of ruling relations in multiple forms, and power as productive force, rather than targeting things, then we might consider the ways in which subjects, spaces, and resources are enmeshed (Moore 2005). Indeed, Moore (2005) suggests we also have to consider how particular technologies also produce territories, and that these territories can often overlap in the same space. For example, in the case of the space of the northern Ecuadorian Amazon, political struggles are motivated by the desire to gain access to petroleum rents, resulting in multiple and overlapping spaces of governance (cf. Watts 2003, 2004a,b). In turn, these overlapping spaces have different, sometimes contradictory and contentious, practices of rule and subjection, but are all tied to the political economy of oil in Ecuador. Thus, my dissertation draws on Moore's (2005: 7) analysis of multiple, overlapping sovereignties that are “entangled in the single site, yet multiple spatialities” of the northern Amazon region, a site marked by ongoing oil extraction.

This project seeks to understand the ways in which CSR programs have reshaped development processes that center on indigenous subjectivity and identity. I argue that this focus is especially relevant given the previous emphasis on organized, indigenous political struggle and protest in the Amazon region by activists, academics and indigenous peoples, as a means for indigenous peoples to insert themselves into debates over access to, and control over resources
(Perreault 2003a; Sawyer 2004). As Li (2007:1) argues, it is the “inevitable gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished” within processes of development that can illuminate not only how CSR programs seek to change populations, but also the effects of CSR programs on those populations. Understood as a macro-scale, ‘immanent’ process, development follows the uneven expansion of capital on a global scale, producing various networks and connections (Cowen and Shenton 1996). These networks depend on particular ‘institutional arrangements,’ such as those that regulate and govern capital expansion (Bebbington and Kothari 2006). Development can also be understood as ‘intentional,’ where interventions might foster additional capital growth, or ‘modify’ existing production systems at different scales (Bebbington 2002; Cowen and Shenton 1996). Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the social relationships produced through CSR programs result in indigenous ambivalence and uncertainty that can both sustain and challenge ongoing CSR programs, producing multiple and overlapping spaces of resource governance.

To explore these processes of ambivalence and uncertainty, I use Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of the Carnival and the ‘carnivalesque’ qualities of the state and subject formation through oil governance. Bakhtin drew on histories of the medieval carnivals, and argued that these were moments to explore other identities, and to live without rules. In the moments of the carnival, then, rules could be mocked, while simultaneously allowing for a process of rejuvenation. The carnival is a “moment of sanctioned play” (Hiebert 2003: 114). It addresses the ambivalence of subjects engaging in the carnival, or the pushing aside of institutions and rules of the state for a moment, yet at the same time remaining self-reflexive of one’s usual participation in institutions. The carnivalesque examines both social stability and social protest, sometimes in relation to the
state (see also Docker 1994; Nelson 1999). In other words, the carnivalesque view can shatter any notions of the state as stable and consensual.

The carnival is necessary precisely because of the stability produced through institutional relationships (see Heibert 2003). The carnival world can undo the walls between classes and cultures; there is a blending of the profane and the sacred. In turn, the carnivalesque invokes an ambivalent quality, highlighted by its vigor and inventiveness (Docker 1994). This carnivalesque quality weaves its way through my analysis as institutional relationships that make up the state are challenged producing openings through which certain discourses and relationships between the company and indigenous peoples enter, suggesting the possibility for new forms of governance.

Repsol-YPF controls all who enter and exit the region, monitoring a territory and the population within, including residents of Pompeya, state and NGO representatives. Indigenous peoples are the targets of 'improvement schemes' implemented through CSR programs, and an indigenous identity is re-articulated within this process of development. Indeed, CSR programs depend on defining those who are in need of development, and the trustees, those who are already developed, tasked with providing development (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Li 2007). In the case of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, the marked, patchwork presences of the state have pushed corporations into a state-like role. While the corporation discursively claims it does not want to take on the role of the state, it simultaneously benefits from the state’s strategic presences at the point of extraction. The corporation relies on state protection, sometimes in the form of military power, “writing the rules to legitimate [its] actions” (Li 2007: 17). In this confusion of state and corporate roles, uneven capitalist processes of expansion through oil extraction also leave behind destruction and chaos at the local level. Following Goldman
(2004:170), the “good of the nation and the citizen” depend on the extractive industry, and populations must become “intelligible” to the project experts. CSR programs have the ability to “adjudicate… the traditional and the modern, and the ecologically irrational and rational” (Goldman 2004: 184). Oil extraction on the one hand is depoliticized, but on the other hand, the institutionalization of new versions of environmentalism, regulation and subjectivity highlight the ongoing politicization of resource extraction through CSR programs (Ferguson 1990; Goldman 2004; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003b). In this dissertation, I address the daily practices of CSR programs to explore spaces of oil governance, producing new indigenous subjectivities. Ethnography can highlight the way in which desires are produced and whether a population has been “redirected according to plan” (Li 2007: 282). However, this analysis can also point to the contradictions in CSR programs and the points at which indigenous populations might be able to redirect the spaces of rule. In the following chapters, I explore the role of the state, corporation and indigenous populations engaged in CSR programs that are reconfiguring relationships of governance, sovereignty, and discipline.

Outline of Chapters

In Chapter 2, “An Institutional Ethnography of CSR,” I explain my methodological approach as institutional ethnography (IE) of CSR programs to understand the geographies of CSR programs in the oil industry in Ecuador. In particular, I address the social relationships between corporate, state and indigenous actors out of which CSR programs emerge. I develop this methodology to focus on CSR programs as multiscalar processes that uncover disjunctures between discourse and practice, and the contradictions inherent in CSR programs. In turn, I
explore the way in which my own subjectivity is reworked through the spatial relationships of CSR programs, and the challenges of studying CSR programs in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.

In Chapter 3, “Indigenous Subjectivity and the Space of Extraction,” I explore the everyday politics of resistance in Pompeya, and the way in which CSR programs produce an ambivalent response in indigenous peoples toward challenging corporate presence and the lack of state presence at the local level. I argue that this ambivalence is linked to a long history of outsiders in the region and cultural norms that suggest more powerful neighbors should redistribute their wealth to the less powerful, reproduced through CSR programs. This ambivalence disrupts the well-organized indigenous movement in the 1990s and indigeneity as a political identity.

Chapter 4 “The Duplicitous Nature of the State” is an examination of the particular histories of oil extraction in Ecuador, and the privatization of extraction processes that led to CSR program implementation. In particular I explore histories of indigenous political organizing in relation to the state. I draw on the concept la Patria to focus on oil as a particular territory of the nation, and to question indigenous belonging in the nation-state. In response to neoliberal policies implemented throughout the 1990s, in 2007 the state started a process of seeking additional control over corporate operations, limiting CSR programs at the local level, and establishing the state's right to the majority of windfall profits from extraction. I suggest that these processes expose the multiple-sides of the petro-state, its political and economic bodies, as well as elite and non-elite bodies, indigenous and non-indigenous bodies, reflected through conversations with indigenous leadership in local level organizations.

In Chapter 5, “The Zone of Influence,” I examine CSR programs and the production of the corporation's 'zone of influence' through the concept of trusteeship. I begin by exploring
indigenous peoples as deficient subjects and targets of development projects through CSR programs in the space of Pompeya. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the corporation's strategic maneuverings with the state. On the one hand, the corporation benefits from lack of state presence, and on the other it advocates for a greater role for the state at the local level. In doing so, the corporation ensures its continued presence, but also confirms its lack of responsibility toward indigenous populations in terms of indigenous membership in the nation-state. I argue that this contradictory process is reflected in the company's discourse and practice and serves as a point of intervention for indigenous populations in the governance of resources.

In the concluding chapter, I examine ambivalence and uncertainty in relation to social mobilization. I explore narratives of resistance and alternatives to CSR programs that emerged through an IE of CSR programs. Indeed, spaces of struggle are not always separate from sites of domination, and these spaces emerge out of relationships between the dominant and dominated. By examining the contradictions in CSR programs, I conclude by asking whether there are new spaces and sites in Ecuador for indigenous peoples to generate narratives about new forms of resource extraction and development, which might also incorporate indigenous peoples as citizens with rights and access to resources.
Chapter 2

An Institutional Ethnography of CSR

Introduction

In January 2009, I had been in Ecuador for a few months, and I was flying back and forth between Coca and Quito, usually on a monthly basis. On one of these occasions, I had arrived for my return flight to Quito, and was waiting in the small room that served as the gate area in the Coca airport. There are only a few flights each day between Coca and Quito, and I was on the last flight at five in the afternoon.\(^{20}\) I looked up to see Samuel, the Repsol-YPF community relations officer, and Rodrigo from ENTRIX, the environmental consulting company employed by the oil company, walk into the room.\(^{21}\) I had met both Samuel and Rodrigo in Quito at the offices of Repsol-YPF. They came over to chat. Having arrived on the early morning flight from Quito, and returning that same evening, Samuel and Rodrigo had been in Coca for a series of meetings with indigenous groups. This pattern of targeted, quick visits into the Amazon region characterized corporate, and many Quito based NGO visits. Meetings with indigenous communities occurred in Coca at the request of the corporation, and indigenous representatives had to come to the town from communities, often requiring early morning boat travel for several hours along the Napo River. My work also took on this pattern of quick trips to the region, and I grappled with my own privilege, as I, too, moved in and out of the Amazon region. Financially, I was able to afford the quick flights to Coca, but it was difficult for me to show up in Pompeya and explain that I was able to fly back and forth to Quito, let alone to the United States. I wanted

\(^{20}\)I had reserved this ticket several weeks in advance, hence my ability to get a seat on the normally crowded late day flights.

\(^{21}\)All names in the dissertation are pseudonyms.
to position myself differently from Quito based corporate and NGO field staff, but my actions made this more difficult.

I always set up my base of operations in Coca at the Hotel Auca. This was a centrally located place, where I felt safest, and where Quito oil company and NGO staff stayed. I would often overlap with this staff and participate in their meetings organized in the hotel conference rooms. From Coca, all travel further east into the Amazon region is by boat, along the Napo River, or via the occasional access road, like the one that allows overland travel to Pompeya. Repsol-YPF’s port is located in Coca, and workers are flown in from Quito on early morning flights. They are bussed from the airport to the port and take speedboats downriver to Pompeya. For this reason, early morning flights to Coca and evening flights back to Quito are usually fully booked. Both private multinationals and the state company buy up blocks of tickets for their workers.

In this chapter I outline my methodology, an ethnography of CSR programs, conceptualized as institutions, to explore the daily practices of CSR programs, and understand the shifting terrain of relationships between the researcher and researched. I argue that CSR programs operate as a particular framework through which resources are extracted. In turn, my ethnography focuses not only on those actors engaged in resisting corporate operations, but also the ways in which certain populations become subject to corporate power (see Rajak 2010, 2011). I focus on the narratives, or stories of CSR programs that help to secure the corporation’s presence in the Amazon region. However, rather than ignoring those discourses that seem contradictory, my approach analyzes these conversations to examine forms of resistance and indigenous political agency at the local level. Moreover, I am attentive to the ways in which my analysis of CSR programs owes as much to my interpretations, as it does to those I study (cf.
Mountz 2007). Therefore, I examine the outward discursive production of the institution in relation to the everyday practices I observe at the community, regional and national levels. In turn, I focus on the ways in which I also become bound up in corporate narratives, or subject to corporate power.

The overarching objectives of my project included an examination of corporate roles in local development initiatives and the role of indigenous peoples in the governance of oil extraction. In turn, I designed an extensive multi-method research analysis to examine not only the material ‘merits’ of CSR programs, but also the way in which CSR programs may also shape local indigenous livelihoods. I aimed to answer the following questions: 1) How do indigenous populations perceive and respond to CSR programs, and how has this response changed over time? (2) What CSR programs does Repsol-YPF implement in indigenous communities, and how are these selected? (3) In what ways does the state facilitate CSR programs?

I begin by discussing the way in which geographers have conducted ethnography of institutions in particular within development ethnographies, and how I framed my own research as an ethnography to uncover the meanings and processes of CSR programs. Next I move into a discussion of research methods, and how my research unfolded in the community of Pompeya. In particular, I focus on two aspects of the everyday that characterized my research experience. First, I was confronted with the disjuncture between the field as 'out there' and my own role as a researcher in confronting the everyday I wished to study and understand (Katz 1994; England 1994; G. Rose 1997). Second, I focus on the underlying aims of the research project, designed to ensure indigenous peoples' access to and control over resources. I address the way in which my own identity intersected with, and came to reflect the cultural, material, geopolitical, and institutional aspects of CSR programs in Ecuador, and which contributed to the challenges I
encountered in furthering the political aims of my research project (see Nagar 2002). In attempting to uncover the daily practices of CSR programs, I recognized CSR programs were constructed differently depending on where I was physically located, and with whom I was speaking (see Mountz 2007, 2010). I had to reconcile the way in which my own role as a researcher was often bound up in corporate discourse, national or regional state office discourses, local level indigenous organization discourse, or the responses to these in an indigenous community in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. I was bound by my own politics of wanting to shift power relationships, where my own perceived power at the community level hindered this process, and indigenous peoples' responses reflected a political ambivalence that underscored their subjection to corporate power.

My research allowed me to move between corporate, state and indigenous offices at multiple scales. While industry-produced programs and projects were identifiable at the local level, they seemed to exacerbate social and environmental injustices in indigenous communities, and conflicted with CSR discourse that continued to reflect the corporation's stated aims of reducing the social and environmental harms from ongoing oil extraction. Exploring this disconnect between discourse and practice during my field research in Ecuador provoked feelings of failure, as my own role as an ethnographer was at times bound up within the corporation's definition of CSR, and simultaneously challenged by my observations in Pompeya. CSR programs were so firmly embedded in daily lives at the local level,\(^22\) it became increasingly emotionally depressing and physically demanding, as well as logistically challenging to spend days, let alone weeks, in Pompeya.

\(^{22}\) By ‘embedded in daily lives at the local level’ I am referring to indigenous peoples’ dependence on corporate operations, and how their subjection to corporate power made it emotionally difficult for me spend long periods of time in Pompeya. Very little changed on a daily basis there, as residents went about their day-to-day tasks of working on *finca*s, and returning home in the evening.
Getting off the plane in Coca, the capital of Orellana province, I was hit with a wall of heat and humidity. I usually took the short, half-hour flight from Quito into the Amazon region to avoid long, 10-12 hour bus rides on winding roads that dropped steeply from the Sierra (highlands) to the Oriente (Amazon region). These flights were usually filled with Quito-based oil workers, NGO staff, and researchers, like myself, those who could afford to pay the $60 one-way ticket. Of course, a flight gives one little time to adjust to the altitude in Quito, and conversely, the heat and humidity of the Amazon region.

Coca is not a place that I ever came to enjoy. It is a frontier town that offers little more than bars, restaurants, hotels, and oil industry services, including vast storage facilities with pipeline segments and workers’ compounds for sub-contractors such as Halliburton. Coca’s population includes service industry staff, local government officials, NGO employees, and indigenous peoples who have sought employment or educational opportunities outside of their communities. Adding to this mix, the Catholic mission's local vicariato is based in Coca, along with offices for FCUNAE (Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana), the Kichwa indigenous organization for the local region. While it was initially not my intention to spend much time in Coca, I ultimately did spend several weeks there interviewing NGO and local government representatives, as well as members of FCUNAE. Moreover, indigenous organizations would sometimes hold meetings in Coca with company and government officials, which I occasionally attended.

Back at the airport, I had only met Rodrigo (the ENTRIX representative) once before in Samuel's office, and he asked again what my project was about. I explained that I was attempting to conduct ethnography of CSR. He responded, “But CSR is only a discourse. How can you

---

23 Translated as a vicariate, this is a territorial jurisdiction of the Catholic church, usually present in missionary regions, or places where there are not sufficient numbers for a diocese.
study it?” A brief discussion ensued, in which Samuel chimed in claiming that in fact CSR was more than just a discourse, defending the company's CSR projects in indigenous communities. This brief exchange with company officials reflects the maneuverings of the corporation in promoting an 'official' CSR discourse, and the difficulty of reconciling discourse with the material projects and programs implemented at the local level. Indeed, within the first weeks of my work, this gap between discourse and practice was glaringly obvious to me, as neatly described CSR projects in corporate reports had already failed at the local level due to lack of interest in communities, changing corporate whims, or shifts in state control over corporations.

Initially, I felt that the lack of response in Pompeya was apathy toward me and my work. Upon reflection, however, after leaving the space of Pompeya, I realized it was a powerful ambivalence – toward challenging corporate operations and the risk of disrupting CSR programs, combined with the historic, patchwork presences of the state in the region – and that this ambivalence influenced indigenous populations' political agency and access to and control over resources. As Sultana (2007) writes, rarely do researchers comment on failed collaborations, or connections and solidarities that did not emerge during the research process. Indeed, while the researcher might feel some burden to initiate these connections, their successes depend on research respondents' willingness to participate. The lack of connection I experienced in Pompeya, I argue, in part reflects both my own positionality as a white, female graduate student based in North America, but also the cultural, geopolitical and material influences of the space of Pompeya, a community marked by histories of oil extraction, missionary presence and other patron-client relationships (see Chapter 3). I began to question how the knowledge I might produce in the research process could reflect not only my interactions with community residents, but also shape a social and political agenda to highlight indigenous peoples' rights and
representation in Ecuador. Indeed, the iterative process of CSR programs in Pompeya led to uncertainty and ambivalence among community members, reflected in my interactions in the space of the community. Drawing on work by feminist geographers, and Bondi (2004: 5) in particular, I mobilize the concept of ambivalence through the dissertation to argue that this political response is not so much about inability to make a decision as it is about “creating spaces in which tensions, contradictions and paradoxes can be negotiated fruitfully and dynamically.” Furthermore, I acknowledge that this uncertainty was not only something I ‘uncovered’ within indigenous subjects, but also a tension I encountered in my own subjectivity.

Several months into my research in Pompeya, frustrations with this perceived lack of response and logistical challenges pushed me toward looking for CSR relationships outside the community of Pompeya and its relationship to Repsol-YPF. While initially resistant to shifting my proposed research plan - I was adamant that the more time I spent in Pompeya, the more I would uncover about CSR operations, I eventually decided to pursue Repsol-YPF’s relationship with local level Waorani indigenous organizations headquartered in Puyo in the central Amazon region. This decision was primarily based on limited connections I felt with residents of Pompeya, and my own ability to sustain long periods of time in the community, something I explore more fully in the rest of the chapter. Eventually, after weeks of illness, and frustration with how my research was progressing, I shifted my focus slightly. Corporate connections to indigenous organizations (see subsequent chapters for a full exploration of these relationships) were more easily uncovered in the sense that corporate monies funded the indigenous organizational programs on an annual basis. My interviews eventually included state and NGO representatives in Coca and Tena (in the central Amazon region) who could also comment on corporate roles in the region. Throughout the course of my fieldwork I kept up conversations
with corporate representatives, and as much as possible, state representatives in Quito. Research methods included participant observation and informal interviews in Pompeya, semi-structured interviews with indigenous organizations, state representatives, and corporate officers, as well as archival and library research on information regarding corporate contracts, histories of indigenous peoples and resource extraction in Ecuador.\(^{24}\)

I was building an understanding of CSR programs by studying the daily practices of corporate, state and indigenous relationships at multiple scales, highlighting the politicization of the corporation's attempts to depoliticize discourse and practice of CSR programs. My research design allowed me to tack back and forth between material CSR projects at the local level and regional and national scale discursive dynamics of resource governance. Through participant observation in particular, I could more fully evaluate relationships of power that influenced access to and control over resources at multiple scales, and challenges to indigenous rights and representation in Ecuador. This ethnographic process constantly forced me to question my own role as a researcher, to ensure I was not complicit in the corporation's aims to depoliticize resource governance decisions. The power of the company in the space of indigenous communities, as well as in corporate offices in Quito forced me to constantly question my own participation in CSR programs, and the ways in which the company disciplined my own actions. In turn, my analysis of CSR programs in this dissertation reflect attempts to remain critical of CSR programs, challenging corporate discourse through the different spaces of governance that emerge from the social relationships of CSR programs.

\(^{24}\) It is difficult to quantify my interviews at the community level because these were often informal conversations that were not recorded. I reconstructed these interviews in my fieldnotes. I conducted about 20 interviews with state, corporate and indigenous organization leadership. Many of these interviews included follow up conversations.
Institutional ethnographies

I was not engaged in studying the corporation itself (cf. Schoenberger 1997) as a development institution, but rather the specific programs that fell under the corporate rubric of CSR, or the way in which CSR programs manifested themselves as 'ruling relations' that emerge through social relationships to facilitate oil extraction and resource distribution (see Smith 1987, 2005, 2006). This prompted me to turn to literatures that could address understandings of the institution as a series of networks and daily practices, as “everyday, embodied practices and relationships,” rather than a pre-existing entity, synonymous with organization (Mountz 2007: 47). One of the challenges I found in studying CSR was my inability to “penetrate” or “get inside” CSR programs, as other institutional ethnographies suggest (see King 2009: 411; Bebbington et al. 2004: 34; Goldman 2004). I argue that these challenges emerge from different conceptualizations of institutions.

I conducted an ethnography of CSR programs drawing on institutional ethnography (IE), conceptualized by D. Smith (1987, 2005, 2006), to investigate development and resource governance in Ecuador. Following Holstein (2006: 293), Dorothy Smith developed institutional ethnography to understand the “everyday world,” through what she calls “ruling relations” or the various processes of administration and governance that shape peoples’ activities in that world. For Smith, “textually-mediated social organization” is key, and she urges institutional ethnographers to focus on the “texts-in-use” in various settings and locations. Texts can refer to books, or airline reservations, for example, and enable movement from the local to trans-local (see Smith 2006). For Smith, institution refers to “coordinated and intersecting work processes and course of action.” For example, health-care might be considered an institution, linked by the actions and work processes of hospitals, homes, doctors’ offices, and clinics. As DeVault and
McCoy (2002: 753) argue institutions are not studied as a whole, rather the aim is to uncover particular strands of the “institutional complex” and note the points of connections to other pieces. The goal of IE is to explain and identify those social processes that have “generalizing effects.” In other words, IE is a “sociology for people not just about them” (Holstein 2006: 293).

Scholars have employed ethnography to address a variety of institutions, including conservation organizations (King 2009), indigenous organizations (Perreault 2003a,b), and development institutions (Bebbington, et al. 2004; Moore 2000; Goldman 2004). Other studies have used ethnographic approaches to investigate the role of the state as institution (Gupta 1995; Mountz 2004, 2007, 2010). Central to my investigation of CSR programs, I expand on studies that employ ethnography to understand the internal workings of development institutions, including examination of individual actors and power dynamics that produce dominant discourses (Bebbington 2000; Bebbington 2004; King 2009). In particular, geographers have used ethnography to investigate the “structures, ideas and actions of various organizations and networks” (King 2009: 410). Within development studies, ethnography can be used to examine organizations' engagement with theories of network and agency (King 2009; Perreault 2003a,b). Perreault (2003a,b), for example, examines discourse production within indigenous organizations and the way in which these discourses connect with transnational networks to at once challenge and reproduce official understandings of citizenship and state-produced development. While my methodological approach builds on these geographical conceptualizations of ethnographies of institutions to uncover discourse and practice of CSR in the context of development and environmental governance, I explore CSR programs as a set of “daily practices” (Mountz 2010: xxiv). It is through the daily struggles of everyday life that we see the structural constraints of the institution emerge, and the processes through which people work to challenge or subvert those
structures. If we note, then, the points at which individuals work to subvert challenges to institutional discourse and practice, these can also be “political breaking points” (Mountz 2010: xxv). In turn, ethnography is not only about discourses and interviews, but also observation, and it is through participant observation that we can document various “frustrations, subversions and networks” that result in these breaking points, which are theorized as an “institutional arrangement of social practices” (see Mountz 2010: xxv, Herbert 2000).

To understand these variations in the use of institution, it is helpful to return to a historical analysis of the term institution within geographical literature. Typically, argue Philo and Parr (2000), institution refers to hospitals, asylums and prisons – places to treat and improve human minds and bodies. In turn, geographies of the institution emerged to study the location of the institution in relation to towns and resources, as well as the geographies in institutions, to understand their internal arrangement. As the movement toward deinstitutionalization challenged the notion that certain populations had to be segregated from mainstream societies in order to be improved, studies of institutions shifted to focus not only on one site, but also networks of relationships and power flows (Philo and Parr 2000). With this expanded notion of institution, studies have addressed the role of organizations, often referred to as institutions, with agency, and clear rules, perhaps the “rules-in-use” addressed by political ecologists (see Himley 2008; Peet and Watts 2004). Others have focused on “middle-ways” drawing on both structure and agency (see Giddens 1979, 1981, 1984) to address institutions as social practices that become routinized in “everyday social life” (Philo and Parr 2000: 516). Examples of this latter conceptualization include religion and the church, for example, institutions that continue to fascinate scholars. As Philo and Parr (2000: 517) point to, the examples of institutions outlined above assume the institutions is a “pre-given.” They exist prior to certain relationships, and
studies focus on the outcomes of those institutions. Thus, a third way to study institutions is to focus on how institutions are formed, “sustained,” and “transformed” (Philo and Parr 2000: 517).

What are the geographies of these institutions themselves? How do they come into being? How do they survive? (Philo and Parr 2000: 517). My research builds on this third conceptualization of the institution. CSR is not necessarily a “locatable object, but a series of networks through which governance takes place” (Mountz 2010: xxiv).

Studying the everyday can expose operations of CSR programs and projects, which necessitates a process of “studying up” (see Nadar 1972) – defined as a starting point to resist institutional actions. IE, as explored by Dorothy Smith (1987, 2005, 2006), is one such mechanism to begin to map out the movement from everyday life upwards toward what she calls the relations of ruling (see also DeVault 2006). An ethnography of the institution of CSR counters its “depoliticizing” aspects – it “demystifies its power,” and “uncovers assumptions” (Mountz 2010: xxv, 2007). An ethnographic approach can challenge and blur the boundaries of the institution of CSR. I draw on empirical data to analyze the social relationships between corporate, state and indigenous actors. In turn, these relationships produce competing claims on oil resources, and lead to overlapping questions of territory, resource access, and sovereignty in the northern Amazon region. Relationships that form within CSR programs certainly expand well beyond the local level, but also emerge far beyond the clearly defined projects and programs labeled as CSR programs by the company. Assessing the way CSR permeates, and indeed emerges out of social relationships is challenging, and as a researcher, I was never entirely sure how my daily work would unfold. I outline these early stages of my fieldwork in Ecuador in the remainder of the chapter. Eventually, I tried to embrace the daily unknown in my research, as I crafted a spatial understanding of CSR.
Following Rajak (2010, 2011), the aim of my dissertation is to focus on the production of CSR programs through the social relationships that form in the spaces of resource extraction. Building on other studies of CSR programs (for example, Zalik 2004; Sawyer 2004; Bebbington 2010; Himley 2008, 2010) that explore the resource curse, conflict, dispossession, and resistance, my research contributes an ethnography of relationships that adhere within the framework of CSR to study up networks of power, and address indigenous political agency and access to and control over resources. In other words, CSR is much more than just a public relations campaign that allows corporations to pursue oil and profit unhindered (Rajak 2010, 2011). Following Mountz (2010: xxiv) I suggest CSR “does not exist outside of the people who comprise it, their everyday work, and social embeddedness in local relationships.” As such, my analysis challenges Rodrigo’s claims that CSR is ‘just a discourse,’ to uncover the social relationships that allow the corporation to present CSR programs as a cohesive discourse. By theorizing CSR programs as an “institutional arrangement of social practices” I document the various subversions and networks that are rooted in the local level, but extend beyond the bounds of Ecuador and an indigenous community (Mountz 2010: xxv). By rooting my analysis in everyday processes, I can uncover why and how indigenous peoples are at times subjected to the corporation's power, and the way in which CSR programs seem to emerge as a coherent entity. I draw on Wolford (2010: 5) to argue that CSR programs are not “necessarily or naturally cohesive.” Instead, they reflect the corporation's deliberate attempt to present them as such. My dissertation therefore addresses CSR programs as a set of dynamic practices, networks and performances that are motivated by human agency and the particular context in which they emerge.
CSR programs produce a framework through which resources continue to be extracted. Thus ethnographic analysis should focus not only on those agents engaged in resisting extraction, but also the various partnerships and processes that allow certain populations to become subject to that power (Rajak 2010, 2011). Indeed, my analysis allows me to ask why, where, and how CSR programs emerge, and which narratives and tales are used to secure the corporation's presence in the region (Mountz 2007). To do so, I take a critical ethnographic approach (Hart 2004) to explore the “ethnography of the particular” (Abu-Lughod 2000: 263), one that is at once localized and global (see Wolford 2006, 2010). Rather than ignoring or “editing out” (Wolford 2006: 339) those discourses that seem unreasonable or contradictory, my analysis brings in these conversations to explore questions of resistance, and indigenous political agency in the space of the northern Amazon region.

Furthermore, because my ethnography of CSR reflects the daily practices of relationships that adhere within a framework of CSR programs, this analysis “on any given day owes as much to the observer as to the observed” (Mountz 2007: 47). In other words, the everyday lives of the researched also reflect the researcher's presence, both in the way in which the researcher “mediates” the relationships she observes, and the response to the researcher's presence that emerge through everyday lives of the researched (England 1994: 85). Moreover, as Mountz (2007) reflects, the outward discursive production of the institution, may not match the relationships that emerge through daily practices the researcher observes. The role of the researcher, I argue, is to confront and locate the particular social relations that emerge through CSR programs, which include the material implications of CSR projects at the community level, contracts between the Ecuadorian state and multinational corporations, and between the corporation and indigenous organizations. In addition, these relationships of CSR emerge in the
way local indigenous identities reflect the power relations inherent in corporate discourse and practice and strategic state presences. The researcher herself may be bound up in these narratives, as she is located within the power of the institution, which in turn may interpret and name her motives (Mountz 2007). “Academic and state therefore serve as both 'object' and 'subject' of ethnographic research” (Mountz 2007: 48). My work builds on Mountz’s approach to the state in order to address CSR programs as more fluid and dynamic, and challenge the seemingly coherent discourse of multinational corporations.

Building on five weeks of preliminary research conducted during June and July 2007, my proposed research included two phases: 17 months of fieldwork in Ecuador, during which I planned to spend about 60% of my time in the Kichwa community of Pompeya in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region, and the remaining 40% split between Coca and Quito. This phase was to be followed by four months of data analysis in Syracuse, NY. In essence, my work was to be an ethnography of CSR programs rooted in the community of Pompeya, with occasional trips to understand CSR at regional and national levels. Within the first week of my work, it became clear that I could not carry out my research as I anticipated in Pompeya. Logistical challenges, including personal safety and health, in addition to gendered relations made it difficult to live for long periods in the community. While not abandoning my research questions completely, I had to become flexible enough to try and engage a broader array of actors in addressing CSR. Thus, logistical issues that often revolved around my positionality and questions of power, combined with daily practices of CSR programs, challenged my research design and methods throughout my fieldwork period in Ecuador. This chapter, then, speaks to the practical and logistical challenges of exploring CSR programs as a set of daily practices, but also the meanings and social relationships that this analysis makes possible.
Accessing the everyday

After conducting preliminary fieldwork in Ecuador in 2007, I decided that it would be more beneficial for the goals I had established regarding my research - a focus on competing sovereignties tied to indigenous peoples' access and control over resources, to go directly to the Amazon region upon my arrival in Ecuador. I knew there were various CSR projects in place at the community level that provided the material aspects of development, including a drinking water system, transportation, and sewing cooperatives, and thought these would be good starting points for my ethnography of CSR programs. Over the course of my fieldwork in Ecuador, my research plans changed considerably. I had selected the community of Pompeya as a place to carry out my research because Repsol-YPF had CSR programs in Pompeya. Repsol-YPF was the one multinational company with rights to an oil block in Ecuador that also agreed to talk to me about its CSR programs during preliminary research, and seemed open to having me study its programs upon my return to Ecuador. Pompeya serves as the entrance to the oil block where Repsol-YPF carries out its extraction operations in Block 16. The community has the advantage of being accessible over land (in addition to via the Napo River), and Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP)\(^{25}\) the organization that would help me with my research logistics in the Amazon region, maintained a house in Pompeya. While I had stayed at this house during preliminary research, and it was rather basic, I still thought I could handle living there for an extended period of time. I had decided, prior to my arrival in Ecuador, that I did not need an apartment in Quito, and would instead come back to a friend’s house in the city when necessary. However, within a week of my time in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region, it became obvious that my logistical plans were not going to work. I was unhappy, felt unsafe, and at risk for

\(^{25}\) In English, the Ecuadorian Fund for People’s Progress
parasite borne illnesses because of the lack of drinking water. The overwhelming loneliness I felt upon my arrival in Pompeya was something I had not necessarily considered when writing my proposal. In some ways fieldwork is always lonely, but living in a small, rural community in the Amazon region magnified those feelings. I did not know anyone, or have anyone to talk to initially. Pompeya does have cell phone reception, and I would often have long conversations with a colleague also conducting her field research in Ecuador during this same period. We spoke almost every night in these first few weeks in Pompeya. These conversations were important as I reconsidered my research plan (Billo and Hiemstra 2012).

Pompeya has a clearly defined center, where I was staying, and other houses scattered several kilometers along oil well access roads. The community center was marked by communal houses and a medical center on the edge of a soccer field, along with individual family houses, primarily those families who could afford to move off of their farm plots, usually employees of the state or the company. The current geography of the community was established by missionary presence through the 1950s and 1960s, to facilitate access to the community. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, corporations used these community centers as focal points for projects like electricity provision and other services, including the medical facilities and drinking water system. Outlying areas in Pompeya do not have electricity, or access to drinking water. On a daily basis, residents living in the community center travel to their garden plots, or chacras, in the surrounding landscape. A company-run bus shows up in the community center every morning to take family members to their farms during the day. Women pile onto the bus with buckets of chicha, a thick drink made most commonly from fermented yuca and water. This drink is a staple of the lowland Kichwa diet, and if fermented long enough, becomes alcoholic.

Sometimes young children would be strapped to women’s backs, while men would carry...

26 The potable water system had worked only briefly, and was broken during the entire period of my field research.
machetes, ready for a day's work. As people went about their daily tasks, during the day, the center of Pompeya was mostly empty.

With help from FEPP, I was introduced to a few people in Pompeya, but I discovered most residents were busy during the day working on their chacras outside of the community center. In turn, I needed a community member's help getting from the center of the community to the chacras – someone who could also introduce my project goals to community members. From a logistical standpoint, I also needed help translating my questions from Spanish to Kichwa. While most Pompeyans are bilingual, older residents still primarily speak Kichwa. Moreover, I did not feel particularly safe walking around on my own. I needed to find someone reliable I could work with as my guide and assistant. Eventually, as I pondered my next steps, a community member, David, approached me. As part of the company's cacao production project (See Chapter 5), he was used to working with outsiders, and assumed I was another in a long line of researchers employed by the company. With David, I started a series of house-to-house interviews. These early conversations with Pompeyans were challenging. It was soon clear that most in Pompeya were aware that indeed there were corporate programs in the community, but they could not, or did not want to assess them one way or another. Indeed, my questions about CSR operations prompted concern in the community, I soon learned, because many assumed I was working for the company and were wary of criticizing corporate operations.

My research proposal included plans to hold focus groups and workshops with Pompeyans, complete house-to-house surveys, and do in-depth interviews. Eventually, I realized that some of these methods would have to be discarded, precisely because of the legacy of

---

27 David was one of several informal research assistants I employed while in Pompeya. I paid my assistants for their time accompanying me through the community. All recorded interviews through the dissertation were transcribed by an Ecuadorian living in Quito, and translated by me from Spanish to English.

28 This misconception about my role in the community continued through my research period.

29 The company also conducted house-to-house interviews when implementing CSR programs.
corporate research methods and their impacts on community daily lives. Moreover, because it was so hard to even schedule interviews, I did not want to make people overly wary by pulling out my recorder, and instead took notes by hand in my research journal. I reconstructed these interviews each evening. As I better understood community dynamics and needs, I also decided that neither surveys nor workshops were realistic. Instead, participant observation became a key research method, as I learned the most from taking part in daily activities, including work *mingas* to harvest different agricultural products, and attendance at community meetings, religious services, and on one occasion, a traditional wedding (Hyndman 2001; Herbert 2000).

The challenges I faced in conducting research in part reflected Pompeya as a community that is over-studied by multinational companies, as well as the state company. Residents were tired of constant questioning and house-to-house visits that recalled similar processes the company used to gather data on community culture and livelihoods. Most importantly, though, community members wanted to know how they would benefit from my research (see Sundberg 2003). Rather than providing material benefits to research respondents, I could only tell potential participants that I was trying to piece together the story of CSR, and at the very least had the ability to travel more often to Quito and Coca and talk to people they might not necessarily be able to access.

Sultana (2007) recounts how, during her research experience in Bangladesh, many potential research participants walked away as she tried to engage them in conversation, refusing to participate in yet another study. She found these responses happened more often in those villages that had been over-studied by development NGOs, reflecting an “international donor and NGO-driven development” history of Bangladesh (2007: 381). In Pompeya, the long history of

---

30 Participation in these activities occurred after several months in Pompeya, and after I slowly started to get to know other residents who invited me to different events.
patriarchal relationships between indigenous peoples and the church, and between the community and oil companies, as well as patron-client relationships during the rubber industry, marks a more telling ambivalence toward powerful actors. In the context of this history, I was just another in a long line of outsiders invading the space of Pompeya. This ambivalence also marked cultural responses to the presence of an outsider (whether perceived as anything from an oil company to myself, as a white, foreign woman) and expectations that a 'new neighbor' should distribute wealth and resources. My positionality as a white, female graduate student from North America continued to challenge the success of my research at the local level, and informed my understanding of the power relationships of CSR programs in the space of an indigenous community. I reflect on my positionality and identity, including the logistics of my gender, in the next section.

Positionality, identity, and the everyday

While in Ecuador, I found I embodied the tension between being the 'object under study' as well as the 'rigorous social scientist' during the period of my fieldwork (Mountz 2007; Herbert 2000). I was often reminded in my work in the Amazon region that I was a foreign woman working alone. This made me the target of unwanted attention by bored oil workers in Pompeya, and an object of interest for community members. While I came to develop a ‘thick skin’ when dealing with these situations, I still found myself getting increasingly frustrated. Most community members were fascinated with my physical difference - the color of my skin, for example, and then of course the inevitable curiosity about why I was a lone woman conducting research in a place far from home. I did not sufficiently consider, prior to beginning my work in Ecuador, the ways in which my own identity and positionality would be reflected back to me.
through the daily realities I encountered not only in Pompeya, but also in regional and national settings. In Pompeya, I often felt my difference was a liability – I stood out, and was the subject of much questioning. As Sundberg (2003) notes, often researchers become more aware of their whiteness, both in the sense of a source of privilege, but also as an impediment. Over time, as people began to recognize me, the questions stopped, and I also learned to avoid situations where I knew the interview would not be helpful. On the other hand, I was aware that my perceived position of privilege reverberated through the community when I was mistaken as an employee of the company, or someone who could offer financial resources to community members.

Moreover, I felt that from a practical standpoint my gender did not lend itself to making my research progress (see Billo and Hiemstra 2012; Sundberg 2003). To some extent, I designed my research project knowing that it would be challenging to work in Pompeya as a woman. I thought I was up to the day-to-day challenges of life in indigenous communities, and in fact this was part of the reason I wanted to do this work. Even among the NGOs that work in Pompeya and the Amazon region, very few of the field staff are women. I had conducted my master’s research there, and was aware of how difficult it was to live in rural Amazonian communities, merely from a health standpoint. Somewhat constant stomach illnesses were a problem for me in Pompeya, especially in the early days. Whenever I arrived at a house for an interview I was offered a bowl of chicha. Without knowing where the water came from, and unable to refuse the drink out of politeness and cultural custom, I gambled with how my body would react. If I was lucky, the chicha was made using untreated rainwater, and if not, river water. While I developed some resistance, I never knew how or when I might become ill.

Throughout my fieldwork period, I emailed my advisor, Tom Perreault, and other committee members. These were long emails relaying everything from new information I had
gathered, people I had spoken to, and my doubts and concerns about my work. I sent Tom an email after I returned from my first trip to Pompeya. I explained my living situation in the community, but that it seemed like it might be possible for me to live with nuns in the Catholic mission. FEPP is a Catholic church-based organization and works closely with the mission in Pompeya. With running water, showers, a safe and secure house, and other people to talk to, the mission was an ideal situation. In early December 2008, I returned to Pompeya to live with the nuns.

The Napo River divides Pompeya, and the nuns are on the northern side of the river. The center of the community is on the southern side. This meant I had to cross the river in company boats most days to do my work. The last crossing every afternoon was at 4:30pm, just as everyone was getting back from work. In making sure I was safer and healthier, I also sacrificed opportunities to do more interviews. Moreover, as I became part of the nuns' community, I wanted to try and participate as much as possible, to avoid becoming a burden. As a result, on one occasion, I had to give up the opportunity to attend a community meeting to help the nuns get to the doctor in Limoncocha, a town about 20 minutes away. It was hard not to feel pulled in different directions as my own subjectivity was reworked within the social relations of the everyday of the field.

Also, as I needed to cross the river more regularly, I had additional contact with oil workers and company guards. The guards checked everyone who entered and exited the oil block. Initially I was asked to show my ID, but over time was recognized and received fewer questions. But, I stood out. No matter where I went, I was an object of questions from guards who spent all day in the heat with no one to talk to, except during scheduled crossings of trucks and workers, about four times a day. I learned to make sure I did not arrive too early to catch a
boat across the river, because then I was forced to engage in conversation with workers. I also was increasingly frustrated with merely having to repeatedly describe my work and what I was doing in Pompeya, and would answer just yes or no to their persistent questions, and try and pretend I did not really speak Spanish.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, these experiences also speak to the daily realities of corporate presence in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. The control over and monitoring of the company regarding my actions was reflected in my frustrations, and I had to learn how to navigate company presence and power.

The focus on my gendered and raced identity by community members and oil staff alike altered my own perception of my positionality, and was not limited to my work at the local level. I was increasingly aware of my whiteness and positioning as a female student from the United States in any conversation I conducted in government or corporate offices in Quito. A researcher herself is often positioned by her age, gender, race/ethnicity, and biography, for example, all of which contribute to the researcher's insights or inhibitions in the field (England 1994). Sultana (2007), for example, comments on the ‘reverse power relations’ she encountered in meetings with policy officials. In other words, she was subjected to the power of policy officials over her access. Her position as a researcher, like mine, was 'othered' by those who were studying and observing my role in the field.

Many of the interactions I had in Quito reflected research respondents' paternalistic and sometimes condescending attitude toward me and my work. Almost all of the government executives I interacted with were male, and one of the two corporate officers I came to know in Quito was also male. Meetings with Samuel, the community relations officer for Repsol-YPF, reflected his power over me, often reducing the time of our meetings, and refusing to answer my

\textsuperscript{31}Ironically, my own feelings about the constant questions mirror indigenous peoples' responses to my own curiosities about their daily lives.
questions directly, if at all. The latter I perceived to be a discursive maneuver to present CSR programs in a consistently positive light. Samuel would sometimes keep me in his office at the end of the day as he chatted on the phone and finished up his day's tasks. Then he would offer to drive me home as we talked about my life in the United States and my career plans following graduate school. During this period, Samuel was finishing a law degree, and took an extended leave of absence from his job at Repsol-YPF to finish his thesis. In contrast, I was only able to set up one meeting with Margo, the director of the Fundación Repsol in Quito. She refused to answer repeated requests for a second meeting, even after I left a series of messages with her assistant. My inability to schedule a second meeting with Margo also marked the reverse power relations in our relationship, as Margo was able to determine my access to her and the Fundación. Despite the seeming ‘openness’ of Samuel to meet with me, he was still able to ensure he crafted his own discourse of CSR programs. Meanwhile, my experience with Margo reflects a more overt power relationship, refusing to even set aside time for follow-up meetings.

Moreover, in one interaction in the regional government office of SENPLADES (Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo) in Tena, in the central Amazon region, I had what was perhaps one of my most frustrating conversations. The interview was conducted in English, because the respondent, Eduardo, had studied in the US and wanted to practice his English. As the following excerpt illustrates, Eduardo was not interested in listening to me, and answering the specific questions I had outlined for the interview. I introduced my project goals in some detail at the outset of the interview, including my work in Pompeya, and interviews I was conducting in Coca and Quito, but Eduardo wanted to start from his own beginning, to tell his own story, and ensure that I fully understood his agenda. The interview became a sort of political opportunity for him, and a chance to demonstrate the state's control over indigenous populations.
and outsiders. The narrative Eduardo crafted left little space for other views, and established the state’s power over its resources and territory. However, his narrative also speaks to the ways in which institutional analysis can also uncover the daily practices of social relationships, which often contradict these ‘coherent’ discourses. I wondered, too, if this interview would have happened differently if I were an older, “more established male academic” (England 1994: 85).

Eduardo: I would like to show you this oil block – here, for example – for example, here is Coca. You know, Coca? Have you been there?

Emily: I have, yes.

Eduardo: Here is Coca, and all these black areas is where the oil companies are working, for example. So there, we say that the reservoirs of oil, especially in the Yasuni National Park – I don’t have a map of the blocks that belongs to the oil companies, for example, but this part belongs to the Kichwa and this part belongs to Andes Petroleum (a Chinese company).

Later in the interview, Eduardo asked if I had been to Pompeya, again surprising to me after I had already explained where I was conducting my research. He was expounding on why it was important to the state to build a series of local universities:

Eduardo: I say here because we have a lot of rivers – a university, here, in Tena, because there are not a lot of universities – quality universities. That’s why our people have to go to Quito. Next to Coca – maybe you visited, I don’t know – Pompeya.

Emily: That’s where I do my research, yeah.

Eduardo: Yeah, Pompeya – about one hour down the river from Pompeya, we think we have to build international puerto for – what is the word in English?

Emily: It’s like a port for boats.

Eduardo: – for boats – big boats – because the proposal of our government is to be here, for example.
I felt at certain points that my questions were lost in translation, but at other moments it seemed obvious that Eduardo was exercising his power over me, directing the conversation toward his own agenda, refusing to grant me the opportunity to ask questions. My concerns stemmed from my own observations in Pompeya and Coca, which seemed to contradict the neat and tidy plans presented by Eduardo. Without being able to express my own opinions, though, highlighted the differences between Eduardo’s narrative of the state and the everyday realities I encountered in the Amazon region. Uncovering the relationships between companies and indigenous peoples, also serves to tell a story of the state — one that is quickly subverted by bureaucrats like Eduardo (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the very subject of this conversation was to let me know precisely what the government thought of foreign researchers, like myself:

Emily: What about in the indigenous communities – in Pompeya, for example, or the Waorani territory – will you go into the communities and work there, or you’re mainly just working in Coca, Loreto?

Eduardo: Also, another project that we think is very important is scientific research center because it is not – is not just – you don’t feel offended?

Emily: No, I don’t feel offended.32

Eduardo: Because we have – is very sad to know that many researchers, especially from other countries, come to Ecuador – especially to the Amazon region – we don’t know what they are doing – what kind of research. There are many, many researchers that – they come here, they go to the communities, try to do a lot of – they have a lot of information and we don’t know. I think when I was in the U.S., I do a lot of research – thesis, dissertation, everything – is there. But we here, in Ecuador, we don’t know – we don’t know those researchers.

32 Eduardo asked me if I was offended before actually beginning his commentary on the role of researchers. I responded thinking he was referring to the entire interview, and something in my body language had prompted this question.
So we think that if we want to change our development, based in our reality in what we really want, we have to know what we have – for example, what kind of animal, what kind of vegetation – everything that we have. Because it’s good that the researchers from outside come here, but we must know what they are doing. Also, we worry about – there are many NGOs – for example, international corporations – they come here and they try to do a lot of proposals. But they have their own proposals with their own objectives. They are not based in Ecuadorian objectives.

The state's desire to control and facilitate all research and development projects by foreign researchers and organizations was disconcerting. While I hoped my research would be useful to those I interviewed in Ecuador, I certainly did not want my research agenda manipulated by the state. This interview speaks to the way in which institutional boundaries are blurred, as the everyday extends beyond the immediate space of the community, as I too, became subject to the state’s power. Indeed, I hoped my work might be most useful to indigenous communities, some of the most marginalized populations in Ecuador, and those the state actively sought to control through policy regulations, including CSR programs (Andolina et al. 2009). This interview points to the challenges that confront researchers when studying institutions (Mountz 2007, 2010). I was wary that my research objectives and aims would be interpreted by the state and corporation alike, and indeed bound up with these institutions' agendas. This concern was magnified when at times I felt I had more in 'common' with those I interviewed in government offices, because of our relative positions of privilege and access to education. I remained conflicted by these feelings and wanting to connect with community members in Pompeya, the everyday, material and social realities of conducting research in a place that was marked by years of outsider presence. These everyday realities were reworked through my own subjectivity and

33 At the end of my fieldwork period, I left a brief summary of my research with key participants in the community and in regional and national offices. I hope to publish parts of my dissertation in Spanish language journals to make my findings accessible to those living and working in Ecuador. Eventually, I plan to return to Pompeya to conduct follow up research in the community.
positioning in the space of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, which ultimately determined my access to interviewees. In the next section, I turn to ways in which my identity was rewritten through the material and geopolitical aspects of the everyday I encountered in Ecuador.

*Participant observation and power*

Ethnography is more than the conduct of interviews. It involves close observations of a group's daily activities. “Any group of persons...becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal once you get close to it...” (Goffman 1961: ix-x quoted in Herbert 2000: 551-2). I use the following anecdote from my fieldwork experiences to demonstrate the difficulties of ethnography, as the ethnographer “shuttles between insider and outsider roles” (Herbert 2000: 552). Herbert (2000) suggests that the ethnographer must have a sufficient amount of empathy to understand how the “social world...is made meaningful by its members” (p. 552). Indeed, this understanding is impossible if the researcher enters the field with rigid categories (Herbert 2000).

*Fieldnotes, April 22, 2009, Coca*

*This morning I learned that Don Ricardo died last night. I was really sad to hear that. I was upset because he had been such a great support. He had just written me an email, too. I didn’t write back because I thought I would see him first. He said he found a Kichwa grammar book for me and I could borrow a copy of the history of the community he’d written. I don’t know if there will be a service this weekend, but I hope there’s something. I don’t know what will become of all his books either. I hope there’s something I can do for his family or to help keep his work alive.*
I was surprised by the sadness I felt with Don Ricardo's unexpected passing. He had been a huge help in getting me access to former community presidents, and showing interest in my work. I was in Coca when I received word of Don Ricardo's death. I had started to feel a close connection with him, and he was one resident of Pompeya I felt understood my project goals and intentions. In many ways, my relationship with Don Ricardo suggested there might be a turning point for me in Pompeya - a way to become more engaged in the community. We had met on one of my first days in Pompeya. Don Ricardo had come to the community center looking for a computer, and hoped that he could use the one at FEPP's house. Don Ricardo was a prolific writer, and advocate for his community. Having heard so much about his writing, I decided to pay a visit to his house, about a kilometer outside the center of Pompeya. (His daughters were involved in the women's cooperative organized by FEPP, and through these connections I contacted Don Ricardo.)

Don Ricardo's house did not have access to electricity, and it also lacked the walls of some of the more 'modern' houses. I was surprised by the number of books Don Ricardo had; I rarely saw books in the other houses I visited in Pompeya. Don Ricardo had a long-standing connection with the Catholic Church, and benefited from schooling provided by the local mission. He and his wife made sure that their children all attended and graduated from high school. Only one daughter still needed to finish her last two years of school. His oldest son is an architect in Puyo. At the time of his passing, he was working on a history of the community of Pompeya, and took advantage of the computers in the distance learning high school provided by Repsol-YPF to begin to type up his documents. He had also recently completed an autobiography, which was eventually published posthumously by the Capuchine Mission's
publishing house, CICAME. We had made plans to do a language exchange. I would teach him some English, and in exchange he would teach me a little Kichwa. His sudden passing prevented those plans from occurring.

With a colleague at FEPP, I attended Don Ricardo's wake in Pompeya. We gathered at the house of his youngest daughter. The casket was placed under a covered porch area as members of the community sat and paid their respects. One community member was drunk, voicing his memories of Don Ricardo, and in some ways providing a bit of comic relief for a somber occasion. While I had been present in Pompeya for some months at that point, and was generally recognized by community members, I still felt out of place. I could not really shake the idea of my role as a researcher, observing, witnessing a community event, rather than paying my respects to the family. Was I just an outsider gawking at a 'cultural event'?

As I questioned my own role at the wake, I began to wonder if I was just like the community relations staff at Repsol-YPF – as community members often interpreted my role. Indeed, a community relations field officer hovered at the wake for Don Ricardo. He greeted Pompeyans by name, and was also on his cell phone, trying to facilitate the religious service for Don Ricardo. At this point, the service was an hour behind schedule and the Repsol-YPF officer was growing impatient. He wondered if anyone had a phone number for the mission. Because I had lived with the nuns, their number was programmed into my cell phone. I passed it over, and the corporate officer got in touch with the priest and nuns to start the service. This 'collusion' with the corporate officer seemed to confirm my role as an outsider, and observer, rather than a friend paying her respects. I stayed only a little while longer, as the service began in Kichwa.

Despite my overwhelmingly positive experience with Don Ricardo, I also heard stories about how he would easily lapse into machismo, especially criticizing the nuns as women. I taught more formal English classes at the local distance learning high school that was once under the mission's auspices. Now the school is funded solely by the state. These classes challenged my creativity and resourcefulness, as the students were painfully shy, and lacked self-confidence in the classroom.
The emotions I felt, prompted by participation in this service for Don Ricardo, forced me to rethink my role as a researcher conducting research within marginalized communities. As England (1994: 86) writes, there “needs to be recognition that the research relationship is inherently hierarchical…” Reflexivity, she argues, cannot do away with these power imbalances, but it can make us more aware, as researchers, of the risks of exploitative or asymmetrical relationships, and indeed the reverse power relations I acknowledged earlier. Thus, to approach research, then, does not mean abandoning the project altogether, but to acknowledge the partiality of the researcher's perspective. As D. Smith (1987) acknowledges, the researcher herself interacts with the subjects she wishes to study, and forms part of the relationships she wishes to understand. As my work at the local level continued to be challenged by logistical difficulties, I remained conflicted by my stated research aims, addressing and undoing power relations that subjected indigenous populations to corporate control, and my own access to Pompeya. These difficulties emerged in a practical way in March 2009, when the nuns asked me to leave their house.

Fieldnotes: March 17

*The nuns kicked me out yesterday, saying they didn’t have space for me anymore. I think, though, it's not me specifically they're annoyed at, but just internal issues amongst themselves, and orders from the Vicariato in Coca. I'm just one person they can get rid of, which might make their lives a little easier. However, the bad news is, they don't want me to come back again in the future. They said they never expected I would spend the whole year there, which I don't think is true. I'm hoping they might relent, but I think I need to find other options. I asked around in the community if anyone knew of a place to stay, and there is one house where people have rented*
rooms, but it's under construction. I could possibly live with a family, but most families are so big, it could be hard to have an extra person living there. I also am not entirely sure I'm ready for that kind of living. I'm feeling really tired of moving every couple weeks or so. Also living in the community means my stomach will probably be really unhappy most of the time. Every time I drink chicha it's never pleasant, and I really don't want to drink more beer.

Despite pursuing options to live with families, I had exhausted all my possibilities for places to stay. In fact, I did go back to Pompeya once more after leaving the nuns, and stayed in a rented room without a lock on the door. I immediately got sick with a stomach illness, and felt extremely unsafe. I left Pompeya after four days. While the comfort of the nuns’ house made it possible for me to keep working and hope any illness passed quickly, living in one room, unable to get up and work, was utterly depressing. During this brief stay in Pompeya, I also explored the possibility of living in a research station in Limoncocha. I initially thought this could be a real possibility, allowing me to live with other researchers in a seemingly secure location. However, on a visit to the station to explore this option, I was subjected to physical harassment from local government employees, leaving me shaken and scared. Indeed, as Mountz (2007) notes, it is easier for me to write about these experiences without mentioning the emotional challenges they presented. As my research moved forward, the more I dreaded spending time in Pompeya.

After these experiences in Pompeya, through conversations with committee members and friends, I began to outline another plan for my work. I started trying to pursue other CSR relationships in Quito and in Puyo in the southern Amazon region. Repsol-YPF gives money to indigenous organizations, and one of these is located in Puyo. While I continued to pursue these new directions, I remained increasingly uncertain of their relationship to my overall research
goals. Not wishing to abandon my research in Pompeya, I set up a more limited schedule for my work in the community. Ultimately, I was able to work out an arrangement with the nuns and vicariato in Coca. We established a more formal plan for my time at their house, reduced to one week of every month, and I paid the nuns a set amount for each day I stayed with them.

Fieldnotes July 25, 2009

I finally arrived in Pompeya. I’m tired of that bus ride, although the trip is tons quicker now [because the state paved the road] from Sacha to Pompeya. I ended up spending the afternoon with the Hermana (Hna.) Paula and it also started to rain hard. A tree had fallen on the electric line so the [state] company came out and shut off the electricity. We were without power and still are. The worst will be if we run out of water. [The nuns use an electric pump to get water from a well that collects rainwater to a tank on the roof. The tanks feeds the kitchen and bathrooms.] Their generator is not working either. I think the Hna. Paula is just lonely – no one else is here.

After breakfast yesterday I finally went to cross to the other side. I definitely took my time and it was also raining. I crossed in a Petroamazonas boat because I missed the earlier Repsol boats. There was going to be a wedding that afternoon. The novio’s family had all arrived from another community. I took my cell phone to charge, but it turns out the whole side of Pompeya hadn’t had electricity for 15 days or so. The municipio had been there, but hadn’t fixed it. Those with generators used them. The whole wedding was with a generator.

Electricity only arrived at the nuns about half way through my field research period, and was provided by the state at about the same time they started paving the road to the community. Prior to that period, the nuns used a generator in the evening.

Near the end of my fieldwork period, the company had turned over electricity provision to the local municipal government, in an attempt to reduce indigenous dependence on its operations.
Conclusions

Borrowing this sentence from Mountz (2007: 47), she writes: “Some readers might think this chapter is only about me, not [CSR programs]. But I would disagree.” I explore my own relationship to CSR programs, and the challenges of studying CSR discourse and practice in order to recount the various twists and turns of CSR programs and the micro-geographies of institutional networks that emerge in various localities in Ecuador. I also became entangled in corporate social responsibility and the various networks and daily practices that this methodology uncovered. My analysis of CSR programs is contrasted with the taken for granted, dominant frameworks of CSR produced by the corporation itself, and often reflected in popular literature. In other words, CSR programs produce a particular framework through which resources continue to be extracted, and my ethnographic analysis focuses not only on those agents engaged in resisting extraction, but also the various partnerships and processes that allow certain populations to become subject to that power. Thus it is necessary to acknowledge the ways in which both observer and observed interact and produce CSR as a set of dynamic and contextual performances. CSR programs are as much an “idea” as they are “material realities” and CSR emerges from those ideas that are performed in one particular moment, in certain places and contexts. Institutions, then, as this chapter illuminates are inherently contradictory, and ethnography can draw attention to the performance of human nature. My project attempts to “name” and “interpret” the power of institutions and the people within them, understanding that narratives about CSR are often far removed from the realities of its daily practices (Mountz 2007: 48). Again, returning to my conversation with Rodrigo and Samuel in the Coca airport, CSR is much more than a discourse as made evident by corporate presence at community funerals, providing transportation, and until recently electricity, for example.
While my research in Pompeya was shorter than planned, in the end I felt like I was beginning to exhaust possibilities there. I had additional research contacts in Pompeya, but my work was not advancing any more quickly with more time spent there. I worked with one more research assistant (the first having abandoned me because he lost interest), and eventually became close to a second family in Pompeya, who also helped me logistically with interviews, and took me to community events (see Chapter 3). Moreover, I was beginning to drag my feet once I arrived in Pompeya (see also Mountz 2007, 2010). I would leave the nuns’ house later and later in the day to catch a boat across the river. I had interviewed all the former community presidents, and without a daily plan, given the difficulty communicating and relative unreliability in trying to plan ahead, it was hard to say how each day would unfold.

In many ways, the process through which my relationship ultimately unfolded with the nuns and the mission allowed me to expand my research project. It forced me to look elsewhere for CSR relationships, including pushing harder for interviews in government offices in Quito, such as the Ministry of Non-renewable Resources and the Ministry of Environment. I also began to seek out other non-profits engaged with Repsol’s foundation, and continued my work in Puyo to try and relate CSR to collective action and an indigenous movement. I spent more time in Coca, conducting semi-structured interviews with actors more closely tied to a movement opposing corporate influence, as well as regional government representatives. While I wasn’t always sure which direction these new contacts would take, I slowly began to accept that the daily unknown was part of my research. Through conversations over email, and visits from committee members, I realized that an institutional ethnography could still be a very crucial part of my work. I was connecting seemingly unrelated actors and their stories to understand the daily practices of CSR and the social relationships that sustained it not only discursively, but enabled
its material, cultural and political impacts to emerge. My analysis points to the importance of institutional ethnography that moves beyond the margins and boundaries of the institution itself, and uncovers the daily practices of CSR programs, or the social relationships that facilitate resource extraction and distribution (cf. Mountz 2007, 2010). Following Nagar (2002: 183), given the way my research unfolded, I could instead ask, “What kinds of struggles did my analysis make possible [for residents in Pompeya]?” Thus, my identity was grounded in a “deeper political reflexivity” that forced me to rethink my theoretical commitments and frameworks, and the language I used in writing up my research experiences (Nagar 2002: 183).

I continued to work in Pompeya, but realized it would not be the sole focus of my research. Indeed, my experiences in Pompeya and observation of company projects and programs confirmed that the gap between discourse and practice within CSR programs exposes their crucial flaws, and the myriad opportunities and challenges in confronting corporate operations. While dominant discourses of CSR programs define them as a series of development projects, my analysis suggests CSR programs are part of a much larger complex of oil governance in the Ecuador, relying on particular social, cultural, and political relationships that facilitate access to and control over resources, exacerbating social and environmental injustices in indigenous communities. I explore these histories of the Ecuadorian Amazon region in the next section, and the political ambivalence that marks indigenous subjects, that can both sustain and challenge CSR programs.
Chapter 3

Indigenous Subjectivity and the Space of Pompeya

Introduction

When I arrived in Pompeya in November 2008, it seemed like an easy task to locate the different CSR projects in the community and residents' active engagement with them. Instead, I was confronted with an empty community, houses locked during the day, and no signs of anyone. Where was the lively, bustling community corporate brochures had advertised? Unsure of how to proceed, I wandered back to the guardhouse and entrance to Block 16.

The guardhouse is a covered structure with room for vehicles to unload and a couple of offices where staff monitor events in the area. I walked upstairs to an office room, knocked and went in. The room was frigid. Air conditioning was blasting, and in contrast to the heat and humidity outside I shivered. I looked around the room at the men, as all eyes were trained on me. Roberto, a community relations staff-person in charge of implementing and maintaining CSR projects, had worked in the field for several years. He took me downstairs to another air-conditioned office. After he quizzed me about how I arrived in the community and who gave me permission to be there, I began to ask my own questions. Roberto quickly interrupted and suggested we head into Pompeya where he could show me Repsol-YPF's various projects, the ones I could not find on my own. We climbed into the pickup truck to travel the 100 yards I had just walked, back to the community. Our first stop was the sewing facility where Roberto introduced me to a woman from Quito in charge of organizing women from Pompeya into this sewing program. The machines were in an unused communal building, one of several in Pompeya, all part of earlier iterations of CSR. Yet, the fabric was housed in a locked, newly
constructed building on the edge of the community center. On this day, no one was working. Our second stop was at the agricultural high school in Pompeya. There I was shown a series of chicken coops behind the classrooms. This project was designed with funds from the Fundación Repsol, a non-profit foundation affiliated with the company. The Fundación is tasked with projects that should have a wider, longer-term influence, and involves communities outside Repsol-YPF’s oil block. This project's goal encourages students to raise the chickens and sell them in the weekly market in Pompeya. Again, a paid non-indigenous staff-person showed me the project. There were no students in sight. It seemed that despite corporate discourse to the contrary, CSR projects were not necessarily designed with indigenous participation in mind. These were top-down projects that required outsider presence in the community to cajole indigenous people into participating. Rather than producing a bustling, vibrant community, CSR projects in Pompeya had the opposite effect. The more time I spent in Pompeya, I understood that these seemingly apathetic responses to corporate operations actually involved more complex interactions between indigenous populations, the state and corporate discourses and practices. This chapter highlights the way in which power flows through CSR programs leading to particular indigenous subjectivities that contribute to the facilitation of resource extraction (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Foucault 1991; Moore 2005).

Literature in environmental governance and development draws on long-standing interests in political ecology about subaltern resistance and mobilization, and the way indigenous peoples have claimed access to territory and land rights (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Himley 2008; Watts and Peet 2004). In particular as an environmental justice concern, mobilization can call attention to the uneven spatial distribution of environmental costs and benefits (Perreault

38 Most buildings in Pompeya are kept locked to prevent petty theft.
2006). Yet, the uncertainty and ambivalence in the space of Pompeya highlights a lack of collective action, therefore, it is also important to consider how CSR and governance processes may actually codify inequalities, explored through ethnographies of CSR (Himley 2008). Indeed, drawing on critical anthropologies and geographies of development, I contribute to discussions of indigenous political subjectivities within the space of the northern Ecuadorian Amazon region.

By grounding studies of governmentality in particular places and within certain struggles it becomes possible to view subject formation and the territories upon which these formations emerge. Subjects' conduct can both sustain and challenge forms of rule (Agrawal 2005; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Li 2007; Moore 2005, 2000, 1998). Indeed, in Ecuador the strategic presences of the state in the northern Amazon region allowed for additional corporate presence, and CSR programs were mandated by the state to facilitate oil extraction. Thus, my focus, while concerned with indigenous populations' participation in governance strategies, also examines the way in which corporations challenge state sovereignty. Indigenous populations become targets in development schemes operated through CSR programs. These programs are designed as a means to improve indigenous populations' own welfare, but also to ensure a corporation's continued production of wealth. In turn, arrangements of state, capital and indigenous populations resulted in challenges to the state's sovereignty in oil governance. The particular governing technologies of CSR programs can produce power relations that lead to indigenous “subjection to government,” but also “subjects of action” (Moore 2005: 6). I explore possibilities for action at the local level by examining the corporation's failure to fully incorporate indigenous populations into resource governance decisions, and thus the space to challenge corporate operations. Indeed, this failure highlights the corporation's pursuit of its own satisfaction, rather than others'.
If CSR programs are understood as sites of struggle or entanglement, with differential impacts on different groups of people, institutional approaches that investigate conflict often assign individuals and groups an identity prior to their entry into social relations (see Peet and Watts 1996; Agrawal 2005). Sundberg (2004: 46) argues that this process precludes the way in which social identities are also at stake within “daily discourses, practices and performances” of management of natural resources, struggles of access and control, and considerations of whose environmental knowledge counts. Thus, following Sundberg (2004: 46), I explore how certain identities and positionings are produced through the practices, discourses and performances of social institutions. In turn, this conceptualization can confront the notion of identity as something homogenous and fixed, and instead begins to understand it in its relational sense, or articulated with other identities (Sundberg 2004; Nelson, D. 1999; Gibson-Graham 1996). The subject is produced through the disciplining practices of the institution, which constantly shift and change, but remains located in a particular time and place. Thus, repetition of particular performances leads to the normative practices and discourses through which gendered and racialized bodies are produced (Sundberg 2004). Identity becomes an “iterative process...produced through a recursive relationship between power/discourse and critically reflexive, geographically embedded subjects” (Nelson, L. 1999: 384). The “identities-in-the-making approach” can highlight the way disciplining discourses and practices are invoked, reconstituted, enacted and subverted (Sundberg 2004: 46). Thus, the challenge becomes one of how to locate identities in a particular time and place. Ethnography can be one method to begin to highlight “multi-dimensional identities,” and the way they are “produced, enacted and transformed...in articulation with others” (Sundberg 2004: 47; Moore 1998).
Indeed, by focusing on the “mundane” aspects of everyday life in Pompeya, my goal is to link processes of political identity formation to state and corporate power to understand the politics of resistance in the space of an indigenous community (Nelson 2006: 369; Wolford 2010). I examine layers and histories of domination and resistance in Pompeya, arguing that resistance becomes more complex if we highlight its more everyday processes (see Agrawal 2005; Muratorio 1991; Ortner 1995; Scott 1985; Wolford 2010). In particular, the ambiguity of resistance (Ortner 1995) demonstrates not only processes of domination, and the importance of maintaining that power, but also subordinates' ambivalence as a form of resistance (cf. Muratorio 1991; Wolford 2010). Furthermore, there is never one singular or unitary subordinate, but instead subordinates are divided along class lines, gender, age, and other forms of difference. Failure to highlight these so-called internal divisions leads to a romantic portrayal of resistance (Agrawal 2005; Hale 2006, 2011). Thus, it is important to have a full picture of the politics of resistance, including historical analysis (Ortner 1995) as well as a spatial analysis (Moore 1998). As Moore (1998: 349) argues, in order to maintain the complexity of sites of struggle, we must ensure our scholarship does not reproduce separate sites for power and resistance. Instead, by focusing on the politics of place we can locate social actors in “multiple and shifting fields of power.”

My ethnographic research aims to make complex indigenous subjectivity in the space of Pompeya. Indigenous peoples contended with the presence of outsiders in the region long before the oil companies arrived. Here we can point to the rubber industry, lowland hacienda systems of production, patron-client relationships and missionaries that essentially removed indigenous access and rights to resources (Muratorio 1991; Whitten 1976). Indeed, oil companies are just the latest in a long line of outside actors that sought to claim access to resources in the region, challenging indigenous territorial sovereignty. Following this introduction, I examine the politics
of indigenous organizing in Ecuador, to explore the way in which indigenous identity was
politicized through the 1990s responding to the roll-back of state regulation, and roll-out of
neoliberal policies. This context serves as an important backdrop for comparing and contrasting
politicization of indigenous identities in the everyday space of a Pompeya. Next, I explore a
particular history of Pompeya, one marked by the presence of outsiders, including Protestant and
Catholic missionaries, who pushed for the establishment of a community based on indigenous
rights to territory established by state law. However, the constant presence of outsiders is
reflected through indigenous customs and practices that revolve around gift giving, and the way
in which the company emerges as a powerful actor that is expected to contribute a constant flow
of material goods. To that end, in the third section of the chapter, I include a series of
observations within a women's micro-credit organization that operates with funds from the
Fundación Repsol. Within this group, I note the gendered outcomes of CSR programs in
Pompeya that influence identity production and relationships with the company. The final
section of the chapter focuses on an interview I conducted with the former president of the local
parish government that encompasses Pompeya. While not Kichwa, Doña Barbara, a resident of
Pompeya, elaborated on the challenges and opportunities within the community, the influence of
oil and her own desires to motivate the community to demand more from both the corporation
and the state. Doña Barbara's participation in local government and corporate negotiations
allowed her to develop a perspective and particular skills to challenge dominant discourse and
practices, and position herself within these programs to improve and promote local level control
over territory and production processes, reestablishing an indigenous identity rooted in
communities. Following Li (2007), Doña Barbara reflects a discourse of entitlement and political
activism that emerges through participation in corporate and government arenas. While not
necessarily opposed to the language of improvement, Doña Barbara is embodying a form of political consciousness that calls on (re)claiming indigenous rights and access to resources through collective indigenous agency that might challenge corporate and state projects. At the same time, though, Doña Barbara criticizes indigenous forms of community organization and subsistence farming as a 'waste of time', embodying the racial tensions that still underlie attempts to organize and control indigenous populations. This sort of ambiguity in resistance processes lends crucial insights into understanding operations of power that often confronts subordinate populations. In the next section I turn to histories of indigenous organizing in Ecuador, and relationships between indigenous identity and the nation-state.

*Indigenous movement organization in Ecuador*

Debates about *plurinacionalidad*, promoted by *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*[^39] (CONAIE), the national indigenous federation and other indigenous organizations in Ecuador through the 1990s argued that Ecuador is made up of distinct nationalities and peoples. In particular, conversations focused on indigenous territories, citizenship, and political autonomy (Lucero 2003; Perreault 2001; Selverston-Scher 2001). The indigenous movement in Ecuador through the 1990s reflected these concerns, and local indigenous organizations engaged in constructing political identities within the nation, challenging dominant views of political inclusion (Andolina 2003). In turn, in the late 1990s, local organizations were imbricated with these discourses, linking the discursive and material aspects of indigenous lives including territory, citizenship and nationality to other aspects of Kichwa lives (Perreault 2001).

[^39]: Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
Despite constitutional reforms in the late 1990s, these did little to address power inequalities between Ecuador's ruling elites and the masses. Elite discourse and practice were predicated on Western models of development rooted in capitalism that ensured prosperity through hard work and discipline (Andolina 2003). Additional protests against austerity measures paralyzed the country in the early 2000s, challenging Ecuadorian democracy and the role of the state in protecting its own peoples. Thus, for Perreault (2003b) the protests through the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated the structural inequalities that exist in Ecuador and how different populations engage with and challenge these existing structures. In turn, analysis of particular institutions can be important sites of negotiation and struggle, as indigenous populations construct a sense of regional identity, rooted in territory. Yet, indigenous actors must also operate from a “fully modern subject position,” interacting with state agencies, national and international NGOs and other transnational networks (Perreault 2003b: 602). Furthermore, indigenous institutions' engagement with the nation-state is not one of solely resistance. Sometimes it has been oppositional, and at other times more accepting of the nationalist project (Perreault 2003b; Radcliffe 1996).

Scholars have emphasized the way in which contemporary cultural and political indigenous organizations have their roots in corporatist regimes that emerged in Ecuador in the mid-twentieth century until the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s (Yashar 1998, 2005, 2007; Lucero 2003, 2008; Perreault 2001). The corporatist regimes are most notable for their social benefits to citizens, including food and energy subsidies, as well as access to education, welfare, and healthcare, in exchange for state approved modes of political organization and participation. In turn, citizenship was characterized by a notion of 'homogenous' mestizo identity, and indigenous peoples were expected to adapt to this model (Radcliffe 1996;
Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). Indigenous identities were perceived as hindering development processes, and in turn would prevent the formation of a “homogenous nation” (Perreault 2003b: 67). This discourse was informed by “liberal yet Orientalist ideas” about backwardness linked to notions of indigenous culture and ongoing Spanish legacies of colonization (Andolina 2003: 732; Yashar 2005). Access to state benefits were predicated on state-sanctioned, class-based peasant or labor organizations. This process of organizing was promoted through the state's agrarian reforms in 1964 and 1973, through which land and agricultural credit was distributed to those members of peasant organizations (Perreault 2003b; Selverston-Scher 2001; Yashar 2005).

The institutions that emerged to facilitate this process of organizing included state-based organizations, such as the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian and Colonization Reform (IERAC) and non-state organizations, labor unions and the Protestant and Catholic churches and their affiliated organizations. Moreover, various indigenous and campesino organizations, including the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI), the National Federation of Campesino Organizations (FENOC) and the Ecuadorian Center for Class-based Organizations (CEDOC) helped to establish indigenous communities. During this period, indigenous organizations were established along class-based lines. The first indigenous organization to emerge in the Ecuadorian Amazon was the Federation of Shuar Centers in 1964 (see Chapter 5). This was followed by a provincial peasant organization Provincial Federation of Peasant Organizations of Napo (FEPOCAN), which changed its name to Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo (FOIN)\(^{40}\), based in Tena (Brysk 2000; Perreault 2001, 2003a,b; Sawyer 2004; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 1998, 2005, 2007). As Perreault (2001) has noted, the change in the organization's name explicitly notes the movement toward an indigenous identity, rather than campesino, and a movement away from

\(^{40}\)Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo
corporatist ideals. In 1976, the eastern most communities affiliated with FOIN formed their own organization *Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana*\(^\text{41}\) (FCUNAE), based in Coca. Soon thereafter, in 1979, the *Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza* (OPIP)\(^\text{42}\) emerged, founded in Puyo. Each organization, writes Perreault (2003a) was engaged in organizing community organizations and legalizing communal land claims for affiliated communities. In turn, in 1980, *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana* (CONFENAIE) emerged at the regional level, and in 1986 CONAIE was established (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of these organizations).

By the 1980s, Ecuador's corporatist model was declining due to debt crises, and the rise of neoliberalism, as was the case in much of Latin America. A civilian government returned in Ecuador in 1979, but its growth was slow and uneven, with resistance from labor, opposition parties and the growing indigenous movement (Carriére 2001). Thus, as outlined in Chapter 4, social programs were dismantled under World Bank and International Monetary Fund policy, leading to political and social conflict. In turn, the class-based organizations of previous decades were terminated, and could no longer support indigenous organizations. This meant that indigenous organizations were no longer assured of accessing and influencing the state (Yashar 1998; 2005). However, increased presence of transnational NGOs and aid agencies suggested that there were new means for advocacy networks and support for indigenous organizations to emerge (Brysk 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, new forms of indigenous organizing were popularized that focused on ethnic identity and the 'glocalization' of identity politics (Swyngedouw 1997). Drawing on conversations in geography that suggested that spatial-scale emerged out of social relationships, and in turn these relationships could organize spatial

---

\(^\text{41}\) In English, this organization is the Federation of United Native Communities of the Ecuadorian Amazon.

\(^\text{42}\) Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza
processes, Perreault (2003b) argues that identities are (re)constructed as rooted in local places, such as communities and territories, and also globally linked by national and transnational networks (cf. Brysk 2000; Escobar 1995; Valdivia 2005). In turn, these processes have opened new spaces for indigenous political mobilization, and additional “cultural revalorization” (Perreault 2003b: 100). Thus, scalar distinctions between local, regional, national, and global are the result of interactions between social actors and structural forces. Furthermore, these scales of analysis are produced through relationships of power, and involve struggle, compromise, and negotiation (Perreault 2003b; Swyngedouw 1997). Empowerment, then, results from the articulation of political mobilization tied to indigenous identity at a variety of scales. In turn, the concept of “jumping scales” is increasingly important for indigenous organizations as they work through particular networks (Perreault 2003b; Smith 1996).

Decentralization through neoliberal policies meant that indigenous populations had more direct contact with local government organizations, changing the terms of citizenship for indigenous peoples. Citizenship was connected to certain state agencies like the National Directorate for Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB), and the Council for the Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE) (see Perreault 2003a). Furthermore, World Bank funded projects like PRODEPINE (Project for the Development of Indigenous and Black Peoples of Ecuador) funds ethno-development projects in the country (Andolina et al. 2009). By the mid-1990s, concerns within CONAIE about representation in Ecuador prompted the emergence of the indigenous political party Pachakutik (Andolina 2003). Constitutional reforms in 1997-1998 expanded indigenous political rights. Furthermore, in other Andean countries similar processes were occurring (Brysk 2000; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 1998, 2005). Thus, as scholars (see, for example, Sawyer 2004; Yashar 1998, 2005) have noted, while
neoliberal reforms reduced social rights, they also extended political and civil rights for indigenous populations, allowing indigenous organizations to reassert their ethnic identities in new ways. Indeed, the space of indigenous communities has led to “semi-autonomous spaces of political organizing, and cultural and social reproduction” (Perreault 2003b: 71).

Yet, my research comes at a period of over a decade after the well-organized movement emerged in the 1990s in Ecuador. Indeed, the indigenous movement in Ecuador successfully earned indigenous populations rights to territory and political rights in the state. However, in communities like Pompeya, the presence of oil companies and CSR programs have produced different outcomes. In particular, the roll-out of CSR programs in the 1990s emphasized the ability of CSR to disrupt mobilization, through legally binding contracts, direct contributions to indigenous organizations that influenced indigenous leadership, or projects and programs at the local level that led to ambivalence and uncertainty about corporate presence within local communities.

Contrary to literature that focuses on the organized indigenous mobilization and institutions in Ecuador, my dissertation highlights the everyday production of uncertainty in community spaces like Pompeya. In particular, this uncertainty emphasizes the state's presences in the region and long histories of outsiders, including the more recent increased presence of corporations and their material projects and programs, raising important questions about indigenous rights and access to resources within Ecuador, and representation as indigenous subjects. Thus, while drawing attention to both material and symbolic production of indigenous identity, I emphasize challenges to indigenous territorial sovereignty and political agency through ongoing CSR programs and corporate presence at the local level, explored as a set of
daily practices rooted in the everyday spaces of the local community. I explore these histories in the next section.

Lowland Kichwa livelihood practices

Prior to the 1940s, the Upper Napo Kichwa or Runa lived primarily in the region to the north of the Napo River up to the border with Colombia. There were three Kichwa populations in the region, and different groups were clustered by language dialect (Macdonald 1999; Whitten 1976).\(^4\) Since the 1960s, economic opportunities, land scarcity and other infrastructural development have allowed the Kichwa to relocate to other parts of the Amazon. Much of this land prior to the 1960s was a sort of patchwork of Indian territories. Kinship and land use practices, as well as spiritual forces marked communities and their territories. There was always movement amongst these settlements, as the Kichwa sought out new land for garden plots, hunting and fishing (Macdonald 1999).

Prior to the late 19\(^{th}\) Century, there was little access and encroachment on Amazonian indigenous territories (Macdonald 1999), but just before the turn of the 20\(^{th}\) Century this shifted, and altered relationships between Napo-Runa and non-Indian populations. Employed by patrones, or the ‘rubber bosses’ within the rubber industry, indigenous populations essentially worked in conditions of slavery. In turn, this led to a long history of patron-client relationships in the region. Furthermore, argues Macdonald (1999) the Napo-Runa were slowly incorporated into market based economic structures, impacting the socio-economic patterns outlined above. During the last years of the 19\(^{th}\) Century and first decade of the 20\(^{th}\) Century, the rubber industry

\(^4\) Indeed, the Kichwa language is related to a larger language group called Quechua, which emerged from a group in southern Peru, near Cusco. Incan expansion extended this language further south into Bolivia and north into Ecuador. Kichwa is widely spoken in the highlands in Ecuador, and extends into the lowlands of the Oriente, although the Kichwa in the lowlands is quite different from that which is spoken in the Sierra (Whitten 1976).
dominated the Amazon rainforest, and Indians were the key workers exploited in this process. By 1912, though, the rubber industry was no longer able to compete with a Malaysian rubber boom, and production in the Amazon dropped off considerably (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991).

Patron-client ties served to dominate the region in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, and local populations often accepted these relationships because the *patrón* provided material goods. A similar process was occurring in the Ecuadorian highlands. In the highlands, indigenous peasants were bound to a system of *huasipungo*, where indigenous peoples worked for a landlord in exchange for land use, wages, animals, and rights to water and food. Often indigenous populations entered into a lifetime of indebtedness. This system, however, was abolished with the passage of the land reform laws in 1964 and 1973, due to the hacienda's ineffectiveness in production practices, and the inequitable distribution of wealth (Macdonald 1999; Yashar 2005). Yet, in contrast to the highlands, Amazonian populations were more difficult to control because of the region's inaccessibility, and indigenous populations' hostility toward outsiders, including missionaries. In turn, these geographical and cultural differences are reflected in forms of resistance in the two regions (Muratorio 1991). Often Amazonian indigenous populations would refuse to pay debt payments to *patrones*. In this period, *patrones* were typically government officials (who had expelled Catholic missionaries in 1905) or other non-Indian populations. Things like shotguns and ammunition, as well as salt and cloth were all acquired from *patrones*, who could also serve as intermediaries between Indians and outside institutions, and help solve disputes. In turn, while *patrones* were permanent residents in the region, and Indian populations were structured into haciendas, indigenous peoples could still practice their subsistence production processes. *Patrones* only controlled workers, and not the
exploitation of land (MacDonald 1999). Once the rubber boom was over, though, traders and
*patrones* returned to the major outposts, which included the Tena-Archidona area. Following this
retreat, new hacienda settlements began to crop up in the Amazon region (Muratorio 1991).

These new haciendas took over indigenous lands, and expanded. This process only
intensified, and sometimes included cattle raising (see Perreault 2003 a,b). White *patrones* and
other settlers continued to use racist language that accused indigenous populations of 'savagery'
and this justified their land occupations. In turn, the haciendas developed their own production of
manioc and plantains for subsistence, as well as cash crops that included cotton, coffee and rice,
reflected in interviews I had with residents in Pompeya, discussed later in the chapter. Sugar
cane was also an important cash crop. In the Amazon region, the debt-peonage relationships
were focused mostly on trading and extractive industries, and not agriculture, as in the Sierra. In
turn, these production processes were reflected in work contracts. Extractive economies allowed
indigenous peoples to sign short-term contracts with the *patrón*. The haciendas in the Amazon
region were also smaller than those found in the Sierra, and *patrones* were never able to fully
remove indigenous populations from their land, or control their exploitation. The Napo Runa
never became permanent laborers in haciendas (Muratorio 1991; Yashar 2005).

During this period of the early to mid-20th century, there was not yet a problem of land
scarcity, and indebtedness among indigenous populations in the Amazon region is often
discussed as a coercive mechanism (cf. Macdonald 1999). Amazonian indigenous peoples were
often forced into indebtedness after being plied with alcohol by *patrones*, failing to notice the
price of the goods. Furthermore, many of the goods provided by *patrones*, such as salt, cotton
cloth, knives and axes had become essential tools in subsistence practices. Consequently, there
were both market based and cultural influences that produced these relationships with *patrones*,
which continue to be reflected in relationships with oil companies today (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991).

Missionaries also dominated the region during this period, although to different levels of success. In the 1860s, Ecuador's president, García Moreno, had signed a pact with the Catholic Church, whereby the church set out to 'moralize' the country. Moreno assigned the Jesuits the Amazon region. Initially, though, Jesuit missionaries were never able to dominate the region (and were forced out in 1905). Indigenous communities were not firmly established to allow for sufficient control and provide a disciplined labor force. Furthermore, epidemics of smallpox broke out that prevented success of the missionaries. It was only later, by the 1920s, with early oil explorations in the Oriente, that the missionaries became a larger presence (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991).

In the central Amazon region the Josephine mission was dominant. Its goal was to integrate Indians into economic development through labor. The mission also pointed out the region's vast natural resources to the state. It built schools and churches, not just in major towns, but also in small indigenous villages. In the late 1920s, evangelical missionaries entered the region, also emphasizing education. The Protestant mission's economic support came from donors in the United States, and while the Josephines maintained control of their schools, the Protestant missions turned over their schools to the state, and churches to indigenous pastors. Yet, there was still much cooperation between Catholic and Protestant missions in transportation, as well as economic and evangelization strategies (Muratorio 1991). At the same time, the 1920s was a period of initial oil exploration, and through the 1930s and 1940s missionaries and oil companies shared information on access to the region; oil companies followed missionary constructed trails and maps (Kimmerling 1996; Sawyer 2004). Muratorio (1991) writes that both
Catholic and Protestant missions considered this collaboration an important part of the country's modernization, as well as modernizing indigenous populations. Indeed, oil companies offered much better conditions in their camps, when compared to *patrones*. Wages were also paid directly to each worker. In the next section, I explore these histories through the space of Pompeya.

*The space of Pompeya*

Kichwas in the north central part of Ecuador's *Oriente* migrated from Tena in the central Amazon region. Don Pascual, a former community president in Pompeya, and his family came from the area near Misahauillí. His family was drawn by the promise of access to land. Muratorio writes that the 1970s was a time of mass colonization in the Amazon region due to oil development in the northern Amazon region, and many *Napo Runa* settled further east along the Napo River. In 1980, colonization occurred between Coca and Rocafuerte, the latter lies along the border with Peru, in part to respond to the government's policy of “live frontiers” following a 1981 border skirmish with Peru (Muratorio 1991: 179; Yashar 2005).

The land that was promised to the Kichwas was actually inhabited by the Waorani, and Kichwa populations encroached onto Waorani land. The Catholic mission was primarily interested in the Waorani, ostensibly to release them from slavery, but Kichwas followed behind the mission. The relationships between missionaries, oil companies and indigenous peoples are complex. Muratorio (1991) suggests that the mission used Kichwa populations as “penetration agents” to help integrate the Waorani into market economies and “white civilization.” While there has been some inter-marriage between the Kichwa and Waorani, this was often considered a form of reciprocity for additional access to land, and produced tensions (Muratorio 1991: 212).
In Pompeya, the Catholic mission constructed a school, and many older residents of Pompeya, including Don Sandro, a former community president, attended. Many residents of Pompeya learned Spanish at this school. Don Pedro continued his schooling to become a catequist. Much of the mission's presence was on the northern side of the river, where the mission's houses and school still exist today. As Don Sandro says, “It was the church who warned us of the pressure of the colonists (mestizos from the Sierra). And so, we started to work with the church to organize ourselves.”

With the erosion of the corporatist citizenship regime at the end of the 1970s, and implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, the state began to encourage colonization of the Amazon region to relieve land pressures in the highlands. This internal colonization was reflected in Ecuador's early land reform laws, La Ley de Tierras Baldías y Colonización passed in 1936. This was the initial state solution to the highland hacienda system, and designed to promote flows of landless, “unproductive workers” onto land considered unoccupied (Macdonald 1999: 66). Later, the 1964 and 1973 land and agrarian reform laws oversaw this migration, or internal colonization. Indigenous populations did not hold title to their lands in this period, and there was little they could do to stop this encroachment. Often cattle grazing was used to clear land, in addition to farming. The indigenous organizations that emerged in the 1960s, including among the Shuar and Kichwa in the mid- to late-1960s were examples of reactions to this colonization process. State presence following the discovery and extraction of oil in 1967 and 1972, respectively, included the military government's appointment of political officers, such as the teniente político (tasked with adjudicating conflicts in communities, while serving the interest of the national state), police, military and judges. These state appointments

\[\text{44} \text{ Fue la Iglesia quien nos advirtió de la presión de los colonos. Y así, empezamos a trabajar con la iglesia a organizarnos.}\]
were designed to provide security in the region, but did not mean greater democratization. They often discriminated against indigenous populations (Little 1992; Yashar 2005).

Between 1970 and 1975, Pompeya, which at this time only included 53 people, began a process of claiming rights to territory, with support of the church. Many of the original founders are still living in the community today. Following the suggestion of the Catholic priests, the Kichwas used the acronym UNAE, which in Spanish means: *Union Nativo Ecuatorianos*. Today the Kichwa organization in the region uses FCUNAE (*Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana*) as its acronym. Indeed, one of the key actors in the organizing of the community and FCUNAE was a Kichwa priest, Umberto Andi de Águilar.

Despite ongoing pressure from the *patrones*, who accused indigenous people of being communists, says Don Sandro, the Kichwa continued their push for independence. During this period, several Kichwa communities were established along the banks of the river, including Sani Isla, San Carlos, San Jose, and Santa Teresa. Local leaders went to the Ministry of Agriculture and Farming to gain legal rights to their territory (see also Muratorio 1991). As Don Sandro related, “The goal was to preserve land and territory for our children, to tie them to the area, and to prevent colonists from entering.”

The name Pompeya actually came from Argentine priests who happened to be missionaries during that period. The mission was known as the Mission Pompeya, and was extended to include the entire community.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was also oil company presence by Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE, the state company), Shell and Texaco. All the access to the region was by helicopter in this early period, leaving little trace of company presence, and the companies would provide work for community members. Don Sandro worked as a guide for the

---

45 El objetivo era preservar la tierra y el territorio para nuestros hijos, para atarlos a la zona, y para evitar la entrada de colonos.
companies. By the early 1990s, with the arrival of US companies Conoco and Maxus, there was more pressure to open the region to drilling. Pompeya fought the companies' entrance, but under pressure from the state, and unable to resist the material things the company offered, they gave in to company demands. In 1992, the community opened to oil drilling, and Pompeya signed its first agreement with Conoco and Maxus, however Don Sandro remembers a feeling of being duped. Don Sandro says, “The first community relations person was a woman. She tricked us.”

Here, I build on Nelson (2009) who argues that discourses of duping and tricking often circulate as assumptions about how the world works, or that the world available to us “hides another face behind it.” It forces us to question, or pushes us toward moments of “reckoning,” suggesting that there are singular identities to uncover, for example those of perpetrator and victim. It challenges those identities that are “assumed,” or how we can take for granted our own identities, or those of others. For example, we can consider that subjection is a power assumed by the subject, either through our names, sex, gender or ethnicity (cf. Butler 1997). Often these identities can feel ‘false,’ and we can blame forces such as patriarchy, capitalism, or history for them. Nelson (2009) queries whether it is possible to name the people behind these forces, and suggests that some of these identities are the result of plans, networks, and end-goals. How do we uncover which identities are the result of well-funded plans, and which are taken on and inhabited (Nelson 2009)? This quandary, or the difficulty of reckoning in the midst of duplicity, “may be the conditions of possibility for political action and knowledge in our age” (Nelson 2009: xx).

For example, Don Sandro plays on discourses of abandonment by the state and the offering of ‘trinkets and beads,’ which also mirror histories of debt-peonage relationships that

46 La primera relacionista comunitaria era una mujer. Ella nos engañó.
47 I explore this notion of ‘engañar’ (duping, tricking) further in the next chapter.
made it hard to oppose the entrance of companies. In Pompeya, several of the same community relations staff people who were there in this initial period still work in the region today, albeit for different companies. All of these initial negotiations took place during the period of a military dictatorship in Ecuador. Soon thereafter, the community of Pompeya and daily lives changed dramatically.

“We’re lazy about our customs,” says Don Sandro. Before all the houses were made traditionally, out of palm. There was natural light, from a plant in the region. “Our eyes opened when the company arrived,” recounted Don Sandro. Little by little people began to leave hunting and fishing behind. Chicha was no longer shared amongst families and community members, or left for several days to ferment. Starting in 1979, the geography of the community shifted, and people began to move to the center. Trees were cut down and burned to open the space.

Don Pascual says:

It was with our children that Pompeya began to grow. We looked for work and land. Now we need to have fewer kids, because there’s no space. I only have four. As well, education is important, but it’s expensive. In the 1970s we would sell corn and rice in Coca. We would just hunt and fish, and grow yuca. There wasn’t much production because there wasn’t transportation. Just one or two times a month were there boats to Coca. The center of Pompeya didn’t exist like it is now, but with machetes we began cutting [the trees].

---

48 Somos vagos de nuestras costumbres.
49 Nuestros ojos se abrieron cuando la compañía llegó.
50 Kichwa families are typically quite large, often with 6-12 children. In part this was because children often died at an early age, and children could also help parents in farming practices.
During this period, there was some tension between the Kichwa and Waorani. Don Sandro said that as the community began clearing their land, some Kichwas kept guard out of fear the Waorani would attack them. Eventually, formal meetings were held with Waorani leaders to establish official territory delineation. In 1983, community leaders returned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Farming to establish new territorial boundaries. The Kichwa maintain their territory until the Tiputini River, and these are the boundaries that exist today.

In the early 1990s, Conoco began construction on roads to access oil blocks in Pompeya. All the roads through the community were finished in 16 days, using sand that was dredged from within the community. During this initial entrance of the companies there was some negotiation between CONFENIAE and FCUNAE and private multinationals. CONFENIAE asked for $200,000 from the company to split amongst all the indigenous communities in the region. In return Conoco offered $50,000, which was rejected by the community. Eventually, the community succumbed to the pressures of community relations officers. Soon thereafter, following the signing of a formal agreement with the community, Conoco left control of the operations to Maxus and the agreement was transferred to that company.

As community president between 2006-2007, Don Pascual was engaged in signing agreements with the companies in Block 15, currently operated by Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of Petroecuador. He makes the distinction between the state company, which today provides subsistence type projects, including pools for fish, and other agricultural projects, and Occidental (Oxy), the private multinational that operated in Block 15 prior to Petroamazonas, and worked to provide infrastructural improvements to communities within the Block. He says:

*Convenios* (agreements) with Oxy were hard. We had to talk with them all day and all night. Everything we do is with the company. There are a lot of budgets. There’s very little help from the state. The *junta parroquial* only recently arrived and it works in six communities. There’s little coordination. FCUNAE helped us more in organizing
ourselves. The mission is just interested in evangelization. Now there are conflicts with the state and company. The state knows the company is here, so doesn’t want to give certain things.  

Meanwhile, community culture and customs continue to change. Don Sandro says:

Now we keep living more or less the same way, but before we didn’t know how to grow café or cacao or aves (poultry). Now there are more pools for fish rather than in the river. There aren’t any fruits. Now we ask for projects from the company in the agreements. The latest idea is tourism. Before the fincas were to grow food to live – now it’s just food from outside. Before everyone spoke Kichwa, and now it’s different. No one greets the others either. No one knows artesanía except the older people and no one practices it. Before we would work on this. Now beer has influenced everything. Before we just used traps, and now it’s rifles. The capacitación projects teach us new things, but it’s nothing we did before.  

Don Luis concurs:

Before we would have music – like drums and flutes, but we’ve left those customs behind. Only those with money live in the center of the community. We have products, but nowhere to sell them. Café, cacao, piscinas (pools for fish farming), aves all arrived with Petroamazonas. We did already know how to cultivate café, but once Petroamazonas arrived, it became more important. Before we would sell products in Coca. It would take two days to get there. We have chickens, but mostly for parties. There’s no work with the company, but with Maxus there was and they gave us everything – like Papá Noel (Santa Claus).  

---

52 Los convenios con Oxy fueron muy duros. Tuvimos que hablar todo el día y la noche. Todo lo que hacemos es con la compañía. Hay tantos presupuestos. Hay poco apoyo del estado. La junta parroquial recién llegó y trabaja en seis comunidades. No hay coordinación. FCUNAE nos apoyó en organización. La misión solo tiene interés en evangelización. Ahora hay conflictos con el estado y la compañía. El estado sabe que la compañía está aquí y no da ciertas cosas.


While my conversations with residents of Pompeya seemed to mark the moment of loss of indigenous traditions and customs with the arrival of companies, the history of the Amazon region points to much longer historical processes of encroachment and influence by outsiders, as outlined in the first part of this section. The historical processes of patron-client relationships constructed a hierarchical system through which patrons could be called on for material goods. Indeed, the gift giving tied to corporations through CSR programs seemed to establish the company as the latest patron in the region, firmly rooting the corporation in the region. As Wilson (2010) states, within Amazonian cultures, gift giving also has important social relationships, and hierarchical leadership patterns are often marked by a leader's generosity. Drawing on Michael Uzendoski (2005), Wilson suggests that for the Napo Runa when commodities are turned into gifts this actually creates social value and produces identities and relationships between individuals. One learns more about oneself through these acts of gift giving. It becomes a moral obligation for the more powerful to give gifts, and can “soothe social tensions that may actually emerge from the inequality itself” (Wilson 2010: 229). In turn, discourse at the community level often differentiates between those who collaborate, and those who work for personal gains, and often contributes to evaluations of leadership. Community social relationships with the company through CSR programs reflects this social process of gift giving leading to patriarchal relationships in the community that reflect corporate presence (see Rajak 2011). In the next two sections I turn to a discussion of daily lives in Pompeya through CSR programs to reflect on the ambivalence of indigenous peoples' engagement with CSR programs, and the contradictory outcomes of corporate presence that reproduce gendered and racialized dimensions of Kichwa identities.
Daily lives in Pompeya

In March of 2009, following the recommendation of one of the Repsol-YPF bus drivers, I contacted Luisa, a resident of Pompeya to help me with my interviews and community participation. Many of my interactions in Pompeya were with the extended family of Luisa. In part, this is because her family had more experience with outsiders, and was involved in much of the leadership of Pompeya. Luisa is 26 with two young children. Her husband initially operated the Repsol-YPF boats that run oil workers, and sometimes community members, to and from Coca, the capital of Orellana province where Pompeya is located, on the Napo River. Later in my fieldwork period, Luisa's husband took a job as a Repsol-YPF guard. This new job allowed him to sleep at home every night. It became available when another community member showed up drunk to work, something not tolerated by the company. This resulted in a series of confrontations between Luisa's family and the fired worker. Her grandmother, Doña María, was the only Kichwa woman who still wore traditional clothing, and walked barefoot. She lived alone on the outskirts of the community. I was curious to know about Doña María's perspective on life in Pompeya, and the changes over the years. My other conversations with community elders were all with men.

On a day in early March, following a series of postponements due to scheduling conflicts, and my early exit from Pompeya because of stomach illnesses, Luisa had confirmed with her grandmother that she would be waiting for us in the afternoon. We had made plans to go in the morning, but word came that parents needed to pick up their state school vouchers (for lower income residents of Ecuador), now up to $30/month from $15/month. Instead, we hopped on the 1pm Repsol-YPF bus out to her grandmother's house, near the Petroamazonas well, but Doña

---

55 These jobs in transportation or working as guards for the company are offered to male residents of indigenous communities. There is no other regular employment with the company for community members.
María was not waiting for us. Without a cell phone, there was no way to know where she was. We walked around a bit exploring her farm, but she did not appear. Luisa knew her family was working on clearing the Petroamazonas pipeline from tall brush, and so we entered the clearing in the trees and began following the pipeline until we came across her aunt and uncle, Doña Ingrid and Don Pedro. This type of work was offered by the companies every now and then to residents, in exchange for a little cash. Doña Ingrid and Don Pedro were finishing up their work, and we followed a trail through the forest back to their farm plot. Along the way, Don Pedro, a boastful, talkative person pointed out different plants, including wild cacao, which he claimed was good for curing snakebites. He also noted tapir tracks. Soon we arrived in a clearing where Luisa's mother, Doña Mercedes, was holding a minga (a collective work day) to harvest rice. We arrived just as the food was being served, and ate chicken soup. The chicha and beer were offered around. Soon Don Pedro began a monologue about his relationship with the company, boasting of his long and close ties to Repsol-YPF.

Don Pedro claimed he had worked in a guide capacity for companies that operated in the region before Repsol-YPF, including the state company and Maxus. He acknowledged his relationship with Repsol-YPF stating that it was right that he had spoken at the opening ceremony of the Centro de Acopio, an agricultural drying facility funded by the corporation (see chapter 6). Don Pedro claimed he had been offered additional work with the company during the 1990s, but had turned it down because he felt he had roots in Pompeya and on his farm. I tried to probe further into Don Pedro's life, but he wanted to fill me in on medicinal properties of Amazonian plants and trees. Don Pedro's mother, Doña María, had been a good dancer, he said, but he quickly ended his own practice of indigenous traditions out of embarrassment. He told me
people used to laugh at him. The conversation continued, but I had to catch a boat back to the Catholic mission on the other side of the river.

I finally met Doña María in late July 2009. I traveled with Luisa on the community bus, along with her children, sister and niece. It was a family gathering, and we ate many products Doña María had gathered from her land, including bananas, cacao, and yuca. Doña María does not speak Spanish, and much of the conversation had to be translated from Kichwa for my benefit. I learned she never sleeps in the center of the community, even though both her granddaughters have houses there. Her house was more traditional, with open walls to the jungle, but with a metal roof. Her kitchen included an open fireplace for cooking, but she also had a modern stove and gas. Luisa told me her grandmother only uses the latter when she's sick. Doña María showed me the traditional light she uses, produced by burning a seed found in the jungle.

Through Luisa, I asked a few questions about changes in the community, and Doña María's life. She came to Pompeya as a girl from a town along the border with Peru. Her family became part of the mission, although initially was under rule of the patrones. In contrast to the men I interviewed, Doña María did not learn Spanish in the mission, perhaps because girls were not encouraged to attend school. At age fourteen she married, and a year later had her first child. She moved to the south side of the river, and started to work the land, which was really Waorani territory. Doña María recounted stories of the Waorani taking their things when they were working on the farms. Community meetings were called by the president of the comun (community) on a conch. Doña María noted how people used to work together on farms. One woman would cook, one would serve chicha, while others worked. When the companies entered, everything changed, she said. The companies bought off the dirigentes (community leadership), and “nothing was the same.”
The space of Pompeya is marked by these complex productions and negotiations of identity that reflect a long history of social injustices due to outsider presence, including patrons, corporations and missionaries, and the marked absence of the state. Indeed, indigenous peoples engage with these negotiations with outsiders on a daily basis, which is reflected in indigenous knowledge production and outsiders' often racialized interpretations of this knowledge. The iterative process of 'identities in the making' leads to certain norms about indigenous populations reflected in subject formation in the space of Pompeya (Sundberg 2004). Furthermore, today the sense of inclusiveness and participation that marks market-based employment offered by the company produces certain 'privileged' indigenous subjects in Pompeya. In turn, though, these so-called modernizing practices introduced by corporations also raise questions about disciplining practices of multinationals. In the next section I turn to a specific company funded micro-credit project that explores the production of power that flows through CSR programs, producing hierarchical relationships among indigenous populations.

*Micro-credit project*

In this section, I focus on a women's micro-credit organization to explore how particular gendered and racialized norms are produced through CSR practices and discourses. This organization was formed by FEPP, an Ecuadorian NGO, with funds from the Fundación Repsol. Monthly meetings were held the second Sunday of the month, following community meetings on the first Sunday of each month. However, if the community meeting was postponed, so too was the women's organization meeting. This was the case during the initial months I spent in Pompeya, but finally a scheduled meeting did take place. Loans were made to group members to invest in individual purchases of chickens to raise and sell in local markets, or to invest in
agricultural products like corn, also for sale at the weekly market or in Coca. The profits would be distributed to members of the group. The planting and harvesting of agricultural products occurred in *mingas*, organized through the women's group. Husbands of the members usually engaged in these workdays, and two men were present at this month's meeting, including Don Pedro.

On the appointed meeting day, women slowly trickled into FEPP's house in Pompeya, which FEPP had turned over to the women's group for its meetings. I arrived, along with two nuns from the Catholic mission, who ran a similar organization with women from the community living on the other side of the river. This division between the micro-credit groups was often a point of contention, and the women of Pompeya-**Sur** (whose meeting I was attending) wondered why they could not join forces. The nuns were hesitant to do so, given the disorganization in Pompeya-**Sur**, although this was not disclosed to group members. Much of the meeting was conducted in Kichwa. Members of the group held officer positions, and each spoke in turn. Doña Ingrid was president, Doña Celeste treasurer, and Doña Martha secretary. Eleven women were present, despite 30 official members.

The meeting got under way about an hour after it was scheduled, and was designed to breathe life into the organization, which was suffering because of members' debts. Moreover, the former president had spent much of the group's profits and initial loans made by FEPP in parties. I was informed that $3000 was originally deposited in the group's account by FEPP, and the organization was $1600 in debt. Many women owed the group between $200 and $400, amounts that had accumulated over the five to six years of the organization's existence. The two men present, including Doña Ingrid's husband, Don Pedro, dominated this meeting, and suggested that the organization was in disarray because there had not been a meeting for three months. “It's
the fault of the secretary and treasurer,” said Don Pedro, with no qualms about insulting Doña Celeste and Doña Martha, who were both present. Also discussed was land that had been set aside for the women to raise chickens, which had recently been repossessed by the community.

“Who sold the land? Who authorized it? No one signed [the sale],” stated Don Pedro. Much of the blame was placed on Doña Barbara, a community member and politically active resident through the local state government and often the subject of much envy by other residents, although no one knew for sure who had sold this land. There was also a brief discussion of why the FEPP representative was not present at this meeting. Apparently, he was supposed to be there, but had not shown up for several months. He had proposed that the women's organization ask the company for broadband Internet connection, but no one was really sure what the Internet would be used for. Moreover, monthly regional meetings are held in Coca at FEPP offices with various representatives from micro-credit organizations in indigenous communities along the Napo River, and someone from Pompeya should be present at each meeting. Because of transportation issues and childcare, no one willingly attended these meetings. After several hours, this month's meeting concluded with few decisions.

However, the group continued to exist despite halting steps. A month later, on February 22nd, I attended the next meeting. In this meeting, a decision was made to mail letters to outstanding debtors obligating them to pay back the loans. Once again, Don Pedro was present, pushing the women to organize themselves and send the letters. However, once Don Pedro left the meeting the women began to say how tired they were of the group. Doña Ingrid said, “My husband is always saying that I should do things with the organization. But, I also have to wash

---

56 Es la culpa de la secretaria y la tesorera.
57 I didn't tape this meeting, but instead recorded the meeting in my fieldnotes, noting where there were direct quotes (See also Sundberg 2004; Emerson et al. 1995).
58 ¿Quien vendió el terreno? ¿Quién lo autorizó? Nadie lo firmó.
the clothes and do things in the house.”59 There is little motivation on the part of the women to continue in the group, despite FEPP agreeing to deposit another $10,000 in the organization's account. Indeed, FEPP also has to demonstrate to Repsol-YPF that its programs are successful.

The microcredit organizations in Kichwa communities are a cornerstone of its programs with the Fundación, and the organization receives a large portion of its finances from the Fundación. By the end of my fieldwork period in 2010, FEPP was no longer the recipient of funds from the Fundación, and had to let some of its employees go.

What I want to highlight from these encounters with the women's organization is the way in which the narratives and performances enacted in the meeting “(re)configure gender and race in contradictory ways” (Sundberg 2004: 50). Indeed, as Sundberg (2004) notes in her account of a women's organization in Guatemala, this meeting in Pompeya also reproduces male superiority. Despite a female leadership council that runs the organization, Don Pedro ignores these women and chooses to run the meeting himself, telling women how they need to behave in order to keep the organization active. Much of Don Pedro's feelings of superiority and identity stem from his role with the company, and he often reverted to stories about his relationship with Samuel, the head of community relations in Quito, recounting how he was selected to fly to Quito for meetings. Indeed, while there is not mention of the role of women in securing their own access to wealth, the organization was established with corporate and NGO goals to improve the role for women in a male dominated Kichwa society. Instead, Don Pedro's role in the meeting reproduces a patriarchal corporate narrative that disciplines women's gendered behavior under the guise of providing new opportunities for women outside of the home. CSR programs shift debates at the community level to focus on maintaining corporate presence, rather

59 Siempre mi marido está diciendo que tengo que hacer cosas con la organización. También tengo que limpiar la ropa, y hacer las cosas en la casa.
than engaging with inequalities that emerge in resource access and control. Furthermore, community discussions revolve around CSR programs rather than the ongoing social and environmental injustices that are linked to resource extraction and ongoing corporate presence in indigenous territory. Discourse and practice are tied to ensuring the constant flow of projects from the company.

Yet, as Doña Ingrid states, she's tired of the organization, and finds it difficult to balance her participation there with work at home, something her family also expects her to do. This paradoxical positioning of a gendered and racialized identity emerges through the top-down process of governance and development. The women are encouraged by male community members to perform particular tasks that show they are organized and engaged in the micro-credit process, to ensure continued support of the company and FEPP within the community. Rather than producing a role for women as independent decision-makers, this group (re)produces an indigenous identity tied to women's inferiority in the community. In other words, CSR programs, despite their inclusionary and participatory appearance, lead to unequal outcomes in resource governance decisions, and specifically women's participation in discussions about livelihoods and making a living, as well as access to and distribution of resources. In turn, I argue that the micro-credit organization produces ambivalence and uncertainty that fails to create the space for women to claim control over their own daily lives in the space of the community.

Development, politics and CSR programs

In this section, I address flows of power through new conjunctures of state, corporate and indigenous relationships and the production of politics in relation to development in the space of Pompeya, drawing on a conversation I had with a community resident, and at the time, president
of the *junta parroquial*, Doña Barbara. It is significant that Doña Barbara is not Kichwa; she acknowledges that this gives her a different perspective on life, and possibilities for the future. Implicit in her own positioning is the production of an indigenous identity tied to a long history of racism and oppression. Doña Barbara arrived in Pompeya in 1972, migrating with her family from the city of Ambato located in the south-central Andes mountains in Ecuador, as the community and Amazon region began to be opened to outsiders. Her husband is Kichwa from Pompeya. As corporate presence persists in the region, Doña Barbara uses her interactions with the company and local state actors to argue that there might be a different way forward for Pompeya. While still focused on improvement, she suggests that this vision should also include democratic citizenship (Li 2007).

When I arrived in Ecuador in 2008, Doña Barbara was serving as the president of the *junta parroquial* (parish government). She had her finger on the pulse of the community, and its relationship to state and corporate politics. Because Doña Barbara was so vocal, and perhaps not afraid to challenge authority and certain hierarchical and gender norms in the community, she also had her share of enemies in the community, including Don Pedro. She never sat still, running from one meeting to the next in Coca or Quito, and traveling downriver to the communities of the parish. Eventually, I was able to catch her for a brief interview. We talked about her vision for the community, and her frustrations. Indeed, Doña Barbara lamented the fact that she was president of the parish when Pompeya needed a leader in the community. When her term as parish president ended, she was elected to the position of community President in 2010. She says,

---

60 Doña Barbara was usually the subject of much jealous gossip in the region. Many accused her of taking state funds for personal gain, reflecting these social relationships of gift giving, and uneven distribution of wealth (even if incorrect). Furthermore, this jealousy or “envidia” emerges when goods are unevenly divided, argues Hutchins (2010).
Well, years ago, when I came [to Pompeya], a company was already here. In this period it was called CEPE (the state company). I came in 1972, and I married… Sure, the visions at that time, they [the companies] were motivating the people, but we were all natos, we never imagined what was going to happen…not only with us, but with the people already living here, natives from here. I remember in 1982, when they established the community as it is today, they worked with fist and the efforts of all the natives from here, the old people, many of whom are no longer alive, they made this community. I remember in 1993, the company Repsol came. Today there is Petroamazonas, which at that time was Oxy. And, during this period, the people knew nothing about negotiations, until almost today, they still don't know very well. But, little by little, it has turned toward those who speak the most, but they don't want to listen.  

Indeed, the space of Pompeya has always been one of competing claims, including missionaries, internal colonists, oil companies, and indigenous peoples themselves. Commenting on development, and the movement within CSR programs from material gifts toward formal programs, Doña Barbara argues that gifts are the root of the community's inability to move forward. “Yes, people are more interested in gifts, or, because of gifts everything falls apart, even if it's because of the presence of outsiders, the community falls apart. They (community members) can't see anything positive in themselves, and the company doesn't either.”

When companies first arrived, they initially offered work to local people, and would pay community members for damages to their land and property from oil spills and infrastructural development. Eventually the company began to offer material gifts, which were often lost or damaged. As Doña Barbara says,

---

61 Bueno, hace años atrás yo cuando vine ya estaba una compañía, esa época le decían CEPE yo vine en el año 1972 vine...me casé...Claro las visiones en esa época ellos iban incentivando pero siempre fuimos natos y no imaginamos lo que iba a suceder, lo que sucedía y lo que iba a suceder y eso ocurría no solo en nosotros...sino en la gente actual, nativa de aquí mismo, y cuando nosotros me acuerdo que en el año de 1982 que se hizo la, la actual Pompeya que es esta, que se trabajó con puño y fuerzas de toda la gente nativa de, los antiguos, que ya ahora actualmente ya no existen, hay poquitos se hizo esta comunidad se formó, me acuerdo que en el año de 1993 vino la petrolera REPSOL. Hoy actualmente los que son ha, los de Petroamazonas que esa época era OXI en este año, y que esa época pues la gente no sabía nada de negociaciones pues hasta casi actualmente todavía no se sabe bien, pero medio, medio que horita poquito a poquito se le ha ido al que más habla pues no le quieren escuchar.

62 Si más es los regalos que más les interesa, o sea el, por el regalo lo caen, aunque sea a golpe pero lo caen, pero de hay no hay algo positivo en ellos mismo y, y la compañía también no se hasta ahora.
“Yes, yes, and those programs (CSR programs) – I remember that first they came to offer work...they would also pay for any damages in the form of projects. They (the company) gave a lot of things. They've invested a lot of money in this community, but… In actuality, there were few projects – it was more material things we didn't think about how long these things would last. It's like saying: I gave it to you, and you threw it in the river, so you don't have it anymore.”

In other words, the community was often blamed for its inability to manage the gifts it received from the company. Here Doña Barbara is reflecting on this corporate process that establishes powerful relationships between the corporation and the community through gift giving. She makes the distinction between these earlier CSR projects and development, noting that the various gifts were all things the community could have gotten for itself: “We haven't had much development, to be able to maintain it, we only received things, insignificant material things, I say. The computers, boat motors, little canoes, these are all things the community itself could get, but these were the most comment things given by the company.”

For Doña Barbara, development is about community participation, and actually requesting certain things. It is not a process of gift giving. She notes one particular project that was in place when I arrived in Pompeya. It was a sewing cooperative organized by the community relations department of Repsol-YPF. Doña Barbara states that this particular project was the only one designed to concensuarse (build consensus) of all the projects offered by the company. In other words, for Doña Barbara, this project might have helped to remove ownership from the company. Indeed, if CSR programs are often premised on gift-giving, much of the

---

63 Si, si y esos programas me acuerdo que primero vinieron a ofrecer trabajo, ofrecieron o dieron trabajo también, ofrecieron indemnizaciones pagaron en obras, dieron muchas cosas han invertido harto dinero en esta comunidad pero...En obras pocas y más en otros materiales que casi no ha tenido un buen sentido duradero, o sea es como decir, diste y le botaste al agua pues no tiene.
64 No ha tenido una gran, un gran desarrollo para poder mantener, solo habido cosas, materiales insignificantes digo yo, las computadoras, una, los motores, las canoitas, que eso usted sabe eso hasta la misma comunidad puede conseguir pero eso es lo que habido más.
project's control remains with the company (Rajak 2011). In Pompeya, this sewing project soon disappeared, as the company began to reduce its programs at the local level, highlighting corporate control over CSR projects. A company employee from Quito organized the project, and when Repsol-YPF ended her salary, few women were motivated to continue.

Development is about a sense of entitlement, she argues, and how local people must learn to intervene, and make demands of the company rather than merely accept gifts. By juxtaposing gift-giving with entitlement, Doña Barbara essentially highlights the role of the company as a paternalistic institution (Rajak 2011). She says:

“A plan has to be made with the people from here. One can't make one that's implemented from above. Instead, it has to begin from below, and we should move up. So, our objective [in the junta parroquial] is to work with the communities, with assemblies, outlining how it will happen, and ensuring they [the communities] know everything.\(^{65}\)

Doña Barbara believes that all of these problems can be traced to the history of the community, and its relationship with the mission, which gave the Pompeya everything. This paternalistic role was later passed onto the company. Now no one can get rid of this mentality that it's the community's right to get everything as a constant flow of gifts. She believes that no one in Pompeya has any responsibilities. Work on the farm is just to pass the time. As she points out, a family can spend one day on the farm harvesting a crop to sell, and then there's nothing to do during the rest of the week. This language reflects the sort of disorder that outsiders seek to correct. Traditional farming practices are not really a way to make a living, and instead there needs to also be some sort of outsider regulation, argues Doña Barbara. Yet, this discourse

\(^{65}\) Las personas que claro, el un plan se tiene que hacer justamente con las personas de aquí, no se puede hacer desde arriba hacia abajo, sino que desde abajo deberíamos ir para arriba, entonces nuestro objetivo es trabajar con las comunidades, con asambleas, detallando dando a conocer todo.
reinforces racist ideologies and problems of modernity and progress that remain inscribed on indigenous bodies (see Wilson 2008).

Doña Barbara describes community meetings where only the leaders (all men) discuss projects with the company, as they are the ones approached by community relations staff. Ultimately, though, the company has the last word, deciding which projects will be implemented that year, or over the next three years. The community president does not know how to communicate the process with companies to the rest of the community. She says, “The trouble is, no one seems interested [in changing the system]. I have to figure out how to change that. Of course, alcohol influences everything here.”66 Here, Doña Barbara is reflecting on long histories of debt-peonage relationships, where indigenous populations were co-opted by alcohol, and indebted to the patrones.

I attended one community meeting in December 2008. These meetings should be held once a month, on the first Sunday of each month. Due to various scheduling conflicts, and lack of participation, this was the first meeting the community had attempted to hold in some time. All registered community members are required to attend, and participate in the community-wide minga to clean up the community center. If not, one has to pay a $1 fine. In a community of 650 people, there are at least 200 socios (community members), but on this morning only about 40 people showed up. The president was not in attendance. The community guidelines state that the president must be present to have an official meeting, and so a discussion ensued as to whether it was even possible to hold the meeting. Doña Barbara was vocal in attempting to convince people that the meeting should not hinge on the president's attendance. Eventually a decision was made to reschedule the meeting for the following Wednesday, and after a couple hours, people

66 El problema es que nadie parece interesado. Tengo que encontrar la manera de cambiar eso. Por supuesto, el alcohol influye en todo lo de aquí.
dispersed. Indeed, during my entire fieldwork period, community meetings continued to be postponed, and I never attended another one. The company implements projects in an attempt to monitor and control indigenous populations, while also criticizing the so-called disorderly process of indigenous communities and kinship ties. Indeed, the social disorganization highlighted by Doña Barbara through CSR programs points to enduring processes of racism in Ecuador, and the attempts by a corporation to exercise control and authority over indigenous subjects in the space of indigenous territory. In the next section I explore the impacts of this long history of gift-giving through CSR programs, to reflect on relationships between corporations and ongoing indigenous marginalization in the nation-state.67

Understanding deficiency, moving toward rights

My conversation with Doña Barbara took place just as the state was engaged in rewriting the Ecuadorian constitution, ostensibly promoting indigenous rights, and shifting contracts with private multinationals to ensure the state received the majority of windfall profits from ongoing extraction (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the state started to have more presence in the northern Amazon region: roads into Pompeya-Norte were paved, and the municipal government constructed a sewer system in the center of Pompeya, which included latrines for households. These material shifts prompted new discourses at the local level suggesting that perhaps the state had not forgotten the region, and the shifting conjunctures of state, corporate and indigenous relationships opened the space for Doña Barbara to begin to question the role of the company in the community. She asked whether there is also space for indigenous people to make collective rights-based claims within the state. Indeed, Doña Barbara seems to embody this ambivalence at

67 As Rajak (2011: 212) writes, gift-giving can be interpreted as “on the one hand, personal commitment, passion and warmth; on the other paternalism, patronage, control, and crucially, exclusion.” This distinction again reflects the duplicitous nature of CSR programs.
the local level, highlighting racialized processes of development, while also suggesting indigenous populations use their collective difference to ensure ongoing development. Doña Barbara asks whether it is possible to separate this long history of a racialized indigenous identity from questions of self-esteem (or the marked uncertainty and ambivalence in the space of Pompeya), and that this intervention might be the crux of opening a conversation that revolves around collective rights based claims. She says, “Yes, here we basically have to talk about the theme of personal self-esteem. I have realized, or even I have been a part of this - we didn't believe in ourselves, men equally as much as women, we didn't place value in who we are.”

For Doña Barbara, her work as a local level politician is to get people to actually confront their lack of self-esteem. For her, this is a process that must be taught, through interaction, and cannot be something given to people to read about. She says:

“If we would start to talk about that (self-esteem), and afterwards we could begin, how I said, to move little by little to discuss the theme of leadership, collective rights, knowledge that these people have rights, and this right has to be taught. Because, if I give someone a paper, they're not going to read it, they're going to leave it piled up. That is what one aims for, and there's a lot, as they say, there's a lot that is important to me.”

Here Doña Barbara is reflecting on the damage of ongoing corporate presence (and other outsiders) to an indigenous identity, wondering if there is a way for indigenous people to reclaim their difference from racialized language of CSR programs. Indeed, this lack of self-esteem reflects the long history of outsider presence that positioned indigenous populations as deficient subjects and receptacles for CSR projects (See Chapter 5). Designed within discourse and

\[\text{Si aquí lo que netamente hay que hablar el tema del autoestima personal, me he dado cuenta, o hasta yo he sido parte de eso de que no nos estimamos a nosotras mismas, tanto el hombre como la mujer no nos estimamos a nosotros mismos y nos valorizamos lo que somos.} \]

\[\text{Arrancando hablaríamos de eso, luego empezaríamos como decía ir poco a poco hablando del tema de liderazgo, de, de derechos colectivos, saber de que esta gente tiene un derecho, y ese derecho que tenemos que enseñar, por que también si le doy un papel tampoco me van a leer lo van a dejar arrumado. Eso es, a eso es lo que uno se solicita y hay mucho como dicen, y hay mucho que me importa muchísimo.} \]

112
practice of development, these programs merely served to prevent any local level challenges to corporate and state oil extraction operations. Within this conjuncture, Doña Barbara asks whether it might be possible to shift the terms of the debate, exploring a new role for indigenous peoples in development processes through the state.

*The politics of CSR*

Despite the aims of corporate and state programs that position indigenous people as deficient subjects, Doña Barbara's positioning as a resident of Pompeya reflects her participation in local politics, and her contacts with both state and corporate actors and ideas. Doña Barbara aims to instruct people in the practice of politics. She, too, is engaged in the will to improve and empower, and her vision includes active engagement with indigenous rights and responsibilities. Yet, Doña Barbara suggests that it is an indigenous right to claim projects not only from the company, but also from the state. Her goal is to organize local people into committees, to work collectively to ensure communities' ongoing development. This new conjuncture of state, indigenous and corporate actors opened a gap in companies' long dominance in the region, and for Doña Barbara to pursue another avenue of community based organizing, one that is perhaps out from under the gaze of CSR programs. She says,

> Here we lack depth – a person that can really guide the community, and who can really let them know things they don't know yet. Because, to be the president [of the junta parroquial] is a lot of work – it's more project development than to be working with people, organizing, motivating them, helping them know the law, all their rights. So, there's not really that time for a president to do all that. But, when one is part of a committee, or becomes a member, well, he or she can work continually with the people, training them, helping them to know a lot of things people here don't know. The people here don't even know their collective rights! They don't know collective rights of indigenous people!\(^70\)

\(^70\) [A]quí falta profundizar que haya una persona quien les guíe de verdad, y les de a conocer, por que el estar en la presidencia es mucho trabajo, es más gestión que estar juntamente con la gente organizando, haciéndoles incentivar, dándoles a conocer leyes, derechos en todo campo, entonces no hay ese tiempo para una per, para un presidente,
The challenge, though, is to engage people over the long term. The company has also conditioned local people to expect immediate, tangible results.

[Yet], they're only interested for a moment in something – in the theme of money, they come, but when you say collaborate, participate, let's do that, no…But, when they [the companies] say, we're going to give you this, or there's food, there, yes, the whole world moves.

She was looking forward to the end of her term in April 2009, when she might be able to spend more time in Pompeya, to become a real community presence. Doña Barbara maintains a critical view of the role of the company, and what it is doing to the community, yet she advocates for a more savvy relationship with corporations, rather than ending corporate support altogether. She suggests that the community just needs a few people who are interested in development, without losing indigenous traditions:

I don't see anything positive for the people here. For those who recognize this, and here we have about 200 community members, [of which] we are 10 who think that this community has to develop, to better day to day, without forgetting tradition or culture - that is the principle. But, we always have to have a development mentality, because if we weren't to have that…

There is hope that the community take control of its own development, because it has its own indigenous identity, albeit one that must be reclaimed:

Yes, there's hope that the community also views its own development, as a community, because they also have their own identity, their own needs, their own culture, language, so for all these reasons, they should…we should begin this year to make a communal
plan. And, those of us in the junta parroquial, with the current budget, we can maintain parish board plans with all the communities.\(^73\)

As my fieldwork neared its end in May 2010, Doña Barbara was elected community president. It was the first time a woman was president of Pompeya, and she essentially took the job because no one else wanted to do it. Following the brief presidency of Manuel, the youngest President Pompeya has had to date, who viewed his job as negotiating with the companies for new projects, Doña Barbara was taking concrete action to begin to restructure Pompeya, for better or worse. She organized a committee that would be in charge of collecting electricity payments from households in the community center. Similarly, she attempted to revamp the potable water committee to get it up and running again (see Chapter 5). It still remains to be seen what new conjunctures will emerge as the corporation's role shifts in the community of Pompeya, and whether indigenous peoples can begin to direct development processes in their community. Doña Barbara's discourse and actions point to the ambivalence and uncertainty in resisting powerful actors in the region, especially given the state’s patchwork presence. She urges collective action rooted in 'traditional' indigenous identity production, which raises important questions about monitoring and controlling indigenous populations, indigenous sovereignty and identity, and her own role as a non-indigenous community leader with close ties to both state and corporate actors.

\(^{73}\) Si hay una esperanza de que también la comunidad vea su propio desarrollo como comunidad, porque ellos también tienen su, su propia identidad, su propia necesidad, su propia cultura, su idioma entonces por lo mismo siempre deberían estar, deberíamos estar ya de este año empezar a someternos a un plan comunal y nosotros la junta parroquial pues ya con el presupuesto actualmente vamos a mantener estos planes parroquiales con todas las comunidades….
Conclusion

This chapter explores indigenous subjectivity and identity in the space of the northern Amazon region, and the community of Pompeya in order to investigate indigenous political agency tied to relations of rule and sovereignty. Indeed, by exploring the conduct of conduct, and relationships of self-discipline that are linked to improvement regimes like CSR programs, we can understand more fully the ebbs and flows of forms of rule through the space of the northern Amazon region, and the production of both a space of rule and the subjects within. I attempt to explore the production of power, subjects, and territory by examining the way in which indigenous peoples articulate 'selective sovereignties' in the space of their community (Moore 2005: 221). The chapter takes a historical perspective in an attempt to point to earlier iterations of indigenous subject formation tied to daily struggles grounded in particular places, which are then reflected in the space of the community today. In designing the chapter in this fashion, I place politics alongside development, exploring how local people are incorporated into, and come to understand development as both subjects of action, as well as the way in which power relations lead to subjection to government (cf. Li 2007; Moore 2000, 2005).

Local populations acknowledge their own complicity in CSR programs, but are unsure whether or how to undo these practices. Indeed, the corporation represents a powerful actor engaged in a history of gift giving following cultural norms and histories in the region. In essence, this chapter calls attention to the spatial inequalities defined by a patchwork state presence in the region, and CSR programs that serve to subject indigenous populations to corporate presence. By highlighting the difference between entitlement and gift giving, though, Doña Barbara calls attention to corporate control over development processes. The everyday practices and daily struggles that emerge through CSR programs help to illuminate the
unevenness of ruling relations in the space of an indigenous community. Indeed, CSR programs grant local people a sense of legitimacy in the space of their community, drawing on symbolic and practical aspects of an indigenous identity rooted in gift giving. In turn, though, CSR programs also call into question indigenous sovereign control over their own territory in the space of their community. The uncertainty and ambivalence produced through participation in CSR programs, on the one hand, highlights the lack of collective action in Pompeya, and inability to call attention to their rights and access to resources. On the other hand, though, it also masks indigenous peoples' resistance to full incorporation into CSR programs as corporate subjects. Ambiguity can reflect the ways in which people try and reconcile their personal circumstances with a view of how the world ought to work (Wolford 2006). The multiple and overlapping spaces of sovereignty in the space of Pompeya that are at once selective and situated suggests community members' ability to draw on specific social relationships when it is most beneficial to them, or situating their struggles amid “modes of power and practices of subjection” (Moore 2005: 280). In the next chapter, I turn to the state's interpretation of CSR programs, and relationships between oil resources and modernization that challenges indigenous citizenship and rights in the state, but also the state's sovereignty.
Chapter 4

The Duplicitous Nature of the State

While oil is considered a national priority, the people who live in zones of exploitation, well, we’re going to be the most vulnerable in terms of our rights, because, in addition to extraction, we don’t have anyone to turn to.

It’s the same government that is handing out the (oil) camps, that is telling private companies to do what they want - there is no contamination, that is in charge of controlling (extraction), that is following environmental interests, while at the same time other government officials, including the president, have an extractive vision like no other government before. 74

Personal Interview, President, Oficina de Derecho Ambiental 75, NGO, Coca, 2009

Introduction

When I arrived in Ecuador in October 2008, Repsol-YPF was close to being forced out of the country over contract disputes with the state (El Comercio 6 November, 2008). So-called production contracts had dictated a 50-50 split between the state and private companies for windfall profits from extraction; the state, in the midst of restructuring its oil extraction processes, was seeking to take 99% of those profits, leaving private companies with 1%. Repsol-YPF was still reeling from the state's political stance against the company when I met with Samuel, the community relations officer, at Repsol-YPF's offices in Quito on November 8, 2008. Samuel immediately showed me a copy of El Comercio, a national newspaper in Ecuador, from

---

74 Entonces, mientras el petróleo esté considerado de prioridad nacional, la gente que vivimos en zonas de, de explotación hidrocarburíferas pues vamos a ser vulnerados nuestros derechos, por que encima de eso no tenemos a quien acudir, por que es el mismo gobierno el que está entregando los campos, el que está diciendo vayan, no hay contaminación, es el mismo que se encarga de vigilar, el mismo ministro entrega los campos petroleros el mismo ministro también, he, controla a la, a la institución de que vela por los intereses ambientales, aunque sea otros ministro está dirigido por el mismo gobierno el mismo presidente, está puesto por un mismo presidente y que especialmente este presidente a, a, tiene una visión extractivista como ningún otro...

75 Office of Environmental Rights
a few days prior. On November 4, 2008 NAWE (Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador)\textsuperscript{76} the Waorani indigenous organization had written a quarter-page declaration (\textit{Manifiesto de la Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador – NAWE – Al Gobierno Ecuatoriano y a la Opinión Pública}) pressing the state to prevent Repsol-YPF from leaving. NAWE cited the company's help through corporate social responsibility programs in local communities, and stated that without that help the Waorani people could not survive.

Indigenous groups’ seeming support for Repsol-YPF, or rationalization of their rights through a private corporation, raises questions about indigenous agency and political participation in the Ecuadorian state against the backdrop of ongoing oil extraction. Following Nelson (2009), I ask why indigenous peoples need CSR programs to make these claims on the state. What is the authority that thinks it can grant these claims? How do indigenous organizations (and the communities they claim to represent) make a living in “a world structured in dominance…” (Nelson 2009: 158)?

In turn, I argue that CSR programs, and neoliberal shifts more broadly, led to the entanglement of indigenous populations within neoliberal policies (cf. Andolina, et al. 2009; Bakker 2010; Hale 2011; Moore 2005). The roll-out of neoliberal reforms in Ecuador both created the space for indigenous organizations to claim collective rights to territory following a sustained indigenous movement through the 1990s. Yet, neoliberal policies and programs also circumscribed the terms of debates about rights and cultural difference by containing political participation to the local level, and limiting indigenous participation in questions of resource governance, and membership in the nation-state (cf. Hale 2011; Sawyer 2004).

\textsuperscript{76}In English, this organization is the Waorani Nationality of Ecuador. When the organization was founded in 1990, it was the Organization of Huaorani Nationalities of Amazonian Ecuador (ONHAE). The new spelling of Waorani reflects the shift toward non-Hispano origins of the name of the indigenous group.
Globally, the transnational indigenous social movements of the 1990s called into question the impacts of oil extraction on indigenous populations, while also challenging indigenous citizenship, and meanings of the nation in Ecuador (cf. Fontaine 2003; Sawyer 2004). In turn, neoliberal ideologies challenged the state’s control over oil resources and modernization (cf. Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008). The discourses and processes of modernization through oil resources, or the linking of a political body to a state’s natural body (cf. Coronil 1997) through la Patria (cf. Martz 1987; Perreault and Valdivia 2010) is made more complex by indigenous relationships to a private company that provides ‘modernization’ in the form of material resources and infrastructural improvements. Neoliberal processes of privatization challenge state sovereignty and links between a territory and oil resources (cf. Perreault and Valdivia 2010). Thus, state sovereignty is threatened by both the possibility of indigenous organizing, as well as ongoing neoliberal policies that redistribute oil wealth removing the state’s control over its sub-surface resources. The Ecuadorian state operates under the fear of being “dispossessed from both within and without” (Nelson 2009: 210). How does it reconcile these encroachments?

I contend that the recent shifts in the state that ostensibly promote indigenous participation in political-economic debates, including the drafting of a new constitution, also expose the state’s strategic and duplicitous interests in oil governance and relationships to indigenous and other marginalized populations in Ecuador. In Chapter 3, indigenous peoples claimed they were duped by the company (cf. Nelson 2009). Here I suggest the state also engages in duping, leaving those populations at the point of extraction to the ‘control’ of multinational corporations (even if it claims oversight of corporate operations).
To be duped, argues Nelson (2009: 12) “is different from claiming ignorance.” It is a way to avoid taking full responsibility. But, duping can also be “world shattering. Trust is deceived, betrayed…At the moment of becoming conscious of the duplicity the self splits into the pre-self that didn’t know and the new self that is in the know.” People become uncertain. It forces one to question how to act after such revelations. And, yet, Nelson cautions, the person, or institution who claims to be duped could still be avoiding responsibility. How might we know?

The state’s attempts to undo neoliberal policies, and the formal end of CSR programs, also exposes its duplicitous nature – and continues to challenge notions of Ecuador as a petro-state. The Ecuadorian state suffers from crises of legitimacy that stem from extraction of oil. As is typical for petro-states, the so-called resource curse effect argues that while the state generates significant resources it lacks the authority and autonomy to enact economic policies, and often postpones much needed reforms. In the case of Ecuador, the state becomes predatory, and CSR programs tend to exacerbate these processes (Bebbington 2010; Bridge 2004).

While Correa claims that the state was also ‘duped’ by private companies, and responds by signing new contracts with multinationals to capture more of the rents from oil resources, this earlier process of turning over zones of resource extraction to private companies was also strategic. It was a plan that could allow the state to extract yet more oil. In turn, by publically challenging corporate presence in Ecuador, the state outwardly feigns ignorance in these two-faced processes (of capitalism). Yet, behind the scenes (cf. Nelson 2009), the duplicitous nature of the state emerges, as Claudia, the president of FCUNAE, and other indigenous leaders make clear. Local indigenous organizations refuse to be duped by the state.
Outline of the chapter

In order to develop my argument about indigenous entanglement in neoliberal policies and the state’s duplicitous nature, I begin by examining the resource curse, state sovereignty, and subject formation in the space of Ecuador. Next, I turn to histories of oil extraction, and the political economy of petroleum, including neoliberal policies that restructured state institutions and shaped citizen-subject formation. I follow this section with an exploration of indigenous social movements that emerged through the 1990s to challenge oil extraction and its negative impacts, and also grant indigenous peoples rights to territory and representation in electoral politics. Despite the achievements of the indigenous movement through the 1990s, the marches also “inadvertently circumscribed the terrain...upon which future struggles among state, national elite, corporate, and indigenous actors would take place” (Sawyer 2004: 30).

In the latter half of the chapter, I focus on recent shifts in contracts between multinationals and the Ecuadorian state to explore new forms of access to resource rents, and responses by indigenous leaders. Close ties between indigenous organizations and corporations through CSR programs produced confusion and ambivalence within indigenous leadership, but also allowed the space for more productive questioning of the state. I conclude by examining a ‘new’ model of development in Ecuador, one in which the state claims more of the rents from oil extraction leading Ecuador toward renewed goals of modernization and development.

In other words, the state has reached its moment of ‘reckoning,’ throwing off the ‘wizard’ s’ mantle of neoliberalism (Nelson 2009) (at least discursively) and moving into something that some scholars are critically examining as post-neoliberal (cf. Bebbington and Bebbington 2010; Escobar 2010; Macdonald and Ruckert 2009; Peck et al. 2009). Yet, Ecuador remains a petro-state, and continues to struggle with control over sovereign territory and state
control over resource extraction and distribution. It is forced to reckon with its political and economic roles as it shifts the terms of extraction (cf. Coronil 1997; Nelson 2009).

**Petro-states**

In this section I explore the governable space of the nation (cf. Watts 2004a), produced through petro-capitalism, a space that is subject to conflict given the presence of multinational oil companies (see, for example, Watts 2003, 2004a,b; Zalik 2004). I examine this space in the context of the state’s national patrimony tied to its subterranean oil resources (see Valdivia 2008; Perreault and Valdivia 2010). I build on geographical literature (see *inter alia* Bebbington and Bebbington 2010; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Bebbington 2009; LeBillon 2001; Valdivia 2008; Watts 2001; Moore 2000) that calls for analyses of resource conflict that are attentive not only to political economies that structure resource access and control, but also attention to ‘meanings and social identities’ that emerge from within resource politics.

Terry Karl (1997: 15) argues that because mining states “own the center of accumulation,” rely so heavily on profits from extractive industries, and provide the means through which these rents enter the economy, the states themselves become the object of rent seeking behavior, even from their own institutions. It is not easy, then, to separate economic ‘rationality’ from political behavior, as Coronil (1997) also suggests in linking the natural body of the state to its political body (see below). In turn, political decisions hinge on the economic performance of the extractive industry. In petro-states or oil states, Karl (1997) argues, these processes are even more firmly entrenched, because of the extraordinary nature of oil rents - there is little need for further investment in order to continue capturing income. This allows the state to expand its jurisdiction, but at the same time weakens its authority by increasing
opportunities for both public and private actors to engage in rent seeking behavior (cf. Watts 2001, 2004a,b). Therefore, these other public and private institutions can have a direct impact on the decision-making processes of the state. In moments of extremely high profits, these features that are unique to oil states can become exaggerated (Karl 1997).

LeBillon (2001) argues that the windfall rents in oil-rich states provide little incentive for the production of rules to develop a diversified economy. This prevents possibilities for alternative forms of economic power. Furthermore, on the one hand “domestic political competition” can be stymied by devolving the resource sector to foreign firms, as Ecuador did throughout the 1990s, but on the other hand this move satisfies international financial institutions. In petro-states (cf. Coronil 1997; Karl 1997; Nelson 2009), wealth and power are usually concentrated in the hands of elites, leaving marginalized groups frustrated. Often, argues LeBillon (2001), political change is the only way for the marginalized to voice their grievances. Sometimes this leads to violent outcomes (cf. Watts 2004a,b). In Ecuador, political protest was muted by the state’s mandate to require CSR programs linked to privatization policies, and these CSR institutions often served to erase, or blur the boundaries between state elites, and marginalized indigenous populations, as I argue throughout the dissertation.

Building on discussions of petro-states (cf. Coronil 1997; Karl 1997; Watts 2005), I ask what the removal of CSR programs exposes or uncovers about the state and its relationship to indigenous populations and oil wealth. Others have considered the ‘magic of the state’ that arises from political and economic processes. Fernando Coronil (1997: 4) argues that the petro-state is magical because of its subsoil resources, its natural body, and a second body, the political body, that together make up the state as a single agent that could “remake the nation.” Diane Nelson (2009: 217) finds that Guatemala’s “magic is less potent,” relying on agro-export industries and
increasingly on mineral resources. In the case of Guatemala, if the state defends the interests of the elites, it looks strong, but in the post-war era in Guatemala it also claims to represent the poor, and here it looks weak. Nelson (2009: 218) argues that elites drain the state of resources so it looks “anemic” or “incompetent and corrupt.” Continuing, she suggests that a state can often split – wondering which face to show. This forces us to ask if the state is weak, unable to harness the wealth of oil, “pathetically” letting others do it? “Or is [the state engaging in a] brilliant ploy to get off the hook of having to provide for people, a neoliberal dream in which they eagerly privatize themselves?” (p. 255). I suggest a neoliberal/post-neoliberal moment following the election of Rafael Correa in 2007 in Ecuador that calls for renewed attention to these questions of rentier-effects, and petro-states in particular is also a moment of ‘reckoning’ to continue to explore the ways in which “petroleum is the body through which state and citizen meet” (Valdivia 2008: 460). My analysis contributes to these arguments to suggest that reflection on the multiple bodies of the state complicates analysis of subject formation and challenges state sovereignty.

Building on Coronil’s (1998) arguments linking sub-surface resources to the political body that makes up the nation, others have also examined petroleum as a “‘thing’ through which actors represent and enforce the conduct of government” (Valdivia 2008: 459). In turn, subject identities, or territorialities are produced through a sense of belonging to this “physical body.” Valdivia’s (2008) analysis builds on Foucauldian relationships between ‘humans and things’ as the art of governing, or ‘conduct of conduct,’ but she suggests that we have to understand the quality of the ‘thing’ through which governance takes place. In the case of Ecuador, oil’s physical qualities are important to understanding the economic and political relationships of oil production. Furthermore, the particular technologies of production, including pipelines and
pumping stations, are also shaped by petroleum’s material qualities. These are also the sites at which oil-workers stopped production, leading to political processes that can challenge how oil is governed. In other words, these protests form the sites through which “acts of citizenship” are made visible (Valdivia 2008).

My analysis of CSR programs, indigenous peoples, and the state focuses on the way in which the physical body of oil produces pollution and physically harms indigenous populations. CSR programs can cover up those risks, but not eliminate them. How, then, I ask, can indigenous peoples make up the body-politic of the state, if it literally makes them sick? The production of the territory of the nation-state is also dependent on masking these negative externalities that are simultaneously produced in the body of the nation and the bodies of indigenous citizens. Sovereignty, then, is produced through CSR programs and disciplinary techniques, forcing the state to reconcile its multiple bodies. If indigenous protests through the 1990s called attention to these health impacts, CSR programs mask the social injustices that are tied to oil extraction. In the next section I turn to oil extraction in Ecuador, and state and corporate maneuvering to gain control over oil rents.

_Ecuador’s political economy of oil_

As the global importance of petroleum grew through the 20th Century, companies sought out new spaces and frontiers for the expansion of global capital. Some of this expansion happened in the Ecuadorian Amazon region. In turn, the Ecuadorian government, aiming to capitalize on these explorations opened large areas of the region to foreign exploration and investment - what some have called _entreguismo_ – or the selling out of the country’s interests (see Valdivia 2008). During this period contracts were signed on a concessionary basis – through
renting or leasing – and there were few regulations placed on corporations. In this way, argues Valdivia (2008: 460), the state could increase its wealth, and in turn the “well-being of its citizens.” Yet, exploration efforts were largely unsuccessful. Ecuador’s crude was difficult to access and of low quality, and some companies returned their concessions (Martz 1986; Valdivia 2008).

Oil extraction began in earnest with the discovery of productive wells by Texaco Petroleum and Gulf in 1967. In 1963 a large oil field was uncovered in the neighboring Putumayo region in Colombia, and companies hoped to find more deposits across the border in Ecuador. Soon thereafter, the Ecuadorian government signed a contract with Texaco-Gulf (Gerlach 2003). Because of the incipient nature of Ecuador's oil industry, along with entreguismo, and rent seeking behavior to accrue profits, investments favored private oil companies, as the state sought rent from oil extraction. After successful findings in the field along the border, other fields were discovered by Texaco-Gulf. Ecuador soon received additional requests to open the Amazon region to additional explorations by foreign companies. About 30 concessions were granted by 1970, encompassing 10 million hectares and involving several companies that invested in exploration and production (Fontaine 2003; Gerlach 2003; Martz 1984; Valdivia 2008).

Following these discoveries, a former Minister of Natural and Energy Resources, Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, announced that oil was the “inalienable Patrimony of the State” and the constitution reflected this, establishing ownership through the Ecuadorian population (quoted in Valdivia 2008: 460-1). Furthermore, the government would be the only administrator of the resource. In 1971, a military coup nationalized sub-surface resources, and established the

---

77 Although foreign oil companies, including Shell Oil, arrived in the Amazon region in the 1920s (geologic studies suggested the possibility of petroleum in the Amazon region), exploration efforts were largely unproductive and many private companies returned their concessions in 1948 (Sawyer 2004, Valdivia 2008).
country’s first hydrocarbons law (*la Ley de Hidrocarburos*), which allowed the state to retain rights to the subsoil in the Amazon region. It also laid the groundwork for a national company, *la Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana* (CEPE), although the company itself wasn’t established until the following year. (In 1989, CEPE changed its name to Petroecuador, and was restructured, explained in-depth below.) Many of these institutional shifts sought to regain state control over oil rents and private investments (Gerlach 2003).

The hydrocarbons law is most notable for establishing the government’s sovereignty in the region, by retaining state rights to the subsoil, and ending the earlier “system of concessions” to foreign oil interests.\(^{78}\) These changes essentially meant that CEPE was granted full exploration and exploitation rights in the region, and transportation and refining would also be state controlled. Foreign companies that were interested in the region would have to sign a series of agreements with CEPE to extract oil, and CEPE controlled all the pricing (Martz 1987).\(^{79}\) In 1972 Texaco finished construction on the *Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano* (SOTE) pipeline from the northern Amazon region to the coast, and plans were established to construct a refinery on the coast (Martz 1987). During this period of the 1960s and 1970s, Ecuador’s military government put together a series of plans that were to end the country’s social and economic contradictions (Sawyer 2004). As Martz (1987) suggests, it soon became clear that the country’s oil resources would aid the government in these plans. Specifically, a restructuring of the state’s economic and social services, subsidized by oil revenues, marked the 1970s.

The hydrocarbons law developed petroleum as a public resource used to finance development of the nation. In other words, the state is framed as a one that “cares” for a

---

\(^{78}\) This retention of state sovereignty is not unique to Ecuador, and in fact is quite common in most Latin American states. See for example, Coronil (1997).

\(^{79}\) Martz (1987) suggests that in reality, this law was quite weak, and did little to protect the economic interests of the state.
population's well-being, that finances public projects, all dependent on ongoing resource extraction (Valdivia 2008: 462; Coronil 1998). During this period CEPE became the most important state institution as it managed and distributed the wealth from oil extraction. Redistribution of wealth, coupled with low prices on many basic goods due to state subsidies, led to the increased purchasing power of the population. Yet, as the international price for oil began to decline in the 1980s, so did Ecuador’s socio-political stability (Gerlach 2003).

In the 1970s, Ecuador had entered into a program of moderate foreign indebtedness, which it continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In committing to these foreign indebtedness policies, Ecuador tried to instigate a series of reforms that eliminated a role for the state (Martz 1987). Ecuador joined OPEC in 1973, but left again in 1992 when global oil prices plummeted. (In 2008, Ecuador rejoined the cartel under current President Correa.) Oil continues to finance infrastructural improvement in the country, especially in the major cities. In the 1970s and 1980s, roads and airports were built in the Amazon region to facilitate access, and immigration from the highlands to the lowlands intensified. Oil was equated with modernization and progress (Valdivia 2005; Gerlach 2003). At the same time, the Amazon region was devastated socially and environmentally by extraction, especially the northern Amazonian provinces of Orellana and Sucumbios.\footnote{These two provinces did not exist when oil extraction began in Ecuador. Instead, they were cleaved from Napo – Sucumbios in 1989, and Orellana in 2000 – to help administer oil development and capture additional rents.} Texaco (today Chevron) is implicated in much of this devastation, as one of the first companies to begin extraction (Kimmerling 1993).\footnote{A longstanding lawsuit brought against Chevron by Ecuadorian plaintiffs, including some indigenous populations was recently decided in an Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio, in the northern Amazon region. The plaintiffs received an $18 billion settlement in January 2012 to pay for health and environmental damages following Texaco’s operations in Ecuador. (See Keefe 2012 for more information on the history of the case and the recent decision, as well as Sawyer 2002, 2006, 2009a,b and Valdivia 2007 for a more critical analysis of the lawsuit, corporate sovereignty, and indigenous rights.)}

Throughout the 1980s, the government sought out loans from the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank that would fund exploration and
development of oil, anticipating that increased oil production would also increase state revenue. Petroleum prices continued to fall and the government instituted structural adjustment policies. International lending institutions pushed for the privatization of oil operations to re-finance Ecuador's growing debt (Valdivia 2008; Sawyer 2004). In turn, the government approved changes to the hydrocarbons law. CEPE was the first institution to undergo restructuring because it was viewed as inefficient and corrupt. Its name was changed to Petroecuador, and although it remained a state company it was divided into several affiliated, independent branches. Each branch addressed a different piece of extraction, including exploration, distribution, and production, designed to make oil extraction in Ecuador more efficient. Furthermore, the industry opened to foreign investment, to expand infrastructure, increase production and spur economic growth (Valdivia 2008).

State controlled oil fields were leased to foreign multinational companies, or sometimes operated under a joint venture. Oil production in Ecuador boomed in the 1990s when the country exited OPEC under President Durán Ballén. International investors and institutions were in favor of these policies, to increase Ecuador's economic stature on a global scale. The new hydrocarbons law, drafted with the World Bank, was designed to reduce the state's control over extraction. Private corporations began to extract oil in so-called “marginal fields” and they were also granted permission to begin expansion of the SOTE pipeline. In 2003 the OCP (Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado) pipeline was constructed with financial backing from several private companies, including Repsol-YPF (Sawyer 2004).

The SOTE pipeline initially transported oil from all the fields in the Oriente, including the higher quality extracted by Petroecuador, and the lower quality extracted by private companies, resulting in a type of oil known as the ‘Oriente Blend’. The blended oil is discounted
in international markets accounting for differences in quality. In turn, the reduction of value in oil from Petroecuador’s oil fields was interpreted as an attack on national identity, and threatened national sovereignty (see Valdivia 2008). This sentiment, combined with policies that favored increases in private extraction, led to the proposed construction of the OCP pipeline, ostensibly to alleviate pressure on the older SOTE pipeline. In turn, opposition movements, including Petroecuador workers, critiqued construction of this pipeline on the grounds that it would reduce Ecuador’s oil reserves more rapidly, and it threatened the social and environmental health of the localities it passed through. Despite these protests, the pipeline was put into production in 2003. The OCP pipeline could transport crudes of higher density, while the SOTE was left for Petroecuador’s oil fields. Separating the two crudes could increase prices for Ecuador’s Oriente Blend, and the pipeline became a particular ‘technology of rule’ through which the state could “rationalize the participation of private companies in petroleum extraction as beneficial for the Ecuadorian people” (Valdivia 2008: 472).

At the same time, new contracts with multinationals were established. Previous contracts were “risk-service contracts” where foreign companies granted services to the Ecuadorian government in return for a portion of profits from discovered oil. Oil exploration was at the multinational's own risk. If oil was discovered, the state would reimburse the company for its exploration costs. If oil was not found, the state had no obligations. These agreements were signed with Petroecuador, and theoretically it monitored all foreign multinational activity (Sawyer 2004; Martz 1987). In the 1990s, production-sharing contracts were introduced, and control over multinational operations disappeared. Contracts were given to companies that committed to investing the most capital, with the most involved exploration plans, and those that offered the state the best production-sharing agreement. Because there was no reimbursement,
there was no need for Petroecuador to monitor investments and corporate activity. The
Ecuadorian state used these contracts to boost investment from foreign multinationals. A
required piece of these contracts were CSR programs. With little state monitoring, however,
there was no oversight in corporate operations and corporations often implemented programs that
should have been the state's responsibility.

Building on others (see Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008; Watts 2001), I
examine this history of a nationalist development project through oil extraction in Ecuador
arguing that it contributes to, and constitutes a sense of community, with and through oil
Subterranean resources and hydrocarbons production correspond to the territoriality of the
nation-state (Watts 2004, 2001; Perreault and Valdivia 2010). The “ideological construction” of
the nation is linked in the term “la Patria” (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 3; Sawyer 2004).
Following Perreault and Valdivia (2010), la Patria is understood both in the sense of a
“government and citizens,” and a “natural body” of nature and territory, the basis of the economy
(see also Coronil 1997). In turn, petroleum in Ecuador becomes the “patrimonio nacional or
inheritance of the nation and its citizens,” linking oil extraction to modernization and growth of
the state (Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 691; Watts 2001). Perreault and Valdivia (2010), argue
that the “imagined hydrocarbon communities” they study produce implications for citizenship
and national belonging, and impact and influence resource struggles. Thus, by linking la Patria
to natural resources, scholars have argued that contestation over resource extraction policies
frame the governance of subjects and in turn, subjects also shape technologies that discipline

There are numerous studies that have explored relationships between citizenship and state
power (see inter alia Secor 2004; Watts 2001; Perreault 2006; Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2008). In
the context of the Ecuadorian nation, Valdivia (2008: 458) explored “petro-citizenship” as a way to understand how “life ought to be conducted” in Ecuador, tied explicitly to the governance of oil. Citizenship hinges on inclusion and exclusion, and emerges in everyday life (Secor 2004; Valdivia 2008). It allows us to question an individual's or group's relationship to a territory, or political body, and who is worthy of being a member (Painter and Philo 1995). As Sawyer (2004) argues, la Patria is about possession, and patriarchal processes of a white, male elite (despite being a feminine noun in Spanish). “La Patria is the right of conquest” (Sawyer 2004: 221). In turn, indigenous populations in Ecuador have positioned themselves against the state by using the language of “the nation” to challenge discourses of la Patria. The nation becomes a chosen site of struggle, and a process of creating a collective sense of belonging. I turn to these struggles in the next section, and the production of an indigenous social movement throughout the 1990s.

*Development, indigenous peoples, and oil*

As explored in the previous chapter, beginning in the 1960s, the state began a process of “agricultural colonization” in the Amazon region to make the land more productive. In 1964, Ecuador enacted its first agrarian reform law, which also coincided with US-related ‘concerns’ regarding social inequalities in Latin America that might result in another Cuban-style revolution. Furthermore, this law did away with the “feudal system of serfdom” that led to the expropriation of hacienda and former Church lands in the highlands (Sawyer 2004: 44). In the Amazon region, the discourse surrounding passage of the law included a notion of *tierras baldías* or “underworked lands” that were in need of development, despite existence of indigenous populations in the region. These agrarian reforms were used to promote the Amazon
region within the nation-state, especially during a period of conflict with Peru, and to present it as a “release valve” for population pressures in the highlands (Macdonald 1999; Yashar 2005; Valdivia 2005; Sawyer 2004). (During the same period oil exploration and extraction was beginning in Ecuador, as outlined above, and in the previous chapter.)

As conflicts emerged between indigenous populations and internal colonists, indigeneity was identified with preventing progress of a modern nation-state. The modern-nation state was linked to petroleum revenues, and progress was tied to programs that furthered health, education and urbanization, but also notions of welfare, and taking care of a population. The central government provided subsidies for populations, kept taxes low, and offered credit for industrial investment (Carriere 2001; Gerlach 2003; Perreault and Valdivia 2011). National policies were designed to incorporate indigenous populations into the 'civilized state', calling for an end to subsistence practices and cultural norms that marked indigenous difference from mestizo populations (Valdivia 2005; Muratorio 1994; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).

Indigenous peoples organized to collectively respond to these land grabs instituted by the state, defending their land and collective autonomy (Yashar 2005). The state had essentially turned over the Amazon region to missionaries prior to the 1960s, because it was unable to control and tame the so-called 'savages' (Yashar 2005). Missionaries had started a process of 'civilizing' indigenous peoples through Christianity. These missionary groups initially included the Jesuits and later the Catholic Josephines and Salesians. At about the same time, though, Evangelical Protestants also entered the region. This often resulted in conflict between Catholics and Protestants, although both ultimately wanted to see capitalist development in the Amazon region (Muratorio 1991). Many missionary programs, including attending schools and church services, were promoted through a process of gift giving in an attempt to persuade Kichwa
communities to give up their cultural traditions (Muratorio 1991). The Summer Institute of Linguistics, a Protestant group, focused on ways to draw indigenous peoples into “productive society,” as rational, national subjects, or “peasant citizens” (Valdivia 2005: 288). Following attempts to settle indigenous groups by building schools, churches and health facilities, indigenous populations became dependent on church based development programs. Missionaries also provided Spanish language skills, allowing indigenous groups to communicate among and across each other, and ultimately this allowed indigenous Amazonian groups the local autonomy they needed to demand rights to territory (Sawyer 2004).

Furthermore, progressive missionaries introduced ideas of 'liberation theology' whereby indigenous populations were exposed to ideas about 'dependency theory' and notions of 'core-periphery' power relationships through trade of raw materials (Muratorio 1991). Indeed, this prompted indigenous populations to question development banks and multinational corporations. Several indigenous Amazonian groups emerged in this period, including the Federación de Centros Shuar, formed with the help of Salesian priests influenced by liberation theology (Macdonald 1999). Other lowland Kichwa organizations include FOIN – also aided to some extent by the Josephines – and OPIP (see Perreault 2003a,b and Sawyer 2004, respectively, for in-depth discussions of the histories and politics of these organizations in Ecuador.)

Following these models, highland and lowland indigenous groups organized at local, regional and national levels. At the regional level, the following indigenous organizations emerged: CONFENAIE (est. 1980) in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) (est. 1972) in the highlands, and Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana (COICE) on the coast. (Today COICE is the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras de la Costa Ecuatoriana or CONICE.)
CONFENAIE represents eight indigenous nationalities: Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar Shiwiari, Siona, Secoya, Cofan and Waorani (Sawyer 2004). It not only sought to defend indigenous land and cultures, but also demanded a percentage of proceeds from oil and mining companies (Yashar 2005). CONFENAIE remains a fraught organization as it seeks to balance territorial claims with participation in oil wealth, and local level organizations have often surpassed the role of CONFENAIE. Yet, these regional organizations decided it was necessary to establish a national indigenous organization. CONAIE was founded in 1986 and is the national umbrella organization for indigenous organizations in Ecuador. It negotiates indigenous demands, not only within the state, but also beyond its borders (Sawyer 2004).

During the economic crisis of the 1980s in Ecuador that resulted from falling oil prices, which led to the subsequent adoption of neoliberal policies promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, NGOs and church organizations began to take on the role of the state, using the language of autodesarrollo and capacitación as a means to develop indigenous people as productive individuals in society. In turn, processes promoted by the state and NGOs that aimed to privatize the agricultural industry in the Amazon region, threatened its cultural integrity. As a result, some indigenous groups saw this incorporation into society as one way to gain legitimacy within the state, and to claim rights to territory and access to resources. Others, though, saw this process of incorporation as one that highlighted the inferiority of indigeneity to mestizo practices, and many indigenous groups used their difference as a means to gain rights in the state (Valdivia 2005; Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008; Sawyer 2004).

In 1992, OPIP organized a march to Quito with support from CONAIE and CONFENAIE, along with indigenous rights organizations in the United States and Europe. The march was designed to call attention to agrarian reform laws of the 1960s that led to colonization
of the Amazon region, and worries that additional oil exploration would devastate indigenous territory in the southern Amazon region. The mobilization also aimed to defend and gain legal title to indigenous peoples’ lands (Yashar 2005; Sawyer 2004). Moreover, in 1990, CONAIE led a 10-day mobilization to obstruct the workings of the Ecuadorian state; roadblocks, boycotts, local government office occupations and land repossessions paralyzed the country. The marches called attention to indigenous demands for rights to territory, but indigenous groups were characterized by the state as subversive, and accused of aiming to form a state within a state (Sawyer 2004).

If the earlier marches in 1990 and 1992 demonstrated the power of CONAIE (and OPIP) to organize an uprising, a third mobilization in 1994 spoke to CONAIE's ability to debate, protest, and renegotiate the agrarian reform law (Macdonald 1999; Yashar 2005; Sawyer 2004). In 1994, indigenous peoples in Ecuador mobilized again, and marched from the Amazon region to the capital, closing highways and stopping oil production (Yashar 2005; Valdivia 2005; Sawyer 2004). This public outcry forced demands for equality and participation to be met at the national level. CONAIE successfully renegotiated the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law, calling for increased control by indigenous peoples over territory and resources. While Sawyer (2004) argues that the central neoliberal tenets of the law remained in place, the uprising and subsequent dialogue demonstrated the state's weaknesses in controlling its indigenous citizens - no longer could indigenous groups be excluded from these national debates.

Yet, indigenous demands were not solely limited to national level participation; transnational spaces also allowed for indigenous mobilization, including through the United Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO). By the 1990s, the Ecuadorian state legally recognized its pluricultural population in the ILO Convention 169 as well as in
constitutional reforms in 1998. Cultural difference and marginalization of indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian state marked the agendas of indigenous organizations, and linked indigeneity to socially just, ecologically sound ways of life. As a result, indigenous organizations used “socially recognized difference” to improve livelihoods and communities (Lucero 2008; Valdivia 2005: 290).

Neoliberalism presented the opportunity to use indigenous difference, and produce a new subject who can act as a “global, rational being with needs and rights” (Valdivia 2005: 290). Despite the relative 'success' of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, the state still maintains its rights to the oil beneath indigenous territory. Furthermore, while recognition of indigenous rights at the national level represented significant progress for indigenous populations in Ecuador, lowland indigenous populations remain impacted by ongoing oil extraction. Indeed, oil extraction seems to depend upon marking boundaries between those who can carry on “Ecuador's destiny” and those who are “racially inferior” (Sawyer 2004: 105). Those members of the ruling regime could claim that additional oil operations would “invigorate la Patria,” but only if pollution and subjectivities of Amazonian peoples were ignored. In other words, oil development can also excoriate human life in the name of securing it (Stoler 1995 in Sawyer 2004: 105).

Indigenous protests focused on the ways in which “race, class, and gender informed notions of citizenship and property” (Sawyer 2004: 107). When companies entered the Amazon region, they were trespassing on indigenous territory, argued indigenous leaders. In response, the government claimed that public space belonged to the state, removing claims to citizenship for indigenous peoples. Neoliberal reforms relied on marking the boundaries that could exclude certain populations, whose claims to property, citizenship and rights were not worthy of
recognition. Thus, state institutions were “disavowing their responsibility” leading to
“hyperexploitation” (Sawyer 2004: 107). At the same time, argues Sawyer (2004), protestors
disrupted flows of capital in and out of the country, occupying Ministry of Energy offices in
Quito. Yet, the political openings at the national level for indigenous peoples only served to
solidify corporate presence at the local level. Companies intensified their push to open additional
oil wells, by offering more sophisticated CSR projects and dividing indigenous groups, diffusing
the organizational power that motivated the movements of the 1990s.

In other words, the indigenous movements through the 1990s successfully achieved
collective rights to territory for indigenous populations, and transnational advocacy networks
promoted those rights on an international stage through, for example World Bank policies (see
Andolina, et al. 2009). Simultaneously, however, neoliberal policies advocated by development
banks, and enacted by the Ecuadorian state allowed for multinational presence in indigenous
territory, and the implementation of CSR programs. Hale (2011: 195) argues that there is a
“hard-nosed economic logic” at the root of these contradictory processes. So-called
‘development with identity’ can encompass not only a modern state’s recognition of cultural
difference, but also the “regimes of rights” that can help marginalized populations “negotiate the
rigors of modernity.” Thus, “chaos and contention” are replaced with something more intelligible
and predictable, and furthermore something that can be monitored by the market. Hale (2006)
notes that this process of replacement is even more evident in those territories that are closely
linked to the globalized economy. Indigenous peoples, then, were not only entangled with
neoliberal policies, but more specifically with corporate capital.

I suggest that processes of replacement also contain indigenous political participation to
the local level, and prohibit indigenous involvement in larger political economic structures (cf.
Hale 2011). Hale’s (2011: 196) analysis calls attention to the spatial differentiation in governance processes, and the way in which the state can devolve responsibility to the local level through “carefully crafted regimes of autonomy,” but still achieve neoliberal outcomes through other means. Multinationals remain in the country, CSR programs offer sufficient pieces of oil’s riches, and the state continues reaping the profits of its sub-surface resources. In turn, I consider the ways in which the discourses and practices of the indigenous movement through the 1990s sought to reshape the body of the nation, and the ways in which the ‘governable space of the nation’ is simultaneously challenged by corporate claims to oil (cf. Watts 2001, 2004a).

Despite maintaining rights to the sub-surface resources, neoliberal reforms challenged the sovereignty of the state in oil production – the territory of the nation and its oil resources was no longer under the state’s jurisdiction. More recent reforms in hydrocarbons development seek to reclaim state control over production processes. In turn, claims on the state by indigenous groups in the northern Amazon region stand, at least in part in contrast to a national indigenous movement that emerged in the 1990s. Indeed, I argue that this must be the outcome of neoliberal processes. The space of the nation is no longer a viable space to voice indigenous concerns. Instead, communities, oil concessions and local level organizations emerge as new spaces through which to secure indigenous rights and access to resources. While NAWE exercised its rights through a private corporation, new leadership in the organization and in other Amazonian organizations highlight both the containment and undoing of the indigenous movement, but also challenges to the state through the emergence of indigenous subjects that reflect corporate and state maneuvers, exposing the duplicitous nature of the state. In the next section, I turn to these questions through recent shifts in oil governance.
When I arrived in Ecuador to begin my fieldwork in October 2008, the state had already initiated a process to take more of the windfall profits of oil extraction. President Correa planned to shift contracts with private companies from the so-called production-sharing contracts toward the older, service-lending contracts implemented in the 1980s. Production contracts had eliminated the state's role in overseeing oil operations, while service-lending contracts called for additional monitoring of oil operations. During the period of my fieldwork between 2008-2010, the state's discourse was one of taking back control of oil operations from corporations. An official in the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources informed me “it was time for private companies to respect Ecuadorian law” (Personal Interview 2009). Subsequent negotiations with private companies continued to reflect this discourse. In this section I investigate the early stages of institutional shifts from production contracts to service-lending contracts, and indigenous claims on the state and interventions in oil governance through CSR programs.

In the 1990s, when the price of oil began to fall, companies claimed higher costs of extraction, and the state could no longer cover the costs of repaying companies. Petroecuador, the state company, went into debt in its attempts to repay companies. In turn, private companies were covered financially by the state, but not much was left over for the state's own benefit. The state repaid the corporation for its so-called social programs, including CSR projects, which the company considered part of its operational costs to extract oil. This prompted shifts in the hydrocarbons law, which would guarantee the state a portion of profits from extraction based on the price per barrel of oil. This law passed without public consideration, and was in violation of

---

82 I borrow these phrases from Nelson (2009), which she uses to refer to the ‘political body’ of the state.
83 Formerly this Ministry was the Ministry of Energy, then Mines and Petroleum and now the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources.
Ecuador’s constitution, because it took public goods and invested them in private operations. Despite their illegality, production-sharing contracts were signed with private companies through the 1990s (El Comercio October 22, 2007; see also Sawyer 2004).

Profits from oil extraction in Ecuador were intimately linked to the global price for oil, because the private company was the majority investor. In the early period of extraction (1970s-80s) in Block 16, currently operated by Repsol-YPF, the price of a barrel of oil was increasing. The company and state split the windfall profits 20%-80% where the state had 20% and the company 80%. The price kept rising and this system continued without challenge, until the arrival of President Alfredo Palacio in 2005. Palacio declared the 20%-80% could work only until the price of a barrel of oil reached $25/barrel. Above $25/barrel, the windfall profits would be split 50%-50%. This became known as the Law of 50-50. Yet, this new law only served to give the company even more profits. If the company was already earning 80% on each barrel of oil until $25/barrel, it would continue to earn more profits overall once the price reached $26/barrel. The state would never earn as much as the company (Almeida 2009).

When Correa took office in 2007, he immediately introduced the idea of a 99%-1% split of windfall profits, reforming the so-called Law 42, a section of the hydrocarbons law, and angering private companies. Repsol-YPF initiated a lawsuit in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) operated by the World Bank in Washington, DC, claiming Ecuador had violated the terms of its contract (Almeida 2009, El Comercio November 16, 2007). The state ultimately reached an interim agreement with Repsol-YPF. Some have suggested that the 99%-1% split was merely a “scare tactic” by Correa (Almeida 2009), and the president never believed companies would agree to these terms. I suggest this language invokes

---

84 Palacio served as President from April 2005 until January 2007. He had been Ecuador’s vice-president, but following growing unrest and the expulsion of President Lucio Gutiérrez, he was appointed President.
the carnivalesque quality of the political body governing oil extraction in Ecuador (cf. Nelson 2009). However, these tactics, whether real or not, combined with the risk of Repsol-YPF leaving the country, prompted indigenous groups, self-identifying as CSR recipients, to protest Repsol-YPF's exit in November 2008. This is when NAWE published its declaration in *El Comercio*.

The declaration included seven points, and was addressed to President Correa and the Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Derlis Palacios.\(^{85}\) NAWE's President during this period, Enqueri Nihua Ehuenguime, who also signed the declaration, later left the organization leaving behind a trail of unpaid taxes. NAWE mentioned the agreement signed with Maxus in 1993 when the company began its operations in Block 16 in 1999; the agreement was later transferred to Repsol-YPF when the company took over operations from Maxus. The agreement, *Acuerdo de Amistad, Respeto y Apoyo Mutuo* (Agreement of Friendship, Respect and Mutual Support) lasts for a period of 20 years – through 2013. The declaration in *El Comercio* mentions the cooperation between the Waorani and Repsol-YPF, preventing any obstacles to Repsol-YPF's operations, and in so doing serving the country by guaranteeing the state ongoing profits from extraction. The company agrees to certain annual obligations established with NAWE. The fourth point lists many of the services the company provides the Waorani, including medical, education, transportation, handicrafts, organizational support, travel and participation in the United Nations forum on Indigenous Peoples. The declaration claims that this support is required by the Waorani pueblo on a daily basis for its existence and improvement to daily lives.\(^{86}\) For this reason, states the declaration, the Waorani are writing to request that the state continue negotiating with Repsol-YPF to reach an agreement, so that the Waorani pueblo and its

---

\(^{85}\) Palacios was eventually removed from this position.

\(^{86}\) “el pueblo requiere diariamente para su existencia y acceso a mejores condiciones de vida.” (El Comercio Nov. 4, 2008)
communities remain respected, can continue to work with, cooperate, participate and benefit from oil production, something which also belongs to the Waorani people. Furthermore, point six requests that the Ecuadorian government require all companies that work in Waorani territory to sign agreements with NAWE, and benefit all the Waorani, not just a few communities. If not, CSR programs will divide the Waorani people. In turn, companies must seek the permission of the Waorani to enter their territory, as Maxus did in 1993. Through their declaration the Waorani intervened in discussions of oil governance and corporate capitalism, claiming rights to their territory and to oil, threatening the state's control over oil production and the Waorani pueblo. Yet, as negotiations continued at the national level, indigenous groups were not involved in debates over new extraction contracts.

Reforming the hydrocarbons law

During this period of tension between the company and the state, the price for oil remained relatively low globally, and it seemed financially difficult for Repsol-YPF to continue to operate in the country (Almeida 2009). Ecuador's oil varies in quality, and companies often spend more money investing in technology to extract oil than they earn on each barrel (see Valdivia 2008). However, company staff informed me that Repsol-YPF wanted to maintain its political presence in the region; it has operations in every South American country except French Guyana. During this period, the state and Repsol-YPF agreed to an interim 70% - 30% split on windfall profits, where the state received the 70% share. However, this new split only applied to excess oil when the price per barrel went above $42.50/barrel. At $42.50/barrel the base level split would be the older 80%-20% split. Yet, when this agreement was reached in 2008, the price

---

87 Negotiations in Ecuador took place between President Correa and the Spanish Minister of migration. Many Ecuadorians have migrated to Spain, and maintaining cordial political ties between the countries is important (El Comercio Feb. 26, 2009).
per barrel never went above $42.50, according to Alexandra Almeida at Acción Ecológica (Personal Interview 2009). Despite this renegotiation, the company continued to have the upper hand. The 70%-30% negotiation remained the “new” split with private companies, even though private companies continued to profit from extraction at the 80%-20% price (El Comercio 17 November, 2007; Almeida 2009).

After negotiations with Correa's administration, Repsol-YPF's contract with Petroecuador was extended through 2018, and the company was expected to pay $250 million in royalties to state coffers, and invest in oil infrastructure through that year. In addition, the company agreed to increase production of crude in the block (El Comercio Nov. 7, 2008). These shifts, though, prompted Repsol-YPF to claim it had less money for CSR programs, and its tenuous relationship with the state prevented it from signing any new contracts at the community level in Pompeya. The agreement with the Waorani remains in place because the funds for NAWE are not directly tied to profit negotiations with the state, and because the agreement precedes recent negotiations (Morales 2009). Furthermore, the Fundación Repsol will also continue its programs because the funding for these is not impacted by negotiations with the state (Valdez 2009). Meanwhile, President Correa continued to push for service-lending contracts, and implemented a series of reforms to the hydrocarbons law in 2009.

The final changes to the hydrocarbons law arrived at the Constituent Assembly for debate in June 2010, and became law in July 2010. Some analysts pointed to pressure from President Correa to ensure the reforms passed (El Comercio 26 June, 2010). The current hydrocarbons law establishes a new Agency, la Agencia Nacional de Petróleo, to oversee contract negotiations,

---

88 It is also important to remember that Waorani territory lies within Block 16, and the Waorani have always had a “closer” relationship with the company than those Kichwa communities impacted by Repsol-YPF's access to the block. In interviews with Samuel, his “sympathies” lie with indigenous groups, and he argued he would not and could not abruptly end the company's support in communities (Morales November 8, 2008; January 29, 2009).
rather than Petroecuador. In addition to this shift in oversight of operations, also included was the move toward new service-lending contracts for all private companies operating in Ecuador. A fixed, single tariff to pay the operation costs of companies would be established on a contractual basis, and tied to barrels of oil extracted. The tariff ensures that 100% of the profits from oil are invested in the state, de-linking the state's investments from the fluctuating price of oil on global markets. The reforms also included a 120-day limit, or until November 23, 2010, to negotiate new contracts to replace the participation contracts.

On July 30, 2010, according to El Comercio (29 July 2010), the state handed over the terms of the new service-lending contracts to private companies operating in Ecuador. El Comercio (11 August 2010) reported that Repsol-YPF began its negotiations with the state on August 23, 2010. In addition, the state planned to ensure it would receive at a minimum 90% of the total extracted petroleum rent established by the new contracts. This would be an increase from the existing 65% average established through the older production contracts. The negotiation of this new tariff would happen on an individual basis dependent on the productivity of each oil block. As the November 2010 deadline loomed closer, several negotiations fell apart. Petrobras, the Brazilian state company, along with several smaller companies, left Ecuador because they failed to reach a contract agreement. Repsol-YPF signed a new contract days before its contract negotiation deadline. This marked the end of four years of negotiations with the state and private companies.

Meanwhile, indigenous organizations are left to maneuver between these shifting relationships at the national level making their own claims on the state and private companies at the point of extraction. Given this political maneuvering to ensure the state received the majority

---

89 Despite posting contracts online through the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources, I am unable to find the new tariffs agreed to between the state and Repsol-YPF. Newspaper accounts did not publish this information.
share of oil extraction royalties, combined with President Correa’s election platform that ensured rights for all, including nature, how could indigenous populations not be confused and puzzled, and sometimes angered, by a state that seems to be sending mixed messages (cf. Auyero and Swistun 2009)? In the next sections I elaborate on this confusion and anger through conversations with indigenous leadership in organizations at the local level, as well as through participant observation in indigenous meetings in Coca.

*Indigenous organizations, CSR programs, and the governance of oil*

In this section I explore new spaces of governance that emerge at the point of extraction that challenge the territory of the nation tied oil resources. I begin with shifts in leadership in the Waorani organization NAWE that engaged in new negotiations with multinationals. As outlined in earlier chapters, Block 16 (concession established in 1973) lies inside Waorani territory, and along the border with Yasuni National Park. The Ecuadorian *Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC)* granted the Waorani rights to their territory (612,560 hectares) in April 1990. Because the Waorani territory overlapped with the park, the boundaries of the park were modified to accommodate this land titling, rather than establishing the park in conjunction with Waorani territory. Moreover, the Waorani land titling was established with the state's condition that the Waorani not disrupt oil extraction that occurs in their territory (Gavaldá 2003). At the same time, the park boundaries were carefully redrawn to exclude the majority of Block 16. Yasuni became a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1989, and this recognition prohibits oil extraction inside the park's borders (Gavaldá 2003; Almeida 2009; Sawyer 2004). Yet, due to a series of constitutional reforms, oil drilling does happen inside the park (Pearson 2010).
My exploration of CSR programs in Block 16 led me to the Waorani organization, which in recent years has received $800,000 to $1 million annually from Repsol-YPF. Indeed, Maxus, the company operating in Block 16 before the arrival of Repsol-YPF in 1999 instigated the founding of the organization. The establishment of NAWE by Maxus reflects more recent characterizations of indigenous organizations in Ecuador that emerged through support of corporations. Sawyer (2004) recounts ARCO's strategies to divide indigenous groups through the 1980s and 1990s, siphoning off indigenous people who favored corporate influence, and forming other organizations that favored company support. Leadership in NAWE is the primary negotiator with the company, making it much easier for the company to work with the entire Waorani pueblo, or in other words to monitor the Waorani population. However, it became clear that the Waorani do not organize themselves under an umbrella organization like NAWE (Almeida 2009). Each community is autonomous, and this continues to plague company relationships with NAWE and Waorani communities. Today NAWE's leadership continues to be tempted by corporate monies, and several presidents have been accused of taking money for personal gain, calling into question the effectiveness of the organization (see High 2006).

In the early months of my fieldwork, in late 2008 and early 2009, NAWE continued to be in disarray. I heard stories when I arrived in Puyo, the capital of Pastaza Province and location of NAWE's offices, about NAWE's president leaving the organization, taking the computer that was provided by Repsol-YPF. Indeed, the organization no longer had a staffed office in Puyo when I arrived in March 2009. However, the new President, Pedro, elected around this same time, was  

---

90 The Waorani have historically been considered more difficult to 'control' and 'access'. Indeed, at the turn of the 20th century, the Capuchin missionaries (who are still present today) took up residence in Coca, and established themselves along the banks of the middle Napo River, in the community of Pompeya. Bishop Alejandro Labaca's goal was to contact the Waorani to lessen the impact of the fast approaching oil industry, and reduce any associated violence. Yet, Labaca was later found speared to death by the Waorani, prompting national responses, including indigenous organizations who claimed title to their lands, pushing the Waorani into the national political sphere (Macdonald 1999).
viewed as someone who could revamp the organization (Lopez 2009). Furthermore, in 2005, a Waorani women's organization was established, the *Associación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana* (AMWAE). AMWAE, though technically a subsidiary of NAWE, receiving 5% of NAWE's overall operating budget, had stronger leadership, a clear vision for the organization, and successful programs in place (Noss 2009). Both NAWE and AMWAE operate with so-called 'technical advisors,' non-indigenous men to help manage the organizations' programs. These advisors are employees of Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), an international conservation organization that funds several programs in both NAWE and AMWAE.

The rumors and stories about NAWE that were recounted to me in Puyo were the result of cultural impacts from oil company presence at the local level. Indeed, High's (2006: 36) analysis points to the Waorani traditions of “non-reciprocal giving and receiving,” which has ultimately influenced their negotiations with oil companies (see also Chapter 3). Instead of long-term sustained support, the Waorani ask for immediate, material goods, such as food (High 2006). The oil companies are associated with a source of constant gifts as new neighbors, which reflects the traditional hunting and gathering economy of the Waorani (Rival 2002). Geographic patterns within Waorani territory, I was informed by Repsol-YPF program officers and others, reflect this relationship with companies and many Waorani inside Block 16 have moved closer to oil operations to access corporate handouts. New 'communities' emerge through which the company controls the Waorani population.

---

91 The founding of AMWAE was linked to the *Consejo Nacional de Mujeres* (National Council of Women), recognized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution. The council has since dissolved (personal communication with Dana Hill).

92 WCS had also approached FCUNAE, the Kichwa organization in the northern Amazon region, as a possible project recipient at the end of my fieldwork period in May 2010.
The growth of NAWE as a political organization mirrors these negotiations with the company, although in recent years dependence on oil companies is more pronounced. As High (2006) suggests, NAWE is dedicated to negotiations with oil companies and administering company funded projects. He argues that the organization would probably not exist were it not for the relationship with Repsol-YPF. NAWE does have other sources of funding, including USAID and WCS, but the close relationship with Repsol-YPF recounted to me by interview respondents affiliated with NAWE and AMWAE, spoke to the company’s significant contributions (Lopez 2009). In 2009, the newly elected Waorani leaders suggested they would like to move the organization away from ENTRIX-based (the consulting company employed by Repsol-YPF) control of corporate monies.93

ENTRIX establishes certain programs based on perceived deficiencies in Waorani communities, such as education and health care, and Repsol-YPF money is funneled into these programs. NAWE has little say over how the money can be used and distributed. On July 17, 2009, NAWE organized a meeting to work toward changing the organization's practices. I traveled to Coca to observe this meeting. Local Waorani community leaders, FCUNAE leadership, a Pachakutik representative94, and AMWAE leaders were also present. The meeting was organized around themes of defending territory, stating that NAWE's strength lay with the Waorani communities. Much of WCS's work with NAWE and the Waorani has to do with delineating territory. The Waorani are proud of their heritage, and often reference the fact that as an indigenous group, they only exist in this part of Ecuador, and nowhere else in the world (Field Notes 2009).

---

93 High (2006) notes claims by NAWE to end support by the company completely, but since the time of his research this has not happened.
This meeting in Coca was a call to organize the Waorani and to work together on a community level. The meeting opened with a few words from a Pachakutik leader. Next, the new president of NAWE spoke about CSR projects, reminding those present that the company offered only a few material items here and there - not enough for communities to rely on. He relayed a conversation at Repsol-YPF's offices in Quito with the community relations director, Samuel, apparently to discuss CSR programs and extraction. Samuel stated, “Extraction is never going to stop,” and Pedro replied, “Well, I never thought I'd become president [of NAWE],” suggesting “anything is possible.” Pedro recounted how he secured funding for several computers, and was looking for office space in Puyo. In turn, he would search for ways to involve the youth (Field Notes 2009). Essentially, the meeting was a call to action, a way to reestablish faith in NAWE. Pedro would not be corrupted by Repsol-YPF, although for financial reasons, he would not immediately end funding from company. Instead, the goals for the new administration in NAWE included ending ENTRIX's role in distributing money to NAWE (Noss 2009). The Waorani preferred to work directly with Repsol-YPF, and to have more say in how monies from the company are distributed.

I often remained unsure of corporate and indigenous relationships. Later, when I asked Repsol-YPF about this gathering in Coca, the community relations officer, Samuel, confirmed that NAWE was not planning to end Repsol-YPF's support completely. Indeed, the company was also dependent on indigenous people's continued reliance on corporate operations, and any point of weakness in this relationship was quickly hidden. This quick subversion of a possible crack in the façade of CSR programs points to the discursive construction of CSR programs that often does not match the everyday realities in indigenous communities and organizations. In a
conversation with Pedro, he told me that NAWE is essentially maintaining Repsol-YPF, not the other way around.  

Meanwhile, the Kichwa organization for the northern Amazon region, FCUNAE, was also struggling to reorganize itself during this period. FCUNAE, while a prior recipient of money from companies, which ultimately led to its downfall, is now trying to find renewed financial support. In January 2009 Claudia was elected president of the organization, and she was the first female president of FCUNAE. She hoped that Repsol-YPF might be able provide some support, despite the fraught histories of FCUNAE linked to oil influence. The organization was left with few options because the patchwork state presences at the local level made it impossible for the organization to dialogue with state representatives. FCUNAE was established with the support of Catholic missionaries in the 1970s (Velasco 2009). Claudia told me what happened to FCUNAE in the recent past:

> We have had seriously real themes of conflicts… perhaps, because of the situation of our colleagues in leadership positions, because of our previous leadership who left things, in reality, in a process of almost the collapse of our organization. But, this doesn't mean that our bases are falling apart, in actuality we're revealing this [problem of lack of] self-esteem in the communities, and we're working on the issue of the environment, so that when you refer to themes of oil - one that has been...one that is really difficult - so that we would say, previously our colleagues didn't think about what would happen with oil issues. But, the companies have entered [into communities, and people’s lives] and unfortunately what has continued to be left to our organizations is contamination, and more contamination and unknown diseases that our Kichwa brothers and sisters are currently suffering from here in the Ecuadorian Amazon region.  

---

95 ...pero el Waorani mantenga la empresa Repsol.
96 Hemos tenido seriamente realmente temas de conflictos he, de pronto, por la situación de los compañeros dirigentes, por los compañeros dirigentes anteriores que dejaron haciendo en realidad casi caída nuestra organización, pero eso no significa de que nuestras bases están desmayadas, más bien estamos revelando esta autoestima de, de todas las comunidades y que, y que estamos trabajando en la cuestión del medio ambiente por que en cuanto se refiere a las, a las temas petroleras ha sido un tema tan difícil, tan que diríamos de pronto anteriormente no pensaban nuestros compañeros que pasaría con estos temas petroleros, pero han entrado y lamentablemente lo que si han dejado a nuestras organizaciones es contaminación, más contaminación y enfermedades desconocidas que actualmente están sufriendo nuestros hermanos quichuas de aquí de la amazonia ecuatoriana, por esta
Claudia’s comment focuses on the way in which oil permeates indigenous peoples’ lives through the company. Furthermore, indigenous organizations are entangled in these relationships of corporate capital and neoliberal reforms. This has not only politically marginalized indigenous organizations, but also physically impacted indigenous livelihoods and bodies. The body politic of a state rooted in oil has literally made indigenous populations sick. And she continued, stating that there is no help from companies (or the state) today, something that is hard for the organization as it seeks out financial support:

And the oil companies, a little...no, let's say 80, 50 or, very few, also have contributed to our organization, and in...Well, in that, in the time of the other colleagues, and currently in this new leadership, we haven't been touched absolutely at all [by the companies], because the companies now, we might say, have denied everything, all the help to this sector, to FCUNAE.97

Claudia also seeks to regain the trust of Kichwa communities in the region. In Pompeya I was often informed that FCUNAE representatives would ask community members for funds, but most in Pompeya were wary of contributing to an organization that had such a long history of failed leadership and corporate influence. Moreover, they were unsure what FCUNAE could do for them (Davila 2009).

Claudia agreed,

But the issue of our institution has been really difficult and it hasn't fallen to pieces like other organizations. It's a big organization that includes the cantón of Aguarico until here, until the province of Francisco de Orellana, where we have been a single, [unified] group of people. It hasn't been broken up into centros like other federations. No, it has been a federation strengthened by its bases [in the communities], and that has given us solidarity, even though our communities are resentful and are angry at what happened in our federation.98

97 Y las compañías petroleras un poco, no digamos el 80, el, el 50 sino muy poco también han contribuido a nuestra organización y en, bueno en ese, en el tiempo de los otros compañeros y ahora actualmente en esta nueva dirigencia no hemos tocado absolutamente por que las empresas petroleras ahorita más bien he, han negado toda la, todo el apoyo a este sector de la FCUNAE.

98 Pero la, la cuestión de nuestra institución ha sido muy fuerte y no se ha roto en pedazos como otras organizaciones es una organización grande conformada desde el cantón Aguarico hasta acá, hasta la provincia que es el, Francisco
Yet, Claudia also outlined a call for reinvestment in FCUNAE. She called for a return to subsistence living, using indigenous knowledge of the natural environment to implement conservation programs, even if pollution from oil extraction and the existing role of companies makes this almost impossible. Furthermore, she acknowledges the limited ‘solutions’ presented by the company – or the technical solutions that attempt to solve political economic problems. She says,

We [as indigenous peoples] are, at the very least, socialized to conserve the environment. They know very well how to do it, my communities, and that has been the theme of our colleagues in each institution. Because, here we now have municipalities, provincial advisors, national parks, the cooperatives of Yasuní National Park, and other institutions, FCUNAE, and others, such as leadership for the conservation of the environment, and for that we have to go community by community socializing our people. But, this socialization is not something they're aware of – they only know words, and technical solutions, nothing more. From now on, the conservationist ideal must make them the knowledgeable ones. They know how to take care of nature, how to take care of animals, and in this contamination – there was just an oil spill, and everything was damaged, fish died, while the government didn’t say anything, and nothing happened. We are left at this point, and for the government la Patria is for everyone, and nothing more. Here no. Here how would the pueblos indígenas live? That doesn't interest them [the state]. What interests them is how to take out the oil, and have more profits and to be well.99

Again, Claudia recounts the way in which la Patria cannot account for those populations living at the point of extraction, and the so-called benefits of modernization are replaced with pollution. Claudia’s reaction forces us to consider where and how the state emerges. When we
try and look for it, it disappears, and only its effects remain. Returning to the two bodies of the state, those individuals who can carry out its deeds, and the other body, the larger social forms of incorporation, these two bodies are reflected in Claudia’s discourse, and indeed within Claudia herself (cf. Nelson 2009). Claudia’s analysis mirrors Hale’s (2011) framing of the neoliberal state tied to resources as a pretense. The state is unable to monitor new spaces of governance that emerge through certain technologies of rule, such as CSR programs.

Claudia went on to explain that the Kichwa cannot protest the current government and its continued push for oil extraction in indigenous territory. If the Kichwa attempt to strike, the government will merely implement pressure to disrupt the strike, making future dialogue all but impossible. She says,

There's not even a way to protest, because if we say something real, the government puts them [indigenous peoples] in prison. They can't even hold a strike...they can't state their thoughts, because he who is saying something bad, is thrown in prison. So, we are in a country that is really, is very critical and harsh.100

My conversation with Claudia demonstrated the strategic interests of the state in the Amazon region. I argue that this conversation also reflects a process of competing sovereignties and contradictions, or the duplicitousness of the state. FCUNAE confronts and internalizes these processes, made more complex by questions of ongoing oil extraction. While the state continues to push for ongoing oil extraction at the national level, and removes CSR programs at the local level in an attempt to garner more of the profits from resource extraction, those populations at the point of extraction see these changes as challenging their rights to participate in the body-politic of the nation. Indeed, the state’s disciplinary practices that prevent indigenous protests

100 ni como protestar por que si decimos algo realidad el gobierno ya les mete preso no pueden hacer paro, no pueden, no pueden pronunciar sus pensamientos por que ya el que está pronunciando mal ya está preso, entonces estamos en un país realmente es muy crítica y dura
highlight strategic state interests in oil rents, rather than indigenous membership in the nation-state.

My analysis also suggests that while the company might have duped indigenous peoples, they are certainly not duped by the state. While oil company operations and programs infiltrated communities and organizations at the local and regional levels, the state maintained its interest in controlling ongoing oil operations at the national level. This distancing of the state also suggests an expansion of state power through absence. Mountz (2004: 329) argues that the “less accessible the decision-makers are to those whose lives they influence, the larger looms the power of the state to act without demands for accountability.” Claudia's confusion and uncertainty mirrors these contradictions, but also highlights the way in which she negotiates these processes of marginalization (cf. Bondi 2004; Hale 2011).

Meanwhile, in Coca, where FCUNAE offices are located, infrastructure and facilities are non-existent. There are no decent hospitals or educational facilities, for example. “How,” asked Claudia, “could there be any room for indigenous advancement without these basic resources?” She goes on,

Really the government should put a hand on the chest and help in health issues, because due to the pollution they [local people] are dying – because of the water, bad basic services here, and everything here really hurts us as an organization.101

Claudia said she just wanted to be able to dialogue with President Correa, but it seemed impossible. Correa has taken a turn toward dictatorial decision-making, she claimed, leaving little space for indigenous peoples to present their own ideas.102 She says,

---

101 Realmente el gobierno debería ponerse la mano en el pecho y ayudar en el campo de salud, por que, por la contaminación se están muriendo, por el agua, malos servicios básicos acá, y todo esto realmente si nos duele como organización.
102 My conversation with Claudia essentially mirrored much of what Bebbington (2009) observed in the region, and the authoritarian style of ruling that prevents debate over how extraction occurs.
A dialogue must happen, not just with my federation, but with various federations, with various *pueblos* that are throughout the Amazon region, the coast, the mountains, where they also have their culture, and that if there is a march, that possibly it would happen with CONFENIAE and CONAIE.\(^{103}\) They are already saying there is going to be a peaceful march, not revolutionary, but peaceful, and that he [President Correa] must listen and to say, well, the *pueblos indígenas* are protesting, they are doing this, what do they want. We would dialogue, from each side, them as much as us. That is...that is what we want in a dialogue. And that is what does not exist; it's not there. Only [President Correa] is there, blah, blah, blah, every Saturday [referring to his weekly radio address to the nation]. [He says] 'this is what I do, this is what I say, this is it.'\(^{104}\)

Thus, the only viable option for indigenous peoples is to turn to the company, which is better at protecting the environment and providing some basic health care and educational opportunities, according to Claudia. As our conversation concluded, she recounted a recent transportation request she made of Repsol-YPF – a canoe to allow access to Coca and then Quito. Repsol-YPF responded that it was unable to provide such services now, because the state prohibited it:

So, now, as well, the state got rid of a budget that said the companies had to help the communities – they ended that budget – it doesn't exist anymore. For us, it was mentioned one time, when we went...we wanted to go with some urgency to Quito, and that it was urgent that they help us with a canoe to be able to travel. The response the company gave us was that now they don't have support [for communities]. Why?! Because the government has ended these forms of support, because the money is going toward other issues.\(^{105}\)

---

\(^{103}\) CONFENIAE was also non-existent through much of my fieldwork. It had divided into two factions, and neither side was willing to negotiate to reorganize the institution (Grefa 2009; Alvarez 2009). These sorts of divisions characterize the history of the indigenous movement in Ecuador (see Lucero 2008). Much of this hinges on conflicts amongst indigenous groups, especially between the dominant lowland Kichwas and the Shuar.

\(^{104}\) Un diálogo que debe haber no solo con mi federación sino con varias federaciones, con varios pueblos que aglutina la amazonia, la costa, la sierra, donde también tienen su cultura y que si es que hay una marcha que posiblemente está con CONFENIAE y CONAIE ya diciendo que va haber una marcha pacífica no, no de revolucionarios, sino pacífica sino que él debería escucharnos y decir bueno pueblos indígenas protestan, están en esto, que quieren haber, que quieren, dialoguemos hagamos un diálogo de parte a parte, tanto ellos como nosotros, eso es lo que, lo que realmente queremos un diálogo, un diálogo y eso es lo que no existe, eso es lo que no hay, solamente él está, bla, bla, bla todos los sábados esto es lo que yo hago, esto es lo que digo, esto es.

\(^{105}\) Entonces ahora también le quitó un presupuesto que las compañías tenían para apoyar a las comunidades, quitó ese presupuesto ya no hay, no, a nosotros nos mencionó una vez que fuimos queríamos irnos de urgencia a Quito y de urgencia que nos apoyen con una canoa para poder viajar, la respuesta que dio la empresa petrolera es que ahora no tienen apoyo. ¿Por qué?, Porque el gobierno ya les quitó esos apoyos, por que les está mandando para otro lado, para otra cosa.
Claudia's complaint also acknowledges the construction of beneficiaries through CSR programs, and the company's process of defining the particular territory that falls under the company's rule. In other words, the company defines those who will receive gifts, and any claims made on the company are rejected as one of entitlement (Rajak 2011).

My conversation with Claudia also acknowledges state strategies through the 1990s. Indigenous demands were dismissed as subversive, and indigenous peoples were accused of threatening *la Patria* and state sovereignty (Sawyer 2004). The conversation I had with Claudia exposes the way values that regulate social life exist nowhere, and yet they produce ‘real effects.’ Furthermore, the state is only ‘actual’ in the activity of citizens, and the notion of ‘Fatherland’ in the actions of those that heed its call. Yet, the state cannot also be *reduced* to these effects. It exists nowhere, and yet we cannot explain the material reality of suffering without referring to it (cf. Žižek 1992 in Nelson 2009: 24).

The ‘carnival’ of the state, then, allows us to witness and experience the domesticated versions of submitting to the state, but also a glimpse into the other side – the “inevitability of collaboration; the obscene arbitrariness of the market” (Nelson 2009: 24). This chapter points to the way in which CSR programs, framed through discourses of participation and inclusion and *economic* justice, also fail to address questions of resource distribution and rights, or questions of *social* justice. The state's self-imagining as a petro-state, and visions of *la Patria* continue to challenge indigenous membership in the nation state. In turn, it is these moments of uncertainty and resistance within indigenous leadership, which we must continue to uncover to produce alternative discourses and practices (Mountz 2010).

Following Hale (2011) I want to consider the ways in which Claudia’s frustrations may also reflect broader debates within indigenous and other marginalized populations. We might
first ask, as Hale (2011: 188) does, “to what extent can black and indigenous territorial rights advance within the broader logic of neoliberal development…?” Hale (2011) argues that in responding to this question we have to consider the ways in which the state is reconfigured in new ways, focusing on those spaces where resources are most productive, which leaves other areas and inhabitants to fend for themselves.

In the case of Ecuador, I contend that this pattern of state restructuring emerges most clearly in the recent shifts in governance of natural resources, as the Ecuadorian state identifies ‘strategic resources’ deemed necessary for the country’s ongoing development. Despite living at the point of extraction, indigenous populations are left to fend for themselves in the face of ongoing resource extraction, or as CSR programs illustrate, through the material resources provided by corporations. Furthermore, building on Hale (2011), indigenous entanglement with the structures of dominance that communities intend to challenge leads to movement confusion, and limits indigenous resistance.

As Nelson (2009) notes, there is also participation in these programs without consideration of outcomes. In the same way that she is concerned about marginal populations that are “acted on by NGOs,” corporations also act on indigenous populations in Ecuador. In turn, the company provides an image of what indigenous peoples should be, and indigenous peoples become the victim – they are passive. CSR programs are about how to spend the money, and as the previous chapter illustrated, people start to fight with one another. CSR programs, then, can tell us about how the state is being run, and as Nelson (2009) suggests, rather than the presence of political movements, we see a state and people engaged in managing money. I explore the strategic practices of the Ecuadorian state in managing resources and a population in the space of the nation in the next section.
State Institutions and Oil Governance

Rafael Correa was elected in 2007 under the slogan “citizen participation” or participación ciudadana. In 2008, Correa called for a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Ecuadorian Constitution. The new Constitution includes rights for nature, and incorporates the language of “collective wellbeing” or buen vivir and sumaq kawsay in Spanish and Kichwa, respectively. CONAIE participated in drafting the new Constitution. Yet, as many authors, including Bebbington and Bebbington (2010) and Escobar (2010) acknowledge, these moves toward other models of development do little to slow extraction. Instead, oil is a resource deemed necessary for the country's ongoing development (Escobar 2010). Correa’s plan only calls more attention to the state’s interest in its natural resources, its national patrimony. In fact, part of Correa's development plan for the nation was to divide the country into zones based on availability of natural resources. In this section, I explore development in Ecuador tied to ongoing extraction of these “strategic industries,” and the contradictory language of the nation's development and rights outlined in the new Ecuadorian Constitution.

Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (SENPLADES)106, the state institution tasked with development of the country, has a regional office in Tena, the capital of Napo Province. I was referred to the director of this office, Eduardo, a Kichwa who graduated from the private Universidad de San Francisco, in Cumbayá, a wealthy suburb of Quito.107 Professors I spoke with at the university knew Eduardo, as he successfully used the scholarships offered by private companies (part of CSR programs), including Repsol-YPF, to attend university in Quito. Following university in Ecuador, he attended with full scholarship the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he studied Latin American Studies. While earning his master's

106 The National Secretariat of Planning and Development
107 Eduardo is the same person I interviewed referenced in Chapter 2, when I had a particularly frustrating interview experience.
degree he met Rafael Correa, a graduate student of economics at the same university. In my interview with Eduardo, he recounted a meeting where Correa urged Eduardo to return to Ecuador following his degree, to use his knowledge in his own country. Eduardo did so, and initially began working for EnCana a Canadian oil company, as a community relations staff person that operated Block 15 in the region.\footnote{This is the same block where Pompeya is located, currently operated by Petroecuador. EnCana sold its rights to Occidental Petroleum, the company later ousted by the Ecuadorian government due to contract disputes (Kimmerling 2006).} Later Eduardo was appointed director of the Tena office of SENPLADES. Eduardo, while capitalizing on opportunities made available because of company interventions and programs, now takes a political stance that aims to undermine these same opportunities that at least in part led to his own successful career (Roca 2009).\footnote{Thanks to Nancy Hiemstra for noting this contradiction.} The duplicitousness of the state embodied in an indigenous bureaucrat.

SENPLADES was formed in 2004, and is tasked with development projects around the country.\footnote{See Escobar (2010) for a discussion of development defined by SENPLADES. In particular, Escobar (p. 21-22) notes the mixing of “mainstream” development concepts, including economic growth and its ties to “strategic areas” that include energy, hydrocarbons, mining, and water, among others.} The institution was re-structured to some degree with Correa's election in 2007, and it now operates with various zonal/regional headquarters. Rather than operating on a provincial basis, the country is divided into “zones” tying several provinces together. These zones, Eduardo informed me, were designed to become the new administrative and political capitals of the country, instead of the provincial capitals.\footnote{Distribution of rents from oil extraction is currently determined on a provincial basis. In 2007 a reform to the hydrocarbon law known as Law 010, which manages the distribution of oil rents in Amazonian provinces, was presented in the Ecuadorian congress. The proposed reform included an increase in rents captured from each barrel of oil extracted, from 50 cents/barrel to $1/barrel. According to an \textit{El Comercio} article from July 2, 2007, since 2005, Amazonian provinces have received between $200-$286 million from private companies and Petroecuador. The Law 010 relies on the state institution ECORAE to distribute rents in each province. Increasing the rent on each barrel would add an additional $90 million/year to the total amount. Moreover, the provinces of Sucumbíos and Orellana receive an additional 5 cents/barrel because these provinces produce the most oil in Ecuador. The proposed reform called on the local governments to manage more closely the distribution of monies, and President Correa stated that each dollar must be accounted for in infrastructural improvements (El Comercio 2 July 2007).} Zone 2, where Eduardo works, encompasses the provinces of Orellana, Napo and Pichincha, conspicuously linking Quito, the capital city, to the
richest oil producing area of the country. Development in Zone 2 relies on ongoing oil production, as well as tourism in the cloud forest area that connects Quito to the lowlands of the Amazon region. SENPLADES is also tasked with overcoming pollution problems linked to ongoing oil extraction. Tests of the water in this area show that most of it is polluted and unsafe for drinking, but it is unclear what infrastructural improvements will be made to solve these issues (Roca 2009).

I tried to steer the conversation toward impacts on indigenous communities, although this seemed to be an area that was even less studied than others. Eduardo could tell me about practices inside Block 16, and impacts on Waorani culture, and the shifting geographies of communities due to CSR programs. He repeated the stories of the Waorani moving to be closer to oil operations, waiting for corporate handouts. Many of the themes we discussed had to do with the government's desire to take back control over processes in the country, not only oil extraction, but also research by foreign scientists, and NGOs. In other words, the state would oversee the country's development and monitor outsiders' presence in the country. This, Eduardo informed me, was the hallmark of Correa's platform. Within the oil extraction industry companies would merely provide a service for the state, extracting oil, eliminating any local development projects in indigenous communities. Eduardo claimed that current CSR projects are reimbursed by the state. If a private company spent $2 million providing local projects in indigenous communities, this would be reimbursed, he told me. Shifts in implementation of CSR programs were explained to indigenous leaders, Eduardo informed me, but many leaders were indignant that the state had the right to determine relationships in indigenous territory, as the case with NAWE and FCUNAE suggests. Eduardo worried that this “attitude” might pose problems for the state's plans (Roca 2009).
These plans include what the state thinks is best for a community. If a community claims to need a school, the state will decide that this is indeed necessary. If a community has been harvesting cacao, SENPLADES’ statistics will determine whether cacao is the agricultural product that will reap the most benefits for the region. Similarly, tourism will be presented in certain communities as a viable option, but not others. Yet those communities, like Pompeya, impacted by ongoing extraction will still be implicated in an extraction model. If new seismic testing is required, indigenous people will be employed; if an oil spill occurs, indigenous people will engage in cleanup procedures (Roca 2009). This happens today, except a private company is in charge. Merely replacing a multinational company with the state continues to raise questions about indigenous participation in resource governance decisions. Even though the new Constitution opens the space for different viewpoints, including interculturality and rights to nature, interpretations of these goals remain contradictory (see Escobar 2010; Gudynas 2009). Questions of territory, rights to resources, and participation in governance decisions highlight concerns about oil as a resource linked to indigenous subjectivities and constructions of the nation in Ecuador.

Conclusion

How do we avoid reproducing the very structures we’re trying to undo? What is the relationship between economic justice and social justice? This chapter aims to bring to the forefront real and practical questions about indigenous participation in governance processes, ones that are still up for debate. How do indigenous organizations in Ecuador engage with the global economy? Or, how can they interact with mestizo populations? Finally, what relationship can these organizations have with the state? (cf. Hale 2011). This chapter draws on Hale’s (2011)
consideration of linking processes of everyday resistance with political outcomes. How can we begin to make change? By focusing on processes of neoliberal reforms in the nation-state, including privatization of resource extraction and implementation of CSR programs, I highlight the unanticipated impacts of these practices and programs.

Neoliberal reforms in Ecuador demonstrate the state's desire to use petroleum for the country's national development, contrasted with the relatively weak institutions to facilitate that process (Perreault and Valdivia 2010). In order to secure its oil wealth, certain populations were excluded from governance processes, namely those living at the point of extraction. Thus, indigenous protests through the 1990s called attention to the failure of the state to recognize indigenous citizenship and rights, or their membership in the nation-state. The implementation of CSR programs was designed to aid the state in resource extraction, and also incorporated indigenous subjects into various local level 'development' projects, diffusing the politics of indigenous membership in the nation-state.

While CSR programs can incorporate indigenous populations into processes of economic growth and development, they do little to address questions of social justice and resource distribution. Thus, shifts in oversight of multinationals in Ecuador, including a formal end to CSR programs calls attention to the disjuncture between state provision and marginalized indigenous populations. CSR programs do not render the state obsolete. Instead, they operate as a particular mechanism that allows multinationals to “confront tensions between a global political economy and state authority” (Rajak 2011: 232). In turn, CSR programs take on national projects of development, positioning the corporation at the forefront of resource extraction processes in Ecuador. However, as illustrated by Correa's campaign, the state has
started a process to take back control over its economic growth tied to ongoing resource extraction.

I build on studies that link petroleum development to questions of nation-building, subject formation, citizenship, and regulation of social life (cf. Valdivia 2008; Watts 2004, 2003). The development of petroleum as an energy resource through the 20th century shaped Ecuador as a petro-state. In turn, petroleum was transformed into economic wealth to be used for the good of the nation and its citizens. Furthermore, petroleum developed particular imaginaries and belongings within the nation-state that could shape understandings of territory and nationhood (see Valdivia 2008; Perreault and Valdivia 2010). Yet, this process allowed for certain populations to be exploited in the name of securing economic wealth.

This chapter highlights the tenuous construction of the Ecuadorian nation rooted in oil extraction. The state's push to link processes of modernization with resource extraction continues to raise questions about how to understand indigenous roles in the nation state, and who is worthy of membership. Failure to acknowledge and respond to indigenous peoples' subjectivity that emerged through links to multinationals and CSR programs will only continue to undermine nation-building in Ecuador (see Watts 2004a,b). Dismissing indigenous claims to resources through CSR programs allows the nation-state to reclaim its control over resource extraction, and secure its source of wealth, but it also discounts expressions of rights to resources, and belonging in the nation-state. While CSR programs produce spaces of inclusion, they also lead to spaces of exclusion (Rajak 2011). The following chapter addresses the corporation's 'zone of influence' to understand how CSR programs operate as a technology of rule that further reconfigures relationships in the governance of oil and challenges state sovereignty.
Chapter 5

The Zone of Influence

Until what point does the presence of the private companies, the presence of an NGO, the presence of the church, through which, currently...well, has produced...there has been a lot of money, and it has generated a passive position, no? That is probably certain. If you compare it to other communities that haven't received as much, and their activity, their efforts, they are involved more, that is certain. But, it's complicated. To analyze this theme requires a study that has to analyze cultural aspects, because the communities, the majority Kichwa, in themes of abandonment on the part of the state over a lot of time, the presence of private oil companies that haven’t always known how to handle the support that they gave to communities – if they intervene...there are a lot of intervening factors. I believe it is complicated to evaluate, and, and above all, you have said it perfectly, you have identified a problem that...that exists. We have the philosophy that with intervention we try to end a little of that, or we end the gift giving. To not look at what it has done, but to try and create engaging...or, to say, folks, what you have, I'm not going to be here year after year repairing the potable water system. I put it there, and you wanted to have the system. Perfect. Now manage it.\textsuperscript{112}

Personal Interview, Margo, Director of the Fundación Repsol, Quito, Ecuador, October 2008

\textit{Introduction}

In November of 2008, I was beginning my fieldwork in the community of Pompeya. I had decided to conduct a series of house to house interviews to try and understand a bit more about daily lives in relation to CSR programs. David, a research assistant from Pompeya, and I planned to meet one morning to begin these visits. Because of its large size, Pompeya is divided

\textsuperscript{112} Hasta que punto la presencia de empresas privadas, la presencia de ONG, la presencia de la iglesia a través real, pues ha generado ahí un, una, habido mucho dinero y ha generado una posición pasiva no, eso si probablemente sea cierto, en cambio lo comparas con otras comunidades que no han recibido tantas comunidades, mucho más su actividad he, más esfuerzos, he, se involucra más, eso si pero es complicado no analizar ese tema ya requiere de un estudio que, que tiene que analizar ya aspectos culturales por que las comunidades en su mayoría quichuas en temas de abandono por parte del estado durante muchísimo tiempo, presencia de la empresa privada petrolera que no siempre ha sabido manejar muy bien los apoyos que daba a la comunidad entonces ahí si intervienen, intervienen muchos factores, yo creo que es complicado evaluar y, y sobre todo bien habías dicho esto perfecto has identificado un problema que, que, que existe nosotros con la filosofía de intervención que tenemos intentamos romper un poco eso, no o sea se acabó el regalar dar, no mirar lo que se ha hecho sino intentar crear involucración o sea decirles señores, eso se ha hecho ustedes tienen que, yo no voy a estar aquí año tras año reparando la planta de agua potable, yo la puse, ustedes querían una planta, perfecto, ahora gestionenla.
into different branches that correspond with oil well access roads. The Via Maxus and a road that connects Petromazonas' oil well with the center of the community essentially form axes along which the community is organized. I used these axes as points to begin conducting my interviews. On this day, we headed into the eastern most branch toward the Petromazonas oil well, riding on the Repsol-YPF bus with Pompeyans traveling to work on their farms. As we got closer to the well, I could hear the sounds of the drilling, the non-stop motor droning away. The bus dropped us at the chain link fence that marked the boundaries of the well. At this point the noise was almost deafening, and it was impossible to hold a conversation. As we walked around the corner of the fence to find a house to begin the interviews, I decided to take a photo of the well. Poking my camera between the holes in the fence, I snapped a couple shots of the facility, and David and I continued on our house-to-house visits.

We wrapped up the interviews in houses located close to the well and began the several kilometers walk back to the center of the community, stopping off at other houses along the way. Soon, though, a company pick-up truck approached us. The driver slowed and stopped. He immediately asked whether I had taken a photo of the oil well. Company personnel at the well must have contacted staff at the guardhouse, I reasoned. I replied that yes, I had taken a few photographs of company operations. The Petromazonas personnel asked me to delete my photos. Trying to engage the company staff person in conversation, I asked why I had to do so, and he responded that it was an Ecuadorian law that no photos are allowed of oil operations. For a moment, I contemplated only pretending to delete my photos, but decided as this was early on in my fieldwork period I should not risk angering company personnel further. Indeed, after deleting the photos, the company representative asked to see my camera to ensure that I had done so. Wordlessly, I handed it over, as he flipped through my photos. Satisfied that I had removed
the offending photographs, the corporate officers went on their way. I was shocked and angered by the power the state, and by extension the state company, had over my decisions and freedom to behave as I wanted in Pompeya. Indeed, Petroamazonas, a privately operated and organized subsidiary of the state company took on this policing role in the absence of other state officials.

Meanwhile, David, unfazed, continued our hot, tiring walk. I tried to ask David why the state had this policy, but he did not know, nor was he interested in commenting on what it was like to live under these rules. Instead, he preferred to tell me his plans to become an eco-tourism guide, and asked whether I could help him get a guide book. David's lack of concern for state policy was not necessarily surprising to me. Corporate presence in the region, and company and state rules and regulations that governed resource extraction were the norms through which Pompeyans lived their lives. David and I continued our walk, without tree cover, as the sun continued to beat down on us. Soon, the same pick-up truck approached from behind us; it had turned around at the well and was headed back to the guardhouse near the center of Pompeya. David flagged it down to see if we might get a ride back. I was still angry, and did not want anything to do with the Petroamazonas officials. But, it was too late. David climbed in the back of the truck, and company officials urged me to get in the back seat inside. As we drove, the officials began asking me a series of questions about my work and who had granted me permission to be there, and I became nervous I might not be allowed back into the block. A private security service, paid for by Repsol-YPF, monitored access to Block 16, and I usually passed through this entrance on my way to the community. We were dropped off at the center of the community, and nothing more was said to me about my access, or the work I was conducting. Occasionally I would see this Petroamazonas representative on my river crossings in Repsol-YPF boats. He would say hello, remembering me by name.
The everyday space of Pompeya and indigenous territory is a complex arrangement of corporate, state and indigenous interactions all designed to facilitate oil extraction (see Watts 2001, 2003). In this chapter I explore these governable spaces established through corporate claims to trusteeship. Trusteeship is “defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007: 4; Cowen and Shenton 1996). In turn, by conceptualizing CSR programs as programs of improvement, I also explore the way in which trustees intervene in state and indigenous relationships designed as programs that will lead to more beneficial outcomes (Li 2007). Indeed, corporations reconfigure relationships at the point of extraction to ensure their ongoing presence that facilitates resource extraction.

Trusteeship is not a process of domination. Instead it aims to “enhance a capacity for action” (Li 2007: 5; Cowen and Shenton 1996). The role of the trustee is to intervene in relationships between a population and its resources, territory, and customs, for example and adjust them as necessary. To ensure that development processes are beneficial, sometimes a population must be divided by gender, age, income, or race, to find points of entry and correct deficiencies (Foucault 1991; Li 2007). Trustees provide enticements. Their schemes often appear as the result of everyday interactions, rather than external imposition. They become common sense. Calculation is essential for improvement schemes, because it helps to prioritize a series of goals, and to focus on the tactics necessary to achieve results (Goldman 2004).

Li argues that there are two key practices to understanding how the will to improve is translated into programs. The first is “problematization” or identifying the deficiencies that must be corrected. The second is “rendering technical” or a set of practices that can set boundaries between trustees and recipients, determine who has the ability to diagnose deficiencies, and who receives “expert direction” (Li 2007: 7; Mitchell 2002). Problems must have solutions, and these
solutions emerge as part of a whole, with techniques and prescriptions that are clear for the person with appropriate training (Li 2007; Mitchell 2002). For Li (2007), the process of rendering technical also means questions are rendered non-political (see also Birkenholtz 2009; Ferguson 1990; Rose 1999). This means political-economic questions are excluded from prescriptions and diagnoses. In other words, the capacities of the poor become the focus, rather than processes that have impoverished the poor (Ferguson 1990; Mitchell 2002). Depoliticization becomes routine because experts are trained to examine problems in technical terms (cf. Escobar 1992, 1995; Sachs 1992; Yapa 1996). Thus, the diagnosis of the problem through various institutions, including the government, corresponds to the experts who are available. At the same time, these processes make clear the boundary between trustees, those able to diagnose problems, and the recipients, those who remain subject to expert advice (Li 2007; Pigg 1992).

Yet, depoliticization is not a secure accomplishment (Li 2007: 11; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003b). Instead, experts tend to rule by disguising their failures, and designing new programs that go unchallenged, effectively eliminating any controversy within the political system. Experts continually search for closure to ensure their diagnoses are complete (Rose 1999). This process avoids questions the expert cannot answer, including any political-economic questions, such as the control over the means of production and the structures that lead to inequalities (Ferguson 1994; Li 2007; Mitchell 2002). In turn, as explored through Chapter 3, more recent studies of development have called attention to its contentious processes that reflects cultural, political and economic struggles (Goldman 2004; Moore 2000; Perreault 2003b).

This chapter is about how CSR programs function as a technology of rule. To govern, following Foucault (1991) is about structuring “the possible field of action of others.” In turn, there are particular moments, or places where we can study the effects of power. Indeed,
following Moore (2005: 5), if we “pry apart government and the state,” we can understand the way in which power relations engage in articulating subjects and space through particular practices. As explored through the prior two chapters, we saw the way in which power is grounded through historic, and spatial practices, and how certain struggles are rooted, “gain traction” and shape fields of action (Moore 2005: 6). CSR programs operate to facilitate highly asymmetric modes of power. Indeed, no longer is a simple binary of resistance/dominance easily mapped onto the space of an indigenous community. Instead, as I demonstrated in prior chapters, ambivalence and uncertainty, and divisions at the local level, which ultimately undermine indigenous organizing, are the result of historic processes of power that compete for control over indigenous populations (Agrawal 2005; Moore 2000).

The Amazon region is marked by long histories of outsider presence that sought to control indigenous populations through various projects of rule, and these “political technologies encountered subjects and territories already embedded in ruling relations” (Moore 2005: 9, 2000). In turn, the interventions of corporations and CSR programs, the subject of this chapter, relieves the state of the risks of collective challenges from indigenous organizations, but also confronts indigenous populations who do not fully embrace the interventions of CSR programs. Indeed, by engaging with the company, encouraged by the state historically, indigenous populations received the material rewards of resource extraction, and corporate knowledge is transferred to indigenous populations, leading to new forms of capital accumulation (Goldman 2004). By encouraging participation in CSR programs, the state essentially continued the patron-client relationships of earlier centuries. This stands in contrast to neoliberal rhetoric of self-help, and instead decentralization and privatization continue to promote paternalism (Zalik 2004: 403). In other words, the inclusionary and participatory nature of CSR programs (Bridge and Perreault
2009) also lead to certain entanglements, including questions of social justice, rights, and distribution of wealth, which I attempt to pry apart through the chapter (Moore 2005; Bridge and Perreault 2009; Hale 2011).

While oil blocks are rented to private corporations these often do not correspond with a company's 'zone of influence'. For example, Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, and Repsol-YPF has to secure its 'right of way' through the community. The company implements CSR projects in Pompeya, in addition to Waorani communities that lie inside Repsol's oil block through NAWE, the Waorani indigenous organization, as explored in Chapter 4. Moreover, the company's Foundation, the Fundación Repsol, designs projects in Kichwa communities along the Napo River, well outside the company's immediate space of operations. Thus, these new spaces of corporate influence raise important questions about control over (subterranean) territory, and the people within that territory, or the governance of 'men and things'.

This chapter addresses the politics of CSR programs. The corporation is most concerned with maintaining its own power and presence in Ecuador, linked to the ongoing accumulation of capital, and points to the necessity of limited state control in maintaining its legitimacy, marked by indigenous participation in CSR programs. Indeed, the uncertainty and ambivalence that characterized conversations I had with indigenous peoples in part reflects the state's own confusion and uncertainty in monitoring corporate activity. If we consider the space of extraction as one that is shared between the dominant and the dominated, we might explore the processes through which indigenous peoples find the company as a good provider of basic services, rather than the state. In turn, we can use this analysis to think about how these views also contribute to indigenous populations' own inaction, and in turn their ongoing domination (Auyero and Swistun 2009). In the next two sections, I draw on conversations with corporate representatives that
occurred in Quito, and participant observation in Pompeya to focus on the ways in which the company generates knowledge of indigenous populations – it judges needs and deficiencies in the space of Pompeya, and this is critical for the corporation's implementation of CSR programs. In turn, the ongoing 'failure' of CSR programs generates new sites of encounter and new forms of power and knowledge in the space of indigenous communities. In the last section of the chapter, I examine the company's maneuvering between state regulation and ties to indigenous populations. While the company often takes on projects that should be the state's responsibility, and indeed its presence in the region allows it to monitor and control indigenous populations, it also acknowledges that the state's absence contributes to disarray at the local level. Thus, this contradictory position of benefiting from, but also challenging state presence points to openings in the governance of resource extraction. It is in these contradictory spaces that room for additional indigenous participation in control over rights and access to resources might be created.

The 'zone of influence' and Pompeya

Pompeya serves as the entrance to Block 16, although it is actually located inside Block 15, currently leased by Petroamazonas. As a result, Pompeya is a recipient of CSR programs from both Repsol-YPF and Petroamazonas. The community receives a monthly sum for the use of its territory for the guardhouse operated by a private security company paid by Repsol-YPF. These guards check all who enter and exit the region, and company officials informed me that the company has prevented colonization of the region, or entry of outsiders. In addition to the

---

113 Block 15 used to be operated by Occidental (Oxy), a United States' based company. In 1999, Oxy violated terms of its contract and was forced out of Ecuador (Kimmerling 2006). This left Block 15 to the state company, and its subsidiary Petroamazonas.

114 In the community agreement signed between 2006-2008, this “rental fee” paid to Pompeya was $500/month.
monitoring of the access to the block, the company has also implemented several CSR projects. Repsol-YPF has both a community relations staff responsible for impacts from oil extraction at the point of extraction, and the Fundación Repsol, designed to implement development projects outside of Repsol-YPF's oil block. The foundation implements projects through NGOs and the local **junta parroquial** government, but has also worked at the community level in the case of an agricultural project with the local high school. The various CSR programs implemented by the corporation correspond to different perceived deficiencies in the community. For example, the foundation is responsible for a cacao production project that is designed to provide economic development for local Kichwa communities along the Napo River and the micro-credit project to stimulate economic development for women. These projects are implemented through local NGOs, and the foundation provides the funding. Other infrastructural projects, such as a potable water system, were developed in conjunction with the local government. Simultaneously, community relations staff invests in projects such as a women's sewing group, transportation, health facilities, education, conservation and subsistence programs within Pompeya and other communities impacted directly by corporate operations.

I describe these projects and programs below in the context of two encounters. The first is a meeting I had with Samuel, the community relations staff person in Quito. He discussed the way projects are implemented in Pompeya, stating that if a community is left to make decisions about CSR projects on its own, this will lead to the community's own downfall. Yet, at the same time Repsol-YPF hopes Pompeya will eventually be an “autonomous” community able to make its own decisions. The second encounter describes an opening celebration organized by an Ecuadorian NGO, Conservación y Desarrollo (CyD) of an agricultural drying facility for the cacao project. CyD is a recipient of funds from the Fundación Repsol. In turn, through the
chapter, I argue that the everyday spaces of indigenous communities are converted into spaces of oil extraction.

**Encounter One: Community Relations**

In October 2008, I set up a meeting with Samuel, the first of several I had during my fieldwork period. We had met the year before as I outlined my proposal to study CSR programs of an oil company in the Amazon region. Samuel was open to my ideas, and offered to let me study Repsol-YPF’s programs, because he was proud of what the company was doing. This was the only company operating in Ecuador at the time that even agreed to meet with me. I arrived at Repsol-YPF’s offices in the northern part of Quito, an area marked by international corporations in glassed-in office buildings and business hotels. Repsol-YPF's security required that I wait in the lobby as the receptionist called up to Samuel's office to confirm my appointment. My name was approved and I was given a badge that stated the floor I was to visit, in exchange for my identification. I proceeded into the building flashing my badge to enter the turnstile into the elevators. I arrived on floor six where I had to reconfirm my name to the guard positioned on that floor. Soon Samuel came out to meet me. We walked back to his corner office with views down to the street. The afternoon equatorial sun filtered into the building. Samuel was with Rodrigo, a project manager at ENTRIX, a Texas-based environmental consulting firm Repsol-YPF worked with to implement its CSR programs. ENTRIX was in charge of establishing community deficiencies, which CSR programs were designed to address. The company employed anthropologists and biologists to carry out house-to-house surveys gathering data on livelihoods to figure where the corporation should intervene. In this conversation, I wanted to learn about the different projects the community relations staff had in place in Pompeya.
Samuel informed me that community relations programs encompassed only the direct area of influence of corporation operations. This included two Kichwa communities, Pompeya and Indillama impacted by the Via Maxus, and the Waorani communities located within Block 16. Yet, despite this delineation of responsibility, Samuel assured me that the company did more than was required by law: “we're not adjusting ourselves exclusively to comply with the law”, he said. Community relations projects are typically focused projects that address certain community needs defined by the company. These projects are not necessarily designed to be sustainable, but instead should last the period of the CSR agreement signed with local communities. Samuel elaborates,

We arrived at an agreement, and that is the agreement that continues to be effective. But, much of those agreements are short-term. Because they are not agreements that are going to be valid for a long time, but instead obey certain situations. We don't have projects, we might say sustainable projects, but mostly projects that assist in focusing, and in some cases over the long term.

Samuel enjoys talking; one sentence flowed into the next. He spoke quickly and it was hard for me to get a word in to direct the conversation. This seemed typical of community relations staff, as I soon learned in other conversations in the offices of Petroamazonas and with Repsol-YPF field staff. Community relations like to get their story down first, as a sort of public relations campaign, before any questions are asked. I had to temper my skepticism as the words flowed over me. My familiarity with Pompeya made me question whether or not we were viewing the same projects, as the rosy picture Samuel painted seem to contrast with the almost non-existent programs, and run down facilities I had seen in the community. Indeed, in hiding the reality of

---

115 no estamos nosotros ajustándonos exclusivamente a lo que manda la ley.
116 ...llegamos a un acuerdo y ese es el acuerdo que sigue vigente, pero muchos de esos acuerdos son puntuales, entonces como no son acuerdos que van a tener vigencia sino que obedecen a ciertas coyunturas no necesariamente, no necesariamente tenemos proyectos digamos sustentables, más son proyectos de asistencia focalizada, en algunos casos si es con, a, a largo plazo...
Pompeya in company discourse and glossy annual reports, the corporation also reveals the process through which it crafts its legitimacy, all in the face of ongoing impacts from oil extraction (see Auyero and Swistun 2009).

Samuel began his monologue describing the way in which Pompeya exists today is all due to the company: the center of the community with the soccer field, the multiple communal buildings, transportation and medical facilities. He went on to discuss a new project, a sewing group for women in Pompeya to produce clothing for communities in the area, including the Waorani. The company would pay the women's cooperative to make the clothing. In my visits to Pompeya, I rarely saw women working on this project, and the house the company had built to store the women's fabrics was overgrown with grass. The sewing machines were located in one of the several abandoned communal buildings. Samuel said that implementing this project was difficult. The company had to overcome gender barriers, and work with households to allow women to participate in this program. He elaborates,

Look, since 2004, it has been tremendously difficult because women have had to overcome a ton of barriers, cultural barriers. Well, women, whose role is in the home, to take care of the children, the chacra, it has been difficult to convince men to allow women to attend a course or create a company. Women try to earn their own resources, which for a Kichwa is really clear. Kichwa men are machistas, well, so, for example this has been really, really complicated. But, despite it all, we have managed to constitute, without a doubt, we have good management, helped with it, as have the women with the junta parroquial.117

117 Mira que desde el 2004 ha sido tremendamente difícil por que las mujeres han tenido que superar un montón de barreras, un montón de barreras culturales pues no, las mujeres su rol cual es, es el hogar, cuidar de los niños, la chacra pues, entonces hacer que los hombres les permitan asistir a un curso o que les permitan he, crear una empresa y que ellas traten de ganar sus propios recursos para un quichua es muy claro, he, los hombres son, he, un quichua es machista pues si, entonces eso por ejemplo ha sido muy, muy complicado, pero con todo hemos logrado que se constituya la he,…y que sin duda han hecho una buena gestión, ayudado con todo lo…y ellas con la junta parroquial.
During my seventeen months of fieldwork, this project ended because of the company's decision to stop paying a woman from Quito to live and work with the women in Pompeya. This was partially tied to the state's mandate to end CSR programs at the local level (see Chapter 4).

In one of my first meetings with Samuel, I was given a copy of ENTRIX's diagnostic report of the so-called 'zone of influence' in Repsol-YPF's operations. This report established the education, healthcare, and cultural deficiencies in the region and is used as a tool to determine ongoing CSR projects. Samuel focused on the role of the company in education, and the formation of a 'virtual' high school. The company provided the several old computers and internet service for students. When I was in Pompeya, however, I only saw between four and six students using the computers. As the months of my fieldwork period went on, many of the computers broke down and the internet service disappeared. Because the state cannot fully provide resources for schools and medical facilities, the company provides much of this in Pompeya – or “top-up salaries” – support that enables state employees in extraction zones to be paid the equivalent of employees elsewhere in Ecuador (Zalik 2004: 415). In my conversation with Samuel and Rodrigo, we talked about how funding for these state services works,

Samuel - Similarly, for the high school, they have a deficit of teachers, so practically, from last year until the beginning of this year, we've helped with teachers. But, the budget was that the directives had to commit themselves to management through the Ministry to reach the partidas. And just this year they reached the partidas. The other theme is health. The doctors who are at the sub-centro de Salud are, what are they called?

Rodrigo - Residents.

S - The medical residents, who in practice are students who are practicing in all the sub-centros.

Emily - Do you pay them?

S - No, we don't pay them, but we help them. For example, with logistics, with food. They don't receive, or they receive a minimum of income from the state, so we help them so that they feel better. We give them food. With Petroamazonas we constructed a new
house. Before they had the same one there [in Pompeya]. We are integrating the sub-centro and the house, which was constructed by us.

R - We have contributed equipment, basic equipment for the sub-centro, things it might normally have.  

Electricity is provided free of charge in the center of the community because the company needs it for its own operations. However, by the end of my fieldwork period this shifted, and community members were expected to pay a nominal monthly fee to the state for electricity.

In Pompeya, people get from the center of the community to their fincas on the outskirts via a bus service provided by the company. Company trucks now frequently travel the roads that criss-cross Pompeya, constructed by companies. Most residents of Pompeya do not walk anymore, and hitch rides whenever possible, as illustrated in the introduction to this chapter. The company run bus is an example of a project requested by the community, and is frequently the

---

118 S: Igualmente entonces para el colegio he, tenían déficit de profesores, entonces he, por, prácticamente, este el año anterior hasta principios de este año apoyábamos con profesores nosotros, pero la, la propuesta era que he, la, las directivas tenían que comprometerse hacer las gestiones ante el Ministerio para lograr que, conseguir las partidas, y justamente en este año ya las consiguieron las partidas, por, el otro tema es la salud, los médicos que, los médicos que atienden el subcentro de salud he, son médicos que se les llama, como se llaman los...

R: Residentes.

S: Los médicos residentes que en la práctica son estudiantes que están haciendo he, prácticas no, en todos los subcentro.

E: ¿Y es, ha, pagado para ellos?

S: No, no les pagamos pero les ayudamos por ejemplo con la logística, con todo lo que es la alimentación, ellos no reciben, o reciben un mínimo de ingreso no cierto, de parte del estado, entonces nosotros para ayudarles para que ellos se sientan mejor, les damos por ejemplo todo lo que es la alimentación, si, he, de parte de Petroamazonas les construyó una nueva casa antes tenían ahí mismo estaban integrado el centro de salud y la casa que fue construido precisamente por nosotros.

R: La casa del médico si, entonces digamos está, hemos contribuido a equiparle con equipos básicos o sea de lo que normalmente tiene un centro de salud.

119 Zalik (2004) writes about electrification between Shell and communities in the Niger Delta. Maintenance and upkeep for the services is usually dependent on communities themselves, but in other more 'developed' regions of the company's operations this responsibility is not shifted to communities. In part, this reflects corporate concerns that financing infrastructural improvements like electricity would mean the company would have to provide similar services in all the communities in which it operates. However, this discourse also reflects the corporation's preoccupation with undoing the image of the company as 'the only government we know.' As Zalik notes, though, this discourse changes if the company's image is challenged, or if competition with other companies in the region force it to also implement these changes.
topic of much debate as community members want a larger vehicle. Yet, the majority of CSR projects are implemented with company recommendations. As Samuel says, “the things that are best for a community, such as education or health care are paradoxically the things that other people think are best for a community. If a community is left to its own devices it will choose things that will lead to its own demise.”

Communal buildings and chickens are the result of community desires. He continues: “The issue of chickens 'we want 20 chickens' so they leave with 20 chickens. In three months do they have food? No.” Of course, the company's own recommendations also result in failure, raising questions about how CSR programs are received at the local level. “So, we suggest why don't we do a poultry raising project, consistently, you understand, that might be managed, that they can manage like a small micro-credit project, but this never results in anything.”

Continuing, Samuel concluded that this community failure was due to a loss of traditional Kichwa practices, including conducting mingas. Instead, indigenous people in Pompeya would rather work independently, earning an income. Yet, when this source of income ends, no one has anything. In some ways, says Samuel, this is almost a good thing, because then the community is forced to return to things it knows, including working within the social fabric of the community. Samuel would like to continue supporting indigenous livelihoods until the community is able to stand on its own, “until they consolidate, and take control and autonomy.” Perhaps this would occur through a series of micro-credit projects. However, the community cannot take on

---

120 Las cosas buenas para ellos son las cosas paradójicamente inducidas por quienes creen que es bueno para ellos, por ejemplo; educación, salud, pero si tu dejas a que la comunidad fije sus prioridades probablemente son prioridades que, que, que conspiran contra su propio futuro.

121 La cuestión de los pollos, 'queremos 20 pollos' entonces, claro salen con 20 pollos en tres meses y tienen comida? No.

122 Entonces les planteamos a que hagamos un proyecto avícola, consistente no cierto, que sea gestionario, que se lo pueda gestionar como una pequeña micro empresa, pero no, nunca dio resultado.

123 hasta que se consolide y tome fuerza y tome autonomía.
these challenges because it is not aware of its own potential, and there's a lack of *capacitación*, argued Samuel. Yet, CSR projects are predicated on ensuring that community residents continue to call on the company for ongoing support, and thus, development is never complete in the region. This sort of language was mirrored in the conversation I had with Doña Barbara, the *junta parroquial* president (see Chapter 3). She was a close confidante of Samuel's and could usually ensure that CSR projects would be implemented. Samuel discussed this relationship with me. He says,

Sure, but Doña Barbara is one of the...she has made possible the presence of the *junta parroquial*, with its main office in Pompeya. She has made possible the position of *teniente política*. In any moment she asked for help so that there's presence of an authority, to control excesses and everything. I mean, she is the one who leads the *junta parroquial*, but she doesn't have enough support from her own community, they don't have anyone to lead them, because they have started to see each other with jealousy. The communities could do much more if they conducted themselves with mutual and reciprocal support. And the institutions like the *minga* are disappearing, losing importance. Each person wants to have his/her own work and to have his/her own income. Each person wants to be involved in some business, and so on. But, the paradox is that many times what one terms, explains, suggests is the best for them, is not what one thinks is the best. For me it's much easier to build [a school or health care facility], than to give them a micro-credit project through which we have to continue helping and supporting until they consolidate, and take control, and become autonomous. They are also less likely to take on these challenges, because they don't believe in their own potential, and obviously there's a lack of *capacitación*, a lack of this type of help.124

---

124 Claro, pero Doña Barbara es una de las, de las, ella ha hecho posible que esté la junta parroquial, la sede en Pompeya, ella ha hecho posible que esté la tenencia política, ella he, algún momento pidió ayuda para que se, para que haya presencia de la autoridad, para controlar desmanes y todo, o sea ella es la que lidera la junta parroquial, pero en su propia comunidad no tiene el ascendiente ni el apoyo necesario por que le comienzan a ver con cierto celo, no, las comunidades podrían hacer mucho más si tuvieran una conducta de mayor apoyo mutuo recíproco y a instituciones como la minga, ha ido perdiendo, perdiendo peso, cada quien quiere tener su trabajo y tener sus ingresos, cada quien quiere meterse en algún negocio y así por el estilo, pero la, la paradoja está en que muchas veces lo que uno termina he, he, explicando he, sugiriendo es lo más positivo para ellos mismo aunque no sea lo más positivo para uno, para mi puede ser más fácil hacerles una construcción y darles que tener un proyecto de micro empresa en la que tenemos que seguir ayudando y subsidiando hasta que se consolide y tome fuerza y tome autonomía, entonces y ellos también son muy poco proclives a asumir esos retos por que no creen en su propio potencial, y obviamente falta capacitación, falta ese tipo de, de asistencia.
Samuel's remarks failed to acknowledge the way in which the corporation itself, and ongoing implementation of CSR programs might contribute to, and undermine the community's lack of control over its own development. As Zalik (2004) suggests, transferring large amounts of cash directly to local residents like Doña Barbara and community presidents, often results in distrust and poor management (see Chapter 3). In some cases, community members have resisted participation in corporate projects because of the risks of conflict (Zalik 2004). For Samuel, it is much easier to continue to implement CSR programs, as a kind of technical solution to the community's ongoing failure to take control of its own development. Samuel's acknowledgment of these paradoxes at the community level raises important questions as to why the company chooses to engage at the community level. It seems obvious from these remarks that CSR programs are not designed to secure wealth for indigenous populations, and cooperation among community members is undermined by corporate presence. Why then, does the corporation's presence persist? I argue that this question can be answered more fully by addressing the state's mandate that required corporations implement CSR programs as a more efficient way to extract resources. In turn, CSR programs as programs of improvement are analyzed in terms of their technical capacity, or focus on solutions, rather than problems, and their repeated failure only reconfirms the need to continue to implement CSR programs, and the corporation's role as trustee. Furthermore, the zone of influence that encompasses the point of oil extraction is outlined by the corporations, and it is the corporation, not the state, that is the actor necessary for the proper management of relations between 'men and things,' or the ongoing extraction of oil, and one that will benefit the wider population (Li 2007).

Our conversation, and subsequent ones, was marked by Samuel's desire to show me different photos of indigenous peoples on his laptop. “Look,” he would say, “this is Don Pedro.
He used to be president of the comunas. I helped his wife when she was sick. We flew her to Quito. Whenever they see me in the community they always say how grateful they are." These sorts of asides seemed to assure Samuel as much as me that he was still important to people in Pompeya. On other occasions, Samuel answered phone calls from an indigenous community member looking for help with a flight to Quito, or support for a sick family member. Samuel had to determine whether the case warranted support, or not. During a later visit, Samuel had just returned from a celebration of the re-election of the Waorani president to their women's organization, AMWAE. He showed me a photo of an indigenous woman wearing traditional clothing and a feathered headdress. Samuel wanted me to notice something in the photo. “What is different about her?” he kept asking. When I didn't know how to respond, he said, “She's part Kichwa, part Waorani. This is what makes her so beautiful.”

The objectification of this indigenous woman, while sitting in Samuel's office in Quito was stunning. The paternalism that underlay his characterization of indigeneity was difficult for me to process, especially when considering Samuel's discourse of undoing indigenous machismo. Indeed, this racialized discourse marked a longer history of marginalization of indigenous peoples, and Samuel, as an upper-class Ecuadorian mestizo embodied this history and ensuing discourse that reaffirmed his patriarchal role. Through the corporation, indigenous populations are helpless, non-modern societies that require the intervention of outsiders to become modern, rational and sustainable populations. Hence, despite neoliberal rhetoric that promises otherwise, privatization promotes paternalism (Zalik 2004).

In other interviews and conversations with Samuel and NGO representatives and missionaries, I was always cautioned to be wary of indigenous responses. “They will tell you

---

125 Mira, esto es don Pedro. Él era presidente de la comunas. Me ayudó a su esposa cuando ella estaba enferma. Nos llevó en avión a Quito. Cada vez que me ven en la comunidad que siempre dicen lo agradecidos que son.

126 ¿Qué es diferente acerca de ella? Ella es parte Kichwa, parte Waorani. Esto es lo que la hace tan hermosa.
what you want to hear,” I was repeatedly informed. Thus, this notion that indigenous people were constantly searching for 'help' from those deemed to have more power, was implicitly transferred to me as an outsider. Often my role as a white, North American woman conducting house to house visits about the role of oil companies was equated with that of an oil worker, as explored in Chapter 2. In a conversation with a priest who had worked for years in the region, I was told that Kichwa people are gatherers; they will always take things that are offered to them (see Chapter 3 for a further discussion of cultural norms). In other words, it is indigenous culture that also leads to indigenous populations’ own downfall. As the next section illustrates, these indigenous cultural norms of gift-giving expected from a powerful neighbor seem to characterize the 'failure' of CSR projects, while also highlighting the corporation's stubborn adherence to technical programs that fill community deficiencies, or its inclusive, authoritative, and disciplinary practices to ensure the conversion of indigenous populations into modern, rational subjects (see Goldman 2004).

Encounter Two: Fundación Repsol

The following excerpt is a moment I spent in Pompeya in March 2009. I was invited to attend the opening of an agricultural drying facility, the Centro de Acopio, in Pompeya. This project was the result of funds from the Fundación Repsol. The foundation was established in 2001, and receives funding from the corporation to implement projects within and beyond the immediate area of extraction. In this case, the Fundación has programs in several indigenous Kichwa communities along the Napo River. It invites Ecuadorian NGOs to submit applications for funding opportunities. The cacao project was successfully funded through the Ecuadorian

---

127 Ellos le dirán lo que quieren oír. This comment also speaks to arguments made in feminist scholarship: “there is no underlying truth to be discovered in interviews, only a series of narratives that people tell, performances offered at distinct moments for distinct reasons” (Mountz 2007: 46; Rose 1997)
NGO CyD in 2007, with support of Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio (FEPP), an NGO with a long history of working in the region.\textsuperscript{128}

In its Annual Report from 2008, Repsol-YPF summarizes the project this way:

The company, jointly with six Kichwa communities, launched a program for planting and marketing cocoa. This agrosustainable project is being carried out in Block 16 in the Yasuní National Park. The agroforestry approach, which combines trees and shrubs, was chosen for this project, an environmentally-friendly and economically viable farming activity. In the Kichwa communities, farmers attend two training courses per month in field schools, with workshops and practical classes covering all technical cocoa production aspects, including planting, the use of natural insecticides, grafting, and pruning. The farms have received the Rainforest Alliance Certified Seal of Approval, which ensures that farming and management methods comply with environmental and social standards, including acceptable salaries, proper equipment, and access to education and medical assistance. The project’s first crop, with the brand name Ekocao, was acquired in March by Ecuatoriana de Chocolate, the leading company in the sector.\textsuperscript{129}

After a period of several months working in Pompeya, CyD decided to hold a grand opening of the cacao drying facility. Drying is the final step in production of cacao for markets. I attended the opening event with staff from FEPP’s Coca office. Coca is an easy 30-minute flight from Quito. Many office workers based in Quito come to Coca for the day, including the Fundación Repsol staff. On this day, they were scheduled to arrive on an early morning flight from Quito, but heavy rain in Coca delayed their plane. By late morning, the foundation staff arrived, along with Repsol staff from Spain, and CyD Quito employees. At Repsol’s port in Coca, we were all asked to watch a safety video before boarding the speedboats that would whisk us the several kilometers upstream to Pompeya. We put on life vests, and were handed

\textsuperscript{128} In subsequent visits to the region, the foundation decided to end funding for other projects FEPP was involved in. The FEPP regional office was a shell of its former activity. Staff members left to find other work, and it was not clear what projects would be available in the future. The Fundación money was crucial to the office's survival.

\textsuperscript{129} Despite Zalik's (2004) observations of CSR programs in Nigeria that avoided local production, “value-added agricultural processing” and eco-tourism, for example, because of multinational concerns with risks of increased costs from land access and environmental compensation that might increase if non-oil activities became more prosperous, Repsol-YPF seemed to promote this process through this particular cacao production project. Thus, where Zalik observed neoliberal development processes of post-secondary education, or entrepreneurship and a clear avoidance of projects that might strengthen the local economy, my work in Ecuador seemed to mark a move toward some sort of post-neoliberal development agenda, although one that is still driving by corporations.
earplugs to cover the sound of the motor. With the sides of the boat unfurled to keep water out, the journey had a rather disembodied feel, especially when contrasted with the bumpy bus ride I normally took to arrive in Pompeya, where the sights, sounds and smells could not be avoided.

In an hour's time when the bus normally took three, we arrived at Repsol’s pier in Pompeya. We climbed the steps from the river, and proceeded down a covered walkway, enclosed by fencing. All workers have to pass through a metal detector and put their bags through an x-ray machine. However, community members are allowed to exit the walkway before this point. We waited as our names were called to pass through the metal detector and enter the guardhouse at the entrance to Block 16. At the guardhouse we climbed into vans for the short trip into the community, but the vans drove us to the far side of Pompeya, away from the Centro. Following the direction of the Fundación Repsol’s Quito-based director, the van driver had arrived in the wrong part of the community. Laughing, acknowledging her mistake, the director jumped out in her city shoes, as we trekked through the mud and water to the project site.

The director had not visited the community in several months, and was clearly not familiar with the location of the project. We arrived mud splattered and wet to join waiting project participants from Pompeya. Having waited most of the day for the rain to subside, we watched a condensed version of events. Quito dignitaries sitting at long tables faced the indigenous audience to say how excited they were about this project. This project, in particular, is an example of the way in which CSR programs shift people's relationships to their environment. The foundation's project hinged on making indigenous populations “intelligible to global experts, managers and investors,” and this could be done through “market-oriented, scientifically based and ecologically sustainable” projects designed and operated by
multinationals in conjunction with NGOs. In turn, the project of governing oil extraction expands through new sites of encounter, leading to new forms of power/knowledge (Goldman 2004: 170-71). Furthermore, as Zalik argues, depoliticization is an objective of corporate operations as NGOs move away from community activism toward community development. Indeed, the company seeks out support from other institutions, including non-profits, governments and international agencies in order to foster the corporation's efforts. For Zalik (2004: 418), this process also calls attention to the simultaneous exposure and subversion of neoliberal policies in practice, as the support of other institutions might, in effect, serve as a form of government subsidy.

Because Repsol-YPF's oil block lies partially inside Yasuní National Park, the company and its CSR programs are in part concerned with ensuring limited impact on the park, especially in the context of traditional indigenous subsistence farming and hunting practices.

Samuel reminded me:

But, there's also another, another thing that still...that is important to know – that they are located in a buffer zone, in a protected area, and in the protected area is the Yasuní National Park. This also puts the breaks on whatever conventional project, whatever project one does there. It has to be a project that doesn't harm the flora and fauna of the zone...well, that will not be able to. So, there are a series of legal figures, current conditions that typify the areas that constitute putting the breaks on - to conceive of whatever project should receive the permission and approval of the Ministry of Environment, which is the last place of responsibility of environmental politics in the protected areas and in others.\(^\text{130}\)

\(^{130}\) Pero también hay otro, otro asunto que todavía no, no, que es importante conocer, el hecho de que ellos estén ubicados en un área de amortiguamiento, en un área protegida y en la propia área protegida que es el parque nacional Yasuní también le pone frenos a cualquier proyecto convencional, cualquier proyecto que se haga ahí tiene que ser un proyecto que no atente a la flora y la fauna de la zona y eso es un, y eso es un freno, si tu tienes que poner piscinas de, de una especie que no es de la zona pues no van a poder hacerlo, entonces hay una serie de figuras jurídicas, de condiciones reales de tipificación de las áreas que también constituye un freno a cual, para impulsar cualquier proyecto y cualquier proyecto debería pasar por el permiso y la aprobación de el Ministerio del Ambiente que es última instancia el responsable de las políticas ambientales en las áreas protegidas y en otras.
Indeed, related to these concerns is the Yasuni-ITT project, which refers to an oil block in the vicinity of my work in Block 15 and the park. President Correa has pledged to leave the oil in the ground in this block with the financial support of the international community, compensating Ecuador for the loss of revenue from not exploiting these oil fields. The project is quite controversial and several funders have backed out, while Correa himself has threatened to dismantle the project. Currently, it still stands as Ecuador continues to look for financial support (Time 2012).

A Repsol appointed community member spoke on behalf of the community. He mentioned the benevolence of the company, and the long association the community has had with Repsol. The paternalistic relationship between the company and community was obvious, despite industry claims to the contrary. In this project, according to NGO staff, indigenous peoples would take responsibility for production and replication of project goals. If an indigenous person can earn $300-400/year, CyD told me, this would constitute a successful project. Environmental conservation at the community level had failed in the past, said CyD, because it was not accompanied by a market based approach. If indigenous peoples can learn to work together, to be good neighbors to one another, emulating Repsol’s own model, then there would be less individualistic behavior, including hunting within the bounds of Yasuní National Park. Instead the money earned through the project would provide the option of buying a chicken, rather than killing a monkey illegally when desperate (Personal Interview, CyD 2010). Yet, the roots of this so-called “individualistic” behavior were not discussed.

CyD's goals for the cacao project, I was informed, were to open markets for indigenous peoples in the region. A CyD representative told me:

Although cacao is the community's main source of income, there's still a major weakness in the management of this product. So our first step is to better this management, and the
second is to accompany this management with better agricultural practices, and that these practices will allow community members to reach certain socio-environmental processes, or in other words, reach norms and processes of environmental certification. What we're trying to do is not pressure people to adapt a forced model, instead we're trying to guide the people, so that they pay attention to these social and environmental processes related to their agricultural practices and productivity.\textsuperscript{131}

In other words, indigenous populations are being made accountable for their “ecologically destructive conduct” and this process of targeting indigenous people, and accounting for them, is central to the implementation of CSR programs. Indeed, CSR programs “compel” indigenous populations to participate in this new process of governing resource extraction (Goldman 2004: 171), further highlighting the opportunistic, and individualistic result of earlier iterations of CSR programs.

After the formal part of the ceremony, we watched school children perform traditional dances, and then were shown around the drying facilities of the Centro. Throughout the whole day’s celebration Ecuadorian military monitored the events. Oil companies often call on the military to ensure worker protection and ongoing production. The only other state presence was the local, junta parroquial president, Doña Barbara, and municipal government representatives from Coca. Their role was to merely witness the success of the project. The junta parroquial operates on a budget of $30,000/year, which also pays salaries. With a much larger operating budget, the company has funded and implemented projects through the junta parroquial, like a potable water system in Pompeya.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} A pesar de que el cacao es su gran ingreso, hay una debilidad fuertísima en, en el manejo de ese producto, entonces el producto que les da el …y no lo manejan, entonces primero mejorar eso y segundo acompañar se manejo de buenas prácticas agrícolas, y que las buenas prácticas agrícolas les permitan a ellos alcanzar procesos socio ambientales, o este, alcanzar normas, procesos de certificación socio ambientales, nosotros en general lo que estamos tratando es en no presionarles a un modelo forzado de…. o tiene que ser….o tiene que ser …..lo que hacemos es trabajar en la filosofía en guiar a la gente a que, a que atienda procesos sociales y ambientales relacionados con su cultivo, su productividad,

\textsuperscript{132} The total amount of “social investments” Repsol-YPF made in Ecuador in 2008 is $667,449 (Annual Report 2009).
Foundation funding has also included contributions to schools, sometimes in the form of practical learning opportunities for the agricultural high school in Pompeya. In both cases, funding was provided to initiate the project, and the state is expected to maintain the project. In practice this is rarely successful; the water system is still not operational. These perceived deficiencies in the community often do not correlate with indigenous concerns. Many in Pompeya informed me that they have lived for years without potable water, and did not find it necessary to have drinking water now. This despite knowing that many illnesses stem from untreated water, the result of years of corporate operations. CSR programs rest on corporate calculations and technical solutions, but these cannot address ongoing resource extraction that continues to contaminate the environment and harm local people.

The water system emerged from data gathered on illnesses in the community, namely parasites, a result of untreated water. With funds from the provincial government, a plan was put in place to begin building a potable water system. The Foundation believed it could contribute pieces of this project, and constructed a water tower and treatment facility for the community. However, according to the director of the Foundation, the responsibility for maintaining this project would fall to the community members themselves. She reiterates,

We left the idea, but if you want this to function, then it is absolutely necessary that you make a small committee, or something, to manage and we will give the project, and there it stays. This is our policy. I mean, one cannot afterward allow the people to get accustomed to not only the giving of money, but now additional help...I mean, we spoke very clearly with the community that the project has a beginning when we see that there are no technical problems. And it was like this. Effectively, I got a lot of calls. The people let me know that they are now with this project of sewage pipes, and that a truck hit one, and broke the pipe. Our policy is that you, the community, will need to see how to fix it. We don't want to create dependence. We believe that is very important. One constructs one thing, does something perfectly, but you all need to see how to manage it, administrate it - if it breaks, repair it, but not create dependence through the project. And, moreover, we give them all the rest, and yes, I certainly know that it's not functioning,
that effectively one of the channels broke, or that the one that brings the water from the river broke, they have to see [how to fix it].

Despite this language of the foundation, the water project never functioned during the months I was in Pompeya. There was little motivation in Pompeya to fix the project, and the Foundation refused to step in to take care of the process. Again, it went against company policy. Margo acknowledges,

My policy is, well, until they show concern, interest, well why will I do it? I mean, we don't want them...to continue to be poorly accustomed to what we're doing. We think, we reflect...I understand that they [the junta parroquial] have budget problems, but that is not a problem of budgets, to demonstrate interest - to demonstrate I want this to return to functioning. It's not money, it's simply I want it, or I don't. So, there we stay, and it will be like that, until they see that they also have to do things.

While the company aims to convert indigenous populations into modern subjects by informing them of their deficiencies, technical solutions through CSR programs cannot fully “reconstitute” indigenous subjects (Goldman 2004: 171). Again, despite the participatory strategy of CSR programs that involve oil industry staff and NGOs operating at the local level, the patron-client relationships of earlier decades are firmly entrenched (see Zalik 2004), and indeed, CSR

---

133 Nosotros nos dejamos la idea pero si ustedes quieren que esto funcione es absolutamente necesario que haya un, una pequeña junta lo que sea que esté gestionando y nosotros entregamos el proyecto y ahí quedó, es nuestra política, o sea no se puede luego, he, acostumbrar a la gente a que no solamente te di la plata sino que ahora te voy ayudar, ha, se rompió...o sea se habló muy claramente con la comunidad el proyecto tiene un principio de entrega cuando veamos que ya no hay problemas técnicos como así fue, efectivamente yo he recibido varias llamadas, gente que me avisó de que he, están ahora con toda esta obra del alcantarillado que dicen se metió un camión para cavar se rompió una tubería, nuestra política es, ustedes verán como, como arreglan, o sea nosotros, no crear dependencia, eso creemos que es bien importante, se construyó una cosa, se hizo una cosa perfecto, pero ustedes ahora tienen que gestionarlo, administrarlo, si se rompe reparar, pero no crear la dependencia de hicimos la obra y además les damos haciendo todo el resto, y sí efectivamente yo se que, que no está funcionando, que efectivamente se rompió una de las canalizaciones, o sea la que trae el agua del río se rompió, ellos tienen que ver ya.

134 Mi política es, bueno hasta que no demuestren preocupación, interés pues por que voy hacerlo, o sea, no queremos...seguir mal acostumbrando en nosotros hacemos, nosotros pensamos, nosotros reflexionamos no, yo entiendo que ellos tienen problemas presupuestarios, pero eso no es un problema presupuestario el de mostrar interés, el de mostrar preocupar, el demostrar quiero que esto vuelva a funcionar, no es plata, es simplemente quiero o no quiero entonces y ahí queda y, y así será, o sea he, hasta que no vean que ellos también tienen que hacer cosas
programs exacerbate those tensions, while failing to focus on questions of social justice and indigenous rights. Commenting on the presence of the company in Pompeya, Samuel agrees with Margo's comments. Pompeya serves as the entrance to the block, and when the community suggests that it is deserving of more, Samuel reminds them that no oil is actually extracted by Repsol-YPF under its territory. He says,

And so...while the communities continue having this patronage mentality that depends on what you give them, and to want only this politics, and not take on self-development roles, roles of shared work, roles that take on the risk to begin to control other criteria simply because they will be the first victims of the assisted politics that they prefer. And this is not simply the fault of the company in this relationship - there are always two parts. So this is the situation. In the case of Pompeya specifically, we cooperate with them, not withstanding that we don't have more obligations than just securing our right to pass through. In some occasions they are already there with their established discourse, saying that you take our oil from here. But, you all already know that from here we don't even take a single barrel of oil! But, well, this is where we are.\(^{135}\)

Thus, despite the corporation's aim to return to traditional governance structures located at the community level, corporate officers' access to power is typically greater than that of community residents, and as a result their presence might reinforce the tendency to promote a paternalistic development process (Zalik 2004). Indeed, Samuel confirms that the community's demands on the company challenge its 'gift-giving' strategy, and this notion of community entitlement is quickly dismissed as illegitimate. The top-down process of program implementation assumes that indigenous populations have no knowledge of their environment or conservation, and CSR programs fail to account for indigenous populations as those who have often made knowledge of

\(^{135}\) Entonces que va...cuando las comunidades sigan teniendo una mentalidad clientelar de depender de lo que les den y querer únicamente esa política y no asumir, he, he, roles de autogestión, roles de trabajo compartido, roles de asumir el riesgo, de, de manejar con otros criterios simplemente ellos serán los primeros victimas de la política asistencialista que ellos prefirieron y que no es culpa simplemente de la empresa en esta relación siempre hay dos partes, siempre hay dos partes, entonces esa es la, esa es la situación, pero en casi di tu de, de Pompeya específicamente nosotros cooperamos con ellos no obstante que no tenemos obligaciones más allá de la, del derecho de paso, en algunas ocasiones ellos como ya están con su discurso he, establecido, dicen si pero de aquí se llevan nuestro petróleo, ustedes saben que nosotros no sacamos de su territorio ni un solo barril, pero bueno eso es lo que estamos,
the environment available in the first place (see Claudia's comments in the previous chapter). In turn, certain knowledges are privileged, while others are de-legitimized and destabilized. Despite claiming to want “participatory, non-hierarchical development”, the company's operations suggest that its model relies on “long-standing social authority structures” rather than a modern concept of 'empowerment' (Zalik 2004: 409; Bridge and Perreault 2009; Rajak 2011). In the next section, I explore the relationship between the company and the state, to try and understand how the corporation maintains its operations in communities.

*Negotiating sovereignties*

In this section of the chapter I explore relationships between the corporation and a neoliberal state. Indeed, the hollowed-out state cannot take on the everyday tasks of development, nor does it have constant visible presence in monitoring extraction. Instead, it contracts this work to other institutions, including oil companies and their CSR programs. Even in this process of state retrenchment, a rich literature has emerged to critique the state as a monolithic institution, and focuses on the daily struggles that can challenge these conceptions (see Mountz 2010, 2004; Herbert 1997; Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1991; Nelson 2009). The state, then, is imagined and shared; it functions as a set of individuals connected through networks. A variety of people are working across state institutions collaborating, colluding, and also producing contradictions (Mountz 2010).

In my conversations with Samuel, though, he constructs the state in a monolithic way, suggesting that the state is something mystical and elusive – that it is disembodied – lacking ability to engage in the day-to-day practices of development (see Mountz 2010, 2004). I suggest that the corporation cannot function without ensuring the state remains elusive, hollowed out,
and disembodied. Thus, the company strategically operates to ensure that state power is hidden, allowing the company to operate in its place. Yet, Repsol-YPF is also not a coherent, monolithic institution, and as explored through the dissertation, the company relies on a series of networks of NGOs, indigenous organizations, and even state employees, such as Doña Barbara to implement projects. These networks also lead to contradictions reflected in corporate discourse and practice.

In many of my conversations with Samuel, he took great pleasure in comparing the company to the state, and acknowledging that it was the state's historic absence that led to a greater role for the company in the region. Yet, Samuel's story hinged on critiquing the state's total absence, and pointing to the role the company was forced to take on, and in turn the company's ability to develop close ties with indigenous populations and monitor the region. The company actually fails to acknowledge the strategic presences of the state. For example, the state is still present in the context of education, and aspects of health care. State law requires that companies implement CSR programs in certain infrastructural and development contexts, thus companies are complying with state mandates that ensure oil will continue to be extracted. Furthermore, it is state law that ensures Repsol-YPF’s access to oil, while the Ecuadorian military guarantees the company’s security in extraction processes. Repsol-YPF’s story, then, also stops short of suggesting the company should, or indeed is a viable substitute for the state. Samuel’s careful crafting of the company's role protects the corporation from the responsibilities of citizenship and rights for indigenous populations (cf. Bebbington 2010). Indeed, Rajak (2011: 232) argues that CSR programs allow the company to “negotiate, rather than supersede the state.”
Samuel became increasingly animated when discussing recent shifts in Ecuador that were changing the rules of CSR operations. Explored through the previous chapter, the state has started to increase control over foreign companies operating in the country. Samuel, though, argued that this increased monitoring of corporate activities would only continue to impact indigenous peoples negatively, because it would eliminate CSR programs and 'abandon' local communities. He claimed the state could not do what the companies do – operating in the space of indigenous communities and getting to know individuals by name. In other words, CSR discourse and practice hinges on the company's ability to “converge with and incorporate national processes of development” (Rajak 2011: 232). The following paragraphs discuss the way in which Samuel defends the company's operations, arguing that CSR programs are in the best interest of indigenous populations.

As Samuel continued our conversation, though, it seemed obvious that his monologue was full of contradictions, and I am attentive to these contradictions as a possible way to challenge CSR programs. Responding to a question I asked about the state's strategic presences in the region, he says,

Exactly, exactly. You might say, it has characterized the Amazon region, the absence of the state, the absence of the state. I mean, to say in terms of, a public ethic, the state wouldn't have the ethic, a lack of ethic to challenge those who are doing something there, because the state isn't there. That is the situation.

Samuel's discourse of CSR programs turned on limited state monitoring of corporate activity, arguing that this crafts the corporation's zone of influence. Much of what we know about the company and its operations comes from the company itself. The companies submit reports of their programs, but the state does not follow up. There is very little understanding of what goes

---

136 Exacto, exacto, o sea que a caracterizado a la Amazonía, la ausencia del estado, la ausencia del estado, es decir en términos de, de una ética pública, el estado no tendría, carecería de ética hasta para cuestionar aquellos que hacen algo allá por que el estado no está esa es la situación,
on inside a corporation's oil compound, and by extension the company's 'zone of influence' (see Auyero and Swistun 2009). The legal agreement between the state and company that mandates CSR programs at the local level, also does not merit any further state monitoring. In turn, this enables the ongoing implementation of CSR programs. Samuel says,

The state is absent. The state, the only thing it does through the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum currently and with the Subsecretary of Environmental Production, is require an annual report that also includes community relations, and a general report of activities. But, it's not that the state is saying to you, send me this agreement, in certain terms, even if they are required to coordinate. But, they are always absent. So, more so, it's the positive disposition of the company to keep the authority informed, such that, for example, we signed an agreement with NAWE, with the Waorani, saying that certain activities we had shared, designed together with them. In doing so, in executing [the projects] this year this allows me to remit the activities in a schedule and the budget is determined so that [the state] can speak to, or follow up as necessary. But, that depends on the authority. We are not able to impose an authority, or a particular authority, or a particular management.  

Samuel *constructs* the state and its historic absence as a gap in monitoring indigenous populations in the northern Amazon region. Instead, corporations have to move into this void of the state's absence, and follow up with authorities, and the lack of state regulation allows the company to monitor itself. However, as explored in earlier chapters, as well as this one, the state is not entirely absent. It does construct roads, pays teachers, and of course the presence of the local *junta parroquial* is more recent evidence of the state. Yet, Samuel’s story relies on the state’s complete absence. This allows the company to operate freely, without critique, and without responsibility to other institutions. Furthermore, CSR programs are discursively

---

137 El estado está ausente, el estado lo único que hace a través del Ministerio de Minas y Petróleo actual y de la Subsecretaría de producción ambiental es de requerir el informe anual en el que consta también la parte de relaciones comunitarias como parte del informe general de actividades, pero no es que la, no es que el estado te está diciendo enviemela convenio, en que términos, aunque ellos tienen la obligación de coordinar, pero ellos siempre están ausentes, entonces más es he, más es la disposición positiva de una compañía de tener informada a la autoridad, no, de tal manera que por ejemplo nosotros firmamos un acuerdo con, con la NAHUE con los huahuranis decimos tales actividades hemos compartido, hemos diseñado conjuntamente con ellos he, en hacerla, en ejecutar este año me permito remitir las actividades, el cronograma y el presupuesto destinado para que usted se pronuncie o usted haga el seguimiento que considere, pero hay ya depende de la autoridad, nosotros no podemos imponer a una autoridad tal o cual gestión.
entrenched - Samuel suggests indigenous populations would be left with nothing, were it not for
the company. He acknowledges that early iterations of CSR programs in Ecuador had a more
functional purpose to ensure ongoing extraction, but more recently they have beneficial impacts
on peoples' daily lives. Samuel elaborates,

We still didn't have, not even the legislation for these activities. What happened was the
responsibility of the company that would see [what was needed]. The company was going
to execute policies and management through the guise of social responsibility, which is
also a recent paradigm. It was done also because it was functional, in terms of its
operating facilities... I mean, I assume these activities because they are functional for
what I'm going to do, because if I don't do this, if I don't assume these roles, I'm not going
to be able to operate either. So, it was also instrumental, but it's also become part of a
paradigm of social responsibility. 138

The company points to CSR programs' roles in facilitating oil extraction, but also the production
of new forms of human behavior that are linked to the corporation, instead of the state (see
Escobar 1995; Stoler 1995), and interventions into indigenous peoples' relationships with their
territory. Samuel confirmed that CSR programs became more formal through the 1990s, which
was also when the state began to establish environmental laws. Samuel says,

[CSR] is not a requirement. The requirements, in social and environmental terms recently
began to be forged in a more developed way in the middle of the 1990s. But, in the
1980s, we had hardly isolated certain environmental dispositions, and at a certain point,
most recently in the 1990s, the Ministry of Environment was created, which also did not
exist before. 139

---

138 No había todavía ni siquiera la legislación para estas actividades lo que, lo que había es la responsabilidad de la
empresa que veía que si bien iba a ejecutar políticas y gestiones dentro del marco de responsabilidad social que son
también paradigmas recientes, era, por, lo hacían también por que era funcional a su, a sus facilidades operativas..., es
decir yo asumo estas actividades por que también son funcionales para lo que voy hacer, por que si no hago esto
si no asumo estos roles tampoco voy a poder operar, entonces era también, era también instrumental, pero también
ha pasado a ser un paradigma de responsabilidad social.
139 No es una obligación, las obligaciones he, he, en términos sociales y ambientales recién comienzan a irse
forjando de manera más desarrollada a mediados de la década del noventa, pero en los años 80 no habían apenas
ciertas disposiciones ambientales aisladas, a tal punto que recién en los años 90 se crea el Ministerio del Ambiente
que tampoco existía.
CSR programs contributed to the regulation of resource extraction, and corporate operations were a mandatory part of the state's resource extraction laws. CSR as a legal requirement contributes to the corporation's process of managing indigenous populations to ensure accumulation. Much of Samuel's confirmation of CSR programs and company presence at the local level stems from the relationships he has established with local populations. He mentioned to me the way in which daily lives were shared between the company and local peoples, acknowledging this sense of inclusion that is forged between corporate and indigenous actors. The corporation's ongoing presence in the region has also allowed the company to share in everyday struggles, according to Samuel, and to get to know community residents on a daily basis. Samuel suggested that this sort of relationship is impossible for the state. He told me,

> The state is indifferent in this topic. If you see me at any moment answering a call from a native, who says that he/she has a sick relative, who has to be evacuated. We do it. But, if they call the state, they will not know the bureaucrat, the individual, and that individual probably will say that it's not my problem. That's the difference with a company that operates, and is working in the zone, in terms of a level of neighborly permanence. Daily lives are shared, and this is really difficult with the state, really difficult with the state.  

The corporation imagines itself as a neighbor, albeit a powerful one, that can re-construct the space of a community and its zone of influence through CSR programs. Thus, not only is it critical that the corporation can judge local populations' needs and deficiencies, but it is the corporation's presence in the region that prevents the formation of state institutions, in order to ensure its ongoing presence. This is essential for the company's operations. The company's social consent model prevents mobilization that might lead to the formation of state institutions (see Bebbington 2010). Samuel criticized the state in terms of its inability to monitor the region and

---

140 El estado es indiferente a esta materia, si, si, si tu me ves cualquier momento respondiendo la llamada de un nativo diciendo que tienen un enfermo y que tienen que evacuar eso lo hacemos nosotros pero si lo llaman al es, al estado no sabrán a que funcionario, no sabrán a que personaje y ese personaje probablemente dirá ese no es mi problema, esa es la diferencia entre una empresa que opera y que está en la zona trabajando en un nivel de vecindad permanente, de cotidianidad compartida y eso es muy difícil con el estado, muy difícil con el estado.
indigenous territory, both in the context of increasing colonization and conservation concerns, as well as the state's inability to be present at the local level responding to community members' needs. He said,

But, for us, the theme that is most important in Pompeya is control of colonization. We want to know that in the moment in which we leave, we will go knowing that through this port, not one colonist entered.\textsuperscript{141}

Preventing colonization places the company on the side of indigenous populations, who historically were opposed to internal colonization, and claimed rights to their territory. In the following statement he notes the way in which local communities have rights to their territory, but also the way in which the communities have signed agreements with the company to ensure continued access. He says,

One of the most important things for our operation on the Napo River, is that the port of entrance has to be the port that is most watched and protected, most of all because of the theme of colonization. Since its design, the oil model that was in place, that we conducted, it was identified that there was a point of risk, a key point, and consequently we never thought of constructing a bridge. We only use river operations, so we have canoes, boats, barges. You know that, and that it's a border that helps us a lot, in preventing colonization. In Pompeya, there's no colonization, in Indillama there's no colonization, and in Waorani territory, and the communities in the interior of the block, there's no colonization. What there is, is extensive use of the land on the part of each community. And here it's important that you, I don't know if you already have it, but that you obtain an agreement signed by the communities of Pompeya, Indillama, Centro Anañgu and others with the Ministry of Environment that gives them power to control their territory, and therefore, additionally, to us in Pompeya and Indillama, we have certain agreements, we also have agreements that were made the year before last, I don’t know, two or three years when they were pressuring [us].\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{141} Pero para nosotros los temas más importantes este momento en Pompeya son el control de colonización queremos que el rato que nos vayamos irnos sabiendo que por esa puerta que nosotros abrimos no hay un solo colono.

\textsuperscript{142} Una de las cosas más importantes para nuestra operación en el río Napo es que al ser la puerta de ingreso tiene que ser la puerta más cuidada y protegida, sobre todo por el tema de colonización, desde el diseño del modelo petrolero que íban, a, nosotros a ejecutar, se, se identificó que esa era, he, era un punto de riesgo y un punto clave consecuentemente nunca se pensó en un puente, solo en operaciones he, he, fluviales, no, por eso tenemos las canoas, tenemos los botes, tenemos las, las gabarras, tu conoces igual eso y eso es una frontera que nos ayuda mucho, mucho a cuidar la colonización. En Pompeya no existe colonización, en Indillama no existe colonización y en territorio huahurani en las comunidades del interior del bloque tampoco, lo que si hay es un uso extensivo del suelo por parte de las propias comunidades. Y aquí es importante que tu, he, no se si ya lo tienes, pero te consigas el
In other words, oil’s spatial fix highlights the importance of ensuring indigenous populations also desire the benefits of oil, and incorporating them into an “incentive structure” (Zalik 2004: 420). Samuel continued to critique the state, saying that it was the state's absences that forced the company to take greater control of the region, and that it is the state that should be there to ensure ongoing development in communities. In other words, none of the project failures in Pompeya or other communities in the corporation's zone of influence can be attributed to the company. He says,

There's not harmonious development, sure, because there are too many actors in the zone. The actor that should be there in a permanent way, providing a horizon toward where they must develop themselves is the state. But, the state is not there, so we must be able to control the colonization. But what happens when we are not controlling [colonization], and not just that theme, [but considering in the case of] Pompeya, there's already another road that has arrived [a second road was constructed in Pompeya, going against the company's wishes].

Similarly, the presence of Yasuní National Park in the region further complicates legal concerns regarding corporate presence and oil drilling inside the park's boundaries (see Sawyer 2004). Again, Samuel critiqued the lack of state institutions in the region that failed to monitor the park and activities within its borders. Thus, the company is required to monitor activities inside the park, and develops CSR programs to ensure limited impact on the park. Samuel said,

That is the worst attack, the worst attack, is to Yasuní National Park. However, there's already a road there. Who approved that road? What state authority said do it? No one. The prefecture said do it, and they did it. So, it is the weakness of the absence of institutions. And, it's not only bad, not only bad for the Amazon region. The worst part of

convenio firmado por las comunidades de Pompeya, Indillama, Centroañango y otras con el Ministerio del Ambiente, en el cual el Ministerio del Ambiente les da potestad para manejar su territorio, ya, entonces adicional a que nosotros en Pompeya y en Indillama tenemos convenios puntuales, tenemos también un convenio que se hizo el año antepasado, no se dos años o tres años cuando presionaba.

143 no hay un desarrollo armónico claro por que están algunos. De los actores que están en la zona, el actor que debería estar de manera permanente dando el horizonte por donde deben desarrollarse es el estado pero el estado no está, entonces, nosotros podemos ir controlando la colonización, pero que pasa cuando nosotros no estemos controlando eso, y no solo ese tema, hacia Pompeya ya llegó otra carretera.
the Amazon region is the absence of the state. The worst part of Ecuador is that the state is a state with little coercive capacity to say these are the norms...that we follow. This is a country in which they inaugurate a new constitution and... the first institution responsible to ensure that the constitution stands is the first to violate it. That is Ecuador. A lot of things depend on friendships, interpersonal relations and not just socially acceptable and shared rules. That is the problem with Ecuador, and in the Amazon region this approach is much more serious.144

The company generates a discourse of the state's 'averted gaze', which “feeds uncertainty and confusion 'by its implacable opacity, its refusal to comprehend, and its inability to act responsibly to the human suffering that presents itself” (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 294 quoted in Auyero and Swistun 2009: 101). While Scheper-Hughes (1992) is writing in the context of infant deaths in Brazilian shantytowns, and the state’s indifference replicated in women’s own attitudes toward the deaths of their babies, which suggests infant death is a natural occurrence, I argue that a similar process occurs in Ecuador in the context of daily lives in Pompeya. Indigenous populations reflect the state’s patchwork, strategic presences in everyday processes, made all the more ‘real’ by the company’s discourse that suggests the state has never been present, and continues to be completely absent. Indeed, it is this understanding of the state, implicitly transferred to indigenous populations through the material evidence of CSR programs that contributes to the corporation's ongoing presence. While Foucault (1975) wrote about the hostile gaze of the state, and its disciplinary practices of surveillance, Scheper-Hughes (1992) proposes an averted gaze of the state, and the reflection of this aversion in local populations that becomes

144 Ya, ese es el peor atentado, el peor atentado a, al parque nacional Yasuní, sin embargo ya está la carretera ahí, quien aprobó esa carretera, que autoridad del estado dijo háganlo, nadie, la prefecta dijo se hace y se hizo. Entonces es la debilidad de la ausencia de instituciones, y no es solo malo, no es solo un mal de la Amazonia, el mal de la Amazonia es la ausencia de estado. El mal del Ecuador es que el estado es un estado con poca capacidad coercitiva para decir estas son las normas...que hay que, que cumplir, este es un país en el que se inaugura una nueva constitución y el primer, la primera institución responsable de velar por la constitución...es la primera en violarla ese es el Ecuador, muchas cosas dependen de la amistad, de la relación interpersonal y no de las reglas socialmente aceptadas y compartidas ese es el problema del Ecuador, y en la, y en la Amazonía este enfoque es mucho más grave.
formalized in state institutions. Yet, in Ecuador in 2007, the state’s role started to shift, which also highlighted the underlying contradictions in corporate operations.

The new governing practices in Ecuador initiated by President Correa's administration forced the company to confront a newly engaged state. Samuel argued that the state seemed to be attempting to monitor companies more closely. Thus, Samuel again confronts his own contradictions, claiming that the relative absence of the state is the root of the problems in the Amazon region, but also reacting to the state's aims to seize more control from the companies. I suggest that the state's renewed interest exposes corporate operations for what they really are – the pursuit of profit that hinges on incorporating indigenous populations into an incentive structure – to desire the 'benefits of oil'. Furthermore, the shifts in regulation of companies, and claiming the majority of windfall profits poses a contradictory process of profit maximization of a private company, and a social consent model of development that requires stability.

CSR programs focus on solutions, rather than addressing political economic problems, suggesting a “blurring of development and compensation” (Zalik 2004: 419; Rajak 2011). The impacts and effects of oil extraction always seem to be someone else's responsibility (Auyero and Swistun 2009). As the following quote suggests, Samuel seems to think that a corporation can more effectively ensure democracy than the state through its processes of 'self-regulation'. He says,

I see, at this moment, there's the highest level of deinstitutionalization than ever before. That a president with a high level of authoritarianism, a sort of clientelism that determines that which he does, and does not do. That is not democracy. At the very least, not for me...We have confronted problems [with indigenous communities], but for us, we are interested in having a relationship in which we negotiate and discuss with the authorities about what our role is, and what is the role for them. But not an imposed

---

145 Of course, Samuel does not point to the corporation's own production of clientelism and patronage through processes of gift-giving that leads to indigenous deference to power.
position, in which they say whatever, and whoever does that is going to go to prison. No, that's not democracy.\(^{146}\)

Samuel started to comment on the new legal changes in governance of oil, critiquing the state for its concern with maintaining profits in regulating oil extraction. He suggests that companies are caught in the middle, and defends the failures in corporate practices by criticizing the state's inability to monitor oil extraction in any sort of consistent way. Furthermore, the company's attempts to intervene in the region are challenged by a renewed interest by the state. If a company is left to its own devices, or if the state maintains laws that allow the company to operate as it wishes, reflected in the company’s profit margins, the company will have more success in terms of monitoring and controlling the region. He says,

Ecuador wants to have rules of the game for periods of prosperity, and rules of the game for companies during periods of downturns. It punishes you when you are doing well, when you are prosperous, and it pretends to look the other way when you are declining, or it continues to punish you when you are in a bad situation, and these aren't the rules of the game. So, in contexts like these, what is the situation? These are the concepts also of social responsibility that must be equaled out and I wonder how to continue. Executing social responsibility, when I am a subject that is feeling punished, and disrespected by the same state where I am, if you would have stable rules of the game, you would also have a politics of social responsibility that is stable. Does it make sense to have a foundation when tomorrow we are leaving? This also depends on the vision of the company. I believe that the companies have to prioritize their politics of social assistance, and that social assistance is not just a response to a positive situation, but also one during difficult times. It is for us, including within a 99% -1% split, that we continue doing we are doing. The Foundation continues supporting what it can, with what it is able to do, and much more. But, the legal insecurity places limits on you, and that is the situation. For example, you will have heard in recent days that the Waorani pueblo made a declaration against the state, so that the state would arrive at an agreement with Repsol, because if Repsol left the country, they would be left with almost a situation of abandonment.\(^{147}\)

\(^{146}\) Yo veo que este rato hay mayor nivel de desinstitucionalización que antes, que antes, eso de que un jefe presidente con alto nivel de autoritarismo, de clientelismo ordene lo que se hace y lo que no se debe hacer eso no es democracia, al menos para mi, no... nosotros hemos enfrentado problema, pero a nosotros nos interesa tener una relación de, en que negociemos y discutimos, y discutamos con las autoridades cual es nuestro rol y cual es el rol de ellos, pero no una posición impuesta en que digan cualquiera que hace eso se va preso, no, eso no es democracia.

\(^{147}\) el Ecuador quiere tener unas reglas de juego para la época de prosperidad y unas reglas de juego respecto a las empresas para la época de limitaciones, te castigo cuando estás bien y me hago el de la vista gorda por último cuando estás mal o te sigo cayendo cuando estás mal, y esas no son reglas de juego. Entonces en escenarios como
As the above quote illustrates, the company is stymied by the state's return to legal forms of control and monitoring. If limits are placed on its CSR programs, the company's 'social license to operate' is also curbed. Samuel refers to the state's process whereby it started to push Repsol-YPF out of the country, arguing that it had to adhere to a 99%-1% split in windfall profits. He suggests that even through these unfair divisions of profits from extraction, a company is forced to maintain its CSR programs. Thus, “partnership development is contradicted by the profit maximizing logic of the private company” (Zalik 2004: 419; Rajak 2011). Yet, Samuel argues that CSR is much more than just a responsibility to those communities where oil is extracted. For him, his job is about creating personal ties, connections, with local people, and this relationship validates the company's work. Indeed, he uses the word 'abandonment' to suggest the company is necessary for indigenous populations' survival. He continues,

Not like a social responsibility. We take it on like a social responsibility in which we leave effort. We do it with a lot of conviction, with a lot of commitment. But not all the companies. In our case, because we have done it almost like a relation, an affiliation with the people from there. That time I entered with Rodrigo from ENTRIX, and there was a community leader who said to me, 'I saw in the news that Repsol was going', and she started to cry. We also go into it establishing ties of empathy, and of affiliation, personal affinity.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ No como una responsabilidad social, nosotros lo asumimos como una responsabilidad social en que dejamos esfuerzo, he, lo hacemos con mucha convicción, con mucha entrega pero no todos, no todas las empresas, nuestro caso por que hemos hecho casi una relación he, he, filial con la gente de ahí no, he, esa vez yo ingresé con [Rodrigo] y había una dirigente que me dijo yo vi en las noticias que REPSOL se iba y, y comenzó a llorar, también van estableciéndose lazos de empatía y de filiación personal, de afinidad personal.
CSR is a commitment for Samuel. It reflects on the company as a good 'neighbor.' It is only right that a company that is present in the region give back or take responsibility. He says,

There is another type of empathetic, personal relationship that is functional for what we do. But, we don't view it from this perspective. We see it more from a perspective of a pledge that we take on, and that we must be loyal and worthy of this commitment. Afterward, because of our presence, [indigenous peoples] give through life stories and care. Her husband was on the brink of dying [looking at a photo], and came to Quito. We helped him, they operated and now he is back in his house. He's living. So all these cases disrupt certain paradigms. We have a good relationship. Things stay with the people. Many say that the indigenous pueblos are ungrateful. It's probably the case, but we have seen everything.\textsuperscript{149}

Essentially, Samuel argues that the company has the ability to perform tasks the state cannot, suggesting that a state could never know individual citizens by name and is a monolithic, nameless institution (see Mountz 2010 for a critique). CSR programs, then, are constructed by the corporation with indigenous peoples' interests at heart, providing for a population that has 'suffered' at the hands of an 'absent' state. Yet, Samuel fails to acknowledge the ways in which the corporation contributes to, and benefits from the state's strategic presences both in the context of limited state monitoring, and the state’s approval of extraction through contracts with Petroecuador, and military presence. Indeed, what this struggle between the state, indigenous populations and corporation represents are political processes that are motivated by the desire to gain access to oil rents. For Watts, these processes are subsumed under his term “oil complex” defined by a “unity” of company, state, and community, a territorial process constituted by oil concessions, and in which practices of oil companies challenge more customary forms of rule,

\textsuperscript{149}Sea hay otro tipo de relación de empatía personal que es funcional para lo que hacemos pero que nosotros no le vemos desde esa perspectiva, lo vemos más de un, de una perspectiva de un compromiso que asumimos y que debemos ser leales y dignos a ese compromiso, no, después y,y, no solamente, y no solamente se, se dan estos casos por, por tu presencia se dan por los testimonios de vida y de asistencia, el esposo de ella estuvo al borde de morirse, vino a Quito, le ayudamos, se operó ahora está de nuevo en su casa, está viviendo, entonces toda estas cosas rompen ciertos paradigmas, rompen estos paradigmas y tenemos una buena relación, cosas quedan en la gente, muchos dicen que los pueblos indígenas son ingratos, es probable, pero nosotros hemos visto de todo.
such as ethnic and local state relations. Watts (2003: 54) writes that “petro-capitalism (as a dynamic set of forces) refigure differing sorts of governable spaces in which contrasting identities, and forms of rule come into play.” In turn, the oil complex as a “static institution” linked to the dynamic processes of petro-capitalism can reconfigure governable spaces through which different identities, and different forms of rule emerge. Indigenous subjects within the corporation's zone of influence reflect the compensatory nature, and the materiality of CSR projects. Oil's spatial boundedness highlights the state's control over the formation of subjects of the oil state, but that this subject formation requires conditioning subjects to desire the 'benefits' of cheap oil, incorporating them into an incentive structure, and these modes of regulation often contradict one another (Zalik 2004; Rajak 2011). It is in these contradictory processes that indigenous populations must continue to insert themselves into debates about resource access and control.

Conclusion

“Rendering contentious issues technical is a routine practice for experts, I insist that this operation should be seen as a project, not a secure accomplishment” (Li 2007: 10). This statement by Li (2007) suggests that there are points of intervention in practices of rule. Indeed, the company is not a monolithic institution, and it does produce contradictory outcomes, despite doing all it can to ensure its ongoing presence by depoliticizing its operations. In turn, by assuming, or concluding that depoliticization is an effective outcome, we run the risk of overlooking and excluding questions that will not go away, including historic and political economic questions. If we explore CSR programs on their own terms, as development projects rooted in neoliberal forms of post-Fordist capitalist production, we can also point to the way that
these projects, rather than promoting the self-help rhetoric of neoliberalism, instead lead to ongoing paternalism and patron-client relationships of earlier decades. My dissertation, and this chapter in particular, aims to specifically highlight the corporation's move toward expert "closure" through CSR programs that avoids analysis of corporate operations. Following Li (2007), it is precisely these underlying aims of development projects that should draw our attention.

In the second part of the chapter, I attempted to examine the competing interests between state and corporate control of the region. I argued that ongoing CSR programs actually prevent the formation of state and indigenous institutions that might lead to different development and governance outcomes. The corporation reflects a discourse, and the material practices of CSR programs contribute to the company's attempts to paint the state in neoliberal, hollowed-out, uncaring terms. Indeed, the company builds on the historic, only patchwork presences of the state as a strategic maneuver to ensure its ongoing presence. Yet, rather than ensuring rights for indigenous peoples, the company is more interested in its own presence in Ecuador, as a powerful actor that is engaged in the 'conduct of conduct' of indigenous populations. Indeed, my discussion with Samuel seemed to highlight the impacts from additional state control over corporations, rather than the possibilities that increased presence of the state might have on indigenous rights and citizenship in Ecuador. In turn, the ambivalence and confusion of the state in regulating oil extraction, and the corporation's 'expert' discourse is reflected in indigenous subjectivities. Thus, this chapter is also an exploration of competing sovereignties as both state and corporation seek control over a territory and oil wealth, which ultimately hinges on the population within that territory.
Yet, I argue that the competition that ensues between the corporation and state also opens the space for additional indigenous control over their own development. If we explore the contradictory practices in development, both through the company and the hollowed out state, as well as the participation of indigenous organizations and leaders we can see the ways in which these actors at times support, and at other times challenge the processes that might lead to alternative outcomes, and additional control over resources for indigenous populations (cf. Mountz 2010; Wolford 2006, 2010). Indeed, if we consider CSR programs as daily practices, this allows us to investigate these different pathways to confront corporate operations. Resistance, then, does not always come from the outside (see Gupta 1995; Moore 2005, 2000). My dissertation presents an exploration of alternative narratives, or “counter-discourses” (Abu-Lughod: 263) that are sometimes suppressed, or normalized as culturally acceptable, i.e. the state as facilitator of capital flows for investment and economic growth, that can “expose inconsistencies in [Ecuador's] self-imaginings” (Mountz 2010: xxv). I explore these spaces of ambivalence in the next chapter, the conclusion.
Chapter 6

Conclusions

We began our fieldwork with the specter of collective action in mind, and we ended up with extensive notes that register its absence. (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 136)

If the state is simultaneously confused, neglectful, and bold, why should we expect otherwise from sick and weak neighbors? (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 101)

Introduction

In recent months, indigenous populations across Ecuador took to the streets participating in a march organized by CONAIE, walking from the Amazon region to Quito protesting the state's push to open the southern Amazon region to copper mining. In an attempt to diversify its economic reliance on oil extraction, the Correa administration is moving forward with large-scale mining projects. The protest began in the province of Zamora Chinchipe, in the southern Amazon region, the location of these new mines, on International Women's Day on March 8, and ended in Quito on March 22, World Water Day. It was designed to call attention to the social and environmental impacts of mining, in particular the impacts on water resources, and indigenous rights and participation in resource governance decisions. On March 5th, 2012, President Correa signed a $1.4 billion contract with the Chinese owned company Ecuacorriente to begin a copper strip-mining project, the largest ever in Ecuador. The country plans to take 52% of the profits, or $4.5 billion over 25 years. Other negotiations are underway with Canadian companies, and a second project with Ecuacorriente. The contracts stipulate that 10% of royalties should fund projects in communities impacted by the mine, and the current contract with Ecuacorriente includes $100 million for social and environmental projects in the province of Zamora Chinchipe.
(Becker 2012). In other words, despite the state's aims to take back control of resource extraction from multinationals, CSR programs will continue in Ecuador.

This dissertation, therefore, serves as a timely investigation into the social dynamics of resource extraction and environmental governance, and multinationals' roles therein, a process that only continues to intensify in Ecuador. Furthermore, it points to the role of CSR programs as development projects in communities that bear the brunt of resource extraction, and the entangled relationships between a state, its citizens, and multinational corporations.

I argue that CSR programs can facilitate the expansion of global capitalism by linking a corporation's goals to a national development project, blurring the boundaries between marginalized citizens and a state. In turn, my project aims to investigate CSR programs on their own terms, as development projects. I uncover the way in which CSR programs, premised on neoliberal tenets of self-help, and grassroots development, instead present a return to the clientelism and patronage of earlier decades (see Li 2007; Rajak 2010, 2011; Zalik 2004). Furthermore, the ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous subjects allowed the corporation to manipulate populations, but also points to challenges to corporate operations, as well as to state sovereignty.

I explore the relationships between the state, company and indigenous populations to examine how indigenous subjects are produced through CSR programs. In turn, by conceptualizing CSR programs as institutions, I uncover the way in which corporations and CSR programs discipline indigenous populations in the space of extraction in Ecuador’s northern Amazon region. Following Watts (2003, 2004,b) and Moore (2005), I examine overlapping spaces of governance, linked by ongoing oil extraction. The particular historical context of the roll-out of neoliberal policies and practices that could facilitate oil extraction, and the ongoing
retrenchment of the state in the northern Amazon region, combined with indigenous social movements through the 1990s is overshadowed by CSR programs in the space of Pompeya. In turn, corporate programs emphasize development projects and indigenous deficiencies, producing and relying on indigenous uncertainty and ambivalence.

CSR programs define deficient subjects, targeting indigenous populations as those in need of development. In turn, discourse at the point of extraction revolves around participation in the nation-state linked to an extractive industry, and indigenous rights and representation are secured through this participation. Thus, while CSR programs depoliticize resource extraction, my dissertation aims to highlight the politicization of CSR programs that rely on the production of particular indigenous subjectivities. Ethnographic analysis, and the exploration of the daily practices of CSR programs illuminate the relationships of power that both manipulate and present a coherent framework of extraction.

While resources continue to be extracted in Ecuador, CSR programs resulted in challenging state sovereignty. The corporation is often engaged in the day-to-day practices of indigenous populations, leading to dependence on corporate operations. In other words, the corporation intervenes in processes of government, leading to new territories of rule, which shape people’s belonging in the nation-state. My dissertation points to the role of indigenous subjects in relation to the state, and sovereign power. In turn, as the state continues to base development and modernization processes in resource extraction, the role of indigenous peoples in these processes will continue to be crucial to state’s sovereign control over its territory. The continued delegitimization of indigenous rights, and the ability of CSR programs to squash protest, highlights the state’s failure to equitably distribute resources. In other words, CSR programs in Ecuador acutely highlight the resource curse and its effects (cf. Bebbington 2010).
In this conclusion I focus on productive processes of ambivalence. While the current emphasis on large-scale mining in Ecuador has prompted nation-wide protests, organized indigenous collective action is less evident in the spaces of oil extraction in the northern Amazon region. I argued through the dissertation that the uncertainty and ambivalence in indigenous subjectivities I uncovered contributes to this inaction, and challenges a collective indigenous identity. However, I also want to suggest that this ambivalence can highlight possible spaces for calling attention to power relations produced through corporate programs, and the state's ongoing attempts to dismiss indigenous claims to resources and membership in the nation-state.

My dissertation is a story of the state, and its relationship to some of its most marginalized citizens, indigenous peoples. It is also a story of environmental governance, and the interventions of a powerful multinational oil company that shifts relationships at the point of extraction leading to unintended and unanticipated outcomes, exacerbating relationships of power that result in challenges to state sovereignty and indigenous collective action. By exploring relationships between the state, a private multinational, and indigenous populations that form through CSR programs, I aimed to uncover alternative narratives that might begin to challenge those dominant discourses and practices that continue to marginalize indigenous populations.

Throughout the period of my research, I was frustrated by the uncertainty in indigenous responses to CSR programs I encountered in Pompeya, which I mistook as apathy toward me, and my project. Eventually, though, my work focused on how this ambivalent response was produced. What were the power relationships that led to this outcome? In turn, how do the relationships produced through CSR programs contribute to a lack of collective action in indigenous communities and organizations, and influence indigenous rights and representation in
the state? The spaces of ambivalence become productive spaces for exploring tensions and complexities in processes of resistance and challenging dominant power structures (cf. Bondi 2004)

Spaces of ambivalence

I analyzed the production of both CSR programs, and indigenous subjectivities to explore overlapping spaces of governance, formed through social relations between the state, indigenous peoples, and the company. I drew on Foucault's (1991) governmentality framework to investigate how CSR programs produce competing sovereignties tied to access and control over oil wealth, and the production of particular indigenous subjects. In other words, I examined not just subject formation that is the result of particular technologies of rule, but also how those technologies operate to produce subjects (Agrawal 2005; Birkenholtz 2009; Rajak 2011). I explored the way in which sovereignty is linked to subject formation, and how subjects can challenge sovereignty, or become subject to sovereign power (Li 2007; Moore 2005; Valdivia 2008). I designed my dissertation so that each chapter might address an overlapping space of governance in the northern Amazon region: community, nation-state, and corporate 'zone of influence' (Moore 2005; N. Rose 1999; Watts 2003, 2004).

In turn, I argue that indigenous ambivalence and uncertainty is produced in these different spaces, which leads to particular forms of governing oil extraction, challenges state and indigenous sovereignty, and contributes to ongoing corporate presence. In other words, corporate practices sought to discipline the space of oil extraction, shaping the conduct of indigenous residents. More recent attempts by the state to regain control over the space of extraction, following years of outsider presence, reflect the state's loss of profits from oil extraction and loss
of control over indigenous subjects. My analysis of CSR programs can emphasize the contradictory processes of extending neoliberalism into the farthest corners of the state, undermining local state control, while simultaneously emphasizing ensuring state control from afar (see Nightingale 2005). In turn, my project emphasizes the contradictory processes of a locatable government in offices and agencies in Ecuador, and the more hidden processes of the state. Indigenous uncertainty and ambivalence emerge through these competing claims of state and corporate control to oil wealth, but also produce the space for indigenous subjects to strategically use their agency and highlight their own politics and control over territory.

In this conclusion I call attention to the possibilities of using this ambivalence and uncertainty as creating a space to productively explore the tensions and contradictions I uncovered in my research. I suggest that by placing indigenous subjects alongside more powerful actors, alternative narratives might emerge to challenge dominant discourses and practices. While CSR programs could be reduced to corporate policy, I argue that by exploring CSR programs as a set of daily practices, I can uncover the everyday social relationships in which they are embedded (Mountz 2010). Thus, my dissertation points to the epistemological distinctions in institutional analysis that have emerged historically. Arguing that the institution emerges out of social relationships, rather than existing as something to be penetrated allows a focus on the way in which different groups and individuals are engaged in the formation of CSR programs. My dissertation contributes to ethnographies of development (King 2009; Bebbington et al. 2004; Perreault 2003a,b) that challenge the depoliticization of development practices (Escobar 1999; Ferguson 2004), and highlight the micro-practices and politics of development processes that emerge through daily practices (see Mountz 2007, 2010). I aim to uncover the central contradictions or inconsistencies in resource governance through CSR programs (Mountz
An IE can point to these contradictions, or the cracks in the façade of CSR programs (Mountz 2007).

**Contributions**

Ecuador relies on oil for 50% of its economic revenues (EIA 2010), yet the economic wealth from this extraction has flowed to major cities in Ecuador, leaving the Amazon region with few of the benefits of resource extraction. Instead the region continues to be devastated socially and environmentally, and protests that have included the region's indigenous populations, along with other activists have called attention to these atrocities (Kimmerling 1996; Sawyer 2004). While the marches through the 1990s highlighted indigenous rights and representation in the state, including rights to territory, the state still maintained its rights to the sub-surface resources below indigenous territory. Furthermore, the neoliberalization of the oil industry's operations through the 1990s, including privatization of resource extraction, removed control over multinationals from the state. CSR programs emerged in Ecuador during this period of indigenous protests and neoliberal reforms, mandated by the state as part of company operations (Benalcázar 2006; Fontaine 2005; Veintimilla 2006). Corporations represent a long line of outsiders in the region, continuing the relationships of power that contribute to the marginalization of indigenous populations in the state.

In Ecuador, the alternative manifestations of the state in the Amazon region left indigenous communities to negotiate directly with outsiders – rubber barons, missionaries, and private multinationals – which set up a long history of patron-client relationships, reflected in relationships with corporations today (Macdonald 1999; Muratorio 1991; Whitten 1976). The state's strategic presences also contributed to Repsol-YPF and its CSR programs' confirmation as
a leading example of grassroots development. In other words, these outside institutions establish particular forms of government, and following Foucault, challenge state sovereignty, discipline and government. My dissertation, then, highlights the particular contradictions that confirm the entrenchment of neoliberal policies and programs at the local level, while undermining local state control. It does so by employing a Foucauldian approach rooted in governmentality to address the power relationships that contribute to government, sovereignty and discipline that emerge through institutional analysis of CSR programs. This approach offers a complementary methodological and epistemological frame to other studies that have investigated neoliberal processes of resource governance and political economy (see, for example, Moore 2000; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008), and explores the production of sovereignty and subjectivity through CSR programs.

Furthermore, my dissertation offers an ethnography of CSR programs, contributing to a small, but growing body of literature within the academy. On a global scale, we see the emergence of CSR programs and a series of voluntary reporting standards for corporations engaged in CSR initiatives (Porter and Kramer 2006; The Economist 2008; Rajak 2011). In turn, CSR programs and corporations undermine, and hence fill in spaces where the state is ‘absent’, yet these voluntary standards cannot take the place of more formal rules and regulations, including state institutions that might regulate resource extraction, and often prevent their formation (Bebbington 2010; The Economist 2008; Frynas 2005). While discussions of CSR programs, and their possible benefits, have emerged in popular literature, more critical studies have also developed in academic literature. The Niger Delta and Shell Oil's CSR programs have provided numerous case studies (Livesey and Kearins 2002; Zalik 2004). These critical analyses have sometimes taken the form of ethnographic research (Himley 2010; Welker 2009), focusing
on the corporation's goals of 'consent based regulation' (Zalik 2004), and the prevention of state institutions that might better distribute resources, contributing to the resource curse (Bebbington 2010). Indeed, CSR programs are often faulted for their inclusionary and participatory nature that cannot address questions of resource distribution and social justice (Zalik 2004). My dissertation offers a first look at these unequal outcomes that emerge through ethnographies of CSR programs questioning indigenous subject formation in the space of the Ecuadorian nation-state.

My study of CSR programs as development projects premised on a notion of gift giving, despite corporate discourse to the contrary, focuses on the contradictory processes of CSR programs through institutional relationships. I argued through the dissertation that corporations operated as trustees in Ecuador (see Cowen and Shenton 1998; Li 2007), diagnosing deficiencies and providing technical solutions that fail to address political economic problems. CSR programs are not merely about facilitating capital's expansion, but also about the maneuvering of social relationships that lead to additional resource extraction. I explore the production of an ambivalent indigenous subjectivity through CSR programs. I aimed to uncover the way in which CSR programs lead to social relationships that challenge state sovereignty and the ways in which CSR programs are designed to coerce indigenous peoples into resource extraction regimes through the company’s ‘zone of influence’. To do so, my project investigates the operation of CSR programs as institutions that engage in the governance of resources by shifting indigenous subjectivity.
Contradictions in overlapping spaces of governance

My investigation begins from the point of institutional analysis, developed in Chapter 2. I argue that conceptualizing institutions through social relationships develops an approach that can explore the various networks and connections within CSR programs, and also beyond the ‘boundaries’ of the institution itself. These networks often extend outside the official discourse and practice of the corporation. Furthermore, my analysis is attentive to the role of the researcher herself within institutional dynamics, and argues that institutional formation through social relationships must also address the role of the researcher. My dissertation, therefore, explores the ways in which I was bound up in corporate discourse and practice, and the challenges of extricating myself from institutional processes.

I argue that this approach to institutions is different from other institutional analyses in geography that often see the institution in its a priori manifestation, as something to be penetrated. Furthermore, my dissertation uses institutional ethnography to address social relationships within and produced through CSR programs. My analysis is grounded in Dorothy Smith’s (1987) use of IE to examine how subjects emerge through the institution and vice-versa. Indeed, other development ethnographies have not necessarily drawn on Smith’s definition of IE, reflecting epistemological differences in institutional conceptualization. However, my analysis also lends itself to a critique of Smith’s institutional approach, arguing for a more spatialized conceptualization of the institution, exploring differences between the institution’s centers and margins, for example. This analysis serves as the basis for my dissertation that is attentive to subject formation through CSR programs, and the ambivalence of indigenous peoples in the presence of corporate and state operations.
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between subject formation and long histories of local state absences, and ongoing strategic state presences manifest in their geographical distance from the region. In turn, the formation of patron-client relationships between the company and indigenous populations, contributes to indigenous doubts in the state's efficacy as a sovereign. The contradictory, uncertain relationships at the community level are “mediated by the many appropriations, denials and distortions carried out by existing institutions” (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 157). Indeed, the way in which the state has used and misused oil wealth, the implementation of CSR programs, and oil's ongoing contamination of Ecuador contributes to indigenous populations' own uncertainty, and a lack of collective action. This uncertainty, on the one hand, produces indigenous powerlessness and the ongoing social and environmental impacts of resource extraction (see Auyero and Swistun 2009). Furthermore, indigenous cultural norms dictate that more powerful actors should distribute wealth to those with less power. Yet, on the other hand, in the space of Pompeya, certain residents are also challenging the role of multinationals and CSR programs, pointing to the way in which development through CSR programs is premised on gift-giving, rooted in long histories of outsider presence in the region.

The argument I craft in Chapter 3 suggests that by placing politics alongside development, we can uncover inconsistencies and uncertainties in CSR programs which also place additional power in the hands of indigenous populations (Li 2007; Wolford 2010). Following Doña Barbara, by juxtaposing gift-giving with a discourse of entitlement, the community might challenge corporate power and control in the space of the community, and call on both state and corporate actors for development. In other words, Doña Barbara attempted to “shape how subjects would be governed” (Moore 2005: 254). In turn, the ambivalent indigenous subject is produced through the institutional relationships of CSR programs. Furthermore,
indigenous sovereignty is tied to notions of CSR programs and corporate presence acknowledging and challenging indigenous histories of sovereignty and territory in the Ecuadorian nation-state.

In Chapter 4, I explore relationships between the capitalist state and its political body (Coronil 1997; Valdivia 2008). I argue that the recent shifts in governance following the election of President Correa expose the duplicitous processes of the petro-state (cf. Nelson 2009). In turn, I use Bakhtin’s carnival to uncover possible openings in governance processes and examine shifts in governance strategies reflected in neoliberal/post-neoliberal transitions. I argue that while the post-neoliberal moment offers an opening for new forms of governance, subject formation and sovereignty produced through corporate programs exacerbates these new possibilities. Indeed, as the carnival promises, these are moments to try on new identities, but these new moments cannot happen without some contemplation of the institutional disciplining to which subjects are accustomed. Thus, the carnival is appealing, and yet dangerous at the same time.

I examine the duplicitous nature of the state in the context of territorial sovereignty linked to the state’s sub-surface rights to oil, or *la Patria*. For Sawyer (2004), *la Patria* is about the right of conquest, by a white, male elite. In Ecuador, indigenous protests through the 1990s presented alternative ways of understanding the nation, and challenged discourses of *la Patria* by using symbolic claims of nation and *plurinacionalidad* forcing the state to consider nation as separate from state. Scholarship has linked *la Patria* to natural resources, including oil, and struggles over territoriality and membership in the nation are also rooted in struggles over resources (Perreault and Valdivia 2010; Valdivia 2008).
If we consider the histories of indigenous political organizing, tied to alternative notions of nation-building, neoliberalism through the 1990s opened the space for indigenous political claims to control over territory, but also contained the movement through additional development of natural resource extraction and privatization of oil operations (cf. Hale 2011). CSR programs emerged, in part, as a way for the state to control indigenous protests, imposing its will, rather than following indigenous peoples' (see Moore 2005). I argue that this process of containment also presents certain contradictions that call into question the state's sovereignty. When these ‘duping’ processes are exposed – incorporating indigenous peoples into the sovereign state through coercive practices, only to marginalize them further – we might start to question the carnival of the state’s practices. What continues to be indigenous territory is coopted by state discourses of oil production for the good of the nation, and engagement in CSR programs to ‘develop’ indigenous populations. Thus, state practices serve to regulate the multiple bodies of the state – the rich and the poor, the natural and the political – through engagement in neoliberal programs and practices and the disciplinary processes of CSR programs. By incorporating indigenous subjects into neoliberal reforms through CSR programs, the state extended neoliberal policies and programs into the farthest corners of its territory. Simultaneously, though, it undermines local state presence, while strengthening state control from afar.

I conducted my research at a period when Ecuador started to pull away from neoliberal policies in an effort to gain more of the windfall profits from oil extraction. Those profits had historically accrued to private multinationals, leaving the state with little and also representing a material and symbolic challenge to state sovereignty tied to oil wealth. With the election of President Correa in 2007, who threatened to kick Repsol-YPF out of the country over contract
disputes, the state initiated a process to seek out new ways to control multinational operations, and perhaps reclaim its sovereign right to oil resources. Linked to these new changes to Ecuador's hydrocarbon laws, the state also called for an end to CSR operations.

This shift in resource governance was a catalyst for indigenous organizations, as recipients of CSR projects to highlight CSR programs and claim rights to the material wealth of oil extraction. Yet, these claims also marked indigenous organizations’ entanglements in corporate capital and neoliberal programs. The state's removal of CSR programs refocuses attention on the state, and discussions of political and economic relationships within petro-states. I argue that the state cannot be made up of just two bodies – the political and the economic. Instead, I explore the ways in which multiple bodies of indigenous, state, and corporate individuals emerge through relationships within the institutions of CSR programs, reshaping state processes of governance. The state’s sovereignty is extended to its subterranean territory, and subjects are formed through these subsoil resources. In the case of indigenous peoples, however, the state’s subsurface resources make indigenous bodies sick. CSR programs can cover up these illnesses, but do not eliminate them. These political networks, however, have come to define the course of the state. Relationships within CSR programs could erase the boundaries between the economic body of the state and its political body, including incorporating indigenous peoples into state processes of sovereignty and control over territory, easing the tensions that developed in the 1990s. Yet, at the same time, this conjuncture also calls into question state sovereignty, as indigenous subjects embody the duplicitous nature of the state, and yet refuse to be duped by the state’s maneuverings to claim more wealth from oil. It is these conflicting, coercive relationships that serve to produce challenges to state sovereignty, and indigenous membership in Ecuador.
Chapter 5, then, is an exploration of how CSR programs operate as technology of rule. I argue through the chapter that corporate operations are premised on defining those who fall within the company's zone of influence, and those who are excluded. Furthermore, the company defines its zone of influence by including those populations directly influenced by resource extraction who are inside Repsol-YPF's oil block, as well as a much wider swathe of the northern Amazon region, incorporating those communities that are also marked by the state's strategic presences. The corporation operates as a trustee, and claims to know what is best for indigenous populations, which, cautions Li (2007), is also a claim to power.

Repsol-YPF defines certain deficiencies in indigenous communities, those that have technical solutions, eliminating the political economic questions it cannot answer. As a result, CSR programs tend to exacerbate processes of resource access and distribution. In conversations with corporate officers, the company produces a discourse that ensures that the state is constructed as a monolithic institution and absent from the Amazon region entirely. Therefore, the proposed shifts in regulation of oil in Ecuador challenge corporate operations, and point to the way in which the company maintains its presence through regulation from afar. Yet, the state's reliance on oil requires that indigenous populations are incorporated into CSR programs that can also make them amenable to ongoing extraction. Thus, indigenous subjects come to reflect the compensatory projects of CSR programs, rather than membership in the nation-state that ultimately undermines the state's control over its subjects. My dissertation, therefore, is an examination of subject formation in the corporate zone of influence. Governmentality can uncover the disciplining practices of these spaces of corporate regulation and rule, and corporate 'territory' that is produced through relationships with indigenous subjects. Furthermore,
indigenous subject formation in the space of corporate rule reflects broader processes of neoliberal subjectivity.

A story of the state

CSR programs can “fix” indigenous subjects in a particular ruling regime, regulating them, clearing up confusion, and calculating distribution (Foucault 1991; Moore 2005). The ambivalence and uncertainty of indigenous subjects, however, calls into question this process of disciplining through CSR programs, challenging state aims to fix populations in certain places and territories. By turning over control of the space of extraction to corporations, the state is confronted by the unintended outcomes and effects, and the uncertainty of contested micropractices of rule. Indeed, a discourse of inclusion and exclusion is repeated through the dissertation, in the context of indigenous membership in the nation-state, as well as in the inclusionary practices of CSR programs. While the period of the 1990s highlighted indigenous attempts to gain full rights and membership in the nation-state as indigenous citizens, the implementation of CSR programs diffused indigenous collective action rooted in an indigenous political identity. Today, inclusion in CSR programs underscores indigenous subjectivity in the northern Amazon region, but also calls into question environmental and social justice and rights for indigenous peoples as citizens, and their ongoing exclusion from the state.

On the one hand, we might consider problems of “distributional justice” where the spatially fixed process of oil extraction rooted in the region has left behind social and environmental harms. On the other hand, the complexity of CSR programs also reflects a process that calls into question “procedural equity” as indigenous populations' ambivalence leaves them uncertain about political participation and citizenship claims in Ecuador. Thus, actors like Doña
Barbara and Claudia remain key representatives of communities like Pompeya, pointing to not only the disproportionate exposure of the community to ongoing oil extraction, but also a process of “deliberate exclusion” from political decisions that lead to risk and threats to indigenous rights (Carruthers 2008: 8; Perreault 2006).

This is a story of the way in which the dominated reflect the dominant (Auyero and Swistun 2009). The uncertainty and ambivalence, and duplicity that has marked the state's regulation of resource extraction, and its strategic presence in the Amazon region, is mirrored in indigenous subjects today. Furthermore, the incorporation of indigenous populations into CSR programs allows resource extraction to continue, but also calls into question the state's sovereign power. Indeed, while the organized collective action by indigenous peoples and others through the 1990s threatened the state's ongoing economic wealth from oil extraction, it also occurred during a period of implementation of neoliberal policies including privatization of oil extraction and CSR programs. The neoliberal entanglements I explore through the dissertation reflect the state's attempts to 'erase' indigenous difference in the name of securing wealth and membership in the nation-state. In other words, la Patria would be strengthened by ignoring the rights and collective difference of indigenous peoples. In turn, CSR programs that aimed to contain an indigenous movement, also serve to highlight ongoing indigenous difference and rights and access to resources, predicated on membership in the nation-state.

Thus, despite the state's new push to control multinationals, and undo the impacts of neoliberal policies of the 1990s by seeking additional control over resource extraction, it still confronts challenges within indigenous populations. The removal of CSR programs, something mandated by state law, but not yet happening in practice at the local level, suggests the space for a new political strategy rooted in indigenous territory. The state's ability to control the territory
of the nation-state, and base its development in ongoing resource extraction will also necessitate creating the space for indigenous subjects to claim and earn rights and access to resources. In other words, the implementation of CSR programs called into question the state's (in)effectiveness as a sovereign, and a powerful symbol of modernity (cf. Watts 2004a). This conjuncture of state, corporate and indigenous relationships highlights the links between distribution of wealth, indigenous difference and social marginalization, and the state's ability to act in pursuit of the collective interest in securing a common citizenship.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMWAE</td>
<td>Asociación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDOC</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Center for Class-based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPE</td>
<td>Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERES</td>
<td>Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODENPE</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COICE</td>
<td>Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAIE</td>
<td>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFENAIE</td>
<td>Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONICE</td>
<td>Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras de la Costa Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CyD</td>
<td>Conservación y Desarrollo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINEIB</td>
<td>Directorate for Intercultural Bilingual Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECUARUNARI</td>
<td>Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCUNAE</td>
<td>Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEI</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Federation of Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENOC</td>
<td>National Federation of Campesino Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPOCAN</td>
<td>Provincial Federation of Peasant Organizations of Napo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPP</td>
<td>Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIN</td>
<td>Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI</td>
<td>Global Reporting Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSID</td>
<td>International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Institutional Ethnography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IERAC</td>
<td>Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian and Colonization Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAWE</td>
<td>Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCP</td>
<td>Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONHAE</td>
<td>Huaorani Nationalities of Amazonian Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPIP</td>
<td>Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OXY</td>
<td>Occidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODEPINE</td>
<td>Project for the Development of Indigenous and Black Peoples of Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENPLADES</td>
<td>Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOTE</td>
<td>Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCS</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Bebbington, A. 2010. Extractive industries and stunted states: Conflict, responsibility, and


Bunker, S. G. 1985. Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the
Failure of the Modern State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.


Hyndman, J. 2001. The field as here and now, not there and then. The Geographical Review 91


Moore, D.S. 2000. The crucible of cultural politics: reworking "development" in Zimbabwe's


Nelson, L. 1999. Bodies (and spaces) do matter: The limits of performativity. *Gender, Place, and
Culture 6: 331-354.


Roca, E. 2009. Interview with Emily Billo. SENPLADES. Tena, Ecuador: June 16.


Sawyer, S. 2009b. 'So That the World Can Know': Amazonians Take on Chevron" NACLA November: 46-49.


Welker, M.A. 2009. “Corporate security begins in the community”: Mining, the corporate social


Biographical Data

NAME OF AUTHOR: Emily Ruth Billo

PLACE OF BIRTH: Brussels, Belgium

DATE OF BIRTH: December 9th, 1977

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:
   Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York
   Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
   Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont

DEGREES AWARDED:
   Master of Regional Planning, 2006, Cornell University
   Bachelor of Arts in Environmental Studies, 2000, Middlebury College

AWARDS AND HONORS:
   National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, 2009-2010
   Inter-American Foundation Grassroots Development Fellowship, 2008-2009
   Syracuse University Graduate Tuition Scholarship, 2006 – 2008

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
   Visiting Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies Program, Bucknell University, 2012 – present
   Teaching Fellow, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 2011-2012
   Instructor, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, 2011
   Teaching Assistant, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, 2006-2008, 2010-2011
   Research Assistant, Department of Regional Planning, Cornell University, 2004-2006
   Program Assistant, Natural Resources Defense Council, 2001-2004