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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an in-depth case study of NATO advisors and their perceived influence in Afghanistan (2009-2012). It explores the two-part question, how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms? I argue that security sector reform (SSR) programs in fragile states lack an explicit theory of change that specifies how reform occurs. From this view, I theorize internationally led SSR as “guided institutional transfer,” grounded in rationalist and social constructivist explanations of convergence, diffusion, and socialization processes. Responding to calls for greater depth and emphasis on interactions and institutional change in SSR research, I examine NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan as an extreme case of SSR in which external-internal interactions were the highest. A stratified, purposive sample of 68 military and civilian elites (24 ministerial advisors, 27 embedded field advisors and commanders, and 17 experts and external observers) participated in a confidential, semi-structured interview.

Content analysis of interviews and supporting documentation reveal that participants perceived modest impact on capacity development in both the Afghan security ministries and security forces; however, they perceived limited normative impact on both organizational and individual levels. Second, participants who used heavy-handed or transactional approaches rarely saw positive or enduring outcomes with their counterparts. Third, legitimacy-based approaches that elicited partner engagement were perceived as more effective than power-based approaches (e.g., demands, incentives), though the techniques participants favored (e.g., persuasion, guided discovery learning) varied by level and context. Fourth, in addition to Afghan political and
cultural constraints, NATO’s campaign strategy, accelerated timeline, and high resource inflow created perverse incentives for some advisors and leaders to pressure or induce their counterparts in the spirit of progress. Finally, advisors with the unique ability to develop close relationships were more likely to promote capacity transfer and, elicit curiosity and dialogue on security governance norms (e.g., civilian control, ethical leadership).
THE PROSPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER:
A WITHIN-CASE STUDY OF NATO ADVISOR INFLUENCE ACROSS THE
AFGHAN SECURITY MINISTRIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES,
2009-2012

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DISSERTATION

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Philosophy in Social Science in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs

Syracuse University

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For Hinesy, T.K., Doug, J.P., and Jared
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

We were, after all, amateurs—and probably are still amateurs.

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan senior ministerial advisor, interviewed by author, December 12, 2012

Picture a rural setting, on the outskirts of a village named Halqah Baylo in Ghazni province, south central Afghanistan. A former US Army Special Forces detachment commander reflects on a fateful night in 2011 with his team and their partner Afghan army commando unit.

We literally had just a brutal couple of weeks. We were in Firebase Baylo [with our Afghan unit], and the instant we got up there we started getting into firefights. ... [One night], about 4 in the morning, we got hit by a couple IEDs [roadside bombs]. We took no casualties and in the morning continued to move through this village, you know, Predators [unmanned drones], everything on station [standby]. At the end of the day, we seemed to be heading back to the firebase and that’s when everything really broke out.

We were probably ambushed from 15 to 25 spots all around us, essentially pinned down. It took awhile to get out of that and, at that point, we hadn’t taken any casualties. ... Once we thought we were in the clear, we had a truck basically ... roll off a bridge, and this was my Afghan guys. So I had maybe six Afghans in the truck roll off a bridge into a very well known river in Baylo that had killed a number of Americans. ... And so we had a truck fall about 15 feet off into it. The first eight guys going into the river were myself, my senior medic, my fox [operations and intelligence sergeant], and I think one or two others. ... And literally, had one of us lost our grip we would’ve been gone too because at that point it’s 11 at night, the water’s about 40 degrees and the truck’s flipped upside down. You’ve got basically an entire ODA [Special Forces team] gripping on to this truck and I remember we were just ripping guys out of there.

I had my senior medic come over to me—at this point, I still think we were missing three guys that were pinned under the truck for about 3 and a half, or 4 minutes. And, I remember, he came over and he was like, ‘Listen, you know we’re still basically in a firefight. We don’t know when we’re going to get back. We’ve got these [Afghan] guys that are messed up. We’re going to call in a MEDEVAC and it’s dangerous in terms of where we’re positioned right now, but what do you want me to do in terms of the morale with these guys?’ He’s like, ‘On a professional assessment, this guy I should pronounce dead, but there’s a potential I could bring him back, what do you want me to do?’

At that point, you know, can you do everything you can to save somebody’s life? And I remember our Afghan army unit looked at us—because none of them were in the water, maybe one or two of them who had a good friend. But you had eight Americans that are pretty much—as far as the severity, I would say it was less so in a firefight than
jumping in this river. They [the Afghans] look at you in a much different light and then they see Juan [the medic] basically bring this guy back to life and how hard that they [the team members] were working. You know, those are the points where you really build credibility because, at that point, your [Afghan] guys know they’ll follow you anywhere because they are as important to you as your own men are. ... So, those are some of those things coming back to rapport and understanding cultural awareness. And a lot of it is humanity too. ... Like, ‘You’re there for me; I’ll be there for you.’ (Interview 3)

Now envision the Afghan capital, Kabul, same year, 2011. A former NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) ministerial advisor illustrates tense moments inside the Afghan Ministry of Defense headquarters.

I [temporarily advised] General Karimi [the Afghan Chief Army of Staff] and his front office for about a month and developed a little bit of a relationship with him. ... There was that bombing attack during ... that month ... and I was in General Karimi’s office when the suicide attacker came in and made it to the third floor, but it didn’t detonate. I didn’t really do anything at the time; one of our brigadiers [a US general] was meeting with Karimi. His PSD [personal security team] came in and we escorted Karimi back to the back room and then I told the LT [US lieutenant], ‘Hey, stay with him and if anybody comes through the door that you don’t recognize then start shooting.’ And I stepped into the outer office. I was in the outer office, but I was still like two walls away from where the attack culminated—basically a wall between us and them.

I didn’t think I did anything special. You know, one, I wanted to step out and see what was going on. But Karimi’s kid [a junior staff officer] was very, very frantic and later on he was like, ‘Hey, sir, you were so calm when you stepped out.’ ... [As an aside.] NTM-A insisted that if we ride in Afghan vehicles, put on your body armor, your Kevlar [helmet], but you know what? You’re sitting in a vehicle with Afghans who don’t have anything on. No, I’m not going to do that. So I took some gambles early on. I just didn’t wear body armor.

And I remember one of the outer office guys going, ‘Hey, were you scared [during the attack]?’ I’m like, ‘No, why would I be scared? I was with you guys.’ And you could see that little smile creep on their face and go, ‘OK.’ But in my mind, I’m going, ‘I need to get under the desk.’ But I just stood there and I don’t know if it was more street cred with them or whatever. But it’s just those little—what I perceive to be—the appreciative moments from them of either taking some little risks or treating them as peers are probably the best little pieces that stick out in my mind. Like I said, a lot of it goes back to relationships. It might not have been anything. I might be reading more in to it than what I thought it was. But I think I could walk back over there and still walk in and pick up those friendships where I left off and hopefully advise again without having to go through much ... but that to me is a big piece of it. (Interview 29)
In his bestseller *The Tipping Point*, author Malcolm Gladwell (2000, 12) defines a tipping point as “the moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point” when ideas spread like wildfire. His book, which attempts to explain rapid, epidemic-like social movements, is really about the people—the agents—who spark social change. In these opening vignettes, two US Army embedded advisors serving in Afghanistan in the same year but in different settings, describe a more elemental tipping point concerning relationship formation. They highlight critical events and actions they perceived necessary in their efforts to build credibility and influence with the Afghans with whom they were working.

This dissertation is about security sector reformers and perceptions of influence. In Afghanistan, influence has been fundamental to the NATO International Security Assistance Force’s (NATO-ISAF) campaign strategy. At least since 2009, the campaign rested, in part, on the concept of partnering—that is, implanting NATO advisors within and affixing NATO combat units to Afghan security ministries, military, and police forces, from top to bottom. NATO assumed partnering would accelerate Afghans’ development and, consequently, hasten the progression to fully sovereign, Afghan-led security operations. This campaign feature has been a critical component of the broader goal to supplant the need for NATO forces to protect the Afghan population from and ultimately overcome the stalemate with the Taliban insurgency. Implicit within this intense focus on partnering is the belief that trainers, advisors, and units would inspire, or influence, changes in Afghan security institutions’ capacity and professionalism.

The dissertation addresses the two-part question, how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local
capacity, values, and security governance norms? The study has three overarching research objectives: (a) to understand how partnership and advising approaches potentially contribute to, or constrain, the transfer of capacity and professional practices (i.e., norms); (b) to develop theory on security reform and assistance programs in fragile environments; and (c) to develop prescriptive knowledge for the design and implementation of future programs focused on security reform and capacity building.

Research Problem and Rationale

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has increasingly sharpened its focus on the security sector\(^1\) as a starting point for development and security assistance in fragile states. These efforts have produced only modest outcomes, at best. Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged as a policy tool aimed at transforming the security architecture—the armed security services; civilian management bureaucracies; political, legislative, and judicial oversight bodies; and civil society actors—within developing, transitioning, and fragile or postconflict\(^2\) countries into more effective, professional, accountable, and legitimate agents of the state (Ball 2005, Hänggi 2009, McFate 2008). SSR is intentionally broad in scope. In fragile settings plagued by insecurity, however, training and equipping local forces are often prioritized over long-term institutional development and sector-wide reform, as witnessed in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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\(^1\) I adopt a narrow view of the security sector for this study, centered on the state’s core security actors—the military, police, intelligence services, border control, and the civilian ministerial bodies that provide direct management and oversight (Hänggi 2004, 2009).

\(^2\) When using the terms fragile and postconflict I mean “the period when levels of insecurity are high; when violence is pervasive; when institutions are rudimentary, weak or nonexistent; and when the very distinction between war and peace is blurred” (Berdal 2009, 20).
Despite the international community’s extensive commitment of financial and human resources to SSR programs over the last decade and a half, results have been less than modest. Of the nearly two dozen major interventions since 1989, experts point to Sierra Leone as the only state to achieve some limited success with internationally led SSR, as it assumed full control of its security operations within three years (Brzoska and Law 2007, Jackson 2010, Sedra 2010a). SSR in fragile states is remarkably challenging due to prevailing corruption, politicization, and unprofessionalism within the security services, and weak or nonexistent civilian control (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder 2004). This has led some scholars to conclude that SSR—and postwar state reconstruction more broadly—are simply overambitious, if not misguided, given the historical record (Egnell and Haldén 2009, Herbst 2004). Yet, pragmatic and pessimistic rebukes of security-based reconstruction initiatives cut against the grain of normative arguments for supporting populations with grievances that warrant SSR in the first place, for example: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Congo, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and most pressingly, Syria.

SSR has also suffered from a “conceptual-contextual divide” (Channa 2002, Scheye and Peake 2005, Sedra 2010a) since its inception. This refers to the disparity between SSR’s idealist vision of reform (substance and process) and the realities that professionals face while influencing reform in practice. In this light, critics have pointed to the lack of scholarly attention on reform context, specifically, the need for increased understanding of conditions and approaches likely to produce successful and sustainable outcomes. For example, Scheye and Peake (2005, 307) call for research that examines institutional change and resistance to external efforts by tracing interactions, behaviors, and beliefs within security institutions over time. SSR scholars are also calling for more pragmatism in institution building efforts (Andersen, 2011;
Sedra, 2010; Scheye, 2010). That is, instead of basing SSR programs on a normative idea of how local actors ought to provide security, SSR should be people-focused—based on better engagement with local actors in how they perceive and provide security (Scheye, 2010).

There is clear room for improvement upon past and current practice and a need for research focused on the level of individual and small-group interactions. These observations, taken with the likelihood that state fragility will remain a major foreign policy challenge for the near future, provide the driving motivation for this dissertation.

**The Argument**

This exploratory project responds directly to calls for greater scrutiny over interactions and institutional change in SSR programs. It does not test theory, but rather develops contingent, or “middle-range,”\(^3\) theory and applied knowledge. I aim to understand the extent to which interaction approaches (i.e., causal mechanisms\(^4\)) contribute to, or hinder, the transfer of capacities and professional norms to host nation security institutions. By studying this process at the individual level, I intend to uncover individual and small-group causal mechanisms of a pedagogical nature that are more or less effective at driving institutional change. From a policy perspective, I intend to gain a more nuanced understanding of how and to what extent these approaches operate to inform current and future SSR program design and practice in fragile states. This study is resolutely problem-driven and extends the current state of theoretical and

\(^3\) Middle-range theories are narrow in scope and focused on the production of contingent generalizations, or conditions under which certain outcomes are likely to hold, as opposed to more general theories that explain social phenomena according to covering laws (e.g., democratic peace and balance of power theories in international relations). For a thorough discussion on policy-oriented research designs and middle-range theory see chapter 12 in George and Bennett (2005, 261-285).

\(^4\) Causal mechanisms are “the unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett 2005, 137). See also Hedström and Swedberg (1998, 25).
practical knowledge on SSR through an in-depth analysis of the challenges that arise when foreign actors work with host-nation security actors to influence changes in organizational structures, behaviors, and beliefs.

I argue that internationally led SSR programs are instances of guided institutional transfer of functional capacity and security governance norms across a state’s security sector. Guided institutional transfer is a specific type of diffusion process of knowledge, skills, and ideas across groups. Note that I introduce the modifier “guided” to underscore the roles that external actors intentionally serve in shaping and influencing the process. Functional reform entails transforming the security apparatus into a more effective, economically sustainable, and legitimate instrument of the state. Normative reform requires changing the rules, practices, beliefs, and organizational culture within the security sector toward a greater affinity with notions of security governance, most notably, respect for human rights, accountability to the rule of law, and democratic control of the armed forces. From the outset, I assume that this process is inherently political and contested, but neither inevitable nor impossible.

Two theoretical views explain how institutional transfer occurs across nations, organizations, and social groups. First, the rationalist approach asserts that institutional transfer is the result of two interacting groups’ strategic choices. Actors looking to influence others to adopt specific practices and alter their preferences do so both through coercion and material inducements. Conversely, local actors learn from abroad and choose to emulate or integrate foreign practices based upon the rational belief that such adoption will provide gains in efficiency or legitimacy, or both, especially in competitive or uncertain environments. Under the rationalist model, the extent of institutional transfer is the combined outcome of these external pushing and local pulling (or resisting) forces. Second, the constructivist approach argues that
the ideas exchanged between actors through repeated social interactions and communication alter their preferences and behaviors over time. Whereas the rationalist accounts characterize institutional transfer *vis-à-vis* the manipulation of rewards and punishments, the constructivist explanation necessitates altering substantive beliefs through repeated social interaction and persuasion.

Both rationalist and constructivist approaches help explain institutional transfer in statebuilding contexts, but to varying extents. They must be taken together to provide a complete account of the process. The rationalist explanation is incomplete since it only accounts for the short-term decision to adopt a foreign practice, not necessarily its long-term internalization. The constructivist approach complements its rationalist counterpart by accounting for the acceptance of specific behaviors or practices on beliefs that they are appropriate (i.e., the right, or accepted way of behaving) (Checkel 2005, 804-805). Fully understanding why and how institutional transfer occurs in some cases and not in others requires knowledge of both the structural forces (incentives and constraints) as well as the cultural and ideational factors that shape decisions to change and ultimately internalize new practices. More importantly, given practitioners’ repeated references to and challenges with building local ownership and enduring capabilities, the inclusion of a constructivist perspective in this study presents a ripe opportunity for theory development in an otherwise under-theorized policy area.

Executing this study requires establishing the presence of different influencing approaches, identifying the conditions under which they operated, and evaluating the extent to which institutional transfer has occurred (Checkel 2005, 816). Accordingly, my approach combines process tracing\(^5\) and within-case analysis to investigate these interactions. In addition,

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\(^5\) Process tracing is “a procedure for examining diagnostic pieces of evidence [e.g., causal process observations] – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011a, 3). This technique is
since this project is exploratory and requires extensive in-depth analysis on foreign and local interactions, I assume a modest approach by first examining efforts within a single case—Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan case represents a strategic choice based on my research objectives to explore interactions. In this sense, Afghanistan is an extreme case (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301) compared to 10 other cases\(^6\) of internationally sponsored SSR, based on its high level of external and local interactions. I also restrict my analytical focus on Afghanistan by examining partnership interactions during NATO’s operational troop surge period from December 2009 to September 2012, when NATO-Afghan partnerships were the highest.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

Ten chapters comprise the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I introduce the concept of security sector reform while highlighting its core commitments and evolution over the last two decades. I also situate SSR within its broader parent literatures on state- and peacebuilding. Consistent with the recent shift toward a second-generation approach to SSR that centers on pragmatism and nuance, I highlight how this dissertation rests squarely upon scholarly and expert appeals for greater attention to context and institutional change. I close this chapter by arguing that until more SSR cases emerge, or clearer outcomes surface over time, or both, knowledge accumulation will be most productive via studies that investigate phenomena below the state level of analysis.

Chapter 3 makes two notable theoretical contributions. First, I argue that central to SSR’s conceptual-contextual divide is the absence of a bona fide theory of change that specifies how reform occurs. From this position, I assert that internationally sponsored SSR, as a purposeful intervention in fragile states, is best theorized as a process of guided institutional transfer in which external actors apply an array of approaches to induce both functional and normative changes within a target state’s security institutions. I ground these arguments in rationalist and constructivist accounts of convergence, diffusion, and socialization processes. From these arguments, I present an initial theoretical framework for case analysis of advisor influence based on three logics of action: power, legitimacy, and efficiency.

I specify my case design and analysis procedures in Chapter 4. The chapter covers the dissertation’s overarching logic of inquiry, rationale for focusing on Afghanistan from 2009 to 2012 as an extreme case, sampling and data analysis procedures, and overall limitations. The chapter also highlights participant selection; design and conduct of 68 intensive interviews with US and NATO elites7 (embedded advisors, unit leaders, and subject matter experts); and qualitative content analysis procedures.

Chapters 5 and 6 introduce the case from historical and sociological perspectives. In the former, I provide a historical primer on the evolving organizational structures and partnerships between NATO and Afghan forces from 2001 to 2014. In addition, since my analytical focus ranges from 2009 to 2012, I provide specific attention to three primary NATO-Afghan interaction contexts: ministerial advising, embedded field advising, and unit-to-unit partnered field operations. Drawing upon the interview data, Chapter 6 illustrates the three partnering

7 The term elite indicate individuals I chose for a specific purpose due to their position and experience as they relate to the study’s research question and objectives. (Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman 1975, Aberbach and Rockman 2002, Hochschild 2005)
contexts to highlight the various settings, actors, tasks, and roles that participants assumed throughout their service in Afghanistan.

Chapters 7 through 9 are my primary empirical chapters. They present the results of extensive qualitative content analysis on embedded advisor and unit commander influencing approaches and perceived changes in the institutional transfer of local capacity, values, and security governance norms. The chapters contribute rich detail on participants’ interactions with Afghan counterparts, advising philosophies, interactions, influencing approaches, and their perceived effectiveness.

Chapter 7 focuses on ministerial advisor influence and draws upon interviews with participants who served within or supported the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and supporting documentation. The data show strong support that ministerial advisors and key leaders relied on both power-based forms of influence (e.g., coercive demands, rewards, and punishments) and legitimacy-based approaches (e.g. persuasion, brokerage, mobilization). Participants viewed legitimacy-based approaches contributing to better outcomes.

Chapter 8 focuses on tactical level commander and embedded field advisor experiences. They too indicated similar use and attitudes toward power- and legitimacy-based influencing approaches. However, unlike their ministerial counterparts who preferred methods of persuasion, brokering, and advising around difficult counterparts, tactical advisors and unit leaders preferred a variety of guided teaching and symbolic demonstration forms of influence. Notably, ministerial and tactical participants rarely referred to approaches that encouraged Afghan innovation or experimentation.

Chapter 9 highlights participants’ observations on institutional transfer based on an evaluative framework outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Overall, the majority of participants reported
limited institutional transfer, pertaining mainly to organizational capacity. Despite limited change, the data also reveal that close personal relationships, dialogue, and organizational approach and demeanor were key factors in promoting institutional transfer.

The concluding chapter outlines six significant case findings, their associated explanations and theoretical propositions. Overall, the case suggests that high goal-oriented pressure and advisor inexperience best explain the prevalence to employ power-based influencing approaches over alternatives. In addition, despite severe structural constraints to change (local politics and culture), agents with the ability to develop close relationships are more likely to promote the transfer of knowledge, skills, and security governance norms.
CHAPTER 2. SECURITY ASSISTANCE WITH A TWIST OF LIBERALISM: A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM LITERATURE

*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

*Who will guard the guardians themselves?*

Satires of Juvenal, Book VI, lines 347-348

Building and reforming state security institutions into more effective and humane public agents is now a common feature of conflict prevention and international peacebuilding. The widely held belief that unprofessional, unregulated, or unsustainable armed forces are threats to both economic development and international security is a major driving force behind these peace interventions. Security sector reform (SSR) is an offshoot of this philosophy. SSR starts from the premise that security and development go hand in hand. To some degree, most major donor states and international organizations (IOs) engage in SSR programs and activities.

Regrettably, the international community’s experience with SSR over the past fifteen or so years has not been good. Consequently, the international SSR discourse is currently in a state of reflection. Many lessons have emerged, but few have translated into impactful results. Arguments on the future of SSR range from pessimistic (abandon the concept altogether because it will not work) to optimistic (apply greater, better coordinated, and better-delivered resources) to more strategic (carefully select, design, and contextualize programming).

In this chapter, I review the evolving SSR literature in four sections. The first section introduces the SSR concept, its history, and its core commitments. The second section positions SSR as a main element within its broader parent literatures on international state- and peacebuilding. The third section highlights SSR research trends and notes the emergence of a “2nd generation” of SSR research. The closing section situates the study within scholar and expert pleas for greater analytical focus on SSR praxis, context, and institutional change.
What is Security Sector Reform?

Broadly conceived, SSR entails all policies, programs, and activities aimed “to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, and democracy” (OECD 2005, 16). The term emerged among Western donor states in the late 1990s as a new approach to security assistance in developing and conflict-prone states. SSR starts from the assumption that security and development are inseparable (Collier et al. 2003). Intended to create an entry point for development by strengthening a state’s ability to provide internal security, SSR’s end goal is to produce “accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting [security] service[s]” (UNDP 2003, 5).

SSR distinguishes itself from past forms of security assistance by placing a strong emphasis on how states democratically govern their security forces (Hänggi 2009, 337). Previous Cold War-era “train-and-equip” security assistance programs primarily fixed on client states’ “functional imperative” (Huntington 1957, 2), specifically, their military effectiveness to defend the state from external threats. SSR’s goals go much further. It additionally concentrates on fragile and developing states’ “societal imperative” (1957, 2) to be accountable to their citizens and faithful to societal values, by promoting democratic civilian control of the uniformed security services. Democratic security governance implies more than simply control of security services by an elected civilian executive, but rather “effective governance of the security sector in a framework of democratic legitimacy and accountability” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002, 48).

Historical Roots

During the Cold War, security assistance was predominantly a function of the ideological rivalry between the major powers in the East and West. These powers provided aid to client
states, largely through military-related financial, materiel, and technical support (e.g. “train-and-equip” programs), to maintain regime stability and promote national interests. Donor states gave little attention to how their partners governed their security forces as long as the outcome served their strategic goals. Consequently, partner countries’ security services were free to enjoy the benefits of unrestricted military assistance, often to the detriment of their citizens’ human rights and their country’s economic development.

This approach to security assistance lingered for some time after the Cold War, however, despite many Western states’ strategic shift away from the power politics of old and toward conflict prevention, sustainable development, and democracy promotion. With growing concern over the number of civil wars\(^8\) (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75) and series of questionable outcomes in postconflict interventions throughout the 1990s, policymakers recognized a clear need to reassess the prevailing state- and regime-centric approach to foreign assistance (Short 1999).

The SSR concept grew out of several overlapping discourses among policymakers, academics, and United Nations officials in the 1990s. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Western powers turned their attention toward achieving a democratic peace (The White House 1993, 5). Global arms transfers to the developing world declined significantly as a result (SIPRI 2013a). The new environment created space for security and development experts and local actors to confer on topics of overlapping interest such as democratic reform and conflict mitigation (Ball and Hendrickson 2006, 5). Likewise, NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement elevated the importance of democratic civil-military relations in these reform debates. Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition countries’ membership in NATO and the

\(^8\) According to Fearon and Laitin, there were 25 ongoing civil wars in 1999, though not all were necessarily a consequence of the new post-Cold War international system.
EU was predicated on the adoption of specific domestic political reforms, especially civilian political control and accountability of the armed forces (Jacoby 2004, NATO 1995).

Meanwhile, the elevated focus on *human security* within the United Nations played an important role in SSR’s conception. The UN Human Development Programme (UNDP) famously introduced the concept in a 1994 report, defining human security as “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression … [and] protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP 1994, 23). Notwithstanding debates over its analytical utility (see Special Issue of *Security Dialogue*, September 2004), human security expands the referent object of security beyond the state to protecting individuals from harm and promoting human development. Before this, security almost exclusively referred to the defense of nation-states and political regimes. From a human security perspective, however, advancing a state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly over the use of force—the Weberian definition of statehood and locus of past security assistance programming—is a necessary, but insufficient condition to producing positive human development outcomes. From this emerged the notion that past programs centered on developing military or police effectiveness were too narrowly designed to prevent security forces from committing human rights abuses, meddling in domestic politics, or worse, staging a *coup d’état*.

At the same time, scholars were also advancing two closely related propositions about developing and conflict-prone states during that would shape the genesis and evolution of the SSR concept. The first, widely known as the “security-development nexus,” contends that security and economic development are strongly linked. It is hard to imagine any hypothetical situation where a community or nation would experience economic growth in the middle of a civil war. Insecurity’s adverse effects on development are a given. However, does the reverse...
argument that persistent poverty causes conflict (e.g., development in reverse) also hold? Collier et al. (2003) not only found that poverty drives conflict but also that effective development reduces the likelihood of future conflicts. A chief implication of this was that development and security professionals could no longer ignore each other’s efforts. This was uncomfortable territory for the donor and non-governmental organization (NGO) communities, which traditionally resist any affiliation with armed actors, especially government militaries, to maintain a neutral image to those receiving foreign aid and technical assistance.

The second academic proposition, “institutionalization before liberalization” (Paris 2004, 179), is a critique on hastily implemented democratic reforms after civil wars. Paris argues that liberal reforms—namely democratic elections and market deregulation—have a higher likelihood of long-term success in the presence of a baseline level of security and functioning bureaucratic and legal institutions. Prematurely introduced reforms may not only fail but also increase the likelihood of renewed conflict. The argument complements Samuel Huntington’s (1968/2006) *Political Order in Changing Societies*, which asserts that state stability is a function of political institutions’ ability to evolve with and accommodate societal change over time. Accordingly, assistance programs and peacebuilding interventions should prioritize institution building, specifically, constructing a functional government bureaucracy, before launching ahead with political and economic liberalization.

If these related policy and academic discourses provided the necessary fuel for the advent of SSR, then the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) Secretary Clare Short’s speech at Kings College in 1999 lit the intellectual fire. In her speech, she openly questioned past assumptions about foreign assistance (Short 1999). Short challenged existing views and approaches, noting how, at the time, economic aid programs were superficial and military
assistance still enabled autocratic regimes and human rights abusers. In her view, neither effort seriously addressed systemic poverty or insecurity. Short called for a wholesale departure from the regime-centered, train-and-equip foreign policies of the Cold War to which many donors still clung. In sum, she offered a new direction for international policy to reform or construct state security institutions in a more comprehensive and integrated fashion that supports human security and economic development in tandem. In this view, Chuter (2006, 3) sardonically described the birth of SSR as creating “the bastard child of civil-military relations and development studies.”


Core Commitments and Activities

SSR is a highly normative international project. Fundamentally, SSR assumes that a system of democratically governed security forces is the best form of civil-military relations and best way for a state to ensure both national and human security concurrently.

SSR has both short and long-term aims. Without haste, SSR seeks to strengthen military, police, and intelligence services’ ability to provide security. Over the long term, however, SSR
pursues “radical changes to the purpose, structure, and values of security organizations” so that “they serve the interests of society as a whole” (Peake, Scheye, and Hills 2008, vii). The OECD-DAC SSR Handbook (2007, 21) proposes four overarching goals:

- “Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system
- Improved delivery of security and justice services
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process
- Sustainability of justice and service delivery”

These core ideals represent the main blueprint for SSR programming. Civilian political supremacy over military and policing affairs is SSR’s paramount ideal, distinguishing SSR from previous forms of security assistance. Additional value-laden principles and best practices have been introduced over time, for example, rule of law primacy, civilianization, gender mainstreaming, and regional or context-specific approaches (Sedra 2010c, 6-8).

The first goal suggests that SSR is inherently bound to promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance practices of the security sector (Ball 2002, Hänggi 2003, OECD 2005, 12, UNCHR 2000). The second and fourth goals target the effectiveness and efficiency of a state’s primary service providers—the military, police, courts, and prison systems. Security forces must be able to protect their citizens from internal political violence as well as external threat. Security forces should also be sustainable in the sense they are properly “right-sized,” or better aligned within their state’s economic wherewithal. Importantly, the third goal refers to the degree of agency or sovereign control that local actors possess in the reform process (Nathan et al. 2007, 4). Narten (2009, 252) defines local ownership as both a “process and final outcome” when local representatives assume control over planning, decision-making, management, implementation and evaluation over statebuilding programs “with the aim of making external peace and statebuilding assistance redundant.” This poses particular difficulty both to donors
who are typically unwilling to hand over unrestricted funds to local reformers and to local political actors whose individual interests may be misaligned with the idea of a democratically governed security sector (Donais 2008, 4). The challenge, nevertheless, is that some degree of ownership is necessary for reforms to last over the long term (2008, 278).

SSR’s main tenets suggest a process of deep political and organizational change. Less explicit, however, is the array of activities and interactions among various international and host-nation actors working toward (or against) such change. The Handbook proposes a straightforward approach to SSR programming broken down into five phases: needs assessment; ownership and consensus building; program design; implementation; and evaluation. In reality, however, SSR programs rarely, if ever, proceed in such a linear fashion. SSR “is a social process that may take a long, complex and uneven path…an ongoing process in which no society will ever achieve perfection” (Hänggi 2003, 17).

SSR implementation and management, in particular, have been criticized as “area[s] of benign analytical neglect” (Brzoska and Law 2007, ii, Peake, Scheye, and Hills 2008, vii). Recently, experts have pressed forward to refine the SSR model and improve program design and implementation (Andersen 2011, Keane and Downes 2012, Sedra 2010a). I elaborate on these efforts below.

SSR in Practice: Variation by Scope, Context, and Actors

No two attempts at security sector reform are quite alike. Some are more similar than others are, but all tend to vary by scope, local context, or the actors involved in the process.

First, policymakers have the greatest challenge defining the scope of the security sector within SSR programs. Choosing which organizations to include and exclude for programming
support is a significant challenge. SSR’s lofty goals require a holistic, sector-wide effort. A program focused solely on enhancing the effectiveness of actors mandated to use armed violence—military forces, police, gendarmeries, intelligence services, customs and border police—will not guarantee democratic governance, accountability, or sustainability. If so, then how broad should SSR programs be?

Most SSR scholars and experts agree that any SSR policy or program should consider more than the uniformed services. There is far less consensus about which additional state and non-state actors to include and exclude when defining the security sector and scope of programming. Hänggi (2004, 3) maps these varied outlooks into narrow and wide views of the security sector. In addition to the core uniformed security providers, a narrow view of the security sector is state-centered and includes the civilian executive and administrative bodies responsible for their management and oversight—for example, defense and interior ministries, legislative oversight committees, and specialized judicial bodies (Greene 2003, 2, Hendrickson 1999, 29, OECD 2001, 8). Wider views include civil society groups such as the media, NGO watchdogs, think tanks, and academia, which collectively monitor and advise security sector officials (Saferworld, International Alert, and Clingendael 2002, 3-4, UNDP 2002, 87). The widest views of the security sector also include armed non-state actors—i.e., local militia, private security companies, and criminal or terrorist organizations—many of which compete with the state for legitimacy (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002, 179, OECD 2005, 16-17).

The decision to adopt a narrow or wide approach to SSR is significant in practice (Wulf 2004, 3). On the one hand, a narrowly designed SSR program focusing only on the uniformed services’ development may prove insufficient to affect any lasting impact on democratic security governance. On the other hand, if scoped too broadly, the SSR program may turn unmanageable
and incoherent, leading to a similar outcome with even more wasted (or inefficiently programmed) resources.

Second, further complicating the issue is the observation that no two states, much less their security sectors, are identical. Each has its own unique history and legacy of war and conflict, political culture, and human and natural resource endowments. Over time, these factors shaped security institutions’ present condition, organizational culture, and relationships with their political leaders and society. The result is a globally diverse collection of states with different traditions, rules, and norms of providing external defense, internal policing, and justice. Accordingly, needs and aspirations for SSR are also unique. As Brzoska notes, “to some extent, all countries need security sector reform—but obviously great differences exist as the urgency of reform, its priorities, and the possibilities for development donors to support it. ... It is essential that security sector reform activities suit the circumstances of a particular country” (Brzoska 2003, 40-41).

The consequence is that SSR professionals operate in a wide range of environments with different partner security institutions and potentials for reform. Researchers have classified these varied contexts for both analytical and program design purposes. For example, Hänggi, (2004, 5-7) identifies three contextual categories: developing, democratic transition (mainly CEE countries), and postconflict states. Wulf (2004, 6) also offers a scale of reform potential ranging from war torn countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan on the low end to bona fide postconflict countries like South Africa on the high end. Lilly et al. (2002, 12-14) are most helpful, providing not only a taxonomy of five analytical categories ranging from consolidating democracies to conflict-torn countries but also nuanced SSR goals and roles for external actors based on defined contextual conditions. Identifying these contextual
differences is challenging, yet critical, to developing contingent lessons and generalization for future reform efforts.

Third, SSR programs vary by the degree to which actors, external or internal, drive the overall reform process. On one extreme, external actors drive the process almost exclusively at the outset as seen following the U.N. Security Council’s mandate for transitional administrations in Kosovo and Timor Leste (1999) and the US intervention in Iraq (2003). Internally driven SSR sits on the opposite extreme, but it is far less recognized. An example of this is Peru’s attempt to professionalize its police forces (2001-2004). Given that the development community created SSR, it is no surprise that the most heavily documented SSR cases are those where international sponsors have the greatest involvement (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder 2004, 125, Brzoska and Law 2007, i). Moreover, international sponsors themselves vary in their level of organization and commitment. In some cases individual donor states lead the SSR process—take Sierra Leone (U.K.) and Iraq (US), for example. Most other internationally led SSR missions that commenced under an international organization’s banner and were comprised of multiple contributing donor states, for example, Afghanistan (NATO), Timor Leste (UN), and Kyrgyzstan (OSCE).

Security Sector Reform and Liberal Statebuilding

This dissertation expressly deals with internationally led SSR in the midst of ongoing conflict. SSR has occurred to varying degrees across an array of developing, postauthoritarian, postconflict, and conflict-prone settings—from the Solomon Islands and Haiti to the Balkans and Afghanistan (Hänggi 2004). In developing and transitioning states, SSR is typically seen as a tool to reduce poverty, ensure sustainable growth, and provide greater access to justice (Garrasi, Kuttner, and Wam 2009, Narayan-Parker 2000). In conflict-affected countries, however, SSR is
a core element of an international strategy to build state structures capable of safeguarding an enduring liberal peace. In other words, SSR is a central feature of broader state- and peacebuilding efforts. Some consider SSR as “the armed wing of statebuilding” (Jackson 2010)—one key part of a broader reconstruction and reform effort. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) note the near synonymous nature of statebuilding and peacebuilding, that statebuilding, as a global project, now subsumes the normative foundations of liberalism such as democracy, capitalism, and human rights. Here, peacebuilding further qualifies statebuilding by the degree and type of state that is presumed to maximize human security—a liberal democracy (2009, 28). This section offers a brief review of the statebuilding and peacebuilding literature⁹ as it bears directly on the future direction of SSR research.

International statebuilding emerged as a field of inquiry in the late 1990s out of the Cold War literature on UN-led peacekeeping operations. Whereas previous Cold War-era peacekeeping operations mainly involved cease-fire enforcement, monitoring and other demobilization activities, post-Cold War interventions increasingly took on additional activities to provide interim administration and build state governance capacity as witnessed in Kosovo and Timor Leste.

Statebuilding is the deliberate intervention by a state or international organization (UN, NATO, OSCE, etc.) in a fragile state to improve its governance, typically through programs aimed at creating or strengthening government institutions. The statebuilding literature is replete with formal definitions, but most share two common activities: constructing government institutions and enhancing the state’s capacity to exercise a core set of functions (Call and Cousens 2008, Chandler 2006, 1, Fukuyama 2004, ix, Meierhenrich 2004, OECD 2008, Paris and Sisk 2009c, 14-15, Suhrke, Wimplemann, and Dawes 2007).

⁹ I predominantly use the term statebuilding throughout the rest of this chapter for consistency purposes.
The statebuilding literature is centered on three primary factors leading to positive or negative statebuilding outcomes: statebuilders’ external inputs (e.g., troops, resources, and intervention duration); host nation state inputs (e.g., local security, politics, economics, and incentives); and interactions between international and local actors (Miller 2010, 14-47). The first, and largest, cluster of statebuilding research proposes a number of statebuilder-oriented variables contributing to success or failure. The most obvious of these—more money, time, and people—suggest that statebuilding success is a matter of external commitment (Dobbins 2003, Jones 2006). Others argue that better strategic coherence and coordination among the myriad actors involved in statebuilding missions would lead to better outcomes (Fearon and Laitin 2004, Fukuyama 2006, Paris and Sisk 2009b).

Statebuilders’ sequencing of reform activities is a topic of sizeable debate in this vein. At least three views have emerged on sequencing. The neoliberal or “liberalization first” model, popular throughout the 1990s, is the traditional approach to postwar reconstruction aimed at the rapid establishment of a market economy to promote foreign investment (Boyce and Pastor 1998, Woodward 2002) and demilitarizing politics via democratic electoral administrations (Lyons 2004, Reilly 2002). Roland Paris argues against such rapid liberalization, however, contending that it may threaten a fragile peace in states with fledgling or nonexistent governance institutions. Rather, a functioning bureaucracy must precede liberal economic or political reforms (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, Paris 2004). Finally, proponents of the security-first approach believe that statebuilding is impossible in the midst of conflict. Rather, efforts to keep the peace; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) combatants; and strengthen the state’s monopoly of force must take initial priority over other statebuilding activities (Call and Wyeth 2008, Etzioni 2007, Fortna 2004, 2007). Security sector reform ostensibly fits within a security-first approach to
statebuilding, though its liberal-democratic commitments demonstrate how lines between the schools of thought can easily blur.

Statebuilding is far messier in practice, however, and rarely follows a linear sequence of activities, planned or otherwise. Rather, statebuilding efforts should align with the needs of the recipient state (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). Paris and Sisk’s edited volume (2009b) squarely addresses the inherent contradictions of statebuilding and the reality that there is no one best approach to ensure its success. They note how statebuilders can only manage, at best, the inherent contradictions of statebuilding operations and call for closer examination of critical dilemmas of footprint (i.e., physical presence), mission duration, policy and programming coherence, and local participation and dependency (Edelstein 2009, Paris and Sisk 2009a, 306-311).

The second cluster of statebuilding explanations focuses on domestic conditions within target states. The foremost factor is the target state’s security environment, namely, whether or not warring parties have reached a peace settlement. States embroiled in conflict, as recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, are likely to pose significant challenges for statebuilders. Although circumstances may call for military intervention to stem hostilities, in the absence of a common external threat, conflict-prone and divided societies are more likely to reject armed statebuilders as occupiers (Edelstein 2004, 2009). Moreover, security itself is deeply political in how it infers a degree of legitimacy with certain actors in the use of force. Statebuilding operations are “doubly difficult” in that they demand legitimation from both citizens and the international community, sources which “may contradict as well as complement each other” (Rubin 2008, 26). In the absence of a peace agreement, interventions fundamentally
alter local power dynamics, creating new winners and losers, or worse, spoilers who work to
undermine the overall peace and statebuilding process (Stedman 1997).

Local capacity is another factor theorized to impact statebuilding outcomes. Experts
define capacity in different ways, however. A state’s economic condition is a common
perspective on capacity. For example, Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) find that local capacity
(measured by proxies of GDP per capita, energy consumption, and natural resource dependence)
plays a more influential role in “higher-order” interventions where democracy is the end goal
than in more limited, “lower-order,” peacekeeping interventions. In addition, the incentive
structures of war economies, especially those fueled by natural resources, are particularly
difficult to reverse (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Fearon 2004, 2005). Belligerents funded by black
market activities are likely to resist efforts by the state to reestablish control over its economy.
Likewise, a state’s capacity to manage its economy and absorb the flood of aid accompanying a
statebuilding mission weighs heavily on the efficacy of foreign assistance (Collier 2007).

Researchers have also viewed capacity in terms of a target state’s ability to govern.
Conventional wisdom contends that working with any preexisting rules and capital (human and
material) is generally preferred to building institutions from scratch, barring undemocratic
institutions that challenge statebuilders’ ends. Accordingly, the state of governance at the outset
before liberalization” argument that strong governance institutions must precede liberal reforms
is a prime example. The absence of government institutions does not imply the absence of
governance, however. Seemingly, in even the direst circumstances, local actors tend to adapt and
carry on with informal rules and systems of governance (Menkhaus 2007, 2008). Statebuilders
thus face the great challenge of reconciling tensions between state institutions based on direct
rule and rational-legal authority and informal governance structures that often tend to be more legitimate in the eyes of local citizens.

The third cluster of explanations for statebuilding outcomes involves the interactions between statebuilders and host nation actors. In this view, statebuilders’ actions, by nature of their intervention, influence structural and behavioral changes in the host nation. Doyle (1995, 82-83) conceptualizes this interaction as an obsolescing bargaining dynamic where the advantage gradually shifts away from foreign actors and toward the host nation actors after intervention. Statebuilders are increasingly locked into ensuring a fruitful outcome while host nation actors’ gain influence over directing aid to their advantage. Likewise, their costs of defecting, or noncompliance, decline over time as well. In the worst case, local actors turn spoiler. Stedman (1997) identifies strategies (inducement, coercion, socialization) for managing spoilers based on their number, aims, locus of power, and position within or outside of the state- or peacebuilding effort. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) conceptualize this dynamic occurring among three sets of actors: peacebuilders, state elites, and subnational elites. Their strategic interaction produces four outcomes: cooperative, compromised, captured, and conflictive peacebuilding. Based on the parties’ interests, they argue that compromised peacebuilding (where peacebuilders recognize the interests and authority of state and subnational elites, while the state and subnational elite acknowledge the merits of peacebuilders’ reforms) is the most likely outcome (2009, 25). Since cooperative peacebuilding is highly unlikely (48), compromised peacebuilding poses the best option among three less desirable outcomes.
SSR Research: Working to Bridge Policy and Practice

SSR remains a work in progress from both a research and a practical perspective. The returns on the international community’s extensive investment of financial and human resources to SSR programs over the last two decades have not been good. This has led some scholars to conclude that SSR—and postwar statebuilding more broadly—are simply overambitious, if not misguided, given the historical record on state formation and failure (Egnell and Haldén 2009, Herbst 2004). Yet others note how “even the least successful of the reconstruction efforts have had a beneficial impact on the overall level of human security in countries where they have occurred” (Brzoska and Law 2007, 111). While “at this point it is not appropriate to discard the SSR concept,” donor states have overstretched it and have yet to translate lessons to improved practice (van de Goor and van Veen 2010, 98-99). Expectations to restore functioning security sectors should “be tempered with a strong dose of realism” (Law 2006, 16). Still, as long as SSR endures as a viable policy tool, governments must show greater pragmatism and selectivity in their programming (Scheye 2010), while the SSR research community must provide more nuance in determining where, when, and how to implement programs.

The Center of Attention: Internationally-Led Security Sector Reform

While SSR occurs in a variety of contexts, SSR programs in fragile and conflict-prone states—Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor Leste, for example—receive a disproportionate focus in the literature compared to SSR in developing and transitioning societies. A number of aspects differentiate conflict prone security sectors from others (Law 2006, 2-3). Invariably, these settings involve an external intervention and a substantial international (largely military) presence providing security and interim governance.
Efforts to regain a basic level of security and control over state and non-state armed groups are paramount. Programs to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate (DDR) armed groups into society are often necessary (Civic and Miklaucic 2011, Muggah 2005). Security institutions, if present, are often afflicted by corruption, politicization, unprofessionalism, weak civilian control, or any combination thereof (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder 2004, 1). Likewise, initial steps to reconstruct the security sector typically occur before any democratic election that would legitimate the process (Law 2006, 3). Finally, because human and social capital is often low in the aftermath of conflict, internationally led SSR involves substantial employment of foreign trainers and advisors (military and civilian) to provide financial and material resources, guidance, and technical assistance to local security providers.

Unsurprisingly, the same dilemmas of statebuilding (Paris and Sisk 2009b) also plague externally driven SSR. Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder (2004, 131-132) and Brzoska and Law (2007, vi-vii) note Paris and Sisk’s inherent contradictions, though in the context of postconflict SSR. Notably, they stress the importance for reformers to understand there is no such thing as a blank slate for SSR. The state of insecurity pressures reformers to build security institutions quickly, though the legacy of conflict often necessitates a difficult process of disbanding belligerent groups and making bargains to create political and social space for reform. Rather, they conclude that that postconflict SSR success depends on the capacity and commitment of international actors; local ownership of and demand for reforms; proper reform sequencing and nesting within broader peace settlements; and sufficient monitoring and evaluation (Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder 2004, 136-139, Brzoska and Law 2007, x-xi).
First-Generation SSR

The first generation of SSR literature, typified by the OECD-DAC handbook, emphasizes the foundational principles for SSR program design. The two primary contributions of this early work on SSR were institutionalizing the normative goal of democratic security governance within the donor community and providing a prescriptive framework for program implementation. No donor state or international organization has yet to implement this highly normative and sequentially rigid model fully as prescribed. This fact raises questions about the appropriateness of the orthodox model in conflict-prone settings. Channa (2002) was the first to describe a “conceptual-contextual divide,” or the apparent disconnect between how academics and policymakers ideally conceive of SSR and how professionals carry out reforms in practice when faced with the daily frictions of on-the-ground reality.

Although donor states may label them as such, most SSR programs barely qualify as bona fide SSR by OECD standards (Ball and Hendrickson 2006, 16). Typically, strengthening security force effectiveness and capacity have received greater priority than security sector governance, management, and accountability (Ball 2005, 30, Law 2006, 16). In part, good governance and democratization in insecure environments are expensive and time-consuming goals to pursue (Smith 2001, 13). In addition, despite the beneficence, building military capacity becomes the international community’s default priority in these settings partly because these operations are usually led or at least heavily influenced by donor states’ military forces (Schnabel and Born 2011, 23-24). Critics point out to the contrary that “regardless the degree of insecurity encountered in peacebuilding, governmental legitimacy is the objective, police its primary instrument, and military force its operational enabler” (Bayley and Perito 2010, 163).
This disconnect is further reflected in a corpus of applied literature consisting of technically oriented “how-to” guides (OECD 2005, 2007, UNDP 2003, USAID et al. 2009, US Army 2008a) and donor-driven policy reports (Brzoska 2003, Nathan et al. 2007, Wulf 2000). It also includes several edited volumes evaluating SSR cases across thematic issue areas (Civic and Miklaucic 2011, England and Boucher 2009); global regions (Call 2007, Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005); programming contexts such as developing, transitioning, and conflict-prone states (Cawthra and Luckham 2003); and degree of international actor involvement (Ekengren and Simons 2011, Law 2007). These case studies often conclude with a listing of unmistakable upshots, for example, “one-size-fits all” SSR models are counterproductive (Cawthra and Luckham 2003), broad local participation and strong leadership are critical for success (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005), and justice sector reform takes longer than military and police reform (Call 2007). Formal testing of hypotheses or causal mechanisms—process tracing or structured, focused comparative case analysis, for example—is extremely rare.

To be fair, this is largely a reflection of a phenomenon that does not easily lend itself to quantitative methods that rely on advanced statistical techniques due to the relatively small number of state-level cases. At least three factors contribute to the dearth of empirical methods applied to internationally led SSR cases. First, SSR is still a relatively new field of scholarly inquiry (about 15 years old) and one that international statebuilding research tends to overshadow or subsume. Second, collecting rich and reliable data from a single conflict zone, much less several, has understandable limitations. Third, the complexity and local contingency of statebuilding efforts in postconflict environments make valid state level comparisons and generalizations difficult.
By contrast, a smaller group of experts criticizes this early work as “misleadingly optimistic” (Ball and Hendrickson 2006, 24-28) about the likelihood of success and for frequently replicating “a mixed bag of policy prescriptions…with little direction as to priorities” (Brzoska and Law 2007, iv). These laundry lists of guiding principles and best practices “provide practitioners with neither the requisite intellectual foundation nor operational guidance to craft institutions that arrest insecurity” (Scheye and Peake 2005, 296). Perhaps most problematic across the SSR literature, both for research and practice, is the lack of consensus on how to measure program impact. For example, instilling local ownership in targeted institutions—a widely accepted imperative for success—is nevertheless a “poor methodological indicator” (Scheye and Peake 2005, 301-302) and difficult to operationalize or observe empirically (Boughton and Mourmouras 2002, Brzoska 2006).

Some go further, casting doubt on the expertise of the very community of academic and development professionals who advanced the initial concept. Chuter (2006, 6) laments the lack of real security experience within this research and practice community, noting how “the DNA of security sector reform…comes largely from groups which have deliberately shunned too close an involvement with that sector and so have little practical knowledge of how it works.” Consequently, SSR research “tends to privilege constraints by outsiders: reduction, control, oversight, monitoring, downsizing, and the strengthening of organizations outside the security sector” (2006, 6).

There are, however, at least three notable exceptions. First, Brzoska and Law’s (2007) edited volume (previously a special issue of International Peacekeeping) provides one of the relatively stronger comparative studies to date on conflict-prone SSR. Featuring case studies from Afghanistan, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor Leste, the authors develop a
framework for evaluating SSR programs under international auspices that includes three
overarching areas of emphasis: (a) local risk factors that shape SSR outcomes; (b) international
community efforts; and (c) SSR success criteria. They find three major patterns across the six
cases (Brzoska and Law 2007, 111-113):

- that international efforts are generally too limited in scope, unbalanced in focus, and
too focused on host nation security force effectiveness over accountability;
- efforts to change local normative beliefs lag behind organizational and other
structural changes; and
- efforts to prioritize, from highest to lowest, reforming security institutions, reforming
civil management authorities, and reforming other parliamentary, judicial, and civil
society institutions providing security sector oversight and monitoring.

These conclusions reflect the broader challenge of SSR in conflict-prone environments that the
immediacy for establishing basic security a state monopoly of force trumps the medium- to long-
term goals of building administrative and oversight capacity. The result in practice is often a
misalignment in the pace of institution building on different organizational levels and across
other functional areas throughout the security sector and broader state bureaucracy (on pacing
challenges, see also Dubik 2009).

Second, another strong comparative study by Peake, Scheye, and Hills (2008, vii) takes
an uncommon approach by focusing on SSR program management, an area previously
recognized for its “benign analytical neglect.” The authors apply a structured comparative
approach to nine SSR case study contributions from experts with either field-based research or
direct work experience, or both. A number of interesting findings emerge including inadequate
organizational structure and resourcing; many unqualified field personnel; poor communication
between headquarters and field personnel; and a total absence of meaningful monitoring and
evaluation (2008, 166-167). “Good management begins at home” (166) before any hope of
reforming foreign security institutions.
Lastly, RAND recently published a study that questions how the US Department of Defense can increase its effectiveness in building partner capacity and what security assistance approaches are effective under what circumstances (Paul et al. 2013). After comparing data on 29 cases of US capacity building efforts with partner nations from 1990 to 2009, the study finds—unsurprisingly—that capacity building prospects are promising if they are “consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy economically and in terms of governance” (2013, 89). This claim predictably echoes much of the existing statebuilding literature on factors leading to better outcomes.

More interestingly, however, the authors find that low initial host-nation absorptive capacity was not an impediment to ministerial development. Save ministerial development, low absorptive capacity correlated highly with low effectiveness on all other security assistance objectives. The authors argue “ministerial capacity building itself can help improve absorptive capacity and does not require as much of a baseline from which to make improvements” (2013, 77). This finding suggests that ministerial development should precede, or at least take high priority among, other capacity building efforts.

Much like the plea for greater analytical emphasis on praxis, there is also a largely unanswered call for theoretical development in SSR (Hänggi 2004). There are a few exceptions here as well. Cohen (2009) provides a starting point through a principal-agent model that maps institutional relationships within the host nation security sector. His model, however, omits interactions with international actors involved in the SSR process. In addition, no one, Cohen included, has tested the model on different SSR cases. Piotukh and Wilson (2009) argue that institutional evolution and organizational learning are two theoretical frameworks better suited
for SSR program design than the rationalist approach, which tends to apply privilege more rigid, technocratic methods that run counter to goals of local ownership and sustainable reform. Both of these papers are mainly descriptive. They present SSR in theoretical terms with limited case evidence to support their respective fit.

A Second-Generation SSR

Recent SSR literature indicates a departure from the orthodox, ideal-type view advanced by the OECD. This is largely due to the criticism that rigid blueprints will not work. Conventional SSR is not easily adapted to different contexts. This approach quickly turns problematic when political and security conditions change or funding commitments dry up (Sedra 2010d, 111). Moreover, as postconflict interventions stall or deteriorate, they often revert to a Cold War train-and-equip approach, despite retaining commitment to SSR’s central tenets of democratic governance and accountability. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia are prime examples. At best, this usurps the SSR brand. At worst, it blurs the SSR identity to the point it loses legitimacy (Sedra 2010d, 103).

Andersen (2011) notes how two schools of thought have emerged in the ongoing SSR policy debate. First, the “monopoly school,” proponents of conventional SSR, assume that “the Weberian state-model is the only form of political order in which good governance and democratic accountability can be ensured” (2011, 12). The monopoly school, closely aligned with international statebuilding advocates, calls for a redoubling of effort and commitment to SSR core principles, for example, greater adherence to a common SSR language, better-coordinated resources, and more focus on governance and accountability mechanisms (GDAVD and UNDP 2010, UNDP 2010). Yet, fragile states—where the majority of SSR programs
occur—are often hybrid political orders, or “places in which diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order co-exist, overlap and intertwine” (Boege et al. 2008, 8). Consequently, the fundamental question for advocates of the SSR monopoly school and statebuilders more broadly, is whether a state-centric approach that marginalizes non-state power brokers can overcome such deeply embedded and resistant political fragmentation (Andersen 2011, 11). This question points directly to reformers’ continuing struggles with local ownership.

Alternatively, the hybrid school, or pragmatic approach, argues that that the traditional SSR offers little guidance on how to address the inherent supply and demand problem in partner states, specifically, “how to choose among the plethora of competing political owners,” their adversarial self-interests, and variable willingness to address issues of civil-military relations and security governance (Scheye 2010, 11). Rather, legitimate governance (and potential reform) must first be rooted in preexisting institutions (Bruce Baker 2010, Boege et al. 2009, Hughes 2010). Instead of basing SSR programs on a normative idea about how security provision ought to be provided, SSR should be people-focused—based on realistic assessments of how local communities perceive and provide security (Scheye 2010).

The hybrid approach “takes politics take seriously” (2010, 12) by working with both the state and local communities in an iterative fashion in search of sustainable solutions rather than adhering to a strict reform template or timetable. It recognizes that SSR is a protracted process and that supporting local, non-state initiatives in the short term, sometimes with less than ideal partners (Hulsman and Debat 2006, 57), may provide an entry point for building long-term local ownership and “a constituency for reform” (Keane and Downes 2012, 2). Furthermore, a people-centered approach facilitates SSR research and program evaluation by serving as a more useful analytical lens. Specifically, it demands “a juxtaposition of international benchmarks with the
power and interests of local actors” (Podder 2013, 5) as opposed to evaluation based solely on OECD Handbook standards.

Notably, Andersen (2011, 15) argues—overstates perhaps—that these two schools of thought pose a paradoxical choice between a people-centered, multi-layered view of security that surrenders liberal values and a state-based view of security that privileges human rights and good governance. Rather, a more targeted and politically sensitive approach to SSR as supported by Scheye (2010) would presumably retain the hybrid school’s purchase in the field while allowing flexibility to integrate various elements of the liberal statebuilding agenda. An example, though not without its flaws, is the Afghan Local Police program: a community based policing initiative that supports the development of locally grown and vetted police forces intended to augment the state controlled Afghan National Police.

**The Way Ahead: Filling the Need for Interaction-Based SSR Research**

This literature review demonstrates that state-level comparative research on SSR programs is reaching a point of diminishing returns in the positivist social science sense. One should not interpret this as a call to abandon all comparative approaches. Rather, SSR is a relatively new and contemporary phenomenon. I argue that until more cases emerge, or clearer outcomes surface over time, or both, knowledge accumulation in this field is best served by studies that investigate phenomena below the state level of analysis.

Specifically, this literature review reveals a need to examine the conditions and practices that lead to reform. Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake explicitly call for more inquiry on “institutional change *vis-à-vis* resistance…sensitivity to questions of organizational behavior and structure, managerial competencies and leadership…[and] detailed analyses of the cultures,
structures and daily routines embodied by security sector institutions” (2005, 307). In a similar
vein, Paul et al. (2013, 92) argue for more granularity and nuance with a focusing on the level of
human interaction in security assistance partnerships. In other words, leading experts call upon
scholars to examine institutional change and resistance in practice by tracing the interactions,
behaviors, and beliefs among security actors and institutions undergoing SSR.

Arguably, the most significant interactions in SSR settings occur between foreign
advisors and host nation security force leaders. Granted, formal military advising between
nations has been around for centuries—at least since Friedrich von Steuben, a Prussian officer,
provided expertise to the Continental Army during America’s Revolutionary War. However, the
practice has only received limited scholarly attention mainly though historical (Gibby 2012,
Stoker 2008) and defense policy perspectives (Carter and Alderson 2011, Farmer 2010, Jason
mentoring in SSR and statebuilding settings has barely surfaced in the academic literature. Rosén
(2011, 152) highlights how organized coaching and mentoring is a more intense relationship-
based form of military technical assistance, when advisors represent “an expression of neoliberal
governmentality in global security governance.” Likewise, Tarp and Rosén (2012) posit that
coaching and mentoring, when performed appropriately, have more potential than traditional
technical assistance.

Additionally, military training and exchange programs have received only modest
attention among international relations scholars. Two studies on transnational military-to-
military interactions worth highlighting support the claim that ideational mechanisms play a key
role in shaping institutional norms of civilian control and influencing broader trends of political
liberalization in authoritarian states. In her study of 160 states from 1972–2000, Carol Atkinson
(2006) shows a positive and significant (p < 0.05) correlation between US military educational exchanges and nations experiencing democratic transition, specifically, that social interactions are more effective than material inducements in inculcating democratic norms. Likewise, Ruby and Gibler (2010) find a similar result by regressing the number of international officer attendees (more than 11,000 foreign officers) at the US intermediate- and senior-level schools (e.g., US Army War College, Air War College, etc.) between 1950 and 1999 on the occurrence of a coup attempt in their home country. They find that the presence of foreign officers in US professional military education programs has a negative, statistically significant (p < 0.01) association with coup attempts, even after controlling for several predictors of government instability and running a second test for endogeneity to refute the possibility that the US military’s selection process was based a priori on coup attempts (2010, 346-347). Nevertheless, although these two studies on military assistance inform the understanding of security assistance partnerships and interactions, they predate the advent of SSR.

In closing, this review clearly reveals that the study of foreign and local interactions in security reform settings is wide open. Accordingly, I aim to contribute to this gap by exploring the role and influence of embedded security advisors on multiple levels of analysis. More importantly, I also strive to uncover helpful knowledge of practices that work (and do not work) in contested environments and will inform and improve future SSR programming.
CHAPTER 3. THEORIZING SECURITY INTERVENTIONS: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS GUIDED INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.

Niccolò Machiavelli

In 2012, the overwhelming majority (31 of 32, 97 percent) of the world’s armed conflicts were internal civil wars (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013, 510). Of these ongoing conflicts, one in four involved an external state providing security assistance in the form of troops and related support to one or more warring parties. These statistics are part of a longer, unprecedented trend of foreign involvement in civil wars dating back to the end of World War II (2013, 510). In the last two decades, more than 20 internal conflicts involved peace interventions designed to prevent a resumption of violence and to strengthen or reconstruct state institutions (Paris and Sisk 2009c, 1-2).

Recent scholarship on civil war follows this trend by examining the transnational effects on civil conflict (see, for example, Blattman and Miguel 2010, Checkel 2013, Salehyan 2009, Tarrow 2007). This research focuses on the inherent external-internal links in international affairs—interactions between global-to-local and state-to-nonstate actors. The current research agenda explores how these interactions shape civil war outcomes (Checkel 2013, 4). Through the study of security sector reform (SSR) programs, this dissertation fits within the broader theoretical endeavor to explain transnational interactions as they relate to conflicts. As a central element of postwar peace and statebuilding interventions, SSR is a transnational tool of influence by design and in application. Below the state level in particular, SSR programs are comprised of layered interactions between state, nonstate, foreign, and local actors. Yet, as the previous chapter highlights, SSR is a policy tool in clear need of sharpening. State and international
policymakers require better knowledge of which strategies of influence work in different circumstances and to what extent. If heeded by policymakers, this wisdom should carry over into better program design and implementation. Professionals also stand to benefit with a more nuanced appreciation for influencing change with foreign partners.

My overarching theoretical goal is to develop explanations for how interactions between individuals and organizations influence institutional change (or not) in SSR program settings. With few, if any, unqualified cases of SSR success at the state level, this aim is valuable for developing middle-range theory and prescriptive guidance on future SSR program design. Because my initial intent is to build, as opposed to test, theory, this chapter does not present specific hypotheses. Rather, I build a case for conceptualizing SSR as a process of guided institutional transfer. From this, I present a theoretical framework of possible causal mechanisms and institutional outcomes for follow on case analysis and inductive hypothesis generation.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the following section, I propose theorizing SSR as both a process and a program. Next, I ground the dissertation in three overarching concepts of social change: convergence, diffusion, and socialization. I argue that internationally sponsored SSR programs are instances of “guided institutional transfer” in which external actors apply an array of approaches to induce both functional and normative changes within a target state’s security institutions. The final section outlines my theoretical framework for subsequent case analysis. There I describe institutional transfer in terms of SSR’s intended functional and normative goals. I also outline how institutional transfer occurs according to three logics of action: power, legitimacy, and efficiency. Building on the work of Bennett (2013b), Checkel (2005), and Mahoney (2000), I conclude by highlighting an initial set of potential causal mechanisms that may operate in the context of internationally sponsored SSR. This framework
not only provides an analytical guide for future case analysis of institutional transfer, but also allows analytical flexibility for causal mechanism discovery and refinement.

**Theorizing Programs, Processes, and Mechanisms**

Policymakers advance SSR as both a program intervention and a process. SSR is, in principle, a program intervention sponsored by external or local actors, or both, to alter the existing security institutions in a given state. This reform involves changing institutional structures and norms. The ideal achievement is a security sector characterized by a practically boundless list of liberal and Weberian qualities—civilian oversight and accountability; effective governance and service delivery; professionalism; legitimacy and ownership; and sustainability, to name a few (OECD 2007). SSR in conflict-prone states typically involves significant interaction between foreign and indigenous actors. These efforts proceed with the implicit assumption that the precise mix of external assistance and local cooperation will ignite a process of institutional change. However, professionals with expertise implementing SSR in the field reveal a far more difficult and contested experience (Peake, Scheye, and Hills 2008, Scheye 2010).

For more than a decade, scholars and practitioners have bemoaned the great disparity between SSR’s lofty aspirations and the daily obstacles that SSR professionals confront (Channa 2002, Podder 2013, Schnabel and Born 2011). Consequently, as a concept, SSR provides little more than a normative blueprint—-for analysts, an unrealistic benchmark to assess widespread program failures; for professionals, a collection of aspirations and best practices.

These implementation challenges have spurred substantial reconsideration of SSR’s orthodox model. Recent debate centers on the need for greater pragmatism and contextualization
in SSR programming. Leading SSR expert Mark Sedra advocates for a “second-generation SSR” (2010d) that is more adaptable to local conditions than the orthodox approach. This view recognizes that in certain contexts, particularly conflict-prone states, conditions may not be ripe for wholesale, top-down reform, but they nevertheless demand some degree of transformation to address insecurity concerns or to prevent a relapse into conflict. Indigenous and hybrid reforms may serve as interim solutions within a much longer vision of future reform (Bruce Baker 2010, Ball 2010, Keane and Downes 2012, Scheye 2010). Questions remain, however. Conceptually, to what extent does retreating from SSR’s ideals for short-term gains lead to a return to the “train-and-equip” mentality that it was originally intended to replace? Practically, in what specific circumstances and when should more limited aims be pursued?

As ambitious or unrealistic as it may be, I contend that the extant search to resolve SSR’s “conceptual-contextual divide” (Channa 2002) has less to do with altering SSR’s conceptual vision and more to do with its deficiency in advancing an underlying theory of change that specifies the casual mechanisms involved in the process.

Program Theory and Implementation

SSR may lack theory in terms of case explanation, but it is still theoretical. The concept is a normative idea that guides collective action. It implies causation between an intervention and its purported goals. Above all, however, SSR truly lacks a sufficient program theory—an articulated explanation, or at least set of assumptions, for how specific inputs, activities, and interactions will trigger desired outcomes (Patricia J. Rogers et al. 2000, Patricia J. Rogers and Weiss 2007, Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004, 146-164, Weiss 1997).
Most policy and program interventions start with a logic model. They advance an argument, or at least assume that a certain set of inputs and activities will produce a desired effect. Often visually accompanied by a flow chart or table, this logical sequence—consisting of inputs, activities, outputs, and expressed short- and long-term outcomes—amounts to an implementation theory. The OECD Handbook on SSR is a perfect example. The Handbook spells out a linear sequence of phases and activities: a preparatory phase that includes assessment, consensus-building, and program design; an implementation phase with technical assistance and capacity development; and a consolidation phase that provides long-term financial and technical support (OECD 2007, 24-36, Sedra 2010c, 9).

Few policy or program interventions, however, advance a program theory. Traditional implementation theories and logic models fail to “examine the causal mechanisms involved in programs and policies ... and do not show the different complementary or alternate casual strands involved in achieving the outcomes” (Patricia J. Rogers and Weiss 2007, 62). Program theory, rather, goes a step further than implementation theory by specifying causal mechanisms and pathways of change, not simply associations between observed activities and changes (Weiss 1997, 511). SSR programs are rooted in tacit assumptions of change, such as the broad belief that capacity-building efforts will change host nation institutions. They lack, however, explicit descriptions for how this occurs. Rather, a more fruitful pursuit for SSR program evaluation, theory development, and future program refinement is to specify the underlying chain of activities at work, the degree to which they produce change, and the new pathways of change and resistance.
Social Processes and Causal Mechanisms

This dissertation starts from the view that security sector reform, in essence, is a goal-oriented, interactive process of social change. In practice, SSR is never a lock-step series of moves that international actors take to reengineer a set of host nation security organizations. Any linear or recipe-like conception of SSR in which successful outcomes depend on the right sequence, quantity, and mix of ingredients denies the dynamics of how political and social institutions change over time. Rather, SSR is complex, uneven, improvisational, and evolving in nature. A theory of SSR should, therefore, account for its empirical reality as a dynamic and often contested process that unfolds over time (Peake, Scheye, and Hills 2008).

Because of SSR’s evolutionary and improvisational nature, process-oriented research is a more appropriate approach to its study than variance-oriented research. Variance-oriented research is the traditional, deductive-nomological model for explaining and testing causality between two or more phenomena. It is best associated with formal modeling and related statistical methods for testing causal inference and generalizing from a sample to its broader population. In its simplest form, it asks whether a variable \( x \) causes variable \( y \). Variance-oriented research is also correlational. It tests for causal inference between \( x \) and \( y \) by examining the correlational strength between observed changes in each variable. Without elaborating on the assumptions of inferential statistics, it is worth pointing out that variance-oriented research entails comparing and drawing causal interference between two or more variables occurring within numerous, stable cases of a specific phenomenon—“large-n” statistical studies in quantitative methods parlance (Langley 2009, 411). Internationally led SSR does not fit this
approach easily, unfortunately, as there are only thirteen cases.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, the treatment of reform and the local circumstances in these cases are often inimitable, making cross-case comparison hard and generalization to the broader population (i.e., external validity) even harder.

Alternatively, process-oriented research delves into causal complexity. It asks whether and how \( x \) leads to \( y \) by examining the underlying temporal sequence of events (\( a \), then \( b \), then \( c \))—the causal mechanisms—that necessarily link \( x \) to \( y \) (Collier 2011b, 824). Causal mechanisms are “the unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett 2005, 137). Process-oriented research seeks knowledge of how causal mechanisms operate though a close examination of particular cases. Consequently, though process-oriented research surrenders the broad explanatory power that variance-oriented research offers, its strengths lie in fine-grained case knowledge, discovery of novel social phenomena, and theory building (Collier 2011b, 824). It “provides a powerful means of using both induction and deduction to develop and test theories about hypotheses” (Andrew Bennett 2013b, 472, citing Checkel 2006, Collier 2011b, George and Bennett 2005).

SSR is clearly ripe for process- and mechanism-based theory development. It lacks any clear specification for how activities would necessarily contribute toward the achievement of its professed goals. Moreover, at this point, knowledge of how and when mechanisms operate and whether they contribute to a causal sequence, or not at all, is presently more helpful to policymakers and professionals than a traditional variance oriented approach.

\textsuperscript{10} The universe of state-level cases of internationally sponsored SSR includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste.
Conceptual Grounding: Convergence, Diffusion, and Socialization Processes

In this section, I introduce three overarching concepts of social change that this dissertation draws upon: convergence, diffusion, and socialization. The first two are highly interdisciplinary concepts. Political scientists, economists, organization analysts, and development scholars have all taken on the challenge of convergence processes. Convergence studies span from the largely defunct field of modernization studies to recent variants of new institutionalism.

Diffusion is even more interdisciplinary than convergence. It adds the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and several political science subfields, including public policy, international relations, and security studies. Additionally, because of its interdisciplinary nature, diffusion is perhaps the most scattered of the three research traditions. Its analysts tend to use inconsistent labels (e.g., diffusion, transfer, and imitation), take up structural and agent-based explanations, and focus on different stages and outcomes of the overall process.

Socialization is also interdisciplinary, though relatively less so. Beyond sociology, the concept carries over to political science subfields of international relations and security studies, anthropology, social psychology, and education. A key distinction is that convergence and diffusion are predominantly rooted in a rational choice assumption of human behavior, save culturist approaches. Socialization, rather, affixes to constructivist philosophy in which behavior is a consequence of identities, social interaction, and how actors make sense of their environment. In the following three sections, I provide a brief overview of each concept and highlight the major scholarly works as they relate to this dissertation.
Convergence and Institutional Change

Convergence, a concept dating back to the modernization literature of the 1950s and 1960s, describes a process by which political and economic institutions in different societies grow more alike over time. Central to this literature is the presumption of underlying processes driving traditional societies to modernize into industrial, if not ultimately democratic, societies (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 158). Modernization theory views resistance to modern institutions as a natural aspect of the development process and ascribes the origins of such opposition to firmly held traditional norms and values. For these scholars, the idea of transplanting modern institutions in pre-modern societies was absurd due to impeding local norms and values (Lerner 1964, 14), or at least doubtful due to the likely disruption of local power dynamics (Pye and Pye 1985, 25). Consequently, because convergence was seen as inevitable, taken with modernization theory’s overshadowing criticism for its ethnocentrism, cultural over-determinism and conceptual imprecision (Tipps 1973), scholars of this era largely ignored the underlying process explaining how institutions move across societies (Jacoby 1996, 43-45).

Around 1980, convergence experienced somewhat of a revival alongside a renewed emphasis in political science and economics on examining institutions as they operate within and interact with their broader institutional environment. “New institutionalism” generated a variegated research stream on how norms, interests, and history shape actors’ behavior within institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996). One of the key early works related to convergence processes is DiMaggio and Powell’s influential article on “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These authors argue that, over time, institutions become more isomorphic, or similar, according to two logics: competitive and institutional. Competitive isomorphism occurs
due to environmental pressures that drive innovation and survival. This idea is rooted in the Weberian view of Western state formation through the rational bureaucratization of military and state governing structures (Tilly 1985, 1992, Weber, Gerth, and Mills 2009). Much like a firm in a free market system, competition for survival drives innovation and rationalized efficiency in the provision of national defense and, by extension, other public goods and services.

Institutional isomorphism occurs because of constraining environmental forces—coercive, mimetic, and normative—that drive institutional convergence without economic efficiency as the primary goal (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Coercive mechanisms operate when institutions compel or induce others to take on specific practices or organizational structures (Larmour 2005). Examples abound, from laws and government regulations in the business arena to economic sanctions and warfare on the international stage. Second, uncertainty influences choices to voluntarily mimic or emulate foreign practices perceived to be successful. When goals are ambiguous or solutions are unclear due to environmental complexity, modeling other practices that appear to work is a more cost-effective, risk-averse strategy than trial and error. Here, emulation may occur “unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or explicitly via organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 151). Third, normative pressures, rooted in societal beliefs and attitudes, legitimate specific institutional forms and behaviors over others. In the case of this study, international norms of civilian control over state security forces may or may not conflict with locally held norms of appropriate civil-military relations.

Substantial literature on institutional change and persistence (e.g., path dependence) has emerged in the years since this DiMaggio and Powell’s article (see, for example, Aldrich and Ruef 2006, Genschel 1997, Hall and Taylor 1996, Hay and Wincott 1998, James Mahoney 2000,
James Mahoney and Thelen 2010, North 1990, Peters 2005, Pierson 2004). A key observation in this literature is that, once established, institutions resist change. Path dependence emerges as increasing material or social capital from existing rules and structures serve as positive feedback to actors. In effect, the feedback reinforces and incentivizes repeated future behavior (North 1990, Pierson 2004, 21). Meanwhile, the creation of new rules or structures requires large sunk costs (Pierson 2004, 35). As increasing returns and positive feedback accumulate over time, transaction costs of switching to other alternatives increase, making the collective decision to alter the status quo or change course increasingly difficult (Williamson 1985).

However, institutions also change over time in both dramatic and incremental fashion. Social revolutions have forced major overhauls in political systems and in some cases, their wholesale replacement. Modest institutional changes occur as well—witness the evolution of British House of Lords over more than 700 years (James Mahoney and Thelen 2010). One of the central criticisms of research on institutional change is the emphasis on major exogenous shocks that incite radical institutional change, as opposed to incremental changes driven from within. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) provide a general model that integrates both exogenous and endogenous sources of institutional change. They argue that institutional change is the result of balance of power changes and matters of institutional compliance. Environmental forces and positive feedback continuously shape the balance of power among actors within institutions. Likewise, the more institutional rules and structures are ambiguous or loosely enforced, the more there are opportunities for actors to change the functional- and power-distributional characteristics of the institution. Four patterns of institutional change—displacement, layering, drift, and conversion—emerge according to the variation in number of actors with power to resist (i.e., “veto points”) and actors’ discretion to enforce rules.
First, displacement occurs when groups throw out old rules and supplant them with new ones. It can be a sudden occurrence, as in the repeal of a law, or a slow-moving process, when a new institution emerges in direct competition with older institutions. The abolition of slavery in the US is such an example. While it took a civil war to resolve the issue, change advocates held a stronger position than status quo defenders all while rule enforcement was high in the form of the Union Army. Layering is the addition to or partial revision of existing rules and structures on top of old. Here, there are many possibilities for actors to defend the status quo and rule enforcement is high, thus change agents have limited options for wholesale change and resort to additions or piecemeal revisions where possible. Drift takes place when institutions remain fixed despite external environmental changes, resulting in an altered impact on society. Drift stems from insufficient institutional enforcement, specifically “the failure to adapt and update an institution so as to maintain its traditional impact in a changed environment” (James Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 19). Last, conversion occurs when rules remain fixed, but actors reinterpret or repurpose them to fit the changing environment. Conversion is predominant when actors exploit ambiguities or gaps in the rules. An example of conversion is the use of the filibuster in the US Senate, whereby a minority party uses the procedural right to endless debate over a bill as a tool for political obstruction.

Diffusion and Transfer Processes

In the social realm, diffusion broadly describes the spread of ideas or practices from one individual or group to another (Katz, Levin, and Hamilton 1963, 237). Diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system” (Everett M. Rogers 2003, 5). Diffusion research attempts to explain how
innovation adoption patterns emerge across groups. Explanations for adoption tend to combine motivational factors within the adopting social unit and communication pathways linking the social unit to its external environment. For example, Rogers (2003) argues that aspects of the innovation, open communication channels, time, and the broader social structure each impact the spread of innovations. Berry and Berry (1999, 172-178) contend that elite communication networks, geographic proximity, pioneering adopters, and top-down pressure—national-to-local directed legislation, for example—are key influences in the policy adoption process. Strang and Meyer (1993, 493) argue that diffusion is “shaped and accelerated” by cultural similarities and “theorizations” (i.e., common understanding) of relevant concepts, for example, what an organization, or a state, is and does.

Diffusion is a highly interdisciplinary social science concept. The study of diffusion dates back to early 20th century anthropologists (Wissler 1914) who documented the spread of practices among American Indian tribes and other sociologists who examined the spread of amateur radio (Bowers 1937). Rogers (2003, Ch. 11) identified six research traditions on diffusion in his seminal 1962 meta-analysis: anthropology, early sociology, rural sociology, education, industrial economics, and medical sociology. Diffusion research entered the political science field not long after Walker’s study on cross-state adoptions of legislation and public policy in the US (1969), which paved the way for hundreds more studies (see for example, Collier and Messick 1975, Savage 1985). A recent meta-analysis on diffusion research (Erin R. Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013) highlights considerable growth over the last two decades in studies of public policy in the subfields of American politics, international relations, and comparative politics.
Of note, diffusion research in the subfield of security studies has grown in the last two decades as well (Goldman and Andres 1999, Goldman and Eliason 2003, Horowitz 2010). This thread rests within a broader literature on military innovation and change (see, for example, Avant 1994, Farrell and Terriff 2002, Kier 1997, Posen 1984, Rosen 1991) and explores how military technology, doctrine, and organizational forms spread throughout the international system. Eliason and Goldman (2003, 7-8) emphasize that studies on military diffusion processes are rare because of the dominating neorealist assumption that interstate competition drives weaker states to imitate the strongest or most successful states (Resende-Santos 1996, 2007, Waltz 1979). This claim dodges cultural explanations of military change (Farrell and Terriff 2002, Kier 1997). I would only add that a key distinction between military diffusion and military innovation research is that the former seeks a more nuanced understanding of the variable patterns and rates of adoption, whereas the latter focuses on testing different explanatory variables of change, namely, international structure, bureaucratic politics, organizational economics, and culture.

Like policy diffusion, policy transfer is a narrower subset of diffusion-oriented inquiry that focuses on how elites choose policies and institutional designs from abroad. Policy transfer is “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and place” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 344). Whereas the broader diffusion literature presumes more of an involuntary, epidemic-like spread of ideas and institutions, the policy transfer literature specifically targets the agency of local actors pulling in new or alternative institutional arrangements. Though policy transfer is the dominant moniker (e.g., Bulmer and Padgett 2005, Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, Evans 2009, James and Lodge 2003,
Marsden and Stead 2011), researchers have used different terms and phrases to describe, as Colin Bennett puts it, “virtually the same phenomenon” (Colin J. Bennett 1991, 32). Other labels include lesson drawing (Rose 1991, 1993), imitation (Jacoby 2000, Westney 1987), emulation (Jacoby 2004), institutional transfer (Larmour 2005), and institutional transplantation (De Jong, Lalenis, and Mamadouh 2002).

Early studies in this loose collection of scholarship focus on the receiving actors and their willingness to borrow or import foreign designs, taking little notice of instances of external influence (Bulmer and Padgett 2005, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000, Evans and Davies 1999, James and Lodge 2003, Rose 1991, 1993). Richard Rose’s (1991) paper on the process of drawing policy lessons from abroad illustrates this line of research. He identifies five patterns of lesson-drawing from abroad: copying—accepting a foreign program in near exact form and substance; emulation—accepting a foreign program with adaptations to fit local realities; hybridization—combining two or more foreign programs; synthesis—combining a foreign program with a local program; and inspiration—using the ideas of a foreign model to stimulate local innovation (1991, 19-24).

Others have demonstrated how contingent adaptation of foreign models is more likely the rule than the exception. For example, Westney’s (1987) study of the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) highlights how Japan, operating as a “rational shopper” and driven to imitate successful institutional designs, initially emulated Western models (the French police force, Britain’s postal system, and Western newspapers), but inevitably modified their designs to successfully integrate them with local circumstances and cultural practices. Majone (1991) shows that policy makers, when looking for foreign models to imitate, are actually less interested in “a detailed blueprint, which is indeed likely to be inapplicable to the specific conditions in which they operate, than
general guidance and *prima facie* evidence that the proposed policy is feasible” in their present circumstances (Majone 1991, 80).

Over time, however, this line of research has expanded to incorporate external factors, including foreign coercion, alongside willing indigenous pursuit of foreign innovations (Hoberg 1991, Majone 1991). Ikenberry (1990) argues that the early diffusion of government privatization occurred in three forms: external inducement, emulation or “policy bandwagoning,” and social learning. Here, external inducement varies widely from “overt coercion to loose structuring of incentives” between nations (1990, 99). Emulation and policy bandwagoning are driven primarily by competitive pressures in the international system, or to a lesser extent, by political elite expectations of successful adoption and changes in domestic norms regarding the role of government (99, 101). Ikenberry’s third pattern of diffusion, social learning, operates similarly to emulation, with the central difference being that the diffusion process first unfolds across societies so that a “consensual knowledge” about new policy approaches eventually influences policy change in government, as opposed to political elite decision-making acting as the primary mechanism of change (103-104). Likewise, Dolowitz, and Marsh (1996, 346-349) make categorical distinctions between voluntary transfer, direct coercive transfer, and indirect coercive transfer. In particular, they call for increased scholarly attention on latter cases of indirect coercive transfer, which are conceptually similar to Ikenberry’s loosely structured incentives intended to induce local actors to adopt specific practices. Further refining the spectrum between external “pushing” and local “pulling” dynamics, Ward (1999, 58) offers a range of six types of exporter-importer interactions based on the degree of external coercion and local willingness to adopt foreign models: authoritarian imposition, contested imposition, negotiated imposition, undiluted borrowing, selective borrowing, and synthetic innovation.
Wade Jacoby has done considerable work in this area as well by drawing close attention to the politics and strategic choice involved in the emulation process. In a study of German reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II, Jacoby (2000) posits that “institutional transfer” necessitates three conditions. First, state elites must seek out a foreign institutional design. Second, these elites attempt to detect the design’s legal framework and the actors that will make it work. Third, elites choose which aspects of the institutional design to construct in pure or approximate form depending upon its congruence with existing indigenous structures (2000, 2). He explicitly argues that successful transfer more importantly requires foreign actors and domestic elites to adopt adaptive strategies that allow civil society to make meaningful alterations that help fit local circumstances, as opposed to “fetishizing” over exact copies (2000, 3).

Jacoby developed this theoretical work further in his subsequent study (2004, 5-12, 34-36) that examines Western institutional design adoptions and domestic consequences within states seeking EU and NATO membership. To explain variation in the mode of emulation, Jacoby argues that the extent that domestic actors emulate foreign institutions varies based upon the pressure applied by international actors and the degree of domestic actors’ willingness to replicate external rules and structures. The result is a helpful typology of four modes of emulation based on variation in coercive pressure and local agency: copies, templates, patches, and thresholds. Intuitively, copies occur when domestic actors actively look outward to external sources to willingly mimic or emulate foreign practices with little to no outside pressure to do so. Templates, like copies, also occur under low external pressure but are only approximate in form as local actors adopt or modify elements of the original. As external pressure increases, a threshold results when domestic actors and low domestic commitment to implement an exact
copy remain low. For example, a threshold would occur when external actors demand adherence to a specific benchmark, such as international safety standards, while domestic organizations or groups retain discretion over how they meet the benchmark internally. Finally, patches occur when external pressure is high and locals remain faithful to implementing the reform explicitly.

Socialization Processes

Socialization describes “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005, 804). Socialization is ubiquitous in that it occurs within groups of all sizes—families, firms, nations, and international organizations, to name a few. It is also a form of soft power; it shapes actors’ behavior “at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 283). Instead of behavior manipulation via coercive force, threats, or incentives, socialization involves forming new identities when actors learn roles and acceptable conduct within a group. Internalization of sanctioned behavior because the collective considers it routine, good, or right is what March and Olsen (2006) describe as switching from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. Thus, socialization results when actors assent to the group’s rules and norms out of a genuine belief in their legitimacy instead of fear- or reward-based calculation.

In recent years, constructivist international relations (IR) scholars have written extensively on state socialization processes and the promotion of international norms such as human rights (e.g., Alderson 2001, Checkel 2001, 2005, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Flockhart 2006, Harrison 2004, Risse 1999, Thies 2003, 2010). Centered on shared ideas and beliefs among groups, constructivist IR scholarship argues that groups, namely states and international organizations, internalize new ideas and norms in a sequence of stages.
Consider, for example, Wendt’s “cultures of anarchy” argument that the evolving culture of the international system—sequentially Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantean—has socialized states to behave according to underlying assumptions from mutual enmity to rivalry to friendship over time (1999, 259-301). Wendt provides three degrees of internalization in *Social Theory of International Politics* (Harrison 2004, 41-42, Wendt 1999, 266-278). In the first stage, the actor complies with an external demand purely because of coercion or immediate threat of punishment such that there is no choice other than compliance. Here, “given the external source of his behavior the quality of his compliance is low and requires constant pressure,” else he returns to his previous behavior (Wendt 1999, 269). Actors in the second stage of internalization comply because they believe it to be in their self-interest but do not necessarily consider it as legitimate or the right thing to do. Behavior is less compulsory and more internally driven than in the first stage, but still completely rational and instrumental. Internalization is only partial at this point. If “the costs of following the rules outweigh the benefits,” the actors will no longer observe them (Wendt 1999, 271). In the third and final stage, actors willingly follow rules and norms because of a belief they are legitimate. Full internalization means that the actor fully incorporates these new behaviors, roles and expectations as part of her identity. The result is a shared identity among the collective that dissolves distinctions between external and internal actors.

Constructivists continue to refine and elaborate arguments for the norm transmission process across states. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 895-905) describe a general three-stage norm life cycle in which: (a) norms emerge and entrepreneurial actors promote them; (b) norms cascade via peer pressure and in-group conformity; and then (c) norms are internalized, or become “taken for granted.” Risse and Sikkink (1999, 15-18) advance a “spiral model” that describes the five stages through which rogue states progress to become human
rights norm followers: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status (e.g., acquiescence), and rule following behavior. Checkel (2005, 808) simplifies this process by focusing on two socialization phases. The first rationalist stage (i.e., Type I internalization) occurs when actors instrumentally choose to comply; in other words, they “role play” because it works to their benefit. In the following constructivist stage (Type II internalization), actors experience a total transformation in value orientations and interests.

Flockhart (2006) offers a thought-provoking layered model of “complex socialization” that integrates social identity theory with constructivist IR. She argues that norm transfer across states occurs via three-way interactions among the international community, state elites, and domestic masses. Identity-based filters (i.e., in- and out-group characteristics) resting between international, state, and local levels primarily moderate the degree of top-down norm penetration. Additional factors like domestic political structure and external socialization strategies are secondary. More concisely, identity can serve as either an accelerant or an additional source of friction on multiple levels in the socialization process. The more that domestic audiences or political elites consider the socializing actor(s) as an outsider, ceteris paribus, the harder norm internalization will become.

Flockhart’s model is complemented by de Nevers’ (2007) study that evaluates whether certain characteristics of norm violating states affect when and how great powers use force to promote norm compliance. Her study is exemplary of IR research that sits on the rationalist-constructivist divide by exploring when and under what circumstances power- or identity-based explanations hold greater theoretical purchase. She finds that powerful states most often promote norms coercively on nonstate actors and weaker states considered pariahs by the international
community. They reserve persuasive approaches for peer (or near-peer) powers and international community “insiders.”

Socialization lies at the heart of constructivist approach to social action. It is viewed more complementary than conflicting with rational choice theory, despite well-documented epistemological debates (see Zürn and Checkel 2005). Socialization holds potential to compensate for rational choice’s inability to distinguish between purely instrumental (i.e., cost versus benefit) and norm-driven behavior (Wendt 1999, 101). By extension, constructivist scholarship concentrates on non-instrumental socialization mechanisms like persuasion (Checkel 2001, 2005, Gheciu 2005, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Persuasion—arguably the most critical non-rationalist socialization mechanism (Checkel 2001, 564, Johnston 2005)—is “a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes … [and] convincing someone through argument and principled debate” (Checkel 2001, 562). Role-playing (e.g., copying or mimicking) is another mechanism that occurs when agents with limited information use social and other environmental cues to assume appropriate identity roles. Additionally, role-playing does not require communicative interaction with members of an out-group (Checkel 2005, 810).

**Security Sector Reform as Guided Institutional Transfer**

How does security sector reform measure against these three processes? I classify internationally sponsored security sector reform as a type of guided institutional transfer. It is a diffusion process, though a highly specific one that involves external and local agents and structures interacting on multiple levels to establish a Western form of security governance. SSR is also a purposeful—hence guided—process.
The classification of SSR as guided institutional transfer represents a conceptual integration of policy transfer and socialization process described above. SSR in conflict-prone states is an inherently interactive process in which transnational actors attempt to influence domestic change. Foreign actors communicate rules, structures, routines, and norms to local actors. In response, local actors learn these codes, to varying degrees, and choose whether, when, and how to embed or adapt within their own political, organizational, social, and cultural milieu. Though perhaps perpetuating the glut of conceptual labels to describe this phenomenon, institutional transfer is preferable to its alternatives outlined earlier in this chapter.

In the broadest sense, SSR envisions the cross-national movement of security governance norms and structures. From a macro-social perspective, this could fit within a diffusion, convergence, or isomorphism framework. Yet, SSR’s recent empirical record demonstrates a contentious and inconclusive experience. It is not as inevitable or evolutionary as these concepts suggest. The diffusion literature holds a slight advantage over the other two since it includes external and internal variables of interaction (Jacoby 2006, 631). Yet, the vast majority of diffusion literature centers on structural interactions and outcomes. It ignores the politics of adoption (Jacoby 2000, 7-8) and is preoccupied with the geographic spread of institutions instead of post-diffusion outcomes, such as successful, modified, or failed adoptions (see Savage 1985). This tack overlooks the actors involved, their interactions with each other and with various structures, and the timing, circumstances, and dynamics of advancing and adopting a foreign practice. Policy transfer, diffusion’s conceptual offshoot, is better suited to address agency and the politics of institutional reform because of its emphasis on agency.

Internationally sponsored SSR is also a guided process, particularly due to its interactive and interventionist nature. It ultimately necessitates local ownership—the willful acceptance and
internalization of reforms by indigenous actors. Local actors may initially emulate, resist, or convert foreign organizational models promoted by external reformers. For reforms to endure, however, local actors must voluntarily elect to maintain them. To have any meaning or legitimacy, local individuals and groups must understand what the reforms entail, why they are necessary, and the new roles and behaviors expected of them. For example, recognizing what a liberal democracy is and why it may be good first requires exposure to more fundamental ideas such as liberty, human rights, statehood, citizenship, and political participation, to name a few. Repeated exposure to ideas about what it means to be a good soldier—a professional soldier—conditions a specific military mindset steeped in the norms of just warfare (i.e., *jus ad bellum* and *jus ad bello*). Examples like these illustrate how SSR requires ideational changes for structural changes to have any real substance. Accordingly, dynamics of diffusion and socialization occur in tandem.

**Theoretical Framework**

This section outlines a theoretical framework for cases of internationally sponsored SSR. I begin by describing institutional transfer, SSR’s central purpose, along two dimensions: functional and normative. I follow this with a discussion on how transfer occurs according to three different institutional logics: power, efficiency, and legitimacy. Finally, I contribute to mid-range theory on SSR by highlighting the range of possible combinations of causal mechanisms that facilitate and constrain institutional transfer in these settings.
Desired Program Outcome: Institutional Transfer

Internationally led SSR occurs in the wake of an external intervention in a conflict-prone or postconflict state when outside actors implement programs with the purpose of building new or reforming existing state bureaucracies. The substance of this reform has both functional and normative components (Hänggi 2004, 5). Functional reform entails transforming the security apparatus into a more effective, efficient, and affordable coercive instrument of the state. Normative reform requires changing the ideas, beliefs, and organizational culture within the security sector toward a greater affinity with notions of security governance, specifically, deference and respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic civilian control over the use of coercive force. Since, by definition, institutions are comprised of individuals and organizations structured around a collection of constraints and prescriptions (Ostrom 2005, 3), SSR’s desired outcomes must advance along two dimensions: functional-normative and individual-organizational (Table 3.1).

Functional Reform for Institutional Performance

Functional reform centers on building individual and organizational capacity. The purpose of building capacity is to create or strengthen a security sector’s collective ability to perform its intended function for the state and society, namely, to maintain a monopoly of the use of coercive force. At the state level, security sector effectiveness is defined by how well it jointly provides state and human security, specifically, how well the military fights wars and how successful the police enforces the rule of law. Avoiding and winning wars, protecting the homeland, and maintaining domestic order are the primary benchmarks of effective security
sector performance, but not necessarily just or ethical performance, which I address in the following section.

Below the state level, the meaning of institutional performance burgeons due to the diversity of complex organizations and their personnel pursuing multiple goals. Effectiveness and efficiency mean different things to different actors in different contexts (Biddle 2004, 5-6, Cameron 1978). Consider hard military power, for example. Effective territory controllers do not necessarily make good peacekeepers or intelligence collectors. Nor do good counterterrorist units necessarily make effective community-level crime fighters. Effective performance varies by organization, operational mission, and task.

Efficiency—the speed or quality at which individuals and organizations accomplish tasks given minimal resources—also varies along these lines. Individuals and organizations can be “effective, efficient, both, or neither” (Ostroff and Schmitt 1993, 1345). Whereas effective security provision is necessary for state survival, efficiency is necessary for sustainable security. States govern with finite resources that constrain them to make choices on how to maintain security forces within their means. Efficiency, however, may pose trade-offs with effectiveness (Thomas A. Mahoney 1988, Tangen 2005). For example, developing organizational efficiencies in counterinsurgency may erode conventional war fighting capabilities.

For individuals, functional reform means developing human capital through education and training. In conflict-prone environments, individual capacity building efforts vary widely depending on individuals’ baseline capacity and position. For example, military and police enlistees receive an initial course of instruction to develop the basics skills and learn expectations of military or police service. The content of this instruction might include familiarization with operational procedures (e.g., tactics), marksmanship, rules of conduct, and in some cases, basic
literacy. Experienced-based on-the-job training is common in insecure environments due to local pressures to deploy security forces quickly.

Organizationally, functional reform involves transforming the security sector organizations into effective and economically sustainable public bureaucracies. States must be able to mobilize, train, equip, deploy, and sustain their security forces. Such capacity starts with the ability to extract resources—people, materials, and revenue—from society (Tilly 1985). Resources provide capital to compensate personnel, infrastructure, and arms. Once employed, leaders must direct and sustain these forces to win wars and enforce laws effectively. This requires a division of labor and established routines for collective action—rules, policies, doctrine, and numerous management systems, including human resources, operations, logistics, communications, and financial systems.

Organizational capacity building involves introducing new organizational forms such as government ministries, agencies, and operational headquarters and prescribing management systems to local officials. Implementation may also require technical assistance to aid in organizational formation and individual development. For example, supply chain management systems exist to sustain security operations in the field by ensuring units receive necessary provisions like food, water, fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support. Modern logistical systems, in particular, rely heavily on information technology to track and synchronize supply and demand of resources throughout the organization. Building this capability from scratch is a complex effort that combines physical infrastructure and technology investments with instruction on how to use and manage the system. Human resource and financial management systems are similar bureaucratic functions necessary to sustain effective security institutions.
Table 3-1. Targeted SSR Program Impacts (Functional and Normative).

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
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| **Functional Capacity** | • Knowledge and skills  
|                     | • Leadership                                     | • Resources                             |
|                     | • Experience                                     | • Infrastructure                        |
|                     | • Resources                                       | • Management                            |
| **Norms and Values** | • Professionalism                                | • Civilian supremacy                    |
|                     | • Integrity                                       | • Legal accountability                  |
|                     | • Human rights values                             | • Human rights norms                    |

**Normative Reform for Democratic Security Governance**

Whereas functional reform addresses matters of institutional performance, normative reform takes on the much harder issue of civil-military relations. All states, to varying degrees, face the challenge of finding and managing an appropriate civil-military balance—that is, “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize” (Feaver 2003, 2). Yet, finding the ideal balance between a society’s rulers and its guardians has been one of “the oldest problems of human governance,” dating well back to Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War (Kohn 1997, 140).

SSR stands on the idea that democratic security governance is the best means of achieving this delicate balance while also maintaining both state and human security. Democratic security governance is a widely recognized body of political norms based around three overarching principles: civilian control over the armed forces, including police and law enforcement actors; security force accountability to constitutional, humanitarian, and human rights laws; and respect for human rights (Hänggi 2003, 12-17). Granted, no state has ever fully achieved this ideal. Nevertheless, the United Nations and regional organizations like NATO, the

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11 This table is an adaptation of Serge Rumin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh’s “Capacity and Integrity Framework” designed for police capacity assessments (UN 2006, 15).
EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe have acknowledged a commitment to these core principles. NATO and EU have gone further by including these principles in their formal membership requirements. The empirical correlation between democratic political order and military success bolsters normative claims advocating democratic security governance (Lake 1992). Digging deeper, Biddle and Long (2004, 541) find that “the battlefield effectiveness bonus previously attributed to democracy [in general] is [more specifically] a product of many democracies’ superior human capital, civil-military relations, and cultural background.” However, the democratic victory theory remains an intensely debated topic, as Henderson and Bayer (2013) argue that relative military capabilities between adversaries is a stronger predictor of war outcomes than the democratic attributes of either one.

Democratic security governance implies that civilian control over all armed actors is necessary for a democracy to flourish. This ground is well covered by civil-military relations classics such as Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957), Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* (1971), and to a lesser extent, Samuel E. Finer’s *The Man on Horseback* (2002). Central to this debate is the role that military professionalism plays in maintaining civilian control in democracies and how civilian authorities should best promote professionalism within their core security institutions.

Reform focused on establishing civilian control thereby entails limiting the opportunities motives for security actors to (a) intervene in sovereign political issues; and (b) violate human rights, either domestically or on foreign soil. First, limiting opportunities involves establishing mechanisms of subjective constitutional, institutional, and societal control over the security forces (Huntington 1957, 80-81). Legislative or parliamentary control over budgets, force size
and structure, and promotions of senior security officials are a few examples of subjective controls over the armed forces. In theory, these measures are largely formal and straightforward. However, in fragile states where the rule of law is thin or compromised, they may lack any real authority or democratic substance.

Second, limiting political and predatory motives involves inculcating professional and liberal-democratic attitudes. According to Huntington (1957, 62-64, 79), professionalization produces an “ethic,” or “mindset,” that grounds its members in a sense of “conservative realism”—an apolitical sense of duty and obligation to country; preoccupation with threats to state security; drive to ensure a minimally sufficient state of readiness to meet such threats; and caution to overcommit or risk state survival. This professional mindset places a high premium on obedience and subordination to authority “as the highest virtue of military men” and, while reinforced by a liberal education, understands that “the military are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism” (Huntington 1957, 79). Accordingly, any act in violation of the principle of civilian control would be considered unprofessional and in direct conflict with the professional military ethic.

Janowitz goes further by arguing for expanding military officer and civilian defense leader education in the social sciences and military affairs to better understand “the other,” improve oversight capacity, and achieve greater societal and political-military integration (Janowitz 1971, 420-430). As Finer (2002, 6, 23-24) points out, however, professionalism alone may not guarantee civil obedience or chivalry in the field. Professionalism may actually produce forces that view themselves as morally superior to civilian political authorities or their society. Rather, security forces must also possess a cultural indisposition to intervene in politics or
violate human rights norms. Finer (2002, 30) claims “acceptance of civilian supremacy, not just professionalism, is the truly effective check” on military interventions in politics.

Individually, normative reform requires changing attitudes and values toward civilian supremacy and human rights. Security assistance and training programs involve engagements between foreign and local security forces that include formal or informal training on matters such as democratic accountability, human rights, humanitarian law, gender and ethnic sensitivity, and codes of conduct (Hänggi 2004, 18).

Normative reform of security organizations requires creating and strengthening civilian oversight and control mechanisms over the core security agencies. Prime examples include civilian budget approval authority, financial audits, civilian directed review of doctrine and professional education curriculum, and independent financial audits and judicial reviews. Civilian directed policies that establish and enforce standards of moral-ethical conduct and adherence to international or societal norms fall within this category of reform as well. These examples suggest that SSR demands a robust effort that includes civilian bureaucratization as much as—if not more than—military and police training.

How Does Guided Institutional Transfer Occur?

*Three Logics of Action*

Three logics of social action—power, efficiency, and legitimacy—explain the transfer of institutions between individuals and across societies. The first two, power and efficiency, are based in rational choice philosophy. This view suggests that institutional transfer is the result of strategic choices between two or more interacting actors or groups. These choices are inherently consequentialist and utilitarian. Actors seek maximum payoffs and therefore base their decisions
and behaviors on a determination of expected gains and losses. Accordingly, actors influence others through the exercise of power and manipulation of material resources to alter the others’ preferences and resulting behavior.

Coercion is the prime example of a power-based explanation for actors compelling other actors. Coercion can take many forms, however. The hegemonic use of physical force like physical violence or deadly military force is an extreme example. Lesser examples include the threat of force, punishment, and related forms retributive justice (e.g., criminal law).

A second major form of power-based institutional transfer is the manipulation of material resources. Actors use resources to incentivize behavioral change. Consider economic inducements, for example. Powerful states also use foreign aid payments and sanctions as carrots and sticks to influence compliance with international law and promote their national interests like peace, stability, economic development, and democratization. In both cases, less powerful actors comply based on consequentialist reasoning; they comply because the expected losses of defiance exceed the gains.

Rational actors and institutions are also efficiency seekers. They create institutions—rules, organizations, and norms—to serve a function. A rationalist interpretation of institutional transfer suggests that actors change or replace existing institutions because that will provide increased gains in functional efficiency. Here, actors learn from their environment. They innovate and develop new practices organically through experiment and trial and error. Actors may also imitate practices they view to be more effective than prevailing ones, as highlighted above.

Still, the rationalist view of institutional transfer explains only a portion of the entire process. It only explains the short-term decision to adopt a new practice, not necessarily its long-
term internalization. If the rational account is true alone, then the successful creation of new institutions is possible exclusively through the manipulation of local actors’ incentive structures. Keeping with the carrot and stick international relations analogy, a more powerful state may induce a weaker state to change its behavior—enforcing violations of international norms like aggression or human rights abuses—through threats of force or economic sanctions. Yet, the weaker state’s compliance to these demands is a necessary but insufficient condition for full acceptance of the norm. Once an incentive or a threat of sanction dissolves, weaker states may revert to their previous ways, barring the emergence of other self-reinforcing influences that create path dependence (James Mahoney 2000).

Alternatively, under the constructivist approach, institutional transfer is complete when an actor or group views it as legitimate. In other words, the players consider the new institution as agreeable with the community’s established social rules and norms and treat it as a given. The constructivist approach complements its rationalist counterpart by distinguishing a shift in actors’ behavior from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness (Checkel 2005, 804-805). Whereas the rationalist view characterizes institutional transfer vis-à-vis the manipulation of rewards and punishments, the constructivist view argues that the internalization of institutions is the result of their socialization. Out-group actors influence their counterparts by making normative and factual appeals aimed at changing perceptions and beliefs in favor of a new institution or practice (Kriesberg and Dayton 2012, 89). In-group proponents (e.g. “norm entrepreneurs”) also persuade others by auspiciously framing arguments to select audiences (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893). At the same time, culture acts as a structural enabler and constraint to normative change. Over time, ideas exchanged between actors through repeated social interactions and communication alter beliefs and preferences.
I combine rationalist and constructivist perspectives for three reasons. First, taken together, they provide the fullest theoretical explanation for the institutional transfer process. As Thomas Risse notes, “many controversies in international relations and comparative politics could be avoided if scholars agree that it is not either strategic bargaining or institutionalization or arguing that explains norms socialization processes but a combination of all three modes of action” (1999, 530). Second, SSR demands both the transfer of institutional capacities and norms. It also requires local ownership and an entrenched fidelity to normative principles such as civilian supremacy over the armed forces, rule of law, and human rights. This requires more than material inducements and sanctions to shape behavior. It calls for a shift away from beliefs based on consequences toward beliefs based in appropriateness.

Third, this dissertation aims to build theory on SSR. Since the project is an exploratory effort focusing on transnational and domestic interactions, limiting it to either a rational or a constructivist perspective would unnecessarily restrict the range of possible causal mechanisms and mechanism combinations to generate hypotheses. More importantly, given practitioners’ repeated references to and challenges with local ownership and sustainable reform, the inclusion of a constructivist perspective in this study presents a ripe opportunity for theory development in an otherwise under-theorized policy area.

**Toward a Typological Theory of SSR**

This dissertation responds to calls for interaction-focused research and theoretical development on SSR (Paul et al. 2013, Scheye 2010, Scheye and Peake 2005). Accordingly, typological theorizing, or “the development of contingent generalizations about combinations or configurations of variables” (George and Bennett 2005, 233), is a sound first step toward theory
development in SSR. Typological theories help specify the various mechanisms that link independent variables or contingent scope conditions with outcomes (2005, 234).

Typological theory building begins with an initial exploratory and inductive step when researchers examine an important case or series of cases to build or refine an initial theoretical framework. Here, the researcher pays close attention to operative causal mechanisms. Additionally, she should “avoid a premature, a priori characterization of variance of the dependent and independent variables” and instead allow variance to emerge in the case explanation (241). For example, the simplistic categorization of success and failure leaves little room for discovery of different explanations for outcomes as well as types and gradations thereof (241-242).

Although inductive typological theory building starts open-ended, existing theoretical concepts, particularly those on causal mechanisms, help guide research design and form the basic building blocks of a typological theory (241). Accordingly, this dissertation builds upon classifications of rationalist and constructivist social mechanisms advanced by Bennett (2013b), Checkel (2005), and Mahoney (2000). In Table 3.2, I combine and abridge Andrew Bennett’s two most recent working taxonomies (Andrew Bennett 2013a, 473, 2013b, 218) on causal mechanisms invoked within the literature on civil wars. Bennett locates causal mechanisms along two dimensions: institutional logics of action (material power, legitimacy, and efficiency) and agent-structure interaction combinations (agent-to-agent, structure-to-agent, agent-to-structure, and structure-to-structure).
Like Bennett’s classifications, Table 3.2 is not an exhaustive listing of all possible causal mechanisms. Likewise, the proposed cell locations for the causal mechanisms are not necessarily fixed. Instead, the table serves as an preliminary analytical tool to consider alternative theoretical explanations for how foreign and local actors interact in an SSR setting (Andrew Bennett 2013a, 214). I also use it as a starting point for developing an analytical framework in the following chapter. I have already covered several of these mechanisms in detail, specifically, emulation, diffusion, and socialization. Power-based mechanisms are mostly uncomplicated. In addition to inducements like coercion or incentives, it is not hard to imagine how having more or less resources might, in turn, enable or constrain one’s agency. Revolution is a common feature of social movements. Look no further than the recent Arab Spring and accompanying wave of uprisings across Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Efficiency-based mechanisms are

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12 I locate the mechanisms in cells here consistent with Bennett’s initial placement. Bennett also includes a fourth column outlining structure-to-structure interactions and corresponding mechanisms of social evolution, power transition, moral hazard, and adverse selection. At this stage, I choose to omit analytical focus on structure-to-structure interactions. This is a pragmatic choice to focus the study more narrowly on interactions strictly between agents and structures.
also clear-cut. Evolutionary selection is essentially Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory that self-regulating institutions, by their open nature, produce sustained improvement in goods and services. Efficiency logic, or rationality, also motivates individuals and groups to compete, innovate, and learn. Legitimacy mechanisms operate on the level of beliefs and social norms. For example, individuals shame others based on behavior that deviates from custom. Socialized individuals emulate virtuous behaviors of role models and heroes. Non-violence movement leaders (e.g., Mohandas Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela) are norm entrepreneurs who use framing as a means of changing beliefs and transforming conflicts.

One can envision internationally sponsored SSR programs as a series of interactions between foreign and local agents and structures. Foreign SSR proponents, often playing roles of advisors or trainers to local agents at various levels, may use a number of different approaches to influence reform though their counterparts. Various forms of coercion, material inducement, and persuasion are potential mechanisms available to external actors, both organizations and individuals. For example, consider the small unit task of planning a security patrol. A foreign advisor may direct (i.e., coerce) a local leader how to conduct the planning and execution of the patrol. He may also use inducements by offering or withholding material support during the mission in return for the local leader’s compliance. Other options include explanations and rational arguments (i.e., persuasion) for why a particular method works best, or letting the local leader do it his way (i.e., innovate) and learn from success or failure with the potential of risking injury or death. Hypothetically, external actors can employ these mechanisms exclusively, in combination, and sequentially, in repeated interactions, to varying degrees of effect in the
development of security institutions over time. In response, local actors choose to accept these inducements as is, reject them, modify them, or develop their own solutions.

In what types of operational settings do specific causal mechanisms or combinations of mechanisms repeatedly arise? Are there recurring patterns of outcomes? A central purpose of typological theory is to develop contingent explanations of a phenomenon as it occurs in different contexts. Importantly, Zürn and Checkel (2005, 1055) clustered together four broad categories of scope conditions previously found to activate causal mechanisms of social change: properties of the socializing actor; properties of the political system and actors to be socialized; properties of the issues or norms of socializing; and properties of the interaction between actors. These broad factors mirror much of the statebuilding literature, which similarly clusters around three broad factors that shape reform outcomes: external inputs, host nation inputs, and the interactions between external and local actors (see Miller 2010, 14-47, Paul et al. 2013, 3).

Examining the specific role of persuasion, Checkel (2001, 562-563) also notes five conditions under which it will more likely to lead to successful socialization:

- in novel or uncertain environments;
- when the target actor has “few prior, ingrained beliefs;”
- the external actor is “an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong;”
- the persuader adheres to principles of reason and deliberative argument as opposed to stating demands; and
- “the interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, private settings.”

This loose grouping of scope conditions provides a helpful starting point for the theory development on internationally sponsored SSR. Still, it also leaves open substantial room for refinement, particularly in how persuasion mechanisms combine with other power- or efficiency-based mechanisms leading to constructive or detrimental reform outcomes. Table 3.3 outlines my
initial theoretical framework. Described in SSR terms, the partnership context—the interaction setting combined with local and external actor properties—conditions the use and efficacy of various inducement strategies (power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based) to achieve functional and normative institutional transfer outcomes. For now, this serves as a theoretical guide (Falleti 2006) to examine individual cases of internationally sponsored SSR.

Table 3-3. Theoretical Framework for Internationally Sponsored Security Sector Reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Scope Conditions</th>
<th>Causal Mechanisms</th>
<th>Institutional Transfer Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSR program</td>
<td>Interaction context</td>
<td>Power-based</td>
<td>Individual capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention</td>
<td>External actor properties</td>
<td>Legitimacy-based</td>
<td>Organizational capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local actor properties</td>
<td>Efficiency-based</td>
<td>Individual values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

This chapter serves two broad purposes. First, it makes an original theoretical contribution by recasting SSR as a process of guided institutional transfer. In turn, this provides an alternative approach to SSR research and theory building focused on the role of interactions and causal mechanisms in the guided transfer of Western security institutions. Second, it provides a model for designing exploratory case studies of SSR programs aimed at identifying causal mechanisms and reform outcomes on multiple levels of analysis.

SSR is undoubtedly an interaction-rich phenomenon. It holds ample potential for the development of contingent, middle-range theory; the discovery of new and refinement of existing causal mechanisms; and the extraction of prescriptive knowledge on the efficacy of
different approaches to promoting reform. Understanding whether, why, and how institutional transfer occurs in different settings or on different levels of analysis requires the close examination of interactions across a wide range of settings. More importantly, the inclusion of a constructivist perspective in this study presents a ripe opportunity for theory development in an under-theorized policy area, given practitioners’ repeated references to and challenges with local ownership and reform sustainability.
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN: A WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PARTNERING IN AFGHANISTAN

This project is an in-depth examination of a single case of security sector reform—Afghanistan. It specifically responds to calls for greater analytical focus on interactions and institutional change in security assistance partnerships.\(^{13}\) I seek to answer the two-part question, (a) how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and (b) what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms? Security assistance programs carry the implicit assumption that partnership interactions produce institutional change. Yet, there is no explicit program theory that explains how this process unfolds or to what degree change occurs in different settings. Accordingly, this study pursues the development of program theory and knowledge of effective security assistance practices.

The case study examines original data collected through 68 in-depth interviews with US and NATO coalition advisors, unit leaders, and subject matter experts. The interviews focus on how NATO actors sought to influence their Afghan security force counterparts. Specifically, the interviews explore various approaches that advisors and leaders applied to induce changes in ANSF capacity and professional behavior and their perceived effectiveness. The following sections detail the study’s overall logic of inquiry, case selection, sampling, data analysis procedures, and inherent limitations.

\(^{13}\) I use terms partner, partnering, and partnership to represent any of three types of NATO-to-Afghan interactions: advisor-to-advisee, leader-to-leader, and unit-to-unit.
Logic of Inquiry

Foreign security force advising, as a topic of inquiry, poses substantial difficulties for traditional, variable-oriented social science research as modeled in, for example, King, Keohane, and Verba’s *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994). Given adequate resources and full access to participants, an ideal project on security assistance partnerships would follow a quasi- or natural experiment design. Such a study would compare two similar host-nation security organizations over time while one organization receives assistance from foreign advisors (treatment group) and the other receives none (control group). This would require close investigation of interactions between foreign and indigenous actors and performance outcomes over time. Comparing the results of host-nation organizations with and without foreign advisors would allow one to draw conclusions on foreign advisors’ impact.

The ideal design is unrealistic, however, for at least three significant reasons. First, subnational cases of security force advising that also suit analysis as a natural experiment, though plausible, are not readily apparent. Second, there is a substantial barrier to entry in gaining access to and cooperation of foreign and host-nation governments in deeply-divided societies as well as recruiting individual foreign and local participants while maintaining a perception of neutrality (Cammett 2006). Finally, conducting such a study in the midst of an ongoing conflict involves great personal risk.

Instead, this study follows a causal process and mechanism-oriented research design (Brady and Collier 2010, George and Bennett 2005). It aims to uncover causal mechanisms embedded in the interactions between advisors and advisees and their surrounding contexts. The study also explores the extent to which these interactions produce changes in functional performance and values over time. Such an investigation requires analytic induction, or the in-
depth examination of particular cases and “working backward from observed outcomes to causal mechanisms” (James Mahoney 2001, 591). Theory building is thereby possible through the process tracing of “causal process observations”—information that provides insight “about context, process, or mechanism[s] and [contribute] to causal inference” (Collier 2011b, Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, 2).

Process tracing is a form of within-case analysis that is “analogous to a detective attempting to solve a crime by looking at clues and suspects and piecing together a convincing explanation, based on fine-grained evidence that bears on potential suspects’ means, motives, and opportunity” (Andrew Bennett 2010, 208). It is especially “strong on questions of interactions” (Checkel 2008, 116) and addressing “issues of timing, sequencing, [complexity], and multiple causalities” (Falleti 2006, 4). Process tracing, as an overarching research method, is a well-supported choice given my primary research objective to understand how mechanisms within security assistance partnerships contribute to or impede institutional transfer.

Causal mechanisms are challenging to measure, however. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2008) identify ethnography as one of three methods, including systematic event data and statistical analysis, to detect causal mechanisms. They note that ethnography, despite its sparing use vis-à-vis statistics and event histories, “is the method perhaps best suited to the demands of a mechanism-based approach” (2008, 317). Security advising in foreign settings does not easily lend itself to either event data or statistical analysis due to the challenges just described. Accordingly, I use ethnography via in-depth semi-structured interviews as a primary means of data collection. I supplement and triangulate this primary data by collecting official documents.

Figure 4.1 depicts this study’s logic of inquiry and inference. I cover each step in detail in following sections, but provide a general description here as an introduction and justification.
First, I identified distinct contexts of advisor-advisee interactions based on previous case knowledge and preliminary investigation. Second, I selected participants from these contexts and interviewed them confidentially in a semi-structured format.

Semi-structured interviews are essential to this research design. On the one hand, the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3 guided the interview protocol construction to ensure elicited data inform my central questions on causal mechanisms and institutional transfer outcomes. On the other hand, the questions are open-ended and the interview format is flexible enough to capture rich detail on interactions, process, contradictory evidence, and potential theoretical novelty. Finally, content analysis of interview transcripts and related documents allows me to draw theoretical conclusions for testing in other existing or future cases.

Figure 4-1. Case Study Logic of Inquiry.
Case Selection

The current set of post-Cold War, state-level security sector reform cases with significant external, international program sponsorship includes 11 host-nation states: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste (Brzoska 2006, Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder 2004, Wulf 2004). This project takes a modest approach to building theory by first examining partnership interactions within a single case—Afghanistan. Naturally, examining two or more case studies for the purpose of comparing and generalizing findings to a broader population would be preferable. The choice of a single in-depth case study, however, follows my research objective of achieving a better understanding of the interactions between foreign and local actors, a goal that SSR scholars and practitioners have advocated for extensively (Chapter 2). This decision is also a practical one, considering the amount of time necessary to conduct in-depth case research involving qualitative methods.

Still, a single case study, despite the limitations of generalizing it to a broader population of cases (external validity), may still contribute novel insights on the causal mechanisms operating within the case. An exploratory case study reveals how foreign and local actors interact and how those interactions contributed to intended or unintended outcomes. Knowledge gained from studying these interactions may also provide a roadmap for future comparative case research on security sector reform and internationally led statebuilding more broadly.

George and Bennett (2005, 71) discuss at length the importance of “structured, focused comparison” in case study research as a way to ensure “an orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question.” Structuring this individual case research adds a worthwhile degree of rigor and transparency by allowing other scholars the
ability to replicate\textsuperscript{14} previous case research, examine new cases, and appraise the quality of scholarly work based upon a common standard for comparison, evaluation, and empirical accumulation. To structure cases, George and Bennett (2005, 70) stress the importance of grounding the research design in a theoretical framework appropriate for the overall research goals. Accordingly, the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter provides analytical structure for the research design to include both data collection and analysis procedures described below.

Selecting the case of Afghanistan is a strategic choice. In light of my theory-building pursuits and focus on advisor-advisee interactions, Afghanistan represents an extreme case \textit{vis-à-vis} the other 10 cases of internationally sponsored SSR. A case is extreme when it holds unusually high or low values on a particular dimension of interest compared to the average among a given population of cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301). Dimensions of interest may vary; they could be dependent or independent variables or other factors relating to the overall research aims. Given my interest in observing causal mechanisms in security assistance partnerships, an extreme case that is high on interactions is ideal. Afghanistan is undoubtedly extreme in terms of maximum potential for external-to-local SSR interactions, based on factors such as number of foreign troops, civilians, and contributing nations (SIPRI 2013b). Only the Iraq case is remotely close along these dimensions. While the total cost of intervention in Iraq exceeds (for now) the cost of that in Afghanistan (Belasco 2011, Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008), total US commitments in both personnel and financial resources to the effort to build and equip the Afghan National Security Forces are double ($50.6 billion; US SIGAR 2012) the resources

\textsuperscript{14} I use this term lightly with the understanding that qualitative research is not necessarily replicable, especially more interpretive and ideographic research. For example, it is impossible to recreate an interview.
committed to build the Iraqi Security Forces ($25.5 billion; GAO 2012a) and growing as the mission continues through 2014.

Moreover, I narrow my analytical focus on the Afghanistan case further by exploring partnership interactions occurring during NATO’s operational surge period from December 2009 to September 2012. At no other point in time have NATO and Afghan security force interactions been higher (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2013, 7, DoD 2013b, 48-49). Since I am examining Afghanistan as an extreme case, I purposely focus my attention toward interactions that occurred when NATO-Afghan partnerships were most acute. During this time, the United States alone, already the largest contributing member of the coalition, increased its total troop presence by more than 33,000 to a peak of just over 100,000 (Figure 4.2; Livingston and O'Hanlon 2013, 4). As pronounced in NATO’s Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration on Afghanistan (NATO 2009), this period marked a major shift in NATO’s strategy to accelerate the development of the Afghan security sector, with particular emphasis on partnering with the Afghan army, national police, and defense and interior ministries. Before the summit, Afghan security sector reform was decentralized according to a lead-nation approach as four major international donors—the United States, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—individually oversaw reforms in the Afghan army, police, judiciary, and counternarcotics. This revised approach to SSR involved a substantial increase in the number of trainers and advisors working with Afghan forces and further centralized the overall effort through the establishment of a new three-star level command, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.
Figure 4-2. US Troop Presence in Afghanistan from November 2001 to August 2013.

Source: Image from Brookings Institution Afghanistan Index (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2013, 4)

Within Case Sampling

My analytical attention centers on interactions between NATO and Afghan security force actors and organizations. As this is an exploratory investigation, I aim to maximize variation in types of interactions—settings, organizations, and actors—across the Afghanistan case. I also seek to capture a wide spectrum of partnership interactions in different settings across the Afghan security sector. However, this does not necessarily imply haphazard or convenience sampling. Sampling must be as systematic as possible. This requires an understanding of how both NATO and Afghan forces were organized and how NATO aligned its training and advising efforts during this period. The following chapter provides a more detailed historical case introduction, but for the purposes of within-case sampling, it is important to note, briefly, how
NATO organized its multinational International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) during the Afghan surge period.

From 2009 to 2012, NATO-ISAF was commanded by (in succession), US Army Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, and then US Marine Corps General John Allen. Three major organizations fell under their command: the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A); ISAF Joint Command (IJC); and a NATO Special Operations Element. The NTM-A was established November 21, 2009, as a comprehensive, multi-national effort to develop the capabilities of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP) forces. NTM-A “supports the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security” (NTM-A, 2011c).

Within the Afghan ministries of defense and interior, NTM-A assigns teams of military officers, government civilians, and civilian contractors to advise Afghan ministerial officials and staff on developing enterprise level organizational functions necessary to generate and sustain the uniformed ANSF—for example, human resources; recruiting; operations and planning; intelligence; logistics and acquisitions; and communications and public relations. Outside of the Afghan ministries, NTM-A serves the role of a training organization for the Afghan security forces. Over time, as the Afghan forces have developed their own internal training centers and academies, NTM-A trainers’ roles have evolved from providing direct instruction to new Afghan military and police recruits to advising and assisting Afghan instructors who now lead the majority of the training.
NTM-A is not the only NATO organization that interacts with Afghan forces, however.\textsuperscript{15} The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) comprises the bulk of armed international security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. This organization spans across six operational regions of Afghanistan: capital, north, east, west, south, and southwest. Each regional command (RC) aligns with Afghan security forces in the field. Relationships between NATO and Afghan units are diverse and evolving although, generally, NATO units conduct combined—partnered—unit operations with Afghan security forces. An example would be a US infantry platoon conducting a combined security patrol with an Afghan army infantry platoon. In theory, both units plan and execute operations as one team. Naturally, this requires the units to develop cooperative relationships, especially between unit leaders.

In addition to partnered unit operations, IJC embeds small teams of NATO advisors, both military and civilian contractors, within Afghan units on multiple levels to provide additional support in developing the Afghan security force capabilities and professionalism. Names for these teams have evolved considerably over time—Embedded Training Team (ETT), Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), Security Force Advisory and Assistance Team (SFAAT)—though their basic function has remained largely constant from inception. As Afghan units mature and develop capabilities to plan and lead operations independently, both NATO’s embedded advisors and operational units gradually reduce, or transition, their support to allow the Afghan forces to assume greater responsibility for local security. Notably, NATO’s various special operations forces also perform both operational partnering and embedded advising roles.

\textsuperscript{15} Several other government agencies from the United States and NATO coalition member states have provided advisors to the Afghan government and security sector. For example, the US Departments of State and Justice provide advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior to assist in the development of rule of law, corrections, and other specialized law enforcement functions.
NATO forces have interacted with the Afghan security ministries and security forces on all levels. The corresponding challenge as a case researcher is thus selecting a sufficient variety of contexts in which these interactions occur.

Stratified, Purposive Sampling

Given the multilayered vertical and horizontal alignment of NATO personnel interacting across the Afghan security sector and the variety of actors involved, a stratified, purposive sampling strategy provides a systematic approach to maximize within-case variation to partnering interactions. Stratified sampling is appropriate when the research requires representation among different levels or subgroups within the population of interest (Teddlie and Yu 2007, 79). This study demands the careful distinction of different interaction contexts across different levels of analysis and organizational settings.

Purposive sampling, as opposed to random sampling, is used to achieve representativeness, comparability, or contrast (Teddlie and Yu 2007, 80). This form of sampling includes several subtypes. For example, selecting Afghanistan as an extreme case is form of purposive sampling. Accordingly, my sampling of participants within different strata is purposive in two ways. First, it seeks representativeness among the different types of actors (e.g., persons of different rank or status) working in each interaction setting. Second, it requires the use of intermediaries to the different settings to assist in participant identification and selection. This process combines opportunistic and snowball sampling, two subtypes of a broader purposive sampling strategy of identifying participants.
Alternatively, random sampling is an impractical and less helpful approach. The study requires candor and empirical richness on topics of a political and, at times, sensitive nature with a population of military and civilian defense sector elites. Gaining this level of access and openness required several months of building trust and reputational credibility with my gatekeeper intermediaries who assisted in the recruiting process. Randomly selecting individuals for this study is incredibly difficult since the total population spans numerous militaries, civilian government agencies, and contracted private military and security firms. A random sampling strategy is impractical given the uncertain likelihood of gaining official sponsorship from all the relevant organizations. Moreover, it is doubtful that elite participants would be as forthcoming via such a mechanical recruitment process, especially at the senior levels, if they participate at all.

My sampling frame is bounded according to four nested strata: level of analysis (strategic and tactical); alignment with core Afghan security institutions (ministries and uniformed services); type of partnering engagements (advisors and partnering units); and participant attributes (military, government civilian, and civilian contractor). Figure 4.3 is a tree map that provides a depiction of this nested population. The sampling approach closely mirrors the NATO-ISAF command structure, in which the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan focuses on institutional development of the ANSF—namely, recruiting, training, equipping, and ministerial advising—while the ISAF Joint Command focuses on operations with Afghan army and police units in the field, including providing embedded advisor teams and ground forces to conduct combined operations. To triangulate and strengthen the credibility (i.e., internal validity) of my

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17 Given the nascent state of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), I omit the operational level of war as a level of analysis. What might be considered operational level commands (consider Army Corps-level headquarters, using the United States as an example) in the Afghan context, I fold into the strategic level of analysis. The operational level of the ANSF is simply too thin to add any additional analytically utility.
findings, I also include external observers of NATO partnering efforts and subject matter experts as a final stratum.

**Table 4-3. Tree Map of Stratified-Purposive Sampling Frame.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Tactical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghan Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial Advising</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Ministerial Advisors</td>
<td>Embedded Training, Mentoring, and Advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Military</td>
<td>- Active Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- DoD Civilians</td>
<td>- National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Civilian Contractors</td>
<td>- Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Civilian Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Type of Partnering Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partnered Field Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participant Attributes</td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Battalion Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Company Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- U.S. Army Special Forces (ODA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. External Observers and Subject Matter Experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Afg. Staff</td>
<td>NATO-ISAF Cdr’s COIN Advise &amp; Assist Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ofc. of the Sec. of Defense-Policy</td>
<td>U.S. Army Human Terrain Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
<td>RAND Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data Collection**

Data collection occurred between March 2012 and April 2013 and in March 2014. The primary data for this project consists of semi-structured interviews and official NATO and Afghan government documents. Interviews occurred with individuals who match my sampling frame and previously served in at least one of the following roles: an embedded military or police advisor (ministerial and tactical); a leader of a tactical unit partnered with Afghan army or police forces; a third-party observer of NATO-ANSF advising or partnered activities; or a third
Semi-structured interviews

Interviews provide “access to the context of people’s behavior and thereby ... a way for researchers to understand the meaning of that behavior” (Seidman 2006, 10). Intensive interviews with elites “do directly what statistical analysis seeks to do indirectly and at a distance—show what attitudes or values are ‘correlated,’ how strongly they are associated, and how and why people link or moralize particular views” (Hochschild 2005, 125). I specifically chose a semi-structured interview format to collect data relevant to my research questions, yet allow participants flexibility to provide contextual nuance and meaning. The degree of structure imposed on participants via questioning, however, presents important tradeoffs, as Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman (1975, 5-6) explain:

Although imposing structure on the respondent may lessen the opportunity to capture his pattern of thinking and possible motivations for response, an unbounded interview situation presents dilemmas to any researcher seeking to code responses systematically. There is no easy way out of this predicament. Still, the choice of procedure should follow upon rather than dictate the character of one’s research concerns. In interviewing elites, highly structured questions are best for measuring choices between well-specified behavioral alternatives. They are inappropriate where the range of responses is either unknown in advance or highly complex, i.e., multidimensional. Structured questions are least attuned to exploring and mapping basic beliefs, attitudes, and values.

Semi-structured interviews offer three key advantages as a means of qualitative data collection: They are helpful when participants cannot be observed; they allow participants to provide additional context and historical information; and they allow the researcher to guide the
discussion (Creswell 2009, 179). All three of these factors are relevant to this specific case analysis. First, I am unable to observe a variety of different interaction contexts in Afghanistan directly since these interactions occurred in the past. Moreover, with present NATO-ANSF interactions on the decline, gaining access to them for participant observation poses substantial challenges and personal risk. Second, I am interested in understanding the participants’ lived experiences, behaviors, motivations, and perceptions of their Afghan counterparts’ actions and impulses. Finally, I seek to answer theoretical questions that demand a degree of structure in the data collection process, hence my employment of the semi-structured interview.

Sixty-eight military and civilian elite stakeholders participated in a confidential semi-structured interview exploring their interactions with Afghan security forces during their period(s) of service in Afghanistan. The interviews followed a theoretically grounded (Chapter 2) interview protocol consisting of a core set of open-ended questions on the participants’ background, interactions with their ANSF counterpart, attitudes toward various influencing approaches, and perceived changes in ANSF capacity and professionalism. I constructed open-ended questions specifically to elicit responses on the presence or absence of power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based causal mechanisms and observations of institutional transfer of security governance capacity and norms. Additional questions were asked of participants who served as or with civilian contractor trainers and advisors to explore any unforeseen relational dynamics among actors within the NATO coalition. The complete interview protocol is located in Appendix D, Table D-3.

Access to participants for this study was not readily apparent. Identifying military and civilian elites who met my sampling criteria and subsequently recruiting them to participate in the study required a significant degree of networking and trust building with intermediaries
within various organizational access points throughout the US defense establishment. I recruited participants through intermediaries within the following organizations: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI); US Military Academy at West Point; Joint Center for Security Force Assistance (JCISFA); National Defense University; and DynCorp International, LLC. With my direction, intermediaries provided assistance identifying individuals meeting the stratified sampling criteria. All participants provided written consent to the confidential interview and audio recording that followed an institutional review board approved protocol. The interviews occurred at Syracuse University and three separate US military installations—the US Army War College, National Defense University, and Fort Drum, NY. All interviews conducted at military installations occurred in person. Those held at Syracuse University took place in person, by telephone, or by Skype with participants serving in Afghanistan at the time of the interview.

The current sample of participants is robust and diverse. It includes individuals who have personally advised one or more Afghan officials from as high as the Afghan ministers of defense and deputy minister of interior and their assistant ministers down to lowest Afghan army platoon leader or district police chief. The sample covers NATO interactions with all core Afghan security institutions: the MoD and MoI, ANA, all ANP organizations (uniformed police, civil order police, local police), and the national directorate of security. In my recruiting and selection process, I also considered participants’ time and location of service in Afghanistan to ensure a principal analytical focus on the operational surge period. Notably, several participants served multiple stints with experience dating back to 2003. Location is especially important to consider among tactical-level participants to capture greater variation in the physical location. Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A provide a detailed account of the study’s sample participants, to include
rank and titles in Afghanistan. As an additional check, I used two intermediaries and two participants on separate occasions to validate sample representativeness and historical accuracy of my writing. Appendix A provides additional graphs depicting the sample’s density and coverage in Afghanistan over time.

Sample Limitations

Despite its strengths, the sample is not without limitations. The obvious flaw in the sample—and the study’s principal shortcoming—is the lack of Afghan security force perspectives, specifically from Afghan leaders who worked directly with NATO trainers and advisors. Gaining access to these individuals has proven challenging. This requires more than simply traveling to Afghanistan to interview any Afghan citizen who will participate or even seeking out willing Afghan soldiers or police. Gaining access to a sufficient number of Afghan counterparts would require not only the clearance of multiple Afghan security agencies, but also the identification, negotiated access to, and willing participation of multiple Afghan officials specifically assigned NATO advisors. This is in addition to the normal barriers to overseas fieldwork (e.g., research visas, travel expenses, multiple institutional review boards, translators, and time) and the conflict that persists in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, triangulation provides a means to mitigate this weakness. First, the stratified sampling frame already ensures a degree of triangulation through the purposeful selection of diverse groups of individuals and perspectives. Moreover, the use of third-party participants and observers helps substantiate interpretations and findings. NATO has two internal organizations that perform assessments and, occasionally, interview Afghan security forces, among their other duties. The first organization is the US Army Human Terrain System, comprised of contracted civilian analysts and social scientists. These researchers embed with
tactical units throughout Afghanistan to perform a number of duties related to enhancing their unit’s understanding of local culture and the existing social, political, economic environment. These civilian analysts develop relationships within local Afghan communities and security forces and observe how NATO units operate and interact with them. Three of my participants were Human Terrain Team analysts who provided additional insight on the local perspective through some of the interviews they conducted with local Afghan security forces in the field.\(^{18}\)

The second NATO organization is the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT). This organization reports directly to the NATO-ISAF commander and serves in a quasi-independent advising and auditing role. Created during General Stanley McCrystal’s tenure, the CAAT Team is comprised of several high-end military officers and civilian contractors\(^ {19}\) who travel throughout Afghanistan to provide their expertise to tactical commanders. They report back directly to the ISAF commander on ongoing counterinsurgency operations and partnering efforts with the Afghan security forces. This organization provides the commander an independent and critical perspective on operations that originates outside the direct influence of the military chain of command. Six participants served on the CAAT team and provided me an additional perspective outside that of a typical embedded advisor or leader of a unit partnered with Afghan forces.

The sample’s second limitation concerns its representativeness vis-à-vis the NATO coalition. Fortunately, I was able to interview one German and two Canadian participants. Still, despite the United States holding the majority of ANSF training and advising activities across Afghanistan, the sample lacks perspectives from a few key contributing coalition countries.

\(^{18}\) These are recollections of interviews with Afghans that the participants personally conducted for NATO-ISAF.

\(^{19}\) Most were current or former special operators or civilian academics with specialized regional or counterinsurgency expertise.
specifically the U.K. and Italy. To achieve a true representation based on Afghan surge troop commitments would require the additional recruitment of roughly six U.K., two German, and three Italian participants.

A third sampling limitation is the representation of US Marine Corps participants at the tactical level. The sample includes one US Marine officer who led a battalion with both embedded advising and tactical partnering responsibilities. However, the additional recruitment of three to five Marine officers would have improved the overall sample representativeness.

Finally, it is worth noting that five participants are female, despite the reality that male combat troops (mainly with infantry, armor, artillery, and engineer occupational specialties) and civilian contractor personnel have performed the majority of Afghan security force advising and partnering activities. Three of these five participants—a military police officer, an embedded Human Terrain Team analyst, and a Ph.D. analyst working with special operations forces—had direct involvement in or observation of ANSF advising or partnered tactical operations.

Primary Documents

Primary documents provide an additional means of triangulation and include digital photocopies of two-dozen Afghan government and NATO official planning texts obtained through key informants. These include, for example, translated copies of the Afghan National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Afghan MoI Directive on Operational Activities of the General Directorate of Police Special Units. Primary NATO sources include images several unclassified PowerPoint briefings and reports.

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20 During the Afghanistan surge, the U.K. had approximately 9,500 troops in Helmand province and Italy had 4,000 in western Afghanistan. Refer to the Brookings Institution’s Afghanistan Index for full listing of NATO and non-NATO troop contributions in Afghanistan. url: http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index [accessed March 4, 2014].
Data Analysis

Data analysis involved interview transcription and qualitative content analysis of the resulting transcripts. I transcribed 10 interviews and a transcription service transcribed all other remaining interviews (more than 90 hours of audio). Once completed, I reviewed all transcripts (more than 1,000 pages) and corrected those with minor inaccuracies related to military jargon, acronyms, and Afghan names and physical locations. The average interview length is 1 hour, 11 minutes with a standard deviation of ±20.9 minutes. The longest interview lasted 2 hours, 6 minutes; the shortest was 20 minutes. I was unable to record four interviews, but still documented key insights in field notes.

After transcription, I cleaned and de-identified all interview transcripts and field notes from unrecorded interviews and imported them into QSR NVivo, a computer-based software program for qualitative content analysis. Content analysis is the process of making meaning of human communication (Krippendorff 2004). In this case, the 68 interviews represent qualitative data requiring interpretation. Typically, the content within texts and other communications like interviews are interpreted and analyzed through the use of codes, or “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña 2013, 3). Coding is thus a procedure to link raw data to broader concepts, variables, and theories for further analysis (2013, 5).

Coding qualitative data is an iterative process that often occurs in stages. Saldaña (2013) outlines 37 possible types of coding methods that qualitative analysts may employ and separates them into first- and second-cycle approaches. First-cycle approaches are typically straightforward and involve direct interaction with the data via code identification. Second-cycle approaches are more analytic, developing “a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual, and/or
theoretical organization” (2013, 207). Choosing which coding techniques to use depends on the aims of the research and the need to develop a coding scheme before, during, or after the analysis (Campbell et al. 2013, 299-301, Weston et al. 2001, 382). A coding scheme is a hierarchical classification system that arranges codes into categories of higher order meaning. Qualitative researchers can approach this in few different ways (Creswell 2009, 187). One approach is to start by constructing a coding scheme in advance with an *a priori* theoretical orientation. Passages of text with bearing on these concepts are subsequently coded, or assigned, to the concepts for further analysis. When mixed-methods are appropriate, qualitative data can be quantized for statistical analysis or assigned numeric values to indicate values on a scale (Auer-Srnka and Keszegi 2007, Saldaña 2013, 63, Sandelowski, Voils, and Knafl 2009). Alternatively, researchers may explore the data by assigning codes first and then allowing a higher order classification system of patterns and relationships to emerge in the process (i.e., "grounded theory"; Charmaz 2006). Finally, researchers may employ these approaches in combination when there is a compelling research need for pragmatism and eclecticism in coding approaches (Saldaña 2013, 60).

In all, this research calls for an analytical approach that evaluates how the data respond to existing theoretical concepts, yet remains open to the emergence of new insights, concepts, patterns, or relationships. The study starts from a predetermined framework of theoretical concepts—power-, efficiency-, and legitimacy-based causal mechanisms and institutional transfer outcomes on individual and organizational capacity and values. Therefore, the framework-based interview protocol lightly structured the data. Even so, an additional analytical process is necessary to interpret the meaning of participants’ responses for theory building purposes.
In the spirit of transparency and qualitative rigor, I also provide a coding protocol complete with all code names, definitions, and examples in Appendix D. The primary unit of textual analysis (Krippendorff 2004) varies from individual sentences to whole paragraph responses from the participants. This unit-of-meaning approach is common when coding semi-structured interviews—as opposed to coding individual sentences or phrases—because decontextualizing participant responses may defeat the exploratory purpose of the research design.

Coding occurred in three steps. First, I assigned codes representing individual and contextual attributes to each participant in the study (attribute coding). Second, to initially organize the interview transcripts, I coded interviews according to the semi-structured interview protocol (structural coding). Third, I combined three techniques—initial, magnitude, and evaluation coding—as a procedure to code and appraise the data according to my theoretical framework. I provide a brief description of these steps below.

**Step 1: Attribute coding**

Attribute coding, also known as “setting” or “context” coding (Bogdan and Biklen 2007), involves identifying and assigning descriptive information about the participant and his or her contextual circumstances. In NVivo, I first established participant case nodes representing each individual in the study. NVivo has a feature that allows users to create and assign classifications such as individual characteristics to nodes. Using this feature, I created 30 attributes corresponding to the participant (e.g., rank, gender, and age range), his or her interactions with ANSF (e.g., ANSF partner organization, partner attributes) and other contextual factors of interest (location, tour start/end dates, previous training). I then coded the individual case nodes
by each of the 30 attributes. These attributes reflect the sampling strata outlined previously and aid in subsequent analysis of within case variation. After this attribute assignment procedure, I linked the individual participant case nodes to their corresponding interview transcripts.

**Step 2: Structural coding (organizing by interview questions)**

Structural coding simply involves the segregation of interview data by their corresponding questions. This technique is suited for structured and semi-structured interviews and aids in the initial organization of data into like segments for more detailed coding and analysis (Saldaña 2013, 84). It allows the analyst to retrieve all interview responses for a particular question quickly. Accordingly, in NVivo I created codes representing each question in the interview protocol and coded them to each of the corresponding interview responses in the transcripts. Responses naturally varied widely in length and at times included follow-up or probing questions.

**Step 3: Initial and evaluation coding**

This step evaluates participant responses based on my theoretical framework. Appraising the data involves a three part series of deductive and inductive analytical moves (see Figure 4.4). The initial framework ultimately guides my coding and analysis. From this, I created a preliminary coding hierarchy of two primary parent nodes: modes of influence and institutional transfer outcomes. Three sub-nodes—power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based influence—fall under the modes of influence parent node. Likewise, institutional transfer has four sub-nodes: individual capacity, individual values, organizational capacity, and organizational norms. These
nodes and sub-nodes serve as primary categorical buckets to assign and group observations on various influencing approaches and institutional transfer outcomes.

In the second, inductive move, I recorded observations on modes of influence and institutional transfer outcomes. Initial coding, also referred to as open coding (Charmaz 2006, Corbin and Strauss 2008), is a way to break qualitative data down into discrete elements for closer examination, comparison, and conceptual categorization (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 102). It is intended to serve as a starting point when initial codes “are tentative ... may be reworded as analysis progresses ... [and] can also alert the researcher that more data are needed” (Saldaña 2013, 101). This step resulted in multiple groups of codes organized under their corresponding parent nodes in the overarching framework.

The third, deductive move involves evaluating the initial codes on both modes of influence and institutional transfer outcomes. Evaluation coding involves applying additional codes “that assign judgments about the merit, worth, or significance of programs or policy” (Saldaña 2013, 119, citing Rallis & Rossman 2003, 92). Evaluation codes may also interpret magnitude to assess the presence or intensity of a piece of data. It is akin to applying a scale or rating system to interview responses when the main difference is that the analyst interprets the descriptive content and then assigns a rating to it.

To evaluate modes of influence, I coded each observation on a simple attitude scale of perceived effectiveness (positive, neutral-mixed, and negative). Neutral-mixed is the default interpretation for all observations. Neutral responses are those in which participants note the presence of a specific mode of influence but are ambivalent, indifferent, or unclear in their expression toward its effectiveness or outcome. 21 I assigned positive evaluations to observations

21 For example, “I/we tried method x, but I'm not sure whether it was effective or not.”
in which participants provide a clear indication of positive effectiveness. Converse1y, I assigned negative responses to observations in which participants clearly express negative attitudes or undesirable outcomes. After coding perceived attitudes toward the various modes of influence, I scored each observation on standard attitude scale of -1 (negative) to 1 (positive), and tallied an average perceived attitude score (adjusting for advisors providing multiple or conflicting views, or both) for each mode of influence subcategory.

To evaluate institutional transfer outcomes under each subcategory (individual capacity, individual values, organizational capacity, organization norms), I coded each participant’s response(s) into one of six values of perceived change: Not Observed, No Change, Limited Change, Moderate Change, Significant Change, Change Not Necessary. I assigned participants providing no response on observed change to the Not Observed category. This was necessary because while nearly all participants commented on at least one of the four types of institutional transfer, not every participant commented on all four. Note how this is distinct from the No Change value, which I reserved for participants providing clear indication that they observed no change on a given category. Limited change is the default category for participants indicating they saw some capacity or normative change. Used sparingly, moderate and significant change values are for moderate and extreme observations in which participants provided more emphatic.

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22 For example, qualifying comments such as, “this approach seemed to work well.”
23 For example, comments like “that approach was a total failure,” or “that didn’t seem to work.
24 The scoring is a simple average of advisors providing positive (+1), neutral (0), and negative (-1) views. The final scores were adjusted to avoid over-counting advisors who indicated multiple or conditional attitudes on a given mode of influence. For example, a participant might have two observations on a given mode of influence, one positive and one negative. That participant’s net contribution to the average attitude score is thus 0 (neutral). Multiple observations of the same attitude (i.e., two or more positive observations by the same individual) are only counted once to represent that individual’s net contribution as (+1, positive) to the overall average score.
25 It was common for participants to comment on some but not all types of institutional transfer. For example, a participant might observe limited capacity change in his/her individual and organizational counterparts, observe no value change in their individual counterpart, but then omit any comment directly related to organizational norms.
expression related to specific change they observed.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, I created a sixth value—Change Not Necessary—during the coding process because, unexpectedly, several participants expressed views that they felt that change was unnecessary for a particular Afghan individual.

**Figure 4-4. Theory-Guided Coding Procedures.**

Coding Reliability

To test for reliability, I recruited two volunteers to code a randomly selected sample of 40 de-identified interview excerpts (recording units) related to modes of influence and institutional transfer outcomes. One volunteer is a civilian PhD student with no prior military service and a

\textsuperscript{26} See Coding Framework in Appendix D for definitions and examples.
modest familiarity with the topic. The second volunteer is a mid-grade active duty US Army officer with first-hand experience in Afghanistan. Together, their diverse backgrounds (outsider and insider) provide a helpful audit of my coding efforts.

To conduct this test I used Microsoft Excel’s random number generator function to produce 40 random numbers. From this, I drew 40 interview excerpts (20 ministerial; 20 tactical) stored in my QSR NVivo project file. Next, I provided my coding protocol, evaluation code examples, the sample of 40 interview excerpts, and basic coding instructions to the volunteers to assign codes accordingly. The first round of coding resulted in an initial agreement level of more than 75 percent between my codes and the volunteers’ codes. However, following a discussion over discrepancies, the volunteers modified approximately half of their inconsistent responses resulting in greater consistency and more than 90 percent agreement. Note that the majority of these initial discrepancies were either a misreading of the excerpt or subtle differences in subjective interpretations of positive institutional transfer (e.g., limited versus moderate observed change). The final Krippendorf’s alpha (α) for the sample was 0.911, which indicates sound reliability (see Appendix D, Table D-2).

Threats to Validity

This research design suffers from two significant, and largely unavoidable, threats to validity: the omission of perspectives from Afghan security force personnel and the absence of a clear counterfactual to make comparisons. I have already outlined the challenges of including Afghan perspectives in the sampling limitations section and will not belabor those here.

27 Krippendorf’s alpha (α) is the standard inter-coder reliability measure for qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff 2004, 221-222). Krippendorff (2004, 241) claims that values above 0.800 should be interpreted as reliable. Researchers should draw tentative conclusions only from values that range between 0.667 and 0.800.
However, this lack of Afghan representation poses a separate problem in evaluating changes in ANSF capacities and values. I have no objective means of evaluating these changes below the national level. Therefore, my findings are limited to perceived ANSF changes via my participants’ observations. At this point, the only means I have to mitigate this is through interviews that triangulate around a particular interaction context. For example, I interviewed two different senior embedded advisors to Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak—one US and one Canadian—who were advisors at different times during the Afghan surge. In other cases, especially at the tactical level, I interviewed third-party observers to these interactions to gather multiple different viewpoints.

The second problem involves identifying sub-state counterfactual cases. In the purest form, a counterfactual case to the NATO-ANSF partnership is an Afghan security force organization that has never received NATO training or advisors. If these exist at all, they are rare cases or secret organizations within the Afghan government, or both, and access to them is not viable.

There is an argument to consider that some indigenous Afghan security structures (ethnic militia and arbakai tribal police) may serve as counterfactuals. The challenge here, beyond already established access and risk concerns, is that these are non-state organizations. The purpose of analyzing counterfactuals is not only to strengthen the validity of program (non-)impact findings, but also to refute the claim that the institutional transfer of capacities and democratic security governance norms would occur in the absence of the program intervention. In other words, counterfactuals provide the opportunity for a with- and without-program comparison. Yet, SSR program outcomes (transfer of capacity and democratic security norms) presume a connection, however delicate, to the state security apparatus. Therefore, a
counterfactual case still requires security forces linked to the Afghan government in some way to have any analytical utility.

I argue that, despite its weaknesses, this study nevertheless follows a rigorous qualitative design that is attentive to its limitations. Maxwell (2009, 243-245) identifies seven strategies to address validity challenges in qualitative research: intensive long-term involvement; rich data collection via verbatim transcripts; respondent validation; searching for discrepant evidence; triangulation by diversity of individuals, settings, and other data sources; use of quasi-statistics or quantized analysis of qualitative sources and data; and comparison using multiple sites or implicit comparison within single cases. This study employed all of these strategies. Data collection of 68 in-depth interviews was laborious and intensive—it took a year to complete and nine more months to transcribe and analyze. Stratified-purposive sampling via different access points and intermediaries produced a rich, highly diverse, and triangulated data set of experiences from individuals across a range of different interaction settings within the Afghanistan case. This triangulated diversity, in turn, aided in the search of varied, if not discrepant, perspectives and related evidence for a detailed case analysis. I also repeatedly used numerous intermediaries and key informants for internal validity checks on sample representativeness and, later, on overall interpretation after analysis and writing. Moreover, my coding procedures make use of numerical results and descriptive statistics of the data to demonstrate further confidence in my interpretation.

Finally, I must restate how SSR scholars have implored for more studies of this analytical depth and breadth. It is no secret why there are so few: They take a long time to complete, a substantial degree of patience and persistence to build trust and gain access to participants. In the end, I designed this study with the intent to fill a clearly specified gap in knowledge.
The Researcher’s Role and Perspective

I am the principal data collection instrument and interpreter in this qualitative study. This requires that I briefly discuss my background, values, and assumptions and how these may influence the study. Before entering graduate school in 2007, I served for seven years as a US Army officer (2000-2007). During this time, I served in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001-2002), Afghanistan (2003-2004), and Iraq (2005-2006). In Bosnia, I was a young lieutenant and worked directly with the Bosnian armed forces on disarmament and demobilization efforts, specifically, improving their accountability procedures and storage of their weapons and equipment. This involved weekly visits to, and monthly inspections of, more than two-dozen cantonment areas in northern Bosnia around the contested Brčko district.

Later in Afghanistan, I initially trained and deployed with a US unit to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to conduct combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At the outset of this deployment, however, I was reassigned to the 10th Mountain Division headquarters to serve as an Aide-de-Camp to the division’s Deputy Commanding General (CG). While in Afghanistan, the Deputy CG served as the operations director for all conventional, US-led, ground combat operations across the country. At the time, the total force size then was not more than one-tenth the size of its peak level during the troop surge period (2009-2012). This experience, in particular, allowed me to witness operations at both the tactical and operational (Division and Combined-Joint Task Force) levels. It also provided me a window into the strategic and political aspects of the Afghanistan mission. I was often a spectator to my supervisor’s and his supervisors’ interactions with senior Afghan political and military officials; US diplomats; visiting elected officials and political appointees; and other officials from coalition member
states. In this role, I also traveled extensively and often across southern, central, and eastern Afghanistan and South-Central Asia.

Two years later as an Army captain, I served in a dual-hatted leadership and operational staff role for an infantry battalion in Baghdad, Iraq. Almost daily, my unit conducted combined operations alongside one of the first newly formed Iraqi Army infantry units. It was in this role that I quickly learned the importance and challenges of working with local officials. This often led me to reflect on my previous experiences in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, particularly how my colleagues and I approached working with locals and how these relationships could have been developed further or approached differently to achieve better or different outcomes. In all, these three experiences in the US Army shaped my research interests in security assistance programs, especially training and advisory efforts with foreign security forces. This dissertation is a product of this driving curiosity.

Like all researchers, I carry certain values, assumptions, and subjectivity that bear upon this study. I consider the democratic norms and principles that underpin security sector reform to be morally just. However, I do not necessarily agree that democratic security reform requires foreign intervention or that SSR is a panacea to internal conflict, poverty reduction, or related societal ills. In the end, I am a pragmatist. I assume that there must be a better way of knowing when SSR is ripe and better ways of implementing it in practice. I also assume that, regardless of the outcomes or strategic wisdom of reform efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is useful knowledge to extract from them, especially in the interactions between foreign and local actors.

My military background and experience in Afghanistan is both a benefit and a liability. On the one hand, it provides me deep prior knowledge of NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan as well as the physical and institutional environments in which security force trainers and advisors are
situated. It undeniably enhanced my ability to navigate and gain access to different segments of the US defense community. After all, I am a cultural insider (Adler and Adler 1987) to the majority of the study’s participants. My social proximity to the community was a great benefit not only in terms of access, but also in the candor and richness of the interviews.

Still, this experience has its disadvantages. The central challenge of being an insider is the potential for my personal experiences to cloud the interview process or subsequent interpretation. As inescapable as the problem may be, I have taken steps in the research design to help mitigate it. Recruiting participants from diverse security advising and partnering environments and then interviewing them in an open-ended format allows for the entry and discovery of perspectives and related data that diverge from my own inherent biases and assumptions. In addition, though deeply familiar with the topic and my participants’ various settings, I have never served directly as an embedded advisor. In all my overseas experience, I served in more of a participant-observer role to the actual training and advising efforts. Had I served as an advisor, I suspect I would have stronger opinions on how advisors should or should not approach the role.
CHAPTER 5. WITH PARTNERS LIKE THESE—NATO-LED RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN’S SECURITY MINISTRIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, 2001-2014

[NATO-International Security Assistance Force] ISAF will partner with the [Afghan National Security Forces] ANSF at all levels—from the government ministries down to platoon level. An embedded partnership does not change ISAF’s mission; rather, it enhances our capabilities to perform the mission by establishing a trust-based relationship between ANSF and ISAF units.

General Stanley McChrystal (2009)

Live, eat, train, plan, and operate together. Depend on one another. Hold each other accountable at all echelons down to trooper level. Help our ANSF partners achieve excellence. Respect them and listen to them. Be a good role model.

General David Petraeus (2010)

The West’s most recent collaboration with armed groups in Afghanistan started in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, when US and U.K. special and clandestine operations units fought alongside the Northern Alliance to expel the Taliban from power. Real-time video footage and images of the US Army’s 5th Special Forces Group riding into combat on horseback alongside their anti-Taliban partners famously captured this moment in time. More than twelve years later, a coalition of 50 nations has since toiled—in the midst of a bloody counterinsurgency campaign and a contentious statebuilding initiative—to create an Afghan security apparatus of more than 344,000 uniformed soldiers and police and an additional 24,000 Afghan local police (ALP) guardians (DoD 2013b, 3). In the years between, however, Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) growth in size and performance has been anything but steady and the present day prognosis is uncertain.

Afghanistan, often quipped as “the graveyard of empires,” has an almost interminable history of working with, and often rejecting, foreign military forces (Barfield 2010, Farrage
The long legacy of rejecting foreign occupations, most notably the British Empire and Soviet Union, is one of the most unifying features of a society otherwise deeply fragmented along ethnic and tribal lines. It also serves as a prophetic reminder looming heavily over those now involved in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and counterinsurgency (Giustozzi 2007, 2008, 2009, Jones 2010b, Malkasian 2013, Oliker 2011, Sedra 2006).

This chapter introduces the case study with a focus on NATO and Afghan security forces since 2001. The historical record on NATO’s and the United States’ experience in Afghanistan is already well documented (Barfield 2010, Giustozzi 2008, Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, Jones 2008, 2010b, Malkasian 2013, Rubin 2013, Wright et al. 2010). The purpose of this chapter, rather, is to re-present this history as a focused overview of the evolving security assistance partnerships between NATO and Afghan forces. I give special emphasis to the NATO surge period of 2009–2012 since this is the specific analytical period of the broader study.

Four sections follow. Unfortunately, this subject matter is awash with numerous organizational names, programs, and acronyms. Unfamiliar readers may grow quickly overwhelmed. To assist, I begin with a brief section that outlines the organizational structure of the ANSF as of spring 2014 to provide the reader a primer and point of reference before diving into further detail. Three historical narrative sections follow this overview, each representing a major historical shift in both the war and NATO’s focus on ANSF development. The first period is characterized as a time of fragmented inattention (2001-2009), the second by a period of urgent focus and accelerated growth (2009-2012) referred to widely as the Afghanistan “surge,” and the third by a tenuous transition to full Afghan control of security responsibility (2013-2014). Given my analytical focus, I give the greatest attention to the Afghan surge period,
emphasizing a variety of NATO-Afghan interaction contexts: ministerial advising, institutional training, embedded field advising, and partnered field operations.

**Organization of Afghanistan’s Core Security Actors**

This section provides a brief organizational overview of Afghanistan’s security sector focused on its primary governance institutions—the Afghan Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) Ministries and the Afghan National Army (ANA) General Staff (GS)—and their subordinate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). To be precise, Afghanistan’s security sector is vertically organized on four levels (from highest to lowest): national, strategic, operational, and tactical. The national level includes the President of Afghanistan, Cabinet, Office of Administrative Affairs, National Security Council, and Parliament. The MoD, MoI, and ANA GS lie directly below this on the strategic level. Down further sit the ANA Ground Forces Command (GFC), Army Corps, and National Police regional headquarters, which make up the operational level. Finally, the tactical level is comprised of ANA units (e.g., brigades, battalion-kandaks, companies, and below) and their police equivalents at the provincial, district, and sub-district. Nevertheless, as general caveat, this dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the strategic (MoD, MoI, and GS) and tactical levels.  

Horizontally, the Afghan government differentiates its security functions into defense and law enforcement activities, thus, the MoD and MoI provide direct oversight of their respective uniformed military and police forces. On paper, the MoD, General Staff, and National command structure is relatively clear-cut. By comparison, the command structure between the

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28 Detailed in the previous chapter, this was a pragmatic choice based upon NATO’s concentration of advisory interactions at the ministerial and tactical levels as well as the relative underdevelopment of operational headquarters like the ANA Ground Forces Command at the time. For analytical simplicity in subsequent chapters, I integrate interactions with individuals at the ANA Corps and senior police pillars levels with all those on the tactical level.
MoI and its various police services is considerably more complex, partly due to the higher degree of functional specialization across police agencies and the greater rate of reorganization and leadership turnover since 2002 (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2012, Ch. 6).

The Minister of Defense directly oversees a ministerial staff and the Afghan National Army’s Chief of the General Staff. The ANA general staff is mostly physically co-located within the MoD much as the Pentagon in the United States houses the civilian offices of the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries with the military service Chiefs of Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps). Three services fall under the ANA Chief of the General Staff—the ANA Ground Forces Command, Afghan Special Operations Command, and the Afghan Air Force—as well as five major institutional support commands (Figure 5.1). Notably, the ANA ground forces command headquarters oversees the bulk of Afghanistan’s soldiers arrayed geographically across six regional army corps and one army division based in Kabul and its surrounding areas. As of August 2013, the ANA had 185,329 personnel with a goal of reaching 187,000; the Afghan Air Force had 6,616 personnel with a goal of 8,000 (DoD 2013b, 47, 55).

Alternatively, the MoI oversees a ministerial staff and seven law enforcement organizations in total. Six of these organizations—four primary and two auxiliary police forces—comprise the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Figure 5.2). In addition to the ANP, the MoI controls the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A) as a separate entity that provides drug interdiction and enforcement capabilities.

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29 There are a few exceptions of offices located off the MoD grounds.
30 I do not focus on partnerships with the Afghan Air Force in this study, primarily due to its relative size and nascent character vis-à-vis the other ANSF (ANA and ANP).
Afghanistan’s four primary police pillars are the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). First, the AUP is Afghanistan’s principal civilian law enforcement organization; it is recruited and organized within regions\(^{31}\) and includes a highway patrol\(^{32}\) and a

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\(^{31}\) In 2013, the MoI changed its command and control structure from policing zones to regions (DoD 2013b, 60).

\(^{32}\) The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) was initially an independent organization, but dissolved and folded into the AUP in 2006 by presidential decree (NATO-ISAF IJC 2011, 10)
fire department. Second, the ANCOP, widely cited as the most capable Afghan police element (DoD 2013b, 63), is a national constabulary force that provides the MoI a nationwide rapid response capability and augmentation force for unstable areas. The ANCOP also organizes around regional brigades and battalions, similar to a military force. Third, the ABP patrols Afghanistan’s borders and manages its border crossing points and international airports. 33 Finally, the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) force conducts internal affairs and special policing activities (e.g., anti-corruption investigations, surveillance and forensics, counterterrorism, special tactics). Due to its technical and often sensitive nature, it is comprised of number subunits and branches, including the General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU).

The MoI also oversees two auxiliary sub-pillar organizations of the ANP: the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The APPF is a state-owned enterprise that strictly provides protective services (e.g., guards) for critical infrastructure and personnel, facilities, and construction sites. 34 The second auxiliary force is the ALP, which is a collection of community-based security forces. The ALP is directly accountable to village or local tribal leaders; however, they fall under the oversight of the MoI via local AUP district chiefs of police. The ALP is akin to neighborhood watch groups for rural areas who provide an additional line of defense in remote areas of Afghanistan. Unlike the ANP, neither the APPF nor the ALP holds official arrest or investigative powers.

As of August 2013, the ANP had a total force of 152,336 officers and patrolmen, three percent shy of its goal of 157,000 (DoD 2013b). Meanwhile, the CNP-A had 2,759 personnel, which exceeded it authorized strength (US SIGAR 2013, 106).

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33 The Ministry of Finance retains control over customs agents. (NATO-ISAF IJC 2011, 6)
34 President Karzai created the APPF to replace the need to employ private contractors for security guard and related protective services.
In December 2001, prominent Afghan leaders signed the Bonn Agreement that paved the way for an interim Afghan authority and a timetable for reconstruction. The Bonn Agreement included a formal request for international assistance “in the establishment and training of a new Afghan security and armed forces” (UN 2001, Annex I, 2). The UN Security Council subsequently endorsed this agreement and approved the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide this assistance (UNSC 2001, 3). At its inception, ISAF was a UN-sanctioned body, not specifically led by the UN or NATO, but a coalition of willing nations (most were NATO members). In 2002, as US-led combat operations continued
across Afghanistan, NATO established an ISAF headquarters in Kabul but remained confined to the capital region. There it focused on protecting the interim Afghan authority and initiating the Afghan security sector reform (SSR) process, also referred to as the “lead nation approach” to Afghanistan reconstruction. NATO promptly assumed command of ISAF in 2003. Likewise, the NATO-led ISAF’s geographic security responsibilities expanded from the capital region outward. By October 2006, NATO-ISAF headquarters assumed responsibility for all international military forces in Afghanistan (NATO-ISAF, 2014).

Under the lead nation model, five donor states assumed responsibility for separate SSR pillars: the United States took primary responsibility for developing the Afghan National Army (ANA); Germany undertook Afghan National Police (ANP) development; Italy agreed to rebuild the justice sector; the U.K. tackled counternarcotics; and Japan engaged in disarmament and reintegration of former Taliban (Sedra 2006, 96). In hindsight, many insiders, experts, and senior Afghan government officials eventually concluded that this approach was “a disaster” (Jones 2010b, 240) due to uneven progress and poor coordination among the various donor states and other international actors. The reconstruction model was most problematic for the Afghan justice and law enforcement sectors, where trainers and advisors from different countries, socialized in different legal traditions and criminal procedures, provided contradictory guidance and caused unnecessary confusion among Afghan officials (Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 31, Perito 2009).

Afghan army and police development was uneven from the outset. Reconstruction of the ANA started immediately following the Taliban’s removal from power with a battalion from the US Army’s 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG) leading the training effort at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the inaugural director of the
newly established Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A), oversaw both this initial training effort as well as the establishment of the new Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) with the assistance of senior military staff and additional subject matter experts provided by private contracting firm Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). In 2003, OMC-A created a subordinate organization, Task Force Phoenix, to take over direction of the day-to-day training established by the US Army’s 3rd Special Forces Group at the Kabul training center. Early on in this process, OMC-A promptly shifted its training effort to a “train-the-trainer”35 model to develop a cadre of Afghan military trainers (Giustozzi 2007, 48).

OMC-A, along with 3rd SFG and Task Force Phoenix, focused the bulk of their initial technical assistance resources and energies on the rapid generation of armed forces over the long-term management capacity inside the defense ministry. It was clear these organizations essentially started from scratch. OMC-A’s first recruiting commander, Colonel David Francavilla, recalled how the new Afghan army recruits “had no military training…[t]hey may have known how to pull a trigger, but no military discipline, no marksmanship, and no tactics other than hunting” (Wright et al. 2010, 262). By June 2003, OMC-A generated a fledgling army of 7,000 Afghan soldiers, yet attrition in the junior ranks was rampant partly due to the low pay and lack of a banking system making it difficult for soldiers to send money back to their families (Wright et al. 2010, 261-263).

Meanwhile, Afghan police development lagged well behind ANA’s. Germany launched the Afghan police development program in March 2002 based on a European model of providing a five-year program for police officers and a three-month course for non-commissioned officers (Perito 2009, 3). In 2003, only a dozen German police trainers had been dedicated to the task of

35 “Train-the-trainer,” while somewhat intuitive, is a common term in military and government circles describing efforts of instructors who are teaching students how to instruct with the end goal that the trainees eventually take over as primary trainers.
rebuilding the Afghan police while 1,500 Afghan police cadets participated in formal police training (Jones 2010b, 165, Perito 2009, 3). Germany’s initial approach to police development was thorough, but too slow and insufficient given the scope of insecurity and need to generate a total police force of 70,000 officers. Consequently, the United States stepped in to augment German efforts with an additional police-training program.

As the German-, and subsequently EU-, led police training program continued and focused on developing senior law enforcement officers, the United States hired DynCorp International to set up a new training program focused on creating patrolmen and non-commissioned police officers. The US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) oversaw this training until 2005 when the DoD assumed responsibility for both Afghan army and police development.

By 2007, the United States officially assumed the role of lead nation for police training while the European Union’s police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) consolidated the many disjointed coalition efforts under one umbrella organization focused on advising the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI). EUPOL, however, has never truly emerged as a major actor in Afghanistan’s police reform due to persistent coordination challenges and general European discontent with the conflict (Bayley and Perito 2010, 30, Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 62-63, Perito 2009, 10).

The decision to move all ANSF training and development under DoD occurred over growing concerns of INL’s ability to manage the ANP training on the ground (Jones 2010b, 167-168). As DoD assumed lead responsibility for both army and police development, OMC-A (the lead US training agency on the ground) was briefly renamed to the Office of Security
Cooperation—Afghanistan (OSC-A) in July 2005, but then finally supplanted by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2006 (Wright et al. 2010, 302).

CSTC-A subsequently oversaw all US training and development efforts related to the ANSF. This included funding and equipping, basic and advanced institutional training, ministerial development, and operational support in the field via embedded training teams (ETTs). Notably, other NATO-ISAF members complemented this advisory effort by providing additional Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) even though neither the United States nor its partners could fill even half of the required number of embedded training teams that CSTC-A requested (DoD 2009, 38-39).

By October 2008, the ANA was 68,000 strong (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2014, 6) notwithstanding substantial recruiting, retention, and equipping challenges along the way (Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 24-26). The MoD, however, lagged far behind the ANA in institutional capacity since it started from scratch to ensure adequate ethnic representation well over a year after ANA training commenced (Jones 2010b, 176-177). Even as a few of the newly formed Afghan infantry battalions that emerged fared reasonably well in the field—Operations Maiwand and Achilles in 2007, for example—the overall force was still entirely dependent on US operational and material support (Jones 2010b, 179-180, Younossi et al. 2009, 43). The MoD was still years away from possessing sufficient and independent capacity to even sustain, much less grow, the ANA in the face of a mounting Taliban insurgency.

At this same time, the ANP was just shy of 80,000 police officers (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2014, 6)—12,000 larger than the ANA—though it continued to face incredible challenges with corruption, vetting of recruits, operational effectiveness, paying police, and basic organizational management within the MoI (Jones et al. 2006, 98, DoS IG and DoD IG 2006). In
particular, the MoI “lacked a clear organizational structure, basic management functions, and an overall strategy for policing … [as well as] a culture of accountability and transparency” (GAO, 2009, 8). Moreover, as of April 2008 and after more than $6 billion spent on ANP development, not a single Afghan police unit was rated fully capable and 77 percent were rated “not capable” in any way (GAO, 2008).

The majority of junior patrol officers who joined the ANP had little or no police training to start with, much less any formal education. Consequently, the quality and duration of instruction was insufficient and largely exacerbated by endemic illiteracy and lack of prior educational experiences among police recruits (Perito 2009, 4). CSTC-A eventually adopted a plan to retrain local ANP district police forces as whole units, using the specialized Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) as a stopgap force to temporarily stand in for the district level police units while they received a period of focused refresher training.

The Afghan government established the ANCOP in 2006 as a quick reaction force after the ANP struggled to quell riots in Kabul (Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 53). Under the Focused District Development program, the MoI deployed ANCOP units as temporary replacements for district-level ANP units to allow them to attend a seven-week training course at regional police training centers. Upon completion, ANP unit rotated back to their home district with assigned advisors from a US PMT or NATO POMLT (Perito 2009, 5-6).

With US leadership fixation on Iraq’s initial liberation and subsequent spiral into sectarian civil war in 2006, the NATO-ISAF mission received comparably less attention and resources to support ANSF development. Meanwhile, the Taliban—widely assumed by NATO-ISAF to be a low threat in the wake of their ouster—resurfaced with vengeance and posed a grave threat to the Afghan state and NATO-ISAF (Giustozzi 2007). The Taliban insurgency
rapidly escalated from 2007 on, primarily due to a lack of Afghan faith in their own government to provide basic services and enforce the rule of law (Jones 2008). The ANP, grossly ill equipped and ill trained for counterinsurgency, bore the brunt of losses to insurgent attacks in 2007 and 2008, though NATO and ANA forces also experienced record level casualties over consecutive years (Livingston, Messera, and O'Hanlon 2010). NATO-ISAF’s light footprint, economical approach to Afghanistan’s reconstruction ultimately contributed to weak and corrupt Afghan government institutions. Avoiding total collapse of the Afghan state and reversing the Taliban’s gains required a drastic change in strategy.

A Rekindled Partnership, *Shona ba Shona*\(^{36}\): 2009–2012

With the Afghanistan mission mired in crisis, US President Barack Obama made two announcements in 2009 that marked a shift in overall strategy and replaced the NATO-ISAF commander, General David McKiernan, with General Stanley McChrystal. First, in March 2009 he declared, “We will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in security their country” (The White House 2009b). He also acknowledged that resources for training the ANSF would no longer be “denied because of the war in Iraq” (The White House 2009a). Consequently, having already ordered the deployment of 17,000 additional troops to regain control of Taliban footholds in southern Afghanistan, Obama deployed 4,000 more soldiers to expand the training capacity of the ANA and ANP. Through 2009, neither the United States nor its coalition partners could fill even 50 percent of the badly needed embedded trainers (Cordesman, Mausner, and

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\(^{36}\) This Dari phrase means “shoulder-to-shoulder.”
Kasten 2009, 81, Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 42-43, DoD 2009, 38-39).\textsuperscript{37} Proclaiming a renewed focus on accelerating ANSF growth and training, he added that “every American unit in Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner” (The White House 2009b).\textsuperscript{38}

That December in a speech at West Point, President Obama announced an additional surge of 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan to “target the insurgency and secure key population centers...[and also to] increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight” (The White House 2009a). Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) combined with accelerated security force assistance (SFA)—fervently advocated by the new NATO-ISAF Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, at the time\textsuperscript{39}—was the approved strategy going forward after Obama’s West Point speech, a December 2009 summit of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, and a January 2010 conference in London (Schroeder 2013, 37). Notably, this was the first unified strategy for the coalition in more than nine years of war. The strategic restart also included a clearly defined end of December 31, 2014.

Partnership and partnering—terms couched as the key to future success in Afghanistan—dominated the strategic discourse. President Obama’s language used in his speeches reflects a fundamental belief that, beyond providing additional material resources to grow the ANSF to more than 300,000 (171,000 ANA and 134,000 ANP), increasing the interactions between NATO and Afghan forces would be the key to transferring capacity faster to the ANSF. This, in

\textsuperscript{37} Nor would they ever meet this requirement collectively through 2013.
\textsuperscript{38} General McKiernan’s initial strategic review informed the March 2009 announcement.
\textsuperscript{39} Upon taking command, General McChrystal conducted a second strategic assessment, which factored into the additional troop increase announcement in December 2009.
turn, would presumably hasten ANSF ability to carry out the fight against the Taliban and provide for their nation’s security independently. *Shona ba shona*—“shoulder to shoulder” in Dari—was the new military campaign slogan, and interactions between NATO and Afghan forces increased from top to bottom in short time.

The shift to a COIN and SFA strategy in late 2009 brought about a significant reorganization within NATO-ISAF command structure. To streamline and increase the overall unity of effort across the coalition, General McChrystal integrated all US and coalition efforts into three main organizations: an operational International Joint Command (IJC), the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), and a Special Operations Element. NATO-ISAF was thereafter “Americanized” (Schroeder 2013, 39-40) as the overarching NATO command along with the new subordinate operational (IJC) and training and advising (NTM-A) commands were “dual-hatted” positions held exclusively by US senior generals. For example, the new NTM-A commander, Lieutenant General William Caldwell, also simultaneously served as the commanding general of CSTC-A, the US portion—and primary funding arm—of the overall training and ministerial development mission (see Figure 5.3).

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40 In this instance, these officers served as official commanders of all US forces under their command while also exercising operational control of other coalition units and personnel assigned to their organization.

41 Notably, starting in May 2005, the US Congress assigned specific security assistance authorization funding to the CSTC-A commander through the creation of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), intended to grow the ANSF’s capacity and capabilities (McFarland 2013).
Ministerial Advising and Institutional Training

NTM-A/CSTC-A grew considerably in both size and interactions with ANSF. The training command focused on three broad aims: generating additional Afghan forces and infrastructure to meet new increased force level goals (basic entry training), developing Afghan leadership capacity (officer and non-commissioned officer education), and building an enduring institutional capacity inside the Afghan defense and interior ministries (Caldwell and Finney 2011, Farrage 2012). By 2012, NTM-A/CSTC-A grew to approximately 6,000 trainers and advisors in Kabul and across 82 sites across Afghanistan, from 38 contributing countries.
(Farrage 2012). Roughly, half of these personnel were Americans, 1,000 of them civilian contractors (Farrage 2012, GAO, 2012b).

Additionally, private military and security firms DynCorp International, MPRI (now Engility), and Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater) have made significant contributions in ANSF institutional training and development since the outset of the conflict. From 2001 to 2012, the United States has spent at least $5 billion on ANSF training and advising contracts with these three firms (see Figure 5.4). From 2004 to 2010, DynCorp was the leading provider of police trainers and law enforcement advisors, although Academi provided some specialized support to the Afghan Border Police. Likewise, MPRI was the leading provider of trainers and advisors for the Afghan Army and Ministry of Defense. After a contested rebidding process in 2010, DynCorp took over as the lead training and advising service provider across the Afghan security forces. Contract oversight responsibility for the Afghan army and police training programs fell between the DoD and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). In 2009, the DoD assumed full control of contract oversight and administration for all training and mentoring services provided to the ANSF, including both the ministries of defense and interior and the Afghan military and police. Appendix C, Figure C-1A includes a detailed timeline of this contracting history.

During this period, NTM-A/CSTC-A made a concerted effort to focus more resources and advisors toward accelerating development of the Afghan defense and interior ministries. After all, the goal was for the MoD and MoI to assume full management and oversight of the ANSF, although their capacity sorely lagged behind that of their respective uniformed ANA and ANP. Consequently, NTM-A/CSTC-A expanded the number of advisors inside the Ministry of Defense, ANA General Staff, and Ministry of Interior.
By mid-2012, 306 ministerial advisors were working with the MoD and ANA General Staff, while 206 ministerial advisors were working with the MoI (Farrage 2012). The majority of ministerial advisors to the most senior Afghan ministerial positions were military officers. Of these advisors, most were US Army colonels and Navy captains, along with a smaller number of military and government civil servant advisors from Canada, the U.K., and Estonia (author interviews; Appendix B). DoD civilians held 60 of these positions, however (DoD 2011).

The DoD also established a Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, in partnership with the US Institute of Peace, to provide civilian expertise in executive-level defense and police management functions such as policy development, financial management,
human resources, acquisitions, and logistics (Garamone 2011). By employing DoD civil servants as ministerial advisors, the MoDA program also served an ancillary function of exposing Afghan ministerial leaders (nearly all former military officers or militia leaders serving in *de jure* civilian positions) and their staff to democratic security governance norms, namely civilianization and civilian control (Scheer, Caldwell, and Digiovanni 2011, 138).

In an April 2012 congressionally mandated progress report, DoD cited that, from 2009 to 2012, NTM-A/CSTC-A boasted commendable gains in generating new Afghan forces, yet only marginal gains in ministerial development (DoD 2012). In just under three years, the training command oversaw net increases of more than 100,000 ANA and 57,000 ANP (197,000 and 149,000 total strength) (Farrage 2012, DoD 2012, 20, 30). The MoD’s overall progress, however, remained largely stagnant during this period. This, in large part, was due to expansion of new Afghan departments and offices (e.g., the Office of Strategy and Policy, Ground Forces Command, and the Afghan Air Force), persistent challenges with criminal patronage influence and corruption, and human capital shortfalls in areas requiring technical expertise like acquisitions and logistics (International Crisis Group 2010, 10-12, DoD 2012, 14-16). The MoI lagged behind even further, facing many similar challenges though none more acute than internal criminal activity (DoD 2012, 17). The technical capacity to communicate with police forces across the provinces had improved dramatically, yet the willingness to lead or follow was heavily politicized (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, 34-35).

**Field-Based Advising and Operational Partnering**

Although NTM-A/CSTC-A expanded its institutional and ministerial advising capacity with the change in NATO strategy, it relinquished control of its embedded advising formations
in the field to the operational headquarters IJC. As part of General McChrystal’s move to better streamline the NATO mission, moving the embedded teams under IJC made sense due to its comparative advantage supporting embedded advisors’ sustained presence with and assessment of ANSF units and improved coordination with field commanders (Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, 60).

Beyond gaining control of the embedded advising teams, IJC oversaw an increase in the operational partnering of NATO combat forces and ANSF. While the embedded teams (10 to 20 individuals) would typically maintain a nearly constant presence with their Afghan counterparts, regular NATO combat units also combined their efforts with the ANSF units as an additional mode of building capacity. For example, whereas in 2009 only 10 percent of NATO and ANSF units conducted combined operations, by mid-2012, 89 percent of ANSF units partnered with a NATO unit, and the Afghan units led, on average, half of these partnered operations (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2014, 7, DoD 2012, 13).

NATO-ISAF envisioned combined NATO and ANSF operations, in addition to employing embedded advisors, as an additional method to socialize new ANSF units into planning and executing tactical operations independently. Partnered operations ranged from routine security patrols and meetings with local Afghan leaders to direct action operations like armed raids and searches against Taliban or other criminal elements. It was common, especially early in the surge, for Afghan units at the army kandak (battalion) or police district levels to have both embedded advisors within their organization and a consistent external relationship with a NATO combat unit (author interviews).

As part of the broader geographic transition process that started in 2011, the degree of partnership between regular NATO and ANSF units varied, largely depending on the Afghan
unit’s capability and national caveats of the specific NATO unit. Less experienced or less capable Afghan units would often have both advisors and externally assigned NATO partner units, but as their operational capacity improved, the NATO partner units would gradually reduce their frequency of contact, affording the Afghan units greater autonomy over time. Finally, when Afghan units were assessed as fully capable, the embedded advisors would depart, leaving the Afghan units fully independent (NATO 2012). By mid-2012, the ANSF had 20 fully independent ANA battalions and 72 rated “effective with advisors” (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2014, 8). Two years before, no ANA battalions were operating independently. The ANP, though still behind the ANA, saw similar gains. In the same time, the ANP moved from zero to 49 independent police districts and nearly doubled its number (70 to 130) of police districts assessed as effective with advisors (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2014, 8).

As ANSF units outgrew their need for support from partnered units, and eventually embedded advisor teams, IJC increasingly shifted its operational focus toward assisting Afghan units in their transition to taking an increased share of overall security responsibility. For example, in 2012 the US Army began modifying its brigade combat teams, its primary conventional combat formation, into security force assistance brigades (SFABs). In essence, these brigades were reorganized into several Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) of 48 soldiers—mostly mid-career commissioned and noncommissioned officers—to assist Afghan brigade-level staff and lower-level Security Force Advise and Assist Teams (SFAATs) of 9, 12, or 18 soldiers to advise at the ANSF battalion level and below. This move supplanted previous

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42 For example, Germany’s national caveat restricted its units both regionally and operationally. The German government confined its units to Regional Command-North (a more benign area of Afghanistan) and would not authorize them to conduct offensive operations, including all German embedded advisor teams. See Saideman and Auerswald (2012, 76).

43 Since its transformation 2004, the US Army typically deploys its conventional tactical forces as brigade combat teams (BCTs). A typical BCT is comprised of approximately 4,000 soldiers, organized around two to three infantry or mechanized armor (tank) battalions, one field artillery battalion, and a special troops battalion with additional combat support capabilities (e.g., combat engineers, maintenance, logistics, communications).
embedded training and advising model (ETT/OMLT) advising model and added further acronyms to the alphabet soup of embedded advisor formations. Figure 5.5 lists NATO’s numerous security assistance organizations over time.

Complicating the security transition, however, was an alarming rise in ANSF-initiated attacks on NATO coalition members throughout 2012. Thought to be driven by a combination of Taliban and Haqqani network infiltration and cross-cultural friction and stress between coalition and ANSF troops (Armstrong 2013, Bordin 2011), in 2012 alone, such insider attacks resulted in 61 coalition deaths (Roggio and Lundquist 2012). Concerns grew so severe that the NATO-ISAF commander, General John Allen, ordered a temporary stay on all embedded and partnered operations to review and update necessary safety precautions and standard operating procedures for partnered activities to resume.

Training and Advising via Grassroots Security Initiatives

Since 2001, the US and the Afghan government have attempted, and failed on several occasions, to create community-based defense forces as a means of augmenting the ANP’s development. CSTC-A first attempted to create an Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) force to address rising insecurity in rural provinces (Helmand, Zabol, Kandahar, Farah, Oruzgan, and Ghazni) between 2006 and 2008. This initiative was unsuccessful because it was poorly connected with local tribal structures for endorsement and its members were even more corrupt than the uniformed police at the time, further undermining the already troubled national police development effort (Cordesman, Mausner, and Kasten 2009, 135, Jones 2010a, 48-49).

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44 As of February 2014, there have been 86 documented insider attacks since January 1, 2008, resulting in 142 NATO coalition deaths and 163 coalition wounded. The Long War Journal maintains an up-to-date data summary of insider attacks at [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php).
CSTC-A’s second attempt was the creation of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) in 2009. Given the growing Taliban insurgency, there was widespread recognition that the need for community-based security was dire, especially in the rural Pashtun areas where the Taliban enjoyed near impunity and the Afghan government had little penetration. AP3 was thus a pilot program in Wardak province to promote governance and security in local villages and extend the Afghan government’s reach beyond the district level (Saum-Manning 2012, 4-5). Conceptually, the Afghan government loosely modeled the AP3 force after arbakai, a resilient, customary Pashtun structure use for community defense purposes (Schmeidl and Karokhail 2009, 320). US Army Special Forces trained and armed more than 1,100 local guardians—ideally recruited and vetted by local elders—to fill a community policing role (Lefèvre 2010, 1).

At first, AP3 showed promise as violence in Wardak dropped considerably. However, CSTC-A chose not to expand the program because it turned out that the appointed leader made many hires directly, rather than recruiting and vetting the force through the local jirgas, as was intended (Lefèvre 2010, 1, Shreckengast 2012, 3). Reportedly, local villages and critics were also concerned that active Taliban, rather than former Taliban or more neutral Afghan fence sitters, may have joined the AP3 in the glossed-over recruiting process (Saum-Manning 2012, 5).

Meanwhile, as the AP3 pilot program was under way in Wardak province, elsewhere US Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) independently experimented with a similar effort called the Local Defense Initiative (LDI). The

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45 A brief note for clarification: AP3 would not be the end of an Afghan institution using the “public protection” moniker, however. In August 2010, President Hamid Karzai published an official decree and a subsequent implementation strategy to disband all non-diplomatic private security contractors—namely, all contractors not already working for NATO or other foreign government officials—operating throughout the country by March 2012. As a result, the Afghan government resurrected the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) name by establishing a state-run enterprise under MoI control to supplant the myriad private contracting firms providing physical security and fixed site protection (e.g., security guards). In all, President Karzai was likely motivated to consolidate power over non-state security providers in Afghanistan as he saw them undermining the ANSF by competing in the same labor market and posing great risk of co-option by Taliban or other rival groups.
first LDI test sites in emerged in Kandahar, Daikundi, Nangarhar, and Helmand provinces in early 2010 and new sites of strategic value (e.g., areas lacking state governance or ISAF presence) continued to surface well into 2011 (Lefèvre 2010, 15). Under LDI, US Special Operations Forces46 (SOF) embedded in rural communities known to have either requested assistance or resisted Taliban influence. Once accepted by locals, SOF teams worked through local elders to select and train a local force in basic marksmanship and defensive tactics.

Though LDI had some early successes, like AP3, it too suffered some initial setbacks related to weak oversight and public perception that the program was potentially creating more destabilizing and abusive armed groups (Human Rights Watch 2011, Saum-Manning 2012, 7). LDI would endure, however, despite competing visions between NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government on the control and permanency of the locally generated forces. Specifically, the MoI saw the future of the LDI program as a means of rewarding and consolidating central authority, whereas NATO, especially CFSOCC-A, viewed LDI as a counterinsurgency tactic to isolate the insurgency from the Afghan population (Lefèvre 2010, 21). Nevertheless, LDI evolved into the Village Stability Operations / Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program as President Karzai authorized the creation of the Afghan Local Police under the MoI’s oversight in summer 2010. This approval effectively created a hybrid structure by expanding efforts to develop locally generated security forces and consolidating all coalition, Afghan, and other unsanctioned militias under MoI oversight (Hakimi 2013, 394).

46 There is often confusion between the terms Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces (SF). The latter technically refers specifically to US Army Special Forces (aka, Green Berets, A-Teams). Special Operations Forces, or SOF, rather, is an umbrella term for any elite unit from the various branches of the US military under its Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or the NATO coalition. The US has numerous SOF, for example: US Army Special Forces; US Army 75th Ranger Regiment; US Navy SEALs; US Marine Corps Special Operations Regiment, aka Force Reconnaissance; and US Air Force para-rescue jumpers (PJs), tactical air controllers, and Raven security teams; among others.
VSO/ALP was an enhanced version of its LDI precursor. Importantly, the term Village Stability Operations (VSO) is a broader concept that incorporates the task of training local forces among others. VSO involves additional governance and development initiatives to empower local communities and strengthen their ties to a local district government and economic markets (Saum-Manning 2012, 7-8). Accordingly, SOF teams of US Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, or Marine Special Operations established individual Village Stability Platforms (VSPs) in selected Afghan communities. Additional support personnel with expertise in culture, development, and strategic communications support these VSPs (Saum-Manning 2012, 8, Shreckengast 2012, 2).

The Afghan government also injected several new provisions to bring the ALP under MoI oversight. Surely, SOF teams still worked through local power brokers, often tribal elders, to nominate ALP recruits and subsequently led their training and advising. However, MoI directed that potential sites self-nominate to the MoI for approval prior to any VSO/ALP development (Saum-Manning 2012, 10). Additionally, the MoI mandated with SOF assistance the biometric enrollment of all ALP recruits for further vetting and the registration of individual weapons. The MoI provided recruits a one-year contract for 60 percent of the pay of an ANP officer. Upon successful completion, the ALP was then eligible to join the ANSF (Human Rights Watch 2011, 55-56, Shreckengast 2012, 2). District police chiefs provided direct oversight of ALP in their jurisdiction since the ALP had no arrest or investigation authority.

Despite the stigmas of past local defense force experiments in Afghanistan, VSO/ALP shows considerable promise. Saum-Manning (2012, 15-16) notes positive trends in violence data, local polling, and reports from NGO groups related to ALP effectiveness and perceptions. To date, the ALP is more than 24,000 strong and “appears to be one of the most resilient
institutions in the ANSF,” although it has suffered a disproportionate share of casualties (DoD, 2013b, 69). Though it is clear that the ALP will be necessary in the short term, uncertainty remains as to whether the Afghan government should continue to further strengthen its control of the ALP or fully absorb it into the ANP (Goodhand and Hakimi 2014, 44-45).

**Transition and Uncertainty: 2013, 2014, and Beyond**

The ANSF experienced a major test in 2013. It was a watershed moment marking the first full fighting season with the ANSF leading operations against the Taliban. By October 2013, the ANSF was conducting 95 percent of all conventional operations and 98 percent of all special operations across Afghanistan (DoD 2013b, 1). While Afghan casualties were up 79 percent in the latter half of 2013, insurgent attacks were down 12 percent from the same period in 2012.47 Similarly, the Afghan public’s confidence level in its army and police trended upward, sitting at 88 and 72 percent, respectively (The Asia Foundation 2013, 7). Afghan governance and public institutions also show some signs of improvement despite clear need for continued reform, technical capacity, and economic development assistance, and focused rule of law and anti-corruption efforts.

Despite the positive, albeit modest, gains, however, the ANSF is still years away from being self-sustainable. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is holding its ground in Taliban strongholds like Helmand province in the south (Phillips and Hodge 2014) but recently experienced a temporary tactical setback along the eastern border with Pakistan (Graham-Harrison 2014). Still, the ANA badly lacks airlift and close air support capabilities, which are critical to supporting and distributing resources and troops around Afghanistan’s difficult terrain.

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47 This casualty spike was expected given both the transition to Afghan-led operations and the perennial rise in insurgent activity during the typical Afghan spring-summer-fall fighting season.
Likewise, the Afghan National Police (ANP), despite its rapid growth, remains plagued by corruption and better prepared for counterinsurgency (COIN) than its intended role of community policing and enforcing the rule of law (Planty and Perito 2013). Finally, while the security ministries may be able to solve short-term problems, “they still lack a systematic and proactive planning method for strategic planning, budget development, and sustainment processes” (DoD 2013b, 36). The ANSF will undoubtedly require international assistance in the form of financial, material, and advisory support beyond the scheduled end of NATO’s mission in 2014.

Ultimately, Afghanistan’s most significant challenges ahead are primarily political. ANSF development will thus remain a necessary, but insufficient condition in Afghanistan’s future. At present, three critical questions lie at the crux of the nation’s long-term survival. First, will Afghan President Karzai sign the Parliament-approved bilateral security agreement with the United States to ensure continued security assistance beyond 2014? Can the Afghan government ensure a transparent, free, and fair transfer of power in the upcoming presidential election? Finally, will the Afghan government and the Taliban reach a peace settlement? In sha’Allah.
### Major NATO Security Assistance Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A:</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (2009–present)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJC:</td>
<td>NATO International Joint Command (2009–present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSOCC-A:</td>
<td>Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL:</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (2009–present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMC-A:</td>
<td>Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC-A:</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan</td>
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### Strategic Level Advisors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAG:</td>
<td>Ministerial Advisor Group (collective of defense and interior ministry advisors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAG:</td>
<td>Enterprise Advisor Group (collectives of cross-functional advisor teams)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT:</td>
<td>Ministerial Advisor Team (team of ministerial advisors focused on an office/dept.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoDA:</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors (reference to DoD civilian advisors or program)</td>
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### Tactical Level Advisors (2012–Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFAB:</td>
<td>US Security Force Assistance Brigade (modified US brigade combat team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFAT:</td>
<td>US Security Force Assistance Team (48-man brigade-level advisor team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFAAT:</td>
<td>US Security Force Advise and Assist Team (9-, 12-, 18-man tactical advisor team)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT:</td>
<td>NATO/European Military Assistance Team (SFAAT equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT:</td>
<td>NATO/European Police Assistance Team (SFAAT equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEP:</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Professionals (MPRI contractors advising US units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPM:</td>
<td>Embedded Police Mentors (DynCorp contractors assigned to ANP SFAATs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF:</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces (umbrella term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF/ODA:</td>
<td>US Army Special Forces, Operational Detachment-Alpha (Green Berets; A-Team)</td>
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### Tactical Level Advisors (pre–2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETT:</td>
<td>US Embedded Training Teams (10 to 20-man ANA advisor team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMLT:</td>
<td>US Embedded Police Training Team (10 to 20-man ANP advisor team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMLT:</td>
<td>NATO/European Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (similar to ETT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMLT:</td>
<td>NATO/European Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (similar to PMT)</td>
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### Local Defense Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VSO/VSP:</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations / Village Stability Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI/LDI:</td>
<td>Community / Local Defense Initiative (VSO precursor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP3:</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Program (pilot program; not Afghan Public Prot. Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP:</td>
<td>Afghan National Auxiliary Police (2006-2008; folded into ANP)</td>
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CHAPTER 6. ADVISING AND PARTNERING IN CONTEXT AND PRACTICE

Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk.

T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-seven Articles,” 1917, article 5

This chapter illustrates the many contexts in which NATO embedded advisors and tactical units interacted with Afghan ministerial, army, and police officials. The previous chapter provided a historical overview of NATO’s endeavor to reconstruct the Afghan security ministries, army, and police. In this chapter, I provide a thick description (Geertz 1972) of the backdrops and practices of embedded advising and partnered security assistance operations in Afghanistan, while drawing upon data collected via 68 in-depth interviews. For analytical purposes, I separate the NATO’s various pursuits into two primary interaction settings, based upon their level of governance—strategic (i.e., ministerial) advising and tactical security assistance. Additionally, due to NATO’s operational design, there is greater variation in NATO-Afghan interaction settings at the tactical level. Accordingly, I separate tactical assistance efforts into three sub-contexts based on their unique character of interaction: embedded tactical advising; unit-to-unit partnered operations; and special operations-led village stability operations.

The two main sections that follow are organized along these lines. The first section illustrates ministerial advising; the second depicts tactical security assistance. In each, I describe the various settings and actors alongside the tasks and roles that they assumed throughout their service in Afghanistan.
Ministerial Advising: Contention over Roles

Advisors to the Afghan security ministries lived between two worlds: a predominantly US military inhabited NATO training headquarters (NTM-A) and the Afghan security ministries. Personal living quarters and offices were located on Camp Eggers, a military compound in Kabul near the US embassy and Afghan Presidential Palace. With Camp Eggers serving as their home station, most ministerial advisors did not fully embed themselves inside the Afghan ministries. Rather, they spent their days moving back and forth between Camp Eggers and their assigned Afghan ministries. Given the security requirements for coalition personnel to travel around Afghanistan, moving back and forth between Camp Eggers and the security ministries was often a challenge (Interview 23). All advisors commuted to the defense (MoD) or interior (MoI) ministry from Camp Eggers. Some even walked or hitched a ride to the MoD grounds before the surge. However, as the numbers of ministerial advisors increased along with safety concerns, many advisors commuted via an armored shuttle bus. This, naturally, posed a challenge for advisors with irregular schedules or demands requiring extended time with their Afghan counterparts.

Ministerial advisors were almost exclusively a mixture of senior US military officers (colonels/lieutenant colonels), DoD civil servants (GS-14/15 grade), and civilian contractors from MPRI and DynCorp (Interview 26). This mixture “changed over time [, but] civilians were certainly the minority. There were quite a few contract positions there. ... They recognize[d] that

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48 Camp Eggers grew considerably during the Afghan surge, as NTM-A headquarters reportedly expanded from a size of 900 to a peak of approximately 2,200 military and civilian personnel (Interview 32). As many as 800 military, government civil servants, and civilian contractor advisors worked with the Afghan ministries; in June 2012, 306 and 260 advisors were partnered with the Afghan MoD and MoI, respectively (Farrage 2012). NTM-A senior leadership and staff filled the remaining positions on Camp Eggers. In addition to the ministerial advisors, NTM-A headquarters oversaw and supported more than 1,000 trainers (many civilian contractors) and more than 3,000 Afghan instructors dispersed over 82 training sites across Afghanistan (Farrage 2012).

49 Most contractor advisors had some military or law enforcement experience.
the military did not have the full skill set to do this kind of work and there was aggressive recruiting for this skill set, and in general some of those skills came from civilian workforce” (Interview 11). The U.K, Canada, Australia, Poland, France, and Estonia each contributed individual NTM-A senior leaders and ministerial advisors as well, though these numbers were relatively small, in the single figures, by comparison (Appendix B, Figure B-2). Other US government agencies such as the Departments of State, Justice, and others provided a limited number of personnel to work with the MoI and other ANSF elements in developing specialized policing, counternarcotics, and related intelligence capabilities (Interviews 7, 42). The same is true for the 26 coalition nations contributing to the European Union Police Training Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) (Federal Republic of Germany 2014; see also Appendix B, figure B-3).

Few ministerial advisors worked individually. Most advisors worked in small teams for the most senior ministerial officials or had a unique circumstance with an Afghan official or office; an Army colonel or an equivalently ranked officer led the teams from a different service or coalition partner nation (Interview 26). One unsuspecting civilian advisor noted his surprise upon arrival: “I sort of discovered through the process of getting up to speed that I was a senior advisor, not the senior advisor to that assistant minister. There was already an existing senior military advisor who was basically leading the advisor cadre in that office” (Interview 33). Advisor teams varied in size and personnel according to the specific Afghan ministerial office, department, or staff section they supported and the relative priority of effort that NTM-A conferred to it (Appendix B). For example, at one point a nine-man team of ministerial advisors (military and civilian) supported the Afghan Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy and his staff (Interview 33), whereas the senior advisor to the Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior for Counternarcotics advised alone (Interview 7). This arrangement should be
unsurprising given NTM-A’s emphasis on growing strategic planning and policy development capacity rather than counternarcotics (an area supported more heavily by the U.K. and other US law enforcement-oriented agencies). Other advisor teams grew over time in light of increasing demand or need. The initial senior advisor to the MoI’s legal department started out advising alone but had a team of seven advisors by the end of his tour (Interview 28). However, one advisor attributed some of this variation to inconsistent advisor management and resource alignment with ministerial development priorities (Interview 33).

Several of the more senior coalition military officers serving in advisory roles held additional responsibilities. One senior advisor was “double-hatted” as advisor to both Afghan chief of the general staff (commander of the ANA) and vice chief of staff (Interview 60). At one point, he also served as the NTM-A chief of advisors. A British colonel was “triple-hatted” in that he simultaneously held a senior advisor role inside MoD and a lead staff role in NTM-A, while functioning as one of the senior British officers who carried additional management responsibilities. Consequently, “he basically did the advising mission about half time” (Interview 33). However, nearly all advisors working in, but not leading, advisor teams focused solely on their advising duties.

Ministerial advising was unpredictable and filled with continuous learning. Advisors serving earlier during the surge especially felt that advising “was pretty much discovery learning … go over there and see what you can do to help out” (Interview 7). On average, ministerial advisors worked 12-hour days (some more), six to seven days a week, and interacted with their counterparts most days except Friday, the Muslim day of prayer. The length and extent of their daily interactions varied widely.

*I work with him every day. I get anywhere from five minutes to it could be all day.*

(Interview 26)
It all depends on the day ... you never know what’s going to happen. Sometimes we’ll go there with an agenda, thinking we want to talk with him or with some of his staff, and the next thing you know he has other people in his office that we didn’t anticipate. (Interview 19)

Most advisors spent about three to four hours a day, usually late morning to early afternoon, at the ministries and then spent their late afternoons and evenings reacting to the day’s events, catching up on NTM-A staff work, and relaying their activities and new revelations on ministerial perceptions, motivations, and power dynamics to fellow advisors and senior NTM-A leaders (Interview 19).

In the evening, the advisors would return and report back, in a group setting, to our brigadier general. ‘OK, I sat in general so and so’s office today. We talked about this. We talked about that. I overheard him talking to somebody about this.’ That would increase our situational awareness and understanding of this complex mosaic. ... And then we would scratch our heads and go, ‘gee whiz, it’s not quite the chain of command we thought they had, but it’s nice to know that’s how decisions are being made over there.’ (Interview 32)

At a minimum, most senior advisors’ days included an early morning office meeting with their counterpart to discuss the day’s events and upcoming organizational issues and exchange any other relevant information between NATO and the ministry. Plainly put, “we’d meet every day for anywhere from 15 minutes to 45 minutes to talk through these things, [and I’d] ask what I could do for him to maybe provide advice to him on some topics” (Interview 15).

Advisors frequently sat in on their counterparts’ meetings with other Afghan and coalition leaders as well. Many even traveled with their counterparts, countrywide or beyond if necessary, to meet with subordinate army and police units, attend ceremonies, and observe ongoing training or development efforts. For example, one senior advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak often accompanied him internationally, including a trip to Poland to attend a meeting of NATO coalition defense ministers (Interview 16).
When not with their counterparts, advisors often shifted their or their teams’ attention to their counterparts’ supporting staff or subunit. One advisor noted, “I ended up spending more time with his staff because he was very busy and he wasn’t always there” (Interview 23).

You could have a real easy day like, ‘Hey sir, I just need five minutes,’ or you’ll be in there for two hours talking about whatever and then you might not get to see him the next day but you’re able to work with his staff and those younger folks that you can influence and help. (Interview 26)

To be sure, despite the unpredictability—and sometimes because of it—ministerial advising could turn monotonous. Sitting around as a passive listener-observer or simply waiting around was routine: “there was a lot of sit-around-and-wait” (Interview 7). One advisor considered it a part of the job.

I sat through a lot of meetings, drank a lot of tea. Sat through a number of meetings where no English was spoken and I didn’t have my interpreter with me. I’m sure I missed some things, but I didn’t always feel like I needed to know what was being said so it did not bother me. (Interview 15)

However, a contrasting view was that the monotony was a symptom of the language barrier. Consequently, advisors were limited in their ability to gain full appreciation of their surroundings in the ministries. Weak or duplicitous interpreters only complicated the matter.

My sense was that 50 percent of the time, I really didn’t know what was going on other than to know who was in the room, but I wouldn’t know what was being discussed. I didn’t feel that the interpreters were always as forthright as they might have been, particularly when Afghan is the only business that’s being discussed. Sometimes factional business was being discussed and had I been better prepared I probably would have been able to understand what was going on much more fully than I was. (Interview 61)

Not all ministerial advisors shared a common vision of their role. This disconnect was most apparent in what ministerial advisors called themselves as the provided advise and assistance to their counterpart. Before the surge and even into 2009 “a lot of guys would use the
term mentor” to describe their job (Interview 15). Mentor was the official title for some time, but as one advisor pointed out, the term was “a bit of a misnomer [that] never went over well with the Afghans. You’re talking about senior officials and they didn’t like the idea that some upstart colonel was going to come over and tell him how to do his job” (Interview 16). Mentoring and coaching, rather, was more likely to occur with lower-ranking ministerial staff (Interview 15). Even so, titles were inconsequential for those advising at the highest levels.

*The naming conventions were really important. You know, we started off as mentors. ... Well there’s no frickin’ way in hell that anybody is going to mentor a Minister of Defense. There was no way in hell that we could even come close. ... It was his country, it was his culture, it was his language. You know, we were not in the game at that level. (Interview 38)*

Yet, discrepancies over role identity were present on a deeper level than that of individual title. To some the job was an open-ended charge to do whatever was needed (within their powers): “For those advisors that fit the job, those that believed in what we called focused advising and that advising was hard work, our job was really enablers to create a win-win outcome” for NATO and the ANSF (Interview 38). Consequently, advising required far more than providing advice, *per se*. Many advisors assumed different roles depending on the circumstances. These roles include executive assistant, speech/briefing preparer, trip planner, strategic negotiator (e.g., “giving reverse atmospherics”), meeting coordinator, information facilitator (e.g., “carrying the mail”), intra-governmental connection maker, gate-keeper (from intrusive individuals), and at times, even advocate (Interviews 14, 15, 16, 17, 26, 32, 33, 36, 38, 42).

*I got involved in all kinds of stuff that I had no idea that I was going to get pulled into—anything from trying to coordinate access to foreign officials through their defense*

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50 Notably, ministerial participants who participated in the peak surge years (2010-2012) all referred to themselves as advisors. Also, open source NTM-A literature consistently uses the term “ministerial advisors,” suggesting a clear change in affinity to the label “advisor” over “mentor.”
attachés, trying to work with him on which aircraft they were going to buy from which country, black ops [classified operations] that were going on. It was things that I got pulled into that I didn’t anticipate being pulled into at all. (Interview 16)

Citing the nascent character of the various functional areas within the ministries—for instance, operations, logistics, and communications—other advisors took more of a managerial approach to advising out of necessity, natural predisposition, or both.

_Ninety-nine percent of my business with him was not specific to [his function]. It was organizational development, it was leadership, it was training, it was operations management, stuff that would apply ... [to] any type of organization with a mission. ... Their problems were so basic._ (Interview 7)

In this vein, another advisor felt that the essence of the position was more about developing the broader organization rather than purely providing advice to individual counterparts.

_Advising is not a very good term for what we do at our level. A lot of the military folks think advisor is one-on-one making recommendations about the bigger decision for the individual and don’t fully appreciate the real purpose of capacity development and helping our advisees, not necessarily to do their own job and to make decisions themselves, but to increase the capacity of the organization to perform its mission._ (Interview 36)

Several others held more pessimistic views of themselves and their fellow advisors. “A lot of advisors will basically do the one or two hours, three to a maximum five days a week, drop by, drop off some papers, have some chai, try and convince the guy of the coalition perspective and leave” (Interview 61). Others were no more than “eyes and ears into the Afghan Ministry of Defense” who reported to NTM-A superiors whom they met with and what they spoke about each day (Interview 32). Advisor selection was also seen as a significant problem in that greater priority was assigned to subject matter expertise rather than interpersonal skills.

_There is far too much reliance on subject matter experts. ... —we’re just throwing people in advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they’re in many cases more detrimental than they are effective. ... What made the difference was relationships, relationships,
relationships. ... Just because you’re a subject matter expert or just because you have an eagle on your collar [an Army colonel] does not make you an expert in everything, and when it comes to building relationships, a lot of people are just not cut out for that. Without the relationship, I do not believe you can have the difficult, sometimes even contentious, discussions required to effect real meaningful change. If you don’t have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time. (Interview 61)

**Tactical Security Assistance: Three Degrees of Embeddedness**

The United States and NATO based the Afghan surge on the premise that partnering with the ANSF through embedded advisor teams and combined unit-to-unit operations would accelerate ANSF development and hasten its ability to secure Afghanistan independently. Accordingly, three distinct tactical-level partnering contexts manifested in the Afghanistan case: embedded tactical advising, NATO and ANSF partnered unit operations, and special operations-led village stability operations. First, embedded advisors operated in small teams of 10 to 20 soldiers and maintained a continuous, focused presence with their assigned Afghan unit, typically an ANA battalion or ANP district. Second, NATO-ISAF tactical units established operational partnerships with ANSF organizations (army and police) assigned to the same geographic location. Through these organizational partnerships, NATO and ANSF units coordinated and combined regular security operations (e.g., patrols, security checkpoints, counterinsurgency-based raids, etc.) in a given area. As a rule, these missions “would be half US, half Afghan” (Interview 43), but the practice varied by unit and location. Several participants expound on this below. Finally, numerous US special operations forces (SOF)—beyond embedding and partnering with Afghan special operations units—also led the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program. VSO/ALP remains a unique effort to partner with rural communities to provide focused development and security assistance. I describe these three settings further below.
Embedded Tactical Advising

NATO-ISAF assigned the bulk of its embedded advisor teams\textsuperscript{51} to provide assistance at the Afghan army battalion *kandak* and police district levels. Afghan army *kandaks* were comprised of approximately 600 soldiers, except after attrition or desertion-based fluctuation. Police units were far more disparate in size, based on type (uniformed police vs. border police), location (rural vs. urban area), and level of development. For example, one embedded border police advisor advised an ABP battalion of 100 border police during the first portion of his tour and later embedded with a second, newer battalion with fewer than 50 border police (Interview 5).

US Army and Marine Corps mid-grade officers\textsuperscript{52}—majors and senior captains, mostly—led the majority of battalion-level advisor teams, comprised of “anywhere from 10 to 16 people, depending on who was on leave” (Interview 39).\textsuperscript{53} Advisor team leaders directly advised the Afghan battalion *kandak* commander, while other members advised key Afghan leaders on the *kandak* staff and subordinate company commanders. A common exception to the standard advising team was the smaller, four-man advisor team (SFAT), led by a lieutenant colonel, to advise Afghan army brigade headquarters, one level above the battalion *kandaks*. A participant from a smaller brigade level assistance teams described the alignment of their interactions the assigned Afghan brigade’s key leaders.

*I was on a four-man team, which included a Lieutenant Colonel, two Majors of which I was one, and a Sergeant First Class. We advised an ANA brigade headquarters in*

\textsuperscript{51} Embedded advisor teams carried different names—embedded training teams (ETTs), police mentor teams (PMTs), operational mentor and liaison teams (P/OMLTs), security force advise and assist teams (SFAATs), and special operations forces—depending on the time they served in Afghanistan, the type of Afghan unit they embedded with (army vs. police), and their country of origin (US vs. non-US). Chapter 5 contains a complete overview.

\textsuperscript{52} The US Air Force and Navy also assigned advisors to specialized ANSF units, particularly after the Afghan Air Force’s re-inauguration in 2008.

\textsuperscript{53} Special Forces ODA teams, originally created for a foreign advising and irregular warfare role, have 12 members.
In theory, NATO assigned advisor teams to ANSF units until they were self-sufficient. Often not enough advisor teams were available for every Afghan unit, though this shortfall subsided during the surge. Consequently, NATO-ISAF had to choose which units received advisor teams, occasionally resulting in ad hoc arrangements of ANSF units receiving advisor support and others receiving none.

We had 12 combat outposts, each one of those covered down on a battalion-kandak or a police district or both. I had about, just talking US forces here, I had about 16 teams between army kandak, police and border... and to do that I had about 400 Americans, both support and security personnel as well as the actual trainers. I did not have enough Americans to cover down on every Army kandak or every Afghan national police district, or every border outpost. There were a number of ways in which we had to pick and choose where we put coverage. ... So it was kind of a hodge-podge, not every kandak, not every outpost and not every border district had mentor teams. (Interview 2)

Predictably, advisor teams were usually, if not always, co-located with their Afghan units. One advisor recounted, “We were literally embedded ... I lived on the same floor in a [vacant] Russian hospital with the Afghan commander and his battalion staff” (Interview 39). Sharing close quarters was commonplace, especially in the more remote settings and rural combat outposts. However, specialized and supporting units—intelligence and logistics units, for example—were typically geographically closer to a higher headquarters, which, with greater infrastructure, provided more accommodation for joint working areas and segregated lodging. Although these teams were still embedded in principle, their degree of embeddedness varied by task. One participant highlighted this variation:
[Our] Afghan intelligence company lived in an adjoining FOB [base] on the Afghan side of our FOB ... [but] they went back to their own area every night. [However,] we did have HUMINT [intelligence collection] teams in the Arghandab valley who did live right with the Afghans on a regular basis in the same part of the FOB in the tent next door and things like that. (Interview 54)

Unfailingly, advisor team leaders sought out a professional working relationship with the corresponding Afghan battalion commander or police chief. Likewise, other officers and non-commissioned officers on the team worked to build similar relationships with lower-level unit commanders (Interview 27). Described as an “initial phase of gaining situational awareness and building rapport and relationships,” advisors emphatically saw this process as necessary before any genuine advising could occur (Interview 10). The progression could take weeks or months, depending on advisors’ local knowledge and ability to build trust with the Afghan leadership. Moreover, this process restarted every six to 12 months as new advisor teams replaced the old. One advisor noted the how his team arrived in Afghanistan to partner with an Afghan unit that had no foreign advisors assigned to it for several years. Advisors had to learn the Afghan unit’s organization and its leaders’ personalities before providing advice or assistance.

We arrived and ... that [Afghan unit] had not had any dedicated advisors at the time when we were arrived. They had in the past, I think several years prior, but we just kind of showed up cold. There was nobody to transition with and so we kind of walked in and introduced ourselves from square one. So there was a focus in the very beginning, I would say, you know the first month or two, was really like, just gaining situational awareness. ... I mean, we didn’t know what their task organization was in a difficult [environment]—you know, through language and even just kind of culturally understanding what they had, how their forces were arrayed around the province, how they were employed. ... A lot of times they were not necessarily employed in the same [way], per their doctrine, and just kind of learning who all the personalities were ... and it’s difficult when you’re not replacing another Western advisor team. (Interview 10)

After an initial rapport-building phase, advisors focused their efforts on helping the Afghan organization achieve self-reliance. Most advisors split their efforts into supporting the
unit’s development as a functional unit (e.g., operations/tactics, planning, logistics) and individual leader development. Due to their steady proximity, embedded advisors had an advantage in emphasizing leader development compared to other NATO unit’s operating in the field.

_We came in with the idea that we would to provide that persistent coverage on them and focus 100 percent of our time whereas anytime you’re with a partner force there just is not enough time in the day to really focus on developing the officers and NCOs of the ANA._ (Interview 53)

How embedded advisors allocated their efforts and attention varied, based on the Afghan unit’s strengths and weaknesses. One representative advisor participant described his efforts as 90 percent “pure advising,” which entailed providing assistance in the unit’s operational planning and logistics functions. The other 10 percent was “teaching and educating,” where, in his words, “we would identify places where we could add value by putting together a course or a class, whether that would be on artillery training or an MDMP [planning] presentation” (Interview 10). By contrast, on the less experienced side, one US Army Special Forces team leader described how his team focused solely on training before conducting live security operations because the Afghan commando unit was inexperienced—despite its individual members being chosen for high performance out of basic training (Interview 3). Conversely, embedded advisors with the most experienced Afghan units acted more like observers and liaisons who mainly relayed performance information back to NATO-ISAF and intervened only when necessary to prevent injury, loss of life, or a comparable catastrophe. One advisor described how his Afghan unit needed his team less and less over time.

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54 Operational planning activities include, for example, devising and writing short- and long-term unit plans, schedules, and written operations orders (directives) to subordinate units. Logistics functions often include requesting, tracking, and receiving material such as fuel, food, ammunition, and repair parts.
So we [initially] established a battle rhythm [daily routine] with them. At first we did simple things like PMCI [regular inspections], you know, clean out their equipment, like change of command inventory [equipment layouts] because I just liked to see what they had and basically make them want to do that stuff. ... And then we came into some training and then we ended up with essentially our first partnered operation [with another NATO unit]. And from there it’s kind of like we’ve been setting them more off on their own, and whereas now we’re basically an information liaison. ... If the ANA tell us they send a report for... more ammo or gear we’re over here kind of shadow tracking it and their higher headquarters. Their brigade advisor [will reply to us] like, ‘Hey, this is what’s going on.’ And it goes up and down the chain. (Interview 53)

Partnered Unit Field Operations

Whereas embedded advisors provided focused attention and assistance to individual ANSF units, regular NATO-ISAF tactical units partnered with all ANSF in their assigned area of responsibility. The number and type of ANSF units in a given area were in constant flux, especially in more conflict prone areas. Few NATO-ANSF partnership arrangements were identical since “in Afghanistan, four kilometers from one location is completely different than the place that you’re standing” (Interview 44). Therefore, it was the norm for NATO units to have multiple ANSF partner organizations to work with over the duration of their tour.

I was partnered with all three ANSF forces: [ANA, ABP, and AUP]. Roughly, it was 100 to 150 ABP, about 50 ANA, and 30 AUP. (Interview 40)

[We] partnered with various security forces as it went on. ... It was ANCOP originally and then we got a new ANA kandak, freshly trained, in the summer... about two and a half, three months in. (Interview 1)

I was partnered with several different Afghanistan security forces, most intimately with the ANA. I also partnered over time with three or four different Afghan National Civil Order Police kandaks and then also Afghan Uniformed Police element in the district that operated my AO. We also stood up and partnered closely with Afghan Local Police, about 200 Afghan local police. (Interview 43)

There were several different ANSF agencies in charge of securing that highway. They had several checkpoints. ... Mostly it was... Afghan National Police and they had several checkpoints along the way. There were some ANA checkpoints there and then there were a couple other smaller [elements] of the ANSF. (Interview 50)
NATO-ISAF tactical units did not have the same luxury of developing one, focused organizational partnership like the embedded advisor teams. Instead, having multiple Afghan partner units meant that NATO tactical units’ leaders had little choice other than to allocate their attention and resources across several units. As a result, unit leaders had little choice other to share or delegate responsibility for engaging and supporting the various ANSF units in the area.

[My lieutenants] would do a lot of [partnering], because I just couldn’t, I couldn’t be with all three, all the time, so, the lieutenants would do that. (Interview 40)

When we just had one police station in the south, I partnered with the police chief and I partnered with the ANA company commander. [But] as we started to recruit more police, I was able to push partnership of the police down to my platoon leaders [lieutenants] and I was able to maintain partnership with the ANA commander. ... I was able to have the platoon leaders work day-to-day daily patrols ... and then I would try to see the police chiefs at least one a week to go over what they wanted to accomplish. (Interview 1)

Seemingly the more geographically remote the location of NATO and ANSF units, the more austere and physically proximal their living arrangements became, particularly with the ANA. A US infantry company commander recalled, “We didn’t even have good living conditions for our own guys, but one of the ANA companies basically lived out of a burned out school that we had lived out of two months previously” (Interview 1). Many tactical infantry units “lived right next to” (Interview 55) their ANA partner unit(s), but maintained “separate living areas” (Interview 43) in the same patrol base or command post. Some NATO and ANA units not only lived and ate together on the same compound, but also had their battalion staffs share adjoined workspaces and operations centers (Interview 45). This particular closeness and frequency of interaction was nearly similar to many embedded advisor teams’ proximity of contact. However, it was not always the case, especially in the wake of increasing insider, or
green-on-blue, attacks on coalition soldiers. In hindsight, one participant felt that integrating headquarters staffs at the battalion level or higher, while well intended, was a step too far because it bred dependency.

[I am] just providing some constructive criticism, it was way too close in terms of the way we were in the command post. I didn’t have an issue with combined TOCs [operations centers], but they really needed their own space. They need their own offices away from us because you kind of get this dependency when you’ve got Big Brother there all the time who’s got all the resources and everything to make everything happen. It does not promote autonomy in that regard. (Interview 43)

Police partnerships were comparably close, particularly in the larger cities where more NATO military police forces were available to work alongside ANP. One participant described how her military police unit began its deployment advising only senior police leaders at the provincial level, but then expanded its mission to conduct partnered patrols with lower-level police units.

We lived out at the provincial police headquarters where the provincial chief of police and his chief of security [lived]. ... We were heavily into mentorship the first six months without being aligned with any particular police stations. Then in the second half [of the deployment], we picked up two MP [military police] companies and then we were aligned with [lower-level] units. We either had three or four sub-districts and each one of those sub-districts typically had one or two police stations. Afghan police stations would have a couple hundred Afghan police assigned and then each one of those police stations we’d put an MP platoon of approximately 30 people, who would live there in most cases. We had a few places that the terrain just wouldn’t allow for an embed. In those cases the kids would just commute back and forth to mentor their partners. (Interview 63)

Village Stability Operations

NATO-ISAF, through its subordinate US special operations command (CFSOCC-A), established the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program as

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55 In mid-2012, NATO-ISAF leadership temporarily halted all partnered operations to reevaluate security posture while working with ANSF.
part of broader population-centric counterinsurgency strategy to displace and isolate the Taliban from its rural sanctuaries throughout Afghanistan. To do this, SOF teams built inroads with rural Afghan communities to provide them a combination of local development and security assistance. In exchange for providing access to development projects and local markets, SOF teams worked through local leaders to select, raise, and train Afghan Local Police forces who served their communities in a defensive role.

Village stability operations (VSO) is a more holistic form of advising and partnering compared to embedded advising and partnered field operations because of its expanded emphasis on local governance and security provision. Instead of simply showing up in Afghanistan and being assigned an ANSF unit to advise or partner with, US special operations teams normally spend months or more studying and shaping the conditions (e.g., removing bad actors) in a local area before selecting and approaching a local village or community to become a village stability platform (VSP). The initial feasibility assessment is necessary to “understand the dynamics and the layers of what’s going on ... where power and influences flow” (Interview 46) to avoid fueling further conflict or disrupting the local power structures.

By design, the VSO/ALP program empowered local communities by offering them development assistance in return for nominating trusted community members to serve as community ALP guardians. Local elders retained full authority over the ALP. They nominated, vetted, and dismissed if necessary, members of their police force to ensure local legitimacy and ownership of the guardians. They also participated with community members in the selection of development priorities and projects. In return, SOF teams provided training to the ALP in basic defensive tactics and facilitated payment to the ALP and the delivery of local development projects through Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme. The SOF teams also worked to
connect the ALP to the nearest district ANP chief of police to establish a thin layer of Afghan government oversight of the ALP through the MoI. Also, as the VSO/ALP program developed, SOF teams and district level police facilitated the biometric\(^{56}\) enrollment of existing and new ALP members.

Rooted in population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine (Kilcullen 2007), the goal of VSO/ALP was to create multiple series of geographically interconnected secure areas—“security bubbles” (Interview 62)—across the countryside. Ideally, community ALP guardians provide local defense of their communities and, together, form a secure link between rural communities and district centers policed by ANP. In concept, SOF teams approached the chief power broker in a local Afghan community to gauge his interest—“we wanted to align where the true power and access to the power brokers lie ... whoever was truly holding the power in there needed to get pulled into the table” (Interview 46). Most often, this was a tribal elder. Once a SOF team established a local ALP force and the community VSP site matured, the team would create a transition plan to ensure sufficient district-level ANP oversight and that pay and other funding streams would continue in their absence (Interview 58). Upon meeting these conditions, the team would depart the village to initiate the process elsewhere. A commander of multiple SOF teams described his philosophy:

\[I saw that all my village stability platforms, all 13, were being piecemealed to the enemy because they weren’t interconnecting security bubbles. So what I did was I needed to find the variable that was kind of critical. And what I found, it was commerce. I saw ALP willing to stay and fight even after we left or pulled out of that area, if they had a link to the larger commerce market. So, I did a commerce analysis of the province using a variety of INTs [intelligence sources] and interviews and then I made about 12 VSP moves over the course of my time there, which is a ton—open, close, shift. Things as simple as moving [a VSP site] 19 kilometers to the north can pacify a whole valley is\]

\(^{56}\) NATO forces supported the Afghan government in establishing a biometric identification system and database. New soldiers and police officers’ biometric data (e.g., fingerprints, photo, eye scan, and personal identification information) were collected, stored in the database, and screened to ensure new members were not known members of the Taliban.
what I found. Our SIGACTS [attacks] went down by 75 percent by the end, which was really, I was getting crushed by IEDs [roadside bombs], so by making these few key moves, caused the IEDs to go down and that’s what really allowed us to control or pacify the province. (Interview 62)

Summary

Collectively, these brief narratives offer preliminary insights into NATO’s major partnering milieus in Afghanistan. Strategic, or ministerial, advising occurred in a mostly stable physical setting. Yet, ministerial advisors’ tasks and nature of interactions with Afghan counterparts varied considerably from advisor to advisor. In addition, a variety of actors—military, government civil servants, and civilian contractors—each with different backgrounds and expertise participated as advisors. Consequently, the interviews reveal substantial disagreement over what, exactly, a ministerial advisor’s role is and his or her appropriate degree of embeddedness with an assigned counterpart.

Alternatively, aside from the predetermined variation built into NATO’s operational design (advisor teams, unit partnering, and VSO), tactical assistance efforts varied the most in the types of interactions between NATO and ANSF leaders. By definition and supported by data, embedded advisor teams clearly experienced the closest and most frequent interactions with their ANSF counterparts. Tactical unit leaders’ interactions, however, varied considerably by individual leader, locale, and type of unit (combat vs. support). Some units partnered strictly with the Afghan army or the police. Other units partnered with numerous ANSF at different times. Also, the higher ranking the tactical leader, the more likely he or she had to share, or delegate, interaction time across several ANSF units. Finally, VSO is distinct from embedded advising and unit partnering in that SOF leaders prioritized relationship building with community leaders rather than the ALP guardian forces they created. Although relationships and influence with both
were still important, SOF leaders generally preferred to influence through community power networks than through the ALP directly.

I explore and expound upon these contextual nuances further in the following two chapters, which explore advisor and partner leader influence across the Afghan security ministries and uniformed services.
CHAPTER 7. PUSHERS, PLANTERS, AND DOUBLE AGENTS: ADVISOR INFLUENCE INSIDE THE AFGHAN SECURITY MINISTRIES

Wise men don’t need advice. Fools won’t take it.

Benjamin Franklin

This chapter addresses NATO advisors’ perceived influence inside the Afghan security ministries during NATO’s troop surge from 2009 to 2012. Thirty-one, semi-structured, confidential interviews with elites⁵⁷ who served within or supported the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (24 ministerial advisors; 7 staff and subject matter experts) reveal insights on advising philosophies, interactions, influencing approaches, and their perceived effectiveness. Content analysis of interviews and supporting documentation show strong support that ministerial advisors and key leaders relied on both power-based forms of influence (e.g., coercive demands, rewards, and punishments) and legitimacy-based approaches (e.g., persuasion, brokerage, mobilization); however, advisors generally viewed legitimacy-based approaches as contributing to better outcomes. Efficiency-based influence techniques—approaches that encouraged local Afghan innovation and self-directed learning—were in the minority.

Four main sections follow. First, I detail my content analysis procedures and provide a brief overview of the results. In the next, three sections, I provide a detailed account of how advisors observed and perceived various power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based forms of influence while highlighting diverse viewpoints. This serves two purposes. First, the act of presenting the data in this manner helps to validate both my content analysis and subsequent interpretations. Second, because this project serves both academic and practitioner audiences, the

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⁵⁷ The term elite is not in reference to a participant’s status, but that he or she was chosen for a specific purpose. See Chapter 4 for discussion on the stratified, purposive sampling strategy chosen for this study.
data also provides an important historical record for continued reflection and education among security assistance policymakers and professionals.

**Advisor Influence in the Afghan Ministries**

How did ministerial advisors influence their Afghan counterparts? Recall that much social science theory suggests that influence operates on one of three logics of action: power, legitimacy, and efficiency. Power-based approaches exert pressure on targeted actors to comply out of reward or consequence. Legitimacy-based approaches exert influence by appealing to or altering actors’ beliefs and socially accepted practices. Efficiency-based approaches create opportunities based on recipient actors’ openness to new practices or solutions to problems.

Since this project includes both rationalist and constructivist perspectives, falsification of truth claims is not possible (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 106). Rather, the best standard for valid interpretation is to show multiple, competing views and to integrate the widest range of evidence as possible (2007, 21, 106). In the course of content analysis, I recorded 83 discrete observations made by 24 ministerial advisors and two third-party observers in response to questions on influencing approaches—what I call *modes of influence*—personally used or observed in use with Afghan officials and staff. I coded each observation in three ways. First, I coded observations according to my theoretical framework (power-, legitimacy-, or efficiency-based mode of influence) and subsequently organized them into various subthemes as

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58 See theoretical framework in Chapter 3.
59 The unit of textual analysis is the “unit of meaning” (Krippendorff 2004, see also Chapter 4), that is an independent thought provided by the participant. The length could vary from a sentence to a few paragraphs. In this case, an “observation” is a series of remarks related to one specific observation of a type of influencing approach as described by the participant.
60 While the total number of ministerial-level participants is 31, all 24 advisors and only two third-party experts provided first-hand accounts of observed influencing approaches.
appropriate (e.g., coercion, material inducement, persuasion). Second, I coded each observation on a simple attitude scale of perceived effectiveness (positive; neutral-mixed; and negative). This second coding move primarily serves as an analytical means to highlight consistency and variability in influencing approaches and their perceived effectiveness. It also adds greater analytical rigor and confidence in the overall interpretation. Finally, I scored each mode of influence on a standard attitude scale of -1 (negative) to 1 (positive), while adjusting for advisors providing multiple or conflicting views, or both, on a given mode of influence. Table 7-1 provides a summary of ministerial advisor observations and attitudes derived from the content analysis.

The following subsections explore the data in greater depth, but overall the content analysis reveals ministerial advisors’ substantial use of both power- and legitimacy-based modes of influence, with varying degrees of perceived effectiveness. All 26 observing participants noted the presence of either power- or legitimacy-based influence and half (13) noted the presence of both forms (Figure 7-2). Twenty-one (80.8 percent) noted the use of power-based influence, specifically coercion via forceful demands and material inducement through giving or taking material items away from their counterparts. Notably, study participants were highly doubtful about the use of coercion as a productive form of influence with their counterparts, despite widespread use. They were also more undecided, if not slightly cynical, toward the use of material inducements.

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61 I assigned positive and negative attributions to responses clearly expressing a positive or negative tone. Neutral responses were those in which advisors noted the presence of a specific mode of influence, but were ambivalent, indifferent, or unclear in their expression toward its effectiveness or outcome. For example, “I/we tried method x, but I'm not sure whether it was effective or not.”

62 A less rigorous but often accepted practice would be simply presenting dominant themes without a careful examination of conditions for why participants hold consistent or divergent views.
Eighteen participants (69.2 percent) noted the use of legitimacy-based influence, though it manifested in greater variety compared to power-based alternatives. I describe this variation in detail below, but briefly, advisors were most vocal about using persuasive argumentation, brokerage (i.e., shaping information and deliberating), and mobilization (i.e., working around their counterpart). Other lesser-used forms of influence included isolation (i.e., removing counterpart from normal context), teaching, and shaming. Compared to power-based approaches, advisors typically expressed a greater degree of optimism about legitimacy-based approaches, particularly persuasion and mobilization, though this was not without some degree of reservation or uncertainty.

Finally, only four (15.4 percent) ministerial advisors noted the use of efficiency-based approaches, namely, encouraging trial and error and facilitating emulation and dialogue. The four viewed these efforts as mostly positive; however, their low representation across the sub-sample suggests that ministerial advisors employed these forms of influence less frequently than others.
Table 7-1. Ministerial Advisor Observations and Attitudes on Modes of Influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-sample size: 26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 24 Ministerial advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 Third-party observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants with Observations</th>
<th>Sub-Sample Coverage</th>
<th>Observation Count</th>
<th>Observation Avg.</th>
<th>Advisor Attitudes Toward Mode of Influence</th>
<th>Adjusted Standard Attitude Score</th>
<th>Weighted Attitude Score by % Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral / Mixed</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-based Influence</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Demands, pressure tactics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forced dismissal of leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material inducements</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material threats, sanctions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives, favors, indulgences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.05</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy-based Influence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
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<td>34.6%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic timing, weaving</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seed planting in conversation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appealing to image, pride</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mimicking communication style</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citing military history</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
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<td>Reciprocity</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>Brokerage</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Mobilization</td>
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<td>Teaching</td>
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<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.50</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active, on-the-job instruction</td>
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<td>7.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expository methods (lectures)</td>
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<td>3.8%</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1.50</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>69.2%</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>Facilitating emulation</td>
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<td>11.5%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitating cooperative dialogue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Sample Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. This represents the number of ministerial participants (out of 26 total) making observations in a given (sub) category.
2. This is the count of participants with negative, neutral, or positive attitudes toward a specific mode of influence. It is not a total count of individual observations. Counts will not necessarily sum up to the total of advisors (second column) in a given subcategory since several participants offered more than one observation with differing/conditional attitudes toward their effectiveness. For example, “coercion in instance x was a total failure due to condition a, but was necessary in instance y because of condition b.”
3. This indicates the number of participants expressing differing or conditional attitudes toward a particular mode of influence (see note 2).
4. This indicates the average attitude for a specific mode of influence scored on a scale of -1 (negative) to 1 (positive). The scores are adjusted to avoid over-counting advisors who indicated multiple or conditional attitudes on a given mode of influence. For example, under the Teaching category, one of the two participants provided a positive and negative example of a type of teaching. These two observations were thus adjusted to a net contribution of 0 (neutral) in the overall scoring. Advisors providing both positive and neutral views contribute an average score of 0.5 in the overall computation; those with negative and neutral contribute a -0.5.
5. In this case, participants noted the presence of a specific mode of influence, but either with ambivalence/indifference or without expressing a clearly discernible (+/-) attitude towards its effectiveness or outcome. For example, “I/we tried method x, but I’m not sure whether it was effective or not.”
6. Subcategory amounts will not necessarily add up to the subtotals because several participants provided observations on different modes of influence. For example, 21 participants noted power-based approaches overall. Sixteen of these noted the presence of coercion, while 11 advisors noted material inducement. Five of these same participants noted the presence of both coercion and inducement.

Figure 7-2. Set Distribution of Ministerial Participants Observing Power-, Legitimacy-, and Efficiency-based Approaches
Power-based Influence

Coercion

Sixteen ministerial participants (61.5 percent) noted the use of coercive demands. The distribution of views reveals a highly unfavorable outlook on coercive tactics. One participant dismissed coercion as a viable approach noting, “I don’t think we have any coercive leverage particularly at the advisor level… [yet] we end up pushing a lot more for the price and outcome” (Interview 36). Attempts at coercion still took place despite ostensibly negative outcomes, as four participants describe below.

The strategies that we found were the absolutely least effective were the ones that we said, ‘This is what you need to do’… [They] normally didn’t happen… You don’t go in pounding on desks. You don’t point fingers. You don’t direct Afghans… Once they dig their heels in, they are dug in. It’s just so hard; once they’ve turned on that confrontation it’s so hard to get them to back down. (Interview 17)

When an advisor was fairly aggressive and pushing a certain agenda, that person was kind of marginalized. (Interview 11)

The coercive tactics, if you only have a couple transactions, you can get away with that. In an advising role there are very, very few times when you play that because of the pace of operations and lack of oversight. (Interview 33)

I think coercion was always counterproductive when I saw it employed in Afghanistan or when people would attempt to employ it…. The Afghan generals are a great deal more ruthless and brutal than we are. They’ve come up from a much harder school than we have … and every time I think I saw a threat made to an Afghan general, regardless of the gravity of the threat, it failed and usually rebounded on us. (Interview 60)

The content of coercive demands varied from mundane bureaucratic routines to the compelled adoption of major policy or structural reforms. For example, among the more banal requests, one advisor noted the Afghan Army Chief of General Staff’s (the ANA commanding general) reaction to coalition demands that he give a presentation via PowerPoint in a certain way:
One time he had to brief ... [for] this Saturday senior security shura [Afghan-NATO leadership meeting]. More and more, the briefing [responsibility] was shifting over to the Afghans. The Afghans had difficulty with PowerPoint. That’s probably one of the bad things we showed them how to do was how to do PowerPoint. The coalition senior leaders in the room wanted slides in a certain way with certain pieces of information, and I tried to convey that to the general to the point he got very angry with me. He said, ‘It’s my briefing and I’ll pitch it the way I want to pitch it.’ He didn’t use the word pitch. All I could think of was what I was told came down from high, that, ‘I want the slides a certain way.’ I just knew that sitting in there on the following Saturday that he was going to pitch it the way he wanted to and the coalition guys are going to rip my ass because he didn’t do it their way. The right way would have been, ‘This is the information we really need to see.’ (Interview 15)

On more strategic and political matters, coercion stemmed from NATO’s urgency to develop enterprise-level functions63 within the Afghan defense and interior ministries, specifically, setting policies, developing doctrine, and building effective systems to create, direct, and sustain units in the field. Developing these executive level functions inside the nascent Afghan ministries involved advisors urging their Afghan counterparts to create similar written policies and regulations and to enact structural reforms on topics ranging from gender integration to the devolution of authority to intermediate level commanders below the ministerial level. Often NATO personnel would draft policies for their counterparts in English, translate them into Dari, and then give them to their counterparts for approval, signature, and implementation.

As an example, Appendix B, Figure B-4 provides an excerpt from a signed copy of the Ministry of Interior Directive on Operational Activities of the General Directorate of Police Special Units. The document is split into two columns: English on the left, Dari translation on the right. Three advisors separately describe how this process unfolded below, each indicating that without Afghan involvement or buy-in from inception the effort was usually met with

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63 Enterprise-level functions pertain to large organizations’ capacity to manage and support multiple departments and independent units or organizations. For example, ministries are focused on macro-level functions such as force generation (recruiting, training, doctrine), policy development, operations (command, control, communications), and sustainment (budget/finance, acquisitions, logistics, maintenance).
opposition.

*We had a couple of instances where the staff would put together ... they didn’t have a physical security strategy ... [a plan for] how you control documents and lock up the building and control access and those types of things. So the guys on the staff wrote up a 70-page regulation on how you should do it. And then the expectation was, ‘Oh you are just going to hand them a copy of it in English and a week later they are going to translate it and sign it and it would be their new regulation.’ You had to socialize things like that and get them involved in the process.* (Interview 13)

*We tried to get a recruiting order signed. It was two pages long and we had [a meeting] with my boss and the deputy minister. We had it prepared in Dari and we took it in there and my boss said, ‘We need to get it signed now; it’s a month overdue,’ and I almost laughed in front of the deputy minister but I didn’t. The deputy minister looks at it and it’s in Dari, his staff prepared it and I’m kidding you not, he goes, ‘Oh, there’s some misspelled words.’ And it didn’t get signed for a month, but after a month, they redesigned it and sent it out. If you get pushy with them, they will push you off. If you have a little give and take, then they are probably going to be OK with it.* (Interview 26)

Another advisor expressed his frustration with the persistent imposition of Western organizational models, especially those related to acquisitions and logistics. On one instance, he was asked by NTM-A leadership to urge his deputy minister counterpart to try to convince the minister of defense, Abdul Rahim Wardak, to approve an acquisition purchase of replacement propellers for their C-27 transport aircraft. The fleet was grounded completely at the time, in part, due to Afghan neglect and disdain for the C-27 and desire for new C-130 transport aircraft (Interview 61). “So I was asked to go get [the deputy minister] to go see the minister and change his mind…. [The deputy minister] sure didn’t believe in that mission and it was a pretty heated argument. He knew I was pushing it, but he wasn’t buying. We ended up, by the way, in the minister of defense’s office and got thrown out” (Interview 61). He also describes a separate incident of a US Army major arguing with an Afghan general officer about a change that NATO wanted made in its logistics system.

*I remember clearly [the Afghan general] kind of threw up his hands and said, ‘I hear what you’re saying. I disagree with you. I’m going to make the change, but when you...*
leave I’m going to go back and do it the way the Russians did it. ’ Now, here’s the real moral of that story. I kind of just shoved it aside until that evening in the staff meeting I heard that incident portrayed as a huge success. I said to myself, ‘There’s no success there. The guy deferred, he didn’t agree, so it’s not sustainable. It’s not enduring. That’s no success.’ But we do that, have done that over and over and over again in Afghanistan and other countries. (Interview 61).

Advisors supplied more examples of Afghan leaders shirking or stalling on coercive demands, especially when it was apparent to them that NATO could not maintain focus on the issue in question. Several participants noted Minister Wardak’s staunch resistance under NATO pressure on matters related to internal structure, authority, and materiel. He, in particular, “never signed any documents” (Interview 14) and “knew that there was never a follow up” even after he yielded to pressures (Interview 38). A major example was his lengthy hesitation to approve Decree 5001 which devolved a significant degree of power and authority on matters such as senior officer promotion and assignment below his and the ANA Chief of General Staff’s level.64

Another respondent described the drawn-out process of urging Minister Wardak to destroy large caches of World War II-era ammunition and more than 6,000 tons of outdated, unstable explosives scattered across the country, which posed a great risk to both Afghan and NATO personnel (Ian Graham 2010). “Through a lot of pressure and coercion and trade-offs and so on, the minister did agree and did start a destruction process” led by the Indian government (Interview 38). However, after a month or so, the Afghans halted the destruction and “to this day the ammunition still exists” (Interview 38). NTM-A simply had less staying power to follow through on coercive demands involving high-level political actors.

Despite the apparent drawbacks of more forceful approaches detailed above, three advisors felt that a degree of assertiveness was necessary to maintain momentum; otherwise,

64 The excerpt at the end of this chapter provides more details on this example.
nothing would be accomplished. For some, success equated to keeping their counterparts on schedule.

*I was the one who started the process and made sure that they started on time because they would delay things and constantly I had to worry about delays and milestones. I laid out a whole series of milestones for the preparation of each document so that I could be relatively sure that they were going to complete on time. Had I not been the pusher of that, I don’t think the documents would ever have been completed on their own volition.* (Interview 14)

This advisor added that he did not want his counterpart to become “his big buddy” but rather gain the “value of working for something” and he “was a disappointment to him [his counterpart]” because he “just refused” to give him material goods (Interview 14). He added, “At times I was kind of dictating what should be placed in the documents” but if they felt strongly about something “I would back off” so as not to lose their ownership in any particular product (Interview 14). He described a situation in which an Afghan colonel serving as a staff member to his Afghan general counterpart modified a previously agreed upon strategic planning document.

*We had to reel him back in and say this is not what was agreed on and there’s some major conflicts with the National Military Strategy and so why don’t we go back to the original document? Well, he didn’t like that, so it basically became a power struggle between me and [my counterpart].* (Interview 14)

Despite the conflict, the advisor felt intervening through his counterpart was necessary due to the potential consequences of the Afghan General Staff planning operations in a manner inconsistent with the National Military Strategy.

Two other advisors explained how coercion was necessary in high-profile incidents, but this required senior NATO leadership involvement: “sometimes the senior military leadership just has to go over and somebody has to be fired” (Interview 22). One incident involved a situation of corruption and neglect so egregious that it made the international news and endangered the overall NATO mission in Afghanistan. Widely publicized, this episode involved
the discovery that the Afghan army surgeon general, Major General Ahmad Zia Yaftali, pilfered tens of millions of dollars’ worth of pharmaceuticals (paid for by the United States) and denied other resources from the Dawood Military Hospital to the point wounded Afghan soldiers were suffering needlessly and starving to death (for details see Abi-Habib 2011). There was a great deal of Afghan resistance to simply removing, much less prosecuting, Yaftali, though he was eventually removed.65

A more successful example of pressure tactics involved NTM-A commander Lieutenant General William Caldwell’s determined persistence to remove multiple Afghan generals filling posts inside the Ministry of Interior. As one advisor recounts, his efforts were helped by two events: the passage of a retirement law (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Justice 2010); and the 2010 appointment of Afghan Army Chief of General Staff, Bismullah Khan Mohammadi to serve as the new Minister of Interior, who, notably, has been a close partner with the Afghan coalition (Moyar 2010).

Material Inducement

In contrast to the predominantly negative views on coercive tactics, 11 advisors expressed (42.3 percent) decidedly mixed, if not cynical, views on the use of material resources—funding, equipment, and supplies—as tools of influence. These views differed almost

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65 As told by an advisor present at the time, they first tried to work with Yaftali, but once discovering that he was “a malign actor,” NTM-A cut off all interactions with him (Interview 32). “Finally, Petraeus went to [Minister Wardak] with the demand, ‘You must fire this guy’” (Interview 32). Yaftali, however, happened to be the second-most powerful ethnic Tajik in Afghanistan in the wake of the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani in 2011. Wardak initially balked “with great hesitation” due to the ethnic politics involved “but he was fired and even the deputy minister of defense who is highly regarded by the coalition as an honest broker but also a Tajik, felt some outrage” (Interview 32). The only positive outcome of this particular story (to date) was that the ISAF commander fired Yaftali after a forceful demand. The Afghan government has yet to arrest or charge Yaftali with a crime, despite public outrage. General Petraeus’s successor, General John Allen, ultimately “decided there was little to gain in picking a fight with Mr. Karzai over the matter” given his overt obstruction and clear unwillingness to pursue the investigation any further (Rosenberg and Bowley 2012).
perfectly according to the type of inducement. Advisors viewed inducements applied as threats or punishments as effective when necessary, but inducements used as incentives to be largely ineffective. Notwithstanding, material punishments were rare, threats were hollow, and incentives relied upon too frequently.

Advisors saw using resources as incentives as a trap. While incentives may provide short-term gains, they only perpetuated unhelpful dependency and false expectations in the end. Advisors often succumb to “the stuff game” (Interview 28)—providing material resources to their counterparts—especially at the outset of their relationship as a participant recounts:

> An early sense of whether you’re a competent advisor, in [the Afghans’] view, is whether you can deliver them the stuff that they want. I think every advisor falls prey to that initially because there is this process by which you’re requesting things, equipment, big and small, to assist in the accomplishment of their mission. ... At the end of the day, it really was kind of an exchange. (Interview 28)

One incentivizing tactic some advisors used was to arrange exchange trips for their counterparts to visit the United States and other countries to learn how security ministries operate elsewhere. Still, “the positive reinforcement thing, to hold a carrot out there so that they would accomplish something, ... [was] kind of an insulting way to do business” and created a dynamic by which they were “looking at us to reward their good behavior” (Interview 28). Consequently, “it didn’t matter at the end of the day if he liked me or didn’t like me, but ‘what can you do for me?’ … If I could help him solve [his problems], he loved me, [but] I felt like my stock, the value wasn’t increasing as much” (Interview 21). Using material incentives, quid pro quo propositions, and guilt-laden reminders of individual or NATO assistance efforts were not “seen as being too awfully effective” (Interview 21).

More problematic, advisors were under great pressure to show results and thus some would “do things for their counterparts just to show progress, but it may not necessarily be what
the Afghans want or what they can sustain” (Interview 21). The temptation to do favors and yield to “the stuff game” was strong. For example, one advisor described his frustration with caving in to his counterpart’s constant requests to print off documents after repeated attempts to convince him to request printer ink through the Afghan supply system (Interview 14). Another argued that “sometimes you had to pick the ball up,” but the real difficulty lies in “figuring out how far you move the ball for them before you give it back” (Interview 15).

In contrast, four advisors noted successful instances of threats and punishments by withholding resources as a means of enforcing Afghan compliance. One interior ministry advisor had sufficient authority to cut funding off, or at least his counterpart believed he did, and had no qualms about using it when necessary. As he put it, “The only way I could get [my counterpart] to do anything is if I waved money in front of him or I threatened to take money away” (Interview 42). He described an instance in which his counterpart was not feeding or temporarily sheltering a portion of his police forces as they were relocating their headquarters.

_We were setting up Conex containers [temporary shelters] for his people to live in and the money that we gave him—he wouldn’t pay for the food or anything like that til finally I threatened him. I said, ‘I’ll take away all the money. I’ll do it directly and you won’t get any,’ and that got him motivated._ (Interview 42)

Two other advisors noted the successful withholding of fuel for accountability purposes. One case involved shutting off jet fuel to ensure Afghan pilots were properly logging their flight hours and that the planes were not being used for undocumented drug runs (Interview 32). A similar approach was used to improve ANSF vehicle accountability. An advisor described how the Afghans initially had trouble with and resisted requests to take stock of all the vehicles that had been issued to them over the years. That changed when NTM-A told the Afghans that it would ration out fuel based on the number of vehicles they could actually and account for. He
recounts, “they did a lot better after that and actually found almost every one of their vehicles” (Interview 22).

Finally, an advisor noted the effectiveness of threatening to cut funding off to build a law school for training new ANA lawyers. The school required a sufficient number of Afghan legal instructors to be trained and ready to teach once the construction was completed. However, the advisor’s counterpart “didn’t want to give up his few good literate officers” to perform the initial training before the school was built. He would rather “wait until they got their new offices” instead of going to the temporary school which was in a less than desirable condition (Interview 34).

_It was kind of childishness and at one point I just threatened to take the money away. I said, ‘We’ll cancel this project. We’ll put the funds back into uncommitted funds and forget about it. We’ll send all these folks home.’ They blinked and they provided the people that we needed them to provide and then we proceeded with the training and allowed the construction to move forward._ (Interview 34)

He noted how there is a general misconception that power-based approaches to advising were unfailingly ineffective (Interview 34). Despite the initial fallout, he noted that his relationship improved for the better over time. After his threat to scrap the new law school altogether, his counterpart “got angry” and felt “shamed” because he was not allowed to save face. However, after a few weeks his counterpart “saw that [he] was truly committed to him” and he eventually “got over it” (Interview 34).

From a broader perspective, advisors expressed considerable cynicism about their influence via material resources. The glut of resources was “an interesting problem” (Interview 32). With roughly $4 billion of NATO funding injected into the ANSF annually, the flow and availability of material resources played a central role in the daily life of ministerial advisors. “We couldn’t spend the money that we had” to the point “there was more money than good
ideas” (Interview 32). The advisor describes a weekly resourcing meeting that occurred every Saturday at NTM-A headquarters in which just about everything was approved. “Everybody who had a bright idea from, ‘Yeah, we need to build a new fitness center for this [Afghan] army unit,’ from $200,000 up to a couple million dollars would bring their bright ideas up. And I would say 98 percent of them got approved” (Interview 32).

Three advisors surmised that using threats or withholding resources could have been helpful but noted that Afghan officials knew that their advisors had no ability to make credible threats. Cutting off resources “would have been very, very effective many, many times” but it rarely occurred (Interview 32). One advisor noted that withholding resources was the only viable option to curb the incessant obstruction of criminal investigations and prosecutions of high-level officials for corruption and other crimes within the Afghan military (Interview 34). Yet, senior NATO leaders, in particular, were reluctant to cut off projects and resources.

Many times at the colonel level we would advise our leadership, ‘We’re seeing bad behavior. They’re not responding to our advice. I say we take some of their pet projects and just stop them, not move forward on the money and the support we’re providing them.’ And the response we would get from our [supervisors] was something along the lines of ‘Not going to happen.’ (Interview 32)

Advisors, thus, had little, if any, ability to turn off the flow of money and resources. “There’s a momentum with spending that—not just [for] buildings, but also for weapons, for ammunition, for vehicles” (Interview 35)—that if you stop the money upstream once it is in the system it hurts both the Afghans and other members of the NATO coalition. Even if they had the power, the potential ripple effects pose risks of greater disruption to the overall reconstruction effort. For example, “if you stop a construction project [with labor provided by Afghan contractors], those guys are going away and they might not come back when it’s time to start it back up again,” all of which would further delay visible progress (Interview 35).
Still, even when there was a growing consensus to cut back on material resources, such as the numerous $300,000 armored sport utility vehicles used by Afghan senior officials to move around Kabul, higher-order politics could quickly undermine the stance. All it took was a meeting between the Afghan minister and a senior NATO or government leader to thwart cutting off resources (Interview 61).

**Legitimacy-Based Influence**

More than two-thirds (18 of 26) of the ministerial participants offered insights on legitimacy-based forms of influence. Advisors generally hold a more favorable view of these approaches than of power-based influence. They describe these approaches in a richer variety of forms than power-based approaches. Participants noted six distinct modes of influence rooted in the logic of legitimacy: persuasion, brokerage, mobilization, isolation, teaching, and shaming.

**Persuasion**

The most widely discussed form of legitimacy-based influence was persuasion, more specifically, the act of communicating an argument to a counterpart to provoke action or change beliefs. The only negative view expressed on persuasion was described as making a request couched in a justification for why NATO needed action.

*One that rarely worked was, especially when we were being rushed, was that sort of influence tactic of ‘this is really important to NTM-A, this is really important to ISAF,’ which I think is unfortunately overused by many advisors, frequently would not produce the kind of result, and rarely was it ever a sustainable result.* (Interview 33).
Three advisors expressed neutral or mixed views on persuasion. Without providing a clear indication of its effectiveness other than it was hard to do well, one advisor noted that the hardest aspect of advising was “selling” (Interview 66). Taking on cultural traits were necessary: “You have to go native a little bit to sell…but not too much” (Interview 66). Another “could never tell what [his counterpart] was really accepting and internalizing and agreeing to, or whether he was just blowing him off,” partly due to cultural and language barriers and partly “because of his [counterpart’s] personality” (Interview 7). The third noted that simple rational argumentation, or using “straight logic, ‘here’s why this is good, this will lead to blah, blah, blah’…was spotty” (Interview 33). To this participant, logical argumentation worked occasionally with “more educated” Afghan counterparts (Interview 33).

Eight advisors expressed positive views on persuasion. Among the more positive perspectives, several noted how they were more persuasive when injecting argumentative appeals that mattered in some way to their counterpart. For one ministerial advisor, persuasive arguments were those that included reasons for why specific actions enhanced his counterpart’s organizational reputation and prestige.

_Toward the end of my assignment, I was increasingly linking hard decisions or things that needed to be done, ways of doing things to ‘this is important for building bilateral defense relations with the United States. This is important to proving that your ministry is ready to execute the strategic partnership agreement.’ And that definitely worked. I mean, I don’t overplay that, but I think I was able to help the assistant minister and his deputy understand why it was important for them … in large part because of that argumentation. And that seemed to work well._ (Interview 33)

The same advisor noted a separate technique that he felt was helpful. He used “seed planting,” as he described, to shape future discussions and build local ownership of ideas. Ministerial officials’ needs and requests were often unpredictable and, consequently, it was “tough to work through your agenda” on a daily basis (Interview 33). As a means of adapting to
the daily tumult, but still moving forward on specific tasks or milestones, the advisor would “plant a seed” by introducing an idea posed as a question. For example, rather than having a 30-minute conversation about a particular topic and making a rational argument, he would inject a comment such as, “Hey, have you thought about blah, blah, blah? Next week I hear that is happening. What do you think?” (Interview 33). He added that his counterparts, when acting on the ideas he had planted previously, frequently caught him off guard weeks later.

I was surprised at how often I would forget that I planted the seed. One of the principals would bring something up that I had mentioned two or three weeks prior. And so I thought that that was successful, but the unsuccessful part was that I lost track of some of the seeds that I had planted and it became kind of a chaotic environment by surprise, but those are good surprises. (Interview 33)

Another advisor explained how mimicking his counterpart’s style of communication and argumentation was the best way to get through to him. He lamented how, initially, his “general was really stubborn… [and] basically had the attitude that it was going to be his way or no way” (Interview 24). At the time, this general had recently been appointed as the first national-level chief of a new police structure within the Ministry of Interior. Naturally, among this general’s first priorities was establishing the organizational structure of his headquarters. As told by the advisor, the general grossly overstaffed his headquarters—“I’m like, ‘General, you can’t do that. We need to whittle this [headquarters] down to like 25 people’” (Interview 24). In all of his counterpart’s stubbornness, he recognized how the general was, in a way, “a warrior poet” in that he would always tell him longwinded stories and anecdotes to prove his points. He described, “so I basically did the same thing right back at him and I found he actually responded to that better than anything … at that point, I realized that a light had come on, ‘OK, I got it, I know how to deal with this guy, I know what’s going to work and what’s not going to work’” (Interview 24).
Citing examples of military history were useful in dissuading another advisor’s counterpart from making poor choices related to strategy and operational design. The advisor described an instance in which his general tried to convince him that putting all of the Afghan army units on a Pakistan border would cause the Taliban insurgency to “wither on vine” (Interview 14). In this instance, historically grounded argumentation—delivered in a respectful manner—seemed to work as a means of steering a counterpart away from a potential blunder.

Three advisors noted how timing was just as important as the substance of their arguments (Interviews 15, 16, 66). At one point early in a relationship, one advisor thought he would “push the envelope” (Interview 16) on an issue with his counterpart. His counterpart shot back a look and said in response, “I’m not ready for that yet” (Interview 16).

Timing was an important aspect of trying to be effective in that job. When he was ready to listen about a particular idea, you had to be able to know and sense when that opportunity existed to be able to float an idea or to have a conversation with him to further an issue or to solve a problem that was created. (Interview 16)

Even though NTM-A leaders occasionally pressured him to force an issue with his counterpart, “in some cases it would take [him] five days to have that conversation with [his counterpart] about it, not because [he] was afraid to talk to him about it, but because [he was] looking for those signals” for the right timing (Interview 16). Another advisor described his timing process as weaving sensitive topics into conversations (Interview 15). He felt that at times there was little “benefit of going in there every day and hammering on the same thing,” but rather weave it into conversation even if it took a few days for the right opportunity (Interview 15).

Sometimes when he would express something in frustration, it would open the door for me to be able to say, ‘Well, you know, sir, that’s a great point. We’re frustrated with that, too. I think coalition senior leaders are looking for you and your team to do something about that. Do you have any suggestions? What is your strategy towards dealing with that?’ He goes, ‘I don’t know. We’re working on this or that,’ and then I may say, ‘Well, sir, as you go through this, maybe you might want to consider A, B, and C as you do that.’ He’s like, ‘OK, that’s good,’ or he would come back and say, ‘Well, that may work
in your army, but it won’t work here in Afghanistan and here’s why,’ and then he would explain it. (Interview 15)

Brokerage

Brokerage, another mode of legitimacy-based influence that emerged from the interviews, is similar to persuasion in that it shares the purpose of guiding action or beliefs. Its key distinction, however, lies in the subtlety of communication. Instead of a direct rational argument, brokerage is an ultimately a selective exchange of information. Advisors deliver information or knowledge in a manner that reveals intentions and allows the counterpart room to consider alternatives or adaptations. Often the advisor attempts to steer the process toward a choice or solution that functions well for both parties.

Participants viewed brokerage either positively or neutrally, as if it were simply a given aspect of their job. Importantly, no participant gave any indication that brokering was ineffective.

As described in the narrative above, some advisors viewed this in terms of shaping a dialogue through the act of sharing information, while others saw it as a means of socializing ideas to build ownership. Nevertheless, in this sense advisors were brokering for institutional reform. The basic example of brokerage occurs when advisors propose a solution such as an organizational model or policy for their counterpart’s consideration. But rather than directly forcing or appealing for its adoption, as described above, the advisor works with his counterpart to confer a sense of ownership in the outcome or final product, including adaptations.

They’re interested in hearing our process, but it’s likely they have another way and for their purposes it may be a better way…. I think it’s important to present our process and how we would do things. And then you kind of just talk it through and see what their position is, and not be too insistent on doing it our way. (Interview 23)

I found that the best strategy for me was [to] come up with the best game plan that I thought would work for them and then show it to them. So I would write strategies, I would write concepts of [operations], I would write organizational flows that I thought
would work for him and let him chop on it. Or I would write these things, you know, transfer, translate them all in to Dari and then we’d have working groups and we’d kind of work through them. I felt, to me, that was the strategy that worked. (Interview 21)

Too many guys went in with the attitude that they were going to fix things on my tour and that general is going to listen to everything I say.... In my mind, it was all compromise ... they had their agenda and you had your agenda and somewhere in between you had to reach an amicable solution. (Interview 24)

While this process was collaborative, advisors were at times selective about the information they presented to their counterpart.

We had lots of conversations about you know, ‘This is how we do it in the US, this is how I saw the Swedes do it, this is how I saw the French do it’ kind of thing and let them figure it out their own way. When you deliver discussions like that, you are just selective about what parts of the discussion you are talking about and where you are trying to get them to ... and then you skew it the way you think it should go. No, really, you are selling used cars. (Interview 13)

Advisors sometimes operated as brokers in both directions. Several advisors indicated how they were essentially middlemen operating between NATO and the Afghan ministries, much like double agents relaying information between the ministries and NTM-A/CSTC-A.

The [generals] had a very great deal of [combat] experience. What they lacked, I think, was the ability to understand what ISAF wanted from them or to connect effectively with us.... So I tried to help them with that as much as I could and I think that’s probably where advisors were most effective as well. (Interview 60)

A major portion of what I did was also just be [a liaison] between CSTC-A and the Afghan Ministry of Defense and their army staff ... I was the guy that carried the mail or I floated ideas. So [my counterpart] would suggest something and I would then plant the seed back at CSTC-A and gauge the response.... It helped me think, ‘Are we trying to frame the issue so we can find common interests or do we have common interests and people just aren’t talking to each other? (Interview 16)

Another advisor described how he used a white dry erase board to communicate ideas back and forth with his counterpart. He explained, “The actual act of me drawing it, out as opposed to shoving this thing that has already been prepared, was more personal because he was able to take the pen out of my hand and he could draw his thoughts” (Interview 42). In the course
of this back-and-forth process, he discovered that his counterpart resisted the new organizational structures NATO had planned, particularly in terms of numbers of officers of various rank in their headquarters. After gaining a better understanding of his counterpart’s needs, he took the information back to NTM-A.

That helped build a rapport because I had to end up going back [to NTM-A] and saying, ‘You’re telling me that you’re only going to give them x, y, and z, but they really want to do it this way and it’s probably better off … because they don’t know how to do it your way.’ (Interview 42)

Mobilization

Mobilization is a form of influence that seven ministerial advisors discussed in either positive (four) or neutral (three) perspectives. In an advising context, mobilization describes the act of influencing an individual indirectly through his surrounding organizational social network—subordinates, peers, and superiors. Participants had no shortage of adjectives for describing this approach. First, “holistic mentoring,” involved being able to work with multiple actors and understand the social networks within the organization (Interview 66). It was important because sometimes “your guy might not be receptive, but others around him might be” (Interview 66). Another described this approach as focusing on the office over the individual. While “you cannot necessarily mentor and encourage the personal development of the 70-year-old lieutenant general who’s been a lieutenant general for 30 years, you certainly can help his colonel, his chief of staff, [and] his office staff” (Interview 60). Finally, triangulation66 is another term ministerial advisors used to describe the act of influencing around a specific Afghan leader.

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66 Triangulation was the term the participant used. One should not confuse this with triangulation as a research method to enhance validity of truth claims.
So [one approach] was triangulation, where ... if you’re working with a principal, one way to influence that principal so that he or she is getting direction or inspiration from multiple levels of the organization so that you are orchestrating someone above him giving them direction. Myself, as an advisor, [I was] providing horizontal inspiration or guidance and also working with subordinates to be feeding that principal ideas or thoughts so that they are kind of constantly getting indicators to move in one direction, or potentially move in one direction, as a decision-maker. And that generally seemed to work reasonably well, especially in a hierarchical system. (Interview 33)

However, working around counterparts does not necessarily mean every advisor working with any and every Afghan who would listen. Effective network-based influence requires having the right advisor(s) influencing the right Afghans, namely, “the pragmatists” (Interview 17) and norm entrepreneurs. One advisor mentioned that the advisors sometimes “war gamed” who within the network of advisors would introduce a particular idea with a particular Afghan leader “to give [the idea] more traction” (Interview 16). Unfortunately, the language barrier often limits advisors’ ability to identify the more internally influential local actors.

And that’s kind of finding those right people. It’s not always the people who speak great English, and dress western, and are the ones that know how to make you smile. It’s finding those people who are willing to address issues, willing to look at topics, and really sit down and be open about things, I guess. And sometimes that means they will openly tell you that you’re absolutely wrong and go away. That’s fine. At least you understand that’s where they are coming from. But finding those people and then working through them, we definitely saw success with that... A lot of the time, I think we partner with the people who speak English the best, and smile, and tell us what we want to hear. And those people in my opinion and from my experience don’t get a lot done. It’s the pragmatists; it’s the folks who are willing to sit down at the table with you, not confrontationally, but as kind of fellow statesmen. (Interview 17)

Other Legitimacy-based Approaches: Isolation, Teaching, and Shaming

To a lesser extent, participants cited use of three additional legitimacy-based approaches— isolation, teaching, and shaming. Two participants noted a benefit of interacting with their counterpart outside of his normal environment. One advisor noted that getting his
deputy minister counterpart out of the office “helped me as an advisor” to better explain concepts. He also mentioned that his method for dealing with resistance was “talking off line, in private” (Interview 66). In a more neutral stance, one advisor said that advising in private was best.

*Advising probably is something that should take place behind closed doors. And I found behind closed doors even the Afghan principals sometimes were not reluctant at all to ask questions, to ask for advice and assistance, but out in the open where there’s other Afghans particularly about, things could come up most remarkably, at which point I didn’t try to push things too hard. I tried to, I suppose, know my place. When we were out and about doing Afghan business, it’s not my place to be front and center.* (Interview 60)

Teaching is another method two advisors mentioned. Most ministerial advisors whose counterparts were deputy ministers or higher did not necessarily teach their counterparts in a formal sense. There were apparent exceptions within the ministries, however. Subordinate staff sections comprised of Afghan colonels and below, or other Afghan officers with more technical specialty, civil engineering for example, were occasionally subject to training from NTM-A advisors and contractors. Both observations reveal that active teaching—hands-on, on-the-job style training—was generally effective. One advisor described a process through which, initially, classroom-style instruction for Afghan engineers was ineffective (Interview 23). Upon receiving poor feedback, they successfully adapted by having a Western architecture firm contracted for ongoing facility construction integrate the Afghan engineers into the design process and daily work on site (Interview 23).

Another advisor described a civilian contractor’s impressive employment of teaching tools to simultaneously create and train a programming and analysis staff section within the MoD. The function of this particular ministry staff office was to integrate operational plans with budgeting. In his words:
He built with his Afghan counterparts a very disciplined and structured instructional course over 44 weeks in 22 sessions where he basically kept them on a schedule of building skills in relation to the flow of work. And then [he] was able to successfully bridge the real-world, inbox-type of advising to the skill building that was happening in the office with the staff and the leadership. That seemed to work really well with that particular organization, given that they were at a relatively low level of capability. ... My sense is that he sort of emphasized classes that were related to certain points in the annual budgeting process in relationship to what this office was supposed to be doing at certain points in time. And then he’d use next year’s program to sort of emphasize points again and made adjustments along the way depending on real-world things that were happening. And I saw him several times very successfully link, ‘as we were talking about in class last week, blah, blah, blah, here’s why this week we need to be focusing on yada, yada related to a particular working group.’ And it seemed to be very useful, helpful, and appreciated by his Afghan counterparts. (Interview 33)

Finally, two ministerial advisors noted their attempted use of shaming their counterparts to little or unknown effect. One mentioned his use of occasional sarcasm with a police general when he shirked leadership responsibilities, such as making phone calls to coordinate meetings at the provincial or district level.

He became very—at some points when he didn’t want to do something he was—I won’t say passive aggressive, but he basically wouldn’t act.... I kept telling him ‘General, you are the chief of the Afghan Local Police so it is your responsibility.’ I would use sarcasm with him sometimes. One time he said, ‘Who am I to do this? Who am I to do this?’ I finally looked at him and said, ‘I don’t know, General. I thought you were the chief and as a chief, you’re in charge.’ That kind of hit home with him I guess. ‘Oh, OK, I’ll do it.’ (Interview 24)

With little indication of effectiveness, another tells a story about how he and some fellow advisors tried to build a sense of shame by demonstrating their work ethic in hopes it would inspire a similar degree of effort their counterparts.

We would try with varying degrees of success to build a degree of shame, I guess is one way to express it. We would demonstrate to them in certain ways how hard we were working in order to ensure their success. ... It became a refrain among some advisors that I, [or other advisors] shouldn’t care more about their mission than they do. I shouldn’t be working harder than they are, was kind of the advisor mantra. We would use that, sort of our willingness to work the hard long hours, as a way to inspire them to do
the same or to build the sense of shame that they were not working as hard as we were at getting their country to where it needed to be. (Interview 28)

Efficiency-based Influence

Efficiency-motivated actions are rational and utilitarian. Individuals and groups seek to maximize gains. For example, an actor emulates a successful foreign practice when she believes it will bring greater gains over the status quo. Actors may also experiment to explore new methods or technologies that will bring greater returns. Since this motivation is primarily internal, advisors mainly play a facilitating role.

Facilitating Emulation, Innovation, and Dialogue

Notably, only four advisors (15.4 percent) described instances of playing such a role. In uncertain terms, one noted how creating a regular meeting, or “staff call…to talk out issues” was necessary to facilitate dialogue between two Afghan generals who did not get along and refused to communicate with each other (Interview 19). However, all four described how they positively facilitated emulation in some way. One advisor arranged for more computer-aided design training for Afghan engineers.

One of the topics that kept coming up was they all wanted some new engineering software and training...towards the end they were doing very advanced lighting simulations and topographical computer programs, not to mention AutoCAD. ... That was a big surprise—that that’s what they wanted and when they got it they really took advantage of it. I think it has to do with their marketability outside of Afghanistan. (Interview 23)

Three others noted similar circumstances in which their counterpart(s) were first allowed to struggle, experiment, or try different options; grew frustrated; and were then more open to
One advisor let his counterpart flounder during the early stages of implementing a national identification card program.

*He pretty much came to us and said, ‘No, I don’t really need your help. It’s going to be an Afghan solution for the Afghan people. Blah, blah, blah.’ And now all of a sudden he’s coming to us more and more, asking us for help, because I think he’s beginning to see that it’s too big of a bite.* (Interview 19)

Another described a process of experimenting with different formats for senior field commanders and staff to brief the ANA chief of staff.

*We tried a bunch of different types of briefing settings to see what would stick. [After a few months of trying different formats] we waited until the moment he expressed some frustration and then we said, ‘Why don’t you put out a theme every week of something you want briefed to you, just that particular topic?’ That was moderately successful ... even though some of the coalition guys were, ‘Well, that’s not really how it should work. This is what [he should do].’ ‘Well, first of all, it’s not your briefing, it’s his briefing.’* (Interview 15)

Finally, Minister Wardak’s approval of establishing a strategic communications office within the ministry, distinct from his own personal public affairs spokesperson, serves as another example. For some time, the Taliban had been highly effective at constructing pre-planned propaganda and releasing their messages simultaneous with their violent attacks throughout Afghanistan. The MoD’s messaging was often untimely and “always on the defensive” (Interview 21). Instead, they “wanted to beat the drum in a good way and also have the capability to defend against the Taliban propaganda” (Interview 21).

*We briefed it to Wardak. And he was all over it. He was like, ‘I know exactly what you’re talking about and I’m all for it and we need to do this.’ So, to me, that was an exciting time to see the Afghans embrace it, and they really did”* (Interview 21)
Conclusion

In response to the study’s central question, strong evidence supports the claim that ministerial advisors relied most heavily upon both power- and legitimacy-based approaches to influence their Afghan counterparts; they rarely used efficiency-based approaches.67 There is also a significant discrepancy between commonly used approaches and their perceived outcomes. These two key observations have significant implications for SSR program theory and practice, which I address in greater depth in the concluding chapter after a similar exploration of advisor influence at the tactical level.

67 One explanation for this is the semi-structured interview format. It is possible that a greater share of ministerial advisors also use efficiency-based approaches than is reflected in the data. However, the questions asked were open ended (e.g., “How did you influence your counterpart? What was effective/not effective?”). Therefore, the data reflects more of the participants’ raw, initial observations than observations intentionally skewed toward any one particular mode of influence.
Excerpt: Narrative Illustration of Ministerial Coercion: Decree 5001

Several advisors serving at different times noted a particular difficulty convincing Minister of Defense Wardak to sign off on strategic documents—“the minister of defense never signed any documents” (Interview 14). The prolonged approval process for Decree 5001, the Ministry of Defense Organizations and Functions Manual, serves as an important illustration. Decree 5001 stipulates that all authorities, command relationships, organizational structures, and missions originate from the President of Afghanistan through the Ministry of Defense, general staff, and subordinate elements of the Afghan Army and Air Force. It is essentially “a mirror copy” (Interview 16) of the US DoD Joint Publication 1 (DoD, 2013a).

The wrangling over this particular document predates the establishment of the NATO training mission to at least 2007. Even then, Directive 5001 was a priority for the CSTC-A commander, Major General Robert Cone. Initially, Minister Wardak “signed it because [General] Cone was really adamant about him signing it and then Cone left and Wardak just put it in his desk drawer and it never saw the light of day” (Interview 14). The issue lingered into 2009. At that point, another adviser noted, “I don’t think they were quite there yet and we were pushing it pretty hard to get it enacted and signed. [Minister Wardak] was very resistant and pushing back on it” (Interview 16). A NTM-A information paper shows that even in January 2011 the decree was still “under review” (see Figure B-5).

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68 Appendix A of the MoD Organizations and Functions Manual, March 29, 2011, defines the command relationship for the ANA accordingly: “Ultimate command authority for the ANA is held by the President of Afghanistan. Command authority may be devolved to the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ground Forces Commander, the AAF Commander, and Afghanistan’s Special Operations Command – all levels of command are ultimately responsible to the President of Afghanistan for the ANA, AAF, and ASOC as appropriate. The First Deputy and all staff in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, Recruiting, Training, Logistic and Medical Commands have no command authority outside their own mission specific chain of command, unless specifically directed by either the President of Afghanistan, Minister of Defense or Chief of the General Staff” (DoD IG 2013, 6-7).
As a caveat, it is important to highlight that in 2004, Minister Wardak outwardly welcomed the assistance from the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC-A—NTM-A’s and CSTC-A’s precursor) and several of its civilian contractor advisors from MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Inc., now a subsidiary of Engility, Inc.) in the drafting and approval Afghanistan’s first National Military Strategy. A DoD press release from 2004 cites, “Wardak said that the help of the MPRI mentors contributed greatly to the development of the [National Military Strategy]. He noted how valuable an August 2004 seminar was in bringing together representatives from the MoD, the Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan and MPRI in order to work on the National Military Strategy” (DVIDS, 2004). In this instance, Afghan leadership was clearly heavily involved and invested in the joint working group that drafted its military strategy.

However, under closer examination, the substance of the Afghan National Military Strategy is uncontroversial, at least from the Afghan president or defense minister’s perspective. A 2010 version of the Afghan National Military Strategy (see Appendix B, Figure B-4) shows that this document merely defines roles and missions of the ministry and subordinate organizations and establishes goals and priorities across the Afghan defense sector. It does not outline specifics on command relationships or individual powers and authorities below the minister himself. Decree 5001 was eventually approved with an effective date of March 29, 2011 (DoD IG 2013, 82).

An advisor shared some important insights into Minister Wardak’s recalcitrance and eventual assent to signing the document. He suggests that Wardak “probably did a smart thing” by holding out for Parliament’s passage of the Afghan military service law (Interview 16). This legislation spelled out promotion authorities and retirement benefits, creating for him somewhat
of an out from approving a policy that might later prove politically risky to him or the country.

Much of Wardak’s opposition seemed to stem from the risks of delegating too much authority to subordinates of different ethnicity.

What I sensed was the underlying part of that was, for example, the ethnic divides and differences among the Afghans and the traditional authority the senior ministerial officials have vis-à-vis their subordinates. … In their system, the minister has virtually all power to do promotions and selections and everything else. Well, the Afghan National Army Chief of Staff wants to have some authority, too, in determining who his battalion commanders are and corps commanders are and whatnot, so there was some real tension about what authorities they should have and at what level should the ANA Chief of Staff be allowed to promote and influence promotions of those folks. Obviously, when you have a history of having coups and other things like that, you don’t want to be giving too much authority down below and delegating that. … So, I think there were some sensitivities and concerns about that. (Interview 16)

A related factor potentially contributing to the high-level resistance may be opposition to the organizational structures that Decree 5001 enacted. Since 2009, NATO has worked to develop an Afghan Ground Forces Command, an operational headquarters positioned above the seven Afghan army corps-level headquarters, reporting directly to the ANA Chief of General Staff. According to a 2013 DoD Inspector General report, several MoD officials and senior Afghan Army officers still express doubt about this headquarters as an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and that the “codified [command and control] guidance may not reflect current Afghan command practice, nor be sustainable in the future” (DoD IG2013, 7).
CHAPTER 8. TEACH, BRIBE, OR DRAG: TACTICAL ADVISOR AND UNIT LEADER INFLUENCE ON THE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

Neither situations nor people can be altered by the interference of an outsider. If they are to be altered, that alteration must come from within.

Phyllis Bottome, *Survival*, (1943)

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Major General John M. Schofield in an address to the US Military Academy Corps of Cadets, August 11, 1879 (USMA, 1950)

This chapter addresses NATO advisor perceived influence inside the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) during the NATO troop surge from 2009 to 2012. Thirty-seven, semi-structured, confidential interviews—conducted with embedded advisors (15), tactical unit commanders (10), Special Forces team leaders (six), and external observers and subject matter experts (10)69—reveal insights on advising philosophies, interactions, influencing approaches, and their perceived effectiveness. Content analysis of interviews and supporting video evidence show that tactical participants used mainly power- and legitimacy-based approaches, much like their ministerial counterparts did. Additionally, these tactical participants strongly favored the

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69 For a detailed breakdown, see Appendix A, Table A-2. Notably, four participants served simultaneously in both an embedded and partnered unit capacity.
use of legitimacy-based approaches; yet, unlike those who worked inside the Afghan security ministries and favored persuasion and brokering, they favored a variety of teaching methods. Efficiency-based modes of influence were scanty mentioned.

This chapter follows the same structure as Chapter 7. Accordingly, I provide four sections—one brief overview of the content analysis results and three sections on the three main forms of influence: power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based influence.

**Tactical Advisor and Commander Influence across the Afghan Security Forces**

Following the same content analysis procedures as in the previous chapter, I recorded 101 unique observations made by a sub-sample of 31 embedded advisors, partner unit commanders, and third-party participants who observed power-, legitimacy-, and efficiency-based modes of influence. I subsequently scored each observation according to the participant’s perceived attitude. Broadly, much like their ministerial advisor colleagues, tactical-level participants also discerned a substantial degree of power- and legitimacy-based modes of influence. All 31 tactical-level participants noted observations of either power-based influence, legitimacy-based influence, or both. Only two participants in the sub-sample also observed efficiency-based influence. Table 8-1 and Figure 8-2 provide a summary of tactical-level advisor and unit leader observations and attitudes derived from the content analysis.

The content analysis reveals similar attitudes toward power-based approaches as those held by ministerial advisors. First, coercion ostensibly fails in all but extreme cases—those being the removal of corrupt or inept Afghan leaders. Of those viewed as failures, the majority were attributed to NATO tactical units compelling (i.e., “dragging”) Afghan army and police to

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70 This sub-sample of 31 represents all those of the 37 interviews who directly participated or observed NATO-ANSF partnerships (i.e., embedded advising, partnered operations, village stability operations).
conduct security patrols and raids. Attitudes on material inducements split along two lines: material threats or sanctions (positive) and material incentives and favors (negative). Participants generally said that using resources as incentives stymied development and prolonged dependency. Material threats and sanctions were largely effective. Moreover, a key observation was as available material resources diminished, NATO-ANSF advising relationships improved.

Second, tactical participants expressed legitimacy-based influence in the greatest variety of forms. Among these legitimacy-oriented subtypes, 18 noted four different teaching methods: guided discovery, symbolic modeling, and expository instruction (e.g., classes and lectures), and one-on-one evaluation. Eleven participants had mixed feelings toward persuasion—a clear distinction from their ministerial advisor counterparts, who tended to favor a variety of techniques. Other lesser modes include symbolic reinforcement, shaming, mobilization, and isolation.

Finally, only two participants mentioned the utility in facilitating ANSF innovation by providing resources and latitude to work through their own problems and experience controlled failure.
Table 8-1. Tactical Level Observations and Attitudes on Modes of Influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power-based Influence</th>
<th>Participants with Observations</th>
<th>Sub-Sample Coverage</th>
<th>Observation Count</th>
<th>Observation Avg.</th>
<th>Advisor Attitudes Toward Mode of Influence</th>
<th>Advisors w/ Mult. or Conditional Attitudes</th>
<th>Adjusted Standard Attitude Score</th>
<th>Weighted Attitude Score by % Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material inducements</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>10 1 8</td>
<td>2 -0.12</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives, favors, indulgences</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>10 1 3</td>
<td>0 -0.50</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material threats, sanctions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0 0 5</td>
<td>0 -1.00</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>12 0 3</td>
<td>0 -0.60</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands, pressure tactics</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>12 0 0</td>
<td>0 -1.00</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced dismissal of leader</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 0 3</td>
<td>0 1.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.95</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 3 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 0.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.35</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy-based Influence</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Advisor Attitudes Toward Mode of Influence</th>
<th>Advisors w/ Mult. or Conditional Attitudes</th>
<th>Adjusted Standard Attitude Score</th>
<th>Weighted Attitude Score by % Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>4 3 15</td>
<td>4 0.61</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided discovery learning</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0 2 11</td>
<td>0 0.85</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic modeling, demonstration</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 7</td>
<td>0 0.80</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expository methods (lectures)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 0 0</td>
<td>0 -1.00</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-on-one evaluation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
<td>0 0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 4 4</td>
<td>0 0.09</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational argumentation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 4 2</td>
<td>0 -0.11</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to image, pride</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 0 1</td>
<td>0 1.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouragement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 0 1</td>
<td>0 1.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Reinforcement</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0 0 7</td>
<td>0 1.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaming</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0 2 2</td>
<td>0 0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0 1 3</td>
<td>0 0.75</td>
<td>0.10</td>
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<td><strong>90.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 3 15</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 0.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.35</strong></td>
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<th>Advisor Attitudes Toward Mode of Influence</th>
<th>Advisors w/ Mult. or Conditional Attitudes</th>
<th>Adjusted Standard Attitude Score</th>
<th>Weighted Attitude Score by % Coverage</th>
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<td>Facilitating innovation</td>
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<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 1 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 0.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.03</strong></td>
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| Sub-Sample Total                                          | 31                             | 100.0%              | 101               | 3.26             |                                          |                                          |                                  |                                  |
1. This represents the number of number of tactical advisors, partnered leaders, and third-party observers (out of 31 total) making observations in a given (sub) category.
2. This is the count of participants with negative, neutral, or positive attitudes toward a specific mode of influence. It is not a total count of individual observations. Counts will not necessarily sum up to the total of participants (second column) in a given subcategory since several participants offered more than one observation with differing/conditional attitudes toward their effectiveness. For example, “Coercion in instance x was a total failure due to condition a, but was necessary in instance y because of condition b.”
3. This indicates the number of participants expressing differing or conditional attitudes toward a particular mode of influence (see note 2).
4. This indicates the average attitude for a specific mode of influence scored on a scale of -1 (negative) to 1 (positive). The scores are adjusted to avoid over-counting participants who indicated multiple or conditional attitudes on a given mode of influence. For example, under the Teaching category, three participants commented on several different teaching methods with different corresponding attitudes. Advisors providing both positive and neutral views contribute an average score of 0.5 in the overall computation; those with negative and neutral contribute a -0.5.
5. In this case, advisors noted the presence of a specific mode of influence, but either with ambivalence/indifference or without expressing a clearly discernible (+/-) attitude toward its effectiveness or outcome. For example, “I/we tried method x, but I’m not sure whether it was effective or not.”
6. Subcategory amounts will not necessarily add up to the subtotals because many advisors provided observations on different modes of influence. For example, 21 advisors noted power-based approaches overall. Fifteen of these noted the presence of coercion and 17 observed inducement; therefore, 11 advisors noted the presence of both coercion and inducement.

**Figure 8-2. Set Distribution of Tactical Participants Observing Power-, Legitimacy-, and Efficiency-based Approaches.**
Power-based Influence

Material Inducements

Of all modes and types influencing approaches, tactical-level participants had the most to say about using material inducements. Seventeen embedded advisors, partnered leaders, and observers (54.8 percent) noted the presence of material inducements: “It was definitely a quid pro quo environment. They would do what we wanted them to do operational-wise as long as we were able to provide something for them. ... That was kind of our carrot on the stick that we used to keep them moving forward” (Interview 5). Expressing the lone neutral view on material resources, this advisor saw resources as a given aspect of advising and exerting influence. However, participants expressed a clear attitudinal distinction between, on the one hand, incentivizing Afghan behavior, and on the other hand, threatening, limiting, or placing conditions on the release of material resources to Afghan counterparts. Ten participants provided negative comments on the use of material inducements to motivate counterpart behavior, while three noted some limited benefits in specific circumstances. Five participants saw positive gains in withholding or material resources.

Only three participants noted the successful use of material inducements as incentives. Interestingly, two battalion commanders noted some limited gains when used in specific circumstances in which Afghan culture would enable a mutually beneficial outcome. For example, one saw limited success by placing a television in an Afghan police station and configuring its arrangement in a way that would incentivize the police force to maintain round-the-clock shifts.

Truthfully, we put televisions in there because, if you have a television in there with cable that has the Afghan news on it, it’s more likely that people are going to stay there 24 hours anyway. So we kind of used their culture to bring that concept along. We made the
TOC [operations center] look less like a US TOC and more like a Shura room with the flags and the pictures of Karzai and kind of break area. It’s not in our culture to hang out in the TOC and get chewed out by the sergeant major, but for them, if you can get them to hang out in their radio room, they’re more likely to be doing their job. We kind of had to see things the way they see it to get the thing that the U.S. wanted, which was to have a 24-hour TOC. We had some success, not full success with that. (Interview 63)

A second infantry battalion commander saw resources as means to promote a sense of equity and build morale in his ANA counterparts. Specifically, he used resources “to show good faith” (Interview 43) that he genuinely cared about his Afghan counterpart, his counterpart’s soldiers, and their living conditions. He was mindful of the unmistakable disparity between US and Afghan amenities and comforts (e.g., equipment, air conditioned living and working quarters, food) and how this imbalance negatively affected the working relationship between his and his Afghan counterpart’s soldiers.

Nevertheless, strong majority participants noting the use of material resources conveyed a clear perception that material incentives bred dependency, or worse, instilled heightened or counterproductive expectations in their counterparts: “Giving them things to do things—atrocious. That is bad leadership. Do not do it.” (Interview 44).

You constantly hear guys saying you know, ‘I can get you this.’ It’s kind of the carrot-and-the stick approach. ‘I can get you this if you do this for me. I can get you that if you do this for me or, hey, if you don’t do this for me, then I’m not going to let you get x.’ Yeah, very much a carrot and a stick, reward and incentive. … But you can also see with the Afghans themselves. Saying if you want me to go on patrol, you need to get me this. (Interview 18)

I remember one morning we were in a compound for a few days and there was a resupply the night before. And the Afghans, no joke, were, like, ‘Where is the fresh fruit?’ This is the morning. We’re like, ‘Fresh? What is it, the freaking Hilton? You’re wanting a continental breakfast? Seriously? You want a tablecloth and a bucket of fruit?’ … When we pay out all these people, we create a culture of dependency. (Interview 31)
The interviews also clearly demonstrate a degree of learning from past units’ overindulgence with the ANA and ANP. Previous NATO units were apparently “throwing money at problems ... giving them tons of fuel, giving them tons of full support to get them on their feet” (Interview 48). Outgoing NATO units started warning fresh units rotating into Afghanistan, “if you start giving [the Afghans] fuel, it’s going to be a never-ending cycle. You’re going to create a culture of dependency” (Interview 50).

Though it may have caused some initial friction, participants also noted benefits of withholding material resources from their counterparts while still providing them intellectual capital though their expertise as advisors. Their units “started weaning [the ANSF] off” of their support and became a “safety net to prevent catastrophic failure” (Interview 48). NATO units began shifting their approach to providing their counterparts fuel and supplies only as a last resort.

_We made an immediate decision to, ‘Hey, we’re not here to give you stuff. We’re only advisors. We don’t have any money. We don’t have any resources. All we have is us and what we know.’ ... We weren’t buying them ... the nice things. We were buying them stuff they actually needed and they weren’t getting through their supply chain and I think we kind of started almost like a new command climate._ (Interview 53)

_They’re making a whole lot of progress because I think it’s been accelerated because we’ve stepped back ... I think personally that it has accelerated their development out of necessity._ (Interview 48)

Several units placed conditions on the release of supplies. For example, some would go to great lengths to verify that their Afghan counterparts made every effort to request supplies through their own troubled and underdeveloped logistics system.

_The same thing applied to the ANP and ANA, you know, ‘Did you go through the process?’ Same thing for logistics with those guys. ‘Did you put in the request? Let me call up the squadron. Hey, did you guys get the request? Yes. They can’t get anything from higher? No. OK, I’ll give it to them.’ You know, if they’re doing the right thing, then they’d see a reward._ (Interview 1)
The biggest thing ... was forcing the Afghans to use their own chain of command and their logistics and things like that. ... We had to get them to the point where they could do their own and be more self-sufficient. So what we did was require them to go through the process ... a very ponderous, slow process. They at least had the experience, then, of having to do it themselves before we hand things off. (Interview 54)

Threats worked as well for those with the ability to control resources. For example, because US SOF teams controlled ALP weapons and pay, they could easily penalize underperforming ALP by putting them on half-pay for a month or taking away their weapons for unprofessional behavior (Interviews 18, 47). One infantry battalion commander successfully threatened to pull back his unit’s support to an ANA battalion commander until a corrupt and possibly unstable subordinate commander was removed.

They had a company commander that was absolutely corrupt and incompetent and one of the things that I said was, ‘I am not going to tell you whether or not you should remove him or not. I’m not going to say one way or the other. But I will say that as long as he is there, I will not have my Marines partnered on any advisor training capacity with that company, because I do not trust his decision making and I do not trust that he will not otherwise fly off the handle’ He did on a couple of occasions, lose all kinds of control and threatened one of my lieutenants. (Interview 55)

Most interestingly, one third-party observer noted a broader trend that as NATO increasingly rolled back its resources deeper into its security transition with the ANSF, tactical units initially struggled to maintain influence with their counterparts. However, ostensibly those who best managed the diminishing ability to apply material influence had taken the time to develop effective working relationships with key Afghan leaders.

When [a new unit] came in, they were faced with the budget cuts and the stand-down in providing sustainment and support like fuel truck parts and all the things that the US partners had been doing to keep them hobbling along in light of corruption and other problems. So they didn’t have that carrot anymore, so that was a challenge and they found ways around it. I think that at times they probably didn’t get the responsiveness from this AUP unit that their predecessors would have had when they had to call them up for last-minute missions, but I know this one platoon leader in particular just made time.
He knew that one of these police lieutenants, who was a big personality and really respected in his community ... and so he found a way to make sure that they did more than just once-a-week visits there, somehow get him on base, somehow invite them over so that they can have dinner on the US base, that kind of thing. (Interview 57)

Coercion

Only three of 15 participants noted positive outcomes resulting from coercion. Each illustration depicted the removal of an inept or dishonest Afghan leader. For clarity’s sake, NATO leaders were not directly firing unfit Afghan commanders. Although the participants pushed and initiated removal by collecting evidence against the incompetents and reprobates in question, Afghan superior officers carried out their dismissals. Yet, in contrast to many Western military forces in which an officer’s relief for cause is typically a career-ending event, it was commonplace for fired Afghan leaders to simply be reassigned elsewhere (Interview 5).

Part of the key to success for us was the replacement of the kandak commander. The initial guy that I was partnered with spoke very good English, [was formerly] a general officer in the Ministry of Defense, well connected, but a very difficult person to operate with, not necessarily interested in cooperating, obviously interested in lining his own pockets, and dealing with all that corruption. It was more about what can I do to get money from the Americans and get more comforts. Over time, through basically building a case against him, he was removed. The guy that came in behind him was essentially placed there to cooperate. When he was there and it was as if a cloud had been lifted off of that unit—the ANA guys in the kandak were literally almost dancing in the street. They were so happy to see this guy go. (Interview 43)

I had issues with that [ABP] battalion commander. I ended up getting him relieved of command and detained, and then trying to rebuild after we got rid of him. I forget what they were called, but the internal affairs division that was based out of Orgun came down and detained him based off of, he was smuggling money, selling the fuel instead of feeding his men. He wasn’t feeding his men well. We had a bunch of sworn statements from them, so we got him detained by basically their internal affairs and relieved of his battalion command. (Interview 5)

Barring intolerable circumstances related to corruption or gross incompetence, coercion by telling Afghan soldiers or police what to do was “obviously the worst thing you can do”
Forceful demands via direct orders or pushy requests were highly detrimental to advisors’ and partnered unit leaders’ relationships and their long-term ability to influence their Afghan counterparts.

_Coercion is an absolute fail. You can’t coerce them into doing anything and if they do do it after you’ve coerced them into doing it, the negative ramifications that it’s going to have on everything else you’re trying to do is astronomical._ (Interview 44)

_You can’t holler at these guys [Afghan soldiers]. You can’t. You can’t just go in there—unless it’s a life-and-death situation—and stop these guys from doing some of the things that they do, because you completely disenfranchise yourself._ (Interview 10)

_You’re dealing with a very direct culture and so when people get told, ‘Do this, do that,’ not unlike ours, I don’t think too many people, even the most disciplined army soldier loves to be told what to do. I don’t think it’s inherent as [sic, ‘unique to’] Americans as individuals. Afghans are certainly no different. There’s a lot of pride._ (Interview 31)

At the same time, embedded advisors and especially partnered unit leaders clearly operated under a substantial degree of external pressure to compel Afghan forces to take over responsibility for security operations. Consequently, coalition forces drove up the frequency of combined NATO-ANSF operations. Several embedded advisors, partnered unit leaders, and third-party participants confirmed this observation. Yet, Afghan motivation to conduct operations varied by the unit’s overall experience and its leader’s personal willingness. Consequently, a common initial outcome was “big-brother partnering” by which a US unit would drag Afghan units around on patrols rather than planning and executing the operations in a genuinely collaborative or partnered manner, as intended. This caused tactical units a considerably degree of frustration.

_One of my complaints ... this whole concept of you have to ... you will go on your partner’s operations. Well what if they don’t want to go out that day? Well, are you going to force them to go out? Well, if you force them to go out, you’ve created a level of animosity that you’re not going to be able—no, just don’t go out. Why is that mission so important that day that you go and collect that intelligence that day? Fuck that, just don’t go out. You will make better strides by just sitting down in the [base camp] and the two
hours or three hours that you would have been out on that dismounted patrol, talking to your Afghan chain-of-command and partners and finding out why they didn’t want to go out that day. (Interview 44)

I spent a lot of time talking to the units about this. Initially we heard a lot of frustration and negativity about the fact they felt they had to drag the ANSF along, kind of just like what you see in the Marjah film with the guys pushing ANA in the door first. (Interview 57)

This last participant references the HBO documentary, The Battle for Marjah (Wonke and Anderson 2011), a front-line account of a U.S. Marine infantry company’s experience in Helmand province during the first major offensive during the Afghanistan surge in 2010 (video available on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9Pq5JZ2Fd8; accessed March 1, 2014). Minutes 23:00-25:00 in the film feature a Marine infantry squad clearing a Taliban-occupied compound alongside a squad of ANA in the midst of an extended battle. In the clip, a Marine squad leader forcefully and colorfully orders a four-man team of ANA soldiers to enter the compound. In all fairness, militaries are instruments of coercion and the film represents tactical unit partnering at its extreme—direct combat. The use of harsh commands and language in the act of exercising controlled violence should be somewhat unsurprising.71 However, the more pertinent question at hand is whether this approach is an effective tool to influence ANA development over time.

The battle of Marjah was an example of NATO’s initial offensive push to clear Taliban out from their southern footholds in early 2010, with ANA largely in tow. As the mission shifted toward relinquishing responsibility for security operations to the ANA, partnered unit operations

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71 While the squad leader’s use of insults may arguably reflect questionable leadership and professionalism, other US Marines in the film were just as susceptible to bellicose commands. The same film later depicts (53:00-55:30 min) a firefight in which a Marine squad leader shouts harsh orders at different US members of his unit. Aggressive coercion (i.e., “command and control”) of subordinate infantry units maneuvering on a battlefield is a necessary element of achieving tactical victory in ground combat, given the intensity, chaos, consequences, and overall “fog of war” (Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret 1976/1984).
took on more of a “schizophrenic” character (Interview 57). Platoon and company leaders were in constant tension, torn between building ownership in their Afghan counterparts to collect their own intelligence to drive their own operations and the top-down pressure to increase security operations in general. On one day, Afghan units would conduct operations driven by local intelligence that they collected over weeks or months with US support. On another day, a higher headquarters would direct an operation that might confuse or irritate the Afghan units due to the lack of understanding of why the coalition was insisting they conduct or participate in a particular mission (Interview 57).

Confusion, however, was inconsequential compared to other potentially negative outcomes stemming from coercive demands. One advisor recounted how pushing the police to investigate local individuals without any real understanding of the local community created local Afghan blowback and further undermined, rather than strengthened, the police in the locals’ eyes.

*There have been times when we stepped in I think and tried to direct their operations and you’ve probably seen something like this before where we knew where somebody [a suspected bad guy] was, we wanted them to go there to do something about it even if it’s just biometric [enrollment]. ... What we don’t understand sometimes is all of the dynamics behind that. We basically forced the police to go do some operations and what we had done is screwed up an entire social kind of structure that was there previously that was accepted. And it backfired on us because we’ve kind of put the police in a bind with this guy and had people looking at us in a bad light because we were messing with someone they thought was a good person who protected them or something.* (Interview 48)

At its worst, coercion could breed resentment to the point of physical violence. For example, one heated incident involved a highly regarded ANA squad leader’s refusal and threat to a US platoon sergeant’s directive to search the house of a suspected Taliban affiliate. After a series of extended interviews with both the US and ANA platoon, the most likely explanation
was that repeated directives to search individual homes, especially bedrooms, was causing a significant rift between the US and ANA.

*I interviewed the platoon right afterwards where they were out with their ANA partners and they were trying to clear a house in this one kinetic [violent] district that I mentioned. The ANA leader refused and then they pushed him again because they had multiple pieces of intel that indicated that the house had this particular individual in it. He refused again and then something happened and then he turned his gun, pointed his gun at one of the unit leaders. I think it was the platoon sergeant said, ‘Kill me.’ [The Afghan was] like, ‘I’ll kill you first, too. Tell me to go in that house again.’ So it was interesting later on is that they actually said he’d been such a phenomenal partner for them to work with. This ANA leader who refused to do that mission, and as we talked to more ANA personnel about their feelings about clearing houses and what community security responsibility really looked like, they, the Tajik and Pashtun ANA, would say that it’s the worst thing that we’re doing. It’s the biggest problem in partnership, next to Qur’an burning. (Interview 57)*

Two participants noted how they learned their lesson to avoid using coercive demands. Upon reflection, one embedded advisor expressed appreciable regret for being forceful, if not somewhat disrespectful, to a more senior Afghan officer. He noted, “Looking back and even right then at that moment we all recognized that that was wrong. Here I was forcing the Afghans to do something outside of their system just to accomplish a short-term coalition goal” (Interview 12). A battalion commander also explained that he had to discourage his junior lieutenants and captains from “get[ing] into some contentious fight about some op[eration] that they [thought needed] to be done” if their Afghan counterparts didn’t think it was valuable (Interview 55). Rather, instead of “goad[ing] [the Afghans] into taking action…then you either need to get rid of the Afghan leader who is inept or unwilling, or you just need to kind of recognize that it is just not something they are interested in doing” (Interview 55).
Legitimacy-based Influence

Twenty-eight tactical level participants (90.3 percent) observed the use of legitimacy-based approaches to influence their Afghan counterparts. Six varieties of influence emerged from the data (from most to least frequent): teaching, persuasion, symbolic reinforcement, shaming, mobilization, and isolation. With the exception of teaching via classroom-style instruction and Western-oriented explanations of concepts and activities, participants were consistently optimistic about the effectiveness of legitimacy-based influence.

Teaching

Teaching was tactical participants’ most highly observed and revealing legitimacy-based mode of influence. In all, 18 participants (58.1 percent) noted its use. However, the teaching methods they described varied; so did their attitudes. The data reveal four distinct types of teaching methods used (highest to lowest frequency): guided discovery learning, symbolic modeling and demonstration, expository instruction (i.e., lectures and explanations), facilitating learning dialogue, and one-on-one evaluation. Participants viewed guided discovery, modeling, demonstration, and discussion methods positively; they saw little utility in expository instruction.

Note that education scholars classify teaching and learning methods based on two key factors: (a) the learner’s level of activity and (b) the degree to which the teacher structures the learning process. The former factor applies to the concept of active learning (Bonwell and Eison 1991). Whereas passive learning essentially amounts to listening, active learning entails learner engagement in “higher-order thinking tasks [such] as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation” (1991, iii). Active learning is also further measured along behavioral (i.e., physical) and cognitive activity dimensions (Mayer 2004, 15).
The latter factor applies to how instructors shape and deliver knowledge content. In highly structured environments, instructors provide learners with the problems and the relevant answers, concepts, information, or rules. A lecture is a prime example. Conversely, unstructured, or discovery learning, occurs when “the learner is not provided with the target information or conceptual understanding and must find it independently” (Alfieri et al. 2011, 2). Discovery learning is essentially a self-guided process with minimal to no instructor involvement. Importantly, between these extremes lie “guided discovery learning” methods “in which the student receives problems to solve but the teacher also provides hints, direction, coaching, feedback, and/or modeling to keep the student on track” (Mayer 2004, 15).

**Guided Discovery Learning**

Participants expressed guided discovery in three forms: (a) lightly structured problem solving; (b) questioning counterparts to elicit divergent thinking and creativity (i.e., exploring multiple solutions, see for example, Baer 1993, Runco 2012); and (c) facilitating dialogue. Participants were mostly positive toward guided discovery. Two participants with neutral attitudes carried a tone of indifference or impartiality. For example, “we’re trying to teach. ... we’re not telling him how to suck an egg, but just trying to give him solutions or ideas ... and, if he takes them and he adopts them and he’s successful, then we’re successful” (Interview 19). Or, “we were literally saying, ‘Hey, that’s not how I would do it,’ but they are taking the lead, you know? ‘It’s your country, tell us how you want to run it in the future. What are your plans in the future?’ ” (Interview 46). Contrast those with tactical participants (10) who expressed guided discovery in a more discernibly positive light.
First, creating conditions that promoted counterpart problem solving was effective. For some, the biggest challenge was stepping back, letting go of “that military mindset of problem solving” and instead “create conditions where problems can be solved” (Interview 47). “It’s understanding that you’re not going to get them to where you want them to be; you just have to guide them in the direction you’d like them to head. You have to recognize that they’ve got to figure out their way of getting there. ... [and] they figure out where they want to go too” (Interview 47). For example, an embedded advisor working with an Afghan police unit that lacked close ties with a local community was praised for setting up a scavenger hunt game for the police to collect information about people in a local bazaar.

They would have a goal of getting three more names of who was in the bazaar, who they were, why they were liked or disliked or what their reputation was and getting trivia about the local community. From what they said, that worked really well because it was an area where the police did not have a great reputation. (Interview 57)

Two others saw it necessary to toss aside formal military planning methods—namely, the Military Decision Making Process\(^{72}\) (MDMP)—and instead “give [the Afghans] a tactical problem” (Interview 18). “Let them solve that problem and if the way that they solve it works, move forward with that. If it doesn’t work, coach them using what you know. You know, AAR [critique] it [with them],” an advisor added (Interview 18). Allowing counterparts to develop their own procedures organically seemed successful and sustainable.

\(^{72}\) According to US Army Field Manual 5-0 (2010, B-1), “the military decision making process is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. It is a process that helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.” See also Grigsby et al. (2011).
between partners and leaders and subordinates. They definitely were able to say, ‘OK, here’s a problem, we’ll dialogue about that.’ Not through MDMP necessarily—we’re never going to teach them that fully—but they understood everything. They understood the meat of what any problem solving methodology approach should do, which is evaluate the situation, identify the real, the crux of the problem, verify the resources you have available to fix that problem, do a troop-to-task, you know, evaluate the feasibility of maintaining or sustaining the solution and then implementing it in a kind of methodical way. I think that’s somewhat abstract in my explanation but really it’s a systematic thing I think we passed on the staff level to them. They do things differently. (Interview 45)

Second, posing questions to open up counterparts to new ideas and to inspire creativity, vision, and reflection on long-term goals was also encouraging. For example, one young US Army captain serving as an embedded advisor claimed that he “took on [his] civilian contractors mindset,” by emulating his approach that was “more kind of talk problems and see what solutions [the Afghans] would generate and then guide them toward the solution that he thought they should [adopt]” (Interview 12). Others employed similar approaches.

_The main thing I would try to do first is ask them what they thought the problem was—what their issue was—try to get them to work eventually, to possible solutions. I already had an end in mind of what I wanted, but the chief thing first was to try to get through the talk and listen to what their concerns were because I found if you’re able to talk, they were able to address or at least get out what they want to do, it will be a little bit easier to go ahead and advise them or influence them to what we thought they needed to do._ (Interview 41)

An embedded advisor to the commander of the Kabul Military Training Center stressed the importance of emphasizing “commander’s visualization” with his counterpart.

_‘Sir, what do you see? What do you want out of this institution? I think that both of our bosses are telling us that we have to produce 60,000 recruits by the end of the year. How do you see that happening?’ If I could get him to agree on the first portion which is we have to produce 60,000 recruits by one year’s time, of a certain level of skill, I’ve already won._ (Interview 37)

Later he provided an example of how being transparent with the resources he had available not only instilled greater ownership, but also allowed his counterpart to think, prioritize needs,
budget for them, and generally make more thoughtful decisions that supported Afghan military training and facility management.

I had him develop ownership by creating a budget for him. I openly told him the resources I had available to me. ... I added it up and I said, ‘Sir, I don’t think anyone’s ever showed you this, but this is the money that I have available to you. ... How do you see the employment of those resources?’ And I think a light bulb just went off and he realized that there is no never-ending bucket of resources. And his decision making became much, much more precise. Much more conservative in his estimates of we need this or we need that. It was, ‘We really do need two of these for this reason.’ And, of course, he wouldn’t just come up with these ideas on his own. We would talk, discuss, but I gave him the ability, kind of the inside picture of funding management. It was that important for him to learn that, understand that, and then, frankly, so that he realized that he just couldn’t come every single week and ask for 50 things ... and it allowed him to change his outlook. (Interview 37)

Third, only two advisors mentioned the utility in generating internal dialogue between their Afghan counterparts, namely, through informal officer professional development dialogues (Interview 10) and lessons learned seminars (Interview 18) intended to foster learning and development through discussion.

I would take rudimentary lessons that I would want to—really inculcate into their brain. So we’d bring them up, we’d have dinner with them on Sunday nights, if we were not out in the field. We’d have a nice sit-down dinner with our Afghan counterparts, the commander and the staff and all of my staff. And then we go over to our conference room. You pick the topic for a typical OPD [officer professional development discussion] and those were the topics where we Americans and my staff and my counterparts would take rotations and be the lead discussion person for that OPD. And then a lot of times we would have like a little practical exercise for our Afghan counterparts to do. It built camaraderie, and it also built the technical capability. Everything that we did we conducted a rehearsal and an after action review—to the point where they started doing them themselves. (Interview 10)

A lessons learned-type seminar. ... first of all it was a novel concept. The corps commander bit on to it and loved it. ... The Afghans loved it and when they came together, they did it in their way. ... At the end of the day they were all very, very pleased—very, very happy—and the way that they come in and yelled for a lesson learned, ‘Come in, no thin skin, tell what you’re doing good and you’re doing bad.’ For them, culturally, they don’t [normally] do that. You don’t tell everybody what they’re doing bad per se. (Interview 18)
Symbolic Modeling and Demonstration

Eight participants (25.8 percent) noted the use of symbolic modeling and demonstration techniques. All but one (neutral) expressed a positive attitude toward this approach. Advisors and unit leaders exhibited symbolic modeling by presenting oneself to Afghan counterparts as a professional leader. Similarly, they demonstrated specific tasks—expressed through a physical act or display—to their counterparts. In both cases, the advisor or unit leader visually communicates an expected role or task performance standard expected of their counterpart(s).

First, modeling leadership norms was important to several advisors. The lone neutral participant “didn’t feel comfortable telling [his counterpart] how to be a professional” but still “wanted to show him through his actions” (Interview 53). He highlighted the importance of leading by example—“what [we do] in front of them, the way we act in front of them, how we handle situations” (Interview 53)—as a way to demonstrate rather than preach about professional behavior. A police advisor noted how his unit “used [them]selves as examples to [their] partners... and have seen them go and emulate that for themselves” (Interview 48). He provided a specific example of their counterpart police leaders moving away from a selfish, kleptocratic, “every-man-for-himself” mindset. Over time, the Afghan leaders “imitate[d]” the selfless—“taking care of your people” (Interview 48)—leadership image the advisors were intentionally promoting, particularly in how they began addressing the stark differences in living conditions and amenities between major police headquarters and austere rural sub-stations and outposts. Another leader of several embedded advisor teams—who likened ANSF developmental progress to “standing on a glacier”—keenly noted how he would stress to his advisors the importance of exhibiting professional bearing at all times and that this was showing some marginal effects on individual Afghan soldiers and police.
You are training them [the Afghans] just by walking around. You two guys right there ... when you guys are standing around outside smoking a cigarette every Afghan that walks by you, every Afghan soldier or policeman, they’re looking at you to see how you treat each other. The respect that you show each other by virtue of your rank or position, how you stand. You train each other and the Afghans just by walking around, how you walk, talk, eat, salute, and bullshit. ... And I had a lot of people come back to me saying, ‘Sir, you were right on. They [the Afghans] were watching me and they were trying to mimic me,’ and I’m like ‘bingo, we’re makin’ progress.’ (Interview 2)

Courage under fire was another norm noted by an advisor with tactical and strategic level tours in Afghanistan. He observed that this type of demonstration is not as possible at the strategic level.

I wanted them to act a certain way because that’s the way I acted, and it was the right way. So, when it came to going up and taking the high ground after we hit an IED [roadside bomb], I led, you what I mean, with my head up and I showed them that I wasn’t scared, even if I was. You know, that I wasn’t nervous or afraid even if I was, because that’s the way I wanted them to act. So it was more like a demonstrating and a showing, you know, just a demonstrative means of like ‘this is how I want you to do this and this is how you do it on your own.’ Whereas at the strategic level, you can’t really do that. (Interview 4)

Second, demonstration by task performance was also cited as a means of influence in both training and field environments. For example, “We ... adjusted how we were teaching to [make] it more visual ... through repetition, through visual learning and demonstration, that was the key” (Interview 37). A battalion commander explained that “you can tell them [the Afghan units] all you want, but if you don’t show them what right looks like, they have a hard time visualizing what they should be doing” (Interview 55). He felt that it was important for units to demonstrate both tactics and planning procedures, but be cognizant that the Afghans will not necessarily execute the tasks perfectly at first. Through repetition and patience, they will “get better every time” (Interview 55). Similarly, another unit leader chided, “The assumption that [the ANSF] don’t want to be good or they do not want to be as good as you because they’re
Afghans is a false assumption ... they desperately want to secure their AO [assigned area]” (Interview 44). Rather, the Afghans “just don’t know how to do it sometimes and you just got to show them. As soon as they know and they can do it on their own, they don’t want you around. They will tell you to go away” (Interview 44).

Finally, a participant explained how his unit established an operational coordination center intended for representatives from the Afghan police, army, and civilian agencies to share information. He explained how, at first, the various ANSF representatives “would kind of shrug it off” and not actively participate in the meetings (Interview 50). “But the more we shared with them, the more they started to share back with us and [consequently] the more they’d share among themselves.” He added that as his unit gradually stepped away from the new coordination center, the ANSF representatives continued to hold regular meetings and share information “because they found value in” it (Interview 50).

**Expository instruction**

Four tactical participants identified a clear ineffectiveness in expository teaching methods—techniques in which the advisor or unit leader presents all relevant information directly to their counterpart. In particular, rigid programs of instruction (POI), Western-led combined planning, and explanations of complex Western concepts did not appear to resonate well with Afghan counterparts. For example, a third-party participant observed how when US tactical leaders held the majority of their combined partnering meetings and planning sessions on their turf—in their offices, using Western tools, graphics, and other technologies—the resulting mission “becomes Americanized” and the Afghans learn less compared to US leaders who emphasized combined planning on Afghan turf (Interview 8).
One advisor gave an example of trying to explain the concept of miles per gallon to a police commander whose unit was constantly running out of fuel. He attempted to explain this concept and suggest the commander base his unit’s patrol frequency based on the total area they wanted to cover and their unit’s monthly fuel allotment. However, “the entire concept even of just miles per gallon—you know, that’s such a big thing in the States—that was so foreign to them that even my linguist said, ‘Sir, I can’t explain that to them. They will not understand’” (Interview 48). Rather than explaining Western concepts, he argued, “You’ve really got to ask them what works for them or put things in their context and their frame of reference.”

Two participants noted serious difficulties with “lockstep, rigid POIs” that led to training of “garbage” quality—the POIs were no more than exact translations of US Army training classes ranging from tactical drills to barracks maintenance (Interview 18). One advisor scrapped a tactics POI to focus on problem solving (Interview 18). Another rewrote a basic rifle marksmanship POI entirely (Interview 18). To a Western soldier or police officer, concepts like aim point, target silhouette, and target center of mass may be simple, but they only lead to confusion in languages without equivalent words, phrases, or concepts.

*It’s all about teaching. ... For example, you’re instructing a group of basic soldiers on marksmanship and they’re pointing at a target. Now, you’ve already got some difficulties with translation and there’s not a whole of Pashtun words or Dari words as it relates to targets and silhouette and aim point. The words just don’t translate. So, we have to simplify the instructions so that it was really easy to understand. But how do you make something easy to understand when you’re looking at 25 meter target that’s got all these weird shapes on it, and how do you explain what the center mass is? And what we realized was, and we did it through empirical testing, what we realized was those guys flat were confused. ... So, we completely changed the target. What were we trying to get at? We were trying to test the ability for an individual to shoot and that bullet hole was going through an object. Does the object need to be 50 different shapes? No. Does it need to be something which demonstrates the ability for them to have the proper sight picture, trigger squeeze, body position, so that the point of aim is the same every single time? Yes. As soon as we changed that, just that one little simple thing ... just that alone created almost a 50 percent increase in qualifications for us. We changed—we rewrote the entire program instruction.* (Interview 37)
One-on-one evaluation

With the exception of participants from the SOF community, nearly all tactical participants provided skeptical views on how they rated ANSF development via an evaluation framework called the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). However, only one embedded advisor noted—without any clear positive or negative attitude toward its effectiveness—that he would formally sit down with his counterpart to “give him 30-day reviews ... like, ‘All right, this is what you did really good and this is what you can improve on’ ” (Interview 53).

Persuasion

More than one-third (11) of tactical participants noted the use of persuasion as a mode of influence, although they expressed mixed attitudes toward it. On the positive end, one advisor felt he “could make a lot of money” [i.e., progress] by “feeding their ego” and appealing to their honor—“like, ‘this is going to make you look bad, Sir’ ” (Interview 2). Over time, patient and persistent encouragement also helped a battalion commander build confidence in timid ANA and ANP units to take on more security responsibility (Interview 43).

Nine other participants held largely mixed views on pure rational argumentation. Those who felt positively (2) remarked how they offered advice respectfully (Interviews 53, 37). One commented how he could not have done that without already having a strong working relationship.

Maybe one or two times to where I ... would really try to say, ‘I respectfully disagree, and this is the reason why.’ Very, very rarely would I do that, and when I did, I made sure that he knew that it was one of those times. Again, based off the trust in our relationship.

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73 The CUAT is cited as having several shortcomings as a valid and reliable evaluation metric, including the ability to assess Afghan soldier and police loyalty, unit history, civil-military relations, and corruption. Additionally, assessor impartiality and inter-rater consistency are two significant flaws (Mausner 2010).
would say, ‘Sir, we really do need to talk. I don’t agree with you. And let me give you an alternate perspective.’ He would defer. Never took advantage of it though and I think he knew that. (Interview 37)

The seven other participants held mixed to negative views on persuasion. It was not uncommon for Afghan leaders to occasionally ignore operational justifications or rationales. However, for one US Marine Corps battalion commander, it was imperative that his junior officers learn to tolerate the rejection or resistance.

_We can talk about how it is important, we could emphasize how, and we could try to show how important it is. But if they just don’t want to do it, don’t become frustrated and angry with the Afghans. You have to maintain patience, proper decorum, and be professional at all times._ (Interview 55)

A US Army platoon leader echoed this sentiment as he found it particularly challenging to motivate and convince ANP to actively patrol outside the perimeter of their fixed security checkpoints because they simply “didn’t see the need to” (Interview 50). To him “it was very difficult to be like, ‘You guys have to do this on your own, too. We’re not going to be here in four months. We’re going to be gone.’ ” The Afghan police simply “had different visions of how to do the job” and “it was difficult to enforce” because they did not “hold anything over them” (Interview 50).

Moreover, “trying to rationalize with the Afghans usually blew up in my face because you come off as you don’t know what you’re talking about,” said another embedded Special Forces team leader (Interview 47). Given that he was 29 years old at the time while his counterpart was 50 “in a country where living to 50 is an achievement,” rational argumentation “would have been insulting.” Moreover, argumentation “failed the minute you started your logic chain, because it started from your perspective and not from theirs.” He added an example of a
local shura at which a military civil affairs officer suggested the Afghan locals start a farming cooperative.

_I don’t know a damn thing about farming, but I’m going to tell these Afghans who’ve been doing it their whole entire existence how to farm? The civil affairs team talked about like maybe doing a farming co-op or something, so that they can kind of pool their resources together ... and one of the elders looked over and said, loosely translated, ‘We don’t trust each other with our lives, do you think we’re going to trust each other with our produce?’ _ (Interview 47)

Interestingly, in the context of Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police development, another Special Forces officer explained, “persuasion will not work—it’s a myth,” because the local villages viewed them strictly as “guns and money” (Interview 62). Conversely, he clarified, “persuasion, honestly, comes more into play with ANA and ANP, getting them to do what you want, [because] you’re not legally allowed to offer them more pay.” Recall how SOF teams working under the VSO/ALP program have high discretion and control over incoming resource flows compared to other embedded advisor teams and tactical units.

Symbolic Reinforcement

Seven participants noted success with the use of symbolic reinforcement techniques. These approaches appeared in three forms: performance awards, creating peer pressure, and reinforcing Afghan leaders’ power and authority. First, one battalion commander remarked how he “always made a big deal about anything good the ANA guys did ... and they would perceive this” (Interview 43). He emphasized the importance of using commander’s coins and medals to reinforce the conspicuous service and valor of high performing Afghans.

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74 Commander’s coins are tokens “about the size of half-dollar coins ... custom minted and emblazoned with the unit insignia ... [and] powerful and versatile tools which can instill unit pride, enhance esprit de corps, ... reward outstanding performance” they are also used to build rapport and external relations (Sommerkamp 1997, 6).
We gave—there’s something called a shona-ba-shona medal that our brigade had. We gave medals, we gave coins, we gave a dang case of Pepsi. We would do nice things to show that we were paying attention to the good things that they did. ... If some ANA soldier out on a checkpoint did something good, like we had a couple of guys capture a couple of Taliban trying to smuggle in some hand grenades and mines and these guys were just doing their job and they captured these guys. I’d go out there and I’d pat them on the back and I’d shake their hands and tell them how great they are, and that works. It’s leadership—the same kind of thing you’d do for your own soldiers. (Interview 43)

Second, a company commander described how he motivated Afghan army and border police units to share patrolling responsibility by drafting a memorandum of agreement that obligated the units to rotate patrols. He noted how the border police commander “was completely of the mindset, ‘Hey, this is our country, this is our job, US forces are here to help us do it, not do it for us.’ And so, when it would come to things like leading a patrol ... [the ABP commander] was very much taking the lead” (Interview 40). However, the Afghan army commander was “just adamant, he’s not leading, he’ll follow us, he’ll go, he’ll support the mission, but he’s not going to lead.” After drafting the memorandum of agreement, the ABP commander was able to “peer pressure” the ANA commander in to assuming greater responsibility.

So we had that in writing and then whenever they would renege on the agreement then we had it on paper and we’d go back to them and, you know, like, ‘Hey, look, this is where you put your name to it. You said you’d agree to it. ’And at that point if they still refused, then, we’d just call their higher command and explain the exact same thing to them. And every single time it ended with their higher command saying, ‘Hey, if it’s your turn, it’s your turn—go lead.’ (Interview 40)

Finally, five participants all saw the importance of empowering their counterparts by reinforcing their position and image as authority figures. An embedded police advisor remarked, “It was always good” to “do something that could make them look powerful in the eyes of the local populace or the local elders” (Interview 5). This was especially valuable after he sacked a previously corrupt Afghan police commander and had to help a new police commander rebuild
trust with the local community. He noted how important it was to make every effort “sit in the background” in local *shuras* [community leader gatherings] and to redirect local Afghan attention and deference toward the new Afghan police commander he advised. Over time, the new Afghan commander was able “to explain that the corruption that had been going on was going to stop” as well as recruit “about 10 to 15 new policemen” (Interview 5). An infantry company commander felt similarly deferring local attention to his counterparts.

*When we did the shuras, we made sure that ANP and ANA were there, and then anyone who tried to talk to us, I’d say ‘Hey, that’s the guy you have to talk to.’ And that took a little while ... a couple of months [for the ANA and ANP leaders] to go from, ‘Oh, I’m just here to sit and observe’ to ... have them step up [to assume the leadership role].* (Interview 1)

SOF teams were particularly keen on reinforcing local power structures in two ways: primarily to establish local civilian control and secondly to build up the community’s respect of the ALP. One leader noted “a transformation over six or seven months” in which initially the “elder power structure didn’t have much clout,” but through reinforcement, the “people were starting to work on problems on their own and they weren’t taking problems to us ... and having their own meetings” (Interview 51). Another reinforcement example was a SOF team’s creation of a local radio-based talk show that featured interviews from local police leaders and allowed community members to call in and ask questions. In the participant’s words, “We were immediately able to put out a counter-message to what the Taliban was saying over the radio that everybody around can hear because we are handing out these hand-cranked solar powered radios. ... We really built them up as that kind of professional emblem throughout the valley” (Interview 47).

One third-party observer noted a clear difference between one US battalion commander’s philosophy that included ANA and ANP leaders in nearly every key meeting to other units that
“saw the job was just to handhold them [the Afghans] and keep them from killing themselves, or us, and leave” (Interview 57).

One example in particular was when General Allen [the NATO-ISAF commander] came down and did battlefield circulation. His main agenda was to talk about partnership and how to get beyond the rhetoric to results. Of all the units that he visited, Colonel [name omitted] was the only one that actually brought his ANA counterpart and I think they had their ANP counterparts there, too, like the chief of police because he was such a key partner. They were the only ones who include them in the meeting with General Allen and I was there when General Allen was able to ask the ANA brigade commander how he saw the threat and what his biggest concerns and priorities were for the spring. The ANA commander had got a map out. He was really enthusiastic and talked about the debates that he had with Colonel [omitted]. It was one of those moments where a lot of little decisions had been made to lead up to that and not just decisions to include the ANA, which none of the other units had even considered doing. (Interview 57)

Shaming

Four participants observed the use of shame as a mode of influence, namely through expressing disappointment and by highlighting comparisons to other higher performing Afghan units. All but one participant was firm in his conviction about its effectiveness. Although the lone neutral advisor did not indicate a perceived effectiveness, he was still convinced that shaming through expressed disappointment was the strongest possible play he could make in addressing the corruption challenges.

I’m a son and a father, and there is nothing more devastating than have a disappointed father, and he would tell you so. You will make your own corrections in life. ‘Son, I love you, but you know what? That action that you just did was very disappointing.’ That is the most humbling form of discipline that I ever got from my dad. I didn’t need a spanking, I didn’t need to be put in the corner, or have my car taken away for five days. The fact that I let my father down was enough punishment for me. So I used that lesson with the Afghans. ‘If you guys are willing to tolerate this, you’re letting your country down, your men down, and yourselves down.’ And that’s how we dealt with the corruption thing. (Interview 10)
The remaining participants held more confident views toward shaming. A company commander described this as “a pride thing” that if he approached his Afghan officer counterpart directly about a disciplinary matter he would “shut down” or be confrontational, “like protecting their turf” (Interview 1). Conversely, if he approached him “like, ‘Hey, we’re friends, that really hurt me. It’s making the two of us as a team look bad,’ then you’ll see an [Afghan] NCO” swiftly address the issue in question. Another battalion commander shared a similar approach, but this took a considerable time—six to eight months—and patience to build up the credibility and respect necessary to admonish his Afghan counterparts to any noticeable effect.

Occasionally, I would lecture their staff and some of the officers that I was more close with. Once I knew I had their trust and their respect, then I could be more stern with them. That took me, again, that took six to eight months before I could say ... I’d close the door and say, ‘Look, you’re really disappointing me. You know this isn’t cool. You’re not doing what you’re supposed to be doing. I know it. You know it.’ They would react to that, react to my leadership. Again, that takes time, effort, and patience. (Interview 43)

Both he and another participant also noted the utility in creating “healthy professional competition.” One noted, “I could say, ‘Well, look ANA guys, ANCOP are doing the same thing. They’re doing the same thing and they’re not complaining about it. They’re not asking for electricity and Chigo’s [air conditioners] and a bunch of comforts but we’re doing this mission. They can do it, why can’t you” (Interview 43)? Seemingly an exception to the rule, the other participant noted how his unit “never had to force” his Afghan counterparts to go out on a mission; rather, one sharply directed question aimed at their pride and honor was ample motivation.

I ever started to go out on a mission and they weren’t standing next to me, all you got to do is turn around and look at them and say, ‘Hey, why am I going out to die for your country and you’re not? Why am I going to protect your people? You’re going to let me protect your women for you? And just turn around and walk out the gate and I promise you before you make it halfway out the ECP [checkpoint], there’ll be 40 Afghan soldiers standing next to you. (Interview 44)
Even so, the same participant highlighted that the best influence possible was to “let them shame themselves.” He gave another example of an Afghan leader who effectively shamed underperforming subordinates by calling out and comparing their units’ performance.

The Afghan XO [executive officer] was brilliant at this. Every week, once their success started going about eight months into it, he would hold up a piece of paper at the operations update briefing—because the company commanders all had to come in for the commander’s update brief and he had the statistics. He showed, ‘Hey, first coy [Afghan company] ... you did 55 unilateral operations, you attended two shuras, you did your training with the ANP, and you did your training with the ALP. Good job. Hey, second [company commander], you did 66 missions and you had it all laid out [during an equipment inspection]. Hey third [company commander], why did you only do 20 missions this week? And there was like blank silence around. But that was all he had to do because that company commander right then and there had been shamed into not following his orders and the next week, they did. (Interview 44)

Mobilization

Recall that mobilization is the act of influencing via sympathetic counterparts (i.e., norm entrepreneurs) in the Afghan hierarchy or social network. Only four tactical-level participants mentioned this mode of influence. Two noted how they actively sought out Afghans whom they “could get on board.” Taking more of a neutral, matter-of-fact stance, one tactical leader noted that the ongoing security transition meant that they had to show progress—“everything had to happen quick, fast, and in a hurry” (Interview 50). Consequently, his unit’s focus was “developing relationships and figuring out who [to] trust there—who at the checkpoint can we actually work with and who’s going to be an honest and good partner?” Another described how “identifying leaders within the ANSF that we could get on board or who were already on board and empowering them. ... That was definitely the biggest success for us” (Interview 40). Two other tactical participants both described the effectiveness of influencing above and below their counterparts in the Afghan hierarchy.
A technique that works well is kind of convince the higher headquarters that this is a good thing and then find that right level where they see it as a decision they can make. ... Find that right level and make it come down the chain. ... I’ve seen [Afghans] say ‘Hey, no, no, can’t do that,’ but if we knew their boss told them to do it, they’re like, ‘Absolutely, we’re all on board.’ (Interview 45)

My counterpart, the brigade S3 [operations officer] was ... I think kind of based on his ego, he was a little bit harder to work with than a lot of the other officers. ... I had to, in a lot of cases work through the commander in order to—the commander was much easier to work with in terms of being teachable, being coachable, and being kind of more open to our advice—so, in a lot of cases, kind of work through the commander in order to influence my counterpart. ... [Also, his assistant] was a major and also much easier to work with and very coachable and really wanted to hear what we had to say ... and so I think we were able to modify a lot of behaviors through him as well. (Interview 6)

Isolation

Oddly, only one advisor noted the effectiveness of isolating Afghans as means to accelerate trust and relationship building and capacity development. His experience was compelling and atypical enough to warrant including an extended extract.

The first thing we did is we built a wall all the way around our battalion [headquarters]. We did that for few reasons. It was partially to protect us from indirect [mortar and rocket] fire, but secondly, I didn’t want—we didn’t want anybody looking into our battalion. You didn’t want them to be able to see what we were doing. We needed to develop a location where we could freely express ideas, concerns, and build that trust in us and in our partners without interference from anybody else on the damn planet. And we focused a massive amount of energy to do that. We had the Corps of Engineers come and build us a giant super deck in the back of battalion TOC [operations center]. That super deck ... was a party zone, designed solely to get the Afghans to let their hair down and enjoy themselves with us. We built party tables. There was a giant barbecue pit where we could roast lamb. There was a movie screen that we put up in the back. And then we started inviting the Afghans over. The first day, one or two of them came over, then the next one there was about 20 or 30 of them that came over, and then about a week later we did it for a third time and about 50 of them came over.

[At first] their entire staff—we couldn’t even find [them]. I mean when you get to Afghanistan, there were so—this battalion was so non-mission capable, it didn’t even have assigned personnel to staff sections. Where’s the S1 [personnel officer]? Well he’s in his barracks. Where’s his barracks? We don’t know. It was a disaster. So it was just getting these guys to come over was a huge undertaking. And then figuring out who the
hell they were at the battalion level. ... They were working in one way, shape, or form, but not anything that we would recognize in the modern military.

So, what do we do? Well, we can’t drink alcohol because of general order one but we can drink near beer. So we went out and we got about 600 bottles of near beer and we taught them how to play flip cup. I want you to imagine 30 Afghan men lined up on one table on one side and 30 American men lined up on the table on the other side playing a 60-man game of flip cup near beer. And I shit you not, that became a regular occurrence into something they had never seen. ... So then they teach us how to play this, [Afghan card game]. ...

So little by little, all these table games show up. ... And we sat out there—at a minimum once every other week—in battalion functions, roasting goat and this is how successful these things became. They came up with goats. They were capable of doing it. We didn’t ask them to, but they wanted to. But at some point, we have all these goats, we’re having all these barbeques, we’re having all these parties, and we’re really getting to know these guys and then there was a tipping point.

All of a sudden they just embraced us and it took—what we thought would take six months—... all happened for us within about the second or the third month that we were there. Whereas some of these other [US] battalions by the second or third month had cut ties with their ANA partners—weren’t even communicating with them anymore. So I guess—I’m very passionate about this—that is literally the first step—that friendship, that bond—that’s the connection you need to make. ... It’s more important than any operation. ... We were at least six months ahead on partnership already. It was almost sickening. We couldn’t get rid of them. I mean they were literally—as soon as they realized that we were serious about our friendship ... they embraced us and it was unbelievable. We had to rapidly change what our plans were. We had to accelerate some of our operations. ... [By the end] we had the only [ANA] battalion [across the brigade] to be conducting unilateral ANA operation with no American soldiers; the only battalion ANA air assaults. ... That’s unheard of ... that does not happen in Afghanistan. (Interview 44)

**Efficiency-Based Influence**

Rational individuals and groups emulate foreign practices to generate higher expected gains. Likewise, competition and entrepreneurialism drive individuals to experiment and innovate. Only two tactical-level participants provided comments related to efficiency-based influence. Although many participants spoke about the importance of creating conditions for local ownership and problem solving to take root, their actions—take guided discovery, for example—did not necessarily produce Afghan-inspired outcomes. Rather, participants demonstrated and guided their counterparts toward a desired—and Western conceived—solution.
Nevertheless, external influence holds potential to drive efficiency-based action by creating space for innovation and experimentation to occur. This, however, involves a degree of risk taking. One unit leader’s view was consistent with others who felt that it was important to encourage locally developed solutions, but there was an important distinction between guiding toward desirable solutions and letting counterparts experience a tolerable level of failure to inspire organic learning. Unfortunately, overarching timelines, top-down pressure, and corresponding concern over showing progress tend to breed risk aversion over risk acceptance.

It’s not an American mission; it’s their mission. They’ve got to understand what that means and how they’re going to go do it, and that’s just a wholesale difference in thought. We’re so concerned with us succeeding in the mission, but you have to give respect and empower them to do it. And if they fail, they fail. I know technically that means you failed, but you have to accept that that’s a possibility. You’re accepting a lot of risk. But, at some point you have to understand that that’s OK. As long as you’re keeping your soldiers safe while doing that, that’s fine. The thing that gets into that is that there are timelines—‘we gotta get this done’, you know—and that’s one of those pressures. (Interview 1)

Finally, a second tactical leader noted the significance of building low-cost sand tables and terrain models for their Afghan counterparts to lead their own mission rehearsals. Not only did this act help inspire Afghan motivation to lead their own planning and rehearsals, but it also reinforced a positive working relationship between the two units.

We said, ‘Well, what the hell do you guys want?’ They said, ‘Well, we want a fucking terrain model. We use terrain models [to plan and rehearse]. If we can’t walk the ground—and then it was another epiphany—like holy shit, these guys are like Ranger School 101 out of Darby Base. So then an order came out from the battalion—every [Afghan] company will have a terrain model that is a minimal of about 10 by 20 feet. And at the battalion level, we built a gargantuan—it was the biggest train model on that COP [outpost]. The terrain model was the size of my house and it had stadium seating built all the way around it with overhead cover and speakers hooked up and the whole nine yards and they loved us for it. They were like, ‘Oh my God, they listened to us.’ ... After that, every joint planning session that we ever did was done around a sand table because that what they understand. (Interview 44).
Conclusion

In response to the study’s central question, there is strong evidence to support the claim that tactical participants, like their ministerial counterparts, relied on both power- and legitimacy-based modes of influence. Attitudes toward both approaches were consistent on both levels as well. However, there was a clear distinction between ministerial and tactical participants on the various types of legitimacy-based modes of influence they employed, especially those related to persuasion and teaching. Efficiency-based influence was even more scarcely applied, though this lack of evidence only suggests—it does not necessarily prove—that its relatively minimal use was true across the board. In the concluding chapter, I provide a more detailed explanatory account of advisor influence on both levels by contrasting the subtle differences in participants’ favored approaches and their observations on institutional transfer.
CHAPTER 9. CULTURE, CORRUPTION, AND CONNECTEDNESS: THE LIMITS AND PROSPECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER

*If you want to change the culture, you will have to start by changing the organization.*

Mary Douglas (n.d.)

This chapter presents data from content analysis of participant responses addressing the question: to what extent did NATO’s partnering efforts with the Afghan security ministries and national security force contribute to the transfer of security governance capacity and norms? Findings suggest that the majority of participants in this study observed limited institutional transfer overall. Three broad patterns emerged. First, both ministerial and tactical participants observed a modest degree of organizational capacity transfer. Tactical participants, in particular, expressed the greatest relative degree of organizational capacity gains with 85 percent noting a limited degree of change or better. More than half of these (six of 10) also attributed the capacity gains to their empowering or confidence-building approaches with their Afghan counterparts.

Conversely, participants saw limited or no transfer of individual capacity and values and organizational norms. In particular, ministerial advisors noted the greatest lack of change in individual values and organizational norms while tactical participants held more divided views. Unsurprisingly, participants on both levels cited corruption and culture as the two leading factors constraining change. However, the few ministerial and tactical participants expressing positive, albeit limited, changes in individual-level values highlighted the importance of dialogue and personal connectedness in stimulating their counterpart’s open-mindedness. Participants on both levels also noted struggles with and missed opportunities for providing greater support and advocacy of higher-performing junior and mid-level officers.
Finally, the data reveals several outliers. Eight participants who advised senior Afghan officials saw no need, much less ability, to develop their counterpart’s skills or professionalism any further. In other words, they felt that their Afghan counterpart possessed the requisite experience, skills, and values necessary for their position.

In the next section, I provide a brief overview of my coding and analysis procedures and present the results in tabular and graphical form. The remaining three sections on outliers, functional transfer, and normative transfer highlight central themes emerging from participants’ observations on institutional transfer.

Data Analysis

In Chapter 3, I argued that internationally led security sector reform (SSR) programs are instances of guided institutional transfer—foreign interventions aimed at building a sufficient degree of capacity, democratic accountability, and local ownership in a host nation’s security institutions. Applying the theoretical framework I advanced in that chapter, I coded participants’ responses to open-ended questions on their observed changes in individual Afghans and their respective organizations along functional capacity and normative dimensions. I recorded observations on institutional transfer from all 24 ministerial advisors, all 27 embedded field advisors, and nine third-party observers (60 participants total). Table 9-1 summarizes and

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75 First, I coded observations according to the framework’s four main analytical categories: individual capacity, individual values, organizational capacity, and organizational norms and rules. Second, I coded these observations on an attitude scale ranging from No Change to Significant Change (refer to Chapter 4 and Appendix D for full explanation on coding procedures and examples). Note, I added evaluation codes No Comment and Change Not Necessary to account for participants who either did not provide an observation on a specific category or explicitly expressed the view that their counterpart or counterpart organization did need to change. Finally, I calculated a weighted average transfer score to compare across categories.
Figure 9-2 depicts the full range of participants’ perceptions of institutional transfer across the Afghan security sector.

The results show limited institutional transfer overall. On its face, this is unremarkable in light of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) semiannual reports to Congress on progress and stability in Afghanistan (for example, DoD, 2012). The content analysis results are highly consistent with DoD progress reports, which note that tactical ANSF units have made only modest strides in effectiveness, namely, in the ability to conduct independent operations below the battalion level. Likewise, the development of key functional areas inside the security ministries like strategic planning and policy development improved, yet others—acquisitions and logistics, for example—trailed behind. My content analysis results and DoD’s Section 1230 reports both reflect a lack of significant normative change, particularly with regard to corruption and accountability. Altogether, this consistency supports the validity of my content analysis procedures and the representativeness of my sampling.

Nevertheless, these findings are worth a closer thematic examination. The DoD progress reports only provide a strategic assessment of the mission and output-based metrics of ANSF development (e.g., ministerial functional capability and ANSF unit ratings). They do not provide insight into the substance and daily nuance of the transfer and resistance to specific capacities and norms.

In addition, note that two factors explain the higher lack of participant comments on the individual level—the open-ended interview format and the nature of participants’ interactions. The semi-structured interview format did not force participants into providing ratings on all four subcategories.76 For that reason, I provide the set diagrams in Figure 9-2 to specify the exact

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76 I purposely chose not to structure the interview to avoid forcing participants into rating observed changes on individual capacity, individual values, organizational capacity, and organizational norms. Instead, I openly inquired
subcategories participants rated and did not rate. Additionally, subgroups of participants did not comment on specific categories. For example, the four Special Forces officers who led village stability operations programs had nothing to add on individual change. This was largely due to their emphasis on providing only basic defensive training to ALP and then working exclusively through the local tribal elder as opposed to maintaining a direct advisory relationship with a police chief or army commander, much like other embedded advisor teams.

participants about any observed changes. This was a research design tradeoff (see Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman 1975, 3-8) in which, on the one hand, I have a missing data problem, but on the other hand, I gain nuance and contextualized data that support the study’s main objective.
Table 9-1. Observations on Institutional Transfer of Security Governance Capacity and Norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Institutional Transfer</th>
<th>Transfer Score *</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Δ perceived</td>
<td>No comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ministerial Advisors (24)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (2)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual capacity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (1)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual values</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (0)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational capacity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (1)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational norms and rules</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (2)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Advisors, Leaders (27)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (7)</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual capacity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (1)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual values</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (1)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (4)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational norms and rules</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Third-party observers (7)</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a. This transfer score is a weighted average of participants noting various degrees of institutional transfer; it ranges from 0 (no transfer) to 3 (significant transfer). To calculate, I assigned the following weights to each degree of transfer: No change=0, No comment=0, Limited=1, Moderate=2, Significant=3, Change Not Necessary=Omitted. Naturally, I omitted all participants noting Change Not Necessary since they are not actual instances of change.
Figure 9-2. Set Distribution of Advisor and Unit Leader Observations on Institutional Transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set Total: 24 Ministerial Advisors</th>
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<tr>
<td>No Perceived Change (16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV (5)</td>
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<td>OC (2)</td>
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<td>ON (14)</td>
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<td>IV' (11)</td>
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<td>ON' (4)</td>
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<td>Perceived Positive / Unneeded Change (21)</td>
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<td>IV (8)</td>
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<td>ON (6)</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set Total: 27 Tactical Advisors and Unit Leaders</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC (0)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>ON (8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Comment (27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC' (17)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV' (15)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>OC' (4)</td>
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<td>ON' (7)</td>
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<td>Perceived Positive / Unneeded Change (27)</td>
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<td>IC (9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC (23)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>ON (12)</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key  IC: Individual Capacity  IV: Individual Values  OC: Organizational Capacity  ON: Organizational Norms/Rules
Afghan Outliers: The Senior Defense and Paramilitary Elite

Several participants saw no shortfall in their counterparts’ skills or values. Eight ministerial and two tactical-level participants felt that their Afghan counterparts were already professional, namely, that their counterparts’ skills or values sufficiently matched the requirements of their position. Note that these advisors worked with the most senior Afghan ministerial officials and military officers. On the ministerial level, these counterparts included the Afghan minister of defense; two assistant ministers of defense, ANA chief of the general staff; ANA chief of operations; ANA chief of acquisitions, technology, and logistics; and the deputy director general at the Afghan Office of Administrative Affairs. On the tactical level, counterparts included the commander of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and the ANCOP chief of intelligence.

These advisors emphasized that they had little offer in terms of personal skills or development due to their counterparts’ education and experience. A senior advisor scoffed at the idea of mentorship: “There’s no frickin’ way in hell that anybody is going to mentor a minister of defense,” he said, referring to the education, decades of combat experience, and political power that many of the most senior Afghan ministerial officials possess (Interview 38). Another saw that his counterpart, the senior director of operations for the Afghan army, clearly knew how to do his job and so focusing on his counterpart’s personal growth was “less of a requirement” (Interview 29).

These advisors also viewed Soviet-educated officers as possessing more Western-minded professional skills and experience than their non-Soviet-trained peers. For example, the head of acquisitions, technology, and logistics for ANA had 40 years of logistics experience and “was a Ph.D. honor graduate of the Soviet Air Force Academy” (Interview 61). According to his
advisor, there was “probably not a lot we’re really going to teach this guy” (Interview 61). The advisor to the KMTC commander described him as “a little bit ambitious ... but very, very engaging,” which “made him successful” (Interview 37). He added, “Even by Western standards, it was very clear that he was the commander [and] had a good presence” (Interview 37). The advisor to the ANCOP intelligence chief felt similarly.

[He was] legitimately MI [intelligence]-trained, tons of experience. ... He was one of the most professional senior officers that I’ve worked with from a host nation. I didn’t have to [focus on professionalism] with him and he actually would teach me on the nuances of professionalism at his echelon at the Afghan level. I didn’t have to do that with him and that was a luxury. At the same time, I would watch him do the same with subordinate MI [intelligence] officers within the organization. (Interview 25)

Advisors to the most senior Afghan officials—Minister of Defense Wardak, Army Chief of General Staff Karimi, and other senior deputy ministers—collectively conveyed the sense that their counterparts all clearly understood normative concepts like civilian control, civilianization, and gender integration. With regard to civilian control, “in their own minds, they had civilian control” (Interview 60). Minister of Defense Wardak, himself a former general, “was at the beck and call of his president,” which, at times, was “an obstacle [to] getting something done” through him (Interview 16). Yet, as one advisor noted, the MoD was not as effective as the MoI at handling the Afghan Parliament. In his words, “I think the [defense] ministry didn’t tend to see itself and disliked the idea that it was under Parliament. The minister loathed having to appear before Parliament” (Interview 60).

Similarly, ANA Chief General Karimi, “fully understood how the American system worked—understood that he took his orders from the president and through Minister Wardak” (Interview 15). Yet, Parliament seemed like a nuisance to him because of its poor understanding of the state and circumstances of the Afghan army.
His complaint most of the time was that Parliament had little to no knowledge of what was going on with the army. He often said there were a number of the elder members of Parliament who still thought their army was exactly the same as it was during the years of the Soviet regime where they still thought they had fighters [jets] and stuff. He constantly had to educate them on the fact of what they had and didn’t have anymore. ... He had no issues with the fact that they were under civilian control. He just wished the civilians understood better what the army was capable of and allowing the system to work instead of having somebody over at the palace picking up the phone and going, ‘I need three helicopters today,’ instead of calling over and saying, ‘We would like three helicopters. By giving us three helicopters, what’s that going to do to your operational support?’ (Interview 15)

This sentiment—responsiveness to civilian executive authority combined with frustration directed at uninformed civilian lawmakers—is not atypical of civil-military relations in even the most advanced democracies.

Acceptance of civil supremacy over the security forces was less of an issue than gender integration and civilianization (i.e., filling ministerial staff positions with civilian political appointees and civil servants over senior military or police commanders). Individual Afghan leaders at the top generally “got it” (Interview 61) with respect to these norms. However, among their staff members, wider acceptance of civilianization and gender integration were generational issues for most of their subordinate staff officers (Interview 61).

**Functional Capacity Transfer**

**Individual Capacity**

Participants saw Afghan leader development as a slow, incremental process, but necessary for long-term ANSF and ministerial development. Challenges with—and at times lack of emphasis on—active endorsement and empowerment of high performing junior and mid-grade officers in both the ANSF and security ministries was a recognized missed opportunity.
Only five ministerial advisors saw “some lasting impact on the development of individual leaders” (Interview 28) or with the development of specific skills like public relations (Interview 15). Four others saw no change because their counterpart “was incompetent” (Interview 7), “not a very good organizer” (Interview 14), “really stubborn and ... had the attitude that it was going to be his way or no way” (Interview 24), or was unpopular with his peers and the minister—e.g., “not a mover and a shaker” (Interview 21). An advisor to the head of the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police said, “I tried to get the deputy minister out of the operational business and focus on strategic stuff. ... It was just chaotic and rambling the way they were doing things” (Interview 7). One non-advisor ministerial participant on the NTM-A staff recounted a conversation he had with another female advisor.

*I asked her, ‘Do you see any progress? Tell me about the progress you really see. Get away from those charts you’ve read that have gone from red to green, away from that. What have you really seen?’ And she said, ‘I haven’t seen any progress and it hurts me being here for 10 months. For the first three months, I thought I was making a difference with him, but I really wasn’t. At month six I could tell he was waiting for the next person to come. He got all he could out of me.’* (Interview 56)

One ministerial advisor said that NATO missed a major opportunity by not focusing more on developing mid-grade officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) because they were more receptive to acquiring new skills and more open to technology (e.g., computers, automated systems, cell phones) than most senior Afghan officers.

*This is where I think we were going wrong with the Afghan staff. Where you could see it is in the younger fellows and not in the old ones. The 70-year-olds are not going to change. You can buy them all the computers you want and give them the most stable senior advisor in the Western world and a 70-year-old wily old Afghan is still going to be a 70-year-old wily old Afghan. Where you could see it is that major/lieutenant colonel level. I think in terms of the development of the Afghan staff we would have done a great deal better to put more emphasis on those guys, the guys effectively we made ourselves over the past 10 years. They could learn. Their learning skills, their access to Western education have been more extensive. They’re a little more technically savvy.* (Interview 60)
On the tactical level, a few participants noted that a growing number of young Afghan soldiers and police patrolmen were improving—i.e., gaining tactical proficiency (Interviews 12, 53) and “emulat[ing] our soldiers a lot” (Interview 40). However, junior and mid-grade Afghan officers “were a mixed bag” (Interview 50) seemingly because officer appointments and promotions were not consistently based on merit. A tactical leader explained, “Either the [Afghan leader had] been around forever and just worked his way up through the ranks, or he [was] well connected and came from a family with money that was able to get some type of education and put [him] in a position of leadership” (Interview 50). Despite young Afghan officers’ inexperience or incompetence, however, some held great development potential.

We got a real young police chief, and he came in, and everybody was saying he was under-qualified for this job. And from looking at his bio and stuff, he appeared to be under-qualified for the job. And then he made up for inexperience with just activity and over the course of the five months that we were together, I really felt like he became a more professional officer—that he kind of took on the responsibilities, and understood the responsibilities of being a police chief and his necessity to engage with the locals fairly, and his soldiers fairly, though strict. And you could kind of see that in the five months as he progressed, but our kandak commander and many of the company commanders, in the Afghan National Army, not so much. In a lot of soldiers you saw greater capacity, but I wouldn’t say greater professionalism. (Interview 55)

The data also reveal a broader trend in which NATO advisors and field commanders toiled—with mixed results—to identify effective and ineffective Afghan leaders, encourage the Afghan leaders who could perform, and remove or reassign those who could not.

Organizational Capacity

No participant, ministerial or tactical, openly claimed that his or her counterpart’s organization did not improve. Rather, the bulk of participants saw limited transfer of
organizational capacity or better. Ministerial advisors observed mainly marginal bureaucratic and process-oriented gains. Tactical participants fared slightly better. Notably, tactical units and advisor teams expressing the greatest degree of capacity gains also tended to attribute these gains to their avoidance of heavy-handed approaches with their Afghan partners.

Most ministerial advisors saw limited development in ministerial planning capability and bureaucratic reporting or tracking systems—“we got the bureaucracy better” (Interview 7). Most described progress in terms of the NTM-A ministerial development rating system used to monitor progress (Interviews 11, 13, 19, and 21). For example,

[The Afghan MoI] policy guys went from [a rating score of] 3 [needs significant NATO support] to 1 [capable of autonomous operations] just shortly after I left. The plans guys were at a 3 when I got there and then they were 2 when I left and I think they are a 1 now. They’re doing quite well. Again, they put all the smart guys in this section. (Interview 13)

An advisor mentioned that Afghan MoI strategic planners started taking the lead writing policies on their own. The quality of the policies, however, was still dubious (by Western standards) though the process was nevertheless Afghan-led. This and the Afghan logistics and maintenance program still “was pretty much a disaster” (Interview 61).

I’d say in the last year [policy development is] definitely Afghan-owned. We’re to a point now where the policies are, the working documents are written and done by the Afghans and it gets to be a challenge because we have a huge shortage in ability to translate documents. So the advisors are at the point where they can’t really give advice on some of these things because they can’t understand what was written. But one of the things—I think is a mixed bag of feelings—is if they’re proud of the question of quality of the content. If you look at most of the policies that have been written the last year or two by the Afghans and you show them to someone from the coalition and they’ll say this is a pretty mediocre policy at best—it’s crappy and fails to meet the mark in our opinion. (Interview 36)

Tactical participants saw slightly better gains in planning capacity and willingness to conduct independent operations. Most experienced Afghan soldiers and police (especially the
ANCOP and some ABP) were tough and not afraid of battle (Interviews 1, 50). Afghan
collection of ANF, ANCOP, and ANA soldiers—this is my experience—if they think a firefight is about
to go down, their motivation goes way up, they just run ahead into a village because they
thought they heard something and then they ran back disappointed like, 'Aww, no
Taliban.' ... [but] their staffs stink. Their kandak had no staff and that was like pulling
teeth every time I was up at squadron [headquarters] I was like, 'So, where’s their
S3 [operations] shop?' Their staffs are weak but at the company and below, especially in
Afghanistan, you’re looking at company commanders who have been doing this longer
than we [junior officers] have. (Interview 1)

Nevertheless, Afghan units, through repetition and experience, were improving—many in their
own way—with or without direct involvement of NATO forces.

[There was] a clear change in their thought process. ... They started forming their own
goals and doing unilateral patrols from the time we got there to the time they ended, they
were clearly thinking about where they were going and why they were. Seemed to have a
better grasp of, you know, targeting the enemy and utilizing the operations to an end
state instead of just, well, ‘We’re getting paid to patrol, so go to the bazaar today and
let’s go to this village tomorrow.’ There was a lot more clear decision-making process
put in [to give reason to] why they went where they went. (Interview 40)

I think there was a positive change over time. I don’t know how much of that was the
Afghans themselves and how much of it was us. I’ll have to think about it, like what we
uniquely changed in them. I don’t know about that. I think we uniquely got them to think
more about evidence. They did become better about taking photos, and photos are good.
They didn’t do it in the way that we might expect, but they did use a camera phone. ... The
Afghans started doing storyboards, trying to tell a story about a crime rather than just
make judgments about people as being bad guys or good guys. That’s more
professionalized policing for sure. (Interview 63)

Ten tactical participants cited moderate or significant gains organizational capacity. Two
attributed these gains to their Afghan counterparts—via ANA combat experience (Interview 39)
and a stronger, better organized ANCOP commander (Interview 25). The other two were US Army SOF team members who advised a group of fairly capable of ANA commandos.

Having dealt with maybe 45 different ANA units and 50 different ANP units, they were head and shoulders above even when I first got them, at least the core group. So in seven, eight, nine months, I think they learned a lot. You know, I’d like to say operationally, but I would say maybe just learned a lot about the potential basics of running an organization, and just a chain of command and how it’s supposed to work. (Interview 3)

I think that from where we started to where we ended up, the product was much better. You know the guys were more confident and competent, they could shoot a lot better, they would carry their weapons properly, not with their finger on the triggers. They knew how to clear buildings. I’m not talking about dynamic free-flow CQB [close quarters battle techniques], but they would strongwall a compound. You didn’t have to tell them to pick up security; they just did it. And they went from, you know, at the beginning where you’ve got guys kind of picking daisies and acting goofy, you know, not paying attention, all the way down to kind of pretty competent and professional fighting force. (Interview 4)

Six participants who noted the greatest advances in Afghan organizational capacity attributed the gains to one or a combination of three approaches—hands-off, controlled failure, or confidence building—with their counterparts. Three different battalion commanders described these approaches in their own words:

I never tried to push too hard. ... I showed him [our objectives and campaign plan] and he modified them. And we spent weeks actually doing this. And then he took that as he saw it and he started giving commander’s guidance [to his soldiers] against it. ... I’ve already figured it out because he said, “Yes,” and then at that point, we just have to figure out how to make it happen and for him to give guidance to his subordinates. (Interview 37)

You don’t let them fail. It’s OK for them not to be successful in everything they’ve done, but overall they can’t fail. You’ve got to bolster them up. And we did that multiple times. We had two RFs [reserve forces] on standby when they put those forces into the field, so if they ever got themselves into a shit sandwich, that we would be able to pull them out. And you know I think it worked. I also think that you don’t try to do it [conduct a mission] every time, you do it only when they [the Afghans] think it’s important. (Interview 55)

It became a process of convincing the ANA and then later on, the ANCOP, and the [uniformed] police, that you can defend a small outpost by yourself. You don’t have to have my guys there with you; you can do this yourself. You can build your own positions,
you can fill your own sandbags, you can put in your own wire. And initially, they were not too motivated to do that and obviously pretty scared to do that, but I showed them that we have mutual support. ... As we were able to convince the ANA that this would work, they actually became much more confident in this sort of way of operating. ... We were able to show the ANA a way to operate that they were capable of operating independently and then it gave them access to the population and gave them access to other areas that they could patrol into and conduct raids as they develop the unit. What I could do is show them a way to win, show them a way that they can operate and build for them a model for success that would give them some confidence. And it worked and as they started to see this working, they became more and more aggressive and had more and more success. ... I felt as if they really could do this whole thing fairly independently. (Interview 43)

Norm and Rule Transfer

Individual Values

Participants saw limited changes in individual values among their counterparts. The interviews detailed how Afghan politics, military culture, and corruption constrained Afghan belief and behavioral change, especially on matters of criminal prosecution, civilianization, and gender integration. Yet, these forces were not always fixed. Evidence also suggests that in a few cases, dialogue and strong interpersonal relationships played a critical role in attracting curiosity in—and in some instances adoption of—practices of norms of integrity, selfless leadership, and Western forms of military and police organization.

Systemic corruption

Unsurprisingly, participants on both ministerial and tactical levels cited systemic corruption\(^{77}\) as the major impediment to professional behavior at the individual level. Even Afghans with above average scruples still had to survive. Many ministerial officials, even those

\(^{77}\) Participants noted corruption mainly in terms of economic side payments (e.g., bribes and favors), embezzlement, nepotism, petty theft and extortion, and judicial obstruction.
who ostensibly despised corruption and were open-minded to Western security governance norms, faced considerable difficulty separating their official duties from the ethnic shadow politics occurring behind the scenes (Interview 28). For example, a senior advisor to the ANA’s legal department expressed great frustration with the “schizophrenic military justice machine” (Interview 34) that pursued criminal prosecutions of junior soldiers but suppressed prosecutions of officers above the rank of captain. However, he still acknowledged that “there were quite a few ANA legal officers who were frustrated with [corruption], wanted to see it change, and there were judges who wanted to see things happen.” He added that his Afghan army prosecutor counterpart “was also scared. ... There were times where [the counterpart] thought [the advisor] was trying to get him killed” because of his zeal for pushing the Afghans to move forward with high-level prosecutions (Interview 34). Systemic corruption also trickled down to the junior enlisted soldiers and police.

The vast majority of average soldiers or policeman knew that they had to kind of make their way on their own, especially with the police. The average patrolman was very much about corruption, shaking down [stealing], because they were getting shaken down by their mid-level leadership and their senior leadership. And so they had no qualms about shaking down the local populace—‘[If] they’re not from my tribe, I don’t give a shit.’ The kandak commander was marginally competent, I like the guy personally, I thought he was, he had been at it for a long time and I appreciate a lot of the sacrifices he had made. But he had no qualms about bribes and corruption and all of that kind of stuff. (Interview 55)

Culture shock

Tactical advisors and leaders cited occasional cultural clashes with immorality and leader unassertiveness as additional barriers to individual value changes—this in addition to systemic corruption and typical discipline problems common to most militaries, such as vandalism and “passive mediocrity and recalcitrance” (Interview 2). Tolerating effective yet immoral Afghan
leaders with widespread popular support was a challenge for some. One battalion commander explained how her unit had to learn to cope with an “[un]savory sexual character” serving as a police chief—“if the public likes a leader and if peers like the leader, who are we, the Americans, to try and get in there and change that person” (Interview 63)? In addition, unlike ministerial advisors who generally saw senior Russian-educated Afghans as more amenable to Western organizational models and doctrine, a tactical leader said, “One of biggest surprises that I had is how little of effect we really had on their officers’ mentality. They really are very much still influenced by, I think, the Russian time—the PRA [the Red Army] versus us” (Interview 43). This comment was in specific reference to Afghan mid-grade officers’ reluctance to take initiative or make decisions without their supervisor’s approval.

**Professional values and the inability to connect**

Five ministerial-level participants saw no discernable change in their counterpart’s professional values. For example, one flatly doubted his impact on changing beliefs at the individual level.

*We talked about values ... and I tried to get them to do, ‘OK, what’s the vision of the [counter-narcotics police]?’ You know, the way I was trained, the vision includes a purpose statement, why the organization exists, the values of that organization, the things you don’t want to compromise. Honestly, I can’t tell if I had any [impact].* (Interview 7)

Two of the five doubtful advisors also expressed frustration with their inability to connect with their counterpart due to language, culture, or personality.

*There were times when my frustration level would rise due to some time-sensitive issue that we were trying to solve and it just never got to his front burner. And probably because of the language barrier, and in part because of culture, but also because of his personality. ... I could never tell what he was really accepting and internalizing and*
agreeing to, or whether he was just kinda blowing me off, nodding his head north and south [up and down], you know, go away, come back when you can give me something. (Interview 7)

At the end of the day, it [our relationship] really was kind of an exchange. In one particular case, I felt that if I could deliver stuff or at least be perceived as trying to do that, even if I failed, there would be a reciprocal level of effort to accomplish that which I was advising. (Interview 28)

The centrality of dialogue and relationships

By contrast, two dominant themes emerged from the four positive, albeit limited, observations of changes in individual values: the role of dialogue in opening Afghans up to new ideas and claims that relationship quality was a necessary condition for the idea shifts to occur. On the role of dialogue, for example, one MoI advisor felt that an established Institutional Reform Working Group (IRWG), commissioned by the MoI in July 2011 (NTM-A, 2011a, 7-18) and codified in the National Police Strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior 2011), was showing some marginal impact on individual MoI staff members. He described how the working group was effective in providing a deliberative forum for MoI staff to openly discuss Western policing concepts and ideas.

It went from very philosophical, you know, this is what policing is, to this is how a ministry of interior would organize, to this is what ministry officials do and this is what police commissioners do, and this is what policemen do. So it was kind of a full spectrum working group. And it went through, and I’ll tell you it was a good six months of meeting twice a week with the Afghans and it was very enlightening to me. At first they would say, ‘Oh, we have that, we don’t need this concept or this idea, we have that.’ And we knew that they did not. And so it became a process of having them adopt these ideas by discussing and questioning, and it took time. In the end, quite a few of the Afghan officials adopted these ideas. It was a really rewarding process to see. (Interview 11)

78 The IRWG was comprised of MoI staff and members of the NTM-A and EUPOL and responsible for creating a path forward to: better distinguish political and operational positions within the MoI, improve civilian oversight of the police, strengthen the internal affairs function, and better enforce the police code of conduct (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior 2011).
A ministerial advisor also provided an example of his counterpart opening up to the idea of employing senior noncommissioned officers as bona fide staff officers and key leaders, as they are employed in Western military organizations. To him this would not have been possible without a strong relationship and extended dialogue with his counterpart.

_I did see some change. I think I was instrumental in showing him that staff work is more critical. Most of their system is really individual-centric. ... I think I did have some movement in that. ... Let me tell you a specific incident in which I was able to really move the needle with the guy. When he got his own command, I said, ‘Now you get a sergeant major?’ He said, ‘Yes, we have sergeant majors.’ I said, ‘What does your sergeant major do?’ He said, ‘Our sergeant major is usually like your sister’s son.’ I said, ‘Ah. Let me tell you our theory about NCOs and sergeant majors,’ and we had a lot of discussions about that. And, in fact, he had refused this particular individual they wanted to assign as a sergeant major because he didn’t know him. He ended up taking that individual to be his sergeant major, who graduated from the Sergeant Major Academy, and he embraced the philosophy that the sergeant major was a part of his staff, so much so that at his weekly staff meetings he had the sergeant major sit at the table with him and the sergeant major always traveled with us when we traveled. That is unheard of in the Afghan army. ... I’ll take credit for that change. That’s what he was willing to try and learn why it worked for us. That was based on a number of lengthy conversations, so over those conversations he not only agreed to try the idea, but he went back and accepted a guy he had rejected because he was not related._ (Interview 61)

An advisor to Minister of Defense Wardak shared an interaction in which he felt he had triggered a deputy minister’s reflection on what it meant to be a professional senior official. He described a time when he was planning a trip with Minister Wardak to attend a gathering of NATO defense ministers in Krakow, Poland. At the time, the UAE had also invited Minister Wardak to attend a weapons demonstration show in Abu Dhabi, all expenses paid, after the NATO gathering. Instead of accompanying the minister to UAE, the advisor decided he would cut the trip short and head back to Kabul immediately after the gathering in Poland. He described how this action “just sort of floored” one of the MoD deputy ministers and that “he had the opportunity to ask questions because of [their] personal relationship and so he got a better opportunity to understand [the advisor’s] motive” (Interview 16).
[The Deputy Minister] was like, ‘Why would you do that? This was like four free days on the UAE.’ I said, ‘Well, one, my mission is here. You don’t need me there ... because the UAE is covering your expenses so why would I soak up four days of just a boondoggle?’ So, I said, ‘I’m just going to fly back here.’ He came back to me later and said that had a huge impact on him. ... I can only assume what that meant to him, because he wasn’t fluent in English, but what he was really, I think, trying to tell me is, ‘What does it mean to be ethical or to be a proper steward of your office?’ I think that that was a stark difference of what he thought about and what he was going to choose to do. He thought nothing of it before, but when I questioned it, he suddenly questioned it. He had an opportunity to explore with questions, ‘Why am I doing this? Why wouldn’t I spend the four days of living high on the hog in the UAE at their expense when the alternative was to come back to Afghanistan and be locked in Camp Eggers in your little prison, if you will, when I could be in a really nice hotel in Abu Dhabi or something?’ (Interview 16)

The extent to which this event changed the deputy minister’s beliefs on professional behavior is difficult to verify, but the observation that it triggered his curiosity is significant. Taken with the stories of the Afghan sergeant major and the MoI institutional reform working group, there is a pattern that suggests belief change on the individual level starts through dialogue and reflection. To conclude this story, the MoD advisor said, “There is opportunity through advisors and our experiences, I think, as we get to know these guys, to teach them something about what it means to be a professional. Many of these guys are long past their schooling, so when are they supposed to get it at the senior rank” (Interview 16)?

Tactical leaders also expressed the importance of dialogue and relationships in promoting changes in individual values. For one leader of multiple embedded advisor teams, group discussion about leadership promoted open questioning among Afghan leaders.

They’d ask us ... ‘Why do you go on every patrol?’ Or they’d ... ask us why we did things the way we did it, and that would allow us to kind of get in there and talk about leading from the front and the need for leaders to be on the patrol and you know, have ownership from start to finish. ... That [Afghan] lieutenant, he got to the point where he was, you know, doing PCCs and PCIs [inspections] the night before an operation and then doing a brief afterwards. He just got it. Unfortunately, I couldn’t clone him, and there weren’t one of him in each group, but it started to take a hold in him, and then with his group, that group of about 30 from the north, they definitely had some marked pride and professionalism and you could look at them and see that they had adopted the idea of a
rank structure and they knew who was in charge and they knew not just from the lieutenant, but, you know, he appointed his own NCOs and those NCOs took ownership. It was great to see it with them, but the rest wasn’t there. (Interview 40)

Another tactical leader noted drastic change in his counterpart through constant dialogue on what it meant to lead soldiers. He felt that his ability to connect with his counterpart on a personal level contributed significantly to his counterpart’s professional development.

Our profession is leadership, caring for soldiers—caring for their [Afghan] soldiers—doing the right thing. Kind of saying, ‘Hey, you know I could probably make more money on the civilian side, but I want to serve.’ That type of stuff is the conversations that I think were the most beneficial to them. That’s exactly how we felt, that we could offer them the most benefit with developing that leadership aspect. The most beneficial, fruitful conversations were very personal conversations that would … really end up being leadership conversations about what it means to lead soldiers. … My guy definitely changed and would try to do things to kind of, not please me, but show me that he understood what I was talking about. … So I would say I definitely saw changed behavior. … If you build that relationship, you will definitely see a change in the personality. If you can reach them on a personal level, they are 10 times more receptive than any American I’ve ever met. They will die for you. (Interview 45)

Organizational Norms and Rules

Participants’ views on organizational norms were mostly elaborations and generalization of the same thematic issues discussed on the individual level. However, as a whole, they were more pessimistically vocal on ANSF and security ministry professionalization than they were about their specific counterparts’ professionalization. Ministerial participants (14) were the most vocal about not seeing any tangible changes in security governance norms—for example, “substantively, I didn’t see a maturing or even a professionalization of their staff” (Interview 32). Three third-party observers with comparable views support this approximate 2-to-1 no change-limited change ratio. Their comments centered primarily on accountability and civilianization.
By contrast, tactical participants had slightly optimistic views. Police corruption remained a significant problem, but their community relations and legitimacy seemed to be improving. ANA cohesion and willingness to fight were improving, yet patronage-based officer selections and promotions continued to stymie effective unit leadership and morale.

**Accountability and corruption**

Advisors saw the accountability issue (i.e., absence of effective rule of law) as a deeply seated problem in that it simultaneously reinforced and was, in return, afflicted by, systemic corruption and undue political influence on the military justice system (Interview 34). Ineffective rule of law was outwardly advancing a culture of cronyism, nepotism, and impunity and, to some, it did not receive the level of attention that it should have.

[They must] get subordinates do things and then hold them accountable. If they fuck up, you gotta fire them. And not just CNPA, I mean the Afghan society at large. If a guy fucks up inside the Afghan leadership, they don’t fire him, or shoot him, or send him to jail; they just move him to another position. So there’s no accountability. Unless you have accountability, you’re not going to solve the corruption problem. (Interview 7)

Unfortunately [rule of law] wasn’t the priority of the American coalition leadership. Their priority was where those army statutes began. Like spend this money while the money is coming good, let’s spend it, get the weapon systems in place. Get the boots on the ground. Let’s make this army as big as possible. That’s what’s key to getting out. And the idea of the rule of law was just backburnered. I don’t want to say not taken seriously but not understood and ... it’s not given that emphasis. It’s given a lot of lip service by both sides of the leadership, the coalition side and the Afghan side. (Interview 34)

**Ministerial civilianization**

Civilization “was a very tough concept for [the Afghans] to understand. They have a bit of distrust for civilians” (Interview 11). “When I was there, [civilianization] was not” taking
root (Interview 22). Part of this distrust stemmed from the ethnic balance that the ministries, by law, had to retain (Interview 38). The idea of introducing civilians into the ministries was unsettling to many senior leaders from rival ethnic groups.

[The ministers and staff] take their uniform off and they become minister and mister instead of general. And I guess this does go back to 2003 when we were first putting together the MoD for them and manning it and stuff. Everyone [the Afghans] wanted to retain their mujahedeen rank and everyone was a general and you had so many generals to go around so we basically laid down the law. ‘OK, you got 15 top generals and the pyramid went from there. You guys figure it out.’ ... You know, I don’t care one way or the other, but I think, for the most part, they were hesitant to accept civilians into the MoD. I think they felt more comfortable having it more militarized and so that will be an evolutionary process for them to wean themselves off of that and accept more civilians. (Interview 14)

That was one of the things in the working group, that institutional reform working group. That was one of the things that we saw as the long pole in the tent. That was going to be a generational initiative because you have all these people that were either in the Soviet system, or were in the mujahedeen, and they were both very militaristic by nature. That’s what they understood. They lived it. Trying to get them to understand it, several months of meetings at two hours a clip, you know, it’s a cultural change. I think with sustained advising that will happen. (Interview 11)

Another advisor saw it as an economic and supply-side issue. NTM-A only paid for ministerial and ANSF salaries—not civil servants’ salaries—so the ministries had no incentive to hire civilians (Interview 19). Furthermore, “they have a hard time hiring civilians because they don’t pay much and if civilians have any type of education they’ll go work somewhere else” (Interview 19).

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the ministerial advisors who mentioned the difficulties with civilianization served in the earlier years, between 2008 and 2011. An advisor who served through 2012 mentioned:

At the end of [2012], they will have approximately 10,000 [civilian] positions and [as of April 2012] over 2,600 have been filled. So, on civilians it’s based on who you ask. Will it benefit them? Sure. ... I think so in some of the positions and it’s just getting the leadership to understand the value when you have 10,000 civilians within your force. ...
Are they making progress? We’ve got a pretty aggressive civil service advisor. It’s going to take time. This isn’t going to happen overnight—not here. (Interview 26)

Civilian control

Most ministerial advisors mentioned civilian control only in reference to their individual counterpart’s attitudes (e.g., “in their own minds they had civilian control” (Interview 61)). Only one ministerial advisor spoke at length about civilian control from a broader organizational perspective. First, he stressed the importance for working specific civilian control-oriented language into the Afghan National Military Strategy. NATO was starting to provide training stressing the importance of democratic civilian control.

One of the small successes that I think I could take at least a little bit of credit for, or at least can say I was a part of that conversation, was actually getting explicit reference to civilian oversight and control in the National Military Strategy. And NATO started to do some good training on ‘Here’s why civilian control and oversight is important.’ That does great skill building through their Building Integrity Program and Enduring Partnership Program. And to the extent that we were trying to articulate that as one of our kind of strategic talking points as a team of advisers, that was starting to take hold. (Interview 33)

Even so, he felt NATO and OSD could have done more to promote the concept of civilian control inside the security ministries. To him, the responsibility fell not only on NTM-A leadership, but also on civilian leadership within NATO members’ ministries and departments of defense.

I was underwhelmed by how much COMISAF [ISAF commander] and foreign heads of state would emphasize that point [civilian control]. I was underwhelmed by, you know, civilian counterparts in whatever ministry of defense you want to say, whether it was OSD, whether it was a MoD from somewhere in Europe. I think a lot of civilian ministries of defense have been bludgeoned by this axiom of ‘trust the commander in the field.’ You know, ‘Don’t manage the war with a 6000-mile, 3000-km screwdriver. Don’t get into the tactical or operational weeds, blah, blah, blah.’ ... There’s almost this like unwillingness to ask questions or challenge the commanders in the field on ministerial development issues, or even inquire.
A lot of people ... have been habitualized over time to engage with Minister Wardak, or his predecessor, or the chief of general staff, because they speak English, and, ‘I first met General Karimi, you know, in 2003 when I took my first trip to Afghanistan, blah, blah, blah.’ So therefore, I should go see him every time I’m in Afghanistan even though I’m now, [a US deputy secretary of defense], a two-star equivalent, who probably doesn’t have to spend time with General Karimi on every visit to Afghanistan. ’But maybe he should spend some time with his counterpart in the Afghan office of assistant ministry of defense for strategy and policy. …

I think it’s a habit to not think about these sorts of things, you know, just give it lip service and hope that it trickles down, and people being too close to a problem so therefore not able to take a step back and actually ask the hard questions, ‘How are we actually implementing the policy decision and objective of instilling civilian oversight in the Afghan system.’ (Interview 33)

**Ministerial professionalism**

A majority of ministerial advisors saw the Afghan security ministries grow more capable, but not more professional. At the level of organization, advisors and Afghans both differentiated professionalism in the security ministries almost exclusively along ethnic lines. The interviews highlight a military social class-like distinction of Soviet educated military elites and ostensibly less professional former anti-Soviet mujahedeen. A ministerial advisor expressed how the ANA Chief of General Staff Karimi was often frustrated with the former mujahedeen generals who “had no more than a high school education” but “got positions purely on politics” (Interview 15). The advisor described how Karimi had a longer vision, namely, that the Afghan military academy was the key to change as it educated a new generation of professional officers—of all Afghan ethnicities—and inculcated a growing sense of nationalism.

*Part of being a professional is you have a code of standards you live by and you have a professional development process. He really saw the military academy there as the mechanism that’s eventually going to bring that about, that they’re going to go through the school, they’re going to get educated, they’re going to learn how to do things the right way, they’re going to learn about standards. Also, that was a way of bringing back this idea of nationalism, that Afghans first, Pashtun second. But, yeah, he was quite agitated. He knew he had battalion and brigade commanders who couldn’t read and certainly had no critical thinking skills but there were things he couldn’t do about it.*
But they recognized, especially the old-guard guys, the guys that came up in the ‘60s and ‘70s and ‘80s under the Soviet style, were the best educated, the most disciplined and most system-oriented guys going. Now, they were rigid and did not like risk, especially all those that have gone through the Soviet system. They weren’t into risk, but they certainly understood how to think. They understood how to use the system properly and processes. The guys who had no education, former mujahedeen guys, I don’t know. I’m sure they were spectacular on the battlefield when they were chasing Soviets around, but they’re not equipped to lead a modern, functioning army. That causes some friction. (Interview 15)

Another advisor acknowledged the skills gap across ethnic groups. Yet, he added that even though many former anti-Soviet mujahedeen ministerial officials “weren’t school trained ... [or] have a lot of education to back it up,” he nevertheless “saw certainly a lot of professional dedication and commitment on their part” (Interview 16). Many former mujahedeen were “very much experienced” (Interview 61), but not in the Western sense. It was difficult for them to encourage their Afghan counterparts to break old, mistrusting habits and micromanagement and, instead, to adopt more of a strategic management role and work through institutions.

Bismillah Khan Mohammadi [now the minister of defense, former interior minister and ANA chief of staff] was [formerly] one of the leading commanders in the Northern Alliance. ... We used to joke that General Mohammadi was the senior company commander [a captain] in Afghanistan and to some extent that was true. Within what he could see and touch he was the dominant personality and that was, in a sense, the way he operated. He traveled around all over the place. He went to visit people all over the place. He had the habit of just dropping in on people in his helicopter rather than try to work through an institution, which I suppose, I’m not going to say he didn’t trust, but it perhaps wasn’t as robust as a Western equivalent would be. So in terms of that kind of professionalism, I’d say not [much changed]. I’d say the Afghan National Army is almost by nature a tactical beast. (Interview 61)

**Tactical professionalism**

Tactical participants viewed Afghan professionalism in many facets. With the Afghan police, corruption was clearly the greatest issue, most notably with the regular AUP patrolmen who extorted money from locals at security checkpoints. Some police units saw marginal
improvements, though, based on the interviews, this was an exception to the rule. For example, a military police commander serving from 2011 to 2012 saw no change in corruption among police officials in her area of responsibility.

*I don’t think we made a difference on corruption. I think probably over time I was better able to figure out what the Afghans cared about on corruption. They cared very much about somebody who was using excessive force versus somebody who took small bribes.*

(Interview 63)

Yet, one year later, in the same Afghan city and with the same AUP force, a different military police commander serving from 2012 to 2013 observed a slight shift in police leaders taking more action on petty theft and corruption.

*You have police leaders—and even junior AUP—those guys speaking out against what two years ago was probably normal. So that to me is a huge change towards a positive in professionalism. It’s kind of a shift in the paradigm there of what they think right looks like and actually vocalizing and speaking out against those things—to the soldiers, to the public. And then I have personally seen AUP commanders who, when their AUPs did something wrong—that went against sort of those things—that they would punish them or fire them. And that means they’re putting some action behind their words, and that not just paying a lip service, but actually doing something about it was pretty significant.*

(Interview 48)

Participants mainly expressed concerns about ANA professionalism as it related to Afghan resistance to promote leaders based on merit and their collective willingness to fight the Taliban (Interviews 3, 37). On the latter issue, a majority of tactical leaders cited positive trends in ANA confidence, especially as the tactical leaders stepped away and assumed more of a standby, reserve role. Changing norms on officer promotions, however, appears to be a long-term issue.

*It’s not a meritocracy; it’s a matter of who you know. For example, the Afghan company commander we had was not the best officer in the unit. There were some very senior first lieutenants who could have been much better company commanders than him, but he was appointed because he was connected. His father knew some people in the tribe. They put*
him in there and he was pretty weak. He got a little better as time went on, but he was
definitely not the best officer in that unit. (Interview 54)

Redefining and elevating the normative role, identity, and authority of ANA noncommissioned
officers also appears to be another generational project. This cuts against the grain of Afghan
societal mores and high power distance—or, the acceptance and submission to an unequal
distribution of power within a group (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010, 27)

That’s one area I think is probably a bridge too far. It’s so strongly a part of their
culture. You know, it’s one of those cultural things we’re not going to change, so I think
our focus needs to be on their officers. I think it’s a very hierarchical culture and so
there’s this kind of high power distance thing going on. Whereas like a platoon leader or
a company commander [in a Western army] you spend a lot of time with your NCOs and
you get to know them well and you ask their advice and things like that, I think that you
don’t see that so much in their Army because, for the same reasons that, you know, even
outside of the military, you know, an elder of a village or some guy in a senior
government position would not behave the same way. He would not—he’s the guy in
charge and so recognizing that. Whereas like as a platoon leader you see yourself as an
equal with your platoon sergeant, as company commander you see your first sergeant as
co-equals and so forth, up the line. (Interview 6)

Respect for human rights and Afghan citizens was a theme that related to ANA, ANP,
and ALP. Petty theft and bribes were “a way of doing business” (Interview 63). Non-life-
threatening beatings of suspected criminals were also common.

I think ... the way the US views human rights and corruption is going to be very different
than the way the Afghans view it. I learned pretty early on that what they care about most
with human rights is missing people and I absolutely get that. So I think accountability of
loved ones as they’ve been picked up by security forces and taken away somewhere. I
think that is common to both cultures. They care a lot about that. If their son was missing,
you’d have family members show up and say, ‘Hey, my son got picked up by the police
and I don’t know where he is.’ They cared a lot about that.

They don’t care so much about beatings that aren’t very injurious, I guess. You
know it’s typical to see Afghan police with a stick trying to beat off kids who are getting

79 The US Army and its sister services have well established identities and roles for their noncommissioned officers.
For example, the US Army NCO Creed is an artifact of these norms, which opens with the following stanza, “No
one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of Soldiers. As a Noncommissioned
Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps, which is known as ‘The Backbone of the Army’” (US
Department of the Army 2008b, 345).
unruly. At least in Kandahar, if you picked up a drug addict, they would shave the guy bald, sometimes obviously nicking his head as they were doing it. The way they explained it to me was that was to shame him and also because drug addicts were often dirty and lousy. To us that would look like prisoner abuse; to them that’s just a way of doing business. (Interview 63)

However, despite observed mistreatment of criminals and wrongdoers, ANSF were clearly improving in their interactions with local communities.

I looked at professionalism as how do you interact with the local population. ... Initially, the ANP going on patrol would just sit there and we would talk to villagers, you know, they just thought, ‘OK, just walk around the village.’ Every time we went on patrol they saw us basically [interacting] with civilians, you know, ‘Hey, how are you doing? Do you have any issues?’ After awhile, we started to see ANP start talking to locals. ... That is something that just kind of rubs off on them. (Interview 1)

We put a lot of emphasis on, ‘You [ALP] need to be a visible sign of respect and authority in your community. And you’re not going to be respected without that.’ I really do feel that we gotten a long way towards that. By the time we left, we were—people were seeing them as these legitimate forces of security in their community, the professional ones. (Interview 47)

You would see [some ANCOP units] commonly hand out money, like the gunner in the back of a truck while just driving by. If we were stopped in traffic, they’d hand out money to the ones who were begging in the middle of the street. The gunner in the back probably makes $5 a week, you know, so it was a sense of these are our people and everything. That just kind of stuck in my mind that this unit, the leadership, at least in the majority of the forces, has a recipe for success, now we just have to draw it out of them and make them more effective. That’s what I thought was pretty significant because I’ve traveled and watched other forces that just do not do that. (Interview 25)

**Conclusion**

Participants in this study reveal that NATO advisors and unit leaders had little influence on institutional transfer, with the exception of organizational capacity. Culture and corruption were their primary explanations for why this was the case. Nevertheless, the data also reveals that personal relationships, dialogue, and organizational approach and demeanor help promote functional and ideational changes. In the concluding chapter, I will elaborate on these findings,
along with those in Chapters 7 and 8, as they relate to SSR program theory development and policy implementation.
CHAPTER 10. CASE ANALYSIS, THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Within reach of those who are trained in assessment, we hope ... by the elimination of some and the better placement of others, to decrease the ultimate failures or unsatisfactory performers, by such a number that (i) the amount saved plus (ii) the amount of harm prevented plus (iii) the amount gained is greater than the cost of the assessment program. ... The most important item, the amount of harm prevented, is scarcely calculable. It consists of the friction, the impairment of efficiency and morale, the injury to the reputation of an organization that results from the actions of a man who is stupid, apathetic, sullen, resentful, arrogant, or insulting in his dealings with members of his own unit or of allied units, or with customers or citizens of foreign countries.

US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Assessment of Men, 1948, 8-9

Security sector reform (SSR) experts and professionals are in a period of deep introspection. Since its inception in the late 1990s, the orthodox SSR model, rooted in liberal-democratic and state-centric views of security, has achieved few successes in practice. Scholars agree that any way forward requires greater nuance, flexibility, political awareness, and modesty in its implementation, but they remain divided over whether this should be achieved through more or less local engagement (Sedra 2010b). This dissertation responds to these appeals. Given the scholarly gaps in addressing agent-level interactions in SSR settings (Chapter 2), I focused this project on a single case—Afghanistan from 2009 to 2012—when foreign and local interactions were the greatest. The project goal (like SSR) was ambitious—to develop contextual knowledge on the effectiveness of different agent-level engagement strategies and their potential impacts on SSR-related outcomes.

I argued in Chapter 3 that SSR needs a better-specified program theory that explains how reform is to occur. I illustrated how internationally led SSR is a type of guided institutional transfer. This diffusion process involves external and local structures and agents interacting on
multiple levels to establish Western forms of security governance and effectiveness. Many diffusion processes involving the spread of institutions are inevitable (i.e., isomorphic, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). However, institutional transfer under the auspices of internationally led SSR programs is highly uncertain, due to existing domestic factors, including violence, politics, and corruption (Brzoska and Law 2007). In addition, as a purposeful—i.e., guided—set of activities, SSR necessitates local actors’ ownership and willingness to accept or convert foreign organizational models, practices, and norms promoted and socialized by its reformers and advocates. The external actors thus influence these changes through various socialization approaches rooted in the logics of power, legitimacy, and efficiency.

From this, I applied a theoretical framework to assess advisor and tactical leader influence across the Afghan security ministries (strategic level) and national security forces (tactical level). Based on in-depth interviews from a diverse sample of 68 participants, I explored the perceived effectiveness of different advising and influencing approaches. I also evaluated perceived observations on institutional transfer outcomes across the Afghan security sector.

Seven sections follow. In the first and primary section, I present six major case findings and theoretical propositions and present the alternative explanation of coalition senior leader impact on NATO-ISAF partnering efforts. Next, I provide an overall case summary. I briefly discuss the dissertation’s broader theoretical contribution. I discuss implications for SSR and US security assistance policy and programming. Finally, I end with three brief sections highlighting the study’s limitations, areas for future research, and overall contributions.
Case Findings and Theoretical Propositions

In light of the three previous empirical chapters, this section presents six case findings and corresponding theoretical propositions.

**Case Finding 1.** Coercive influence was mostly ineffective, if not counterproductive, in nearly all circumstances. Resistance to reform was often rooted in the substance of the request. Demands that threatened elite authority or control of resources faced the greatest resistance at the ministerial level. By contrast, demands that ran counter to cultural norms faced the greatest resistance at the tactical level. Level of education, however, appears to mitigate cultural resistance.

Coercive influence was a failure. At the ministerial level, demands usually met resistance when their content threatened existing power structures within the ministry or across ethnic lines. Controversial demands (e.g. Decree 5001) usually faced stiff resistance. Coercion rarely worked in circumstances of corruption when advisors thought demands were necessary to remove or prosecute senior officials. Senior Afghans occasionally reassigned other senior officers, but they rarely fired and almost never prosecuted them, even after direct intervention by senior NATO commanders.

Pressure for normative reform (e.g. gender integration) was more likely to produce half-hearted conciliation or deferment. Demands over less inherently political matters—for instance, doctrine, organizational routines, and practices—had mixed outcomes. Many Soviet-educated ministry officials were more likely to be open to (or at least acquainted with) Western defense organizational models. Advisors also noted that pushy advising mannerisms damaged interpersonal relationships. Afghan ministry officials and staff often marginalized aggressive advisors, ignoring them until they were redeployed and likely hoping for a more amicable replacement.
Tactical participants saw similar resistance. Units that compelled their Afghan partners to conduct combined operations with them did little to develop leadership or local ownership. In many cases, such coercion bred resentment. In extreme cases, soldiers who forced Afghans to perform actions antithetical to Afghan culture (e.g., invasive house searches) provoked strong responses—sometimes violence—and eroded the trust between units. Notably, removing incompetent or toxic Afghan leaders was effective and comparably less difficult to influence than at senior levels. However, NATO leaders and advisors never fired their counterpart directly. Rather, they collected evidence to support their counterpart’s removal. This had limitations because Afghan commanders relieved for cause were usually reassigned instead of discharged.

**Proposition 1**

*Resistance to institutional reform is greatest in the institutional and organizational center and on matters of power and authority. Culture plays a stronger barrier to change on the periphery.*

**Case Finding 2:** *Advisors and unit commanders faced considerable pressure to demonstrate progress in their counterparts’ individual and organizational development. Data suggest a strong relationship between structural pressure and advisors’ inclination to rely on demands and pressure tactics.*

Short timelines and strategic ambition shaped coalition members’ behavior considerably. By design, the troop surge in late 2009 had a clearly defined end—September 2012—a point at which troop levels would return to their pre-surge levels. The overall mission had a predetermined conclusion too. Afghan and NATO leaders at a 2011 summit in Lisbon, Portugal, agreed that NATO-ISAF would stand down on December 31, 2014. September 2012 and December 2014 were major constraints on how the NATO coalition planned its campaign. In
other words, NATO had two years and an additional 33,000 US troops to beat back the Taliban insurgency and accelerate ANSF and ministerial growth and development. After that, NATO had another two years to prepare the ANSF and security ministries to assume full responsibility while, simultaneously, the United States steadily reduced its total personnel (surge and pre-surge) from a peak of 100,000 in mid-2010 to an undetermined number to remain after 2014.\(^\text{80}\)

This was no small feat. Nearly doubling—in four years—an Afghan force of 177,000 soldiers and police to 352,000 and developing two government ministries capable of independently raising, training, managing, and sustaining the ANSF demanded industrial-scale institution building.

Ministerial and tactical participants were operating in a pressure-filled environment beyond the risks associated with working in the midst of a major conflict. The ambitious campaign timeline required planners to establish deadlines and measure progress by output- and capability-based production metrics for personnel to meet before 2014. This cultivated an intensely goal-minded organizational setting in which advisors and leaders felt constant pressure to show progress.

\textit{You’ve got all these issues to deal with and as an advisor you’re expected to step in to a certain problem set and now pile on the pressures that are on the coalition folks. So, from ISAF to IJC to NTM-A, the pressure to make something happen and make it happen quickly, because we’ve got timelines that we’re working under. You’ve got to transition at a certain point, and are these guys going to be ready? So you’ve got all these pressures from the coalition members demanding, basically, movement on the Afghan side. So now, I put myself in the guy that I’m advising’s shoes and I go, ‘Holy crap!’ I don’t even know what issues he’s got at home, but I’m certain he’s got some, you know? Between a wife, kids, whatever. ... But you think about his personal life, and he’s trying to get ahead just like you and I do here in our professional lives. ... And now you come in and say, ‘I’m here to help. But, oh, by the way, I’m under pressure, so it’s all on you now because I have to get something done. And I don’t know the second, third, fourth order effects of making you do this. It might be a bad thing. It could be a good thing, but it...}

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\(^\text{80}\) This chapter was written in spring 2014 at a time of uncertainty surrounding the bilateral security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States. If the agreement by President Karzai’s successor, estimates of a residual force of advisors, trainers, and counterterrorist units range in the upper thousands of personnel (6,000 to 10,000).
might be a bad thing. ... But I don’t think we think through enough the cultural issues that are required to be successful. And then you couple that with timelines, milestones. It just adds that much more pressure to these guys. It’s a complex environment to be successful. (Interview 21)

Documentation adds further support to the claim that structural pressure weighed heavily on advisors. Figure 10-1 features an excerpt from a document that provided guidance to advisors during a monthly meeting. The highlighted portion (there are more examples within the document) explicitly tells advisors “to push [Afghan] leaders for more progress” on conducting a personal asset inventory—a process whereby all units muster their personnel to verify their strength and identify shortfalls and missing personnel.

Figure 10-1. Excerpt from Advisors Council Meeting, Advisor Focus Areas and Guidance, May 20, 2011

Source: (NTM-A, 2011, 5)

The interview data and documentation strongly suggest that goal-oriented pressure had a considerable impact on how advisors and unit leaders approached their duties. This implies the following theoretical proposition:

**Proposition 2**

Under conditions of high goal-oriented organizational pressure, foreign advisors are more inclined to pursue power-based forms of influence.
Case Finding 3. Resource overabundance created perverse incentives. For those advisors and commanders with easy access, inducing behavior through material resources and favors was tempting. However, these efforts had little enduring impacts on ministerial- and tactical-level counterparts and often promoted dependency. Conversely, material threats and sanctions were effective, but only in circumstances in which advisors or unit leaders had authority and credibility to follow through or rescind their support. Inadequate control or oversight led to rent-seeking behavior among some Afghan counterparts who worked to direct the flow of resources to their favor.

The data show a clear divergence between participant attitudes toward, on the one hand, using material resources to motivate behavior or compliance, and on the other hand, withdrawing, or threatening to cut or reduce, material goods and services. Participants were also unenthusiastic on the use of incentives but less pessimistic than their views on coercion. Some saw it necessary to acquire resources (e.g., supplies, fuel) or to perform certain tasks (e.g., “pick up the ball,” Interview 15) for their counterpart in exchange for cooperation or compliance out of a need to maintain developmental momentum. This is also a clear reflection of the high degree of goal-oriented structural pressure described above. Again, there was a clear perception that showing progress was necessary even if it occasionally required enticing cooperation or substituting, rather than developing, capacity. At best, this produced short-term results or prevented major failure; at worst, it bred continued dependence and delayed learning and development. This dynamic was worsened by the glut of resources pouring into Afghanistan at the time—NTM-A had more money than ideas as one advisor described (Interview 32).

Conversely, participants saw that reducing or cutting material resources and services—or threatening cutback—was effective. Yet, few advisors had personal authority or control to do so. Only a small fraction of ministerial advisors (4) and tactical unit leaders (5) indicated they had influence over resources and services—namely, salaries, fuel, contracts, and advisory support—and could therefore take action or make a credible threat if needed. Despite these few exceptions, most had little influence, much less control, over resources, given the strong undercurrent of
spending. Simply put, material inducements were a trap, material threats were mostly hollow, and sanctions were scarce, due to the combined lack of advisor authority and weak oversight.

The clear excess of resources had a negative impact on advisors’ ability to influence ANSF and ministerial development. As Chapter 7 details, NTM-A could not spend its budget fast enough. Note that in its peak years between 2010 and 2012, NTM-A had, on average, a $10 billion annual budget (about $800 million per month) for Afghan security force and ministerial development (SIGAR, 2014, 72). However, NTM-A cut this figure in half by fiscal year 2013, in part due to a major shift in funding priorities under new leadership. A senior NTM-A staff officer noted a drastic change under Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger who replaced Lieutenant General William Caldwell in 2011. He described how, in the initial years under Caldwell, NTM-A was “buying everything to equip the ANSF,” but Bolger “brought that to a standstill and developed a very methodological approach to accounting and procurement” (Interview 67). From 2011 to 2012 NTM-A “cut around $5 billion out of ASFF funding [verified by SIGAR, 2014] ... on contracts that were extant for everything from maintenance of helicopters to water delivery.” It also cut back on supplying armored SUVs; stopped delivery of new ammunition and explosives—“at great cost”—until the ANA finally disposed of its outdated ammunition stockpiles; and withheld repair parts as an attempt to stimulate the ANA to make better use of its logistics reporting system. He stated, “We found that given a hard transition time, they [their Afghan counterparts] took it on [greater responsibility]. They aren’t stupid and they know how to take care of their troops, albeit in a truly Afghan fashion” (Interview 67).

Tactical participants saw similar improvements. The data, detailed in Chapter 7, highlight a degree of learning from previous units’ mistakes of incentivizing their counterparts with fuel and other material goods. Eight tactical-level participants (one-quarter) noted how rejecting
requests for fuel or other supplies—by choice or by budget cuts—improved developmental outcomes in their Afghan counterparts’ organization out of necessity. A third-party observer to several tactical brigades also witnessed how the reduced availability of material resources pressured tactical units to redouble their efforts on relationship building.

The data suggest that the rapid increase in funding availability in NTM-A’s first few years hit a point of diminishing returns. More material resources did not necessarily lead to better outcomes. This is a common malady in international development and postwar statebuilding. Foreign aid has a point of diminishing returns (Collier and Dollar 2002, Lensink and White 2001) that is typically worsened by domestic characteristics like weak governance and economic policies (Burnside and Dollar 2004) and, naturally, conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Therefore, another theoretical proposition follows.

**Proposition 3**

*Under conditions of high resource availability, foreign advisors are more inclined to rely on material inducements as a means of gaining influence and compliance. Conversely, under conditions of resource scarcity, advisors are more likely to explore alternative means of influence.*

**Case Finding 4.** *There was little evidence showing a deliberate, coalition-directed effort to drive Afghan innovation. Despite resource availability, structural pressure via time constraints and declining public support reinforced NATO-ISAF risk aversion and reluctance to consider experimentation. Advisors and unit leaders thus tended to assume a similar risk orientation.*

The data lack sufficient evidence to suggest that NATO-ISAF actively supported Afghan innovation. To clarify, the lack of evidence does not prove that no Afghan innovation occurred. Rather it is highly likely, yet difficult to know. Nor does the lack of data imply that coalition
members were not working to build Afghan local ownership in various policies, systems, and procedures or Afghan willingness to conduct independent security operations. However, most approaches focusing on local ownership (e.g., socialized policy adaptations, guided discovery learning, and planting ideas in conversation) intentionally promoted learning of and adaptation to Western concepts and models—not pure, Afghan-generated solutions. The subtle difference between guided discovery learning and pure discovery learning best captures this distinction. In guided discovery, teachers structure the learning environment so that the student has sufficient ability and freedom to discover a predetermined concept or solution(s). By contrast, in pure discovery settings, individuals and groups find a concept or solution on their own, without external support steering the learning process toward a preferred outcome.

Rarely did advisors or unit leaders note or observe circumstances in which they or others intentionally provided Afghan officials or units the opportunity to innovate (Kanter 2000, 2006, Scott and Bruce 1994)—to explore, experiment, fail, learn, and adapt. Exceptions were few. The emergence of the VSO/ALP program counts as an innovation, albeit more a Western than pure Afghan experiment, that emerged out of experiments with the AP3 program in Wardak province and other prototype local defense initiatives. The few participants who noted the importance of letting their counterparts experience a tolerable degree of failure or allowing them to problem solve independently described this as a discovery process rather than an intentionally planned approach.

What explains the lack of an organized effort? Structure and agency both provide reasonable explanations. I address agency-based explanations in the next subsection. From a structural view, a combination of organizational slack and risk of failure explain the apparent lack of focus on Afghanistan innovation. Previous sections highlight how the surge period was
characterized by a high degree of structural pressure to accelerate ANSF and ministry
development and a glut of material resources. NATO had ample slack in resources, but no slack
in time with the mission ending in December 2014. Innovation and experimentation also invite
the risk of failure. With the exception of SOF units provided more operational latitude, NATO-ISAF was risk averse and disinclined to experiment, given the fading public tolerance for a
decade-long war (longest in US history) and a short time frame to show results. The spike in
insider attacks on coalition personnel only reinforced conservatism in partnering—“Nothing
advisors did was worth getting them killed” (Interview 67). The costs and consequences of
organized trial and error were too simply too high.

**Proposition 4:**

*As goal-oriented pressure increases, organizational risk tolerance, and thus willingness
to experiment and to innovate, decreases. Consequently, advisors are less likely to
courage local experimentation and innovation.*

**Case Finding 5.** *The constant rotation of NATO advisors and units at six-, nine-, and 12-
month intervals constrained their ability to develop effective, long-term, and transformational
relationships with their partners. This also intensified Afghan frustration and advisor fatigue.
Nevertheless, reported relationship closeness associated closely with positive perceptions of
influence and institutional transfer outcomes (despite clear limitations of the latter).
Specifically, participants citing effective modes of influence (persuasion, guided discovery,
discussion) also tended to stress the strength of their relationship(s) as a necessary condition.
Overall, some advisors had agency to influence their host-nation counterparts, but this was
moderated (positively and negatively) by their ability to form close relationships.

Participants on both levels of analysis viewed legitimacy-based modes of influence to be
more effective than power-based approaches. Afghan leaders usually rejected coercive
approaches and ignored or marginalized their advisor. In addition, Afghan leaders who were
accustomed to their advisors delivering resources ignored them once the leaders determined that their advisors could no longer provide value. These are hallmarks of perpetually transactional interpersonal relationships. Participants noted that many advisors, especially at the ministerial level, came in thinking they were going to solve everything on their watch (Interview 24).

_I have seen many US military and civilian mentors fail their mission within the first two weeks of taking over because they came in and immediately pushed a plan, a demand, or tried to implement immediate changes by pushing a good idea or a way of doing something before the relationship was built. And in many cases, they approached this relationship from such a culturally insensitive perspective that nothing was achieved and the relationship was forever unattainable, ending in the mentor accomplishing nothing._ (Interview 68)

Remarkably, advisors and leaders had one year or less to build a productive relationship with their counterparts. This time constraint limited their ability to develop professional bonds. It was common for many to start making headway with their counterparts toward the end of their deployment, when a new advisor or unit would come in and restart the relationship development process. Between the “advisor overload” created by “constant flow in of good intended leaders” who “believed they needed to advise” Afghan senior leadership (Interview 67) and more than a decade of new NATO advisors and personalities rotating in and out, the Afghans were clearly frustrated.

_Often times, in the Afghan army anyway, and police, some of these guys [Afghans] have just got so fucking fed up with the rotation of Americans, the rotation of Spanish that rotate three times as fast as Americans did, and Italians which rotated twice as fast as Americans ... that they just said, ‘Fuck you guys. I’m going to do what I want to do.’_ (Interview 2)

Conversely, advisors who used legitimacy- or efficiency-based approaches fared better. Ministerial participants saw the greatest utility in applying persuasion and negotiation skills. For those who used or observed it, persuasion was moderately effective except in the form of rational
logic (e.g., explaining costs and benefits). Persuasion worked best when accompanied by rationales embedded in a counterpart’s worldview or motivations. In other words, appeals to personal reputation, ego, or other core beliefs were likely to have greater sway than pure economic arguments. Ministerial advisors cited other helpful means such as targeted questioning, subtle cueing, and careful timing. These required a sophisticated understanding of a counterpart’s thinking style and mannerisms and the ability to recognize opportunities as they emerged in the daily encounters. Advisors who acted as brokers by communicating information between NTM-A and the Afghan ministries and who socialized reforms by promoting Afghan involvement were also moderately influential. Several noted how a degree of personal trust was necessary for their partner to be willing to disclose his interests and motivations.

Tactical advisors stressed the importance of teaching skills, empowering Afghan authority figures, and leading by example. These participants claimed that guided discovery teaching methods worked best to stimulate ANSF problem solving, capacity development, and ownership. Two symbolic influencing techniques also proved effective. First, demonstration—acting out roles and tasks and modeling professional behavior—produced some limited emulative effects on the ANSF. Second, symbolic reinforcement—deflecting attention and respect to Afghan leaders and presenting meaningful tokens (e.g., commander’s coins and medals) to reinforce good performance—were also influential.

On both levels, participants perceived limited outcomes on institutional transfer. Specifically, they saw modest gains in organizational capacity, but little change otherwise, especially on the transfer of norms and values. Yet, there were exceptions. Among these exceptions advisors attributed the strength of their advisory relationship to their counterparts’ curiosity (e.g., stewardship of office), dialogue (e.g., professional development discussions over
meals), and limited experimentation (e.g., empowerment of senior NCOs) with Western security norms.

It is worth noting three important points from organizational science and social psychology. First, influential communications necessitate credibility, authority, and social attractiveness (likeability) in the persuader (Cialdini 2012, Perloff 2014). Second, interpersonal trust and relationship building take time to develop but ultimately have a positive impact on interorganizational performance—i.e., two or more groups working together toward common outcomes (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998). The process begins as highly transactional, but through the reinforcement of repeated, positive interactions, the relationship eventually involves “proclivity to positive regard and liking and receptiveness to alternative viewpoints and new ideas” (Alexopoulos and Buckley 2013, 368, citing Baker and Edwards 2012, Gillespie 2003, Levin and Cross 2004, Walter and Bruch 2008, Zand 1972). Finally, benevolence-based trust (likeability) and competence-based (professional respect) aid in the transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge in interpersonal relationships (Levin and Cross 2004).

Techniques of persuasion, negotiation, teaching, and symbolic modeling are communicative acts. On the one hand, effective influence was associated with an advisor or leader’s ability to frame his arguments or adapt her teaching methods to her counterparts’ worldviews and practices. This required a familiarity with the partner and his circumstances. Gaining this knowledge reflects a degree of interpersonal closeness and trust. On the other

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81 A relationship is close when two people have great impact, or interdependence, on each other. This “is revealed in four properties of their interconnected activities: (1) the individuals have frequent impact on each other, (2) the degree of impact per each occurrence is strong, (3) the impact involves diverse kinds of activities for each person, and (4) all of these properties characterize the interconnected activity series for a relatively long duration of time. ... Close ... is virtually synonymous with influential” (Kelley et al. 1983, 13). See also Aron, Aron, and Smollan (1992) and Berscheid, Snyder, and Omoto (1989).

82 Trust is a multidisciplinary concept with a diversity of definitions. Prominent definitions assert that trust involves positive expectations of another person and an acceptance of vulnerability in the relationship under conditions of
hand, successful persuasion—meaning acceptance or internalization of the skill, knowledge, or idea being presented—also requires the recipient actor to hold a basic level of esteem in the communicator. Three examples, in particular, add context to how this critical process unfolded.

*It’s a personal relationship. I can tell you that you’re not going to get anywhere getting these guys to accept what you have to say until there’s trust there, until the guy thinks that you actually care, and that first few weeks is kind of weird because you know the guy’s looking at you, he’s measuring you up and until he decides ‘Hey, I think this guy’s going to be OK,’ you’re not going to get anywhere. ... I had a couple corps commanders to advise, but [one] I had fought against taking on. You know, this guy is a bad dude, this is all the reports I have, and when [he] came in, he and I are measuring each other up; he flat out said, ‘Why are you saying these terrible things about me? Why did you not want me to come? I know from Kabul that you did not want me here.’ He outing me. So I said, ‘Here’s the deal,’ and I was completely honest. I said, ‘Well, sir, this is what I heard. Now I don’t know if it’s true or not, but I haven’t launched any investigations. But from my standpoint, I’m only as good as the information I get, just like you, and if you are willing to learn and move ahead and make this corps as good as it can be and all that, I’m willing to ignore what I’ve been told about your previous behavior about skimming cash and all that other bullshit. I’m willing to choose to move ahead.’ And so he thought about it and this was like a couple minutes sitting in his office in his overstuffed chairs. He thought about it and looked out the window and he goes, ‘I have chosen to like you.’ He said it like declaratively; it was kind of interesting. That was exactly what he said, ‘I have chosen to like you.’ And we became pretty good friends after that, but we had this honest, frank, pretty intense thing like, ‘Hey motherfucker,’ and that’s pretty much what he said to me more or less. And rather than me bullshit him, I completely told the truth and I think once I did that we became pretty good friends and he would actually act on the stuff I would suggest to him. (Interview 2)*

*When I first got with [the deputy minister], he said, ‘Look, I want you to be my advisor, but you have to understand how the system works.’ I said, ‘Well, why did you pick me? Why did you pick me to be an advisor after all this time, all these uniforms [military officers]?’ He said, ‘Because I think you’re different.’ I said, ‘OK.’ He said, ‘One thing I need you to understand is how our system really works—not the way you want it work, how it really works.’ So I would—I’m just going to put an arbitrary time on it. For about the first month that I was with him I was much more the observer than I offered any advice. I think that goes back to our original discussion about why I believe time is critical. The longer you can spend with these people, the better you understand them. In America today ... we think the rest of the world should run just like we run and they don’t. It’s almost a high level of hubris that we think we’re so much better than everybody else and our way is the only way. ... We all too often just go in there and say, ‘Hi. How are you doing? Here’s the new deal we thought up for you.’ So I spent a lot of time just traveling with him in the beginning. ... I don’t know that anybody thought I was a*
particularly great advisor for the first 60 to 90 days, maybe six months. I think they were happy with me, but I don’t think the real effect and reputation kicked in until later on when they figured out [the deputy minister] and I could get things done, but that was a cooperative effort, probably more him than me, but again, he believed I was there to try and help him do good. (Interview 61)

There was a period there where he was sort of testing me, as well, and testing me in terms of where my loyalties were and who did I work for, him or the American general across the border? There were things that he would test me on. I was a doctor. I got a Ph.D. most recently. He said, ‘Oh, you guys are so smart.’ He was sort of testing me out there as well. I’d say, ‘Well, you know, life experience counts for a lot, too. There are a lot of people out there who are very smart because they’ve learned things from having to do hard stuff and solve some difficult problems.’ So it was those kind of responses. [He thought,] ‘Oh, OK. Well, the guy’s not then thinking he’s smarter than me.’ But a lot of those were tests that I think he floated to me in the process of trying to determine who am I, can I be trusted, what’s our relationship and role going to be, [like,] ‘If you think you’re coming in here to tell me how to do my job, I’ve got another thing coming.’ So I think there was that development for probably a good 30 to 60 days. But then you could see that there were things that eventually that relationship matured. There were personal things he would share. In some cases maybe it was a little tidbit there and then he probably waited to see whether it floated around the headquarters and ever came back to him and if he felt like, ‘OK, I trusted him that far and it didn’t go anywhere, then I’ll throw a little bit more at him.’ (Interview 16)

Still, based on the third previous example, it is worth reiterating that there was substantial disagreement about an advisor’s role, especially at the ministerial level (Chapter 6). Senior NTM-A commanders feared that their advisors were getting too close to their partner to the point they were serving as personal assistants (Interview 67).

The data support the following proposition:

**Proposition 5:**

*Increased interaction time and advisor patience and credibility increase interpersonal trust development, disclosure of intimate personal knowledge, and, consequently, advisor influence and institutional transfer.*
Case Finding 6. Individual attributes of advisors and leaders were relevant factors in the identification and use of alternative modes of influence. Aside from structural pressure and resource availability, advisor personality and inexperience best explains the tendency to use seemingly less effective modes of influence. The data suggest that, besides language skills, social and cultural intelligence—the ability to develop trusting relationships, read cultural cues, and act accordingly in foreign settings—are critical factors in effective advising.

Structure was not the only factor in coalition advisors and unit leaders’ tendency to use power-based approaches over alternatives. Individual attributes are also relevant, specifically, the ability to predict a counterpart’s reaction to, and the short- and long-term outcomes of, different forms of influence. Surely, advisors or leaders may make demands knowingly without regard for the outcome or their counterpart’s acceptance. The data suggest that this type of reckless, hegemonic behavior was rare. Rather, in the absence of structural pressure, advisors’ inexperience or inability to interpret interpersonal and cultural cues, or both, best explains the propensity to push a policy, activity, or idea on a foreign counterpart.

In addition to the findings in Chapter 9 that highlight the importance of relationships and dialogue in guiding institutional transfer, a majority of participants highlighted the critical importance of selecting advisors with personalities suited for the role. Certainly, functional expertise and competence were also critical to provide value to their counterpart—especially for ministerial advisors expected to have knowledge of ministerial and general staff operations (Interviews 15, 33). However, advising and partnering entailed more than providing technocratic or tactical expertise. Participants on both levels made consistent claims that having the right personality and the ability to develop relationships were essential factors in effective advising. A simple query of the interview transcripts reveals that 27 of 51 (53 percent) of the advisors and unit leaders mentioned personality when discussing their partnering or advising relationship. Several participants claimed that a fitting, gregarious personality was more important—for both parties—than functional competence or subject matter expertise.
If you don’t have personality and personal skills, it doesn’t matter if you’re the most tactically sound [competent] guy in the world, I think you’re only going to make it so far. I would almost rate the personal [characteristics] two-thirds and the tactical [expertise] one-third. I think if you can’t deal with people you’re probably going to do more damage than good. (Interview 29)

My team chief had a hard time partnering. He was just not a people person ... some of that stuff you just can’t teach. Some people are going to be great at it because they’re good in their personal relationships and some people aren’t. (Interview 5)

I saw some very senior guys have a very negative approach with the Afghans and I saw very junior guys have very positive rapport with the Afghans and the Afghans would bend over backwards for them. I think maturity and personality have a huge role to play in it [effective advising]. (Interview 24)

It’s interesting because if you were to take all your lieutenants in rank order and say, ‘Who’s best and who’s worst?’ sometimes those who are middle to the bottom come out to be better trainers and I think it’s just because they’re respectful and easy-going. So there’s not necessarily a correlation between what we think would be a good leader and what makes a good trainer. I had one particular LT that my company commander was not impressed with at all and yet Afghan after Afghan just sang her praises, so to me that’s success. And it wasn’t because she was doing anything wrong, she was just not a real badass, hard charger, always throwing her weight around. She was there for them. She was respectful. (Interview 63)

You can give guys all the training in the world, but if they don’t have the right personality to match with the guy they’re advising they’re not going to get very far. Ultimately, your credibility with the person you’re working with is your entry through the doorway. If they don’t like you, they don’t respect you, you’re combat ineffective. You’re useless. ... What I’m saying is, the critical thing, is first the relationship and it’s largely personality-driven. (Interview 16)

Everybody places, in my opinion, far too much reliance on this subject matter expert business. I learned a long time ago that just because you’re a subject matter expert or just because you have an eagle on your collar does not make you an expert in everything, and when it comes to building relationships, a lot of people are just not cut out for that. Without the relationship, I do not believe you can have the difficult, sometimes even contentious, discussions required to effect real meaningful change. (Interview 61)

Reading interpersonal and cultural cues are key aspects of social\textsuperscript{83} and cultural\textsuperscript{84} intelligence (or, competence, in management terms). There are several forms of intelligence

\textsuperscript{83} Social intelligence is “the ability to understand and manage [people] and to act wisely in human relations” (E.L. Thorndike 1919, 228, 1927). This definition as evolved over time to include the ability to recognize interpersonal
(Gardner 1993, 2011), although social and cultural intelligences are practical, nonacademic types (Sternberg 1997) because they involve adaptive behavior as opposed to raw intellect. The concepts also overlap. Whereas social intelligence pertains to individual performance in a social setting, cultural intelligence is more specific in that it relates to performance in cross-cultural interactions and situations. Cultural intelligence is a personal attribute rooted in an individual’s values (e.g. tolerance, ideology, prejudice), educational background (including past cultural exposure), and personal interest in other cultures (Earley and Ang 2003, 188-192). People may learn and develop cultural competency through education (e.g., language and cultural training) and new cross-cultural experiences (2003, 190-191). Cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, and personality play a key role in negotiation outcomes (Sharma, Bottom, and Elfenbein 2013).

Knowledge, experience, and suitable personality are essential in any foreign advising setting. Certainly for advisors, relationships with their counterparts evolve—and ideally improve—over time as both become further acquainted, learn about the other’s background, and build mutual trust through repeated interaction. Thus, interpersonal mistakes and miscues are more likely to occur at the outset of an advising relationship. Advisors may also lack broader cultural or political awareness of how an advisee might perceive the substance or characteristics of a specific policy, action, or idea. Education, training, and experience can mitigate these shortfalls to an extent. However, an advisor’s values and cultural curiosity, while not entirely fixed, are more intrinsic traits. Advisors may simply lack genuine interest or inclination to foster cross-cultural relationships.

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84 Cultural intelligence is “a person’s [cognitive] ability to develop patterns from cultural cues; motivational ... desire and directed effort to engage others and follow through; and ... capability to appropriately enact selected behavior in accordance with cognition and motivation” (Earley and Ang 2003, 12).
85 Twenty-two US participants (43 percent of advisors and leaders) noted receiving a modest level of advising, culture, and language training, or better, through the Ministry of Defense Advisors program, the Afghan-Pakistan Hands program, or the US Army Special Forces.
From 2009 to 2012, NATO-ISAF faced a considerable challenge with advisor selection. Finding and placing culturally extroverted and experienced subject matter experts in advising positions was a doubly challenging human resourcing proposition, especially on the scale that NATO needed to fill the positions (roughly 6,000 trainers and advisors including 600 ministerial advisors Farrage 2012). The creation and expansion of NTM-A/CSTC-A brought a wave of ministerial advisors and trainers—“too many advisors ... that didn’t do much [though] the good ones cannot be overstated,” according to a senior NTM-A staff officer (Interview 67). NTM-A chose and placed military officers, government civilians, and civilian contractors in advisor positions based on past performance and functional expertise in hopes they would continue to excel.

*The army, in my estimation, has done a horrible job at trying to find the right people for the right jobs and instead of just, ‘Who’s available? Let’s send them over there,’ they needed to be doing a little bit better job. First of all, a number of the guys that I worked with had never worked at a strategic level headquarters before. Some of them, I don’t even know if they’ve ever been at the operation level, but yet here they are in a strategic level headquarters trying to teach a particular G staff member how to do things. So they didn’t have the experience to establish credibility and some of them just didn’t have the personality. You’ve got to be adaptive to working within their culture. If you’ve got to sit there and listen to a long, rambling story, then you have to sit there and listen to it. It may not allow you to tick off two or three things on your checklist because you never get to your checklist, but then again, it’s never about your checklist, it’s about them. Afghans can be very friendly and chatty and social, and if you don’t fit into that, you can’t do that, then you’re just not going to do well. The other thing is it’s never about you, and some of the guys that rolled in there came out of some pretty high-powered positions or out of command where it’s always been about them and then all of a sudden it’s about the guy they’re trying to advise. So the army’s done a bad job. (Interview 15)*

Similarly, the NATO troop surge increased the number of advisor teams and combat units available to partner with ANSF units in the field.

*You want to send your best and your brightest, not your second, your JV [junior varsity] squad. And I’ve got to be honest with you, I saw some JV squad. ... I saw all too many times, quite frankly, in my time where there were embedded trainers who should have never been in country. They were, for whatever reason, they didn’t have what it took to
be there. I had to replace one individual; it wasn’t for incompetence, it was just that—I don’t want to get into all the details, but bottom line is he needed to be moved. (Interview 10)

The data support the following proposition:

**Proposition 6:**

*Greater cross-cultural experience and personality fit enhance recognition and use of appropriate choices among alternative modes of influence.*

**Alternative Explanation—Leadership Impacts**

What role did senior leadership play in promoting influence and institutional transfer?

Most, but not all, NATO-ISAF and NTM-A senior officers took a hands-off approach to advising and engaging with the Afghan leadership. As a general observation, meetings between NATO and Afghan senior officials were mostly formal, business-like encounters, as one participant described.

*One of the most frustrating things for me over there was to watch the coalition general officers, and I’m mainly talking US—both Army and Marine Corps—not develop those relationships with their Afghan counterpart, and a lot of that was left to the coalition O-6s [colonels] and below. ‘Here, you go and do this. You engage with them, and by the way, when you’re there with them, do this,’ instead of taking the time and treating an Afghan generals like a peer, developing that peer relationship. Our guys would come in with maybe an hour meeting scheduled and they would try to run through the agenda topics. And it was just sort of contrary to Afghan culture, from what I picked up from my interpreter. ... It didn’t seem like our generals were getting that. You had few that would touch it, but for the most part, they would come in, have their talking points down. And I would just be dumbfounded, ‘No wonder you’re not getting that ... making headway with these guys.’ Because to me, as a third-party guy sitting in on this meeting, I would be insulted if you were talking to me like this and it’s obvious that you’re not concerned about your counterpart, you’re concerned about your agenda. You could watch some of the Brit generals come in from ISAF. They wouldn’t have a notebook in their hand and there would be more of that conversational engagement. You could tell that they were hitting the points that they needed to hit throughout the course of that meeting, but they*
were doing it in a much more personable and engaging manner. You know, it was almost like they could think on their feet and that was, I guess, the best way I could describe it ... was that our American generals didn’t seem to be able to grasp that (Interview 29).

Notably, a prevailing theme from the interviews on leadership was the drastic change in philosophy and organizational culture between NTM-A’s founding commander, Lieutenant General Caldwell and Lieutenant General Bolger, who took command in November 2011. Notably, Caldwell shepherded NTM-A and CSTC-A’s expansion. Under this expansion, staff members noted his regular involvement in ministerial advisors’ meetings. He also routinely gave town hall-style sessions with a “narrative” on “redeveloping a professional force” and how “the number one priority [was] leadership” (Interview 56). He also promoted “tough love” with the ANSF especially regarding logistics and a willingness to let them struggle to motivate the improvement of their systems (Interview 56).

In 2011, when LTG Bolger took command, NTM-A had reached its zenith in both personnel and ASFF funding. Several senior NTM-A personnel noted a drastic change—“a 180” and “a culture shock” (Interview 56). Several noted how NTM-A was suffering from an overgrown bureaucracy—“staff bloat” (Interview 60) and “advisor overload” (Interview 67)—and so Bolger’s chief priority, in support of the broader drawdown of surge forces, was to make drastic cuts in NTM-A personnel and contracts by roughly 3,000 personnel and $5 billion in his first year.

Bolger’s philosophy on the advising effort was also a major departure from the norm. He changed NTM-A’s mission statement from developing the ANSF and security ministries to supporting IJC—“with Bolger it became about the fight, not about development” (Interview 56). His outlook “was let’s kind of finish this up and get off the stage” (Interview 67). He was not “terribly interested in the advisory effort” (Interview 61) and that “did not go unnoticed inside
the MoD” when it “took Bolger a long time just to have a meeting with [Minister] Wardak” after taking command (Interview 56). Rather than focus on professionalizing the ANSF and ministries, the key to success became solving ANSF logistics woes.

The data indicate two well-intentioned leaders with contrasting visions for NTM-A and the future of ANSF and ministerial development. On the one hand, Caldwell prioritized security and ministerial development through meaningful engagement, but as NTM-A grew, it lost efficiency, created perverse incentives, and ostensibly fueled additional corruption with its vast resources. Based on current data it is hard to attribute that solely to NTM-A or to the broader political and strategic pressures driven by the Afghan surge, though both are likely contributors. On the other hand, Bolger seemed fixed on 2014 and viewed himself as an eagle-eyed steward, focused on the essentials. Institutional development and professionalization were beyond his reach or interest. Rather, his pursuit was to cut bureaucracy, pinion the resource flow, and tackle the one functional issue he saw as vital to preventing long-term ANSF failure—logistics.

Overall, participants’ observations of senior leaders provide additional support to the findings outlined above. Leader priorities and prerogatives exemplified the overarching structural pressures of the time.

**Case Summary**

NATO’s operational surge from 2009 to 2011 was a response to a renewed Taliban insurgency and stalled Afghan institution-building efforts (The White House 2009b). The surge brought about an outpouring of resources—increased financial and material resources via the Afghan security forces fund and additional human capital through the NATO training mission
expansion, increase of ministerial and field advisors, and rise in combined NATO-ANSF field operations.

Predictably, the data show that advisors and unit leaders believed they had some modest impact on developing organizational capacity on both the security ministries and the ANSF, but little noticeable impact otherwise. Local politics and culture were significant barriers to change. In addition, external factors, especially the overall program strategy and campaign design, placed pressure on advisors and leaders (though not all) to coerce in the spirit of progress and created perverse incentives for advisors and leaders to rely on easy incentives to gain Afghan compliance over the harder, time-intensive tasks of building long-term influence and ownership. The external pressure and risk aversion also seems to have had a chilling effect on advisors’ willingness to experiment and innovate with their Afghan partners.

Individual agency was not entirely lost. SSR and foreign advising are deeply human undertakings. Relationships, personalities, and influencing approaches matter. In many ways, this is a commonsensical and rather unsurprising finding. It is clear that, despite intense political or cultural barriers, positive relationships increase cross-cultural communication and transmission of practices and norms—the necessary, but insufficient condition for transfer and acceptance to occur. Conversely, negative relationships shut down communication and either stall the institutional transfer process, or worse, promote resistance to change. The finding that individuals are key factors in the transfer process has clear implications for future SSR program design, engagement strategy, and implementation.

Still, the case has other illuminating and counterintuitive findings, particularly at the ministerial level. For example, many senior ministerial officials (e.g., Minister Wardak, ANA Chief of General Staff Karimi) did not require further professional development according to
their advisors. These officials already had extensive Western formal and military education and several advisors expressed there was nothing they could teach their counterparts. Even if their counterparts had specific needs or opportunity for personal development in line with SSR ideals, the individual growth in question related to executive-level leadership skills as civilian bureaucrats and political appointees. Yet, the majority of ministerial advisors were active duty colonels or civilians with prior military or law enforcement experience. While many had exceptional combat records and command experience at the battalion or brigade level, few had enterprise-level experience working in equivalent institutional headquarters (e.g., the Office of the Secretary of Defense).

In addition to the intriguing disagreement over the appropriate role of a ministerial advisor (Chapter 6), participants raised the question about which individuals were best qualified and best suited to serve in advisor positions. NTM-A faced a dilemma on this issue. On the one hand, civilian defense officials with experience at the Assistant Secretary level were the most qualified in terms of equivalent functional expertise. Yet there was not a readily defined bench of civilian defense experts to fill these roles. On the other hand, advisors noted that, in addition to the majority of Afghan ministerial officials being former general officers, several Afghan officials distrusted civilians and thought that many were spies. Afghan officials ostensibly deferred to NATO military officers over civilians regardless of rank or grade, save civilian contractors who were military retirees with several years of experience in Afghanistan and established relationships.

Granted, the US Ministry of Defense Advisor’s (MoDA) program infused NTM-A with dozens of civilian defense officials from the Pentagon. Yet, the interviews revealed a wide variation in opinions on the question of who should be doing what in these positions and how to
best organize, align, and manage them. Military officers expressed some skeptical views on the
civilian MoDA advisors, namely, their ability to operate effectively in predominantly military
environment and staff headquarters. Military officer views on civilian contractors were more
mixed, however, and depended largely on the contractor’s former military or law enforcement
background and associated credibility. By contrast, civilian MoDA advisors openly questioned
the level of expertise and appropriateness of military officers advising a civilian defense
institution (though it was far from it in reality). In many cases, civilian MoDA advisors worked
on advisor teams under the supervision of a military officer. Some expressed concerns about the
mixed signals this sent to Afghan officials related to normative matters like civilianization.
Another open question related to the appropriateness of a handful (though not most) civilian
contractors, advising senior Afghan ministerial officials working in strategic planning and policy
offices under the defense and interior ministers. This is clearly a knotty issue concerning, at a
minimum, civil-military relations; advisor selection, management, and alignment; inherently and
quasi-governmental roles and functions; and contingency contracting. This topic is well beyond
the scope of this dissertation, but one that I intend to explore further in the near future.

Overall, it is premature to know the true impact of NATO-ISAF’s surge strategy
(combined counterinsurgency and security force assistance), but this dissertation clearly reveals,
in great detail, how war—as “a political instrument” and “continuation of policy by other means”
(Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret 1976/1984, 87)—negatively interacts with reform efforts. In
particular, the fixed timeline, driven by political and domestic desires to curtail more than a
decade-long intervention, was clearly misaligned against advisors’ developmental imperatives,
which required a longer-time horizon and an incentive structure that promoted cooperative
behavior. If anything, it only reinforces the primacy of individuals in the reform effort given the
structural pressure and incentives under which they operated. The ability to buffer the external pressure, resist the temptation to use resources for shortsighted gains while maintaining patience and understanding was not an easy task.

**A Brief Return to Theory**

Beyond the case findings and grounded propositions, this dissertation contributes to growing literature at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics that examines external influences on domestic political transformations and conflict (e.g., Checkel 2013, Jacoby 2006). Though I did not test theory in this project, the institutional transfer perspective I employed shows continued promise in explaining how and the extent to which local actors take up Western-promoted practices and norms. The approach allows for case analysis that integrates foreign and local influences together over time, space, and level of analysis. It also provides a window into how actors attempt to exert influence and why they do so under various structural conditions. I contend this is analytically superior to juxtaposing external influence or domestic factors as alternative explanations.

The dissertation also suggests that organization theory may provide a fruitful alternative explanatory account for various features of the overall SSR enterprise. First, a transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985) approach focused on interfirm cooperation in strategic alliances (Parkhe 1993) may prove a worthy alternative explanation to the institutional transfer approach. For example, participants noted how many Afghan leaders suffered from advisor fatigue due to a decade or more of mixed interactions with NATO advisors and officials. A transaction cost approach might help uncover the costs that both external and local actors incur through repeated interactions over time. Second, given NATO’s immense challenges with internal coordination of
resources and information and goal alignment among advisors (i.e., advisor role disagreement), principal-agent theory may provide some analytical utility on matters of advisor management (for example, Feaver 2003). Participants’ repeated concerns about some advisors “going native” suggest the possibility of “divided principal” scenarios in which advisors cater to two masters with competing interests (Avant 2002). Throwing private contractors into this mix only adds an additional layer of complexity with regard to maintaining goal alignment and information symmetry.

**Policy Implications**

People matter and approach is everything in internationally led security sector reform. The dissertation’s most important finding is that—even against great odds—individuals play both positive and negative roles in the transfer of knowledge, capacity, ideas, and norms. Relationship closeness is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition in the transfer process—but it is a vital one. The right individual can be instrumental in the cross-cultural communication of knowledge and skills and the inspiration of professional behaviors that drive and reinforce local reform. Conversely, the wrong individual—as the OSS clearly recognized (1948)—can prove disastrous. Influencing approaches are also paramount. Knowing when, where, and how to present ideas and how to provoke local involvement, learning, and ownership in a foreign setting are fundamental skills for any agent of reform. I highlight three significant policy and program design implications below.

First, SSR lacks a program theory that sufficiently specifies the causal mechanisms involved in producing outcomes. This dissertation provides a program-oriented theoretical framework based on the concept of guided institutional transfer. Moreover, it shows strong
support that individuals act as both positive and negative causal mechanisms in the transfer process and should be taken into greater consideration the process of program design and implementation. SSR programs, especially those under international auspices, are comprised of people, often from many nations. Each individual brings a unique set of skills, expertise, motivations, and personality attributes. Who they are is as important as their individual expertise or specialty when communicating SSR’s functional and normative content. Of course, as leading experts SSR argue, future SSR efforts should espouse more nuance and program contextualization. However, the programs must also carefully select those who participate in SSR programming efforts and be strategic in how these individuals align with, communicate, and influence their host nation counterparts toward common goals.

In this chapter’s opening paragraphs, I noted that the current impasse on SSR programming centers on the optimal degree of engagement with a host nation. This dissertation suggests that as the demand or opportunity for SSR engagement increases, so does the need for greater scrutiny and prudence in the selection and alignment of program assistance organizations, officials, and staff with host nation counterparts. More staff, advisors, or technical assistants do not necessarily imply better or faster outcomes. In addition, effective and adaptive management of such actors is vital.

By contrast, engagement must be particularly strategic when it is unripe or the need is low. Specifically, nurturing relationships with reform-minded officials (norm entrepreneurs) and officials a generation or more removed from those currently holding positions of power are important steps for consideration. SSR officials should carry out such activities with great care, however, and be mindful of any unnecessary risks or harms this approach may place on local partners.
This is also a time of lower risk to invest in small-scale programming efforts (efficiency-based influence), given the reduced stakes of political commitment or liability. Policymakers should seek opportunities to guide and promote local dialogue on SSR principles in relation to local needs. Low-risk investments in education and training on different global models of security that allow local actors to become “rational shoppers” (Westney 1987) may present opportunities for greater payoff in both human security outcomes and cost savings in future years.

Second, if the international community decides more international involvement in a fragile state is necessary, SSR initiatives should be designed for innovation and fit. This is not an easy task. Clearly, the need for security in conflict-torn states trumps all other initiatives. Yet, local institutional capacity and ownership are the keys to displacing the need for and reducing the duration of foreign interventions. As SSR programs shift from initial stakeholder engagement to implementation, donor states should build a degree of organizational slack (resources and funding) into their operational design to encourage counterpart innovation, deliberation, and trial and error with different systems, policies, and practices. Program officials and advisors should facilitate local actors’ education and identification of best fitting or adaptable systems and models.

It is worth emphasizing that at no other point in a major intervention will the total costs of innovation and experimentation be lower. It is easier to learn from failure and make changes early in a campaign than it is later on. Moreover, delayed innovation efforts are simply harder to harvest and institutionalize. Afghanistan is a case in point. NATO-ISAF spent many years and billions of dollars working to install various Western systems and models (e.g., logistics) of questionable sustainability. By 2009, the rush to grow the ANSF quickly created an impatient
NATO force that was focused on outputs over outcomes. A quote on innovation by Harvard Business School Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter draws striking parallels to the case:

*When a company is both too product centric and too revenue impatient, an additional problem can arise. The organization’s innovation energy can dissipate across a raft of tiny me-too projects chasing immediate revenue. Perversely, such projects may raise costs in the long run. While a failure to encourage small wins can mean missed opportunities, too many trivial projects are like seeds sown on stony ground—they might sprout, but they do not take root and grow into anything useful. If new ideas take the form not of distinctive innovations but of modest variations, the resulting proliferation can dilute the brand, confuse customers, and increase internal complexity—such as offering a dozen sizes and flavors of crackers rather than a new and different snack food, a problem Kraft currently faces. (Kanter 2006, 76)*

The lesson is that the longer program officials wait to innovate with their partners, the more locked in to their initial decisions they will be. Granted Afghanistan started with myriad challenges in 2001; yet, it is reasonable to suggest that an innovation-based approach in the early years may have produced more sustainable outcomes, quicker, and at a reduced cost in both human and financial terms.

Third, SSR program officials and advisors should prioritize relationship development from the outset and identify synergistic partnerships worth sustaining and growing long term. In other words, (a) find good advisors who can build close relationships yet remain faithful to the mission; (b) make every effort to lengthen their stay to exploit their collaborative success. While not guaranteed to do so, closer and lengthier relationships are more likely to accelerate institutional transfer, which is also in the strategic interests of time and savings.

Next to prudent selection and placement, personnel turnover was likely the largest impediment to NATO’s ability to influence and accelerate security force development. Rotating advisors in and out on one-year assignments, or less (especially for other coalition forces), was highly unproductive. The result was that, even despite years of intelligence gathering, the reality
for NATO-ISAF units was never achieving more than a few months’ worth of in-depth knowledge in any given locale because they were in a near constant state of relearning local actors and social dynamics.

The operational design implications of this point are clear. Unfortunately, this requires a major culture shift in how Western governments and militaries do statebuilding. Particularly in Western militaries, this idea runs counter to the powerful norm of limiting unit and personnel deployment cycles to a year or less. This norm has governed NATO’s operational design methodology at least since its involvement in the Balkans. The United States’ intense involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the mid-2000s only reinforced the expectation. It also runs counter to how many Western militaries, particularly the US military, incentivizes their officer corps. With the exception of the US SOF and foreign area officer (FAO) communities, advisor duty does not have comparable prestige or future promotion benefit as serving in key command and functional staff roles in conventional military units.

A related suggestion is for donor government officials to recognize the value and make better use of civilian contractors serving in advisor roles. While the topic is more suited for a subsequent study, numerous participants noted the value that many civilian contractors offered as advisors. Although they were subject to the same challenges of selection and fit as military and government civilian advisors, the difference was that they were not restricted to the same rotational timelines. Consequently, civilian contractors established longer-lasting relationships with their Afghan counterparts and were the only institutional memory of the various Afghan actors and environment as military units rotated through each year.

My final recommendation is for US policymakers to continue to make sound investments in the nation’s security assistance centers of excellence. This echoes several recommendations
related to cross-cultural engagement training and education and institutionalizing US government capabilities gained over the past decade (Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker 2011, Luján 2013, Nagl 2007). It also fits within a broader smart power (Nye 2011) approach to foreign policy that emphasizes national power projection, influence, and goodwill through more cost-effective means than through military force or occupation. Even in the face of shrinking defense budgets (perhaps more so) and a defense establishment reorienting its posture toward cyber war and conventional security threats, it is in the United States’ national interest to continue to strengthen existing and build new relationships with foreign ministries and security forces through existing programs. As the world grows increasingly complex, the ability to shape global affairs will grow ever more difficult. While they are no substitute for military power, security cooperation and assistance capabilities must be viewed as the proverbial ounce of prevention amidst the pound of supposed cure found in other defense and diplomatic capabilities. Security assistance and international engagement will remain essential to ensuring global stability and conflict prevention, enforcing global norms, and cultivating future international partners—irrespective of budget constraints or internal debates over roles and missions (Reveron 2010). Investments in these efforts must be thoughtful and people-centered.

Notably, a common theme among the ministerial advisors was the consternation over who (military, government civil servant, and civilian contractor) was best to offer advice at the ministerial level. Several noted that numerous ministerial advisors, status irrespective, did not have the experiential background (e.g., civilian secretary or military general staff) to match the needs of their counterpart. Participants remarked on the shortcomings of advisors who lacked previous experience working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service secretary offices,
or on the US Joint or military service staffs, despite their stellar military command records and legitimacy among their US peers. This implies a human resourcing capability deficit.

In the short and medium term, the US government should continue to support security assistance programs that simultaneously promote bilateral relations across ministries and develop a deeper bench of civilian and military experts qualified to advise senior defense officials. DoD’s Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) and Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, in partnership with the US Institute of Peace, play critical roles in building and sustaining this capability. Furthermore, rule of law and justice development programs such as the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) are equally, if not more, important given SSR’s normative underpinnings.

In the long term, the dissertation highlights the importance of continued education in the development of language skills, cross-cultural competency, and regional expertise. It also suggests the importance for identifying and retaining individuals with these unique skills. Notably the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands program\(^{86}\) has demonstrated great value to the point the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed its expansion to the Asia-Pacific region (Dempsey 2013). The MoDA program has also grown into a global program. These skills take years to develop, however. As the last decade has shown, leaders across the entire defense and security establishment—not just advisors—will require deeper understanding of other regions and cultures. Accordingly, language and cultural immersion opportunities must especially target junior officers in the formative years of their careers.

\(^{86}\) The US Joint Staff established the Afghan-Pakistan Hands program in 2009 to develop a cadre of military officers with advanced language, cultural, historical, and political expertise on the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. Several participants in this study were also AFPAK Hands.
Limitations

The goal of this dissertation was to develop theory and collect lessons for SSR and security assistance policy. I did not test theory so the findings cannot be generalized to other SSR cases. However, the case study method I developed to explore advisor influence may be applied to SSR cases and compared for causal interference (i.e., structured, focused case comparison, George and Bennett 2005). The structure- and agent-level theoretical propositions I developed may also be tested in other instances of SSR. Furthermore, this approach has broader application to statebuilding efforts and may be applied to other non-security-related technical assistance efforts.

I carefully outlined the dissertation’s methodological shortcomings in Chapter 4, chiefly, the absence of the Afghan perspective in the case. I made every effort to mitigate this limitation by drawing upon a large, diverse sample of actors from different settings that includes several third-party observers with different institutional loyalties. In addition to the large sample and deliberate presentation of contrasting perspectives in Chapters 6 through Chapter 9, the interviews with third-party observers support the validity of my overall case interpretation.

Still, there is a great deal more to learn from this dataset. Going forward with the project, I would like to revisit the scaling system, specifically the arguably oversimplified positive-negative scale on participant attitudes used in Chapters 7 and 8. Specifically, I would like to expand the scale to allow for multiple variants of positive or negative sentiments that capture more nuances. Doing this will allow for a more systematic and contextualized analysis of the reasons (explicit and implicit) for why participants’ felt positive or negative toward any given mode of influence. For example, this would allow me to methodically code justifications for
various attitudes rooted in perceived agency of the advisor participant, individual attributes of the advisee counterpart, other structural factors (politics, culture), or any combination of these.

Next Steps for Research

What do we know from this dissertation? First, we know that security sector reform is a fundamentally human undertaking. Pouring resources and people into SSR programs with the expectation that they will produce local change and ownership is a fatal strategy. Second, we know that power-based forms of influence—essential tools in international politics—are unlikely to produce positive outcomes in the transnational transfer of skills, values, and norms at the individual and organizational levels. Third, we know that legitimacy-based influence is more likely to contribute to institutional transfer, but highly dependent upon individuals and relationship development.

What more needs to be done? This project reveals several avenues for future research. First, given the scarcity of participant observations of and emphasis on of local innovation (efficiency-based influence), we need more research on locally inspired solutions in security sector development and governance. Future research should also focus on external engagement strategies that encourage or create resources and opportunities for local innovation and experimentation. This approach fits squarely within a 2nd generation approach to SSR research and programming that prioritizes existing institutions and local adaptation (Sedra 2010a).

Second, SSR research should continue to explore how structures and agents interact in different settings. If individuals have limited ability to accelerate or impede the transfer of SSR program content in an extreme case like Afghanistan, how significant are advisor’s influencing approaches vis-à-vis structural constraints in other SSR settings (e.g., postconflict and
What significance do structural pressure and resources have on how advisors approach their duties elsewhere? Answering these questions would inform the design of more tailored approaches in future settings. Two interesting case comparisons would involve examining the impacts of external pressure and resources on advisors in the Palestinian Territories and Republic of Columbia. Both represent cases of lesser degrees of external resources and external pressure compared to Afghanistan.

Third, the guided institutional transfer model I developed in this dissertation should be tested theoretically against alternatives and extended beyond security sector reform settings. Future research should test the model against alternative theories such as transaction cost economics and principal-agent theory, which I previously mentioned. The model also has great potential for application in other international development and statebuilding contexts involving external and local interactions. In fact, I recommend researchers investigate knowledge and norm transfer processes in settings in which access to both external technical assistants and local actors is more likely. Specifically, a study that compares the perceptions of paired external and local actors on various influencing approaches and outcomes would be fascinating and would hold incredible value for both theory and practice.

Finally, two significant themes within the Afghanistan case are ripe for further investigation. Research on private military and security contractors centers almost exclusively on their battlefield regulation and role as security providers (Avant 2002, 2005, Banks 2011, de Nevers 2009). Academics have focused little attention on the role of civilian contractors as advisors and reform agents of the state (except for Cusumano 2010). This study reveals significant importance of and reliance upon the private sector in providing advisors at the ministerial and tactical level. Future research should focus on issues of contract design, contract
advisor selection, and generalization to other current and future light-footprint security assistance settings. Also, the question over the appropriateness of who advises (e.g., civilians, military, or contractors) senior foreign officials serving positions that shape national policy should be addressed more explicitly.

Second, advisor selection, training, and management are potential growth areas for policy-oriented research beyond the Afghanistan case. The dissertation highlights the importance and extreme difficulty in finding and placing individuals with the right expertise and temperaments in advisor positions. Programs like Global MoDA, DIRI, ICITAP, and other US military programs (e.g., Foreign Area Officer, Special Operations) are key to identifying and building long-term US government capacity for future ministerial, rule of law, and military-to-military engagement. How these programs are resourced and integrated toward broader, long-term strategic ends is unclear and worth closer examination.

**Closing**

Drawing on the case of Afghanistan, this dissertation explored the two-part question, how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms? First, I found that advisors who used heavy-handed or transactional approaches rarely felt they achieved positive or enduring outcomes. Second, I found that approaches eliciting partner engagement were viewed to be more effective than coercive approaches, though the techniques used varied by level and context. For example, persuasion techniques were perceived to be most effective at the ministerial level while guided discovery teaching methods were preferred at the tactical level.
Third, and most importantly, this dissertation suggests that despite severe political and cultural constraints to change, agents with the ability to develop close relationships also saw a greater likelihood of promoting local transfer of knowledge, skills, and security governance norms.

Beyond the core findings, theoretical propositions, and recommendations outlined above, this study makes three major intellectual contributions. First, it adds knowledge to a substantial research gap identified in the SSR literature, namely, the need for detailed case studies on external and local actor interactions. The dissertation demonstrates clear potential for future interaction-based research in producing greater knowledge that informs both theory and practice. Second, it contributes to SSR theory development by conceptualizing SSR programs as instances of guided institutional transfer. The dissertation also provides theoretical propositions to be tested in comparative research. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this study serves as a historical record and teaching tool for policymakers and security and development professionals.
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND KEY TERMS

## Commonly Used Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADSO</td>
<td>Active Duty Service Obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAFPAK</td>
<td>Afghanistan and Pakistan Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD</td>
<td>Assistant Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Afghan National Auxiliary Police (2006-2008; later folded into ANP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP3</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Program (pilot program; not APPF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APH</td>
<td>AFPAK Hands Program (advanced cultural and language training for military officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Civilian Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>Absent Without Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAV</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI/LDI</td>
<td>Community / Local Defense Initiative (VSO antecedent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (local development funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSSC-A</td>
<td>US Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>US DoS Civilian Police Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJIATF-Shafafiyat</td>
<td>Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (ISAF Anti-Corruption Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOTF-A</td>
<td>US Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Capability Milestone (Afghan reliance metric from 4 to 1, self-reliant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Counternarcotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNP-A</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>Afghan Chief of the General Staff (4-star senior ANA commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIJC</td>
<td>Commander, NATO International Joint Command (3-star commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMISAF</td>
<td>Commander, NATO-ISAF (4-star senior commander)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Command Outpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Chief of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUAT</td>
<td>Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>US Congressional Commission on Wartime Contacting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOM</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>U.K. Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRI</td>
<td>US Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deputy Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>US Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD IG</td>
<td>US Department of Defense Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoJ</td>
<td>US Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>US Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS IG</td>
<td>US Department of State Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVIDS</td>
<td>US Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAG</td>
<td>Enterprise Advisor Group (group of cross-functional advisor teams)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordinance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPM</td>
<td>Embedded Police Mentors (DynCorp contractors with ANP SFAATs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETT</td>
<td>US Embedded Training Teams (10 to 20-solider ANA advisor team; pre-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (2009–Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>US Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Focused District Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FET</td>
<td>Female Engagement Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOO</td>
<td>Field Ordering Officer (ref. to operational funds for tactical units)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>US Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDAVD</td>
<td>Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>General Directorate of Police Special Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>Afghan Ground Forces Command (3-star operational headquarters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GiRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTS</td>
<td>US Army Human Terrain System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTT</td>
<td>US Army Human Terrain Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HN  Host Nation
HUMINT  Human Intelligence
HQ  Headquarters
ICITAP  US DoJ International Criminal Investigative Training Program
IED  Improvised Explosive Device
IG  Inspector General
IJC  NATO-ISAF International Joint Command (2009-present)
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INL  DoS International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau
IO (v1)  International Organization
IO (v2)  Military Information Operations
IR  International Relations
IRWG  Afghan MoI Institutional Reform Working Group
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
JAG  Judge Advocate General (military attorney)
JRTC  US Army Joint Readiness Training Center
KLE  Key Leader Engagement (NATO and Afghan leadership meeting)
KMTC  Kabul Military Training Center
LDI  Local Defense Initiative (see CDI)
LEP  Law Enforcement Professionals (MPRI contractors advising U.S. units)
MAG  Ministerial Advisor Group (all defense and interior ministry advisors)
MAT (v1)  Ministerial Advisor Team (team of ministerial advisors focused on an office/dept.)
MAT (v2)  NATO/European Military Assistance Team (SFAAT equiv.; 2012-present)
MCTF  Major Crimes Task Force
MDB  NTM-A Ministerial Development Board (program evaluation)
MDMP  Military Decision Making Process
METL  Mission Essential Task List
MINDEF  Afghan Minister of Defense
MININT  Afghan Minister of Interior
MoDA  Ministry of Defense Advisors (DoD civilian advisors or training program)
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MoI  Ministry of Interior
MP  Military Police
MPRI  Military Professional Resources, Inc. (PMSC)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS  Afghanistan National Directorate of Security
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NATO-NTM  US Army National Training Center
NTM-A  NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (2009-present)
O/C  Observer / Controller for training exercise
OAA  Afghan Office of Administrative Affairs (Cabinet Secretariat)
OCC  Operational Coordination Center (fusion center for ANA and ANP)
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC OECD Development Assistance Council
ODA Operational Detachment–Alpha (12-man U.S. Army Special Forces Team)
OMLT NATO/European Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (ETT equivalent; pre-2012)
ONSC Afghanistan Office of National Security Council
OPD Officer Professional Development
OPS Operations
OSD US Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS US Office of Strategic Services (1942-1945)
PAT NATO/European Police Assistance Team (SFAAT equivalent; 2012-present)
PMCI Pre-mission Combat Inspection
PMT US Embedded Police Training Team (10 to 20-person ANP advisor team; pre-2012)
PMSC/PSC Private Military and Security Company
POI Program of Instruction
POMLT NATO/European Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (PMT equivalent; pre-2012)
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSS Police Sub-Station
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PU Partner Unit
QRF Quick Reaction Force
RC Regional Commands (Central, North, South, Southwest, East, West)
RSC Regional Support Command (regional logistics hubs)
RTC Regional Training Center
SF US Army Special Forces (i.e., Green Berets)
SFAA Security Force Assistance
SFAB US Security Force Assistance Brigade
SFAT US Security Force Assistance Team (48-man brigade-level advisor team)
SFAAT US Security Force Advise and Assist Team (9-, 12-, 18-man advisor team)
SFG US Army Special Forces Group
SJA Staff Judge Advocate (military staff attorney; see also JAG)
SIGACT Significant Activities (e.g., enemy initiated attacks)
SIGAR US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOE NATO-ISAF Special Operations Element (all NATO SOF)
SOF US Special Operations Forces (e.g., SF, SEALs, Rangers)
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SSR Security Sector Reform
STRATCOM Strategic Communications
TCP Traffic Check Point
TF Task Force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tactical Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>US Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARNG</td>
<td>US Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>US Forces–Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>US Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>US Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations (see also CDI/LDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSP</td>
<td>Village Stability Platform (individual VSO site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>Executive Officer (second officer in command)</td>
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</table>
### Key Military Staff Functions

**Military Staff Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level / Echelon</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GS-</td>
<td>Afghan general staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ-</td>
<td>NATO Combined-Joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-</td>
<td>Corps and division level staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-</td>
<td>Brigade and battalion level staff</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Military Staff Functions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1/G1/CJ1/GS1</td>
<td>Personnel / Human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2/G2/CJ2/GS2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4/G4/CJ4/GS4</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5/ -</td>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>- G5/CJ5/GS5</td>
<td>Plans / Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>S6/G6/CJ6/GS6</td>
<td>Information systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>S7/ -</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- G7/CJ7/GS7</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- G8/CJ8/GS8</td>
<td>Finance / Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- G9/CJ9</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Commonly Used Dari Terms and Phrases

- **coy**: Afghan infantry company (~120 soldiers)
- **kandak**: Afghan infantry battalion (~400 soldiers)
- **tashkil**: Official document authorizing a unit’s structure, personnel, and equipment
- **shona ba shona**: Shoulder-to-shoulder
### APPENDIX A. SAMPLE OF PARTICIPANTS

#### Table A–1. Strategic Level Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title(s)</th>
<th>Time in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense</td>
<td>10 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Canadian Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense</td>
<td>24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15**</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>MPRI</td>
<td>Asst. Chief of Advisors for Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Development</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Aquisitions, Technology &amp; Logistics</td>
<td>24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-14</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Advisor to Deputy MoD - Installation Management</td>
<td>18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel**</td>
<td>US Army, JAG</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to MoD Legal Advisor</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel**</td>
<td>Canadian Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Chief of Advisors, Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Development</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3 - Chief of Operations</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15**</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Advisor to Deputy MoD - Administration</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor**</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Administration</td>
<td>48 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Advisor &amp; Director, MoD Development &amp; Transition</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Counternarcotics</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Counternarcotics</td>
<td>11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT. COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to MoD Chief of Afghan Local Police</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT. COMMANDER</td>
<td>US Navy, JAG</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to MoD Chief of Staff</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL****</td>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan National Police</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAIN (USN)***</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Communications</td>
<td>11 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministry of Interior Advisors (13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title(s)</th>
<th>Time in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SES**</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Chief of Advisors, Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Development</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>U.S. Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Administration</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Administration</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor**</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Administration</td>
<td>48 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Advisor &amp; Director, MoD Development &amp; Transition</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Counternarcotics</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Counternarcotics</td>
<td>11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT. COLONEL</td>
<td>US Army, Aviation</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to MoD Chief of Afghan Local Police</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT. COMMANDER</td>
<td>US Navy, JAG</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Legal Advisor to MoI</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL****</td>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAIN (USN)***</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Communications</td>
<td>11 months</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### Office of Administrative Affairs (Cabinet Secretariat) Advisor (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title(s)</th>
<th>Time in Afghanistan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LT. COLONEL</td>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>Advisor to Deputy Director General, OAA</td>
<td>12 months</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Staff and Third-Party Subject Matter Experts (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title(s)</th>
<th>Time in Afghanistan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLONEL**</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, NTM-A Deputy Commander of Operations</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPTAIN (USN)***</td>
<td>US Navy</td>
<td>NTM-A Command Historian</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>Strategic Planner, NTM-A Commander's Advisory Group</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>OSD-DoD</td>
<td>Director, OSD MoDA Program</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contractor</td>
<td>Coffey Group (AUS)</td>
<td>DFID, Rule of Law Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy</td>
<td>36 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>US Institute of Peace</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERGEANT FIRST</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Medical Sergeant, ODA</td>
<td>&gt; 12 mo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class****</td>
<td>Special Assistant, CJTF-Shafafiyat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Program Evaluation Director</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rank ordered by political authority or seniority of Afghan counterparts
** Dual/triple-hatted advisor assignments or reassigned during tour
***Advised principals in both MoD and MoI
****Served on both strategic and tactical levels
### Table A–2. Tactical Level Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Civilian Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Afghan Army</th>
<th>Afghan Police</th>
<th>Primary Location (Province)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>ANA ANSF</td>
<td>ANSF ANSF ANSF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Embedded Advisors and Trainers (15)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>USARNG, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Corps Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Bakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Herat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>USARNG, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Brigade Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Konar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Team Member - Brigade Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paktika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Engineer</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Konar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paktika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Army, Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Battalion Commander, Kabul Military Training Ctr</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Army, Military Police</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Marine Corps, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Helmand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Army, Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Afghan Uniformed Police Trainer</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
<td>Kabul; Khost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Advisor to Kabul Military Training Center G1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
<td>Kabul; Khost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>USAR, Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANSF COMISAF CAAT Advisor</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partnered Operations, General Purpose Forces (10)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
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<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Army, Military Police</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
<td>US Marine Corps, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel*</td>
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<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion Executive Officer</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major**</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion S3; Brigade S3; Division G5</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar; Uruzgan; Zabul; Daykundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Rifle Company Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Rifle Company Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Paktika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>USARNG, Infantry</td>
<td>Rifle Company Commander</td>
<td>X</td>
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Table A–2. Tactical Level Participants  (page 2 of 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank / Civilian Grade</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Duty Title</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Afghan Army</th>
<th>Afghan Police</th>
<th>Primary Location (Province)</th>
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<td>ANCOP  AUP ABP ALP</td>
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<td>Partnered Operations, Special Forces (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Company Commander, 13x ODA</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Team Commander, ODA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Zabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Team Commander, ODA</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Team Commander, ODA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Kunar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>US Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Team Commander, ODA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class***</td>
<td>U.S. Army, Special Forces</td>
<td>Medical Sergeant, ODA</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Zabul, Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Assistant to CG, CJIAF-Shafafiya</td>
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<td>Third-Party Observers and Subject Matter Experts (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>German Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
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<td>Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major**</td>
<td>US Army, Infantry</td>
<td>Rifle Company Commander</td>
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<td>Undisclosed PMSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>USARNG, Infantry</td>
<td>Commander, Agri-business Development Team</td>
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<td>Nangarhar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Contractor</td>
<td>US Army HTS</td>
<td>Human Terrain Team Social Scientist</td>
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<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contractor</td>
<td>US Army HTS</td>
<td>Human Terrain Team Social Scientist</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Paktika; Paktiya; Khost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>Analyst, CJSOTF-A</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>Analyst, CJSOTF-A</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contractor</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>CIVPOL, Program Manger, DynCorp</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Contractor</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>VP, Training and Mentoring, DynCorp</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Served simultaneously in both embedded advising and partnered tactical operations position
** Served on multiple training or advising deployments
*** Served on both strategic and tactical levels
Figure A-1. Total Sample Coverage over Time
Figure A-2. Strategic Level Sample Coverage over Time

Sample Coverage Timeline: NTM-A Miniterial / Strategic Advising

- Total Strategic
- MoD+OAA
- MoI
- NTMA/SME
Figure A-3. Tactical Level Sample Coverage over Time

Coverage Timeline:
Tactical Level Participants

Participants

Total Tactical
Partnered Units
Embedded Advisors
TPOs/SMEs

APPENDIX B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENT EXCERPTS

Figure B-1. NTM-A / CSTC-A Organization, PowerPoint briefing, June 2012
Figure B-2. Advisor Alignment with the Afghan Defense Ministry, PowerPoint briefing, November 2011

Names/phone numbers blacked out by author.
Figure B-3. Advisor Alignment with the Afghan Interior Ministry, PowerPoint briefing, April 2012

Names/phone numbers blacked out by author.
Figure B–4. Excerpt from MoI Directive on Operational Activities of the General Directorate of Police Special Units, 2011

Cover and first page.
and ISU. Additional units will be added to GDPSU and placed in support as required. As the wider MOI is developed, placement of VPPD and ISU and the capabilities of those units will be reviewed.

Provincial Response Companies (PRCs):

[Image of a map or diagram of a provincial response company structure]

Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) are the most important component of the provincial police. They are responsible for implementing police procedures and policies at the provincial level, with the aim of providing effective and efficient police services to the population. The PRCs are established in all provinces and are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the population.

Training:

The PRCs receive training in a variety of areas, including law enforcement, emergency response, and conflict resolution. This training is designed to ensure that the PRCs are able to effectively respond to a wide range of situations.

Conclusion:

The establishment of the PRCs is an important step in the development of the police force in this region. The PRCs are equipped with the necessary resources and training to provide effective police services to the population.

Figure B-4 continued. Final two pages.
National Military Objectives

In accordance with national interests, national security goals, and existing threats, the prioritized national military objectives of the MoD and the ANA are as follows:

- Defeat insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan
- Safeguard the territorial integrity and ensure the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan
- Contribute to a stable and secure environment within the country in support of national interests and security goals of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ensuring imposition of the rule of law
- Continue MoD reform so as to establish a strong defense sector in accordance with the national interests and security goals, and to permit the MoD to assume primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s security, enabling gradual withdrawal of international security forces
- Contribute to a stable regional and international security environment by developing multilateral military cooperation, cultivating friendly relations with neighboring and coalition countries (including NATO/ISAF), and participating in collective security systems, both regional and international.

Strategic Roles and Missions of the MoD and ANA

The strategic roles of the MoD and ANA are (1) to defend against and deter aggression, endangering sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests, and national and Islamic values; (2) to support and defend the Constitution of Afghanistan; (3) to defeat the insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan; (4) to establish the rule of law, military justice, and an anti-corruption culture; and (5) to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and reintegration.

In support of these roles and the national military objectives, the prioritized strategic missions of the MoD and the ANA will be as follows:

- Defeat the insurgency and terrorism within Afghanistan
- Maintain security, support law enforcement, follow up human rights and create better environment.
- Increase intelligence capabilities within the ANA; build and strengthen bilateral intelligence capabilities with the ANP and Allies
- Train and equip the ANA in accordance with the cadre policy; provide operationally capable, professional, and nationally oriented military forces, as part of the on-going reform of the MoD and ANA, corresponding to the threats and its defense-oriented doctrine; and improve capabilities in order to execute its strategic missions and achieve the national military objectives
Figure B-5 continued. Afghan National Military Strategy, 2010, pp. 11, 15.

- Build and field additional ANA forces within the country (in terms of quantity and quality); and provide a foundation of national security based on security threats and through the efficient use of resources
- Support the ANP and Afghanistan Border Police (ABP) during emergencies. Be prepared to assume command and control of ANSF, whenever the threat surpasses the capability of the ABP to counteract, and during a national crisis in which the territorial integrity of Afghanistan is threatened
- Support the process of dismantlement of illegally armed groups (DIAG)
- Coordinate with and actively support other agencies and ministries of the Government of Afghanistan to stop the cultivation of poppies and trafficking of narcotics within the country
- Assist the civilian authorities in response to natural or man-made disasters, other security situations, or crises as requested
- Maintain the security of major highways to ensure their unfettered use during crises and natural disasters, to preserve and expand national interests.
- Work in concert with other agencies and ministries of the Government of Afghanistan, develop, and strengthen bilateral and collective military relationships with coalition, allied, friendly, and neighboring countries
- Create a sustainable, well-trained, ethnically representative, and professional military force that can provide security, uphold the rule of law, inculcate respect for human rights, and instill a culture of anti-corruption
- Maintain coordination and collaboration with the security agencies of Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF. Additionally, expand and ensure the use of operations coordination centers (OCC) as the formal command and control centers for emergencies and crises

Reform, Composition, and Development of the National Army

Reform of the National Army

Reform of the defense sector is a priority of the Afghan Government. The reform of the defense sector is required in order to transform it into an effective and modern system, conforming to standards practiced in coalition countries. The goal is to transform the National Army into an effective force, capable of executing combined arms operations, both independently and in cooperation with Coalition forces and NATO/ISAF. ANA reform continues in accordance with national resource capacities, Parliamentary authorizations, assistance from coalition countries, NATO, the international community, the Strategic Defense Planning System and the Force Management System.

Composition of the National Army

Based on international community primary assessment on threats level against national security of Afghanistan, the balance of ANA equip and armed structure was planned to 70000 including structure of Light infantry units. As the threats level increased mentioned number raised to 86000 then in Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board IX (September 2008) approved the expansion of the ANA to 134,000 (12,000 of which is accounted for under Training, Transition, Hospital, and School) in accordance with the Afghan National Defense Strategy. International

- A Security Challenge will arise if there is an improper balance of forces in the regional commands
- A Political-Military Challenge will arise if the Pakistani government fails to combat illegal militias, terrorism, Al-Qaeda and Taliban effectively

Immediate Tasks (priorities) for the Ministry of Defense and General Staff

- Development and implementation of annual assessment plan, that should explain the accomplishment of MoD and ANA strategic missions, the 1st Deputy of Ministry of Defense and CoGS are responsible to implement and supervise that plan.
- The mentioned plan for assessment will follow up the implementation of priorities with mentioned objectives in all levels, and will get the situation report from different sections.
- Assessment of possibilities and needs to create lawful Kandak Rotation Policy in all levels of ANA, IOT effectively support the readiness and forces operations.
- Development of necessary plans IAW directions and requirements of MoD operational planning guidance.
- Increase recruitment capacity to permit the expansion of the ANA force structure to 171,600 by the 2011.
- Development of programs to expand ANA cooperation and coordination with ANP, and NATO/ISAF, and also to develop independent operations capabilities.
- To expand ANA intelligence capabilities and coordination with relevant organizations

Coalition forces IOT reduce civilian casualties.

This National Military Strategy is valid in both national languages (Pashto, Dari) as well as in English.

Minister of National Defense
Abdul Rahim “Wardak”

Assistant Minister
For strategy and Policy
LG Mohibullah “Mohib”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decree</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADSO</td>
<td>Requires enlisted soldiers, NCOS and officers to serve in the ANA for 3, 5, and 10 years, respectively. An additional 3.1 service obligation applies to education and training abroad.</td>
<td>11 Aug 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Presidential Amnesty for Deserters who return to duty by the end of the Solar Year.</td>
<td>22 Aug 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>467</td>
<td>MOD GS internal review of roles, responsibilities, authorities and command structures w/ assistance from A5 and ANA Development to provide principles based phased approach for revision and update of 2001.</td>
<td>Oct 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>528</td>
<td>Attrition: Units with the highest attrition rates will be investigated. ANA leadership, ANAREC, local police, shuras, governors, district governors and tribal leaders, will extend maximum effort to locate and recall AWOL personnel. AT&amp;L, G4, the Department of Installations Management and Control and other relevant offices will collectively improve the quality of food, clothing, lodging and medical care. Mod and GS Legal departments and IG departments will investigate ANA personnel who commit legal infractions.</td>
<td>23 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>530</td>
<td>Recruitment: To conserve ANA strength levels, units will implement a 60% monthly re-contracting goal. GS will also receive inspection reports on all ANA units to ensure 30 leave policy is in effect and to identify and solve problems adversely affecting re-contracting. Assistant Ministry for Policy &amp; Strategy is to develop a policy for a re-contracting bonus.</td>
<td>25 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>531</td>
<td>AWOL soldiers will be dropped from rolls after 45 days. All units will have a trained reenlistment/re-contracting officer and adhere to policy. Each unit will assist ANAREC in reinstituting NCOs and soldiers who have left. In turn, ANAREC must recruit at least 1200 NCOs and soldiers per month. All NCOs are required to complete team leader courses prior to receiving pay increases.</td>
<td>25 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561</td>
<td>Directs preparing for transition and performing without advisors.</td>
<td>26 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4594</td>
<td>Sends 150-200 qualified officers on two-month TDYs to training sites to serve as additional instructors and improve operation of training units.</td>
<td>27 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4402</td>
<td>Implements POA decision to authorize Corps to be manned at 115 percent.</td>
<td>29 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4448</td>
<td>Transfers medical logistics responsibilities from OTSG to AT&amp;L to improve oversight.</td>
<td>01 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>562</td>
<td>Establishes senior board on assignments and retirements to allow for leadership growth within the MOD.</td>
<td>11 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4512</td>
<td>Tasks the G2 to prevent enemy influence within ANA units. Units should take necessary actions to increase unit readiness and limit vulnerabilities.</td>
<td>12 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence: Directs intelligence and security organizations to adopt increased security measures to protect against insurgent attacks.</td>
<td>12 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Cooperation</td>
<td>Outlines procedures for sharing of assets and resources between MOD and MOI.</td>
<td>14 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4665</td>
<td>Provision of medical care for ANA personnel and their families.</td>
<td>19 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5001</td>
<td>Chain of command, organization, functions, roles, and responsibilities for the MOD, ANA General Staff, and intermediate commands.</td>
<td>Under Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross Ministerial Support Agreement</td>
<td>Cooperative agreement which helps each Ministry to maximize efficiency through sharing capabilities and resources in support of building overall security.</td>
<td>22 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561</td>
<td>Commission of assessment in preparation for transition.</td>
<td>27 Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX C. CONTRACTING FOR AFGHAN SECURITY FORCE TRAINING, ADVISING, AND DEVELOPMENT

## Table C–1. Contract Totals for ANSF Training and Advising Services (as of May 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Partner Institutions</th>
<th>Contract / Task Order</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Purchaser</th>
<th>Performance Period (Date signed / Last payment to recipient)</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W91CRB-10-C-0030</td>
<td>DynCorp</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>2/12/2010 / 10/31/2013 (Exp.)</td>
<td>$249,208,419</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Partner Institutions</th>
<th>Contract / Task Order</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Purchaser</th>
<th>Performance Period (Date signed / Last payment to recipient)</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total Obligated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-AQMMA-08-F-5375</td>
<td>DoS/INL</td>
<td>7/30/2008 / 2/7/2013</td>
<td>$672,787,198</td>
<td>$4,098,103,361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. On 5/20/09, DynCorp received $4,907,908; on 9/21/12, DynCorp gave back $19,043.
2. On 3/30/07, DynCorp received $11,808,807; on 8/24/12, DynCorp gave back $68,946.
3. On 3/7/06, DynCorp received $4,251,662; on 8/24/07, DynCorp gave back $7,226,938.
4. On 12/3/08, DynCorp received $1,710,403; on 8/15/12, DynCorp gave back $5,874,152.
5. 4/29/10 was the only date money was given to MPRI; on 6/15/12, MPRI gave back $7,689,726.
6. On 6/25/11, Xe received $12,000,000; on 8/22/11 they gave back $11,179,153.

**Primary Source:** [http://www.usaspending.gov](http://www.usaspending.gov)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Corresponding Audit Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 9; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Training</td>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corresponding Audit Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 9; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

*This table present data for private sector human technical/training/advising services alone; not for ANSF facility construction, equipment purchases, or operational funds.*
Figure C-1. Timeline of Afghan Training and Advising Contracts, 2004-2013


Afghan MoD and National Army Advisors

- DOD Oversight
- MPRI: W91CRB-05-D-0014
- DynCorp: W91CRB-10-C-0030

Afghan MoI Advisors and Police Training

- DOS/INL Oversight
- DOD Oversight
- DynCorp: S-AQMA-08-F-5375
- MPRI: W91CRB-10-C-0100
- DynCorp: S-AQMA-10-F-2708
- DynCorp: W91CRB-11-C-0053

Afghan National Police Training

- DOS/INL Oversight
- DynCorp: S-AQMPD-04-C-0282
- DynCorp: S-AQMPD-04-C-0460
  - DynCorp: S-AQMPD-04-C-1076
  - DynCorp: S-AQMPD-05-F-1473
  - DynCorp: S-AQMPD-05-F-2522
  - DynCorp: S-AQMPD-05-F-4305

Afghan Border Police Training & Advising

- DOD Oversight
- Academi (Xe): W9113M-07-D-0005-0017

Source: [http://www.usaspending.gov](http://www.usaspending.gov)
## APPENDIX D. CODING AND INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS

### Table D-1. Codes and Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Types</th>
<th>Code/Node Name</th>
<th>Values (if applicable)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant/Partnership Attributes</td>
<td>Tour Start Date</td>
<td>Start date of first deployment to Afghanistan</td>
<td>This attribute indicates the start date of the participant's deployment to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tour End Date</td>
<td>End date of first deployment to Afghanistan</td>
<td>This attribute indicates the end date of the participant's deployment to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tour Start (2) Date</td>
<td>Start date of second deployment to Afghanistan</td>
<td>This attribute indicates the start date of the participant's second deployment to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tour End (2) Date</td>
<td>End date of second deployment to Afghanistan</td>
<td>This attribute indicates the end date of the participant's second deployment to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>GT-010/SES; O6/GS1; O5/GS13-14; O4/GS12; O3/GS11-10; O1-2/E7/GS7-9; E5-6/GS6; Co-Contrarian-Exp/Policy/Advisor, N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the rank of the participant. The values range from O10 (General/Admiral) and SES to E5-6 (Major/Kaptain) and GS6 government civilian. Additional values for contractors are listed and broken down by executive/program manager and a general contractor professional. This attribute is the participant's title while serving in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>[Provided by participant; no exact set of values]</td>
<td>This attribute describes the title held by the participant while serving in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functional Role</td>
<td>Embedded Advisor(Ministerial); Embedded Advisor(Tac/Oper); Institutional Instruction Trainer; Partnered Unit Leader(GPF); Partnered Unit Leader(SOF); Staff Officer; Analyst; Senior Commander; Program Manager; Executive; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the functional role held by the participant while serving in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical Level of War</td>
<td>Political-Strategic (Ministerial &amp; Service HQs); Operational (Corps/Division); Tactical (Brigades &amp; Below)</td>
<td>This attribute indicates the analytical level of the participant's experience in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M40 Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M45 Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ministerial Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDS-K Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA-GPF Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANA-SOF Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANGOP Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUP Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIP Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALP Partnership</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>Presence/Absece of direct partnership/assignment with ANSF institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tour Length</td>
<td>&lt;2mo.; 2-5mo.; 6-8mo.; 9-12mo.; 12mo.; &gt;12mo.; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the length of the participant's service in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIV-MIL Background</td>
<td>ActiveMilitary(GPF); ActiveMilitary(SOF); ActiveMilitary-USMC; ActiveMilitary-AF-Trained; ActiveMilitary-AF; Gall-Ras-Afghan(GPF); Gall-Ras-Afghan(SOF); Civilian-NH/Govt; Civilian-PriorMIL; Civilian-PriorCIV; Civilian-PriorGovt</td>
<td>This attribute describes the background of the participant. Particular emphasis is given to whether the participant is military or civilian, their branch of military service (i.e., Army vs. USMC), or law enforcement experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male; Female</td>
<td>This attribute describes the gender of the participant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60+; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the general age group in which the participant falls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>US; UK; GER; CAN; AUS; ITL; AUS</td>
<td>This attribute describes the nationality of the participant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Previous Advisor-Cultural Training</td>
<td>Extensive(ME); Moderate (PrevExp); Limited(&lt;1yr); None</td>
<td>This attribute describes the participant's experience in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US-MADA Program</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>This attribute designates whether or not the participant took part in the DoD-USIP Mission Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US-APAK Hand</td>
<td>Boolean (Y/N)</td>
<td>This attribute designates whether or not the participant was a member of DoD's APAK Hands Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Attributes</td>
<td>AFG-Ethnicity</td>
<td>Pushtun; Tajik; Hazara; Uzbek; Multiple; Unknown; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the ethnicity(ies) of the participant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AFG-Previous Russian Training &amp; Education</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>This attribute designates whether or not the participant received Russian-based training or education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partner Attributes-Open Codes-TBD</td>
<td>In vivo codes</td>
<td>Emergent codes describing the participant's descriptions/perceptions of Afghan partner(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Context</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Set of 34 Afghan provinces</td>
<td>This attribute links the participant to a primary location in Afghanistan (see Location Nodes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence/Attack Levels</td>
<td>Often; Sometimes; Seldom; Never; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the level of violence in which the participant's partnership took place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction Frequency</td>
<td>Fully embedded; Daily interactions; Multiple weekly interactions; Weekly or less; N/A</td>
<td>This attribute describes the participant's frequency of interaction with her/his Afghan partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment-Open Codes-TBD</td>
<td>In vivo codes</td>
<td>Emergent codes describing the partnering environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Socialization Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Node Name</th>
<th>Values (if applicable)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>Negative; Neutral; Positive</td>
<td>This code describes and evaluates advisors' perceived effects on observed use of coercive influencing approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Inducement Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>Negative; Neutral; Positive</td>
<td>This code describes and evaluates advisors' perceived effects on observed use of coercive influencing approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>Negative; Neutral; Positive</td>
<td>This code describes and evaluates advisors' perceived effects on observed use of coercive influencing approaches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Institutional Transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code/Node Name</th>
<th>Values (if applicable)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Capacity Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>No Change; Limited; Moderate; Significant: Not Necessary</td>
<td>This code evaluates the perceived presence of ANSF individual capacity change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Values Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>No Change; Limited; Moderate; Significant: Not Necessary</td>
<td>This code evaluates the perceived presence of ANSF individual value change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>No Change; Limited; Moderate; Significant: Not Necessary</td>
<td>This code evaluates the perceived presence of ANSF organizational capacity change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Values Open/Descriptive Codes-TBD</td>
<td>No Change; Limited; Moderate; Significant: Not Necessary</td>
<td>This code evaluates the perceived presence of ANSF organizational norm change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluation Code Examples

Modes of Influence (Mechanisms)

Negative Example  Note: Clear negative reaction toward mode of influence.

*I think coercion was always counterproductive when I saw it employed in Afghanistan or when people would attempt to employ it. The reason I think that’s so is that the Afghan generals are a great deal more ruthless and brutal than we are. They’ve come up from a much harder school than we have. They are much less afraid, I think, to inflict the pain on their own people than we are to see it. And every time I think I saw a threat made to an Afghan general, regardless of the gravity of the threat, it failed and usually rebounded on us.*

Neutral/Mixed Example  Note: Indifferent attitude toward advising influence as brokering a negotiation.

*In my mind, it was all a compromise. You had to reach a compromise that everybody could live with. They obviously had their agenda and you had your agenda and somewhere in between you had to reach an amicable solution that everybody could live with. That was the attitude I took going into it.*

Positive Example  Note: Clear reference to advising above and below individual reasonably effective.

*Myself, as an advisor, providing horizontal inspiration or guidance and also working with subordinates to be feeding that principal ideas or thoughts so that they are kind of constantly getting indicators to move in one direction, or potentially move in one direction, as a decision-maker. And that generally seemed to work reasonably well, especially in a hierarchical system ... like, the ANA, in Afghan culture where you know leadership is valued and guidance to superiors is actually followed, at least heeded, worried about ... and that seemed to work reasonably well.*
Institutional Transfer

Not Observed

Note: Participant omits direct reference to any observed change in institutional transfer.

No Change Examples

Note: Clear indications of no change.

I think one of biggest surprises that I had is how little of effect we really had on their officers’ mentality.
Over a certain period of time eventually it would have to rub off. But that’s such a kind of nuanced, kind of out-there concept. I guess what I’m saying is, I guess there are no real shortcuts to that. If we had the same unit, say that it is two units of US soldiers, two battalions that go year on, year off at the same with an Afghan kandak. Yeah, I think you would see that kind of professionalism, that idea that, that kind of soldier integrity, you’d see that kind of thing rub off. But, culturally and internally they’re still, I think, very conflicted.

Limited Change Examples

Note: Indication of modest progress.

I think there’s some high spots, there are quite a few senior leaders that are interested in education, that have been getting education, are pushing for more civilian policing type things. There’s still a lot of challenges and there’s still a lot of the senior personnel that just moved over from the army and they’re not police officers. Still corruption is a major problem. There is still a lot of problems with patronage, but I think it’s moving in the right direction. The question is how quick and is it going to be quick enough.

You could be there six months and you’re going to think you haven’t made any difference at all, and after a couple more months you’re going to say, ‘hmmm,’ and you’re going to compare it to what it was when you first got there and say, ‘Hey, I think we move the ball down the field a little bit.’ You measure it in just the baby steps. It truly is like standing on a glacier ... we had a couple kandak commanders who were good and they got better. The corps commander was pretty good and I know he got better. I mean it takes a long time to turn that battleship around.
Moderate Change Example  
Note: Clear expression of more than a modest degree of positive change.

I expected this [Afghan occupation of a defensive position] to be a very painful process. So, I go out there first light to link up with the Afghan company commander out at the first position and there’s my counterpart kandak [battalion] commander; he’s out there drinking tea with some of the elders. He’s got the company commander with him, he’s got the platoon leader out there, and he’s got his soldiers, and all forms of security. And he kind of pulled me aside and said, ‘I had to go out there and make sure they went out this morning on this mission. I’m going to stay out here until they’re set in and I’m gonna make sure that they get this done.’ That’s when I realized that they got it. He understood what he needed to do. He understood the personality of his unit. He understood the importance of the mission. He had bought into it and that those dynamics that work in any good army were at work in his army. There was the battalion commander at the decisive point. He was there with his men, with that company commander to make sure that they were going to be successful. I remember looking at my sergeant major and I was like, ‘I think our work is done here. They’re getting to the point where they don’t even want us here anymore. I’m OK with that.’

Significant Change Example  
Notes:  Emphatic expression of positive change (extremely rare).

[Initially] this battalion was so non-mission-capable, it didn’t even have assigned personnel to staff sections. When you say, where’s the METL [mission essential task list]? They don’t have a METL. Where’s the S1 [personnel officer]? ‘Well, he’s in his barracks.’ Where’s his barracks? ‘We don’t know.’ It was a disaster. So it was just getting these guys to come over was a huge undertaking … [By the end] we had the only battalion to be conducting unilateral ANA operations with no American soldiers; the only battalion ANA air assaults. I don’t know if you knew that but the ANA battalion commander conducted its own unilateral air assault without us. That’s unheard of. I never—that does not happen in Afghanistan. [The] battalion commander came in and said, ‘The enemy is here. I want to do an air assault to that location and I want to do on this time and I’m going to write the operation order plan’ and they did. All we did was provided them a CH47 [helicopter].
General Karimi fully understood how the American system worked. He was very well educated. He understood that and he took his orders from the president, and through Minister Wardak. He was extremely respectful to Minister Wardak and clearly understood that he was his superior, both as a military guy and age-wise and wisdom and all that. He also understood that things were supposed to come through Parliament, as well, which didn’t always work well because his complaint most of the time was that Parliament had little to no knowledge of what was going on with the army. He often said there were a number of the elder members of Parliament who still thought their army was exactly the same as it was during the years of the Soviet regime, where they still thought they had fighters and stuff. He constantly had to educate them on the fact of what they had and didn’t have anymore. So he understood the system as it was and he had no issues with the fact that they were under civilian control. He just wished the civilians understood better what the army was capable of and allowing the system to work instead of having somebody over at the palace picking up the phone and going, ‘I need three helicopters today,’ instead of calling over and saying, ‘We would like three helicopters. By giving us three helicopters, what’s that going to do to your operational support?’
### Table D-2. Reliability Test Results on Evaluation Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Samples</th>
<th>Author Codes</th>
<th>1st Round</th>
<th>2nd Round</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sample Coder #1</td>
<td>Sample Coder #2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sample Coder #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical-Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Negative</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Positive</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Positive</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial-Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Positive</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Negative</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Negative</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>Mixed/Neutral</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical-Transfer Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Limited</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Significant</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Moderate</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 No Change</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial-Transfer Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Limited</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Krippendorf’s α:
- Tactical-Influence: 0.875
- Ministerial-Influence: 0.973
- Tactical-Transfer Outcomes: 0.973
- Ministerial-Transfer Outcomes: 0.819
- Sample Total: 0.758 (1st Round) 0.911 (2nd Round)
## Table D-3. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Information</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. When you were deployed (mo/yr)?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Describe your job while deployed.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How were you selected for this position?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO-ANSF Interaction Context</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Could you please describe your experience with respect to training/advising Afghan security forces?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Please describe the violence levels.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialization Mechanisms</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Please share with me your philosophy on partnering, advising, training. Your unit’s?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were effective? What do you attribute that success to?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were unsuccessful? What do you attribute that lack of success to?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Did you ever experience any resistance or undermining behavior? If so, please describe.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. What motivated your Afghan partner(s)? Did their motivation vary across individuals?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Funding</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. What discretion did you, or your unit, have to leverage funding (ASFF / CERP / FUOP) or major contracts for your Afghan partners? How did you use it?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring and Evaluation; Institutional/Policy/Norm Transfer</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Were you required to monitor capacity or professional development with your ANSF counterpart(s)? How did you do this? Was this standardized in any way?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Did you observe any changes in capacity or professionalism? Please describe.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Did you ever have discussions of ‘civilian control’, ‘superintendence’, or what it means to be a professional soldier/police officer?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contractor Support</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Did you work at all with private contractor trainers or advisors? If so, please describe how they were employed. What monitoring/oversight tools did you have at your disposal?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Contractor Trainers / Advisors</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. Did you ever deviate from your task order / statement of work / program of instruction in to complete your job? Why? How often? Did you receive any inquiries from your counterparts?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Did you ever face any conflicts or dilemmas between your task order / program of instruction and your relationship with your local partner?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Managers</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. Who did you report to (or supervise)? What was that interaction like?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. How much discretion did you have to amend your contractor’s task orders? Was this discretion (or lack thereof) significant toward your mission? What were some of the considerations you would take into account before and after amending task orders?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closing</th>
<th>Advisors / Unit Leaders</th>
<th>Contractors</th>
<th>Third Party Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. What was your relationship with your counterparts like when you left?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Do you have one lasting story or memory from your deployment?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Is there anything I didn’t ask that you think would be valuable to know?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure D-1. Informed Consent Form (In-person)
Voluntary Participation and Potential Risks: Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you may stop participating at any time without penalty. You do not have to answer any questions that you prefer not to, and you may withdraw at any time without consequence. The overall risk to participants is minimal, though it is mainly employment related, such that if a participant offers unfavorable information about their employer or organization that is directly attributable to them, there is a possibility that it could harm their employment standing. This risk, however, is mitigated by maintaining all participants' confidentiality in any publications that follow from this study, as described above.

Available Sources of Information: If at a later time you wish to provide additional comments, you may contact Nick Armstrong by phone, (315) 443-2033 or by email: namstro@maxwell.syr.edu. If you have questions, concerns, complaints about the research, please contact the INSCT Director, Professor William C. Banks, at (315) 443-2284 or by email at wcbanks@law.syr.edu. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you have questions, concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone other than me or my supervisor, please contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at (315) 443-3013.

AUTHORIZATION: All of my questions have been answered, I am over the age of 18 and I wish to participate in this research study. By signing electronically below, I have read and understand this consent form and I volunteer to participate in this research study. I understand that my consent does not take away any of my legal rights in the case of negligence or other legal fault of anyone who is involved in this study. I further understand that nothing in this consent form is intended to replace any applicable Federal, state, or local laws.

Audio tape authorization (to select, type in as 'X' to the left of your choice below):

- I agree
- I do not agree
- to be audio taped

Digital signature of participant

[Signature]

Digital Signature Instructions: Right click on signature box above. Click on 'sign'. Create a digital signature profile per instructions. If necessary. Type full name in the signature box and click 'submit'. Once complete, the signature will date itself and the document will be saved as read-only. *Please return by email to namstro@maxwell.syr.edu. I will sign, scan, and return a digital copy with both signatures by email.

Signature of researcher

Date

Syracuse University IRO Approved

Printed name of researcher

Page 2

Page 1
REFERENCES


Schmeidl, Susanne, and Masood Karokhail. 2009. "The Role of Non-State Actors in ‘Community-Based Policing’—An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-


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CURRICULUM VITAE

NICHOLAS J. ARMSTRONG
narmstro@maxwell.syr.edu

EDUCATION

2014  Ph.D., Maxwell School of Syracuse University
      Social Science (Interdisciplinary doctoral program)
      Subfields: Public Administration and Policy; International Relations
      Advanced Certificates in Security Studies and Postconflict Reconstruction

2008  M.P.A., Maxwell School of Syracuse University
      Public Administration, US National Security and Foreign Policy

2000  B.S., United States Military Academy at West Point
      Engineering Management, Mechanical Engineering (minor)

Institutes / Advanced Leadership Training

2012  Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy,
      Columbia University (SWAMOS)

2011  Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research,
      Maxwell School of Syracuse University (IQMR)

2004  US Army Ranger School, Fort Benning, GA

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2008-  Research Fellow, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism,
       Syracuse University College of Law and Maxwell School

       Commissioned Officer, US Army, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY

          Officer, 1-87 Infantry
          Combat service Iraq

2004-2005  Speechwriter and Special Assistant to General Lloyd J. Austin III, 10th Mountain
          Division Commander

2003-2004  Aide-de-Camp to Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III, 10th Mountain Division
          Deputy Commander
          Combat service in Afghanistan

2002-2003  Battery Executive Officer and Platoon Leader, 3-6 Field Artillery

2000-2002  Company Fire Support Officer, 2-22 Infantry
          Peacekeeping duty in Bosnia
HONORS AND AWARDS

Affiliations

2013- Fellow, Institute for Veterans and Military Families, Syracuse University
2012- Fellow, Centre for Security Governance, Kitchener, ON, Canada

Research Grants and Awards

2013-2014 Smith Richardson Foundation, World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship, $7500
2013 Maxwell School, Roscoe-Martin Dissertation Award, $1000
2012 Maxwell School, Summer Project Assistance Award, $1000
2012 Moynihan Institute (Maxwell), Bharati Memorial Award for Doctoral Research
2011 Co-PI, US Dept. of State, Embassy Kabul, International Visitor Leadership Program Grant, $12,634
2010-2012 Fellow, US Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
2009-2010 Consultant-Investigator, National Science Foundation, Engineering Division, “From Battlefield to Classroom,” $231,138, with Laura Steinberg and Corri Zoli

Military Decorations

Bronze Star Medal (two awards), Army Commendation Medal (three awards), Army Achievement Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal w/ Campaign Star, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary and Service Medals (Afghanistan), Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (Bosnia), Overseas Service Ribbon, NATO Medal, Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Combat Action Badge, Ranger Tab

PUBLICATIONS

Peer-reviewed Articles


Conference Papers


Monographs and Reports


Op-Ed and Blog Contributions

New York Times-At War, Huffington Post, Small Wars Journal, Security Governance Group, INSCT on Security
TEACHING

Teaching Assistant. PAI730: Fundamentals of Postconflict Reconstruction, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Dept. of Public Administration and International Affairs, Fall 2011.

TA/Mentor. PAI752: MPA Capstone, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Dept. of Public Administration and International Affairs, Spring 2010-2012.

Facilitator/Group Mentor. US Army War College International Strategic Crisis Negotiation Exercise (simulation). Maxwell School of Syracuse University, May 2012.

LECTURES AND PRESENTATIONS

Guest Speaker. “Security Sector Reform.” Maxwell school graduate course: Comparative Civil-Military Relations, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, April 2014.


Guest Lecturer. “Security Sector Reform.” Maxwell school graduate course: Fundamentals of Postconflict Reconstruction, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, September 2013.


SERVICE | OTHER

2012- Director of Veteran Outreach (volunteer), Team Red, White and Blue—Syracuse - Charity Event Director, Inaugural Eagle Ride (cycling), Jamesville, NY, 2013
2012 Executive Committee, Empire State Marathon, Syracuse, NY, 2012
2012 Finisher, JFK 50-mile Ultra-marathon

RESEARCH METHODS TRAINING

Quantitative Research: program/policy evaluation, social science statistical methods, surveys, social network analysis, game theory

Qualitative Research: interviews and focus groups, structured-focused case comparison, process tracing, content analysis

Data Analysis and Software: NVivo, SPSS, SAS (basic), UCINET, Access, EndNote, WordPress

MEMBERSHIPS

Academic
Public Management Research Association
International Studies Association

Professional
Association of the United States Army
West Point Association of Graduates
10th Mountain Division Association
US Army Ranger Association
US Field Artillery Association